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diff --git a/79014-h/79014-h.htm b/79014-h/79014-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f710e39 --- /dev/null +++ b/79014-h/79014-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,13910 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> +<head> + <meta charset="UTF-8"> + <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> + <meta name="format-detection" content="telephone=no,date=no,address=no,email=no,url=no"> + <title> + Gestalt Psychology | Project Gutenberg + </title> + <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover"> + <style> + +body { + margin-left: 7%; + margin-right: 7%; +} + +h1,h2,h3 { + text-align: center; + clear: both; +} + +h3 { + page-break-after: avoid + } + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} +h2.nobreak {page-break-before: avoid;} + +a {text-decoration: none;} +a:hover {text-decoration: underline;} + +p { + text-indent: 1.3em; + margin-top: .5em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .5em; +} + +p.noindent, .footnote p { + text-indent: 0; +} + +hr.chap { + border: none; + position: relative; + text-align: center; + margin: 3em 0; + page-break-after: avoid + } +hr.chap::before { + content: "ꕥ"; + position: relative; + padding: 0 1em; + background: white; + color: #777; + z-index: 1 + } +hr.chap::after { + content: ""; + position: absolute; + top: 50%; + left: 0; + width: 100%; + border-top: 2px solid #ddd; + z-index: 0 + } +hr.front { + width: 10%; + margin: 1.5em 45%; + border: 0; + border-top: 1px solid #777; + page-break-after: avoid + } + +hr.tb { + border: none; + text-align: center; + margin: 2em 0; + page-break-after: avoid +} + +hr.tb::before { + content: "❧"; + color: #777; + font-size: 1.2em; +} + +table { + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; +} + +table td { padding: 0.25em; } + +.tdr {text-align: right;} + +.pagenum { + right: 1%; + font-size: x-small; + color: #333; + text-indent: 0; + text-align: right; + position: absolute; + font-style: normal; +} + +blockquote { + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + margin-left: 5%; + margin-right: 5%; +} + +.center {text-align: center; text-indent: 0;} + +.right {text-align: right;} + +.smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + +ul.index { list-style-type: none; } +li.ifrst { + margin-top: 1em; + text-indent: -2em; + padding-left: 1em; +} +li.indx { + margin-top: .5em; + text-indent: -2em; + padding-left: 1em; +} +li.isub1 { + text-indent: -2em; + padding-left: 2em; +} + +/* Footnotes */ + +.footnote {margin-left: 7%; margin-right: 7%;} + +.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 88%; text-align: right;} + +.fnanchor { + vertical-align: super; + font-size: 0.7em; +} + +/* Poetry */ + +/* uncomment the next line for centered poetry */ +/* .poetry-container {display: flex; justify-content: center;} */ +.poetry-container {text-align: center;} +.poetry {text-align: left; margin-left: 5%; margin-right: 5%;} +.poetry .stanza {margin: 1em auto;} +.poetry .verse {text-indent: -3em; padding-left: 3em;} + +/* Images */ + +figcaption {font-weight: bold;} +figcaption p {margin-top: 0.1em; margin-bottom: 0.2em; text-align: inherit; text-indent: 0;} + +.illowe8 img { + max-width: 8em; +} + +.illowe10 img { + max-width: 20em; +} + +.illowe15 img { + max-width: 25em; +} + +.figcenter { + margin: 2em auto; + text-align: center; + page-break-inside: avoid; + display: table; +} + +.transnote h2 { + text-align:left; +} + +.transnote p { + text-indent: 0; +} + +.smaller {font-size:smaller;} +.xsmall {font-size:x-small;} +.larger {font-size:larger;} +.xlarge {font-size:x-large;} + + +/* Poetry indents */ +.poetry .indent0 {text-indent: -3.0em;} + </style> +</head> + +<body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 79014 ***</div> + + +<figure class="figcenter illowe8" id="title"> + <img src="images/title.jpg" alt=""> +</figure> + +<h1> +GESTALT<br> +PSYCHOLOGY +</h1> + +<p class="center"> +BY<br> +<span class="xlarge">DR. WOLFGANG KÖHLER</span><br> +<br><br><br> +NEW YORK<br> +HORACE LIVERIGHT<br> +1929 +</p> + +<hr class="front"> + +<p class="center smaller"> +Copyright, 1929, by<br> +<span class="smcap">Horace Liveright, Inc.</span><br> +<br> +First printing, April, 1929<br> +Second printing, April, 1929<br> +Third printing, August, 1929<br> +Fourth printing, October, 1929<br> +<br> +PRINTED IN THE U. S. A. BY<br> +QUINN & BODEN COMPANY. INC.<br> +RAHWAY, N. J. +</p> + +<hr class="front"> + +<p class="center larger"> +<i>To</i><br> +MAX WERTHEIMER +</p> + +<hr class="front"> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="pvii"></a>[vii]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Preface"> + <i>Preface</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>I OFFER this book to the patient reader, feeling +more than ever how much I have been inferior +to my task. Nothing is easier than to criticize it. +<i>Gestalt</i> psychology, the subject matter I have tried +to present, resembles in 1928 a promising start more +than a complete achievement. At all events it would +have been difficult to introduce it adequately. To +present it skillfully in a foreign language was far +beyond my linguistic ability. I have done all that I +possibly could. The greatest difficulty, however, is +that only certain simple and almost crude concepts of +<i>gestalt</i> psychology would yield to my painful efforts +to convey them through the medium of English. +Under these circumstances the optimism of my excellent +publisher is responsible if the incomplete portrait +of an incomplete thing is here recommended to +public consideration.</p> + +<p>Certain other trends in contemporary psychology +are discussed in connection with <i>gestalt</i> psychology. +The first question a foreign psychologist has to answer +in America is, of course: How do you like behaviorism? +This vigorous school has energetically +drawn certain lines beyond which a psychologist +should never go. And, then, indicating the only +direction that all psychologists must take, it has left +<span class="pagenum" id="pviii">[viii]</span>little place open for free discussion of theory and +research; in other words, it has developed into such +a fundamentalism that I felt myself forced to clear +my way for a certain liberalism to which I am accustomed +in science.</p> + +<p>With introspectionism things are not entirely different. +In this psychological school a scheme of procedure, +which is just the opposite to my own, has +become dominant. This is unfortunate. If behaviorists +should refuse to take account of this book +because in it <em>direct experience</em> is employed and referred +to without apology, introspectionists would +not treat it any better, since my use of experience, +from their point of view, is not of the right sort. I +have had to explain, then, not only how I could eat +the forbidden fruit in spite of all commandments, but +also why I took the common ware from the street +and from the market-place instead of buying the +standardized and sterilized products which introspection +would furnish from its cultivated orchard. +It was my aim, however, to make this discussion productive +and, in addition to criticism, the reader will +find some of our own rules of procedure expressed +in these first chapters. If the fighting spirit should +be found to prevail in some paragraphs, I beg you +to remember that, as in politics, we sometimes strike +at a system though we are fond of its defenders.</p> + +<p>Certain psychologists, both in the United States +<span class="pagenum" id="pix">[ix]</span>and in England, will recognize their own ideas or, +at least, find some similarities to them, in these chapters. +Instead of treating all the instances of this +convergence and agreement in detail, I only mention +the theory of “emergent evolution” and the doctrine +of Professor Whitehead’s imposing work, with all +the respect which is due them both. Perhaps Professor +R. M. Ogden will allow me to call him a +<i>gestalt</i> psychologist. I have not been able to see +quite clearly to what degree there is agreement with +certain other eminent psychologists. In Professor +Bentley’s well-known book, for example, his term +“organization” sometimes seems to come very near +the concept of <i>gestalt</i>. But there must be some difference, +since on the other hand, the basic doctrine +of introspective psychology seems to be preserved in +a manner incompatible with <i>gestalt</i> psychology. Future +development will undoubtedly show whether or +not our views can be brought to a full congruence.</p> + +<p>Dr. Mortimer Adler deserves the reader’s thanks +as well as my own for the skill and tact which he +displayed in the correction of my text, which was +finally revised by K. Koffka.</p> + +<p>My thanks are due to Mrs. L. Köhler, without +whose help my work would have been all but impossible.</p> + +<p>To Max Wertheimer I should like to dedicate +something of which I could be prouder than these +<span class="pagenum" id="px">[x]</span>ten chapters. I hope he will accept them, however, +as a testimony of my good will and of our friendship.</p> + +<p class="right"> + W. K. +</p> + +<p class="noindent"> + Ormor, Sweden,<br> + <span style="margin-left: 1.0em;">August 12, 1928.</span> +</p> + +<hr class="front"> + +<nav> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="pxi">[xi]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Contents"> + <i>Contents</i> + </h2> +</div> + +<table> + <tr class="xsmall"><td></td><td>CHAPTER</td><td class="tdr">PAGE</td> + <tr><td></td><td>PREFACE</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#pvii">vii</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">I.</td><td>THE VIEWPOINT OF BEHAVIORISM</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#p3">3</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">II.</td><td>PSYCHOLOGY AS A YOUNG SCIENCE</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#p35">35</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">III.</td><td>THE VIEWPOINT OF INTROSPECTION</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#p70">70</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">IV.</td><td>DYNAMICS AS OPPOSED TO MACHINE THEORY</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#p103">103</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">V.</td><td>SENSORY ORGANIZATION</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#p148">148</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">VI.</td><td>THE PROPERTIES OF ORGANIZED WHOLES</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#p187">187</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">VII.</td><td>BEHAVIOR</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#p224">224</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">VIII.</td><td>ASSOCIATION</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#p269">269</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">IX.</td><td>REPRODUCTION</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#p301">301</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">X.</td><td>INSIGHT</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#p349">349</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr"></td><td>INDEX</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#p395">395</a></td></tr> +</table> + +</nav> + +<main> +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> +<p class="center" style="font-weight:bold; font-size:2em;"> +GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY +</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p3">[3]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="I"> + I + <br> + <i>The Viewpoint of Behaviorism</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>THERE seems to be a single starting point for +psychology, exactly as for all the other sciences: +the world as I find it, naïvely and uncritically. The +naïveté may be lost as we proceed. Problems may be +found, which were completely hidden from our eyes +at first, and for their solution it may be necessary to +devise concepts which seem to have little contact +with uncritical experience; nevertheless the whole +development should begin with a naïve picture of the +world. This origin is necessary because there is no +other basis from which a science can arise. In my +case, which may be taken as representative of many +others essentially similar to it, that naïve picture consists, +at this moment, of a blue lake with dark forests +around it, a big, gray stone, hard and cool, which I +have chosen as a chair, a paper on which I write, a +faint noise of the wind which hardly moves the trees, +and a strong odor characteristic of boats and fishing. +But there is more in this world: somehow I now behold, +though it does not become fused with the blue +lake of the present, another lake of a milder blue, +and I find myself, some years ago, looking at it from +its shore in Illinois. I am perfectly accustomed to +beholding thousands of pictures of this kind which +<span class="pagenum" id="p4">[4]</span>arise some way or other when I am alone. And +there is still more in this world: my hand and fingers +moving lightly over the smooth surface of the +paper; now, when I stop writing and look around +again, there is a feeling of health and vigor, but in +the next moment I feel something like a dark pressure +somewhere in my interior which tends to develop +into a feeling of being hunted—I have promised +to have this manuscript ready within a few +months.</p> + +<p>Most people live in such a world permanently, +which is <em>the world</em> for them, and hardly ever find +problems or difficulties in its properties. Crowded +streets may take the place of the lake, a cushion in a +sedan that of my stone, some serious words of a business +transaction may be remembered instead of Lake +Michigan, and the dark pressure may have to do +with tax-paying instead of book-writing. All these +are minor differences so long as one takes the world +at its face-value, as we all do except in those hours +when science disturbs our natural attitude. There +are problems, of course, even for the most uncritical +citizen of this first-hand world. But, for the most +part, they do not refer to the nature of it; they are of +a practical or an emotional sort and they usually +mean that, this world being taken for granted, we +do not know how to judge or how to behave in that +actual part of it which we face as our present situation.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p5">[5]</span></p> + +<p>Various sciences, most of all physics and biology, +began centuries ago to destroy the simple confidence +with which human beings take that naïve world as +<em>the reality</em>. Though hundreds of millions still remain +undisturbed, the scientist has found it, in some +respects, full of almost contradictory properties. +Fortunately he has been able to discover another +world, as it were, behind it, whose properties, highly +different from those of the everyday world of naïve +people, do not seem to be contradictory at all. No +wonder therefore that now, as psychology begins to +be a science, some of its most energetic students +should wish to make it go the way of the exact sciences +at once. Indeed, if other sciences have found +the naïve world of everyday reality impervious to +and unavailable for scientific method, what hope of +better success can we as psychologists have? And if +the enormous and almost impossible feat of jumping +out of the world of direct, but confused, experience +into a world of clear and hard reality, has already +been achieved by physical science, it would seem +wise for the psychologist to take advantage of that +great event in the history of science and begin to construct +psychology on the solid basis laid down by the +physicist and the physiologist outside the field of uncritical +experience.</p> + +<p>A few words about the history of scientific criticism +will help to define better the material or field +to be given up by psychological investigation and +<span class="pagenum" id="p6">[6]</span>to indicate what shall be taken as a better object of +research. Our naïve experience consists of objects, +their properties and changes, existing quite independently +of us. It does not matter to them and +their existence whether or not we see and feel and +hear them; they remain exactly as they are when we +state their properties, when we are not present or are +occupied in other matters. It was a great step when +men began to ask how seeing and feeling and hearing +occur, and it was a revolution when they found that +colors and noises and smells, etc., were merely products +of some of the influences exerted on man by his +surroundings. Still these surroundings seemed to +subsist in their primary characteristics and to remain +“the real world,” if only you subtracted those “secondary +qualities” as purely subjective ingredients. +But finally even the “primary qualities” of naïve +realism were assimilated to the secondary as subjective. +The form, weight and movement of the objects +of immediate experience were treated as colors and +sounds, i.e., as functions of the experiencing organism, +as end results of its complicated processes. And +therefore we cannot hold that these objects excite the +processes, since, according to this point of view, their +very existence as parts of immediate experience is +only a consequence of these processes. So the picture +of the objective and independent <em>physical world</em> of +physical things, of physical time, of physical movement +and physical space, has to be constructed as +<span class="pagenum" id="p7">[7]</span>something different from the world-picture of direct +experience.</p> + +<p>Physical objects, which <em>as such</em> we can neither see +nor feel, exert upon each other a great variety of +physical influences, which <em>as such</em> similarly do not +occur in the world of immediate experience. There +is one physical object more interesting than all the +others but in every way as foreign to naïve experience +as they are: that is my physical body, an astounding +system of electromagnetic entities. If the right +influences be exerted upon this system by other physical +objects, those processes will occur in it, the consequences +of which I know as the exterior part of the +world of naïve experience, the so-called external sensory +world. But an enormous amount of physical activity +is constantly going on inside my body. We +have sufficient grounds, therefore, to assume that +there are still other processes with the occurrence of +which the <em>inner</em> side of our immediate experience is +connected: such are the feeling of strain, when I contract +the muscles of my arm, also that of hunger and +fatigue, my “memory image” of Lake Michigan, fear +and hope and so on, almost <i lang="la">ad infinitum</i>.</p> + +<p>At present we shall not consider <em>how</em> the physicist +accomplishes the gigantic task of investigating the +properties of a world which does not appear directly +in any part of immediate experience. But there can +be no doubt concerning the remarkable success of his +procedure. Whereas the world of naïve man is somewhat +<span class="pagenum" id="p8">[8]</span>confused, revealing its subjective character in +any critical discussion of its properties, the world of +the physicist gives short shrift to confusion and contradiction. +And though we find ourselves surprised +by the rapid changes which physical theory undergoes +in our times, we still have the feeling that +progress is made with most of these changes. Eventually +there will be agreement about all the more +important properties of the physical world.</p> + +<p>For a while psychology was supposed to be the +science of the events of direct experience, both in its +external and its internal aspects, as contrasted to +physical objects and occurrences.⁠<a id="FNanchor_1_1" href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> By description of +direct experience the psychologist hoped to get not +only an orderly registration of all the possible varieties +of such experience, but also a great deal of information +about the functional relations among these +events. He even aimed at formulating laws governing +the flow of direct experience.</p> + +<p>The well-known psychological school of behaviorism +has leveled against the older psychology the +criticism that it was misguided both with respect to +its subject-matter and its aim. It has not been +possible, according to the behaviorist, to register +the varieties of direct experience in a convincing +manner, nor has anything come of the attempt to +<span class="pagenum" id="p9">[9]</span>describe their functional relationships or to formulate +the laws of so-called “mental life.” In no +respect, the behaviorist holds, do we have the +impression that there exists a real and progressive +science of direct experience, clear in its methods +and results. On the contrary, we find endless discussions +of minor and, less frequently, major items, +different psychologists giving quite different descriptions +of “facts” which are supposed to be more +or less the same for both of them. Take the example +of “images”! One psychologist claims to have them +in numbers, many of them almost as lively and concrete +as perceptions. Others tell us that there are +no real images at all in direct experience and that +probably the first man was deceived by words or +other motor phenomena which correspond to objects +and facts not actually present in experience. If the +famous method of “introspection,” i.e., observation of +direct experience,⁠<a id="FNanchor_2_2" href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> cannot give better results in such +a gross investigation, what shall we expect from it +when we are confronted by questions of equal or even +greater importance which are also more subtle and +intrinsically more difficult? Unfortunately, the adherents +of introspection do not seem to trust their +own procedure. At least they must have agreed upon +facing important problems as seldom as possible, +since they are occupied mainly with describing the +<span class="pagenum" id="p10">[10]</span>more remote and less exciting corners of experience, +as e.g., minor nuances of sensations, or the “glassy” +appearance of certain parts of space, and so forth. +If all I have to do to develop the science of direct experience +is to describe it, why then not attack the +central facts of “mental life” at once, instead of +scratching a little at the surface, or periphery, of it? +There was a time in Germany, not very long ago, +when people began to joke about psychology’s ponderous +discussion of trifles. And, indeed, it was +strange to see how the description of a direct experience, +what happens, for instance, during a single +comparison of two tones or colors, could fill hundreds +of pages without giving us the slightest positive +idea about how the occurrence and accuracy of +such a comparison might be explained. Even in a +state of perplexity a science can be highly interesting. +But psychology, so far as it deals with direct experience +by the method of introspection, has not only +been a complete failure; it has also become boresome +for all those who are not professionally connected +with it.</p> + +<p>And the behaviorist is not slow in giving us reasons +why this must be so. The meaning of “direct experience,” +through opposition to the world of physics, +becomes associated with concepts like “the mental,” +“mind” and “soul,” almost without our being aware +of this association. Thus gradually this term becomes +the expression for “spiritual life” or the name +for the effects of a special mental substance, existing +independently of the facts of physics and biology. +<span class="pagenum" id="p11">[11]</span>Consequently, all the old prejudices and superstitions +of religious or metaphysical extraction slip into the +concept and into the treatment of direct experience. +The psychologist loses his impartial judgment; what +he has heard about “mind,” or “soul,” and their +miraculous properties since the early days of his +childhood, creeps into his statements and makes +“introspection” an ill disguised rhetoric in favor of +prescientific mythology and medieval darkness.</p> + +<p>However, if this were the only argument against +introspection, the introspectionist might answer that +if the behaviorist were right in this point, his criticism +would not apply to the description of direct +experience itself, but rather would indicate an accidental +source of defect in the method. Then, some +increase of self-criticism and a careful elimination of +religious or metaphysical interests in students of +psychology might be a remedy for these defects, and +a very welcome gesture towards sober behaviorism at +the same time.</p> + +<p>But the behaviorist has other reasons for not accepting +direct experience as a field of scientific research. +First of all, as a procedure, introspection +lacks the chief methodological virtue of physical research, +a position of observation external to the +system under observation; on the contrary, it is a +special process <em>in</em> this system itself, and all chances +are against its leaving the “observed” parts of the +system undisturbed. <i lang="la">Hinc illæ lacrimæ!</i> An example +of this is the attempt to study introspectively the +<span class="pagenum" id="p12">[12]</span>direct experience of sorrow and joy; they do not remain +the same, but rather tend to disappear when the +selfsame person who has or had the sorrow and the +joy must assume the attitude of introspection.</p> + +<p>But even supposing that this difficulty might be +overcome by some scarcely imaginable improvement +of the method, we still should find it useless, the behaviorist +argues, because of its miserable and inevitable +subjectivity. What is the first characteristic +of an objective statement as the result of an objective +scientific procedure? That whoever happens to be +interested in it can be obliged to understand it in one +determinate meaning, if only you give him exact +definitions of the terms you are using in your statement. +So we define the atomic weight or the atomic +number of an element, so analogy and homology of +morphological structures, and there is no physicist +or biologist who does not know the exact significance +of those words. If now you listen to psychologists +talking, let us say, about the “confusion” which they +observe in peripheral vision, what exact meaning can +be conveyed by this word so long as it is not fixed by +definition? A real definition, however, seems to be +impossible wherever one has to do with the ultimate +data of direct experience. If you are asked for the +definition of “confusion,” you may attempt to define +it negatively, say in terms of “lack of clearness.” But +that does not help you very much, since your friend +will then ask what you mean by “clearness.” You +<span class="pagenum" id="p13">[13]</span>may tell him that a rather high degree of clearness is +a normal property of the central parts of a simple +and orderly visual field. But such a field might have +more than one normal property and you did not give +a <i lang="la">differentia specifica</i> in your pseudo definition, in +addition to which the words “simple” and “orderly” +need definition as badly as did “confusion” and +“clearness.” In any case, you have now resorted to +the only thing which seems feasible where, as in +this field of direct experience, a true definition cannot +be achieved, viz., a kind of <em>demonstration</em>. You +do not define your term, but you give your friend a +hint about what conditions are necessary in order to +have the specific kind of direct experience about +which you are talking. Supposing that he understands +the words by which you describe those conditions, +there is some chance now that he may attach +your undefined term to the precise phase of his +actual direct experience that your use of the term +intended. But what a crude and altogether vague +procedure this is, if you compare it with the elegant +definitions of the exact sciences!</p> + +<p>And still we have supposed that, given the same +conditions, your friend, who cannot make statements +about any direct experience except <em>his own</em>, must +find in it the same properties, objects and occurrences, +which you have found in <em>your</em> direct experience. +You cannot, as the physicists seem to do, make your +two statements about one and the same event, neither +<span class="pagenum" id="p14">[14]</span>do you make readings from one and the same apparatus +or scale. You have <em>two</em> events in <em>two</em> experiences. +What is your evidence for assuming that +under the same conditions the ultimate data of experience +are the same for both of you? Unfortunately +you shall never know whether this is the case +or not. On one hand, color blindness and similar +phenomena show conclusively that such an identity +does not exist; on the other, you have no proof of that +identity even in those cases where all the tests you +might imagine give the same description, i.e., the +verbal report you both make. Your friend may report +“red” where you say “red.” Still you do not +know more than that your friend always has the <em>same</em> +quality wherever and whenever you have your “red,” +without knowing at all that he has <em>just that</em> quality +which you call “red.” Neither does it help you to a +real identification of qualities in the two direct experiences +that what he calls “red” seems to have +(more or less) the same “stimulating” value as you +find verified in your own description, because you +will see at once that he may use the same term +“stimulating” in quite a different meaning, so that +he does not have the same kind of experience when +he uses it.</p> + +<p>This is subjectivity in its extreme form. If every +one has his own direct experience and if he is forever +excluded from that of all other persons, direct +experience is the private affair of each of us, and with +<span class="pagenum" id="p15">[15]</span>respect to it a common science cannot possibly be +achieved. Indeed, so little can be derived from the +direct experience of one man, concerning similar experiences +in others, that, in epistemology, it has +become a truism that I shall never know whether or +not there exists any “direct experience” at all even in +my best friend. Whatever I see or hear when we talk +together is a part of <em>my</em> experience. Certainly, what +I call his attitude, or his voice, in my experience, is +determined by physical events in the muscles and in +the nervous system, etc., of his physical body. It is +not only possible but even necessary to understand +these physical events from the viewpoint of pure +physics or physiology. Consequently, there is no +proof that some of these processes in my friend are +accompanied by “direct experience” in him.</p> + +<p>The behaviorist might add to this criticism that +he does not deny the great contributions which, before +his time, the older forms of psychology have +made to the advancement of this science. But he will +say that, looking upon those achievements from the +present point of view, one will easily discover a simple +fact: viz., that nearly all of them are to the credit +not of introspection and description but of the “objective +experiment.” The meaning of this word may be +explained as follows: Instead of making a subject +observe and describe his direct experience in a given +case, we place him in a well-defined situation to which +he has to react by certain performances. These we +<span class="pagenum" id="p16">[16]</span>can state and measure without his giving us any +description of his experience. So Weber’s law was +discovered; this was the kind of experiment by which +Fechner made psychology an experimental science; +memory and the formation of habits were investigated +by research of this type with almost no introspection; +and since Binet and Simon we have learned to treat +intelligence in the same manner. If we are not mistaken, +even the introspectionist gives us “descriptions” +of colors and tones, pleasure and volition, only +so long as he has not found a method by which he +might transform them through objective experiments +into measurable achievements or reactions. The +introspectionist himself seems to accept the “descriptive” +observation of a fellow introspectionist, according +to the measure in which the other has been able +to give objective experiments as a verification and +corroboration of his descriptions. What, then, is the +use of “direct experience” and its description?</p> + +<p>From their common criticism all behaviorists do +not draw quite the same conclusions about “direct +experience.” None of them, it is true, find direct +experience a matter of interest for science, since as +the private affair of those who have such experience +it is not accessible to the objective observation +undertaken by others, as it ought to be were it a +proper object of scientific research. A few members +of the school seem to go so far as to deny the existence +of direct experience altogether; they simply abominate +<span class="pagenum" id="p17">[17]</span>the notion. But these minor differences of +opinion are of no importance for us, because in the +question of <em>method</em> all behaviorists have not only the +same negative but also the same positive opinion. +Their program is a simple consequence of the foregoing +argument. In his objective experiment the +psychologist has tacitly accepted the procedure of +the exact sciences, even if he has not become fully +aware of the difference in principle which separates +this attitude from that of introspection. Both the +physicist and the chemist are interested in knowing +how a system which they are investigating will react +when exposed to a certain set of conditions; they also +ask how the reaction will change with a variation of +those conditions. Both questions are answered by +objective observation, registration and measurement. +This is exactly the form of real experimentation in +psychology, too: a subject of a certain type (child, +adult, man, woman, animal) is the system to be investigated; +certain conditions are given and objectively +controlled; the most important of these we call +“the stimuli”; and a reaction occurs which is observed +quite objectively.</p> + +<p>The only thing which psychologists need, then, +is to recognize, generally and in principle, that this +form of procedure is the only possible one, and also +that it is precisely the same as that of all other exact +sciences. Behavior, i.e., the reaction of a living +system, is its only subject-matter, and behavior in no +<span class="pagenum" id="p18">[18]</span>way includes any direct experience. In the experimental +work of the future, even the highest forms +of behavior will be studied and described in purely +objective terms. They <em>must</em> be, since personal, direct +experience does not occur at a single point in the +whole experiment. For some this truth is somewhat +hidden by the fact that in most of our experiments +language reactions are of a special importance. If +the experimenter himself enjoys what he calls direct +experience and if this experience includes a great +many things associated with words, he will be inclined +to take the words of his subject as signs of +similar direct experience on his part. Nevertheless, +the words are registered as responses of the subject, +and as such are purely objective, physical facts, produced +by certain processes in the larynx and the +mouth of the subject. Though the experimenter +knows that other objective processes (of innervation, +inhibition, and so forth) will have occurred before +these sound waves are produced by the action of +muscles, he will never be able to decide, according to +our analysis, whether there was any direct experience +accompanying those inner processes. Perhaps we +should discipline ourselves to a less frequent use of +language reactions in our experiments, until finally +we overcome the danger of associating language with +direct experience, and introspection will have disappeared +from psychology as an exact science.</p> + +<p>Of course, not all the reactions of the subject are +<span class="pagenum" id="p19">[19]</span>observed with equal facility in the objective manner. +Sometimes even strong stimulation will not produce +any overt behavior which can be registered externally +with our present methods. But in the majority of +these cases the physiologist can give us highly valuable +information about the functioning of the autonomic +part of the nervous system and about the +subsequent reactions which occur in the most important +visceral organs, including the endocrine +glands. One of the main tasks of psychology will be +to develop and to adapt the physiological techniques +until these visceral reactions can be registered with +perfect ease under the conditions of behavioristic +experimentation. We also have some evidence for +assuming that, in addition to the reactions just mentioned, +so-called “thinking” consists in slight innervations +of the muscles concerned in speech reactions.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>So far I hope that I have given a fair statement +of the opinions which prevail among behaviorists. +It ought to be the more correct, since I sympathize +with these opinions in several points, most of all in +the criticism of “introspection.” Indeed, much of +current introspection seems to be rather sterile and, +in an odd contrast to its ambitions, to lead research +away from the more urgent problems. Whether this +be an intrinsic property of introspection or merely a +consequence of some accidental mistake usually associated +with it, we shall discuss later on.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p20">[20]</span></p> + +<p>At present, we have a simpler problem before us. +In the natural sciences, so the behaviorist tells us, +methods deal with objective reality, whereas in the +treatment of direct experience—if there is such a +thing—they deal with something entirely subjective. +Is that true? Is that the real reason why natural +science has won the admiration of the world and +psychology is still in an embryonic state? I cannot +admit it. It seems to me that, starting with an +admirable enthusiasm for exactness, behaviorism has +been misled completely at this point and that, consequently, +the energy spent by behaviorism in its fight +against “direct experience” and “consciousness” has +been spent in the wrong direction. So, at least, the +situation appears to me because, whatever may have +happened to the keen leaders of behaviorism in their +individual development, I must give the following +report about myself. It is a well-known story, but +some psychologists seem to have forgotten it.</p> + +<p>There cannot be the slightest doubt for me that, as +a child, I had “direct experience” before I even +dreamed of a world like that of physics. Of course, +I did not know that term then, which could acquire +its meaning later on only by the very fact that the +world of physics became opposed to it. There were +innumerable varieties of experiences appearing as +“objective,” i.e., as existing or occurring independently +and externally. There were other experiences +which belonged to me personally and privately, +<span class="pagenum" id="p21">[21]</span>and insofar were “subjective,” such as, among others, +dreadful fear upon certain occasions, and an overwhelming, +warm happiness at Christmas.</p> + +<p>In the following chapters we shall be occupied +mainly with “objective experience.” This term, +however, may be misinterpreted rather easily. So I +shall try to specify its meaning a little more. Doing +so, I shall even run the risk of repeating some arguments +several times, because this is the point where +most of our difficulties arise.</p> + +<p>The name “experience” seems to indicate that, +though appearing as “objective,” those things and +events were felt by me as “being given in my perception” +and therefore as “subjective.” Certainly, they +were not. They simply <em>were there outside</em>, and at +that time I had no suspicion whatever of their being +the effects of something else upon “me.” I must go +further. There was not even a question of their +depending upon my presence; upon my keeping my +eyes open, and so forth. When I went around an +object it remained the same identical thing. So +absolutely “objective” were those objects and events, +that there was no place left for a more objective +world. Even now, this “objectivity” is still so strong +and natural, that I am constantly tempted to attribute +to the interior of these self-same “things” all those +properties which, in the meantime, physics has taught +me to attribute to objects of the physical world. +When, in these pages, I talk about “direct experience” +<span class="pagenum" id="p22">[22]</span>of the “objective” type, the word is always used +in this meaning: e.g., a chair as something there outside, +hard, stable, brown, generally without any taint +of “being perceived” by me, of being “a subjective +phenomenon.”</p> + +<blockquote> +<p>In some cases, it is true, the discrimination between +the “objective” and the “subjective” side of +direct experience may become dubious: as with after-images +or with the prick of a needle in my finger. +That does not make the discrimination less important +in itself. In physics the discrimination of the +conducting substances from insulators remains of +high value, though between the extremes we find a +great many intermediate cases. For us, the main +point is the fact that in “things” and their “movements,” +etc., an almost unsurpassable degree of +“objectivity” is reached.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>At the time when I began to understand physics I +did not learn only about the physical world. Another +lesson was necessarily connected with studying +physics, and it was this lesson that gave the term +“direct experience” its connotation or, better, which +introduced me to a manner of thinking that made the +meaning of “direct experience” clear. The physical +world could not be the same as that “objective” world +which I had had around me the whole time. Certain +physical objects were found to influence a particularly +interesting physical body, viz., my physical +organism, and what has been called “objective” experience +here, was shown to depend upon subsequent +<span class="pagenum" id="p23">[23]</span>and very complicated processes in that physical +organism. Though that influence, exerted by other +physical objects, starts these processes in the organism, +there is no possibility of identifying the final +product, “things” and their “changes” as I have them +in immediate experience, with those physical objects +from which the influences came. If a wound is not +the gun which emitted the projectile, then the “thing” +which I have before me, which I see and feel, cannot +be identical with the corresponding physical object. +This object, influencing my physical organism, +produces certain disturbances in it, <em>the final outcome</em> +of which is the “thing” before me in direct experience.⁠<a id="FNanchor_3_3" href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> + +<p>Such “things,” however, were the first items <em>I +knew</em>. Therefore, a picture of the physical world +had to be <em>constructed</em> after I once appreciated the +necessity of it. Hence it is built up by inference as +something found indirectly or mediately; and, <em>in +contrast to it</em>, the world around me, as I had it before +and still have it, quite apart from the physicist’s construction, +is now called the world of direct, or immediate, +experience.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p24">[24]</span></p> + +<p>But how can I say that a “chair,” for example, is +an “objective experience” if I must admit that it +depends upon certain processes in my organism? +Does not the chair become “subjective” then? It +does and it does not. At this very moment the meaning +of our terms has changed. In the last paragraphs +“objective” has denoted a certain experienced property +which some parts of my direct experience, in +contrast to other experiences, possess <em>as such</em> (exactly +as they have size, color, hardness and so forth); the +term “subjective” in <em>this</em> paragraph means their +genetic dependence upon my physical organism. +“Subjectivity,” in this latter meaning, is not itself a +directly experienced property, but a relationship +which we ascribe to “objective” experiences after we +have learnt to regard them as the outcome of organic +processes and, therefore, as distinct from the physical +reality external to the physical organism. Sometimes +the two connotations of the term are confused in the +most deplorable manner as though what is “subjective” +genetically ought also to be “subjective” in experience. +So most introspectionists seem to think +that, properly speaking, the chair before me must be +a subjective phenomenon <em>in experience</em>, appearing +“before me” only in consequence of some illusion. +And since there is no “subjective” chair to be discovered, +the behaviorist derides the introspectionist +for dwelling in a world of imaginary ghosts. The +simple truth is that some of the experiences depending +<span class="pagenum" id="p25">[25]</span>upon processes in my physical organism have the +character of “objectivity,” whereas others, depending +upon other processes in the same organism, have a +“subjective” character, this contrast being something +altogether indifferent to the <em>genetic</em> “subjectivity” of +<em>both</em> types of processes and experiences, as depending +upon the physical organism. After this, I hope that +no misunderstanding of the term “objective experience” +will be possible. When I talk about “a chair,” +the chair of my everyday life is meant and not some +“subjective phenomenon” to be observed perhaps by +highly trained introspectionists, but utterly unknown +to me.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, we have seen that we cannot +identify the chair of “objective experience” with the +chair as a part of the physicist’s world. Under these +circumstances, the world of direct experience being +the first I had, and since all that I know about the +physical world being inferred later on from the +properties of the experienced world, how can I deny +this experienced world which, for me, is the only +basis upon which I can continue to guess about physical +realities? No one can prevent me from thinking, +if I choose, that after all the physical world may be +the more important and more essential one. But even +then I must confess that the other world has existed +first and always <em>for me</em>, and that I still can see no +other way of discovering the properties of physical +reality but by observing “objective experiences” and +<span class="pagenum" id="p26">[26]</span>drawing my conclusions about the physical world +from them. With future progress of physiology I +may become able to discover even the nervous processes +underlying my “observing” and “guessing” and +so be able to give a physical theory of these events. +But even then, since the world of physiology is part of +the physical world and <em>as such</em> is not directly accessible +to me, any progress whatever along this line will +depend upon my observing what I call a body or a +nervous system as parts of “direct experience.” It +may be otherwise for behaviorists, so that the physical +(and physiological) world <em>as such</em> is directly +known to them, and that for them the term “known” +has nothing to do with direct experience. But that +cannot change my report about my own case in which +affairs are as I have described them. It is in the +terms of this description that I must decide whether +I shall become a behaviorist or not.</p> + +<p>What then about the behaviorist’s statement that +observation in physics deals with objective reality +whereas, in the treatment of direct experience, it +deals with something subjective?</p> + +<p>Let me describe my own procedure when I investigate +the physical properties of a physical object. +Is there any considerable amount of H<sub>4</sub>C<sub>2</sub>O<sub>2</sub> in a +given mixture of chemical substances? I know about +these substances by the corresponding “objective experience” +before me, and I find the positive answer +to the question by smelling, i.e., in direct experience. +<span class="pagenum" id="p27">[27]</span>This being a rather crude procedure, let us consider +a case of fine measurement. What is the intensity of +an electric current which, under certain conditions, +must exist in a given wire? The position of a needle +on the scale of a definite apparatus will tell me, but +it will tell me in direct optical experience, the whole +apparatus being an “objective” part of my actual experience, +exactly as the wire and the given set of +conditions must manifest themselves either as parts of +direct experience or by a sufficient testimony of their +existence in some part of experience which I have +learnt to regard as a sign for them. And this is true +of all possible objective statements or measurements +which I shall ever be able to make in physics. They +are statements about my actual objective experiences +in these different cases. I shall never be able to make +a direct statement about a physical event <em>as such</em>. +Therefore my observation of physical facts will +always remain of the same kind in principle as that +of an after-image, or of the “confusion” which I find +so characteristic of peripheral vision, or of my feeling +healthy. Therefore, the exactness of my physical +observation cannot depend upon my avoidance of +“direct experience” in physics. I do not avoid it, +for I cannot avoid it. Yet the procedure <em>works</em>. +<em>Some</em> observations of direct experience must then be +an adequate basis for science.</p> + +<p>If all the concrete statements which I can make in +physical research are observations of direct experience, +<span class="pagenum" id="p28">[28]</span>there are some inevitable consequences. How +do I define my terms as a physicist? Since my knowledge +of physics consists entirely of concepts and +observations derived from or contained in direct +experience, all the terms which I use in discussing +physical problems must refer either to concepts or +observations or, more probably, complicated combinations +of the two—in any case, products of my direct +experience. If I try to define them, my definitions +must refer to other concepts or observations, and so +forth. A gestural denotation toward the locus of the +phenomena about which I am talking, as, for instance, +a hint where to make certain observations or +have certain direct experiences, will be the ultimate +step in any process of definition I may attempt. Even +the most abstract concepts of physics, as, for example, +that of entropy, can have no meaning without a +reference, indirect though it may be, to truly direct +experiences. I shall never be able to give a definition +of my terms in physics or to understand a definition +given by others, which, in this respect, differs in +principle from what I may use as a definition in +psychology. Nevertheless the method of physics is +successful. I never have difficulty with definitions +when I talk with physicists about their science. +Hence some definitions, or hints about cases of direct +experience, must be sufficiently safe for exact science. +Therefore the exactness of my definitions in physics +<span class="pagenum" id="p29">[29]</span>cannot be the result of their being independent of +“direct experience,” for they are not independent.</p> + +<p>But the behaviorist tells me that observation of my +direct experience is a private affair of mine, whereas +in physics, two physicists can make the same observation +on the same galvanometer. I deny the truth of +this statement. If another man observes the galvanometer, +he observes something other than the galvanometer +as a physical object, since the object of his +observation is the result of certain organic processes, +determined by the physical galvanometer. Again, +the galvanometer I am observing is the final result of +a different series of processes occurring in <em>my</em> physical +organism. By no means do we “observe the same +instrument” then, though physically both series of +processes are started by the same physical object. +Still, our statements about our observations seem to +agree so well in a great many cases, that we do not +discuss the question very much, whether there is an +absolute philosophical proof for sufficient similarity +between my galvanometer and his. Again the procedure +works. Since I, at least, do not know about +a galvanometer except through “objective experience,” +and yet almost all the statements which the +other man makes agree with my statements, the +privacy of direct experience does not disturb us at +all—in physics. Again, in principle, there is no difference +here between physics and psychology. All +<span class="pagenum" id="p30">[30]</span>physicists, when working with others in such a case, +are convinced naïvely that their fellow-physicists +“have a galvanometer before them,” and that their +observations refer to it. In this sense they assume +that their fellow-workers have a very definite “objective +experience,” highly similar to their own experience, +and they quite naïvely understand the words +of their colleagues as statements about that experience. +That, however, is allowing private affairs in +exact science. It does not seem to disturb scientific +procedure, as it does not disturb the affairs of everyday +life, wherein it is the most general and natural +occurrence. In certain cases, therefore, belief in the +“direct experience” of others must be innocent and is +not a hindrance to scientific progress. If psychology +does not make rapid advancement, the reason for it +cannot be that belief as such.</p> + +<p>There remains one consequence of the elementary +fact that observation in physics involves observation +of direct experience. As a physicist, observing my +apparatus, I do not fear that my activity as an +observer has any serious or distorting influence upon +the essential properties of what I observe, if only I +keep myself, as a physical system, at a certain distance +from the apparatus, as another physical system. +Now, as direct experiences both the apparatus to be +observed and my “activity” of observing depend +upon processes in the same system, viz., my physical +organism. Again the behaviorist must be wrong +<span class="pagenum" id="p31">[31]</span>when he declares that, because of the fact just mentioned, +direct experience can not be observed scientifically, +since in this case of observation in physics, +the situation is similar: the material to be observed +and the process of observing belong to the same system. +Thus we see that the physicist and the psychologist +are in exactly the same situation in this respect. +It does not matter at all whether I call myself a +physicist or a psychologist in observing a galvanometer. +In both cases my observation is directed towards +the same “objective experience.” The procedure +works in physics. Why not in psychology? +There must be some cases in which my observation +of direct experience does not disturb the observed +facts seriously.</p> + +<p>This argument contains in itself a most remarkable +limitation of the range of its own application. It +does not mean at all, that all forms of so-called introspection +are justified, even less does it mean that +<em>generally</em> the products of so-called introspection are +independent of introspection. Here the critical position +of behaviorism has exaggerated the scope of a +fair argument and unjustly applied it to <em>all</em> statements +about direct experience, although the critical +point is thoroughly justified in a great many cases.</p> + +<p>I have described how, as a physicist, I must deal +with direct experience. Evidently some epistemological +difficulties with respect to the objectivity of +procedure in that science may be derived from that +<span class="pagenum" id="p32">[32]</span>description by a very extreme purist, as the behaviorist +seems to be. But, fortunately, those dilemmas +had not yet been discovered, when in the time of +Galileo, Newton and Huyghens the first really important +steps were made in physics. Those great +investigators carried on, pragmatically naïve and +happily undisturbed by a “behaviorism” of physics +which might have impeded or blocked the whole +development for the sake of “epistemological purity.” +Somehow the procedure has worked in spite of the +fact that logically, perhaps, it is not possible to certify +it as absolutely objective. Sciences which wish to +carry on their researches and be productive often +show a certain healthy disdain of such scruples. It +might be better for psychology, too, if, after listening +to a very wholesome critical lesson from behaviorism, +it returns to undertaking productive work with some +naïveté, using all possible means which yield results.</p> + +<p>As a scientific attitude the Homeric assault of behaviorists +against “direct experience,” “consciousness” +and so forth, appears very strange to me. They +do not generally show an undue interest in epistemological +considerations. It is just <em>one</em> question which +suddenly arouses their interest: How can I know +about the direct experience of others? I shall never +have a definite proof of the validity of such knowledge. +But physics, that is another matter! There we +are safe! The behaviorist, however, forgets that it is +a truism in epistemology that I shall never be able to +<span class="pagenum" id="p33">[33]</span>“prove” conclusively the existence of an independent +physical world. As an extreme purist I might argue +this point exactly as the behaviorist disputes the +assumption of direct experience in others. Somehow +it does not occur to the behaviorist to apply his epistemological +criticism to the assumption of the physical +world. He does not say: Thou shalt not work upon a +physical world, the existence of which will always +remain a mere assumption. On the contrary, he assumes +its reality with all the healthy naïveté which he +lacks in psychology. The reason is, perhaps, that the +achievements of physical science are imposing and +have become the ideal of behaviorism. But to the +mind of a methodological purist that cannot be taken +as a satisfactory proof of the existence of the physical +world. Of course, personally and practically I am as +convinced of its existence as any behaviorist has ever +been, and I am fully aware of the fact that sciences +may and must believe and postulate, where the epistemologist, +if he likes, may doubt. But then I shall +believe and postulate the direct experience of others, +as well as the existence of physical entities, if this +makes my procedure simpler and more productive. +And I feel the more justified in this attitude, since I +have seen that all work I may do in physics is founded +on direct experience and that, therefore, the enormous +superiority of physics over psychology in accomplishment, +cannot follow from any differences in +this respect.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p34">[34]</span></p> + +<p>At this moment I see the behaviorist smiling +ironically: With all his medieval philosophy Mr. +Köhler will never make any progress against the +sound scientific basis of behaviorism. I answer that +this basis of behaviorism is as philosophical as anything +could be: it is purely epistemological. In this +connection the only difference between the behaviorist +and me is one of completeness: the behaviorist sees +a single theorem of epistemology and, as an extreme +purist, he dwells exclusively on this one point, ignoring +the context from which it has been taken. I am +aware of this context; it is stated in the foregoing +argument; and I find myself therefore opposed to +behaviorism, or any other one-sided and impractical +purism in science.</p> + + +<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h3> + +<blockquote> +<p>W. S. Hunter: <cite>Human Behavior</cite>. 1928.</p> + +<p>K. Koffka: <cite>The Growth of the Mind</cite>. 1924. 2nd edition, +1928.</p> + +<p>J. B. Watson: in <cite>Psychologies of 1925</cite> (ed. by C. Murchison).</p> + +<p>A. P. Weiss: <cite>A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior</cite>. +1925.</p> +</blockquote> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p35">[35]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="II"> + II + <br> + <i>Psychology as a Young Science</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>IN the first chapter I became slightly autobiographical +in order to show why I have found it +impossible to become a behaviorist. If I am ever to +become one, some adherent of that school will have +to effect the conversion. I do not myself see the +way.</p> + +<p>So far direct experience has been shown to be the +raw material of both physics and psychology. If +despite this fact the physical sciences are so far +ahead of psychology in their development, what +shall be our method of imitating their achievements?</p> + +<p>Contemporary physics has a real advantage in the +careful selection of the experiences which play a +decisive rôle in the crucial moments of physical +research. Of course, the physicist ignores all “<em>subjective</em> +experience,” as defined in the previous chapter, +as far as possible, because apparently it has +nothing to do with the properties of the physical +world. All the difficulties of psychologists who try +to observe and describe subjective experience are +simply avoided by the physical sciences.</p> + +<p>But the selection and exclusion does not stop there. +<span class="pagenum" id="p36">[36]</span>If most “objective experience” was taken as evidence +of physical existences and physical events in +early investigations, a more critical view of the situation +tended to eliminate large parts of this material +as well. The process of selection has become particularly +severe, since the advancement of science +has made it possible almost everywhere to transform +qualitative observation into quantitative measurement. +At the present time almost all physical +measurements are made in an extremely indirect +way. We do not observe an experienced counterpart +of the physical variable in question; we observe +a related but different object the virtue of +which is that it lends itself to more exact statement +and is shown, or supposed, to be in a well-known +functional relationship to the physical variable. Of +all possible objective experience nothing seems better +to fulfill the requirements of the physicist than +the localization of a single line (a needle) on a +scale of other lines, especially if this localization +becomes the coincidence of the first line (needle) +with one of the others (or inclusion between two +which are near to each other). The range of +direct experiences used in measurement has now +reached a minimum value, indeed. It almost seems +as if the same scale and the same needle were used +universally; it tells a hundred altogether different +stories about the physical world. It means “atmospheres” +or “volts,” or “ampères” or “temperature” +<span class="pagenum" id="p37">[37]</span>and so forth, as the case may be. In addition to +observing a definite coincidence, and controlling the +connection of the apparatus with the system to be investigated, +the physicist has only to recognize certain +words and figures on the scale. That is all the direct +experience which enters into the procedure. There +is not much opportunity for serious blundering. +Even so simple a property as physical size is not +measured directly. No physicist measures the length +of an object by comparing it with the experienced +length of a standard object directly. That would not +be accurate enough. Rather he prefers the method +of coinciding lines or points. Defining physical +length by this method, he measures the length of a +line by observing the coincidence of its ends with +certain points on a scale.</p> + +<p>If now we ask ourselves whether we shall imitate +the procedure of the physical sciences in psychology, +two answers are to be given to our question, because +that procedure has two aspects. In the first place, +the procedure involves making statements about +physical systems by means of objective experience. +As the behavior of men and animals is observed in +our objective experience—the direct experience of +the <em>subjects</em> not playing any rôle in the matter—such +a study is perfectly legitimate and undoubtedly will +be much more extended in the future. Though it +existed before the days of behaviorism, this school is +fundamentally right in praising the advantages of +<span class="pagenum" id="p38">[38]</span>objective procedure as against prevailing introspection. +Although behaviorists have gone too far +through failing to appreciate that, even in the objective +method, direct experience remains the raw +material as “the objective experience” of an observer, +their error is of no practical importance as long as +the second part of their answer to our question is +proper. Unfortunately, behaviorism has here tended +to take the wrong position.</p> + +<p>As we have seen, in present physics objective procedure +is characterized by the use of a small group +of selected experiences and, consequently, by the exclusion +of the great variety of objective experience, +the exclusion being made to satisfy the requirements +of quantitative measurement. Shall we do the same +thing in psychology as a science of behavior? Evidently +that will depend upon the nature of behavior +itself. It is difficult to judge about a method as such. +A method is not good or bad in itself. It is good if it +is properly adapted to the essential aspects of my +problems and my material; and it is bad if it lacks regard +for those essentials or misdirects research. +Therefore, what has been shown to be an excellent +procedure in one science or for some problems may +be altogether useless or even a hindrance in another +science or for other problems. In this respect, behavior +is easily seen to have distinctly different phases +and to give the psychologist different tasks correspondingly. +Wherever indirect and quantitative +<span class="pagenum" id="p39">[39]</span>methods can be applied in conformity with the task, +they should be applied. Since C. P. Richter and his +collaborators at the Phipps Psychiatric Clinic have +now discovered a way in which the various drives +of animals, and their temporal changes, can be investigated +by registering amounts of general or of +special activity,⁠<a id="FNanchor_4_4" href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> we shall be keenly interested in the +future development of the method. It is the correct +procedure in cases in which total amounts of activity +in relation to outer and inner conditions can yield us +valuable information.</p> + +<p>But what about other cases where either our problems +are not of the quantitative type or we have no +way as yet to transfer our observations from the direct +experiences with which we are concerned to a special +region, indirectly connected with the first, but better +adapted to finely accurate statement and registration? +Obviously, qualitative types of behavior are +not less important than quantitative differences of +some sort. Where we know about the qualitative +varieties which occur in behavior and where, in a +concrete case, we are sure about the special type before +us under observation, we may be interested in +finding ways of quantitative measurement. But the +discrimination of qualitative types must be primarily +accomplished. During the observation of a puppy +under a given set of conditions, this important question +<span class="pagenum" id="p40">[40]</span>will frequently arise: whether certain behavior +of the animal represents playful activity or “serious” +reaction to the situation. Such a question does not +imply “consciousness” in the puppy; it refers to +some very characteristic differences in what is being +objectively observed. The difference is one of +“quality” of behavior. Again, while observing a +man in a somewhat critical situation, it may be decisive +to observe whether he talks to us in a “steady” +or in a “shaky” voice. At the present time this is +necessarily a qualitative discrimination; even should +we find in the future a method to measure the steadiness +of a voice, this method would forever presuppose +that in direct observation we know what is +meant by unsteadiness as a definite characteristic of +the voice.</p> + +<p>In a similar way, we are restricted in the application +of indirect methods to many other forms of behavior. +I take it that the behaviorists hold that we +can investigate the “emotional behavior” of subjects +without being involved with their “consciousness” or +“subjective experience.” Certainly, psychologists +have tried to transfer observation in this case to a +region of more accurate registration and measurement. +Much work has been done to develop +pneumographic, plethysmographic, galvanographic +methods, and so forth. The result is not altogether +encouraging, however; for again, our interpretation +of the curves recorded by all these apparatus depends +<span class="pagenum" id="p41">[41]</span>greatly upon simultaneous <em>direct</em> observation; by no +means do we feel justified to draw conclusions from +the curves alone. All these procedures seem to be +more problematic in themselves at the present time +than an aid for the solution of psychological problems. +In most cases it is easier to see “anger” +directly in a subject’s attitude than to state and measure, +let us say, the adrenin in his blood.</p> + +<p>Why does this difficulty beset behavioristic psychology, +and not occur in physics? The answer is +simple enough: Physics is an old science and psychology +is in its infancy. Over centuries physicists have +succeeded in eliminating a great many forms of more +direct and qualitative observation, relying upon a +small number of indirect and very accurate observations +as decisive in experimentation. Their success +depended on previously acquired knowledge about +the physical world. Most indirect methods and +sound measurement presuppose a vast background of +knowledge. Qualitative observation, experimentation +and analysis have provided the primary knowledge +which enabled the physicist to discover where he +could measure an important factor, and what physical +relation makes an indirect observation capable of +indicating occurrences not well observable directly. +Oersted had to discover the deflection of a magnet in +the neighborhood of an electric current before exact +measurement of intensities of current became possible. +His was a qualitative, direct observation; indirect +<span class="pagenum" id="p42">[42]</span>and quantitative procedure was the fruit of it. +Even in our days, Röntgen did not <em>measure</em> at the +start of his investigation of X-rays. He had to discover +and to analyze their properties in qualitative +experimentation first of all. Later on his rays could +become a means of measuring the constants of crystals. +Too easily do we forget the simple truth that +in their origins as well as at the opening of a new +field of special investigation later on, the natural +sciences, physics, geology, biology, rely upon qualitative +statements almost completely. Certainly, the +quantitative and the accurate indirect methods are +the most imposing features of exact sciences <em>now</em> +when we review them or consider them superficially. +But we ought to be aware of the fact that in most +cases this procedure is a mere refinement and end result +of the underlying free and direct observation, +without which there would not have been a basis +upon which to build the refined superstructure. In +the eighteenth century Cavendish measured the resistances +of different materials by comparing the +shocks he received in his arm when conductors of +those materials were used to connect him with a battery, +the other pole of which was in his other hand! +Was that improper? On the contrary, it was perfectly +sound in a young science, which was trying to +find that first knowledge of facts upon which more +refined methods may afterwards be founded.</p> + +<p>From this it follows that where we have a good +<span class="pagenum" id="p43">[43]</span>quantitative problem in psychology and an accurate +method of measuring and registering, as in the case +of Richter’s excellent experiments, we can immediately +apply the quantitative and indirect procedure, +as used in physics. The problems which Galileo +attacked in the seventeenth century could be solved +quantitatively at once, the qualitative experience of +everyday life having sufficiently provided the necessary +basis. But for the majority of psychological +problems this is not the case. Where do we have that +first more or less qualitative knowledge of important +functional relationships in psychology which might +become the basis for indirect and exact measurement? +It does not exist. Since the development of more +“exact” methods presupposes its existence, our main +task must be the gathering of that knowledge. In +most cases our preliminary advance in this direction +will have to be crude and qualitative. Whoever protests +that conclusion in the name of purism does not +understand our actual situation in psychology; he +sees neither the nature of, nor the historical background +prerequisite for, special quantitative methods. +If we wish to imitate the physical sciences, we +must not imitate them in their contemporary, most +developed form; we must imitate them in their historical +youth, when their state of development was +comparable to our own at the present time. Otherwise +we should behave like boys who try to copy the +imposing manners of full-grown men without understanding +<span class="pagenum" id="p44">[44]</span>their <i lang="fr">raison d’être</i>, also without seeing that +in development one cannot jump over intermediate +and preliminary phases. A survey of the history of +physics is certainly illuminating. Let us imitate the +natural sciences, but intelligently!</p> + +<p>Behavior is enormously rich in forms and nuances. +Only acknowledging this wealth, and studying it directly +as it is given in all its fascinating varieties, shall +we become able gradually to find those forms of more +quantitative, and perhaps more accurate, procedure +which may become as adequate for us as are the methods +of physics in its realm. At present, and in this +broader historical perspective, qualitative observation +and analysis may be, in a sense, more exact, i.e., +adequate to our subject-matter, than much blind +measurement. We shall press forward towards +more refined methods, of course; but owing to our +situation as beginners, we can go forward only +through the use of less refined methods for the time +being.</p> + +<blockquote> +<p>If organisms were more similar to the systems investigated +in physics, a great many methods of the +physicist might be introduced in our science exactly as +the physicist uses them. But the similarity is not +very considerable, practically. One of the greatest +advantages which makes the physicist’s work so much +easier, is the simplicity of his systems. And his systems +are simple because in physics the experimenter +determines their main properties himself. He prepares +them, more or less. I am far from believing +<span class="pagenum" id="p45">[45]</span>that organic processes are of a supernatural kind. +On the contrary, the most startling difference between +the organism and a simple system investigated +by the physicist is the enormous number of physical +and chemical processes which, depending upon each +other in the most intricate manner, occur in the organism +simultaneously. And we are utterly unable +to create simple organic systems for elementary +study. An amœba is a more complicated system +than all known systems of the inorganic world. We +also know that, in studying the properties of a nerve-muscle-preparation, +we are not investigating “a +part” of natural behavior; because, physiologically, +its properties are not only simpler but also radically +different in some respects from what they would be if +the same nerve and muscle were contributing to normal +behavior. It is the <em>whole</em> organism, as some behaviorists +have rightly said, the behavior of which is +our subject-matter. But in the whole organism one +can seldom follow the change of one variable alone +as the consequence of one change in outer conditions. +The change of one factor usually involves concomitant +changes in a great many others and these affect +the first retroactively. Now, isolation of changes +and reduction of variables are the great artifices by +which the physicist makes exact measurement possible +in his simple systems. Since this procedure does +not work in our case, since we have to take the organism +more or less as it is, any kind of observation +that gives us an expression of its total attitude and +activity, of the integrated tendencies and states which +it undergoes, will be the right observation to begin +with. Such is typical behavior as we see (or hear) +it before us, changing, with the conditions we give +our subject, in innumerable phases, and much too +attractive to be already excluded for the sake of narrowing +<span class="pagenum" id="p46">[46]</span>ideals, taken prematurely from quite another +field of research.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>In the meantime, however, the outward aspect of +physics has been too seductive. Since experimental +psychology first became a science, every now and then +a wave of blind imitation has swept it off its feet. +Fechner himself was the first to copy <em>adult</em> physics +when psychology was an embryo. He seems to have +been convinced that measuring in itself would make +a science out of psychology. We have seen the result: +If flowers are impossible without a root and a +stem, measuring, which is fruitful only as the most +refined consequence of previous qualitative observation +and experimentation, necessarily becomes a dead +routine without it. Hundreds of thousands of quantitative +psychophysical experiments have been made +almost in vain, because no one knew just what he was +measuring or what were the processes upon which +the whole procedure was built. In Fechner’s own +day, however, psychology came into existence as a +science, not as a result of his psychophysics, but rather +casually and <em>in spite</em> of the premature quantitative +program.</p> + +<p>The lesson seems to have been forgotten, however. +Sometimes, when viewing the admirable energy with +which “intelligence” is tested quantitatively by hundreds +of able psychologists, one is almost reminded +of Fechner’s time. In this case, it is true, there seems +to be a positive result for practical purposes at least. +<span class="pagenum" id="p47">[47]</span>Apparently something like a crude total ability for +certain achievements is measured by those tests which +have been invented and applied since Binet and +Simon. And since the test-scores show a rather satisfactory +correlation with certain general abilities in +study or other work of subsequent life, we have in +these tests a first approach towards a practical prognosis. +Still there is a grave danger in this very success. +Do we know or do we learn by those tests what +processes and factors, which are masked by the gross +scores, coöperate in the test performance? We do +not know, nor do we learn much, concerning these +factors. Figuratively speaking, a given total score +may mean: degree 3 of “intelligence,” together with +degree 1 of “accuracy,” with degree 4 of “ambition” +and degree 3 of “quickness of fatigue,” or it may +mean “intelligence” 6, “accuracy” 2, “ambition” 1, +and “quickness of fatigue” 4,—and so forth.⁠<a id="FNanchor_5_5" href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Quite +a number of different factors may combine in various +proportions in order to give the same I.Q. And +that fact matters, even for practical purposes. In the +educational situation a teacher should treat the child +according to the actual nature and strength of the +various factors constituting the total I.Q. of a given +child. This is not a new criticism, of course, but it +must be repeated for the sake of science. We seem +<span class="pagenum" id="p48">[48]</span>to be too well satisfied sometimes by our testing enterprise +because it is a quantitative procedure, and as +such it appeals to us as thoroughly scientific. This is +superficial, however. If we compare the nature of +testing with the main traits of our ideal, viz., the +procedure of physics, we find a difference which may +be decisive. What does the physicist ask when he must +face a new field of research? In such cases his +questions have been: Is light an oscillatory process? +If it is, does it oscillate in the direction of propagation +or vertically to it? Is magnetism produced by +the magnetic fields of elementary currents in molecular +structures? Why does surface tension produce +<em>regular</em> forms of liquids and liquid films? How can +the spectrum of one element contain thousands of different +lines? This is the type of question with which +we find the physicist occupied. They are his fundamental +problems, in the treatment of which quantitative +work appears at definite stages as an aid toward +the solution, eventuating finally in the determination +of laws, but directed and governed throughout by +those questions about the <em>nature</em> of states and processes. +What are the phenomena? Are they of one +type or another? Such are the main problems of experimental +science, in the <em>service</em> of which we find +measurement. If now we ask ourselves what problems +about the processes underlying intelligent behavior +we are solving by our tests, not very many of +us will have an answer ready. But some will answer +<span class="pagenum" id="p49">[49]</span>that from now on, intelligence shall be defined as the +X which is measured by those tests and that measuring +is more scientific than grubbing among the unknown +functions of the nervous system. The fact is +that we are not in the habit of asking questions about +underlying processes in psychology, questions similar +to those in which the whole interest of physicists +is centered. Instead of imitating the very kernel of +physics, we assume merely the outer, quantitative +form of exact science. Think of a physicist interested +in all types of motors who would restrict his +study of them to the following tests to be applied to +all the various types: measurement of their volume, +of temperature at their surface, of ionization of the +air in their neighborhood, of their actual frequency +of revolution, and of the total weight of the bodies; +who would calculate from these data an average +“power-coefficient” for each of them, define “power” +by the method, never ask a question about the working +process in their interior, and remain satisfied by +this quantitative procedure for many years. I know +I am exaggerating in some respects if I compare +intelligence testing with such an attitude. I do it +intentionally in order to call attention to the main +point, viz., that admiration for quantitative method +leads us almost exclusively to those research tasks +which immediately afford us an opportunity for +measurement. Given the natural narrowness of human +interest, the next consequence will be our failure +<span class="pagenum" id="p50">[50]</span>to see those problems which do not lend themselves +immediately to quantitative investigation, problems +which may be, however, the more essential and the +more scientific, in a deeper meaning of that word. +In such problems qualitative observation and experimentation +would constitute the first step; but since in +adult physics (as it appears from without) these +methods seem to be despised, we dare not undertake +these fundamental tasks. Wishing to be utterly +scientific, we may just miss those opportunities for +research which, in our stage as an immature science, +would be the most scientific of all. The nature and +the actual development of our problems should decide +about the methods to be followed. What actually +happens, however, is that an imposing method +blurs our view of the subject-matter. This method +then begins to decide what problems we shall see. I +do not object in principle to testing as a preliminary +mode of diagnosis and prognosis. But just as the engineer +learns from the investigations of processes in +physics, even practical diagnosis in applied psychology +will never go very far without an eager interest +in the inner nature of intelligent behavior. Eventually, +if all psychologists occupied with “intelligence” +are engineers in the field of testing, who shall +investigate the “physics” of intelligence, without +which we shall never have a true and sensible engineering?</p> + +<p>Occasionally, in animal psychology, the situation +<span class="pagenum" id="p51">[51]</span>has tended to become somewhat similar to that just +described. In experimentation on animals almost +the only quantitative method is statistical. We do +not measure in the proper meaning of that term, but +we count positive and negative cases at least. In +order to have cases which are comparable, and therefore +may be counted, we put our animals in situations +where their behavior is restricted to a few types of +reaction. These we count and the result of our experiments +is given in frequencies enumerating these +few possible alternative reactions. I do not criticize +the method as such; I have used it myself. But we +should never forget that, when used exclusively, it +may make our knowledge of behavior narrower. +With a given problem in mind we exclude a great +many behavior possibilities by our choice of experimental +conditions. We do not see them any more. +Some psychologists will at least observe the remaining +forms of behavior during the experiment as an +aid for the interpretation of quantitative results; but +others will not, because in their opinion what is not +quantitative cannot be scientific. In this case, what +is left of the material are abstract figures. Even then +the procedure may be valuable, if the experimenter +is one of those who always find new and productive +problems for experimentation. For most of us, however, +conservatism may become the consequence of +such an attitude, since, admiring figures and curves, +<span class="pagenum" id="p52">[52]</span>we keep away from the true source of new ideas and +new problems in our youthful science: i.e., from a +broad outlook upon our subject-matter.</p> + +<p>Once more I venture to defend broad and qualitative +information as a necessary supplement to quantitative +work. Otherwise behavioristic psychology +might become as sterile as supposedly it is exact. +Too great an interest in present quantitative methods +and in their standardization is not a hopeful response +to the fact that the development of psychology depends +upon the discovery of <em>new</em> methods and problems +in the future, and not upon the monotonous repetition +of a few standardized methods which fit only +our primitive problems. If the reader says that behavioristic +psychology does not need this advice, I +reply that Watson has been criticized because his +well-known observations on children were not made +in the sanctified form of quantitatively controlled experiments. +I do not think that those observations +give quite an adequate account of autochthonous +reactions and of learning in children; but, on the +other hand, they reveal more interesting facts than +we might have learnt from columns of abstract figures. +An eminent psychologist was friendly enough +to say a few approving words about my own work +on intelligent behavior in apes. Still, he added, you +have missed the main point by not applying the statistical +method. To my mind this means an inability +to see the problems which I had tried to treat in +<span class="pagenum" id="p53">[53]</span>a preliminary way. Those problems concerned the +characteristic forms of intelligent behavior in a special +type of animal, as influenced by various situations. +What may be valuable in those observations +would disappear in an abstract statistical treatment +of the “results.” Am I right then in warning against +a one-sided glorification of quantitative procedure +<em>as such</em>? Let us apply it, but not before we know by +qualitative analysis where to find good problems for +quantitative research.</p> + +<p>A certain broadmindedness and a clear appreciation +of our present predicament would be wholesome, +then, in the application of behavioristic methods. +There is more in a scientific method than +observing, experimenting and measuring. In physics, +at least, observing and measuring usually result +from definite questions, and these questions are preliminary +forms of hypotheses concerning unknown +properties of nature. Observed but enigmatic aspects +of nature may be deduced and explained from assumptions +about unknown parts of it. Taken as such, +however, an assumption is not what the physicist +wants. Fortunately, a concrete assumption made in +order to explain certain observations will always lead +to consequences other than those facts for which it +was made. These new consequences are to be tested +in further observation and experimentation. What +is the hidden basis of electrolytical conduction? Arrhenius +makes the hypothesis of molecules being +<span class="pagenum" id="p54">[54]</span>dissociated into independent ions. By their charge +conduction is explained. But from their assumed independence +definite conclusions are to be drawn +about the optical properties of the electrolyte. These +are tested in new experiments. Thus, productive +method contains a bold hypothesis as essentially as +it requires adequate observation, and the growth of +physics is a constant oscillation from the first to the +second and vice versa.