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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f57f44 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text +*.htm text +*.html text +*.png binary +*.jpg binary +*.svg text +*.pdf binary +*.bmp binary +*.zip binary +*.midi binary +*.mp3 binary diff --git a/8422-8.txt b/8422-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..920ab51 --- /dev/null +++ b/8422-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2176 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Moral Deliberations in Modern Cinema, by Sam Vaknin + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +** This is a COPYRIGHTED Project Gutenberg eBook, Details Below ** +** Please follow the copyright guidelines in this file. ** + +Title: Moral Deliberations in Modern Cinema + +Author: Sam Vaknin + +Posting Date: August 13, 2012 [EBook #8422] +Release Date: July, 2005 +First Posted: July 9, 2003 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORAL DELIBERATIONS IN MODERN CINEMA *** + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Copyright (C) 2002 by Lidija Rangelovska. + + + + +Moral Deliberations in Modern Cinema + + + +1sst EDITION + + + + + +Sam Vaknin, Ph.D. + + + + + +Editing and Design: + +Lidija Rangelovska + + + + + + Lidija Rangelovska + + A Narcissus Publications Imprint, Skopje 2003 + + + Not for Sale! Non-commercial edition. + + + + + + + + + + + +© 2002 Copyright Lidija Rangelovska. + +All rights reserved. This book, or any part thereof, may not be used +or reproduced in any manner without written permission from: + +Lidija Rangelovska - write to: + +palma@unet.com.mk or to + +vaknin@link.com.mk + + + +Visit the Author Archive of Dr. Sam Vaknin in "Central Europe Review": + +http://www.ce-review.org/authorarchives/vaknin_archive/vaknin_main.htm +l + + +Visit Sam Vaknin's United Press International (UPI) Article Archive +-Click HERE! + + +Philosophical Musings and Essays + +http://samvak.tripod.com/culture.html + + +Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited + +http://samvak.tripod.com/ + + + +Created by: LIDIJA RANGELOVSKA + +REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA + +C O N T E N T S + + + +I. The Talented Mr. Ripley + +II. The Truman Show + +III. The Matrix + +IV. Shattered + +V. Titanic + +VI. Being John Malkovich + +VII. Dreamcatcher - The Myth of Destructibility + +VIII. The Author + +IX. About "After the Rain" + + The Talented Mr. Ripley + + By: Sam Vaknin + + +"The Talented Mr. Ripley" is an Hitchcockian and blood-curdling study +of the psychopath and his victims. At the centre of this masterpiece, +set in the exquisitely decadent scapes of Italy, is a titanic +encounter between Ripley, the aforementioned psychopath protagonist +and young Greenleaf, a consummate narcissist. + +Ripley is a cartoonishly poor young adult whose overriding desire is +to belong to a higher - or at least, richer - social class. While he +waits upon the subjects of his not so hidden desires, he receives an +offer he cannot refuse: to travel to Italy to retrieve the spoiled and +hedonistic son of a shipbuilding magnate, Greenleaf Senior. He embarks +upon a study of Junior's biography, personality, likes and hobbies. In +a chillingly detailed process, he actually assumes Greenleaf's +identity. Disembarking from a luxurious Cunard liner in his +destination, Italy, he "confesses" to a gullible textile-heiress that +he is the young Greenleaf, travelling incognito. + +Thus, we are subtly introduced to the two over-riding themes of the +antisocial personality disorder (still labelled by many professional +authorities "psychopathy" and "sociopathy"): an overwhelming dysphoria +and an even more overweening drive to assuage this angst by belonging. +The psychopath is an unhappy person. He is besieged by recurrent +depression bouts, hypochondria and an overpowering sense of alienation +and drift. He is bored with his own life and is permeated by a +seething and explosive envy of the lucky, the mighty, the clever, the +have it alls, the know it alls, the handsome, the happy - in short: +his opposites. He feels discriminated against and dealt a poor hand in +the great poker game called life. He is driven obsessively to right +these perceived wrongs and feels entirely justified in adopting +whatever means he deems necessary in pursuing this goal. + +Ripley's reality test is maintained throughout the film. In other +words - while he gradually merges with the object of his admiring +emulation, the young Greenleaf - Ripley can always tell the +difference. After he kills Greenleaf in self-defense, he assumes his +name, wears his clothes, cashes his checks and makes phone calls from +his rooms. But he also murders - or tries to murder - those who +suspect the truth. These acts of lethal self-preservation prove +conclusively that he knows who he is and that he fully realizes that +his acts are parlously illegal. + +Young Greenleaf is young, captivatingly energetic, infinitely +charming, breathtakingly handsome and deceivingly emotional. He lacks +real talents - he know how to play only six jazz tunes, can't make up +his musical mind between his faithful sax and a newly alluring drum +kit and, an aspiring writer, can't even spell. These shortcomings and +discrepancies are tucked under a glittering facade of non-chalance, +refreshing spontaneity, an experimental spirit, unrepressed sexuality +and unrestrained adventurism. But Greenleaf Jr. is a garden variety +narcissist. He cheats on his lovely and loving girlfriend, Marge. He +refuses to lend money - of which he seems to have an unlimited supply, +courtesy his ever more disenchanted father - to a girl he impregnated. +She commits suicide and he blames the primitiveness of the emergency +services, sulks and kicks his precious record player. In the midst of +this infantile temper tantrum the rudiments of a conscience are +visible. He evidently feels guilty. At least for a while. + +Greenleaf Jr. falls in and out of love and friendship in a predictable +pendulous rhythm. He idealizes his beaus and then devalues them. He +finds them to be the quiddity of fascination one moment - and the +distilled essence of boredom the next. And he is not shy about +expressing his distaste and disenchantment. He is savagely cruel as he +calls Ripley a leach who has taken over his life and his possessions +(having previously invited him to do so in no uncertain terms). He +says that he is relieved to see him go and he cancels off-handedly +elaborate plans they made together. Greenleaf Jr. maintains a poor +record of keeping promises and a rich record of violence, as we +discover towards the end of this suspenseful, taut yarn. + +Ripley himself lacks an identity. He is a binary automaton driven by a +set of two instructions - become someone and overcome resistance. He +feels like a nobody and his overriding ambition is to be somebody, +even if he has to fake it, or steal it. His only talents, he openly +admits, are to fake both personalities and papers. He is a predator +and he hunts for congruence, cohesion and meaning. He is in constant +search of a family. Greenleaf Jr., he declares festively, is the older +brother he never had. Together with the long suffering fiancee in +waiting, Marge, they are a family. Hasn't Greenleaf Sr. actually +adopted him? + +This identity disturbance, which is at the psychodynamic root of both +pathological narcissism and rapacious psychopathy, is all-pervasive. +Both Ripley and Greenleaf Jr. are not sure who they are. Ripley wants +to be Greenleaf Jr. - not because of the latter's admirable +personality, but because of his money. Greenleaf Jr. cultivates a +False Self of a jazz giant in the making and the author of the Great +American Novel but he is neither and he bitterly knows it. Even their +sexual identity is not fully formed. Ripley is at once homoerotic, +autoerotic and heteroerotic. He has a succession of homosexual lovers +(though apparently only platonic ones). Yet, he is attracted to women. +He falls desperately in love with Greenleaf's False Self and it is the +revelation of the latter's dilapidated True Self that leads to the +atavistically bloody scene in the boat. + +But Ripley is a different -and more ominous - beast altogether. He +rambles on about the metaphorical dark chamber of his secrets, the key +to which he wishes to share with a "loved" one. But this act of +sharing (which never materializes) is intended merely to alleviate the +constant pressure of the hot pursuit he is subjected to by the police +and others. He disposes with equal equanimity of both loved ones and +the occasional prying acquaintance. At least twice he utters words of +love as he actually strangles his newfound inamorato and tries to +slash an old and rekindled flame. He hesitates not a split second when +confronted with an offer to betray Greenleaf Sr., his nominal employer +and benefactor, and abscond with his money. He falsifies signatures +with ease, makes eye contact convincingly, flashes the most heart +rending smile when embarrassed or endangered. He is a caricature of +the American dream: ambitious, driven, winsome, well versed in the +mantras of the bourgeoisie. But beneath this thin veneer of hard +learned, self-conscious and uneasy civility - lurks a beast of prey +best characterized by the DSM IV (Diagnostic and Statistics Manual): + +"Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviour, +deceitfulness as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or +conning others to personal profit or pleasure, impulsivity or failure +to plan ahead... reckless disregard for safety of self or others +...(and above all) lack of remorse." (From the criteria of the +Antisocial Personality Disorder). + +But perhaps the most intriguing portraits are those of the victims. +Marge insists, in the face of the most callous and abusive behaviour, +that there is something "tender" in Greenleaf Jr. When she confronts +the beguiling monster, Ripley, she encounters the fate of all victims +of psychopaths: disbelief, pity and ridicule. The truth is too +horrible to contemplate, let alone comprehend. Psychopaths are inhuman +in the most profound sense of this compounded word. Their emotions and +conscience have been amputated and replaced by phantom imitations. But +it is rare to pierce their meticulously crafted facade. They more +often than not go on to great success and social acceptance while +their detractors are relegated to the fringes of society. Both +Meredith and Peter, who had the misfortune of falling in deep, +unrequited love with Ripley, are punished. One by losing his life, the +other by losing Ripley time and again, mysteriously, capriciously, +cruelly. + +Thus, ultimately, the film is an intricate study of the pernicious +ways of psychopathology. Mental disorder is a venom not confined to +its source. It spreads and affects its environment in a myriad +surreptitiously subtle forms. It is a hydra, growing one hundred heads +where one was severed. Its victims writhe and as abuse is piled upon +trauma - they turn to stone, the mute witnesses of horror, the +stalactites and stalagmites of pain untold and unrecountable. For +their tormentors are often as talented as Mr. Ripley is and they are +as helpless and as clueless as his victims are. + + The Truman Show + + By: Sam Vaknin + + +"The Truman Show" is a profoundly disturbing movie. On the surface, it +deals with the worn out issue of the intermingling of life and the +media. + +Examples for such incestuous relationships abound: + +Ronald Reagan, the cinematic president was also a presidential movie +star. In another movie ("The Philadelphia Experiment") a defrosted Rip +Van Winkle exclaims upon seeing Reagan on television (40 years after +his forced hibernation started): "I know this guy, he used to play +Cowboys in the movies". + +Candid cameras monitor the lives of webmasters (website owners) almost +24 hours a day. The resulting images are continuously posted on the +Web and are available to anyone with a computer. + +The last decade witnessed a spate of films, all concerned with the +confusion between life and the imitations of life, the media. The +ingenious "Capitan Fracasse", "Capricorn One", "Sliver", "Wag the Dog" +and many lesser films have all tried to tackle this (un)fortunate +state of things and its moral and practical implications. + +The blurring line between life and its representation in the arts is +arguably the main theme of "The Truman Show". The hero, Truman, lives +in an artificial world, constructed especially for him. He was born +and raised there. He knows no other place. The people around him - +unbeknownst to him - are all actors. His life is monitored by 5000 +cameras and broadcast live to the world, 24 hours a day, every day. He +is spontaneous and funny because he is unaware of the monstrosity of +which he is the main cogwheel. + +But Peter Weir, the movie's director, takes this issue one step +further by perpetrating a massive act of immorality on screen. Truman +is lied to, cheated, deprived of his ability to make choices, +controlled and manipulated by sinister, half-mad Shylocks. As I said, +he is unwittingly the only spontaneous, non-scripted, "actor" in the +on-going soaper of his own life. All the other figures in his life, +including his parents, are actors. Hundreds of millions of viewers and +voyeurs plug in to take a peep, to intrude upon what Truman innocently +and honestly believes to be his privacy. They are shown responding to +various dramatic or anti-climactic events in Truman's life. That we +are the moral equivalent of these viewers-voyeurs, accomplices to the +same crimes, comes as a shocking realization to us. We are (live) +viewers and they are (celluloid) viewers. We both enjoy Truman's +inadvertent, non-consenting, exhibitionism. We know the truth about +Truman and so do they. Of course, we are in a privileged moral +position because we know it is a movie and they know it is a piece of +raw life that they are watching. + +But moviegoers throughout Hollywood's history have willingly and +insatiably participated in numerous "Truman Shows". The lives (real or +concocted) of the studio stars were brutally exploited and +incorporated in their films. Jean Harlow, Barbara Stanwyck, James +Cagney all were forced to spill their guts in cathartic acts of on +camera repentance and not so symbolic humiliation. "Truman Shows" is +the more common phenomenon in the movie industry. + +Then there is the question of the director of the movie as God and of +God as the director of a movie. The members of his team - technical +and non-technical alike - obey Christoff, the director, almost +blindly. They suspend their better moral judgement and succumb to his +whims and to the brutal and vulgar aspects of his pervasive dishonesty +and sadism. The torturer loves his victims. They define him and infuse +his life with meaning. Caught in a narrative, the movie says, people +act immorally. + +(IN)famous psychological experiments support this assertion. Students +were led to administer what they thought were "deadly" electric shocks +to their colleagues or to treat them bestially in simulated prisons. +They obeyed orders. So did all the hideous genocidal criminals in +history. The Director Weir asks: should God be allowed to be immoral +or should he be bound by morality and ethics? Should his decisions and +actions be constrained by an over-riding code of right and wrong? +Should we obey his commandments blindly or should we exercise +judgement? + +If we do exercise judgement are we then being immoral because God (and +the Director Christoff) know more (about the world, about us, the +viewers and about Truman), know better, are omnipotent? Is the +exercise of judgement the usurpation of divine powers and attributes? +Isn't this act of rebelliousness bound to lead us down the path of +apocalypse? + +It all boils down to the question of free choice and free will versus +the benevolent determinism imposed by an omniscient and omnipotent +being. What is better: to have the choice and be damned (almost +inevitably, as in the biblical narrative of the Garden of Eden) - or +to succumb to the superior wisdom of a supreme being? A choice always +involves a dilemma. It is the conflict between two equivalent states, +two weighty decisions whose outcomes are equally desirable and two +identically-preferable courses of action. Where there is no such +equivalence - there is no choice, merely the pre-ordained (given full +knowledge) exercise of a preference or inclination. Bees do not choose +to make honey. A fan of football does not choose to watch a football +game. He is motivated by a clear inequity between the choices that he +faces. He can read a book or go to the game. His decision is clear and +pre-determined by his predilection and by the inevitable and +invariable implementation of the principle of pleasure. There is no +choice here. It is all rather automatic. But compare this to the +choice some victims had to make between two of their children in the +face of Nazi brutality. Which child to sentence to death - which one +to sentence to life? Now, this is a real choice. It involves +conflicting emotions of equal strength. One must not confuse +decisions, opportunities and choice. + +Decisions are the mere selection of courses of action. This selection +can be the result of a choice or the result of a tendency (conscious, +unconscious, or biological-genetic). Opportunities are current states +of the world, which allow for a decision to be made and to affect the +future state of the world. Choices are our conscious experience of +moral or other dilemmas. + +Christoff finds it strange that Truman - having discovered the truth - +insists upon his right to make choices, i.e., upon his right to +experience dilemmas. To the Director, dilemmas are painful, +unnecessary, destructive, or at best disruptive. His utopian world - +the one he constructed for Truman - is choice-free and dilemma-free. +Truman is programmed not in the sense that his spontaneity is +extinguished. Truman is wrong when, in one of the scenes, he keeps +shouting: "Be careful, I am spontaneous". The Director and fat-cat +capitalistic producers want him to be spontaneous, they want him to +make decisions. But they do not want him to make choices. So they +influence his preferences and predilections by providing him with an +absolutely totalitarian, micro-controlled, repetitive environment. +Such an environment reduces the set of possible decisions so that +there is only one favourable or acceptable decision (outcome) at any +junction. Truman does decide whether to walk down a certain path or +not. But when he does decide to walk - only one path is available to +him. His world is constrained and limited - not his actions. + +Actually, Truman's only choice in the movie leads to an arguably +immoral decision. He abandons ship. He walks out on the whole project. +He destroys an investment of billions of dollars, people's lives and +careers. He turns his back on some of the actors who seem to really be +emotionally attached to him. He ignores the good and pleasure that the +show has brought to the lives of millions of people (the viewers). He +selfishly and vengefully goes away. He knows all this. By the time he +makes his decision, he is fully informed. He knows that some people +may commit suicide, go bankrupt, endure major depressive episodes, do +drugs. But this massive landscape of resulting devastation does not +deter him. He prefers his narrow, personal, interest. He walks. + +But Truman did not ask or choose to be put in his position. He found +himself responsible for all these people without being consulted. +There was no consent or act of choice involved. How can anyone be +responsible for the well-being and lives of other people - if he did +not CHOOSE to be so responsible? Moreover, Truman had the perfect +moral right to think that these people wronged him. Are we morally +responsible and accountable for the well-being and lives of those who +wrong us? True Christians are, for instance. + +Moreover, most of us, most of the time, find ourselves in situations +which we did not help mould by our decisions. We are unwillingly cast +into the world. We do not provide prior consent to being born. This +fundamental decision is made for us, forced upon us. This pattern +persists throughout our childhood and adolescence: decisions are made +elsewhere by others and influence our lives profoundly. + +As adults we are the objects - often the victims - of the decisions of +corrupt politicians, mad scientists, megalomaniac media barons, +gung-ho generals and demented artists. This world is not of our making +and our ability to shape and influence it is very limited and rather +illusory. We live in our own "Truman Show". Does this mean that we are +not morally responsible for others? + +We are morally responsible even if we did not choose the circumstances +and the parameters and characteristics of the universe that we +inhabit. The Swedish Count Wallenberg imperilled his life (and lost +it) smuggling hunted Jews out of Nazi occupied Europe. He did not +choose, or helped to shape Nazi Europe. It was the brainchild of the +deranged Director Hitler. Having found himself an unwilling +participant in Hitler's horror show, Wallenberg did not turn his back +and opted out. He remained within the bloody and horrific set and did +his best. Truman should have done the same. Jesus said that he should +have loved his enemies. He should have felt and acted with +responsibility towards his fellow human beings, even towards those who +wronged him greatly. + +But this may be an inhuman demand. Such forgiveness and magnanimity +are the reserve of God. And the fact that Truman's tormentors did not +see themselves as such and believed that they were acting in his best +interests and that they were catering to his every need - does not +absolve them from their crimes. Truman should have maintained a fine +balance between his responsibility to the show, its creators and its +viewers and his natural drive to get back at his tormentors. The +source of the dilemma (which led to his act of choosing) is that the +two groups overlap. + +Truman found himself in the impossible position of being the sole +guarantor of the well-being and lives of his tormentors. To put the +question in sharper relief: are we morally obliged to save the life +and livelihood of someone who greatly wronged us? Or is vengeance +justified in such a case? + +A very problematic figure in this respect is that of Truman's best and +childhood friend. They grew up together, shared secrets, emotions and +adventures. Yet he lies to Truman constantly and under the Director's +instructions. Everything he says is part of a script. It is this +disinformation that convinces us that he is not Truman's true friend. +A real friend is expected, above all, to provide us with full and true +information and, thereby, to enhance our ability to choose. Truman's +true love in the Show tried to do it. She paid the price: she was +ousted from the show. But she tried to provide Truman with a choice. +It is not sufficient to say the right things and make the right moves. +Inner drive and motivation are required and the willingness to take +risks (such as the risk of providing Truman with full information +about his condition). All the actors who played Truman's parents, +loving wife, friends and colleagues, miserably failed on this score. + +It is in this mimicry that the philosophical key to the whole movie +rests. A Utopia cannot be faked. Captain Nemo's utopian underwater +city was a real Utopia because everyone knew everything about it. +People were given a choice (though an irreversible and irrevocable +one). They chose to become lifetime members of the reclusive Captain's +colony and to abide by its (overly rational) rules. + +The Utopia came closest to extinction when a group of stray survivors +of a maritime accident were imprisoned in it against their expressed +will. In the absence of choice, no utopia can exist. In the absence of +full, timely and accurate information, no choice can exist. Actually, +the availability of choice is so crucial that even when it is +prevented by nature itself - and not by the designs of more or less +sinister or monomaniac people - there can be no Utopia. In H.G. Wells' +book "The Time Machine", the hero wanders off to the third millennium +only to come across a peaceful Utopia. Its members are immortal, don't +have to work, or think in order to survive. Sophisticated machines +take care of all their needs. No one forbids them to make choices. +There simply is no need to make them. So the Utopia is fake and indeed +ends badly. + +Finally, the "Truman Show" encapsulates the most virulent attack on +capitalism in a long time. Greedy, thoughtless money machines in the +form of billionaire tycoon-producers exploit Truman's life shamelessly +and remorselessly in the ugliest display of human vices possible. The +Director indulges in his control-mania. The producers indulge in their +monetary obsession. The viewers (on both sides of the silver screen) +indulge in voyeurism. The actors vie and compete in the compulsive +activity of furthering their petty careers. It is a repulsive canvas +of a disintegrating world. Perhaps Christoff is right after al when he +warns Truman about the true nature of the world. But Truman chooses. +He chooses the exit door leading to the outer darkness over the false +sunlight in the Utopia that he leaves behind. + + The Matrix + + By: Sam Vaknin + + +It is easy to confuse the concepts of "virtual reality" and a +"computerized model of reality (simulation)". The former is a +self-contained Universe, replete with its "laws of physics" and +"logic". It can bear resemblance to the real world or not. It can be +consistent or not. It can interact with the real world or not. In +short, it is an arbitrary environment. In contrast, a model of reality +must have a direct and strong relationship to the world. It must obey +the rules of physics and of logic. The absence of such a relationship +renders it meaningless. A flight simulator is not much good in a world +without aeroplanes or if it ignores the laws of nature. A technical +analysis program is useless without a stock exchange or if its +mathematically erroneous. + +Yet, the two concepts are often confused because they are both +mediated by and reside on computers. The computer is a self-contained +(though not closed) Universe. It incorporates the hardware, the data +and the instructions for the manipulation of the data (software). It +is, therefore, by definition, a virtual reality. It is versatile and +can correlate its reality with the world outside. But it can also +refrain from doing so. This is the ominous "what if" in artificial +intelligence (AI). What if a computer were to refuse to correlate its +internal (virtual) reality with the reality of its makers? What if it +were to impose its own reality on us and make it the privileged one? + +In the visually tantalizing movie, "The Matrix", a breed of AI +computers takes over the world. It harvests human embryos in +laboratories called "fields". It then feeds them through grim looking +tubes and keeps them immersed in gelatinous liquid in cocoons. This +new "machine species" derives its energy needs from the electricity +produced by the billions of human bodies thus preserved. A +sophisticated, all-pervasive, computer program called "The Matrix" +generates a "world" inhabited by the consciousness of the unfortunate +human batteries. Ensconced in their shells, they see themselves +walking, talking, working and making love. This is a tangible and +olfactory phantasm masterfully created by the Matrix. Its computing +power is mind boggling. It generates the minutest details and reams of +data in a spectacularly successful effort to maintain the illusion. + +A group of human miscreants succeeds to learn the secret of the +Matrix. They form an underground and live aboard a ship, loosely +communicating with a halcyon city called "Zion", the last bastion of +resistance. In one of the scenes, Cypher, one of the rebels defects. +Over a glass of (illusory) rubicund wine and (spectral) juicy steak, +he poses the main dilemma of the movie. Is it better to live happily +in a perfectly detailed delusion - or to survive unhappily but free of +its hold? + +The Matrix controls the minds of all the humans in the world. It is a +bridge between them, they inter-connected through it. It makes them +share the same sights, smells and textures. They remember. They +compete. They make decisions. + +The Matrix is sufficiently complex to allow for this apparent lack of +determinism and ubiquity of free will. The root question is: is there +any difference between making decisions and feeling certain of making +them (not having made them)? If one is unaware of the existence of the +Matrix, the answer is no. From the inside, as a part of the Matrix, +making decisions and appearing to be making them are identical states. +Only an outside observer - one who in possession of full information +regarding both the Matrix and the humans - can tell the difference. + +Moreover, if the Matrix were a computer program of infinite +complexity, no observer (finite or infinite) would have been able to +say with any certainty whose a decision was - the Matrix's or the +human's. And because the Matrix, for all intents and purposes, is +infinite compared to the mind of any single, tube-nourished, +individual - it is safe to say that the states of "making a decision" +and "appearing to be making a decision" are subjectively +indistinguishable. No individual within the Matrix would be able to +tell the difference. His or her life would seem to him or her as real +as ours are to us. The Matrix may be deterministic - but this +determinism is inaccessible to individual minds because of the +complexity involved. When faced with a trillion deterministic paths, +one would be justified to feel that he exercised free, unconstrained +will in choosing one of them. Free will and determinism are +indistinguishable at a certain level of complexity. + +Yet, we KNOW that the Matrix is different to our world. It is NOT the +same. This is an intuitive kind of knowledge, for sure, but this does +not detract from its firmness. If there is no subjective difference +between the Matrix and our Universe, there must be an objective one. +Another key sentence is uttered by Morpheus, the leader of the rebels. +He says to "The Chosen One" (the Messiah) that it is really the year +2199, though the Matrix gives the impression that it is 1999. + +This is where the Matrix and reality diverge. Though a human who would +experience both would find them indistinguishable - objectively they +are different. In one of them (the Matrix), people have no objective +TIME (though the Matrix might have it). The other (reality) is +governed by it. + +Under the spell of the Matrix, people feel as though time goes by. +They have functioning watches. The sun rises and sets. Seasons change. +They grow old and die. This is not entirely an illusion. Their bodies +do decay and die, as ours do. They are not exempt from the laws of +nature. But their AWARENESS of time is computer generated. The Matrix +is sufficiently sophisticated and knowledgeable to maintain a close +correlation between the physical state of the human (his health and +age) and his consciousness of the passage of time. The basic rules of +time - for instance, its asymmetry - are part of the program. + +But this is precisely it. Time in the minds of these people is +program-generated, not reality-induced. It is not the derivative of +change and irreversible (thermodynamic and other) processes OUT THERE. +Their minds are part of a computer program and the computer program is +a part of their minds. + +Their bodies are static, degenerating in their protective nests. +Nothing happens to them except in their minds. They have no physical +effect on the world. They effect no change. These things set the +Matrix and reality apart. + +To "qualify" as reality a two-way interaction must occur. One flow of +data is when reality influences the minds of people (as does the +Matrix). The obverse, but equally necessary, type of data flow is when +people know reality and influence it. The Matrix triggers a time +sensation in people the same way that the Universe triggers a time +sensation in us. Something does happen OUT THERE and it is called the +Matrix. In this sense, the Matrix is real, it is the reality of these +humans. It maintains the requirement of the first type of flow of +data. But it fails the second test: people do not know that it exists +or any of its attributes, nor do they affect it irreversibly. They do +not change the Matrix. Paradoxically, the rebels do affect the Matrix +(they almost destroy it). In doing so, they make