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| author | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 05:15:57 -0700 |
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| committer | Roger Frank <rfrank@pglaf.org> | 2025-10-15 05:15:57 -0700 |
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diff --git a/852-h/852-h.htm b/852-h/852-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d536f1d --- /dev/null +++ b/852-h/852-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,13698 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> + <meta charset="UTF-8"> + <title> + Democracy and Education | Project Gutenberg + </title> + <style> /* <![CDATA[ */ + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} +.big {font-size: 1.5em;} +</style> + </head> + <body> +<div>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 852 ***</div> + + <p> + <br><br> + </p> + <h1> + DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION + </h1> + <h2> + by John Dewey + </h2> + <p> + <br> <br> + </p> + <hr> + <p> + <br> <br> + </p> + <h4> + Transcriber's Note: + </h4> + <p> + I have tried to make this the most accurate text possible but I am sure + that there are still mistakes. + </p> + <p> + I would like to dedicate this etext to my mother who was a elementary + school teacher for more years than I can remember. Thanks. + </p> + <p> + David Reed + </p> + <p> + <br> <br> + </p> + <hr> + <p> + <br> <br> + </p> + <blockquote> + <p class="toc"> + <span class="big"><b>CONTENTS</b></span> + </p> + <p> + <br> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0001"> <b>Chapter One: Education as a Necessity of + Life</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM"> Summary. It + is the very nature of life to strive to continue in being. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0002"> <b>Chapter Two: Education as a Social Function</b> + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM27"> Summary. The + development within the young of the attitudes </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0003"> <b>Chapter Three: Education as Direction</b> + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM3"> Summary. The + natural or native impulses of the young do not agree </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0004"> <b>Chapter Four: Education as Growth</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM4"> Summary. + Power to grow depends upon need for others and plasticity. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0005"> <b>Chapter Five: Preparation, Unfolding, and + Formal Discipline</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM5"> Summary. The + conception that the result of the educative process </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0006"> <b>Chapter Six: Education as Conservative and + Progressive</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM6"> Summary. + Education may be conceived either retrospectively </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0007"> <b>Chapter Seven: The Democratic Conception in + Education</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM7"> Summary. + Since education is a social process, and there are many kinds </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0008"> <b>Chapter Eight: Aims in Education</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM8"> Summary. An + aim denotes the result of any natural process </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0009"> <b>Chapter Nine: Natural Development and Social + Efficiency as Aims</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM9"> Summary. + General or comprehensive aims are points of view for surveying </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0010"> <b>Chapter Ten: Interest and Discipline</b> + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM10"> Summary. + Interest and discipline are correlative aspects of activity </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0011"> <b>Chapter Eleven: Experience and Thinking</b> + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM11"> Summary. In + determining the place of thinking </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0012"> <b>Chapter Twelve: Thinking in Education</b> + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM12"> Summary. + Processes of instruction are unified in the degree </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0013"> <b>Chapter Thirteen: The Nature of Method</b> + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM13"> Summary. + Method is a statement of the way the subject matter </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0014"> <b>Chapter Fourteen: The Nature of Subject + Matter</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM15"> Summary. The + subject matter of education consists primarily </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0015"> <b>Chapter Fifteen: Play and Work in the + Curriculum</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM16"> Summary. In + the previous chapter we found that the primary subject </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0016"> <b>Chapter Sixteen: The Significance of + Geography and History</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM17"> Summary. It + is the nature of an experience to have implications </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0017"> <b>Chapter Seventeen: Science in the Course of + Study</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM18"> Summary. + Science represents the fruition of the cognitive factors </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0018"> <b>Chapter Eighteen: Educational Values</b> + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM19"> Summary. + Fundamentally, the elements involved in a discussion of value </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0019"> <b>Chapter Nineteen: Labor and Leisure</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM20"> Summary. Of + the segregations of educational values </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0020"> <b>Chapter Twenty: Intellectual and Practical + Studies</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM21"> Summary. The + Greeks were induced to philosophize </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0021"> <b>Chapter Twenty-one: Physical and Social + Studies: Naturalism and Humanism</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM22"> Summary. The + philosophic dualism between man and nature is reflected </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0022"> <b>Chapter Twenty-two: The Individual and the + World</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM23"> Summary. + True individualism is a product of the relaxation of the grip </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0023"> <b>Chapter Twenty-Three: Vocational Aspects of + Education</b> </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM24"> Summary. A + vocation signifies any form of continuous activity </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0024"> <b>Chapter Twenty-four: Philosophy of Education</b> + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM25"> Summary. + After a review designed to bring out the philosophic issues </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0025"> <b>Chapter Twenty-five: Theories of Knowledge</b> + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM26"> Summary. + Such social divisions as interfere with free and full </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2HCH0026"> <b>Chapter Twenty-six: Theories of Morals</b> + </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_SUMM27"> Summary. The + most important problem of moral education in the school </a> + </p> + </blockquote> + <p> + <br> <br> + </p> + <hr> + <p> + <br> <br> <a id="link2HCH0001"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h2> + Chapter One: Education as a Necessity of Life + </h2> + <p> + 1. Renewal of Life by Transmission. The most notable distinction between + living and inanimate things is that the former maintain themselves by + renewal. A stone when struck resists. If its resistance is greater than + the force of the blow struck, it remains outwardly unchanged. Otherwise, + it is shattered into smaller bits. Never does the stone attempt to react + in such a way that it may maintain itself against the blow, much less so + as to render the blow a contributing factor to its own continued action. + While the living thing may easily be crushed by superior force, it none + the less tries to turn the energies which act upon it into means of its + own further existence. If it cannot do so, it does not just split into + smaller pieces (at least in the higher forms of life), but loses its + identity as a living thing. + </p> + <p> + As long as it endures, it struggles to use surrounding energies in its own + behalf. It uses light, air, moisture, and the material of soil. To say + that it uses them is to say that it turns them into means of its own + conservation. As long as it is growing, the energy it expends in thus + turning the environment to account is more than compensated for by the + return it gets: it grows. Understanding the word "control" in this sense, + it may be said that a living being is one that subjugates and controls for + its own continued activity the energies that would otherwise use it up. + Life is a self-renewing process through action upon the environment. + </p> + <p> + In all the higher forms this process cannot be kept up indefinitely. After + a while they succumb; they die. The creature is not equal to the task of + indefinite self-renewal. But continuity of the life process is not + dependent upon the prolongation of the existence of any one individual. + Reproduction of other forms of life goes on in continuous sequence. And + though, as the geological record shows, not merely individuals but also + species die out, the life process continues in increasingly complex forms. + As some species die out, forms better adapted to utilize the obstacles + against which they struggled in vain come into being. Continuity of life + means continual readaptation of the environment to the needs of living + organisms. + </p> + <p> + We have been speaking of life in its lowest terms—as a physical + thing. But we use the word "Life" to denote the whole range of experience, + individual and racial. When we see a book called the Life of Lincoln we do + not expect to find within its covers a treatise on physiology. We look for + an account of social antecedents; a description of early surroundings, of + the conditions and occupation of the family; of the chief episodes in the + development of character; of signal struggles and achievements; of the + individual's hopes, tastes, joys and sufferings. In precisely similar + fashion we speak of the life of a savage tribe, of the Athenian people, of + the American nation. "Life" covers customs, institutions, beliefs, + victories and defeats, recreations and occupations. + </p> + <p> + We employ the word "experience" in the same pregnant sense. And to it, as + well as to life in the bare physiological sense, the principle of + continuity through renewal applies. With the renewal of physical existence + goes, in the case of human beings, the recreation of beliefs, ideals, + hopes, happiness, misery, and practices. The continuity of any experience, + through renewing of the social group, is a literal fact. Education, in its + broadest sense, is the means of this social continuity of life. Every one + of the constituent elements of a social group, in a modern city as in a + savage tribe, is born immature, helpless, without language, beliefs, + ideas, or social standards. Each individual, each unit who is the carrier + of the life-experience of his group, in time passes away. Yet the life of + the group goes on. + </p> + <p> + The primary ineluctable facts of the birth and death of each one of the + constituent members in a social group determine the necessity of + education. On one hand, there is the contrast between the immaturity of + the new-born members of the group—its future sole representatives—and + the maturity of the adult members who possess the knowledge and customs of + the group. On the other hand, there is the necessity that these immature + members be not merely physically preserved in adequate numbers, but that + they be initiated into the interests, purposes, information, skill, and + practices of the mature members: otherwise the group will cease its + characteristic life. Even in a savage tribe, the achievements of adults + are far beyond what the immature members would be capable of if left to + themselves. With the growth of civilization, the gap between the original + capacities of the immature and the standards and customs of the elders + increases. Mere physical growing up, mere mastery of the bare necessities + of subsistence will not suffice to reproduce the life of the group. + Deliberate effort and the taking of thoughtful pains are required. Beings + who are born not only unaware of, but quite indifferent to, the aims and + habits of the social group have to be rendered cognizant of them and + actively interested. Education, and education alone, spans the gap. + </p> + <p> + Society exists through a process of transmission quite as much as + biological life. This transmission occurs by means of communication of + habits of doing, thinking, and feeling from the older to the younger. + Without this communication of ideals, hopes, expectations, standards, + opinions, from those members of society who are passing out of the group + life to those who are coming into it, social life could not survive. If + the members who compose a society lived on continuously, they might + educate the new-born members, but it would be a task directed by personal + interest rather than social need. Now it is a work of necessity. + </p> + <p> + If a plague carried off the members of a society all at once, it is + obvious that the group would be permanently done for. Yet the death of + each of its constituent members is as certain as if an epidemic took them + all at once. But the graded difference in age, the fact that some are born + as some die, makes possible through transmission of ideas and practices + the constant reweaving of the social fabric. Yet this renewal is not + automatic. Unless pains are taken to see that genuine and thorough + transmission takes place, the most civilized group will relapse into + barbarism and then into savagery. In fact, the human young are so immature + that if they were left to themselves without the guidance and succor of + others, they could not acquire the rudimentary abilities necessary for + physical existence. The young of human beings compare so poorly in + original efficiency with the young of many of the lower animals, that even + the powers needed for physical sustentation have to be acquired under + tuition. How much more, then, is this the case with respect to all the + technological, artistic, scientific, and moral achievements of humanity! + </p> + <p> + 2. Education and Communication. So obvious, indeed, is the necessity of + teaching and learning for the continued existence of a society that we may + seem to be dwelling unduly on a truism. But justification is found in the + fact that such emphasis is a means of getting us away from an unduly + scholastic and formal notion of education. Schools are, indeed, one + important method of the transmission which forms the dispositions of the + immature; but it is only one means, and, compared with other agencies, a + relatively superficial means. Only as we have grasped the necessity of + more fundamental and persistent modes of tuition can we make sure of + placing the scholastic methods in their true context. + </p> + <p> + Society not only continues to exist by transmission, by communication, but + it may fairly be said to exist in transmission, in communication. There is + more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and + communication. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they + have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess + things in common. What they must have in common in order to form a + community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge—a + common understanding—like-mindedness as the sociologists say. Such + things cannot be passed physically from one to another, like bricks; they + cannot be shared as persons would share a pie by dividing it into physical + pieces. The communication which insures participation in a common + understanding is one which secures similar emotional and intellectual + dispositions—like ways of responding to expectations and + requirements. + </p> + <p> + Persons do not become a society by living in physical proximity, any more + than a man ceases to be socially influenced by being so many feet or miles + removed from others. A book or a letter may institute a more intimate + association between human beings separated thousands of miles from each + other than exists between dwellers under the same roof. Individuals do not + even compose a social group because they all work for a common end. The + parts of a machine work with a maximum of cooperativeness for a common + result, but they do not form a community. If, however, they were all + cognizant of the common end and all interested in it so that they + regulated their specific activity in view of it, then they would form a + community. But this would involve communication. Each would have to know + what the other was about and would have to have some way of keeping the + other informed as to his own purpose and progress. Consensus demands + communication. + </p> + <p> + We are thus compelled to recognize that within even the most social group + there are many relations which are not as yet social. A large number of + human relationships in any social group are still upon the machine-like + plane. Individuals use one another so as to get desired results, without + reference to the emotional and intellectual disposition and consent of + those used. Such uses express physical superiority, or superiority of + position, skill, technical ability, and command of tools, mechanical or + fiscal. So far as the relations of parent and child, teacher and pupil, + employer and employee, governor and governed, remain upon this level, they + form no true social group, no matter how closely their respective + activities touch one another. Giving and taking of orders modifies action + and results, but does not of itself effect a sharing of purposes, a + communication of interests. + </p> + <p> + Not only is social life identical with communication, but all + communication (and hence all genuine social life) is educative. To be a + recipient of a communication is to have an enlarged and changed + experience. One shares in what another has thought and felt and in so far, + meagerly or amply, has his own attitude modified. Nor is the one who + communicates left unaffected. Try the experiment of communicating, with + fullness and accuracy, some experience to another, especially if it be + somewhat complicated, and you will find your own attitude toward your + experience changing; otherwise you resort to expletives and ejaculations. + The experience has to be formulated in order to be communicated. To + formulate requires getting outside of it, seeing it as another would see + it, considering what points of contact it has with the life of another so + that it may be got into such form that he can appreciate its meaning. + Except in dealing with commonplaces and catch phrases one has to + assimilate, imaginatively, something of another's experience in order to + tell him intelligently of one's own experience. All communication is like + art. It may fairly be said, therefore, that any social arrangement that + remains vitally social, or vitally shared, is educative to those who + participate in it. Only when it becomes cast in a mold and runs in a + routine way does it lose its educative power. + </p> + <p> + In final account, then, not only does social life demand teaching and + learning for its own permanence, but the very process of living together + educates. It enlarges and enlightens experience; it stimulates and + enriches imagination; it creates responsibility for accuracy and vividness + of statement and thought. A man really living alone (alone mentally as + well as physically) would have little or no occasion to reflect upon his + past experience to extract its net meaning. The inequality of achievement + between the mature and the immature not only necessitates teaching the + young, but the necessity of this teaching gives an immense stimulus to + reducing experience to that order and form which will render it most + easily communicable and hence most usable. + </p> + <p> + 3. The Place of Formal Education. There is, accordingly, a marked + difference between the education which every one gets from living with + others, as long as he really lives instead of just continuing to subsist, + and the deliberate educating of the young. In the former case the + education is incidental; it is natural and important, but it is not the + express reason of the association. While it may be said, without + exaggeration, that the measure of the worth of any social institution, + economic, domestic, political, legal, religious, is its effect in + enlarging and improving experience; yet this effect is not a part of its + original motive, which is limited and more immediately practical. + Religious associations began, for example, in the desire to secure the + favor of overruling powers and to ward off evil influences; family life in + the desire to gratify appetites and secure family perpetuity; systematic + labor, for the most part, because of enslavement to others, etc. Only + gradually was the by-product of the institution, its effect upon the + quality and extent of conscious life, noted, and only more gradually still + was this effect considered as a directive factor in the conduct of the + institution. Even today, in our industrial life, apart from certain values + of industriousness and thrift, the intellectual and emotional reaction of + the forms of human association under which the world's work is carried on + receives little attention as compared with physical output. + </p> + <p> + But in dealing with the young, the fact of association itself as an + immediate human fact, gains in importance. While it is easy to ignore in + our contact with them the effect of our acts upon their disposition, or to + subordinate that educative effect to some external and tangible result, it + is not so easy as in dealing with adults. The need of training is too + evident; the pressure to accomplish a change in their attitude and habits + is too urgent to leave these consequences wholly out of account. Since our + chief business with them is to enable them to share in a common life we + cannot help considering whether or no we are forming the powers which will + secure this ability. If humanity has made some headway in realizing that + the ultimate value of every institution is its distinctively human effect—its + effect upon conscious experience—we may well believe that this + lesson has been learned largely through dealings with the young. + </p> + <p> + We are thus led to distinguish, within the broad educational process which + we have been so far considering, a more formal kind of education—that + of direct tuition or schooling. In undeveloped social groups, we find very + little formal teaching and training. Savage groups mainly rely for + instilling needed dispositions into the young upon the same sort of + association which keeps adults loyal to their group. They have no special + devices, material, or institutions for teaching save in connection with + initiation ceremonies by which the youth are inducted into full social + membership. For the most part, they depend upon children learning the + customs of the adults, acquiring their emotional set and stock of ideas, + by sharing in what the elders are doing. In part, this sharing is direct, + taking part in the occupations of adults and thus serving an + apprenticeship; in part, it is indirect, through the dramatic plays in + which children reproduce the actions of grown-ups and thus learn to know + what they are like. To savages it would seem preposterous to seek out a + place where nothing but learning was going on in order that one might + learn. + </p> + <p> + But as civilization advances, the gap between the capacities of the young + and the concerns of adults widens. Learning by direct sharing in the + pursuits of grown-ups becomes increasingly difficult except in the case of + the less advanced occupations. Much of what adults do is so remote in + space and in meaning that playful imitation is less and less adequate to + reproduce its spirit. Ability to share effectively in adult activities + thus depends upon a prior training given with this end in view. + Intentional agencies—schools—and explicit material—studies—are + devised. The task of teaching certain things is delegated to a special + group of persons. + </p> + <p> + Without such formal education, it is not possible to transmit all the + resources and achievements of a complex society. It also opens a way to a + kind of experience which would not be accessible to the young, if they + were left to pick up their training in informal association with others, + since books and the symbols of knowledge are mastered. + </p> + <p> + But there are conspicuous dangers attendant upon the transition from + indirect to formal education. Sharing in actual pursuit, whether directly + or vicariously in play, is at least personal and vital. These qualities + compensate, in some measure, for the narrowness of available + opportunities. Formal instruction, on the contrary, easily becomes remote + and dead—abstract and bookish, to use the ordinary words of + depreciation. What accumulated knowledge exists in low grade societies is + at least put into practice; it is transmuted into character; it exists + with the depth of meaning that attaches to its coming within urgent daily + interests. + </p> + <p> + But in an advanced culture much which has to be learned is stored in + symbols. It is far from translation into familiar acts and objects. Such + material is relatively technical and superficial. Taking the ordinary + standard of reality as a measure, it is artificial. For this measure is + connection with practical concerns. Such material exists in a world by + itself, unassimilated to ordinary customs of thought and expression. There + is the standing danger that the material of formal instruction will be + merely the subject matter of the schools, isolated from the subject matter + of life-experience. The permanent social interests are likely to be lost + from view. Those which have not been carried over into the structure of + social life, but which remain largely matters of technical information + expressed in symbols, are made conspicuous in schools. Thus we reach the + ordinary notion of education: the notion which ignores its social + necessity and its identity with all human association that affects + conscious life, and which identifies it with imparting information about + remote matters and the conveying of learning through verbal signs: the + acquisition of literacy. + </p> + <p> + Hence one of the weightiest problems with which the philosophy of + education has to cope is the method of keeping a proper balance between + the informal and the formal, the incidental and the intentional, modes of + education. When the acquiring of information and of technical intellectual + skill do not influence the formation of a social disposition, ordinary + vital experience fails to gain in meaning, while schooling, in so far, + creates only "sharps" in learning—that is, egoistic specialists. To + avoid a split between what men consciously know because they are aware of + having learned it by a specific job of learning, and what they + unconsciously know because they have absorbed it in the formation of their + characters by intercourse with others, becomes an increasingly delicate + task with every development of special schooling. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. It is the very nature of life to strive to continue in being. + </h2> + <p> + Since this continuance can be secured only by constant renewals, life is a + self-renewing process. What nutrition and reproduction are to + physiological life, education is to social life. This education consists + primarily in transmission through communication. Communication is a + process of sharing experience till it becomes a common possession. It + modifies the disposition of both the parties who partake in it. That the + ulterior significance of every mode of human association lies in the + contribution which it makes to the improvement of the quality of + experience is a fact most easily recognized in dealing with the immature. + That is to say, while every social arrangement is educative in effect, the + educative effect first becomes an important part of the purpose of the + association in connection with the association of the older with the + younger. As societies become more complex in structure and resources, the + need of formal or intentional teaching and learning increases. As formal + teaching and training grow in extent, there is the danger of creating an + undesirable split between the experience gained in more direct + associations and what is acquired in school. This danger was never greater + than at the present time, on account of the rapid growth in the last few + centuries of knowledge and technical modes of skill. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Two: Education as a Social Function + </h2> + <p> + 1. The Nature and Meaning of Environment. We have seen that a community or + social group sustains itself through continuous self-renewal, and that + this renewal takes place by means of the educational growth of the + immature members of the group. By various agencies, unintentional and + designed, a society transforms uninitiated and seemingly alien beings into + robust trustees of its own resources and ideals. Education is thus a + fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating, process. All of these words mean + that it implies attention to the conditions of growth. We also speak of + rearing, raising, bringing up—words which express the difference of + level which education aims to cover. Etymologically, the word education + means just a process of leading or bringing up. When we have the outcome + of the process in mind, we speak of education as shaping, forming, molding + activity—that is, a shaping into the standard form of social + activity. In this chapter we are concerned with the general features of + the way in which a social group brings up its immature members into its + own social form. + </p> + <p> + Since what is required is a transformation of the quality of experience + till it partakes in the interests, purposes, and ideas current in the + social group, the problem is evidently not one of mere physical forming. + Things can be physically transported in space; they may be bodily + conveyed. Beliefs and aspirations cannot be physically extracted and + inserted. How then are they communicated? Given the impossibility of + direct contagion or literal inculcation, our problem is to discover the + method by which the young assimilate the point of view of the old, or the + older bring the young into like-mindedness with themselves. The answer, in + general formulation, is: By means of the action of the environment in + calling out certain responses. The required beliefs cannot be hammered in; + the needed attitudes cannot be plastered on. But the particular medium in + which an individual exists leads him to see and feel one thing rather than + another; it leads him to have certain plans in order that he may act + successfully with others; it strengthens some beliefs and weakens others + as a condition of winning the approval of others. Thus it gradually + produces in him a certain system of behavior, a certain disposition of + action. The words "environment," "medium" denote something more than + surroundings which encompass an individual. They denote the specific + continuity of the surroundings with his own active tendencies. An + inanimate being is, of course, continuous with its surroundings; but the + environing circumstances do not, save metaphorically, constitute an + environment. For the inorganic being is not concerned in the influences + which affect it. On the other hand, some things which are remote in space + and time from a living creature, especially a human creature, may form his + environment even more truly than some of the things close to him. The + things with which a man varies are his genuine environment. Thus the + activities of the astronomer vary with the stars at which he gazes or + about which he calculates. Of his immediate surroundings, his telescope is + most intimately his environment. The environment of an antiquarian, as an + antiquarian, consists of the remote epoch of human life with which he is + concerned, and the relics, inscriptions, etc., by which he establishes + connections with that period. + </p> + <p> + In brief, the environment consists of those conditions that promote or + hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic activities of a living + being. Water is the environment of a fish because it is necessary to the + fish's activities—to its life. The north pole is a significant + element in the environment of an arctic explorer, whether he succeeds in + reaching it or not, because it defines his activities, makes them what + they distinctively are. Just because life signifies not bare passive + existence (supposing there is such a thing), but a way of acting, + environment or medium signifies what enters into this activity as a + sustaining or frustrating condition. + </p> + <p> + 2. The Social Environment. A being whose activities are associated with + others has a social environment. What he does and what he can do depend + upon the expectations, demands, approvals, and condemnations of others. A + being connected with other beings cannot perform his own activities + without taking the activities of others into account. For they are the + indispensable conditions of the realization of his tendencies. When he + moves he stirs them and reciprocally. We might as well try to imagine a + business man doing business, buying and selling, all by himself, as to + conceive it possible to define the activities of an individual in terms of + his isolated actions. The manufacturer moreover is as truly socially + guided in his activities when he is laying plans in the privacy of his own + counting house as when he is buying his raw material or selling his + finished goods. Thinking and feeling that have to do with action in + association with others is as much a social mode of behavior as is the + most overt cooperative or hostile act. + </p> + <p> + What we have more especially to indicate is how the social medium nurtures + its immature members. There is no great difficulty in seeing how it shapes + the external habits of action. Even dogs and horses have their actions + modified by association with human beings; they form different habits + because human beings are concerned with what they do. Human beings control + animals by controlling the natural stimuli which influence them; by + creating a certain environment in other words. Food, bits and bridles, + noises, vehicles, are used to direct the ways in which the natural or + instinctive responses of horses occur. By operating steadily to call out + certain acts, habits are formed which function with the same uniformity as + the original stimuli. If a rat is put in a maze and finds food only by + making a given number of turns in a given sequence, his activity is + gradually modified till he habitually takes that course rather than + another when he is hungry. + </p> + <p> + Human actions are modified in a like fashion. A burnt child dreads the + fire; if a parent arranged conditions so that every time a child touched a + certain toy he got burned, the child would learn to avoid that toy as + automatically as he avoids touching fire. So far, however, we are dealing + with what may be called training in distinction from educative teaching. + The changes considered are in outer action rather than in mental and + emotional dispositions of behavior. The distinction is not, however, a + sharp one. The child might conceivably generate in time a violent + antipathy, not only to that particular toy, but to the class of toys + resembling it. The aversion might even persist after he had forgotten + about the original burns; later on he might even invent some reason to + account for his seemingly irrational antipathy. In some cases, altering + the external habit of action by changing the environment to affect the + stimuli to action will also alter the mental disposition concerned in the + action. Yet this does not always happen; a person trained to dodge a + threatening blow, dodges automatically with no corresponding thought or + emotion. We have to find, then, some differentia of training from + education. + </p> + <p> + A clew may be found in the fact that the horse does not really share in + the social use to which his action is put. Some one else uses the horse to + secure a result which is advantageous by making it advantageous to the + horse to perform the act—he gets food, etc. But the horse, + presumably, does not get any new interest. He remains interested in food, + not in the service he is rendering. He is not a partner in a shared + activity. Were he to become a copartner, he would, in engaging in the + conjoint activity, have the same interest in its accomplishment which + others have. He would share their ideas and emotions. + </p> + <p> + Now in many cases—too many cases—the activity of the immature + human being is simply played upon to secure habits which are useful. He is + trained like an animal rather than educated like a human being. His + instincts remain attached to their original objects of pain or pleasure. + But to get happiness or to avoid the pain of failure he has to act in a + way agreeable to others. In other cases, he really shares or participates + in the common activity. In this case, his original impulse is modified. He + not merely acts in a way agreeing with the actions of others, but, in so + acting, the same ideas and emotions are aroused in him that animate the + others. A tribe, let us say, is warlike. The successes for which it + strives, the achievements upon which it sets store, are connected with + fighting and victory. The presence of this medium incites bellicose + exhibitions in a boy, first in games, then in fact when he is strong + enough. As he fights he wins approval and advancement; as he refrains, he + is disliked, ridiculed, shut out from favorable recognition. It is not + surprising that his original belligerent tendencies and emotions are + strengthened at the expense of others, and that his ideas turn to things + connected with war. Only in this way can he become fully a recognized + member of his group. Thus his mental habitudes are gradually assimilated + to those of his group. + </p> + <p> + If we formulate the principle involved in this illustration, we shall + perceive that the social medium neither implants certain desires and ideas + directly, nor yet merely establishes certain purely muscular habits of + action, like "instinctively" winking or dodging a blow. Setting up + conditions which stimulate certain visible and tangible ways of acting is + the first step. Making the individual a sharer or partner in the + associated activity so that he feels its success as his success, its + failure as his failure, is the completing step. As soon as he is possessed + by the emotional attitude of the group, he will be alert to recognize the + special ends at which it aims and the means employed to secure success. + His beliefs and ideas, in other words, will take a form similar to those + of others in the group. He will also achieve pretty much the same stock of + knowledge since that knowledge is an ingredient of his habitual pursuits. + </p> + <p> + The importance of language in gaining knowledge is doubtless the chief + cause of the common notion that knowledge may be passed directly from one + to another. It almost seems as if all we have to do to convey an idea into + the mind of another is to convey a sound into his ear. Thus imparting + knowledge gets assimilated to a purely physical process. But learning from + language will be found, when analyzed, to confirm the principle just laid + down. It would probably be admitted with little hesitation that a child + gets the idea of, say, a hat by using it as other persons do; by covering + the head with it, giving it to others to wear, having it put on by others + when going out, etc. But it may be asked how this principle of shared + activity applies to getting through speech or reading the idea of, say, a + Greek helmet, where no direct use of any kind enters in. What shared + activity is there in learning from books about the discovery of America? + </p> + <p> + Since language tends to become the chief instrument of learning about many + things, let us see how it works. The baby begins of course with mere + sounds, noises, and tones having no meaning, expressing, that is, no idea. + Sounds are just one kind of stimulus to direct response, some having a + soothing effect, others tending to make one jump, and so on. The sound + h-a-t would remain as meaningless as a sound in Choctaw, a seemingly + inarticulate grunt, if it were not uttered in connection with an action + which is participated in by a number of people. When the mother is taking + the infant out of doors, she says "hat" as she puts something on the + baby's head. Being taken out becomes an interest to the child; mother and + child not only go out with each other physically, but both are concerned + in the going out; they enjoy it in common. By conjunction with the other + factors in activity the sound "hat" soon gets the same meaning for the + child that it has for the parent; it becomes a sign of the activity into + which it enters. The bare fact that language consists of sounds which are + mutually intelligible is enough of itself to show that its meaning depends + upon connection with a shared experience. + </p> + <p> + In short, the sound h-a-t gains meaning in precisely the same way that the + thing "hat" gains it, by being used in a given way. And they acquire the + same meaning with the child which they have with the adult because they + are used in a common experience by both. The guarantee for the same manner + of use is found in the fact that the thing and the sound are first + employed in a joint activity, as a means of setting up an active + connection between the child and a grownup. Similar ideas or meanings + spring up because both persons are engaged as partners in an action where + what each does depends upon and influences what the other does. If two + savages were engaged in a joint hunt for game, and a certain signal meant + "move to the right" to the one who uttered it, and "move to the left" to + the one who heard it, they obviously could not successfully carry on their + hunt together. Understanding one another means that objects, including + sounds, have the same value for both with respect to carrying on a common + pursuit. + </p> + <p> + After sounds have got meaning through connection with other things + employed in a joint undertaking, they can be used in connection with other + like sounds to develop new meanings, precisely as the things for which + they stand are combined. Thus the words in which a child learns about, + say, the Greek helmet originally got a meaning (or were understood) by use + in an action having a common interest and end. They now arouse a new + meaning by inciting the one who hears or reads to rehearse imaginatively + the activities in which the helmet has its use. For the time being, the + one who understands the words "Greek helmet" becomes mentally a partner + with those who used the helmet. He engages, through his imagination, in a + shared activity. It is not easy to get the full meaning of words. Most + persons probably stop with the idea that "helmet" denotes a queer kind of + headgear a people called the Greeks once wore. We conclude, accordingly, + that the use of language to convey and acquire ideas is an extension and + refinement of the principle that things gain meaning by being used in a + shared experience or joint action; in no sense does it contravene that + principle. When words do not enter as factors into a shared situation, + either overtly or imaginatively, they operate as pure physical stimuli, + not as having a meaning or intellectual value. They set activity running + in a given groove, but there is no accompanying conscious purpose or + meaning. Thus, for example, the plus sign may be a stimulus to perform the + act of writing one number under another and adding the numbers, but the + person performing the act will operate much as an automaton would unless + he realizes the meaning of what he does. + </p> + <p> + 3. The Social Medium as Educative. Our net result thus far is that social + environment forms the mental and emotional disposition of behavior in + individuals by engaging them in activities that arouse and strengthen + certain impulses, that have certain purposes and entail certain + consequences. A child growing up in a family of musicians will inevitably + have whatever capacities he has in music stimulated, and, relatively, + stimulated more than other impulses which might have been awakened in + another environment. Save as he takes an interest in music and gains a + certain competency in it, he is "out of it"; he is unable to share in the + life of the group to which he belongs. Some kinds of participation in the + life of those with whom the individual is connected are inevitable; with + respect to them, the social environment exercises an educative or + formative influence unconsciously and apart from any set purpose. + </p> + <p> + In savage and barbarian communities, such direct participation + (constituting the indirect or incidental education of which we have + spoken) furnishes almost the sole influence for rearing the young into the + practices and beliefs of the group. Even in present-day societies, it + furnishes the basic nurture of even the most insistently schooled youth. + In accord with the interests and occupations of the group, certain things + become objects of high esteem; others of aversion. Association does not + create impulses or affection and dislike, but it furnishes the objects to + which they attach themselves. The way our group or class does things tends + to determine the proper objects of attention, and thus to prescribe the + directions and limits of observation and memory. What is strange or + foreign (that is to say outside the activities of the groups) tends to be + morally forbidden and intellectually suspect. It seems almost incredible + to us, for example, that things which we know very well could have escaped + recognition in past ages. We incline to account for it by attributing + congenital stupidity to our forerunners and by assuming superior native + intelligence on our own part. But the explanation is that their modes of + life did not call for attention to such facts, but held their minds + riveted to other things. Just as the senses require sensible objects to + stimulate them, so our powers of observation, recollection, and + imagination do not work spontaneously, but are set in motion by the + demands set up by current social occupations. The main texture of + disposition is formed, independently of schooling, by such influences. + What conscious, deliberate teaching can do is at most to free the + capacities thus formed for fuller exercise, to purge them of some of their + grossness, and to furnish objects which make their activity more + productive of meaning. + </p> + <p> + While this "unconscious influence of the environment" is so subtle and + pervasive that it affects every fiber of character and mind, it may be + worth while to specify a few directions in which its effect is most + marked. First, the habits of language. Fundamental modes of speech, the + bulk of the vocabulary, are formed in the ordinary intercourse of life, + carried on not as a set means of instruction but as a social necessity. + The babe acquires, as we well say, the mother tongue. While speech habits + thus contracted may be corrected or even displaced by conscious teaching, + yet, in times of excitement, intentionally acquired modes of speech often + fall away, and individuals relapse into their really native tongue. + Secondly, manners. Example is notoriously more potent than precept. Good + manners come, as we say, from good breeding or rather are good breeding; + and breeding is acquired by habitual action, in response to habitual + stimuli, not by conveying information. Despite the never ending play of + conscious correction and instruction, the surrounding atmosphere and + spirit is in the end the chief agent in forming manners. And manners are + but minor morals. Moreover, in major morals, conscious instruction is + likely to be efficacious only in the degree in which it falls in with the + general "walk and conversation" of those who constitute the child's social + environment. Thirdly, good taste and esthetic appreciation. If the eye is + constantly greeted by harmonious objects, having elegance of form and + color, a standard of taste naturally grows up. The effect of a tawdry, + unarranged, and over-decorated environment works for the deterioration of + taste, just as meager and barren surroundings starve out the desire for + beauty. Against such odds, conscious teaching can hardly do more than + convey second-hand information as to what others think. Such taste never + becomes spontaneous and personally engrained, but remains a labored + reminder of what those think to whom one has been taught to look up. To + say that the deeper standards of judgments of value are framed by the + situations into which a person habitually enters is not so much to mention + a fourth point, as it is to point out a fusion of those already mentioned. + We rarely recognize the extent in which our conscious estimates of what is + worth while and what is not, are due to standards of which we are not + conscious at all. But in general it may be said that the things which we + take for granted without inquiry or reflection are just the things which + determine our conscious thinking and decide our conclusions. And these + habitudes which lie below the level of reflection are just those which + have been formed in the constant give and take of relationship with + others. + </p> + <p> + 4. The School as a Special Environment. The chief importance of this + foregoing statement of the educative process which goes on willy-nilly is + to lead us to note that the only way in which adults consciously control + the kind of education which the immature get is by controlling the + environment in which they act, and hence think and feel. We never educate + directly, but indirectly by means of the environment. Whether we permit + chance environments to do the work, or whether we design environments for + the purpose makes a great difference. And any environment is a chance + environment so far as its educative influence is concerned unless it has + been deliberately regulated with reference to its educative effect. An + intelligent home differs from an unintelligent one chiefly in that the + habits of life and intercourse which prevail are chosen, or at least + colored, by the thought of their bearing upon the development of children. + But schools remain, of course, the typical instance of environments framed + with express reference to influencing the mental and moral disposition of + their members. + </p> + <p> + Roughly speaking, they come into existence when social traditions are so + complex that a considerable part of the social store is committed to + writing and transmitted through written symbols. Written symbols are even + more artificial or conventional than spoken; they cannot be picked up in + accidental intercourse with others. In addition, the written form tends to + select and record matters which are comparatively foreign to everyday + life. The achievements accumulated from generation to generation are + deposited in it even though some of them have fallen temporarily out of + use. Consequently as soon as a community depends to any considerable + extent upon what lies beyond its own territory and its own immediate + generation, it must rely upon the set agency of schools to insure adequate + transmission of all its resources. To take an obvious illustration: The + life of the ancient Greeks and Romans has profoundly influenced our own, + and yet the ways in which they affect us do not present themselves on the + surface of our ordinary experiences. In similar fashion, peoples still + existing, but remote in space, British, Germans, Italians, directly + concern our own social affairs, but the nature of the interaction cannot + be understood without explicit statement and attention. In precisely + similar fashion, our daily associations cannot be trusted to make clear to + the young the part played in our activities by remote physical energies, + and by invisible structures. Hence a special mode of social intercourse is + instituted, the school, to care for such matters. + </p> + <p> + This mode of association has three functions sufficiently specific, as + compared with ordinary associations of life, to be noted. First, a complex + civilization is too complex to be assimilated in toto. It has to be broken + up into portions, as it were, and assimilated piecemeal, in a gradual and + graded way. The relationships of our present social life are so numerous + and so interwoven that a child placed in the most favorable position could + not readily share in many of the most important of them. Not sharing in + them, their meaning would not be communicated to him, would not become a + part of his own mental disposition. There would be no seeing the trees + because of the forest. Business, politics, art, science, religion, would + make all at once a clamor for attention; confusion would be the outcome. + The first office of the social organ we call the school is to provide a + simplified environment. It selects the features which are fairly + fundamental and capable of being responded to by the young. Then it + establishes a progressive order, using the factors first acquired as means + of gaining insight into what is more complicated. + </p> + <p> + In the second place, it is the business of the school environment to + eliminate, so far as possible, the unworthy features of the existing + environment from influence upon mental habitudes. It establishes a + purified medium of action. Selection aims not only at simplifying but at + weeding out what is undesirable. Every society gets encumbered with what + is trivial, with dead wood from the past, and with what is positively + perverse. The school has the duty of omitting such things from the + environment which it supplies, and thereby doing what it can to counteract + their influence in the ordinary social environment. By selecting the best + for its exclusive use, it strives to reinforce the power of this best. As + a society becomes more enlightened, it realizes that it is responsible not + to transmit and conserve the whole of its existing achievements, but only + such as make for a better future society. The school is its chief agency + for the accomplishment of this end. + </p> + <p> + In the third place, it is the office of the school environment to balance + the various elements in the social environment, and to see to it that each + individual gets an opportunity to escape from the limitations of the + social group in which he was born, and to come into living contact with a + broader environment. Such words as "society" and "community" are likely to + be misleading, for they have a tendency to make us think there is a single + thing corresponding to the single word. As a matter of fact, a modern + society is many societies more or less loosely connected. Each household + with its immediate extension of friends makes a society; the village or + street group of playmates is a community; each business group, each club, + is another. Passing beyond these more intimate groups, there is in a + country like our own a variety of races, religious affiliations, economic + divisions. Inside the modern city, in spite of its nominal political + unity, there are probably more communities, more differing customs, + traditions, aspirations, and forms of government or control, than existed + in an entire continent at an earlier epoch. + </p> + <p> + Each such group exercises a formative influence on the active dispositions + of its members. A clique, a club, a gang, a Fagin's household of thieves, + the prisoners in a jail, provide educative environments for those who + enter into their collective or conjoint activities, as truly as a church, + a labor union, a business partnership, or a political party. Each of them + is a mode of associated or community life, quite as much as is a family, a + town, or a state. There are also communities whose members have little or + no direct contact with one another, like the guild of artists, the + republic of letters, the members of the professional learned class + scattered over the face of the earth. For they have aims in common, and + the activity of each member is directly modified by knowledge of what + others are doing. + </p> + <p> + In the olden times, the diversity of groups was largely a geographical + matter. There were many societies, but each, within its own territory, was + comparatively homogeneous. But with the development of commerce, + transportation, intercommunication, and emigration, countries like the + United States are composed of a combination of different groups with + different traditional customs. It is this situation which has, perhaps + more than any other one cause, forced the demand for an educational + institution which shall provide something like a homogeneous and balanced + environment for the young. Only in this way can the centrifugal forces set + up by juxtaposition of different groups within one and the same political + unit be counteracted. The intermingling in the school of youth of + different races, differing religions, and unlike customs creates for all a + new and broader environment. Common subject matter accustoms all to a + unity of outlook upon a broader horizon than is visible to the members of + any group while it is isolated. The assimilative force of the American + public school is eloquent testimony to the efficacy of the common and + balanced appeal. + </p> + <p> + The school has the function also of coordinating within the disposition of + each individual the diverse influences of the various social environments + into which he enters. One code prevails in the family; another, on the + street; a third, in the workshop or store; a fourth, in the religious + association. As a person passes from one of the environments to another, + he is subjected to antagonistic pulls, and is in danger of being split + into a being having different standards of judgment and emotion for + different occasions. This danger imposes upon the school a steadying and + integrating office. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM27"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. The development within the young of the attitudes and + </h2> + <p> + dispositions necessary to the continuous and progressive life of a society + cannot take place by direct conveyance of beliefs, emotions, and + knowledge. It takes place through the intermediary of the environment. The + environment consists of the sum total of conditions which are concerned in + the execution of the activity characteristic of a living being. The social + environment consists of all the activities of fellow beings that are bound + up in the carrying on of the activities of any one of its members. It is + truly educative in its effect in the degree in which an individual shares + or participates in some conjoint activity. By doing his share in the + associated activity, the individual appropriates the purpose which + actuates it, becomes familiar with its methods and subject matters, + acquires needed skill, and is saturated with its emotional spirit. + </p> + <p> + The deeper and more intimate educative formation of disposition comes, + without conscious intent, as the young gradually partake of the activities + of the various groups to which they may belong. As a society becomes more + complex, however, it is found necessary to provide a special social + environment which shall especially look after nurturing the capacities of + the immature. Three of the more important functions of this special + environment are: simplifying and ordering the factors of the disposition + it is wished to develop; purifying and idealizing the existing social + customs; creating a wider and better balanced environment than that by + which the young would be likely, if left to themselves, to be influenced. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0003"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Three: Education as Direction + </h2> + <h3> + 1. The Environment as Directive. + </h3> + <p> + We now pass to one of the special forms which the general function of + education assumes: namely, that of direction, control, or guidance. Of + these three words, direction, control, and guidance, the last best conveys + the idea of assisting through cooperation the natural capacities of the + individuals guided; control conveys rather the notion of an energy brought + to bear from without and meeting some resistance from the one controlled; + direction is a more neutral term and suggests the fact that the active + tendencies of those directed are led in a certain continuous course, + instead of dispersing aimlessly. Direction expresses the basic function, + which tends at one extreme to become a guiding assistance and at another, + a regulation or ruling. But in any case, we must carefully avoid a meaning + sometimes read into the term "control." It is sometimes assumed, + explicitly or unconsciously, that an individual's tendencies are naturally + purely individualistic or egoistic, and thus antisocial. Control then + denotes the process by which he is brought to subordinate his natural + impulses to public or common ends. Since, by conception, his own nature is + quite alien to this process and opposes it rather than helps it, control + has in this view a flavor of coercion or compulsion about it. Systems of + government and theories of the state have been built upon this notion, and + it has seriously affected educational ideas and practices. But there is no + ground for any such view. Individuals are certainly interested, at times, + in having their own way, and their own way may go contrary to the ways of + others. But they are also interested, and chiefly interested upon the + whole, in entering into the activities of others and taking part in + conjoint and cooperative doings. Otherwise, no such thing as a community + would be possible. And there would not even be any one interested in + furnishing the policeman to keep a semblance of harmony unless he thought + that thereby he could gain some personal advantage. Control, in truth, + means only an emphatic form of direction of powers, and covers the + regulation gained by an individual through his own efforts quite as much + as that brought about when others take the lead. + </p> + <p> + In general, every stimulus directs activity. It does not simply excite it + or stir it up, but directs it toward an object. Put the other way around, + a response is not just a re-action, a protest, as it were, against being + disturbed; it is, as the word indicates, an answer. It meets the stimulus, + and corresponds with it. There is an adaptation of the stimulus and + response to each other. A light is the stimulus to the eye to see + something, and the business of the eye is to see. If the eyes are open and + there is light, seeing occurs; the stimulus is but a condition of the + fulfillment of the proper function of the organ, not an outside + interruption. To some extent, then, all direction or control is a guiding + of activity to its own end; it is an assistance in doing fully what some + organ is already tending to do. + </p> + <p> + This general statement needs, however, to be qualified in two respects. In + the first place, except in the case of a small number of instincts, the + stimuli to which an immature human being is subject are not sufficiently + definite to call out, in the beginning, specific responses. There is + always a great deal of superfluous energy aroused. This energy may be + wasted, going aside from the point; it may also go against the successful + performance of an act. It does harm by getting in the way. Compare the + behavior of a beginner in riding a bicycle with that of the expert. There + is little axis of direction in the energies put forth; they are largely + dispersive and centrifugal. Direction involves a focusing and fixating of + action in order that it may be truly a response, and this requires an + elimination of unnecessary and confusing movements. In the second place, + although no activity can be produced in which the person does not + cooperate to some extent, yet a response may be of a kind which does not + fit into the sequence and continuity of action. A person boxing may dodge + a particular blow successfully, but in such a way as to expose himself the + next instant to a still harder blow. Adequate control means that the + successive acts are brought into a continuous order; each act not only + meets its immediate stimulus but helps the acts which follow. + </p> + <p> + In short, direction is both simultaneous and successive. At a given time, + it requires that, from all the tendencies that are partially called out, + those be selected which center energy upon the point of need. + Successively, it requires that each act be balanced with those which + precede and come after, so that order of activity is achieved. Focusing + and ordering are thus the two aspects of direction, one spatial, the other + temporal. The first insures hitting the mark; the second keeps the balance + required for further action. Obviously, it is not possible to separate + them in practice as we have distinguished them in idea. Activity must be + centered at a given time in such a way as to prepare for what comes next. + The problem of the immediate response is complicated by one's having to be + on the lookout for future occurrences. + </p> + <p> + Two conclusions emerge from these general statements. On the one hand, + purely external direction is impossible. The environment can at most only + supply stimuli to call out responses. These responses proceed from + tendencies already possessed by the individual. Even when a person is + frightened by threats into doing something, the threats work only because + the person has an instinct of fear. If he has not, or if, though having + it, it is under his own control, the threat has no more influence upon him + than light has in causing a person to see who has no eyes. While the + customs and rules of adults furnish stimuli which direct as well as evoke + the activities of the young, the young, after all, participate in the + direction which their actions finally take. In the strict sense, nothing + can be forced upon them or into them. To overlook this fact means to + distort and pervert human nature. To take into account the contribution + made by the existing instincts and habits of those directed is to direct + them economically and wisely. Speaking accurately, all direction is but + re-direction; it shifts the activities already going on into another + channel. Unless one is cognizant of the energies which are already in + operation, one's attempts at direction will almost surely go amiss. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, the control afforded by the customs and regulations of + others may be short-sighted. It may accomplish its immediate effect, but + at the expense of throwing the subsequent action of the person out of + balance. A threat may, for example, prevent a person from doing something + to which he is naturally inclined by arousing fear of disagreeable + consequences if he persists. But he may be left in the position which + exposes him later on to influences which will lead him to do even worse + things. His instincts of cunning and slyness may be aroused, so that + things henceforth appeal to him on the side of evasion and trickery more + than would otherwise have been the case. Those engaged in directing the + actions of others are always in danger of overlooking the importance of + the sequential development of those they direct. + </p> + <p> + 2. Modes of Social Direction. Adults are naturally most conscious of + directing the conduct of others when they are immediately aiming so to do. + As a rule, they have such an aim consciously when they find themselves + resisted; when others are doing things they do not wish them to do. But + the more permanent and influential modes of control are those which + operate from moment to moment continuously without such deliberate + intention on our part. + </p> + <p> + 1. When others are not doing what we would like them to or are threatening + disobedience, we are most conscious of the need of controlling them and of + the influences by which they are controlled. In such cases, our control + becomes most direct, and at this point we are most likely to make the + mistakes just spoken of. We are even likely to take the influence of + superior force for control, forgetting that while we may lead a horse to + water we cannot make him drink; and that while we can shut a man up in a + penitentiary we cannot make him penitent. In all such cases of immediate + action upon others, we need to discriminate between physical results and + moral results. A person may be in such a condition that forcible feeding + or enforced confinement is necessary for his own good. A child may have to + be snatched with roughness away from a fire so that he shall not be burnt. + But no improvement of disposition, no educative effect, need follow. A + harsh and commanding tone may be effectual in keeping a child away from + the fire, and the same desirable physical effect will follow as if he had + been snatched away. But there may be no more obedience of a moral sort in + one case than in the other. A man can be prevented from breaking into + other persons' houses by shutting him up, but shutting him up may not + alter his disposition to commit burglary. When we confuse a physical with + an educative result, we always lose the chance of enlisting the person's + own participating disposition in getting the result desired, and thereby + of developing within him an intrinsic and persisting direction in the + right way. + </p> + <p> + In general, the occasion for the more conscious acts of control should be + limited to acts which are so instinctive or impulsive that the one + performing them has no means of foreseeing their outcome. If a person + cannot foresee the consequences of his act, and is not capable of + understanding what he is told about its outcome by those with more + experience, it is impossible for him to guide his act intelligently. In + such a state, every act is alike to him. Whatever moves him does move him, + and that is all there is to it. In some cases, it is well to permit him to + experiment, and to discover the consequences for himself in order that he + may act intelligently next time under similar circumstances. But some + courses of action are too discommoding and obnoxious to others to allow of + this course being pursued. Direct disapproval is now resorted to. Shaming, + ridicule, disfavor, rebuke, and punishment are used. Or contrary + tendencies in the child are appealed to to divert him from his troublesome + line of behavior. His sensitiveness to approbation, his hope of winning + favor by an agreeable act, are made use of to induce action in another + direction. + </p> + <p> + 2. These methods of control are so obvious (because so intentionally + employed) that it would hardly be worth while to mention them if it were + not that notice may now be taken, by way of contrast, of the other more + important and permanent mode of control. This other method resides in the + ways in which persons, with whom the immature being is associated, use + things; the instrumentalities with which they accomplish their own ends. + The very existence of the social medium in which an individual lives, + moves, and has his being is the standing effective agency of directing his + activity. + </p> + <p> + This fact makes it necessary for us to examine in greater detail what is + meant by the social environment. We are given to separating from each + other the physical and social environments in which we live. The + separation is responsible on one hand for an exaggeration of the moral + importance of the more direct or personal modes of control of which we + have been speaking; and on the other hand for an exaggeration, in current + psychology and philosophy, of the intellectual possibilities of contact + with a purely physical environment. There is not, in fact, any such thing + as the direct influence of one human being on another apart from use of + the physical environment as an intermediary. A smile, a frown, a rebuke, a + word of warning or encouragement, all involve some physical change. + Otherwise, the attitude of one would not get over to alter the attitude of + another. Comparatively speaking, such modes of influence may be regarded + as personal. The physical medium is reduced to a mere means of personal + contact. In contrast with such direct modes of mutual influence, stand + associations in common pursuits involving the use of things as means and + as measures of results. Even if the mother never told her daughter to help + her, or never rebuked her for not helping, the child would be subjected to + direction in her activities by the mere fact that she was engaged, along + with the parent, in the household life. Imitation, emulation, the need of + working together, enforce control. + </p> + <p> + If the mother hands the child something needed, the latter must reach the + thing in order to get it. Where there is giving there must be taking. The + way the child handles the thing after it is got, the use to which it is + put, is surely influenced by the fact that the child has watched the + mother. When the child sees the parent looking for something, it is as + natural for it also to look for the object and to give it over when it + finds it, as it was, under other circumstances, to receive it. Multiply + such an instance by the thousand details of daily intercourse, and one has + a picture of the most permanent and enduring method of giving direction to + the activities of the young. + </p> + <p> + In saying this, we are only repeating what was said previously about + participating in a joint activity as the chief way of forming disposition. + We have explicitly added, however, the recognition of the part played in + the joint activity by the use of things. The philosophy of learning has + been unduly dominated by a false psychology. It is frequently stated that + a person learns by merely having the qualities of things impressed upon + his mind through the gateway of the senses. Having received a store of + sensory impressions, association or some power of mental synthesis is + supposed to combine them into ideas—into things with a meaning. An + object, stone, orange, tree, chair, is supposed to convey different + impressions of color, shape, size, hardness, smell, taste, etc., which + aggregated together constitute the characteristic meaning of each thing. + But as matter of fact, it is the characteristic use to which the thing is + put, because of its specific qualities, which supplies the meaning with + which it is identified. A chair is a thing which is put to one use; a + table, a thing which is employed for another purpose; an orange is a thing + which costs so much, which is grown in warm climes, which is eaten, and + when eaten has an agreeable odor and refreshing taste, etc. + </p> + <p> + The difference between an adjustment to a physical stimulus and a mental + act is that the latter involves response to a thing in its meaning; the + former does not. A noise may make me jump without my mind being + implicated. When I hear a noise and run and get water and put out a blaze, + I respond intelligently; the sound meant fire, and fire meant need of + being extinguished. I bump into a stone, and kick it to one side purely + physically. I put it to one side for fear some one will stumble upon it, + intelligently; I respond to a meaning which the thing has. I am startled + by a thunderclap whether I recognize it or not—more likely, if I do + not recognize it. But if I say, either out loud or to myself, that is + thunder, I respond to the disturbance as a meaning. My behavior has a + mental quality. When things have a meaning for us, we mean (intend, + propose) what we do: when they do not, we act blindly, unconsciously, + unintelligently. + </p> + <p> + In both kinds of responsive adjustment, our activities are directed or + controlled. But in the merely blind response, direction is also blind. + There may be training, but there is no education. Repeated responses to + recurrent stimuli may fix a habit of acting in a certain way. All of us + have many habits of whose import we are quite unaware, since they were + formed without our knowing what we were about. Consequently they possess + us, rather than we them. They move us; they control us. Unless we become + aware of what they accomplish, and pass judgment upon the worth of the + result, we do not control them. A child might be made to bow every time he + met a certain person by pressure on his neck muscles, and bowing would + finally become automatic. It would not, however, be an act of recognition + or deference on his part, till he did it with a certain end in view—as + having a certain meaning. And not till he knew what he was about and + performed the act for the sake of its meaning could he be said to be + "brought up" or educated to act in a certain way. To have an idea of a + thing is thus not just to get certain sensations from it. It is to be able + to respond to the thing in view of its place in an inclusive scheme of + action; it is to foresee the drift and probable consequence of the action + of the thing upon us and of our action upon it. To have the same ideas + about things which others have, to be like-minded with them, and thus to + be really members of a social group, is therefore to attach the same + meanings to things and to acts which others attach. Otherwise, there is no + common understanding, and no community life. But in a shared activity, + each person refers what he is doing to what the other is doing and + vice-versa. That is, the activity of each is placed in the same inclusive + situation. To pull at a rope at which others happen to be pulling is not a + shared or conjoint activity, unless the pulling is done with knowledge + that others are pulling and for the sake of either helping or hindering + what they are doing. A pin may pass in the course of its manufacture + through the hands of many persons. But each may do his part without + knowledge of what others do or without any reference to what they do; each + may operate simply for the sake of a separate result—his own pay. + There is, in this case, no common consequence to which the several acts + are referred, and hence no genuine intercourse or association, in spite of + juxtaposition, and in spite of the fact that their respective doings + contribute to a single outcome. But if each views the consequences of his + own acts as having a bearing upon what others are doing and takes into + account the consequences of their behavior upon himself, then there is a + common mind; a common intent in behavior. There is an understanding set up + between the different contributors; and this common understanding controls + the action of each. Suppose that conditions were so arranged that one + person automatically caught a ball and then threw it to another person who + caught and automatically returned it; and that each so acted without + knowing where the ball came from or went to. Clearly, such action would be + without point or meaning. It might be physically controlled, but it would + not be socially directed. But suppose that each becomes aware of what the + other is doing, and becomes interested in the other's action and thereby + interested in what he is doing himself as connected with the action of the + other. The behavior of each would then be intelligent; and socially + intelligent and guided. Take one more example of a less imaginary kind. An + infant is hungry, and cries while food is prepared in his presence. If he + does not connect his own state with what others are doing, nor what they + are doing with his own satisfaction, he simply reacts with increasing + impatience to his own increasing discomfort. He is physically controlled + by his own organic state. But when he makes a back and forth reference, + his whole attitude changes. He takes an interest, as we say; he takes note + and watches what others are doing. He no longer reacts just to his own + hunger, but behaves in the light of what others are doing for its + prospective satisfaction. In that way, he also no longer just gives way to + hunger without knowing it, but he notes, or recognizes, or identifies his + own state. It becomes an object for him. His attitude toward it becomes in + some degree intelligent. And in such noting of the meaning of the actions + of others and of his own state, he is socially directed. + </p> + <p> + It will be recalled that our main proposition had two sides. One of them + has now been dealt with: namely, that physical things do not influence + mind (or form ideas and beliefs) except as they are implicated in action + for prospective consequences. The other point is persons modify one + another's dispositions only through the special use they make of physical + conditions. Consider first the case of so-called expressive movements to + which others are sensitive; blushing, smiling, frowning, clinching of + fists, natural gestures of all kinds. In themselves, these are not + expressive. They are organic parts of a person's attitude. One does not + blush to show modesty or embarrassment to others, but because the + capillary circulation alters in response to stimuli. But others use the + blush, or a slightly perceptible tightening of the muscles of a person + with whom they are associated, as a sign of the state in which that person + finds himself, and as an indication of what course to pursue. The frown + signifies an imminent rebuke for which one must prepare, or an uncertainty + and hesitation which one must, if possible, remove by saying or doing + something to restore confidence. A man at some distance is waving his arms + wildly. One has only to preserve an attitude of detached indifference, and + the motions of the other person will be on the level of any remote + physical change which we happen to note. If we have no concern or + interest, the waving of the arms is as meaningless to us as the gyrations + of the arms of a windmill. But if interest is aroused, we begin to + participate. We refer his action to something we are doing ourselves or + that we should do. We have to judge the meaning of his act in order to + decide what to do. Is he beckoning for help? Is he warning us of an + explosion to be set off, against which we should guard ourselves? In one + case, his action means to run toward him; in the other case, to run away. + In any case, it is the change he effects in the physical environment which + is a sign to us of how we should conduct ourselves. Our action is socially + controlled because we endeavor to refer what we are to do to the same + situation in which he is acting. + </p> + <p> + Language is, as we have already seen (ante, p. 15) a case of this joint + reference of our own action and that of another to a common situation. + Hence its unrivaled significance as a means of social direction. But + language would not be this efficacious instrument were it not that it + takes place upon a background of coarser and more tangible use of physical + means to accomplish results. A child sees persons with whom he lives using + chairs, hats, tables, spades, saws, plows, horses, money in certain ways. + If he has any share at all in what they are doing, he is led thereby to + use things in the same way, or to use other things in a way which will fit + in. If a chair is drawn up to a table, it is a sign that he is to sit in + it; if a person extends his right hand, he is to extend his; and so on in + a never ending stream of detail. The prevailing habits of using the + products of human art and the raw materials of nature constitute by all + odds the deepest and most pervasive mode of social control. When children + go to school, they already have "minds"—they have knowledge and + dispositions of judgment which may be appealed to through the use of + language. But these "minds" are the organized habits of intelligent + response which they have previously required by putting things to use in + connection with the way other persons use things. The control is + inescapable; it saturates disposition. The net outcome of the discussion + is that the fundamental means of control is not personal but intellectual. + It is not "moral" in the sense that a person is moved by direct personal + appeal from others, important as is this method at critical junctures. It + consists in the habits of understanding, which are set up in using objects + in correspondence with others, whether by way of cooperation and + assistance or rivalry and competition. Mind as a concrete thing is + precisely the power to understand things in terms of the use made of them; + a socialized mind is the power to understand them in terms of the use to + which they are turned in joint or shared situations. And mind in this + sense is the method of social control. + </p> + <p> + 3. Imitation and Social Psychology. We have already noted the defects of a + psychology of learning which places the individual mind naked, as it were, + in contact with physical objects, and which believes that knowledge, + ideas, and beliefs accrue from their interaction. Only comparatively + recently has the predominating influence of association with fellow beings + in the formation of mental and moral disposition been perceived. Even now + it is usually treated as a kind of adjunct to an alleged method of + learning by direct contact with things, and as merely supplementing + knowledge of the physical world with knowledge of persons. The purport of + our discussion is that such a view makes an absurd and impossible + separation between persons and things. Interaction with things may form + habits of external adjustment. But it leads to activity having a meaning + and conscious intent only when things are used to produce a result. And + the only way one person can modify the mind of another is by using + physical conditions, crude or artificial, so as to evoke some answering + activity from him. Such are our two main conclusions. It is desirable to + amplify and enforce them by placing them in contrast with the theory which + uses a psychology of supposed direct relationships of human beings to one + another as an adjunct to the psychology of the supposed direct relation of + an individual to physical objects. In substance, this so-called social + psychology has been built upon the notion of imitation. Consequently, we + shall discuss the nature and role of imitation in the formation of mental + disposition. + </p> + <p> + According to this theory, social control of individuals rests upon the + instinctive tendency of individuals to imitate or copy the actions of + others. The latter serve as models. The imitative instinct is so strong + that the young devote themselves to conforming to the patterns set by + others and reproducing them in their own scheme of behavior. According to + our theory, what is here called imitation is a misleading name for + partaking with others in a use of things which leads to consequences of + common interest. The basic error in the current notion of imitation is + that it puts the cart before the horse. It takes an effect for the cause + of the effect. There can be no doubt that individuals in forming a social + group are like-minded; they understand one another. They tend to act with + the same controlling ideas, beliefs, and intentions, given similar + circumstances. Looked at from without, they might be said to be engaged in + "imitating" one another. In the sense that they are doing much the same + sort of thing in much the same sort of way, this would be true enough. But + "imitation" throws no light upon why they so act; it repeats the fact as + an explanation of itself. It is an explanation of the same order as the + famous saying that opium puts men to sleep because of its dormitive power. + </p> + <p> + Objective likeness of acts and the mental satisfaction found in being in + conformity with others are baptized by the name imitation. This social + fact is then taken for a psychological force, which produced the likeness. + A considerable portion of what is called imitation is simply the fact that + persons being alike in structure respond in the same way to like stimuli. + Quite independently of imitation, men on being insulted get angry and + attack the insulter. This statement may be met by citing the undoubted + fact that response to an insult takes place in different ways in groups + having different customs. In one group, it may be met by recourse to + fisticuffs, in another by a challenge to a duel, in a third by an + exhibition of contemptuous disregard. This happens, so it is said, because + the model set for imitation is different. But there is no need to appeal + to imitation. The mere fact that customs are different means that the + actual stimuli to behavior are different. Conscious instruction plays a + part; prior approvals and disapprovals have a large influence. Still more + effective is the fact that unless an individual acts in the way current in + his group, he is literally out of it. He can associate with others on + intimate and equal terms only by behaving in the way in which they behave. + The pressure that comes from the fact that one is let into the group + action by acting in one way and shut out by acting in another way is + unremitting. What is called the effect of imitation is mainly the product + of conscious instruction and of the selective influence exercised by the + unconscious confirmations and ratifications of those with whom one + associates. + </p> + <p> + Suppose that some one rolls a ball to a child; he catches it and rolls it + back, and the game goes on. Here the stimulus is not just the sight of the + ball, or the sight of the other rolling it. It is the situation—the + game which is playing. The response is not merely rolling the ball back; + it is rolling it back so that the other one may catch and return it,—that + the game may continue. The "pattern" or model is not the action of the + other person. The whole situation requires that each should adapt his + action in view of what the other person has done and is to do. Imitation + may come in but its role is subordinate. The child has an interest on his + own account; he wants to keep it going. He may then note how the other + person catches and holds the ball in order to improve his own acts. He + imitates the means of doing, not the end or thing to be done. And he + imitates the means because he wishes, on his own behalf, as part of his + own initiative, to take an effective part in the game. One has only to + consider how completely the child is dependent from his earliest days for + successful execution of his purposes upon fitting his acts into those of + others to see what a premium is put upon behaving as others behave, and of + developing an understanding of them in order that he may so behave. The + pressure for likemindedness in action from this source is so great that it + is quite superfluous to appeal to imitation. As matter of fact, imitation + of ends, as distinct from imitation of means which help to reach ends, is + a superficial and transitory affair which leaves little effect upon + disposition. Idiots are especially apt at this kind of imitation; it + affects outward acts but not the meaning of their performance. When we + find children engaging in this sort of mimicry, instead of encouraging + them (as we would do if it were an important means of social control) we + are more likely to rebuke them as apes, monkeys, parrots, or copy cats. + Imitation of means of accomplishment is, on the other hand, an intelligent + act. It involves close observation, and judicious selection of what will + enable one to do better something which he already is trying to do. Used + for a purpose, the imitative instinct may, like any other instinct, become + a factor in the development of effective action. + </p> + <p> + This excursus should, accordingly, have the effect of reinforcing the + conclusion that genuine social control means the formation of a certain + mental disposition; a way of understanding objects, events, and acts which + enables one to participate effectively in associated activities. Only the + friction engendered by meeting resistance from others leads to the view + that it takes place by forcing a line of action contrary to natural + inclinations. Only failure to take account of the situations in which + persons are mutually concerned (or interested in acting responsively to + one another) leads to treating imitation as the chief agent in promoting + social control. + </p> + <p> + 4. Some Applications to Education. Why does a savage group perpetuate + savagery, and a civilized group civilization? Doubtless the first answer + to occur to mind is because savages are savages; being of low-grade + intelligence and perhaps defective moral sense. But careful study has made + it doubtful whether their native capacities are appreciably inferior to + those of civilized man. It has made it certain that native differences are + not sufficient to account for the difference in culture. In a sense the + mind of savage peoples is an effect, rather than a cause, of their + backward institutions. Their social activities are such as to restrict + their objects of attention and interest, and hence to limit the stimuli to + mental development. Even as regards the objects that come within the scope + of attention, primitive social customs tend to arrest observation and + imagination upon qualities which do not fructify in the mind. Lack of + control of natural forces means that a scant number of natural objects + enter into associated behavior. Only a small number of natural resources + are utilized and they are not worked for what they are worth. The advance + of civilization means that a larger number of natural forces and objects + have been transformed into instrumentalities of action, into means for + securing ends. We start not so much with superior capacities as with + superior stimuli for evocation and direction of our capacities. The savage + deals largely with crude stimuli; we have weighted stimuli. Prior human + efforts have made over natural conditions. As they originally existed they + were indifferent to human endeavors. Every domesticated plant and animal, + every tool, every utensil, every appliance, every manufactured article, + every esthetic decoration, every work of art means a transformation of + conditions once hostile or indifferent to characteristic human activities + into friendly and favoring conditions. Because the activities of children + today are controlled by these selected and charged stimuli, children are + able to traverse in a short lifetime what the race has needed slow, + tortured ages to attain. The dice have been loaded by all the successes + which have preceded. + </p> + <p> + Stimuli conducive to economical and effective response, such as our system + of roads and means of transportation, our ready command of heat, light, + and electricity, our ready-made machines and apparatus for every purpose, + do not, by themselves or in their aggregate, constitute a civilization. + But the uses to which they are put are civilization, and without the + things the uses would be impossible. Time otherwise necessarily devoted to + wresting a livelihood from a grudging environment and securing a + precarious protection against its inclemencies is freed. A body of + knowledge is transmitted, the legitimacy of which is guaranteed by the + fact that the physical equipment in which it is incarnated leads to + results that square with the other facts of nature. Thus these appliances + of art supply a protection, perhaps our chief protection, against a + recrudescence of these superstitious beliefs, those fanciful myths and + infertile imaginings about nature in which so much of the best + intellectual power of the past has been spent. If we add one other factor, + namely, that such appliances be not only used, but used in the interests + of a truly shared or associated life, then the appliances become the + positive resources of civilization. If Greece, with a scant tithe of our + material resources, achieved a worthy and noble intellectual and artistic + career, it is because Greece operated for social ends such resources as it + had. But whatever the situation, whether one of barbarism or civilization, + whether one of stinted control of physical forces, or of partial + enslavement to a mechanism not yet made tributary to a shared experience, + things as they enter into action furnish the educative conditions of daily + life and direct the formation of mental and moral disposition. + </p> + <p> + Intentional education signifies, as we have already seen, a specially + selected environment, the selection being made on the basis of materials + and method specifically promoting growth in the desired direction. Since + language represents the physical conditions that have been subjected to + the maximum transformation in the interests of social life—physical + things which have lost their original quality in becoming social tools—it + is appropriate that language should play a large part compared with other + appliances. By it we are led to share vicariously in past human + experience, thus widening and enriching the experience of the present. We + are enabled, symbolically and imaginatively, to anticipate situations. In + countless ways, language condenses meanings that record social outcomes + and presage social outlooks. So significant is it of a liberal share in + what is worth while in life that unlettered and uneducated have become + almost synonymous. + </p> + <p> + The emphasis in school upon this particular tool has, however, its dangers—dangers + which are not theoretical but exhibited in practice. Why is it, in spite + of the fact that teaching by pouring in, learning by a passive absorption, + are universally condemned, that they are still so entrenched in practice? + That education is not an affair of "telling" and being told, but an active + and constructive process, is a principle almost as generally violated in + practice as conceded in theory. Is not this deplorable situation due to + the fact that the doctrine is itself merely told? It is preached; it is + lectured; it is written about. But its enactment into practice requires + that the school environment be equipped with agencies for doing, with + tools and physical materials, to an extent rarely attained. It requires + that methods of instruction and administration be modified to allow and to + secure direct and continuous occupations with things. Not that the use of + language as an educational resource should lessen; but that its use should + be more vital and fruitful by having its normal connection with shared + activities. "These things ought ye to have done, and not to have left the + others undone." And for the school "these things" mean equipment with the + instrumentalities of cooperative or joint activity. + </p> + <p> + For when the schools depart from the educational conditions effective in + the out-of-school environment, they necessarily substitute a bookish, a + pseudo-intellectual spirit for a social spirit. Children doubtless go to + school to learn, but it has yet to be proved that learning occurs most + adequately when it is made a separate conscious business. When treating it + as a business of this sort tends to preclude the social sense which comes + from sharing in an activity of common concern and value, the effort at + isolated intellectual learning contradicts its own aim. We may secure + motor activity and sensory excitation by keeping an individual by himself, + but we cannot thereby get him to understand the meaning which things have + in the life of which he is a part. We may secure technical specialized + ability in algebra, Latin, or botany, but not the kind of intelligence + which directs ability to useful ends. Only by engaging in a joint + activity, where one person's use of material and tools is consciously + referred to the use other persons are making of their capacities and + appliances, is a social direction of disposition attained. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM3"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. The natural or native impulses of the young do not agree with + </h2> + <p> + the life-customs of the group into which they are born. Consequently they + have to be directed or guided. This control is not the same thing as + physical compulsion; it consists in centering the impulses acting at any + one time upon some specific end and in introducing an order of continuity + into the sequence of acts. The action of others is always influenced by + deciding what stimuli shall call out their actions. But in some cases as + in commands, prohibitions, approvals, and disapprovals, the stimuli + proceed from persons with a direct view to influencing action. Since in + such cases we are most conscious of controlling the action of others, we + are likely to exaggerate the importance of this sort of control at the + expense of a more permanent and effective method. The basic control + resides in the nature of the situations in which the young take part. In + social situations the young have to refer their way of acting to what + others are doing and make it fit in. This directs their action to a common + result, and gives an understanding common to the participants. For all + mean the same thing, even when performing different acts. This common + understanding of the means and ends of action is the essence of social + control. It is indirect, or emotional and intellectual, not direct or + personal. Moreover it is intrinsic to the disposition of the person, not + external and coercive. To achieve this internal control through identity + of interest and understanding is the business of education. While books + and conversation can do much, these agencies are usually relied upon too + exclusively. Schools require for their full efficiency more opportunity + for conjoint activities in which those instructed take part, so that they + may acquire a social sense of their own powers and of the materials and + appliances used. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0004"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Four: Education as Growth + </h2> + <h3> + 1. The Conditions of Growth. + </h3> + <p> + In directing the activities of the young, society determines its own + future in determining that of the young. Since the young at a given time + will at some later date compose the society of that period, the latter's + nature will largely turn upon the direction children's activities were + given at an earlier period. This cumulative movement of action toward a + later result is what is meant by growth. + </p> + <p> + The primary condition of growth is immaturity. This may seem to be a mere + truism—saying that a being can develop only in some point in which + he is undeveloped. But the prefix "im" of the word immaturity means + something positive, not a mere void or lack. It is noteworthy that the + terms "capacity" and "potentiality" have a double meaning, one sense being + negative, the other positive. Capacity may denote mere receptivity, like + the capacity of a quart measure. We may mean by potentiality a merely + dormant or quiescent state—a capacity to become something different + under external influences. But we also mean by capacity an ability, a + power; and by potentiality potency, force. Now when we say that immaturity + means the possibility of growth, we are not referring to absence of powers + which may exist at a later time; we express a force positively present—the + ability to develop. + </p> + <p> + Our tendency to take immaturity as mere lack, and growth as something + which fills up the gap between the immature and the mature is due to + regarding childhood comparatively, instead of intrinsically. We treat it + simply as a privation because we are measuring it by adulthood as a fixed + standard. This fixes attention upon what the child has not, and will not + have till he becomes a man. This comparative standpoint is legitimate + enough for some purposes, but if we make it final, the question arises + whether we are not guilty of an overweening presumption. Children, if they + could express themselves articulately and sincerely, would tell a + different tale; and there is excellent adult authority for the conviction + that for certain moral and intellectual purposes adults must become as + little children. The seriousness of the assumption of the negative quality + of the possibilities of immaturity is apparent when we reflect that it + sets up as an ideal and standard a static end. The fulfillment of growing + is taken to mean an accomplished growth: that is to say, an Ungrowth, + something which is no longer growing. The futility of the assumption is + seen in the fact that every adult resents the imputation of having no + further possibilities of growth; and so far as he finds that they are + closed to him mourns the fact as evidence of loss, instead of falling back + on the achieved as adequate manifestation of power. Why an unequal measure + for child and man? + </p> + <p> + Taken absolutely, instead of comparatively, immaturity designates a + positive force or ability,—the power to grow. We do not have to + draw out or educe positive activities from a child, as some educational + doctrines would have it. Where there is life, there are already eager and + impassioned activities. Growth is not something done to them; it is + something they do. The positive and constructive aspect of possibility + gives the key to understanding the two chief traits of immaturity, + dependence and plasticity. + </p> + <p> + (1) It sounds absurd to hear dependence spoken of as something positive, + still more absurd as a power. Yet if helplessness were all there were in + dependence, no development could ever take place. A merely impotent being + has to be carried, forever, by others. The fact that dependence is + accompanied by growth in ability, not by an ever increasing lapse into + parasitism, suggests that it is already something constructive. Being + merely sheltered by others would not promote growth. For + </p> + <p> + (2) it would only build a wall around impotence. With reference to the + physical world, the child is helpless. He lacks at birth and for a long + time thereafter power to make his way physically, to make his own living. + If he had to do that by himself, he would hardly survive an hour. On this + side his helplessness is almost complete. The young of the brutes are + immeasurably his superiors. He is physically weak and not able to turn the + strength which he possesses to coping with the physical environment. + </p> + <p> + 1. The thoroughgoing character of this helplessness suggests, however, + some compensating power. The relative ability of the young of brute + animals to adapt themselves fairly well to physical conditions from an + early period suggests the fact that their life is not intimately bound up + with the life of those about them. They are compelled, so to speak, to + have physical gifts because they are lacking in social gifts. Human + infants, on the other hand, can get along with physical incapacity just + because of their social capacity. We sometimes talk and think as if they + simply happened to be physically in a social environment; as if social + forces exclusively existed in the adults who take care of them, they being + passive recipients. If it were said that children are themselves + marvelously endowed with power to enlist the cooperative attention of + others, this would be thought to be a backhanded way of saying that others + are marvelously attentive to the needs of children. But observation shows + that children are gifted with an equipment of the first order for social + intercourse. Few grown-up persons retain all of the flexible and sensitive + ability of children to vibrate sympathetically with the attitudes and + doings of those about them. Inattention to physical things (going with + incapacity to control them) is accompanied by a corresponding + intensification of interest and attention as to the doings of people. The + native mechanism of the child and his impulses all tend to facile social + responsiveness. The statement that children, before adolescence, are + egotistically self-centered, even if it were true, would not contradict + the truth of this statement. It would simply indicate that their social + responsiveness is employed on their own behalf, not that it does not + exist. But the statement is not true as matter of fact. The facts which + are cited in support of the alleged pure egoism of children really show + the intensity and directness with which they go to their mark. If the ends + which form the mark seem narrow and selfish to adults, it is only because + adults (by means of a similar engrossment in their day) have mastered + these ends, which have consequently ceased to interest them. Most of the + remainder of children's alleged native egoism is simply an egoism which + runs counter to an adult's egoism. To a grown-up person who is too + absorbed in his own affairs to take an interest in children's affairs, + children doubtless seem unreasonably engrossed in their own affairs. + </p> + <p> + From a social standpoint, dependence denotes a power rather than a + weakness; it involves interdependence. There is always a danger that + increased personal independence will decrease the social capacity of an + individual. In making him more self-reliant, it may make him more + self-sufficient; it may lead to aloofness and indifference. It often makes + an individual so insensitive in his relations to others as to develop an + illusion of being really able to stand and act alone—an unnamed form + of insanity which is responsible for a large part of the remediable + suffering of the world. + </p> + <p> + 2. The specific adaptability of an immature creature for growth + constitutes his plasticity. This is something quite different from the + plasticity of putty or wax. It is not a capacity to take on change of form + in accord with external pressure. It lies near the pliable elasticity by + which some persons take on the color of their surroundings while retaining + their own bent. But it is something deeper than this. It is essentially + the ability to learn from experience; the power to retain from one + experience something which is of avail in coping with the difficulties of + a later situation. This means power to modify actions on the basis of the + results of prior experiences, the power to develop dispositions. Without + it, the acquisition of habits is impossible. + </p> + <p> + It is a familiar fact that the young of the higher animals, and especially + the human young, have to learn to utilize their instinctive reactions. The + human being is born with a greater number of instinctive tendencies than + other animals. But the instincts of the lower animals perfect themselves + for appropriate action at an early period after birth, while most of those + of the human infant are of little account just as they stand. An original + specialized power of adjustment secures immediate efficiency, but, like a + railway ticket, it is good for one route only. A being who, in order to + use his eyes, ears, hands, and legs, has to experiment in making varied + combinations of their reactions, achieves a control that is flexible and + varied. A chick, for example, pecks accurately at a bit of food in a few + hours after hatching. This means that definite coordinations of activities + of the eyes in seeing and of the body and head in striking are perfected + in a few trials. An infant requires about six months to be able to gauge + with approximate accuracy the action in reaching which will coordinate + with his visual activities; to be able, that is, to tell whether he can + reach a seen object and just how to execute the reaching. As a result, the + chick is limited by the relative perfection of its original endowment. The + infant has the advantage of the multitude of instinctive tentative + reactions and of the experiences that accompany them, even though he is at + a temporary disadvantage because they cross one another. In learning an + action, instead of having it given ready-made, one of necessity learns to + vary its factors, to make varied combinations of them, according to change + of circumstances. A possibility of continuing progress is opened up by the + fact that in learning one act, methods are developed good for use in other + situations. Still more important is the fact that the human being acquires + a habit of learning. He learns to learn. + </p> + <p> + The importance for human life of the two facts of dependence and variable + control has been summed up in the doctrine of the significance of + prolonged infancy. 1 This prolongation is significant from the standpoint + of the adult members of the group as well as from that of the young. The + presence of dependent and learning beings is a stimulus to nurture and + affection. The need for constant continued care was probably a chief means + in transforming temporary cohabitations into permanent unions. It + certainly was a chief influence in forming habits of affectionate and + sympathetic watchfulness; that constructive interest in the well-being of + others which is essential to associated life. Intellectually, this moral + development meant the introduction of many new objects of attention; it + stimulated foresight and planning for the future. Thus there is a + reciprocal influence. Increasing complexity of social life requires a + longer period of infancy in which to acquire the needed powers; this + prolongation of dependence means prolongation of plasticity, or power of + acquiring variable and novel modes of control. Hence it provides a further + push to social progress. + </p> + <p> + 2. Habits as Expressions of Growth. We have already noted that plasticity + is the capacity to retain and carry over from prior experience factors + which modify subsequent activities. This signifies the capacity to acquire + habits, or develop definite dispositions. We have now to consider the + salient features of habits. In the first place, a habit is a form of + executive skill, of efficiency in doing. A habit means an ability to use + natural conditions as means to ends. It is an active control of the + environment through control of the organs of action. We are perhaps apt to + emphasize the control of the body at the expense of control of the + environment. We think of walking, talking, playing the piano, the + specialized skills characteristic of the etcher, the surgeon, the + bridge-builder, as if they were simply ease, deftness, and accuracy on the + part of the organism. They are that, of course; but the measure of the + value of these qualities lies in the economical and effective control of + the environment which they secure. To be able to walk is to have certain + properties of nature at our disposal—and so with all other habits. + </p> + <p> + Education is not infrequently defined as consisting in the acquisition of + those habits that effect an adjustment of an individual and his + environment. The definition expresses an essential phase of growth. But it + is essential that adjustment be understood in its active sense of control + of means for achieving ends. If we think of a habit simply as a change + wrought in the organism, ignoring the fact that this change consists in + ability to effect subsequent changes in the environment, we shall be led + to think of "adjustment" as a conformity to environment as wax conforms to + the seal which impresses it. The environment is thought of as something + fixed, providing in its fixity the end and standard of changes taking + place in the organism; adjustment is just fitting ourselves to this fixity + of external conditions. 2 Habit as habituation is indeed something + relatively passive; we get used to our surroundings—to our clothing, + our shoes, and gloves; to the atmosphere as long as it is fairly equable; + to our daily associates, etc. Conformity to the environment, a change + wrought in the organism without reference to ability to modify + surroundings, is a marked trait of such habituations. Aside from the fact + that we are not entitled to carry over the traits of such adjustments + (which might well be called accommodations, to mark them off from active + adjustments) into habits of active use of our surroundings, two features + of habituations are worth notice. In the first place, we get used to + things by first using them. + </p> + <p> + Consider getting used to a strange city. At first, there is excessive + stimulation and excessive and ill-adapted response. Gradually certain + stimuli are selected because of their relevancy, and others are degraded. + We can say either that we do not respond to them any longer, or more truly + that we have effected a persistent response to them—an equilibrium + of adjustment. This means, in the second place, that this enduring + adjustment supplies the background upon which are made specific + adjustments, as occasion arises. We are never interested in changing the + whole environment; there is much that we take for granted and accept just + as it already is. Upon this background our activities focus at certain + points in an endeavor to introduce needed changes. Habituation is thus our + adjustment to an environment which at the time we are not concerned with + modifying, and which supplies a leverage to our active habits. Adaptation, + in fine, is quite as much adaptation of the environment to our own + activities as of our activities to the environment. A savage tribe manages + to live on a desert plain. It adapts itself. But its adaptation involves a + maximum of accepting, tolerating, putting up with things as they are, a + maximum of passive acquiescence, and a minimum of active control, of + subjection to use. A civilized people enters upon the scene. It also + adapts itself. It introduces irrigation; it searches the world for plants + and animals that will flourish under such conditions; it improves, by + careful selection, those which are growing there. As a consequence, the + wilderness blossoms as a rose. The savage is merely habituated; the + civilized man has habits which transform the environment. + </p> + <p> + The significance of habit is not exhausted, however, in its executive and + motor phase. It means formation of intellectual and emotional disposition + as well as an increase in ease, economy, and efficiency of action. Any + habit marks an inclination—an active preference and choice for the + conditions involved in its exercise. A habit does not wait, Micawber-like, + for a stimulus to turn up so that it may get busy; it actively seeks for + occasions to pass into full operation. If its expression is unduly + blocked, inclination shows itself in uneasiness and intense craving. A + habit also marks an intellectual disposition. Where there is a habit, + there is acquaintance with the materials and equipment to which action is + applied. There is a definite way of understanding the situations in which + the habit operates. Modes of thought, of observation and reflection, enter + as forms of skill and of desire into the habits that make a man an + engineer, an architect, a physician, or a merchant. In unskilled forms of + labor, the intellectual factors are at minimum precisely because the + habits involved are not of a high grade. But there are habits of judging + and reasoning as truly as of handling a tool, painting a picture, or + conducting an experiment. Such statements are, however, understatements. + The habits of mind involved in habits of the eye and hand supply the + latter with their significance. Above all, the intellectual element in a + habit fixes the relation of the habit to varied and elastic use, and hence + to continued growth. We speak of fixed habits. Well, the phrase may mean + powers so well established that their possessor always has them as + resources when needed. But the phrase is also used to mean ruts, routine + ways, with loss of freshness, open-mindedness, and originality. Fixity of + habit may mean that something has a fixed hold upon us, instead of our + having a free hold upon things. This fact explains two points in a common + notion about habits: their identification with mechanical and external + modes of action to the neglect of mental and moral attitudes, and the + tendency to give them a bad meaning, an identification with "bad habits." + Many a person would feel surprised to have his aptitude in his chosen + profession called a habit, and would naturally think of his use of + tobacco, liquor, or profane language as typical of the meaning of habit. A + habit is to him something which has a hold on him, something not easily + thrown off even though judgment condemn it. + </p> + <p> + Habits reduce themselves to routine ways of acting, or degenerate into + ways of action to which we are enslaved just in the degree in which + intelligence is disconnected from them. Routine habits are unthinking + habits: "bad" habits are habits so severed from reason that they are + opposed to the conclusions of conscious deliberation and decision. As we + have seen, the acquiring of habits is due to an original plasticity of our + natures: to our ability to vary responses till we find an appropriate and + efficient way of acting. Routine habits, and habits that possess us + instead of our possessing them, are habits which put an end to plasticity. + They mark the close of power to vary. There can be no doubt of the + tendency of organic plasticity, of the physiological basis, to lessen with + growing years. The instinctively mobile and eagerly varying action of + childhood, the love of new stimuli and new developments, too easily passes + into a "settling down," which means aversion to change and a resting on + past achievements. Only an environment which secures the full use of + intelligence in the process of forming habits can counteract this + tendency. Of course, the same hardening of the organic conditions affects + the physiological structures which are involved in thinking. But this fact + only indicates the need of persistent care to see to it that the function + of intelligence is invoked to its maximum possibility. The short-sighted + method which falls back on mechanical routine and repetition to secure + external efficiency of habit, motor skill without accompanying thought, + marks a deliberate closing in of surroundings upon growth. + </p> + <p> + 3. The Educational Bearings of the Conception of Development. We have had + so far but little to say in this chapter about education. We have been + occupied with the conditions and implications of growth. If our + conclusions are justified, they carry with them, however, definite + educational consequences. When it is said that education is development, + everything depends upon how development is conceived. Our net conclusion + is that life is development, and that developing, growing, is life. + Translated into its educational equivalents, that means (i) that the + educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and that + (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, + reconstructing, transforming. + </p> + <p> + 1. Development when it is interpreted in comparative terms, that is, with + respect to the special traits of child and adult life, means the direction + of power into special channels: the formation of habits involving + executive skill, definiteness of interest, and specific objects of + observation and thought. But the comparative view is not final. The child + has specific powers; to ignore that fact is to stunt or distort the organs + upon which his growth depends. The adult uses his powers to transform his + environment, thereby occasioning new stimuli which redirect his powers and + keep them developing. Ignoring this fact means arrested development, a + passive accommodation. Normal child and normal adult alike, in other + words, are engaged in growing. The difference between them is not the + difference between growth and no growth, but between the modes of growth + appropriate to different conditions. With respect to the development of + powers devoted to coping with specific scientific and economic problems we + may say the child should be growing in manhood. With respect to + sympathetic curiosity, unbiased responsiveness, and openness of mind, we + may say that the adult should be growing in childlikeness. One statement + is as true as the other. + </p> + <p> + Three ideas which have been criticized, namely, the merely privative + nature of immaturity, static adjustment to a fixed environment, and + rigidity of habit, are all connected with a false idea of growth or + development,—that it is a movement toward a fixed goal. Growth is + regarded as having an end, instead of being an end. The educational + counterparts of the three fallacious ideas are first, failure to take + account of the instinctive or native powers of the young; secondly, + failure to develop initiative in coping with novel situations; thirdly, an + undue emphasis upon drill and other devices which secure automatic skill + at the expense of personal perception. In all cases, the adult environment + is accepted as a standard for the child. He is to be brought up to it. + </p> + <p> + Natural instincts are either disregarded or treated as nuisances—as + obnoxious traits to be suppressed, or at all events to be brought into + conformity with external standards. Since conformity is the aim, what is + distinctively individual in a young person is brushed aside, or regarded + as a source of mischief or anarchy. Conformity is made equivalent to + uniformity. Consequently, there are induced lack of interest in the novel, + aversion to progress, and dread of the uncertain and the unknown. Since + the end of growth is outside of and beyond the process of growing, + external agents have to be resorted to to induce movement toward it. + Whenever a method of education is stigmatized as mechanical, we may be + sure that external pressure is brought to bear to reach an external end. + </p> + <p> + 2. Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more + growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more + education. It is a commonplace to say that education should not cease when + one leaves school. The point of this commonplace is that the purpose of + school education is to insure the continuance of education by organizing + the powers that insure growth. The inclination to learn from life itself + and to make the conditions of life such that all will learn in the process + of living is the finest product of schooling. + </p> + <p> + When we abandon the attempt to define immaturity by means of fixed + comparison with adult accomplishments, we are compelled to give up + thinking of it as denoting lack of desired traits. Abandoning this notion, + we are also forced to surrender our habit of thinking of instruction as a + method of supplying this lack by pouring knowledge into a mental and moral + hole which awaits filling. Since life means growth, a living creature + lives as truly and positively at one stage as at another, with the same + intrinsic fullness and the same absolute claims. Hence education means the + enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure growth, or adequacy of + life, irrespective of age. We first look with impatience upon immaturity, + regarding it as something to be got over as rapidly as possible. Then the + adult formed by such educative methods looks back with impatient regret + upon childhood and youth as a scene of lost opportunities and wasted + powers. This ironical situation will endure till it is recognized that + living has its own intrinsic quality and that the business of education is + with that quality. Realization that life is growth protects us from that + so-called idealizing of childhood which in effect is nothing but lazy + indulgence. Life is not to be identified with every superficial act and + interest. Even though it is not always easy to tell whether what appears + to be mere surface fooling is a sign of some nascent as yet untrained + power, we must remember that manifestations are not to be accepted as ends + in themselves. They are signs of possible growth. They are to be turned + into means of development, of carrying power forward, not indulged or + cultivated for their own sake. Excessive attention to surface phenomena + (even in the way of rebuke as well as of encouragement) may lead to their + fixation and thus to arrested development. What impulses are moving + toward, not what they have been, is the important thing for parent and + teacher. The true principle of respect for immaturity cannot be better put + than in the words of Emerson: "Respect the child. Be not too much his + parent. Trespass not on his solitude. But I hear the outcry which replies + to this suggestion: Would you verily throw up the reins of public and + private discipline; would you leave the young child to the mad career of + his own passions and whimsies, and call this anarchy a respect for the + child's nature? I answer,—Respect the child, respect him to the end, + but also respect yourself.... The two points in a boy's training are, to + keep his naturel and train off all but that; to keep his naturel, but stop + off his uproar, fooling, and horseplay; keep his nature and arm it with + knowledge in the very direction in which it points." And as Emerson goes + on to show this reverence for childhood and youth instead of opening up an + easy and easy-going path to the instructors, "involves at once, immense + claims on the time, the thought, on the life of the teacher. It requires + time, use, insight, event, all the great lessons and assistances of God; + and only to think of using it implies character and profoundness." + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM4"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. Power to grow depends upon need for others and plasticity. + </h2> + <p> + Both of these conditions are at their height in childhood and youth. + Plasticity or the power to learn from experience means the formation of + habits. Habits give control over the environment, power to utilize it for + human purposes. Habits take the form both of habituation, or a general and + persistent balance of organic activities with the surroundings, and of + active capacities to readjust activity to meet new conditions. The former + furnishes the background of growth; the latter constitute growing. Active + habits involve thought, invention, and initiative in applying capacities + to new aims. They are opposed to routine which marks an arrest of growth. + Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with + growing; it has no end beyond itself. The criterion of the value of school + education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued growth + and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact. + </p> + <p> + 1 Intimations of its significance are found in a number of writers, but + John Fiske, in his Excursions of an Evolutionist, is accredited with its + first systematic exposition. + </p> + <p> + 2 This conception is, of course, a logical correlate of the conceptions of + the external relation of stimulus and response, considered in the last + chapter, and of the negative conceptions of immaturity and plasticity + noted in this chapter. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0005"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Five: Preparation, Unfolding, and Formal Discipline + </h2> + <p> + 1. Education as Preparation. We have laid it down that the educative + process is a continuous process of growth, having as its aim at every + stage an added capacity of growth. This conception contrasts sharply with + other ideas which have influenced practice. By making the contrast + explicit, the meaning of the conception will be brought more clearly to + light. The first contrast is with the idea that education is a process of + preparation or getting ready. What is to be prepared for is, of course, + the responsibilities and privileges of adult life. Children are not + regarded as social members in full and regular standing. They are looked + upon as candidates; they are placed on the waiting list. The conception is + only carried a little farther when the life of adults is considered as not + having meaning on its own account, but as a preparatory probation for + "another life." The idea is but another form of the notion of the negative + and privative character of growth already criticized; hence we shall not + repeat the criticisms, but pass on to the evil consequences which flow + from putting education on this basis. In the first place, it involves loss + of impetus. Motive power is not utilized. Children proverbially live in + the present; that is not only a fact not to be evaded, but it is an + excellence. The future just as future lacks urgency and body. To get ready + for something, one knows not what nor why, is to throw away the leverage + that exists, and to seek for motive power in a vague chance. Under such + circumstances, there is, in the second place, a premium put on + shilly-shallying and procrastination. The future prepared for is a long + way off; plenty of time will intervene before it becomes a present. Why be + in a hurry about getting ready for it? The temptation to postpone is much + increased because the present offers so many wonderful opportunities and + proffers such invitations to adventure. Naturally attention and energy go + to them; education accrues naturally as an outcome, but a lesser education + than if the full stress of effort had been put upon making conditions as + educative as possible. A third undesirable result is the substitution of a + conventional average standard of expectation and requirement for a + standard which concerns the specific powers of the individual under + instruction. For a severe and definite judgment based upon the strong and + weak points of the individual is substituted a vague and wavering opinion + concerning what youth may be expected, upon the average, to become in some + more or less remote future; say, at the end of the year, when promotions + are to take place, or by the time they are ready to go to college or to + enter upon what, in contrast with the probationary stage, is regarded as + the serious business of life. It is impossible to overestimate the loss + which results from the deflection of attention from the strategic point to + a comparatively unproductive point. It fails most just where it thinks it + is succeeding—in getting a preparation for the future. + </p> + <p> + Finally, the principle of preparation makes necessary recourse on a large + scale to the use of adventitious motives of pleasure and pain. The future + having no stimulating and directing power when severed from the + possibilities of the present, something must be hitched on to it to make + it work. Promises of reward and threats of pain are employed. Healthy + work, done for present reasons and as a factor in living, is largely + unconscious. The stimulus resides in the situation with which one is + actually confronted. But when this situation is ignored, pupils have to be + told that if they do not follow the prescribed course penalties will + accrue; while if they do, they may expect, some time in the future, + rewards for their present sacrifices. Everybody knows how largely systems + of punishment have had to be resorted to by educational systems which + neglect present possibilities in behalf of preparation for a future. Then, + in disgust with the harshness and impotency of this method, the pendulum + swings to the opposite extreme, and the dose of information required + against some later day is sugar-coated, so that pupils may be fooled into + taking something which they do not care for. + </p> + <p> + It is not of course a question whether education should prepare for the + future. If education is growth, it must progressively realize present + possibilities, and thus make individuals better fitted to cope with later + requirements. Growing is not something which is completed in odd moments; + it is a continuous leading into the future. If the environment, in school + and out, supplies conditions which utilize adequately the present + capacities of the immature, the future which grows out of the present is + surely taken care of. The mistake is not in attaching importance to + preparation for future need, but in making it the mainspring of present + effort. Because the need of preparation for a continually developing life + is great, it is imperative that every energy should be bent to making the + present experience as rich and significant as possible. Then as the + present merges insensibly into the future, the future is taken care of. + </p> + <p> + 2. Education as Unfolding. There is a conception of education which + professes to be based upon the idea of development. But it takes back with + one hand what it proffers with the other. Development is conceived not as + continuous growing, but as the unfolding of latent powers toward a + definite goal. The goal is conceived of as completion,—perfection. + Life at any stage short of attainment of this goal is merely an unfolding + toward it. Logically the doctrine is only a variant of the preparation + theory. Practically the two differ in that the adherents of the latter + make much of the practical and professional duties for which one is + preparing, while the developmental doctrine speaks of the ideal and + spiritual qualities of the principle which is unfolding. + </p> + <p> + The conception that growth and progress are just approximations to a final + unchanging goal is the last infirmity of the mind in its transition from a + static to a dynamic understanding of life. It simulates the style of the + latter. It pays the tribute of speaking much of development, process, + progress. But all of these operations are conceived to be merely + transitional; they lack meaning on their own account. They possess + significance only as movements toward something away from what is now + going on. Since growth is just a movement toward a completed being, the + final ideal is immobile. An abstract and indefinite future is in control + with all which that connotes in depreciation of present power and + opportunity. + </p> + <p> + Since the goal of perfection, the standard of development, is very far + away, it is so beyond us that, strictly speaking, it is unattainable. + Consequently, in order to be available for present guidance it must be + translated into something which stands for it. Otherwise we should be + compelled to regard any and every manifestation of the child as an + unfolding from within, and hence sacred. Unless we set up some definite + criterion representing the ideal end by which to judge whether a given + attitude or act is approximating or moving away, our sole alternative is + to withdraw all influences of the environment lest they interfere with + proper development. Since that is not practicable, a working substitute is + set up. Usually, of course, this is some idea which an adult would like to + have a child acquire. Consequently, by "suggestive questioning" or some + other pedagogical device, the teacher proceeds to "draw out" from the + pupil what is desired. If what is desired is obtained, that is evidence + that the child is unfolding properly. But as the pupil generally has no + initiative of his own in this direction, the result is a random groping + after what is wanted, and the formation of habits of dependence upon the + cues furnished by others. Just because such methods simulate a true + principle and claim to have its sanction they may do more harm than would + outright "telling," where, at least, it remains with the child how much + will stick. + </p> + <p> + Within the sphere of philosophic thought there have been two typical + attempts to provide a working representative of the absolute goal. Both + start from the conception of a whole—an absolute—which is + "immanent" in human life. The perfect or complete ideal is not a mere + ideal; it is operative here and now. But it is present only implicitly, + "potentially," or in an enfolded condition. What is termed development is + the gradual making explicit and outward of what is thus wrapped up. + Froebel and Hegel, the authors of the two philosophic schemes referred to, + have different ideas of the path by which the progressive realization of + manifestation of the complete principle is effected. According to Hegel, + it is worked out through a series of historical institutions which embody + the different factors in the Absolute. According to Froebel, the actuating + force is the presentation of symbols, largely mathematical, corresponding + to the essential traits of the Absolute. When these are presented to the + child, the Whole, or perfection, sleeping within him, is awakened. A + single example may indicate the method. Every one familiar with the + kindergarten is acquainted with the circle in which the children gather. + It is not enough that the circle is a convenient way of grouping the + children. It must be used "because it is a symbol of the collective life + of mankind in general." Froebel's recognition of the significance of the + native capacities of children, his loving attention to them, and his + influence in inducing others to study them, represent perhaps the most + effective single force in modern educational theory in effecting + widespread acknowledgment of the idea of growth. But his formulation of + the notion of development and his organization of devices for promoting it + were badly hampered by the fact that he conceived development to be the + unfolding of a ready-made latent principle. He failed to see that growing + is growth, developing is development, and consequently placed the emphasis + upon the completed product. Thus he set up a goal which meant the arrest + of growth, and a criterion which is not applicable to immediate guidance + of powers, save through translation into abstract and symbolic formulae. + </p> + <p> + A remote goal of complete unfoldedness is, in technical philosophic + language, transcendental. That is, it is something apart from direct + experience and perception. So far as experience is concerned, it is empty; + it represents a vague sentimental aspiration rather than anything which + can be intelligently grasped and stated. This vagueness must be + compensated for by some a priori formula. Froebel made the connection + between the concrete facts of experience and the transcendental ideal of + development by regarding the former as symbols of the latter. To regard + known things as symbols, according to some arbitrary a priori formula—and + every a priori conception must be arbitrary—is an invitation to + romantic fancy to seize upon any analogies which appeal to it and treat + them as laws. After the scheme of symbolism has been settled upon, some + definite technique must be invented by which the inner meaning of the + sensible symbols used may be brought home to children. Adults being the + formulators of the symbolism are naturally the authors and controllers of + the technique. The result was that Froebel's love of abstract symbolism + often got the better of his sympathetic insight; and there was substituted + for development as arbitrary and externally imposed a scheme of dictation + as the history of instruction has ever seen. + </p> + <p> + With Hegel the necessity of finding some working concrete counterpart of + the inaccessible Absolute took an institutional, rather than symbolic, + form. His philosophy, like Froebel's, marks in one direction an + indispensable contribution to a valid conception of the process of life. + The weaknesses of an abstract individualistic philosophy were evident to + him; he saw the impossibility of making a clean sweep of historical + institutions, of treating them as despotisms begot in artifice and + nurtured in fraud. In his philosophy of history and society culminated the + efforts of a whole series of German writers—Lessing, Herder, Kant, + Schiller, Goethe—to appreciate the nurturing influence of the great + collective institutional products of humanity. For those who learned the + lesson of this movement, it was henceforth impossible to conceive of + institutions or of culture as artificial. It destroyed completely—in + idea, not in fact—the psychology that regarded "mind" as a + ready-made possession of a naked individual by showing the significance of + "objective mind"—language, government, art, religion—in the + formation of individual minds. But since Hegel was haunted by the + conception of an absolute goal, he was obliged to arrange institutions as + they concretely exist, on a stepladder of ascending approximations. Each + in its time and place is absolutely necessary, because a stage in the + self-realizing process of the absolute mind. Taken as such a step or + stage, its existence is proof of its complete rationality, for it is an + integral element in the total, which is Reason. Against institutions as + they are, individuals have no spiritual rights; personal development, and + nurture, consist in obedient assimilation of the spirit of existing + institutions. Conformity, not transformation, is the essence of education. + Institutions change as history shows; but their change, the rise and fall + of states, is the work of the "world-spirit." Individuals, save the great + "heroes" who are the chosen organs of the world-spirit, have no share or + lot in it. In the later nineteenth century, this type of idealism was + amalgamated with the doctrine of biological evolution. + </p> + <p> + "Evolution" was a force working itself out to its own end. As against it, + or as compared with it, the conscious ideas and preference of individuals + are impotent. Or, rather, they are but the means by which it works itself + out. Social progress is an "organic growth," not an experimental + selection. Reason is all powerful, but only Absolute Reason has any power. + </p> + <p> + The recognition (or rediscovery, for the idea was familiar to the Greeks) + that great historic institutions are active factors in the intellectual + nurture of mind was a great contribution to educational philosophy. It + indicated a genuine advance beyond Rousseau, who had marred his assertion + that education must be a natural development and not something forced or + grafted upon individuals from without, by the notion that social + conditions are not natural. But in its notion of a complete and + all-inclusive end of development, the Hegelian theory swallowed up + concrete individualities, though magnifying The Individual in the + abstract. Some of Hegel's followers sought to reconcile the claims of the + Whole and of individuality by the conception of society as an organic + whole, or organism. That social organization is presupposed in the + adequate exercise of individual capacity is not to be doubted. But the + social organism, interpreted after the relation of the organs of the body + to each other and to the whole body, means that each individual has a + certain limited place and function, requiring to be supplemented by the + place and functions of the other organs. As one portion of the bodily + tissue is differentiated so that it can be the hand and the hand only, + another, the eye, and so on, all taken together making the organism, so + one individual is supposed to be differentiated for the exercise of the + mechanical operations of society, another for those of a statesman, + another for those of a scholar, and so on. The notion of "organism" is + thus used to give a philosophic sanction to class distinctions in social + organization—a notion which in its educational application again + means external dictation instead of growth. + </p> + <p> + 3. Education as Training of Faculties. A theory which has had great vogue + and which came into existence before the notion of growth had much + influence is known as the theory of "formal discipline." It has in view a + correct ideal; one outcome of education should be the creation of specific + powers of accomplishment. A trained person is one who can do the chief + things which it is important for him to do better than he could without + training: "better" signifying greater ease, efficiency, economy, + promptness, etc. That this is an outcome of education was indicated in + what was said about habits as the product of educative development. But + the theory in question takes, as it were, a short cut; it regards some + powers (to be presently named) as the direct and conscious aims of + instruction, and not simply as the results of growth. There is a definite + number of powers to be trained, as one might enumerate the kinds of + strokes which a golfer has to master. Consequently education should get + directly at the business of training them. But this implies that they are + already there in some untrained form; otherwise their creation would have + to be an indirect product of other activities and agencies. Being there + already in some crude form, all that remains is to exercise them in + constant and graded repetitions, and they will inevitably be refined and + perfected. In the phrase "formal discipline" as applied to this + conception, "discipline" refers both to the outcome of trained power and + to the method of training through repeated exercise. + </p> + <p> + The forms of powers in question are such things as the faculties of + perceiving, retaining, recalling, associating, attending, willing, + feeling, imagining, thinking, etc., which are then shaped by exercise upon + material presented. In its classic form, this theory was expressed by + Locke. On the one hand, the outer world presents the material or content + of knowledge through passively received sensations. On the other hand, the + mind has certain ready powers, attention, observation, retention, + comparison, abstraction, compounding, etc. Knowledge results if the mind + discriminates and combines things as they are united and divided in nature + itself. But the important thing for education is the exercise or practice + of the faculties of the mind till they become thoroughly established + habitudes. The analogy constantly employed is that of a billiard player or + gymnast, who by repeated use of certain muscles in a uniform way at last + secures automatic skill. Even the faculty of thinking was to be formed + into a trained habit by repeated exercises in making and combining simple + distinctions, for which, Locke thought, mathematics affords unrivaled + opportunity. + </p> + <p> + Locke's statements fitted well into the dualism of his day. It seemed to + do justice to both mind and matter, the individual and the world. One of + the two supplied the matter of knowledge and the object upon which mind + should work. The other supplied definite mental powers, which were few in + number and which might be trained by specific exercises. The scheme + appeared to give due weight to the subject matter of knowledge, and yet it + insisted that the end of education is not the bare reception and storage + of information, but the formation of personal powers of attention, memory, + observation, abstraction, and generalization. It was realistic in its + emphatic assertion that all material whatever is received from without; it + was idealistic in that final stress fell upon the formation of + intellectual powers. It was objective and impersonal in its assertion that + the individual cannot possess or generate any true ideas on his own + account; it was individualistic in placing the end of education in the + perfecting of certain faculties possessed at the outset by the individual. + This kind of distribution of values expressed with nicety the state of + opinion in the generations following upon Locke. It became, without + explicit reference to Locke, a common-place of educational theory and of + psychology. Practically, it seemed to provide the educator with definite, + instead of vague, tasks. It made the elaboration of a technique of + instruction relatively easy. All that was necessary was to provide for + sufficient practice of each of the powers. This practice consists in + repeated acts of attending, observing, memorizing, etc. By grading the + difficulty of the acts, making each set of repetitions somewhat more + difficult than the set which preceded it, a complete scheme of instruction + is evolved. There are various ways, equally conclusive, of criticizing + this conception, in both its alleged foundations and in its educational + application. (1) Perhaps the most direct mode of attack consists in + pointing out that the supposed original faculties of observation, + recollection, willing, thinking, etc., are purely mythological. There are + no such ready-made powers waiting to be exercised and thereby trained. + There are, indeed, a great number of original native tendencies, + instinctive modes of action, based on the original connections of neurones + in the central nervous system. There are impulsive tendencies of the eyes + to follow and fixate light; of the neck muscles to turn toward light and + sound; of the hands to reach and grasp; and turn and twist and thump; of + the vocal apparatus to make sounds; of the mouth to spew out unpleasant + substances; to gag and to curl the lip, and so on in almost indefinite + number. But these tendencies (a) instead of being a small number sharply + marked off from one another, are of an indefinite variety, interweaving + with one another in all kinds of subtle ways. (b) Instead of being latent + intellectual powers, requiring only exercise for their perfecting, they + are tendencies to respond in certain ways to changes in the environment so + as to bring about other changes. Something in the throat makes one cough; + the tendency is to eject the obnoxious particle and thus modify the + subsequent stimulus. The hand touches a hot thing; it is impulsively, + wholly unintellectually, snatched away. But the withdrawal alters the + stimuli operating, and tends to make them more consonant with the needs of + the organism. It is by such specific changes of organic activities in + response to specific changes in the medium that that control of the + environment of which we have spoken (see ante, p. 24) is effected. Now all + of our first seeings and hearings and touchings and smellings and tastings + are of this kind. In any legitimate sense of the words mental or + intellectual or cognitive, they are lacking in these qualities, and no + amount of repetitious exercise could bestow any intellectual properties of + observation, judgment, or intentional action (volition) upon them. + </p> + <p> + (2) Consequently the training of our original impulsive activities is not + a refinement and perfecting achieved by "exercise" as one might strengthen + a muscle by practice. It consists rather (a) in selecting from the + diffused responses which are evoked at a given time those which are + especially adapted to the utilization of the stimulus. That is to say, + among the reactions of the body in general occur upon stimulation of the + eye by light, all except those which are specifically adapted to reaching, + grasping, and manipulating the object effectively are gradually eliminated—or + else no training occurs. As we have already noted, the primary reactions, + with a very few exceptions are too diffused and general to be practically + of much use in the case of the human infant. Hence the identity of + training with selective response. (Compare p. 25.) (b) Equally important + is the specific coordination of different factors of response which takes + place. There is not merely a selection of the hand reactions which effect + grasping, but of the particular visual stimuli which call out just these + reactions and no others, and an establishment of connection between the + two. But the coordinating does not stop here. Characteristic temperature + reactions may take place when the object is grasped. These will also be + brought in; later, the temperature reaction may be connected directly with + the optical stimulus, the hand reaction being suppressed—as a bright + flame, independent of close contact, may steer one away. Or the child in + handling the object pounds with it, or crumples it, and a sound issues. + The ear response is then brought into the system of response. If a certain + sound (the conventional name) is made by others and accompanies the + activity, response of both ear and the vocal apparatus connected with + auditory stimulation will also become an associated factor in the complex + response. + </p> + <p> + (3) The more specialized the adjustment of response and stimulus to each + other (for, taking the sequence of activities into account, the stimuli + are adapted to reactions as well as reactions to stimuli) the more rigid + and the less generally available is the training secured. In equivalent + language, less intellectual or educative quality attaches to the training. + The usual way of stating this fact is that the more specialized the + reaction, the less is the skill acquired in practicing and perfecting it + transferable to other modes of behavior. According to the orthodox theory + of formal discipline, a pupil in studying his spelling lesson acquires, + besides ability to spell those particular words, an increase of power of + observation, attention, and recollection which may be employed whenever + these powers are needed. As matter of fact, the more he confines himself + to noticing and fixating the forms of words, irrespective of connection + with other things (such as the meaning of the words, the context in which + they are habitually used, the derivation and classification of the verbal + form, etc.) the less likely is he to acquire an ability which can be used + for anything except the mere noting of verbal visual forms. He may not + even be increasing his ability to make accurate distinctions among + geometrical forms, to say nothing of ability to observe in general. He is + merely selecting the stimuli supplied by the forms of the letters and the + motor reactions of oral or written reproduction. The scope of coordination + (to use our prior terminology) is extremely limited. The connections which + are employed in other observations and recollections (or reproductions) + are deliberately eliminated when the pupil is exercised merely upon forms + of letters and words. Having been excluded, they cannot be restored when + needed. The ability secured to observe and to recall verbal forms is not + available for perceiving and recalling other things. In the ordinary + phraseology, it is not transferable. But the wider the context—that + is to say, the more varied the stimuli and responses coordinated—the + more the ability acquired is available for the effective performance of + other acts; not, strictly speaking, because there is any "transfer," but + because the wide range of factors employed in the specific act is + equivalent to a broad range of activity, to a flexible, instead of to a + narrow and rigid, coordination. (4) Going to the root of the matter, the + fundamental fallacy of the theory is its dualism; that is to say, its + separation of activities and capacities from subject matter. There is no + such thing as an ability to see or hear or remember in general; there is + only the ability to see or hear or remember something. To talk about + training a power, mental or physical, in general, apart from the subject + matter involved in its exercise, is nonsense. Exercise may react upon + circulation, breathing, and nutrition so as to develop vigor or strength, + but this reservoir is available for specific ends only by use in + connection with the material means which accomplish them. Vigor will + enable a man to play tennis or golf or to sail a boat better than he would + if he were weak. But only by employing ball and racket, ball and club, + sail and tiller, in definite ways does he become expert in any one of + them; and expertness in one secures expertness in another only so far as + it is either a sign of aptitude for fine muscular coordinations or as the + same kind of coordination is involved in all of them. Moreover, the + difference between the training of ability to spell which comes from + taking visual forms in a narrow context and one which takes them in + connection with the activities required to grasp meaning, such as context, + affiliations of descent, etc., may be compared to the difference between + exercises in the gymnasium with pulley weights to "develop" certain + muscles, and a game or sport. The former is uniform and mechanical; it is + rigidly specialized. The latter is varied from moment to moment; no two + acts are quite alike; novel emergencies have to be met; the coordinations + forming have to be kept flexible and elastic. Consequently, the training + is much more "general"; that is to say, it covers a wider territory and + includes more factors. Exactly the same thing holds of special and general + education of the mind. + </p> + <p> + A monotonously uniform exercise may by practice give great skill in one + special act; but the skill is limited to that act, be it bookkeeping or + calculations in logarithms or experiments in hydrocarbons. One may be an + authority in a particular field and yet of more than usually poor judgment + in matters not closely allied, unless the training in the special field + has been of a kind to ramify into the subject matter of the other fields. + (5) Consequently, such powers as observation, recollection, judgment, + esthetic taste, represent organized results of the occupation of native + active tendencies with certain subject matters. A man does not observe + closely and fully by pressing a button for the observing faculty to get to + work (in other words by "willing" to observe); but if he has something to + do which can be accomplished successfully only through intensive and + extensive use of eye and hand, he naturally observes. Observation is an + outcome, a consequence, of the interaction of sense organ and subject + matter. It will vary, accordingly, with the subject matter employed. + </p> + <p> + It is consequently futile to set up even the ulterior development of + faculties of observation, memory, etc., unless we have first determined + what sort of subject matter we wish the pupil to become expert in + observing and recalling and for what purpose. And it is only repeating in + another form what has already been said, to declare that the criterion + here must be social. We want the person to note and recall and judge those + things which make him an effective competent member of the group in which + he is associated with others. Otherwise we might as well set the pupil to + observing carefully cracks on the wall and set him to memorizing + meaningless lists of words in an unknown tongue—which is about what + we do in fact when we give way to the doctrine of formal discipline. If + the observing habits of a botanist or chemist or engineer are better + habits than those which are thus formed, it is because they deal with + subject matter which is more significant in life. In concluding this + portion of the discussion, we note that the distinction between special + and general education has nothing to do with the transferability of + function or power. In the literal sense, any transfer is miraculous and + impossible. But some activities are broad; they involve a coordination of + many factors. Their development demands continuous alternation and + readjustment. As conditions change, certain factors are subordinated, and + others which had been of minor importance come to the front. There is + constant redistribution of the focus of the action, as is seen in the + illustration of a game as over against pulling a fixed weight by a series + of uniform motions. Thus there is practice in prompt making of new + combinations with the focus of activity shifted to meet change in subject + matter. Wherever an activity is broad in scope (that is, involves the + coordinating of a large variety of sub-activities), and is constantly and + unexpectedly obliged to change direction in its progressive development, + general education is bound to result. For this is what "general" means; + broad and flexible. In practice, education meets these conditions, and + hence is general, in the degree in which it takes account of social + relationships. A person may become expert in technical philosophy, or + philology, or mathematics or engineering or financiering, and be inept and + ill-advised in his action and judgment outside of his specialty. If + however his concern with these technical subject matters has been + connected with human activities having social breadth, the range of active + responses called into play and flexibly integrated is much wider. + Isolation of subject matter from a social context is the chief obstruction + in current practice to securing a general training of mind. Literature, + art, religion, when thus dissociated, are just as narrowing as the + technical things which the professional upholders of general education + strenuously oppose. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM5"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. The conception that the result of the educative process is + </h2> + <p> + capacity for further education stands in contrast with some other ideas + which have profoundly influenced practice. The first contrasting + conception considered is that of preparing or getting ready for some + future duty or privilege. Specific evil effects were pointed out which + result from the fact that this aim diverts attention of both teacher and + taught from the only point to which it may be fruitfully directed—namely, + taking advantage of the needs and possibilities of the immediate present. + Consequently it defeats its own professed purpose. The notion that + education is an unfolding from within appears to have more likeness to the + conception of growth which has been set forth. But as worked out in the + theories of Froebel and Hegel, it involves ignoring the interaction of + present organic tendencies with the present environment, just as much as + the notion of preparation. Some implicit whole is regarded as given + ready-made and the significance of growth is merely transitory; it is not + an end in itself, but simply a means of making explicit what is already + implicit. Since that which is not explicit cannot be made definite use of, + something has to be found to represent it. According to Froebel, the + mystic symbolic value of certain objects and acts (largely mathematical) + stand for the Absolute Whole which is in process of unfolding. According + to Hegel, existing institutions are its effective actual representatives. + Emphasis upon symbols and institutions tends to divert perception from the + direct growth of experience in richness of meaning. Another influential + but defective theory is that which conceives that mind has, at birth, + certain mental faculties or powers, such as perceiving, remembering, + willing, judging, generalizing, attending, etc., and that education is the + training of these faculties through repeated exercise. This theory treats + subject matter as comparatively external and indifferent, its value + residing simply in the fact that it may occasion exercise of the general + powers. Criticism was directed upon this separation of the alleged powers + from one another and from the material upon which they act. The outcome of + the theory in practice was shown to be an undue emphasis upon the training + of narrow specialized modes of skill at the expense of initiative, + inventiveness, and readaptability—qualities which depend upon the + broad and consecutive interaction of specific activities with one another. + 1 As matter of fact, the interconnection is so great, there are so many + paths of construction, that every stimulus brings about some change in all + of the organs of response. We are accustomed however to ignore most of + these modifications of the total organic activity, concentrating upon that + one which is most specifically adapted to the most urgent stimulus of the + moment. 2 This statement should be compared with what was said earlier + about the sequential ordering of responses (p. 25). It is merely a more + explicit statement of the way in which that consecutive arrangement + occurs. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0006"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Six: Education as Conservative and Progressive + </h2> + <p> + 1. Education as Formation. We now come to a type of theory which denies + the existence of faculties and emphasizes the unique role of subject + matter in the development of mental and moral disposition. According to + it, education is neither a process of unfolding from within nor is it a + training of faculties resident in mind itself. It is rather the formation + of mind by setting up certain associations or connections of content by + means of a subject matter presented from without. Education proceeds by + instruction taken in a strictly literal sense, a building into the mind + from without. That education is formative of mind is not questioned; it is + the conception already propounded. But formation here has a technical + meaning dependent upon the idea of something operating from without. + Herbart is the best historical representative of this type of theory. He + denies absolutely the existence of innate faculties. The mind is simply + endowed with the power of producing various qualities in reaction to the + various realities which act upon it. These qualitatively different + reactions are called presentations (Vorstellungen). Every presentation + once called into being persists; it may be driven below the "threshold" of + consciousness by new and stronger presentations, produced by the reaction + of the soul to new material, but its activity continues by its own + inherent momentum, below the surface of consciousness. What are termed + faculties—attention, memory, thinking, perception, even the + sentiments, are arrangements, associations, and complications, formed by + the interaction of these submerged presentations with one another and with + new presentations. Perception, for example, is the complication of + presentations which result from the rise of old presentations to greet and + combine with new ones; memory is the evoking of an old presentation above + the threshold of consciousness by getting entangled with another + presentation, etc. Pleasure is the result of reinforcement among the + independent activities of presentations; pain of their pulling different + ways, etc. + </p> + <p> + The concrete character of mind consists, then, wholly of the various + arrangements formed by the various presentations in their different + qualities. The "furniture" of the mind is the mind. Mind is wholly a + matter of "contents." The educational implications of this doctrine are + threefold. + </p> + <p> + (1) This or that kind of mind is formed by the use of objects which evoke + this or that kind of reaction and which produce this or that arrangement + among the reactions called out. The formation of mind is wholly a matter + of the presentation of the proper educational materials. + </p> + <p> + (2) Since the earlier presentations constitute the "apperceiving organs" + which control the assimilation of new presentations, their character is + all important. The effect of new presentations is to reinforce groupings + previously formed. The business of the educator is, first, to select the + proper material in order to fix the nature of the original reactions, and, + secondly, to arrange the sequence of subsequent presentations on the basis + of the store of ideas secured by prior transactions. The control is from + behind, from the past, instead of, as in the unfolding conception, in the + ultimate goal. + </p> + <p> + (3) Certain formal steps of all method in teaching may be laid down. + Presentation of new subject matter is obviously the central thing, but + since knowing consists in the way in which this interacts with the + contents already submerged below consciousness, the first thing is the + step of "preparation,"—that is, calling into special activity and + getting above the floor of consciousness those older presentations which + are to assimilate the new one. Then after the presentation, follow the + processes of interaction of new and old; then comes the application of the + newly formed content to the performance of some task. Everything must go + through this course; consequently there is a perfectly uniform method in + instruction in all subjects for all pupils of all ages. + </p> + <p> + Herbart's great service lay in taking the work of teaching out of the + region of routine and accident. He brought it into the sphere of conscious + method; it became a conscious business with a definite aim and procedure, + instead of being a compound of casual inspiration and subservience to + tradition. Moreover, everything in teaching and discipline could be + specified, instead of our having to be content with vague and more or less + mystic generalities about ultimate ideals and speculative spiritual + symbols. He abolished the notion of ready-made faculties, which might be + trained by exercise upon any sort of material, and made attention to + concrete subject matter, to the content, all-important. Herbart + undoubtedly has had a greater influence in bringing to the front questions + connected with the material of study than any other educational + philosopher. He stated problems of method from the standpoint of their + connection with subject matter: method having to do with the manner and + sequence of presenting new subject matter to insure its proper interaction + with old. + </p> + <p> + The fundamental theoretical defect of this view lies in ignoring the + existence in a living being of active and specific functions which are + developed in the redirection and combination which occur as they are + occupied with their environment. The theory represents the Schoolmaster + come to his own. This fact expresses at once its strength and its + weakness. The conception that the mind consists of what has been taught, + and that the importance of what has been taught consists in its + availability for further teaching, reflects the pedagogue's view of life. + The philosophy is eloquent about the duty of the teacher in instructing + pupils; it is almost silent regarding his privilege of learning. It + emphasizes the influence of intellectual environment upon the mind; it + slurs over the fact that the environment involves a personal sharing in + common experiences. It exaggerates beyond reason the possibilities of + consciously formulated and used methods, and underestimates the role of + vital, unconscious, attitudes. It insists upon the old, the past, and + passes lightly over the operation of the genuinely novel and + unforeseeable. It takes, in brief, everything educational into account + save its essence,—vital energy seeking opportunity for effective + exercise. All education forms character, mental and moral, but formation + consists in the selection and coordination of native activities so that + they may utilize the subject matter of the social environment. Moreover, + the formation is not only a formation of native activities, but it takes + place through them. It is a process of reconstruction, reorganization. + </p> + <p> + 2. Education as Recapitulation and Retrospection. A peculiar combination + of the ideas of development and formation from without has given rise to + the recapitulation theory of education, biological and cultural. The + individual develops, but his proper development consists in repeating in + orderly stages the past evolution of animal life and human history. The + former recapitulation occurs physiologically; the latter should be made to + occur by means of education. The alleged biological truth that the + individual in his growth from the simple embryo to maturity repeats the + history of the evolution of animal life in the progress of forms from the + simplest to the most complex (or expressed technically, that ontogenesis + parallels phylogenesis) does not concern us, save as it is supposed to + afford scientific foundation for cultural recapitulation of the past. + Cultural recapitulation says, first, that children at a certain age are in + the mental and moral condition of savagery; their instincts are vagrant + and predatory because their ancestors at one time lived such a life. + Consequently (so it is concluded) the proper subject matter of their + education at this time is the material—especially the literary + material of myths, folk-tale, and song—produced by humanity in the + analogous stage. Then the child passes on to something corresponding, say, + to the pastoral stage, and so on till at the time when he is ready to take + part in contemporary life, he arrives at the present epoch of culture. + </p> + <p> + In this detailed and consistent form, the theory, outside of a small + school in Germany (followers of Herbart for the most part), has had little + currency. But the idea which underlies it is that education is essentially + retrospective; that it looks primarily to the past and especially to the + literary products of the past, and that mind is adequately formed in the + degree in which it is patterned upon the spiritual heritage of the past. + This idea has had such immense influence upon higher instruction + especially, that it is worth examination in its extreme formulation. + </p> + <p> + In the first place, its biological basis is fallacious. Embyronic growth + of the human infant preserves, without doubt, some of the traits of lower + forms of life. But in no respect is it a strict traversing of past stages. + If there were any strict "law" of repetition, evolutionary development + would clearly not have taken place. Each new generation would simply have + repeated its predecessors' existence. Development, in short, has taken + place by the entrance of shortcuts and alterations in the prior scheme of + growth. And this suggests that the aim of education is to facilitate such + short-circuited growth. The great advantage of immaturity, educationally + speaking, is that it enables us to emancipate the young from the need of + dwelling in an outgrown past. The business of education is rather to + liberate the young from reviving and retraversing the past than to lead + them to a recapitulation of it. The social environment of the young is + constituted by the presence and action of the habits of thinking and + feeling of civilized men. To ignore the directive influence of this + present environment upon the young is simply to abdicate the educational + function. A biologist has said: "The history of development in different + animals. . . offers to us. . . a series of ingenious, determined, varied + but more or less unsuccessful efforts to escape from the necessity of + recapitulating, and to substitute for the ancestral method a more direct + method." Surely it would be foolish if education did not deliberately + attempt to facilitate similar efforts in conscious experience so that they + become increasingly successful. + </p> + <p> + The two factors of truth in the conception may easily be disentangled from + association with the false context which perverts them. On the biological + side we have simply the fact that any infant starts with precisely the + assortment of impulsive activities with which he does start, they being + blind, and many of them conflicting with one another, casual, sporadic, + and unadapted to their immediate environment. The other point is that it + is a part of wisdom to utilize the products of past history so far as they + are of help for the future. Since they represent the results of prior + experience, their value for future experience may, of course, be + indefinitely great. Literatures produced in the past are, so far as men + are now in possession and use of them, a part of the present environment + of individuals; but there is an enormous difference between availing + ourselves of them as present resources and taking them as standards and + patterns in their retrospective character. + </p> + <p> + (1) The distortion of the first point usually comes about through misuse + of the idea of heredity. It is assumed that heredity means that past life + has somehow predetermined the main traits of an individual, and that they + are so fixed that little serious change can be introduced into them. Thus + taken, the influence of heredity is opposed to that of the environment, + and the efficacy of the latter belittled. But for educational purposes + heredity means neither more nor less than the original endowment of an + individual. Education must take the being as he is; that a particular + individual has just such and such an equipment of native activities is a + basic fact. That they were produced in such and such a way, or that they + are derived from one's ancestry, is not especially important for the + educator, however it may be with the biologist, as compared with the fact + that they now exist. Suppose one had to advise or direct a person + regarding his inheritance of property. The fallacy of assuming that the + fact it is an inheritance, predetermines its future use, is obvious. The + advisor is concerned with making the best use of what is there—putting + it at work under the most favorable conditions. Obviously he cannot + utilize what is not there; neither can the educator. In this sense, + heredity is a limit of education. Recognition of this fact prevents the + waste of energy and the irritation that ensue from the too prevalent habit + of trying to make by instruction something out of an individual which he + is not naturally fitted to become. But the doctrine does not determine + what use shall be made of the capacities which exist. And, except in the + case of the imbecile, these original capacities are much more varied and + potential, even in the case of the more stupid, than we as yet know + properly how to utilize. Consequently, while a careful study of the native + aptitudes and deficiencies of an individual is always a preliminary + necessity, the subsequent and important step is to furnish an environment + which will adequately function whatever activities are present. The + relation of heredity and environment is well expressed in the case of + language. If a being had no vocal organs from which issue articulate + sounds, if he had no auditory or other sense-receptors and no connections + between the two sets of apparatus, it would be a sheer waste of time to + try to teach him to converse. He is born short in that respect, and + education must accept the limitation. But if he has this native equipment, + its possession in no way guarantees that he will ever talk any language or + what language he will talk. The environment in which his activities occur + and by which they are carried into execution settles these things. If he + lived in a dumb unsocial environment where men refused to talk to one + another and used only that minimum of gestures without which they could + not get along, vocal language would be as unachieved by him as if he had + no vocal organs. If the sounds which he makes occur in a medium of persons + speaking the Chinese language, the activities which make like sounds will + be selected and coordinated. This illustration may be applied to the + entire range of the educability of any individual. It places the heritage + from the past in its right connection with the demands and opportunities + of the present. + </p> + <p> + (2) The theory that the proper subject matter of instruction is found in + the culture-products of past ages (either in general, or more specifically + in the particular literatures which were produced in the culture epoch + which is supposed to correspond with the stage of development of those + taught) affords another instance of that divorce between the process and + product of growth which has been criticized. To keep the process alive, to + keep it alive in ways which make it easier to keep it alive in the future, + is the function of educational subject matter. But an individual can live + only in the present. The present is not just something which comes after + the past; much less something produced by it. It is what life is in + leaving the past behind it. The study of past products will not help us + understand the present, because the present is not due to the products, + but to the life of which they were the products. A knowledge of the past + and its heritage is of great significance when it enters into the present, + but not otherwise. And the mistake of making the records and remains of + the past the main material of education is that it cuts the vital + connection of present and past, and tends to make the past a rival of the + present and the present a more or less futile imitation of the past. Under + such circumstances, culture becomes an ornament and solace; a refuge and + an asylum. Men escape from the crudities of the present to live in its + imagined refinements, instead of using what the past offers as an agency + for ripening these crudities. The present, in short, generates the + problems which lead us to search the past for suggestion, and which + supplies meaning to what we find when we search. The past is the past + precisely because it does not include what is characteristic in the + present. The moving present includes the past on condition that it uses + the past to direct its own movement. The past is a great resource for the + imagination; it adds a new dimension to life, but OD condition that it be + seen as the past of the present, and not as another and disconnected + world. The principle which makes little of the present act of living and + operation of growing, the only thing always present, naturally looks to + the past because the future goal which it sets up is remote and empty. But + having turned its back upon the present, it has no way of returning to it + laden with the spoils of the past. A mind that is adequately sensitive to + the needs and occasions of the present actuality will have the liveliest + of motives for interest in the background of the present, and will never + have to hunt for a way back because it will never have lost connection. + </p> + <p> + 3. Education as Reconstruction. In its contrast with the ideas both of + unfolding of latent powers from within, and of the formation from without, + whether by physical nature or by the cultural products of the past, the + ideal of growth results in the conception that education is a constant + reorganizing or reconstructing of experience. It has all the time an + immediate end, and so far as activity is educative, it reaches that end—the + direct transformation of the quality of experience. Infancy, youth, adult + life,—all stand on the same educative level in the sense that what + is really learned at any and every stage of experience constitutes the + value of that experience, and in the sense that it is the chief business + of life at every point to make living thus contribute to an enrichment of + its own perceptible meaning. + </p> + <p> + We thus reach a technical definition of education: It is that + reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning + of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of + subsequent experience. (1) The increment of meaning corresponds to the + increased perception of the connections and continuities of the activities + in which we are engaged. The activity begins in an impulsive form; that + is, it is blind. It does not know what it is about; that is to say, what + are its interactions with other activities. An activity which brings + education or instruction with it makes one aware of some of the + connections which had been imperceptible. To recur to our simple example, + a child who reaches for a bright light gets burned. Henceforth he knows + that a certain act of touching in connection with a certain act of vision + (and vice-versa) means heat and pain; or, a certain light means a source + of heat. The acts by which a scientific man in his laboratory learns more + about flame differ no whit in principle. By doing certain things, he makes + perceptible certain connections of heat with other things, which had been + previously ignored. Thus his acts in relation to these things get more + meaning; he knows better what he is doing or "is about" when he has to do + with them; he can intend consequences instead of just letting them happen—all + synonymous ways of saying the same thing. At the same stroke, the flame + has gained in meaning; all that is known about combustion, oxidation, + about light and temperature, may become an intrinsic part of its + intellectual content. + </p> + <p> + (2) The other side of an educative experience is an added power of + subsequent direction or control. To say that one knows what he is about, + or can intend certain consequences, is to say, of course, that he can + better anticipate what is going to happen; that he can, therefore, get + ready or prepare in advance so as to secure beneficial consequences and + avert undesirable ones. A genuinely educative experience, then, one in + which instruction is conveyed and ability increased, is + contradistinguished from a routine activity on one hand, and a capricious + activity on the other. (a) In the latter one "does not care what happens"; + one just lets himself go and avoids connecting the consequences of one's + act (the evidences of its connections with other things) with the act. It + is customary to frown upon such aimless random activity, treating it as + willful mischief or carelessness or lawlessness. But there is a tendency + to seek the cause of such aimless activities in the youth's own + disposition, isolated from everything else. But in fact such activity is + explosive, and due to maladjustment with surroundings. Individuals act + capriciously whenever they act under external dictation, or from being + told, without having a purpose of their own or perceiving the bearing of + the deed upon other acts. One may learn by doing something which he does + not understand; even in the most intelligent action, we do much which we + do not mean, because the largest portion of the connections of the act we + consciously intend are not perceived or anticipated. But we learn only + because after the act is performed we note results which we had not noted + before. But much work in school consists in setting up rules by which + pupils are to act of such a sort that even after pupils have acted, they + are not led to see the connection between the result—say the answer—and + the method pursued. So far as they are concerned, the whole thing is a + trick and a kind of miracle. Such action is essentially capricious, and + leads to capricious habits. (b) Routine action, action which is automatic, + may increase skill to do a particular thing. In so far, it might be said + to have an educative effect. But it does not lead to new perceptions of + bearings and connections; it limits rather than widens the + meaning-horizon. And since the environment changes and our way of acting + has to be modified in order successfully to keep a balanced connection + with things, an isolated uniform way of acting becomes disastrous at some + critical moment. The vaunted "skill" turns out gross ineptitude. + </p> + <p> + The essential contrast of the idea of education as continuous + reconstruction with the other one-sided conceptions which have been + criticized in this and the previous chapter is that it identifies the end + (the result) and the process. This is verbally self-contradictory, but + only verbally. It means that experience as an active process occupies time + and that its later period completes its earlier portion; it brings to + light connections involved, but hitherto unperceived. The later outcome + thus reveals the meaning of the earlier, while the experience as a whole + establishes a bent or disposition toward the things possessing this + meaning. Every such continuous experience or activity is educative, and + all education resides in having such experiences. + </p> + <p> + It remains only to point out (what will receive more ample attention + later) that the reconstruction of experience may be social as well as + personal. For purposes of simplification we have spoken in the earlier + chapters somewhat as if the education of the immature which fills them + with the spirit of the social group to which they belong, were a sort of + catching up of the child with the aptitudes and resources of the adult + group. In static societies, societies which make the maintenance of + established custom their measure of value, this conception applies in the + main. But not in progressive communities. They endeavor to shape the + experiences of the young so that instead of reproducing current habits, + better habits shall be formed, and thus the future adult society be an + improvement on their own. Men have long had some intimation of the extent + to which education may be consciously used to eliminate obvious social + evils through starting the young on paths which shall not produce these + ills, and some idea of the extent in which education may be made an + instrument of realizing the better hopes of men. But we are doubtless far + from realizing the potential efficacy of education as a constructive + agency of improving society, from realizing that it represents not only a + development of children and youth but also of the future society of which + they will be the constituents. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM6"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. Education may be conceived either retrospectively or + </h2> + <p> + prospectively. That is to say, it may be treated as process of + accommodating the future to the past, or as an utilization of the past for + a resource in a developing future. The former finds its standards and + patterns in what has gone before. The mind may be regarded as a group of + contents resulting from having certain things presented. In this case, the + earlier presentations constitute the material to which the later are to be + assimilated. Emphasis upon the value of the early experiences of immature + beings is most important, especially because of the tendency to regard + them as of little account. But these experiences do not consist of + externally presented material, but of interaction of native activities + with the environment which progressively modifies both the activities and + the environment. The defect of the Herbartian theory of formation through + presentations consists in slighting this constant interaction and change. + The same principle of criticism applies to theories which find the primary + subject matter of study in the cultural products—especially the + literary products—of man's history. Isolated from their connection + with the present environment in which individuals have to act, they become + a kind of rival and distracting environment. Their value lies in their use + to increase the meaning of the things with which we have actively to do at + the present time. The idea of education advanced in these chapters is + formally summed up in the idea of continuous reconstruction of experience, + an idea which is marked off from education as preparation for a remote + future, as unfolding, as external formation, and as recapitulation of the + past. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0007"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Seven: The Democratic Conception in Education + </h2> + <p> + For the most part, save incidentally, we have hitherto been concerned with + education as it may exist in any social group. We have now to make + explicit the differences in the spirit, material, and method of education + as it operates in different types of community life. To say that education + is a social function, securing direction and development in the immature + through their participation in the life of the group to which they belong, + is to say in effect that education will vary with the quality of life + which prevails in a group. Particularly is it true that a society which + not only changes but-which has the ideal of such change as will improve + it, will have different standards and methods of education from one which + aims simply at the perpetuation of its own customs. To make the general + ideas set forth applicable to our own educational practice, it is, + therefore, necessary to come to closer quarters with the nature of present + social life. + </p> + <p> + 1. The Implications of Human Association. Society is one word, but many + things. Men associate together in all kinds of ways and for all kinds of + purposes. One man is concerned in a multitude of diverse groups, in which + his associates may be quite different. It often seems as if they had + nothing in common except that they are modes of associated life. Within + every larger social organization there are numerous minor groups: not only + political subdivisions, but industrial, scientific, religious, + associations. There are political parties with differing aims, social + sets, cliques, gangs, corporations, partnerships, groups bound closely + together by ties of blood, and so on in endless variety. In many modern + states and in some ancient, there is great diversity of populations, of + varying languages, religions, moral codes, and traditions. From this + standpoint, many a minor political unit, one of our large cities, for + example, is a congeries of loosely associated societies, rather than an + inclusive and permeating community of action and thought. (See ante, p. + 20.) + </p> + <p> + The terms society, community, are thus ambiguous. They have both a + eulogistic or normative sense, and a descriptive sense; a meaning de jure + and a meaning de facto. In social philosophy, the former connotation is + almost always uppermost. Society is conceived as one by its very nature. + The qualities which accompany this unity, praiseworthy community of + purpose and welfare, loyalty to public ends, mutuality of sympathy, are + emphasized. But when we look at the facts which the term denotes instead + of confining our attention to its intrinsic connotation, we find not + unity, but a plurality of societies, good and bad. Men banded together in + a criminal conspiracy, business aggregations that prey upon the public + while serving it, political machines held together by the interest of + plunder, are included. If it is said that such organizations are not + societies because they do not meet the ideal requirements of the notion of + society, the answer, in part, is that the conception of society is then + made so "ideal" as to be of no use, having no reference to facts; and in + part, that each of these organizations, no matter how opposed to the + interests of other groups, has something of the praiseworthy qualities of + "Society" which hold it together. There is honor among thieves, and a band + of robbers has a common interest as respects its members. Gangs are marked + by fraternal feeling, and narrow cliques by intense loyalty to their own + codes. Family life may be marked by exclusiveness, suspicion, and jealousy + as to those without, and yet be a model of amity and mutual aid within. + Any education given by a group tends to socialize its members, but the + quality and value of the socialization depends upon the habits and aims of + the group. Hence, once more, the need of a measure for the worth of any + given mode of social life. In seeking this measure, we have to avoid two + extremes. We cannot set up, out of our heads, something we regard as an + ideal society. We must base our conception upon societies which actually + exist, in order to have any assurance that our ideal is a practicable one. + But, as we have just seen, the ideal cannot simply repeat the traits which + are actually found. The problem is to extract the desirable traits of + forms of community life which actually exist, and employ them to criticize + undesirable features and suggest improvement. Now in any social group + whatever, even in a gang of thieves, we find some interest held in common, + and we find a certain amount of interaction and cooperative intercourse + with other groups. From these two traits we derive our standard. How + numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared? How + full and free is the interplay with other forms of association? If we + apply these considerations to, say, a criminal band, we find that the ties + which consciously hold the members together are few in number, reducible + almost to a common interest in plunder; and that they are of such a nature + as to isolate the group from other groups with respect to give and take of + the values of life. Hence, the education such a society gives is partial + and distorted. If we take, on the other hand, the kind of family life + which illustrates the standard, we find that there are material, + intellectual, aesthetic interests in which all participate and that the + progress of one member has worth for the experience of other members—it + is readily communicable—and that the family is not an isolated + whole, but enters intimately into relationships with business groups, with + schools, with all the agencies of culture, as well as with other similar + groups, and that it plays a due part in the political organization and in + return receives support from it. In short, there are many interests + consciously communicated and shared; and there are varied and free points + of contact with other modes of association. + </p> + <p> + I. Let us apply the first element in this criterion to a despotically + governed state. It is not true there is no common interest in such an + organization between governed and governors. The authorities in command + must make some appeal to the native activities of the subjects, must call + some of their powers into play. Talleyrand said that a government could do + everything with bayonets except sit on them. This cynical declaration is + at least a recognition that the bond of union is not merely one of + coercive force. It may be said, however, that the activities appealed to + are themselves unworthy and degrading—that such a government calls + into functioning activity simply capacity for fear. In a way, this + statement is true. But it overlooks the fact that fear need not be an + undesirable factor in experience. Caution, circumspection, prudence, + desire to foresee future events so as to avert what is harmful, these + desirable traits are as much a product of calling the impulse of fear into + play as is cowardice and abject submission. The real difficulty is that + the appeal to fear is isolated. In evoking dread and hope of specific + tangible reward—say comfort and ease—many other capacities are + left untouched. Or rather, they are affected, but in such a way as to + pervert them. Instead of operating on their own account they are reduced + to mere servants of attaining pleasure and avoiding pain. + </p> + <p> + This is equivalent to saying that there is no extensive number of common + interests; there is no free play back and forth among the members of the + social group. Stimulation and response are exceedingly one-sided. In order + to have a large number of values in common, all the members of the group + must have an equable opportunity to receive and to take from others. There + must be a large variety of shared undertakings and experiences. Otherwise, + the influences which educate some into masters, educate others into + slaves. And the experience of each party loses in meaning, when the free + interchange of varying modes of life-experience is arrested. A separation + into a privileged and a subject-class prevents social endosmosis. The + evils thereby affecting the superior class are less material and less + perceptible, but equally real. Their culture tends to be sterile, to be + turned back to feed on itself; their art becomes a showy display and + artificial; their wealth luxurious; their knowledge overspecialized; their + manners fastidious rather than humane. + </p> + <p> + Lack of the free and equitable intercourse which springs from a variety of + shared interests makes intellectual stimulation unbalanced. Diversity of + stimulation means novelty, and novelty means challenge to thought. The + more activity is restricted to a few definite lines—as it is when + there are rigid class lines preventing adequate interplay of experiences—the + more action tends to become routine on the part of the class at a + disadvantage, and capricious, aimless, and explosive on the part of the + class having the materially fortunate position. Plato defined a slave as + one who accepts from another the purposes which control his conduct. This + condition obtains even where there is no slavery in the legal sense. It is + found wherever men are engaged in activity which is socially serviceable, + but whose service they do not understand and have no personal interest in. + Much is said about scientific management of work. It is a narrow view + which restricts the science which secures efficiency of operation to + movements of the muscles. The chief opportunity for science is the + discovery of the relations of a man to his work—including his + relations to others who take part—which will enlist his intelligent + interest in what he is doing. Efficiency in production often demands + division of labor. But it is reduced to a mechanical routine unless + workers see the technical, intellectual, and social relationships involved + in what they do, and engage in their work because of the motivation + furnished by such perceptions. The tendency to reduce such things as + efficiency of activity and scientific management to purely technical + externals is evidence of the one-sided stimulation of thought given to + those in control of industry—those who supply its aims. Because of + their lack of all-round and well-balanced social interest, there is not + sufficient stimulus for attention to the human factors and relationships + in industry. Intelligence is narrowed to the factors concerned with + technical production and marketing of goods. No doubt, a very acute and + intense intelligence in these narrow lines can be developed, but the + failure to take into account the significant social factors means none the + less an absence of mind, and a corresponding distortion of emotional life. + II. This illustration (whose point is to be extended to all associations + lacking reciprocity of interest) brings us to our second point. The + isolation and exclusiveness of a gang or clique brings its antisocial + spirit into relief. But this same spirit is found wherever one group has + interests "of its own" which shut it out from full interaction with other + groups, so that its prevailing purpose is the protection of what it has + got, instead of reorganization and progress through wider relationships. + It marks nations in their isolation from one another; families which + seclude their domestic concerns as if they had no connection with a larger + life; schools when separated from the interest of home and community; the + divisions of rich and poor; learned and unlearned. The essential point is + that isolation makes for rigidity and formal institutionalizing of life, + for static and selfish ideals within the group. That savage tribes regard + aliens and enemies as synonymous is not accidental. It springs from the + fact that they have identified their experience with rigid adherence to + their past customs. On such a basis it is wholly logical to fear + intercourse with others, for such contact might dissolve custom. It would + certainly occasion reconstruction. It is a commonplace that an alert and + expanding mental life depends upon an enlarging range of contact with the + physical environment. But the principle applies even more significantly to + the field where we are apt to ignore it—the sphere of social + contacts. Every expansive era in the history of mankind has coincided with + the operation of factors which have tended to eliminate distance between + peoples and classes previously hemmed off from one another. Even the + alleged benefits of war, so far as more than alleged, spring from the fact + that conflict of peoples at least enforces intercourse between them and + thus accidentally enables them to learn from one another, and thereby to + expand their horizons. Travel, economic and commercial tendencies, have at + present gone far to break down external barriers; to bring peoples and + classes into closer and more perceptible connection with one another. It + remains for the most part to secure the intellectual and emotional + significance of this physical annihilation of space. + </p> + <p> + 2. The Democratic Ideal. The two elements in our criterion both point to + democracy. The first signifies not only more numerous and more varied + points of shared common interest, but greater reliance upon the + recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control. The second + means not only freer interaction between social groups (once isolated so + far as intention could keep up a separation) but change in social habit—its + continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by + varied intercourse. And these two traits are precisely what characterize + the democratically constituted society. + </p> + <p> + Upon the educational side, we note first that the realization of a form of + social life in which interests are mutually interpenetrating, and where + progress, or readjustment, is an important consideration, makes a + democratic community more interested than other communities have cause to + be in deliberate and systematic education. The devotion of democracy to + education is a familiar fact. The superficial explanation is that a + government resting upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those + who elect and who obey their governors are educated. Since a democratic + society repudiates the principle of external authority, it must find a + substitute in voluntary disposition and interest; these can be created + only by education. But there is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more + than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of + conjoint communicated experience. The extension in space of the number of + individuals who participate in an interest so that each has to refer his + own action to that of others, and to consider the action of others to give + point and direction to his own, is equivalent to the breaking down of + those barriers of class, race, and national territory which kept men from + perceiving the full import of their activity. These more numerous and more + varied points of contact denote a greater diversity of stimuli to which an + individual has to respond; they consequently put a premium on variation in + his action. They secure a liberation of powers which remain suppressed as + long as the incitations to action are partial, as they must be in a group + which in its exclusiveness shuts out many interests. + </p> + <p> + The widening of the area of shared concerns, and the liberation of a + greater diversity of personal capacities which characterize a democracy, + are not of course the product of deliberation and conscious effort. On the + contrary, they were caused by the development of modes of manufacture and + commerce, travel, migration, and intercommunication which flowed from the + command of science over natural energy. But after greater + individualization on one hand, and a broader community of interest on the + other have come into existence, it is a matter of deliberate effort to + sustain and extend them. Obviously a society to which stratification into + separate classes would be fatal, must see to it that intellectual + opportunities are accessible to all on equable and easy terms. A society + marked off into classes need he specially attentive only to the education + of its ruling elements. A society which is mobile, which is full of + channels for the distribution of a change occurring anywhere, must see to + it that its members are educated to personal initiative and adaptability. + Otherwise, they will be overwhelmed by the changes in which they are + caught and whose significance or connections they do not perceive. The + result will be a confusion in which a few will appropriate to themselves + the results of the blind and externally directed activities of others. + </p> + <p> + 3. The Platonic Educational Philosophy. Subsequent chapters will be + devoted to making explicit the implications of the democratic ideas in + education. In the remaining portions of this chapter, we shall consider + the educational theories which have been evolved in three epochs when the + social import of education was especially conspicuous. The first one to be + considered is that of Plato. No one could better express than did he the + fact that a society is stably organized when each individual is doing that + for which he has aptitude by nature in such a way as to be useful to + others (or to contribute to the whole to which he belongs); and that it is + the business of education to discover these aptitudes and progressively to + train them for social use. Much which has been said so far is borrowed + from what Plato first consciously taught the world. But conditions which + he could not intellectually control led him to restrict these ideas in + their application. He never got any conception of the indefinite plurality + of activities which may characterize an individual and a social group, and + consequently limited his view to a limited number of classes of capacities + and of social arrangements. Plato's starting point is that the + organization of society depends ultimately upon knowledge of the end of + existence. If we do not know its end, we shall be at the mercy of accident + and caprice. Unless we know the end, the good, we shall have no criterion + for rationally deciding what the possibilities are which should be + promoted, nor how social arrangements are to be ordered. We shall have no + conception of the proper limits and distribution of activities—what + he called justice—as a trait of both individual and social + organization. But how is the knowledge of the final and permanent good to + be achieved? In dealing with this question we come upon the seemingly + insuperable obstacle that such knowledge is not possible save in a just + and harmonious social order. Everywhere else the mind is distracted and + misled by false valuations and false perspectives. A disorganized and + factional society sets up a number of different models and standards. + Under such conditions it is impossible for the individual to attain + consistency of mind. Only a complete whole is fully self-consistent. A + society which rests upon the supremacy of some factor over another + irrespective of its rational or proportionate claims, inevitably leads + thought astray. It puts a premium on certain things and slurs over others, + and creates a mind whose seeming unity is forced and distorted. Education + proceeds ultimately from the patterns furnished by institutions, customs, + and laws. Only in a just state will these be such as to give the right + education; and only those who have rightly trained minds will be able to + recognize the end, and ordering principle of things. We seem to be caught + in a hopeless circle. However, Plato suggested a way out. A few men, + philosophers or lovers of wisdom—or truth—may by study learn + at least in outline the proper patterns of true existence. If a powerful + ruler should form a state after these patterns, then its regulations could + be preserved. An education could be given which would sift individuals, + discovering what they were good for, and supplying a method of assigning + each to the work in life for which his nature fits him. Each doing his own + part, and never transgressing, the order and unity of the whole would be + maintained. + </p> + <p> + It would be impossible to find in any scheme of philosophic thought a more + adequate recognition on one hand of the educational significance of social + arrangements and, on the other, of the dependence of those arrangements + upon the means used to educate the young. It would be impossible to find a + deeper sense of the function of education in discovering and developing + personal capacities, and training them so that they would connect with the + activities of others. Yet the society in which the theory was propounded + was so undemocratic that Plato could not work out a solution for the + problem whose terms he clearly saw. + </p> + <p> + While he affirmed with emphasis that the place of the individual in + society should not be determined by birth or wealth or any conventional + status, but by his own nature as discovered in the process of education, + he had no perception of the uniqueness of individuals. For him they fall + by nature into classes, and into a very small number of classes at that. + Consequently the testing and sifting function of education only shows to + which one of three classes an individual belongs. There being no + recognition that each individual constitutes his own class, there could be + no recognition of the infinite diversity of active tendencies and + combinations of tendencies of which an individual is capable. There were + only three types of faculties or powers in the individual's constitution. + Hence education would soon reach a static limit in each class, for only + diversity makes change and progress. + </p> + <p> + In some individuals, appetites naturally dominate; they are assigned to + the laboring and trading class, which expresses and supplies human wants. + Others reveal, upon education, that over and above appetites, they have a + generous, outgoing, assertively courageous disposition. They become the + citizen-subjects of the state; its defenders in war; its internal + guardians in peace. But their limit is fixed by their lack of reason, + which is a capacity to grasp the universal. Those who possess this are + capable of the highest kind of education, and become in time the + legislators of the state—for laws are the universals which control + the particulars of experience. Thus it is not true that in intent, Plato + subordinated the individual to the social whole. But it is true that + lacking the perception of the uniqueness of every individual, his + incommensurability with others, and consequently not recognizing that a + society might change and yet be stable, his doctrine of limited powers and + classes came in net effect to the idea of the subordination of + individuality. We cannot better Plato's conviction that an individual is + happy and society well organized when each individual engages in those + activities for which he has a natural equipment, nor his conviction that + it is the primary office of education to discover this equipment to its + possessor and train him for its effective use. But progress in knowledge + has made us aware of the superficiality of Plato's lumping of individuals + and their original powers into a few sharply marked-off classes; it has + taught us that original capacities are indefinitely numerous and variable. + It is but the other side of this fact to say that in the degree in which + society has become democratic, social organization means utilization of + the specific and variable qualities of individuals, not stratification by + classes. Although his educational philosophy was revolutionary, it was + none the less in bondage to static ideals. He thought that change or + alteration was evidence of lawless flux; that true reality was + unchangeable. Hence while he would radically change the existing state of + society, his aim was to construct a state in which change would + subsequently have no place. The final end of life is fixed; given a state + framed with this end in view, not even minor details are to be altered. + Though they might not be inherently important, yet if permitted they would + inure the minds of men to the idea of change, and hence be dissolving and + anarchic. The breakdown of his philosophy is made apparent in the fact + that he could not trust to gradual improvements in education to bring + about a better society which should then improve education, and so on + indefinitely. Correct education could not come into existence until an + ideal state existed, and after that education would be devoted simply to + its conservation. For the existence of this state he was obliged to trust + to some happy accident by which philosophic wisdom should happen to + coincide with possession of ruling power in the state. + </p> + <p> + 4. The "Individualistic" Ideal of the Eighteenth Century. In the + eighteenth-century philosophy we find ourselves in a very different circle + of ideas. "Nature" still means something antithetical to existing social + organization; Plato exercised a great influence upon Rousseau. But the + voice of nature now speaks for the diversity of individual talent and for + the need of free development of individuality in all its variety. + Education in accord with nature furnishes the goal and the method of + instruction and discipline. Moreover, the native or original endowment was + conceived, in extreme cases, as nonsocial or even as antisocial. Social + arrangements were thought of as mere external expedients by which these + nonsocial individuals might secure a greater amount of private happiness + for themselves. Nevertheless, these statements convey only an inadequate + idea of the true significance of the movement. In reality its chief + interest was in progress and in social progress. The seeming antisocial + philosophy was a somewhat transparent mask for an impetus toward a wider + and freer society—toward cosmopolitanism. The positive ideal was + humanity. In membership in humanity, as distinct from a state, man's + capacities would be liberated; while in existing political organizations + his powers were hampered and distorted to meet the requirements and + selfish interests of the rulers of the state. The doctrine of extreme + individualism was but the counterpart, the obverse, of ideals of the + indefinite perfectibility of man and of a social organization having a + scope as wide as humanity. The emancipated individual was to become the + organ and agent of a comprehensive and progressive society. + </p> + <p> + The heralds of this gospel were acutely conscious of the evils of the + social estate in which they found themselves. They attributed these evils + to the limitations imposed upon the free powers of man. Such limitation + was both distorting and corrupting. Their impassioned devotion to + emancipation of life from external restrictions which operated to the + exclusive advantage of the class to whom a past feudal system consigned + power, found intellectual formulation in a worship of nature. To give + "nature" full swing was to replace an artificial, corrupt, and inequitable + social order by a new and better kingdom of humanity. Unrestrained faith + in Nature as both a model and a working power was strengthened by the + advances of natural science. Inquiry freed from prejudice and artificial + restraints of church and state had revealed that the world is a scene of + law. The Newtonian solar system, which expressed the reign of natural law, + was a scene of wonderful harmony, where every force balanced with every + other. Natural law would accomplish the same result in human relations, if + men would only get rid of the artificial man-imposed coercive + restrictions. + </p> + <p> + Education in accord with nature was thought to be the first step in + insuring this more social society. It was plainly seen that economic and + political limitations were ultimately dependent upon limitations of + thought and feeling. The first step in freeing men from external chains + was to emancipate them from the internal chains of false beliefs and + ideals. What was called social life, existing institutions, were too false + and corrupt to be intrusted with this work. How could it be expected to + undertake it when the undertaking meant its own destruction? "Nature" must + then be the power to which the enterprise was to be left. Even the extreme + sensationalistic theory of knowledge which was current derived itself from + this conception. To insist that mind is originally passive and empty was + one way of glorifying the possibilities of education. If the mind was a + wax tablet to be written upon by objects, there were no limits to the + possibility of education by means of the natural environment. And since + the natural world of objects is a scene of harmonious "truth," this + education would infallibly produce minds filled with the truth. + </p> + <p> + 5. Education as National and as Social. As soon as the first enthusiasm + for freedom waned, the weakness of the theory upon the constructive side + became obvious. Merely to leave everything to nature was, after all, but + to negate the very idea of education; it was to trust to the accidents of + circumstance. Not only was some method required but also some positive + organ, some administrative agency for carrying on the process of + instruction. The "complete and harmonious development of all powers," + having as its social counterpart an enlightened and progressive humanity, + required definite organization for its realization. Private individuals + here and there could proclaim the gospel; they could not execute the work. + A Pestalozzi could try experiments and exhort philanthropically inclined + persons having wealth and power to follow his example. But even Pestalozzi + saw that any effective pursuit of the new educational ideal required the + support of the state. The realization of the new education destined to + produce a new society was, after all, dependent upon the activities of + existing states. The movement for the democratic idea inevitably became a + movement for publicly conducted and administered schools. + </p> + <p> + So far as Europe was concerned, the historic situation identified the + movement for a state-supported education with the nationalistic movement + in political life—a fact of incalculable significance for subsequent + movements. Under the influence of German thought in particular, education + became a civic function and the civic function was identified with the + realization of the ideal of the national state. The "state" was + substituted for humanity; cosmopolitanism gave way to nationalism. To form + the citizen, not the "man," became the aim of education. 