</p> + +<p>In behavioristic psychology we cannot complain +about a lack of unknown parts of the organic systems +we study to which to apply productive hypotheses. +We know a little about the elementary effects of +stimulation upon the sense organs of our subjects; +we observe their responsive behavior when it becomes +overt. But between the two terms of the +sensori-motor circuit there is more <i lang="la">terra incognita</i> +than was on the map of Africa sixty years ago. If +behavior is to be understood as depending upon inner +organization as well as outer conditions, we must try +to imagine the modes and traits of these inner processes, +which are either started from without by environmental +stimulation or aroused intra-organically +by inner dynamics. For those who know the history +of physics and wish to emulate it intelligently in psychology, +this task of finding productive assumptions +about the hidden parts of behavior will probably +appear the most important of all. The whole future +development of psychology depends upon it. Here +<span class="pagenum" id="p55">[55]</span>all the creative force of behaviorism ought to be concentrated +in a fine emulation of physics. Behaviorism’s +critical attitude toward introspection and direct +experience is an absolutely negative feature of the +movement, at a time when <em>positive</em> ideas are needed. +If I feel a little disappointed by the work of behaviorism, +the reason is not so much a certain innocence +in its treatment of direct experience and in its imitation +of adult physics, but its astounding sterility in +the development of productive concepts about functions +underlying observable behavior. As an imitation +of physics it is scarcely a satisfactory achievement +for the behaviorist to have taken the old concept +of reflex action from physiology (including the reflexes +of inner secretion) and to give us no further +comprehension into the formation of new individual +behavior than is offered by his concepts of positive +and negative “conditioning.” Why should behaviorism +be so utterly negativistic in its characteristic statements? +“Thou shalt not acknowledge direct experience +in science” is the first commandment and “Thou +shalt not conceive of other functions but reflexes and +conditioned reflexes” is the second. I do not see how +the behaviorist can reconcile this creed with our actual +knowledge of organic processes and of behavior. +Nor do I understand why, from the standpoint +of “exactness,” the organism should be conceived as +such a crude and poor affair. In its effort to imitate +the technical procedure of physics, behaviorism often +<span class="pagenum" id="p56">[56]</span>shows a stubborn narrowness; the same attitude becomes +quite striking in the exclusion of all but two +types of processes from its assumptions about the +inner side of behavior. What a strange conservatism +and dogmatism in a revolutionary school! Even now, +as an adult science, physics is allowed to have at least +one new idea about the atom every year. Though +<em>our</em> science is so very young, most behaviorists do +not even dream of any possible change in the nature +of their two fundamental ideas. The truth was revealed +to them in its perfection at the birth of behavioristic +psychology.</p> + +<p>The two behavioristic concepts in question show +one remarkable property: If you compare them with +various types of processes in the inorganic world of +the physicist, you will find that even simple physical +systems are by far richer in the variety of their kinds +of function than is the nervous system of man in the +eyes of a radical behaviorist. A soap-bubble does +not show us reflexes, it is true; therefore we cannot +expect to find conditioned reflexes in it. Nevertheless +those functional properties which the soap-bubble +does exhibit are decidedly superior in some respects +to the monotony of reflexes and conditioned +reflexes. The same thing holds for innumerable +structures in the inorganic world. Sometimes their +behavior will at once remind us of the behavior of organisms, +although they lack reflexes and conditioned +reflexes. However, by the standard of exactness as +<span class="pagenum" id="p57">[57]</span>the behaviorist understands it, it would be heresy to +follow this hint. His imitation of physics excludes +most of the functional possibilities given in physics +itself. In organisms there shall be nothing but reflexes. +Some members of the school even are beginning +to protest cautiously against this strange situation.</p> + +<p>It is not probable that an observer, looking upon +human and animal behavior without prejudices, +would find reflexes and conditioned reflexes as the +most natural, or as the only, types of function by +which his observations might be explained. For +those, however, who are deeply convinced that the +theory of original and acquired reflexes is the whole +truth about the nervous system, there is no real incentive +for the further observation of natural behavior, +since they do not feel the need of any new +information or new functional concepts. On the +other hand, the restriction of observation to counting +the frequency of the few reactions retained in standard +experiments will protect those conservative concepts; +and so one narrowness keeps the other alive.</p> + +<p>But even with a more impartial interest in all the +various forms of behavior, how shall we find more +productive concepts, if the gap between the observable +stimulating environment and observable overt +responses is as large as we find it in the present stage +of physiology? Of course we shall use whatever hint +may be given by nerve physiology and endocrinology. +<span class="pagenum" id="p58">[58]</span>But even the more recent discoveries about the all +or none law and the metabolism in nervous activity +do not give us just that basis which we need for our +purposes. In such a situation anything will be valuable +upon which we may base a working hypothesis. +In a critical predicament even a stone or a chair may +become a weapon, though the strategist would despise +it in exact warfare. There is no serious danger in +developing a working hypothesis upon a somewhat +wavering ground, since, in empirical science, such an +assumption will be tested and continually corrected +in further observation and experimentation. Either +it serves as a path toward new explorations, its consequences +being verified by success, or it is shown to +lead us the wrong way. In the first case no one will +have scruples about the previous legitimation of its +birth; in the second, we shall discard it as soon as +observed facts are against it, or as soon as we find it +bare of real productive power.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>The basis upon which I propose to build a working +hypothesis has much in its favor. In some respects +it is just as solid as objective observation is in +behavioristic psychology, and in others, it is certainly +not insecure enough to raise serious doubts.</p> + +<p>In an experiment in behavioristic psychology the +“direct experience” of the subject does not play any +rôle. If he has such experience I as experimenter +do not assume that it has the slightest influence upon +<span class="pagenum" id="p59">[59]</span>the course of the physiological events. My assumptions +about those events must be able to explain thoroughly +the overt behavior of the physical organism +of the subject. Direct experience is not a “force” +interfering with the chain of physical causation. +(The opposite hypothesis is made by dualists. But I +do not think that it, on the other hand, is productive, +or that it illuminates the innermost nature of things.)</p> + +<p>I cannot exclude <em>my own</em> direct experience in observing +behavior, as I cannot avoid dealing with +direct experience even when employing the most +“indirect” methods of physics. Moreover in behavioristic +psychology I have to use objective experience +in a great variety of forms which no longer are +material for observation in adult physics. If I can +rely upon objective experience for my statements +about the behavior of the subject I observe objectively +in a behavioristic experiment, why should I +hesitate to utilize it to develop a working hypothesis +in the following manner?</p> + +<p>Suppose I am used as a subject in a behavioristic +experiment. With me as a subject, behavioristic research +would have the same difficulty in developing +a working hypothesis about the hidden processes underlying +my behavior. But in this case I can help +to build a bridge over the “large gap” mentioned +above. During much of my own behavior I have +direct experience. Now there is no doubt that this +experience depends upon some of those processes +<span class="pagenum" id="p60">[60]</span>about which we wish to formulate a working hypothesis. +It is more than probable that, under these +circumstances, I may use my direct experience in order +to guess about these processes. It is granted that +direct experience does not accompany <em>all</em> the unobservable +events which produce the behavior observable +from without; hence the hypothesis I am about +to offer has a limited application. But in our crucial +situation we have not much to choose. Confident as +we are of further help from physiology, we are so +utterly in the dark at present that it would be pure +folly not to profit by any help that we can get for +our work.</p> + +<p>Let me declare that I do not propose to “introspect” +in the technical meaning of the word. The +same kind of simple and naïve statements about experience +which I make as an observer of other people, +of animals, of instruments and so forth, shall now +be used for another purpose. Objective experience +depends upon physical events outside my organism +and upon physiological events <em>in</em> it concurrently. As +depending upon physical events <em>outside</em> my organism, +objective experience leads to the construction of +the surrounding physical world; as depending upon +physiological events <em>in</em> my organism, it gives me +hints about these processes. <em>There is no reason at all +why the construction of physiological processes directly +underlying experience should be impossible, +if experience allows us the construction of a physical +<span class="pagenum" id="p61">[61]</span>world outside, which is related to it much less intimately.</em></p> + +<p>Obviously, I must have some leading principle in +making my inferences from given properties of direct +experience to the properties of concomitant +physiological processes. In a more special form +such a principle was established by Hering many +years ago. Its content is the following: My various +experiences can be ordered systematically according +to the sorts and degrees of similarity found between +them, exactly as animals are ordered in zoölogy and +plants in botany. The processes upon which these +experiences depend are not known directly; but if I +knew their properties, I should be able to order them +as systematically according to similarities as I do +order the experiences actually. It is possible to +imagine a great many different relationships between +the two systematic orders, that of experiences and that +of physiological processes. But I should have ever +so much difficulty in trying to relate definite experiences +to definite processes so long as I failed to assume +one specific relationship between the two orders, +viz., that of <em>congruence or isomorphism in their systematic +properties</em>. This principle is sometimes formulated +more explicitly in a number of “psychophysical +axioms.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_6_6" href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Here it will suffice to give some +examples of its application.</p> + +<p>A sound of given qualitative properties is produced +<span class="pagenum" id="p62">[62]</span>in various degrees of experienced intensity or +loudness. The systematic order of all these different +experienced intensities may be represented by a +straight line, which means that, following that order, +we have the impression of moving continually in the +same direction. What may correspond to loudnesses +in the underlying processes? The principle +decides that whatever the concrete nature of these +processes, the physiological fundaments of all the +experienced degrees of loudness must show the same +order as these show themselves, i.e., that of a straight +line. More especially: if a definite loudness is situated +between two other loudnesses in the systematic +order of experiences, the process corresponding to +the first shall be between the processes corresponding +to the two others in the order of underlying physiological +events. That gives the congruence or isomorphism +between the two systems, which I mentioned +above.</p> + +<blockquote> +<p>At the present time the all-or-none law does not +allow us to choose “intensity of nervous activity” as a +physiological correlate of experienced degrees of +loudness. But our principle could be equally well +applied if frequency or density (number) of elementary +currents were taken as the correlate of +loudness.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>As another example, colors in their relation to +underlying processes have been considered so thoroughly +by G. E. Müller,⁠<a id="FNanchor_7_7" href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> that there is no need of +<span class="pagenum" id="p63">[63]</span>repeating his theory here. In some respects his +assumptions go far beyond the principle we are discussing +here, insofar as he draws conclusions about +the <em>retinal</em> processes, whereas the principle <em>as such</em> +applies only to the processes underlying visual experience +directly. In his hypothesis it also happens +that these processes are chemical reactions. Such a +transgression of the principle is perfectly sound, +however, and shows the productive force of it. If +there is congruence between the system of color experiences +and that of underlying processes, not all +kinds of physical events will appear fit to give a +system of so much variety (of so many “dimensions”) +as the system of colors is found to possess. +Chemical reactions may easily be the only type of +event which can be taken into consideration here. +So the principle of systematic congruence serves to +restrict the number of those physical processes which +we may draw upon in developing the concrete hypothesis +about the “large gap.”</p> + +<p>On the other hand, we have begun to apply the +principle itself in a much more general, and at the +same time much more concrete, form than either +Hering or Müller would have done. As used by +these authors it is based upon the <em>logical</em> order in +which we arrange certain experiences after abstracting +them from their context and judging about their +similarities. It attributes a congruent logical order +to the underlying processes, similarly abstracted +<span class="pagenum" id="p64">[64]</span>from their dynamic context like dead specimens in a +museum. But what about the real concrete order of +experiences, which itself is experienced? At this +moment I have before me three white points on a +black surface, one in the middle of the field and the +others in symmetrical positions on both sides of the +center one. This is an order again; not an abstract, +logical order, however, but a concrete, experienced +order. As experienced it depends upon physiological +processes in my organism, so that some feature +of a physiological function must correspond to it. +And applied to this concrete order our principle says +that correlated with the visually experienced symmetry +there is an homologous symmetry of dynamic +context in the underlying processes. Or, in the same +example: one point is seen <em>between</em> the others, this +relation being experienced exactly as the white of +the point is. Again in the underlying processes there +must be something functional which corresponds to +that “between.” Applied to the <em>concrete</em> order our +principle claims that the experienced “between” is +accompanied by a functional “between” in the concrete +dynamic context of concurrent physiological +events. If the principle is applied strictly in this +manner to <em>all</em> cases of spatial order in experience, it +will lead to the general statement that <em>all experienced +order in space is a true representation of a corresponding +order in the underlying dynamical context +of physiological processes</em>.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p65">[65]</span></p> + +<p>This is a bold hypothesis. It has far-reaching +consequences, if it is taken seriously enough. Its significance +will become clearer in the following chapters +where we shall also discuss some misinterpretations +which may easily arise. For the present I will +offer another application of the same principle. The +temporal position of one experience as “between” +two others is frequently experienced, in the same way +that spatial “betweenness” is. Now as far as it is +experienced, time must have a functional correlate +in underlying physiological processes no less than experienced +space. Again, then, the temporal “between” +is correlated with a functional “between” in +the concrete dynamic context of physiological events. +And if, in this manner, we apply the principle +throughout, we will arrive at the proposition that +<em>experienced order in time is a true representation +of the corresponding concrete order in the underlying +dynamical context</em>.</p> + +<p>Both temporal and spatial orders do not exhaust +the field of application of this principle. <em>More</em> +order is experienced than that of space and time. +Certain experiences “belong together” in a concrete +manner, whereas others do not, or, at least, belong +together less intimately. And again this “belonging +together” may be itself experienced. The very moment +I form this sentence of my manuscript, a shrill, +disagreeable voice begins to sing in the neighbor’s +house. The context of my sentence is something +<span class="pagenum" id="p66">[66]</span>which, though extended in time, is experienced as +belonging together, whereas those sharp notes are +experienced as something foreign, as not belonging +to that context, though they are experienced <em>at the +same time</em>. In this case our principle applied formulates +the proposition that <em>to a context, experienced +as “one thing” belonging together, there corresponds +a dynamical unit or whole in the underlying +physiological processes</em>. In this respect again, the +order of experience is a true representation of a corresponding +functional order in the processes upon +which it depends. Perhaps it is this last application +of the principle which has the greatest importance +for gestalt psychology. In this form, at least, it becomes +a radical physiological hypothesis about common +sensory experiences as well as about the more +subtle and complicated processes involved in observable +behavior.</p> + +<p>In the last case I have taken an example from outside +the realm of <em>objective</em> experience in the more +restricted meaning of this term. A sentence I may +be forming is not a part of objective experience, as +is the chair before me. Still my statement about that +experience is no less simple and obvious than were +earlier ones about spatial or temporal orders. I +admit that this is not always so, however. I do not +wish to recommend the observation of <em>subjective</em> experience +for our purposes without some limitation; +as yet it looks as though only very simple statements +<span class="pagenum" id="p67">[67]</span>about one’s own <em>subjective</em> experience can be made +with a high degree of certainty. Moreover, we have +enough cases of objective experience to provide an +adequate basis for developing a working hypothesis.</p> + +<p>In the last paragraphs my own direct experience +was taken as a basis for constructing a general working +hypothesis about the relation between experience +and unobservable constituents of behavior. The only +way in which I can bring my observations in that +field of direct experience before the scientific public +is through spoken or written language, which, as I +understand it, refers to my direct experience. However, +in terms of the position already taken in this +chapter, all language as a series of physiological +events is the peripheral outcome of other purely +physiological processes in my organism, particularly +of those upon which my direct experience depends. +My general hypothesis states that the concrete order +of actual experience is a true representation of the +dynamic order of corresponding physiological processes. +Therefore, <em>if, to me, my language is an adequate +“symbol” for my own direct experience, it is an +objective symbol for those physiological processes at +the same time</em>. We may also conclude, then, that it +does not matter very much whether I take it as a +symbol for one or the other, since in the respects in +which they correspond, there is no difference between +them.</p> + +<p>If I now go back to behavioristic psychology I +<span class="pagenum" id="p68">[68]</span>have to deal with language as one form of behavior +observed in my subjects. There is no reason now +why I should not take language as a symbol, since +only the most superficial view would treat it merely +as a phonetical event. The behaviorist himself, +when listening to a scientific argument, will find himself +reacting not to the phonetical properties of +speech, but to its symbolic meaning: he will react in +the same way practically to the nouns “experiment” +and “<i lang="de">Versuch</i>,” to “animal” and “<i lang="de">Tier</i>,” though in +each case the first and second words are utterly different +phonetically. Why should we change that attitude +when the other person is called a “subject,” +and talks during an experiment?</p> + +<p>The language of my subject may be taken either +as indicative of direct experience in my subject or of +those processes which underlie his direct experience. +If the subject says, “This book is bigger than that,” +his words may be interpreted as stating a definite +direct “comparison-experience” which he is having +or the corresponding dynamic relationship in his +physiological process. Since, for my hypothesis the +same “order” is meant in both cases, the alternative +is not important. From the viewpoint of behavioristic +psychology the physiological interpretation is necessary, +but the other meaning is not excluded. This +second interpretation is kept distinct from the causal +explanation of observable behavior, but if it is suggested +by the words of the subject, it can do no harm. +<span class="pagenum" id="p69">[69]</span>The behavior of a chick can tell me without words +that he is able to react to one brightness in its <em>relation</em> +to another.⁠<a id="FNanchor_8_8" href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> If in the course of an experiment, a +human subject tells me that he sees one object as +brighter than the other, the scientific value of this +sentence is exactly the same as that of the chick’s behavior, +whether I assume direct experience in the +human subject or not. Why then should I decline +to accept language as one of the nicest and most instructive +forms of behavior? Of course, we can obtain +the same results in man as in the chick, without +language, by applying the somewhat clumsy, statistical +methods of animal psychology, and some behaviorists +seem to prefer such a procedure. The +only reason I can see for this attitude is historical. +Introspectionists have used the “verbal report” in +“introspection”; and I am ready to admit that their +method was something like a blind alley. But, as +is usually the case in such a situation, behaviorists +have become negatively conditioned to much more +than the “harmful stimulus” alone, so that they shy +away not only from introspection but also from all +things once connected with it, and primarily from +language, though it is in itself utterly innocent.</p> + + +<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h3> + +<blockquote> +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Die Methoden der psychologischen Forschung +beim Affen</cite>. Abderhaldens Handbuch der biologischen +Arbeitsmethoden VI, D. 1921.</p> +</blockquote> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p70">[70]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="III"> + III + <br> + <i>The Viewpoint of Introspection</i> + </h2> +</div> + +<blockquote> +<p>Round about the accredited and orderly facts +of every science there ever floats a sort of dust-cloud +of exceptional observations.</p> + +<p class="right"> + <span class="smcap">W. James</span>, <cite>The Will to Believe</cite>. +</p> +</blockquote> + + +<p>WILLIAM JAMES has well described how a +vivid interest in the “irregular phenomena” +of the “dust-cloud” will often mark the beginning +of a new productive era in a science. At such times, +what has been exceptional, and a part of the dust-cloud, +may suddenly become the very center of scientific +work. We shall see presently that introspection +has developed a procedure by which an orderly +though artificial system of psychology is <em>protected</em> +against a similar revolution, a procedure in which +the most interesting observations are continually +exiled into the dust-cloud.</p> + +<p>In referring to introspection I am not considering +any special school, but all those psychologists who +treat direct experience in the manner now to be discussed.</p> + +<p>For the most part introspectionists will agree with +what has been said about behaviorism in the first +chapters; some, indeed, will have recognized their +own arguments in parts of my criticism. Wherein +<span class="pagenum" id="p71">[71]</span>lies the difference then between introspectionism and +my position? This difference, I promise, will become +startlingly clear as soon as we discuss the observation +of direct experience. Since <em>objective</em> experience +is so much more legitimated by its use in +physics and behavioristic psychology, we shall first +examine the treatment of it by introspectionists, with +the result that, for all practical or concrete purposes, +introspectionism will be found to be astonishingly +similar to behaviorism.</p> + +<p>The very moment we begin to move naïvely in the +field of direct experience, protests will arise on all +sides. If I say that I see a book before me on my +desk, I shall be criticized because nobody can <em>see</em> a +“book.” Lifting the book between my fingers, I am +inclined to say that I feel the weight, external to my +fingers and roughly in that place where the book is +also seen. This, a critic would remark, is an excellent +example of a typical statement by an untrained +observer, quite satisfactory, it is true, for the practical +purposes of common life, but altogether different +from the kind of description given by a trained psychologist. +Even the character of being an “object,” +or “thing,” which I have tacitly attributed to the experiences +I have called “book” and “desk,” is improper +in correct psychological description. If observation +is to give us simple and genuine data as +the elements of psychology, we must learn to make +the all-important distinction between <em>sensation</em> and +<span class="pagenum" id="p72">[72]</span><em>perception</em>, between the bare sensory material actually +given to us and the host of other items which +since early childhood have become associated with +it. You cannot see a “book,” I am told, since this +term involves some knowledge about a class of objects +to which this specimen belongs, and about their +use, etc., whereas in pure seeing such knowledge cannot +enter. As psychologists our task is to separate +all these “meanings” from the seen material <em>as such</em>, +the manifold of simple sensations. It may be a difficult +task to effect this separation, and to behold the +net sensations which are the actual data; but the +ability to do so is precisely the special talent which +transforms the layman into a psychologist. It ought +to be evident that originally, when we lift a book, +we do not have the experience of a weight external +to our fingers in space. At first there are mere sensations +of touch, and perhaps strain, in our fingers, +whereas that “weight outside” has been connected +with them in a long history and through the influence +of other factors than those of pure sensation in our +hand. A similar consideration will show us easily +that genuine sensory data cannot present “objects.” +“Objects” cannot exist for us before sensory experience +has become imbued with meaning. Who can +deny that meaning fundamentally determines almost +all experience? Does it not finally lead to a kind +of illusion? The German noun “<i lang="de">Igel</i>” sounds to +Germans as though no other animal but a hedgehog +<span class="pagenum" id="p73">[73]</span>could have this name. “Eagle” however, which in +English is acoustically the same as “<i lang="de">Igel</i>” is in German, +sounds to an American as though only an +“<i lang="de">Adler</i>”⁠<a id="FNanchor_9_9" href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> could be called by this name. Here it is +obvious that we have to discriminate between a genuine +sensory experience, which is the same in both languages, +and two different meanings connected with it +in different countries. Again, the symbol + <em>looks</em> +like the sign for addition, especially if you see it between +numbers; but it might as well have been chosen +as a symbol for division. If we feel at first a disinclination +to accept the last statement, the only reason +for it consists in just that sort of complexion +which meaning, since we were children in school, +has given to the innocent symbol. As soon as we +realize how strong this influence is, we have to admit +that probably <em>nothing</em> in the naïve experience of a +normal adult can be free from it. Even the most +lively characteristic of an experience we may try +to describe, may be a property of that experience +only in this acquired or accidental way.</p> + +<p>Meaning depends upon personal biography; it has +a highly complicated origin and represents a somewhat +accidental trait of our material. Therefore we +must get rid of it and learn to approach actual sensations +in such a way that their qualities and laws +may be discovered in their pure form. This procedure +is called “introspection.”</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p74">[74]</span></p> + +<p>Probably all psychologists who are teaching at the +present time have learned this lesson thoroughly, +though many perhaps implicitly and not as a well-formulated +program. Its basis seems justified; its +content seems sound scientifically. Therefore, if introspection +is possible and can lead us to actual sense +data, we should be inclined to follow in its footsteps. +Direct experience as such, it is true, will not be +worth so very much under these circumstances. Of +all <em>objective</em> experience, at most only the part +cleansed and selected by introspection will become +the subject-matter of our study.</p> + +<p>However, we should not form a definite judgment +before knowing more about the criteria for the selection +of some experiences as the genuine ones and the +exclusion of those other parts of experience which +are assigned to the influence of meaning. Let us +consider a few more examples, then, which exhibit +other properties than those to be found in the cases +already mentioned.</p> + +<p>Do you see that man on the street approaching us +at an even gait? Now he is ten yards away, and presently +five. What do you say about his size at the two +distances? That five yards away it was practically +the same as ten yards off? But that is impossible! +A simple consideration of geometrical optics will tell +you that during the man’s approach his height must +have doubled and his breadth too, so that his total +size must have become four times the amount it was +<span class="pagenum" id="p75">[75]</span>at ten yards. We transfer the observation from the +street into the laboratory. Here I have two cardboard +rectangles. The sides of the first have a length +of two and three inches, those of the second are six +and nine. If now I hold the first before you at a +distance of one yard and the second at three yards, +you will admit that, optically, they must have the +same size approximately, since their linear dimensions +vary exactly as do their distances. But you tell +me that the further rectangle appears much larger +to you than the nearer one? There you have it! +Yours cannot be a statement about actual sensory experience. +A slight change of conditions will make +you realize that my opinion is right. Look through +the opening of this screen, which will show you the +two rectangles on a homogeneous background, but no +more of their surroundings. Do they look different +now? Still a little. Then we shall be even more +cautious. I darken the room; then I turn the light +on, allowing you to make your observation through +the screen, only for a small fraction of a second, so +that practically no eye-movements can occur during +that time. Now both rectangles have the same size, +do they not? After some practice you will be able, +perhaps, to see them as equally large even without +the help of my screen and the short exposure, as soon +as you look upon them in the proper way—which is +the method of introspection for obtaining pure sensory +experience. If you do not accept my demonstration, +<span class="pagenum" id="p76">[76]</span>you might even go so far as to believe that +the after-image of an object changes its size according +to the distance from which you “project” it upon +a screen, because in untrained observation it certainly +seems to change considerably, according to the distance +of your fixation point. But that is absurd. +How could it really change, if the area of the retinal +after-effect remain constant?</p> + +<p>My second example may be regarded as a natural +consequence of the first. When dining with your +friends, what forms do the plates have in your experience, +those to the left, to the right, and opposite +you? They are circular, you say, as is your own +plate? Impossible again! They must be elliptical, +as you will admit after you have once thought about +their projection upon your retina; some of them must +even be very flat ellipses, and even your own plate +will become an ellipse as soon as your eye does not +look down upon it vertically. It will be worth while +to apply to this case a procedure similar to the one +we used in the first example. On this plane which, +as you see, is oblique to the direction of your eye I +fix a circle; on this other plane, at right angles to the +direction of your eye, I fix an ellipse, whose shape is +chosen in such a manner that from its place it is projected +upon your retina in the same form as the circle +is from its oblique plane. Though you describe +the first as a circle and the second as an ellipse, they +are two almost identical ellipses in actual sensory +<span class="pagenum" id="p77">[77]</span>experience. Take this screen with two holes in it, +which lets you see both forms, but excludes, however, +the data by which the angles of the planes became +known to you at first. Both forms look alike +now? All right. After a short while you will be +able to see correctly without the screen, providing +you adopt the attitude of introspection. Once more, +the corresponding observation on an after-image of a +given form, “projected” upon planes of different +oblique positions with respect to your line of vision, +will elucidate the case completely. Its form seems +to vary according to the positions of the plane, +though the retinal after-effect has the same form +throughout. This being absurd, you see the importance +of observing genuine sensory experience by +way of introspection.</p> + +<p>A similar paradox has been much discussed since +Helmholtz wrote his <cite lang="de">Physiologische Optik</cite>. Here +on this desk near the window, and parallel to it, a +vertical screen is fastened. On the window side of +the screen I place a black paper on the desk, and in +the shadow of the screen, a white paper. These papers +are selected in a special manner: the dark one +exposed to the direct illumination from the window +reflects the same amount of light as the white paper +reflects under its low intensity of illumination. You +call the first one “black” and the second “white”? +Then again you have experiences which are not to +be trusted, because under these circumstances the +<span class="pagenum" id="p78">[78]</span>images projected upon your retina are both of them +equally intense. So the sensations, i.e., brightnesses, +of both must also be the same. Moreover this can +be demonstrated. Take this piece of gray cardboard +and look through the two holes in it so that one of +them is filled by a section of the “black,” and the +other by a section of the “white” paper. Now, as +the surroundings of the papers are excluded from +vision, and thus you have pure sensations before you, +their approximate equality is obvious. Again, with +a little practice—most painters observe objects this +way—you will be able, without the cardboard, to +destroy the illusion of their difference—just by looking +at the papers in the attitude of introspection.</p> + +<p>All these observations are of an illusory sort, then, +the purification of which exhibits the true sensory +facts. In this and other respects they are comparable +to a great many well-known “optical illusions,” +the diagrams of which fill many pages in our +textbooks. Take the famous Müller-Lyer figures! +When you observe them often and try to pick the +main line out of its surroundings, you will find the +illusion become unstable, and finally it may even disappear. +It was not, then, a true sensory fact. The +same thing may be shown in another manner. Accurately +draw the two figures, one above the other. +If now you fix your attention carefully upon the two +left ends of the two main lines, you will find the one +vertically above the other. Repeating the same observation +<span class="pagenum" id="p79">[79]</span>with the right ends, you find the same result. +It follows that both lines have the same +length.⁠<a id="FNanchor_10_10" href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Similarly you will find all the other illusions +variable, according to the attitude of the observer, +and avoidable by practice. Therefore they +cannot be classed as genuine sensory experience.</p> + +<p>Recently, stroboscopic movement has been investigated +by some German and American psychologists. +Under appropriate conditions successive stimulation +by two lights at two points not too distant from each +other produces an experience of movement from the +first to the second. But if in making your observation +in the attitude of introspection, you find nothing but +a “gray flash,” must we not be very careful, indeed, +before accepting the report of “movement”? Did +not the observers of Benussi⁠<a id="FNanchor_11_11" href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> report similar experiences +when their skin was touched successively at two +different points? But in their description the movement +did not usually occur upon the skin; it formed a +curve through empty space touching the skin only at +those points. Evidently, such an experience cannot +belong to the world of touch alone; it is no genuine +sensory fact, then.</p> + +<p>If all these are examples of illusions which, for +psychological purposes, have to be corrected by introspection, +something must transform pure sensory experience +so that for untrained people it assumes an +<span class="pagenum" id="p80">[80]</span>illusory character. This is the case indeed, and in +most of our examples we can discover that “something” +easily enough.</p> + +<p>The man approaching us on the street does not +grow larger, as for simple optical reasons he should. +The circle observed on the oblique plane does not +become an ellipse; it seems to remain a circle after +its retinal image has become a very flat ellipse. The +white object in the shadow remains white, the black +paper remains black in full light, though the first +may reflect much less light than the second. These +three examples have one common property: the +physical object <em>as such</em> remaining constant, while +actual stimulation varies according to more or less +accidental conditions (of distance, of position, of +illumination), our experience agrees with the constancy +of the physical object much better than with +the varying stimulation produced by it. From this +fact we draw the simple conclusion that all such +apparent constancy in experience is the product of +<em>learning</em>. Since our early childhood we have +observed that a distant object is much bigger, +“really,” when we come near to it. In the same way +we have learnt that an object situated obliquely in +relation to our glance has quite another “real” form +when we look at it vertically. Again in the same +manner we have observed that an object which we +see under abnormal conditions of illumination will +show quite another “real” brightness or darkness as +<span class="pagenum" id="p81">[81]</span>soon as conditions become normal. As these observations +have been repeated millions of times, our knowledge +of the “real” size, the “real” form, the “real” +brightness, has become so intimately connected with +what we see, that with time we seem to <em>see</em> those +constant “real” properties instead of the ever changing +ones corresponding to varying stimulation. In +short, those facts, though strange at first, are explained +by <em>meaning</em>, and then completely fit into our +scientific system.</p> + +<p>We have already seen that probably no experience +escapes from the influence of meaning. Hence we +do not here introduce a new hypothesis. If untrained +people seem to “see” what from this viewpoint is a +product only of past learning, that again is an illusion, +to be found generally wherever we discover the +indirect origin of the experience. Remember the +symbol +, which <em>looks</em> like the sign for addition. +Furthermore, meaning as an after-effect of past +observations must be <em>reproduced</em> and reproduction +presupposes reproducing factors in the actual situation. +Obviously, then, if we do not see the distances, +the oblique positions and the degrees of illumination, +no reproduction of the “normal” size, form and +brightness will be possible. It is precisely this which +happens when the given objects are observed through +holes in a screen: since, under these conditions, the +surroundings of the objects and, with them, their +<em>actual</em> distance, position and illumination are excluded +<span class="pagenum" id="p82">[82]</span>from vision, corresponding reproductions are +made impossible. The objects must now be experienced +exactly as, in pure sensation, they have been +the whole time. The same proof is given by introspection. +In our terms this procedure means an +isolation of local size, form and brightness from their +context in an actual situation. Thus it separates +them from the factors determining the reproduction +of “meanings,” and under these conditions of isolation +the effect is that of pure sensation determined by +the actual stimulation.</p> + +<p>If in the case of size and form, after-images show +a surprising variation with the relative distance and +position of the background, this also is a direct consequence +of our explanation. After-images are localized +upon the background. If the distance and the +position of this background operate as factors of reproduction, +as in the previous case, the same after-image +will take on a great many apparently different +sizes and forms, relative to the changes of the background +in distance and position.</p> + +<p>Finally, in terms of our explanation we can understand +why, under extreme conditions, there is no +“constancy of size,” etc. Ten yards away a man is +scarcely smaller than at a distance of five yards; but +fifty yards off he looks smaller, and 1,000 yards away +he usually becomes a tiny object, indeed. During +most of our life we are interested in objects rather +near to us; so we learn little about things far off and +<span class="pagenum" id="p83">[83]</span>the consequence is that with increasing distance the +relation between the true sensory experience and +the meaning changes, to the advantage of the former. +In all these arguments there is great persuasive +force and cogency. Most psychologists do not for a +moment doubt the truth of the explanation in terms +of “meaning.” It also seems to correspond to a very +natural tendency in human thinking. Physicists who +have never studied psychology will tend to give the +same explanation, as soon as they become acquainted +with the facts we are considering. And if you demonstrate +the phenomena to a freshman, he will give +the “meaning theory” at once.</p> + +<p>The importance of this theory is not less considerable +on this account. There is practically no field of +vision which does not exhibit some of the facts we are +discussing. When we open our eyes we behold sizes, +forms and brightnesses, and, of these appearances, +only a very few will be exempted from the verdict +which, from the viewpoint of introspection, must be +imposed upon them. The facts themselves are not +exceptional; only the demonstration of their surprising +deviation from what one should expect them to +be is something unusual. This demonstration is a +matter of psychological, one might almost say, of +laboratory, sophistication; the facts themselves are +affairs of every moment and of everybody.</p> + +<p>Though the extent of objective experience which +shall not be trusted thus increases in scope, we have +<span class="pagenum" id="p84">[84]</span>not yet reached its limits. The simple localization +of objects manifests similar properties. Looking +at a point before me I see the objects around it in +different places, corresponding to the different places +which their images occupy on my retina. If I now +fixate another point, the same objects ought to appear +in other places according to the new positions of their +retinal images. But actually the objects do not seem +to have moved. Their localization in space is again +relatively independent of retinal position. Or take +the speed of seen movement: the same physical movement +may be seen from many different distances. +When I am ten yards away from the moving object, +retinal speed will be one-half of what it is at a distance +of five yards. In direct experience, however, +there is no appreciable difference of speed between +the two cases of movement.⁠<a id="FNanchor_12_12" href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Obviously, the same +explanation can be given here which has heretofore +been applied to the constancy of size, form and +brightness. Once more we are dealing with meaning. +And ultimately we recall that first illustration, +and indeed the most general case of the illusory +character of direct experience: if we seem to perceive +“objects” in our visual field, even those “objects,” +from the standpoint of introspection, must +also be products of learning: <em>meaning transforms +sensations into “things.”</em>⁠<a id="FNanchor_13_13" href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p85">[85]</span></p> + +<p>From this it follows that of all objective experience, +as both layman and psychologist enjoy it in the +visual field of everyday life, very little is left as pure +and genuine sensory fact. That such is the consequence +we must accept, if we go the ways of introspectionism, +will become clearer to us now at every +step.</p> + +<p>Introspection, however, draws a much more serious +conclusion from the foregoing analysis. Not +only shall all those experiences which are supposed +to be influenced by meaning not be treated as primary +sensory experiences; but, in addition, they shall be +excluded from the subject-matter of psychology. +Some introspectionists may hesitate to acknowledge +explicitly such a radical principle, but in their researches +most of them proceed as though they had +completely accepted it. After they have classified a +given experience as one that must be explained by +the effects of meaning, they rest satisfied, and are no +longer any more interested in it than if it were found +to belong to astronomy. This means that most objective +experience is excluded from the introspectionist’s +psychology as soon as he has found it susceptible +to his explanation in terms of meaning. In the following +chapters we shall see that wherever we touch +upon a somewhat unusual and therefore interesting +observation, the introspectionist will offer us this +same explanation, and we shall always be urged to +<em>discard</em> the observation because meaning is involved. +<span class="pagenum" id="p86">[86]</span>Whether the explanation is right or wrong, we continually +face in common life the kind of first-hand +objective experience which is discarded by introspectionism. +Toward it all our interests are directed. +There are millions of people who will never transform +the “objects” of their environments into “true” +sensations, who will always react to sizes, brightnesses +and speeds as they find them naïvely, who will like +and dislike forms as they appear to them in their objective +world without recourse to introspection, and +what are held to be the true sensory facts will never +play an appreciable rôle in their lives. As long as +the introspectionist’s attitude prevails, however, psychology +will never seriously study those experiences +which form the matrix of our whole life. Instead, it +will observe and discuss the properties of rare and unusual +experiences which, though they are supposed to +be continually present beneath our naïve experiences, +seem to be so well hidden most of the time that their +existence has nothing to do with life as we actually +experience it. Even the best introspectionist will +not find or state these experiences unless he assumes +the special attitude which—fortunately for him—he +does not assume except in the laboratory. The enterprise +of psychological observation is thus undertaken, +removed so far from common experience, that +if we should ever learn the laws of pure sensory +process, all of them together would not lead us back +to the psychological world we live in; because this +<span class="pagenum" id="p87">[87]</span>world is one of direct and naïve experience, and utterly +foreign to these laws of pure sensory process. +If, therefore, the introspectionist’s psychology does +not treat the facts we have to deal with in life, if most +of these facts are exiled from his science, he cannot +complain about his own fate. It is only to be expected +that such a psychology would not satisfy people +for long. If you condemn interest in the experience +of daily life and define genuine experience as a +rare something only found by artificial procedure, it +is inevitable that your professional as well as your lay +audience will tell you that they do not care for your +kind of psychology. And they will not stop there. +Since you have asserted that your experience is the +only genuine one, they will interpret your procedure +as the only possible scientific approach to the problems +of experience. Thus they will condemn <em>all</em> direct experience +as material of psychology, after you have +given away the greater part of it for the artefacts of sophisticated +and sterile introspection. This reaction +had to come. It has come in the form of behaviorism.</p> + +<p>I do not feel justified in calling those artefacts <em>unreal</em>. +When I apply the introspectionist’s methods I +myself can get those special experiences which corroborate +his findings. But I do not attribute to them +a rare value as though they were worth more, as +though they were more “true” than everyday experience. +If that common experience involves meaning, +the experiences given by introspection depend upon +<span class="pagenum" id="p88">[88]</span>the attitude of introspecting and cannot be shown to +exist without it, as we shall see later on. Moreover, +for actual life, common experience is found to be +incalculably more important than any of the introspectionist’s +“true sensations.” Let us grant for a +moment that all the facts mentioned above are what +they are for us because of the influence of meaning. +Do they become less real or less significant psychologically +because of this genesis? Is a certain amount +of H<sub>2</sub>O which I have before me no real chemical +substance because I know that it has been formed by +the oxidation of hydrogen? Would that hydrogen be +a “true” chemical substance, but not the water? Is +the water not worth the chemist’s investigation? I +do not see why an experience which contains acquired +meaning should be less interesting and important +for psychology than experiences not so composed. +Take the case of the symbol +, which every +one will agree is a product of meaning. When seen +between figures it <em>looks</em> like “plus,” i.e., <em>its meaning +appears localized in the visual field</em>. A strange fact, +indeed, which may entail some very important questions! +Why should such problems not be investigated +in psychology? It is the same situation with +regard to all the other cases which are explained by +meaning. Why should we lose our interest in the +problems they engender, because the fatal word +“meaning” has been uttered?</p> + +<p>Furthermore there is positive reason why, instead, +<span class="pagenum" id="p89">[89]</span>we should examine these problems with particular +attention. We have to discriminate between two +types of cases among the examples considered. One, +represented by the symbol +, is distinguished by the +fact that child psychology offers an adequate account +of the growth of meaning in this concrete case. For +the second type, represented by most of the other +cases, such an account has not yet been given. It has +been in no way demonstrated that the objectivity of +things, the localization of weights, the constancy of +size, form, speed, localization and brightness, the +variation of after-images, and so forth, are really +produced by the influence of meaning. It may seem +extremely plausible to most of us that such is the +case, but none of the experiments and observations I +have mentioned in this connection can be regarded +by an unprejudiced psychologist as satisfactory +proof. In our present situation it is merely an hypothesis +that the second group of facts quite properly +belongs together with the first class, and as an hypothesis +it is to be treated.</p> + +<p>The customary thing to do with an hypothesis is to +test it. Does introspectionism test this hypothesis? +Quite the contrary, since all interest in the experiences +which it is intended to explain, is destroyed for +the introspectionist by the explanation itself. Thus +we have before us an assumption which would never +be examined at all, if all psychologists were extreme +introspectionists. If this be strange, it becomes the +<span class="pagenum" id="p90">[90]</span>more surprising when you realize that at this point +most psychologists would not listen calmly to our discussion +of “meaning theory” as an hypothesis. At +first they might express only an incredulous smile, +as though they had been asked to believe something +fantastical; but if you insisted upon this point they +would grow impatient, because in their opinion you +were disturbing the sound basis of careful science by +an obtrusive paradox.</p> + +<p>When a scientific argument tends to become rather +emotional it undoubtedly prods some deep-rooted +presupposition, the discussion of which is felt to be +offensive. No one enjoys the discussion of what for +him is secure beyond discussion. In the face of this +exhibition of temper, the more calmly should we realize +that the attitude of introspectionism, if taken so +piously, becomes a real danger. Let us suppose for a +moment that in the cases of objectivity, size, form, +speed, localization, brightness, etc., the explanation +by meaning is incorrect. We should then immediately +draw the conclusion that all the facts in question +are a part of genuine sensory experience. But +these facts would tell quite a different story about +sensory experience than that given by the introspectionists. +Hence it would follow that what we learn +about “true” sensations from them has to be regarded +as distorted truth. Whether or not this be really the +case, depends therefore upon the validity of the +general explanation by meaning. And this explanation +<span class="pagenum" id="p91">[91]</span>is not to be tested; it <em>shall</em> not even be examined! +It will be obvious then that, used by the introspectionist +in this manner, <em>the meaning theory serves as a +defensive bulwark for his quite definite and special +ideas about sensory facts</em>.</p> + +<p>This makes us suspicious of the meaning theory. +Introspectionists may be so utterly convinced of it, +not because independently it is particularly attractive +in itself, but because their prior firm belief about +the nature of sensory facts will not permit them +to acknowledge certain experiences. If these “irregular” +experiences can be explained away by meaning, +the belief will be reassured.</p> + +<p>In order to show that such is the case, we have only +to consider the arguments brought forward in favor +of the meaning theory. They have little indeed to do +with meaning, but very much with convictions about +the world of pure sensory experience.</p> + +<p>Take the “constancy of brightness” as an example. +A white paper in the shadow appears as white, a +black one in bright illumination as black, though the +white may reflect less light actually than the black. +Is there anything in this experience, in the white +and the black <em>as such</em>, which tells us directly that we +have to do with an effect of meaning? Nothing at +all. The argument is of an indirect kind, viz., our observation +in this case cannot be reduced to “pure sensation”; +it must, therefore, be a product of meaning.</p> + +<p>First of all, one can <em>change</em> the experience by looking +<span class="pagenum" id="p92">[92]</span>at the papers in a special manner. Therefore, it +is not a true sensory experience. A primitive conviction, +then, which paradoxically both needs and +supports the meaning theory is this: <em>True sensory +facts are independent of changes in subjective attitude</em>. +Evidently, however, such a statement is not a +sufficient support of the theory. If, in the attitude +of introspection, I can transform the apparent white +into a dark shade, and the apparent black into a +rather bright nuance, the opposite change will occur +spontaneously as soon as I forsake that attitude and +behold the papers as other people do. From the +viewpoint of experience the “true” brightnesses, appearing +during the period of my experimental attitude, +are as changeable, then, as those which I had +before and which I customarily have. Logically, I +might as well condemn the experiences found during +“introspection” and refuse to call them “true,” because +they disappear whenever I return to the everyday +attitude. The introspectionist, however, is far +from treating both experiences with the same measure. +He thinks that what he experiences in his special +manner is true experience, that, hidden somehow, +it ever exists behind the veil of meaning +whenever he falls back into a more naïve attitude. +Thus it becomes clear that there is still another belief +which makes him prefer his special and rare +experiences.</p> + +<p>His other belief is easy to find. Why should we +<span class="pagenum" id="p93">[93]</span>be surprised by all these observations on size, form, +localization, speed, brightness, etc.? Why not take +them quietly and as a matter of course? Obviously, +because under the given experimental conditions +of stimulation we expect to have experiences +quite different from those which we really +have. Naturally, we say, seen size should be proportional +to retinal size, to changes in retinal form +there should correspond changes in seen form, localization +in the visual field should vary with retinal +localization, seen speed with retinal speed, and seen +brightness should follow the variations of retinal +intensity. While the everyday experience of the layman +contradicts these expectations in the most shocking +manner, the special attitude cultivated by introspectionism +succeeds in obtaining precisely those +other experiences which, according to the introspectionist, +we ought “naturally” to have always; or we at +least <em>approach</em> that state of affairs which our understanding +considers the appropriate one. <em>This</em> is the +fact which makes the introspectionist prefer the special +and rare experiences found by an artificial attitude, +and which also makes him believe in a permanent, +though hidden, existence of these “pure sensations” +under the opaque cover of naïve experience. +It becomes apparent, then, that the procedure and +the results of introspection acquire a special sanction +through their agreement with definite presuppositions +about the relation between stimulation and sensory +<span class="pagenum" id="p94">[94]</span>experience. The same suppositions lead to the +condemnation of everyday experience. No one can +understand the scientific trend of introspectionism +who has not discovered, who does not see, this decisive +point. How many times, as a student, have I +read and heard that the Müller-Lyer phenomenon +does not represent a “true” sensory fact, because by +analytical observation and practice we can destroy +the “illusion”! If this be taken as a proof, obviously +one kind of experience is given a <em>higher value</em> than +another. If you ask, why? you will ultimately get no +other reason than the one already stated: that one experience +agrees with the properties of peripheral +stimulation whereas the other does not. Those that +do not are discarded with the aid of the meaning +theory.</p> + +<p>A second fundamental conviction, then, underlying +this theory and the whole scientific viewpoint of +introspectionism is this: <em>The main properties of +“true” sensory experiences follow the corresponding +properties of peripheral stimulation.</em></p> + +<p>The introspectionist’s belief takes a form still more +concrete. How did he proceed in order to find the +true sensory facts in the case of brightness, for instance? +He tried to isolate the white and the black +paper under observation so that they were taken out +of their context as far as possible. The same thing +is done by those who try to destroy the Müller-Lyer +illusion, and similarly in all the other cases. Such +<span class="pagenum" id="p95">[95]</span>an analytical and isolating attitude will have effects +similar to those of a perforated screen, which, concealing +the particular surroundings of the objects, +gives them a new <em>homogeneous</em> environment. If +now the “illusions” disappear, this effect of isolation +is explained in terms of the exclusion of all those +secondary factors, and in particular meaning, which +before had distorted the true sensory experience. But +the possibilities of pertinent explanation are not exhausted +with this. The effect produced by isolation +proves at least that objective experience in one part of +the field does not develop, independently of its neighborhood, +as a function of local stimulation alone. If +this be taken as a description of facts, we may explain +the facts in one of two ways: (1) <em>Either</em> “true” experience +depends upon local stimulation exclusively, +whereas the meaning which almost always adheres +to it depends upon (is reproduced by) the properties +of the environing field; (2) <em>Or</em> natural sensory experience +<em>itself</em> is not determined locally; i.e., the +properties of any one part of the field depend normally +upon the conditions given in the whole field, +or, at least, in a larger area of it. In <em>both</em> cases isolation, +or the introduction of a homogeneous environment, +would make local experience correspond better +to local stimulation. The introspectionist, however, +does not consider the alternative. He only seems to +see that one horn of the dilemma, according to which +isolation gives the “true” sensation, and naïve experience +<span class="pagenum" id="p96">[96]</span>is a product of meaning. Again we find him +partial to an astounding degree; he <em>prefers</em> that +hypothesis (although unwilling to regard it <em>as such</em>) +which gives him local sensory facts determined by +local stimulation. In a well-known example, when +our subjects make eye-movements along the main +lines of the Müller-Lyer figures, these movements +are shown to have different extents for the two +figures, corresponding to the difference of their apparent +lengths. There you have it, we are told! The +illusion is not an optical fact; it is produced by the +accompanying motor phenomena, or at least by innervation +tendencies if overt movements do not occur. +This is an altogether partial statement because, supposing +that the two lines <em>have</em> different lengths in +“true” vision, nothing would be more natural than +that the eye-movements should be different correspondingly. +Only by prejudice can the fact in question +be interpreted as though it proved the indirect +genesis of the Müller-Lyer effect. It may prove +instead that sensory experience is influenced by stimulation +in a larger area and that, therefore, eye-movements, +depending upon sensory experience, will also +vary when surroundings are changed.</p> + +<p>Recapitulating the foregoing analysis, we may +conclude that: <em>A decisive motive in introspectionism +is the belief that true sensations are independent of +subjective attitude and depend only upon local stimulation +<span class="pagenum" id="p97">[97]</span>as purely local experiences.</em>⁠<a id="FNanchor_14_14" href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> This is the only +rule which helps us to understand on what occasions +the introspectionist begins to introspect. Very seldom +will you find him introspecting where, without +any technique, he obtains certain simple relations between +local stimulation and experience. But where +these relations do not seem to exist <i>prima vista</i>, you +will find him taking recourse simultaneously to the +introspective procedure and to the theory of meaning.</p> + +<p>Here is the remarkable result of our inquiry. The +whole procedure of present introspectionism seems +at first to be in full contrast to behaviorism’s purely +physiological viewpoint. If the introspectionist is +not the advocate of direct experience, who else should +be able to play that rôle? But we have found that +there is some restriction upon his enthusiasm for +direct experience. A foreign judge has the chair. +He examines direct experience beforehand, convicts +most of it, and sends it away for correction by a special +procedure. This judge is a <em>physiologist!</em> His +ideas about the sensory part of the nervous system +are extremely definite. When the introspectionist +mentions physiology, he seems to talk about a helpful +servant; but when we look at the facts, the servant +rules the introspectionist.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p98">[98]</span></p> + +<p>If introspectionism is much less guided by direct +experience than by definite physiological principles +which decide what shall be called “true” sensations, +its viewpoint is not so very far from that of behaviorism. +And this similarity of general ideas becomes +even more striking if we compare in detail the +physiological creed of introspectionism with that of +behaviorism.</p> + +<p>The main concepts of behaviorism are those of +reflex and conditioned reflex. What is the characteristic +trait of reflex action? That from a definite +receptor organ nervous excitation is conducted along +a definite path, through definite “centers” and along +other definite paths towards a definite effector organ. +The <em>order</em> of organic reactions in their dependence +upon definite stimulation is explained by this conception: +a preëxisting arrangement of more or less +isolated conductors enforces that order. It is true +that behaviorists do not suppose the anatomical +arrangements to be <em>absolutely</em> rigid and constant. +But, though a certain “irradiation” of excitation is +admitted, almost the only biological value attributed +to this plasticity consists in the fact that, if some other +factor can make the connections practically rigid, +this other factor will have a certain range of different +possibilities to work upon. Hence, order of functions +is enforced fundamentally in the reflex arc, but, +at a higher level of the nervous system, connections +<span class="pagenum" id="p99">[99]</span>may be built (or blocked) by another factor. This +other factor is “conditioning.”</p> + +<p>If now we consider the definite physiological ideas +which silently determine introspectionism’s criteria +for “true” sensory experience, we find the following +two: <em>First</em>, local sensation depends upon local stimulation; +it does not depend upon other processes in +the nervous system, not even upon those issuing from +neighboring points in the same sense organ. There +is only one physiological assumption which would +explain such an independence of local sensation, +namely isolated conduction from one point of the +sense organ toward one point of that region the activity +of which is accompanied by sensory experience. +This, however, is nothing but the first half of a reflex +arc, so that in this respect introspectionism agrees +completely with behaviorism. If experience does not +seem to obey this principle universally, that is because +we have a <em>second</em> principle: At a higher level +of the nervous system at least, connections may be +built during development, which did not exist originally +at birth. A corollary of this principle is: that +certain experiences will be followed and accompanied +by others, or by reproduced material corresponding +to them, in the form of “meaning.” Though this +term sounds a trifle more refined than “conditioning,” +in the physiological considerations of most introspectionists +it means the automatic formation of new +conducting connections, just as conditioning does for +<span class="pagenum" id="p100">[100]</span>behaviorists. Again there is no real difference between +the one viewpoint and the other.</p> + +<p>During their lively controversy over whether introspection, +or the objective observation of behavior, +is the true procedure, it does not occur to either +party that some other theme might be more important +and urgent, namely, that concerning their common +convictions as to the basic type of nervous process +underlying experience or behavior. This assumed +basis appears self-evident to both of them. And since +so much is taken for granted by both, we should not +be surprised to find the same conservatism in introspectionism +which is so striking in behaviorism.</p> + +<p>That psychology is a very young science and that +therefore its future and its progress will probably +depend upon discoveries unsuspected at the present +time, seems not to be realized by most introspectionists. +In sensory experience, at least, the essential +traits of all possible and acceptable observations are +fixed for them before they begin to observe. Consequently, +they show an almost negativistic attitude +whenever an observation does not agree with that preëstablished +truth; and their experimentation tends to +become a rather defensive and critical procedure. If +others point to some new observation that does not exactly +conform to the fundamental concepts mentioned +above, they are eager to quell the disturbance, and to +dismiss it by appropriate introspection and discussion. +I admit that criticism of new observations is a +<span class="pagenum" id="p101">[101]</span>healthy procedure in science; yet I have known introspectionists +who spend their scientific lives in a critical +defense of what they believe to be unquestionably +true. In these circumstances one cannot expect them +to have a youthful interest in free observation and +naïve discovery. If the main points are already established, +and if further observation cannot give us +essentially new hints, why should we strain our eyes +in the chaos of a large world behind which, anyway, +the old truth <em>must</em> be hidden everywhere? As William +James would say, whatever happens is a “nothing +else but” for them; it can be reduced to an old +story. In this attitude again there is no real difference +between behaviorism and introspectionism, +though each defends its conservatism by different +methods. But there is a real difference between preferring +to be at rest upon preëstablished ground or +preferring adventure and intellectual curiosity which +take you full-sail into the open sea of experience. If +you choose the latter, perplexity will be your usual +feeling, and a glimpse of clear-shaped coasts a rare +reward on some Sunday of research. But the next +generation will have more Sundays as a result of your +exploration. Certainly, neither this nor the next generation +is needed in psychology, if we stay at home +and know beforehand that no other sites can be found +in the future.</p> + +<p>I do not see, then, why introspectionism should be +preferred to behaviorism, or vice versa. They are so +<span class="pagenum" id="p102">[102]</span>much alike in their fundamental opinions and in +their general attitudes, that all their wrangling seems +like a family quarrel to the onlooker. And it is +among precisely those themes, over which they do not +quarrel, that we shall find the problems of <i>gestalt</i> +psychology. For the present, however, we shall pursue +this question: Is it true that the processes underlying +experience and behavior are determined mainly +by the connections of given nerve-paths, and that +some change in the conductivity of these connections +is the secret of an individual’s development?</p> + + +<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h3> + +<blockquote> +<p>M. Bentley: <cite>The Field of Psychology</cite>. 1924.</p> + +<p>K. Koffka: <cite>Gestalt Psychology</cite>. The Psychological Bulletin. +1922.</p> + +<p>D. Katz: <cite lang="de">Die Erscheinungsweisen der Farben</cite>. Ergänzungsband +7 der Zeitschr. f. Psychol. 1911.</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Uber unbemerkte Empfindungen und Urteilstäuschungen</cite>. +Zeitschr. f. Psychol., 63. 1913.</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Akustische Untersuchungen</cite> III. Zeitschr. +f. Psychol., 72. 1915.</p> +</blockquote> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p103">[103]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="IV"> + IV + <br> + <i>Dynamics as Opposed to Machine Theory</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>SOMETIMES people are conservative and right +at the same time. Still it seems highly improbable +that in our very young science conservative +opinions should be right, opinions which are opposed +to almost all experience, and which have scarcely +been examined, because they have been protected by +the “meaning theory.”</p> + +<p>Some of the physiological presuppositions lurking +behind introspection are hardly convincing if they +are once examined critically. In one of our examples, +apparent movement, produced by touching +successively two different points on the subject’s skin, +is not admitted as a “true” sensory fact because +usually it forms a curve through empty space, only +the ends of which are felt on the skin (cf. p. <a href="#p79">79</a>). +But why should all the experiences which depend +physiologically upon the stimulation of a sense organ +be localized in the same place where that sense organ +is localized as an experience? In vision, this is not +the case; forms or colors are not seen at the place +where we feel our eyes. Neither are sounds heard +generally where we localize our ears. Behind the +introspectionist’s argument there seems to be some +<span class="pagenum" id="p104">[104]</span>primitive confusion of the peripheral processes produced +by stimulation with sensory experiences depending +upon them of the physiological locus of the +first with the sensory localization of the second.</p> + +<p>I think this case is typical because it shows that the +apparent self-evidence of the argument from physiology +prevents a critical consideration of it, whereas +any examination of the case would efface the self-evidence +of the assumption. In this chapter I shall +try to show that even the main assumptions of introspective +psychology and behaviorism are by no means +axiomatic, though they agree with a common prejudice +which is thousands of years old.</p> + +<p>We have seen that those assumptions are utterly +dependent upon the explanatory force of the meaning +theory. Unprotected by this theory those assumptions +would be destroyed by any observations which +contradicted them. Recent experimental work on +some of the experiences discussed as examples in the +last chapter bears upon the explanation of those +experiences in terms of meaning. In order to <em>learn</em> +that sometimes white is black and vice versa, an +individual needs time and <em>much</em> experience, largely +because he has to learn it so thoroughly that finally +the products of learning will be “projected” into his +field of vision as definite nuances of brightness instead +of the “true” ones. We should expect, then, +that young or primitive subjects would not show the +“constancy of brightness” to any considerable degree. +<span class="pagenum" id="p105">[105]</span>But when the experiment was made with +young chicks under very severe conditions, they were +found to possess approximately as good a “constancy +of brightness” as I do.⁠<a id="FNanchor_15_15" href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> Similar experiments made +on the “constancy of size” with children (from two +years up), and with young apes, also gave positive +results.⁠<a id="FNanchor_16_16" href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> Though it is difficult to exclude slight +influences of meaning upon the phenomena in question, +it seems altogether unlikely, even without further +work, that <em>in principle</em> these phenomena are +produced by meaning. I do not deny that objective +experience is imbued with acquired meaning in many +respects. But, as has been said before, where this +influence is not demonstrated in the history of individuals, +or somehow demonstrated independently, no +indirect argument is strong enough to be accepted in +lieu of such a demonstration.</p> + +<p>Since in these instances the meaning theory begins +to relinquish the field, a radical change in fundamental +principles becomes unavoidable. The phenomena +we have here discussed, such as constancy of size, +form, localization, speed and brightness, the stroboscopic +movement, the well-known illusions and so +forth, become just as decisive in our understanding of +genuine sensory experience as the so-called “normal” +cases of introspection, i.e., as the observations that at +<span class="pagenum" id="p106">[106]</span>a given distance and on a homogeneous background +seen size depends mainly upon retinal size; that +(apart from contrast and other exceptions) in a given +illumination seen brightness depends upon retinal +intensity, and so on. In these cases, usually regarded +as normal, size, brightness, etc., are found to vary +with the properties of local stimulation, because conditions +of surrounding stimulation are practically +constant. For the same reason, by assuming the introspective +attitude, we may find experiences corresponding +to local stimulation even in those other +cases where <i>naïve</i> experience shows the contrary, because +by an analytical attitude the influence of surrounding +conditions temporarily can be suppressed +to a high degree.</p> + +<p>But we do not suppose such isolation to be the normal +state of affairs. If in all the examples given we +accept direct experience at its face-value, our fundamental +assumption about the processes underlying +experience and behavior must be opposite to the +assumptions of both introspectionists and behaviorists; +i.e., instead of reacting to local stimuli by local +and mutually independent events, the organism reacts +to an actual <em>constellation</em> of stimuli by a total +process which, as a functional whole, is its response +to the whole situation. This is the only viewpoint +which can explain how to a given local stimulus there +may correspond altogether different experiences as +soon as surrounding stimulation is changed. We face +<span class="pagenum" id="p107">[107]</span>this dilemma: <em>Either</em> we take the traditional horn, in +which case direct experience and everyday behavior +are irrelevant to our psychological analysis, <em>or</em> we +trust all kinds of experience impartially, in which +case we have to accept the suggested radical change +in physiological theory.</p> + +<p>“Total process” and “functional whole” are, however, +terms which sound rather vague, or even mystical, +to most scientists. It would be well to present +our physiological assumption in more definite detail. +This may be done. And at the same time we shall +obtain a more general view of our problem if we ask +ourselves just why the prevailing viewpoint should +have appeared so utterly convincing to the last +generations.</p> + +<p>The chief reason seems to be that sensory experience +is in most cases quite orderly, and that the behavior, +which accompanies it, is no less orderly. +Now since the early days of European science man +has been deeply convinced that the processes of nature, +if they are left to their own “blind” play, will +never produce anything like order. Why should +they? Does not the accidental intercourse of inorganic +natural forces around us produce chaos and destruction +everywhere? We have been able to formulate +some of the rules according to which isolated +processes occur in nature necessarily, but where many +processes influence each other without control, no +reason is apparent why confusion and general disorder +<span class="pagenum" id="p108">[108]</span>should be avoided or why the whole complex +should develop toward an orderly distribution. +<em>Without control</em>—this appears to me to be the decisive +point. For as soon as man began to restrict the +possibilities of natural processes by appropriate rigid +arrangements, the same forces which apparently +would have produced chaos, destruction or disorder +without control were guided toward orderly function +in the service of mankind. This has been man’s +conception of nature for thousands of years; in modern +times the engineer still enforces in the same manner +the functional order in his machines. The +“blind” forces of nature are allowed to make the machines +<em>move</em>, but the <em>order</em> of the movement is enforced +by those special arrangements which are the +essential traits of the machines and the pride of their +inventors.</p> + +<p>From this viewpoint, which prevails even in current +theory, a young science will tend to presuppose +the existence of “special arrangements” wherever the +distribution of forces or processes in nature is found +to be orderly. Aristotelian astronomy is a good example. +The movements of stars in the sky maintain +a remarkable order, so different from what one would +expect to occur in “free” nature, that something special +must control those celestial events. Obviously, +the possibility of a star running wild or a planet +going astray must be excluded by rigid arrangements. +<span class="pagenum" id="p109">[109]</span>Therefore, in Aristotelian theory, the stars are fixed +upon those famous crystal spheres, the turning of +which forces the stars to move in their apparently +regular orbits. There are even engineers, viz., the +stellar deities, who watch and control the machinery. +Three hundred years ago this conception was still entertained +in pious awe. The functional value of its +crystal spheres in the orderly sky, however, was precisely +the same as that of any rigid arrangement enforcing +orderly processes in our machines. There is +a deep longing for rest and safety in man. Early in +history it was satisfied by such a primitive belief, the +content of which may appear crude, narrow and absurd +to modern eyes. What was so shocking in Galileo’s +astronomical discoveries? That there was so +much going on in the sky and the astronomical order +was so much less definite than one could happily believe +before! If the heavens begin to show a lack of +rigid institutions, similar to the flexibilities we observe +on this planet, who can feel secure in his most +important beliefs? There was much exceedingly +human, miserable fear in the furious attacks directed +against Galileo by the Aristotelians of his time, and +the fear was evoked by the amount of change and dynamics +Galileo found in the world as the home of +mankind. One may well suppose that the excitement +produced by Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of +the blood contained a similar element of fear, because +<span class="pagenum" id="p110">[110]</span>the conception of man as a rigid structure was +suddenly disturbed by the idea of internal unrest, accompanied +by the possibility of its fatal cessation at +any moment.</p> + +<p>In any case the same general motive expresses itself +in the well-known tendency of early biological +thought to explain all remarkable properties of organic +life, and most of all its orderly course, by special +arrangements enforcing order. In the time of +Descartes, his so-called mechanical interpretation of +organic functions may have been bold enough; still +he was absolutely conservative in assuming without a +moment’s hesitation that—apart from the influence of +one engineer, the soul—all delicate, vital processes +were enforced by special arrangements, connections +and channels throughout the whole body of man. +Figuratively, the organism was for him what the sky +had been for Aristotle—full of crystal spheres. He +did not know the laws of dynamics, it is true. But +though we know much more about them since his +time, the main changes in biological theory seem to +have been refinements of his type of thinking rather +than discoveries of new general concepts about organic +order. Even in our own day, though doubting +the validity of that machine-conception as a satisfactory +explanation of <em>all</em> organic order, biologists do +not give us any other clear general principle whereby +to understand the orderliness of organic function.</p> + +<p>We shall see at once what the possibilities of alternative +<span class="pagenum" id="p111">[111]</span>explanation are, if we try to get a more concrete +picture of the characteristic trait in Aristotelian +and biological machine theory.</p> + +<p>In physical processes we find two sorts of factors +determining events at every moment. In the first +class belong the actual forces of the process itself; +they represent the <em>dynamical</em> side of it. In the second +class we have those properties of the system which +may be regarded as <em>constant conditions</em> of its events. +So, at the present time, the elementary charge of one +electron seems to be an unchangeable condition of +all physical events. In a conducting wire the specific +conductivity of its material will be regarded as such +a given condition. On the other hand, the electrostatic +forces of the current itself driving an electron +along that wire are an example of a dynamical factor. +But among the constant conditions two further classes +may be discriminated. In the case of electric current +it is one given condition that all moving charges have +the amount of electronic charge or multiples of it. +Another condition of the current is given by the mode +of the distribution, the connections and the spatial +order of the conducting material, i.e., a network of +wires.</p> + +<p>Immediately the fact becomes clear that, whereas +in all systems of nature, in addition to their own dynamical +forces, processes depend upon conditions of +the first class, the influence of special conditions of +the second class may dominate in one case and be at a +<span class="pagenum" id="p112">[112]</span>minimum in another. When we consider the play of +electrons in an atom or the integration of atoms +forming a molecule, we do not find a special topography +laid down beforehand which determines those +processes. At every moment, in addition to constant +properties of the material (first class of conditions), +the actual <em>dynamical</em> situation develops the next event +out of itself. If we wish to refer to the second class of +conditions in such a case, it would be to point out that +the topographical situation consists of physical space +without any special determining or limiting feature +in it. On the other hand, the equilibrated distribution +of electric charge on the surface of a conductor +depends upon the rigidly given form of that conductor +as a limiting topographical condition; and in +a steam-engine the piston can move only one definite +way, determined by the rigid walls of the cylinder.</p> + +<p>This leads to a classification of physical systems +which is decisive for our problem. In all of them +process is to be regarded as necessarily determined, +but among the various cases we find enormous differences +in the relative influence which limiting +topographical conditions, on the one hand, and the +play of actual forces, on the other, exert upon the +course of events. Wherever we have given topographical +conditions, preëstablished and not changeable +by the process itself, their existence means the +exclusion of some dynamical possibilities and the restriction +of the process to only the possibilities compatible +<span class="pagenum" id="p113">[113]</span>with those conditions. Electric charges may +move through the conductor in various ways, but they +are <em>prevented</em> from leaving it, and so their final distribution +depends upon its form. Again the electric +current may have one direction or the other, its distribution +may vary enormously; but, if the wires are +surrounded by isolating material, the dynamics of +the current itself will remain restricted to the interior +of the wires. The most extreme case will consist in a +system where preëstablished topographical arrangements +exclude all processes except only one; and an +example of this type is given by the piston’s motion +strictly confined between the walls of the cylinder.</p> + +<p>In this case the steam in the cylinder exerts its pressure +in all directions, but, owing to the topographical +conditions, it is not allowed to do work except in <em>one</em> +direction, in that, namely, in which the piston is free +to move for a certain distance. Consequently, nothing +but the motion as such is determined dynamically +in such a system, whereas its direction is strictly enforced +by topographical arrangement.</p> + +<p>Now this is exactly the relation between dynamics +and preëstablished topographical conditions which +we find in typical industrial machines. The number +and forms of special one-way functions which may be +enforced in such systems are enormous and varied. +Still the general principle is everywhere the same. +Sometimes a little more than the minimum may be +left to dynamical determination, but at present no +<span class="pagenum" id="p114">[114]</span>one would construct mechanical systems for industrial +purposes where the form and distribution of +process would be to any considerable degree a matter +of dynamics.