it REAL. It is their +REALITY because they KNOW it and they irreversibly CHANGE it. + +Applying this dual-track test, "virtual" reality IS a reality, albeit, +at this stage, of a deterministic type. It affects our minds, we know +that it exists and we affect it in return. Our choices and actions +irreversibly alter the state of the system. This altered state, in +turn, affects our minds. This interaction IS what we call "reality". +With the advent of stochastic and quantum virtual reality generators - +the distinction between "real" and "virtual" will fade. The Matrix +thus is not impossible. But that it is possible - does not make it +real. + + + The Shattered Identity + + By: Sam Vaknin + + + Read these essays first: + + The Habitual Identity + + Death, Meaning, and Identity + + Fact and Truth + + Dreams - The Metaphors of Mind + + +I. Exposition + +In the movie "Shattered" (1991), Dan Merrick survives an accident and +develops total amnesia regarding his past. His battered face is +reconstructed by plastic surgeons and, with the help of his loving +wife, he gradually recovers his will to live. But he never develops a +proper sense of identity. It is as though he is constantly ill at ease +in his own body. As the plot unravels, Dan is led to believe that he +may have murdered his wife's lover, Jack. This thriller offers +additional twists and turns but, throughout it all, we face this +question: + +Dan has no recollection of being Dan. Dan does not remember murdering +Jack. It seems as though Dan's very identity has been erased. Yet, Dan +is in sound mind and can tell right from wrong. Should Dan be held +(morally and, as a result, perhaps legally as well) accountable for +Jack's murder? + +Would the answer to this question still be the same had Dan erased +from his memory ONLY the crime -but recalled everything else (in an +act of selective dissociation)? Do our moral and legal accountability +and responsibility spring from the integrity of our memories? If Dan +were to be punished for a crime he doesn't have the faintest +recollection of committing - wouldn't he feel horribly wronged? +Wouldn't he be justified in feeling so? + +There are many states of consciousness that involve dissociation and +selective amnesia: hypnosis, trance and possession, hallucination, +illusion, memory disorders (like organic, or functional amnesia), +depersonalization disorder, dissociative fugue, dreaming, psychosis, +post traumatic stress disorder, and drug-induced psychotomimetic +states. + +Consider this, for instance: + +What if Dan were the victim of a Multiple Personality Disorder (now +known as "Dissociative Identity Disorder")? What if one of his +"alters" (i.e., one of the multitude of "identities" sharing Dan's +mind and body) committed the crime? Should Dan still be held +responsible? What if the alter "John" committed the crime and then +"vanished", leaving behind another alter (let us say, "Joseph") in +control? + +Should "Joseph" be held responsible for the crime "John" committed? +What if "John" were to reappear 10 years after he "vanished"? What if +he were to reappear 50 years after he "vanished"? What if he were to +reappear for a period of 90 days - only to "vanish" again? And what is +Dan's role in all this? Who, exactly, then, is Dan? + +II. Who is Dan? + +Buddhism compares Man to a river. Both retain their identity despite +the fact that their individual composition is different at different +moments. The possession of a body as the foundation of a self-identity +is a dubious proposition. Bodies change drastically in time (consider +a baby compared to an adult). Almost all the cells in a human body are +replaced every few years. Changing one's brain (by transplantation) - +also changes one's identity, even if the rest of the body remains the +same. + +Thus, the only thing that binds a "person" together (i.e., gives him a +self and an identity) is time, or, more precisely, memory. By "memory" +I also mean: personality, skills, habits, retrospected emotions - in +short: all long term imprints and behavioural patterns. The body is +not an accidental and insignificant container, of course. It +constitutes an important part of one's self-image, self-esteem, sense +of self-worth, and sense of existence (spatial, temporal, and social). +But one can easily imagine a brain in vitro as having the same +identity as when it resided in a body. One cannot imagine a body +without a brain (or with a different brain) as having the same +identity it had before the brain was removed or replaced. + +What if the brain in vitro (in the above example) could not +communicate with us at all? Would we still think it is possessed of a +self? The biological functions of people in coma are maintained. But +do they have an identity, a self? If yes, why do we "pull the plug" on +them so often? + +It would seem (as it did to Locke) that we accept that someone has a +self-identity if: (a) He has the same hardware as we do (notably, a +brain) and (b) He communicates his humanly recognizable and +comprehensible inner world to us and manipulates his environment. We +accept that he has a given (i.e., the same continuous) self-identity +if (c) He shows consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns +("memory") in doing (b) for a long period of time. + +It seems that we accept that we have a self-identity (i.e., we are +self-conscious) if (a) We discern (usually through introspection) long +term consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in our +manipulation ("relating to") of our environment and (b) Others accept +that we have a self-identity (Herbert Mead, Feuerbach). + +Dan (probably) has the same hardware as we do (a brain). He +communicates his (humanly recognizable and comprehensible) inner world +to us (which is how he manipulates us and his environment). Thus, Dan +clearly has a self-identity. But he is inconsistent. His intentional +(willed) patterns, his memory, are incompatible with those +demonstrated by Dan before the accident. Though he clearly is +possessed of a self-identity, we cannot say that he has the SAME +self-identity he possessed before the crash. In other words, we cannot +say that he, indeed, is Dan. + +Dan himself does not feel that he has a self-identity at all. He +discerns intentional (willed) patterns in his manipulation of his +environment but, due to his amnesia, he cannot tell if these are +consistent, or long term. In other words, Dan has no memory. Moreover, +others do not accept him as Dan (or have their doubts) because they +have no memory of Dan as he is now. + +Interim conclusion: + +Having a memory is a necessary and sufficient condition for possessing +a self-identity. + +III. Repression + +Yet, resorting to memory to define identity may appear to be a +circular (even tautological) argument. When we postulate memory - +don't we already presuppose the existence of a "remembering agent" +with an established self-identity? + +Moreover, we keep talking about "discerning", "intentional", or +"willed" patterns. But isn't a big part of our self (in the form of +the unconscious, full of repressed memories) unavailable to us? Don't +we develop defence mechanisms against repressed memories and +fantasies, against unconscious content incongruent with our +self-image? Even worse, this hidden, inaccessible, dynamically active +part of our self is thought responsible for our recurrent discernible +patterns of behaviour. The phenomenon of posthypnotic suggestion seems +to indicate that this may be the case. The existence of a +self-identity is, therefore, determined through introspection (by +oneself) and observation (by others) of merely the conscious part of +the self. + +But the unconscious is as much a part of one's self-identity as one's +conscious. What if, due to a mishap, the roles were reversed? What if +Dan's conscious part were to become his unconscious and his +unconscious part - his conscious? What if all his conscious memories, +drives, fears, wishes, fantasies, and hopes - were to become +unconscious while his repressed memories, drives, etc. - were to +become conscious? Would we still say that it is "the same" Dan and +that he retains his self-identity? Not very likely. And yet, one's +(unremembered) unconscious - for instance, the conflict between id and +ego - determines one's personality and self-identity. + +The main contribution of psychoanalysis and later psychodynamic +schools is the understanding that self-identity is a dynamic, +evolving, ever-changing construct - and not a static, inertial, and +passive entity. It casts doubt over the meaningfulness of the question +with which we ended the exposition: "Who, exactly, then, is Dan?" Dan +is different at different stages of his life (Erikson) and he +constantly evolves in accordance with his innate nature (Jung), past +history (Adler), drives (Freud), cultural milieu (Horney), upbringing +(Klein, Winnicott), needs (Murray), or the interplay with his genetic +makeup. Dan is not a thing - he is a process. Even Dan's personality +traits and cognitive style, which may well be stable, are often +influenced by Dan's social setting and by his social interactions. + +It would seem that having a memory is a necessary but insufficient +condition for possessing a self-identity. One cannot remember one's +unconscious states (though one can remember their outcomes). One often +forgets events, names, and other information even if it was conscious +at a given time in one's past. Yet, one's (unremembered) unconscious +is an integral and important part of one's identity and one's self. +The remembered as well as the unremembered constitute one's +self-identity. + +IV. The Memory Link + +Hume said that to be considered in possession of a mind, a creature +needs to have a few states of consciousness linked by memory in a kind +of narrative or personal mythology. Can this conjecture be equally +applied to unconscious mental states (e.g. subliminal perceptions, +beliefs, drives, emotions, desires, etc.)? + +In other words, can we rephrase Hume and say that to be considered in +possession of a mind, a creature needs to have a few states of +consciousness and a few states of the unconscious - all linked by +memory into a personal narrative? Isn't it a contradiction in terms to +remember the unconscious? + +The unconscious and the subliminal are instance of the general +category of mental phenomena which are not states of consciousness +(i.e., are not conscious). Sleep and hypnosis are two others. But so +are "background mental phenomena" - e.g., one holds onto one's beliefs +and knowledge even when one is not aware (conscious) of them at every +given moment. + +We know that an apple will fall towards the earth, we know how to +drive a car ("automatically"), and we believe that the sun will rise +tomorrow, even though we do not spend every second of our waking life +consciously thinking about falling apples, driving cars, or the +position of the sun. + +Yet, the fact that knowledge and beliefs and other background mental +phenomena are not constantly conscious - does not mean that they +cannot be remembered. They can be remembered either by an act of will, +or in (sometimes an involuntary) response to changes in the +environment. The same applies to all other unconscious content. +Unconscious content can be recalled. Psychoanalysis, for instance, is +about re-introducing repressed unconscious content to the patient's +conscious memory and thus making it "remembered". + +In fact, one's self-identity may be such a background mental +phenomenon (always there, not always conscious, not always +remembered). The acts of will which bring it to the surface are what +we call "memory" and "introspection". + +This would seem to imply that having a self-identity is independent of +having a memory (or the ability to introspect). Memory is just the +mechanism by which one becomes aware of one's background, "always-on", +and omnipresent (all-pervasive) self-identity. Self-identity is the +object and predicate of memory and introspection. It is as though +self-identity were an emergent extensive parameter of the complex +human system - measurable by the dual techniques of memory and +introspection. + +We, therefore, have to modify our previous conclusions: + +Having a memory is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition for +possessing a self-identity. + +We are back to square one. The poor souls in Oliver Sacks' tome, "The +Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat" are unable to create and retain +memories. They occupy an eternal present, with no past. They are thus +unable to access (or invoke) their self-identity by remembering it. +Their self-identity is unavailable to them (though it is available to +those who observe them over many years) - but it exists for sure. +Therapy often succeeds in restoring pre-amnesiac memories and +self-identity. + +V. The Incorrigible Self + +Self-identity is not only always-on and all-pervasive - but also +incorrigible. In other words, no one - neither an observer, nor the +person himself - can "disprove" the existence of his self-identity. No +one can prove that a report about the existence of his (or another's) +self-identity is mistaken. + +Is it equally safe to say that no one - neither an observer, nor the +person himself - can prove (or disprove) the non-existence of his +self-identity? Would it be correct to say that no one can prove that a +report about the non-existence of his (or another's) self-identity is +true or false? + +Dan's criminal responsibility crucially depends on the answers to +these questions. Dan cannot be held responsible for Jack's murder if +he can prove that he is ignorant of the facts of his action (i.e., if +he can prove the non-existence of his self-identity). If he has no +access to his (former) self-identity - he can hardly be expected to be +aware and cognizant of these facts. + +What is in question is not Dan's mens rea, nor the application of the +McNaghten tests (did Dan know the nature and quality of his act or +could he tell right from wrong) to determine whether Dan was insane +when he committed the crime. A much broader issue is at stake: is it +the same person? Is the murderous Dan the same person as the current +Dan? Even though Dan seems to own the same body and brain and is +manifestly sane - he patently has no access to his (former) +self-identity. He has changed so drastically that it is arguable +whether he is still the same person - he has been "replaced". + +Finally, we can try to unite all the strands of our discourse into +this double definition: + +It would seem that we accept that someone has a self-identity if: (a) +He has the same hardware as we do (notably, a brain) and, by +implication, the same software as we do (an all-pervasive, omnipresent +self-identity) and (b) He communicates his humanly recognizable and +comprehensible inner world to us and manipulates his environment. We +accept that he has a specific (i.e., the same continuous) +self-identity if (c) He shows consistent intentional (i.e., willed) +patterns ("memory") in doing (b) for a long period of time. + +It seems that we accept that we have a specific self-identity (i.e., +we are self-conscious of a specific identity) if (a) We discern +(usually through memory and introspection) long term consistent +intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in our manipulation +("relating to") of our environment and (b) Others accept that we have +a specific self-identity. + +In conclusion: Dan undoubtedly has a self-identity (being human and, +thus, endowed with a brain). Equally undoubtedly, this self-identity +is not Dan's (but a new, unfamiliar, one). + +Such is the stuff of our nightmares - body snatching, demonic +possession, waking up in a strange place, not knowing who we are. +Without a continuous personal history - we are not. It is what binds +our various bodies, states of mind, memories, skills, emotions, and +cognitions - into a coherent bundle of identity. Dan speaks, drinks, +dances, talks, and makes love - but throughout that time, he is not +present because he does not remember Dan and how it is to be Dan. He +may have murdered Jake - but, by all philosophical and ethical +criteria, it was most definitely not his fault. + + Titanic, or a Moral Deliberation + + By: Sam Vaknin + +The film "Titanic" is riddled with moral dilemmas. In one of the +scenes, the owner of Star Line, the shipping company that owned the +now-sinking Unsinkable, joins a lowered life-boat. The tortured +expression on his face demonstrates that even he experiences more than +unease at his own conduct. Prior to the disaster, he instructs the +captain to adopt a policy dangerous to the ship. Indeed, it proves +fatal. A complicating factor was the fact that only women and children +were allowed by the officers in charge into the lifeboats. Another was +the discrimination against Third Class passengers. The boats sufficed +only to half the number of those on board and the First Class, High +Society passengers were preferred over the Low-Life immigrants under +deck. + +Why do we all feel that the owner should have stayed on and faced his +inevitable death? Because we judge him responsible for the demise of +the ship. Additionally, his wrong instructions - motivated by greed +and the pursuit of celebrity - were a crucial contributing factor. The +owner should have been punished (in his future) for things that he has +done (in his past). This is intuitively appealing. + +Would we have rendered the same judgement had the Titanic's fate been +the outcome of accident and accident alone? If the owner of the ship +could have had no control over the circumstances of its horrible +ending - would we have still condemned him for saving his life? Less +severely, perhaps. So, the fact that a moral entity has ACTED (or +omitted, or refrained from acting) in its past is essential in +dispensing with future rewards or punishments. + +The "product liability" approach also fits here. The owner (and his +"long arms": manufacturer, engineers, builders, etc.) of the Titanic +were deemed responsible because they implicitly contracted with their +passengers. They made a representation (which was explicit in their +case but is implicit in most others): "This ship was constructed with +knowledge and forethought. The best design was employed to avoid +danger. The best materials to increase pleasure." That the Titanic +sank was an irreversible breach of this contract. In a way, it was an +act of abrogation of duties and obligations. The owner/manufacturer of +a product must compensate the consumers should his product harm them +in any manner that they were not explicitly, clearly, visibly and +repeatedly warned against. Moreover, he should even make amends if the +product failed to meet the reasonable and justified expectations of +consumers, based on such warrants and representations. The payment +should be either in kind (as in more ancient justice systems) or in +cash (as in modern Western civilization). + +The product called "Titanic" took away the lives of its end-users. Our +"gut justice" tells us that the owner should have paid in kind. Faulty +engineering, insufficient number of lifeboats, over-capacity, hubris, +passengers and crew not drilled to face emergencies, extravagant +claims regarding the ship's resilience, contravening the captain's +professional judgement. All these seem to be sufficient grounds to the +death penalty. + +And yet, this is not the real question. The serious problem is this : +WHY should anyone pay in his future for his actions in the past? +First, there are some thorny issues to be eliminated. Such as +determinism: if there is no free will, there can be no personal +responsibility. Another is the preservation of personal identity: are +the person who committed the act and the person who is made to pay for +it - one and the same? If the answer is in the affirmative, in which +sense are they the same, the physical, the mental? Is the "overlap" +only limited and probabilistic? Still, we could assume, for this +discussion's sake, that the personal identity is undeniably and +absolutely preserved and that there is free will and, therefore, that +people can predict the outcomes of their actions, to a reasonable +degree of accuracy and that they elect to accept these outcomes prior +to the commission of their acts or to their omission. All this does +not answer the question that opened this paragraph. Even if there were +a contract signed between the acting person and the world, in which +the person willingly, consciously and intelligently (=without +diminished responsibility) accepted the future outcome of his acts, +the questions would remain: WHY should it be so? Why cannot we +conceive of a world in which acts and outcomes are divorced? It is +because we cannot believe in an a-causal world. + +Causality is a relationship (mostly between two things, or, rather, +events, the cause and the effect). Something generates or produces +another. Therefore, it is the other's efficient cause and it acts upon +it (=it acts to bring it about) through the mechanism of efficient +causation. A cause can be a direct physical mechanism or an +explanatory feature (historical cause). Of Aristotle's Four Causes +(Formal, Material, Efficient and Final), only the efficient cause +creates something distinguishable from itself. The causal discourse, +therefore, is problematic (how can a cause lead to an effect, +indistinguishable from itself?). Singular Paradigmatic Causal +Statements (Event A caused Event B) differ from General ones (Event A +causes Event B). Both are inadequate in dealing with mundane, routine, +causal statements because they do not reveal an OVERT relation between +the two events discussed. Moreover, in daily usage we treat facts (as +well as events) as causes. Not all the philosophers are in agreement +regarding factual causation. Davidson, for instance, admits that facts +can be RELEVANT to causal explanations but refuses to accept them AS +reasons. Acts may be distinct from facts, philosophically, but not in +day-to-day regular usage. By laymen (the vast majority of humanity, +that is), though, they are perceived to be the same. + +Pairs of events that are each other's cause and effect are accorded a +special status. But, that one follows the other (even if invariably) +is insufficient grounds to endow them with this status. This is the +famous "Post hoc, ergo propter hoc" fallacy. Other relations must be +weighed and the possibility of common causation must be seriously +contemplated. Such sequencing is, conceptually, not even necessary: +simultaneous causation and backwards causation are part of modern +physics, for instance. + +Time seems to be irrelevant to the status of events, though both time +and causation share an asymmetric structure (A causes B but B does not +cause A). The direction (the asymmetry) of the causal chain is not of +the same type as the direction (asymmetry) of time. The former is +formal, the latter, presumably, physical, or mental. A more serious +problem, to my mind, is the converse: what sets apart causal (cause +and effect) pairs of events from other pairs in which both +member-events are the outcomes of a common cause? Event B can +invariably follow Event A and still not be its effect. Both events +could have been caused by a common cause. A cause either necessitates +the effect, or is a sufficient condition for its occurrence. The +sequence is either inevitable, or possible. The meaninglessness of +this sentence is evident. + +Here, philosophers diverge. Some say (following Hume's reasoning and +his constant conjunction relation between events) that a necessary +causal relation exists between events when one is the inevitable +outcome (=follows) the other. Others propound a weaker version: the +necessity of the effect is hypothetical or conditional, given the laws +of nature. Put differently: to say that A necessitates (=causes) B is +no more than to say that it is a result of the laws of nature that +when A happens, so does B. Hempel generalized this approach. He said +that a statement of a fact (whether a private or a general fact) is +explained only if deduced from other statements, at least one of which +is a statement of a general scientific law. + +This is the "Covering Law Model" and it implies a symmetry between +explaining and predicting (at least where private facts are +concerned). If an event can be explained, it could have been predicted +and vice versa. Needless to say that Hempel's approach did not get us +nearer to solving the problems of causal priority and of +indeterministic causation. + +The Empiricists went a step further. They stipulated that the laws of +nature are contingencies and not necessary truths. Other chains of +events are possible where the laws of nature are different. This is +the same tired regularity theory in a more exotic guise. They are all +descendants of Hume's definition of causality: "An object followed by +another and where all the objects that resemble the first are followed +by objects that resemble the second." Nothing in the world is, +therefore, a causal necessity, events are only constantly conjoined. +Regularities in our experience condition us to form the idea of causal +necessity and to deduce that causes must generate events. Kant called +this latter deduction "A bastard of the imagination, impregnated by +experience" with no legitimate application in the world. It also +constituted a theological impediment. God is considered to be "Causa +Sui", His own cause. But any application of a causal chain or force, +already assumes the existence of a cause. This existence cannot, +therefore, be the outcome of the use made of it. God had to be recast +as the uncaused cause of the existence of all things contingent and +His existence necessitated no cause because He, himself, is necessary. +This is flimsy stuff and it gets even flimsier when the issue of +causal deviance is debated. + +A causal deviance is an abnormal, though causal, relation between +events or states of the world. It mainly arises when we introduce +intentional action and perception into the theory of causation. Let us +revert to the much-maligned owner of the sinking Titanic. He intended +to do one thing and another happened. Granted, if he intended to do +something and his intention was the cause of his doing so - then we +could have said that he intentionally committed an act. But what if he +intended to do one thing and out came another? And what if he intended +to do something, mistakenly did something else and, still, +accidentally, achieved what he set out to do? The popular example is +if someone intends to do something and gets so nervous that it happens +even without an act being committed (intends to refuse an invitation +by his boss, gets so nervous that he falls asleep and misses the +party). Are these actions and intentions in their classical senses? +There is room for doubt. Davidson narrows down the demands. To him, +"thinking causes" (causally efficient propositional attitudes) are +nothing but causal relations between events with the right application +of mental predicates which ascribe propositional attitudes supervening +the right application of physical predicates. This approach omits +intention altogether, not to mention the ascription of desire and +belief. + +But shouldn't have the hapless owner availed his precious place to +women and children? Should not he have obeyed the captain's orders +(=the marine law)? Should we succumb to laws that put our lives at +risk (fight in a war, sink with a ship)? The reason that women and +children are preferred over men is that they represent the future. +They are either capable of bringing life to the world (women) - or of +living longer (children). Societal etiquette reflects the arithmetic +of the species, in this (and in many another) case. But if this were +entirely and exclusively so, then young girls and female infants would +have been preferred over all the other groups of passengers. Old women +would have been left with the men, to die. That the actual (and +declared) selection processes differed from our theoretical exercise +says a lot about the vigorousness and applicability of our theories - +and a lot about the real world out there. The owner's behaviour may +have been deplorable - but it, definitely, was natural. He put his +interests (his survival) above the concerns of his society and his +species. Most of us would have done the same under the same +circumstances. + +The owner of the ship - though "Newly Rich" - undoubtedly belonged to +the First Class, Upper Crust, Cream of Society passengers. These were +treated to the lifeboats before the passengers of the lower classes +and decks. Was this a morally right decision? For sure, it was not +politically correct, in today's terms. Class and money distinctions +were formally abolished three decades ago in the enlightened West. +Discrimination between human beings in now allowed only on the basis +of merit (=on the basis of one's natural endowments). Why should we +think one basis for discrimination preferable to another? Can we +eliminate discrimination completely and if it were possible, would it +have been desirable? + +The answers, in my view, are that no basis of discrimination can hold +the moral high ground. They are all morally problematic because they +are deterministic and assign independent, objective, exogenous values +to humans. On the other hand, we are not born equal, nor do we proceed +to develop equally, or live under the same circumstances and +conditions. It is impossible to equate the unequal. Discrimination is +not imposed by humans on an otherwise egalitarian world. It is +introduced by the world into human society. And the elimination of +discrimination would constitute a grave error. The inequalities among +humans and the ensuing conflicts are the fuel that feeds the engines +of human development. Hopes, desires, aspirations and inspiration are +all the derivatives of discrimination or of the wish to be favoured, +or preferred over others. Disparities of money create markets, labour, +property, planning, wealth and capital. Mental inequalities lead to +innovation and theory. Knowledge differentials are at the heart of +educational institutions, professionalism, government and so on. +Osmotic and diffusive forces in human society are all the results of +incongruences, disparities, differences, inequalities and the negative +and positive emotions attached to them. The passengers of the first +class were preferred because they paid more for their tickets. +Inevitably, a tacit portion of the price went to amortize the costs of +"class insurance": should anything bad happen to this boat, persons +who paid a superior price will be entitled to receive a superior +treatment. There is nothing morally wrong with this. Some people get +to sit in the front rows of a theatre, or to travel in luxury, or to +receive superior medical treatment (or any medical treatment) +precisely because of this reason. There is no practical or +philosophical difference between an expensive liver transplant and a +place in a life boat. Both are lifesavers. + +A natural disaster is no Great Equalizer. Nothing is. Even the +argument that money is "external" or "accidental" to the rich +individual is weak. Often, people who marry for money considerations +are judged to be insincere or worse (cunning, conspiring, evil). "He +married her for her money", we say, as though the she-owner and the +money were two separate things. The equivalent sentence: "He married +her for her youth or for her beauty" sounds flawed. But youth and +beauty are more temporary and transient than money. They are really +accidental because the individual has no responsibility for or share +in their generation and has no possibility to effect their long-term +preservation. Money, on the other hand, is generated or preserved (or +both) owing to the personality of its owner. It is a better reflection +of personality than youth, beauty and many other (transient or +situation-dependent) "character" traits. Money is an integral part of +its owner and a reliable witness as to his mental disposition. It is, +therefore, a valid criterion for discrimination. + +The other argument in favour of favouring the first class passengers +is their contribution to society. A rich person contributes more to +his society in the shorter and medium term than a poor person. Vincent +Van Gogh may have been a million times more valuable to humanity, as a +whole, than his brother Theo - in the long run. But in the +intermediate term, Theo made it possible for Vincent and many others +(family, employees, suppliers, their dependants and his country) to +survive by virtue of his wealth. Rich people feed and cloth poor +people directly (employment, donations) and indirectly (taxation). The +opposite, alas, is not the case. Yet, this argument is flawed because +it does not take time into account. We have no way to predict the +future with any certainty. + +Each person carries the Marshall's baton in his bag, the painter's +brush, the author's fables. It is the potential that should count. A +selection process, which would have preferred Theo to Vincent would +have been erroneous. In the long run, Vincent proved more beneficial +to human society and in more ways - including financially - then Theo +could have ever been. + + Being John Malkovich + + By: Dr. Sam Vaknin + + +A quintessential loser, an out-of-job puppeteer, is hired by a firm, +whose offices are ensconced in a half floor (literally. The ceiling is +about a metre high, reminiscent of Taniel's hallucinatory Alice in +Wonderland illustrations). By sheer accident, he discovers a tunnel (a +"portal", in Internet-age parlance), which sucks its visitors into the +mind of the celebrated actor, John Malkovich. The movie is a tongue in +cheek discourse of identity, gender and passion in an age of languid +promiscuity. It poses all the right metaphysical riddles and presses +the viewers' intellectual stimulation buttons. + +A two line bit of dialogue, though, forms the axis of this +nightmarishly chimerical film. John Malkovich (played by himself), +enraged and bewildered by the unabashed commercial exploitation of the +serendipitous portal to his mind, insists that Craig, the +aforementioned puppet master, cease and desist with his activities. +"It is MY brain" - he screams and, with a typical American finale, "I +will see you in court". Craig responds: "But, it was I who discovered +the portal. It is my livelihood". + +This apparently innocuous exchange disguises a few very unsettling +ethical dilemmas. + +The basic question is "whose brain is it, anyway"? Does John Malkovich +OWN his brain? Is one's brain - one's PROPERTY? Property is usually +acquired somehow. Is our brain "acquired"? It is clear that we do not +acquire the hardware (neurones) and software (electrical and chemical +pathways) we are born with. But it is equally clear that we do +"acquire" both brain mass and the contents of our brains (its wiring +or irreversible chemical changes) through learning and experience. +Does this process of acquisition endow us with property rights? + +It would seem that property rights pertaining to human bodies are +fairly restricted. We have no right to sell our kidneys, for instance. +Or to destroy our body through the use of drugs. Or to commit an +abortion at will. Yet, the law does recognize and strives to enforce +copyrights, patents and other forms of intellectual property rights. + +This dichotomy is curious. For what is intellectual property but a +mere record of the brain's activities? A book, a painting, an +invention are the documentation and representation of brain waves. +They are mere shadows, symbols of the real presence - our mind. How +can we reconcile this contradiction? We are deemed by the law to be +capable of holding full and unmitigated rights to the PRODUCTS of our +brain activity, to the recording and documentation of our brain waves. +But we hold only partial rights to the brain itself, their originator. + +This can be somewhat understood if we were to consider this article, +for instance. It is composed on a word processor. I do not own full +rights to the word processing software (merely a licence), nor is the +laptop I use my property - but I posses and can exercise and enforce +full rights regarding this article. + +Admittedly, it is a partial parallel, at best: the computer and word +processing software are passive elements. It is my brain that does the +authoring. And so, the mystery remains: how can I own the article - +but not my brain? Why do I have the right to ruin the article at will +- but not to annihilate my brain at whim? + +Another angle of philosophical attack is to say that we rarely hold +rights to nature or to life. We can copyright a photograph we take of +a forest - but not the forest. To reduce it to the absurd: we can own +a sunset captured on film - but never the phenomenon thus documented. +The brain is natural and life's pivot - could this be why we cannot +fully own it? + +Wrong premises inevitably lead to wrong conclusions. We often own +natural objects and manifestations, including those related to human +life directly. We even issue patents for sequences of human DNA. And +people do own forests and rivers and the specific views of sunsets. + +Some scholars raise the issues of exclusivity and scarcity as the +precursors of property rights. My brain can be accessed only by myself +and its is one of a kind (sui generis). True but not relevant. One +cannot rigorously derive from these properties of our brain a right to +deny others access to them (should this become technologically +feasible) - or even to set a price on such granted access. In other +words, exclusivity and scarcity do not constitute property rights or +even lead to their establishment. Other rights may be at play (the +right to privacy, for instance) - but not the right to own property +and to derive economic benefits from such ownership. + +On the contrary, it is surprisingly easy to think of numerous +exceptions to a purported natural right of single access to one's +brain. If one memorized the formula to cure AIDS or cancer and refused +to divulge it for a reasonable compensation - surely, we should feel +entitled to invade his brain and extract it? Once such technology is +available - shouldn't authorized bodies of inspection have access to +the brains of our leaders on a periodic basis? And shouldn't we all +gain visitation rights to the minds of great men and women of science, +art and culture - as we do today gain access to their homes and to the +products of their brains? + +There is one hidden assumption, though, in both the movie and this +article. It is that mind and brain are one. The portal leads to John +Malkovich's MIND - yet, he keeps talking about his BRAIN and writhing +physically on the screen. The portal is useless without JM's mind. +Indeed, one can wonder whether JM's mind is not an INTEGRAL part of +the portal - structurally and functionally inseparable from it. If so, +does not the discoverer of the portal hold equal rights to John +Malkovich's mind, an integral part thereof? + +The portal leads to JM's mind. Can we prove that it leads to his +brain? Is this identity automatic? Of course not. It is the old +psychophysical question, at the heart of dualism - still far from +resolved. Can a MIND be copyrighted or patented? If no one knows WHAT +is the mind - how can it be the subject of laws and rights? If JM is +bothered by the portal voyagers, the intruders - he surely has legal +recourse, but not through the application of the rights to own +property and to benefit from it. These rights provide him with no +remedy because their subject (the mind) is a mystery. + +Can JM sue Craig and his clientele for unauthorized visits to his mind +(trespassing) - IF he is unaware of their comings and goings and +unperturbed by them? Moreover, can he prove that the portal leads to +HIS mind, that it is HIS mind that is being visited? Is there a way to +PROVE that one has visited another's mind? (See: "On Empathy"). + +And if property rights to one's brain and mind were firmly established +- how will telepathy (if ever proven) be treated legally? Or mind +reading? The recording of dreams? Will a distinction be made between a +mere visit - and the exercise of influence on the host and his / her +manipulation (similar questions arise in time travel)? + +This, precisely, is where the film crosses the line between the +intriguing and the macabre. The master puppeteer, unable to resist his +urges, manipulates John Malkovich and finally possesses him +completely. This is so clearly wrong, so manifestly forbidden, so +patently immoral, that the film loses its urgent ambivalence, its +surrealistic moral landscape and deteriorates into another banal +comedy of situations. + + Dreamcatcher - The Myth of Destructibility + + By: Dr. Sam Vaknin + + Read these essays first: + + The Habitual Identity + + Death, Meaning, and Identity + + Being John Malkovich + + "Shattered" Identity + + More Film REVIEWS - HERE! + + In the movie "Dreamcatcher", four childhood friends, exposed to an +alien, disguised as a retarded child, develop psychic powers. Years +later they reunite only to confront a vicious extraterrestrial +life-form. Only two survive but they succeed to eradicate the monster +by incinerating it and crushing its tiny off-spring underfoot. + +Being mortal ourselves, we cannot conceive of an indestructible +entity. The artifacts of popular culture - thrillers, action and +sci-fi films, video games, computer viruses - assume that all +organisms, organizations and automata possess fatal vulnerabilities. +Medicine and warfare are predicated on a similar contention. + +We react with shock and horror when we are faced with "resistant +stains" of bacteria or with creatures, machines, or groups able to +survive and thrive in extremely hostile environments. + +Destruction is multi-faceted. Even the simplest system has a structure +and performs functions. If the spatial continuity or arrangement of an +entity's structure is severed or substantially transformed - its +functions are usually adversely affected. Direct interference with a +system's functionality is equally deleterious. + +We can render a system dysfunctional by inhibiting or reversing any +stage in the complex processes involved - or by preventing the +entity's communication with its environs. Another method of +annihilation involves the alteration of the entity's context - its +surroundings, its codes and signals, its interactive patterns, its +potential partners, friends and foes. + +Finding the lethal weaknesses of an organism, an apparatus, or a +society is described as a process of trial and error. But the outcome +is guaranteed: mortal susceptibility is assumed to be a universal +trait. No one and nothing is perfectly immune, utterly invulnerable, +or beyond extermination. + +Yet, what is poison to one species is nectar to another. Water can be +either toxic or indispensable, depending on the animal, the automaton, +or the system. Scorching temperatures, sulfur emissions, ammonia or +absolute lack of oxygen are, to some organisms, the characteristics of +inviting habitats. To others, the very same are deadly. + +Can we conceive of an indestructible thing - be it unicellular or +multicellular, alive or robotic, composed of independent individuals +or acting in perfect, centrally-dictated unison? Can anything be, in +principle, eternal? + +This question is not as outlandish as it sounds. By fighting disease +and trying to postpone death, for instance, we aspire to immortality +and imperishability. Some of us believe in God - an entity securely +beyond ruin. Intuitively, we consider the Universe - if not time and +space - to be everlasting, though constantly metamorphosing. + +What is common to these examples of infinite resilience is their +unbounded and unparalleled size and might. Lesser objects are born or +created. Since there has been a time, prior to their genesis, in which +they did not exist - it is easy to imagine a future without them. + +Even where the distinction between individual and collective is +spurious their end is plausible. True, though we can obliterate +numerous "individual" bacteria - others, genetically identical, will +always survive our onslaught. Yet, should the entire Earth vanish - so +would these organisms. The extinction of all bacteria, though +predicated on an unlikely event, is still thinkable. + +But what about an entity that is "pure energy", a matrix of fields, a +thought, immaterial yet very real, omnipresent and present nowhere? +Such a being comes perilously close to the divine. For if it is +confined to certain space - however immense - it is perishable +together with that space. If it is not - then it is God, as perceived +by its believers. + +But what constitutes "destruction" or "annihilation"? We are familiar +with death - widely considered the most common form of inexistence. +But some people believe that death is merely a transformation from one +state of being to another. Sometimes all the constituents of a system +remain intact but cease to interact. Does this amount to obliteration? +And what about a machine that stops interacting with its environment +altogether - though its internal processes continue unabated. Is it +still "functioning"? + +It is near impossible to say when a "live" or "functioning" entity +ceases to be so. Death is the form of destruction we are most +acquainted with. For a discussion of death and the human condition - +read this Death, Meaning, and Identity + + + + T H E A U T H O R + + + +SHMUEL (SAM) VAKNIN + + +Curriculum Vitae + +Click on blue text to access relevant web sites - thank you. + +Born in 1961 in Qiryat-Yam, Israel. + +Served in the Israeli Defence Force (1979-1982) in training and +education units. + +Education + +Graduated a few semesters in the Technion - Israel Institute of +Technology, Haifa. + +Ph.D. in Philosophy (major : Philosophy of Physics) - Pacific Western +University, California. + +Graduate of numerous courses in Finance Theory and International +Trading. + +Certified E-Commerce Concepts Analyst. + +Certified in Psychological Counselling Techniques. + +Full proficiency in Hebrew and in English. + +Business Experience + +1980 to 1983 + +Founder and co-owner of a chain of computerized information kiosks in +Tel-Aviv, Israel. + +1982 to 1985 + +Senior positions with the Nessim D. Gaon Group of Companies in Geneva, +Paris and New-York (NOGA and APROFIM SA): + +- Chief Analyst of Edible Commodities in the Group's Headquarters in +Switzerland. +- Manager of the Research and Analysis Division +- Manager of the Data Processing Division +- Project Manager of The Nigerian Computerized Census +- Vice President in charge of RND and Advanced Technologies +- Vice President in charge of Sovereign Debt Financing + +1985 to 1986 + +Represented Canadian Venture Capital Funds in Israel. + +1986 to 1987 + +General Manager of IPE Ltd. in London. The firm financed international +multi-lateral countertrade and leasing transactions. + + +1988 to 1990 + +Co-founder and Director of "Mikbats - Tesuah", a portfolio management +firm based in Tel-Aviv. +Activities included large-scale portfolio management, underwriting, +forex trading and general financial advisory services. + +1990 to Present + +Free-lance consultant to many of Israel's Blue-Chip firms, mainly on +issues related to the capital markets in Israel, Canada, the UK and +the USA. + +Consultant to foreign RND ventures and to Governments on +macro-economic matters. + +President of the Israel chapter of the Professors World Peace Academy +(PWPA) and (briefly) Israel representative of the "Washington Times". + +1993 to 1994 + +Co-owner and Director of many business enterprises: + +- The Omega and Energy Air-Conditioning Concern +- AVP Financial Consultants +- Handiman Legal Services + Total annual turnover of the group: 10 million USD. + + +Co-owner, Director and Finance Manager of COSTI Ltd. - Israel's +largest computerized information vendor and developer. Raised funds +through a series of private placements locally, in the USA, Canada and +London. + +1993 to 1996 + +Publisher and Editor of a Capital Markets Newsletter distributed by +subscription only to dozens of subscribers countrywide. + +In a legal precedent in 1995 - studied in business schools and law +faculties across Israel - was tried for his role in an attempted +takeover of Israel's Agriculture Bank. + +Was interned in the State School of Prison Wardens. + +Managed the Central School Library, wrote, published and lectured on +various occasions. + +Managed the Internet and International News Department of an Israeli +mass media group, "Ha-Tikshoret and Namer". + +Assistant in the Law Faculty in Tel-Aviv University (to Prof. S.G. +Shoham). + +1996 to 1999 + +Financial consultant to leading businesses in Macedonia, Russia and +the Czech Republic. + +Collaborated with the Agency of Transformation of Business with +Social Capital. + +Economic commentator in "Nova Makedonija", "Dnevnik", "Izvestia", +"Argumenti i Fakti", "The Middle East Times", "Makedonija Denes", "The +New Presence", "Central Europe Review" , and other periodicals and in +the economic programs on various channels of Macedonian Television. + +Chief Lecturer in courses organized by the Agency of Transformation, +by the Macedonian Stock Exchange and by the Ministry of Trade. + +1999 to 2002 + +Economic Advisor to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia and to +the Ministry of Finance. + +2001 to present + +Senior Business Correspondent for United Press International (UPI) + +Web and Journalistic Activities + +Author of extensive Websites in Psychology ("Malignant Self Love") - +An Open Directory Cool Site + +Philosophy ("Philosophical Musings") + +Economics and Geopolitics ("World in Conflict and Transition") + +Owner of the Narcissistic Abuse Announcement and Study List and the +Narcissism Revisited mailing list (more than 3900 members) + +Owner of the Economies in Conflict and Transition Study list. + +Editor of mental health disorders and Central and Eastern Europe +categories in web directories (Open Directory, Suite 101, Search +Europe). + +Columnist and commentator in "The New Presence", United Press +International (UPI), InternetContent, eBookWeb and "Central Europe +Review". + +Publications and Awards + +"Managing Investment Portfolios in states of Uncertainty", Limon +Publishers, Tel-Aviv, 1988 + +"The Gambling Industry", Limon Publishers., Tel-Aviv, 1990 + +"Requesting my Loved One - Short Stories", Yedioth Aharonot, Tel-Aviv, +1997 + +"The Macedonian Economy at a Crossroads - On the way to a Healthier +Economy" (with Nikola Gruevski), Skopje, 1998 + +"Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited", Narcissus Publications, +Prague and Skopje, 1999, 2001, 2002 + +The Narcissism Series - e-books regarding relationships with abusive +narcissists (Skopje, 1999-2002) + +"The Exporters' Pocketbook", Ministry of Trade, Republic of Macedonia, +Skopje, 1999 + +"The Suffering of Being Kafka" (electronic book of Hebrew Short +Fiction, Prague, 1998) + +"After the Rain - How the West Lost the East", Narcissus Publications +in association with Central Europe Review/CEENMI, Prague and Skopje, +2000 + +Winner of numerous awards, among them the Israeli Education Ministry +Prize (Literature) 1997, The Rotary Club Award for Social Studies +(1976) and the Bilateral Relations Studies Award of the American +Embassy in Israel (1978). + +Hundreds of professional articles in all fields of finances and the +economy and numerous articles dealing with geopolitical and political +economic issues published in both print and web periodicals in many +countries. + +Many appearances in the electronic media on subjects in philosophy and +the Sciences and concerning economic matters. + +Contact Details: + +palma@unet.com.mk + +vaknin@link.com.mk + + +My Web Sites: + +Economy / Politics: + +http://ceeandbalkan.tripod.com/ + +Psychology: + +http://samvak.tripod.com/index.html + +Philosophy: + +http://philosophos.tripod.com/ + +Poetry: + +http://samvak.tripod.com/contents.html + + +Return + + + After the Rain + + How the West + + Lost the East + + + + The Book + + This is a series of articles written and published in 1996-2000 in + Macedonia, in Russia, in Egypt and in the Czech Republic. + + How the West lost the East. The economics, the politics, the + geopolitics, the conspiracies, the corruption, the old and the new, + the plough and the internet - it is all here, in colourful and + provocative prose. + + From "The Mind of Darkness": + + "'The Balkans' - I say - 'is the unconscious of the world'. People +stop to digest this metaphor and then they nod enthusiastically. It is +here that the repressed memories of history, its traumas and fears and + images reside. It is here that the psychodynamics of humanity - the + tectonic clash between Rome and Byzantium, West and East, + Judeo-Christianity and Islam - is still easily discernible. We are + seated at a New Year's dining table, loaded with a roasted pig and + exotic salads. I, the Jew, only half foreign to this cradle of +Slavonics. Four Serbs, five Macedonians. It is in the Balkans that all + ethnic distinctions fail and it is here that they prevail +anachronistically and atavistically. Contradiction and change the only + two fixtures of this tormented region. The women of the Balkan - + buried under provocative mask-like make up, retro hairstyles and too + narrow dresses. The men, clad in sepia colours, old fashioned suits + and turn of the century moustaches. In the background there is the + crying game that is Balkanian music: liturgy and folk and elegy +combined. The smells are heavy with muskular perfumes. It is like time + travel. It is like revisiting one's childhood." + + + + The Author + +Sam Vaknin is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited +and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He is a columnist for +Central Europe Review and eBookWeb , a United Press International +(UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and the editor of mental health +and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory and Suite101. + +Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government of +Macedonia. + +Visit Sam's Web site at http://samvak.tripod.com + + + + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Moral Deliberations in Modern Cinema, by Sam Vaknin + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORAL DELIBERATIONS IN MODERN CINEMA *** + +***** This file should be named 8422-8.txt or 8422-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/8/4/2/8422/ + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +** This is a COPYRIGHTED Project Gutenberg eBook, Details Below ** +** Please follow the copyright guidelines in this file. ** + +Title: Moral Deliberations in Modern Cinema + +Author: Sam Vaknin + +Posting Date: August 13, 2012 [EBook #8422] +Release Date: July, 2005 +First Posted: July 9, 2003 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORAL DELIBERATIONS IN MODERN CINEMA *** + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Copyright (C) 2002 by Lidija Rangelovska. + + + + +Moral Deliberations in Modern Cinema + + + +1sst EDITION + + + + + +Sam Vaknin, Ph.D. + + + + + +Editing and Design: + +Lidija Rangelovska + + + + + + Lidija Rangelovska + + A Narcissus Publications Imprint, Skopje 2003 + + + Not for Sale! Non-commercial edition. + + + + + + + + + + + +(C) 2002 Copyright Lidija Rangelovska. + +All rights reserved. This book, or any part thereof, may not be used +or reproduced in any manner without written permission from: + +Lidija Rangelovska - write to: + +palma@unet.com.mk or to + +vaknin@link.com.mk + + + +Visit the Author Archive of Dr. Sam Vaknin in "Central Europe Review": + +http://www.ce-review.org/authorarchives/vaknin_archive/vaknin_main.htm +l + + +Visit Sam Vaknin's United Press International (UPI) Article Archive +-Click HERE! + + +Philosophical Musings and Essays + +http://samvak.tripod.com/culture.html + + +Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited + +http://samvak.tripod.com/ + + + +Created by: LIDIJA RANGELOVSKA + +REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA + +C O N T E N T S + + + +I. The Talented Mr. Ripley + +II. The Truman Show + +III. The Matrix + +IV. Shattered + +V. Titanic + +VI. Being John Malkovich + +VII. Dreamcatcher - The Myth of Destructibility + +VIII. The Author + +IX. About "After the Rain" + + The Talented Mr. Ripley + + By: Sam Vaknin + + +"The Talented Mr. Ripley" is an Hitchcockian and blood-curdling study +of the psychopath and his victims. At the centre of this masterpiece, +set in the exquisitely decadent scapes of Italy, is a titanic +encounter between Ripley, the aforementioned psychopath protagonist +and young Greenleaf, a consummate narcissist. + +Ripley is a cartoonishly poor young adult whose overriding desire is +to belong to a higher - or at least, richer - social class. While he +waits upon the subjects of his not so hidden desires, he receives an +offer he cannot refuse: to travel to Italy to retrieve the spoiled and +hedonistic son of a shipbuilding magnate, Greenleaf Senior. He embarks +upon a study of Junior's biography, personality, likes and hobbies. In +a chillingly detailed process, he actually assumes Greenleaf's +identity. Disembarking from a luxurious Cunard liner in his +destination, Italy, he "confesses" to a gullible textile-heiress that +he is the young Greenleaf, travelling incognito. + +Thus, we are subtly introduced to the two over-riding themes of the +antisocial personality disorder (still labelled by many professional +authorities "psychopathy" and "sociopathy"): an overwhelming dysphoria +and an even more overweening drive to assuage this angst by belonging. +The psychopath is an unhappy person. He is besieged by recurrent +depression bouts, hypochondria and an overpowering sense of alienation +and drift. He is bored with his own life and is permeated by a +seething and explosive envy of the lucky, the mighty, the clever, the +have it alls, the know it alls, the handsome, the happy - in short: +his opposites. He feels discriminated against and dealt a poor hand in +the great poker game called life. He is driven obsessively to right +these perceived wrongs and feels entirely justified in adopting +whatever means he deems necessary in pursuing this goal. + +Ripley's reality test is maintained throughout the film. In other +words - while he gradually merges with the object of his admiring +emulation, the young Greenleaf - Ripley can always tell the +difference. After he kills Greenleaf in self-defense, he assumes his +name, wears his clothes, cashes his checks and makes phone calls from +his rooms. But he also murders - or tries to murder - those who +suspect the truth. These acts of lethal self-preservation prove +conclusively that he knows who he is and that he fully realizes that +his acts are parlously illegal. + +Young Greenleaf is young, captivatingly energetic, infinitely +charming, breathtakingly handsome and deceivingly emotional. He lacks +real talents - he know how to play only six jazz tunes, can't make up +his musical mind between his faithful sax and a newly alluring drum +kit and, an aspiring writer, can't even spell. These shortcomings and +discrepancies are tucked under a glittering facade of non-chalance, +refreshing spontaneity, an experimental spirit, unrepressed sexuality +and unrestrained adventurism. But Greenleaf Jr. is a garden variety +narcissist. He cheats on his lovely and loving girlfriend, Marge. He +refuses to lend money - of which he seems to have an unlimited supply, +courtesy his ever more disenchanted father - to a girl he impregnated. +She commits suicide and he blames the primitiveness of the emergency +services, sulks and kicks his precious record player. In the midst of +this infantile temper tantrum the rudiments of a conscience are +visible. He evidently feels guilty. At least for a while. + +Greenleaf Jr. falls in and out of love and friendship in a predictable +pendulous rhythm. He idealizes his beaus and then devalues them. He +finds them to be the quiddity of fascination one moment - and the +distilled essence of boredom the next. And he is not shy about +expressing his distaste and disenchantment. He is savagely cruel as he +calls Ripley a leach who has taken over his life and his possessions +(having previously invited him to do so in no uncertain terms). He +says that he is relieved to see him go and he cancels off-handedly +elaborate plans they made together. Greenleaf Jr. maintains a poor +record of keeping promises and a rich record of violence, as we +discover towards the end of this suspenseful, taut yarn. + +Ripley himself lacks an identity. He is a binary automaton driven by a +set of two instructions - become someone and overcome resistance. He +feels like a nobody and his overriding ambition is to be somebody, +even if he has to fake it, or steal it. His only talents, he openly +admits, are to fake both personalities and papers. He is a predator +and he hunts for congruence, cohesion and meaning. He is in constant +search of a family. Greenleaf Jr., he declares festively, is the older +brother he never had. Together with the long suffering fiancee in +waiting, Marge, they are a family. Hasn't Greenleaf Sr. actually +adopted him? + +This identity disturbance, which is at the psychodynamic root of both +pathological narcissism and rapacious psychopathy, is all-pervasive. +Both Ripley and Greenleaf Jr. are not sure who they are. Ripley wants +to be Greenleaf Jr. - not because of the latter's admirable +personality, but because of his money. Greenleaf Jr. cultivates a +False Self of a jazz giant in the making and the author of the Great +American Novel but he is neither and he bitterly knows it. Even their +sexual identity is not fully formed. Ripley is at once homoerotic, +autoerotic and heteroerotic. He has a succession of homosexual lovers +(though apparently only platonic ones). Yet, he is attracted to women. +He falls desperately in love with Greenleaf's False Self and it is the +revelation of the latter's dilapidated True Self that leads to the +atavistically bloody scene in the boat. + +But Ripley is a different -and more ominous - beast altogether. He +rambles on about the metaphorical dark chamber of his secrets, the key +to which he wishes to share with a "loved" one. But this act of +sharing (which never materializes) is intended merely to alleviate the +constant pressure of the hot pursuit he is subjected to by the police +and others. He disposes with equal equanimity of both loved ones and +the occasional prying acquaintance. At least twice he utters words of +love as he actually strangles his newfound inamorato and tries to +slash an old and rekindled flame. He hesitates not a split second when +confronted with an offer to betray Greenleaf Sr., his nominal employer +and benefactor, and abscond with his money. He falsifies signatures +with ease, makes eye contact convincingly, flashes the most heart +rending smile when embarrassed or endangered. He is a caricature of +the American dream: ambitious, driven, winsome, well versed in the +mantras of the bourgeoisie. But beneath this thin veneer of hard +learned, self-conscious and uneasy civility - lurks a beast of prey +best characterized by the DSM IV (Diagnostic and Statistics Manual): + +"Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviour, +deceitfulness as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or +conning others to personal profit or pleasure, impulsivity or failure +to plan ahead... reckless disregard for safety of self or others +...