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diff --git a/78995-0.txt b/78995-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c02015 --- /dev/null +++ b/78995-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,22557 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78995 *** + GORDON AT KHARTOUM + +[Illustration: _Charles George Gordon 1882_] + + + GORDON AT + KHARTOUM + + BEING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF + EVENTS + + IN CONTINUATION OF “A SECRET HISTORY OF THE + ENGLISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT” + + BY + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT + + “_We are an honest nation, but our diplomatists + are conies, and not officially honest._”—GORDON. + + LONDON: PUBLISHED BY + STEPHEN SWIFT AND COL., LTD. + MCMXI + + + CHISWICK PRESS: CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO. + TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON. + + + + + PREFACE + + +IN the present volume, which is a continuation of my “Secret History of +the Occupation of Egypt,” I take up once more the task of chronicling +the events of my time. Lord Cromer’s recent book, “Modern Egypt,” makes +this a duty to the truth which I feel ought not to be postponed, while +there is also the hope that by insistence it may still be possible to +direct those in power with us to adopt an attitude towards the +Mohammedan World less antagonistic than in the past to its thoughts and +feelings. + +The period treated here, between 1882 and 1886, is the darkest of the +whole Anglo-Egyptian record, a monument indeed of perverse unwisdom +recognized by all. But I doubt if it is yet fully understood how immense +a wrong was inflicted by our English mismanagement of affairs at Cairo, +not only on Egypt and the Upper Nile, but on all Mohammedan lands +hindered by it in their work of liberal enlightenment, and thrown back +for a whole generation on lines of fanatical reaction. This I hope to +make clear. Lord Cromer would have us believe that it was contrary to +our Government’s desire that we remained on in Egypt in spite of +repeated declarations of an intention to withdraw. It will here be shown +that there was never any such intention at the Foreign Office, and that +if it existed in Mr. Gladstone’s mind it was of that barren kind which +refuses to take the means which alone can lead to the desired result. +With regard to the Soudan and the series of barbarous campaigns which +signalized those three disastrous years, the explanation, too, has been +made that these were forced by circumstances upon our Government, as was +also the separation of the Upper from the Lower Nile, a separation +brought about under conditions of violent disruption, which made it a +permanent injury to Egypt and absolute ruin to the Soudan, with the +depopulation of whole provinces through famine and disease and chronic +warfare. It will be shown that European action alone was the initial +cause of the trouble, that the fanatical character of the Soudanese +revolt was due solely to the intervention of the Christian Powers at +Cairo and that its extent and violence were increased by each successive +step of English intervention, also that to the refusal to make peace +with the Mahdi, either before or after the fall of Khartoum, may fairly +be ascribed all that subsequently happened of misfortune to the tribes +of the Upper River. These were realities that needed placing in their +proper perspective, and I have endeavoured in this volume to present +them as they to my knowledge were. + +My personal position while the chief tragedy of the time, Gordon’s fatal +mission to Khartoum, was being enacted was one singularly advantageous +for my present purpose of accurate narration. Occupying no official +post, I nevertheless found myself a deeply interested spectator behind +the official scenes in London, as well as behind those of the Oriental +world, and from time to time playing a small part myself in the drama, +close enough to the chief personages to observe the details of their +action, and in near view of the machinery used for their stage effects. +The diary, which with an instinct of its future importance I kept +carefully written at the time, remains with me as a sure guide on which +I can rely for each day’s happenings, and this, in spite of its many +crudities of thought and expression, and much in it that I am conscious +is to my own disadvantage, I have decided to print almost uncensored as +it stands. It is the strongest evidence I can offer of the accuracy of +my narrative, and the best refutation of the pseudo-history which has +grown up about the mission. On many points I am very conscious that my +diary needs apology. It was written with no thought of publication, and +contains harsh judgements of men and things with many of which I have +since come to disagree, violences of language of which I am now ashamed, +and expressions of feeling softened since by years and by that tolerance +of view taken in old age of human insanities. Much in it I would +willingly not have written, or written otherwise, and much recording my +own sayings and doings I would suppress in publishing if it were not for +the feeling that to do so would impair its entire sincerity. In telling +things disadvantageous to others I could not in fairness be sparing of +my own mistakes. Therefore I leave all unexplained to its own +justification and the indulgence of my readers. + +On one point only have I thought it necessary to reconsider at any +length my attitude of the time. This is in respect of the blame laid by +me on Gordon for the failure of his mission on lines of peace. As will +be seen from my diary I was one of the few Englishmen who, with a strong +feeling of esteem and affection for Gordon, disapproved from the first +of his mission, suspecting what was indeed the fact, that there was in +it a political intrigue connected with the continued occupation of +Egypt, and I was one of the very few who rejoiced at the failure of the +relief expedition and the fall of Khartoum. My belief, however, at the +time, that Gordon was himself through his soldier’s obstinacy mainly +responsible for the failure, and that he did, as was being pretended by +Ministers, exceed his instructions, wantonly changing the character of +his mission from a peaceful one to one of war, was unjust, and I +recognize the necessity of correcting my misjudgement. The publication +of Lord Cromer’s book four years ago, with its exaggerated attack on +Gordon on these very heads, roused my suspicion and caused me to re- +examine the evidence connected with the whole matter, and I speedily +discovered that, though Gordon made without doubt many mistakes in its +discharge, the prime responsibility of the mission as one necessarily of +war was certainly not his, but that of those who sent him; also, on +further examination, that in spite of Lord Cromer’s denial the failure +of the mission was principally due to no other than Lord Cromer’s self. + +I have consequently devoted several chapters of the present volume to +clearing up this much vexed matter, and I have added to them, for the +special benefit of Egyptian readers ignorant of Gordon’s superlative +moral merit and regarding him only as a too zealous agent of the British +Government, and so their enemy, a memoir of this great man’s life and +character, gathered in part from his published letters scattered through +many works now out of print and notably from those wonderful letters to +his sister collected by Dr. Hill, in part from my own recollection of +him, and that of others who knew him personally. In this, which has been +to me a labour of love as well as of reparation, I have been powerfully +assisted by Gordon’s nephew and literary heir, Colonel Louis Gordon, by +his sole surviving sister, Mrs. Moffitt, and by his niece, Miss Gordon, +who are the chief living authorities on all things concerning him. These +have not only put me on the track of all published knowledge, but have +been good enough to entrust to me many important documents not hitherto +printed, which will be found either in the text of this volume or the +Appendix. One of these is of deciding value to the case, a letter which +Lord Cromer in his _apologia_ seems to have forgotten, and which fixes +on himself the responsibility of the mission as one far wider in scope +than has hitherto been admitted. + +If I have anything to add to these few words of preface it is this—I +have been reproached with lack of patriotism in that I have made it my +business of late years to denounce the errors and political misdeeds of +my fellow countrymen in Egypt. In answer to this I can only say that I +belong to a generation of Englishmen holding an idea of patriotism +entirely different from that now accepted, and one that I think saner. +According to the teaching of my youth the patriotic idea was essentially +connected with the love of the land of one’s birth, the passion of +courage which prompted Thermopylae and Bannockburn and the thousand and +one battles where men have stood up in defence of their homes against +invading strangers; also with that other moral courage which +strengthened a man to oppose in speech the folly of his fellow men whom +he saw doing dishonour to that land. It had nothing whatever to do with +the modern idea, now prevalent among Englishmen, of solidarity with the +enterprises, often criminal, of the cosmopolitan finance of London and +Liverpool and Manchester, which has usurped control over our lives and +honour in its dealings with our national affairs abroad, which controls +our press, manipulates our parliament, and uses our ancient and +honourable English name for its base un-English purposes. There is no +lack of patriotism in refusing to bow to this new leadership in evil, or +in denouncing its ungodly doings. + +I am by instinct of birth a conservative to my inmost fibre, that is to +say a believer in tradition and the value of all that is ancient in our +national institutions and creeds and moralities. I remember the disgust +of my older Tory friends when, under Semitic influence thirty-five years +ago, the new-fangled style of Empress was proposed to be added to the +time-honoured title inherited by our Sovereign Lady Queen Victoria, and +when the British Empire first began to be talked about as an improvement +in nomenclature on our long sufficing Kingdom of England. What was good +enough for the “spacious days of great Elizabeth” was surely, we +protested, good enough for us. We wanted none of the imperial nonsense. +As to a transfer of our patriotic loyalty from our good island realm of +England to a colonial monarchy beyond the seas, it seemed not only a +vulgarity but a contradiction in physical terms. We did not spare our +mockery and contempt for the whole “Brummagem” innovation. + +This is my sentimental view of British imperialism still, nor is it a +matter of sentiment alone with me. My reading of history has taught, and +practical experience has confirmed to me the fact that the task +undertaken by a nation of ruling other nations against their will is the +most certain step for it upon the road to national ruin. It is +impossible to exercise tyrannical authority abroad and retain a proper +respect for the dignity of liberty at home. The two things are not +permanently compatible. The virus of lawlessness in foreign lands +infects the body politic at home by a gradual process of contempt for +human brotherhood and equal right, which are the basis of all law and +the only guarantee of freedom in free nations. Nor, on the other hand, +can a community afford to distribute its energies in a hundred different +directions without injury to its mental balance and danger of +intellectual decay. The British Empire of the present day is being run +on lines of speculation which is often sheer gambling. It has lost the +sense of all economy in its finances, and all moderation in its +spendthrift ways. How can it be moderate with a thousand speculative +ventures to uphold in all four quarters of the globe? Moreover—and this +is perhaps the most dangerous feature of it all—the vanity of +imperialism, of being members of an imperial caste, is rapidly teaching +Englishmen to rely, wherever possible, for their living upon the labour +of others rather than their own. The great Crown Colonies, the Indian +Empire, and the South African federation are all slave communities in +disguise, where white men do not work themselves but live by “native” +labour. The example of their sloth is gaining rapid ground at home, and +soon all will be too proud to do any manual service. The virile part of +the community is flocking already to lands where they can live in less +laborious ways; the feebler part remains to propagate and starve at +home. Who shall say that England is not on a perilous downward path? + +What moves me most to anger is to note how, just as four hundred years +ago the Spanish race, urged by the speculative lust of gold and a belief +in their own supreme imperial and Christianizing mission, rushed out +upon the innocent New World and enslaved and slew its primitive peoples +happier far than they, so we English-speaking men enslave and slay in +the name of civilization—here, there, and everywhere—races less well +armed, but in other respects more fit for survival in the spaces they +have primitively occupied than ourselves. The work of subjugation goes +on under a score of false pretences; and these, officially recorded, +remain for the misleading of posterity in the pages of our printed Blue +Books. History thus comes to be written in a sense suited to the self- +satisfaction of those who would like to think themselves God’s +messengers to an unenlightened heathendom, while in reality they are +only gathering in its wealth, and their crimes of conquest are +concealed. In the days of Spain’s madness there was a single honest monk +who denounced his fellow countrymen for their misdeeds, and dared to +love the Indians more than his own people, because he saw these +suffering atrocities of injustice at their conquerors’ hands. He was not +popular in Castile for his plain speaking. Yet where—among the +nations—is imperial Spain to-day? And which has the better title now to +be called a patriot, Las Casas or Pizarro? + +There will be found at the end of the volume an Appendix containing a +selection of papers forming the _pièces justificatives_ of this portion +of my history. Some of these are of considerable intrinsic value, others +of less importance but needed for the refutation in detail of the +historic inaccuracies of Lord Cromer’s book, and in answer to certain +remarks found in it concerning myself. Such especially are the +additional evidence here brought forward of the Khedive Tewfik’s +connection with the riots at Alexandria and Tantah in 1882, which, +without reason given, Lord Cromer has pronounced to be unproved; and my +correspondence with 10, Downing Street, which he has in a few sentences +attempted to discredit. The correspondence makes my position towards Mr. +Gladstone absolutely clear, as does, in another direction, my more +generally interesting correspondence with my Oriental friends. + +The pencil drawing of Gordon, reproduced as frontispiece to the volume, +is by Edward Clifford, and is now in the collection of the National +Portrait Gallery. Though inadequate as displaying Gordon’s more +popularly heroic attitude, it is the only one that at all reveals his +inner and more mystic mind, or which I recognize as a true presentment +of the man as I personally remember him. + + W. S. B. + + _13th September_ 1911. + + Twenty-ninth anniversary + of Tel-el-Kebir. + + + + + CONTENTS + + + PAGE + + GENERAL GORDON _Frontispiece_ + + PREFACE v + + CHAPTERS + + I. THE DUFFERIN SETTLEMENT 1 + + II. SIR EVELYN BARING ARRIVES AT CAIRO 38 + + III. GORDON’S WORK ON THE WHITE NILE 87 + + IV. GORDON IN PALESTINE 122 + + V. GORDON’S LAST MISSION 144 + + VI. WAS GORDON DISOBEDIENT? 181 + + VII. EXCITEMENT ABOUT GORDON IN LONDON 207 + + VIII. MY EXCLUSION FROM EGYPT 245 + + IX. CONSTANTINOPLE IN 1884 284 + + X. GORDON’S DEATH. CHAOS 344 + + XI. RANDOLPH CHURCHILL AND THE FOURTH PARTY 412 + + XII. THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1885—RANDOLPH AT THE 471 + INDIA OFFICE—DRUMMOND WOLFF’S MISSION + + NOTE ABOUT THE MAHDI’S DEATH 505 + + APPENDICES + + A. UNPUBLISHED GORDON PAPERS 509 + + B. MR. BLUNT’S ORIENTAL CORRESPONDENCE 539 + + C. CORRESPONDENCE WITH DOWNING STREET 568 + + D. CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL 608 + + E. ARABI’S PROGRAMME OF 1883, AND MOHAMMED ABDU’S 617 + VIEWS + + F. EXTRACTS FROM LADY ANNE BLUNT’S DIARY 627 + + G. LETTERS TO MR. BLUNT ALLUDED TO IN, AND 630 + EXEMPLIFYING, THE TEXT + + INDEX 645 + + + + + GORDON AT KHARTOUM + + CHAPTER I + + THE DUFFERIN SETTLEMENT + + +I TAKE up my narrative of Egyptian events where I left them at the end +of 1882. + +The restoration of the Khedive Tewfik at Cairo had been accomplished by +Lord Wolseley’s army, and Egypt, prostrate and dumb, lay like a woman +betrayed waiting the fate to be allotted to her at the hand of her +despoiler. Arabi’s trial over, it became a matter of supreme interest +for all of us who had interested ourselves in the National movement as +one of progress and reform to speculate on what was to be the ultimate +fortune or ill-fortune of the Egyptians meted out to them by Mr. +Gladstone’s Government—whether they would return to their ancient +slavery under the Circassians, or whether, as we hoped, Gladstone would +make good his promises of favouring the development of their political +institutions, and helping them on their road to self-government—or +whether, again, they would meet the fate of so many other nations of the +East, and become permanently incorporated in the British Empire. + +For this last course all the Imperialists of England, headed by “The +Times,” were crying out, and it was generally believed that Bismarck, +then Lord Paramount of Europe, would consent to it, while France, though +sullen and vexed with herself for having missed an opportunity of +acquisition she had long marked out as her own, was not prepared for +effectual remonstrance. Her seizure of Tunis the year before, under +circumstances of even less legality, closed her mouth for any moral +preaching, as did the avowed selfishness of her attitude towards Egypt +which had been even more blatantly than ours that of advocate there of +financial and foreign commercial interests. + +I do not think, however, that it was really within the power of our +Liberal Government all at once and so entirely to falsify their pledges. +A protocol of disinterestedness had been signed by Lord Dufferin at +Constantinople at the meeting of the Conference the previous summer, +which in the most public manner possible engaged England to make her +intervention one for the general European good, and not merely for +British advantage. Lord Granville, too, was bound over and over again by +his declarations to the theory that the English army had been sent to +Egypt solely to restore order and maintain the _status quo_, while both +the Khedive’s authority and the Sultan’s had been invoked to give the +intervention a colour of legality, and Sir Beauchamp Seymour in a solemn +document, published a fortnight after the bombardment of Alexandria and +before landing troops, had engaged the faith of England not to attempt +conquest or in any way injure either the religion or the liberties of +the Egyptians. To annex or proclaim a protectorate would consequently +have been a huge moral lapse Gladstone was not prepared for, though a +certain section of the Cabinet, headed by Hartington and Chamberlain, +were pushing hard in that direction, while the Foreign Office, refusing +to accept the evidence of the new facts revealed at the trial, clung to +its false theory of the causes of the war, which it needed as an excuse, +and hardened its heart against all repentance for its past mistakes. +Moreover—and for this I think I may claim to have helped to avert from +Egypt the supreme disaster of annexation—the non-conformist conscience +of the old-fashioned Liberals of England was now awake to the iniquity +of the war, and was indignant at the betrayal by Gladstone of his +Midlothian principles, and was insisting with him that liberty should +not be altogether suppressed on the Nile. This was a consideration which +could not but affect a politician of Gladstone’s temperament; and there +was yet another reason perhaps stronger than all the rest with him, +though I as yet only half suspected it, his economic prudence as ex- +Chancellor of the Exchequer, which made him shrink from incurring full +responsibility for England for the liabilities of a country then +believed to be on the point of bankruptcy. Egypt from that point of view +might be a burden involving money expenditure for many years as well as +international trouble, and this consideration in all probability decided +him. It is certain that, in subsequent years, his scruples about +retaining Egypt became less and less imperative in almost exact +correspondence with the revival of the financial credit. + + +Be this as it may, the opportunity of English annexation was, +fortunately for the Egyptians, let slip in 1882, and did not again recur +in Mr. Gladstone’s lifetime; nor, let us hope, will another be found in +the still less scrupulous future reserved for the British Empire. Egypt, +though wounded almost to death, did not die as a nation with the +destruction of her national army at Tel-el-Kebir, and still preserves +her historic identity as a legally self-governing State, technically +dependent on no European Power. The settlement of her future as such was +the outcome of the divergent ideas and motives and pledges and interests +just enumerated, and, as all the world knows, was entrusted to Lord +Dufferin, already in Egypt, in the opening months of the year 1883. +Dufferin’s task, it may be admitted, was a difficult one. It was to +effect a compromise which should at the same time satisfy Europe, keep +nominal faith with the Khedive, and have at least an appearance of +giving back to the Egyptians the political liberties they had for a +moment won and were now once more deprived of. At the time of his +appointment I had considerable confidence in Dufferin. I had known him +personally for more than twenty years, from the time indeed when, as an +attaché to the Legation at Athens, I had made his acquaintance on his +return from his Nile tour in the winter of 1859-60, and I knew that his +sympathy with the fellahin had then been great. He was in those days an +interesting and very charming young man of not much more than thirty, +and he had spent most of his time at Athens with us at the Legation, +joining our rides and excursions, and taking part in our mounted paper- +chases which took place twice a week, as well as in such social +amusements as the Corps Diplomatique at Athens afforded. His mother, +herself the most charming of women, was travelling with him, and both +had been especially kind to me in a way I did not forget, and I am glad +to think that during the whole of Lord Dufferin’s long life the pleasant +relations thus begun between us were maintained as often as we met. + +In the year following he had received his first public appointment, that +of Commissioner to Syria at the time of the Maronite massacres, and he +had returned to Athens after them, and I remembered the details of the +settlement he had so successfully arranged for the Lebanon. By this he +had pledged himself to the principle of provincial autonomy under +Ottoman sovereignty, while a little later the weight of his opinion had +been given to our Government when it insisted with the French that they +should withdraw their army of occupation from Syria. It is curious how +closely parallel were, in fact, the two cases of intervention—the French +intervention in Syria in 1860 and the English intervention in Egypt in +1882. It seemed to me, therefore, that he might be trusted to oppose +anything like a renewal of the old Turco-Circassian tyranny, and also to +respect the independent administrative rights of the Egyptian people. +His task, however, as I have said was a difficult one, indeed almost +impossible. In order to give back their liberty to the fellahin, or +indeed to introduce any of the reforms advocated by Arabi and his +friends, it would have been necessary to reinstate, if not Arabi +himself, at least a Nationalist Ministry, for the Turco-Circassian +clique, which Wolseley had put back into power, were the enemies of all +reform, while the Khedive himself, who had betrayed his constitutional +pledges, could no longer be trusted to work honestly with a +constitutional Government. He would need to be replaced by some other +prince who had not forfeited the confidence of his people. + +Such a course, though difficult from the Foreign Office point of view, +would have met with little obstacle in Egypt itself. Indeed, it would +have been a quite simple affair. Tewfik, at that time, had absolutely no +friend in the country outside the circle of his own small palace clique, +and hardly a voice would have been raised for him if his retirement had +been insisted on as a political necessity, not even in all probability +his own. Pensioned, he would not unwillingly have returned to private +life, for his experience of the Khedivial dignity had not been such as +to cause him to be enamoured of it. Two courses would then have been +open in regard to his successor. Either the recognized order of +succession might have been followed, which would have placed the present +Khedive Abbas, still a child, upon the throne, under a Regency; or the +older order of succession might have been reverted to, which would have +given it to Prince Halim. In neither case would there have been +difficulty in restoring a constitutional regime. Probably the best +arrangement, if our Foreign Office could have been got to consent to it, +would have been the first, with Arabi for Regent. Arabi was still, in +spite of his defeat and the poor fight of it he had made at Tel-el- +Kebir, most widely popular, and could have been trusted to work honestly +with those plans of material and moral reform which England professed to +have at heart, not indeed as Minister, for he lacked the administrative +ability, but as exercising by delegation the duties of a constitutional +head of the State. For that no Egyptian could have been better fitted, +he being a large-minded man as well as a good Moslem. Nor would +England’s legitimate influence have been a loser by it. Arabi, in spite +of the quarrel forced upon him by the Foreign Office, had always refused +to see an enemy in the English people. He had nursed himself to the last +in the belief that, if only the British public could be got to know the +truth, it could not fail to sympathize. England, it must be remembered, +was traditionally believed in Egypt, prior to 1882, to be the universal +patron of liberal and national movements throughout the world, and in an +especial manner the friend of Islam. Arabi had been bred in that +tradition, and had to the last moment, in common with most Egyptians, +imagined that the quarrel was due to a mistake as to facts. The +rectification of it would therefore have seemed natural to him and to +all, and would have restored the general Egyptian goodwill. + +For a moment we thought that Dufferin, whom the disclosures connected +with the trial had made acquainted with the true history of the war, +would have recommended this enlightened course, and it would have saved +him and his employers at the Foreign Office much subsequent trouble had +he had the courage to insist on it. He was perfectly aware of Tewfik’s +real character, and he was aware also of Arabi’s merits. Indeed, so far +had his confidence gone in the honesty and patriotism of the defeated +National leader that he had got him at the moment of his leaving for +Ceylon to draw up a Memorandum of Reform for Egypt, the text of which, +though doubtless existing at the Foreign Office, has never been +published. It will be found at the end of this chapter, a copy of it +having been furnished to me by Arabi from Ceylon the following summer. +Also I had learned from General Charles Gordon, in a conversation I had +had with him, while Arabi was still in prison, in December 1882, that +the idea of Arabi’s rehabilitation and recall to Egypt was at the time +contemplated in Downing Street; while, as will be seen further on, I +received additional confirmation of it as being in Gladstone’s mind in a +message received from him as late as the summer of 1883. We were +therefore not without justification in the hope we reposed in Dufferin, +though it is improbable that the Foreign Office, obstinate and deeply +compromised, was ever converted from its hostility to the National +leader. Indeed it is pretty certain that, whatever representations of +the truth Dufferin may have made or whatever new suggestions offered, +the policy he was instructed by Lord Granville to pursue remained +unyielding; and the publication a few months later of Dufferin’s famous +despatch of 7th February did but register a foregone conclusion.[1] + +Nevertheless, it is worth while to put on record what evidence we +possess of a wiser and more liberal policy having been contemplated at +least for a moment by some of those in power. Not to lay too much stress +on the hopes held out to us by Dufferin at the time of the compromise of +Arabi’s trial, which may have been dictated by an unauthorized desire to +persuade us, it is certain that Arabi’s early return to Egypt was +believed in not only at Cairo at the end of the year 1882, but also in +London. Gordon’s evidence on this head is decisive, and shows that it +was entertained in official quarters. Though looked upon in Downing +Street as “not clothed in the rightest of minds,”[2] Gordon’s opinion on +Egyptian affairs was considered worth taking. He was in occasional +correspondence with Lord Northbrook, and he was intimate[3] with +Reginald Brett (the present Lord Esher), just then transferred with Lord +Hartington, whose private secretary he was, to the War Office, while +Wolseley also was his friend. There was talk, too, already at the time, +as we shall presently see, of Gordon’s possible return as Governor- +General to the Soudan, and he was in an excellent position to hear and +know. What therefore he told me in the conversation referred to cannot +but be convincing of the fact. The circumstances under which it took +place were these. + +It will be remembered by readers of my first volume, “A Secret History +of the English Occupation of Egypt,” that while the campaign of Tel-el- +Kebir was still in progress I received a letter from General Gordon +dated Cape Town, 3rd August 1882, the text of which is there given, +expressing to me the strongest sympathy with my view of the iniquitous +causes of the war, and ending with the words, “As for Arabi, whatever +may become of him individually, he will live for centuries in the +people; they will never be ‘your obedient servants’ again.” A copy of +this letter I had forwarded to Gladstone, and it had not been without +effect on him in what had happened subsequently in Egypt. To Gordon I +had sent in reply a printed copy of my private correspondence with +Downing Street, and the article on the Egyptian Revolution, published in +the September number of the “Nineteenth Century Review,” and had +received a second letter from him which I here print. + + + “En route to England 21 _Oct._ 1882. + +“MY DEAR MR. BLUNT, + + “THANK you for your kind letter Sept. 7, received as I was leaving +Cape Town. Sorry you have been abused, but you are not the worse because +the world does so, neither are you better when it praises you. You are +as you are. Thanks for XIX century and pamphlet, which I read with +interest. I have a conviction that things will turn out well for the +Egyptian people in the long run, and though our people may suffer, it +will be for welfare of the human race. I cannot now write on the +subject, for I have an idea that things are ruled for the best, by an +overruling Power, and that to put any say in what He does seems +presumptuous on my part; in fact if one took up the cudgels for the +oppressed every-where, one would have too much to do. I may meet you +some day, and perhaps can enlighten you on some subjects, such as why +the Joint Note 9 Janry was written, from _my_ point of view. As for +Dilke I think he is an impostor in a great measure. With kind regards. +Believe me, Yrs. sincerely, + + “C. G. GORDON. + +“_P.S._—I have seen papers up to 26 Oct. and it seems H. M. G. have just +fought to reinstate the Parasite ring of Pachas. As for Raouf and Ismail +[Eyoub] Pachas’ being on Arabi’s trial, it means simply the condemnation +of Arabi. I know both these two men well, they would shrink at nothing, +and are the representative men of the Pacha clique.” + + +It was therefore natural that, on his return to England in November I +should be one of the first persons upon whom the General called. My +diary, which at the time I had unfortunately interrupted, fails me in +regard to the exact details of the visit paid me; and I have no more +than a memorandum to the effect that Gordon called at my house in James +Street, Buckingham Gate, on 5th December, and that not finding me at +home he left his name with my servant at the door characteristically +thus: “General Gordon or Gordon Pasha. I daresay you have heard of him +before”; and with it a note written on a sheet of my own paper. But this +I have preserved and it fixes the date. It says: “I will call at +Buckingham Gate 9 a.m. Friday, if you could be in. I sincerely hope you +can recover the £4,000 you spent on Arabi [alluding to the costs of the +trial]. I will give £5 a year till you are repaid. It would be a +pleasure to do it and no risk, for Arabi will be back in Egypt within +two years, and he will repay it. I hope that the inferior prisoners will +not be forgotten, for Riaz and Co. will do their best to crush them, for +Riaz’ fate depends on their extinction. My address, 68, Elm Park Road, +Chelsea.” + +It must have been therefore on Friday the 8th December that Gordon +called again, and, as I remember well, breakfasted with us and spent the +whole forenoon in talk, mainly on Egypt and the Soudan, but also on +India and the relations generally between Europe and the East. With +regard to Egypt my recollection is distinct that we were in entire +agreement in our sympathy with the “rebellion,” and our condemnation of +Tewfik. In my “Nineteenth Century” article I had engaged myself to write +a sequel to it, but I remember that he advised me to leave this promise +for the present unfulfilled. “You do not require it,” he said, “for your +own justification, and, as for the Government, they are resolved now to +do justice. You may have perfect faith in Mr. Gladstone, and I know that +he intends to restore Arabi as soon as public opinion shall have cooled +down, and he can do it without too sudden a reversal of his policy. +Arabi will be back in Egypt in a couple of years, and you can then write +your history far more effectively than now.” + +This is my recollection of the visit, and it is confirmed to me on the +point in question by a second note received from him at the close of the +year bidding me farewell just before his leaving England for Jerusalem, +which letter I have also preserved. + + + “5 Rockstone Place, Southampton 2, 26, 12, 82. + +“MY DEAR MR. BLUNT, + + “THANK you for your kind note. I am sorry not to have seen you and +Lady Blunt before I left. I go tomorrow and will do my best about the +Sheiks.[4] Above is my safe address. I will write you from Palestine. + +“I have to a small degree tried to use the verse: ‘If thou seest the +violent oppression of the poor, or the subversion of justice, marvel not +at it, for the Higher than the Highest regardeth it.’ Ecc. v, 8. + +“Not that I am inclined to be silent on these matters if I think I can +do any good, but it comforts me to feel that one can get access to a +Higher than they. + +“Arabi will be back in a couple of years, say in 18 months. + +“I think things are very critical in Cairo, and the day I called on you, +I went to Brett and begged him to urge Government to assemble the +Notables at once. Napoleon I suffered far more from the revolts of Cairo +than from the troops. Colvin is to be recalled. + +“Believe me with kindest regards to Lady Blunt and yourself, and with +hopes for the future thro’ your efforts, Yours sincerely, + + “C. G. GORDON.” + + +This taken with the rest is, I think, decisive. As to the Soudan, my +recollection of Gordon’s talk is that he expressed himself at the time +in entire sympathy with the Mahdi as the popular leader of a revolt +against an iniquitous Government, but that, whereas I, sharing the views +of many Egyptian Nationalists in 1882, was for giving the Soudanese +complete independence, Gordon insisted on the retention of Khartoum as a +necessity for Egypt in connection with the Nile water-supply, and as an +outpost to be held politically. On this point alone we disagreed. + +Arabi’s memorandum, drawn up for Lord Dufferin, is another important bit +of evidence. It shows that at least the question of a change of Khedive +had been presented to, and must have been considered by, him; nor is it +to be supposed that the intention of a complete pardon for the writer +can have been absent from the diplomatist to whom it was addressed. It +is certain, at any rate, that Dufferin was influenced by it in his +scheme of reforms, and was then favourably impressed, and to this I can +testify of my own knowledge, for I more than once had opportunities in +after years of learning the high opinion Dufferin entertained of the ex- +National leader. The passage in the memorandum of immediate importance +to the point we are considering is this: + +“The question,” says the memorandum, “of appointing a new ruler (Waly) +is an important one, and I will lay before you my own views and those of +my comrades. I say: that the family of Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohammed +Ali, is absolutely worthless for the sovereignty; no matter how they +might be controlled by a Constitution, for they are of notoriously +corrupt principles. In my opinion there is a choice of two courses. 1. +To appoint Halim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali Pasha, Waly of Egypt, under +the conditions before laid down [_i.e._, those of a Constitution]. He is +a man who has been tried by misfortune, and has tasted the bitterness of +injustice, and has reached the age of about fifty-five years, and I +believe that such a man might try to win the sympathy of the people by +justice and kindness. 2. The other course is to appoint as Waly for +Egypt one of her own men of the National Party whose deeds have borne +witness to their goodness of disposition and peaceful character. But, as +to any idea of appointing a foreign ruler, I say that, as the mass of +the Egyptians are Moslems, with the exception of the Coptic section (and +these are the same as the Egyptians in their dealings and ways of life), +I believe that the appointment of a foreign Waly would not suit the +temper of the Egyptians, but would perhaps lead to trouble among them.” + +This, though not conforming to strict official phraseology, goes to the +root of the matter, and is full of common sense. Let us consider how it +would have been if Dufferin had made the idea of such a change of ruler +his own, as he made other recommendations of the memorandum his own, and +had pressed it as a necessity of the Egyptian case upon the Foreign +Office if an honest settlement was to be made and the British troops +withdrawn from Egypt. As regards Egypt proper, the appointment of Halim +would have solved the whole difficulty of popular disaffection. Halim, +who was a really estimable man, bore a good repute in Egypt. His +domestic life was a blameless one. His wife, a woman of high distinction +with a good European education, would have helped him in his relations +with the resident foreign element, and he himself was sufficiently +Europeanized to play the part needed of a modern Egyptian ruler. He had +none of the vices of the elder branch of the family of Mohammed Ali. He +was neither a spendthrift nor a voluptuary, nor a coveter of his +neighbour’s goods, nor on any point a law breaker. Moreover there would +have been no difficulty in obtaining the Sultan’s consent to the +appointment. Halim was in some sort the Sultan’s own candidate, as also +the candidate of most of the European Powers. He could have worked +easily with the National Party and the Constitution, and thus the +British garrison could have been at once withdrawn. If to this had been +added, what was talked of at the time, the appointment of Sir Charles +Wilson as Malet’s successor at the British Agency, even a preponderance +of English influence in Egypt could have been secured. Wilson was a +strong sympathizer with the Nationalists, and his advice would have been +followed. The suggestion of Halim was an entirely wise one, suited to +every necessity of the case, as would have been the other of Abbas with +Arabi for Regent. + +Above all it would have saved Egypt and England from those terrible +disasters which beset both countries with a pursuing curse in regard to +the Soudan during the next three years. That the intervention in Egypt +was the direct cause of the revolt in the Soudan is certain. One of the +most fatal acts of the Dual Control had been to give to the Soudan in +1880, as Gordon’s successor, a reactionary and wholly corrupt Circassian +Governor-General, Raouf Pasha, and it had been through his tyranny and +incapacity that the country had fallen into disorder and the Mahdi had +gained his first adherents. Two years later Arabi’s first administrative +act when he became War Minister at Cairo had been to recall Raouf,[5] +and send a really competent man, Abd-el-Kader Pasha, to replace him. +Under Abd-el-Kader the rebellion had been localized, Khartoum +scientifically fortified, and order restored everywhere but in the +western provinces. Moreover Arabi had put himself into epistolary +communication with the Mahdi, and had established a _modus vivendi_ +between him and the National Government in view of the common menace of +European and Christian aggression in Lower Egypt. It was the landing of +English troops at Alexandria that gave its fanatical character to the +Mahdist rebellion, while it also denuded the Soudan of its best troops +recalled to Egypt to repel the menace of invasion. But for Tel-el-Kebir, +the utmost misfortune that could have befallen Egypt in that direction +would have been the loss of the Bahr el Ghazal province and Kordofan. +Even now, after the defeat of Tel-el-Kebir, all could have been repaired +had the change of Khedive been resolved on according to Arabi’s +suggestion, with a recall of the Nationalist leaders, and an end put to +the tyrannical Circassian regime at Cairo. Terms could easily have been +come to with the Mahdi which would have secured Khartoum and the Eastern +Soudan from attack. The Christian army withdrawn from Cairo, the Mahdi’s +rebellion would have lost its fanatical _raison d’être_. It will be seen +later that Arabi, even before the defeat of Hicks, was quite ready to +abandon Kordofan and the Equatorial provinces, while there would have +been no difficulty in retaining Khartoum, where the chief weakness of +the garrison in 1883 lay in the fact that the troops composing it were +Arabi’s ex-soldiers devoted to him and wholly disaffected to Tewfik. For +the issue of bloodshed and destruction witnessed for a generation in the +Soudan, the obstinacy of our Foreign Office in retaining Tewfik was +directly responsible. It was one of those fatal mistakes which statesmen +make and persist in because they are too proud to own their error. + + +Was there ever a greater tragedy of errors? And all for what? It is +probable that the real reason why Tewfik was maintained in his place as +Khedive, instead of being pensioned and sent to join his father in an +exile more or less honourable, was neither a consideration of Egypt’s +interests nor that of England’s interests, nor yet of the interests of +Europe, nor so much as those of the bondholders. None of the upholders +of these interests had any belief or trust in Tewfik as a prince capable +of maintaining order at Cairo, or of restoring Egyptian credit, or even +of efficiently serving British interests. He was known to have none of +the qualities of a strong ruler, and he was popular with no one, native +or European. As a puppet prince he might have his uses, but the +situation demanded something more than a puppet prince, and he was good +for no other purpose, political or financial. No. The probability is +that the real reason with Gladstone’s Cabinet was that Tewfik’s +retirement would have entailed the retirement also of Lord Granville, +and Lord Granville was too popular a member of the Cabinet to be forced +into such a step against his will; also that Lord Granville, a needy +man, much in debt, and dependent on his official salary to eke out an +insufficient income, was not prepared for the personal sacrifice. The +fiction of Tewfik’s loyalty and of Arabi’s rebellion had therefore to be +persisted in and upheld. It could not be contemplated that a Minister +should admit an error which had been accompanied by the slaughter of +thousands of peasants, and the expenditure of millions, and a war which +had been boasted of as one undertaken as a “duty of honour.” Granville +must have resigned if his Cabinet had belied him. There was no +“political” way out of it, except for the Foreign Office to harden its +heart and persevere in its accomplished wrong. This, I say, was the +tragedy of the situation, and for this Egypt was sacrificed. As for +Dufferin, he doubtless argued, being an old diplomatist with a career to +maintain, that he had been sent to Egypt by the Foreign Office to get +them out of an all but impossible scrape, but that his instructions did +not include the duty of proving them fools. He therefore made his +settlement on the lines prescribed. It may be said of him with truth +that he missed, unwillingly, an heroic opportunity, and I think also +with truth that it left him with occasional qualms of conscience which +troubled him through the rest of his long and eminently successful life. + +For these reasons nothing in the way of an efficient new policy was +insisted on by Dufferin, or adopted by the Government, and all the rest +of the programme so elaborately drawn up by him of councils and +assemblies, and dignified with the name of a Constitution, was rendered +impotent from the outset by being entrusted to hands the least desirous +of its success and the least competent to deal with it. + +We, who were watching, were not long in being undeceived in our hopes. +The new year 1883 began badly. Although its actual first act at Cairo +was the issuing of the decree promised us by Dufferin of a general +amnesty for all connected with the “Rebellion,” and though I had +received from him a private letter announcing to me the good news of the +release of 450 political prisoners, for which I had duly thanked him, it +soon appeared that the operation of the decree was being evaded in +practice where the Khedive needed to be indulged in acts of unsatisfied +vengeance on those who had specially offended him. But for this, I had +intended that with the issue of the amnesty my political intervention in +Egypt should end. I felt that I had done my whole duty by salvaging, as +far as I could, the wreck of the National Party; I had so far succeeded +in saving the lives, if not the liberty, of all concerned, and it was my +thought to rely, as Gordon had advised me, on Gladstone for the rest, +and to turn my energies into other channels. A very few days, however, +passed before it became evident that things were going less fairly in +Egypt than they seemed. About the 15th of January Napier,[6] having +finished his work at Cairo, returned to London, and from him I learned +that, notwithstanding the amnesty and the clearing of the prisons +announced by Dufferin, a certain number of the political prisoners had +been detained while others were being arrested and put on trial before +special courts on charges connected with the past year. The charges +brought were so-called “criminal charges” against persons implicated in +the riots at Alexandria, Tantah, and other places, before or during the +war, and on this pretence vengeance was being taken on political enemies +by the Khedive and the Court Party. What made these prosecutions the +more infamous was the fact that innocent men were being indicted for the +very crimes their accusers had been themselves guilty of, and, to make +the injustice of it the more glaring, some of them were being tried +before military courts appointed by the very man, Omar Pasha Lutfi, now +Minister of War, who with the Khedive’s connivance and suggestion had +prepared the Alexandria riot not a year before. It was a “judicial +atrocity” of the most shameless kind. + +I therefore wrote to Dufferin a letter, the full text of which will be +found in the Appendix at the end of this volume, complaining of the +exceptions that had been made to the amnesty. “It would seem,” I said, +“most unfair that the leaders of the ‘rebellion’ having foregone their +right of being publicly defended, any of their followers or associates +should be punished for rebellion. . . . I cannot understand how it can +be the wish of our Government to make scapegoats of the rank and file of +those charged with the criminal acts of June and July, while the chief +offenders enjoy immunity. If one thing has been proved to the +satisfaction of the Government more than another, it is that Omar Lutfi +was responsible for the murderous character of the riots of the 11th of +June, yet we read still of executions at Alexandria for crimes committed +on that day by others, the chief culprit himself being the while at +large, in honour, and even holding high office under the Khedive. I say +nothing of the Khedive himself, though you doubtless know how little his +conduct on that day would have borne investigation.” + +Dufferin’s answer to this, while personally amiable, was the reverse of +satisfactory. It referred me to a report drawn up by Sir Charles Wilson +about the discharge of political prisoners, but ignored the real point +of my remonstrance, the breach of the amnesty of which I had complained. +The monstrosity of the prosecutions’ being carried on in the Khedive’s +name for acts due to the Khedive’s own instigation was too delicate +ground to be ventured on, and Dufferin was diplomatically silent. In the +meanwhile men were being hanged, and among them, on the 5th of February, +a young officer charged with being responsible for the riot at Tantah in +July 1882. + +The riots of Tantah, which took place a few days after the bombardment +of Alexandria, were the work of the Alexandrian mob which had fled from +that city. They were permitted and encouraged by the then governor of +the province, Ibrahim Pasha Adhem, an adherent of the Khedive, who +sought to emulate the conduct of Omar Pasha Lutfi in the Alexandrian +case. The Tantah massacre would have attained very large proportions but +for the intervention of Ahmed Bey Minshawi, a neighbouring fellah +proprietor of great local authority, aided by Yusuf Abu Diab, one of +Abd-el-Aal Pasha’s aides-de-camp, who had been sent by Arabi to protect +the Christians. The governor, Ibrahim Adhem, had then been arrested by +Arabi’s order, and sent a prisoner to the citadel, but on the return of +the Khedive to Cairo had been reinstated in his office at Tantah and had +inverted the _rôle_ of guilt in the affair. Early in the year 1883 Abu +Diab had been singled out and tried for the other’s crime, and now while +I was still in correspondence with Dufferin hanged at Tantah. His +execution, where the truth of the affair was known to every one and +where Abu Diab was highly esteemed, struck terror through the whole +province. I did not hear of the case until too late to intervene; but +when, a few days later, Dufferin’s unsatisfactory answer came, I +resolved not to allow such another injustice to go by without public +remonstrance. It is impossible that Dufferin who, though he had refused +to examine into the history of the Alexandrian riot, knew in a general +way how the case really lay as between the Khedive and the Nationalists, +should not have suspected that this and other trials on similar charges +were a perversion of justice. Also it is certain that there was a strong +political interest to serve, if the Khedive was to be rehabilitated and +supported, in providing him with a scapegoat for his own and his agents +crimes. Nor can it be left out of view that the theory of the +Nationalists’ responsibility for the riot had been made the pretext and +excuse throughout by our diplomacy, and by Dufferin himself at the +Constantinople Conference, for its intervention. Dufferin was no +sentimentalist in politics, and could at times be hard. In this case, as +in others which preceded and followed it, he contented himself with +directing the formal presence of an Englishman at the trial, one +unacquainted with the language, to watch it, and thus allowed the +Khedive to have practically his own way. + +The next case that occurred was that of the vengeance taken on a number +of unfortunate Bedouins charged with the murder of Professor Palmer +during the war. Palmer (see “Secret History”) had been sent by our +Government, and especially by Lord Northbrook, to bribe the Bedouin +tribes east of the Suez Canal, and with him Gill and Charrington, two +English officers, had met their deaths in its performance. They had all +three, travelling disguised, been taken prisoners and shot in the desert +by order of the Egyptian governor of Nakhl, an act not of common murder +but clearly of warfare, and one which should certainly have been covered +by the amnesty, the business the disguised officers were on giving them +the character of spies. But our Government had special reasons for +resenting their death; and after the war was over an English officer, +Colonel Warren, was despatched to the Sinai peninsula to “do justice” on +the tribes. This duty he performed by driving in to Suez some scores of +Bedouins, men, women, and children, and selecting out of them five for +hanging, while the rest were retained for many months in prison as +hostages for more important persons still at large. This was the same +Warren who afterwards figured so lugubriously at Spion Kop in the Boer +war. The true facts of the case had been brought to my knowledge by +Palmer’s widow, who came to me incensed against the Government, and +holding them, and especially Lord Northbrook who had sent him, +responsible for her husband’s death. She now laid the whole particulars +before me; and we had questions put about it in Parliament, and +eventually a debate raised on the Address, and another in the House of +Lords, in which Her Majesty’s Ministers rose, one after the other, and, +like Ananias and Sapphira, lied valiantly in the public cause. It is a +curious feature of our parliamentary conventions that so worthy and +straightforward a man as the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman should +have consented on this occasion to deny absolutely facts of which there +was the clearest possible written proof, and of which he could not have +been ignorant, in Palmer’s own handwriting, while also it concerned a +sum of public money no smaller than £20,000. Lord Northbrook was the +Minister really responsible and Bannerman was his Under-Secretary at the +Admiralty, and to him the work of denial was given by his chief. We +failed to save the Bedouins but obtained for the lady a handsome +pension, and for Palmer sepulture in St. Paul’s. The whole story is +instructive but has been told in my “Secret History,” and its sequel +does not sufficiently concern Egyptian history to detain me here. + +A third still more important case among the political hangings of the +year was that of Suliman Bey Sami, the Nationalist Colonel of the +Alexandria garrison, who, at the time of the riots, had come down with +his regiment and put an end to the massacre in spite of the conniving +civil Governor, Omar Pasha Lutfi. Omar Lutfi was a strong partisan of +the Khedive, and the resentment of the Court party was, for this reason, +especially keen against Sami. It was a case precisely on the same lines +as that of Abu Diab, except that the charge brought against Sami was not +in regard to his conduct at the time of the riot, but for having set +fire to Alexandria during the bombardment a month later. It is +especially disgraceful to our Government that this man should have been +hanged with their connivance, and by a court-martial appointed by this +very Omar Lutfi, because the charge brought against him concerned one of +their own political fictions, namely, that Alexandria was set fire to +not at all by the guns of the British fleet, but solely by the +Egyptians, a fiction in which they had not only a political but also a +pecuniary interest, involving responsibility for the three millions +sterling indemnity claimed by the victims of the bombardment. The +hanging, moreover, was the clearest possible breach of the amnesty, for +Suliman’s act had the perfectly legitimate excuse of warfare, as one +designed to cover the retreat of the Egyptian army. Here the case was so +strong a one against the Government that I was able to secure the help +of that really efficient fighter in the House of Commons, Lord Randolph +Churchill, an occasion memorable to me as the beginning of a valuable +political friendship long preserved. + +Randolph Churchill was an extraordinarily interesting young man, the +most attractive at that time in English public life, the head of the +little group of four Tories in the House of Commons which went by the +name of the Fourth Party. Until the spring of 1883 I had not come across +him personally. He had been kept away from the House during the whole +earlier session of 1882 by illness, and I had not had the good fortune +of securing his help. I have often thought that but for the accident of +his illness that spring, when the Egyptian crisis occurred, the whole +trouble and discredit of the bombardment and the war might have been +prevented, for it needed nothing but a powerful and persistent voice on +the Opposition side in Parliament to deter Mr. Gladstone from an +enterprise so strangely at variance with his life-long teaching. +Unfortunately, such a voice had not been available. The members of Mr. +Gladstone’s own party did not dare, with the single exception of Sir +Wilfrid Lawson, to reproach him with the necessary courage, and as for +the Tory Opposition, not one of them had the wisdom to take with him a +humanitarian line, the only one which could have convinced him of his +folly. + +In the short autumn session, Churchill had reappeared and had given +courage to his followers, and they had helped us in getting a fair trial +for the vanquished “rebels,” Churchill himself generously subscribing to +the Arabi defence fund. But so far we had not personally met. Now, +however, in my anger at the barbarities which were being committed in +Egypt, and by the advice of my friends, especially Lady Gregory and my +cousin, Algernon Bourke, who was still on the staff of the “Times” (see +“Secret History”) I turned to Churchill as the one man capable of +dealing in Parliament effectively with the case. Dufferin, his mission +ended, had turned his back on Egypt, and the small local protection +given by his presence was no more to be had. It was an urgent necessity, +if these black doings were to be stopped, that the home Government +should be at once subjected to vigorous and even violent remonstrance, +and that Gladstone should be attacked individually as the responsible +author of the atrocities due to his intervention. In his younger days +Gladstone had denounced the State crimes of Bourbon rule in Naples with +its arrests, imprisonments, and sanguinary political punishments, and it +was urgent now that some one should stand up in the House and remind him +of his more reputable past, and shame him from the countenance his +agents were giving to the same State crimes in Egypt. Churchill in his +place below the gangway was the man for this. He was “spoiling,” I was +told, “for a fight,” and to him in my new need I turned as the one +knight errant on whom I could quite rely. + +I like to remember Lord Randolph as I then first saw him one afternoon +in May when, by appointment, I met him to discuss the situation at some +rooms in the Strand where a chess tournament was going on. Chess was one +of his few hobbies, and he had asked me to meet him there. At the time +of which I speak he was, with no very regular features, a distinctly +good-looking young man, smartly dressed and with a certain distinction +of manner which marked him from the common herd. He was of ordinary +height—by no means the dwarf his caricatures suggest—well built and well +set up, his face a pleasant one, eyes full of intelligence, though +rather _à fleur de tête_, while his mouth, overhung with a strong +moustache curling up above his cheeks, gave an aggressive tone to his +countenance it would not otherwise have had. In colour he was then, as +always, rather pale, with a look of ill-health which later increased +from year to year, a symptom of the constitutional weakness of which he +so prematurely died. There was no lack, however, as yet of virility in +his movements or gestures. On the contrary, it was just the vital force +in him which was the chief attraction and the frank irresponsibility in +all he did and said. Indeed, it was difficult when conversing with him, +even after he had become a Cabinet Minister, to regard him as a quite +serious statesman—a glorified schoolboy rather, ready still to rob an +orchard or tie a cracker to the head master’s coattail. This simplicity +of speech and pleasant humour, joined to a high-bred courtesy with +strangers, made him a favourite, especially with young men nor only of +his own class in England, while, as I afterwards found, it opened to him +no less the doors of confidence in the minds of the many Orientals whom +I brought to see him—minds usually suspicious of Englishmen, and slow to +reveal their thoughts. He had none of that arrogant coldness that so +much repels these, nor again of that abruptness of address which is apt +to frighten them, as birds are frightened at any too sudden movement. +Such visitors never failed after an interview with Churchill to speak to +me enthusiastically in his praise. To myself he was invariably charming. +My somewhat romantic view of politics, so little like his own, attracted +him, and my knowledge of the East, of which he was as yet ignorant; and, +being some ten years his senior in age, I was able to inspire him almost +from the beginning of our intercourse with new ideas, enlarging his +political horizon, and as I have always been glad to think, encouraging +him in the humaner paths of public virtue. To these he was already in a +vague way inclined, and on the occasion of our first meeting I had no +difficulty in persuading him to take up the Egyptian patriotic case, the +more so because it gave him an opportunity for immediate action in +Parliament most damaging to the Government. He found it a pleasant +fancy, when I suggested it to him, that he should array himself in the +Grand Old Man’s Midlothian garments, left as it were outside a tavern +door, and preach to him to his face of “righteousness and temperance and +a judgement to come.” + +With Churchill’s assistance I was able to enlist other strong helpers, +Drummond Wolff, who was the member of the Fourth Party specially +affected to foreign affairs, and Gorst (Sir John) its legal adviser—both +men of great ability and political courage. Outside their radius, too, I +had for friends in the House of Commons Robert Bourke,[7] who +represented foreign affairs on the Opposition front bench; Sir Wilfrid +Lawson, the most honest man in Parliament; and Labouchere, whom I had +known in my old diplomatic days as a fellow attaché, and who was now +leader of the extreme Radical division below the gangway. All these were +good men and true in a parliamentary fight, and, working together, could +be counted on to force the official entrenchments of the Government, and +make the Grand Old Man the object of daily attacks which should convince +him of his shame. We had good help, too, from the Irish party, and it +had been O’Donnell who had opened the campaign for us with the Palmer +case. + +Thanks especially to Churchill’s energy that summer, and to the great +publicity he was able to give to the Khedive’s connection with the +riots, I have the satisfaction of remembering that we succeeded at last +in putting a stop to the worst barbarities of the restored regime at +Cairo, nor was any further political hanging after that summer permitted +as long as Gladstone remained in office. The experience of the past +year, however, left me wholly sceptical of the good faith of either our +Cairo diplomacy or the London Foreign Office, and permanently estranged +me from that vast official machinery of the British Empire which, I now +came to see, maintained its power in the East only by a system of +mingled lying, force, and fraud repellent to common honesty and equally +demoralizing to the governors and those it governed. It was in this mood +that Dufferin’s famous “Charter” of Egypt’s liberty found me when at +last I read it in the pages of a new Blue Book. + +I reproduce from among my papers the following interesting letter from +Lady Gregory[8] which admirably describes our common feeling about the +charter at the time we read it. It was written just when I was seeking +to bring forward the charges against the Khedive, and when Dufferin, +having returned to England, was using his influence with the press to +get the charge hushed up. It is too good and instructive a letter not to +be printed here in full. + + + (Undated but written at the beginning of May 1883.) + +“I am curious to hear what you think of Lord Dufferin’s despatch. It +reminds me of what someone of the ancients said of human life, ‘a comedy +to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel.’ + +“I am very sorry I did not know you had not seen Lord Dufferin’s +despatch. I read it, and sent it off yesterday to Sir William, but would +have sent it to you first if I had known. It would not, however, do much +to put you in good spirits. There are some good suggestions in it, taken +from Arabi’s programme, such as a National Bank to come between the +people and the usurers, and a reform in the working of the Cadastre. But +for all evils his remedy is: Put in more Europeans. Of course when the +country is well stocked with English surveyors and judges and engineers +it will be necessary to keep English troops there to protect them. I +would rather they annexed at once. There would be less hypocrisy about +it. He winds up with a panegyric on Nubar, Sherif and Riaz and alludes +in terms of admiration to Sultan Pasha and calls the Khedive amiable and +benevolent. So you may imagine the style of the document, in which there +are poetic allusions to Memnon and Pactolus and a great flourish about +putting the house-tax on Europeans, and this ridiculous Parliament which +is to have no hold on the purse strings and will be of course useless, +but sounds well. I don’t blame Lord Dufferin so much. Of course the +Government told him what was expected of him, but he might just as well +have drawn up this prose poem at Therapia without going to Egypt at all. + +“I enclose copy of your statement which I am keeping for the present. I +have seen Chenery[9] to-day and talked the matter over with him, but +Lord Dufferin has been beforehand with me! having already interviewed +him and, as if he knew what was coming, persuaded him that any attack on +the Khedive would add immense difficulty to the action of the Government +just now—that, whatever his faults may be, he has promised to support +English policy, and that for the interests of the Empire it is much +better to let bygones be bygones—and that the ‘Times’ is such a very +important paper that anything that appeared in it against Tewfik would +at once be made use of by the French, and within two hours be +telegraphed to the Khedive, who would believe the Government and the +‘Times’ were the same thing—that this is a time of change in Egypt, a +new man being sent there and a new start made and the less stir made +about what had already occurred there the better. This is also Lord +Granville’s view! + +“Poor Chenery had then to listen to my appeal as to whether Arabi’s +character was never to be cleared from the slurs cast upon it by +Gladstone and Dilke in the House, and never withdrawn, just to save the +Khedive whom no one has any opinion of, and he became agitated after +reading your statement and said that if it were true the Khedive ought +to be hanged—but that at the same time, for the reasons given before, he +is very doubtful whether he ought to publish it, even in a letter from +you. In the end he said that, if you would modify as far as possible the +_personal_ attack on the Khedive and add a paragraph laying the crime +more on the Palace party than on him and make it as much as possible a +defence of Arabi rather than an indictment of Tewfik, he would see if he +could publish it, though not binding himself by a promise, and if he +could not would return it to you in time to publish it elsewhere, as I +told him it must be out by the 11th. He was very kind and I think was +really anxious to be amiable, and spoke most affectionately of you, and +I really don’t blame him for not wishing to quarrel with the Government. +Indeed I was hopeless from the time I heard Lord Dufferin had taken him +in hand. What are we against him? + + + Don’t seek to hinder him + + Or to bewilder him + + Sure he’s a pilgrim + + From the Blarney stone! + + +“I told Sir William all this and he is pretty sure Chenery will be +afraid to print it in any form, and I should be very unwilling to take +away any of the force of the accusation against Tewfik. I thought all +the more of its importance from Chenery being so afraid of the effect it +might have. Sir William and I both think that if you could get Lord +Randolph to make the statement in the House it would be your best +course, as it would thus gain publicity, and the Tories at all events +might take it up. Do you think this will be possible? I should not like +you to publish it in any paper but the ‘Times.’ Chenery talked +cheerfully of a ‘little pamphlet,’ but that was of course to prevent the +little foundling being laid on his own doorstep.” + + +My own impression of Dufferin’s charter, and his famous dispatch +expounding it, was little different from that here quoted. It was +obvious to all of us who knew anything of Egypt that in the present +condition of things there, under the restored regime of Tewfik and the +Turco-Circassian Pashas maintained in power by a British army and +allowed to imprison and hang whom they would, where there was neither +freedom of speech nor of the press, and where all political society was +honeycombed with spies, the talk of giving back liberty to the Egyptians +was in the nature of a sorry jest. The Queen’s speech which had ushered +it in on the opening of Parliament had been a mere repetition of all the +old Foreign Office platitudes of the previous years. Her Majesty had +been made by Gladstone’s Cabinet to say: “The reconstitution of Egypt +and the reorganization of its affairs under the authority of the Khedive +have in part been accomplished, and will continue to receive my earnest +attention. It will be my endeavour to secure that full provision shall +be made for the exigencies of order, for a just representation of the +wants and wishes of the population, and for the observance of +international obligations,” a programme more meagre than that of the +previous year, in which “the prudent development of Egyptian +institutions” had been promised, with the result of Egypt’s parliament +having been crushed and abolished six months later by a British army. +What was it possible to hope from the liberalism of a government which +had restored the absolute power of a Prince so detested by his subjects +that it needed British bayonets to keep him on his throne? Dufferin’s +charter, to be made a reality, called for a change of Khedive as a first +condition of its success, and of this no sign whatever had been given. +To talk of granting a Constitution, as a novelty, to a people who had +just been robbed of their Constitution, and whose constitutional leaders +had been ruined and driven into exile, could be only a mockery; and as +such it appeared to us. Dufferin had indeed been a “pilgrim from the +Blarney stone.” + + +MEMORANDUM OF REFORMS FOR EGYPT DRAWN UP AT LORD DUFFERIN’S REQUEST BY +AHMED ARABI PASHA, DECEMBER 1882 (EXACT DATE NOT GIVEN) + +1. The Constitution granted to the Egyptian Nation of 7th February 1882 +should be confirmed. + +2. Rules should be laid down as to the limiting of the power of whoever +may be appointed Ruler of Egypt, so that he shall no longer be an +absolute Ruler. + +3. Rules should also be laid down as to the Ministers and Heads of +Departments, so that each should have conditions imposed on him which he +could not transgress. + +4. A Mejlis or Council of Elders should be formed as a Body of Appeal on +important questions where differences shall have occurred between the +Government and the Chamber of Representatives. + +5. New regulations should be issued for the reorganization of the +various administrative departments, so that each Department or Province +or Office should have so many officials of assigned rank belonging to +it, at fixed salaries liable neither to increase nor to decrease, with +regulations as to promotion according as vacancies occur through +resignation or death or for any other natural reason. + +_Remark._—Public offices in Egypt have hitherto been conducted on no +fixed rule, but every Minister or Governor or Chief of Police has done +with his administration as he pleased, dismissing or promoting all under +him without inquiry, and removing officials from post to post according +to his fancy, so that the budget has always exceeded what was right, and +increased from year to year without sufficient reason; this it is which +has caused yearly deficits in the budget. + +6. Rules should be made to control the action of the police so that they +should cease to interfere with the judicial inquiry into cases, as now +is done, but each police station should have a small Council to deal +with cases in its own district and refer them to the tribunals of First +Instance for decision. The police should appear in the character of +prosecutors only. + +7. Municipalities should be formed in Cairo, Alexandria, and other +considerable Egyptian towns, as may be suited to each town, and the +funds raised by dues in each town should be kept in the treasury of each +Administration to be spent on improvements for that town only, such as +mending roads, repairing public buildings, lighting the town with gas, +supplying water, erecting slaughter-houses, hospitals, and public +markets for the sale of whatever produce is brought in from the country, +and on whatever else may be of advantage to the town or prevent its +injury. + +8. Rules shall be laid down to control the transactions of the small and +the large banks, and to fix the maximum rate of interest all over Egypt. + +_Remark._—The banks themselves are at present the cause of the ruin and +destruction and misery which have fallen upon the indigent fellah. + +9. Tribunals shall be instituted all over Egypt with the formation of +the High Courts, one of them at Cairo, the other at Alexandria, the +members of both of which shall be chosen from among the Native and +Foreign Notables; and it shall be their function to pronounce final +decisions. Rules shall be laid down for the guidance of these Courts +suitable to the country. + +10. The Consular jurisdictions shall be abolished, and all suits +concerning foreigners inhabiting Egypt shall be tried before the +abovementioned tribunals. + +11. All foreigners inhabiting Egypt shall be on an equal footing with +the natives in paying taxes and customs duties, and all such imposts as +are incumbent on the natives. + +12. The Mixed Tribunals shall be abolished, the Courts abovementioned +being sufficient. + +13. The official language in all parts of the country shall be Arabic. + +14. Egypt shall remain dependent on the Ottoman Porte as she is now, +inasmuch as we know that the hearts of the Egyptians are in sympathy +with the Porte. But inasmuch as the shoulders of Egypt are burdened with +debts, and as the situation demands such a diminution of the debt, as +will be mentioned below, so also it becomes necessary to diminish and +limit the yearly tribute paid to the Porte to the amount imposed upon +Egypt in the time of Mohammed Ali Pasha, considering, too, that at that +time Egypt had no debt. + +15. The Suez Canal shall be under the protection of the European powers +generally and jointly. + +16. Slavery shall be abolished absolutely and permanently. + +17. The Sudan ought to remain a dependency of Egypt, and that because it +has a fertile climate; and, if a railway were made to Khartoum, it would +become the great centre of commerce for the Sudan and the East, and it +would begin to be gradually civilized. + +18. A rule should be made determining the conditions according to which +everyone, whether native or foreign, is employed in the Egyptian public +administration, and the term of his service and retirement and promotion +and dismissal shall be fixed. + +19. The assessment of taxes in general must be reformed, and the customs +duties, because they are based at present on inequitable principles. + +20. All these administrations, of which the revenues are mortgaged for +the Egyptian debt, such as railways, ports, Governorships, the +Municipality in Cairo, and the Administrations of the Domains and the +Daira Sanieh, shall revert to the Government, in order that they (the +Government) may administer these revenues as they think best, and may +refund the surplus to the Treasury of the Malieh, inasmuch as the +continuance of those administrations under present conditions is a +yearly loss to the Egyptian Treasury. + +21. The Caisse de la Dette shall be abolished, the Treasury of the +Malieh being sufficient. + +22. The Egyptian Debt must be unified and diminished to 50 millions +sterling, at an interest of 3 per cent. yearly, so that the Egyptian +Government shall be itself a guarantee for the payment of the +instalments when due, and those instalments shall be paid at the dates +fixed, and those dates shall be fixed at the end of the harvest, winter +and summer. + +23. A commission shall be formed of eminent engineers and men of science +and art to repair ancient Arab buildings which have begun to decay, and +to restore them to their original condition, taking care to preserve the +hieroglyphics and temples and monuments of ancient Egypt, and to examine +them and put them in order, and to build a large museum to receive the +Egyptian and Arab antiquities. + +24. The native schools in the towns and villages shall be put in order +and made accessible for the education of children of both sexes and the +spread of knowledge and civilization. + +25. A real Budget shall be drawn up each year with great accuracy, so +that the Government may know its exact revenue, as also its expenses. +These should be reckoned each year, after the necessary reforms shall +have been decided on. Three months before the end of each financial year +there shall be an inspection of the surplus cash in the Treasury of the +Malieh remaining after payment of all expenses; and this sum shall be +divided into two portions, according to circumstances—one of them to be +applied to paying off a part of the original capital of the Debt, and +the other to reclaiming lands suitable for cultivation. + +26. The question of appointing a new Ruler (Waly) is an important one, +and I will lay before you my own views and those of my comrades. I say: +That the family of Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali, is absolutely +worthless for the sovereignty, no matter how they might be controlled by +a constitution, for they are people of notoriously corrupt principles. + +In my opinion there is a choice of two courses: + +1. To appoint Halim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali Pasha, as Waly for Egypt +under the conditions above laid down. He is a man who has been tried by +misfortunes, and has tasted the bitterness of injustice, and has reached +the age of about 55 years, and I believe that such a man may try to win +the sympathy of the people by justice and kindness. + +2. The other to appoint as Waly for Egypt one of her own men of the +national party, whose deeds have borne witness to their goodness of +disposition and peaceful character. But as to any idea of appointing a +foreign Ruler, I say that, as the mass of the Egyptians are Moslems, +with the exception of the small section of Copts, and these also are the +same as the Egyptians in their dealings and ways of life, I believe that +the appointment of a foreign Waly would not suit the character of the +Egyptians, but that it would perhaps cause trouble among them. As to the +regard to be had for the interests of foreigners, I say that when +equitable tribunals shall have been formed, with the High Courts +previously mentioned, those Courts will themselves guarantee the +interests of natives and foreigners together, for it has hitherto been +unheard of that any Egyptian should wrong a foreigner. + + + + + CHAPTER II + + SIR EVELYN BARING ARRIVES AT CAIRO + + +THE events briefly narrated in the last chapter will explain the +bitterness of heart with which in the late summer of 1883 I once more +prepared to leave England for Egypt on my road to India. What little +belief I may have retained in the honour or indeed the common honesty of +Mr. Gladstone’s Government in its relations with the unfortunate people, +which it had first passed under the harrow of its arms and then mocked +with the jibes of its diplomacy, had given place in me to a resentment +which seemed to impose it as a duty henceforth of my life to take sides +with the poor Nile dwellers against their European betrayers, and to do +my utmost to counterwork the financial and Foreign Office rogues in +their design of perpetuating their subjection. + +In Egypt itself there seemed little for the present to accomplish. With +Churchill’s help I had succeeded in putting a stop to the worst excesses +of the restored regime. Malet and Colvin were both being removed to less +dangerous spheres of official activity, and the appointment of Major +Baring in their place at Cairo seemed a guarantee against any violent +renewal. Baring, who was afterwards to be Lord Cromer, had a reputation +at that time for large-mindedness which imposed upon the public, in +spite of his financial connections, and caused it to be believed that he +would do his best to hasten, not delay, the evacuation of Cairo. He was +supposed to represent Mr. Gladstone’s policy of a reconstruction of the +Khedivial autonomy on a basis of free institutions as declared in his +famous speech of 9th August, when he promised that “having given Egypt a +fair start England would wish her God speed.” It is worth recalling +this, and also John Morley’s testimonial to Major Baring’s sound Liberal +ideas, published at the time of his appointment in the “Pall Mall +Gazette,” if only for the contrast of his prediction with the notorious +sequel of Lord Cromer’s career. This is how Morley announced the event: + + +“Major Evelyn Baring is now semi-officially announced to have been +appointed Consul-General in Egypt in place of Sir Edward Malet. The +selection is a good one. Major Baring is something more than an eminent +Anglo-Indian; he is an experienced Anglo-Egyptian, familiar both with +men and affairs in the Nile Valley. His appointment will help to +reassure the public both at home and abroad as to the tendency of +English policy in Egypt, for it is well understood both at Cairo and in +London that Major Baring is not an advocate of a forward policy, and +that he is free from any delusions as to the possibility of inaugurating +a millennium in Egypt by placing it under ‘the masterful hand of a +British Resident.’ It is not in that direction that Major Baring will +lead the country in which he will be the accredited representative of +England.” + + +I had disburdened my mind to a certain extent of its anger by writing my +diatribe in verse (see “Secret History”) “The Wind and the Whirlwind,” +but I felt that a more active campaign was required of me, and Egypt +being, as it seemed for the present, closed to me, I had made up my mind +before publishing what I still had in view, a true history of the +Egyptian revolution and the intrigues which had ruined it, to pay a +visit to Arabi and his fellow exiles in Ceylon, and from there to go on +northwards and make good my knowledge of the Islamic situation by +visiting Mohammedan India. In this last design I had been encouraged by +that early apostle of Mohammedan reform, Seyd Jemal-ed-Din Afghani, a +sketch of whose biography has been given elsewhere, and whose +acquaintance I had made that spring in London. Since the time of his +having been expelled from Egypt in 1879 by the Anglo-French control, +Jemal-ed-Din had wandered through many lands both east and west, in +India first, whence he had been driven by the persecution of the +political police; and then in the United States, where he had +endeavoured to qualify by residence as an American citizen; and then, +after passing through London, lastly at Paris, where he had gathered +around him a group of Nationalist exiles banished from Egypt after Tel- +el-Kebir. I had talked my intended visit to India over with him, and he +had thought it might be of use; and it had been fixed that I was to +leave England at the beginning of September for the East, when the +incident occurred to which allusion has been made in my “India under +Ripon,” and which sent me once more to Egypt. As it relates to a point +which has been challenged by Lord Cromer in his “Modern Egypt,” I will +give some further account of it here, and it will serve as yet another +proof of the half intention there was still in Downing Street to recall +Arabi. + +A few days before the date fixed for my departure an unexpected message +reached me from Mr. Knowles, the editor of the “Nineteenth Century +Review,” who, an old friend of Gladstone’s, had once before been used by +the Prime Minister to convey a message to me, and whom I knew to be +interested in Arabi’s case, begging me to call on him before starting on +my journey; and I consequently went to breakfast with him at his house +at Clapham on the morning of the 29th August. Knowles then informed me +that he had recently seen the Prime Minister, and that it was in +Gladstone’s mind, notwithstanding all that had occurred during the past +year, to recall Arabi to Egypt, and that he only needed an excuse of +some public kind to do so. His idea was that according to the new +Constitution decreed in harmony with Lord Dufferin’s despatch, Arabi +might be elected to one of the two consultative bodies which were to +form the basis of Egyptian self-government. Elections to the General +Assembly were about to be held, and, if it could be arranged that Arabi +should be returned as a member of it, it would serve as a reason for +urging his pardon on the Egyptian Government, and his recall from exile. +It was thought, too, that during my passage through Egypt I might +usefully suggest such a course to my friends there and so arrange the +matter. This plan, with its parliamentary device so characteristic of +Gladstone’s mind, was one which I could not refuse to fall in +with—though I knew how difficult it would be to carry out. It would, of +course, be impossible to do anything at all without our Government’s +help at Cairo. Knowles, however, told me that Malet, already for some +time appointed to Brussels, was to leave for his new post in a few days, +and that Baring, who was to succeed him at the Agency, was expected to +inaugurate the new regime in full accordance with Liberal principles. +Colvin, too, was on the point of leaving Egypt to resume his place in +India as before in the Civil Service. The field was therefore open, and +anything might be expected. I have a record of this conversation in +letters which I wrote at the time to Mrs. Howard, whose guest at Nawarth +I had recently been, and to Lady Gregory. These say: + + + “_30th August_, 1883. + +“At James Street I found many important letters, among others a note +from Knowles, asking me to breakfast at Clapham; there he gave me the +news. He had seen Mr. Gladstone lately, and is assured he will both stay +in office, and, if he can find some way for his pride, restore the +National Party in Egypt. It appears they are quite aware the present +state of things cannot be made to go on, and Sir Evelyn Baring has been +appointed with _carte blanche_ to devise a new policy in place of +Malet’s and Dufferin’s, which have proved failures. Baring has written +an article for the ‘Nineteenth Century’ on Lord Ripon’s policy in India, +full of the most Liberal ideas, which will come out in October, and +Knowles thinks he will receive me with open arms. So he advises me to be +there soon after he arrives, and thinks the Government will be delighted +if we can get Arabi returned for Cairo, and other Nationalists for other +places.” + + +Lord Cromer’s article here referred to, and which will be found in the +October number of the “Nineteenth Century Review” of 1883, though not a +very striking one, is of importance in connection with the view taken of +it at the time in the minds of those who appointed him and with his +later views. It is a somewhat feeble plea for local self-government in +India and a free press. He declares himself to be on the side of those +“who have established a free press, who have promoted education, who +have admitted natives more and more largely to the public services in +various forms, and who have favoured the extension of Local Self- +Government.” The most forcible passage in the article says: “No one who +watches the signs of the times in India with even moderate care can +doubt that we have entered upon a period of change. The spread of +education, the increasing influence of a free press, the substituting of +legal for discretionary administration, the progress of railways and +telegraphs, the easier communication with Europe, and the more ready +influx of European ideas, are beginning to produce a marked effect upon +the people. New ideas are springing up. New aspirations are being called +forth. The power of public opinion is growing daily. Such a condition of +affairs is one in which the task of Government, and especially of a +despotic Government, is beset with difficulties of no light kind. To +move too fast is dangerous, but to lag behind is more dangerous still. +The problem is how to deal with this new born spirit of progress, raw +and superficial as in many respects it is, so as to direct it into a +right course, and to derive from it all the benefits which its +development is capable of ultimately conferring upon the country, and at +the same time to prevent it from becoming, through blind indifference or +stupid repression, a source of serious political danger. It is only what +ought to be expected by every thoughtful man, that after fifty years of +a free press, and thirty years of expanding education, with European +ideas flowing into the country on every side, and old indigenous +customs, habits and prejudices breaking down, changes should be taking +place in the thoughts, the desires and the aims of the intelligent and +educated men of the country, which no wise and cautious Government can +afford to disregard, and to which they must gradually adapt their system +of administration, if they do not wish to see it shattered by forces +which they have themselves called into being, but which they have failed +to guide and control.” + +Again, in a second letter a week later, I wrote: + + + “_8th Sept._, 1883. + +“We have taken our places for Suez by the French steamer which leaves +Marseilles on the 16th, and so hope to arrive at Cairo about the 25th. +By that time Malet and Colvin will have gone their ways, let us hope for +_ever_, and if there is anything in Knowles’s argument I shall find the +field open for me with Baring. At the same time I confess I am far from +sanguine. In the first place I do not trust Mr. Gladstone as you do, and +then I _know_ the difficulties; these will be immense, and without +really cordial co-operation from Baring I could do nothing at all that +would be any good. I rather suspect, too, that the Foreign Office may be +trying to make use of me by encouraging just so much opposition to the +elections as to make them appear spontaneous. But we shall see; half an +hour’s talk with Baring will probably be enough to show me whether it is +worth my while staying in Egypt or whether I should not rather go on to +India. . . . I had a very interesting talk with an Oriental yesterday +who tells me . . . that there are still strong influences about the +Sultan in favour of Arab independence in Egypt, and that, if the English +Government chooses, the party can be restored, but it all depends upon +the action of our Government.” + + +Parliament at the date of this letter had not long been prorogued, and +all the world was out of town. Gladstone, among the rest, was away; he +had gone yachting with Sir Donald Currie, his host on the occasion, Sir +Algernon West, and a party of his other friends, and was actually, I +believe, on the coast of Norway, and I could not wait for his return, my +own departure from England being fixed for the 12th of September. +Nevertheless, while I was considering the matter I received a note from +Sir Edward Hamilton, Gladstone’s private secretary, asking to see me +before I went, and the morning before I was to start I heard again from +him that he wished to see me. I went therefore to him the same morning +to Downing Street, and talked the matter of the restoration of the +National Party over with him, as described in “India under Ripon,” and +it was agreed between us that I was to call on Baring while passing +through Cairo, and that if Baring would help I would try to get the +Nationalist leaders elected at the elections; but all depended on the +co-operation of our officials. He asked me whether I was going to take +anybody with me to Egypt, and I said I had been thinking of taking +Sabunji, my Oriental secretary,[10] but that as he was looked upon with +so much suspicion by the Foreign Office I had resolved not to do so. +Later, however, I found it necessary to take him, and I let Hamilton +know my change of plan. The next day I started with my wife for Paris, +where, as I have explained in my other volume, I saw Sheykh Jemal-ed- +Din, and arranged with him the details of my Indian journey. + +It was on this occasion that I first made acquaintance with James Sanua, +better known as Sheykh Abu Naddara, who was living in a little lodging +in the Avenue de Clichy, where he edited his paper and gained a +precarious livelihood as a master of languages. About this very worthy +Egyptian patriot, who has resided now in Paris for upwards of thirty +years and has gained a considerable position in the French journalistic +world, I will here say a few words. James Sanua was one of the earliest +sufferers for liberty on the Nile. An Egyptian Jew by birth, and a man +of considerable wit and education, he had become acquainted with Sheykh +Jemal-ed-Din, Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, and others of the Mohammedan +reformers, who with their wide ideas of religious tolerance received him +into their circle in the Azhar, and put him in the way of literary work. +They then, seeing that he had a pleasant wit, encouraged him in a plan +he had of starting a puppet show, which, under the guise of amusement, +was to spread political ideas among the lower class. This had an +immediate success, the butt of Sanua’s wit being, under various +disguises, always the Khedive Ismaïl. The Polichinelle of the puppet +show was a personage in spectacles, called _Abu Naddara_, Father of +Glasses, from whom Sanua took his adopted name—he was himself half blind +with a neglected ophthalmia. From this commencement he went on to +publishing a small newspaper, at first in manuscript, and then +lithographed, which was distributed by hand at Cairo and Alexandria. In +it the same tone of nonsense was kept up, and with good political +effect, among the people of the streets. It was continued for two or +three years; Ismaïl himself, who came to hear of it, joining, it is +said, in the laughter, until at last it overstepped the bounds of what +his despotism considered allowable, when it was suppressed and its +author summarily exiled. Sanua, however, was not to be beaten so easily, +and with the help of his friends found a refuge in Paris, and there +continued to print his “Abu Naddara” as a monthly sheet, and to get it +distributed as regularly as before in Egypt. At one time it had +considerable political importance, and was of sufficient interest to +induce the British Museum to desire a complete series of its numbers, +which I helped them to obtain. (See also Appendix E.) + + +About the actual condition of things in Egypt Sanua told me there were +two parties, the clerical, which looked to Constantinople for help, and +the lay, which was powerless because it had no leader. He and Jemal-ed- +Din were at that time on intimate terms with each other, and we spent +most of our time with them during the few days we were at Paris. On the +17th we left for Marseilles; and from this point I am able to take up my +narrative by transcription from my journal. + +“_16th Sept._—On board the Pei Ho. Sat at dinner next a well-known +Syrian merchant of Alexandria, Naghib Zogheb, and learned his views, +which, no doubt, represent those of the commercial class generally. He +is all for continued occupation, annexation, or anything else that shall +secure commercial stability. He looks upon the English policy as ‘_très +fin_. It says little, and does a great deal.’ All posts are being filled +up with Englishmen. The low class Europeans do not like this, as it +takes the bread out of their mouths, but he and all respectable men are +pleased. He believes Egypt to be perfectly solvent, but the English have +been persuading the fellahin not to pay their debts to the usurers. +Zogheb is too great a man to be a usurer with the fellahin himself, so +as to assist the collection of the revenue, and thinks the English will +end by being not unpopular except with the ‘fanatics.’ The Khedive and +his Ministers are only dummies. Tewfik is _un homme nul_, disliked by +the _indigènes_, and despised by the Europeans. + +“_17th Sept._—My Syrian neighbour is amusingly naïve. It appears that he +does lend money, but only in hundreds and thousands; indeed Sabunji +tells me he is the greatest of all the Alexandrian usurers, and at +dinner to-day he detailed to me some of his transactions. ‘To get money +from the Arabs,’ he says, ‘_il faut de la ruse_. They owe you £100; they +have not the money; you take produce from them worth £200, or you lend +them another £100 on the value of £200. Yet there are some of them who, +when brought before the Court, are so shameless as to deny their +signatures.’ I asked him at how much he reckoned the private debts of +the fellahin, and he told me to guess. I said, ‘Our Government pretends +they owe ten millions.’ He said, ‘Say twelve or fifteen, but their +creditors would be content with eight millions, if it was secured or +paid off and they could leave the country. The whole thing could be well +settled for ten millions.’ ‘There is no difficulty,’ he added, ‘in Egypt +except what is to be done with the _indigènes_. All the rest is simple. +Egypt should be colonized by Europeans, by Englishmen, and made to pay +all her debts.’ But the soil was getting worked out by overcropping, +losing about 15 per cent. yearly, set off by about 15 per cent. more +land being cultivated. He was again eulogistic of English cunning in +getting hold of Egypt. ‘They spent a deal of money in buying the +Bedouins, but it was money well spent. At Port Said they had had the +face to say when they disembarked that they came as friends to help the +Khedive; but all is fair when one’s own interest is concerned.’ For +himself he was glad they came and hoped they would remain. + +“_18th Sept._—I have a new neighbour at table, another moneylender, a +Greek of Cairo. His views are not very different from the other’s, and +he thinks that the English Government is really serious about +withdrawing the troops.” [_N.B._—It was intended at the time to withdraw +the Cairo garrison at the end of the year, leaving only 3,000 men at +Alexandria as an “army of observation.”] “‘The misfortune is,’ he says, +‘that Mr. Gladstone is too loyal. He promised not to annex, and he +thinks it necessary to keep his promise. But you will see, the day the +English troops go, there will be another massacre of Europeans. The army +under Sir Wood will join the Arabs; they are all savages together. To +know the Arabs you must have lived with them. They are like beasts. You +take an Arab servant, you treat him well, he poisons you on the first +opportunity; you beat him, perhaps he loves you. The English have +destroyed respect for the Khedive. He will be the first person killed. +There is no government in Egypt. The Khedive hates the English. The +Arabs hate the Khedive. The poor Europeans join the Arabs against the +English. Every one who is interested in the country prays for Mr. +Gladstone’s retirement from office. Then the country will be annexed.’ I +asked him about Arabi, whether the Arabs still talked of him. He said: +‘They talk of him only as a vagabond. They do not love any one except a +man to beat them. Lord Dufferin was told by his Government to give them +a Constitution. He has given them one. But if you ask him what he thinks +of the Arabs, he will tell you the same as I do. Commerce is ruined in +the country because we are all waiting to see what will happen. Business +does not go on. We keep our money in our pockets for fear. The +uncertainty destroys our confidence.’ Poor usurers! + +“_19th Sept._—Another talk with Zogheb. He says: ‘The whole question in +Egypt is this—to what extent could the fellah be replaced by other +labour? If he alone can dig and plough Europe _must_ come to terms with +him.’ I have written out my programme for the restoration of a National +Government in Egypt carefully, and have given it to Sabunji to +translate. He is also translating the ‘Wind and the Whirlwind.’ + +“_20th Sept._—Sabunji has made acquaintance with a young Circassian, a +naval officer. In common with the rest of the Egyptian navy he took no +part in the war, and detests the English cordially. The Circassians, he +said, were all against Tewfik because he was a fool, and because he had +betrayed the country to the English. If it had not been for Tewfik and +Sultan Pasha, the English would have been driven out of Egypt with the +courbash. Tewfik gave all the plans of Tel-el-Kebir and the Wady to +Wolseley, and Sultan Pasha helped them with the Bedouins. He was very +wroth with Sultan Pasha, ‘a dog, the son of a Coptic dog.’ Asked about +possible substitutes for Tewfik, he said, ‘Nobody thinks of Halim. A few +would like Hassan but he is not so popular as his father. Ismaïl is the +man we all want.’ He was with Dervish Pasha when he was arrested on his +return to Constantinople. He says Dervish was condemned to three years +imprisonment, but is now at large. He is young and a sailor, and has +probably spoken the truth as regards the general feeling of the +Circassians. They were all with Arabi in the last days and during the +war, just as the Sultan was. They hate the Arabs, but they hate the +English more. + +“About three o’clock we sighted the P. and O. homeward mail, with Malet +probably on board. + +“_21st Sept._—I asked my moneylending friends to-day at breakfast their +opinion of our various officials in Egypt. Colvin they said was a stupid +fellow, quite ignorant of finance. He had come as an officer of the +Cadastral Survey, and had been pushed on by influence into positions he +was quite unfit for. Blignières was really a financier, but Colvin, oh +no! Baring? That was quite a different thing. He was a man in a million. +He and Blignières had done everything between them that had been done +for Egypt. Baring was a master of finance, a man who knew his mind, and +was as firm as a rock. His appointment had made Egyptian stock go up +already. Malet was a diplomatist; he knew nothing of finance, he was +neither liked nor disliked; he was neither capable nor incapable. +Dufferin had been a great success; he was charming, gave parties, went +to the theatre, played cricket with the officers, conciliated everybody, +even the foreign Consuls. His report on Egypt was founded on the truth, +but it was full of _plaisanteries_. Wood[11] was an able man; he knew +how to manage the natives. The Arabs were like machines; they obeyed +their officers. Zogheb is of opinion they will continue to obey them, +even after the Army of Occupation is withdrawn. + +“_22nd Sept._—Arrived at Port Said during the night, and sent Sabunji +like a raven from the Ark to get intelligence. He came back with the +news that Ibrahim Tewfik is governor of the place, the same agent of the +Khedive who got up the trouble with the Bedouins in Boheyra. He has, of +course, been promoted and rewarded. Sabunji got hold of a fellah and +went the round of the shops with him, looking in at the windows. In one +of them there was a picture of Arabi, and the man asked him if he knew +it. Sabunji feigned ignorance, and when the man told him it was Arabi, +asked if the people still thought of him. The man answered ‘Some do.’ +‘How many?’ asked Sabunji, ‘the greater or the smaller number?’ ‘Perhaps +the greater,’ said the man. + +“_24th Sept._—Landed about midday at Suez, and spent the remainder of +the day with the Wests (the British Consul and his wife). Senior wrote +about them thirty years ago that they were ‘looking forward daily to +their final departure from Suez,’ and here they still are. West is a man +who knows Egypt as well as, if not better than, any Englishman in the +country. His knowledge, however, is a little out of date, though he +spent three weeks as acting Consul at Alexandria between the riots and +the bombardment last year. I had a long discussion of the financial +position with him. He was surprised when I told him of Colvin’s opinion +of its hopelessness. Colvin was here only the day before yesterday on +his way to India, but did not talk to him about finance. With regard to +the elections, he said that people would elect the man in the district +they were most afraid of. At Suez they had chosen the Sub-Governor. In +most places they would choose the chief of the police. + +“I asked him about the riots at Alexandria. He was of opinion that they +were planned. He could not say who planned them. If it was Omar Lutfi it +must have been also the Khedive, for Omar Lutfi was, and had always +been, a devoted partisan of Tewfik. But he had been of opinion when at +Alexandria that it was Arabi. If it was in fact the Khedive, the Foreign +Office did quite right not to enquire into it. Tewfik was our king in +our game of chess, and our business was to defend him. If anybody upset +him we must put him on his legs again. It didn’t do to enquire too +closely into those things. He had never seen Arabi, so could not judge +of his character. + +“West talked a good deal about the Palmer expedition; thought Palmer had +much overrated his power of bringing the Bedouins over to the English +side. Palmer had not seen the Terrabin Arabs or the Howeytat. He, West, +had thought his second expedition with Gill and Charrington a very +foolish one. All the Bedouins believed that the Sultan had given Arabi +the sword of Islam and that he must be victorious. Of Colonel Warren’s +method of examining the ‘guilty ones’ he gave a graphic account. He used +to pretend friendliness with them, and drink coffee and smoke cigarettes +and endeavour through his interpreters—for he knew no word of Arabic—to +trip them up in conversation, and make them contradict each other. On +this kind of evidence he satisfied himself as to the identity of five +Bedouins as the men who had been actually told off to shoot Palmer and +his companions, but they were only the executioners. Ibn Mershid was the +Sheykh who gave the order, but Ibn Shedid, the Howeytat Sheykh at Cairo, +was afraid of him, and let him go. They had got Ibn Mershid’s wife and +children still in prison at Suez, and twelve Bedouins in all charged +with the affair. This is monstrous. I shall apply to Baring for an order +to see them, and get them released. + +“_25th Sept._—To Cairo by the morning train. On the road there are still +some traces of the war, at Shaluf some human bones and a skull or two +lying about, but less than one would expect. The principal remains are +the iron hoops of packing cases, and broken tins of preserved meat. The +celebrated lines of Tel-el-Kebir are, after all, but a low bank and a +very shallow dry ditch. They would hardly stop a hunting field. Cairo +looks absolutely unchanged, but by reason of the time of year there are +hardly any foreigners in the town. The hotels are empty; we have the +Hôtel du Nil almost entirely to ourselves. The only sign of English +occupation that I have seen since landing in Egypt has been three men in +English uniform. + +“At dinner to-day I sat next Colonel Kelly, who is working the police +and constabulary under Baker Pasha. He gives an absurd account of their +functions, which are restricted to paying and clothing the men, and +ordering their promotion. They take all their orders from the Prefect of +police, who unites the functions of chief constable, judge, jury, and +framer of the laws. The Prefect has under him a private service of +spies, and neither Baker nor this Colonel have any right to enquire +either why people are arrested, or what becomes of them afterwards. The +Englishmen are supposed to have a right of inspecting the prisons, but +out of Cairo and Alexandria they are prevented from really doing this by +the Mudirs who refuse them all access. Amongst the constabulary are two +battalions, 500 men each, one mounted, the other on foot, composed +entirely of Turks from Turkey. [This constabulary corps was sent three +months later with Baker to Souakin, where all composing it were routed +and slain by the Mahdists under Osman Digna.] + +“_26th Sept._—Sent a note to Baring early, asking for an interview to +talk over the political situation, and got a very amiable answer, +inviting me to breakfast. Baring, who looks about fifty [he was really +forty-two], imposes on one a good deal as a man of sense and integrity, +and, without being exactly brilliant, seems capable of original ideas. +He breakfasted with his suite, among whom I found Aranghi, Malet’s Greek +dragoman, still in his same office, and from the circumstance I did not +augur well of any change of policy. We talked about India, the Rajputs, +Salar Jung, and other interesting topics. Baring said that Salar Jung +was the finest looking Oriental he had ever met, with admirable manners, +and great dignity. The present state of things at Hyderabad was much +‘mixed’ since his death, as all had depended on his personal character. + +“After breakfast we went down to his room, which I knew so well as +Malet’s, and he asked me my views about the state of things in Egypt. I +gave him a sketch of the position two years ago, of the parties in the +Azhar, and the manner in which the Liberal party there had been +alienated from England, and the triumph of the fanatical party on the +restoration of the Khedive. He seemed to agree with me that a reform +should have a religious basis, but would not admit that the Turks and +Circassians were incapable of this. He explained that he had come to +Egypt originally as representative of the Bondholders, and that he had +always held the interests of these and of Egypt to be identical. The +Control had, in fact, done great good. While Controller he had always +refused to act in too close concert with the Consul-General, as he held +himself to be above all things one of the Khedive’s officers. He had +found that by showing the chief personages, even Riaz, that he only +wished their good he had generally succeeded in making them do as he +wanted. I objected that he had not prevented Riaz’s cruelty, his +arbitrary arrests and persecutions. He said that Riaz’s fault was that +he saw things too _couleur de rose_, he would not believe that +neglecting the just claims of the soldiers would raise a rebellion. With +regard to finance, which we next discussed, I was glad to find that +Baring held sound views on the point of the fellahin’s debts. He was for +settling them down to date, and restoring the old state of the law, +making mortgage impossible. He quite understood the evils attending the +mixed tribunals, as similar to those of the Civil Courts in India. He +said that they should be his first care. He did not, however, seem at +all hopeful of Egypt’s solvency. With the introduction of a new system +of government and the abolition of the courbash, the financial prospect +was a very doubtful one. He talked about the elections as a novel +experiment, which, if it had not succeeded this time, might another. I +explained to him that there was no such novelty in it whatever, and that +two years ago there had been elections which _had_ succeeded, and if +these last had not, it was because all liberty had been crushed. How +could a man vote independently as long as there was nothing in the +nature of _habeas corpus_ to secure him from arbitrary arrest? These +arbitrary arrests were, with the debts, the reason of the rebellion, and +would be again. He promised to have this provided against though +‘perhaps _habeas corpus_ was too much to give _all at once_.’ What the +country wanted above all was order and peace. I asked him if he did not +think of restoring the National Party, at least the civilian exiles; but +he said this was quite out of the question. They could not restore the +National Party without another revolution, and another revolution could +not be. He asked me whether the Nationalists had no leader in Egypt; I +said none that I knew of, the Reign of Terror had crushed all courage +out of the few who had not been exiled or imprisoned. In conclusion he +said, that as far as he was concerned, he should support the Khedive and +the Circassians with all his power. I saw that it was useless talking +further. Whatever Gladstone may dream of, or pretend to dream, it is +clear the Foreign Office has not changed its mind.” + +This conversation, which I transcribe as it stands in my diary, is +extremely interesting as showing the ideas with which Lord Cromer +started on his long career as Resident in Egypt. The last part of it had +been carried on in rather a heated tone, for I had spoken my mind +strongly on the impossibility of any attempt either at carrying out the +promised constitution, or even of introducing practical reforms for the +emancipation of the fellahin, through the instrumentality of the +Circassian ruling class. At the time Baring refused to believe me, but +he afterwards acknowledged the truth of my view, though it was not till +many years later, by practically discarding all the Circassian Pashas +from active participation in the government. I did not speak to him of +the part Gladstone had had in my coming to consult him, saying only that +I had come from Downing Street, and that I understood that something in +the nature of a restoration of the National Party was there desired. I +should have spoken more plainly had he shown any indication of sharing +that idea, but it was clear from the outset that our views on this +subject were at a hopeless disaccord, and I left him much disappointed. +“This is an end therefore,” I wrote, “to any plans we may have had in +Egypt, and I have decided that we shall sail in the British India boat +on the 3rd.” + +As this was the first occasion on which I met the present Lord Cromer of +the many meetings of which mention will be made in these memoirs, I will +here, for the benefit especially of Egyptian readers, attempt a sketch +of his very remarkable personality, not merely as I saw him first, but +as it revealed itself to me in after years. A member by birth of the +well-known London banking family, Baring Brothers, of Dutch, it is +generally said of Jewish, origin, Lord Cromer belonged from the +beginning of his career to the inner ring of the high finance of Europe, +and owed to it the cosmopolitan character, along with the energy for +work, and the clear business head distinguishing those who compose it. +Several members of the Baring family have in the last hundred years +entered English political life, and have been raised to the peerage, and +this with their great wealth has given the family an influence in the +official world, wider perhaps than that of any other that can be named. +Evelyn Baring himself was sixth son of the head of the firm, and having +but a younger son’s portion was given the army as a profession. He made +his education at Woolwich, and served for fourteen years in the +artillery, without however seeing any active service, and then in 1872 +when his cousin, Lord Northbrook, also a Baring, was appointed Governor- +General of India, went to India with him as his private secretary. Thus +removed to civil employment, and having left the army with the rank of +Major, he found himself more in his true element than as a soldier, and +was able for the first time to prove his administrative worth, and he +did so with such credit that, on Northbrook’s term of office in India +coming to an end in 1876, a well-paid financial post was found for him +in Egypt, first as Commissioner of the Public Debt, and then as +Comptroller-General of Finance. This was the beginning of Lord Cromer’s +Egyptian career. + +In 1880, the Whigs having once more come into office, Baring got further +advancement and returned to India with Lord Ripon, as his Finance +Minister. In all these posts he showed his family aptitude, having +precisely the qualities which money-dealing on a large scale demands. He +was a man of integrity and prudence, with sufficient imagination, and no +more, to foresee events likely to affect the financial situation, and he +had the promptitude of will and ready self-reliance required to deal +with each as it arose successfully. The same qualities served him, +though in a less degree, as administrator. Incapable, as I judge him, of +any very original conceptions, and with small powers of sympathy outside +the narrow school of English or rather European political thought in +which he was bred, he spent half a life time in the East without +understanding it or attempting to understand; also his judgement of +individuals was very fallible. Like all business men of practical +ability, his views were necessarily short ones, and he judged men rather +by a rapid calculation of averages, than by any clear individual +insight. Time in his busy life was too valuable to waste in long +deliberation, or in reconsidering a course once resolved on; a judgement +pronounced, whether on men or things, was always with him the _chose +jugée_, which was not worth further discussion. It must stand or fall on +the merits assigned to it, and could not block the way to new cases. + +Personally I liked Lord Cromer. He had a reputation for rudeness, but I +do not think it was justified; at least he was never rude to me. On the +contrary, I found it a pleasure to talk with him, as I often did in +later years at Cairo on public business. He was always so concise and to +the point. He did not affect the mystery diplomatists mostly indulge in, +nor care to deceive or flatter, unless it might be a travelling +journalist or a too inquisitive M.P., whom he had an object in cajoling. +In talk with me he was generally sincere, whether in agreement or +disagreement; our views were not often the same, but when they differed +he did not resent speech in me as plain as his own. Above all he was +quick to understand, and as quick to decide; it was the secret of his +long success on his own lines in Egypt. His failure, when it came, was +due, I think, to what the French call the defect of his qualities, his +excessive economy of time which limited his view to work immediately in +hand, and his lack of the larger imagination which once or twice at +critical moments left him blind. + +Such I found him personally. With a pen in his hand, however, and when +writing with a view to publicity, Lord Cromer was by no means the plain +direct man I found him in his private talk. His yearly reports, so far +from being straightforward, are models of insincerity, especially those +written in his later years, when the habit of political make-believe had +grown upon him with the double part he was daily called to play in the +“Veiled Protectorate.” No one knew better than he how, with a show of +frankness, to conceal an inconvenient truth, and how by the admission of +a minor error of judgement a larger mistake could be left undealt with. +He understood, too, in great perfection the art, through praise of his +subordinates, to praise, without seeming it, himself. Year after year +his reports used to be published, making an impression on the public +mind of being the simple record of great things performed by one +careless of personal fame, and at the same time so superior to his +readers in his knowledge of his subject as to have the right to say: +“This, I and those with me did; that we left undone; the result is what +you see.” To me, who knew more of Egypt than the public knew, his +reports revealed themselves as less candid, and very much less modest. +Reading them, they always reminded me of those first chapters of the +Book of Genesis in which at the end of each day of Creation “The Lord +saw all the work that he had done, and found it very good.” Yet, if we +turn to the same reports now in the light of later experience, we +recognize easily enough how vain-glorious and how fallacious most of +them are. As to his value as a historian, his book, “Modern Egypt,” is +not history at all in any sense of being a dependable record of things +which actually happened as they happened. It is a long piece of special +pleading in regard to his own administrative achievements, in which the +defects concealed at the time have latterly become very visible. Lord +Cromer never seems to have taken the trouble to consult any native +authority, or to have gone further afield than the Blue Books for his +knowledge of events unconnected with his own special work. Even about +these he is occasionally inaccurate, and seldom quite sincere. As a +diagnosis of the land he lived in for so many years without really +seeing it—for his mornings were spent at his desk, and his evenings in +the European society of Cairo—his final judgements are fallacious +through ignorance, the work of a stranger to Egypt rather than of one so +long resident there. His prediction of the future of Islam is a fallacy +already proved; and his adoption of Lord Milner’s foolish phrase about +Egypt being the “Land of Paradox,” a confession of ignorance inexcusable +in one with such long experience, and not a trifle absurd. + +But to resume my journal. + +The few days that I still spent in Egypt before taking steamer for +Colombo showed me only too clearly how hopeless the political position +was. On the 27th I called on Sir Benson Maxwell, who had recently been +appointed Adviser to the Egyptian Government in the Department of +Justice, which it was designed to reform. “He received me with great +cordiality, saying that, although rowing in a different boat from mine, +he had great sympathy with my ideas. He is a most liberal-minded man, +but, like Baring, he thinks he has discovered a vein of liberal feeling +among the Turks. Tewfik, Sherif, and Fakri, he believes, are opposed to +Constantinople and jealous of Egypt’s independence. He thinks the Turks +born to rule, the Arabs to obey. The Turks could be taught justice under +English guidance; they wished the English to stay and help them. Ali +Mubarak (but he is an Egyptian) had besought him not to desert them till +their scheme of justice was in working order. He had a great respect for +Sherif (the then Prime Minister) as an honest and good man. I told him +the first thing he ought to do was to abolish arbitrary arrest, and he +explained that something of the sort was included in his plan, but +nothing will be so much as begun before Christmas. I told him of the +case of the Bedouin women and children in prison at Suez, which moved +his indignation. It was military law, he said, not justice. We will see +if anything comes of it. Maxwell is an honest man and really believes +what he says, which is more than most of them do, but I am afraid the +Turks are making a fool of him. He will do his best and fail, and go +home, as many another has done before him. He goes home on leave in a +couple of days; his business of reforming justice being at a standstill. +He thought very little of Dufferin’s charter, but the odd thing is, they +all imagine it to be the first suggestion in the direction of free +government ever made in Egypt.” + +The prediction I have just quoted of Sir Benson Maxwell’s failure in +Egypt was amply verified the following year, when, failing to get his +reforms adopted by the Khedive’s Government, and being ill-supported by +Baring, he finally retired from Egypt. + +“Met Lionel Moore (formerly Oriental secretary at the Embassy at +Constantinople) and went shopping with him in the Bazaar. He was very +communicative, and told me amusing stories connected with the events of +June and July at Alexandria. He was staying with Cookson on the day of +the riot, and had been out driving in the direction of Ramleh. On coming +in to the Consulate at 3, Cookson asked him to go to the Governor’s, +Omar Lutfi’s, because he, Cookson, had been wounded, and might not +survive the day. He was to deliver this message: he was to ask Omar +Lutfi if he could put down the riot with the soldiers, or whether he, +Cookson, should ask help from the ships. He had accordingly gone to the +Governor’s house, and had found him sitting with Tulba at about 3.30, +and, on delivering his message, Omar Lutfi had referred him to the +officers, who rudely answered that there would be safety for all ‘_Amàn +li jamia_’; he had accordingly gone up to Tulba and called him a rascal, +and bade him provide for the safety of the town. On this Tulba, who had +his sword across his knees, half drew it, and Moore, who had provided +himself with a heavy stick, put himself in a defensive attitude, and +defied him to come on and he would take his sword from him, whereupon +Omar Lutfi and the rest had pushed him out of the room, and downstairs, +and out of the house. Another story was that he had gone with Beresford +to help him to sketch one of the forts, and had detained the soldiers +talking while the other made his drawing. Then he had gone away to +Syria, and did not come back till after the war. We talked about Malet. +He said he was the most incapable man in diplomacy. He knew how to turn +a dispatch so as to please the Foreign Office, but he was absolutely +ignorant of everything that went on in Egypt. I reminded him of what he +had told me last year of the arrangement made at that time (January +1882) between the English and French Governments, whereby it was agreed +that in case of intervention, a French force should land, and the +English fleet should watch the seaports. The agreement held good till +Gambetta’s fall. Going up the Mouski he told me that Tewfik had not a +single friend in the country. The Circassians and all were against him. +Halim would be a better man. He thought Arabi honest, but Tulba and +Mahmud Sami were poor scoundrels. He did not believe in the Arabs. +Baring had promised him a place, because he was the only Englishman in +Cairo, with Rogers, who knew Arabic.” [N.B.