</p> + +<p>It is the same idea again which occurs to Aristotle +when he views the remarkable order of celestial +movement. His spheres are topographical conditions +enforcing that order. And since Cartesius, neurologists +have worked with the same concepts wherever +they have dealt with orderly organic function in +higher animals and in man. It is not the dynamics of +nervous processes as such which they suppose tend +toward coördinated function. Vitalists may have +such a mystical idea! Rather, special anatomical +topography is the only explanation for order; and +by it the dynamics of process are compelled to produce +orderly results.</p> + +<p>Once more we return to point out that it is the same +conception which forms the common basis of both introspectionism +and behaviorism, so far as their physiological +principles are concerned. Take vision, for +example. How many things may be present simultaneously +in one actual field! Still, excluding extreme +peripheral regions, there does not seem to be +any confusion for the most part. One object appears +separated from all others, and the sharpness of its +contours is evidence of a high accuracy of function. +But the field is not only clear as such; it also corresponds +admirably to the physical realities. Points +<span class="pagenum" id="p115">[115]</span>which are neighbors in physical space are neighbors +also in the visual field; the center of a circle in physical +space appears as the middle of a symmetrical +figure in vision, and so forth. All this order is as +remarkable as it is necessary for our response to the +objects which, in the form of bodily movement, must +be adjusted properly to the physical world. The +order of projected images upon the retina is easily +explained by the properties of the pupil, the lens and +so forth. But what about the processes which, +streaming from here into the brain, will eventually +determine experience and behavior? Since experience +and behavior show a similar order, this order +must have been enforced or preserved throughout the +entire process. Only one kind of explanation seems, +then, to be possible: In the nervous system we have +a topographical arrangement, preventing confusion +and mixture during conduction. Indeed, if from +each point of the retina local processes are conducted +on definite and isolated paths toward their final cortical +termini, and if the totality of these termini somehow +reproduces the geometry of local retinal processes, +then the dynamics of the process are excluded +completely from the determination of its own direction +and distribution. In terms of such a construction +of the facts we can feel secure that the most important +property of vision, i.e., its accurate order, is +guaranteed by so trustworthy a factor as preëstablished +anatomical conditions.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p116">[116]</span></p> + +<p>Similar considerations would lead to similar results +in the case of touch and hearing. But what +about learning and habit formation?</p> + +<p>At the present time most psychologists would +answer this question by saying that in some parts of +the nervous system, between its optical and acoustical +sectors, for instance, paths of nervous activity are +not fixed once for all in the youth of an individual. +Either no paths will be ready for conduction at first, +or else from one point of the tissue several paths will +conduct processes equally well in several directions, +so that disorderly diffusion will occur. In the +adult, however, we observe a great many associations, +let us say, again, between the optical and the acoustical +centers, and very seldom is there any confusion +in the play of reproductions. The thing we have +before us now is called a book, its parts pages, and +so forth. It is a serious symptom if some one does not +call things by their right names. Normally, the connection +between definite visual processes and definite +acoustical and motor processes works astonishingly +well. What other explanation can be offered? +Where we had at first no conducting path or perhaps +several indifferent paths, we might assume that with +time one single path has become differentiated and +so much more susceptible to excitation than all the +others, that now processes must follow this one path. +This would mean that, disregarding the <em>genesis</em> of +this dominant one-way function, the perfect order +<span class="pagenum" id="p117">[117]</span>of association and reproduction is again explained +altogether in terms of the properties of topographical +conditions. Though these conditions are not +supposed to exist in the same manner in infancy, +and though the changes by which they are produced +remain obscure at the present time, when +once they are established the direction and order of +processes is as rigidly enforced by them, and any +influence of dynamics will be as utterly excluded, as +is the case supposedly in simple sensory conduction. +As the railroad train remains on its tracks because +these determine one way of least resistance, and as +the enormous power of the engine has no influence +upon direction, so in reproduction as well as in sensory +processes all order and direction is a result of +prearrangement, independently of the actual properties +and dynamical forces of the process itself.</p> + +<p>If for the sake of order dynamics shall not take +part in the distribution of processes, and if distribution +shall be merely an effect of given topographical +conditions, important consequences follow.</p> + +<p>First of all, excluding only the somewhat obscure +<em>genesis</em> of associations and habit, what happens in +the nervous system will depend either upon inherited +machine arrangements or upon secondarily <em>acquired</em> +arrangements. Therefore, where an actual +performance is not an instance of the learning process +as such, it must be explained either by original topographical +conditions, or by past learning, i.e., by +<span class="pagenum" id="p118">[118]</span>acquired changes in those conditions.⁠<a id="FNanchor_17_17" href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> Now, this +alternative is nothing but the old dualism of nativistic +and empiristic explanation. No reader of all the +famous discussions between nativists and empirists +can have a serious doubt that a nativistic explanation +has always meant the assumption of a given anatomical +basis for the actual fact in question. If such +explanation did not seem to be acceptable, then only +one other possibility was left open, that of learning. +These authors never entertain the idea that some specific +and orderly function might occur without being +controlled either by special arrangements preëstablished +<i lang="la">ad hoc</i> or by arrangements acquired in learning. +What may this third alternative be? Vitalism? +We shall see.</p> + +<p>In well-established one-way streets what happens +at the end of them will mainly depend upon what has +happened at the entrance. Sensory experience will +therefore consist of purely local elements of experience, +the genuine properties of which must depend +upon local stimuli exclusively. If, for the maintenance +of order, the isolation of processes in each pathway +and in each final cell (of the brain) must be absolute, +then no influence of processes in other parts of +the nervous system will be able to alter sensory experience, +and so it must remain the same whatever +the changes of attitude. By enumerating the actual +<span class="pagenum" id="p119">[119]</span>properties of all elements at a given time we give +an exhaustive account of the presented field. This +is what has been called the summative, or mosaic, +character of sensory experience, as it is understood +from this viewpoint. Evidently, in terms of it, the +sensory field becomes “inflexible,” exactly as its +physiological basis is mainly determined by rigid +topography. It also becomes “poor,” because the +variety of experiences is restricted to those indifferent +patterns of elements which we may find +by varying independently the properties of the local +elements. Any organization of processes in the field +is excluded because order must be explained by +functional separation. Specific function, dynamically +extended over an area of the field, is excluded +for the same reason; we have to deal with a purely +<em>geometrical</em> pattern of <em>local</em> processes.</p> + +<p>How “empty” and “dead” does the organism appear +in this theory! Dynamically, it has nothing to +contribute to the monotonous elementary currents +conducted compulsorily from a point of stimulation +to a point of reaction. So it becomes an indifferent +stage for actors indifferent to the stage as well as to +each other. As an object of research in dynamics +it is less interesting than a molecule or a soap-bubble +which are both of them functional wholes.</p> + +<p>If between the field of sensory processes and the +effector organs conduction is determined in the same +manner as, in this theory, it is between local stimuli +<span class="pagenum" id="p120">[120]</span>and the elements of that field, a thoroughly adequate +formula for research in psychology will be: to find +out what stimuli produce what reactions in the effector +organs. The statement that stimuli, on the one +hand, and reactions, on the other, are the only points +of interest in psychology, corresponds absolutely to +the picture of the organism, and especially the nervous +system, as lacking any characteristic process of +its own as a whole. Since other schools do not pretend +to have new positive ideas about the functioning +of the nervous system, that seductive formula of behaviorism +has found a rather general assent as expressing +the viewpoint of natural science in psychology. +Unfortunately, in its present usage, it is +not only seductive, but also ambiguous and superficial.</p> + +<p>From the fact that in this theory dynamics is excluded +from the determination of order and distribution, +one more consequence follows immediately. +Everywhere in nature dynamical events depend upon +the properties of those processes and materials which +exert influences upon one another. In a solution, +containing Na<sub>2</sub>SO<sub>4</sub> and BaCl<sub>2</sub>, BaSO<sub>4</sub> will be precipitated +because of certain properties of Ba, SO<sub>4</sub> +and H<sub>2</sub>O which, in their mutual relations, determine +the dynamics of the process. Two electric currents +will produce mutual attraction of their conductors +if both have the same direction; repulsion, on the +other hand, if the direction of one current is opposite +<span class="pagenum" id="p121">[121]</span>to that of the other. The rule is general, that +“relative properties” as exemplified in these cases +are decisive for dynamical interaction. A theory, +therefore, which excludes dynamics from the determination +of distribution, allowing it the production +only of elementary nervous current, will have to +draw the inference that the properties of local processes +have no influence whatever upon the total distribution +in the field. A given local process will be +altogether indifferent to its neighbors, running its +course uninfluenced by their existence. All possible +patterns may be produced by appropriate sets of +peripheral stimuli; no mutual forces are admitted +which, in the whole field, would produce certain +definite distributions rather than others. A similar +consideration in the case of association and reproduction +will occupy us later on.</p> + +<p>When confronted with such an unretouched picture +of current assumptions about physiological functions, +most psychologists will protest. They will declare +that one should not take too literally what has +been used rather as an analogy in a preliminary endeavor +to develop ideas about the processes of the +nervous system. Every one admits, moreover, that +there are cases of “irradiation” in some parts of the +tissue! To this criticism I must answer that if <em>all</em> +analogies chosen, in the first tentative picturing of +orderly nervous function, are of the same type, using +topographical arrangements as the basis of order, +<span class="pagenum" id="p122">[122]</span>this may be taken as evidence that other analogies +do not occur to these authors. Preliminary though +it may be, it remains a machine-picture, and no other +has been developed, which is different in principle. +As to irradiation of current, this concept as such does +not mean more than a lack of definiteness and accuracy +in the machine; it presupposes order enforced +by strict isolation as the normal case, a slight deviation +from which is the whole content of the idea. I +admit that it makes our ideas about nervous functioning +a little more nebulous than they should be +according to the extreme viewpoint of machine +theory; but I deny that in this manner <em>order</em> of distribution +can be or has been explained by any one. +Granted that all conductors may “leak” a little at +certain points and that, therefore, local processes may +become interfused mutually to a certain degree, I +am unable to deduce orderly distribution or organization +from such an indifferent “spreading” or interpenetration +of essentially isolated units.</p> + +<p>Let us compare the consequences of the theory +with observation. Some relevant data have already +been mentioned. Other and much more important +data will occupy us in the next chapters.</p> + +<p>That constancy of brightness and of size cannot +be explained by the assumption of one-way conduction +determining local sensory experience in terms +of local stimulation does not need further discussion, +since, because of their incompatibility with that assumption, +<span class="pagenum" id="p123">[123]</span>those facts are commonly believed to exemplify +the influence of meaning. But now that experimentation +has shown that the meaning theory +does not seem to explain them either, neither the empiristic +nor the nativistic assumptions help us in these +cases. So we must try to conceive a third kind of +nervous function other than the types in which processes +are strictly directed either by inherited or by +acquired arrangements. If there is a third reasonable +assumption, it will be necessary to apply it also +in those other cases, such as constancy of form, speed, +localization, and so forth, which are so similar to +constancy of brightness and size, that the same explanation +should obviously be given in all these instances. +Quite generally then the alternative between +empiristic and nativistic hypotheses must be +misleading.</p> + +<p>The introspective theorem that changes of attitude +cannot influence “true” sensory experience does not +agree better with the facts. It seems rather to be +an arbitrary definition of “true” sensory experience. +In observation, at least, if I transform the white in +the shadow and the black in full light into two similar +grays, <em>by “introspection</em>,” there can be no more +radical influence of attitude upon sensory experience +than this transformation which occurs under constant +conditions of stimulation. And the same holds +wherever introspection, destroying natural experience +by an artificial technique, finds its “true” sensations +<span class="pagenum" id="p124">[124]</span>instead. Fortunately in one part of our +science at least, this seems to be the prevailing opinion. +When we analyze a clang we hear several notes +appear successively in the mass which previously we +heard as a <em>unity</em>. If in this case we agree that under +constant conditions of stimulation our attitude transforms +one sensory reality into others, and that the +clang heard as one is not less real than the partial +tones apparent during analysis, we have no right to +contradict similar observations in other cases.⁠<a id="FNanchor_18_18" href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> + +<p>As to the statement that sensory experience is a +purely local affair, each point of a sensory field depending +upon “its” local stimulus exclusively, we +must reiterate that no grounds have ever been given +for such a radical assumption. Rather it seems to +be an <i lang="la">a priori</i> belief about what <em>ought</em> to be the nature +of things, experience to the contrary notwithstanding. +As far as observation goes the properties +of local retinal stimulation do not simply determine +the size, the form, the localization and the brightness +of local experience; neither does retinal speed determine +seen speed, as it probably ought to according +to the thesis that the geometry of retinal facts determines +<span class="pagenum" id="p125">[125]</span>spatial experiences. As a matter of observation, +all the well-known “illusions” may be cited as +evidence of the fact that local processes depend upon +<em>sets</em> of stimuli. To some degree this controversy will +be settled by pragmatic principles: the decision will +go to that side whose principles prove most fruitful +in the further development of psychology. In +the meantime, however, we may carry on our analysis +of the polemical situation at present.</p> + +<p>Almost all psychologists agree, in the case of one +experience, upon the fact that local sensory experience +is determined by more than merely local stimulation. +This case is that of color-contrast, which +most psychologists suppose to be an effect of interaction +in the nervous system. If here the point-to-point +correlation between retinal stimuli and sensory +experience is surrendered, because the determination +of local experience by conditions in a larger area is +too evident, how can we proceed hereafter as if this +discovery and concession had not been made? It +took science some time before it would accept simple +observation even in this case. Helmholtz refused to +do so and, of course, he applied the meaning theory +in order to save its fundamental belief, i.e., the point-to-point +determination of local sensory fact by local +stimulation. But after the first step has been made, +we should realize not only that one theory of contrast +has taken the place of another, but also that instead +of applying persistently one general principle +<span class="pagenum" id="p126">[126]</span>to all sensory experience, we have begun to accept a +new one. In the future, wherever experience does +not correspond to local stimulation, we should, at +least, consider the possibility that such an experience +may depend upon the total set of conditions in a +larger field, exactly as contrast does. <em>If</em> it does, this +may help us to understand why changes of attitude +affect sensory experience in some cases. Sensory experience, +which depends upon the constellation of +stimuli in a larger area, and therefore does not correspond +to merely local, inflexible units of process, +may be influenced by “processes of attitude” as well. +The most important point, however, seems to be that +if we find a type of process depending upon <em>sets</em> of +stimuli instead of single ones, this process may be +that “third possibility” we are seeking. Certainly, it +would neither be like the elementary processes of +nativistic machine theory, i.e., absolutely determined +by <em>inherited</em> arrangements, nor like the processes of +empiristic theory, upon which a similar compulsion +is exerted by <em>acquired</em> arrangements.</p> + +<p>In the next chapters I shall try to show that other +facts, much more important than those we have considered +hitherto, point exactly in the same direction. +For the sake of order in nervous function the machine +theory excludes <em>organization of process</em> in the +field. But we shall see that organization may be regarded +as a typical fact in sensory experience. Again +the theory excludes the assumption of any specific +<span class="pagenum" id="p127">[127]</span>process dynamically extended over an area of the +field. But it will not be difficult to show that there +are experiences in great number the specific properties +of which belong to <em>extended wholes</em> and do not +exist in local isolation. This means also that the real +variety of processes occurring in the sensory field is +simply enormous when compared with those essentially +indifferent patterns of local elements which +may occur according to the machine theory.</p> + +<p>If dynamics are excluded from the determination +of distribution, local process will correspond everywhere +with its stimulus; the actual properties of +stimulation in their mutual relationships will play no +rôle in the whole affair, as they would undoubtedly in +the case of dynamical interaction. Reviewing our observations, +however, we find that everywhere the aspect +of sensory experience depends upon the properties +of stimuli in their mutual interrelationship. This +is well known in the case of contrast and tonal fusion, +but we may cite as well all those observations which +were discussed at length in the last chapter. Constancy +of brightness, for instance, depends upon the +relation of the illumination and brightness of the +neighborhood to the brightness of the field in question. +That <em>organization</em> in the field depends upon +the definite “relative properties” of local conditions, +will be shown in the next chapter.</p> + +<p>All these facts make it probable that something is +wrong with the machine theory; they look as though +<span class="pagenum" id="p128">[128]</span>they might be better understood by dynamical theory. +Sometimes the observer finds dynamical events quite +obviously occurring directly within the field. This +is particularly the case, when sudden stimulation or +change of stimulation is followed by a <em>development</em> +of process. If we cause a bright figure suddenly to +appear in the dark, this figure will have at once +neither its full size nor its “right” place. Instead it +will appear with an energetic movement of extension +as well as of approach. At the moment of abrupt +disappearance, it will appear to have a movement +of contraction and recession. Obviously, such +observations would be exceedingly strange if considered +in terms of machine theory. Or again, take the +surprising fact that in touch, as well as in vision and +hearing, the distance of objects and events may vary +considerably if the stimuli are given in a certain +manner. In some beautiful experiments of von Frey +two distant points of the arm touched at the same +time will appear to be one-half the distance apart +which they appear to be when touched in slow succession. +Scholz and Kester have both measured the +mutual “attraction” which lights as well as sounds +show when presented under adequate conditions. If +the machine theory did not have its inordinate historical +prestige, no one would hesitate to take these +observations as evidence of dynamical interaction +within the field. The stroboscopic movement, which +belongs to the same class of observations, has acquired +<span class="pagenum" id="p129">[129]</span>a unique importance by the fact that experimentation +in this field led Wertheimer explicitly to +discard the purely summative theory of sensory experience, +not only for the problem in question but +generally.⁠<a id="FNanchor_19_19" href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> If at some distance from each other two +stimuli are successively projected upon the retina of +a subject, a movement will be seen, starting from the +locus of the first and ending in the region of the second. +Under favorable conditions there will not even +be two “impressions.” One “thing” will move from +one place to the other—certainly a case of dynamics +which it would be difficult to understand by the +theory of isolated local processes. After the more +important properties of stroboscopic movement were +investigated by Wertheimer, Koffka and others, there +was much discussion, mostly about minor points, +which almost tended to obscure the main facts. As +was to be expected also, meaning was rather liberally +offered as an explanation. Nevertheless, if +conditions and the attitude of the observer are not too +inadequate, we undoubtedly <em>have</em> movement in the +visual field. Those who do not believe direct experience, +where it contradicts the supposed properties of +“true” sensation, may deduce the “reality” of that +movement from the fact that, when repeated, it produces +an after-image of movement in the opposite +direction, exactly as “real” movement does. Though, +historically, Wertheimer’s investigation was the beginning +<span class="pagenum" id="p130">[130]</span>of <i>gestalt</i> theory, in the proper meaning of +that phrase, the following considerations of sensory +process will take another slant, because to me +another way seems more advisable as an introduction.⁠<a id="FNanchor_20_20" href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> + +<blockquote> +<p>There are several well-known arguments which +favor the machine theory. I have sometimes heard +that it gives us a picture of nervous function which, +clear and simple in itself, is the more easy to understand +since in practical life we enforce order everywhere +in the same manner, i.e., by arrangements <i lang="la">ad +hoc</i>. I must confess that such a policy of the least +scientific effort seems to me unacceptable. The comfort +and the habits of the scientist do not count +where he must deal with the properties of his subject-matter. +Furthermore, only the psychologist, +neurologist and physiologist will save time and effort +by an assumption which explains order by arrangement. +They simply hand their problem down to +somebody else; wherever, in theory, a problem of +function is reduced to one of special arrangements, +the science of “morphogenesis” in its ontogenetic +and phylogenetic branches is amicably asked to solve +it, i.e., to explain the origin of the arrangements. +So the avoidance of difficulties in our science means +that others have proportionally more difficulties. +And, by the way, at some point functional problems +must be treated as truly functional. If it is barely +possible to understand the ontogenesis of anatomical +structure by the working of “special arrangements” +<span class="pagenum" id="p131">[131]</span>in the egg and germ, it would be ridiculous to explain +<em>phylogenesis</em> by arrangements which bring it about.</p> + +<p>Yet it will be said that we do have special arrangements +guaranteeing definite function in a great +many organs of the body. Nobody can deny it, and +I shall admit at once that the existence of the optic +nerves as a conducting system between the eyes and +the brain may be regarded as an example. Still, in +our body, there is another conducting system in +which a great many substances are transported +along with the <em>blood</em>. And here, though the conduits +are a general arrangement “for transportation,” +we do <em>not</em> have special arrangements for carrying +each part of the fluid to its right place. What +a definite part of the tissue pours into the blood or +takes away from it at a given time is not determined +by isolating conductors; everywhere it depends upon +the actual relationship between the state of the tissue +in question and the chemical properties of the +blood, and yet normally we have order in the whole +affair. The example shows that the existence of +“organs” does not allow us to draw any inference +about elementary processes being kept in order entirely +by machine-arrangements.</p> + +<p>However, I may be forgetting that in physiology +and pathology we have much evidence for assuming +a “projection” of retinal points upon definite points +of the <i>area striata</i> in the brain! I am not certain +whether the facts in question prove that between the +retina and the <i>area striata</i> conduction is completely +a point-to-point affair. But that does not matter, +since at the present time neurologists no longer believe +that the <i>area striata</i> is the terminus of optic +processes and that visual experience is concomitant +with processes in <em>this</em> area. If up to this region +conduction should be a matter of strictly isolated +<span class="pagenum" id="p132">[132]</span>paths, the functional problem we are occupied with +would have to be solved in parts beyond the <i>area +striata</i>.</p> + +<p>I shall be told that the nervous system consists +of cells the fibers of which <em>are</em> isolated from each +other. I answer that in its gray ganglionic and +nuclear fields conditions are different. Here mutual +influence is not only possible; it is necessary.</p> + +<p>But what of the all-or-none law? Does it not +prove that elementary conduction is a matter of +each single nerve fiber, occurring in one definite +manner as long as the properties of the conductor +remain the same? Experimental investigation of +the all-or-none law is not yet complete and, so far +as I know, we have no evidence as yet of its application +to central fields. Supposing, however, that it +holds in brain tissue as it seems to hold in peripheral +nerves, the alternative between a strict machine +theory of distribution and dynamical conceptions +would remain as open as before, because, then, in +each part of the nervous system the number of elementary +organs taking part in any actual process, +i.e., the density of the process, would have to be determined +somehow, as would also the frequency of +current in each single organ. Both properties of +the process may either depend upon given local arrangements +or upon dynamical intercourse in the +ganglionic tissue. As distribution of energy is a +dynamical problem in physics notwithstanding the +quantum theory, so the all-or-none law, as a sort +of quantum theory in nerve physiology, does not exclude +dynamical distribution of process.</p> + +<p>A final argument which maintains that distribution +of process by preëstablished and isolating conductors +is the only way to explain the order of the +field in its relation to the external physical world, +seems to have two parts. <em>First</em>, it presupposes that +<span class="pagenum" id="p133">[133]</span>dynamical interaction, not controlled by special arrangements +at each step, must produce chaos and +confusion. We have here the old human prejudice +which, in a great many cases of dynamical interaction, +is absolutely unwarranted. <em>Secondly</em>, as to the +relation between the external physical world and the +sensory field, the theory of isolated conductors enforcing +order would explain a strict correspondence +of sensory facts to <em>retinal stimulation</em>. But in the +last chapter we saw that much experience is exiled +“into the dust-cloud” of psychology by introspectionism +just because it does <em>not</em> agree at all with the +properties of stimulation. To be sure, the constancy +of size, form, brightness, localization and speed in +the sensory field corresponds fairly well with the +constant properties of <em>physical objects</em>; but this +agreement is <em>not</em> explained by the machine theory of +vision which refers to constant relations between +local <em>retinal stimulation</em> and local experience.</p> +</blockquote> + +<p>If we are not satisfied by the alternative between +order enforced by preëstablished arrangements and +order determined by acquired arrangements, what +else can produce order? For the moment we restrict +our discussion to sensory processes and return to our +statement (cf. p. <a href="#p111">111</a>) that, in physical systems, the +relative influence of topographical conditions, on the +one hand, and of the play of actual forces, on the +other, may vary enormously. In typical man-made +machines the rôle of topographical conditions prevails +to such an extent that the only rôle of dynamics +is to drive processes along a path laid down by those +conditions. This means that typical machines are +essentially a <em>special</em> type of physical system and that +<span class="pagenum" id="p134">[134]</span>outside the little world of man-made machines there +exists an immense world of other physical systems, +in which the direction of processes is not completely +determined by topographical arrangements.</p> + +<p>Let us consider a drop in a current of water which +moves through a narrow pipe. Why does it move? +Because, aside from inertia, pressure is higher on +one side of it than on the other. But this difference +of pressure works in one direction only, the walls of +the pipe excluding all its other effects. Now let us +suppose that the pipe disappears and that the drop +(and the whole column of water in the pipe) becomes +a part of a larger volume of water. The drop +will probably also move in its new environment. But +now it is exposed to forces on all sides, and its movement +will be in the direction of the <em>resultant</em> vector +of force. Obviously this movement is no less necessary +than was the movement in the pipe, but here +there is no local arrangement which can determine a +single direction as the only one possible. Therefore +the path of the drop will be determined <em>dynamically</em> +in the new case, i.e., by resultant force at each moment. +It follows that in this situation the path +which our drop takes will depend upon the dynamical +situation it encounters at each stage, and that it +will change when this situation changes. This is +one simple example out of millions. <em>In all of them +not only movement, or process as such, but also the +direction and distribution of process is determined</em> +<span class="pagenum" id="p135">[135]</span><em>dynamically by interaction</em>. It is events of this type +which are excluded almost completely from machines, +and the same type of process is practically +excluded by standard neurological and psychological +theory. <i>Gestalt</i> psychology sees no ground +for its exclusion and rather proposes to give this +type of process a fundamental rôle in psychological +theory.</p> + +<p>In the pipe the drop of water moves because movement, +under differential pressure, is an approach toward +equilibrium. Such is the effect of forces at +all points of all systems. When surrounded by water, +the movement of the drop will still be an illustration +of the same rule.⁠<a id="FNanchor_21_21" href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> The only difference is that +now the direction of movement, according to the +rule, will depend upon the actual <em>dynamical</em> situation. +If we consider all the drops in the given volume +of water, we will find the distribution of water +gradually changing from one moment to the next. +But whereas in pipes the distribution of the movement +in space depends upon the form and the spatial +position of the pipes, in the “dynamical case” it depends +mainly upon the play of actual forces. In +pipes, order is produced by <em>exclusion</em> of dynamical +interaction; whatever distribution may result in the +“dynamical case” is <em>produced</em> by dynamics itself.</p> + +<p>At this point our interest concentrates upon this +<span class="pagenum" id="p136">[136]</span>question, whether Aristotelians and modern theorists +are right in assuming that <em>anything</em> may happen in +dynamical interaction and that, therefore, dynamics +is to be regarded almost as a synonym for disorder. +What we see around us in inorganic nature seems to +corroborate that opinion, since the blind meeting of +forces and processes usually leads to chaos and destruction. +What we have before us in these cases, +however, may be described as follows: There is a +thing at rest or a process going on uniformly; suddenly +a new factor impinges upon the first thing or +process from without, and after a short while, another +new influence, again independent, is exerted +from without, and so forth. Anything indeed may +happen under these circumstances, and in most cases +the end result of such fortuitous concurrence is disorder +and destruction. This, I think, is the picture +most men have in mind when they refer to dynamics, +as though accidental impact were its only form!</p> + +<p>There are, however, other cases, much more interesting +for our present discussion. If in a basin, +for instance, water is somehow distributed, perhaps +in full movement, at a given moment there is a definite +pressure at each point, and everywhere differences +of pressure will tend to alter the distribution +and the direction of local drops of water. Supposing +now that the basin itself does not change and that +no outer influences accidentally impinge upon the +system during its redistribution, what will the result +<span class="pagenum" id="p137">[137]</span>of continual internal interaction be? If we try to +find the answer by imagining an indefinite number +of drops, each moving under the resultant force in +its immediate proximity, and each again influencing +its proximate neighbors by that movement,—if we +notice that this picture changes continually, as the +distribution, and, therefore, the actually resultant +force at each point changes in the smallest fraction +of a second,—then we are inclined to dismiss the task +as beyond our efforts, and to treat the events of this +field in terms of the confusion or destruction that +is attributed to nature in the case of accidental impacts.</p> + +<p>But in this we are wrong. We are projecting our +own confusion into the course of objective events. +We become guilty of anthropomorphism. The +physicist has quite a different attitude toward the +problem. By observation, as well as by theoretical +calculation, he is led to the conclusion that, generally, +undisturbed dynamical interaction will produce +a definite orderly distribution.</p> + +<p>Let us review an example we entertained at the +beginning of this chapter. To Aristotelian theorists +the striking order of astronomical movements appeared +inexplicable without the assumption of special +arrangements controlling them. Now in modern +times no one believes in those crystal spheres. +But the order is there! And since the stars did not +“<em>learn</em>” to move so orderly, some factors other than +<span class="pagenum" id="p138">[138]</span>preëstablished and acquired topographical arrangements +must be able to produce and to maintain order +in distribution and movement. And in the prevalent +conception of the solar system, it is continuous dynamical +interaction, without any topographical arrangements, +which produced and still maintains the +order.</p> + +<p>Other examples may be found in all parts of physics +and chemistry: when two atoms come into their +sphere of mutual influence, the play of dynamic interaction +immediately begins, and, as the case may +be, depending upon their “relative properties,” they +either separate again or they form an orderly molecule,—an +architectonic structure,—without the aid +of any arrangements <i>ad hoc</i>.</p> + +<p>If we suspend a number of straight wires so that +they form different angles with each other, the whole +distribution being irregular, electric current entering +the wires turns them into parallel lines. This is +an orderly result of electrodynamic interaction.</p> + +<p>Or again, we pour oil into a liquid with which it +does not mix. In spite of the violent interaction of +molecules at their common surface, this surface remains +sharply determined, not by any arrangement +enforcing this orderly distribution, but just by the +play of surface dynamics between the oil and the +other liquid. If specific density is the same for both +liquids, these surface forces will change the distribution +<span class="pagenum" id="p139">[139]</span>until the oil forms a regular sphere swimming +in the other liquid.</p> + +<p>I might go on to describe hundreds of examples. +In all of them the situation would be the same in +principle. Dynamical interaction, undisturbed by +accidental impacts from without, leads to orderly +distribution, though there are no special preëstablished +arrangements.</p> + +<p>And what is the explanation of this general tendency +in undisturbed dynamics? It is simple enough. +In all these systems we have one resulting force at +each point at each instant of time. All the resultant +forces together form one texture of stresses. From +the principles of physics one can deduce, therefore, +that, <em>for the system as a whole</em>, the immediate effect +of all those forces will have one definite direction. +At each point the forces will produce changes of +movement or process which, when considered in their +totality, bring the system nearer to the balance of the +forces themselves. The factor of inertia may cause +the real course of events to deviate from the ideal +exemplification of this principle. But where, as in +most organic systems, inert velocities not corresponding +to actual forces are destroyed by friction, the +real distribution of processes will exhibit the principle +perfectly, and will finally reach a state of stability, +of rest or of stationary process. The fact that +this state will be an <em>orderly</em> distribution has been +<span class="pagenum" id="p140">[140]</span>explained by Ernst Mach as follows: In orderly +and regular distributions the totality of internal +stresses will be more balanced than in a state of disorder. +Therefore, by undisturbed interaction a system +approaches order. For all details I must refer +the reader to the literature quoted at the end of this +chapter.⁠<a id="FNanchor_22_22" href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></p> + +<p><em>Dynamical self-distribution</em> is the third kind of +functional concept which I propose to add to psychological +theory, in addition to distribution enforced +by inherited arrangements and order determined by +acquired arrangements. More concretely and for +the visual field, my assumption is that the order and +distribution in this field is in each case the result of +dynamical interaction. From this viewpoint the +processes underlying the visual field in a state of <em>rest</em> +represent the equilibrated distribution of sensory dynamics +under actually given conditions. When not +at rest, sensory dynamics will be in a state of <em>developing +dynamical distribution</em>.</p> + +<p>Though the direction of local process in a system +is not altogether determined by local arrangement, +the result of dynamical self-distribution as a whole +may still depend upon topographical conditions (cf. +pp. <a href="#p112">112</a>–113). Thus the electric current in a network +<span class="pagenum" id="p141">[141]</span>of wires is distributed dynamically; yet the actual +distribution as a whole depends upon the position of +the electrodes and upon the conductivities in all the +conductors. Similarly, the totality of processes in +the optical part of the nervous system will depend +upon given conditions in each case. For the moment, +though this will prove to be an inexact assumption +when it is examined more closely, I shall suppose +that in the interior of the optical network the +general conditions of conduction remain constant. +But, then, as a set of peripheral conditions, we have +the patterns of different chemical reactions on the +retina, as they are produced in each case by actual +stimulation. Upon these varying conditions the self-distribution +of process will depend primarily. If +neurologists are correct when they assert that between +the retina and the <i>area striata</i> of both hemispheres, +conduction is a matter of isolated pathways, then the +<i>area striata</i> will be a sort of “central retina,” in +which the pattern of retinal stimulation is copied by +a pattern of central processes. In this case <em>dynamical</em> +distribution will begin here, depending upon the +actual pattern of processes in the occipital lobes.</p> + +<p>It will be evident that the task such a theory must +face is enormously more difficult than that of machine +theory. Where arrangements are altogether +responsible for distribution, the concrete dynamical +properties of process are of little concern. If we do +not know about them, it does not matter very much. +<span class="pagenum" id="p142">[142]</span>In dynamical theory, on the contrary, the whole development +of the theory requires that we know those +properties of the process. And since as yet physiology +is not very instructive concerning them, the extension +of the theory depends instead upon the assumptions +which we make. Experimentation on visual +experiences will have to give us the necessary +hints for making our hypotheses, and the consequences +of our hypotheses will then have to be tested +by experiments of the same sort. At the present time +only the first steps have been made in this direction, +and it will take us a long time before we feel firm +ground under our feet. Let us remember, however, +that all the perplexities we may find on our way, and +all the mistakes we make in its course, are not to be +referred to the fundamental concept of self-distribution +by interaction; they should be referred to the +particular assumptions concerning process, force and +interaction, which we have made.</p> + +<p>As an example which will make our analysis more +concrete, I shall introduce one special problem. If +from a given pattern, either on the retina or on the +“central retina,” processes start into the conducting +network beyond, and if their distribution is determined +dynamically, why should differences among +the processes, corresponding to differences in color, +be preserved on the way? This is generally the case: +to the accurate retinal contour of the image of a letter +on a white page corresponds the sharp outline of +<span class="pagenum" id="p143">[143]</span>the letter in my visual field. If the totality of processes +issuing from the area of the letter remains detached +somehow from the processes surrounding it, +we may understand, perhaps, how even in dynamical +distribution the most essential and crude geometrical +properties of retinal pattern may be sustained. But +how can one set of processes remain detached from +the rest in dynamical theory? This embarrassing +question certainly could not occur for the assumption +of isolated pathways. My answer is based on the +fundamental principle of the theory. If under these +circumstances one set of processes remains detached +from the rest there must be dynamical factors at +work. Generally, processes corresponding to a definitely +colored area will have definite properties as a +class of processes, different from the properties of a +class of surrounding processes which corresponds to +another color. They will remain segregated in the +nervous network if we suppose that in the ganglionic +fields, where they “touch” each other, their differential +properties provide <em>separating forces of contact</em>, +so that they mutually exclude each other. Take as +an example the contact of oil and water. Here interaction +is so strong that the form of the surface is determined +by it; but this surface as such remains a +sharp boundary and the drop of oil remains detached +from the water by those same molecular forces which, +at the time, mold the form of the drop. I shall +assume, then, that, in optical processes, contours are +<span class="pagenum" id="p144">[144]</span>preserved by similar forces of antagonistic contact, +depending upon differences in the properties on the +two sides of the contour. From this viewpoint, interaction +will thus determine general distribution; it +will also have an influence upon size and form, and +so forth, but it will not generally “dissolve” processes, +corresponding to a homogeneous area of color, +in the surrounding processes. This may seem a bold +hypothesis. But recent experiments have shown that +this assumption is in the right direction. It would +be surprising if <em>all</em> process differences should act as +separating surface forces of the kind just described +in the case of color, for in physics such forces exist +between oil and water, for instance, but not between +water and alcohol, or a great many other pairs of +different materials. Indeed, when reëxamining the +results of older experimental investigations, Liebmann⁠<a id="FNanchor_23_23" href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> +proved that, whereas very slight differences +of brightness gave sharp contours, neighboring areas +of different color, even with maximal differences of +chroma <em>alone</em>, will show mutual diffusion.⁠<a id="FNanchor_24_24" href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> We may +conclude, then, that mainly differences of brightness +provide effective forces of separation. Under normal +conditions neighboring areas of different chroma +will almost always be different in brightness. Therefore, +sharp contours on the retina will in most cases +give accurate contours in the visual field.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p145">[145]</span></p> + +<p>Without further discussion we can draw a rather +important conclusion. We are accustomed to regard +order enforced by rigid arrangements as exceptionally +secure. If, however, the order of sensory experience +be conceived as the result of sensory dynamics, +this will seem to most people like explaining +the quiet life of an orderly citizen as the outcome +of many moral struggles and catastrophes. But, in +this connection, the chief point is that in those cases +in which the machine theory of visual order seems to +be most convincing, dynamical theory gives exactly +the same results. As an example we may take the +symmetry of a seen circle, corresponding to the symmetry +of its retinal image. Is it necessary to explain +this correspondence by insulated conductors which +maintain the geometrical properties of the retinal +image all along the line of those processes underlying +visual experience? By no means. Assuming +that surface forces of separation keep the processes +of the circle distinct from the surrounding processes, +the dynamical influences exerted upon the processes +of the circle will be the same in all directions,⁠<a id="FNanchor_25_25" href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> if, in +the immediate neighborhood of the circle, surrounding +processes are homogeneous. Therefore, if the +network has the same conducting properties throughout +that part of the nervous system, i.e., if it is functionally +<span class="pagenum" id="p146">[146]</span>“homogeneous,” there will be not the slightest +reason why the symmetry of the process should +be disturbed. In this case, dynamical theory gives +the same result, then, which until now has been +rather clumsily explained by preëstablished arrangements +<i lang="la">ad hoc</i>.</p> + +<p>Since the rôle dynamics plays is so slight in contemporary +theory, it may seem very strange to some +psychologists. Hence I wish to make the following +statement expressly: <em>these concepts do not contain a +single thought in the direction of vitalism</em>. It is true +that a number of difficulties may be removed by +them, difficulties which vitalism can still raise quite +properly against the claims of unqualified “mechanistic” +ideas. But, in our field of research, “mechanistic” +ideas have almost always been explanations +by topographical arrangements, and “dynamical” +ideas, the type of idea prevalent in general physics, +occurred no more to the mechanist than to the vitalist.</p> + +<p>I shall not try to develop more detailed theorems +about sensory dynamics until we become further acquainted +with the main facts and their significance. +Some consequences of dynamical theory will be obvious +at once. From this viewpoint, sensory experience +is allowed to be as <em>fluid</em> and <em>manifold</em> as, to +observation, it reveals itself. Furthermore, as local +processes are not isolated,—their existence and their +actual properties depending upon the dynamical context +<span class="pagenum" id="p147">[147]</span>in a larger area,—the visual field may prove to +be <em>organized</em>. In this case, as everywhere in physics, +organization will be found to depend upon what I +have called the “relative properties” of stimulation. +We may eventually find specific properties in experience +characteristic of extended areas and not analyzable +into local sensations, just as existence exclusively +as <em>functional wholes</em> is a property of many dynamical +states in physics. The next chapters will +be concerned with the development of these matters.</p> + + +<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h3> + +<blockquote> +<p>K. Koffka: <cite>The Growth of the Mind</cite>. 1924.</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im +stationären Zustand</cite>. 1920.</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Gestaltprobleme und Anfänge einer Gestalttheorie</cite>. +1924.</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Komplextheorie und Gestalttheorie</cite>. Psychol. +Forsch. 6. 1925.</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Zur Theorie der Regulation</cite>. Arch. f. Entwicklungsmech. +1927.</p> + +<p>M. Wertheimer: <cite lang="de">Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt, I</cite>. +Psychol. Forsch. 1. 1921.</p> + +<p>M. Wertheimer: <cite lang="de">Drei Abhandlungen zur Gestalttheorie</cite>. +1925.</p> +</blockquote> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p148">[148]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="V"> + V + <br> + <i>Sensory Organization</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>A DYNAMICAL distribution will be rightly +regarded as a functional whole. Take, for example, +a simple electric circuit: the differences of +potential and the densities of current distribute themselves +along the conductors in such a manner that a +stable or stationary state is produced and maintained. +No part of this distribution is self-sufficient; +local processes depend throughout upon the totality +of the distribution.</p> + +<p>If a similar conception is to be applied to the processes +underlying sensory experience, we must avoid +a mistake. Protesting against the atomism which had +been introduced into the treatment of sensory experience, +William James once said that, in the sensory +field, local experiences are interwoven with +their neighbors in a manner which is beyond the +grasp of purely intellectual theory. He seems to +think that, in original sensory experience, there +is uniform continuity and that all cuts and boundaries +are introduced later on for pragmatic reasons.</p> + +<p>From the viewpoint of <i>gestalt</i> psychology such a +statement does not correspond to the facts. In the +last chapter we saw that, notwithstanding the general +<span class="pagenum" id="p149">[149]</span>dynamical interdependence throughout the field, +there may be boundaries in it where forces of “segregation” +and “separation” take the place of those of +“coherence” operating elsewhere.</p> + +<p>Indeed, in the visual field, for instance, we have +two kinds of order. One of them is the order with +which we found the machine theory occupied in its +effort to explain how a given local process is properly +placed between its neighbors, and not confused therewith. +However, there is another order in the field +which has escaped the attention of many psychologists, +though it is not less important than the first. +In most visual fields the contents of certain areas “belong +together,” so that we have circumscribed, or +bounded, units before us, from which their surroundings +are excluded. If James did not admit this +organization of the field as a sensory fact, the reason +for it was the enormous power of the theory of +meaning, which has been an obdurate obstacle to our +seeing important problems, more in this connection +than elsewhere. For the same reason there may be +only a few readers who will not quarrel with the next +paragraphs as long as they see any possibility of so +doing.</p> + +<p>When I look at the desk before me I find quite a +number of circumscribed units which appear detached +and segregated in the field: a piece of paper +as against the surface of the desk, a pencil, an eraser, +a cigarette, and so forth. In all these cases there are +<span class="pagenum" id="p150">[150]</span>two mutually dependent conditions. The existence +of a unit involves its segregation from its surroundings. +In order to satisfy myself that I am here talking +about realities, I may try to form other units +consisting of parts of those objects and parts of their +environment taken together. In some cases my +attempt will be a complete failure. In others, where, +for some reason, there is greater success, the result is +so strange that it indicates by contrast what a specific +reality the original organization was.</p> + +<p>But the reader says: Of course, you are somehow +talking about realities. Still, something may be real +psychologically without belonging to sensory experience +proper. How can you forget for a moment +that a piece of paper, a pencil, a cigarette, are objects +known by use! You have handled them during many +years and so you had more opportunity than you +needed for learning that they <em>behave</em> practically as +units. This previous experience being projected into +your field of vision, why do you lay so much stress +upon a simple fact which is widely known and well +explained, and which has been accounted for ever +since, or probably even before, Aristotle wrote his +textbook of psychology. My answer will be more +extensive than this argument. Until we are able +to prevent such superficial applications of the +meaning principle, there can be little agreement +about the most elementary problems of <i>gestalt</i> psychology. +Who in the world would deny that a piece +<span class="pagenum" id="p151">[151]</span>of paper, a pencil, and so on, are well-known objects? +That I know their uses and their names by previous +experience and that hence they are full of “meaning,” +shall also be granted without hesitation. But from +these facts there is a large step to the statement that +neither the paper nor the pencil would exist <em>as segregated +units</em> in my visual field without that previous +knowledge about their practical behavior and use. +It may be that before I had that knowledge the same +things occurred in the sensory field as units, unknown +and unnamed, but still as segregated wholes. When +I see a <em>green</em> object, I can tell the name of the color +immediately; furthermore I know that green is used +as a signal on railroad tracks and also as a symbol of +hope. But I do not believe that, therefore, the color +green <em>as such</em> must be explained by meaning. Existing +independently it has acquired several secondary +properties in my lifetime and I agree with the reader +in praising all the advantages which this kind of +learning holds for all of us. In exactly the same +manner, sensory units may have acquired names and +may have become richly symbolic in the context of +our knowledge, while existing, nevertheless, as +segregated units in the sensory field prior to +such accretions. Such is the conception which +<i>gestalt</i> psychology offers to defend. It even goes so +far as to hold that it is precisely the original organization +and segregation of circumscribed wholes which +make it possible for the sensory world to appear so +<span class="pagenum" id="p152">[152]</span>utterly imbued with meaning to the adult, because, +in its gradual entrance into the sensory field, meaning +follows the lines drawn by natural organization. It +usually enters into segregated wholes.</p> + +<p>If the explanation by meaning were correct, wholes +should be segregated in the field only insofar as they +are recognized as definite known objects. But this +is not the case. Looking into a dark corner or walking +through mist in the evening, the reader will frequently +have found before him an unknown something, +detached from its environment as one whole, +the use or the meaning of which he did not discover +until after a more detailed observation. Walking +through an unknown country at night, I have often +had such an unrecognized whole in the field for +several minutes. It is evident to me, therefore, that +my knowledge about the practical behavior of things +does not determine their existence as detached units. +The same argument may be restated in a more general +form. Whenever we say to ourselves or others: +Now, look here! What may that something there +be, at the foot of that hill, just to the right of the +next tree, between those two houses, and so on?—we +ask about the meaning or the use of that something, +demonstrating by our very question that segregation +is independent of knowledge and meaning. As, in +physics, a molecule is segregated as a functional unit, +so definite wholes seem to be dynamically detached in +the sensory field.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p153">[153]</span></p> + +<p>But so fond are we of our empiristic convictions +that, in this predicament, the explanation by meaning +will immediately assume another form. Your +unknown whole, seen in the mist, so the reader will +say, appears as something separate, because it is +darker, for instance, than the gray mist around. I +admit that no <em>special</em> knowledge about this definite +group of sensations, as meaning a particular object +through past experience, is needed for unifying and +segregating it. But you under-rate the wonderful +achievements of previous experience if you restrict +its effects to particular cases. We have always observed +that a set of adjacent sensations, possessing +almost the same quality, different from that of the +environment, “behave together,” i.e., move and are +moved, appear and disappear, at the same time. This +is the case with stones, with papers, with hats, with +boots, with many animals, with leaves. As physical +objects they are bound together, so that physically +they move as units. It is only one example of the +well-known generalizing power of memory if now +we treat as units and even believe we <em>see</em> as units <em>all</em> +groups of adjacent sensations which are more or +less homogeneously colored and sufficiently different +from their surroundings. So we must not be astonished +by the fact that, in the mist for instance, an +area of darker nuance is seen as one individual something, +though we may be unable to tell its <em>special</em> use +or meaning.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p154">[154]</span></p> + +<p>I am not satisfied, however, by this form of the +theory either. Units are formed and segregated in +the field in a great many cases where this rather bold +explanation does not apply. Take all units consisting +of separate parts! If we look up at the sky on a clear +night, some constellations of stars are seen immediately +as belonging together and as detached from +their environment. Cassiopeia is an example, the +Dipper is another. In past ages people saw the same +groups as belonging together and at the present time +children do not need instruction in order to perceive +them as units. In Fig. 1 the reader has before him +two definite groups of patches. Why not merely six +patches? Or two other groups? Or three groups of +two members each? Looking passively at the figure +every one beholds those particular groups in the field, +two units being segregated, each containing three +definite patches. What about generalized meaning +in these cases? No previous experience could separate +Cassiopeia from the other fixed stars around it. +As far as everyday experience goes, they all move +together. And no hint at the generalizing properties +of memory will help here. We cannot possibly assert +<span class="pagenum" id="p155">[155]</span>that we have <em>learnt</em> to see a number of separate +patches, similar to each other and different from the +environment, as one thing or one group, because they +move together regularly. They are very far from +doing that. On the desk in my room are sitting five +flies which are five black dots as I see them from +where I am. These dots begin to move separately +and to move in different directions. So do three +yellow leaves which a breeze lifts from the ground +separately; so again three stones which my hand +moves, one after the other. My general experience +is that, at least as often as not, similar members of a +group, which are separated by the common background, +are movable and move <em>independently</em>. If, +nevertheless, in this case definite groups are formed +and segregated, this happens despite our general +previous knowledge about the behavior of their +members.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig01"> +<img src="images/fig01.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 1</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Investigating <em>which</em> separate “patches” tend to become +included in one group, we find that, among +other factors, their equality or similarity and their +common difference from other “patches,” favor their +becoming grouped together and their segregation +from others. So we see that in the case of separate +members the same rule holds, without the influence +of meaning, which was said to explain unknown <em>continuous</em> +wholes under the influence of generalized +previous knowledge (cf. p. <a href="#p153">153</a>). Consequently, in +this latter case, the indirect genesis of groupings +<span class="pagenum" id="p156">[156]</span>through previous experience is not needed any more +than it is where separate members form groups. The +grouping of separate members is used in one of our +tests for color-blindness: A rectangular field is filled +with dots at equal distances from each other. For +the normal eye certain groups of them belong together +and are seen segregated from the rest at once, +and since these groups form written numbers, normal +persons will read the numbers without difficulty. +The dots in question have similar chroma and are +sufficiently different from the others to appear as one +group which, as a whole, is recognized immediately. +But for those color-blind people who do not perceive +the given differences of chroma, no group will be +segregated spontaneously, so that they do not see and +cannot read the numbers. In this example, the general +acquaintance with numbers is the same for both +normal and color-blind subjects. Therefore, the +striking difference as to grouping depends directly +upon sensory conditions.</p> + +<p>Groups consisting of separate members have a special +interest for theory insofar as they also prove that +one unit segregated in the field may at the same time +belong to a larger unit. One dot in our last example +represents a continuous detached area; still it is a +member of a larger whole, the number, which as a +larger unit is again segregated in the whole field. +There is nothing peculiar or mystical in such a subordination, +since, in physics, a molecule as a larger +<span class="pagenum" id="p157">[157]</span>functional whole contains several atoms as subordinate +wholes. The atoms belong to the molecule +functionally; still they do not altogether lose their +functional individuality in that dynamical whole.</p> + +<p>Following the casual observations of others, Wertheimer +was the first to see the fundamental importance +of spontaneous grouping in sensory fields +and to demonstrate, by a great many examples, the +main principles upon which it depends. Most of his +illustrations entail the grouping of separate dots or +lines, because, by using meaningless constellations in +this manner, it is easier to guard the demonstration +against disturbing arguments and criticism in terms +of previous knowledge. He has pointed out most +clearly, however, that the same principles may hold +for all formation and segregation of wholes. I do +not know a better introduction to these problems than +is given by Wertheimer’s paper of 1923.⁠<a id="FNanchor_26_26" href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> The reader +is asked to make himself acquainted with them by +studying it. Some of the principles are easy to understand. +We have already considered one of them, +which claims that the equal and the similar tend to +form units separated from what is dissimilar to them. +Where we have no differences of quality, or other +properties, among the members, relative distance will +often be decisive. In one of our examples <em>two</em> groups +(of three members each) are formed, because among +the six patches some distances are small as compared +<span class="pagenum" id="p158">[158]</span>with others, those patches, the distances separating +which are relatively small, belonging together in one +group. In some cases, perhaps the most interesting +ones, it seems more natural to define the rule of +grouping not by given conditions, but by the tendency +toward certain results. As the physicist is accustomed +to say that surface tension works in the line +of reduction of surface, so in the sensory field grouping +will produce certain wholes rather than others. +We may say that simple and regular wholes, or +closed areas, are formed more easily and more generally +than irregular, or “broken,” and open wholes. +It becomes evident here that, in contrast to the +indifferent mosaic of sensations assumed in older +theory, this order of the field shows a strong “predilection” +for certain general kinds of organization as +against others, exactly as the formation of molecules +and the working of surface forces in physics operates +in certain definite directions.⁠<a id="FNanchor_27_27" href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a></p> + +<p>Recently the nature of grouping as a sensory and +elementary fact has been demonstrated in the most +convincing manner by experiments which Hertz has +made on birds (<i>Garrulus glandarius</i>).⁠<a id="FNanchor_28_28" href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> A number +of little flower-pots are put upon the ground upside +down. If the rather tame bird, sitting high up on a +<span class="pagenum" id="p159">[159]</span>branch, sees that the experimenter puts some food +under one of the pots, he will come down very soon, +lift the pot and take the food. This is a simple form +of “delayed reaction” as Hunter investigated it years +ago. In these experiments, however, the main point +was not the <em>delay</em> of reaction as such, but its dependence +upon the actual constitution of the field. The +bird reacts without difficulty if there is one pot only. +But when there is more than one everything depends +upon whether the “right” pot in some way stands out +from the rest in the aggregate. If it is put in a regular +line with the others so that, for human vision, it +becomes absorbed as one indifferent member in a +series, the bird lifts one pot or another in a haphazard +way, even if the distances between them are as large +as 25 cm. As soon, however, as, by grouping, the +right pot becomes something strikingly apart, i.e., +segregated from the rest for the human observer, the +bird selects the right object at once. So in the case +of Fig. 2, in which the right pot is physically only +<span class="pagenum" id="p160">[160]</span>10 cm. apart from a straight line of other pots, it is +chosen at once. Obviously, here, the line of other +pots is a well-bound whole and the one pot a segregated +thing by itself for the bird as it is for man. +Even in the situation of Fig. 3, where the right object +is 6 cm. from the next and this 2 cm. from the last, +grouping is definite enough to allow an accurate reaction. +But in the case of Fig. 4, where the right +object is 3 cm. apart from the next and this 2 cm. +from the last, reactions become a matter of chance. +The bird cannot keep the right pot apart before reacting, +unless definite grouping helps him to do so. +If the grouping is very well determined for man, +however, the bird will have no difficulties at all, +though the right object may be in immediate contact +with its next neighbor. In the situation of Fig. 5, +12 pots are arranged so that they form a closed +ellipse for human vision. The right pot is put close +<span class="pagenum" id="p161">[161]</span>to one of the other twelve. The human observer will +have before him one closed whole and one object outside. +The bird chooses the right one at once. This +example seems to me particularly valuable, because +it shows that single objective distances as such are not +decisive, but rather the grouping which results from +the <em>total</em> constellation. How Hertz was able to demonstrate +similar effects by the application of other +principles, as, for instance, differences in size or +chroma, may be better appreciated by reading the +original paper. To me these experiments seem to +open an altogether new field of research in animal +psychology, providing we give up our somewhat conservative +and negativistic mood in this branch of +science, and begin to believe in the possibility of new +problems. But as that negativism has not yet disappeared +<span class="pagenum" id="p162">[162]</span>completely, I should remark that, if grouping +is demonstrated in these birds as a “sensory fact,” +it does not imply “consciousness” in the animals. +From our viewpoint, it is true, this does not matter +very much (cf. above Chapter II). One thing is +proved, however, that grouping occurs in sensory +processes.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig02"> +<img src="images/fig02.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 2</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig03"> +<img src="images/fig03.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 3</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig04"> +<img src="images/fig04.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 4</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig05"> +<img src="images/fig05.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 5</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>By further experimentation it must be possible to +find out how far birds and other animals see <em>continuous</em> +wholes, segregated in the field, as man does; +though even now it would be difficult to understand +the behavior of those birds, and their reactions to +grouping, if the pots themselves were not detached +units in their field. In any case the elementary +nature of continuous wholes is demonstrated by certain +observations on the first reactions of congenitally +blind persons after they have been operated upon. +Generally, the problems most interesting to the ophthalmologist +in those cases are those of visual depth +and of an original similarity between forms in vision +and forms in touch. Results have been discussed in +several ways, but in most of the cases one side of the +observed facts is not given adequate attention. It is +generally true that when the patient is asked about +an object, known by touch from previous life, but +given him the first time optically and without the +help of touch, there is no satisfactory answer; with a +very few exceptions the patient does not recognize +those forms directly. Still there is something very +<span class="pagenum" id="p163">[163]</span>positive in his reactions: When asked about “that +something” which he has before him, <em>he understands +the question</em>. Obviously he has before him some +thing as a segregated unit, to which he refers the +question and which he tries to name. At least, if the +object is a simple and compact form, the patient does +not have to <em>learn</em> what “aggregate of sensations” he +shall “treat as one thing.” Thus elementary organization +is an original sensory fact.</p> + +<p>In Wertheimer’s paper on sensory grouping one +finds the same problem discussed in the case of wholes +of a somewhat different sort. As we experience <em>time</em>, +it has some properties in common with space, particularly +with one dimension of it, namely its sagittal +axis with man as the center. Therefore, words referring +to relations on this axis are used as terms for +temporal relations everywhere and in all languages. +In English we have something “before” or “behind” +us in both meanings; we look “forward” in space as +in time, and death will come “nearer” in time, as one +place is nearer to me in space than another. Perhaps, +physiologically, there is a corresponding similarity +between the two, because, with respect to the +organization and segregation of extended units, we +find the same general principles determining temporal +order which are known to us from the visual +field in a state of rest. By approaching my hand +now and then for two-second intervals to the opening +of an organ pipe which is sounding continually, I +<span class="pagenum" id="p164">[164]</span>can lower the pitch slightly. In hearing, the effect +will be a segregation of the corresponding number of +auditory units, the constant tone appearing as general +background and the somewhat different notes as +so many “patches” singled out from it. Of course, +there are no such units in the physical stimulation. +Physically we have thousands of waves of equal or +different wave-length, all of them following each +other indifferently. It hardly needs to be mentioned +that in the same manner an appropriate succession of +visual stimuli will be found to result in temporal unification +and segregation. The same thing is true of +touch and other senses. Again, “temporal dots” will +readily form “temporal groups” in all these cases, +the groups containing the dots as subordinate units +and so forth.</p> + +<p>It is in these <em>groups</em> that the principles of temporal +organization are recognized most easily. With my +finger I tap on the desk three times at very short intervals +and, after waiting for a second, I repeat the +tapping. People who hear this sequence for a while +get groups in time. Physically each sound is indifferent +to every other; they are independent events as +the stars of Cassiopeia are practically independent. +Logically, other forms of grouping are quite possible +which do not occur, however, in the experience of an +observer who is listening calmly. Therefore, the +groups, as we observe them, represent an example of +physiological or, if one likes, psychological organization. +<span class="pagenum" id="p165">[165]</span>The principle determining it in this case is +relative distance in time exactly as relative distance in +space was a principle of grouping in the simultaneously +presented visual field. If all the intervals are +made equal, we still get groups when introducing differences +of intensity or quality in the series, especially +when the tapping is done according to a simple regular +scheme. In temporal sequences equality or similarity +plays the same rôle as against differences of +properties, which we have found in the visual field.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig06"> +<img src="images/fig06.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 6</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In the most general case of sensory organization +both space and time are involved in the same experience +of grouping. A simple example will show what +is meant: In a dark room we move a lamp hidden in +a box, so that one bright point is the only thing visible +on the dark ground. Let us suppose that the point +moves in the following form without a change in +speed: <i lang="la">vide</i> Fig. 6. A naïve observer will describe +what he has seen as three curious figures, or three +movements (I, II, III); perhaps he will correct himself +after a while and say that there were seven movements +(1, I, 2, II, 3, III, 4). But he will not say that +<span class="pagenum" id="p166">[166]</span>he saw 53 or 16 or 29 movements! Now, as applied +to the number of optical stimuli which impinge serially +upon his retinæ as quite independent events, there +is no reason why one of the larger numbers should be +less correct than three or seven. But, in experience, +instead of an indifferent series we again find a definite +product of organization. The reader will have realized +already that with respect to a more complex +experience such as I may have if I see some one “nodding +twice” or “shaking his head a few times,” there +is much in the experience that is not covered by our +present discussion; but, neglecting the meaning of +those particular movements, he will also realize that +there is a sensory organization of the given movements +into “two” or “a few” sub-wholes.</p> + +<p>This seems to be an appropriate place to mention +an indirect explanation of organization and grouping, +preferred by some of the best psychologists in +America. If I understand them rightly, a few of +them claim that the overt movements which we make +when responding to stimuli will produce the facts in +question. Others would say that one particular kind +of experience, namely, the kinesthesis occurring during +such movements, is responsible for organization +and grouping. In order to answer certain obvious +objections, the first will say that in adults mere <em>tendencies</em> +to movement will suffice instead of the overt +movements which occurred originally. Similarly, +the other hypothesis assumes that even faint reproductions +<span class="pagenum" id="p167">[167]</span>of past kinesthetic experiences will be sufficient +to explain organization of other (e.g., visual) +experiences in the adult.</p> + +<p>In either case, whether the tendency toward movement, +or kinesthetic experience, is taken as decisive, +the fundamental question will be how these factors +produce a definite organization, apparent in the +visual field, or elsewhere. As far as I can see the +only answers are, in the first case, that our overt +movements are organized in exactly the same manner +physiologically which, to naïve observation, is +plainly given, for instance, in the visual field; or, in +the second case, that kinesthetic experiences, and perhaps +their reproductions, exhibit that organization. +Whatever the process may be, by which organization +is supposed to be introduced into the chief sensory +field, which for most persons is that of vision, it cannot +be imported without existing beforehand in +whichever region it is said to have its origin. As +long as we consider peripheral movements or sequences +of kinesthetic experiences as a series of +instantaneous events which follow each other independently +and indifferently, it will hardly be possible +to use them to explain the occurrence of definite +segregated wholes and groups anywhere. Let us take +the bright point moving in dark space as an example. +If we say that the observer talks about three or seven +movements in this case, because he makes or experiences +three or seven eye-movements, we are presupposing +<span class="pagenum" id="p168">[168]</span>the same organization in the temporal and +spatial sequence of eye-movements, or the experiences +of them, which I personally seem to have in +the visual field <em>as such</em>. Otherwise the observer +might as well report 53 or 29 or any other number +of events, for apart from organization such an enumeration +would be no more arbitrary than that of +three or seven parts.</p> + +<p>I was once told that all the observations of <i>gestalt</i> +psychology are very old and have long been explained +by the kinesthetic experiences which occur +during eye-movements. This sounds as though a +hint about the kinesthetic experiences accompanying +vision were satisfactory as an explanation of the phenomena +of visual organization. But we see that, instead +of having solved the problem, we have only +shifted it from one place to another, for now we have +to solve the problem of the segregation of wholes in +the temporal and spatial extension of kinesthetic experiences.</p> + +<p>I shall not deny that the problem of organization +exists in the field of movements and kinesthetic experiences. +On the contrary, I am convinced that the +facts in either of these fields cannot be understood +rightly without taking our point of view. But +why should movements and the processes underlying +kinesthetic experience be the only material capable +of being organized, or of being treated from the +viewpoint of <i>gestalt</i> theory? If organization is +<span class="pagenum" id="p169">[169]</span>physiologically possible in one field, why not in +others? In order to explain the apparent organization +of visual experience by accompanying motor +experiences, one must assume spatial as well as temporal +organization of these motor phenomena. I do +not see any reason why such organization should be +excluded from optics and acoustics. If there are +some more general grounds for the exclusion, I am +not yet aware of them. In the meantime we shall not +discuss the difficulties which would arise, were we to +try to explain <em>concrete</em> particular cases of visual organization +by motor phenomena, for in the next +chapter we shall again return to the question of indirect +explanations of organization.</p> + +<p>After what has been said about organization, we +cannot be surprised to learn that serious lesions in the +optical center of the brain may produce a kind of +“blindness” in persons, who at the same time are not +deprived of vision. Careful examination of such a +case by Gelb and Goldstein⁠<a id="FNanchor_29_29" href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> has shown that, here, the +field of vision has undergone a radical change, organization +having disappeared almost completely, so +that the field shows a more or less chaotic character. +Where he fixes his attention, the patient is able to +grasp some small fraction of a line, for instance, but +he can no longer see extended wholes as clear-cut +forms. It is particularly interesting to observe that +this patient begins spontaneously to rely to a great +<span class="pagenum" id="p170">[170]</span>degree upon motor experience instead of vision. +Following the fractions of contours, which are +clearer to him, with movements of the eye, he is able +in time to build up motor wholes and to recognize +them. So, if his name is written on a blackboard, +he will follow the first letters and soon guess the rest. +But it is possible to exclude this procedure by a simple +trick: draw a few lines, which have the same +color as the letters, across the name. Since to the +patient the name is never given optically as one simultaneously +and well-organized whole, and since +now he does not see it as one thing and the crossing +lines as another pattern apart from it, he will follow +parts of a letter or parts of the crossing lines indifferently. +The result is that he cannot read the name +under these circumstances. The example shows, by +the way, how much motor function, accompanying +vision, depends itself upon normal visual organization. +Organization being a matter of extended regions +of the field, wherever only local fractions may +become organized to some degree, the <em>control</em> which +organization in a large area normally exerts upon +the motor function, is made impossible, and results +like those I have just mentioned become inevitable.</p> + +<p>But why should wholes, detached by the operations +of sensory dynamics, correspond so generally to +objects, or things, in the practical meaning of the +words? Do we have to assume that a surprising +harmony is established between the laws of sensory +<span class="pagenum" id="p171">[171]</span>dynamics and the area or the limits of physical things +around us? No such assumption need be made, for +there are exceptions to the correspondence of sensory +organization and physical units. Take all the cases +of groups of separate members, the constellations in +the sky, the examples of dots forming definite groups +(Fig. 1) above, the instances of grouping in ornaments, +the parts of which are, in their physical nature, +indifferent to each other, i.e., without functional +interrelation. In countless cases organization +is a sensory reality without there being a corresponding +physical unit. Also, continuous sensory wholes +may occur in the absence of an homologous physical +unit. The reader himself at some time has seen a +strange object, perfectly unknown to him, which later +on, perhaps after some movement of his head and +eyes, metamorphosed into a single well-known thing +and some part of another one, these two together +having been, at first, unified and segregated as one +unknown whole. The same example shows that +sometimes to a definite physical object there does not +correspond a sensory unit, because in vision its parts +have been absorbed by surrounding areas which happen +to have qualities appropriate to this effect. This +was the case in the puzzle-pictures which years ago +amused the readers of magazines. And in the last +war it became a real art to make things, guns, cars, +boats, disappear at some distance by painting upon +them an irregular design, the parts of which would +<span class="pagenum" id="p172">[172]</span>form indifferent spots by intermingling with parts of +their environment. The objects themselves are destroyed +as optical realities and in their place appear +meaningless patches which do not arouse military +suspicion, since similar patches are produced constantly +by the accidental properties of country and +sea.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, it is not difficult to explain +why visual units in general correspond to physical +objects. The things around us are either made by +man or are products of nature. Objects of the first +class are prepared for our purposes. Therefore, we +give them a form and surface, etc., so that they are +likely to be seen without difficulty. Without knowing +the principles of sensory organization in an abstract +form, man works in conformity with them, and +so the physical units which are the products of his +art will appear as visual units. Furthermore, it is +not easy to create a somewhat compact object which, +when placed in a simple environment, would not +fulfill the general conditions of visual segregation. +Camouflage is a difficult art.