(and above all) lack of remorse." (From the criteria of the +Antisocial Personality Disorder). + +But perhaps the most intriguing portraits are those of the victims. +Marge insists, in the face of the most callous and abusive behaviour, +that there is something "tender" in Greenleaf Jr. When she confronts +the beguiling monster, Ripley, she encounters the fate of all victims +of psychopaths: disbelief, pity and ridicule. The truth is too +horrible to contemplate, let alone comprehend. Psychopaths are inhuman +in the most profound sense of this compounded word. Their emotions and +conscience have been amputated and replaced by phantom imitations. But +it is rare to pierce their meticulously crafted facade. They more +often than not go on to great success and social acceptance while +their detractors are relegated to the fringes of society. Both +Meredith and Peter, who had the misfortune of falling in deep, +unrequited love with Ripley, are punished. One by losing his life, the +other by losing Ripley time and again, mysteriously, capriciously, +cruelly. + +Thus, ultimately, the film is an intricate study of the pernicious +ways of psychopathology. Mental disorder is a venom not confined to +its source. It spreads and affects its environment in a myriad +surreptitiously subtle forms. It is a hydra, growing one hundred heads +where one was severed. Its victims writhe and as abuse is piled upon +trauma - they turn to stone, the mute witnesses of horror, the +stalactites and stalagmites of pain untold and unrecountable. For +their tormentors are often as talented as Mr. Ripley is and they are +as helpless and as clueless as his victims are. + + The Truman Show + + By: Sam Vaknin + + +"The Truman Show" is a profoundly disturbing movie. On the surface, it +deals with the worn out issue of the intermingling of life and the +media. + +Examples for such incestuous relationships abound: + +Ronald Reagan, the cinematic president was also a presidential movie +star. In another movie ("The Philadelphia Experiment") a defrosted Rip +Van Winkle exclaims upon seeing Reagan on television (40 years after +his forced hibernation started): "I know this guy, he used to play +Cowboys in the movies". + +Candid cameras monitor the lives of webmasters (website owners) almost +24 hours a day. The resulting images are continuously posted on the +Web and are available to anyone with a computer. + +The last decade witnessed a spate of films, all concerned with the +confusion between life and the imitations of life, the media. The +ingenious "Capitan Fracasse", "Capricorn One", "Sliver", "Wag the Dog" +and many lesser films have all tried to tackle this (un)fortunate +state of things and its moral and practical implications. + +The blurring line between life and its representation in the arts is +arguably the main theme of "The Truman Show". The hero, Truman, lives +in an artificial world, constructed especially for him. He was born +and raised there. He knows no other place. The people around him - +unbeknownst to him - are all actors. His life is monitored by 5000 +cameras and broadcast live to the world, 24 hours a day, every day. He +is spontaneous and funny because he is unaware of the monstrosity of +which he is the main cogwheel. + +But Peter Weir, the movie's director, takes this issue one step +further by perpetrating a massive act of immorality on screen. Truman +is lied to, cheated, deprived of his ability to make choices, +controlled and manipulated by sinister, half-mad Shylocks. As I said, +he is unwittingly the only spontaneous, non-scripted, "actor" in the +on-going soaper of his own life. All the other figures in his life, +including his parents, are actors. Hundreds of millions of viewers and +voyeurs plug in to take a peep, to intrude upon what Truman innocently +and honestly believes to be his privacy. They are shown responding to +various dramatic or anti-climactic events in Truman's life. That we +are the moral equivalent of these viewers-voyeurs, accomplices to the +same crimes, comes as a shocking realization to us. We are (live) +viewers and they are (celluloid) viewers. We both enjoy Truman's +inadvertent, non-consenting, exhibitionism. We know the truth about +Truman and so do they. Of course, we are in a privileged moral +position because we know it is a movie and they know it is a piece of +raw life that they are watching. + +But moviegoers throughout Hollywood's history have willingly and +insatiably participated in numerous "Truman Shows". The lives (real or +concocted) of the studio stars were brutally exploited and +incorporated in their films. Jean Harlow, Barbara Stanwyck, James +Cagney all were forced to spill their guts in cathartic acts of on +camera repentance and not so symbolic humiliation. "Truman Shows" is +the more common phenomenon in the movie industry. + +Then there is the question of the director of the movie as God and of +God as the director of a movie. The members of his team - technical +and non-technical alike - obey Christoff, the director, almost +blindly. They suspend their better moral judgement and succumb to his +whims and to the brutal and vulgar aspects of his pervasive dishonesty +and sadism. The torturer loves his victims. They define him and infuse +his life with meaning. Caught in a narrative, the movie says, people +act immorally. + +(IN)famous psychological experiments support this assertion. Students +were led to administer what they thought were "deadly" electric shocks +to their colleagues or to treat them bestially in simulated prisons. +They obeyed orders. So did all the hideous genocidal criminals in +history. The Director Weir asks: should God be allowed to be immoral +or should he be bound by morality and ethics? Should his decisions and +actions be constrained by an over-riding code of right and wrong? +Should we obey his commandments blindly or should we exercise +judgement? + +If we do exercise judgement are we then being immoral because God (and +the Director Christoff) know more (about the world, about us, the +viewers and about Truman), know better, are omnipotent? Is the +exercise of judgement the usurpation of divine powers and attributes? +Isn't this act of rebelliousness bound to lead us down the path of +apocalypse? + +It all boils down to the question of free choice and free will versus +the benevolent determinism imposed by an omniscient and omnipotent +being. What is better: to have the choice and be damned (almost +inevitably, as in the biblical narrative of the Garden of Eden) - or +to succumb to the superior wisdom of a supreme being? A choice always +involves a dilemma. It is the conflict between two equivalent states, +two weighty decisions whose outcomes are equally desirable and two +identically-preferable courses of action. Where there is no such +equivalence - there is no choice, merely the pre-ordained (given full +knowledge) exercise of a preference or inclination. Bees do not choose +to make honey. A fan of football does not choose to watch a football +game. He is motivated by a clear inequity between the choices that he +faces. He can read a book or go to the game. His decision is clear and +pre-determined by his predilection and by the inevitable and +invariable implementation of the principle of pleasure. There is no +choice here. It is all rather automatic. But compare this to the +choice some victims had to make between two of their children in the +face of Nazi brutality. Which child to sentence to death - which one +to sentence to life? Now, this is a real choice. It involves +conflicting emotions of equal strength. One must not confuse +decisions, opportunities and choice. + +Decisions are the mere selection of courses of action. This selection +can be the result of a choice or the result of a tendency (conscious, +unconscious, or biological-genetic). Opportunities are current states +of the world, which allow for a decision to be made and to affect the +future state of the world. Choices are our conscious experience of +moral or other dilemmas. + +Christoff finds it strange that Truman - having discovered the truth - +insists upon his right to make choices, i.e., upon his right to +experience dilemmas. To the Director, dilemmas are painful, +unnecessary, destructive, or at best disruptive. His utopian world - +the one he constructed for Truman - is choice-free and dilemma-free. +Truman is programmed not in the sense that his spontaneity is +extinguished. Truman is wrong when, in one of the scenes, he keeps +shouting: "Be careful, I am spontaneous". The Director and fat-cat +capitalistic producers want him to be spontaneous, they want him to +make decisions. But they do not want him to make choices. So they +influence his preferences and predilections by providing him with an +absolutely totalitarian, micro-controlled, repetitive environment. +Such an environment reduces the set of possible decisions so that +there is only one favourable or acceptable decision (outcome) at any +junction. Truman does decide whether to walk down a certain path or +not. But when he does decide to walk - only one path is available to +him. His world is constrained and limited - not his actions. + +Actually, Truman's only choice in the movie leads to an arguably +immoral decision. He abandons ship. He walks out on the whole project. +He destroys an investment of billions of dollars, people's lives and +careers. He turns his back on some of the actors who seem to really be +emotionally attached to him. He ignores the good and pleasure that the +show has brought to the lives of millions of people (the viewers). He +selfishly and vengefully goes away. He knows all this. By the time he +makes his decision, he is fully informed. He knows that some people +may commit suicide, go bankrupt, endure major depressive episodes, do +drugs. But this massive landscape of resulting devastation does not +deter him. He prefers his narrow, personal, interest. He walks. + +But Truman did not ask or choose to be put in his position. He found +himself responsible for all these people without being consulted. +There was no consent or act of choice involved. How can anyone be +responsible for the well-being and lives of other people - if he did +not CHOOSE to be so responsible? Moreover, Truman had the perfect +moral right to think that these people wronged him. Are we morally +responsible and accountable for the well-being and lives of those who +wrong us? True Christians are, for instance. + +Moreover, most of us, most of the time, find ourselves in situations +which we did not help mould by our decisions. We are unwillingly cast +into the world. We do not provide prior consent to being born. This +fundamental decision is made for us, forced upon us. This pattern +persists throughout our childhood and adolescence: decisions are made +elsewhere by others and influence our lives profoundly. + +As adults we are the objects - often the victims - of the decisions of +corrupt politicians, mad scientists, megalomaniac media barons, +gung-ho generals and demented artists. This world is not of our making +and our ability to shape and influence it is very limited and rather +illusory. We live in our own "Truman Show". Does this mean that we are +not morally responsible for others? + +We are morally responsible even if we did not choose the circumstances +and the parameters and characteristics of the universe that we +inhabit. The Swedish Count Wallenberg imperilled his life (and lost +it) smuggling hunted Jews out of Nazi occupied Europe. He did not +choose, or helped to shape Nazi Europe. It was the brainchild of the +deranged Director Hitler. Having found himself an unwilling +participant in Hitler's horror show, Wallenberg did not turn his back +and opted out. He remained within the bloody and horrific set and did +his best. Truman should have done the same. Jesus said that he should +have loved his enemies. He should have felt and acted with +responsibility towards his fellow human beings, even towards those who +wronged him greatly. + +But this may be an inhuman demand. Such forgiveness and magnanimity +are the reserve of God. And the fact that Truman's tormentors did not +see themselves as such and believed that they were acting in his best +interests and that they were catering to his every need - does not +absolve them from their crimes. Truman should have maintained a fine +balance between his responsibility to the show, its creators and its +viewers and his natural drive to get back at his tormentors. The +source of the dilemma (which led to his act of choosing) is that the +two groups overlap. + +Truman found himself in the impossible position of being the sole +guarantor of the well-being and lives of his tormentors. To put the +question in sharper relief: are we morally obliged to save the life +and livelihood of someone who greatly wronged us? Or is vengeance +justified in such a case? + +A very problematic figure in this respect is that of Truman's best and +childhood friend. They grew up together, shared secrets, emotions and +adventures. Yet he lies to Truman constantly and under the Director's +instructions. Everything he says is part of a script. It is this +disinformation that convinces us that he is not Truman's true friend. +A real friend is expected, above all, to provide us with full and true +information and, thereby, to enhance our ability to choose. Truman's +true love in the Show tried to do it. She paid the price: she was +ousted from the show. But she tried to provide Truman with a choice. +It is not sufficient to say the right things and make the right moves. +Inner drive and motivation are required and the willingness to take +risks (such as the risk of providing Truman with full information +about his condition). All the actors who played Truman's parents, +loving wife, friends and colleagues, miserably failed on this score. + +It is in this mimicry that the philosophical key to the whole movie +rests. A Utopia cannot be faked. Captain Nemo's utopian underwater +city was a real Utopia because everyone knew everything about it. +People were given a choice (though an irreversible and irrevocable +one). They chose to become lifetime members of the reclusive Captain's +colony and to abide by its (overly rational) rules. + +The Utopia came closest to extinction when a group of stray survivors +of a maritime accident were imprisoned in it against their expressed +will. In the absence of choice, no utopia can exist. In the absence of +full, timely and accurate information, no choice can exist. Actually, +the availability of choice is so crucial that even when it is +prevented by nature itself - and not by the designs of more or less +sinister or monomaniac people - there can be no Utopia. In H.G. Wells' +book "The Time Machine", the hero wanders off to the third millennium +only to come across a peaceful Utopia. Its members are immortal, don't +have to work, or think in order to survive. Sophisticated machines +take care of all their needs. No one forbids them to make choices. +There simply is no need to make them. So the Utopia is fake and indeed +ends badly. + +Finally, the "Truman Show" encapsulates the most virulent attack on +capitalism in a long time. Greedy, thoughtless money machines in the +form of billionaire tycoon-producers exploit Truman's life shamelessly +and remorselessly in the ugliest display of human vices possible. The +Director indulges in his control-mania. The producers indulge in their +monetary obsession. The viewers (on both sides of the silver screen) +indulge in voyeurism. The actors vie and compete in the compulsive +activity of furthering their petty careers. It is a repulsive canvas +of a disintegrating world. Perhaps Christoff is right after al when he +warns Truman about the true nature of the world. But Truman chooses. +He chooses the exit door leading to the outer darkness over the false +sunlight in the Utopia that he leaves behind. + + The Matrix + + By: Sam Vaknin + + +It is easy to confuse the concepts of "virtual reality" and a +"computerized model of reality (simulation)". The former is a +self-contained Universe, replete with its "laws of physics" and +"logic". It can bear resemblance to the real world or not. It can be +consistent or not. It can interact with the real world or not. In +short, it is an arbitrary environment. In contrast, a model of reality +must have a direct and strong relationship to the world. It must obey +the rules of physics and of logic. The absence of such a relationship +renders it meaningless. A flight simulator is not much good in a world +without aeroplanes or if it ignores the laws of nature. A technical +analysis program is useless without a stock exchange or if its +mathematically erroneous. + +Yet, the two concepts are often confused because they are both +mediated by and reside on computers. The computer is a self-contained +(though not closed) Universe. It incorporates the hardware, the data +and the instructions for the manipulation of the data (software). It +is, therefore, by definition, a virtual reality. It is versatile and +can correlate its reality with the world outside. But it can also +refrain from doing so. This is the ominous "what if" in artificial +intelligence (AI). What if a computer were to refuse to correlate its +internal (virtual) reality with the reality of its makers? What if it +were to impose its own reality on us and make it the privileged one? + +In the visually tantalizing movie, "The Matrix", a breed of AI +computers takes over the world. It harvests human embryos in +laboratories called "fields". It then feeds them through grim looking +tubes and keeps them immersed in gelatinous liquid in cocoons. This +new "machine species" derives its energy needs from the electricity +produced by the billions of human bodies thus preserved. A +sophisticated, all-pervasive, computer program called "The Matrix" +generates a "world" inhabited by the consciousness of the unfortunate +human batteries. Ensconced in their shells, they see themselves +walking, talking, working and making love. This is a tangible and +olfactory phantasm masterfully created by the Matrix. Its computing +power is mind boggling. It generates the minutest details and reams of +data in a spectacularly successful effort to maintain the illusion. + +A group of human miscreants succeeds to learn the secret of the +Matrix. They form an underground and live aboard a ship, loosely +communicating with a halcyon city called "Zion", the last bastion of +resistance. In one of the scenes, Cypher, one of the rebels defects. +Over a glass of (illusory) rubicund wine and (spectral) juicy steak, +he poses the main dilemma of the movie. Is it better to live happily +in a perfectly detailed delusion - or to survive unhappily but free of +its hold? + +The Matrix controls the minds of all the humans in the world. It is a +bridge between them, they inter-connected through it. It makes them +share the same sights, smells and textures. They remember. They +compete. They make decisions. + +The Matrix is sufficiently complex to allow for this apparent lack of +determinism and ubiquity of free will. The root question is: is there +any difference between making decisions and feeling certain of making +them (not having made them)? If one is unaware of the existence of the +Matrix, the answer is no. From the inside, as a part of the Matrix, +making decisions and appearing to be making them are identical states. +Only an outside observer - one who in possession of full information +regarding both the Matrix and the humans - can tell the difference. + +Moreover, if the Matrix were a computer program of infinite +complexity, no observer (finite or infinite) would have been able to +say with any certainty whose a decision was - the Matrix's or the +human's. And because the Matrix, for all intents and purposes, is +infinite compared to the mind of any single, tube-nourished, +individual - it is safe to say that the states of "making a decision" +and "appearing to be making a decision" are subjectively +indistinguishable. No individual within the Matrix would be able to +tell the difference. His or her life would seem to him or her as real +as ours are to us. The Matrix may be deterministic - but this +determinism is inaccessible to individual minds because of the +complexity involved. When faced with a trillion deterministic paths, +one would be justified to feel that he exercised free, unconstrained +will in choosing one of them. Free will and determinism are +indistinguishable at a certain level of complexity. + +Yet, we KNOW that the Matrix is different to our world. It is NOT the +same. This is an intuitive kind of knowledge, for sure, but this does +not detract from its firmness. If there is no subjective difference +between the Matrix and our Universe, there must be an objective one. +Another key sentence is uttered by Morpheus, the leader of the rebels. +He says to "The Chosen One" (the Messiah) that it is really the year +2199, though the Matrix gives the impression that it is 1999. + +This is where the Matrix and reality diverge. Though a human who would +experience both would find them indistinguishable - objectively they +are different. In one of them (the Matrix), people have no objective +TIME (though the Matrix might have it). The other (reality) is +governed by it. + +Under the spell of the Matrix, people feel as though time goes by. +They have functioning watches. The sun rises and sets. Seasons change. +They grow old and die. This is not entirely an illusion. Their bodies +do decay and die, as ours do. They are not exempt from the laws of +nature. But their AWARENESS of time is computer generated. The Matrix +is sufficiently sophisticated and knowledgeable to maintain a close +correlation between the physical state of the human (his health and +age) and his consciousness of the passage of time. The basic rules of +time - for instance, its asymmetry - are part of the program. + +But this is precisely it. Time in the minds of these people is +program-generated, not reality-induced. It is not the derivative of +change and irreversible (thermodynamic and other) processes OUT THERE. +Their minds are part of a computer program and the computer program is +a part of their minds. + +Their bodies are static, degenerating in their protective nests. +Nothing happens to them except in their minds. They have no physical +effect on the world. They effect no change. These things set the +Matrix and reality apart. + +To "qualify" as reality a two-way interaction must occur. One flow of +data is when reality influences the minds of people (as does the +Matrix). The obverse, but equally necessary, type of data flow is when +people know reality and influence it. The Matrix triggers a time +sensation in people the same way that the Universe triggers a time +sensation in us. Something does happen OUT THERE and it is called the +Matrix. In this sense, the Matrix is real, it is the reality of these +humans. It maintains the requirement of the first type of flow of +data. But it fails the second test: people do not know that it exists +or any of its attributes, nor do they affect it irreversibly. They do +not change the Matrix. Paradoxically, the rebels do affect the Matrix +(they almost destroy it). In doing so, they make it REAL. It is their +REALITY because they KNOW it and they irreversibly CHANGE it. + +Applying this dual-track test, "virtual" reality IS a reality, albeit, +at this stage, of a deterministic type. It affects our minds, we know +that it exists and we affect it in return. Our choices and actions +irreversibly alter the state of the system. This altered state, in +turn, affects our minds. This interaction IS what we call "reality". +With the advent of stochastic and quantum virtual reality generators - +the distinction between "real" and "virtual" will fade. The Matrix +thus is not impossible. But that it is possible - does not make it +real. + + + The Shattered Identity + + By: Sam Vaknin + + + Read these essays first: + + The Habitual Identity + + Death, Meaning, and Identity + + Fact and Truth + + Dreams - The Metaphors of Mind + + +I. Exposition + +In the movie "Shattered" (1991), Dan Merrick survives an accident and +develops total amnesia regarding his past. His battered face is +reconstructed by plastic surgeons and, with the help of his loving +wife, he gradually recovers his will to live. But he never develops a +proper sense of identity. It is as though he is constantly ill at ease +in his own body. As the plot unravels, Dan is led to believe that he +may have murdered his wife's lover, Jack. This thriller offers +additional twists and turns but, throughout it all, we face this +question: + +Dan has no recollection of being Dan. Dan does not remember murdering +Jack. It seems as though Dan's very identity has been erased. Yet, Dan +is in sound mind and can tell right from wrong. Should Dan be held +(morally and, as a result, perhaps legally as well) accountable for +Jack's murder? + +Would the answer to this question still be the same had Dan erased +from his memory ONLY the crime -but recalled everything else (in an +act of selective dissociation)? Do our moral and legal accountability +and responsibility spring from the integrity of our memories? If Dan +were to be punished for a crime he doesn't have the faintest +recollection of committing - wouldn't he feel horribly wronged? +Wouldn't he be justified in feeling so? + +There are many states of consciousness that involve dissociation and +selective amnesia: hypnosis, trance and possession, hallucination, +illusion, memory disorders (like organic, or functional amnesia), +depersonalization disorder, dissociative fugue, dreaming, psychosis, +post traumatic stress disorder, and drug-induced psychotomimetic +states. + +Consider this, for instance: + +What if Dan were the victim of a Multiple Personality Disorder (now +known as "Dissociative Identity Disorder")? What if one of his +"alters" (i.e., one of the multitude of "identities" sharing Dan's +mind and body) committed the crime? Should Dan still be held +responsible? What if the alter "John" committed the crime and then +"vanished", leaving behind another alter (let us say, "Joseph") in +control? + +Should "Joseph" be held responsible for the crime "John" committed? +What if "John" were to reappear 10 years after he "vanished"? What if +he were to reappear 50 years after he "vanished"? What if he were to +reappear for a period of 90 days - only to "vanish" again? And what is +Dan's role in all this? Who, exactly, then, is Dan? + +II. Who is Dan? + +Buddhism compares Man to a river. Both retain their identity despite +the fact that their individual composition is different at different +moments. The possession of a body as the foundation of a self-identity +is a dubious proposition. Bodies change drastically in time (consider +a baby compared to an adult). Almost all the cells in a human body are +replaced every few years. Changing one's brain (by transplantation) - +also changes one's identity, even if the rest of the body remains the +same. + +Thus, the only thing that binds a "person" together (i.e., gives him a +self and an identity) is time, or, more precisely, memory. By "memory" +I also mean: personality, skills, habits, retrospected emotions - in +short: all long term imprints and behavioural patterns. The body is +not an accidental and insignificant container, of course. It +constitutes an important part of one's self-image, self-esteem, sense +of self-worth, and sense of existence (spatial, temporal, and social). +But one can easily imagine a brain in vitro as having the same +identity as when it resided in a body. One cannot imagine a body +without a brain (or with a different brain) as having the same +identity it had before the brain was removed or replaced. + +What if the brain in vitro (in the above example) could not +communicate with us at all? Would we still think it is possessed of a +self? The biological functions of people in coma are maintained. But +do they have an identity, a self? If yes, why do we "pull the plug" on +them so often? + +It would seem (as it did to Locke) that we accept that someone has a +self-identity if: (a) He has the same hardware as we do (notably, a +brain) and (b) He communicates his humanly recognizable and +comprehensible inner world to us and manipulates his environment. We +accept that he has a given (i.e., the same continuous) self-identity +if (c) He shows consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns +("memory") in doing (b) for a long period of time. + +It seems that we accept that we have a self-identity (i.e., we are +self-conscious) if (a) We discern (usually through introspection) long +term consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in our +manipulation ("relating to") of our environment and (b) Others accept +that we have a self-identity (Herbert Mead, Feuerbach). + +Dan (probably) has the same hardware as we do (a brain). He +communicates his (humanly recognizable and comprehensible) inner world +to us (which is how he manipulates us and his environment). Thus, Dan +clearly has a self-identity. But he is inconsistent. His intentional +(willed) patterns, his memory, are incompatible with those +demonstrated by Dan before the accident. Though he clearly is +possessed of a self-identity, we cannot say that he has the SAME +self-identity he possessed before the crash. In other words, we cannot +say that he, indeed, is Dan. + +Dan himself does not feel that he has a self-identity at all. He +discerns intentional (willed) patterns in his manipulation of his +environment but, due to his amnesia, he cannot tell if these are +consistent, or long term. In other words, Dan has no memory. Moreover, +others do not accept him as Dan (or have their doubts) because they +have no memory of Dan as he is now. + +Interim conclusion: + +Having a memory is a necessary and sufficient condition for possessing +a self-identity. + +III. Repression + +Yet, resorting to memory to define identity may appear to be a +circular (even tautological) argument. When we postulate memory - +don't we already presuppose the existence of a "remembering agent" +with an established self-identity? + +Moreover, we keep talking about "discerning", "intentional", or +"willed" patterns. But isn't a big part of our self (in the form of +the unconscious, full of repressed memories) unavailable to us? Don't +we develop defence mechanisms against repressed memories and +fantasies, against unconscious content incongruent with our +self-image? Even worse, this hidden, inaccessible, dynamically active +part of our self is thought responsible for our recurrent discernible +patterns of behaviour. The phenomenon of posthypnotic suggestion seems +to indicate that this may be the case. The existence of a +self-identity is, therefore, determined through introspection (by +oneself) and observation (by others) of merely the conscious part of +the self. + +But the unconscious is as much a part of one's self-identity as one's +conscious. What if, due to a mishap, the roles were reversed? What if +Dan's conscious part were to become his unconscious and his +unconscious part - his conscious? What if all his conscious memories, +drives, fears, wishes, fantasies, and hopes - were to become +unconscious while his repressed memories, drives, etc. - were to +become conscious? Would we still say that it is "the same" Dan and +that he retains his self-identity? Not very likely. And yet, one's +(unremembered) unconscious - for instance, the conflict between id and +ego - determines one's personality and self-identity. + +The main contribution of psychoanalysis and later psychodynamic +schools is the understanding that self-identity is a dynamic, +evolving, ever-changing construct - and not a static, inertial, and +passive entity. It casts doubt over the meaningfulness of the question +with which we ended the exposition: "Who, exactly, then, is Dan?" Dan +is different at different stages of his life (Erikson) and he +constantly evolves in accordance with his innate nature (Jung), past +history (Adler), drives (Freud), cultural milieu (Horney), upbringing +(Klein, Winnicott), needs (Murray), or the interplay with his genetic +makeup. Dan is not a thing - he is a process. Even Dan's personality +traits and cognitive style, which may well be stable, are often +influenced by Dan's social setting and by his social interactions. + +It would seem that having a memory is a necessary but insufficient +condition for possessing a self-identity. One cannot remember one's +unconscious states (though one can remember their outcomes). One often +forgets events, names, and other information even if it was conscious +at a given time in one's past. Yet, one's (unremembered) unconscious +is an integral and important part of one's identity and one's self. +The remembered as well as the unremembered constitute one's +self-identity. + +IV. The Memory Link + +Hume said that to be considered in possession of a mind, a creature +needs to have a few states of consciousness linked by memory in a kind +of narrative or personal mythology. Can this conjecture be equally +applied to unconscious mental states (e.g. subliminal perceptions, +beliefs, drives, emotions, desires, etc.)