1 The historic + situation to which reference is made is the after-effects of the + Napoleonic conquests, especially in Germany. The German states felt (and + subsequent events demonstrate the correctness of the belief) that + systematic attention to education was the best means of recovering and + maintaining their political integrity and power. Externally they were weak + and divided. Under the leadership of Prussian statesmen they made this + condition a stimulus to the development of an extensive and thoroughly + grounded system of public education. + </p> + <p> + This change in practice necessarily brought about a change in theory. The + individualistic theory receded into the background. The state furnished + not only the instrumentalities of public education but also its goal. When + the actual practice was such that the school system, from the elementary + grades through the university faculties, supplied the patriotic citizen + and soldier and the future state official and administrator and furnished + the means for military, industrial, and political defense and expansion, + it was impossible for theory not to emphasize the aim of social + efficiency. And with the immense importance attached to the nationalistic + state, surrounded by other competing and more or less hostile states, it + was equally impossible to interpret social efficiency in terms of a vague + cosmopolitan humanitarianism. Since the maintenance of a particular + national sovereignty required subordination of individuals to the superior + interests of the state both in military defense and in struggles for + international supremacy in commerce, social efficiency was understood to + imply a like subordination. The educational process was taken to be one of + disciplinary training rather than of personal development. Since, however, + the ideal of culture as complete development of personality persisted, + educational philosophy attempted a reconciliation of the two ideas. The + reconciliation took the form of the conception of the "organic" character + of the state. The individual in his isolation is nothing; only in and + through an absorption of the aims and meaning of organized institutions + does he attain true personality. What appears to be his subordination to + political authority and the demand for sacrifice of himself to the + commands of his superiors is in reality but making his own the objective + reason manifested in the state—the only way in which he can become + truly rational. The notion of development which we have seen to be + characteristic of institutional idealism (as in the Hegelian philosophy) + was just such a deliberate effort to combine the two ideas of complete + realization of personality and thoroughgoing "disciplinary" subordination + to existing institutions. The extent of the transformation of educational + philosophy which occurred in Germany in the generation occupied by the + struggle against Napoleon for national independence, may be gathered from + Kant, who well expresses the earlier individual-cosmopolitan ideal. In his + treatise on Pedagogics, consisting of lectures given in the later years of + the eighteenth century, he defines education as the process by which man + becomes man. Mankind begins its history submerged in nature—not as + Man who is a creature of reason, while nature furnishes only instinct and + appetite. Nature offers simply the germs which education is to develop and + perfect. The peculiarity of truly human life is that man has to create + himself by his own voluntary efforts; he has to make himself a truly + moral, rational, and free being. This creative effort is carried on by the + educational activities of slow generations. Its acceleration depends upon + men consciously striving to educate their successors not for the existing + state of affairs but so as to make possible a future better humanity. But + there is the great difficulty. Each generation is inclined to educate its + young so as to get along in the present world instead of with a view to + the proper end of education: the promotion of the best possible + realization of humanity as humanity. Parents educate their children so + that they may get on; princes educate their subjects as instruments of + their own purposes. + </p> + <p> + Who, then, shall conduct education so that humanity may improve? We must + depend upon the efforts of enlightened men in their private capacity. "All + culture begins with private men and spreads outward from them. Simply + through the efforts of persons of enlarged inclinations, who are capable + of grasping the ideal of a future better condition, is the gradual + approximation of human nature to its end possible. Rulers are simply + interested in such training as will make their subjects better tools for + their own intentions." Even the subsidy by rulers of privately conducted + schools must be carefully safeguarded. For the rulers' interest in the + welfare of their own nation instead of in what is best for humanity, will + make them, if they give money for the schools, wish to draw their plans. + We have in this view an express statement of the points characteristic of + the eighteenth century individualistic cosmopolitanism. The full + development of private personality is identified with the aims of humanity + as a whole and with the idea of progress. In addition we have an explicit + fear of the hampering influence of a state-conducted and state-regulated + education upon the attainment of these ideas. But in less than two decades + after this time, Kant's philosophic successors, Fichte and Hegel, + elaborated the idea that the chief function of the state is educational; + that in particular the regeneration of Germany is to be accomplished by an + education carried on in the interests of the state, and that the private + individual is of necessity an egoistic, irrational being, enslaved to his + appetites and to circumstances unless he submits voluntarily to the + educative discipline of state institutions and laws. In this spirit, + Germany was the first country to undertake a public, universal, and + compulsory system of education extending from the primary school through + the university, and to submit to jealous state regulation and supervision + all private educational enterprises. Two results should stand out from + this brief historical survey. The first is that such terms as the + individual and the social conceptions of education are quite meaningless + taken at large, or apart from their context. Plato had the ideal of an + education which should equate individual realization and social coherency + and stability. His situation forced his ideal into the notion of a society + organized in stratified classes, losing the individual in the class. The + eighteenth century educational philosophy was highly individualistic in + form, but this form was inspired by a noble and generous social ideal: + that of a society organized to include humanity, and providing for the + indefinite perfectibility of mankind. The idealistic philosophy of Germany + in the early nineteenth century endeavored again to equate the ideals of a + free and complete development of cultured personality with social + discipline and political subordination. It made the national state an + intermediary between the realization of private personality on one side + and of humanity on the other. Consequently, it is equally possible to + state its animating principle with equal truth either in the classic terms + of "harmonious development of all the powers of personality" or in the + more recent terminology of "social efficiency." All this reinforces the + statement which opens this chapter: The conception of education as a + social process and function has no definite meaning until we define the + kind of society we have in mind. These considerations pave the way for our + second conclusion. One of the fundamental problems of education in and for + a democratic society is set by the conflict of a nationalistic and a wider + social aim. The earlier cosmopolitan and "humanitarian" conception + suffered both from vagueness and from lack of definite organs of execution + and agencies of administration. In Europe, in the Continental states + particularly, the new idea of the importance of education for human + welfare and progress was captured by national interests and harnessed to + do a work whose social aim was definitely narrow and exclusive. The social + aim of education and its national aim were identified, and the result was + a marked obscuring of the meaning of a social aim. + </p> + <p> + This confusion corresponds to the existing situation of human intercourse. + On the one hand, science, commerce, and art transcend national boundaries. + They are largely international in quality and method. They involve + interdependencies and cooperation among the peoples inhabiting different + countries. At the same time, the idea of national sovereignty has never + been as accentuated in politics as it is at the present time. Each nation + lives in a state of suppressed hostility and incipient war with its + neighbors. Each is supposed to be the supreme judge of its own interests, + and it is assumed as matter of course that each has interests which are + exclusively its own. To question this is to question the very idea of + national sovereignty which is assumed to be basic to political practice + and political science. This contradiction (for it is nothing less) between + the wider sphere of associated and mutually helpful social life and the + narrower sphere of exclusive and hence potentially hostile pursuits and + purposes, exacts of educational theory a clearer conception of the meaning + of "social" as a function and test of education than has yet been + attained. Is it possible for an educational system to be conducted by a + national state and yet the full social ends of the educative process not + be restricted, constrained, and corrupted? Internally, the question has to + face the tendencies, due to present economic conditions, which split + society into classes some of which are made merely tools for the higher + culture of others. Externally, the question is concerned with the + reconciliation of national loyalty, of patriotism, with superior devotion + to the things which unite men in common ends, irrespective of national + political boundaries. Neither phase of the problem can be worked out by + merely negative means. It is not enough to see to it that education is not + actively used as an instrument to make easier the exploitation of one + class by another. School facilities must be secured of such amplitude and + efficiency as will in fact and not simply in name discount the effects of + economic inequalities, and secure to all the wards of the nation equality + of equipment for their future careers. Accomplishment of this end demands + not only adequate administrative provision of school facilities, and such + supplementation of family resources as will enable youth to take advantage + of them, but also such modification of traditional ideals of culture, + traditional subjects of study and traditional methods of teaching and + discipline as will retain all the youth under educational influences until + they are equipped to be masters of their own economic and social careers. + The ideal may seem remote of execution, but the democratic ideal of + education is a farcical yet tragic delusion except as the ideal more and + more dominates our public system of education. The same principle has + application on the side of the considerations which concern the relations + of one nation to another. It is not enough to teach the horrors of war and + to avoid everything which would stimulate international jealousy and + animosity. The emphasis must be put upon whatever binds people together in + cooperative human pursuits and results, apart from geographical + limitations. The secondary and provisional character of national + sovereignty in respect to the fuller, freer, and more fruitful association + and intercourse of all human beings with one another must be instilled as + a working disposition of mind. If these applications seem to be remote + from a consideration of the philosophy of education, the impression shows + that the meaning of the idea of education previously developed has not + been adequately grasped. This conclusion is bound up with the very idea of + education as a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth + directed to social aims. Otherwise a democratic criterion of education can + only be inconsistently applied. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM7"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. Since education is a social process, and there are many kinds + </h2> + <p> + of societies, a criterion for educational criticism and construction + implies a particular social ideal. The two points selected by which to + measure the worth of a form of social life are the extent in which the + interests of a group are shared by all its members, and the fullness and + freedom with which it interacts with other groups. An undesirable society, + in other words, is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to + free intercourse and communication of experience. A society which makes + provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms + and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through + interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far + democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives + individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and + the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing + disorder. Three typical historic philosophies of education were considered + from this point of view. The Platonic was found to have an ideal formally + quite similar to that stated, but which was compromised in its working out + by making a class rather than an individual the social unit. The so-called + individualism of the eighteenth-century enlightenment was found to involve + the notion of a society as broad as humanity, of whose progress the + individual was to be the organ. But it lacked any agency for securing the + development of its ideal as was evidenced in its falling back upon Nature. + The institutional idealistic philosophies of the nineteenth century + supplied this lack by making the national state the agency, but in so + doing narrowed the conception of the social aim to those who were members + of the same political unit, and reintroduced the idea of the subordination + of the individual to the institution. 1 There is a much neglected strain + in Rousseau tending intellectually in this direction. He opposed the + existing state of affairs on the ground that it formed neither the citizen + nor the man. Under existing conditions, he preferred to try for the latter + rather than for the former. But there are many sayings of his which point + to the formation of the citizen as ideally the higher, and which indicate + that his own endeavor, as embodied in the Emile, was simply the best + makeshift the corruption of the times permitted him to sketch. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0008"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Eight: Aims in Education + </h2> + <h3> + 1. The Nature of an Aim. + </h3> + <p> + The account of education given in our earlier chapters virtually + anticipated the results reached in a discussion of the purport of + education in a democratic community. For it assumed that the aim of + education is to enable individuals to continue their education—or + that the object and reward of learning is continued capacity for growth. + Now this idea cannot be applied to all the members of a society except + where intercourse of man with man is mutual, and except where there is + adequate provision for the reconstruction of social habits and + institutions by means of wide stimulation arising from equitably + distributed interests. And this means a democratic society. In our search + for aims in education, we are not concerned, therefore, with finding an + end outside of the educative process to which education is subordinate. + Our whole conception forbids. We are rather concerned with the contrast + which exists when aims belong within the process in which they operate and + when they are set up from without. And the latter state of affairs must + obtain when social relationships are not equitably balanced. For in that + case, some portions of the whole social group will find their aims + determined by an external dictation; their aims will not arise from the + free growth of their own experience, and their nominal aims will be means + to more ulterior ends of others rather than truly their own. + </p> + <p> + Our first question is to define the nature of an aim so far as it falls + within an activity, instead of being furnished from without. We approach + the definition by a contrast of mere results with ends. Any exhibition of + energy has results. The wind blows about the sands of the desert; the + position of the grains is changed. Here is a result, an effect, but not an + end. For there is nothing in the outcome which completes or fulfills what + went before it. There is mere spatial redistribution. One state of affairs + is just as good as any other. Consequently there is no basis upon which to + select an earlier state of affairs as a beginning, a later as an end, and + to consider what intervenes as a process of transformation and + realization. + </p> + <p> + Consider for example the activities of bees in contrast with the changes + in the sands when the wind blows them about. The results of the bees' + actions may be called ends not because they are designed or consciously + intended, but because they are true terminations or completions of what + has preceded. When the bees gather pollen and make wax and build cells, + each step prepares the way for the next. When cells are built, the queen + lays eggs in them; when eggs are laid, they are sealed and bees brood them + and keep them at a temperature required to hatch them. When they are + hatched, bees feed the young till they can take care of themselves. Now we + are so familiar with such facts, that we are apt to dismiss them on the + ground that life and instinct are a kind of miraculous thing anyway. Thus + we fail to note what the essential characteristic of the event is; namely, + the significance of the temporal place and order of each element; the way + each prior event leads into its successor while the successor takes up + what is furnished and utilizes it for some other stage, until we arrive at + the end, which, as it were, summarizes and finishes off the process. Since + aims relate always to results, the first thing to look to when it is a + question of aims, is whether the work assigned possesses intrinsic + continuity. Or is it a mere serial aggregate of acts, first doing one + thing and then another? To talk about an educational aim when + approximately each act of a pupil is dictated by the teacher, when the + only order in the sequence of his acts is that which comes from the + assignment of lessons and the giving of directions by another, is to talk + nonsense. It is equally fatal to an aim to permit capricious or + discontinuous action in the name of spontaneous self-expression. An aim + implies an orderly and ordered activity, one in which the order consists + in the progressive completing of a process. Given an activity having a + time span and cumulative growth within the time succession, an aim means + foresight in advance of the end or possible termination. If bees + anticipated the consequences of their activity, if they perceived their + end in imaginative foresight, they would have the primary element in an + aim. Hence it is nonsense to talk about the aim of education—or any + other undertaking—where conditions do not permit of foresight of + results, and do not stimulate a person to look ahead to see what the + outcome of a given activity is to be. In the next place the aim as a + foreseen end gives direction to the activity; it is not an idle view of a + mere spectator, but influences the steps taken to reach the end. The + foresight functions in three ways. In the first place, it involves careful + observation of the given conditions to see what are the means available + for reaching the end, and to discover the hindrances in the way. In the + second place, it suggests the proper order or sequence in the use of + means. It facilitates an economical selection and arrangement. In the + third place, it makes choice of alternatives possible. If we can predict + the outcome of acting this way or that, we can then compare the value of + the two courses of action; we can pass judgment upon their relative + desirability. If we know that stagnant water breeds mosquitoes and that + they are likely to carry disease, we can, disliking that anticipated + result, take steps to avert it. Since we do not anticipate results as mere + intellectual onlookers, but as persons concerned in the outcome, we are + partakers in the process which produces the result. We intervene to bring + about this result or that. + </p> + <p> + Of course these three points are closely connected with one another. We + can definitely foresee results only as we make careful scrutiny of present + conditions, and the importance of the outcome supplies the motive for + observations. The more adequate our observations, the more varied is the + scene of conditions and obstructions that presents itself, and the more + numerous are the alternatives between which choice may be made. In turn, + the more numerous the recognized possibilities of the situation, or + alternatives of action, the more meaning does the chosen activity possess, + and the more flexibly controllable is it. Where only a single outcome has + been thought of, the mind has nothing else to think of; the meaning + attaching to the act is limited. One only steams ahead toward the mark. + Sometimes such a narrow course may be effective. But if unexpected + difficulties offer themselves, one has not as many resources at command as + if he had chosen the same line of action after a broader survey of the + possibilities of the field. He cannot make needed readjustments readily. + </p> + <p> + The net conclusion is that acting with an aim is all one with acting + intelligently. To foresee a terminus of an act is to have a basis upon + which to observe, to select, and to order objects and our own capacities. + To do these things means to have a mind—for mind is precisely + intentional purposeful activity controlled by perception of facts and + their relationships to one another. To have a mind to do a thing is to + foresee a future possibility; it is to have a plan for its accomplishment; + it is to note the means which make the plan capable of execution and the + obstructions in the way,—or, if it is really a mind to do the thing + and not a vague aspiration—it is to have a plan which takes account + of resources and difficulties. Mind is capacity to refer present + conditions to future results, and future consequences to present + conditions. And these traits are just what is meant by having an aim or a + purpose. A man is stupid or blind or unintelligent—lacking in mind—just + in the degree in which in any activity he does not know what he is about, + namely, the probable consequences of his acts. A man is imperfectly + intelligent when he contents himself with looser guesses about the outcome + than is needful, just taking a chance with his luck, or when he forms + plans apart from study of the actual conditions, including his own + capacities. Such relative absence of mind means to make our feelings the + measure of what is to happen. To be intelligent we must "stop, look, + listen" in making the plan of an activity. + </p> + <p> + To identify acting with an aim and intelligent activity is enough to show + its value—its function in experience. We are only too given to + making an entity out of the abstract noun "consciousness." We forget that + it comes from the adjective "conscious." To be conscious is to be aware of + what we are about; conscious signifies the deliberate, observant, planning + traits of activity. Consciousness is nothing which we have which gazes + idly on the scene around one or which has impressions made upon it by + physical things; it is a name for the purposeful quality of an activity, + for the fact that it is directed by an aim. Put the other way about, to + have an aim is to act with meaning, not like an automatic machine; it is + to mean to do something and to perceive the meaning of things in the light + of that intent. + </p> + <p> + 2. The Criteria of Good Aims. We may apply the results of our discussion + to a consideration of the criteria involved in a correct establishing of + aims. (1) The aim set up must be an outgrowth of existing conditions. It + must be based upon a consideration of what is already going on; upon the + resources and difficulties of the situation. Theories about the proper end + of our activities—educational and moral theories—often violate + this principle. They assume ends lying outside our activities; ends + foreign to the concrete makeup of the situation; ends which issue from + some outside source. Then the problem is to bring our activities to bear + upon the realization of these externally supplied ends. They are something + for which we ought to act. In any case such "aims" limit intelligence; + they are not the expression of mind in foresight, observation, and choice + of the better among alternative possibilities. They limit intelligence + because, given ready-made, they must be imposed by some authority external + to intelligence, leaving to the latter nothing but a mechanical choice of + means. + </p> + <p> + (2) We have spoken as if aims could be completely formed prior to the + attempt to realize them. This impression must now be qualified. The aim as + it first emerges is a mere tentative sketch. The act of striving to + realize it tests its worth. If it suffices to direct activity + successfully, nothing more is required, since its whole function is to set + a mark in advance; and at times a mere hint may suffice. But usually—at + least in complicated situations—acting upon it brings to light + conditions which had been overlooked. This calls for revision of the + original aim; it has to be added to and subtracted from. An aim must, + then, be flexible; it must be capable of alteration to meet circumstances. + An end established externally to the process of action is always rigid. + Being inserted or imposed from without, it is not supposed to have a + working relationship to the concrete conditions of the situation. What + happens in the course of action neither confirms, refutes, nor alters it. + Such an end can only be insisted upon. The failure that results from its + lack of adaptation is attributed simply to the perverseness of conditions, + not to the fact that the end is not reasonable under the circumstances. + The value of a legitimate aim, on the contrary, lies in the fact that we + can use it to change conditions. It is a method for dealing with + conditions so as to effect desirable alterations in them. A farmer who + should passively accept things just as he finds them would make as great a + mistake as he who framed his plans in complete disregard of what soil, + climate, etc., permit. One of the evils of an abstract or remote external + aim in education is that its very inapplicability in practice is likely to + react into a haphazard snatching at immediate conditions. A good aim + surveys the present state of experience of pupils, and forming a tentative + plan of treatment, keeps the plan constantly in view and yet modifies it + as conditions develop. The aim, in short, is experimental, and hence + constantly growing as it is tested in action. + </p> + <p> + (3) The aim must always represent a freeing of activities. The term end in + view is suggestive, for it puts before the mind the termination or + conclusion of some process. The only way in which we can define an + activity is by putting before ourselves the objects in which it terminates—as + one's aim in shooting is the target. But we must remember that the object + is only a mark or sign by which the mind specifies the activity one + desires to carry out. Strictly speaking, not the target but hitting the + target is the end in view; one takes aim by means of the target, but also + by the sight on the gun. The different objects which are thought of are + means of directing the activity. Thus one aims at, say, a rabbit; what he + wants is to shoot straight: a certain kind of activity. Or, if it is the + rabbit he wants, it is not rabbit apart from his activity, but as a factor + in activity; he wants to eat the rabbit, or to show it as evidence of his + marksmanship—he wants to do something with it. The doing with the + thing, not the thing in isolation, is his end. The object is but a phase + of the active end,—continuing the activity successfully. This is + what is meant by the phrase, used above, "freeing activity." + </p> + <p> + In contrast with fulfilling some process in order that activity may go on, + stands the static character of an end which is imposed from without the + activity. It is always conceived of as fixed; it is something to be + attained and possessed. When one has such a notion, activity is a mere + unavoidable means to something else; it is not significant or important on + its own account. As compared with the end it is but a necessary evil; + something which must be gone through before one can reach the object which + is alone worth while. In other words, the external idea of the aim leads + to a separation of means from end, while an end which grows up within an + activity as plan for its direction is always both ends and means, the + distinction being only one of convenience. Every means is a temporary end + until we have attained it. Every end becomes a means of carrying activity + further as soon as it is achieved. We call it end when it marks off the + future direction of the activity in which we are engaged; means when it + marks off the present direction. Every divorce of end from means + diminishes by that much the significance of the activity and tends to + reduce it to a drudgery from which one would escape if he could. A farmer + has to use plants and animals to carry on his farming activities. It + certainly makes a great difference to his life whether he is fond of them, + or whether he regards them merely as means which he has to employ to get + something else in which alone he is interested. In the former case, his + entire course of activity is significant; each phase of it has its own + value. He has the experience of realizing his end at every stage; the + postponed aim, or end in view, being merely a sight ahead by which to keep + his activity going fully and freely. For if he does not look ahead, he is + more likely to find himself blocked. The aim is as definitely a means of + action as is any other portion of an activity. + </p> + <p> + 3. Applications in Education. There is nothing peculiar about educational + aims. They are just like aims in any directed occupation. The educator, + like the farmer, has certain things to do, certain resources with which to + do, and certain obstacles with which to contend. The conditions with which + the farmer deals, whether as obstacles or resources, have their own + structure and operation independently of any purpose of his. Seeds sprout, + rain falls, the sun shines, insects devour, blight comes, the seasons + change. His aim is simply to utilize these various conditions; to make his + activities and their energies work together, instead of against one + another. It would be absurd if the farmer set up a purpose of farming, + without any reference to these conditions of soil, climate, characteristic + of plant growth, etc. His purpose is simply a foresight of the + consequences of his energies connected with those of the things about him, + a foresight used to direct his movements from day to day. Foresight of + possible consequences leads to more careful and extensive observation of + the nature and performances of the things he had to do with, and to laying + out a plan—that is, of a certain order in the acts to be performed. + </p> + <p> + It is the same with the educator, whether parent or teacher. It is as + absurd for the latter to set up his "own" aims as the proper objects of + the growth of the children as it would be for the farmer to set up an + ideal of farming irrespective of conditions. Aims mean acceptance of + responsibility for the observations, anticipations, and arrangements + required in carrying on a function—whether farming or educating. Any + aim is of value so far as it assists observation, choice, and planning in + carrying on activity from moment to moment and hour to hour; if it gets in + the way of the individual's own common sense (as it will surely do if + imposed from without or accepted on authority) it does harm. + </p> + <p> + And it is well to remind ourselves that education as such has no aims. + Only persons, parents, and teachers, etc., have aims, not an abstract idea + like education. And consequently their purposes are indefinitely varied, + differing with different children, changing as children grow and with the + growth of experience on the part of the one who teaches. Even the most + valid aims which can be put in words will, as words, do more harm than + good unless one recognizes that they are not aims, but rather suggestions + to educators as to how to observe, how to look ahead, and how to choose in + liberating and directing the energies of the concrete situations in which + they find themselves. As a recent writer has said: "To lead this boy to + read Scott's novels instead of old Sleuth's stories; to teach this girl to + sew; to root out the habit of bullying from John's make-up; to prepare + this class to study medicine,—these are samples of the millions of + aims we have actually before us in the concrete work of education." + Bearing these qualifications in mind, we shall proceed to state some of + the characteristics found in all good educational aims. (1) An educational + aim must be founded upon the intrinsic activities and needs (including + original instincts and acquired habits) of the given individual to be + educated. The tendency of such an aim as preparation is, as we have seen, + to omit existing powers, and find the aim in some remote accomplishment or + responsibility. In general, there is a disposition to take considerations + which are dear to the hearts of adults and set them up as ends + irrespective of the capacities of those educated. There is also an + inclination to propound aims which are so uniform as to neglect the + specific powers and requirements of an individual, forgetting that all + learning is something which happens to an individual at a given time and + place. The larger range of perception of the adult is of great value in + observing the abilities and weaknesses of the young, in deciding what they + may amount to. Thus the artistic capacities of the adult exhibit what + certain tendencies of the child are capable of; if we did not have the + adult achievements we should be without assurance as to the significance + of the drawing, reproducing, modeling, coloring activities of childhood. + So if it were not for adult language, we should not be able to see the + import of the babbling impulses of infancy. But it is one thing to use + adult accomplishments as a context in which to place and survey the doings + of childhood and youth; it is quite another to set them up as a fixed aim + without regard to the concrete activities of those educated. + </p> + <p> + (2) An aim must be capable of translation into a method of cooperating + with the activities of those undergoing instruction. It must suggest the + kind of environment needed to liberate and to organize their capacities. + Unless it lends itself to the construction of specific procedures, and + unless these procedures test, correct, and amplify the aim, the latter is + worthless. Instead of helping the specific task of teaching, it prevents + the use of ordinary judgment in observing and sizing up the situation. It + operates to exclude recognition of everything except what squares up with + the fixed end in view. Every rigid aim just because it is rigidly given + seems to render it unnecessary to give careful attention to concrete + conditions. Since it must apply anyhow, what is the use of noting details + which do not count? + </p> + <p> + The vice of externally imposed ends has deep roots. Teachers receive them + from superior authorities; these authorities accept them from what is + current in the community. The teachers impose them upon children. As a + first consequence, the intelligence of the teacher is not free; it is + confined to receiving the aims laid down from above. Too rarely is the + individual teacher so free from the dictation of authoritative supervisor, + textbook on methods, prescribed course of study, etc., that he can let his + mind come to close quarters with the pupil's mind and the subject matter. + This distrust of the teacher's experience is then reflected in lack of + confidence in the responses of pupils. The latter receive their aims + through a double or treble external imposition, and are constantly + confused by the conflict between the aims which are natural to their own + experience at the time and those in which they are taught to acquiesce. + Until the democratic criterion of the intrinsic significance of every + growing experience is recognized, we shall be intellectually confused by + the demand for adaptation to external aims. + </p> + <p> + (3) Educators have to be on their guard against ends that are alleged to + be general and ultimate. Every activity, however specific, is, of course, + general in its ramified connections, for it leads out indefinitely into + other things. So far as a general idea makes us more alive to these + connections, it cannot be too general. But "general" also means + "abstract," or detached from all specific context. And such abstractness + means remoteness, and throws us back, once more, upon teaching and + learning as mere means of getting ready for an end disconnected from the + means. That education is literally and all the time its own reward means + that no alleged study or discipline is educative unless it is worth while + in its own immediate having. A truly general aim broadens the outlook; it + stimulates one to take more consequences (connections) into account. This + means a wider and more flexible observation of means. The more interacting + forces, for example, the farmer takes into account, the more varied will + be his immediate resources. He will see a greater number of possible + starting places, and a greater number of ways of getting at what he wants + to do. The fuller one's conception of possible future achievements, the + less his present activity is tied down to a small number of alternatives. + If one knew enough, one could start almost anywhere and sustain his + activities continuously and fruitfully. + </p> + <p> + Understanding then the term general or comprehensive aim simply in the + sense of a broad survey of the field of present activities, we shall take + up some of the larger ends which have currency in the educational theories + of the day, and consider what light they throw upon the immediate concrete + and diversified aims which are always the educator's real concern. We + premise (as indeed immediately follows from what has been said) that there + is no need of making a choice among them or regarding them as competitors. + When we come to act in a tangible way we have to select or choose a + particular act at a particular time, but any number of comprehensive ends + may exist without competition, since they mean simply different ways of + looking at the same scene. One cannot climb a number of different + mountains simultaneously, but the views had when different mountains are + ascended supplement one another: they do not set up incompatible, + competing worlds. Or, putting the matter in a slightly different way, one + statement of an end may suggest certain questions and observations, and + another statement another set of questions, calling for other + observations. Then the more general ends we have, the better. One + statement will emphasize what another slurs over. What a plurality of + hypotheses does for the scientific investigator, a plurality of stated + aims may do for the instructor. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM8"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. An aim denotes the result of any natural process brought to + </h2> + <p> + consciousness and made a factor in determining present observation and + choice of ways of acting. It signifies that an activity has become + intelligent. Specifically it means foresight of the alternative + consequences attendant upon acting in a given situation in different ways, + and the use of what is anticipated to direct observation and experiment. A + true aim is thus opposed at every point to an aim which is imposed upon a + process of action from without. The latter is fixed and rigid; it is not a + stimulus to intelligence in the given situation, but is an externally + dictated order to do such and such things. Instead of connecting directly + with present activities, it is remote, divorced from the means by which it + is to be reached. Instead of suggesting a freer and better balanced + activity, it is a limit set to activity. In education, the currency of + these externally imposed aims is responsible for the emphasis put upon the + notion of preparation for a remote future and for rendering the work of + both teacher and pupil mechanical and slavish. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0009"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Nine: Natural Development and Social Efficiency as Aims + </h2> + <p> + 1. Nature as Supplying the Aim. We have just pointed out the futility of + trying to establish the aim of education—some one final aim which + subordinates all others to itself. We have indicated that since general + aims are but prospective points of view from which to survey the existing + conditions and estimate their possibilities, we might have any number of + them, all consistent with one another. As matter of fact, a large number + have been stated at different times, all having great local value. For the + statement of aim is a matter of emphasis at a given time. And we do not + emphasize things which do not require emphasis—that is, such things + as are taking care of themselves fairly well. We tend rather to frame our + statement on the basis of the defects and needs of the contemporary + situation; we take for granted, without explicit statement which would be + of no use, whatever is right or approximately so. We frame our explicit + aims in terms of some alteration to be brought about. It is, then, DO + paradox requiring explanation that a given epoch or generation tends to + emphasize in its conscious projections just the things which it has least + of in actual fact. A time of domination by authority will call out as + response the desirability of great individual freedom; one of disorganized + individual activities the need of social control as an educational aim. + </p> + <p> + The actual and implicit practice and the conscious or stated aim thus + balance each other. At different times such aims as complete living, + better methods of language study, substitution of things for words, social + efficiency, personal culture, social service, complete development of + personality, encyclopedic knowledge, discipline, a esthetic contemplation, + utility, etc., have served. The following discussion takes up three + statements of recent influence; certain others have been incidentally + discussed in the previous chapters, and others will be considered later in + a discussion of knowledge and of the values of studies. We begin with a + consideration that education is a process of development in accordance + with nature, taking Rousseau's statement, which opposed natural to social + (See ante, p. 91); and then pass over to the antithetical conception of + social efficiency, which often opposes social to natural. + </p> + <p> + (1) Educational reformers disgusted with the conventionality and + artificiality of the scholastic methods they find about them are prone to + resort to nature as a standard. Nature is supposed to furnish the law and + the end of development; ours it is to follow and conform to her ways. The + positive value of this conception lies in the forcible way in which it + calls attention to the wrongness of aims which do not have regard to the + natural endowment of those educated. Its weakness is the ease with which + natural in the sense of normal is confused with the physical. The + constructive use of intelligence in foresight, and contriving, is then + discounted; we are just to get out of the way and allow nature to do the + work. Since no one has stated in the doctrine both its truth and falsity + better than Rousseau, we shall turn to him. + </p> + <p> + "Education," he says, "we receive from three sources—Nature, men, + and things. The spontaneous development of our organs and capacities + constitutes the education of Nature. The use to which we are taught to put + this development constitutes that education given us by Men. The + acquirement of personal experience from surrounding objects constitutes + that of things. Only when these three kinds of education are consonant and + make for the same end, does a man tend towards his true goal. If we are + asked what is this end, the answer is that of Nature. For since the + concurrence of the three kinds of education is necessary to their + completeness, the kind which is entirely independent of our control must + necessarily regulate us in determining the other two." Then he defines + Nature to mean the capacities and dispositions which are inborn, "as they + exist prior to the modification due to constraining habits and the + influence of the opinion of others." + </p> + <p> + The wording of Rousseau will repay careful study. It contains as + fundamental truths as have been uttered about education in conjunction + with a curious twist. It would be impossible to say better what is said in + the first sentences. The three factors of educative development are (a) + the native structure of our bodily organs and their functional activities; + (b) the uses to which the activities of these organs are put under the + influence of other persons; (c) their direct interaction with the + environment. This statement certainly covers the ground. His other two + propositions are equally sound; namely, (a) that only when the three + factors of education are consonant and cooperative does adequate + development of the individual occur, and (b) that the native activities of + the organs, being original, are basic in conceiving consonance. But it + requires but little reading between the lines, supplemented by other + statements of Rousseau, to perceive that instead of regarding these three + things as factors which must work together to some extent in order that + any one of them may proceed educatively, he regards them as separate and + independent operations. Especially does he believe that there is an + independent and, as he says, "spontaneous" development of the native + organs and faculties. He thinks that this development can go on + irrespective of the use to which they are put. And it is to this separate + development that education coming from social contact is to be + subordinated. Now there is an immense difference between a use of native + activities in accord with those activities themselves—as distinct + from forcing them and perverting them—and supposing that they have a + normal development apart from any use, which development furnishes the + standard and norm of all learning by use. To recur to our previous + illustration, the process of acquiring language is a practically perfect + model of proper educative growth. The start is from native activities of + the vocal apparatus, organs of hearing, etc. But it is absurd to suppose + that these have an independent growth of their own, which left to itself + would evolve a perfect speech. Taken literally, Rousseau's principle would + mean that adults should accept and repeat the babblings and noises of + children not merely as the beginnings of the development of articulate + speech—which they are—but as furnishing language itself—the + standard for all teaching of language. + </p> + <p> + The point may be summarized by saying that Rousseau was right, introducing + a much-needed reform into education, in holding that the structure and + activities of the organs furnish the conditions of all teaching of the use + of the organs; but profoundly wrong in intimating that they supply not + only the conditions but also the ends of their development. As matter of + fact, the native activities develop, in contrast with random and + capricious exercise, through the uses to which they are put. And the + office of the social medium is, as we have seen, to direct growth through + putting powers to the best possible use. The instinctive activities may be + called, metaphorically, spontaneous, in the sense that the organs give a + strong bias for a certain sort of operation,—a bias so strong that + we cannot go contrary to it, though by trying to go contrary we may + pervert, stunt, and corrupt them. But the notion of a spontaneous normal + development of these activities is pure mythology. The natural, or native, + powers furnish the initiating and limiting forces in all education; they + do not furnish its ends or aims. There is no learning except from a + beginning in unlearned powers, but learning is not a matter of the + spontaneous overflow of the unlearned powers. Rousseau's contrary opinion + is doubtless due to the fact that he identified God with Nature; to him + the original powers are wholly good, coming directly from a wise and good + creator. To paraphrase the old saying about the country and the town, God + made the original human organs and faculties, man makes the uses to which + they are put. Consequently the development of the former furnishes the + standard to which the latter must be subordinated. When men attempt to + determine the uses to which the original activities shall be put, they + interfere with a divine plan. The interference by social arrangements with + Nature, God's work, is the primary source of corruption in individuals. + </p> + <p> + Rousseau's passionate assertion of the intrinsic goodness of all natural + tendencies was a reaction against the prevalent notion of the total + depravity of innate human nature, and has had a powerful influence in + modifying the attitude towards children's interests. But it is hardly + necessary to say that primitive impulses are of themselves neither good + nor evil, but become one or the other according to the objects for which + they are employed. That neglect, suppression, and premature forcing of + some instincts at the expense of others, are responsible for many + avoidable ills, there can be no doubt. But the moral is not to leave them + alone to follow their own "spontaneous development," but to provide an + environment which shall organize them. + </p> + <p> + Returning to the elements of truth contained in Rousseau's statements, we + find that natural development, as an aim, enables him to point the means + of correcting many evils in current practices, and to indicate a number of + desirable specific aims. (1) Natural development as an aim fixes attention + upon the bodily organs and the need of health and vigor. The aim of + natural development says to parents and teachers: Make health an aim; + normal development cannot be had without regard to the vigor of the body—an + obvious enough fact and yet one whose due recognition in practice would + almost automatically revolutionize many of our educational practices. + "Nature" is indeed a vague and metaphorical term, but one thing that + "Nature" may be said to utter is that there are conditions of educational + efficiency, and that till we have learned what these conditions are and + have learned to make our practices accord with them, the noblest and most + ideal of our aims are doomed to suffer—are verbal and sentimental + rather than efficacious. + </p> + <p> + (2) The aim of natural development translates into the aim of respect for + physical mobility. In Rousseau's words: "Children are always in motion; a + sedentary life is injurious." When he says that "Nature's intention is to + strengthen the body before exercising the mind" he hardly states the fact + fairly. But if he had said that nature's "intention" (to adopt his + poetical form of speech) is to develop the mind especially by exercise of + the muscles of the body he would have stated a positive fact. In other + words, the aim of following nature means, in the concrete, regard for the + actual part played by use of the bodily organs in explorations, in + handling of materials, in plays and games. (3) The general aim translates + into the aim of regard for individual differences among children. Nobody + can take the principle of consideration of native powers into account + without being struck by the fact that these powers differ in different + individuals. The difference applies not merely to their intensity, but + even more to their quality and arrangement. As Rouseau said: "Each + individual is born with a distinctive temperament. We indiscriminately + employ children of different bents on the same exercises; their education + destroys the special bent and leaves a dull uniformity. Therefore after we + have wasted our efforts in stunting the true gifts of nature we see the + short-lived and illusory brilliance we have substituted die away, while + the natural abilities we have crushed do not revive." + </p> + <p> + Lastly, the aim of following nature means to note the origin, the waxing, + and waning, of preferences and interests. Capacities bud and bloom + irregularly; there is no even four-abreast development. We must strike + while the iron is hot. Especially precious are the first dawnings of + power. More than we imagine, the ways in which the tendencies of early + childhood are treated fix fundamental dispositions and condition the turn + taken by powers that show themselves later. Educational concern with the + early years of life—as distinct from inculcation of useful arts—dates + almost entirely from the time of the emphasis by Pestalozzi and Froebel, + following Rousseau, of natural principles of growth. The irregularity of + growth and its significance is indicated in the following passage of a + student of the growth of the nervous system. "While growth continues, + things bodily and mental are lopsided, for growth is never general, but is + accentuated now at one spot, now at another. The methods which shall + recognize in the presence of these enormous differences of endowment the + dynamic values of natural inequalities of growth, and utilize them, + preferring irregularity to the rounding out gained by pruning will most + closely follow that which takes place in the body and thus prove most + effective." 1 Observation of natural tendencies is difficult under + conditions of restraint. They show themselves most readily in a child's + spontaneous sayings and doings,—that is, in those he engages in when + not put at set tasks and when not aware of being under observation. It + does not follow that these tendencies are all desirable because they are + natural; but it does follow that since they are there, they are operative + and must be taken account of. We must see to it that the desirable ones + have an environment which keeps them active, and that their activity shall + control the direction the others take and thereby induce the disuse of the + latter because they lead to nothing. Many tendencies that trouble parents + when they appear are likely to be transitory, and sometimes too much + direct attention to them only fixes a child's attention upon them. At all + events, adults too easily assume their own habits and wishes as standards, + and regard all deviations of children's impulses as evils to be + eliminated. That artificiality against which the conception of following + nature is so largely a protest, is the outcome of attempts to force + children directly into the mold of grown-up standards. + </p> + <p> + In conclusion, we note that the early history of the idea of following + nature combined two factors which had no inherent connection with one + another. Before the time of Rousseau educational reformers had been + inclined to urge the importance of education by ascribing practically + unlimited power to it. All the differences between peoples and between + classes and persons among the same people were said to be due to + differences of training, of exercise, and practice. Originally, mind, + reason, understanding is, for all practical purposes, the same in all. + This essential identity of mind means the essential equality of all and + the possibility of bringing them all to the same level. As a protest + against this view, the doctrine of accord with nature meant a much less + formal and abstract view of mind and its powers. It substituted specific + instincts and impulses and physiological capacities, differing from + individual to individual (just as they differ, as Rousseau pointed out, + even in dogs of the same litter), for abstract faculties of discernment, + memory, and generalization. Upon this side, the doctrine of educative + accord with nature has been reinforced by the development of modern + biology, physiology, and psychology. It means, in effect, that great as is + the significance of nurture, of modification, and transformation through + direct educational effort, nature, or unlearned capacities, affords the + foundation and ultimate resources for such nurture. On the other hand, the + doctrine of following nature was a political dogma. It meant a rebellion + against existing social institutions, customs, and ideals (See ante, p. + 91). Rousseau's statement that everything is good as it comes from the + hands of the Creator has its signification only in its contrast with the + concluding part of the same sentence: "Everything degenerates in the hands + of man." And again he says: "Natural man has an absolute value; he is a + numerical unit, a complete integer and has no relation save to himself and + to his fellow man. Civilized man is only a relative unit, the numerator of + a fraction whose value depends upon its dominator, its relation to the + integral body of society. Good political institutions are those which make + a man unnatural." It is upon this conception of the artificial and harmful + character of organized social life as it now exists 2 that he rested the + notion that nature not merely furnishes prime forces which initiate growth + but also its plan and goal. That evil institutions and customs work almost + automatically to give a wrong education which the most careful schooling + cannot offset is true enough; but the conclusion is not to education apart + from the environment, but to provide an environment in which native powers + will be put to better uses. + </p> + <p> + 2. Social Efficiency as Aim. A conception which made nature supply the end + of a true education and society the end of an evil one, could hardly fail + to call out a protest. The opposing emphasis took the form of a doctrine + that the business of education is to supply precisely what nature fails to + secure; namely, habituation of an individual to social control; + subordination of natural powers to social rules. It is not surprising to + find that the value in the idea of social efficiency resides largely in + its protest against the points at which the doctrine of natural + development went astray; while its misuse comes when it is employed to + slur over the truth in that conception. It is a fact that we must look to + the activities and achievements of associated life to find what the + development of power—that is to say, efficiency—means. The + error is in implying that we must adopt measures of subordination rather + than of utilization to secure efficiency. The doctrine is rendered adequate + when we recognize that social efficiency is attained not by negative + constraint but by positive use of native individual capacities in + occupations having a social meaning. (1) Translated into specific aims, + social efficiency indicates the importance of industrial competency. + Persons cannot live without means of subsistence; the ways in which these + means are employed and consumed have a profound influence upon all the + relationships of persons to one another. If an individual is not able to + earn his own living and that of the children dependent upon him, he is a + drag or parasite upon the activities of others. He misses for himself one + of the most educative experiences of life. If he is not trained in the + right use of the products of industry, there is grave danger that he may + deprave himself and injure others in his possession of wealth. No scheme + of education can afford to neglect such basic considerations. Yet in the + name of higher and more spiritual ideals, the arrangements for higher + education have often not only neglected them, but looked at them with + scorn as beneath the level of educative concern. With the change from an + oligarchical to a democratic society, it is natural that the significance + of an education which should have as a result ability to make one's way + economically in the world, and to manage economic resources usefully + instead of for mere display and luxury, should receive emphasis. + </p> + <p> + There is, however, grave danger that in insisting upon this end, existing + economic conditions and standards will be accepted as final. A democratic + criterion requires us to develop capacity to the point of competency to + choose and make its own career. This principle is violated when the + attempt is made to fit individuals in advance for definite industrial + callings, selected not on the basis of trained original capacities, but on + that of the wealth or social status of parents. As a matter of fact, + industry at the present time undergoes rapid and abrupt changes through + the evolution of new inventions. New industries spring up, and old ones + are revolutionized. Consequently an attempt to train for too specific a + mode of efficiency defeats its own purpose. When the occupation changes + its methods, such individuals are left behind with even less ability to + readjust themselves than if they had a less definite training. But, most + of all, the present industrial constitution of society is, like every + society which has ever existed, full of inequities. It is the aim of + progressive education to take part in correcting unfair privilege and + unfair deprivation, not to perpetuate them. Wherever social control means + subordination of individual activities to class authority, there is danger + that industrial education will be dominated by acceptance of the status + quo. Differences of economic opportunity then dictate what the future + callings of individuals are to be. We have an unconscious revival of the + defects of the Platonic scheme (ante, p. 89) without its enlightened + method of selection. + </p> + <p> + (2) Civic efficiency, or good citizenship. It is, of course, arbitrary to + separate industrial competency from capacity in good citizenship. But the + latter term may be used to indicate a number of qualifications which are + vaguer than vocational ability. These traits run from whatever make an + individual a more agreeable companion to citizenship in the political + sense: it denotes ability to judge men and measures wisely and to take a + determining part in making as well as obeying laws. The aim of civic + efficiency has at least the merit of protecting us from the notion of a + training of mental power at large. It calls attention to the fact that + power must be relative to doing something, and to the fact that the things + which most need to be done are things which involve one's relationships + with others. + </p> + <p> + Here again we have to be on guard against understanding the aim too + narrowly. An over-definite interpretation would at certain periods have + excluded scientific discoveries, in spite of the fact that in the last + analysis security of social progress depends upon them. For scientific men + would have been thought to be mere theoretical dreamers, totally lacking + in social efficiency. It must be borne in mind that ultimately social + efficiency means neither more nor less than capacity to share in a give + and take of experience. It covers all that makes one's own experience more + worth while to others, and all that enables one to participate more richly + in the worthwhile experiences of others. Ability to produce and to enjoy + art, capacity for recreation, the significant utilization of leisure, are + more important elements in it than elements conventionally associated + oftentimes with citizenship. In the broadest sense, social efficiency is + nothing less than that socialization of mind which is actively concerned + in making experiences more communicable; in breaking down the barriers of + social stratification which make individuals impervious to the interests + of others. When social efficiency is confined to the service rendered by + overt acts, its chief constituent (because its only guarantee) is omitted,—intelligent + sympathy or good will. For sympathy as a desirable quality is something + more than mere feeling; it is a cultivated imagination for what men have + in common and a rebellion at whatever unnecessarily divides them. What is + sometimes called a benevolent interest in others may be but an unwitting + mask for an attempt to dictate to them what their good shall be, instead + of an endeavor to free them so that they may seek and find the good of + their own choice. Social efficiency, even social service, are hard and + metallic things when severed from an active acknowledgment of the + diversity of goods which life may afford to different persons, and from + faith in the social utility of encouraging every individual to make his + own choice intelligent. + </p> + <p> + 3. Culture as Aim. Whether or not social efficiency is an aim which is + consistent with culture turns upon these considerations. Culture means at + least something cultivated, something ripened; it is opposed to the raw + and crude. When the "natural" is identified with this rawness, culture is + opposed to what is called natural development. Culture is also something + personal; it is cultivation with respect to appreciation of ideas and art + and broad human interests. When efficiency is identified with a narrow + range of acts, instead of with the spirit and meaning of activity, culture + is opposed to efficiency. Whether called culture or complete development + of personality, the outcome is identical with the true meaning of social + efficiency whenever attention is given to what is unique in an individual—and + he would not be an individual if there were not something incommensurable + about him. Its opposite is the mediocre, the average. Whenever distinctive + quality is developed, distinction of personality results, and with it + greater promise for a social service which goes beyond the supply in + quantity of material commodities. For how can there be a society really + worth serving unless it is constituted of individuals of significant + personal qualities? + </p> + <p> + The fact is that the opposition of high worth of personality to social + efficiency is a product of a feudally organized society with its rigid + division of inferior and superior. The latter are supposed to have time + and opportunity to develop themselves as human beings; the former are + confined to providing external products. When social efficiency as + measured by product or output is urged as an ideal in a would-be + democratic society, it means that the depreciatory estimate of the masses + characteristic of an aristocratic community is accepted and carried over. + But if democracy has a moral and ideal meaning, it is that a social return + be demanded from all and that opportunity for development of distinctive + capacities be afforded all. The separation of the two aims in education is + fatal to democracy; the adoption of the narrower meaning of efficiency + deprives it of its essential justification. + </p> + <p> + The aim of efficiency (like any educational aim) must be included within + the process of experience. When it is measured by tangible external + products, and not by the achieving of a distinctively valuable experience, + it becomes materialistic. Results in the way of commodities which may be + the outgrowth of an efficient personality are, in the strictest sense, + by-products of education: by-products which are inevitable and important, + but nevertheless by-products. To set up an external aim strengthens by + reaction the false conception of culture which identifies it with + something purely "inner." And the idea of perfecting an "inner" + personality is a sure sign of social divisions. What is called inner is + simply that which does not connect with others—which is not capable + of free and full communication. What is termed spiritual culture has + usually been futile, with something rotten about it, just because it has + been conceived as a thing which a man might have internally—and + therefore exclusively. What one is as a person is what one is as + associated with others, in a free give and take of intercourse. This + transcends both the efficiency which consists in supplying products to + others and the culture which is an exclusive refinement and polish. + </p> + <p> + Any individual has missed his calling, farmer, physician, teacher, + student, who does not find that the accomplishments of results of value to + others is an accompaniment of a process of experience inherently worth + while. Why then should it be thought that one must take his choice between + sacrificing himself to doing useful things for others, or sacrificing them + to pursuit of his own exclusive ends, whether the saving of his own soul + or the building of an inner spiritual life and personality? What happens + is that since neither of these things is persistently possible, we get a + compromise and an alternation. One tries each course by turns. There is no + greater tragedy than that so much of the professedly spiritual and + religious thought of the world has emphasized the two ideals of + self-sacrifice and spiritual self-perfecting instead of throwing its + weight against this dualism of life. The dualism is too deeply established + to be easily overthrown; for that reason, it is the particular task of + education at the present time to struggle in behalf of an aim in which + social efficiency and personal culture are synonyms instead of + antagonists. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM9"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. General or comprehensive aims are points of view for surveying + </h2> + <p> + the specific problems of education. Consequently it is a test of the value + of the manner in which any large end is stated to see if it will translate + readily and consistently into the procedures which are suggested by + another. We have applied this test to three general aims: Development + according to nature, social efficiency, and culture or personal mental + enrichment. In each case we have seen that the aims when partially stated + come into conflict with each other. The partial statement of natural + development takes the primitive powers in an alleged spontaneous + development as the end-all. From this point of view training which renders + them useful to others is an abnormal constraint; one which profoundly + modifies them through deliberate nurture is corrupting. But when we + recognize that natural activities mean native activities which develop + only through the uses in which they are nurtured, the conflict disappears. + Similarly a social efficiency which is defined in terms of rendering + external service to others is of necessity opposed to the aim of enriching + the meaning of experience, while a culture which is taken to consist in an + internal refinement of a mind is opposed to a socialized disposition. But + social efficiency as an educational purpose should mean cultivation of + power to join freely and fully in shared or common activities. This is + impossible without culture, while it brings a reward in culture, because + one cannot share in intercourse with others without learning—without + getting a broader point of view and perceiving things of which one would + otherwise be ignorant. And there is perhaps no better definition of + culture than that it is the capacity for constantly expanding the range + and accuracy of one's perception of meanings. + </p> + <h3> + 1 Donaldson, Growth of Brain, p. 356. + </h3> + <p> + 2 We must not forget that Rousseau had the idea of a radically different + sort of society, a fraternal society whose end should be identical with + the good of all its members, which he thought to be as much better than + existing states as these are worse than the state of nature. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0010"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Ten: Interest and Discipline + </h2> + <p> + 1. The Meaning of the Terms. We have already noticed the difference in the + attitude of a spectator and of an agent or participant. The former is + indifferent to what is going on; one result is just as good as another, + since each is just something to look at. The latter is bound up with what + is going on; its outcome makes a difference to him. His fortunes are more + or less at stake in the issue of events. Consequently he does whatever he + can to influence the direction present occurrences take. One is like a man + in a prison cell watching the rain out of the window; it is all the same + to him. The other is like a man who has planned an outing for the next day + which continuing rain will frustrate. He cannot, to be sure, by his + present reactions affect to-morrow's weather, but he may take some steps + which will influence future happenings, if only to postpone the proposed + picnic. If a man sees a carriage coming which may run over him, if he + cannot stop its movement, he can at least get out of the way if he + foresees the consequence in time. In many instances, he can intervene even + more directly. The attitude of a participant in the course of affairs is + thus a double one: there is solicitude, anxiety concerning future + consequences, and a tendency to act to assure better, and avert worse, + consequences. There are words which denote this attitude: concern, + interest. These words suggest that a person is bound up with the + possibilities inhering in objects; that he is accordingly on the lookout + for what they are likely to do to him; and that, on the basis of his + expectation or foresight, he is eager to act so as to give things one turn + rather than another. Interest and aims, concern and purpose, are + necessarily connected. Such words as aim, intent, end, emphasize the + results which are wanted and striven for; they take for granted the + personal attitude of solicitude and attentive eagerness. Such words as + interest, affection, concern, motivation, emphasize the bearing of what is + foreseen upon the individual's fortunes, and his active desire to act to + secure a possible result. They take for granted the objective changes. But + the difference is but one of emphasis; the meaning that is shaded in one + set of words is illuminated in the other. What is anticipated is objective + and impersonal; to-morrow's rain; the possibility of being run over. But + for an active being, a being who partakes of the consequences instead of + standing aloof from them, there is at the same time a personal response. + The difference imaginatively foreseen makes a present difference, which + finds expression in solicitude and effort. While such words as affection, + concern, and motive indicate an attitude of personal preference, they are + always attitudes toward objects—toward what is foreseen. We may call + the phase of objective foresight intellectual, and the phase of personal + concern emotional and volitional, but there is no separation in the facts + of the situation. + </p> + <p> + Such a separation could exist only if the personal attitudes ran their + course in a world by themselves. But they are always responses to what is + going on in the situation of which they are a part, and their successful + or unsuccessful expression depends upon their interaction with other + changes. Life activities flourish and fail only in connection with changes + of the environment. They are literally bound up with these changes; our + desires, emotions, and affections are but various ways in which our doings + are tied up with the doings of things and persons about us. Instead of + marking a purely personal or subjective realm, separated from the + objective and impersonal, they indicate the non-existence of such a + separate world. They afford convincing evidence that changes in things are + not alien to the activities of a self, and that the career and welfare of + the self are bound up with the movement of persons and things. Interest, + concern, mean that self and world are engaged with each other in a + developing situation. + </p> + <p> + The word interest, in its ordinary usage, expresses (i) the whole state of + active development, (ii) the objective results that are foreseen and + wanted, and (iii) the personal emotional inclination. + </p> + <p> + (I) An occupation, employment, pursuit, business is often referred to as + an interest. Thus we say that a man's interest is politics, or journalism, + or philanthropy, or archaeology, or collecting Japanese prints, or + banking. + </p> + <p> + (ii) By an interest we also mean the point at which an object touches or + engages a man; the point where it influences him. In some legal + transactions a man has to prove "interest" in order to have a standing at + court. He has to show that some proposed step concerns his affairs. A + silent partner has an interest in a business, although he takes no active + part in its conduct because its prosperity or decline affects his profits + and liabilities. + </p> + <p> + (iii) When we speak of a man as interested in this or that the emphasis + falls directly upon his personal attitude. To be interested is to be + absorbed in, wrapped up in, carried away by, some object. To take an + interest is to be on the alert, to care about, to be attentive. We say of + an interested person both that he has lost himself in some affair and that + he has found himself in it. Both terms express the engrossment of the self + in an object. + </p> + <p> + When the place of interest in education is spoken of in a depreciatory + way, it will be found that the second of the meanings mentioned is first + exaggerated and then isolated. Interest is taken to mean merely the effect + of an object upon personal advantage or disadvantage, success or failure. + Separated from any objective development of affairs, these are reduced to + mere personal states of pleasure or pain. Educationally, it then follows + that to attach importance to interest means to attach some feature of + seductiveness to material otherwise indifferent; to secure attention and + effort by offering a bribe of pleasure. This procedure is properly + stigmatized as "soft" pedagogy; as a "soup-kitchen" theory of education. + </p> + <p> + But the objection is based upon the fact—or assumption—that + the forms of skill to be acquired and the subject matter to be + appropriated have no interest on their own account: in other words, they + are supposed to be irrelevant to the normal activities of the pupils. The + remedy is not in finding fault with the doctrine of interest, any more + than it is to search for some pleasant bait that may be hitched to the + alien material. It is to discover objects and modes of action, which are + connected with present powers. The function of this material in engaging + activity and carrying it on consistently and continuously is its interest. + If the material operates in this way, there is no call either to hunt for + devices which will make it interesting or to appeal to arbitrary, + semi-coerced effort. + </p> + <p> + The word interest suggests, etymologically, what is between,—that + which connects two things otherwise distant. In education, the distance + covered may be looked at as temporal. The fact that a process takes time + to mature is so obvious a fact that we rarely make it explicit. We + overlook the fact that in growth there is ground to be covered between an + initial stage of process and the completing period; that there is + something intervening. In learning, the present powers of the pupil are + the initial stage; the aim of the teacher represents the remote limit. + Between the two lie means—that is middle conditions:—acts to + be performed; difficulties to be overcome; appliances to be used. Only + through them, in the literal time sense, will the initial activities reach + a satisfactory consummation. + </p> + <p> + These intermediate conditions are of interest precisely because the + development of existing activities into the foreseen and desired end + depends upon them. To be means for the achieving of present tendencies, to + be "between" the agent and his end, to be of interest, are different names + for the same thing. When material has to be made interesting, it signifies + that as presented, it lacks connection with purposes and present power: or + that if the connection be there, it is not perceived. To make it + interesting by leading one to realize the connection that exists is simply + good sense; to make it interesting by extraneous and artificial + inducements deserves all the bad names which have been applied to the + doctrine of interest in education. + </p> + <p> + So much for the meaning of the term interest. Now for that of discipline. + Where an activity takes time, where many means and obstacles lie between + its initiation and completion, deliberation and persistence are required. + It is obvious that a very large part of the everyday meaning of will is + precisely the deliberate or conscious disposition to persist and endure in + a planned course of action in spite of difficulties and contrary + solicitations. A man of strong will, in the popular usage of the words, is + a man who is neither fickle nor half-hearted in achieving chosen ends. His + ability is executive; that is, he persistently and energetically strives + to execute or carry out his aims. A weak will is unstable as water. + </p> + <p> + Clearly there are two factors in will. One has to do with the foresight of + results, the other with the depth of hold the foreseen outcome has upon + the person. + </p> + <p> + (I) Obstinacy is persistence but it is not strength of volition. Obstinacy + may be mere animal inertia and insensitiveness. A man keeps on doing a + thing just because he has got started, not because of any clearly + thought-out purpose. In fact, the obstinate man generally declines + (although he may not be quite aware of his refusal) to make clear to + himself what his proposed end is; he has a feeling that if he allowed + himself to get a clear and full idea of it, it might not be worth while. + Stubbornness shows itself even more in reluctance to criticize ends which + present themselves than it does in persistence and energy in use of means + to achieve the end. The really executive man is a man who ponders his + ends, who makes his ideas of the results of his actions as clear and full + as possible. The people we called weak-willed or self-indulgent always + deceive themselves as to the consequences of their acts. They pick out + some feature which is agreeable and neglect all attendant circumstances. + When they begin to act, the disagreeable results they ignored begin to + show themselves. They are discouraged, or complain of being thwarted in + their good purpose by a hard fate, and shift to some other line of action. + That the primary difference between strong and feeble volition is + intellectual, consisting in the degree of persistent firmness and fullness + with which consequences are thought out, cannot be over-emphasized. + </p> + <p> + (ii) There is, of course, such a thing as a speculative tracing out of + results. Ends are then foreseen, but they do not lay deep hold of a + person. They are something to look at and for curiosity to play with + rather than something to achieve. There is no such thing as + over-intellectuality, but there is such a thing as a one-sided + intellectuality. A person "takes it out" as we say in considering the + consequences of proposed lines of action. A certain flabbiness of fiber + prevents the contemplated object from gripping him and engaging him in + action. And most persons are naturally diverted from a proposed course of + action by unusual, unforeseen obstacles, or by presentation of inducements + to an action that is directly more agreeable. + </p> + <p> + A person who is trained to consider his actions, to undertake them + deliberately, is in so far forth disciplined. Add to this ability a power + to endure in an intelligently chosen course in face of distraction, + confusion, and difficulty, and you have the essence of discipline. + Discipline means power at command; mastery of the resources available for + carrying through the action undertaken. To know what one is to do and to + move to do it promptly and by use of the requisite means is to be + disciplined, whether we are thinking of an army or a mind. Discipline is + positive. To cow the spirit, to subdue inclination, to compel obedience, + to mortify the flesh, to make a subordinate perform an uncongenial task—these + things are or are not disciplinary according as they do or do not tend to + the development of power to recognize what one is about and to persistence + in accomplishment. + </p> + <p> + It is hardly necessary to press the point that interest and discipline are + connected, not opposed. + </p> + <p> + (i) Even the more purely intellectual phase of trained power—apprehension + of what one is doing as exhibited in consequences—is not possible + without interest. Deliberation will be perfunctory and superficial where + there is no interest. Parents and teachers often complain—and + correctly—that children "do not want to hear, or want to + understand." Their minds are not upon the subject precisely because it + does not touch them; it does not enter into their concerns. This is a + state of things that needs to be remedied, but the remedy is not in the + use of methods which increase indifference and aversion. Even punishing a + child for inattention is one way of trying to make him realize that the + matter is not a thing of complete unconcern; it is one way of arousing + "interest," or bringing about a sense of connection. In the long run, its + value is measured by whether it supplies a mere physical excitation to act + in the way desired by the adult or whether it leads the child "to think"—that + is, to reflect upon his acts and impregnate them with aims. + </p> + <p> + (ii) That interest is requisite for executive persistence is even more + obvious. Employers do not advertise for workmen who are not interested in + what they are doing. If one were engaging a lawyer or a doctor, it would + never occur to one to reason that the person engaged would stick to his + work more conscientiously if it was so uncongenial to him that he did it + merely from a sense of obligation. Interest measures—or rather is—the + depth of the grip which the foreseen end has upon one, moving one to act + for its realization. + </p> + <p> + 2. The Importance of the Idea of Interest in Education. Interest + represents the moving force of objects—whether perceived or + presented in imagination—in any experience having a purpose. In the + concrete, the value of recognizing the dynamic place of interest in an + educative development is that it leads to considering individual children + in their specific capabilities, needs, and preferences. One who recognizes + the importance of interest will not assume that all minds work in the same + way because they happen to have the same teacher and textbook. Attitudes + and methods of approach and response vary with the specific appeal the + same material makes, this appeal itself varying with difference of natural + aptitude, of past experience, of plan of life, and so on. But the facts of + interest also supply considerations of general value to the philosophy of + education. Rightly understood, they put us on our guard against certain + conceptions of mind and of subject matter which have had great vogue in + philosophic thought in the past, and which exercise a serious hampering + influence upon the conduct of instruction and discipline. Too frequently + mind is set over the world of things and facts to be known; it is regarded + as something existing in isolation, with mental states and operations that + exist independently. Knowledge is then regarded as an external application + of purely mental existences to the things to be known, or else as a result + of the impressions which this outside subject matter makes on mind, or as + a combination of the two. Subject matter is then regarded as something + complete in itself; it is just something to be learned or known, either by + the voluntary application of mind to it or through the impressions it + makes on mind. + </p> + <p> + The facts of interest show that these conceptions are mythical. Mind + appears in experience as ability to respond to present stimuli on the + basis of anticipation of future possible consequences, and with a view to + controlling the kind of consequences that are to take place. The things, + the subject matter known, consist of whatever is recognized as having a + bearing upon the anticipated course of events, whether assisting or + retarding it. These statements are too formal to be very intelligible. An + illustration may clear up their significance. You are engaged in a certain + occupation, say writing with a typewriter. If you are an expert, your + formed habits take care of the physical movements and leave your thoughts + free to consider your topic. Suppose, however, you are not skilled, or + that, even if you are, the machine does not work well. You then have to + use intelligence. You do not wish to strike the keys at random and let the + consequences be what they may; you wish to record certain words in a given + order so as to make sense. You attend to the keys, to what you have + written, to your movements, to the ribbon or the mechanism of the machine. + Your attention is not distributed indifferently and miscellaneously to any + and every detail. It is centered upon whatever has a bearing upon the + effective pursuit of your occupation. Your look is ahead, and you are + concerned to note the existing facts because and in so far as they are + factors in the achievement of the result intended. You have to find out + what your resources are, what conditions are at command, and what the + difficulties and obstacles are. This foresight and this survey with + reference to what is foreseen constitute mind. Action that does not + involve such a forecast of results and such an examination of means and + hindrances is either a matter of habit or else it is blind. In neither + case is it intelligent. To be vague and uncertain as to what is intended + and careless in observation of conditions of its realization is to be, in + that degree, stupid or partially intelligent. + </p> + <p> + If we recur to the case where mind is not concerned with the physical + manipulation of the instruments but with what one intends to write, the + case is the same. There is an activity in process; one is taken up with + the development of a theme. Unless one writes as a phonograph talks, this + means intelligence; namely, alertness in foreseeing the various + conclusions to which present data and considerations are tending, together + with continually renewed observation and recollection to get hold of the + subject matter which bears upon the conclusions to be reached. The whole + attitude is one of concern with what is to be, and with what is so far as + the latter enters into the movement toward the end. Leave out the + direction which depends upon foresight of possible future results, and + there is no intelligence in present behavior. Let there be imaginative + forecast but no attention to the conditions upon which its attainment + depends, and there is self-deception or idle dreaming—abortive + intelligence. + </p> + <p> + If this illustration is typical, mind is not a name for something complete + by itself; it is a name for a course of action in so far as that is + intelligently directed; in so far, that is to say, as aims, ends, enter + into it, with selection of means to further the attainment of aims. + Intelligence is not a peculiar possession which a person owns; but a + person is intelligent in so far as the activities in which he plays a part + have the qualities mentioned. Nor are the activities in which a person + engages, whether intelligently or not, exclusive properties of himself; + they are something in which he engages and partakes. Other things, the + independent changes of other things and persons, cooperate and hinder. The + individual's act may be initial in a course of events, but the outcome + depends upon the interaction of his response with energies supplied by + other agencies. Conceive mind as anything but one factor partaking along + with others in the production of consequences, and it becomes meaningless. + </p> + <p> + The problem of instruction is thus that of finding material which will + engage a person in specific activities having an aim or purpose of moment + or interest to him, and dealing with things not as gymnastic appliances + but as conditions for the attainment of ends. The remedy for the evils + attending the doctrine of formal discipline previously spoken of, is not + to be found by substituting a doctrine of specialized disciplines, but by + reforming the notion of mind and its training. Discovery of typical modes + of activity, whether play or useful occupations, in which individuals are + concerned, in whose outcome they recognize they have something at stake, + and which cannot be carried through without reflection and use of judgment + to select material of observation and recollection, is the remedy. In + short, the root of the error long prevalent in the conception of training + of mind consists in leaving out of account movements of things to future + results in which an individual shares, and in the direction of which + observation, imagination, and memory are enlisted. It consists in + regarding mind as complete in itself, ready to be directly applied to a + present material. + </p> + <p> + In historic practice the error has cut two ways. On one hand, it has + screened and protected traditional studies and methods of teaching from + intelligent criticism and needed revisions. To say that they are + "disciplinary" has safeguarded them from all inquiry. It has not been + enough to show that they were of no use in life or that they did not + really contribute to the cultivation of the self. That they were + "disciplinary" stifled every question, subdued every doubt, and removed + the subject from the realm of rational discussion. By its nature, the + allegation could not be checked up. Even when discipline did not accrue as + matter of fact, when the pupil even grew in laxity of application and lost + power of intelligent self-direction, the fault lay with him, not with the + study or the methods of teaching. His failure was but proof that he needed + more discipline, and thus afforded a reason for retaining the old methods. + The responsibility was transferred from the educator to the pupil because + the material did not have to meet specific tests; it did not have to be + shown that it fulfilled any particular need or served any specific end. It + was designed to discipline in general, and if it failed, it was because + the individual was unwilling to be disciplined. In the other direction, + the tendency was towards a negative conception of discipline, instead of + an identification of it with growth in constructive power of achievement. + As we have already seen, will means an attitude toward the future, toward + the production of possible consequences, an attitude involving effort to + foresee clearly and comprehensively the probable results of ways of + acting, and an active identification with some anticipated consequences. + Identification of will, or effort, with mere strain, results when a mind + is set up, endowed with powers that are only to be applied to existing + material. A person just either will or will not apply himself to the + matter in hand. The more indifferent the subject matter, the less concern + it has for the habits and preferences of the individual, the more demand + there is for an effort to bring the mind to bear upon it—and hence + the more discipline of will. To attend to material because there is + something to be done in which the person is concerned is not disciplinary + in this view; not even if it results in a desirable increase of + constructive power. Application just for the sake of application, for the + sake of training, is alone disciplinary. This is more likely to occur if + the subject matter presented is uncongenial, for then there is no motive + (so it is supposed) except the acknowledgment of duty or the value of + discipline. The logical result is expressed with literal truth in the + words of an American humorist: "It makes no difference what you teach a + boy so long as he doesn't like it." + </p> + <p> + The counterpart of the isolation of mind from activities dealing with + objects to accomplish ends is isolation of the subject matter to be + learned. In the traditional schemes of education, subject matter means so + much material to be studied. Various branches of study represent so many + independent branches, each having its principles of arrangement complete + within itself. History is one such group of facts; algebra another; + geography another, and so on till we have run through the entire + curriculum. Having a ready-made existence on their own account, their + relation to mind is exhausted in what they furnish it to acquire. This + idea corresponds to the conventional practice in which the program of + school work, for the day, month, and successive years, consists of + "studies" all marked off from one another, and each supposed to be + complete by itself—for educational purposes at least. + </p> + <p> + Later on a chapter is devoted to the special consideration of the meaning + of the subject matter of instruction. At this point, we need only to say + that, in contrast with the traditional theory, anything which intelligence + studies represents things in the part which they play in the carrying + forward of active lines of interest. Just as one "studies" his typewriter + as part of the operation of putting it to use to effect results, so with + any fact or truth. It becomes an object of study—that is, of inquiry + and reflection—when it figures as a factor to be reckoned with in + the completion of a course of events in which one is engaged and by whose + outcome one is affected. Numbers are not objects of study just because + they are numbers already constituting a branch of learning called + mathematics, but because they represent qualities and relations of the + world in which our action goes on, because they are factors upon which the + accomplishment of our purposes depends. Stated thus broadly, the formula + may appear abstract. Translated into details, it means that the act of + learning or studying is artificial and ineffective in the degree in which + pupils are merely presented with a lesson to be learned. Study is + effectual in the degree in which the pupil realizes the place of the + numerical truth he is dealing with in carrying to fruition activities in + which he is concerned. This connection of an object and a topic with the + promotion of an activity having a purpose is the first and the last word + of a genuine theory of interest in education. + </p> + <p> + 3. Some Social Aspects of the Question. While the theoretical errors of + which we have been speaking have their expressions in the conduct of + schools, they are themselves the outcome of conditions of social life. A + change confined to the theoretical conviction of educators will not remove + the difficulties, though it should render more effective efforts to modify + social conditions. Men's fundamental attitudes toward the world are fixed + by the scope and qualities of the activities in which they partake. The + ideal of interest is exemplified in the artistic attitude. Art is neither + merely internal nor merely external; merely mental nor merely physical. + Like every mode of action, it brings about changes in the world. The + changes made by some actions (those which by contrast may be called + mechanical) are external; they are shifting things about. No ideal reward, + no enrichment of emotion and intellect, accompanies them. Others + contribute to the maintenance of life, and to its external adornment and + display. Many of our existing social activities, industrial and political, + fall in these two classes. Neither the people who engage in them, nor + those who are directly affected by them, are capable of full and free + interest in their work. Because of the lack of any purpose in the work for + the one doing it, or because of the restricted character of its aim, + intelligence is not adequately engaged. The same conditions force many + people back upon themselves. They take refuge in an inner play of + sentiment and fancies. They are aesthetic but not artistic, since their + feelings and ideas are turned upon themselves, instead of being methods in + acts which modify conditions. Their mental life is sentimental; an + enjoyment of an inner landscape. Even the pursuit of science may become an + asylum of refuge from the hard conditions of life—not a temporary + retreat for the sake of recuperation and clarification in future dealings + with the world. The very word art may become associated not with specific + transformation of things, making them more significant for mind, but with + stimulations of eccentric fancy and with emotional indulgences. The + separation and mutual contempt of the "practical" man and the man of + theory or culture, the divorce of fine and industrial arts, are + indications of this situation. Thus interest and mind are either narrowed, + or else made perverse. Compare what was said in an earlier chapter about + the one-sided meanings which have come to attach to the ideas of + efficiency and of culture. + </p> + <p> + This state of affairs must exist so far as society is organized on a basis + of division between laboring classes and leisure classes. The intelligence + of those who do things becomes hard in the unremitting struggle with + things; that of those freed from the discipline of occupation becomes + luxurious and effeminate. Moreover, the majority of human beings still + lack economic freedom. Their pursuits are fixed by accident and necessity + of circumstance; they are not the normal expression of their own powers + interacting with the needs and resources of the environment. Our economic + conditions still relegate many men to a servile status. As a consequence, + the intelligence of those in control of the practical situation is not + liberal. Instead of playing freely upon the subjugation of the world for + human ends, it is devoted to the manipulation of other men for ends that + are non-human in so far as they are exclusive. + </p> + <p> + This state of affairs explains many things in our historic educational + traditions. It throws light upon the clash of aims manifested in different + portions of the school system; the narrowly utilitarian character of most + elementary education, and the narrowly disciplinary or cultural character + of most higher education. It accounts for the tendency to isolate + intellectual matters till knowledge is scholastic, academic, and + professionally technical, and for the widespread conviction that liberal + education is opposed to the requirements of an education which shall count + in the vocations of life. But it also helps define the peculiar problem of + present education. The school cannot immediately escape from the ideals + set by prior social conditions. But it should contribute through the type + of intellectual and emotional disposition which it forms to the + improvement of those conditions. And just here the true conceptions of + interest and discipline are full of significance. Persons whose interests + have been enlarged and intelligence trained by dealing with things and + facts in active occupations having a purpose (whether in play or work) + will be those most likely to escape the alternatives of an academic and + aloof knowledge and a hard, narrow, and merely "practical" practice. To + organize education so that natural active tendencies shall be fully + enlisted in doing something, while seeing to it that the doing requires + observation, the acquisition of information, and the use of a constructive + imagination, is what most needs to be done to improve social conditions. + To oscillate between drill exercises that strive to attain efficiency in + outward doing without the use of intelligence, and an accumulation of + knowledge that is supposed to be an ultimate end in itself, means that + education accepts the present social conditions as final, and thereby + takes upon itself the responsibility for perpetuating them. A + reorganization of education so that learning takes place in connection + with the intelligent carrying forward of purposeful activities is a slow + work. It can only be accomplished piecemeal, a step at a time. But this is + not a reason for nominally accepting one educational philosophy and + accommodating ourselves in practice to another. It is a challenge to + undertake the task of reorganization courageously and to keep at it + persistently. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM10"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. Interest and discipline are correlative aspects of activity + </h2> + <p> + having an aim. Interest means that one is identified with the objects + which define the activity and which furnish the means and obstacles to its + realization. Any activity with an aim implies a distinction between an + earlier incomplete phase and later completing phase; it implies also + intermediate steps. To have an interest is to take things as entering into + such a continuously developing situation, instead of taking them in + isolation. The time difference between the given incomplete state of + affairs and the desired fulfillment exacts effort in transformation, it + demands continuity of attention and endurance. This attitude is what is + practically meant by will. Discipline or development of power of + continuous attention is its fruit. The significance of this doctrine for + the theory of education is twofold. On the one hand it protects us from + the notion that mind and mental states are something complete in + themselves, which then happen to be applied to some ready-made objects and + topics so that knowledge results. It shows that mind and intelligent or + purposeful engagement in a course of action into which things enter are + identical. Hence to develop and train mind is to provide an environment + which induces such activity. On the other side, it protects us from the + notion that subject matter on its side is something isolated and + independent. It shows that subject matter of learning is identical with + all the objects, ideas, and principles which enter as resources or + obstacles into the continuous intentional pursuit of a course of action. + The developing course of action, whose end and conditions are perceived, + is the unity which holds together what are often divided into an + independent mind on one side and an independent world of objects and facts + on the other. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0011"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Eleven: Experience and Thinking + </h2> + <p> + 1. The Nature of Experience. The nature of experience can be understood + only by noting that it includes an active and a passive element peculiarly + combined. On the active hand, experience is trying—a meaning which + is made explicit in the connected term experiment. On the passive, it is + undergoing. When we experience something we act upon it, we do something + with it; then we suffer or undergo the consequences. We do something to + the thing and then it does something to us in return: such is the peculiar + combination. The connection of these two phases of experience measures the + fruitfulness or value of the experience. Mere activity does not constitute + experience. It is dispersive, centrifugal, dissipating. Experience as + trying involves change, but change is meaningless transition unless it is + consciously connected with the return wave of consequences which flow from + it. When an activity is continued into the undergoing of consequences, + when the change made by action is reflected back into a change made in us, + the mere flux is loaded with significance. We learn something. It is not + experience when a child merely sticks his finger into a flame; it is + experience when the movement is connected with the pain which he undergoes + in consequence. Henceforth the sticking of the finger into flame means a + burn. Being burned is a mere physical change, like the burning of a stick + of wood, if it is not perceived as a consequence of some other action. + Blind and capricious impulses hurry us on heedlessly from one thing to + another. So far as this happens, everything is writ in water. There is + none of that cumulative growth which makes an experience in any vital + sense of that term. On the other hand, many things happen to us in the way + of pleasure and pain which we do not connect with any prior activity of + our own. They are mere accidents so far as we are concerned. There is no + before or after to such experience; no retrospect nor outlook, and + consequently no meaning. We get nothing which may be carried over to + foresee what is likely to happen next, and no gain in ability to adjust + ourselves to what is coming—no added control. Only by courtesy can + such an experience be called experience. To "learn from experience" is to + make a backward and forward connection between what we do to things and + what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. Under such conditions, + doing becomes a trying; an experiment with the world to find out what it + is like; the undergoing becomes instruction—discovery of the + connection of things. + </p> + <p> + Two conclusions important for education follow. (1) Experience is + primarily an active-passive affair; it is not primarily cognitive. But (2) + the measure of the value of an experience lies in the perception of + relationships or continuities to which it leads up. It includes cognition + in the degree in which it is cumulative or amounts to something, or has + meaning. In schools, those under instruction are too customarily looked + upon as acquiring knowledge as theoretical spectators, minds which + appropriate knowledge by direct energy of intellect. The very word pupil + has almost come to mean one who is engaged not in having fruitful + experiences but in absorbing knowledge directly. Something which is called + mind or consciousness is severed from the physical organs of activity. The + former is then thought to be purely intellectual and cognitive; the latter + to be an irrelevant and intruding physical factor. The intimate union of + activity and undergoing its consequences which leads to recognition of + meaning is broken; instead we have two fragments: mere bodily action on + one side, and meaning directly grasped by "spiritual" activity on the + other. + </p> + <p> + It would be impossible to state adequately the evil results which have + flowed from this dualism of mind and body, much less to exaggerate them. + Some of the more striking effects, may, however, be enumerated. (a) In + part bodily activity becomes an intruder. Having nothing, so it is + thought, to do with mental activity, it becomes a distraction, an evil to + be contended with. For the pupil has a body, and brings it to school along + with his mind. And the body is, of necessity, a wellspring of energy; it + has to do something. But its activities, not being utilized in occupation + with things which yield significant results, have to be frowned upon. They + lead the pupil away from the lesson with which his "mind" ought to be + occupied; they are sources of mischief. The chief source of the "problem + of discipline" in schools is that the teacher has often to spend the + larger part of the time in suppressing the bodily activities which take + the mind away from its material. A premium is put on physical quietude; on + silence, on rigid uniformity of posture and movement; upon a machine-like + simulation of the attitudes of intelligent interest. The teachers' + business is to hold the pupils up to these requirements and to punish the + inevitable deviations which occur. + </p> + <p> + The nervous strain and fatigue which result with both teacher and pupil + are a necessary consequence of the abnormality of the situation in which + bodily activity is divorced from the perception of meaning. Callous + indifference and explosions from strain alternate. The neglected body, + having no organized fruitful channels of activity, breaks forth, without + knowing why or how, into meaningless boisterousness, or settles into + equally meaningless fooling—both very different from the normal play + of children. Physically active children become restless and unruly; the + more quiescent, so-called conscientious ones spend what energy they have + in the negative task of keeping their instincts and active tendencies + suppressed, instead of in a positive one of constructive planning and + execution; they are thus educated not into responsibility for the + significant and graceful use of bodily powers, but into an enforced duty + not to give them free play. It may be seriously asserted that a chief + cause for the remarkable achievements of Greek education was that it was + never misled by false notions into an attempted separation of mind and + body. + </p> + <p> + (b) Even, however, with respect to the lessons which have to be learned by + the application of "mind," some bodily activities have to be used. The + senses—especially the eye and ear—have to be employed to take + in what the book, the map, the blackboard, and the teacher say. The lips + and vocal organs, and the hands, have to be used to reproduce in speech + and writing what has been stowed away. The senses are then regarded as a + kind of mysterious conduit through which information is conducted from the + external world into the mind; they are spoken of as gateways and avenues + of knowledge. To keep the eyes on the book and the ears open to the + teacher's words is a mysterious source of intellectual grace. Moreover, + reading, writing, and figuring—important school arts—demand + muscular or motor training. The muscles of eye, hand, and vocal organs + accordingly have to be trained to act as pipes for carrying knowledge back + out of the mind into external action. For it happens that using the + muscles repeatedly in the same way fixes in them an automatic tendency to + repeat. + </p> + <p> + The obvious result is a mechanical use of the bodily activities which (in + spite of the generally obtrusive and interfering character of the body in + mental action) have to be employed more or less. For the senses and + muscles are used not as organic participants in having an instructive + experience, but as external inlets and outlets of mind. Before the child + goes to school, he learns with his hand, eye, and ear, because they are + organs of the process of doing something from which meaning results. The + boy flying a kite has to keep his eye on the kite, and has to note the + various pressures of the string on his hand. His senses are avenues of + knowledge not because external facts are somehow "conveyed" to the brain, + but because they are used in doing something with a purpose. The qualities + of seen and touched things have a bearing on what is done, and are alertly + perceived; they have a meaning. But when pupils are expected to use their + eyes to note the form of words, irrespective of their meaning, in order to + reproduce them in spelling or reading, the resulting training is simply of + isolated sense organs and muscles. It is such isolation of an act from a + purpose which makes it mechanical. It is customary for teachers to urge + children to read with expression, so as to bring out the meaning. But if + they originally learned the sensory-motor technique of reading—the + ability to identify forms and to reproduce the sounds they stand for—by + methods which did not call for attention to meaning, a mechanical habit + was established which makes it difficult to read subsequently with + intelligence. The vocal organs have been trained to go their own way + automatically in isolation; and meaning cannot be tied on at will. + Drawing, singing, and writing may be taught in the same mechanical way; + for, we repeat, any way is mechanical which narrows down the bodily + activity so that a separation of body from mind—that is, from + recognition of meaning—is set up. Mathematics, even in its higher + branches, when undue emphasis is put upon the technique of calculation, + and science, when laboratory exercises are given for their own sake, + suffer from the same evil. + </p> + <p> + (c) On the intellectual side, the separation of "mind" from direct + occupation with things throws emphasis on things at the expense of + relations or connections. It is altogether too common to separate + perceptions and even ideas from judgments. The latter are thought to come + after the former in order to compare them. It is alleged that the mind + perceives things apart from relations; that it forms ideas of them in + isolation from their connections—with what goes before and comes + after. Then judgment or thought is called upon to combine the separated + items of "knowledge" so that their resemblance or causal connection shall + be brought out. As matter of fact, every perception and every idea is a + sense of the bearings, use, and cause, of a thing. We do not really know a + chair or have an idea of it by inventorying and enumerating its various + isolated qualities, but only by bringing these qualities into connection + with something else—the purpose which makes it a chair and not a + table; or its difference from the kind of chair we are accustomed to, or + the "period" which it represents, and so on. A wagon is not perceived when + all its parts are summed up; it is the characteristic connection of the + parts which makes it a wagon. And these connections are not those of mere + physical juxtaposition; they involve connection with the animals that draw + it, the things that are carried on it, and so on. Judgment is employed in + the perception; otherwise the perception is mere sensory excitation or + else a recognition of the result of a prior judgment, as in the case of + familiar objects. + </p> + <p> + Words, the counters for ideals, are, however, easily taken for ideas. And + in just the degree in which mental activity is separated from active + concern with the world, from doing something and connecting the doing with + what is undergone, words, symbols, come to take the place of ideas. The + substitution is the more subtle because some meaning is recognized. But we + are very easily trained to be content with a minimum of meaning, and to + fail to note how restricted is our perception of the relations which + confer significance. We get so thoroughly used to a kind of pseudo-idea, a + half perception, that we are not aware how half-dead our mental action is, + and how much keener and more extensive our observations and ideas would be + if we formed them under conditions of a vital experience which required us + to use judgment: to hunt for the connections of the thing dealt with. + There is no difference of opinion as to the theory of the matter. All + authorities agree that that discernment of relationships is the genuinely + intellectual matter; hence, the educative matter. The failure arises in + supposing that relationships can become perceptible without experience—without + that conjoint trying and undergoing of which we have spoken. It is assumed + that "mind" can grasp them if it will only give attention, and that this + attention may be given at will irrespective of the situation. Hence the + deluge of half-observations, of verbal ideas, and unassimilated + "knowledge" which afflicts the world. An ounce of experience is better + than a ton of theory simply because it is only in experience that any + theory has vital and verifiable significance. An experience, a very humble + experience, is capable of generating and carrying any amount of theory (or + intellectual content), but a theory apart from an experience cannot be + definitely grasped even as theory. It tends to become a mere verbal + formula, a set of catchwords used to render thinking, or genuine + theorizing, unnecessary and impossible. Because of our education we use + words, thinking they are ideas, to dispose of questions, the disposal + being in reality simply such an obscuring of perception as prevents us + from seeing any longer the difficulty. + </p> + <p> + 2. Reflection in Experience. Thought or reflection, as we have already + seen virtually if not explicitly, is the discernment of the relation + between what we try to do and what happens in consequence. No experience + having a meaning is possible without some element of thought. But we may + contrast two types of experience according to the proportion of reflection + found in them. All our experiences have a phase of "cut and try" in them—what + psychologists call the method of trial and error. We simply do something, + and when it fails, we do something else, and keep on trying till we hit + upon something which works, and then we adopt that method as a rule of + thumb measure in subsequent procedure. Some experiences have very little + else in them than this hit and miss or succeed process. We see that a + certain way of acting and a certain consequence are connected, but we do + not see how they are. We do not see the details of the connection; the + links are missing. Our discernment is very gross. In other cases we push + our observation farther. We analyze to see just what lies between so as to + bind together cause and effect, activity and consequence. This extension + of our insight makes foresight more accurate and comprehensive. The action + which rests simply upon the trial and error method is at the mercy of + circumstances; they may change so that the act performed does not operate + in the way it was expected to. But if we know in detail upon what the + result depends, we can look to see whether the required conditions are + there. The method extends our practical control. For if some of the + conditions are missing, we may, if we know what the needed antecedents for + an effect are, set to work to supply them; or, if they are such as to + produce undesirable effects as well, we may eliminate some of the + superfluous causes and economize effort. + </p> + <p> + In discovery of the detailed connections of our activities and what + happens in consequence, the thought implied in cut and try experience is + made explicit. Its quantity increases so that its proportionate value is + very different. Hence the quality of the experience changes; the change is + so significant that we may call this type of experience reflective—that + is, reflective par excellence. The deliberate cultivation of this phase of + thought constitutes thinking as a distinctive experience. Thinking, in + other words, is the intentional endeavor to discover specific connections + between something which we do and the consequences which result, so that + the two become continuous. Their isolation, and consequently their purely + arbitrary going together, is canceled; a unified developing situation + takes its place. The occurrence is now understood; it is explained; it is + reasonable, as we say, that the thing should happen as it does. + </p> + <p> + Thinking is thus equivalent to an explicit rendering of the intelligent + element in our experience. It makes it possible to act with an end in + view. It is the condition of our having aims. As soon as an infant begins + to expect he begins to use something which is now going on as a sign of + something to follow; he is, in however simple a fashion, judging. For he + takes one thing as evidence of something else, and so recognizes a + relationship. Any future development, however elaborate it may be, is only + an extending and a refining of this simple act of inference. All that the + wisest man can do is to observe what is going on more widely and more + minutely and then select more carefully from what is noted just those + factors which point to something to happen. The opposites, once more, to + thoughtful action are routine and capricious behavior. The former accepts + what has been customary as a full measure of possibility and omits to take + into account the connections of the particular things done. The latter + makes the momentary act a measure of value, and ignores the connections of + our personal action with the energies of the environment. It says, + virtually, "things are to be just as I happen to like them at this + instant," as routine says in effect "let things continue just as I have + found them in the past." Both refuse to acknowledge responsibility for the + future consequences which flow from present action. Reflection is the + acceptance of such responsibility. + </p> + <p> + The starting point of any process of thinking is something going on, + something which just as it stands is incomplete or unfulfilled. Its point, + its meaning lies literally in what it is going to be, in how it is going + to turn out. As this is written, the world is filled with the clang of + contending armies. For an active participant in the war, it is clear that + the momentous thing is the issue, the future consequences, of this and + that happening. He is identified, for the time at least, with the issue; + his fate hangs upon the course things are taking. But even for an onlooker + in a neutral country, the significance of every move made, of every + advance here and retreat there, lies in what it portends. To think upon + the news as it comes to us is to attempt to see what is indicated as + probable or possible regarding an outcome. To fill our heads, like a + scrapbook, with this and that item as a finished and done-for thing, is + not to think. It is to turn ourselves into a piece of registering + apparatus. To consider the bearing of the occurrence upon what may be, but + is not yet, is to think. Nor will the reflective experience be different + in kind if we substitute distance in time for separation in space. Imagine + the war done with, and a future historian giving an account of it. The + episode is, by assumption, past. But he cannot give a thoughtful account + of the war save as he preserves the time sequence; the meaning of each + occurrence, as he deals with it, lies in what was future for it, though + not for the historian. To take it by itself as a complete existence is to + take it unreflectively. Reflection also implies concern with the issue—a + certain sympathetic identification of our own destiny, if only dramatic, + with the outcome of the course of events. For the general in the war, or a + common soldier, or a citizen of one of the contending nations, the + stimulus to thinking is direct and urgent. For neutrals, it is indirect + and dependent upon imagination. But the flagrant partisanship of human + nature is evidence of the intensity of the tendency to identify ourselves + with one possible course of events, and to reject the other as foreign. If + we cannot take sides in overt action, and throw in our little weight to + help determine the final balance, we take sides emotionally and + imaginatively. We desire this or that outcome. One wholly indifferent to + the outcome does not follow or think about what is happening at all. From + this dependence of the act of thinking upon a sense of sharing in the + consequences of what goes on, flows one of the chief paradoxes of thought. + Born in partiality, in order to accomplish its tasks it must achieve a + certain detached impartiality. The general who allows his hopes and + desires to affect his observations and interpretations of the existing + situation will surely make a mistake in calculation. While hopes and fears + may be the chief motive for a thoughtful following of the war on the part + of an onlooker in a neutral country, he too will think ineffectively in + the degree in which his preferences modify the stuff of his observations + and reasonings. There is, however, no incompatibility between the fact + that the occasion of reflection lies in a personal sharing in what is + going on and the fact that the value of the reflection lies upon keeping + one's self out of the data. The almost insurmountable difficulty of + achieving this detachment is evidence that thinking originates in + situations where the course of thinking is an actual part of the course of + events and is designed to influence the result. Only gradually and with a + widening of the area of vision through a growth of social sympathies does + thinking develop to include what lies beyond our direct interests: a fact + of great significance for education. + </p> + <p> + To say that thinking occurs with reference to situations which are still + going on, and incomplete, is to say that thinking occurs when things are + uncertain or doubtful or problematic. Only what is finished, completed, is + wholly assured. Where there is reflection there is suspense. The object of + thinking is to help reach a conclusion, to project a possible termination + on the basis of what is already given. Certain other facts about thinking + accompany this feature. Since the situation in which thinking occurs is a + doubtful one, thinking is a process of inquiry, of looking into things, of + investigating. Acquiring is always secondary, and instrumental to the act + of inquiring. It is seeking, a quest, for something that is not at hand. + We sometimes talk as if "original research" were a peculiar prerogative of + scientists or at least of advanced students. But all thinking is research, + and all research is native, original, with him who carries it on, even if + everybody else in the world already is sure of what he is still looking + for. + </p> + <p> + It also follows that all thinking involves a risk. Certainty cannot be + guaranteed in advance. The invasion of the unknown is of the nature of an + adventure; we cannot be sure in advance. The conclusions of thinking, till + confirmed by the event, are, accordingly, more or less tentative or + hypothetical. Their dogmatic assertion as final is unwarranted, short of + the issue, in fact. The Greeks acutely raised the question: How can we + learn? For either we know already what we are after, or else we do not + know. In neither case is learning possible; on the first alternative + because we know already; on the second, because we do not know what to + look for, nor if, by chance, we find it can we tell that it is what we + were after. The dilemma makes no provision for coming to know, for + learning; it assumes either complete knowledge or complete ignorance. + Nevertheless the twilight zone of inquiry, of thinking, exists. The + possibility of hypothetical conclusions, of tentative results, is the fact + which the Greek dilemma overlooked. The perplexities of the situation + suggest certain ways out. We try these ways, and either push our way out, + in which case we know we have found what we were looking for, or the + situation gets darker and more confused—in which case, we know we + are still ignorant. Tentative means trying out, feeling one's way along + provisionally. Taken by itself, the Greek argument is a nice piece of + formal logic. But it is also true that as long as men kept a sharp + disjunction between knowledge and ignorance, science made only slow and + accidental advance. Systematic advance in invention and discovery began + when men recognized that they could utilize doubt for purposes of inquiry + by forming conjectures to guide action in tentative explorations, whose + development would confirm, refute, or modify the guiding conjecture. While + the Greeks made knowledge more than learning, modern science makes + conserved knowledge only a means to learning, to discovery. To recur to + our illustration. A commanding general cannot base his actions upon either + absolute certainty or absolute ignorance. He has a certain amount of + information at hand which is, we will assume, reasonably trustworthy. He + then infers certain prospective movements, thus assigning meaning to the + bare facts of the given situation. His inference is more or less dubious + and hypothetical. But he acts upon it. He develops a plan of procedure, a + method of dealing with the situation. The consequences which directly + follow from his acting this way rather than that test and reveal the worth + of his reflections. What he already knows functions and has value in what + he learns. But will this account apply in the case of the one in a neutral + country who is thoughtfully following as best he can the progress of + events? In form, yes, though not of course in content. It is self-evident + that his guesses about the future indicated by present facts, guesses by + which he attempts to supply meaning to a multitude of disconnected data, + cannot be the basis of a method which shall take effect in the campaign. + That is not his problem. But in the degree in which he is actively + thinking, and not merely passively following the course of events, his + tentative inferences will take effect in a method of procedure appropriate + to his situation. He will anticipate certain future moves, and will be on + the alert to see whether they happen or not. In the degree in which he is + intellectually concerned, or thoughtful, he will be actively on the + lookout; he will take steps which although they do not affect the + campaign, modify in some degree his subsequent actions. Otherwise his + later "I told you so" has no intellectual quality at all; it does not mark + any testing or verification of prior thinking, but only a coincidence that + yields emotional satisfaction—and includes a large factor of + self-deception. The case is comparable to that of an astronomer who from + given data has been led to foresee (infer) a future eclipse. No matter how + great the mathematical probability, the inference is hypothetical—a + matter of probability. 1 The hypothesis as to the date and position of the + anticipated eclipse becomes the material of forming a method of future + conduct. Apparatus is arranged; possibly an expedition is made to some far + part of the globe. In any case, some active steps are taken which actually + change some physical conditions. And apart from such steps and the + consequent modification of the situation, there is no completion of the + act of thinking. It remains suspended. Knowledge, already attained + knowledge, controls thinking and makes it fruitful. + </p> + <p> + So much for the general features of a reflective experience. They are (i) + perplexity, confusion, doubt, due to the fact that one is implicated in an + incomplete situation whose full character is not yet determined; (ii) a + conjectural anticipation—a tentative interpretation of the given + elements, attributing to them a tendency to effect certain consequences; + (iii) a careful survey (examination, inspection, exploration, analysis) of + all attainable consideration which will define and clarify the problem in + hand; (iv) a consequent elaboration of the tentative hypothesis to make it + more precise and more consistent, because squaring with a wider range of + facts; (v) taking one stand upon the projected hypothesis as a plan of + action which is applied to the existing state of affairs: doing something + overtly to bring about the anticipated result, and thereby testing the + hypothesis. It is the extent and accuracy of steps three and four which + mark off a distinctive reflective experience from one on the trial and + error plane. They make thinking itself into an experience. Nevertheless, + we never get wholly beyond the trial and error situation. Our most + elaborate and rationally consistent thought has to be tried in the world + and thereby tried out. And since it can never take into account all the + connections, it can never cover with perfect accuracy all the + consequences. Yet a thoughtful survey of conditions is so careful, and the + guessing at results so controlled, that we have a right to mark off the + reflective experience from the grosser trial and error forms of action. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM11"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. In determining the place of thinking in experience we first + </h2> + <p> + noted that experience involves a connection of doing or trying with + something which is undergone in consequence. A separation of the active + doing phase from the passive undergoing phase destroys the vital meaning + of an experience. Thinking is the accurate and deliberate instituting of + connections between what is done and its consequences. It notes not only + that they are connected, but the details of the connection. It makes + connecting links explicit in the form of relationships. The stimulus to + thinking is found when we wish to determine the significance of some act, + performed or to be performed. Then we anticipate consequences. This + implies that the situation as it stands is, either in fact or to us, + incomplete and hence indeterminate. The projection of consequences means a + proposed or tentative solution. To perfect this hypothesis, existing + conditions have to be carefully scrutinized and the implications of the + hypothesis developed—an operation called reasoning. Then the + suggested solution—the idea or theory—has to be tested by + acting upon it. If it brings about certain consequences, certain + determinate changes, in the world, it is accepted as valid. Otherwise it + is modified, and another trial made. Thinking includes all of these steps,—the + sense of a problem, the observation of conditions, the formation and + rational elaboration of a suggested conclusion, and the active + experimental testing. While all thinking results in knowledge, ultimately + the value of knowledge is subordinate to its use in thinking. For we live + not in a settled and finished world, but in one which is going on, and + where our main task is prospective, and where retrospect—and all + knowledge as distinct from thought is retrospect—is of value in the + solidity, security, and fertility it affords our dealings with the future. + </p> + <p> + 1 It is most important for the practice of science that men in many cases + can calculate the degree of probability and the amount of probable error + involved, but that does alter the features of the situation as described. + It refines them. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0012"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Twelve: Thinking in Education + </h2> + <p> + 1. The Essentials of Method. No one doubts, theoretically, the importance + of fostering in school good habits of thinking. But apart from the fact + that the acknowledgment is not so great in practice as in theory, there is + not adequate theoretical recognition that all which the school can or need + do for pupils, so far as their minds are concerned (that is, leaving out + certain specialized muscular abilities), is to develop their ability to + think. The parceling out of instruction among various ends such as + acquisition of skill (in reading, spelling, writing, drawing, reciting); + acquiring information (in history and geography), and training of thinking + is a measure of the ineffective way in which we accomplish all three. + Thinking which is not connected with increase of efficiency in action, and + with learning more about ourselves and the world in which we live, has + something the matter with it just as thought (See ante, p. 147). And skill + obtained apart from thinking is not connected with any sense of the + purposes for which it is to be used. It consequently leaves a man at the + mercy of his routine habits and of the authoritative control of others, + who know what they are about and who are not especially scrupulous as to + their means of achievement. And information severed from thoughtful action + is dead, a mind-crushing load. Since it simulates knowledge and thereby + develops the poison of conceit, it is a most powerful obstacle to further + growth in the grace of intelligence. The sole direct path to enduring + improvement in the methods of instruction and learning consists in + centering upon the conditions which exact, promote, and test thinking. + Thinking is the method of intelligent learning, of learning that employs + and rewards mind. We speak, legitimately enough, about the method of + thinking, but the important thing to bear in mind about method is that + thinking is method, the method of intelligent experience in the course + which it takes. + </p> + <p> + I. The initial stage of that developing experience which is called + thinking is experience. This remark may sound like a silly truism. It + ought to be one; but unfortunately it is not. On the contrary, thinking is + often regarded both in philosophic theory and in educational practice as + something cut off from experience, and capable of being cultivated in + isolation. In fact, the inherent limitations of experience are often urged + as the sufficient ground for attention to thinking. Experience is then + thought to be confined to the senses and appetites; to a mere material + world, while thinking proceeds from a higher faculty (of reason), and is + occupied with spiritual or at least literary things. So, oftentimes, a + sharp distinction is made between pure mathematics as a peculiarly fit + subject matter of thought (since it has nothing to do with physical + existences) and applied mathematics, which has utilitarian but not mental + value. + </p> + <p> + Speaking generally, the fundamental fallacy in methods of instruction lies + in supposing that experience on the part of pupils may be assumed. What is + here insisted upon is the necessity of an actual empirical situation as + the initiating phase of thought. Experience is here taken as previously + defined: trying to do something and having the thing perceptibly do + something to one in return. The fallacy consists in supposing that we can + begin with ready-made subject matter of arithmetic, or geography, or + whatever, irrespective of some direct personal experience of a situation. + Even the kindergarten and Montessori techniques are so anxious to get at + intellectual distinctions, without "waste of time," that they tend to + ignore—or reduce—the immediate crude handling of the familiar + material of experience, and to introduce pupils at once to material which + expresses the intellectual distinctions which adults have made. But the + first stage of contact with any new material, at whatever age of maturity, + must inevitably be of the trial and error sort. An individual must + actually try, in play or work, to do something with material in carrying + out his own impulsive activity, and then note the interaction of his + energy and that of the material employed. This is what happens when a + child at first begins to build with blocks, and it is equally what happens + when a scientific man in his laboratory begins to experiment with + unfamiliar objects. + </p> + <p> + Hence the first approach to any subject in school, if thought is to be + aroused and not words acquired, should be as unscholastic as possible. To + realize what an experience, or empirical situation, means, we have to call + to mind the sort of situation that presents itself outside of school; the + sort of occupations that interest and engage activity in ordinary life. + And careful inspection of methods which are permanently successful in + formal education, whether in arithmetic or learning to read, or studying + geography, or learning physics or a foreign language, will reveal that + they depend for their efficiency upon the fact that they go back to the + type of the situation which causes reflection out of school in ordinary + life. They give the pupils something to do, not something to learn; and + the doing is of such a nature as to demand thinking, or the intentional + noting of connections; learning naturally results. + </p> + <p> + That the situation should be of such a nature as to arouse thinking means + of course that it should suggest something to do which is not either + routine or capricious—something, in other words, presenting what is + new (and hence uncertain or problematic) and yet sufficiently connected + with existing habits to call out an effective response. An effective + response means one which accomplishes a perceptible result, in distinction + from a purely haphazard activity, where the consequences cannot be + mentally connected with what is done. The most significant question which + can be asked, accordingly, about any situation or experience proposed to + induce learning is what quality of problem it involves. + </p> + <p> + At first thought, it might seem as if usual school methods measured well + up to the standard here set. The giving of problems, the putting of + questions, the assigning of tasks, the magnifying of difficulties, is a + large part of school work. But it is indispensable to discriminate between + genuine and simulated or mock problems. The following questions may aid in + making such discrimination. (a) Is there anything but a problem? Does the + question naturally suggest itself within some situation or personal + experience? Or is it an aloof thing, a problem only for the purposes of + conveying instruction in some school topic? Is it the sort of trying that + would arouse observation and engage experimentation outside of school? (b) + Is it the pupil's own problem, or is it the teacher's or textbook's + problem, made a problem for the pupil only because he cannot get the + required mark or be promoted or win the teacher's approval, unless he + deals with it? Obviously, these two questions overlap. They are two ways + of getting at the same point: Is the experience a personal thing of such a + nature as inherently to stimulate and direct observation of the + connections involved, and to lead to inference and its testing? Or is it + imposed from without, and is the pupil's problem simply to meet the + external requirement? Such questions may give us pause in deciding upon + the extent to which current practices are adapted to develop reflective + habits. The physical equipment and arrangements of the average schoolroom + are hostile to the existence of real situations of experience. What is + there similar to the conditions of everyday life which will generate + difficulties? Almost everything testifies to the great premium put upon + listening, reading, and the reproduction of what is told and read. It is + hardly possible to overstate the contrast between such conditions and the + situations of active contact with things and persons in the home, on the + playground, in fulfilling of ordinary responsibilities of life. Much of it + is not even comparable with the questions which may arise in the mind of a + boy or girl in conversing with others or in reading books outside of the + school. No one has ever explained why children are so full of questions + outside of the school (so that they pester grown-up persons if they get + any encouragement), and the conspicuous absence of display of curiosity + about the subject matter of school lessons. Reflection on this striking + contrast will throw light upon the question of how far customary school + conditions supply a context of experience in which problems naturally + suggest themselves. No amount of improvement in the personal technique of + the instructor will wholly remedy this state of things. There must be more + actual material, more stuff, more appliances, and more opportunities for + doing things, before the gap can be overcome. And where children are + engaged in doing things and in discussing what arises in the course of + their doing, it is found, even with comparatively indifferent modes of + instruction, that children's inquiries are spontaneous and numerous, and + the proposals of solution advanced, varied, and ingenious. + </p> + <p> + As a consequence of the absence of the materials and occupations which + generate real problems, the pupil's problems are not his; or, rather, they + are his only as a pupil, not as a human being. Hence the lamentable waste + in carrying over such expertness as is achieved in dealing with them to + the affairs of life beyond the schoolroom. A pupil has a problem, but it + is the problem of meeting the peculiar requirements set by the teacher. + His problem becomes that of finding out what the teacher wants, what will + satisfy the teacher in recitation and examination and outward deportment. + Relationship to subject matter is no longer direct. The occasions and + material of thought are not found in the arithmetic or the history or + geography itself, but in skillfully adapting that material to the + teacher's requirements. The pupil studies, but unconsciously to himself + the objects of his study are the conventions and standards of the school + system and school authority, not the nominal "studies." The thinking thus + evoked is artificially one-sided at the best. At its worst, the problem of + the pupil is not how to meet the requirements of school life, but how to + seem to meet them—or, how to come near enough to meeting them to + slide along without an undue amount of friction. The type of judgment + formed by these devices is not a desirable addition to character. If these + statements give too highly colored a picture of usual school methods, the + exaggeration may at least serve to illustrate the point: the need of + active pursuits, involving the use of material to accomplish purposes, if + there are to be situations which normally generate problems occasioning + thoughtful inquiry. + </p> + <p> + II. There must be data at command to supply the considerations required in + dealing with the specific difficulty which has presented itself. Teachers + following a "developing" method sometimes tell children to think things + out for themselves as if they could spin them out of their own heads. The + material of thinking is not thoughts, but actions, facts, events, and the + relations of things. In other words, to think effectively one must have + had, or now have, experiences which will furnish him resources for coping + with the difficulty at hand. A difficulty is an indispensable stimulus to + thinking, but not all difficulties call out thinking. Sometimes they + overwhelm and submerge and discourage. The perplexing situation must be + sufficiently like situations which have already been dealt with so that + pupils will have some control of the meanings of handling it. A large part + of the art of instruction lies in making the difficulty of new problems + large enough to challenge thought, and small enough so that, in addition + to the confusion naturally attending the novel elements, there shall be + luminous familiar spots from which helpful suggestions may spring. + </p> + <p> + In one sense, it is a matter of indifference by what psychological means + the subject matter for reflection is provided. Memory, observation, + reading, communication, are all avenues for supplying data. The relative + proportion to be obtained from each is a matter of the specific features + of the particular problem in hand. It is foolish to insist upon + observation of objects presented to the senses if the student is so + familiar with the objects that he could just as well recall the facts + independently. It is possible to induce undue and crippling dependence + upon sense-presentations. No one can carry around with him a museum of all + the things whose properties will assist the conduct of thought. A + well-trained mind is one that has a maximum of resources behind it, so to + speak, and that is accustomed to go over its past experiences to see what + they yield. On the other hand, a quality or relation of even a familiar + object may previously have been passed over, and be just the fact that is + helpful in dealing with the question. In this case direct observation is + called for. The same principle applies to the use to be made of + observation on one hand and of reading and "telling" on the other. Direct + observation is naturally more vivid and vital. But it has its limitations; + and in any case it is a necessary part of education that one should + acquire the ability to supplement the narrowness of his immediately + personal experiences by utilizing the experiences of others. Excessive + reliance upon others for data (whether got from reading or listening) is + to be depreciated. Most objectionable of all is the probability that + others, the book or the teacher, will supply solutions ready-made, instead + of giving material that the student has to adapt and apply to the question + in hand for himself. + </p> + <p> + There is no inconsistency in saying that in schools there is usually both + too much and too little information supplied by others. The accumulation + and acquisition of information for purposes of reproduction in recitation + and examination is made too much of. "Knowledge," in the sense of + information, means the working capital, the indispensable resources, of + further inquiry; of finding out, or learning, more things. Frequently it + is treated as an end itself, and then the goal becomes to heap it up and + display it when called for. This static, cold-storage ideal of knowledge + is inimical to educative development. It not only lets occasions for + thinking go unused, but it swamps thinking. No one could construct a house + on ground cluttered with miscellaneous junk. Pupils who have stored their + "minds" with all kinds of material which they have never put to + intellectual uses are sure to be hampered when they try to think. They + have no practice in selecting what is appropriate, and no criterion to go + by; everything is on the same dead static level. On the other hand, it is + quite open to question whether, if information actually functioned in + experience through use in application to the student's own purposes, there + would not be need of more varied resources in books, pictures, and talks + than are usually at command. + </p> + <p> + III. The correlate in thinking of facts, data, knowledge already acquired, + is suggestions, inferences, conjectured meanings, suppositions, tentative + explanations:—ideas, in short. Careful observation and recollection + determine what is given, what is already there, and hence assured. They + cannot furnish what is lacking. They define, clarify, and locate the + question; they cannot supply its answer. Projection, invention, ingenuity, + devising come in for that purpose. The data arouse suggestions, and only + by reference to the specific data can we pass upon the appropriateness of + the suggestions. But the suggestions run beyond what is, as yet, actually + given in experience. They forecast possible results, things to do, not + facts (things already done). Inference is always an invasion of the + unknown, a leap from the known. + </p> + <p> + In this sense, a thought (what a thing suggests but is not as it is + presented) is creative,—an incursion into the novel. It involves + some inventiveness. What is suggested must, indeed, be familiar in some + context; the novelty, the inventive devising, clings to the new light in + which it is seen, the different use to which it is put. When Newton + thought of his theory of gravitation, the creative aspect of his thought + was not found in its materials. They were familiar; many of them + commonplaces—sun, moon, planets, weight, distance, mass, square of + numbers. These were not original ideas; they were established facts. His + originality lay in the use to which these familiar acquaintances were put + by introduction into an unfamiliar context. The same is true of every + striking scientific discovery, every great invention, every admirable + artistic production. Only silly folk identify creative originality with + the extraordinary and fanciful; others recognize that its measure lies in + putting everyday things to uses which had not occurred to others. The + operation is novel, not the materials out of which it is constructed. + </p> + <p> + The educational conclusion which follows is that all thinking is original + in a projection of considerations which have not been previously + apprehended. The child of three who discovers what can be done with + blocks, or of six who finds out what he can make by putting five cents and + five cents together, is really a discoverer, even though everybody else in + the world knows it. There is a genuine increment of experience; not + another item mechanically added on, but enrichment by a new quality. The + charm which the spontaneity of little children has for sympathetic + observers is due to perception of this intellectual originality. The joy + which children themselves experience is the joy of intellectual + constructiveness—of creativeness, if the word may be used without + misunderstanding. The educational moral I am chiefly concerned to draw is + not, however, that teachers would find their own work less of a grind and + strain if school conditions favored learning in the sense of discovery and + not in that of storing away what others pour into them; nor that it would + be possible to give even children and youth the delights of personal + intellectual productiveness—true and important as are these things. + It is that no thought, no idea, can possibly be conveyed as an idea from + one person to another. When it is told, it is, to the one to whom it is + told, another given fact, not an idea. The communication may stimulate the + other person to realize the question for himself and to think out a like + idea, or it may smother his intellectual interest and suppress his dawning + effort at thought. But what he directly gets cannot be an idea. Only by + wrestling with the conditions of the problem at first hand, seeking and + finding his own way out, does he think. When the parent or teacher has + provided the conditions which stimulate thinking and has taken a + sympathetic attitude toward the activities of the learner by entering into + a common or conjoint experience, all has been done which a second party + can do to instigate learning. The rest lies with the one directly + concerned. If he cannot devise his own solution (not of course in + isolation, but in correspondence with the teacher and other pupils) and + find his own way out he will not learn, not even if he can recite some + correct answer with one hundred per cent accuracy. We can and do supply + ready-made "ideas" by the thousand; we do not usually take much pains to + see that the one learning engages in significant situations where his own + activities generate, support, and clinch ideas—that is, perceived + meanings or connections. This does not mean that the teacher is to stand + off and look on; the alternative to furnishing ready-made subject matter + and listening to the accuracy with which it is reproduced is not + quiescence, but participation, sharing, in an activity. In such shared + activity, the teacher is a learner, and the learner is, without knowing + it, a teacher—and upon the whole, the less consciousness there is, + on either side, of either giving or receiving instruction, the better. IV. + Ideas, as we have seen, whether they be humble guesses or dignified + theories, are anticipations of possible solutions. They are anticipations + of some continuity or connection of an activity and a consequence which + has not as yet shown itself. They are therefore tested by the operation of + acting upon them. They are to guide and organize further observations, + recollections, and experiments. They are intermediate in learning, not + final. All educational reformers, as we have had occasion to remark, are + given to attacking the passivity of traditional education. They have + opposed pouring in from without, and absorbing like a sponge; they have + attacked drilling in material as into hard and resisting rock. But it is + not easy to secure conditions which will make the getting of an idea + identical with having an experience which widens and makes more precise + our contact with the environment. Activity, even self-activity, is too + easily thought of as something merely mental, cooped up within the head, + or finding expression only through the vocal organs. + </p> + <p> + While the need of application of ideas gained in study is acknowledged by + all the more successful methods of instruction, the exercises in + application are sometimes treated as devices for fixing what has already + been learned and for getting greater practical skill in its manipulation. + These results are genuine and not to be despised. But practice in applying + what has been gained in study ought primarily to have an intellectual + quality. As we have already seen, thoughts just as thoughts are + incomplete. At best they are tentative; they are suggestions, indications. + They are standpoints and methods for dealing with situations of + experience. Till they are applied in these situations they lack full point + and reality. Only application tests them, and only testing confers full + meaning and a sense of their reality. Short of use made of them, they tend + to segregate into a peculiar world of their own. It may be seriously + questioned whether the philosophies (to which reference has been made in + section 2 of chapter X) which isolate mind and set it over against the + world did not have their origin in the fact that the reflective or + theoretical class of men elaborated a large stock of ideas which social + conditions did not allow them to act upon and test. Consequently men were + thrown back into their own thoughts as ends in themselves. + </p> + <p> + However this may be, there can be no doubt that a peculiar artificiality + attaches to much of what is learned in schools. It can hardly be said that + many students consciously think of the subject matter as unreal; but it + assuredly does not possess for them the kind of reality which the subject + matter of their vital experiences possesses. They learn not to expect that + sort of reality of it; they become habituated to treating it as having + reality for the purposes of recitations, lessons, and examinations. That + it should remain inert for the experiences of daily life is more or less a + matter of course. The bad effects are twofold. Ordinary experience does + not receive the enrichment which it should; it is not fertilized by school + learning. And the attitudes which spring from getting used to and + accepting half-understood and ill-digested material weaken vigor and + efficiency of thought. + </p> + <p> + If we have dwelt especially on the negative side, it is for the sake of + suggesting positive measures adapted to the effectual development of + thought. Where schools are equipped with laboratories, shops, and gardens, + where dramatizations, plays, and games are freely used, opportunities + exist for reproducing situations of life, and for acquiring and applying + information and ideas in the carrying forward of progressive experiences. + Ideas are not segregated, they do not form an isolated island. They + animate and enrich the ordinary course of life. Information is vitalized + by its function; by the place it occupies in direction of action. The + phrase "opportunities exist" is used purposely. They may not be taken + advantage of; it is possible to employ manual and constructive activities + in a physical way, as means of getting just bodily skill; or they may be + used almost exclusively for "utilitarian," i.e., pecuniary, ends. But the + disposition on the part of upholders of "cultural" education to assume + that such activities are merely physical or professional in quality, is + itself a product of the philosophies which isolate mind from direction of + the course of experience and hence from action upon and with things. When + the "mental" is regarded as a self-contained separate realm, a counterpart + fate befalls bodily activity and movements. They are regarded as at the + best mere external annexes to mind. They may be necessary for the + satisfaction of bodily needs and the attainment of external decency and + comfort, but they do not occupy a necessary place in mind nor enact an + indispensable role in the completion of thought. Hence they have no place + in a liberal education—i.e., one which is concerned with the + interests of intelligence. If they come in at all, it is as a concession + to the material needs of the masses. That they should be allowed to invade + the education of the elite is unspeakable. This conclusion follows + irresistibly from the isolated conception of mind, but by the same logic + it disappears when we perceive what mind really is—namely, the + purposive and directive factor in the development of experience. While it + is desirable that all educational institutions should be equipped so as to + give students an opportunity for acquiring and testing ideas and + information in active pursuits typifying important social situations, it + will, doubtless, be a long time before all of them are thus furnished. But + this state of affairs does not afford instructors an excuse for folding + their hands and persisting in methods which segregate school knowledge. + Every recitation in every subject gives an opportunity for establishing + cross connections between the subject matter of the lesson and the wider + and more direct experiences of everyday life. Classroom instruction falls + into three kinds. The least desirable treats each lesson as an independent + whole. It does not put upon the student the responsibility of finding + points of contact between it and other lessons in the same subject, or + other subjects of study. Wiser teachers see to it that the student is + systematically led to utilize his earlier lessons to help understand the + present one, and also to use the present to throw additional light upon + what has already been acquired. Results are better, but school subject + matter is still isolated. Save by accident, out-of-school experience is + left in its crude and comparatively irreflective state. It is not subject + to the refining and expanding influences of the more accurate and + comprehensive material of direct instruction. The latter is not motivated + and impregnated with a sense of reality by being intermingled with the + realities of everyday life. The best type of teaching bears in mind the + desirability of affecting this interconnection. It puts the student in the + habitual attitude of finding points of contact and mutual bearings. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM12"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. Processes of instruction are unified in the degree in which + </h2> + <p> + they center in the production of good habits of thinking. While we may + speak, without error, of the method of thought, the important thing is + that thinking is the method of an educative experience. The essentials of + method are therefore identical with the essentials of reflection. They are + first that the pupil have a genuine situation of experience—that + there be a continuous activity in which he is interested for its own sake; + secondly, that a genuine problem develop within this situation as a + stimulus to thought; third, that he possess the information and make the + observations needed to deal with it; fourth, that suggested solutions + occur to him which he shall be responsible for developing in an orderly + way; fifth, that he have opportunity and occasion to test his ideas by + application, to make their meaning clear and to discover for himself their + validity. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0013"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Thirteen: The Nature of Method + </h2> + <h3> + 1. The Unity of Subject Matter and Method. + </h3> + <p> + The trinity of school topics is subject matter, methods, and + administration or government. We have been concerned with the two former + in recent chapters. It remains to disentangle them from the context in + which they have been referred to, and discuss explicitly their nature. We + shall begin with the topic of method, since that lies closest to the + considerations of the last chapter. Before taking it up, it may be well, + however, to call express attention to one implication of our theory; the + connection of subject matter and method with each other. The idea that + mind and the world of things and persons are two separate and independent + realms—a theory which philosophically is known as dualism—carries + with it the conclusion that method and subject matter of instruction are + separate affairs. Subject matter then becomes a ready-made systematized + classification of the facts and principles of the world of nature and man. + Method then has for its province a consideration of the ways in which this + antecedent subject matter may be best presented to and impressed upon the + mind; or, a consideration of the ways in which the mind may be externally + brought to bear upon the matter so as to facilitate its acquisition and + possession. In theory, at least, one might deduce from a science of the + mind as something existing by itself a complete theory of methods of + learning, with no knowledge of the subjects to which the methods are to be + applied. Since many who are actually most proficient in various branches + of subject matter are wholly innocent of these methods, this state of + affairs gives opportunity for the retort that pedagogy, as an alleged + science of methods of the mind in learning, is futile;—a mere screen + for concealing the necessity a teacher is under of profound and accurate + acquaintance with the subject in hand. + </p> + <p> + But since thinking is a directed movement of subject matter to a + completing issue, and since mind is the deliberate and intentional phase + of the process, the notion of any such split is radically false. The fact + that the material of a science is organized is evidence that it has + already been subjected to intelligence; it has been methodized, so to say. + Zoology as a systematic branch of knowledge represents crude, scattered + facts of our ordinary acquaintance with animals after they have been + subjected to careful examination, to deliberate supplementation, and to + arrangement to bring out connections which assist observation, memory, and + further inquiry. Instead of furnishing a starting point for learning, they + mark out a consummation. Method means that arrangement of subject matter + which makes it most effective in use. Never is method something outside of + the material. + </p> + <p> + How about method from the standpoint of an individual who is dealing with + subject matter? Again, it is not something external. It is simply an + effective treatment of material—efficiency meaning such treatment as + utilizes the material (puts it to a purpose) with a minimum of waste of + time and energy. We can distinguish a way of acting, and discuss it by + itself; but the way exists only as way-of-dealing-with-material. Method is + not antithetical to subject matter; it is the effective direction of + subject matter to desired results. It is antithetical to random and + ill-considered action,—ill-considered signifying ill-adapted. + </p> + <p> + The statement that method means directed movement of subject matter + towards ends is formal. An illustration may give it content. Every artist + must have a method, a technique, in doing his work. Piano playing is not + hitting the keys at random. It is an orderly way of using them, and the + order is not something which exists ready-made in the musician's hands or + brain prior to an activity dealing with the piano. Order is found in the + disposition of acts which use the piano and the hands and brain so as to + achieve the result intended. It is the action of the piano directed to + accomplish the purpose of the piano as a musical instrument. It is the + same with "pedagogical" method. The only difference is that the piano is a + mechanism constructed in advance for a single end; while the material of + study is capable of indefinite uses. But even in this regard the + illustration may apply if we consider the infinite variety of kinds of + music which a piano may produce, and the variations in technique required + in the different musical results secured. Method in any case is but an + effective way of employing some material for some end. + </p> + <p> + These considerations may be generalized by going back to the conception of + experience. Experience as the perception of the connection between + something tried and something undergone in consequence is a process. Apart + from effort to control the course which the process takes, there is no + distinction of subject matter and method. There is simply an activity + which includes both what an individual does and what the environment does. + A piano player who had perfect mastery of his instrument would have no + occasion to distinguish between his contribution and that of the piano. In + well-formed, smooth-running functions of any sort,—skating, + conversing, hearing music, enjoying a landscape,—there is no + consciousness of separation of the method of the person and of the subject + matter. In whole-hearted play and work there is the same phenomenon. + </p> + <p> + When we reflect upon an experience instead of just having it, we + inevitably distinguish between our own attitude and the objects toward + which we sustain the attitude. When a man is eating, he is eating food. He + does not divide his act into eating and food. But if he makes a scientific + investigation of the act, such a discrimination is the first thing he + would effect. He would examine on the one hand the properties of the + nutritive material, and on the other hand the acts of the organism in + appropriating and digesting. Such reflection upon experience gives rise to + a distinction of what we experience (the experienced) and the experiencing—the + how. When we give names to this distinction we have subject matter and + method as our terms. There is the thing seen, heard, loved, hated, + imagined, and there is the act of seeing, hearing, loving, hating, + imagining, etc. + </p> + <p> + This distinction is so natural and so important for certain purposes, that + we are only too apt to regard it as a separation in existence and not as a + distinction in thought. Then we make a division between a self and the + environment or world. This separation is the root of the dualism of method + and subject matter. That is, we assume that knowing, feeling, willing, + etc., are things which belong to the self or mind in its isolation, and + which then may be brought to bear upon an independent subject matter. We + assume that the things which belong in isolation to the self or mind have + their own laws of operation irrespective of the modes of active energy of + the object. These laws are supposed to furnish method. It would be no less + absurd to suppose that men can eat without eating something, or that the + structure and movements of the jaws, throat muscles, the digestive + activities of stomach, etc., are not what they are because of the material + with which their activity is engaged. Just as the organs of the organism + are a continuous part of the very world in which food materials exist, so + the capacities of seeing, hearing, loving, imagining are intrinsically + connected with the subject matter of the world. They are more truly ways + in which the environment enters into experience and functions there than + they are independent acts brought to bear upon things. Experience, in + short, is not a combination of mind and world, subject and object, method + and subject matter, but is a single continuous interaction of a great + diversity (literally countless in number) of energies. + </p> + <p> + For the purpose of controlling the course or direction which the moving + unity of experience takes we draw a mental distinction between the how and + the what. While there is no way of walking or of eating or of learning + over and above the actual walking, eating, and studying, there are certain + elements in the act which give the key to its more effective control. + Special attention to these elements makes them more obvious to perception + (letting other factors recede for the time being from conspicuous + recognition). Getting an idea of how the experience proceeds indicates to + us what factors must be secured or modified in order that it may go on + more successfully. This is only a somewhat elaborate way of saying that if + a man watches carefully the growth of several plants, some of which do + well and some of which amount to little or nothing, he may be able to + detect the special conditions upon which the prosperous development of a + plant depends. These conditions, stated in an orderly sequence, would + constitute the method or way or manner of its growth. There is no + difference between the growth of a plant and the prosperous development of + an experience. It is not easy, in either case, to seize upon just the + factors which make for its best movement. But study of cases of success + and failure and minute and extensive comparison, helps to seize upon + causes. When we have arranged these causes in order, we have a method of + procedure or a technique. + </p> + <p> + A consideration of some evils in education that flow from the isolation of + method from subject matter will make the point more definite. + </p> + <p> + (I) In the first place, there is the neglect (of which we have spoken) of + concrete situations of experience. There can be no discovery of a method + without cases to be studied. The method is derived from observation of + what actually happens, with a view to seeing that it happen better next + time. But in instruction and discipline, there is rarely sufficient + opportunity for children and youth to have the direct normal experiences + from which educators might derive an idea of method or order of best + development. Experiences are had under conditions of such constraint that + they throw little or no light upon the normal course of an experience to + its fruition. "Methods" have then to be authoritatively recommended to + teachers, instead of being an expression of their own intelligent + observations. Under such circumstances, they have a mechanical uniformity, + assumed to be alike for all minds. Where flexible personal experiences are + promoted by providing an environment which calls out directed occupations + in work and play, the methods ascertained will vary with individuals—for + it is certain that each individual has something characteristic in his way + of going at things. + </p> + <p> + (ii) In the second place, the notion of methods isolated from subject + matter is responsible for the false conceptions of discipline and interest + already noted. When the effective way of managing material is treated as + something ready-made apart from material, there are just three possible + ways in which to establish a relationship lacking by assumption. One is to + utilize excitement, shock of pleasure, tickling the palate. Another is to + make the consequences of not attending painful; we may use the menace of + harm to motivate concern with the alien subject matter. Or a direct appeal + may be made to the person to put forth effort without any reason. We may + rely upon immediate strain of "will." In practice, however, the latter + method is effectual only when instigated by fear of unpleasant results. + (iii) In the third place, the act of learning is made a direct and + conscious end in itself. Under normal conditions, learning is a product + and reward of occupation with subject matter. Children do not set out, + consciously, to learn walking or talking. One sets out to give his + impulses for communication and for fuller intercourse with others a show. + He learns in consequence of his direct activities. The better methods of + teaching a child, say, to read, follow the same road. They do not fix his + attention upon the fact that he has to learn something and so make his + attitude self-conscious and constrained. They engage his activities, and + in the process of engagement he learns: the same is true of the more + successful methods in dealing with number or whatever. But when the + subject matter is not used in carrying forward impulses and habits to + significant results, it is just something to be learned. The pupil's + attitude to it is just that of having to learn it. Conditions more + unfavorable to an alert and concentrated response would be hard to devise. + Frontal attacks are even more wasteful in learning than in war. This does + not mean, however, that students are to be seduced unaware into + preoccupation with lessons. It means that they shall be occupied with them + for real reasons or ends, and not just as something to be learned. This is + accomplished whenever the pupil perceives the place occupied by the + subject matter in the fulfilling of some experience. + </p> + <p> + (iv) In the fourth place, under the influence of the conception of the + separation of mind and material, method tends to be reduced to a cut and + dried routine, to following mechanically prescribed steps. No one can tell + in how many schoolrooms children reciting in arithmetic or grammar are + compelled to go through, under the alleged sanction of method, certain + preordained verbal formulae. Instead of being encouraged to attack their + topics directly, experimenting with methods that seem promising and + learning to discriminate by the consequences that accrue, it is assumed + that there is one fixed method to be followed. It is also naively assumed + that if the pupils make their statements and explanations in a certain + form of "analysis," their mental habits will in time conform. Nothing has + brought pedagogical theory into greater disrepute than the belief that it + is identified with handing out to teachers recipes and models to be + followed in teaching. Flexibility and initiative in dealing with problems + are characteristic of any conception to which method is a way of managing + material to develop a conclusion. Mechanical rigid woodenness is an + inevitable corollary of any theory which separates mind from activity + motivated by a purpose. + </p> + <p> + 2. Method as General and as Individual. In brief, the method of teaching + is the method of an art, of action intelligently directed by ends. But the + practice of a fine art is far from being a matter of extemporized + inspirations. Study of the operations and results of those in the past who + have greatly succeeded is essential. There is always a tradition, or + schools of art, definite enough to impress beginners, and often to take + them captive. Methods of artists in every branch depend upon thorough + acquaintance with materials and tools; the painter must know canvas, + pigments, brushes, and the technique of manipulation of all his + appliances. Attainment of this knowledge requires persistent and + concentrated attention to objective materials. The artist studies the + progress of his own attempts to see what succeeds and what fails. The + assumption that there are no alternatives between following ready-made + rules and trusting to native gifts, the inspiration of the moment and + undirected "hard work," is contradicted by the procedures of every art. + </p> + <p> + Such matters as knowledge of the past, of current technique, of materials, + of the ways in which one's own best results are assured, supply the + material for what may be called general method. There exists a cumulative + body of fairly stable methods for reaching results, a body authorized by + past experience and by intellectual analysis, which an individual ignores + at his peril. As was pointed out in the discussion of habit-forming (ante, + p. 49), there is always a danger that these methods will become mechanized + and rigid, mastering an agent instead of being powers at command for his + own ends. But it is also true that the innovator who achieves anything + enduring, whose work is more than a passing sensation, utilizes classic + methods more than may appear to himself or to his critics. He devotes them + to new uses, and in so far transforms them. + </p> + <p> + Education also has its general methods. And if the application of this + remark is more obvious in the case of the teacher than of the pupil, it is + equally real in the case of the latter. Part of his learning, a very + important part, consists in becoming master of the methods which the + experience of others has shown to be more efficient in like cases of + getting knowledge. 1 These general methods are in no way opposed to + individual initiative and originality—to personal ways of doing + things. On the contrary they are reinforcements of them. For there is + radical difference between even the most general method and a prescribed + rule. The latter is a direct guide to action; the former operates + indirectly through the enlightenment it supplies as to ends and means. It + operates, that is to say, through intelligence, and not through conformity + to orders externally imposed. Ability to use even in a masterly way an + established technique gives no warranty of artistic work, for the latter + also depends upon an animating idea. + </p> + <p> + If knowledge of methods used by others does not directly tell us what to + do, or furnish ready-made models, how does it operate? What is meant by + calling a method intellectual? Take the case of a physician. No mode of + behavior more imperiously demands knowledge of established modes of + diagnosis and treatment than does his. But after all, cases are like, not + identical. To be used intelligently, existing practices, however + authorized they may be, have to be adapted to the exigencies of particular + cases. Accordingly, recognized procedures indicate to the physician what + inquiries to set on foot for himself, what measures to try. They are + standpoints from which to carry on investigations; they economize a survey + of the features of the particular case by suggesting the things to be + especially looked into. The physician's own personal attitudes, his own + ways (individual methods) of dealing with the situation in which he is + concerned, are not subordinated to the general principles of procedure, + but are facilitated and directed by the latter. The instance may serve to + point out the value to the teacher of a knowledge of the psychological + methods and the empirical devices found useful in the past. When they get + in the way of his own common sense, when they come between him and the + situation in which he has to act, they are worse than useless. But if he + has acquired them as intellectual aids in sizing up the needs, resources, + and difficulties of the unique experiences in which he engages, they are + of constructive value. In the last resort, just because everything depends + upon his own methods of response, much depends upon how far he can + utilize, in making his own response, the knowledge which has accrued in + the experience of others. As already intimated, every word of this account + is directly applicable also to the method of the pupil, the way of + learning. To suppose that students, whether in the primary school or in + the university, can be supplied with models of method to be followed in + acquiring and expounding a subject is to fall into a self-deception that + has lamentable consequences. (See ante, p. 169.) One must make his own + reaction in any case. Indications of the standardized or general methods + used in like cases by others—particularly by those who are already + experts—are of worth or of harm according as they make his personal + reaction more intelligent or as they induce a person to dispense with + exercise of his own judgment. If what was said earlier (See p. 159) about + originality of thought seemed overstrained, demanding more of education + than the capacities of average human nature permit, the difficulty is that + we lie under the incubus of a superstition. We have set up the notion of + mind at large, of intellectual method that is the same for all. Then we + regard individuals as differing in the quantity of mind with which they + are charged. Ordinary persons are then expected to be ordinary. Only the + exceptional are allowed to have originality. The measure of difference + between the average student and the genius is a measure of the absence of + originality in the former. But this notion of mind in general is a + fiction. How one person's abilities compare in quantity with those of + another is none of the teacher's business. It is irrelevant to his work. + What is required is that every individual shall have opportunities to + employ his own powers in activities that have meaning. Mind, individual + method, originality (these are convertible terms) signify the quality of + purposive or directed action. If we act upon this conviction, we shall + secure more originality even by the conventional standard than now + develops. Imposing an alleged uniform general method upon everybody breeds + mediocrity in all but the very exceptional. And measuring originality by + deviation from the mass breeds eccentricity in them. Thus we stifle the + distinctive quality of the many, and save in rare instances (like, say, + that of Darwin) infect the rare geniuses with an unwholesome quality. + </p> + <p> + 3. The Traits of Individual Method. The most general features of the + method of knowing have been given in our chapter on thinking. They are the + features of the reflective situation: Problem, collection and analysis of + data, projection and elaboration of suggestions or ideas, experimental + application and testing; the resulting conclusion or judgment. The + specific elements of an individual's method or way of attack upon a + problem are found ultimately in his native tendencies and his acquired + habits and interests. The method of one will vary from that of another + (and properly vary) as his original instinctive capacities vary, as his + past experiences and his preferences vary. Those who have already studied + these matters are in possession of information which will help teachers in + understanding the responses different pupils make, and help them in + guiding these responses to greater efficiency. Child-study, psychology, + and a knowledge of social environment supplement the personal acquaintance + gained by the teacher. But methods remain the personal concern, approach, + and attack of an individual, and no catalogue can ever exhaust their + diversity of form and tint. + </p> + <p> + Some attitudes may be named, however,-which are central in effective + intellectual ways of dealing with subject matter. Among the most important + are directness, open-mindedness, single-mindedness (or whole-heartedness), + and responsibility. + </p> + <p> + 1. It is easier to indicate what is meant by directness through negative + terms than in positive ones. Self-consciousness, embarrassment, and + constraint are its menacing foes. They indicate that a person is not + immediately concerned with subject matter. Something has come between + which deflects concern to side issues. A self-conscious person is partly + thinking about his problem and partly about what others think of his + performances. Diverted energy means loss of power and confusion of ideas. + Taking an attitude is by no means identical with being conscious of one's + attitude. The former is spontaneous, naive, and simple. It is a sign of + whole-souled relationship between a person and what he is dealing with. + The latter is not of necessity abnormal. It is sometimes the easiest way + of correcting a false method of approach, and of improving the + effectiveness of the means one is employing,—as golf players, piano + players, public speakers, etc., have occasionally to give especial + attention to their position and movements. But this need is occasional and + temporary. When it is effectual a person thinks of himself in terms of + what is to be done, as one means among others of the realization of an end—as + in the case of a tennis player practicing to get the "feel" of a stroke. + In abnormal cases, one thinks of himself not as part of the agencies of + execution, but as a separate object—as when the player strikes an + attitude thinking of the impression it will make upon spectators, or is + worried because of the impression he fears his movements give rise to. + </p> + <p> + Confidence is a good name for what is intended by the term directness. It + should not be confused, however, with self-confidence which may be a form + of self-consciousness—or of "cheek." Confidence is not a name for + what one thinks or feels about his attitude it is not reflex. It denotes + the straightforwardness with which one goes at what he has to do. It + denotes not conscious trust in the efficacy of one's powers but + unconscious faith in the possibilities of the situation. It signifies + rising to the needs of the situation. We have already pointed out (See p. + 169) the objections to making students emphatically aware of the fact that + they are studying or learning. Just in the degree in which they are + induced by the conditions to be so aware, they are not studying and + learning. They are in a divided and complicated attitude. Whatever methods + of a teacher call a pupil's attention off from what he has to do and + transfer it to his own attitude towards what he is doing impair directness + of concern and action. Persisted in, the pupil acquires a permanent + tendency to fumble, to gaze about aimlessly, to look for some clew of + action beside that which the subject matter supplies. Dependence upon + extraneous suggestions and directions, a state of foggy confusion, take + the place of that sureness with which children (and grown-up people who + have not been sophisticated by "education") confront the situations of + life. + </p> + <p> + 2. Open-mindedness. Partiality is, as we have seen, an accompaniment of + the existence of interest, since this means sharing, partaking, taking + sides in some movement. All the more reason, therefore, for an attitude of + mind which actively welcomes suggestions and relevant information from all + sides. In the chapter on Aims it was shown that foreseen ends are factors + in the development of a changing situation. They are the means by which + the direction of action is controlled. They are subordinate to the + situation, therefore, not the situation to them. They are not ends in the + sense of finalities to which everything must be bent and sacrificed. They + are, as foreseen, means of guiding the development of a situation. A + target is not the future goal of shooting; it is the centering factor in a + present shooting. Openness of mind means accessibility of mind to any and + every consideration that will throw light upon the situation that needs to + be cleared up, and that will help determine the consequences of acting + this way or that. Efficiency in accomplishing ends which have been settled + upon as unalterable can coexist with a narrowly opened mind. But + intellectual growth means constant expansion of horizons and consequent + formation of new purposes and new responses. These are impossible without + an active disposition to welcome points of view hitherto alien; an active + desire to entertain considerations which modify existing purposes. + Retention of capacity to grow is the reward of such intellectual + hospitality. The worst thing about stubbornness of mind, about prejudices, + is that they arrest development; they shut the mind off from new stimuli. + Open-mindedness means retention of the childlike attitude; + closed-mindedness means premature intellectual old age. + </p> + <p> + Exorbitant desire for uniformity of procedure and for prompt external + results are the chief foes which the open-minded attitude meets in school. + The teacher who does not permit and encourage diversity of operation in + dealing with questions is imposing intellectual blinders upon pupils—restricting + their vision to the one path the teacher's mind happens to approve. + Probably the chief cause of devotion to rigidity of method is, however, + that it seems to promise speedy, accurately measurable, correct results. + The zeal for "answers" is the explanation of much of the zeal for rigid + and mechanical methods. Forcing and overpressure have the same origin, and + the same result upon alert and varied intellectual interest. + </p> + <p> + Open-mindedness is not the same as empty-mindedness. To hang out a sign + saying "Come right in; there is no one at home" is not the equivalent of + hospitality. But there is a kind of passivity, willingness to let + experiences accumulate and sink in and ripen, which is an essential of + development. Results (external answers or solutions) may be hurried; + processes may not be forced. They take their own time to mature. Were all + instructors to realize that the quality of mental process, not the + production of correct answers, is the measure of educative growth + something hardly less than a revolution in teaching would be worked. + </p> + <p> + 3. Single-mindedness. So far as the word is concerned, much that was said + under the head of "directness" is applicable. But what the word is here + intended to convey is completeness of interest, unity of purpose; the + absence of suppressed but effectual ulterior aims for which the professed + aim is but a mask. It is equivalent to mental integrity. Absorption, + engrossment, full concern with subject matter for its own sake, nurture + it. Divided interest and evasion destroy it. + </p> + <p> + Intellectual integrity, honesty, and sincerity are at bottom not matters + of conscious purpose but of quality of active response. Their acquisition + is fostered of course by conscious intent, but self-deception is very + easy. Desires are urgent. When the demands and wishes of others forbid + their direct expression they are easily driven into subterranean and deep + channels. Entire surrender, and wholehearted adoption of the course of + action demanded by others are almost impossible. Deliberate revolt or + deliberate attempts to deceive others may result. But the more frequent + outcome is a confused and divided state of interest in which one is fooled + as to one's own real intent. One tries to serve two masters at once. + Social instincts, the strong desire to please others and get their + approval, social training, the general sense of duty and of authority, + apprehension of penalty, all lead to a half-hearted effort to conform, to + "pay attention to the lesson," or whatever the requirement is. Amiable + individuals want to do what they are expected to do. Consciously the pupil + thinks he is doing this. But his own desires are not abolished. Only their + evident exhibition is suppressed. Strain of attention to what is hostile + to desire is irksome; in spite of one's conscious wish, the underlying + desires determine the main course of thought, the deeper emotional + responses. The mind wanders from the nominal subject and devotes itself to + what is intrinsically more desirable. A systematized divided attention + expressing the duplicity of the state of desire is the result. One has + only to recall his own experiences in school or at the present time when + outwardly employed in actions which do not engage one's desires and + purposes, to realize how prevalent is this attitude of divided attention—double-mindedness. + We are so used to it that we take it for granted that a considerable + amount of it is necessary. It may be; if so, it is the more important to + face its bad intellectual effects. Obvious is the loss of energy of + thought immediately available when one is consciously trying (or trying to + seem to try) to attend to one matter, while unconsciously one's + imagination is spontaneously going out to more congenial affairs. More + subtle and more permanently crippling to efficiency of intellectual + activity is a fostering of habitual self-deception, with the confused + sense of reality which accompanies it. A double standard of reality, one + for our own private and more or less concealed interests, and another for + public and acknowledged concerns, hampers, in most of us, integrity and + completeness of mental action. Equally serious is the fact that a split is + set up between conscious thought and attention and impulsive blind + affection and desire. Reflective dealings with the material of instruction + is constrained and half-hearted; attention wanders. The topics to which it + wanders are unavowed and hence intellectually illicit; transactions with + them are furtive. The discipline that comes from regulating response by + deliberate inquiry having a purpose fails; worse than that, the deepest + concern and most congenial enterprises of the imagination (since they + center about the things dearest to desire) are casual, concealed. They + enter into action in ways which are unacknowledged. Not subject to + rectification by consideration of consequences, they are demoralizing. + </p> + <p> + School conditions favorable to this division of mind between avowed, + public, and socially responsible undertakings, and private, ill-regulated, + and suppressed indulgences of thought are not hard to find. What is + sometimes called "stern discipline," i.e., external coercive pressure, has + this tendency. Motivation through rewards extraneous to the thing to be + done has a like effect. Everything that makes schooling merely preparatory + (See ante, p. 55) works in this direction. Ends being beyond the pupil's + present grasp, other agencies have to be found to procure immediate + attention to assigned tasks. Some responses are secured, but desires and + affections not enlisted must find other outlets. Not less serious is + exaggerated emphasis upon drill exercises designed to produce skill in + action, independent of any engagement of thought—exercises have no + purpose but the production of automatic skill. Nature abhors a mental + vacuum. What do teachers imagine is happening to thought and emotion when + the latter get no outlet in the things of immediate activity? Were they + merely kept in temporary abeyance, or even only calloused, it would not be + a matter of so much moment. But they are not abolished; they are not + suspended; they are not suppressed—save with reference to the task + in question. They follow their own chaotic and undisciplined course. What + is native, spontaneous, and vital in mental reaction goes unused and + untested, and the habits formed are such that these qualities become less + and less available for public and avowed ends. + </p> + <p> + 4. Responsibility. By responsibility as an element in intellectual + attitude is meant the disposition to consider in advance the probable + consequences of any projected step and deliberately to accept them: to + accept them in the sense of taking them into account, acknowledging them + in action, not yielding a mere verbal assent. Ideas, as we have seen, are + intrinsically standpoints and methods for bringing about a solution of a + perplexing situation; forecasts calculated to influence responses. It is + only too easy to think that one accepts a statement or believes a + suggested truth when one has not considered its implications; when one has + made but a cursory and superficial survey of what further things one is + committed to by acceptance. Observation and recognition, belief and + assent, then become names for lazy acquiescence in what is externally + presented. + </p> + <p> + It would be much better to have fewer facts and truths in instruction—that + is, fewer things supposedly accepted,—if a smaller number of + situations could be intellectually worked out to the point where + conviction meant something real—some identification of the self with + the type of conduct demanded by facts and foresight of results. The most + permanent bad results of undue complication of school subjects and + congestion of school studies and lessons are not the worry, nervous + strain, and superficial acquaintance that follow (serious as these are), + but the failure to make clear what is involved in really knowing and + believing a thing. Intellectual responsibility means severe standards in + this regard. These standards can be built up only through practice in + following up and acting upon the meaning of what is acquired. + </p> + <p> + Intellectual thoroughness is thus another name for the attitude we are + considering. There is a kind of thoroughness which is almost purely + physical: the kind that signifies mechanical and exhausting drill upon all + the details of a subject. Intellectual thoroughness is seeing a thing + through. It depends upon a unity of purpose to which details are + subordinated, not upon presenting a multitude of disconnected details. It + is manifested in the firmness with which the full meaning of the purpose + is developed, not in attention, however "conscientious" it may be, to the + steps of action externally imposed and directed. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM13"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. Method is a statement of the way the subject matter of an + </h2> + <p> + experience develops most effectively and fruitfully. It is derived, + accordingly, from observation of the course of experiences where there is + no conscious distinction of personal attitude and manner from material + dealt with. The assumption that method is something separate is connected + with the notion of the isolation of mind and self from the world of + things. It makes instruction and learning formal, mechanical, constrained. + While methods are individualized, certain features of the normal course of + an experience to its fruition may be discriminated, because of the fund of + wisdom derived from prior experiences and because of general similarities + in the materials dealt with from time to time. Expressed in terms of the + attitude of the individual the traits of good method are + straightforwardness, flexible intellectual interest or open-minded will to + learn, integrity of purpose, and acceptance of responsibility for the + consequences of one's activity including thought. + </p> + <p> + 1 This point is developed below in a discussion of what are termed + psychological and logical methods respectively. See p. 219. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0014"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Fourteen: The Nature of Subject Matter + </h2> + <p> + 1. Subject Matter of Educator and of Learner. So far as the nature of + subject matter in principle is concerned, there is nothing to add to what + has been said (See ante, p. 134). It consists of the facts observed, + recalled, read, and talked about, and the ideas suggested, in course of a + development of a situation having a purpose. This statement needs to be + rendered more specific by connecting it with the materials of school + instruction, the studies which make up the curriculum. What is the + significance of our definition in application to reading, writing, + mathematics, history, nature study, drawing, singing, physics, chemistry, + modern and foreign languages, and so on? Let us recur to two of the points + made earlier in our discussion. The educator's part in the enterprise of + education is to furnish the environment which stimulates responses and + directs the learner's course. In last analysis, all that the educator can + do is modify stimuli so that response will as surely as is possible result + in the formation of desirable intellectual and emotional dispositions. + Obviously studies or the subject matter of the curriculum have intimately + to do with this business of supplying an environment. The other point is + the necessity of a social environment to give meaning to habits formed. In + what we have termed informal education, subject matter is carried directly + in the matrix of social intercourse. It is what the persons with whom an + individual associates do and say. This fact gives a clew to the + understanding of the subject matter of formal or deliberate instruction. A + connecting link is found in the stories, traditions, songs, and liturgies + which accompany the doings and rites of a primitive social group. They + represent the stock of meanings which have been precipitated out of + previous experience, which are so prized by the group as to be identified + with their conception of their own collective life. Not being obviously a + part of the skill exhibited in the daily occupations of eating, hunting, + making war and peace, constructing rugs, pottery, and baskets, etc., they + are consciously impressed upon the young; often, as in the initiation + ceremonies, with intense emotional fervor. Even more pains are consciously + taken to perpetuate the myths, legends, and sacred verbal formulae of the + group than to transmit the directly useful customs of the group just + because they cannot be picked up, as the latter can be in the ordinary + processes of association. + </p> + <p> + As the social group grows more complex, involving a greater number of + acquired skills which are dependent, either in fact or in the belief of + the group, upon standard ideas deposited from past experience, the content + of social life gets more definitely formulated for purposes of + instruction. As we have previously noted, probably the chief motive for + consciously dwelling upon the group life, extracting the meanings which + are regarded as most important and systematizing them in a coherent + arrangement, is just the need of instructing the young so as to perpetuate + group life. Once started on this road of selection, formulation, and + organization, no definite limit exists. The invention of writing and of + printing gives the operation an immense impetus. Finally, the bonds which + connect the subject matter of school study with the habits and ideals of + the social group are disguised and covered up. The ties are so loosened + that it often appears as if there were none; as if subject matter existed + simply as knowledge on its own independent behoof, and as if study were + the mere act of mastering it for its own sake, irrespective of any social + values. Since it is highly important for practical reasons to counter-act + this tendency (See ante, p. 8) the chief purposes of our theoretical + discussion are to make clear the connection which is so readily lost from + sight, and to show in some detail the social content and function of the + chief constituents of the course of study. + </p> + <p> + The points need to be considered from the standpoint of instructor and of + student. To the former, the significance of a knowledge of subject matter, + going far beyond the present knowledge of pupils, is to supply definite + standards and to reveal to him the possibilities of the crude activities + of the immature. (i) The material of school studies translates into + concrete and detailed terms the meanings of current social life which it + is desirable to transmit. It puts clearly before the instructor the + essential ingredients of the culture to be perpetuated, in such an + organized form as to protect him from the haphazard efforts he would be + likely to indulge in if the meanings had not been standardized. (ii) A + knowledge of the ideas which have been achieved in the past as the outcome + of activity places the educator in a position to perceive the meaning of + the seeming impulsive and aimless reactions of the young, and to provide + the stimuli needed to direct them so that they will amount to something. + The more the educator knows of music the more he can perceive the + possibilities of the inchoate musical impulses of a child. Organized + subject matter represents the ripe fruitage of experiences like theirs, + experiences involving the same world, and powers and needs similar to + theirs. It does not represent perfection or infallible wisdom; but it is + the best at command to further new experiences which may, in some respects + at least, surpass the achievements embodied in existing knowledge and + works of art. + </p> + <p> + From the standpoint of the educator, in other words, the various studies + represent working resources, available capital. Their remoteness from the + experience of the young is not, however, seeming; it is real. The subject + matter of the learner is not, therefore, it cannot be, identical with the + formulated, the crystallized, and systematized subject matter of the + adult; the material as found in books and in works of art, etc. The latter + represents the possibilities of the former; not its existing state. It + enters directly into the activities of the expert and the educator, not + into that of the beginner, the learner. Failure to bear in mind the + difference in subject matter from the respective standpoints of teacher + and student is responsible for most of the mistakes made in the use of + texts and other expressions of preexistent knowledge. + </p> + <p> + The need for a knowledge of the constitution and functions, in the + concrete, of human nature is great just because the teacher's attitude to + subject matter is so different from that of the pupil. The teacher + presents in actuality what the pupil represents only in posse. That is, + the teacher already knows the things which the student is only learning. + Hence the problem of the two is radically unlike. When engaged in the + direct act of teaching, the instructor needs to have subject matter at his + fingers' ends; his attention should be upon the attitude and response of + the pupil. To understand the latter in its interplay with subject matter + is his task, while the pupil's mind, naturally, should be not on itself + but on the topic in hand. Or to state the same point in a somewhat + different manner: the teacher should be occupied not with subject matter + in itself but in its interaction with the pupils' present needs and + capacities. Hence simple scholarship is not enough. In fact, there are + certain features of scholarship or mastered subject matter—taken by + itself—which get in the way of effective teaching unless the + instructor's habitual attitude is one of concern with its interplay in the + pupil's own experience. In the first place, his knowledge extends + indefinitely beyond the range of the pupil's acquaintance. It involves + principles which are beyond the immature pupil's understanding and + interest. In and of itself, it may no more represent the living world of + the pupil's experience than the astronomer's knowledge of Mars represents + a baby's acquaintance with the room in which he stays. In the second + place, the method of organization of the material of achieved scholarship + differs from that of the beginner. It is not true that the experience of + the young is unorganized—that it consists of isolated scraps. But it + is organized in connection with direct practical centers of interest. The + child's home is, for example, the organizing center of his geographical + knowledge. His own movements about the locality, his journeys abroad, the + tales of his friends, give the ties which hold his items of information + together. But the geography of the geographer, of the one who has already + developed the implications of these smaller experiences, is organized on + the basis of the relationship which the various facts bear to one another—not + the relations which they bear to his house, bodily movements, and friends. + To the one who is learned, subject matter is extensive, accurately + defined, and logically interrelated. To the one who is learning, it is + fluid, partial, and connected through his personal occupations. 1 The + problem of teaching is to keep the experience of the student moving in the + direction of what the expert already knows. Hence the need that the + teacher know both subject matter and the characteristic needs and + capacities of the student. + </p> + <p> + 2. The Development of Subject Matter in the Learner. It is possible, + without doing violence to the facts, to mark off three fairly typical + stages in the growth of subject matter in the experience of the learner. + In its first estate, knowledge exists as the content of intelligent + ability—power to do. This kind of subject matter, or known material, + is expressed in familiarity or acquaintance with things. Then this + material gradually is surcharged and deepened through communicated + knowledge or information. Finally, it is enlarged and worked over into + rationally or logically organized material—that of the one who, + relatively speaking, is expert in the subject. + </p> + <p> + I. The knowledge which comes first to persons, and that remains most + deeply ingrained, is knowledge of how to do; how to walk, talk, read, + write, skate, ride a bicycle, manage a machine, calculate, drive a horse, + sell goods, manage people, and so on indefinitely. The popular tendency to + regard instinctive acts which are adapted to an end as a sort of + miraculous knowledge, while unjustifiable, is evidence of the strong + tendency to identify intelligent control of the means of action with + knowledge. When education, under the influence of a scholastic conception + of knowledge which ignores everything but scientifically formulated facts + and truths, fails to recognize that primary or initial subject matter + always exists as matter of an active doing, involving the use of the body + and the handling of material, the subject matter of instruction is + isolated from the needs and purposes of the learner, and so becomes just a + something to be memorized and reproduced upon demand. Recognition of the + natural course of development, on the contrary, always sets out with + situations which involve learning by doing. Arts and occupations form the + initial stage of the curriculum, corresponding as they do to knowing how + to go about the accomplishment of ends. Popular terms denoting knowledge + have always retained the connection with ability in action lost by + academic philosophies. Ken and can are allied words. Attention means + caring for a thing, in the sense of both affection and of looking out for + its welfare. Mind means carrying out instructions in action—as a + child minds his mother—and taking care of something—as a nurse + minds the baby. To be thoughtful, considerate, means to heed the claims of + others. Apprehension means dread of undesirable consequences, as well as + intellectual grasp. To have good sense or judgment is to know the conduct + a situation calls for; discernment is not making distinctions for the sake + of making them, an exercise reprobated as hair splitting, but is insight + into an affair with reference to acting. Wisdom has never lost its + association with the proper direction of life. Only in education, never in + the life of farmer, sailor, merchant, physician, or laboratory + experimenter, does knowledge mean primarily a store of information aloof + from doing. Having to do with things in an intelligent way issues in + acquaintance or familiarity. The things we are best acquainted with are + the things we put to frequent use—such things as chairs, tables, + pen, paper, clothes, food, knives and forks on the commonplace level, + differentiating into more special objects according to a person's + occupations in life. Knowledge of things in that intimate and emotional + sense suggested by the word acquaintance is a precipitate from our + employing them with a purpose. We have acted with or upon the thing so + frequently that we can anticipate how it will act and react—such is + the meaning of familiar acquaintance. We are ready for a familiar thing; + it does not catch us napping, or play unexpected tricks with us. This + attitude carries with it a sense of congeniality or friendliness, of ease + and illumination; while the things with which we are not accustomed to + deal are strange, foreign, cold, remote, "abstract." + </p> + <p> + II. But it is likely that elaborate statements regarding this primary + stage of knowledge will darken understanding. It includes practically all + of our knowledge which is not the result of deliberate technical study. + Modes of purposeful doing include dealings with persons as well as things. + Impulses of communication and habits of intercourse have to be adapted to + maintaining successful connections with others; a large fund of social + knowledge accrues. As a part of this intercommunication one learns much + from others. They tell of their experiences and of the experiences which, + in turn, have been told them. In so far as one is interested or concerned + in these communications, their matter becomes a part of one's own + experience. Active connections with others are such an intimate and vital + part of our own concerns that it is impossible to draw sharp lines, such + as would enable us to say, "Here my experience ends; there yours begins." + In so far as we are partners in common undertakings, the things which + others communicate to us as the consequences of their particular share in + the enterprise blend at once into the experience resulting from our own + special doings. The ear is as much an organ of experience as the eye or + hand; the eye is available for reading reports of what happens beyond its + horizon. Things remote in space and time affect the issue of our actions + quite as much as things which we can smell and handle. They really concern + us, and, consequently, any account of them which assists us in dealing + with things at hand falls within personal experience. + </p> + <p> + Information is the name usually given to this kind of subject matter. The + place of communication in personal doing supplies us with a criterion for + estimating the value of informational material in school. Does it grow + naturally out of some question with which the student is concerned? Does + it fit into his more direct acquaintance so as to increase its efficacy + and deepen its meaning? If it meets these two requirements, it is + educative. The amount heard or read is of no importance—the more the + better, provided the student has a need for it and can apply it in some + situation of his own. + </p> + <p> + But it is not so easy to fulfill these requirements in actual practice as + it is to lay them down in theory. The extension in modern times of the + area of intercommunication; the invention of appliances for securing + acquaintance with remote parts of the heavens and bygone events of + history; the cheapening of devices, like printing, for recording and + distributing information—genuine and alleged—have created an + immense bulk of communicated subject matter. It is much easier to swamp a + pupil with this than to work it into his direct experiences. All too + frequently it forms another strange world which just overlies the world of + personal acquaintance. The sole problem of the student is to learn, for + school purposes, for purposes of recitations and promotions, the + constituent parts of this strange world. Probably the most conspicuous + connotation of the word knowledge for most persons to-day is just the body + of facts and truths ascertained by others; the material found in the rows + and rows of atlases, cyclopedias, histories, biographies, books of travel, + scientific treatises, on the shelves of libraries. + </p> + <p> + The imposing stupendous bulk of this material has unconsciously influenced + men's notions of the nature of knowledge itself. The statements, the + propositions, in which knowledge, the issue of active concern with + problems, is deposited, are taken to be themselves knowledge. The record + of knowledge, independent of its place as an outcome of inquiry and a + resource in further inquiry, is taken to be knowledge. The mind of man is + taken captive by the spoils of its prior victories; the spoils, not the + weapons and the acts of waging the battle against the unknown, are used to + fix the meaning of knowledge, of fact, and truth. + </p> + <p> + If this identification of knowledge with propositions stating information + has fastened itself upon logicians and philosophers, it is not surprising + that the same ideal has almost dominated instruction. The "course of + study" consists largely of information distributed into various branches + of study, each study being subdivided into lessons presenting in serial + cutoff portions of the total store. In the seventeenth century, the store + was still small enough so that men set up the ideal of a complete + encyclopedic mastery of it. It is now so bulky that the impossibility of + any one man's coming into possession of it all is obvious. But the + educational ideal has not been much affected. Acquisition of a modicum of + information in each branch of learning, or at least in a selected group, + remains the principle by which the curriculum, from elementary school + through college, is formed; the easier portions being assigned to the + earlier years, the more difficult to the later. The complaints of + educators that learning does not enter into character and affect conduct; + the protests against memoriter work, against cramming, against gradgrind + preoccupation with "facts," against devotion to wire-drawn distinctions + and ill-understood rules and principles, all follow from this state of + affairs. Knowledge which is mainly second-hand, other men's knowledge, + tends to become merely verbal. It is no objection to information that it + is clothed in words; communication necessarily takes place through words. + But in the degree in which what is communicated cannot be organized into + the existing experience of the learner, it becomes mere words: that is, + pure sense-stimuli, lacking in meaning. Then it operates to call out + mechanical reactions, ability to use the vocal organs to repeat + statements, or the hand to write or to do "sums." + </p> + <p> + To be informed is to be posted; it is to have at command the subject + matter needed for an effective dealing with a problem, and for giving + added significance to the search for solution and to the solution itself. + Informational knowledge is the material which can be fallen back upon as + given, settled, established, assured in a doubtful situation. It is a kind + of bridge for mind in its passage from doubt to discovery. It has the + office of an intellectual middleman. It condenses and records in available + form the net results of the prior experiences of mankind, as an agency of + enhancing the meaning of new experiences. When one is told that Brutus + assassinated Caesar, or that the length of the year is three hundred + sixty-five and one fourth days, or that the ratio of the diameter of the + circle to its circumference is 3.1415. . . one receives what is indeed + knowledge for others, but for him it is a stimulus to knowing. His + acquisition of knowledge depends upon his response to what is + communicated. + </p> + <p> + 3. Science or Rationalized Knowledge. Science is a name for knowledge in + its most characteristic form. It represents in its degree, the perfected + outcome of learning,—its consummation. What is known, in a given + case, is what is sure, certain, settled, disposed of; that which we think + with rather than that which we think about. In its honorable sense, + knowledge is distinguished from opinion, guesswork, speculation, and mere + tradition. In knowledge, things are ascertained; they are so and not + dubiously otherwise. But experience makes us aware that there is + difference between intellectual certainty of subject matter and our + certainty. We are made, so to speak, for belief; credulity is natural. The + undisciplined mind is averse to suspense and intellectual hesitation; it + is prone to assertion. It likes things undisturbed, settled, and treats + them as such without due warrant. Familiarity, common repute, and + congeniality to desire are readily made measuring rods of truth. Ignorance + gives way to opinionated and current error,—a greater foe to + learning than ignorance itself. A Socrates is thus led to declare that + consciousness of ignorance is the beginning of effective love of wisdom, + and a Descartes to say that science is born of doubting. + </p> + <p> + We have already dwelt upon the fact that subject matter, or data, and + ideas have to have their worth tested experimentally: that in themselves + they are tentative and provisional. Our predilection for premature + acceptance and assertion, our aversion to suspended judgment, are signs + that we tend naturally to cut short the process of testing. We are + satisfied with superficial and immediate short-visioned applications. If + these work out with moderate satisfactoriness, we are content to suppose + that our assumptions have been confirmed. Even in the case of failure, we + are inclined to put the blame not on the inadequacy and incorrectness of + our data and thoughts, but upon our hard luck and the hostility of + circumstance. We charge the evil consequence not to the error of our + schemes and our incomplete inquiry into conditions (thereby getting + material for revising the former and stimulus for extending the latter) + but to untoward fate. We even plume ourselves upon our firmness in + clinging to our conceptions in spite of the way in which they work out. + </p> + <p> + Science represents the safeguard of the race against these natural + propensities and the evils which flow from them. It consists of the + special appliances and methods which the race has slowly worked out in + order to conduct reflection under conditions whereby its procedures and + results are tested. It is artificial (an acquired art), not spontaneous; + learned, not native. To this fact is due the unique, the invaluable place + of science in education, and also the dangers which threaten its right + use. Without initiation into the scientific spirit one is not in + possession of the best tools which humanity has so far devised for + effectively directed reflection. One in that case not merely conducts + inquiry and learning without the use of the best instruments, but fails to + understand the full meaning of knowledge. For he does not become + acquainted with the traits that mark off opinion and assent from + authorized conviction. On the other hand, the fact that science marks the + perfecting of knowing in highly specialized conditions of technique + renders its results, taken by themselves, remote from ordinary experience—a + quality of aloofness that is popularly designated by the term abstract. + When this isolation appears in instruction, scientific information is even + more exposed to the dangers attendant upon presenting ready-made subject + matter than are other forms of information. + </p> + <p> + Science has been defined in terms of method of inquiry and testing. At + first sight, this definition may seem opposed to the current conception + that science is organized or systematized knowledge. The opposition, + however, is only seeming, and disappears when the ordinary definition is + completed. Not organization but the kind of organization effected by + adequate methods of tested discovery marks off science. The knowledge of a + farmer is systematized in the degree in which he is competent. It is + organized on the basis of relation of means to ends—practically + organized. Its organization as knowledge (that is, in the eulogistic sense + of adequately tested and confirmed) is incidental to its organization with + reference to securing crops, live-stock, etc. But scientific subject + matter is organized with specific reference to the successful conduct of + the enterprise of discovery, to knowing as a specialized undertaking. + Reference to the kind of assurance attending science will shed light upon + this statement. It is rational assurance,—logical warranty. The + ideal of scientific organization is, therefore, that every conception and + statement shall be of such a kind as to follow from others and to lead to + others. Conceptions and propositions mutually imply and support one + another. This double relation of "leading to and confirming" is what is + meant by the terms logical and rational. The everyday conception of water + is more available for ordinary uses of drinking, washing, irrigation, + etc., than the chemist's notion of it. The latter's description of it as + H20 is superior from the standpoint of place and use in inquiry. It states + the nature of water in a way which connects it with knowledge of other + things, indicating to one who understands it how the knowledge is arrived + at and its bearings upon other portions of knowledge of the structure of + things. Strictly speaking, it does not indicate the objective relations of + water any more than does a statement that water is transparent, fluid, + without taste or odor, satisfying to thirst, etc. It is just as true that + water has these relations as that it is constituted by two molecules of + hydrogen in combination with one of oxygen. But for the particular purpose + of conducting discovery with a view to ascertainment of fact, the latter + relations are fundamental. The more one emphasizes organization as a mark + of science, then, the more he is committed to a recognition of the primacy + of method in the definition of science. For method defines the kind of + organization in virtue of which science is science. + </p> + <p> + 4. Subject Matter as Social. Our next chapters will take up various school + activities and studies and discuss them as successive stages in that + evolution of knowledge which we have just been discussing. It remains to + say a few words upon subject matter as social, since our prior remarks + have been mainly concerned with its intellectual aspect. A difference in + breadth and depth exists even in vital knowledge; even in the data and + ideas which are relevant to real problems and which are motivated by + purposes. For there is a difference in the social scope of purposes and + the social importance of problems. With the wide range of possible + material to select from, it is important that education (especially in all + its phases short of the most specialized) should use a criterion of social + worth. All information and systematized scientific subject matter have + been worked out under the conditions of social life and have been + transmitted by social means. But this does not prove that all is of equal + value for the purposes of forming the disposition and supplying the + equipment of members of present society. The scheme of a curriculum must + take account of the adaptation of studies to the needs of the existing + community life; it must select with the intention of improving the life we + live in common so that the future shall be better than the past. Moreover, + the curriculum must be planned with reference to placing essentials first, + and refinements second. The things which are socially most fundamental, + that is, which have to do with the experiences in which the widest groups + share, are the essentials. The things which represent the needs of + specialized groups and technical pursuits are secondary. There is truth in + the saying that education must first be human and only after that + professional. But those who utter the saying frequently have in mind in + the term human only a highly specialized class: the class of learned men + who preserve the classic traditions of the past. They forget that material + is humanized in the degree in which it connects with the common interests + of men as men. Democratic society is peculiarly dependent for its + maintenance upon the use in forming a course of study of criteria which + are broadly human. Democracy cannot flourish where the chief influences in + selecting subject matter of instruction are utilitarian ends narrowly + conceived for the masses, and, for the higher education of the few, the + traditions of a specialized cultivated class. The notion that the + "essentials" of elementary education are the three R's mechanically + treated, is based upon ignorance of the essentials needed for realization + of democratic ideals. Unconsciously it assumes that these ideals are + unrealizable; it assumes that in the future, as in the past, getting a + livelihood, "making a living," must signify for most men and women doing + things which are not significant, freely chosen, and ennobling to those + who do them; doing things which serve ends unrecognized by those engaged + in them, carried on under the direction of others for the sake of + pecuniary reward. For preparation of large numbers for a life of this + sort, and only for this purpose, are mechanical efficiency in reading, + writing, spelling and figuring, together with attainment of a certain + amount of muscular dexterity, "essentials." Such conditions also infect + the education called liberal, with illiberality. They imply a somewhat + parasitic cultivation bought at the expense of not having the + enlightenment and discipline which come from concern with the deepest + problems of common humanity. A curriculum which acknowledges the social + responsibilities of education must present situations where problems are + relevant to the problems of living together, and where observation and + information are calculated to develop social insight and interest. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM14"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. The subject matter of education consists primarily of the + </h2> + <p> + meanings which supply content to existing social life. The continuity of + social life means that many of these meanings are contributed to present + activity by past collective experience. As social life grows more complex, + these factors increase in number and import. There is need of special + selection, formulation, and organization in order that they may be + adequately transmitted to the new generation. But this very process tends + to set up subject matter as something of value just by itself, apart from + its function in promoting the realization of the meanings implied in the + present experience of the immature. Especially is the educator exposed to + the temptation to conceive his task in terms of the pupil's ability to + appropriate and reproduce the subject matter in set statements, + irrespective of its organization into his activities as a developing + social member. The positive principle is maintained when the young begin + with active occupations having a social origin and use, and proceed to a + scientific insight in the materials and laws involved, through + assimilating into their more direct experience the ideas and facts + communicated by others who have had a larger experience. 1 Since the + learned man should also still be a learner, it will be understood that + these contrasts are relative, not absolute. But in the earlier stages of + learning at least they are practically all-important. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0015"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Fifteen: Play and Work in the Curriculum + </h2> + <p> + 1. The Place of Active Occupations in Education. In consequence partly of + the efforts of educational reformers, partly of increased interest in + child-psychology, and partly of the direct experience of the schoolroom, + the course of study has in the past generation undergone considerable + modification. The desirability of starting from and with the experience + and capacities of learners, a lesson enforced from all three quarters, has + led to the introduction of forms of activity, in play and work, similar to + those in which children and youth engage outside of school. Modern + psychology has substituted for the general, ready-made faculties of older + theory a complex group of instinctive and impulsive tendencies. Experience + has shown that when children have a chance at physical activities which + bring their natural impulses into play, going to school is a joy, + management is less of a burden, and learning is easier. Sometimes, + perhaps, plays, games, and constructive occupations are resorted to only + for these reasons, with emphasis upon relief from the tedium and strain of + "regular" school work. There is no reason, however, for using them merely + as agreeable diversions. Study of mental life has made evident the + fundamental worth of native tendencies to explore, to manipulate tools and + materials, to construct, to give expression to joyous emotion, etc. When + exercises which are prompted by these instincts are a part of the regular + school program, the whole pupil is engaged, the artificial gap between + life in school and out is reduced, motives are afforded for attention to a + large variety of materials and processes distinctly educative in effect, + and cooperative associations which give information in a social setting + are provided. In short, the grounds for assigning to play and active work + a definite place in the curriculum are intellectual and social, not + matters of temporary expediency and momentary agreeableness. Without + something of the kind, it is not possible to secure the normal estate of + effective learning; namely, that knowledge-getting be an outgrowth of + activities having their own end, instead of a school task. More + specifically, play and work correspond, point for point, with the traits + of the initial stage of knowing, which consists, as we saw in the last + chapter, in learning how to do things and in acquaintance with things and + processes gained in the doing. It is suggestive that among the Greeks, + till the rise of conscious philosophy, the same word, techne, was used for + art and science. Plato gave his account of knowledge on the basis of an + analysis of the knowledge of cobblers, carpenters, players of musical + instruments, etc., pointing out that their art (so far as it was not mere + routine) involved an end, mastery of material or stuff worked upon, + control of appliances, and a definite order of procedure—all of + which had to be known in order that there be intelligent skill or art. + </p> + <p> + Doubtless the fact that children normally engage in play and work out of + school has seemed to many educators a reason why they should concern + themselves in school with things radically different. School time seemed + too precious to spend in doing over again what children were sure to do + any way. In some social conditions, this reason has weight. In pioneer + times, for example, outside occupations gave a definite and valuable + intellectual and moral training. Books and everything concerned with them + were, on the other hand, rare and difficult of access; they were the only + means of outlet from a narrow and crude environment. Wherever such + conditions obtain, much may be said in favor of concentrating school + activity upon books. The situation is very different, however, in most + communities to-day. The kinds of work in which the young can engage, + especially in cities, are largely anti-educational. That prevention of + child labor is a social duty is evidence on this point. On the other hand, + printed matter has been so cheapened and is in such universal circulation, + and all the opportunities of intellectual culture have been so multiplied, + that the older type of book work is far from having the force it used to + possess. + </p> + <p> + But it must not be forgotten that an educational result is a by-product of + play and work in most out-of-school conditions. It is incidental, not + primary. Consequently the educative growth secured is more or less + accidental. Much work shares in the defects of existing industrial society—defects + next to fatal to right development. Play tends to reproduce and affirm the + crudities, as well as the excellencies, of surrounding adult life. It is + the business of the school to set up an environment in which play and work + shall be conducted with reference to facilitating desirable mental and + moral growth. It is not enough just to introduce plays and games, hand + work and manual exercises. Everything depends upon the way in which they + are employed. + </p> + <p> + 2. Available Occupations. A bare catalogue of the list of activities which + have already found their way into schools indicates what a rich field is + at hand. There is work with paper, cardboard, wood, leather, cloth, yarns, + clay and sand, and the metals, with and without tools. Processes employed + are folding, cutting, pricking, measuring, molding, modeling, + pattern-making, heating and cooling, and the operations characteristic of + such tools as the hammer, saw, file, etc. Outdoor excursions, gardening, + cooking, sewing, printing, book-binding, weaving, painting, drawing, + singing, dramatization, story-telling, reading and writing as active + pursuits with social aims (not as mere exercises for acquiring skill for + future use), in addition to a countless variety of plays and games, + designate some of the modes of occupation. + </p> + <p> + The problem of the educator is to engage pupils in these activities in + such ways that while manual skill and technical efficiency are gained and + immediate satisfaction found in the work, together with preparation for + later usefulness, these things shall be subordinated to education—that + is, to intellectual results and the forming of a socialized disposition. + What does this principle signify? In the first place, the principle rules + out certain practices. Activities which follow definite prescription and + dictation or which reproduce without modification ready-made models, may + give muscular dexterity, but they do not require the perception and + elaboration of ends, nor (what is the same thing in other words) do they + permit the use of judgment in selecting and adapting means. Not merely + manual training specifically so called but many traditional kindergarten + exercises have erred here. Moreover, opportunity for making mistakes is an + incidental requirement. Not because mistakes are ever desirable, but + because overzeal to select material and appliances which forbid a chance + for mistakes to occur, restricts initiative, reduces judgment to a + minimum, and compels the use of methods which are so remote from the + complex situations of life that the power gained is of little + availability. It is quite true that children tend to exaggerate their + powers of execution and to select projects that are beyond them. But + limitation of capacity is one of the things which has to be learned; like + other things, it is learned through the experience of consequences. The + danger that children undertaking too complex projects will simply muddle + and mess, and produce not merely crude results (which is a minor matter) + but acquire crude standards (which is an important matter) is great. But + it is the fault of the teacher if the pupil does not perceive in due + season the inadequacy of his performances, and thereby receive a stimulus + to attempt exercises which will perfect his powers. Meantime it is more + important to keep alive a creative and constructive attitude than to + secure an external perfection by engaging the pupil's action in too minute + and too closely regulated pieces of work. Accuracy and finish of detail + can be insisted upon in such portions of a complex work as are within the + pupil's capacity. + </p> + <p> + Unconscious suspicion of native experience and consequent overdoing of + external control are shown quite as much in the material supplied as in + the matter of the teacher's orders. The fear of raw material is shown in + laboratory, manual training shop, Froebelian kindergarten, and Montessori + house of childhood. The demand is for materials which have already been + subjected to the perfecting work of mind: a demand which shows itself in + the subject matter of active occupations quite as well as in academic book + learning. That such material will control the pupil's operations so as to + prevent errors is true. The notion that a pupil operating with such + material will somehow absorb the intelligence that went originally to its + shaping is fallacious. Only by starting with crude material and subjecting + it to purposeful handling will he gain the intelligence embodied in + finished material. In practice, overemphasis upon formed material leads to + an exaggeration of mathematical qualities, since intellect finds its + profit in physical things from matters of size, form, and proportion and + the relations that flow from them. But these are known only when their + perception is a fruit of acting upon purposes which require attention to + them. The more human the purpose, or the more it approximates the ends + which appeal in daily experience, the more real the knowledge. When the + purpose of the activity is restricted to ascertaining these qualities, the + resulting knowledge is only technical. + </p> + <p> + To say that active occupations should be concerned primarily with wholes + is another statement of the same principle. Wholes for purposes of + education are not, however, physical affairs. Intellectually the existence + of a whole depends upon a concern or interest; it is qualitative, the + completeness of appeal made by a situation. Exaggerated devotion to + formation of efficient skill irrespective of present purpose always shows + itself in devising exercises isolated from a purpose. Laboratory work is + made to consist of tasks of accurate measurement with a view to acquiring + knowledge of the fundamental units of physics, irrespective of contact + with the problems which make these units important; or of operations + designed to afford facility in the manipulation of experimental apparatus. + The technique is acquired independently of the purposes of discovery and + testing which alone give it meaning. Kindergarten employments are + calculated to give information regarding cubes, spheres, etc., and to form + certain habits of manipulation of material (for everything must always be + done "just so"), the absence of more vital purposes being supposedly + compensated for by the alleged symbolism of the material used. Manual + training is reduced to a series of ordered assignments calculated to + secure the mastery of one tool after another and technical ability in the + various elements of construction—like the different joints. It is + argued that pupils must know how to use tools before they attack actual + making,—assuming that pupils cannot learn how in the process of + making. Pestalozzi's just insistence upon the active use of the senses, as + a substitute for memorizing words, left behind it in practice schemes for + "object lessons" intended to acquaint pupils with all the qualities of + selected objects. The error is the same: in all these cases it is assumed + that before objects can be intelligently used, their properties must be + known. In fact, the senses are normally used in the course of intelligent + (that is, purposeful) use of things, since the qualities perceived are + factors to be reckoned with in accomplishment. Witness the different + attitude of a boy in making, say, a kite, with respect to the grain and + other properties of wood, the matter of size, angles, and proportion of + parts, to the attitude of a pupil who has an object-lesson on a piece of + wood, where the sole function of wood and its properties is to serve as + subject matter for the lesson. + </p> + <p> + The failure to realize that the functional development of a situation + alone constitutes a "whole" for the purpose of mind is the cause of the + false notions which have prevailed in instruction concerning the simple + and the complex. For the person approaching a subject, the simple thing is + his purpose—the use he desires to make of material, tool, or + technical process, no matter how complicated the process of execution may + be. The unity of the purpose, with the concentration upon details which it + entails, confers simplicity upon the elements which have to be reckoned + with in the course of action. It furnishes each with a single meaning + according to its service in carrying on the whole enterprise. After one + has gone through the process, the constituent qualities and relations are + elements, each possessed with a definite meaning of its own. The false + notion referred to takes the standpoint of the expert, the one for whom + elements exist; isolates them from purposeful action, and presents them to + beginners as the "simple" things. But it is time for a positive statement. + Aside from the fact that active occupations represent things to do, not + studies, their educational significance consists in the fact that they may + typify social situations. Men's fundamental common concerns center about + food, shelter, clothing, household furnishings, and the appliances + connected with production, exchange, and consumption. + </p> + <p> + Representing both the necessities of life and the adornments with which + the necessities have been clothed, they tap instincts at a deep level; + they are saturated with facts and principles having a social quality. + </p> + <p> + To charge that the various activities of gardening, weaving, construction + in wood, manipulation of metals, cooking, etc., which carry over these + fundamental human concerns into school resources, have a merely bread and + butter value is to miss their point. If the mass of mankind has usually + found in its industrial occupations nothing but evils which had to be + endured for the sake of maintaining existence, the fault is not in the + occupations, but in the conditions under which they are carried on. The + continually increasing importance of economic factors in contemporary life + makes it the more needed that education should reveal their scientific + content and their social value. For in schools, occupations are not + carried on for pecuniary gain but for their own content. Freed from + extraneous associations and from the pressure of wage-earning, they supply + modes of experience which are intrinsically valuable; they are truly + liberalizing in quality. + </p> + <p> + Gardening, for example, need not be taught either for the sake of + preparing future gardeners, or as an agreeable way of passing time. It + affords an avenue of approach to knowledge of the place farming and + horticulture have had in the history of the race and which they occupy in + present social organization. Carried on in an environment educationally + controlled, they are means for making a study of the facts of growth, the + chemistry of soil, the role of light, air, and moisture, injurious and + helpful animal life, etc. There is nothing in the elementary study of + botany which cannot be introduced in a vital way in connection with caring + for the growth of seeds. Instead of the subject matter belonging to a + peculiar study called botany, it will then belong to life, and will find, + moreover, its natural correlations with the facts of soil, animal life, + and human relations. As students grow mature, they will perceive problems + of interest which may be pursued for the sake of discovery, independent of + the original direct interest in gardening—problems connected with + the germination and nutrition of plants, the reproduction of fruits, etc., + thus making a transition to deliberate intellectual investigations. + </p> + <p> + The illustration is intended to apply, of course, to other school + occupations,—wood-working, cooking, and on through the list. It is + pertinent to note that in the history of the race the sciences grew + gradually out from useful social occupations. Physics developed slowly out + of the use of tools and machines; the important branch of physics known as + mechanics testifies in its name to its original associations. The lever, + wheel, inclined plane, etc., were among the first great intellectual + discoveries of mankind, and they are none the less intellectual because + they occurred in the course of seeking for means of accomplishing + practical ends. The great advance of electrical science in the last + generation was closely associated, as effect and as cause, with + application of electric agencies to means of communication, + transportation, lighting of cities and houses, and more economical + production of goods. These are social ends, moreover, and if they are too + closely associated with notions of private profit, it is not because of + anything in them, but because they have been deflected to private uses:—a + fact which puts upon the school the responsibility of restoring their + connection, in the mind of the coming generation, with public scientific + and social interests. In like ways, chemistry grew out of processes of + dying, bleaching, metal working, etc., and in recent times has found + innumerable new uses in industry. + </p> + <p> + Mathematics is now a highly abstract science; geometry, however, means + literally earth-measuring: the practical use of number in counting to keep + track of things and in measuring is even more important to-day than in the + times when it was invented for these purposes. Such considerations (which + could be duplicated in the history of any science) are not arguments for a + recapitulation of the history of the race or for dwelling long in the + early rule of thumb stage. But they indicate the possibilities—greater + to-day than ever before—of using active occupations as opportunities + for scientific study. The opportunities are just as great on the social + side, whether we look at the life of collective humanity in its past or in + its future. The most direct road for elementary students into civics and + economics is found in consideration of the place and office of industrial + occupations in social life. Even for older students, the social sciences + would be less abstract and formal if they were dealt with less as sciences + (less as formulated bodies of knowledge) and more in their direct + subject-matter as that is found in the daily life of the social groups in + which the student shares. + </p> + <p> + Connection of occupations with the method of science is at least as close + as with its subject matter. The ages when scientific progress was slow + were the ages when learned men had contempt for the material and processes + of everyday life, especially for those concerned with manual pursuits. + Consequently they strove to develop knowledge out of general principles—almost + out of their heads—by logical reasons. It seems as absurd that + learning should come from action on and with physical things, like + dropping acid on a stone to see what would happen, as that it should come + from sticking an awl with waxed thread through a piece of leather. But the + rise of experimental methods proved that, given control of conditions, the + latter operation is more typical of the right way of knowledge than + isolated logical reasonings. Experiment developed in the seventeenth and + succeeding centuries and became the authorized way of knowing when men's + interests were centered in the question of control of nature for human + uses. The active occupations in which appliances are brought to bear upon + physical things with the intention of effecting useful changes is the most + vital introduction to the experimental method. + </p> + <p> + 3. Work and Play. What has been termed active occupation includes both + play and work. In their intrinsic meaning, play and industry are by no + means so antithetical to one another as is often assumed, any sharp + contrast being due to undesirable social conditions. Both involve ends + consciously entertained and the selection and adaptations of materials and + processes designed to effect the desired ends. The difference between them + is largely one of time-span, influencing the directness of the connection + of means and ends. In play, the interest is more direct—a fact + frequently indicated by saying that in play the activity is its own end, + instead of its having an ulterior result. The statement is correct, but it + is falsely taken, if supposed to mean that play activity is momentary, + having no element of looking ahead and none of pursuit. Hunting, for + example, is one of the commonest forms of adult play, but the existence of + foresight and the direction of present activity by what one is watching + for are obvious. When an activity is its own end in the sense that the + action of the moment is complete in itself, it is purely physical; it has + no meaning (See p. 77). The person is either going through motions quite + blindly, perhaps purely imitatively, or else is in a state of excitement + which is exhausting to mind and nerves. Both results may be seen in some + types of kindergarten games where the idea of play is so highly symbolic + that only the adult is conscious of it. Unless the children succeed in + reading in some quite different idea of their own, they move about either + as if in a hypnotic daze, or they respond to a direct excitation. + </p> + <p> + The point of these remarks is that play has an end in the sense of a + directing idea which gives point to the successive acts. Persons who play + are not just doing something (pure physical movement); they are trying to + do or effect something, an attitude that involves anticipatory forecasts + which stimulate their present responses. The anticipated result, however, + is rather a subsequent action than the production of a specific change in + things. Consequently play is free, plastic. Where some definite external + outcome is wanted, the end has to be held to with some persistence, which + increases as the contemplated result is complex and requires a fairly long + series of intermediate adaptations. When the intended act is another + activity, it is not necessary to look far ahead and it is possible to + alter it easily and frequently. If a child is making a toy boat, he must + hold on to a single end and direct a considerable number of acts by that + one idea. If he is just "playing boat" he may change the material that + serves as a boat almost at will, and introduce new factors as fancy + suggests. The imagination makes what it will of chairs, blocks, leaves, + chips, if they serve the purpose of carrying activity forward. + </p> + <p> + From a very early age, however, there is no distinction of exclusive + periods of play activity and work activity, but only one of emphasis. + There are definite results which even young children desire, and try to + bring to pass. Their eager interest in sharing the occupations of others, + if nothing else, accomplishes this. Children want to "help"; they are + anxious to engage in the pursuits of adults which effect external changes: + setting the table, washing dishes, helping care for animals, etc. In their + plays, they like to construct their own toys and appliances. With + increasing maturity, activity which does not give back results of tangible + and visible achievement loses its interest. Play then changes to fooling + and if habitually indulged in is demoralizing. Observable results are + necessary to enable persons to get a sense and a measure of their own + powers. When make-believe is recognized to be make-believe, the device of + making objects in fancy alone is too easy to stimulate intense action. One + has only to observe the countenance of children really playing to note + that their attitude is one of serious absorption; this attitude cannot be + maintained when things cease to afford adequate stimulation. + </p> + <p> + When fairly remote results of a definite character are foreseen and enlist + persistent effort for their accomplishment, play passes into work. Like + play, it signifies purposeful activity and differs not in that activity is + subordinated to an external result, but in the fact that a longer course + of activity is occasioned by the idea of a result. The demand for + continuous attention is greater, and more intelligence must be shown in + selecting and shaping means. To extend this account would be to repeat + what has been said under the caption of aim, interest, and thinking. It is + pertinent, however, to inquire why the idea is so current that work + involves subordination of an activity to an ulterior material result. The + extreme form of this subordination, namely drudgery, offers a clew. + Activity carried on under conditions of external pressure or coercion is + not carried on for any significance attached to the doing. The course of + action is not intrinsically satisfying; it is a mere means for avoiding + some penalty, or for gaining some reward at its conclusion. What is + inherently repulsive is endured for the sake of averting something still + more repulsive or of securing a gain hitched on by others. Under unfree + economic conditions, this state of affairs is bound to exist. Work or + industry offers little to engage the emotions and the imagination; it is a + more or less mechanical series of strains. Only the hold which the + completion of the work has upon a person will keep him going. But the end + should be intrinsic to the action; it should be its end—a part of + its own course. Then it affords a stimulus to effort very different from + that arising from the thought of results which have nothing to do with the + intervening action. As already mentioned, the absence of economic pressure + in schools supplies an opportunity for reproducing industrial situations + of mature life under conditions where the occupation can be carried on for + its own sake. If in some cases, pecuniary recognition is also a result of + an action, though not the chief motive for it, that fact may well increase + the significance of the occupation. Where something approaching drudgery + or the need of fulfilling externally imposed tasks exists, the demand for + play persists, but tends to be perverted. The ordinary course of action + fails to give adequate stimulus to emotion and imagination. So in leisure + time, there is an imperious demand for their stimulation by any kind of + means; gambling, drink, etc., may be resorted to. Or, in less extreme + cases, there is recourse to idle amusement; to anything which passes time + with immediate agreeableness. Recreation, as the word indicates, is + recuperation of energy. No demand of human nature is more urgent or less + to be escaped. The idea that the need can be suppressed is absolutely + fallacious, and the Puritanic tradition which disallows the need has + entailed an enormous crop of evils. If education does not afford + opportunity for wholesome recreation and train capacity for seeking and + finding it, the suppressed instincts find all sorts of illicit outlets, + sometimes overt, sometimes confined to indulgence of the imagination. + Education has no more serious responsibility than making adequate + provision for enjoyment of recreative leisure; not only for the sake of + immediate health, but still more if possible for the sake of its lasting + effect upon habits of mind. Art is again the answer to this demand. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM15"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. In the previous chapter we found that the primary subject + </h2> + <p> + matter of knowing is that contained in learning how to do things of a + fairly direct sort. The educational equivalent of this principle is the + consistent use of simple occupations which appeal to the powers of youth + and which typify general modes of social activity. Skill and information + about materials, tools, and laws of energy are acquired while activities + are carried on for their own sake. The fact that they are socially + representative gives a quality to the skill and knowledge gained which + makes them transferable to out-of-school situations. It is important not + to confuse the psychological distinction between play and work with the + economic distinction. Psychologically, the defining characteristic of play + is not amusement nor aimlessness. It is the fact that the aim is thought + of as more activity in the same line, without defining continuity of + action in reference to results produced. Activities as they grow more + complicated gain added meaning by greater attention to specific results + achieved. Thus they pass gradually into work. Both are equally free and + intrinsically motivated, apart from false economic conditions which tend + to make play into idle excitement for the well to do, and work into + uncongenial labor for the poor. Work is psychologically simply an activity + which consciously includes regard for consequences as a part of itself; it + becomes constrained labor when the consequences are outside of the + activity as an end to which activity is merely a means. Work which remains + permeated with the play attitude is art—in quality if not in + conventional designation. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0016"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Sixteen: The Significance of Geography and History + </h2> + <p> + 1. Extension of Meaning of Primary Activities. Nothing is more striking + than the difference between an activity as merely physical and the wealth + of meanings which the same activity may assume. From the outside, an + astronomer gazing through a telescope is like a small boy looking through + the same tube. In each case, there is an arrangement of glass and metal, + an eye, and a little speck of light in the distance. Yet at a critical + moment, the activity of an astronomer might be concerned with the birth of + a world, and have whatever is known about the starry heavens as its + significant content. Physically speaking, what man has effected on this + globe in his progress from savagery is a mere scratch on its surface, not + perceptible at a distance which is slight in comparison with the reaches + even of the solar system. Yet in meaning what has been accomplished + measures just the difference of civilization from savagery. Although the + activities, physically viewed, have changed somewhat, this change is + slight in comparison with the development of the meanings attaching to the + activities. There is no limit to the meaning which an action may come to + possess. It all depends upon the context of perceived connections in which + it is placed; the reach of imagination in realizing connections is + inexhaustible. The advantage which the activity of man has in + appropriating and finding meanings makes his education something else than + the manufacture of a tool or the training of an animal. The latter + increase efficiency; they do not develop significance. The final + educational importance of such occupations in play and work as were + considered in the last chapter is that they afford the most direct + instrumentalities for such extension of meaning. Set going under adequate + conditions they are magnets for gathering and retaining an indefinitely + wide scope of intellectual considerations. They provide vital centers for + the reception and assimilation of information. When information is + purveyed in chunks simply as information to be retained for its own sake, + it tends to stratify over vital experience. Entering as a factor into an + activity pursued for its own sake—whether as a means or as a + widening of the content of the aim—it is informing. The insight + directly gained fuses with what is told. Individual experience is then + capable of taking up and holding in solution the net results of the + experience of the group to which he belongs—including the results of + sufferings and trials over long stretches of time. And such media have no + fixed saturation point where further absorption is impossible. The more + that is taken in, the greater capacity there is for further assimilation. + New receptiveness follows upon new curiosity, and new curiosity upon + information gained. + </p> + <p> + The meanings with which activities become charged, concern nature and man. + This is an obvious truism, which however gains meaning when translated + into educational equivalents. So translated, it signifies that geography + and history supply subject matter which gives background and outlook, + intellectual perspective, to what might otherwise be narrow personal + actions or mere forms of technical skill. With every increase of ability + to place our own doings in their time and space connections, our doings + gain in significant content. We realize that we are citizens of no mean + city in discovering the scene in space of which we are denizens, and the + continuous manifestation of endeavor in time of which we are heirs and + continuers. Thus our ordinary daily experiences cease to be things of the + moment and gain enduring substance. Of course if geography and history are + taught as ready-made studies which a person studies simply because he is + sent to school, it easily happens that a large number of statements about + things remote and alien to everyday experience are learned. Activity is + divided, and two separate worlds are built up, occupying activity at + divided periods. No transmutation takes place; ordinary experience is not + enlarged in meaning by getting its connections; what is studied is not + animated and made real by entering into immediate activity. Ordinary + experience is not even left as it was, narrow but vital. Rather, it loses + something of its mobility and sensitiveness to suggestions. It is weighed + down and pushed into a corner by a load of unassimilated information. It + parts with its flexible responsiveness and alert eagerness for additional + meaning. Mere amassing of information apart from the direct interests of + life makes mind wooden; elasticity disappears. + </p> + <p> + Normally every activity engaged in for its own sake reaches out beyond its + immediate self. It does not passively wait for information to be bestowed + which will increase its meaning; it seeks it out. Curiosity is not an + accidental isolated possession; it is a necessary consequence of the fact + that an experience is a moving, changing thing, involving all kinds of + connections with other things. Curiosity is but the tendency to make these + conditions perceptible. It is the business of educators to supply an + environment so that this reaching out of an experience may be fruitfully + rewarded and kept continuously active. Within a certain kind of + environment, an activity may be checked so that the only meaning which + accrues is of its direct and tangible isolated outcome. One may cook, or + hammer, or walk, and the resulting consequences may not take the mind any + farther than the consequences of cooking, hammering, and walking in the + literal—or physical—sense. But nevertheless the consequences + of the act remain far-reaching. To walk involves a displacement and + reaction of the resisting earth, whose thrill is felt wherever there is + matter. It involves the structure of the limbs and the nervous system; the + principles of mechanics. To cook is to utilize heat and moisture to change + the chemical relations of food materials; it has a bearing upon the + assimilation of food and the growth of the body. The utmost that the most + learned men of science know in physics, chemistry, physiology is not + enough to make all these consequences and connections perceptible. The + task of education, once more, is to see to it that such activities are + performed in such ways and under such conditions as render these + conditions as perceptible as possible. To "learn geography" is to gain in + power to perceive the spatial, the natural, connections of an ordinary + act; to "learn history" is essentially to gain in power to recognize its + human connections. For what is called geography as a formulated study is + simply the body of facts and principles which have been discovered in + other men's experience about the natural medium in which we live, and in + connection with which the particular acts of our life have an explanation. + So history as a formulated study is but the body of known facts about the + activities and sufferings of the social groups with which our own lives + are continuous, and through reference to which our own customs and + institutions are illuminated. + </p> + <p> + 2. The Complementary Nature of History and Geography. History and + geography—including in the latter, for reasons about to be + mentioned, nature study—are the information studies par excellence + of the schools. Examination of the materials and the method of their use + will make clear that the difference between penetration of this + information into living experience and its mere piling up in isolated + heaps depends upon whether these studies are faithful to the + interdependence of man and nature which affords these studies their + justification. Nowhere, however, is there greater danger that subject + matter will be accepted as appropriate educational material simply because + it has become customary to teach and learn it. The idea of a philosophic + reason for it, because of the function of the material in a worthy + transformation of experience, is looked upon as a vain fancy, or as + supplying a high-sounding phraseology in support of what is already done. + The words "history" and "geography" suggest simply the matter which has + been traditionally sanctioned in the schools. The mass and variety of this + matter discourage an attempt to see what it really stands for, and how it + can be so taught as to fulfill its mission in the experience of pupils. + But unless the idea that there is a unifying and social direction in + education is a farcical pretense, subjects that bulk as large in the + curriculum as history and geography, must represent a general function in + the development of a truly socialized and intellectualized experience. The + discovery of this function must be employed as a criterion for trying and + sifting the facts taught and the methods used. + </p> + <p> + The function of historical and geographical subject matter has been + stated; it is to enrich and liberate the more direct and personal contacts + of life by furnishing their context, their background and outlook. While + geography emphasizes the physical side and history the social, these are + only emphases in a common topic, namely, the associated life of men. For + this associated life, with its experiments, its ways and means, its + achievements and failures, does not go on in the sky nor yet in a vacuum. + It takes place on the earth. This setting of nature does not bear to + social activities the relation that the scenery of a theatrical + performance bears to a dramatic representation; it enters into the very + make-up of the social happenings that form history. Nature is the medium + of social occurrences. It furnishes original stimuli; it supplies + obstacles and resources. Civilization is the progressive mastery of its + varied energies. When this interdependence of the study of history, + representing the human emphasis, with the study of geography, representing + the natural, is ignored, history sinks to a listing of dates with an + appended inventory of events, labeled "important"; or else it becomes a + literary phantasy—for in purely literary history the natural + environment is but stage scenery. + </p> + <p> + Geography, of course, has its educative influence in a counterpart + connection of natural facts with social events and their consequences. The + classic definition of geography as an account of the earth as the home of + man expresses the educational reality. But it is easier to give this + definition than it is to present specific geographical subject matter in + its vital human bearings. The residence, pursuits, successes, and failures + of men are the things that give the geographic data their reason for + inclusion in the material of instruction. But to hold the two together + requires an informed and cultivated imagination. When the ties are broken, + geography presents itself as that hodge-podge of unrelated fragments too + often found. It appears as a veritable rag-bag of intellectual odds and + ends: the height of a mountain here, the course of a river there, the + quantity of shingles produced in this town, the tonnage of the shipping in + that, the boundary of a county, the capital of a state. The earth as the + home of man is humanizing and unified; the earth viewed as a miscellany of + facts is scattering and imaginatively inert. Geography is a topic that + originally appeals to imagination—even to the romantic imagination. + It shares in the wonder and glory that attach to adventure, travel, and + exploration. The variety of peoples and environments, their contrast with + familiar scenes, furnishes infinite stimulation. The mind is moved from + the monotony of the customary. And while local or home geography is the + natural starting point in the reconstructive development of the natural + environment, it is an intellectual starting point for moving out into the + unknown, not an end in itself. When not treated as a basis for getting at + the large world beyond, the study of the home geography becomes as deadly + as do object lessons which simply summarize the properties of familiar + objects. The reason is the same. The imagination is not fed, but is held + down to recapitulating, cataloguing, and refining what is already known. + But when the familiar fences that mark the limits of the village + proprietors are signs that introduce an understanding of the boundaries of + great nations, even fences are lighted with meaning. Sunlight, air, + running water, inequality of earth's surface, varied industries, civil + officers and their duties—all these things are found in the local + environment. Treated as if their meaning began and ended in those + confines, they are curious facts to be laboriously learned. As instruments + for extending the limits of experience, bringing within its scope peoples + and things otherwise strange and unknown, they are transfigured by the use + to which they are put. Sunlight, wind, stream, commerce, political + relations come from afar and lead the thoughts afar. To follow their + course is to enlarge the mind not by stuffing it with additional + information, but by remaking the meaning of what was previously a matter + of course. + </p> + <p> + The same principle coordinates branches, or phases, of geographical study + which tend to become specialized and separate. Mathematical or + astronomical, physiographic, topographic, political, commercial, + geography, all make their claims. How are they to be adjusted? By an + external compromise that crowds in so much of each? No other method is to + be found unless it be constantly borne in mind that the educational center + of gravity is in the cultural or humane aspects of the subject. From this + center, any material becomes relevant in so far as it is needed to help + appreciate the significance of human activities and relations. The + differences of civilization in cold and tropical regions, the special + inventions, industrial and political, of peoples in the temperate regions, + cannot be understood without appeal to the earth as a member of the solar + system. Economic activities deeply influence social intercourse and + political organization on one side, and reflect physical conditions on the + other. The specializations of these topics are for the specialists; their + interaction concerns man as a being whose experience is social. + </p> + <p> + To include nature study within geography doubtless seems forced; verbally, + it is. But in educational idea there is but one reality, and it is pity + that in practice we have two names: for the diversity of names tends to + conceal the identity of meaning. Nature and the earth should be equivalent + terms, and so should earth study and nature study. Everybody knows that + nature study has suffered in schools from scrappiness of subject matter, + due to dealing with a large number of isolated points. The parts of a + flower have been studied, for example, apart from the flower as an organ; + the flower apart from the plant; the plant apart from the soil, air, and + light in which and through which it lives. The result is an inevitable + deadness of topics to which attention is invited, but which are so + isolated that they do not feed imagination. The lack of interest is so + great that it was seriously proposed to revive animism, to clothe natural + facts and events with myths in order that they might attract and hold the + mind. In numberless cases, more or less silly personifications were + resorted to. The method was silly, but it expressed a real need for a + human atmosphere. The facts had been torn to pieces by being taken out of + their context. They no longer belonged to the earth; they had no abiding + place anywhere. To compensate, recourse was had to artificial and + sentimental associations. The real remedy is to make nature study a study + of nature, not of fragments made meaningless through complete removal from + the situations in which they are produced and in which they operate. When + nature is treated as a whole, like the earth in its relations, its + phenomena fall into their natural relations of sympathy and association + with human life, and artificial substitutes are not needed. + </p> + <p> + 3. History and Present Social Life. The segregation which kills the + vitality of history is divorce from present modes and concerns of social + life. The past just as past is no longer our affair. If it were wholly + gone and done with, there would be only one reasonable attitude toward it. + Let the dead bury their dead. But knowledge of the past is the key to + understanding the present. History deals with the past, but this past is + the history of the present. An intelligent study of the discovery, + explorations, colonization of America, of the pioneer movement westward, + of immigration, etc., should be a study of the United States as it is + to-day: of the country we now live in. Studying it in process of formation + makes much that is too complex to be directly grasped open to + comprehension. Genetic method was perhaps the chief scientific achievement + of the latter half of the nineteenth century. Its principle is that the + way to get insight into any complex product is to trace the process of its + making,—to follow it through the successive stages of its growth. To + apply this method to history as if it meant only the truism that the + present social state cannot be separated from its past, is one-sided. It + means equally that past events cannot be separated from the living present + and retain meaning. The true starting point of history is always some + present situation with its problems. + </p> + <p> + This general principle may be briefly applied to a consideration of its + bearing upon a number of points. The biographical method is generally + recommended as the natural mode of approach to historical study. The lives + of great men, of heroes and leaders, make concrete and vital historic + episodes otherwise abstract and incomprehensible. They condense into vivid + pictures complicated and tangled series of events spread over so much + space and time that only a highly trained mind can follow and unravel + them. There can be no doubt of the psychological soundness of this + principle. But it is misused when employed to throw into exaggerated + relief the doings of a few individuals without reference to the social + situations which they represent. When a biography is related just as an + account of the doings of a man isolated from the conditions that aroused + him and to which his activities were a response, we do not have a study of + history, for we have no study of social life, which is an affair of + individuals in association. We get only a sugar coating which makes it + easier to swallow certain fragments of information. Much attention has + been given of late to primitive life as an introduction to learning + history. Here also there is a right and a wrong way of conceiving its + value. The seemingly ready-made character and the complexity of present + conditions, their apparently hard and fast character, is an almost + insuperable obstacle to gaining insight into their nature. Recourse to the + primitive may furnish the fundamental elements of the present situation in + immensely simplified form. It is like unraveling a cloth so complex and so + close to the eyes that its scheme cannot be seen, until the larger coarser + features of the pattern appear. We cannot simplify the present situations + by deliberate experiment, but resort to primitive life presents us with + the sort of results we should desire from an experiment. Social + relationships and modes of organized action are reduced to their lowest + terms. When this social aim is overlooked, however, the study of primitive + life becomes simply a rehearsing of sensational and exciting features of + savagery. Primitive history suggests industrial history. For one of the + chief reasons for going to more primitive conditions to resolve the + present into more easily perceived factors is that we may realize how the + fundamental problems of procuring subsistence, shelter, and protection + have been met; and by seeing how these were solved in the earlier days of + the human race, form some conception of the long road which has had to be + traveled, and of the successive inventions by which the race has been + brought forward in culture. We do not need to go into disputes regarding + the economic interpretation of history to realize that the industrial + history of mankind gives insight into two important phases of social life + in a way which no other phase of history can possibly do. It presents us + with knowledge of the successive inventions by which theoretical science + has been applied to the control of nature in the interests of security and + prosperity of social life. It thus reveals the successive causes of social + progress. Its other service is to put before us the things that + fundamentally concern all men in common—the occupations and values + connected with getting a living. Economic history deals with the + activities, the career, and fortunes of the common man as does no other + branch of history. The one thing every individual must do is to live; the + one thing that society must do is to secure from each individual his fair + contribution to the general well being and see to it that a just return is + made to him. + </p> + <p> + Economic history is more human, more democratic, and hence more + liberalizing than political history. It deals not with the rise and fall + of principalities and powers, but with the growth of the effective + liberties, through command of nature, of the common man for whom powers + and principalities exist. + </p> + <p> + Industrial history also offers a more direct avenue of approach to the + realization of the intimate connection of man's struggles, successes, and + failures with nature than does political history—to say nothing of + the military history into which political history so easily runs when + reduced to the level of youthful comprehension. For industrial history is + essentially an account of the way in which man has learned to utilize + natural energy from the time when men mostly exploited the muscular + energies of other men to the time when, in promise if not in actuality, + the resources of nature are so under command as to enable men to extend a + common dominion over her. When the history of work, when the conditions of + using the soil, forest, mine, of domesticating and cultivating grains and + animals, of manufacture and distribution, are left out of account, history + tends to become merely literary—a systematized romance of a mythical + humanity living upon itself instead of upon the earth. + </p> + <p> + Perhaps the most neglected branch of history in general education is + intellectual history. We are only just beginning to realize that the great + heroes who have advanced human destiny are not its politicians, generals, + and diplomatists, but the scientific discoverers and inventors who have + put into man's hands the instrumentalities of an expanding and controlled + experience, and the artists and poets who have celebrated his struggles, + triumphs, and defeats in such language, pictorial, plastic, or written, + that their meaning is rendered universally accessible to others. One of + the advantages of industrial history as a history of man's progressive + adaptation of natural forces to social uses is the opportunity which it + affords for consideration of advance in the methods and results of + knowledge. At present men are accustomed to eulogize intelligence and + reason in general terms; their fundamental importance is urged. But pupils + often come away from the conventional study of history, and think either + that the human intellect is a static quantity which has not progressed by + the invention of better methods, or else that intelligence, save as a + display of personal shrewdness, is a negligible historic factor. Surely no + better way could be devised of instilling a genuine sense of the part + which mind has to play in life than a study of history which makes plain + how the entire advance of humanity from savagery to civilization has been + dependent upon intellectual discoveries and inventions, and the extent to + which the things which ordinarily figure most largely in historical + writings have been side issues, or even obstructions for intelligence to + overcome. + </p> + <p> + Pursued in this fashion, history would most naturally become of ethical + value in teaching. Intelligent insight into present forms of associated + life is necessary for a character whose morality is more than colorless + innocence. Historical knowledge helps provide such insight. It is an organ + for analysis of the warp and woof of the present social fabric, of making + known the forces which have woven the pattern. The use of history for + cultivating a socialized intelligence constitutes its moral significance. + It is possible to employ it as a kind of reservoir of anecdotes to be + drawn on to inculcate special moral lessons on this virtue or that vice. + But such teaching is not so much an ethical use of history as it is an + effort to create moral impressions by means of more or less authentic + material. At best, it produces a temporary emotional glow; at worst, + callous indifference to moralizing. The assistance which may be given by + history to a more intelligent sympathetic understanding of the social + situations of the present in which individuals share is a permanent and + constructive moral asset. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM16"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. It is the nature of an experience to have implications which + </h2> + <p> + go far beyond what is at first consciously noted in it. Bringing these + connections or implications to consciousness enhances the meaning of the + experience. Any experience, however trivial in its first appearance, is + capable of assuming an indefinite richness of significance by extending + its range of perceived connections. Normal communication with others is + the readiest way of effecting this development, for it links up the net + results of the experience of the group and even the race with the + immediate experience of an individual. By normal communication is meant + that in which there is a joint interest, a common interest, so that one is + eager to give and the other to take. It contrasts with telling or stating + things simply for the sake of impressing them upon another, merely in + order to test him to see how much he has retained and can literally + reproduce. + </p> + <p> + Geography and history are the two great school resources for bringing + about the enlargement of the significance of a direct personal experience. + The active occupations described in the previous chapter reach out in + space and time with respect to both nature and man. Unless they are taught + for external reasons or as mere modes of skill their chief educational + value is that they provide the most direct and interesting roads out into + the larger world of meanings stated in history and geography. While + history makes human implications explicit and geography natural + connections, these subjects are two phases of the same living whole, since + the life of men in association goes on in nature, not as an accidental + setting, but as the material and medium of development. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0017"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Seventeen: Science in the Course of Study + </h2> + <p> + 1. The Logical and the Psychological. By science is meant, as already + stated, that knowledge which is the outcome of methods of observation, + reflection, and testing which are deliberately adopted to secure a + settled, assured subject matter. It involves an intelligent and persistent + endeavor to revise current beliefs so as to weed out what is erroneous, to + add to their accuracy, and, above all, to give them such shape that the + dependencies of the various facts upon one another may be as obvious as + possible. It is, like all knowledge, an outcome of activity bringing about + certain changes in the environment. But in its case, the quality of the + resulting knowledge is the controlling factor and not an incident of the + activity. Both logically and educationally, science is the perfecting of + knowing, its last stage. + </p> + <p> + Science, in short, signifies a realization of the logical implications of + any knowledge. Logical order is not a form imposed upon what is known; it + is the proper form of knowledge as perfected. For it means that the + statement of subject matter is of a nature to exhibit to one who + understands it the premises from which it follows and the conclusions to + which it points (See ante, p. 190). As from a few bones the competent + zoologist reconstructs an animal; so from the form of a statement in + mathematics or physics the specialist in the subject can form an idea of + the system of truths in which it has its place. + </p> + <p> + To the non-expert, however, this perfected form is a stumbling block. Just + because the material is stated with reference to the furtherance of + knowledge as an end in itself, its connections with the material of + everyday life are hidden. To the layman the bones are a mere curiosity. + Until he had mastered the principles of zoology, his efforts to make + anything out of them would be random and blind. From the standpoint of the + learner scientific form is an ideal to be achieved, not a starting point + from which to set out. It is, nevertheless, a frequent practice to start + in instruction with the rudiments of science somewhat simplified. The + necessary consequence is an isolation of science from significant + experience. The pupil learns symbols without the key to their meaning. He + acquires a technical body of information without ability to trace its + connections with the objects and operations with which he is familiar—often + he acquires simply a peculiar vocabulary. There is a strong temptation to + assume that presenting subject matter in its perfected form provides a + royal road to learning. What more natural than to suppose that the + immature can be saved time and energy, and be protected from needless + error by commencing where competent inquirers have left off? The outcome + is written large in the history of education. Pupils begin their study of + science with texts in which the subject is organized into topics according + to the order of the specialist. Technical concepts, with their + definitions, are introduced at the outset. Laws are introduced at a very + early stage, with at best a few indications of the way in which they were + arrived at. The pupils learn a "science" instead of learning the + scientific way of treating the familiar material of ordinary experience. + The method of the advanced student dominates college teaching; the + approach of the college is transferred into the high school, and so down + the line, with such omissions as may make the subject easier. + </p> + <p> + The chronological method which begins with the experience of the learner + and develops from that the proper modes of scientific treatment is often + called the "psychological" method in distinction from the logical method + of the expert or specialist. The apparent loss of time involved is more + than made up for by the superior understanding and vital interest secured. + What the pupil learns he at least understands. Moreover by following, in + connection with problems selected from the material of ordinary + acquaintance, the methods by which scientific men have reached their + perfected knowledge, he gains independent power to deal with material + within his range, and avoids the mental confusion and intellectual + distaste attendant upon studying matter whose meaning is only symbolic. + Since the mass of pupils are never going to become scientific specialists, + it is much more important that they should get some insight into what + scientific method means than that they should copy at long range and + second hand the results which scientific men have reached. Students will + not go so far, perhaps, in the "ground covered," but they will be sure and + intelligent as far as they do go. And it is safe to say that the few who + go on to be scientific experts will have a better preparation than if they + had been swamped with a large mass of purely technical and symbolically + stated information. In fact, those who do become successful men of science + are those who by their own power manage to avoid the pitfalls of a + traditional scholastic introduction into it. + </p> + <p> + The contrast between the expectations of the men who a generation or two + ago strove, against great odds, to secure a place for science in + education, and the result generally achieved is painful. Herbert Spencer, + inquiring what knowledge is of most worth, concluded that from all points + of view scientific knowledge is most valuable. But his argument + unconsciously assumed that scientific knowledge could be communicated in a + ready-made form. Passing over the methods by which the subject matter of + our ordinary activities is transmuted into scientific form, it ignored the + method by which alone science is science. Instruction has too often + proceeded upon an analogous plan. But there is no magic attached to + material stated in technically correct scientific form. When learned in + this condition it remains a body of inert information. Moreover its form + of statement removes it further from fruitful contact with everyday + experiences than does the mode of statement proper to literature. + Nevertheless that the claims made for instruction in science were + unjustifiable does not follow. For material so taught is not science to + the pupil. + </p> + <p> + Contact with things and laboratory exercises, while a great improvement + upon textbooks arranged upon the deductive plan, do not of themselves + suffice to meet the need. While they are an indispensable portion of + scientific method, they do not as a matter of course constitute scientific + method. Physical materials may be manipulated with scientific apparatus, + but the materials may be disassociated in themselves and in the ways in + which they are handled, from the materials and processes used out of + school. The problems dealt with may be only problems of science: problems, + that is, which would occur to one already initiated in the science of the + subject. Our attention may be devoted to getting skill in technical + manipulation without reference to the connection of laboratory exercises + with a problem belonging to subject matter. There is sometimes a ritual of + laboratory instruction as well as of heathen religion. 