</p> + +<p>With objects produced by nature, the situation +is not altogether different. A condition fulfilled by +most natural things is the presence of one class of surface +properties in contact with another class of surrounding +surface properties. This difference is due +to the fact that the common origin of the parts of one +thing will probably make them similar, whereas in +<span class="pagenum" id="p173">[173]</span>the surroundings the surface properties will generally +be of a different character. Therefore, one condition +of visual segregation is given in the case of most +things. Even if a stone lies half-embedded in the +sand, which is nothing but tiny fractions of the same +kind of stone, the difference of coherence, and therefore +of “inner detail,” between the surface-elements +of the stone and those of the sand will be sufficient +in most cases to make the stone optically one thing. +At least, at the boundary between a natural object +and its surroundings some discontinuity of properties +almost universally prevails. This discontinuity +separates the environment from the interior of the +object by a closed outline. Since, as a rule, that will +suffice to make even a meaningless area appear as a +segregated whole in the sensory field, it will certainly +have that effect where the boundary of a physical +object is concerned. If there are no such differences +and no discontinuity whatever between the object +and its surroundings, no visual unit will exist, it is +true. But try to find objects which, without fulfilling +any of the conditions of sensory segregation, are +still plainly before you, because of the influence of +meaning! You will have a hard task. Our general +experience shows that wherever the conditions of +visual segregation work against a unit, it will not +exist in the sensory field of a naïve observer, even if +it is well-known as such and is camouflaged only +momentarily by special circumstances. A more detailed +discussion would have to treat here the problem +<span class="pagenum" id="p174">[174]</span>of visual depth and the segregation of things +as three-dimensional wholes. But, though this question +is of the greatest importance for the correspondence +of physical units and sensory segregations, I +must leave it untouched for the present, because as +yet in this field experimentation as well as theory is +in a rather undeveloped state.</p> + +<p>In the last paragraphs I have laid some stress upon +the fact that organization in a sensory field is something +which originates as a characteristic achievement +of the nervous system. This emphasis has +become necessary because some psychologists have recently +said that, according to <i>gestalt</i> psychology, +“<i lang="de">gestalten</i>,” i.e., segregated sensory wholes in this +connection, exist outside the organism and simply extend +or project themselves into it. This is so absolutely +wrong that I cannot comprehend how the +misunderstanding arose.⁠<a id="FNanchor_30_30" href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a></p> + +<p>But after what we have seen, it is quite another +problem to ask how far sensory organization, though +being a characteristic achievement of the nervous +system, may have an objective value at the same time. +Between the physical objects around us and our eyes +waves of light are the only means of communication. +These do not bring the “<i lang="de">gestalten</i>” ready-made into +<span class="pagenum" id="p175">[175]</span>the organism; rather, the segregation of wholes occurs +in the nervous system; but the result may tell +more about some of the objective properties of the +world around us than the rays of light would be able +to do. We do not always learn more about an object, +the nearer we approach it. For instance, when a lens +is put in the way of the light reflected by a bright object, +it would not be wise, for the purpose of getting +a clear image of the object, to bring the screen as near +as possible to the lens (and thereby the object); at a +certain distance the projection tells much more about +the object than nearer by. Similarly, sensory organization +may give us a “truer” picture of the world +around us in some respects than the rays of light, +though these are the first messengers coming from the +objects and sensory organization occurs later on and +farther off.</p> + +<p>Indeed, the waves of light do not contain the slightest +indication of any organization or any “belonging +together” which may exist among the parts of the +objects by which they are reflected. Each element +of the physical surface reflects light independently +and, as reflectors, two elements of the surface of a +sheep, for instance, have no more to do with each +other than one of them has to do with a surface element +in the animal’s environment. In reflection, +therefore, no trace is left of those units which exist in +the physical world; they are dispersed completely +into an indifferent mass of rays, all equally independent +<span class="pagenum" id="p176">[176]</span>of each other. By the refractory properties +of our eye those rays, which come from one point in +the outside world, are made to converge upon one +point of the retina; also the geometrical relations of +the points on the surface of an object are reconstructed +here, in large measure. Still, each local +stimulus thus achieved is an independent affair, and +rays coming from elements of the surface of one +physical object, the sheep for instance, are as indifferent +to each other as they are to stimuli from +the sheep’s environment. So we have no organization +at all in retinal stimulation, no wholes, no +groups, no segregation. It cannot be asserted, in +opposition, that there is one definite area or patch on +the retina as the image of the animal, for the elements +of this area are as independent of each other functionally +as any one of them is independent of an +element outside the image. In psychology much +has been said about the stimulus-error which consists +in our confusing our knowledge about the physical +conditions of sensory experience with experience as +such. But another mistake, which I propose to call +the <em>experience-error</em>, is not less unfortunate. It occurs +when we unintentionally attribute certain properties +of sensory experience to the actual constellation +of stimuli, properties which are so very common +that we tend to apply them to whatever we are +thinking about. This is the case primarily, wherever +we have not yet learned to see the <em>problem</em> contained +<span class="pagenum" id="p177">[177]</span>in those common properties of experience. No wonder, +then, that neurologists and some psychologists +still talk about “<em>the</em> retinal process” corresponding to +an object, as though there were something like a segregated +functional unit on the retina. Whereas as a +matter of fact the whole retina is a mosaic of indifferently +related spots, and this is the case until sensory +organization begins physiologically.</p> + +<p>Once we have realized, however, that stimulation, +as such, is completely unorganized, the enormous +biological value of sensory organization will become +apparent. Since the rules governing this organization +conform to the structure of objective units, to +objective divisions, to objective “belonging together,” +in very many cases the result of their operation is a +kind of reconstruction of those aspects of the objective +physical situation which are temporarily lost +on the way between the objects and the sense organ. +It is true that continuous wholes are sometimes segregated, +and groups of separate members are often +formed, which do not correspond to objective physical +units. But that is not a serious deficiency when +compared with the indefinitely large number of cases +in which organization is a picture of objective facts. +If all the content of the sensory field were indifferent +grains of sensory stuff, it would be a hard task to +orientate ourselves in and to react to such a world. +I am not sure that even after years of trial and error +with regard to such a field, a child would <em>learn</em> to +<span class="pagenum" id="p178">[178]</span>organize it. Considering the situation impartially, +we may come to the conclusion that organization of +the field, as an original sensory fact, is much more +important biologically than the properties of local +stimulation are. Color-blind people are perfectly +able to adjust to their environment although their +experience has fewer nuances of stimulation than the +normal. This is so because their lack is not a serious +impediment with respect to the practically important +similarities and differences in stimulation. Differences +of chroma are usually associated with differences +of brightness (cf. p. <a href="#p144">144</a>). That is enough for +<em>organization</em>, and since most of our behavior will +be determined by this property of the field, even a +large deficit as to qualities does not matter very much.</p> + +<p>Organization is no less important for the procedure +of science than it is for practical life. We +saw in the first chapter that, as a physicist, sensory +experience is my only primary material. But what +experience? The system I am investigating, the apparatus +of research, its scale, the needle, and so forth, +are all of them segregated wholes, or sub-units, in my +sensory field. If they were not given to me in such +an order of “belonging together,” physical research +would be all but impossible. About this phase of +“objective method” we do not hear very much, when +behaviorists recommend the procedure of the natural +sciences to us. But we should, since, if we consider +physical research as a series of physiological events +<span class="pagenum" id="p179">[179]</span>occurring in the physicist, we are still confronted +with the problem of organization as an aspect of those +events, which is absolutely indispensable for their +success.</p> + +<p>At the same time we can understand why the formula +of “stimulus and response,” though sounding +well at first, is quite misleading as long as the term +“stimulus” is used as carelessly as most behaviorists +do use it. One stimulus, when taken in the strict +meaning of the word, is not followed by one definite +reaction in a great many cases (cf. Chapters III and +IV). In optics, for instance, the organism will respond +to an objective constellation of millions of +stimuli by developing, first of all, an organized field, +many and perhaps the most essential properties of +which have no physical partner among the single +stimuli (cf. Chapter VI). Reactions of the effector +organs may and will begin very soon, in many +cases; but, as the eye-movements show, even the first +of these reactions will depend upon the developing +organization of the field, because the laws of optically +determined eye-movements refer to the boundaries +of segregated wholes, to the situation of +these wholes in the field, and to lines, but not +to “sensations” as such. Apart from eye-movements, +what is called “acting” in man will be +a reaction to a well-developed field and in most +cases to some definite whole in it. If, therefore, +we say that in psychology the right formula is, +<span class="pagenum" id="p180">[180]</span><i>Constellation of stimuli—Organization—Reaction to +results of organization</i>, such a statement fits the facts +incomparably better than the usual one. The organism +is not barren functionally; it is not a box containing +conductors each with a separate function; it +responds to a situation, first, by dynamical events +peculiar to it <em>as a system</em> and, then, by behavior +which depends upon the results of that dynamical +organization and order. Suppose that somewhere in +a factory HNO<sub>3</sub> were produced out of its elements +and that in another part of the factory the product +of that chemical organization were used to dissolve +silver,—would you say that the silver reacts to nitrogen, +hydrogen and oxygen? You certainly would +not, because what happens to the silver depends upon +that chemical organization, and it cannot be understood +as a reaction either to those elements separately +or to the sum of them. If that is so, we should also be +very careful before we refer to types of behavior as +being reactions to “a stimulus” or to “some stimuli.” +Even the last expression would often be quite ambiguous, +because it might mean that the behavior in +question is the consequence of several stimuli working +independently at the same time, whereas it may +depend upon a product of sensory organization.</p> + +<p>Once I tried to convince a behaviorist that referring +to “a female” as “a stimulus” for a male bird is +equivalent to completely closing one’s eyes to the +problem of <i>gestalt</i> and organization. It was not possible. +<span class="pagenum" id="p181">[181]</span>Though (or because?) he treats sensory experience +as something without any interest for +psychology, the behaviorist committed the “experience-error” +so continually and pervasively that “the +female bird” remained “a stimulus” for him. How +often has “a mouse,” “a door,” “the experimenter” +and so on been called “the stimulus” in animal psychology! +Innocent though this expression may be, +if it is used as an abbreviation by those who are fully +aware of the problem of organization, it will hide +this problem in a most unfortunate manner when +used by an author who is not free from the +“experience-error.”</p> + +<p>I mentioned above the great biological value of +sensory organization as a reconstruction in nervous +process of objective “belonging together.” But how +can it be a reconstruction if, on the way from the +objects to the sense organ, the waves of light are an +unorganized mass of independent events? There +must be something in this transmission of rays which +determines the “right” organization in most cases. +We have seen, indeed, that the relations of neighborhood, +of similarity and difference among the +stimuli, though these are indifferent to each other +dynamically, are in some respects a copy of the corresponding +relations among the surface-elements of +surrounding objects. Some definite relations among +the stimuli as they issue from the physical object, and +the preservation of these relations in transmission, +<span class="pagenum" id="p182">[182]</span>seems to be an essential condition for the organization +of units corresponding to objects in the outer +world. But if organization of the field depends upon +the relations of stimuli as these are distributed on the +retinæ, we must draw the conclusion that sensory organization +cannot be understood by considering independent +local processes as such. Now we know that, +in dynamical self-distribution, process-in-extension +exists as a functional whole. So we must assume +that sensory organization, as we have considered it +in this chapter, is a property of such a dynamical +distribution, occurring under definite conditions of +stimulation. At the same time we must remember +that everywhere in physics dynamics depends upon +the <em>relations</em> between given conditions. The more +probable will it appear to us that sensory organization, +as depending upon the relations of stimuli, is +to be explained as an effect of sensory dynamics +within the field. By studying organization, therefore, +we may be able to discover what particular +kind of dynamical events is responsible for sensory +order.</p> + +<p><i>Gestalt</i> psychology is said by some critics to repeat +the word “whole” continually, to neglect the +existence of parts and therefore to sacrifice that wonderful +tool of all scientific procedure, analysis. +Nothing could be a more misleading statement, as +may be judged from the fact that we found it necessary +to mention <em>segregation</em> wherever we were dealing +with a unit or a definite whole. In dynamical distribution, +<span class="pagenum" id="p183">[183]</span>as we have seen, the functional “interwovenness” +of a field is altogether compatible with +dynamical segregation. We may even say that in +<i>gestalt</i> analysis we find the <em>genuine</em> “parts” of the +field as segregated wholes and groups and, in these +wholes or groups, their genuine “parts” again as +subordinate wholes and members, whereas the so-called +sensations of introspective analysis are parts +existing only in construction and theory. For this +very reason analysis as a statement about “real” parts, +existing in consequence of organization, is a perfectly +legitimate and necessary procedure in <i>gestalt</i> +psychology, probably much more valuable than any +analysis into sensations which certainly no one finds +segregated in his visual field.</p> + +<p>One remark is needed here about another kind of +analysis. I may passively accept what I find before +me as the sensory field. Then analysis is possible in +the meaning just defined. I may, however, adopt a +special attitude with regard to the field, selecting +some of its members and more or less suppressing the +rest. In many cases a change of organization will be +the consequence of such an attitude, and hence “analysis” +of this sort involves a real transformation of +sensory facts in <i>gestalt</i> psychology (cf. Chapter IV, +p. <a href="#p124">124</a>). Of course, an analytical attitude is not the +only one by which a change of organization may be +produced. When we select certain members of the +field, we can keep them together at the same time +and so favor one special kind of “belonging together” +<span class="pagenum" id="p184">[184]</span>instead of that which would prevail without our interference. +Again the change produced by our attitude +will be a real transformation.</p> + +<p>From the viewpoint of <i>gestalt</i> psychology a change +of attitude involves a definite physiological stress exerted +upon a sensory field by processes originating in +other parts of the nervous system, and to some degree +the organization of the field may yield to it. The +figure 7, for instance, is seen normally as a symmetrical +form. By picking out the lines marked “a” +however and keeping them together I can almost see +the figure 7a, the lines marked “b” being repressed. +In the same way I may favor the lines marked “b” +and, as it were, create the figure 7b. How concrete +and real such a change is, will become apparent if we +consider the point which is the center of the figure +<span class="pagenum" id="p185">[185]</span>objectively. When we produce the figure 7a by favoring +the “a,” that point is shifted to the right, as it +also is, of course, when the lines marked “b” are not +drawn at all. It is shifted to the left when we produce +Fig. 7b.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig07"> +<img src="images/fig07.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 7</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig07a"> +<img src="images/fig07a.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 7a</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig07b"> +<img src="images/fig07b.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 7b</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe8" id="fig08"> +<img src="images/fig08.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 8</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In some cases sensory organization seems to change +without any influence being exerted upon it from +without, simply because processes which remain the +same for some time in the same part of the nervous +system tend to alter conditions in that part and to +block their own path. We know that the same thing +occurs in electrolytical cells in which the current +polarizes the electrodes and thereby creates forces +opposed to itself. In Fig. 8 we are confronted by a +<span class="pagenum" id="p186">[186]</span>pattern formed by three narrow sectors. Looking at +the center of it, most persons will suddenly see another +pattern after a while. In the new shape those +lines, which belong together in the first pattern as +contours of one arm, belong to separate arms and +vice versa. The organization is changed. By appropriate +experimentation, making our subject fixate the +center for a long while, we can reduce the time for +either shape to a minimum value, so that the alternations +follow each other very quickly.⁠<a id="FNanchor_31_31" href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> If now the +figure is turned around a little, so that the arms have +another position, the figure becomes as stable again +as it was at first, and only after some time the alternation +will quicken, as in the first position. In my +judgment, this fact may be taken as evidence for +assuming that a local effect of organized processes +itself produces the alternations of organization.</p> + + +<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h3> + +<blockquote> +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Die physischen Gestalten</cite>, etc. 1920.</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Komplextheorie und Gestalttheorie</cite>. Psychol. +Forsch. 6, 1925.</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: in <cite>Psychologies of 1925</cite> (ed. by C. Murchison).</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Bemerkungen zur Gestalttheorie</cite>. Psychol. +Forsch, 11, 1928.</p> + +<p>M. Wertheimer: <cite lang="de">Untersuchungen zur Lehre von der Gestalt, +II</cite>. Psychol. Forsch. 4. 1923.</p> +</blockquote> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p187">[187]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="VI"> + VI + <br> + <i>The Properties of Organized Wholes</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>THE dawn of the <i>gestalt</i> problem in modern psychology +was not the idea of dynamical self-distribution +as opposed to order enforced by arrangement; +nor did it begin with the discovery that +segregated wholes represent highly important sensory +phenomena. The starting point was the observation +that sensory fields are replete with qualities +and properties which one neglects if one takes +“sensations” as their sole content and which, indeed, +may have a mysterious aspect when first viewed in +this way. It was von Ehrenfels who, preceded by +some casual observations of Mach, directed the attention +of psychologists toward the fact that a great +many, and perhaps the more important, properties +of sensory fields do not fit into the scheme of concepts +which is centered around the idea of “sensation.”</p> + +<p>If it is natural for a “sensation” independently to +fill its local place in the field, determined by one +local stimulus alone, the characteristic and surprising +feature in those other qualities (which are usually +neglected) is their existence only as properties of +somewhat extended regions. From this fact it seems +<span class="pagenum" id="p188">[188]</span>to follow that those qualities of von Ehrenfels cannot +be determined by single local stimuli; their existence, +then, depends upon several stimuli having a specific +effect in a certain <em>area as such</em>.</p> + +<p>As an example we may take a glass of water in +which soap is dissolved. The aspect of such a liquid +is called “<span lang="de">trübe</span>” in German, which in English means +something like “dim” or “turbid.” Now look at it +through a little hole made in a piece of cardboard +and you will see the hole filled with a certain hue +of gray (perhaps a little bluish or reddish), but the +quality of “dimness” or “turbidness” will have disappeared. +It is the property of a more extended +field and depends upon more than local uniform +stimulation. Exactly the same is true of the dimness +or diffusedness which appears as a quality of +things seen in a dark corner. Again no local impression, +“isolated” artificially, shows any dimness, +but the extended area does so in a striking manner. +“Clearness” and “definiteness” as qualities of a field +or of parts of it, have the same supralocal character. +I may also mention the property of a surface which +we perceive by touch as “rough” (the German +“<span lang="de">rauh</span>”). There is no character like “roughness” in +purely local experience of touch. And further we +see that von Ehrenfels’ peculiar qualities occur in +temporal extension as well as in space in that the +German word “<span lang="de">rauh</span>” is used for certain acoustical +phenomena, as it is for “rough” surfaces. When +<span class="pagenum" id="p189">[189]</span>listening to rather rapid beats or to the “R” of human +speech we get that peculiar sensory quality, which +seems to be intrinsically similar to the “roughness” +of a surface. Again, as this quality depends upon +rapid beats, if stimulation is shortened below a certain +limit, it disappears, whereas other acoustical +qualities will subsist. In passing we may remark +that in most cases words like “homogeneity” and +“continuity,” whether applied to optical or to other +experiences, mean properties of extended sensory +fields.</p> + +<p>From a functional point of view, these observations +are less surprising than was the general opinion +at the time of von Ehrenfels’ discovery. The processes +directly underlying our experience of a color +will be a certain chemical reaction, i.e., certain molecules +are built up or destroyed. Now the chemist +may analyze such a reaction, but there is a natural +limit to his analysis, because at least one whole specimen +of each atom or molecule taking part in the reaction, +and the whole dynamical event thus comprised, +must be included. Beyond that limit what +is called “this specific reaction” will lose its meaning +for the chemist and, therefore, for psychophysical +theory which associates one definite color with +one definite kind of reaction. Therefore, even before +parting with the theory of “local sensations” we +are obliged to accept dynamical realities existing +only in somewhat extended areas of space. If that is +<span class="pagenum" id="p190">[190]</span>so in chemistry, the same fact should not frighten us +when we face it in direct experience.</p> + +<p>According to the theory of dynamical self-distribution +color as a quality is dependent upon chemical +reactions in a brain-field, although the production of +local chemical reactions in a certain distribution is +only one side of the total process. There is much +more that is characteristically spatial and dynamically +real in such a coherent distribution than in the +mosaic of local sensation-processes which are the +“dynamical realities” of machine theory.</p> + +<p>From the new viewpoint the Ehrenfels-qualities, +corresponding to more extended dynamical realities +than color, would be physiologically produced at +the same time as color, since each is a phase of the +same total “process-in-distribution.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_32_32" href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> In machine +theory there must be “sensations” first of all, if upon +this basis something else shall be founded as a secondary +product. It would have been a superhuman +achievement for von Ehrenfels to have gone so far +as to sacrifice at once the machine theory and its sensations. +To him his peculiar qualities remained new +bits of experience simply added to the sensations, and +in the school of Graz (v. Meinong, Witasek, Benussi) +there was much discussion about the <i lang="de">fundierte +<span class="pagenum" id="p191">[191]</span>Inhalte</i> (qualities founded upon the basis of sensation) +as the product of intellectual faculties working +upon the sensations. So, with regard to the fundamental +concepts applied to the sensory field, not +much was changed.</p> + +<p>An enormous number of the new qualities discovered +for psychological theory by von Ehrenfels are +properties of those segregated wholes which were discussed +in the last chapter. “Simple,” “complicated,” +“regular,” “harmonious,” are words which <em>may</em> have +a meaning when applied to an experience occupying +a point in space and time, though in most cases they +refer to products of organization. But when we call +something “symmetrical” this something is certainly +a segregated whole. Similarly, “slender,” “round,” +“angular,” “clumsy,” “graceful” are specific properties +of definite wholes. And from these there is only +one step to the more particular “form-qualities” +given in the characteristic aspect of a circle, a triangle, +a pear, an oak-tree, and so forth, all of them +existing exclusively in their corresponding wholes. +In German the word “<span lang="de">gestalt</span>” may be used as a +synonym for “form,” or perhaps “shape.” So von +Ehrenfels, taking the case of specific shape as the +most important and evident among his qualities, applied +the name of “<span lang="de">gestaltqualitäten</span>” to all of them. +Therefore it will be clear that not only the different +forms or shapes of objects and figures are included, +but also qualities like “regular.” Furthermore, +<span class="pagenum" id="p192">[192]</span>we have seen that there are temporal <i lang="de">gestaltqualitäten</i> +as well as spatial ones, since the definition +applies to the specific properties of a melody, to its +“major” or “minor” character, for instance, in the +same way it does to the “angularity” of a figure. +Finally, seen movement as a whole may have a +<i lang="de">gestaltqualität</i> which is temporal and spatial at the +same time. This is the case in the aspect of a definite +form of dancing and in the characteristic movements +of animals, such as “jumping” or “creeping.”</p> + +<p>At this point a general remark about terminology +may be useful. For von Ehrenfels the new characteristic +properties themselves were objects of outstanding +importance; he was more interested in them +than in those segregated parts of the field which exhibit +the best examples of <i lang="de">gestaltqualitäten</i> as their +properties. In the German language however—at +least since the time of Goethe, and especially in his +own papers on natural science—the noun “gestalt” +has two meanings: besides the connotation of “shape” +or “form” as a <em>property</em> of things, it has the meaning +of a concrete individual and characteristic entity, existing +as something detached and <em>having</em> a shape or +form as one of its attributes. Following this tradition, +in <i lang="de">gestalt theorie</i> the word “gestalt” means any +segregated whole, and the consideration of <i lang="de">gestaltqualitäten</i> +has become a more special side of the +<i lang="de">gestaltproblem</i>, the prevailing idea being that the +same general type of dynamical process which leads +<span class="pagenum" id="p193">[193]</span>to the formation and segregation of extended wholes +will also explain their specific properties.⁠<a id="FNanchor_33_33" href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> Here the +main stress is laid upon a characteristic type of process. +This, indeed, is the most general concept of +<i lang="de">gestalttheorie</i>: wherever a process dynamically distributes +and regulates itself, determined by the actual +situation in a whole field, this process is said to +follow principles of <i lang="de">gestalttheorie</i>. In all cases of +this type the process will have some characteristic +which exists in an extended area only, so that a consideration +of local points or local factors as such will +not give us full insight into the nature of the process. +From this viewpoint, even the segregation of circumscribed +wholes becomes one more or less particular, +though highly important, case among the +various possibilities which are included in the most +general idea of self-distribution and self-regulation, +and in consequence the concept of <i>gestalt</i> may be applied +far beyond the limits of sensory fields. According +to the most general definition of <i>gestalt</i>, the +processes of learning, of reproduction, of striving, +of emotional attitude, of thinking, acting, and so +forth, may be included as subject matter of <i lang="de">gestalttheorie</i> +insofar as they do not consist of independent +elements, but are determined in a situation as a +whole. Quite apart from psychology the same will +<span class="pagenum" id="p194">[194]</span>be true of ontogenetic development, and other biological +events, wherever they show the definite marks +of self-distribution and self-regulation. And this extension +of the term does not mean vagueness, as many +seem to believe. If prior to detailed investigation +the general use of concepts belonging to machine and +mosaic theory has prevailed for such a long time +and so widely, it cannot be forbidden to discuss the +opposite principle of dynamical order and regulation, +which certainly is less known among psychologists +though equally well established by physical +theory. By no means do we believe, however, that +any problem is really solved by the application of +the general principle <em>as such</em>. On the contrary, +when the principle seems to apply the concrete task +of research is just beginning because we want to +know the manner in which each special kind of +process regulates itself under the conditions of each +particular case.⁠<a id="FNanchor_34_34" href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a></p> + +<p>If in the treatment even of sensory fields the real +solution remains a task for the future, at least the +first step may be made at once. Here, as everywhere, +it will consist in the recognition of the reality and +the concreteness of the problem. No one fails to see +that there is a problem in visual depth as a property +determined by conditions on the two retinæ, or—more +generally—by stimulation on a two-dimensional +<span class="pagenum" id="p195">[195]</span>surface. To see the real problem in the case +of “form,” as a property of segregated wholes, seems +to be much more difficult. The reason is the same as +in the case of segregated wholes themselves (cf. +pp. <a href="#p175">175</a>–177). When we consider retinal stimulation, +for instance, our thinking operates with ready-made +wholes which already have definite forms as we know +them from perception. So we say innocently that +“the form” of our pencil or of a circle is projected +upon the retina. These words contain the experience-error. +There is no factor in retinal stimulation +which might pick out of the geometrical distribution +of <em>all</em> local stimuli that circumscribed whole +which will appear in the form of our pencil or of a +circle, only after such a segregated whole has become +a functional reality. On the retina we have the indifferent +mosaic of millions of local stimuli, and +nothing else. By arbitrary geometrical thinking, we +may select and combine certain retinal spots; thus +we may imaginatively impose all possible forms upon +the retina, including, if we like, those of the pencil +and of the circle. We must not forget, however, that +this is mere play when compared with retinal reality +and that the form of these objects is at this moment +not more really there physiologically than that of an +angel or of an Arabic letter.</p> + +<p>Some concrete examples will show us what is +meant by “concrete, real form” better than any +amount of general discussion. Sometimes we look +<span class="pagenum" id="p196">[196]</span>upon the map of a country the general form of which +we have seen thousands of times on other maps. But +what we really see remains a foreign and completely +unknown figure for a long while, until finally something +happens in our field of vision and the known +form suddenly appears, the unknown figure disappearing +completely at the same time. Excellent cases +for this observation are the charts of ship captains, +whereon the sea and its bordering regions are represented +as land and the coast are on common maps. +Now, the general contour of the land is the same on +the maritime chart as it is on the usual map; the +geometrical line separating land and water “is projected” +upon the retina as always.⁠<a id="FNanchor_35_35" href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> Notwithstanding +that fact, when looking at such a map of the Mediterranean +I may fail completely to see Italy; instead I +see some “funny” figures (corresponding to the Adriatic +and so forth) which are new to me but nevertheless +“have a concrete form” in my visual field, +whereas on the usual map it is the peninsula that +“has a concrete form.” So “to have form” as a concrete +property is a peculiar feature distinguishing +certain areas of our actual visual field from others +which have no form. In our example, so long as the +Mediterranean “has form,” the area corresponding +to Italy is formless and vice versa. One is tempted +to say that even a form existing on the retina does +<span class="pagenum" id="p197">[197]</span>not necessarily determine a corresponding form in +vision. But we have to insist upon the fact that <em>no</em> +form at all is given on the retina as a functional +reality, neither that of Italy nor that of the Mediterranean. +There is only a certain geometrical constellation +of different local stimuli. Whether the +physiological process starting from the retina under +these conditions will lead to a simple “line” as real +form, or to the form of the peninsula with the contour +as its border, or to that of the Mediterranean, +the contour now being its boundary-line, whether it +will produce any other or <em>no</em> form whatsoever, all +this cannot be deduced from the constellation of +retinal stimuli before we know by visual experience +what area is segregated, and distinguished as having +<em>real</em> visual form.</p> + +<p>As a second example the following variation of +Fig. 8 (or Fig. 8 itself) may be taken: Fig. 9. +With exactly the same constellation of stimuli we +<span class="pagenum" id="p198">[198]</span>may have two different forms, either a cross consisting +of four slender arms or a cross (like that of an +order) containing four large sectors. So long as we +<em>really</em> have the first one, i.e., as existing in vision, the +other will be absorbed in the general surroundings, +which optically have <em>no real form</em> at the time. When +the second form becomes a visual reality, the first +disappears.⁠<a id="FNanchor_36_36" href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> The observer will remark that the +oblique lines are boundary-lines of the <em>real form</em> in +both cases. They belong to the slender cross as <em>its</em> +contours, in the first case, and to the large cross, in +the second.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig09"> +<img src="images/fig09.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 9</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Simple observations of this kind were first made by +Rubin,⁠<a id="FNanchor_37_37" href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> who has given us a great many examples. +That only definite special parts of the field have “real +form” (as their most characteristic property) was +shown conclusively by the fact that subjects who had +seen <em>one</em> definite form at the first presentation of such +an “ambiguous” pattern, did not recognize the pattern, +if later on, at the second presentation, the other +form happened to be seen. This second form had not +existed as a visual reality when, previously, the first +one was experienced; so the second one was something +completely new when seen in the later presentation. +Again, when one of the two crosses (Fig. 9) is “real,” +one does not see other forms which are quite as real +<span class="pagenum"><a id="p199"></a><a id="p200"></a>[200]</span>(or <em>unreal</em>) geometrically on the retina. So one does +not see the form 9a or 9b or 9c.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig09abc"> +<img src="images/fig09abc.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 9a, Fig. 9b, Fig. 9c</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In the case of Fig. 10 two unknown forms will be +seen as a group through which a horizontal line is +laid. When I tell the reader that the number 4 is +before him in the field, he will undoubtedly find it; +but if he is not influenced by theoretical prejudices, +he will confess that the form of the 4 did not exist as +a visual reality at first and that, if it began to exist +later on, that meant a transformation of visual reality.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig10"> +<img src="images/fig10.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 10</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In the last example it will be obvious that the +reality of a form depends upon the existence of a +definite whole which, when segregated as such, <em>has</em> +that real form, others, which would correspond to +other wholes, being excluded from visual existence. +So when we first look at Fig. 10 we have a definite +organization, consisting of two unknown wholes +with the horizontal line running through them. +Consequently one part of the geometrical constellation +<span class="pagenum" id="p201">[201]</span>of the 4 is absorbed by the whole on the left +side, a second fraction by the angular whole to the +right and the rest by the horizontal. And the destruction +of the 4 as a whole also destroys its form. +When after instruction, the observer really gets the 4 +as a form in his visual field, a corresponding whole is +produced at the same time. We formulate the general +theorem that real form depends upon the segregation +of corresponding wholes. This statement is +confirmed by all observations of puzzle pictures, of +camouflaged objects, and so forth. The existence of +visual form presupposes the existence of wholes +which, then, have a real form as their specific property. +The reader will be able to convince himself +that even the reality of partial forms depends upon +the existence of corresponding sub-wholes.</p> + +<p>The <em>objects</em> around us are, in most cases, very stable +wholes; therefore, we regularly see them with their +definite forms, excepting in those rare instances in +which the wholes and their real forms are disguised +by chance conditions or by intentional camouflage. +This is the reason why we so easily fail to see the +problem of form and why we remain satisfied by “the +form given objectively in retinal projection.” There +is, however, no visual form in the world to which our +last considerations do not apply. Wherever we have +“real form” in the visual field, we must assume a +specific property of functional process in that area. +But the processes do not have this special property +<span class="pagenum" id="p202">[202]</span>in all parts of the field. If you walk along a street +between high houses on a bright day, the sky is seen +above you surrounded by darker contours of houses +and towers. Do you see that bright area as a form? +Generally not; it has no form, it is indifferent “background,” +though on your retinæ there does exist a +homogeneous area surrounded by contours. These +contours remain borders of the houses; the houses +have forms, but the sky has not. If you wish to see a +certain area of the sky as a definite visual form, look +at it through a little hole cut into a box which you +then put over your head. If the hole is cut like the +letter H you will see an area of the sky in the corresponding +form as a bright figure on a black ground. +And now <em>this ground</em> has no visual form.</p> + +<p>Who wishes to judge about the problems of <i>gestalt</i> +theory ought to be well acquainted with these observations +and with the consequences to be deduced +therefrom. Exactly as we may either have color +in a definite part of our visual field, or mere brightness +of a certain nuance, so a definite area may have +a certain form or it may be formless, i.e., merely +extended.</p> + +<p>Since “real form” presupposes a segregated whole, +the existence of “form” depends upon factors of +stimulation similar to those upon which the segregation +and organization of wholes depend. Again, +definite relations in the total constellation of retinal +stimuli are found to be decisive for the existence of +<span class="pagenum" id="p203">[203]</span>real form. But no abstract consideration of all the +logical relations that might possibly obtain among +local stimuli would make us able to forecast where or +when a specific form will be seen. As for the existence +of segregated wholes, i.e., organization, certain +<em>special</em> relations again are important and others +indifferent; which are the important ones can only +be discovered by the observation of real forms appearing +under a given set of conditions.</p> + +<p>Since for some time to come it will be impossible to +observe physiologically the inner dynamics of optical +processes, we cannot do more at present than draw +conclusions from the properties of the visual field in +comparison with given retinal constellations. In the +course of this attempt we find that “form,” wherever +it exists, is a <em>supra</em>local property of that part of the +field; so the property of the underlying process must +be a supralocal phase of it. We find also that “form” +is a property exclusively of segregated wholes; so, +with or after the organization of these wholes, that +special supralocal property of physiological process +must develop which is the basis of “real form” in +direct experience. As it is an attribute of detached +wholes, this phase of the process exists only in definite +areas, which are determined by certain relations +of stimulation. These relations must be decisive +<em>dynamically</em> for “form,” as they are for “wholes” +which have “form” as their most important visual +property. Evidently, one cannot understand “form” +<span class="pagenum" id="p204">[204]</span>from the viewpoint of mosaic theory; dynamical self-distribution +with its functional coherence and structure +of process is the only principle known at present, +which may give us an explanation of “form” in the +future.⁠<a id="FNanchor_38_38" href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a></p> + +<p>I shall not try to demonstrate with the same care +the concrete reality of definite forms in <em>time</em>. What +has been said would have to be repeated more or less +in the case of melodies, of rhythms, of seen movements +and so forth. The “form” of a musical <i>motif</i> +begins at a definite point and ends at another; then +another <i>motif</i> may follow. But there is no real +form extended from the second tone of the first figure +to the third of the second figure; and between the +two figures there is what is called a “dead” interval +(corresponding, as “empty” time, to the mere extension +or ground outside a visual form). Again when +in the dark room a bright spot in motion describes the +path of <a href="#fig06">Fig. 6</a>, we see certain definite forms of movement, +1 → 2, 3 → 4, 5 → 6, for example. We do not +see other forms, such as, for instance, a form corresponding +<span class="pagenum" id="p205">[205]</span>to a fraction of 1 → 2, the horizontal, and +a fraction of II, taken together. Real form coincides +with the wholes and sub-wholes segregated +in this case as in that of melodies and rhythms. In +passing we may remark that the behavior of others is +continually seen in <em>forms</em> of events which correspond +to the natural grouping of what we see or hear of +them.</p> + +<p>As form is a property of segregated wholes, what +has been said against the explanation “by meaning,” +or other indirect explanations, in the case of segregated +wholes, will be more or less to the point with +respect to their forms, though, probably, for most +readers this is yet a rather critical issue. Therefore, +the problem shall be treated once more in the following +paragraphs.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig11"> +<img src="images/fig11.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 11</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>1. What is the effect of our past experience of certain +definite forms upon visual experience in subsequent +life? Drawings like Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 contain +<span class="pagenum" id="p206">[206]</span>a great many geometrical lines the outline of +which, when given alone, would make us see other +forms than those which we see naïvely. Thus, in both +of them the outline of Fig. 13 is present geometrically. +If now we have a large number of drawings, +seen naïvely in a certain way, and besides them certain +other figures geometrically contained in the first, +will training or repeated experience with regard to +the latter change the way we see the first, so that the +learned forms become “real” when the larger drawings +are shown? Gottschaldt has recently made such +experiments.⁠<a id="FNanchor_39_39" href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> Since past experience is supposed to +<span class="pagenum" id="p207">[207]</span>have its effects upon form independently of our +knowledge about the presence of corresponding outlines, +i.e., automatically, the subjects were not told to +analyze or to look for the “learned” forms. The +larger drawings were given them simply for description. +Under these circumstances, with three previous +exposures of the smaller forms, the training had no +effect upon subsequent perception of form in more +than 90 per cent. of the cases. When the number of +previous exposures of the smaller forms was increased +to 520 with new subjects, the result was still +the same, the drawings being seen unchanged by the +training in 95 per cent. of the trials. Not even the +few cases, which showed a positive result, can be +explained by the mere fact of previous training, because +all those subjects, who occasionally saw the +“learned” forms in the larger drawings, had some +suspicion about the aim of the experiment and asked +the experimenter whether they should look for the +“learned” forms in the larger drawings. Though +they were not instructed to do so, of course they went +into the test with an attitude of definite expectation. +So the few positive results do not prove an automatic +after-effect of past experience upon forms seen subsequently, +since, apart from training as such, there +was this other factor of expectation.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig12"> +<img src="images/fig12.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 12</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig13"> +<img src="images/fig13.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 13</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Gottschaldt’s larger drawings were “difficult,” i.e., +of a highly stable organization. In some of them, in +spite of strong efforts, I cannot really <em>see</em> the smaller +<span class="pagenum" id="p208">[208]</span>form, even when I know about its geometrical presence +and position. However, if any one criticizes this +“difficulty,” by his own argument he recognizes the +reality of stable visual form as something stronger in +such cases than a very large amount of previous experience. +Furthermore, the larger drawing (Fig. +12) cannot be said to have its stable organization in +consequence of much experience in previous life outside +the laboratory. What we naïvely see there is not +better known from previous experience than the small +figure 13. After these results, whoever defends the +automatic influence of past experience upon our seeing +definite forms, will have incumbent upon him the +task of supporting his theory by other experiments. +If such an influence exists, it must be restricted to +rather special cases.</p> + +<p>2. Where “form” <em>exists</em> originally, it acquires a +meaning very easily. But here a whole with its form +is given first and then the meaning “creeps into it.” +That meaning automatically produces a form where +beforehand there is none, has not been shown experimentally +in a single case, as far as I know. It may +be that in a very <em>unstable</em> constellation, in which a +certain form can be seen or organized, past experience +of such a form will tend to produce it really, +whereas without that previous experience, this would +not happen. Even in this case, however, we should +still have to explain what factors produced that form +in previous life. It is only assumed, then, that conditions +<span class="pagenum" id="p209">[209]</span>were more favorable, and the question remains +open whether they were not favorable for its originating +directly. In any case, even granting that +previous experience of a certain form favors its +appearance in the future, we ought to realize that +such an occurrence will be limited to definite cases, +namely those in which the actual constellation does +not tend decidedly toward other more stable wholes +and forms. The number 4, for instance, is certainly +a well-known form; but when <a href="#fig10">Fig. 10</a> is shown to +hundreds of people without any special instruction or +warning, only a few of them will see the 4 and mention +it in their description of the figure. If any one +protests that we have never seen the 4 in such an +environment before, he misses the point, because no +explanation in terms of previous experience is needed +when 4 is given upon a homogeneous ground, as it +usually is. If past experience has an influence, it +is exactly in such a case as that of Fig. 10, in which +its influence ought to be effective. And after all, it +is not the “unusual” environment as such which prevents +our seeing the 4 immediately. In the following +figure (14) the 4 <em>is</em> seen at once, though in my judgment +the environment is not less unusual than in the +first case. Why, then, is it seen now? Because the +relation between the added lines and the geometrical +parts of the 4 is not such that these parts are absorbed +in the formation of other wholes. But this is a principle +of original organization. So we may say that +<span class="pagenum" id="p210">[210]</span>any influence of past experience upon the organization +of forms in the future depends upon the degree +and the stability of sensory organization in the actual +case. I shall give a few more examples which show +the absorption or destruction of a well-known form +by actual organization into other less known forms.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig14"> +<img src="images/fig14.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 14</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe8" id="fig15"> +<img src="images/fig15.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 15</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Look at Fig. 15 before you read the next lines. No +one would use the name of letter E in describing it +as long as he is a naïve observer, though the well-known +E is present geometrically, and the form really +seen is less known. Fig. 16 may be beheld as an +ornament for months before one first finds two H’s in +<span class="pagenum" id="p211">[211]</span>it. Similarly the letter K is hidden in Fig. 17. If +the reader is already a little sophisticated, he would +be wise to show these figures to some of his more +naïve friends, for five seconds perhaps, asking them +only to give a spontaneous description of them. I +do not think the enormous experience we all have +with respect to these letters will produce any considerable +effect upon the result, as long as the subjects +do not begin to look for hidden forms. If they +do, of course, the result will be produced by actual +attitude apart from previous experience. When we +give our subjects a hint about the camouflaged form, +we create in them what the physicist might call a +“<em>special vector</em>,” favoring that concrete form. But +when our subject, adopting an indifferent attitude, +looks unaided at some of the unknown figures, this vector +<span class="pagenum" id="p212">[212]</span>does not exist, despite a great deal of “past experience.” +Without it, the hidden forms do not appear.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig16"> +<img src="images/fig16.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 16</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe8" id="fig17"> +<img src="images/fig17.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 17</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>3. Again, some psychologists will go so far as to +derive all form in the visual field from tactual or +motor experience. Our answer in this case is once +more simple enough: Real form is a concrete property +of certain things. If its history is to be traced to +other than visual experiences, we must have concrete +real form in those other regions in which it has its +origin. Nothing can be imported from other fields +into vision without having originally occurred in +these other fields. So the whole problem would only +be shifted from one sensory field to another, and the +explanation would have to assume original forms in +the latter. This reasoning applies also to our sensations +of eye-movements. If visual form shall be derived +from them, real form must be a property of +some of these kinesthetic experiences. Therefore, +such an hypothesis does not seem to be a scientific +gain, and we may as well acknowledge the problem +of visual form <em>as such</em>.</p> + +<p>4. I find a decisive argument against explanations +of form in terms of past experience, in the following +consideration. No doubt, parts of the visual field can +reproduce past experiences associated with them in +previous life. But when we ask what factors are the +main reproductive properties in these cases, we see +that in 99 out of 100 cases <em>reproduction depends upon +the form of a segregated whole in the field</em>. Take +<span class="pagenum" id="p213">[213]</span>the concrete real form away, so that reproduction can +be aroused by only the color or the place or, perhaps, +the size of an area, and you will realize that for the +most part, without form, visual realities are not specific +enough to reproduce definite experiences. When +we talk about the automatic influence of past experience +upon actual vision, we are tempted to extend this +idea to the creation of definite “form” by reproduction. +But then we forget that there is not much +reproduction without form itself as a reproductive +factor, and that, from the viewpoint of such an +hypothesis, form <em>as such</em> must be strictly excluded +from the sensory field and, therefore, from the reproductive +features of the situation, supposedly being +present in the field <em>only by way of</em> the reproduction +of past experience. The curious result is that we presuppose +“form,” erroneously and unawares, in order +to get form reproduced from past experience! A +naïve observer does not see the 4 in our example, +although it is such a well-known figure. Why? Past +experience cannot work if there is no specific factor +present which might reproduce that definite part of +past experience under the circumstances of the case. +In our example the ever so well-known 4 will not be +reproduced, as, in other examples, countless other +well-known forms are not reproduced either, there +being nothing in the actual optical processes which +might effect that definite reproduction. I suspect +that a great many explanations in terms of meaning +<span class="pagenum" id="p214">[214]</span>and past experience fail completely to realize this +side of the question. It is easy to say: This, of course, +is so because in earlier life certain things have happened. +But the time has come for more concrete +thinking in this field. Reproduction does play a +highly important rôle in mental life and in behavior. +It can play it only if the sensory world is sufficiently +endowed with concrete properties in those areas +which are said to reproduce our previous experience. +If it is not, because we regard it as a mosaic of sensations, +by what factors can a definite reproduction be +determined? “Transposing” shows that a form will +remain the same independently of the color, the place +and the size of its area. If, now, a definite form is +said to appear in the field by reproduction, I do not +see what characteristic of the mosaic can possibly determine +the right reproduction, since we cannot rely +upon color, place and size for it.</p> + +<p>In order to show that “form” can never be explained +by the existence of “sensations,” von Ehrenfels +laid great stress upon this very fact—mentioned +previously by Mach—that a form can be “transposed,” +i.e., will remain the same as a visual property, +after its brightness, color, size and place are +changed. Of course, when shifted too far toward +the periphery of the field, a form will change its +character more or less, but, excepting this case, the +possibilities of transposing a form are very numerous. +Again in this respect temporal form behaves like +<span class="pagenum" id="p215">[215]</span>spatial form, since a melody may be rendered in different +keys and still remain the same, so far as its +musical form is concerned. Indeed, nothing can +show better than these facts that the specific supralocal +organization of the processes underlying form +as a sensory experience must be a physiological +reality, certainly as much as are the processes underlying +chroma as a quality of sensory experience. +Since, in the case of vision, we can change not only +chroma, but brightness, localization and size of a +form, without disturbing the form itself, the usual +categories of quality, intensity, position, extension do +not help us when real form is to be explained. There +is only one thing we cannot change too much without +influencing form itself, viz., that special set of relations +of stimulation which seem to be decisive for the +segregation of a definite whole and for the specific +dynamical structure underlying form.⁠<a id="FNanchor_40_40" href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> We do not +normally <em>experience</em> these relations in the sensory +field. But in the determination of self-distribution of +process, in the segregation and “formation” of wholes, +they must become almost all-important somewhere +between the retinæ and the psychophysical field.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p216">[216]</span></p> + +<p>Up to the present time there has been a tendency to +regard the remarkable properties of wholes, especially +the possibility of transposing their translocal +properties, as the achievement of “higher” processes. +From the viewpoint of <i>gestalt</i> theory sensory organization +is as natural and primitive a fact as any other +side of sensory dynamics. If, for von Ehrenfels and +the <i lang="de">Grazer Schule</i>, <i lang="de">Gestaltqualitäten</i> and form are +treated as a superstructure built upon the foundation +of sensations, this assumption would fail to account +for the evident rôle of <i>gestalt</i> in such biological processes +as ontogenesis. In psychology, too, the influence +of <i>gestalt</i> has been demonstrated by Hertz (cf. +Chapter V) in very primitive behavior, in which no +one would assume the operation of “higher” processes. +Lashley seems to have been the first to find +that an animal, trained to react positively to one of +two “stimuli,” will shift his reaction spontaneously +when he finds himself before two other stimuli of the +same class, the new reaction being directed to that +stimulus which plays the same rôle in the new pair as +a whole, which another specific stimulus played in +the pair used during the learning process. I wonder +why these experiments failed to exert their due share +of influence upon current theoretical formulations. +Without knowing Lashley’s work I have repeated the +same experiments on apes and chicks, with special +care to exclude all possibilities of indirect explanation. +There is no doubt, now, that a chick, trained +<span class="pagenum" id="p217">[217]</span>with two grays, I and II (II being darker than I), +always to choose II, will, after a while, when II and +the new (darker) gray III are given, in the majority +of the trials not choose II but the unknown nuance +III. The same experiments were performed on apes +with size, and also with different hues of color. +Several investigators have been able to confirm these +experiments. We may conclude that animals react +to such pairs as to wholes, either side of which has a +definite character depending upon its “position” in +the whole. So II is “the dark side” of the first pair; +then, in the new pair, III assumes this rôle, and since +the animal has learned to choose the dark side of the +pair rather than a more or less definite gray, it tends +to avoid the specific gray of the learning period and +to choose the new gray after the transposition. Again +it does not matter at all in such a case, whether or not +we assume that the chick has direct experience. The +difference between choice depending upon a more +or less definite intensity of light and reaction depending +upon one definite side of a structure, is the same +for either assumption. Once more the formula of +“stimulus and response” becomes altogether misleading, +since it neglects the fact that between the stimuli +and reaction there is the organization of definite +wholes with specific properties, upon which the reaction +so obviously depends.</p> + +<p>In order to prove that dynamical self-distribution +will explain “transposition,” we have to show that +<span class="pagenum" id="p218">[218]</span>“transposition” is possible in self-balanced physical +systems. Nothing can be easier! First of all, if +under certain conditions all forces of a dynamical +distribution are in equilibrium with regard to each +other, it is evident that the equilibrium is not disturbed +if the intensity of all those forces decreases +or increases in the same proportion. <em>All</em> forces being +reduced to one-half of their first value or increased +to three times that amount, they will balance each +other as before. The supralocal dynamical structure +is largely independent of absolute intensities. +Now let the dynamical structure be the self-distribution +of current in an electrolyte, depending upon the +total form of the electrolytic conductor. Again the +intensity of current has no influence upon its distribution. +Also, if instead of ions like Na and Cl, K +and Br or any others carry the electric charges, the +distribution of current will not be changed. Or, take +as an example the electromotive phenomena developed +when two solutions (I and II) of different ionic +concentration are in contact. Those phenomena, existing +only in the pair of solutions as a whole, depend +upon the <em>relation</em> of the ionic concentrations, the +absolute concentrations being indifferent. If, in a +definite case, the solution II with a concentration of +1/20 n is the electropositive side of the pair, as against +I with a concentration, say, of 1/4 n, in a new pair +with the concentrations 1/20 n (II) and 1/100 n (III) +the new solution III becomes the electropositive side. +<span class="pagenum" id="p219">[219]</span>To be “the electropositive side” of such a physical +system is no less a <em>gestalt property</em> in a definite electrochemical +whole than to be “the dark side” is a +<em>gestalt property</em> in a sensory pair.</p> + +<p>In some respects form is the most important property +which a whole may have; the introduction of it +as a specific reality will help us to understand certain +of the properties which occur only in wholes. In +Figs. 8 and 9 we observed a change of form, now one +cross or star being present as a form, and then the +other. But something else changes at the same time. +When we see the slender cross, the area of this cross +has a character of solidity and coherence; we may +even say that this slender cross has the substantiality +of a “thing,” whereas the environment appears as +comparatively “empty” and “loose.” Exactly the +contrary is true when the other cross dominates the +field; the large cross becomes “solid” and “substantial,” +whereas the narrow angles have become “loose” +and “empty,” like the environment. Because an area +becomes “solid” when appearing as “form” or +“figure,” Rubin, who was the first to describe the difference, +has called the “solid” quality the “figure” +character, whereas to the “looseness” of the environment +he gave the name of “ground” character. This +term “ground,” or “background,” is the more appropriate +since we find the “figure” protruding a little, +as if in three-dimensional space, and the environment +localized behind it, so that the solid “figure” appears +<span class="pagenum" id="p220">[220]</span>as something apart, behind which the “ground” +seems to extend without interruption like a simple +homogeneous plane. The sky above the houses (cf. +p. <a href="#p202">202</a>) has the character of ground.</p> + +<p>I do not think we ever find that character of “solidity” +where we do not have a segregated whole. +That character, then, is a typical property of segregated +wholes and belongs to von Ehrenfels’ qualities. +Some psychologists will try to derive this character +from touch or other previous experiences which we +have had with things, in the practical meaning of the +word. We find that all visual things, which as such +are clearly perceived in the field of vision, have the +same character of “solidity.” But as it appears as a +visible quality, it may be such a quality <em>originally</em>; +it may even belong, independently of other experiences, +to the primary constituents of the meaning of +the term “thing” in common life. Whether the empiristic +explanation is justified or whether this quality +is founded directly upon the specific dynamics of seen +form, will be decided by further research. As yet it +has been shown that, functionally, “figure” and +“ground” behave differently. Constancy of color has +been shown to be more striking for “figure” than for +“ground” (Rubin); the limen for a patch of color +projected upon the “figure” was found to be higher +than upon “ground” of the same objective intensity +(Gelb and Granit); after-images are more vivid +<span class="pagenum" id="p221">[221]</span>when observed upon a “figure” than they are upon +“ground” (Frank).</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>After all these considerations the reader will be +prepared to accept some statements as concrete which, +in consequence of their more general character, he, +without that preparation, might be tempted to despise +as “mere philosophy.” If in our experiment on +animals “the dark side” is something which, as such, +exists only in a definite whole, the same thing is implied +in a great many terms which we are continually +using as trivial words in common life. We do not +realize generally that all their meanings presuppose +definite wholes in which something plays that rôle to +which the words apply, as “the dark side” applies to +the rôle one gray plays in a pair of grays. I give the +following few examples, selected from a large store: +The German “<span lang="de">Rand</span>” (English “brink” or “edge”) +is such a word; again “<span lang="de">Anfang</span>” (beginning), “<span lang="de">Ende</span>” +and “<span lang="de">Schluss</span>” (“end” and “close”), “<span lang="de">Stück</span>” and +“<span lang="de">Teil</span>” (“piece” and “part”), “<span lang="de">Rest</span>” (“rest” or “remnant”); +and even “<span lang="de">Loch</span>” (“hole”) and “<span lang="de">Störung</span>” +(“disturbance”), which presuppose a definite experienced +whole, with respect to which an area may +appear as a “hole,” or some factor as a “disturbance.” +Intentionally I do not restrict my examples to those +cases in which the words apply to sensory facts. +There is not the slightest reason why I should do so. +<span class="pagenum" id="p222">[222]</span>And the reader will easily understand that talking +about a “disturbing” factor in the case of “thinking” +presupposes a definite dynamical whole, as it does in +sensory experience. There is no meaning in the +word without it. Whoever is slightly acquainted +with musical theory will recognize at once that a +tone cannot have the character of the “tonic” without +belonging to a larger musical whole, in which it +plays a definite rôle; of course, the same is true of +the leading-tone, which has its strong dynamical +properties in the definite key of a sequence of tones, +and not independently.</p> + +<p>Obviously we must have similar cases in the world +of adjectives and verbs. Indeed, “<span lang="de">hohl</span>” (“hollow”) +and “<span lang="de">offen</span>” (“open”), “complete” and “incomplete” +belong in the same group, as terms referring necessarily +to specific wholes. Finally, in the realm of +activities and events we might give a long list in +which there ought to be included: “starting” or “beginning,” +“ending” and “finishing” or “closing,” “desisting” +and “interrupting,” also “proceeding” and +“continuing,” even “deviating,” “bending,” “retarding” +and so forth. If we try to find out what we mean +when we use terms like “hesitating” or “deviating” +with reference to the activities of others or to heard +music or to our own stream of thought, we shall find +that their meaning depends upon extended dynamical +structures, the change of which is described by those +words. They may be applied to sensory experience, +<span class="pagenum" id="p223">[223]</span>but their essential meaning remains the same in other +fields of experience, because the principal aspects of +<i>gestalt</i> are found in all of them. To say that they are +imported into these other fields from the region of +sensory experience, in a merely analogical way, +would be no more than another vicious circle of the +kind described above (cf. pp. <a href="#p212">212</a>–214).</p> + + +<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h3> + +<blockquote> +<p>W. Köhler: Psychol. Forschung 4. 1924.</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Die physischen Gestalten</cite>. 1920.</p> + +<p>E. Rubin: <cite lang="de">Visuell wahrgenommene Figuren</cite>. 1921.</p> + +<p>W. Sander: <cite lang="de">Bericht ü. d. 9. Kongress f. exper. Psychologie</cite>. +1927.</p> + +<p>M. Wertheimer: Psychol. Forschung 4. 1924.</p> +</blockquote> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p224">[224]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="VII"> + VII + <br> + <i>Behavior</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>IT will be difficult to understand this and the next +chapters unless we first solve a problem which +presents serious difficulties to some psychologists.</p> + +<p>When I referred to “objective experience” in an +earlier discussion I laid great stress upon the fact that +things, their movements and changes, are given as +<em>outside</em> or <em>before</em> us. At the same time “objective +experience” is regarded as depending upon processes +in a certain field of the brain. How then can it +appear before us? About the facts there can be no +doubt. Under certain conditions a sound may be +localized in my head, it is true; but that tree over +there is seen as something far off and the window, +though much nearer, is still <em>outside</em>, beyond any possibility +of doubt. Functionally, however, their +existence, as is the case of all the other surrounding +objects, is a matter of processes in my brain, and +therefore <em>in</em> me. So much can be proved by the +simplest physiological considerations.</p> + +<p>Let us attack this problem from the physiological +side at once. For simplicity’s sake we shall proceed +at first as though the visual field were the only objective +experience we have.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p225">[225]</span></p> + +<p>One thing is immediately obvious. Though we +usually have many objects before us, their totality appears +as ordered in one visual space, so that any one +of them has definite spatial relations to all the others. +This statement is rather superficial, because it neglects +the actual grouping and “belonging together” +of some objects rather than others; but for our present +purposes it will be sufficient. The pencil is nearer +to that book than to the lamp, the knife is between +the book and the fountain-pen, and so forth.</p> + +<p>As all properties of the field depend upon physiological +processes in the brain or certain of their +properties, so the relative position of experienced +objects will depend upon a definite order of the processes +which are their physiological basis; the mere +geometrical localization of the processes in the brain +cannot be the correlate of seen spatial order. I take +it for granted that whatever is experienced has a +<em>dynamical</em> basis physiologically, i.e., depends upon +physical states and events. Process-in-extension, coherent +functionally and self-maintaining dynamically, +is supposed to contain those dynamical relations +between “segregated wholes,” which, in experience, +appear as positions of objects in mutual relation and +order. Of course, these dynamical relations, underlying +experienced spatial order, exist in an aggregate +of cells and fibers, which are extended in physical +space. But only the dynamical relations count for +our problem, not the geometrical distances and areas +<span class="pagenum" id="p226">[226]</span>as such, through which that dynamical order extends. +Still we may safely assume not only that, where two +objects touch each other in visual experience, the +<em>dynamical contact</em> of the corresponding processes +is immediate and direct, but that the two processes +take place in two <em>neighboring areas</em> of the brain. +Again, if two objects are experienced as separated +from each other in visual space, some process, <em>not</em> +corresponding to the objects, will mediate <em>dynamically</em> +between them; and at the same time the area of +the first will not be in geometrical contact with the +area of the second. We shall not go further. The +<em>geometrical</em> distribution of processes in the brain +will <em>not</em> be an adequate picture of visual order in all +respects. Only with respect to those crudest properties +of visual space, neighborhood and distance in +general, will the underlying dynamical order of +processes be extended homologously in brain-space.⁠<a id="FNanchor_41_41" href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> +But no more need be assumed in order to picture in +imagination what follows, and to discuss our problem +in simple terms. We must not forget, however, +that, if in the next paragraph relative localization in +visual space is connected with relative position of +processes in the brain, this is meant as an abbreviation +for the <em>dynamical</em> relations of process-in-extension.</p> + +<p>In visual experience the pencil there is external to +<span class="pagenum" id="p227">[227]</span>that book and at a certain distance from it. We know +now, at least in a general scheme, what is the physiological +basis of this separation. Our next task will +consist in applying that scheme consistently. My +hand is in the same visual field as an experienced +object. Evidently, as this new segregated whole is +external to the pencil and the book in visual experience, +the process, corresponding to it in the brain, +must be external to the processes corresponding to the +pencil and to the book, dynamically and, as we have +seen, geometrically. There is not the slightest reason +why the hand, as a visual object, should be treated in +a manner different from the pencil or the book, or +the spatial relation between the hand and pencil or +the book different from the spatial relation between +the latter. Beside my hand I have other parts of +myself in the visual field: my arm, for instance, very +often my feet, my chest and, though in peripheral +vision, the tip of my nose. They are visual experiences, +exactly as are the pencil and the book. Therefore, +in my brain as a <em>physical</em> system there must be +processes corresponding to these experienced bodily +members, as there are processes underlying those +objective experiences which I do not reckon among +the parts of what I call my body. And the processes +underlying the seen book, the seen pencil and all the +other surrounding seen objects will be external to +the processes which underlie the experiences of arm, +feet, chest and nose, for the same reason that the +<span class="pagenum" id="p228">[228]</span>processes corresponding to those seen objects are external +to each other.</p> + +<p>Here we have, in principle at least, the solution +of our problem. To some extent my body, to which +common speech frequently refers as “I,” is a group +of visual experiences just as other things are. As +these are seen external to each other, so “I” am experienced +external to all of them in vision. If I +find no difficulty in their appearing separately in +different parts of the field, and if their mutual localization +can be understood by the dynamo-geometrical +relations of the processes underlying them, I am simply +obliged to apply the same idea to myself as a visual +experience in the same field and to the processes +underlying this experience. No new hypothesis is +needed to explain why “I” am external to those objects +and they external to me. If there were a paradox +in their relative localization with regard to +“me,” the same paradox ought to be found in their +mutual localization. I have only to become aware of +the fact that, as a visual experience, this “I” depends +upon processes in a definite circumscribed part of +my brain as a physical system, no less than do any +other objects in the field.</p> + +<p>Following this consideration, it becomes an almost +impossible idea that things should be experienced as +being “in me.” The pencil might be experienced +<em>in</em> the book just as well! Everybody is accustomed +to discriminate sharply between the thing as a <em>physical +<span class="pagenum" id="p229">[229]</span>object</em> and as the <em>experienced whole</em>, corresponding +to it, which appears in the visual field. If we +could only accustom ourselves also to make the same +distinction as radically and consistently in the case of +our body! In one meaning this body is a physical +organism, certain processes of which underlie <em>all</em> experience. +At the same time “my body” or “myself” +is a particular one among all other sensory experiences, +and, as such, it is also represented by definite +particular processes in a definite part of the brain at +a given moment. Dynamo-geometrical relations in +the brain-field mean spatial relations in visual experience. +In this respect, other visual things are evidently +outside or external to the special thing called +“my body.” But, you say, all these processes are <em>in</em> +the brain, i.e., <em>in me</em>, after all! That does not matter +for our problem, because experience depends upon +the processes of a definite field, and experienced +space depends upon the totality of dynamo-geometrical +relations <em>in</em> it; the only meaning which “in” +and “outside” have in experience is determined by +this dynamical context, and to the <em>physical</em> place +which this context has in the physical world, in the +physical body, and more particularly in the physical +skull, <em>there does not correspond any experience at all</em>. +All the possible spatial relations we can have in sensory +experience are restricted to the inner dynamical +properties and relations of that field; the anatomical +relation between this field and its surroundings, +<span class="pagenum" id="p230">[230]</span>which do not contain “psychophysical” processes, is +an affair of the physical world which does not occur +in my sensory experience. Therefore, “things” are +“before” and “around” me, as far as experience is +concerned. If somebody expects that “things” or +“I” or both should be localized in my brain, he does +not see that in the first half of this sentence he is talking +about direct experiences whereas in the second +half “my brain” is a concept referring to physical +existence. So he confuses experienced space with the +space of the physicist, which no one experiences +directly, and he expects to see certain particular +parts of <em>experienced</em> space localized in relation to +parts of <em>physical</em> space, which is altogether impossible.</p> + +<p>This is also the reason why every one is so astonished +when he is first told that things, colors, etc., +which he experiences as being external and distant, +depend upon events occurring in himself! Of course, +this is correct if meant physiologically, so that “himself” +is the physiological organism, not experienced +directly. It is far from correct and evident for some +one who does not discriminate between the physical +organism and “himself” as one particular whole in +experience, because for the most part, distant things +and colors do not appear as depending upon that particular +experience, “himself,” at all. Why should +they? In experience a tree depends upon “myself” +just as much or as little as in the brain the particular +<span class="pagenum" id="p231">[231]</span>and local process corresponding to “myself” determines +that corresponding to the tree. Such an influence +will sometimes occur and will then be experienced, +too, but in general the “tree” and “I” will +not depend upon each other more than any other +segregated wholes depend upon each other when, dynamically, +they are distant from each other.</p> + +<p>Perhaps all this is too well known to be discussed +here. But four years ago a distinguished psychiatrist +formulated this as the most difficult problem to be +found in all the relations of “mind” and “body”: +that things appear as being outside of us, whereas we +should expect them to be in our interior!</p> + +<p>As yet we have taken “ourselves” and “things” exclusively +as visual experiences. But the situation remains +the same if we consider other experiences as +well. Things, their properties, events and so on, may +be experienced by touch instead of visually; things +are warm or cold, they smell, are heavy, audible +and so forth. But all these experiences are somehow +localized in experienced space, either in a well-defined +or in a more confused manner. All of them +appear as localized more or less in relation to visual +experiences. So a voice is heard as outside the window; +this room, given visually, seems to have or contain +the smell of a cigarette, and the cold surface of +the safety-razor in my hand is felt where the thing +is seen. Two different explanations may be given +for the fact that all sensory experiences appear in +<span class="pagenum" id="p232">[232]</span>one and the same space.⁠<a id="FNanchor_42_42" href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> <em>Either</em> the reason is the +same as for the special case of binocular vision in +which, notwithstanding the duality of peripheral +sense organs, one single visual space contains all visual +experience. What has occurred here may have +happened with respect to <em>all</em> sensory experiences as +depending upon a large number of different sense +organs: in phylogenesis, and also in early individual +life, for dynamical reasons which we do not have to +discuss here, the distribution of sensory processes in +the brain may have developed in such a direction +that, now, all of them occur in one psychophysical +field and that, therefore, corresponding to their +dynamo-geometrical relations, all sensory experience +appears in one experienced space. <em>Or</em> the relative +localization of experiences furnished by different +sense organs may have been <em>learned</em> by all of us in +early childhood, so that in consequence of that learning +a sound, for instance, would seem to issue from a +place in the same space in which we see objects. In +any case, whether we accept the more “nativistic” or +the “empiristic” explanation, all sensory experiences +are now given to us in one space, the same space in +which we have visual objects around us and, in one +region of which, parts of “ourselves.” Some of the +non-visual experiences are localized outside, as +<span class="pagenum" id="p233">[233]</span>sounds are almost universally, and also weights; but +other non-visual experiences appear <em>inside</em> that region +of the visual field which we call ourselves, as, for instance, +the feeling of “coldness” and all kinesthesis. +In the interior of this region we find eventually a +great many experiences the origin of which may be a +matter of much discussion, but which certainly are +localized there somewhat diffusedly, as our feeling +“tired,” “nervous,” “healthy,” even “happy” and so +forth, i.e., the more or less “subjective” experiences. +From what we have said about the separation of visual +experiences as belonging partially to ourselves +and partially to our surroundings, it will be obvious +that the same thing is true of all other experiences +except certain particular experiences which are always +localized in our interior. All this is not more +astounding than is the external localization of visual +things outside our body, itself a particular visual +thing.⁠<a id="FNanchor_43_43" href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a></p> + +<p>After these preliminary remarks we are prepared +for the treatment of an old problem: How does it +come to pass that we ascribe to others experiences +similar to those we have ourselves? We continually +seem to do that, not only in general, but in particular; +we attribute to others definite particular experiences +at a definite time. To begin with, I shall not +<span class="pagenum" id="p234">[234]</span>discuss the question, whether such attribution can +be legitimated in psychology as a science. But in +common life something like sympathetic attribution +seems to be a most frequent occurrence, and +may be regarded as fundamental for social psychology. +What is its nature, and what are its modes +of occurrence? A certain paradox is connected with +the problem: sometimes other people seem to judge +my subjective experience more soundly from without +than I am able to do it myself “from within.” What +shall I say, for instance, in order to describe to others +what I feel as a lack of inner determination or as +hesitation in a certain situation? But others say that +they “see” that hesitation most clearly on my face, +and I am inclined to believe them, since I know that +characteristic expression very well from my observation +of others. I think it was Nietzsche who occasionally +said that somehow the “you” is earlier than +the “I.” This seems to apply most of all to our +knowledge of “character” and “personality,” since it +is extremely difficult to get a definite picture of our +own character from our subjective experiences, +whereas the main traits of the character of others +may sometimes be strikingly apparent in their attitude.</p> + +<p>I do not think that the language of others is our +main or most trustworthy cue, in the sense that the +content of it might be taken as a description of their +experience. People do not talk sincerely about their +<span class="pagenum" id="p235">[235]</span>subjective experiences, and we ascribe to them pomposity +or modesty, friendliness or coldness, without +their telling us a single word about such traits. In a +foreign country, we appreciate to a great extent that +others are “provocative” or “kind,” though we may +be absolutely unable to understand their language. +Where we do understand their words, their <em>manner</em> +of talking is often a better cue, and we trust it more +than the content of their talk. Also, a certain kind of +silence can occasionally tell us more about others +than any number of words could reveal in the same +situation. Furthermore, the behavior of apes, for +instance, shows the unprejudiced observer that they +usually “understand” each other very well, though +they do not use language, in the usual meaning of +that word. For these reasons, our discussion will +deal with a fundamental aspect of our problem, even +if we exclude language from it as communication by +the meaning of words and sentences.