? + +In other words, can we rephrase Hume and say that to be considered in +possession of a mind, a creature needs to have a few states of +consciousness and a few states of the unconscious - all linked by +memory into a personal narrative? Isn't it a contradiction in terms to +remember the unconscious? + +The unconscious and the subliminal are instance of the general +category of mental phenomena which are not states of consciousness +(i.e., are not conscious). Sleep and hypnosis are two others. But so +are "background mental phenomena" - e.g., one holds onto one's beliefs +and knowledge even when one is not aware (conscious) of them at every +given moment. + +We know that an apple will fall towards the earth, we know how to +drive a car ("automatically"), and we believe that the sun will rise +tomorrow, even though we do not spend every second of our waking life +consciously thinking about falling apples, driving cars, or the +position of the sun. + +Yet, the fact that knowledge and beliefs and other background mental +phenomena are not constantly conscious - does not mean that they +cannot be remembered. They can be remembered either by an act of will, +or in (sometimes an involuntary) response to changes in the +environment. The same applies to all other unconscious content. +Unconscious content can be recalled. Psychoanalysis, for instance, is +about re-introducing repressed unconscious content to the patient's +conscious memory and thus making it "remembered". + +In fact, one's self-identity may be such a background mental +phenomenon (always there, not always conscious, not always +remembered). The acts of will which bring it to the surface are what +we call "memory" and "introspection". + +This would seem to imply that having a self-identity is independent of +having a memory (or the ability to introspect). Memory is just the +mechanism by which one becomes aware of one's background, "always-on", +and omnipresent (all-pervasive) self-identity. Self-identity is the +object and predicate of memory and introspection. It is as though +self-identity were an emergent extensive parameter of the complex +human system - measurable by the dual techniques of memory and +introspection. + +We, therefore, have to modify our previous conclusions: + +Having a memory is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition for +possessing a self-identity. + +We are back to square one. The poor souls in Oliver Sacks' tome, "The +Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat" are unable to create and retain +memories. They occupy an eternal present, with no past. They are thus +unable to access (or invoke) their self-identity by remembering it. +Their self-identity is unavailable to them (though it is available to +those who observe them over many years) - but it exists for sure. +Therapy often succeeds in restoring pre-amnesiac memories and +self-identity. + +V. The Incorrigible Self + +Self-identity is not only always-on and all-pervasive - but also +incorrigible. In other words, no one - neither an observer, nor the +person himself - can "disprove" the existence of his self-identity. No +one can prove that a report about the existence of his (or another's) +self-identity is mistaken. + +Is it equally safe to say that no one - neither an observer, nor the +person himself - can prove (or disprove) the non-existence of his +self-identity? Would it be correct to say that no one can prove that a +report about the non-existence of his (or another's) self-identity is +true or false? + +Dan's criminal responsibility crucially depends on the answers to +these questions. Dan cannot be held responsible for Jack's murder if +he can prove that he is ignorant of the facts of his action (i.e., if +he can prove the non-existence of his self-identity). If he has no +access to his (former) self-identity - he can hardly be expected to be +aware and cognizant of these facts. + +What is in question is not Dan's mens rea, nor the application of the +McNaghten tests (did Dan know the nature and quality of his act or +could he tell right from wrong) to determine whether Dan was insane +when he committed the crime. A much broader issue is at stake: is it +the same person? Is the murderous Dan the same person as the current +Dan? Even though Dan seems to own the same body and brain and is +manifestly sane - he patently has no access to his (former) +self-identity. He has changed so drastically that it is arguable +whether he is still the same person - he has been "replaced". + +Finally, we can try to unite all the strands of our discourse into +this double definition: + +It would seem that we accept that someone has a self-identity if: (a) +He has the same hardware as we do (notably, a brain) and, by +implication, the same software as we do (an all-pervasive, omnipresent +self-identity) and (b) He communicates his humanly recognizable and +comprehensible inner world to us and manipulates his environment. We +accept that he has a specific (i.e., the same continuous) +self-identity if (c) He shows consistent intentional (i.e., willed) +patterns ("memory") in doing (b) for a long period of time. + +It seems that we accept that we have a specific self-identity (i.e., +we are self-conscious of a specific identity) if (a) We discern +(usually through memory and introspection) long term consistent +intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in our manipulation +("relating to") of our environment and (b) Others accept that we have +a specific self-identity. + +In conclusion: Dan undoubtedly has a self-identity (being human and, +thus, endowed with a brain). Equally undoubtedly, this self-identity +is not Dan's (but a new, unfamiliar, one). + +Such is the stuff of our nightmares - body snatching, demonic +possession, waking up in a strange place, not knowing who we are. +Without a continuous personal history - we are not. It is what binds +our various bodies, states of mind, memories, skills, emotions, and +cognitions - into a coherent bundle of identity. Dan speaks, drinks, +dances, talks, and makes love - but throughout that time, he is not +present because he does not remember Dan and how it is to be Dan. He +may have murdered Jake - but, by all philosophical and ethical +criteria, it was most definitely not his fault. + + Titanic, or a Moral Deliberation + + By: Sam Vaknin + +The film "Titanic" is riddled with moral dilemmas. In one of the +scenes, the owner of Star Line, the shipping company that owned the +now-sinking Unsinkable, joins a lowered life-boat. The tortured +expression on his face demonstrates that even he experiences more than +unease at his own conduct. Prior to the disaster, he instructs the +captain to adopt a policy dangerous to the ship. Indeed, it proves +fatal. A complicating factor was the fact that only women and children +were allowed by the officers in charge into the lifeboats. Another was +the discrimination against Third Class passengers. The boats sufficed +only to half the number of those on board and the First Class, High +Society passengers were preferred over the Low-Life immigrants under +deck. + +Why do we all feel that the owner should have stayed on and faced his +inevitable death? Because we judge him responsible for the demise of +the ship. Additionally, his wrong instructions - motivated by greed +and the pursuit of celebrity - were a crucial contributing factor. The +owner should have been punished (in his future) for things that he has +done (in his past). This is intuitively appealing. + +Would we have rendered the same judgement had the Titanic's fate been +the outcome of accident and accident alone? If the owner of the ship +could have had no control over the circumstances of its horrible +ending - would we have still condemned him for saving his life? Less +severely, perhaps. So, the fact that a moral entity has ACTED (or +omitted, or refrained from acting) in its past is essential in +dispensing with future rewards or punishments. + +The "product liability" approach also fits here. The owner (and his +"long arms": manufacturer, engineers, builders, etc.) of the Titanic +were deemed responsible because they implicitly contracted with their +passengers. They made a representation (which was explicit in their +case but is implicit in most others): "This ship was constructed with +knowledge and forethought. The best design was employed to avoid +danger. The best materials to increase pleasure." That the Titanic +sank was an irreversible breach of this contract. In a way, it was an +act of abrogation of duties and obligations. The owner/manufacturer of +a product must compensate the consumers should his product harm them +in any manner that they were not explicitly, clearly, visibly and +repeatedly warned against. Moreover, he should even make amends if the +product failed to meet the reasonable and justified expectations of +consumers, based on such warrants and representations. The payment +should be either in kind (as in more ancient justice systems) or in +cash (as in modern Western civilization). + +The product called "Titanic" took away the lives of its end-users. Our +"gut justice" tells us that the owner should have paid in kind. Faulty +engineering, insufficient number of lifeboats, over-capacity, hubris, +passengers and crew not drilled to face emergencies, extravagant +claims regarding the ship's resilience, contravening the captain's +professional judgement. All these seem to be sufficient grounds to the +death penalty. + +And yet, this is not the real question. The serious problem is this : +WHY should anyone pay in his future for his actions in the past? +First, there are some thorny issues to be eliminated. Such as +determinism: if there is no free will, there can be no personal +responsibility. Another is the preservation of personal identity: are +the person who committed the act and the person who is made to pay for +it - one and the same? If the answer is in the affirmative, in which +sense are they the same, the physical, the mental? Is the "overlap" +only limited and probabilistic? Still, we could assume, for this +discussion's sake, that the personal identity is undeniably and +absolutely preserved and that there is free will and, therefore, that +people can predict the outcomes of their actions, to a reasonable +degree of accuracy and that they elect to accept these outcomes prior +to the commission of their acts or to their omission. All this does +not answer the question that opened this paragraph. Even if there were +a contract signed between the acting person and the world, in which +the person willingly, consciously and intelligently (=without +diminished responsibility) accepted the future outcome of his acts, +the questions would remain: WHY should it be so? Why cannot we +conceive of a world in which acts and outcomes are divorced? It is +because we cannot believe in an a-causal world. + +Causality is a relationship (mostly between two things, or, rather, +events, the cause and the effect). Something generates or produces +another. Therefore, it is the other's efficient cause and it acts upon +it (=it acts to bring it about) through the mechanism of efficient +causation. A cause can be a direct physical mechanism or an +explanatory feature (historical cause). Of Aristotle's Four Causes +(Formal, Material, Efficient and Final), only the efficient cause +creates something distinguishable from itself. The causal discourse, +therefore, is problematic (how can a cause lead to an effect, +indistinguishable from itself?). Singular Paradigmatic Causal +Statements (Event A caused Event B) differ from General ones (Event A +causes Event B). Both are inadequate in dealing with mundane, routine, +causal statements because they do not reveal an OVERT relation between +the two events discussed. Moreover, in daily usage we treat facts (as +well as events) as causes. Not all the philosophers are in agreement +regarding factual causation. Davidson, for instance, admits that facts +can be RELEVANT to causal explanations but refuses to accept them AS +reasons. Acts may be distinct from facts, philosophically, but not in +day-to-day regular usage. By laymen (the vast majority of humanity, +that is), though, they are perceived to be the same. + +Pairs of events that are each other's cause and effect are accorded a +special status. But, that one follows the other (even if invariably) +is insufficient grounds to endow them with this status. This is the +famous "Post hoc, ergo propter hoc" fallacy. Other relations must be +weighed and the possibility of common causation must be seriously +contemplated. Such sequencing is, conceptually, not even necessary: +simultaneous causation and backwards causation are part of modern +physics, for instance. + +Time seems to be irrelevant to the status of events, though both time +and causation share an asymmetric structure (A causes B but B does not +cause A). The direction (the asymmetry) of the causal chain is not of +the same type as the direction (asymmetry) of time. The former is +formal, the latter, presumably, physical, or mental. A more serious +problem, to my mind, is the converse: what sets apart causal (cause +and effect) pairs of events from other pairs in which both +member-events are the outcomes of a common cause? Event B can +invariably follow Event A and still not be its effect. Both events +could have been caused by a common cause. A cause either necessitates +the effect, or is a sufficient condition for its occurrence. The +sequence is either inevitable, or possible. The meaninglessness of +this sentence is evident. + +Here, philosophers diverge. Some say (following Hume's reasoning and +his constant conjunction relation between events) that a necessary +causal relation exists between events when one is the inevitable +outcome (=follows) the other. Others propound a weaker version: the +necessity of the effect is hypothetical or conditional, given the laws +of nature. Put differently: to say that A necessitates (=causes) B is +no more than to say that it is a result of the laws of nature that +when A happens, so does B. Hempel generalized this approach. He said +that a statement of a fact (whether a private or a general fact) is +explained only if deduced from other statements, at least one of which +is a statement of a general scientific law. + +This is the "Covering Law Model" and it implies a symmetry between +explaining and predicting (at least where private facts are +concerned). If an event can be explained, it could have been predicted +and vice versa. Needless to say that Hempel's approach did not get us +nearer to solving the problems of causal priority and of +indeterministic causation. + +The Empiricists went a step further. They stipulated that the laws of +nature are contingencies and not necessary truths. Other chains of +events are possible where the laws of nature are different. This is +the same tired regularity theory in a more exotic guise. They are all +descendants of Hume's definition of causality: "An object followed by +another and where all the objects that resemble the first are followed +by objects that resemble the second." Nothing in the world is, +therefore, a causal necessity, events are only constantly conjoined. +Regularities in our experience condition us to form the idea of causal +necessity and to deduce that causes must generate events. Kant called +this latter deduction "A bastard of the imagination, impregnated by +experience" with no legitimate application in the world. It also +constituted a theological impediment. God is considered to be "Causa +Sui", His own cause. But any application of a causal chain or force, +already assumes the existence of a cause. This existence cannot, +therefore, be the outcome of the use made of it. God had to be recast +as the uncaused cause of the existence of all things contingent and +His existence necessitated no cause because He, himself, is necessary. +This is flimsy stuff and it gets even flimsier when the issue of +causal deviance is debated. + +A causal deviance is an abnormal, though causal, relation between +events or states of the world. It mainly arises when we introduce +intentional action and perception into the theory of causation. Let us +revert to the much-maligned owner of the sinking Titanic. He intended +to do one thing and another happened. Granted, if he intended to do +something and his intention was the cause of his doing so - then we +could have said that he intentionally committed an act. But what if he +intended to do one thing and out came another? And what if he intended +to do something, mistakenly did something else and, still, +accidentally, achieved what he set out to do? The popular example is +if someone intends to do something and gets so nervous that it happens +even without an act being committed (intends to refuse an invitation +by his boss, gets so nervous that he falls asleep and misses the +party). Are these actions and intentions in their classical senses? +There is room for doubt. Davidson narrows down the demands. To him, +"thinking causes" (causally efficient propositional attitudes) are +nothing but causal relations between events with the right application +of mental predicates which ascribe propositional attitudes supervening +the right application of physical predicates. This approach omits +intention altogether, not to mention the ascription of desire and +belief. + +But shouldn't have the hapless owner availed his precious place to +women and children? Should not he have obeyed the captain's orders +(=the marine law)? Should we succumb to laws that put our lives at +risk (fight in a war, sink with a ship)? The reason that women and +children are preferred over men is that they represent the future. +They are either capable of bringing life to the world (women) - or of +living longer (children). Societal etiquette reflects the arithmetic +of the species, in this (and in many another) case. But if this were +entirely and exclusively so, then young girls and female infants would +have been preferred over all the other groups of passengers. Old women +would have been left with the men, to die. That the actual (and +declared) selection processes differed from our theoretical exercise +says a lot about the vigorousness and applicability of our theories - +and a lot about the real world out there. The owner's behaviour may +have been deplorable - but it, definitely, was natural. He put his +interests (his survival) above the concerns of his society and his +species. Most of us would have done the same under the same +circumstances. + +The owner of the ship - though "Newly Rich" - undoubtedly belonged to +the First Class, Upper Crust, Cream of Society passengers. These were +treated to the lifeboats before the passengers of the lower classes +and decks. Was this a morally right decision? For sure, it was not +politically correct, in today's terms. Class and money distinctions +were formally abolished three decades ago in the enlightened West. +Discrimination between human beings in now allowed only on the basis +of merit (=on the basis of one's natural endowments). Why should we +think one basis for discrimination preferable to another? Can we +eliminate discrimination completely and if it were possible, would it +have been desirable? + +The answers, in my view, are that no basis of discrimination can hold +the moral high ground. They are all morally problematic because they +are deterministic and assign independent, objective, exogenous values +to humans. On the other hand, we are not born equal, nor do we proceed +to develop equally, or live under the same circumstances and +conditions. It is impossible to equate the unequal. Discrimination is +not imposed by humans on an otherwise egalitarian world. It is +introduced by the world into human society. And the elimination of +discrimination would constitute a grave error. The inequalities among +humans and the ensuing conflicts are the fuel that feeds the engines +of human development. Hopes, desires, aspirations and inspiration are +all the derivatives of discrimination or of the wish to be favoured, +or preferred over others. Disparities of money create markets, labour, +property, planning, wealth and capital. Mental inequalities lead to +innovation and theory. Knowledge differentials are at the heart of +educational institutions, professionalism, government and so on. +Osmotic and diffusive forces in human society are all the results of +incongruences, disparities, differences, inequalities and the negative +and positive emotions attached to them. The passengers of the first +class were preferred because they paid more for their tickets. +Inevitably, a tacit portion of the price went to amortize the costs of +"class insurance": should anything bad happen to this boat, persons +who paid a superior price will be entitled to receive a superior +treatment. There is nothing morally wrong with this. Some people get +to sit in the front rows of a theatre, or to travel in luxury, or to +receive superior medical treatment (or any medical treatment) +precisely because of this reason. There is no practical or +philosophical difference between an expensive liver transplant and a +place in a life boat. Both are lifesavers. + +A natural disaster is no Great Equalizer. Nothing is. Even the +argument that money is "external" or "accidental" to the rich +individual is weak. Often, people who marry for money considerations +are judged to be insincere or worse (cunning, conspiring, evil). "He +married her for her money", we say, as though the she-owner and the +money were two separate things. The equivalent sentence: "He married +her for her youth or for her beauty" sounds flawed. But youth and +beauty are more temporary and transient than money. They are really +accidental because the individual has no responsibility for or share +in their generation and has no possibility to effect their long-term +preservation. Money, on the other hand, is generated or preserved (or +both) owing to the personality of its owner. It is a better reflection +of personality than youth, beauty and many other (transient or +situation-dependent) "character" traits. Money is an integral part of +its owner and a reliable witness as to his mental disposition. It is, +therefore, a valid criterion for discrimination. + +The other argument in favour of favouring the first class passengers +is their contribution to society. A rich person contributes more to +his society in the shorter and medium term than a poor person. Vincent +Van Gogh may have been a million times more valuable to humanity, as a +whole, than his brother Theo - in the long run. But in the +intermediate term, Theo made it possible for Vincent and many others +(family, employees, suppliers, their dependants and his country) to +survive by virtue of his wealth. Rich people feed and cloth poor +people directly (employment, donations) and indirectly (taxation). The +opposite, alas, is not the case. Yet, this argument is flawed because +it does not take time into account. We have no way to predict the +future with any certainty. + +Each person carries the Marshall's baton in his bag, the painter's +brush, the author's fables. It is the potential that should count. A +selection process, which would have preferred Theo to Vincent would +have been erroneous. In the long run, Vincent proved more beneficial +to human society and in more ways - including financially - then Theo +could have ever been. + + Being John Malkovich + + By: Dr. Sam Vaknin + + +A quintessential loser, an out-of-job puppeteer, is hired by a firm, +whose offices are ensconced in a half floor (literally. The ceiling is +about a metre high, reminiscent of Taniel's hallucinatory Alice in +Wonderland illustrations). By sheer accident, he discovers a tunnel (a +"portal", in Internet-age parlance), which sucks its visitors into the +mind of the celebrated actor, John Malkovich. The movie is a tongue in +cheek discourse of identity, gender and passion in an age of languid +promiscuity. It poses all the right metaphysical riddles and presses +the viewers' intellectual stimulation buttons. + +A two line bit of dialogue, though, forms the axis of this +nightmarishly chimerical film. John Malkovich (played by himself), +enraged and bewildered by the unabashed commercial exploitation of the +serendipitous portal to his mind, insists that Craig, the +aforementioned puppet master, cease and desist with his activities. +"It is MY brain" - he screams and, with a typical American finale, "I +will see you in court". Craig responds: "But, it was I who discovered +the portal. It is my livelihood". + +This apparently innocuous exchange disguises a few very unsettling +ethical dilemmas. + +The basic question is "whose brain is it, anyway"? Does John Malkovich +OWN his brain? Is one's brain - one's PROPERTY? Property is usually +acquired somehow. Is our brain "acquired"? It is clear that we do not +acquire the hardware (neurones) and software (electrical and chemical +pathways) we are born with. But it is equally clear that we do +"acquire" both brain mass and the contents of our brains (its wiring +or irreversible chemical changes) through learning and experience. +Does this process of acquisition endow us with property rights? + +It would seem that property rights pertaining to human bodies are +fairly restricted. We have no right to sell our kidneys, for instance. +Or to destroy our body through the use of drugs. Or to commit an +abortion at will. Yet, the law does recognize and strives to enforce +copyrights, patents and other forms of intellectual property rights. + +This dichotomy is curious. For what is intellectual property but a +mere record of the brain's activities? A book, a painting, an +invention are the documentation and representation of brain waves. +They are mere shadows, symbols of the real presence - our mind. How +can we reconcile this contradiction? We are deemed by the law to be +capable of holding full and unmitigated rights to the PRODUCTS of our +brain activity, to the recording and documentation of our brain waves. +But we hold only partial rights to the brain itself, their originator. + +This can be somewhat understood if we were to consider this article, +for instance. It is composed on a word processor. I do not own full +rights to the word processing software (merely a licence), nor is the +laptop I use my property - but I posses and can exercise and enforce +full rights regarding this article. + +Admittedly, it is a partial parallel, at best: the computer and word +processing software are passive elements. It is my brain that does the +authoring. And so, the mystery remains: how can I own the article - +but not my brain? Why do I have the right to ruin the article at will +- but not to annihilate my brain at whim? + +Another angle of philosophical attack is to say that we rarely hold +rights to nature or to life. We can copyright a photograph we take of +a forest - but not the forest. To reduce it to the absurd: we can own +a sunset captured on film - but never the phenomenon thus documented. +The brain is natural and life's pivot - could this be why we cannot +fully own it? + +Wrong premises inevitably lead to wrong conclusions. We often own +natural objects and manifestations, including those related to human +life directly. We even issue patents for sequences of human DNA. And +people do own forests and rivers and the specific views of sunsets. + +Some scholars raise the issues of exclusivity and scarcity as the +precursors of property rights. My brain can be accessed only by myself +and its is one of a kind (sui generis). True but not relevant. One +cannot rigorously derive from these properties of our brain a right to +deny others access to them (should this become technologically +feasible) - or even to set a price on such granted access. In other +words, exclusivity and scarcity do not constitute property rights or +even lead to their establishment. Other rights may be at play (the +right to privacy, for instance) - but not the right to own property +and to derive economic benefits from such ownership. + +On the contrary, it is surprisingly easy to think of numerous +exceptions to a purported natural right of single access to one's +brain. If one memorized the formula to cure AIDS or cancer and refused +to divulge it for a reasonable compensation - surely, we should feel +entitled to invade his brain and extract it? Once such technology is +available - shouldn't authorized bodies of inspection have access to +the brains of our leaders on a periodic basis? And shouldn't we all +gain visitation rights to the minds of great men and women of science, +art and culture - as we do today gain access to their homes and to the +products of their brains? + +There is one hidden assumption, though, in both the movie and this +article. It is that mind and brain are one. The portal leads to John +Malkovich's MIND - yet, he keeps talking about his BRAIN and writhing +physically on the screen. The portal is useless without JM's mind. +Indeed, one can wonder whether JM's mind is not an INTEGRAL part of +the portal - structurally and functionally inseparable from it. If so, +does not the discoverer of the portal hold equal rights to John +Malkovich's mind, an integral part thereof? + +The portal leads to JM's mind. Can we prove that it leads to his +brain? Is this identity automatic? Of course not. It is the old +psychophysical question, at the heart of dualism - still far from +resolved. Can a MIND be copyrighted or patented? If no one knows WHAT +is the mind - how can it be the subject of laws and rights? If JM is +bothered by the portal voyagers, the intruders - he surely has legal +recourse, but not through the application of the rights to own +property and to benefit from it. These rights provide him with no +remedy because their subject (the mind) is a mystery. + +Can JM sue Craig and his clientele for unauthorized visits to his mind +(trespassing) - IF he is unaware of their comings and goings and +unperturbed by them? Moreover, can he prove that the portal leads to +HIS mind, that it is HIS mind that is being visited? Is there a way to +PROVE that one has visited another's mind? (See: "On Empathy"). + +And if property rights to one's brain and mind were firmly established +- how will telepathy (if ever proven) be treated legally? Or mind +reading? The recording of dreams? Will a distinction be made between a +mere visit - and the exercise of influence on the host and his / her +manipulation (similar questions arise in time travel)? + +This, precisely, is where the film crosses the line between the +intriguing and the macabre. The master puppeteer, unable to resist his +urges, manipulates John Malkovich and finally possesses him +completely. This is so clearly wrong, so manifestly forbidden, so +patently immoral, that the film loses its urgent ambivalence, its +surrealistic moral landscape and deteriorates into another banal +comedy of situations. + + Dreamcatcher - The Myth of Destructibility + + By: Dr. Sam Vaknin + + Read these essays first: + + The Habitual Identity + + Death, Meaning, and Identity + + Being John Malkovich + + "Shattered" Identity + + More Film REVIEWS - HERE! + + In the movie "Dreamcatcher", four childhood friends, exposed to an +alien, disguised as a retarded child, develop psychic powers. Years +later they reunite only to confront a vicious extraterrestrial +life-form. Only two survive but they succeed to eradicate the monster +by incinerating it and crushing its tiny off-spring underfoot. + +Being mortal ourselves, we cannot conceive of an indestructible +entity. The artifacts of popular culture - thrillers, action and +sci-fi films, video games, computer viruses - assume that all +organisms, organizations and automata possess fatal vulnerabilities. +Medicine and warfare are predicated on a similar contention. + +We react with shock and horror when we are faced with "resistant +stains" of bacteria or with creatures, machines, or groups able to +survive and thrive in extremely hostile environments. + +Destruction is multi-faceted. Even the simplest system has a structure +and performs functions. If the spatial continuity or arrangement of an +entity's structure is severed or substantially transformed - its +functions are usually adversely affected. Direct interference with a +system's functionality is equally deleterious. + +We can render a system dysfunctional by inhibiting or reversing any +stage in the complex processes involved - or by preventing the +entity's communication with its environs. Another method of +annihilation involves the alteration of the entity's context - its +surroundings, its codes and signals, its interactive patterns, its +potential partners, friends and foes. + +Finding the lethal weaknesses of an organism, an apparatus, or a +society is described as a process of trial and error. But the outcome +is guaranteed: mortal susceptibility is assumed to be a universal +trait. No one and nothing is perfectly immune, utterly invulnerable, +or beyond extermination. + +Yet, what is poison to one species is nectar to another. Water can be +either toxic or indispensable, depending on the animal, the automaton, +or the system. Scorching temperatures, sulfur emissions, ammonia or +absolute lack of oxygen are, to some organisms, the characteristics of +inviting habitats. To others, the very same are deadly. + +Can we conceive of an indestructible thing - be it unicellular or +multicellular, alive or robotic, composed of independent individuals +or acting in perfect, centrally-dictated unison? Can anything be, in +principle, eternal? + +This question is not as outlandish as it sounds. By fighting disease +and trying to postpone death, for instance, we aspire to immortality +and imperishability. Some of us believe in God - an entity securely +beyond ruin. Intuitively, we consider the Universe - if not time and +space - to be everlasting, though constantly metamorphosing. + +What is common to these examples of infinite resilience is their +unbounded and unparalleled size and might. Lesser objects are born or +created. Since there has been a time, prior to their genesis, in which +they did not exist - it is easy to imagine a future without them. + +Even where the distinction between individual and collective is +spurious their end is plausible. True, though we can obliterate +numerous "individual" bacteria - others, genetically identical, will +always survive our onslaught. Yet, should