1 It has been + mentioned, incidentally, that scientific statements, or logical form, + implies the use of signs or symbols. The statement applies, of course, to + all use of language. But in the vernacular, the mind proceeds directly + from the symbol to the thing signified. Association with familiar material + is so close that the mind does not pause upon the sign. The signs are + intended only to stand for things and acts. But scientific terminology has + an additional use. It is designed, as we have seen, not to stand for the + things directly in their practical use in experience, but for the things + placed in a cognitive system. Ultimately, of course, they denote the + things of our common sense acquaintance. But immediately they do not + designate them in their common context, but translated into terms of + scientific inquiry. Atoms, molecules, chemical formulae, the mathematical + propositions in the study of physics—all these have primarily an + intellectual value and only indirectly an empirical value. They represent + instruments for the carrying on of science. As in the case of other tools, + their significance can be learned only by use. We cannot procure + understanding of their meaning by pointing to things, but only by pointing + to their work when they are employed as part of the technique of + knowledge. Even the circle, square, etc., of geometry exhibit a difference + from the squares and circles of familiar acquaintance, and the further one + proceeds in mathematical science the greater the remoteness from the + everyday empirical thing. Qualities which do not count for the pursuit of + knowledge about spatial relations are left out; those which are important + for this purpose are accentuated. If one carries his study far enough, he + will find even the properties which are significant for spatial knowledge + giving way to those which facilitate knowledge of other things—perhaps + a knowledge of the general relations of number. There will be nothing in + the conceptual definitions even to suggest spatial form, size, or + direction. This does not mean that they are unreal mental inventions, but + it indicates that direct physical qualities have been transmuted into + tools for a special end—the end of intellectual organization. In + every machine the primary state of material has been modified by + subordinating it to use for a purpose. Not the stuff in its original form + but in its adaptation to an end is important. No one would have a + knowledge of a machine who could enumerate all the materials entering into + its structure, but only he who knew their uses and could tell why they are + employed as they are. In like fashion one has a knowledge of mathematical + conceptions only when he sees the problems in which they function and + their specific utility in dealing with these problems. "Knowing" the + definitions, rules, formulae, etc., is like knowing the names of parts of + a machine without knowing what they do. In one case, as in the other, the + meaning, or intellectual content, is what the element accomplishes in the + system of which it is a member. + </p> + <p> + 2. Science and Social Progress. Assuming that the development of the + direct knowledge gained in occupations of social interest is carried to a + perfected logical form, the question arises as to its place in experience. + In general, the reply is that science marks the emancipation of mind from + devotion to customary purposes and makes possible the systematic pursuit + of new ends. It is the agency of progress in action. Progress is sometimes + thought of as consisting in getting nearer to ends already sought. But + this is a minor form of progress, for it requires only improvement of the + means of action or technical advance. More important modes of progress + consist in enriching prior purposes and in forming new ones. Desires are + not a fixed quantity, nor does progress mean only an increased amount of + satisfaction. With increased culture and new mastery of nature, new + desires, demands for new qualities of satisfaction, show themselves, for + intelligence perceives new possibilities of action. This projection of new + possibilities leads to search for new means of execution, and progress + takes place; while the discovery of objects not already used leads to + suggestion of new ends. + </p> + <p> + That science is the chief means of perfecting control of means of action + is witnessed by the great crop of inventions which followed intellectual + command of the secrets of nature. The wonderful transformation of + production and distribution known as the industrial revolution is the + fruit of experimental science. Railways, steamboats, electric motors, + telephone and telegraph, automobiles, aeroplanes and dirigibles are + conspicuous evidences of the application of science in life. But none of + them would be of much importance without the thousands of less sensational + inventions by means of which natural science has been rendered tributary + to our daily life. + </p> + <p> + It must be admitted that to a considerable extent the progress thus + procured has been only technical: it has provided more efficient means for + satisfying preexistent desires, rather than modified the quality of human + purposes. There is, for example, no modern civilization which is the equal + of Greek culture in all respects. Science is still too recent to have been + absorbed into imaginative and emotional disposition. Men move more swiftly + and surely to the realization of their ends, but their ends too largely + remain what they were prior to scientific enlightenment. This fact places + upon education the responsibility of using science in a way to modify the + habitual attitude of imagination and feeling, not leave it just an + extension of our physical arms and legs. + </p> + <p> + The advance of science has already modified men's thoughts of the purposes + and goods of life to a sufficient extent to give some idea of the nature + of this responsibility and the ways of meeting it. Science taking effect + in human activity has broken down physical barriers which formerly + separated men; it has immensely widened the area of intercourse. It has + brought about interdependence of interests on an enormous scale. It has + brought with it an established conviction of the possibility of control of + nature in the interests of mankind and thus has led men to look to the + future, instead of the past. The coincidence of the ideal of progress with + the advance of science is not a mere coincidence. Before this advance men + placed the golden age in remote antiquity. Now they face the future with a + firm belief that intelligence properly used can do away with evils once + thought inevitable. To subjugate devastating disease is no longer a dream; + the hope of abolishing poverty is not utopian. Science has familiarized + men with the idea of development, taking effect practically in persistent + gradual amelioration of the estate of our common humanity. + </p> + <p> + The problem of an educational use of science is then to create an + intelligence pregnant with belief in the possibility of the direction of + human affairs by itself. The method of science engrained through education + in habit means emancipation from rule of thumb and from the routine + generated by rule of thumb procedure. The word empirical in its ordinary + use does not mean "connected with experiment," but rather crude and + unrational. Under the influence of conditions created by the non-existence + of experimental science, experience was opposed in all the ruling + philosophies of the past to reason and the truly rational. Empirical + knowledge meant the knowledge accumulated by a multitude of past instances + without intelligent insight into the principles of any of them. To say + that medicine was empirical meant that it was not scientific, but a mode + of practice based upon accumulated observations of diseases and of + remedies used more or less at random. Such a mode of practice is of + necessity happy-go-lucky; success depends upon chance. It lends itself to + deception and quackery. Industry that is "empirically" controlled forbids + constructive applications of intelligence; it depends upon following in an + imitative slavish manner the models set in the past. Experimental science + means the possibility of using past experiences as the servant, not the + master, of mind. It means that reason operates within experience, not + beyond it, to give it an intelligent or reasonable quality. Science is + experience becoming rational. The effect of science is thus to change + men's idea of the nature and inherent possibilities of experience. By the + same token, it changes the idea and the operation of reason. Instead of + being something beyond experience, remote, aloof, concerned with a sublime + region that has nothing to do with the experienced facts of life, it is + found indigenous in experience:—the factor by which past experiences + are purified and rendered into tools for discovery and advance. + </p> + <p> + The term "abstract" has a rather bad name in popular speech, being used to + signify not only that which is abstruse and hard to understand, but also + that which is far away from life. But abstraction is an indispensable + trait in reflective direction of activity. Situations do not literally + repeat themselves. Habit treats new occurrences as if they were identical + with old ones; it suffices, accordingly, when the different or novel + element is negligible for present purposes. But when the new element + requires especial attention, random reaction is the sole recourse unless + abstraction is brought into play. For abstraction deliberately selects + from the subject matter of former experiences that which is thought + helpful in dealing with the new. It signifies conscious transfer of a + meaning embedded in past experience for use in a new one. It is the very + artery of intelligence, of the intentional rendering of one experience + available for guidance of another. + </p> + <p> + Science carries on this working over of prior subject matter on a large + scale. It aims to free an experience from all which is purely personal and + strictly immediate; it aims to detach whatever it has in common with the + subject matter of other experiences, and which, being common, may be saved + for further use. It is, thus, an indispensable factor in social progress. + In any experience just as it occurs there is much which, while it may be + of precious import to the individual implicated in the experience, is + peculiar and unreduplicable. From the standpoint of science, this material + is accidental, while the features which are widely shared are essential. + Whatever is unique in the situation, since dependent upon the + peculiarities of the individual and the coincidence of circumstance, is + not available for others; so that unless what is shared is abstracted and + fixed by a suitable symbol, practically all the value of the experience + may perish in its passing. But abstraction and the use of terms to record + what is abstracted put the net value of individual experience at the + permanent disposal of mankind. No one can foresee in detail when or how it + may be of further use. The man of science in developing his abstractions + is like a manufacturer of tools who does not know who will use them nor + when. But intellectual tools are indefinitely more flexible in their range + of adaptation than other mechanical tools. + </p> + <p> + Generalization is the counterpart of abstraction. It is the functioning of + an abstraction in its application to a new concrete experience,—its + extension to clarify and direct new situations. Reference to these + possible applications is necessary in order that the abstraction may be + fruitful, instead of a barren formalism ending in itself. Generalization + is essentially a social device. When men identified their interests + exclusively with the concerns of a narrow group, their generalizations + were correspondingly restricted. The viewpoint did not permit a wide and + free survey. Men's thoughts were tied down to a contracted space and a + short time,—limited to their own established customs as a measure of + all possible values. Scientific abstraction and generalization are + equivalent to taking the point of view of any man, whatever his location + in time and space. While this emancipation from the conditions and + episodes of concrete experiences accounts for the remoteness, the + "abstractness," of science, it also accounts for its wide and free range + of fruitful novel applications in practice. Terms and propositions record, + fix, and convey what is abstracted. A meaning detached from a given + experience cannot remain hanging in the air. It must acquire a local + habitation. Names give abstract meanings a physical locus and body. + Formulation is thus not an after-thought or by-product; it is essential to + the completion of the work of thought. Persons know many things which they + cannot express, but such knowledge remains practical, direct, and + personal. An individual can use it for himself; he may be able to act upon + it with efficiency. Artists and executives often have their knowledge in + this state. But it is personal, untransferable, and, as it were, + instinctive. To formulate the significance of an experience a man must + take into conscious account the experiences of others. He must try to find + a standpoint which includes the experience of others as well as his own. + Otherwise his communication cannot be understood. He talks a language + which no one else knows. While literary art furnishes the supreme + successes in stating of experiences so that they are vitally significant + to others, the vocabulary of science is designed, in another fashion, to + express the meaning of experienced things in symbols which any one will + know who studies the science. Aesthetic formulation reveals and enhances + the meaning of experiences one already has; scientific formulation + supplies one with tools for constructing new experiences with transformed + meanings. + </p> + <p> + To sum up: Science represents the office of intelligence, in projection + and control of new experiences, pursued systematically, intentionally, and + on a scale due to freedom from limitations of habit. It is the sole + instrumentality of conscious, as distinct from accidental, progress. And + if its generality, its remoteness from individual conditions, confer upon + it a certain technicality and aloofness, these qualities are very + different from those of merely speculative theorizing. The latter are in + permanent dislocation from practice; the former are temporarily detached + for the sake of wider and freer application in later concrete action. + There is a kind of idle theory which is antithetical to practice; but + genuinely scientific theory falls within practice as the agency of its + expansion and its direction to new possibilities. + </p> + <p> + 3. Naturalism and Humanism in Education. There exists an educational + tradition which opposes science to literature and history in the + curriculum. The quarrel between the representatives of the two interests + is easily explicable historically. Literature and language and a literary + philosophy were entrenched in all higher institutions of learning before + experimental science came into being. The latter had naturally to win its + way. No fortified and protected interest readily surrenders any monopoly + it may possess. But the assumption, from whichever side, that language and + literary products are exclusively humanistic in quality, and that science + is purely physical in import, is a false notion which tends to cripple the + educational use of both studies. Human life does not occur in a vacuum, + nor is nature a mere stage setting for the enactment of its drama (ante, + p. 211). Man's life is bound up in the processes of nature; his career, + for success or defeat, depends upon the way in which nature enters it. + Man's power of deliberate control of his own affairs depends upon ability + to direct natural energies to use: an ability which is in turn dependent + upon insight into nature's processes. Whatever natural science may be for + the specialist, for educational purposes it is knowledge of the conditions + of human action. To be aware of the medium in which social intercourse + goes on, and of the means and obstacles to its progressive development is + to be in command of a knowledge which is thoroughly humanistic in quality. + One who is ignorant of the history of science is ignorant of the struggles + by which mankind has passed from routine and caprice, from superstitious + subjection to nature, from efforts to use it magically, to intellectual + self-possession. That science may be taught as a set of formal and + technical exercises is only too true. This happens whenever information + about the world is made an end in itself. The failure of such instruction + to procure culture is not, however, evidence of the antithesis of natural + knowledge to humanistic concern, but evidence of a wrong educational + attitude. Dislike to employ scientific knowledge as it functions in men's + occupations is itself a survival of an aristocratic culture. The notion + that "applied" knowledge is somehow less worthy than "pure" knowledge, was + natural to a society in which all useful work was performed by slaves and + serfs, and in which industry was controlled by the models set by custom + rather than by intelligence. Science, or the highest knowing, was then + identified with pure theorizing, apart from all application in the uses of + life; and knowledge relating to useful arts suffered the stigma attaching + to the classes who engaged in them (See below, Ch. XIX). The idea of + science thus generated persisted after science had itself adopted the + appliances of the arts, using them for the production of knowledge, and + after the rise of democracy. Taking theory just as theory, however, that + which concerns humanity is of more significance for man than that which + concerns a merely physical world. In adopting the criterion of knowledge + laid down by a literary culture, aloof from the practical needs of the + mass of men, the educational advocates of scientific education put + themselves at a strategic disadvantage. So far as they adopt the idea of + science appropriate to its experimental method and to the movements of a + democratic and industrial society, they have no difficulty in showing that + natural science is more humanistic than an alleged humanism which bases + its educational schemes upon the specialized interests of a leisure class. + For, as we have already stated, humanistic studies when set in opposition + to study of nature are hampered. They tend to reduce themselves to + exclusively literary and linguistic studies, which in turn tend to shrink + to "the classics," to languages no longer spoken. For modern languages may + evidently be put to use, and hence fall under the ban. It would be hard to + find anything in history more ironical than the educational practices + which have identified the "humanities" exclusively with a knowledge of + Greek and Latin. Greek and Roman art and institutions made such important + contributions to our civilization that there should always be the amplest + opportunities for making their acquaintance. But to regard them as par + excellence the humane studies involves a deliberate neglect of the + possibilities of the subject matter which is accessible in education to + the masses, and tends to cultivate a narrow snobbery: that of a learned + class whose insignia are the accidents of exclusive opportunity. Knowledge + is humanistic in quality not because it is about human products in the + past, but because of what it does in liberating human intelligence and + human sympathy. Any subject matter which accomplishes this result is + humane, and any subject matter which does not accomplish it is not even + educational. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM17"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. Science represents the fruition of the cognitive factors in + </h2> + <p> + experience. Instead of contenting itself with a mere statement of what + commends itself to personal or customary experience, it aims at a + statement which will reveal the sources, grounds, and consequences of a + belief. The achievement of this aim gives logical character to the + statements. Educationally, it has to be noted that logical characteristics + of method, since they belong to subject matter which has reached a high + degree of intellectual elaboration, are different from the method of the + learner—the chronological order of passing from a cruder to a more + refined intellectual quality of experience. When this fact is ignored, + science is treated as so much bare information, which however is less + interesting and more remote than ordinary information, being stated in an + unusual and technical vocabulary. The function which science has to + perform in the curriculum is that which it has performed for the race: + emancipation from local and temporary incidents of experience, and the + opening of intellectual vistas unobscured by the accidents of personal + habit and predilection. The logical traits of abstraction, generalization, + and definite formulation are all associated with this function. In + emancipating an idea from the particular context in which it originated + and giving it a wider reference the results of the experience of any + individual are put at the disposal of all men. Thus ultimately and + philosophically science is the organ of general social progress. 1 Upon + the positive side, the value of problems arising in work in the garden, + the shop, etc., may be referred to (See p. 200). The laboratory may be + treated as an additional resource to supply conditions and appliances for + the better pursuit of these problems. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0018"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Eighteen: Educational Values + </h2> + <p> + The considerations involved in a discussion of educational values have + already been brought out in the discussion of aims and interests. + </p> + <p> + The specific values usually discussed in educational theories coincide + with aims which are usually urged. They are such things as utility, + culture, information, preparation for social efficiency, mental discipline + or power, and so on. The aspect of these aims in virtue of which they are + valuable has been treated in our analysis of the nature of interest, and + there is no difference between speaking of art as an interest or concern + and referring to it as a value. It happens, however, that discussion of + values has usually been centered about a consideration of the various ends + subserved by specific subjects of the curriculum. It has been a part of + the attempt to justify those subjects by pointing out the significant + contributions to life accruing from their study. An explicit discussion of + educational values thus affords an opportunity for reviewing the prior + discussion of aims and interests on one hand and of the curriculum on the + other, by bringing them into connection with one another. + </p> + <p> + 1. The Nature of Realization or Appreciation. Much of our experience is + indirect; it is dependent upon signs which intervene between the things + and ourselves, signs which stand for or represent the former. It is one + thing to have been engaged in war, to have shared its dangers and + hardships; it is another thing to hear or read about it. All language, all + symbols, are implements of an indirect experience; in technical language + the experience which is procured by their means is "mediated." It stands + in contrast with an immediate, direct experience, something in which we + take part vitally and at first hand, instead of through the intervention + of representative media. As we have seen, the scope of personal, vitally + direct experience is very limited. If it were not for the intervention of + agencies for representing absent and distant affairs, our experience would + remain almost on the level of that of the brutes. Every step from savagery + to civilization is dependent upon the invention of media which enlarge the + range of purely immediate experience and give it deepened as well as wider + meaning by connecting it with things which can only be signified or + symbolized. It is doubtless this fact which is the cause of the + disposition to identify an uncultivated person with an illiterate person—so + dependent are we on letters for effective representative or indirect + experience. + </p> + <p> + At the same time (as we have also had repeated occasion to see) there is + always a danger that symbols will not be truly representative; danger that + instead of really calling up the absent and remote in a way to make it + enter a present experience, the linguistic media of representation will + become an end in themselves. Formal education is peculiarly exposed to + this danger, with the result that when literacy supervenes, mere + bookishness, what is popularly termed the academic, too often comes with + it. In colloquial speech, the phrase a "realizing sense" is used to + express the urgency, warmth, and intimacy of a direct experience in + contrast with the remote, pallid, and coldly detached quality of a + representative experience. The terms "mental realization" and + "appreciation" (or genuine appreciation) are more elaborate names for the + realizing sense of a thing. It is not possible to define these ideas + except by synonyms, like "coming home to one" "really taking it in," etc., + for the only way to appreciate what is meant by a direct experience of a + thing is by having it. But it is the difference between reading a + technical description of a picture, and seeing it; or between just seeing + it and being moved by it; between learning mathematical equations about + light and being carried away by some peculiarly glorious illumination of a + misty landscape. We are thus met by the danger of the tendency of + technique and other purely representative forms to encroach upon the + sphere of direct appreciations; in other words, the tendency to assume + that pupils have a foundation of direct realization of situations + sufficient for the superstructure of representative experience erected by + formulated school studies. This is not simply a matter of quantity or + bulk. Sufficient direct experience is even more a matter of quality; it + must be of a sort to connect readily and fruitfully with the symbolic + material of instruction. Before teaching can safely enter upon conveying + facts and ideas through the media of signs, schooling must provide genuine + situations in which personal participation brings home the import of the + material and the problems which it conveys. From the standpoint of the + pupil, the resulting experiences are worth while on their own account; + from the standpoint of the teacher they are also means of supplying + subject matter required for understanding instruction involving signs, and + of evoking attitudes of open-mindedness and concern as to the material + symbolically conveyed. + </p> + <p> + In the outline given of the theory of educative subject matter, the demand + for this background of realization or appreciation is met by the provision + made for play and active occupations embodying typical situations. Nothing + need be added to what has already been said except to point out that while + the discussion dealt explicitly with the subject matter of primary + education, where the demand for the available background of direct + experience is most obvious, the principle applies to the primary or + elementary phase of every subject. The first and basic function of + laboratory work, for example, in a high school or college in a new field, + is to familiarize the student at first hand with a certain range of facts + and problems—to give him a "feeling" for them. Getting command of + technique and of methods of reaching and testing generalizations is at + first secondary to getting appreciation. As regards the primary school + activities, it is to be borne in mind that the fundamental intent is not + to amuse nor to convey information with a minimum of vexation nor yet to + acquire skill,—though these results may accrue as by-products,—but + to enlarge and enrich the scope of experience, and to keep alert and + effective the interest in intellectual progress. + </p> + <p> + The rubric of appreciation supplies an appropriate head for bringing out + three further principles: the nature of effective or real (as distinct + from nominal) standards of value; the place of the imagination in + appreciative realizations; and the place of the fine arts in the course of + study. + </p> + <p> + 1. The nature of standards of valuation. Every adult has acquired, in the + course of his prior experience and education, certain measures of the + worth of various sorts of experience. He has learned to look upon + qualities like honesty, amiability, perseverance, loyalty, as moral goods; + upon certain classics of literature, painting, music, as aesthetic values, + and so on. Not only this, but he has learned certain rules for these + values—the golden rule in morals; harmony, balance, etc., + proportionate distribution in aesthetic goods; definition, clarity, system + in intellectual accomplishments. These principles are so important as + standards of judging the worth of new experiences that parents and + instructors are always tending to teach them directly to the young. They + overlook the danger that standards so taught will be merely symbolic; that + is, largely conventional and verbal. In reality, working as distinct from + professed standards depend upon what an individual has himself + specifically appreciated to be deeply significant in concrete situations. + An individual may have learned that certain characteristics are + conventionally esteemed in music; he may be able to converse with some + correctness about classic music; he may even honestly believe that these + traits constitute his own musical standards. But if in his own past + experience, what he has been most accustomed to and has most enjoyed is + ragtime, his active or working measures of valuation are fixed on the + ragtime level. The appeal actually made to him in his own personal + realization fixes his attitude much more deeply than what he has been + taught as the proper thing to say; his habitual disposition thus fixed + forms his real "norm" of valuation in subsequent musical experiences. + </p> + <p> + Probably few would deny this statement as to musical taste. But it applies + equally well in judgments of moral and intellectual worth. A youth who has + had repeated experience of the full meaning of the value of kindliness + toward others built into his disposition has a measure of the worth of + generous treatment of others. Without this vital appreciation, the duty + and virtue of unselfishness impressed upon him by others as a standard + remains purely a matter of symbols which he cannot adequately translate + into realities. His "knowledge" is second-handed; it is only a knowledge + that others prize unselfishness as an excellence, and esteem him in the + degree in which he exhibits it. Thus there grows up a split between a + person's professed standards and his actual ones. A person may be aware of + the results of this struggle between his inclinations and his theoretical + opinions; he suffers from the conflict between doing what is really dear + to him and what he has learned will win the approval of others. But of the + split itself he is unaware; the result is a kind of unconscious hypocrisy, + an instability of disposition. In similar fashion, a pupil who has worked + through some confused intellectual situation and fought his way to + clearing up obscurities in a definite outcome, appreciates the value of + clarity and definition. He has a standard which can be depended upon. He + may be trained externally to go through certain motions of analysis and + division of subject matter and may acquire information about the value of + these processes as standard logical functions, but unless it somehow comes + home to him at some point as an appreciation of his own, the significance + of the logical norms—so-called—remains as much an external + piece of information as, say, the names of rivers in China. He may be able + to recite, but the recital is a mechanical rehearsal. + </p> + <p> + It is, then, a serious mistake to regard appreciation as if it were + confined to such things as literature and pictures and music. Its scope is + as comprehensive as the work of education itself. The formation of habits + is a purely mechanical thing unless habits are also tastes—habitual + modes of preference and esteem, an effective sense of excellence. There + are adequate grounds for asserting that the premium so often put in + schools upon external "discipline," and upon marks and rewards, upon + promotion and keeping back, are the obverse of the lack of attention given + to life situations in which the meaning of facts, ideas, principles, and + problems is vitally brought home. + </p> + <p> + 2. Appreciative realizations are to be distinguished from symbolic or + representative experiences. They are not to be distinguished from the work + of the intellect or understanding. Only a personal response involving + imagination can possibly procure realization even of pure "facts." The + imagination is the medium of appreciation in every field. The engagement + of the imagination is the only thing that makes any activity more than + mechanical. Unfortunately, it is too customary to identify the imaginative + with the imaginary, rather than with a warm and intimate taking in of the + full scope of a situation. This leads to an exaggerated estimate of fairy + tales, myths, fanciful symbols, verse, and something labeled "Fine Art," + as agencies for developing imagination and appreciation; and, by + neglecting imaginative vision in other matters, leads to methods which + reduce much instruction to an unimaginative acquiring of specialized skill + and amassing of a load of information. Theory, and—to some extent—practice, + have advanced far enough to recognize that play-activity is an imaginative + enterprise. But it is still usual to regard this activity as a specially + marked-off stage of childish growth, and to overlook the fact that the + difference between play and what is regarded as serious employment should + be not a difference between the presence and absence of imagination, but a + difference in the materials with which imagination is occupied. The result + is an unwholesome exaggeration of the phantastic and "unreal" phases of + childish play and a deadly reduction of serious occupation to a routine + efficiency prized simply for its external tangible results. Achievement + comes to denote the sort of thing that a well-planned machine can do + better than a human being can, and the main effect of education, the + achieving of a life of rich significance, drops by the wayside. Meantime + mind-wandering and wayward fancy are nothing but the unsuppressible + imagination cut loose from concern with what is done. + </p> + <p> + An adequate recognition of the play of imagination as the medium of + realization of every kind of thing which lies beyond the scope of direct + physical response is the sole way of escape from mechanical methods in + teaching. The emphasis put in this book, in accord with many tendencies in + contemporary education, upon activity, will be misleading if it is not + recognized that the imagination is as much a normal and integral part of + human activity as is muscular movement. The educative value of manual + activities and of laboratory exercises, as well as of play, depends upon + the extent in which they aid in bringing about a sensing of the meaning of + what is going on. In effect, if not in name, they are dramatizations. + Their utilitarian value in forming habits of skill to be used for tangible + results is important, but not when isolated from the appreciative side. + Were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no + road from a direct activity to representative knowledge; for it is by + imagination that symbols are translated over into a direct meaning and + integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it. When + the representative creative imagination is made merely literary and + mythological, symbols are rendered mere means of directing physical + reactions of the organs of speech. + </p> + <p> + 3. In the account previously given nothing was explicitly said about the + place of literature and the fine arts in the course of study. The omission + at that point was intentional. At the outset, there is no sharp + demarcation of useful, or industrial, arts and fine arts. The activities + mentioned in Chapter XV contain within themselves the factors later + discriminated into fine and useful arts. As engaging the emotions and the + imagination, they have the qualities which give the fine arts their + quality. As demanding method or skill, the adaptation of tools to + materials with constantly increasing perfection, they involve the element + of technique indispensable to artistic production. From the standpoint of + product, or the work of art, they are naturally defective, though even in + this respect when they comprise genuine appreciation they often have a + rudimentary charm. As experiences they have both an artistic and an + esthetic quality. When they emerge into activities which are tested by + their product and when the socially serviceable value of the product is + emphasized, they pass into useful or industrial arts. When they develop in + the direction of an enhanced appreciation of the immediate qualities which + appeal to taste, they grow into fine arts. + </p> + <p> + In one of its meanings, appreciation is opposed to depreciation. It + denotes an enlarged, an intensified prizing, not merely a prizing, much + less—like depreciation—a lowered and degraded prizing. This + enhancement of the qualities which make any ordinary experience appealing, + appropriable—capable of full assimilation—and enjoyable, + constitutes the prime function of literature, music, drawing, painting, + etc., in education. They are not the exclusive agencies of appreciation in + the most general sense of that word; but they are the chief agencies of an + intensified, enhanced appreciation. As such, they are not only + intrinsically and directly enjoyable, but they serve a purpose beyond + themselves. They have the office, in increased degree, of all appreciation + in fixing taste, in forming standards for the worth of later experiences. + They arouse discontent with conditions which fall below their measure; + they create a demand for surroundings coming up to their own level. They + reveal a depth and range of meaning in experiences which otherwise might + be mediocre and trivial. They supply, that is, organs of vision. Moreover, + in their fullness they represent the concentration and consummation of + elements of good which are otherwise scattered and incomplete. They select + and focus the elements of enjoyable worth which make any experience + directly enjoyable. They are not luxuries of education, but emphatic + expressions of that which makes any education worth while. + </p> + <p> + 2. The Valuation of Studies. The theory of educational values involves not + only an account of the nature of appreciation as fixing the measure of + subsequent valuations, but an account of the specific directions in which + these valuations occur. To value means primarily to prize, to esteem; but + secondarily it means to apprise, to estimate. It means, that is, the act + of cherishing something, holding it dear, and also the act of passing + judgment upon the nature and amount of its value as compared with + something else. To value in the latter sense is to valuate or evaluate. + The distinction coincides with that sometimes made between intrinsic and + instrumental values. Intrinsic values are not objects of judgment, they + cannot (as intrinsic) be compared, or regarded as greater and less, better + or worse. They are invaluable; and if a thing is invaluable, it is neither + more nor less so than any other invaluable. But occasions present + themselves when it is necessary to choose, when we must let one thing go + in order to take another. This establishes an order of preference, a + greater and less, better and worse. Things judged or passed upon have to + be estimated in relation to some third thing, some further end. With + respect to that, they are means, or instrumental values. + </p> + <p> + We may imagine a man who at one time thoroughly enjoys converse with his + friends, at another the hearing of a symphony; at another the eating of + his meals; at another the reading of a book; at another the earning of + money, and so on. As an appreciative realization, each of these is an + intrinsic value. It occupies a particular place in life; it serves its own + end, which cannot be supplied by a substitute. There is no question of + comparative value, and hence none of valuation. Each is the specific good + which it is, and that is all that can be said. In its own place, none is a + means to anything beyond itself. But there may arise a situation in which + they compete or conflict, in which a choice has to be made. Now comparison + comes in. Since a choice has to be made, we want to know the respective + claims of each competitor. What is to be said for it? What does it offer + in comparison with, as balanced over against, some other possibility? + Raising these questions means that a particular good is no longer an end + in itself, an intrinsic good. For if it were, its claims would be + incomparable, imperative. The question is now as to its status as a means + of realizing something else, which is then the invaluable of that + situation. If a man has just eaten, or if he is well fed generally and the + opportunity to hear music is a rarity, he will probably prefer the music + to eating. In the given situation that will render the greater + contribution. If he is starving, or if he is satiated with music for the + time being, he will naturally judge food to have the greater worth. In the + abstract or at large, apart from the needs of a particular situation in + which choice has to be made, there is no such thing as degrees or order of + value. Certain conclusions follow with respect to educational values. We + cannot establish a hierarchy of values among studies. It is futile to + attempt to arrange them in an order, beginning with one having least worth + and going on to that of maximum value. In so far as any study has a unique + or irreplaceable function in experience, in so far as it marks a + characteristic enrichment of life, its worth is intrinsic or incomparable. + Since education is not a means to living, but is identical with the + operation of living a life which is fruitful and inherently significant, + the only ultimate value which can be set up is just the process of living + itself. And this is not an end to which studies and activities are + subordinate means; it is the whole of which they are ingredients. And what + has been said about appreciation means that every study in one of its + aspects ought to have just such ultimate significance. It is true of + arithmetic as it is of poetry that in some place and at some time it ought + to be a good to be appreciated on its own account—just as an + enjoyable experience, in short. If it is not, then when the time and place + come for it to be used as a means or instrumentality, it will be in just + that much handicapped. Never having been realized or appreciated for + itself, one will miss something of its capacity as a resource for other + ends. + </p> + <p> + It equally follows that when we compare studies as to their values, that + is, treat them as means to something beyond themselves, that which + controls their proper valuation is found in the specific situation in + which they are to be used. The way to enable a student to apprehend the + instrumental value of arithmetic is not to lecture him upon the benefit it + will be to him in some remote and uncertain future, but to let him + discover that success in something he is interested in doing depends upon + ability to use number. + </p> + <p> + It also follows that the attempt to distribute distinct sorts of value + among different studies is a misguided one, in spite of the amount of time + recently devoted to the undertaking. Science for example may have any kind + of value, depending upon the situation into which it enters as a means. To + some the value of science may be military; it may be an instrument in + strengthening means of offense or defense; it may be technological, a tool + for engineering; or it may be commercial—an aid in the successful + conduct of business; under other conditions, its worth may be + philanthropic—the service it renders in relieving human suffering; + or again it may be quite conventional—of value in establishing one's + social status as an "educated" person. As matter of fact, science serves + all these purposes, and it would be an arbitrary task to try to fix upon + one of them as its "real" end. All that we can be sure of educationally is + that science should be taught so as to be an end in itself in the lives of + students—something worth while on account of its own unique + intrinsic contribution to the experience of life. Primarily it must have + "appreciation value." If we take something which seems to be at the + opposite pole, like poetry, the same sort of statement applies. It may be + that, at the present time, its chief value is the contribution it makes to + the enjoyment of leisure. But that may represent a degenerate condition + rather than anything necessary. Poetry has historically been allied with + religion and morals; it has served the purpose of penetrating the + mysterious depths of things. It has had an enormous patriotic value. Homer + to the Greeks was a Bible, a textbook of morals, a history, and a national + inspiration. In any case, it may be said that an education which does not + succeed in making poetry a resource in the business of life as well as in + its leisure, has something the matter with it—or else the poetry is + artificial poetry. + </p> + <p> + The same considerations apply to the value of a study or a topic of a + study with reference to its motivating force. Those responsible for + planning and teaching the course of study should have grounds for thinking + that the studies and topics included furnish both direct increments to the + enriching of lives of the pupils and also materials which they can put to + use in other concerns of direct interest. Since the curriculum is always + getting loaded down with purely inherited traditional matter and with + subjects which represent mainly the energy of some influential person or + group of persons in behalf of something dear to them, it requires constant + inspection, criticism, and revision to make sure it is accomplishing its + purpose. Then there is always the probability that it represents the + values of adults rather than those of children and youth, or those of + pupils a generation ago rather than those of the present day. Hence a + further need for a critical outlook and survey. But these considerations + do not mean that for a subject to have motivating value to a pupil + (whether intrinsic or instrumental) is the same thing as for him to be + aware of the value, or to be able to tell what the study is good for. + </p> + <p> + In the first place, as long as any topic makes an immediate appeal, it is + not necessary to ask what it is good for. This is a question which can be + asked only about instrumental values. Some goods are not good for + anything; they are just goods. Any other notion leads to an absurdity. For + we cannot stop asking the question about an instrumental good, one whose + value lies in its being good for something, unless there is at some point + something intrinsically good, good for itself. To a hungry, healthy child, + food is a good of the situation; we do not have to bring him to + consciousness of the ends subserved by food in order to supply a motive to + eat. The food in connection with his appetite is a motive. The same thing + holds of mentally eager pupils with respect to many topics. Neither they + nor the teacher could possibly foretell with any exactness the purposes + learning is to accomplish in the future; nor as long as the eagerness + continues is it advisable to try to specify particular goods which are to + come of it. The proof of a good is found in the fact that the pupil + responds; his response is use. His response to the material shows that the + subject functions in his life. It is unsound to urge that, say, Latin has + a value per se in the abstract, just as a study, as a sufficient + justification for teaching it. But it is equally absurd to argue that + unless teacher or pupil can point out some definite assignable future use + to which it is to be put, it lacks justifying value. When pupils are + genuinely concerned in learning Latin, that is of itself proof that it + possesses value. The most which one is entitled to ask in such cases is + whether in view of the shortness of time, there are not other things of + intrinsic value which in addition have greater instrumental value. + </p> + <p> + This brings us to the matter of instrumental values—topics studied + because of some end beyond themselves. If a child is ill and his appetite + does not lead him to eat when food is presented, or if his appetite is + perverted so that he prefers candy to meat and vegetables, conscious + reference to results is indicated. He needs to be made conscious of + consequences as a justification of the positive or negative value of + certain objects. Or the state of things may be normal enough, and yet an + individual not be moved by some matter because he does not grasp how his + attainment of some intrinsic good depends upon active concern with what is + presented. In such cases, it is obviously the part of wisdom to establish + consciousness of connection. In general what is desirable is that a topic + be presented in such a way that it either have an immediate value, and + require no justification, or else be perceived to be a means of achieving + something of intrinsic value. An instrumental value then has the intrinsic + value of being a means to an end. It may be questioned whether some of the + present pedagogical interest in the matter of values of studies is not + either excessive or else too narrow. Sometimes it appears to be a labored + effort to furnish an apologetic for topics which no longer operate to any + purpose, direct or indirect, in the lives of pupils. At other times, the + reaction against useless lumber seems to have gone to the extent of + supposing that no subject or topic should be taught unless some quite + definite future utility can be pointed out by those making the course of + study or by the pupil himself, unmindful of the fact that life is its own + excuse for being; and that definite utilities which can be pointed out are + themselves justified only because they increase the experienced content of + life itself. 3. The Segregation and Organization of Values. It is of + course possible to classify in a general way the various valuable phases + of life. In order to get a survey of aims sufficiently wide (See ante, p. + 110) to give breadth and flexibility to the enterprise of education, there + is some advantage in such a classification. But it is a great mistake to + regard these values as ultimate ends to which the concrete satisfactions + of experience are subordinate. They are nothing but generalizations, more + or less adequate, of concrete goods. Health, wealth, efficiency, + sociability, utility, culture, happiness itself are only abstract terms + which sum up a multitude of particulars. To regard such things as + standards for the valuation of concrete topics and process of education is + to subordinate to an abstraction the concrete facts from which the + abstraction is derived. They are not in any true sense standards of + valuation; these are found, as we have previously seen, in the specific + realizations which form tastes and habits of preference. They are, + however, of significance as points of view elevated above the details of + life whence to survey the field and see how its constituent details are + distributed, and whether they are well proportioned. No classification can + have other than a provisional validity. The following may prove of some + help. We may say that the kind of experience to which the work of the + schools should contribute is one marked by executive competency in the + management of resources and obstacles encountered (efficiency); by + sociability, or interest in the direct companionship of others; by + aesthetic taste or capacity to appreciate artistic excellence in at least + some of its classic forms; by trained intellectual method, or interest in + some mode of scientific achievement; and by sensitiveness to the rights + and claims of others—conscientiousness. And while these + considerations are not standards of value, they are useful criteria for + survey, criticism, and better organization of existing methods and subject + matter of instruction. + </p> + <p> + The need of such general points of view is the greater because of a + tendency to segregate educational values due to the isolation from one + another of the various pursuits of life. The idea is prevalent that + different studies represent separate kinds of values, and that the + curriculum should, therefore, be constituted by gathering together various + studies till a sufficient variety of independent values have been cared + for. The following quotation does not use the word value, but it contains + the notion of a curriculum constructed on the idea that there are a number + of separate ends to be reached, and that various studies may be evaluated + by referring each study to its respective end. "Memory is trained by most + studies, but best by languages and history; taste is trained by the more + advanced study of languages, and still better by English literature; + imagination by all higher language teaching, but chiefly by Greek and + Latin poetry; observation by science work in the laboratory, though some + training is to be got from the earlier stages of Latin and Greek; for + expression, Greek and Latin composition comes first and English + composition next; for abstract reasoning, mathematics stands almost alone; + for concrete reasoning, science comes first, then geometry; for social + reasoning, the Greek and Roman historians and orators come first, and + general history next. Hence the narrowest education which can claim to be + at all complete includes Latin, one modern language, some history, some + English literature, and one science." There is much in the wording of this + passage which is irrelevant to our point and which must be discounted to + make it clear. The phraseology betrays the particular provincial tradition + within which the author is writing. There is the unquestioned assumption + of "faculties" to be trained, and a dominant interest in the ancient + languages; there is comparative disregard of the earth on which men happen + to live and the bodies they happen to carry around with them. But with + allowances made for these matters (even with their complete abandonment) + we find much in contemporary educational philosophy which parallels the + fundamental notion of parceling out special values to segregated studies. + Even when some one end is set up as a standard of value, like social + efficiency or culture, it will often be found to be but a verbal heading + under which a variety of disconnected factors are comprised. And although + the general tendency is to allow a greater variety of values to a given + study than does the passage quoted, yet the attempt to inventory a number + of values attaching to each study and to state the amount of each value + which the given study possesses emphasizes an implied educational + disintegration. + </p> + <p> + As matter of fact, such schemes of values of studies are largely but + unconscious justifications of the curriculum with which one is familiar. + One accepts, for the most part, the studies of the existing course and + then assigns values to them as a sufficient reason for their being taught. + Mathematics is said to have, for example, disciplinary value in + habituating the pupil to accuracy of statement and closeness of reasoning; + it has utilitarian value in giving command of the arts of calculation + involved in trade and the arts; culture value in its enlargement of the + imagination in dealing with the most general relations of things; even + religious value in its concept of the infinite and allied ideas. But + clearly mathematics does not accomplish such results, because it is + endowed with miraculous potencies called values; it has these values if + and when it accomplishes these results, and not otherwise. The statements + may help a teacher to a larger vision of the possible results to be + effected by instruction in mathematical topics. But unfortunately, the + tendency is to treat the statement as indicating powers inherently + residing in the subject, whether they operate or not, and thus to give it + a rigid justification. If they do not operate, the blame is put not on the + subject as taught, but on the indifference and recalcitrancy of pupils. + </p> + <p> + This attitude toward subjects is the obverse side of the conception of + experience or life as a patchwork of independent interests which exist + side by side and limit one another. Students of politics are familiar with + a check and balance theory of the powers of government. There are supposed + to be independent separate functions, like the legislative, executive, + judicial, administrative, and all goes well if each of these checks all + the others and thus creates an ideal balance. There is a philosophy which + might well be called the check and balance theory of experience. Life + presents a diversity of interests. Left to themselves, they tend to + encroach on one another. The ideal is to prescribe a special territory for + each till the whole ground of experience is covered, and then see to it + each remains within its own boundaries. Politics, business, recreation, + art, science, the learned professions, polite intercourse, leisure, + represent such interests. Each of these ramifies into many branches: + business into manual occupations, executive positions, bookkeeping, + railroading, banking, agriculture, trade and commerce, etc., and so with + each of the others. An ideal education would then supply the means of + meeting these separate and pigeon-holed interests. And when we look at the + schools, it is easy to get the impression that they accept this view of + the nature of adult life, and set for themselves the task of meeting its + demands. Each interest is acknowledged as a kind of fixed institution to + which something in the course of study must correspond. The course of + study must then have some civics and history politically and patriotically + viewed: some utilitarian studies; some science; some art (mainly + literature of course); some provision for recreation; some moral + education; and so on. And it will be found that a large part of current + agitation about schools is concerned with clamor and controversy about the + due meed of recognition to be given to each of these interests, and with + struggles to secure for each its due share in the course of study; or, if + this does not seem feasible in the existing school system, then to secure + a new and separate kind of schooling to meet the need. In the multitude of + educations education is forgotten. + </p> + <p> + The obvious outcome is congestion of the course of study, overpressure and + distraction of pupils, and a narrow specialization fatal to the very idea + of education. But these bad results usually lead to more of the same sort + of thing as a remedy. When it is perceived that after all the requirements + of a full life experience are not met, the deficiency is not laid to the + isolation and narrowness of the teaching of the existing subjects, and + this recognition made the basis of reorganization of the system. No, the + lack is something to be made up for by the introduction of still another + study, or, if necessary, another kind of school. And as a rule those who + object to the resulting overcrowding and consequent superficiality and + distraction usually also have recourse to a merely quantitative criterion: + the remedy is to cut off a great many studies as fads and frills, and + return to the good old curriculum of the three R's in elementary education + and the equally good and equally old-fashioned curriculum of the classics + and mathematics in higher education. + </p> + <p> + The situation has, of course, its historic explanation. Various epochs of + the past have had their own characteristic struggles and interests. Each + of these great epochs has left behind itself a kind of cultural deposit, + like a geologic stratum. These deposits have found their way into + educational institutions in the form of studies, distinct courses of + study, distinct types of schools. With the rapid change of political, + scientific, and economic interests in the last century, provision had to + be made for new values. Though the older courses resisted, they have had + at least in this country to retire their pretensions to a monopoly. They + have not, however, been reorganized in content and aim; they have only + been reduced in amount. The new studies, representing the new interests, + have not been used to transform the method and aim of all instruction; + they have been injected and added on. The result is a conglomerate, the + cement of which consists in the mechanics of the school program or time + table. Thence arises the scheme of values and standards of value which we + have mentioned. + </p> + <p> + This situation in education represents the divisions and separations which + obtain in social life. The variety of interests which should mark any rich + and balanced experience have been torn asunder and deposited in separate + institutions with diverse and independent purposes and methods. Business + is business, science is science, art is art, politics is politics, social + intercourse is social intercourse, morals is morals, recreation is + recreation, and so on. Each possesses a separate and independent province + with its own peculiar aims and ways of proceeding. Each contributes to the + others only externally and accidentally. All of them together make up the + whole of life by just apposition and addition. What does one expect from + business save that it should furnish money, to be used in turn for making + more money and for support of self and family, for buying books and + pictures, tickets to concerts which may afford culture, and for paying + taxes, charitable gifts and other things of social and ethical value? How + unreasonable to expect that the pursuit of business should be itself a + culture of the imagination, in breadth and refinement; that it should + directly, and not through the money which it supplies, have social service + for its animating principle and be conducted as an enterprise in behalf of + social organization! The same thing is to be said, mutatis mutandis, of + the pursuit of art or science or politics or religion. Each has become + specialized not merely in its appliances and its demands upon time, but in + its aim and animating spirit. Unconsciously, our course of studies and our + theories of the educational values of studies reflect this division of + interests. The point at issue in a theory of educational value is then the + unity or integrity of experience. How shall it be full and varied without + losing unity of spirit? How shall it be one and yet not narrow and + monotonous in its unity? Ultimately, the question of values and a standard + of values is the moral question of the organization of the interests of + life. Educationally, the question concerns that organization of schools, + materials, and methods which will operate to achieve breadth and richness + of experience. How shall we secure breadth of outlook without sacrificing + efficiency of execution? How shall we secure the diversity of interests, + without paying the price of isolation? How shall the individual be + rendered executive in his intelligence instead of at the cost of his + intelligence? How shall art, science, and politics reinforce one another + in an enriched temper of mind instead of constituting ends pursued at one + another's expense? How can the interests of life and the studies which + enforce them enrich the common experience of men instead of dividing men + from one another? With the questions of reorganization thus suggested, we + shall be concerned in the concluding chapters. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM18"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. Fundamentally, the elements involved in a discussion of value + </h2> + <p> + have been covered in the prior discussion of aims and interests. But since + educational values are generally discussed in connection with the claims + of the various studies of the curriculum, the consideration of aim and + interest is here resumed from the point of view of special studies. The + term "value" has two quite different meanings. On the one hand, it denotes + the attitude of prizing a thing finding it worth while, for its own sake, + or intrinsically. This is a name for a full or complete experience. To + value in this sense is to appreciate. But to value also means a + distinctively intellectual act—an operation of comparing and judging—to + valuate. This occurs when direct full experience is lacking, and the + question arises which of the various possibilities of a situation is to be + preferred in order to reach a full realization, or vital experience. + </p> + <p> + We must not, however, divide the studies of the curriculum into the + appreciative, those concerned with intrinsic value, and the instrumental, + concerned with those which are of value or ends beyond themselves. The + formation of proper standards in any subject depends upon a realization of + the contribution which it makes to the immediate significance of + experience, upon a direct appreciation. Literature and the fine arts are + of peculiar value because they represent appreciation at its best—a + heightened realization of meaning through selection and concentration. But + every subject at some phase of its development should possess, what is for + the individual concerned with it, an aesthetic quality. + </p> + <p> + Contribution to immediate intrinsic values in all their variety in + experience is the only criterion for determining the worth of instrumental + and derived values in studies. The tendency to assign separate values to + each study and to regard the curriculum in its entirety as a kind of + composite made by the aggregation of segregated values is a result of the + isolation of social groups and classes. Hence it is the business of + education in a democratic social group to struggle against this isolation + in order that the various interests may reinforce and play into one + another. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0019"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Nineteen: Labor and Leisure + </h2> + <h3> + 1. The Origin of the Opposition. + </h3> + <p> + The isolation of aims and values which we have been considering leads to + opposition between them. Probably the most deep-seated antithesis which + has shown itself in educational history is that between education in + preparation for useful labor and education for a life of leisure. The bare + terms "useful labor" and "leisure" confirm the statement already made that + the segregation and conflict of values are not self-inclosed, but reflect + a division within social life. Were the two functions of gaining a + livelihood by work and enjoying in a cultivated way the opportunities of + leisure, distributed equally among the different members of a community, + it would not occur to any one that there was any conflict of educational + agencies and aims involved. It would be self-evident that the question was + how education could contribute most effectively to both. And while it + might be found that some materials of instruction chiefly accomplished one + result and other subject matter the other, it would be evident that care + must be taken to secure as much overlapping as conditions permit; that is, + the education which had leisure more directly in view should indirectly + reinforce as much as possible the efficiency and the enjoyment of work, + while that aiming at the latter should produce habits of emotion and + intellect which would procure a worthy cultivation of leisure. These + general considerations are amply borne out by the historical development + of educational philosophy. The separation of liberal education from + professional and industrial education goes back to the time of the Greeks, + and was formulated expressly on the basis of a division of classes into + those who had to labor for a living and those who were relieved from this + necessity. The conception that liberal education, adapted to men in the + latter class, is intrinsically higher than the servile training given to + the latter class reflected the fact that one class was free and the other + servile in its social status. The latter class labored not only for its + own subsistence, but also for the means which enabled the superior class + to live without personally engaging in occupations taking almost all the + time and not of a nature to engage or reward intelligence. + </p> + <p> + That a certain amount of labor must be engaged in goes without saying. + Human beings have to live and it requires work to supply the resources of + life. Even if we insist that the interests connected with getting a living + are only material and hence intrinsically lower than those connected with + enjoyment of time released from labor, and even if it were admitted that + there is something engrossing and insubordinate in material interests + which leads them to strive to usurp the place belonging to the higher + ideal interests, this would not—barring the fact of socially divided + classes—lead to neglect of the kind of education which trains men + for the useful pursuits. It would rather lead to scrupulous care for them, + so that men were trained to be efficient in them and yet to keep them in + their place; education would see to it that we avoided the evil results + which flow from their being allowed to flourish in obscure purlieus of + neglect. Only when a division of these interests coincides with a division + of an inferior and a superior social class will preparation for useful + work be looked down upon with contempt as an unworthy thing: a fact which + prepares one for the conclusion that the rigid identification of work with + material interests, and leisure with ideal interests is itself a social + product. The educational formulations of the social situation made over + two thousand years ago have been so influential and give such a clear and + logical recognition of the implications of the division into laboring and + leisure classes, that they deserve especial note. According to them, man + occupies the highest place in the scheme of animate existence. In part, he + shares the constitution and functions of plants and animals—nutritive, + reproductive, motor or practical. The distinctively human function is + reason existing for the sake of beholding the spectacle of the universe. + Hence the truly human end is the fullest possible of this distinctive + human prerogative. The life of observation, meditation, cogitation, and + speculation pursued as an end in itself is the proper life of man. From + reason moreover proceeds the proper control of the lower elements of human + nature—the appetites and the active, motor, impulses. In themselves + greedy, insubordinate, lovers of excess, aiming only at their own satiety, + they observe moderation—the law of the mean—and serve + desirable ends as they are subjected to the rule of reason. + </p> + <p> + Such is the situation as an affair of theoretical psychology and as most + adequately stated by Aristotle. But this state of things is reflected in + the constitution of classes of men and hence in the organization of + society. Only in a comparatively small number is the function of reason + capable of operating as a law of life. In the mass of people, vegetative + and animal functions dominate. Their energy of intelligence is so feeble + and inconstant that it is constantly overpowered by bodily appetite and + passion. Such persons are not truly ends in themselves, for only reason + constitutes a final end. Like plants, animals and physical tools, they are + means, appliances, for the attaining of ends beyond themselves, although + unlike them they have enough intelligence to exercise a certain discretion + in the execution of the tasks committed to them. Thus by nature, and not + merely by social convention, there are those who are slaves—that is, + means for the ends of others. 1 The great body of artisans are in one + important respect worse off than even slaves. Like the latter they are + given up to the service of ends external to themselves; but since they do + not enjoy the intimate association with the free superior class + experienced by domestic slaves they remain on a lower plane of excellence. + Moreover, women are classed with slaves and craftsmen as factors among the + animate instrumentalities of production and reproduction of the means for + a free or rational life. + </p> + <p> + Individually and collectively there is a gulf between merely living and + living worthily. In order that one may live worthily he must first live, + and so with collective society. The time and energy spent upon mere life, + upon the gaining of subsistence, detracts from that available for + activities that have an inherent rational meaning; they also unfit for the + latter. Means are menial, the serviceable is servile. The true life is + possible only in the degree in which the physical necessities are had + without effort and without attention. Hence slaves, artisans, and women + are employed in furnishing the means of subsistence in order that others, + those adequately equipped with intelligence, may live the life of + leisurely concern with things intrinsically worth while. + </p> + <p> + To these two modes of occupation, with their distinction of servile and + free activities (or "arts") correspond two types of education: the base or + mechanical and the liberal or intellectual. Some persons are trained by + suitable practical exercises for capacity in doing things, for ability to + use the mechanical tools involved in turning out physical commodities and + rendering personal service. This training is a mere matter of habituation + and technical skill; it operates through repetition and assiduity in + application, not through awakening and nurturing thought. Liberal + education aims to train intelligence for its proper office: to know. The + less this knowledge has to do with practical affairs, with making or + producing, the more adequately it engages intelligence. So consistently + does Aristotle draw the line between menial and liberal education that he + puts what are now called the "fine" arts, music, painting, sculpture, in + the same class with menial arts so far as their practice is concerned. + They involve physical agencies, assiduity of practice, and external + results. In discussing, for example, education in music he raises the + question how far the young should be practiced in the playing of + instruments. His answer is that such practice and proficiency may be + tolerated as conduce to appreciation; that is, to understanding and + enjoyment of music when played by slaves or professionals. When + professional power is aimed at, music sinks from the liberal to the + professional level. One might then as well teach cooking, says Aristotle. + Even a liberal concern with the works of fine art depends upon the + existence of a hireling class of practitioners who have subordinated the + development of their own personality to attaining skill in mechanical + execution. The higher the activity the more purely mental is it; the less + does it have to do with physical things or with the body. The more purely + mental it is, the more independent or self-sufficing is it. + </p> + <p> + These last words remind us that Aristotle again makes a distinction of + superior and inferior even within those living the life of reason. For + there is a distinction in ends and in free action, according as one's life + is merely accompanied by reason or as it makes reason its own medium. That + is to say, the free citizen who devotes himself to the public life of his + community, sharing in the management of its affairs and winning personal + honor and distinction, lives a life accompanied by reason. But the + thinker, the man who devotes himself to scientific inquiry and philosophic + speculation, works, so to speak, in reason, not simply by *. Even the + activity of the citizen in his civic relations, in other words, retains + some of the taint of practice, of external or merely instrumental doing. + This infection is shown by the fact that civic activity and civic + excellence need the help of others; one cannot engage in public life all + by himself. But all needs, all desires imply, in the philosophy of + Aristotle, a material factor; they involve lack, privation; they are + dependent upon something beyond themselves for completion. A purely + intellectual life, however, one carries on by himself, in himself; such + assistance as he may derive from others is accidental, rather than + intrinsic. In knowing, in the life of theory, reason finds its own full + manifestation; knowing for the sake of knowing irrespective of any + application is alone independent, or self-sufficing. Hence only the + education that makes for power to know as an end in itself, without + reference to the practice of even civic duties, is truly liberal or free. + 2. The Present Situation. If the Aristotelian conception represented just + Aristotle's personal view, it would be a more or less interesting + historical curiosity. It could be dismissed as an illustration of the lack + of sympathy or the amount of academic pedantry which may coexist with + extraordinary intellectual gifts. But Aristotle simply described without + confusion and without that insincerity always attendant upon mental + confusion, the life that was before him. That the actual social situation + has greatly changed since his day there is no need to say. But in spite of + these changes, in spite of the abolition of legal serfdom, and the spread + of democracy, with the extension of science and of general education (in + books, newspapers, travel, and general intercourse as well as in schools), + there remains enough of a cleavage of society into a learned and an + unlearned class, a leisure and a laboring class, to make his point of view + a most enlightening one from which to criticize the separation between + culture and utility in present education. Behind the intellectual and + abstract distinction as it figures in pedagogical discussion, there looms + a social distinction between those whose pursuits involve a minimum of + self-directive thought and aesthetic appreciation, and those who are + concerned more directly with things of the intelligence and with the + control of the activities of others. + </p> + <p> + Aristotle was certainly permanently right when he said that "any + occupation or art or study deserves to be called mechanical if it renders + the body or soul or intellect of free persons unfit for the exercise and + practice of excellence." The force of the statement is almost infinitely + increased when we hold, as we nominally do at present, that all persons, + instead of a comparatively few, are free. For when the mass of men and all + women were regarded as unfree by the very nature of their bodies and + minds, there was neither intellectual confusion nor moral hypocrisy in + giving them only the training which fitted them for mechanical skill, + irrespective of its ulterior effect upon their capacity to share in a + worthy life. He was permanently right also when he went on to say that + "all mercenary employments as well as those which degrade the condition of + the body are mechanical, since they deprive the intellect of leisure and + dignity,"—permanently right, that is, if gainful pursuits as matter + of fact deprive the intellect of the conditions of its exercise and so of + its dignity. If his statements are false, it is because they identify a + phase of social custom with a natural necessity. But a different view of + the relations of mind and matter, mind and body, intelligence and social + service, is better than Aristotle's conception only if it helps render the + old idea obsolete in fact—in the actual conduct of life and + education. Aristotle was permanently right in assuming the inferiority and + subordination of mere skill in performance and mere accumulation of + external products to understanding, sympathy of appreciation, and the free + play of ideas. If there was an error, it lay in assuming the necessary + separation of the two: in supposing that there is a natural divorce + between efficiency in producing commodities and rendering service, and + self-directive thought; between significant knowledge and practical + achievement. We hardly better matters if we just correct his theoretical + misapprehension, and tolerate the social state of affairs which generated + and sanctioned his conception. We lose rather than gain in change from + serfdom to free citizenship if the most prized result of the change is + simply an increase in the mechanical efficiency of the human tools of + production. So we lose rather than gain in coming to think of intelligence + as an organ of control of nature through action, if we are content that an + unintelligent, unfree state persists in those who engage directly in + turning nature to use, and leave the intelligence which controls to be the + exclusive possession of remote scientists and captains of industry. We are + in a position honestly to criticize the division of life into separate + functions and of society into separate classes only so far as we are free + from responsibility for perpetuating the educational practices which train + the many for pursuits involving mere skill in production, and the few for + a knowledge that is an ornament and a cultural embellishment. In short, + ability to transcend the Greek philosophy of life and education is not + secured by a mere shifting about of the theoretical symbols meaning free, + rational, and worthy. It is not secured by a change of sentiment regarding + the dignity of labor, and the superiority of a life of service to that of + an aloof self-sufficing independence. Important as these theoretical and + emotional changes are, their importance consists in their being turned to + account in the development of a truly democratic society, a society in + which all share in useful service and all enjoy a worthy leisure. It is + not a mere change in the concepts of culture—or a liberal mind—and + social service which requires an educational reorganization; but the + educational transformation is needed to give full and explicit effect to + the changes implied in social life. The increased political and economic + emancipation of the "masses" has shown itself in education; it has + effected the development of a common school system of education, public + and free. It has destroyed the idea that learning is properly a monopoly + of the few who are predestined by nature to govern social affairs. But the + revolution is still incomplete. The idea still prevails that a truly + cultural or liberal education cannot have anything in common, directly at + least, with industrial affairs, and that the education which is fit for + the masses must be a useful or practical education in a sense which + opposes useful and practical to nurture of appreciation and liberation of + thought. As a consequence, our actual system is an inconsistent mixture. + Certain studies and methods are retained on the supposition that they have + the sanction of peculiar liberality, the chief content of the term liberal + being uselessness for practical ends. This aspect is chiefly visible in + what is termed the higher education—that of the college and of + preparation for it. But it has filtered through into elementary education + and largely controls its processes and aims. But, on the other hand, + certain concessions have been made to the masses who must engage in + getting a livelihood and to the increased role of economic activities in + modern life. These concessions are exhibited in special schools and + courses for the professions, for engineering, for manual training and + commerce, in vocational and prevocational courses; and in the spirit in + which certain elementary subjects, like the three R's, are taught. The + result is a system in which both "cultural" and "utilitarian" subjects + exist in an inorganic composite where the former are not by dominant + purpose socially serviceable and the latter not liberative of imagination + or thinking power. + </p> + <p> + In the inherited situation, there is a curious intermingling, in even the + same study, of concession to usefulness and a survival of traits once + exclusively attributed to preparation for leisure. The "utility" element + is found in the motives assigned for the study, the "liberal" element in + methods of teaching. The outcome of the mixture is perhaps less + satisfactory than if either principle were adhered to in its purity. The + motive popularly assigned for making the studies of the first four or five + years consist almost entirely of reading, spelling, writing, and + arithmetic, is, for example, that ability to read, write, and figure + accurately is indispensable to getting ahead. These studies are treated as + mere instruments for entering upon a gainful employment or of later + progress in the pursuit of learning, according as pupils do not or do + remain in school. This attitude is reflected in the emphasis put upon + drill and practice for the sake of gaining automatic skill. If we turn to + Greek schooling, we find that from the earliest years the acquisition of + skill was subordinated as much as possible to acquisition of literary + content possessed of aesthetic and moral significance. Not getting a tool + for subsequent use but present subject matter was the emphasized thing. + Nevertheless the isolation of these studies from practical application, + their reduction to purely symbolic devices, represents a survival of the + idea of a liberal training divorced from utility. A thorough adoption of + the idea of utility would have led to instruction which tied up the + studies to situations in which they were directly needed and where they + were rendered immediately and not remotely helpful. It would be hard to + find a subject in the curriculum within which there are not found evil + results of a compromise between the two opposed ideals. Natural science is + recommended on the ground of its practical utility, but is taught as a + special accomplishment in removal from application. On the other hand, + music and literature are theoretically justified on the ground of their + culture value and are then taught with chief emphasis upon forming + technical modes of skill. + </p> + <p> + If we had less compromise and resulting confusion, if we analyzed more + carefully the respective meanings of culture and utility, we might find it + easier to construct a course of study which should be useful and liberal + at the same time. Only superstition makes us believe that the two are + necessarily hostile so that a subject is illiberal because it is useful + and cultural because it is useless. It will generally be found that + instruction which, in aiming at utilitarian results, sacrifices the + development of imagination, the refining of taste and the deepening of + intellectual insight—surely cultural values—also in the same + degree renders what is learned limited in its use. Not that it makes it + wholly unavailable but that its applicability is restricted to routine + activities carried on under the supervision of others. Narrow modes of + skill cannot be made useful beyond themselves; any mode of skill which is + achieved with deepening of knowledge and perfecting of judgment is readily + put to use in new situations and is under personal control. It was not the + bare fact of social and economic utility which made certain activities + seem servile to the Greeks but the fact that the activities directly + connected with getting a livelihood were not, in their days, the + expression of a trained intelligence nor carried on because of a personal + appreciation of their meaning. So far as farming and the trades were + rule-of-thumb occupations and so far as they were engaged in for results + external to the minds of agricultural laborers and mechanics, they were + illiberal—but only so far. The intellectual and social context has + now changed. The elements in industry due to mere custom and routine have + become subordinate in most economic callings to elements derived from + scientific inquiry. The most important occupations of today represent and + depend upon applied mathematics, physics, and chemistry. The area of the + human world influenced by economic production and influencing consumption + has been so indefinitely widened that geographical and political + considerations of an almost infinitely wide scope enter in. It was natural + for Plato to deprecate the learning of geometry and arithmetic for + practical ends, because as matter of fact the practical uses to which they + were put were few, lacking in content and mostly mercenary in quality. But + as their social uses have increased and enlarged, their liberalizing or + "intellectual" value and their practical value approach the same limit. + </p> + <p> + Doubtless the factor which chiefly prevents our full recognition and + employment of this identification is the conditions under which so much + work is still carried on. The invention of machines has extended the + amount of leisure which is possible even while one is at work. It is a + commonplace that the mastery of skill in the form of established habits + frees the mind for a higher order of thinking. Something of the same kind + is true of the introduction of mechanically automatic operations in + industry. They may release the mind for thought upon other topics. But + when we confine the education of those who work with their hands to a few + years of schooling devoted for the most part to acquiring the use of + rudimentary symbols at the expense of training in science, literature, and + history, we fail to prepare the minds of workers to take advantage of this + opportunity. More fundamental is the fact that the great majority of + workers have no insight into the social aims of their pursuits and no + direct personal interest in them. The results actually achieved are not + the ends of their actions, but only of their employers. They do what they + do, not freely and intelligently, but for the sake of the wage earned. It + is this fact which makes the action illiberal, and which will make any + education designed simply to give skill in such undertakings illiberal and + immoral. The activity is not free because not freely participated in. + </p> + <p> + Nevertheless, there is already an opportunity for an education which, + keeping in mind the larger features of work, will reconcile liberal + nurture with training in social serviceableness, with ability to share + efficiently and happily in occupations which are productive. And such an + education will of itself tend to do away with the evils of the existing + economic situation. In the degree in which men have an active concern in + the ends that control their activity, their activity becomes free or + voluntary and loses its externally enforced and servile quality, even + though the physical aspect of behavior remain the same. In what is termed + politics, democratic social organization makes provision for this direct + participation in control: in the economic region, control remains external + and autocratic. Hence the split between inner mental action and outer + physical action of which the traditional distinction between the liberal + and the utilitarian is the reflex. An education which should unify the + disposition of the members of society would do much to unify society + itself. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM19"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. Of the segregations of educational values discussed in the + </h2> + <p> + last chapter, that between culture and utility is probably the most + fundamental. While the distinction is often thought to be intrinsic and + absolute, it is really historical and social. It originated, so far as + conscious formulation is concerned, in Greece, and was based upon the fact + that the truly human life was lived only by a few who subsisted upon the + results of the labor of others. This fact affected the psychological + doctrine of the relation of intelligence and desire, theory and practice. + It was embodied in a political theory of a permanent division of human + beings into those capable of a life of reason and hence having their own + ends, and those capable only of desire and work, and needing to have their + ends provided by others. The two distinctions, psychological and + political, translated into educational terms, effected a division between + a liberal education, having to do with the self-sufficing life of leisure + devoted to knowing for its own sake, and a useful, practical training for + mechanical occupations, devoid of intellectual and aesthetic content. + While the present situation is radically diverse in theory and much + changed in fact, the factors of the older historic situation still persist + sufficiently to maintain the educational distinction, along with + compromises which often reduce the efficacy of the educational measures. + The problem of education in a democratic society is to do away with the + dualism and to construct a course of studies which makes thought a guide + of free practice for all and which makes leisure a reward of accepting + responsibility for service, rather than a state of exemption from it. + </p> + <p> + 1 Aristotle does not hold that the class of actual slaves and of natural + slaves necessarily coincide. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0020"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Twenty: Intellectual and Practical Studies + </h2> + <p> + 1. The Opposition of Experience and True Knowledge. As livelihood and + leisure are opposed, so are theory and practice, intelligence and + execution, knowledge and activity. The latter set of oppositions doubtless + springs from the same social conditions which produce the former conflict; + but certain definite problems of education connected with them make it + desirable to discuss explicitly the matter of the relationship and alleged + separation of knowing and doing. + </p> + <p> + The notion that knowledge is derived from a higher source than is + practical activity, and possesses a higher and more spiritual worth, has a + long history. The history so far as conscious statement is concerned takes + us back to the conceptions of experience and of reason formulated by Plato + and Aristotle. Much as these thinkers differed in many respects, they + agreed in identifying experience with purely practical concerns; and hence + with material interests as to its purpose and with the body as to its + organ. Knowledge, on the other hand, existed for its own sake free from + practical reference, and found its source and organ in a purely immaterial + mind; it had to do with spiritual or ideal interests. Again, experience + always involved lack, need, desire; it was never self-sufficing. Rational + knowing on the other hand, was complete and comprehensive within itself. + Hence the practical life was in a condition of perpetual flux, while + intellectual knowledge concerned eternal truth. + </p> + <p> + This sharp antithesis is connected with the fact that Athenian philosophy + began as a criticism of custom and tradition as standards of knowledge and + conduct. In a search for something to replace them, it hit upon reason as + the only adequate guide of belief and activity. Since custom and tradition + were identified with experience, it followed at once that reason was + superior to experience. Moreover, experience, not content with its proper + position of subordination, was the great foe to the acknowledgment of the + authority of reason. Since custom and traditionary beliefs held men in + bondage, the struggle of reason for its legitimate supremacy could be won + only by showing the inherently unstable and inadequate nature of + experience. The statement of Plato that philosophers should be kings may + best be understood as a statement that rational intelligence and not + habit, appetite, impulse, and emotion should regulate human affairs. The + former secures unity, order, and law; the latter signify multiplicity and + discord, irrational fluctuations from one estate to another. + </p> + <p> + The grounds for the identification of experience with the unsatisfactory + condition of things, the state of affairs represented by rule of mere + custom, are not far to seek. Increasing trade and travel, colonizations, + migrations and wars, had broadened the intellectual horizon. The customs + and beliefs of different communities were found to diverge sharply from + one another. Civil disturbance had become a custom in Athens; the fortunes + of the city seemed given over to strife of factions. The increase of + leisure coinciding with the broadening of the horizon had brought into ken + many new facts of nature and had stimulated curiosity and speculation. The + situation tended to raise the question as to the existence of anything + constant and universal in the realm of nature and society. Reason was the + faculty by which the universal principle and essence is apprehended; while + the senses were the organs of perceiving change,—the unstable and + the diverse as against the permanent and uniform. The results of the work + of the senses, preserved in memory and imagination, and applied in the + skill given by habit, constituted experience. + </p> + <p> + Experience at its best is thus represented in the various handicrafts—the + arts of peace and war. The cobbler, the flute player, the soldier, have + undergone the discipline of experience to acquire the skill they have. + This means that the bodily organs, particularly the senses, have had + repeated contact with things and that the result of these contacts has + been preserved and consolidated till ability in foresight and in practice + had been secured. Such was the essential meaning of the term "empirical." + It suggested a knowledge and an ability not based upon insight into + principles, but expressing the result of a large number of separate + trials. It expressed the idea now conveyed by "method of trial and error," + with especial emphasis upon the more or less accidental character of the + trials. So far as ability of control, of management, was concerned, it + amounted to rule-of-thumb procedure, to routine. If new circumstances + resembled the past, it might work well enough; in the degree in which they + deviated, failure was likely. Even to-day to speak of a physician as an + empiricist is to imply that he lacks scientific training, and that he is + proceeding simply on the basis of what he happens to have got out of the + chance medley of his past practice. Just because of the lack of science or + reason in "experience" it is hard to keep it at its poor best. The empiric + easily degenerates into the quack. He does not know where his knowledge + begins or leaves off, and so when he gets beyond routine conditions he + begins to pretend—to make claims for which there is no + justification, and to trust to luck and to ability to impose upon others—to + "bluff." Moreover, he assumes that because he has learned one thing, he + knows others—as the history of Athens showed that the common + craftsmen thought they could manage household affairs, education, and + politics, because they had learned to do the specific things of their + trades. Experience is always hovering, then, on the edge of pretense, of + sham, of seeming, and appearance, in distinction from the reality upon + which reason lays hold. + </p> + <p> + The philosophers soon reached certain generalizations from this state of + affairs. The senses are connected with the appetites, with wants and + desires. They lay hold not on the reality of things but on the relation + which things have to our pleasures and pains, to the satisfaction of wants + and the welfare of the body. They are important only for the life of the + body, which is but a fixed substratum for a higher life. Experience thus + has a definitely material character; it has to do with physical things in + relation to the body. In contrast, reason, or science, lays hold of the + immaterial, the ideal, the spiritual. There is something morally dangerous + about experience, as such words as sensual, carnal, material, worldly, + interests suggest; while pure reason and spirit connote something morally + praiseworthy. Moreover, ineradicable connection with the changing, the + inexplicably shifting, and with the manifold, the diverse, clings to + experience. Its material is inherently variable and untrustworthy. It is + anarchic, because unstable. The man who trusts to experience does not know + what he depends upon, since it changes from person to person, from day to + day, to say nothing of from country to country. Its connection with the + "many," with various particulars, has the same effect, and also carries + conflict in its train. + </p> + <p> + Only the single, the uniform, assures coherence and harmony. Out of + experience come warrings, the conflict of opinions and acts within the + individual and between individuals. From experience no standard of belief + can issue, because it is the very nature of experience to instigate all + kinds of contrary beliefs, as varieties of local custom proved. Its + logical outcome is that anything is good and true to the particular + individual which his experience leads him to believe true and good at a + particular time and place. Finally practice falls of necessity within + experience. Doing proceeds from needs and aims at change. To produce or to + make is to alter something; to consume is to alter. All the obnoxious + characters of change and diversity thus attach themselves to doing while + knowing is as permanent as its object. To know, to grasp a thing + intellectually or theoretically, is to be out of the region of + vicissitude, chance, and diversity. Truth has no lack; it is untouched by + the perturbations of the world of sense. It deals with the eternal and the + universal. And the world of experience can be brought under control, can + be steadied and ordered, only through subjection to its law of reason. + </p> + <p> + It would not do, of course, to say that all these distinctions persisted + in full technical definiteness. But they all of them profoundly influenced + men's subsequent thinking and their ideas about education. The contempt + for physical as compared with mathematical and logical science, for the + senses and sense observation; the feeling that knowledge is high and + worthy in the degree in which it deals with ideal symbols instead of with + the concrete; the scorn of particulars except as they are deductively + brought under a universal; the disregard for the body; the depreciation of + arts and crafts as intellectual instrumentalities, all sought shelter and + found sanction under this estimate of the respective values of experience + and reason—or, what came to the same thing, of the practical and the + intellectual. Medieval philosophy continued and reinforced the tradition. + To know reality meant to be in relation to the supreme reality, or God, + and to enjoy the eternal bliss of that relation. Contemplation of supreme + reality was the ultimate end of man to which action is subordinate. + Experience had to do with mundane, profane, and secular affairs, + practically necessary indeed, but of little import in comparison with + supernatural objects of knowledge. When we add to this motive the force + derived from the literary character of the Roman education and the Greek + philosophic tradition, and conjoin to them the preference for studies + which obviously demarcated the aristocratic class from the lower classes, + we can readily understand the tremendous power exercised by the persistent + preference of the "intellectual" over the "practical" not simply in + educational philosophies but in the higher schools. 