</p> + +<p>The answer which philosophers have given to the +question raised, is very well known. Since I cannot +directly perceive the experiences of another, the only +evidence available is his body or, more particularly, +the changes and events which I observe as occurring +on its surface, or issuing therefrom. These, however, +have nothing to do with the non-apparent direct experiences +of other persons, apart from the simple rule +of concomitant variation in accordance with which +definite direct experiences unobservable to others are +<span class="pagenum" id="p236">[236]</span>usually accompanied by definite bodily events which +are observable by others. Originally I learned this +rule for myself alone, by observing that definite +experiences were accompanied by definite movements +or changes in <em>my</em> own body. This observation, +made millions of times very early in my life, +induces me to draw an inference by analogy wherever +afterwards I observe the same bodily events in others. +From the fact that the Earth is inhabited by organisms +the inference is sometimes drawn that there also +are organisms on another planet, similar to the Earth, +as Mars is, for instance. In the same manner we are +said to infer that behind the several bodily reactions +or “expressions,” which we observe in others, there +are occurring unobservably definite experiences similar +to those we have experienced in ourselves when +we have observed ourselves undergoing the same +bodily changes. Evidently such an inference cannot +be worth very much, as the parallel astronomical +case shows. Furthermore, the whole theory seems to +be an arbitrary construction, since no one explicitly +draws such inferences by analogy in common life, +though he may “understand” his fellow men to a considerable +degree.</p> + +<p>Therefore, a modification of that hypothesis is proposed +by psychologists. The basis of it remains the +same: In millions of cases we have had experiences +when we could observe bodily reactions in ourselves +at the same time. The constant repetition of these +<span class="pagenum" id="p237">[237]</span>simultaneous occurrences has built up associations +between them, so that in the future the mere observation +of certain bodily events will forcefully reproduce +the idea of the associated definite experiences. +But we may go further: instead of “free” ideas we +very often get an “assimilation” of the reproduced +material by the reproducing material. So the symbol ++ looks like “adding,” a coffin appears imbued +with the gloominess of death, and the flag with the +special value of our country. In the same way, by +an enormous force of association, the bodily changes +of others appear as imbued with those experiences +which have so repeatedly accompanied those changes +in ourselves. This is the reason why we seem to <em>see</em> +friendliness in other people’s faces or to <em>hear</em> anger +in a certain animal cry.</p> + +<p>Evidently we are dealing once more with a special +application of the meaning theory. I do not believe +it to be in principle a solution of the problem. First +of all, from its viewpoint we should be utterly unable +to understand any behavior in others except that +which we know because of its extremely frequent +occurrence in ourselves. But this logical consequence +of the theory is not quite corroborated by the +facts, for sometimes I understand others as being +highly different from me. The characteristic manliness +of Douglas Fairbanks is something which impresses +me very much, though unfortunately I shall +never be able to achieve it myself. On the other +<span class="pagenum" id="p238">[238]</span>hand, a certain kind of envy, mean and hideous to +the highest degree, is plainly visible to me in certain +definite facial expressions of others. But I am +happy to state that it does not occur among my own +subjective experiences. Again, some psychologists +are right in protesting that the theory does not work +in the most important of all cases, which is that of +facial expression. We do see changes in the “expression” +of other people’s faces; but we usually do not +see our own face. No one usually looks into the mirror +when he is angry. We may “feel” some contractions +of our face when we are angry, but since the +angry face of others is given to us in <em>visual</em> experience, +there does not seem to be a reproducing factor +here which might have been associated with our subjective +experiences in previous life. Finally, a chimpanzee +reacts very quickly and adequately to the +friendly or the angry attitude of another chimpanzee. +Shall we assume that he projects into the other’s +face the reproduction of his own subjective experiences? +This seems to be a rather bold assumption!</p> + +<p>Let us consider for a moment what is implicitly +presupposed in this hypothesis, as in that of the “inference +by analogy.” Why should our “understanding” +of others be such an indirect procedure? Obviously, +because we are convinced that “the mental +life” of others is something radically different from +and even incomparable with the bodily events which +we can observe in their behavior. Nothing but an external +<span class="pagenum" id="p239">[239]</span>correlation seems to exist, and to be possible +here, between the facts of two different worlds. If +that is so, we should expect that, in spite of assimilation, +it must be extremely easy to analyze the product. +Where things are combined, the natures of +which are so different as to make them incomparable, +the slightest effort toward analysis should separate +them at once. But if in a friendly-looking face we +try to separate the mere bodily configuration and the +friendliness, we find the task rather difficult, as long +as we look at the whole face and do not analyze the +face itself as a mosaic of colored spots.</p> + +<p>This makes us wonder for a moment why philosophers +and some psychologists should suppose that the +facts of behavior, which we can observe in others, +should be <i lang="la">toto genere</i> different from the experiences +which these others may have. But the reason is obvious +enough. The “stuff” and the “events” which +occur in the “bodily” world, on the one hand, and in +the “conscious” world, on the other, are believed to +have incomparable properties since Descartes. This +is philosophy. And we may perceive at once that, in +this connection at least, it is bad philosophy. For this +reason: in the introduction to this chapter we saw that +the noun “body” is dangerously ambiguous. It may +either mean a physical organism which, as such, +cannot be experienced directly any more than the +physical structure of an atom, or it may mean an experienced +“thing,” as a segregated visual whole. +<span class="pagenum" id="p240">[240]</span>Now, if we talk about the “bodily events” and so +forth, as the only material we can have and observe +in order to understand others, the meaning of the +word “bodily” can refer only to the experienced thing +and its changes as sensory experiences, since the physical +body of another does not occur <em>as such</em> in any +part of our direct experience. It is as remote and +distinct from our sensory experience as is the “consciousness” +of others. Therefore, when we discuss +how we “understand” other people, we have to decide +first of all, whether or not our sensory experience +of others as <em>experienced</em> “bodies” contains a +more direct cue for that understanding. Of course, +our sensory experience of others depends ultimately +upon stimulation issuing from their physical bodies. +But in the fifth chapter we found that our sensory +experience will sometimes give us more valuable +hints about the realities in which we are interested +than the physical events themselves, which constitute +the stimuli for that experience, are able to give. +So, though in the genetic series our sensory experience +of others is more remote from their “mental +life” than are the physical events issuing from the +surface of their bodies, we may find something valuable +in the former which we cannot find in the latter. +The most interesting question is whether our sensory +experience of the behavior of others can give us a +hint about those events in them which in ourselves +<span class="pagenum" id="p241">[241]</span>we call <em>subjective</em> experiences. We would regard it +as such a hint if we could discover a similarity between +our sensory experience of the behavior of +others and those subjective experiences. Suppose +that there were such a similarity, we could then dispense +with the indirect approach through inferences +by analogy, or through association and assimilation, +since theory has approached the subjective experience +of others indirectly only because it had assumed +as a prior dogma that there could not be any similarity +at all between the events of the “bodily world” +and of “mental life.”</p> + +<p>I will proceed cautiously. In its efforts to assort +experiences into separate classes, psychology has introduced +certain rigid distinctions and barriers +among the several classes which, first of all, we shall +try to remove.</p> + +<p>One of these barriers, built by Helmholtz, is that +between the qualities of the different senses, as though +they were incomparable. I contend that they are +comparable in more than one case. “Brightness,” for +instance, is an attribute of some auditory as well as +of visual experiences. We may go a little farther +and say that in the “coolness” of an object which we +touch there is a certain affinity to brightness, whereas +in “warmth” there is something similar to dark nuances. +In the preceding chapter I mentioned the +fact that the German word “rauh” is used for certain +<span class="pagenum" id="p242">[242]</span>auditory experiences as well as for a definite character +of touched surfaces. Again, the German poet +Morgenstern states that</p> + +<div class="poetry-container"> + <div class="poetry"> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0"><i lang="de">Die Möwen sehen alle aus, als ob sie Emma hiessen.</i></div> + </div> + <div class="stanza"> + <div class="verse indent0">(All seagulls look as though their name were Emma.)</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p>To the German at least, because of his pronunciation +of the name, its sound seems to contain something +similar to the aspect of the birds. But we may construct +another example. If, looking at these two figures +(18 and 19), the reader is asked to choose which +he would rather call “takete” or “maluma,” he will +probably be able to decide with ease.⁠<a id="FNanchor_44_44" href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a></p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig18"> +<img src="images/fig18.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 18</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig19"> +<img src="images/fig19.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 19</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>I take it for granted, then, that there are some +similarities between the experiences we have through +different sense organs. In passing we may remark +that in primitive languages one finds much evidence +for assuming that the names of things and events +often originate according to this similarity between +their properties in vision or touch, and certain sounds +or acoustical wholes.⁠<a id="FNanchor_45_45" href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> In modern languages, it is +true, most of these names have lost much of this +character.</p> + +<p>For our main problem it is interesting to know +what names are given to subjective experiences. +First of all, most of us will agree with the statement +that, if peripheral vision is “confused” in comparison +with foveal vision, in this respect almost all subjective +<span class="pagenum" id="p243">[243]</span>experience is more similar to peripheral than +to foveal vision. And if the reader agrees with me +here, he has admitted that in one point, at least, subjective +experiences may be compared with objective +experiences. Recently Klages has collected a large +number of words which we apply to subjective experiences +and all of which have at the same time a +meaning in the realm of objective experience.⁠<a id="FNanchor_46_46" href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> Here +a few instances must suffice. Something arouses a +“bitter” feeling in us. In German one talks about +being in a “soft” mood (<i lang="de">“weiche” Stimmung</i>). +<span class="pagenum" id="p244">[244]</span>“Sweet” love seems to occur in all countries, also +“bright” joy or “dark” grief, and not only in my +country is wrath called “hot.”</p> + +<p>More dynamically, one talks about a tense expectation, +this subjective experience being compared +with what we feel when we touch a taut string. A +certain kind of thinking is called “straight,” and +every one knows immediately what is meant by it. +We may have “rest” or “restlessness” in a visual +field, but we apply the same terms to something +similar in our subjective experience. When one feels +nervous one might use “flickery” as an appropriate +word for his subjective state, it being similar to visual +flicker, for instance. Again, we feel “attracted” towards +something or inclined to “reject” the idea of +it; our spirits are “high” or “low,” and so forth. The +reader will be able to fill out the list by dozens of +other terms which, as these few examples, are used +both for objective and subjective experiences without +creating difficulties of understanding in communication. +Some psychologists may refuse to draw +any conclusions from such verbal hints. They will +say that here we have to do with mere analogies. I +cannot accept this as an argument, however, because +what else is an analogy but some kind of similarity? +Language does not use the words generally applied +to sensory experiences in a haphazard way as terms +for subjective experiences. If one of these terms is +<span class="pagenum" id="p245">[245]</span>applied to just one class of subjective states or experiences, +and not to others, and a second of these terms +is applied exclusively to a second class, and so on, +there must be some principle which regulates this +definite extension of meaning. Furthermore, there +must be something at the basis of the correct <em>understanding</em> +of this kind of verbal practice, when a <em>new</em> +application and transfer of meaning is suddenly invented +by some one trying to describe his subjective +state in a lively manner. I contend that this <em>something</em> +is a certain degree of similarity between definite +experiences of the “inner” and “outer” world.</p> + +<p>Though I realize that there is some truth in the +James-Lange theory of emotional experiences, I do +not wish to make my statements seem to depend upon +this theory. Of course, if the so-called emotional +aspect of subjective experience <em>is</em> sensory experience +issuing from our muscles, viscera, and so forth, it +will be a truism that emotional experiences are “similar” +to certain “sensory” experiences, since they are +declared even to be identical by that hypothesis. But +we may recognize a similarity without accepting the +identity. From this viewpoint, maintaining a certain +cautiousness toward the James-Lange theory, we +may find a similarity even between subjective experiences +and those of vision or hearing, so that, in this +respect, our theory would be more general than that +of James and Lange.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p246">[246]</span></p> + +<p>With this preparation we can approach the problem, +whether our objective experience of the behavior +of others is capable of showing us something essentially +similar to their “mental life”—a question +which has a reasonable meaning if understood in +terms of the last paragraphs. I shall discuss a few +concrete cases in which unprejudiced observation +seems to give a clear answer.</p> + +<p>Two scientists in Poland are talking about the difference +of their theories. I can observe their behavior +as it develops before me in my visual and +acoustical experience but, since they talk in a foreign +language, I cannot understand their words. +For a while the aspect of the scene is calm, both visually +and acoustically. But suddenly the man to the +left, as though “struck” by some of his colleague’s +words, makes but a slight receding movement of the +head and, from this moment, the quality of his voice +and the expression of his face show a certain character +of hardness. To this change there seems to correspond +immediately a transformation of the other’s +behavior, insofar as, from now on, the man to the +right becomes a picture of what the musician calls +“crescendo,” both as I see and as I hear him. Soon +the first person also becomes increasingly dynamic, +and the whole scene is approaching an extreme state +of agitation, when presently I see the man to the right +looking at a placard on the wall and smiling. He says +<span class="pagenum" id="p247">[247]</span> +a few words to the other, who also looks in that direction, +a certain brightness appearing on his face at +the same time; and from this moment their conversation +resumes its initial smoothness and placid +quality.</p> + +<p>These scientists happen to know the German language. +So, when the discussion is over, the man to +the left tells me that a short while after the conversation +started some unexpected words of his friend +appeared to him as a personal offense or insult, and +that he could not avoid having a bitter feeling as a +result of it. The friend, on the other hand, reports +that, beginning rather abruptly, the man to the left +manifested such a closed and hard appearance, as +though to indicate that he would never surrender his +position or be open to persuasion, and that as a result +he felt anger continually rising and increasing within +himself. The first, the man to the left, reports that a +similar wave of irritation occurred in himself after +a while; and both of them tell me that the placard on +the wall reads “Keep smiling” in their language, +and that, almost at once after becoming aware of it, +they felt much more relaxed and calm.</p> + +<p>Is it really possible to deny that in such a case my +objective experience pictures some essential traits of +what the others experience subjectively? I see the two +scientists as one visual group, the members of which +are directed towards each other in all their attitudes. +Similarly, each of them feels that he is attacking +<span class="pagenum" id="p248">[248]</span>the other or defending his own opinions against +an attack directed toward them. Again, the sudden +receding movement of one of them pictures very +well the felt increase of social distance which followed +from something like an offense. Neither will +deny that, from this moment, there began an emotional +crescendo, which found an adequate expression +in the visual and acoustical crescendo of my +sensory experience of the total scene. Finally, I +could see the return to calmness, resulting from their +looking at the placard for a moment. And this calmness +itself, as seen and heard by me, is similar to +what both tell me about their subjective state at that +time.</p> + +<p>But the lesson which this example teaches seems +extremely general to me. It seems to teach that all +forms of dynamical development occurring in subjective +experiences may be expressed by similar +forms of objective experiences in the sensory field +of an observer. Quite generally the inner processes, +whether emotional or intellectual, show types of development +which may be given names, usually applied +to musical events, such as: <i>crescendo</i> and +<i>diminuendo</i>, <i>accelerando</i> and <i>ritardando</i>. As these +qualities occur in the world of auditory experiences, +they are found in the visual world too, and +so they can express <em>similar</em> dynamical traits of inner +life in directly observable behavior. Who has not +found himself occasionally walking faster when +<span class="pagenum" id="p249">[249]</span>thinking about the disagreeable attitude of an adversary! +Again, to the increasing inner tempo and +dynamical level there corresponds a <i>crescendo</i> and +<i>accelerando</i> in visible movement. Of course, the +same inner development may express itself acoustically, +as in the <i>accelerando</i> and <i>reforzando</i> of speech. +Or look at your friend on different mornings. Sometimes +his movements will be even and calm, sometimes +his whole visible surface, his face and his fingers, +will be unstable and restless. He does not need +to tell you in the first case that he is well and at rest, +nor in the second that he feels restless subjectively, +because both states are apparent directly in your +objective experience. In the same way, hesitation +and lack of inner determination become visible in a +form obviously similar to them as subjective experiences, +as <i>ritardando</i> of visible or audible behavior, or +as slight, disorderly, starting movements in different +directions, not organized into one whole. As long +as human beings behave naturally, any <em>sudden</em> change +of inner direction, any sudden event in their subjective +life, will appear as a sudden event on their +visible surface or in their speech-melody. In a +moment of <em>sudden</em> fright, human beings <em>jump</em> back, +or start. When some one experiences that flash by +which a new idea or the solution of a problem comes +to him, he will suddenly interrupt his walking or +abruptly strike his head. Here both his inner experience +and his outer aspect will exhibit the same interruption +<span class="pagenum" id="p250">[250]</span>of continuity. For similar reasons the +activity of a man, as it is seen by us, will often show +an organization which corresponds to the organization +of his doing and planning, as experienced subjectively. +Actions which flow from one determining +source appear as one stream of visible events in most +cases. Where a new “idea” leads to new action in +subjective experience, the observer will see one +stream of visible development ceasing and another +one starting independently. If one action consists of +relatively segregated members, subjectively, the same +“articulation” will frequently prevail in visible behavior. +So with regard to dynamical structure, not +only the so-called expressive movements but also +the practical behavior of human beings is a good picture +of their inner life, in a great many cases. The +reader who may have lost the feeling here that I am +discussing concrete things should review an earlier +chapter in which, among other examples, the organization +of seen movement was considered. In my +book <cite>The Mentality of Apes</cite> the description of +animal behavior includes a great many instances of +this type.</p> + +<p>It will be convenient, however, to treat in detail a +few examples which are of a somewhat different +kind. In objective as well as in subjective experience +we find states to which the names of “tension” +and “direction” may be applied. If my attention is +attracted by a strange object, a snake for instance, I +<span class="pagenum" id="p251">[251]</span>feel directed toward it and at the same time a feeling +of tension is experienced. A friend, even if he has +not recognized the snake, will see me and especially +my face and eyes directed toward it; in the tension +of my face he will have a visual picture of my inner +tension, as in its direction he has a direct picture of +the direction which I experience. It cannot be said +in objection that vision will not apprise him in any +way of my “connection” with the object, since there +is nothing in space between my eyes and the snake, +which might be a “stimulus” for his seeing that connection. +Such an argument seems to forget what has +been said about grouping in visual space. As soon as +my eyes are seen looking in a definite direction—and +in this respect our eyes are astonishingly expressive—a +segregated whole or object, which in the field of an +observer is situated in that line of direction, may become +immediately connected with my gaze and my +whole person. This case of grouping is not more +problematic than all the others we have discussed. +We may at once add the case in which the direction +of attitude is the opposite, i.e., away from something. +Again, grouping may become so striking that no one +can see such a movement or reaction without referring +it to a definite object, from which it is +averted, exactly as the event is felt subjectively by +the person whom we are observing. As an example, +I give the following statements, taken from a famous +experiment, literally:</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p252">[252]</span></p> + +<p>“He started to reach for the head of the animal +with the forefinger of his left hand but withdrew it +suddenly before contact.”</p> + +<p>(Wool is presented to a child in a paper package).... +“He then began to play with the paper, avoiding +contact with the wool itself.” Both statements +occur in Dr. Watson’s description of his experiments +with children.⁠<a id="FNanchor_47_47" href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> In the first, the movement of a finger +is compellingly seen as <em>directed toward the animal</em>, +though “objective” methods of observation, as Dr. +Watson understands the term, would not find the +slightest connection in space between the finger and +the animal, and though, therefore, his description +seems to imply an almost purposive psychology. In +the second statement, the same observation applies to +the words “avoiding contact with the wool.” “Avoid” +is a term which may surprise us in a description governed +by the ideal of the natural sciences and the fear +of so-called “purpose.” However that may be, the +example shows that, in visual experience, the tendency +toward grouping and directed reference is so +strong that even the most radical behaviorist cannot +resist it. Therefore, if I “avoid contact” with a +definite object or if I “reach for” another, these facts +of my experience must be excellently pictured in the +organized field which an observer of my behavior +himself beholds as his <em>objective</em> experience.</p> + +<p>In the last few examples it is the spatial, more than +<span class="pagenum" id="p253">[253]</span>the temporal, side of visible behavior which resembles +the inner experiences of a person. This is +also the case, where a state of inner depression expresses +itself in a drooping carriage of the body as a +visual whole, similar to the posture of the normal +person in a period of extreme fatigue or sorrow, but +even more decidedly in the attitude characteristic of +certain insane patients. Just the contrary is seen in +those patients who enjoy a supranormal euphoria or +“elevation.” Usually, their body as a visual thing +will show most clearly a corresponding erectness, +and in one case, which Dr. Janet described admirably +at the last International Congress, the patient began +to walk on tiptoe.</p> + +<p>Most readers will be well acquainted with the next +case which, by the way, is particularly interesting for +social psychology. A man in a leading position, but +perhaps a little too good-hearted for his office, +treats his inferiors as friends. When he sometimes +finds himself obliged to censure one of them severely, +and to make him feel that friendly relations are over, +such a man becomes a most suggestive object of observation. +If he has not already trained himself on +previous occasions, he will have the greatest difficulty +in uttering those decisive words which will +show the other quite openly and definitely that the +superior has radically changed his mind. In spite +of the best intentions provided by a feeling of duty, +those words will not be uttered, but in their place +<span class="pagenum" id="p254">[254]</span>others which do not go to the center of the affair. +They come near to it; the other man may guess the +whole truth from them if he is sensitive enough, but +they leave something like a screen around the main +point. Viewed from without the official’s activity is +a picture of his inner perturbation. The stress of +firm intention is in him, but social factors prevent his +behaving entirely according to his intentions. Consequently +you may see him walking up and down +before the other, as a magnetic needle swings in the +field of force. He himself feels the strain and the +obligation to act directly, but also feels that he is +constantly “deflected.” When he stops, his eyes +are worth observing. All the inner direction +and difficulties of a person become visible more +easily in the sensitive play of the eyes than elsewhere, +particularly under the pressure of “social +forces.” Of course, it is rather easy to say nice things +(which one does not believe) to another man, while +looking into his eyes steadily. Social forces are not +opposed to that; on the contrary, they operate precisely +in that direction. But try to look into another’s +eyes, i.e., toward what we experience for some reason +as the center of the other man’s personality, and then +tell him what obligates you to be less friendly toward +him, and, as it were, to reject him socially! For some +persons this is an extremely onerous task. So the +man in our example may well intend to look into the +other’s eyes; but his own eyes will either stop short +<span class="pagenum" id="p255">[255]</span>somewhere, at the mouth or the nose, for instance, or +when they reach the full glance of the other man, +they will be deflected very soon as though by an +irresistible force. Just as this man feels his intentions +bending around and his words avoiding the socially +decisive step, his visible behavior appears to us as +persistently deflected from the main direction, which +is toward the other, and especially from the visible +center of his personality, i.e., his eyes.</p> + +<p>This may suffice as a description of cases in which +the similarity of the objective and the subjective experiences +of the same behavior seems to me obvious. +The reader will find a great many other examples, +as soon as he begins to observe other people from this +point of view. If that similarity is not a familiar fact +to the psychologist, the reason may be the analytical +tendency of our science. Indeed, when we think of +other people’s appearance in terms of local nuances +of brightness, chroma, and so forth, we feel inclined +to deny the idea of such similarity. But as soon as +we look upon behavior more naïvely and are not +afraid to recognize grouping, and a great many qualities +of the von Ehrenfels type, as realities in sensory +experience, the similarity becomes obvious in thousands +of cases.</p> + +<p>Our problem has a genetical side also. Why +should behavior in the objective experience of an +observer be similar to what is being experienced subjectively +by the individual under observation? The +<span class="pagenum" id="p256">[256]</span>answer is rather simple in the case of temporal and +dynamical traits of behavior. A pianist while playing +a sonata is living in a dynamical stream, the +organization of which is very clear to him. In his +experience he ends one “phrase” now and at a definite +moment begins the next one. He starts a +<i>crescendo</i> as the Ehrenfels-quality of one musical +development and a <i>ritardando</i> as that of another. +Whatever the laws of motor innervation may be, the +impulses which are conducted to his muscles follow +the organization of the scheme he “has in mind.” +The final results are sound waves, and these are not +dynamically organized, because in the air one wave +is independent of the previous waves and so forth. +But something remains which is sufficient for organization +in those who listen. Where he intends a +<i>crescendo</i> as an Ehrenfels-quality, the product of +his playing will be a series of waves of increasing +intensity. In those who listen this series will produce +an acoustical whole which again has the same +Ehrenfels-quality of “swelling.” Where, in his experience, +he ends a “phrase” and afterwards starts +a new one, the relations of the waves as to temporal +distance, intensity, and so forth, will be such that in +the acoustical organization experienced by the audience +one whole ends and a new one begins at corresponding +moments. In some respects the situation +is the same as in the case of physical objects +that appear as segregated wholes in visual experience. +<span class="pagenum" id="p257">[257]</span>Though among the light-waves reflected by +the surfaces of objects, and consequently among the +stimuli projected upon the retina, there is no organization, +the relations between the stimuli are so +well preserved that, in the nervous system, organization, +which depends upon those relations, will generally +build up “adequate” wholes. As in this case, +organization comes nearer the objective facts in some +essential points than the indifferent mosaic of stimuli +does, so in our example, acoustical organization will +correspond to something in the pianist which does not +exist <em>as such</em> in the sound waves between him and his +audience. Once more the mediating properties of +the stimuli are their relationships. If we assume that +the pianist has experiences similar to our own, the +knowledge implicit in our acoustical organization +goes beyond the knowledge implicit in our having +visual objects as segregated wholes. For the organization +which we experience will correspond not only +to the organization of his nervous processes, but also +to the organization of his musical “intentions,” as he +<em>experiences</em> them. In order to understand this, we +must remember the concluding remarks of the second +chapter. If the pianist intends a musical phrase as a +whole, shall we assume that the processes corresponding +to that experienced development-as-a-whole are +also one whole functionally, or shall we assume the +contrary? Where, for his experience, the phrase +ends and after a discontinuity a new one begins, shall +<span class="pagenum" id="p258">[258]</span>we suppose that the corresponding processes of his +brain are functionally continuous or shall we assume +that the physiological organization is discontinuous, +and hence similar to that of his experiences? <i>Gestalt</i> +psychology assumes the similarity of organization in +both cases; it makes this hypothesis quite generally +and in all respects. And from this viewpoint the +genesis of communication between the experiences of +one man and those of another becomes simple enough. +The experiences of the first, the pianist, are a picture +of the corresponding processes in his brain, so far as +organization is concerned. Innervation of the +pianist’s muscles occurs as something like a projection +of that picture upon his muscles. The sound-waves +which he produces are not organized, but the +relations between them somehow correspond to and +represent that previous organization. In a similar +nervous system a new organization is built up depending +upon those relations existing among the acoustical +stimuli. To some degree it will be similar to that +which exists or has just existed in the nervous system +of the pianist. Therefore the experience corresponding +to these processes will be correspondingly similar +to the organization of the experience in the pianist. +As in this example, the similarity between the inner +experiences of one man and the sensory experience of +another may be explained wherever we find such a +correspondence existing with respect to temporal +organization and dynamics.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p259">[259]</span></p> + +<p>It will not be necessary to repeat the argument in +the case of “direction,” of “tension,” of “lack of determination,” +and so forth. Even where we do not +have full insight into the reasons <em>why</em> the peripheral +overt behavior of a human organism pictures the +organization of its experiences, or better that of the +corresponding processes in his brain, we have to +admit that this connection very often exists. The +temporal and other relations of the stimuli which +are produced by such activity in one organism are +just the right ones, then, to determine the appropriate +organization and similar Ehrenfels-qualities +in other organisms receptive to those stimuli. A +man who makes a great effort to find a name which +he cannot immediately remember will, very probably, +contract his face. The face thus contracted +produces just the constellation of stimuli which, in +the objective experience of another, will determine +the character of “tension” as an Ehrenfels-quality +of that face as a visual whole. We have also seen +how the almost inevitable visual grouping of a man +with those objects towards which he is directed, will +complete the picture so that, in this respect too, we +see something similar to what is going on “in” that +man.</p> + +<p>At this point the reader may protest that, after all, +our understanding of other people remains an indirect +affair. Though, in our objective experience, the +other may exhibit properties similar sometimes to +<span class="pagenum" id="p260">[260]</span>his inner experiences, our objective experience remains +something different numerically from those +inner experiences of another. The first gives us what +we call “bodily events” in direct objective experience, +whereas the second will never become an objective +experience of ours. Therefore, in one point at +least, we do not seem to be better off than other +theorists! Something like a concluding step in our +analysis seems to be needed if we are to use our objective +experiences as a basis for guessing about similar +inner processes in others.</p> + +<p>Indeed, the discussion has proceeded to this point +as though in this final step the old and the new idea +would become identical compulsively, the only difference +being the acknowledgment of a much better +basis for this last step in the new theory. It is now +time, however, to change this aspect of the problem. +It has to be changed in the direction of agreement +with what is sound and justified in behaviorism.</p> + +<p>If I recollect the incidents of a day which has been +particularly filled with social contacts and the continual +necessity of understanding other people, I +have to confess that I have scarcely, if ever, had an +“image,” or anything like it, of the inner experiences +of those other people! To speak the truth: I have +never even thought of the possibility of having one. +I intentionally summon such an “image” now, in the +hope of producing and “having” what, from the +usual viewpoint, should always be the kernel of social +<span class="pagenum" id="p261">[261]</span>understanding. But the resulting product is very +poor and decidedly unusual. It becomes quite +obvious by such a test that generally social understanding +does <em>not</em> depend upon that procedure. +What else happens then? The answer is simple, +though it will surprise some of my readers.</p> + +<p>In my objective experience of my neighbor’s anger +there is no “dualism” between the “movements of +his body” and his “inner experiences.” Even for +the scientist this dualism does not exist, so long as he +remains naïve and does not theorize too much. To +ask for the <em>final step</em> from certain of our objective +experiences, viz., the behavior of others, to the inference +of their inner life, is nothing but the introduction +of a sophisticated, scientific and philosophical +classification into a field which, to the unprejudiced +observer, does not require such a treatment. +Philosophy, in trying to build up a picture of the +world, may be compelled, perhaps, to make a distinction +between “mind” and “body.” But that does +not mean that our objective experience of others +must appear to us as something insufficient and limited, +<em>behind</em> which an altogether different kind of +event occurs. This is not necessary because objective +experience as such contains <em>all</em> the material needed +for understanding others, at least in all those cases +which we have treated here. When I refer to the +calmness of another man standing before me in everyday +life, I refer to his visible appearance, which is not +<span class="pagenum" id="p262">[262]</span>something “merely” visible to me, but contains all +the “calmness” I am interested in <em>without any further +idea about something additional such as, for instance, +his “consciousness</em>.” If he becomes more and more +excited, according to my eyes and ears, this <em>crescendo</em> +is not an indifferent sensory fact. In its dynamical +properties it <em>contains</em> what I call the man’s excitement, +and I do not think of the man as a locus +of events belonging to an essentially different world. +At least, before I begin to philosophize, I do not +do so. In the same way, when I refer to other +men’s “hesitation,” “restlessness,” “determination,” +“depression,” “avoiding,” “reaching for,” and also +their “joy,” “fear,” “anger,” “embarrassment” and +so forth, I am usually far from inferring “inner experiences” +in them, by making “a last step” from +my sensory experiences into quite another field. +On the contrary, what I denote by those terms <em>remains</em> +entirely in sensory space. Though the terms +may also be applied to <em>my</em> inner experiences, which +often are strikingly similar to those objective experiences, +they do not usually refer to the inner experiences +of others when used in an everyday description +of their conduct.</p> + +<p>May I ask the reader to make an experiment before +criticizing these statements? It is easy enough +to produce embarrassment in some one. If the +reader tries it and if he becomes convinced that he +has been successful, he should ask himself whether +<span class="pagenum" id="p263">[263]</span>what he calls the embarrassment of the other is not +present to him in sensory space. He should also ask +whether or not he imagines something out of another +world, i.e., the subjectively experienced embarrassment +of the other, when he “understands” that man’s +behavior, as we understand each other in daily life. +Sometimes, it is true, we experience the other man’s +attitude as something issuing from “his interior.” +But what is here called “his interior” is a part of the +same sensory space in which his visible face is seen. +Even such a description does not refer to events in a +world apart; it means an event in the self-same world +in which we see the other “looking at a definite +object,” for instance. If in my objective experience +the other man is a segregated whole and if to this +whole there corresponds a functional whole of processes +in my brain, we have no right to expect that +the dynamics of that functional whole should be +restricted to its boundary in all cases, the interior of +it remaining altogether empty. So we may well +understand the fact that sometimes a dynamical attitude +seems to issue from another person’s “interior.”</p> + +<p>The conclusion of this discussion is that the +“numerical difference” between fear as experienced +subjectively and fear as experienced objectively by +an observer, shall not be denied. But we have to add +immediately that this theoretical difference does not +play an appreciable rôle in common life, because +here, from the viewpoint of a naïve observer, the +<span class="pagenum" id="p264">[264]</span>frightened behavior, as it is experienced objectively, +<em>is the</em> fear of the other. Similarly, to this observer +the pencil before him <em>is the</em> pencil, though in a +moment of theoretical consideration he may realize +that, in addition to it, there exists a pencil as an +unexperienced physical object.</p> + +<p>I mention one more consequence of this theory or, +as one should better say, of this description: All +physical events or states which send similar constellations +of stimuli to our eyes and ears, as issue +from the physical body of another person, will +look or sound “emotional,” “restless,” “directed +towards something,” “determined,” and so forth, just +as a living person does. No one can hear naïvely +the rumbling <em>crescendo</em> of thunder without thus +understanding it as “menacing.” Different types of +weather are experienced in the same manner, i.e., as +calm or restless or friendly, and so forth.⁠<a id="FNanchor_48_48" href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> No one +thinks of imagining the subjective experiences of the +weather in such a case. What surrounds us in sensory +space, we describe as restless or menacing or +friendly, because these are the dynamical attributes +or Ehrenfels-qualities which characterize the sensory +experiences in question.</p> + +<p>I wish to state expressly, however, that sometimes +the problem of “understanding” seems to present +difficulties which cannot be solved in this way. +<span class="pagenum" id="p265">[265]</span>Wherever the objective experience which we have +of another person does not appear as similar to those +inner experiences which he probably has, a new situation +is before us. One might say, for instance, that, +from the viewpoint of our theory, laughing as seen +and heard by others is not an appropriate expression +of that group of subjective states which are usually +accompanied by laughing. Whether in such cases +the theory of association and assimilation, or any +other indirect explanation, may be accepted as a supplement, +I shall not try to decide here. Suppose that +such a supplement should become necessary; the facts +described in this chapter would be an excellent basis +for it, because where understanding has already occurred +as something direct and obvious, this core of +experiences might well tend to complete itself in the +form of meaning acquired indirectly. On the other +hand, we do not claim that what is going on within +a person will <em>always</em> be evident in his sensory appearance. +A theory that would pretend so much +could not possibly be right. Most persons begin to +conceal themselves to some degree early in life. A +well-trained actor or pianist does not “look” his stage +fright at all; he does not “sound” it either. To be +sure, sometimes, calmness acquired as a social form +will become transparent in consequence of some +slight but treacherous nuance of effort in it. Real +embarrassment, as, for instance, in the example considered +above (pp. 253–255), is a thing which few +<span class="pagenum" id="p266">[266]</span>people can conceal altogether. By no means can we +deny, however, that innumerable passing events and +traits of inner life remain hidden in social contact, +because suppression of peripheral “projection” has +become a facile automatism in adults. Moreover, I +shall concede without hesitation that, on the way +from organized processes in one person through the +transmission by waves of light or sound to new +organization in a second person, much may be lost or +distorted. The theory gives us neither an altogether +new nor an altogether perfect key to another person’s +inner life; it tries only to describe so far as it can that +kind of understanding which is the common property +and practice of mankind.</p> + +<p>A special relevant task consists in considering what +further effects those sensory experiences may have, +which, possessing the qualities of calmness or restlessness, +of tension or relaxation, and so forth, appear +to us both in our fellow men and the weather. In our +nervous system, the processes underlying those experiences +do not remain isolated, the psychophysical +field is larger, and other parts of it are very apt to +develop processes which we experience as subjective. +We have seen that these have much in common with +the processes underlying our objective experience of +the behavior of others. Therefore, a rather direct +influence seems to be possible. Social contagion +particularly, but also fear, as an effect of menacing +objective experience, or haughtiness as a consequence +<span class="pagenum" id="p267">[267]</span>of the humbleness of others, experienced objectively, +must be considered from the new viewpoint.</p> + +<p>These are problems which we may leave to a future +time when the simpler facts described in this chapter +will have found more general acknowledgment. One +word more shall be said, however, about the application +of the new viewpoint to scientific method. In +this respect one might be inclined to say that such an +understanding of others is all right for the purposes +of common life, but not for those of science. It +ought to be excluded, therefore, from behavioristic +studies as something which originates in our sensory +processes as a very indirect and complicated result of +stimulation. We have seen, however, that even such +a radical behaviorist as Dr. Watson does not keep +himself free from its use, because too little would be +left of the qualitative observation and description of +behavior, if he should try seriously to exclude even +the slightest trace of that “understanding.” Take +the example of the physicist! If he would exclude +from objective observation whatever exists for him +as a product of sensory organization only, he could +neither rely upon the sensory segregation of <em>objects</em>, +including his apparatus, nor upon their <em>form</em> as a +visual experience, since it does not exist without the +“indirect and complicated” processes of sensory organization. +It is obvious that such an extreme procedure +would make his scientific task an impossible +affair. Quite the same is true of behavioristic psychology. +<span class="pagenum" id="p268">[268]</span>At least as preliminary material the sensory +experiences which we have considered in this +chapter have to be used, wherever they occur as striking +and evident in behavior as objective experience. +With naïve confidence the physicist did likewise to +a great extent, before he could develop the present +methods of his science which restrict the use of sensory +experience to certain special and very reliable +cases. In our young science it will be convenient to +follow his example with caution, as we proposed in +the second chapter. But I wish to lay some stress +upon the necessary caution. Only those should be +allowed to apply this method in objective psychology +who know how to discriminate between the apparent +data of objective experience and the mere play of +untrained and prejudiced imagination.</p> + + +<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h3> + +<blockquote> +<p>Buytendijk und Plessner: <cite lang="de">Philosophischer Anzeiger</cite>. +1925.</p> + +<p>E. von Hornbostel: <cite lang="de">Festschrift Meinhof</cite>.</p> + +<p>L. Klages: <cite lang="de">Vom Wesen des Bewusstseins</cite>. 1921.</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Die Methoden der psychologischen Forschung +beim Affen</cite> (Cf. Chapter II).</p> + +<p>Usnadze: Psychol. Forsch., 5. 1924.</p> +</blockquote> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p269">[269]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="VIII"> + VIII + <br> + <i>Association</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>WITHOUT the observation of direct experience +we should be in great danger of constructing +an artificially simplified system of psychology, +as is that of current behaviorism. On the +other hand, it seems absolutely impossible to me to +develop psychology as a science of direct experience +or of “consciousness.” For the development of +that science the field of actual experience alone is +inadequate, especially when compared with the +totality of those processes in the nervous system, a +few of which are at each moment accompanied by +experience, but <em>all</em> of which seem to be more or less +interdependent. How can one pretend to construct +an adequate theory of psychological events using +experience alone, if the processes underlying experience +are merely a dynamical province of a much +larger functional whole? It is almost impossible to +deny this fact nowadays. Therefore, we cannot hope +to understand experience itself exclusively from its +own aspect, any more than one could hope to learn +and understand the game of chess through watching +only the moves in one corner of the board the whole +time.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p270">[270]</span></p> + +<p>In this latter case the observer of the game would +soon become aware of the fact that something important +was going on beyond the narrow field of his +observation, that evidently the moves in it referred to +something beyond, since they even seemed to come +from there and to disappear again into the unseen. +Exactly the same is true of experience. When reading +or talking about things which are not present, we +do not usually develop adequate “images” of them. +Sometimes scarcely anything at all seems to be experienced +of those absent things. When asked about +my profession I answer that I am a psychologist. But +all the <em>actual</em> experience connected with this word is +a certain feeling of familiarity, of being sure about +it, and of a certain direction in which I might start +at once in order to furnish more concrete and detailed +data. This “readiness for transition” in a +definite direction, the mark of which is not given +explicitly in actual experience, has been described +excellently by William James. It is one of the most +frequent and common things to be found in experience. +And its most conspicuous character consists in +its being <em>experienced as</em> pointing beyond the actual +field of experience towards something particular and +ready outside. So experience tells us about its own +functional incompleteness. Nor should we be too +much astonished by the fact; nothing else can be expected +if, of a larger functional whole, only a restricted +field has experience as a correlate; to the +<span class="pagenum" id="p271">[271]</span>dynamical dependence of this field upon definite +physiological states beyond itself corresponds the +felt definite direction in experience. Though not +experienced actually, those physiological states “beyond” +seem to be definite enough; for in general our +reading and talking go the right way, sufficiently +determined by those “states beyond.”</p> + +<p>Perhaps the simplest example of this is “successive +comparison,” in its different forms. After a few +years of traveling I meet a friend, and my first +idea is “How old he looks!” That does not at +all mean that he looks particularly old on an absolute +scale. I see older-looking men every day. Nor +does it mean that I reproduce an image of him, as I +knew him before, and now compare the two. Nevertheless, +what is meant refers to the past and represents +an extreme form of what occurs in most cases +of successive comparison. If five seconds after a first +noise I hear a second one, similar but sufficiently +louder, I am able to judge about the relation of their +intensities without any difficulty, though I do <em>not</em> reproduce +the first at the moment of the second. +(Personally, I am not able to experience even a somewhat +inadequate “image” of one noise when I hear a +second one which is slightly different.) In this point +all observers at present seem to agree.</p> + +<p>But how do we judge about the relation, if only +one of the noises is actually experienced? We may +answer that we do not experience the second noise as +<span class="pagenum" id="p272">[272]</span>something isolated and discrete, but that, when it occurs, +it seems to come with a definite direction +“from something in the past.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_49_49" href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> Even if we take this +for granted, however, our problem is not yet solved. +Our judgments are usually rather accurate. Hence, +what is left of the past, i.e., of the first sound, which +now determines the direction with which the second +noise appears, must be a fairly definite representative +of the first noise. On the other hand, this <em>trace</em> of +the first sound is an effect not comparable to that +process which, five seconds before, was accompanied +by our experience of the first sound. If it were still +of the same kind, it should be accompanied by a similar +experience throughout, which it certainly is not. +Hence, the only possibility seems to be that a physiological +product of that first process remains after +that process itself has ceased, that such a product +represents sufficiently well that process by which it +was produced, and that the definite direction with +which the second noise appears depends upon the +“level” of that product in its relation to the intensity +of the second noise.</p> + +<p>The concentration of those molecules which have +taken part in the first process may be considered as a +product of that process, left behind as its trace, with +corresponding properties. There are other hypotheses. +But no theory will be competent which does +<span class="pagenum" id="p273">[273]</span>not assume some trace corresponding more or less to +the actual properties of the first process. Some years +ago I developed a more detailed theory of successive +comparison, primarily concerned with the way in +which the trace of a first sound determines the +direction with which the second sound appears.⁠<a id="FNanchor_50_50" href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> +I concluded that by experimentation on successive +comparison we are able to find out what happens to +the trace of the first process after this process itself +has ceased. The final result of these considerations +was that such a trace is preserved for a long time and +that, probably, it is identical with what has to be +assumed as the physiological basis of enduring memory +and of reproduction.</p> + +<p>In some degree all sound theories of memory, of +habit, and so forth, will be hypotheses about physiological +traces. Furthermore, each of these theories +will have to assume that the properties of the traces +correspond more or less to those of the processes by +which they were produced. Otherwise we should not +be able to explain the accuracy of reproduction which +in a great many cases is very high. In <i>gestalt</i> psychology +we state at once the assumption that, as far as +the original process (and the experience which may +have accompanied it) has been organized in a definite +manner, its trace must have similar properties +of organization, in general. Take the examples given +in Chapter VI where the concept of “real form” was +<span class="pagenum" id="p274">[274]</span>considered. If certain segregated wholes with definite +forms are experienced in our field of vision, +the aspect of one of them later on may reproduce +other experiences which had been present at the same +time. But if, for some reason, instead of that particular +organization, grouping and form, we experience +other wholes with their real forms, no reproduction +will occur, though the same, or almost the same, +stimuli may be given us. So the number 4 will reproduce +its name when written in a certain environment +(cf. p. <a href="#p209">209</a>), but when <a href="#fig10">Fig. 10</a> is shown to an +unprejudiced subject, this name will not occur at all. +On the other hand, if the subject has once found the +4 in that figure, which means that 4 has now become +a segregated whole, he will consequently find it again +easily, and reproduce the name. From this it follows +that the traces of past experiences are neither an indifferent +continuum nor a mosaic of independent +points; rather they must be pictures of past organization. +As such they take part in processes of reproduction.</p> + +<p>This same property of the traces may be deduced +from recognition. When Rubin induced his subjects +at the first presentation to see certain pictures in a +definite distribution of figure and ground, they recognized +them very well if, afterwards, the same organization +was favored by the conditions of the experiment. +If, however, in the second presentation what +had been figure before became ground, and vice +<span class="pagenum" id="p275">[275]</span>versa, the subjects found unknown forms in the field, +i.e., failed to recognize, though the constellation of +stimuli was the same throughout. Here again the +traces are shown to correspond entirely to past organization, +and not to the aggregate of past stimuli. We +may go a little further: In most cases of reproduction +the reproduced material itself appears as organized. +This is true not only of “images,” but also of motor +“melodies” with which we are well acquainted, as +Michotte and van der Veldt have shown most vividly +in a recent book.⁠<a id="FNanchor_51_51" href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> Readers who have visual images +will easily find that their image of a definite individual +tree is detached from the dim environment, as +a figure-whole possessing a real form. Of course, in +“free imagination” and in dreaming the field given +us may be very different from any sensory experience +we have ever had before. Nevertheless, even the +oddest creations of dreaming will remain figures, +groups or events, which, whether very definite in +shape or not, exhibit all the essential properties of +organization.</p> + +<p>So decisive will organization be in a tremendous +number of cases that we may change the stimuli in +the most radical manner and still get the same recognition +or the same reproduction, if only the essential +traits of the organization in question remain the +same. A melody is recognized in a key which may +not contain a single tone of its first presentation. Or +<span class="pagenum" id="p276">[276]</span>again, some days after we have heard it the first time +we find ourselves humming it spontaneously in a +changed key. Here all the factors excepting organization +seem to be indifferent for reproduction. I +hardly need mention the fact that an unknown figure +seen to-day in red color somewhat to the left of the +point of fixation and in a definite size, will be recognized +without difficulty if to-morrow it appears as +green or yellow, somewhat to the right and in quite +another size.⁠<a id="FNanchor_52_52" href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> Evidently, then, recognition and reproduction +deal with the organization of past events +as much or rather more than with local effects of +stimulation, which are assumed as the parts of past +events in mosaic theory. We shall come back to this +point later on.</p> + +<p>From this viewpoint some facts can be explained +which would remain perplexing if we did not recognize +the reality of organization. When we experiment +on delayed reaction in animals we find that some +of them are able to choose the right object, let us say +among three equal ones before them, after a delay of +many seconds or even some minutes; though at the +time when the delay is over and we release the +animal, the right object does not exhibit any +peculiar traits, as it did before the delay. If, during +the delay, the animal remains directed towards the +right object, his correct choice is not very astonishing. +A real problem arises in the case in which the animal +<span class="pagenum" id="p277">[277]</span>moves freely in his cage during the delay and still +assumes the right direction after we release it. It +has been said that in such a case the animal’s reaction +depends upon some internal cue. This is true insofar +as there would be no reason at all for the right +reaction after the delay without some after-effect of +previous stimulation (for instance, the aspect of +food) which at that time made one object a particular +thing. That after-effect is undoubtedly an internal +cue. But when, after the delay and after +accidental movements of the animal, the internal cue +works the right way, there must be some characteristic +of the right object by which it can be discriminated. +This something cannot be discovered +when we examine each object by itself, because in +exact experimentation they all have the same properties. +Still there is some difference between them, and +this difference is the rôle which each object plays in +the group. One is the left end, one the right end, +and one the middle or interior part of the group. If, +with that after-effect as an internal cue, the animal +reacts after the delay, the only property (of the right +object) which can make the animal refer its cue to +the right object is <em>the place of that object in the +group of three objects</em>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_53_53" href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> The particular stimulus (the +food, for instance, or a light, as in Hunter’s famous +experiments) which was given at the beginning of +<span class="pagenum" id="p278">[278]</span>the delay has operated as a distinguishing mark of +one definite and well characterized member of the +group (let us say, of the first to the right in a single +case). Therefore, after the delay, the group, and +that definite rôle which just one member of it plays +in sensory process, is able to work upon the cue and +to produce the right reaction. In this sense delayed +reaction to one among several objects, having identical +properties as isolated objects, involves the principles +of organization and cannot be understood +without them. This becomes even more obvious, +perhaps, when we consider the multiple choice +method which Yerkes has used with so much success. +There it is evidently the definite rôle of one object in +a group which has become connected with a definite +reaction and consequently will reproduce that reaction +whatever may be the position of the group.</p> + +<p>The main interest of experimental psychology has +not been directed toward the nature of the traces +which are left in the nervous system after the original +processes have faded away. When we say that the +traces of organized processes must be organized +themselves, we do not seem to have mentioned the +most important feature of memory, habit and so +forth, namely, that those traces are <em>connected</em> in the +manner which is generally called their “association” +and which leads to the reproduction of the second +when the first is activated by a repetition of its process. +That there are traces is one basic factor of +<span class="pagenum" id="p279">[279]</span>habit, etc. But if two processes, A and B, have occurred +frequently together, reactivation of the trace +of A is said to reactivate B in consequence of a curious +bond between them created by those past events. +This is the second basic factor of habit, and almost +all the classical research on memory has dealt with +the formation of that bond and its career in the course +of time. There is almost no other phase of our +science of which we are prouder than this, because +here methods have been developed and laws have +been found which may almost be compared with +those of the natural sciences.</p> + +<p>In some respects this pride seems fully justified to +me, though at the present time we have begun to +realize that we have used those excellent methods to +investigate inconsiderately a special type of memory +and habit and that we should not apply the results +obtained to everyday memory and habit. There is +one problem, however, which was not made an +object of those experiments because it did not seem at +first to be a problem. Indeed, it was presupposed +as a fact that the mere repetition of two processes, +A and B, having occurred frequently together, would +create that curious bond, the association, between +them. This concept of association shall be discussed +in the following paragraphs.</p> + +<p>The law of association just mentioned has been +considered particularly satisfactory, due to the purely +mechanical character of its content, which does not +<span class="pagenum" id="p280">[280]</span>in the least imply mystical forces or anything else +foreign to the ideals of natural science. I must confess, +however, that just from the viewpoint of natural +science the law of contiguity appears rather strange +to me. A and B happen to occur together and, whatever +the nature of A and B may be, the bond is produced +between them! I do not know a single law or +rule in physics or chemistry which might be compared +in this respect with the concept of association. +I repeat what was said in Chapter IV: Wherever an +A and B have anything to do with each other in +physics, the effect is found to depend upon the properties +of A and B in their relations to each other. +This is the case in astronomy where acceleration +depends upon the masses of A and B. It is the case +in electrostatics where the occurrence of attraction +or repulsion depends upon the nature of electric +charges. In chemistry we find the violent reaction or +indifference of atoms determined by the relation of +their properties in the given case. But there is not a +single example of an effect produced by the interaction +of two things or processes quite independently +of their properties. Nevertheless this is the character +of the classical law of association, as we find it stated +in most textbooks.</p> + +<p>At this point we return to that trait of mosaic +theory which we have found so characteristic of its +treatment of sensory processes. If the distribution +and direction of events in the central nervous system +<span class="pagenum" id="p281">[281]</span>are determined dynamically by interaction in the +field, they must depend upon “the relative properties” +of those processes which exert influences upon each +other. This is excluded in principle by the mosaic +theory of the sensory field. Sensation processes are +assumed to be indifferent to each other in general, +so that, with regard to them, any pattern may exist +equally well in the field. Exactly the same assumption +of discrete bits of process, altogether indifferent +to each other, underlies the classical concept of association +for, without even mentioning the actual properties +of A and B in their relations to each other, it +states that <em>any</em> A and <em>any</em> B may acquire that neutral +bond, if it is supposed only that they occur together a +number of times.</p> + +<p>It seems to me that, even at the present time and +before any experimental research has been specially +directed upon this question, we may say confidently +that, in this point at least, the concept of association +is opposed to a large number of well-known facts. In +order to corroborate this claim, we have only to +gather statements scattered in papers, the authors of +which have worked with the classical methods and +the classical nonsense syllables, which their subjects +had to commit to their memories.</p> + +<p>We see at once that in a series of these syllables +the A and B (i.e., two syllables following each other) +cannot remain altogether indifferent to each other, +since by a simple experiment we can prove that A and +<span class="pagenum" id="p282">[282]</span>B are not even indifferent to F and G and H and so +forth (i.e., to members remote in the series). When +a subject is told to write down six syllables which we +read to him quickly, he is usually able to comply. +But if, instead of six, we give him a series of twelve +syllables, the result is that on the average less than six +are written down. This argues a mutual disturbance +which indicates that even syllables rather distant in +time are not indifferent to each other. If after some +repetitions we test the subject, giving him single +syllables and instructing him to name the following +one in each case, our procedure is based upon the +assumption that there are a number of independent +associations and reproductions, the results admitting +a statistical treatment. This does not seem to be altogether +correct insofar as it neglects a more general +interdependence. It may be neglected whenever this +interdependence is the same statistically in all the +series and when the problems under investigation are +the usual ones. However, as soon as the nature of +association itself becomes a problem, we must be +more careful.</p> + +<p>In a more striking manner the same warning may +be deduced from what happens to a series of syllables +during learning. The subjects read them in a definite +and rhythmical distribution which, usually, consists +of larger wholes, containing sub-units. At the same +time the reading will assume the character of a +<span class="pagenum" id="p283">[283]</span>melody, the pitch of the voice going up and down, +following that grouping exactly.⁠<a id="FNanchor_54_54" href="#Footnote_54_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> Evidently, a process +of organization occurs during learning and most +of all during the first readings of the series. If that +be so, the syllables ought to acquire a definite “flavor” +which belongs to them insofar as they have a particular +place in the larger whole. This consequence +is verified perfectly in those cases in which, after +learning a series as a whole, the subjects are shown the +same syllables in another sequence. In the new order +<em>they look or sound new or strange</em>. A similar implication +is to be found in the highly important concept +of “association with place,” which means that a syllable +is learnt as having a definite place, not absolutely +but with respect to the whole series in which it occurs. +Objectively, the rôle of organization is most convincingly +proved if, after learning the whole series +completely so that it is repeated as a whole without +hesitation, the subjects are shown single syllables in +order to reproduce the following one in each case. +It has been found by Nagel that scarcely one-third of +the reproductions was achieved under these circumstances.⁠<a id="FNanchor_55_55" href="#Footnote_55_55" class="fnanchor">[55]</a> +When given alone, a syllable is obviously +not the same thing as it is in the stream of the organized +series.</p> + +<p>Nonsense syllables were chosen by Ebbinghaus and +<span class="pagenum" id="p284">[284]</span>his successors as the best material for investigating +associations, because they wished to keep their experiments +free from the older, already-formed associations +which, if “meaningful” material were +employed, would influence the results in an uncontrolled +manner. Furthermore, nonsense syllables +seemed to be a more uniform material than any other. +It would be altogether unjust if we should deny the +value of the great impulse which psychology received +from that method. It seems, however, that +the early investigators used this method in a somewhat +one-sided manner. The most valuable observations, +perhaps, were made after the one-sidedness of +the original point of view was discovered.</p> + +<p>Some psychologists have criticized the method of +Ebbinghaus in that it does not at all investigate automatic +associations, whereas the results of the method +are formulated as though that were the case. Indeed, +if the mere neighborhood of the syllables is supposed +to produce their association, most experiments using +this material are far from testing such a pure association, +since the subject does not simply receive a succession +of syllables, but rather <em>is asked to learn them</em>. +If he follows this instruction, some factor takes part +in what is built up during learning, and this factor +is not even mentioned when the results are formulated +in terms of automatic associations. Undoubtedly, +here is a flaw in the scientific procedure. The +mistake is a grave one for it has been shown that without +<span class="pagenum" id="p285">[285]</span>that factor the learning of series of nonsense syllables +would be almost impossible.⁠<a id="FNanchor_56_56" href="#Footnote_56_56" class="fnanchor">[56]</a></p> + +<p>But what are the subjects doing when they try +to learn a series intentionally? No one is better +authorized to give an answer to this question than +G. E. Müller, who has spent a large part of his scientific +life studying the rules of association and reproduction. +His answer is: “A series of figures, +consonants, syllables and so forth, is learned essentially +by our combining the members of the series in +an attitude of synthesis, so that they become solid +groups.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_57_57" href="#Footnote_57_57" class="fnanchor">[57]</a> We have seen in an earlier chapter that +by a corresponding attitude one may favor definite +forms of grouping, and that the products of this procedure +may be just as real as any spontaneous organization +is. Following the statement of Müller, we +may say, therefore, that intentional learning essentially +means intentional organizing.</p> + +<p>Though such an attitude seems to be almost necessary +in the case of nonsense material and, most of all, +of syllables, it is not needed evidently where the +material has other properties. Time and again we +find ourselves reproducing events from our past experience, +where the incentive to reproduction has +certainly not been <em>intentionally</em> combined with what +we are now able to reproduce. If that be so, we must +draw the conclusion that the nonsense material used +<span class="pagenum" id="p286">[286]</span>in classical investigations may be excellent in some +respects from the viewpoint of exactness, but that it +cannot teach us the whole truth about so-called associations. +These are not formed in the same manner +when, instead of the classical material, we have to +deal with the more natural experiences of everyday +life.</p> + +<p>If now we ask ourselves, whether <em>all</em> our experiences +outside the laboratory associate themselves +spontaneously, so that the evocation of one may reproduce +its neighbors, we must confess that this is not +the case. We may hear a telephone number dozens +of times together with a name and still remain unable +to reproduce it when the name occurs later on. In +this case conditions seem to be similar to those present +in the case of nonsense syllables. The name and the +number are as indifferent to each other as are those +syllables usually. Thus the suspicion arises that we +may have spontaneous association where organization +is spontaneous, and that intentional combining is +needed where the material in itself is but slightly +organized.</p> + +<p>This assumption is corroborated by the well-known +fact that meaningful nouns form associations +much more easily than nonsense material. In this +case, of course, the nouns appear as imbued with their +meanings by a process of learning accomplished in +our childhood. When as adult subjects we learn a +series of nouns we find these meanings ready-made, +<span class="pagenum" id="p287">[287]</span>and obviously now it is these <em>meanings</em> which are so +easily associated. But why should they be? At the +present time most psychologists will answer that this +is a consequence of their having been previously associated, +so that the actual process of learning has only +to strengthen some particular bond between the +meanings of a pair of nouns which existed a long +time before. But at this point the difference between +<i>gestalt</i> psychology and associationism becomes +striking. Let somebody read the following pairs of +nouns a few times, with an attentive attitude: lake-sugar, +boot-plate, girl-kangaroo, pencil-gasoline, +palace-bicycle, railroad-elephant, book-toothpaste. +Learning will be considerably easier here than if +the same number of nonsense syllables were given. +Can one really say that between lake and sugar, +palace and bicycle, and so forth, there are old associations +which just need some slight exercise and which +thereupon facilitate the learning? It seems to me +that we cannot, mainly because the same words have +occurred thousands of times in other much more +regular connections, which ought absolutely to inhibit +the <em>assumed</em> associations in this particular case. +But there is another explanation. When I read those +words I may imagine as a (very strange) picture, +how a lump of sugar might dissolve in a lake, how a +boot might rest on a plate, how a girl might feed a +kangaroo, and so forth. If this happens during reading +I shall have experienced some well organized +<span class="pagenum" id="p288">[288]</span>though quite unusual wholes, and it may be that here +learning is so easy, because <em>organizing</em> is so much +easier in this case than in that of indifferent nonsense +syllables. In order to exclude the possibility of frequent +similar combinations in the past, I have chosen +strange pairs of nouns, the meanings of which may +be organized into larger wholes (pictures), but do +not do so quite spontaneously. It seems to me that +those combinations and sequences which become even +more easily associated in everyday life are simply +cases of strong spontaneous organization.</p> + +<p>We may say, then, that in one respect nonsense +syllables constitute the worst material which might +be chosen for discovering essentially what association +is. As they do not spontaneously form well-characterized +organizations, the nature of spontaneous association +will not become apparent to the psychologist +who uses them. Furthermore, as the series of syllables +are built up in a haphazard manner, one cannot +even examine the way in which learning depends +upon what may be called the structure of a series. +Even though it be composed of nonsense material +throughout, a series may be constructed in a great +many different ways. Syllables may be chosen which +fit together phonetically in a very characteristic way, +or the contrary may be done. Some pairs may be +constructed according to one principle, some according +to another. The whole series may exhibit an +extraordinarily striking principle of structure or it +<span class="pagenum" id="p289">[289]</span>may be an indifferent series, as are the usual ones. +All these variations of material ought to be examined +in order to see whether or not organization is the +essential fact underlying so-called association. From +the trend of the foregoing discussion, we should be +inclined to say that it is.</p> + +<p>As a last argument in favor of this thesis we may +mention the fact that, sometime after learning a +series of members by combining them into pairs, for +instance, the subjects will be able to reproduce the +second members of these pairs rather easily, if the +first members are given them as stimuli to reproduction, +whereas, on the other hand, the number of right +reproductions will be small if we present the second +members of pairs and ask for the following serial +items which are the first members of the next successive +pairs or groups. If we suppose that during +learning the members of the whole series objectively +formed a uniform sequence as to spatial and temporal +intervals, this result makes it evident that the old rule +of association is superficial and that the conditions of +association are ambiguous as long as we do not take +into account the organization of the material. We get +strong association only in those parts of a series where +organization is also strong. It is true that neighborhood +or proximity in space and time is a factor of +great importance in association. But it does not seem +to operate directly. In an earlier chapter we saw +that the factor of neighborhood is one of the conditions +<span class="pagenum" id="p290">[290]</span>upon which depend grouping and the segregation +of wholes. From what we have just stated it +would follow, then, <em>that neighborhood in space and +time influences association only insofar as it determines +organization</em>. Since this condition is just one +among a great many others determining organization, +and since organization seems to be the really decisive +condition of association, the rule of association has to +be reformulated accordingly.</p> + +<p>I repeat. Where organization is naturally strong +we have spontaneous association; where there is +practically no organization association does not occur +until some organization is created intentionally. +Also, after being associated, the members of a series +have definite properties which depend upon their +position in the surrounding whole, as tones do in an +organized melody. And finally, if in a series we determine +those sequences which are the <em>solid</em> groups +in the total series, and if, then, we also determine +where association is strongest we shall find that both +coincide.</p> + +<p>After these preliminaries we can discuss the nature +of that particular bond which is said to originate between +the traces of two processes when these processes +are associated. The prevailing opinion is that during +learning the nerve fibers uniting the place of one +process with that of the other acquire an increased +conductivity, because with each repetition some particular +current of nervous energy is assumed to pass +<span class="pagenum" id="p291">[291]</span>from one to the other. In consequence of this change +of conductivity, whenever the process corresponding +to the first trace activates this trace the current +spreads along those fibers to the second trace, and +reactivates it also. With this hypothesis one may +understand, perhaps, why after some repetitions the +current should flow in that particular direction and +thereby increase its conductivity; but we do not at all +see why it should flow in just that direction on the +<em>first</em> occasion. And this is a serious difficulty, particularly +in those cases where after one single experience +we find the association well established. One +can scarcely avoid the inference that in this case the +processes underlying the experience <em>as such</em> contain +all that is implied in the concept of association, at +once and originally, no special bond being necessary +for it.</p> + +<p>We do not know what happens in reproduction. +The only thing we seem compelled to assume is some +physiological communication between the traces of +two processes, A and B, so that an event activated in +A will spread to B and not to other traces, with the +processes of which it had nothing whatever to do in +the past. Now, two hypotheses are possible: If we +believe A and B to be two processes indifferent to +each other, which accidentally occur near to each +other in space and time, then some special bond, some +change of conductivity in fibers between them may be +needed as a basis of the association. In full contrast +<span class="pagenum" id="p292">[292]</span>to this older view, however, we may make quite a +different assumption: Whenever we “associate” A +and B we experience them, not as two indifferent +things, but as members of one organized group. This +certainly may be taken for granted, after the foregoing +analysis. In this case the process underlying +the experience cannot consist of two indifferent parts, +one belonging to A and one to B. It must be one +functional whole in which A and B possess only a +<em>relative</em> independence. If that be so, there will not +be two separate traces left behind after the process +itself has faded, but <em>one</em> trace of the functional whole, +with the after-effects of A and B in it as local regions +of that single trace. In this way A and B, or their +after-effects, would be as well connected in the single +trace of the whole organized process as they might +ever be by means of the special bond which united +them, according to the older point of view. If such +a bond determined “the spreading of nervous activity” +from A to B, the segregated trace of one process-in-extension +might well do precisely the same. Unfortunately, +in neither case do we know as yet what +are the functional properties of that “spreading” and +what sort of nervous communication would be +capable of determining its course in the observed +manner of reproduction.</p> + +<p>It will be convenient to give our assumption a +somewhat radical formulation so that it will be easier +to distinguish it from the usual one. From our viewpoint, +<span class="pagenum" id="p293">[293]</span>association is given up as a special and independent +theoretical concept. It is not more than a +name for the fact that organized processes leave a +trace picturing their organization and that in consequence +of it reproductions are possible. I do not +deny that repetition will make the association +stronger, but as long as the process remains the same, +repetition does not involve a change in a special +bond; it means that the whole trace of the organized +process becomes more enduring and stable. Nor +shall I deny that sometimes, as in the case of nonsense +material, some special attitude is needed for +producing an association. But, as we have seen before, +such an attitude consists in favoring definite +organizations. When these are experienced, the +processes corresponding to them will also be organized, +and so will their traces. The only problem +which is new in such a case is that of “intentional” +organization. But this problem shall be treated +quite apart from association.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>Some psychologists will be inclined to say that it +does not matter very much whether we accept one +theory of association or the other, since we are not +able to look into the brain to decide which one is +right. This indicates a complete misunderstanding, +however, of the value of a hypothesis. If there is +anything concrete in a hypothesis, it must be possible +to deduce concrete consequences from it, and to examine +<span class="pagenum" id="p294">[294]</span>them in further experimentation. It is easy +enough to do that in this case.</p> + +<p>In the old rule about association nothing was said +about the properties of the A and B which are associated +because, in principle, association was believed +to be an indifferent bond between processes indifferent +to each other and to the bond. Organization, +however, is not at all an aggregation of indifferent +material. On the contrary, in sensory experience we +have found organization to depend most decidedly +upon “the relative properties” of stimulation. Therefore, +if association is a consequence of organization, +it must also depend upon the mutually relative properties +of what is or shall be associated. In some degree +this is verified by what we have reported above. +But much more has to be done in the way of varying +the nature of the material according to the principles +of <i>gestalt</i> theory, so that we may see more definitely +whether, other circumstances remaining the same, an +association will be the stronger, the better organized +is the group or the whole, according to those principles. +As yet we do not seem to have any experiments +planned specially and deliberately in order to answer +this question. As we know a great deal about +the conditions upon which sensory organization depends, +the path is laid and it will be the more interesting +to follow in this direction since we should be +able to deduce from all the rules known in the field +of sensory organization, corresponding rules for association. +<span class="pagenum" id="p295">[295]</span>Of course, we cannot hope to find all the +properties of association in this manner, because the +rules of sensory experience are in no way instructive +with respect to the formation of <em>traces</em> as such; nor +can we from those rules deduce the career of a trace +in the course of time, and under the influence of other +processes and traces which develop after it in the +same region of the nervous system. On the other +hand, when once the identification of association with +the traces of functional wholes is verified sufficiently, +further discoveries with regard to association may +give us hints about properties of organization itself +which, for some reason, we may fail to detect directly +in sensory experience.