the entire Earth vanish - so +would these organisms. The extinction of all bacteria, though +predicated on an unlikely event, is still thinkable. + +But what about an entity that is "pure energy", a matrix of fields, a +thought, immaterial yet very real, omnipresent and present nowhere? +Such a being comes perilously close to the divine. For if it is +confined to certain space - however immense - it is perishable +together with that space. If it is not - then it is God, as perceived +by its believers. + +But what constitutes "destruction" or "annihilation"? We are familiar +with death - widely considered the most common form of inexistence. +But some people believe that death is merely a transformation from one +state of being to another. Sometimes all the constituents of a system +remain intact but cease to interact. Does this amount to obliteration? +And what about a machine that stops interacting with its environment +altogether - though its internal processes continue unabated. Is it +still "functioning"? + +It is near impossible to say when a "live" or "functioning" entity +ceases to be so. Death is the form of destruction we are most +acquainted with. For a discussion of death and the human condition - +read this Death, Meaning, and Identity + + + + T H E A U T H O R + + + +SHMUEL (SAM) VAKNIN + + +Curriculum Vitae + +Click on blue text to access relevant web sites - thank you. + +Born in 1961 in Qiryat-Yam, Israel. + +Served in the Israeli Defence Force (1979-1982) in training and +education units. + +Education + +Graduated a few semesters in the Technion - Israel Institute of +Technology, Haifa. + +Ph.D. in Philosophy (major : Philosophy of Physics) - Pacific Western +University, California. + +Graduate of numerous courses in Finance Theory and International +Trading. + +Certified E-Commerce Concepts Analyst. + +Certified in Psychological Counselling Techniques. + +Full proficiency in Hebrew and in English. + +Business Experience + +1980 to 1983 + +Founder and co-owner of a chain of computerized information kiosks in +Tel-Aviv, Israel. + +1982 to 1985 + +Senior positions with the Nessim D. Gaon Group of Companies in Geneva, +Paris and New-York (NOGA and APROFIM SA): + +- Chief Analyst of Edible Commodities in the Group's Headquarters in +Switzerland. +- Manager of the Research and Analysis Division +- Manager of the Data Processing Division +- Project Manager of The Nigerian Computerized Census +- Vice President in charge of RND and Advanced Technologies +- Vice President in charge of Sovereign Debt Financing + +1985 to 1986 + +Represented Canadian Venture Capital Funds in Israel. + +1986 to 1987 + +General Manager of IPE Ltd. in London. The firm financed international +multi-lateral countertrade and leasing transactions. + + +1988 to 1990 + +Co-founder and Director of "Mikbats - Tesuah", a portfolio management +firm based in Tel-Aviv. +Activities included large-scale portfolio management, underwriting, +forex trading and general financial advisory services. + +1990 to Present + +Free-lance consultant to many of Israel's Blue-Chip firms, mainly on +issues related to the capital markets in Israel, Canada, the UK and +the USA. + +Consultant to foreign RND ventures and to Governments on +macro-economic matters. + +President of the Israel chapter of the Professors World Peace Academy +(PWPA) and (briefly) Israel representative of the "Washington Times". + +1993 to 1994 + +Co-owner and Director of many business enterprises: + +- The Omega and Energy Air-Conditioning Concern +- AVP Financial Consultants +- Handiman Legal Services + Total annual turnover of the group: 10 million USD. + + +Co-owner, Director and Finance Manager of COSTI Ltd. - Israel's +largest computerized information vendor and developer. Raised funds +through a series of private placements locally, in the USA, Canada and +London. + +1993 to 1996 + +Publisher and Editor of a Capital Markets Newsletter distributed by +subscription only to dozens of subscribers countrywide. + +In a legal precedent in 1995 - studied in business schools and law +faculties across Israel - was tried for his role in an attempted +takeover of Israel's Agriculture Bank. + +Was interned in the State School of Prison Wardens. + +Managed the Central School Library, wrote, published and lectured on +various occasions. + +Managed the Internet and International News Department of an Israeli +mass media group, "Ha-Tikshoret and Namer". + +Assistant in the Law Faculty in Tel-Aviv University (to Prof. S.G. +Shoham). + +1996 to 1999 + +Financial consultant to leading businesses in Macedonia, Russia and +the Czech Republic. + +Collaborated with the Agency of Transformation of Business with +Social Capital. + +Economic commentator in "Nova Makedonija", "Dnevnik", "Izvestia", +"Argumenti i Fakti", "The Middle East Times", "Makedonija Denes", "The +New Presence", "Central Europe Review" , and other periodicals and in +the economic programs on various channels of Macedonian Television. + +Chief Lecturer in courses organized by the Agency of Transformation, +by the Macedonian Stock Exchange and by the Ministry of Trade. + +1999 to 2002 + +Economic Advisor to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia and to +the Ministry of Finance. + +2001 to present + +Senior Business Correspondent for United Press International (UPI) + +Web and Journalistic Activities + +Author of extensive Websites in Psychology ("Malignant Self Love") - +An Open Directory Cool Site + +Philosophy ("Philosophical Musings") + +Economics and Geopolitics ("World in Conflict and Transition") + +Owner of the Narcissistic Abuse Announcement and Study List and the +Narcissism Revisited mailing list (more than 3900 members) + +Owner of the Economies in Conflict and Transition Study list. + +Editor of mental health disorders and Central and Eastern Europe +categories in web directories (Open Directory, Suite 101, Search +Europe). + +Columnist and commentator in "The New Presence", United Press +International (UPI), InternetContent, eBookWeb and "Central Europe +Review". + +Publications and Awards + +"Managing Investment Portfolios in states of Uncertainty", Limon +Publishers, Tel-Aviv, 1988 + +"The Gambling Industry", Limon Publishers., Tel-Aviv, 1990 + +"Requesting my Loved One - Short Stories", Yedioth Aharonot, Tel-Aviv, +1997 + +"The Macedonian Economy at a Crossroads - On the way to a Healthier +Economy" (with Nikola Gruevski), Skopje, 1998 + +"Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited", Narcissus Publications, +Prague and Skopje, 1999, 2001, 2002 + +The Narcissism Series - e-books regarding relationships with abusive +narcissists (Skopje, 1999-2002) + +"The Exporters' Pocketbook", Ministry of Trade, Republic of Macedonia, +Skopje, 1999 + +"The Suffering of Being Kafka" (electronic book of Hebrew Short +Fiction, Prague, 1998) + +"After the Rain - How the West Lost the East", Narcissus Publications +in association with Central Europe Review/CEENMI, Prague and Skopje, +2000 + +Winner of numerous awards, among them the Israeli Education Ministry +Prize (Literature) 1997, The Rotary Club Award for Social Studies +(1976) and the Bilateral Relations Studies Award of the American +Embassy in Israel (1978). + +Hundreds of professional articles in all fields of finances and the +economy and numerous articles dealing with geopolitical and political +economic issues published in both print and web periodicals in many +countries. + +Many appearances in the electronic media on subjects in philosophy and +the Sciences and concerning economic matters. + +Contact Details: + +palma@unet.com.mk + +vaknin@link.com.mk + + +My Web Sites: + +Economy / Politics: + +http://ceeandbalkan.tripod.com/ + +Psychology: + +http://samvak.tripod.com/index.html + +Philosophy: + +http://philosophos.tripod.com/ + +Poetry: + +http://samvak.tripod.com/contents.html + + +Return + + + After the Rain + + How the West + + Lost the East + + + + The Book + + This is a series of articles written and published in 1996-2000 in + Macedonia, in Russia, in Egypt and in the Czech Republic. + + How the West lost the East. The economics, the politics, the + geopolitics, the conspiracies, the corruption, the old and the new, + the plough and the internet - it is all here, in colourful and + provocative prose. + + From "The Mind of Darkness": + + "'The Balkans' - I say - 'is the unconscious of the world'. People +stop to digest this metaphor and then they nod enthusiastically. It is +here that the repressed memories of history, its traumas and fears and + images reside. It is here that the psychodynamics of humanity - the + tectonic clash between Rome and Byzantium, West and East, + Judeo-Christianity and Islam - is still easily discernible. We are + seated at a New Year's dining table, loaded with a roasted pig and + exotic salads. I, the Jew, only half foreign to this cradle of +Slavonics. Four Serbs, five Macedonians. It is in the Balkans that all + ethnic distinctions fail and it is here that they prevail +anachronistically and atavistically. Contradiction and change the only + two fixtures of this tormented region. The women of the Balkan - + buried under provocative mask-like make up, retro hairstyles and too + narrow dresses. The men, clad in sepia colours, old fashioned suits + and turn of the century moustaches. In the background there is the + crying game that is Balkanian music: liturgy and folk and elegy +combined. The smells are heavy with muskular perfumes. It is like time + travel. It is like revisiting one's childhood." + + + + The Author + +Sam Vaknin is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited +and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He is a columnist for +Central Europe Review and eBookWeb , a United Press International +(UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and the editor of mental health +and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory and Suite101. + +Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government of +Macedonia. + +Visit Sam's Web site at http://samvak.tripod.com + + + + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Moral Deliberations in Modern Cinema, by Sam Vaknin + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MORAL DELIBERATIONS IN MODERN CINEMA *** + +***** This file should be named 8422.txt or 8422.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/8/4/2/8422/ + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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Do not change or edit the +header without written permission. + +Please read the "legal small print," and other information about the +eBook and Project Gutenberg at the bottom of this file. Included is +important information about your specific rights and restrictions in +how the file may be used. You can also find out about how to make a +donation to Project Gutenberg, and how to get involved. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**eBooks Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*****These eBooks Were Prepared By Thousands of Volunteers!***** + + +Title: Moral Deliberations in Modern Cinema + +Author: Sam Vaknin + +Release Date: July, 2005 [EBook #8422] +** This is a COPYRIGHTED Project Gutenberg eBook, Details Below ** +** Please follow the copyright guidelines in this file. ** + +Copyright (C) 2002 by Lidija Rangelovska. +[This file was first posted on July 9, 2003] + +Edition: 10 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: Latin1 + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, MORAL DELIBERATIONS IN MODERN CINEMA *** + + + + +Copyright (C) 2002 by Lidija Rangelovska. + + + + +Moral Deliberations in Modern Cinema + + + +1sst EDITION + + + + + +Sam Vaknin, Ph.D. + + + + + +Editing and Design: + +Lidija Rangelovska + + + + + + Lidija Rangelovska + + A Narcissus Publications Imprint, Skopje 2003 + + + Not for Sale! Non-commercial edition. + + + + + + + + + + + +© 2002 Copyright Lidija Rangelovska. + +All rights reserved. This book, or any part thereof, may not be used +or reproduced in any manner without written permission from: + +Lidija Rangelovska - write to: + +palma@unet.com.mk or to + +vaknin@link.com.mk + + + +Visit the Author Archive of Dr. Sam Vaknin in "Central Europe Review": + +http://www.ce-review.org/authorarchives/vaknin_archive/vaknin_main.htm +l + + +Visit Sam Vaknin's United Press International (UPI) Article Archive +-Click HERE! + + +Philosophical Musings and Essays + +http://samvak.tripod.com/culture.html + + +Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited + +http://samvak.tripod.com/ + + + +Created by: LIDIJA RANGELOVSKA + +REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA + +C O N T E N T S + + + +I. The Talented Mr. Ripley + +II. The Truman Show + +III. The Matrix + +IV. Shattered + +V. Titanic + +VI. Being John Malkovich + +VII. Dreamcatcher - The Myth of Destructibility + +VIII. The Author + +IX. About "After the Rain" + + The Talented Mr. Ripley + + By: Sam Vaknin + + +"The Talented Mr. Ripley" is an Hitchcockian and blood-curdling study +of the psychopath and his victims. At the centre of this masterpiece, +set in the exquisitely decadent scapes of Italy, is a titanic +encounter between Ripley, the aforementioned psychopath protagonist +and young Greenleaf, a consummate narcissist. + +Ripley is a cartoonishly poor young adult whose overriding desire is +to belong to a higher - or at least, richer - social class. While he +waits upon the subjects of his not so hidden desires, he receives an +offer he cannot refuse: to travel to Italy to retrieve the spoiled and +hedonistic son of a shipbuilding magnate, Greenleaf Senior. He embarks +upon a study of Junior's biography, personality, likes and hobbies. In +a chillingly detailed process, he actually assumes Greenleaf's +identity. Disembarking from a luxurious Cunard liner in his +destination, Italy, he "confesses" to a gullible textile-heiress that +he is the young Greenleaf, travelling incognito. + +Thus, we are subtly introduced to the two over-riding themes of the +antisocial personality disorder (still labelled by many professional +authorities "psychopathy" and "sociopathy"): an overwhelming dysphoria +and an even more overweening drive to assuage this angst by belonging. +The psychopath is an unhappy person. He is besieged by recurrent +depression bouts, hypochondria and an overpowering sense of alienation +and drift. He is bored with his own life and is permeated by a +seething and explosive envy of the lucky, the mighty, the clever, the +have it alls, the know it alls, the handsome, the happy - in short: +his opposites. He feels discriminated against and dealt a poor hand in +the great poker game called life. He is driven obsessively to right +these perceived wrongs and feels entirely justified in adopting +whatever means he deems necessary in pursuing this goal. + +Ripley's reality test is maintained throughout the film. In other +words - while he gradually merges with the object of his admiring +emulation, the young Greenleaf - Ripley can always tell the +difference. After he kills Greenleaf in self-defense, he assumes his +name, wears his clothes, cashes his checks and makes phone calls from +his rooms. But he also murders - or tries to murder - those who +suspect the truth. These acts of lethal self-preservation prove +conclusively that he knows who he is and that he fully realizes that +his acts are parlously illegal. + +Young Greenleaf is young, captivatingly energetic, infinitely +charming, breathtakingly handsome and deceivingly emotional. He lacks +real talents - he know how to play only six jazz tunes, can't make up +his musical mind between his faithful sax and a newly alluring drum +kit and, an aspiring writer, can't even spell. These shortcomings and +discrepancies are tucked under a glittering facade of non-chalance, +refreshing spontaneity, an experimental spirit, unrepressed sexuality +and unrestrained adventurism. But Greenleaf Jr. is a garden variety +narcissist. He cheats on his lovely and loving girlfriend, Marge. He +refuses to lend money - of which he seems to have an unlimited supply, +courtesy his ever more disenchanted father - to a girl he impregnated. +She commits suicide and he blames the primitiveness of the emergency +services, sulks and kicks his precious record player. In the midst of +this infantile temper tantrum the rudiments of a conscience are +visible. He evidently feels guilty. At least for a while. + +Greenleaf Jr. falls in and out of love and friendship in a predictable +pendulous rhythm. He idealizes his beaus and then devalues them. He +finds them to be the quiddity of fascination one moment - and the +distilled essence of boredom the next. And he is not shy about +expressing his distaste and disenchantment. He is savagely cruel as he +calls Ripley a leach who has taken over his life and his possessions +(having previously invited him to do so in no uncertain terms). He +says that he is relieved to see him go and he cancels off-handedly +elaborate plans they made together. Greenleaf Jr. maintains a poor +record of keeping promises and a rich record of violence, as we +discover towards the end of this suspenseful, taut yarn. + +Ripley himself lacks an identity. He is a binary automaton driven by a +set of two instructions - become someone and overcome resistance. He +feels like a nobody and his overriding ambition is to be somebody, +even if he has to fake it, or steal it. His only talents, he openly +admits, are to fake both personalities and papers. He is a predator +and he hunts for congruence, cohesion and meaning. He is in constant +search of a family. Greenleaf Jr., he declares festively, is the older +brother he never had. Together with the long suffering fiancee in +waiting, Marge, they are a family. Hasn't Greenleaf Sr. actually +adopted him? + +This identity disturbance, which is at the psychodynamic root of both +pathological narcissism and rapacious psychopathy, is all-pervasive. +Both Ripley and Greenleaf Jr. are not sure who they are. Ripley wants +to be Greenleaf Jr. - not because of the latter's admirable +personality, but because of his money. Greenleaf Jr. cultivates a +False Self of a jazz giant in the making and the author of the Great +American Novel but he is neither and he bitterly knows it. Even their +sexual identity is not fully formed. Ripley is at once homoerotic, +autoerotic and heteroerotic. He has a succession of homosexual lovers +(though apparently only platonic ones). Yet, he is attracted to women. +He falls desperately in love with Greenleaf's False Self and it is the +revelation of the latter's dilapidated True Self that leads to the +atavistically bloody scene in the boat. + +But Ripley is a different -and more ominous - beast altogether. He +rambles on about the metaphorical dark chamber of his secrets, the key +to which he wishes to share with a "loved" one. But this act of +sharing (which never materializes) is intended merely to alleviate the +constant pressure of the hot pursuit he is subjected to by the police +and others. He disposes with equal equanimity of both loved ones and +the occasional prying acquaintance. At least twice he utters words of +love as he actually strangles his newfound inamorato and tries to +slash an old and rekindled flame. He hesitates not a split second when +confronted with an offer to betray Greenleaf Sr., his nominal employer +and benefactor, and abscond with his money. He falsifies signatures +with ease, makes eye contact convincingly, flashes the most heart +rending smile when embarrassed or endangered. He is a caricature of +the American dream: ambitious, driven, winsome, well versed in the +mantras of the bourgeoisie. But beneath this thin veneer of hard +learned, self-conscious and uneasy civility - lurks a beast of prey +best characterized by the DSM IV (Diagnostic and Statistics Manual): + +"Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviour, +deceitfulness as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or +conning others to personal profit or pleasure, impulsivity or failure +to plan ahead... reckless disregard for safety of self or others +...(and above all) lack of remorse." (From the criteria of the +Antisocial Personality Disorder). + +But perhaps the most intriguing portraits are those of the victims. +Marge insists, in the face of the most callous and abusive behaviour, +that there is something "tender" in Greenleaf Jr. When she confronts +the beguiling monster, Ripley, she encounters the fate of all victims +of psychopaths: disbelief, pity and ridicule. The truth is too +horrible to contemplate, let alone comprehend. Psychopaths are inhuman +in the most profound sense of this compounded word. Their emotions and +conscience have been amputated and replaced by phantom imitations. But +it is rare to pierce their meticulously crafted facade. They more +often than not go on to great success and social acceptance while +their detractors are relegated to the fringes of society. Both +Meredith and Peter, who had the misfortune of falling in deep, +unrequited love with Ripley, are punished. One by losing his life, the +other by losing Ripley time and again, mysteriously, capriciously, +cruelly. + +Thus, ultimately, the film is an intricate study of the pernicious +ways of psychopathology. Mental disorder is a venom not confined to +its source. It spreads and affects its environment in a myriad +surreptitiously subtle forms. It is a hydra, growing one hundred heads +where one was severed. Its victims writhe and as abuse is piled upon +trauma - they turn to stone, the mute witnesses of horror, the +stalactites and stalagmites of pain untold and unrecountable. For +their tormentors are often as talented as Mr. Ripley is and they are +as helpless and as clueless as his victims are. + + The Truman Show + + By: Sam Vaknin + + +"The Truman Show" is a profoundly disturbing movie. On the surface, it +deals with the worn out issue of the intermingling of life and the +media. + +Examples for such incestuous relationships abound: + +Ronald Reagan, the cinematic president was also a presidential movie +star. In another movie ("The Philadelphia Experiment") a defrosted Rip +Van Winkle exclaims upon seeing Reagan on television (40 years after +his forced hibernation started): "I know this guy, he used to play +Cowboys in the movies". + +Candid cameras monitor the lives of webmasters (website owners) almost +24 hours a day. The resulting images are continuously posted on the +Web and are available to anyone with a computer. + +The last decade witnessed a spate of films, all concerned with the +confusion between life and the imitations of life, the media. The +ingenious "Capitan Fracasse", "Capricorn One", "Sliver", "Wag the Dog" +and many lesser films have all tried to tackle this (un)fortunate +state of things and its moral and practical implications. + +The blurring line between life and its representation in the arts is +arguably the main theme of "The Truman Show". The hero, Truman, lives +in an artificial world, constructed especially for him. He was born +and raised there. He knows no other place. The people around him - +unbeknownst to him - are all actors. His life is monitored by 5000 +cameras and broadcast live to the world, 24 hours a day, every day. He +is spontaneous and funny because he is unaware of the monstrosity of +which he is the main cogwheel. + +But Peter Weir, the movie's director, takes this issue one step +further by perpetrating a massive act of immorality on screen. Truman +is lied to, cheated, deprived of his ability to make choices, +controlled and manipulated by sinister, half-mad Shylocks. As I said, +he is unwittingly the only spontaneous, non-scripted, "actor" in the +on-going soaper of his own life. All the other figures in his life, +including his parents, are actors. Hundreds of millions of viewers and +voyeurs plug in to take a peep, to intrude upon what Truman innocently +and honestly believes to be his privacy. They are shown responding to +various dramatic or anti-climactic events in Truman's life. That we +are the moral equivalent of these viewers-voyeurs, accomplices to the +same crimes, comes as a shocking realization to us. We are (live) +viewers and they are (celluloid) viewers. We both enjoy Truman's +inadvertent, non-consenting, exhibitionism. We know the truth about +Truman and so do they. Of course, we are in a privileged moral +position because we know it is a movie and they know it is a piece of +raw life that they are watching. + +But moviegoers throughout Hollywood's history have willingly and +insatiably participated in numerous "Truman Shows". The lives (real or +concocted) of the studio stars were brutally exploited and +incorporated in their films. Jean Harlow, Barbara Stanwyck, James +Cagney all were forced to spill their guts in cathartic acts of on +camera repentance and not so symbolic humiliation. "Truman Shows" is +the more common phenomenon in the movie industry. + +Then there is the question of the director of the movie as God and of +God as the director of a movie. The members of his team - technical +and non-technical alike - obey Christoff, the director, almost +blindly. They suspend their better moral judgement and succumb to his +whims and to the brutal and vulgar aspects of his pervasive dishonesty +and sadism. The torturer loves his victims. They define him and infuse +his life with meaning. Caught in a narrative, the movie says, people +act immorally. + +(IN)famous psychological experiments support this assertion. Students +were led to administer what they thought were "deadly" electric shocks +to their colleagues or to treat them bestially in simulated prisons. +They obeyed orders. So did all the hideous genocidal criminals in +history. The Director Weir asks: should God be allowed to be immoral +or should he be bound by morality and ethics? Should his decisions and +actions be constrained by an over-riding code of right and wrong? +Should we obey his commandments blindly or should we exercise +judgement? + +If we do exercise judgement are we then being immoral because God (and +the Director Christoff) know more (about the world, about us, the +viewers and about Truman), know better, are omnipotent? Is the +exercise of judgement the usurpation of divine powers and attributes? +Isn't this act of rebelliousness bound to lead us down the path of +apocalypse? + +It all boils down to the question of free choice and free will versus +the benevolent determinism imposed by an omniscient and omnipotent +being. What is better: to have the choice and be damned (almost +inevitably, as in the biblical narrative of the Garden of Eden) - or +to succumb to the superior wisdom of a supreme being? A choice always +involves a dilemma. It is the conflict between two equivalent states, +two weighty decisions whose outcomes are equally desirable and two +identically-preferable courses of action. Where there is no such +equivalence - there is no choice, merely the pre-ordained (given full +knowledge) exercise of a preference or inclination. Bees do not choose +to make honey. A fan of football does not choose to watch a football +game. He is motivated by a clear inequity between the choices that he +faces. He can read a book or go to the game. His decision is clear and +pre-determined by his predilection and by the inevitable and +invariable implementation of the principle of pleasure. There is no +choice here. It is all rather automatic. But compare this to the +choice some victims had to make between two of their children in the +face of Nazi brutality. Which child to sentence to death - which one +to sentence to life? Now, this is a real choice. It involves +conflicting emotions of equal strength. One must not confuse +decisions, opportunities and choice. + +Decisions are the mere selection of courses of action. This selection +can be the result of a choice or the result of a tendency (conscious, +unconscious, or biological-genetic). Opportunities are current states +of the world, which allow for a decision to be made and to affect the +future state of the world. Choices are our conscious experience of +moral or other dilemmas. + +Christoff finds it strange that Truman - having discovered the truth - +insists upon his right to make choices, i.e., upon his right to +experience dilemmas. To the Director, dilemmas are painful, +unnecessary, destructive, or at best disruptive. His utopian world - +the one he constructed for Truman - is choice-free and dilemma-free. +Truman is programmed not in the sense that his spontaneity is +extinguished. Truman is wrong when, in one of the scenes, he keeps +shouting: "Be careful, I am spontaneous". The Director and fat-cat +capitalistic producers want him to be spontaneous, they want him to +make decisions. But they do not want him to make choices. So they +influence his preferences and predilections by providing him with an +absolutely totalitarian, micro-controlled, repetitive environment. +Such an environment reduces the set of possible decisions so that +there is only one favourable or acceptable decision (outcome) at any +junction. Truman does decide whether to walk down a certain path or +not. But when he does decide to walk - only one path is available to +him. His world is constrained and limited - not his actions. + +Actually, Truman's only choice in the movie leads to an arguably +immoral decision. He abandons ship. He walks out on the whole project. +He destroys an investment of billions of dollars, people's lives and +careers. He turns his back on some of the actors who seem to really be +emotionally attached to him. He ignores the good and pleasure that the +show has brought to the lives of millions of people (the viewers). He +selfishly and vengefully goes away. He knows all this. By the time he +makes his decision, he is fully informed. He knows that some people +may commit suicide, go bankrupt, endure major depressive episodes, do +drugs. But this massive landscape of resulting devastation does not +deter him. He prefers his narrow, personal, interest. He walks. + +But Truman did not ask or choose to be put in his position. He found +himself responsible for all these people without being consulted. +There was no consent or act of choice involved. How can anyone be +responsible for the well-being and lives of other people - if he did +not CHOOSE to be so responsible? Moreover, Truman had the perfect +moral right to think that these people wronged him. Are we morally +responsible and accountable for the well-being and lives of those who +wrong us? True Christians are, for instance. + +Moreover, most of us, most of the time, find ourselves in situations +which we did not help mould by our decisions. We are unwillingly cast +into the world. We do not provide prior consent to being born. This +fundamental decision is made for us, forced upon us. This pattern +persists throughout our childhood and adolescence: decisions are made +elsewhere by others and influence our lives profoundly. + +As adults we are the objects - often the victims - of the decisions of +corrupt politicians, mad scientists, megalomaniac media barons, +gung-ho generals and demented artists. This world is not of our making +and our ability to shape and influence it is very limited and rather +illusory. We live in our own "Truman Show". Does this mean that we are +not morally responsible for others? + +We are morally responsible even if we did not choose the circumstances +and the parameters and characteristics of the universe that we +inhabit. The Swedish Count Wallenberg imperilled his life (and lost +it) smuggling hunted Jews out of Nazi occupied Europe. He did not +choose, or helped to shape Nazi Europe. It was the brainchild of the +deranged Director Hitler. Having found himself an unwilling +participant in Hitler's horror show, Wallenberg did not turn his back +and opted out. He remained within the bloody and horrific set and did +his best. Truman should have done the same. Jesus said that he should +have loved his enemies. He should have felt and acted with +responsibility towards his fellow human beings, even towards those who +wronged him greatly. + +But this may be an inhuman demand. Such forgiveness and magnanimity +are the reserve of God. And the fact that Truman's tormentors did not +see themselves as such and believed that they were acting in his best +interests and that they were catering to his every need - does not +absolve them from their crimes. Truman should have maintained a fine +balance between his responsibility to the show, its creators and its +viewers and his natural drive to get back at his tormentors. The +source of the dilemma (which led to his act of choosing) is that the +two groups overlap. + +Truman found himself in the impossible position of being the sole +guarantor of the well-being and lives of his tormentors. To put the +question in sharper relief: are we morally obliged to save the life +and livelihood