—An entire libel on Mahmud +Sami, who was a very distinguished man. But Tulba was of small account.] + +This Lionel Moore was an Irishman by birth, a man of ability, much wit, +and a great knowledge of the East and Eastern languages. He had been +born in Syria, his father having been Consul at Jerusalem, and he spoke +Arabic almost as his mother tongue, so that he was commonly known in +diplomacy as the Irish Arab. He was brother of the Colonel Moore +mentioned in my “India under Ripon” as A.D.C. to the Duke of Connaught; +and he himself, as Oriental secretary at Constantinople, had accompanied +the then Prince of Wales in his tour in Palestine, and had remained a +favourite with the Prince. He was one of the _habitués_ of Marlborough +House when in England. He had, however, been obliged to leave the +diplomatic service on account of a mysterious illness which had attacked +him, and kept him, if I remember rightly, for two years semi-unconscious +at the Buckingham Palace Hotel. On recovery he was a changed man, and +had never fully regained the use of his wits, though he remained +talkative and amusing. But for this weakness, he would undoubtedly have +been given the re-employment he sought, for there was no man in Egypt +who could speak Arabic as he did of the purest kind and with a knowledge +of its literature, and a power of quotation such as he possessed. He +lived on for several years after this, and died some time in the +eighties. + +“Anne went yesterday to see Arabi’s wife, and has gone to-day to see +some of the other ladies. They tell her that all the people here have +the idea that the exiles will soon come back, that they are protected by +a high personage in England, and that Tewfik is to go away. The +soldiers, too, think this. + +“_28th Sept._—To breakfast with Moore, who told us much what he had told +me yesterday. He said most emphatically that Tewfik had not a single +friend in the country, and could not stay when the English were gone. +Then to Ali Fehmy’s house, a sad visit. Last time I was there I sat with +him and Arabi in the garden talking about the Sultan; now all is empty. +The old porter was full of tears and thanks, and told us how happy the +world would be if his master returned. We went on to another small house +to see Ali Fehmy’s daughter, a nice little Egyptian girl with a pleasant +voice, who talked sensibly about things. She is not married yet, and I +went upstairs with Anne to see her. I have written to Eddy Hamilton +telling him of my disappointment at the state of things here, and to +Sanua. I have also applied to the Domains Commissioner for the title- +deeds of my property at Sheykh Obeyd. + +“_29th Sept._—Hotter than ever. Started at 5.30 for our garden (Sheykh +Obeyd) and stopped at Matarieh to meet Sabunji and his friend Count +Gerouais, with whom he had been staying at Ramleh. The Gerouais are +Syrians, ennobled some generations back by the Papal Court, and, what is +strange, they are ardent Nationalists. We found Sabunji disguised in his +proper dress of an Abbé, which gives him a most respectable appearance. +They brought us news, though less than we expected, the most important +being that Gerouais had sent his black servant to Damanhur to look for +Sheykh Mohammed Khalil, and had returned with the tale that he had died +a month before of cholera. His account showed the suspicion and terror +of the country districts, for the people he enquired of besought him one +and all to depart out of their coasts, an account which exactly +corresponds with one brought me yesterday, in answer to enquiries I had +made for other friends, of the Boab (gate-keeper) of the Azhar.” + +The news of Khalil’s death distressed me much, as it was that of my +earliest friend at the Azhar, Mohammed Abdu’s most devoted disciple. +Poor man! as I afterwards learnt, he had been driven out of the Azhar on +the Khedive’s restoration on account of his connection with me, and had +wandered about afterwards with a heart broken over the misfortunes of +his country. He was of the salt of the earth, and his persecution shows +how relentlessly the best men of the Liberal Party were tracked and +punished by the reactionaries whom we had replaced in power. + +“We found our garden undamaged, and gathered a dozen large pomegranates +to take to Arabi. During the war the Mudir of the district had had the +house broken into and had taken some of our things, including 17 rifles, +some pistols, and the small brass cannon I had bought two years ago for +Ibn Rashid (the Emir of Hail), an act which formed the basis of the +French fiction of my having bought a house and stored it as a ‘veritable +arsenal’ before the war. The things were taken to the citadel.[12] We +returned at half-past twelve, entertained Moore at breakfast, and +afterwards went with him to the Boulac Museum. After dinner Gerouais +came with old Salim Basalim and his son. From the old man we learnt a +good deal about the feeling of the people at Cairo. All classes, high +and low, hate Tewfik, but are in terror of their lives. His spies are +everywhere, but, where two or three are gathered together, they long for +the return of the exiles. I asked him what the people thought about me, +and he said: ‘Out of four two would be delighted to see you, and would +say so, one would be delighted but would not say so, and one would not +care.’ At first, after the war, people said: ‘What has Mr. Blunt been +doing that we hear nothing of him,’ and they were angry, saying he had +deserted them, but when Napier and Broadley came they knew that he was +still their friend. I explained the political situation in England as +far as it affected Egypt, the difference of ideas between the two +parties, the one which would annex, the other which would leave Egypt, +Lord Granville’s illiberal ideas, and Mr. Gladstone’s character. I bade +him tell his friends not to lose heart, that it was impossible the +present _régime_ could last, that with patience they would see the +exiles back, and the party of liberty restored. He promised to spread +this opinion everywhere, and said: ‘There are many in this town who, if +they knew you had passed down the street, would kiss the dust of your +footsteps.’ Then he looked about him in a frightened way, and said he +must go. They are all in terror of their lives. + +“_30th Sept._—In the morning came Ali, our head gardener, who finished +his narrative of the seizure of our property. I told him the people were +donkeys, seeing I was the only friend they had had in England during the +war. He said they did not know what they were doing. They had wanted to +cut the water and take the coals of the engine, but fortunately were +prevented, or the garden would have been ruined. + +“Next came a nephew of Arabi’s, who had been living on what was left of +the family estate near Zagazig. I asked him about the elections. He said +the fellahin were frightened at being put down on the register, and +understood it as a device for enlisting them in the army, but he was +afraid of talking. He was followed by Suliman Nashaat, a brother of Abd- +el-Aal’s, who was more courageous. He confirmed what the other had told +about the elections. In the towns the Governor or the Prefect of police +had sent round privately to tell the people who they were expected to +choose, and there was no opposition possible. Dufferin’s Constitution +would be well enough if they had an honest ruler, one who desired +liberty, but under Tewfik it was quite useless. There had never been +such tyranny in Egypt before, not even under Ismaïl Pasha. Ismaïl had +taken people’s money, but they were not molested as now by the police. +They were imprisoned now, and put to death on false charges, so that +there were many who wished Ismaïl back. Many of the Circassians were now +of the party of liberty, and wished a return of the exiles. The party of +liberty did not wish ill to the Europeans, and were at one with the +Copts and the Coptic Patriarch, while Boutros[13] and other rich Copts +were on the side of Tewfik. As soon as the English troops went the +people would rise against Tewfik and kill him. The soldiers would kill +their English officers—they were all ready. I told him that would be +very foolish. He reproached Arabi with having run away from Tel-el- +Kebir; Arabi, he said, used to take three hours saying his prayers +instead of attending to his business. It was not the place of a +commander to pray so much and run away so soon, and many complained that +he had thus lost his honour. Still the people liked him because he was +good, but he was more of an _alem_ than a soldier. His own brother, Abd- +el-Aal, would not have run away. Abd-el-Aal had written over and over +again to ask to be sent to Tel-el-Kebir, and he had been the last to +surrender. This is quite true. He then gave a touching picture of the +death of Yusuf Abu Diab, his brother’s aide-de-camp, who was hanged at +Tantah by the Khedive for saving the lives of Christians. Anne has +written the account down in full. He, Suliman Nashaat was in prison with +Yusuf, and afterwards went with him to the gallows, and received his +last words. Suliman Sami he had known well. It was true that Suliman had +burned Alexandria against Arabi’s orders, but he was hanged because he +would not give up certain papers. Kandil had had papers, and he was +promised his life if he would hold his tongue about the riots of June. +There were plenty of people who would give witness if the case was gone +into against the Khedive. In the Azhar every one was frightened. El +Abbasi, the new Sheykh El Islam, hated liberty. El Edwi, one of the most +courageous Sheykhs, had been exiled to his village, but the Khedive +thought now of sending him to the Mahdi to find out what his views were. +Suliman evidently sympathizes with the Mahdi, and half believes in him. +He said the issue would show whether he was sent by God. Anne has gone +to see Princess Inja Hanum. + +“_1st Oct._—Last night a young man looked in who explained that he was a +friend of Wahby Bey’s, and that he had been arrested with twenty-five +others on a charge of having been connected with a Frenchman who went by +the name of Mohammed Said, and had formed or pretended to form a society +against the English called ‘Les Vengeurs.’ His only connection with him +was that the Frenchman had come to lodge in his house, and would not go +away. They had all been brought before a mixed commission, on which two +Belgians had sat, and their release was ordered. But Osman Pasha Ghaleb, +the Prefect of police, had detained most of them by superior orders from +the Palace on suspicion. The man Husseyn Bey brought me a letter from +one of them, Abd el Razak Bey, F.R.G.S., ex-director of the Naval +College, written in very good English, and asking me to come and see him +in the Zaptieh prison. Accordingly I wrote this morning to Sir E. +Baring, asking permission to pay the visit, but as no answer came, and +as we are going away to-morrow, I went with Husseyn Bey to try and get +in. The discipline of the prison is so lax that this was easy enough. +The man at the door brought a key for the asking, but they only let us +stay a few minutes. I got out of Razak, however, a most valuable piece +of information. He was in prison with Kandil, and knows he had papers +connecting the Khedive with the riots of June. Omar Lutfi got them from +Kandil on a promise of saving his life, but they meant all the same to +hang him, as they did Suliman Sami, who also had compromising documents. +I found with Abd el Razak in the prison four others, Mohammed Effendi +Fenni, late chief interpreter of the Council of Ministers, Mustafa Bey +Sidki, a brother of Husseyn Bey, a landed proprietor at Shubra, Huseyn +Sagr, and Saad-el-Zagloul, assistant editor of the ‘Wakaya’ under +Mohammed Abdu.[14] All these gave me messages to Arabi, and begged me to +look after their interests. Then we were hurried away. + +“Went with Suliman to pay some visits to distinguished members of the +Party of Liberty as the National Party is now called. The first house we +called at was Emin Bey Shemsi’s, late deputy for Zagazig, and chairman +of a section; he had with him three friends, one whom he introduced as a +philosopher, another a tall vigorous young fellow, and a third, an old +fellah Notable from his own town. Shemsi used to be a country neighbour +and personal friend of Arabi’s. He is a very intelligent man, and of +some courage too, or he would not have received us, for he was only let +out of prison a few months ago, and is still watched by spies. I asked +him to tell the history of the two crises in which the Notables were +concerned last year. In the first, that which resulted in Sherif’s fall, +there was, he told us, very little difference of opinion. Sultan Pasha +alone supported Sherif. In the second, when Mahmud Sami summoned the +Chamber, they were more divided. They met at Sultan Pasha’s house before +the whole of their number had arrived at Cairo, and Sultan at first got +thirty to side with him, leaving forty-five in favour of the Ministry. +But on the occasion of the second meeting, when the windows were broken +by the mob and Arabi made his famous speech after the receipt of my +telegram, Sultan was left alone. There was no doubt in the world that +all Cairo, deputies, Ulema, merchants, and mob, insisted on Arabi’s +return to power. + +“They then asked me to explain how it had come about, that with Mr. +Gladstone and the Liberal Party in power, there had been a war against +liberty, and I explained to them the financial conditions on which the +matter hinged, and the divergence between Mr. Gladstone and Lord +Granville. They were full of gratitude to me for the attempt I had made +to get them justice, and asked me what they were to do now to get +themselves out of the hands of their tyrants. I said it was first +necessary to prove to the world that they detested Tewfik, and desired +the return of Arabi, and I asked Shemsi about the possibility of +electing Arabi for the Chamber at Cairo. They laughed lugubriously, and +explained how the elections were managed. The voting took place in the +police station, under the superintendence of the police, and at each +station there were men in plain clothes to watch the voting and direct +the election on the part of the Government. A man who should have the +courage to write Arabi’s name on his paper would at once be hustled +away, and he and his family would be ruined. ‘You don’t understand,’ he +said, ‘how these things are done with us. It would be impossible that +any one should so much as speak of Arabi. If the election were free, +every one in Cairo would vote for him.’ I said: ‘If this is so, you have +nothing to do but to make a new revolt; the English troops are to be +withdrawn in the spring, and you must then get the Egyptian army on your +side. People must be ready to revolt once and twice and thrice for +liberty. Then they obtain it.’ There was a division of opinion as to the +probability of the soldiers joining. But they seemed to think the +English officers had them under their thumbs, and they next proposed to +go as a committee to London to lay their distress before the English +Government. I said I would do what I could to help them in this. But if +things are thus, their case is nearly hopeless. The revolt, to be of any +use, should be immediately on the departure of our troops, for with Lord +Salisbury in power it would only serve as a pretext for annexation. +Shemsi and the philosopher seemed to dread the departure of the English +troops. As long as Lord Dufferin had been here there was a check, but +Malet aided and encouraged Tewfik in his vengeance. We were to have met +at their house the telegraph clerk, Mustafa Bey, who sent the message +from Tewfik to Omar Lutfi ordering the riot at Alexandria, but he was +too frightened to come. + +“Our next visit was to an ex-Mudir, a man of superior education and good +manners. We asked him about the reception recently given to Tewfik in +the provinces. His answer was, ‘If Riaz Pasha, who is my worst enemy, +were to come to see me, what should I do? I should meet him with a band +of music at the door. When we fear a man we meet him with a smile; dark +looks would bring endless trouble on our heads.’ He seemed less +timorous, however, than Shemsi, though he too had been in prison, and +came in the evening to repay our visit. + +“Sabunji has got tired of being at Matarieh, and has come into the town. +This is foolish of him as he may get into trouble, but I have told him +we must all be off back to Suez to-morrow. Husseyn Bey came again at +nightfall to say that my visit to the prison is known, and that the +sentries have been put under arrest. He wants me to write to Baring to +ask his protection. If I do, I must of course tell Baring that I went +without his permission. It is curious that of all the people I have seen +not one will hear of English annexation, even as an escape from +imprisonment and persecution. They all declare they would then revolt +against any odds. + +“_2nd Oct._—This morning Baring’s answer has come. He regrets that he +‘cannot give me the order asked for to visit the prison, such matters +being settled by the Egyptian Government, etc.’ Rot! I shall write and +tell him I have seen the prisoners, and recommend them to his +protection.” I did so in a letter dated 3rd October, with the speedy and +satisfactory result that on the 6th October Sir Evelyn Baring wrote the +following short dispatch to Lord Granville: + +“I have the honour to inclose a copy of an important circular issued to +the Mudirs of the several provinces by the Minister of the Interior. It +is to be hoped that the issue of this circular will have the effect of +clearing the gaols of all persons who are improperly or unnecessarily +detained in prison.” And again 10th October: “I have the honour to +inclose herewith, extracted from the ‘Moniteur Egyptien’ of the 9th +inst., a decree granting a general amnesty to all offenders accused of +crimes connected with the rebellion, except to those accused of murder +or rape.” + +Saad Zagloul and the rest of those with him in prison were consequently +released. I learned the news a few weeks later in Ceylon, and that it +was due to my intervention, though I cannot remember that any of the +prisoners wrote personally to thank me. My action on their behalf was, I +believe, a chief reason for my exclusion from Egypt during the following +three years, for Baring resented my interference with what ought to have +been his sole business. There is a passage in his “Modern Egypt” which +displays his displeasure and makes complaint of my correspondence with +Mr. Gladstone through Hamilton. His representations, however, to the +Foreign Office that it should be discontinued did not have the full +effect he supposes, though it made Hamilton cautious. Gladstone’s answer +to Granville, which Cromer with somewhat puerile malice quotes, proves +nothing more than that the two Ministers were in different camps about +Egypt, and that Gladstone was anxious to minimize to his colleague the +attention he paid to my opinion. Granville never forgave my action in +Egypt in 1882, but Gladstone knew that I had been right, though he did +not dare avow it publicly. He allowed Hamilton still to remain in touch +with me, as will be seen in the course of the present volume, as long as +he was in office. All that Cromer was able to effect when he discovered +that I had told the Prime Minister the truth, was that having shortly +after assumed the _rôle_ of masterly Resident he decreed my exclusion +from Egypt, and induced the Foreign Office to support him in continuing +it till 1886. My relations, however, with the other side of Downing +Street continued on a friendly footing as long as Gladstone remained in +power, while Cromer himself some years afterwards came round to my views +and tried to get up a native Egyptian Ministry favourable to England out +of the _débris_ of the Nationalist Party, going even to the length of +consulting me about those capable of composing it; but it was then too +late, and English policy in Egypt has floundered ever since in a +Serbonian bog of irreconcilable native hostility. He would have done +better to have taken my advice in 1883. + +“The ‘Phare d’Alexandrie’ has a long article describing the displeasure +of the Khedive at my arrival, and at the visits paid me by relations of +the exiles, and there is also rather a nice paragraph in an Arabic paper +saying that I had returned to Cairo, and that feasts would have been +prepared for me, but those who should have been my hosts were no longer +there—strangers had come to eat up the banquet. We have left Cairo for +Suez. Gerouais was at the station to see us off with Sabunji, who, thank +God, has not been arrested.” + +This is my last entry while in Egypt that year. From Cairo and again +from Suez I wrote two long letters to Hamilton for Mr. Gladstone’s +reading, one on 28th September, two days after I had seen Baring, and a +second on 3rd October, immediately before embarking for Ceylon. These +will be found in the Appendix. + +The next six months, following on this brief visit to Cairo, were spent +by me in Ceylon and India, an account of which will be found already +published in my volume, “India under Ripon.” The only thing I did that +winter of importance for Egypt more than is there recorded was to obtain +from Arabi and his companions in exile at Colombo a clear statement of +the policy they would recommend, drawn up more or less on the lines of +Arabi’s memorandum of the year before, with such additions to it as the +events of the intervening twelve months might have suggested, especially +in regard to the Soudan and Dufferin’s unworkable charter. The document, +embodied in a letter I sent to the “Times” on 5th November and published +13th December, is one of historical importance, and will be found in the +Appendix. + +It reiterates the truth which underlay the whole Egyptian position, +namely, that the supposed necessity of maintaining Tewfik on the +Khedivial throne at Cairo must, if persisted in, vitiate any attempt to +restore self-government to the Egyptians, or to free England from the +prolonged responsibility of protecting him with an occupying force. It +suggests in what way Constitutional Government could be restored, and +enumerates a variety of reforms, most of which have been subsequently +made part of English policy. About the Soudan, too, the affairs of which +were about to become a main subject of interest for those responsible +for Egypt’s welfare, it contains a remarkable paragraph, which may be +taken as the text of what will be found in the following few chapters of +this volume. And be it noted that at the time it was written, 3rd +November, no one at Cairo, still less in London, had begun to perceive +the truth that other than military means were necessary to deal with the +situation created by the Mahdi’s rebellion, if a great misfortune, both +for Egypt and for the Soudan, was to be avoided. Arabi, who as +Nationalist Minister of War in 1882, had been responsible for the +appointment of Abd-el-Kader Pasha to the post of Governor-General at +Khartoum, and who in the common interests of the two countries had put +himself into communication with the Mahdi, and was to a certain point in +sympathy with the cause Mohammed Ahmed represented as being that of a +revolt against the Turco-Circassian tyranny they had alike suffered +from, was in a far better position to understand how the difficulty +should be dealt with than any of those in whose hands its solution now +lay, and it is certain that, had he been able to maintain himself +against Wolseley at Tel-el-Kebir, no difficulty whatever would have +arisen in regard to retaining Khartoum, or even eventually of recovering +the lost provinces, had such been in the designs of nationalized Egypt. +The passage is as follows: + +“Although he (Arabi) is of opinion that a certain connection will always +be necessary between the lower and upper waters of the Nile, he holds +that in the present military and financial position of Egypt it is +unwise to attempt the reconquest of all or, perhaps, of any of the lost +provinces. He believes that the movement of the so-called Mahdi is not +one merely of fanaticism, or that it is only a revolt of the slave- +dealers. He thinks that Mohammed Ahmed commands the goodwill of the +inhabitants, and that it would be far wiser for the Egyptian Government +to come to terms with him than to continue their military operations +against him. The Soudan brings nothing into the Cairo treasury, and if +Egypt is to enjoy liberty at home she should avoid ideas of conquest +abroad. The terms that could be made with the Mahdi Arabi has been too +long out of Egypt to judge; but from the communications which reached +him while in power he does not believe a friendly arrangement admitting +Egypt’s suzerainty impossible. The suzerainty of Egypt the Soudanese +would probably be glad to admit, for it would protect them against +European aggression.” + +This question of the Soudan was being already much discussed among the +exiles while I was in Ceylon, though the defeat of Hicks was not yet +known. And, as it was to become a main subject of interest to us all +during the next two years, I may as well here present the general case +of it as it appeared to Nationalist eyes, for it will enable readers +better to understand both my own point of view and that prevalent at the +time in Egypt. It will serve, too, as a corrective to the false light in +which it is seen and described by nearly all European writers, who fail +to understand that Europe itself was the sole responsible cause of the +trouble. This is how I, looking at the matter, so to say, with Oriental +eyes, saw and see it. + +The revolt in the Soudan stood in close analogy with that in Lower +Egypt. Both had a double character, beginning as the natural rebellion +of a people against long misgovernment, and taking later a religious +complexion when Christian Europe had intervened in support of the +tyrannical ruler against the people. The only difference between the two +cases lay in the fact that, whereas in Egypt the reformers were +enlightened men, representing the humaner and more progressive side of +Islam, the Soudanese reformers were reactionary and fanatical. It cannot +be too strongly insisted on that the great, the capital wrong committed +by our English Government in 1882 was less the destruction of the hopes +of free government in Egypt as a nation, than the treacherous blow its +armed intervention struck everywhere at the aspirations of liberal +Islam. Arabi, a devout but the least fanatical of Moslems, had come in +1882 to represent not Egypt only, but every Mohammedan land alarmed at +the encroachment of Christendom and looking to constitutional reform as +its surest safety. And it was just this leader of reform that +constitutional and Liberal England chose to strike down. What wonder +then that the defeat at Tel-el-Kebir should have been taken through all +Mohammedan lands as a set back to reform, an impulse to reaction? At +Constantinople it had the immediate effect of putting all power into the +hands of the Sultan Abdul Hamid’s fanatical following, and of enabling +him to crush what remained of the constitutional party and the party of +religious liberalism. In Persia it had consequences of much the same +reactionary nature, and throughout North Africa it determined the whole +character of religious thought on lines of fiercely bitter hatred of +Christendom. The French invasion of Tunis had been answered by the +counter-move of the fighting fraternity of the Senussia. The English +invasion of Egypt was answered by Mohammed Ahmed’s appearance in the +Soudan as Mahdi. It made it therefore imperative in 1883, if the Soudan +was not to be lost to the fanatics, that without delay a liberal +Mohammedan Government should be restored at Cairo capable of attracting +to it the humaner elements of Islam, and pitting them against the less +humane. Had this been done by the end of the year 1882, and the English +army withdrawn from Cairo, the situation at Khartoum could have been +saved without recourse to arms. Otherwise an English occupation of +Khartoum was the sole alternative to an immediate and complete +abandonment of the whole of the Upper Nile. + +What was done, as we know, was to take neither one course nor the other. +It was decided that Tewfik was to be maintained at Cairo, propped up by +British bayonets; and at Khartoum that his authority was to be restored +without any military propping whatever—the authority of Tewfik, who had +come to be regarded as a renegade to Islam, almost as a _Kafr_, the +docile servant of a Christian Power! Was it to be expected that the +Soudanese, a fiercely Mohammedan population, proud of their Arab descent +and of their anti-crusading ancestry, should accept the domination of +one so contemptible, re-imposed on them by a Christian general and +without a Christian army at his back? Naturally and inevitably, no! +There was, besides, a special reason for anger against Tewfik, which I +do not find recorded in any history of the time, but which largely +contributed to the detestation in which he was held among the Soudanese. +One of the first acts of the restored regime at Cairo had been to arrest +the supreme head of the Malekite rite, which is that prevalent in the +Soudan and throughout North Africa, Sheykh El Aleysh, a venerable and +highly revered personage, who was treated with the utmost indignity, +and, as was currently reported, was done to death in prison by the +Khedive’s order. The news of this impiety was to the Soudanese a new +proof of Tewfik’s apostate character, and made a reconciliation between +him and them doubly impossible. Add to it the folly of recalling Abd-el- +Kader, and replacing him with the corrupt and incapable Court favourite +Ala-ed-Din Pasha, and giving him Hicks, an Englishman, but without an +English military backing, as his Chief of the Staff, and we see the full +madness from a Moslem point of view of the attempt made in the spring of +1883 to retain the Soudan; while perhaps the crowning folly of all was +to reinforce the Khedivial garrison at Khartoum with the broken remnants +of Arabi’s army disbanded after Tel-el-Kebir, and recruited afresh for +Tewfik’s service. Colonel Stewart, who was sent by Dufferin that winter +of 1882-83 to report on the condition of things in the Soudan, describes +the army Hicks was about to command as a congregation of raw +undisciplined recruits mixed with others on the point of mutiny. “The +question,” he says, “is whether they will remain faithful or desert, +knowing as they will that the Mahdi will not harm them. . . . At one of +the late skirmishes they were heard complaining, ‘O Effendina Arabi! If +you knew the position Tewfik has placed us in.’” + +Certain historians have laid stress on the distinction to be drawn +between the policy of sending Hicks to hold Khartoum and the insanity of +sending him, with an army so disaffected and so ready to mutiny, against +the Mahdi in Kordofan. Hicks, they say, might have held his own at +Khartoum if the Egyptian Government had been content to leave him there. +I see no warrant for believing this. Hicks did his best and was a +gallant officer, but he was from the first a doomed man, as Gordon after +him was doomed. The fact of their Christianity, and of their holding +Tewfik’s commission, made it impossible for either of them to succeed in +stemming the rebellion; and, though both were able to hold out for a +while, nothing but a backing of European troops could have saved them +from failure. Hicks, just as Gordon did, gained at the outset an +ephemeral advantage, but only to be replied to by the revolt of the +Eastern provinces in favour of the Madhi; and, left without English +help, he would have been beleaguered at Khartoum, as Gordon was, and +compelled, as Gordon was, to surrender. His advance into Kordofan only +accelerated his ruin. + +As to this expedition, for which Tewfik and his Ministers and Malet were +jointly responsible, it has been the fashion to consider it an act of +reckless folly on the part of the Egyptian Government, of lack of +intelligent prescience on the part of Malet. It was in my opinion +something more criminal than this. On the part of the Khedive and +Sherif, and especially of Omar Lutfi, the Minister of War, it was a +deliberate scheme to rid themselves of the last remnant of Arabi’s rebel +army and of an English officer obnoxious to their plans. They wanted, or +at least Tewfik wanted, a vengeance on the regiments which had headed +the revolt against him in 1881, a vengeance which had been denied him by +the amnesty after Tel-el-Kebir; while none of them wanted English +interference in the affairs of the Soudan. Be it remembered that Hicks’s +soldiers included Arabi’s own regiment of the Guard, or what was left of +it, and that Omar Lutfi, who had contrived with Tewfik the Alexandria +riots, had sent them to the Soudan in chains. Hicks and his regiments of +old Arabists, we may be quite sure, were ordered deliberately to their +death at Obeid. All Tewfik’s attitude towards Gordon later was in +accordance with this reading of the Hicks expedition, and it is the only +reading that explains what otherwise would remain an inexplicable act of +madness. As to Malet, he was, in this, as in all else, the Khedive’s too +facile dupe, his unconscious accomplice, just as he had been his dupe in +the case of the Alexandria massacre. He believed what Tewfik told him, +and did not look beyond. Nothing is more remarkable than the easy +indifference displayed by Malet in his published correspondence of that +summer as to all that was going on in the Soudan. Hicks saw the danger +and everybody else saw it. Malet saw nothing or saw only what the +Khedive told him. He did not care to see more. + + +An additional proof of this, if any be needed besides that of the Blue +Books, is supplied to me, though a negative one only, by my own talk +with Baring at Cairo in September, and the record of it already given. I +remember that in it, though our discussion ranged over the whole field +of his Egyptian difficulties, he did not so much as allude to the Soudan +as being one of those he had immediately to face—a remarkable omission +when it is considered that he had just been spending ten days with Malet +at his elbow, who must have had full time to bring his knowledge of +every branch of the Egyptian question up to date. Like Malet, Lord +Cromer’s lack of foresight during the whole of the first two months of +his arrival is most noticeable in the Blue Books. These show that his +sole anxiety in those last months before the storm broke in the Soudan +was the financial difficulty. His only reference to danger in that +quarter is where he records a conversation on 26th October with an +unnamed gentleman, who described the finance of the Soudan to him as +“_un trou inconnu_.” Of other than the financial danger there is not a +word. In his “Modern Egypt,” Cromer excuses himself from all +responsibility in regard to Hicks, by saying that Hicks had already +started on his campaign three days before his, Cromer’s, arrival. But +this is not strictly true. + +Hicks, though he left Khartoum on the 8th September, remained on in camp +on the Nile bank at Duem till the 26th, and could have been still +recalled by telegraph had Cromer so insisted. What is true is that +Cromer did not foresee the consequences, as Malet did not foresee them. +Otherwise how is it possible to account for the optimism of his dispatch +of 6th October, where, in complete ignorance of the perils threatening +the restored regime, he wrote his confident dispatch reporting that +order having been now completely restored “the British garrison of Cairo +might with safety be withdrawn”? A small force of 3,000 men, to be +retained at Alexandria not as an army any longer of occupation but of +observation only, would, he assured Lord Granville, be “amply sufficient +to maintain the honour of Her Majesty’s arms against any force that it +may be supposed with any degree of probability it may have to +encounter.” I, as a stranger spending a week at Cairo, had found out +more than this; and Granville had hardly agreed to the evacuation before +the storm broke, and it was already too late to apply any remedy short +of the dispatch to Khartoum of a British army. + +To bring my narrative back to the historical date at which I left it. +The rapid sequence of events was startling. On the 1st November news +reached Cairo that Captain Moncrieff, British Consul at Suakin, with 500 +Egyptian troops in garrison there, having gone forth to give battle to +the rebels at Tokar on the Red Sea littoral, had been surprised and +slain. On the 19th November the first rumour of Hicks’s defeat was +received, and two days later, the 21st, knowledge came of the full +disaster. The whole of the Soudan west and south of Khartoum was +reported to be in insurrection, as well as the Eastern provinces; and +Colonel Coetlogon, the English officer left by Hicks in charge of the +Khartoum garrison, was telegraphing that Khartoum itself could not be +held “unless immediately succoured.” All then was for some weeks in +confusion at the Cairo War Office, and hardly less in London. Cromer, on +the very first news, one can hardly say otherwise than in a panic, had +advised the abandonment of the whole Soudan, and by return of telegraph +Lord Granville had agreed, and the necessary order of evacuation had +been given to the Egyptian Government. Some more weeks had then been +wasted in distracted counsels, and, on the 14th January 1884, Gordon was +dispatched on his mission to Khartoum. It was in this brief order that I +learned the events while travelling in India, and that the news about +Gordon reached me at Delhi. It was then that I wrote him that too +prophetic letter, the text of which is given in my “India under Ripon,” +warning him of the treachery of those who were sending him on his +mission and foretelling his defeat and death. For the convenience of my +present readers, I reprint it here in the Appendix. + + + + + CHAPTER III + + GORDON’S WORK ON THE WHITE NILE + + +AND here, before I go further, it will, I think, make matters still +clearer in regard to the history of the next twelve months in Egypt, +including, as it must, Gordon’s heroic defence of Khartoum, if I break +off my personal narrative and devote a chapter or two to a critical +examination of that truly wonderful man’s character. I propose to do so +not in the spirit of mere hero-worship, though I hold him to have been +by far the most chivalric figure among Englishmen of our generation; and +still less of belittlement; but in the spirit of a sane historian, +reconstructing from the many records we have of his inner spiritual life +no less than of his public actions, and from some sources, too, of +private knowledge and my own recollection of him, a picture of the +living man he was. + +To appreciate Gordon’s character at all accurately, and thereby to judge +his career at its true value, it is essential to recognize him as a man +of many contradictions and a singularly complex character. He himself, +in one of those intimate letters which through life he was in the habit +of writing to his sister, and which form the most complete self- +revelation made in any letters that have been published in our time, +says: “Talk of two natures in one! I have a hundred, and none think +alike and all want to rule”; and, again: “No man in the world is more +changeable than I”—an exaggeration of the truth yet no less strictly +true. Gordon had at least two distinctly antagonistic features in his +nature—the one, that of a man of action, with an imperative need of +strong practical work, the instinct of a soldier who saw the thing he +had it in his mind to do with absolute clearness of vision, and as +clearly the way to do it—the other, that of a religious mystic, occupied +not with this world but with spiritual forces in a world unseen; +perplexed perpetually, and perpetually in doubt as to the precise will +of God with him, a fatalist, a disbeliever in his own free will, and +consequently liable to sudden changes of plan; a seeker of omens and +supernatural directions; at times (as he also himself says) a “religious +fanatic,” perhaps hardly on this one point sane. Not that Gordon was in +the smallest degree a fanatic in the sense of one who hated another for +his creed. His mind was large on this as on all other matters; but he +was imbued with the belief in God’s direct dealings with man and with +his own interpretation of them, as suited to his own spiritual and +temporal case, and with the nothingness of worldly affairs or of life +and death for himself and others in view of a life to come. + +Entering the army early he saw service for the first time at the siege +of Sebastopol, and remained on in Turkey when the war was over as one of +the officers on the Commission of frontier delimitation in Bessarabia +and Armenia. This gave him his first experience of the Mohammedan East. +In 1860 he joined the British forces in China, where he took part in the +capture of Pekin, and again stayed on, specially employed. Shanghai, one +of the Treaty Ports, was just then threatened by the Taiping rebellion, +and for its protection an Imperial Chinese force had been raised under +European officers, and the command of it was given to Gordon. With the +permission of his superiors he thus entered a foreign service, and found +himself, at the early age of twenty-nine, commanding an army of Asiatics +under the Chinese Emperor. His military authority was practically +absolute, and by a display of strategy of the highest order and lavish +personal courage he succeeded in breaking the Taiping rebellion, and +restoring one of the richest provinces of China and some of its most +populous cities to the Imperial Government. The Emperor, in gratitude +for so great a service, loaded him with honours, and would have enriched +him if Gordon had been willing. But with a fine contempt for wealth he +would take nothing but his stipulated pay, and, the work done, returned +to his ordinary duties in England without further remark or claim on his +own Government. + +This stamps him as a man entirely above the rank of the common soldier +of fortune. That he was also a man of immense natural military genius +cannot be doubted, with a power of exerting influence over the soldiers +he commanded, and turning the rawest material into good fighting stuff, +and in this he compares favourably with any of the great European +leaders of Asiatics that can be named in history. It is by no means +certain, however, to my mind that in this first brilliant episode of +Gordon’s life, any more than in his latest at Khartoum, he was fighting +on what I should consider the right side, the side that is of those who +had the better right in justice. Indeed the Taipings, though the methods +of their insurrection were barbarous in the extreme, represented what +was more probably the juster cause of the Chinese people than that of +the Man Chu Emperors, in whose service Gordon was. Gordon, however, did +not often stop to consider points like these when he accepted foreign +employment, and only discovered his mistake when it was too late to +retire from it. This was the case with him, as he found to his cost, +when serving the Khedive Ismaïl, and so, too, he discovered and would +have avowed it if he had survived his last campaign against the Mahdi. +What is important about the Chinese episode is the strong effect it had +upon his character. The terrible sights which he there witnessed in the +lands laid waste by the Taipings, the appalling incidents of an Eastern +civil war, the cruelties inflicted on the weak, the outraged women and +the starving children, famine, pestilence, and death spread over +immensely populous areas, joined with the almost miraculous victories +achieved by the army he commanded, the huge personal risks daily run, +and his unvarying success, bred in him a conviction that he was under +immediate divine direction, and had for his special mission in life the +redressing of wrongs and the protection of the helpless. His attitude +thenceforth, though he made mistakes, was that of the Christian knight +errant, seeking service through the world wherever there were dragons of +iniquity to fight, or distressed persons to be rescued by feats of arms. +It is necessary to remember this if we are to understand rightly the +spirit of his early Egyptian service. + +For a while, however, Gordon’s humanitarian impulse was to be turned +into more peaceful channels. In 1865 he returned to England and was +given a command at Gravesend with the engineering task of fortifying the +entrance to the Thames. Here he had much spare time, and devoted it to +works of mercy among the poor, especially to the rescuing of the waifs +and strays of the London streets, boys for whom he found employment, and +whom he befriended with money and advice. Gordon had, from his youth up, +been deeply religious. He belonged to no church or sect, unless it were +that of what is called Bible Christianity, a form of belief based solely +on the Old and New Testaments as interpreted, each man, by the light of +his own spiritual conscience. He owed this to his mother. It is a little +difficult, now in the twentieth century, when the higher criticism has +permeated all theology and when science has accepted evolution as its +recognized basis, to realize how at the beginning of Queen Victoria’s +reign the great body of educated Englishmen were brought up to believe +with an implicit faith in the text of the authorized English version of +the Holy Scriptures as the literal word of God containing all direction +needed for the spiritual wants of man. This was specially the case in +the middle rank of society, that of Gordon’s mother, which for the most +part had nonconformist traditions and had remained equally unaffected by +the scepticism of the eighteenth century and by the Oxford Church +movement of the nineteenth in the direction of authority. Nor was it +till some years after Gordon’s education was over, and he was well +launched on his military career, that the publication of Darwin’s +“Origin of Species” prevailed at last in dissociating scientific +training from the simpler English creeds. + +Gordon therefore carried with him untouched into his active life the +Biblical foundation of his childhood. He held the text of Scripture from +the first verse of Genesis to the last of Revelations to be God’s +written word, and that it was given to every man by faith and prayer and +constant study to find in it all necessary direction both for his +temporal and his eternal needs. He spent a certain portion of every day +in studying the Book, and, being of a logical mind, in seeking counsel +in its pages for each morrow as it came. His certainty that the text was +inspired induced him by a further logic to believe that, relying on it, +he, too, was inspired. This is the real key to much that otherwise would +be inexplicable in his public career. + +In his moral life Gordon stood on the highest possible plane. Apart from +a few boyish escapades at school—and he was all his life high- +spirited—there is no record of his ever having transgressed the +straitest rules of exemplary conduct. He seems never to have been in +love, or to have indulged even for a moment in any dream of earthly +happiness to be found in domestic joys. These he regarded as not +intended for him, and he was as far from the thought of marriage as +though he had renounced the possibility of it by vow. “What a blessing,” +he exclaims in one of his letters to his sister, “one was never married! +Marriage spoils human beings.” Even the sentimental regard in which many +women held him was distasteful to him. “What I dislike,” he says, “in +——’s letters is the sentimental part; it is to me quite painful; she is +so impressive. I do hope you will try and quiet her. I am torn in two +with the wish not to be unkind, and yet I wish her not to bother me.” +That was his general attitude toward women other than the old and +helpless. Dr. Barnes, who was in some measure Gordon’s spiritual adviser +in the last five years of his life, says of him: “Gordon was much less +at ease in talking to women than in talking to men. While conversing +with women he seemed to exercise even more than his usual self-control +in the expression of his thought and feeling. His sympathy, geniality, +and attractiveness became as it were veiled, and he was ‘himself again’ +only when the restraint was removed. He was seen at his best in the +society of young children, his keen interest for whom had not been +dulled either by solitude or by the necessity—which had often been +imposed on him in other relations—for strictly-guarded intercourse. With +children he was quite at home.” + +In all things he was abstemious. Even the poor pleasures of the table +were generally denied. He hated feasts and entertainments, and at +Greenwich allowed his uncomfortable meals to be freely interrupted by +any caller on however trifling a business. “His meals,” says his brother +of him, “were of the most frugal kind, and his arrangements were such +that no one was ever prevented seeing him in consequence of his being +engaged at any of them, for he had a table with a deep drawer in which +when drawn out, the food was deposited, and so if any one came the +drawer was shut and there were no signs that he had been engaged +otherwise than at his ordinary work.” In his evenings, instead of +enjoying rest or talk, he would go out to ragged schools or on some +other work of mercy. His money he would give away as long as he had any +available, and he would even borrow to give, this not in small driblets, +but in considerable sums of £50 and £100 and £200 at a time. On himself +he would spend nothing. Speaking to Sir Rivers Wilson about him in 1878, +the Catholic Bishop of Khartoum explained the wonderful influence he +then enjoyed among the Soudanese as due to his alms-giving and his +chastity. It astonished all men that he should care nothing for the two +things those in power mostly indulged in, the love of money and the love +of women. In all this Gordon was a saint. + +Seven years of his life were passed in this way at Gravesend, and there +grew up around him a little band of religious admirers which gradually +made for him a name in the English humanitarian world. He was willing +always to talk on the things of the spirit with the spiritually-minded, +and to write to those who sought his opinion or counsel by letter, +whether it was on a public or a private matter. It was with the poor and +unimportant that he preferred to correspond rather than with those in +high places, though among these also he had friends. Thus on a +foundation of general esteem gradually acquired, the power came to him +which he was to wield in public affairs, and was steadily built up. His +worth in his own profession was acknowledged, for he had done mighty +deeds in war,—that could not be denied, though by many of his fellow +soldiers he was accounted “insubordinate,” by others mad. It seemed +enough to them to prove his insanity that he did not ask promotions or +rewards and that he was careless of his pay. + +The only failing I can really find in him—for that of drink with which +he has been charged was not a serious one—was a certain tendency to +court publicity, which he himself acknowledged as a snare to his +generally humble attitude. His sister seems at one time to have pointed +this out to him, and his reply shows that he felt her reproach as true. +“Newspapers,” he says in answer to her, “feed a passion I have for +giving my opinion . . . You drew a bow at a venture with your full +strength and you have done for your brother; the arrow has gone in up to +its feathers! He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory! Why, +you have knocked down the work of years; what have I ever been talking +of but self? . . . I have a sort of wish that I could get rid of +_Colonel Gordon_.” He called this craving for publicity “Agag; a +catering for notice and praise; hailing the tram of the world!” a thing +which must be “hewn in pieces before the Lord”—and yet he yields over +and over again to it, while he torments himself for his weakness, a +point in his character which he shares with many saints who have been +canonized by popular acclaim, and which must not be missed, for it, too, +explains much. + + +Such was Gordon at the time of his first entrance on the Egyptian scene +in 1874, and it is with the Egyptian period only of his life that we +need concern ourselves in any detail. His connection with the Khedivial +service came about in this way. In 1871 he was sent on special service +once more to Turkey, and finding himself at Constantinople in connection +with the Danube commission, to which he had been appointed, it chanced +that he met Nubar Pasha at the English Embassy and had a talk with him, +which determined his after life. The Egyptian Government was in search +of an engineer officer who would undertake, in succession to Sir Samuel +Baker, the administration of the Equatorial Province of the Upper Nile, +and Nubar consulted him as to the securing of such an officer; and this +led a year later to Gordon’s agreeing to go there himself as the Khedive +Ismaïl’s servant. What tempted him to the work was, I think, a certain +natural restlessness and a desire for useful professional employment. +English military life at home, with its constant round of unreal duties +and of social inanities, was thoroughly distasteful to him, and the +freedom of an independent command abroad in however wild a region was +always preferred by him to ordinary employment at home. Also he had +become interested in the suppression of the slave trade on the Nile and +Congo, which was being much discussed at the time, and this was probably +what decided him. Be this as it may, he visited Cairo on his way back +from the Danube in 1873 and, having received permission from the War +Office in London, was named Governor of the Equatorial Province at the +beginning of the following year, his instructions on leaving Cairo for +the seat of his new government at Gondokoro being to open a trade route +by river to the Equatorial Lakes, to establish the Khedive’s authority +on these to the Nile sources, and also to put a stop to the slave +raiding in the upper provinces, which had become a scandal in Europe, +and was injuring the Khedive’s credit. Gordon’s idea at starting on his +mission was that the first half of his instructions would, when +accomplished, bring about the second half. “Open out the country,” he +says in one of his letters of the time, “and it [the slave trade] will +fall of itself.” It was the general idea held by English humanitarians +of the day, but one which Gordon found reason to distrust later. + +There are two ways of looking at this question. The slave raiding which +prevailed along the whole border line between Equatorial Africa and the +waterless northern deserts which extend from the White Nile to the +Atlantic had for many centuries been a terrible scourge upon the +indigenous black race. It was carried on by the Bedouin tribes, more or +less Arab in their origin and Mohammedan in their religion, who had +invaded and conquered North Africa in the early centuries of Islam. +These considered the Pagan negroes their lawful booty wherever they +could capture them, and made a trade of bringing them with other +equatorial produce to the sea coasts of Morocco and the rest of the +Mohammedan States bordering the Mediterranean and Red Seas. It was a +yearly tithe of many thousands taken from the unwarlike agricultural +villagers, and may justly be likened to the depredation inflicted on the +antelope herds of the same borderland by lions living on the desert +outskirts. At first sight, and from a humanitarian point of view, it +would seem that the destruction of these human lions was the beneficent +duty of any one who would undertake it, and the extirpation of the slave +raiders by force of arms the surest way of bringing prosperity to the +negro inhabitants. And such was the view taken by most of our European +explorers of the nineteenth century, Schweinfurth, Baker, Stanley, and +the rest, who were in correspondence with the anti-slavery association +in London and were constantly urging the duty of the penetration and +civilizing of Central Africa by the states of Europe. Africa once +Europeanized, they argued, slave-raiding must necessarily be made to +cease and the negroes be freed from an immemorial misfortune. The +reasoning harmonized well with the commercial ideas of the day, which +saw in Central Africa new fields for its enterprise; and the civilized +occupation of the two lines of waterway by which the Soudan could most +easily be reached, the Nile and the Congo, was pushed on by the +societies as a duty of humanity. I remember attending a meeting of the +Royal Geographical Society under Sir Roderick Murchison, to which I had +just been elected in 1862, in which our then Consul Petherick at +Khartoum was praised for his exploration of the White Nile, as yet an +unknown region, on this very ground, that benefit must necessarily +accrue to the negroes from the opening up of their country through +Englishmen acting in conjunction with the Viceroy of Egypt. Yet this +very exploration of Petherick’s turned out to be the beginning of far +worse evils to the negroes of the White Nile than any they had during +all the centuries of their unexplored history experienced, even to the +total destruction of some of their communities. + +The truth is—and this Gordon came to understand at Khartoum, as we to- +day are coming to understand it on the Congo—though European +civilization is able to deal with certain evils incidental to +uncivilized life, it brings with it other evils ten times more +destructive than those it cures. It destroys the lions, but the +antelopes are not found thereby to increase. On the contrary they become +a prey, all of them, to the newcomer, their far more scientific and +unsparing friend. And so it is also with the negroes who are ten times +worse ruined by European conquest. Of the reality of this truth Gordon +gained at least occasional glimpses during the years he served the +Khedive Ismaïl in the Soudan. For myself I have never been in any doubt, +since I have had an opinion at all on the matter, that the only true +humanity towards the negroes of Equatorial Africa would have been to +leave them unvisited, uncivilized, and severely alone with their own +local troubles. The alternative policy to that of force applied to the +slave raiders was that of the encouragement of Mohammedan reform in the +Mediterranean Moslem states, and with it to secure the abolition of +slavery as a legal institution and so the demand of slaves from the +interior. This policy, however, was never one at all popular with the +anti-slave-trade associations. Our professional humanitarians were no +more anxious to abolish slavery altogether than masters of foxhounds are +anxious to abolish foxes; and Mohammedan reformers were generally +discouraged by the societies and reminded that slavery was recognized by +the Koran, and so could not be legally condemned by any reformers +professing themselves Moslems. This was certainly the case in 1882 when +Sheykh Mohammed Abdu and Arabi included the complete abolition of +slavery in their programme of national reform. Sir William Muir and +Allen, the anti-slavery secretary, at once took up the cudgels against +them in the “Times,” and their anger knew no bounds. It was an unheard- +of thing, they said, that a Mohammedan reformer should dare to strike at +the roots of a time-honoured Oriental institution to which their English +society owed its _raison d’être_. + +Yet the Egyptian reformers of that day were perfectly sincere in their +intention. They were poor men, representing a community too humble to be +slave owning itself, arrayed against a wealthy ruling class possessed of +slaves. Their interests did not warp their judgement, and their +judgement on this, as on other things, was humanitarian. The Khedive and +the Turkish Pashas, however, were infinitely preferred by Allen and the +agents of the society in Egypt, whose salaries would have ceased had +slavery and slave dealing really disappeared from the Nile. As to our +diplomatic representatives, at Cairo as elsewhere, they hated the worry +of the whole slavery question and resented anything that raised its +abolition in practical form. It meant for them the tiresome duty of +presenting remonstrances to Mohammedan princes who all possessed slaves +and who wished to keep them and not to be deprived of the means of +getting new ones when required. I remember well the disgust with which +dispatches from the Slave Trade department of the Foreign Office were +regarded in our Chancelleries. All the same, the method of dealing with +them as I have just indicated would have been the true line for our +humanitarians to take if the interests of the raided black villagers of +the Upper Nile had been alone in question. A pronouncement against +slavery at Cairo by a Nationalist Sheykh el Islam, would have been worth +more to them than a whole army of civilized protectors sent to guard +their desert frontier against _jellabat_. + +It will be interesting to give some extracts from Gordon’s letters to +his sister and others bearing on these points, letters written while in +Ismaïl’s service, for they are infinitely instructive, and as human +documents unsurpassed in the political history of our time. They were +begun immediately on his arrival at Cairo at the beginning of 1874, and +continued without interruption during the whole period of his Soudan +service. It must be remembered that the official world of Cairo of that +day represented a society as pecuniarily corrupt and as destitute of all +public virtue as could well be found upon the face of the globe. The +Khedive Ismaïl, who had all the vices of the East overlaid with a veneer +of Western civilization, plausible, unscrupulous, and profoundly +immoral, had gathered round him a gang of European speculators whose one +object was to extract money from his coffers by contracts, loans, and +services rendered at extravagant rates in every branch of the +administration. Among the highest paid were those that took service in +the Soudan and ministered to Ismaïl’s ambition of conquering the Upper +Nile to its sources, and on the pretence of putting down the slave trade +adding province after province to his African empire. Gordon’s +predecessor as Governor of the Equatorial Provinces, Sir Samuel Baker, +had been paid at the extravagant rate of £10,000 a year, exclusive of +all his expenses, and had left Egypt at the close of his four years’ +engagement with a solid sum of £40,000 untouched at his banker’s. The +arrival therefore of Gordon with his unself-seeking ways was a wholly +disturbing element for the official mind, and made him enemies from the +beginning not only among his fellow Europeans who considered that he was +underselling them in the administrative market, but by the Turco- +Circassian and Armenian Pashas who were amassing large fortunes in the +general reign of extravagance. The allusion made in one of the first +extracts given is to an interview between Gordon and Sherif Pasha, then +Prime Minister, in which there had been a characteristic +misunderstanding between the two, Gordon refusing the £10,000 salary of +his predecessor, and protesting that £2,000 would be ample, Sherif +imagining that his refusal was only the coyness of a rogue who wanted a +still huger sum. It was difficult, too, for any one at Cairo to +understand that Gordon had the suppression of the slave trade really at +heart or that his acceptance of the mission to the Equatorial Nile would +be followed by any practical result in a humanitarian direction. Ismaïl, +as little as the rest, was sincere in this, but affected a zeal in +suppressing the slave trade, which at first took in the not very +discerning mind of Gordon, who with all his power of managing Orientals +_en masse_ was far from being a good judge of individual character,[15] +thinking to gain thereby a prop in humanitarian England to his failing +commercial credit. The process of Gordon’s undeception both as to Ismaïl +and as to the reality of the good he was doing or could possibly do in +the Soudan is to me the most interesting feature of the letters, and I +will give such extracts from them as seem to bear most directly on this +feature of his character, with others exemplifying the strange religious +mysticism which was to play so important a part in the drama of his +later exploits at Khartoum. Incidentally, too, the extracts will explain +much of the official ill-will manifested towards Gordon in 1884 not only +by Nubar and the Court clique of ministerial Pashas, but by our own +English diplomatists at the British Consulate-General, including Lord +Cromer. These are my quotations: + +“I believe if the Soudan was settled the Khedive would prevent the slave +trade; but he does not see his way to do so till he can move about the +country. . . . My object is to show the Khedive and his people that gold +and silver idols are not worshipped by all the world. They are very +powerful gods, but not so powerful as our God; so if I refuse a large +sum you will not be angry at my doing so. From whom does all the money +come? From poor miserable creatures who are ground down to produce it. +Of course these ideas are outrageous. ‘Pillage the Egyptians’ is still +the cry. . . . + +“I remember that God has at all times worked by weak and small means. +All history shows this to be His mode, and so I believe if He will He +may work by me. . . . I paid a visit to Sherif Pasha, the Minister of +Justice, and let him understand that your brother was not an hireling. I +did this rather sharply. . . . I think I can see the true motive now of +the expedition, and believe it to be a sham, to catch the attention of +the English people. As Baker said: I think the Khedive is quite innocent +(or nearly so) of it, but Nubar is the chief man. Now what has happened? +There has been a mutual disappointment. Nubar thought he had a rash +fellow to deal with, who could be persuaded to cut a dash, etc., etc., +and he found he had one of the Gordon race. This latter thought the +thing real, and found it a sham and felt like a Gordon who has been +humbugged. . . . Though I do not credit myself with anything, it cannot +be denied but that your brother’s conduct [in wishing to cut down +expenses] is a silent reproach to the usual mode of doing things in this +country and is the more cutting from its silence. It is Greek and Hebrew +to them to reason that all the coin one takes is wrung out of poor +people. . . . Nubar and your brother do not hit it off, and the other +evening So-and-so said foolishly, ‘Do not make an enemy of Nubar. He +will or may do you mischief.’ It was too much, and your brother replied, +in the midst of a circle of guests, that there was no one living who +could do him the slightest injury which he could feel, and that he would +not shape his face to suit any one beyond acting loyally. . . . I think +they think me very queer, and I am, I dare say. . . . You have no idea +of the intrigues here; it is a regular hot bed, and things cannot last +long like this. They are paying 36 per cent. for money. . . . I think +the Khedive likes me, but no one else does; and I do not like them—I +mean the swells whose corns I tread on in all manner of ways. I saw so +and so at Suez. He agrees with me in our opinion of the rottenness of +Egypt: it is all for the flesh, and in no place is human nature to be +studied with such advantage. Duke of This wants steamer—say £600. Duke +of That wants house, etc. All the time the poor people are ground down +to get money for all this. Who art thou to be afraid of a man? If He +wills, I will shake all this in some way not clear to me now. Do not +think I am an egoist. I am like Moses who despised the riches of Egypt. +We have a king mightier than these, and more enduring riches and power +in Him than we can have in this world. I will not bow to Haman.”[16] + +Arrived at the seat of his labours and engaged in the work set him by +the Khedive of opening up the White Nile to the Equatorial Lakes, we +find him speedily disgusted with the methods in use for the spreading of +civilization in those remote regions, the petty warfare waged by the +troops he was given to command against the primitive negro tribes which +were living happily without him, and whose only wish was to be left +alone. Baker had been brutal with these poor blacks; Gordon’s heart went +out towards them. He speedily saw the fallacy of the pretence that he +was sent there to do them good. + +“They (the native blacks) have had no communication with the world. They +would seem to get on well without any regular laws and to live out their +span in comparative quiet. . . . No country presents such a field for a +philosopher as this country does with its dense population quite +innocent of the least civilization. I should say that they are +singularly free from vice; their wars are generally very harmless +affairs and seldom cause bloodshed. . . . Is it not remarkable that you +never find anything like ambition in a native sheikh? They will readily +agree to plunder their neighbour, but would never think of annexing his +tribe to theirs. . . . They are in tribes of 100 or 300 families, and I +expect have been so for ages. . . . The natives suffered in their attack +to-day and I do not think they will trouble us again. . . . If they are +to be put down it is better I should do it than an exterminating pasha +who would have no mercy. . . . I wish the whole of this business was +over. I do not want to hurt these people, but we must defend ourselves.” +And later, a detachment of his soldiers having been surprised by the +blacks and destroyed: “We derided the poor blacks who fought for their +independence, and now God gave them the victory. I declare, in spite of +the expressions you may note in my letters, I truly sympathize with +them. They say, ‘We do not want your cloth and beads; you go your way +and we will go ours; we do not want to see your chief. . . . This land +is ours, and you shall not have it, neither its bread nor its flocks.’ +Poor fellows! You will say I am most inconsistent, and so I am, and so +are you. We are dead against our words when it comes to action. . . . I +have a number of Niam-Niam soldiers. . . . The Niam-Niam warriors are +fearful objects; they do look very fierce. They are thick set, sturdy +fellows, and they look brave and fearless. I declare it is rather a +trial to me to set them on the satin-skinned Baris, but these latter +will not leave me alone. . . . Did I not mention the incantations made +against us by the magicians on the other side, and how somehow, from the +earnestness that they made them with, I had some thought of misgiving on +account of them? It were odd their repulse was so soon to follow. These +prayers were earnest prayers for celestial aid in which the prayer knew +he would need help from some unknown power to avert a danger. That the +native knows not the true God is true, but God knows him and moved him +to pray and answered his prayer. ‘The horse is prepared for the day of +battle, but the victory is of the Lord.’ . . . The tax-gatherers are out +and there is immense excitement among the natives on the other side. Six +or seven hundred are collected on the hill tops. . . . We cannot see +what the tax-gatherers are doing. . . . The taxes are in sight . . . 200 +cows and 1,500 sheep. . . . The daughter of the Sheykh was taken: I have +now sent to him to say if he will submit I will leave him alone and that +he is to come for his daughter. I hope sincerely to make friends with +him and end this miserable work, for it is just that. + +“I wish they would submit now and save any more of these wars or rather +miserable cattle raids; but it is no use wishing—you must take their +cows, otherwise they will never give in. . . . To-day on a bare rock a +mile off stood a man with two attendants. He held his hands clasped +together at the back of his head, and turned to all quarters, putting +them down sometimes straight to his sides. I watched him with my glass. +‘Come, curse me this people: for they are too mighty for me.’ I can +quite enter into these poor people’s misery at their impotency. ‘We do +not want beads. We do not want the Pasha. . . . We want our own lands +and you to go away.’ Their poor minds never conceived such a trial as +this before. Rain was their only care, now _civilization_ (?) is to +begin with them. They are to be brought into the family of nations. . . +. There are a great number of natives on Balak’s hill to-day. . . . +Balaam is there with his hands in the same position; the kings and +princes of Midian are sitting like apes behind him. . . . How I hate +this country and all the work. . . . I am thoroughly disgusted. These +(the Khedive’s) people are unfit to acquire the country . . . incapable +of civilizing the natives. . . . They are conies, a feeble race. . . . I +cannot help it, but I have taken such a dislike to these blacks that I +cannot bear their sight. I do not mean the natives, but these soldiers. +They are nothing but a set of pillagers, and are about as likely to +civilize these parts as to civilize the moon. Though it tells against my +operations, I am glad in my heart that they are afraid of the natives. +God permits me to open the road to the interior, but, humanly speaking, +I see nothing to encourage the hope that this occupation of their lands +will be of any advantage towards civilizing them. In excuse for taking +this employ I can only say that I think I have accomplished a work with +the nearly minimum amount of suffering to natives and soldiery which +would have been done by an Arab Pasha with a great amount of suffering +to soldiery and natives. . . . Some philanthropic people write to me +about ‘noble work,’ ‘poor blacks,’ etc. I have I think stopped their +writings by acknowledging ourselves to be a pillaging horde of +brigands.” + +Such, as seen in these intimate letters, was Gordon’s own opinion of his +work down to the end of his two years as Governor of the Equator. He +reconciled it to his conscience only by the reflection that, if another +had been entrusted with it than himself, the injury inflicted on the +negro tribes would have been greater than it was. + +At this time, October 1876, he was so little in love with his exhausting +and thankless work, and in so great despair of doing real good in the +Soudan, that he resolved to throw it up. “I want to see my way clear +first,” he writes. “Comfort of the body, a very strong gentleman says, +‘What is the use of opening more country to such a Government? There is +more now under their power than they can ever manage. Retire now.’ But +Mr. (I do not know what) says, ‘Shut your eyes to what may happen in +future; leave that to God, and do what you think will open the country +thoroughly to both lakes. Do this not for His Highness or for his +Government, but do it blindly and in faith.’” And a few days later, “To- +day Reason says strongly, ‘Do not stay and aid such a Government.’ But I +do not like to be beaten, which I am if I retire; and by retiring I do +not remedy anything. By staying I keep my province safe from injustice +and cruelty in some degree. . . . When a house gives ominous cracks +prior to a fall one’s desire is—the rule in ships—to leave it. . . . But +I do not like the idea, even if the cracks are serious. Why should I +fear? Is man more strong than God? Things have come to such a pass in +these Mussulman countries that a crisis must come about soon.” + +He had come, too, to persuade himself that he was an instrument in God’s +hands for purposes, obscure at present, but ultimately to be made +manifest, which would more than counterbalance the immediate evil. The +idea recurs perpetually in his letters, joined with that of a fatalism +as absolute as that of any Moslem. Indeed, it is evident that the long +years spent with none but Moslems on the Upper Nile, where he was cut +off from all communication with men of his own Christian creed, +heightened, if it did not initiate, the predestinarian tone of his +religious thought. It is a point in his character of the highest +importance if we are to understand his action when later he was called +upon to rescue the Soudan garrisons. It seems to have grown upon him +that he was one pre-ordained to do God’s work as was Joshua when leading +the armies of Israel as conquerors into the promised land. The +uncompromising logic of his mind made him accept this inference from +results, and he refused to acknowledge that the same faith which had +inspired Joshua and Moses to deeds that were miraculous should be +lacking to his own as absolute faith. All were but instruments in the +hands of the same God—all were under equal direction. It will be worth +while to collect the passages in his letters which most clearly +illustrate this belief, a belief founded on Bible teaching, and +intensified in the Soudan by the solitude in which he lived. What the +Koran was to his Moslem companions, that the Bible was to him, with the +Islamic doctrine of submission to God’s providence for good and for +evil, the fatalism which believes in all things as pre-ordained. Each +year spent in the Soudan added to the illusion of his divine +instrumentality, especially in the suppression of the slave trade, which +signalized the second period of his work when he had become Governor- +General, a position to which he was promoted in 1877. + +“Has it ever struck you,” he writes from Kordofan to his sister, “that +if man’s birth and death are predetermined by God to happen at certain +epochs, so every intervening event must be also predetermined? Few are +atheistical enough to say either man’s birth or death are things of +chance; and how can they therefore dispute that the intervening events +are not preordained. In governing these countries I wish I could realize +this truth more than I do. . . . The more I live in this country and the +more God prospers me, the more I despise myself and feel despicable; +some of the _coups_ I have made, and which have been successful, have +been such flukes, or chances, as the world calls them, as to astonish me +quite as much as they have astonished others, and I cannot feed myself +with the thought of ‘How clever I am,’ for impressed on my mind is the +fact, ‘You know you had no idea of what would happen on your so acting.’ +. . . I have really no troops with me, but I have the Shekinah (the +Lord) and I do like trusting to Him and not to man. . . . Had I not got +this Almighty Power to back me, with His infinite wisdom, I do not know +how I could even think of what is to be done. . . . I do not believe in +man’s free will; therefore, if my actions are right they are His +actions; if evil, they are the inevitable produce of the corrupt body in +which I am placed by Him. . . . Those who hold by man’s free will must +consequently be more or less elated if they do well. Now, if you +accepted what I think the truth, namely, that man has no free will, you +would never be elated, for you would not arrogate to yourself your +actions; neither would you be depressed by your evil acts. . . . I own I +feared to trust God in this slave dealer’s business; I was tossed up and +down. Perhaps physical fatigue may have been the cause. I hold to ‘Trust +in the Lord and lean not on thine own understanding.’ And He has brought +me through. . . . You and I are flies on the wheel; try and realize +this, that you do not move the wheel. . . . All this points to the +absolute rule God has over events, good or evil. As I said before ‘Be a +fool’ in the world’s language.” + +And again: “I wonder if I look ambitious in your eyes. Do you think I +sought this place? You should know more than most people, for you have +all my thoughts in my letters. Judging myself, I fear it was so when I +took the work in hand; not that I cared for the money or the honours to +come from it. I think, however, my main idea was a quixotic one—to help +the Khedive, mixed with the feeling that I could with God’s direction +accomplish this work. . . . If God puts ten pounds on a man He will give +him strength to bear twenty pounds. And if He puts twenty tons on a man +He will (if He wills) give him power to carry sixty tons. This He has +done for me; and I in saying this do not seek the praise of any man or +society, or king or power. I would have your prayers—they will be +heard—but no praise, for He is the GOVERNOR-GENERAL, and I am only His +useless agent, by whom He deigns to work His will. . . . I feel I am +only a straw, yet God gave the men in Darfour courage under me. I cannot +look back or forward to ever having done or to ever doing anything +worthy of commendation. . . . I do not and cannot chew the cud of self- +complacency. . . . I no more believe in the foresight of Napoleon or the +Duke. People made out their talent as foresight after the thing was +done. God gives the thought, man carries it out, for the thought is +given so strongly as to force him to act thus.” + +“I am now, thank God, so far from the least thought of man’s free will +that it never enters into my calculation in these thoughts, however it +may guide me as Governor-General or as fellow-man. . . . I feel so +strongly that death is not an evil to man that, if I thought the +shooting of any number of slave dealers would be of avail in stopping +the slave trade, I would shoot them without the least compunction, +though if a slave dealer was ill and it was in my power to cure him I +would do my best to do so. . . . I believe entirely in the Old and New +Testaments as being inspired by God. . . . I base my belief on the +Scripture entirely; it is there distinctly laid down that God rules all +things. . . . To accept the doctrine of man having no free will we must +acknowledge his utter insignificance. For my part I can give myself no +credit for anything I ever did; and further I credit no man with +talents, etc., etc., in anything he may have done. Napoleon, +Luther—indeed, all men—I consider were directly worked on and directed +to work out God’s great scheme. Everything that happens to-day, good or +evil, is settled and fixed. . . . No comfort is equal to that which he +has who has God for his stay, but believes, not in words but in fact, +that all things are ordained to happen and must happen.” + +Again, when worn out with work and loneliness: “Long before you get this +I shall be out of my troubles; so do not pity me, for I have the +Almighty to guide me and death is no terror. I only wish you to know how +worn I am through having to lean on GOD ALONE. It seems odd but it is +diametrically opposed to our flesh to do so, and it is very trying. My +flesh says, ‘I should like 1,000 good, trustworthy soldiers, and not His +promise.’ It is utterly wrong, but a widow would prefer £15,000 in the 3 +per cent. consols to the promise that God will provide for her. After my +spirit I prefer the promise; after my flesh I prefer the 1,000 soldiers; +not having them my spirit lords it over my flesh and conquers; but the +flesh suffers all the same, and I see the deep lines in my face getting +deeper and deeper day by day. _Why did you go?_ Well, He sent me, for I +went on a toss up. He is the GOVERNOR-GENERAL, I am only His agent.” + +All these are passages from Gordon’s letters written to his sister +during his service under the Khedive Ismaïl between 1874 and 1879. They +explain the man. With regard to its results from a humanitarian point of +view he was, as I have said, conscious of failure, even when his friends +in England were loudest in their praise of his success. He knew it had +no permanence. + +The work indeed that he had undertaken was one which could not be +achieved under the circumstances which then ruled the Soudan. At +Khartoum and throughout the whole country slavery was the recognized +basis of social and industrial life. The slave was as much property as +the ox or the sheep, and though his lot was less hard than it had been +in Christian lands a few decades before—for the slave was not put to +field labour, as in the West Indies, and was admitted to a certain +filial position in the household of his master—the thought of his having +any natural right to freedom had not yet penetrated the humanest local +brain. The Egyptian officials at Khartoum were, as a rule, the very +worst section of their class, men exiled for their misdemeanours from +the lower Nile, while the army was, to a large extent, recruited from +convicted criminals. The native Soudanese of Arab origin were wholly +disaffected to the Government, and many of them, driven from their homes +by its exactions, had formed themselves into bands of robber slave +hunters, and were in revolt against it. No real help was to be had from +Cairo. Gordon had some nine or ten Europeans with him in all, scattered +through the country, and the Christian population of Khartoum, mostly +Greeks, were hardly less interested in the slave trade than their Moslem +neighbours, many of them being themselves slave owners. There were a few +Catholic missionaries, and a bishop, but they exercised little +influence, and Gordon, as an Englishman determined to stop the trade, +was practically alone. The Soudan was an immense territory with no +natural frontiers, few means of communication, and a population of +several warlike millions, unamalgamated except by the tie of a somewhat +fanatical anti-Christian creed. He thus describes the western regions, +where the raids were chiefly organized: “These countries are very +curious; they seem to be peopled with huge tribes of Bedouin Arabs, with +a small nucleus of more settled people who congregate in the larger +villages. . . . Some of them can put from 2,000 to 6,000 horse or camel +men into the field. . . . Now these tribes raid on the negro tribes to +the south, or else exchange cloth for slaves with the Bedouin tribes +beyond even the pretended boundary of Egypt. . . . The tribes sell the +slaves to the little merchants, _jellabat_, of all kinds, who flock into +these lands. The merchants, who come from all parts of Egypt, then come +down to the more populous places . . . and sell them to others. Even +with the British Government in possession, I do not know how this slave +trade could be stopped.” + +Nevertheless, as a soldier, and he was a dogged one, Gordon fought on, +though conscious of its being morally a losing battle. As a soldier he +was successful and accomplished the work given him of subduing the +revolted slave dealers; though the slave trade itself he could not stop, +much less slavery in the Soudan. The caravans were too intangible on the +open western frontier, and he had no means of setting the recaptured +slaves at liberty. In order at all to deal with the case he was obliged +himself to purchase slaves, for which he accuses himself thus to +imaginary humanitarians sitting in their easy chairs at home: “The +slaves I buy are already torn from their homes, and whether I buy them +or not they will remain slaves. . . . It is not as if I encouraged raids +for the purpose of getting slaves as soldiers. But people will say, ‘By +buying slaves you increase the demand and indirectly encourage raids.’ I +say, ‘Yes, I should do so, if after buying them I still allowed the +raids to continue.’ . . . This slave question is most troublesome and +difficult to manage. A number of slaves taken in the last raid made near +here (in Darfour) refuse to go back, for they find they are better fed +with their new masters than they were with the old. . . . Darfour is a +regular cockpit. One thing troubles me. What am I to do with the two or +three thousand slaves that are now at Shaka, if we take it? I cannot +take them back into their own country; I cannot feed them. Solve this +problem for me. I must let them be taken by my auxiliaries, or by my +soldiers, or by the merchants. There is no help for it. If I let them +loose they will be picked up in every direction, for an escaped slave is +like an escaped sheep, the property of him who finds him or her. . . . +If I let the slaves be taken by my soldiers, by the tribes, or by the +merchants, instead of there being a cessation of the slave caravans +there will be a great increase of them for two or three months and a +corresponding outcry against me. But at any rate the slaves will go by +frequented routes and will not die on the road. . . . Shall I be +cowardly for fear of what ill-informed Europe may say?” + +This was written in the early days of his Darfour campaign. As it +proceeded, the horrors of the midsummer warfare in a waterless +wilderness oppressed him as a nightmare, the necessity of reducing all, +tribes, slave raiders, and slaves alike, by thirst and hunger, seizing +the wells and the hidden supplies of corn. “The men find the corn by +probing the ground, and by the ‘question’ applied to captives, which I +cannot prevent. The detachment of the Leopard tribe are without water, +and have been so for a day. I am sorry for it. Consider it as we may, +war is a brutal, cruel affair. . . . You see the people coming over the +sand, like flies on a wall. The poor fugitives cannot stand the thirst, +and are coming down one by one to water. You have not the very least +idea of the fearful effect of want of water in this scorched-up country. +. . . Hunger is nothing to thirst; the one can be eased by eating grass, +the other is swift and insupportable.” + +And all—though he succeeded with the help of his Italian Lieutenant, +Gessi, in breaking up the chief slave trading band under Suliman +Zebehr—for almost nothing. He finds he cannot solve the problem. “There +are some 6,000 more slave dealers in the interior who will obey me now +they have heard that Zebehr’s son and the other chiefs have given in. +You can imagine what a difficulty there is in dealing with all these +armed men. I have separated them here and there, and in course of time +will rid myself of the mass. Would you shoot them all? Have they no +rights? Are they not to be considered? Had the planters no rights? Did +not our Government once allow slave-trading? Do you know that cargoes of +slaves came into Bristol Harbour in the time of our fathers? . . . I +must notice to you one thing which is very different among the society +here and that of the planters in the Colonies. One never hears of owners +of slaves keeping gangs of them for field labour, or for cultivation. +They are kept for slave servants, or by the slave dealers as slave +troops. . . . Certain Greeks are now at Katarif on whom I have my eye, +who have gangs of slaves cultivating cotton. I mean to make a swoop on +them. In fact the condition of the negro is incomparably better in these +lands than ever it was in the West Indies, and I therefore claim for my +people a greater kindness of heart than was possessed by the planters, +with all their Christian profession and civilization. You speak of +Mohammedanism being imperilled [he means in peril of damnation]. Not so. +I find the Mussulman quite as good a Christian as many a Christian, and +do not believe he is in any peril. All of us are more or less pagans. I +like the Mussulman; he is not ashamed of his God; his life is a fairly +pure one. Certainly he gives himself a good margin in the wife line, but +at any rate he never poaches on others. Can our Christian people say the +same?” + +It is of importance to consider these sayings of Gordon’s in connection +with his subsequent action, which so surprised and shocked his English +friends six years later. + +“This morning I came on a caravan of slaves which is accompanying +me—some sixty or eighty men, women and children chained. What am I to do +with them? Their homes are too far off to send them to; so I decided to +make the slave merchant take off their chains as scandalous, and then to +leave them with him. He, looking on them as valuable cows, will look +well after them. Don Quixote would have liberated them, and made an +attempt to send them back some forty days march through hostile tribes +to their homes—which they would have never reached. The only remedy is +to stop slave raids on the frontier. . . . You must stop it at its +source. Once the slaves have left the source it is useless to try. . . . +In all previous emancipations, either there has been a strong government +to enforce obedience, or a majority of the nation wished it. Here in +this country there is not one that wishes it, or who would aid it even +by advice. . . . _No one_ is uninterested in the matter.” And he could +not stop the trade. It was like the hydra with a hundred heads. As soon +as he cut off one band another took its place. As soon as he closed one +entrance to the slave caravans another entrance was discovered. What he +achieved was a miracle, for all depended on himself and his one European +Lieutenant, Gessi. No one else either in the Soudan or Cairo cared for +or wished to see the traffic stopped. + +The last year of Gordon’s Governor-Generalship was one of harassing +disappointments. The Khedive had failed him. He received no more +support. There was a new regime at Cairo, the Nubar-Wilson one. He was +at loggerheads with it, and talks of it in his letters as a +“Hermaphrodite government.” They did not understand him, and he had no +respect for them. It was a constant exchange of telegrams between Cairo +and Khartoum in which Cairo made impossible demands for money, and +Khartoum responded with bitter refusals. He was left quite unaided in +regard to the slave trade. “I have no belief,” he wrote, “in the Cairo +Government acting against slavery. . . . Nubar never helped me at the +equator, though I wrote to him frequently, waste of time as it was!” It +was the same with the Khedive, though he still pitied him, for Ismaïl +was now at bay surrounded by the financial wolves that were on the point +of devouring him. + +“I can say truly,” he writes in 1879; “that my life is one long series +of flesh-vexing telegrams, of rows, of disputes—a regular Ishmaelite +existence—I am at war with nearly every one at Cairo, and my crest is a +thistle.” “I am exceedingly weary, and wish with a degree of bitterness +that it was all over. I am cooped up here (at Khartoum) now, and am much +occupied with the finances, which are in a very low state. . . . I am +striking daily deadly blows against the slave trade, and am establishing +a sort of Government of Terror about it.” “I am stronger than ever in my +belief that if H. H. had taken my advice he would be in a better plight +than he is now, and at any rate would have fallen with dignity. Now I +see by the paper he is offering to abdicate. This sort of thing cannot +last, and I fear for him. He cannot go straight—even his dispatches to +me are all evasive. . . . The continual wars that I carry on, and cannot +help, are very wearisome; and I feel more and more daily ‘How long? how +long?’” + +It was in this state of despair, and weary of his life that Gordon threw +himself into the excitement of his last campaign against the Darfour +slave raiders, a campaign he was not destined to finish, for he was +recalled in the midst of it once more to Cairo, and had to leave the +final capture of the chief raider, Suliman Zebehr, to his Lieutenant +Gessi. He had lost, however, his zest for fighting. “I no longer delight +in war,” he writes, “or fights like this one before me. I look on the +accounts one reads of wars as so much romance writing, and, somewhat +like the Chinese people, I have rather a contempt for the warrior. . . . +Eminent services, etc., are eminent nonsense.” His iron health, too, was +breaking down. “I have almost entirely given up smoking, for I am much +affected in my circulation. If I had gone on with it much longer I +believe my heart would have stopped altogether. I may indeed say that I +have lost every desire in a material way for the things of this life, +and I have no wish for eating, drinking, or comforts. If I have a wish +for anything, it would be for a dreamless sleep.” It was a terrible +oppression to him, too, to find that in spite of all he could do the +slave trade was only “scotched not killed.” Indeed it flourished still, +despite the cost. “I have just made a calculation of the loss of life in +Darfour during the years 1875-1879. It comes to 16,000 Egyptians, and +some 50,000 natives of Darfour—add to this the loss of life on the Bahr +Gazelle some 15,000, and you will have a fine total of 81,000; and this +exclusive of the slave trade which one may put down for three years at +from 80,000 to 100,000. Upwards of 470 slave dealers have been driven +out of this place since I came here two days ago. This evening we were +surprised at a caravan coming in. The slave dealers had come on here +with them, and hearing I was here, and having no water, they abandoned +their slaves and fled. The slaves were sadly distressed by thirst, +thirty had died on the road. Though the water here is putrid, and +everything is wretched enough, I am revived when I make these captures. +You must count them up. From Oomchanga to Toashia, during, say, a week, +we must have caught from 500 to 600. I suppose we may consider that +nearly that number must have been passing every week for the last year +and a half or two years along this road!!! and this during my tenure of +office!!!—which is very creditable to me. These slaves just captured +have been four to five days without water. They were in the most +terrible distress.” A few days later, 21st July, he takes what was to be +his final leave of Khartoum, till his last fatal return to it in 1884. +“I shall D.V. leave for Cairo in ten days. . . . I am a wreck, like the +portion of the ‘Victory,’ towed into Gibraltar after Trafalgar; but God +has enabled me, or rather has used me, to do what I wished to do—that is +to break down the slave trade.” + +It was his last word of comfort to his sick soul. At Cairo, when he +arrived there, he found a new order of things established still less to +his mind than the old one had been. The Khedive Ismaïl had made his exit +from the scene, and his place was occupied, not filled, by the poor +dummy Tewfik, with the Anglo-French financial control for tutor and +guardian. He did not long consent to serve it. After finding himself +sent on a fool’s errand to Abyssinia, where he nearly met his death, he +folded his tent and, shaking the dust of Egypt from his feet, once more +returned to England. Nothing then was further from his mind than that he +should ever see the Nile again. Body and soul he had been overwrought. +The British surgeon who examined him at Alexandria before he left found +him suffering from “symptoms of nervous exhaustion and alteration of the +blood.” He recommended “several months of complete rest and quiet,” and +insisted strongly on his “abstaining from all exciting work, especially +such as implies business or political excitement.” + + + + + CHAPTER IV + + GORDON IN PALESTINE + + +SUCH is the history of Gordon’s first service in the Soudan under Ismaïl +Pasha, from 1874 to 1879, in its principal features as gathered from his +own letters. At this time of his life, 1880, there is no question that +to the official world in England as in Egypt, except among his intimate +friends who knew him well, Gordon was considered mad; nor wholly, +perhaps, without excuse. He had quarrelled in his last two years with +nearly every official person at Cairo, including the new Viceroy Tewfik, +Nubar Pasha, and most of the Khedivial ministers, as well as with M. de +Lesseps and Lord Cromer. There is an interesting memorandum drawn up by +himself relating the circumstances which led to his collision with the +last of these, and, as it throws light on their later relations, as well +as giving a lively picture of the writer, it will be worth epitomizing +here. + +The memorandum tells us that in the spring of 1878 Ismaïl Pasha, being +in financial difficulties, sent for him (Gordon) to come from Khartoum +to Cairo, and help him in making an arrangement with the representatives +of his creditors. “I arrived,” says Gordon, “on the 7th March, at 9.30 +p.m. His Highness sent his equerry to meet me at the terminus and was +waiting dinner. Dirty as I was, after a railway journey of 350 miles, I +had to obey, but before dinner His Highness took me aside and asked me +to be President of an Inquiry into the state of the finances of the +country. . . . I said I would accept the Commission of Inquiry as +President. His Highness said, ‘You will see Lesseps, who will act with +you.’ I said ‘Yes,’ and accepted the mission with the agreement that the +Commissioners of the Dette were not to be on the Inquiry. I was angry +with these Commissioners because I thought they had been too hard on His +Highness. The next day I saw Mr. Vivian, the English Consul-General, and +he said, ‘I wonder you could accept the Presidency without the +Commissioners of the Dette.’ I said I was free to accept or to refuse. I +then called on the German Consul-General, and when there the French and +Austrian Consuls-General and also Vivian came in, and attacked me for +having accepted the post of President. They said I was risking His +Highness his throne, if he formed the Commission of Inquiry without the +creditors’ representatives. I said, ‘Why do you not tell him so?’ They +said, ‘You ought to do so.’ I said, ‘Well, will you commission me to do +so from you with any remarks I like to make as to the futility of your +remarks?’ They all said, ‘Yes, we authorize you to do so in our names.’ +I did so that evening, and told His Highness just before dinner at +Abdin. I said, ‘I have seen the four Consuls-General to-day, and they +told me to tell your Highness from them that you run a serious personal +risk if you have a Commission of Inquiry without the Commissioners of +the Dette being upon it.’ His Highness did not seem to care a bit, and +said he was only afraid of England, who he was sure would not move. He +said, ‘You will see Lesseps to-morrow and arrange the Enquête with him.’ +The next day Lesseps came with Standen, now Resident Commissioner for +the British Government Suez Canal Shares at Paris, an old friend of +mine. Lesseps began, ‘We must have the Commissioners of the Dette on the +Enquête.’ I said, ‘It is a _sine qua non_ that they are not to be upon +it.’ Lesseps replied, ‘They must be upon it.’ Then in came Cherif Pasha +and said, ‘Are you agreed?’ I left Lesseps to speak and he said ‘Yes,’ +at which I stared and said, ‘I fear not.’ Then Lesseps and Cherif Pasha +discussed it, and Lesseps gave in and agreed to serve on the Commission +without the Commissioners, but he must ask permission from Paris. Cherif +Pasha was pleased, but I instinctively felt old Lesseps was ratting, so +I asked Cherif Pasha to stop a moment and said to Standen, ‘Now see that +Lesseps does not make a mess of it, let him say at once will he act +without the Commissioners of Dette or not, do this for my sake, take him +into that corner and speak to him.’ Standen did so while I took Cherif +Pasha into the other corner, much against his will, for he thought I was +a bore raising obstacles. I told him that Lesseps had declared before he +came he would not act unless with the Commissioners. Cherif was huffed +with me and turned to Lesseps, whom Standen had already dosed in his +corner of the room, and he and Lesseps had a close conversation again +for some time, and then Cherif came to me and said, ‘Lesseps has +accepted without the Commissioners of the Dette. I disgusted Cherif as I +went downstairs with him by saying, ‘He will never stick to it.’ When +downstairs in one of the many antechambers to the Palace His Highness +gave me (shall I ever lodge in palaces again? I hope not) I found +Baring. Now Baring is in the Royal Artillery, while I am in the Royal +Engineers. Baring was in the nursery while I was in the Crimea. He has a +pretentious grand patronizing way about him. We had a few words +together. I said I would do what His Highness asked me. He said it was +unfair to the creditors, and in a few moments all was over. When oil +mixes with water we will mix together! I went upstairs.” + +This is interesting as a record of the incompatibility of temper and +ideas existing between Gordon and Cromer six years before 1884. It +explains indeed what would otherwise be inexplicable, the quarrel that +broke out at once between them when Gordon returned to Cairo on his +final mission. + +It is not necessary to continue Gordon’s story of how he was played with +on the earlier occasion by our Cairo diplomatists, but one scene which +gives us an amusing glimpse of Lesseps, and at the same time of Gordon’s +character, I will add: “The next morning,” he continues, “the 8th March +at 9 I went to Lesseps en route to His Highness. Lesseps said, ‘See what +Cherif Pasha has written to me.’ ‘Mon cher Vicomte, son Altesse le +Khedive m’a chargé de vous présenter ses grands remerciments pour avoir +accepté d’être sur la Commission d’Enquête et elle me prie d’ajouter que +c’est ce qu’elle a toujours attendu d’un si ancien ami de Mehemet Ali et +ses fils.’ This letter had been written before I saw Lesseps, and of +course His Highness thanked him for being upon the Enquête _without_ the +four Commissioners of the Dette, which Lesseps declined to do except +under certain conditions, so the letter was written to Lesseps thanking +him for services which the Khedive was furious about. Lesseps said, +looking at his pretty young wife of twenty-two, ‘I am off to Halowan and +shall not be back until night. I have telegraphed to my Government to +ask permission to be on the Enquête with you. Here is a copy of the +telegram, will you give it to His Highness?’ He gave it over to me to +read. I read it, it was thus: ‘Son Altesse le Khedive m’a prié de me +joindre avec M. Gordon et les Commissionaires de la Caisse pour faire +une Enquête sur les finances d’Egypte, je demande permission.’ I said, +‘Oh! my dear old fellow M. Lesseps, this will never do.’ He said, ‘Well, +anyway it is off, and I am off to Halowan and shall not be back to- +night.’ Well, off I had to go with this telegram to Abdin. Cherif and +Riaz Pasha were in the antechamber, drowsy and happily smoking. As I +went in I saw a bald-headed ‘coot,’ the Consul-General of the Pays Bas, +going in to His Highness. Cherif drowsily said, ‘Well, any news?’ I +said, ‘No, only I have a telegram for His Highness from Lesseps.’ So +Riaz and Cherif chatted away in Turkish till I saw the ‘coot’ go out and +Cherif was called in. Suddenly Cherif came flying out, all drowsiness +gone, and said, ‘Where is the telegram of Lesseps?’ I gave it him and +then in came flying Pharaoh (the Khedive) with Cherif. Pharaoh threw +himself on the sofa and said, ‘Je suis tout à fait bouleversé avec ce +télégramme de Lesseps. C’est tout à fait contre mes désirs. Barrat! +(l’esclave écrivain de son altesse) venez ici, dites à quelqu’un d’aller +à Halowan et de dire à Lesseps de ne pas télégraphier à Paris,’ and then +turning to me His Highness said, ‘I put the whole affair into your +hands.’ Then, calling Barrat, he said, ‘Telegraph to Goschen, Gordon is +charged with the whole affair, arrange with him.’ Consequently I +telegraphed to Goschen, ‘I have recommended His Highness to suspend the +payment of the next Coupon in order to pay the employés and meet +pressing claims. I will arrange with you for the Commission of Inquiry +into the finances.’ Goschen answered, ‘I will not look at you, the +matter is in the hands of Her Majesty’s Government.’ I then wrote to His +Highness and proposed that he should suspend the payment of the Coupon +and pay the employés and pressing claims, that he should do it by decree +and quote me. Throw all the blame upon me, saying if he did not like to +do this I would myself write to Lord Derby, to say I had recommended His +Highness to do so-and-so; that I did not ask Her Majesty’s Government to +give any acquiescence to it, but merely to tell them if the Khedive did +this, it was my fault. The Khedive hesitated and did not answer me, and +shut himself up in his harem for two days and the game was lost. (There +would have been no risk in this.) Vivian (English Consul-General), of +course, was on the _qui vive_; he knew that some strong measure was in +prospect, and telegraphed to Her Majesty’s Government, begging the same +to authorize him to join the French Consul-General, to stop His Highness +taking any sharp measures. Of course Vivian pointed out the Red +Republican nature of your humble servant. Lord Derby, against anything +abrupt, telegraphed to Vivian, who came to me and said, ‘I have a +telegram; I will read it to you; but you are not to say anything about +it until I have communicated it to His Highness, for it would not be +proper.’ The telegram ran thus: ‘You are authorized in conjunction with +your French colleague, to inform His Highness that Her Majesty’s +Government trusts His Highness will do nothing without accordance with +his creditors, and that Her Majesty’s Government are willing to send +Rivers Wilson out to help him, and that Her Majesty’s Government think +that Baring ought to be on the Inquiry.’ Vivian then said, ‘What will +you recommend His Highness to do?’ I said, ‘I would recommend him to bow +to Her Majesty’s Government.’ Vivian said, ‘What will he do?’ I said, +‘He might say I am sovereign and will do as I will.’ Vivian (who was a +pretty black-eyed boy, and was put by General Fox under my care at the +Royal Military Academy, and whom Ruck Keene kicked on the ankle when he +was removed from that rough school) went home, and on the morrow went in +great pomp to His Highness with the French Consul-General, saying on +leaving, ‘C’est tout ce que nous avons à dire à votre altesse pour le +moment.’ Of course my tongue was tied; but before they (the two Consuls- +General) went to His Highness I wrote to Cherif Pasha, and said, hoping +to take the wind out of their sails, ‘Tell His Highness if he is +troubled, to ask Her Majesty’s Government for Rivers Wilson to come out +and help me’; and I added (for I had begun to see, with Pharaoh +wavering, it was necessary for _me_ to look to _my retreat_), ‘I will +not act with any of the four Commissioners of the Dette.’ This also gave +His Highness a reason for refusing Her Majesty’s Government’s +recommendation, that Baring should be on the Commission of Inquiry, +because he could quote my objections. + +“Now, would you believe it? Vivian never gave His Highness the true +telegram. He and the French Consul-General gave him a paper: ‘Our +Governments authorize us to inform your Highness, that they trust you +will only act in accord with your creditors.’ Unimportant as this paper +was, it sickened him for two days, during which he only spoke of the +Soudan; till at last I took an opportunity, as the moment of secrecy was +over, to tell him what the true telegram was. He looked quite surprised +and said, ‘Why, they never told me that!’ The fact, however, was that +the paper the Consuls-General gave him was so vague, and the solemnity +of their manner was so great, that His Highness got frightened; and when +I did tell him, after these two days, he had already given in, and had +agreed to have the Commissioners of the Caisse (or Dette) upon the +Inquiry, and as a sequel to call for Rivers Wilson. He never told me he +had given in; but four days after I heard of it, and on my seeing him he +said (for it was no longer a secret that he had ceded), ‘Have you any +news?’ I said, ‘Yes, I hear your Highness has agreed to the four +Commissioners of the Dette being on the Inquiry.’ He said ‘Yes’ and the +subject dropped. Five days after that I left Cairo with no honours by +the ordinary train, paying my passage. The sun which rose with such +splendour, set in the deepest obscurity. I calculate my financial +episode cost me £800. His Highness was bored with me after my failure, +and could not bear the sight of me, which his surroundings soon knew. I +dare say I may have been imprudent in speech. I have no doubt it is +better as it is. His Highness and I would have fallen out about the +composition of the Commission of Inquiry, for I feel sure it was meant +to be packed, and that I was only to be the figure head; but the +families of the Ameer of Afghanistan will never change their natures; +peace be to them.” + +After this things had only gone from bad to worse in Gordon’s relations +with the official world. His last act at Cairo, just before leaving it +as he thought for ever at the end of 1879, was to have a serious quarrel +with Nubar Pasha. He held Nubar responsible for much of Ismaïl’s +indebtedness to Europe, and for the international pressure which had +been put upon him, and had led to his deposition; and at their leave- +taking he had spoken his opinion of him so strongly to his face that he +considered it necessary to offer the Armenian ex-Minister +“satisfaction.” There are letters extant referring to this and to +Nubar’s answer declining the hostile invitation. + +There are some curious letters, too, which Gordon wrote about the time +of his arrival in London to Lady Burton, wife of Sir Richard Burton, +who, like himself, had quarrelled with the Foreign Office, giving his +opinion on the chief official personages at Cairo, and of those at home. +In one of these he says, 4th February 1880: “You write to an orb which +is setting or rather is set; I have no power to aid your husband in any +way. I went to F. O. to-day and, as you know, Lord Hammond is very ill. +Well, the people there were afraid of me, for I have written hard things +to them, and though they knew all, they would say nought. I said, ‘Who +is the personification of Foreign Office?’ They said, ‘Currie is.’ I saw +Currie, but he tried to evade my question, _i.e._, ‘Would F. O. do +anything to prevent the Soudan falling into chaos?’ It was no use. I +cornered him, and then he said, ‘I am merely a clerk to register letters +coming in and going out.’ So then I gave it up and marvelled. I must say +I was surprised to see such a thing, a great Government like ours +governed by men who dare not call their souls their own. Lord Hammond +rules them with a rod of iron. If your husband would understand that F. +O. is at present Lord Hammond, and he is ill, he would see that I can do +nothing. I have written letters to F. O. that would raise a corpse; it +is no good. I have threatened to go to the French Government about the +Soudan; it is no good.” + +Again, from Lausanne, 12th March 1880: “Of course your husband failed +with Tewfik. I scent carrion a long way off and felt that the hour of my +departure from Egypt had come, so I left quietly. Instead of A (Ismaïl), +who was a good man, you have B (Tewfik), who may be good or bad as +events will allow him. B is the true son of A, but has the inexperience +of youth and may be smarter. The problem working out in the small brains +of Tewfik is this: ‘my father lost his throne because he scouted the +creditors; the Government only cared for the creditors; they did not +care for good government, so if I look after the creditors I may govern +the country as I like.’ No doubt Tewfik is mistaken, but these are his +views backed up by a ring of Pashas.” + +And a month later from Paris: “I do not like or believe in Nubar. He is +my horror; for he had led the old ex-Khedive to his fall, though Nubar +owed him everything. When Ismaïl became Khedive, Nubar had £3 a month; +he now owns £1,000,000. Things will not and cannot go straight in Egypt; +and I would say, ‘Let them glide.’ Before long time elapses things will +come to a crisis. The best way is to let all minor affairs rest, and to +consider quietly how the ruin is to fall. It must fall ere long. United +Bulgaria—Austria; Syria—France; and Egypt—England. France would then +have as much interest in repelling Russia as we have. Supposing you got +out Riaz, why you would have Riaz’s brother; and if you got rid of the +latter, you would have Riaz’s nephew. _Le plus on change, le plus c’est +la même chose_. . . . Egypt is usurped by the family of the Sandjak of +Salonique, and (by our folly) we have added a ring of Circassian pashas. +The whole lot should go.” + +These letters show what Gordon’s attitude was towards the Khedive Tewfik +and the regime of the Dual Control, and are useful as explaining how +impossible it seemed two and three years later at Cairo that he should +ever again be employed in the Khedivial service, or accept such were it +offered him. It was hardly better as between him and the Foreign Office. +His final quarrel with our diplomacy will be found narrated in an entry +of my diary of 1880 quoted in my “Secret History,” which tells the story +of Gordon’s correspondence with Lord Lyons at the Paris Embassy on his +way home to England. It was in regard to what he considered ought to be +done in the matter of appointing his successor at Khartoum, and this was +repeated at the Foreign Office on his arrival in London. Talking over +this episode of Gordon’s career with Sir Rivers Wilson recently (1910), +he repeated to me the story with more circumstantial details. At that +time, the spring of 1880, Wilson was in the habit of being consulted at +the Foreign Office on Egyptian matters; and he told me that on one +occasion he was sent for by Lord Salisbury, who was then Foreign +Secretary, and asked his opinion of Gordon in connection with some +proposals that had been made at the War Office for his re-employment. +Wilson, while Finance Minister at Cairo the year before, had come into +collision with Gordon, not personally but officially, and a number of +violent telegrams had passed between the two, Gordon being at Khartoum, +Wilson at Cairo. They had never met, and now both had left Egypt, and +both under an official cloud. Wilson, in spite of their quarrel and +though he considered Gordon wrong-headed and perverse, entertained a +high personal respect for him, and hearing of his arrival in London, +left a card on him at the hotel where he was lodging, and Gordon +returned the visit next morning, as he explained, “to apologize for the +rudeness of his telegrams.” Wilson on this occasion was much taken with +“the strange little unpretending man with eyes like blue diamonds,” and +had much conversation with him about the affairs of Egypt, in which both +were interested; he knew the common talk at the Foreign Office, where +Gordon was considered mad, and when a few days later Salisbury asked his +opinion about him, he understood at once what was in question, Gordon’s +sanity, and answered that though Gordon for all ordinary Foreign Office +work was officially “impossible,” nevertheless, if there were anything +exceptionally astonishing to do in a wild country, he was the man to do +it, as, for instance, to settle matters with Cetewayo, the Zulu +chieftain who was giving trouble in South Africa.[17] Nevertheless, the +idea of Gordon’s madness persisted at the Foreign Office, and he +remained unemployed either there or at the War Office as long as the +Tories were in power. + +Gordon’s life for the next year was a series of abortive undertakings, +accepted in haste and repented of at leisure. On the formation of +Gladstone’s ministry of May 1880, Lord Ripon, having been appointed +Viceroy of India, offered him the post, a very important one, of going +with him as his official private secretary. The offer was made to him +through the instrumentality of Lord Northbrook, who had been in +correspondence with him about various matters during his own +Viceroyalty, and Gordon, under the idea that an entirely new departure +was about to be taken in India, according to those principles of justice +and self-government of which he approved, without well considering his +own unfitness for a post whose principal duties were essentially those +of conciliation, self-effacement, and the disguising of unpleasant +truths, in an ill-considered moment accepted. An interesting memorandum +will be found in the Appendix giving the true story of Gordon’s ideas at +starting with Lord Ripon, and the reason of his resignation within a few +days of their arrival at Bombay. It has never before, I believe, been +published. He had held the post barely a month.[18] + +Three days later, 7th July, we find him embarked on a new adventure in +consequence of a telegram received from China, whither he had been +called by Sir Robert Hart to advise on a threatened quarrel between the +Chinese Emperor and the Emperor of Russia; and without delay he proceeds +thither, gives his advice for peace, which is sound and good, but +refuses to stay more than two days at Pekin, and, having come into +collision with our diplomacy at Tientsin, as he had before at Cairo, he +leaves once more for England, which he reaches 21st October. His +restless energy at this period seems to have had no bounds. + +The same autumn saw him in the west of Ireland, whither he had gone “to +have a little shooting and satisfy himself on the state of the lower +classes.” Here again he was bent upon good work, and from Glengariff +addressed a memorandum to Lord Northbrook on the subject of settling the +land question on lines identical with those adopted in 1886, but so far +in advance of what Gladstone’s Government was as yet prepared for that +Downing Street became more than ever convinced that, as Sir E. Hamilton +wrote to me about it, “the writer did not seem to be clothed in the +rightest of minds.”[19] In February 1881 we find him offering his views +(quite sound ones) about Afghanistan to the “Times,” and about the art +of irregular warfare to the “Army and Navy Gazette.” In April he offers +his services to the Cape Government to assist in terminating the Basuto +war, and soon after, in May, wishing to serve a friend, he volunteers +for Mauritius. In July and September he addresses the Government on the +question of the Suez Canal, the route to India by the Cape, and the +uselessness of Malta and Gibraltar; and on the 24th of March 1882, +having received his promotion to the rank of General, he leaves +Mauritius for the Cape, where he accepts new service in Basutoland and +does good work. But again not for long; and the 14th of October sees him +once more in England—having again quarrelled with the Cape authorities. +The year had been one of constant activity and constant change, and of +that unconscious self-advertisement he reproached himself with later to +his sister as “Agag” or “hailing the tram of the world.” + +It was at this time, during his short stay in London at the close of +1882, that I had the talk with him described at the beginning of this +volume. His personality, as I saw him then, remains very clear with me. +It is that of a little, quite unmilitary man, not specially +distinguished except for his clear gray-blue eyes, and his singularly +frank, unconventional manner. There was nothing in the smallest degree +assertive about him, or which could give a stranger the idea of his +being a leader of men, or a man accustomed to authority and importance +in the world. His conversation was pleasant without any special grace of +manner, and he impressed me principally with an appearance of extreme +natural goodness and honesty of speech. He had, what is often the case +with men of very superior understanding, a great humility in expressing +his opinion even about those things he knew the best. At the same time +he was quite able to maintain his own in argument, and had much wit and +pleasant humour in discussion. He seemed to take it for granted that the +person he was talking to was as good and honest as himself, and with as +good a right to an opinion. At that time, as far as my recollection +goes, he had no thought of ever returning to Egypt. He had quarrelled +too entirely with Tewfik and the Pashas, who composed the Khedivial +Court party under the restored regime, to think it possible. His mind +was set on a religious retreat in the Holy Land, and, if he had any +other plan beyond, it was to take service under King Leopold on the +Congo. It was one of his aberrations of intelligence to be constantly +deceived as to character, and he looked upon Leopold as an enlightened +prince, and his Congo scheme as a humanitarian enterprise for the +suppression of the slave trade. + +Thus at the end of the year 1882, instead of going to Egypt he left +England for Jerusalem, and stayed on in its neighbourhood for nearly the +whole of 1883. This was the most mystical part of his life, and has been +fully dealt with in various semi-religious works. I confess that it is +difficult for any one who is not himself a mystic to read these without +a suspicion that on this one point Gordon was at this time less than +entirely sane. His great object in visiting the Holy Land was to re-read +the Bible, which had been his constant study all his life, on the spot +where so many of the events recorded in it happened. He had convinced +himself that by prayer and study every riddle contained in the Book +could be made clear down to the smallest historical and geographical +allusions, hence his time was devoted to localizing the various biblical +events, and reconciling difficulties by solutions, which he considered +to be inspired as he read. This led him sometimes into a labyrinth of +impossibilities, which he nevertheless clung to and expounded in his +letters to his friends, and not to his religious friends only, or to his +sister, though these were the chief recipients of his confidences, but +to some whom one would have thought entirely outside the category of +those to whom such could possibly be made. One of them may be quoted as +showing how far he was from the track of ordinary reason about the +physical facts of the modern world we know. It might have been written +by a recluse of the sixth century, while it was addressed to one no less +a Gallio about spiritual things than the late Sir Richard Burton. Gordon +had been trying to identify the respective sites of the Garden of Eden +and of Ararat, where Noah’s Ark rested, with other points of biblical +geography, which he thought might interest Burton as a geographer and +Oriental scholar. “My idea,” he says, writing from Jerusalem, June 3, +1883, “is that the Pison is the Blue Nile, and that the sons of Joktan +were at Harrar, Abyssinian Godjam, but it is not well supported. The +rock of Harrar was the platform Adam was moulded on out of clay from the +Potters’ Field. He was then put in Seychelles, Eden, and after the Fall, +brought back to Mount Moriah to till the ground in the place he was +taken from. Noah built the ark twelve miles from Jaffa at Aïn Judeh; the +Flood began, the Ark floated up and rested on Mount Baris, afterwards +Antonia; he sacrificed on the Rock (Adam was buried on Skull Hill, hence +the skull under the Cross). It was only 776 A.D. that Mount Ararat of +Armenia became the site of the Ark’s descent. Koràn says El Judi +(Ararat) is holy land. After the Flood the remnants went East to plain +of Shimar. Had they gone East from El Judi, near Mosul, or from Armenian +Ararat they could never have reached Shimar. Shem was Melchizedek.” Was +ever serious letter written to so mocking a reader? + +The question of Gordon’s religious monomania is a difficult one to +handle. In treating it, it is hardly possible not to do violence to what +is sacred to us all, our beliefs, avowed or unavowed, in the +supernatural. There are very few who in their hearts do not hold and +cling to beliefs quite contrary to reason, and who do not attach to +their own personalities an importance in the immensity of things they +cannot at all deserve. Who then of us has a right to say of his fellow +that he is less than reasonable because he believes this or that +doctrine of his relations with the unseen more strongly than the rest? +Gordon was not singular among Englishmen, even in our unbelieving day, +in his thought that God had created him for a special purpose in the +world—it is indeed the foundation of all Christian doctrine—nor is it +easy to argue that the logical deduction he drew from it that God, +having so created him, was also in constant communication with him, +inspiring him with a daily knowledge how to fulfil that purpose, was +other than a sane one. Nevertheless we cannot leave out of account this +feature of the position if we are to consider the public case, which we +are now fast approaching. The truth would seem to be that his year at +Jerusalem was for him, if I may use an expression theologians would not +I think condemn, a complete religious debauch which left him more than +ever the prey of his own visions, a puppet in the hands of his imagined +duty to do this or that for God, he knew not what, which God should +presently reveal to him. He was waiting for a call. His letters that +year to his sister and to Doctor Barnes, a friend of the same school of +pietism as his own, give indications of this. Under Doctor Barnes’ +influence he had during the past two years shifted somewhat his position +in regard to the Church of England, of which he was not before a +professed member. He had never been confirmed, but he now became a +regular communicant, even adopting the doctrine of transubstantiation, +or at any rate of there being supernatural elements in the sacrament of +bread and wine. His letters are full of this. He corresponded, too, +while at Jerusalem with English Church dignitaries, and through Doctor +Barnes became intimate with Bishop Temple, and in this way the aspect of +his religious mind, which before had been extremely eclectic, became +more definitely that of orthodox English Christianity. + +Of what the future was to bring him he wrote little, but there are +several letters of his about Egypt which are of interest and may be +given here. + + +These are to his sister: + +“28 _February_ 1883.—Wonderful are the works of God in the Soudan! Look +at His work. He has upset the Egyptian people thoroughly, and they will +get their liberty from the oppressing Pachas. He has permitted this +revolt, which will end, I believe, in the suppression of the slave trade +and slave-holding, and He has humbled _me_. I will speak about myself +for one moment. I foresaw the Egyptian and Soudan affair, and was not +listened to. I am glad I was humiliated, for the things of this world +will pass away. I expect Laurence Oliphant will go to the Soudan; there +will be no end of trouble to reconquer it, and I am sorely tempted to +write Lord Dufferin my ideas; but I will not, for Jesus is Lord and He +knows what to do.” + +“3 _March_ 1883.—I have great comfort in thinking that our Lord rules +every petty and great event of life both on a small and large scale. +Therefore He governs the Soudan now through A., B., and C., as much as +he did when I was there, and neither I, nor A., B., and C., have or had +anything to do with the Government, as far as others were concerned. +With respect to the motives of our actions, it is another matter; they +are the permanent residues—the things unseen. This comforts me, for I +feel that their welfare, and the course of events that takes place, are +being conducted by the same hand, whether I am there or not.” + +“13 _March_.—. . . I am quite quiet about the Cape and the Soudan; my +sympathies are with the people of those countries and not with the +Turkish Pashas whom our Government will try and replace. Good will come +of it.” + + +To me he wrote: “_April_ 3, 1883.—I am living quietly enough here and do +not hear anything from Egypt. I expect Arabi will be back there in a +year or so. Some of the officers from Egypt have been here. I do not +think that it will be a favourite station for the army. I expect that +the only man who can, humanly speaking, give quiet to Egypt and some +hope of our benefiting the people is Nubar. He is the sort of man who +could work with Arabi, and I think the trials he has gone through have +benefited him. It is very quiet here, and one can live undisturbed, +which is a great comfort. Government ought to get Tewfik’s deposition +cancelled by the new House, for it has not been so at present.” + + +Again to his sister: + +“16 _April_ 1883.—I am at work from morning to night. As for Egypt and +the Cape, I no more care for them; and Lord Dufferin’s despatch shows +that, even had I gone out, it would have been another fiasco.” + +“7 _May_ 1883.—. . . I had a letter from Egypt which is not very +sanguine about the state of affairs, all because our Government will not +say they will stay; yet stay they must, whether they like it or not.” + + +On the 15th August, when the difficulty of General Hicks’ position in +the Soudan became known to him, he wrote: “If they do not make Nubar +Pasha prime minister or regent in Egypt they will have trouble, as he is +the only man who can rule that country. . . . Unless Hicks is given +supreme power he is lost, it can never work putting him in a subordinate +position, recent events at Cairo show what dependence can be placed upon +the Pashas. . . . Hicks must be made Governor General, otherwise he will +never end things satisfactorily.” On 2nd September he writes to Laurence +Oliphant, then at Haifa: “Her Majesty’s Government right or wrong will +not take a decided line in re Egypt and the Soudan, they drift but at +the same time cannot avoid the onus of being the real power in Egypt +with the corresponding advantage of being so. It is undoubtedly the fact +that they maintain Tewfik and the Pashas in power against the will of +the people. This alone is insufferable from disgusting the people, to +whom also Her Majesty’s Government have given no inducement to make +themselves popular. Their present action is a dangerous one, for without +any advantage over the Canal or to England, they keep a running sore +open with France and are acting in a way which will justify Russia to +act in a similar way in Armenia, and Austria in Salonica. Further than +that, Her Majesty’s Government must eventually gain the odium which will +fall upon them when the interest of the debt fails to be paid, which +will soon be the case. Also, Her Majesty’s Government cannot possibly +avoid the responsibility for the state of affairs in the Soudan, where a +wretched war drags on in a ruined country, at a cost of half a million +per annum, at least. + +“I say therefore to avoid all this, if Her Majesty’s Government will not +act firmly and strongly and take the country (which, if I were they, I +would not do), let them attempt to get the Palestine Canal made and quit +Egypt to work out its own salvation. In doing so lots of anarchy will +take place. This anarchy is inseparable from a peaceful solution; it is +the travail in birth. Her Majesty’s Government do not prevent anarchy +now; therefore, better leave the country and thus avoid a responsibility +which gives no advantage and is mean and dangerous.” + +“15 _September_ 1883.—If the Palestine canal is made we shall abandon +Egypt, which will then get self government, and will succeed under God’s +blessing, for He has a blessing for it.” + +“28 _September_ 1883.—. . . Graham (Sir Gerald) writes from Egypt that +he is likely to go there at the end of the year: that looks as though we +should evacuate it. I like watching how God governs all things there; He +acts to us as we act to others.” + +“25 _November_ 1883.—. . . As for the Soudan, I am much interested, but +should feel repugnance to going back there; and that is a great gain, +for I had a sneaking desire to return there, when I first came out here. +As for the Congo, I have not much choice left me.” + +The Palestine Canal, to which he alludes, was a somewhat fanciful scheme +much talked of at the time by which the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea +were to be inundated and transformed into a long narrow lake, united at +the one end with the Mediterranean by a cutting at Haifa, and at the +other end with the Red Sea at Akabah. It interested Gordon principally +because he looked upon it as the possible fulfilment of Ezekiel’s +prophecy, “Their fish [_i.e._, of the Dead Sea] shall be according to +their kinds as the fish of the great sea [Mediterranean] and it shall +come to pass that the fishers shall stand upon it from En-Gedi even unto +En-Eglaim; they shall be a place to spread forth nets.” He also looked +upon it as a possible alternative route to the Suez Canal, which was the +excuse of our having occupied Egypt. “Anything,” he says about the +scheme, “is better than the wretched want of sympathy between us and the +Egyptians, which is now daily increasing into a deadly hate. We must +have a nemesis unless we show more sympathy. What single good thing have +we done the people? . . . Our Government will never get out of Egypt, +for the Europeans there will thwart any reform.” + +These quotations are of some value as an indication of what his policy +was for Egypt as well as the Soudan, immediately previous to his +employment by the British Government there. As will be seen in the next +chapter, they must already to some extent have had their influence at +the Foreign Office. His thoughts, however, were but little connected +with Egypt. It was not to Egypt but to the Congo that he intended to +proceed, and it was in obedience to a summons from King Leopold at the +end of the year that, waking out of his long religious trance, he +returned to Europe. His first visit was to Brussels, and only after he +had arranged things there with Leopold did he go on, on the 7th of +January 1884, to his sister’s house at Southampton. + + + + + CHAPTER V + + GORDON’S LAST MISSION + + +THE problem of how, notwithstanding Gordon’s well-known views about the +Soudan and Egypt, and the recollection of his past conflicts with our +diplomacy both at Cairo and in Downing Street, and the belief +entertained there of his madness, he came to be once more employed by +Gladstone’s Government, and sent to Khartoum on a mission ostensibly not +of his own choosing, and then left to perish, is one of perennial +interest, which history has not yet finally solved. It has been +variously dealt with by official apologists as well as by Gordon’s +friends. Morley has given an authoritative version of it in his “Life of +Gladstone,” Fitzmaurice another in his “Life of Granville,” and Cromer +yet a third in his “Modern Egypt”; but they none of them agree; while +opposed to them we have Sir Henry Gordon’s and Egmont Hake’s narratives, +supplemented by Stead’s account of his own part in it, and no few other +annalists who each has added his contribution to the general knowledge. +Above all we have Gordon’s own diary at Khartoum, and we have the Blue +Books, a body of official information bulkier, perhaps, than that +concerning any individual ever employed by the British Government since +Blue Books were first published. Nevertheless I doubt if the whole truth +has yet been told, or the real reasons given, or the responsibility of +failure placed quite on the right shoulders. I will endeavour to supply +the lacking evidence and reconcile the various narratives. + +The first official suggestion of Gordon’s re-employment in Egypt seems +to have been due to Sir Charles Wilson, that excellent engineer officer +who, it will be remembered (see “Secret History”) did such good service +to Egypt and the cause of justice at the time of Arabi’s trial. Wilson +was at that time very closely in Lord Dufferin’s confidence, having +served under him as perambulating Consul-General for some years in Asia +Minor; and, being a personal friend and fellow officer of Gordon’s and +better acquainted than any Englishman then at Cairo with Soudanese +affairs, he was consulted by Dufferin on the subject as soon as the +latter arrived in Egypt. The result was a despatch, dated 18th November +1882, in which, after repeating Wilson’s opinion, Dufferin adds: “It can +be understood that the Khedive should be unwilling to abandon a country +with such possibilities of development; and it is probable that, if only +some person like Colonel Gordon could be found to undertake its +administration, fairly good government might be maintained there without +drawing upon Egypt either for men or money. Colonel Gordon I believe has +already broken up and disorganized in a great measure the former centres +of the slave traffic, and the same energy and ability which has gone so +near to effecting this difficult task ought to be sufficient to keep the +country in order.” + +Although, as already explained, I do not believe that at that date, and +apart from a change of Khedive and a reconstruction of the National +party at Cairo, Gordon could have effected any permanent settlement of +the Soudan trouble unsupported by an adequate military force from +without, there was still a chance that something of the sort might have +succeeded. + +It is just possible that, if Gordon had been sent at once to Khartoum, +and that if, as was being talked of at the end of the year 1882, Wilson +had succeeded Malet at Cairo, and a Nationalist Ministry been +reinstated, even under Tewfik, Gordon might have succeeded in +reconstituting an effective government at Khartoum in opposition to the +Mahdi, though I doubt it for the reasons already given. At any rate the +suggestion was not adopted—it is probable that Riaz and the other Pashas +of the restored regime opposed it[20]—and nothing more came of it than +the sending of Colonel D. H. Stewart to Khartoum “to report,” and a +little later, January 1883, to an offer made by Dufferin to Wilson that +he should himself go to Khartoum as Governor-General. Wilson, I think, +wisely declined this, for it was already too late; and on his refusal +Hicks was entrusted with the thankless task, with the result we have +seen. + +Stewart’s report of affairs on arrival at Khartoum proved of the most +pessimistic kind. He placed the Mahdi’s followers at 338,000 men, and +recommended the abandonment of the southern and eastern provinces to +their own chiefs, and Darfour to its original Royal Family. He +pronounced the Egyptians “quite unfit in every way to undertake such a +trust as the government of so vast a country with a view to its +welfare”—and in opposition to Wilson, who believed in the Soudan as a +country of great prospective wealth, he pronounced it to be a financial +burden on Egypt hardly worth retaining. + +While mentioning the names of these two distinguished officers, Wilson +and Stewart, who were destined to play each of them a tragic part in the +coming drama of Gordon’s defence of Khartoum, I will say what I remember +of them personally, for it so happened that I met them both at Aleppo in +the summer of 1881. They were travelling together at the time, employed +on special service as consuls in Asia Minor, under the terms of the +Cyprus Convention, and they were both staying, as I was, for some days +in the house of the British Consul. They were men of very different +types and characters. Wilson shared many of Gordon’s characteristics. He +was a serious man, with a large knowledge of the East, and much sympathy +with its peoples, altogether humane and lovable. Like Gordon, he was a +biblical scholar and greatly interested in the topography of such of the +lands in which he travelled as were connected with the Old and New +Testaments. He had served with Palmer and others on the Palestine +Exploration Staff, and was full of learning on the subjects that +interested him. After our meeting at Aleppo he travelled with us to +Scanderoon, and on by sea as far as Smyrna, where we parted company. I +have always retained a very pleasant recollection of him and a high +respect for his character. Stewart, on the other hand, though also a +hard worker and a man of ability, was of a quite different type. He was +a smart young cavalry captain of Hussars, the 11th, with all the +ordinary English officer’s contempt for “natives” and inability to deal +courteously with them. Though I found him an excellent fellow in other +ways, our ideas on the East differed entirely. He was all for the +extension of English authority, and had little sympathy with Orientals. +He was desirous, at the moment, of visiting the Anazeh tribes, from some +of which I had just come, and I gave him letters to two or three of the +leading Anazeh Sheykhs, my friends. But he, after gallopping about the +desert for some weeks with a Turkish escort, gave up his attempt, having +failed to get into pleasant relations with any of them; they “were all,” +he explained to me, “such rogues and liars.” I judge his character by +this. He was a good, active, fearless young Englishman, with all our +English virtues, but too little fellow feeling with ways not English to +succeed in inspiring Eastern confidence. In one of his dispatches from +Khartoum he expresses his “contempt and disgust” for what he holds to be +the “cowardice” of the poor exiled Arabist soldiers at Khartoum, sent to +die in a cause they abhorred. He could not understand their +unwillingness as soldiers to fight. + +Lord Cromer’s high opinion of Stewart was justified by the fact that +both in their separate ways were typical of our English intolerance of +Oriental character, and one needs no other explanation than this to +understand how it was that Stewart and Gordon failed to pull together. +Stewart’s death by treachery at Arab hands was one of the minor +tragedies of the Nile campaign. His report, nevertheless, of February +1883, was an able one, and had considerable influence on Soudanese +policy. Dufferin, in his own report, written about the same time as +Stewart’s, adopts more than one of his ideas, and though Dufferin takes +a far more cheerful view of the situation, as was natural in a man of +his hopeful Irish nature, he recommends with Stewart the abandonment of +the western provinces. “Some persons,” says Dufferin, “are inclined to +advise Egypt to withdraw altogether from the Soudan and her other +acquisitions in that region. But she can hardly be expected to acquiesce +in such a policy. Possessing the lower ranges of the Nile, she is +naturally inclined to claim dominion along its entire course; and when +it is remembered that the territories in question, if properly +developed, are capable of producing inexhaustible supplies of sugar and +cotton, we cannot be surprised at her unwillingness to abandon them. +Unhappily, Egyptian administration in the Soudan has been almost +uniformly unfortunate. The success of the present Mahdi . . . is a +sufficient proof of the Government’s inability either to reconcile the +inhabitants to its rule or to maintain order. The consequences have been +most disastrous.” He then goes on to say that he places high hopes on +General Hicks, who has just been appointed Chief of the Staff at +Khartoum, and to suggest the construction of a Souakin to Berber +railway, which would “change all the elements of the problem. . . . The +finances of the Soudan once rehabilitated . . . commerce would +eventually extend the blessings of civilization for some distance +through the surrounding region. I apprehend, however,” he concludes, +“that it would be wise upon the part of Egypt to abandon Darfur, and +perhaps Kordofan, and to be content with maintaining her jurisdiction in +the provinces of Khartoum and Senaar.” + +This part of the report, we know from Wilson’s biographer, was +practically Wilson’s own; and we know also that Wilson and Gordon were +at one on the subject, and there can be little doubt that, if Dufferin +had had full power at the date of his report to deal with the Soudan, +and if Wilson had gone there, such would have been his instructions. As +it was, the Foreign Office resolved on doing nothing, and Hicks was left +unaided and undirected. It was not till nine months later that the +question of either Wilson or Gordon was brought forward by Lord +Granville. It came about in this way. + +In the fortnight immediately following the news of Hicks’s disaster, +Gordon, who had powerful friends both at Cairo, in Sir Charles Watson +and Sir Evelyn Wood, and at the War Office, in Lord Wolseley and +Reginald Brett (Lord Esher), had his name brought forward, whether +consciously or unconsciously I am not sure, in official circles as a +possible saviour of what was now an almost hopeless situation at +Khartoum. At the War Office it was known that Gordon, though he +considered himself engaged to King Leopold for the Congo, would not in +his secret heart be otherwise than glad to take the affairs of the +Soudan once more in hand. He was beginning to chafe at his long inaction +in the Holy Land, and had a longing for his old life of active +employment; and, at the suggestion probably of Hartington, and perhaps +also of Northbrook, with whom Gordon was in occasional correspondence, +Lord Granville, so we are informed by Fitzmaurice, wrote to Gladstone, +27th November: “Do you see any objection to using Gordon in some way? He +has an immense name in Egypt, he is popular at home, he is a strong but +very sensible opponent of slavery, he has a small bee in his bonnet. If +you do not object I could consult Baring by telegraph.” To this +Gladstone consented, and the telegram, which appears in the Blue Books, +was dispatched to Cromer, 1st December: “If General Charles Gordon were +willing to go to Egypt would he be of any use to you or to the Egyptian +Government, and if so in what capacity?” Cromer, however, without +ceremony refused the offer. He explains in “Modern Egypt” that his real +reason for refusing was that he knew Gordon to be an entirely unfit +person for the task, and that the reason he gave at the time of the +Egyptian Government’s being unwilling to send a Christian to Khartoum, +in view of the religious feeling there, was not the true one; and he +proceeds to give his reasons, founded on his knowledge of Gordon’s +character, for his belief in the unfitness, though he says nothing of +their personal quarrel in 1878, or of the ill-relations in past years +between Gordon and Tewfik. + +It is certain all the same that Gordon’s status as a Christian was a +perfectly sound reason with Sherif for refusing his appointment, as +Gordon himself discovered when it was too late, three months afterwards. +And I cannot help suspecting that the whole plea of personal +“unfitness,” put forward in “Modern Egypt,” has been an afterthought on +Cromer’s part, devised to screen his own share in Gordon’s mission and +its failure. That Cromer and Gordon were personally antipathetic we +know. But, except as a Christian, it is nonsense to talk of Gordon as an +“unfit” person for such a duty as was then proposed. It had not at that +time been as yet decided that Khartoum was to be evacuated, and no +Englishman could have possibly been more fit than Gordon to hold it, if +that was possible, against the Mahdi, and restore the Khedive’s lost +authority. What Gordon was really unfit for, was to be the obedient +agent of a shifty and treacherous diplomacy, nominally a servant of +Egypt, but ready to execute any order of the British Agency at Cairo, +and to defend or betray his Egyptian employers at English bidding. +Cromer’s idea of loyalty and fitness for service in Egypt was always +that of loyalty to himself. Gordon’s was a quite different idea. He held +that an Englishman, accepting employment and receiving pay from a +foreign prince, was bound in honour to do the best he could, not for his +own country’s diplomatic interests, but for the advantage of the prince +and people he served. If Cromer had told us the whole of his thought in +“Modern Egypt,” we should have found it to be this, and that it was in +this sense only, and of his own personal dislike that his objection to +Gordon on the ground of “unfitness” must be understood. + +Still less is there any truth in what he goes on to say that at this +time, December 1883, his hand was forced about Gordon by the London +press, and especially the “Pall Mall Gazette”; for such is the reverse +of fact and easily disproved. Any one who will take the trouble of +looking through the files of the chief London newspapers of that date +will find hardly any mention in them at all of Gordon. Indeed, the press +seems to have been quite ignorant of the proposal made regarding him. +During the whole of that year, 1883, Gordon had been all but ignored by +the English public; and, with the exception of two “headed articles” in +the “Times,” written early in the year while Dufferin was still +considering the appointment of Hicks, and one or two references to +Gordon in the “St. James’s Gazette,” I can find absolutely nothing about +him. As to the “Pall Mall,” that paper was on all matters where Egypt +was concerned run strictly on Gladstonian lines, advocating the +evacuation of the country at the earliest possible date, and with regard +to the Soudan complete abstention. All the earlier part of the year +Morley had been still its editor; and he, having experienced a revulsion +of feeling in regard to the attitude his paper had taken in bringing +about the war of 1882, was now in a mood of anti-Imperialist repentance, +nor had the “Pall Mall” changed its tone when Morley, having entered +Parliament, left his desk in Northumberland Street at the end of August. + +William Stead, the new editor, who four months later was to run Gordon +for the Soudan, and be the chief advocate of accepting responsibility in +Egypt, was still in October reproving the Tory press for this very +advocacy, and indignant with the “Times” for its protest against the +withdrawal of the troops. As to Gordon, the only mention of him is one +rather of depreciation, written at the time of the first news of Hicks’ +defeat, and the article might have emanated from the pen of Lord Cromer +himself; “Sir Samuel Baker,” says Stead in a leading article, 20th +November, on the disaster in Kordofan, “fought and conquered in the same +region, and it was also the scene of the labours of Colonel Gordon, but +although we should have lamented the fate of either of these daring +adventurers, no one dreamed that their defeat and death would have +entailed any responsibility upon the English Government. The fact that +since Gordon’s resignation we have occupied the Delta makes no +difference in our relation to the officers in command of the Egyptian +forces in the Soudan. Whether Hicks falls, or whether he conquers is not +our business. _Not a single British soldier will be ordered to Khartoum +if the Mahdi were to rout the whole force under the orders of the +Khedive’s officers_. . . . The question arises whether Sir E. Baring +ought not to tell the Egyptian Government that this kind of folly has +gone on long enough, and that there would be no chance of the re- +establishment of its prestige, credit, and independence, until its +ambition in the Soudan is restricted within a manageable compass.” + +This article, be it noted, was published just a week before Granville’s +proposal to send Gordon, and, while it stands in strange contrast with +Stead’s pronouncements of two and three months later, it contradicts +absolutely Lord Cromer’s excuse that the sending of Gordon was forced on +the Government by Stead. It is a mere juggling with the issue to shift +the date of the pressure exercised by the press in January and February, +1884, back to November and December 1883. I will return to this matter +of the “Pall Mall” and the London press later. What is of more +historical importance is to show, as can easily be done by a reference +to the Blue Books and to his own avowals, that Cromer, in spite of his +attempt to shift the responsibility of the Gordon mission from his own +on to the back of the London public, was himself, in all but the +individual choice of Gordon as its instrument, the responsible proposer +of the mission. The facts are these: + +Lord Cromer tells us that his first anxiety about Hicks and the Soudan +was in consequence of a talk with Giegler Pasha on 19th November, the +day before the article last quoted. Giegler seems to have infected +Cromer with something of the panic at that time beginning to prevail at +Khartoum; and, taking as he did a purely financial view of the +situation, he straightway telegraphed to Granville that, if Hicks should +be beaten, “the wisest course for the Egyptian Government to adopt would +be to accept defeat and fall back on whatever point of the Nile they +could hold with confidence.” There is nothing, however, to show that at +that time he meant more by this advice than to repeat Dufferin’s +recommendation of a withdrawal from the southern and western provinces, +and a concentration on Khartoum and Suakin. Indeed I think it is pretty +clear that it was so understood at the Foreign Office when Granville the +next day replied, “If consulted, recommend the abandonment of the Soudan +_within certain limits_.” It was then that the idea of Gordon’s being +sent was suggested; and certainly if an Englishman was to go in order to +carry out the abandonment Gordon was the obvious man. There was, indeed, +nobody else to do it with anything like as good a chance of success. The +only English officer then at Khartoum was Colonel Coetlogon, an +acknowledged incapable, who had telegraphed that Khartoum could not hold +out two months against the Mahdi, while Gordon, though not dispatched +till January, and though ultimately unsuccessful, managed by his great +energy and military genius to keep the Egyptian flag flying at Khartoum +for nearly twelve months after Coetlogon’s date. Yet Cromer in his +“Modern Egypt” says he judged Gordon for this purpose, “an unfit +person.” The next stage in the affair is that, the panic at Khartoum +still continuing, Cromer on the 3rd December writes a long dispatch, +still under the influence of the panic, recommending a withdrawal of the +Egyptian garrisons, not only to Khartoum or Berber, but even as far as +to Wady Halfa, thus abandoning the Soudan in its entirety. It was +probably Coetlogon’s continued telegrams that suggested it, and the +unwillingness of the English Government to give any material assistance. +And to this proposal Granville, on 13th December, at once assents, +explaining that all the English Government is prepared to do is to +“assist in maintaining order in Egypt proper, and in defending it as +well as the ports in the Red Sea.” + +By the 22nd December, however, we find Cromer in a different mood. He +had found the Egyptian Government unable to “agree to the abandonment of +the territories which they consider absolutely necessary for the +security and even for the existence itself” of Egypt, and they were for +invoking the aid of the Sultan and of Turkish troops. Moreover, the +reports from Khartoum had begun to be less alarming; the Mahdi had not +advanced to attack the place, and was lingering on at El Obeyd. Although +Cromer does not say so precisely in his despatch of that date (22nd +December), it is easy to read between the lines of it that the idea had +occurred to him that, while insisting upon the abandonment of the whole +Soudan by Egypt, it might be possible not to surrender it to the Mahdi, +but to build up some other form of native self-government, under English +direction at Khartoum, which should constitute a semi-civilized buffer +state between Egypt and the Mahdi’s fanatical rule. The idea of this is +to be found in the last sentences of his despatch, where, after +recounting the difficulties attendant on the proposed withdrawal and the +objections raised by Sherif Pasha, he goes on, in contradiction of his +first alarmist dispatches: “The immediate position is not, I think, so +alarming as appears to be thought in England. Dissensions seem to be +rife among the tribes of the Soudan, some of the most important being +opposed to the Mahdi. It is quite possible that by a judicious +expenditure of money and by good management the Government of the +Khedive may succeed in maintaining its authority northwards from +Khartoum. They will not, however, be able to hold that country except on +sufferance, and I believe them to be perfectly incapable of governing it +properly.” Therefore they must be coerced into abandoning it, and he +asks for power to coerce them. “The only way,” he says, “in which it can +be carried out, will be for me to inform the Khedive that Her Majesty’s +Government insist on the adoption of this course, and that if his +present Ministers will not carry out the policy others must be named who +will consent to do so.” Then he adds, disclosing here his thought: “_It +would also be necessary to send an English officer of high authority to +Khartoum with full power to withdraw the garrisons and to make the best +arrangements possible for the future government of that country_.” + +I recommend this dispatch to the renewed attention of historians, for in +it lies not only the demand for new absolute powers to be undertaken by +England in Egypt, but also in regard to the Soudan, the germ of that +claim, afterwards enforced upon the Khedive in 1899, that Egypt should +abandon the Soudan, leaving it to England to decide what later should be +its status. The Egyptian Government was to withdraw its troops, but “an +English officer of high authority” was to be sent to Khartoum, not only +to insist upon the withdrawal, but also to provide the Soudan with a new +government. One cannot help thinking that Cromer may have already +contemplated what he afterwards carried out, the appropriation of the +great Nile provinces to England herself. + +At any rate it is quite certain that we see in this dispatch of 22nd +December clearly set forth what was to be the Gordon mission, though +Gordon himself is not named in it. An English officer was to go to +Khartoum not only to bring away the garrison, as was afterwards +pretended, but to re-establish order and set up a new political regime. +It is characteristic of Cromer’s lack of scruple as a historian that, in +order to evade admitting his initial responsibility for the mission and +for its failure, he should have omitted, in quoting the concluding +sentence of this dispatch in “Modern Egypt,” the essential word +“English,” and should have altered it into “an officer of high +authority,” thereby enabling him to make it appear that it was not +Gordon or any Englishman, but an Egyptian officer he had in his mind +when writing it. The omission can hardly have been an accident in a +passage so important. Yet none of his critics so far have noticed the +manœuvre.[21] + +This brings us to the end of the year 1883, and almost to the date, 7th +January 1884, of Gordon’s arrival from Palestine in England; and again I +beg the attention of historians to what I am now going to say. + +The particular choice of Gordon for the mission Cromer had proposed, +though as we have seen his name had been more than once talked of at the +Foreign Office, would probably never have been actually made and +insisted on but for a combination of chances closely connected with a +Cabinet intrigue just then coming to a head in London. Down to the end +of the year 1883 nobody was thinking at all of Gordon in connection with +actual circumstances in the Soudan, nor was anything known of Cromer’s +proposal. Gordon had been away close on a year in Palestine, and had +kept silence, an unusual thing with him, during the whole of it as far +as the press was concerned. Not a dozen persons in England knew of his +being on his way back to Europe, and his few friends at head-quarters +looked upon him as being engaged to King Leopold for service on the +Congo, and so out of the question for Khartoum—this although they knew +also that the idea of the Soudan was once more present to his mind, +since the defeat of Hicks, as a possibility and a temptation for his +ambition. He had written to Wolseley to get him leave at the War Office +to enter Leopold’s service, and on landing at Genoa had gone straight to +Brussels, there to arrange terms with the King about the Congo. Except +for a few reviews of Hake’s book “Chinese Gordon,” which had been +published at Christmas time, I can find nothing about him in any of the +London newspapers. And so things stood at the end of the year. + +It would be a curious matter to speculate what might have been the +respective fates of the Nile population and those of the Congo if +Gordon’s contract, then all but signed, with Leopold had been carried +into effect. It would probably have been for the welfare, or, let us +say, the lesser suffering of both. It is difficult to think of the Congo +venture taking the inhuman shape it did had Gordon ever had personally +to do with it, and had he been left alive to protest against a violation +of human rights so monstrous; while, on the other hand, the Egyptian +Soudan might have been spared the destruction of four-fifths of its +inhabitants at the blundering hands of our Government, and its present +melancholy subjection to European rule. Chance, however, or whatever +directs the destinies for good and evil in the world, ruled it +otherwise, and Gordon, turned aside from the Congo, was to meet his +fate, not there, but upon the Upper Nile, while the Congo was to become +the scene of still greater horrors. Whose the hands were exactly that +pulled the strings in the affair and sent him to his doom, and what was +the relative amount of responsibility assignable to each of the chief +actors, with the mystery of their secret motives, I have been at great +pains to ascertain. This is how the thing, when carefully examined, +appears to have come about. + +Gordon’s return to Europe, as I have said, coincided very exactly with a +crisis both in London and at Cairo closely connected with the mission he +was a few days later to be entrusted with. Gladstone’s Cabinet had, at +Cromer’s suggestion, agreed that the Khedive’s Government should be +advised to evacuate the whole Soudan as far north as Wady Halfa, and the +Khedive and Sherif Pasha, his Prime Minister, had refused, and Cromer +had asked permission to add threats to advice, and to insist upon the +advice being taken. The request involved an entire change in Gladstone’s +Egyptian policy, which had, so far, been to assume a minimum of +governing responsibility in Egypt proper, and none at all in the Soudan. +On this point, however, he no longer could count upon a clear majority +in his Cabinet, and parties within it were so evenly balanced that, as +is usual in such cases, the London press was being called in to add +weight to opinion on either side. + +Moreover, the press being largely in the hands of capitalists and City +financiers, it was happening, as is also usual in such cases, that the +balance of journalistic opinion, directly it came to understand the +position in the Cabinet, was as largely on the side where money +interests were involved. These lay strongly with the continuation of the +British occupation of Egypt, and with the undertaking by England, where +the chance should be given, of new responsibilities. The house of +Rothschild still held half the Domains Loan of £9,000,000 in its own +hands, and the “Times” was its obedient organ. It needed therefore only +a slight impulse from the War Office, which was the head-quarters of the +faction opposed to Gladstone, to set the press in motion on the Soudan +question; and on the first day of the year 1884, we find the “Times” +publishing a strong letter from Sir Samuel Baker protesting against the +abandonment of the Soudan by civilization, and urging the employment of +British or Indian troops for the purpose of recovering it from the +Mahdi. It was a powerful letter, and we find it supported by a leading +article, as strongly recommending the assumption of full authority by +England at Cairo and citing with regard to the Soudan the Dufferin +recommendation of the year before, namely that, while Darfour and +Kordofan might be abandoned, Khartoum and the northern and eastern +provinces should be retained, that troops should be sent to Assouan, and +that communication with the Red Sea should be reopened by the +construction of a railway from Berber to Souakin. This was not only the +Dufferin but also the Gordon policy, as was well known both to Samuel +Baker and to those who inspired the “Times.” Baker was interested in the +Soudan both by his former connection with it and by the fact that his +brother Valentine (Baker Pasha) had just been ordered to Souakin to +defend the Red Sea coast against Osman Digna the new Mahdist leader. In +Baker’s letter to the “Times” occurs the first public suggestion I can +find of Gordon’s being employed by the Government to solve the +difficulty at Khartoum. It is not repeated in the “Times” article, nor +is it more than a question “Why should not General Gordon Pasha be +invited to assist the Government?” + +Two days later, a Cabinet meeting being about to be held where the fate +of the new policy of Egypt was to be decided, we find the “Pall Mall +Gazette” yielding to the same influence and announcing its sudden +conversion from the evacuationist Gladstonian view of Egyptian policy, +of which it had been so stout and consistent a supporter, to that of +Gladstone’s political opponents in the Cabinet. It opened its campaign +by publishing the first of a series of leading articles on the crisis, +issued on consecutive days and headed respectively, “Facing a Crisis,” +“The Alternatives,” “Downing Street and Cairo,” and “The Drift of Events +in Egypt.” All were sensational articles, and all in favour of the full +authority in Egypt Cromer was demanding, namely, that of enabling him to +coerce the Khedive, take the supreme power at Cairo into his own hands +and assume sole responsibility in regard to the Soudan. + +No one, I think, with any knowledge of journalism can doubt that a +conversion so sudden and so violent can have been due to anything less +than a Ministerial hint of the very directest kind. The decision of the +Cabinet to undertake the new responsibility at Cairo was come to on the +3rd January, the date of the first “Pall Mall Gazette” article, but it +was not known to the general public till the 7th, the date of the fourth +article, and so must have been the result of private information from +within the Cabinet, probably from the War Office and communicated by +Brett, who was Hartington’s private secretary and his usual intermediary +with the press, besides being an old member of the “Pall Mall” +staff.[22] There is, however, as yet no mention in any of the “Pall Mall +Gazette” articles of Gordon, nor can I find his name in any London paper +except in the one phrase I have quoted from the “Times,” during that +first week of the year, the reason doubtless being that Gordon’s few +friends knew that on landing at Genoa he had gone straight to Brussels, +_en route_ for the Congo. The only allusion to Gordon in the “Pall Mall +Gazette” of that week is not in the articles, but in an “occasional +note,” and again in the form of a query, “Chinese Gordon is to undertake +the administration of the Congo. . . . Is it not a pity that at a time +when so much other work is urgently wanting to be done in Egypt and +elsewhere the ablest leader of irregular forces England has produced +should be told off to the service of an International Association amid +the swamps of the Congo?” + +This was all that had been said about Gordon before his arrival at +Southampton on the 7th. He had spent the best part of the week at +Brussels before proceeding to England, and had found there on 2nd +January a communication awaiting him from Wolseley, with whom he had +been in correspondence, telling him that the permission he had asked for +at the War Office to take service under King Leopold was refused him by +the British Government. This had brought him in haste to England, and he +had arrived at his sister’s house at Southampton so angry about the +refusal that his first act had been to sign and send in his papers to +the War Office resigning his commission in Her Majesty’s army. His +brother Sir Henry tells us that the refusal was “more a Foreign Office +than a War Office question, and the refusal emanated from the former.” +Gordon took it to be due to a Foreign Office prepossession against him. +It is possible, however, to read the refusal in another sense, and that +Granville, who had already once proposed him to Cromer, and who was +considering Cromer’s demand for an English officer, still wished to +retain a hold over Gordon for the contingency of his being required at +Khartoum; and this is how I am inclined to interpret it. It is difficult +indeed to understand it otherwise, seeing that the Foreign Office must +have just then received Cromer’s telegram asking for an officer to carry +out a duty precisely such as Gordon was most fitted, indeed the only man +fitted, to perform. + +For these reasons, too, I refuse to accept as entirely reliable Mr. +Stead’s claim to absolute independence of official inspiration in the +matter of his celebrated interview with Gordon at Southampton, which +took place on the day following the general’s arrival there. Mr. Stead’s +genius may very well have conceived the idea of the visit as the +particular form in which Gordon was to be advertised; but in view of the +series of articles just alluded to, and knowing as I do the ways of +journalism and the close connection there was that year between the +“Pall Mall Gazette” and the War Office through Lord Esher, and having, +moreover, been myself more than once interviewed by Mr. Stead, I find it +impossible not to recognize in the sudden entrance of Gordon into the +intrigue one of those manœuvres worked from time to time in the “Pall +Mall” columns through Lord Esher’s agency. + +We know from Fitzmaurice’s “Life of Granville” that the antagonism +between Hartington and Gladstone did actually exist at the time, and +that it had just then reached a critical stage; and we know that +Hartington, as Secretary for War, must have been the Minister to whom +the choice of an officer for Khartoum had been referred, and who, in +fact, did a few days later decide it, and we know Lord Esher’s position +at the War Office, and we know his connection with the “Pall Mall +Gazette.” Lord Esher was Gordon’s friend, Mr. Stead at the time was not. +Lord Esher was conversant with his movements, with his application for +leave to serve King Leopold, with the refusal of his leave, and I +decline to believe that there was no hint given on which Mr. Stead +acted. In every newspaper office there are scores of such journalistic +secrets never divulged and easily forgotten, and it seems to me vastly +more probable that the Gordon “boom” was one of them. + +What is quite certain is that, from the moment of the publication of the +interview, the “Pall Mall” became avowedly the organ of that section of +the Cabinet which was working for intervention in the Soudan, if +necessary, by force of arms. If any one doubts this he needs to go no +further than to the files of the “Pall Mall” for proof. There is among +the rest a perfectly plain confession of the fact in a leading article +of 14th February, where Stead thus excuses himself as the Liberal editor +of a Liberal journal for his advocacy of the Gordon mission at a time +when many Liberals were far from approving it. “From a mere party point +of view,” Stead writes, “it is often the most useful thing a true +Liberal can do to oppose the immediate policy of his party, for it is +only by that means that he can secure the adoption of the policy which +will give victory to his own side. _Cabinets, it must never be +forgotten, are composite bodies, and the outsider who advocates a new +departure is often the exponent of the views of those who in the secrecy +of the council chamber have been hitherto unsuccessfully striving for +the policy_ that makes for righteousness and peace. There are times when +the most loyal followers may find it necessary to indicate to his +leaders the path of safety which they may hitherto have been too +preoccupied to perceive or too evenly divided to adopt.” The whole +passage, and especially those words which I have italicized, is a very +candid avowal of the position of things as between the “Pall Mall +Gazette” and the section of the Cabinet represented by Hartington, and +it was explained to me in this way on my return to England by those in a +position to know. + +With regard to the interview itself, perhaps the most important part of +it in this regard are the phrases used in the leading article +recommending the interview. It is a repetition and amplification of the +question put by Sir Samuel Baker in his “Times” letter of a week before. +“Why not,” asks Stead, “send Chinese Gordon with full powers to Khartoum +to assume absolute control of the territory, to relieve the garrisons, +and do what can be done to save what can be saved from the wreck in the +Soudan? . . . No one can deny the urgent need in the midst of that +hideous welter of confusion for the presence of such a man with a born +genius for command and unexampled capacity for organizing ever- +victorious armies and a perfect knowledge of the Soudan and its people. +Why not send him out with _carte blanche_ to do the best that can be +done?” + +Here we have the Gordon mission exactly as it was sent, in fact if not +nominally, by Her Majesty’s ministers nine days later, almost exactly as +it had been proposed by Cromer in December, namely, the sending of “an +English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full power to +withdraw the garrisons and to make the best arrangements possible for +the future government of that country.” Seeing that nothing as yet was +known outside the public offices of Cromer’s dispatch or of his having +made any such demand, and the extreme improbability of an identity of +ideas between Stead and Cromer by mere journalistic inspiration, I think +we may fairly conclude that the description by Stead of what Gordon was +to effect at Khartoum was due to a War Office suggestion rather than +mere accident. At any rate, it is absurd that Cromer, of all persons, +should complain as he does in his “Modern Egypt” of the idea of the +mission having been forced upon him by the “Pall Mall Gazette.” All that +can fairly be said is that Stead, having got an inkling that such a +mission had been demanded, put the dots promptly and powerfully on the +_i_’s and named the only man capable of carrying it out effectually. It +is difficult indeed to understand, notwithstanding all we know of +Cromer’s dislike of Gordon and his recent protestations, that Gordon was +absent from his mind when he penned his telegram of 22nd December. Lord +Cromer has a convenient way of forgetting things when it suits him to +forget, and it has probably suited him to forget this among the rest. At +any rate, it is impossible to suggest another name. + +Neither, I think, can it be pretended that Stead’s recommendation of +Gordon for the post was so potent and instantaneous an influence at the +Foreign Office as to have forced Granville’s hand unless Granville had +been already willing. Between the publication of the “Pall Mall” +interview and Lord Granville’s second proposal to Cromer of sending +Gordon there was an interval of less than twenty-four hours, and it is +far more likely that those in the Cabinet who wanted to send Gordon +should have made use of Stead to popularize their plan than that Stead +should have been able by his few words, however powerful, so suddenly to +force it on them. Gordon’s views, publicly and forcibly stated in the +“Pall Mall Gazette,” may possibly have quickened the pace, and this is +all that can reasonably be affirmed about it. The real object of the +press campaign of the past week, it is essential to understand, had been +to force not Granville’s hand, but Gladstone’s. Granville needed no +convincing. He was already of the Hartington faction in regard to Egypt. +But Gladstone, it was known, would be difficult to persuade. Gladstone, +unlike the rest, really wanted to get out of Egypt, he really wanted to +have nothing to do with the Soudan, and he had only consented to the new +responsibility undertaken at Cairo a fortnight before of making and +unmaking ministries on its being explained to him that thus alone could +he escape being involved in the further responsibility of Khartoum. It +was necessary now to force his hand to the idea of sending up an +“English officer of high authority” not only to withdraw the garrisons, +but also to stay on at Khartoum and to “arrange a future government.” +Gladstone could hardly be made to swallow this second dose of +responsibility, except through pressure from outside the Cabinet, the +pressure of public opinion, and this it was that was put upon him by +Hartington through Stead and the magic of Gordon’s name. The “Pall Mall +Gazette” had more than once been used to coerce Gladstone. It was the +paper that he chiefly read.[23] + +Granville’s position was quite different. It was an intermediate one +between Gladstone’s and Hartington’s. A Whig by birth and tradition and, +as Foreign Secretary in 1881-82, the member of the Cabinet most directly +concerned in the aggression on Egypt, he needed no conversion at all to +the idea of remaining on at Cairo or of a further commitment to +responsibility in the Soudan, and he was certainly at one with +Hartington on these points; but, on the other hand, Gladstone was his +chief, with whom he could not afford to quarrel. He was poor and in +debt, and dependent on Gladstone for his continuance in office. What +made him of value in the Cabinet was his amiability. He was friends with +both factions,[24] and was used by them both as go-between. In the +present instance it was necessary to get Gladstone to go with Hartington +the way the Whigs wanted. They had used the press, and precisely the +“Pall Mall Gazette” under Morley, against him in the spring of 1882 when +they wanted his consent for the sending of the fleet to bombard +Alexandria. They were using the same “Pall Mall Gazette” under Stead now +that they wanted his consent to the sending of an “English officer” to +Sarawak the Soudan. They had pretended to Gladstone in 1882 that the +mission of the fleet would be one of moral pressure only, to protect +British subjects, and give moral support to the Khedive—no actual firing +of guns, nothing at all like an armed intervention in Egypt, still less +like a permanent occupation. They pretended to him now that Gordon’s +mission was to be an entirely peaceful one, a tour of inspection, to +withdraw the garrisons by peaceable means and return at once in a few +weeks. Of course it was nothing really of the sort; it could not really +be anything of the sort, and they knew it; it was to arrange a new +government at Khartoum, and this could only be done by reorganizing a +fighting force under Englishmen, and thus indirectly by an English +occupation of Egypt indefinitely prolonged. + +Any one who will take the trouble to go through all the documents of the +case with an open mind will, I think, inevitably agree with this reading +of the facts. It is the only one that accounts rationally for +Gladstone’s position afterwards or for that of any one of those +principally concerned. Morley, in his “Life of Gladstone,” would have +one believe that Granville and Hartington, and Dilke and Northbrook, +four level-headed English politicians, at least as much rogues +politically as fools, went suddenly mad on Stead’s persuading them that +Gordon was a miracle man. Cabinet Ministers, however, do not go mad in +this way; their madnesses have much more method than that. Nor are they +thus carried off their legs in twenty-four hours by a newspaper +interview. It is they that inspire the newspapers, not the newspapers +them; and, though Heaven knows they are guided at times by little enough +wisdom, it is seldom to the press they go for their folly, especially at +the Foreign Office. For the rest of the situation it is necessary to +consider that Granville does not seem to have understood all when on the +9th, the evening of the day after Stead’s interview was published, he +telegraphed to Cromer, “Would General Charles Gordon or Sir Charles +Wilson be of assistance under altered circumstances in Egypt?”—the +“altered circumstances” being of course Cromer’s assumption of all +power. Stead’s _ballon d’essai_ had been well received in London by the +morning papers, and Granville doubtless felt surer of his ground with +Gladstone. The circumstances, however, had not been favourable to either +Gordon or Wilson. Nubar hated Gordon, and the Khedive hated Wilson, who +had baulked him in his intention of hanging Arabi;[25] and Cromer, who +only wanted now an obedient agent at the end of a wire, and who knew +Gordon was not the man implicitly to obey any of them, willingly joined +Nubar and the Khedive in their refusal. Once more, therefore, Gordon was +found to be “quite unfit,” and Cromer’s reply, 12th January, was, “I +have consulted Nubar Pasha and I do not think that the services of +General Gordon or Sir Charles Wilson can be utilized at present.” + +Cromer in his “Modern Egypt” says that the man they had in view then was +after all no Englishman, but an Egyptian, Abd-el-Kader Pasha, an +excellent man doubtless for a job in the Soudan, but he does not explain +Nubar’s objection to Gordon, and in order to avoid the difficulty of +doing so, and of reconciling his refusal of either Englishman now +offered him with his special request a few weeks before for an English +officer, he drops, as we have seen, the word “English” out of his +earlier telegram. The attempt to get Abd-el-Kader to undertake their +work occupied another several more days in the final decision, and it +was not till Gladstone’s and Cromer’s and Nubar’s consent had all been +obtained, by the 16th, that the actual sending on the 18th was carried +into effect. How this was engineered in London, and on what conditions, +we will now examine, following Gordon’s steps from day to day in +accordance with his recorded movements. + +Stead’s interview with Gordon took place at Southampton on the 8th +January, and was published on the afternoon of the 9th. It reached +Gordon at Southampton on the morning of the 10th, and had on him a very +disturbing influence. In the interview itself he had been careful not to +suggest that he was himself willing to undertake the task proposed to +him; on the contrary, he had suggested Sir Samuel Baker as the proper +man for it. He looked upon the Soudan as a temptation to vain glory, and +Stead’s suddenly thrusting him forward into the glare of publicity as a +candidate for the duty troubled his conscience. In his heart he was +tempted to go, if only the Government would send him, yet it was what he +called his “Agag,” the thing he must “hew in pieces,” his besetting sin +of “hailing the tram of the world.” It was in this double mood that he +fled the same evening to the vicarage of his religious friend, Dr. +Barnes, at Heavitree, near Exeter, there to take spiritual counsel, and +also to see Baker, who lived in the neighbourhood, and consult with him +as to what was to be done. Barnes’ story of this visit is brief, but +enlightening and most characteristic of the man Gordon was. The worthy +vicar thus records it: + +“He [Gordon] found time to spend a night at Heavitree Vicarage, and on +the morning of Friday the 11th of January, he received Holy Communion in +the parish church. This, so far as I can trace his course, was, with one +exception, his last communion. On the same morning he visited Bishop +Temple, with whom, as we have seen from a letter already quoted, he had +wished to ‘talk about those things’—the only things which seemed to him +to be of really vital interest and importance. + +“Later in the day he went on to Sandford Orleigh, Sir Samuel Baker’s +house; and to those who accompanied him it was pleasant to see the +meeting between the two ex-governors of the Soudan. While we were +driving from Newton Abbot Station to Sandford Orleigh, Sir Samuel Baker +pressed on Gordon the expediency of his again going to the Soudan as +Governor-General, if Her Majesty’s Government should require it. Gordon +was silent, but his eyes flashed, and an eager expression passed over +his face as he looked at his host. Late at night, when we had retired, +he came to my room, and said in a soft voice, ‘You saw me to-day?’ ‘You +mean in the carriage?’ ‘Yes; you saw _me_—that was _myself_—the self I +want to get rid of.’” + +The same evening he wrote a letter to Baker—it was probably agreed +between them that he should do so—in which he again urged Baker to +accept the task, and gave him his idea of what would be necessary for +successfully carrying it out. This letter Baker sent to the “Times,” and +it appeared in that paper on the morning of the 14th. We will return to +what he said in it later, when we consider precisely what those who sent +him on his mission intended him to do. It had the effect of causing +Granville to write that same day privately (note the humanitarian +appeal) to Gladstone: “If Gordon says he believes he could by his +personal influence excite the tribes to escort the Khartoum garrison and +inhabitants to Suakin, a little pressure on Baring might be advisable. +The destruction of these poor people would be a great disaster.” Also on +the morning of the 15th, Gladstone’s consent having been obtained, +Wolseley, who had already sent for Gordon, was commissioned to sound him +as to his willingness to go, and found him to be so under certain +conditions. + +What these were, and what exactly passed between the two on the 15th, it +is very difficult to disentangle from the conflicting evidence, for +little of it was put in writing at the time, and the chief testimony +regarding it rests upon the recollections of persons, or rather of +partisans, all concerned in excusing themselves many years after the +event. Thus Lord Esher (Brett) tells us that on that occasion, besides +Wolseley, Gordon saw Hartington and Granville, but I think there must be +some confusion of memory here in which the interview of the 15th has +been mixed up with that of three days later, the 18th. Esher’s words +are: “In January 1884, after his interviews with Lord Hartington and +Lord Granville, Gordon came for the last time to Tilney Street. He was +leaving for Brussels. I can see him now with his muffler and his warm +coat walking about the nursery with my eldest son in his arms.” Now +Gordon, in a letter from Brussels dated the 17th, says: “Brocklehurst is +here with me. Government and authorities have been exceedingly kind and +I have every reason to be grateful to them for I have often worried them +and they have decided to let me stay on in H. M. S. (Service?).” This, +as Brett was certainly in the best position to know, would seem +conclusive as to the date, for Gordon left for Brussels the next +morning, the 16th, but I feel sure that the visit described at Tilney +Street was on the 18th, when Gordon certainly saw both Hartington and +Granville. About the 15th, writing soon after the event, Sir Henry +Gordon says very clearly, “on the 15th January General Gordon came up to +London in accordance with a telegram from Lord Wolseley and had an +interview with him of over two hours, during which time although Lord +Wolseley saw some members of the Cabinet General Gordon did not.” And +Sir Henry goes on to say that his brother that same evening came to dine +with him, and next morning went with Brocklehurst to Brussels. As to +what took place between Wolseley and Gordon, nothing very precisely is +known, as Gordon seems to have kept his own counsel about it. +Fitzmaurice says briefly: “Lord Wolseley met General Gordon, then on his +way to Brussels, and discussed the situation in Egypt with him. Having +asked the General what under the circumstances of the hour he would do, +Lord Wolseley received the reply ‘I would send myself.’ The brief +conversation suggested that General Gordon, stirred by the thought of +the threatened collapse of the edifice which he had helped to raise, +through the very dangers he had foreseen, and believing that he alone +was the man of the situation, was prepared to cancel his existing +engagements and return to the Soudan.” + +The text of Granville’s telegram of the same evening to Cromer, using +the gentle pressure which Gladstone had agreed to, is given in “Modern +Egypt,” dispatched, doubtless, on Wolseley’s report of the conversation. +“I hear indirectly that Gordon is ready to go straight to Suakin without +passing through Cairo on the following rather vague terms, his mission +to be to report to Her Majesty’s Government on the military situation in +the Soudan and to return without any further engagement towards him. He +would be under you for instructions and will send letters through you +under flying seal. You and Nubar Pasha to give him all assistance and +facilities as to telegraphing, etc. Egyptian Government to send Ibrahim +Fowzi to meet him at Suez with a writer to attend on him. He might be of +use in informing you and us of the situation. It would be popular at +home but there may be countervailing objections. Tell me your real +opinion with or without Nubar Pasha.” The word “indirectly” would seem +to mean that Granville had not himself seen Gordon that day. The phrase +about the mission being to “report” only seems to have been the gentle +way of putting things calculated to gain Cromer’s acquiescence, and it +is on this initial account of the mission communicated also to +Gladstone, with the design to allay his suspicions as well, that the +legend was based to which Gladstone always adhered, that Gordon had +received no other instructions, and had disobeyed them by understanding +that they covered wider ground. It is quite impossible, however, that +this should have been all that passed between Wolseley and Gordon during +the two hours their conference had lasted, or that it was in this sense +that Gordon understood the proposal made to him by the War Office. +Gordon’s letter to Baker had been published the morning of the day +before in the “Times,” and it was very explicit about what ought to be +done in the Soudan, and the minimum of outside support needed to +accomplish it successfully. + +Cromer, in his “Modern Egypt,” makes light of the interview with Stead +at Southampton as being only talk, but he cannot say the same of the +published letter which, according to his usual controversial practice, +he passes by in silence. Gordon in the interview had declared in the +plainest possible words not only that Khartoum ought to and must be held +against the Mahdi, but that the evacuation of its garrison, with the +garrisons of Darfur and the Upper Nile, was a physical impossibility; he +lays this down in language as to which there can be no conceivable +mistake: “Whatever you decide about evacuation you cannot evacuate +because your army cannot be moved; you must either surrender absolutely +to the Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all hazards, the latter is the only +course which ought to be entertained. There is no serious difficulty +about it, the Mahdi’s forces will fall to pieces of themselves, but if +in a moment of panic orders are issued for the abandonment of the whole +of the Eastern Soudan, a blow will be struck against Egypt and the peace +of the East which may have fatal consequences. . . . Nubar should be +left untrammelled by any stipulations concerning the evacuation of +Khartoum; there is no hurry. The garrisons can hold their own at +present, let them continue to hold on until disunion and tribal +jealousies have worked their natural result in the camp of the Mahdi. +Nubar should be free to deal with the Soudan in his own way. How he will +deal with the Soudan I cannot profess to say, but I should imagine that +he would appoint a Governor-General at Khartoum with full powers, and +furnish him with 2,000,000 sterling. . . . Sir Samuel Baker might be +appointed Governor-General, he might take his brother as Commander-in- +Chief.” This was a strong fighting policy, and, _mutatis mutandis_, +precisely how he afterwards understood his instructions. In his letter +to Baker he had been even more explicit. “To my mind,” he says, +“patience and diplomacy are far more needed than arms. Still to some +degree you must have the latter. . . . I would recommend (1) permission +to be got from the Sultan to engage 4,000 of his reserved troops, both +officers and men, which will be under your brother’s command, and be +volunteers with the promise of remuneration at the end of their service; +(2) that some 2,000 Belooches under the native officers should be +enlisted in India, who have been soldiers of Her Majesty, old sturdy +warriors; for your cavalry you can horse them in the Hedjaz, Palestine, +and Syria; (3) that Her Majesty’s Government will allow you to purchase +from Her Majesty animals, paying a percentage upon all purchases; (4) +that Her Majesty’s Government should allow military store officers to +aid you but not to go into the field”—another fighting programme. + +With these two pronouncements of what was to be done hot before them—and +Hartington and Granville and Wolseley must all have read them—it is +ludicrous to suppose that the real object of the mission, as it was +certainly understood by Gordon, and afterwards, to the best of his +power, put in execution by him, was not discussed between Gordon and +Wolseley, or by Wolseley as go-between with Hartington and Granville, or +that these did not understand it in an active sense. Cromer scouts the +idea of Gordon having been sent to him only to report, and in this +Cromer is right. The talk of reporting was only make-believe, gently to +propitiate him, Cromer, and to propitiate Gladstone; it never had any +reality. Hartington, describing the mission some weeks later in the +House of Commons, while attempting to excuse the Government, admits that +the mission had a larger and more important scope than either reporting +or a withdrawal of the garrisons. “Gordon’s mission,” he says, 20th +February 1884, was “to attempt the rescue of 28,000 men contained in +Khartoum and the other portions of the Soudan, and not only these +garrisons, but also to make some arrangement for the better government +of those provinces.” He was clearly quoting Cromer’s original words of +the previous December, which had all along remained the basis of the +mission as understood by himself and his own section of the Cabinet at +the War Office. + +If Gordon was not sent at once on the 15th to Khartoum it was because +Cromer had not yet answered Granville’s latest telegram. While waiting +for it he consequently went back to Brussels to excuse himself with King +Leopold for breaking his Congo agreement. The War Office had already +refused to accept his resignation of his commission, and on the 17th, +Cromer and Nubar having capitulated on the 16th declaring now that +Gordon was the best man, Gordon was telegraphed for and returned to +London.[26] Here on the 18th the same process of interviewing took place +at the War Office; first, a talk between Gordon and Wolseley; then, in +the afternoon, with four members of the Cabinet, who had been hastily +got together, all of them members of the Hartington faction and without +Gladstone, who was still away invalided at Hawarden. The discussion that +day seems to have been little more than formal, for Gordon was already +in his train by eight o’clock to catch the Brindisi mail for Egypt, and +the instructions had had to be drafted and written out and signed at the +Foreign Office, and a search made for Stewart, who was to go with him, +and good-byes to be said. Gordon was brought into a room where the four +Ministers, Hartington, Granville, Dilke, and Northbrook,[27] were, and +exchanged a few words with them, and that seems to have been all. The +whole of the details clearly had been arranged with Wolseley. Gordon’s +own account of the interview is given in a letter he wrote to Barnes in +the train, and posted at Brindisi on the 22nd. + +“I saw Wolseley at 8 a.m. He said nothing was settled, but Ministers +would see me at 3.30 p.m. No one knew I had come back. At noon he, +Wolseley, came for me and took me to Ministers. He went in and talked to +the Ministers and came back and said: ‘Her Majesty’s Government want you +to understand this—Government are determined to evacuate Soudan, for +they will not guarantee future government. Will you go and do it?’ I +said, ‘Yes.’ He said, ‘Go in.’ I went in and saw them. They said, ‘Did +Wolseley tell you our orders?’ I said, ‘Yes.’ I said, ‘You will not +guarantee future government of Soudan, and you wish me to go up and +evacuate now.’ I said ‘Yes,’ and it was over, and I left at 8 p.m. for +Calais. Very little passed between us. The Duke [of Cambridge] and +Wolseley came to see me off, so that is over.” + + + + + CHAPTER VI + + WAS GORDON DISOBEDIENT? + + +IT is said that Gordon drafted his own instructions at the Foreign +Office, but I find it hard to believe this, for, if true, it would go +near to proving him as great a diplomatic rogue as those who sent him. +The instructions are a very crafty document. They begin with a manifest +insincerity about Gordon’s going to Egypt “to report on the measures it +may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons and +the European population in Khartoum,” and he is also “to consider and +report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the Interior +and upon the manner in which the safety and good administration of the +Red Sea Ports can be secured.” Then there is a paragraph about the slave +trade as manifestly insincere, introduced for the satisfaction of the +Anti-Slavery Association in London, and he is to send his reports on +these subjects under flying seal through Cromer. In all this it is +impossible to find more than a hint of the true object of the mission. +It is contained in the document, but hidden away in the two unobtrusive +concluding paragraphs. These are: “You will consider yourself authorized +and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government +may desire to entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir +E. Baring. You will be accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will assist +you in the duties thus confided to you.” (Gordon afterwards described +Stewart as having been sent with him as his dry nurse to keep him out of +mischief.) “On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with +Sir E. Baring, who will arrange to meet you and will settle with you +whether you should proceed direct to Suakin, or should go yourself or +dispatch Colonel Stewart to Khartoum _via_ the Nile.” + +These instructions, I say, are a model of how to conceal an intention, +and have the true Foreign Office ring. They really amount to _carte +blanche_ to propose or do anything that the missioner could get Cromer +to consent to, and, in fact, cover all and more than all that Gordon +eventually tried to perform. “Such other duties as the Egyptian +Government might entrust to you” would have included either his handing +over the whole Soudan to the Mahdi, or his determination to smash the +Mahdi, or again to Sarawak the Soudan on his own account or King +Leopold’s or the Queen’s. Cromer was made responsible for all, and the +Government at home retained the ordinary parliamentary privilege of +disavowing their own responsibility for things if things went wrong. +Above all, it enabled Granville to telegraph to Gladstone with a free +conscience that Gordon had been sent by the War Office simply “to +report.” + +I confess that, though I have blamed and still blame Gladstone for +nearly all the misfortunes that have happened since 1882 in Egypt, I +here feel some sympathy with him as with a man duped and deceived. He +certainly would never have consented to the Gordon mission in its full +sense if he had been allowed to understand the full meaning of the +instructions. He would have known, not only that the sending of Gordon +“to report” would make it very difficult not to accept and act upon his +report—this point he noticed in a letter written by him at the time—but +also that sending Gordon, who was a fighter born, on a merely peaceful +mission to carry out a military plan which he had himself declared to be +impossible except with the aid of a large body of troops, would make the +sending of troops also a certainty. Gordon was in the eyes of the +British public a Christian hero starting on a crusade, and it was +inconceivable that he should be left to perish for want of Christian +help. It is true that, when Gladstone arrived three days later in +London, a Cabinet was held, where the thing was more or less explained +to him, and that he consented to what had been done; but it was by this +time a _fait accompli_, and too late to stop Gordon, who had already +reached Brindisi and was on the high seas on his way to Port Said. His +mission could no longer be cancelled. All the religious press of England +had risen like one man to the occasion, and were rejoicing over Gordon +as the champion of Christendom. It was too late to recall him. + +What the choice of such a missioner meant for the Government in the way +of new astonishing responsibilities may be gathered from Stead’s scream +of triumph printed in the “Pall Mall Gazette” on the day after his +departure. It is headed “At Last.” It began: “The whole Egyptian +question has been revolutionized in an hour. At yesterday’s informal +meeting of the Ministers at the War Office there was taken one of those +decisive steps that make or mar the destinies of Empires. . . . The +question called for immediate decision. After some consultation +Ministers determined to accept General Gordon’s conditions. The decision +was arrived at between 3 and 4 yesterday afternoon. At 8 General Gordon +had left London for Khartoum. The die was cast. Henceforth we have the +full and undivided responsibility for affairs in the Soudan. Whether we +evacuate the country or whether we retain it, as soon as General Gordon +takes command, and for so long as General Gordon’s commission holds, +England is directly responsible for whatever is done in the name of the +Egyptian Government between the third Cataract and the Equatorial Lakes. +That is an enormous extension of our responsibilities, but vast as it is +it is not all. Whether the public realizes it or not, the dispatch of +General Gordon to the Soudan, exercising practically unlimited powers +not as Governor-General of the Khedive, but as the accredited +representative of the British Government, must entail as a natural and +inevitable corollary the assumption sooner or later of a similar +responsibility as direct and as unlimited for the affairs of Egypt +proper.” + +Gladstone after this was powerless to draw back, and, putting a good +face on the matter as long as the sun shone, he went in for the gamble +with the rest. An immense gamble it certainly was, and one for which he +was destined to pay heavily. + +As for Gordon himself he started in the highest possible spirits. He had +got the secret wish of his heart thrust upon him without his seeking it; +he had not “hailed the tram of the world”; it was “the tram of the +world” that had hailed him, and his conscience was at rest. He was +certain now that God was with him and that the service imposed on him +was God’s service, and so could not but succeed. His very first act +after seeing the Ministers was to telegraph to Barnes from the War +Office at five o’clock: “I go to the Soudan to-night; if He goes with me +all must be well.” And in a letter to the same Barnes on his way to +Brindisi, he says: “I am quite restored to my peace, thank God, and in +His hand He will hide me. . . . The Hosts are with me. Mahanaim.” He +counted much upon the prayers that were being offered for him in every +church and chapel in England. “If people ask after me, tell them they +can greatly help me with their prayers, not for my earthly success, but +that my mission may be for God’s glory, the welfare of the poor and +wretched, and for me what He wills, above all for a humble heart.” And +again, 26th January: “I leave for the Soudan to-night. I feel quite +happy for I say if God is with me who can or will be hurtful to me? May +He be glorified, the world and people of the Soudan be blessed, and may +I be the dust under His feet.” + +That Gordon was absolutely sincere in this estimate of his mission we +cannot doubt. Yet what a self-delusion! What a blindness! He did not +perceive that those who were sending him on this last great adventure of +his life were no angels of the Lord, but four wily statesmen doing the +work mainly of the London Stock Exchange, and interested far more in +perpetuating England’s robber hold on Egypt than in any humanitarian +scheme which might be imagined for the Soudan—he himself a useful pawn +in their not very noble game, and some of them ready enough already to +sacrifice and betray him. He did not perceive this or understand that, +if it were a question of God being on one side or the other, it could +hardly be with these, but with the poor fanatic Soudanese who really did +believe in Him and counted on Him to hear their vociferous prayers and +praises, and give them the victory. He did not understand that all the +men of good in the Soudan would be found on the Mahdi’s side, and all +the men of Belial, the scoundrel refuse of the corrupt city of Khartoum, +on his own, leaving him with only the least godly weapons of the flesh +wherewith to fight, some modern superiority of weapons, money to buy a +faithless fidelity, and his own skill and courage as a fighting man. + +It was an instinct of his self-delusion and a knowledge of the base ends +of those that sent him that caused me to write to him as I did from +Delhi. I knew that this time he must be wrong, that he was being sent on +a fool’s errand, and that he would be betrayed and defeated. + +Of the many things with which Gordon has been reproached officially in +the conduct of his mission by those who would shift the blame of his +failure from their own backs on to his, I will endeavour to deal with +the chief and especially with those brought against him by Lord Cromer, +only premising once again that the mission itself was according to my +ideas a bad one and doomed from the first to failure. Lord Cromer, his +chief assailant, has reproached him with a constant change of plan, with +insubordination, with failure to do his duty, and with being the cause +of his own defeat. I will endeavour to set these matters in their true +light. + +Gordon’s idea when he left London seems to have been a clear one as to +the general lines of what he was to do. He was to make his way to +Khartoum as he best could, take over the military command of the place +from Coetlogon, withdraw the Egyptian garrisons from their outlying +posts in the interior, and make what arrangements he could for a +government at Khartoum to take the place of the Khedive’s. It was to be +a government which was not to be an Egyptian Government, and for which +Her Majesty’s Government was not to be responsible. These two conditions +had been imposed on him, and he had accepted them. All the rest was left +to his discretion, subject only to Cromer’s official approval. + +A point he on his side had insisted on at the outset was that he should +go under orders from his own Government, and not merely as taking +foreign service with his Government’s permission. His insistence about +this was, I believe, primarily with him a matter of honour. He had +engaged himself to King Leopold, and he could not with any decency throw +him over to enter the service of another foreign prince unless it was in +compliance with an order he as a soldier was bound to obey from his own +Government. Also it would ease his conscience, as signifying to him more +clearly the command of God, and not the gratification of his own secret +wish. This is how I read the matter. It could not have been with him a +rooted objection to re-entering a foreign service or in particular the +Khedive’s service, for as we have seen he recommended Baker, if he went +to the Soudan, to go there as the Khedive’s Governor-General. What would +have been the right course for Baker must have been the right course +also for himself. As a matter of fact he would have found himself even +more powerless than he proved to be at Khartoum if he had gone there +simply as a British officer. Stewart had gone there as such, but his had +been no executive mission. Gordon’s was to be essentially executive, and +it was imperative with him to have local authority from the local +sovereign, if only to treat with the tribes for the withdrawal of the +garrisons. The English Government could not give him this—it must of +necessity be given him by the Khedive. It argues therefore no change of +plan that Gordon, on his way to Egypt, should have proposed that if he +went to Khartoum it should be in his old capacity as Governor-General. +He had gained all that he wanted for his soldier’s honour once he had +received his own Government’s order to undertake the service. The +Governor-Generalship was a means to an end, and in his view the only +means. + +A more reasonable reproach which might be made to him—but it has not +been officially made—is that he abandoned the idea he certainly had at +the outset of going straight on a peaceful errand to the Mahdi at El +Obeyd and treating with him personally for the withdrawal of the +Egyptian garrisons. I have always been of opinion that that would have +been his wisest course; and it certainly was in his mind when he started +from London, for passing through Paris the next morning he saw Sheffield +at the Embassy and told him of his intention so to do. There was, of +course, considerable risk in the matter, but it was just one of those +risks Gordon had over and again run successfully in the Soudan, and +there is good reason to believe that, properly accompanied, he would +have been courteously received at El Obeyd, and that, if he had +negotiated on the basis of withdrawing the garrisons peaceably and +handing over Khartoum at once to the Mahdi, the Mahdi would have +provided the necessary escorts. At any rate, it was his best chance. But +that was not what either our Government or the Government at Cairo +wanted; and, once at Cairo and in the Khedive’s service, this course was +formally forbidden him, nor did Gordon persist in it. It cannot be too +strongly repeated that what Gordon was intended to do was not merely to +evacuate the Soudan, but to establish a Government at Khartoum and in +the eastern provinces which should take the place of the Khedive’s +Government and serve as a barrier between Egypt proper, including the +Red Sea coast, and the Mahdi’s fanatical advance. To hand over Khartoum +to the Mahdi was not, at that time, whatever Lord Cromer may now +pretend, in his more than in the Khedive’s plan. I think, nevertheless, +that if Gordon had understood the full political power and religious +position acquired by Mohammed Ahmed since the fall of El Obeyd and the +destruction of Hicks’s army, he would have held to the idea of treating +with the Mahdi personally. Unfortunately he throughout underrated his +opponent and allowed himself to be persuaded that through the power of +money and a display of vigour, joined with reforms in the way of more +freedom, less taxation, and better justice, he could build up a counter +popularity to that possessed by the Mahdi. It was a snare into which he +too easily fell. + +Another sudden change of plan, which Lord Fitzmaurice says surprised and +disturbed the Government soon after Gordon had been despatched upon his +mission, and in regard to which he is severe, calling it a plan +“fantastic in the extreme,” is that which Gordon announced of re- +establishing the family of the Sultans of Darfur in their hereditary +possessions. It was, perhaps, not a very practical idea, but that the +Foreign Office should have been surprised at it only shows its ignorance +of its own records, for it is to be found in no less conspicuous a +document than Stewart’s Soudan Report of February 1883, to say nothing +of its having been repeatedly put forward unofficially by Gordon in +print and officially by Abd-el-Kader Pasha in December at Cairo. The +whole conception of the re-establishment of independent native states in +opposition to the Mahdi was, in my opinion, one unsuited to the +circumstances of the case, however desirable in itself; but, at any +rate, there was nothing new in it nothing to “surprise or disturb” Lord +Granville. Gordon had hardly arrived at Khartoum before he found the +whole scheme impracticable, and it was heard of no more. Even under the +most favourable circumstances it would have been very difficult of +accomplishment, and, as a move counter to the Mahdi, could not possibly +have succeeded. + +Much the same may be said about the idea of employing Zebehr. Here, too, +the “surprise and disturbance” of the Foreign Office were entirely +gratuitous. When Gordon arrived at Cairo Zebehr had already been engaged +there for some weeks recruiting and drilling a black force from among +the Soudanese, and had got together 200 ex-soldiers and ex-slaves +impressed in Egypt proper. These were destined to be sent with Zebehr +for service in the Soudan, and had been regularly enlisted by Zebehr for +the Government. It was therefore gratuitous on the part of the Foreign +Office to affect surprise that it should be proposed by Gordon to take +Zebehr and his men with him. There was, of course, reason for comment +that it should have been Gordon, and no other, who made the request, for +Gordon had quarrelled with Zebehr and had been responsible for his son’s +death, and Zebehr had been the head and front of the slave trade +rebellion in the Soudan. But Gordon was no longer on an anti-slavery +war-path. He had lived long enough to understand that battling in the +Bahr el Gazal against the slave-hunters was not the surest way of +dealing with the evil of slavery or stopping the trade. And his present +mission was of an entirely different kind, one which needed Zebehr’s +help, not a continuance of his hostility. Gordon was a man who never +pursued his resentments far, and he was always ready to forget a quarrel +and to believe once more in the man’s friendship who had wronged him or +whom he had wronged. He had buried the hatchet with Tewfik and Nubar and +Cromer. Why not also with Zebehr? There was nothing really to be +surprised at, nothing to blame or to forbid. + +As to the policy of enlisting Zebehr as an ally I am not of opinion that +it would have led to much profit in the way of helping Gordon to +establish a buffer state against the Mahdi. Zebehr had been too long +absent from the Soudan to be of use to him in that way. His influence +was dead, and it is all but certain that he would have yielded to the +new influence abroad among his people and thrown in his lot with the +Mahdi. I do not think he would have betrayed Gordon. He was a man of old +Arab nobility and chivalrous traditions, and he had no actual blood feud +with Gordon, for it was Gessi, not Gordon himself, who had had Suliman +Zebehr shot. In after years I have talked these matters over with +Zebehr, and am convinced that he would not have betrayed Gordon, only +that he could not have stemmed the tide which was then so strongly +flowing in the Mahdi’s favour. All that he could have done would have +been to serve as intermediary between Gordon and the Mahdi, and to warn +Gordon against some of the worst mistakes he made. + +The great weakness of Gordon’s position at Khartoum was that, being +almost ignorant of Arabic and without any dependable native interpreter +(for his old secretary Berzati had accompanied Hicks on his fatal +campaign and there lost his life), he was left to the tender mercies of +Greek merchants and other Christian informants as to what was going on. +Zebehr would, at any rate, have supplied him with reliable news and a +correct interpretation of the letters he received from the Mahdi. As it +was, with no one near him to explain the exact truth, Gordon was as a +blind man at Khartoum and became the tool of rogues who betrayed him +with false tales and prevented him from seeing what otherwise he could +not but have recognized, the sincerity and high character of the Mahdi. +With Zebehr at his side he could not have committed his last crowning +mistake of offering Mohammed Ahmed a tarboosh and a Sultanate, an insult +which more than any other sealed his doom. + +Lastly, as to Gordon’s pretended insubordination and disobedience to his +instructions, the case against him is really not maintainable. Even +admitting that his instructions on leaving London, and the free hand +accorded him, were nothing more than are contained within the four +corners of the written memorandum drawn up at the Foreign Office, he +must stand personally absolved. The paragraph, “You will consider +yourself authorized and instructed to perform such other duties as the +Egyptian Government may desire to intrust to you and as may be +communicated to you by Sir E. Baring,” covers him entirely from any +blame there might be in the extension of his duty in Egypt. Lord Cromer +tries in his “Modern Egypt” to evade his own responsibility in regard to +such extensions of duty by pleading that it was Gordon himself who +initiated them; thus he instances a telegram he received from Granville +dated the 18th: “Gordon suggests that it may be announced in Egypt that +he is on his way to Khartoum to arrange for the future settlement of the +Soudan for the best advantage of the people.” This telegram, Cromer +points out, says nothing of his duty of reporting, and he adds, “if +General Gordon was to arrange for the future settlement of the Soudan, I +fail to see how he could do so without exercising some executive +authority.” On this ground he protests that “the idea of Gordon’s going +as Governor-General to the Soudan did not emanate from any one in Cairo, +it was made by General Gordon himself.” Lord Cromer seems, however, to +have forgotten that the suggestion about the future settlement of the +Soudan was, in fact, his own of 22nd December, and he has also forgotten +that, if Gordon was sent in order to arrange such a settlement, his +appointment as Governor-General was a necessary part of what he himself +had approved before ever Gordon arrived at Cairo. Lord Cromer’s answer, +23rd January, to the telegram of the 18th, says distinctly: “All +Gordon’s suggestions are excellent and quite in harmony with the lines +on which we have been working. A message was sent by the Khedive some +while ago to the leading men at Khartoum which was in the sense and +almost in the words suggested by Gordon.” This proves that all that had +not at that time been contemplated at Cairo was that the English officer +expected to arrange the new settlement was to be Gordon and not another, +and that he was to go to Khartoum with the full authority of Governor- +General. + +If, however, there remains any doubt as to Cromer’s initiative in the +extension of Gordon’s duties, I am in a position to supply an important +link of evidence by giving the text of a hitherto unpublished letter +written by Cromer to Gordon the day before he landed at Port Said. +Though a most important letter in the controversy, it is not to be found +in any Blue Book, and Cromer in his “Modern Egypt” ignores it entirely. +The circumstances under which it was written were these. Gordon’s idea +in leaving London had been to go straight through the Suez Canal without +visiting Cairo, and to proceed at once to Suakin, where he expected to +be able to put himself into communication with certain Sheykhs of the +Hadendowa tribe to whom he had formerly rendered a service while he was +Governor-General, and through whom he counted on being able to reach +Khartoum, and eventually El Obeyd, for his proposed visit to the Mahdi. +In the Mahdi himself he thought he had recognized the uncle of a young +man who had been formerly in his service, and who had been kindly +treated by him, and so hoped to establish initial good relations with +him. He had come, however, to see that authority from the Khedive was a +necessity of the case, and he expected his Firman of appointment to be +delivered to him by Cromer on his passage through the Canal. Such a +course, however, was not exactly in Cromer’s plan, who wished to get +Gordon to Cairo, and so have him from the start more closely under his +authority, and to talk over with him and Nubar the further instructions +he was to receive. He pretexted, therefore, an inability to spare time +for a journey to Port Said (there was no railway further than Ismailia +at that time) and instead of going himself, he wrote this letter and +sent it by the hand of Sir Evelyn Wood to be delivered to Gordon on +landing, with instructions to intercept him and bring him on to Cairo. + + + “Cairo, _22nd January_, 1884. + +“MY DEAR GORDON, + +“I was exceedingly glad to receive Lord Granville’s telegram informing +me that you and Stewart were coming to Egypt. I feel confident that you +may both render very great services as regards Soudan affairs. I need +hardly assure you that you can rely on my most cordial support and +assistance. + +“Wood, accompanied by Watson, is going to Port Said to meet you. He is +thoroughly acquainted with all the most recent facts of the situation +and with the views entertained by myself and others. Under these +circumstances I will not dwell at any length on the course of action +which, as it appears to me, had better be adopted. I will only say +briefly that I think you had better go to Khartoum and arrange for the +withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons etc. as rapidly as is consistent +with (1) the saving of life and so far as is possible, property; (2) the +establishment of some rough form of Government which will prevent, so +far as is possible, anarchy and confusion arising on the withdrawal of +the Egyptian troops. The task, though very difficult, will not I believe +in your hands be impossible. + +“I hope very shortly to discuss the whole question with you personally +and my views are of course liable to modification by the light of your +greater experience in Soudan matters. + +“Lord Granville told me that you were unwilling to come to Cairo. It is +not, on public grounds, desirable that I should leave Cairo at present, +although of course I would do so for a very short time if it were +absolutely necessary. I hope, however, to convince you that it is +absolutely necessary that you should come to Cairo. The valley of the +Nile is indeed at present the only route by which you can reach +Khartoum. The Souakin-Berber route is closed and, so far as our latest +information goes, there does not appear to be much prospect of its being +opened. It is also, I think, very desirable that before you start you +should discuss the whole situation not only with myself, but with Nubar +and others, so that we may arrange a common plan of action and prevent +any risk of working at cross purposes. For these and other reasons I am +very strongly of opinion that you should come to Cairo. I need hardly +say that I should not propose a course of action, which I believe to be +personally distasteful to yourself, unless I thought that there were +strong public grounds for doing so. Wood has arranged about Ibrahim Bey +Fowzi. + + “Believe me very truly yours, + “EVELYN BARING.” + + +It will be noted in this letter, which was written before Cromer had +seen Gordon and therefore entirely on his own initiative, that he +suggests a new course of action to be adopted far in advance of anything +the original written instructions drawn up at the Foreign Office +contained. In the first place, there is no mention whatever of +reporting; secondly, Gordon is to go to Khartoum by way of Cairo and the +Nile instead of by Suakin. He is also to go himself and not merely to +send Stewart. Thirdly, he is to withdraw the Egyptian garrisons as +rapidly as is consistent with the saving of _property_ as well as life, +an entirely new condition to be found in no previous suggestion +connected with the mission and one necessarily entailing far greater +time and labour to effect. Lastly, he is to establish “some rough form +of government which will prevent anarchy and confusion arising on the +withdrawal of Egyptian troops.” This, although as we have seen it was in +the spirit and intention of the instructions, was an immense extension +of anything that had been actually written or telegraphed, of which we +have any knowledge; and the writer of the letter could hardly have +contemplated, in proposing such an extension, a work which would occupy +less than many months to execute, if not a whole year. It is, moreover, +absolutely at variance with the pretence afterwards made at the Foreign +Office that Gordon’s mission was simply to withdraw the Khartoum +garrison. And lastly, its date proves the idea to be Cromer’s and not +Gordon’s. + +As we know, Sir Evelyn Wood met Gordon at Port Said with this letter in +his hand, and its effect was an entire change of plan on Gordon’s part. +Instead of going on to Suakin, he went back with Wood and Watson to +Cairo, saw Cromer, who took him to Nubar and later to the Khedive both +of whom received him graciously. Cromer then obtained the necessary +Firman (he probably drew it up himself) assigning to Gordon his new +duties. This Firman, be it observed, although it is by far the most +important document of the whole case, is suppressed by Cromer in his +“Modern Egypt;” and instead of it he gives a letter he wrote to Gordon +containing not the instructions themselves but certain remarks about the +way in which the instructions were understood by himself. The +instructions themselves are to be found in Blue Book, Egypt, No. 12, +1884. They amount practically to a _carte blanche_ commission to do +whatsoever Gordon would with the Soudan without restriction of time and +without limit to his authority. They run as follows: + + + “HIS HIGHNESS THE KHEDIVE TO GORDON PASHA. + + “_January_ 26, 1884. + +“EXCELLENCY, + +“HAVING confidence in your tact and experience, and being aware that the +excellent services rendered by you in the Soudan have endeared you to +the people of those provinces, and made them acknowledge the good +derived from your efforts to introduce among them tranquillity and good +government; and seeing that the present state of affairs in those +territories requires a person capable of grappling with the difficulties +of the situation, and of ameliorating the condition of the inhabitants +by restoring public tranquillity on a sure basis, as it is our earnest +desire to do what is just and right, to remove all sources of discontent +and to observe equity towards the native populations, we do hereby +appoint you Governor-General of the Soudan by reason of your perfect +knowledge of that country, and we trust that you will carry out our good +intentions for the establishment of justice and order, and that you will +assure the peace and prosperity of the peoples of the Soudan by +maintaining the security of the roads open to commerce. + +“Now by these presents we make known to you our desire, and urge upon +you a speedy departure for those provinces, so that good government may +be restored by your tact and experience.” + + +This document, which is of the widest conceivable scope, covers +absolutely all that Gordon did at Khartoum, all that he designed to do +and all that he might have done. It included his decree permitting +slavery; it included all his military operations; it included his +refusals to retire before the accomplishment of his full work unless his +Firman were revoked; it included his attempt to smash the Mahdi, and it +would have included, if he had succeeded in so doing, his remaining on +at Khartoum and “Sarawaking” the Soudan to the end of his days; or he +might have ceded the whole Soudan to the Mahdi, or, as far as I can see, +made any other arrangement for its future he might think fit. I repeat +that thus enlarged I do not approve of the mission. Also it was one +bound to fail. But I affirm that Cromer, who was the man responsible for +the enlargement of the mission, who procured the Firman’s signature +authorizing it, and who almost certainly dictated the instructions it +contained, should have been of all men the last to blame Gordon because +he held these instructions binding on him and refused to obey anything +less direct than a counter-firman ordering him not to carry them out. +Cromer’s dispatch to the Foreign Office, enclosing the Firman, admits +his responsibility and the largeness of its scope. “It was thought +desirable,” he says, “after full discussion here that the widest +discretionary powers should be given to General Gordon as regards the +manner of carrying out the policy and as to the best time and mode for +announcing it at Khartoum. . . . Although he takes his instructions from +me, the widest discretionary power has been left to him. His visit to +Cairo was most useful as it will enable the Egyptian authorities to be +of much greater service to him than would have been otherwise possible. +His views differ in no sort of way from those entertained by Nubar Pasha +and myself.” + +Yet Lord Cromer to-day has the face now to come forward and charge +Gordon with overstepping his authorized programme! That he was so +understood to have overstepped them in the summer of 1884 I know, for I +myself thought he had done so, but the full facts had not yet been made +public, and we knew only what the Government chose to tell us. But the +Government itself already knew all, and yet it accused him; and Cromer, +who knew and knows the truth better than any one, accuses him still! + +As to what happened after the mission left Cairo the history is too well +known for there to be any necessity for my recapitulating it here. All +now depended on Gordon’s being able to inspire such confidence in the +Khartoum garrison as to hold the fort till succour should come. This was +expected to be, if at all, from Valentine Baker at Souakin, Sir Samuel’s +brother. The position at Souakin was this. The sending of Hicks to +Khartoum to take command of the Khedivial troops in the spring of 1883 +had been answered by the Mahdi by the dispatch of emissaries into the +provinces between the Nile and the Red Sea to preach a religious war +against the infidel; and the war broke out early in the autumn under the +afterwards celebrated leader Osman Digna, who, with the fighting tribe +of the Hadendowa, set themselves to occupy the caravan road from Berber +to Souakin and lay siege to that seaport and to the fortified places +near it. In October a force of 500 Egyptian troops sent to relieve one +of these last was surprised and routed, and the English Consul, +Moncrieff, a young naval officer who had gone with them, was killed by +the Mahdists. The defeat of Hicks in Kordofan speedily followed, and +Khartoum began to be threatened. The Souakin-Berber route was at that +time the speediest mode of communication between Cairo and Khartoum, and +after one or two more misadventures near the Red Sea coast it became +completely blocked, and it was found necessary to attempt to reopen it, +and thus towards the end of the year, there being no more regular +Egyptian troops to send, Baker Pasha, who had been organizing a corps of +military police at Cairo, was entrusted with the duty, his police +accompanying him, strengthened with the scratch force of Turks and +negroes impressed by Zebehr in Lower Egypt. Baker’s duty, as defined in +the Khedive’s Firman appointing him, was to “take command of the +operations which have for their object the pacification of the regions +lying between Berber and Souakin and the maintenance of communication +between these two points. . . . You should use every means of +conciliation and diplomacy, with a view to secure the obedience and +submission of the Sheikhs of the different tribes before having recourse +to force.” + +Valentine Baker’s character was one that in this double duty inspired +confidence at the War Office. I remember him as long ago as the winter +of 1860-61, when he was in command of the 10th Hussars at York, the +hard-riding popular Colonel of a hard-riding popular cavalry regiment, +the smartest in the British army, hunting, every officer of them, four +days a week with the York and Ainsty or the Bramham Moor hounds—the +ideal man of his cavalry type. Then he fell into trouble, and in the +midst of a promising career had to leave the British army. The campaign +of Plevna was just beginning in the Balkans, and he took service with +the Turks and greatly distinguished himself in the famous retreat after +the fall of that fortress, and thus he had become a Pasha in the +Sultan’s service. But, on receiving the news of Tel-el-Kebir, nothing +would satisfy him but an attempt to get back into the British army, and +he unceremoniously left Constantinople and came to Cairo, where he was +made welcome by his former fellow soldiers and obtained from Sir Evelyn +Wood the command of the _gens d’armerie_, a quasi-military duty under +the Khedive. Valentine Baker was essentially a soldier of fortune and a +fighting man, and was burning with the desire of distinguishing himself +by some action of _éclat_ and so being restored to Her Majesty’s +service. That was his position and that the service he had been sent on, +and he had taken command at Souakin on the last day of the year. + +Gordon was expected to co-operate with him and do the same at Khartoum, +and his original plan of passing through Souakin was in order that they +might make their plans together. Gordon was to help Baker to conciliate +and buy up the Souakin tribes, and he was himself to make his way to +Khartoum and re-establish order there and hold the fort till the +communications were free for both of them between the two places. It was +a plan in which common action was essential; and then the Egyptian +garrisons of the interior were to be sent down to the sea coast and +Gordon was to organize his new government at Khartoum. + +The success of the whole plan as a military one of evacuation depended +on the possibility of a double success in reopening the Souakin-Berber +route and keeping it open, the other line of retreat down the Nile to +Egypt being too long and too difficult, in face of the disturbed state +of the country and the absence of transport, for it to have been +possible to convey the garrisons and the civilians who were to accompany +them in safety northwards. It was an essential part of Gordon’s mission +of evacuation that the road to the coast should be cleared, and, as we +have seen, Gordon, in his letter to Sir Samuel Baker, had made co- +operation between him and Sir Samuel’s brother a first necessity of the +position. No soldier could have been blind to this. + +I am inclined therefore to think that Gordon’s original plan of going to +Souakin to take counsel with Baker would have given Gordon a better +chance of ultimate success than by changing it, as Cromer insisted on +his doing, to the Nile route. Also Gordon had a perfect soldier’s right +to expect that, if according to the new plan he was to play his own part +unassisted at Berber and Khartoum, the Government that sent him should +at least have helped Baker at the other end of the evacuating line, that +between the sea and the Nile, to keep this line open. There is a passage +indicative of the acknowledgement of such an obligation on the part of +the Foreign Office in Fitzmaurice’s “Life of Granville,” to which I +shall return later, a passage which would show that the British +Government at the time of their dispatch of Gordon intended to defend +not only the Red Sea coast against the Mahdi, but also the whole of the +eastern provinces as far inland as the Nile. Had they adhered to this +intention the necessary support would have been given to Gordon, and it +was thus that Gordon understood the position. + +The whole plan, however, lost any chance of success it might have had by +the total and inglorious defeat of Baker at Teb on the 5th February. +Gordon ought then, according to all strategic rule, either to have been +recalled or troops of some sort ought to have been provided to reinforce +him and open the road which Baker had failed to open, the road now more +than ever closed for his retreat. It should have been done at once, if +at all, for on the 19th of May Berber declared for the Mahdi and the +chance was gone. The Government at home, however, could not make up its +mind either to recall Gordon or to send the assistance needed. There was +a conflict of feeling in the Cabinet which prevented anything being +decided. General Graham was sent indeed to Suakin with a British force +in February, but after fighting a battle or two with Osman Digna he was +forbidden to go further and his force was withdrawn. Hartington and +Wolseley at the War Office wanted Gordon supported, but Gladstone stuck +to it that he had always understood Gordon’s mission to be a mission of +peace and would not consent to Graham’s advance. On the other hand, +nobody in the Cabinet or at Cairo seems to have had his wits +sufficiently about him to get Gordon’s Firman revoked, or to have +understood that without such revocation he could not in honour abandon +his mission. Had he been released from his instructions, Gordon could +have left the garrisons to make the best terms they could with the +Mahdi, and gone on, as was his original intention, by way of the White +Nile to the Congo. This would have been, if not a very glorious, at +least a simple solution of the difficulty, and indeed, if troops were +not to be sent, it was the only rational one. + +Lastly, as to the English help promised Gordon which he is blamed for +having counted on, I think it cannot be doubted that when he left London +in February some such promise was made him, or at least that there was +an understanding to that effect between him and the War Office. It may +be gathered from his speeches that Hartington so considered it, and it +is notorious that such was Wolseley’s view. Gordon was to go to +Khartoum, in the first place, to try his luck single-handed, but +Wolseley always counted on helping him if his luck should fail. Whether +the full conclave of the four Ministers who dispatched him on his +mission so understood the case is open to doubt; certainly Gladstone was +not a party to any such promise; and yet it must necessarily have been +present in their minds if not upon their lips. The contrary is +inconceivable. + +Also the Queen, who cannot but have been informed of all at the time, +unquestionably considered her Ministers to have promised Gordon armed +support. Her view of the obligation is to be found in the letter she +wrote to Gordon’s sister a few days after the news of his death reached +England, and which has been published. Queen Victoria’s letter begins +thus: + +“How shall I write to you or how shall I attempt to express _what I +feel_! To _think_ of your dear noble heroic brother, who served his +country and his Queen so truly, so heroically, with a self-sacrifice so +edifying to the world, not having been rescued; that the promises of +support were not fulfilled—which I so frequently and constantly pressed +on those who asked him to go—is to me _grief inexpressible_!” + +This letter, drafted by no secretary, but written with the Queen’s own +royal hand, seems to me conclusive. Its very indignation is the best +proof of its truth, its anger at a betrayal known by the writer to have +been such. It is impossible that the Queen should have used the words +“the promises of support were not fulfilled” without any such having +been understood by her at the time to have been made. There is, of +course, no written record of them in any of the papers presented to +Parliament, and the promises probably were verbal only, as indeed were +all the details of the mission treated departmentally between Wolseley +and Gordon. But it makes it almost certain that the War Office, if not +the Government as a body, had intended military support, if such should +be required, and had spoken of it to Gordon. Gordon certainly counted on +military help, for he alludes to it repeatedly in his diaries. + +Who then, if not her Ministers, can have conveyed to the Queen the idea +of a promise having been given? Who gave or implied an assurance that +the mission would, if necessary, have outside help? Between Wolseley and +Gordon it was certainly understood that the War Office would do its best +to see that he was properly backed when the time came. It might be +difficult to get Gladstone to consent, but pressure would be put. The +Duke of Cambridge also, in all probability, said more than this. He saw +Gordon off at the station, and cannot but have recounted all to Her +Majesty afterwards. However silent Granville and the rest may have been, +these two, Wolseley and the Duke of Cambridge, must have promised. The +Queen’s letter remains its certain proof. + +For the rest of the incidents of Gordon’s tragic mission, having said my +say on the principal points in dispute regarding it, I will now return +to my interrupted diary. It will show how I at the time regarded the +mission, not in the light of my now better knowledge, but as it was +presented to me in part by the public voice, in part by what I learned +privately from those that knew. + + + + + CHAPTER VII + + EXCITEMENT ABOUT GORDON IN LONDON + + +MY Indian journey over I left Bombay for England on the 1st March 1884, +and arrived at Suez on the 12th, and going on by Naples to Paris reached +London on the 27th, altogether too late to be of any avail in the matter +of Gordon. He was already at Khartoum. + +The only noticeable incident on this homeward journey was that passing +through the Suez Canal we found that vessels arriving from Bombay were +subject to quarantine, and so that any intention I might have had of +going ashore was necessarily abandoned. Nevertheless, while I was +standing with other passengers on deck, a Government boat drew alongside +our ship, remaining just outside the prescribed quarantine limit, and I +heard my name called with inquiry whether I was on board, and going to +the gangway was accosted from the boat by an Englishman in the Khedivial +uniform, who informed me that he was Lieutenant-Colonel Gibbons in the +Egyptian service, and that he had been instructed on behalf of the +Government to notify to me that if I attempted to land I should be +subjected to arrest. The announcement mattered little to me under the +circumstances, though it proved afterwards to be the first step in a +course of prohibition and exile which shut me out from Egypt for the +next three years, and which, as will be seen, was maintained against me +as long as Lord Granville continued at the Foreign Office. + +At Paris we spent a few hours in the society of our refugee friends, +Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din and James Sanua. The first I +had not seen since the war, for he had spent the first year of his exile +at Damascus, where the sons of Abd-el-Kader had befriended him, and +where he had lived poorly but in security with a number more of the +Egyptian Nationalist exiles. We found him somewhat Europeanized already +by a two months’ stay in Paris. He had left off shaving his head, and +wore a fez instead of a turban, which rather detracted from his dignity +as Sheykh, though he was still dressed in a respectable fur pelisse. “He +talks now openly against the Sultan and the Turks, complains of the +tyranny in Syria, and argues of the Sherif Own as the coming Caliph. The +Mahdi, he says, is the forerunner of the Arabian Caliph who will soon +be.” To him and to Jemal-ed-Din I related all that I had done in India, +and my thought of going to Constantinople, but they warned me this would +be of no use; I might try, but they expected no good to come of it. All +the power there was in the hands of Osman Pasha of Plevna, who cared +only to fill his own purse. Syria was becoming indoctrinated with ideas +of liberty in spite of the tyranny of spies and police. At +Constantinople nothing could be done. We talked of the Mahdi, who was +now the chief subject of interest with Moslems, and of Gordon, who was +at Khartoum. Jemal-ed-Din entirely approved of the letter I had written +to Gordon, and agreed that he would perish now that he had taken the +wrong side. The following occurs in my diary of + +“_27th March._—We found Jemal-ed-Din in a little room eight feet square +at the top of a house in the Rue de Seize, where he and Abdu edit a +newspaper called the ‘Indissoluble Link.’ Almost at the same time came +in a very curious party of strangers who quite filled the room—a Russian +lady, an American philanthropist, and two young Bengalis who announced +themselves as Theosophists, come, they said, to consult the great +Sheykh. They talked an extraordinary jargon about humanity, but seemed +kind-hearted people, and so full of their cause as to take no notice +whatever of our presence. The main object of their visit was to inquire +about the Mahdi, whom they were all most anxious to believe in as a +humanitarian, but their minds were perplexed about the slave trade, and +they cross-questioned the Sheykh as to the Mahdi’s principles on that +head. The Sheykh had great difficulty in satisfying them, but explained +how much slaves gained among Mohammedans in exchange for their freedom. +This sent them away happy, but the poor Sheykh was put to his last +shifts to hide his amusement. When they were gone we had a good talk +about India, and all that we had done, which pleased him much.” + +I called also at the Embassy, and had an hour with Sheffield, who told +me Gordon’s idea had been to go straight to the Mahdi and make peace +with him, but he had been prevented at Cairo. Now he considered his case +hopeless. Lord Lyons, whom I also saw, acknowledged that we had got into +an inextricable mess in Egypt. The same night we went on to England, +arriving in London. Here I found myself once more in the thick of a +political crisis, of which the main feature was the interminable +Egyptian imbroglio, made more than ever acute by Gordon’s peril at +Khartoum. My journal deals principally with this, and indeed it occupied +for ten months to come almost the whole public thought of Englishmen. + +My first visits on arrival were to Button and Knowles, my threatened +arrest in Egypt being upper-most in my mind. “Button still maintains his +connection with the ‘Times,’ though poor Chenery is dead and his place +as Editor has been taken by a young man, Buckle. He gave me a pathetic +account of Chenery’s death. He had suffered great pain for years from a +cancer, of which he told no one of the ‘Times’ staff, though sometimes +it would make him groan aloud. He was very forlorn, being without +intimate friends while knowing every one. But he had an affection for +Button. Then he had suddenly gone away alone and died. Button’s +political report was that the life of Gladstone’s Cabinet was very +precarious—hardly likely to last through the Session. I stood well now, +he thought, with the public, as every one saw I had been right about +Egypt. + +To Knowles I told what had happened to me in Egypt in consequence of the +encouragement given me. “Mr. Gladstone?” he said, “I should not be +surprised to see him any day order our troops back and clear bodily out +of Egypt; I have known him for years, and as long as he can twist his +conduct into an apparent consistency of words, he will change his +opinions without scruple. But he will not endure being brought face to +face with a flat contradiction. It has always been the same, about art +and literature and everything else. As yet, he has maintained a certain +verbal consistency, but he cannot do it much longer.” + +A third visit was to my sister-in-law, Lady Wentworth, from whom I +learnt that my exclusion from Egypt had been ordered by the Foreign +Office. She knew of this from George Leveson Gower, Granville’s nephew +and Gladstone’s private secretary. Lastly, I saw Randolph Churchill. + +“_30th March._—I found Randolph in bed in a little room at the top of +his house in Connaught Place. We had a long talk about Arabi and my +visit to India. He was curious to know what I had been doing with the +Mohammedans there, for Gorst had given him the idea that I had started +the university at Hyderabad for revolutionary purposes. I told him I +considered a revolution in India certain if changes in the system of +government were not introduced. He said, ‘It is hopeless to try and get +the Conservatives to take up the idea of any sort of change.’ He seemed +taken, however, with the notion I suggested to him of playing the part +of champion of the Mohammedans. I proposed that we should go together to +Constantinople in the recess, but he said he was canvassing Birmingham +and could not possibly find time. About my having been prevented from +landing in Egypt he was especially interested, and thinks it could be +made a capital point of attack on the Government. I told him the history +of Knowles’s message to me from Gladstone, without however mentioning +Knowles’s name. But he said at once: ‘Oh, I know, that’s Knowles, +because he has told lots of people the same thing.’ He advises the whole +of my correspondence about it being lumped at once into the ‘Times,’ and +that Drummond Wolff should be set at the Foreign Office to make the most +of it in Parliament. + +“He told me also that overtures had been made him from the Khedive for a +withdrawal of the charges he had brought forward implicating him in the +massacres of Alexandria, notably through the Prince of Wales, who had +had a quarrel with him, nine years before, and had not spoken to him +since. Now, however, the Prince had dined with him at a select dinner of +people interested in Egypt, and had talked highly of the Khedive to him. +‘The thing, however,’ he said, ‘has served its purpose, and we must go +on to something fresh. I look upon the charge as proved, and I know it +smashed up the Khedive and the Government policy at the time.’ Wentworth +has made a really good speech on the Soudan battles, and may, I think, +help us much in our new campaign. + +“_31st March._—Gordon has been defeated outside Khartoum, his army of +2,500 flying from sixty of the Mahdi’s men. What a hideous comedy it all +is. He is now calling for English troops, he who went out to give +freedom to the Soudan, peace on earth and goodwill towards men. [This is +how I regarded his mission at the time.] Called on Sir Wilfrid Lawson, +the only honest man in Parliament. He urges that we should make some +move for the restoration of Arabi, but I doubt whether the time has +come. At the present time the Mahdi is the one popular man in Egypt. Saw +Lyulph Stanley.[28] He is now for a Protectorate in Egypt, and I can +find nobody in favour of a Nationalist restoration. They all say now +that I was right and Arabi was an honest man, but they treat it as a +matter of history, and rather old history too. Button advises my getting +a legal opinion on the case of my exclusion from Egypt before going any +further. Lawson sends me some doggerel verse about the war, not so good +as the last he wrote, but to the point. + +“_3rd April._—Lunched with Button at the Carlton, who tells me the Jews +were never in such a fright about Egypt as they were two days ago. The +Rothschilds have still four millions invested there and are working the +press all they can. Lady Rosebery is nearly the only person who is +allowed to see Gladstone. But they are in a terrible fright of his doing +something violent, _e.g._, withdrawing the troops from Egypt. He, +Button, sees the Rothschilds nearly daily, for the ‘Times’ is in their +hands. To-day, however, they are more confident, and people are buying +Egyptian stock. While we were talking, Burnaby[29] came in with +Churchill and Gorst, and I had some talk with them. Burnaby looks weak +and wears his arm in a sling. [He was just back from Souakin, where he +had taken part in Graham’s expedition and the battle of Tamanieb as a +volunteer.] And I felt some disgust at shaking hands with a man who has +been murdering the Arabs with his shot gun as he seems to have done. I +have never liked him, for he has the most evil countenance one can +imagine. I like Churchill far the best of the three. He has a light +cheery manner like a boy at school. + +“In the Park, where I sat for a few minutes and saw the two Lytton girls +looking like roses. Their father starts for Sorrento to-night. + +“_4th April._—To Auberon Herbert at the Langham Hotel. He highly +approves of the idea of letting the Egyptians choose their own ruler, +and waiting for a spontaneous movement to bring back Arabi. If the +British Government recalled Arabi now and proposed him, he would be +looked upon with suspicion by the people. Thence to Lawson’s, whom I +found in high delight at having got a declaration out of the Government +that they do not intend to send troops to Khartoum. + +“Lunched with Labouchere. He is more practical, and we have discussed +every detail of the policy to be suggested to Gladstone. He will feel +the ground through Herbert Gladstone, which is his way of consulting the +oracle. He told me the history of Gordon’s mission. Gordon’s idea had +been to go out and make friends with the Mahdi, and to have absolutely +nothing to do with Baring or the Khedive, or with anybody in Egypt. He +was going to Souakin straight, where he counted upon one of the +neighbouring Sheykhs, whose sons’ lives he had saved or spared, and his +mission was to be one entirely of peace. But the Foreign Office and +Baring caught hold of him as he passed through Egypt, and made him stop +to see the Khedive, and so he was befooled into going to Khartoum as the +Khedive’s Lieutenant. Now he had failed altogether in his mission of +peace, and the Government had recalled him more than once in the last +few days, but he had refused to come back. Gladstone had decided +absolutely to recall all the troops from Egypt when Hicks’s defeat was +heard of, and was in a great rage. The expedition to Souakin had been +forced on him by the Cabinet, and Hartington had taken care to give +Graham no special instructions, so that he might fight without orders. +This Graham of course had done, and Gladstone more angry still had gone +down to sulk at Coombe. [Bertram Currie’s villa in Coombe Wood.] Now he +would stand it no longer, and he had let Hartington in by coming up and +making the speech he did last night. Nobody expected it. Labouchere +thought the moment most favourable for a new move. + +“_7th April._—Button tells me the Rothschilds are still in a great state +of anxiety about their money, and Button is for the Government +guaranteeing a loan of £8,000,000. It appears that the French are quite +ready to put in their oar and themselves guarantee if allowed to +protect. There is a split between Nubar and Clifford Lloyd. Nubar has +threatened to resign. This will bring things to a crisis. + +“_8th April._—At Crabbet, dawdling about among the horses, and going to +see the Vardon property, which is for sale, and which I must buy if I +can. This property has for the best part of a century been a thorn in +our flesh, running like a wedge into Crabbet. There is an entry in the +shooting diary of 1824 in which complaint is made of ‘old Vardon’s +poaching.’ Now is the time to rectify our frontier. An estate is a +kingdom, with its wars and intrigues and ambitions and thirst for new +territory, and, though I have no personal wish to increase mine, I +consider this purchase a duty of my reign. + +“I have written to Abdu a statement of my views about India, and to +Selim Faris asking him what chance I should have of being able to +influence people at Constantinople, if I went there, in favour of an +effort at Mohammedan regeneration. + +“_9th April._—Called on Mrs. Howard. We had a tremendous argument, I +defending the Mahdi, she attacking him as a fanatic, and begging me not +to talk in that way in England. She said: ‘It is so stupid of you, +because you have so much sense, and if you would be moderate you might +have great influence.’ I said: ‘My influence will never be great in +England, because English people care nothing for principle and +everything for party, and I am not a party man. My influence lies in the +East, where all understand and accept me.’ We talked about Baring, and +their refusal to let me land in Egypt, and she declared the Foreign +Office had had nothing to do with it. But George said it was the only +sensible thing they had done yet. We went on to Gladstone, and she +described how he had become a political gambler. He had gambled with me +by sending me to Egypt, just as he had since gambled with Gordon. If we +succeeded he won; if we failed he did not intend to pay. This, I doubt +not, is the position exactly. + +“Lunched at the Carlton with Button. He intends to stand for Dorchester +at the General Election, which may be anywhen now. But it will depend on +events in Egypt. Gordon’s death would precipitate matters, but anyhow +Egypt must go bankrupt in a month or two. He asked me why I did not look +out for a constituency, but I said there was none in England would elect +me. I could only conscientiously stand as a Home Ruler, and the Irish +would not have me because I am an Englishman. Besides, I could not +belong to a Party. He agreed that I was not meant for Parliament and had +a stronger position outside. I had some talk with Miltown, who believes +in the Sultan’s Caliphal prestige. I fancy the Tories, when they find +they cannot annex Egypt, will hand it over to the Sultan. Anything would +be better than the present state of things. I care little now who goes +to Egypt so long as the English leave and no other European Power takes +their place. But things are in the most extraordinary muddle; I find +people here more cordial and respectful of my opinion than they were +last year. + +“_10th April._—My letter proposing a new settlement for Egypt is in the +‘Times,’ with a leading article in disparagement. It is all very well to +bluster, but I cannot see how they are to carry on their game of brag +with no soldiers to send to Egypt and the French getting angry, and +bankruptcy staring them in the face. + +“_11th April._—Dined with Eddy Hamilton at the St. James’s Club. He has +been wanting to see me, and has written four times since I came home. In +spite of his declaration that we were not to talk politics, nothing else +was talked of. He began by saying that he had read my letter to the +‘Times,’ and agreed with most of it, but he thought it a pity that I had +mentioned the Khedive’s abdication as a possible thing. I must know that +the English Government was committed to his support. It was committed +before Mr. Gladstone came into office, and such pledges could not be +withdrawn from. He himself had always regretted this, and had considered +the Joint Note of January, 1882, a great mistake. But the thing was done +now and there was no help for it. He was sick of the whole thing and +wished Egypt at the bottom of the sea. But they could not get out of it +till there was a prospect of peace. I said: ‘You will never have peace +as long as you insist on keeping Tewfik, and you are only at the +beginning of your troubles. We will plague you in turn with all the +plagues of Egypt until you let the people go. This year you will have +the Mahdi, next year you will have a flood, and the next a famine.’ He +said: ‘It is impossible to do anything for the Egyptians. They will not +help themselves, they are such miserable cowards, and there is not an +honest man among them.’ I said: ‘As for their cowardice, you have taken +peasants from the fields and have sent them to fight for a man they hate +against a man they love. As for their dishonesty, you have driven the +honest men out of Egypt or frightened them into holes and corners. There +are plenty of honest Egyptians, and I could guarantee an honest +government if you would let me, only not with Tewfik, and not with the +class of men you now employ.’ He said: ‘The rest are too stupid.’ I +said: ‘Egypt is the easiest of all lands to govern, and it does not +require cleverness to do it. It requires honesty and the consent of the +people. In all Arab societies the character of the Ruler is reflected in +the Ministers, and, with a ruler whom they respected, and who had the +qualities they respected, you could reform the whole mass. But Tewfik +they never can respect, and the Circassians are opposed to all reform.’ +We talked about Gordon and the Mahdi. Gordon it appears has written to +say that the Mahdi has no power in the Soudan, and Eddy thinks the whole +thing a myth. He does not want to send an army to Khartoum, but trusts +to the desert frontier as Egypt’s best defence. In this he is right, but +I told him he must expect raids such as the Wahhabis used to make in the +last century on Bagdad and Syria; they used to make desert marches of a +thousand miles. I warned him against employing Indian troops, and told +him my view of the danger of mixing India up with the troubles of Egypt. +He said: ‘I hope there may be no occasion.’ But from his tone I should +judge they have the possibility of employing Indian troops in their eye, +in spite of their public declarations. He said they had no reason to +believe these otherwise than loyal. + +“We then talked about my exclusion from Egypt, and he was glad I had not +attempted to force a landing on my way home, which he had feared. He +assured me the Foreign Office had nothing whatever to do with the matter +(which is not true), and trusted I would let the matter rest. I told him +that was out of the question, and as a public duty, if for no other +reason, I must bring it before the Foreign Office. He seemed much taken +aback by this, and I am sure it was to find out my intentions, amongst +other things, that he proposed this dinner. We then talked about India. +. . . While we were talking the Duke of Marlborough came up and talked +also about India, and my success there with the Mohammedans. He knows +India well, and is a cleverer man than people give him credit for, +cleverer than his brother Randolph. [I ought rather to have said more +intellectual, for he could not compare with Randolph in readiness of wit +or those qualities which made his brother a leader of men. But his mind +was a broad one, and if he had lived for anything else but pleasure he +might have gained a high public position in the world.] + +“I am satisfied with the conversation with Eddy. It is clear they are at +their wits’ end for a policy. They are waiting at present upon +Providence, but Providence will not help them. + +“_12th April._—An important move is noticed in to-day’s telegrams. +Germany and Austria have presented identical notes pressing the claims +of their subjects on the Egyptian Government. This will force a +financial crisis and bring all Europe into the matter. + +“_13th April, Easter Sunday._—An anxious letter from Sir Wilfrid Lawson. +He is as angry as I am about Egypt. He would clear out of it bag and +baggage. I would stay long enough to do justice and make reparation, no +matter at what cost to England. + +“_15th April._—Abdu and Sanua have both written, delighted with my +letter in the ‘Times.’ The French papers have taken it up and reprinted +it, and I expect it will cause some trouble to Baring. + +“_16th April._—Met Button at the Carlton and talked over plans. Drummond +Wolff, whom I met the other day, asked me whether it was true that +Button meant to break with the Fourth Party, and I mentioned this to +Button, and he said that it was so; Randolph was becoming more +unscrupulous than ever, and Gorst was still worse. Not long ago they had +tried to play a trick upon the ‘Times,’ and had all but succeeded. Gorst +had written to Buckle, who is young and new to his work, to say that Sir +Stafford Northcote had decided to retire after the Easter recess from +the leadership of the Opposition, and Buckle had actually got the +article in print, when at twelve o’clock at night the article writer had +suggested that he (Button) should be consulted. Button was in bed, but +he got up and succeeded in finding his uncle, Robert Bourke, who told +him the whole thing was a plant, he having been with Northcote that very +afternoon devising plans for the coming Session. So the article was +stopped just in time. Wolff, Button thinks, is the only honest one of +the lot. I expect Robert Bourke has advised him to have nothing more to +do with them. Young Hamid Ullah is here. + +“_18th April._—Lunched with Colonel Osborn[30] to talk over plans +connected with India. He thinks I have done a great work there, and +agrees with nearly every point of my programme. But he says it is +useless bringing it forward this year, as Parliament is entirely +occupied with the prospect of a dissolution, and it would be impossible +to get members to commit themselves to vigorous action. He is probably +right. + +“At three Mr. Stead, the new ‘Pall Mall’ Editor, called, and I had a +long conversation with him about the prospects in Egypt. He tried to +make me commit myself to some approval of annexation as better than the +present state of things, but I would not do this, and I think he went +away with the impression that I was impracticable. He is by way of +knowing a great deal of the opinions of the various European Cabinets, +and assured me that Germany would not interfere with anything that might +be done or proposed to be done in Egypt, that Bismarck did not care what +happened to the Suez Canal, and that the question would have to be +settled between France and England. He did not believe in the Mahdi +having any real power in the Soudan, and Gordon ought to be reinforced. +Mr. Stead is a smart intelligent pressman, very different indeed from +his predecessor Morley. I do not think we are likely to agree or that he +will make any use of my opinions. We are too wide apart. At any rate he +promised to publish nothing as mine without letting me see what he had +written. + +“As he was going, Jack and Mark Napier rushed in to ask if I would help +them to save Gordon.[31] They had an idea, which was to get together a +thousand sportsmen, men they explained who would be ready ‘to go a +thousand miles to shoot a lion,’ and try to force a passage from Suakin +to Berber and carry off Gordon on the true principles of a rescue. They +thought I might like to join them and show them the way. But I told them +the scheme was nonsense, and even if it wasn’t I would have nothing to +do with armed operations against the Arabs. Much as I liked Gordon +personally, I considered him to be in the wrong and the others in the +right, and I would rather see him perish than cause the death of one of +his opponents. If it came to sending an Embassy to the Mahdi, I might be +able to help them, and I advised them to put this idea forward, rather +than the other. I have written to Jemal-ed-Din to ask him what he thinks +of it. + +“_19th April._—At Crabbet. Count Alfred Potocki came down with his son +Roman, and Mr. Marcowski, manager of Count Branicki’s stud, all Poles +and breeders of Arab horses, to see our horses. They have come over to +England on purpose to see them, and are in raptures. Count Potocki is a +very distinguished man. Forty years ago he was attaché to the Austrian +Embassy in London and knew everybody worth knowing, and he still keeps +up a marvellous acquaintance with English politics. We talked over the +whole situation with regard to Egypt. He ridicules the idea of the +French being able to fight over the matter, and he considers Gladstone +the most dangerous man England has ever had as minister. He tells me the +new Russian Ambassador in London who has just been appointed is the same +Staal[32] who was my friend twenty-five years ago at Athens. It is +singular how many men whom I was with there, and knew intimately as +colleagues, have since distinguished themselves. Haymerlé, whom I +remember lamenting that he never on account of his birth could rise +higher than the rank of Secretary, died Prime Minister of Austria; +Nelidoff is Ambassador to the Porte; Staal is Ambassador in London; +Malzen Grand Chamberlain at Munich, and Dufferin, who however was only a +visitor at Athens in 1859, holds first European rank as a Diplomatist +after Bismarck. We talked about Lytton, who Potocki declares will be the +next Tory Foreign Secretary, and we talked about India. + +“Button telegraphs that a Conference has been called! + +“_20th April._—The ‘Observer’ announces that the Conference will be held +in London, but will confine itself to financial matters. Baring has been +summoned to England. My only fear now is the re-establishment of the +Dual Control, which is evidently on the cards. + +“_21st April._—Twiss has given his opinion on the case of my being +prevented landing in Egypt. It is wholly adverse to my legal position as +having a right to land. I must now treat the case diplomatically. + +“_22nd April._—Parliament met yesterday, and Gladstone has at last +admitted that Gordon is ‘hemmed in,’ though he denies that he is +‘surrounded.’ The Governor of Berber[33] telegraphs that he must make +friends with the Mahdi, and the French are writing violent articles. The +‘Pall Mall’ this evening predicts a war with France. + +“_23rd April._—To London. Things worse than ever in Egypt. Baring is on +his way home to be hauled over the coals, and about time; Nubar talking +again of resigning if Berber is not relieved; and Topsy Egerton,[34] who +is in charge at Cairo, recommending a mixed English and Egyptian +expedition of relief. + +“Jack and Mark Napier came again, and I read them the draft of a letter +I have written to Gladstone, proposing to act as mediator for the relief +of Gordon.[35] This was suggested by one I received this morning from +Jemal-ed-Din to the effect that for my sake he would do what he could +with the Mahdi to save Gordon’s life. Button advised me to take it +myself to Downing Street and ask to see Gladstone. But the Prime +Minister was busy with a Cabinet Council, and I was obliged to entrust +it to Eddy Hamilton in the hope of getting an answer. Button says it is +too late, and that they decided yesterday to send a relief expedition to +Berber. But as yet they have announced no such intention. Lord De la +Warr,[36] too, approves of the letter, and I think at least it will be +an advantage to put it on record that the offer was made. I told Eddy +briefly the nature of my proposal, and he said he was entirely for +peace, but he could not promise me Mr. Gladstone would see me, because I +was looked upon as an opponent of their Egyptian policy.[37] + +“My idea of a solution would be either to go myself or get some one else +to go, Jemal-ed-Din or Abdu or young Abd-el-Aal, first to Dongola, and +thence to Obeyd. There ought not to be much difficulty about this. The +condition, I fancy, which might be accepted would be the evacuation of +the fortified places by Gordon and such Europeans, Turks, Copts, and +others as might wish to go back to Egypt; a treaty of peace, or rather +an engagement on the part of the Mahdi that he would fix his frontier at +Berber and Dongola, and the Egyptian Government theirs at Assouan; a +guarantee of the Red Sea from Foreign European attack; an indemnity to +the Hadendowas as blood money for those slain at Teb, Tamasi, and +elsewhere. For myself I should stipulate that no military operation was +to be begun during my mission, that no revenge should be taken for my +death, or expedition be sent for my release in case of capture, and that +it should be recorded in writing that the terms of the agreement should +be kept. I should also mention that I should expect Arabi to be restored +in Lower Egypt should my mission prove successful. But it is extremely +unlikely they will let me go. + +“At the Carlton Club I met Seymour FitzGerald,[38] with whom I talked +about India. He wonders I do not stand at Horsham for the next +elections, or as a Tory Home Ruler in Ireland. Major Napier,[39] too, +was there, and old Ranalagh with whom I have always had a sympathy as +having been once a rebel. He fought with the Carlists in Spain. De la +Warr is expecting the ex-Khedive at Buckhurst. + +“Later to Button’s, where I met Brocklehurst, Gordon’s chief friend and +correspondent, and had a long talk with him about Gordon. It appears +that Gordon asked repeatedly for me when he was starting for Egypt, and +it is a thousand pities I did not see him (being away in India), as I +could have prevented his making the mistake of going to Tewfik and +neglecting to go to the Mahdi. Brocklehurst declares that Gordon, from +first to last, has refused to believe in the Mahdi’s influence, and does +not believe in it now. He says that if he had done so he would certainly +have made friends with him. But he is very angry with Baring. He does +not trust much to the relief expedition, though he is in favour of +trying it, and I think he is inclined to support my plan of negotiation +instead. The only thing is, is it not too late? + +“Dined at Pembridge Crescent to meet Arthur Godley, who has always been +sympathetic with my ideas. He is now at the India Office, and can afford +to talk more openly than formerly when he was Gladstone’s Private +Secretary. He is all for peace in Egypt, and thinks Gordon mad, which I, +too, begin to think may be the real explanation of it. About India he +was very ready apparently to take my views. But he considered the ill- +feeling between Englishmen and natives was confined to Bengal. I am to +go to him again in a day or two at the India Office to talk over Indian +affairs. He agreed with me when I said that the end of it all would be +that we should leave Egypt and only keep possession of her debt. + +“_24th April._—No answer from Downing Street, but Button says that at +the Cabinet Council yesterday afternoon they changed their minds in +favour of peace. Wolseley was there, and there was to be no expedition +after all. He thinks perhaps my letter may have had something to do with +it. Lunched at the Carlton and met Jem Lowther,[40] who talked about +Egypt, and Robert Bourke, who is asking the question about the dispatch +of troops to Berber and Khartoum. It is the opinion of both these Right +Honourable Gentlemen that the Government would give its ears to learn +that Gordon was dead. + +“To the House of Commons and heard Gladstone make his explanation about +Gordon. It is certainly most audacious. But I am convinced it means no +troops, though nearly everybody seemed to understand the contrary. What +he said was that ‘All human means would be taken.’ Button, who was in +the gallery with me, whispered ‘Human means means you.’ Rivers +Wilson[41] was also in the gallery, and proposes to come and see me to- +morrow, a thing he has not done for the last two years. Gladstone is +looking thin and old. To my mind he does not show to advantage in the +House of Commons. He is argumentative, short tempered, and insincere; +the reverse in fact of what he is at home. And to-day he looked like a +fraudulent bankrupt trying to make his creditors believe he was paying +them twenty shillings in the pound. One wonders how he can inspire +confidence in his supporters, but I have never heard him on a really +great occasion. + +“I have written to Jemal-ed-Din, sending extracts from the ‘Pall Mall,’ +which has my letter to Gordon, the one written from India, in it, and a +leading article recommending that I should be sent to Obeyd to treat +with the Mahdi.” [It says: “If everything—Khartoum, arsenals, steamers, +and munitions of war—if all these are to be handed over to the Mahdi and +the garrisons are to trust their lives to his tender mercies, our proper +agent in the Soudan is not General Gordon, but Mr. Wilfrid Blunt. +General Gordon was prepared to go a great length in order to conciliate +the Mahdi. Mr. Blunt is prepared to go all lengths. General Gordon, as a +last resort, and being a man of war from his youth up, has always avowed +his readiness to fight rather than see his men cut to pieces. Mr. +Wilfrid Blunt would not injure the hair of an Arab to save the lives of +General Gordon and all his men. Mr. Blunt, then, is obviously the man to +whom the Government should turn in this the hour of their need. He +represents their policy to a nicety. If they will not relieve Berber, +and if they can do nothing to assist Gordon to hold Khartoum, let them +at least send Mr. Blunt in hot haste to El Obeid to arrange with the +Mahdi for the escape of the abandoned garrisons. Mr. Blunt is not less +brave than General Gordon, and he could be sacrificed at least as +safely.”] + +“At Button’s, where I looked in again to ask his advice about an answer +which has come from Downing Street. Reginald Brett, Hartington’s +Secretary, called, and Button saw him in the other room. He states +positively that the Government has decided not only not to send troops +to Berber, but to forbid the Egyptian Government sending any. They mean +to do nothing at all, and have telegraphed to Egypt to say so. He thinks +they will certainly come to me. Eddy Hamilton’s note is to the effect +that Mr. Gladstone will answer later, but is now laying my proposal +before the Cabinet. He writes, however, another private note suggesting +that I should talk it over with Brand.[42] This, however, Button +recommends me not to do, so I have written to say I can only talk to Mr. +Gladstone, and will wait his convenience. What they want is, evidently, +that I should take all the responsibility of the negotiation on myself, +and offer terms which they might afterwards repudiate. But they won’t +catch me again doing this, and, if I go to Obeyd, I go as British envoy. +Otherwise I should only be waylaid by the Khedive on my road. Button is +in high delight at the upshot of it all. He tells me it was Wolseley +himself who told him what had been decided in the Cabinet. + +“Dined at Pembridge Crescent to meet Captain Abney, a friend of +Gordon’s. + +“_25th April._—To Button’s early, to talk matters over again. But there +is nothing new, except that the Bisharin Arabs have joined the Mahdi, +and the desert of Korusko is blocked. The telegrams in the papers don’t +say this. But Button had it from Wolseley, and I have written again to +Jemal-ed-Din, asking him about the terms which we might ask. The +Government won’t say anything to me till Baring arrives; that is to say +on Monday. + +“Wrote a number of letters, to Jemal-ed-Din especially, and to Arabi, +asking the latter whether it would be possible for him to work with +Ismaïl in case such a solution should be proposed. He is to answer by +telegram, the words ‘Content,’ or ‘Refuse.’ This because I think the +time is come when a new settlement _must_ be made; and this is not the +most unlikely of the many proposals that will be brought forward. + +“_26th April._—Called on Button. He tells me the Cabinet are again +wavering about sending troops to Berber, or rather Khartoum, for they +would probably start from Massowa if at all. The reason of this is that +the Liberal M.P.s understood Mr. Gladstone’s declaration yesterday in a +sense exactly opposite to his real meaning, that is to say as a promise +of sending troops, and half a dozen of their leaders went to him and +explained how much they approved of it, and Mr. Gladstone had been +unable to satisfy them by saying that all he had meant was that Gordon +should be ordered home. So, to please these people, there is to be more +slaughter. But we shall know when I get the answer to my letter. Button +tells me that several members of the Cabinet would be glad to go out of +office, notably Harcourt,[43] who is afraid of dynamite and is tired of +being watched by the police. Three or four days ago, talking of the +Conference with Natty Rothschild, Harcourt said: ‘Our hope is that the +Powers will refuse our proposals, which will give us an excuse for +coming straight out of Egypt.’ Button advises me not to send in my +papers about my being refused entrance to Egypt until I get my answer +about the Soudan. My own idea was to do so at once, as it is a rule of +strategy to fight stronger than ever when you are negotiating for peace. + +“Then to Rivers Wilson whom I found in bed with a cold and a fox +terrier. He is of opinion that the Conference will meet and that it will +be impossible to exclude politics. ‘Ferry,’[44] he said, ‘is beginning +to feel his legs, and he means to restore the Dual Control, and will +insist on dragging in everything if he is asked to make a concession of +French financial rights. You talk about altering the Law of Liquidation, +but that is out of the question, and whatever happens, Egypt must pay +the interest on the debt. If this was not so I should be very happy to +see you set up Arabi or anybody you liked at Cairo. But what there must +be is a strong Government, which can collect the taxes and pay the +interest.’ He believes Egypt still able to raise £9,000,000 of revenue +and pay away half of it. But he spoke less positively than in former +days. We talked about Ismaïl. He would never have anything to do with +his coming back. Ismaïl was no longer any good, as he had lost all his +prestige, and though clever could not maintain himself. Tewfik was good +as an instrument. He himself had chosen him in preference to Halim as +being the more absolutely servile of the two—but of course he could not +rule. Arabi had lost all sympathy in England by his personal cowardice. +Rivers in fact is all for annexation if annexation is allowed by the +other Powers, which he doubts. I then told him my views for Egypt. He +has a good deal of influence with the Rothschilds, and if we could get +them at all on our side we should win the game. + +“Then on to Labouchere, who has just written a capital letter about +Egypt in the ‘Times.’ He wants me to get Arabi to write him a letter +from Ceylon, giving his view about a possible restoration of the +National Party. He considers Gordon to be a stark lunatic, and is for +leaving him to his own devices. + +“_28th April._—Berber is being abandoned, the garrison having gone over +to the Mahdi. Khartoum will follow. + +“_29th April._—The ‘Standard’ has a telegram, saying that certain troops +and tribes from Khartoum have joined the Mahdi. If so, Gordon’s end has +come. The ‘Daily News’ has a letter from O’Kelly[45] at Dongola, +describing the Mahdi and his system in almost the same language that +these were described to me at Cairo seven months ago. I wonder whether +Eddy Hamilton would still maintain that the Mahdi was nobody. + +“To London and found a letter from Jemal-ed-Din, giving me in detail his +idea of the Mission of Peace that might be sent to the Mahdi.[46] Button +tells me that the Government have decided _pour tout potage_ to send +Curly Knox to Khartoum! The idea is that he, knowing the country as a +sportsman, and something of the language, could smuggle himself into the +town, where he could deliver to Gordon the Government’s order that he +should return. The Government think that this will absolve them from all +further responsibility, and that, if Gordon—as he probably would—should +refuse to come back, his blood would be on his own head. I remember +Curly Knox ever since the days of the Crimean war. Now he is a somewhat +decayed blood, a rabid damned-nigger guardsman. And I would not be in +his shoes when the Mahdi has got hold of him—only he will never go. +Baring has been to the ‘Times’ people, which is always a sign with +officials that they feel their position shaky; and Button is sure he +won’t go back to Egypt. He has made too absurd a hash of it there. +Colvin, he said, was a clever fellow to get out of it when he did. + +“Called on Hill, the Editor of the ‘Daily News,’ who has been asking me +to write for him. He agreed as to re-establishing a National Government +in Egypt, but it was necessary to find some formula for Mr. Gladstone +which could reconcile him to it; Mr. Gladstone changed his principles +constantly—but every time he needed a fresh formula, by which he could +satisfy his mind that he was consistent; he had nailed his colours to +Tewfik, and it would require management to get him to abandon him. As +for Gordon, they were going to do nothing now except perhaps get ready +for moving a small column of relief in July. + +“Luncheon at the Carlton with Burnaby, whom I especially dislike. He +said he did not care a rap what happened to Gordon or Khartoum, and why +should he? So long as he has something to tell his electors, it will be +enough. He is a dull heavy fellow in my opinion, with a dash of cunning +and more than a dash of brutality. Afterwards to the House of Commons, +where I had a long talk with Lawson and John Morley,[47] whom Mrs. +Howard has written advising me to take into my councils. We three +discussed the whole thing. First, about Gordon, who we agreed was past +praying for. Morley said the Government were willing to bite their +tongues out now for having sent him; they were very angry with him, for +he had done everything he said he wouldn’t do, and done nothing that +they told him to do. He thought if his death had happened two months +ago, it would have turned out the Ministry. Now people were tired of +Gordon, and, though there would be a row, it would blow over. He thought +the Government would rather do anything than accept my help, it would be +very unpopular, and, with the failure of Gordon before their eyes, they +would be doubly disinclined. Still the necessity might be so great as to +force them. + +“About Egypt I explained my views at length, Morley insisting that I +should put aside all moral arguments, and treat the case only as it +might appear to regard English interests. I said, therefore, that I +recognized two undoubted interests—(1) the Suez Canal, and (2) the +friendship of the Mohammedan world. Both these he admitted, and said you +may add a third. If things go on as they are now, we shall be at war +with France in less than five years. I then explained that as regards +the Suez Canal, we must either make an arrangement with Europe or with +France, and secure our interest in it by sharing it with them. The +friendship of the Mohammedan world could be best secured by establishing +a Mohammedan Government in Egypt and withdrawing our troops. But France +would only be satisfied with the establishment of a strong Government, +which could keep order. This could be done by allowing the people to +choose their own ruler—a ruler who would be supported by the troops. +Egypt was the easiest country in the world to govern, but you must have +the troops on your side. This seemed to please Morley as practical and +businesslike. He asked me, however, to explain how it was that last +August Sherif Pasha had declared to the Government that he was satisfied +with the loyalty of the troops and begged them to withdraw; it was then +decided that all the English troops should leave Egypt in the spring, +except a Corporal’s guard to be stationed at Alexandria, not to protect +the Khedive, but to prevent interference from the French. I told him the +reason was this, that the Egyptians then had no leader, and were +hopeless in the hands of the Circassians. But now the Mahdi had appeared +as a champion, and the army would serve him rather than Tewfik. It was +necessary therefore now to consider the Mahdi, and find a ruler who +could act on friendly terms with him. He asked about Arabi, saying he +was out of the question now. But I told him I still considered Arabi a +valuable man, as a good Mohammedan and one who would take advice. But he +must not be recalled as our nominee, which would spoil his influence. +‘Yes,’ Morley said, ‘the Egyptians must choose, and we must leave the +country—but we must not make it over to France.’ + +“_1st May._—Mr. Gladstone’s answer has come. Her Majesty’s Government +cannot make use of my offer to act as mediator in the Soudan, ‘in as +much as it must already be known throughout that region that they in +common with the Government of Egypt have no other desire than to promote +the evacuation of the country—and the restoration of its liberties.’ +This is as pure a specimen of Gladstonese as can be found in Hansard. +And the ‘promotion of an evacuation’ is as funny as anything since the +French were reported to have ‘evacuated Spiders and Worms’ [an old +Napoleonic joke]. + +“To a Peace Conference, where I arrived just in time to prevent two +annexationists, Villiers Stuart and McCoan from carrying a resolution +calling on England to ‘take a determined course with regard to reform in +Egypt,’ specifying the reforms suggested by Arabi. I exposed this +manœuvre as meaning the dispatch to Egypt of fifty more Clifford Lloyds +and twenty more Evelyn Barings, and got an amendment passed that ‘reform +in Egypt should be entrusted to the only hands capable of effecting it, +those of the Egyptians themselves.’ McCoan went away in a huff, and +Stuart talked of resigning the chair. + +“To the House of Commons, where I had a talk in the tea room with old +Donald Currie.[48] He told me that Gladstone had it all his own way +still in the Cabinet, and was at last anxious about Gordon. ‘His one +idea now,’ he said, ‘is to avoid more bloodshed.’ Both he and Sir George +Campbell,[49] who joined our conversation, talked of Gordon as having +gone off his head. I showed him that terms must be come to at once with +the Mahdi if we were not to have another bloody war. He promised to +speak to Gladstone in this sense. + +“Spent the evening with Button looking through the Gordon Blue Book. It +is most damaging for the Government. Donald Currie and Campbell talked +of Gordon as having gone off his head. But this Blue Book shows the +Government went off theirs too. + +“_2nd May._—Went to see Lady C. who talked about the Prince of Wales and +his political ideas. She says he is coming round a bit to Arabi. + +“_3rd May._—There has been a great split between Randolph Churchill and +Lord Salisbury; and Churchill has resigned the Chairmanship of the +Conservative Union. This will probably save the Government, who were +threatened with a dissolution, nominally on the Reform Bill, but really +on their Egyptian policy. + +“_5th May._—Sent in my case of exclusion from Egypt to Lord Granville. +It is certainly a strong one, and I think it must harass them if it does +no other good. + +“_6th May._—An extraordinary set of Parliamentary Papers published +relating to Gordon. Reading these and the others carefully through, I +have come to the conclusion that Gordon is a very self-willed man, +without fixed rule of action. In any case he has clearly lost his head, +and, having failed to exercise the influence he expected over the +Soudanese, has turned against them, and is now the bitterest enemy of +everything he supported as good last year. He is fighting for his own +hand as simply and solely as any adventurer of them all. It will lead to +a new war, if he has not his head cut off and sent to Obeyd before the +summer is over. + +“_7th May._—Called on Percy Wyndham,[50] who is much exercised against +the Government, as is natural, but at the same time is reasonable about +Gordon. I find most people inclined in private to think him out of his +mind. Percy has acted very straight in all this Egyptian business. He +was one of the minority of nine, and the only Tory who voted against the +war in 1882, and he has never made a mistake on any essential point. I +told him about my being refused a landing in Egypt, and he has promised, +when the time comes, to take the matter up in Parliament. As my nearest +relation, he is the right man to do it. + +“Lunched with Dr. Leitner.[51] He shows great sympathy with the +Mohammedans, but is one of the Conservative school, loving the Turks, +and desiring no change. He wants me to make it up with the Sultan, and +urges me to go to Constantinople, and thinks I might gain influence +there. + +“_8th May._—Button also thinks I had better go to Constantinople and +that Dufferin would be glad to see me. He, Button, has seen Wolseley, +who assures him no preparations are yet made for a Soudan expedition. +But he thinks, all the same, they will send a small force when the Nile +rises and will have a large force in Egypt. He wants me to call on him, +but I don’t think I will do this, as anything I could tell him would +only make him more anxious to send troops. I wrote yesterday to Jemal- +ed-Din, telling him I washed my hands of Gordon, that he had proved +himself a friend neither to liberty, nor to the Arabs, nor yet to Islam. + +“A long talk with Mrs. Howard. She says people will never forgive me for +having given Arabi information before the war, especially about his +being attacked from the Suez Canal. Lord Granville is very angry still +and F. Leveson,[52] but she thinks not Mr. Gladstone. She says the +Government could never recognize the Mahdi as a religious personage. + +“_9th May._—Mrs. Howard, talking yesterday of my article in the +‘Nineteenth Century’ on the proposed Arab race at Newmarket, said that +Freddy Leveson had asked Rosebery the other day why he continued on the +turf, and he had answered because it was the easiest way in England to +be accepted as a statesman, and he had appealed to Gladstone, who quite +agreed with him. She tells me that her husband, who represents the ideas +of the rank and file of the Liberal Party, is infinitely disgusted with +the Egyptian Policy, and says that half the party would vote against the +Government but for Home Questions. + +“Called on Hugh Wyndham[53] in Dover Street, he having asked to see me. +He is Secretary of the Constantinople Embassy. We talked the Eastern +Question thoroughly through, and he seemed disposed to think my policy +might be adopted eventually as far as allowing the Arabs to set up a +Caliphate was concerned. Constantinople, he says, is crumbling to +pieces, the Turks of Europe emigrating in a continuous stream to Asia +Minor. The Germans are still supporting the Sultan. The Government of +the Porte is defunct, and the Sultan rules everything through a changing +set of Ministers who are all opposed to each other. The Sultan himself +is a mono-maniac, fancying himself in constant danger of assassination. +Hugh had seen him when Dufferin was on leave, and the Sultan had talked +to him for three-quarters of an hour about a certain Armenian doctor who +had been found dead in the Bosphorus, and he could be got to think of +nothing else. He thought Dufferin would wish to see me if I went to +Constantinople. + +“_10th May._—To Button’s. He tells me the Government scheme was to offer +a remission of the English interest on the Suez Canal shares, for a +reduction of interest on the bonds. This had been proposed to France, +and at first was well received, but later Alphonse Rothschild had put +pressure on the French Government, and now they would do nothing unless +there was an international control. + +“_11th May._—The ‘Observer’ announces that a relief expedition under +Wolseley will be dispatched to Khartoum in October. Jemal-ed-Din writes +expressing his great confidence in me, which is satisfactory,[54] for it +is of course difficult they should understand how I can remain on +confidential terms with our officials here and yet be true to Islam. It +is a strange position, but its strangeness is its strength. + +“_12th May._—Met Churchill at the Carlton. He said: ‘Well, we shall have +Arabi back very soon now.’ I said: ‘I am afraid they will hand over +Egypt to the Conference—and the Conference will hand it over to Italy, +and Italy will hand it over to Ismaïl.’ He said they would like to do it +perhaps, but they would be prevented. I asked him about his own affairs, +saying: ‘You have been in the wars since I saw you.’ ‘Yes, as usual,’ he +said, ‘and I am not out of it yet.’ Thence to the India Office, where I +had it out with Godley about the Patna case.[55] I told him there had +been a compact that if I did not publish the case it would be inquired +into and redressed; and nothing had been done. I did not wish to annoy +Lord Ripon, but I should have to bring it before Parliament before the +end of the Session. He promised to write to Primrose and represent this +to him, which he admitted was fair. We talked about Hyderabad affairs. +Cordery, he told me, was in London, and I explained, for his private +information, the whole history of the intrigue against Salar Jung and +the Nizam.[56] He did not seem at all surprised and said everything was +going on right now. And I presume Cordery is not to return there. He +approved very heartily of the University scheme. Godley is a good +fellow, and I hear he always speaks of me in high terms. I have always +believed he left Gladstone partly because of the Egyptian war. + +“After this to the House of Commons, where there was a tremendous crush +to hear the debate on the Vote of Censure, the Duke of Cambridge and +many another bigwig being left out in the cold. I got in through Harry +Brand, who entrusted me to Ponsonby, who squeezed me into the +Ambassadors’ Gallery, where I had a capital place. Hicks Beach’s[57] +speech was an excellent one, very well prepared and arranged, and rising +at certain points to eloquence. His best hits were when he asked if ever +a British Government received such a telegram as one of General +Gordon’s, and when he pointed to Mr. Gladstone and repeated, ‘You will +incur indelible disgrace.’ It was a dignified speech, almost in the old- +fashioned style, with a Latin quotation, and without the modern +Parliamentary violence, and will increase Beach’s reputation. Mr. +Gladstone was to my mind not so happy. While Beach was speaking he had +been taking notes in pen and ink, and rose to answer him more as a man +might in a debating club, than as a statesman arraigned on a +dishonourable charge. He was argumentative, sarcastic, petulant, but in +the course of speaking he became angry, and then he spoke with effect. I +was immensely pleased of course at the line he took of declining to make +war on the Mahdi’s followers who were ‘men fighting for their country’s +freedom’ [‘rightly struggling to be free’], and Scott Holland,[58] who +was near me in the Gallery, was equally excited. But he did not state +his case quite frankly, and constantly spoilt it by drawing fine +distinctions and quibbling as is his wont with words. In a speech of +this sort, it was surely a mistake of oratory ever to suggest a laugh. +His argument, however, was a strong one, that the Opposition had never +during all the Egyptian troubles formulated an alternative policy, and +he was powerful when he challenged Hicks Beach to say that he would send +an army to Khartoum. Having said this he waited a moment, and then +pointing to Beach, turned to the House and screamed ‘Look! Dumb!’ This +was a great oratorical success. But as I have said before, oratory under +the circumstances was rather out of place. I have been unfortunate in +never hearing Gladstone quite at his best, though Lawson called this one +of his best. + +“_13th May._—Talked things over with Button. He advises me certainly to +go to Constantinople, but to tell nobody about it. It seems there is +some chance of the Vote of Censure being carried, and all now depends on +the Irish members. If they can turn the Government out, they will do so, +for the sake of a dissolution. But if they doubt their power they will +vote for Government. They will only make up their minds at the last +moment. If the Government is not beaten on the division, the +Conservatives will bring forward an address to the Crown to restrain the +Ministers from sacrificing British interests in Egypt. Button says this +is a quite Constitutional course. + +“Called on Harry Brand, who thinks the Government will be beaten on the +division. He would vote against them himself if he was not in the +Government. ‘There is one man.’ he said, ‘who will be happy if it goes +against us, and that is Hartington. He is sick of office, and wants to +be away amusing himself. As things go worse for the Government, his +spirits rise.’ We walked together in the Park. I then went on to Stanley +of Alderley.[59] + +“Stanley is quite reconciled to me now, and talks to me as Mohammedan to +Mohammedan, though he warns me still not to speak evil of the Turks. +‘There is a maxim,’ he says, ‘among Catholics, that whoever speaks ill +of the Jesuits, speaks ill of the Church, and so it is with the Turks. +They are the race which has carried out the teaching of the prophet in +its purity more than any other.’ I told him I had no quarrel with the +Turks except in their relations with the Arabs, whom they always managed +to corrupt, and I was come to ask his advice about going to +Constantinople. I had been through India, and was charged by the Indian +Mohammedans to see the Sultan and lay before him the need of a social +and moral reform for Islam, and to urge him to take the matter up, as +Emir el Mumenin, and to warn him that, if he neglected this duty, the +Indian Mohammedans would fall off from him. He thought the idea a good +one, and that I would be listened to, and he has promised to come to +James Street on Monday at noon, with letters he will write to Vefyk and +Khair-ed-Din Pashas on the subject. I intend, if the Government is not +turned out on the Vote of Censure, to leave for Paris and Constantinople +on Monday evening. Stanley is a good fellow, and I have known him now +for twenty-five years. He knows a great deal about Islam, but his ideas +are all confused, and he has no knowledge of the Arabs. He tells me he +was never in India—only in Ceylon and Siam, and knows so little of +modern ideas in India, that he had not heard of Seyd Ahmed being charged +with rationalism nor of the rivalry between Abd-el-Latif and Amir Ali at +Calcutta. + +“Lunched at the Gregorys. Later to the House of Commons. Lymington, whom +I met there, said: ‘I am coming to think after all we should have done +better to stick to Arabi.’ Lymington was one of Gladstone’s strongest +supporters at the time of the war.[60] + +“_14th May._—The Government are not turned out. The Irish waited, as +Button said they would, till the last minute, and then voted against the +Government, but nevertheless there remained a majority of twenty-eight. +I don’t know whether to be glad or sorry, but I think on the whole I am +glad. The measure of their iniquity is not yet full. Called on Button. +Natty Rothschild is selling Egyptian stock. He sold £150,000 Preference +Stock yesterday. Button thinks it will end by a partial repudiation when +the Conference meets. + +“Met Lascelles[61] in the evening at St. James’s Club. Talking about +Gordon, he said he had always been a man of violent temper, and what he +had done lately at Khartoum was nothing more than what he had always +done. Nubar said of him long ago: ‘He reads the Bible all the +morning—and then gets up and orders a man to be hanged.’ Gordon’s idea +on leaving England had been to convert the Soudanese to Christianity. +His (Lascelles’) brother-in-law, the Bishop of Exeter (Dr. Temple), had +told him that Gordon had called on him to ask whether he considered that +the Soudanese converts might be allowed to keep three wives. The Bishop +had thought this would be uncanonical.[62] Lascelles has been in +Bulgaria several years superintending the growth of liberty there, and +we might do worse than have him Consul General at Cairo. He says he has +been much disappointed in Nubar. Sherif, he says, is a good companion, +but without ideas. Riaz, when he first came into office, was under the +influence of Gabriel Charmes, who when he wanted him to do anything used +to tell him M. Thiers would have done it in his place. But they +quarrelled at last, Charmes wanting something which Riaz would not give, +and Riaz answering that M. Thiers would have said no. + +“_17th May._—Went down to Crabbet with Tommy Bowles, the Editor of +‘Vanity Fair.’[63] He is thinking of starting a new political newspaper +to be called ‘The Statesman,’ or, ‘The Précis Writer,’ and wants me to +assist him, but I would not promise. He told a good story about +Disraeli, who, having ventured some more than usually daring lie in +Parliament, was walking home afterwards with Monty Corry.[64] Monty +congratulated him on nobody having found him out, and called it a +special interposition of Providence. ‘Yes,’ said Dizzy, ‘God is great, +and He seems to me to get greater and greater every day.’ + +[N.B.—With regard to my offer of mediation, through Jemal-ed-Din, with +the Mahdi—an offer which I still believe might at that date, May, have +saved the disaster of Gordon’s death—it is worth noting that the +decision of the Government refusing it was delayed until after Lord +Cromer’s arrival from Egypt in London, which seems to fix on Lord Cromer +the departmental responsibility of the refusal, and with it of the loss +of whatever chance there was of a peaceful solution. It was then already +too late in the season to send an English army up the Nile before the +rising of the river.] + + + + + CHAPTER VIII + + MY EXCLUSION FROM EGYPT + + + “_19th May_, 1884. + + +“I WAS to have gone to Paris to-day, but, besides that I am far from +well, Lord Granville’s answer has come, shortly refusing to interfere. +This will oblige me to take action, and so I have put off my journey. +Perhaps it is as well. + +“_20th May._—To London, and saw Stanley, who has given me good letters +of introduction to Vefyk and Khair-ed-Din Pashas. In them he says he was +not able to approve my ideas of two years ago about Egypt, but that I +have returned now from India with saner ones, and that we are agreed as +to the residence of Europeans in Africa and Asia; also that I have been +prevented by the English authorities from landing in Egypt. + +“Tried to find Churchill about bringing my case forward in Parliament, +but he was out, and I think now I will first write to Gladstone, giving +him warning of what I intend, and so leaving a last loophole for peace. +Lady Gregory is all for this. She tells me Layard told Sir William that +a high official of the Foreign Office had said quite recently that +though it would be a bitter pill they would have to restore Arabi before +long. But I doubt it while Gladstone remains in office. + +“To Mrs. S.’s, a garden party. Mme. de Novikoff was there. She has been +in communication with the ex-Khedive Ismaïl, who has got her to advocate +his return to Egypt. + +“_21st May._—To Button’s, and arranged our plan of campaign. If my +letter to Gladstone comes to nothing, the ‘Times’ will print one from me +telling the story of my exclusion from Egypt. He thinks it should be +brought forward in the Lords instead of the Commons, and we think +Marlborough would be a good man to do it. Then I went to Knowles and +fortunately found him at home. I told him I was going to bring the case +forward in Parliament, and might be obliged to quote Gladstone’s +intention last year of restoring Arabi. He did not like this, and backed +out of having told me more than that it had been his impression that Mr. +Gladstone had such an idea, or that he might have had it if it had +become popular. This is nothing more than I had expected of Knowles; he +is evidently in a great fright of being compromised. I promised not to +bring his name in if I could help it—but I might be driven into doing +it. + +“To Crabbet with Admiral Tryon, a lovely day spent among the horses. + +“_22nd May._—Crabbet. Knowles must have gone straight to Eddy Hamilton, +for by this morning’s post I get a letter from Eddy evidently in a great +fright, saying he cannot believe I am going to bring him into the +matter, that his conversation with me last year went no farther than +wishing me _bon voyage_, and that he is quite innocent of representing +Mr. Gladstone in any way. I must expect both him and Knowles to swear +hard. But I have got the substance of my conversation with Eddy in this +journal, and of that with Knowles in my letters of the time. Moreover, I +have Eddy’s letter received at Bombay, speaking of himself as ‘conduit +pipe,’ between me and head-quarters. He must have forgotten this last. +Eddy won’t be injured by it. They will give him a fat permanent post +when they have made a scapegoat of him, but I have written to him to say +that if he likes I will refer the whole thing to Mr. Gladstone instead +of to Parliament. I hope they will accept this as I don’t want to break +with Mr. Gladstone if I can help it, and I should be grieved to have a +row with Eddy. + +“_25th May._—Crabbet. Eddy accepts a reference to Mr. Gladstone, and I +think nothing could be better. Harry Brand came down; we rode in the +forest and talked politics all day. Talking about Gordon, he told me +that Gladstone had not seen him before he was sent out, nor was there +any Cabinet Council; the thing was settled by a committee of the +Cabinet, consisting of Hartington, Northbrook, and Dilke. Gladstone was +only told that an engineer officer had been sent to Khartoum to report. +Harry had expostulated with Hartington about the mission, and had urged +that Gordon should be stopped at Korusko, but was told it was too late. +Baring was unfriendly to Gordon, having quarrelled with him four years +ago when he was Controller; they had called each other names. He says +nothing has been decided yet at the War Office about an expedition. They +will decide nothing till they hear from Gordon. He thinks the Souakin +route impossible for an army. A contractor has offered to run water in +pipes, to be condensed at the sea-side. + +“_26th May._—Lunched with Lady Gregory. Gladstone has been saying that +he can’t understand why people find fault with the Turks, who are very +good people. The ‘Pall Mall Gazette’ publishes ‘Mr. Wilfrid Blunt on the +crisis in Egypt.’ + +“_27th May._—Wrote a long letter to Gladstone, giving a full account of +the Knowles and Hamilton interviews last year (see Appendix). + +“_28th May._—Crabbet. Derby Day. Drove to Epsom. Harry Brand joined us +in the evening. He says it is quite untrue that any arrangement has been +made with the Turks for their help in the Soudan, also I ought to have +come and seen him about Gordon, as he would have brought me to speak +with Hartington, who is mainly responsible for Gordon’s having gone out, +and so is most concerned in getting him back. + +“_29th May._—Frederic Harrison came down. We had a pleasant discussion +at dinner and afterwards about the situation, only he takes the English +instead of the Egyptian point of view. He said he was not averse to war +under _all_ circumstances, and thought England would lose morally if she +left Egypt ruined to the French or to Europe. He says, however, +annexation is the only logical result of our Egyptian policy. He +approves my letter to the ‘Times.’ + +“_30th May._—The Oaks Day. Drove Harry Brand and Harrison to Epsom, an +odd party, in an odd turn out—the phaeton and four Arabs. We did the +sixteen and a half miles from the Lodge Gate at Crabbet to the top of +Epsom Hill in one hour and thirty-two minutes, our best record yet. And +one hour and thirty-three minutes coming home. Bozra had been only in +harness three times before, and never in the team. + +“_31st May._—To London and saw Button, who says that, whatever Harry +Brand may say, the Sultan proposed not long ago to send troops to the +Soudan, and that his offer was accepted—but coupled with the condition, +that as a proof of his sincerity he should send a thousand men to Suakin +in ten days. This he declined. Gladstone has published an article signed +G. in the ‘Fortnightly,’ which, if really his, seems dangerously like +handing over Egypt to the French, or to a European administrative +control, the very worst thing that could happen. Button highly approves +of my letter to Gladstone, and I have sent it in. I went, however, first +to Palace Green to get my letters to Mrs. Howard for reference. They are +quite satisfactory as to my interview with Knowles. I am now in a +position, if necessary, to prove my account of what he said, and I think +I have them all in a wonderful fix. + +“Lunched at the Club with Edward Sartoris, and passed through St. +James’s Square, where there was a considerable crowd looking at the +effects of the dynamite explosion. [A series of dynamite explosions +attributed to the Fenians.] Nothing more than a few broken windows as +the material effect, but the moral ones are great. Harry was very +indignant this morning when he read the account of it, and with me for +saying that it was due to the wickedness of the Government. + +“_1st June._—Crabbet. Began a letter to the ‘Times.’ The gist of it is, +that if Mr. Gladstone really hands over Egypt unconditionally to Europe, +it means handing it over to the bondholders, and handing it over to the +bondholders means the driving out of the Egyptians in favour of European +colonists. I cannot believe Mr. Gladstone, after all his protestation of +giving the Egyptians their liberty, would do this. I imagine, instead, +he must be contemplating the securing of terms for them first from +Europe, and establishing a Government at Cairo, strong because supported +by the people, and then withdrawing his troops. I put forward the rival +claims of Ismaïl, Halim, and Arabi. One thing is clear in Egypt. The +legend of Tewfik’s loyalty has been spoilt. He is loyal still +perhaps—but no longer _to us_. + +“_2nd June._—Began a series of articles for the ‘Fortnightly,’ called +‘Ideas about India.’ + +“_3rd June._—Button has given me the whole history of the G. article in +the ‘Fortnightly.’ It appears that Escott, the ‘Fortnightly’ Editor, +sent it to Buckle directing his attention to it, and saying it was from +the pen of one of our most prominent statesmen, and that it represented +Mr. Gladstone’s views. Buckle gave it to his article writer, who, before +committing himself, wrote to Escott saying he concluded the author of +the article to be Mr. Gladstone, and that if so, he should be happy to +give it all prominence, but wished to know whether he was correct. To +this Escott replied that the author was out of town, and that the +article might be accepted as representing Mr. Gladstone’s views. Button +thinks it is Godley, but I am nearly certain it is Herbert Gladstone, +who is often used to air his father’s most advanced ideas. Button tells +me that an expedition is to start shortly for Khartoum, as the military +authorities are of opinion that it will be less dangerous now than +later, when the Nile rises. They are to go from Suakin to Berber, and +will lose about half their force. + +“Dined with Admiral Tryon, and had a talk with Owen Burne about India. +He is the head of the Secret Department at the India Office, and I fancy +had his eye on me during my late journey. We talked about everything, +however, very pleasantly. He expressed his opinion that the native +armies ought to be made more use of than they have hitherto been. He +knew Scindia and Holkar well, and they had repeatedly proposed to lend +their troops on condition of being given rank in the Imperial Army. We +also talked about Hyderabad. He takes Cordery’s view about things there, +of course. Like every one here, he is astonished to learn that Lord +Ripon is a success or popular with anybody. + +“_4th June._—Down to Crabbet. The Frederic Harrisons and John Morley +came and we had a long political discussion till midnight. Morley says +it is a necessity of the English commercial system that the field of +their enterprise should be constantly enlarged. For this reason he +thinks we shall not leave Egypt, and he thinks something new must be +devised there. He is for a strong Government no matter what—Riaz, if you +can get no better—and he would allow the cutting off of heads or +anything. Marat, he says, is his idea of a man for revolutionary times. +He does not see his way to Arabi, does not understand his merits as a +statesman. But I think he wishes me well. He said: ‘Why don’t you +persuade Gladstone to send you to Egypt?’ I said: ‘I would do so if I +could get to see him.’ He and Harrison had an interesting talk about the +various statesmen of the day. Chamberlain, Morley thinks, is the man of +the future—a true Radical and one who would never change; he would ‘put +Burt[65] in office, if he had the chance,’ he had a strong will and +ideas. Dilke was only a sham Radical; Dilke was too much a man of the +world, wanted to please everybody; he had seen his best political day, +and would be merged in Chamberlain’s individuality. The danger was that, +when a Radical Cabinet came to office, the two would divide Home and +Foreign policy between them, when Dilke would play every kind of Jingo +prank. Morley has a great opinion of Parnell, who, he says, is a +powerful man and a patriot. Gladstone thinks highly of him too. When the +Phoenix Park murders took place, Parnell wrote to Gladstone to say that +if he, Gladstone, thought it would do any good or relieve the situation, +he would retire from public life; he was disgusted at the murders. This +Mr. Gladstone told Morley himself. Dillon too was a patriot. Healy had +only a blind hatred of England. The rest were second rate men. Dillon +had written to Morley lately from California as follows: ‘Dear Morley. +You said a year ago that English troops would be out of Egypt. Yours +truly.’ Salisbury would be a great force if he was in the House of +Commons; he would like to abolish the House of Lords so as to get into +the other House. Hicks Beach was much the best man the Opposition had in +the front bench; he always reasoned out his arguments. Plunket was their +best speaker. Gibson was tiresome, Northcote a noodle. Gladstone had a +supreme contempt for Northcote. Morley has a high opinion of Churchill; +thinks he may come over yet to the Radicals; he had the talent of +interesting, was industrious, kind-hearted, and wonderfully quick. +Hartington was weak, had no fixed opinion or power of will or decision; +he was an excellent critic, but with no initiative. He thinks Lawson and +Labouchere have ruined the Egyptian cause by their jokes—people were +afraid of seeming to agree with them. Trevelyan was a success, and +deservedly so. Lefevre would always be unpopular. For Granville Morley +has a ‘supreme contempt’—he can find no other word. + +“_5th June._—I drove Morley to the station in the morning. He seems much +in agreement with me about Egypt, and I hope he may make his agreement +known to others. I gave him Lyall’s letter[66] to read and my two +letters from Egypt to Eddy Hamilton, and explained to him something of +my idea how to govern Egypt. He said he was all for strong measures now, +hanging if necessary. If we could only get Morley to declare himself it +would be most important, but he says the weak part of our programme is +Arabi. Perhaps it is. + +“Lady Gregory came down in the afternoon, and the Harrisons stayed on. +Harrison interests me, being a thoroughly honest good fellow. Morley +told us this morning a great deal about Stead, his successor in the +‘Pall Mall Gazette.’ Stead was only a clerk at so many shillings a week +to start with, and came straight to the ‘Pall Mall’ from a small +northern paper. He was a man of entire belief in himself, a good deal of +imagination, and not a little superstition; a believer in dreams and +inspirations. On one occasion in the autumn of 1882 he sent Morley a +message, saying he wanted to see him on important business. This was to +tell him that, having gone for a cruise round the Isle of Wight, he had +had a sudden inspiration just off the Needles to the effect that Morley +would be in Parliament and have left the ‘Pall Mall’ by the following +March. When it happened, Stead had taken it entirely as a matter of +course; he has boundless ambition, and has it as a maxim that a +newspaper Editor is stronger than any Minister. Morley looks upon him as +a political quack. He, Morley, eschews the ‘Pall Mall’ now and all its +works. + +“_6th June._—My letter is in the ‘Times’ and reads well, and I have +written to Arabi to warn him that perhaps he will be proposed to shortly +to return, and to ask him whether he would be prepared to serve as +Regent for a term of years with Tewfik’s son in minority. Harrison went +away and has promised to write in support of me to the ‘Times.’ + +“_7th June._—The ‘Times’ has some polite words about my letter in its +leading article. Button writes that the letter has been a great +success—the best I have ever written. It will have made one or two +people at the Foreign Office angry. But Mrs. Gladstone asks us to her +party next week, the first time since the war. + +“_9th June._—Harrison’s letter is in the ‘Times,’ and one from Edwin +Arnold in something the same sense. On the other hand, Morley publishes +a letter to his constituents, which may read any way about Egypt. It +does not leave a good impression. + +“Button tells me that an agreement was come to on Friday between +Granville and Waddington about Egypt to the following effect: (1) That +an International Control Audit should be established; (2) That English +troops should remain in Egypt for three years; and (3) That England +should advance eight million sterling. Hartington, Dilke, and +Chamberlain are violently opposed to the arrangement; and it is from +Hartington that the ‘Times’ has lately been receiving its information as +to the negotiations. + +“Dined with Frank Lascelles, who has been staying at Chatsworth, and he +confirms what Button says of Hartington’s dislike of the arrangement. +According to Button, Hartington would have left the Government but for +his father, who declared that it was the boast and glory of his family +that no member of it had ever voted with the Tories. Fidelity to party +was his first principle. Lascelles has seen Baring lately, who tells him +he is going back to Egypt after the Conference, to go on trying to prove +that ‘two and two make something more than four.’ Lascelles was at some +pains to prove to me that Arabi might yet act with Tewfik. Eddy was at +the club dining at another table, and we agreed, whatever happened in +the matter of my exclusion from Egypt, we would not quarrel. I am to +have an answer from Mr. Gladstone to-morrow. The ‘Pall Mall’ published +late in the evening a special edition giving the terms of the agreement +with France pretty much as Button gave them. + +“_10th June._—The ‘Daily News’ contradicts in vague language the terms +of the agreement. But Button declares they are true all the same, and, +what is more, that Bismarck has refused to allow any diminution on the +interest of the unified debt. This he had from Natty Rothschild. He says +the Government will certainly be turned out. The Opposition are doing +all they can to hasten the Franchise Bill, which they will pass through +the Lords, and then bring on the Egyptian Question in the form of an +Appeal to the Crown. Then there will be a dissolution, and the Tories, +if in office, will be able to have a redistribution of seats exactly as +they like to supplement the Bill; it would be a mistake in tactics to +throw out the Bill. Once passed, the Liberals would have no cry at all +to go to the country on. But I fancy their cry would be the fear of an +European war. + +“Called on Lawson and persuaded him to oppose the Government +arrangement, about which he was in doubt, I hope, successfully. There is +nothing now but to turn out the Government. Lord Salisbury will not dare +annex. Harry Brand writes ‘Annexation and war are in the possible +future.’ + +“Went to see Mrs. Howard. She tells me George is furious against the +Government. And he has told the Government whip that, if any terms have +been agreed to with France at all like those just published, he and many +of his friends will vote against the Government, adding that for himself +he would not present himself for re-election in case of a dissolution. +She is entirely in agreement with my last letter to the ‘Times,’ and so +it seems is George. We discussed Morley and Harrison. Morley I expect +found the arrangement with France concluded when he got back to London, +and has probably been told that a defeat of the Government would mean +war. Hence his letter, but he is evidently a trimmer. The letter reads +both ways, and they will probably give him office if they ride out the +storm. + +“Gladstone’s answer has come. He says that ‘in his opinion it is +impossible that any friend of his could without the grossest error of +judgement have given me any ground for the supposition that he was +favourable to any restoration of the exiles to Egypt.’ This is not a +denial. He goes on to say that ‘without questioning in any way my +intentions or my honour, he has deplored my proceedings in Egypt, as +alike injurious to Egyptian and British interests.’ I am writing to +thank him for the courteous tone of his answer, and do not propose to +bring the matter before Parliament until after the present crisis. +Harrison is much disgusted with Morley for backing out of his agreement +with us. + +“_11th June._—To Mrs. Gladstone’s party. The Grand Old Man came forward +in a hearty manner, and shook me warmly by the hand, saying with +emphasis, ‘How do you do, Mr. Blunt. I am very glad indeed to see you.’ +He has a hand which reminds me of Cardinal Newman’s, when seven years +ago the Cardinal cured my toothache with its touch, soft, warm, and +nervous. He is looking uncommonly well, and as alert and cheerful as if +he was going to heaven instead of head over heels into perdition before +the end of next week. I had some words with Mr. Forster,[67] who said he +had read and agreed with my letter in the ‘Times.’ He talked over the +chances, too, of turning out the Ministry, evidently hoping to do so. He +is an ugly roughish-looking man, but I can imagine may have power. I am +glad to have had these few words with him, but the crowd was too great +for much talk. Lady Gregory overheard Dilke saying, ‘The Arabi Party is +strong here to-night. I have seen both Blunt and Gregory.’ Baring was +there. + +“_12th June._—Saw Lascelles at the Club. He does not expect to get sent +to Egypt, and thinks Baring will go back there. But it all depends on +the Ministerial crisis. Dined at Lord De la Warr’s. I had rather +expected to meet Ismaïl, the ex-Khedive, but found only his +representative, Broadley, who tells me that Ismaïl is hurt at my +description of him in my ‘Times’ letter, but wants to see me. I have no +objection, though it cannot lead to anything. Arabi will have nothing to +do with him, and Ismaïl has hardly any chance at all of getting back to +Egypt. + +“_13th June._—Called on Button. He tells me the Government mean to stand +to their guns about the arrangement with France, and will be beaten. +With him was a man Gordon’s friends are sending to Khartoum to carry +letters and newspapers. He is to have £500 and go in disguise as a +Morocco merchant by way of Korosko. I cross-questioned him a good deal +about his plans, which are all based on the notion that the Mahdi’s +movement is a ‘trumpery insurrection’; so he will come to grief, unless +indeed he is wise enough to put the £500 in his pocket and go off and +amuse himself with it at Monaco, a result far from unlikely, to judge by +his looks. + +“_16th June._—Lytton writes answering my proposal to go for a night to +Knebworth. He says my political ideas about Egypt and India disgust him, +but hopes to see me all the same. So I am going, under promise to say +nothing about politics. This is quite fair. Lytton’s position is a +perfectly logical one, and I cannot expect him either to sympathize or +tolerate. + +“To Knebworth. Nobody staying in the house but Miss Lyall and Sinnett, +the Apostle of Theosophy. Politics being barred, our talk has been +almost all on occult sciences. Sinnett seems a worthy, if not a very +wise, man, with considerable humility and naïvety. He was formerly +Editor of the ‘Pioneer’ in India, and there became acquainted with +certain Oriental mystics. Practically, however, his system is +undistinguishable from ordinary spiritualism, and the real manager is +Madame Blavatsky. In this lady he has a profound belief, and told us of +various trifling miracles she is in the habit of working. She can make +bells ring in the air—and, by holding her hand to a pane of glass, can +produce tapping noises. She discovered once a cup and saucer in the +ground at a picnic, and can make electric sparks pass through his head. +He is distinctly of opinion that she has lived in other forms, before +her present life, and that she knows her own past history. But she has +not told him of it, and, such is the secrecy of these sublime adepts, +that if he were to ask her about it, she would be obliged to tell him an +untruth. He gave us a recipe, which he called a very simple one, for +obtaining the services of a _genius_. You must make acquaintance with a +sick man near his end, and persuade him that you are his best friend, +and get him to entrust to you his last wishes, as also some article of +property—such as a ring to which he is attached, and you must promise +him to perform his wish. He must then die, with anxiety regarding it and +regarding you upon his mind, and you must be careful to deceive him and +leave his wish unperformed. Then he will return to you through the +instrumentality of the ring in hope of urging you to fulfil your +promise, and will do all your bidding. This is a black and immoral art, +but he assured us exceedingly simple of execution. The high adepts scorn +to practise it. + +“_19th June._—A capital speech of Churchill’s to-day reported from +Aylesbury. I have written to congratulate him, and exhort him to take up +the mantle of honesty let drop by Mr. Gladstone. + +“_20th June._—Lunched with the Howards. George is quite converted now +from his belief in Gladstone, and looks upon him as completely +dishonest. He dined at Downing Street two days ago with other M.P.s, and +says the party, notwithstanding all, will vote solid for the Ministry, +all but a few members, himself among them. But even he is not, as I +understand, going to vote against them. The fact is there is no +opposition which can undertake the Government, and the Government can do +as it likes. + +“_22nd June._—Our annual Lawn Tennis Tournament at Crabbet. There were +there Godfrey Webb, Eddy Hamilton, Button, Sandys, Nigel Kingscote, +Harry Brand and his brother Artie, Frank Lascelles, Mallock, Elcho, and +others. We had a merry evening with songs. Eddy, who sat next me, talked +pretty freely about Egypt, and I gather they would give a good deal to +find some excuse there for getting rid of the Khedive. ‘He has been +cunning enough,’ Eddy said, ‘to stick to us, and we are bound to him.’ + +“_23rd June._—To London, and lunched with Lawson, and went down with him +afterwards to the House. Churchill, whom I met in the lobby, says that +Arabi’s only chance lies in the agreement with France being upset. He is +pleased with the letter I wrote him. Morley still professes not to have +made up his mind. Ponsonby got me into the Gallery. Gladstone was in +good form, as I believe he always is when he has a statement to make, +and he did it with dignity if not with any great eloquence. He talked a +good deal about France’s interests in Egypt, and our own interests, and +Europe’s interests, but never a word for good or evil of the Egyptians’ +interests, never a word but one, and that sounded like an afterthought, +and passed without remark. But there was a great deal about the +principle which would be decided at the Conference, by which I suppose +he meant the principle of the European concert—for every other has been +thrown to the winds. My programme has been followed on every point, +except that of doing justice to the Egyptians. Egypt is to be +neutralized, the Suez Canal neutralized, the Soudan separated from +Egypt—all as I recommended, but no lowering of the interest on the debt, +no re-establishment of popular government. Morley tells me all that it +is proposed to do is to lower the interest one half per cent., and even +that is not certain. + +“Button declares that Bismarck will not allow any reduction. His +position is this. He had a quarrel some time ago with the Frankfort +Rothschilds, and he is glad now to be able to prove to them that he is +real arbiter on the Nile, and they have come to him on their hands and +knees, and he will support their demand for the whole pound of flesh +because they demand it, caring of course nothing about the results to +them, and glad to break down the Anglo-French agreement. Therefore there +is good chance of the Conference collapsing as soon as it meets. The +Opposition was feebler in the Debate than anything I could have +imagined. Northcote was like an old woman afraid of responsibility, and +Randolph played into Gladstone’s hands by making a violent and foolish +speech against France. When I say foolish, I mean foolish under the +circumstances, for it had some good hits, as when he compared Gladstone +to Charles II kept on the throne by Louis XIV as his servant. But it was +not in harmony with the feeling of the House; and Lascelles, who dined +to-night with Forster, tells me they consider Churchill’s speech to have +gained votes for the Government. But they look to no vote being taken +till after the Conference as their best chance of upsetting the +agreement. Goschen made this point good. + +“_24th June._—Went down home to Crabbet. There is nothing more I can do +now in Egyptian matters, and for the moment I had better pay attention +to my horses. If we win the Arab race at Newmarket it will do more for +my ideas than half a dozen victories of the Mahdi. Lord Bradford comes +down this week with Ebrington to see the stud. He wants mares to put to +his horse Chippendale. + +“_25th June._—To a party at Devonshire House where I talked principally +to Mrs. Howard. She has been converted back to Gladstone by hearing the +debate the other night. George, however, holds out and is likely to be +alone in the cave with Forster when it comes to a division. + +“_26th June._—I hear from Button that the Opposition has decided on a +new Vote of Censure before the Conference, or rather while the +Conference is sitting, being moved thereto by Randolph, who had +threatened to move one himself. Labouchere tells me the Government, or +at least certain members of the Cabinet, are riding for a fall, and that +Randolph wants to make it impossible for the Conservatives to come in. +He wants me to get Abdu over from Paris as a sort of representative of +the National Party during the Conference. Bismarck, Button tells me, +will agree to a reduction of the Unified if Ferry agrees, but only ½ per +cent., and it is doubtful whether they can get even this. The Unified +Stock is held in France, Germany, and Italy, the Preference in England. +It is a hopeless state of things whichever way one looks. + +“_28th June._—Lunched at the Carlton with Churchill and Wolff. Churchill +is very angry about something or another, and says he is going away, and +shall have nothing more to do with Parliament this Session. He talked of +Northcote as ‘an old blackguard.’ + +“_30th June._—To Newmarket for Lord Falmouth’s sale. His brood mares +were magnificent, the finest according to my ideas being Palmflower, +Spinaway, Chevisaunce, and Jeannette. Wheel-of-Fortune is less taking. +Of the stallions the one I should have chosen to breed from is +Kingcraft. We dined with the Clay Seymers, Lord Wolverton and young +Leigh there.[68] + +“_1st July._—First day of the July meeting. The racing did not interest +me. After it we went to Lord Calthorpe’s paddocks, and saw Petrarch, the +handsomest horse in the world. We are staying with Button in St. Mary’s +Square. He tells me the Vote of Censure has been shelved. + +“_2nd July._—The long looked for day of the Arab race, but somehow I +felt less excited about it than when years ago we ran Yellow Boy at +Gibraltar. The weather was perfect, and all the world and his wife were +there. They say the July course was never so crowded, and there was +quite a mob to see the Arabs stripped, so that Geheimniss, who was +walking over for the July Cup, passed absolutely unnoticed through the +crowd. I was satisfied with the look of all the horses—and especially of +Halfa, my own entry, who was much admired, but I did not see Admiral +Tryon’s horse at all, for he was brought in quite at the end, and as +soon as they had started on their canter, we rode to the corner to see +the race. Jem Lowther was there also on horseback, very genial, and, +while we were waiting, we talked about the ‘awful mess’ in Egypt. Then +we saw the horses coming in a cluster at a tremendous pace over the +hill, beyond the fir trees, and we cantered back towards the paddock. +They overtook us at the bottom of the hill, and to my grief and surprise +I saw it was all over with Halfa, and what seemed to be the Indian +horses going on alone, with Rataplan well up. I felt that I had suffered +a disastrous defeat, but was a little consoled by finding that after all +a home bred three year old, though not mine, had won. This was Admiral +Tryon’s Asil; Dictator second; Rataplan, who had been making the running +for Halfa, third. + +“I fear, nevertheless, the race will be considered a failure as most of +the young ones were left behind, and there are suspicions with regard to +Tryon’s horse, whether he is really an Arab. After the race, Jousiffe, +Dictator’s trainer, came to me as representing his owner, and wanted me +to raise an objection to Asil on this score, but I refused point blank +to listen to anything of the sort. I was at Aleppo when Henderson, the +Consul there, bought Asil’s dam for Tryon, and though I did not see her, +nor can vouch for her pedigree, I think there can be no conceivable +doubt she was an Arab; she stood 15.2, but such a height is possible, +though I never saw it in the desert. She was in foal, Tryon says, to +Henderson’s Abeyan Sherrak horse, whom I know well, and the colt was +dropped a few days after landing in England. Besides, Asil is in the +Stud Book as an Arab and so is legally an Arab, whatever he may be in +fact. It would in any case be fatal to have a dispute on such a question +this first race, and I am glad my horse, or rather Abd-el-Rahman’s, was +second, so as to prevent other action—but I will see the horse. + +“Dined with Button and two of the Paulets, and George Wyndham.[69] A +very young man’s party. + +“_3rd July._—The sporting papers are down on the race as childish, +because the Arabs did not beat English horses, and I fear the Jockey +Club will not have the courage to repeat it; but Hawfa Williams, the +manager of Sandown, has promised a race there for the 22nd. We called +this morning at Hopper’s stables and saw Asil. Anything less like an +Arab horse I never saw. He is long, low, strong, rather coarse, and very +slack over the loins—like an English horse—his head plain but well set +on, great hocks and arms. I don’t wonder at Jousiffe wanting me to +object to him.” + +This failure at Newmarket was a great disappointment to me at the time. +I had counted on proving, by a practical demonstration, that Arab horses +bred in England, and properly trained, would greatly improve in speed as +compared with those bred in the desert. The race, however, seemed to +show the contrary, as, with the exception of Tryon’s colt, the two Arab +horses brought from India had it all their own way. Moreover, a little +later, Tryon matched his colt against an inferior English thoroughbred, +and was handsomely beaten. The ultimate result, however, was not I +think, as far as Arab breeding in England was affected by it, wholly a +misfortune. It convinced me that I was on wrong lines in breeding Arabs +for speed, and not for those more valuable qualities in which their true +excellence lies. Had I continued with my original purpose, I should have +lost time and money, and probably have also spoiled my breed, producing +stock, taller perhaps and speedier, but with the same defects found in +the English thoroughbred. Politically, however, I no doubt lost +something through the publicity of my Newmarket experience. For success +on the turf seems always to have been held in England as in some measure +connected with political capacity, and if I had been able to prove my +point with the sporting world, my opinion on Eastern affairs generally +would have gained in credit. + +“There seems every prospect of the Conference breaking down. + +“_4th July._—Lunched with Lady Gregory and on to the Howards. Mrs. +Howard asked me why I thought that England would be obliged to see +decent Government given to Egypt if we acknowledged a Protectorate, and +I said, ‘If you invite a young lady to dine with you at Greenwich you +don’t look too closely how she behaves—but when you have married her you +take care she dresses respectably.’ + +“_7th July._—Another letter from me in the ‘Times,’ and also one from +Benson Maxwell (both about Egypt), and there is a leading article +sufficiently polite to me. Called on Bruce,[70] who is expected to move +the Vote of Censure—a fairly sensible man, but without go or plan of +action, like all the rest of the Tories; yet he is the best man they can +find for it. No wonder Randolph has his way with them. He is occupied +over head and ears with his National Association and is tired of Egypt. + +“_8th July._—Dined at Wentworth House. Percy and Madeline were there, +and Henry Cowper, and Millais grown very prosy and as dull as a breeder +of cattle. I sat between Lady Wharncliffe and Sir Wilfrid Lawson, the +latter very amusing, with a fire of good stories, kept up all dinner- +time. He is going to hold an open air meeting in Hyde Park against the +Lords—and asked me to join in it. But the Lords to my mind are a very +respectable institution, and I care nothing at all for the Franchise +Bill which they are throwing out. + +“_9th July._—The Lords threw the Bill out last night, and there is +likely to be a row, but no dissolution. Marlborough’s first speech the +other night was a failure. People were interested to hear him, but found +his speech dull, and after the first ten minutes began to talk. + +“_11th July._—The Mudir of Dongola, it seems certain now, has joined the +Mahdi, and Berber is as certainly taken, while there are rumours, too, +of the fall of Khartoum. I have written to Hyndman, in answer to a +letter of his asking me to join the Democratic Socialists. This of +course I cannot do. + +“_12th July._—Luncheon with the Gregorys, where I met Rowsell, the +Domains Commissioner just from Cairo. His view of the situation there is +that the Mahdi will be at Cairo in the autumn. I asked him about Tewfik, +and he said: ‘Tewfik has intelligence enough to know that he has no +friends, and is fatalistic enough to let things take their course. He +will sit twiddling his thumbs from right to left, till he is told to +begin twiddling them from left to right.’ I asked him what he would +himself do when the Mahdi came to Cairo. He said: ‘Turn Mussulman of +course.’ + +“To Mrs. Buxton’s, near Weybridge, to meet George Trevelyan. The place +is prettily situated on the edge of Wisley Heath, now grown over with +fir trees. I remember it thirty years ago, absolutely bare, when we used +as boys to go to the Hut Pond from Horsley to fish. At Waterloo Station +was George Howard. He has seen Goschen, who would like to talk to me in +the morning about Egypt, or rather to hear me talk. Goschen says I am an +imprudent person who, if you tell anything to him, and he has reason to +be dissatisfied with you afterwards, repeats what you tell him. I will +go to him, but I trust him as little as he trusts me. + +“George Trevelyan[71] is a capital fellow—very lively and amusing. I had +a long talk with him after dinner. He made me explain to him the whole +history of the Revolution in Egypt, and especially of the Joint Note of +January, 1882, as he wanted, he said, to arrive at a knowledge of the +exact moment where our policy made a mistake. He was of course quite +ignorant even of the general outline of the story, but seized the points +with great intelligence. He is a man of energy, wit, and sympathy. I +asked him if he could tell me whose idea it was sending Clifford Lloyd +to Egypt, and he said: ‘It was ours, in Ireland. We would have sent him +anywhere to get rid of him.’ His description of Lloyd was amusing. He +was an energetic man of great self sufficiency. To talk to him you would +think him a Clive or a Warren Hastings. But his whole thought was to +advertise himself by his vigour. On one occasion he had telegraphed to +Vernon Harcourt, begging him to send him a couple of bloodhounds to aid +his police operations in Ireland. At first they had thought the telegram +a hoax, but it was nevertheless true. Besides, he was very greedy of pay +and allowances, and was always bothering Lord Spencer to increase these. +In the smoking room we had a general discussion about Ireland, and the +possibility of its independence. Trevelyan has a mean idea of the Irish, +and thinks they could not govern themselves respectably or solvably, but +would relapse into barbarism. I cited the instance of Greece as at least +as hopeless at starting as that of Ireland, and yet it had settled down +and become prosperous. We all agreed anyhow that Ireland in its present +condition was ruining England, and especially the English Parliament—but +Trevelyan does not believe in any true middle term between coercion and +separation. + +“_13th July, Sunday._—Had some interesting conversation with Trevelyan +and Sir James Carmichael.[72] The latter is Childers’ private secretary +at the Conference, and he says that he has had to go over the public +accounts of Arabi’s time, and finds them in a great mess. He complains +that, whatever Arabi’s honesty may have been, great peculation took +place under him. He is, however, wholly opposed to the Turks and +Circassians, and also to English administration in Egypt. He would like +to keep on Tewfik, and give him an Egyptian administration. He described +Nubar well for what he is, and said: ‘His days of office are numbered.’ +Trevelyan described Lord Spencer as the ablest administrator he had come +across, an administrator born, for he had had no training, a man of +sense and very high integrity. + +“_14th July._—Dined at the Travellers. Next table to me sat with others +Staal, the new Russian Ambassador. It is twenty-three years since we +met, but I knew him again directly. We were great friends in those days +at Athens, and I think he was really glad to see me when I explained +after dinner who I was. ‘Are you any relation,’ he enquired, ‘to the +Blunt who is a friend of the Mahdi?’ He asked me to come and see him, +which I shall do. Staal is an old man now, but has something of the kind +honest manner of former days. This has given me great pleasure. + +“_15th July._—Button tells me that the Lords are determined to fight on +the Franchise Bill. They dare not let the Bill pass, as it would mean +the absolute defeat of the Conservative Party at the next elections, and +Mr. Gladstone’s stay in office for the rest of his natural life. They +mean to hold on then till a Dissolution of Parliament, trusting to Egypt +to get them a majority at the elections. + +“Then to call on Goschen, whom I found much as two years ago, that is to +say, very intelligent and receptive, though I do not trust him. We +discussed Egypt thoroughly, agreeing on most points, and I gave him a +sketch of a plan of operations. First, we must make peace with the +Mahdi—we must either make peace or fight, there was no middle term. It +would not be necessary for the English Government to acknowledge the +Mahdi. Secondly, we must accept Egypt’s debt, or a composition of the +debt. If we did not want to fight France, we had better pay. This done, +we could establish what Government we liked in Egypt, leave it to manage +its own affairs, and withdraw our troops to Alexandria. Goschen thought +it very likely would end in our accepting the debt, but I fancy he would +like to administer the country according to Indian methods. I cannot +boast, however, of having got anything very distinct out of him. + +“Dined with Broadley and Marriott, M.P. for Brighton, who is anxious to +take up my case of exclusion from Egypt. I do not like Marriott, but he +may help in the Debate, if we can get one on it. Broadley declares that +Parnell and the Irish brigade will also support me, and that Parnell +wants particularly to see me. I shall be glad to make his acquaintance, +as I believe him to be a man of very high calibre, and I wholly +sympathize with his cause. + +“_16th July._—To Blenheim, a lovely day. The Duke very agreeable. I care +for few of the pictures, but the Raphael is about the finest I have +seen. The ‘Charles the First’ Vandyke is also splendid, and other +Vandykes are good—and there are two excellent Mytens, but of all the +pictures the one I should care most to have is a Reynolds, ‘The Fortune +Tellers.’ The Rembrandts are not Rembrandts, and the Rubens are less +than first rate, nor do I care for the large Reynolds. On the whole the +Duke does well to sell his pictures. The house is very fine, in the +style I like best. + +“_21st July._—Mohammed Abdu has just arrived from Paris. His ideas are +rather changed since we last saw him. The dominant feeling now is hatred +for England; and in this is merged the hatred of the Circassians. It is +the old story over again. When Europe presses and threatens, they all +join their ranks just as they did at the time of the Joint Note and the +Ultimatum. He has not, however, abandoned Arabi, though he seems to +think him played out as a political personage in Egypt, and this is +probably the case. + +“I have arranged with Percy Wyndham and Sir Wilfrid Lawson that they +shall bring on my case of exclusion in connection with the Vote of +Supply in the Diplomatic Estimates. Lawson was much engaged with his +procession to Hyde Park to protest against the Lords, and again asked me +to join it, but I refused. As it happened, however, I did join it +unintentionally, for I happened to be going their way, and walked with +them from Pall Mall to Hyde Park Corner. They were respectable looking +men, most of them, not roughs. The procession was orderly, not to say +dull. I had been at the Carlton, where I had found Churchill. He +promises to take up my case of exclusion when the estimates come on, and +so I have written to Buckle to explain all the circumstances, and +enclosing a letter about it for the ‘Times.’ Broadley and Marriott came +to James Street very anxious to have all the fat in the fire at once, +and the stoking to do themselves, but I don’t mean to trust my case to +them. At the corner of Hyde Park, when I arrived with the procession, I +found Passmore Edwards,[73] and we discussed the situation. He thinks +the Lords will give in at once, overwhelmed by the majesty of the +people—but I don’t believe this, and I extremely doubt whether the House +of Lords is not as popular an institution as there is in the country. It +is certainly so with the middle class in the South of England. I have +arranged with Labouchere that I should bring Abdu to see the House of +Commons to-morrow afternoon. He also will support me in the affair of my +exclusion from Egypt. + +“_22nd July._—The Arab race at Sandown. More successful than the +Newmarket one, though Halfa did not win. She ran creditably, and I am +glad to say Hadramaut (a colt of my breeding) beat Asil on the post, and +the Indian horses were all left behind. + +“With Abdu to the House of Commons. We missed Labouchere but found +George Howard, who showed us all over the place. I had made Abdu dress +in his blue jibbeh and white turban, and he created quite a sensation in +the lobby. Chesson came to us directly, and asked us to a public dinner +there was to be given to Indians and other Orientals next week, and the +photographer insisted on taking the Sheykh’s portrait.[74] He was +introduced to several M.P.s, and we listened to an Irish member, Sexton +I think, declaiming on the wrongs of Ireland. From the terrace by the +river we showed Abdu the police boat cruising around to prevent dynamite +attempts, a sight which edified him, and we pointed out to him Mr. +Bright talking on a bench to Nathaniel Rothschild. + +“Parnell was walking up and down at the far end in solitary gloom, and I +got George Howard to introduce us. He was really charming, having a +sympathetic manner, at least to us, as fellow rebels; wanted Abdu to +come and see him and give him information, and said: ‘We have one of +ourselves now in Egypt, Mr. O’Kelly. But we are afraid he may be kept +away a long time.’ I told him that it had been Abdu and Jemal-ed-Din who +had given O’Kelly the letters which had enabled him to go to the Mahdi, +and he seemed surprised at my knowing this. Parnell’s manner of gloom +and reserve seems unnatural to him, and every now and then there is a +twinkle in his eye and a smile which seemed to show the real man better. +I should say he was a good fellow, and I am sure I could get on well +with him. At parting his manner was _empressé_, and he made us a little +speech, saying that he had had much honour in making the acquaintance of +the Egyptian patriot and with emphasis much _pleasure_ in making my own. +He promised to write and propose a day for seeing the Sheykh. In +appearance Parnell is tall, good-looking, pale, and with the least +little touch of weakness about the mouth, such as one often sees in +Irishmen, enough to show that he is more Irish than English, and enough +to add a certain charm to his countenance. Altogether I was much taken +with him. + +“_23rd July._—Mirza Bakir, a Persian Sufi (living in exile in London) +came to breakfast, and went with Abdu and me after it to Sir Wilfrid +Lawson’s. The visit was not so successful as I had hoped. Lawson put his +questions to Abdu rather too abruptly, and I think a little frightened +him, at any rate he would not speak quite out, except on the point of +its being absolutely necessary the English troops should be withdrawn as +a first step towards re-establishing peace in Egypt. Much the same +conversation took place afterwards with Labouchere, to whom we next +went. Labouchere tried to convince Abdu that Mr. Gladstone wanted to get +the troops out of Egypt, and that the best way to do it was for the +Egyptians to refuse to pay any taxes as long as they remained there. But +Abdu argued with some point that Mr. Gladstone had been talking about +withdrawing for a long time, but that instead of taking troops away, he +was sending more and filling the country with English officials. He +complained that, were the taxes to be refused, it would be taken as an +excuse for annexation. It was impossible to convince him that this was +not so. Neither Lawson nor Labouchere affected Abdu with any sense of +their sincerity. This is because they do not know how to talk to +Orientals; their abruptness appears like hostility. + +“Dinner at home with Abdu and Bakir, who had a long discussion as to +whether it was permitted by the traditions (hawadith) to talk at meals, +a point which they solved _ambulando_; also as to whether the Koran was +originally a book, or only a compilation of oral sentences. Abdu holds +the latter opinion, and I am quite with him, but the old Mirza is stiff +as to its being a miraculous _book_. This is curious considering how +very latitudinarian he is on most points. + +“_24th July._—My letter about my exclusion is in the ‘Times,’ with a +splendid leading article supporting it, and demanding an inquiry. I have +arranged with Lawson that he should bring it forward—and he has put down +a notice regarding it. Percy Wyndham will say something if he finds +something to say, and Churchill will push it to an issue. We called on +Churchill and had a much more satisfactory conversation with him than +with the others yesterday. Churchill’s manner was just right, and Abdu +came away highly delighted. ‘That young man,’ he said, ‘has more sense +than the other two’—meaning Lawson and Labouchere—‘and he has a better +heart.’ As I am going to write the whole of this conversation for the +‘Pall Mall,’ I will not repeat it here. Churchill promised to speak to +Chamberlain about Abdu and try to get him an audience through him of +Gladstone. I am sure that if Abdu were to see Gladstone it would go far +towards a settlement. Went down to the House at question time and +arranged things definitely with Lawson about bringing my case forward. I +do not intend anything to be said about Eddy Hamilton or Knowles, or +Gladstone, unless my hand is forced—but if I am attacked I shall know +how to defend myself. My letter in the ‘Times’ has evidently been a +success, and I am sure the Government, when it decreed my exclusion, +thought me too friendless to be a danger; they cannot have been prepared +for the ‘Times’ taking it up. + +“_26th July._—The day of our Arab horse sale at Crabbet. There were +quite three hundred people there. + +“_27th July._—Dined at Sambourne’s, a party of jocose literary people +connected with ‘Punch’—Burnand, Du Maurier, Boughton, Black, Boehm, and +Reed. Burnand is amusing, but Du Maurier told a story three times over +during the dinner, and I cannot remember it now, although it was also +told once again on rather different lines by Boughton. During the fourth +telling I went to sleep, much to Sambourne’s distress, who is one of +those excellent hosts whose care and pride it is that their guests +should be amused, but I find it difficult now that I drink no wine to +keep my spirits up long to the level of a convivial occasion. After +dinner Cumberland, the thought reader, and others came, but I went home +to bed, drunk for the want of wine. [I had been a tea-totaller since +1883.] + +“_28th July._—Talking to Abdu, he told me the names of the three men +who, bought by Sultan Pasha, betrayed the army at Tel-el-Kebir. They +were Ali Yusuf, a Turk in command of a division, the middle division of +the three, who had retired and so let Wolseley in; secondly, Abd-el- +Rahman Hasan in command of the cavalry scouts, an Egyptian, who had +neglected to give notice of the English approach; and thirdly, Ragheb +Nashid, a Circassian Caimakam, who held the position in advance. These +were the only traitors. Nadim fled to the Soudan. Ali Fehmy was beaten +at Kassasin because Mahmud Sami failed to keep his rendezvous. In +reconstructing a Nationalist Government, he says Ali Fehmy should be +Minister of War, Yakub Sami Minister of the Interior, and Arabi +President of the Chamber, Abd-el-Aal to command the army. I have engaged +Mirza Bakir as Secretary at £1 a week. + +“Called on Churchill and found him in bed. He will take up my case with +Lawson, and I gave him a copy of my private correspondence for use if we +are pushed to it, but I explained to him my position towards Downing +Street, and that I did not wish to quarrel with Gladstone. He has +already bestirred himself about Abdu, and will take him to see +Hartington to-morrow. Robert Bourke will also take up my case. Mrs. +Howard gives me leave to quote my letters to her as written to a +political friend. + +“_29th July._—Took Abdu and Bakir to the Carlton where we met Churchill, +and I handed them over to him, and he took them to see Hartington. They +came back highly delighted. Hartington had shown them great politeness +and intelligence, and Abdu thinks he has created a good impression. + +“Spent a couple of hours at Hammersmith with Mrs. Morris and her +husband, who is a democratic socialist. We discussed the merits of his +scheme of the universe, but I cannot make it fit in with my ideas. +Still, we agree on many points. He calls Gladstone a confirmed Tory, too +old to change. The Morris’s house has a nice old-fashioned garden full +of flowers, pinks especially. I like these suburban gardens, they have +more character than others, and the space is all made use of. [This was +the first time I saw William Morris. I had made Mrs. Morris’s +acquaintance the summer before, 1883, at Naworth, for she was a friend +of Mrs. Howard’s, but, though I had been once or twice to see her at +Hammersmith, I had not before met him.] + +“_1st August._—To a party at Mrs. S.’s, where I found the ex-Khedive, +Ismaïl Pasha. She asked me whether I should like to be introduced to +him, but I would not make any advance in that direction, though I have +no special quarrel now with Ismaïl. He is a repulsive-looking man, a +worthy son of the butcher Ibrahim. Philip Currie was there, more amiable +than the last time we met, also Malkum Khan. I reminded Malkum of our +first meeting in Grosvenor Place four years ago, when he suggested to me +the ideas I have since worked out. I asked him what he thought of +Ismaïl. He said: ‘He has learned much during his exile, and might carry +out reforms now.’ I said: ‘He is without belief. He could not help us.’ +‘He is without belief,’ he said, ‘but not an unbeliever. He has not +strength of mind enough for that.’ Another old acquaintance there was +Madame de Novikof. + +“_2nd August._—Interviewed Abdu for the ‘Pall Mall Gazette.’[75] + +“_3rd August, Sunday._—Crabbet. De Winton is here, who has been in Egypt +for the last fifteen years. Among other things he told me of interest, +was that he was present when the twenty thousand pounds were paid over +by Gill to Palmer at Suez, and he says that Palmer had unlimited credit +over and above this sum. Lionel Moore came in the afternoon. He says he +always suspected the Khedive must have had something to do with the +Alexandria riots. + +“_4th August._—A ‘great day of milling.’ My case came up in the House of +Commons this afternoon. I went with Abdu, and Anne went with Lady +Wentworth. The F.O. had published a Blue Book in the morning on the +case, from which it appears that I am charged by Sherif Pasha with +various things, every one of which I am fortunately able to deny. The +Government in fact had not a word to say, and as far as the debate went, +it was altogether a victory for us, though it leaves things where they +were. The most satisfactory point is that the Government were afraid to +attack me, although Randolph blurted out the whole story of my +conversations with Knowles and Hamilton. Mr. Gladstone had gone out of +the House after Lawson had finished his opening speech, thinking no +doubt that the thing was over, but when Churchill got up they sent for +him back. I was afraid at first the attack would set his back up, but he +took the thing very good humouredly, spoke of me handsomely, and told +his little story without wincing. Knowles he said had persuaded me ‘in +the interests of his review.’ I don’t suppose he feels equivocation at +all, and he had got a paper from Eddy, which he read out, declaring our +conversation had been wholly exclusive of politics, so I hope no harm +has been done for I can’t afford to quarrel with him yet, and I have +written to Eddy to explain that I did not intend Churchill to mention +him or Knowles, _unless I was attacked_. Robert Bourke came in well at +the end on the legal aspect of the case, and Sir Henry James’s defence +of the Government was a very lame one. On the whole I think it has +strengthened my position, not only with the public, but with the +Government. The House was decidedly favourable to me in the debate. + +“_5th August._—The collapse of the Conference occupies all minds. It was +announced on Sunday in the ‘Observer,’ and of course we are delighted. +It puts everything back into its old impossible groove, and I shall +continue to hope as long as England remains solely responsible in Egypt. +Egyptian Stocks have all gone up, for they take the failure of the +Conference to mean some sort of Protectorate and guarantee by England. +Button telegraphs that Northbrook goes to Egypt. + +“_6th August._—Broadley writes proposing an accidental interview with +Ismaïl Pasha at Escott’s house, and I shall go to it, though I feel sure +I shall not like Ismaïl, but it is time I should know him, and Broadley +promises _monts et merveilles_ for the National cause if he ever gets +back to Egypt. Abdu went to see him last week, but they did not talk +politics. + +“_7th August._—A political breakfast given by Indians at the Westminster +Palace Hotel, Sir Wilfrid Lawson presiding. I had not expected to make a +speech, but made one to the satisfaction of the Indians and the wrath of +the newspapers, ‘St. James’s’ and ‘Globe.’ + +“_8th August._—The ‘Times’ correspondent at Cairo, Moberly Bell, +telegraphs that I am looked upon there as leader of a powerful party +opposed to the Khedive, etc. + +“In the afternoon by appointment to tea at Escott’s, to meet the ex- +Khedive ‘by accident’ because neither Ismaïl nor I have been willing to +make first advance towards acquaintance. He was there when I arrived, +with his secretary Lavison. The tone of our interview throughout was +polite and even friendly. Disagreeable subjects were avoided, such as +the evils of Turkish and Circassian rule, and Ismaïl’s past dealings +with the Jews. Ismaïl’s is certainly a repulsive countenance, and I fail +to find in him that charm of conversation I have always heard him +credited with. Nor did he show any special shrewdness of observation. He +uttered the usual platitudes of progress and civilization, the necessity +of considering the religious prejudices of the people, and the influence +which could be exercised by a good ruler—but in no original way. As to +practical matters, the fellahin, he said, if well governed were quite +able to pay the interest on the Egyptian debt. The Soudan was a rich +country which should be developed by extending the railway from Wady +Halfa to Khartoum. He asked about India and the peasantry there, and +seemed pleased to learn my opinion that they were worse off than in +Egypt. On my side, I explained my views of Mohammedan regeneration, and +especially that of the Arabs. I told him of my conversation with Nubar +[at Paris in 1878], and how he had tried to persuade me that the English +was the only Government which was likely to befriend them. This amused +him. We had been speaking in French, but now he talked a little Arabic +to see what I knew of the language, and he said: ‘At least you speak it +better than Nubar.’ He himself speaks Arabic with a strong Turkish +accent, and he complimented me on mine. But we soon went back to French, +where I fancy he is more at home. He threw a fly over me twice as if to +begin more special matters, saying that he intended spending next summer +also in London. I did not however respond by any hope that next summer +would see him in Egypt. We spoke a little of Mohammed Abdu, but Arabi +was not mentioned. My impression of Ismaïl decidedly is, that he is not +the saviour of our society. There is nothing different in him from the +common run of Europeanized Turks. I am glad, nevertheless, to have seen +the old despot, if only to assure myself once more that he is not our +man. + +“This has been the hottest and driest summer I ever spent at home. From +the 28th of March till now there has not been one really rainy day, +though a few attempts at such. The ground has always been like iron and +the ponds are half empty. But Sussex is at its best in such weather, and +the corn is splendid, most of it already cut. + +“_10th August._—Broadley writes that Ismaïl is enchanted with me. + +“To Scotland in the evening, and found in the same carriage our friend +Eddy, who is going to Taymouth Castle for grouse shooting. We talked +about the Debate. He said he had met Randolph Churchill the next day at +dinner and seemed quite satisfied with the turn things had taken. It is +evident we need not quarrel.” + +From the 11th to the 16th of August I stayed at Lude House near Blair +Atholl, which had been rented by my country neighbour in Sussex, Mrs. +Montefiore. On the 17th, my birthday of 44, I went on to Naworth Castle +to stay with the Howards, Frank Lascelles among others being there. I +stayed at Naworth till the 23rd, but my journal contains almost nothing +political. The only entries worth transcribing are: + +“_19th August._—A letter has come from Arabi approving the scheme of +Abbas and a protectorate. I shall send this to Gregory to show to +Gladstone, with whom he is invited to stay next week at Dalmeny. + +“_20th August._—It is announced that Sami-Ullah of Aligarh is to join +Lord Northbrook’s staff in Egypt, recommended for the post by Sir +Auckland Colvin; also that there is talk of Tewfik’s abdication in +favour of Abbas and a protectorate. + +“_21st August._—George is away at Newcastle, staying at Sir William +Armstrong’s with the Prince of Wales. The Prince, it appears, has been +frightened by the agitation against the House of Lords and thinks the +Throne, too, is in danger, and he wishes to dissociate himself from Lord +Salisbury’s tactics. For this reason he went to see the procession to +Hyde Park last month and now is paying a visit to the Radicals of +Sheffield and making himself generally agreeable. He asked to have +George Howard and his wife invited to the Festival, and Morley and Cowan +have both made speeches and joined in the loyalty. It was Lord +Shaftesbury who long ago warned the Prince never to separate himself +from the people. The Newcastle Festival has been a great success. It is +wonderful how these democrats of the north love a king. + +“_22nd August._—I have written to Gregory, who is to be at Dalmeny for +Gladstone’s campaign in Midlothian, to post him up to the latest phase +of the Egyptian situation. I have told him that Arabi will have nothing +to do with Ismaïl or Tewfik, but could return to Egypt with Abbas or any +one else. + +“_24th August, Sunday._—I spent the day at Sir Wilfrid Lawson’s at +Brayton, and on the 25th went on to Lord Stanley at Alderley. Alderley +is the sort of place I like. It reminds me somewhat of Crabbet, but is +altogether larger. The house, though comfortable, is unworthy of the +rest, having been built early in the present century, when the original +house was burnt down. The best thing is the kitchen garden, which is the +quaintest and most beautiful I ever saw, sloping down on three sides to +a large square pond or tank, on the fourth side a high wall overgrown by +a great copper beech. There is also a very fine beech wood overhanging +another pond of, I should say, sixty acres.[76] Many fine trees in the +park, but terribly undermined by rabbits. Stanley and I fished in the +wood and caught two little trout. He is a thoroughly honest good fellow, +and works all he can for the Mohammedans. + +“_27th August._—To London, where I saw Button for a few minutes and +heard from him of Wolseley’s appointment to command the troops in Egypt. +They are really going to Khartoum at last, having persuaded the Grand +Old Man that Gordon is in danger. + +“_2nd Sept._—We have settled to go to Constantinople on the 12th or +15th. Button has just got a letter from Wolseley, who says that he hopes +to get everything done at Khartoum without fighting, perhaps without an +expedition—more bloodshed would be unpopular, and so must be avoided. +Dined with Bertram Currie at Coombe. He has put up a temple in his +garden to the Grand Old Man, containing his bust, in honour of a visit +paid to him by the Prime Minister. + +“_8th Sept._—Saw Lady C. She told me about the Prince of Wales, that +although he is pretending to join the Radicals over the Franchise Bill, +he really hates Gladstone worse than poison. + +“_9th Sept._—I have engaged young Hope as my private secretary at £80 a +year. He is to do all that Button’s private secretary does for him, keep +my correspondence, newspaper cuttings, etc., etc., etc. I go to Paris on +Saturday. + +“_11th Sept._—It is announced that Lord Ripon comes home from India in +December, and is succeeded by Lord Dufferin.” + + + + + CHAPTER IX + + CONSTANTINOPLE IN 1884 + + + “_13th Sept._ 1884. + + +“LEFT London in low spirits, aggravated by the announcement of Lord +Northbrook having presented a complimentary letter from the Queen to +that miserable Tewfik. I am on my way to Constantinople to try and urge +the Sultan to take a lead in reform. He must do so now, or he will lose +his hold over Islam for ever, but I do not expect to succeed; all is too +rotten there for any solid building. + +“I arrived late at the Hotel St. Romain, and dined as in old days at +Bignon’s with Bitters.[77] Bitters is looking older, and we are all +sinking into the grave, whether we have worked or whether we have +played. Only Henri the fat waiter is unchanged, the same tremulous +mountain of flesh as of yore. + +“_14th Sept., Sunday._—After breakfasting with Bitters in the Rue +Mazarine, I went to the races of Longchamps and saw Archiduc win a race +in fine style, galloping like a machine all the way. A beautiful day, +but few people, it being September. The only soul I knew there to speak +to, the Duke of Fernan Nuñez. At the Embassy there is no one, even +Atlee[78] gone to Dieppe, Lyons in England, and Sheffield and all of +them. + +“Abdu and Sanua came to dinner—both despondent about affairs in Egypt. + +“_15th Sept._—To the Wagrams at Gros Bois. I had intended only to spend +the afternoon, but have been asked to stay on. This is a most +interesting place. Gros Bois was built and enclosed with a wall by +Francis I’s mother, but the present house, or at least the inside of it, +is of much later date. The decorations are wholly _Empire_ as befits its +owners, and it forms a fine monument of the Bonapartist episode. I was +taken over the gallery and state rooms and shown the pictures and +relics, Napoleon’s bed from St. Helena and the rest, and driven out +afterwards in the great wood which surrounds the house—a delightful day. +All is on a large scale, but nothing is kept up. The grass grows where +it wills, and there are no flowers in the vases. The servants are +ancient, almost decrepit; in the stables are no fine horses. The little +Princess would change all this if she could, but her father-in-law will +not hear of having a chair altered. He and all the rest of the family +are away, only Prince Alexander and his wife and a little son and heir a +year old; they are in mourning, as his mother died this summer. + +“_16th Sept._—The Prince is the best fellow in the world and the best +sportsman. He inherits his love of sport from his father, who, he tells +me, goes out shooting every day of the year, hunting the woods with dogs +for roe, even during the nesting season, and so doing endless damage to +game. Gros Bois is a place, however, which can stand a deal of +disturbance, and he took me out for a by-day with two old huntsman +keepers and a slow hound. It was an absolutely lovely morning and as hot +as July, and waiting in the green rides for roe to pass was delightful. +I shot two and missed a third. The second was hunted well by the dogs +and crossed a clearing twice before he came within shot, and I got him +at last with a snap shot across a ride, the dog close behind. We also +killed as many hares, a few rabbits, and a pheasant or two. There are in +the wood a number of _faisans venérés_, the sacred pheasants of China, +which have bred and multiplied since they first escaped from the +_faisanderie_, when the Prussians were here. The Prussians occupied the +Château and took a good many things, but on the whole did less damage +than might have been expected, the property being recommended to them by +the King of Bavaria, whose relative the Prince is. Altogether two most +delightful days, and it was like a douche to come back to this wretched +little Hotel St. Romain, with its drunken waiters. Dined and sat till +late at a café on the Boulevard with Abdu and Jemal-ed-Din. + +“_17th Sept._—Anne arrived from England in the early morning; she tells +me Malet has been appointed Ambassador at Berlin. Malet did all Lord +Granville’s dirty work two years ago, let them suppress his dispatches, +ate dirt for them, told stories for them; and this is his fair reward. +Though not a man to command, he is a good servant, and if they want a +docile one at the end of a telegraph wire, they could not do better than +take him. He is not likely to let his imagination run away with him, or +make any scholar’s mistakes on points of detail. Bismarck no doubt has +asked for him, as a safe man, and because he (Bismarck) was a great +friend of Malet’s parents in old days at Frankfort. The only time I ever +met Bismarck[79] was at Lady Malet’s, or rather at old Lord Brougham’s, +where she was staying, in Dover Street some twenty years ago. Edward +Malet was at Frankfort when I first went there in 1860, not actually +_attaché_, but doing his father’s work with us in the chancery, always a +good boy but a dull one. We neither liked him nor disliked him, +Schomberg Kerr and I, and I don’t remember that we ever saw much of him +except in the chancery—a mouldy place it was, smelling of apples. + +“Breakfasted with Bitters, and played tennis in the afternoon with +Leigh, winning three sets out of four. Biboche was there looking aged, +and Sérafin. + +“_18th Sept._—To the Embassy, and saw Walsham, the first secretary, now +in charge.[80] There is a telegram from Gordon at Khartoum which sounds +as if he were in great straits and very wild. He says the Government is +responsible for all that has happened, that he expects two hundred +thousand Turkish soldiers, and wants £300,000; is going to destroy +Berber and send Stewart to relieve the garrisons on the White Nile and +Dongola. He wants an expedition quick. + +“To Vienna by evening train. + +“_20th Sept._—Vienna. Called at the Embassy and on Victor Drummond,[81] +whom I had not seen since we were at Athens together. With him I found +Hadji Petros, King George’s _aide-de-camp_, son of the original of +About’s ‘Hadji Stavros’ in the ‘Roi des Montagnes.’ How things have +marched since then, and they say people cannot govern themselves. + +“Dined at the Embassy. Sir Augustus Paget very amiable. We talked about +Egypt. He remembers Nubar when Nubar was Abbas Pasha’s Dragoman, etc. +(as already given in my ‘Secret History’). Lady Paget talked about Mrs. +Howard and the Stanley family, especially about Lady Amberley and her +son.” This was the present Lord Russell, whom I had known from a child, +and had met a little while before at Naworth and liked. He had had a +strange bringing up of an almost Spartan kind. I remember finding him +once lying in the fender when I came to call upon his mother, his head +almost under the grate. I asked whether she did not think it dangerous; +she answered: ‘It will be useful to him. If a coal falls out it will +teach him not to lie there again.’ On the other side of me was the +Comtesse De la Torre, an old friend of Gobineau’s, of whom we talked +much.” + +I had known Count Gobineau well, having made his acquaintance in 1870 +through Lytton. It was during the Prussian war, and Gobineau was in +extremities for money, the Prussians being in occupation of his country +house. He had written to Lytton about some Oriental manuscripts he was +desirous of selling, and Lytton, who was at Vienna, had written to me +asking me to help him. I had done what I could for him, and had earned +much gratitude. After the war I went to stay with him at Trye and we +became close friends. I have some thirty or forty of his letters, +chiefly on literary subjects, and his own private copy of his celebrated +book “Sur l’inégalité des Races Humaines.” This book was, I think, the +first to protest against the old doctrine of the essential brotherhood +of man, and, as the author of it, Gobineau gained a great posthumous +renown in Germany, and became the founder of a school of thought there +called _Das Gobinismus_. He was a very agreeable man with much +imagination, a bit of a poet and a bit of an artist, besides being an +excellent talker on all subjects. He had been French Minister in Persia, +and in 1870 was Minister in Brazil, and an intimate friend of the +Brazilian Emperor. + +“Dufferin was here only yesterday, and we have therefore just missed +him, which is most provoking. + +“_21st Sept._—By night train to Lançut, Count Alfred Potocki’s country +place beyond Crakow, arriving on the 22nd. The Château is only a couple +of miles from the station, a very handsome building, partly of the last +century, partly older. It is very large, with one of the handsomest +suites of rooms I ever saw, the furniture having been brought from +Paris, at the time of the great Revolution, by the wife of the Potocki +of the day. Lançut was inherited from a Princess Lubomirska, who in turn +inherited it from an ancestor of the fourteenth century. These Potockis +are allied to, but of a different branch from, the Potocki who with +Branicki betrayed Poland to Catherine of Russia. They are very +patriotic. Their family has been distinguished in Poland for many +centuries, and in the long gallery there are portraits, most of them +badly restored, of some dozen of them. Four were Generalissimos or +Hetmans of the Polish army, and one, Stanislas, was killed before Vienna +in the last siege by the Turks, 1683. The present Count is about sixty, +a most distinguished man. Forty years ago he was _attaché_ in London, +and has since been Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior at +Vienna, and for eight years Governor of Gallicia. The Countess was a +Princess Sanguscko from Russian Poland, where she has large estates. +There are two sons, Roman, whom we met in Egypt three years ago, and +Joseph, who bought our horse Pharaoh, and two daughters; one of them is +here, Madame Tyschkiewicz, a charming person, as they all are. + +“_23rd Sept._—This is an old-fashioned place. The Countess has two +dwarfs, who follow her about wherever she goes, of the size of children +of six or seven years old, but really of twenty-two and twenty-five, not +misshapen or ugly, children of a Polish peasant on the estate, the +father not being particularly small; the dwarfs’ two brothers are tall +enough to be in the army. It is the fashion with the nobility to keep +these little people; they get three florins a month, everything found, +and presents. + +“Drove in the afternoon to a horse fair, I with Count Roman in a little +carriage with four ponies—three white and a spotted one. It used to be +the Polish fashion to have all spotted horses. From the high plain one +can see the Russian frontier to the north ten miles away, and to the +south the last ripple of the Carpathian Hills. This is a great country +for Jews, Gallicia containing nearly eight hundred thousand of them. +They wear long gowns, with felt hats and long curls. They are disliked +as moneylenders, but have not been persecuted here as they are in +Russia. The rest of the population is half Polish, half Ruthenian, three +millions of each. The Ruthenians are Slavs; they are Catholic, but use +the Greek Ritual and have married priests. In Russian Poland the +Ruthenians have been compelled to join the Orthodox Church. The Poles +are all Catholic. Roman tells me the estate here is about twenty +thousand hectares—forty thousand acres—none of it let, but cultivated +under intendants. They are suffering from the same thing here as +elsewhere, the low price of wheat. We met and overtook a number of Jews +upon the road, nine and ten in a cart. It is a joke here to laugh at the +Jews for going about so many together, and to count them with the +fingers. This makes them angry, as they think the last one counted will +die. At the fair the horses, for common horses, seemed pretty good, +better than you would see anywhere else out of England. The ponies of +the country are like the Asiatic ponies, and were brought here they say +by the Tartars. After this we drove in the forest, a great fir wood, and +got home in the dark. + +“The young men, Tyschkiewicz and Roman, have been talking about the +meeting of the three Emperors; they declare it to have been directed +entirely against the anarchists, and to have no relation either to Egypt +or to England. When the Russian Emperor came through Warsaw, he received +a letter from the Nihilists telling him he had nothing to fear while in +Poland, as Poland had suffered too much already, and they would not +bring more trouble on its people. Half the Poles in Warsaw were +nevertheless arrested as a precaution. The Empress would not leave the +Emperor, but followed wherever he went. The Emperor had tried to speak +Polish, which is a finable offence at Warsaw. + +“_24th Sept._—We went out, Roman and I, to the forest to try and get a +roebuck, but saw none but does. There was a part fenced off in which are +red and fallow deer, all too tame. A stag followed us about, butting at +the carriage. I was asked to shoot two young fallow deer, but missed +them, and not sorry. The forest is a great fir wood, with a sprinkling +of oak and birch on a sandy soil. We drove the four ponies again in a +little carriage like a sledge of the date of Napoleon the First. Joseph +has gone away to Antonin, their place in Russian Poland, where we are to +follow him to-morrow. + +“_25th Sept._—Before going away, went over the house again. It is really +magnificent, with splendid Louis-Seize furniture, china, and bronzes. A +grand vase with brass mounts by Goutière, a whole service of Oriental +china on a large scale, a Sèvres stand valued at a hundred thousand +francs, and much else, a dozen rooms _en suite_, a theatre, a chapel and +a ball-room, all splendidly furnished. Of pictures some excellent +Bouchers, Dutch pieces in Snyders’ style, and a quantity more,—almost +all good. I liked especially a woman by Vincent, a small picture, but +first rate. The family lives in a corner of the house. + +“To Lemberg with Countess Potocka, four hours by train, a handsome +country town of four thousand inhabitants. The Diet is sitting, and +Roman and his father are members. They have a house here at which we +dined, and went afterwards to the Governor Zalewski’s reception. + +“_26th Sept._—Father Lubienski called, and told me much about politics. +He looks upon the Polish case as hopeless in Russia till there is a war, +but it is probable there may be some slight change for the better in +consequence of the meeting of the Emperors. The Austrian Government +succeeded in conciliating the Poles, so why not the Russian? Only the +Russians are altogether inferior intellectually and morally to the +Poles. + +“Went to see the Museum of Natural History, which is the best of the +sort I ever saw. There are no fewer than twenty eagles, and every kind +of bird natural to Galicia is represented with nest and young, all well +stuffed. The beasts less well, but interesting. The elk is still found +in some of the forests, and the aurochs, or bison, just beyond the +frontier—but the last is almost extinct. There was a white roe in the +collection, shot last year by Count Arthur Potocki. This young man was +at dinner last night. He told me about the roe, and about the Branicki +stud—which he helps its owner to manage—also of some wonderful trout +fishing he had had, twelve hundred killed with the fly in a week, and +weighing four hundred pounds. Afterwards we were driven to the top of a +hill where there are public gardens with a fine view in the direction of +Russia. + +“_27th Sept._—Started for Antonine, Father Lubienski seeing us to the +station. The fine weather is gone, and we had a disagreeable journey, +first by rail crossing the Russian frontier to Czerny Ostrov, a small +station in Volhynia, an eight hours’ journey, then by road. We were met +by two carriages and four, and drove fifty versts over fearfully muddy +roads to Antonine. The country here is like Salisbury Plain or the +Pampas, great rolling downs of black earth without a stone or pebble for +hundreds of miles, all under plough, no fences, no trees, except where +there are plantations of oak or birch. These are rare, but Antonine +itself is nearly surrounded by a very handsome oak wood of about eighty +years’ growth—fortunately no firs. The house is not a very large one and +without pretence, a good squire’s residence with pleasure grounds and +gardens of about forty acres. There is a large pond let to Jews at £200 +a year for pike. Round this the village stands, and there are a dozen +respectable houses like bungalows occupied by the administrators of the +estate. This used to be a principality, and is still of thirty-five +thousand acres of land in hand, but the greater part now belongs to the +peasantry, who, thanks to their enfranchisement by Alexander II, are +well off. All the land they cultivated was by that act given them, the +Government paying the Lord of the Manor a small price for it. Their land +taxes are very low, not more than a tenth of what it is in Galicia. The +peasants are Ruthenians by race, but were forcibly converted a hundred +years ago to the Greek church, and are now to all intents and purposes +Russian. Industry thrives under protection, and the estate sugar mill +pays well. + +“_28th Sept._—As far as I can make out, all is very well managed in this +part of Russia to the advantage of the Russian peasants, but the Polish +landlords are vexatiously treated. Poles in Russia are not allowed to +buy land, or to make wills, and are liable to confiscation at the +pleasure of the Emperor. They are, in fact, outlaws, and it is the +avowed policy to get rid of them. For this reason they stick closer to +the lands they have, and some of them are still very rich—the richest +being the Branickis, and next to them the Sangusckos. The Polish nobles +were originally granted their lands when these were uninhabited steppes +on the frontier liable to incursions from the Tartars, and the peasantry +were their feudal retainers, but of a different race, Ruthenian, living +under shelter of their castles. There are still some Catholic villagers, +but these are not Ruthenians; they are the descendants of impoverished +Polish nobles, and are still proud of their rank. The late Prince +Sanguscko, the owner of Antonine, took part in the Polish rising of +1830, and was exiled for ten years to Siberia and to serve as a common +soldier against the Circassians. He distinguished himself in the war, +and so was restored to his country. Afterwards he made several journeys +in the East, and brought back horses and mares from Aleppo, Damascus, +and Egypt, to add to his Arab stud already existing at Slavuta since +1803. He died three years ago, leaving half his lands to his daughter, +Countess Alfred Potocka, and half his stud to her son Joseph, now our +host. The half of the stud was then removed here, and there are now +forty-two brood mares. + +“We went over the stud to-day. First, the stallions, of which Palatine +is about the handsomest horse imaginable. His fault is that he is rather +shallow in girth, but his head, neck, and carriage are superb, and he +has fine action, a gray with dark mane and tail. Artiste, a bay, fifteen +hands two, with beautiful action and carriage and a fine head, came +next. And after him Cyprian, a chestnut, of far more substance that +either of the other two. They like him, however, here the best and are +very likely right. Lastly, there was Pharaoh, looking more beautiful +than ever, and he gave me a pang of regret. He is fully appreciated +here, and has got some good colts this year of his own gorgeous dark bay +colour. Colour, it appears, is a very important point here at the sales, +gray being at a discount, and chestnut the favourite. The sales take +place in May, but the prices are small. A lovely team of four gray +stallions, fifteen hands, is now for sale at two hundred pounds, and a +team of gray mares, fourteen two, for a hundred and forty; all young +animals and perfectly broken. Twenty years ago Arabs were much more the +fashion, but now young Austria goes in for English blood. + +“The brood mares are splendid, hardly a bad one among them, and a dozen +of the best are absolutely perfect. You could not find such a dozen +mares together anywhere in Arabia. + +“_29th Sept._—There was Mass this morning in a funny little chapel in +the garden. Afterwards we went hunting with slow hounds and greyhounds, +and found two foxes in a marsh, which was drawn by black and tan hounds +of the dachshund sort, but bigger. Got the old one away, a fine old gray +fox, but the greyhounds were on the wrong side, and we had no run. Then +we coursed three hares, a greyhound I gave Joseph Potocki running well, +but the fastest was a brindled Circassian dog. The hares had no chance. +The country is a great open plain, but enclosed here and there with +banks and ditches. + +“_30th Sept._—Another day among the horses and the brood mares at +pasture beside an oak wood, a very beautiful sight. Then to the sugar +mill, which brings in a profit of £250 a day for nearly three months +every year; that is £20,000, consuming 1,400 acres of beetroot, each +acre thus giving about £15, but the land can only grow it once in seven +years; still the profit is enormous, and they have other mills +elsewhere. The director of the stud, and the late Prince’s secretary, +worthy men, dine with us every evening, observing, however, much +etiquette with Count Joseph, after the manner of courts. + +“_1st Oct._—Again out coursing, and drew a cover for a fox blank, and +then had some good runs after hares, getting four. I had a fall at one +of the banks. They are dangerous fences to ride fast at as the ditches +are ten feet wide. + +“_2nd Oct._—We went to-day to see the cellars. There is one bottle of +Hungarian wine labelled 1683, and perhaps a thousand bottles of the last +century, as well as mead of the same date, which the Poles used to get +drunk on. To become intoxicating the honey must have been kept for +twenty-five years. There are also many dozens of brandy a hundred years +old or more, and all sorts of curious liquors and burgundies, and +ancient Spanish wines. The 1683 bottle was reserved to be drunk by the +King of Poland. + +“Among the letters which came yesterday was one from Primrose; it +contained a copy of an apology written by Dr. Kerr to Villayet Ali (the +Patna case), a rather lame one. But as Primrose says, ‘it is a very +unusual thing to get an apology at all from an Englishman to any +native,’ so I suppose we must be content.[82] + +“_3rd Oct._—We were to have gone to-day to the Branickis, but a telegram +came in the night altering our plan. This sends us straight to Odessa. +We started from Szepetovka station, thirty-two miles off, which we did +in four hours twenty minutes; this country has fine woods of oak and +birch, infested with swine, as in ancient Europe. These are spotted, as +are sometimes the cows and as were the mediaeval horses of Poland. At +Szepetovka we found that the Odessa express went in the morning, so we +stayed the night at the Potocki factory. + +“_4th Oct._—To-day we have been travelling by train across ‘the unwise, +unjust, unmerciful Ukraine’ as far as Kasjatin. Our way lay through fine +forests, for the forest country begins here, and we are close to the +great bog of the Dnieper, a marsh as large as Ireland, and one of the +largest in the world. + +“Further on, the country is open, and closely resembles the ‘campo’ of +Buenos Ayres. + +“_5th Oct._—All night in the train, very dirty and stuffy. Russian +generals with spurs on. Fat women, half undressed, eating apples. +Windows nailed up for the winter. + +“Found letters at Odessa, one from Rajah Emir Hassan which talks of a +Madrasa being opened on my plan at Lucknow. This looks as if the scheme +of a general university had been abandoned. Called on Consul-General +Perry, who hates Russia and Odessa, and every country but Spain. + +“_6th Oct._—To the Odessa Exhibition, and saw the out of doors fair. +Here horses were exhibited, Russian trotters—a poor lot, and _soidisant_ +Arabs, a poorer. The best horse was a large Russian dray stallion—white, +short legged, very strong, and with extraordinary good short limbs. + +“_9th Oct._—After a disagreeable passage arrived in the Bosphorus and +anchored off the Asiatic shore in quarantine, near a pretty village with +two mosques, near enough to see the Mueddin in his tower, and the women +who come out in the evening to sit on the beach. The weather is heavenly +and consoles us for much. The quarantine is an act of reprisal by the +Ottoman Government against Europe. They have been pestered with advice +and remonstrance for the last hundred years about sanitary arrangements, +and now they are turning the tables. This has its excuse. I remember the +fiendlike action of the European Sanitary Board at Alexandria towards +the unfortunate Mecca pilgrims at Wej, and how the fat Greek Sinadino +boasted that they had been kept for I don’t know how many days without +water. Numbers died there, and it was one of the causes of the +revolution of 1882. + +“_10th Oct._—I have been reading Madame de Crequy’s memoirs, a +delightful volume, lent me by Madame Coumarof, wife of a Russian +Secretary of Embassy, on her way to her husband’s post, a clever and +well informed woman. She believes in dreams and that she will be +crucified some day at Kief. She has told me a good bit about the Russian +peasantry, which is much what I found in Volhynia; they are well off, +eat meat daily, have good houses, and are able to live on their own +land. It is difficult to get labour for wages, hence land is cheap, this +in great Russia on the Volga. + +“Hugh Wyndham came off to within speaking distance of our ship. He +brought the news that one of Gordon’s two steamers had gone ashore +somewhere near Berber, and the crew with Stewart had been killed by the +Arabs. I made Stewart’s acquaintance at Aleppo in 1881. He was a good +straightforward man, very enthusiastic about his work, but strangely +unsympathetic with the Eastern people he worked amongst. I gave him +letters of introduction to some of our desert friends near the +Euphrates, and he made a flying journey through the Sebaa and Shammar +tribes on a camel, but he distrusted the Bedouins and disliked them. I +put the violent line Gordon has taken against them down to his account. +I expect Gordon will be killed next—I wish it could be Wolseley or +Northbrook; it would disgust people with their unjust wars. + +“_12th Oct._—Among our fellow passengers is an American named Howe, of +the romantic globe trotting sort, who is in ecstasies at all things, and +his fellow traveller, a Swede, Mr. Claes Lagergren, Chamberlain to the +Pope. The latter is the more interesting, as with a _doucereux_ +ecclesiastical manner he is really well informed and sympathizes with +those things in the world which are right. These two have been +travelling together through Algeria, Spain, Sweden, and Russia, an oddly +assorted pair. Lagergren has been at Damascus and in Egypt. There was +also a Mohammedan on board from Kazan, who comes yearly to +Constantinople to trade. In the third class are some thirty Jew pilgrims +going to Jerusalem, very interesting people, very dirty, very devout. +They read their Bibles all day long, and say their prayers turning to +the east, and clothed in striped chasubles. + +“_14th Oct._—Our five days’ quarantine over, we were landed in the +Embassy launch at Therapia, and went to see Hugh, and dined with him at +the Embassy. Count Corti was there, an ugly little man but sensible and +clever. Anne has had a good deal of conversation with him. I am more +than ever sorry to have missed Dufferin, who has left the best +reputation behind him in the Embassy, and would probably have been glad +to see us. We intend to stay a few days here at Therapia to make +acquaintance with the Ambassadors, especially Nélidof, whom I knew so +well at Athens. + +“_15th Oct._—At Madame Petala’s Hotel, where I was in 1860; spent the +morning writing, and then by steamer to Buyukdereh to call on Madame +Coumarof, and also on the Russian Ambassador. Nélidof received me very +cordially, reminding me of many instances of our old life at Athens, +which I had forgotten, jokes I had made, the name of my dog, the paper +chases in the olive woods, Lady Dufferin’s visit, and twenty other +things which it gave me a pang to remember. He told me that Madame +Ozerof had died some years ago at Athens and Ozerof, his former chief, +had a post now of Grand Chamberlain at St. Petersburg, but was old and +lived with his married daughter in the Crimea, and that he had kept up +his intimacy with Haymerlé till the day of his death. Of Haymerlé he +said that his end was caused to a certain extent by chagrin. He was a +great worker and master of detail, and had made himself so necessary to +everybody that at last he had become Prime Minister of Austria. But, +once in power, he was unable to cope with the situation. He had married +a little _bourgeoise_ of Frankfort, and this had emphasized his own want +of birth; and Viennese society had given him the cold shoulder. He was +worried into his grave. We talked a little about politics, about the +possibility of reforming Mohammedan society, which he naturally does not +believe in. He said: ‘What will always prevent any reform is the +Caliphate.’ He then talked of a movement there had been in favour of the +Konieh branch of the Sultan’s family, being under the impression that +these were descended from the Koreysh; but I explained to him that this +was a mistake, and that the Konieh people represented only an elder +phase of the Turkish Sultanate, the Seljukian, not at all the Caliphate. +His ideas, like those of nearly every one, are quite vague on this +point. I was very much pleased with my visit. + +“Later I met another old friend, Madame de Radowitz, the Prussian +Ambassadress, whom I had known at Berne in 1867. She, too, reminded me +of things which gave me a pang. The third old acquaintance was Mrs. +Goschen. Called with Hugh on Count Corti, who is most agreeable. He +remembers Constantinople in Bulwer’s time, and how his Excellency got +his island from the Sultan, and sold it afterwards for £20,000 to Ismaïl +Pasha. This little transaction was the ruin of Bulwer’s career. There is +an _entente cordiale_ between Corti and the English Embassy. We are to +lunch with him on Sunday. + +“Later to the French Embassy. Monsieur de Noailles is not unlike Lord +Salisbury on a small scale. His wife is a Pole by birth, and acquainted +with all our Polish friends, has been a beauty, and is still a _femme +d’esprit_; has a salon; we found her agreeable and the house agreeable. +It is an old Turkish country house, with a single fine room, comfortable +and dignified—a great contrast to our own Therapia Embassy, which was +built by Sir Henry Elliot, in the Swiss Gothic style one sees at Bombay, +an eye-sore to the Bosphorus. + +“_17th Oct._—With the Wyndham children to see the Palace of Belabeg on +the Asiatic shore; a modern building in very moderate taste, with a vast +deal of paint and gilding and marqueterie work and sham marble. It makes +one ill to think of the millions it must have cost, and the meanness of +the result. The views, however, from the windows are splendid, and in +the garden there are two fine tigers and some healthy looking ostriches. +We then steamed down the Bosphorus. Nothing in Stamboul is changed, +except that a railway has been run through the Seraglio gardens, and the +bridge of boats has become an iron one. But at Pera and Galata there are +marks of time, gaps where wooden houses have been burned, and a +multiplicity of tall new stucco houses. + +“At Pera we are at the Hotel Royal. My first care has been to send +Stanley’s two letters of introduction to Achmet Vefyk and Khair-ed-Din +Pashas. They are away in their villas. Next I called on Hobart +Pasha;[83] he told us a great deal about the Sultan, who never goes out +now from Yildiz Kiosk, a small palace between Pera and Hissar, and has +not been in Stamboul for years. He says he likes him, that he is very +intelligent and well intentioned, but the Government is as bad as ever. + +“The Sultan won’t hear of anything like independent administration in +the Provinces, which Hobart thinks with me would be the best cure for +the Empire. He talked a great deal about Halim Pasha, whose cause in +Egypt he has been pleading with Gladstone. Halim is supported strongly +by the Sultan. The Sultan told Hobart only the other day that if he +could do anything towards getting Halim back to Egypt, he would be +rendering him a great service. He urges me to see him and has promised +to let Halim know I am here. Dufferin, he says, has entirely destroyed +English influence by the violent line he has taken against the Sultan, +and the strong language he used about him. He had ended by ceasing to +have any communication at all with the palace, and had not seen the +Sultan for seven months when he was recalled. He escaped from all +business: whenever a message came on any matter he used to slip off in +his yacht and pretend he was too short-sighted to see the boats they +sent out after him. He had a yacht called the ‘Hermione,’ ingeniously +arranged so that he could be quite alone in her, managing the sails +himself by a system of ropes and pulleys, his own invention. Thus he put +off troublesome affairs. + +“Henderson, the Consul at Aleppo, who is here, tells us the state of the +Provinces is much as it always was, or worse, the Pashas eating up the +people. Jamil Pasha at Aleppo has made £300,000 in the four years he has +been there. He is a great favourite with the Sultan, sending him horses +constantly. + +“Just before sunset we rode out on hired ponies to the Okmaidan and saw +the Golden Horn in its glory. There is nothing like it, or near to it, +in the world. + +“_18th Oct._—Whittaker, the Editor of the ‘Levant Herald,’ called. He +gave me much the same account of what is going on here. The Sultan is +played upon by the palace intriguers, who frighten him with stories of +plots. He is a timid man. The other day his horse reared with him in the +street, and he will not ride an Arab horse again. He rides, however, +‘pretty well for a Sultan,’ on trained horses, and shoots at a mark in +the old Turkish fashion. Khair-ed-Din he calls a wind-bag, and Vefyk a +man of crotchets. Of Saïd Pasha, the Vizier, he said: ‘He is an honest +man but quite ignorant of European affairs; knowing that he is ignorant +he tries to make up by reading, and he is now in a complete muddle. He +belongs to the old Turkish school, blindly hating all that is foreign; +he is personally honest, but has no power, for the Sultan always +interferes.’ + +“In the afternoon we rode round Stamboul: it is wonderfully shrunk and +depopulated since I first remember it, many houses abandoned and the +streets empty. The Seraglio point has been turned into a new semi- +European quarter of the most wretched kind, with roads and tramways and +stucco houses everywhere. The Mohammedan population seems scarcer, +turbans have almost disappeared, and it is difficult to distinguish +between Nazarene and Moslem. An interesting ride, but sad. Hobart called +again in the evening, keen that I should see Halim without delay. Khair- +ed-Din’s secretary has also called, fixing my visit to that Highness for +Monday morning. + +“_19th Oct._—By the half-past nine boat to Therapia. Selim Faris joined +us as agreed at Ortakeui (he was afraid of being seen with me), and we +travelled on with him. His information was interesting. Of the Sultan he +gives much the same account as the rest, that is to say he speaks of him +as a good man, sincerely anxious to further the prosperity of Islam, and +immensely jealous of his position as Emir el Mumenin and Khalifa, but +quite ignorant of the means through which to act, a prey to charlatans +and intriguers of every kind, except the European kind. Faris has +friends at the palace, and declares that the Sultan shall see me, +although he tells me my name is in bad odour there. The Sultan was at +one time much pleased at my letters in the ‘Times,’ when I defended the +Egyptians before the war, but he was angry at my sticking to Arabi after +he himself had abandoned him; and Tewfik’s envoy, Sabit Pasha, is +constantly telling him that I am head of a party in England bent on +restoring the Arabian Caliphate. The Sultan, he assured me, supported +Halim, but there would be danger in making Halim an English candidate. +Arabi is quite out of favour. Faris’s paper, the ‘Jowaib,’ was stopped +last year because he had been to see Lord Granville in London, but he is +forgiven now. He thought the Sultan would take an interest in Indian +education, but the whole Turkish State was dying. The Caliphate would +some day return to Arabia. The Sultan knew it and was doing all in his +power to prevent it, but it must come. He charged me to keep this +conversation secret. Lunched with Count Corti, the Italian Ambassador, +agreeable but ugly, with the ugliness of Socrates, a great Anglomane and +friend of Dufferin’s. He told me he had been at one time favourite +Ambassador with the Sultan, who had given him beautiful horses, but he +once said something favourable about Dufferin in conversation, and from +that time the Sultan would have nothing more to do with him. Dufferin +was not generally liked here, Hugh tells me, and seems to have been a +fiasco politically. On to the French Embassy in Corti’s steam launch. +Everybody here is most amiable to us, I suppose because strangers are +rare. + +“_20th Oct._—To call on Khair-ed-Din Pasha at Kurujesme. He has a +handsome house there, being very rich, a man of about fifty-five, tall, +not very agreeable in countenance, and with dyed hair. He received me +well, talked sensibly, explaining his ideas with considerable clearness, +and has the manner of a man used to State affairs. He had retired, he +told me, from these, but the Party he had represented was for progress +on Eastern lines, not in imitation of Europe. He asked me to explain to +him the British policy in Egypt, which I did, and I asked him in turn to +explain to me how it was that with a Sultan, who was admittedly a good +man and well meaning, things only got worse in the Empire. At this he +laughed, and excused himself from answering, he being he said a Tunisian +born, and a stranger. ‘But go to Vefyk Pasha,’ he said. ‘He knows +everything, and will tell you.’ He then gave me two volumes of +‘Controversial Theology,’ which he had had translated into French, and +one for Stanley. And we talked about India, and the danger there was for +the English of a quarrel with Islam. ‘But they don’t mind,’ he said. +‘They say the Mohammedans in India are so happy and so fond of them +there is no fear.’ We parted the best of friends. + +“Then on to Achmet Vefyk’s. This is the most remarkable Turk I have ever +met, and one of the most remarkable men. He reminds me a little of old +Ragunath Rao,[84] having the same keen intelligence, power of vivid +expression, and bursts of wit. He is equally outspoken. Like the old +Rajah, he is a man of the past age. He lives in a little wooden cottage, +a kind of hermitage on the hill, to get to which you have to climb an +almost impossible path, and he affects an extreme simplicity of life. He +was out in his garden when I arrived, and I was shown upstairs to a +meanly furnished ante-room, but sunny and cheerful, where I sat on the +divan till he came in. He came upstairs slowly, like a man bent with +rheumatism, an old man in an old-fashioned dress, a gown and slippers, +with a large square fez of the time of Sultan Mahmoud. He took me into +an inner room a little better furnished, with some old-fashioned painted +chairs, covered with Broussa velvet. He talked about the decay of +Turkey. ‘The beginning of our ruin,’ he said, ‘was the Commercial Treaty +of 1832. Before that, our people had trades and industries. Now there +are one hundred and fifty thousand beggars in Stamboul alone. Look at +these chairs, the velvet on them is from a manufactory that supplied all +Europe. Now we buy our velvets, when we can afford to buy them, from +Lyons. They forced tariffs on us, which gave all the advantage to the +foreigner and broke up our trade corporations, which were the life of +the people. This is what has principally ruined us. Then we have had bad +luck. Our Sultans have been worthless. Formerly we should have deposed +them all, till we got a good one—but Europe interferes with our rights +now. You must not suppose that the deposition of a Sultan is a lawless +act. It is our right. The Sultan Khalifa Emir el Mumenin is not a +religious teacher, he is only the chief of the Moslems, and each of us +is as good as he, and better if he observes the law better. It is for us +to tell the Sultan what he is to do and not to do; and when I was young +there were ten thousand men ready to tell him this. Now there are only +myself and four or five others—old men; the rest have no courage except +to ask for money. You have just been to Khair-ed-Din. He came here as +leader of a party of reform—he has made himself rich, and he stops here +to get a place or a pension. He will do any dirty work the Sultan may +bid him do. I had refused to do that, and I live in this old tumble-down +house. The Sultan sends for me every now and then to beg me to be his +minister, but I will not be minister unless I have power. When the +Russians were at the gates of Constantinople I was made Vizier, and sent +to treat with them. The Grand Duke Nicholas wanted the Sultan to come +out and pay him a visit, that he might see how large his army was. But +the Sultan shut himself up, declaring that they wanted to make him +prisoner, and carry him away to Russia. I refused Nicholas point blank, +and said he must come first to the Sultan, and I succeeded. The Sultan +refused for twenty days, and for twenty days I put the Grand Duke off, +on one pretext or another, and in the end I got the Sultan to receive +him, and to pay him the return visit. The Grand Duke Nicholas was a man +altogether brutal and corrupt.’ + +“He then talked about India. ‘The English,’ he said, ‘have lost their +political senses. Formerly I remember many men who had correct ideas +about the East, and he named several, Alison and Lord Napier. Now they +seem deprived of reason. What did they mean by sending that young man +Bulwer to be Viceroy of India? I remember him here very many years ago, +a pretty little young man he was, fond of saying pretty things to the +ladies. A man with such a talent for writing poetry, how could he make a +Viceroy to sit on the throne of Sultan Akbar?’ I told him about the +misfortunes of the Indian Mohammedans, and how they had charged me to +speak to the Sultan if possible and enlist his sympathy. But he said: ‘I +advise you to be very cautious about this. If the Sultan was a man +worthy of his position, it would be well—but in confidence I tell you, +and do not repeat this even to Lord Stanley—he is mad. His is a peculiar +madness. He is clever and agreeable, and all who see him go away +convinced that he agrees with them, and so he does. For three days he +pays attention to what he has been told. Then he begins to suspect, and +then he sees a new person who tells him the other thing, and all his +ideas are changed. He is a man of fixed and violent ideas, which he +changes every week.’ ‘He is not then,’ I asked, ‘the good man people say +he is?’ ‘Do not believe it. The Sultan is _un misérable et un fou_. He +is out of his mind with fear and jealousy. Sometimes, when the fit is on +him, he will walk round and round in his palace for four days and +nights, never sleeping, hardly sitting down, hardly eating, and all for +fear of assassination. If you came to him to tell him such a thing as +you propose, he would listen to you and be delighted, then he would +suspect a plot, and be in a fever till you had left Stamboul. Already he +is probably asking himself why you have come, and when you mean to go. I +advise you to be very cautious. People will come to you from him telling +you this and that. He has an army of 4,000 spies, and you must not stay +long in Constantinople. Besides, if you gave him any such message from +India, it is possible he might take it up and make an intrigue of it, +and spoil it as he spoiled the movement in Egypt. He cares only for +intrigue and for being cleverer than all those he meets, and for +outwitting them—intrigue, and saving money, and fear of what is coming. +You had better wait. It will come in five or six months. The movement in +Bulgaria and East Roumelia will bring on the crisis, and he will be +deposed. Then with the new Sultan something might be done, but with this +one never. Do not forget that he is a madman and do not trust him.’ I +asked him what prince there was who could succeed him. ‘The prince next +in succession,’ he said, ‘is calm and reasonable. It is possible we may +have better luck with him—but our State is ruined through the men of the +present day, who are all corrupt. Look at the young Turkey Party, what +fools they are! Which of them cares for anything but folly, pleasure, +and money?—and we are all becoming paupers.’ + +“We talked about Egypt. Vefyk has an old grudge against the Turks of +Mehemet Ali, ‘who were every one of them worthless.’ The Egyptians he +despises; ‘Arabi may have been an honest man, but he was an ignorant one +who did not know what Europe’s power was. A couple of Turkish regiments +would have settled the matter at any moment. Arabi thought that he could +stand alone, without the support of the Sultan. He was a fool.’ I asked +him about Halim. ‘Halim,’ he said, ‘is like them all. He is an +intriguer, a man of no sense.’ Then we went on to talk about Stanley, +and it was agreed that I should come back with Anne and breakfast with +him on Wednesday. In going out he stopped me and said in a mysterious +way: ‘I must tell you something which I beg you will not forget. You are +going to see Halim Pasha. He is the best sportsman we have in +Constantinople, he has killed more bears and more wolves than any other. +Remember this, and when he asks you what I said of him, you will be able +to answer with a clear conscience that I told you something to his +credit.’ And the old man burst into a roar of laughter at his conceit, +and so I went away. + +“I met Anne outside, who had come by the steamer, and we went on to +Prince Halim’s, which is close by—a fine house by the water side. We +were received at the door by a man whom I did not recognize, but who +turned out to be Ismaïl Jowdat, who had been Prefect of Police for the +foreigners at Cairo during the war, and who, having kept order and saved +much European life there, was exiled by Malet after Tel-el-Kebir. At the +top of the stairs we were met by Halim, who in looks is not remarkable, +and who, if he had not said ‘_c’est moi_,’ I should have taken for a +servant. He is short and fat, but is younger looking and less obese than +Ismaïl, and is more active and alert. His features are rough and without +defined expression, his eyes small and restless, and his manner, though +far from bad, is without grace or special charm. He is in fact a very +plain man, made plainer by his beard being dyed. There is something +frank, however, in his way of talking, and it is difficult not to see +that he is far more respectable than any of his cousins. He did not ask +me about Vefyk, so I was not obliged to make use of Vefyk’s little +stratagem, and we talked at once about Egypt. + +“‘There is no solution,’ he said, ‘of the Egyptian question except +through the Sultan. Egypt at the present moment is on strike, and so +will remain as long as the Sultan is not invited to establish a new +order of things. If England were to annex the country outright, she +might perhaps manage it, but short of annexation she cannot get on +without help—help from Europe, and help from Constantinople. The Sultan +is the true solver of the riddle now, as he was in 1878, and whoever +undertakes to manage Egypt must reckon with him. The simplest solution +would be for the European Powers to beg the Sultan to name a new +Khedive. Anyone whom the Sultan named would meet with a good reception. +If the Sultan were to name Ismaïl once more I should bow to his +decision, although I should consider it a great misfortune for Egypt. +Ismaïl’s partisans are the capitalists and speculators of Europe; all +those who want the reign of pillage to begin again. The people do not +wish for them, and would not long endure him. But they would accept him +from the Sultan, and I too. Ismaïl was always false from a child. We +were at school together; he never quarrelled, but if a boy insulted him, +he went quietly and stole his exercises out of his desk so as to bring +him into trouble. We are both fifty-four years old, he being two months +younger than me, but he is old from the life he has led. I have all my +life been fond of sport, riding, moving about. This keeps a man +vigorous. It is a mistake to say I do not care to go back to Egypt; I do +care, and I feel sure it is my destiny, but I do not wish to make a +fiasco. They say I might have come forward before the war. I was twice +asked, but not through the intermediary of any one I could depend upon. +Once it was through Monsieur Ninet. He is very likely a good man, but I +ask you, was he a proper person to represent Egypt in a serious matter? +I tried hard to get into direct relations with Arabi, but never +succeeded. I will come forward if asked to do so by the Egyptians, or if +named by the Sultan.’ I asked him what he thought should be the form of +Government for Egypt. He said: ‘No constitution as yet. Egypt wants a +strong Government just now. She should be ruled by a Liberal despot, a +council if you will, but absolute power in the ruler. Eastern nations +understand this, not the other. As to finance, I see no difficulty. I do +not believe in Egypt’s exhaustion. She could pay all her debts with +economy. Certainly, if the interest on the debt could be lowered for a +few years, she would recover. But the peasants’ debts must be settled at +once. As to the Soudan, my policy would be that of my father, to hold +the whole Nile Valley as a trade route, as far as the Equator if +necessary, but not to leave the river banks. The Upper Nile is quite +necessary to Egypt; it must be reconquered.’ I understood him to expect +this to be done by Turkish troops. + +“On the whole my impression of Halim is favourable. He is outspoken, +practical, and seems gifted with common sense. I should say he was +honest; he has very little of the prince about him, much more of the +_bourgeois_. Perhaps this is what Egypt requires. Ismaïl Jowdat and +Mustafa Bey, Arabi’s doctor, who are apparently living dependent on +Halim, accompanied us to the door and thanked me very warmly for having +saved their lives after the war. + +“_21st Oct._—Went to see the Yeni-Jami and St. Sophia’s. In the latter +the _Asr_ was going on. Perhaps a hundred persons present. I wished I +could have joined in this, but only looked on from the gallery. + +“Miss Laing called, who had been Princess Nazli’s governess, and is now +living with Princess Halim. She told us much that was interesting. She +had been very intimate with Arabi, and is very grateful to him for +having protected her during the war. She has no doubt in the world about +the Khedive’s complicity in the Alexandria riot. It was never intended +to go as far as it went, but was certainly planned. Dufferin extracted a +promise from her not to correspond with Arabi after his exile. Arabi was +a quite honest man, but no administrator, and not quite _à la hauteur de +la situation_. He would have carried the revolution through, however, if +Egypt alone had been concerned. The fellahin would certainly support +Halim, especially if he came back with Arabi. + +“_22nd Oct._—Rode to Roumeli Hissar again, and breakfasted with Vefyk. +He gave us eleven Turkish dishes, a very good repast, and entertained us +with much historical disquisition. The word Arab and Europe he told us +are identical, and signify the Unknown Land. The first Arabs, the +Himyarites, were Hamites, and are the same people with the Abyssinians. +Queen Belkis was an Himyarite, but they were later invaded from Chaldea +by a Semitic race under Adnan. The Himyarites are the same with the +Phoenicians, as their names denote, both meaning red.[85] Perseus and +Andromeda were the Persians and the Medes, and he, Vefyk, had been +shocked to find Grote, in his ‘History of Greece,’ repeating the old +fables. He assured us that history, as he was explaining it to us, had +always been taught in the Oriental schools. Abraham was a new man, and +only got his nobility by marrying a daughter of the Himyarite king. From +that he went on to the modern history of his own doings on the +Euphrates, how he had divided the tribes, and built forts on the river +and starved out the Anazeh. On Midhat he was very severe as a make- +believe reformer. He himself, on the contrary, had done real good; he +had rebuilt the ruins of Nissa and the Baths of Broussa, and had made +roads as short cuts from village to village across the hills. Midhat +only made plans, and was in the hands of adventurers. He also gave us a +history of his doings with Nejd and the Ibn Rashids and the +Montefiks—and repeated what he had told me before about the Sultan. + +“After breakfast we went on to Halim’s, and made acquaintance with his +wife and son. The Princess is certainly a superior person, and took part +in our conversation. The son is very like himself; they are at their +best on the subject of Bedouin life, horses, and sport. He told us about +the eighty-four mile race between his horse and the English mare in +1864. His horse was a bay Hadban from the Anazeh, but bought by a +dealer. The English mare’s name was Alabama, which seems to have +belonged to several owners, of whom the principal was Mr. Smart. After +about sixty miles, Alabama stopped, and Hadban came in gaily. An +objection was raised on the score of the jockey having lost five pounds +in weight, but eventually the money was paid. The race was run from Suez +to Cairo in seven hours fifty minutes. This is not very different from +the account given me by Hetherington, who trained Alabama, except that +according to him Alabama was some way ahead of Hadban when she stopped, +and nearer home. Hetherington said that he had ridden out to meet the +horses coming in, and stopped the mare to give her some gruel, after +which she could not move, but it is evident he would not have stopped +her if she had not been pretty nearly done. Halim assured us that he had +ridden one of his Arab horses once, at trot and canter, for twenty-four +hours, another for eighteen hours. + +“Coming in after dark, Count Corti came. He has a poor opinion of Vefyk, +whom he calls mad. Of Halim, however, his opinion is high, and he had +reported it so to his Government when they had enquired about him. But +the Italian Government was all for Ismaïl.” The reason of the patronage +given by the Italian Government to the ex-Khedive was, that at the time +when Ismaïl could command money in plenty, he had lent a large sum to +the King of Italy. + +“We have a fancy for taking a house at Bebek, just under Roumeli Hissar. + +“_23rd Oct._—Went across the water to Kadikeui to see the Polish patriot +Langiewitz and his horses, for he has a small Arab stud. He was at the +head of the revolt of 1863, an unfortunate affair, which was not fully +joined in by the nobles, and was disapproved by the Potockis and others. +He is a very little man, with big beard and spectacles, more like a +Professor than a General, with an English wife—worthy people, very. He +has got a nice old-fashioned Turkish house, with large grounds, for +which he pays a rent of £160, and one might do worse than end one’s days +in such a retirement. He talked sympathetically of Arabi and the +Egyptian war. About Constantinople, he told us that a census of the +population had recently been taken, which showed the Mohammedans already +in a minority there. Here at Scutari and Kadikeui the decaying number +was equally noticeable. His wife had been thirty years in the country, +he nearly twenty. The state of things was wholly hopeless for the Turks. + +“On coming in I found the Russian Ambassador, with whom I discussed the +same point, but he would not admit the population to be diminishing, +though he agreed that all lands habitable by Europeans would sooner or +later be possessed by them. He talked of the progress made by the +Germans in Asia Minor. We were talking about the Egyptian Revolution, as +to which he was anxious to hear the truth, when we were interrupted. + +“Whittaker, who came in next, told some amusing stories of the Sultan +and his dealings with the Ambassadors. To avoid talking business with +them, he arranges to have inconvenient people present, or to be +interrupted, and when hard pressed a band of music strikes up. None of +the Ambassadors are on confidential terms with the Sultan. The last who +was so was Layard, and he had disgusted the Sultan with all foreign +intimacy. Layard, when he was Ambassador here, had his breakfast table +supplied daily by the Sultan—butter, milk, bread, and the rest—and dined +with him constantly; and there was a constant flow of presents, +sometimes of value. This while Disraeli was in power; but when Gladstone +came into office, Layard, who had hitherto supported the Sultan at the +Foreign Office, had, in the hope of keeping his place, written the +dispatch against him which Granville so treacherously published. Since +which the Sultan has trusted nobody. He treats his own ministers as +slaves, and, when one of his Viziers wrote on some occasion resigning +his office, all the answer he got was, ‘When I want you to leave me, you +dog, I will let you know.’ + +“_24th Oct._—Selim Faris called with great talk about my being received +at the palace, and advising me to write to Munir Pasha asking an +audience. I asked Faris to tell me frankly all his opinion of the +Sultan’s character and of the chance of my interview having some good +effect, and I think he was sincere in what he told me. He said: ‘The +Sultan is a man who has really good intentions and who really wishes to +serve the interests of the Mohammedans and of religion generally, and +especially of the Caliphate. But he is quite ignorant of the world, and, +to tell the whole truth, he is crazy. He cannot keep to any plan or line +of conduct, and he is ruining the Mohammedans and religion, and his own +Caliphate. The question of the Caliphate is one which is coming on now +very rapidly. The English Government, from its connection with India, +must eventually become its protector, whether it intends it or not, and +will guard the shores of the Red Sea, for the Caliphate must return to +Arabia. I should advise you nevertheless to see the Sultan if possible. +You might gain an influence over him, though there is nothing certain in +his conduct, and things cannot be worse than they are now. There is a +foundation of good in his character on which to work, and you need not +believe the stories of his caring only for money. He cares rather to +spend it. Send in your letter to Munir, and when the audience is agreed +to we will talk over what you should say to the Sultan, or rather what +you should not say.’ This decides me to stay on another week here in the +chance of succeeding. He also talked about Dufferin and the work +Mackenzie Wallace had done for him here, and how he had written most of +his Egyptian report for him. Wallace has now gone as Dufferin’s regular +secretary to India at £3,000 a year. + +“At noon we went to the Selamlik to see the Sultan go to mosque, just +outside his palace walls. It was a very simple affair, a couple of +companies of rather ill-groomed soldiers, a few men on seedy horses, +half a dozen dust carts filled with sand to sprinkle the road, two +carriages full of ladies who did not enter the mosque, about fifty +officials in uniform, including Tahir Pasha, a Grand Chamberlain, and +Hafiz Behram-Agha, the Sultan’s chief Eunuch. This last is a grave, +respectable-looking person in black clothes, with considerable dignity +of manner. He stood on the doorstep outside during prayer with the rest +of the courtiers. Last of all the Sultan drove up in a victoria with the +hood up, two white horses of nondescript breed, two elderly officials on +the back seat, and a driver in a handsome Eastern dress. The Sultan got +out immediately the carriage stopped, turned an instant to salute the +people, and disappeared inside the mosque door. He is small and slight, +but being well shaped looks taller than he is. His face is handsome, +very black eyes, beard, and eyebrows, a nose of prodigious length and a +calm passionless expression—a dignified apparition. But I saw it all +from a considerable distance, and only for two seconds each time, going +in and coming out. As he drove away there was a melancholy attempt at +cheering, the hood was put down, and the Emir el Mumenin was rapidly +driven away from men’s sight. We occupied a little pagoda opposite the +mosque, with a couple of score of sight-seers and officials. Next me +were Ismaïl Jowdat and Husseyn Pasha, one of the Sultan’s aides-de-camp. + +“Afterwards Ismaïl Jowdat came to the hotel, and spent three hours +giving me an account of the events of 1882 in Egypt.” These are embodied +in my “Secret History” and need not be repeated.[86] + +“_25th Oct._—Rode to the Okmaidan and found the Jews keeping Sabbath in +their best clothes. Some of them were catching goldfinches in a net, and +we had the satisfaction of letting a bird go. These Jews talk Spanish; +one of them told me that their families had come four hundred years ago +from Spain. + +“_26th Oct._—Count Corti came to take us in a steam launch to Therapia. +We had luncheon with the Wyndhams and called on the Noailles. The +arrangements of the French Embassy at Constantinople depend neither on +the Sultan nor on the Ambassador, but on the fancy of his son, a youth +of fifteen. Monsieur Doudou, as he is called, makes the rain and fine +weather on the Bosphorus, goes out sailing in a boat by himself to the +terror of his parents, who have him accompanied by another boat to pick +him up. When he goes out riding two negroes run beside him for the same +purpose, and when he goes out walking, he is surrounded by an Oriental +retinue. If Monsieur Doudou stays out late there is no dinner at the +Embassy, and the Ambassador cannot return to Pera until his son +consents. They are very anxious just now to gain his consent to this +necessary autumnal move, but Monsieur Doudou is out of humour, having +styes in his eyes, and will not be cajoled. A few nights ago, his +parents being out dining, he gave a ball at the Embassy to the +housemaids, and ended by smashing all the bells. When the Ambassador +returned, he enquired the meaning of the rumpus, and was told that it +was his son; ‘Rien, que cela!’ said M. de Noailles, and went off pleased +to his bed. + +“On our way back to Constantinople Count Corti entertained us with +stories of the Berlin Congress, and of Lord Salisbury’s antics there. +Disraeli and Salisbury had gone there quite on their high horse to curb +the territorial ambition of Russia, and the publication of the secret +convention for the acquisition of Cyprus was a great shock to everybody. +Salisbury broke it gently to Waddington before the news was published; +and Waddington consulted his colleagues, it being generally agreed that +there was no middle course between going to war and saying nothing. ‘_Il +faut la guerre ou se taire_.’ But the publication was a great blow to +Disraeli, who took to his bed, and did not appear for four or five days. +Lord Salisbury, however, brazened it out and came to the Congress with +an air of defiance. There was no rupture between him and Waddington, and +they remained on apparently friendly terms—but Waddington had his +revenge. He was sitting one day with Salisbury, and, the conversation +leading that way, Waddington asked what the English Government would say +to France taking Tunis, and Salisbury said he did not see the harm. +Whereupon Waddington communicated this to Paris, and on his return the +French Ambassador in London was instructed to write to Lord Salisbury +reminding him of his words. Thus Salisbury was caught; ‘But,’ said +Corti, ‘if he had known anything of his business, he would have declined +to answer the note officially and would have pleaded a private +conversation.’ He did not believe that any arrangement of condominion +was come to between Salisbury and Waddington at that time, though I told +him, without mentioning names, of the letter Lytton had shown me.[87] +Count Corti is interesting diplomatically, as he has been to more +Congresses than any man in Europe. He said it was a pity the Sultan kept +up his feud with the English Government, but seemed inclined to agree +with me that our Government would have to come to terms with him about +Egypt. He spoke very strongly in favour of Halim, and of the Sultan’s +wish to make him Viceroy in Tewfik’s place. If it is true that Dufferin +holds this view, our chances look brighter than I have imagined. There +is a talk of Evelyn Baring as Ambassador here, a not unlikely thing +considering what a failure his policy in Egypt has been. He, like Malet, +has served the Government by holding his tongue, and letting his +dispatches be mutilated and suppressed. So he will be rewarded. + +“_27th Oct._—Selim Faris called to ask whether I had received any answer +from the Sultan, but none has come. He said it was quite necessary the +English Government should come to terms with the Mohammedans for both +their sakes. This must eventually happen, as England would be obliged, +whether she liked it or not, to make herself their protector. With +regard to the Sultan he might be pacified by being allowed to appoint a +new Viceroy in Egypt, but it would be most dangerous to allow him to +administer the country. What he cared about most was to give the world +some striking proof of his power. He would jump at the idea. At the same +time Faris is convinced that he will never really forgive England, but +will take his revenge whenever the opportunity offers. I asked him if +the Sultan was on good terms with any of the foreign Ambassadors, and he +said: ‘Yes, with the German—and quite lately with the Russian.’ There +seems to be an alliance for the moment with Russia against England. + +“Whittaker came in next, and I asked him the reason of Dufferin’s ill +success here. He explained that he had begun badly. The Sultan was +wanting in politeness to him, and he resented it, and Lady Dufferin was +shown no attention. During the whole of her stay at Constantinople she +was only once asked to the palace, and then the Sultan did not see her. +But it was almost impossible to deal with Abdul Hamid. In the +negotiation about Egypt he had changed his mind constantly, telegraphing +orders and counter orders to Musurus after he had agreed with Dufferin. +This made Dufferin say he lied. Then Dufferin with all his outside +amiability was a very hard man. Whittaker says he might be cruel if +occasion offered, and the transitions between the velvet and the iron +were too abrupt. The Turks did not like this. For the last eight months +he was neither invited to, nor went near, the Palace. Goschen was much +more successful, though he, too, gave offence by going to the Palace in +a shooting jacket; but Whittaker thinks that if he had stayed longer he +would have been liked on account of his frank manner. + +“Henderson also called. He said we had been very near war over the +Dulcigno business. Goschen had given him orders at one time to pack and +be ready to leave the Aleppo Consulate. Next Ismaïl Jowdat. I read him +over the account of what he had told me on Friday about the events of +1881 and he corrected it on many points (see Appendix). + +“_28th Oct._—Mustafa Bey, Arabi’s doctor, breakfasted with us. He is the +most satisfactory man of all I have yet met, and, having been with Arabi +throughout the war, he is excellent evidence. Arabi’s character, he +said, was quite distinct from that of all those who surrounded him. He +was the only one of those in high command who had real patriotism or +real religion, who did not seek his personal interest, and who saw +things clearly. His fault was that he was too confiding, too humane, and +too little censorious of others. He, Mustafa, was with Arabi at Tel-el- +Kebir to the last moment. No attack was expected, as Ali Yusuf, who +commanded the _avant-garde_, had been bought by Sultan Pasha, and Saoud +el Tehawi, who managed the scouting business, was also in the pay of +both sides. Arabi was asleep still in his tent when they heard a sound +of shots (not cannon he says) and presently soldiers running away +accompanied by Bedouins. Arabi drew his sword and tried to rally them, +begging them to fight for their country and their religion, but they +shouted to him ‘_Ya ibn el kelb_’—‘Why should we have ourselves killed +for you?’ The Bedouins, too, fired at him. It was the doctor who got +Arabi to mount and ride off. He himself, after having got into a train +which was stopped by the English, made his way to Zagazig on foot. He +says I am quite correct in my estimate of the characters of the six +exiles in Ceylon. Mahmud Fehmy and Abd-el-Aal are honest men. Mahmud +Sami and Yakub Sami joined the movement from personal motives of spite +against the Khedive; and Toulba was never anything but a worthless +_gamin_. Arabi was wrong to trust them, but he had few good men to +choose from, and when men swore oaths to him he trusted them. Thus he +trusted the Khedive. Ali Fehmy was only half-hearted. He was certainly +acting in concert with the Khedive in the affair of Abdin, but Arabi was +not in their confidence. The thing had been arranged as long before as +July, and Sherif was in the plot. Riaz wanted to make himself regent, +just as Sultan Pasha afterwards expected to be made regent when Tewfik +was to abdicate after Arabi’s trial. Sultan, at least, had told his +friends this, showing them the Order of Michael and George he had +received, ‘The same as had been given to the Sultan of Zanzibar.’ + +“He then gave us the whole history of the Tantah massacre in detail, +which he knew first from the official enquiry made before Arabi when it +happened, and at which he assisted, and secondly from Ahmed Minshawi +with whom he had lived afterwards at Beyrout, and who came here with +him, and who had repeatedly told him the story. The true facts were +these: + +“The Mudir of Tantah, Ibrahim Adhem, with Osman Rafaat, excited the +populace against the Christians, as Ismaïl Jowdat related, telling them +that Arabi had ordered it; and the Mudir shut himself up also as +related. Minshawi lived at a village called Koreyshiyeh, and happening +to come in that day by train with Abd-el-Aal Pasha’s son, Emir Bey, and +Husseyn Wasif, a magistrate, they found Christians being killed, and +Minshawi interfered. They, the populace, called out to him that Arabi +had ordered it, but Minshawi had said to the effect of ‘Damn Arabi,’ and +insisted on their stopping. He had then gone with Abu Diab, who had also +been trying to stop the massacre, to the Mudirieh, and had kicked in the +door of his room and expostulated with him for letting the thing go +on—Abu Diab using strong language, for he was very angry. Then they +telegraphed to Arabi at Kafr Dawar to send soldiers to stop the +massacre, but the telegram had to go round by Ramleh, and was delayed. +But at last the massacre was stopped. The whole thing was enquired into +at Kafr Dawar immediately, and the Mudir was sent to Cairo and there +imprisoned till the end of the war, Darwish Pasha replacing him. After +the war Adhem was reinstated, and when the commission was sent to +Tantah, Ismaïl Yusri, the President, who was a comparatively honest man, +ascertained the truth and informed the Khedive that he should be obliged +to find him, Adhem, guilty, and so begged to be replaced by another on +the Commission. This was done, and an officer less scrupulous was +appointed who accepted the false evidence Ibrahim Adhem was allowed to +trump up against Abu Diab. Ibrahim Adhem, however, was deposed, and +Husseyn Wasif (a Circassian, not the same as the magistrate) was +appointed. He it was who was made a scape-goat of for Ibrahim Adhem’s +sake, and was deprived by Clifford Lloyd and sent to the Soudan. Mehariz +Bey, formerly sub-Mudir, is now Mudir of Boheyra. Minshawi is the son- +in-law of Abdallah Pasha, the English renegade, and his son Emir still +goes by the name of the Englishman. + +“Mustafa Bey confirms all Ismaïl’s statements of the Khedive’s +connection with the Alexandrian massacres. He was at Alexandria at the +time, and was the doctor employed to examine the bodies. There were +fifty-one Christian bodies, twenty-three Mohammedan, of which eight were +_mustafezzin_, all the latter killed by pistol shots. The English doctor +wanted to make out the Christian bodies had wounds made by _des armes +blanches_, but this was not the case. Omar Lutfi certainly gave orders +to the mustafezzin to come unarmed. I like the worthy doctor much. In +face and figure he is not unlike Lord Lyons. + +“We rode in Stamboul past the bazaars and the tower and the horse +market, and dined with Whittaker. Sat next to Mr. Laing, Director of the +_regie_, who seems a sensible man, and had a talk with a certain +Mohammed Bey, more or less of a spy I believe of the palace. I told him +a good deal of what I intend him to repeat there. Sinadino has gone +bankrupt at Cairo, so there is still justice in the world! + +“_29th Oct._—The Egyptian Princes, Osman and Kiamyl, came to see us. I +never thought to like them so well, but they talked patriotically about +the late war, and were really improved by the part they played. [Here +follows the conversation I have recorded with Prince Kiamyl in my +‘Secret History.’] About Arabi’s trial Kiamyl said: ‘If you had only +gone on, Tewfik would have been broken. He was in a terrible fright, +knowing that his crimes would have been laid bare. It is a pity you +allowed the compromise.’ The Sultan, the Princes told us, was mad with +fear; the disease had begun fifteen years ago when a little girl he had +was burned to death. The least mention in praise of any man was +sufficient to arouse his suspicion. He had never received them except in +public audience. To ask for a private audience was enough to ensure his +displeasure. With them was Aarif Bey, who had been the Princes’ tutor, +the same who came with them two years ago to Crabbet. He is a Kurd of +Arab origin and a man of very superior education.[88] We have decided to +go by French boat to Marseilles on Wednesday, as there is small chance +of my getting an audience with the Sultan. + +“_30th Oct._—With Count Corti to the Bazaars. Selim Faris came at five. +He gave an amusing account of the Sultan’s manœuvres to set every one by +the ears, which is his system, according to the _divide et impera_ rule. +‘You see the palace,’ he said. ‘The Sultan sits here with a plan before +him, showing the rooms occupied by each of his household. If he finds +two together making friends, he puts them far off each other. His whole +object is to put next each other those who hate each other most. His +chief chamberlain and his second chamberlain would poison each other if +they could; they are lodged together in this corner. There is Ghazi +Osman with Deli Nuzret whom he hates, and there again Abdallah Ibn Saoud +and Sheykh Ahmed Assad, both Arabs and bitter enemies. Thus the Sultan +comes to know everything, and there cannot be any plot against him he +thinks. It was just the same in Egypt; when he sent Dervish Pasha, he +also sent Sheykh Ahmed Assad, his greatest enemy, to watch, and, after +them, Kadri Bey, his secretary, to watch them both, and even that was +not enough, for they had not been there a fortnight when he sent a +fourth, Ahmed Bey, one of his aides-de-camp. Kadri wrote to the Sultan +complaining that this last was laughing at him, and insulting him +publicly, but the Sultan rewarded the aide-de-camp, and Kadri has been +in disgrace ever since. The Sultan has never seen him since his return +to Constantinople. The others told him he was bribed, but Kadri took +nothing but a few jewels. Dervish took money. He got £40,000 in +_consolidés_ from Tewfik, besides jewels and articles of value, but he +was clever enough to send presents by every post to the various members +of the household. Kadri didn’t. I know everything that goes on in the +palace through Zaffir Bey, the Sultan’s private secretary, the same who +wrote to Arabi. He and his father have been friends with my father for +forty years, and I have one other friend in the palace. It does not do +to have more, and even these I am obliged to pretend not to know. I +shall go to-morrow at six o’clock, before it is light, to find out about +your letter to Munir Pasha. I will let you know at breakfast time. I +should like you to see the Sultan for the sake of your friends in Ceylon +and India. But the Sultan cannot help you, he is so busy and has no +memory. He writes down everything that is told him in a diary, but he +has no memory. He has always been very kind to me, but I have been in a +mess with him several times. First because I would not write against +Ismaïl when they were going to depose him, and for other things. But I +am protected by Zaffir Bey, and he always intercedes till the Sultan +forgives me and makes me presents. I have three jewelled boxes from him, +and when I went to England last year he gave me £300; but I got into +disgrace by dining with Lord Granville, and my newspaper was suspended. +Now I am in favour again, and the _Jowaib_ is to go on next month as +before, I am very fond of the Sultan. He is so kind, but he is a child. +He does not understand, though he wants to know everything. He has spies +in every house, either the cook or a slave. When he wants particularly +to know about any of the Pashas, he makes them a present of one of his +women, and then he hears everything. I was offered one once, but I would +not have her. The Sultan has not so many women as some of the Sultans +have had—perhaps twenty-five or thirty at a time, but there are several +hundred more in the palace, servants and slaves of these. Abdul Hamid +has never been married legally. I knew him long before he came to the +throne. I never heard the story about his daughter being burnt, but it +was Abdul Aziz’s death and Murad’s dethronement that have driven him +mad.’ + +“Faris has promised to help me with all details in my History of the +Egyptian Invasion. He tells me he can tell me everything that went on +between the Sultan and Egypt, but I think I know all pretty well as it +is. Faris also gave a curious account of the dethronement of Ismaïl in +1879. Ismaïl had written to Abdul Hamid to say that he was threatened +with dethronement by the Powers, and to ask whether he should abdicate. +But the Sultan would not hear of this, and sent him word that he was +never to give in and that he would support him. At the same time he +called a council to discuss the matter, and hid himself in the council +room behind a curtain. Khair-ed-Din was Vizier, and spoke strongly in +favour of yielding to the Powers, saying that if they did not the Powers +would act without them, and the prestige of the Sultan would be lost. +Abdul Hamid, hearing this, changed his mind, and the Ministers were sent +at once to the telegraph office, and there wrote out the order deposing +Ismaïl. This tallies closely with what Lascelles told me of Ismaïl’s +surprise at the order. Faris was in the palace and heard everything as +it happened. ‘And I could have cried my eyes out,’ he said, ‘with +vexation, for Ismaïl was then my patron.’ + +“_31st Oct._—Stayed indoors. Our first visitor was Aarif Bey, and he and +Ismaïl Jowdat, who came later, stayed to luncheon. Aarif is more +interesting than I at all suspected in spite of his distinguished +appearance and pretensions to Arab descent. He told me his history and +that of his family. They are a family of Seyyids settled 700 years ago +in Kurdistan, where, until sixty-five years ago, they were hereditary +rulers, their capital being Mardin. But the centralization of the Empire +destroyed them, and his grandfather was brought away to live at +Constantinople by Sultan Mahmud. It is clear, however, that they have +preserved their descent pure, and he spoke in scorn of the mongrel Turks +of modern times. After lamenting the dangers and misfortunes of Islam he +communicated to me the secret that all was arranged for a Kurdish rising +next May, and that he was going to put himself at the head of it. They +would be able to put 80,000 men under arms,—this without the help of +Russia, which had offered them arms, but whose alliance they refused. +They did not wish to quarrel with the Sultan, but to stand to their arms +and demand the right of local self-government. Their country was +abominably misruled by ignorant and corrupt Stamboulis, and they felt +that if they did nothing they would one day be engulfed in the common +ruin of the Empire. Every year they were becoming poorer and weaker, but +the Kurds were a nation still of three millions, and warlike men. He +asked me whether I thought the English Government would give them its +moral support. He had seen Dilke when in London two years ago, and had +asked him about it, and Dilke had told him that, though the idea was not +discouraged, he considered the time an unfavourable one. This must have +been about a month before the bombardment of Alexandria, and it tallies +curiously with what Eddy Hamilton wrote to me about the projected Syrian +rising a little more than a year earlier.[89] + +“I told Aarif in return the history of my correspondence with Downing +Street on just these points, and warned him not to trust to Mr. +Gladstone or to England, which was far too busy in all parts of the +world just now to attend to Kurdistan. Russia, too, would be sure to +prevent anything like Mohammedan Nationalism on her frontier. The +Russian design was to take possession of the Euphrates and the head of +the Persian Gulf. To this he said that the Kurds were willing to risk a +quarrel with Russia, that, if they waited, their fate would be only more +certain afterwards, and that at present Russia favoured them. And he +asked me to plead their cause in England. I promised him to do this, but +told him very frankly that it would be almost impossible to attract +sympathy in England for the Kurds. A Kurdish question would not be +understood there, and all that was known with us of the Kurds was taken +from the tales of travellers who had been robbed by them. I advised him +therefore strongly to put his case forward as part of the Armenian +question, which was already understood in England, and had attracted +sympathy, and was even provided for in the Treaty of Berlin. As an +Armenian rising, it would be understood, and would have a kind of legal +standing. He told me that the Armenians were with the Kurds in this +matter, but that there was the difficulty as to who should be their +chief, for the Armenians would want a Christian, while the Kurds would +have none but a Mohammedan. Anne suggested, however, that there might be +two chiefs, and we looked out the position on the map and found that in +fact the country might be divided into two districts. The north with Van +as capital would be Christian. The south with Diarbekr would be +Mohammedan. He assured us the Arabs, too, were with them, the Shammar, +the Taï, and the Jibouri—and the rising would begin for certain next +May. + +“Aarif’s father is Seyyid Yusuf Sidki. His brother-in-law was one of the +leaders of the last Kurdish revolt with Sheykh Obeidallah. They would +have conquered Persia but for the Sultan’s intervention. + +“Selim Faris also looked in. He has been to the Palace and finds that +Munir Pasha has not dared mention my name to the Sultan or forward my +letter. They are all afraid. + +“_1st Nov._—Aarif Bey came again to tell me that he had arranged with +Ahmed Bey, the Sultan’s _Chef de Cabinet politique_, that we should meet +to-night at the theatre and have a talk, and he thinks that then Ahmed +Bey, who sees the Sultan every day, will arrange for an audience Monday +or Tuesday, and I have told him that I cannot and will not stay past +Wednesday, when the French steamer starts. Aarif, in spite of his +revolutionary projects in Kurdistan, is on confidential terms with the +Sultan’s Cabinet, and sends them reports on political subjects. When we +saw him in England in 1882 he seems to have had something of a private +mission, and has clearer ideas of English political parties than is +usual with foreigners. His estimates of Gladstone, Salisbury, and Dilke +were correct, and he described how, after an interview with Salisbury, +in which he, Salisbury, had held language entirely favourable to the +Sultan’s rights in Egypt, he had gone the next day to hear him speak +exactly in the opposite sense in the House of Lords. I asked him about +the relations existing between the Sultan and Russia, and he told me +that all the advances at present were on the side of Russia, that the +Sultan only trusted the Germans, who, he remarked, could not possibly +help him; that he still had some trust in Lord Salisbury with regard to +Egypt, if he should come into power again, but that he knew perfectly +well that there was no material help to be expected from England any +more. I told him I was quite of that opinion. Whatever else we might do, +we were quite certain never to send any more troops to help the Sultan +against a European Power, and that, if I had to advise for his good, it +would be to make an alliance with Russia. Russia, of course, never could +be a friend, but if they could tide over the next twenty-five years, +there might well be a revolution there, a European war, or heaven knew +what. But Russia was the greatest danger Turkey had, for it menaced it +in Asia, and the conquest of Asia Minor would be an end of all things. +Aarif quite agreed with this and said that if England continued in her +present line of policy, an alliance with Russia was inevitable. The only +thing that prevented it was that the Russian Government was _tellement +canaille_, that the Sultan would not trust them, but he would be driven +to it. + +“Aarif also gave us a capital account of the way Lord Dufferin had +tricked the Sultan in the matter of the proclamation of Arabi’s +rebellion. The Sultan, he assured me, still had a kindly feeling for +Arabi, and it was entirely against the grain that he had issued the +proclamation. But Dufferin had bullied him by threatening to leave +Constantinople, or acknowledge Abd-el-Mutalleb, the Sherif of Mecca, +Caliph. Afterwards, when the Sultan wanted to sign the convention for +sending troops, Dufferin went off to the Princes Islands and could not +be got at. There had been a great debate among the Ulema as to the +legality of the proclamation, and he, Aarif himself, had pronounced +strongly against it on the ground of a certain _hadith_ which declared +every Mohammedan justified in defending Mohammedan interests against the +infidel, whether with the Caliph’s sanction or without it. He also told +us about his visit to the Oxford and British Museums, and the Arabic +documents he had found there. + +“Next we went to tea successively at the German and Russian Embassies. +At the latter we made acquaintance with M. Onou, the Chancellier, who +knows Syria well and something of the desert. We talked about Arabia, +and I think I made some impression on Nélidof by the warmth of my +pleadings. His wife has a great hatred for Lord Dufferin. She was a +Princess, and her brother was the owner of that stud of 150 horses which +was burnt last year. + +“At half past six Aarif returned and took us to dine at a restaurant, +and we went on to the theatre, but Ahmed Bey Jellal-ed-Din was not +there, and had sent us a message by Ahmed Pasha, another aide-de-camp, +to say that the Sultan had kept him on service. The play was, I forget +what—the ‘Princess Something.’ I hate these things. + +“I have forgotten the principal event of the day, the visit of Ahmed +Minshawi. He came early in the morning, having been sent by the Syrian +banker. It is clear that Ismaïl Jowdat did not intend him to see us, and +they have quarrelled about something, as they all do. Minshawi is a true +fellah of the Arabi type, but altogether inferior to him, a large, +nervous, heavy-handed man, with his eyes rather too close together, and +a general heaviness relieved by occasional flashes. He was very +difficult at first to reassure, and explained that he had been so hunted +for the last two years by the police that he had lost all his courage. +It is not given to every one, he said, to be courageous, and he lamented +his fallen fortunes. ‘I used to be a man of large wealth. I lived like a +prince at home, respected by all, surrounded by friends, and confident +in myself. Now I am treated as a _fakir_. The Turks have no bowels of +compassion. They have no charity. With us the stranger is respected. +Here he is watched by the police,—and he asked nervously whether there +was any one listening, as the door creaked. ‘I used to have four +thousand acres of good land worth £60 or £70 each (I am not sure of the +figures), and half a dozen steamers on the river. Now I receive not £20 +a year from my property. I am driven out of my home and live as I can on +what remains to me of the ready money I took with me.’ The tears rolled +down from his eyes as he spoke, and he sat for some minutes silent on +the sofa weeping. + +“I asked him to tell me how it all came about, and he said it was from +his having interfered to save the lives of the Christians at Tantah. He +had gone into Tantah that morning thinking of nothing, and when he saw +the people being killed he had lost his temper and laid about him with +his stick to stop them, and he had expostulated with the Mudir, and he +had taken 150 of the people, Syrians, Jews, or Greeks, to his country +house, and had kept them at his own cost during the war. The people who +had got up the riot were Ibrahim Adhem and his wakil, Mehariz, who is +now Mudir. These two were solely answerable for it. He had heard of +Osman Rafaat’s coming to Tantah, but had not seen him. I asked him about +Abu Diab. ‘_Wallah!_’ he said, ‘if there was one innocent in the world +it was Abu Diab.’ I then tried to get out of him what his political +views were. But he was very cautious, after the manner of his people. +‘If,’ he said, ‘you were to take an ox or a camel or an ape, or even a +hare, and give it to the Egyptians as their Governor, they would be +grateful and loyal to it. Before the war we loved the English, but we do +not love them now. They have destroyed us, and they have given us to +those who have no mercy.’ After much pressing, I got out of him that he +would like Abbas with a regent, Riaz, or, if it were possible, Arabi. He +said Riaz because he would keep order, but Arabi the people would like +far better. He did not wish Ismaïl. He should have no objection to +Halim. But any one would be acceptable so long as Tewfik went away. I +urged him to come to England to give evidence, and he said he would, but +what was he to do with the family? His family was here, and he had no +friend to leave them with. I fear he is a rather helpless ally. Still we +must make what use of him we can, and he is to come again on Monday. + +“_2nd Nov., Sunday._—By steamer to Roumeli Hissar to have luncheon with +Halim Pasha, and take leave. But we unfortunately missed the boat, and +did not get there till nearly two o’clock. The Princess is certainly a +very charming person, and still a pretty woman. She gave us luncheon in +the kiosk in the garden, a very handsome room. Some Turkish dishes, +among others one of chicken with walnut sauce. Afterwards I had a long +talk with Halim. Explained to him how the war had been brought about, +and Mr. Gladstone’s desire to be rid of Egypt, and begged him to further +my design of bringing forward now the charges against the Khedive, by +sending Ismaïl Jowdat and Mustafa Bey to England. And he promised to +send them and to get them to agree with Minshawi not to quarrel. At +going away I said to the Prince: ‘I suppose it is understood between us +that if Your Highness returns to Egypt, Arabi is to return too.’ He +said: ‘You may count upon it. I have never had any other idea, and I +only regret that I have not been able sooner to put myself in direct +communication with him. All the exiles shall be recalled.’ I like Halim +more the more I see him. He is plain spoken and direct in all he says. + +“His Beatitude Stephen Peter X, Monseigneur Azarian, Patriarch of the +Catholic Armenians, called on us. He is a dignified and intelligent man, +to whom we had brought letters from Madame Volodkowich; and he told us +in detail the Armenian situation. The desire of the Catholic Armenians +was to have such a government as that of the Lebanon. They did not want +to be separated from the Porte, as their greatest danger was absorption +by Russia. But the administration had become worse than it had ever +been, and the people would bear it no longer. With regard to the Kurds, +he said they were much less fanatical than the Turks, and the accounts +of their misdeeds were very much exaggerated. He was sure that, if they +had a government like that of the Lebanon, they would all live together +very peaceably. The Turkish Government favoured the Catholics, as they +did not conspire with Russia, which the Orthodox did. But even these did +not wish Armenia to be absorbed by Russia. + +“Of the Sultan he gave the most favourable account I have yet heard. He +says that he has known personally four Sultans, and Abdul Hamid is far +the best of them, and perhaps the best Sultan there ever was. He is a +good man, and works hard to know everything concerning his country, and +is most intelligent. He has no vices, has few women, neither drinks nor +amuses himself, and is severely economical. He has no debts, paying +everything, down to the last detail of his household, every Thursday. He +knew this as the Sultan’s accountant is an Armenian Catholic. Only, all +his servants are bad, and he trusts no one. The Government of the Porte +is worse than it ever was, a mere den of corruption, and it is +impossible that a catastrophe is not impending. The Greeks in Roumelia +are all members of secret societies, and so are the Syrians, and one of +these days it will occur. The finance will break down, for nobody is +paid and the people are all coming to beggary. Everything can be bought. +The new Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem is a man whose name stands first on +the list of those dangerous to the Empire, as he is a head centre of +Pan-slavism. Yet he procured his nomination by spending money. All was +going to ruin, and would go to ruin. He, the Patriarch, was sorry for +it. A worthy old man. Peace be with His Beatitude. + +“_3rd Nov._—Our first visitor was Ahmed Minshawi, from whom we got +additional details, and I have drawn up a statement of the evidence he +is prepared to give, which will be most valuable.[90] As he gets more +confidence his face lights up, and he acquires even a certain eloquence. +He reminds me every now and then of Arabi, typical fellahin both. He was +driven away by the arrival of Doctor Dickenson. [Here follows Doctor +Dickenson’s account of the death of Abdul Aziz, which has been related +previously in my ‘Secret History,’ see pages 52 to 55.] Dr. Dickenson is +a very precise old gentleman, and the sort of witness whose evidence +would be accepted by any jury in the world. I therefore entirely believe +his account. Midhat and Damad, he told us, died in chains at Taïf, some +months ago, having been starved to death. Midhat’s end was hastened by a +carbuncle, but he was none the less made away with. The Sheykh el Islam +has also recently died there who gave the fetwa authorizing Abdul Aziz’s +deposition. This act of terror has given Abdul Hamid the absolute power +he now holds. + +“We went to the Russian Embassy again to say good-bye, and see some +horses given by the Sultan to Nélidof. The horses are of no great +account, a chestnut and a gray worth £50 or £60 a piece. + +“Coming back we found Mustafa Bey, and we have arranged that he is to +encourage Minshawi, and when we telegraph come with him to England and +give his evidence. Ismaïl Jowdat also came in. We wrote out a _procès +verbal_ for Minshawi to sign. What I intend to do is to invite Mr. +Gladstone to examine the evidence privately, or appoint Trevelyan or +somebody of equivalent integrity to examine it. If he refuses I shall do +it publicly. Ismaïl Jowdat will come at once with us to England. + +“While we were talking, Aarif Bey came in with a message from Ahmed Bey +to the effect that they had been afraid to present my request of an +audience to the Sultan; but that they had spoken of my wish to see the +horses, etc., and that the Sultan had been most gracious, and would send +an aide-de-camp to-morrow to show us over the stables and the palace. I +confess the story did not sound to me quite coherent, and Selim Faris, +who looked in later, tells me that he has just been to the palace, and +that the true account of it is that Munir did give my letter to the +Sultan, but that he wishes to put off on others the responsibility of +not answering it, that he is as usual undecided, and would like to find +out a little more about me first, and he will probably send an aide-de- +camp on purpose to report concerning me to-morrow. He will see me later +if I will only wait. But I can’t wait. The Sultan asked Zaffir about me +on Friday, but Zaffir pretended he had never heard of me. This +invitation to the palace and stables is at any rate a proof that he is +not ill-disposed, and we must make the most of it. The idea of the +palace at present is that nothing new will come on in Egypt till next +summer, and he thinks if I come back then I shall be able to do a great +deal. Perhaps he is right. In any case we shall not have wasted our time +here. + +“Our last visitor was Mr. de Leon, formerly American Consul-General at +Cairo, now agent of a company for making a ship-railway over the isthmus +of Akaba. The scheme seems to me chimerical from the fact that Suez is a +far easier, shorter, and more direct route. + +“_4th Nov._—Ismaïl Jowdat came in the morning, having written out the +evidence given us by Minshawi in Arabic for him to sign. But Minshawi +did not appear till too late, for we had to go out at a quarter to one +to the old Seraglio, where the Sultan had appointed an aide-de-camp to +meet us and show us everything. This _Serai_ is a delightful old place, +and the position the finest, without exception, in the world. By good +luck the aide-de-camp on duty was old Vefyk Pasha’s son, an extremely +nice, intelligent young man, who knew the history of the various Sultans +well, and so was able to explain us everything. We were received in +State and conducted round by the whole staff of the Palace. The Treasury +is full of interesting things which belong to the domain of Murray. But +what was to me most attractive was the series of effigies of the Sultans +dressed in their actual clothes. This recalls past glories better than +anything else could do. Mahmud’s miserable hussar jacket closes the +series, but there are lower depths still since, left unrepresented. The +young man confessed himself ashamed of his wretched uniform and fez, a +rare instance of good taste in a modern Oriental. In the kiosk we drank +the Sultan’s coffee, which I confess I only sipped, remembering its +fatal name. The Dolmabakji to which we were next taken is without +interest inside, and we were disappointed of our promised visit to the +stables, as the Sultan was having the horses paraded at the Yildiz +Palace in order to choose one for an Ambassador. At least such was the +excuse given—but I half suspect they were afraid of our criticism. The +visit to the palaces is, however, a proof of the Sultan’s goodwill, and +when I thanked the young man and gave him a message of thanks to the +Sultan he told me that they all knew of me as a defender of Islam and a +friend. + +“Selim Faris, who came in the evening, tells me it was Musurus (the +Turkish Ambassador in London) who set the Sultan against me, telling him +that I was seeking to found an Arabian Empire; but he is now undeceived. +He advises me to write a memorandum of my ideas to the Sultan. + +“_5th Nov._—Ahmed Minshawi came and signed his evidence (see Appendix). +Mustafa Bey Nejdi also called, and then Count Corti, to wish us goodbye, +and we went on board the French steamer, having spent three weeks at +Constantinople, an interesting visit, though our main object of seeing +the Sultan remained unachieved. It was a dark evening with a huge bank +of black clouds to the north, signs of winter in the Black Sea, when we +steamed out of the Golden Horn and passed Seraglio point and the city +walls on our way home. Ismaïl Jowdat goes with us. + +“_6th Nov._—Really there never was such good fortune. On board there is +an acquaintance of Ismaïl’s, Mohammed Assad Bey, Muteserif of Candia, on +his way to his post, uncle-in-law of our friend Aarif Bey. He is by +birth one of the hereditary Kurdish chiefs, but exiled at the age of +seventeen (he is now fifty-seven) on account of his father’s rebellion—a +most interesting man. He has been many years in Crete, and has seen many +changes in the Empire, all for the worse. He lamented the quarrels +between England and Islam, which he attributed to its true causes, +first, the obstinacy of the Porte in effecting no reforms, and secondly, +the dishonesty of England in regard to Egypt. In regard to the latter, +he said what they all say and to which there is no answer, that the +English caused misgovernment in Egypt so as to have an excuse for taking +it. He said that all his life he had been accustomed to respect +Englishmen as men of just dealing, but they were changed and he +respected them no more. If he had not seen Ismaïl Jowdat with us, he +should not have cared to make our acquaintance. From having the best +reputation in the East the English had now the worst. About his own +country, Kurdistan, he talked much in the sense that Aarif had done—only +he seemed to see less hope in the trouble which was coming. The Russians +he said were very busy stirring up the Christian Armenians, and the +thing would break out in the spring. It would begin with the Armenians, +then the Kurds would take up arms in self-defence. There would be +stories of bloodshed and massacre greatly exaggerated, and the Russians +would take it as a pretext for intervention. The Turks had about 150,000 +Nizams in Asia Minor, and the Kurds could put a far greater number under +arms. But he augured ill for the result. The Russians wanted Mesopotamia +and Bagdad and Bussora. The Turks could fight well, but they had no +leader. All the Turkish commanders were corrupt and selfish, and they +would be bribed again by the Russians. I asked him who was the natural +Kurdish leader, and he said: ‘There are several hundred Kurds in the +Custom House at Galata. Yesterday, when I passed through, they all +bowed.’ His elder brother, however, would seem to be the man, and this +agrees with Aarif’s account. Obeidallah is the religious chief only. In +the evening Ismaïl Jowdat gave a full account of all he knew in +connection with Arabi and the events of 1881. [The substance of what I +learned from him is embodied in his statement (see Appendix).] + +“_12th Nov._—We arrived without incident at Marseilles and went on +immediately to Paris.” + + + + + CHAPTER X + + GORDON’S DEATH. CHAOS + + + “_13th Nov._ 1884. + + +“I HAVE been away from home just two months—it seems like six, and I +shall be glad when it is over. I called to-day on Lord Lyons but found +him uncommunicative. We talked a while about things at Constantinople, +as to which he affected to know very little, and I told him I thought +the Government would be well advised to make its peace with the Sultan. +He thought this would be easy now that Dufferin had left Constantinople, +and discussed possible or rather impossible appointments of a successor. +Layard, he said, has been put out of all chance by the publication of +his last despatch. He asked me about Goschen, though saying he certainly +would not go back, as he wanted to remain in England. He also talked a +little about Dufferin’s chances of success in India, but said nothing +that was of the least importance. + +“There is a report again to-day that Khartoum is taken, and this time it +seems better founded. + +“_14th Nov._—We breakfasted with the Wagrams at Voisin’s. They had come +in on purpose from Gros Bois. Afterwards I called on Sheffield, who as +usual told me a great deal. Northbrook and Baring have been concocting a +report to please Gladstone. It will say that everything is going on for +the best in Egypt, and propose some temporary financial arrangements, +the reduction of the Egyptian army, a loan of eight millions, and a +speedy evacuation; all the administration to be in Egyptian hands, and +nothing at all in the shape of a protectorate. On the contrary, Egypt is +to be put under international control as before proposed. This has +throughout been Mr. Gladstone’s policy. Baring has insisted on all +English employés in Egypt reporting in this sense, and refuses to +forward their views if in contradiction. He only wants to flatter +Gladstone and hopes to be transferred to an Embassy. He will very likely +go to Constantinople. Hartington and Dilke, on the other hand, are +determined on a Protectorate, and on pushing on to Khartoum and +establishing a Government there with an English Governor—on staying in +Egypt and treating the whole thing like an Indian principality. +Sheffield says, however, that the Powers won’t stand this. Bismarck is +now hand in glove with the French and will give our Government a slap in +the face. He has given them one about the Congo, and he means to give +another about Egypt. He will probably propose to settle the Egyptian +question over the head of England. He was very angry at the stopping of +the sinking fund having been done without consulting him. It was not +Northbrook’s plan, who had no idea but that of conciliating the European +Powers and the Europeans in Egypt. But when he telegraphed that money +must be had, and proposed that the English Government should supply +£300,000 for immediate necessities, Gladstone settled the matter the +other way, saying that he had promised Parliament that no money should +be expended without their leave. Granville, in all he does, only +consults Mr. Gladstone’s fancies, knowing that his only hold on office +is through him. He has no policy of any kind except to obey the Old Man; +he likes office and he likes his pay, and hangs on. He knows he will +never be in office again. Gladstone only consults the electors. Between +them the whole thing is going to indescribable pot. + +“Malet’s appointment to Berlin is simply Bismarck’s nomination. He +refused Morier on the ground that he was an intriguer, and insisted on +having Malet, and our Government, being on their knees to him, +consented. Sheffield is of opinion that we shall have the whole of +Europe on our back in a very short time. + +“Now we start to-night for England. + +“_15th Nov._—Arrived in London by the early train from Paris. My first +visit as soon as it was light was to Button, who gave me all the news. +Northbrook has come back from Egypt, a more complete failure than any of +his predecessors. He was taken hold of there by the Greeks and other +commercial residents, and wrote a report, recommending a policy of +financial disinterestedness on the part of England. The coupons of the +Suez Canal shares were to be cut, England was to pay the Army of +Occupation, and finally to advance £20,000,000 without security. But +none of his colleagues will hear of such an arrangement, and he has been +made to suppress his Report—and there is some talk even of his retiring +from the Cabinet. He is delighted with the Khedive and the whole gang, +as was sure to be the case. Hartington and Dilke, when he came home, +told him he was an ass, and Button thinks they will get their way in the +end. This way is to guarantee three per cent. on all the debts, and +assume a Protectorate. He says that Gladstone will certainly not listen +to a word against Tewfik, but thinks I may as well write to him, and +propose to bring my new evidence against him. The style of argument we +may expect to be met with is that all Oriental evidence is worthless. At +the time when Churchill was bringing on the case against the Khedive +last year, he, Button, was staying with Northbrook in the country, and +he told him how important it was that the matter should be hushed up. +With regard to native evidence Northbrook said: ‘I have always made it a +rule to listen to all that can be produced, but I do not let it +influence me, I judge by the antecedent probabilities of the case.’ ‘You +refer I suppose to the Baroda case,’ said Button maliciously. ‘Well, +yes,’ he answered—‘that was my method, and I think it the safest one.’ + +“Then to Gregory’s. Sir William was at Dalmeny with Gladstone, and had a +great deal of talk there with Eddy Hamilton about Egypt, and about me. +Eddy talked nicely about me, but Gregory confirms what Button says, that +Gladstone is as wrapped up in Tewfik as ever. This is our great +difficulty. To Crabbet in the evening. + +“_19th Nov._—Again to London. Wolseley is in a mess. The Nile Expedition +can’t get on, and Gordon writes that he can only hold out to a certain +date. Wolseley is going to make a rush for Khartoum with a few hundred +men, but it is thought doubtful whether he will succeed. My letter +offering to re-open the evidence against the Khedive in the matter of +the Alexandrian riot has gone in to Gladstone, having been looked over +by Gregory, and a sentence altered.[91] + +“Dined at the Carlton, where I found the big-wigs of the Party very busy +over the compromise of the Franchise Bill. I felt rather like a spy +among them, though heaven knows I care nothing whatsoever about their +politics. Only I fancy they look upon me as a damned Radical. Leconfield +was there and we talked a little about horses. + +“_20th Nov._—Called on Stanley of Alderley, who lives in a garret, +leaving all the rooms of his house empty. He says the Ottoman Empire +will outlive the British. _Inshallah!