</p> + +<p>A second consequence of our hypothesis, which +ought to be examined experimentally for the sake of +that hypothesis, may have practical value as well. +This consequence belongs to animal psychology. We +have seen that nonsense syllables do not usually associate +spontaneously because they do not form well-organized +groups unless we combine them. In some +cases series of them have been read passively hundreds +of times without an appreciable effect in learning. +But, as we have seen, the same subjects “have +a good memory” in everyday life and can reproduce +thousands of events which they have never intended +to commit to their memories. This reminds one of a +strange contrast which all animal psychologists have +observed between animal learning, as it occurs during +<span class="pagenum" id="p296">[296]</span>experimentation in the laboratory, and habit formation +as it develops in the same animals outside the +laboratory. I do not think that the concrete reason +for this difference is contained in the reference to +the “natural” circumstances present in the latter situation +but not in the former. What does the term +“natural” mean here? I suggest that it may mean +“favorable” with respect to association in a very particular +way, i.e., with respect to organization.</p> + +<p>Indeed, it would seem in this connection that a +great many experiments, most of all those on sensory +discrimination, proceed in the wrong way, because, +blinded by that old concept of association as a binding +together of two indifferent things largely by +many repetitions, we do not take account of organization +at all when we are constructing the experimental +situation. For instance, on the rear walls of +two alleys we fix two objects which we wish the animal +to learn to discriminate. On the floor, in no connection +whatever with those objects, we put the wires +for punishment in the case of a wrong choice, in such +a way that an electric shock applied at this point will +be more foreign to the wrong object even, perhaps, +than one syllable is to the next in experimentation on +human association. On the other hand, the animal +will be fed after a right choice somewhere behind +the scene, i.e., in a situation just as separate from the +right object as the shock is from the wrong one. A +young behaviorist once asked me whether, apart +<span class="pagenum" id="p297">[297]</span>from vague concepts, <i>gestalt</i> theory had anything +new and concrete to offer science upon which it might +work. It seems to me that if we had nothing to give +behaviorism except our criticism of this method and +some suggestions toward a better one, it would be +quite sufficient. In man learning seems to depend +upon organization. It is highly improbable that the +same rule should not apply to habit formation in +animals. Therefore, when we investigate sensory +discrimination in animals, instead of separating those +“stimuli” from each other, the coöperation of which +most probably determines learning, we ought to +make that coöperation as easy as we can. Some +years ago I proposed the following procedure: +If the wrong object made a sudden movement +against the animal, whenever the latter made the +wrong choice, we should certainly have a situation +much more similar to the animal’s learning in +common life, and a more efficient one, because then +the negative stimulus would immediately imbue itself +with “negativity.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_58_58" href="#Footnote_58_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> It is quite possible that a +variation of procedure in this direction would save +the experimenter much time. In addition to this +practical reason, however, it seems to me a sound +law of experimentation that conditions should be +varied in <em>all</em> respects. If behaviorists are interested +in finding the conditions and the nature of learning, +they may have great success some day if they vary +<span class="pagenum" id="p298">[298]</span>the conditions of habit formation according to the +principles of organization.</p> + +<p>These remarks apply to the formation of so-called +conditioned reflexes in the same way that they do to +older methods used to study learning. From the +viewpoint of machine theory it sounds a little nicer +if we talk about conditioned reflexes instead of associations. +I do not find, however, that the first concept +is clearer than the second. One might even say +that what we call a conditioned reflex now is just one +special case of a certain type of association, because it +is evident that the “stimulus,” which is to be artificially +connected with a reflex, cannot be made to +produce that reflex except by first becoming “connected” +with an <em>adequate</em> “stimulus” which naturally +produces that reflex. This means an association +of two sensory processes however. The association +may become so strong that <i>via</i> the mere trace of +the adequate sensory process the new one will eventually +arouse the reflex. But since that association +is the thing to be “learned,” before a conditioned +reflex can occur, and since the association of two +processes is a direct effect of their organization into +one whole, the same consequences have to be deduced +here as in human association and in the old form of +animal discrimination experiments. As yet no one +seems to have examined the question whether a +change in the presentation of the “artificial stimulus,” +in its relation to the natural one, exerts an influence +upon the building up of the conditioned reflex. A +<span class="pagenum" id="p299">[299]</span>bell rings and food is shown or given, but no attention +is paid to those experimental conditions upon +which organization would depend. That is not at +all astonishing since the old concept of “connecting +two separate processes by learning” still prevails. On +the other hand, animal psychology has an opportunity +here to test the value of two assumptions at the +same time, namely, that conditioning is practically +the same thing as associating two sensory processes, +and that associating depends upon organization.</p> + +<p>When seen from the viewpoint we have reached +in this chapter, certain earlier discussions will assume +a somewhat surprising aspect. Our conclusion +is that association depends upon organization because +association is just an after-effect of an organized +process. Now, when we first introduced the +concept of organization, we were hampered at every +step by those empiristic hypotheses which sought to +explain by the influence of meaning or other affiliated +factors whatever experiences did not fit into the +scheme of mosaic or machine theory. In many of +those cases I hope that I have shown that, fundamentally, +the experiences in question cannot be derived +from previous learning in any form; and that, +therefore, organization has to be accepted as an original +aspect of our experiences. Now we may go further +and make the statement that, on the contrary, +wherever the influences of past experience can really +be discovered in actual experience, this secondary effect +itself is a consequence of past organization, because, +<span class="pagenum" id="p300">[300]</span>generally, meaning will accompany an actual +experience or be contained in it by a process of reproduction, +and this reproduction will be based upon +the trace of a larger organized whole. Consequently, +if we try to reduce organization in principle to associated +meanings, we must explain actual organization +by the traces of previous organization in a larger +area. If our theory is right, the whole procedure +would mean a vicious circle, for organization would +be the more fundamental functional concept, and association +or meaning would be ideas depending upon +it. So much concerning the question of principle. I +repeat, however, that very often our actual experiences +<em>are</em> really and thoroughly imbued with meaning. +In these cases it should be acknowledged as a +fact that the after-effects of previous organization +determine the properties of actual experience. We +may talk about an association under these circumstances +if we keep in mind that even here it is the +concept of organization which remains decisive functionally.</p> + + +<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h3> + +<blockquote> +<p>M. Bentley: <cite>The Field of Psychology</cite>. 1924.</p> + +<p>K. Koffka: <cite>The Growth of the Mind</cite>. 1924.</p> + +<p>Michotte and van der Veldt: <cite lang="fr">L’Apprentissage du mouvement +et l’automatisme</cite>. 1928.</p> + +<p>R. M. Ogden: <cite>Psychology and Education</cite>. 1926.</p> + +<p>O. Selz: <cite lang="de">Die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlaufs</cite>. +1913.</p> +</blockquote> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p301">[301]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="IX"> + IX + <br> + <i>Reproduction</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>PSYCHOLOGY knows three main topics which +are to be investigated in the field of memory +and habit: (1) learning and those processes the +traces of which make reproduction and recognition +possible, (2) the career of these traces in the time +between their formation and recall, and (3) the processes +of reproduction and recognition themselves. In +some degree reproduction or recognition will be +needed in the investigation of <em>all</em> these problems, to +give us evidence of either the laws of learning, or +those of retention, or those of recall itself. Nevertheless, +in the first case we can keep conditions constant +with respect to retention, and also with respect +to the circumstances of reproduction, while the conditions +of learning are varied; in the second case, the +conditions of learning and those of reproduction will +remain constant, those of the interval between learning +and recall being varied; and in the last case, we +vary only the circumstances of reproduction or recognition. +So we are able practically to separate the +three classes of problems. In this chapter our attention +will be directed mainly to questions of retention +and recall, though we shall also have to treat +<span class="pagenum" id="p302">[302]</span>one highly important feature which may as well be +regarded as belonging to the topic of learning and +the formation of traces.</p> + +<p>In the sixth chapter I mentioned certain experiments +in which, after learning to choose one side of +a pair, for instance the darker of two grays, animals +had to react to a new pair, consisting of the “right” +object of the learning period and a new object, which +had more or less the same relation to the “right” object +as this had had to the “wrong” object during +learning. The result was that in the majority of +the trials the animals chose that side which, in the +new pair, played the same rôle which the right object +had played during learning. This means that +they chose the <em>new</em> object which, in our example, was +now “the dark side of the pair.”</p> + +<p>This result is not quite general, however. It depends +upon what interval of time elapses between +the training with the old pair and the first trials with +the new one. Occasionally, after the learning period, +a chick was given the new pair in between choices +on the old one; and this procedure was repeated until +the single trials with the new pair, each of them distributed +between trials with the old one, could be +regarded as numerous enough. It was found that, +under these circumstances, the animal chose the +“right” object of the learning period quite as often +as the new object, which would now be the right +side <em>in the pair</em>. Obviously, this must be explained +<span class="pagenum" id="p303">[303]</span>in the following manner: When the chick reacts to +the group before him, the chick sees⁠<a id="FNanchor_59_59" href="#Footnote_59_59" class="fnanchor">[59]</a> it as a pair in +which either gray plays a definite rôle as the dark +or the bright side of it; but at the same time the first +is seen as a more or less definite dark gray and the +second as a bright one. Both ways of seeing them +are altogether compatible with each other as long as +the pair is not “transposed.” If during learning the +chick reacts to the right object as one side of the +pair and also as a more or less definite gray, there +must be two products of training which will become +opposed to each other as soon as we introduce the +new pair, because now the first product of learning +will favor the choice of one object, and the second +the choice of the other. Let us suppose, now, that +these different effects of learning do not fade equally +fast with time; an increase of the interval between +trials with the old pair and trials with the new one +will favor those reactions which depend upon the +more enduring product of training. From our experiment +it follows, then, that the habit depending +upon the pair as a whole is more enduring than the +habit depending upon the nuance <em>as such</em>, since the +pair as a whole is relatively less decisive when the +animal reacts to the new pair immediately after some +trials with the old one. But the two habits are alike +<span class="pagenum" id="p304">[304]</span>with the exception only that one of them depends +upon the <em>organization</em> of a trace whereas the other +depends upon the trace of a certain nuance of brightness. +Hence, in the course of time, the traces of organization +remain much more stable than do the +traces of a more or less definite gray. This may be a +more general fact. It has been remarked by several +psychologists that we are frequently able to remember +the general structure of something at a time when +we cannot get the more particular content of it at +all. It would be worth while to test this statement +by appropriate experimentation, particularly since +we might get some insight thereby into the nature of +so-called “concepts.” In the case of the chick it was +very easy to examine the hypothesis by having the +same animal react to the new pair once more, after +some minutes had elapsed since his last trials with +the old one. The result was that the “relative” reactions +predominated.</p> + +<p>There is much to discover in this field. At the +beginning of the last chapter we noticed one way of +studying the career of traces by investigating successive +comparison. Here we have a second way. A +third one, somewhat similar to the second, is also to +be found in certain observations on animals. I shall +treat it as an example of what new problems <i>gestalt</i> +psychology raises in a concrete case. When Yarbrough⁠<a id="FNanchor_60_60" href="#Footnote_60_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> +investigated delayed reaction in cats he +<span class="pagenum" id="p305">[305]</span>found them able to react correctly after no more than +four seconds if they had to choose between three objects, +whereas in the case of two objects the delay +could be increased to more than four times that +amount. Why is the result so much greater in the +second case? An explanation may be derived from +the examination of a human subject in a similar, +though more difficult, task. If I have 25 objects, +all of which have the same properties, before me in +a semicircle, they play very different rôles in the +semicircle as a whole; the rôle of two of them is particularly +well defined and characteristic, namely, +that of the first to the left and that of the first to the +right side, which are the “ends” of the whole; in +some degree, but much less, a third one will be characterized +as a special member of the group, i.e., the +central one. The rest will be more or less like an +indifferent filling. Suppose now that the experimenter +points to one of the objects, and that, after a +delay in which I do not fixate that object carefully, +I am told to go toward it; my reaction will always +be correct if one of those three objects had been +pointed to. However, as long as I do not mark the +right object in an indirect way by counting at the +first presentation, in order to find it again by counting +after the delay, wrong reactions will occur rather +often when the designated object has an indifferent +position. Thus I may choose the sixteenth instead +of the seventeenth, or the eighth instead of the ninth, +<span class="pagenum" id="p306">[306]</span>rather easily, and, if the delay is increased or my attitude +is slightly dreamy at the first presentation, such +errors may become rather frequent. Of course, this +is the same dependence of delayed reaction upon the +more or less specific position of a member in a group, +which was demonstrated by Hertz in certain birds +(cf. pp. <a href="#p158">158</a>–162), so that we may apply the same +idea to the case of a cat which must choose between +three objects after a delay. If the cue which the +cat has acquired before the delay refers to the first +object (for instance, at the left), the cue will be connected +with a very definite place in the whole group; +and the same will be true if the third object (the first +to the right) becomes connected with the cue. If, +however, the second object is connected with the cue +before the delay, this cue will refer to a place which, +for the cat, is much less definitely characterized in +the group. At the time when that object is marked +out (by a light, for instance) among the others, its +rôle in the whole may be sufficiently clear for some +moments; but chances are that after some time the +cue will lose its rather unstable localization, the +whole becoming just an undifferentiated stretch, only +the ends of which remain well-characterized places. +Consequently, the animal will react correctly less +often when, instead of two objects, the experiment is +made with three. The cat might begin to react more +correctly again, perhaps, if the experimenter gave +the three objects another distribution in space so that +<span class="pagenum" id="p307">[307]</span>all of them would have well-characterized locations. +The reader will be inclined to say that such an explanation +appears somewhat artificial to him, since, +with three objects, the probability of error is increased +anyhow and the cue cannot be fixed so easily in a +more complicated situation. This objection should +be examined by introducing that change of conditions +to which I have just alluded. From the viewpoint +of organization, “complication” is not simply a +matter of number, but also of distribution in space. +If, therefore, the three objects are distributed in a +way which characterizes each one equally well, we +may be able to decide whether or not we should accept +the explanation in terms of mere increase of +number. There is one result in Yarbrough’s experiments +which makes me more inclined toward the +other hypothesis: If mere number, as against lack +of definite rôle in the group, were the decisive condition +producing failure, the false reactions of the +animals should be distributed in a haphazard manner +among the three objects. But this is not the case. +After a long delay (beyond 4 seconds) <em>some of the +cats did not go to the second object at all</em>. All their +reactions were directed toward the first or the third +object! This is just what we should expect in terms +of our explanation, whereas one cannot understand it +at all without taking account of organization. We +may say, then, with some confidence that in cats the +traces of past events undergo a rapid transformation +<span class="pagenum" id="p308">[308]</span>which destroys the minor or less stable characteristics +of groups as wholes, so that subsequent behavior +depends upon a more simplified organization than +existed in the traces at first.</p> + +<p>A somewhat similar observation was made by Mr. +Tinklepaugh and me when, using another method, +we performed some experiments on delayed reaction +with a monkey. A very large square on the ground +was covered with sand some inches high. Before the +animal certain marks were made on the sand, as, for +instance, a hill of the same material or, in another +experiment, a straight line which we drew on the +surface with a finger. After this preparation, food +was buried in the sand in a place which, for the +human subject, was characterized at once as having +a rather definite position <em>near</em> the mark. We wished +to see whether the animal would use the mark in fixing +the place of the food because, without a mark in +the homogeneous sand, his previous reactions to buried +food had not been very clear. The monkey who +had observed those preparations was not released +from his place until some time had elapsed. When +allowed to approach the sand he would go <em>to the +mark</em> at once and search for the food <em>in it</em>. As far +as I can remember now, he never searched <em>near</em>, i.e., +around the mark. Though further observations +would be desirable, one explanation seems probable +at once: As in the last case where delayed reaction +was investigated in cats, the reaction of the animal +<span class="pagenum" id="p309">[309]</span>depends upon a trace and upon the actual organization +of the field. This field is well organized, the +hill or the line forming an outstanding feature in it. +The localization of the place of the hidden food, +however, is much less definite. Therefore, we may +assume that a simplification occurs in this case similar +to the one which determines the reactions of the +cats in Yarbrough’s experiments with three objects. +The trace which remains in the monkey will be transformed +during the delay to the disadvantage of its +less defined regions and the result will be that the +monkey’s cue is absorbed by the outstanding mark +just as, after some delay, the cats react only to the +well-characterized parts of the situation. It may be +that the method used by us in this preliminary way +will be developed some day into a more accurate instrument +for investigating the career of traces in +animals.⁠<a id="FNanchor_61_61" href="#Footnote_61_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a></p> + +<p>Traces are not rigid, then; there are definite dynamical +tendencies in them; and in animals the traces +may be transformed more easily than in man. That +being the case, the study of delayed reaction in animals +becomes highly important for general psychology +because it may show us the working of those tendencies +in a measure which could not be observed in +man.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p310">[310]</span></p> + +<p>There can be no doubt that, in principle, we find +similar changes in man also. Koffka and Wulf⁠<a id="FNanchor_62_62" href="#Footnote_62_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> +have observed these changes by making their subjects +draw figures which they had seen previously +for a few seconds, first after a delay of some minutes +and then after days or even weeks. The figures had +not simply lost details at the time of graphic reproduction. +The changes were much more interesting +since they showed two opposite directions: In reproduction +the figures were either more regular than the +original ones or some traits which might be taken as +characteristic of their organization were considerably +exaggerated in the drawings. The authors give +the explanation that, during the first presentation, the +figures could be seen in somewhat different kinds of +organization. If this organization was a rather simple +and regular form, the change of the trace would +be in the direction of increased regularity; if, however, +some articulation, irregularity or lack of symmetry +was seen as the main characteristic of the figure, +the transformation would enhance this property. +Therefore, in both cases the change seemed to +produce an approach toward something like an extreme +type or the ideal of the first organization.</p> + +<p>In all these cases behavior depending upon the +actual properties of the traces is used as an indicator +of their changes. Still there are other cases where +<span class="pagenum" id="p311">[311]</span>the traces can be shown to be practically unchanged, +although reproduction is difficult or even impossible +under the circumstances in question. In the last +chapter we mentioned some examples of this kind. +Now we have to treat others which will show us that +the possibilities of reproduction are much more restricted +than one might expect.</p> + +<p>If association as a basis for reproduction is just another +expression of the fact that the traces of functional +wholes are themselves detached wholes, one +might somewhat rashly deduce from this theory that, +after a trace is formed, any group of stimuli which +represents a considerable fraction of the original +constellation of stimuli will reproduce those parts of +the original process the stimuli for which are not +actually given. However, this would mean a complete +misunderstanding of <i>gestalt</i> theory, because +from what we have seen in the sixth chapter, it follows +that between the properties of an organized +whole and the actual constellation of stimuli, let us +say on the retina, there does not exist a correspondence +as to parts, as though one region of the organized +whole separately depended upon some definite +fraction of that constellation, a second one upon another +and so forth. On the contrary, upon a large +group of stimuli and their “relative properties” depends +the organized process as a whole in a manner +which cannot be analyzed into independent local or +partial effects of stimulation. Therefore, in general, +<span class="pagenum" id="p312">[312]</span>if an organized process has left its trace in the nervous +system, some fraction of the original group of +stimuli will not determine a partial process which +occurred in that functional whole, but something different +and new, a picture of which is not contained +in the trace of that whole. Consequently this new +process will not be able to reproduce anything on the +basis of that trace; just as some other group of stimuli +which we might choose in an altogether arbitrary +manner would determine a new process and consequently +would be foreign to that trace. For instance, +Fig. 20 will not reproduce the missing lines of an H +normally, though, geometrically, that figure is the +larger part of an H. Neither will Fig. 21 reproduce +the missing lines of an R, and so forth, because, when +we have seen an H or an R, we have never had the +given figures as real experiences. There is nothing +in the traces of an H and an R, which might correspond +to the processes of Figs. 20 and 21, and reproduction +does not occur. We shall conclude, then, +that reproduction will be restricted to those cases +where the process intended as the excitant of reproduction +<span class="pagenum" id="p313">[313]</span>is sufficiently similar to a partial process of +the original whole. This will be the case if the +process intended as an excitant corresponds to a +natural member or sub-whole of the original organization, +because under these circumstances the trace +of that sub-whole, though not identical with the exciting +process, will be similar to it, at least. If this +similarity is marked enough, reproduction will occur +under favorable conditions. So U. S. will reproduce +an A. rather easily, and the stars the rest of the +American flag, because here we give as an excitant +what was present in the original organization as a +<em>relatively</em> independent region. This is the chief +requirement. If we draw a profile from the nose +downwards to the chin, this line does not correspond +to a complete sub-whole of a face. Nevertheless, +since the influences exerted upon that outline by the +organization of a complete profile are not so very +strong, the process determined by that line will be +sufficiently similar to the corresponding process in +the whole profile and to the corresponding trace, so +that reproduction can occur.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig20-21"> +<img src="images/fig20-21.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p><span style="float: left; padding-left:1em;">Fig. 20</span> <span style="float: right; padding-right:1em;">Fig. 21</span></p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Even so, we find reproduction much more difficult +than is supposed in current empiristic theories. It +seems to be restricted to a rather narrow path between +a Scylla and a Charybdis. Association is necessary +for reproduction, and association means a +sufficient degree of organization. Reproduction, +<span class="pagenum" id="p314">[314]</span>however, presupposes a certain degree of similarity +between an actual process as an excitant and some +region of the organized trace. The more a region is +absorbed by a larger organization, the less will corresponding +stimulation be able to effect reproduction. +We have already described the narrow path +that any possible reproduction must take between +these limiting conditions.</p> + +<p>To demonstrate the foregoing contentions I made +the following experiment: The subjects are shown +simultaneously pairs of figures for a short time. +After a while parts of those drawings are presented +to them with the instruction to reproduce the missing +lines. Now, in a case like that of Fig. 22, for +instance, either the vertical at the left was presented +or Fig. 23, which represents <em>geometrically a</em> much +larger part of the original. With the first as an +excitant, however, we get many more correct reproductions +than with the second. Of course! The +“larger part” is something which in the first exposure +did not occur as a real form. Even the first +vertical to the left has now lost its reproducing +<span class="pagenum" id="p315">[315]</span>power, because in the original pair it had been segregated +as something apart, whereas now it has become +the left limiting end of a regular series of parallels.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe15" id="fig22-23"> +<img src="images/fig22-23.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p><span style="float: left; padding-left:1em;">Fig. 22</span> <span style="float: right; padding-right:1em;">Fig. 23</span></p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>If this last point proves that a trace does not respond +by reproduction if the organization of the excitant +becomes foreign by being embedded in a somewhat +different environment, reproduction will be +even much more restricted than we should have previously +supposed. Evidently, in problems of memory +and habit, not only the organization given at +the time of first “association” will be decisive for reproduction, +but organization existing in the <em>actual</em> +field will be equally important in determining or +preventing reproduction. When given in a certain +environment a certain process may be an excellent +incentive to reproduction on the basis of some trace +existing in the nervous system. But it will not occur +regularly again in just that environment which was +given when the trace was formed. Hence the chances +are that, quite apart from the rather crude obstacles +considered above, even a slight change of the surrounding +field may make an excitant unable to reproduce +what has been “well connected” with it in +the past. That this is true can be deduced from +Nagel’s experiments (cf. above p. <a href="#p283">283</a>). In a well-learned +series of nonsense syllables each member, +though embedded in the whole series, would certainly +seem to be a thing by itself. But if one of +them is given alone as an incentive to reproduction, +<span class="pagenum" id="p316">[316]</span>this change of environment is sufficient in the majority +of cases to make reproduction impossible.</p> + +<p>The same influence of actual organization upon reproduction +has been demonstrated in a rather surprising +form by Shepard and Fogelsonger.⁠<a id="FNanchor_63_63" href="#Footnote_63_63" class="fnanchor">[63]</a> These +psychologists made their subjects learn pairs of syllables. +Some of these pairs had identical second members. +(Between the first occurrence of such a syllable +and its repetition in another pair there was an interval +of 25 minutes.) At the time of testing the product +of learning, the first syllable of a pair was given as +the excitant of reproduction; but where two syllables +had been followed by the same second member at different +times, both were given together as incentives to +reproduction of their common partner. If it were +not for organization one should expect that, both excitants +working in the same direction, the syllable +associated with them would be more easily reproduced +than a syllable for which there was only one +excitant. But the contrary was observed; it seemed +as though some inhibition were in the way of reproduction +when it was aroused by two excitants. The +disturbance was particularly striking when both syllables +were presented simultaneously, but it also existed +when they were given in rapid succession. The +explanation seems to be that during learning the subjects +had always had a single first syllable together +with its partner, and that when, in the critical cases +<span class="pagenum" id="p317">[317]</span>of reproduction, two syllables appeared before them, +both would look so foreign at first in this new grouping +that neither could immediately reproduce the +common partner. This explanation has been confirmed +by observation. The subjects reported that +reproduction became possible through an attitude of +analysis which would sufficiently isolate one of the +syllables. Furthermore, from this explanation it follows +that any extraneous syllable, one which never +appeared in the learning series, would have the same +effect when presented together with the first member +of a learned pair. The authors have found this to +be the case, in fact. Thus the explanation seems to +be quite verified. Our conclusion is that even a very +slight alteration of circumstances, if only it influences +the organization of the excitants, or incentives, will +make reproduction difficult or impossible.</p> + +<p>A similar result was obtained by Frings in his work +on inhibitions,⁠<a id="FNanchor_64_64" href="#Footnote_64_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> though his problem refers to learning +more than to reproduction. In the classical experiments +it had been shown that, if a syllable A has become +associated with a syllable B, the same A can +not be as easily associated with a third syllable C as +could any indifferent syllable. Also, after A has become +associated with C as well as with B, when A is +used as an excitant of reproduction, the competition +of the two different tendencies to reproduction will +<span class="pagenum" id="p318">[318]</span>have an inhibiting effect. Frings was able to show +that under certain circumstances these inhibitions +may completely disappear. His subjects were made +to learn series of syllables, the instruction being that +the syllables should be read and memorized as +groups of the anapest rhythm in which, after two +less accentuated members, the third one follows with +the main accent. In such a group the first two members +will form a sub-whole. When after a while the +product of learning is tested, these two members are +given as an excitant, and the last one is to be reproduced. +If now, in a given case, a group like (ac)d +occurs in one series and a group like (bc)e in another +series, we should expect the association between +c and e to be inhibited, because c was first +followed by d, and later followed by e. Similarly, +<em>after</em> associating (bc)e as well as (ac)d, in spite of +that inhibition, the subjects should have difficulty in +reproducing e, if bc is given, or d, if ac is given. +From the viewpoint of organization, however, we +must realize that in (ac)d the syllable c is a member +of the sub-whole (ac), whereas in (bc)e it is a +member in a different sub-whole (bc), and that therefore +c is not quite the same thing in both cases. We +might also say that in the first case not c, but rather +the sub-whole (ac), has been associated with d; and +again that in the other case (bc), not c, becomes or +has become associated with e. Considering this, we +should predict that there will be inhibition neither +<span class="pagenum" id="p319">[319]</span>in learning nor in reproduction. Experimentation +has confirmed this view. Wherever c figured as a +member of two different sub-wholes, no inhibition +occurred. It is particularly interesting, however, +that inhibition occurred immediately if a subject +had been very fatigued at the time of learning, and +therefore had not been able to grasp the syllables in +rhythmic complexes, according to the instructions.</p> + +<p>Though the reader will have already noticed that, +in consequence of varying organization, experimental +findings may differ considerably from what ought +to occur according to the classical laws of association +and reproduction, the most radical restriction +of these rules remains to be considered. We cannot +proceed, however, without first discussing a certain +more general topic.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>In one of the preceding chapters we laid some +stress on the point that our “self” occurs as an experienced +whole in the same field which contains +our experiences of surrounding objects and events. +Consequently, that field of our brain, as a physical +system which is the locus of the processes underlying +objective experience, will also contain processes +corresponding to the experience of the “self.” In +many respects, the processes belonging to this particular +whole are different from those corresponding +to “outside” experiences, though, with regard to dynamical +interrelation, the processes corresponding to +<span class="pagenum" id="p320">[320]</span>the “self” prove to be true members of the total field. +Two examples will suffice to corroborate this point.</p> + +<p>If a certain thing moves objectively in the visual +field, I shall, under the usual conditions, see that +thing as moving. But we know many instances in +which, <em>objectively</em>, one thing being in motion and +another at rest, the first remains at rest while the +second moves. This is not an “accidental illusion,” +moreover. It depends upon definite circumstances +and necessarily prevails whenever these are present. +Every one has occasionally seen the moon in rapid +motion when clouds were passing it in the opposite +direction. When a point on the window of a moving +railroad carriage is fixated, the objects outside at +once begin to glide in the opposite direction. We +may say, then, that any change of spatial relations in +a part of the field may have dynamical effects upon +those parts of the whole field which objectively are +not moved. With regard to the spatial relation of +the “external” environment and the “self,” precisely +the same observation is frequently made, as we all +know. If our environment is, objectively, turned +around us with appropriate speed, the result in experience +will be that we feel ourselves turning +around in the opposite direction. Michotte and +Gatti have recently shown that the same effect may +be produced by moving two handles toward one side, +the subject’s hands being turned passively with the +handles: once more the body (as an experience) +<span class="pagenum" id="p321">[321]</span>seems to turn in the opposite direction. We may +draw the conclusion that under adequate conditions +a change of spatial relations between the processes +underlying our objective experience and those corresponding +to the experience of our own self, +will have dynamical effects upon the latter processes, +just as the processes corresponding to the +experience of moving clouds exert a dynamical influence +upon the processes underlying our experience +of the moon. It becomes obvious, therefore, +that we must include the self in the dynamical interrelation +of the whole field.</p> + +<p>As a second example, I refer to the fact that just +as things or spots frequently appear before me as +grouped in a definite manner, the self is very often +experienced as a member of such a group. Of +course, if I put my hands on a desk before me and +another person does the same on the opposite side +of the desk, I have two pairs of hands before me as +visual groups. But the whole self may enter a group +just as easily: If somebody accompanies me along a +street and, ahead of <em>us</em> another pair is walking, I feel +(and partially see) myself as a member of one of +two groups.</p> + +<p>Until now the reader may have restricted the concept +of organization more or less to the region of +external experiences. From the last examples it +seems to follow that organization is an affair involving +the whole field and that the “self” is included as +<span class="pagenum" id="p322">[322]</span>the most interesting member of this larger organization. +At first one may feel opposed to this treatment +of the “self” because, in a great many respects, it remains +something particular and apart. During all +the radical changes which the outside field undergoes +in the course of time the “self” under normal +conditions does not lose its identity. At the same +time, and notwithstanding that identity, inner experiences +will generally be felt as much more lively and +dynamical than the average objective experiences. +Although these differences may exert an enormous +influence upon the actual organization of the whole +field, nevertheless they do not place the self beyond +organization <em>as such</em>. Sometimes they confer upon +the self a central position in the field. But for a +great many persons not even this is permanently the +case, especially since objective experience contains +other <em>persons</em> in social life, who may occasionally +become the center of our total field instead of the +“self.”</p> + +<p>With this remark, however, we have gone far beyond +the discussions of the previous chapters. We +have enlarged our view of dynamics as determining +the field and its changes.</p> + +<p>In objective experience grouping may be “static” +as, for instance, in the case of indifferent patches, a +group of which would seem to correspond to a state +of equilibrium in the nervous system. On the other +hand, we have seen that nothing is more likely to +<span class="pagenum" id="p323">[323]</span>determine grouping and organization in general than +the direction of attitude and of visible behavior. +Even a behaviorist like Watson describes the behavior +of a child as being directed to or away from +an object. In some situations a barking dog will be +experienced by any observer as barking <em>at</em> something +definite in his surroundings. If, therefore, we apply +the term “dynamical” here in a more special meaning, +we may say, perhaps, that the most compulsory +organization which can occur in experience is a +dynamical event or attitude, consisting of one member +from which it issues, and another one toward which +it is directed. Sometimes, as in the case of “avoiding” +or “yielding,” it would be a better description +to say that one member exhibits an attitude directed +<em>away</em> from the second member of such a whole. In +both cases the type of organization remains the same, +the main feature being the bipolar structure and the +dynamical directedness of the whole.</p> + +<p>This type of dynamical structure occurs not only +in merely objective experience but also between the +experienced self and parts of the experienced environment. +We may even say that, apart from drowsiness +and similar states of low vitality, the organization +of the total field will almost always have +just that bipolar character, the self being directed +to something else or away from it. The reader +will remember our discussion of visual organization. +Some diagrams were presented as examples of +<span class="pagenum" id="p324">[324]</span>it. Organization was considered as a property of +the visual field. This account, however, was not a +complete description of the total field, since it included +neither the self as a member of the field nor +that particular attitude of so-called attention or +interest which, as it were, was a direction in the field +from the self to the diagrams. All psychologists +know that, normally, this direction will coincide with +that of fixation. It becomes particularly striking, +however, if, while fixating a given point, we “direct +ourselves” successively toward the other objects to +be seen in the vicinity of that point.</p> + +<p>Obviously, bipolar organization varies in more +respects than in direction and in the type of external +object. All the nuances of emotional attitude toward +objects and events are phases of it. When we like or +dislike, when we hate or admire something, that +bipolarity <em>as such</em> remains the same. Sometimes, the +direction is opposite: an explosion occurs in our +neighborhood and we feel ourself frightened away; +when confronted with a particularly imposing or +overbearing man, we may also feel thrown back.</p> + +<p>Bipolar organization reminds one of those cases +in physics in which either lines of force, or a +process with a definite direction, develops between +two parts of a field, depending upon the actual +properties of those parts in their relation to each +other. In <i>gestalt</i> theory the varieties of directed attitude +are not considered as the operation of preëxisting +<span class="pagenum" id="p325">[325]</span>drives or instincts, but rather as the effects of +actual situations. In this connection, however, the +term “situation” has to be used with some care. Evidently +it is not only the external situation which in a +great many cases has to be considered, but the internal +situation of the organism as well. This is so +well known through recent studies on hunger, sexual +behavior, and so forth, that I scarcely need mention +the fact. Even after the adult has developed well-established +preferences and forms of conduct in relation +to these internal forces the corresponding attitudes +will not appear unless the inner situation of the +organism requires it. This does not mean that the +intensity of those forces is independent of the external +situation. But we may say, at least, that without +any appropriate objects the internal situation +will often produce very strong effects corresponding +to it, whereas, on the other hand, when complete +“saturation” is reached, even the most adequate +object will not produce a corresponding +attitude.</p> + +<p>If we compare bipolar organization with a field of +force or a stress existing between regions of different +potential, these words may contain more than a superficial +analogy. What we experience as our “self” +depends first of all upon the inner situation of our +organism as a physiological system. We may also say +that the particular processes underlying the experience +of our “self” are determined by the ever-changing +<span class="pagenum" id="p326">[326]</span>activities of the organism. Perhaps it is +not too bold an hypothesis to suggest that, according +to the actual nature of those processes, in the first +place, and the properties of processes underlying objective +experience, in the second place, something like +a field of force or stress originates between them. +Since, in terms of our general principle, the organization +of experience is a picture of underlying physiological +organization, we can hardly find a more fitting +assumption. In some cases, however, the +directed attitude of the self toward external experience +does not seem to depend upon the inner situation +of the organism, as much as it does in the case of +hunger and sex. After being alone for some weeks +most persons will feel an all but insuperable “drive” +toward social contact, even with strangers. It is +difficult to understand, at the present time, how this +directed attitude should depend upon the physiological +situation of the organism as, for instance, +hunger depends upon it. Nevertheless, for the most +part, this attitude is quite similar to the need for food, +and I do not hesitate to interpret it as a stress in the +field between the self and those particular surrounding +processes which are the physiological correlate +of our experience of other persons.</p> + +<p>The play of all these stresses, their origins, the +strain exerted by them upon different parts of the +total field, the changes which may be the consequence +of that strain, and the cessation of stresses and strains +<span class="pagenum" id="p327">[327]</span>which follows certain of those changes—this is the +major study of psychology, as it is the major content +of our life.⁠<a id="FNanchor_65_65" href="#Footnote_65_65" class="fnanchor">[65]</a> As yet experimental psychology has +little information for us on this theme, and in these +chapters we have not given it its due place, either. +The reason for this neglect is my wish to introduce +the concept of dynamical organization by applying +it to simpler problems. Since we have become acquainted +with the concept in the realm of sensory +experience we may now extend its use to the total +field—and even beyond it. It is expedient, however, +to return to sensory organization time and +again so that a feeling of continuity and scientific +prudence may accompany us on our way.</p> + +<p>For instance, if the reader should feel a break between +what has been discussed in previous chapters +and our present statements, let him consider the following +point with me. In the sensory field segregation +and grouping have been regarded as products of +dynamical intercourse. If directed attitude, as occurring +between the self and the environment, is to +be regarded as belonging to the same general class of +physiological dynamics, we can expect it to have +similar effects. This is the case, indeed, for, in the +total field including the self, we find grouping dependent +upon those directed attitudes. If in discussion +two scientists argue against a third one, the +field of each of them is organized according to this +<span class="pagenum" id="p328">[328]</span>particular social situation and the direction of attitudes +in it. They are not simply “three” men; they +are a group of two, with one man external to, or +rather opposed to, it. At the same time another +grouping might be more natural from the viewpoint +of purely <em>visual</em> organization, because, spatially, the +third man may be nearer to one of his opponents than +this opponent is to the second opponent. Nevertheless, +if in the middle of the discussion one of the three +happened to perceive this other, visual grouping, for +some reason, he would realize that what he had previously +experienced as the organization of his field +was quite as real as now the new grouping is. Grouping +based upon social forces is much more interesting +than purely visual organization, however, because +their members experience definitely directed attitudes +which do not generally appear in the same +lively manner when a number of things are seen as +two groups solely for optical reasons. The reader +will easily find similar examples in his daily life. +Four people sitting symmetrically at a desk may +experience themselves in several kinds of grouping. +When they are playing bridge, however, two +groups, consisting of two members sitting opposite +in space, will immediately originate in the field of +each of the four. A great many problems of social +psychology, some of them much more important +and serious than these, will acquire a new aspect +as soon as we consider them in such a concrete manner. +<span class="pagenum" id="p329">[329]</span>For the present our examples must suffice as a +demonstration of the fact that directed attitudes influence +organization and grouping quite as much as +visual factors do. Therefore we are justified in applying +the concept of organization to the total field +including the self and the stresses occurring between +it and its environment.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>With the concept of the total field in mind we +return to the discussion of association and reproduction.</p> + +<p>First of all, we realize that it is incorrect to treat +the problems of learning and memory as though they +referred only to sensory experience. What is called +an “association” has been found to be the trace of +organized processes. If now we see that in the total +field, including the self and its attitudes, we have as +much organization as in mere sensory experience, +one consequence will be that all the actual total fields +which occur in the course of a lifetime may leave +organized traces. Obviously we can remember our +attitudes as well as those experiences toward which +they were directed; and reproduction may proceed +from an attitude toward its object, or vice versa, just as +one objective experience may remind us of another.</p> + +<p>But something more important seems to follow +from our concept of the total field. The following +experience is common: I have a task which, perhaps, +I do not like, but which is urgent. In the course of +<span class="pagenum" id="p330">[330]</span>the day I find myself occupied by a great many other +things. I talk with friends, read a book, and so +forth. But time and again something like a dark +pressure appears somewhere in the field and, if I examine +it, it will be found to issue from that task. +Here we have a persistent tendency toward reproduction, +or reappearance in the actual field, and this +perseveration seems to depend upon the particular +nature of the trace in question. It is in connection +with this experience that we can understand certain +important experiments made by Lewin and Zeigarnik.⁠<a id="FNanchor_66_66" href="#Footnote_66_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a></p> + +<p>The subject is given a number of little tasks, one +after the other, as, for instance, to copy some lines +from a book; to continue an ornament, the principle +of which is given in a sample; to solve a simple +mathematical problem; to find twelve towns, the +names of which begin with the letter L; and so forth. +In some cases the subject is allowed to finish his +work, in others the experimenter interrupts him before +he has fully accomplished it. After a series of +twenty-two tasks, one-half of which is finished, the +subject is asked what tasks were given to him. In +most cases the report is very characteristic. The first +tasks which the subject recalls are those which were +interrupted, and the total number of this class which +is recalled is much larger than that of the other. +When 32 subjects were examined in this way, 26 recalled +<span class="pagenum" id="p331">[331]</span>more interrupted tasks than finished ones; in +16 subjects the superiority of the former was more +than 60 per cent., and in the average of all subjects +the superiority was 90 per cent.⁠<a id="FNanchor_67_67" href="#Footnote_67_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> Care was taken to +eliminate the influence of particular properties of +the different tasks; all tasks were interrupted exactly +as often as they were finished in the case of different +subjects. Of 22 tasks, 17 were more frequently recalled +after interruption than after completion. +When the same experiment was repeated with 47 +students, the superiority of recall for interrupted +work was again 90 per cent., in the average; in a +third experiment with 45 children, it was 110 per +cent.</p> + +<p>The most plausible explanation points to the fact +that, when solving a task, the subject is in a state of +stress which usually will not disappear until the solution +is accomplished. If the work is interrupted before +the solution, the trace of this situation contains +that stress. Moreover, just as during the work the +stress may be considered as the force which keeps the +work going, it seems to have a somewhat similar +tendency in the trace. Since recall would be the first +step toward finishing the task, we cannot be surprised +by the result of this interesting investigation.⁠<a id="FNanchor_68_68" href="#Footnote_68_68" class="fnanchor">[68]</a> If this +explanation is correct, several consequences may be +<span class="pagenum" id="p332">[332]</span>deduced from it. I shall not mention more than one. +Under normal conditions we do not expect the stress +in a trace to be preserved indefinitely. It is altogether +more probable that it should disappear with +time. Indeed, when recall was examined after a +delay of 24 hours, the superiority of the interrupted +tasks had considerably decreased.</p> + +<p>The experiments of Lewin and Zeigarnik refer to +recall as depending upon the properties of the original +situation. A much more difficult problem which +we have to discuss is concerned with how far reproduction +depends upon the actual total field in which +something might operate as an excitant of reproduction. +In this connection, almost all experiments on +memory should be subjected to serious criticism. +Just as we are not investigating automatic associations +in experiments in which our subjects are instructed to +<em>learn</em> nonsense material, we are not examining spontaneous +reproduction in experiments in which we +give our subjects one nonsense syllable out of the +learned series, and then ask them to reproduce the +next one. In this case, again, the procedure does not +fit the meaning of the rule of association and reproduction. +Were we to follow this rule more accurately, +we should give the first syllable unexpectedly +in some situation and wait for an automatic reproduction +of the second. The usual experiment differs +absolutely from such a procedure for obvious reasons. +If a subject can be directed in several ways toward a +<span class="pagenum" id="p333">[333]</span>part of his actual field, he can also assume very definite +attitudes toward something which lies beyond +that field, and primarily toward something in the +past. We know this attitude very well from instances +in which we try to remember the name of an author +or of a place. We are certain that such an attitude +has an influence upon reproduction. But although +the law of association does not mention this condition, +the classical investigation of that law quite generally +and rather innocently introduces precisely this +special condition. Therefore we are not justified in +applying the results of that experimental work either +to the concept of automatic recall or to reproduction +as it may occur spontaneously under other conditions +in the total field.</p> + +<p>Some time ago almost all psychologists would have +said that automatic reproduction in consequence of +previous association is the prime motor of mental +life and of behavior. Here caution seems to be +highly advisable. As yet experimental evidence is +strictly opposed to such a view, since it shows that +reproduction will not occur unless very special conditions +are fulfilled. The most important work in +this field has been done by Lewin.⁠<a id="FNanchor_69_69" href="#Footnote_69_69" class="fnanchor">[69]</a> Among his experiments +there is one in which the problem is +examined directly. He made his subjects learn pairs +<span class="pagenum" id="p334">[334]</span>of syllables either in the usual manner or by some +new procedure, which I shall not describe here. +After a large number of repetitions, distributed over +several days, the subject was given single syllables +with the instruction to read them and then to wait +passively. If under these circumstances some of the +learned syllables are presented among others, one +should expect the second members of the learned +pairs to be reproduced automatically. In general, +however, this was not the case. Even when the instruction +was changed to “Tell me the first thing occurring +to you after reading each syllable!”, the +result remained negative, with a few exceptions. It +is interesting to examine those cases where the reproduction +of the associated syllable did occur. Obviously +the subject’s attitude is not well defined by the +instruction to wait passively. After some “waiting” +a particular attitude will almost always be assumed +unintentionally. If a syllable appears as a familiar +one to the subject, for instance, his attitude may become +one of identifying and examining the learned +material. However, as soon as he begins to be +directed to the old context, in consequence of this +attitude, reproduction will occur. Of course, such +reproduction cannot be called automatic, since it +depends upon a special attitude of the subject.</p> + +<p>It does not suffice as a basis for reproduction for the +subject to be directed <em>somehow</em> to the presented syllable +itself. In these experiments he had to be directed +<span class="pagenum" id="p335">[335]</span>to it as <em>to a member of a known pair or series</em>; otherwise, +there was no reproduction. In everyday life +we may observe the same fact whenever we like. +Certainly, well-known objects are sufficiently associated +with their names. Nevertheless when we +walk along a street, we are successively directed to +a great many things. But we are far from reproducing +their names. If you say that objects are associated +with a great many things besides their names, +and that these diverse associations inhibit each other, +you admit by this very argument that almost no +associations lead normally to appropriate reproductions. +When will they do so? If, as a psychologist, +you have just stated that you did not reproduce the +names of the car, the tower, the door, the window +when you noticed them, in keeping with your normal +attitude in walking along the street, this statement +itself will very probably change your attitude. +During the next minute you will probably assume +the attitude of naming, and whatever you look at +will at once reproduce its name. Therefore, the +mutual inhibition of several associations does not +seem to be the main factor that prevents reproduction. +As soon as your attitude coincides with the +direction of existing associations, reproduction occurs +at once and without any appreciable effect of +inhibition.</p> + +<p>It may be a wholesome occupation for a psychologist +to make more observations along this line. If he +<span class="pagenum" id="p336">[336]</span>does, it will seem altogether strange to him that our +science should have regarded automatic reproduction +as the main motor of mental life and behavior for so +long. We may congratulate ourselves on the fact +that, in this case, unprejudiced experience is strictly +opposed to theory. At any given moment in our +normal lives we find ourselves occupied with some +work, some problem, the subject-matter of some conversation, +and so forth. Under these circumstances +the total field is well organized; dynamical relationships +between the self and its objects form one +functional whole, the development of which we +call our “working,” our “solving” the problem, our +“expressing” our own opinion, and so on. I admit +that this is a somewhat optimistic description of life. +If I return to this manuscript after an interruption of +a week my “working” at first does not quite correspond +to the description given. At one moment a +faint noise will suffice to give me a direction irrelevant +to the task, at another something else will affect +me similarly. If, even then, I am occupied with a +given thing at a given moment, a great many “deflections” +of attitude will occur in the course of time +until finally the work itself begins to be the development +of one functional whole. What about reproduction +during such a happy period of work? All +the words and concepts occurring in the work itself +are associated with other words, concepts and situations +which have nothing whatever to do with the +<span class="pagenum" id="p337">[337]</span>development of the work in question. These associations +belong to very different epochs and interests in +my life. If each of them automatically led to the +appropriate reproduction, the field would become a +chaos of incoherent stuff in a few moments, instead of +one identical whole transforming itself in an orderly +manner toward the solution of my one actual task. +Excluding states of insanity, that evidently does not +happen. Even if my attitude is deflected a few times +before I become completely absorbed in the work, +I am somehow so well directed toward my real task +that “distractions” remain precisely what this term +means, and instantly, in spite of them, my attitude +is bent back to the main task. Automatic reproduction +might account for some distractions and disturbances, +just as do noises and other foreign experiences, +but it cannot explain the normal continuity and persistency +of our working, thinking and doing. On the +contrary, if there are automatic and independent reproductions, +they must be factors of little weight in +comparison to the stresses and dynamical tendencies +existing in an actual situation. Some of us, it is true, +would be inclined to explain the order and continuity +of actual work entirely by the force of associations. +Originally, they would say, there was indeed a chaos +of ever-changing attitudes and reproductions. But +in the development from childhood to adult life, +some of our attitudes, experiences, and so forth, have +become so well associated that, now, continuous currents +<span class="pagenum" id="p338">[338]</span>of them will predominate over a great many +disturbances and reproductions of lesser importance. +I cannot accept this theory, however. If my writing +in English about a problem I have very seldom discussed +even in my own language could be pictured +as the reproduction of thousands of well-established +associations, I might agree with the theory. Unfortunately, +no such current of associations is ready-made +in me which would produce what I have to +write in these very pages. Nevertheless, I persist in +writing about one subject-matter and, I hope, coherently. +Therefore, when comparing the relative +importance of automatic reproductions with the +stresses of the actually developing organization of +the field in such a case, the balance will undoubtedly +be in favor of the latter. Habit has been enormously +overrated in the theoretical treatment of life.</p> + +<p>In some of Lewin’s experiments this has been +demonstrated quite convincingly.⁠<a id="FNanchor_70_70" href="#Footnote_70_70" class="fnanchor">[70]</a> I shall describe +them in a simplified manner. To begin with, his +subjects had to learn pairs of nonsense syllables. +Afterwards they were shown certain other syllables +serially, the instruction being that in each syllable the +first letter should be put in the place of the last and +vice versa; whereupon they had to pronounce the +result. The time required for this operation was +measured. The reader will notice that here we have +the situation I was just describing. The subject is +<span class="pagenum" id="p339">[339]</span>working on a definite task. If, among the second +series of syllables, the first one of a <em>learned</em> pair is +given, automatic reproduction should either bring +about a wrong reaction or, at least, inhibit the right +one so that, in such a case, the time of reaction would +be increased. On the other hand, if a syllable presented +for reaction is the first member of a <em>learned</em> +pair and if the syllable to be formed by the subject is +identical with the second member of that learned +pair, previous association should facilitate the reaction, +and the time of reaction should be decreased. +To the author’s surprise nothing of the kind was +observed. There were no wrong reactions caused by +reproduction on the basis of previous association. +Where reproduction should have inhibited the subject’s +response, the time of reaction was usually not +raised above the average; where reproduction should +have accelerated it, the time was the same as in the +case of “neutral” or control syllables.⁠<a id="FNanchor_71_71" href="#Footnote_71_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> It is obvious +then that, under these circumstances, the dynamical +development of the total field will follow its own +ways or laws, practically independent of the strong +associations which some of its parts may have +acquired in the past.</p> + +<p>Recently Dr. Lewin told me that this fact might +be explained, partially at least, in terms of a principle +which I discussed at the beginning of this chapter. +<span class="pagenum" id="p340">[340]</span>If A has been associated with B, A will not reproduce +B, if the properties of A are changed. We +know that such a change will occur when, the stimuli +corresponding to A being given, A becomes part of a +new organization. If during learning a syllable A +is read naturally, it is taken simply as a whole. However, +if the subject later obeys the instruction to +interchange the first and the last letters of the syllable +A, he will view the syllable in terms of this task. +Consequently, it will appear in a new organization, +the first and the last letters being seen as outstanding +members of the syllable, or whatever else may be +changed by its entrance into a new total field. This +might suffice to make A unable to reproduce B. The +explanation seems to be corroborated by the observation +that in most cases the subjects did not even notice +the presentation of <em>known</em> syllables among the new +ones. In any case, it is advisable to make similar +experiments using other material, the properties of +which would be more characteristic and less likely to +be changed in a new total field. Neither Dr. Lewin +nor I yet feel convinced that an adequate theory of +the whole matter has been formulated. In some of +his experiments the subject’s attitude towards the +syllables was practically the same during learning +as it was during the subsequent testing, but it did not +lead to reproduction either, so long as other circumstances +remained as I have described them. If +objects normally do not effect the automatic reproduction +<span class="pagenum" id="p341">[341]</span>of their names (cf. above pp. <a href="#p333">333</a>–335), it +would be a bold assumption to make in every case +that reproduction did not occur because the properties +of the objects had been altered too much by our +actual attitude.</p> + +<p>In certain very interesting experiments Lewin has +finally succeeded in creating reproductions or inhibitions +on the basis of previous associations, <em>against</em> +the task given by the experimental instruction. This +was achieved by arranging the whole situation in a +special manner. If, in the case of certain syllables, +reproduction will effect the same result as would the +procedure strictly corresponding to the instructions, +and if, then, the subject is seduced into relying upon +reproduction as the easier way, his attitude may unintentionally +become completely one of reproducing. +The total field having now acquired this direction +temporarily, the next syllable will tend to reproduce +its partner, though in this case <em>reproduction</em> may be +absolutely wrong with respect to the experimental +task. Both erroneous reproduction and inhibition +of the correct performance were demonstrated by +Lewin in these neat experiments. This would almost +seem to show that reproductive tendencies cannot +influence a given total field before the actual attitude +has been transformed into one of reproducing.</p> + +<p>Still I hesitate to adhere to such a radical assumption. +I take it as definitely established that psychology +has gone much too far in admitting the free play +<span class="pagenum" id="p342">[342]</span>of independent and automatic reproductions. But +shall we suppose that during our whole lifetime no +reproduction will occur without our attitudinal +direction being one of reproducing? It may be so. +Until much more is known about the matter through +further experimentation, however, we should hold +our judgment <i lang="la">in suspenso</i>. Moreover, if actual attitude +should be shown to be all but decisive for the +reproduction issuing from a part of the field, another +equally important problem will become that of the +genesis and change of attitudes themselves. Certainly, +attitudes do arise, they persist, they change +and disappear, for many reasons. And we may safely +say that the problem of reproduction is here again. +We do not know very much about the reproduction +of attitudes <em>as such</em>. But the possibility of this kind +of reproduction, even in the simplest and most “classical” +form, cannot be denied in our present state of +knowledge.</p> + +<p>In no case shall we be inclined to give our discussion +of reproduction an exaggerated meaning. Current +theories of habit, association and reproduction, +it is true, do not realize how very special the conditions +are which must be fulfilled before a well-organized +situation is seriously influenced by “foreign” +reproductions. It is also true that we are just beginning +to see the most important problems in this field. +Again it is fortunately true that reproduction will not +occur in millions of cases in which we should have +<span class="pagenum" id="p343">[343]</span>predicted it from the viewpoint of the rather superficial +classical theories. But, after all, enough remains +of reproduction which must be taken into +account. If, in writing these pages, I am not continually +deflected from my task by a great many accidental +reproductions, on the other hand, I could not +write a single word if I had no reproductions at all. +English words are continually though hesitantly arising +from somewhere—by reproduction. In writing, +my hand moves across the paper in forms much more +easily reproduced. There is no question about the +occurrence and the <em>value</em> of reproduction in almost +every moment of our life. The problem is merely to +explain why, excluding instances of occasional error, +of stupidly repeated habit, and so forth, reproduction +should be restricted mainly to those cases <em>in which it +has a value with respect to the actual total field and +its dynamical development as a functional whole</em>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_72_72" href="#Footnote_72_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a></p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>This is a chapter of criticism and of open problems. +I cannot avoid adding one more question which +has not yet found adequate attention in all quarters, +though von Kries pointed it out thirty years ago.</p> + +<p>Suppose A and B have become associated; how +does a process A (or A<sup>1</sup>, very similar to A), bring +about the reproduction of B? In addition to the +problems discussed in the preceding pages, here is a +<span class="pagenum" id="p344">[344]</span>question of great difficulty. In some textbooks, it is +true, reproduction is explained easily enough on the +basis of machine theory. The process A has been +conducted along a definite path in the nervous system; +similarly, and at practically the same moment, +B has been conducted along another path. Between +the central terminal nuclei of both paths, it is assumed +that fibers become specially conductive, in +consequence of those simultaneous processes in the +central nuclei of paths A and B. From this viewpoint +reproduction will occur later on when a new +process A (or A<sup>1</sup>) is conducted along the same path +to the same final station which, now, is especially +well connected with the terminal nucleus of path B. +Taking the line of least resistance, the process will +spread to the place of B and reactivate it. Every one +knows figures like this (Fig. 24) which, neglecting +some minor complications and giving simple lines +instead of neurones, contains the whole functional +scheme involved in that idea. Obviously, this is +purely a machine theory, in which reproduction does +not depend upon the properties of associated processes. +If A reproduces B, this is the case because, +<span class="pagenum" id="p345">[345]</span>once and for all, the process A is conducted along +one definite path to a nucleus of termination from +which one set of conductive mechanisms—in the +direction of B’s nucleus—has previously been made +more pervious and permeable than <em>any</em> others.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowe10" id="fig24"> +<img src="images/fig24.jpg" alt=""> +<figcaption> +<p>Fig. 24</p> +</figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The nature of this scheme makes it unfit to explain +real reproduction, for two reasons:</p> + +<p>(1) If a process X, altogether different from A, +should happen to be conducted along A’s path to +its final nucleus, it would take the line of least resistance +from there, spread to the nucleus of B and +reproduce it, though X has never occurred together +with B a single time. You object, claiming that this +scheme was to be applied only to such processes +as had occurred simultaneously before? But in the +scheme itself such a restriction is not mentioned; +in any case we cannot deduce from the scheme why +it should be so. Therefore, the scheme will not explain +one essential condition of reproduction.</p> + +<p>(2) If the process A should happen to start from +quite another point of the receptor organ along another +path, it will not be conducted to that cerebral +cells which have been especially connected with the +cerebral nucleus of B. Consequently there is no reason +why it should spread to B rather than to any +other cells. This means that, in such a case, A will +not reproduce B, though it is associated with it. If, +under experimental conditions, however, a process +A, starting from one region of the retina, has been +<span class="pagenum" id="p346">[346]</span>associated with another process B, a process A (or +A<sup>1</sup>) projected upon quite another part of the retina, +will reproduce B without great difficulty. So much +has been shown by E. Becher.⁠<a id="FNanchor_73_73" href="#Footnote_73_73" class="fnanchor">[73]</a></p> + +<p>If you object that between the new path of A and +the cerebral area of B there <em>may</em> also be some highly +conductive path, you introduce chance conditions instead +of an explanation by definite acquired machine +arrangements, i.e., you give up your claim to precise +explanation. Moreover, if coming from this new +point of origin A should happen to find such readily +conductive paths to B, the same might conceivably be +true of all possible processes D, E, F and so forth, +which, therefore, should “reproduce” B at any time +without previous association.</p> + +<p>The weakness of the whole scheme is, then, that it +makes reproduction depend upon <em>the specific location +of paths and nuclei</em> in each particular case, as +though such simple location were a true representative +of definite process. Only if this were so, might a +theory of reproduction become a purely topographical +matter. In the optic sector of the nervous system, +at least, a given process may be conducted in one +bundle of fibers at one time, and another process may +be conducted in the same bundle shortly afterwards. +Furthermore, the same process may be conducted in +<span class="pagenum" id="p347">[347]</span>certain fibers now, and in other fibers later on. +Therefore, the necessary requirement for making the +machine theory of reproduction possible is not fulfilled +in the case of our most important sense organ. +In the optical system the correlation between the +different kinds of process and the different localities +in which they may occur is very near to zero. This +should destroy all hope of treating reproduction +exclusively in terms of topographical conditions.</p> + +<p>I shall admit at once that, in this respect, we are as +yet no better off with the hypothesis about association +which was proposed in the last chapter. It is similar +to the old view insofar as it assumes a physiological +trace of (AB) and insofar as, in each case, this +trace must have some <em>place</em> in the nervous system. +If, then, the process A enters the nervous system +from a different point of origin and along another +path, how does it arrive at the specific locus of that +trace? One feels inclined to give a dynamical explanation. +The similarity between A and its trace +might work <em>as though</em> A were attracted to the trace. +I shall not venture an explanation here, however, +for a very simple reason. The problem is formulated +as if automatic reproduction were the simplest +and most common event in the world. But we have +seen that it probably is not. Perhaps, when we learn +a little more about the concrete rules and conditions +of reproduction <em>as such</em>, we shall be better able to +treat its physiological basis.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p348">[348]</span></p> + + +<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h3> + +<blockquote> +<p>E. Becher: <cite lang="de">Gehirn und Seele</cite>. 1911.</p> + +<p>J. von Kries: <cite lang="de">Die materiellen Grundlagen der Bewusstseinserscheinungen</cite>. +1901.</p> + +<p>K. Lewin: Psychol. Forsch. 1 and 2. 1921, 1922.</p> + +<p>K. Lewin: <cite lang="de">Vorsatz, Wille und Bedürfnis</cite>. 1926.</p> + +<p>W. Poppelreuter: Zeitschr. f. Psychol. 61. 1912.</p> +</blockquote> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p349">[349]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="X"> + X + <br> + <i>Insight</i> + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>IF habit and reproduction are not to be regarded as +the main motors of so-called mental life, what +shall we say are the real ones? To this question there +is one answer, not well formulated but implicitly +accepted, which we may call the layman’s belief. It +is the layman’s belief that, in general, he himself +directly feels <em>why</em> at one time he has one attitude, +and later on another; also that, for the most part, he +knows and understands directly <em>why</em> he is inclined +to do one thing in a certain particular situation and +<em>why</em> a definitely different thing under subsequent +different conditions. In his view, then, he is experiencing +directly and truly much of that dynamical +context, the development of which constitutes mental +life. Opposed to this belief and altogether foreign +to it, we have the view of most learned psychologists +at the present time. From their viewpoint, one is +inclined to do one thing now and then another, because, +in the first instance, certain nerve paths are +most available and, in the second instance, certain +other paths are most open. Fortunate those people +in whom the most permeable nerve paths in practise +are usually the right and appropriate ones! From +<span class="pagenum" id="p350">[350]</span>the psychologist’s point of view it would be a pure +mystery if a person’s behavior should ever be determined, +as the layman believes, directly by the concrete +properties of the actual situation. The layman’s +belief is in full agreement with everyday experience; +the learned view harmonizes with what we +suppose to be the viewpoint of natural science. I +shall confess at once that I choose the layman’s belief +whole-heartedly. In the treatment of sensory process +<i>gestalt</i> psychology prefers the data of naïve description +to the findings of prejudiced introspection. Following +this line, the theory of the sensory field has +begun to have a much more intimate contact with the +natural sciences than it ever had when it imitated a +self-made ideal of these disciplines. Similarly if, +with regard to the total field, we adopt the view of +common experience, what is <em>called</em> the viewpoint of +natural science will soon be given up, in place of +which we shall substitute the theory of dynamics. +At the start of our present discussion, therefore, the +obvious, almost the vulgar, will have to be said. It +is not our fault that, to a deplorable degree, the obvious +has disappeared from learned psychology, so +that we have to rediscover it. Later in the course of +this analysis the obvious aspects of common experience +will be found to express certain fundamental +properties of physical dynamics in the nervous system. +This is exactly the contrary of the prevailing +opinion.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p351">[351]</span></p> + +<p>We have attacked the atomistic theory of sensory +experience. After things and the self, events and +groups, have been recognized as natural parts of the +field and its development, the worst mistake which +might occur would consist in our falling back upon +atomism at this higher level. It was once the psychologist’s +primary aim to look for all possible sensations, +to collect and to order them in something +like a museum. After they were thus gathered and +arrayed as independent bits of experience, the sensory +field had consequently to be regarded as a mosaic +of indifferent spots. We would face the same danger +in this present treatment if, after discussing a certain +type of segregated whole in one chapter, and another +type in a later chapter, the self in one chapter, and attitudes +in another, we should again seem to be opening +a museum to the public. The ways of real life +do not coincide with those of classification, and if, +by abstraction, we unite the members of one class, we +very probably cut the live bonds of dynamical reality +at the same time. Perhaps, the most interesting +forms of dynamical context occur between members +of altogether different classes. It is instructive to see +hundreds of hearts together in a collection; but, in +operation, a heart has much more to do with a lung +than with another heart. We should not learn very +much about their specific coöperation in a classifying +museum. In a similar way, when we treat sensory +wholes as one class, selves as a second and attitudes +<span class="pagenum" id="p352">[352]</span>as a third, we might easily be misled into the view +that out of some sensory objects, some self and some +attitudes, actual total fields might be composed <i lang="la">ad +libitum</i>. It is evident to any one that such an +assumption would be altogether childish, there being +certain <em>correlations</em> between the objects, the selves +and their attitudes occurring in one common field. +Even from the viewpoint of traditional psychology, +it would be so. However, we cannot be satisfied with +this statement because, generally, much more than +mere correlation will occur between the most essential +parts of a given total field. Just this surplus is +the obvious aspect of every one’s life to which we +have alluded and it is forgotten in at least one-half +of scientific psychology.</p> + +<p>One attitude in which I sometimes find myself is +admiration. But I am never simply “admiring.” +My admiration always is “of” something; it does not +occur as something by itself and indifferently. Nor +is there the slightest doubt about what its object is at +a given moment. In the concert-hall, yesterday at +9 o’clock, it was that <i>alto</i> voice, singing calmly, confidently +and seriously, toward which my admiration +was directed,—not the nose of my neighbor, not the +back of the conductor, none of the thousands of other +objects and events before me. How is that? Admiration +is a directed attitude; the voice is heard as singing +at a definite place. Do I state that the direction +of the first goes to the place in question and stops +<span class="pagenum" id="p353">[353]</span>there, as a long stick might be fastened between me +and that place, and end there? Do I notice something +like that and say, then: “Oh, I guess this curious +attitude of mine somehow has something to do +with that singing!”? I certainly do not. As my +attitude arises, it is experienced as being the natural +outcome of what characterizes the singing voice. So +long as the attitude persists, it is felt as being founded +upon the properties of that performance. No indirect +criteria, no coefficients of correlation are needed, +then, to teach me about some probable connection +here, because this actual attitude <em>is experienced as +depending directly upon something definite</em>.</p> + +<p>Some weeks ago I saw my little child smiling for +the first time, and I was charmed. How did I know +that my attitude was concerned with that smile? If +the total field were a mosaic of states, events and +things, some of them directed and some not, but all +of them distributed indifferently in consequence of +some hidden mechanism, I could not guess their +mutual connection except by the indirect procedure +of scientific induction: a change here would be followed +by a change there; elimination of this part +would be accompanied by disappearance of that +other part. Empirical rules of concomitant variation, +and so forth, would be all I could find out +about the connections existing between the several +parts. In my case, the frequent concomitance of the +smile on the child’s face with that other bit of experience, +<span class="pagenum" id="p354">[354]</span>my being charmed, would have made me assume +that probably there was some connection between +the two. How far have we gone in psychology +that it is possible, or even seems advisable, to carry +on such discussion seriously! One side of my child’s +face is a little darker because of a shadow. Before +the sufficient number of experiences have occurred, +I might as well refer my being charmed to that +shadow!</p> + +<p>After a long walk, on a hot summer day, I drink a +glass of fresh beer. There is the cool touch and a +characteristic taste in my mouth; there is also great +pleasure. Did I have to learn gradually that the +second refers to the first? That it has nothing to do +with the spider that I see on the wall, or the size of +that chair? I did <em>not</em> learn it. I am no more sure of +my enjoyment as such, and of touch and taste by +themselves, than I am of enjoying just this touch and +taste. Enjoyment is felt as the adequate attitude <em>belonging +to</em> those actual experiences, or as their +natural result. Between the attitude and its sensory +basis we experience what in German is called <i lang="de">ihr +sachlicher Zusammenhang</i>.