of someone who greatly wronged us? Or is vengeance +justified in such a case? + +A very problematic figure in this respect is that of Truman's best and +childhood friend. They grew up together, shared secrets, emotions and +adventures. Yet he lies to Truman constantly and under the Director's +instructions. Everything he says is part of a script. It is this +disinformation that convinces us that he is not Truman's true friend. +A real friend is expected, above all, to provide us with full and true +information and, thereby, to enhance our ability to choose. Truman's +true love in the Show tried to do it. She paid the price: she was +ousted from the show. But she tried to provide Truman with a choice. +It is not sufficient to say the right things and make the right moves. +Inner drive and motivation are required and the willingness to take +risks (such as the risk of providing Truman with full information +about his condition). All the actors who played Truman's parents, +loving wife, friends and colleagues, miserably failed on this score. + +It is in this mimicry that the philosophical key to the whole movie +rests. A Utopia cannot be faked. Captain Nemo's utopian underwater +city was a real Utopia because everyone knew everything about it. +People were given a choice (though an irreversible and irrevocable +one). They chose to become lifetime members of the reclusive Captain's +colony and to abide by its (overly rational) rules. + +The Utopia came closest to extinction when a group of stray survivors +of a maritime accident were imprisoned in it against their expressed +will. In the absence of choice, no utopia can exist. In the absence of +full, timely and accurate information, no choice can exist. Actually, +the availability of choice is so crucial that even when it is +prevented by nature itself - and not by the designs of more or less +sinister or monomaniac people - there can be no Utopia. In H.G. Wells' +book "The Time Machine", the hero wanders off to the third millennium +only to come across a peaceful Utopia. Its members are immortal, don't +have to work, or think in order to survive. Sophisticated machines +take care of all their needs. No one forbids them to make choices. +There simply is no need to make them. So the Utopia is fake and indeed +ends badly. + +Finally, the "Truman Show" encapsulates the most virulent attack on +capitalism in a long time. Greedy, thoughtless money machines in the +form of billionaire tycoon-producers exploit Truman's life shamelessly +and remorselessly in the ugliest display of human vices possible. The +Director indulges in his control-mania. The producers indulge in their +monetary obsession. The viewers (on both sides of the silver screen) +indulge in voyeurism. The actors vie and compete in the compulsive +activity of furthering their petty careers. It is a repulsive canvas +of a disintegrating world. Perhaps Christoff is right after al when he +warns Truman about the true nature of the world. But Truman chooses. +He chooses the exit door leading to the outer darkness over the false +sunlight in the Utopia that he leaves behind. + + The Matrix + + By: Sam Vaknin + + +It is easy to confuse the concepts of "virtual reality" and a +"computerized model of reality (simulation)". The former is a +self-contained Universe, replete with its "laws of physics" and +"logic". It can bear resemblance to the real world or not. It can be +consistent or not. It can interact with the real world or not. In +short, it is an arbitrary environment. In contrast, a model of reality +must have a direct and strong relationship to the world. It must obey +the rules of physics and of logic. The absence of such a relationship +renders it meaningless. A flight simulator is not much good in a world +without aeroplanes or if it ignores the laws of nature. A technical +analysis program is useless without a stock exchange or if its +mathematically erroneous. + +Yet, the two concepts are often confused because they are both +mediated by and reside on computers. The computer is a self-contained +(though not closed) Universe. It incorporates the hardware, the data +and the instructions for the manipulation of the data (software). It +is, therefore, by definition, a virtual reality. It is versatile and +can correlate its reality with the world outside. But it can also +refrain from doing so. This is the ominous "what if" in artificial +intelligence (AI). What if a computer were to refuse to correlate its +internal (virtual) reality with the reality of its makers? What if it +were to impose its own reality on us and make it the privileged one? + +In the visually tantalizing movie, "The Matrix", a breed of AI +computers takes over the world. It harvests human embryos in +laboratories called "fields". It then feeds them through grim looking +tubes and keeps them immersed in gelatinous liquid in cocoons. This +new "machine species" derives its energy needs from the electricity +produced by the billions of human bodies thus preserved. A +sophisticated, all-pervasive, computer program called "The Matrix" +generates a "world" inhabited by the consciousness of the unfortunate +human batteries. Ensconced in their shells, they see themselves +walking, talking, working and making love. This is a tangible and +olfactory phantasm masterfully created by the Matrix. Its computing +power is mind boggling. It generates the minutest details and reams of +data in a spectacularly successful effort to maintain the illusion. + +A group of human miscreants succeeds to learn the secret of the +Matrix. They form an underground and live aboard a ship, loosely +communicating with a halcyon city called "Zion", the last bastion of +resistance. In one of the scenes, Cypher, one of the rebels defects. +Over a glass of (illusory) rubicund wine and (spectral) juicy steak, +he poses the main dilemma of the movie. Is it better to live happily +in a perfectly detailed delusion - or to survive unhappily but free of +its hold? + +The Matrix controls the minds of all the humans in the world. It is a +bridge between them, they inter-connected through it. It makes them +share the same sights, smells and textures. They remember. They +compete. They make decisions. + +The Matrix is sufficiently complex to allow for this apparent lack of +determinism and ubiquity of free will. The root question is: is there +any difference between making decisions and feeling certain of making +them (not having made them)? If one is unaware of the existence of the +Matrix, the answer is no. From the inside, as a part of the Matrix, +making decisions and appearing to be making them are identical states. +Only an outside observer - one who in possession of full information +regarding both the Matrix and the humans - can tell the difference. + +Moreover, if the Matrix were a computer program of infinite +complexity, no observer (finite or infinite) would have been able to +say with any certainty whose a decision was - the Matrix's or the +human's. And because the Matrix, for all intents and purposes, is +infinite compared to the mind of any single, tube-nourished, +individual - it is safe to say that the states of "making a decision" +and "appearing to be making a decision" are subjectively +indistinguishable. No individual within the Matrix would be able to +tell the difference. His or her life would seem to him or her as real +as ours are to us. The Matrix may be deterministic - but this +determinism is inaccessible to individual minds because of the +complexity involved. When faced with a trillion deterministic paths, +one would be justified to feel that he exercised free, unconstrained +will in choosing one of them. Free will and determinism are +indistinguishable at a certain level of complexity. + +Yet, we KNOW that the Matrix is different to our world. It is NOT the +same. This is an intuitive kind of knowledge, for sure, but this does +not detract from its firmness. If there is no subjective difference +between the Matrix and our Universe, there must be an objective one. +Another key sentence is uttered by Morpheus, the leader of the rebels. +He says to "The Chosen One" (the Messiah) that it is really the year +2199, though the Matrix gives the impression that it is 1999. + +This is where the Matrix and reality diverge. Though a human who would +experience both would find them indistinguishable - objectively they +are different. In one of them (the Matrix), people have no objective +TIME (though the Matrix might have it). The other (reality) is +governed by it. + +Under the spell of the Matrix, people feel as though time goes by. +They have functioning watches. The sun rises and sets. Seasons change. +They grow old and die. This is not entirely an illusion. Their bodies +do decay and die, as ours do. They are not exempt from the laws of +nature. But their AWARENESS of time is computer generated. The Matrix +is sufficiently sophisticated and knowledgeable to maintain a close +correlation between the physical state of the human (his health and +age) and his consciousness of the passage of time. The basic rules of +time - for instance, its asymmetry - are part of the program. + +But this is precisely it. Time in the minds of these people is +program-generated, not reality-induced. It is not the derivative of +change and irreversible (thermodynamic and other) processes OUT THERE. +Their minds are part of a computer program and the computer program is +a part of their minds. + +Their bodies are static, degenerating in their protective nests. +Nothing happens to them except in their minds. They have no physical +effect on the world. They effect no change. These things set the +Matrix and reality apart. + +To "qualify" as reality a two-way interaction must occur. One flow of +data is when reality influences the minds of people (as does the +Matrix). The obverse, but equally necessary, type of data flow is when +people know reality and influence it. The Matrix triggers a time +sensation in people the same way that the Universe triggers a time +sensation in us. Something does happen OUT THERE and it is called the +Matrix. In this sense, the Matrix is real, it is the reality of these +humans. It maintains the requirement of the first type of flow of +data. But it fails the second test: people do not know that it exists +or any of its attributes, nor do they affect it irreversibly. They do +not change the Matrix. Paradoxically, the rebels do affect the Matrix +(they almost destroy it). In doing so, they make it REAL. It is their +REALITY because they KNOW it and they irreversibly CHANGE it. + +Applying this dual-track test, "virtual" reality IS a reality, albeit, +at this stage, of a deterministic type. It affects our minds, we know +that it exists and we affect it in return. Our choices and actions +irreversibly alter the state of the system. This altered state, in +turn, affects our minds. This interaction IS what we call "reality". +With the advent of stochastic and quantum virtual reality generators - +the distinction between "real" and "virtual" will fade. The Matrix +thus is not impossible. But that it is possible - does not make it +real. + + + The Shattered Identity + + By: Sam Vaknin + + + Read these essays first: + + The Habitual Identity + + Death, Meaning, and Identity + + Fact and Truth + + Dreams - The Metaphors of Mind + + +I. Exposition + +In the movie "Shattered" (1991), Dan Merrick survives an accident and +develops total amnesia regarding his past. His battered face is +reconstructed by plastic surgeons and, with the help of his loving +wife, he gradually recovers his will to live. But he never develops a +proper sense of identity. It is as though he is constantly ill at ease +in his own body. As the plot unravels, Dan is led to believe that he +may have murdered his wife's lover, Jack. This thriller offers +additional twists and turns but, throughout it all, we face this +question: + +Dan has no recollection of being Dan. Dan does not remember murdering +Jack. It seems as though Dan's very identity has been erased. Yet, Dan +is in sound mind and can tell right from wrong. Should Dan be held +(morally and, as a result, perhaps legally as well) accountable for +Jack's murder? + +Would the answer to this question still be the same had Dan erased +from his memory ONLY the crime -but recalled everything else (in an +act of selective dissociation)? Do our moral and legal accountability +and responsibility spring from the integrity of our memories? If Dan +were to be punished for a crime he doesn't have the faintest +recollection of committing - wouldn't he feel horribly wronged? +Wouldn't he be justified in feeling so? + +There are many states of consciousness that involve dissociation and +selective amnesia: hypnosis, trance and possession, hallucination, +illusion, memory disorders (like organic, or functional amnesia), +depersonalization disorder, dissociative fugue, dreaming, psychosis, +post traumatic stress disorder, and drug-induced psychotomimetic +states. + +Consider this, for instance: + +What if Dan were the victim of a Multiple Personality Disorder (now +known as "Dissociative Identity Disorder")? What if one of his +"alters" (i.e., one of the multitude of "identities" sharing Dan's +mind and body) committed the crime? Should Dan still be held +responsible? What if the alter "John" committed the crime and then +"vanished", leaving behind another alter (let us say, "Joseph") in +control? + +Should "Joseph" be held responsible for the crime "John" committed? +What if "John" were to reappear 10 years after he "vanished"? What if +he were to reappear 50 years after he "vanished"? What if he were to +reappear for a period of 90 days - only to "vanish" again? And what is +Dan's role in all this? Who, exactly, then, is Dan? + +II. Who is Dan? + +Buddhism compares Man to a river. Both retain their identity despite +the fact that their individual composition is different at different +moments. The possession of a body as the foundation of a self-identity +is a dubious proposition. Bodies change drastically in time (consider +a baby compared to an adult). Almost all the cells in a human body are +replaced every few years. Changing one's brain (by transplantation) - +also changes one's identity, even if the rest of the body remains the +same. + +Thus, the only thing that binds a "person" together (i.e., gives him a +self and an identity) is time, or, more precisely, memory. By "memory" +I also mean: personality, skills, habits, retrospected emotions - in +short: all long term imprints and behavioural patterns. The body is +not an accidental and insignificant container, of course. It +constitutes an important part of one's self-image, self-esteem, sense +of self-worth, and sense of existence (spatial, temporal, and social). +But one can easily imagine a brain in vitro as having the same +identity as when it resided in a body. One cannot imagine a body +without a brain (or with a different brain) as having the same +identity it had before the brain was removed or replaced. + +What if the brain in vitro (in the above example) could not +communicate with us at all? Would we still think it is possessed of a +self? The biological functions of people in coma are maintained. But +do they have an identity, a self? If yes, why do we "pull the plug" on +them so often? + +It would seem (as it did to Locke) that we accept that someone has a +self-identity if: (a) He has the same hardware as we do (notably, a +brain) and (b) He communicates his humanly recognizable and +comprehensible inner world to us and manipulates his environment. We +accept that he has a given (i.e., the same continuous) self-identity +if (c) He shows consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns +("memory") in doing (b) for a long period of time. + +It seems that we accept that we have a self-identity (i.e., we are +self-conscious) if (a) We discern (usually through introspection) long +term consistent intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in our +manipulation ("relating to") of our environment and (b) Others accept +that we have a self-identity (Herbert Mead, Feuerbach). + +Dan (probably) has the same hardware as we do (a brain). He +communicates his (humanly recognizable and comprehensible) inner world +to us (which is how he manipulates us and his environment). Thus, Dan +clearly has a self-identity. But he is inconsistent. His intentional +(willed) patterns, his memory, are incompatible with those +demonstrated by Dan before the accident. Though he clearly is +possessed of a self-identity, we cannot say that he has the SAME +self-identity he possessed before the crash. In other words, we cannot +say that he, indeed, is Dan. + +Dan himself does not feel that he has a self-identity at all. He +discerns intentional (willed) patterns in his manipulation of his +environment but, due to his amnesia, he cannot tell if these are +consistent, or long term. In other words, Dan has no memory. Moreover, +others do not accept him as Dan (or have their doubts) because they +have no memory of Dan as he is now. + +Interim conclusion: + +Having a memory is a necessary and sufficient condition for possessing +a self-identity. + +III. Repression + +Yet, resorting to memory to define identity may appear to be a +circular (even tautological) argument. When we postulate memory - +don't we already presuppose the existence of a "remembering agent" +with an established self-identity? + +Moreover, we keep talking about "discerning", "intentional", or +"willed" patterns. But isn't a big part of our self (in the form of +the unconscious, full of repressed memories) unavailable to us? Don't +we develop defence mechanisms against repressed memories and +fantasies, against unconscious content incongruent with our +self-image? Even worse, this hidden, inaccessible, dynamically active +part of our self is thought responsible for our recurrent discernible +patterns of behaviour. The phenomenon of posthypnotic suggestion seems +to indicate that this may be the case. The existence of a +self-identity is, therefore, determined through introspection (by +oneself) and observation (by others) of merely the conscious part of +the self. + +But the unconscious is as much a part of one's self-identity as one's +conscious. What if, due to a mishap, the roles were reversed? What if +Dan's conscious part were to become his unconscious and his +unconscious part - his conscious? What if all his conscious memories, +drives, fears, wishes, fantasies, and hopes - were to become +unconscious while his repressed memories, drives, etc. - were to +become conscious? Would we still say that it is "the same" Dan and +that he retains his self-identity? Not very likely. And yet, one's +(unremembered) unconscious - for instance, the conflict between id and +ego - determines one's personality and self-identity. + +The main contribution of psychoanalysis and later psychodynamic +schools is the understanding that self-identity is a dynamic, +evolving, ever-changing construct - and not a static, inertial, and +passive entity. It casts doubt over the meaningfulness of the question +with which we ended the exposition: "Who, exactly, then, is Dan?" Dan +is different at different stages of his life (Erikson) and he +constantly evolves in accordance with his innate nature (Jung), past +history (Adler), drives (Freud), cultural milieu (Horney), upbringing +(Klein, Winnicott), needs (Murray), or the interplay with his genetic +makeup. Dan is not a thing - he is a process. Even Dan's personality +traits and cognitive style, which may well be stable, are often +influenced by Dan's social setting and by his social interactions. + +It would seem that having a memory is a necessary but insufficient +condition for possessing a self-identity. One cannot remember one's +unconscious states (though one can remember their outcomes). One often +forgets events, names, and other information even if it was conscious +at a given time in one's past. Yet, one's (unremembered) unconscious +is an integral and important part of one's identity and one's self. +The remembered as well as the unremembered constitute one's +self-identity. + +IV. The Memory Link + +Hume said that to be considered in possession of a mind, a creature +needs to have a few states of consciousness linked by memory in a kind +of narrative or personal mythology. Can this conjecture be equally +applied to unconscious mental states (e.g. subliminal perceptions, +beliefs, drives, emotions, desires, etc.)? + +In other words, can we rephrase Hume and say that to be considered in +possession of a mind, a creature needs to have a few states of +consciousness and a few states of the unconscious - all linked by +memory into a personal narrative? Isn't it a contradiction in terms to +remember the unconscious? + +The unconscious and the subliminal are instance of the general +category of mental phenomena which are not states of consciousness +(i.e., are not conscious). Sleep and hypnosis are two others. But so +are "background mental phenomena" - e.g., one holds onto one's beliefs +and knowledge even when one is not aware (conscious) of them at every +given moment. + +We know that an apple will fall towards the earth, we know how to +drive a car ("automatically"), and we believe that the sun will rise +tomorrow, even though we do not spend every second of our waking life +consciously thinking about falling apples, driving cars, or the +position of the sun. + +Yet, the fact that knowledge and beliefs and other background mental +phenomena are not constantly conscious - does not mean that they +cannot be remembered. They can be remembered either by an act of will, +or in (sometimes an involuntary) response to changes in the +environment. The same applies to all other unconscious content. +Unconscious content can be recalled. Psychoanalysis, for instance, is +about re-introducing repressed unconscious content to the patient's +conscious memory and thus making it "remembered". + +In fact, one's self-identity may be such a background mental +phenomenon (always there, not always conscious, not always +remembered). The acts of will which bring it to the surface are what +we call "memory" and "introspection". + +This would seem to imply that having a self-identity is independent of +having a memory (or the ability to introspect). Memory is just the +mechanism by which one becomes aware of one's background, "always-on", +and omnipresent (all-pervasive) self-identity. Self-identity is the +object and predicate of memory and introspection. It is as though +self-identity were an emergent extensive parameter of the complex +human system - measurable by the dual techniques of memory and +introspection. + +We, therefore, have to modify our previous conclusions: + +Having a memory is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition for +possessing a self-identity. + +We are back to square one. The poor souls in Oliver Sacks' tome, "The +Man Who Mistook his Wife for a Hat" are unable to create and retain +memories. They occupy an eternal present, with no past. They are thus +unable to access (or invoke) their self-identity by remembering it. +Their self-identity is unavailable to them (though it is available to +those who observe them over many years) - but it exists for sure. +Therapy often succeeds in restoring pre-amnesiac memories and +self-identity. + +V. The Incorrigible Self + +Self-identity is not only always-on and all-pervasive - but also +incorrigible. In other words, no one - neither an observer, nor the +person himself - can "disprove" the existence of his self-identity. No +one can prove that a report about the existence of his (or another's) +self-identity is mistaken. + +Is it equally safe to say that no one - neither an observer, nor the +person himself - can prove (or disprove) the non-existence of his +self-identity? Would it be correct to say that no one can prove that a +report about the non-existence of his (or another's) self-identity is +true or false? + +Dan's criminal responsibility crucially depends on the answers to +these questions. Dan cannot be held responsible for Jack's murder if +he can prove that he is ignorant of the facts of his action (i.e., if +he can prove the non-existence of his self-identity). If he has no +access to his (former) self-identity - he can hardly be expected to be +aware and cognizant of these facts. + +What is in question is not Dan's mens rea, nor the application of the +McNaghten tests (did Dan know the nature and quality of his act or +could he tell right from wrong) to determine whether Dan was insane +when he committed the crime. A much broader issue is at stake: is it +the same person? Is the murderous Dan the same person as the current +Dan? Even though Dan seems to own the same body and brain and is +manifestly sane - he patently has no access to his (former) +self-identity. He has changed so drastically that it is arguable +whether he is still the same person - he has been "replaced". + +Finally, we can try to unite all the strands of our discourse into +this double definition: + +It would seem that we accept that someone has a self-identity if: (a) +He has the same hardware as we do (notably, a brain) and, by +implication, the same software as we do (an all-pervasive, omnipresent +self-identity) and (b) He communicates his humanly recognizable and +comprehensible inner world to us and manipulates his environment. We +accept that he has a specific (i.e., the same continuous) +self-identity if (c) He shows consistent intentional (i.e., willed) +patterns ("memory") in doing (b) for a long period of time. + +It seems that we accept that we have a specific self-identity (i.e., +we are self-conscious of a specific identity) if (a) We discern +(usually through memory and introspection) long term consistent +intentional (i.e., willed) patterns ("memory") in our manipulation +("relating to") of our environment and (b) Others accept that we have +a specific self-identity. + +In conclusion: Dan undoubtedly has a self-identity (being human and, +thus, endowed with a brain). Equally undoubtedly, this self-identity +is not Dan's (but a new, unfamiliar, one). + +Such is the stuff of our nightmares - body snatching, demonic +possession, waking up in a strange place, not knowing who we are. +Without a continuous personal history - we are not. It is what binds +our various bodies, states of mind, memories, skills, emotions, and +cognitions - into a coherent bundle of identity. Dan speaks, drinks, +dances, talks, and makes love - but throughout that time, he is not +present because he does not remember Dan and how it is to be Dan. He +may have murdered Jake - but, by all philosophical and ethical +criteria, it was most definitely not his fault. + + Titanic, or a Moral Deliberation + + By: Sam Vaknin + +The film "Titanic" is riddled with moral dilemmas. In one of the +scenes, the owner of Star Line, the shipping company that owned the +now-sinking Unsinkable, joins a lowered life-boat. The tortured +expression on his face demonstrates that even he experiences more than +unease at his own conduct. Prior to the disaster, he instructs the +captain to adopt a policy dangerous to the ship. Indeed, it proves +fatal. A complicating factor was the fact that only women and children +were allowed by the officers in charge into the lifeboats. Another was +the discrimination against Third Class passengers. The boats sufficed +only to half the number of those on board and the First Class, High +Society passengers were preferred over the Low-Life immigrants under +deck. + +Why do we all feel that the owner should have stayed on and faced his +inevitable death? Because we judge him responsible for the demise of +the ship. Additionally, his wrong instructions - motivated by greed +and the pursuit of celebrity - were a crucial contributing factor. The +owner should have been punished (in his future) for things that he has +done (in his past). This is intuitively appealing. + +Would we have rendered the same judgement had the Titanic's fate been +the outcome of accident and accident alone? If the owner of the ship +could have had no control over the circumstances of its horrible +ending - would we have still condemned him for saving his life? Less +severely, perhaps. So, the fact that a moral entity has ACTED (or +omitted, or refrained from acting) in its past is essential in +dispensing with future rewards or punishments. + +The "product liability" approach also fits here. The owner (and his +"long arms": manufacturer, engineers, builders, etc.) of the Titanic +were deemed responsible because they implicitly contracted with their +passengers. They made a representation (which was explicit in their +case but is implicit in most others): "This ship was constructed with +knowledge and forethought. The best design was employed to avoid +danger. The best materials to increase pleasure." That the Titanic +sank was an irreversible breach of this contract. In a way, it was an +act of abrogation of duties and obligations. The owner/manufacturer of +a product must compensate the consumers should his product harm them +in any manner that they were not explicitly, clearly, visibly and +repeatedly warned against. Moreover, he should even make amends if the +product failed to meet the reasonable and justified expectations of +consumers, based on such warrants and representations. The payment +should be either in kind (as in more ancient justice systems) or in +cash (as in modern Western civilization). + +The product called "Titanic" took away the lives of its end-users. Our +"gut justice" tells us that the owner should have paid in kind. Faulty +engineering, insufficient number of lifeboats, over-capacity, hubris, +passengers and crew not drilled to face emergencies, extravagant +claims regarding the ship's resilience, contravening the captain's +professional judgement. All these seem to be sufficient grounds to the +death penalty. + +And yet, this is not the real question. The serious problem is this : +WHY should anyone pay in his future for his actions in the past? +First, there are some thorny issues to be eliminated. Such as +determinism: if there is no free will, there can be no personal +responsibility. Another is the preservation of personal identity: are +the person who committed the act and the person who is made to pay for +it - one and the same? If the answer is in the affirmative, in which +sense are they the same, the physical, the mental? Is the "overlap" +only limited and probabilistic? Still, we could assume, for this +discussion's sake, that the personal identity is undeniably and +absolutely preserved and that there is free will and, therefore, that +people can predict the outcomes of their actions, to a reasonable +degree of accuracy and that they elect to accept these outcomes prior +to the commission of their acts or to their omission. All this does +not answer the question that opened this paragraph. Even if there were +a contract signed between the acting person and the world, in which +the person willingly, consciously and intelligently (=without +diminished responsibility) accepted the future outcome of his acts, +the questions would remain: WHY should it be so? Why cannot we +conceive of a world in which acts and outcomes are divorced? It is +because we cannot believe in an a-causal world. + +Causality is a relationship (mostly between two things, or, rather, +events, the cause and the effect). Something generates or produces +another. Therefore, it is the other's efficient cause and it acts upon +it (=it acts to bring it about) through the mechanism of efficient +causation. A cause can be a direct physical mechanism or an +explanatory feature (historical cause). Of Aristotle's Four Causes +(Formal, Material, Efficient and Final), only the efficient cause +creates something distinguishable from itself. The causal discourse, +therefore, is problematic (how can a cause lead to an effect, +indistinguishable from itself?). Singular Paradigmatic Causal +Statements (Event A caused Event B) differ from General ones (Event A +causes Event B). Both are inadequate in dealing with mundane, routine, +causal statements because they do not reveal an OVERT relation between +the two events discussed. Moreover, in daily usage we treat facts (as +well as events) as causes. Not all the philosophers are in agreement +regarding factual causation. Davidson, for instance, admits that facts +can be RELEVANT to causal explanations but refuses to accept them AS +reasons. Acts may be distinct from facts, philosophically, but not in +day-to-day regular usage. By laymen (the vast majority of humanity, +that is), though, they are perceived to be the same. + +Pairs of events that are each other's cause and effect are accorded a +special status. But, that one follows the other (even if invariably) +is insufficient grounds to endow them with this status. This is the +famous "Post