2. The Modern Theory + of Experience and Knowledge. As we shall see later, the development of + experimentation as a method of knowledge makes possible and necessitates a + radical transformation of the view just set forth. But before coming to + that, we have to note the theory of experience and knowledge developed in + the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In general, it presents us with + an almost complete reversal of the classic doctrine of the relations of + experience and reason. To Plato experience meant habituation, or the + conservation of the net product of a lot of past chance trials. Reason + meant the principle of reform, of progress, of increase of control. + Devotion to the cause of reason meant breaking through the limitations of + custom and getting at things as they really were. To the modern reformers, + the situation was the other way around. Reason, universal principles, a + priori notions, meant either blank forms which had to be filled in by + experience, by sense observations, in order to get significance and + validity; or else were mere indurated prejudices, dogmas imposed by + authority, which masqueraded and found protection under august names. The + great need was to break way from captivity to conceptions which, as Bacon + put it, "anticipated nature" and imposed merely human opinions upon her, + and to resort to experience to find out what nature was like. Appeal to + experience marked the breach with authority. It meant openness to new + impressions; eagerness in discovery and invention instead of absorption in + tabulating and systematizing received ideas and "proving" them by means of + the relations they sustained to one another. It was the irruption into the + mind of the things as they really were, free from the veil cast over them + by preconceived ideas. + </p> + <p> + The change was twofold. Experience lost the practical meaning which it had + borne from the time of Plato. It ceased to mean ways of doing and being + done to, and became a name for something intellectual and cognitive. It + meant the apprehension of material which should ballast and check the + exercise of reasoning. By the modern philosophic empiricist and by his + opponent, experience has been looked upon just as a way of knowing. The + only question was how good a way it is. The result was an even greater + "intellectualism" than is found in ancient philosophy, if that word be + used to designate an emphatic and almost exclusive interest in knowledge + in its isolation. Practice was not so much subordinated to knowledge as + treated as a kind of tag-end or aftermath of knowledge. The educational + result was only to confirm the exclusion of active pursuits from the + school, save as they might be brought in for purely utilitarian ends—the + acquisition by drill of certain habits. In the second place, the interest + in experience as a means of basing truth upon objects, upon nature, led to + looking at the mind as purely receptive. The more passive the mind is, the + more truly objects will impress themselves upon it. For the mind to take a + hand, so to speak, would be for it in the very process of knowing to + vitiate true knowledge—to defeat its own purpose. The ideal was a + maximum of receptivity. Since the impressions made upon the mind by + objects were generally termed sensations, empiricism thus became a + doctrine of sensationalism—that is to say, a doctrine which + identified knowledge with the reception and association of sensory + impressions. In John Locke, the most influential of the empiricists, we + find this sensationalism mitigated by a recognition of certain mental + faculties, like discernment or discrimination, comparison, abstraction, + and generalization which work up the material of sense into definite and + organized forms and which even evolve new ideas on their own account, such + as the fundamental conceptions of morals and mathematics. (See ante, p. + 61.) But some of his successors, especially in France in the latter part + of the eighteenth century, carried his doctrine to the limit; they + regarded discernment and judgment as peculiar sensations made in us by the + conjoint presence of other sensations. Locke had held that the mind is a + blank piece of paper, or a wax tablet with nothing engraved on it at birth + (a tabula rasa) so far as any contents of ideas were concerned, but had + endowed it with activities to be exercised upon the material received. His + French successors razed away the powers and derived them also from + impressions received. + </p> + <p> + As we have earlier noted, this notion was fostered by the new interest in + education as method of social reform. (See ante, p. 93.) The emptier the + mind to begin with, the more it may be made anything we wish by bringing + the right influences to bear upon it. Thus Helvetius, perhaps the most + extreme and consistent sensationalist, proclaimed that education could do + anything—that it was omnipotent. Within the sphere of school + instruction, empiricism found its directly beneficial office in protesting + against mere book learning. If knowledge comes from the impressions made + upon us by natural objects, it is impossible to procure knowledge without + the use of objects which impress the mind. Words, all kinds of linguistic + symbols, in the lack of prior presentations of objects with which they may + be associated, convey nothing but sensations of their own shape and color—certainly + not a very instructive kind of knowledge. Sensationalism was an extremely + handy weapon with which to combat doctrines and opinions resting wholly + upon tradition and authority. With respect to all of them, it set up a + test: Where are the real objects from which these ideas and beliefs are + received? If such objects could not be produced, ideas were explained as + the result of false associations and combinations. Empiricism also + insisted upon a first-hand element. The impression must be made upon me, + upon my mind. The further we get away from this direct, first-hand source + of knowledge, the more numerous the sources of error, and the vaguer the + resulting idea. + </p> + <p> + As might be expected, however, the philosophy was weak upon the positive + side. Of course, the value of natural objects and firsthand acquaintance + was not dependent upon the truth of the theory. Introduced into the + schools they would do their work, even if the sensational theory about the + way in which they did it was quite wrong. So far, there is nothing to + complain of. But the emphasis upon sensationalism also operated to + influence the way in which natural objects were employed, and to prevent + full good being got from them. "Object lessons" tended to isolate the mere + sense-activity and make it an end in itself. The more isolated the object, + the more isolated the sensory quality, the more distinct the + sense-impression as a unit of knowledge. The theory worked not only in the + direction of this mechanical isolation, which tended to reduce instruction + to a kind of physical gymnastic of the sense-organs (good like any + gymnastic of bodily organs, but not more so), but also to the neglect of + thinking. According to the theory there was no need of thinking in + connection with sense-observation; in fact, in strict theory such thinking + would be impossible till afterwards, for thinking consisted simply in + combining and separating sensory units which had been received without any + participation of judgment. + </p> + <p> + As a matter of fact, accordingly, practically no scheme of education upon + a purely sensory basis has ever been systematically tried, at least after + the early years of infancy. Its obvious deficiencies have caused it to be + resorted to simply for filling in "rationalistic" knowledge (that is to + say, knowledge of definitions, rules, classifications, and modes of + application conveyed through symbols), and as a device for lending greater + "interest" to barren symbols. There are at least three serious defects of + sensationalistic empiricism as an educational philosophy of knowledge. (a) + the historical value of the theory was critical; it was a dissolvent of + current beliefs about the world and political institutions. It was a + destructive organ of criticism of hard and fast dogmas. But the work of + education is constructive, not critical. It assumes not old beliefs to be + eliminated and revised, but the need of building up new experience into + intellectual habitudes as correct as possible from the start. + Sensationalism is highly unfitted for this constructive task. Mind, + understanding, denotes responsiveness to meanings (ante, p. 29), not + response to direct physical stimuli. And meaning exists only with + reference to a context, which is excluded by any scheme which identifies + knowledge with a combination of sense-impressions. The theory, so far as + educationally applied, led either to a magnification of mere physical + excitations or else to a mere heaping up of isolated objects and + qualities. + </p> + <p> + (b) While direct impression has the advantage of being first hand, it also + has the disadvantage of being limited in range. Direct acquaintance with + the natural surroundings of the home environment so as to give reality to + ideas about portions of the earth beyond the reach of the senses, and as a + means of arousing intellectual curiosity, is one thing. As an end-all and + be-all of geographical knowledge it is fatally restricted. In precisely + analogous fashion, beans, shoe pegs, and counters may be helpful aids to a + realization of numerical relations, but when employed except as aids to + thought—the apprehension of meaning—they become an obstacle to + the growth of arithmetical understanding. They arrest growth on a low + plane, the plane of specific physical symbols. Just as the race developed + especial symbols as tools of calculation and mathematical reasonings, + because the use of the fingers as numerical symbols got in the way, so the + individual must progress from concrete to abstract symbols—that is, + symbols whose meaning is realized only through conceptual thinking. And + undue absorption at the outset in the physical object of sense hampers + this growth. (c) A thoroughly false psychology of mental development + underlay sensationalistic empiricism. Experience is in truth a matter of + activities, instinctive and impulsive, in their interactions with things. + What even an infant "experiences" is not a passively received quality + impressed by an object, but the effect which some activity of handling, + throwing, pounding, tearing, etc., has upon an object, and the consequent + effect of the object upon the direction of activities. (See ante, p. 140.) + Fundamentally (as we shall see in more detail), the ancient notion of + experience as a practical matter is truer to fact that the modern notion + of it as a mode of knowing by means of sensations. The neglect of the + deep-seated active and motor factors of experience is a fatal defect of + the traditional empirical philosophy. Nothing is more uninteresting and + mechanical than a scheme of object lessons which ignores and as far as may + be excludes the natural tendency to learn about the qualities of objects + by the uses to which they are put through trying to do something with + them. + </p> + <p> + It is obvious, accordingly, that even if the philosophy of experience + represented by modern empiricism had received more general theoretical + assent than has been accorded to it, it could not have furnished a + satisfactory philosophy of the learning process. Its educational influence + was confined to injecting a new factor into the older curriculum, with + incidental modifications of the older studies and methods. It introduced + greater regard for observation of things directly and through pictures and + graphic descriptions, and it reduced the importance attached to verbal + symbolization. But its own scope was so meager that it required + supplementation by information concerning matters outside of + sense-perception and by matters which appealed more directly to thought. + Consequently it left unimpaired the scope of informational and abstract, + or "rationalistic" studies. + </p> + <p> + 3. Experience as Experimentation. It has already been intimated that + sensational empiricism represents neither the idea of experience justified + by modern psychology nor the idea of knowledge suggested by modern + scientific procedure. With respect to the former, it omits the primary + position of active response which puts things to use and which learns + about them through discovering the consequences that result from use. It + would seem as if five minutes' unprejudiced observation of the way an + infant gains knowledge would have sufficed to overthrow the notion that he + is passively engaged in receiving impressions of isolated ready-made + qualities of sound, color, hardness, etc. For it would be seen that the + infant reacts to stimuli by activities of handling, reaching, etc., in + order to see what results follow upon motor response to a sensory + stimulation; it would be seen that what is learned are not isolated + qualities, but the behavior which may be expected from a thing, and the + changes in things and persons which an activity may be expected to + produce. In other words, what he learns are connections. Even such + qualities as red color, sound of a high pitch, have to be discriminated + and identified on the basis of the activities they call forth and the + consequences these activities effect. We learn what things are hard and + what are soft by finding out through active experimentation what they + respectively will do and what can be done and what cannot be done with + them. In like fashion, children learn about persons by finding out what + responsive activities these persons exact and what these persons will do + in reply to the children's activities. And the combination of what things + do to us (not in impressing qualities on a passive mind) in modifying our + actions, furthering some of them and resisting and checking others, and + what we can do to them in producing new changes constitutes experience. + The methods of science by which the revolution in our knowledge of the + world dating from the seventeenth century, was brought about, teach the + same lesson. For these methods are nothing but experimentation carried out + under conditions of deliberate control. To the Greek, it seemed absurd + that such an activity as, say, the cobbler punching holes in leather, or + using wax and needle and thread, could give an adequate knowledge of the + world. It seemed almost axiomatic that for true knowledge we must have + recourse to concepts coming from a reason above experience. But the + introduction of the experimental method signified precisely that such + operations, carried on under conditions of control, are just the ways in + which fruitful ideas about nature are obtained and tested. In other words, + it is only needed to conduct such an operation as the pouring of an acid + on a metal for the purpose of getting knowledge instead of for the purpose + of getting a trade result, in order to lay hold of the principle upon + which the science of nature was henceforth to depend. Sense perceptions + were indeed indispensable, but there was less reliance upon sense + perceptions in their natural or customary form than in the older science. + They were no longer regarded as containing within themselves some "form" + or "species" of universal kind in a disguised mask of sense which could be + stripped off by rational thought. On the contrary, the first thing was to + alter and extend the data of sense perception: to act upon the given + objects of sense by the lens of the telescope and microscope, and by all + sorts of experimental devices. To accomplish this in a way which would + arouse new ideas (hypotheses, theories) required even more general ideas + (like those of mathematics) than were at the command of ancient science. + But these general conceptions were no longer taken to give knowledge in + themselves. They were implements for instituting, conducting, interpreting + experimental inquiries and formulating their results. + </p> + <p> + The logical outcome is a new philosophy of experience and knowledge, a + philosophy which no longer puts experience in opposition to rational + knowledge and explanation. Experience is no longer a mere summarizing of + what has been done in a more or less chance way in the past; it is a + deliberate control of what is done with reference to making what happens + to us and what we do to things as fertile as possible of suggestions (of + suggested meanings) and a means for trying out the validity of the + suggestions. When trying, or experimenting, ceases to be blinded by + impulse or custom, when it is guided by an aim and conducted by measure + and method, it becomes reasonable—rational. When what we suffer from + things, what we undergo at their hands, ceases to be a matter of chance + circumstance, when it is transformed into a consequence of our own prior + purposive endeavors, it becomes rationally significant—enlightening + and instructive. The antithesis of empiricism and rationalism loses the + support of the human situation which once gave it meaning and relative + justification. + </p> + <p> + The bearing of this change upon the opposition of purely practical and + purely intellectual studies is self-evident. The distinction is not + intrinsic but is dependent upon conditions, and upon conditions which can + be regulated. Practical activities may be intellectually narrow and + trivial; they will be so in so far as they are routine, carried on under + the dictates of authority, and having in view merely some external result. + But childhood and youth, the period of schooling, is just the time when it + is possible to carry them on in a different spirit. It is inexpedient to + repeat the discussions of our previous chapters on thinking and on the + evolution of educative subject matter from childlike work and play to + logically organized subject matter. The discussions of this chapter and + the prior one should, however, give an added meaning to those results. + </p> + <p> + (i) Experience itself primarily consists of the active relations + subsisting between a human being and his natural and social surroundings. + In some cases, the initiative in activity is on the side of the + environment; the human being undergoes or suffers certain checkings and + deflections of endeavors. In other cases, the behavior of surrounding + things and persons carries to a successful issue the active tendencies of + the individual, so that in the end what the individual undergoes are + consequences which he has himself tried to produce. In just the degree in + which connections are established between what happens to a person and + what he does in response, and between what he does to his environment and + what it does in response to him, his acts and the things about him acquire + meaning. He learns to understand both himself and the world of men and + things. Purposive education or schooling should present such an + environment that this interaction will effect acquisition of those + meanings which are so important that they become, in turn, instruments of + further learnings. (ante, Ch. XI.) As has been repeatedly pointed out, + activity out of school is carried on under conditions which have not been + deliberately adapted to promoting the function of understanding and + formation of effective intellectual dispositions. The results are vital + and genuine as far as they go, but they are limited by all kinds of + circumstances. Some powers are left quite undeveloped and undirected; + others get only occasional and whimsical stimulations; others are formed + into habits of a routine skill at the expense of aims and resourceful + initiative and inventiveness. It is not the business of the school to + transport youth from an environment of activity into one of cramped study + of the records of other men's learning; but to transport them from an + environment of relatively chance activities (accidental in the relation + they bear to insight and thought) into one of activities selected with + reference to guidance of learning. A slight inspection of the improved + methods which have already shown themselves effective in education will + reveal that they have laid hold, more or less consciously, upon the fact + that "intellectual" studies instead of being opposed to active pursuits + represent an intellectualizing of practical pursuits. It remains to grasp + the principle with greater firmness. + </p> + <p> + (ii) The changes which are taking place in the content of social life + tremendously facilitate selection of the sort of activities which will + intellectualize the play and work of the school. When one bears in mind + the social environment of the Greeks and the people of the Middle Ages, + where such practical activities as could be successfully carried on were + mostly of a routine and external sort and even servile in nature, one is + not surprised that educators turned their backs upon them as unfitted to + cultivate intelligence. But now that even the occupations of the + household, agriculture, and manufacturing as well as transportation and + intercourse are instinct with applied science, the case stands otherwise. + It is true that many of those who now engage in them are not aware of the + intellectual content upon which their personal actions depend. But this + fact only gives an added reason why schooling should use these pursuits so + as to enable the coming generation to acquire a comprehension now too + generally lacking, and thus enable persons to carry on their pursuits + intelligently instead of blindly. (iii) The most direct blow at the + traditional separation of doing and knowing and at the traditional + prestige of purely "intellectual" studies, however, has been given by the + progress of experimental science. If this progress has demonstrated + anything, it is that there is no such thing as genuine knowledge and + fruitful understanding except as the offspring of doing. The analysis and + rearrangement of facts which is indispensable to the growth of knowledge + and power of explanation and right classification cannot be attained + purely mentally—just inside the head. Men have to do something to + the things when they wish to find out something; they have to alter + conditions. This is the lesson of the laboratory method, and the lesson + which all education has to learn. The laboratory is a discovery of the + condition under which labor may become intellectually fruitful and not + merely externally productive. If, in too many cases at present, it results + only in the acquisition of an additional mode of technical skill, that is + because it still remains too largely but an isolated resource, not + resorted to until pupils are mostly too old to get the full advantage of + it, and even then is surrounded by other studies where traditional methods + isolate intellect from activity. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM20"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. The Greeks were induced to philosophize by the increasing + </h2> + <p> + failure of their traditional customs and beliefs to regulate life. Thus + they were led to criticize custom adversely and to look for some other + source of authority in life and belief. Since they desired a rational + standard for the latter, and had identified with experience the customs + which had proved unsatisfactory supports, they were led to a flat + opposition of reason and experience. The more the former was exalted, the + more the latter was depreciated. Since experience was identified with what + men do and suffer in particular and changing situations of life, doing + shared in the philosophic depreciation. This influence fell in with many + others to magnify, in higher education, all the methods and topics which + involved the least use of sense-observation and bodily activity. The + modern age began with a revolt against this point of view, with an appeal + to experience, and an attack upon so-called purely rational concepts on + the ground that they either needed to be ballasted by the results of + concrete experiences, or else were mere expressions of prejudice and + institutionalized class interest, calling themselves rational for + protection. But various circumstances led to considering experience as + pure cognition, leaving out of account its intrinsic active and emotional + phases, and to identifying it with a passive reception of isolated + "sensations." Hence the education reform effected by the new theory was + confined mainly to doing away with some of the bookishness of prior + methods; it did not accomplish a consistent reorganization. + </p> + <p> + Meantime, the advance of psychology, of industrial methods, and of the + experimental method in science makes another conception of experience + explicitly desirable and possible. This theory reinstates the idea of the + ancients that experience is primarily practical, not cognitive—a + matter of doing and undergoing the consequences of doing. But the ancient + theory is transformed by realizing that doing may be directed so as to + take up into its own content all which thought suggests, and so as to + result in securely tested knowledge. "Experience" then ceases to be + empirical and becomes experimental. Reason ceases to be a remote and ideal + faculty, and signifies all the resources by which activity is made + fruitful in meaning. Educationally, this change denotes such a plan for + the studies and method of instruction as has been developed in the + previous chapters. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0021"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Twenty-one: Physical and Social Studies: Naturalism and Humanism + </h2> + <p> + ALLUSION has already been made to the conflict of natural science with + literary studies for a place in the curriculum. The solution thus far + reached consists essentially in a somewhat mechanical compromise whereby + the field is divided between studies having nature and studies having man + as their theme. The situation thus presents us with another instance of + the external adjustment of educational values, and focuses attention upon + the philosophy of the connection of nature with human affairs. In general, + it may be said that the educational division finds a reflection in the + dualistic philosophies. Mind and the world are regarded as two independent + realms of existence having certain points of contact with each other. From + this point of view it is natural that each sphere of existence should have + its own separate group of studies connected with it; it is even natural + that the growth of scientific studies should be viewed with suspicion as + marking a tendency of materialistic philosophy to encroach upon the domain + of spirit. Any theory of education which contemplates a more unified + scheme of education than now exists is under the necessity of facing the + question of the relation of man to nature. + </p> + <p> + 1. The Historic Background of Humanistic Study. It is noteworthy that + classic Greek philosophy does not present the problem in its modern form. + Socrates indeed appears to have thought that science of nature was not + attainable and not very important. The chief thing to know is the nature + and end of man. Upon that knowledge hangs all that is of deep significance—all + moral and social achievement. Plato, however, makes right knowledge of man + and society depend upon knowledge of the essential features of nature. His + chief treatise, entitled the Republic, is at once a treatise on morals, on + social organization, and on the metaphysics and science of nature. Since + he accepts the Socratic doctrine that right achievement in the former + depends upon rational knowledge, he is compelled to discuss the nature of + knowledge. Since he accepts the idea that the ultimate object of knowledge + is the discovery of the good or end of man, and is discontented with the + Socratic conviction that all we know is our own ignorance, he connects the + discussion of the good of man with consideration of the essential good or + end of nature itself. To attempt to determine the end of man apart from a + knowledge of the ruling end which gives law and unity to nature is + impossible. It is thus quite consistent with his philosophy that he + subordinates literary studies (under the name of music) to mathematics and + to physics as well as to logic and metaphysics. But on the other hand, + knowledge of nature is not an end in itself; it is a necessary stage in + bringing the mind to a realization of the supreme purpose of existence as + the law of human action, corporate and individual. To use the modern + phraseology, naturalistic studies are indispensable, but they are in the + interests of humanistic and ideal ends. + </p> + <p> + Aristotle goes even farther, if anything, in the direction of naturalistic + studies. He subordinates (ante, p. 254) civic relations to the purely + cognitive life. The highest end of man is not human but divine—participation + in pure knowing which constitutes the divine life. Such knowing deals with + what is universal and necessary, and finds, therefore, a more adequate + subject matter in nature at its best than in the transient things of man. + If we take what the philosophers stood for in Greek life, rather than the + details of what they say, we might summarize by saying that the Greeks + were too much interested in free inquiry into natural fact and in the + aesthetic enjoyment of nature, and were too deeply conscious of the extent + in which society is rooted in nature and subject to its laws, to think of + bringing man and nature into conflict. Two factors conspire in the later + period of ancient life, however, to exalt literary and humanistic studies. + One is the increasingly reminiscent and borrowed character of culture; the + other is the political and rhetorical bent of Roman life. + </p> + <p> + Greek achievement in civilization was native; the civilization of the + Alexandrians and Romans was inherited from alien sources. Consequently it + looked back to the records upon which it drew, instead of looking out + directly upon nature and society, for material and inspiration. We cannot + do better than quote the words of Hatch to indicate the consequences for + educational theory and practice. "Greece on one hand had lost political + power, and on the other possessed in her splendid literature an + inalienable heritage. It was natural that she should turn to letters. It + was natural also that the study of letters should be reflected upon + speech. The mass of men in the Greek world tended to lay stress on that + acquaintance with the literature of bygone generations, and that habit of + cultivated speech, which has ever since been commonly spoken of as + education. Our own comes by direct tradition from it. It set a fashion + which until recently has uniformly prevailed over the entire civilized + world. We study literature rather than nature because the Greeks did so, + and because when the Romans and the Roman provincials resolved to educate + their sons, they employed Greek teachers and followed in Greek paths." 1 + </p> + <p> + The so-called practical bent of the Romans worked in the same direction. + In falling back upon the recorded ideas of the Greeks, they not only took + the short path to attaining a cultural development, but they procured just + the kind of material and method suited to their administrative talents. + For their practical genius was not directed to the conquest and control of + nature but to the conquest and control of men. + </p> + <p> + Mr. Hatch, in the passage quoted, takes a good deal of history for granted + in saying that we have studied literature rather than nature because the + Greeks, and the Romans whom they taught, did so. What is the link that + spans the intervening centuries? The question suggests that barbarian + Europe but repeated on a larger scale and with increased intensity the + Roman situation. It had to go to school to Greco-Roman civilization; it + also borrowed rather than evolved its culture. Not merely for its general + ideas and their artistic presentation but for its models of law it went to + the records of alien peoples. And its dependence upon tradition was + increased by the dominant theological interests of the period. For the + authorities to which the Church appealed were literatures composed in + foreign tongues. Everything converged to identify learning with linguistic + training and to make the language of the learned a literary language + instead of the mother speech. + </p> + <p> + The full scope of this fact escapes us, moreover, until we recognize that + this subject matter compelled recourse to a dialectical method. + Scholasticism frequently has been used since the time of the revival of + learning as a term of reproach. But all that it means is the method of The + Schools, or of the School Men. In its essence, it is nothing but a highly + effective systematization of the methods of teaching and learning which + are appropriate to transmit an authoritative body of truths. Where + literature rather than contemporary nature and society furnishes material + of study, methods must be adapted to defining, expounding, and + interpreting the received material, rather than to inquiry, discovery, and + invention. And at bottom what is called Scholasticism is the whole-hearted + and consistent formulation and application of the methods which are suited + to instruction when the material of instruction is taken ready-made, + rather than as something which students are to find out for themselves. So + far as schools still teach from textbooks and rely upon the principle of + authority and acquisition rather than upon that of discovery and inquiry, + their methods are Scholastic—minus the logical accuracy and system + of Scholasticism at its best. Aside from laxity of method and statement, + the only difference is that geographies and histories and botanies and + astronomies are now part of the authoritative literature which is to be + mastered. + </p> + <p> + As a consequence, the Greek tradition was lost in which a humanistic + interest was used as a basis of interest in nature, and a knowledge of + nature used to support the distinctively human aims of man. Life found its + support in authority, not in nature. The latter was moreover an object of + considerable suspicion. Contemplation of it was dangerous, for it tended + to draw man away from reliance upon the documents in which the rules of + living were already contained. Moreover nature could be known only through + observation; it appealed to the senses—which were merely material as + opposed to a purely immaterial mind. Furthermore, the utilities of a + knowledge of nature were purely physical and secular; they connected with + the bodily and temporal welfare of man, while the literary tradition + concerned his spiritual and eternal well-being. + </p> + <p> + 2. The Modern Scientific Interest in Nature. The movement of the fifteenth + century which is variously termed the revival of learning and the + renascence was characterized by a new interest in man's present life, and + accordingly by a new interest in his relationships with nature. It was + naturalistic, in the sense that it turned against the dominant + supernaturalistic interest. It is possible that the influence of a return + to classic Greek pagan literature in bringing about this changed mind has + been overestimated. Undoubtedly the change was mainly a product of + contemporary conditions. But there can be no doubt that educated men, + filled with the new point of view, turned eagerly to Greek literature for + congenial sustenance and reinforcement. And to a considerable extent, this + interest in Greek thought was not in literature for its own sake, but in + the spirit it expressed. The mental freedom, the sense of the order and + beauty of nature, which animated Greek expression, aroused men to think + and observe in a similar untrammeled fashion. The history of science in + the sixteenth century shows that the dawning sciences of physical nature + largely borrowed their points of departure from the new interest in Greek + literature. As Windelband has said, the new science of nature was the + daughter of humanism. The favorite notion of the time was that man was in + microcosm that which the universe was in macrocosm. + </p> + <p> + This fact raises anew the question of how it was that nature and man were + later separated and a sharp division made between language and literature + and the physical sciences. Four reasons may be suggested. (a) The old + tradition was firmly entrenched in institutions. Politics, law, and + diplomacy remained of necessity branches of authoritative literature, for + the social sciences did not develop until the methods of the sciences of + physics and chemistry, to say nothing of biology, were much further + advanced. The same is largely true of history. Moreover, the methods used + for effective teaching of the languages were well developed; the inertia + of academic custom was on their side. Just as the new interest in + literature, especially Greek, had not been allowed at first to find + lodgment in the scholastically organized universities, so when it found + its way into them it joined hands with the older learning to minimize the + influence of experimental science. The men who taught were rarely trained + in science; the men who were scientifically competent worked in private + laboratories and through the medium of academies which promoted research, + but which were not organized as teaching bodies. Finally, the aristocratic + tradition which looked down upon material things and upon the senses and + the hands was still mighty. + </p> + <p> + (b) The Protestant revolt brought with it an immense increase of interest + in theological discussion and controversies. The appeal on both sides was + to literary documents. Each side had to train men in ability to study and + expound the records which were relied upon. The demand for training men + who could defend the chosen faith against the other side, who were able to + propagandize and to prevent the encroachments of the other side, was such + that it is not too much to say that by the middle of the seventeenth + century the linguistic training of gymnasia and universities had been + captured by the revived theological interest, and used as a tool of + religious education and ecclesiastical controversy. Thus the educational + descent of the languages as they are found in education to-day is not + direct from the revival of learning, but from its adaptation to + theological ends. + </p> + <p> + (c) The natural sciences were themselves conceived in a way which + sharpened the opposition of man and nature. Francis Bacon presents an + almost perfect example of the union of naturalistic and humanistic + interest. Science, adopting the methods of observation and + experimentation, was to give up the attempt to "anticipate" nature—to + impose preconceived notions upon her—and was to become her humble + interpreter. In obeying nature intellectually, man would learn to command + her practically. "Knowledge is power." This aphorism meant that through + science man is to control nature and turn her energies to the execution of + his own ends. Bacon attacked the old learning and logic as purely + controversial, having to do with victory in argument, not with discovery + of the unknown. Through the new method of thought which was set forth in + his new logic an era of expansive discoveries was to emerge, and these + discoveries were to bear fruit in inventions for the service of man. Men + were to give up their futile, never-finished effort to dominate one + another to engage in the cooperative task of dominating nature in the + interests of humanity. + </p> + <p> + In the main, Bacon prophesied the direction of subsequent progress. But he + "anticipated" the advance. He did not see that the new science was for a + long time to be worked in the interest of old ends of human exploitation. + He thought that it would rapidly give man new ends. Instead, it put at the + disposal of a class the means to secure their old ends of aggrandizement + at the expense of another class. The industrial revolution followed, as he + foresaw, upon a revolution in scientific method. But it is taking the + revolution many centuries to produce a new mind. Feudalism was doomed by + the applications of the new science, for they transferred power from the + landed nobility to the manufacturing centers. But capitalism rather than a + social humanism took its place. Production and commerce were carried on as + if the new science had no moral lesson, but only technical lessons as to + economies in production and utilization of saving in self-interest. + Naturally, this application of physical science (which was the most + conspicuously perceptible one) strengthened the claims of professed + humanists that science was materialistic in its tendencies. It left a void + as to man's distinctively human interests which go beyond making, saving, + and expending money; and languages and literature put in their claim to + represent the moral and ideal interests of humanity. + </p> + <p> + (d) Moreover, the philosophy which professed itself based upon science, + which gave itself out as the accredited representative of the net + significance of science, was either dualistic in character, marked by a + sharp division between mind (characterizing man) and matter, constituting + nature; or else it was openly mechanical, reducing the signal features of + human life to illusion. In the former case, it allowed the claims of + certain studies to be peculiar consignees of mental values, and indirectly + strengthened their claim to superiority, since human beings would incline + to regard human affairs as of chief importance at least to themselves. In + the latter case, it called out a reaction which threw doubt and suspicion + upon the value of physical science, giving occasion for treating it as an + enemy to man's higher interests. + </p> + <p> + Greek and medieval knowledge accepted the world in its qualitative + variety, and regarded nature's processes as having ends, or in technical + phrase as teleological. New science was expounded so as to deny the + reality of all qualities in real, or objective, existence. Sounds, colors, + ends, as well as goods and bads, were regarded as purely subjective—as + mere impressions in the mind. Objective existence was then treated as + having only quantitative aspects—as so much mass in motion, its only + differences being that at one point in space there was a larger aggregate + mass than at another, and that in some spots there were greater rates of + motion than at others. Lacking qualitative distinctions, nature lacked + significant variety. Uniformities were emphasized, not diversities; the + ideal was supposed to be the discovery of a single mathematical formula + applying to the whole universe at once from which all the seeming variety + of phenomena could be derived. This is what a mechanical philosophy means. + </p> + <p> + Such a philosophy does not represent the genuine purport of science. It + takes the technique for the thing itself; the apparatus and the + terminology for reality, the method for its subject matter. Science does + confine its statements to conditions which enable us to predict and + control the happening of events, ignoring the qualities of the events. + Hence its mechanical and quantitative character. But in leaving them out + of account, it does not exclude them from reality, nor relegate them to a + purely mental region; it only furnishes means utilizable for ends. Thus + while in fact the progress of science was increasing man's power over + nature, enabling him to place his cherished ends on a firmer basis than + ever before, and also to diversify his activities almost at will, the + philosophy which professed to formulate its accomplishments reduced the + world to a barren and monotonous redistribution of matter in space. Thus + the immediate effect of modern science was to accentuate the dualism of + matter and mind, and thereby to establish the physical and the humanistic + studies as two disconnected groups. Since the difference between better + and worse is bound up with the qualities of experience, any philosophy of + science which excludes them from the genuine content of reality is bound + to leave out what is most interesting and most important to mankind. + </p> + <p> + 3. The Present Educational Problem. In truth, experience knows no division + between human concerns and a purely mechanical physical world. Man's home + is nature; his purposes and aims are dependent for execution upon natural + conditions. Separated from such conditions they become empty dreams and + idle indulgences of fancy. From the standpoint of human experience, and + hence of educational endeavor, any distinction which can be justly made + between nature and man is a distinction between the conditions which have + to be reckoned with in the formation and execution of our practical aims, + and the aims themselves. This philosophy is vouched for by the doctrine of + biological development which shows that man is continuous with nature, not + an alien entering her processes from without. It is reinforced by the + experimental method of science which shows that knowledge accrues in + virtue of an attempt to direct physical energies in accord with ideas + suggested in dealing with natural objects in behalf of social uses. Every + step forward in the social sciences—the studies termed history, + economics, politics, sociology—shows that social questions are + capable of being intelligently coped with only in the degree in which we + employ the method of collected data, forming hypotheses, and testing them + in action which is characteristic of natural science, and in the degree in + which we utilize in behalf of the promotion of social welfare the + technical knowledge ascertained by physics and chemistry. Advanced methods + of dealing with such perplexing problems as insanity, intemperance, + poverty, public sanitation, city planning, the conservation of natural + resources, the constructive use of governmental agencies for furthering + the public good without weakening personal initiative, all illustrate the + direct dependence of our important social concerns upon the methods and + results of natural science. + </p> + <p> + With respect then to both humanistic and naturalistic studies, education + should take its departure from this close interdependence. It should aim + not at keeping science as a study of nature apart from literature as a + record of human interests, but at cross-fertilizing both the natural + sciences and the various human disciplines such as history, literature, + economics, and politics. Pedagogically, the problem is simpler than the + attempt to teach the sciences as mere technical bodies of information and + technical forms of physical manipulation, on one side; and to teach + humanistic studies as isolated subjects, on the other. For the latter + procedure institutes an artificial separation in the pupils' experience. + Outside of school pupils meet with natural facts and principles in + connection with various modes of human action. (See ante, p. 30.) In all + the social activities in which they have shared they have had to + understand the material and processes involved. To start them in school + with a rupture of this intimate association breaks the continuity of + mental development, makes the student feel an indescribable unreality in + his studies, and deprives him of the normal motive for interest in them. + </p> + <p> + There is no doubt, of course, that the opportunities of education should + be such that all should have a chance who have the disposition to advance + to specialized ability in science, and thus devote themselves to its + pursuit as their particular occupation in life. But at present, the pupil + too often has a choice only between beginning with a study of the results + of prior specialization where the material is isolated from his daily + experiences, or with miscellaneous nature study, where material is + presented at haphazard and does not lead anywhere in particular. The habit + of introducing college pupils into segregated scientific subject matter, + such as is appropriate to the man who wishes to become an expert in a + given field, is carried back into the high schools. Pupils in the latter + simply get a more elementary treatment of the same thing, with + difficulties smoothed over and topics reduced to the level of their + supposed ability. The cause of this procedure lies in following tradition, + rather than in conscious adherence to a dualistic philosophy. But the + effect is the same as if the purpose were to inculcate an idea that the + sciences which deal with nature have nothing to do with man, and vice + versa. A large part of the comparative ineffectiveness of the teaching of + the sciences, for those who never become scientific specialists, is the + result of a separation which is unavoidable when one begins with + technically organized subject matter. Even if all students were embryonic + scientific specialists, it is questionable whether this is the most + effective procedure. Considering that the great majority are concerned + with the study of sciences only for its effect upon their mental habits—in + making them more alert, more open-minded, more inclined to tentative + acceptance and to testing of ideas propounded or suggested,—and for + achieving a better understanding of their daily environment, it is + certainly ill-advised. Too often the pupil comes out with a smattering + which is too superficial to be scientific and too technical to be + applicable to ordinary affairs. + </p> + <p> + The utilization of ordinary experience to secure an advance into + scientific material and method, while keeping the latter connected with + familiar human interests, is easier to-day than it ever was before. The + usual experience of all persons in civilized communities to-day is + intimately associated with industrial processes and results. These in turn + are so many cases of science in action. The stationary and traction steam + engine, gasoline engine, automobile, telegraph and telephone, the electric + motor enter directly into the lives of most individuals. Pupils at an + early age are practically acquainted with these things. Not only does the + business occupation of their parents depend upon scientific applications, + but household pursuits, the maintenance of health, the sights seen upon + the streets, embody scientific achievements and stimulate interest in the + connected scientific principles. The obvious pedagogical starting point of + scientific instruction is not to teach things labeled science, but to + utilize the familiar occupations and appliances to direct observation and + experiment, until pupils have arrived at a knowledge of some fundamental + principles by understanding them in their familiar practical workings. + </p> + <p> + The opinion sometimes advanced that it is a derogation from the "purity" + of science to study it in its active incarnation, instead of in + theoretical abstraction, rests upon a misunderstanding. AS matter of fact, + any subject is cultural in the degree in which it is apprehended in its + widest possible range of meanings. Perception of meanings depends upon + perception of connections, of context. To see a scientific fact or law in + its human as well as in its physical and technical context is to enlarge + its significance and give it increased cultural value. Its direct economic + application, if by economic is meant something having money worth, is + incidental and secondary, but a part of its actual connections. The + important thing is that the fact be grasped in its social connections—its + function in life. + </p> + <p> + On the other hand, "humanism" means at bottom being imbued with an + intelligent sense of human interests. The social interest, identical in + its deepest meaning with a moral interest, is necessarily supreme with + man. Knowledge about man, information as to his past, familiarity with his + documented records of literature, may be as technical a possession as the + accumulation of physical details. Men may keep busy in a variety of ways, + making money, acquiring facility in laboratory manipulation, or in + amassing a store of facts about linguistic matters, or the chronology of + literary productions. Unless such activity reacts to enlarge the + imaginative vision of life, it is on a level with the busy work of + children. It has the letter without the spirit of activity. It readily + degenerates itself into a miser's accumulation, and a man prides himself + on what he has, and not on the meaning he finds in the affairs of life. + Any study so pursued that it increases concern for the values of life, any + study producing greater sensitiveness to social well-being and greater + ability to promote that well-being is humane study. The humanistic spirit + of the Greeks was native and intense but it was narrow in scope. Everybody + outside the Hellenic circle was a barbarian, and negligible save as a + possible enemy. Acute as were the social observations and speculations of + Greek thinkers, there is not a word in their writings to indicate that + Greek civilization was not self-inclosed and self-sufficient. There was, + apparently, no suspicion that its future was at the mercy of the despised + outsider. Within the Greek community, the intense social spirit was + limited by the fact that higher culture was based on a substratum of + slavery and economic serfdom—classes necessary to the existence of + the state, as Aristotle declared, and yet not genuine parts of it. The + development of science has produced an industrial revolution which has + brought different peoples in such close contact with one another through + colonization and commerce that no matter how some nations may still look + down upon others, no country can harbor the illusion that its career is + decided wholly within itself. The same revolution has abolished + agricultural serfdom, and created a class of more or less organized + factory laborers with recognized political rights, and who make claims for + a responsible role in the control of industry—claims which receive + sympathetic attention from many among the well-to-do, since they have been + brought into closer connections with the less fortunate classes through + the breaking down of class barriers. + </p> + <p> + This state of affairs may be formulated by saying that the older humanism + omitted economic and industrial conditions from its purview. Consequently, + it was one sided. Culture, under such circumstances, inevitably + represented the intellectual and moral outlook of the class which was in + direct social control. Such a tradition as to culture is, as we have seen + (ante, p. 260), aristocratic; it emphasizes what marks off one class from + another, rather than fundamental common interests. Its standards are in + the past; for the aim is to preserve what has been gained rather than + widely to extend the range of culture. + </p> + <p> + The modifications which spring from taking greater account of industry and + of whatever has to do with making a living are frequently condemned as + attacks upon the culture derived from the past. But a wider educational + outlook would conceive industrial activities as agencies for making + intellectual resources more accessible to the masses, and giving greater + solidity to the culture of those having superior resources. In short, when + we consider the close connection between science and industrial + development on the one hand, and between literary and aesthetic + cultivation and an aristocratic social organization on the other, we get + light on the opposition between technical scientific studies and refining + literary studies. We have before us the need of overcoming this separation + in education if society is to be truly democratic. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM21"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. The philosophic dualism between man and nature is reflected in + </h2> + <p> + the division of studies between the naturalistic and the humanistic with a + tendency to reduce the latter to the literary records of the past. This + dualism is not characteristic (as were the others which we have noted) of + Greek thought. It arose partly because of the fact that the culture of + Rome and of barbarian Europe was not a native product, being borrowed + directly or indirectly from Greece, and partly because political and + ecclesiastic conditions emphasized dependence upon the authority of past + knowledge as that was transmitted in literary documents. + </p> + <p> + At the outset, the rise of modern science prophesied a restoration of the + intimate connection of nature and humanity, for it viewed knowledge of + nature as the means of securing human progress and well-being. But the + more immediate applications of science were in the interests of a class + rather than of men in common; and the received philosophic formulations of + scientific doctrine tended either to mark it off as merely material from + man as spiritual and immaterial, or else to reduce mind to a subjective + illusion. In education, accordingly, the tendency was to treat the + sciences as a separate body of studies, consisting of technical + information regarding the physical world, and to reserve the older + literary studies as distinctively humanistic. The account previously given + of the evolution of knowledge, and of the educational scheme of studies + based upon it, are designed to overcome the separation, and to secure + recognition of the place occupied by the subject matter of the natural + sciences in human affairs. + </p> + <p> + 1 The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church. pp. + 43-44. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0022"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Twenty-two: The Individual and the World + </h2> + <p> + 1. Mind as Purely Individual. We have been concerned with the influences + which have effected a division between work and leisure, knowing and + doing, man and nature. These influences have resulted in splitting up the + subject matter of education into separate studies. They have also found + formulation in various philosophies which have opposed to each other body + and mind, theoretical knowledge and practice, physical mechanism and ideal + purpose. Upon the philosophical side, these various dualisms culminate in + a sharp demarcation of individual minds from the world, and hence from one + another. While the connection of this philosophical position with + educational procedure is not so obvious as is that of the points + considered in the last three chapters, there are certain educational + considerations which correspond to it; such as the antithesis supposed to + exist between subject matter (the counterpart of the world) and method + (the counterpart of mind); such as the tendency to treat interest as + something purely private, without intrinsic connection with the material + studied. Aside from incidental educational bearings, it will be shown in + this chapter that the dualistic philosophy of mind and the world implies + an erroneous conception of the relationship between knowledge and social + interests, and between individuality or freedom, and social control and + authority. The identification of the mind with the individual self and of + the latter with a private psychic consciousness is comparatively modern. + In both the Greek and medieval periods, the rule was to regard the + individual as a channel through which a universal and divine intelligence + operated. The individual was in no true sense the knower; the knower was + the "Reason" which operated through him. The individual interfered at his + peril, and only to the detriment of the truth. In the degree in which the + individual rather than reason "knew," conceit, error, and opinion were + substituted for true knowledge. In Greek life, observation was acute and + alert; and thinking was free almost to the point of irresponsible + speculations. Accordingly the consequences of the theory were only such as + were consequent upon the lack of an experimental method. Without such a + method individuals could not engage in knowing, and be checked up by the + results of the inquiries of others. Without such liability to test by + others, the minds of men could not be intellectually responsible; results + were to be accepted because of their aesthetic consistency, agreeable + quality, or the prestige of their authors. In the barbarian period, + individuals were in a still more humble attitude to truth; important + knowledge was supposed to be divinely revealed, and nothing remained for + the minds of individuals except to work it over after it had been received + on authority. Aside from the more consciously philosophic aspects of these + movements, it never occurs to any one to identify mind and the personal + self wherever beliefs are transmitted by custom. + </p> + <p> + In the medieval period there was a religious individualism. The deepest + concern of life was the salvation of the individual soul. In the later + Middle Ages, this latent individualism found conscious formulation in the + nominalistic philosophies, which treated the structure of knowledge as + something built up within the individual through his own acts, and mental + states. With the rise of economic and political individualism after the + sixteenth century, and with the development of Protestantism, the times + were ripe for an emphasis upon the rights and duties of the individual in + achieving knowledge for himself. This led to the view that knowledge is + won wholly through personal and private experiences. As a consequence, + mind, the source and possessor of knowledge, was thought of as wholly + individual. Thus upon the educational side, we find educational reformers, + like Montaigne, Bacon, Locke, henceforth vehemently denouncing all + learning which is acquired on hearsay, and asserting that even if beliefs + happen to be true, they do not constitute knowledge unless they have grown + up in and been tested by personal experience. The reaction against + authority in all spheres of life, and the intensity of the struggle, + against great odds, for freedom of action and inquiry, led to such an + emphasis upon personal observations and ideas as in effect to isolate + mind, and set it apart from the world to be known. + </p> + <p> + This isolation is reflected in the great development of that branch of + philosophy known as epistemology—the theory of knowledge. The + identification of mind with the self, and the setting up of the self as + something independent and self-sufficient, created such a gulf between the + knowing mind and the world that it became a question how knowledge was + possible at all. Given a subject—the knower—and an object—the + thing to be known—wholly separate from one another, it is necessary + to frame a theory to explain how they get into connection with each other + so that valid knowledge may result. This problem, with the allied one of + the possibility of the world acting upon the mind and the mind acting upon + the world, became almost the exclusive preoccupation of philosophic + thought. + </p> + <p> + The theories that we cannot know the world as it really is but only the + impressions made upon the mind, or that there is no world beyond the + individual mind, or that knowledge is only a certain association of the + mind's own states, were products of this preoccupation. We are not + directly concerned with their truth; but the fact that such desperate + solutions were widely accepted is evidence of the extent to which mind had + been set over the world of realities. The increasing use of the term + "consciousness" as an equivalent for mind, in the supposition that there + is an inner world of conscious states and processes, independent of any + relationship to nature and society, an inner world more truly and + immediately known than anything else, is evidence of the same fact. In + short, practical individualism, or struggle for greater freedom of thought + in action, was translated into philosophic subjectivism. + </p> + <p> + 2. Individual Mind as the Agent of Reorganization. It should be obvious + that this philosophic movement misconceived the significance of the + practical movement. Instead of being its transcript, it was a perversion. + Men were not actually engaged in the absurdity of striving to be free from + connection with nature and one another. They were striving for greater + freedom in nature and society. They wanted greater power to initiate + changes in the world of things and fellow beings; greater scope of + movement and consequently greater freedom in observations and ideas + implied in movement. They wanted not isolation from the world, but a more + intimate connection with it. They wanted to form their beliefs about it at + first hand, instead of through tradition. They wanted closer union with + their fellows so that they might influence one another more effectively + and might combine their respective actions for mutual aims. + </p> + <p> + So far as their beliefs were concerned, they felt that a great deal which + passed for knowledge was merely the accumulated opinions of the past, much + of it absurd and its correct portions not understood when accepted on + authority. Men must observe for themselves, and form their own theories + and personally test them. Such a method was the only alternative to the + imposition of dogma as truth, a procedure which reduced mind to the formal + act of acquiescing in truth. Such is the meaning of what is sometimes + called the substitution of inductive experimental methods of knowing for + deductive. In some sense, men had always used an inductive method in + dealing with their immediate practical concerns. Architecture, + agriculture, manufacture, etc., had to be based upon observation of the + activities of natural objects, and ideas about such affairs had to be + checked, to some extent, by results. But even in such things there was an + undue reliance upon mere custom, followed blindly rather than + understandingly. And this observational-experimental method was restricted + to these "practical" matters, and a sharp distinction maintained between + practice and theoretical knowledge or truth. (See Ch. XX.) The rise of + free cities, the development of travel, exploration, and commerce, the + evolution of new methods of producing commodities and doing business, + threw men definitely upon their own resources. The reformers of science + like Galileo, Descartes, and their successors, carried analogous methods + into ascertaining the facts about nature. An interest in discovery took + the place of an interest in systematizing and "proving" received beliefs. + </p> + <p> + A just philosophic interpretation of these movements would, indeed, have + emphasized the rights and responsibilities of the individual in gaining + knowledge and personally testing beliefs, no matter by what authorities + they were vouched for. But it would not have isolated the individual from + the world, and consequently isolated individuals—in theory—from + one another. It would have perceived that such disconnection, such rupture + of continuity, denied in advance the possibility of success in their + endeavors. As matter of fact every individual has grown up, and always + must grow up, in a social medium. His responses grow intelligent, or gain + meaning, simply because he lives and acts in a medium of accepted meanings + and values. (See ante, p. 30.) Through social intercourse, through sharing + in the activities embodying beliefs, he gradually acquires a mind of his + own. The conception of mind as a purely isolated possession of the self is + at the very antipodes of the truth. The self achieves mind in the degree + in which knowledge of things is incarnate in the life about him; the self + is not a separate mind building up knowledge anew on its own account. + </p> + <p> + Yet there is a valid distinction between knowledge which is objective and + impersonal, and thinking which is subjective and personal. In one sense, + knowledge is that which we take for granted. It is that which is settled, + disposed of, established, under control. What we fully know, we do not + need to think about. In common phrase, it is certain, assured. And this + does not mean a mere feeling of certainty. It denotes not a sentiment, but + a practical attitude, a readiness to act without reserve or quibble. Of + course we may be mistaken. What is taken for knowledge—for fact and + truth—at a given time may not be such. But everything which is + assumed without question, which is taken for granted in our intercourse + with one another and nature is what, at the given time, is called + knowledge. Thinking on the contrary, starts, as we have seen, from doubt + or uncertainty. It marks an inquiring, hunting, searching attitude, + instead of one of mastery and possession. Through its critical process + true knowledge is revised and extended, and our convictions as to the + state of things reorganized. Clearly the last few centuries have been + typically a period of revision and reorganization of beliefs. Men did not + really throw away all transmitted beliefs concerning the realities of + existence, and start afresh upon the basis of their private, exclusive + sensations and ideas. They could not have done so if they had wished to, + and if it had been possible general imbecility would have been the only + outcome. Men set out from what had passed as knowledge, and critically + investigated the grounds upon which it rested; they noted exceptions; they + used new mechanical appliances to bring to light data inconsistent with + what had been believed; they used their imaginations to conceive a world + different from that in which their forefathers had put their trust. The + work was a piecemeal, a retail, business. One problem was tackled at a + time. The net results of all the revisions amounted, however, to a + revolution of prior conceptions of the world. What occurred was a + reorganization of prior intellectual habitudes, infinitely more efficient + than a cutting loose from all connections would have been. + </p> + <p> + This state of affairs suggests a definition of the role of the individual, + or the self, in knowledge; namely, the redirection, or reconstruction of + accepted beliefs. Every new idea, every conception of things differing + from that authorized by current belief, must have its origin in an + individual. New ideas are doubtless always sprouting, but a society + governed by custom does not encourage their development. On the contrary, + it tends to suppress them, just because they are deviations from what is + current. The man who looks at things differently from others is in such a + community a suspect character; for him to persist is generally fatal. Even + when social censorship of beliefs is not so strict, social conditions may + fail to provide the appliances which are requisite if new ideas are to be + adequately elaborated; or they may fail to provide any material support + and reward to those who entertain them. Hence they remain mere fancies, + romantic castles in the air, or aimless speculations. The freedom of + observation and imagination involved in the modern scientific revolution + were not easily secured; they had to be fought for; many suffered for + their intellectual independence. But, upon the whole, modern European + society first permitted, and then, in some fields at least, deliberately + encouraged the individual reactions which deviate from what custom + prescribes. Discovery, research, inquiry in new lines, inventions, finally + came to be either the social fashion, or in some degree tolerable. + However, as we have already noted, philosophic theories of knowledge were + not content to conceive mind in the individual as the pivot upon which + reconstruction of beliefs turned, thus maintaining the continuity of the + individual with the world of nature and fellow men. They regarded the + individual mind as a separate entity, complete in each person, and + isolated from nature and hence from other minds. Thus a legitimate + intellectual individualism, the attitude of critical revision of former + beliefs which is indispensable to progress, was explicitly formulated as a + moral and social individualism. When the activities of mind set out from + customary beliefs and strive to effect transformations of them which will + in turn win general conviction, there is no opposition between the + individual and the social. The intellectual variations of the individual + in observation, imagination, judgment, and invention are simply the + agencies of social progress, just as conformity to habit is the agency of + social conservation. But when knowledge is regarded as originating and + developing within an individual, the ties which bind the mental life of + one to that of his fellows are ignored and denied. + </p> + <p> + When the social quality of individualized mental operations is denied, it + becomes a problem to find connections which will unite an individual with + his fellows. Moral individualism is set up by the conscious separation of + different centers of life. It has its roots in the notion that the + consciousness of each person is wholly private, a self-inclosed continent, + intrinsically independent of the ideas, wishes, purposes of everybody + else. But when men act, they act in a common and public world. This is the + problem to which the theory of isolated and independent conscious minds + gave rise: Given feelings, ideas, desires, which have nothing to do with + one another, how can actions proceeding from them be controlled in a + social or public interest? Given an egoistic consciousness, how can action + which has regard for others take place? + </p> + <p> + Moral philosophies which have started from such premises have developed + four typical ways of dealing with the question. (i) One method represents + the survival of the older authoritative position, with such concessions + and compromises as the progress of events has made absolutely inevitable. + The deviations and departures characterizing an individual are still + looked upon with suspicion; in principle they are evidences of the + disturbances, revolts, and corruptions inhering in an individual apart + from external authoritative guidance. In fact, as distinct from principle, + intellectual individualism is tolerated in certain technical regions—in + subjects like mathematics and physics and astronomy, and in the technical + inventions resulting therefrom. But the applicability of a similar method + to morals, social, legal, and political matters, is denied. In such + matters, dogma is still to be supreme; certain eternal truths made known + by revelation, intuition, or the wisdom of our forefathers set unpassable + limits to individual observation and speculation. The evils from which + society suffers are set down to the efforts of misguided individuals to + transgress these boundaries. Between the physical and the moral sciences, + lie intermediate sciences of life, where the territory is only grudgingly + yielded to freedom of inquiry under the pressure of accomplished fact. + Although past history has demonstrated that the possibilities of human + good are widened and made more secure by trusting to a responsibility + built up within the very process of inquiry, the "authority" theory sets + apart a sacred domain of truth which must be protected from the inroads of + variation of beliefs. Educationally, emphasis may not be put on eternal + truth, but it is put on the authority of book and teacher, and individual + variation is discouraged. + </p> + <p> + (ii) Another method is sometimes termed rationalism or abstract + intellectualism. A formal logical faculty is set up in distinction from + tradition and history and all concrete subject matter. This faculty of + reason is endowed with power to influence conduct directly. Since it deals + wholly with general and impersonal forms, when different persons act in + accord with logical findings, their activities will be externally + consistent. There is no doubt of the services rendered by this philosophy. + It was a powerful factor in the negative and dissolving criticism of + doctrines having nothing but tradition and class interest behind them; it + accustomed men to freedom of discussion and to the notion that beliefs had + to be submitted to criteria of reasonableness. It undermined the power of + prejudice, superstition, and brute force, by habituating men to reliance + upon argument, discussion, and persuasion. It made for clarity and order + of exposition. But its influence was greater in destruction of old + falsities than in the construction of new ties and associations among men. + Its formal and empty nature, due to conceiving reason as something + complete in itself apart from subject matter, its hostile attitude toward + historical institutions, its disregard of the influence of habit, + instinct, and emotion, as operative factors in life, left it impotent in + the suggestion of specific aims and methods. Bare logic, however important + in arranging and criticizing existing subject matter, cannot spin new + subject matter out of itself. In education, the correlative is trust in + general ready-made rules and principles to secure agreement, irrespective + of seeing to it that the pupil's ideas really agree with one another. + </p> + <p> + (iii) While this rationalistic philosophy was developing in France, + English thought appealed to the intelligent self-interest of individuals + in order to secure outer unity in the acts which issued from isolated + streams of consciousness. Legal arrangements, especially penal + administration, and governmental regulations, were to be such as to + prevent the acts which proceeded from regard for one's own private + sensations from interfering with the feelings of others. Education was to + instill in individuals a sense that non-interference with others and some + degree of positive regard for their welfare were necessary for security in + the pursuit of one's own happiness. Chief emphasis was put, however, upon + trade as a means of bringing the conduct of one into harmony with that of + others. In commerce, each aims at the satisfaction of his own wants, but + can gain his own profit only by furnishing some commodity or service to + another. Thus in aiming at the increase of his own private pleasurable + states of consciousness, he contributes to the consciousness of others. + Again there is no doubt that this view expressed and furthered a + heightened perception of the values of conscious life, and a recognition + that institutional arrangements are ultimately to be judged by the + contributions which they make to intensifying and enlarging the scope of + conscious experience. It also did much to rescue work, industry, and + mechanical devices from the contempt in which they had been held in + communities founded upon the control of a leisure class. In both ways, + this philosophy promoted a wider and more democratic social concern. But + it was tainted by the narrowness of its fundamental premise: the doctrine + that every individual acts only from regard for his own pleasures and + pains, and that so-called generous and sympathetic acts are only indirect + ways of procuring and assuring one's own comfort. In other words, it made + explicit the consequences inhering in any doctrine which makes mental life + a self-inclosed thing, instead of an attempt to redirect and readapt + common concerns. It made union among men a matter of calculation of + externals. It lent itself to the contemptuous assertions of Carlyle that + it was a doctrine of anarchy plus a constable, and recognized only a "cash + nexus" among men. The educational equivalents of this doctrine in the uses + made of pleasurable rewards and painful penalties are only too obvious. + (iv) Typical German philosophy followed another path. It started from what + was essentially the rationalistic philosophy of Descartes and his French + successors. But while French thought upon the whole developed the idea of + reason in opposition to the religious conception of a divine mind residing + in individuals, German thought (as in Hegel) made a synthesis of the two. + Reason is absolute. Nature is incarnate reason. History is reason in its + progressive unfolding in man. An individual becomes rational only as he + absorbs into himself the content of rationality in nature and in social + institutions. For an absolute reason is not, like the reason of + rationalism, purely formal and empty; as absolute it must include all + content within itself. Thus the real problem is not that of controlling + individual freedom so that some measure of social order and concord may + result, but of achieving individual freedom through developing individual + convictions in accord with the universal law found in the organization of + the state as objective Reason. While this philosophy is usually termed + absolute or objective idealism, it might better be termed, for educational + purposes at least, institutional idealism. (See ante, p. 59.) It idealized + historical institutions by conceiving them as incarnations of an immanent + absolute mind. There can be no doubt that this philosophy was a powerful + influence in rescuing philosophy in the beginning of the nineteenth + century from the isolated individualism into which it had fallen in France + and England. It served also to make the organization of the state more + constructively interested in matters of public concern. It left less to + chance, less to mere individual logical conviction, less to the workings + of private self-interest. It brought intelligence to bear upon the conduct + of affairs; it accentuated the need of nationally organized education in + the interests of the corporate state. It sanctioned and promoted freedom + of inquiry in all technical details of natural and historical phenomena. + But in all ultimate moral matters, it tended to reinstate the principle of + authority. It made for efficiency of organization more than did any of the + types of philosophy previously mentioned, but it made no provision for + free experimental modification of this organization. Political democracy, + with its belief in the right of individual desire and purpose to take part + in readapting even the fundamental constitution of society, was foreign to + it. + </p> + <p> + 3. Educational Equivalents. It is not necessary to consider in detail the + educational counterparts of the various defects found in these various + types of philosophy. It suffices to say that in general the school has + been the institution which exhibited with greatest clearness the assumed + antithesis between purely individualistic methods of learning and social + action, and between freedom and social control. The antithesis is + reflected in the absence of a social atmosphere and motive for learning, + and the consequent separation, in the conduct of the school, between + method of instruction and methods of government; and in the slight + opportunity afforded individual variations. When learning is a phase of + active undertakings which involve mutual exchange, social control enters + into the very process of learning. When the social factor is absent, + learning becomes a carrying over of some presented material into a purely + individual consciousness, and there is no inherent reason why it should + give a more socialized direction to mental and emotional disposition. + There is tendency on the part of both the upholders and the opponents of + freedom in school to identify it with absence of social direction, or, + sometimes, with merely physical unconstraint of movement. But the essence + of the demand for freedom is the need of conditions which will enable an + individual to make his own special contribution to a group interest, and + to partake of its activities in such ways that social guidance shall be a + matter of his own mental attitude, and not a mere authoritative dictation + of his acts. Because what is often called discipline and "government" has + to do with the external side of conduct alone, a similar meaning is + attached, by reaction, to freedom. But when it is perceived that each idea + signifies the quality of mind expressed in action, the supposed opposition + between them falls away. Freedom means essentially the part played by + thinking—which is personal—in learning:—it means + intellectual initiative, independence in observation, judicious invention, + foresight of consequences, and ingenuity of adaptation to them. + </p> + <p> + But because these are the mental phase of behavior, the needed play of + individuality—or freedom—cannot be separated from opportunity + for free play of physical movements. Enforced physical quietude may be + unfavorable to realization of a problem, to undertaking the observations + needed to define it, and to performance of the experiments which test the + ideas suggested. Much has been said about the importance of + "self-activity" in education, but the conception has too frequently been + restricted to something merely internal—something excluding the free + use of sensory and motor organs. Those who are at the stage of learning + from symbols, or who are engaged in elaborating the implications of a + problem or idea preliminary to more carefully thought-out activity, may + need little perceptible overt activity. But the whole cycle of + self-activity demands an opportunity for investigation and + experimentation, for trying out one's ideas upon things, discovering what + can be done with materials and appliances. And this is incompatible with + closely restricted physical activity. Individual activity has sometimes + been taken as meaning leaving a pupil to work by himself or alone. Relief + from need of attending to what any one else is doing is truly required to + secure calm and concentration. Children, like grown persons, require a + judicious amount of being let alone. But the time, place, and amount of + such separate work is a matter of detail, not of principle. There is no + inherent opposition between working with others and working as an + individual. On the contrary, certain capacities of an individual are not + brought out except under the stimulus of associating with others. That a + child must work alone and not engage in group activities in order to be + free and let his individuality develop, is a notion which measures + individuality by spatial distance and makes a physical thing of it. + </p> + <p> + Individuality as a factor to be respected in education has a double + meaning. In the first place, one is mentally an individual only as he has + his own purpose and problem, and does his own thinking. The phrase "think + for one's self" is a pleonasm. Unless one does it for one's self, it isn't + thinking. Only by a pupil's own observations, reflections, framing and + testing of suggestions can what he already knows be amplified and + rectified. Thinking is as much an individual matter as is the digestion of + food. In the second place, there are variations of point of view, of + appeal of objects, and of mode of attack, from person to person. When + these variations are suppressed in the alleged interests of uniformity, + and an attempt is made to have a single mold of method of study and + recitation, mental confusion and artificiality inevitably result. + Originality is gradually destroyed, confidence in one's own quality of + mental operation is undermined, and a docile subjection to the opinion of + others is inculcated, or else ideas run wild. The harm is greater now than + when the whole community was governed by customary beliefs, because the + contrast between methods of learning in school and those relied upon + outside the school is greater. That systematic advance in scientific + discovery began when individuals were allowed, and then encouraged, to + utilize their own peculiarities of response to subject matter, no one will + deny. If it is said in objection, that pupils in school are not capable of + any such originality, and hence must be confined to appropriating and + reproducing things already known by the better informed, the reply is + twofold. (i) We are concerned with originality of attitude which is + equivalent to the unforced response of one's own individuality, not with + originality as measured by product. No one expects the young to make + original discoveries of just the same facts and principles as are embodied + in the sciences of nature and man. But it is not unreasonable to expect + that learning may take place under such conditions that from the + standpoint of the learner there is genuine discovery. While immature + students will not make discoveries from the standpoint of advanced + students, they make them from their own standpoint, whenever there is + genuine learning. (ii) In the normal process of becoming acquainted with + subject matter already known to others, even young pupils react in + unexpected ways. There is something fresh, something not capable of being + fully anticipated by even the most experienced teacher, in the ways they + go at the topic, and in the particular ways in which things strike them. + Too often all this is brushed aside as irrelevant; pupils are deliberately + held to rehearsing material in the exact form in which the older person + conceives it. The result is that what is instinctively original in + individuality, that which marks off one from another, goes unused and + undirected. Teaching then ceases to be an educative process for the + teacher. At most he learns simply to improve his existing technique; he + does not get new points of view; he fails to experience any intellectual + companionship. Hence both teaching and learning tend to become + conventional and mechanical with all the nervous strain on both sides + therein implied. + </p> + <p> + As maturity increases and as the student has a greater background of + familiarity upon which a new topic is projected, the scope of more or less + random physical experimentation is reduced. Activity is defined or + specialized in certain channels. To the eyes of others, the student may be + in a position of complete physical quietude, because his energies are + confined to nerve channels and to the connected apparatus of the eyes and + vocal organs. But because this attitude is evidence of intense mental + concentration on the part of the trained person, it does not follow that + it should be set up as a model for students who still have to find their + intellectual way about. And even with the adult, it does not cover the + whole circuit of mental energy. It marks an intermediate period, capable + of being lengthened with increased mastery of a subject, but always coming + between an earlier period of more general and conspicuous organic action + and a later time of putting to use what has been apprehended. + </p> + <p> + When, however, education takes cognizance of the union of mind and body in + acquiring knowledge, we are not obliged to insist upon the need of + obvious, or external, freedom. It is enough to identify the freedom which + is involved in teaching and studying with the thinking by which what a + person already knows and believes is enlarged and refined. If attention is + centered upon the conditions which have to be met in order to secure a + situation favorable to effective thinking, freedom will take care of + itself. The individual who has a question which being really a question to + him instigates his curiosity, which feeds his eagerness for information + that will help him cope with it, and who has at command an equipment which + will permit these interests to take effect, is intellectually free. + Whatever initiative and imaginative vision he possesses will be called + into play and control his impulses and habits. His own purposes will + direct his actions. Otherwise, his seeming attention, his docility, his + memorizings and reproductions, will partake of intellectual servility. + Such a condition of intellectual subjection is needed for fitting the + masses into a society where the many are not expected to have aims or + ideas of their own, but to take orders from the few set in authority. It + is not adapted to a society which intends to be democratic. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM22"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. True individualism is a product of the relaxation of the grip + </h2> + <p> + of the authority of custom and traditions as standards of belief. Aside + from sporadic instances, like the height of Greek thought, it is a + comparatively modern manifestation. Not but that there have always been + individual diversities, but that a society dominated by conservative + custom represses them or at least does not utilize them and promote them. + For various reasons, however, the new individualism was interpreted + philosophically not as meaning development of agencies for revising and + transforming previously accepted beliefs, but as an assertion that each + individual's mind was complete in isolation from everything else. In the + theoretical phase of philosophy, this produced the epistemological + problem: the question as to the possibility of any cognitive relationship + of the individual to the world. In its practical phase, it generated the + problem of the possibility of a purely individual consciousness acting on + behalf of general or social interests,—the problem of social + direction. While the philosophies which have been elaborated to deal with + these questions have not affected education directly, the assumptions + underlying them have found expression in the separation frequently made + between study and government and between freedom of individuality and + control by others. Regarding freedom, the important thing to bear in mind + is that it designates a mental attitude rather than external unconstraint + of movements, but that this quality of mind cannot develop without a fair + leeway of movements in exploration, experimentation, application, etc. A + society based on custom will utilize individual variations only up to a + limit of conformity with usage; uniformity is the chief ideal within each + class. A progressive society counts individual variations as precious + since it finds in them the means of its own growth. Hence a democratic + society must, in consistency with its ideal, allow for intellectual + freedom and the play of diverse gifts and interests in its educational + measures. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0023"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Twenty-Three: Vocational Aspects of Education + </h2> + <p> + 1. The Meaning of Vocation. At the present time the conflict of + philosophic theories focuses in discussion of the proper place and + function of vocational factors in education. The bald statement that + significant differences in fundamental philosophical conceptions find + their chief issue in connection with this point may arouse incredulity: + there seems to be too great a gap between the remote and general terms in + which philosophic ideas are formulated and the practical and concrete + details of vocational education. But a mental review of the intellectual + presuppositions underlying the oppositions in education of labor and + leisure, theory and practice, body and mind, mental states and the world, + will show that they culminate in the antithesis of vocational and cultural + education. Traditionally, liberal culture has been linked to the notions + of leisure, purely contemplative knowledge and a spiritual activity not + involving the active use of bodily organs. Culture has also tended, + latterly, to be associated with a purely private refinement, a cultivation + of certain states and attitudes of consciousness, separate from either + social direction or service. It has been an escape from the former, and a + solace for the necessity of the latter. + </p> + <p> + So deeply entangled are these philosophic dualisms with the whole subject + of vocational education, that it is necessary to define the meaning of + vocation with some fullness in order to avoid the impression that an + education which centers about it is narrowly practical, if not merely + pecuniary. A vocation means nothing but such a direction of life + activities as renders them perceptibly significant to a person, because of + the consequences they accomplish, and also useful to his associates. The + opposite of a career is neither leisure nor culture, but aimlessness, + capriciousness, the absence of cumulative achievement in experience, on + the personal side, and idle display, parasitic dependence upon the others, + on the social side. Occupation is a concrete term for continuity. It + includes the development of artistic capacity of any kind, of special + scientific ability, of effective citizenship, as well as professional and + business occupations, to say nothing of mechanical labor or engagement in + gainful pursuits. + </p> + <p> + We must avoid not only limitation of conception of vocation to the + occupations where immediately tangible commodities are produced, but also + the notion that vocations are distributed in an exclusive way, one and + only one to each person. Such restricted specialism is impossible; nothing + could be more absurd than to try to educate individuals with an eye to + only one line of activity. In the first place, each individual has of + necessity a variety of callings, in each of which he should be + intelligently effective; and in the second place any one occupation loses + its meaning and becomes a routine keeping busy at something in the degree + in which it is isolated from other interests. (i) No one is just an artist + and nothing else, and in so far as one approximates that condition, he is + so much the less developed human being; he is a kind of monstrosity. He + must, at some period of his life, be a member of a family; he must have + friends and companions; he must either support himself or be supported by + others, and thus he has a business career. He is a member of some + organized political unit, and so on. We naturally name his vocation from + that one of the callings which distinguishes him, rather than from those + which he has in common with all others. But we should not allow ourselves + to be so subject to words as to ignore and virtually deny his other + callings when it comes to a consideration of the vocational phases of + education. + </p> + <p> + (ii) As a man's vocation as artist is but the emphatically specialized + phase of his diverse and variegated vocational activities, so his + efficiency in it, in the humane sense of efficiency, is determined by its + association with other callings. A person must have experience, he must + live, if his artistry is to be more than a technical accomplishment. He + cannot find the subject matter of his artistic activity within his art; + this must be an expression of what he suffers and enjoys in other + relationships—a thing which depends in turn upon the alertness and + sympathy of his interests. What is true of an artist is true of any other + special calling. There is doubtless—in general accord with the + principle of habit—a tendency for every distinctive vocation to + become too dominant, too exclusive and absorbing in its specialized + aspect. This means emphasis upon skill or technical method at the expense + of meaning. Hence it is not the business of education to foster this + tendency, but rather to safeguard against it, so that the scientific + inquirer shall not be merely the scientist, the teacher merely the + pedagogue, the clergyman merely one who wears the cloth, and so on. + </p> + <p> + 2. The Place of Vocational Aims in Education. Bearing in mind the varied + and connected content of the vocation, and the broad background upon which + a particular calling is projected, we shall now consider education for the + more distinctive activity of an individual. + </p> + <p> + 1. An occupation is the only thing which balances the distinctive capacity + of an individual with his social service. To find out what one is fitted + to do and to secure an opportunity to do it is the key to happiness. + Nothing is more tragic than failure to discover one's true business in + life, or to find that one has drifted or been forced by circumstance into + an uncongenial calling. A right occupation means simply that the aptitudes + of a person are in adequate play, working with the minimum of friction and + the maximum of satisfaction. With reference to other members of a + community, this adequacy of action signifies, of course, that they are + getting the best service the person can render. It is generally believed, + for example, that slave labor was ultimately wasteful even from the purely + economic point of view—that there was not sufficient stimulus to + direct the energies of slaves, and that there was consequent wastage. + Moreover, since slaves were confined to certain prescribed callings, much + talent must have remained unavailable to the community, and hence there + was a dead loss. Slavery only illustrates on an obvious scale what happens + in some degree whenever an individual does not find himself in his work. + And he cannot completely find himself when vocations are looked upon with + contempt, and a conventional ideal of a culture which is essentially the + same for all is maintained. Plato (ante, p. 88) laid down the fundamental + principle of a philosophy of education when he asserted that it was the + business of education to discover what each person is good for, and to + train him to mastery of that mode of excellence, because such development + would also secure the fulfillment of social needs in the most harmonious + way. His error was not in qualitative principle, but in his limited + conception of the scope of vocations socially needed; a limitation of + vision which reacted to obscure his perception of the infinite variety of + capacities found in different individuals. + </p> + <p> + 2. An occupation is a continuous activity having a purpose. Education + through occupations consequently combines within itself more of the + factors conducive to learning than any other method. It calls instincts + and habits into play; it is a foe to passive receptivity. It has an end in + view; results are to be accomplished. Hence it appeals to thought; it + demands that an idea of an end be steadily maintained, so that activity + cannot be either routine or capricious. Since the movement of activity + must be progressive, leading from one stage to another, observation and + ingenuity are required at each stage to overcome obstacles and to discover + and readapt means of execution. In short, an occupation, pursued under + conditions where the realization of the activity rather than merely the + external product is the aim, fulfills the requirements which were laid + down earlier in connection with the discussion of aims, interest, and + thinking. (See Chapters VIII, X, XII.) + </p> + <p> + A calling is also of necessity an organizing principle for information and + ideas; for knowledge and intellectual growth. It provides an axis which + runs through an immense diversity of detail; it causes different + experiences, facts, items of information to fall into order with one + another. The lawyer, the physician, the laboratory investigator in some + branch of chemistry, the parent, the citizen interested in his own + locality, has a constant working stimulus to note and relate whatever has + to do with his concern. He unconsciously, from the motivation of his + occupation, reaches out for all relevant information, and holds to it. The + vocation acts as both magnet to attract and as glue to hold. Such + organization of knowledge is vital, because it has reference to needs; it + is so expressed and readjusted in action that it never becomes stagnant. + No classification, no selection and arrangement of facts, which is + consciously worked out for purely abstract ends, can ever compare in + solidity or effectiveness with that knit under the stress of an + occupation; in comparison the former sort is formal, superficial, and + cold. + </p> + <p> + 3. The only adequate training for occupations is training through + occupations. The principle stated early in this book (see Chapter VI) that + the educative process is its own end, and that the only sufficient + preparation for later responsibilities comes by making the most of + immediately present life, applies in full force to the vocational phases + of education. The dominant vocation of all human beings at all times is + living—intellectual and moral growth. In childhood and youth, with + their relative freedom from economic stress, this fact is naked and + unconcealed. To predetermine some future occupation for which education is + to be a strict preparation is to injure the possibilities of present + development and thereby to reduce the adequacy of preparation for a future + right employment. To repeat the principle we have had occasion to appeal + to so often, such training may develop a machine-like skill in routine + lines (it is far from being sure to do so, since it may develop distaste, + aversion, and carelessness), but it will be at the expense of those + qualities of alert observation and coherent and ingenious planning which + make an occupation intellectually rewarding. In an autocratically managed + society, it is often a conscious object to prevent the development of + freedom and responsibility, a few do the planning and ordering, the others + follow directions and are deliberately confined to narrow and prescribed + channels of endeavor. However much such a scheme may inure to the prestige + and profit of a class, it is evident that it limits the development of the + subject class; hardens and confines the opportunities for learning through + experience of the master class, and in both ways hampers the life of the + society as a whole. (See ante, p. 260.) + </p> + <p> + The only alternative is that all the earlier preparation for vocations be + indirect rather than direct; namely, through engaging in those active + occupations which are indicated by the needs and interests of the pupil at + the time. Only in this way can there be on the part of the educator and of + the one educated a genuine discovery of personal aptitudes so that the + proper choice of a specialized pursuit in later life may be indicated. + Moreover, the discovery of capacity and aptitude will be a constant + process as long as growth continues. It is a conventional and arbitrary + view which assumes that discovery of the work to be chosen for adult life + is made once for all at some particular date. One has discovered in + himself, say, an interest, intellectual and social, in the things which + have to do with engineering and has decided to make that his calling. At + most, this only blocks out in outline the field in which further growth is + to be directed. It is a sort of rough sketch for use in direction of + further activities. It is the discovery of a profession in the sense in + which Columbus discovered America when he touched its shores. Future + explorations of an indefinitely more detailed and extensive sort remain to + be made. When educators conceive vocational guidance as something which + leads up to a definitive, irretrievable, and complete choice, both + education and the chosen vocation are likely to be rigid, hampering + further growth. In so far, the calling chosen will be such as to leave the + person concerned in a permanently subordinate position, executing the + intelligence of others who have a calling which permits more flexible play + and readjustment. And while ordinary usages of language may not justify + terming a flexible attitude of readjustment a choice of a new and further + calling, it is such in effect. If even adults have to be on the lookout to + see that their calling does not shut down on them and fossilize them, + educators must certainly be careful that the vocational preparation of + youth is such as to engage them in a continuous reorganization of aims and + methods. + </p> + <p> + 3. Present Opportunities and Dangers. In the past, education has been much + more vocational in fact than in name. (i) The education of the masses was + distinctly utilitarian. It was called apprenticeship rather than + education, or else just learning from experience. The schools devoted + themselves to the three R's in the degree in which ability to go through + the forms of reading, writing, and figuring were common elements in all + kinds of labor. Taking part in some special line of work, under the + direction of others, was the out-of-school phase of this education. The + two supplemented each other; the school work in its narrow and formal + character was as much a part of apprenticeship to a calling as that + explicitly so termed. + </p> + <p> + (ii) To a considerable extent, the education of the dominant classes was + essentially vocational—it only happened that their pursuits of + ruling and of enjoying were not called professions. For only those things + were named vocations or employments which involved manual labor, laboring + for a reward in keep, or its commuted money equivalent, or the rendering + of personal services to specific persons. For a long time, for example, + the profession of the surgeon and physician ranked almost with that of the + valet or barber—partly because it had so much to do with the body, + and partly because it involved rendering direct service for pay to some + definite person. But if we go behind words, the business of directing + social concerns, whether politically or economically, whether in war or + peace, is as much a calling as anything else; and where education has not + been completely under the thumb of tradition, higher schools in the past + have been upon the whole calculated to give preparation for this business. + Moreover, display, the adornment of person, the kind of social + companionship and entertainment which give prestige, and the spending of + money, have been made into definite callings. Unconsciously to themselves + the higher institutions of learning have been made to contribute to + preparation for these employments. Even at present, what is called higher + education is for a certain class (much smaller than it once was) mainly + preparation for engaging effectively in these pursuits. + </p> + <p> + In other respects, it is largely, especially in the most advanced work, + training for the calling of teaching and special research. By a peculiar + superstition, education which has to do chiefly with preparation for the + pursuit of conspicuous idleness, for teaching, and for literary callings, + and for leadership, has been regarded as non-vocational and even as + peculiarly cultural. The literary training which indirectly fits for + authorship, whether of books, newspaper editorials, or magazine articles, + is especially subject to this superstition: many a teacher and author + writes and argues in behalf of a cultural and humane education against the + encroachments of a specialized practical education, without recognizing + that his own education, which he calls liberal, has been mainly training + for his own particular calling. He has simply got into the habit of + regarding his own business as essentially cultural and of overlooking the + cultural possibilities of other employments. At the bottom of these + distinctions is undoubtedly the tradition which recognizes as employment + only those pursuits where one is responsible for his work to a specific + employer, rather than to the ultimate employer, the community. + </p> + <p> + There are, however, obvious causes for the present conscious emphasis upon + vocational education—for the disposition to make explicit and + deliberate vocational implications previously tacit. (i) In the first + place, there is an increased esteem, in democratic communities, of + whatever has to do with manual labor, commercial occupations, and the + rendering of tangible services to society. In theory, men and women are + now expected to do something in return for their support—intellectual + and economic—by society. Labor is extolled; service is a much-lauded + moral ideal. While there is still much admiration and envy of those who + can pursue lives of idle conspicuous display, better moral sentiment + condemns such lives. Social responsibility for the use of time and + personal capacity is more generally recognized than it used to be. + </p> + <p> + (ii) In the second place, those vocations which are specifically + industrial have gained tremendously in importance in the last century and + a half. Manufacturing and commerce are no longer domestic and local, and + consequently more or less incidental, but are world-wide. They engage the + best energies of an increasingly large number of persons. The + manufacturer, banker, and captain of industry have practically displaced a + hereditary landed gentry as the immediate directors of social affairs. The + problem of social readjustment is openly industrial, having to do with the + relations of capital and labor. The great increase in the social + importance of conspicuous industrial processes has inevitably brought to + the front questions having to do with the relationship of schooling to + industrial life. No such vast social readjustment could occur without + offering a challenge to an education inherited from different social + conditions, and without putting up to education new problems. + </p> + <p> + (iii) In the third place, there is the fact already repeatedly mentioned: + Industry has ceased to be essentially an empirical, rule-of-thumb + procedure, handed down by custom. Its technique is now technological: that + is to say, based upon machinery resulting from discoveries in mathematics, + physics, chemistry, bacteriology, etc. The economic revolution has + stimulated science by setting problems for solution, by producing greater + intellectual respect for mechanical appliances. And industry received back + payment from science with compound interest. As a consequence, industrial + occupations have infinitely greater intellectual content and infinitely + larger cultural possibilities than they used to possess. The demand for + such education as will acquaint workers with the scientific and social + bases and bearings of their pursuits becomes imperative, since those who + are without it inevitably sink to the role of appendages to the machines + they operate. Under the old regime all workers in a craft were + approximately equals in their knowledge and outlook. Personal knowledge + and ingenuity were developed within at least a narrow range, because work + was done with tools under the direct command of the worker. Now the + operator has to adjust himself to his machine, instead of his tool to his + own purposes. While the intellectual possibilities of industry have + multiplied, industrial conditions tend to make industry, for great masses, + less of an educative resource than it was in the days of hand production + for local markets. The burden of realizing the intellectual possibilities + inhering in work is thus thrown back on the school. + </p> + <p> + (iv) In the fourth place, the pursuit of knowledge has become, in science, + more experimental, less dependent upon literary tradition, and less + associated with dialectical methods of reasoning, and with symbols. As a + result, the subject matter of industrial occupation presents not only more + of the content of science than it used to, but greater opportunity for + familiarity with the method by which knowledge is made. The ordinary + worker in the factory is of course under too immediate economic pressure + to have a chance to produce a knowledge like that of the worker in the + laboratory. But in schools, association with machines and industrial + processes may be had under conditions where the chief conscious concern of + the students is insight. The separation of shop and laboratory, where + these conditions are fulfilled, is largely conventional, the laboratory + having the advantage of permitting the following up of any intellectual + interest a problem may suggest; the shop the advantage of emphasizing the + social bearings of the scientific principle, as well as, with many pupils, + of stimulating a livelier interest. + </p> + <p> + (v) Finally, the advances which have been made in the psychology of + learning in general and of childhood in particular fall into line with the + increased importance of industry in life. For modern psychology emphasizes + the radical importance of primitive unlearned instincts of exploring, + experimentation, and "trying on." It reveals that learning is not the work + of something ready-made called mind, but that mind itself is an + organization of original capacities into activities having significance. + As we have already seen (ante, p. 204), in older pupils work is to + educative development of raw native activities what play is for younger + pupils. Moreover, the passage from play to work should be gradual, not + involving a radical change of attitude but carrying into work the elements + of play, plus continuous reorganization in behalf of greater control. The + reader will remark that these five points practically resume the main + contentions of the previous part of the work. Both practically and + philosophically, the key to the present educational situation lies in a + gradual reconstruction of school materials and methods so as to utilize + various forms of occupation typifying social callings, and to bring out + their intellectual and moral content. This reconstruction must relegate + purely literary methods—including textbooks—and dialectical + methods to the position of necessary auxiliary tools in the intelligent + development of consecutive and cumulative activities. + </p> + <p> + But our discussion has emphasized the fact that this educational + reorganization cannot be accomplished by merely trying to give a technical + preparation for industries and professions as they now operate, much less + by merely reproducing existing industrial conditions in the school. The + problem is not that of making the schools an adjunct to manufacture and + commerce, but of utilizing the factors of industry to make school life + more active, more full of immediate meaning, more connected with + out-of-school experience. The problem is not easy of solution. There is a + standing danger that education will perpetuate the older traditions for a + select few, and effect its adjustment to the newer economic conditions + more or less on the basis of acquiescence in the untransformed, + unrationalized, and unsocialized phases of our defective industrial + regime. Put in concrete terms, there is danger that vocational education + will be interpreted in theory and practice as trade education: as a means + of securing technical efficiency in specialized future pursuits. Education + would then become an instrument of perpetuating unchanged the existing + industrial order of society, instead of operating as a means of its + transformation. The desired transformation is not difficult to define in a + formal way. It signifies a society in which every person shall be occupied + in something which makes the lives of others better worth living, and + which accordingly makes the ties which bind persons together more + perceptible—which breaks down the barriers of distance between them. + It denotes a state of affairs in which the interest of each in his work is + uncoerced and intelligent: based upon its congeniality to his own + aptitudes. It goes without saying that we are far from such a social + state; in a literal and quantitative sense, we may never arrive at it. But + in principle, the quality of social changes already accomplished lies in + this direction. There are more ample resources for its achievement now + than ever there have been before. No insuperable obstacles, given the + intelligent will for its realization, stand in the way. + </p> + <p> + Success or failure in its realization depends more upon the adoption of + educational methods calculated to effect the change than upon anything + else. For the change is essentially a change in the quality of mental + disposition—an educative change. This does not mean that we can + change character and mind by direct instruction and exhortation, apart + from a change in industrial and political conditions. Such a conception + contradicts our basic idea that character and mind are attitudes of + participative response in social affairs. But it does mean that we may + produce in schools a projection in type of the society we should like to + realize, and by forming minds in accord with it gradually modify the + larger and more recalcitrant features of adult society. Sentimentally, it + may seem harsh to say that the greatest evil of the present regime is not + found in poverty and in the suffering which it entails, but in the fact + that so many persons have callings which make no appeal to them, which are + pursued simply for the money reward that accrues. For such callings + constantly provoke one to aversion, ill will, and a desire to slight and + evade. Neither men's hearts nor their minds are in their work. On the + other hand, those who are not only much better off in worldly goods, but + who are in excessive, if not monopolistic, control of the activities of + the many are shut off from equality and generality of social intercourse. + They are stimulated to pursuits of indulgence and display; they try to + make up for the distance which separates them from others by the + impression of force and superior possession and enjoyment which they can + make upon others. + </p> + <p> + It would be quite possible for a narrowly conceived scheme of vocational + education to perpetuate this division in a hardened form. Taking its stand + upon a dogma of social predestination, it would assume that some are to + continue to be wage earners under economic conditions like the present, + and would aim simply to give them what is termed a trade education—that + is, greater technical efficiency. Technical proficiency is often sadly + lacking, and is surely desirable on all accounts—not merely for the + sake of the production of better goods at less cost, but for the greater + happiness found in work. For no one cares for what one cannot half do. But + there is a great difference between a proficiency limited to immediate + work, and a competency extended to insight into its social bearings; + between efficiency in carrying out the plans of others and in one forming + one's own. At present, intellectual and emotional limitation characterizes + both the employing and the employed class. While the latter often have no + concern with their occupation beyond the money return it brings, the + former's outlook may be confined to profit and power. The latter interest + generally involves much greater intellectual initiation and larger survey + of conditions. For it involves the direction and combination of a large + number of diverse factors, while the interest in wages is restricted to + certain direct muscular movements. But none the less there is a limitation + of intelligence to technical and non-humane, non-liberal channels, so far + as the work does not take in its social bearings. And when the animating + motive is desire for private profit or personal power, this limitation is + inevitable. In fact, the advantage in immediate social sympathy and humane + disposition often lies with the economically unfortunate, who have not + experienced the hardening effects of a one-sided control of the affairs of + others. + </p> + <p> + Any scheme for vocational education which takes its point of departure + from the industrial regime that now exists, is likely to assume and to + perpetuate its divisions and weaknesses, and thus to become an instrument + in accomplishing the feudal dogma of social predestination. Those who are + in a position to make their wishes good, will demand a liberal, a cultural + occupation, and one which fits for directive power the youth in whom they + are directly interested. To split the system, and give to others, less + fortunately situated, an education conceived mainly as specific trade + preparation, is to treat the schools as an agency for transferring the + older division of labor and leisure, culture and service, mind and body, + directed and directive class, into a society nominally democratic. Such a + vocational education inevitably discounts the scientific and historic + human connections of the materials and processes dealt with. To include + such things in narrow trade education would be to waste time; concern for + them would not be "practical." They are reserved for those who have + leisure at command—the leisure due to superior economic resources. + Such things might even be dangerous to the interests of the controlling + class, arousing discontent or ambitions "beyond the station" of those + working under the direction of others. But an education which acknowledges + the full intellectual and social meaning of a vocation would include + instruction in the historic background of present conditions; training in + science to give intelligence and initiative in dealing with material and + agencies of production; and study of economics, civics, and politics, to + bring the future worker into touch with the problems of the day and the + various methods proposed for its improvement. Above all, it would train + power of readaptation to changing conditions so that future workers would + not become blindly subject to a fate imposed upon them. This ideal has to + contend not only with the inertia of existing educational traditions, but + also with the opposition of those who are entrenched in command of the + industrial machinery, and who realize that such an educational system if + made general would threaten their ability to use others for their own + ends. But this very fact is the presage of a more equitable and + enlightened social order, for it gives evidence of the dependence of + social reorganization upon educational reconstruction. It is accordingly + an encouragement to those believing in a better order to undertake the + promotion of a vocational education which does not subject youth to the + demands and standards of the present system, but which utilizes its + scientific and social factors to develop a courageous intelligence, and to + make intelligence practical and executive. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM23"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. A vocation signifies any form of continuous activity which + </h2> + <p> + renders service to others and engages personal powers in behalf of the + accomplishment of results. The question of the relation of vocation to + education brings to a focus the various problems previously discussed + regarding the connection of thought with bodily activity; of individual + conscious development with associated life; of theoretical culture with + practical behavior having definite results; of making a livelihood with + the worthy enjoyment of leisure. In general, the opposition to recognition + of the vocational phases of life in education (except for the utilitarian + three R's in elementary schooling) accompanies the conservation of + aristocratic ideals of the past. But, at the present juncture, there is a + movement in behalf of something called vocational training which, if + carried into effect, would harden these ideas into a form adapted to the + existing industrial regime. This movement would continue the traditional + liberal or cultural education for the few economically able to enjoy it, + and would give to the masses a narrow technical trade education for + specialized callings, carried on under the control of others. This scheme + denotes, of course, simply a perpetuation of the older social division, + with its counterpart intellectual and moral dualisms. But it means its + continuation under conditions where it has much less justification for + existence. For industrial life is now so dependent upon science and so + intimately affects all forms of social intercourse, that there is an + opportunity to utilize it for development of mind and character. Moreover, + a right educational use of it would react upon intelligence and interest + so as to modify, in connection with legislation and administration, the + socially obnoxious features of the present industrial and commercial + order. It would turn the increasing fund of social sympathy to + constructive account, instead of leaving it a somewhat blind philanthropic + sentiment. + </p> + <p> + It would give those who engage in industrial callings desire and ability + to share in social control, and ability to become masters of their + industrial fate. It would enable them to saturate with meaning the + technical and mechanical features which are so marked a feature of our + machine system of production and distribution. So much for those who now + have the poorer economic opportunities. With the representatives of the + more privileged portion of the community, it would increase sympathy for + labor, create a disposition of mind which can discover the culturing + elements in useful activity, and increase a sense of social + responsibility. The crucial position of the question of vocational + education at present is due, in other words, to the fact that it + concentrates in a specific issue two fundamental questions:—Whether + intelligence is best exercised apart from or within activity which puts + nature to human use, and whether individual culture is best secured under + egoistic or social conditions. No discussion of details is undertaken in + this chapter, because this conclusion but summarizes the discussion of the + previous chapters, XV to XXII, inclusive. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0024"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Twenty-four: Philosophy of Education + </h2> + <p> + 1. A Critical Review. Although we are dealing with the philosophy of + education, DO definition of philosophy has yet been given; nor has there + been an explicit consideration of the nature of a philosophy of education. + This topic is now introduced by a summary account of the logical order + implied in the previous discussions, for the purpose of bringing out the + philosophic issues involved. Afterwards we shall undertake a brief + discussion, in more specifically philosophical terms, of the theories of + knowledge and of morals implied in different educational ideals as they + operate in practice. The prior chapters fall logically into three parts. + </p> + <p> + I. The first chapters deal with education as a social need and function. + Their purpose is to outline the general features of education as the + process by which social groups maintain their continuous existence. + Education was shown to be a process of renewal of the meanings of + experience through a process of transmission, partly incidental to the + ordinary companionship or intercourse of adults and youth, partly + deliberately instituted to effect social continuity. This process was seen + to involve control and growth of both the immature individual and the + group in which he lives. + </p> + <p> + This consideration was formal in that it took no specific account of the + quality of the social group concerned—the kind of society aiming at + its own perpetuation through education. The general discussion was then + specified by application to social groups which are intentionally + progressive, and which aim at a greater variety of mutually shared + interests in distinction from those which aim simply at the preservation + of established customs. Such societies were found to be democratic in + quality, because of the greater freedom allowed the constituent members, + and the conscious need of securing in individuals a consciously socialized + interest, instead of trusting mainly to the force of customs operating + under the control of a superior class. The sort of education appropriate + to the development of a democratic community was then explicitly taken as + the criterion of the further, more detailed analysis of education. + </p> + <p> + II. This analysis, based upon the democratic criterion, was seen to imply + the ideal of a continuous reconstruction or reorganizing of experience, of + such a nature as to increase its recognized meaning or social content, and + as to increase the capacity of individuals to act as directive guardians + of this reorganization. (See Chapters VI-VII.) This distinction was then + used to outline the respective characters of subject matter and method. It + also defined their unity, since method in study and learning upon this + basis is just the consciously directed movement of reorganization of the + subject matter of experience. From this point of view the main principles + of method and subject matter of learning were developed (Chapters + XIII-XIV.) + </p> + <p> + III. Save for incidental criticisms designed to illustrate principles by + force of contrast, this phase of the discussion took for granted the + democratic criterion and its application in present social life. In the + subsequent chapters (XVIII-XXII) we considered the present limitation of + its actual realization. They were found to spring from the notion that + experience consists of a variety of segregated domains, or interests, each + having its own independent value, material, and method, each checking + every other, and, when each is kept properly bounded by the others, + forming a kind of "balance of powers" in education. We then proceeded to + an analysis of the various assumptions underlying this segregation. On the + practical side, they were found to have their cause in the divisions of + society into more or less rigidly marked-off classes and groups—in + other words, in obstruction to full and flexible social interaction and + intercourse. These social ruptures of continuity were seen to have their + intellectual formulation in various dualisms or antitheses—such as + that of labor and leisure, practical and intellectual activity, man and + nature, individuality and association, culture and vocation. In this + discussion, we found that these different issues have their counterparts + in formulations which have been made in classic philosophic systems; and + that they involve the chief problems of philosophy—such as mind (or + spirit) and matter, body and mind, the mind and the world, the individual + and his relationships to others, etc. Underlying these various separations + we found the fundamental assumption to be an isolation of mind from + activity involving physical conditions, bodily organs, material + appliances, and natural objects. Consequently, there was indicated a + philosophy which recognizes the origin, place, and function of mind in an + activity which controls the environment. Thus we have completed the + circuit and returned to the conceptions of the first portion of this book: + such as the biological continuity of human impulses and instincts with + natural energies; the dependence of the growth of mind upon participation + in conjoint activities having a common purpose; the influence of the + physical environment through the uses made of it in the social medium; the + necessity of utilization of individual variations in desire and thinking + for a progressively developing society; the essential unity of method and + subject matter; the intrinsic continuity of ends and means; the + recognition of mind as thinking which perceives and tests the meanings of + behavior. These conceptions are consistent with the philosophy which sees + intelligence to be the purposive reorganization, through action, of the + material of experience; and they are inconsistent with each of the + dualistic philosophies mentioned. + </p> + <p> + 2. The Nature of Philosophy. Our further task is to extract and make + explicit the idea of philosophy implicit in these considerations. We have + already virtually described, though not defined, philosophy in terms of + the problems with which it deals; and we have pointed out that these problems originate in the conflicts +and difficulties of social life. The problems are such things as the +relations of mind and matter; body and soul; humanity and physical +nature; the individual and the social; theory—or knowing, and +practice—or doing. The philosophical systems which formulate these +problems record the main lineaments and difficulties of contemporary +social practice. They bring to explicit consciousness what men have come +to think, in virtue of the quality of their current experience, about +nature, themselves, and the reality they conceive to include or to +govern both. +</p> +<p> +As we might expect, then, philosophy has generally been defined in ways +which imply a certain totality, generality, and ultimateness of both +subject matter and method. With respect to subject matter, philosophy +is an attempt to <i>comprehend</i>—that is, to gather together the varied +details of the world and of life into a single inclusive whole, which +shall either be a unity, or, as in the dualistic systems, shall reduce +the plural details to a small number of ultimate principles. On the +side of the attitude of the philosopher and of those who accept his +conclusions, there is the endeavor to attain as unified, consistent, +and complete an outlook upon experience as is possible. This aspect is +expressed in the word 'philosophy'—love of wisdom. Whenever philosophy +has been taken seriously, it has always been assumed that it signified +achieving a wisdom which would influence the conduct of life. Witness +the fact that almost all ancient schools of philosophy were also +organized ways of living, those who accepted their tenets being +committed to certain distinctive modes of conduct; witness the intimate +connection of philosophy with the theology of the Roman church in the +middle ages, its frequent association with religious interests, and, at +national crises, its association with political struggles. +</p> +<p> +This direct and intimate connection of philosophy with an outlook upon +life obviously differentiates philosophy from science. Particular facts +and laws of science evidently influence conduct. They suggest things to +do and not do, and provide means of execution. When science denotes not +simply a report of the particular facts discovered about the world but +a <i>general attitude</i> toward it—as distinct from special things to do +—it merges into philosophy. For an underlying disposition represents an +attitude not to this and that thing nor even to the aggregate + of known things, but to the considerations which govern conduct. + </p> + <p> + Hence philosophy cannot be defined simply from the side of subject matter. + For this reason, the definition of such conceptions as generality, + totality, and ultimateness is most readily reached from the side of the + disposition toward the world which they connote. In any literal and + quantitative sense, these terms do not apply to the subject matter of + knowledge, for completeness and finality are out of the question. The very + nature of experience as an ongoing, changing process forbids. In a less + rigid sense, they apply to science rather than to philosophy. For + obviously it is to mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, anthropology, + history, etc. that we must go, not to philosophy, to find out the facts of + the world. It is for the sciences to say what generalizations are tenable + about the world and what they specifically are. But when we ask what sort + of permanent disposition of action toward the world the scientific + disclosures exact of us we are raising a philosophic question. + </p> + <p> + From this point of view, "totality" does not mean the hopeless task of a + quantitative summation. It means rather consistency of mode of response in + reference to the plurality of events which occur. Consistency does not + mean literal identity; for since the same thing does not happen twice, an + exact repetition of a reaction involves some maladjustment. Totality means + continuity—the carrying on of a former habit of action with the + readaptation necessary to keep it alive and growing. Instead of signifying + a ready-made complete scheme of action, it means keeping the balance in a + multitude of diverse actions, so that each borrows and gives significance + to every other. Any person who is open-minded and sensitive to new + perceptions, and who has concentration and responsibility in connecting + them has, in so far, a philosophic disposition. One of the popular senses + of philosophy is calm and endurance in the face of difficulty and loss; it + is even supposed to be a power to bear pain without complaint. This + meaning is a tribute to the influence of the Stoic philosophy rather than + an attribute of philosophy in general. But in so far as it suggests that + the wholeness characteristic of philosophy is a power to learn, or to + extract meaning, from even the unpleasant vicissitudes of experience and + to embody what is learned in an ability to go on learning, it is justified + in any scheme. An analogous interpretation applies to the generality and + ultimateness of philosophy. Taken literally, they are absurd pretensions; + they indicate insanity. Finality does not mean, however, that experience + is ended and exhausted, but means the disposition to penetrate to deeper + levels of meaning—to go below the surface and find out the + connections of any event or object, and to keep at it. In like manner the + philosophic attitude is general in the sense that it is averse to taking + anything as isolated; it tries to place an act in its context—which + constitutes its significance. It is of assistance to connect philosophy + with thinking in its distinction from knowledge. Knowledge, grounded + knowledge, is science; it represents objects which have been settled, + ordered, disposed of rationally. Thinking, on the other hand, is + prospective in reference. It is occasioned by an unsettlement and it aims + at overcoming a disturbance. Philosophy is thinking what the known demands + of us—what responsive attitude it exacts. It is an idea of what is + possible, not a record of accomplished fact. Hence it is hypothetical, + like all thinking. It presents an assignment of something to be done—something + to be tried. Its value lies not in furnishing solutions (which can be + achieved only in action) but in defining difficulties and suggesting + methods for dealing with them. Philosophy might almost be described as + thinking which has become conscious of itself—which has generalized + its place, function, and value in experience. + </p> + <p> + More specifically, the demand for a "total" attitude arises because there + is the need of integration in action of the conflicting various interests + in life. Where interests are so superficial that they glide readily into + one another, or where they are not sufficiently organized to come into + conflict with one another, the need for philosophy is not perceptible. But + when the scientific interest conflicts with, say, the religious, or the + economic with the scientific or aesthetic, or when the conservative + concern for order is at odds with the progressive interest in freedom, or + when institutionalism clashes with individuality, there is a stimulus to + discover some more comprehensive point of view from which the divergencies + may be brought together, and consistency or continuity of experience + recovered. Often these clashes may be settled by an individual for + himself; the area of the struggle of aims is limited and a person works + out his own rough accommodations. Such homespun philosophies are genuine + and often adequate. But they do not result in systems of philosophy. These + arise when the discrepant claims of different ideals of conduct affect the + community as a whole, and the need for readjustment is general. These + traits explain some things which are often brought as objections against + philosophies, such as the part played in them by individual speculation, + and their controversial diversity, as well as the fact that philosophy + seems to be repeatedly occupied with much the same questions differently + stated. Without doubt, all these things characterize historic philosophies + more or less. But they are not objections to philosophy so much as they + are to human nature, and even to the world in which human nature is set. + If there are genuine uncertainties in life, philosophies must reflect that + uncertainty. If there are different diagnoses of the cause of a + difficulty, and different proposals for dealing with it; if, that is, the + conflict of interests is more or less embodied in different sets of + persons, there must be divergent competing philosophies. With respect to + what has happened, sufficient evidence is all that is needed to bring + agreement and certainty. The thing itself is sure. But with reference to + what it is wise to do in a complicated situation, discussion is inevitable + precisely because the thing itself is still indeterminate. One would not + expect a ruling class living at ease to have the same philosophy of life + as those who were having a hard struggle for existence. If the possessing + and the dispossessed had the same fundamental disposition toward the + world, it would argue either insincerity or lack of seriousness. A + community devoted to industrial pursuits, active in business and commerce, + is not likely to see the needs and possibilities of life in the same way + as a country with high aesthetic culture and little enterprise in turning + the energies of nature to mechanical account. A social group with a fairly + continuous history will respond mentally to a crisis in a very different + way from one which has felt the shock of abrupt breaks. Even if the same + data were present, they would be evaluated differently. But the different + sorts of experience attending different types of life prevent just the + same data from presenting themselves, as well as lead to a different + scheme of values. As for the similarity of problems, this is often more a + matter of appearance than of fact, due to old discussions being translated + into the terms of contemporary perplexities. But in certain fundamental + respects the same predicaments of life recur from time to time with only + such changes as are due to change of social context, including the growth + of the sciences. + </p> + <p> + The fact that philosophic problems arise because of widespread and widely + felt difficulties in social practice is disguised because philosophers + become a specialized class which uses a technical language, unlike the + vocabulary in which the direct difficulties are stated. But where a system + becomes influential, its connection with a conflict of interests calling + for some program of social adjustment may always be discovered. At this + point, the intimate connection between philosophy and education appears. + In fact, education offers a vantage ground from which to penetrate to the + human, as distinct from the technical, significance of philosophic + discussions. The student of philosophy "in itself" is always in danger of + taking it as so much nimble or severe intellectual exercise—as + something said by philosophers and concerning them alone. But when + philosophic issues are approached from the side of the kind of mental + disposition to which they correspond, or the differences in educational + practice they make when acted upon, the life-situations which they + formulate can never be far from view. If a theory makes no difference in + educational endeavor, it must be artificial. The educational point of view + enables one to envisage the philosophic problems where they arise and + thrive, where they are at home, and where acceptance or rejection makes a + difference in practice. If we are willing to conceive education as the + process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, + toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as the + general theory of education. Unless a philosophy is to remain symbolic—or + verbal—or a sentimental indulgence for a few, or else mere arbitrary + dogma, its auditing of past experience and its program of values must take + effect in conduct. Public agitation, propaganda, legislative and + administrative action are effective in producing the change of disposition + which a philosophy indicates as desirable, but only in the degree in which + they are educative—that is to say, in the degree in which they + modify mental and moral attitudes. And at the best, such methods are + compromised by the fact they are used with those whose habits are already + largely set, while education of youth has a fairer and freer field of + operation. On the other side, the business of schooling tends to become a + routine empirical affair unless its aims and methods are animated by such + a broad and sympathetic survey of its place in contemporary life as it is + the business of philosophy to provide. Positive science always implies + practically the ends which the community is concerned to achieve. Isolated + from such ends, it is matter of indifference whether its disclosures are + used to cure disease or to spread it; to increase the means of sustenance + of life or to manufacture war material to wipe life out. If society is + interested in one of these things rather than another, science shows the + way of attainment. Philosophy thus has a double task: that of criticizing + existing aims with respect to the existing state of science, pointing out + values which have become obsolete with the command of new resources, + showing what values are merely sentimental because there are no means for + their realization; and also that of interpreting the results of + specialized science in their bearing on future social endeavor. It is + impossible that it should have any success in these tasks without + educational equivalents as to what to do and what not to do. For + philosophic theory has no Aladdin's lamp to summon into immediate + existence the values which it intellectually constructs. In the mechanical + arts, the sciences become methods of managing things so as to utilize + their energies for recognized aims. By the educative arts philosophy may + generate methods of utilizing the energies of human beings in accord with + serious and thoughtful conceptions of life. Education is the laboratory in + which philosophic distinctions become concrete and are tested. + </p> + <p> + It is suggestive that European philosophy originated (among the Athenians) + under the direct pressure of educational questions. The earlier history of + philosophy, developed by the Greeks in Asia Minor and Italy, so far as its + range of topics is concerned, is mainly a chapter in the history of + science rather than of philosophy as that word is understood to-day. It + had nature for its subject, and speculated as to how things are made and + changed. Later the traveling teachers, known as the Sophists, began to + apply the results and the methods of the natural philosophers to human + conduct. + </p> + <p> + When the Sophists, the first body of professional educators in Europe, + instructed the youth in virtue, the political arts, and the management of + city and household, philosophy began to deal with the relation of the + individual to the universal, to some comprehensive class, or to some + group; the relation of man and nature, of tradition and reflection, of + knowledge and action. Can virtue, approved excellence in any line, be + learned, they asked? What is learning? It has to do with knowledge. What, + then, is knowledge? How is it achieved? Through the senses, or by + apprenticeship in some form of doing, or by reason that has undergone a + preliminary logical discipline? Since learning is coming to know, it + involves a passage from ignorance to wisdom, from privation to fullness + from defect to perfection, from non-being to being, in the Greek way of + putting it. How is such a transition possible? Is change, becoming, + development really possible and if so, how? And supposing such questions + answered, what is the relation of instruction, of knowledge, to virtue? + This last question led to opening the problem of the relation of reason to + action, of theory to practice, since virtue clearly dwelt in action. Was + not knowing, the activity of reason, the noblest attribute of man? And + consequently was not purely intellectual activity itself the highest of + all excellences, compared with which the virtues of neighborliness and the + citizen's life were secondary? Or, on the other hand, was the vaunted + intellectual knowledge more than empty and vain pretense, demoralizing to + character and destructive of the social ties that bound men together in + their community life? Was not the only true, because the only moral, life + gained through obedient habituation to the customary practices of the + community? And was not the new education an enemy to good citizenship, + because it set up a rival standard to the established traditions of the + community? + </p> + <p> + In the course of two or three generations such questions were cut loose + from their original practical bearing upon education and were discussed on + their own account; that is, as matters of philosophy as an independent + branch of inquiry. But the fact that the stream of European philosophical + thought arose as a theory of educational procedure remains an eloquent + witness to the intimate connection of philosophy and education. + "Philosophy of education" is not an external application of ready-made + ideas to a system of practice having a radically different origin and + purpose: it is only an explicit formulation of the problems of the + formation of right mental and moral habitudes in respect to the + difficulties of contemporary social life. The most penetrating definition + of philosophy which can be given is, then, that it is the theory of + education in its most general phases. + </p> + <p> + The reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and of social ideals and + methods thus go hand in hand. If there is especial need of educational + reconstruction at the present time, if this need makes urgent a + reconsideration of the basic ideas of traditional philosophic systems, it + is because of the thoroughgoing change in social life accompanying the + advance of science, the industrial revolution, and the development of + democracy. Such practical changes cannot take place without demanding an + educational reformation to meet them, and without leading men to ask what + ideas and ideals are implicit in these social changes, and what revisions + they require of the ideas and ideals which are inherited from older and + unlike cultures. Incidentally throughout the whole book, explicitly in the + last few chapters, we have been dealing with just these questions as they + affect the relationship of mind and body, theory and practice, man and + nature, the individual and social, etc. In our concluding chapters we + shall sum up the prior discussions with respect first to the philosophy of + knowledge, and then to the philosophy of morals. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM24"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. After a review designed to bring out the philosophic issues + </h2> + <p> + implicit in the previous discussions, philosophy was defined as the + generalized theory of education. Philosophy was stated to be a form of + thinking, which, like all thinking, finds its origin in what is uncertain + in the subject matter of experience, which aims to locate the nature of + the perplexity and to frame hypotheses for its clearing up to be tested in + action. Philosophic thinking has for its differentia the fact that the + uncertainties with which it deals are found in widespread social + conditions and aims, consisting in a conflict of organized interests and + institutional claims. Since the only way of bringing about a harmonious + readjustment of the opposed tendencies is through a modification of + emotional and intellectual disposition, philosophy is at once an explicit + formulation of the various interests of life and a propounding of points + of view and methods through which a better balance of interests may be + effected. Since education is the process through which the needed + transformation may be accomplished and not remain a mere hypothesis as to + what is desirable, we reach a justification of the statement that + philosophy is the theory of education as a deliberately conducted + practice. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0025"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Twenty-five: Theories of Knowledge + </h2> + <p> + 1. Continuity versus Dualism. A number of theories of knowing have been + criticized in the previous pages. In spite of their differences from one + another, they all agree in one fundamental respect which contrasts with + the theory which has been positively advanced. The latter assumes + continuity; the former state or imply certain basic divisions, + separations, or antitheses, technically called dualisms. The origin of + these divisions we have found in the hard and fast walls which mark off + social groups and classes within a group: like those between rich and + poor, men and women, noble and baseborn, ruler and ruled. These barriers + mean absence of fluent and free intercourse. This absence is equivalent to + the setting up of different types of life-experience, each with isolated + subject matter, aim, and standard of values. Every such social condition + must be formulated in a dualistic philosophy, if philosophy is to be a + sincere account of experience. When it gets beyond dualism—as many + philosophies do in form—it can only be by appeal to something higher + than anything found in experience, by a flight to some transcendental + realm. And in denying duality in name such theories restore it in fact, + for they end in a division between things of this world as mere + appearances and an inaccessible essence of reality. + </p> + <p> + So far as these divisions persist and others are added to them, each + leaves its mark upon the educational system, until the scheme of + education, taken as a whole, is a deposit of various purposes and + procedures. The outcome is that kind of check and balance of segregated + factors and values which has been described. (See Chapter XVIII.) The + present discussion is simply a formulation, in the terminology of + philosophy, of various antithetical conceptions involved in the theory of + knowing. In the first place, there is the opposition of empirical and + higher rational knowing. The first is connected with everyday affairs, + serves the purposes of the ordinary individual who has no specialized + intellectual + </p> + <p> + pursuit, and brings his wants into some kind of working connection with + the immediate environment. Such knowing is depreciated, if not despised, + as purely utilitarian, lacking in cultural significance. Rational + knowledge is supposed to be something which touches reality in ultimate, + intellectual fashion; to be pursued for its own sake and properly to + terminate in purely theoretical insight, not debased by application in + behavior. Socially, the distinction corresponds to that of the + intelligence used by the working classes and that used by a learned class + remote from concern with the means of living. Philosophically, the + difference turns about the distinction of the particular and universal. + Experience is an aggregate of more or less isolated particulars, + acquaintance with each of which must be separately made. Reason deals with + universals, with general principles, with laws, which lie above the welter + of concrete details. In the educational precipitate, the pupil is supposed + to have to learn, on one hand, a lot of items of specific information, + each standing by itself, and upon the other hand, to become familiar with + a certain number of laws and general relationships. Geography, as often + taught, illustrates the former; mathematics, beyond the rudiments of + figuring, the latter. For all practical purposes, they represent two + independent worlds. + </p> + <p> + Another antithesis is suggested by the two senses of the word "learning." + On the one hand, learning is the sum total of what is known, as that is + handed down by books and learned men. It is something external, an + accumulation of cognitions as one might store material commodities in a + warehouse. Truth exists ready-made somewhere. Study is then the process by + which an individual draws on what is in storage. On the other hand, + learning means something which the individual does when he studies. It is + an active, personally conducted affair. The dualism here is between + knowledge as something external, or, as it is often called, objective, and + knowing as something purely internal, subjective, psychical. There is, on + one side, a body of truth, ready-made, and, on the other, a ready-made + mind equipped with a faculty of knowing—if it only wills to exercise + it, which it is often strangely loath to do. The separation, often touched + upon, between subject matter and method is the educational equivalent of + this dualism. Socially the distinction has to do with the part of life + which is dependent upon authority and that where individuals are free to + advance. Another dualism is that of activity and passivity in knowing. + Purely empirical and physical things are often supposed to be known by + receiving impressions. Physical things somehow stamp themselves upon the + mind or convey themselves into consciousness by means of the sense organs. + Rational knowledge and knowledge of spiritual things is supposed, on the + contrary, to spring from activity initiated within the mind, an activity + carried on better if it is kept remote from all sullying touch of the + senses and external objects. The distinction between sense training and + object lessons and laboratory exercises, and pure ideas contained in + books, and appropriated—so it is thought—by some miraculous + output of mental energy, is a fair expression in education of this + distinction. Socially, it reflects a division between those who are + controlled by direct concern with things and those who are free to + cultivate themselves. + </p> + <p> + Another current opposition is that said to exist between the intellect and + the emotions. The emotions are conceived to be purely private and + personal, having nothing to do with the work of pure intelligence in + apprehending facts and truths,—except perhaps the single emotion of + intellectual curiosity. The intellect is a pure light; the emotions are a + disturbing heat. The mind turns outward to truth; the emotions turn inward + to considerations of personal advantage and loss. Thus in education we + have that systematic depreciation of interest which has been noted, plus + the necessity in practice, with most pupils, of recourse to extraneous and + irrelevant rewards and penalties in order to induce the person who has a + mind (much as his clothes have a pocket) to apply that mind to the truths + to be known. Thus we have the spectacle of professional educators decrying + appeal to interest while they uphold with great dignity the need of + reliance upon examinations, marks, promotions and emotions, prizes, and + the time-honored paraphernalia of rewards and punishments. The effect of + this situation in crippling the teacher's sense of humor has not received + the attention which it deserves. + </p> + <p> + All of these separations culminate in one between knowing and doing, + theory and practice, between mind as the end and spirit of action and the + body as its organ and means. We shall not repeat what has been said about + the source of this dualism in the division of society into a class + laboring with their muscles for material sustenance and a class which, + relieved from economic pressure, devotes itself to the arts of expression + and social direction. Nor is it necessary to speak again of the + educational evils which spring from the separation. We shall be content to + summarize the forces which tend to make the untenability of this + conception obvious and to replace it by the idea of continuity. (i) The + advance of physiology and the psychology associated with it have shown the + connection of mental activity with that of the nervous system. Too often + recognition of connection has stopped short at this point; the older + dualism of soul and body has been replaced by that of the brain and the + rest of the body. But in fact the nervous system is only a specialized + mechanism for keeping all bodily activities working together. Instead of + being isolated from them, as an organ of knowing from organs of motor + response, it is the organ by which they interact responsively with one + another. The brain is essentially an organ for effecting the reciprocal + adjustment to each other of the stimuli received from the environment and + responses directed upon it. Note that the adjusting is reciprocal; the + brain not only enables organic activity to be brought to bear upon any + object of the environment in response to a sensory stimulation, but this + response also determines what the next stimulus will be. See what happens, + for example, when a carpenter is at work upon a board, or an etcher upon + his plate—or in any case of a consecutive activity. While each motor + response is adjusted to the state of affairs indicated through the sense + organs, that motor response shapes the next sensory stimulus. Generalizing + this illustration, the brain is the machinery for a constant reorganizing + of activity so as to maintain its continuity; that is to say, to make such + modifications in future action as are required because of what has already + been done. The continuity of the work of the carpenter distinguishes it + from a routine repetition of identically the same motion, and from a + random activity where there is nothing cumulative. What makes it + continuous, consecutive, or concentrated is that each earlier act prepares + the way for later acts, while these take account of or reckon with the + results already attained—the basis of all responsibility. No one who + has realized the full force of the facts of the connection of knowing with + the nervous system and of the nervous system with the readjusting of + activity continuously to meet new conditions, will doubt that knowing has + to do with reorganizing activity, instead of being something isolated from + all activity, complete on its own account. + </p> + <p> + (ii) The development of biology clinches this lesson, with its discovery + of evolution. For the philosophic significance of the doctrine of + evolution lies precisely in its emphasis upon continuity of simpler and + more complex organic forms until we reach man. The development of organic + forms begins with structures where the adjustment of environment and + organism is obvious, and where anything which can be called mind is at a + minimum. As activity becomes more complex, coordinating a greater number + of factors in space and time, intelligence plays a more and more marked + role, for it has a larger span of the future to forecast and plan for. The + effect upon the theory of knowing is to displace the notion that it is the + activity of a mere onlooker or spectator of the world, the notion which + goes with the idea of knowing as something complete in itself. For the + doctrine of organic development means that the living creature is a part + of the world, sharing its vicissitudes and fortunes, and making itself + secure in its precarious dependence only as it intellectually identifies + itself with the things about it, and, forecasting the future consequences + of what is going on, shapes its own activities accordingly. If the living, + experiencing being is an intimate participant in the activities of the + world to which it belongs, then knowledge is a mode of participation, + valuable in the degree in which it is effective. It cannot be the idle + view of an unconcerned spectator. + </p> + <p> + (iii) The development of the experimental method as the method of getting + knowledge and of making sure it is knowledge, and not mere opinion—the + method of both discovery and proof—is the remaining great force in + bringing about a transformation in the theory of knowledge. The + experimental method has two sides. (i) On one hand, it means that we have + no right to call anything knowledge except where our activity has actually + produced certain physical changes in things, which agree with and confirm + the conception entertained. Short of such specific changes, our beliefs + are only hypotheses, theories, suggestions, guesses, and are to be + entertained tentatively and to be utilized as indications of experiments + to be tried. (ii) On the other hand, the experimental method of thinking + signifies that thinking is of avail; that it is of avail in just the + degree in which the anticipation of future consequences is made on the + basis of thorough observation of present conditions. Experimentation, in + other words, is not equivalent to blind reacting. Such surplus activity—a + surplus with reference to what has been observed and is now anticipated—is + indeed an unescapable factor in all our behavior, but it is not experiment + save as consequences are noted and are used to make predictions and plans + in similar situations in the future. The more the meaning of the + experimental method is perceived, the more our trying out of a certain way + of treating the material resources and obstacles which confront us + embodies a prior use of intelligence. What we call magic was with respect + to many things the experimental method of the savage; but for him to try + was to try his luck, not his ideas. The scientific experimental method is, + on the contrary, a trial of ideas; hence even when practically—or + immediately—unsuccessful, it is intellectual, fruitful; for we learn + from our failures when our endeavors are seriously thoughtful. + </p> + <p> + The experimental method is new as a scientific resource—as a + systematized means of making knowledge, though as old as life as a + practical device. Hence it is not surprising that men have not recognized + its full scope. For the most part, its significance is regarded as + belonging to certain technical and merely physical matters. It will + doubtless take a long time to secure the perception that it holds equally + as to the forming and testing of ideas in social and moral matters. Men + still want the crutch of dogma, of beliefs fixed by authority, to relieve + them of the trouble of thinking and the responsibility of directing their + activity by thought. They tend to confine their own thinking to a + consideration of which one among the rival systems of dogma they will + accept. Hence the schools are better adapted, as John Stuart Mill said, to + make disciples than inquirers. But every advance in the influence of the + experimental method is sure to aid in outlawing the literary, dialectic, + and authoritative methods of forming beliefs which have governed the + schools of the past, and to transfer their prestige to methods which will + procure an active concern with things and persons, directed by aims of + increasing temporal reach and deploying greater range of things in space. + In time the theory of knowing must be derived from the practice which is + most successful in making knowledge; and then that theory will be employed + to improve the methods which are less successful. + </p> + <p> + 2. Schools of Method. There are various systems of philosophy with + characteristically different conceptions of the method of knowing. Some of + them are named scholasticism, sensationalism, rationalism, idealism, + realism, empiricism, transcendentalism, pragmatism, etc. Many of them have + been criticized in connection with the discussion of some educational + problem. We are here concerned with them as involving deviations from that + method which has proved most effective in achieving knowledge, for a + consideration of the deviations may render clearer the true place of + knowledge in experience. In brief, the function of knowledge is to make + one experience freely available in other experiences. The word "freely" + marks the difference between the principle of knowledge and that of habit. + Habit means that an individual undergoes a modification through an + experience, which modification forms a predisposition to easier and more + effective action in a like direction in the future. Thus it also has the + function of making one experience available in subsequent experiences. + Within certain limits, it performs this function successfully. But habit, + apart from knowledge, does not make allowance for change of conditions, + for novelty. Prevision of change is not part of its scope, for habit + assumes the essential likeness of the new situation with the old. + Consequently it often leads astray, or comes between a person and the + successful performance of his task, just as the skill, based on habit + alone, of the mechanic will desert him when something unexpected occurs in + the running of the machine. But a man who understands the machine is the + man who knows what he is about. He knows the conditions under which a + given habit works, and is in a position to introduce the changes which + will readapt it to new conditions. + </p> + <p> + In other words, knowledge is a perception of those connections of an + object which determine its applicability in a given situation. To take an + extreme example; savages react to a flaming comet as they are accustomed + to react to other events which threaten the security of their life. Since + they try to frighten wild animals or their enemies by shrieks, beating of + gongs, brandishing of weapons, etc., they use the same methods to scare + away the comet. To us, the method is plainly absurd—so absurd that + we fail to note that savages are simply falling back upon habit in a way + which exhibits its limitations. The only reason we do not act in some + analogous fashion is because we do not take the comet as an isolated, + disconnected event, but apprehend it in its connections with other events. + We place it, as we say, in the astronomical system. We respond to its + connections and not simply to the immediate occurrence. Thus our attitude + to it is much freer. We may approach it, so to speak, from any one of the + angles provided by its connections. We can bring into play, as we deem + wise, any one of the habits appropriate to any one of the connected + objects. Thus we get at a new event indirectly instead of immediately—by + invention, ingenuity, resourcefulness. An ideally perfect knowledge would + represent such a network of interconnections that any past experience + would offer a point of advantage from which to get at the problem + presented in a new experience. In fine, while a habit apart from knowledge + supplies us with a single fixed method of attack, knowledge means that + selection may be made from a much wider range of habits. + </p> + <p> + Two aspects of this more general and freer availability of former + experiences for subsequent ones may be distinguished. (See ante, p. 77.) + (i) One, the more tangible, is increased power of control. What cannot be + managed directly may be handled indirectly; or we can interpose barriers + between us and undesirable consequences; or we may evade them if we cannot + overcome them. Genuine knowledge has all the practical value attaching to + efficient habits in any case. (ii) But it also increases the meaning, the + experienced significance, attaching to an experience. A situation to which + we respond capriciously or by routine has only a minimum of conscious + significance; we get nothing mentally from it. But wherever knowledge + comes into play in determining a new experience there is mental reward; + even if we fail practically in getting the needed control we have the + satisfaction of experiencing a meaning instead of merely reacting + physically. + </p> + <p> + While the content of knowledge is what has happened, what is taken as + finished and hence settled and sure, the reference of knowledge is future + or prospective. For knowledge furnishes the means of understanding or + giving meaning to what is still going on and what is to be done. The + knowledge of a physician is what he has found out by personal acquaintance + and by study of what others have ascertained and recorded. But it is + knowledge to him because it supplies the resources by which he interprets + the unknown things which confront him, fills out the partial obvious facts + with connected suggested phenomena, foresees their probable future, and + makes plans accordingly. When knowledge is cut off from use in giving + meaning to what is blind and baffling, it drops out of consciousness + entirely or else becomes an object of aesthetic contemplation. There is + much emotional satisfaction to be had from a survey of the symmetry and + order of possessed knowledge, and the satisfaction is a legitimate one. + But this contemplative attitude is aesthetic, not intellectual. It is the + same sort of joy that comes from viewing a finished picture or a well + composed landscape. It would make no difference if the subject matter were + totally different, provided it had the same harmonious organization. + Indeed, it would make no difference if it were wholly invented, a play of + fancy. Applicability to the world means not applicability to what is past + and gone—that is out of the question by the nature of the case; it + means applicability to what is still going on, what is still unsettled, in + the moving scene in which we are implicated. The very fact that we so + easily overlook this trait, and regard statements of what is past and out + of reach as knowledge is because we assume the continuity of past and + future. We cannot entertain the conception of a world in which knowledge + of its past would not be helpful in forecasting and giving meaning to its + future. We ignore the prospective reference just because it is so + irretrievably implied. + </p> + <p> + Yet many of the philosophic schools of method which have been mentioned + transform the ignoring into a virtual denial. They regard knowledge as + something complete in itself irrespective of its availability in dealing + with what is yet to be. And it is this omission which vitiates them and + which makes them stand as sponsors for educational methods which an + adequate conception of knowledge condemns. For one has only to call to + mind what is sometimes treated in schools as acquisition of knowledge to + realize how lacking it is in any fruitful connection with the ongoing + experience of the students—how largely it seems to be believed that + the mere appropriation of subject matter which happens to be stored in + books constitutes knowledge. No matter how true what is learned to those + who found it out and in whose experience it functioned, there is nothing + which makes it knowledge to the pupils. It might as well be something + about Mars or about some fanciful country unless it fructifies in the + individual's own life. + </p> + <p> + At the time when scholastic method developed, it had relevancy to social + conditions. It was a method for systematizing and lending rational + sanction to material accepted on authority. This subject matter meant so + much that it vitalized the defining and systematizing brought to bear upon + it. Under present conditions the scholastic method, for most persons, + means a form of knowing which has no especial connection with any + particular subject matter. It includes making distinctions, definitions, + divisions, and classifications for the mere sake of making them—with + no objective in experience. The view of thought as a purely physical + activity having its own forms, which are applied to any material as a seal + may be stamped on any plastic stuff, the view which underlies what is + termed formal logic is essentially the scholastic method generalized. The + doctrine of formal discipline in education is the natural counterpart of + the scholastic method. + </p> + <p> + The contrasting theories of the method of knowledge which go by the name + of sensationalism and rationalism correspond to an exclusive emphasis upon + the particular and the general respectively—or upon bare facts on + one side and bare relations on the other. In real knowledge, there is a + particularizing and a generalizing function working together. So far as a + situation is confused, it has to be cleared up; it has to be resolved into + details, as sharply defined as possible. Specified facts and qualities + constitute the elements of the problem to be dealt with, and it is through + our sense organs that they are specified. As setting forth the problem, + they may well be termed particulars, for they are fragmentary. Since our + task is to discover their connections and to recombine them, for us at the + time they are partial. They are to be given meaning; hence, just as they + stand, they lack it. Anything which is to be known, whose meaning has + still to be made out, offers itself as particular. But what is already + known, if it has been worked over with a view to making it applicable to + intellectually mastering new particulars, is general in function. Its + function of introducing connection into what is otherwise unconnected + constitutes its generality. Any fact is general if we use it to give + meaning to the elements of a new experience. "Reason" is just the ability + to bring the subject matter of prior experience to bear to perceive the + significance of the subject matter of a new experience. A person is + reasonable in the degree in which he is habitually open to seeing an event + which immediately strikes his senses not as an isolated thing but in its + connection with the common experience of mankind. + </p> + <p> + Without the particulars as they are discriminated by the active responses + of sense organs, there is no material for knowing and no intellectual + growth. Without placing these particulars in the context of the meanings + wrought out in the larger experience of the past—without the use of + reason or thought—particulars are mere excitations or irritations. + The mistake alike of the sensational and the rationalistic schools is that + each fails to see that the function of sensory stimulation and thought is + relative to reorganizing experience in applying the old to the new, + thereby maintaining the continuity or consistency of life. The theory of + the method of knowing which is advanced in these pages may be termed + pragmatic. Its essential feature is to maintain the continuity of knowing + with an activity which purposely modifies the environment. It holds that + knowledge in its strict sense of something possessed consists of our + intellectual resources—of all the habits that render our action + intelligent. Only that which has been organized into our disposition so as + to enable us to adapt the environment to our needs and to adapt our aims + and desires to the situation in which we live is really knowledge. + Knowledge is not just something which we are now conscious of, but + consists of the dispositions we consciously use in understanding what now + happens. Knowledge as an act is bringing some of our dispositions to + consciousness with a view to straightening out a perplexity, by conceiving + the connection between ourselves and the world in which we live. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM25"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. Such social divisions as interfere with free and full + </h2> + <p> + intercourse react to make the intelligence and knowing of members of the + separated classes one-sided. Those whose experience has to do with + utilities cut off from the larger end they subserve are practical + empiricists; those who enjoy the contemplation of a realm of meanings in + whose active production they have had no share are practical rationalists. + Those who come in direct contact with things and have to adapt their + activities to them immediately are, in effect, realists; those who isolate + the meanings of these things and put them in a religious or so-called + spiritual world aloof from things are, in effect, idealists. Those + concerned with progress, who are striving to change received beliefs, + emphasize the individual factor in knowing; those whose chief business it + is to withstand change and conserve received truth emphasize the universal + and the fixed—and so on. Philosophic systems in their opposed + theories of knowledge present an explicit formulation of the traits + characteristic of these cut-off and one-sided segments of experience—one-sided + because barriers to intercourse prevent the experience of one from being + enriched and supplemented by that of others who are differently situated. + </p> + <p> + In an analogous way, since democracy stands in principle for free + interchange, for social continuity, it must develop a theory of knowledge + which sees in knowledge the method by which one experience is made + available in giving direction and meaning to another. The recent advances + in physiology, biology, and the logic of the experimental sciences supply + the specific intellectual instrumentalities demanded to work out and + formulate such a theory. Their educational equivalent is the connection of + the acquisition of knowledge in the schools with activities, or + occupations, carried on in a medium of associated life. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2HCH0026"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Chapter Twenty-six: Theories of Morals + </h2> + <h3> + 1. The Inner and the Outer. + </h3> + <p> + Since morality is concerned with conduct, any dualisms which are set up + between mind and activity must reflect themselves in the theory of morals. + Since the formulations of the separation in the philosophic theory of + morals are used to justify and idealize the practices employed in moral + training, a brief critical discussion is in place. It is a commonplace of + educational theory that the establishing of character is a comprehensive + aim of school instruction and discipline. Hence it is important that we + should be on our guard against a conception of the relations of + intelligence to character which hampers the realization of the aim, and on + the look-out for the conditions which have to be provided in order that + the aim may be successfully acted upon. The first obstruction which meets + us is the currency of moral ideas which split the course of activity into + two opposed factors, often named respectively the inner and outer, or the + spiritual and the physical. This division is a culmination of the dualism + of mind and the world, soul and body, end and means, which we have so + frequently noted. In morals it takes the form of a sharp demarcation of + the motive of action from its consequences, and of character from conduct. + Motive and character are regarded as something purely "inner," existing + exclusively in consciousness, while consequences and conduct are regarded + as outside of mind, conduct having to do simply with the movements which + carry out motives; consequences with what happens as a result. Different + schools identify morality with either the inner state of mind or the outer + act and results, each in separation from the other. Action with a purpose + is deliberate; it involves a consciously foreseen end and a mental + weighing of considerations pro and eon. It also involves a conscious state + of longing or desire for the end. The deliberate choice of an aim and of a + settled disposition of desire takes time. During this time complete overt + action is suspended. A person who does not have his mind made up, does not + know what to do. Consequently he postpones definite action so far as + possible. His position may be compared to that of a man considering + jumping across a ditch. If he were sure he could or could not make it, + definite activity in some direction would occur. But if he considers, he + is in doubt; he hesitates. During the time in which a single overt line of + action is in suspense, his activities are confined to such redistributions + of energy within the organism as will prepare a determinate course of + action. He measures the ditch with his eyes; he brings himself taut to get + a feel of the energy at his disposal; he looks about for other ways + across, he reflects upon the importance of getting across. All this means + an accentuation of consciousness; it means a turning in upon the + individual's own attitudes, powers, wishes, etc. + </p> + <p> + Obviously, however, this surging up of personal factors into conscious + recognition is a part of the whole activity in its temporal development. + There is not first a purely psychical process, followed abruptly by a + radically different physical one. There is one continuous behavior, + proceeding from a more uncertain, divided, hesitating state to a more + overt, determinate, or complete state. The activity at first consists + mainly of certain tensions and adjustments within the organism; as these + are coordinated into a unified attitude, the organism as a whole acts—some + definite act is undertaken. We may distinguish, of course, the more + explicitly conscious phase of the continuous activity as mental or + psychical. But that only identifies the mental or psychical to mean the + indeterminate, formative state of an activity which in its fullness + involves putting forth of overt energy to modify the environment. + </p> + <p> + Our conscious thoughts, observations, wishes, aversions are important, + because they represent inchoate, nascent activities. They fulfill their + destiny in issuing, later on, into specific and perceptible acts. And + these inchoate, budding organic readjustments are important because they + are our sole escape from the dominion of routine habits and blind impulse. + They are activities having a new meaning in process of development. Hence, + normally, there is an accentuation of personal consciousness whenever our + instincts and ready formed habits find themselves blocked by novel + conditions. Then we are thrown back upon ourselves to reorganize our own + attitude before proceeding to a definite and irretrievable course of + action. Unless we try to drive our way through by sheer brute force, we + must modify our organic resources to adapt them to the specific features + of the situation in which we find ourselves. The conscious deliberating + and desiring which precede overt action are, then, the methodic personal + readjustment implied in activity in uncertain situations. This role of + mind in continuous activity is not always maintained, however. Desires for + something different, aversion to the given state of things caused by the + blocking of successful activity, stimulates the imagination. The picture + of a different state of things does not always function to aid ingenious + observation and recollection to find a way out and on. Except where there + is a disciplined disposition, the tendency is for the imagination to run + loose. Instead of its objects being checked up by conditions with + reference to their practicability in execution, they are allowed to + develop because of the immediate emotional satisfaction which they yield. + When we find the successful display of our energies checked by uncongenial + surroundings, natural and social, the easiest way out is to build castles + in the air and let them be a substitute for an actual achievement which + involves the pains of thought. So in overt action we acquiesce, and build + up an imaginary world in, mind. This break between thought and conduct is + reflected in those theories which make a sharp separation between mind as + inner and conduct and consequences as merely outer. + </p> + <p> + For the split may be more than an incident of a particular individual's + experience. The social situation may be such as to throw the class given + to articulate reflection back into their own thoughts and desires without + providing the means by which these ideas and aspirations can be used to + reorganize the environment. Under such conditions, men take revenge, as it + were, upon the alien and hostile environment by cultivating contempt for + it, by giving it a bad name. They seek refuge and consolation within their + own states of mind, their own imaginings and wishes, which they compliment + by calling both more real and more ideal than the despised outer world. + Such periods have recurred in history. In the early centuries of the + Christian era, the influential moral systems of Stoicism, of monastic and + popular Christianity and other religious movements of the day, took shape + under the influence of such conditions. The more action which might + express prevailing ideals was checked, the more the inner possession and + cultivation of ideals was regarded as self-sufficient—as the essence + of morality. The external world in which activity belongs was thought of + as morally indifferent. Everything lay in having the right motive, even + though that motive was not a moving force in the world. Much the same sort + of situation recurred in Germany in the later eighteenth and early + nineteenth centuries; it led to the Kantian insistence upon the good will + as the sole moral good, the will being regarded as something complete in + itself, apart from action and from the changes or consequences effected in + the world. Later it led to any idealization of existing institutions as + themselves the embodiment of reason. + </p> + <p> + The purely internal morality of "meaning well," of having a good + disposition regardless of what comes of it, naturally led to a reaction. + This is generally known as either hedonism or utilitarianism. It was said + in effect that the important thing morally is not what a man is inside of + his own consciousness, but what he does—the consequences which + issue, the charges he actually effects. Inner morality was attacked as + sentimental, arbitrary, dogmatic, subjective—as giving men leave to + dignify and shield any dogma congenial to their self-interest or any + caprice occurring to imagination by calling it an intuition or an ideal of + conscience. Results, conduct, are what counts; they afford the sole + measure of morality. Ordinary morality, and hence that of the schoolroom, + is likely to be an inconsistent compromise of both views. On one hand, + certain states of feeling are made much of; the individual must "mean + well," and if his intentions are good, if he had the right sort of + emotional consciousness, he may be relieved of responsibility for full + results in conduct. But since, on the other hand, certain things have to + be done to meet the convenience and the requirements of others, and of + social order in general, there is great insistence upon the doing of + certain things, irrespective of whether the individual has any concern or + intelligence in their doing. He must toe the mark; he must have his nose + held to the grindstone; he must obey; he must form useful habits; he must + learn self-control,—all of these precepts being understood in a way + which emphasizes simply the immediate thing tangibly done, irrespective of + the spirit of thought and desire in which it is done, and irrespective + therefore of its effect upon other less obvious doings. + </p> + <p> + It is hoped that the prior discussion has sufficiently elaborated the + method by which both of these evils are avoided. One or both of these + evils must result wherever individuals, whether young or old, cannot + engage in a progressively cumulative undertaking under conditions which + engage their interest and require their reflection. For only in such cases + is it possible that the disposition of desire and thinking should be an + organic factor in overt and obvious conduct. Given a consecutive activity + embodying the student's own interest, where a definite result is to be + obtained, and where neither routine habit nor the following of dictated + directions nor capricious improvising will suffice, and there the rise of + conscious purpose, conscious desire, and deliberate reflection are + inevitable. They are inevitable as the spirit and quality of an activity + having specific consequences, not as forming an isolated realm of inner + consciousness. + </p> + <p> + 2. The Opposition of Duty and Interest. Probably there is no antithesis + more often set up in moral discussion than that between acting from + "principle" and from "interest." To act on principle is to act + disinterestedly, according to a general law, which is above all personal + considerations. To act according to interest is, so the allegation runs, + to act selfishly, with one's own personal profit in view. It substitutes + the changing expediency of the moment for devotion to unswerving moral + law. The false idea of interest underlying this opposition has already + been criticized (See Chapter X), but some moral aspects of the question + will now be considered. A clew to the matter may be found in the fact that + the supporters of the "interest" side of the controversy habitually use + the term "self-interest." Starting from the premises that unless there is + interest in an object or idea, there is no motive force, they end with the + conclusion that even when a person claims to be acting from principle or + from a sense of duty, he really acts as he does because there "is + something in it" for himself. The premise is sound; the conclusion false. + In reply the other school argues that since man is capable of generous + self-forgetting and even self-sacrificing action, he is capable of acting + without interest. Again the premise is sound, and the conclusion false. + The error on both sides lies in a false notion of the relation of interest + and the self. + </p> + <p> + Both sides assume that the self is a fixed and hence isolated quantity. As + a consequence, there is a rigid dilemma between acting for an interest of + the self and without interest. If the self is something fixed antecedent + to action, then acting from interest means trying to get more in the way + of possessions for the self—whether in the way of fame, approval of + others, power over others, pecuniary profit, or pleasure. Then the + reaction from this view as a cynical depreciation of human nature leads to + the view that men who act nobly act with no interest at all. Yet to an + unbiased judgment it would appear plain that a man must be interested in + what he is doing or he would not do it. A physician who continues to serve + the sick in a plague at almost certain danger to his own life must be + interested in the efficient performance of his profession—more + interested in that than in the safety of his own bodily life. But it is + distorting facts to say that this interest is merely a mask for an + interest in something else which he gets by continuing his customary + services—such as money or good repute or virtue; that it is only a + means to an ulterior selfish end. The moment we recognize that the self is + not something ready-made, but something in continuous formation through + choice of action, the whole situation clears up. A man's interest in + keeping at his work in spite of danger to life means that his self is + found in that work; if he finally gave up, and preferred his personal + safety or comfort, it would mean that he preferred to be that kind of a + self. The mistake lies in making a separation between interest and self, + and supposing that the latter is the end to which interest in objects and + acts and others is a mere means. In fact, self and interest are two names + for the same fact; the kind and amount of interest actively taken in a + thing reveals and measures the quality of selfhood which exists. Bear in + mind that interest means the active or moving identity of the self with a + certain object, and the whole alleged dilemma falls to the ground. + </p> + <p> + Unselfishness, for example, signifies neither lack of interest in what is + done (that would mean only machine-like indifference) nor selflessness—which + would mean absence of virility and character. As employed everywhere + outside of this particular theoretical controversy, the term + "unselfishness" refers to the kind of aims and objects which habitually + interest a man. And if we make a mental survey of the kind of interests + which evoke the use of this epithet, we shall see that they have two + intimately associated features. (i) The generous self consciously + identifies itself with the full range of relationships implied in its + activity, instead of drawing a sharp line between itself and + considerations which are excluded as alien or indifferent; (ii) it + readjusts and expands its past ideas of itself to take in new consequences + as they become perceptible. When the physician began his career he may not + have thought of a pestilence; he may not have consciously identified + himself with service under such conditions. But, if he has a normally + growing or active self, when he finds that his vocation involves such + risks, he willingly adopts them as integral portions of his activity. The + wider or larger self which means inclusion instead of denial of + relationships is identical with a self which enlarges in order to assume + previously unforeseen ties. + </p> + <p> + In such crises of readjustment—and the crisis may be slight as well + as great—there may be a transitional conflict of "principle" with + "interest." It is the nature of a habit to involve ease in the accustomed + line of activity. It is the nature of a readjusting of habit to involve an + effort which is disagreeable—something to which a man has + deliberately to hold himself. In other words, there is a tendency to + identify the self—or take interest—in what one has got used + to, and to turn away the mind with aversion or irritation when an + unexpected thing which involves an unpleasant modification of habit comes + up. Since in the past one has done one's duty without having to face such + a disagreeable circumstance, why not go on as one has been? To yield to + this temptation means to narrow and isolate the thought of the self—to + treat it as complete. Any habit, no matter how efficient in the past, + which has become set, may at any time bring this temptation with it. To + act from principle in such an emergency is not to act on some abstract + principle, or duty at large; it is to act upon the principle of a course + of action, instead of upon the circumstances which have attended it. The + principle of a physician's conduct is its animating aim and spirit—the + care for the diseased. The principle is not what justifies an activity, + for the principle is but another name for the continuity of the activity. + If the activity as manifested in its consequences is undesirable, to act + upon principle is to accentuate its evil. And a man who prides himself + upon acting upon principle is likely to be a man who insists upon having + his own way without learning from experience what is the better way. He + fancies that some abstract principle justifies his course of action + without recognizing that his principle needs justification. + </p> + <p> + Assuming, however, that school conditions are such as to provide desirable + occupations, it is interest in the occupation as a whole—that is, in + its continuous development—which keeps a pupil at his work in spite + of temporary diversions and unpleasant obstacles. Where there is no + activity having a growing significance, appeal to principle is either + purely verbal, or a form of obstinate pride or an appeal to extraneous + considerations clothed with a dignified title. Undoubtedly there are + junctures where momentary interest ceases and attention flags, and where + reinforcement is needed. But what carries a person over these hard + stretches is not loyalty to duty in the abstract, but interest in his + occupation. Duties are "offices"—they are the specific acts needed + for the fulfilling of a function—or, in homely language—doing + one's job. And the man who is genuinely interested in his job is the man + who is able to stand temporary discouragement, to persist in the face of + obstacles, to take the lean with the fat: he makes an interest out of + meeting and overcoming difficulties and distraction. + </p> + <p> + 3. Intelligence and Character. A noteworthy paradox often accompanies + discussions of morals. On the one hand, there is an identification of the + moral with the rational. Reason is set up as a faculty from which proceed + ultimate moral intuitions, and sometimes, as in the Kantian theory, it is + said to supply the only proper moral motive. On the other hand, the value + of concrete, everyday intelligence is constantly underestimated, and even + deliberately depreciated. Morals is often thought to be an affair with + which ordinary knowledge has nothing to do. Moral knowledge is thought to + be a thing apart, and conscience is thought of as something radically + different from consciousness. This separation, if valid, is of especial + significance for education. Moral education in school is practically + hopeless when we set up the development of character as a supreme end, and + at the same time treat the acquiring of knowledge and the development of + understanding, which of necessity occupy the chief part of school time, as + having nothing to do with character. On such a basis, moral education is + inevitably reduced to some kind of catechetical instruction, or lessons + about morals. Lessons "about morals" signify as matter of course lessons + in what other people think about virtues and duties. It amounts to + something only in the degree in which pupils happen to be already animated + by a sympathetic and dignified regard for the sentiments of others. + Without such a regard, it has no more influence on character than + information about the mountains of Asia; with a servile regard, it + increases dependence upon others, and throws upon those in authority the + responsibility for conduct. As a matter of fact, direct instruction in + morals has been effective only in social groups where it was a part of the + authoritative control of the many by the few. Not the teaching as such but + the reinforcement of it by the whole regime of which it was an incident + made it effective. To attempt to get similar results from lessons about + morals in a democratic society is to rely upon sentimental magic. + </p> + <p> + At the other end of the scale stands the Socratic-Platonic teaching which + identifies knowledge and virtue—which holds that no man does evil + knowingly but only because of ignorance of the good. This doctrine is + commonly attacked on the ground that nothing is more common than for a man + to know the good and yet do the bad: not knowledge, but habituation or + practice, and motive are what is required. Aristotle, in fact, at once + attacked the Platonic teaching on the ground that moral virtue is like an + art, such as medicine; the experienced practitioner is better than a man + who has theoretical knowledge but no practical experience of disease and + remedies. The issue turns, however, upon what is meant by knowledge. + Aristotle's objection ignored the gist of Plato's teaching to the effect + that man could not attain a theoretical insight into the good except as he + had passed through years of practical habituation and strenuous + discipline. Knowledge of the good was not a thing to be got either from + books or from others, but was achieved through a prolonged education. It + was the final and culminating grace of a mature experience of life. + Irrespective of Plato's position, it is easy to perceive that the term + knowledge is used to denote things as far apart as intimate and vital + personal realization,—a conviction gained and tested in experience,—and + a second-handed, largely symbolic, recognition that persons in general + believe so and so—a devitalized remote information. That the latter + does not guarantee conduct, that it does not profoundly affect character, + goes without saying. But if knowledge means something of the same sort as + our conviction gained by trying and testing that sugar is sweet and + quinine bitter, the case stands otherwise. Every time a man sits on a + chair rather than on a stove, carries an umbrella when it rains, consults + a doctor when ill—or in short performs any of the thousand acts + which make up his daily life, he proves that knowledge of a certain kind + finds direct issue in conduct. There is every reason to suppose that the + same sort of knowledge of good has a like expression; in fact "good" is an + empty term unless it includes the satisfactions experienced in such + situations as those mentioned. Knowledge that other persons are supposed + to know something might lead one to act so as to win the approbation + others attach to certain actions, or at least so as to give others the + impression that one agrees with them; there is no reason why it should + lead to personal initiative and loyalty in behalf of the beliefs + attributed to them. + </p> + <p> + It is not necessary, accordingly, to dispute about the proper meaning of + the term knowledge. It is enough for educational purposes to note the + different qualities covered by the one name, to realize that it is + knowledge gained at first hand through the exigencies of experience which + affects conduct in significant ways. If a pupil learns things from books + simply in connection with school lessons and for the sake of reciting what + he has learned when called upon, then knowledge will have effect upon some + conduct—namely upon that of reproducing statements at the demand of + others. There is nothing surprising that such "knowledge" should not have + much influence in the life out of school. But this is not a reason for + making a divorce between knowledge and conduct, but for holding in low + esteem this kind of knowledge. The same thing may be said of knowledge + which relates merely to an isolated and technical specialty; it modifies + action but only in its own narrow line. In truth, the problem of moral + education in the schools is one with the problem of securing knowledge—the + knowledge connected with the system of impulses and habits. For the use to + which any known fact is put depends upon its connections. The knowledge of + dynamite of a safecracker may be identical in verbal form with that of a + chemist; in fact, it is different, for it is knit into connection with + different aims and habits, and thus has a different import. + </p> + <p> + Our prior discussion of subject-matter as proceeding from direct activity + having an immediate aim, to the enlargement of meaning found in geography + and history, and then to scientifically organized knowledge, was based + upon the idea of maintaining a vital connection between knowledge and + activity. What is learned and employed in an occupation having an aim and + involving cooperation with others is moral knowledge, whether consciously + so regarded or not. For it builds up a social interest and confers the + intelligence needed to make that interest effective in practice. Just + because the studies of the curriculum represent standard factors in social + life, they are organs of initiation into social values. As mere school + studies, their acquisition has only a technical worth. Acquired under + conditions where their social significance is realized, they feed moral + interest and develop moral insight. Moreover, the qualities of mind + discussed under the topic of method of learning are all of them + intrinsically moral qualities. Open-mindedness, single-mindedness, + sincerity, breadth of outlook, thoroughness, assumption of responsibility + for developing the consequences of ideas which are accepted, are moral + traits. The habit of identifying moral characteristics with external + conformity to authoritative prescriptions may lead us to ignore the + ethical value of these intellectual attitudes, but the same habit tends to + reduce morals to a dead and machinelike routine. Consequently while such + an attitude has moral results, the results are morally undesirable—above + all in a democratic society where so much depends upon personal + disposition. + </p> + <p> + 4. The Social and the Moral. All of the separations which we have been + criticizing—and which the idea of education set forth in the + previous chapters is designed to avoid—spring from taking morals too + narrowly,—giving them, on one side, a sentimental goody-goody turn + without reference to effective ability to do what is socially needed, and, + on the other side, overemphasizing convention and tradition so as to limit + morals to a list of definitely stated acts. As a matter of fact, morals + are as broad as acts which concern our relationships with others. And + potentially this includes all our acts, even though their social bearing + may not be thought of at the time of performance. For every act, by the + principle of habit, modifies disposition—it sets up a certain kind + of inclination and desire. And it is impossible to tell when the habit + thus strengthened may have a direct and perceptible influence on our + association with others. Certain traits of character have such an obvious + connection with our social relationships that we call them "moral" in an + emphatic sense—truthfulness, honesty, chastity, amiability, etc. But + this only means that they are, as compared with some other attitudes, + central:—that they carry other attitudes with them. They are moral + in an emphatic sense not because they are isolated and exclusive, but + because they are so intimately connected with thousands of other attitudes + which we do not explicitly recognize—which perhaps we have not even + names for. To call them virtues in their isolation is like taking the + skeleton for the living body. The bones are certainly important, but their + importance lies in the fact that they support other organs of the body in + such a way as to make them capable of integrated effective activity. And + the same is true of the qualities of character which we specifically + designate virtues. Morals concern nothing less than the whole character, + and the whole character is identical with the man in all his concrete + make-up and manifestations. To possess virtue does not signify to have + cultivated a few namable and exclusive traits; it means to be fully and + adequately what one is capable of becoming through association with others + in all the offices of life. + </p> + <p> + The moral and the social quality of conduct are, in the last analysis, + identical with each other. It is then but to restate explicitly the import + of our earlier chapters regarding the social function of education to say + that the measure of the worth of the administration, curriculum, and + methods of instruction of the school is the extent to which they are + animated by a social spirit. And the great danger which threatens school + work is the absence of conditions which make possible a permeating social + spirit; this is the great enemy of effective moral training. For this + spirit can be actively present only when certain conditions are met. + </p> + <p> + (i) In the first place, the school must itself be a community life in all + which that implies. Social perceptions and interests can be developed only + in a genuinely social medium—one where there is give and take in the + building up of a common experience. Informational statements about things + can be acquired in relative isolation by any one who previously has had + enough intercourse with others to have learned language. But realization + of the meaning of the linguistic signs is quite another matter. That + involves a context of work and play in association with others. The plea + which has been made for education through continued constructive + activities in this book rests upon the fact they afford an opportunity for + a social atmosphere. In place of a school set apart from life as a place + for learning lessons, we have a miniature social group in which study and + growth are incidents of present shared experience. Playgrounds, shops, + workrooms, laboratories not only direct the natural active tendencies of + youth, but they involve intercourse, communication, and cooperation,—all + extending the perception of connections. + </p> + <p> + (ii) The learning in school should be continuous with that out of school. + There should be a free interplay between the two. This is possible only + when there are numerous points of contact between the social interests of + the one and of the other. A school is conceivable in which there should be + a spirit of companionship and shared activity, but where its social life + would no more represent or typify that of the world beyond the school + walls than that of a monastery. Social concern and understanding would be + developed, but they would not be available outside; they would not carry + over. The proverbial separation of town and gown, the cultivation of + academic seclusion, operate in this direction. So does such adherence to + the culture of the past as generates a reminiscent social spirit, for this + makes an individual feel more at home in the life of other days than in + his own. A professedly cultural education is peculiarly exposed to this + danger. An idealized past becomes the refuge and solace of the spirit; + present-day concerns are found sordid, and unworthy of attention. But as a + rule, the absence of a social environment in connection with which + learning is a need and a reward is the chief reason for the isolation of + the school; and this isolation renders school knowledge inapplicable to + life and so infertile in character. + </p> + <p> + A narrow and moralistic view of morals is responsible for the failure to + recognize that all the aims and values which are desirable in education + are themselves moral. Discipline, natural development, culture, social + efficiency, are moral traits—marks of a person who is a worthy + member of that society which it is the business of education to further. + There is an old saying to the effect that it is not enough for a man to be + good; he must be good for something. The something for which a man must be + good is capacity to live as a social member so that what he gets from + living with others balances with what he contributes. What he gets and + gives as a human being, a being with desires, emotions, and ideas, is not + external possessions, but a widening and deepening of conscious life—a + more intense, disciplined, and expanding realization of meanings. What he + materially receives and gives is at most opportunities and means for the + evolution of conscious life. Otherwise, it is neither giving nor taking, + but a shifting about of the position of things in space, like the stirring + of water and sand with a stick. Discipline, culture, social efficiency, + personal refinement, improvement of character are but phases of the growth + of capacity nobly to share in such a balanced experience. And education is + not a mere means to such a life. Education is such a life. To maintain + capacity for such education is the essence of morals. For conscious life + is a continual beginning afresh. + </p> + <p> + <a id="link2H_SUMM26"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br><br><br><br> + </div> + <h2> + Summary. The most important problem of moral education in the school + </h2> + <p> + concerns the relationship of knowledge and conduct. For unless the + learning which accrues in the regular course of study affects character, + it is futile to conceive the moral end as the unifying and culminating end + of education. When there is no intimate organic connection between the + methods and materials of knowledge and moral growth, particular lessons + and modes of discipline have to be resorted to: knowledge is not + integrated into the usual springs of action and the outlook on life, while + morals become moralistic—a scheme of separate virtues. + </p> + <p> + The two theories chiefly associated with the separation of learning from + activity, and hence from morals, are those which cut off inner disposition + and motive—the conscious personal factor—and deeds as purely + physical and outer; and which set action from interest in opposition to + that from principle. Both of these separations are overcome in an + educational scheme where learning is the accompaniment of continuous + activities or occupations which have a social aim and utilize the + materials of typical social situations. For under such conditions, the + school becomes itself a form of social life, a miniature community and one + in close interaction with other modes of associated experience beyond + school walls. All education which develops power to share effectively in + social life is moral. It forms a character which not only does the + particular deed socially necessary but one which is interested in that + continuous readjustment which is essential to growth. Interest in learning + from all the contacts of life is the essential moral interest. + </p> + <div style="height: 6em;"> + <br><br><br><br><br><br> + </div> + +<div>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 852 ***</div> + </body> +</html> + |