⁠<a id="FNanchor_74_74" href="#Footnote_74_74" class="fnanchor">[74]</a></p> + +<p>The same is true in a great many cases which differ +from the last ones only insofar as the attitude has a +“negative” character.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p355">[355]</span></p> + +<p>For two weeks I have been busy arranging a +carefully adjusted set of instruments for experimentation. +This morning I found them completely out +of order. Whoever may be guilty, I am angry. If, +now, I should say that here is the window, there the +desk, in one corner the instruments out of order, in +another a chair, and near the door myself in an attitude +of anger, would that be an adequate description +of the total situation? It would not. I am sure that +the door has no connection whatever with my attitude; +for I know that, on discovering the unfortunate +change, I was angry <em>about the alteration</em>. Again, +the attitude is felt as <em>founded upon</em> something definite, +its character being the natural and direct consequence +of that something’s properties.</p> + +<p>One beautiful night in Tenerife, when I was working +calmly at my desk, I was suddenly frightened as +I have never before been frightened. The house was +rattling and shaking violently—my first experience +of an earthquake! There was no doubt whatever +about my being frightened <em>by</em> that sudden rattling +and shaking. Once more the attitude—if fright may +be called an attitude—<em>was felt as obviously and +naturally produced by that new experience</em>. We do +not gradually learn that unexpected events of a +strongly dynamical type will be accompanied by +fright, as though <i lang="la">a priori</i> any other experiences, a +friendly face or the smell of a rose, might be accompanied +<span class="pagenum" id="p356">[356]</span>by fright just as well. Fright is <em>experienced +as</em> jumping at us right out of the very nature of certain +definite events.</p> + +<p>After sitting for half an hour in a restaurant, full +of smoke and of talk all around me, I feel “nervous” +and ready to go. My “nervousness” <em>refers to</em> those +properties of my environment. I know this, not only +because in past experience I may have discovered the +rule that under such conditions I shall feel uneasy +after a time. I experience myself directly as disturbed +and confused <em>by</em> those surroundings. I might +say also that I feel myself <em>necessarily growing +“nervous” under the pressure of</em> sticky air and loud, +disorderly noise. Actually these conditions can only +produce that one effect upon me. That is how I feel +them.</p> + +<p>Last but not least, I was very much depressed two +days ago. At the same time I could not hit upon an +adequate presentation of what I conceived to be the +subject-matter of this chapter. Were there two +separate facts, then, the probable connection of which +I might have stated by some indirect method? No +need to! When I was trying to solve my problem, I +felt my depression <em>as based upon</em> my failure directly. +Just such a feeling had to grow out of such a situation +because of its properties.</p> + +<p>If, in all these examples, I feel how my own attitude +is determined by the nature of something before +me, in other instances something before me will be +<span class="pagenum" id="p357">[357]</span>experienced quite as naturally as growing out of my +attitude.</p> + +<p>When I look at <a href="#fig01">Fig. 1</a> without any special effort, +I have two groups of dots before me. But if, for +some reason, I become interested in oblique lines, the +figure will be transformed into three oblique pairs +of dots, for instance, each of which runs like an +oblique line from a lower dot to the right to a dot +higher up to the left. Suppose that the transformation +really occurs; it grows out of my attitude quite +as naturally as my anger develops out of a definite +event. When I scratch my head or hum a tune +simultaneously, I do not feel the slightest connection +of these activities with the described transformation +of Fig. 1. But the transformation is <em>felt as depending +upon</em> that particular attitude directly.</p> + +<p>What was the name of that town on the Santa Fé +Railroad? There it comes! When I am searching +for a name, searching does not occur as one thing +apart; nor does the gap of the forgotten name occur as +an isolated item among other things—a headache, the +noise of the wind, the lamp before me, and so forth. +Searching is experienced as directed toward that +definite name, hidden as yet, but now, at last, yielding +to the stress of my attitude. As it appears, its coming +is felt as <em>being achieved by</em> just this little stress of +mine. I ask again, Did I learn gradually through +numerous experiences that in this particular situation +such an attitude will be <em>followed</em> by a name so +<span class="pagenum" id="p358">[358]</span>that now I may venture to guess about their mutual +relation? Without previous training, would that +noise outdoors be connected with the given attitude +as well?</p> + +<p>I hold my arm horizontally for a while. Very +soon the arm will not remain in that position unless I +exert a special effort. In my total field there is, besides +this effort, the blue sky, a lark’s song, the aspect +of the lifted arm, a smell of moist ground. There is +also a curious feeling in the lifted arm, growing more +intense as the minutes go by, and, with this feeling, +something like a downward pull in the arm. Geometrically, +as it were, or logically, my actual experiences +allow a large number of different combinations +into pairs. My effort may be combined with the +lark’s song, the smell, the color of the lifted hand, +and the blue of the sky. But my effort is not an isolated +something, equally indifferent to all parts of the +field. It is experienced as keeping the arm horizontal +<em>against that downward pull</em>. The nature of the +pull is felt as requiring just such an effort in compensation, +and the nature of the effort is experienced as +compensating just this pull. If some one tries to describe +the situation in terms of indifferent data, each +of which has a place, some of which have a direction +(but independently of each other), some occurring at +one time, and some at another, and all of them having +hundreds of mutual “relations” as to place, distance, +succession or simultaneity, intensity and so on,—he +<span class="pagenum" id="p359">[359]</span>will not even touch what psychologically is the main +feature of the situation.</p> + +<p>In discussing a somewhat similar case David +Hume emphatically defended the opposite view. I +do not know how my arm is lifted, he said, when I +wish to raise it. There can be no more than mere +succession in time, since I do not know the nature of +the physiological mechanism that effects the raising. +What a strange argument! And how much opposed +to what Hume had promised to furnish as an analysis +of pure experience. When we talk about “the arm” +in this connection, we have to deal with an experienced +thing, not with a physical object and its movements +in physical space. Whatever the nature of +peripheral innervation may be in Hume’s case, we +are dealing with a definite “wish” and a definite experienced +movement of our arm. The problem is +whether this particular wish is naturally experienced +as being as foreign or indifferent to the arm’s felt +movement as it is to the seen color of that cloud or +the brown of the skin. In haste the great philosopher +seems to have skipped over a dangerous point here, +unintentionally making use of a simple logical trick, +by which, however, he saved his theory for almost +two centuries.</p> + +<p>In order to make the import of these paragraphs +more circumscribed, I shall consider an objection.</p> + +<p>One might say after all that those experiences of +“depending upon,” “being the natural outcome of,” +<span class="pagenum" id="p360">[360]</span>“being based upon” or of “sustaining against” do not +prove that a <em>necessary</em> connection exists in the field. +I greatly enjoyed the overture to <cite lang="de">Tristan und Isolde</cite> +twenty years ago and, at that time, I might have given +exactly the same description of my enjoyment as the +direct and evident outgrowth of just that piece of +music. What has become of my attitude toward the +piece? I am tired of it. At present, I should be +rather inclined to find aversion the only possible and +natural outcome of hearing the overture. Nor would +I doubt for a moment what this aversion refers to or +is based upon. The answer to this objection will consist +in our saying that all this is absolutely true, but +that it does not really constitute an objection. With +exactly the same physical situation, or sequence of +sound-waves, the same person will feel “pleasure” +<em>growing out of</em> his sensory experience to-day, and be +altogether disgusted by it only a few days later on. +A simple way to achieve that alteration experimentally +would be to give our subject the same +sequence of sounds three hundred times each day.⁠<a id="FNanchor_75_75" href="#Footnote_75_75" class="fnanchor">[75]</a> +But we have no right to say that after more than a +thousand repetitions the same melodies will be experienced +as having quite the same properties they +had to begin with. They have changed, no doubt; +they have become a musical commonplace, sounding +empty and stale. Keep away from these melodies for +a few years! Then you may find something more +<span class="pagenum" id="p361">[361]</span>similar to their original nature again, and if, then, +you enjoy them once more, your enjoyment will be +felt to grow out of them as obviously as when you +first listened to them. An attitude is felt as being +the natural outcome of actual experience; the objection +stated above misinterprets this definition, as +though it meant a constant connection between a set +of <em>stimuli</em> and the attitude.</p> + +<p>For still another reason, music which I enjoyed +twenty years ago may not please me to-day, even +without the unfortunate influence of frequent repetition. +What I call my self has changed its properties +considerably in the meantime. Why, then, +should the music produce the same effects upon this +changed self? Once more I must point out that our +feeling of something naturally depending upon +something else does not refer to a correlation, or a +highly constant “togetherness” <em>as such</em>, stated in +terms of the external observation of a great many +cases. It refers rather to an evident dynamical dependence +as experienced <i lang="la">hic et nunc</i> in one actual +case. As this flower before me is certainly red, +though if I should become color-blind later on, it +would be gray, so such a dependence in the total +field is real now, independently of what the future +will make of it.</p> + +<p>From this consideration we may learn something +more. The way in which a piece of music affects +me now, in contrast to the attitude it produced twenty +<span class="pagenum" id="p362">[362]</span>years ago, has been determined by some change of +my self. I should hesitate very much to assert that +<em>this</em> change of my self was experienced as the only +possible outgrowth of definite conditions, quite as +evidently and directly as, at a given time, my attitude +toward the piece of music is felt to grow out of +its actual properties with natural necessity. Therefore, +I did not experience the <em>way</em> in which one attitude +instead of another has become the natural outcome +of my listening to that piece. Certain conditions +must have gradually changed <em>outside</em> the field +of my experience; the change in my attitude must +somehow depend upon that change of conditions. +But I have never felt the former change being +brought about by the latter change.</p> + +<p>It is an old rule in science that nothing makes certain +positive statements more worthy of credit than +their author’s frank acknowledgment of negative +cases and his attempt to emphasize the contrast himself. +I shall be the last to deny that in hundreds of +cases we are very far from experiencing how one +state of affairs is brought about by others. Let a subject +observe a continuous movement for a while and +then fixate a face or a pattern. His surprise when +he sees the after-image of that movement for the first +time in his life will be sufficient as a proof here that +the experience of the after-effect is necessarily +brought about by certain conditions without the subject +being aware of any natural bond between them. +<span class="pagenum" id="p363">[363]</span>Probably, here, the main conditions remain entirely +outside the field of direct experience.</p> + +<p>Again, after fixating the center of <a href="#fig08">Fig. 8</a> for a +while, many subjects will be greatly surprised when +suddenly another, quite different, shape appears +before them. We do not directly feel <em>why</em> just this +transformation should occur after continuous fixation. +We feel it so little that once a physicist, who +had been shown such a figure consisting of bright +lines in an otherwise dark room, afterwards asked +me how, from my position twelve yards off, I had +been able to put another figure in the place of the +first, so quickly and surprisingly! He did not even +suspect that something in his own organism was +producing the transformation.</p> + +<p>Eventually there cannot be a doubt that even certain +emotional attitudes may occur without our feeling +their <i lang="fr">raison d’être</i> directly. As sometimes we +suddenly feel that we have caught a cold without +knowing where and when, thus some morning we +may feel the way an ominous cloud looks, i.e., with a +silent anger which does not seem to have an obvious +basis in the present field of our experience. Such a +cloud of anger, it is often true, will easily find something +upon which to discharge itself, and, then, that +external something will appear as an adequate object +of the anger. Before that time, we cannot do more +than <em>guess</em> about the hidden first cause of our angry +mood. It may be some unknown climatological condition +<span class="pagenum" id="p364">[364]</span>working upon our organism, or it may be disturbed +digestion. However, we do not directly “feel” +any of these causes. This example may be regarded +as particularly interesting, since it seems to teach us +two different lessons: It corroborates the view that, +as well as instances in which dynamical context <em>as +such</em> is experienced directly and actually, there are +other instances in which effects are conspicuous in +experience, although experience is blind and deaf +as to their determination. The second lesson is that +both sorts of determination may be united in one single +event, because when, in the attitude of a threatening +cloud, we discover something upon which to +release the tension, that something will appear and +probably <em>be</em> appropriate to the production of an +angry reaction. But that we should react so vehemently +will be the result of those hidden conditions +which had transformed us into an ominous cloud before +there was this opportunity for “justified” anger.</p> + +<p>I do not see, however, that the fact of hidden determination +as observed in some cases is an argument +against experienced determination in others. In the +case of cholera and plague, germs are found to be the +decisive condition of disease. In diabetes this is not +the case. Who would deduce an argument against +bacteriology from such a “negative” case? Therefore +we may accept the same duplicity in our case, +too.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p365">[365]</span></p> + +<p>But is it not evident that, in spite of our examples, +so-called “experienced determination,” in a great +many instances, may be a simple product of learning? +When, in my mail, the address on one envelope +is in a certain handwriting, I feel happy over the discovery; +whereas with the finding of some other handwritings, +just the contrary is true. We may neglect +the graphological and esthetic sides of our reaction, +since we know that it is chiefly our acquaintance with +the writers which makes one handwriting very pleasant +and the other disagreeable. In either case we +seem to feel that our attitude is “the natural outcome” +of the aspect of the handwriting. Nevertheless, +our reaction seems to be one which we have had +to learn. The same words and letters would not be +felt as “being the natural basis of our reaction,” if +we had not become “conditioned” to them. What, +then, about that mysterious feeling of natural determination? +The answer is simple enough. Those +words and letters have become imbued with all the +friendly experiences we have had with one person +or with all the animosity connected with another. +As these persons themselves, when present, directly +arouse the corresponding attitude, their handwritings +do so now; not because this <em>attitude</em> has become +gradually “connected” with the handwriting, but because, +saturated with the specific character of those +past experiences, the handwriting represents a <em>natural</em> +<span class="pagenum" id="p366">[366]</span>basis for just this attitude, indeed. There is no reason +why this determination of attitude by the now +apparent properties of something before us, should +not occur and be felt directly.</p> + +<p>With respect to this question another remark will +be to the point. When I am thirsty, I am inclined +to think of refreshing drinks. What I am thus directed +to is brought into my actual experience by +reproduction. That does not matter very much in +our present problem. However reproduction may +have occurred, once the so-called “idea” of the drink +is in the actual field, it is felt to be the natural basis +of longing <em>for</em> it, and the craving is experienced as +being determined directly by just that sort of “idea” +in the present state of the self. The mere circumstance +that something has come into our actual field +by reproduction does not at all decide what kind of +context it may be experienced in when it is there. It +will be wise to remember that well, because the +overwhelming importance of learning, of habit, of +reproduction, has been so constantly emphasized in +psychology, that we will almost stop thinking and +considering any further problems with respect to a +situation in which <em>some</em> influence or participation +of past events and of reproduction has been shown. +But even if all “parts” of a given situation should +be found to owe their actual presence to reproduction, +there would still be one problem before us: In +what degree do they belong dynamically to each +<span class="pagenum" id="p367">[367]</span>other here and now, in the manner we are discussing +in this chapter?</p> + +<p>We have come back to what has been called above +the layman’s belief. Without knowing anything +about the fundamental weight of his conviction he +takes it as the simplest matter in the world, that he +has such a feeling now “because of” a certain aspect +of his actual situation, and that he feels the “because,” +too; also, that he lifts his arm with an effort +felt as “directed against” a heavy weight and “in +spite” of it. I agree with the layman. In the organization +of the total field and in thousands of +cases, we do experience the live dynamical context +determining one state this way and that change another +way. Moreover, we feel where they come from +and where they go to, in those instances. Above all, +we may experience <em>why</em>, issuing from just such an +event, thing or attitude, a given effect should be just +the one we find growing out of it.</p> + +<p>Surprisingly enough, in modern science and most +of all in psychology, there is a tendency not only to +neglect this simple truth, but even to persecute it, as +though it could not be acknowledged from the scientific +viewpoint. David Hume has been thought of +as the father of all the energetic fight against it. But +probably in this great figure of history we should +rather see the exponent, the most eminent representative +and the best enunciator of an intellectual current +which took its origin in Greece or even before, thousands +<span class="pagenum" id="p368">[368]</span>of years ago, arising from some deep need of +mankind for clearness.⁠<a id="FNanchor_76_76" href="#Footnote_76_76" class="fnanchor">[76]</a></p> + +<p>There is one sort of clearness and simplicity into +which our statements and the layman’s belief do +not fit very well. That ideal of clarity would be +achieved, if the world could be conceived as an enormous +number of equal and unequal pieces, related +indifferently as neighbors in space and successors in +time. That this is a true picture of <em>experience</em>, at +least, is silently presupposed at the very outset in +Hume’s famous work, so that he does not prove subsequently +more than he has already implicitly treated +as a settled affair. Since we have noticed that, in a +great many cases, we really do not at all feel <em>how</em> +something is determined by something else, he had +no difficulty in gathering examples appropriate to +his point of view; and since he did not see the other +cases, or disposed of them as quickly and incorrectly +as I have described above, he seemed to have demonstrated +the truth of his view beyond all argumentation.</p> + +<p>Being neighbors and following each other, indifferent +bits of experience will show all possible mutual +relations as to space and time, which, however, +do not prevent them from being an indifferent aggregate. +In addition, there will be an indefinite +number of other relations referring to quality, intensity, +<span class="pagenum" id="p369">[369]</span>and so forth. These, however, would also +form an indifferent network throughout experience, +merely visible to something like a logical eye, but +unreal from the viewpoint of experience itself. +Laws about natural coexistence and sequence of +events? No direct grasp of them is possible +in such a world <em>à la Hume</em>! He is said to have +been the greatest empiricist of them all. But if he +constructs such a world, the plan of which is determined +by his need for a special type of intellectual +clarity, he might quite as justifiably be called a rationalist.</p> + +<p>In his <em>radical empiricism</em> William James laid +great stress upon the fact that “the relations between +things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as +much matters of direct particular experience, neither +more so nor less so, than the things themselves.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_77_77" href="#Footnote_77_77" class="fnanchor">[77]</a> +This view is an obstacle in our way rather than an +aid; neither do we receive any help from James, +when he, though attacking atomism in the treatment +of experience, clearly fails to recognize natural segregations +in the sensory field (Chap. V). “Relations” +might be found indifferently between all parts, fractions, +or bits of the field, if we search for them. In +this respect, and unless more is said, relations will be +entirely unfit to make us understand why some definite +and particular attitude is experienced as arising +“because of” some definite and particular event or +<span class="pagenum" id="p370">[370]</span>thing in the field. The field is by no means experienced +as being everywhere full of those dynamical +bonds. There are <em>relations</em>, nevertheless, between +that same attitude and all the rest of the field.</p> + +<p>In some places, it is true, James attacks our problem +from another side, as when he writes about our +“sustaining a felt purpose against felt obstacles, and +overcoming or being overcome”;⁠<a id="FNanchor_78_78" href="#Footnote_78_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> also where in his +description “the experiencer feels the tendency, the +obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph, or the passive +giving up, just as he feels the time, the space, +the swiftness or intensity, the movement, the weight +and color, the pain and pleasure, the complexity, or +whatever remaining characters the situation may involve.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_79_79" href="#Footnote_79_79" class="fnanchor">[79]</a> +This is something quite unlike an indifferent +network of relations throughout the field. The +stress is not placed precisely where I have tried to +place it, largely because for James “activity” <em>as such</em> +was of chief importance, whereas our description +centers around the experience of a great many different +attitudes as they arise naturally out of the +properties of an event before us, or vice versa. Still +there is some agreement, at least, about our experiencing +directly certain determinations in the total +field.⁠<a id="FNanchor_80_80" href="#Footnote_80_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a></p> + +<p>A great deal of purely sensory organization may +<span class="pagenum" id="p371">[371]</span>be called “silent” because, though we experience the +<em>result</em> of it as segregated wholes with specific properties, +we do not usually feel <em>how</em> this result is dynamically +brought about and maintained. In this +respect the total field is different; it tells us more +about its innermost nature. Here, not only the result +is experienced, but also very much of its “why” and +“how” is felt in just the actual context. Wherever +this is the case we apply the term <em>insight</em>. When +I used this term in my treatment of intelligent behavior +in apes, I ran the risk of an unfortunate misinterpretation. +Since that behavior comprised extraordinarily +conspicuous accomplishments which we did +not expect to find in animals, insight would be readily +misinterpreted as some special and supranatural +faculty producing admirable and otherwise inexplicable +results. As I used and intended the term, nothing +of that sort should be implied in it. To avoid a +similar misunderstanding this time, I have introduced +the concept here in application to very common +and simple facts. It does not mean more than +our experience of definite determination in a context, +an event or a development of the total field; and +in the actual cases there need be nothing like an invention, +or a new intelligent achievement, or so forth. +A total field would be experienced <em>without</em> insight, +if all its several states, wholes, attitudes, etc., were +simply given as a pattern, in which none was felt +<span class="pagenum" id="p372">[372]</span>directly to depend upon any other and none to determine +any other.</p> + +<p>I have repeated several times that, from the viewpoint +of common and unsophisticated experience, +nothing can be more obvious than just that direct +determination. So much so, that in natural life +scarcely a single actual total field would be said +to lack that characteristic. With respect to this conviction +of the layman we have not added more than +truisms, indeed. Among learned psychologists, however, +there will only be a minority at present who, +fully realizing the theoretical importance of this +point, are quite ready to accept it. There is a second +group, much larger than the first, comprising +psychologists, who time and again will talk in a manner +involving, presupposing and implying insight as +a characteristic of their subjects’ or their own experience. +This is done, however, without their being +aware of it, and consequently one does not find +trace of it in the list of their theoretical concepts. +To participate, practically, in the naïve and +sound procedure of the layman is not the same thing +as to realize what one is doing from a theoretical +viewpoint. The less so, since the well-established +and socially acknowledged concepts of experimental +psychology belong almost completely to the theoretical +world of Hume. In a third and last group of +psychologists all those scientists may be counted, to +whom the creed of Hume or the scientific epoch of +<span class="pagenum" id="p373">[373]</span>the nineteenth century seems to be <em>the</em> final stage of +theoretical advance, any essential change or development +thereof being forbidden. What has been described +in the last paragraphs is mysticism in their +eyes. They would probably find no difficulty in +asserting that, riding in a bus, we might refer actual +anger to the friendly face of a beautiful girl before +us just as well as to the man who has at that moment +chosen our feet as a basis for the considerable weight +of his whole body. Or, more correctly, they would +not acknowledge <em>any</em> experience of natural reference +at all, since what “connections” there are, are all due +to indirect learning or conditioning. Consequently, +they never mean an actual “reference to”; they mean +merely a “coming together” or a “following each +other.” There is no doubt that true behaviorists belong +to this third class. But usually they decline to +enlist in any of the parties; because our problem still +seems to remain entirely in the field of direct experience, +of which they refuse to take any account.</p> + +<p>The problem can be readily transformed, however, +into a matter of brain physiology. At the very outset +(Chap. II) it was proposed to use direct experience +as an indicator of those physiological processes +which, occurring between the realm of outer conditions +and the overt behavior of the organism, are not +directly observable at the present time.</p> + +<p>In that field of the brain the processes of +which underlie our experienced field, the context of +<span class="pagenum" id="p374">[374]</span>states and events was said to be a true picture of direct +experience. To the actual order of the experienced +field there corresponds the actual order of +nervous processes, in each case. When one thing appears +as a segregated whole in experience, a corresponding, +detached whole exists in nervous process, +and so forth. Mere continuity and consistency of +theory has obliged us to acknowledge then, that, in +some part of the same physiological field those processes +must occur which, whether they be sensory or +not, underlie the self, its actual states, properties +and attitudes. As in experience I am surrounded by +the things and events of my environment, so the processes +corresponding to my self will be in the midst +of a corresponding environment, consisting of sensory +processes and so forth, in the brain field. If, now, +there is experience not only of things and events, of +my states and attitudes, all occurring indifferently by +themselves, but also of <em>this actual attitude being the +direct outcome of that feature of the environment</em>, +or of <em>this state in my surroundings being determined +by that actual attitude of mine</em>, there seems to be only +one way to conceive the underlying physiological +context. Where, in dynamical determination, the +properties of one part of a field depend directly upon +the actual nature of some other particular part, those +properties do not exist indifferently as such; they +originate and they are maintained by the stress of +just those particular forces which issue from the determining +<span class="pagenum" id="p375">[375]</span>part, according to its actual nature. Assuming +that the same is true in the brain field which +is true in a physical field, the properties of the actual +physiological self⁠<a id="FNanchor_81_81" href="#Footnote_81_81" class="fnanchor">[81]</a> will change and may be kept +changed a while, under the stress of some particular +process in the same field, corresponding to an essential +thing or event in the experienced environment. +The changed state of the self does not exist independently; +it is produced and maintained by something +definite, the actual nature of which expresses +itself in just this dynamical influence. If, therefore, +this particular dynamical context is taken to be the +physiological fact underlying our experience of direct +determination of attitude, no mystery remains in +our description of common experience.</p> + +<p>To make this point more clear, the situation in +one of our concrete examples could be thus stated. +When, on a hot day I enjoy a cool drink, my enjoyment +is felt to refer to, or to be based upon, the properties +of the drink and my thirst, but not to the spider +on the wall, nor to the size of a chair, nor to thousands +of other things. In the brain-field, more particularly +in that part of it which corresponds to the +self, there is a special process B, felt as thirst in experience. +Now when I begin to drink, another process +A, corresponding to experienced coolness and +taste, develops in the same region of the brain-field +<span class="pagenum" id="p376">[376]</span>(experienced interior of the mouth) where until now +there was only the process of “thirst.” In terms of +the theory of insight and of direct physiological determination, +A begins at once to exert an influence +upon B, the influence depending upon the concrete +properties of A and those of the actually existing +state B. The change, which is produced, is felt as +pleasure (and, concomitantly, decreasing thirst). +And this change I assume to be determined by A no +less directly than is the rising temperature of a black +surface determined by the rays of light falling upon +it or the “attitude” of a dwindling fire by a fresh +supply of oxygen. From our viewpoint we do not +have separate bits in experience where we have a +functional context in the physiological total field, one +part of which reacts directly to the definite and particular +properties of another. <em>Therefore</em>, in our example, +we cannot experience enjoyment as something +apart, among a pattern of hundreds of other things. +Enjoyment has to be felt as “referring to” and as referring +to something definite, the process of which +determines the process of enjoyment.</p> + +<p>So far, instead of mystery, the most elementary +concepts of physics are introduced into our view of +the total physiological field. There is not the slightest +reason why we should not experience determination +<em>as such</em>; nor is there any reason why, in concrete +cases, we should not feel just what our actual state +or attitude is based upon; in one word, there is no +<span class="pagenum" id="p377">[377]</span>reason why <em>insight</em> should not be an essential characteristic +of much experience in the total field. Of +course, what has been said about the determination +of the self by parts of the environment, may be applied +to the opposite case at once, in which an actual +attitude of ours is felt directly as producing or as +maintaining a change in our surroundings. Here, +the influencing and the influenced have only changed +places, both physiologically and in experience.</p> + +<p>Although the layman’s belief is thoroughly justified +by such a view, there is strict contradiction between +it and the opinion now prevailing in scientific +psychology. The contrast between machine theory +and dynamical theory becomes clear once more. +Neither in the usual scheme of a reflex, nor in that +of a conditioned reflex, nor even in any attempt to +explain association (in the older form of that concept), +will the properties of one particular process +determine directly the nature of another. An influence +always remains a matter of some intermediate +“paths of optimal conduction,” the particular properties +of a first process A being something apart, +transmission of “nervous energy” along those paths +another separate event, and the effect upon a later +process B, still a third thing, determined by the arrival +of that indifferent “nervous energy.” Therefore, +if another path had been a better conductor, a +different realm or process C, instead of B, would +have been changed by the sudden impulse from without; +<span class="pagenum" id="p378">[378]</span>in any case, the change of B into a B<sup>1</sup> or of C +into a C<sup>1</sup> would have been independent of the concrete +properties of A. In terms of such a theory A +will produce B<sup>1</sup> only because there is that one-way +street between them. By some change in nervous +connections a thirsty man might be roused into a fit +of anger at the experience of the coolness and the +taste of a fresh drink!</p> + +<p>The objection will perhaps be raised that, excluding +certain radical behaviorists, no one has explicitly +presented such an absurd theory of mental life. I +shall not give much weight to this historical question, +because one thing is much more important: +Why do we not formulate the positive theory of direct +dynamical determination in the total field? +Why do we not expressly acknowledge insight as one +of the most fundamental and common facts of mental +life, and, therefore, as fundamental theoretically? +Why do we discuss as many psychological problems +as we possibly can <em>as though</em> the machine concepts +were the only ones available or, at least, the best ones +from the viewpoint of natural science? I do no more +than derive quite frankly the consequences of such +a scientific situation. In doing so, I have but one +aim. We must advance from an implicit and almost +unwitting presupposition of insight and direct dynamical +determination, which, expressed in careless +psychological terminology, cannot give rise to concrete +consequences, to a clear realization of the essential +<span class="pagenum" id="p379">[379]</span>point. This I believe to be the contrast between +the indirect and indifferent connections of processes +in machine theory and the directly adequate determination +of one process by another in the dynamical +theory of the brain field.</p> + +<p>In the last pages it was my original intention to +talk about insight as occurring only in an <em>established</em> +total field, in which an actually existing attitude is +felt to be the outcome of some definite fact in the +environment, or vice versa. I have not been able, +however, to restrict the discussion to such a settled +case, despite my intentions. And nothing could be +more characteristic of our problem than is this failure, +because, in order to produce a somewhat accurate +description, we must necessarily go beyond the +actual state of the total field and take account of a +certain new feature intrinsic to some of our concrete +examples.</p> + +<p>In more than one example it was not so much an +existing state of the self which we felt to be determined +directly by the properties of a given fact before +us, but a <em>change</em> of the self as growing out of +something particular, just appearing in the field. +Sudden fright at an unexpected event of a certain +sort is an instance of this sort of dynamical determination. +Again, when in climbing a mountain we +reach a dangerous place, fear may quickly grow out +of the observation of the lie of the land where we +must take the next three steps. After these steps +have been successfully accomplished, a feeling of relief +<span class="pagenum" id="p380">[380]</span>will develop out of the situation, no less directly.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless there will sometimes be more of a +<em>development</em> in such a dynamical state of the total +field. When I described my feeling in a restaurant, +full of smoke and full of talk, “nervousness,” or uneasiness, +was not the only thing I had to report about +myself. I had to add that I felt very eager <em>to go</em>. +This means that, beside my experiencing uneasiness +as the natural effect directly determined by the environment, +I felt a tendency in my self <em>to move away +from it</em>. Again, this tendency was not experienced +as something arising, <em>as such</em>, without reference to +definite other parts of the total field; on the contrary +it was felt to grow directly out of certain properties +of the situation and my uneasiness. As a layman I +would say that I wanted to go <em>because of</em> my uneasiness +in this particular situation, and as a psychologist +I shall admit that the layman’s expression is absolutely +correct, because it corresponds once more to +the fact that there is insight into the direct determination +of that tendency toward a definite sort of +activity.</p> + +<p>Our life is full of trivial instances of this kind and, +occasionally, the most important and decisive impulses +toward definite forms of conduct arise directly +out of given conditions in the same way. And generally +we experience the <em>how</em> and the <em>why</em> of such +experience.</p> + +<p>I am sitting in full sunlight quite contentedly. +<span class="pagenum" id="p381">[381]</span>After a while I feel too hot; at the same time a +tendency to move away from where I am sitting, +arises. A shadowy place near by seems pleasant; the +impulse away from the sunlight becomes at once a +tendency toward the shadow, and as at first the properties +of one place made me inclined to move away +from it, the properties of another now arouse an impulse +of approach. In both cases there is insight, +since we feel <em>how</em> in the first case one tendency grows +directly out of the nature of one situation, and in the +second <em>how</em> some other part of the field, due to its +properties, quite as naturally determines another impulse. +From an earlier remark the reader will remember +that it does not at all matter for our present +problem whether the relevant properties of the seen +shadow are known to us by previous learning or +some other way.⁠<a id="FNanchor_82_82" href="#Footnote_82_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a></p> + +<p>The same description may usually be given of +fright. When a sudden event is felt as producing +fright in me, I shall have to add at once, in a correct +description, that with the fright there arose a vehement +impulse to move away from the locus of that +event. Again, this tendency immediately to increase +the distance between that place and myself is experienced +<span class="pagenum" id="p382">[382]</span>as being the direct outcome of the startling occurrence +quite as much as the fright itself is felt as +its direct result. We noticed before how, in Watson’s +description of a child’s behavior, the overt behavior +of withdrawing from the uncanny object may +be regarded in the sensory experience of the onlooker, +as a visible picture of the child’s own total field. +Does any one believe that the child feels a fear of +the object, on the one hand, and an impulse to move +away, on the other, as independent experiences? Or +that the child might just as well feel a tendency +toward embracing or swallowing the object, during +his fear? As Watson has shown in this case, the +object has become “dangerous” through previous +learning. This does not prove, however, that between +the danger itself, the fear and the withdrawal, +there is not more than indirect connections.</p> + +<p>As an impulse of withdrawal arises directly out +of certain given situations, so the opposite tendency +belongs as naturally to other situations. I have mentioned +above the case of a shadow attracting, as it +were, a person who has had more than enough of the +sun. We all know that similar instances are more +frequent in our life than trees in a wood. The child, +observed objectively as reaching for an animal’s +head in Watson’s experiment, feels attracted towards +that interesting object, if we are willing to grant him +any experience at all. From our own total field we +are well acquainted with the fact that such a tendency +<span class="pagenum" id="p383">[383]</span>appears to us as being a natural characteristic +of exactly such a situation and of a great many similar +ones. In Spain, after a particularly brilliant +achievement of the toreador, the admiration of the +crowd often drives them so intensely in their hero’s +direction, that, unable to enter the arena themselves, +they hang over the balustrades, reaching toward him +as far as possible; the stress will sometimes be so +great that hats, handkerchiefs, and so on, are thrown +down in the direction of the dominating impulse. +Did these people learn gradually by some process of +conditioning to connect an approach-tendency with +admiration, as though a tendency toward frowning +or shaking the left leg might have been, if conditioned, +equally well “connected” with admiration? +I cannot help thinking sometimes that whether we +are introspectionists, behaviorists or whatever else, +the chief dividing line among contemporary psychologists +would separate those who acknowledge +obvious, direct determination as it appears in common +experience from those who can only admit indirect +“connections.”</p> + +<p>As a last example I choose a simple, practical +event: for some purpose I wish to break a wooden +board. I press against it and, feeling my effort directed +against the felt resistance of the board, I see +and feel the board yielding in the same direction. +Is it true that, as Hume would have us say, this yielding +of the board in my experience does not develop +<span class="pagenum" id="p384">[384]</span>more naturally out of the direction of my effort than +would, for instance, a change of the board’s color or +a darkening of the sun, under the same circumstances? +Personally, I feel the board yielding just +in the direction of my effort and not otherwise, almost +as naturally as I feel myself yielding in a definite +direction, if a friend of mine and I measure our +strength by pressing hard against each other’s shoulders, +and I lose the battle. However that may be, +if once the board begins to yield to my effort, I immediately +feel a tendency toward going on or, rather, +increasing the pressure as a direct outcome of that +change in the board’s resistance. And, indeed, I +really do increase my effort.</p> + +<p>What is the common content of these examples? +That there is more than mere succession in the development +of our attitudes as they refer to actual +objects in our field! Things <em>might</em> occur in human +experience in this way: First, I feel uneasy near a +hot radiator, for instance; then, as something apart +and as an altogether separate bit of experience, I feel +an impulse away from the radiator, and, eventually, +as a third independent feeling, I find myself moving +in some direction which, <em>geometrically</em>, would increase +the distance between that object and me. It +is almost impossible to talk about these three experiences +in a manner which would exclude any natural +context between them as radically as, in terms of the +viewpoint I wish here to exhibit, it ought to be excluded. +<span class="pagenum" id="p385">[385]</span>As we read the words, the context of insight +is built up at once, spontaneously. What is +meant will become more apparent if again I say +that, from such a viewpoint, any event whatsoever +might follow the first instead of the second, and +similarly with the relation between the second and +the third. In experience the real development is +supposed to have no better “connection,” originally, +than any other sequence would have. The first experience +does not <em>require</em> the second, nor the second +the third!</p> + +<p>Again we return to machine theory. Normally, +one might say, the development will consist of just +those three events, indeed. Feeling hot, feeling a +tendency toward moving and moving in a direction +which, geometrically, coincides with the direction of +that tendency. Why do just that second and that +third event follow the first? One possibility: because +there is something like an original reflex, a +well-established path in the nervous system conducting +from the place of the first process to the place of +the second, and a number of similar paths leading +from this second place to the centers controlling the +particular movement of our feet in the certain direction. +In such a theory of the sequence, the result +would be practical enough from the viewpoint of an +observer, and even the subject himself might feel +satisfied at the <em>end</em> of the series, but that would be +all. If, in the same situation (heat), pinching his +<span class="pagenum" id="p386">[386]</span>left thumb between the fingers of the right hand occurred, +followed by his moving in a certain direction +and, then, by his feeling well, the subject would understand +the sequence quite as much as or, better, +quite as little as, when he sees a natural context in +the <em>real</em> development. Mere connections between +parts of the nervous system enforce the sequence, the +<em>properties</em> of A <em>as such</em> do not take part in the determination +of B, and those of B are altogether innocent +of C’s succession. Such a production of the sequence +cannot produce in experience more than a series of +feelings indifferent to each other. There cannot be +insight.</p> + +<p>Suppose that no reflexes are provided in this case; +what theoretical explanation can we give, then, of +the right succession? The second possibility is learning +or habit. Many different things originally happened +in my experience when I felt very hot. Among +them, occasionally, there were impulses toward moving. +Again, among these now and then there was +one accidental impulse, the direction of which was +away from the radiator, <em>geometrically</em>. (Not for the +subject, however, who might just as well define this +direction as northwest, for instance!) After these +few occasions another series of events followed in +a haphazard fashion, all of them equally indifferent +to the foregoing. But sometimes real <em>motion</em> in the +stated direction, and the experience of it, would be +the next events and, finally, an experience of feeling +<span class="pagenum" id="p387">[387]</span>satisfied. However it came to pass in the first +instance, this one sequence, after it has fortunately +happened to occur frequently enough, becomes a +well-established chain of events, in short, a habit. +Thereafter it operates as soon as our subject feels +hot enough. But its operation is no more immediate +or natural than all those other possible combinations +<em>as such</em> would have been. The subject +feels satisfied at the end of the sequence. But if, +after the feeling of heat, counting from one to twenty-six +had brought about this same feeling of relief, +and if this sequence had been well associated, he +would not experience a less natural or satisfying development +than he really does in the case of the habit +of withdrawal. No one development is more natural +than any other; without exception all sequences +are <em>merely</em> sequences, and nothing else. It is only +by some fortunate mechanism that those sequences +are “stamped in” as a habit, the end of which is +<em>practical success</em>. The subject cannot feel in experience +more than an indifferent series of events since, +in the associated series, the properties of heat do not +have any influence upon the “right” tendency as the +next event, and the experience of the “right” movement +will be the third event, independently of the nature +of that tendency. Synapses have become less resistant +between the localities of those processes; the +connecting fibers have become more readily conductive. +But the connections in the nervous system have +<span class="pagenum" id="p388">[388]</span>had nothing to do with the properties of the heat or +with the direction of that tendency away from the +radiator or with the direction of the movement itself. +The neural factors were merely frequency of repetition, +recency, and success in a purely external sense +of the word, or any other principle independent of +the concrete properties of heat, tendency and movement +in their mutual relations with one another.</p> + +<p>And instinct? I know only two ways to give this +term a somewhat concrete meaning as an explanation +of real development in experience and in behavior. +Often the concept means the same thing as “a chain +of reflexes,” with or without some adornments in the +guise of habit formation. In this case what has already +been said about machine theory, about habit or +conditioning as the building up of a secondary machine, +applies immediately to instinct. Two machine +theories of development, knit together in one application, +can lead only to a more complicated theory +of essentially the same type. Instinct is sometimes +regarded as a supranatural process, accomplishing +those practically adequate sequences of behavior +which we are not able to explain otherwise in a sensible +manner. In this form the concept is so little +suited to my scientific taste that I should like to be +excused from further discussion of it.</p> + +<p>And then? Surprisingly enough, apart from these +explanations of behavior, we do not seem to recognize +other than merely “random” sequences in psychology. +<span class="pagenum" id="p389">[389]</span>Where neither an inherited nor an acquired +machine determines the sequence of events, our theoretical +formulations, not accustomed to dynamical +considerations, will regard chance as ruling whatever +may happen to occur. So much we have already +seen in Chapter IV. But a third possibility of orderly +determination was found there, which we shall +now discuss in its application to the total field.</p> + +<p>After what has been said about the states of the self +as depending upon the properties of its environment, +felt uneasiness (felt as resulting from too much heat +on one side of the body) will have a corresponding +process in the underlying brain-field, which will be +determined directly by that other process underlying +the experience of an excess of heat on one side. But +the tendency to move away from the heat is felt as +developing in this situation, just as directly as the +uneasiness is. Consequently we must again draw +the same physiological conclusion: if some process +underlying a certain sensory experience directly +causes another process underlying dislike and uneasiness +in the self, a tendency toward increasing +the distance between the place of the first and the +place of the self must develop just as directly at the +same time. As the tendency is felt to grow out of the +nature of that sensory experience, and of the experience +of uneasiness, the tendency must be physiologically +determined by the concrete properties of the +corresponding processes. In dynamics such a tendency +<span class="pagenum" id="p390">[390]</span>toward increasing the distance between two +things or events is called a field of force. We may +say, then, that there is in the brain-field a field of +force tending to increase the distance between the +place of the radiator and the place of the self. If, +now, the subject overtly moves in that direction, +what happens in the brain-field? As the distance is +enlarged objectively, exactly the same occurs in the +brain-field,—the process corresponding to the self +moving away from the processes of the radiator and +of the heat. The subject will feel himself moving in +precisely the same direction which was felt one moment +before as the direction of a tendency to movement; +and, physiologically, the increase of distance +in the brain-field will correspond exactly to the stress +which, as a field of force, was tending in that same +direction. Therefore, physiologically, as well as in +experience, what happens will be no more than the +natural consequence, the real development, or the +evolution of something which, in germ, was already +implicitly contained in the tendency.</p> + +<p>So we are led to a more complete application of +the theory of direct dynamical determination. There +is no mere sequence of indifferent events, connected +indirectly. Each phase of what happens grows out +of its predecessors, depending upon their concrete +nature. And the subject, whose experiences are an +expression of this one developing context in the +brain-field, will experience the development, along +<span class="pagenum" id="p391">[391]</span>with its “referring to,” “depending upon,” “away +from” and so forth—that is, with <em>insight</em>.</p> + +<p>One remark is needed here with regard to the +overt movement of the organism in its relation to a +field of force, existing between the self and some +part of its environment, in the brain-field. We know +that during the first months a child is not able to +move his hands, in accordance with the interest +which an object has aroused in his sensory field. +This fact may be interpreted in two different ways: +(1) Either there is no natural determination of +overt movement by definite fields of force in the +brain. In this case all “connections” between the +two would have to be learned. (2) Or the hand does +not yet move in the direction of actual interest for +some other reason, whereas when that unknown obstacle +is removed a little later by organic development, +the general direction of the clumsy movements +depends directly upon actual fields of force in the +brain. The astonishingly early coördination of eye-movements +would make me inclined to consider the +second hypothesis no less seriously than the first. +However, the theory of direct determination does not +depend upon this choice. Even if learning should +be the only way in which movements of the hand +or of any other parts of the body become connected +with the distribution of forces in the brain-field, the +<em>right</em> movement will still be marked out by more +than the final success it achieves. As soon as, partially +<span class="pagenum" id="p392">[392]</span>or entirely, the direction of an overt movement +coincides with the actually existing nervous +field of force, there will be a relaxation of tension or +stress. Therefore, any beginning in the right direction +will be felt as being in the right line. Later on, +when coördination of movement is complete, familiar +overt movements will always go in the right direction; +and they will be felt as fitting into the dynamics +of the situation, because, in the brain-field, they produce +the release of previously existing tension.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p>In order to show how the fundamental motors of +behavior can bring about more complicated conduct +through direct determination, I shall conclude with +the analysis of an observation made on an ape several +years ago.</p> + +<p>Outside the animal’s cage a banana is placed on +the ground, beyond the reach of his arm. In a similar +situation some days before the ape had used a +stick as an instrument for the first time. He finds a +stick to-day, too, but it is a rough thing. A branch +projects from the side of the stick, near the ape’s +hand. At first this branch does not operate as an +obstacle because, when he reaches for the fruit, the +ape holds his instrument accidentally in such a position +that the branch is parallel to the bars of the +cage and does not touch them. Presently however, +in order to change his place with regard to the fruit, +the ape pulls the stick back into the cage. When he +reaches for the fruit again, the branch hits a bar and +the stick does not move in the direction of the fruit. +<span class="pagenum" id="p393">[393]</span>The animal tries to overcome the difficulty by pushing +hard and crudely a few times. Suddenly, however, +and just after pressing forward with all his +force, he pulls the stick back in the cage and bites +the branch with the ferocity of anger. It does not +matter for our purposes whether or not this new +conduct was successful. But how did it come about +at all? An explanation may be given in terms of +brain-physiology or from the viewpoint of experience. +Though I do not think that the experience of +animals is a matter of great intrinsic interest for us, +I shall treat the case in terms of experience, since +it would be more difficult to understand the meaning +concretely if I made the neurological analysis. +When the ape is first directed completely toward +the fruit, his reaching for it is determined directly +in the manner we have described. To begin with, +the obstacle in his way directly produces an increased +effort in the same direction. But the ape can scarcely +push against the bar of his cage without localizing +the place of the obstacle after a while by touch and, +perhaps, by vision. He does not feel the obstacle in +the direction of his main effort; he feels it in the locality +of the branch. When an obstacle is experienced +in our way we become angry by immediate determination, +and our anger is an attitude directed +toward or against the obstacle. Consequently, after +the main object, the banana, has determined the primary +direction, the felt obstacle will make the ape’s +direction bend toward the branch, and since the tendency +<span class="pagenum" id="p394">[394]</span>directly determined by anger is attack or destruction, +the ape will begin to destroy the obstacle.</p> + +<p>I do not know whether this is a completely satisfactory +description of the whole process. When he +attacks the branch, the ape, though actually angry, is +probably still determined by his <em>main</em> tendency at +the same time. And this would be required. Otherwise +the whole development would become a sequence +of events, each occurring in direct determination, +i.e., with insight, but not to be regarded as members +of one single development occurring in one +given situation. Here, however, we reach the field +of intelligence proper, which I have excluded from +the program of these chapters.</p> + + +<h3>BIBLIOGRAPHY</h3> + +<blockquote> +<p>W. Benary: Psychol. Forsch. 2. 1922.</p> + +<p>K. Duncker: The Pedag. Sem. 23. 1926.</p> + +<p>Erismann: <cite lang="de">Die Eigenart des Geistigen</cite>. 1923.</p> + +<p>K. Jaspers: <cite lang="de">Psychopathologie</cite>. 1921.</p> + +<p>K. Koffka: <cite>The Growth of the Mind</cite>. 1924.</p> + +<p>K. Koffka: Psychol. Forsch. 9. 1927.</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: <cite>Mentality of Apes</cite>. 1925.</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: <cite lang="de">Die Methoden der Psychologischen Forschung +an Affen</cite>. 1922 (cf. Chap. II).</p> + +<p>W. Köhler: Arch. f. Entw. Mech. 1927.</p> + +<p>K. Lewin: <cite lang="de">Vorsatz, Wille und Bedürfnis. 1927</cite>.</p> + +<p>M. Wertheimer: <cite lang="de">Schlussprozesse im produktiven Denken</cite>. +1920.</p> + +<p>A. N. Whitehead: <cite>Science and the Modern World</cite>. +1925.</p> +</blockquote> + +</main> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="p395">[395]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="INDEX"> + INDEX + </h2> +</div> + + +<ul class="index"> + <li class="ifrst">Ability, <a href="#p47">47</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Abstraction, <a href="#p351">351</a></li> + + <li class="indx"><i>Accelerando</i>, <a href="#p248">248</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Actions, <a href="#p250">250</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Activity, <a href="#p39">39</a> f., <a href="#p222">222</a>, <a href="#p259">259</a>, <a href="#p370">370</a> (James), <a href="#p380">380</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Admiration, <a href="#p352">352</a>, <a href="#p383">383</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Adrenin, <a href="#p41">41</a></li> + + <li class="indx">After image, as case of direct experience, <a href="#p27">27</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">form, <a href="#p77">77</a>, <a href="#p82">82</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">on figure and ground, <a href="#p220">220</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">of movement, <a href="#p362">362</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">size of, <a href="#p76">76</a>, <a href="#p82">82</a></li> + + <li class="indx">All-or-none law, <a href="#p58">58</a>, <a href="#p62">62</a>, <a href="#p132">132</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Ameba, <a href="#p45">45</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Anatomical apparatus, <a href="#p204">204</a> n.;</li> + <li class="isub1">basis, <a href="#p118">118</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">structure, <a href="#p130">130</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Anger, <a href="#p41">41</a>, <a href="#p261">261</a>, <a href="#p355">355</a>, <a href="#p357">357</a>, <a href="#p363">363</a> + f., <a href="#p393">393</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Animal psychology, <a href="#p50">50</a>, <a href="#p69">69</a>, <a href="#p161">161</a>, <a href="#p295">295</a>, <a href="#p299">299</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Animals, delayed reaction, <a href="#p277">277</a>, <a href="#p306">306</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">insight, <a href="#p371">371</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">perception of, <a href="#p162">162</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">transposition of training, <a href="#p216">216</a>, <a href="#p302">302</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Anisotropy, of visual field, <a href="#p215">215</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Anthropomorphism, <a href="#p137">137</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Apes, <a href="#p52">52</a>, <a href="#p105">105</a>, <a href="#p216">216</a> f., <a href="#p235">235</a>, <a href="#p392">392</a>, + <a href="#p394">394</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Approach-tendency, <a href="#p383">383</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Area, and form, <a href="#p202">202</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Area striata, <a href="#p14">14</a>, <a href="#p131">131</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Aristotle, <a href="#p114">114</a>, <a href="#p150">150</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Aristotelians, <a href="#p136">136</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Aristotelian astronomy, <a href="#p108">108</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Arrangements, anatomical, preëstablished and acquired, <a href="#p108">108</a>, <a href="#p118">118</a>, <a href="#p126">126</a>, <a href="#p130">130</a>, + <a href="#p133">133</a>, <a href="#p134">134</a>, <a href="#p140">140</a>, <a href="#p146">146</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Arrhenius, S., <a href="#p53">53</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Articulation,” <a href="#p250">250</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Assimilation, <a href="#p239">239</a>, <a href="#p241">241</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Association, chapter on, <a href="#p267">267–300</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">in empiristic theory, <a href="#p237">237</a>, <a href="#p241">241</a>, <a href="#p265">265</a>, <a href="#p337">337</a>, <a href="#p339">339</a>, + <a href="#p342">342</a>, <a href="#p344">344</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">laws of, <a href="#p333">333</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">as organization, <a href="#p311">311</a>, <a href="#p313">313</a>, <a href="#p315">315</a>, <a href="#p319">319</a>, <a href="#p329">329</a>, + <a href="#p335">335</a>, versus task, <a href="#p341">341</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Associations, and nerve conduction, <a href="#p116">116</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">as machine theory, <a href="#p121">121</a>, <a href="#p377">377</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Astronomical movements, and machine theory, <a href="#p137">137</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Atom, as example of dynamical system, <a href="#p112">112</a>, <a href="#p138">138</a>, <a href="#p280">280</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">as sub whole, <a href="#p157">157</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Atomism, sensory, <a href="#p148">148</a>, <a href="#p351">351</a>, <a href="#p369">369</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Attention, <a href="#p169">169</a>, <a href="#p324">324</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Attitude, analytical, <a href="#p106">106</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">conflict of, <a href="#p335">335</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">dynamical, <a href="#p263">263</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">influence on sensory experience, <a href="#p123">123</a> f., <a href="#p124">124</a> n., <a href="#p126">126</a>, <a href="#p323">323</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">emotional, <a href="#p324">324</a>, <a href="#p363">363</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">introspective, <a href="#p106">106</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and organization of the field, <a href="#p324">324</a> ff., <a href="#p351">351</a> ff.;</li> + <li class="isub1">towards past, <a href="#p333">333</a> ff.;</li> + <li class="isub1">psychological aspect of, <a href="#p184">184</a>, <a href="#p374">374</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and reproduction, <a href="#p333">333</a> ff., <a href="#p341">341</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">of observer, <a href="#p79">79</a>, <a href="#p92">92</a>, <a href="#p96">96</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">as “special vector,” <a href="#p211">211</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Automatic associations, <a href="#p332">332</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Autonomic, part of nervous system, <a href="#p19">19</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Autochthonous reactions, <a href="#p52">52</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Aversion, <a href="#p360">360</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">“Background” (<i>see</i> Ground), <a href="#p219">219</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Bacteriology, <a href="#p364">364</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Balance, of force, <a href="#p139">139</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Banana, <a href="#p392">392</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Beats, <a href="#p189">189</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Becher, E., <a href="#p346">346</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Behavior, chapter on, <a href="#p224">224–268</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">behaviorist’s definition, <a href="#p17">17</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">emotional, <a href="#p40">40</a>, <a href="#p44">44</a>, <a href="#p45">45</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">intelligent, <a href="#p48">48</a>, <a href="#p53">53</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">language as form of, <a href="#p68">68</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">“motors” of, <a href="#p392">392</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">qualitative types of, <a href="#p39">39</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">orderly, <a href="#p107">107</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">physiological foundations of, <a href="#p66">66</a>, <a href="#p102">102</a>, <a href="#p106">106</a>, <a href="#p115">115</a>, <a href="#p373">373</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and physics, <a href="#p37">37</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">as reaction to stimuli, <a href="#p180">180</a>, <a href="#p350">350</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and reflexes, <a href="#p57">57</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">restricted, <a href="#p51">51</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Behaviorism, chapter on, <a href="#p3">3–34</a>, <a href="#p37">37</a>, <a href="#p38">38</a>, <a href="#p41">41</a>, <a href="#p51">51</a>, + <a href="#p53">53</a>, <a href="#p55">55</a> ff., <a href="#p67">67</a> ff., <a href="#p87">87</a>, <a href="#p97">97</a>, <a href="#p98">98</a>, <a href="#p101">101</a>, + <a href="#p104">104</a>, <a href="#p114">114</a>, <a href="#p178">178</a>, <a href="#p260">260</a>, <a href="#p267">267</a> f., <a href="#p296">296</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="p396">[396]</span>Behaviorist, <a href="#p373">373</a>, <a href="#p378">378</a>, <a href="#p383">383</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Belonging Together,” <a href="#p149">149</a>, <a href="#p177">177</a>, <a href="#p181">181</a> ff., <a href="#p225">225</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Benary, W., <a href="#p394">394</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Bentley, M., <a href="#p102">102</a>, <a href="#p300">300</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Benussi, V., <a href="#p130">130</a> n., <a href="#p190">190</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Between,” <a href="#p64">64</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Beyrl, <a href="#p105">105</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Binet and Simon, <a href="#p16">16</a>, <a href="#p47">47</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Biological theory, changes in, <a href="#p110">110</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Birds, <a href="#p158">158</a> ff., <a href="#p162">162</a>, <a href="#p306">306</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Blindness, mental, <a href="#p169">169</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Blood, circulation of, <a href="#p109">109</a>, <a href="#p131">131</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Body, my, <a href="#p23">23</a>, <a href="#p228">228</a> ff., <a href="#p236">236</a>, <a href="#p239">239</a>, <a href="#p320">320</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">ambiguity of concept, <a href="#p229">229</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Bodily events, <a href="#p236">236</a> f., <a href="#p240">240</a>, <a href="#p260">260</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Boring and Teak, <a href="#p47">47</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Brain field, <a href="#p226">226</a>, <a href="#p375">375</a>, <a href="#p379">379</a>, <a href="#p389">389</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Brain physiology, <a href="#p115">115</a>, <a href="#p118">118</a>, <a href="#p132">132</a>, <a href="#p250">250</a>, <a href="#p319">319</a>, + <a href="#p373">373</a>, <a href="#p393">393</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Brightness, constancy of, <a href="#p78">78</a>, <a href="#p80">80</a> ff., <a href="#p91">91</a> f., <a href="#p104">104</a> f., <a href="#p122">122</a>, + <a href="#p127">127</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">versus color, <a href="#p144">144</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">as quality of several senses, <a href="#p241">241</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">absolute versus relative, <a href="#p304">304</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Brown, J. F., <a href="#p84">84</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Bühler, K., <a href="#p204">204</a> f., <a href="#p317">317</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Buytendijk und Plessner, <a href="#p268">268</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Camouflage, <a href="#p172">172</a>, <a href="#p211">211</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Cartesius, <i>see</i> Descartes</li> + + <li class="indx">Cassiopeia, <a href="#p154">154</a>, <a href="#p164">164</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Cats, <a href="#p304">304</a>, <a href="#p306">306</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Cavendish, <a href="#p42">42</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Cells, <a href="#p132">132</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Central fields, <a href="#p132">132</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Central terminal nuclei, <a href="#p344">344</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Cerebral area, <a href="#p345">345</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Character, knowledge of, <a href="#p234">234</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Chemical properties, of the blood, <a href="#p131">131</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Chemistry, <a href="#p138">138</a>, <a href="#p280">280</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Chemical reaction, <a href="#p189">189</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Chick, <a href="#p69">69</a>, <a href="#p105">105</a>, <a href="#p216">216</a>, <a href="#p302">302</a>, <a href="#p303">303</a>, + <a href="#p304">304</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Child, behavior of, <a href="#p323">323</a>, <a href="#p382">382</a>, <a href="#p391">391</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Children, constancy of size for, <a href="#p105">105</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Chimpanzee, <a href="#p238">238</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Circle, constancy of form, <a href="#p76">76</a>, <a href="#p80">80</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Clang, analysis, <a href="#p124">124</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Climatological condition, <a href="#p364">364</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Clouds, relative motion of moon, <a href="#p320">320</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">“ominous,” <a href="#p363">363</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Coefficient of correlation, <a href="#p353">353</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Coherence, <a href="#p149">149</a>, <a href="#p173">173</a>, <a href="#p219">219</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Color, constancy of, <a href="#p220">220</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">localization, <a href="#p103">103</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and reproduction, <a href="#p213">213</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Colors, in distribution, <a href="#p190">190</a>, <a href="#p202">202</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and underlying processes, <a href="#p62">62</a> f., <a href="#p143">143</a>, <a href="#p189">189</a>, <a href="#p215">215</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Communication, genesis of, <a href="#p258">258</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Comparison, <a href="#p10">10</a>, <a href="#p68">68</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Complication, <a href="#p307">307</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Concept, behavioristic, <a href="#p56">56</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">mechanical in biology, <a href="#p114">114</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">of physical things, <a href="#p28">28</a>, <a href="#p230">230</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Concepts, formation of, <a href="#p304">304</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Confusion,” <a href="#p27">27</a>, <a href="#p242">242</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Connections,” in machine theory, <a href="#p383">383</a>, <a href="#p385">385</a>, <a href="#p391">391</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Consciousness,” <a href="#p32">32</a>, <a href="#p40">40</a>, <a href="#p162">162</a>, <a href="#p240">240</a>, <a href="#p262">262</a>, + <a href="#p269">269</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">its relation to direct experience, <a href="#p8">8</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Constant conditions, of events, <a href="#p111">111</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Conditions, total set of, <a href="#p126">126</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Conditioned reflex, <a href="#p55">55</a>, <a href="#p57">57</a>, <a href="#p69">69</a>, <a href="#p99">99</a>, <a href="#p298">298</a> + f., <a href="#p365">365</a>, <a href="#p373">373</a>, <a href="#p383">383</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Conduct, <a href="#p393">393</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Conducting paths, <a href="#p116">116</a>, <a href="#p345">345</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Conduction, of electrolytes, <a href="#p53">53</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">nervous, <a href="#p115">115</a> f., <a href="#p122">122</a>, <a href="#p132">132</a>, <a href="#p387">387</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Conductivity, and learning, <a href="#p290">290</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Conductors, isolated, <a href="#p98">98</a>, <a href="#p122">122</a>, <a href="#p377">377</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Constancy, <i>see</i> Color, form, size</li> + + <li class="indx">Constant properties, <a href="#p112">112</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Constellation, of stimuli in a larger area, <a href="#p126">126</a>, <a href="#p161">161</a>, <a href="#p202">202</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">geometrical versus functional reality, <a href="#p197">197</a>, <a href="#p200">200</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Constellations, of sky, <a href="#p171">171</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Contiguity, laws of, <a href="#p280">280</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Contours, <a href="#p114">114</a>, <a href="#p144">144</a>, <a href="#p170">170</a>, <a href="#p202">202</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Contrast, <a href="#p106">106</a>, <a href="#p125">125</a>, <a href="#p127">127</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Coolness, <a href="#p241">241</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Cornelius, H., <a href="#p193">193</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Cortical termini, <a href="#p115">115</a></li> + + <li class="indx"><i>Crescendo</i>, <a href="#p246">246</a>, <a href="#p248">248</a> f., <a href="#p256">256</a>, <a href="#p262">262</a>, <a href="#p264">264</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Cross, ambiguous figure, <a href="#p198">198</a>, <a href="#p219">219</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Crystal, spheres, <a href="#p109">109</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Current, potential and densities of, <a href="#p148">148</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">of nervous energy, <a href="#p290">290</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Curves, <a href="#p40">40</a> f.</li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Descartes, <a href="#p110">110</a>, <a href="#p239">239</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Delayed reaction, <i>see</i> Animals and Reaction</li> + + <li class="indx">Depression, <a href="#p253">253</a>, <a href="#p356">356</a></li> + + <li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="p397">[397]</span>Descriptive Observation, <i>see</i> Observation</li> + + <li class="indx">Determination, dynamical versus topographical, <a href="#p113">113</a>, <a href="#p134">134</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">point to point in stimulation, <a href="#p125">125</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Development, real, <a href="#p385">385</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx"><i>Diminuendo</i>, <a href="#p248">248</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Dipper, <a href="#p154">154</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Direct dynamical determination, <a href="#p364">364</a> ff., <a href="#p370">370</a> f., <a href="#p374">374</a>, <a href="#p378">378</a>, <a href="#p380">380</a>, + <a href="#p383">383</a>, <a href="#p390">390</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Direction, of change in physical system, <a href="#p139">139</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">in experience, <a href="#p250">250</a>, <a href="#p264">264</a>, <a href="#p271">271</a> f., <a href="#p323">323</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Discrimination, sensory, <a href="#p297">297</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Distribution, of forces or processes, <a href="#p108">108</a>, <a href="#p113">113</a>, <a href="#p121">121</a> f., <a href="#p127">127</a>, + <a href="#p135">135–144</a>, <a href="#p148">148</a>, <a href="#p182">182</a>, <a href="#p187">187</a>, <a href="#p190">190</a>, <a href="#p193">193</a> + f., <a href="#p204">204</a>, <a href="#p217">217</a> f., <a href="#p226">226</a>, <a href="#p280">280</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">of processes, <a href="#p117">117</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Dog, <a href="#p323">323</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Dominating impulse, <a href="#p383">383</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Dreaming, <a href="#p275">275</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Drives, <a href="#p325">325</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Drop, of water, <a href="#p134">134</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Dualists, <a href="#p59">59</a>, <a href="#p261">261</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Duncker, K., <a href="#p394">394</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Dust cloud,” <a href="#p70">70</a>, <a href="#p133">133</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Dynamical, <i>see</i> also Interaction</li> + + <li class="indx">Dynamics, and order, <a href="#p109">109</a> f., <a href="#p111">111</a> ff., <a href="#p117">117</a> ff., <a href="#p127">127</a> ff., <a href="#p133">133</a>, + <a href="#p138">138</a> ff., <a href="#p140">140</a> ff., <a href="#p152">152</a>, <a href="#p182">182</a> f., <a href="#p192">192</a>, <a href="#p216">216</a>, + <a href="#p220">220</a> ff., <a href="#p226">226</a> ff., <a href="#p271">271</a>, <a href="#p327">327</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Dynamical explanation, of reproduction, <a href="#p347">347</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Dynamical interrelation, in total psychophysical field, <a href="#p319">319</a> ff., <a href="#p336">336</a>, <a href="#p349">349</a> ff., <a href="#p361">361</a>, + <a href="#p364">364</a>, <a href="#p370">370</a>, <a href="#p375">375</a>, <a href="#p380">380</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Dynamical structure, in inner and overt behavior, <a href="#p222">222</a>, <a href="#p248">248</a>, <a href="#p250">250</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Dynamical unit, in experience and underlying physiological processes, <a href="#p66">66</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Dynamo-geometrical relations, of sensory processes, <a href="#p226">226</a>, <a href="#p228">228</a> f., <a href="#p233">233</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Ebbinghaus, H., <a href="#p283">283</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Effort, <a href="#p358">358</a>, <a href="#p384">384</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Effector organ, <a href="#p98">98</a>, <a href="#p120">120</a>, <a href="#p179">179</a></li> + + <li class="indx">von Ehrenfels, <a href="#p187">187</a> ff., <a href="#p214">214</a>, <a href="#p220">220</a>, <a href="#p255">255</a>, <a href="#p259">259</a>, + <a href="#p264">264</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Election, <a href="#p111">111</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Electric charge, <a href="#p112">112</a> f., <a href="#p280">280</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Electric current, <a href="#p27">27</a>, <a href="#p41">41</a>, <a href="#p120">120</a>, <a href="#p138">138</a>, <a href="#p140">140</a>, + <a href="#p148">148</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Electrolysis, <a href="#p53">53</a> f., <a href="#p185">185</a>, <a href="#p218">218</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Electromagnetic, entities, <a href="#p7">7</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Electromotive phenomena, <a href="#p218">218</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Electrostatic forces, <a href="#p111">111</a>, <a href="#p280">280</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Elevation, feeling of, <a href="#p253">253</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Ellipse, <a href="#p76">76</a>, <a href="#p80">80</a>, <a href="#p160">160</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Embarrassment, <a href="#p263">263</a>, <a href="#p265">265</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Emotion, <a href="#p193">193</a>, <a href="#p264">264</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Empiricism, <a href="#p118">118</a>, <a href="#p123">123</a>, <a href="#p153">153</a>, <a href="#p220">220</a>, <a href="#p232">232</a>, <a href="#p299">299</a>, + <a href="#p313">313</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Endocrinology, <a href="#p19">19</a>, <a href="#p57">57</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Energy, distribution of, <a href="#p132">132</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Enjoyment, <a href="#p354">354</a>, <a href="#p360">360</a>, <a href="#p375">375</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Entropy, <a href="#p28">28</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Environment, <a href="#p54">54</a>, <a href="#p57">57</a>, <a href="#p95">95</a>, <a href="#p134">134</a>, <a href="#p152">152</a>, <a href="#p173">173</a>, + <a href="#p209">209</a>, <a href="#p219">219</a>, <a href="#p315">315</a> f., <a href="#p320">320</a>, <a href="#p323">323</a>, <a href="#p327">327</a>, + <a href="#p356">356</a>, <a href="#p377">377</a>, <a href="#p389">389</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Envy, <a href="#p238">238</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Epistemology, <a href="#p31">31</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Equilibrium, <a href="#p135">135</a>, <a href="#p140">140</a> n., <a href="#p218">218</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Erismann, <a href="#p394">394</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Euphoria, <a href="#p253">253</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Exact sciences, <a href="#p13">13</a>, <a href="#p18">18</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Experience, <a href="#p24">24</a>, <a href="#p62">62</a> ff., <a href="#p74">74</a>, <a href="#p85">85</a>, <a href="#p104">104</a>, <a href="#p164">164</a>, + <a href="#p166">166</a>, <a href="#p177">177</a>, <a href="#p225">225</a>, <a href="#p251">251</a>, <a href="#p270">270</a>, <a href="#p272">272</a>, + <a href="#p299">299</a>, <a href="#p351">351</a>, <a href="#p355">355</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">blind, <a href="#p364">364</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">common, <a href="#p375">375</a>, <a href="#p383">383</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">depending upon, <a href="#p359">359</a>, <a href="#p361">361</a>, <a href="#p370">370</a>, <a href="#p373">373</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">direct, <a href="#p8">8–39</a>, <a href="#p55">55</a>, <a href="#p58">58</a> ff., <a href="#p67">67</a> ff., <a href="#p84">84</a>, <a href="#p106">106</a> + f., <a href="#p129">129</a>, <a href="#p190">190</a>, <a href="#p203">203</a>, <a href="#p217">217</a>, <a href="#p235">235</a> f., <a href="#p240">240</a>, + <a href="#p269">269</a>, <a href="#p363">363</a>, <a href="#p373">373</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">external, <a href="#p321">321</a> ff.;</li> + <li class="isub1">inner, <a href="#p249">249</a>, <a href="#p253">253</a>, <a href="#p258">258</a>, <a href="#p260">260</a> ff., <a href="#p265">265</a>, + <a href="#p322">322</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and instinct, <a href="#p388">388</a>, <a href="#p385">385</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">kinesthetic, <a href="#p167">167</a> ff., <a href="#p212">212</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">localization of non-visual, <a href="#p233">233</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">localization of, <a href="#p103">103</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and insight, <a href="#p372">372</a>, <a href="#p377">377</a>, <a href="#p385">385</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and meaning, <a href="#p72">72</a>, <a href="#p81">81</a>, <a href="#p360">360</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">naïve, <a href="#p6">6</a>, <a href="#p86">86</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">objective, <a href="#p15">15</a>, <a href="#p21">21</a> ff., <a href="#p60">60</a>, <a href="#p66">66</a> f., <a href="#p71">71</a>, <a href="#p74">74</a>, + <a href="#p83">83</a> ff., <a href="#p105">105</a>, <a href="#p224">224</a>, <a href="#p243">243</a>, <a href="#p255">255</a>, <a href="#p259">259</a> + ff., <a href="#p319">319</a>, <a href="#p322">322</a>, <a href="#p326">326</a>, <a href="#p329">329</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">actual and physiological processes, <a href="#p67">67</a>, <a href="#p102">102</a>, <a href="#p115">115</a>, <a href="#p373">373</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">previous, <a href="#p151">151</a>, <a href="#p153">153</a> f., <a href="#p156">156</a>, <a href="#p205">205</a> f., <a href="#p208">208</a> + ff., <a href="#p213">213</a> f., <a href="#p220">220</a>, <a href="#p237">237</a>, <a href="#p285">285</a>, <a href="#p337">337</a>, <a href="#p354">354</a>, + <a href="#p356">356</a>, <a href="#p365">365</a>, <a href="#p386">386</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">punctiform, <a href="#p191">191</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">sensory, <a href="#p73">73</a> ff., <a href="#p85">85</a>, <a href="#p90">90</a> ff., <a href="#p118">118</a> ff., <a href="#p145">145</a> + ff., <a href="#p167">167</a>, <a href="#p176">176</a>, <a href="#p178">178</a>, <a href="#p215">215</a>, <a href="#p222">222</a> ff., <a href="#p241">241</a> + ff., <a href="#p255">255</a>, <a href="#p266">266</a> f., <a href="#p275">275</a>, <a href="#p288">288</a>, <a href="#p294">294</a>, <a href="#p327">327</a> + ff., <a href="#p351">351</a>, <a href="#p360">360</a>, <a href="#p382">382</a>, <a href="#p389">389</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">subjective, <a href="#p35">35</a>, <a href="#p40">40</a>, <a href="#p66">66</a> f., <a href="#p235">235</a>, <a href="#p238">238</a>, <a href="#p241">241</a> + ff., <a href="#p264">264</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">error, <a href="#p176">176</a>, <a href="#p181">181</a>, <a href="#p195">195</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Experiences, acoustic, <a href="#p242">242</a>, <a href="#p246">246</a>, <a href="#p248">248</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">accurate of physicist, <a href="#p41">41</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">genuine, <a href="#p87">87</a>, <a href="#p95">95</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">“irregular,” <a href="#p91">91</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="p398">[398]</span>unusual versus naïve, <a href="#p86">86</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">visual, <a href="#p169">169</a>, <a href="#p205">205</a>, <a href="#p226">226</a> ff., <a href="#p241">241</a>, <a href="#p246">246</a>, + <a href="#p248">248</a>, <a href="#p252">252</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Experiential, object, <a href="#p36">36</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Expression, <i>see</i> facial</li> + + <li class="indx">Extended areas, <a href="#p147">147</a>, <a href="#p170">170</a>, <a href="#p188">188</a> f., <a href="#p193">193</a>, <a href="#p297">297</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Extension, <a href="#p215">215</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Eye movements, <a href="#p75">75</a>, <a href="#p96">96</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Eyes, <a href="#p254">254</a> f.