hoc, ergo propter hoc" fallacy. Other relations must be +weighed and the possibility of common causation must be seriously +contemplated. Such sequencing is, conceptually, not even necessary: +simultaneous causation and backwards causation are part of modern +physics, for instance. + +Time seems to be irrelevant to the status of events, though both time +and causation share an asymmetric structure (A causes B but B does not +cause A). The direction (the asymmetry) of the causal chain is not of +the same type as the direction (asymmetry) of time. The former is +formal, the latter, presumably, physical, or mental. A more serious +problem, to my mind, is the converse: what sets apart causal (cause +and effect) pairs of events from other pairs in which both +member-events are the outcomes of a common cause? Event B can +invariably follow Event A and still not be its effect. Both events +could have been caused by a common cause. A cause either necessitates +the effect, or is a sufficient condition for its occurrence. The +sequence is either inevitable, or possible. The meaninglessness of +this sentence is evident. + +Here, philosophers diverge. Some say (following Hume's reasoning and +his constant conjunction relation between events) that a necessary +causal relation exists between events when one is the inevitable +outcome (=follows) the other. Others propound a weaker version: the +necessity of the effect is hypothetical or conditional, given the laws +of nature. Put differently: to say that A necessitates (=causes) B is +no more than to say that it is a result of the laws of nature that +when A happens, so does B. Hempel generalized this approach. He said +that a statement of a fact (whether a private or a general fact) is +explained only if deduced from other statements, at least one of which +is a statement of a general scientific law. + +This is the "Covering Law Model" and it implies a symmetry between +explaining and predicting (at least where private facts are +concerned). If an event can be explained, it could have been predicted +and vice versa. Needless to say that Hempel's approach did not get us +nearer to solving the problems of causal priority and of +indeterministic causation. + +The Empiricists went a step further. They stipulated that the laws of +nature are contingencies and not necessary truths. Other chains of +events are possible where the laws of nature are different. This is +the same tired regularity theory in a more exotic guise. They are all +descendants of Hume's definition of causality: "An object followed by +another and where all the objects that resemble the first are followed +by objects that resemble the second." Nothing in the world is, +therefore, a causal necessity, events are only constantly conjoined. +Regularities in our experience condition us to form the idea of causal +necessity and to deduce that causes must generate events. Kant called +this latter deduction "A bastard of the imagination, impregnated by +experience" with no legitimate application in the world. It also +constituted a theological impediment. God is considered to be "Causa +Sui", His own cause. But any application of a causal chain or force, +already assumes the existence of a cause. This existence cannot, +therefore, be the outcome of the use made of it. God had to be recast +as the uncaused cause of the existence of all things contingent and +His existence necessitated no cause because He, himself, is necessary. +This is flimsy stuff and it gets even flimsier when the issue of +causal deviance is debated. + +A causal deviance is an abnormal, though causal, relation between +events or states of the world. It mainly arises when we introduce +intentional action and perception into the theory of causation. Let us +revert to the much-maligned owner of the sinking Titanic. He intended +to do one thing and another happened. Granted, if he intended to do +something and his intention was the cause of his doing so - then we +could have said that he intentionally committed an act. But what if he +intended to do one thing and out came another? And what if he intended +to do something, mistakenly did something else and, still, +accidentally, achieved what he set out to do? The popular example is +if someone intends to do something and gets so nervous that it happens +even without an act being committed (intends to refuse an invitation +by his boss, gets so nervous that he falls asleep and misses the +party). Are these actions and intentions in their classical senses? +There is room for doubt. Davidson narrows down the demands. To him, +"thinking causes" (causally efficient propositional attitudes) are +nothing but causal relations between events with the right application +of mental predicates which ascribe propositional attitudes supervening +the right application of physical predicates. This approach omits +intention altogether, not to mention the ascription of desire and +belief. + +But shouldn't have the hapless owner availed his precious place to +women and children? Should not he have obeyed the captain's orders +(=the marine law)? Should we succumb to laws that put our lives at +risk (fight in a war, sink with a ship)? The reason that women and +children are preferred over men is that they represent the future. +They are either capable of bringing life to the world (women) - or of +living longer (children). Societal etiquette reflects the arithmetic +of the species, in this (and in many another) case. But if this were +entirely and exclusively so, then young girls and female infants would +have been preferred over all the other groups of passengers. Old women +would have been left with the men, to die. That the actual (and +declared) selection processes differed from our theoretical exercise +says a lot about the vigorousness and applicability of our theories - +and a lot about the real world out there. The owner's behaviour may +have been deplorable - but it, definitely, was natural. He put his +interests (his survival) above the concerns of his society and his +species. Most of us would have done the same under the same +circumstances. + +The owner of the ship - though "Newly Rich" - undoubtedly belonged to +the First Class, Upper Crust, Cream of Society passengers. These were +treated to the lifeboats before the passengers of the lower classes +and decks. Was this a morally right decision? For sure, it was not +politically correct, in today's terms. Class and money distinctions +were formally abolished three decades ago in the enlightened West. +Discrimination between human beings in now allowed only on the basis +of merit (=on the basis of one's natural endowments). Why should we +think one basis for discrimination preferable to another? Can we +eliminate discrimination completely and if it were possible, would it +have been desirable? + +The answers, in my view, are that no basis of discrimination can hold +the moral high ground. They are all morally problematic because they +are deterministic and assign independent, objective, exogenous values +to humans. On the other hand, we are not born equal, nor do we proceed +to develop equally, or live under the same circumstances and +conditions. It is impossible to equate the unequal. Discrimination is +not imposed by humans on an otherwise egalitarian world. It is +introduced by the world into human society. And the elimination of +discrimination would constitute a grave error. The inequalities among +humans and the ensuing conflicts are the fuel that feeds the engines +of human development. Hopes, desires, aspirations and inspiration are +all the derivatives of discrimination or of the wish to be favoured, +or preferred over others. Disparities of money create markets, labour, +property, planning, wealth and capital. Mental inequalities lead to +innovation and theory. Knowledge differentials are at the heart of +educational institutions, professionalism, government and so on. +Osmotic and diffusive forces in human society are all the results of +incongruences, disparities, differences, inequalities and the negative +and positive emotions attached to them. The passengers of the first +class were preferred because they paid more for their tickets. +Inevitably, a tacit portion of the price went to amortize the costs of +"class insurance": should anything bad happen to this boat, persons +who paid a superior price will be entitled to receive a superior +treatment. There is nothing morally wrong with this. Some people get +to sit in the front rows of a theatre, or to travel in luxury, or to +receive superior medical treatment (or any medical treatment) +precisely because of this reason. There is no practical or +philosophical difference between an expensive liver transplant and a +place in a life boat. Both are lifesavers. + +A natural disaster is no Great Equalizer. Nothing is. Even the +argument that money is "external" or "accidental" to the rich +individual is weak. Often, people who marry for money considerations +are judged to be insincere or worse (cunning, conspiring, evil). "He +married her for her money", we say, as though the she-owner and the +money were two separate things. The equivalent sentence: "He married +her for her youth or for her beauty" sounds flawed. But youth and +beauty are more temporary and transient than money. They are really +accidental because the individual has no responsibility for or share +in their generation and has no possibility to effect their long-term +preservation. Money, on the other hand, is generated or preserved (or +both) owing to the personality of its owner. It is a better reflection +of personality than youth, beauty and many other (transient or +situation-dependent) "character" traits. Money is an integral part of +its owner and a reliable witness as to his mental disposition. It is, +therefore, a valid criterion for discrimination. + +The other argument in favour of favouring the first class passengers +is their contribution to society. A rich person contributes more to +his society in the shorter and medium term than a poor person. Vincent +Van Gogh may have been a million times more valuable to humanity, as a +whole, than his brother Theo - in the long run. But in the +intermediate term, Theo made it possible for Vincent and many others +(family, employees, suppliers, their dependants and his country) to +survive by virtue of his wealth. Rich people feed and cloth poor +people directly (employment, donations) and indirectly (taxation). The +opposite, alas, is not the case. Yet, this argument is flawed because +it does not take time into account. We have no way to predict the +future with any certainty. + +Each person carries the Marshall's baton in his bag, the painter's +brush, the author's fables. It is the potential that should count. A +selection process, which would have preferred Theo to Vincent would +have been erroneous. In the long run, Vincent proved more beneficial +to human society and in more ways - including financially - then Theo +could have ever been. + + Being John Malkovich + + By: Dr. Sam Vaknin + + +A quintessential loser, an out-of-job puppeteer, is hired by a firm, +whose offices are ensconced in a half floor (literally. The ceiling is +about a metre high, reminiscent of Taniel's hallucinatory Alice in +Wonderland illustrations). By sheer accident, he discovers a tunnel (a +"portal", in Internet-age parlance), which sucks its visitors into the +mind of the celebrated actor, John Malkovich. The movie is a tongue in +cheek discourse of identity, gender and passion in an age of languid +promiscuity. It poses all the right metaphysical riddles and presses +the viewers' intellectual stimulation buttons. + +A two line bit of dialogue, though, forms the axis of this +nightmarishly chimerical film. John Malkovich (played by himself), +enraged and bewildered by the unabashed commercial exploitation of the +serendipitous portal to his mind, insists that Craig, the +aforementioned puppet master, cease and desist with his activities. +"It is MY brain" - he screams and, with a typical American finale, "I +will see you in court". Craig responds: "But, it was I who discovered +the portal. It is my livelihood". + +This apparently innocuous exchange disguises a few very unsettling +ethical dilemmas. + +The basic question is "whose brain is it, anyway"? Does John Malkovich +OWN his brain? Is one's brain - one's PROPERTY? Property is usually +acquired somehow. Is our brain "acquired"? It is clear that we do not +acquire the hardware (neurones) and software (electrical and chemical +pathways) we are born with. But it is equally clear that we do +"acquire" both brain mass and the contents of our brains (its wiring +or irreversible chemical changes) through learning and experience. +Does this process of acquisition endow us with property rights? + +It would seem that property rights pertaining to human bodies are +fairly restricted. We have no right to sell our kidneys, for instance. +Or to destroy our body through the use of drugs. Or to commit an +abortion at will. Yet, the law does recognize and strives to enforce +copyrights, patents and other forms of intellectual property rights. + +This dichotomy is curious. For what is intellectual property but a +mere record of the brain's activities? A book, a painting, an +invention are the documentation and representation of brain waves. +They are mere shadows, symbols of the real presence - our mind. How +can we reconcile this contradiction? We are deemed by the law to be +capable of holding full and unmitigated rights to the PRODUCTS of our +brain activity, to the recording and documentation of our brain waves. +But we hold only partial rights to the brain itself, their originator. + +This can be somewhat understood if we were to consider this article, +for instance. It is composed on a word processor. I do not own full +rights to the word processing software (merely a licence), nor is the +laptop I use my property - but I posses and can exercise and enforce +full rights regarding this article. + +Admittedly, it is a partial parallel, at best: the computer and word +processing software are passive elements. It is my brain that does the +authoring. And so, the mystery remains: how can I own the article - +but not my brain? Why do I have the right to ruin the article at will +- but not to annihilate my brain at whim? + +Another angle of philosophical attack is to say that we rarely hold +rights to nature or to life. We can copyright a photograph we take of +a forest - but not the forest. To reduce it to the absurd: we can own +a sunset captured on film - but never the phenomenon thus documented. +The brain is natural and life's pivot - could this be why we cannot +fully own it? + +Wrong premises inevitably lead to wrong conclusions. We often own +natural objects and manifestations, including those related to human +life directly. We even issue patents for sequences of human DNA. And +people do own forests and rivers and the specific views of sunsets. + +Some scholars raise the issues of exclusivity and scarcity as the +precursors of property rights. My brain can be accessed only by myself +and its is one of a kind (sui generis). True but not relevant. One +cannot rigorously derive from these properties of our brain a right to +deny others access to them (should this become technologically +feasible) - or even to set a price on such granted access. In other +words, exclusivity and scarcity do not constitute property rights or +even lead to their establishment. Other rights may be at play (the +right to privacy, for instance) - but not the right to own property +and to derive economic benefits from such ownership. + +On the contrary, it is surprisingly easy to think of numerous +exceptions to a purported natural right of single access to one's +brain. If one memorized the formula to cure AIDS or cancer and refused +to divulge it for a reasonable compensation - surely, we should feel +entitled to invade his brain and extract it? Once such technology is +available - shouldn't authorized bodies of inspection have access to +the brains of our leaders on a periodic basis? And shouldn't we all +gain visitation rights to the minds of great men and women of science, +art and culture - as we do today gain access to their homes and to the +products of their brains? + +There is one hidden assumption, though, in both the movie and this +article. It is that mind and brain are one. The portal leads to John +Malkovich's MIND - yet, he keeps talking about his BRAIN and writhing +physically on the screen. The portal is useless without JM's mind. +Indeed, one can wonder whether JM's mind is not an INTEGRAL part of +the portal - structurally and functionally inseparable from it. If so, +does not the discoverer of the portal hold equal rights to John +Malkovich's mind, an integral part thereof? + +The portal leads to JM's mind. Can we prove that it leads to his +brain? Is this identity automatic? Of course not. It is the old +psychophysical question, at the heart of dualism - still far from +resolved. Can a MIND be copyrighted or patented? If no one knows WHAT +is the mind - how can it be the subject of laws and rights? If JM is +bothered by the portal voyagers, the intruders - he surely has legal +recourse, but not through the application of the rights to own +property and to benefit from it. These rights provide him with no +remedy because their subject (the mind) is a mystery. + +Can JM sue Craig and his clientele for unauthorized visits to his mind +(trespassing) - IF he is unaware of their comings and goings and +unperturbed by them? Moreover, can he prove that the portal leads to +HIS mind, that it is HIS mind that is being visited? Is there a way to +PROVE that one has visited another's mind? (See: "On Empathy"). + +And if property rights to one's brain and mind were firmly established +- how will telepathy (if ever proven) be treated legally? Or mind +reading? The recording of dreams? Will a distinction be made between a +mere visit - and the exercise of influence on the host and his / her +manipulation (similar questions arise in time travel)? + +This, precisely, is where the film crosses the line between the +intriguing and the macabre. The master puppeteer, unable to resist his +urges, manipulates John Malkovich and finally possesses him +completely. This is so clearly wrong, so manifestly forbidden, so +patently immoral, that the film loses its urgent ambivalence, its +surrealistic moral landscape and deteriorates into another banal +comedy of situations. + + Dreamcatcher - The Myth of Destructibility + + By: Dr. Sam Vaknin + + Read these essays first: + + The Habitual Identity + + Death, Meaning, and Identity + + Being John Malkovich + + "Shattered" Identity + + More Film REVIEWS - HERE! + + In the movie "Dreamcatcher", four childhood friends, exposed to an +alien, disguised as a retarded child, develop psychic powers. Years +later they reunite only to confront a vicious extraterrestrial +life-form. Only two survive but they succeed to eradicate the monster +by incinerating it and crushing its tiny off-spring underfoot. + +Being mortal ourselves, we cannot conceive of an indestructible +entity. The artifacts of popular culture - thrillers, action and +sci-fi films, video games, computer viruses - assume that all +organisms, organizations and automata possess fatal vulnerabilities. +Medicine and warfare are predicated on a similar contention. + +We react with shock and horror when we are faced with "resistant +stains" of bacteria or with creatures, machines, or groups able to +survive and thrive in extremely hostile environments. + +Destruction is multi-faceted. Even the simplest system has a structure +and performs functions. If the spatial continuity or arrangement of an +entity's structure is severed or substantially transformed - its +functions are usually adversely affected. Direct interference with a +system's functionality is equally deleterious. + +We can render a system dysfunctional by inhibiting or reversing any +stage in the complex processes involved - or by preventing the +entity's communication with its environs. Another method of +annihilation involves the alteration of the entity's context - its +surroundings, its codes and signals, its interactive patterns, its +potential partners, friends and foes. + +Finding the lethal weaknesses of an organism, an apparatus, or a +society is described as a process of trial and error. But the outcome +is guaranteed: mortal susceptibility is assumed to be a universal +trait. No one and nothing is perfectly immune, utterly invulnerable, +or beyond extermination. + +Yet, what is poison to one species is nectar to another. Water can be +either toxic or indispensable, depending on the animal, the automaton, +or the system. Scorching temperatures, sulfur emissions, ammonia or +absolute lack of oxygen are, to some organisms, the characteristics of +inviting habitats. To others, the very same are deadly. + +Can we conceive of an indestructible thing - be it unicellular or +multicellular, alive or robotic, composed of independent individuals +or acting in perfect, centrally-dictated unison? Can anything be, in +principle, eternal? + +This question is not as outlandish as it sounds. By fighting disease +and trying to postpone death, for instance, we aspire to immortality +and imperishability. Some of us believe in God - an entity securely +beyond ruin. Intuitively, we consider the Universe - if not time and +space - to be everlasting, though constantly metamorphosing. + +What is common to these examples of infinite resilience is their +unbounded and unparalleled size and might. Lesser objects are born or +created. Since there has been a time, prior to their genesis, in which +they did not exist - it is easy to imagine a future without them. + +Even where the distinction between individual and collective is +spurious their end is plausible. True, though we can obliterate +numerous "individual" bacteria - others, genetically identical, will +always survive our onslaught. Yet, should the entire Earth vanish - so +would these organisms. The extinction of all bacteria, though +predicated on an unlikely event, is still thinkable. + +But what about an entity that is "pure energy", a matrix of fields, a +thought, immaterial yet very real, omnipresent and present nowhere? +Such a being comes perilously close to the divine. For if it is +confined to certain space - however immense - it is perishable +together with that space. If it is not - then it is God, as perceived +by its believers. + +But what constitutes "destruction" or "annihilation"? We are familiar +with death - widely considered the most common form of inexistence. +But some people believe that death is merely a transformation from one +state of being to another. Sometimes all the constituents of a system +remain intact but cease to interact. Does this amount to obliteration? +And what about a machine that stops interacting with its environment +altogether - though its internal processes continue unabated. Is it +still "functioning"? + +It is near impossible to say when a "live" or "functioning" entity +ceases to be so. Death is the form of destruction we are most +acquainted with. For a discussion of death and the human condition - +read this Death, Meaning, and Identity + + + + T H E A U T H O R + + + +SHMUEL (SAM) VAKNIN + + +Curriculum Vitae + +Click on blue text to access relevant web sites - thank you. + +Born in 1961 in Qiryat-Yam, Israel. + +Served in the Israeli Defence Force (1979-1982) in training and +education units. + +Education + +Graduated a few semesters in the Technion - Israel Institute of +Technology, Haifa. + +Ph.D. in Philosophy (major : Philosophy of Physics) - Pacific Western +University, California. + +Graduate of numerous courses in Finance Theory and International +Trading. + +Certified E-Commerce Concepts Analyst. + +Certified in Psychological Counselling Techniques. + +Full proficiency in Hebrew and in English. + +Business Experience + +1980 to 1983 + +Founder and co-owner of a chain of computerized information kiosks in +Tel-Aviv, Israel. + +1982 to 1985 + +Senior positions with the Nessim D. Gaon Group of Companies in Geneva, +Paris and New-York (NOGA and APROFIM SA): + +- Chief Analyst of Edible Commodities in the Group's Headquarters in +Switzerland. +- Manager of the Research and Analysis Division +- Manager of the Data Processing Division +- Project Manager of The Nigerian Computerized Census +- Vice President in charge of RND and Advanced Technologies +- Vice President in charge of Sovereign Debt Financing + +1985 to 1986 + +Represented Canadian Venture Capital Funds in Israel. + +1986 to 1987 + +General Manager of IPE Ltd. in London. The firm financed international +multi-lateral countertrade and leasing transactions. + + +1988 to 1990 + +Co-founder and Director of "Mikbats - Tesuah", a portfolio management +firm based in Tel-Aviv. +Activities included large-scale portfolio management, underwriting, +forex trading and general financial advisory services. + +1990 to Present + +Free-lance consultant to many of Israel's Blue-Chip firms, mainly on +issues related to the capital markets in Israel, Canada, the UK and +the USA. + +Consultant to foreign RND ventures and to Governments on +macro-economic matters. + +President of the Israel chapter of the Professors World Peace Academy +(PWPA) and (briefly) Israel representative of the "Washington Times". + +1993 to 1994 + +Co-owner and Director of many business enterprises: + +- The Omega and Energy Air-Conditioning Concern +- AVP Financial Consultants +- Handiman Legal Services + Total annual turnover of the group: 10 million USD. + + +Co-owner, Director and Finance Manager of COSTI Ltd. - Israel's +largest computerized information vendor and developer. Raised funds +through a series of private placements locally, in the USA, Canada and +London. + +1993 to 1996 + +Publisher and Editor of a Capital Markets Newsletter distributed by +subscription only to dozens of subscribers countrywide. + +In a legal precedent in 1995 - studied in business schools and law +faculties across Israel - was tried for his role in an attempted +takeover of Israel's Agriculture Bank. + +Was interned in the State School of Prison Wardens. + +Managed the Central School Library, wrote, published and lectured on +various occasions. + +Managed the Internet and International News Department of an Israeli +mass media group, "Ha-Tikshoret and Namer". + +Assistant in the Law Faculty in Tel-Aviv University (to Prof. S.G. +Shoham). + +1996 to 1999 + +Financial consultant to leading businesses in Macedonia, Russia and +the Czech Republic. + +Collaborated with the Agency of Transformation of Business with +Social Capital. + +Economic commentator in "Nova Makedonija", "Dnevnik", "Izvestia", +"Argumenti i Fakti", "The Middle East Times", "Makedonija Denes", "The +New Presence", "Central Europe Review" , and other periodicals and in +the economic programs on various channels of Macedonian Television. + +Chief Lecturer in courses organized by the Agency of Transformation, +by the Macedonian Stock Exchange and by the Ministry of Trade. + +1999 to 2002 + +Economic Advisor to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia and to +the Ministry of Finance. + +2001 to present + +Senior Business Correspondent for United Press International (UPI) + +Web and Journalistic Activities + +Author of extensive Websites in Psychology ("Malignant Self Love") - +An Open Directory Cool Site + +Philosophy ("Philosophical Musings") + +Economics and Geopolitics ("World in Conflict and Transition") + +Owner of the Narcissistic Abuse Announcement and Study List and the +Narcissism Revisited mailing list (more than 3900 members) + +Owner of the Economies in Conflict and Transition Study list. + +Editor of mental health disorders and Central and Eastern Europe +categories in web directories (Open Directory, Suite 101, Search +Europe). + +Columnist and commentator in "The New Presence", United Press +International (UPI), InternetContent, eBookWeb and "Central Europe +Review". + +Publications and Awards + +"Managing Investment Portfolios in states of Uncertainty", Limon +Publishers, Tel-Aviv, 1988 + +"The Gambling Industry", Limon Publishers., Tel-Aviv, 1990 + +"Requesting my Loved One - Short Stories", Yedioth Aharonot, Tel-Aviv, +1997 + +"The Macedonian Economy at a Crossroads - On the way to a Healthier +Economy" (with Nikola Gruevski), Skopje, 1998 + +"Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited", Narcissus Publications, +Prague and Skopje, 1999, 2001, 2002 + +The Narcissism Series - e-books regarding relationships with abusive +narcissists (Skopje, 1999-2002) + +"The Exporters' Pocketbook", Ministry of Trade, Republic of Macedonia, +Skopje, 1999 + +"The Suffering of Being Kafka" (electronic book of Hebrew Short +Fiction, Prague, 1998) + +"After the Rain - How the West Lost the East", Narcissus Publications +in association with Central Europe Review/CEENMI, Prague and Skopje, +2000 + +Winner of numerous awards, among them the Israeli Education Ministry +Prize (Literature) 1997, The Rotary Club Award for Social Studies +(1976) and the Bilateral Relations Studies Award of the American +Embassy in Israel (1978). + +Hundreds of professional articles in all fields of finances and the +economy and numerous articles dealing with geopolitical and political +economic issues published in both print and web periodicals in many +countries. + +Many appearances in the electronic media on subjects in philosophy and +the Sciences and concerning economic matters. + +Contact Details: + +palma@unet.com.mk + +vaknin@link.com.mk + + +My Web Sites: + +Economy / Politics: + +http://ceeandbalkan.tripod.com/ + +Psychology: + +http://samvak.tripod.com/index.html + +Philosophy: + +http://philosophos.tripod.com/ + +Poetry: + +http://samvak.tripod.com/contents.html + + +Return + + + After the Rain + + How the West + + Lost the East + + + + The Book + + This is a series of articles written and published in 1996-2000 in + Macedonia, in Russia, in Egypt and in the Czech Republic. + + How the West lost the East. The economics, the politics, the + geopolitics, the conspiracies, the corruption, the old and the new, + the plough and the internet - it is all here, in colourful and + provocative prose. + + From "The Mind of Darkness": + + "'The Balkans' - I say - 'is the unconscious of the world'. People +stop to digest this metaphor and then they nod enthusiastically. It is +here that the repressed memories of history, its traumas and fears and + images reside. It is here that the psychodynamics of humanity - the + tectonic clash between Rome and Byzantium, West and East, + Judeo-Christianity and Islam - is still easily discernible. We are + seated at a New Year's dining table, loaded with a roasted pig and + exotic salads. I, the Jew, only half foreign to this cradle of +Slavonics. Four Serbs, five Macedonians. It is in the Balkans that all + ethnic distinctions fail and it is here that they prevail +anachronistically and atavistically. Contradiction and change the only + two fixtures of this tormented region. The women of the Balkan - + buried under provocative mask-like make up, retro hairstyles and too + narrow dresses. The men, clad in sepia colours, old fashioned suits + and turn of the century moustaches. In the background there is the + crying game that is Balkanian music: liturgy and folk and elegy +combined. The smells are heavy with muskular perfumes. It is like time + travel. It is like revisiting one's childhood." + + + + The Author + +Sam Vaknin is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited +and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He is a columnist for +Central Europe Review and eBookWeb , a United Press International +(UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and the editor of mental health +and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory and Suite101. + +Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government of +Macedonia. + +Visit Sam's Web site at http://samvak.tripod.com + + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK, MORAL DELIBERATIONS IN MODERN CINEMA *** + +This file should be named mfilm10.txt or mfilm10.zip +Corrected EDITIONS of our eBooks get a new NUMBER, mfilm11.txt +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, mfilm10a.txt + +We are now trying to release all our eBooks one year in advance +of the official release dates, leaving time for better editing. +Please be encouraged to tell us about any error or corrections, +even years after the official publication date. + +Please note neither this listing nor its contents are final til +midnight of the last day of the month of any such announcement. +The official release date of all Project Gutenberg eBooks is at +Midnight, Central Time, of the last day of the stated month. 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