</li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Facial expression, <a href="#p238">238</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Fatigue, <a href="#p319">319</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Fear, fright, <a href="#p21">21</a>, <a href="#p109">109</a>, <a href="#p249">249</a>, <a href="#p263">263</a>, <a href="#p266">266</a>, <a href="#p355">355</a> + f., <a href="#p379">379</a>, <a href="#p381">381</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Fechner, G. T., <a href="#p16">16</a>, <a href="#p46">46</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Feeling, of relief, <a href="#p253">253</a>, <a href="#p356">356</a>, <a href="#p379">379</a>, <a href="#p387">387</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Field of force, <a href="#p390">390</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Figure, and ground, <a href="#p219">219</a> f., <a href="#p274">274</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">gamma movement, <a href="#p128">128</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Figures, and memory, <a href="#p310">310</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and reproduction, <a href="#p314">314</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Fixation point, <a href="#p76">76</a>, <a href="#p324">324</a>, <a href="#p363">363</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Fogelsonger, <a href="#p316">316</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Force, lines of, <a href="#p324">324</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Forces, <a href="#p111">111</a> f., <a href="#p121">121</a>, <a href="#p133">133</a> ff., <a href="#p143">143</a> ff., <a href="#p158">158</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Form, constancy of, <a href="#p80">80</a> ff., <a href="#p123">123</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and experience, <a href="#p207">207</a> f., <a href="#p211">211</a> f., <a href="#p275">275</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and meaning, <a href="#p209">209</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">property of whole, <a href="#p219">219</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">“real” as explanation of constancy of form, <a href="#p81">81</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">reality of, <a href="#p195">195</a> ff., <a href="#p205">205</a>, <a href="#p213">213</a> f., <a href="#p273">273</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">as secondary quality, <a href="#p6">6</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">in time, <a href="#p204">204</a>, <a href="#p214">214</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">-qualities, of circle, triangle, etc., <a href="#p191">191</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Forms, localization, <a href="#p103">103</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Frank, H., <a href="#p221">221</a></li> + + <li class="indx">von Frey, <a href="#p128">128</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Frings, <a href="#p317">317</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Function, nervous and machine theory, <a href="#p130">130</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">order of, <a href="#p114">114</a>, <a href="#p118">118</a>, <a href="#p121">121</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Functions, one way, <a href="#p113">113</a>, <a href="#p116">116</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Functionally homogeneous, <a href="#p145">145</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Functional, incompleteness in experience, <a href="#p270">270</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">interrelation, <a href="#p171">171</a>, <a href="#p183">183</a>, <a href="#p204">204</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">reality, of segregated wholes, <a href="#p195">195</a>, <a href="#p197">197</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">relations, of direct experience, <a href="#p8">8</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">relationship, between experiential and physical object, <a href="#p36">36</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">scheme, of traditional nerve psychology, <a href="#p344">344</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">wholes, <i>see</i> Wholes</li> + + <li class="indx">Fundierte Inhalte, <a href="#p191">191</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Galileo, <a href="#p32">32</a>, <a href="#p43">43</a>, <a href="#p109">109</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Galvanometer, <a href="#p29">29</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Ganglionic fields, <a href="#p143">143</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">tissue, dynamical intercourse in, <a href="#p132">132</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Gatti, A., <a href="#p320">320</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Gelb and Goldstein, <a href="#p169">169</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Gelb and Granit, <a href="#p220">220</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Gestalt, meaning of, <a href="#p191">191</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">analysis, <a href="#p183">183</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">primitive behavior, <a href="#p216">216</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">problem, <a href="#p187">187</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">psychology, <a href="#p66">66</a>, <a href="#p97">97</a> n., <a href="#p102">102</a>, <a href="#p130">130</a>, <a href="#p135">135</a>, <a href="#p148">148</a>, + <a href="#p150">150</a> f., <a href="#p168">168</a>, <a href="#p174">174</a>, <a href="#p182">182</a> ff., <a href="#p219">219</a>, <a href="#p223">223</a>, + <a href="#p258">258</a>, <a href="#p273">273</a>, <a href="#p287">287</a>, <a href="#p304">304</a>, <a href="#p311">311</a>, <a href="#p324">324</a>, + <a href="#p350">350</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">-qualitäten, <a href="#p191">191</a>, <a href="#p192">192</a>, <a href="#p216">216</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">theory, <a href="#p140">140</a> n., <a href="#p192">192</a>, <a href="#p202">202</a>, <a href="#p216">216</a>, <a href="#p223">223</a>, <a href="#p296">296</a>, + <a href="#p297">297</a>, <a href="#p322">322</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Gestalten, perception of, <a href="#p174">174</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Goethe, <a href="#p192">192</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Gottschaldt, <a href="#p206">206</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Graz, school of, <a href="#p190">190</a>, <a href="#p216">216</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Ground,” <a href="#p202">202</a>, <a href="#p219">219</a> ff., <a href="#p274">274</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Group and grouping, <a href="#p155">155</a>, <a href="#p158">158</a>, <a href="#p177">177</a>, <a href="#p183">183</a>, <a href="#p251">251</a>, + <a href="#p259">259</a>, <a href="#p274">274</a> f., <a href="#p277">277</a>, <a href="#p285">285</a>, <a href="#p289">289</a>, <a href="#p292">292</a>, + <a href="#p294">294</a>, <a href="#p303">303</a> ff., <a href="#p317">317</a>, <a href="#p321">321</a>, <a href="#p323">323</a>, <a href="#p327">327</a>, + <a href="#p329">329</a>, <a href="#p351">351</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Habit, <a href="#p117">117</a>, <a href="#p273">273</a>, <a href="#p278">278</a> f., <a href="#p301">301</a>, <a href="#p303">303</a>, <a href="#p315">315</a>, + <a href="#p338">338</a>, <a href="#p342">342</a>, <a href="#p349">349</a>, <a href="#p366">366</a>, <a href="#p386">386</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">formation of, <a href="#p16">16</a>, <a href="#p116">116</a>, <a href="#p296">296</a> f., <a href="#p298">298</a>, <a href="#p388">388</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Hand, as visual object, <a href="#p227">227</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Handwritings, <a href="#p365">365</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Harvey, discovery, <a href="#p109">109</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Hearing, distance in, <a href="#p128">128</a></li> + + <li class="indx">von Helmholtz, H., <a href="#p77">77</a>, <a href="#p125">125</a>, <a href="#p241">241</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Hemispheres, <a href="#p141">141</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Hering, E., <a href="#p61">61</a>, <a href="#p63">63</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Hertz, M., <a href="#p158">158</a>, <a href="#p216">216</a>, <a href="#p306">306</a></li> + + <li class="indx">von Hornbostel, E., <a href="#p242">242</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Hume, <a href="#p359">359</a>, <a href="#p367">367</a> ff., <a href="#p377">377</a>, <a href="#p383">383</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Hunger, inner experience, <a href="#p7">7</a>, <a href="#p325">325</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Hunter, W. S., <a href="#p159">159</a>, <a href="#p277">277</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Huyghens, <a href="#p32">32</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">“I,” <a href="#p228">228</a>, <a href="#p230">230</a>, <a href="#p234">234</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Idea, and action, <a href="#p250">250</a>, <a href="#p366">366</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">free, <a href="#p237">237</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Illusion, and memory, <a href="#p72">72</a>, <a href="#p81">81</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Illusions, optical, <a href="#p78">78</a> f., <a href="#p94">94</a> ff., <a href="#p125">125</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Image, <a href="#p260">260</a>, <a href="#p270">270</a> f., <a href="#p275">275</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Images, <i>see also</i> Retinal</li> + + <li class="indx">Impulse, of withdrawal, <a href="#p382">382</a></li> + + <li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="p399">[399]</span>Indifferent network, of relations, <a href="#p369">369</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Inertia, <a href="#p134">134</a>, <a href="#p139">139</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Inference, by analogy, <a href="#p238">238</a>, <a href="#p241">241</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Inhibition, in reproduction, <a href="#p316">316</a> ff., <a href="#p335">335</a>, <a href="#p341">341</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Innervation, <a href="#p18">18</a>, <a href="#p19">19</a>, <a href="#p258">258</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Insight, <a href="#p371">371</a> f., <a href="#p376">376</a> ff., <a href="#p391">391</a>, <a href="#p394">394</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Instinct, <a href="#p325">325</a>, <a href="#p388">388</a>, <a href="#p391">391</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Intelligence, <a href="#p16">16</a>, <a href="#p46">46</a> f., <a href="#p49">49</a> f., <a href="#p371">371</a>, <a href="#p394">394</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Intensity, <a href="#p165">165</a>, <a href="#p215">215</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Interaction, dynamical, <a href="#p135">135</a>, <a href="#p137">137</a>, <a href="#p140">140</a>, <a href="#p143">143</a> f., <a href="#p281">281</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Interest, <a href="#p324">324</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Interval, dead, <a href="#p204">204</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Introspection, <a href="#p9">9</a> ff., <a href="#p18">18</a> f., <a href="#p25">25</a>, <a href="#p31">31</a>, <a href="#p55">55</a>, <a href="#p60">60</a>, + <a href="#p69">69</a>, <a href="#p70">70–102</a> (chapter on), <a href="#p103">103</a> ff., <a href="#p114">114</a>, <a href="#p123">123</a>, <a href="#p133">133</a>, + <a href="#p183">183</a>, <a href="#p350">350</a>, <a href="#p383">383</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Ions, <a href="#p54">54</a>, <a href="#p218">218</a></li> + + <li class="indx">I Q, <a href="#p47">47</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Irradiation, of excitations, <a href="#p98">98</a>, <a href="#p121">121</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Isolation, in sensory field, <a href="#p95">95</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Isolating conductors, as explanation of order, <a href="#p131">131</a> f., <a href="#p145">145</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Jaspers, K., <a href="#p394">394</a></li> + + <li class="indx">James, W., <a href="#p70">70</a>, <a href="#p101">101</a>, <a href="#p270">270</a>, <a href="#p369">369</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">James-Lange, theory of Emotions, <a href="#p245">245</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Janet, P., <a href="#p253">253</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Joy, <a href="#p12">12</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Katz, D., <a href="#p102">102</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Kester, P., <a href="#p128">128</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Kinesthesis, <a href="#p166">166</a> f., <a href="#p233">233</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Klages, L., <a href="#p243">243</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Koffka, K., <a href="#p129">129</a>, <a href="#p300">300</a>, <a href="#p310">310</a>, <a href="#p394">394</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Köhler, W., <a href="#p69">69</a>, <a href="#p102">102</a>, <a href="#p147">147</a>, <a href="#p186">186</a>, <a href="#p194">194</a> + n., <a href="#p223">223</a>, <a href="#p394">394</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Knowledge of other man’s mind, <a href="#p257">257</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">previous, <a href="#p152">152</a>, <a href="#p155">155</a></li> + + <li class="indx">von Kries, J., <a href="#p343">343</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Krueger, F., <a href="#p193">193</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Kühn, <a href="#p285">285</a> n.</li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Language, as special type of behavior, <a href="#p18">18</a>, <a href="#p67">67</a> ff.;</li> + <li class="isub1">primitive, <a href="#p242">242</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Lashley, K. S., <a href="#p216">216</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Laughing, <a href="#p265">265</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Layman, <a href="#p349">349</a> f., <a href="#p367">367</a> f., <a href="#p372">372</a>, <a href="#p377">377</a>, <a href="#p380">380</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Leading-tone, <a href="#p222">222</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Learning, in empiristic theory, <a href="#p80">80</a> f., <a href="#p104">104</a>, <a href="#p117">117</a> f., <a href="#p366">366</a>, <a href="#p373">373</a>, + <a href="#p386">386</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and meaning, <a href="#p151">151</a>, <a href="#p365">365</a>, <a href="#p381">381</a> f., <a href="#p391">391</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">theory of 116, <a href="#p193">193</a>, <a href="#p282">282–303</a>, <a href="#p316">316</a> ff., <a href="#p329">329</a>, <a href="#p340">340</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Lesion, of the brain, <a href="#p169">169</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Level, <a href="#p272">272</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Lewin, K., <a href="#p330">330</a>, <a href="#p332">332</a> f., <a href="#p338">338</a> ff., <a href="#p348">348</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Lewin and Karsten, <a href="#p360">360</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Liebmann, S., <a href="#p144">144</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Light-waves, not organized, <a href="#p174">174</a> f., <a href="#p181">181</a>, <a href="#p257">257</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Local arrangements, <a href="#p132">132</a>, <a href="#p140">140</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">processes, <a href="#p115">115</a>, <a href="#p119">119</a>, <a href="#p121">121</a> f., <a href="#p127">127</a>, <a href="#p129">129</a>, + <a href="#p140">140</a>, <a href="#p146">146</a>, <a href="#p149">149</a>, <a href="#p182">182</a>, <a href="#p231">231</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">sensory elements, <a href="#p82">82</a>, <a href="#p96">96</a>, <a href="#p99">99</a>, <a href="#p118">118</a> f., <a href="#p122">122</a>, + <a href="#p125">125</a>, <a href="#p126">126</a>, <a href="#p147">147</a> f., <a href="#p187">187</a>, <a href="#p189">189</a>, <a href="#p190">190</a>, + <a href="#p193">193</a>, <a href="#p255">255</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">stimulation, <a href="#p95">95</a> ff., <a href="#p99">99</a>, <a href="#p106">106</a>, <a href="#p118">118</a> f., <a href="#p122">122</a>, + <a href="#p124">124</a>, <a href="#p126">126</a>, <a href="#p176">176</a>, <a href="#p178">178</a>, <a href="#p187">187</a> f., <a href="#p203">203</a>, + <a href="#p276">276</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Localization, external, <a href="#p228">228</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">geometrical in brain and nervous system, <a href="#p225">225</a>, <a href="#p346">346</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">in group, <a href="#p306">306</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">of hidden object, <a href="#p309">309</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">in space, <a href="#p84">84</a>, <a href="#p93">93</a>, <a href="#p104">104</a>, <a href="#p215">215</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Mach, E., <a href="#p140">140</a>, <a href="#p187">187</a>, <a href="#p214">214</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Machine-arrangements, and the organism, <a href="#p117">117</a>, <a href="#p122">122</a>, <a href="#p131">131</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Machine, explained, <a href="#p108">108</a> ff., <a href="#p133">133</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">theory, or conception, <a href="#p110">110</a> f., <a href="#p122">122</a>, <a href="#p126">126</a> ff., <a href="#p141">141</a>, <a href="#p145">145</a> + f., <a href="#p149">149</a>, <a href="#p190">190</a>, <a href="#p194">194</a>, <a href="#p298">298</a> f., <a href="#p344">344</a>, <a href="#p347">347</a>, + <a href="#p377">377</a> ff., <a href="#p385">385</a>, <a href="#p388">388</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Magnet, deflection of, <a href="#p41">41</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Magnetism, <a href="#p48">48</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Map, as ambiguous figure, <a href="#p196">196</a></li> + + <li class="indx">McCarthy, <a href="#p343">343</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Meaning of objects, <a href="#p151">151</a> f., <a href="#p173">173</a>, <a href="#p208">208</a>, <a href="#p265">265</a>, <a href="#p300">300</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Meaning, as opposed to pure sensations, <a href="#p72">72</a> f., <a href="#p81">81</a> ff., <a href="#p90">90</a> ff., <a href="#p95">95</a> + ff., <a href="#p105">105</a>, <a href="#p129">129</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">theory, <a href="#p90">90</a> ff., <a href="#p97">97</a>, <a href="#p103">103</a> ff., <a href="#p123">123</a>, <a href="#p125">125</a>, + <a href="#p149">149</a> f., <a href="#p153">153</a> ff., <a href="#p205">205</a>, <a href="#p213">213</a>, <a href="#p237">237</a>, <a href="#p299">299</a>, + <a href="#p351">351</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Meaningful material versus nonsense, <a href="#p284">284</a>, <a href="#p286">286</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Measurement, in psychology, <a href="#p40">40</a>, <a href="#p49">49</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Memory, and association, <a href="#p278">278</a> f., <a href="#p295">295</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">in empiristic theory, <a href="#p153">153</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">and organization, <a href="#p315">315</a>, <a href="#p329">329</a>, <a href="#p332">332</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">physiological theories, <a href="#p273">273</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">image, <a href="#p7">7</a></li> + + <li class="indx">von Meinong, A., <a href="#p190">190</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Melody, <a href="#p204">204</a> f., <a href="#p215">215</a>, <a href="#p275">275</a>, <a href="#p290">290</a>, <a href="#p360">360</a></li> + + <li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="p400">[400]</span>Mental life, <a href="#p9">9</a> f., <a href="#p58">58</a>, <a href="#p214">214</a>, <a href="#p238">238</a>, + <a href="#p240">240</a> f., <a href="#p246">246</a>, <a href="#p336">336</a>, <a href="#p349">349</a>, <a href="#p378">378</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Method, of behaviorism, <a href="#p17">17</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">in psychology, <a href="#p38">38</a> ff., <a href="#p43">43</a> f., <a href="#p52">52</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">of natural science, <a href="#p20">20</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Michotte, A., <a href="#p320">320</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Mind, and body, <a href="#p231">231</a>, <a href="#p261">261</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">relation to direct experience, <a href="#p10">10</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Molecules, <a href="#p53">53</a>, <a href="#p112">112</a>, <a href="#p119">119</a>, <a href="#p138">138</a>, <a href="#p156">156</a>, <a href="#p158">158</a>, + <a href="#p189">189</a>, <a href="#p272">272</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Molecular forces, <a href="#p143">143</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Monkey, <a href="#p308">308</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Moon, <a href="#p320">320</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Morgenstern, C., <a href="#p242">242</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Morphogenesis, <a href="#p130">130</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Mosaic theory, <a href="#p204">204</a>, <a href="#p280">280</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Motor melodies, <a href="#p275">275</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">phenomena, <a href="#p96">96</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Movement, seen, <a href="#p84">84</a>, <a href="#p129">129</a>, <a href="#p192">192</a>, <a href="#p204">204</a>, <a href="#p249">249</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">as secondary quality, <a href="#p6">6</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">of water, <a href="#p134">134</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">co-ordination of, <a href="#p392">392</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">tendency to, <a href="#p167">167</a>, <a href="#p390">390</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">of extension, <a href="#p128">128</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">eye, <a href="#p167">167</a> f., <a href="#p179">179</a>, <a href="#p212">212</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Movements, stroboscopic, <a href="#p79">79</a>, <a href="#p128">128</a>, <a href="#p130">130</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">overt bodily, <a href="#p115">115</a>, <a href="#p166">166</a> f., <a href="#p261">261</a>, <a href="#p392">392</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">celestial, <a href="#p114">114</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Müller, G. E., <a href="#p61">61</a> n. ff., <a href="#p285">285</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Müller-Lyer figure, <a href="#p94">94</a>, <a href="#p96">96</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Musical form, as temporal form, <a href="#p204">204</a>, <a href="#p215">215</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Music, understanding of, <a href="#p257">257</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Muscles, <a href="#p245">245</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Nagel, <a href="#p283">283</a>, <a href="#p315">315</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Nativism, <a href="#p118">118</a>, <a href="#p123">123</a>, <a href="#p232">232</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Natural sciences, <a href="#p42">42</a>, <a href="#p279">279</a>, <a href="#p350">350</a>, <a href="#p378">378</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Neighborhood, factor of, <a href="#p281">281</a>, <a href="#p289">289</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Nervous activity, and all-or-none law, <a href="#p58">58</a>, <a href="#p62">62</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">mechanistic theory of, <a href="#p98">98</a>, <a href="#p100">100</a>, <a href="#p102">102</a>, <a href="#p114">114</a>, <a href="#p116">116</a>, + <a href="#p121">121</a>, <a href="#p126">126</a>, <a href="#p130">130</a>, <a href="#p257">257</a>, <a href="#p349">349</a>, <a href="#p377">377</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">new theory of, <a href="#p123">123</a>, <a href="#p292">292</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">field of force, <a href="#p392">392</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">processes, and experienced field, <a href="#p374">374</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Nervousness,” <a href="#p356">356</a>, <a href="#p380">380</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Nervous system, <a href="#p26">26</a>, <a href="#p49">49</a>, <a href="#p56">56</a> f., <a href="#p97">97</a>, <a href="#p99">99</a>, <a href="#p116">116</a>, + <a href="#p120">120</a>, <a href="#p125">125</a>, <a href="#p132">132</a>, <a href="#p141">141</a> f., <a href="#p174">174</a> f., <a href="#p184">184</a>, + <a href="#p257">257</a>, <a href="#p266">266</a>, <a href="#p269">269</a>, <a href="#p278">278</a>, <a href="#p280">280</a>, <a href="#p312">312</a>, + <a href="#p315">315</a>, <a href="#p322">322</a>, <a href="#p344">344</a>, <a href="#p346">346</a> f., <a href="#p350">350</a>, <a href="#p385">385</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Network, nervous, <a href="#p142">142</a> ff.;</li> + <li class="isub1">of wires, <a href="#p140">140</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Newton, <a href="#p32">32</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Nietzsche, <a href="#p234">234</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Noise, comparison of intensity, <a href="#p271">271</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Nonsense syllables, <a href="#p281">281</a> ff., <a href="#p295">295</a>, <a href="#p315">315</a> ff., <a href="#p332">332</a>, <a href="#p334">334</a>, + <a href="#p338">338</a> ff.</li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Object-characters, <a href="#p20">20</a>, <a href="#p25">25</a>, <a href="#p27">27</a>, <a href="#p71">71</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Object, of naïve experience, <a href="#p6">6</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Objects, physical, their influence on each other, <a href="#p7">7</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Observation, in laboratory and analytical, <a href="#p40">40</a> f., <a href="#p86">86</a>, <a href="#p94">94</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Obstacles, <a href="#p370">370</a>, <a href="#p393">393</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Occipital lobes, <a href="#p141">141</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Oetjen, F., <a href="#p215">215</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Oersted, <a href="#p41">41</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Ogden, R. M., <a href="#p300">300</a></li> + + <li class="indx">One-way street, <a href="#p118">118</a>, <a href="#p378">378</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Ontogenesis, gestalt in, <a href="#p130">130</a>, <a href="#p194">194</a>, <a href="#p216">216</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Optical center, lesions in, <a href="#p169">169</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Optic sector, <a href="#p116">116</a>, <a href="#p346">346</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Order, dynamical, <a href="#p131">131</a>, <a href="#p137">137</a>, <a href="#p140">140</a>, <a href="#p145">145</a>, <a href="#p149">149</a>, + <a href="#p194">194</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">enforced, <a href="#p98">98</a>, <a href="#p122">122</a>, <a href="#p130">130</a>, <a href="#p133">133</a>, <a href="#p145">145</a>, + <a href="#p337">337</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">experienced, and physiological processes, <a href="#p64">64</a> ff., <a href="#p163">163</a>, <a href="#p203">203</a>, <a href="#p230">230</a>, + <a href="#p248">248</a>, <a href="#p258">258</a>, <a href="#p326">326</a>, <a href="#p373">373</a> f., <a href="#p376">376</a>, <a href="#p389">389</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">in psychophysical relations, <a href="#p115">115</a>, <a href="#p170">170</a> ff., <a href="#p256">256</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">logical, as opposed to experienced, <a href="#p63">63</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">spatial, <a href="#p65">65</a>, <a href="#p225">225</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">temporal, <a href="#p65">65</a>, <a href="#p163">163</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Organism, action of, <a href="#p391">391</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">not an isolated system, <a href="#p140">140</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">mechanistic theory of, <a href="#p110">110</a>, <a href="#p119">119</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">as quasi-machine, <a href="#p381">381</a> n.;</li> + <li class="isub1">as part of total saturation, <a href="#p325">325</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">as dynamic system, <a href="#p180">180</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Organisms, and physical systems, <a href="#p44">44</a> f., <a href="#p56">56</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Organization, <a href="#p54">54</a>, <a href="#p122">122</a>, <a href="#p126">126</a> f., <a href="#p149">149</a>, <a href="#p152">152</a>, + <a href="#p158">158</a> n., <a href="#p163">163</a> ff., <a href="#p174">174</a> ff., <a href="#p191">191</a>, <a href="#p202">202</a> f., <a href="#p208">208</a> + ff., <a href="#p217">217</a>, <a href="#p250">250</a>, <a href="#p256">256</a> ff., <a href="#p267">267</a>, <a href="#p273">273</a> ff., <a href="#p278">278</a>, + <a href="#p283">283</a> ff., <a href="#p289">289</a> ff., <a href="#p300">300</a>, <a href="#p307">307</a> ff., <a href="#p313">313</a> ff., <a href="#p323">323</a>, + <a href="#p326">326</a> ff., <a href="#p340">340</a>, <a href="#p367">367</a>, <a href="#p370">370</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">Bipolar, <a href="#p323">323</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Organized trace, <a href="#p293">293</a>, <a href="#p314">314</a>, <a href="#p329">329</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Parts, and wholes, <a href="#p183">183</a>, <a href="#p209">209</a>, <a href="#p366">366</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Path, of optimal conduction, <a href="#p377">377</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Perception, <a href="#p9">9</a>, <a href="#p72">72</a>, <a href="#p195">195</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Peripheral vision, <a href="#p12">12</a>, <a href="#p27">27</a>, <a href="#p242">242</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Peripheral conditions, of vision, <a href="#p141">141</a></li> + + <li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="p401">[401]</span>Persistency, <a href="#p337">337</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Physics, and order by dynamical interaction, <a href="#p137">137</a> f., <a href="#p324">324</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and direct experience, <a href="#p29">29</a> ff., <a href="#p35">35</a> ff., <a href="#p178">178</a>, <a href="#p267">267</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and psychology, <a href="#p29">29</a> ff., <a href="#p41">41</a>, <a href="#p44">44</a>, <a href="#p48">48</a>, <a href="#p57">57</a>, <a href="#p146">146</a>, + <a href="#p280">280</a>, <a href="#p376">376</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Physical system, brain as, <a href="#p227">227</a> f., <a href="#p319">319</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">classification of, <a href="#p56">56</a>, <a href="#p112">112</a>, <a href="#p133">133</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">reality, <a href="#p24">24</a> ff., <a href="#p230">230</a>, <a href="#p239">239</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Physiological locus, confusion with sensory localization, <a href="#p104">104</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Physiological principles, common to Introspectionism and Behaviorism, <a href="#p114">114</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Physiological processes, as correlate of spatial order, <a href="#p225">225</a>, <a href="#p227">227</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Physiological processes, inferred from direct experience, <a href="#p60">60</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Physiological process, and stimulus distribution, <a href="#p197">197</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Physiological stress, as correlate of attitude, <a href="#p184">184</a>, <a href="#p326">326</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Physiological trace, <a href="#p272">272</a> f., <a href="#p291">291</a>, <a href="#p347">347</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Phylogenesis, <a href="#p130">130</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Pianist, example, <a href="#p237">237</a>, <a href="#p257">257</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Pleasure, <a href="#p260">260</a>, <a href="#p376">376</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Poppelreuter, W., <a href="#p348">348</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Position, <a href="#p215">215</a>, <a href="#p217">217</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Potential, <a href="#p325">325</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Practice, <a href="#p94">94</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Pressure, <a href="#p134">134</a>, <a href="#p330">330</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Primary qualities, <a href="#p7">7</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Principle of congruence, in the systematic properties of direct experience and its concomitant physiological processes, <a href="#p61">61</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Process, distribution of, <a href="#p114">114</a>, <a href="#p127">127</a>, <a href="#p132">132</a>, <a href="#p134">134</a>, <a href="#p139">139</a>, + <a href="#p182">182</a>, <a href="#p190">190</a>, <a href="#p225">225</a> f., <a href="#p273">273</a>, <a href="#p292">292</a>, <a href="#p311">311</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">underlying experience, <a href="#p62">62</a>, <a href="#p269">269</a>, <a href="#p291">291</a>, <a href="#p321">321</a>, <a href="#p325">325</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">properties of, <a href="#p142">142</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">of observing and material observed, <a href="#p31">31</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Processes, “Higher,” <a href="#p216">216</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">total, <a href="#p107">107</a>, <a href="#p141">141</a> ff.;</li> + <li class="isub1">sensory, <a href="#p86">86</a>, <a href="#p119">119</a>, <a href="#p133">133</a>, <a href="#p162">162</a>, <a href="#p278">278</a>, <a href="#p280">280</a> + f., <a href="#p298">298</a> f., <a href="#p350">350</a>, <a href="#p374">374</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Properties, of more extended fields, <a href="#p188">188</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">surface—of physical objects, <a href="#p172">172</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">of situation determining behavior, <a href="#p350">350</a>, <a href="#p370">370</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Psycho-physical axioms,” <a href="#p61">61</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Psycho-physical field, <a href="#p215">215</a>, <a href="#p232">232</a>, <a href="#p266">266</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Purpose, <a href="#p370">370</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Puzzle-picture, <a href="#p171">171</a>, <a href="#p201">201</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Qualitative, observation, <a href="#p36">36</a>, <a href="#p41">41</a> ff., <a href="#p44">44</a>, <a href="#p50">50</a>, <a href="#p52">52</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Qualitative, types of behavior, <a href="#p39">39</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Quality, <a href="#p215">215</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Quantitative measurement, <a href="#p36">36</a>, <a href="#p38">38</a> f., <a href="#p42">42</a> f., <a href="#p46">46</a>, <a href="#p48">48</a>, + <a href="#p50">50</a> f., <a href="#p53">53</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Quantum theory, <a href="#p132">132</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Rays, <a href="#p175">175</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Reaction, delayed, <a href="#p159">159</a>, <a href="#p276">276</a>, <a href="#p304">304</a> f., <a href="#p306">306</a>, <a href="#p308">308</a>, + <a href="#p309">309</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">to results of organization, <a href="#p180">180</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Relative reactions, <a href="#p304">304</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Recall, <a href="#p301">301</a>, <a href="#p331">331</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Receptor organs, <a href="#p98">98</a>, <a href="#p345">345</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Recognition, <a href="#p267">267</a>, <a href="#p274">274</a>, <a href="#p301">301</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Reflex action, <a href="#p55">55</a> ff., <a href="#p98">98</a>, <a href="#p298">298</a>, <a href="#p377">377</a>, <a href="#p381">381</a>, + <a href="#p385">385</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx"><i>Reforzando</i>, <a href="#p249">249</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Regularity, change towards, <a href="#p310">310</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Regular, as a form quality, <a href="#p191">191</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Relations, logical between local stimuli, <a href="#p203">203</a>, <a href="#p358">358</a>, <a href="#p369">369</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">spatial, <a href="#p227">227</a>, <a href="#p320">320</a>, <a href="#p321">321</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Relative distance, <a href="#p157">157</a>, <a href="#p165">165</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Relations, constancy of, and constancy hypothesis, <a href="#p97">97</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Relation, in successive comparison, <a href="#p271">271</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Relative properties, determining organization, <a href="#p121">121</a>, <a href="#p127">127</a>, <a href="#p138">138</a>, <a href="#p147">147</a>, + <a href="#p182">182</a>, <a href="#p202">202</a>, <a href="#p257">257</a>, <a href="#p280">280</a> f., <a href="#p294">294</a>, <a href="#p311">311</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Relief, <a href="#p387">387</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Repetition, <a href="#p334">334</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Reproduction, <a href="#p81">81</a> f., <a href="#p116">116</a> f., <a href="#p121">121</a>, <a href="#p193">193</a>, <a href="#p212">212</a> + ff., <a href="#p273">273</a> ff., <a href="#p282">282</a> f., <a href="#p291">291</a> ff., <a href="#p300">300</a>, <a href="#p301">301–348</a> + (chapter on), <a href="#p349">349</a>, <a href="#p366">366</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Repulsion, <a href="#p120">120</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Restless,” <a href="#p264">264</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Retention, <a href="#p301">301</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Retinal pattern, and phenomenal pattern, <a href="#p142">142</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Retinal points, central projection of, <a href="#p141">141</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Retina, chemical reactions on Retina as conditions of organized vision, <a href="#p141">141</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Retinal, position and localization, <a href="#p84">84</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">image, perspective of, <a href="#p76">76</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">geometry of R. stimulation, <a href="#p115">115</a>, <a href="#p124">124</a> f., <a href="#p133">133</a>, <a href="#p166">166</a>, <a href="#p177">177</a>, + <a href="#p194">194</a> ff., <a href="#p200">200</a> f., <a href="#p257">257</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Richter, C. P., <a href="#p39">39</a>, <a href="#p43">43</a></li> + + <li class="indx"><i>Ritardando</i>, <a href="#p248">248</a>, <a href="#p256">256</a></li> + + <li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="p402">[402]</span>Rhythm, <a href="#p204">204</a> f., <a href="#p319">319</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Röntgen, <a href="#p42">42</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst"><i lang="de">Sachlicher Zusammenhang</i>, <a href="#p354">354</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Sander, W., <a href="#p223">223</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Scientific criticism, <a href="#p5">5</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Scientific effort, least, <a href="#p130">130</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Scientific method, <a href="#p12">12</a>, <a href="#p30">30</a>, <a href="#p53">53</a>, <a href="#p267">267</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Scholz, W., <a href="#p128">128</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Schumann, F., <a href="#p79">79</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Searching, <a href="#p357">357</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Secondary Qualities,” <a href="#p6">6</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Segregation, <a href="#p149">149</a> ff., <a href="#p151">151</a>, <a href="#p154">154</a>, <a href="#p156">156</a>, <a href="#p158">158</a>, + <a href="#p163">163</a> f., <a href="#p167">167</a> f., <a href="#p172">172</a> ff., <a href="#p182">182</a>, <a href="#p187">187</a>, <a href="#p191">191</a> + ff., <a href="#p202">202</a> f., <a href="#p212">212</a>, <a href="#p220">220</a>, <a href="#p225">225</a>, <a href="#p231">231</a>, <a href="#p239">239</a>, + <a href="#p251">251</a>, <a href="#p263">263</a>, <a href="#p267">267</a>, <a href="#p274">274</a>, <a href="#p327">327</a>, <a href="#p369">369</a>, + <a href="#p371">371</a>, <a href="#p374">374</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Self, <a href="#p319">319</a> ff., <a href="#p336">336</a>, <a href="#p351">351</a> f., <a href="#p361">361</a>, <a href="#p374">374</a>, + <a href="#p377">377</a>, <a href="#p379">379</a>, <a href="#p389">389</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Selz, O., <a href="#p300">300</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Sensory discrimination, <a href="#p296">296</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Sensory dynamics, <a href="#p170">170</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1">field, <a href="#p119">119</a>, <a href="#p135">135</a>, <a href="#p140">140</a> n., <a href="#p151">151</a> f., <a href="#p158">158</a>, + <a href="#p167">167</a>, <a href="#p173">173</a>, <a href="#p177">177</a>, <a href="#p184">184</a>, <a href="#p187">187</a>, <a href="#p191">191</a>, + <a href="#p193">193</a> f., <a href="#p212">212</a> ff., <a href="#p281">281</a>, <a href="#p327">327</a>, <a href="#p350">350</a> f., <a href="#p391">391</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Sense organs, <a href="#p177">177</a>, <a href="#p347">347</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Sensory organization, <a href="#p163">163</a>, <a href="#p165">165</a> f., <a href="#p170">170</a> ff., <a href="#p185">185</a>, <a href="#p187">187</a>, + <a href="#p215">215</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Sensation, <a href="#p71">71</a> ff., <a href="#p82">82</a>, <a href="#p84">84</a> f., <a href="#p86">86</a>, <a href="#p88">88</a>, <a href="#p91">91</a>, + <a href="#p93">93</a>, <a href="#p98">98</a>, <a href="#p103">103</a>, <a href="#p129">129</a>, <a href="#p153">153</a>, <a href="#p158">158</a>, <a href="#p163">163</a>, + <a href="#p187">187</a>, <a href="#p190">190</a> f., <a href="#p214">214</a>, <a href="#p351">351</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Sexual behavior, <a href="#p325">325</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Shadow, <a href="#p80">80</a>, <a href="#p91">91</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Shepard, J. F., <a href="#p316">316</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Size, constancy of, <a href="#p74">74</a>, <a href="#p81">81</a> ff., <a href="#p86">86</a>, <a href="#p93">93</a>, <a href="#p105">105</a> + f., <a href="#p133">133</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Soap bubble, <a href="#p56">56</a>, <a href="#p119">119</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Social forces, as causes of grouping, <a href="#p328">328</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Social contagion, <a href="#p266">266</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Social psychology, <a href="#p234">234</a>, <a href="#p328">328</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Solar system, <a href="#p138">138</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Sorrow, <a href="#p12">12</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Soul, <a href="#p10">10</a>, <a href="#p110">110</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Sound, localization of, <a href="#p103">103</a>, <a href="#p224">224</a>, <a href="#p232">232</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">waves, not dynamically organized, <a href="#p256">256</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Space, physical, <a href="#p115">115</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">sensory, <a href="#p232">232</a>, <a href="#p262">262</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Speed, seen and retinal, <a href="#p93">93</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Spheres, crystal, <a href="#p109">109</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Spider, <a href="#p354">354</a>, <a href="#p375">375</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Stability of distribution, <a href="#p139">139</a>, <a href="#p148">148</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Standardization, <a href="#p52">52</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Stars, constellations of, <a href="#p154">154</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“States beyond,” physiological, <a href="#p271">271</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Stern, W., <a href="#p215">215</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Stimuli, as indifferent mosaic, <a href="#p257">257</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">constellation of, <a href="#p106">106</a>, <a href="#p125">125</a>, <a href="#p180">180</a>, <a href="#p203">203</a>, <a href="#p215">215</a>, + <a href="#p258">258</a> f., <a href="#p264">264</a>, <a href="#p275">275</a>, <a href="#p311">311</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Stimulus, and response, <a href="#p120">120</a>, <a href="#p166">166</a>, <a href="#p179">179</a>, <a href="#p217">217</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">error, <a href="#p176">176</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Stimulation, under the Constancy Hypothesis, <a href="#p93">93</a>, <a href="#p127">127</a>, <a href="#p133">133</a>, <a href="#p298">298</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Straight line, machine theory for perception of, <a href="#p204">204</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Stress, <a href="#p140">140</a>, <a href="#p326">326</a>, <a href="#p338">338</a>, <a href="#p357">357</a>, <a href="#p370">370</a>, + <a href="#p375">375</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Striving, <a href="#p193">193</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Structure, of two grays, <a href="#p217">217</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">supralocal, <a href="#p203">203</a>, <a href="#p218">218</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Sub-wholes, <a href="#p157">157</a>, <a href="#p183">183</a>, <a href="#p201">201</a>, <a href="#p205">205</a>, <a href="#p282">282</a> + f., <a href="#p313">313</a>, <a href="#p318">318</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Subjective phenomena, <a href="#p21">21</a> f., <a href="#p24">24</a> f., <a href="#p265">265</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Subjectivity, genetic, <a href="#p24">24</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Successive comparison, <a href="#p271">271</a>, <a href="#p273">273</a>, <a href="#p304">304</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Surface tension, <a href="#p48">48</a>, <a href="#p158">158</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Synopses, <a href="#p387">387</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Task, <a href="#p330">330</a> ff., <a href="#p339">339</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Tendency, <a href="#p330">330</a>, <a href="#p370">370</a>, <a href="#p380">380</a> f., <a href="#p384">384</a>, <a href="#p389">389</a>, + <a href="#p390">390</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Temporal organization, <a href="#p164">164</a>, <a href="#p258">258</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Tension, <a href="#p250">250</a> f., <a href="#p364">364</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Ternus, J., <a href="#p130">130</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Thing, one, <a href="#p129">129</a>, <a href="#p155">155</a></li> + + <li class="indx">“Things,” <a href="#p21">21</a> ff., <a href="#p84">84</a>, <a href="#p219">219</a> f., <a href="#p224">224</a>, <a href="#p230">230</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Thinking, <a href="#p19">19</a>, <a href="#p83">83</a>, <a href="#p193">193</a>, <a href="#p244">244</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Time, experience, similar to space experience, <a href="#p163">163</a>, <a href="#p289">289</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">physiological correlate of experienced time, <a href="#p65">65</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Tinklepaugh, O. L., <a href="#p277">277</a> n., <a href="#p308">308</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Togetherness, <a href="#p361">361</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Tonal fusion, <a href="#p124">124</a>, <a href="#p127">127</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Topographical, conditions and arrangements, <a href="#p112">112</a> ff., <a href="#p133">133</a> f., <a href="#p138">138</a>, <a href="#p140">140</a>, + <a href="#p146">146</a>, <a href="#p347">347</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Total field, <a href="#p320">320</a>, <a href="#p324">324</a>, <a href="#p327">327</a>, <a href="#p329">329</a>, <a href="#p332">332</a>, + <a href="#p336">336</a>, <a href="#p343">343</a>, <a href="#p350">350</a>, <a href="#p352">352</a> f., <a href="#p358">358</a>, <a href="#p361">361</a>, + <a href="#p367">367</a>, <a href="#p371">371</a> f., <a href="#p376">376</a>, <a href="#p378">378</a> ff., <a href="#p389">389</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Touch, <a href="#p128">128</a>, <a href="#p162">162</a>, <a href="#p220">220</a>, <a href="#p231">231</a>, <a href="#p242">242</a>, + <a href="#p354">354</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Traces, <a href="#p278">278</a>, <a href="#p291">291</a> ff., <a href="#p302">302</a>, <a href="#p304">304</a>, <a href="#p307">307</a>, <a href="#p309">309</a> + ff., <a href="#p315">315</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Training, <a href="#p207">207</a>, <a href="#p303">303</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Transposition, <a href="#p214">214</a>, <a href="#p216">216</a> ff., <a href="#p303">303</a></li> + + <li class="indx"><span class="pagenum" id="p403">[403]</span>Trial and error, <a href="#p177">177</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Understanding, of others, <a href="#p238">238</a>, <a href="#p240">240</a>, <a href="#p245">245</a>, <a href="#p259">259</a> ff.</li> + + <li class="indx">Unknown something, <a href="#p152">152</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">“Units,” retinal, <a href="#p177">177</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1"><i>see</i> segregation</li> + + <li class="indx">Unrest, <a href="#p110">110</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Usnadze, <a href="#p242">242</a> n.</li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Van der Veldt, <a href="#p275">275</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Verbal report, <a href="#p69">69</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Vector, <a href="#p134">134</a>, <a href="#p211">211</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Visual space, <a href="#p225">225</a> f., <a href="#p232">232</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Visual, form, <a href="#p197">197</a> ff., <a href="#p202">202</a>, <a href="#p208">208</a>, <a href="#p212">212</a> f., <a href="#p328">328</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Visual depth, <a href="#p174">174</a>, <a href="#p194">194</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Vision, form in V. and touch, <a href="#p162">162</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">in birds and humans, <a href="#p159">159</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">localization in, <a href="#p103">103</a>, <a href="#p128">128</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">order in, <a href="#p114">114</a> f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Visual processes, connection with other sensory processes, <a href="#p116">116</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Visual units, corresponding to physical objects, <a href="#p172">172</a>, <a href="#p177">177</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Visual organization, <i>see</i> organization</li> + + <li class="indx">Visual segregation, <i>see</i> segregation</li> + + <li class="indx">Visceral organs, <a href="#p19">19</a>, <a href="#p245">245</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Visual field, <a href="#p84">84</a>, <a href="#p104">104</a>, <a href="#p115">115</a>, <a href="#p129">129</a>, <a href="#p140">140</a>, <a href="#p142">142</a>, + <a href="#p144">144</a>, <a href="#p146">146</a>, <a href="#p149">149</a>, <a href="#p167">167</a>, <a href="#p196">196</a>, <a href="#p201">201</a>, + <a href="#p203">203</a>, <a href="#p212">212</a>, <a href="#p220">220</a>, <a href="#p244">244</a>, <a href="#p274">274</a>, <a href="#p320">320</a>, + <a href="#p324">324</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Vitalism, <a href="#p114">114</a>, <a href="#p118">118</a>, <a href="#p146">146</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Watson, J. B., <a href="#p52">52</a>, <a href="#p252">252</a>, <a href="#p267">267</a>, <a href="#p323">323</a>, <a href="#p382">382</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Weber’s law, <a href="#p16">16</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Weiss, A. T., <a href="#p34">34</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Werner, H., <a href="#p310">310</a> n.</li> + + <li class="indx">Wertheimer, M., <a href="#p129">129</a>, <a href="#p130">130</a> n., <a href="#p147">147</a>, <a href="#p150">150</a> n., <a href="#p157">157</a>, + <a href="#p163">163</a>, <a href="#p186">186</a>, <a href="#p215">215</a> n., <a href="#p223">223</a>, <a href="#p394">394</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Whitehead, A. W., <a href="#p394">394</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Witasek, S., <a href="#p190">190</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Whole, functional, <a href="#p106">106</a> f., <a href="#p119">119</a>, <a href="#p141">141</a>, <a href="#p148">148</a>, <a href="#p157">157</a>, + <a href="#p182">182</a>, <a href="#p263">263</a>, <a href="#p269">269</a>, <a href="#p270">270</a>, <a href="#p292">292</a>, <a href="#p295">295</a>, + <a href="#p311">311</a>, <a href="#p336">336</a>, <a href="#p343">343</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and form, <a href="#p200">200</a> f., <a href="#p205">205</a>, <a href="#p208">208</a> f., <a href="#p209">209</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">and memory, <a href="#p300">300</a>, <a href="#p303">303</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">organized, <a href="#p288">288</a>, <a href="#p294">294</a>, <a href="#p300">300</a>, <a href="#p311">311</a>, <a href="#p337">337</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Wholes, empiristic explanation of, <a href="#p158">158</a> n.;</li> + <li class="isub1">extended, <a href="#p126">126</a>, <a href="#p156">156</a>, <a href="#p169">169</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">motor, <a href="#p170">170</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">specific properties of, <a href="#p221">221</a> f., <a href="#p242">242</a>, <a href="#p253">253</a>, <a href="#p256">256</a>, <a href="#p259">259</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">segregated, <i>see</i> Segregation;</li> + <li class="isub1">preferred, <a href="#p158">158</a>, <a href="#p209">209</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">primitive, <a href="#p161">161</a> f., <a href="#p216">216</a> f.;</li> + <li class="isub1"><i>see also</i> Sub-wholes</li> + + <li class="indx">Warmth, as general quality, <a href="#p241">241</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Words, applying to subjective and objective experiences equally, <a href="#p243">243</a></li> + + <li class="indx">World, of direct experience, <a href="#p5">5</a>, <a href="#p7">7</a>, <a href="#p23">23</a>, <a href="#p25">25</a>, <a href="#p86">86</a>;</li> + <li class="isub1">physical, <a href="#p6">6</a>, <a href="#p8">8</a>, <a href="#p10">10</a>, <a href="#p20">20</a>, <a href="#p22">22</a> f., <a href="#p25">25</a> + f., <a href="#p33">33</a>, <a href="#p35">35</a>, <a href="#p36">36</a>, <a href="#p41">41</a>, <a href="#p60">60</a>, <a href="#p115">115</a>, <a href="#p132">132</a> + f.</li> + + <li class="indx">Wolf, F., <a href="#p310">310</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Wundt, W., <a href="#p79">79</a> n.</li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Yarbrough, J. N., <a href="#p304">304</a>, <a href="#p307">307</a>, <a href="#p309">309</a></li> + + <li class="indx">Yerkes, R. M., <a href="#p278">278</a></li> + + + <li class="ifrst">Zeigarnik, B., <a href="#p330">330</a>, <a href="#p332">332</a></li> +</ul> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="FOOTNOTES"> + FOOTNOTES + </h2> +</div> + + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_1_1" href="#FNanchor_1_1" class="label">[1]</a> It seems more cautious to talk about direct experience than about +“consciousness.” For some people consciousness is rather a function by +or in which we become aware of “immediate experience.” In my terminology, +if some one has a “feeling of becoming aware,” this is only <em>one +special case</em> of direct experience.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_2_2" href="#FNanchor_2_2" class="label">[2]</a> The opposition between introspectionism and behaviorism discussed in +this chapter is the opposition between those who use and those who reject +the observation of direct experience. In Chapter III introspectionism as a +special interpretation of the use of direct experience will be discussed.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_3_3" href="#FNanchor_3_3" class="label">[3]</a> By the way, the same warning applies to the relation between my +organism as a physical system and “my body” as I have it in direct +experience. Obviously “my body” is the outcome of certain special processes +in my physical organism—started in the eyes, muscles, skin, etc.—exactly +as the chair before me is the final product of other special processes +in the same physical organism. And if the chair is seen “before +me,” the “me” of this phrase means my experienced body, of course, not +my organism as an object of the physical world. Even accredited psychologists +do not always seem to be clear about this point. Later on we +shall come back to it.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_4_4" href="#FNanchor_4_4" class="label">[4]</a> Cf. C. P. Richter, <cite>Animal Behavior and Internal Drives. The Quarterly +Review of Biology</cite>, II, p. 307, 1927.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_5_5" href="#FNanchor_5_5" class="label">[5]</a> If it can be demonstrated more generally that the tests measure +“speed” primarily—as Boring and Teak have found in their subjects—the +value of the method would be more restricted than I have here +supposed.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_6_6" href="#FNanchor_6_6" class="label">[6]</a> Cf. G. E. Müller, <cite lang="de">Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 14</cite>, p. 189.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_7_7" href="#FNanchor_7_7" class="label">[7]</a> <i>Loc. cit.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_8_8" href="#FNanchor_8_8" class="label">[8]</a> Cf. Chapter VI.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_9_9" href="#FNanchor_9_9" class="label">[9]</a> The German word for “eagle.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_10_10" href="#FNanchor_10_10" class="label">[10]</a> This argument has been used by Wundt and Schumann.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_11_11" href="#FNanchor_11_11" class="label">[11]</a> <cite lang="de">Archiv f. d. ges. Psychol., 36</cite>, 1917.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_12_12" href="#FNanchor_12_12" class="label">[12]</a> Cf. J. F. Brown, <cite lang="de">Psycholog. Forschung, 10</cite>, 1927.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_13_13" href="#FNanchor_13_13" class="label">[13]</a> Cf. v. Kries, <cite lang="de">Allg. Sinnesphysiologie</cite>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_14_14" href="#FNanchor_14_14" class="label">[14]</a> This is the famous constancy hypothesis. Some introspectionists have +said that <i>gestalt</i> psychology, as any science must, has also to acknowledge +certain constant relations between given conditions and subsequent effects. +Quite! We do not argue against constant relations existing between +conditions and results in general, but only against a constant relation +between <em>local</em> stimulation and <em>local</em> experience. For brevity’s sake we +call that “the” constancy hypothesis.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_15_15" href="#FNanchor_15_15" class="label">[15]</a> <cite lang="de">Optische Untersuchungen am Schimpansen und am Haushuhn. Abhandl. +d. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.</cite>, 1915.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_16_16" href="#FNanchor_16_16" class="label">[16]</a> <i>Op. cit.</i> and Frank, <cite lang="de">Psychol. Forsch., 7</cite>, 1926; <cite lang="de">10</cite>, 1927. Beyrl, +<cite lang="de">Zeitschr. f. Psychol., 100</cite>, 1926.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_17_17" href="#FNanchor_17_17" class="label">[17]</a> Among the first we may count those anatomical arrangements which, +though not ready in embryonic life and at the time of birth, will develop +to their final form by maturation.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_18_18" href="#FNanchor_18_18" class="label">[18]</a> If I say that “attitude” will sometimes have an influence upon sensory +experience, this statement does not mean, that “mental power” can change +the sensory field arbitrarily. First of all, strictly speaking, it is not the +attitude, as an experience, which changes the sensory facts; the physiological +process underlying it changes the sensory process. Also, such a +change is not produced arbitrarily; it necessarily follows definite antecedents. +Furthermore, natural objective experience does not yield to all +slight changes of attitude. Apart from introspection our attitude will not +tend radically to alter sensory experience. Some very important exceptions +will be considered later on.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_19_19" href="#FNanchor_19_19" class="label">[19]</a> <cite lang="de">Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 61</cite>, 1912.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_20_20" href="#FNanchor_20_20" class="label">[20]</a> Benussi has contributed to our knowledge of these problems by excellent +experimental work. His investigation of similar facts in the field +of touch has been mentioned above. Recently certain extremely important +properties of stroboscopic movement have been investigated by Wertheimer +and Ternus (<cite lang="de">Psycholog. Forschung, 7</cite>, 1926).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_21_21" href="#FNanchor_21_21" class="label">[21]</a> I am neglecting here the influence of inert velocities which may be +neglected indeed in all discussion of the nervous system.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_22_22" href="#FNanchor_22_22" class="label">[22]</a> The reader is asked not to judge the physical side of <i>gestalt</i> theory +on the basis only of this short report. The concept of equilibrium is less +fundamental in biology than is that of dynamics. But the <em>direction</em> of +dynamics cannot be defined without it. Furthermore, we are not allowed +to treat the sensory field (or even the organism) as though it were an +isolated system. Therefore the laws of dynamics do not apply here in +their simplest form.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_23_23" href="#FNanchor_23_23" class="label">[23]</a> <cite lang="de">Psycholog. Forschung, 9</cite>, 1927.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_24_24" href="#FNanchor_24_24" class="label">[24]</a> It is well known in photometry that without differences of brightness +figures lose their definite form by diffusion into the ground.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_25_25" href="#FNanchor_25_25" class="label">[25]</a> If the surrounding field is not homogeneous the symmetry of the circle +will be distorted as in the well-known illusion in which two lateral vertical +lines make the circle oblate without, of course, changing the retinal +image. A number of other illusions illustrate the same principle.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_26_26" href="#FNanchor_26_26" class="label">[26]</a> <cite lang="de">Psycholog. Forschung, 4</cite>, 1923.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_27_27" href="#FNanchor_27_27" class="label">[27]</a> One form of empiristic explanation would say that we have learnt to +regard as wholes whatever always moves together. Wertheimer has +pointed out that, here, we have rather to do with one more principle of +sensory segregation and organization: when some parts of the field begin +to move at the same time and in a somewhat uniform way, they will +become one moving whole at once and <i lang="la">ipso facto</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_28_28" href="#FNanchor_28_28" class="label">[28]</a> <cite lang="de">Zeitschrift für vergleichende Physiologie, 7</cite>, 1928.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_29_29" href="#FNanchor_29_29" class="label">[29]</a> <cite lang="de">Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie, 41</cite>, 1918.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_30_30" href="#FNanchor_30_30" class="label">[30]</a> One chapter of <cite lang="de">Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären +Zustand</cite> has the title: “<span lang="de">Denn was innen, das ist aussen</span>.” Should these +words of Goethe have produced the misapprehension? Who reads the +chapter will see at once that that title refers to the similarity between +sensory experience and the physiological processes accompanying it, not +to the relationship between organic processes and the environment +(cf. § 181).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_31_31" href="#FNanchor_31_31" class="label">[31]</a> Not all subjects are equally suitable for this experiment.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_32_32" href="#FNanchor_32_32" class="label">[32]</a> There is some suspicion that the color process, mainly as a chemical +affair, may even <em>follow</em> other more physical sides of the whole dynamical +event on some occasions. In an electrolyte some chemical reaction at +the electrodes may begin after the distribution of current is established +throughout. Similarly, we need not see colors or differences of color in +order to experience definite results of dynamical self-distribution.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_33_33" href="#FNanchor_33_33" class="label">[33]</a> In the theory of F. Krueger, rather the opposite view was held originally +under the influence of von Ehrenfels and Cornelius. Recently, however, +the concept of <i>gestalt</i> in our meaning of the word is given more +attention by Krueger.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_34_34" href="#FNanchor_34_34" class="label">[34]</a> Köhler, <cite lang="de">Gestaltprobleme und Anfänge einer Gestalttheorie</cite>. Jahresberichte +über die gesamte Physiologie, herausgeg. von Rona, Berlin, 1924.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_35_35" href="#FNanchor_35_35" class="label">[35]</a> Of course, even this expression is not justified. There is no “line” +unified and segregated <em>as such</em> in the mosaic of retinal stimuli. There is +not more than a definite series of spots, which qualitatively are stimulated +in a manner different from their neighbors.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_36_36" href="#FNanchor_36_36" class="label">[36]</a> Under certain abnormal conditions both forms may be seen at the +same time.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_37_37" href="#FNanchor_37_37" class="label">[37]</a> <cite lang="de">Visuell wahrgenommene Figuren</cite>, Kopenhagen, Berlin, London, 1921.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_38_38" href="#FNanchor_38_38" class="label">[38]</a> Once, Bühler tried to give an explanation of at least one very characteristic +form, viz., the straight line. As he assumed that all retinal +points which form a straight line are connected with each other in a +special manner anatomically and that, therefore, the straight line is something +specifically determined, his hypothesis has the character of a +machine theory. I do not think that this is the way in which we may +hope to solve our problem. There are a great many particularly characteristic +forms besides the straight line. Shall we assume for each of +them a preëxisting anatomical apparatus? or rather, a great many for +each single form, since it may be projected upon many different parts +of the retina? If not, “form” must be explained <em>dynamically</em> in general, +and the most characteristic or regular forms must be explained by the +special regularity of dynamics occurring under appropriate conditions.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_39_39" href="#FNanchor_39_39" class="label">[39]</a> <cite lang="de">Psychol. Forsch., 8</cite>, 1926. Figures 11–13 are reproduced from Gottschaldt’s +paper.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_40_40" href="#FNanchor_40_40" class="label">[40]</a> We may remark however that, for adults, one more condition must +be fulfilled if we wish to transpose, without altering, specific form: most +forms show a changed aspect <em>as</em> forms when they are turned around, for +instance, upside down. This fact reveals a curious anisotropy of the +visual field, which does not seem to exist in early childhood (Cf. W. +Stern, <cite lang="de">Zschr. f. angew. Psychol.</cite>, 1909, and F. Oetjen, <cite lang="de">Zschr. f. Psychol., +71</cite>, 1915). On the other hand, Wertheimer has laid stress upon the +point that, for a given form, not all relations of stimulation are equally +important. Some of them may be changed considerably without any +remarkable effect upon the actual form.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_41_41" href="#FNanchor_41_41" class="label">[41]</a> <cite lang="de">Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand</cite>, pp. 230, +231.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_42_42" href="#FNanchor_42_42" class="label">[42]</a> Obviously it does not matter in this connection whether or not this +localization, for instance of sounds in relation to visual objects, be <em>correct</em> +in all cases. If it is <em>not</em> correct, then precisely the fact that we are able +to state and measure the error is in itself a proof that the two appear in +the same space.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_43_43" href="#FNanchor_43_43" class="label">[43]</a> The boundary between “ourselves” and objective experience around +us is not altogether sharp and constant. Experiences of touch, for instance, +are rather variable in this respect. Sometimes they are felt as +things and their properties; but they <em>may</em> also be experienced as “subjective.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_44_44" href="#FNanchor_44_44" class="label">[44]</a> Usnadze, <cite lang="de">Psychologische Forschung, 5</cite>, p. 24 f., 1924.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_45_45" href="#FNanchor_45_45" class="label">[45]</a> von Hornbostel, <cite lang="de">Festschrift Meinhof</cite>, 1927.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_46_46" href="#FNanchor_46_46" class="label">[46]</a> L. Klages, <cite lang="de">Vom Wesen des Bewusstseins</cite>, Leipzig, 1921.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_47_47" href="#FNanchor_47_47" class="label">[47]</a> <cite>Psychologies of 1925</cite>, pp. 52 and 54, Clark University Press.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_48_48" href="#FNanchor_48_48" class="label">[48]</a> In this case there is a complication, since weather influences our +physical body and its nervous system, apart from our sensory experience +of the weather.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_49_49" href="#FNanchor_49_49" class="label">[49]</a> We may say, then, that the second noise has a definite rôle or property +which belongs to it as to the second member of a pair (cf. Chapter +VI).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_50_50" href="#FNanchor_50_50" class="label">[50]</a> <cite lang="de">Psychologische Forschung, 4</cite>, 1923.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_51_51" href="#FNanchor_51_51" class="label">[51]</a> <cite lang="fr">L’Apprentissage du mouvement et l’automatisme</cite>, Louvain, Paris, 1928.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_52_52" href="#FNanchor_52_52" class="label">[52]</a> Becher, <cite lang="de">Gehirn und Seele</cite>, Heidelberg, 1911.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_53_53" href="#FNanchor_53_53" class="label">[53]</a> Or in the organization of a larger whole, as O. L. Tinklepaugh has +shown (<cite>The Journal of Compar. Psychol., 8</cite>, 1928).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_54_54" href="#FNanchor_54_54" class="label">[54]</a> Cf. the schemes given by Frings, <cite lang="de">Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 30</cite>, p. 430 f., +1914.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_55_55" href="#FNanchor_55_55" class="label">[55]</a> <cite lang="de">Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 23</cite>, p. 156 f., 1912.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_56_56" href="#FNanchor_56_56" class="label">[56]</a> Kühn, <cite lang="de">Zeitschrift für Psychologie, 68</cite>, 1914. Also Poppelreuter, +<cite lang="de">Zeitschr. f. Psychol., 61</cite>, 1912.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_57_57" href="#FNanchor_57_57" class="label">[57]</a> G. E. Müller, <cite lang="de">Abriss der Psychologie</cite>, p. 25, Göttingen, 1924.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_58_58" href="#FNanchor_58_58" class="label">[58]</a> <cite>The Ped. Seminary, 32</cite>, p. 681, 1925.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_59_59" href="#FNanchor_59_59" class="label">[59]</a> Here as always when I talk about animals I use terms like “seeing” +for simplicity’s sake. Whether or not the chick experiences a visual field +or anything else, the terms have a definite functional meaning in which +alone I am interested.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_60_60" href="#FNanchor_60_60" class="label">[60]</a> <cite>The Journal of Animal Behavior, 7</cite>, p. 87 ff., 1917.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_61_61" href="#FNanchor_61_61" class="label">[61]</a> Something of the kind has been done in the meantime by Mr. Tinklepaugh +insofar as his “substitution method” is an excellent means for +studying certain properties of the traces. (<cite>The Journal of Comparative +Psychology, 8</cite>, p. 224 ff., 1928.) Cf. also <cite lang="de">Psychol. Forsch., I</cite>, p. 10, 1921.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_62_62" href="#FNanchor_62_62" class="label">[62]</a> <cite lang="de">Psychol. Forsch., I</cite>, p. 333 ff., 1922. Cf. also Werner, <cite lang="de">Ztschr. f. Psychol., +94</cite>, 1924.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_63_63" href="#FNanchor_63_63" class="label">[63]</a> <cite>Psychol. Review, 20</cite>, 1913.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_64_64" href="#FNanchor_64_64" class="label">[64]</a> <cite lang="de">Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 30</cite>, 1914. These experiments were planned +by Bühler.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_65_65" href="#FNanchor_65_65" class="label">[65]</a> It will be the theme of the last chapter.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_66_66" href="#FNanchor_66_66" class="label">[66]</a> Cf. <cite lang="de">Psychologische Forschung, 9</cite>, 1927.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_67_67" href="#FNanchor_67_67" class="label">[67]</a> This means that if the average person remembered n finished tasks +he remembered 90 per cent. more unfinished ones; that is, n + 90/100 n.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_68_68" href="#FNanchor_68_68" class="label">[68]</a> In passing we may remark that, here at least, a relationship becomes +discernible between a result of experimental psychology and Freudian +theory.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_69_69" href="#FNanchor_69_69" class="label">[69]</a> <cite lang="de">Psychologische Forschung, 1</cite> and <cite lang="de">2</cite>, 1922. Somewhat similar experiments +had been done before by Poppelreuter (<cite lang="de">Zeitschrift für Psychologie, +61</cite>, 1912), who was also the first to bring forward the criticism mentioned +in the last paragraph.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_70_70" href="#FNanchor_70_70" class="label">[70]</a> <i>Op. cit.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_71_71" href="#FNanchor_71_71" class="label">[71]</a> From these results it would follow that we are not able directly to +measure conation by antagonistic association, as Ach has proposed.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_72_72" href="#FNanchor_72_72" class="label">[72]</a> I have not yet been able to see McCarthy’s book <cite>The Measurement of +Conation</cite> (Chicago, 1926). From what I have heard about it, it would +seem to be a highly valuable contribution to the problems discussed in +this chapter.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_73_73" href="#FNanchor_73_73" class="label">[73]</a> <cite lang="de">Gehirn und Seele</cite>, 1911. Lashley has done similar experiments with +rats. I can confirm his findings: after learning certain visual discriminations +with one eye blindfolded, a chick will react according to the new +habit when, afterwards, the other eye is blindfolded. Becher’s experiments, +however, still seem to me to be more conclusive anatomically.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_74_74" href="#FNanchor_74_74" class="label">[74]</a> I have not been able to find an adequate translation of the German +adjective <i lang="de">sachlich</i> in this connection. “Intrinsic” would come near to it, +perhaps.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_75_75" href="#FNanchor_75_75" class="label">[75]</a> Lewin and Karsten, <cite lang="de">Psychol. Forschung, 10</cite>, 1927.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_76_76" href="#FNanchor_76_76" class="label">[76]</a> In some of Plato’s discussions about the properties of the truly real +world, the same tendency is quite obvious.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_77_77" href="#FNanchor_77_77" class="label">[77]</a> <cite>The Meaning of Truth</cite>, Preface.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_78_78" href="#FNanchor_78_78" class="label">[78]</a> <cite>Some Problems of Philosophy</cite>, p. 213.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_79_79" href="#FNanchor_79_79" class="label">[79]</a> <cite>A Pluralistic Universe</cite>, p. 376.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_80_80" href="#FNanchor_80_80" class="label">[80]</a> Since James’ time this view has been defended by several authors +whose names will be found in the bibliography at the end of this chapter.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_81_81" href="#FNanchor_81_81" class="label">[81]</a> For brevity’s sake the term “self” is applied here, though for more +correct expression I should say: “the actual process corresponding to +the self in actual experience.”</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_82_82" href="#FNanchor_82_82" class="label">[82]</a> I do not forget, of course, that subordinate parts of our organism +will show reactions, externally similar to those described, though belonging +to the reflex type of movement. Stimulated by a prick, the foot will +be withdrawn by reflex. In no case would this fact create an objection +against the theory of insight-reaction. In some of its activities the organism +is doubtlessly similar to a very practical machine; at the same +time in others, and most of all those in which it behaves as a whole, +direct dynamics may decide what happens.</p></div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="transnote chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Transcribers_notes"> + Transcriber’s notes + </h2> + +<p>Figures have been moved from mid-paragraph to after the first paragraph + that mentions them.</p> + +<p>This e-text uses emphasis, language, and citation markup to improve +accessibility.</p> +</div> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 79014 ***</div> +</body> +</html> diff --git a/79014-h/images/cover.jpg b/79014-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..0cdbed7 --- /dev/null +++ b/79014-h/images/cover.jpg diff --git a/79014-h/images/fig01.jpg b/79014-h/images/fig01.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..58fc911 --- 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