_ + +“Luncheon with Lady C., who assured me the Prince of Wales is coming +round to my view of things in Egypt, but he is not Prime Minister and +can do nothing. Dined at the Gregorys’, and sat between Layard and the +Servian Minister. The latter assured me the Servian Government was doing +all it could to retain the Mohammedan population, while orderly and law- +abiding, but they would not stay. + +“_21st Nov._—Amir Ali, who is in London and whom I saw to-day, tells me +that Cordery is going on as ill as ever at Hyderabad. He talked of a +dinner at the Northbrook Club, at which Dufferin had made a speech and +explained to the Indian Mohammedans present what a great advantage it +was for him, now he was to be Viceroy of India, to have resided so long +at Constantinople, and to be in such cordial relations with the head of +their religion! The Sultan was a most admirable man, and they were the +greatest of friends! There never was a greater humbug than Dufferin. + +“_22nd Nov._—Saw Button in the City. He tells me Gordon has sent word to +say he can only hold out six weeks from the fourth of November. This not +on account of provisions, which are plentiful, but of ammunition. +Wolseley consequently intends to make a rush across the desert from +Debbeh, and expects to be at Khartoum with the New Year. All the +telegrams published about Gordon’s recent successes are military lies. +The ‘Times’ is very angry with Northbrook for what he said yesterday in +the House of Lords, and is seeking an occasion to waylay him.[92] Buckle +is not a revengeful man, but it is the ‘Times’ tradition not to forgive. +Chenery used generally to do this himself, waiting his occasion +patiently, and then himself writing the article, which he could do +better than anybody else. + +“_25th Nov._—Wrote to Eddy to hasten on an answer from Mr. Gladstone. +Called on Gregory to consult what was to be done. Churchill is going +away to India and Ceylon next week, and I hardly know how to act in +regard to him. + +“_26th Nov._—Khartoum is again surrounded by twenty-five thousand men, +and the Mahdi holds the passes between that and Debbeh. If so, +Wolseley’s rush will be a dangerous proceeding. Button tells me he means +to take three thousand men with him and artillery, but I doubt his +getting through and back with so few. + +“Mr. Gladstone’s answer has come: ‘In view of my inhibition to refer me +to the Foreign Office, he can only acknowledge the receipt of my +letter.’ My proposal had been that he should himself examine the fresh +evidence against the Khedive Tewfik. + +“_27th Nov._—To Robert Bourke’s. We talked over affairs at +Constantinople, which he understands. He is all for coming to terms with +the Sultan about Egypt. ‘If I had anything to do with it,’ he said, ‘it +is the first thing I should do.’ About renewing the charges against the +Khedive, Bourke was very adverse to anything being done. ‘If you proved +the case to demonstration, it could only do harm, for Tewfik is +necessary for English policy in Egypt. Besides, the case is dead now, +and you could not get any one to take interest in it.’ About India he +was curious to know whether Lord Ripon had really _promised_ Salar Jung +to restore the Berar provinces, and seemed to think the Foreign Office +at Calcutta quite right in resisting it.[93] There is little to choose +between the two parties as to these things. + +“Next to Randolph Churchill. He is going to India on Wednesday, and I +found him in so open a frame of mind as to Indian politics, that I +agreed to give him letters to some of my friends there so that he may +hear the native side of the case. I think it quite possible he may take +a right view, and if so he will be an invaluable ally. He has just +published in the ‘Pall Mall Gazette,’ a sort of manifesto which is +wildly democratic, and as popularity is his guide in politics it may +well be that he will look to it in India also. He is fond of large and +novel conceptions, and Tory democracy might easily be made a cry there, +too. So I risk it. Nothing can be worse for India than the Whigs. +Talking about Egypt, Randolph told me he had just seen Rothschild who +had news from Berlin that Bismarck had declared his intention of +supporting France in any answer she might give to the English finance +proposals, and Randolph seemed to consider that all the fat would be in +the fire. Button told me yesterday that Rothschild held an Egyptian bill +for a million sterling, and had made up his mind to present it at date, +that is to say about Christmas, and so make the Egyptian Government +bankrupt. I said nothing to Randolph about our new evidence against +Tewfik, as he is so imprudent. He is going to Ceylon, and I have +promised to announce his arrival, and have warned him of the little +split there is among the exiles. In spite of his faults it is impossible +not to like Churchill. He has so much _bonhomie_ and so little +pretension. This is the secret of his success. I am depressed all the +same at the aspect of things. I see no prospect now of getting back to +Egypt. Randolph told me even he dared not go there as the Government +would make it too disagreeable for him, not to say dangerous. He had +thought of spending the winter at Cairo, but he had decided not to risk +it. + +“_30th Nov._—Stead writes that he is ‘hungering and thirsting’ to see +me, as he hears I have all the latest news of the Mahdi, and he has an +idea of sending me to make peace with him, and asks for an interview. + +“_1st Dec._—Stead came at one, and we had two hours of it. I told him +peace could easily be made with the Mahdi, but it must be through the +Sultan and not Tewfik. He understood, he said, that I was in constant +communication with the Mahdi, and thought that when Wolseley got to +Khartoum I might go and open negotiations, and a deal more which, as he +is going to develop it into an interview for the ‘Pall Mall,’ I need not +write. I heard later from Button that it was he who had suggested the +thing through Reginald Brett, and it appears that he, Button, has all +along been putting it about that I have communications with the Mahdi. +He says that the French will accept the English financial proposals for +Egypt. Malet has been a great success at Berlin. Bismarck has been +pacified by concessions on the Congo. Lord Granville is to make peace +with the Chinese for Mr. Ferry, who in return will accept the proposals. +Italy is to be compensated in Tripoli, and the general portioning of +plunder to begin. I don’t believe the French will accept, as their game +in Egypt is too good a one. Button tells me the proposals were drafted +by Hartington and only accepted by the Cabinet on the distinct +understanding that if they broke down we were to clear bodily out of +Egypt. It is a toss up which way it goes. + +“_11th Dec._—(After several days’ shooting in the country, and a visit +to the Wyndhams at Wilbury.) To London and saw Button. He tells me a +deal of news. The French and other Governments, he is sure, will accept +the financial proposals for Egypt. Should this fail there will be a +split in the Cabinet, and Gladstone will go out of office. Hartington, +Northbrook, Dilke and the rest are for guaranteeing the debt. Gladstone +will not do this. They will try to carry things on by letting Egypt go +bankrupt, then if Europe won’t stand this Mr. Gladstone will resign, +Lord Salisbury will pass the Redistribution Bill, and Dissolution will +follow at the end of the year. Button himself is off to Tunis for six +weeks with his brother Mayo—a sporting trip. + +“Dined with Bertram Currie. Bertram has the same idea as Button about +the financial proposals; can’t understand the French being such damned +fools as to refuse them. His only wish as an Englishman is to get out of +Egypt; his only fear that we may be trapped into staying. We are the +only thing that stands between Egypt and anarchy, etc., etc. He is not +quite so confident, however, as he used to be, and talked of Northbrook +as having made a fool of himself; Northbrook is so jealous of Dilke or +anybody else going to Egypt that he had insisted on going himself. + +“_15th Dec._—Dinner of the National Arbitration and Peace Association in +honour of Hodgson Pratt. I was asked to return thanks on behalf of the +visitors, and I brought forward the question of peace with the Mahdi, +which was very well received. It is arranged I am to write a letter to +Pratt, stating my views, and to have it published. There were about two +hundred people at the dinner, which was given at the Criterion. Pratt is +a most estimable man, and his Association has a laudable object, but I +doubt its succeeding in the face of the growing brutality of the world, +and I am not at all sure that if it did it would not be a bad thing for +the East. The best chance for the East is, that the nations of Europe +should destroy each other. + +“_17th Dec._—Broadley called with a long story about presents made by +Ismaïl Pasha to the King of Italy. He, Broadley, is in Ismaïl’s pay in +respect to a lawsuit pending in Egypt. He talked also a good deal about +Rochefort and the Communist party, with whom he is intimate in Paris. +There is a scheme for annexing Morocco, and the Communists are doing all +they can to prevent it. + +“At the dinner to Pratt there was some talk of my standing for Greenwich +as Home Ruler at next elections. This is the only platform I could stand +on. + +“_19th Dec._—Stead and Appleton (Secretary of the Peace and Arbitration +Society) came to see me, and we had two hours’ discussion. Stead has +just been staying with Auberon Herbert, and was in high feather—a man of +genius in his way—very anxious to expound my whole plan in the ‘Pall +Mall.’ But I would not let him do this if it was to have a chance of +succeeding. It was a brilliant talk, and resulted in our deciding that a +deputation should wait upon the G.O.M. with which I am to be smuggled in +so as to get at him. My letter to Pratt about peace with the Mahdi is +published in the ‘Times’ and ‘Daily News,’ so I am committed to action +if called upon. + +“Lunched at the Carlton with Wynford. That noble Lord has his own +explanation of our failure in Egypt. ‘You may take my word for it,’ he +said, ‘it all comes of our officials there working on Sundays, it is a +breach of the decalogue which leads to other breaches.’ + +“_20th Dec._—Crabbet. Hunted in a snow storm on the Downs. On our return +found a Mr. Wheeler come to interview me for the Press Association. I +declined to let him print anything of my plans. He is an Irishman and an +amusing fellow, and had some good stories about people he had +interviewed. He had had to hunt officially with the Empress of Austria +one season in Cheshire, the Press Association keeping three horses for +him for the purpose. She rode well—but did not choose her own line. Lady +Rock-Savage rode much better. If Middleton, Bay Middleton, who piloted +the Empress, got a fall, the Empress always stopped. + +“_22nd Dec._—The ‘Times’ has a leading article on my proposal of going +to the Soudan, politer than is usual with them, but of course not +favourable. Wrote an answer going up in the train, and went to the ‘Pall +Mall’ office and gave Stead leave to write an interview, and then +lunched at the Gregorys’. The only possible way to pull this thing +through is by the press; not that I want at all to go to the Soudan. I +have other things far more important to do. But the Soudan is the thin +end of the wedge and we must drive it in if possible. + +“At six o’clock to a meeting of the Arbitration and Peace Committee, +where I found them quite prepared to let things alone. But Karl Blind +backed me up, and it was voted ‘unanimously and enthusiastically,’ that +Mr. Gladstone should be requested to employ my services. Afterwards I +had an interview with a so-called agent of the Mahdi, whom Ismaïl Jowdat +has brought to England. There is a kind of committee here in London of +Oriental sympathizers with the Mahdi, consisting of thirty persons, who +meet every night at a room they have hired for the purpose. Ibrahim Bey +is not an attractive man, an Arabic speaking Egyptian, with the true +Egyptian eyes, but with a curl in his hair and a very low forehead. In +Oriental dress I daresay all this would be concealed, but he wears +French clothes and has discarded even the fez. He is not attractive. His +conversation was more interesting than his face: he assured me there +would be no difficulty in my going to the Mahdi. The best route would be +by Massowa, as the road that way would be open, and he promised to send +word at once, that some of the Mahdi’s men should be on the look out +that way for my coming. Mohammed Obeyd, he said, Arabi’s right-hand man, +is now the Mahdi’s General, and of course would receive me well. He made +his escape after Tel-el-Kebir to Tripoli, and thence to the Soudan.[94] +The Mahdi also knows me well by name. I should have to go by +Constantinople, but arrangements would be made so as to assure me a +quick reception there. The whole thing would take just six weeks. +Ibrahim Bey will go with us, if I like, on Wednesday as part of the +Peace Deputation to Hawarden, but he is hardly a presentable man. + +“_23rd Dec._—My ‘Times’ letter is published, and in the morning Stead +sent me a proof of his interview to correct, a ridiculous thing which I +had to rewrite. [The proof was brought by an office boy, with a message +that it was to go to press in an hour, and it was a mere accident that I +was at home and able to stop it. It contained, among other extravagances +put into my mouth, that Egypt would be better annexed than continue ill- +governed as it was, an idea which, if Stead’s, was certainly not mine. +When I saw Stead later in the day and expostulated with him about this, +his answer was characteristic. ‘Well,’ he said, ‘if you did not say it, +it is just what you ought to have said.’] + +“_24th Dec._—Christmas Eve. By the 10.10 train to Chester with the Peace +Deputation to see Mr. Gladstone. It was to have consisted of three +persons, but Karl Blind and Dr. Clark missed the train, so I had Martin +Wood to myself. I never had much idea that Gladstone would see any of +us, and I was certain he would not see me. So we first sent a telegram +from Chester to say that ‘Mr. Wood had been deputed by the Arbitration +Society to wait on Mr. Gladstone, and that he had brought two gentlemen +conversant with Soudan affairs with him’—Jowdat, who had come with me, +and me. I made Wood add something about Christmas Eve to give us a +countenance, and, without waiting for an answer, we set off in a fly to +Hawarden. The only chance was to rush Mr. Gladstone before he knew who +we were, and we almost succeeded. We were evidently not expected, and +were received at the door by a young footman new to his work, who said +Mr. Gladstone was at home, and if Wood had had the presence of mind to +go in all might have been well. But he fumbled about for a card, and the +footman disappeared, only to be succeeded by the butler, an old hand, +who promptly said ‘Deputation,’ and with very little ceremony turned us +out. Wood weakly argued and appealed to the man’s feelings. But Mr. +Gladstone was ‘finishing his letters for the post, and then would have +his dinner,’ and we were shown the door. Going back to Chester we +plucked up courage, and drafted a letter, in which we endeavoured to +turn the tables, or at any rate to conceal our defeat. We consoled +ourselves by thinking that we were fighting in a good cause, that Mr. +Gladstone must feel ashamed of himself turning away a deputation of +peace on Christmas Eve. It was the climax of all. Here he was making a +senseless war for no object he dared avow, and afraid to look honest +people in the face. Shade of Midlothian! We sat on at the Chester Hotel +till two, and then took the Irish mail back to London—arriving in the +gray of Christmas morning, and bitter cold. + +“_25th Dec._—Down early to Crabbet, feeling ‘the satisfaction of a good +conscience.’ The ‘Pall Mall’ has published my revised interview, but of +course the Government won’t accept my offer. + +“_26th Dec._—Martin Wood’s letter, the one we wrote to Mr. Gladstone at +Chester, is in all the papers in the largest type, and the ‘Daily News’ +has an inspired letter, placing all the blame of the situation on +Bismarck. + +“Hunted with Leconfield’s hounds, the meet at Drungwitch, and had a good +old-fashioned run of two hours, through Plaistow into Sydney wood. Kars +carried me capitally. Anne rode Queen of Sheba. + +“_30th Dec._—Hunted with Leconfield at New Bridge, a run of an hour and +twenty minutes, I on Rataplan, Anne on Proximo (two Arabs we had brought +from India). It was a very rough bit of country, and it is really +astonishing that these horses who have never been across half a dozen +fences in their lives, should have gone as they did. Jowdat and Ibrahim +Bey at Crabbet. + +“_1st Jan._, 1885.—Jowdat and Ibrahim went away to London after I had +shown Ibrahim the horses. Ibrahim is by way of being an Arab by +birth—that is to say, his family was from Moeyla on the Red Sea, and he +turns out to be no other than that Ibrahim Bey Moeylhy who was Ismaïl’s +private secretary, and who was expelled from Paris by Ferry’s Government +a month ago in deference to the Sultan’s wishes. He is an agreeable man, +and extremely clever. It is arranged that we are to have a Conference +with Jemal-ed-Din at Boulogne, and they explained to me the nature of +the Franco-Russo-Indian Conspiracy, of which Jemal-ed-Din is the head. +If the Sultan does not work with him, they say they can depose him. But +he will work with them. They want to force terms of peace on England. +Otherwise they say there will be a revolt in India. [N.B.—This Ibrahim +El Moelhy, brother to Abd-el-Salam Pasha El Moelhy, was a well-known +character who subsequently played a variety of parts in many notable +intrigues both at Yildiz and Abdin. Besides his talent in this +direction—and he used to remind me of Fakredin in Disraeli’s novel +‘Tancred’—he was acknowledged to be the finest chess player in the East. +His pretence of being an ‘agent of the Mahdi’ had however very little +reality, Jemal-ed-Din alone having influence in that direction.] + +“_3rd Jan._—A letter from Selim Faris this morning which disquiets me. +It says that Hassan Pasha Fehmy’s mission from the Sultan, which has +been recently talked of, has for its object to make terms with the +English Government, but that it is intended to support Tewfik, and that +the only alternative is the restoration of Ismaïl, who is patronized now +by Bismarck. Jowdat has got a letter from Halim Pasha’s son, ordering +him back to Constantinople, and warning him against mixing himself up +with Irishmen or Hindus, as such a course might compromise the Prince. + +“_4th Jan._—Dined at the Club, where I had a long talk with Marlborough, +who is writing an article on the evils wrought by Christianity. He is +more intellectual than his brother Randolph, but less attractive. + +“_6th Jan._—Wolseley’s column has reached Gakdul without accident, and +people are again cock-a-hoop. Leonard Courtney tells me Gladstone is ill +with anxiety about Egypt. The departure of Hassan Fehmy’s mission from +Constantinople is announced. + +“_11th Jan._—Button came back last night from Tunis, which he says the +French have ruined,—trade gone, Arab peasantry gone, caravans gone, no +new colonists, old ones in despair. Passing through Paris on his way +home he had seen somebody belonging to the Embassy (Sheffield?), who had +told him that Lord Lyons was furious at the want of policy in Egypt. He +had a policy of his own which it would seem included Arabi’s return, for +Button had been asked whether it would not be possible to get up some +popular demonstration in favour of Arabi. From what he heard at Paris +the difficulty in Egypt is that the rich people evade paying their taxes +and are forty per cent short this year, the peasantry only five per +cent. Lord Lyons’ idea is that Arabi could force the rich to disgorge. +This is exactly in harmony with Knowles’s suggestion to me last year. + +“_12th Jan._—A letter from me in the ‘Times,’ in the best place, and a +leading article upon it.” This explained my position towards the Sultan. + +“Saw Button. He says the Government has decided nothing. Gladstone does +not mean to retire, or Granville, or Northbrook, or any of them. They +have no policy, except to wait on events. They mean nothing by +coquetting with the Sultan. Hassan Fehmy’s mission will lead to nothing. +They look on the Khartoum expedition as a walk over. But my friends +Ibrahim and Ismaïl are quite sure Khartoum has been taken long ago, and +that the steamers at Shendy are in the Mahdi’s hands.[95] + +“_15th Jan._—I have dispatched a letter to the Sultan through Halim +Pasha. + +“_17th Jan._—Button tells me the fate of Egypt will be settled this +week. The French counter-proposals have arrived, and Gladstone means to +clear bodily out of Egypt as well as the Soudan. He will not hear of +resigning alone, and Dilke and Hartington have caved in. The ‘Times,’ +however, does not give up its policy of staying on in Egypt for lost, +and a campaign is being organized of defiance to Europe. ‘Dilke,’ said +Button, ‘always said the only policy was a policy of bounce, and we are +going to bounce it, at a risk of a war with France. But nobody will move +a finger.’ ‘If you want to bounce,’ I said, ‘bounce behind the Sultan, +and I will go with you.’ Certainly I do not want to see Egypt handed +over to Europe. Mr. Gladstone must remain responsible, and must do +justice before he goes. Met Wolff at the Club, who urged me to bring +forward the case now against Tewfik. + +“_18th Jan._—Prepared a memorandum about Tewfik, and tried to find Wolff +to concert measures. Saw Stanley, who will put me in communication with +Hassan Fehmy. Stanley tells me Musurus talks of Tewfik as ‘incapable but +harmless.’ + +“Lady C. tells me the Prince of Wales is now well disposed towards me, +but says I am to be attacked as soon as Parliament meets. She does not +say by whom, or for what. + +“_19th Jan._—There is a telegram in the ‘Daily Telegraph,’ explaining +that Hassan Fehmy’s mission to England is to show an autograph letter +written by the Czar to the Sultan, offering him an alliance. This is +what I have suspected to be Russia’s game. Presided at a meeting of the +East India Association at Exeter Hall, the thing discussed being the age +of entrance to the Civil Service. The meeting was a small one; Stanley +spoke, and Connell, and Tom Hughes, an old twaddler of the first water. + +“_20th Jan._—Button’s bouncing article is in the ‘Times.’ He says the +Government will reject the French proposals, at least of a multiple +control in Egypt. + +“_21st Jan._—Called on Hassan Fehmy, and found Stanley there. We had a +long talk with the Sultan’s Envoy. Stanley explained who I was, and gave +me every help, for he is entirely without that small jealousy which +besets most men, and cares only for ‘the cause.’ We both urged on Hassan +Fehmy to be firm in his dealing with Lord Granville, showing him in how +much need the English Government stood of the Sultan’s help, as regarded +both Egypt and India, and I promised to keep him informed of all that +goes on. He seemed pleased at finding friends, for he is quite a +stranger here, being a good Turk of the old-fashioned sort, knowing +little French and no English, and never having played before at +diplomacy. His face is most sympathetic, and I like him extremely. He +seems honest and good, but without backbone enough for our Foreign +Office rogues. + +“To Bowles at the ‘Vanity Fair’ Office. He advises me to stand for +Parliament, and has suggested Salford, where he says they want a +Conservative Home Rule candidate. He has been nursing the constituency +for two years, but now under the new regulations would not get in +without the Irish vote. With it he says I should certainly be returned. +It is perhaps worth thinking about. + +“_22nd Jan._—News of the battle of Abu Klea—Burnaby killed, as it serves +him right, for he was a mere butcher, and eight other officers including +young De Lisle. Here the bloody work begins again. But this time the +butchery will not be all on one side. They have been pretending for the +last four months that the Mahdi had no men with him, and behold 10,000 +at the first battle; that the Western Soudanese would not fight like +those of the East, and behold the British square broken by their charge +and 800 men throwing their lives away! They must be under good +discipline too, or they would not have waited so long without attacking. +Now Stewart’s[96] army will at any rate not attempt to reach Khartoum +till Wolseley comes up, and then it will be too late. + +“These English soldiers are mere murderers, and I confess I would rather +see them all at perdition than that a single Arab more should die. What +are they? A mongrel scum of thieves from Whitechapel and Seven Dials, +commanded by young fellows whose ideal is the green room of the +Gaiety—without beliefs, without traditions, without other principle of +action than just to get their promotion and have a little fun. On the +other side men with the memory of a thousand years of freedom, with +chivalry inherited from the Saracens, the noblest of ancestors, with a +creed the purest the world ever knew, worshipping God and serving him in +arms like the heroes of the ancient world they are. It is over the death +of these that we rejoice. No, I desire in my heart to see their blood +avenged, and every man of Stewart’s butchering host butchered in their +turn and sent to hell. Gladstone! Great God, is there no vengeance for +this pitiful man of blood, who has not even the courage to be at the +same time a man of iron? What is he that he should have cost the world a +single life? A pedant, a babbler, an impotent old fool. + +“Button tells me the idea at the War Office is that Stewart will send +back his camels to Korti, and that then Wolseley will reinforce him with +2,000 men. Omdurman, Gordon’s outpost, is taken, and they will push on +for Khartoum at all risks. + +“My idea is that Khartoum has fallen already, and that the whole thing +will end as it deserves in disaster. + +“They seem to have come to terms with the Sultan, at any rate about the +Soudan, which they will hand over to him—when they have got it. I hope +Hassan Fehmy will stand firm. He was to see Lord Granville to-day. + +“Dined again at Pembridge Crescent, where John Pollen has just returned +from India. Lord Ripon seems fully to have enjoyed his triumph and John +with him. Stanley called in the evening in James Street. He is a good +friend and a good ally, and shares all my bitter feelings against +Wolseley and his cut-throats. + +“_23rd Jan._—A long list of killed and wounded published, but no more +news of Stewart. Got down home to Crabbet where there is bright sun +instead of the London fog. The ‘Pall Mall’ publishes ‘from an exalted +source’ (Ismaïl’s?), a fanciful programme of Hassan Fehmy’s terms. I +wish there was any chance of their being the true ones. + +“I met Hardinge[97] yesterday at the Club, and talked with him about +Constantinople. I said that Hugh Wyndham deserved great credit for +having brought about a reconciliation between England and the Sultan, +but he laughed at this. ‘Between ourselves,’ he said, ‘Wyndham had +nothing at all to do with it. He had a quarrel with the Sultan two years +ago, and has not been on speaking terms with the Palace since.’ I said: +‘I suppose our little friend Corti managed it for him.’ To this Hardinge +did not answer. Of course it was Corti. + +“_24th Jan._—There is no news from General Stewart, except a ‘bazaar +rumour’ that he is surrounded, and the British public is beginning to +get alarmed. Now we shall hear crying and lamentation. Great God! what a +stupid dull beast the world is. It sends an army out to fight against an +innocent people, and an innocent people destroy that army. One would +think that not a single M.P. from Mr. Gladstone downwards had ever read +a word of the history of Greece or heard of Marathon. This stupidity is +more hideous even than their cruelty and lying. But if there is a God +upon the earth He will this time do justice. + +“The evening papers announce Hobart’s arrival in London. + +“_25th Jan._—Went up to London by the early train to see Hobart. But +first I saw Button, who detailed to me the military situation. It +appears that on the 28th of last month [N.B.—There is a confusion here +as to date. The dispatch referred to is doubtless that of 4th November] +Gordon wrote to Wolseley a long dispatch, in which he said he could not +hold out more than a certain number of days, and for this reason General +Stewart’s expedition was sent. Wolseley would have made it more numerous +than it was if he could have got transport, but he sent every camel he +could lay his hands on. The dispatch was a long one, and stated that +Gordon had steamers at a certain point, about fifteen miles above +Shendy, and proposed that naval officers should be sent to man them. It +particularly mentioned Charlie Beresford as the man to take charge of +them, and for this reason the naval brigade was sent. Gordon had also +written to explain that his reason for dispatching Colonel Stewart and +the rest by river to Dongola was that he understood from Mr. Gladstone, +or rather Lord Granville’s telegram, that no expedition would under any +circumstances be sent to relieve him. All this will be published when +Parliament meets. Button thinks, all the same, that it won’t turn out +the Ministry. He said that the War Office were expecting news hourly, +and that if it did not come to-day, they should consider things had gone +wrong with Stewart. With regard to the diplomatic position, the +Government had accepted the French proposals after all, only protesting +against a Multiple Control; and the French Government had accepted the +acceptance. This is unfortunate, as they may now think they can do +without the Sultan’s help. But our position is still an immensely strong +one, and Button promised to help all he could in the ‘Times’ if we +attacked Tewfik. Buckle is fortunately away, and Button will have things +much more in his own hands till Parliament meets. It won’t be my fault +if we don’t play trumps. + +“Luncheon with the Gregorys. Lady Gregory has arranged with Stead that +Layard shall be interviewed in support of the Sultan. At the Clubs +people are in a great state of excitement, waiting news from Metemmeh +which does not come. I found Godfrey Webb among others. We went together +to call on George Currie, who has just bought the little Gothic House in +Park Lane, a really charming one, Gothic though it be, where we found +Alfred Montgomery. Then to 27 Grosvenor Street, where Hobart has taken a +house. With Hobart I had a long conversation; he had seen the Sultan +before he left, and the Sultan’s idea was by hook or by crook to get a +footing in Egypt. The English Government, he said, were ready to +withdraw their troops to Alexandria and Port Said, and to admit Turkish +troops to Cairo. And the Sultan was thinking of sending a contingent to +help Wolseley in the Soudan, under the belief that half the Mahdi’s +people would lay down their arms at the command of the Caliph. I +exhorted Hobart not to let the Sultan do anything so foolish. I know the +situation, and if the Sultan were to join the English the Sultan would +become as Tewfik has become. They would pay no attention to him, and he +would lose all his influence. With the stream he can ride on the top of +the wave; against it he can only be drowned. I urged him to get Hassan +Fehmy to play a strong game and insist as a preliminary to all +assistance that Tewfik should be deposed. He then told me in confidence +that the Sultan had told him in confidence, that he hated Tewfik, but +that he considered it politic to get a foothold in Egypt first on any +terms. Hobart thought that Hassan Fehmy would not be bold enough to +depart from this plan, or propose Tewfik being replaced. However, he +would try, and as he had a private cypher with the Sultan, he could +telegraph to him all my ideas. I asked him how I was regarded at the +Palace, and he said: ‘At first they could not understand what you were +driving at, but now they see you are a friend and accept you as such.’ + +“Lady C. is making an active propaganda in my favour and in favour of my +ideas. She tells me old Lucan[98] has been with her to-day, and has told +her that the War Office has got news that Stewart is in fact surrounded, +and he will have to capitulate. The news is not exactly official, but +they seem to believe it. + +“_26th Jan._—To see Button. He says the acceptance of the French +proposals has stopped the negotiations for the present with the Sultan, +but they will come on again, and he strongly advises that Hassan Fehmy +should declare himself against Tewfik, and promises that if he does the +‘Times’ will bring the matter forward. Buckle is away on his honeymoon +till the 19th February, and Button will have things pretty much his own +way in Printing House Square, so I have drawn up a memorandum for Hassan +Fehmy of the language he should use, and shall try and get him to send +in a dispatch to Lord Granville without delay. + +“_27th Jan._—Stanley came to me in the morning, and highly approves my +draft memorandum, and we went together to call on Hassan Fehmy, but he +was out, and I have left the memorandum with Stanley to read to him. +Lady A. sent a message by him to say she wished to see me, and I had +luncheon at her house in Grosvenor Street. She is very anxious about her +son, who is with General Stewart, but I had little to say to comfort +her. She would naturally, she told me, sympathize with the Arabs, and +her son, too, had sympathized with them after the Suakin campaign. But +such is the desire of military glory he had volunteered nevertheless. I +also saw Pembroke yesterday, who has grown a beard, and is looking twice +the man he was. He, too, is in a state of anxiety, for Reggie Talbot and +Heale Phipps, both members of the Wilton Club, are with Stewart. Such +are the glories of war. + +“_28th Jan._—The evening papers announce Stewart’s arrival at last at +Metemmeh after more slaughter, another hundred men or so killed and +wounded on the English side, and two thousand they say on the side of +the Arabs. This is infinitely disgusting, and the only thing which seems +to mitigate the evil is, that being now in communication with Gordon by +steamer they may be willing to rescue him, and retire as they said it +was their intention to do. They can perfectly well do this by river, +without any more battles, and the Mahdi has still a large army on the +river bank, between Metemmeh and Khartoum. The Arbitration Association +have elected me to their executive Committee, and have called a meeting +for to-morrow. + +“_29th Jan._—Had a long talk with Ibrahim Bey. I asked what could be +done in the way of getting up a demonstration in Egypt against Tewfik. +He said petitions might be addressed to the British Government asking +for his deposition. The Ulema of the Azhar would sign it, except El +Abbasi, the Sheykh el Islam, who is Tewfik’s creature. Some of the +Notables might and a number of village Sheykhs, but not the Mudirs, as +these are Government officials paid by Tewfik. If the English Government +would give the least encouragement every man in Egypt would sign it. As +to Arabi, he said all the poor are for him, but the rich won’t hear of +him. He urged me to go to Paris and talk things over with Jemal-ed-Din. + +“Hobart, Whittaker tells me, has just been staying at Sandringham. The +Prince of Wales said to him: ‘I suppose we shall have to get rid of +Tewfik.’ Hobart’s instructions from the Sultan are nothing but a +programme of conciliatory language, and compliments to the Queen and +Prince of Wales. He is only here to advise Hassan Fehmy. Hassan Fehmy’s +audience at Osborne was not a success. The Queen would not talk on +important matters, and was not particularly gracious. I am afraid his +mission will lead to nothing. His only chance was to speak out loudly +and firmly, and insist on Tewfik’s deposition. I have got the peace +people to vote a resolution urging Gladstone to retire from Khartoum, +and make peace with the Mahdi. I drafted a letter for them to Gladstone. + +“_30th Jan._—Bowles has published my caricature in ‘Vanity Fair.’ Saw +Brett with Button, he and his master, Hartington, are all for smashing +the Mahdi and keeping Khartoum and Eastern Soudan. If I wanted +evacuation he advised me to send in a memorandum to Chamberlain who has +just been declaring that the Soudan is to be handed over ‘to its own +noble savages.’ Brett is a clever, but unprincipled[99] young man, and +manages all Hartington’s intrigues for him with the press. Button and +Stead are the two he works through most, and their latest achievement +has been getting Temple, who married Hartington’s first cousin +(Lascelles’ sister) made Bishop of London. The ‘Pall Mall’ has been +urging it for the last three weeks, and now it is done. The stupid +public fancies that Stead is a wonderful prophet, when he insists on +this and that policy, and when the policy is adopted. But Hartington +pulls all the strings and gives him the information, and so the campaign +against the Grand Old Man goes on. I am not sure whether Dilke is still +in with them, but I fancy he is. Chamberlain has broken away. Brett, +though of course an enemy to my ideas, sometimes gives useful hints. I +asked him to-day what they were going to do in Lower Egypt. He said: +‘You are going to have English Administration.’ + +“_1st Feb._—Dined with George Currie in Park Lane; Alfred Seymour was +there, and Newton, the Police magistrate, also Walter Seymour, who is +just starting on another venture to Venezuela, this time with a cargo of +arms to make a revolution. Alfred Seymour has a story of Sir Peter +Lumsden having resigned his mission in Afghanistan rather than carry out +the Government’s concessions on the frontier. + +“_2nd Feb._—Wrote the draft of a letter to Chamberlain, urging an +immediate evacuation of Khartoum, but shall keep it till Wilson returns +from Metemmeh with news of Gordon. + +“Old Lord Mark Kerr[100] called in the morning, ‘out of neighbourly +feeling’ he said, as he lives almost next door (in James Street). I had +correspondence with him two years ago about Arabi. + +“Lunched with Button. He has told me more particulars of the Hartington +intrigue. He says that not only was Gordon sent to Khartoum without a +Cabinet Council, but Wolseley also was sent without one. The whole +expedition has been an executive measure, which not all the members of +the Cabinet have ever agreed to. Similarly the financial proposals for +Egypt have never been agreed to by Lord Northbrook, and the Cabinet has +been going on in this way for a year, each minister running his own +hare. Now, however, Chamberlain will break off and leave the rest, +hoping to come in on the top of the wave with the new elections. + +“Letters have come from India showing that Randolph, thanks to my +letters, has been well received, and there is one I am specially glad to +get from Seyd Huseyn at Hyderabad.[101] Salar Jung has invited Randolph, +and he has accepted the invitation. + +“_4th Feb._—Button says there are great things brewing all over Europe. +The French Government, although it promised an answer on the Egyptian +finance question last Wednesday, has remained silent. There is a hitch +somewhere in the negotiations. There is a row between Germany and Russia +on account of the King of Bulgaria’s proposed marriage. The Portuguese +have seized both banks of the Congo, being in league with France, etc. +Bismarck is furious because the Congo Conference seems likely to break +up as the London one did. If we have any luck, there may be a good +general European war all round. + +“Dinner at Lady C.’s, who is anxious I should go into Parliament as a +follower of Churchill’s. She says the Prince of Wales is angry with me +because I only care about the Arabs in this infernal war. Afterwards to +a party at Lady Stanley of Alderley’s (Lord Stanley’s mother), where I +had some talk with Frederic Harrison, and hope to get him to take part +in a peace meeting. Lady Stanley talked about the war, as to which they +are all very cock-a-hoop now. They can’t take any interest, they say, in +the Arabs, because there are so many of them; when a thousand are +killed, there are always thousands more to take their place. Dilke was +there. + +“_5th Feb._—Went to see Lord Mark Kerr, whom I found at breakfast, +walking uneasily round, and eating a mouthful from time to time. He is a +good, excellent man, but vague in his ideas to the verge of insanity. +His instincts are admirable, and he has glimmerings of great thoughts +about the East. He sympathizes with the Arabs as he does with the Indian +natives, and is very angry just now at the Duke of Connaught being +recalled from India instead of being made Commander-in-Chief. ‘The Duke +is not clever,’ he said, ‘but he understands how to talk to a gentleman +in the East—and they should have made him Commander-in-Chief.’ Lord Mark +will help us at any meeting we may get up. + +“Then to see Stanley, who urges me to call again on Hassan Fehmy and on +Staal, the Russian Ambassador, who wants to see me. He, too, will help. +On my return I found Mark Napier, who announced the unexpected and +glorious news of the fall of Khartoum. This turns all our plans topsy- +turvy, but to our great advantage, and I rushed off at once to see +Hassan Fehmy, and had the pleasure of being the first to give him the +news. There was another Englishman with him when I arrived, and the +Ambassador put on a _figure de circonstance_ when he heard what had +happened. But as soon as the Englishman was gone he took me by both +hands, and a smile of pleasure broke out over all his face. He promised +me to have nothing to do with ideas of helping with Turkish troops +against the Mahdi, and seemed quite disposed to follow all my advice. I +left him to seek Button, and fortunately found him just come from the +War Office. It seems that Wilson[102] was delayed by the shallowness of +the river, and took four days getting up to Khartoum from Metemmeh. On +arrival he found the citadel dismantled, no flag flying, and the whole +place full of Arabs, who opened fire on him, and then he turned tail, +and by another accident all three steamers ran aground, and there they +still are, Wilson planted on an island, and the news brought in a boat, +as I understand, by Stuart-Wortley. Button says that Stewart’s force at +Metemmeh runs no risk, as it has abundance of provisions, but I can’t +believe this. In any case the expedition has come altogether to grief, +and the outside of what there is to hope Button says, is that Stewart +can be relieved, and the British Forces concentrated for the summer at +Metemmeh. There is no question of an advance now on Khartoum. It is +unknown what has become of Gordon. Indeed, the whole thing is +conjecture, as Wilson did not land. Button tells me that the Rothschilds +got a telegram this morning from their agents saying that there was no +truth at all in the story. But this cannot be, as Button has seen +Wolseley’s dispatches at the War Office. + +“Lunched with Mark Napier at St. James’s Club, and have agreed to take +him with me if I am sent to make peace with the Mahdi. This seems not +altogether impossible. I met Austin Lee[103] and reminded him how I had +told him they would have to come to me after all. Also Philip Currie +sent me a note in the afternoon asking me to dinner for Saturday, a +thing he has not done for long. I had just time to run in and see Lady +Gregory that we might rejoice together, and then I was interviewed by +Wheeler for the Press Association, and got away by train home to Crabbet +where young Hardinge has come down to hunt. This has been a day of +consolation, and I could not help singing all the way down in the train. +Why had I so little faith? + +“_6th Feb._—A beautiful morning, and we went down to Shoreham, had a +capital run of six miles quite straight over the Downs without a check, +and killed in Newtimber Holt. Hardinge was with us, riding Proximo, and +went all the way close behind the hounds. Harry Brand was out, and we +had a long talk about the Soudan. He says the Government are all for +going on with the war. He himself had been in favour of sending me out +to make peace. But the country would never stand anything now but war. I +told him, if he had any influence with the Cabinet, to use it for the +recall of Wolseley’s expedition, which would certainly suffer great loss +if it stayed. I am strongly of the opinion that Gordon is alive, and +equally of opinion that Wolseley is the worst man in the world to +negotiate for him if he is a prisoner. + +“Had a good deal of talk in the evening with Hardinge. He agreed with me +that Dufferin was too fond of humbugging people to succeed in the East. +He had been very idle, too, at Constantinople, leaving all the work of +the Embassy to Wyndham. The Turks, however, were afraid of him, and he +had got a good deal out of them in the way of claims and such like, +though his main policy had failed. Dufferin was sore about Egypt, where +he considered himself to have been a failure. He thought he could have +carried out his programme if he had been left at Cairo longer. Wyndham +had quarrelled with the Sultan by accusing him of intriguing in Egypt. +He had done this in a fit of temper, but the Sultan never forgave. +Hardinge knew all about how Dilke had worked up the Egyptian war, and of +the dirt Malet had been made to eat. He has a poor opinion of Baring. + +“_7th Feb._—To London early and saw Hassan Fehmy, whom I found in a +state of entire perplexity to know what to do. I therefore had no +difficulty in persuading him to write a formal dispatch to Lord +Granville, protesting against what was going on in Egypt and Soudan. He +asked me to write the draft for him, and I promised to do so. He gave me +a long account of all that he had said to Lord Granville, which seems to +have been very little to the point. A more hopelessly muddled old +gentleman I think I never met, honest though and anxious to do his duty, +which is far better than to be a clever rogue. However, we will remedy +it all by a dispatch that will make old Granville rub his eyes. Button +is of opinion that Wolseley will not be at all anxious to carry on the +campaign at a great expense, but will rather be for negotiating. His +only idea in this direction is to offer money. Harry reproached me +yesterday with having gone over to the Sultan, but I said: ‘If your +hounds change their fox what is the huntsman to do? Is he to go on by +himself or to go with them?’ Down in the afternoon to Wilbury, a day of +wind and rain. Percy Wyndham is staunch in opposition to the war. Wrote +the draft dispatch for Hassan Fehmy. + +“_9th Feb._—At Wilbury. Hunting from Elbarrow, I enjoyed the day more +than any this season. + +“_10th Feb._—Button telegraphed to me last night to come to London as +there was something important going on in connection with Hassan Fehmy’s +mission, so I went up. He has seen Brett who tells him some new and +unexpected departure is about to be taken with regard to Egypt. The +Sultan’s mission is once more in favour. But it may mean many things. +The Sultan ought to offer mediation in the Soudan. Lunched with Lady +Gregory, and in the afternoon went with Stanley to take part in the +Indian Reform Association’s deputation to Lord Ripon. After it was over +Stanley and I had a private talk with Lord Ripon, and we begged him to +expostulate with the Government against sending Indian troops to the +Soudan. He said he would certainly use any influence he had in that +direction, but assured us it was not necessary, as no troops would be +sent. Nevertheless it is announced to-night in all the papers. + +“Dined with Button at the Marlborough Club. It is announced that Gordon +is certainly dead, and there are sensational accounts of the sack of +Khartoum. I am inclined to think it just as well, in the cause of peace, +that the worst should have happened. It will take away the excuse of a +further advance. Button says they all mean war to the knife, but I am +convinced that in six weeks Gordon will be forgotten, and there will be +a strong reaction against the war; then the Government will slip out of +it. If Gordon was alive and a prisoner, then the excitement would be +kept up till he was released. + +“_11th Feb._—George Wyndham is ordered with the Guards to Suakin, and I +have asked Jemal-ed-Din to give him a talisman in case of his being +taken prisoner by the Mahdi. But it is on condition that he does not use +it for any _ruse de guerre_. + +“Saw Hassan Fehmy, who described to me a visit he paid yesterday to +Gladstone. Mr. Gladstone had been most charming, but had not, it seems, +committed himself to anything definite. He, the Pasha, was very angry +about the Italian occupation of Massowa, but I could not get out of him +exactly what proposals he had made on the Sultan’s behalf. Button +declares that it was arranged positively three weeks ago that Turkish +troops should occupy Cairo, but the acceptance by France of the +financial proposals stopped this. Now, however, he tells me, as a great +secret, that the proposals have again broken down. And that is the +reason why they are anxious again to arrange matters with the Sultan. +Hassan Fehmy was very cordial, and promised to come down to Crabbet as +soon as these worries are off his hands. I gave him my draft of his +dispatch to Lord Granville which Stanley had translated into French, but +it was written on Sunday when we thought still that no arrangement could +be come to with the Foreign Office. He said, however, that he would keep +it to use in case the present negotiations broke down. Speaking of +Ismaïl Pasha, he said I might trust him not to compromise himself in +that direction, that the Sultan knew very well that Ismaïl was his worst +enemy. + +“_12th Feb._—Down again to Wilbury, another day’s hunting from Vernham +Gate, and had a hard run of an hour across very steep hills, and killed +in a wood. Kars carried me well, and I was again in front all the way. + +“There is news of another bloody battle in the Soudan. General Earle +killed this time. Morley and Courtney have come out well in favour of +peace, and I am sure the Government will not be allowed to go on with +this butchery. To-night’s ‘Pall Mall’ has an article strongly for +Ismaïl. + +“_14th Feb._—Hunted in Savernake Forest. + +“_15th Feb._—Wilbury. Major Poore, an old disciple of Urquhart’s, +called, and I had some interesting conversation with him. Urquhart +doubtless was the founder of a remarkable school of political morality, +but his eccentricities injured its effect, and much of his practical +teaching is now old-fashioned. + +“_17th Feb._—To London early. I find everybody very angry with Gladstone +for having been to the play the very night the news of Gordon’s death +was received, and I hear that he was hissed in St. James’s Street. + +“To Lymington’s wedding with Miss Pease, the Quaker heiress. We may hope +soon to get the Quakers on the side of peace. Hitherto they have been +dead against it. + +“Talked with Hobart Pasha at his Club, the Army and Navy. He saw +Gladstone yesterday, who told him that he had never had any ill-feeling +towards the Turks, indeed had rather liked them than otherwise. Harcourt +told him that the Government knew that the Sultan’s only wish was to +restore Ismaïl.[104] As to this Hobart expressed to me his great anger. +They have had nothing to do with Ismaïl, who has spoiled Hassan Fehmy’s +mission. + +“_18th Feb._—Button is very anxious to find out what is in the air. I +went accordingly to Hassan Fehmy, and had a few words with him—but he is +a hopeless man. Lord Granville complains of him that he, Hassan, +understands nothing that he says, and that he, Lord Granville, +understands very little of what Hassan says. I can well believe it. He +seemed vexed at being questioned about Ismaïl. + +“Dined with Mrs. S., where Philip Currie was. His special business now +at the Foreign Office is the Afghan frontier. This he flattered himself +he knew thoroughly. ‘The Russians,’ he said, ‘have the strongest hand, +but we hold half a dozen good cards which we may play well.’ It will +take better playing than he gave his cards in Egypt to prevent a war. + +“_19th Feb._—Looked in at Gregory’s. He is writing a plea for Arabi’s +recall to Egypt in the ‘Nineteenth Century.’ It is generally admitted +now in the light of the Soudan rebellion that the Egyptian war was a +mistake, and Arabi an honest man. Jem Lowther, whom I met to-day, says +the Opposition have decided on a Vote of Censure, and the declaration of +an alternative policy in Egypt. It must be either Arabi or annexation. +He said he himself was for annexation. There is a sensational account in +the ‘Pall Mall’ of a retreat from Metemmeh and the recall of Wolseley. I +hope Buller will get his force back without fighting, as defeat might +now injure the cause of peace. People are much agitated about this at +the Carlton, among others Pembroke. While at a meeting of the Peace +Committee we heard Gladstone hooted on his way to Westminster. +Parliament met to-day, and it must have been a gloomy business for the +Grand Old Man to announce his policy of blood, especially as it will +mean a policy of defeat. General Stewart is dead of his wounds. + +“Labouchere sent word to say he wanted to know Ismaïl Jowdat’s address, +and I called on him to-day. He tells me Herbert Gladstone has been at +him to try and find out a way of communicating with the Mahdi. We had a +long talk on the subject. Herbert Gladstone is used by his father as a +go-between, and communicates with the Irish through Labouchere. +Labouchere assures me that many Parliamentary arrangements have in this +way been made up between the Grand Old Man and Mr. Parnell. And he says +it is delicious to hear Mr. Gladstone afterwards denying them in the +House of Commons. I promised him to put the Government in communication +with the Mahdi’s agents whenever they like. + +“_20th Feb._—Labouchere writes that he has seen Herbert Gladstone again, +and wants me to advise the Mahdi to constitute some one his regular +agent by sending him credentials. I had already thought of doing this, +and I had another long talk with him about it. The essential, he says, +is that the thing should not be known, as the Government could never +carry a proposal through the House to employ me in treating. But all the +same they would like to treat, and we agreed that the base of +negotiation might be the complete evacuation of the Soudan by the +English and Egyptians, and a restoration of the Wady Halfa frontier. +Suakin might be given to the Sultan, and in any case must be evacuated +by us. On this basis a peace or truce might be effected and Wolseley’s +troops withdrawn. Labouchere was very amusing about the various little +intrigues he had helped to carry on for Mr. Gladstone, and I hope this +one may succeed as well as the others. He says that on one occasion +Gladstone got his own side to vote against him. + +“Lady Gregory has told me the whole of her husband’s conversation with +Mr. Gladstone (which he had not told me). It was after dinner on +Tuesday. Mr. Gladstone insisted on talking to Sir William in spite of +friends who tried to interrupt. He began by asking him what he would do, +and Gregory said he would certainly not go to Khartoum. To this Mr. +Gladstone replied: ‘Oh, I think, from all the information in our +possession, that the taking of Khartoum will not be a very difficult +matter.’ ‘The difficulty you think,’ said Sir William, ‘will be after?’ +‘Ah, yes,’ said Mr. Gladstone, ‘a twenty times greater difficulty. If I +only knew what was then to be done my mind would be easy.’ He then asked +Sir William whether he thought it would be possible to treat with the +Mahdi. ‘How can we approach such a man? Through what channel and on what +terms?’ ‘There is,’ said Sir William, ‘but one man who could help you +there.’ ‘And who is that? You don’t mean Blunt?’ ‘No,’ said Sir William, +‘not Blunt. I am thinking of Arabi.’ ‘Ah,’ said Mr. Gladstone, ‘that is +a point on which you and I differ. You think Arabi an honest man. I +think him a _consummate blackguard_. Why, I have had in my hands letters +signed by that man in which he offers to barter the liberties of his +country to the Sultan!’ Sir William asked him at what date these had +been written, and Mr. Gladstone said about three weeks before the +bombardment of Alexandria. ‘At that time,’ said Sir William, ‘I suppose +all the Egyptians had been driven into the Sultan’s arms. I do not alter +my opinion of him, which is what it has always been, that he is an +honest man and a patriot.’ ‘Ah,’ said Mr. Gladstone, ‘what would I not +give to believe it with you! If I could only believe him honest _I would +jump at him_.’ This we think rather hopeful, but I fear the old man’s +pride will be too strong for him. + +“Ibrahim Bey called again, and I told him I thought it better he should +not come back to James Street for the present, as it might compromise +us, that the Government were in a fair way to treat and that it would +not do to frighten them. He expressed his willingness to go to Suakin on +a mission if required; and perhaps some day we may use him in this way. + +“M. Taschaud, a Belgian dignitary, called. He is the promoter of +arbitration and peace abroad, and especially I fancy of his own glory. +He is the author of a pamphlet called the ‘Future of Egypt, by an ex- +plenipotentiary,’ and seems to know people about. He assured me that he +had written this pamphlet as an article for the ‘Fortnightly,’ but that +after it was in print Escott had substituted for it the famous article +signed ‘G.’ This, M. Taschaud says, was certainly written with Mr. +Gladstone’s consent, though not by himself. His ideas of Egypt I do not +share, as they seem to consist of internationalizing it for the profit +of Europe. + +“Stanley writes that he has seen Hassan Fehmy, and that it is all right +about the ex-Khedive Ismaïl. So I am satisfied. But I am glad all the +same that they are not thinking now of employing the Sultan to mediate +in the Soudan. He would only make a mess of it. Lunched at the Carlton. +Dined at St. James’s Club with Walter Seymour. Saw Eddy Hamilton looking +pale and harassed. He acknowledged himself pretty near dead beat. I +said: ‘When Wolseley is a prisoner, you will know where to find me.’ + +“_21st Feb._—Nebbi Ullah[105] called and I urged him to come to the +Soudan Conference and protest against the employment of Indian troops +against the Mahdi. He promised to do so and to get others to speak among +the Indians now in London. I think that will have a good effect. After +this came one Johnstone, who is getting up a large meeting in St. +James’s Hall for the week after next, and who has asked me to preside. +He represents himself as having command of the working men’s +association, and says he can get together a good number of popular +working men speakers. I have promised to preside as he wishes, and it +certainly can do no harm, especially as the meeting is to ask for +Arabi’s recall to Egypt as well as for an abandonment of the Soudan +campaign. + +“Then Drummond Wolff called, who wants materials for his speech on the +Vote of Censure. I gave him the text of my letter to Gladstone of last +April proposing to mediate in the Soudan; and urged him strongly to get +the Fourth Party to take up the cause of peace. It was sure to be the +winning cause. + +“After him John Morley, who came for the same purpose and stopped to +luncheon. He wanted particularly an argument against the Slave Trade +cry, and to know whether the Mahdi could be induced to treat on a +civilized basis. He told me that Dilke had told him yesterday that Mr. +Gladstone’s speech on Monday in answer to the motion of censure would be +pitched in quite a different key and far more peaceable. He, Morley, is +to follow immediately after Northcote, and then Mr. Gladstone will reply +to both. It is all very well Morley coming forward now as the champion +of peace, but it was his defection from Frederic Harrison and me last +year that decided the Government to send the expedition. If he had +spoken out then as he does now, he would have prevented it. But he +wished to please his constituents at Newcastle with whom the legend of +the Grand Old Man still survives. I did not, however, reproach him with +the past, as it would have done no good. + +“At the Carlton I coached a third M.P., Robert Bourke, who seems coming +round now to Arabi. I should not be surprised if the Conservatives took +him up after all. + +“Then I called on Cardinal Manning and sat with him an hour in his +private room in which he certainly looks very much in character. It is a +large room, but he has made it habitable with a tall screen lined with +bookcases running round the fire, and ensconced in which he sits. I +never saw him looking better, and complimented him on the effect of his +abstinence. This pleased him. I wanted him to take an active part in +favour of peace, but he would not do this, as he said he was forbidden +by his rulers to take part in politics. But he sympathizes much with my +views, as he has always done, though not very understandingly. Talking +of the English Catholic Laity, he said they were hopelessly dull—most of +them—very old-fashioned Conservatives, and he did not think I should get +much support out of them. The Irish, of course, supported me, but that +was out of hatred to England—and it would not advance my cause. Cardinal +Manning is a link for me with the extreme past, for I have known him +nearly forty years, and I think it is a pleasure for him to see me for +the same reason. He leads a very lonely life, out of harmony with those +about him, and clinging to old recollections. He talked warmly about old +Sussex days and the kindly relations existing there between all classes. +He is very hopeless about England’s prospects, and indeed the news to- +day is enough to make Englishmen gloomy, for Buller and his force seem +surrounded at Abu Klea, and it may well be that even Wolseley may have +to capitulate before the summer is over. + +“_22nd Feb._—The ‘Sunday Times’ has a sensational ‘victory’ at Abu Klea, +but it is evidently not worth much, as Buller is still tied by the +leg—‘want of camels.’ This is just what will make all these campaigns +impotent. Then, being unable to move, they will run short of provisions, +and then the hot weather will come. They will be ‘hemmed in’ by the +Arabs, and unless they make peace will have to capitulate. Button tells +me the Government are ready to treat with the Mahdi on almost any terms +he could ask, and advises me to go to Paris and start negotiations +there. I shall go, but must first hear the opening of the Debate of +Censure. With regard to that, Button tells me some of the Cabinet are +very anxious to get beaten. Chamberlain told a friend of his last night +that he would far rather go to the country and explain peace than have +to explain war. If Morley would only accept Mr. Gladstone’s speech on +Monday as a peace speech and withdraw his motion, many of the Whigs +would go over to the Tories and turn the Government out. I have written +an article on Hassan Fehmy’s mission for Button for the ‘Times,’ and I +took it to him to-day. It is against my rule to do this, as I have only +once written an unsigned thing for them, namely, the article on the +Palmer expedition. But this is an exceptional case. Button says the +Conservatives are all talking now of Arabi and are half disposed to take +him up. They would certainly make terms with the Sultan if they came +into office. + +“Ferid Bey, the First Secretary of the Turkish Embassy, called. He is +very much against the Mahdi, and believes that but for him the English +would long ago have left Egypt. I did my best to persuade him to take a +broad view, and suggested that if they wanted to treat with Lord +Granville effectively they should mass 20,000 men at Gaza. + +“To Crabbet by late train. + +“_23rd Feb._—Wrote to Morley repeating what Button had suggested about +his withdrawing his amendment, so as to turn the Government out and have +a good honest opposition to the war, and also about Ibrahim Bey’s +statement published on Thursday. Beta, who I hear is Morier, mentions it +and challenges me to say whether it is authentic, and I have begged +Morley to say from me that it is so. + +“We hunted with the Crawley and Horsham hounds from Patching, and had a +pretty run across the down to Steyning, whence we came home, Kars having +cut his fetlock with a flint. + +“Up to town in the evening and dined at Lady C.’s. She says all her +friends now are speaking well of me. Met Henry Chaplin at the Carlton, +who thinks Wolseley’s army is lost. + +“_24th Feb._—To Button early. He tells me Philip Currie, with whom he +talked, is anxious to get into communication with the Mahdi, but of +course not through me or anybody who can really help him. The Censure +Debate came on last night, and, though Mr. Gladstone was not of course +outspoken, his speech was nevertheless distinctly more peaceable than +the first. It seems, however, to have been a miserable exhibition of the +old hair-splitting arguments, like all the rest he has made on the +Egyptian business. I cannot understand his reputation as an orator. He +certainly has an extreme facility and power of statement, but he neither +touches nor convinces. It is a lawyer’s eloquence, not a statesman’s—at +least this is the impression his speeches have always made on me. Button +thinks nevertheless he will get his majority, but that the Government +will go to pieces on some smaller issue during the Session. + +“Called on Stanley to tell him something of my plans, and then went by +the tidal train to Paris. + +“_25th Feb._—At the Hotel Wagram. Sanua called last night and we talked +affairs over, and this morning I had two hours with Jemal-ed-Din. I find +there will be more difficulty in treating with the Mahdi now than I +thought, or than would have been the case last year, for the taking of +Khartoum has altered the situation considerably. Also they are much +elated at having killed five English generals, a thing never heard of, +they say, in any war. These they count to be Hicks, Baker, Stewart, +Earle, and now Gordon—and the Mahdi’s terms will be correspondingly +high. Still, Jemal-ed-Din says distinctly that peace can be made if the +English are willing, _first_, to abandon the Soudan, _second_, to hand +over Suakin to the Sultan, _third_, to use their good offices to get the +Italians out of Massowa, and _fourth_, to arrange with the Sultan for +the establishment of Mohammedan Government in Egypt. The recall of Arabi +would much facilitate matters, but any popular Government in Egypt could +be on friendly terms with Mohammed Ahmed. With regard to the method of +treating, Jemal-ed-Din says it is essential that the English Government +should make the first move. The Mahdi could not under present +circumstances send an Embassy to England, or even appoint him (Jemal-ed- +Din) his _wakil_ for that purpose. The Embassy must be sent by England, +and all he can do is to forward it to its destination and recommend it +as a _bona fide_ mission. I asked him about Gordon’s bible, which Mrs. +Allnatt has been very anxious I should try and get back; but Jemal-ed- +Din declines to hold out hopes of its restoration until peace is made. I +begged him, however, to try to obtain it, as if he succeeded it would be +a great proof to our Government of his power. There was an article on +Jemal-ed-Din in yesterday’s ‘Times,’ which is correct as far as it goes, +but Jemal-ed-Din is angry at their having left out all that he said +against Ismaïl Pasha and Prince Hassan’s appointment to the Soudan. + +“Had a long talk at the Embassy with Bungo Herbert[106] on the Mahdi +question, but I don’t know that it will do any good, as Lord Lyons they +say has left off expressing any opinion on Egyptian affairs, as his +advice has never been taken. Herbert is his private secretary now, +Sheffield being away. + +“_26th Feb._—Jemal-ed-Din and Sanua to breakfast. I read them my letter +to the Sultan, which they highly approve of. About Afghanistan, Jemal- +ed-Din assured me that the talk of a quarrel between Russia and the Amir +was all nonsense; that the quarrel, whenever it came off, would be +against us; that the Amir would give free passage to Russia for the +invasion of India, but neither were ready yet for this. + +“There is a telegram in the papers that the Nizam has offered troops for +the Soudan, and at this, too, he laughed. He said they always offered +troops, as they knew they would not be accepted. When Sanua was gone he +told me privately that he had thought over my proposals of negotiations +with the Mahdi, and was sure it could be done. But he would have nothing +to do with it unless the English Government would show its sincerity by +employing me or someone else he could trust to represent them. Then he +would introduce the mission, which must also be accompanied by a +Mohammedan, to a man of high station in Egypt who was in a position to +speak as to terms. He himself was not in such position, and he could do +no more than indicate the way to others who would give the necessary +introductions and safe-conducts to the English agent. It must, however, +be distinctly arranged beforehand that the English Government should +engage itself to protect the persons through whose agency the +negotiations should be carried on. They must not be allowed to suffer at +the hands of the Khedive. He was of opinion that not only a peace might +be made, but also a treaty of commerce, and perhaps even a slave trade +convention—the latter to the extent of guaranteeing the Abyssinians from +slave raids inasmuch as these were illegal. He declined, however, to +enter into communication with any English official on the subject until +I should be first convinced that their intentions were serious, and that +the protection was guaranteed to the Mahdi’s _wakils_. I am well +satisfied with this view of the case, and all the more so from finding +Jemal-ed-Din so cautious in his promises. He does not think it would be +judicious to apply for Gordon’s bible just now. + +“Gladstone to-day recants his declaration of abandoning the Soudan. But +all this debate is selling the bear’s skin before it is killed. My +opinion is that the Berber railroad will never be made, except perhaps a +few miles of it, and that as soon as the Nile rises Wolseley will run +for it down the river to Egypt. + +“_27th Feb._—Hassan Fehmy’s mission it seems is to be recalled, the fall +of Khartoum having altered the situation. Prince Halim writes again, but +this time not about politics, asking me to get him a pair of horses for +the Sultan to drive. In his letter the other day he mentions having +delivered my letter to His Majesty. The horses must be above all things +‘very quiet,’ as the Sultan wishes to drive them himself. + +“Saw Lady Gregory, and had breakfast at the Blounts.[107] Afterwards to +call on Lesseps, but he was not at home. Then to the Embassy, where I +found Walsham, Herbert, Leigh, and another, and talked nonsense with +them for an hour in the Chancery as in old days—also old Atlee, a relic +of the past. Malet is dining to-night at the Embassy. I am dining with +the Wagrams. + +“_28th Feb._—Came over to London by the tidal train and went at once to +see Button. The Government have escaped the Vote of Censure again by the +skin of their teeth—a majority of fourteen only. Button was in the House +to the end, and he says the Old Man was quite overcome when the result +was announced. This is the only thing in the world that can make him +feel. The most hideous failure abroad, war with every nation, India in +revolt, the Empire breaking up, the colonies lost—all these things could +not touch him or make him sleep a wink less sound. But an adverse vote +in the House—that was a very much more serious thing. It is a defeat he +is able to understand. It will be the end of him, though Button thinks +he will not immediately resign. The debate, he says, was in its latter +part of a high order. The first two days the Opposition made nothing of +it, and Northcote was miserably weak, and John Morley a mere +opportunist, but Goschen’s speech was the turning point, and from that +point it was brilliant. By far the best defence, curious to say, of the +Government was made by Lord Derby in the House of Lords. It was Harcourt +who did most damage to them, as he was put up on Thursday to explain +their explanations, and did so entirely on peace principles. But this +was probably arranged, as Dilke and Hartington followed suit. The great +question is—will they resign? We discussed the probabilities of a new +Cabinet, and agreed that Lytton ought to have a seat at one of the +administrative departments. Button says public opinion would hardly +stand him at the Foreign Office or India Office, though I am of opinion +that for the former he is just the man. Churchill will have the India +Office, he says; possibly Hicks Beach the Foreign Office; Lytton more +likely the Admiralty. But I rather doubt his taking office at all. The +Ministry will, however, not resign till the Vote of Supply, when they +will be beaten again. + +“_1st March._—To the Carlton, where I saw Drummond Wolff. He has put a +question about my peace negotiations last year, and drew an answer from +the Grand Old Man which seems to have been very mixed. Mr. Gladstone +excused himself for having refused to see me at Hawarden on the ground +that I ‘should have had him there at my mercy.’ There is more truth in +this than he perhaps meant. + +“_2nd March._—To Button’s, who told me all that had happened on Saturday +at the Cabinet Council. It appears that, Granville having explained that +it was absolutely impossible for him to get on any longer with Bismarck, +and in view of the other complications, all the Cabinet but two had been +in favour of resignation. Mr. Gladstone had quite made up his mind to +this, but Spencer and Trevelyan explained that if they resigned now Lord +Salisbury would dissolve Parliament, and that Parnell would then have +his seventy Home Rule members, and the result would be a revolt in +Ireland; this was the true reason of the Government’s decision to stay +in office. The only thing that does not sound credible in the account is +that it represents the Ministry as having sacrificed party interest for +duty to the country. But it is perhaps easier patriotically to stay in +office than patriotically to resign. The thing moreover cannot last +long, and it will only end by their being kicked out on the Vote of +Supply. It is thought, however, that if Salisbury found himself with a +majority only of one he would carry on the Government without +dissolving. Stead has been persuaded by Dilke not to publish Gordon’s +letters to me. The Government are helping now to get up a memorial to +Gordon and it would not do to publish his private ideas about them. + +“_3rd March._—Went down to the India Office, where I had a talk with +Godley about an attack made on me by Lepel Griffin in connection with my +visit to India. He begged me to give him an account of my offer of +negotiation made last year to Gladstone. He said: ‘You know I have for +three years past disapproved of the course that has been taken in +Egypt.’ Nobody knows better than Godley how easily Mr. Gladstone might +have prevented the whole thing if he had listened to me. + +“Lady C. tells me that the Prince of Wales is going over to Ireland, as +I understand her, on a mission of pacification. I fancy the idea is to +settle the Irish question eventually on the lines of the Austro- +Hungarian settlement; and the idea might work. I don’t suppose the +Parnellites have any grudge against the Crown, though they have against +the Castle, certainly not against the Prince of Wales. But we shall see. + +“Dined at the Carlton next to Jem Lowther, and talked about Egypt and +the Soudan. It is astonishing what crude ideas these Tory leaders have. +People are not wrong in calling them the stupid Party. If I can get into +Parliament I may be able to help them to new notions on Foreign +politics. + +“_4th March._—Refused Escott and Bunting and Alfred Austin to write +articles for them respectively in the ‘Fortnightly,’ ‘Contemporary,’ and +‘National Reviews,’ on the Mahdi. I think it best not to write on +current politics in monthly magazines. These magazines are beginning to +get past their best day as organs of publicity. There are too many of +them, and nobody reads them. + +“The Wentworths came to dinner, and we went on with them to a meeting in +Westminster Town Hall. It was poorly attended, but the speeches were +decidedly good. Wentworth spoke with something approaching to eloquence, +and Harrison made a really admirable oration. My own speech was +descriptive of the Mahdi and Gordon’s mission. It was well received. The +meeting then was invaded by some Socialists and became very noisy. I +confess my sympathies are with them, as they speak the truth, however +brutally, about governments and financiers. I have been asked to repeat +my speech as a lecture at Cambridge. It was as usual quite different +from the speech I had prepared. + +“Met Edward Malet to-day in St. James’s Park. We nodded. + +“_5th March._—Button says about the Soudan expedition that Wolseley +would have to come home, first, on account of his eyes, which were +suffering, and they could not afford that he should go blind, as he does +all the work at the Horse Guards, even now that he is in the Soudan, +telegraphing instructions daily—and, secondly, in view of war +complications. The expedition is breaking up rapidly, and it will be as +I said, not a regiment will remain south of Wady Halfa by midsummer’s +day. + +“Labouchere, on whom I called, tells me the same story. He had it from +one of the Government that there was no intention at all to make the +railway to Berber. They would make it a few miles out from Suakin, +perhaps to a hill station. But even that I doubt. We discussed the +subject of the negotiations, about which he had written to me. His idea +was that I might send the Mahdi a message from the Radical Party, +advising him to send an agent to propose peace, and asking him what +terms he would accept. But I told him this would never do. The Mahdi +would require to be acknowledged, and would only treat with the +Government. All they could expect of him was that the two +plenipotentiaries should meet in Egypt. He said the difficulty was, that +to do so would be to snub Baring and Wolseley. We finally agreed that I +should once more write to Mr. Gladstone, and place a renewal of my offer +on record. This I must do before the 20th, when new battles are expected +with Osman Digna. I look, however, on the Mahdi as quite safe now, with +the summer before him, and the certain change of public opinion here and +foreign complications for our arms elsewhere. + +“_6th March._—Bismarck seems to be interfering once more as honest +broker, and has sent his son Herbert to London; and I notice at the same +time that the telegrams announce Hassan Fehmy as instructed to use +stiffer language to Lord Granville. He is to say that the English +explanations are vague and unsatisfactory. They are at their wits’ ends +at the Foreign Office to know what to do. But their first step will be +to recall Wolseley and his army to Cairo. + +“_7th March._—To see Stanley. He has heard that Bismarck has promised +Granville to use his good offices with Russia to prevent any further +advance on the Afghan frontier. Talked the same matter over with Button, +who is very full of the subject, and who gave me a full account of the +position as it has been told him—in the greatest secrecy. It appears +that Bismarck has recently come forward ostensibly to make peace. This +is always the avowed motive of his interventions, but his offers +generally cover some objects of his own. In the present instance he +wants Zanzibar, and Button has it on his ‘best authority’ that in a very +short time the Zanzibar question will be brought forward. The Sultan of +Zanzibar has long wished the English Government to guarantee his son’s +succession to the throne, but we have refused, and now he is appealing +to Bismarck. There is therefore likely to be question of a German +protectorate, and its declaration will coincide with claims by Germany +to other places on the East Coast of Africa. Bismarck’s mode of action +with Lord Granville is to bully him through Malet, for whom he professes +the greatest possible affection, and whom he charges with his explosives +to hurl at Granville’s head. Granville replies, not through Malet, but +through the German Ambassador. Malet is not thought man enough to beard +the lion, though they are pleased with him for the information he gives +them. He is in fact very much in the position of a ‘Times’ correspondent +at Berlin, obliged to make himself agreeable as a condition of his +receiving news. + +“Herbert Bismarck’s mission was suggested at New Court [the Rothschilds’ +house of business in the City] and carried out through Rosebery, who is +Rothschild’s representative in the Cabinet. At first it was proposed by +the Jews that some one should be sent from London to Berlin, but failing +this they suggested Herbert Bismarck’s visit. The Rothschilds are very +anxious that German influence should predominate as they see in it a +guarantee for England’s remaining in Egypt, and Granville seems to have +given in to the idea, as this morning there is published an abject +apology he made last night in the House of Lords. Button thinks very +likely Bismarck may have promised his good offices with Russia, but does +not think they are sincere, and his real object is Zanzibar and the East +Coast of Africa. On the other hand the Foreign Office, as apart from +Lord Granville, is for a renewal of the Anglo-Franco-Turco Alliance of +1854, with a self-denying clause regarding Egypt. This would enable us +to evacuate Egypt without the fear of French occupation succeeding ours. +They would also mutually oppose Germany’s arrangement with Zanzibar. I +am not sure that this would not be the best solution of the difficulty. +I told him in return about Bismarck’s old scheme of renewing claims to +the Dutch Colonies. [This refers to a principle of German policy, the +details of which I had learned as long before as the late autumn of +1866, when I was staying with Count d’Usedom, then Prussian Envoy at +Florence, at the Villa Capponi outside that city. Usedom was a man of +great enlightenment, and had been the trusted friend of the old King +Frederick William in his Liberal days, and the chief of Bismarck’s +rivals, being especially obnoxious to him on account of his English or +rather Scotch wife, Olympia Malcolm, and his suspected Anglomania. I was +very intimate with both of them, and as they were both very indiscreet I +got to know a great deal of the inner designs of Prussian diplomacy, +making, however, no use at all of my knowledge. Amongst other things +that Usedom told me was this, that it was a settled plan at Berlin to +bring about, in connection with the proposed revival of the German +Empire, also a union with Holland, when Germany, having become a +maritime power, would reassert against England, on Holland’s behalf, a +claim to the old Dutch Colonies.] + +“We then talked about the Afghan complication. He said the whole +difficulty came from an absurd habit the Foreign Office had of asking a +great deal more than they were willing to take. This place, Penjdeh, was +outside the real boundary of Afghanistan, but the Foreign Office had +asked for it meaning to yield it later as a concession. But the Russians +in the meanwhile had seized it, and the concession was rendered ten +times more difficult. Button has it (but he made me promise not to +repeat it as he was not even to allude to it in the ‘Times’) from a +certain source that in view of possible accidents, or at the Amir’s +request, Lumsden has received orders to occupy Herat and put it in a +state of defence. I told him, however, that the Russians did not really +mean war, certainly not war with the Amir, but were making a +demonstration in order to detach the Amir from our alliance. This +incident will not lead to war. + +“In the afternoon attended a deputation to Lord Ripon given by the +Indians resident in London. Anne was seated on the daïs next Lord Ripon. +The noble Lord made a humbugging speech in which he praised the Nizam +for offering to send troops against the Soudanese. He is already +corrupted by association with his Whig friends in office. Lady Ripon has +asked us to her party next week. + +“_8th March._—Down to Crabbet, marking trees in Heathy Ground and +Burley’s Wood, and laying out a new gallop in the Upper Park. This has +been a quiet day, and has done me good, for the excitement of the last +week has made my heart ache. We went to see Pompey, who is very ill and +cannot last long now. His illness gives him a dignity which is touching, +and which I hope we may all have before we die. [Pompey was my black +servant who had been with me for eighteen years.] + +“_9th March._—To London, and called on Lady A., whose son now I hope is +safe, at least for the present, as the Buller Division is on its way +back to Korti. I did not like to call on her before. + +“_10th March._—Leonard Courtney[108] writes proposing that I should +breakfast with him on Thursday, to talk over possible negotiations with +the Mahdi. From all I hear, the Government are ready to jump at any +possible arrangement, so it is through anybody else but me. Called on +Button, who says war is nearly certain with Russia. But I cannot bring +myself to think Russia means to quarrel with the Amir—with us very +likely, but not with him. I expect it will blow over. Button advises me +to call on Staal. + +“_11th March._—Saw Hobart at his club. He tells me the Sultan has +telegraphed to him expressly forbidding him to do anything about sending +troops against the Mahdi. He wanted to know whether the Mahdi was really +opposed to the Sultan, and I satisfied him on that point, and we agreed +to act together in any negotiation of peace that might be arranged. + +“_12th March._—Had a long talk at the Russian Embassy with Staal, for +whom I have a great affection. We talked the whole political situation +over, on my part very frankly, and I told him he must not expect a +revolt in India. He of course deplored the prospect of war, which he +seemed to think imminent, though I do not. I told him all about the +Egyptian War and the Mahdi and Gordon, and the absurdities of our +Ministers. He described having been at Walmer, and how he had found Lord +Granville surrounded by dispatch boxes, tied up with different coloured +string, according as they were pressing or not; the very immediately +pressing were tied up with red tape. A proof that the Czar does not mean +war is that the Emperor of Germany has written to him asking him to +preserve peace, which he certainly would not have done unless he knew +the Czar to be willing. For my own purposes I should like there to be a +war with Russia, or at least an alarming demonstration. But my +conversation with Staal will not have had an otherwise than deterring +effect. I told him very plainly that England meant fighting. Nélidof, he +said, had been very nearly recalled from Constantinople, but had now +been sent back there with renewed favour. + +“Breakfasted with Leonard Courtney at 15, Cheyne Walk, and discussed +with him and his wife the prospects of negotiating with the Mahdi. I had +brought with me the draft of a new letter I was proposing to write to +Gladstone. He said it was not definite enough, and urged me to recast +it, stating the exact terms which I thought might be accepted as a basis +of negotiation. We also talked over the whole situation and the +relations of the Mahdi with the Sultan, with the National party in +Egypt, and with the Mohammedans of India. His wife is a nice woman and +more enthusiastic than he is, and at leaving I urged her to use her +influence with him to keep him up to the mark. These Parliament people +are absurdly pusillanimous, and though Courtney is the boldest of them +he is only half-hearted to speak his mind. Button tells me that he used +for years to be on the staff of the ‘Times,’ having only left them when +he took office three or four years ago. He was considered one of their +very smartest leader writers, but of very dictatorial ways. He is +evidently a very able man. When I came home I re-wrote my letter to +Gladstone in the sense agreed upon, and, saying _bismillah_, sent it +in.[109] In my covering note to Eddy, I said: ‘The fate of several +empires depends upon the reception it receives’—the Russian, the +Turkish, the Mahdi’s, and our own—also it is the ‘Ides of March.’ + +“To a party at Mrs. Earle’s and had some talk with Lytton. He is +bringing out his novel in verse, ‘Glenaveril.’ It is to come out in +parts, published by Murray. + +“_13th March._—The Gregorys are back from Paris. He approves of my +letter to Gladstone. Then to Labouchere, who tells me the Government are +dying to get out of their Soudan campaign. They decided on going to +Khartoum in the first excitement of their disappointment about relieving +Gordon, and hardly knowing whether he was dead or alive, and they have +ever since been repenting. Lately they have been hoping to get out of +the Suakin campaign by some pretext of sending on the troops to +Afghanistan instead, but they can’t quite get up a case for it. They +have never intended making the Berber railway, but only a few miles of +it, as far, perhaps, as Sinkat. Now Osman Digna is stronger than ever, +and insists upon making raids on Suakin. + +“_14th March._—Lady Gregory came to tea, and afterwards I walked home +with her. On my return I found an answer from Downing Street. Eddy +writes that ‘Mr. Gladstone is obliged to me for my letter, but why does +not the Mahdi send a representative to England?’ This looks more like +business than I had expected. + +“Dined with Professor Hunter and half a dozen Radicals at the Reform +Club, where it was proposed to me to make a tour of lectures in +Scotland. Hunter engaged to get me good audiences at Aberdeen, +Edinburgh, Glasgow, and other places. There was also much talk about my +going into Parliament with them, but my connection with the Carlton Club +naturally stands in my way. + +“_15th March._—Zebehr has been arrested at Alexandria by Wolseley’s +order, just as Button told me he would be six months ago. This is really +too bad. + +“The Prince of Wales is going to Berlin to try and effect a +reconciliation with Bismarck. He considers war with Russia inevitable, +‘and a damned good thing too.’ At least such is Lady C.’s account of +what he told her. He had also said that Wolseley was to come back from +Korti, and that the Soudan campaign would come to a natural end in a +very short time. He was all for making peace with the Mahdi. + +“_16th March._—To Button, who confirms this news. + +“_17th March._—An idle day at Crabbet, except that I attended my +neighbour Sir Curtis Lampson’s funeral. He was always an excellent +neighbour to me, and I sincerely regret him, as I believe most do. I met +the funeral just as it was coming through the Rowfant covers, where I +have so often shot with him. He was a very good sportsman, and, though +seventy-nine, held his gun remarkably straight to the end. He was an +American, a member of the Hudson Bay Company, and bought the Rowfant +estate from the Bethunes some forty years ago to breed silver rabbits on +for his firm. He was made a Baronet in connection with the Atlantic +Cable and the Peabody Trust, whose executor he was. R.I.P. + +“_20th March._—The Mudir of Dongola has been joined by the Kababish and +Shaghiyeh tribes, and is going to attack Berber. This is the last we +shall hear of him as Wolseley’s ally, but they are such geese they +suspect nothing. Ibrahim Bey told me a week ago: ‘You will see that in +about ten days the Mudir of Dongola will go over openly to the Mahdi.’ +He thought Zebehr’s arrest a stupid move, as he was not really a friend +of the Mahdi’s. + +“_22nd March._—Eddy Hamilton writes, giving a message from Mr. +Gladstone, to the effect that, ‘If it is thought the Mahdi is not aware +of the instructions to Wolseley about receiving offers of peace, it +might possibly be arranged that the Arab gentleman should be passed +through the British lines.’ This in answer to a question made on the +sixteenth as to whether he would facilitate Ibrahim’s going to Khartoum +to arrange a mission of peace from the Mahdi. + +“The ‘Observer’ announces severe fighting, and that Graham has retired +to Souakin. + +“_23rd March._—To Courtney, to try to get him to take a lead against the +Soudan war, but he said he had left the Ministry too short a time to do +this. He thought Morley was the man for it. + +“At five to Mrs. Howard. She is of opinion that they mean to treat, and +treat through me, but of course want it to be supposed the desire is all +on the Mahdi’s side. She has seen Leveson, Lord Granville’s brother, who +is decidedly for getting out of the Soudan. So I believe is everybody. +George, however, is all for war; he means to leave Parliament after this +Session. There was news of another battle this morning, in which the +English forces were surprised by Osman Digna. + +“_24th March._—The fighting of yesterday has been a very serious affair, +and I think settles Graham’s campaign at Suakin, not on account of the +proof it has given of the courage, skill, and numbers of the Arabs so +much as on account of the destruction of the camels, and especially of +the camel drivers. No native will now dare go outside Suakin, and the +English soldiers will be left to shift for themselves. Whatever else +they can do, they certainly cannot manage camels without help. This will +stop Graham just as it stopped Wolseley. + +“Button, whom I saw to-day in the City, tells me they certainly will +send me to treat with the Mahdi. Matters, he says, stand in this way: +the Government has sent in an ultimatum to Russia on the Afghan boundary +question, and the answer will be given in four or five days—Button +thinks it will be refused—and then the Government has made up its mind +to clear straight out of the Soudan, and even out of Lower Egypt, except +Alexandria, handing over Cairo to the Sultan who will send troops in. In +return for this the Sultan will open the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to +the British Fleet, which will attack Batoum, with the idea of advancing +to Baku and so cut off the Caspian communications. This, however, would +not be at once, the campaign being commenced in Afghanistan. They are +ready to fight Russia, if necessary, for three years. The chief +difficulty will be to prevent Austria from advancing on Salonica; but it +has been ascertained that Bismarck will use all his influence to +localize the war and prevent Austria from taking part in it. Bismarck is +not ready for a solution of the Ottoman question. They will then be only +too happy to employ me in making peace with the Mahdi, and my employment +would now, Button says, be a popular thing, and it would not much matter +whether I succeeded or not. At the end of the summer, having evacuated +the Soudan, it would be out of the question their going back there. Only +will Russia fight? I doubt it. + +“Ibrahim has explained to us Zebehr’s position. The real reason of his +arrest, he said, was not so much that he had corresponded with the +Mahdi, as his connection with the Senoussis. He has latterly been very +intimate with Ibrahim el Senoussi, Senoussi’s relative and agent at +Alexandria, and in conjunction with Huseyn Pasha, the Tunisian, he has +been engaged in working upon the Senoussi brotherhood to get them to +join the Mahdi, and in his name to attack the French in Tunis. Ibrahim +Bey says, though he naturally sympathizes with Zebehr, it is +nevertheless just as well that this plan has been stopped, as the result +would have been to bring about a community of interests between the +French and English in smashing the Mahdi. + +“_25th March._—It appears that our troops lost over three hundred men on +Sunday, besides seven hundred camels and a number of mules and horses, +and one hundred and fifty camp followers. Osman Digna is wielding the +sword of the Lord this time in earnest, and if there is a God in Heaven +he will prevail against the hosts of Mammon. + +“Hunted from Barcombe, and had the best run of the season from a wood +north of the Chailey brook to Lewes race-course without a check. There +the fox was headed, and it took us another twenty minutes to kill him in +a gorse cover; I was riding Queen of Sheba, and, though I did not get a +very good start, I was first up at the check. There was some good +fencing which the mare did admirably, including one very stiff timber +jump with ditch beyond, which she raced over. Up the hills she passed +them all but four or five, and once on top of the down she had no +difficulty in going quite to the front; Anne on Dahma was also well up. + +“When we came home we heard that Pompey was dying. Thus is pleasure +mingled with grief; Pompey has been nearly eighteen years in my service. +He was an admirable servant. + +“_26th March._—There are signs of the Suakin campaign being near an end, +and I feel certain another month will see the whole thing abandoned. +This will be the greatest victory of the Faith since the siege of +Vienna. Arabi writes very _à propos_ about the weak things of the world +confounding the strong, and the triumph of justice in the Soudan.[110] + +“To London and lunched with the Howards and sat on talking politics. +George is all for war, but he thinks that Lorne, whom he had just been +with, would willingly put himself forward in an agitation for peace, and +Mrs. Howard will approach him to that effect. Then I walked down with +George to the House of Commons to hear Gladstone make his statement +about the Egyptian Finance Convention. This he did so lamely and tamely +that I went to sleep over it, as I observed others also did. + +“Halim Pasha has written to Ibrahim to say that Ismaïl Jowdat, on his +arrival at Constantinople, was met by a message that he was to come to +the Palace. There he was kept twelve days and made to draw up a report +of everything he had seen, heard, or done while in London, and then was +sent home and kept there under arrest. Such is the Sultan’s way. + +“Dined at Sydney Buxton’s,[111] where I sat next Mrs. Courtney. She +talked about her work in the east of London, and said she had succeeded +because she had no system. She did not seem clear that it was possible +to improve the condition of the lowest class of people by anything but +individual effort. She thought education might help them to help +themselves; wasn’t sure whether teatotalism was a good thing. To me all +these matters are absolutely hopeless; system has interfered with the +natural law of society, and unnatural misery is the result. Mrs. Buxton, +on the other side of me, told me a story of Hartington having lately +written to a friend to say he could not make out why they were fighting +the Mahdi, as he, the Mahdi, seemed to be the only man who was carrying +out the policy of Her Majesty’s Ministers. Francis Buxton was there, and +we talked about Dilke’s connection with the Joint Note of January, 1882, +and he cited, _à propos_ of it, a conversation he had had with Dilke at +the end of the previous year. He had told Dilke that the Liberal party +would never consent to the annexation of Egypt; to which Dilke had +replied that Egypt might be annexed without calling it at all by that +name. There is no doubt he played all through for annexation. + +“_27th March._—Gave Wheeler a translation of Arabi’s letter; I think its +publication will do good. Dined at Mrs. Charles Buxton’s, and had some +talk with Lord Chancellor Selborne. He was ready to admit they ought +never to have gone into Egypt, but thought them bound now to stay and +repair the wrong done. I told him, certainly, they had wounded the man, +and must now take care he was not left to be robbed by every passer-by. +This _à propos_ of the Financial Convention being debated to-night. + +“_28th March._—To Button, who showed me a letter he had just got from +Wolseley, dated ‘Camp Korti, March 2,’ narrating his vexation at being +forty-eight hours too late to save Gordon, and his anger with Mr. +Gladstone. He then recounted how his plan had been upset by Burnaby’s +death. He had intended Burnaby to succeed Stewart if anything happened +to Stewart, and had told him his plan, but both of them got killed; and +the rest of ‘our London captains,’ Wolseley said, were good for nothing +to take command of the expedition, so the whole thing had broken down. +History, he said, would judge where the fault lay. He was evidently +sorry for himself and down on his luck. Button tells me it was all in +reality Wilson’s fault, as he wasted three days bombarding Metemmeh and +Shendy; also he ought certainly to have sent in a man with the flag of +truce offered him by the Mahdi. But Wolseley did not mention Wilson’s +name in the letter I saw. Button said he wished he could show me one +Wolseley had written to Gordon about the Government. Wolseley was very +angry now with them all. Button considers the campaign over. They can’t +possibly get further than Tamaï, and war with Russia is almost certain. + +“On to Stanley, whom I found in bed, and gave him the news; and then to +Hassan Fehmy, who did not seem aware of all that was happening. But when +I explained he was of course delighted. ‘When we get the Ottoman troops +to Cairo,’ he said, ‘it will be time to proclaim the Mahdi a rebel, but +we have refused to have anything to do with it from Constantinople. That +would not have looked well, and one should never threaten unless one can +execute. We will put down the Mahdi when we are at Cairo.’ This was not +of course my idea, but I left him to his plans, feeling quite sure the +Mahdi would be able to take care of himself. + +“_30th March._—A letter has come from Downing Street in explanation of +the offer already made, and I have sent my answer to Eddy. Went to bury +Pompey at Crawley and then to London, and heard Hartington announce the +news of a peaceful character from Russia. This is unfortunate for our +plans. + +“_31st March._—Eddy now writes that Mr. Gladstone has left London for +Easter, and so it is impossible I should see him—he is really at +Brighton—and proposes to communicate the substance of my last letter to +Hartington, his _locum tenens_. + +“Hunting again, a wonderful scent. The fox took us from Danny to the top +of the hill near the Wind Mills, and along the edge of the downs to the +Dyke, a very severe run, as we went up and down the downs fairly three +times, the last pull up the Dyke Hill stopped every horse but Queen of +Sheba and a thoroughbred carrying eleven stone and Payne the huntsman. +Rode into Brighton and so up to London in time to dine at the Howards. +William Morris was there in morning dress, for he eschews tail coats, +and did most of the talking on his own special subjects—socialism, the +evil of capital, and the rest. This he does excellently well. Mrs. +Howard advises me strongly to see Hartington if I get the chance. He is +quite honest, she says, being a Cavendish, and no Cavendish was ever +able to lie. Humph! + +“_1st April._—Button promises to find out Hartington’s ideas about peace +from Brett, in case I hear any more from him. + +“Lunched at the Carlton, in the vicinity of members of the Fourth Party. +Wolff tells me that Randolph is expected home on Tuesday. + +“_2nd April._—Went to see Lord Lorne at Kensington Palace. I find him +very pleasant, and sufficiently intelligent about Egyptian affairs, and +we talked for an hour. My object was to get him to take the lead in +demonstrations against the Soudan war, but I could not get him to +promise anything definite. He is going to stand for a Metropolitan +Borough, however, and says he will lose no occasion to oppose the war in +his electioneering. This kept me so late that I almost missed my train +for Birmingham, where I had to attend a meeting on the same subject. But +I just hit it off, made my speech, and was back in London by midnight. + +“_3rd April._—A letter came yesterday, while I was away, from Downing +Street, and I went to ask Button’s advice about it. It said that the +policy of the Government was one of freedom for the Soudan, and I was +inclined to take it as a mere phrase, but Button strongly advised me to +accept it in all seriousness, so as to pin the Government down to their +declaration, and dispatch Ibrahim to carry the news to the Mahdi. So I +have written my answer in Button’s sense, and shall go to Paris to- +morrow to set things going. _Bismillah!_ + +“To-day being a Bank Holiday, Button and I, like two clerks, rode out to +Putney and Coombe and back again. The day was fine and enjoyable. We are +expecting a great battle to be fought to-day at Tamaï. + +“_4th April._—Osman Digna has made an April fool of Graham, who marched +his whole army of twelve thousand men ‘to the top of the hill,’ and then +found no enemy, and marched them down again. They will have to evacuate +Suakin without a victory. This is just what we most want. + +“To Paris by the tidal train, and travelled as far as Dover with Lord +Lorne and his sister (Lady Constance Campbell), who are also going +abroad. We talked on many subjects besides Egypt, such as the Crofter +question in Scotland, the Land question in England, Riel’s revolt in +Canada, and the Irish question. Lord Lorne was very sympathetic on +Eastern matters, advising me only not to mix up Arabi with the Soudan +peace agitation. + +“I forgot to say that Button told me yesterday that the Russian answer +about the Afghan frontier is, after all, far from satisfactory. Dufferin +has been given _carte blanche_ to treat with the Amir, who demands a +guarantee for his dynasty, as well as for his dominions. + +“Dined at the Hotel Wagram with Jemal-ed-Din, to whom I read the whole +of my correspondence with Downing Street. He approved the line taken, +but insists that the English Government must write a letter to the Mahdi +for Ibrahim to carry. He will think the matter over, however, and decide +in a day or two. There is no hurry just now, as the Mahdi can much +better afford to wait than Mr. Gladstone. + +“_5th April, Easter Sunday._—Breakfast with Bitters in the Rue Mazarine, +and in the afternoon coming home I stopped at the Embassy and had a talk +with Sheffield, who was communicative as usual. Among other things, he +told me that Gladstone had been very much in favour of having the +Turkish Pashas in Egypt made to pay up the arrears of taxation. But +Baring and Northbrook had persuaded him that government would be +impossible if they offended these gentry, so they have gone on screwing +the money out of the fellahin, and have raised this ridiculous joint +loan. + +“_6th April._—Breakfasted again with Bitters and Godfrey Webb. The +French have been without a Ministry for the last week, but to-day +Monsieur Brisson has formed one; I know too little about French politics +to guess what it portends. Everybody, however, is very angry with Ferry, +the late minister, on account of the Tonquin defeats. The lesson given +to Ferry will not be lost on Gladstone, and will be in favour of peace +in Africa. + +“_7th April._—Jemal-ed-Din and Sanua breakfasted with me. + +“_8th April._—Breakfasted once more with Bitters, and once more to the +Jeu de paume, where there was a great gathering: old Villeplaine, +Brinquant, O’Connor, and the Henneseys, besides Elcho, Arthur Balfour, +and Bungo Herbert. The Elchos are at the Hotel Mirabeau with Godfrey +Webb and the Miss Tennants, Laura and Margot. + +“_9th April._—Breakfasted with the Wagrams. They say peace has been +arranged between France and China. Then to the Hotel Mirabeau. Arthur +Balfour was there, and we talked about the Afghan and Soudan questions, +and while we were talking Elcho came in, having been at the Embassy and +having heard there of the Battle of Penjdeh. We all agreed that this +means war. The newspaper boys on the Boulevard were calling out this +evening, ‘Guerre Russo-Anglaise—grande Victoire Russe.’ + +“_13th April._—Jemal-ed-Din came early, and I read him a new and +unsatisfactory letter I received last night from Downing Street. He +insists that the Government must write a letter to the Mahdi if they +want him to treat; and he says he will come over to England if necessary +to arrange about it, if only I will guarantee his not being arrested +there. I told him there was no danger of arrest, but his experience in +India has made him suspicious of the English Government. He says there +is no reason whatever now that Arabi should not come back to Egypt if +the opportunity offered of a reconciliation with Tewfik. Tewfik is so +feeble and discredited as to be no longer dangerous, and Arabi would +rapidly regain all his lost influence. + +“Back by the tidal train to England.” + +N.B.—My correspondence with 10, Downing Street of this date will be +found in Appendix C, and is worth reading. It would have been still +possible that spring to arrange terms of peace directly with the Mahdi, +who was not the impracticable personage he has been represented to be by +our official historians. Under his successor, the Khalifa Abdullah el +Taïshi, all negotiation became much more difficult. But, unfortunately +for both Egypt and the Soudan, the opportunity was let slip and became +final through the Mahdi’s death in July. It was probably Lord Cromer’s +influence, as in the previous year, that decided it. + + + + + CHAPTER XI + + RANDOLPH CHURCHILL AND THE FOURTH PARTY + + + “_14th April_, 1885. + + +“TO see Button. He tells me there will not now be war with Russia. +Jemal-ed-Din told me the same thing yesterday and I believe it, for +Russia is now in the position of a man who having had an altercation +with another has boxed his ears. He can afford to apologize. Button +tells me Randolph has returned from India quite in harmony with my +ideas. Lord Ripon’s, Randolph thinks, was the only policy, though +clumsily carried out, and if he had not made reforms when he did we +should be now in the position of having them forced from us as the price +of native loyalty. He is also wholly against the Soudan war. This +accords with a letter from him I got last night. + +“I asked Button his advice about my going into Parliament, and told him +I was intending to ask Churchill to support me as a Fourth Party +candidate. But he strongly advised me not to do so. He said, in the +first place, it was doubtful whether I should get in; and, in the +second, Churchill would be sure afterwards to throw it in my teeth. +‘Take his advice if you like,’ he said, ‘but don’t commit yourself as +his supporter.’ I said: ‘Then there is nothing for me but to go to +Parnell.’ This Button thought would be much better. He said: ‘As a +Nationalist you will have a great position, and there will always be +sixty or seventy members who will believe in you on Foreign affairs; I +advise you to do this and have nothing to do with Randolph. Remember how +O’Connell always threw it in Disraeli’s teeth that he had once applied +to him to get him into Parliament. About my correspondence with Downing +Street, he thought they would not give any written message to the Mahdi, +but advised me to continue to treat their assurances as serious, and to +express our readiness to send the messenger. + +“At eleven I called on Randolph and found him very glad to see me, and I +really like him better than any of them personally. He told me about +India pretty much what Button had told me of his opinions, and he +entirely took my view of the Hyderabad intrigue. He said if Lord Ripon +had not appointed Salar Jung they would certainly have annexed the +country, and there were still intrigues at work of the old sort. He also +spoke strongly of the great intelligence and good sense of the +‘natives,’ especially of the Mohammedans and Mahrattas. He had seen +Rajah Amir Hassan of Mahmudabad and shared my views about the Mohammedan +university, and he had stayed with Lyall and talked about me with +him.[112] The only thing he had disagreed with was my having said that +Salar Jung had been poisoned; for he said that young Salar Jung had +expressed his disbelief in anything of the sort, and he had talked to +him very confidentially. He then asked me to write a poem for the +Conservative party for Sir Arthur Sullivan to set to music. I asked: +‘With something about the primrose in it?’ He said: ‘Yes, if you +like—but it does not matter so much what it is, so long as it is +patriotic.’ I told him I would think about it, but feared I couldn’t +manage the primrose. + +“Then Wolff came in and we talked about Lepel Griffin. Churchill said +that he, Griffin, had shown him his article against me in proof at +Indore, and he had expostulated with him about publishing it, and +Griffin would have stopped it if he could, but it was too late. We also +talked about the Soudan. Churchill promised to write a letter to be read +at the Birmingham meeting if I liked. Next about Zebehr’s arrest and +Tewfik’s intrigues. ‘We must get Tewfik deposed,’ he said, ‘as soon as +Abbas comes of age, and have Arabi back.’ Then I asked to talk with him +in private and Wolff went away. I said I was going to consult him about +getting into Parliament; I wanted to push my ideas, but hardly knew how +to set about it. He said: ‘Oh! I can do that for you whenever you like. +If you will come forward as my supporter you can’t do better, and I am +asked almost every day to recommend candidates.’ I said: ‘What will this +bind me to? You know my foreign politics, but at home I am a Catholic +and a Tory as regards the land question and education, and in Ireland I +am a Nationalist.’ He made a face at the word ‘Nationalist.’ He said: +‘You could not come forward as an avowed Nationalist, but you need not +say much about that. If you say that you have wide opinions on the Irish +question it will be enough, and when you are once in Parliament you can +take your own line.’ ‘But what,’ I said, ‘is Tory democracy? Tell me in +two words, for I don’t think I quite understand it.’ He said: ‘That is a +question I am always in a fright lest some one should put it to me +publicly. To tell the truth I don’t know myself what Tory democracy is. +But I believe it is principally opportunism. But say you are a Tory +democrat and that will do.’ I said: ‘You know me well enough to be sure +that I would not be paid to be in Parliament if I was not free to take +my own line. I had thought of standing as an Irish Home Ruler with +Parnell, but I was in doubt, and thought I would consult you.’ He said: +‘You would lose your influence if you did this. Parnell would require +you to join in his policy of obstruction and you would be discredited. +You had better not commit yourself to that, though you might vote with +him on purely Irish questions. But you should write me out a programme +of your ideas, and I will see if there is a constituency that will +accept them.’ I said: ‘I will think it over and let you know.’ Now I +shall consult Mrs. Howard, who will advise me to go in as a Radical, but +that I can’t and won’t do. I think perhaps, after all, I shall be freest +with Randolph; and certainly his conversation to-day binds me to +nothing. + +“F. P. [a young lieutenant R.N. who had been serving with the Naval +Brigade in the Nile campaign] gives me some good accounts of forced +labourers courbashed and chained, under British officers. Four thousand +forced labourers were supplied for the Nile Expedition, half from +Dongola, half from Esneh. They were put to twelve and thirteen hours +labour in the extreme heat of August, only allowed half an hour in the +day to rest; they were small, weak men, and would work only under the +whip. Colonel Grant, in command of the Dongolese, expostulated against +their being so employed. F., who was with the naval contingent, did not +have the men under his own command beaten by English sailors. His remark +was: ‘They did not give it them so thoroughly, but they seemed to mind +it more.’ Many ran away, but were brought back with chains round their +necks. He had found five men one night lying flat with their mouths full +of sand; they would have died if he had not kicked them up and made them +eat. They were kept once five days without food. Colonel Inglefield, in +command of the Esneh men, blew his brains out in a fever in the next +tent to F. He says when Wolseley came up he was quite taken aback at +sight of what the river was. Hammill had surveyed it all and told him of +its being impracticable, and so had every one else who had seen it. He +is very bitter against Wolseley.[113] + +“_15th April._—Wrote draft letters to Mr. Gladstone and Eddy Hamilton in +answer to Eddy’s last, and took them to Mrs. Howard, with whom and with +whose daughter Mary I spent four hours talking. She thinks Gladstone is +serious about negotiating with the Mahdi, and that it is paying me a +great compliment to discuss affairs so delicate with me. I am not sure. +She won’t hear of my having anything to do with Randolph, still less +with Parnell, and says that I should be doing no good going into +Parliament at all. If I should render some signal service to the +Government by helping them to make peace or otherwise, they would give +me a seat in the House of Lords; but I should only lose my influence by +going into the House of Commons. + +“_16th April._—There is a remarkable letter in to-day’s ‘Daily News,’ +giving the account of an Egyptian soldier who had been with Gordon in +Khartoum. According to this, the Mahdi distinctly offered Gordon to +evacuate, and Gordon refused. There are also tales of the capture of +women and children by General Graham, and of his having sent them +prisoners to Massowa. F. P. tells me that, when he was at Suakin last +June, rewards of £1 were offered for the right hands of Arabs brought by +friendly ‘natives’ into the British camp. + +“Went to see Stanley, and arranged with him to bring forward the case of +the Massowa prisoners, and then to Labouchere about a series of +questions to be put on Monday as to military barbarities, forced labour, +etc. He tells me that Chamberlain has proposed to him, as representing +the Radical opposition to the Soudan War, that the Radicals should not +object to the Government’s making their railway as far as Sinkat on +condition it goes no further. They would then hand it over to a company +and retire, boasting that they had civilized Eastern Soudan. They want +to be out of the thing, but must have something to show for the money +they have spent. + +“Hobart tells me that the arrangement being made with the Sultan is that +there should be a joint English and Turkish occupation of Egypt; the +Turkish general to be provided with an English staff.[114] + +“F. tells me stories of how the English soldiers are insulted in the +streets of Cairo. They all hate the Egyptians now, being hated by them. +But the Egyptian soldiers are devoted to their English officers. + +“_17th April._—A letter came last night from Downing Street which seems +to ask for direct communication with the Mahdi’s agent. But Button +assures me that an agreement was come to the day before yesterday with +the Sultan of the kind spoken of by Hobart, and thinks the letter means +that they want nothing more of me. It may very likely be so. George +Howard thinks the whole correspondence merely humbug on Gladstone’s +part, and that he has never had any really serious intentions. He has +become an utter unbeliever in Gladstone, and speaks more bitterly +against him than any one I know out of the Carlton Club. He was for +annexation, but says I prevented it by stirring up the Radicals and I +have not done any good to Egypt instead. Mrs. Howard is disgusted at the +arrangement with the Sultan, and half agreed that I was justified now in +making any arrangement I liked with Randolph. Button is angry with +Buckle for not making full use of the news he brings him, and talks of +leaving the ‘Times.’ + +“_19th April._—Had luncheon at the Carlton Club, where they were going +through the absurdity of Primrose Day. I sat with Randolph, Wolff, and +Borthwick; they wanted me to put one of these flowers in my buttonhole, +but I said I must draw the line somewhere. This worship of an old Hebrew +gentleman under the form of a primrose is certainly one of the most +ridiculous ever imagined. Randolph talked about the arrangement just +made with the Sultan for sending Turkish troops into Egypt, and was all +for an attack on the Government. But I persuaded him not to make any +move against the Sultan. He has made an excellent beginning with the +Indian Mohammedans, and this would not be understood by them. He told me +of his having taken up the cause of the native water carriers at +Benares, who were being impressed for the Soudan campaign, an incident +which shows he has a true instinct with Orientals. I am writing him a +letter stating my political views, and asking him to what extent they +are in harmony with Tory democracy. It will be the manifesto of my +political opinions. + +“Down to Crabbet. + +“_21st April._—A telegram from Button in the evening saying that the +Khartoum expedition is abandoned, and eleven millions asked for Russian +and Soudan wars. + +“_22nd April._—The eleven millions seem to have taken everybody’s breath +away, and war with Russia is considered certain, the garrisons to be +withdrawn from the Soudan. + +“Finished a letter to Churchill, giving my political views, home and +foreign, and proposing them as compatible with Tory democracy, and took +it to London to show to Mrs. Howard. Of course she is much against my +sending it; but as I left said: ‘Well, it will be amusing, anyhow, to +see how you get on with him. But I call it an intrigue.’ Button, whom I +saw afterwards, objected on other grounds. He said I could not count on +Randolph that he would not throw me over, and he could not get me into +Parliament. Nobody would believe me sincere in my Home Conservativism, +and Conservatives would not support me. He strongly advised me again to +join Parnell rather than Randolph, people would understand that; I +should have more influence, and besides be quite certain of a seat in +Parliament. He is to meet Randolph, however, on Friday, and will try to +find out what he really means; and in the meanwhile I withhold my +letter. + +“_23rd April._—George Wyndham has written home accounts of the enormous +number of the Hadendowas who have been killed. Some of these Hadendowas +had shaved their heads and wore the Mahdi’s uniform, ‘a wonderful +instance of fanaticism.’ They (the English officers) are all sick, +however, of the war. + +“Rode in the Park with Sullivan (Sir Edward Sullivan), who tells me Mr. +Gladstone dined with Bertram Currie on Tuesday after the announcement of +the eleven millions war vote. He was in high spirits, and said the +announcement of eleven millions was received by the House ‘with +solemnity.’ He is to give a breakfast to Miss Mary Anderson to-day. +Pembroke was also riding, and came and talked about the Soudan. He could +wish, he said, that after having killed the Arabs ‘we could leave them +some substantial benefit in the shape of a railway.’ What fools the best +of them are. + +“A letter has come from Eddy, giving a new opening, it seems, for +correspondence. Consulted Ibrahim about it; he tells me the French are +sending a secret mission to the Mahdi, _via_ Tripoli, and thinks I might +hint this to Downing Street.[115] + +“_24th April._—It appears that a dynamite explosion took place yesterday +morning during Mr. Gladstone’s breakfast party with Mary Anderson. +Everybody talks now of war as certain, but Button says it will only be a +withdrawal of Ambassadors for the present. The Turkish arrangement has +fallen through, if it ever existed, through Bismarck’s prohibition to +the Sultan of opening the Dardanelles to our fleet. This, perhaps, +accounts for Eddy’s renewal of correspondence. + +“To the House of Commons and saw John Morley and Leonard Courtney, and +urged on them to press the Government to withdraw _immediately_ from the +Soudan, as otherwise the Mahdi may again advance. They said they +understood the Government was intending certainly to do so, but they +would endeavour to get some assurance from them during the debate. +Morley, however, would have nothing to do with urging negotiations with +the Mahdi, whom the Government intended to leave to ‘stew in his juice.’ + +“Bertram, whom I called on later, tells me that Mr. Gladstone told him +at dinner on Tuesday that his idea was still to neutralize Egypt under a +government of its own, and that he counted on the French to aid in doing +this. Bertram, who doubtless repeats Mr. Gladstone’s tone on these +matters, complained of the _unfair_ conduct of the French. ‘If they go +on much longer,’ he said, ‘Mr. Gladstone will throw the whole thing on +their hands and clear bodily out of Egypt.’ He also talked of perhaps +handing it over to the Sultan, who after all was the legal owner; things +were in a deadlock all round. + +“_25th April._—Lady Wentworth came to luncheon, and took me to the +Grosvenor Gallery, private view. The exhibition is not nearly as good as +last year, but there is a fine portrait of Gladstone by Millais, one of +his best, with his eye fixing you like some bird of prey. + +“_26th April._—To Mark Napier’s at Fulham for lawn tennis. He showed me +a letter he had received from Sir Charles Wilson, saying it was Awwam +who betrayed Gordon at Khartoum. This is a fine piece of retributive +justice, for it was Awwam whom Colvin persecuted because he had +complained of the rogueries in the Cadastral service. Colvin had him +arrested and put in irons after the bombardment of Alexandria, and tried +by a mock tribunal and exiled to Khartoum. I wrote, when the amnesty was +promised, to Dufferin to complain especially of Awwam’s treatment, and +he referred my letter to Wilson, who did nothing. So Awwam remained at +Khartoum, and now this very Wilson writes complaining that he betrayed +Gordon. Thus is injustice sometimes requited.[116] + +“At dinner last night at the Denbighs’ Hobart was very warlike, and +talked of commanding the Turkish Fleet in the Black Sea; the Turks might +at first pretend neutrality, and refuse a passage to English ships, but +would join later. I sat next to Lady Dorothy Nevill, certainly the +pleasantest old woman in London. She is a friend, she tells me, of +Chamberlain’s, who tells her the electors care nothing for foreign +politics; she has also seen Gladstone lately, who is in the highest +spirits at the prospect of a new war. On my other side was Lady Brett, +Reginald Brett’s mother, who says she hears from Berlin that Bismarck +treats Malet like a little boy. Of course he does, he has always known +him as such. Lord Salisbury was also there, but I had no opportunity of +speaking to him. + +“The Prince of Wales has written to Lady C., saying he is delighted with +his Irish tour, and is to be back, I think, on Tuesday. I hear, however, +from others, that it has been in reality a fiasco. + +“_27th April._—Called on Justin McCarthy, who has a small lodging with +his son in Ebury Street, but he was not up. The Irish girl who opened +the door told me he never got up till the middle of the day, but I could +see him between two and three. Then to Percy Wyndham in Belgrave Square, +who deplores all that is going on in public affairs. He is an upright, +honest man, with ideas too—but just short of the power to lead, so he +has achieved nothing, and will retire after this Parliament. Back to +McCarthy in the afternoon, whom I found with his son. My object in +calling was to propose an alliance with Parnell, but we talked first +about the Mahdi, and I asked to be put in communication with O’Kelly. +This they promised to do, and, as I found them sensible and sympathetic, +I broached the real subject with them. Young Huntley was most cordial; +the elder, Justin, however, had had some experience of English +alliances, and said they had several times been disappointed, as notably +with Lord Robert Montagu. He also was cordial but more cautious; he said +my connection with Arabi was well known; Arabi was a great hero in +Ireland; so was the Mahdi. He thought Mr. Parnell would be very glad to +talk the matter over with me, and he would arrange a meeting. They asked +had I property in Ireland, and they were glad to hear I had none. What +did I think about coercion? Could they count on me to turn out the +Government? I told him that I was quite prepared to follow Parnell’s +lead on all Irish questions short of dynamite; that in England I should +expect to be free. I was a friend of Churchill’s, and should probably +support him. On foreign politics they knew my opinions, and those of +course I could not give up. As a Nationalist I could take up the cause +of Ireland with my heart in it. Also I was a Catholic and opposed to the +present Government. On all these matters they expressed themselves +satisfied, saying that I had given too many proofs of having the courage +of my opinions for them to have any doubt about me. But the first thing +would be to see Parnell. + +“I am sure these two are very honest fellows, whatever the others may +be, and they said they had no quarrel with England if they got self- +government. They did not want separation; they did not ask me to be +unloyal to my country. But they were sure to succeed. They would have a +great addition of strength in the next Parliament, and counted on +several English constituencies. They counted, too, on Churchill, who was +in favour of Home Rule, and my being a friend of his would be a +recommendation in Irish eyes. On the whole I think the thing will work, +and I am highly satisfied with my visit. I feel more at home with these +people than in the Carlton Club. + +“Down to the House of Commons to hear Mr. Gladstone’s statement about +the war, and on the Vote of Credit. There was a previous debate +connected with it, in which Arthur O’Connor proposed an amendment, +speaking moderately and well. Arthur Balfour, too, spoke with some +eloquence, and there was a division which the Government won by a small +majority. Then Gladstone spoke, a really fine speech, the first fine one +I have heard him make. At the beginning he was not felicitous, as he +involved himself in one of his hair-splitting arguments about his own +consistency, and Harcourt had to pull him vigorously by the coat tails +to get him in hand again. But afterwards he was very clear, to the +point, and impressive. His speech was generally taken in the House as a +declaration of war against Russia; but I think he will try to arbitrate +first. About the Soudan he admitted everything I had been urging for the +past year, and condemned himself most emphatically; the people at +Khartoum had been really against Gordon, they really liked the Mahdi, +and the Mahdi was really establishing a Government; why should they be +disturbed? Why indeed! I am glad to have heard this speech, as I am sure +it is one of the best he ever made—perhaps his last great speech. The +delivery was very remarkable and so dramatic as to suggest the +impression that he must have got it up carefully beforehand with Irving +and Mary Anderson. The effect on the House was decisive, so that the +eleven millions were voted without a dissentient voice. It was a scene +to be remembered. But as a matter of fact, the unanimity was due, I +hear, to the accident of Labouchere and Randolph Churchill being away at +dinner. Both had intended to move amendments. The effect of the speech, +however, was very apparent, for at the beginning the sense of the House, +both on his own and the other side, had been distinctly against Mr. +Gladstone. The triumph was due solely to his eloquence. + +“Dined at the Carlton Club. + +“_28th April._—Rode early. Then to Mrs. Howard, to tell her my ideas +about Ireland. She does not much approve. + +“_29th April._—Button tells me that Wolseley is very angry at the idea +of abandoning the Soudan campaign, says the Mahdi will be up again +shortly and wants to finish him off. To a party at Mrs. T.’s, where I +met Lessar, the Russian agent. He looks his character all over, being a +little, inquisitive, dark, furtive man; but in conversation he talks +frankly enough. I had a few words with him about the collision between +East and West. ‘But what are we to do,’ he asked, ‘when the East won’t +be quiet and we come into collision?’ I said, ‘The West should retire.’ + +“_30th April._—Things already look more like peace with Russia, and I am +inclined to think the whole thing has been got up by Gladstone in order +to get himself out of the Soudan. I met that great man this afternoon in +Pall Mall; he was nearly run over by a cab crossing in front of the +Athenaeum, and I followed him down the steps, past the Duke of York’s +Column, and along Whitehall to Downing Street. He did not see me, but +walked on, black and gloomy, in black, ill-fitting clothes, like a +schoolmaster or an undertaker. He was followed at a distance of twenty +yards by a detective in plain clothes, who eyed me suspiciously, +especially when I crossed between him and his charge, who, taking out +his latchkey, let himself in at the garden gate and disappeared. + +“_1st May._—Button says it is all off with the Turks now, and Hassan +Fehmy wants to be away back to Constantinople. Two days ago I wrote a +violent letter to the ‘Times’ about the atrocities in the Soudan, and I +have arranged with Labouchere that when it appears he shall follow it up +in the House of Commons. I alluded in my letter to the story of the +reward offered at Suakin for human hands. F. P. tells me it was C. who +paid the money for them. + +“Button tells me that Mr. Gladstone writes every day to Stead refuting +his advocacy of Russia. But I am not sure the Government has not put +Stead up to it, so as to prepare for a withdrawal from the quarrel. + +“_4th May._—My letter was printed in the ‘Times’ this morning. To the +House of Commons, and saw Morley walking with Brett. I had begged him to +put a question to Government about a plan which has been announced for +surrounding and capturing Osman Digna. He told me he had not put the +question publicly, but had received a private assurance that no attack +on Osman Digna was intended; so I hope we have put a spoke in Wolseley’s +wheel. Brett told me the same thing. + +“_5th May._—It is announced that Wolseley’s expedition is postponed, and +so my letter seems to have succeeded. Mr. Gladstone made a statement +last night entirely backing out of his quarrel with Russia, and during +the debate that followed Randolph made a remarkable speech, the most +important I have heard him make. It was well prepared and considered, +and was very well received; but it was not oratory of the first water. +As to the matter, it was a violent attack on Russia, with jingo talk +about India. I did not wholly sympathize with this, but it will +certainly have put him on a higher platform with his party. + +“Lady C. sees old Lucan very frequently, and he tells her all the War +Office secrets, and she told me they intended a _coup_ at Suakin. But I +hope we have put a stop to that. The Prince of Wales has been to see +her, and she asked him about my going to the Levee and what uniform I +should wear. He said that, as I had been five years in diplomacy, I was +entitled to wear the diplomatic. So I shall go to it, as I am coming out +as a Home Ruler. It seems he is quite pacified about me now, but is only +urgent that I should attend a levee. Old Lucan is very warlike, would +like—‘By God!’—to go at the Russians again himself. He is the last at +the Horse Guards who was a general in the Crimean War. He is eighty. + +“_6th May._—General Graham has bungled the whole campaign at Suakin. +Alan Charteris, who has come home from there, says all the troops are +disgusted and want the thing to end. There have been letters in the same +sense from up the Nile, where the men are living, or rather dying, in +bell tents. George Wyndham is enthusiastic about the Arabs, I am glad to +hear. Wolseley keeps on board ship at Suakin, pretending he is unwell. + +“Saw Labouchere, who was starting to lay the foundation stone of a +Primitive Methodist Chapel. ‘To such things,’ he said, ‘we are reduced +at election time.’ + +“Met Parnell by appointment at the House of Commons, and walked up and +down the central lobby with him. He told me that it would not do my +standing for an Irish constituency; there were too many jealousies, and +an Englishman would be looked upon as an interloper, whoever he was. +Everybody was wanting to be in Parliament, and he was afraid of giving a +cause of disunion. ‘My countrymen,’ he said, ‘have the weakness of +quarrelling with each other; it is their national defect.’ ‘Like the +Arabs,’ I remarked. Then he corrected himself, as if he had said too +much. ‘Besides,’ he said, ‘we have always been betrayed by all the +English who have gone with us—every one. Sometimes by our own people, +but always by the English.’ I said: ‘I think you need not fear that in +my case.’ ‘No,’ he said, ‘I do not doubt you; but it would be difficult +to make the others understand. For this reason I do not propose that you +should come forward in Ireland. But if you choose an English +constituency I can promise you, wherever it is, the solid Irish vote. +You would vote with us on all Irish questions, but we should not ask +what you thought on other matters. Get Lord Randolph to nominate you +where there are Irish, and I will do all I can for you.’ I was struck by +Parnell’s frankness and straightforwardness in this conversation, and he +has a special charm of manner which doubtless gives him his power. + +“_7th May._—An inordinately busy day, caused by the announcement of a +new ‘victory’ of Graham’s at Suakin. It is a very bad case, the worst +that has happened, for they have surrounded a Bedouin camp, with women +and children and cattle, and have fired into the lot, killing a hundred +and fifty, and intending to exterminate. This has made me so angry I +have not been able to eat all day, and have been galloping over the town +getting up an agitation. My first act was to write to Morley. I reminded +him of his share in the Alexandrian Bombardment, and called upon him to +behave like an honest man and join me. I took the letter to Courtney and +showed it to him and his wife, who took the matter up warmly. And they +sent me on to Burt, the working-man member; he, too, promised me all +assistance. Then I went to Randolph, who was delighted to join in the +fray, and who arranged with Northbrook to support any motion for +adjournment the Radicals might move. And then to Labouchere and the +House of Commons, where I talked to O’Shea[117] and others, so that I +got some of all parties to join me. The upshot of it was that at +question time Morley asked for explanations, and a nice little +discussion followed, and Hartington promised a definite statement of +military policy for Monday. This is very satisfactory, but from all I +hear we shall have to work hard to stop the war, for Wolseley and +Baring[118] are moving heaven and earth to get the campaign renewed, and +Hartington and Northbrook are with them. They fancy they can still make +something commercially profitable out of the Berber railway, and, what +is more important, save their own precious bacon. Gladstone in one of +his answers made a quibble which looks specially ominous. He +acknowledged his statement of policy made last Monday week, but +qualified it by explaining that it was made in connection with the +Russian imbroglio. They certainly have it in their minds to renew the +war, but Button assures me nothing is yet absolutely decided. + +“Randolph, when I saw him, talked over the matter of my going into +Parliament. I told him of my conversation yesterday with Parnell, and +showed him the paper I drew up a little while ago, headed ‘Am I a Tory +Democrat?[119] of which he approved as a possible basis of my joining +his party, though he said of course he did not pledge himself to go with +me on all points. He objected a little to my using the word Home Rule. +‘I know, of course,’ he said, ‘it must come to this, but we haven’t +educated the Party up to it yet, and it would have been better to use +some vaguer expression.’ Also he thought the allusion to Midlothian was +unnecessary, or I might have said: ‘If there was anything good in the +Midlothian doctrines.’ Nevertheless he was pleased with the paper as a +whole, and promised me all his support and gave me Middleton’s[120] +address at St. Stephen’s Chambers, and authorized me to tell him that he +had sent me to arrange for a constituency, and that I should be of very +great value to the Conservative Party. This is, perhaps, the very best +combination I could have, for it leaves me absolutely free, and I come +in as an independent Member on all points on which I care to be +independent. The only question is, ‘Shall I come in?’ Randolph also +showed me a letter he had received from Sir Frederic Roberts[121] about +the state of the army in India, which was interesting. It urged, of +course, a large increase of forces if we were to fight the Russians; but +it was a sensible letter. It said that the native army was less good +than it looked; some regiments were very good, but not by any means all. +I feel confident I shall get on with Randolph; all his instincts are +right ones, and he has courage and is absolutely the reverse of a prig. + +“_8th May._—Morley has written a line, saying he will bring on the +question of Graham’s victory [over the women and children] again to- +night, and has appointed to meet me at one on Monday. I have decided to +go to the Levee that day, as it will be necessary if I am to stand as a +Conservative, especially as a Home Rule Conservative. + +“Had some conversation with Frederic Harrison in the Park. At two I went +to the Peace Association, and arranged for a special meeting to-morrow +to protest against a renewal of the Soudan War. There I learned that +there was to be a great meeting at the Town Hall, Birmingham, and I made +up my mind to go down there and move a resolution. This I did. The +meeting was a fairly large one, perhaps 2,000 people, nearly all +enthusiastic Gladstonians, and the object was to congratulate Mr. +Gladstone on his adhering to principle in settling the Russian quarrel +by arbitration. I asked the Chairman to let me move my resolution +against the Soudan War, and with some difficulty he consented, for it +was not in the order of the day, and he thought it might disturb the +harmony of the occasion. But my speech was a great success, and I +carried my resolution almost unanimously. It was as follows: ‘That this +Meeting deplores the renewal by Lord Wolseley of the war in the Soudan, +and calls upon Mr. Gladstone to fulfil his promise of peace by recalling +Lord Wolseley without delay, and opening friendly negotiations with the +Soudanese leaders.’ It was a bold move, but it succeeded, and I was much +congratulated after it; and several persons expressed to me their +sympathy with Arabi and their desire to have him back in Egypt. I came +back to London by the night train. + +“_9th May._—Rode in the park, where Frederic Harrison introduced me to +Lord Dalhousie, with whom I talked about the possibility of negotiating +with the Mahdi. It seems he has Mr. Gladstone’s ear, and it may do some +good. I forgot to say that yesterday I called on Middleton, the +Conservative agent, and arranged with him that I should stand for one of +the Liverpool wards, if he could arrange it with the Conservatives +there. I told him my ideas freely, and he seemed quite reasonable; +Randolph had seen him and explained the whole position to him. So that +thing is settled. I don’t know whether I shall gain most or lose most by +being in Parliament, but I am determined, if I do get there, to lead the +Party in their foreign politics and about India. + +“_10th May._—Randolph at the Carlton Club talked again about my +parliamentary prospects, and suggested Southwark as a likely +constituency. I hear, through John Pollen and Ripon, that it is settled +to evacuate the Soudan. + +“_11th May._—A great and memorable Monday. The ‘Daily News’ gave a hint +this morning that things stood as John said yesterday, and that the +Government had resolved on a surrender. I went early to Wentworth to +arrange with him to move an amendment to a motion Lord Wemyss is +bringing on in the Lords about the Berber Railway, and then to the +Courtneys’. They seemed ignorant of any pacific intention on the +Government’s part; as also was, or pretended to be, Morley, whom I met +at half past twelve by appointment at the House of Commons. I coached +him in the speech he was intending to make against a continuation of the +war. But I think now he must have been prepared for what was coming, +though probably not for all. Then at half-past four I went again to the +House, and was fortunate enough to find Edward Ponsonby, who gave me the +very best seat in the distinguished strangers’ gallery. From this point +of vantage I listened to every word. We were all prepared for a +surrender, but nobody dreamed of its being so complete. Hartington had +written his speech out beforehand and delivered it plainly, even baldly, +and I don’t know but what the effect was better than if he had used +eloquence. At any rate we believed him, as we should not have believed +Mr. Gladstone. They are to clear out of the Soudan, bag and baggage, at +the very first rising of the Nile; they are to abandon the Berber +Railway and everything, except just Suakin, till such times as they can +make other arrangements with a ‘civilized Power.’ Percy Wyndham asked a +question about this, and whether Suakin was not part of the Ottoman +Empire; and Gladstone gave him one of his roundabout answers: he thought +that Suakin was generally ‘conceived’ to belong to Turkey. However, +Hartington’s declaration was a great ministerial success, and I went +home feeling that at last I had won a real victory. + +“Dined with Lady C., who told me that Mr. Gladstone had been to see her +on Saturday, and she had attacked him on his wickedness in killing the +Arabs, and told him a number of home truths. He took it all in good part +however. She asked him what he thought of me, saying we were friends. He +answered that I was ‘personally a charming person, but on politics mad.’ +Mad people think others mad. + +“_12th May._—What Lady C. told me yesterday gave me the fortunate +inspiration to write to Downing Street to congratulate Mr. Gladstone on +the abandonment of the war, and to add a copy of the new edition of my +sonnets; and two hours later I got a reply from Eddy, evidently in great +good humour, saying that the gift was appreciated, and Mr. Gladstone +‘would turn with pleasure from the Soudan to Proteus.’ These little +interchanges of courtesy in war time are agreeable, and the Old Man +appreciates them, looking on all politics as he does in the light of a +debating club. + +“Went to the Levee to-day for the first time for fifteen or sixteen +years. When it was over Staal ran out after me and warmly entreated me +to come and see him. Down to Crabbet in high spirits. + +“_13th May._—Ibrahim informed me yesterday that he had received an +invitation from the Sultan, conveyed to him through Jowdat, to go to +Constantinople and be one of his secretaries, and he asked my advice +about accepting. He said he was afraid of what might happen, it was such +a very risky thing, Court favour. I said that, if he looked to his own +interest he had better go and take the chance, but that if he really had +ideas of patriotism he had better stay and be ready to carry a message +when required to the Mahdi. I could not advise him: he must judge for +himself. He says for the present he will stay. + +“To London, and called on Mrs. Howard, who is very angry at my +arrangement with Randolph. ‘You must expect no more sympathy,’ she said, +‘in this house.’ However, we parted friends. George, whom I met +yesterday at the Levee, had told her about it. George says I am right +and rejoices, and says I shall ruin the Tory Party. + +“_15th May._—Went down with Percy Wyndham to Hampton Court to see the +last day of the great tennis match between Lambert and Petitt. It was +worth any trouble to see, being quite a unique occasion, and I suppose +the tennis court at Hampton Court has not for a hundred years seen such +an assembly. Not only were the dedans and side galleries filled, but the +other galleries over the pent houses had been fitted up with double rows +of seats, all crammed. The play, too, was probably the strongest, if not +the best, ever seen since tennis was invented. Curiously enough the +young man’s play, which has been described as more Lambertish than +Lambert’s, struck me as the less unclassic of the two. I have never +admired Lambert’s style, and Petitt has a really splendid stroke on the +floor when he chooses. In return Lambert was throughout over-matched, +Petitt having an astonishing judgement and precision. The game, however, +to eyes used to the French style, is spoilt by the perpetual underhand +service, which gives no scope to the first stroke; it consisted in a +succession of these with a boasted return—boasted from the gallery wall. +This is and must be ugly, but no other return is possible. Arthur +Balfour, Alfred Lyttelton, Heathcote, and all the players and amateurs +were there, and we came back in the train with the little American who +brought Petitt over, and who told us Petitt’s history. He was a Sussex +boy, perhaps Kent, and had been merely engaged at fifteen to sweep out +the court under one Hulse at Boston. Hulse would not even let him play, +and he taught himself at odd moments. He never played with any one who +could take less than thirty from him till he came to England. All which +makes his success more miraculous. He is now twenty-four. + +“Dined with Settna and some Indians and Indian sympathisers, Clark, +Digby, Wood, Foggo, etc., at the National Liberal Club, where we +indulged in some rather wild talk about Indian reform. + +“_16th May._—Button has come back from Ireland, and I am glad of it, as +I find it difficult to get on without him. He tells me the Russian +difficulty is not yet over. Randolph Churchill’s violent letter, +published yesterday in the ‘Times,’ was not a mere hasty ebullition, but +Randolph showed it about to his friends before sending it in. These +advised him to cut out the offensive passages, but he deliberately left +them in as he considered they would tell with the electors. + +“Harrison tells me that Gladstone explains his rejection of my offers of +negotiation by saying he does not believe those who made them through me +are really in communication with the Mahdi. Called on Staal and talked +the whole situation over with him. He tells me his Government seems to +be making new difficulties, more than he himself thinks justified. + +“_17th May, Sunday._—In my conversation with Staal yesterday we +discussed the Egyptian situation. He was very curious to know if Mr. +Gladstone was serious at last about evacuating the Soudan; and I told +him that he was,—as serious, that is, as he ever is. ‘He is a great +comedian,’ Staal said, ‘but I was shocked, when he made his speech on +Monday week, at his extraordinary statement of the position on the +Afghan frontier. And I don’t know what to believe now about his +intentions in Egypt. There are the three questions of the Soudan, Egypt, +and the Suez Canal. About Egypt, I understand that it will eventually be +neutralized; and so will the Canal. But what will become of the Soudan?’ +I said: ‘They will certainly end by coming to terms with the Mahdi; +there is no other course.’ ‘But will not the Mahdi invade Egypt?’ ‘No, +if you will establish a popular government.’ He said he believed the +European Governments would be quite willing. About the Canal, he +remarked, the principal difficulty was who should garrison it. The +Sultan insisted upon doing this. I said it required no garrison more +than the Canal Company’s police; and as for the Sultan, ‘_On pourrait +passer outre_.’ This, to which he agreed, is certainly how it will be +arranged sooner or later. + +“Luncheon at Lady Dorothy Nevill’s. Drummond Wolff, Lord Haddington, +Jeune, and Ford, just named Minister at Madrid. Randolph came in late. +Afterwards I looked in on Lothian,[122] and tried to get him to take an +interest in negotiations with the Mahdi. His mind, however, is all in a +muddle, though he is well disposed on the main points; and as he is +rather a close friend of Lord Salisbury’s we may perhaps get something +from him in the debate in the Lords to-morrow. It seems odd to me to be +talking seriously with him on serious political questions after all +these years. + +“_18th May._—Anne went to the Drawing Room. In the afternoon Lord Wemyss +brought on his Soudan motion in the House of Lords, and Wentworth +opposed it. Wentworth’s speech was good in substance, but it rather +unnecessarily jarred in tone upon the noble Lords it was addressed to, +and called down a thunderbolt from the Duke of Argyll who followed. The +Duke’s oration was splendid as a work of art, well reasoned, eloquent in +every mood, and most impassioned. Though I did not agree with a word of +the argument, I could not help admiring him; but the whole discussion +was, as Wentworth said, academical, and will have no effect whatever on +public opinion. There is no possibility now of a conquest of Africa, in +the interests of civilization, being undertaken by England; the only +danger is from a commercial company, to support which a promoter called +upon me this afternoon. He thought I might use my influence with Osman +Digna to get him to help a railway to Berber as a commercial +speculation, but I of course declined to have anything at all to do with +it. + +“I dined after the debate, which we had listened to together, with Percy +Wyndham at the Travellers. He encourages me much to go into Parliament +in support of Randolph, of whom he has a high opinion. ‘You two,’ he +said, ‘if you will stick to your principle of telling the truth at all +cost, may yet save England.’ Only can I get into Parliament really on my +own terms? Philip Currie was dining at another table, and I had some +conversation with him about Egypt and the Afghan question. He is very +polite to me now, and urges me also to go into Parliament. He is very +scornful about the Government, but I believe a good deal of the trouble +has been due to his own mismanagement at the Foreign Office. + +“_19th May._—George Wyndham, I am glad to say, is ordered home again +from Suakin, and there is every reason to believe nothing more will be +done against the Arabs. Down to Crabbet and dined with Locker at +Rowfant. Harrison advises me to write what I have to say about +negotiation to Mr. Gladstone—and publish it. + +“_20th May._—Dined at Francis Buxton’s, a Radical I like particularly. +He was very urgent I should stand for Parliament; Cyril Flower said he +could put me into a safe seat as a Radical. I am like a donkey between +two bundles of hay—very like the donkey. + +“_21st May._—Yesterday we had an Indian meeting in my house to present +Mr. Settna with an address on his return to India, and it was turned +into an address to myself by the Indians present. I made them a speech +in reply which was well received, and advised them to agitate +continually till they got their rights, as there was no party in England +which would do anything for them from any other motive than fear. Some +of them complained that Randolph Churchill, whom I had been extolling as +a sympathiser, had not said a word yet of his desire to help them. And I +wrote to him this morning, _à propos_ of a speech he made last night +declaring for freedom in Egypt and Ireland, and begged him to take an +opportunity soon of saying a word for India; and I met him this +afternoon at the Carlton Club, and he promised me to second Slagg’s +motion for an inquiry into the Indian Government. This is capital, and +encourages me to go on with him in earnest. Sir Robert Peel was there, +very amusing, both of them cutting their jokes at the old Tories. ‘There +won’t be half a dozen of them,’ Randolph said, ‘in the next Parliament.’ +He also declared he would contest Birmingham at all hazards, and +expressed his certainty of turning the Government out at the elections. +Now he is off to Paris for a run and to find out what the new French +policy is. The House adjourns to-morrow. Wagram has arrived from Paris, +looking for a house for the summer. We dined together at St. James’s +Club. + +“Mr. Egmont Hake called to-day to consult me on various points connected +with the ‘Gordon Diaries’ he is publishing. He admits that Gordon made +great mistakes at Khartoum, both as to men and things. I have promised +him a narrative of my efforts at negotiation for his book. + +“_22nd May, and later._—Spent the day with Wagram looking for houses at +Ascot and Windsor. We drove through Windsor Park, which is certainly the +finest thing of its sort in the world. Then down with him to Crabbet, +where he spent Whitsuntide with us. During the week there was absolutely +no move on the political chess-board except that the evacuation of +Dongola is being hurried on, and the evacuation of Suakin stayed—both in +accordance with my programme. Randolph has gone to Paris, where Victor +Hugo is dead; and Hartington and Dilke to Ireland, where Healy is very +much alive. There is an absolute calm after the storm, and the only rock +ahead is a threat by Chamberlain of resignation on the Crimes Act. + +“_31st May._—To London to get news. Button was away, and London nearly +empty, but by great luck I hit upon Gregory just returned from Ireland, +and Churchill just returned from Paris. I met Gregory in the street, and +we sat together for half an hour in Hyde Park. He has seen Morley +lately, and finds him quite ready to go against Tewfik, and has put him +in favour of Halim and Arabi’s return. Morley quite admits now that it +would have been possible to get on with Arabi three years ago, and +regrets the part he took against him, which he excuses on the ground of +wanting information. + +“Churchill, whom I found at the Carlton Club, approves of a move now in +favour of Arabi, and advises me to make war on Ismaïl, whom the ‘Pall +Mall’ is working for. He also tells me Middleton, the Conservative +agent, is very keen about my joining the Party, and promises to see that +the matter of my candidature is settled soon. He will come to Crabbet +for a symposium I am proposing for one of the Sundays of June or July. +The persons to be invited are Staal, Churchill, Morley, Lothian, +Harrison, George Howard, Burt, Parnell, Pembroke, Gregory, Stanley of +Alderley, Percy Wyndham, Hobart, and Morris. [This imagined party never +came to anything on account of the political upset which immediately +afterwards happened. If I remember rightly I did not even issue all the +invitations.] + +“_2nd June._—To London again for the day, but it is like a city of the +dead. The only person I saw was Mrs. Howard. She is half inclined now to +forgive me my political errors, and has invited me to Castle Howard for +next month. She has been seeing something lately of Chamberlain, whom +she attacked about his orchid mania. But he defends himself by saying he +has had an horticultural passion all his life; when he was a little boy +he used to spend his pennies in the market buying pots of daisies. + +“_4th June._—Randolph has made a capital speech, with a declaration of +Conservative policy, including an inquiry into the Government of India +and a sort of Home Rule for Ireland. As regards Egypt, he is for +arranging matters with the Sultan, and retaining with his consent the +protection of Egypt. He is educating the Tory Party, and I am educating +him. + +“_5th June._—Called on Middleton, the Conservative agent, and told him I +could accept Randolph’s programme almost as it stood, and would write in +that sense. He tells me there is a difficulty about finding me a +Conservative seat with my views on Irish Home Rule. But he asked me to +give him a little longer to make inquiries. He still thinks there may be +an opening at Liverpool, or he might find me a place where I could stand +as an independent candidate with a Tory vote. + +“Dined with Whittaker at the Salisbury Club in St. James’s Square. +Hobart and his wife were there, and Villiers the correspondent of the +‘Illustrated London News,’ just back from the Nile campaign. Villiers +gave me much interesting information. He considers the campaign redounds +greatly to Wolseley’s credit, and the credit of all concerned. Like most +correspondents he is more warlike than any soldier, would have eaten the +Arabs’ livers if he could, and has been in all the battles. At the same +time he says the power of the Mahdi is quite unbroken. The Mahdi is a +man of genius and has never made a mistake, and his movement is the most +important there has ever been in Africa. I asked him about the reported +losses of Arabs in battle, and he said they had been absurdly +exaggerated. He knew how generals liked to make big things out of small +ones, and he was quite sure, from first to last and including both +campaigns at Suakin and the Nile, the total Arab loss was under 5,000. +This has consoled me much. He was at Tamaï last year when the British +square was broken, and he is sure there were not above 600 Arabs who +made the charge, nor more than 5,000 altogether opposed to Graham. + +“About Sir Charles Wilson’s delay in reaching Khartoum, he said that +Wilson’s fault, if any, was in not pushing home the attack on Metemmeh. +He had attacked Metemmeh, meaning to take it, but found the place too +strong, and after the repulse it would have been very imprudent to send +the steamers away directly, as it would have invited attack on the camp. +Metemmeh, therefore, and Shendi had to be shelled; Khartoum could have +been taken by the Arabs at any time. The Intelligence Department had +been wrong throughout. Villiers seems an intelligent fellow, and, as I +have said, a fire-eating warrior. So his evidence goes for much. He told +me it was certainly true that a reward of £50 had been offered for +Olivier Pain, dead or alive. It was Wolseley issued it, ‘and quite right +too, the man being a soldier of fortune.’ He himself would have been +‘delighted to put a bullet through him, and drag him into camp by the +heels.’ Such are the amenities of ‘war which is not war.’ + +“_6th June._—Luncheon in Belgrave Square. George Wyndham has written +from Suakin, very angry with me for saying in the ‘Times’ that money had +been paid for dead Arabs’ hands. Only one hand had been brought in, and +it was not of a dead but of a live Arab whom they had gone out and +brought in alive to camp, and nothing was paid for the hand. But that +does not prevent C. from having done the thing last year. Met Harry +Brand in Piccadilly and walked with him up Bond Street. I told him I +thought Randolph the only man who would push reform. But he said the +Government would be in for ever, they would get a majority of fifty more +than they had now after the elections. To a great party at the Foreign +Office for the Queen’s birthday. + +“_8th June._—Crabbet. I have finished my letter to Randolph (the one +intended for publication as a manifesto of my opinions), and have +written to him to say I will bring it him to-morrow. He has made another +wonderful speech at Cambridge. I am convinced he will carry the Tory +Party through at the elections. + +“_9th June._—This morning the astonishing news came of the Government’s +defeat on the Budget. Nobody at all expected it, and it looks very like +a put-up business. People in London, however, say the reason is that the +Whigs and Radicals have got rusty about voting, having been sent for so +often to defend motions of censure, and now they did not believe in the +danger. Anyhow, the Government are out, and the Carlton Club is agog +with delight. + +“I went up by the early train to London, and my first visit was to +Randolph, the hero of the moment (whom I found still in bed). I must say +there never was a man with his head turned less by success than he. We +talked for half an hour, and he read me a very curious letter which +arrived while I was with him from Lepel Griffin. It contained a scheme +of policy for Afghanistan which was briefly this: The Amir’s reception +at Rawal Pindi has been a failure and a mistake; too much fuss had been +made with him, and it had offended the other native princes. Scindia had +said it was ridiculous, and the Maharajah of Cashmere had refused to +come. None of the princes of India were really loyal, except the +Punjabis. The rest disliked us, ‘though,’ said Griffin, ‘I made the most +of their loyalty in my article to encourage them.’ His article was one +about the native army. His scheme for Afghanistan was this: he would +come to an understanding with Russia for its partition, making over to +her the Turcoman provinces and keeping Candahar and Kabul with the +Hindoo Kush for a frontier. This was, I remember, exactly Lytton’s +scheme of securing a ‘scientific frontier.’ Griffin, however, would give +Constantinople to Russia. To this Randolph objected, but he approved of +keeping Candahar, or rather of taking it. I dissuaded him, however, +strongly from meddling with the Afghans, and offered to find out from +Jemal-ed-Din in what way we could make friends with them, and who would +be the most popular Amir to succeed Abd-el-Rahman, if, as Randolph said +was likely soon, he should die. + +“We then talked about the prospects of a change of Government, and he +told me the Conservatives would take office and that all had been +arranged. But they did not wish it known, and had sent word to the ‘Pall +Mall’ that they did not mean to come in. Randolph counts on having a +voice in Foreign Affairs, and he asked me whether I would go on a +mission to the Mahdi. I said I would if sent as a regular envoy. Also +there will be no coercion in Ireland. He read my letter, which I had +brought with me, and approved of it all. ‘I agree with it all,’ he said; +but he asked me to leave out the words ‘Home Rule’ in what I said about +Ireland, and insert the words ‘than you _apparently_ are _yet_ prepared +for.’ He also assured me he was keeping Middleton up to the mark about +my candidature, and again recommended Southwark. We agreed that I should +send my letter to the ‘Times’ to-night for publication. + +“Then to Button in the City, and arranged about publishing the letter; +and then to Mrs. Howard. She dined last night with Hartington and +Granville and Bright, and assured me they had been all as merry and +unconscious of danger as men could be. Bright told her he was at the +Cabinet which decided on the bombardment of Alexandria; but Lord +Granville had assured him that it would not really take place, and it +had long ago been settled that he was to leave the Cabinet on the first +shot fired in any war. It had been a cause of grief and tears with him +to watch the slaughter which had since occurred, but he had not had the +heart to stand up and denounce his former friends. He had, however, +written to Mr. Gladstone after the war to say that if he allowed Arabi +to be tried by the Egyptian Government it would be a ‘lasting infamy.’ I +am asked to Castle Howard for 21st July. + +“Back to Crabbet. We have arranged two parties: one for Staal on the +27th, the other for Randolph on the 4th. Staal did not fancy meeting +Randolph, so we have asked them for separate days. Also a third for the +Club on the 11th of July. + +“_11th June._—Anniversary of the Alexandria riots. Arabi is very nearly +now avenged. I shall send a copy of my letter to Randolph to Lothian, +that he may show it to Lord Salisbury, who will probably have the +Foreign Office. Barring accidents, we must win now; at least we have +gained this—Granville will _never_ be in office again till time shall be +no more. + +“To London. Harry Brand professes himself in high delight at being out +of office, and I fancy there was a little hocus-pocus in the Government +defeat. To Coombe, where we saw ‘As You Like It’ acted in the open air. +I cannot call it a success; I dislike Shakespeare on the stage, and +especially his comedies. His long-winded Elizabethan jokes after these +three hundred years are inexpressibly flat, and this ‘As You Like It’ is +full of them. Then the open-air representation gave only the forest +scenes, and was a bit monotonous. I doubt if anything is gained by its +being out of doors. The _coup d’œil_ was pretty enough, but in no way +reminded one of a forest, and the actors looked even less real than on a +regular stage. The place chosen was no part of Coombe Wood, but a +suburban garden with lime trees, pretty but tame. The ground, littered +with dry fern, looked like a farmyard, and the actors, wading about in +it, out of place and a trifle absurd. The acting was ordinary English +acting, that is to say bad—mostly professional. Lady Archie’s[123] was +certainly the best; she is a tall, graceful woman, with a good stage +voice, and made herself well heard. These are my criticisms, but the day +was perfect—chequered sunlight and shade, with birds singing, and I +enjoyed it very much. + +“Dined with Anne at the Russian Embassy. A pleasant family dinner, +nobody there but ourselves, a secretary, and Monsieur de Lessar. We +talked the political situation over freely, and my impression is that +Lord Salisbury will have trouble in finishing the Afghan frontier +dispute. Staal is evidently much roughed up, especially against +Randolph; and when I asked him whether he would like to meet him at +Crabbet he said he would rather not. He would, however, like to meet +some Conservatives of position; so I have asked Lothian and Pembroke. We +talked about Madame de Novikof, and he acknowledged that she had been +very useful to Russian diplomacy. There was talk also about Ismaïl in a +tone which convinces me that Ismaïl is the Russian candidate. There is a +Christian conspiracy against Islam here in England, consisting of Madame +de Novikof, Stead, and Ismaïl as the Sultan’s chief enemy. Staal said to +me: ‘What they reproach you with is that having been against the Sultan +you have now gone over to him.’ He must have got this from these three. + +“_12th June._—My letter to Randolph is in the ‘Times.’ I have sent +copies of it to Lucknow, Bombay, Colombo, and Constantinople; also to +Sanua and Jemal-ed-Din.[124] + +“_14th June, Sunday._—Crabbet. The ‘Observer’ has a list of the new +Cabinet, which, if true, would suit me well. Randolph at the India +Office, Northcote, Foreign Affairs; no mention of Pembroke, however, +whom I met on Friday looking very mysterious, as people do who have been +talked to about a place but are not sure of getting it. + +“_16th June._—Randolph has made a new row, voting against Northcote with +Beach and others. I suppose Lord Salisbury has not recognized the claims +and policy of the Fourth Party; it is unfortunate, as it seems to +jeopardize the Conservative chance. But I daresay Randolph is right; he +is the only man capable of leading the Tories to victory. Lady C. writes +that the Prince of Wales is highly pleased with my letter to Randolph. + +“_17th June._—Randolph was right and he has won, and nothing he has done +yet has given me so high an idea of his genius as a leader. He has +brought Lord Salisbury to his own terms. Stafford Northcote is to go to +the Lords, and Beach is to lead the Commons as Randolph’s lieutenant. +All the old generals are to be put on the pension list, and the young +fellows to command the battle. This will give the Tory Party a chance at +the elections: it would have had none under Northcote. With Randolph at +the India Office and, who knows, Drummond Wolff Under-Secretary for +Foreign Affairs, I ought to be able to pull through my programme. At the +Radical meeting last night, at St. James’s Hall, Vernon Harcourt +incautiously mentioned Arabi’s name, and it was received with vociferous +cheering. + +“_18th June._—In London. Just saw Randolph at the Carlton Club and +congratulated him. But he said: ‘It is not a case for congratulations +yet. Nothing is settled.’ The old fogies at the Carlton are in a great +taking about Lord Salisbury having accepted office, and are putting +pressure on him to back out of it. It seems there are negotiations going +on with Gladstone to know whether he will support the Conservatives on +the Budget and other matters, and it is doubtful which way it will go. I +had a long talk with Leconfield, who expressed the usual idea—rather +frightened at Randolph—would sooner not come into office. Pembroke the +same. I am all for a bold course, the only one to win the elections. + +“Back to Crabbet; I shall stay here till the crisis is over. + +“_22nd June._—Had a talk with Ferid Bey, first secretary of the Turkish +Embassy, who came down to Crabbet. He is very anxious to find out what +Lord Salisbury’s policy is likely to be. I sketched to him my idea of a +settlement for Egypt; but it is clear the Turks have but one notion, to +get Egypt back ‘after the manner of Syria,’ which, Ferid says, is ‘so +well governed.’ I explained to him, however, that, unless they could get +rid of the debt, they could not get rid of European influence, and for +that reason the Sultan must act in concert with some solvent Power, +which could guarantee the interest of the loans, and so undertake a +joint protection. This could only be England. Acting together, peace +could easily be restored in Egypt by the Sultan’s appointment of a new +Viceroy. + +“Lord Salisbury is to come into office. Lothian, whom I met at the +Carlton Club, told me it was settled this afternoon. I talked to him +about Eastern policy and Lord Salisbury’s foreign policy. He tells me +the great difficulty with Lord Salisbury is that he is a very shy man, +and hardly ever mixes with people out of his own set, so that he does +not know the real turn opinion is taking. Also, with regard to Egypt, it +will be difficult to get him to go against his words. He was strongly +against Arabi before the war, and has always taken the line that the +Government’s fault was that it did not put him down soon enough. There +will be the difficulty. Lothian is coming down to Crabbet next Sunday +and we shall then know more about it. In the meanwhile I have written to +Jemal-ed-Din, begging him to hold himself in readiness to come over here +should he be wanted. The Wagrams have arrived in London. + +“_23rd June._—Sure enough Lord Salisbury is in office. There is talk of +Drummond Wolff going to Egypt in Evelyn Baring’s place. At the Carlton I +found Middleton, who tells me the Conservatives of Southwark will +probably ask me to stand for their division at the elections, and if I +can make sure of the Irish vote I shall certainly be elected. This +sounds well. To a party at Lady Ripon’s, where I met divers +Radicals—Lyulph Stanley, the Courtneys, Sir George Campbell, and others, +all very angry at Randolph’s success. There were Indians there too, but +these were quite willing to take him as an acquisition; he would be +better in any case than Kimberley. The great advantage Randolph has as a +reformer is that he has no respect at all for any one older than +himself; and I expect when he gets strong in his seat after the +elections he will turn the old Indian Council into the street. They say +now at the India Office that they know how to manage him, but we shall +see. Amongst others at the party was the Duke of Argyll, to whom I was +introduced. I began at once with him about his Soudan speech in the +House of Lords, and we had a quarter of an hour’s argument, during the +course of which I told him that the only civilization he was likely to +bring to the Arabs was brandy and venereal diseases. It is difficult to +keep one’s temper with the Duke of Argyll, he is so dictatorial and +_cassant_ in his manner—the very rudest man I ever talked to. Forster +joined us, and I went away without finishing the conversation. + +“_25th June._—Robert Bourke is appointed Undersecretary for Foreign +Affairs, and I have written to congratulate him. This is a very distinct +gain. Also Drummond Wolff goes to Egypt, and Baring is to be recalled. +Thus I have many friends in office, for Arthur Balfour also gets a place +and Sidney Herbert. + +“Called on Button in his new rooms in Northumberland Avenue. He is +standing for Clapham. He tells me the Conservatives mean now to pay no +attention at all to votes in the House, to be silent in face of +resolutions, and if supply is refused to carry on the Government without +it till the elections. They will keep quiet about their foreign policy +till the recess, and then they will act vigorously. Drummond Wolff is +being sent out as a stop-gap, ‘to report.’ Baring will certainly be +recalled. Eventually the Egyptian question will be settled in accord +with the Sultan. Bismarck will support England. They are talking of +Lytton for Constantinople, but I advised his going to Vienna and sending +Paget to Constantinople. Called also on Percy Wyndham, who is much +interested in the way things are turning and my election prospects. I +regret immensely that he should be leaving Parliament at the very moment +when the outlook is brighter and he likely to be appreciated. + +“Lunched at the Alfred Lytteltons—George Curzon, Godfrey Webb, and +others there. Met Eddy Hamilton in fine feather coming out of Lord +Granville’s. He has been made a C. B., which he acknowledges, and given +Welby’s place at the Treasury, which he does not acknowledge. + +“To Drummond Wolff’s daughter’s wedding; the bridesmaids in yellow, +representing the Primrose League. Then to Fulham Palace, where Bee +Lascelles, now Mrs. Bishop Temple, was holding a clerical levee, the +garden ‘crawling alive’ with parsons like an ant’s nest. I escaped to a +side alley, feeling out of my element, and ran up against Frederick +Leveson, who had fled there from the same motive. We had not met since +the bombardment of Alexandria, but he was glad to find any one to say +‘How do you do’ to. ‘You are the first layman I have met here,’ he said; +‘it is like a scene out of Trollope.’ + +“Dined at Frederic Harrison’s and sat next Lord Justice Bowen, and +talked over Lord Randolph’s character. I think I can see the Radicals +are getting a bit uneasy at Randolph’s leadership. If he can succeed in +striking terror in the enemy, confidence will come to our people and we +shall carry the day. Randolph has written, asking me to call on him at +the India Office early next week, which is a sign of good things. They +all say he will change now he is in office, but we shall see. His note +was in answer to one of mine, telling him that Godley was a friend, and +asking him to look up the cases of the Civil Service examinations and +Holkar’s claim. Both these requests were suggested to me by Pollen on +Lord Ripon’s behalf. Lord Ripon supported both cases, but was thrown +over by Lord Kimberley. + +“Gordon’s Diaries are out. They are excellent reading, and he pitches +into Malet and Colvin and Dilke to my heart’s content. + +“_27th June._—A party at Crabbet—the Staals and Wagrams, Harry Brand, +Stanley of Alderley, and Lothian. I have had much talk with Lothian +about the new Conservative policy in Egypt, and have urged him to press +on Lord Salisbury the necessity of very careful dealing with the matter, +as it is one which might very easily be bungled. It is curious having +Lothian down here for the first time after so many years that we have +known each other intimately. I find Staal much more peaceably inclined +towards the present Ministry. He quite understands Churchill’s +irresponsibility. He seems to distrust Salisbury the more of the two. +‘Now they are in office,’ he said, ‘I shall have to be friends with +them.’ + +“_28th June, Sunday._—Button came down, riding from London, and we +played lawn tennis. Button rather disquiets me in what he says of Lord +Salisbury’s intention in Egypt. He has counter-ordered the evacuation of +Dongola, and Harry Brand talks of an expedition to Khartoum as an easy +matter. I am afraid they may be tempted to humour Wolseley. + +“I have been reading Gordon’s journals, and find him perpetually calling +for Turkish troops. To the last he seems to have underrated his enemy, +both physically and morally. What strikes me most in these journals is +Gordon’s inability to see the far higher moral standing ground of his +opponents. I doubt if he understood the letters sent him; they were +probably not translated to him fairly, and he never would see any of the +Mahdi’s men himself. If he had gone to the Mahdi he could not have +blinded himself to the elevation of the position the Mahdi claimed as +socialistic reformer, and he is content to repeat tales, told him by +Greeks and other scoundrels, of the Mahdi putting pepper under his nails +to promote tears, and other like absurdities. If ever right triumphed in +the world it was at the fall of Khartoum. At the same time the journals +make out a far stronger case for Gordon as against the Government than I +could have expected. + +“_30th June._—To London, to see Randolph at the India Office. He had +just been attending his first council and seemed a little oppressed at +the weight of work before him. But he soon cheered up, and talked with +his old frankness and fun about his plans: ‘I am doing all I can now,’ +he said, ‘of course to humour the people in the Office and get them +friendly. But they are very slow, and I can see will prove obstructive. +The Secretary of State, however, can always insist, if he chooses, on +having his own way; and I mean to have mine. We must do things by +degrees. If I was to offer to re-open the question of the Civil Service +examinations straight off there would be a howl all over the Office. But +I mean to carry the Queen’s Proclamation into practice, and see that the +natives get admitted into the services. I can tell them that through +you, but can do no more for the present.’ + +“I asked him about Holkar’s claim. This he professed himself quite ready +to support. ‘Dufferin has promised me,’ he said, ‘not to put the +settlement of this matter into Durand’s hands. All my sympathies are +with Holkar.’ I told him about Staal’s visit and the prospects of peace +with Russia, and advised him to have as little to do with the Afghans as +he could help. But we did not discuss the subject at length. Then we +went on to Egypt, and he said: ‘I am very anxious you should see +Drummond Wolff without delay. Drummond Wolff is very keen to work in the +way we want, and I am beginning to get Lord Salisbury round to our +ideas. Lord Salisbury and I are on the best possible terms; like father +and son,’ he said with a queer smile. Also he went on: ‘I told Lord +Salisbury we should have to get rid of Tewfik the other day, and it +quite startled him. He never seems to have thought of it before, but I +think he will come to it; we must do it little by little. My idea about +Egypt is—only you must promise me you will not repeat it, for if it was +to get about it would spoil everything—that Tewfik should be deposed by +the Sultan, and his son put up under English guardianship. We would then +recall Arabi, at first as a simple citizen,—afterwards, when we saw how +it did, as Minister. But there must be a protectorate.’ I said: ‘Why not +call it something else, an alliance?’ ‘No,’ he said, ‘I think it best to +call a spade a spade. We will call it what it is, a protectorate.’ I +said: ‘You will require very delicate handling to get the Sultan to do +exactly what you want. He is difficult to deal with and a little mad; +and whatever is done should be through his initiative.’ To this he +entirely agreed. + +“He then asked about Dongola and Suakin, whether it would not be best to +get the Sultan to occupy them with his troops. With regard to Suakin, I +said: ‘Certainly, yes; but not Dongola. Any troops left at Dongola would +certainly be attacked.’ And I strongly advise him to accept Lord +Granville’s line of Wady Halfa as the boundary of Egypt. If he did so +there was very little chance of Egypt being invaded this year. A joint +occupation with the Turks in Lower Egypt would be a smaller risk, but I +would not advise it. The Sultan’s intervention should be a moral one. +Randolph is keen also to make peace with the Mahdi, which he said would +be a feather in their caps before the election. And he approved the idea +of Ibrahim going as forerunner to prepare my way before me. I am to talk +all this over, however, with Drummond Wolff when he returns from +Woodstock on Saturday, and afterwards see Lord Salisbury. ‘You need not +mind,’ he said, ‘putting yourself forward in this matter; you are an +authority on Egypt and have a right to be heard.’ Nothing could have +been more satisfactory than all this conversation. With regard to +Ismaïl, Randolph spoke very strongly: ‘I will never consent,’ he said, +‘to his restoration. I should consider it a personal disgrace to be +connected with the restoration of such a scoundrel. As to Halim I know +nothing, and I prefer Tewfik’s boy with a Regency.’ I promised to be +secret on all he had told me, and to act in concert with him and +Drummond Wolff, and I have written to Wolff to propose seeing him Monday +or Tuesday. + +“_1st July._—The ‘Times’ opens fire at Drummond Wolff, and I fear may +spoil our sport, so I have written a short letter about the charges +against the Khedive, and have sent it to Churchill to know whether he +approves its publication. I am for attacking Tewfik now; if they commit +themselves with him they will never get rid of him. The ‘Morning Post’ +has an article in favour of Ismaïl. Randolph has sent back word, through +Hope (my private secretary), that if I had written my letter a fortnight +ago he would have approved it; now he cannot approve it. So I have kept +back the letter; it is useless fighting the battle by myself. + +“To Argyll Lodge, where I had another talk with the Duke, but in more +amicable terms. All the same, it is an uncomfortable house to visit, +through the absurd pride of its inhabitants. + +“_3rd July._—Wrote to Robert Bourke giving an account of my +correspondence with Downing Street about the Mahdi. + +“_4th and 5th July, Sunday._—Our annual Lawn Tennis meeting; those +present were Eddy Hamilton, Wentworth, Frederic Harrison, Elcho, Jack +Napier, Mark Napier, Kingscote, Sandys, Seymour, Mallock, Farquhar, +Button, and George Dallas. + +“Button tells me Randolph has been a great success at the India Office; +he has also won his election at Woodstock most triumphantly, and the +party prospects are good. Not so I fear those of Egypt. Button talks of +their keeping on Tewfik there ‘for a year.’ If so, he will be kept on +altogether. + +“_6th July._—Saw Drummond Wolff at the Carlton Club. He tells me he is +going to Constantinople before he goes to Cairo, which is as it should +be. He is annoyed at the set made at him in the ‘Times,’ and I explained +to him that ‘a Twenty Years’ Resident’ was none other than our friend +Moberly Bell. He asked me about the possibility of treating with the +Mahdi, and I have agreed to bring Jemal-ed-Din from Paris to talk things +over with him. We are to have another and more serious discussion of the +Egyptian business as soon as he has seen Lord Salisbury. + +“Saw Middleton, the Tory agent, who tells me my name is the only one +before the Conservatives of Southwark, and they will probably choose me +as their candidate. But there are certain ‘fossilized Tories’ who are +suspicious of me. + +“Down to Coombe Wood to see Mrs. Batten act Amaryllis in ‘The Faithful +Shepherdess.’ As a _féerie_ it was pretty, much prettier than ‘As You +Like It.’ Mrs. Batten looked very well, but the best was a little Indian +lady, calling herself the Princess Helen of Kappartalla, very pretty, +very graceful, and clever. The piece, like the other, was spoilt by the +professionals. When it was over I stopped to dine with Bertram Currie +[N.B.—He was member of the Indian Council], whose house was close by. +Bertram gave me an account of Randolph’s first council at the India +Office, which took place on Tuesday just before I saw him. Bertram’s +account was that he was much frightened and said nothing, absolutely +nothing. To him, Bertram, he was very humble in a private interview +afterwards: ‘There is one thing,’ Randolph had said, ‘of which I am +profoundly ignorant, and that is finance.’ And so he will be humble till +the day he feels his legs and can strike them. According to Button, he +has held the same language with Ashley Eden and Rawlinson and all of +them. + +“_7th July._—Lord Salisbury has made his statement about Egypt, which is +far from satisfactory, inasmuch as he engages himself to support Tewfik. +It makes a true settlement once more impossible. Nothing, however, can +be done but to accept the position, and I shall not move further in the +matter till I am in Parliament. There are difficulties at Southwark, +which wants a ‘fossilized Tory’; still, Middleton thinks it all right. +If I don’t get in this time I shall leave English politics alone, as I +am too old to wait for another chance. Perhaps it will be better so, and +in any case I leave it to God’s providence for good or for evil. + +“_8th July._—To a political meeting at East Grinstead, where I made my +maiden speech as a Conservative. This commits me to party politics, a +thing I have avoided all my life. + +“_9th July._—Ibrahim has received a letter from Jemal-ed-Din hinting +that, if nothing is done in Egypt in the sense we hope for from +Randolph, he will go off to Afghanistan to raise up trouble against +England. I have consequently written to Wolff, urging him to get Lord +Salisbury to commence negotiations with the Mahdi and sending him my +correspondence with Downing Street.[125] + +“Dined at the Gaskells with Anne, and took in Lady Iddesleigh, late Lady +Northcote,[126] and she questioned me closely about the Mahdi and the +Sultan and Arabi; and afterwards I had some conversation, and Anne had +more, with her husband, who is now Foreign Secretary. Lady Iddesleigh +professed great sympathy with Arabi, and with my ideas generally of a +settlement. She also said she thought it would be a good thing to get +Tewfik to retire on an honourable pension. She is a chatty old woman of +the old-fashioned sort, and talked nicely and simply of her pleasure in +Sir Stafford’s being made an earl. His relations had always looked for a +peerage for him, and an earldom of Iddesleigh had long been an extreme +ambition. His lordship seems to have talked in much the same strain to +Anne about Egypt, and I augur well of their willingness to converse. My +taking Lady Iddesleigh in to dinner was evidently pre-arranged, as it +was not properly my place. + +“The Mahdi’s death is reported, and the arrival of Huseyn Khalifa at +Alexandria to tender submission to Tewfik. But Ibrahim says he must have +brought a summons to the Khedive to become a Moslem. + +“_13th July._—Went to see Wolseley arrive from Egypt at Victoria +Station. There was no great crowd, perhaps two hundred persons on the +platform and three hundred outside. There was a feeble attempt at +cheering from his friends, and I heard a few hoots, certainly no +enthusiasm. Wolseley looked older than when he went away, and rather +careworn. Last time he came back from Egypt it was for a ridiculous +triumph down Pall Mall, with the Grand Old Man waving his handkerchief +like a madman from a window, fresh from Tel-el-Kebir. Now he drives away +from the station with half a dozen little boys running after his +carriage. I like him better as he is. I should like best of all to see +him hanged. + +“_14th July._—To Middleton’s at twelve o’clock to hear my fate at +Southwark. I don’t think it has been Middleton’s fault, but the +Southwark electors at a meeting last night were told I was an out and +out Home Ruler, and that frightened them out of their wits, and they +have selected another candidate. I see nothing for it but to put up with +the disappointment. My failure to get into Parliament will put an end to +my political career, as I have pretty well exhausted the good I can do +with letter writing in the ‘Times,’ and require a new weapon. + +“_16th July._—A deputation has come to me from Camberwell, which has +been offered to me instead of Southwark. I told them very frankly what +my position and views were: that I was a Roman Catholic and Home Ruler +in Ireland, but a devout believer in Randolph and Church and State in +England. They asked me whether I was in favour of Fair Trade and duties +on imported manufactures. And I said that if the Conservative Government +proposed such duties I would support them; but I was not clear how Fair +Trade would work. They asked next about Sir Wilfrid Lawson’s Local +Option. I said I had no intention of voting for it. This is the only +point on which I have had a doubt, but I think I am not called upon to +vote for this particular Bill. After all, England is a Christian country +and must have its beer. + +“On Ireland they were at first a little staggered by my using the word +‘Home Rule,’ but I said I preferred to call a spade a spade; and I +believed the Irish were right in asking a separate Parliament; they did +not wish for a complete separation. But I was an advocate for the right +of nations to govern themselves, and I could make no exception about +Ireland. On the School Board quarrel I was entirely with them; and I +think it a real good fortune for me to have this particular cause to +defend of religious education, for it is one I wholly sympathize with, +and it is of a piece with my Mohammedan teaching in India. Finally, +after an hour and a half’s talk, we parted mutually satisfied, and I am +to attend a local meeting this day week and give my final answer. I am +to pay my own expenses, but they have promised me an easy time of it in +the way of work. + +“This settled, I went at once to Randolph at the India Office and told +him all, and agreed with him that he should write a letter to the +Camberwell Committee congratulating them on their choice of me as +candidate. I found Randolph very cheerful: ‘They will never make an +official of _me_,’ he said, with a funny smile. We talked about Egypt: +‘Tewfik,’ I said, ‘will be a terrible handicap to Lord Salisbury’s +programme; but I suppose you are obliged to keep him.’ ‘We shall see +about that,’ he answered; ‘only we must have patience. Drummond Wolff is +the man to get it done through.’ Then he asked about Arabi, whether I +would answer for him as honest, and he would work with us in an honest +way; and I said ‘he would for the good of the country, but not to +prepare the way for annexation.’ About his own department he told me he +was in great trouble to know what sort of game the Amir was playing in +Afghanistan, and he asked me to try and get him information. And I +offered to bring Jemal-ed-Din from Paris, and talk that matter and Egypt +over with him. He was much pleased at this, and said he would see him at +my house. I expect the India Office people are a bit frightened at my +coming to see Randolph, but they are extremely polite to me. + +“Later I met Wolff at the Carlton Club. He wanted to know whether Arabi +would come back to serve under Tewfik, and whether he would serve with +Sherif or Nubar. I said I would find out, and I have written to Arabi +asking him, and begging him to telegraph ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Wolff also +wanted to hear about the Mahdi. ‘Lord Salisbury will hear what Wolseley +and Baring have to say,’ he said, ‘but he won’t necessarily do what they +advise; and if he wishes, he will make peace with the Mahdi in spite of +them.’ I promised Wolff to introduce some people at Constantinople who +could be of use there. All this sounds well. Then I saw Huntley McCarthy +and arranged with him about the Camberwell Irish, of whom there seem to +be a thousand or so. [N.B.—This was a great exaggeration.] And then to +Cardinal Manning, who gave me his best wishes and promised to write to +the Camberwell priest. + +“_18th July._—To Castle Howard, travelling in company with Mrs. Morris. +In the carriage with us were the Speaker, his wife, and daughter. We +arrived at Castle Howard in floods of rain, which made it look gloomy +enough. But the site of the house is good, the chief block quite +perfect, and the inside a gem. Since the house has been built, however, +I suppose it has never been treated in such a way as it is now; +everything is cut down to the barest necessity of existence: no one to +open the gates at the lodges, not a servant to be seen except at meals, +and no footman with the carriage. The gardens are neglected—they look +the better for it; and the park has been railed off and is being mown +for hay. On the other hand, I doubt if the house ever was cheerfuller. +There were some twenty children and young persons under twenty in it, +and there was a deal of boating on the large pond and tennis on the +lawns. The only person to receive us at the door was Mrs. Howard. She +has made up some rooms for herself in one of the wings, but the whole +house is occupied from one end to the other. The men staying here are +tutors or undergraduates, friends of Charley’s, and all is essentially +_bourgeois_ and communistic. I like it the better. + +“_19th July, Sunday._—George took me round the house and showed me the +pictures. They are an admirable collection, good specimens of every +school. The Velasquez of two children, an Infanta and a Dwarf, is, I +think, the most remarkable; and there is a very interesting picture of +Newmarket in the reign of Queen Anne, which shows the horses of the day +to have been big sixteen hand horses, with heads of the Spanish type. +There are some good marbles too, and the rooms are finely decorated. +Mrs. Howard talks of doing away with the formal parterres in front of +the house, but I have persuaded her that this would be sacrilege. She is +very angry with me for having put on Tory armour for the election, or +rather Radical armour for the Tory cause, and especially for going +against the School Board, of which she and her mother and brother Lyulph +are fierce champions. + +“_20th July._—Mary Howard’s birthday, and I wrote her a sonnet. She is a +wonderful child with her philanthropies, and has been founding a society +of girls in the neighbouring villages for their mutual good and the +furtherance of virtue. She preaches to them for an hour and an hour and +a half at the time, and has got together about a hundred of them. She +has genius and beauty and a blameless heart, and is of the sort which +might convert a world. The sonnet has pleased the child, who is ready +for all martyrdom. In the afternoon she entertained her village friends +with a concert, and made them a little speech afterwards, very simply +and nicely. I know nobody else who could do this without ridicule. + +“I have been avenging myself for the political anger I have aroused in +the house by writing my Tory democratic electoral address, and by +threatening to date it from Castle Howard. + +“_21st July._—A bright day at last, and the place has changed as if by +magic, for it is dependent on the sun for its charms. Mrs. Howard took +me for a drive of four hours, visiting village parsons, in pursuance of +a scheme she has for giving holidays in the country to three or four +hundred girls from Leeds. While in the carriage I read her my address, +and she was so angry I thought she would have stopped the carriage and +put me down to walk home. Old Lady Stanley, her mother, came in the +evening; she is a valiant old lady, and fought the cause of the School +Board at dinner and the cause of Gladstone and her party, which she +loves above principle. + +“_22nd July._—Back to London. Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din is expected in James +Street, and I went down at once to the India Office where I was +fortunate enough to find Randolph just coming from the House. I met him +at the door of the Office and walked with him up to his room. He looked +fagged and ill and complained of the stairs, though in truth it was only +one flight and not a steep one. He promised to meet Jemal-ed-Din at my +house to-morrow at half-past ten, and I explained to him exactly who he +was, with the history of his doings in Egypt and India. ‘He is in the +black book,’ I said, ‘of every one here, and an enemy of England. But if +he was not he would be of no use to us.’ I asked him about the Civil +Service examinations for India in reference to a report in yesterday’s +‘Pall Mall’ of his having decided to take the matter up. But he told me +this was not true; he intended to meddle very little with details, but +to push on a general inquiry into the state of the Indian Government. +‘Everything here,’ he said, ‘is at a deadlock, owing to the uncertainty +of Afghanistan and Egypt.’ I did not stay with him for more than a few +minutes for he seemed quite exhausted. + +“_23rd July._—Jemal-ed-Din arrived in the night, and at half-past ten +punctually Randolph came to James Street; he was all right again and in +his usual spirits. Before introducing the Afghan I read Randolph over my +Electoral Address, of which he highly approved, correcting only a few +words, that is to say, making me leave out the qualifications about the +_South_ of England in speaking of my belief in Tory popularity, and the +allusion to Lord Salisbury having made ‘an alliance with the Irish +leaders.’ He was also doubtful about my saying anything regarding an +Irish Parliament. All the rest he approved, and said it was original and +good. He said he was in favour of import duties on manufactured goods. I +asked him whether he had any special scheme himself for ameliorating the +condition of the poor, and he said ‘No, but Lord Salisbury has.’ + +“Then I showed him Pollen’s letter, communicating Lord Ripon’s message +about agricultural banks in India and the Oxford examinations. He said +that I might tell Lord Ripon that he was favourable about both matters, +and especially about the agricultural banks, and that if he would draw +him up a scheme on paper he would support it. But he had not the +necessary knowledge on either subject to push it without assistance, nor +the time to get the questions up. He seemed pleased at Lord Ripon’s +having communicated with him. I also mentioned the case of Suchait Singh +and the Pundit of Vizianagram, and he told me to send the details to +Moore, his secretary. About Lepel Griffin he said he could not quarrel +with him, but he was writing to him by this mail, and would suggest to +him that he should make me some apology. + +“Then we sent for Jemal-ed-Din, whom Randolph received with great +politeness and made him sit by him on the sofa. They talked in French, +but I soon perceived that Randolph knew very little of the language, and +I had to translate for them. Randolph first asked about the Mahdi’s +death, whether it was true, and Jemal-ed-Din said he thought not, but +even if true it would make little difference, as the Soudanese would +choose a successor. Randolph asked who that would be. _Jemal-ed-Din_: +‘It would not be Osman Digna, but one of the Mahdi’s companions, a man +of religion; Osman Digna would be the General but not the Khalifa. All +would be done as on the occasion of Mohammed’s death, when the most +religious man was chosen.’ Randolph then asked about Afghanistan, what +the Amir’s position was. And Jemal-ed-Din’s account was briefly this: +Abd-el-Rahman, he said, was a good general but he was not a great +politician, though neither was he a fool. He had the majority of the +Afghans with him, but nothing would be easier than to get up revolts +against him. The Afghans were simple-minded people—_peuple +naïf_—ignorant of politics and always ready to fight. The Russians might +make a revolt through Ishak Khan or a dozen others of the sons of Shere +Ali and the princely house. Nothing would be easier. The Russians had no +intention of fighting the Afghans this year, but would make friends with +some of these princes and raise disturbances. They would represent +themselves as allies against the English and would promise the provinces +of Cashmere and Peshawar if India revolted. The Afghans would believe +them. _Randolph_: ‘Do the Afghans hate us more than the Russians?’ +_Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘The Russians have done no harm to the Afghans. The +English have made three wars on them.’ _Randolph_: ‘But do not you +consider that the Russians have done more harm to Islam than we have +done?’ _Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘The Russians have swallowed up a few +principalities, the Crimea, Circassia, and among the Turcomans, but +England has destroyed the great empire at Delhi, it has invaded Egypt, +the Soudan.’ _Randolph_: ‘It was the Mahrattas that destroyed the Mogul +Empire.’ _Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘The Mahrattas came and went. Nadir Shah +invaded India, but he was a Moslem. You remained and you destroyed the +Empire. There are three reasons why the Mohammedans of India have hated +you more than the Russians: Firstly, because you destroyed the Empire of +Delhi; secondly, because you give no salaries to the _imams_ and +_muezzins_ and keepers of the mosques, which the Russians are careful to +do; and you have resigned the Wakaf property and do not repair the +sacred buildings.’ _Randolph_: ‘We repair some of the mosques.’ _Jemal- +ed-Din_: ‘Only when they are works of art, not for the sake of religion. +And, thirdly, because you give no high offices of rank in the army to +Mohammedans. The Russians do this.’ _Randolph_: ‘There are many +Mohammedans in the highest offices in the Native States of India.’ +_Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘The Native States are not British India. What the belly +has not swallowed it does not digest.’ (Here we laughed.) _Randolph_: +‘Then you think England a greater danger to Mohammedans than Russia?’ +_Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘I do not say so; I have spoken of the past. England has +done more harm to us than Russia, but Russia is now more dangerous. If +the Russians remain, I do not say at Penjdeh or Tulfikar or Merushak, +but at Merv still five years, there will be no more Afghanistan and no +more Persia and no more Anatolia and no more India. All will have been +swallowed. They will leave Penjdeh and the rest, but it will matter +nothing; they will remain in Merv.’ _Randolph_: ‘This is true. But what +would you have us do?’ _Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘You must make an alliance with +Islam, with the Afghans, the Persians, the Turks, the Egyptians, the +Arabs; you must drive the Russians back out of Merv to the Caspian Sea. +To make friends with the Mohammedans you must leave Egypt. There is no +danger for Egypt from foreign nations. You hold Cyprus, you hold Aden, +what do you fear? Nor from the Mahdi. With a Mohammedan government in +Egypt the Mahdi is not a danger. Then you must make alliance with the +Mohammedans, who would believe you their friend.’ _Randolph_: ‘Could we +send troops or officers to Afghanistan to help the Afghans against +Russia?’ _Jemal-ed-Din_: ‘If you send troops, as for instance to +Candahar, even with the Amir’s consent, it will be the right of any +Moslem to go to the top of a hill and raise a revolt against you. He +would say you were come under pretence of a friendship to take +possession; and all would believe him. You might, however, send +officers, a few officers, for these could not take possession. They +would be servants of the Amir. But remember, if the Russians stay five +years at Merv it will be too late; you should attack them not through +Afghanistan but by the other side; then the Mollahs would preach a +_jehad_ to join you against the Russians.’ + +“The conversation lasted about three-quarters of an hour, and Randolph +then went away. He did not say much to Jemal-ed-Din, but to me he +expressed himself, as I went with him to the door, much pleased with the +Seyyid’s frankness and the justness of his views. He promised to send +Wolff to see him. Also he recommended me to write to Lord Salisbury, +asking to be supported in my claim to return to Egypt this autumn. I am +cited to appear before a Court there (in connection with my property) in +October, and this gives me a good excuse. + +“I then saw Justin McCarthy at the House of Commons, and asked him about +that portion of my Electoral Address which related to Ireland. He +approved. Thence I went to Cardinal Manning, who warmly approved my +address which I read to him. But he objected to my declaration in favour +of an Irish Parliament, assuring me that the Irish did not want one. He +had just seen six Irish bishops, who all declared this to be the case; +he, the Cardinal, had written to Rome in this sense. He wanted local +self government for Ireland,—not a Parliament which he considered would +be a prelude to separation. He has given me a card of introduction to +Canon McGrath of Camberwell, who will tell me what it is the Irish of +Camberwell want. + +“Partly on this account, partly through what Mr. Palmer, the secretary +of the Camberwell Association told me, I altered this part of my +programme, making it more vague and leaving out the word ‘parliament.’ +Palmer came while we were at dinner, and frightened us by announcing +that two new Conservative candidates had been started, and complaining +that Randolph had not sent the letter he promised. It was almost time +for the meeting, but I sent Hope to Randolph’s house and then to the +House of Commons, where he saw him but could not get the letter from +him, as he said my allusion to the Irish Parliament would be a Cabinet +question. This very nearly upset our coach, but fortunately I had made +my speech before Hope arrived at the meeting, and had won the confidence +of the delegates. There was some close questioning about my Irish ideas, +and I reduced my policy to one of ascertaining Irish wishes and giving +Home Rule as far as possible in accordance with them. Also one old +gentleman declared he could not be party to selecting a Roman Catholic. +But the rest were strongly for me. We, that is the two other candidates, +local people, and myself were turned out into the street for twenty +minutes while the voting was going on (a rather ridiculous proceeding, +during which we compared notes as to our chances), and at the end of it +I was called back and was declared selected by sixteen to one. Three had +not voted, having gone round the corner to allay thirst, but they were +also held to be my supporters. So I may consider it a considerable +triumph.” + + + + + CHAPTER XII + + THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1885—RANDOLPH AT THE INDIA OFFICE—DRUMMOND + WOLFF’S MISSION + + +FOR the next four months I was busy carrying on the work of my +candidature in Camberwell, over the details of which I shall pass +lightly. The constituency was a new one, having only just been created +by the Redistribution Bill, and it was politically a chaos. My chief +supporters were men of no position, character, or intelligence, the most +active of my committee being a sweating tailor; and I had to create +everything in the way of organization, and educate the voters from the +first A B C of instruction on public matters. This was an advantage and +a disadvantage; on the one hand there was little prejudice to overcome, +and on the other extreme difficulty in getting the voters to take any +interest in the matters they were called upon to decide. I began with +very small meetings to very degraded audiences, sometimes in rooms +obtained for the purpose, but oftener mounted on a wagon in the streets, +where I found that nothing much short of pure socialism would be +listened to. The division was supposed to be strongly Radical, but as +time went on my Tory democracy became popular, at least in the streets; +and, as will be seen, I very nearly succeeded in winning the election. +Had I been properly supported from the Conservative head-quarters I have +no doubt I should have succeeded altogether. But the declarations I felt +bound to make in favour of Irish Home Rule, joined to the fact of my +Roman Catholic status, told against me, and in the end I was defeated, +but by only one hundred and sixty-two votes. I will give only such +extracts from my journal as take my candidature out of the ordinary rut +of commonplace experience. My journal was too hastily written at this +time of stress to have much interest apart from the election. + +“_27th July._—There is something exceedingly absurd in this +electioneering business; one hundred frowsy fellows in a stuffy +schoolroom talking nonsense to each other about things they none of them +understand, or care about a straw. It is an experience, however, like +another, and we must go through it if we are to achieve anything of +large importance in the world. Yet it is a terrible come-down after the +politics of the golden East, or even of an Arab tribe. + +“_28th July._—I have been in trepidation the last few days, for the +report of the Mahdi’s death seems confirmed. Went to see Lothian, who +has just been staying at Hatfield. He complains that Lord Salisbury is +less free spoken on affairs now than when he was out of office, but he +gathers from what he heard that there is no danger at all of a new +campaign. A reconciliation will be effected with Turkey, but no further +alliance will be entered into for the defence of Persia or Afghanistan. +‘Lord Salisbury,’ Lothian said, ‘still holds to his old illusion of +believing the Russian advance to be geographically impossible. He still +looks at the map and calls it a great way from the Caspian to the +Persian Gulf.’ Talking of past events, he told me that when the news +came of the fall of Khartoum Hartington actually resigned office, and +was out of office three days; he would not resume his position until the +absurd determination of advancing still on Khartoum was agreed to. This +is curious. [I believe it is also true that the pretence made by +Gladstone of fighting Russia over the Penjdeh incident was nothing more +than a manœuvre to persuade Hartington to agree to an evacuation of the +Soudan.] + +“_29th July._—Wolff, whom I met at the Carlton Club, talked pretty +freely about his plans in Egypt. ‘I wish I knew,’ he said, ‘how to set +up an independent Government at Dongola.’ I said, ‘You had much better +leave it to the Mahdi.’ They will end by doing this. + +“To Crabbet with Nebbi Ullah, who is going back shortly to India to +start a newspaper. He, like all the rest, has become spoilt by his +English life. Jemal-ed-Din and I have done our best to persuade him to +purge himself of it by making the pilgrimage and never to put on +European dress again. But he has not the backbone for this. Indians who +have lived in England are taken by our life and ways, and find it +difficult to return. They generally fall in love with some English woman +and abandon the ways of their people. I spoke strongly to him, but it +will be of no use. ‘If a man,’ said Jemal-ed-Din, ‘wishes to do good to +himself, nothing is easier. But if he wishes to do good to his country +he must deny himself.’ ‘I do not wish to be a martyr,’ said Nebbi Ullah, +‘I wish to keep my English clothes and be able to ride and play lawn- +tennis and get refreshment at refreshment rooms when I travel.’ I said, +‘You may put on your best English clothes and go to church if you like +on Sundays, the English in India will not receive you, and you will lose +all influence with your fellow countrymen.’ + +“_30th July._—Wolff came to James Street as agreed at half-past ten. +Before he saw Jemal-ed-Din I had a talk with him on the general question +of Egypt, the Soudan, and Turkey. With regard to Egypt he told me they +would have to keep on Tewfik for the present, and that Lord Salisbury +could not be got as yet to consent to Arabi’s recall. In the Soudan they +had no idea of any new expedition, Turkish or English. They had rather +make peace with the Soudanese, but had some idea of setting up an +independent government at Dongola. They were resolved to renew the +alliance with the Sultan. The points Wolff principally discussed with +Jemal-ed-Din were as to a possible acknowledgement by the Mahdi of the +Sultan’s Caliphate. This Jemal-ed-Din declared to be impossible, either +for the Mahdi or his successors, but they might be got to accept each +other, as the Ottoman Sultan and the Sultan of Morocco had done, if +Egypt were evacuated by the English and a legal Mohammedan Government +restored there. There would then be no danger from the Soudanese. The +Mahdist movement was religious and the Ulema of Cairo would not permit +him to invade Egypt. There ensued a long discussion about the +evacuation, Wolff declaring that Bismarck had announced in writing to +the Foreign Office that he should approve the French entering Egypt if +we abandoned it. The French would never allow Turkish troops, and it +must be occupied somehow. So it would be by the French. This the Seyyid +refused to believe, as he knew from Ferry and others in France that +nothing of the sort would happen. In the end, however, it was agreed +between Wolff and the Seyyid that, if England consented to fix a date +for evacuation, an arrangement with the Sultan might be come to. There +followed the Slave Trade question in the Soudan. Jemal-ed-Din said it +was impossible to stop the capture of idolatrous tribes in Central +Africa, but the seizure and sale of Abyssinians might be prevented by +the Mahdi. He could arrange that matter and commercial relations with +England and Egypt. It would not be difficult to get the Sultan to +consent to reasonable arrangements for Egypt, and Jemal-ed-Din would go +if necessary to Constantinople—this was my suggestion—nor would it be +difficult to get the Sultan to propose Arabi’s return. Wolff, however, +said distinctly that nothing definite could be settled till after the +elections. His present mission was to feel the ground and prepare for a +policy. The elections would decide whether it could be carried out. +Their talk lasted an hour and a half. + +“Lunched with Meynell and Cox, editors of the ‘Weekly Register’ and +‘Tablet.’ They will go with me to-night to a meeting at Camberwell. Cox +is to see Cardinal Manning and get a message of approval from him. +Meynell told me among other things that Colonel Butler, his brother-in- +law, could give evidence that the bombardment of Alexandria was forced +on by Beauchamp Seymour, that they had tried to bribe the Egyptians to +fire the first shot, or something of the sort. Egmont Hake was there and +promised to give a lecture on Gordon at Camberwell in the interests of +my candidature. Meynell tells me that Lord Salisbury has engaged Hake to +lecture in all the large towns in England preparatory to the elections. +Lord Salisbury is to pay the expenses. + +“_4th Aug._—Randolph, whom I met at the Carlton Club, has promised that +Lewisham and Folkestone shall support me at a meeting at Camberwell, as +the working men insist upon having a lord—‘no M.P.s for us’ they say. +Drummond Wolff talked to me again about Jemal-ed-Din going to +Constantinople. ‘He is too stiff in his ideas, however,’ he said, ‘about +the Mahdi not accepting the Sultan’s Caliphate.’ Wolff will send for +Jemal-ed-Din if he wants him, and will communicate with me through +Randolph, with whom, he tells me, he shall have a private cipher—a new +feature, this, in our diplomacy. Gregory, who called to-day, says that +Wolff told him he should explain to Tewfik that he had acted in the +matter of the massacres on wrong information, and that he considered him +a very honest man. + +“_5th Aug._—I have read over my Electoral Address to McCarthy as far as +it relates to Ireland, and he highly approves it, suggesting only that I +should put in the words ‘Representatives of the Irish Nation,’ so as to +show that I accepted the Irish Parliamentary Party as being the real +national leaders. This I was quite willing to do. He assured me of the +Irish support at Camberwell; they all meant to vote with the Tories. He +warned me not to pay attention to anything they might say about being +indifferent to both parties. It was the _mot d’ordre_ just now to say +this, but the elections would prove which way their predilections +turned. Drummond Wolff has telegraphed from Portsmouth, asking once more +to see Jemal-ed-Din. + +“_6th Aug._—Up to London early with Jemal-ed-Din, and had another long +talk with him and Drummond Wolff. Wolff is quite favourable to a Turco- +Perso-Afghan alliance, but says he shall not be able to talk of this +with the Sultan, except incidentally, as that would be the ambassador’s +business, but shall have to keep to Egypt. He was very anxious to know +how an accord could be made between the Sultan and the Mahdi. Would the +Mahdi acknowledge the Caliphate? Jemal-ed-Din said it would not be +necessary to decide or even raise that point just yet. The thing the +Sultan would really care for was a fixing of a limit of time for the +English occupation. Wolff said that that could be done; and that what +would be proposed would be that the Sultan should co-operate in the +establishment of a permanent order of things preparatory to English +evacuation. On this Jemal-ed-Din said that all could be satisfactorily +arranged, and that it mattered little whether it was Turkish or English +troops which would compose the _ad interim_ garrison. Next there was a +good deal of talk as to whether Jemal-ed-Din should go to Constantinople +while Wolff was there, the principal point being as to whether the +Sultan would understand it rightly. Jemal-ed-Din said that the Sultan +knew him only as an enemy of English policy, and, unless Wolff explained +the position, he would fancy Jemal-ed-Din had come to Constantinople to +counteract Wolff. Wolff, however, said that it would be difficult for +him to protect Jemal-ed-Din, or seem to have anything to do with him. +There was the question, too, of money, but I offered to advance the +Seyyid any money that might be wanted so that no inconvenient questions +should be raised. Wolff explained that he should not tell Lord Salisbury +anything about the Seyyid or his arrangements with me. ‘The reason I am +sent,’ he said, ‘is that I am ready to take responsibilities of this +sort on my shoulders which other men might refuse. I shall have a cipher +with Randolph, and if I want the Seyyid, or have anything else to tell +you, it will be through him.’ He told us, however, again very +distinctly, that he did not expect to be able to settle anything +definitely till after the elections. The French were very adverse to +Turkish troops going to Egypt, and Bismarck would give no firm support +till after the elections. + +“We also talked about the recall of Arabi, and Jemal-ed-Din said it +would be quite easy to get the Sultan to propose it, two words from him +would effect that. I repeated this to Wolff, after he had left my house, +at the Carlton Club, but he said: ‘It would never do to raise the +question of Arabi yet; after the elections we may do it, but not now.’ +Lord Salisbury requires educating to that as to other things. + +“To a meeting at Camberwell with Napier, Meynell, and Lady Colin +Campbell. Randolph sent down Lord Folkestone and Sir Henry Fletcher, as +members of the Government, to support me with a message to the effect +that my presence in Parliament was necessary to the party and they must +get me elected. + +“_7th Aug._—Mr. Cotton,[127] of the Indian Civil Service, came to +breakfast. He is a very enlightened man, and one with whom one can talk +openly. Speaking of the late Durbar, he said that the Amir Abd-el- +Rahman’s unwillingness to allow English troops into Afghanistan came +like a clap of thunder on Lord Dufferin, who, with the rest of the +officials, was under the idea that the Afghans loved us and sought our +help. + +“Randolph made his statement on the Indian Budget last night in a very +masterly speech; but he attacked Lord Ripon in it, as I thought, most +foolishly. I met him at the Carlton Club, and told him I was sorry he +had done it. And he said it was quite necessary on party grounds in view +of the election. But he felt sure native opinion in India would be +satisfied with his promise of inquiry into the Indian Government. +Drummond Wolff was also at the Club, and we talked again about Jemal-ed- +Din’s visit to Constantinople. His last words were that he would write +or telegraph to Randolph, who would communicate his ideas to me. + +“Lunched with Button and Sidney Herbert. Button’s candidature is going +badly at Clapham, and his brother’s at Southwark has, after all, broken +down completely. Now he says the people all say I shall get in for +Camberwell. + +“_9th Aug._—To Windsor with the Wagrams, and called on the Ponsonbys, +who showed us over the Castle, including the Queen’s private rooms. The +long gallery in which she walks is full of interesting pictures. The +series of daubs by Winterhalter of royal marriages and christenings are +daubs certainly, but already interesting through time. I don’t think we +were intended to go into the Queen’s bedroom, but I looked in and was +very nearly locked in by the housekeeper for my curiosity. She had +already turned the key, and thoughts of the Tower and a trial for high +treason crossed my mind, but fortunately I was remembered and released. + +“_13th Aug._—Crabbet. To Newbuildings to spend the day, which, like all +the rest of this summer, was heavenly. Coming home I found an important +communication from Churchill enclosing a deciphered telegram from Wolff, +saying that he wants the Seyyid to join him at Constantinople. The +Seyyid has been in great force here for the last ten days, and has given +us most valuable information about the past history of his own and other +countries. ‘Nadir Shah,’ he says, ‘was the son of a tradesman in Kelaat. +He rose against the Afghan rule, and, having driven the Afghans out of +Persia, conquered Afghanistan and Upper India. It was he who gave Arab +horses to the Turcomans, the breed they now possess.’ [We had staying +with us my cousin, Arthur Chandler, an Oxford divine, who has since +become a colonial bishop, and I arranged that they should have a dispute +together on the fundamental grounds of religion. This was carried on in +very indifferent French but with much spirit by the Seyyid, who +certainly got the best of the argument.] + +“_14th Aug._—To London with the Seyyid. I went at once to the India +Office, where I found Randolph very dull and tired with the end of the +Session, which is to-day. He will be off, however, to Scotland to- +morrow. I told him the Seyyid would start at once, but that he insisted +Wolff should give the Sultan a hint directly or indirectly that he had +ceased to be an enemy of England; also that he hoped Wolff would not +open negotiations till he arrived, or attempt to treat the Egyptian +question separately from that of the Mohammedan alliance. Randolph with +his usual quickness seized the points at once, and wrote a telegram to +Wolff something as follows: ‘Jemal-ed-Din starts for Constantinople on +Sunday. He says, however, he is known to the Sultan only as the enemy of +England, and it would be necessary to give the Sultan a hint that he is +now our friend. He hopes also that you will not enter on the Egyptian +question with the Sultan separately from the larger question of a +Mohammedan alliance. With regard to this last he believes he can be of +great service to you.’ + +“I also saw Ibrahim and wish I had seen him before, for he is a great +support to me with the Seyyid, and is bolder than he is. I am for their +starting together at once, and not waiting for an answer from Wolff. One +never knows what changes of mind may take place, and the ball is at our +foot now and we must play with courage. My fear is lest Wolff should be +scared by the telegram which the Seyyid insisted on. If I had had my +way, he should have started without conditions; Wolff could not refuse +him protection when he arrived. But we shall see. + +“Down again to Crabbet for the night, and for a meeting of the Primrose +League at the Worth School. Young Montefiore was put in the chair, to +practise him for a Parliamentary candidature in London. He had learnt +his little opening speech by heart and recited it nicely. My own speech +dealt principally with the possibility of peasant proprietorship. It +gave satisfaction to the Radicals at the end of the room. + +“_15th Aug._—There is a telegram from Pesth, saying that Wolff has +delayed his departure till Tuesday. This will give Jemal-ed-Din time to +join him there, and they will go on by the same train. Ibrahim is to go +as far as Varna and there wait further orders. To London for this +purpose. Parliament was adjourned yesterday and London is empty. To my +horror I found a letter in James Street from Moore, Randolph’s +secretary, enclosing a telegram from Wolff—just what I expected—to say +he had changed his mind about Jemal-ed-Din; he had better not start till +he telegraphed again from Constantinople. I went first to Moore at the +India Office and talked the matter over, and he agreed with me that it +seemed a pity the Seyyid should not start, and that we might telegraph +that it was too late to stop him. But he would not do anything without +Randolph’s order. So I went on to Connaught Place and saw Randolph. He +has been ill with a slight congestion of the lungs, but says that he is +better to-day, and we discussed the point fully. But I could not +persuade him to let me send the Seyyid, so the whole thing is off. The +tiresome part of it is that it is just at starting that Jemal-ed-Din +would have been of most use. But there is no help. The Seyyid’s ticket +and Ibrahim’s were already taken, and I had given them £100 for their +journey, all for nothing. [I have always been of opinion that Wolff’s +change of mind on this occasion cost him the success of his mission, and +that its ultimate failure was due to his having commenced it on the +common lines of English diplomacy without that moral support which +Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din could have given him both at Constantinople and +elsewhere with the secret societies.] + +“_17th Aug._—My birthday of forty-five, which I spent pleasantly enough +with the children and Anne. Mrs. Sellwood[128] and Cowie had tea with +me. Mrs. Sellwood told me the history of my father’s death, how she had +disliked the hounds coming to Crabbet, and how they had howled, and how +he had caught cold cub hunting and died. Thus the day passed. + +“When I look at my life, I see that it is still progressing, and while +there is progress there is happiness. I look forward to Parliament as +the beginning of a new phase. I shall be Cabinet Minister in five years’ +time; head of my party, perhaps, in ten. But shall I get in? I think it +is in my fate. [I feel some shame in transcribing these vain-glorious +words, but they had more justification at the moment they were written +than they can possibly seem to have now. At that date Randolph Churchill +was certainly the coming man in English public life, and my position +with him was one which, if I had succeeded in obtaining a seat in the +House of Commons, would have made me one of his most trusted +lieutenants. I may say more: I exercised over him a very considerable +influence, precisely in the direction in which he needed most support. I +think I could have prevented him from making some of the larger mistakes +he made, and which eventually caused his ruin. I have sometimes thought +that I could even have maintained him faithful to Irish Home Rule, and +that together we might have persuaded Lord Salisbury to adopt it as the +Tory policy. It would have saved the Tories their present disaster at +the hands of the Irish party. My defeat left Churchill without any +adviser in the ways of political virtue.] + +“_18th Aug._—The Prince of Wales has sent me a message through Lady C. +congratulating me on my standing for Parliament. + +“_19th Aug._—Down to Brocket, where Auberon Herbert, his wife and +children are staying with Henry Cowper. Etty Fane is here, grown to be a +very pretty and clever girl after one London season. Of all people I +like Henry Cowper best as companion. He represents the Whig tradition in +its most attractive form, that of the cultured politician of a hundred +years ago, partly humane, partly sceptical, full of dignity and +profoundly immoral. He told me innumerable stories connected with +Brocket. It was outside the park at Brocket, on the high road, that Lady +Caroline Lamb and her husband were riding when they met Lord Byron’s +funeral, and she fell straightway off her horse. There is a portrait of +Lady Melbourne here, as a young woman, which is charming. + +“_20th Aug._—After luncheon we went to Hatfield, Herbert and I on foot, +Henry and his niece, Miss Fane, in a pony chaise. On the way we +discussed social questions, on which Herbert has very distinct and +original ideas. He is against all State intervention, either against +drink or prostitution, believing in free trade in both as the best cure; +he is against State education, rates, or any kind of taxes, which should +all be voluntary. He trusts to a kind of natural selection to bring +about improvements with as little interference as may be by Government. + +“Hatfield is quite the most perfect thing I have seen, there being none +of those great waste places common in most parks. We drove home all +together in the pony carriage. I am glad to have been here at Brocket, +as it has cleared my ideas on certain points very misty to me; not that +I altogether agree with Herbert, for anarchism is certainly outside the +range of practical politics, but his views are large and elevated and do +one good. + +“_22nd Aug._—To London for Stead’s social demonstration. The procession +was entirely of the rag-tag and bobtail, with banners of the most +curious devices: one represented the Minotaur, a princely personage in a +blue uniform, and his victim; another a van full of middle-aged females, +labelled ‘Protection for Girls.’ Also there were political badges; one +banner stated that its bearer had refused taxes because he had no vote; +and there were socialistic and temperance vans, with ‘John Bright’ and +‘Sir Wilfrid Lawson Associations.’ In the Park I went the round of the +platforms, each with male and female speakers, and was fortunate enough +to hear Stead speak. This he did well, with a good deal of dramatic +action, but a certain self consciousness which occasionally marred the +effect. Besides the regular platform speakers, there were volunteer +orators, who held forth to groups on the ground. One I listened to +attacked Randolph fiercely through his brother Blandford, with whose +history the speaker professed to be well acquainted. The best speech I +heard, however, was from a democratic socialist; he hit the +demonstration hard when he expostulated against all parties in the +state, and especially against the Radical capitalists. Samuel Morley, he +said, had subscribed £2,000 for the protection of girls, but when had he +ever given £5 to a girl of the 5,000 in his own factories to save her +from perdition? It was the capitalists who were the cause of all crime +and misery, and who ground the faces of the poor. What we wanted was not +social reform, but social revolution. And he took his hat and showed on +its brim how a revolution should be made. When the poor, he said, have +got the rich under them they will know how to keep them there. I could +not help cheering. + +“_27th Aug._—A note from Moore asking me to come and see him. Randolph +had told him to read me an extract from a letter of Wolff’s. It was to +the effect that he was in such a delicate position in regard to his +mission that he dared not appear to know Jemal-ed-Din. Jemal-ed-Din, he +said, was opposed to the Sultan’s Caliphate in the Soudan, and if he +acknowledged him as a friend, the Sultan might think that he had some +design on his spiritual pretensions. For this reason he dared not +mention his name. This is all nonsense. The question of the Sultan’s +Caliphate need never be raised, and Jemal-ed-Din is not known as its +opponent. On the contrary his newspaper was always loud on the Sultan’s +rights. The Seyyid, however, declined to go to Constantinople without +some acknowledgement from Wolff, because he says it would ruin his +influence everywhere if the Sultan were to shut the door in his face. +But I am to see Randolph to-morrow. + +“_28th Aug._—At half-past one I called on Randolph at the India Office; +he is looking fagged and ill, and is still obliged to stay in town, but +talks of going to Scotland next week. I feel convinced he will not live +two years, or will be obliged to give up public life. We talked over the +Jemal-ed-Din affair, but as Jemal-ed-Din refuses to go to Constantinople +without Wolff’s support, and as Wolff refuses to commit himself with +Jemal-ed-Din, we agreed the matter must remain so. Then we talked about +Olivier Pain, and I told Randolph the whole story, and how Hartington +had denied the proclamation issued by Wolseley offering £50 for him, +dead or alive. This delighted him, and he offered to send my letter +about it to Lord Salisbury at Dieppe, and I gave it to him. Lastly, I +told him I had heard things were going badly at Hyderabad, and asked him +to write to the Nizam and warn him. But he said that to do so would be +against all rules, and that he could only communicate through the +Government of India. He told me, however, but as an absolute secret, +that he had already written to Lord Dufferin to suggest that Cordery +should be removed from Hyderabad. I then asked him to get Moore sent +there, Colonel Moore, who is now with the Duke of Connaught, and he +seemed to like the idea. Poor Randolph! I fear that the attainment of +his ambition, like the wasps with the honey-pot, will be his death. + +“Lady Gregory sends me a sonnet on the Mahdi’s death, which is very +good. + +“_3rd Sept._—Last night I made my declaration about Ireland. It is the +first public declaration made, since Parnell’s speech, in favour of Home +Rule. + +“_4th Sept._—Ibrahim Bey has received a letter from Ismaïl Jowdat once +more pressing him to come and see the Sultan. It has been decided he +shall go. The Sultan has heard of Jemal-ed-Din having seen one of the +Ministers, and has sent for Ibrahim to find out what it is all about. He +wants Jemal-ed-Din too, but the Seyyid says he will wait till the Sultan +sends for him. For Ibrahim there will be no danger, and I will put him +in communication with Wolff and let Randolph know. + +“_6th Sept._—Ibrahim left last night for Constantinople. Jemal-ed-Din +will stay on in London. + +“_12th Sept._—Lord Salisbury has answered my letter as to my being +allowed to return to Egypt with great politeness. He says he thinks it +can be arranged. George Wyndham has come back from the wars, I am glad +to say, with a sound skin. + +“_15th Sept._—Went to the ‘Pall Mall’ office and saw Milner,[129] the +acting editor in Stead’s place, about a letter I had written for them +but wished to withdraw, and explained to him how the case stood. He +agreed with me that it might be well to defer the publication, and +admitted that I was fully justified in withdrawing the letter under the +circumstances in which Stead was placed. He tells me that from the first +he did not approve of Stead’s “revelations.” He was very amiable about +it all. I like Milner. + +“_16th Sept._—Mr. Tebbutt from St. Ives is here, at Crabbet, and I took +him to Newbuildings, to talk over the question of establishing small +holders there on small rents. But, though a strong Liberal, he does not +advise it; thinks it will not answer. + +“_19th Sept._—Gladstone has published a manifesto, and I have been +writing to him protesting against his repetition of the plea of _honour_ +in excuse of the bombardment of Alexandria. George Wyndham is just back +from Cyprus and the Soudan. He spoke with great admiration of the Arabs. + +“_20th Sept._—There has been a revolution in Roumelia. This is Russian +doing in answer to Wolff’s mission, or rather in anticipation of the +elections here. Jemal-ed-Din always said they would make a move two +months before the elections, and here it is. My feeling is that it is +useless attempting to retain any part of Europe for the Turks except +just the city of Constantinople. I am certain Lord Salisbury will do +nothing to protect them anywhere out of Asia Minor. + +“_21st Sept._—I have written to Mr. Gladstone proposing to meet him on a +platform and discuss the question of Egypt with him as a ‘question of +honour.’ + +“_22nd Sept._—William Morris was arrested two days ago at a socialist +trial for hissing the magistrate, and I have written to congratulate +him. + +“_23rd Sept._—A letter has arrived from Ibrahim giving an account of +himself. He is staying with Jowdat, has been to the Palace, and is to +see the Sultan after Beiram. They are only angry with him for not coming +before. The Sultan is sending a man to Jemal-ed-Din for consultation. + +“_24th Sept._—Talked the whole question of Roumelia over with Jemal-ed- +Din, and we are agreed that it is not Russia but Austria that has +encouraged the movement at this moment. I told the Seyyid it was useless +trying to save European Turkey for the Sultan; Lord Salisbury would not +dare guarantee it. He does not like this, but seems to think me right +all the same. There is a memorandum of Gordon’s of 1880 recommending the +partition of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt to England, Syria to France, +Armenia to Russia, and European Turkey to independent Christian States. +Jemal-ed-Din thinks Wolff must have had a hand in the Roumelian +movement. I don’t. + +“I have been asked to deliver the inaugural address at the Tyneside +lectures at Newcastle on 1st October. I have chosen for my subject +‘Egyptian Aggression, an answer to the Plea of Honour.’ + +“_25th Sept._—Chamberlain has been down in South London speaking. Of his +three proposals, taxing the rich, free schools, and dividing the land I +do not greatly quarrel with any. + +“_28th Sept._—Munif Pasha is in London and has seen the Seyyid. He wants +to see Churchill. I have written about it. + +“_30th Sept._—A great Tory demonstration at Crabbet held in a large tent +in the Park. Sir Walter Bartelot, Gregory, M.P., and Grantham spoke. I +was chairman. Bartelot is a really good speaker. + +“Mr. Gladstone has answered my letter. He declines meeting me in +Midlothian and blames me for my action in Egypt. + +“_3rd Oct._—The Hugh Wyndhams, the two Hardinges, and the Wentworths are +here (at Crabbet). I had a good deal of talk with Hardinge about +Egyptian diplomacy. He was with Dufferin in Egypt after the war. + +“_6th Oct._—Ferid Bey has written to ask to see me, and he came to +luncheon to-day. Jemal-ed-Din was there, and, as long as he was present, +Ferid dealt only with generalities; but, luncheon over, we went upstairs +and, after much beating about the bush, he disclosed to me his real +object. The state of things, he told me, at Constantinople was hopeless, +and the discontent so general that important events might be looked for. +The empire was crumbling to pieces, and not only the empire but the +Turkish nation too would perish if nothing was done to save it. There +were therefore people who thought, and he himself was one, that the only +safety lay in an attempt to restore the constitutional scheme of Midhat, +and to take the absolute power out of the Sultan’s hands. The present +Sultan was incapable of action, and yet he had absorbed all power to +himself, and the government was carried on by a gigantic system of +espionage, which alone hindered a revolt. A revolt, however, might now +be expected, and the power might be put into the hands of some capable +general acting for the nation, while the Sultan might be deposed in +favour of some other person, a member of his family or another—he would +not commit himself to say exactly whom. What made men hesitate was only +this: that they feared a disturbance of any sort at Constantinople would +be taken as a pretext by Russia for military intervention. Bismarck, he +told me, would oppose all idea of constitutional government, but he +thought Lord Salisbury might not be opposed to it. He wanted me to find +out whether the English Government would allow Russian intervention, and +whether a change of Sultan would be acceptable to them. Abdul Hamid +might throw himself into Russian hands and ask protection against his +people. Would the English Government countenance a revolution? He asked +whether I thought it any good his consulting any one out of office, Sir +Henry Elliot for instance. I told him I thought Sir Henry Elliot would +be very little good with Lord Salisbury, but that if he liked I would +speak to Churchill about it. Wolff’s mission was at a standstill because +it was impossible to deal with the present Sultan, and perhaps they +might be willing to find a government with which they could deal. He +begged me to do this, only urging caution as the idea might be +frustrated if the English Government took it badly; also as regards +himself that I should not divulge his part in the affair. ‘The state of +espionage is such,’ he said, ‘at Constantinople that the son is spy on +the father, the brother on the brother, and though I know every man of +note there, there are not two I would trust as I do in talking with +you.’ I told him he need fear nothing on either head, that I would tell +Churchill the position only if I found they were at a standstill in +their negotiations, and that I would be silent as to himself. I asked +him whether Musurus, the ambassador, knew of this. ‘How should he?’ he +said. ‘Musurus is a traitor.’ He also forbade me to speak of it to +Jemal-ed-Din, who was imprudent and also a poor man, who might some day +be tempted by necessity. I have arranged with Moore to see Randolph to- +morrow. + +“_7th Oct._—At twelve saw Randolph at the India Office, and finding +things as I supposed at a standstill with Wolff, told him what I had +heard. I, of course, did not say who had told me, only that it was a +person of high position, in no way connected with Jemal-ed-Din or any +other of my friends. He answered most decidedly that there was not the +remotest danger of Russia being allowed to intervene, and seemed quite +disposed to look favourably on the idea of a change of _régime_ at +Constantinople as favourable to the prospects of an arrangement. He +promised me absolute secrecy about it, and told me something of Wolff’s +progress. Wolff had come to the conclusion that it was very necessary to +take the Arab party at Constantinople into account, and was surprised +that Ibrahim had not been to see him yet. I said he had probably been +forbidden by the Sultan; and to-day a letter came from Ibrahim saying he +had sent in a full report of his doings in England to the Sultan, and +about myself among the rest. But the Sultan had forgotten all about +Wolff and England and everything but Roumelia. Randolph also promised to +send Gorst down to support me at Camberwell, and asked me to speak with +him at a meeting on Indian social reform at the Mansion House. Yesterday +a letter had come from Lord Salisbury telling me that the Egyptian +Government decidedly refused to allow my return to Cairo, and Randolph +encouraged me to insist. I had undertaken not to meddle with political +questions or projects during my stay. Randolph is looking better, and is +very hearty and pleasant. He is the most agreeable and least pedantic of +official men; office has not spoilt him, nor will it. + +“Tea at Lady Gregory’s, where I met Kinglake. + +“_8th Oct._—A long talk with Jemal-ed-Din about prospects at +Constantinople and about the Caliphate. He is for the Mahdi or the +Mahdi’s successor taking the Sultan’s place, or the Sherif Own, or the +Imam of Sanaa—any of these he thought might now take the lead. But +Constantinople must remain the seat of the Caliphate, as Arabia or +Africa would be mere places of exile. Amongst other things, he told me +that it was he himself who had suggested to the Sherif el Huseyn to +claim the Caliphate, but El Huseyn had said it was impossible without +armed support, and the Arabs could never unite except in the name of +religion. Now, Jemal-ed-Din is very anxious to be away again to the +East. He will not go, he says, to Constantinople unless the Sultan sends +for him, and we have agreed that if I do not win my election at +Camberwell we will go together to the Imam of Sanaa in Yemen and raise +the standard of the Caliphate, as I intended to do four years ago. I +asked him whether he thought the Sultan had had El Huseyn assassinated; +and he said, ‘No, but perhaps some pasha had it done.’ + +“Ferid Bey came at twelve, and I told him of the answer I had received +from Churchill, and that I felt very sure our Government would not be +much displeased with a change of _régime_ at Constantinople. At the same +time I told him I thought it would be useless to kick against the union +of Roumelia and Bulgaria. This had been part of his plan. He was of a +different opinion, and said if they could only get free of the present +hindrance in the Sultan’s apathy they were quite ready to carry the war +to the Danube, Turkey’s true frontier. I asked him if they were ready to +fight Russia alone, and he said ‘Yes.’ I told him, ‘If so, go on, I have +nothing to say; but you must not count on assistance from Lord +Salisbury, or any other English Minister; public opinion in England +would not allow it.’ He told me that, without actually deposing Abdul +Hamid, they might put pressure on him to force him to constitutional +courses and a defence of the Empire. I think, nevertheless, he will +discourage his friends from their plan.[130] + +“_9th Oct._—Lord Salisbury has pronounced himself in an admirable speech +in Wales. It will do the Party good, for it is straightforward and +strong. + +“_11th Oct._—I came to Newcastle last night, and made my promised speech +at the theatre to about three thousand people, explaining to them the +intrigues which had brought on the Egyptian War. It is the most +important speech I have ever made, and it lasted two hours. Though most +of the audience were devoted admirers of Gladstone, I succeeded in +carrying them with me, and it was altogether a great success. What a +difference between these north country men and the miserable Camberwell +rabble! I am ashamed of my late electioneering; it is a degrading +business. + +“_12th Oct._—Back to London. Drummond Wolff’s mission is announced as +having succeeded; the Sultan is to send a commissioner with Wolff to +Egypt. I expect Ibrahim Bey has been instrumental in bringing this +about. I hear no more of the threatened revolt at Constantinople. Lord +Salisbury writes to tell me he has forced the Egyptian Government to +receive me in Egypt. + +“The old Cashmiri, Abd-el-Rasul, called and showed me a letter from +Zebehr Pasha at Gibraltar and a correspondence he had had with Lord +Granville, and I promised to ask Churchill to intercede. Also two Indian +delegates with a letter from Ragunath Rao. + +“Down to dine and sleep at Milford (my cousin Robert Webb’s house in +Surrey), and found them all in a barn hearing young Brodrick[131] +orating on Church and State. One cannot escape meetings anywhere now. It +was an absurd business: Bob in the chair, young Brodrick deadly dull; +the crowd cutting their country jokes, and from time to time outside the +bellow of a cow, which set all the meeting off in roars. + +“_13th Oct._—Back to London. Saw Randolph at the India Office at three, +and told him of the success of the Newcastle meeting. He approves of my +going on to another at Edinburgh if it can be arranged. Also he agrees +to see Rama Swami and the other Indian delegates, who called on me a day +or two ago to ask my assistance at the India Office. He has asked me to +bring them to him on Thursday. Moore’s face was a picture when he told +him of this decision, but in his light-hearted way Randolph would hear +of no objection, and so it is settled. Then I laid before him a letter I +had received from Calcutta, about a native woman ravished on a +steamer—the Webb case—and he sent Moore to look it up. Lastly, I asked +him to intercede for the release of Zebehr Pasha at Gibraltar. This, +too, he promised to see to, and said he thought it could easily be +managed. There had already been talk of releasing Zebehr, because the +Colonial Office and the War Office could not agree which was to pay the +expense of keeping him. But Egerton had objected at Cairo—this he told +me confidentially. Randolph is looking decidedly better than he did, and +nothing could be nicer than our relations at present. He volunteered the +information that the Austrian and Russian Governments were both backing +up the Sultan to claim his rights in Roumelia. + +“A letter came to-day from Lord Salisbury, saying that I should go to +the Foreign Office and arrange with Pauncefote[132] the details of my +affairs in Egypt; and I did so. Pauncefote was exceedingly polite to me, +and I spoke pretty frankly to him about Baring and Granville in relation +to my exclusion from Egypt. It is a great triumph to have forced this +matter on the Foreign Office, and to be at last invited back to the +official sanctum after all our quarrels. I met Frank Villiers[133] later +at the club, and laughed about it with him. Rivers Wilson made a third +with us, and we had a grand discussion about the advantage of truth- +telling in politics. They would neither of them hear of it; but I said: +‘Look at me, if I had not made it a rule to speak the exact truth and +have no secrets where should I be to-day? I have been engaged for the +last four years in every kind of intrigue and yet my name stands clear.’ +They laughed at this. Rivers is still bitter about Arabi, but we drove +home together, good friends as of old. + +“_15th Oct._—After luncheon at the Morrises, I took the three delegates +to the India Office, giving them a good sermon first about the folly it +would be for them to hoist a Radical flag here in England. Anyhow, I +think Randolph has converted them, for he was quite charming to them, +putting them at their ease at once. There was nobody present but +ourselves, and the face of the office messenger when he showed us in was +even more comic than Moore’s had been two days ago. The expression on it +was exactly that of the old steward’s in the ‘Mariage à la Mode.’ Mon +Mohun Ghose did most of the talking; he asked Randolph about the +Parliamentary inquiry into the Government of India and what subjects it +would include. Randolph said it would depend on them to make it a useful +one; they must send over their very best men to give evidence, and take +care they were absolutely accurate about their facts, as there were +plenty of old-fashioned people who did not want existing things +disturbed, and who would pick holes where they could. He said Siva +Prasad had informed him that a royal order to come to England would +override caste difficulties, and that the Benares divines would decide +it in this sense. But Chandar Varkar objected to this, that Benares +could not lay down the law for the whole of India; still he hoped it +might have some effect. Mon Mohun Ghose wanted to know whether the +inquiry would include the judicial system, as that was what was giving +rise just now to most ill feeling. And Randolph said that if it depended +on him it should. His colleagues had been most amiable about this +inquiry, and if the Conservatives were in office the inquiry would be a +full and impartial one. He was against members of the Government sitting +on it, but those should be chosen who had most title to consider Indian +affairs, independent men of all parties. He should support the inquiry, +whether he was in office or not. The inquiry would also include the +revenue question, and Rama Swami explained to him the enhancement of the +land revenue grievance. He begged them to address him again on any +special points they required to make known connected with their +respective Presidencies, and at the end of three quarters of an hour +they went away highly delighted. He told me, at leaving, that I might +publish the result, and I have sent a few lines to the Press +Association, epitomizing the interview. The delegates will also +telegraph to India. This is a great move, and will do excellent work in +every way. + +“_18th Oct._—An ultimatum has been sent by Lord Dufferin to King Thebaw +of Burmah. There is a long _communiqué_ in the ‘Observer’ showing how +rich Burmah is, and the wickedness of Thebaw; this has decided me to +write to Churchill and ask explanations. He is unfortunately out of +town. [This ultimatum led to the iniquitous annexation of Upper Burmah.] + +“Delivered an address in the evening at Islington Hall, Frederic +Harrison in the chair, on ‘Reform in Foreign Policy.’ [This was an +appeal against secrecy and other evils in Foreign Affairs.] + +“_20th Oct._—Randolph telegraphs he has been to my house, and is sorry +to miss me. He is just leaving for Lynn, but refers me to Moore. I +travelled up from Crabbet with Frederick Locker, who says it will be +unfair if I succeed in Parliament, seeing that I lived idly and amused +myself for forty years, and that I have succeeded too as a poet. + +“A meeting at the Mansion House for Lady Dufferin’s Indian Female +Doctors’ Fund, for which Randolph had invited me to speak. I was put up +to second Sir Richard Temple; the Anglo-Indians will be very angry at +this. There has been a great row about the Indian delegates, who have +been sat upon by their Radical friends here for having promised to +support me at a meeting in Camberwell, and they are frightened out of +their wits. The Radicals say they won’t allow them to have anything to +do with a Conservative candidate. + +“_21st Oct._—Saw Moore at the India Office, who spoke frankly enough +about Burmah. He said that the India Office had been opposed to +intervention for a long while, that Bernard, the Resident, especially +had opposed it, but now saw its necessity, that great commercial +pressure had been put on the Calcutta Government to take action, and +that perhaps Lord Dufferin was not sorry for so good an excuse at last +to settle the matter. ‘An important point,’ Moore said (and he thought +it would convince me), ‘was that _it would pay_.’ I told him this was +precisely the point which disturbed me. I asked him with whom the +responsibility rested. And he said, entirely with Lord Dufferin; he has +had _carte blanche_ given him in the matter. I said I hoped they would +not imitate the late Government by starting military operations without +declaration of war, and suggested they might wait till Parliament met. +He told me no papers had been published during the last two years. At +leaving he said: ‘I think you may make your mind comfortable as to there +being as much justice and reason in the case as there ever is in cases +of the kind.’ I shall attend the Peace and Arbitration Committee to- +morrow. + +“In the evening we had a grand meeting of the Indian Delegates at Oakley +Hall. We got Jemal-ed-Din to deliver a discourse in Arabic, which no +soul in the room understood, but which was much applauded. Another +followed in Persian from Mirza Bakir; and Rama Swami and Chandar Varkar +spoke also. [It shows the absurdity of London audiences that this was by +far the most successful meeting we had during the canvass.] + +“_24th Oct._—Dinner with Hancock and a nest of Radicals at the Reform +Club. I found them all less liberal than I am, especially about Ireland. + +“_25th Oct._—To Hammersmith, where I found Morris laid up with the gout. +He thought things were going wonderfully well for his ideas, and only +hoped the Whigs would not get in with any large majority. He was +inclined to vote for the Tories, but all voting was against socialistic +principles. + +“_28th Oct._—Wrote a letter to the ‘Times,’ in protest against the +Burmese War, but shall keep it a day or two to see how Lord Salisbury +answers my appeal to him for the recall of Arabi. + +“_1st Nov._—Called on Lady C. yesterday, who said the Prince of Wales +had told her they were discussing the question of recalling Arabi at the +Foreign Office. + +“Also saw Cardinal Manning. He was sitting very feeble in his arm-chair, +before the fire, with a book screen behind him. It would make a fine +picture. Truly, the only old age worth having is the old age of +religion. He talked to me about Urquhart, who, he said, had made great +efforts to enlist him among his disciples—‘a man of great personal charm +and genius, but mentally not quite sound’; also about Gladstone, ‘who +has gone altogether off the track.’ I told him I had hopes about Arabi’s +return under Lord Salisbury but none whatever under Gladstone, he was +too obstinate. ‘He was always like that,’ the Cardinal said, ‘the most +obstinate man in the world; he never would admit he had ever made a +mistake. To understand Gladstone you must remember he is a Scotchman on +his father’s and mother’s side, only by accident an Englishman, born at +Liverpool.’ + +“_2nd Nov._—Randolph writes that Lord Salisbury will certainly not give +me an encouraging reply about Arabi: ‘Even if he was disposed, as I +should be, to favour your views, he would not dare take such a step on +the eve of the election.’ This is bad. + +“Jemal-ed-Din, who had been mysteriously absent for two or three days +from James Street, turned up again this morning. He had left the house +in consequence of a noisy disturbance that occurred in his room on +Thursday between two of his Oriental friends, Wahbi Bey and Abd-el- +Rasul; they seem to have quarrelled over politics or religion and ended +by beating each other over the heads with umbrellas. I had to beg them +both to leave the house, and the Seyyid followed them. One must draw the +line somewhere, and I have now suggested to the Seyyid that he should +take up his quarters elsewhere; he has been three months with me in the +house, the full term of Arab hospitality. [N.B.—This was the last I saw +of the good Seyyid that year; he took huff at my treatment of his +friends, and still more at the disappointment he had had in connection +with Drummond Wolff’s mission, and he left England a few days later in +anger against everything English and, shaking its dust from his feet, +went away to Moscow, where he joined himself with Katkoff, the well- +known Panslavist leader in a campaign against the British Empire. From +Russia he moved on to Persia and Afghanistan with the same object, and, +after much preaching and much persecution from the governments of all +these countries, drifted back at last to Constantinople, where I found +him many years later established in the precincts of the Yildiz Palace, +half pensioner, half prisoner of the Sultan. He died of cancer there, +some think of poison, in 1902, nursed, as I have heard, for sole +attendant, by a Christian servant. Jemal-ed-Din was a man of genius +whose teaching exercised an influence hardly to be overrated on the +Mohammedan reform movement of the last thirty years. I feel highly +honoured at his having lived three months under my roof in England; but +he was a wild man, wholly Asiatic and not easily tamed to European ways. +An account of my subsequent visit to him at Constantinople will be given +in its place.] + +“_4th Nov._—There is a telegram from Cairo to-day which threatens a new +expedition against Dongola. I don’t like a speech Randolph has made on +the subject; he also talks nonsense about fighting for new markets in +connection with the Burmese quarrel. I don’t know what to do; one party +is as bad as the other. Lord Salisbury spoke last night at the Victoria +Hall (where I was present on the platform as one of his chief +supporters), and among other crudities he proposed this remedy of new +markets as a relief for the depression of trade. What nonsense it is +when men talk of ‘creating’ wealth by trade. English trade with Oriental +nations means only the transference of Oriental money into English +pockets; trade creates nothing, and one might parody the French axiom +and say, _Le commerce c’est le vol_. Lord Salisbury’s speech was a poor +affair; he does not come out well on occasions like these, having no +sympathy whatever with the people and being unable to pretend it. He was +evidently aware of his false position, and blundered on from one mistake +to another; even in form he was bad, and it was only towards the end of +his speech that he attained to anything approaching eloquence. Most of +it was a House of Lords reply to his fellow lords, Granville and +Hartington, about whom the South Londoners care less than for the man in +the moon. A few good hits he made, and his audience were quite prepared +to applaud anything, but it fell flat enough considering how great an +occasion it was. The rest of the proceedings were poor, but mercifully +curtailed, as his lordship was anxious to get home to Hatfield. + +“_5th Nov._—Guy Fawkes’ Day, the guy this year being King Thebaw, a sad- +looking black monarch in a turban. This Burmese War is of a piece with +all these wars: hungry commercial speculators making contracts with a +dishonest prince, European intrigues, British remonstrances, official +interference, tales to the prince’s discredit, his subjects praying for +British intervention, threats from Calcutta, appeal of the prince to his +people, who strangely take his side in the quarrel, ultimatum issued, +arrival of fleet, massacre of Europeans, bombardment, slaughter of +natives, triumph of British arms, annexation of territory, pay, prize +money, pensions, peerages all round, and so _da capo_. + +“_6th Nov._—Sent my letter about Burmah to the ‘Times,’ after calling at +the India Office to see if Randolph had any further explanation to make, +but he is out of town. He has stupidly, as I think, identified himself +with Lord Dufferin’s policy of war. But I cannot keep silent on an +occasion of this kind. + +“_11th Nov._—We have decided to have a large meeting at Camberwell in +favour of Arabi’s recall to Egypt, and I went to see Randolph to ask him +about it and other things. He made a first-rate speech the other day at +Manchester, but looks fagged and several years older than when he took +office. I talked to him first about the Soudan, and asked him if +anything had been done in the way of negotiations. And he said that +Mukhtar, the Ottoman commissioner, and Wolff were going to do what they +could to pacificate; that already something had been begun; that Wolff +quite understood the necessity of dealing through Arab channels; that he +had discovered that if the Sultan was influenced by anybody it was by +the Arab Sheykhs, and, finally, that Mukhtar was the man Wolff himself +had wished for, and that all would be done that could be done. All the +same, there was imminent prospect of more fighting. I told him of the +papers I had sent in to Lord Salisbury, and of the meeting we are +getting up for the recall of Arabi. And he highly approved. He said: ‘I +am doing all I can with Lord Salisbury to get him to recall Arabi. But +his prejudices are strong and I shall be glad to have support from +outside.’ About the Burmese war I said that I hoped he did not +disapprove of my letter to the ‘Times,’ but I was obliged to write it, +as I could not afford not to be true to my principles, which were to me +what her virtue is to a woman. He said he thought it quite right, and +hoped I should pull my election through.”[134] + +This proved to be my last talk with Churchill on our familiar and +intimate footing as political allies. In another fortnight the elections +had been fought and lost and won; then came Gladstone’s unexpected +pronouncement in favour of Home Rule, and we followed different paths, +and I saw Churchill no more that year, or at all as friends politically. + +To end the story of the Camberwell election briefly: on the 12th +November I finally declared for Home Rule in its full sense, avowing my +intention in so many words of supporting Parnell in his demand for an +Irish Parliament. I felt bound to do this, but I believe it cost me my +election. All the last fortnight was occupied in heavy work, of which my +wife, with her maid Cowie and my private secretary Hope, an excellent +young man, took the lion’s share, and I was helped by many personal +friends from outside, notably by the Meynells and Pollens, and by an +excellent old-fashioned Radical banker from St. Ives, Mr. Tebbutt, who +came on principle to canvass for me because of my views on foreign +policy, and the Rev. Hugh Chapman of St. Luke’s, now chaplain to the +Savoy. But their devoted labours proved of no avail, and I lost the +election by 162 votes out of 6,112 votes polled. + + THE END. + + + + + NOTE ABOUT THE MAHDI’S DEATH + + +THE policy finally decided on by Lord Salisbury in July, 1885, of +completing the evacuation of the Soudan and leaving it to “stew in its +own juice” till such time as it could be reconquered in English +interests, was a Macchiavellian one, and resulted successfully from the +point of view of imperial ambition. The decision was come to +simultaneously with Mohammed Ahmed’s death, which I thought at the time, +and still think, was not wholly a natural one. His death was due, +according to the official account, to small-pox, but there were too many +interests engaged at Cairo and Constantinople just then not to make it +extremely probable that there was another agency at work to procure a +solution so simple and so timely. The Mahdi’s was a great personality, +commanding unbounded respect in the Soudan, and inspiring the religious +hopes of Mohammedan Egypt as that of a possible deliverer from Christian +domination, while beyond Egypt it had become a rival influence obnoxious +to the Ottoman Caliphate. There are too many examples of such deaths +procured for political ends in the time of Sultan Abdul Hamid and of the +Khedivate to make the suspicion in the present instance unreasonable; +and it must be remembered that with the Drummond Wolff mission a new +opportunity was presenting itself at Constantinople, to which the life +of the Mahdi was a chief obstacle. Be this as it may, it is certain that +the blow dealt by Mohammed Ahmed’s death was fatal to the future of the +Soudan as that of a permanently powerful theocracy. The Khalifa Abdallah +el Taishi, who succeeded him in supreme rule, was a man wholly inferior +intellectually and politically to his master, and under him religious +enthusiasm waned and tribal rivalries took the place of a united front +against the enemy, while also the wisdom was lacking for the conclusion +of an effective peace on lines of commercial intercourse with Egypt. +There was always the excuse at Cairo that the Khalifa was impracticable +to treat with. The story, however, of the reconquest of Khartoum twelve +years later is beyond the scope of the present volume, as is any +appreciation of the actual condition of the Soudan under English rule, +and I leave both reluctantly for another occasion. + + W. S. B. + + + + + APPENDICES + + + APPENDIX A + + UNPUBLISHED GORDON PAPERS + +COLONEL DONNELLY’S CONVERSATION WITH COLONEL C. G. GORDON, 30TH OCTOBER + 1880 (FROM AMONG SIR HENRY GORDON’S PAPERS) + + +THIS was the first time I had seen Colonel Gordon since he left England +as Lord Ripon’s private secretary. I asked him what was the real reason +of his giving up. He gave me to understand a number of things made him +feel that he was _de trop_. “For instance,” he said, “just after we +started, Lord Ripon gave me the minutes and evidence in the inquiry into +Yakub Khan’s connection with Cavagnari’s murder, and asked me to make a +_précis_ and give him my opinion. This was difficult. But after sitting +up the greater part of two nights I was able to give them back with my +remarks all over them in red and black ink. He asked me what I thought +of it. I said I did not see any evidence to prove Yakub guilty; he very +likely was glad Cavagnari was murdered, but I could see nothing to show +that he was implicated in the crime, and you know (to me, Donnelly) +three out of five of the Council (mentioning their names) were of that +opinion. + +“Lord Ripon looked into it and told me to telegraph from Aden to his, +Yakub’s, keepers to meet him at Bombay. I said: ‘My Lord, I think that +will hardly do as you have not yet been sworn in and Lord Lytton is +still Governor General and may make a great fuss.’ Lord Ripon agreed, +thought I was right and said the telegram was not to be sent. When we +got to Bombay Lord Ripon again asked me to telegraph to Yakub’s keepers +to meet him at some station on the way to Simla. I had to ask White +(military secretary) as I did not know the route sufficiently to fix on +a station. He was awfully taken aback. Did I know what the consequences +would be? Every one in India would be staggered and so on. Begged me to +persuade Lord Ripon not to take such a step. I told him that it did not +seem to me it would make any difference one way or the other, but as he +was so very strong on the point, I said I would let Lord Ripon know +before I did anything. I wrote a note and sent it in early in the +morning to Lord Ripon, saying that I myself did not think it would +matter, but, as White was so very anxious on the subject, believing the +end of the world would come if such a step were taken, I thought it as +well to let him know before I carried out his, Lord Ripon’s, +instructions. This was just before breakfast, and he came out in a few +minutes very indignant that any one should have ventured to overrule his +orders; he had no intention of being controlled, and so on. All +breakfast time he looked quite hurt, and injured, and indignant. After +breakfast I left White talking with him in a beseeching way, and +presently he (Lord Ripon) came and asked me if I had sent the telegram. +I said No, I was waiting to see White to settle the place. ‘Well,’ he +said, ‘perhaps after all it was as well not to send it.’ + +“Now this is only one instance,” Gordon said. “There were lots of snubs +of this kind. You know I shouldn’t have minded getting snubbed, if there +was any use in it—but I saw it was only sure to get worse. Lord Ripon +was being surrounded and guided by the very people from whom Lord +Northcote had begged me to keep him clear. When he got to Simla I was +sure he would be completely in the hands of the Lytton party. I felt I +was _de trop_ and could do no good, and that it was as well to give up +as soon as possible. I told Lord Ripon so. He was very nice about it, +said that his regard for me had only been increased by what had +happened, but he saw it was advisable I should resign, was much obliged +to me for doing so, was only afraid of the awkwardness. I showed him the +letter I had written. He said I was giving him too great praise and +taking all the blame on myself—did not wish me to publish it. But I said +I had written it; it was too much trouble to write it again. And so I +sent it. We parted on the best of terms. He said he had a greater regard +for me than ever, and so on. In fact I have no doubt he was much +relieved by being rid of me.” + +The opinion Gordon gave Lord Ripon on the Afghan question was this. He +said either Yakub Khan was guilty or not. If he was not, and there was +no reason for saying he was (_vide_ secret papers, Court of Enquiry on +Yakub Khan), he ought in justice to be restored. And moreover he was the +only man who was likely to be able to hold the country who had any +following. “‘Take him back yourself, my Lord. You can easily do it with +3,000 cavalry. If you succeed, you will be looked upon as the greatest +Governor-General India ever had, and if you fail and are killed you will +have a splendid marble monument put up to you.’ But Lord Ripon did not +seem to see the monument. I offered to do it myself with Yakub and some +lakhs of rupees. But they would not have it. What was the use of my +being there? There was no one who cared to look forward and have a +policy, only to let things drift.” + +As to Candahar, Gordon’s opinion was that we ought to give in to the +Ruler of Afghanistan if we wished him to hold the country. The position +of Candahar with relation to Herat and Cabul was such [here a diagram is +given] that it was impossible for any man to really rule the country +unless he held Candahar. But he thought we had managed our withdrawal +from Cabul very badly. We had been in such a hurry as to look like +running away. Our prestige in India had been much shaken by the Maimand +disaster, and Roberts had only been able to get at Ayoub Khan’s +rearguard. As an illustration of our loss of prestige in India, he gave +an incident which occurred lately. When the Russian gunboats were in the +harbour of Bombay, the Parsees brought their children to see them and to +be introduced to the Russian officers. + +Things were constantly happening which must have made his presence—to +say the least—irksome with a man of Lord Ripon’s calibre of mind. For +instance, the day before they started [from London], Lord Houghton was +lunching with Lord Ripon, Gordon kept away till after lunch was over. +But Lord Houghton was still there when he came in. On being introduced +by Lord Ripon, Lord Houghton said he was delighted to hear he was going +as private secretary; he could not congratulate Lord Ripon too highly on +his great good luck in having such a secretary; he was very glad Lord +Ripon was going as Governor-General, but almost more glad that Gordon +was going as his secretary. + + + EARL OF NORTHBROOK TO GENERAL C. G. GORDON + +_Private._ + + _Jan._ 18, 1884. + +MY DEAR GENERAL, + +I enclose a letter to Sir William Hewett. We have written officially to +him by this mail announcing your mission, and authorizing him to meet +your demands up to £1,000 upon your receipts. I am sure you will like +Hewett. As there is no telegraphic communication with Suakin we shall +arrange for the Helicon to be at Suez from Malta to take you to Suakin. +If she should not be available you will have to put up with the Cygnet, +but she is not nearly so comfortable as the Helicon. + +I will telegraph to you to Port Said to say which arrangement has been +made, to the care of the senior officer. + +I was very glad to see you in such good heart about affairs this +afternoon, and I trust that by God’s blessing you will succeed in +arranging them as satisfactorily as circumstances admit. + + Yours very sincerely, + NORTHBROOK. + + + GENERAL C. G. GORDON TO MISS GORDON + + 19. 1. 84. + +MY DEAR AUGUSTA, + +I arrived in town very tired at 6 a.m. yesterday, went with Brockenhurst +to Barracks, washed and went [to] Wolseley, he said Ministers would see +me at 3 p.m. I went back to Barracks and reposed. At 12.30 p.m. Wolseley +came for me. I went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke and +Northbrook; they said had I seen W. and did I understand their ideas. I +said yes, and repeated what W. had said to me as to their ideas, which +was “_they would evacuate Soudan_.” They were pleased and said, “that +was their idea. Would I go?” I said “yes.” They said “when?” I said “To- +night.” And it was over. I started at 8 p.m. H.R.H. [Cambridge] and Lord +W. [Wolseley] came to see me off. I saw Henry [Sir H. Gordon] and Bob +[R. F. Gordon], no one else except Stokes, all very kind. I have taken +Stewart with me, a nice fellow, we are now in train near Mont Cenis. I +am not moved a bit, and hope to do the people good. Will you tell Sir J. +Cowell all this. Lord Granville said Ministers were very much obliged to +me. I said I was much honoured by going. I telegraphed King [of +Belgians] at once, and told him to wait a few months. Kindest love Mina, +Helen and yourself, A. Burton, and Hayter and Ellen [these two were +servants at Rockstone Place]. + + Believe me, my dear Augusta, yr. affect. brother + C. G. GORDON. + +_Address_—Care H.M. Consul Suez. + + + MEMORANDUM AS TO GENERAL GORDON’S DOINGS IN CAIRO, JANUARY 1884, BY + COLONEL [SIR CHARLES] WATSON (FROM SIR HENRY GORDON’S PAPERS) + + +On Saturday the 19th January when I went into Sir Evelyn Wood’s room at +the War Office he said, “Embrace me.” I said, “What has happened?” He +said, “The English Government is sending General Gordon out to settle +the affairs of the Soudan, and he started from London last night with +Colonel Stewart by the Brindisi Mail.” I said, “That is the best thing I +have heard for the last year. Is it to be made public, or is it still a +secret?” He said, “It is to be made as public as possible, tell +everybody.” Then we did some ordinary business, and I went to my own +office. Colonel Bruce Campbell was there, having come as usual for the +latest information. He said, “What news have you for me?” I replied, +“The newest and best is that General Gordon is coming out to settle the +Soudan, and is now on his way.” He said, “I don’t believe it. The +English Government will never let him come.” “Well,” I said, “I think +you’ll see it’s true.” Then he went away. + +That evening I had to take some papers to Nubar’s house for him to sign. +Soon after I went in he said, “I am to be congratulated. The weight of +the Soudan is off my shoulders. If any one can manage it, Gordon can.” +He really did seem glad that Gordon was coming out, which was good of +him considering the abusive way in which Gordon had both written and +spoken of him. + +The next day Nubar stopped me in the street to talk about Bashi Bazouks, +who had come to Cairo and were troubling him about their pay, and he +again repeated how glad he was that Gordon was coming out. The following +day every one was talking about it; several Egyptians said, “Finished +with the Mahdi.” But that was too hopeful a view. I had to see Major +Vincent about the War Office budget, in which he was very eager to make +more economies, and he asked how much money was Gordon likely to want +for taking all the people out of the Soudan and settling up the affairs +there. I said that Gordon couldn’t answer that question himself, that +there was no doubt that he would do the job better and cheaper than any +one else. Sir Evelyn Baring seemed hopeful and said, “That it was +specially understood that Gordon was under the English and not under the +Egyptian Government, and that therefore he would be under him [Baring] +and not under Nubar. But,” he added smiling, “not that it is very likely +that Gordon will take orders from me or any one else.” + +The next day, the 22nd, Sir Evelyn Wood said to me, “Gordon is coming +out with the intention of going straight through the Canal and on to +Suakin, without coming to Cairo; I can quite understand his not liking +to come to Cairo, but it is very important he should see Baring before +going to the Soudan, and it would look badly if he did not call on the +Khedive. I shall therefore go down to Port Said to-morrow to meet and +try to bring him up to Cairo, and I want you to come with me. Nubar has +arranged for a boat and train to bring him up here.” + +That day there was a telegram from Slatin Bey in Darfour, stating that +he was constantly being attacked by the Mahdi’s people, that his +ammunition was running out, his soldiers were getting demoralized, and +he had had to shoot several of them, and he could not hold out much +longer unless ammunition and reinforcements were sent him. It was +arranged to send a telegram to Dongola to be sent to him as soon as +possible, telling him that General Gordon was going to the Soudan to +withdraw all the Egyptian troops, and everybody else who wished to +leave. This message was to be sent to the Mudir of Dongola with orders +to send it on by several different messengers, so as to make sure of +Slatin Bey getting it. + +In the afternoon Sir E. Wood asked me to see Nubar to make sure that the +necessary arrangements had been made for bringing Gordon quickly up from +Port Said. Nubar looked very tired and spoke French, said he was too +tired to talk in English. He sent for Tigrane who looked very sulky, but +it was not clear whether it was because Gordon was coming out, or +because he was not so important a man as in Cherif’s time. Nubar gave +him orders to see that everything was ready for Gordon’s journey, and +said that no expense would be spared to send him to Khartoum in the +shortest possible time, as the sooner he got there, the sooner things +would be settled. That night we dined at Sir E. Baring’s, a regular +Consular dinner—Austrian, Russian, Netherlands, etc. I was sitting next +Tigrane, who would hardly say a word; he does not seem quite to approve +of the advance of English ideas. Nubar on the contrary, who was also +there, seemed very cheerful. It will be curious to see whether Tigrane +will continue to work with Nubar or not. Other people came in after +dinner for dancing. + +The next morning Sir E. Wood sent to me to say that he was unhappy about +Slatin Bey and the people in Darfour, and asked me to ask Nubar not to +send the message to Dongola until Gordon had arrived. Nubar was not in +his office, and I waited a good while in Tigrane’s room, who was much +more talkative than the night before. He said he was not let to do +anything now, and that Nubar and Sir E. Baring managed everything. He +seemed rather doubtful of the success of Gordon’s mission to the Soudan, +on account of the power that the Mahdi had up there. + +At 11.30 Sir E. Wood and I started for Ismaïlia, and arrived there about +5 p.m. Sir Evelyn was rather uneasy in his mind about Gordon, as he +thought it might be difficult to persuade him to come to Cairo. At +Ismaïlia we were met by the Governor and other Notables, and went +straight over to the pier, where a steam launch was waiting to take us +to Port Said; among others who were there was Khalil Agha, an Albanian +policeman, who had been with me in the campaign, and who had now charge +of the roads and gardens at Ismaïlia. A little French red faced doctor +begged for a passage as he had been telegraphed for from Port Said. We +started at once and reached Port Said at 11.30 p.m. A lot of people met +us, and accompanied Sir Evelyn to the Hôtel des Pays Bas, where rooms +had been engaged for him by the Governor. + +Next morning I went to the P. and O. Office and saw Mr. Roy, who said +that the “Tanjore” from Brindisi would not be in till the afternoon, but +he was proved to be wrong, for half an hour afterwards she was in sight, +and, by the time we had finished breakfast, and Sir Evelyn had inspected +the company of the 8th Battalion stationed at Port Said, the “Tanjore” +was in the harbour close to H.M.S. “Carysfort,” which had been sent from +Malta to take General Gordon to Suakin, and was now waiting for him with +steam up ready to start. Our steam launch was at the pier, and we went +out to the “Tanjore” at once. General Gordon was on the poop talking to +Col. Stewart. A minute served to make him and Sir E. Wood acquainted +with one another, and at the same moment the English Consul put into +General Gordon’s hands a bundle of cipher telegrams from Lord Granville +and Sir E. Baring, and Col. Stewart and I went down at once into the +saloon to decipher them. The Captain of the “Carysfort” came on board to +report his ship ready, and Sir E. Wood seemed at first a little doubtful +how to break the intelligence to General Gordon that he was expected to +come to Cairo instead of going to Suakin as he intended, but the latter +proved quite amenable, and as soon as he was told that the steam launch +was alongside to take him to Ismaïlia, said he was ready to start at +once; so their baggage was put in, and in five minutes we were steaming +to Ismaïlia somewhat to the astonishment of the Captain of the +“Carysfort,” who expected to have taken the General with him. Stewart +and I continued deciphering the telegrams, which were all to the same +effect, that General Gordon had better go to Cairo while he and Sir +Evelyn Wood were becoming acquainted with one another. It was curious to +think that Gordon had sent Sir Evelyn to Egypt, while Sir Evelyn had +really been the means of getting Gordon sent to the Soudan. + +Although Gordon had started so readily for Cairo, he at first seemed of +opinion it would have been better if he had gone to Suakin to make +friends with the chief of the tribes who were fighting against Baker. He +seemed to have little doubt of the practicability of the scheme, but, as +he might not have been able to get by that road to Khartoum, and as the +main thing was to get him to that place as soon as possible, there is +little doubt it was better for him to go by the Nile valley. The five +hours to Ismaïlia were employed by Sir E. Wood making Gordon fully +acquainted with the state of affairs in Egypt and the Soudan. At five +o’clock we reached Ismaïlia and went at once to the station, where a +special train was ready to take Gordon to Cairo. In the carriage was +Mahommed Bey Tuhami, who had formerly been Gordon’s secretary in the +Soudan, and who had been sent down by Gordon’s request to meet him. He +is jet black and now quite blind, having lost his sight on the White +Nile, whither Gordon sent him for taking bakshish to the extent of +£3,000. This did not prevent his being very glad to see his old master +again, and his pleasure was increased when Gordon put £100 into his +hands. He is a wonderful old man, very clear-headed about the Soudan, +knowing nearly every chief by name. He said that Mousa, the chief of the +Hadendowa, whom Gordon had hoped to meet at Suakin [was away] and that +his son Mohammed was at Kassala with part of the tribe, while the rest +of it had left him, and with the Halega tribe under Osman Digna were +fighting against Baker at Suakin. It is possible, therefore, that Gordon +might not have found it as easy as he thought to get through that way. +Tuhami was of opinion that a great many people in the Soudan would be +very glad to hear of Gordon’s arrival, and that many of those who had +joined the Mahdi on account of their hatred of the Egyptian Government +would leave him. He repeatedly insisted that the rebellion was rather +against bad Government than a religious revolt. + +The train reached Cairo at 9 o’clock, but there were not many waiting to +receive the General as we were not due till half an hour later. Gordon +went off with Sir E. Wood. After he had started Nubar Pasha and the +Khedive’s first aide-de-camp came up just too late to receive him. + +The next morning Mohammed Tuhami came to our house with a clerk, Abo El +Melik Shai, and at once set to work to write telegrams to a number of +the Notable people in the Soudan, informing them that Gordon was going +up to bring peace to the country. During the morning one Arab after +another came in until there were seven or eight at work. Gordon looked +in for a few minutes, but spent most of the time with Sir E. Baring, Sir +E. Wood and Nubar. He also went to see the Khedive, and said he had been +very humble and made it up with him. He arranged with him that Abd el +Shakoor, the son of Abd el Kader, one of the late Sultans of Darfour, +was to be sent back to that country. This had been proposed by Gordon +years ago. The Khedive would never agree to it before. In the afternoon +Abd el Shakoor looked in, and the meeting between him and Tuhami was +very interesting. It should be remembered that Tuhami was secretary to +Ismael Pasha Ayoub when he as Governor-General of the Soudan conquered +Darfour, or to speak more correctly when Zebehr Rahama conquered it for +him and killed the Sultan. The young man, Abd el Shakoor, seems +intelligent, but at first sight does not show the strength of character +which he would require. Gordon came in and told him he was to start with +him the next night. The young man asked for a few days delay to collect +his family, but Gordon cut him short, saying, “Look, you want a throne, +throne first, family afterwards.” Tuhami and the other clerks did not +finish their work until late. + +After dinner I went over to Sir E. Wood’s to see Gordon, who had just +gone; Sir E. was sitting with Slade, and was very low. Gordon, who +before he left London had protested in the strongest manner against +sending Zebehr to the Soudan, had that evening written a paper to show +why it would be a good thing to take Zebehr with him. Sir E. said he had +a great respect for Gordon, but he really could not change his opinion +entirely in twelve hours. I said it was not the least surprising, as it +was very usual for Gordon to change his opinion on the smallest +provocation; but in this case I was sure it would all come right, and +that Zebehr would not go. In the same paper he expressed a wish that +Zebehr and he might be confronted with one another in order that the +former might bring any accusation against him he thought fit. + +Leaving Sir E. I went home and found Gordon, who seemed equally low. He +said he had been talking all day and was quite done. Speedy was also at +our house, and he and Gordon had been having an argument about King John +of Abyssinia. He rather took King John’s part, while Gordon said he was +a man on whom no reliance could be placed. Gordon said King John had +never stated what he wants, and that if he had a port he wouldn’t know +what to do with it. He said, however, he might have Senheit and +Gallabat, and free trade at Massowah. + +The next morning Tuhami came again and wrote a proclamation for Gordon +to distribute in the Soudan. Gordon stopped at our house for a couple of +hours, during which time a great many people, principally Egyptians, +came to see him. The majority were persons whom he had known before, and +who wished to go up to the Soudan with him. He refused all the +applications, and the only two he agreed to take with him were Ibrahim +Bey Fawzi, who had formerly been with him in the Soudan, and Ibrahim +Effendi Ruchdi, whom he took as clerks. Ibrahim Bey Fawzi had been +promoted by Gordon to every grade from Lieutenant to Colonel, and +regarded Gordon as his Father. He had also at one time been in disgrace +with Gordon, and had been put in chains. During the Egyptian campaign +Ibrahim Fawzi had been with the rebels at Abou Kir, and had been without +employment since the disbandment of the old Egyptian army. Ibrahim +Ruchdi was a Khartoum clerk, who had been temporarily employed in the +Soudan office in Cairo. Gordon took him back to the Soudan at an +increased rate of pay, _i.e._, £20 a month. A little later in the +morning a deputation of merchants interested in the Soudan commerce came +to present Gordon with an address, and to beg that he would do what he +could to protect the interests of Soudan merchants. He replied to them +that he had been sent out from England by the English Government with a +definite object, viz., to withdraw the Egyptian Government from the +Soudan; that they all knew that the Egyptian Government in the Soudan +was bad, and had been used to oppress the people; that the present state +of affairs could not continue, but that he would do his best to set up +some system of self-government in the Soudan. After the deputation +retired, General Gordon went out, and I went to the War Office and +arranged for lithographing the proclamation alluded to above. + +General Gordon and Colonel Stewart lunched with us. Giegler Pasha came +in afterwards and we all went to Sir E. Baring’s, with whom were Nubar +Pasha and Sir Evelyn Wood. Sir Evelyn Baring said that General Gordon +had expressed a wish that certain matters between him and Zebehr Pasha +might be discussed, and Zebehr Pasha was called in. Gordon and Zebehr +sat near one another, with an interpreter between, and Zebehr Pasha was +asked what he had to say. He said that Gordon without cause had +confiscated his property, had put his people in chains, and had caused +his son to be killed, that when Gordon had gone to the Soudan he +(Zebehr) had put his hand on his (Gordon’s) hand and had asked him to +consider his son as his own son. Then General Gordon said that he had +confiscated the property of Zebehr because he had been convicted by a +court of enquiry at Khartoum of having instigated his son to revolt +against the Government, that the conviction was to a certain extent +based upon a letter written from Zebehr to his son and found among the +latter’s (Suliman’s) papers. _Zebehr_: “I never wrote such a letter. You +should produce it as proof of what you say.” _General Gordon_: “I cannot +produce the letter as it was attached to the proceedings of the court +and sent with the latter to his Highness the Khedive. If the proceedings +can be found the letter should be found with them.” _Zebehr_: “If the +letter can be found I deserve to lose my head,” and he drew his hand +across his throat. _Gordon_: “If the letter was not written, I was not +justified in what I did.” Then Sir Evelyn Baring said that he would see +that the “proceedings” were looked for, and he directed Sir E. Wood to +endeavour to find them. Then _Zebehr_ said to Gordon: “And you killed my +son, although I had specially entrusted him to your care.” _Gordon_: “I +did take care of your son and I had him promoted to the rank of Bey, and +then afterwards he treacherously killed 200 Egyptian soldiers in the +Bahr Gazal.” _Zebehr_ fenced with the question for some time and at last +said: “I was no longer responsible for my son, you had made him a Bey, +you were responsible.” Then _Sir E. Baring_ said that “apparently there +were two questions between Zebehr and Gordon, the first concerning +Zebehr himself which turned on the existence of a certain letter which +would be searched for, that if Zebehr was proved not to be guilty he +would see that compensation was made to him for his losses; the second +question concerned Zebehr’s son, for whose action it now appeared Zebehr +did not hold himself responsible.” Zebehr stood up and made a speech +mainly to the effect that the name of England and the justice of England +were known to all nations, and that he would leave all in the hands of +his Excellency. Zebehr then left the room. Sir E. Baring said that the +next point to discuss was whether Zebehr Pasha was to go to the Soudan +or not, as General Gordon had suggested the advisability of his going. +General Gordon said: “I had better not be here while you are discussing +that. Hear what Watson has to say.” And he went out. Sir E. Baring asked +me what I had to say, and I answered that I considered it would be the +greatest possible mistake to let Zebehr go to the Soudan with Gordon, +and that, if my own opinion was of no value, I had been requested by one +who knew the Soudan well to do all I could to prevent his going, as it +was almost certain that one or the other would not come back alive. Sir +E. Wood also said that he did not think it advisable for Zebehr to go, +and Nubar Pasha expressed the same opinion, but more mildly. Nubar gave +me the idea that for some reason or other he was annoyed at having +Zebehr’s affairs stirred up again and wanted it to relapse into oblivion +as soon as possible. Gordon and Zebehr were then called in again, and +Sir E. Baring informed the latter that it was considered desirable he +should not at present go to the Soudan, but that the question of his +return and of his position generally would be discussed as soon as +General Gordon had returned in safety. Soon after, every one went away. + +That evening there was a large dinner at Sir E. Wood’s, Nubar Pasha, Abd +el Kader, etc., etc. At 9 o’clock we drove to Boulac Dakrour station to +see Gordon off, his train was to start at 9.30, but at the last minute +it appeared that Abd el Shakoor, the Sultan of Darfour, in place of +coming with two or three people as Gordon had arranged, had brought all +his family and followers, nearly fifty in number. Gordon did not like to +leave them behind, so fresh carriages were put on, and the people and +baggage were tumbled into the train, which started at 10.30. During the +following days Tuhami brought me several papers respecting affairs in +the Soudan, which he asked me to send to General Gordon for his +guidance. + +Cairo, _10th Feb._, 1884. + + + GENERAL SIR GERALD GRAHAM TO SIR HENRY GORDON + + Saxon, _Feb. 4th_, 1884. + +MY DEAR SIR HENRY, + +I have been accompanying your brother as far as Korusko and seen him +start off on his journey across the desert. He is much more cheery and +confident than he was when he left Cairo, and looks forward to +constructing a government and army out of native materials as if it were +the simplest thing in the world. He has certainly an extraordinary +influence over the natives, the secret of which seems to me to be that +he is really fond of them and enters into their feelings, while he at +the same time shows an energy that must appear to them superhuman. . . . + + GERALD GRAHAM. + + +GENERAL C. G. GORDON TO MONSIEUR DE MOUTARDIN, RUE ROGATE, NO. 7, PARIS + (FROM SIR HENRY GORDON’S PAPERS) + +(_Apparently translated from the French._) + + Khartoum, 5 _Novr._ 84. + +MY DEAR SIR, + +Thank you for your letter 25 August received yesterday by a spy, and +also for your good wishes for our security. The Arabs are tranquil +enough, they are at the South and S.W. and East, but otherwise they are +not. We are in much vicissitude. I regret sensibly that your Consul, Mr. +Harbin, who went down in a steamer with Colonel Stewart, and Mr. Power, +English Consul, after an uproar were killed _en route_ with the other +M.M. I do not understand, for the steamer had been blinded, had a gun +and a good force. They left here the 10th of September. I had them +escorted below Berber, and they ought to have been at Dongola the 20th +September, but an officer has informed me that on the 14th October they +had not arrived there. It is very grievous. Excuse a longer letter, for +I have so many things to do. + +Believe me my dear M. de Moutardin, Yours sincerely, + + C. G. GORDON. + +P.S. You say to me, “Expedition for my relief,” thank you, +no,—“Expedition for the relief of the garrisons of the Soudan,” _that is +the title_ you understand, is it not? I was sent to succour the +garrisons of the Soudan, I have failed, they sent the Troops to make up +for the failure on my part. Slatin Bey is with the Mahdi 8 miles distant +from here, he is well and has become Muslim, as they say is the case +with all the Europeans! The time of Martyrs for the faith is ended! + + + SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON + + War Office, Cairo, 24. 2. 1885. + +MY DEAR SIR HENRY, + +Since posting my letter to you I have had forwarded to me from Korti a +letter from your brother dated 14. 12. 84. It is sad to get it, but I +thought you would like a copy, so send one. He evidently knew there was +treachery at work in Khartoum some time before it fell. The last +paragraph concerns some small commissions I did for him, it is of no +consequence. The letter was given to Sir Charles Wilson at Gubat by +Kashim el Moos, who commanded the steamers. So Wilson must have had an +anxious time going up. He would have done anything to save your brother, +and must have felt there was no hope before he left Khartoum behind him. +It is a sad story, but I cannot help envying your brother, + + Ever yours sincerely, + C. M. WATSON. + +I have shown the letter to Sir F. Stephenson and Sir E. Baring. The +latter took a copy of it. + + +_Enclosure._ + + Khartoum, 14. 12. 84. + +MY DEAR WATSON, + +I think the game is up and send Mrs. Watson, you and Graham my adieux. +We may expect a catastrophe in the town in or after 10 days time. This +would not have happened (if it does happen) if our people had taken +better precautions as to informing us of their movements. But this is +“spilt milk,” good bye. Mind and let my brother (68, Elm Park Road, +Chelsea) know what I owe you. + + Yours sincerely, + C. G. GORDON. + +The above was received at Gubat by Sir C. Wilson on the 22 January 1885. + + + SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON + + War Office, Cairo, 10. 3. 1885. + +MY DEAR SIR HENRY, + +Since last writing to you I have had a second letter from your brother, +but of earlier date than the one of which I sent you a copy. I am so +often asked for copies of it that I have had it lithographed in +facsimile, and enclose you a copy of it. You will see he speaks strongly +about the government, and he had reason. Why was not General Graham +allowed to go on last year? But it is not much use talking about it now. +I only hope that the government will at last realize that the Soudan +business is a large one that will take years to settle. I have seen +young Anderson of the artillery. He started for Souakim yesterday with +General Graham. + +I hope you are all well, + + Yours very sincerely, + C. M. WATSON. + + +_Enclosure in Facsimile._ + + Kartum, 26. 11. 84. + +MY DEAR WATSON, + +Thanks for your letter which I received yesterday, the steamer which +brought it, had to run the gauntlet of no end of rifle fire and of 6 +guns, she was struck 3 times by shells, but only 7 were wounded. I hope +you and Mrs. Watson are well. I am not ill-treated I consider, but the +Cairo people up here they are the ill used. I will accept _nothing +whatever_ from Gladstone’s Government. I will not even let them pay my +expenses. I will get the King to pay them. I will never put foot in +England again—but will (D.V. if I get out) go to Brussels and so on to +Congo. How is Miss Arnott, the lady who was with me? I greatly fear for +Stewart, Power and Herbin, French Consul. With kindest regards, believe +me yours sincerely, with kindest regards to Mrs. Watson, + + C. G. GORDON. + + + LAST TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL GORDON (FROM AMONG MRS. MOFFITT’S PAPERS) + + Junior United Service Club, + London, S.W. + 8 _June_ 1886. + +An Egyptian Clerk, who was taken prisoner by the rebels at the fall of +Khartoum, and at last succeeded in effecting his escape from Omdurman, +gave me a copy of an Arabic telegram of which he said the following was +the story. + +On or about the 29th December 1884, General Gordon dictated this +telegram to him. It was written on a small piece of paper. General +Gordon then took a cartridge, took out the bullet and shook the +gunpowder out of it. He then folded up the telegram, put it in the +cartridge in place of the powder, and replaced the bullet, so that the +cartridge looked as if it had not been touched. General Gordon then gave +it to a messenger who put it with his other cartridges and started for +Dongola. + +I have never heard that he arrived, neither have I any means of +confirming the truth of the clerk’s story. It seems, however, very +unlikely that he should have invented such a tale, or have written the +telegram himself. + +The translation of the telegram is as follows: + + +“To the Sovereign of the Kingdom. + +“After salutations. I would at once, calling to mind what I have gone +through, inform their Majesties the Sovereigns of the actions of Great +Britain and the Ottoman Empire, who appointed me as Governor-General of +the Soudan for the purpose of appeasing the rebellion in that country. + +“During the twelve months that I have been here, these two Powers, the +one remarkable for her wealth and the other for her military force, have +remained unaffected by my situation, perhaps relying too much on the +news sent by Hussein Pasha Khalifa who surrendered of his own accord. +Although I personally am too insignificant to be taken into account, the +Powers were bound nevertheless to fulfil the engagement upon which my +appointment was based, so as to shield the honor of the Governments. + +“What I have gone through I cannot describe. The Almighty God will help +me.” + +I would observe that the fact of General Gordon speaking of having been +“twelve months” in the Soudan would lead to the supposition that the +telegram was written later than the clerk stated. This is quite possible +as Egyptians are not good at remembering dates. + + C. M. WATSON. + + + SIR CHARLES WILSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON + + Mountjoy Barracks, Phœnix Park, Dublin, + _Sep._ 9 1885. + +MY DEAR GORDON, + +There has never been any doubt in my mind as to the manner of your +brother’s death. He was killed before sunrise, apparently before it was +quite daylight, a short distance outside the Palace gates, where he met +a party of Arabs. He fell at the first discharge, but whether killed, or +severely wounded, we do not know; his body when seen afterwards had +several lance wounds, and his head was cut off by a Dugaini Arab and +exposed on a pole in the open space between the Mahdi’s two camps at +Omdurman. I tried to keep these details from the correspondents in the +Sudan, knowing how painful they would be to you and his family, but as +you have asked for them I give them now. The body was left on the ground +some time, and then appears to have been buried with others in the ditch +south of Khartum. One account was that the body was buried under a large +cairn of stones, where it fell, by people throwing stones at it as they +passed, a common Arab custom. The decapitation is also Arab and what one +might naturally expect; on the other hand the Arabs never mutilate the +dead as the Ethiopic tribes do. Our dead were untouched except by lance +thrusts, whilst those on the Sawakin side were horribly mutilated. You +may therefore be certain that no insult was offered to your brother’s +body. + +My view is that your brother was roused up, just before daylight, by the +news that the Arabs had entered the town, that he hastily collected his +cavasses (armed servants) and left the Palace with the intention of +reaching the stone church, where the ammunition was stored, and then of +blowing up the magazine or trying to hold out till we arrived. He +probably intended picking up the Austrian Consul on his way, but +unfortunately was met by a party of Arabs just after he left the Palace +gates. The Arabs apparently did not know it was your brother when they +fired; they only saw the cavasses in their Egyptian uniform. Your +brother, if he had chosen, might have made an attempt to save his own +life by going on board the steamers which always had steam up; but you +know as well as I do he would never have done that. The steamers tried +to get down the river, but turned back when fire was opened upon them +from Omdurman; had a European been on board they might have run the +gauntlet. My account of your brother’s death is based on two independent +reports made not very long after the fall of Khartum and before the wild +stories which so rapidly grow out of such an event, in semi-civilised +countries, had time to obscure the truth. In all essential particulars +these reports have been confirmed by later ones. The two reports I +allude to were one by a cavass of Ibrahim Bey Rushdi’s, whose master was +killed with your brother and who was present when they were killed. This +man was of Turkish origin, and bribed some Arabs to bring him across the +desert; from Khartum he went down to Cairo with the Mudir of Dongola. +The other was by a leading Sheikh of the Shagiyeh, whom we had sent to +Khartum with letters for your brother; this man was in Khartum when it +fell, and saw your brother’s body not long after he had been killed; he +came down to us by the Wady Bishara road. The two men were unknown to +each other, of different race, and came by different roads, at an +interval of a few days; there could not therefore have been any +collusion. + +Watson is collecting all he can about the last days at Khartum; have you +written to him? + + Yours sincerely, + C. W. WILSON. + + + NOTES FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH A REFUGEE WHO CAME FROM KHARTOUM ON OR +ABOUT THE 3RD NOVEMBER 1887 TO SUAKIN (FROM AMONG MRS. MOFFITT’S PAPERS) + +Rank, _Sergt. Major_. + +Nationality, _Turk_. + +Was formerly in the Garrison at Berber, but escaped at its fall to +Kartoum, where he was one of four Sergeants Orderlies to Gordon. He was +“on duty” on the 26th, and was with Gordon in the “look out” on the top +of the Palace. Gordon the evening before warned the people that he had +seen a great deal of extra excitement going on in the rebel camp, and +that unless a “good resistance was made that night the town would fall.” +The soldiers were in a starving state and many left the lines in search +of food, the civilians armed themselves and went on to the lines. As the +morning star rose the rebels made a feint at the portion of the defence +under Ferag Pasha (with the black troops), but at the same time they +directed their full attack at the defence commanded by Hassan Bey +Benassawie (with the 5th Regt., fellaheen) and succeeded in getting into +the town. Gordon, when he heard the rebels in the town, said: “It is all +finished; to-day Gordon will be killed (“enhardeh Gordon cassoora”), and +went downstairs, followed by the four sergeants, who took their rifles +with them. He took a chair and sat down on the right of the Palace door, +the four sergeants standing on his left; all at once a sheikh galloped +up with some Baggara Arabs; the sergeants were on the point of firing +when Gordon, seizing one of their rifles, said: “No need of rifles; to- +day Gordon is to be killed” (as before). The Sheikh told Gordon that he +had been ordered by the Mahdi to bring him alive. Gordon refused to go, +saying that he would die where he was, and adding that no harm was to be +done to the four sergeants who had not fired on the rebels. The Sheikh +repeated the order three times, and each time Gordon gave the same +answer. After a few words the Sheikh drew his sword and rushing up to +Gordon cut him in a slanting direction over the left shoulder, Gordon +looking him straight in the face and offering no resistance of any kind. +His head was cut off and taken to the Mahdi at Omdurman, and his body +was buried close to the door of the Palace and a tomb built over it. The +four sergeants were not hurt, but taken prisoners, and two have already +managed to escape. The sergeant, on being questioned about the report +made by Colonel Kitchener, states that food was so scarce that Gordon +himself lived on a handful of doura, which was made into a thick soup, +the people living chiefly on the fibre of the palm-tree made into cakes. +All the animals were killed, with the exception of a donkey, over which +there was a guard. Finally an officer stole it and sold its flesh at any +price he asked. A fish was caught and sold in a similar manner. + +Ibrahim Bey Fowsi is now at Omdurman, Farag Ullah Bey is at Galabat. + + + SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON + + Cairo, 2 _July_ 1885. + +MY DEAR SIR HENRY, + +Very many thanks for sending me the “Journals,” which have reached me +this afternoon. I have only just had time to glance at them, but write +at once to catch the Italian mail. They seem most interesting. What a +pity it is that he did not keep them all from the beginning of the siege +instead of sending them down by Stewart, but of course he thought it +safer to do the latter. + +I was very glad to read your paper in the introduction about Sir Charles +Wilson, who seems to be unjustly blamed. Have you seen him since he came +to England? I was a little sorry to see the footnote on page 121 about +Abd-el-Kader Pasha, as it does not quite convey the truth about his +refusal to go to the Soudan. He agreed to go on certain conditions, the +most important of which was that the abandonment of the Soudan was not +to be announced, but in the instructions which were drawn up for him the +abandonment was a leading feature. I made this note upon them at the +time. + +“N.B. Abd-el-Kader did not agree to these instructions on the ground +that an immediate abandonment of Khartoum was inexpedient, and that to +go to the Soudan with such an intention would lead to certain failure. +The proposal to send him therefore fell through (16 Jan. 1884).” + +Abd-el-Kader always remained of the same opinion that to proclaim the +abandonment of the Soudan was to make the removal of the garrisons +impossible. He is one of the best Pashas I have met with, _one who has +not got rich_. + +I shall write again when I have read the Journals. + + Yours very sincerely, + C. M. WATSON. + + + SIR CHARLES WILSON’S ACCOUNT OF HIS EXPEDITION TO OMDURMAN SENT TO SIR + H. GORDON + + Mountjoy Barracks, Dublin, 27 _July_ 1885. + +1. The force under Sir H. Stewart was sent across the desert to occupy +Matammeh, open up communication with General Gordon’s steamers, and +through them with Khartum. It was hoped that the presence of this force, +which was not much larger than a battalion at war strength, on the Nile +at Matammeh would withdraw some of the pressure on Khartum, but it was +not sent to relieve that place. + +2. My mission was to communicate with General Gordon; to deliver Lord +Wolseley’s letters to him; to ascertain from him the exact position of +affairs at Khartum; to inform him that the forces advancing for the +relief of Khartum would be concentrated at Matammeh and Shendy by the +first week in March, and to have three officers in Khartum to assist +General Gordon in the defence until relief came. I was then to return to +Korti, bringing the English soldiers down the river with me. There was +never any question of my attempting the relief of Khartum. + +3. No one at Gubat, no one on the steamers of General Gordon’s flotilla +had the slightest suspicion that a crisis would occur at Khartum within +a few days of our arrival at Matammeh. The first time that the officers +and men on the steamers expressed a doubt as to the safety of Khartum +was when we came under fire of the guns at Halfiyeh. There was therefore +no urgent necessity for an immediate start without consideration for the +position of the little force which had been more than decimated on its +march to the Nile. + +4. The steamers left Gubat at 8 a.m. on the 24th, and arrived off +Omdurman at 2 p.m. on the 28th; they were heavily laden with grain, yet +they made better time up the river as far as times can be compared, than +Lord C. Beresford in the “Safieh,” manned by officers and men of the +Second Division of the Naval Brigade who had come across after the +steamers left; this shows when once started there was no delay. Had the +steamers started at 3 p.m. On the 21st, the day of their arrival, they +would on the evening of the 25th have been some distance below Halfiyeh, +out of sight of Khartum and unable to exert any influence over the +events which occurred at Khartum at dawn on the 26th. It is absurd to +suppose the Mahdi’s plans would have been altered by his knowing the two +steamers were coming up; he probably believed, as General Gordon did, +they could not pass the batteries. + +5. The steamers were under fire from both banks, in action with the +Mahdi’s army, for four hours; it was impossible to land in the face of +such a strong force; they came out of action a little after 4, and about +5 or soon after hauled into the bank to obtain information. We +ascertained then, _i.e._ on the evening of the 28th, that Khartum had +fallen through the treachery of Faraj Pasha at dawn on the 26th, and +that General Gordon had been killed. These were the two capital facts +which it was necessary the Government and Lord Wolseley should know; all +we have learned since is matter of detail. There was frequent +communication with natives on the way down; they all told essentially +the same story, and there was never any doubt in my mind as to the truth +of the main points. + +6. It may be interesting to know that General Gordon’s last great sortie +was on the 17th January, the day of Abu Klea; and that it is almost +certain he and his garrison had heard of the fight at Abu Klea, and +possibly Gubat before the end came. + + C. W. W. + + + MR. EDWARD HAMILTON TO SIR HENRY GORDON + + 10, Downing Street, _20th July_ 1884. + +DEAR SIR, + +I beg to return to you Lord Wolseley’s letter, of which I have retained +a copy. + +Mr. Gladstone is much obliged for your further note of to-day on the +subject of the position of affairs at Khartoum. He admits the force of +what you say; but he was under the impression that there was a known +route to the South and to the sea from Khartoum, and that there must be +persons, perhaps many persons, who are acquainted with it from the +course of trade or otherwise. He would be glad to know whether he is +right or wrong in this impression. Faithfully yours, + + E. W. HAMILTON. + + +MEMORANDUM BY SIR HENRY GORDON, DATED _22nd July_ 1884. FORWARDED TO MR. + GLADSTONE, _23rd July_ 1884. GENERAL GORDON’S PRESENT POSITION + + +There is no proof that Khartoum is invested upon the South—on the +contrary there is presumptive evidence that it is not, since the Rebels, +if in position there, would find it difficult to keep up their +communications for supplies of Food, while their flanks would be exposed +on either side to constant attacks—by means of steamers from Khartoum. +All communications that have come to hand, whether true or not, point to +the country to the South as being open, and as of supplies coming in. + +There is no question but what if General Gordon wished to leave with +Colonel Stewart he could do so at any time, he could go to the Bahr-el- +Gazelle—or he could move to the Equator (see General Gordon’s own +statement that he could get away to the Congo, also Sir Samuel Baker’s +letter to the “Times” of 30th April, and to the fact, according to Dr. +Hill’s book, “Colonel Gordon in Central Africa,” that he was travelling +to and fro on a “low Nile,” in March and April 1874). + +But it is equally certain that General Gordon would not desert the +people who have been faithful to him. + +It is not a question of the safety of the garrison, but it is one of the +protection of the traders at Khartoum. + +The former might be moved to Sennaar and thence transported further to +the South, the latter would not leave—to do so would be worse than death +(see enclosure in No. 3, Egypt, dated Khartoum, 8th April 1884, showing +that General Gordon had traded with the people whom he would not +desert). + +The question would be the same if a force were at Khartoum. + +No doubt General Gordon at this time is doing all he can to secure the +safety of the inhabitants, and would not care how he accomplished it. + +It is believed that he is conferring with the Mahdi, having this object +in view, although he has no faith in his (the Mahdi’s) power. If General +Gordon could secure the safety of the people of Sennaar and Khartoum he +would retire, since it may be assumed that Kassala is safe. + +It seems probable that the Rebels to the North of Khartoum are +instigated by Zebehr, and that the money at Berber has been too great a +temptation to the Governor of that Station. It is doubtful whether +Berber was not quietly given over to the rebels, and that it did not +fall by assault. + +The Tribes to the North of Khartoum rose in rebellion for the reasons +stated in the “Times” of the 10th March, under date of Khartoum 7th +March; “this is not owing to disaffection, but to fear caused by the +pronounced policy of the abandonment of the Soudan, which policy has +been published by sending down the widows and orphans and Cairo +employees from Khartoum. We cannot blame them for rising when no +definite sign is shown of establishing a permanent Government here. The +Mahdi is a nonentity as to any advance on Khartoum, but all-powerful +through his emissaries when backed with pronounced policy of abandonment +without establishing a permanent Government.” + +On the other hand while General Gordon may not, at this time, be in +actual personal danger more than that incidental to disaffection at +Khartoum, or from the daily contingencies which present themselves in +time of war, yet the time is approaching when some steps must be taken +to prove that he, as the agent of the British Government, is not to be +abandoned, and to this must be coupled the fact that his ammunition is +running short, and that he has not been heard of for so long a period. + +It was hoped that the outbreaks among the tribes to the North of +Khartoum would long ago have been put down, and that the country would +have been quiet: such an expectation, however, has not been realized, +and when General Gordon’s ammunition fails he will be at the mercy of +the Rebels. + +In the absence of a Government that could secure the safety of the +inhabitants, matters could not improve, it is therefore necessary, +imperatively so, to reconsider General Gordon’s application to have +Zebehr sent up (see “Times,” 5th March, dated Khartoum, 3rd March). + +“It is now admitted that Zebehr Pasha is the only man connected with the +Soudan, who is endowed with the ability and firmness necessary to head +any Government here. + +“It is out of the question that General Gordon should leave Khartoum +without first having formed a Government which would in some measure +stem the wave of fearful anarchy that must eventually sweep over the +Soudan. The arrival of Zebehr Pasha would draw off to his side the bands +of rebels which are now scattered over the Soudan, and his great +knowledge of the tribes fits him more than any other man to take the +place of the Egyptian Government. He would, of course, come here under +certain stringent conditions. General Gordon had foreseen this ever +since he left Cairo.” I mentioned to Lord Granville in consequence of +confidential information from Cairo, to the effect “that if Zebehr went +up to Khartoum his first act would be to hang General Gordon,” that it +would be dangerous to send Zebehr up, and to this opinion I have adhered +up to the present time. + +As, however, the rebels remain in force to the North of Khartoum, and as +matters have not improved, and cannot improve unless some future in the +way of Government is made clear (bearing also in mind that General +Gordon will not desert the people at Khartoum, unless he can leave them +in safety), the time has now arrived that Zebehr should be sent up. It +would be in compliance with General Gordon’s own request, and Zebehr +might be offered a sum of money provided he established an independent +Government and so enabled General Gordon to leave Khartoum. The payment +might be withheld until the object in view, viz., General Gordon’s +absence from Khartoum, had been secured. + +It is believed that if Zebehr was sent up all danger to the peoples at +Khartoum, Sennaar and Kassala would cease, and the country would be +quieted. + +At the same time it is necessary that other precautions should be taken +the more especially as General Gordon’s ammunition is daily decreased by +expenditure. It would therefore seem desirable that a force should be +sent to Suakim in order to open the road from that place to Berber (one +of General Gordon’s suggestions), but of course if Zebehr agrees to go, +and is successful, then this force would not be called into action, +although no delay should take place in its preparation. + +It would be out of place my making any remarks upon any expedition +advancing by the Nile, nevertheless I do not believe it to be +practicable. + +Any movement of Abyssinia upon Kassala and Sennaar would raise the whole +of the Soudan, and would do an amount of harm that cannot be +contemplated. + + H. W. GORDON. + + + THE RT. HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P., TO SIR HENRY GORDON + + 10, Downing Street, 22 _Feb._ 1885. + +DEAR SIR HENRY GORDON, + +As long as a hope could in any way be entertained that your +distinguished and excellent brother had survived the betrayal of +Khartoum, I was unwilling to forgo the slender consolation it might +afford; and I have also been delayed in writing this note for two or +three days by an inquiry on a kindred subject. But I cannot longer +forbear from addressing to you my humble tribute to his memory, +insignificant as that tribute must be when rendered to one, whose fame +has not only become a national possession, but gone forth throughout the +world. + +Though I had not the privilege of his personal acquaintance, yet his was +a character of which I think many features could be plainly read even +from a distance. The judgement of mankind has pronounced him a hero; and +the application of that lofty name is specially marked in his case by +the fact that it applies not only to his public acts, but to the man; to +the spirit of self-sacrifice, such as distinguished martyrs and +apostles, to a simplicity of character not less remarkable than his +profound enthusiasm and his boundless courage. I cannot but add, though +it is perhaps presumptuous, my admiration of his astonishing command, +under circumstances so difficult of military resource, and of that +inexhaustible strength of will which formed the crown of his powers, it +is difficult to wish any of his virtues had been in any respect +restrained; yet I reflect with pain, now that catastrophe has come, how +ill his generous confidence was requited by some of those for whose +welfare, though they were of a foreign race, it was his desire to live +or die. I congratulate you on your close and intimate association with +General Gordon, and I trust that among us there are and will be many who +will strive to learn lessons in their several places from this noble +example of Christian heroism. Believe me with much respect, faithfully +yours, + + W. E. GLADSTONE. + + + SIR HENRY GORDON TO MR. GLADSTONE + + _23rd February_ (1885). + +DEAR MR. GLADSTONE, + +I am very much obliged for your very kind note of sympathy, and for the +very handsome manner in which you speak of General Gordon’s character +and services. It is not for me to dwell upon them, and the subject is a +very painful one, and therefore I hope you will forgive the brevity of +my reply. + + Yours faithfully, + H. W. GORDON. + + + H.M. QUEEN VICTORIA TO MISS GORDON + + Osborne, _17th Feb._ 1885. + +DEAR MISS GORDON, + +_How_ shall I write to you, or how shall I attempt to express _what I +feel_! To _think_ of your dear, noble, heroic Brother, who served his +Country and his Queen so truly, so heroically, with a self-sacrifice so +edifying to the World, not having been rescued. That the promises of +support were not fulfilled—which I so frequently and constantly pressed +on those who asked him to go—is to me _grief inexpressible_! indeed it +has made me ill! My heart bleeds for you his Sister, who have gone +through so many anxieties on his account, and who loved the dear Brother +as he deserved to be. You are all so good and trustful, and have such +strong faith, that you will be sustained even now, when _real_ absolute +evidence of your dear Brother’s death does not exist—but I fear there +cannot be much doubt of it. Some day I hope to see you again, to tell +you all I cannot express. My daughter Beatrice, who has felt quite as I +do, wishes me to express her deepest sympathy with you. I hear so many +expressions of sorrow and sympathy from _abroad_: from my eldest +daughter the Crown Princess, and from my cousin the King of the +Belgians—the very warmest. Would you express to your other Sisters and +your elder Brother my true sympathy, and what I do so keenly feel, the +_stain_ left upon England, for your dear Brother’s cruel, though heroic, +fate. + + Ever + Dear Miss Gordon, + Yours sincerely and sympathizingly, + V. R. I. + + + MISS AUGUSTA GORDON TO QUEEN VICTORIA + + Rockstone Place, Southampton. + +MADAM, + +The letter which your Majesty has so graciously honoured me with has +deeply touched and gratified me. I am so thankful to know of your +sympathy for, and the endeavours you so very kindly made to save my dear +Brother, though _others dared_ to prevent your supporting him in his +just demands. Never can I cease to be deeply grateful to your Majesty +for the great kindness you have shown towards him. I think he received +the gracious message you sent him through me as in one of the Volumes of +his Diaries he returns a little letter in which I told him of your +Majesty’s message. If permitted I should like to bring over the Original +Diaries when I have the great honour to wait on your Majesty next month. + + I am your Majesty’s devoted subject and servant, + M. AUGUSTA GORDON. + + + MISS AUGUSTA GORDON TO MR. BLUNT + + Rockstone Place, Southampton, _11th September_ 1882. + +Will you kindly give me a copy (two if you can spare them) of your +letter on Egypt written to Mr. Gladstone and others. I am sending on by +the first mail your letters and the 19th Century to my Brother at the +Cape. Strange you were not listened to by those in authority. I fancy +there are many of your way of thinking and there would be many more if +they knew the rights and wrongs done to Egypt. + + A. GORDON. + + + MR. BLUNT TO GENERAL C. G. GORDON + + Delhi, _24th January_, 1884. + +MY DEAR GENERAL, + +I feel obliged to write to you about your mission to the Soudan. I see +it announced to-day by telegraph without explanation of its object, but +I cannot wait till more definite news arrives, and I desire to warn you. +It may be you are going there to make peace between the Mahdi and our +troops in Egypt, to acknowledge his sovereignty in the Soudan, and +arrange terms for the evacuation of Khartoum. If so, I can only wish you +God speed. It is a good work, and you will accomplish it. But if, as I +fear it may be, from the tradition of some of those in power, the object +of your mission is to divide the tribes with a view to retaining any +part of the country for the Khedive, to raise men for him and scatter +money, it is bad work, and you will fail. It must be so. Neither your +courage, nor your honest purpose, nor the inspiration which has hitherto +guided you, will bring you success. I know enough to be able to assure +you that every honest Mohammedan in Egypt and North Africa and Arabia +sympathizes with the Mahdi’s cause, not necessarily believing him to +have a Divine mission, but as representing ideas of liberty and justice +and religious government which they acknowledge to be divine. For this +reason you will only have the men of Belial on your side, and these will +betray you. I beg you be cautious. Do not trust to the old sympathy +which united Englishmen with the Arabs. I fear it is a thing of the +past, and that even your great name will not protect you with them. Also +consider what your death will mean: the certainty of a cry for vengeance +in England, and an excuse with those who ask no better than a war of +conquest. I wish I could be sure that all those who are sending you on +your mission do not foresee this end. Forgive me if I am wrong in my +fears; and believe me yours, very gratefully, in memory of last year, + + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT + + 134, St. Owens, Hereford, _Dec._ 27, 1884. + +DEAR SIR, + +Will you allow me, personally a stranger, to tell you how interested I +am in the result of your application to Mr. Gladstone respecting your +mediation with the Mahdi. + +You will the more readily understand my great interest, when I mention +that I was in London for some weeks last spring for the purpose of +devising some means for the rescue of General Gordon, and that I was +about the first (I believe) to suggest the Volunteer Expedition of which +I see by the “Pall Mall Gazette” you had heard. + +I saw Captain Brocklehurst, having called upon him though a stranger, +but knowing his friendship for General Gordon. My own scheme was in the +first place to have raised a “Khartoum Fund,” for which I had many +promises, and would have had no difficulty in raising from £80,000 and +upwards. My idea was to pay the safe conduct for General Gordon and his +garrison (in fact for all his people at Khartoum) from Khartoum to +Cairo, a certain sum to be paid to the chief of each tribe, the amount +to be in proportion to the extent of territory over which the safe pass +would be given. I saw many members of the House of Commons and other +influential persons, but after discussion, though my plan was approved +by many, it was waived in favour of the Volunteer Expedition, to which I +promised to transfer the £100 I should have subscribed to the “safe +conduct” scheme. + +But the Government negatived decidedly the Volunteer movement, and my +plan had fallen through. It was with much regret that I returned here, +having after much anxiety and trouble effected nothing of that on which +my heart was set. + +If I had known you were in London I would have ventured to have called +on you. I have a strong personal regard for General Gordon, and with +many members of his family I am on terms of friendship. Now, I am +perplexed whether to wish you success in your application to the +Premier—if it would save General Gordon I would pray for it—but if you +should be frustrating plans for his safety I could not. I write to you +freely though a stranger, and I hope you will forgive me, but the one +great interest which I think we both have in common, General Gordon, +will plead my excuse. + + Believe me, dear Sir, yours faithfully, + ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MRS. ALLNATT + + Crabbet Park, _Dec._ 29, 1884. + +MY DEAR MADAM, + +I am sorry that I did not know of your plans for rescuing General Gordon +by peaceful means last year, as your support and that of friends so +liberal and sincere in their efforts would have given great weight to my +plea with Mr. Gladstone, and might perhaps have turned the scale with +him in favour of negociation. This course would, I am convinced, have +been an infinitely surer and better one than that of war which our +Government have chosen. + +My point of view in the matter is of course rather a different one from +yours, for you look only to General Gordon’s safety, whereas I look +also, and indeed primarily, to the well-being of the Nile populations; +but I see no reason that our efforts should not even now be made in +common. + +From all the accounts I receive, Lord Wolseley’s expedition will meet +with determined opposition, and it is quite possible that it may be +several months yet on the road—in which case the time will shortly come +when necessity will compel the Government, if they would not fail +altogether in their object of saving Gordon’s life, to have recourse to +our ideas if not to our help. My principal fear indeed is that, going to +work through ignorance of the conditions before them in a blundering +way, their attempts to treat will be so protracted that Khartoum will in +the interval have fallen. I will not, however, be a prophet of evil, +only I would urge you not to relax your efforts. Any independent appeal +made just now to Mr. Gladstone would, I believe, have at least this good +effect, that it would force on his attention the daily increasing +gravity of Gordon’s situation. + + Very faithfully yours, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT + + 134, St. Owens, Hereford, _Febry._ 17, 1885. + +MY DEAR SIR, + +I thank you for your letter just received. I have given up (as you see) +all hope of the precious life having been saved. But how cruel has been +the martyrdom of his, during weeks and months, owing to the Government, +of which one cannot speak with aught but the greatest contempt and +indignation. Knowing the faith of the devoted Christian soldier, I have +the hope or rather the consolation of thinking that as he was deserted +by man so his God was nearer to him day by day. + +I go tomorrow (Wednesday) till Saturday to Mr. Egmont Hake, the +Biographer of “Chinese Gordon.” I should like very much to talk over one +or two matters with you now, respecting the recovery of his bible and +journal, etc., and also of the proposed additional expedition. Is it not +madness to send one of the Khedive’s sons as Governor General of the +Soudan? I thought the Egyptians were hated by the poor Soudanese. + +Unhappy land! What will be the outcome of all this? God, who created the +world out of chaos, can bring order out of the Egyptian confusion. + + Believe me, My dear Sir, Yrs. sincerely, + ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT. + + + MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT + + 38, Montpellier Terrace, Cheltenham, _Feb._ 21, 1885. + +MY DEAR SIR, + +I am staying here till Wednesday, when I shall D.V. return to Hereford, +where I shall anxiously await the result of your kind effort to procure +for me the bible of dear General Gordon. + +In the train to-day I read in the papers, with dismay, the reply of the +Government to the questions respecting the important and precious +records of Khartoum kept by its devoted Defender. They decline to say +what course they will take regarding them. I have just written to Sir +Henry Gordon most earnestly beseeching him, out of regard to his +brother’s memory, to apply for the possession of the journal, 6 volumes, +on their arrival. One dreads such important and deeply interesting +records getting into the hands of men so unscrupulous as those +comprising the present Government. The papers would probably be cruelly +mutilated before leaving their hands, if there were aught in them that +would condemn those who sacrificed their devoted Envoy to paltry party +devices. + + I am my dear Sir, Yrs. sincerely, + ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT. + + + EXTRACT FROM EDITH, LADY LYTTON’S DIARY + + +_June_ 7, Simla, 1880.—In the evening, while we were at dinner under the +Shemiana on the lawn, Lord William [Beresford] arrived, having left Lord +Ripon at Umballa and come on very quickly to reach us for our last +evening. He says the heat has been tremendous and worse than he has ever +felt it, and he and Major White had to put ice on their heads one night, +expecting every minute to succumb. But Lord Ripon and party have not +complained or been ill. Lord William told us about Colonel Gordon being +so odd; he says the world is not big enough for him, and that there is +no king or country big enough. He hit Lord William on the shoulder, +saying, “Yes, that is flesh, that is what I hate, and what makes me wish +to die.” He resigned the Private Secretaryship, to the Viceroy’s great +inconvenience, because he was asked to answer an address at Bombay +saying that Lord Ripon had read it with interest and would write again +at some time, and he said: “You know perfectly that Lord Ripon has never +read it, and will not write, and I can’t say those sort of things, so I +shall resign, and you take in my resignation.” Colonel Gordon received a +telegram from China asking him to go and fight the Russians there, so he +has gone off to do so, and his last word to Lord William was, “Everyone +will say I am mad, but you say I am not.” + + + COLONEL LOUIS A. GORDON TO MR. BLUNT + + Carpenters, Horsham, Sussex, _Sept._ 4, 1911. + +DEAR MR. BLUNT, + +I am glad to see that you, in your new book “Gordon at Khartoum,” are +undertaking the vindication of my uncle’s memory against an attack on +it, which Lord Cromer thought fit to make in his “Modern Egypt” so many +years after the death of General Gordon and my father Sir Henry Gordon. +I know that nothing that Lord Cromer could write would in the least +affect General Gordon’s memory; but the remarks he makes leave a nasty +taste in the mouth and it is very desirable that they should be +responded to in detail. + +In “Modern Egypt,” page 43, Vol. I, I observe a note which affects my +father, Sir Henry Gordon; Lord Cromer says: “At the instance however, of +General Gordon’s friends and family, a good deal of violent and very +foolish abuse of Lord Granville—and if I remember rightly, of others—was +omitted. It is in my opinion to be regretted that this was done. The +publication of the Journal, as it was originally written, would have +enabled the public to judge more accurately of the value of General +Gordon’s criticisms, than was possible when only an expurgated edition +was issued.” This contains an accusation of tampering with the Journals +which the facts do not warrant. + +As far as Sir Henry Gordon is concerned, expurgation of the kind +referred to by Lord Cromer was certainly not authorised. In his +“Description of the Journals,” page lxv, my father says: “I have +arranged . . . for their issue in a very nearly entire state, only some +6 or 7 pages being omitted which contain, in my opinion, no matter of +public interest; while with regard to names those who are well +acquainted with the affairs of Egypt can fill in the blanks without +difficulty.” That no fraud has been exercised on the public in the +matter, and that the public has not been deprived of the opportunity of +reading the Journals in full, is sufficiently plain by the fact that the +Journals were deposited by my family in the British Museum plain for all +folk to see; so that anyone, caring to do so, can satisfy himself on the +subject. + + Yrs. sincerely, + L. A. GORDON. + + + + + APPENDIX B + + MR. BLUNT’S ORIENTAL CORRESPONDENCE + + + I. AS TO HIS PROPOSED MEDIATION WITH THE MAHDI + + + MR. BLUNT TO SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU AT PARIS + + London, _April_ 7, 1884. + +To my noble and dear friend, the learned Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, the +martyr of liberty, may God continue to enlighten him. + +Your letter, which Her Ladyship has now translated to me in full, has +given me much pleasure except in what you say of your not being able yet +to come to England; but I send you by this post the money needful for +your journey and trust that you will acknowledge to me its safe arrival. +I wrote four days ago to M. Sanua telling him something of the state of +opinion here, and since that time I have written a letter which will be +published in the ‘Times’ of to-morrow or Wednesday in which I have +proposed a solution of the present difficulties and misfortunes in +Egypt. I trust that it may meet with your approval, for in it I propose +that the Egyptian question shall be referred to an European Congress, +that the English army shall retire from the country and that Egypt shall +be placed under the joint protection of the Powers, and so govern +herself according to her own will. + +I propose also that peace shall be made with the Mahdi, and General +Gordon be recalled from Khartoum—nor have I forgotten to recommend that +the decrees of exile against the patriots of Egypt shall be reversed. +With regard to Egypt and Syria and the Arabian Caliphate you know well +my views, for they are published in the book which I wrote three years +ago founded on your learned instructions and your views conveyed to me +through our dear friend (peace be with him) Mohammed Khalil. But with +regard to the Mohammedans of India these are my views, and I beg that +you will communicate them to the noble prince the Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din +(to whom also I send my best compliments) that he may know them himself +and communicate them to the Nawab Rasul Yar Khan and the Ulema of +Hyderabad, though I have already told them of my thoughts, having spoken +freely to all the Mohammedans of India whom I met. My thoughts therefore +about India are these. According to the principles which I hold in +political affairs I desire to see liberty and self government +established everywhere, and in India no less than in other countries of +the world now held in subjection, and I am not prejudiced by the fact +that I was born an Englishman into wishing for other advantage there +than to the Indians, nor should I hesitate to approve of any wise plan +which should hasten their freedom. At the same time my journey in India +has convinced me that the people of that country are not yet +sufficiently united to form an independent nation, unprotected by some +external Power. If all Indians were of one creed and one language and +one race, as was the case in Egypt, I would say to them as I said to +you, “Bismillah,” in the name of God go forward and fear nothing. But it +is not so. I see that though they might free themselves from the English +domination, which is hateful to them, they are not yet prepared to set +anything of profit to them in its place. I see that they must be +educated and prepared for self government. Otherwise their effort would +not prosper. For this reason I have said to them, and I say it again, +take patience for a few years and work out your political education +under a government which allows you this privilege of education, and +later the moment will come when you shall be able to unite and form a +Nation. To the Mohammedans I say this especially, for they are but as +one to five of the population of India, and at the present moment they +are also inferior to the Hindus and Parsis in education, so that it is +possible their condition would be worse under native than under English +rule. By advising them to found an University I desired first to give +them a centre of unity which should add to their strength, for strength +is in union,—and secondly to prepare them to take their full part in the +regeneration of their country. At present, by standing aloof from public +affairs and by remaining in ignorance of English, which is the official +language, they are putting themselves at a disadvantage with the other +races and religions of India. I trust therefore that the learned Seyyid, +when he writes to Hyderabad will encourage them to proceed in this good +work, and not to spare their efforts in the direction I have pointed +out. + +With regard to your newspaper I shall be happy to do what I can to help +you. But I advise you strongly to be moderate in your language about the +English Government—not that anything you can say about its action in +Egypt can surpass my own anger and impatience,—but because I see in the +friendship of England still the best hope for Islam. Believe me, though +England has acted through all this matter as an enemy of religion, there +are still more Englishmen who sympathise with our hopes for the nations +of the East than you will find amongst all the rest of the Europeans. +You cannot trust the French or the Russians or the Austrians or the +Italians to act with you sincerely as friends—and the English being +stronger at sea than all others, must always be counted with, and if +possible secured as friendly. This may yet come about, and I should be +sorry to see an irreconcilable breach made between the party of reform +in Islam and the English people. Think this matter fairly over. For +centuries England was the friend of Islam, and I find very many +Englishmen now who regret and condemn the change of policy. + +You see I have spoken openly all that is in my heart. + + Your friend in good and bad fortune, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU TO MR. BLUNT + +(_Translation from the Arabic._) + + Paris, _April_ 11, 1884. + +To H. E. my dear friend, friend of the Moslems, helper of the Arabs and +defender of the Egyptian nation, etc. + +After salutation to you and to the well-instructed Lady Anne +Blunt—yesterday your letter reached us, and reading it we found it full +of wisdom and useful counsels to the Moslems, and it confirmed our trust +in you that you are their friend. + +The Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din presents you his salutation and will certainly +write to the people of India in Hyderabad and elsewhere, and will advise +them to be quiet, and will tranquillize their minds as you suggested; +and he will expound to them the idea you have so clearly set forth in +your letter, and will put the details before them in the best and most +lucid manner. + +Next, we rejoiced at the admonition you were kind enough to give us, and +at your promise to help our newspaper (the Indissoluble Link), and this +was our hope in you. And indeed God the Most High created you to do +good, and to assist the cause of right, and to defend the oppressed. And +the true character of our newspaper is only this, and to serve those +views for which you are labouring, namely, the preservation of the +independence of the Eastern peoples, and the admonishing of the English +Government that it may abandon its action troubling the minds of Moslems +and make fast their friendship, and that so it shall have them with it +on its side. And indeed we do not love those other Powers referred to in +your letter, nor go with the policy of any one of them. + +And so may peace be with you and the mercy of God. Your sincere friend, + + MOHAMMED ABDU. + + + SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT + +_Privée._ + + Paris le 21 _Avril_, 84. + +MON CHER MONSIEUR, + +J’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir votre aimable lettre dont je vous remercie +et à laquelle je m’empresse de répondre. + +Quoique je n’ai nullement appris pendant les dix années que j’ai passées +en Egypte que M. Gordon fût, à l’époque où il était Gouverneur du +Soudan, ami de la liberté et défenseur de l’Islam, je n’hesite pas +cependant, étant donnée la pleine confiance que j’ai en votre parole, à +plaindre son malheureux sort et à regretter qu’il soit tombé dans une +situation qui devient de plus en plus critique. + +Je ne vous cache pas, cher Monsieur, qu’il m’aurait été facile, vu la +confiance que le Mahdi parait vouloir avoir en moi ainsi que celle de +ses principaux partisans dont un grand nombre sont de mes élèves +Soudanais, de prévenir ce désastre qui ménace Gordon Pacha si les +dernières batailles entre Graham et Osman Digna ne s’étaient pas +engagées; mais après ces batailles sanglantes qui ont coûté tant de sang +Arabe, je crois que le Mahdi et ses partisans sont réduits à voir que le +seul moyen de ratrapper le terrain perdu et de consolider leur prestige +serait de s’emparer de Khartoum et d’arrêter M. Gordon sinon de lui +arracher la vie. + +Cependant, si vous voulez, cher Monsieur, m’écrire avec plus de détails +et _en français_ sur les bases de la paix que vous voudriez conclure et +avec qui désireriez vous qu’elle soit faite pour qu’elle soit acceptable +et en règle, je ne manquerais pas alors de vous fixer sur tout ce que je +pourrais faire dans cette circonstance et sur les moyens efficaces dont +on pourrait se servir pour sauver la vie à ce malheureux Gordon. + +En attendant le plaisir de vous lire, je me mets à votre entière +disposition et vous prie d’agréer mes salutations distinguées. + + JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSEYNI AFGHANI. + + + MR. BLUNT TO SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN AFGHANI + + 10, James Street, le 24 _Avril_, 1884. + +NOBLE ET CHER AMI, + +La bonne réponse que vous avez bien voulu me faire à mes questions sur +le sort de Gordon me touche profondément. Je sais combien il a dû vous +coûter de prendre ainsi part à un projet qui aurait pour bût de prêter +aide à un homme qui malgré ses principes avoués a fait tant de tort à la +cause que nous aimons; mais je vois dans cette affaire une occasion +puissante pour obtenir du Gouvernement Anglais l’abandon de sa politique +actuelle en Egypte. Je viens d’adresser formellement à M. Gladstone une +lettre où je lui fais savoir qu’il serait encore possible pour lui non +seulement de sauver la vie à Gordon mais d’amener la pacification de +toute la vallée du Nil. Hier encore on était résolu d’envoyer une +nouvelle expédition Anglo-Egyptienne au Soudan, mais il parait que déjà +ma lettre aurait produit quelque effet et qu’on soit maintenant de +nouveau à la paix. Je compte donc sous peu de jours recevoir quelque +communication du Gouvernement qui ménerait à un tentatif de négociations +et je voudrais vous prévenir que je pourrais à tout instant vous prier +de vouloir bien venir à Londres où bien d’envoyer le Sheykh Mohammed +Abdu me parler. + +Je vous prie de regarder d’un bon œil mes idées pacifiques. Comme je +vous ai déjà dit, je vois dans l’Angleterre la seule puissance qui +pourrait redevenir un ami sincère de l’Islam; et je vois dans la +nécessité où est dans ce moment notre Gouvernement un puissant lévier +pour amener l’abandon de sa position actuelle d’hostilité. Quant aux +conditions de paix je ne suis pas encore en position de vous les +formuler. Mais selon moi elles devraient s’étendre jusqu’à la cession du +Soudan entier au Mahdi. Je vous envoie copie d’une lettre qui j’ai eu de +Gordon il y a près de deux ans qui vous sera preuve de son bon +caractère. + + Bien votre dévoué, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. BLUNT TO SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN + + 10, James Street, le 25 _Avril_, 1884. + +NOBLE ET CHER AMI, + +Depuis ma lettre d’hier je l’ai d’une source certaine que notre +Gouvernement s’est décidé absolument contre l’expédition, pour le +moment, de toute force militaire Anglaise ou Egyptienne à Berber. Or il +est presque sûr qu’on se prépare à une négociation, et déjà on me fait +entendre que je recevrai sous peu une réponse définitive à ma lettre. +Que pensez vous, pourrai je aller en personne à Obeyd en qualité +d’Envoyé Britannique traiter avec le Mahdi en lui reconnaisant la +souverainté du Soudan? Et croyez vous qu’à ces conditions les tribus qui +assiègent Khartoum permettraient à Gordon et aux Chrétiens de la ville +de retourner sous sauf-conduite en Egypte? Ou bien, si je ne pourrai pas +aller en personne, croyez-vous qu’il se trouverait quelque autre envoyé +capable de mener la négociation à bonne fin? Je vous prie de vouloir +bien me répondre à ces questions. + +En même temps je compte persuader le Gouvernement de restaurer le parti +National en Egypte. Mais dîtes moi franchement votre idée. Qui devrons +nous proposer en place de Tewfik? Serait ce Arabi ou un autre? Les +Circassiens, si je ne me trompe, voudraient Ismaïl. Les autres +voudraient encore peut-être Halim. Mais l’opinion change si vite que je +n’ose dire absolument à qui on donnerait les votes si la chose était +remise à l’election. Surtout qui pourrait agir en Egypte de concert avec +le Mahdi? + +Inshallah! nous mènerons l’affaire cette fois ci à bonne fin. + + Votre bien dévoué, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. BLUNT TO ARABI PASHA + +(_Sent in Arabic._) + + 10, James Street, _April 26th_, 1884. + +To my noble and dear friend Arabi Pasha, may God strengthen his +patience. + +After saying that it has given us extreme pleasure to have news of you +and the rest of the noble Egyptian exiles—this is to inform you that the +hopes of your return to Egypt are, as I think, greater now than at any +previous time since you first went away in Exile. The reason of this is +(after the will of Providence that truth should prevail) that the +English Government has fallen into great trouble in Egypt, first on +account of the finance and secondly with regard to the Mahdi. They are +therefore entirely anxious to leave Egypt, and they see that it is +necessary in order to do this that a stable Government should be set up +at Cairo, and a prince established who should be able to live in +friendship with the Mahdi. + +Therefore it is probable that they will abandon Tewfik inasmuch as he is +incapable of governing and will entrust the government to other hands +before they withdraw their troops. And in these last days the danger to +General Gordon at Khartoum obliges them to come to terms quickly, and I +have proposed (with the permission of God) to go as Envoy to the Mahdi +in order to make peace and to save the life of General Gordon; and, if +they should accept my offer, I do not fear but that they will also +accept my plan for the restoration of good government in Egypt. Now +therefore tell me clearly, on what terms could you and your companions +return to Egypt? I know that you could serve with Halim Pasha. But tell +me, is it impossible that you could serve with Ismaïl? I have several +times received messages from Ismaïl, and his friends tell me that he +promises to act with you if he is restored. But do you think it would be +possible to trust him? I should propose that in any case the command of +the army should be in your hands. Or is there any other prince among the +Princes of Islam whom you would serve and who could live at peace with +the Mahdi; I ask you these things because the aspect of politics +continually changes, and what is true to-day is not true to-morrow, and +what was rejected yesterday may once again be accepted. + +Also a conference is assembling at which it will be necessary that your +opinion should be heard. Therefore write to me your full mind and the +mind of your companions, and, if you should resolve that you could +return to Egypt as Minister to Ismaïl, telegraph to me then one word +“content,” and I shall understand. If you consider that it will be +impossible for you to serve under Ismaïl, telegraph the word “refused.” + +For the rest all things are going well. There are many Englishmen now +who recognize your services to Egypt and I am hopeful of your return +there. + + Your friend, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + +You must not suppose from my writing in this sense that I want you to +make friends with Ismaïl. What I want is that you should tell me your +real opinion as to whether it will be possible for you to work with him. + + + SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT + +_Privée._ + + Paris, _April_ 28, 1884. + +MON CHER MONSIEUR, + +J’ai eu l’honneur de recevoir votre lettre que j’ai lue avec beaucoup +d’attention et à laquelle je m’empresse de répondre. + +Vous ne devez pas ignorer l’importance que les Mohamétans attachent à la +mission divine avec laquelle le Mahdi a paru et qu’ils comprennent par +ce mot, Mahdi: le sauveur de l’Islam des mains de ceux qui ne sont pas +de leur religion. Or je ne vois pas qu’on puisse conclure un traité de +paix avec le Mahdi et par consequent arrêter sa marche tant que celui-ci +voit les Anglais en Egypte. Mais si les bases de la paix stipulent que +l’Egypte sera aux Egyptiens et que Gordon Pacha sera sauvé avec tous les +Chrétiens qui sont avec lui et que, enfin, les troupes Anglaises seront +retirées de l’Egypte, je vois qu’il serait possible sinon facile de +mener cette affaire à bonne fin et d’arrêter l’invasion du Mahdi jusqu’à +un certain point et jusqu’à un certain temps. Dans ce cas il faudrait +envoyer une commission de paix composée en grande partie de Mussulmans +et de quelques Anglais. Quand aux Mussulmans ils auraient pour +instruction de dire qu’ils viennent de la part de la Nation Egyptienne +Mussulmane car si ils seraient envoyés de la part du Gouvernement +Egyptien, je ne crois pas qu’ils réussissent dans leur mission étant +donné l’aversion dont le Mahdi est animé à son égard, et de la part du +Gouvernement Anglais, ils ne seront pas écoutés. Nous en avons acquis +une preuve par le Cheick El Morghani. Quant aux quelques Anglais qui +feront partie de la mission, il est bien entendu qu’ils iront de la part +de leur Gouvernement; quoique, par le fait, tous, Mussulmans et +Chrétiens seront des missionaires Anglais. + +Dans le cas qu’on décide à envoyer cette commission, et dans les +conditions que je me suis permis de vous exposer, je crois que vous, +cher Monsieur, vous devez être le premier nommé parmi les missionaires, +car les Mussulmans ne peuvent pas trouver beaucoup de défenseurs comme +vous. Pour les Mussulmans qu’il faudrait envoyer, je les désignerai et +vous en ferai connaître les noms quand le moment serait venu et qu’on se +serait décidé d’une façon definitive. + +Vous me demandez en qui faut-il remplacer Tewfik? Je réponds que quand +le moment serait venu il ne serait difficile ni à vous ni à moi ni à qui +que ce soit de le savoir. Il faudrait se prononcer pour celui que la +_nation Egyptienne_ veut et pas pour un autre. + + Votre bien dévoué, + JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSEYNI AFGHANI. + + + MR. BLUNT TO SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN + + 10, James Street, le 2 _Mai_, 1884. + +NOBLE ET CHER AMI, + +Je vous remercie bien de vos instructions sur la manière de négocier qui +sont absolument d’accord avec mes idées personnelles. Pour le moment le +Gouvernement se retire du tentatif proposé, mais je suis toujours en +rélation indirecte avec eux, et je pense bien qu’ils se trouveront +encore dans la nécessité de recourir à nos bons offices. Seulement +l’hésitation pourra bien coûter la vie à Gordon. Pour le moment le +Gouvernement est toujours dans l’intention d’abandonner Khartoum, Berber +et Dongola, mais je prévois que dans le cas que Gordon soit encore +debout à Khartoum à l’époque du cru du Nil le public anglais pourra +exiger une opération militaire. + +Quant au général il se pourra que son intention serait de se retirer +vers le Congo, quand il trouvera qu’il ne pourra plus se tenir à +Khartoum, et je crois que le Mahdi serait bien avisé de lui laisser le +passage libre. L’idée de Gordon au Congo parait avoir toujours été d’y +fonder un Etat indigène qui pourrait faire face à l’envahissement de +l’Europe, et en tant il mériterait votre sympathie. Faites un pont d’or +pour l’ennemi qui s’en fuit. Je suis cependant pleinement de votre avis +qu’il soit nécessaire au Mahdi de s’emparer sans delai de Khartoum. Je +vous prie de me croire bien votre ami. + + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT + + Paris, le 7 _Mai_, 1884. + +MON CHER MONSIEUR, + +Je viens d’arriver de l’Italie. J’ai été à l’exposition de Turin et ce +n’est que ce matin que l’on m’a remis vos deux lettres que j’ai lues +avec beaucoup d’attention. + +Votre dernière lettre m’a d’autant plus appris que vous ne vous +intéresserez plus au sort de Gordon qu’il m’a édifié encore une fois sur +la loyauté et la grandeur d’âme qui vous caractérisent. Tout en vous +remerciant d’avoir bien voulu m’envoyer le livre bleu contenant +certaines correspondances relatives au Général Gordon, des quelles vous +avez pu constater qu’il n’était nullement ami de la liberté ni défenseur +de l’Islam, j’ai la ferme conviction que votre nom sera gravé dans le +cœur de chaque musulman en particulier et de chaque Arabe et Oriental en +général à cause de l’intérêt immense que vous prenez pour eux et dont il +ne sauraient vous être trop reconnaissant. J’espère, cher Monsieur, que +vous continuerez à suivre cette voie digne d’un caractère aussi loyal +que le vôtre et que le bon Dieu vous aidera à récolter les fruits du +travail dur que vous faites. + +Veuillez, je vous prie, me faire rappeler au bon souvenir de Madame +Blunt tout en lui présentant mes respectueux hommages et soyez persuadé +que je me mets à votre entière disposition pour tout ce que je pourrais +faire pour vous. + + Votre bien dévoué, + JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSAYNI AFGHANI. + + + ARABI PASHA TO MR. BLUNT + +(_Sent in English._) + + Colombo, _2nd June_ 1884. + +To my lord Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, may God preserve him. + +It is with the greatest pleasure that I acknowledge the receipt of your +letter of the 26th April 1884. I must strongly insist on the fact that +Ismaïl Pasha is a treacherous person who is notorious for his +untrustworthiness, being the causer of the destruction of Egypt. The +national Debt of our country is the work of his hands. There is no one +of the prince’s family who possesses the requisite qualifications for +the throne but Halim Pasha. He is, besides, the direct descendant of the +first Khedive, being the son of Mohammed Ali. Tewfik (the present +Khedive) and the others are members of a third branch, so that Halim +Pasha, who is directly the ancestral representative, is the real owner +of the throne. To add to his right he has the voice of all the Egyptians +in Egypt to hail him, and he has for a long time undergone trials of a +very grave nature, having been subjected to tyranny. Also he would be +able to make a treaty between the Mahdi and the Government of Egypt, +inasmuch as those whom the Mahdi trusts are able to effect this for him. + +If you are resolved to go to the Mahdi, I must most earnestly entreat +you to secure beforehand some letters stamped with my seal, in order +that they may serve as the proof that you are a faithful friend of the +Moslem world, and that you have been instrumental in saving our lives. +May God preserve you. Your most faithful friend, + + AHMED ARABI. + + + ARABI PASHA TO LADY ANNE BLUNT + +(_Translated from the Arabic._) + + Colombo, _March_ 2, 1885. + +To the noble and exalted lady, Lady Anne Blunt; may God protect her. +Amen. + +After presenting my best salutations to your distinguished self and your +illustrious husband, and in response to your two letters with inclosures +relating what Mr. Blunt had written in the “Times” on Egypt and England +and the Sultan, with the remarks made thereon, permit me to assure you +that all that Mr. Blunt has stated in the “Times,” and declared publicly +in many utterances, and all that he described in his poem (kasid) “The +Wind and Whirlwind,” of the disasters and calamities that must ensue, +all these are true, and we see them happening now, as it was necessary +they should happen, and truly the Most High God inspired him with truth +to speak these things, and with a just understanding. For the time has +come now when God shall choose his servants, and shall deliver the weak +and oppressed and abase the mighty and oppress the oppressor, and shall +manifest His power and His strength to the unjust. And thus in times +past He confounded men’s reasoning by His wonderful judgements on the +nations that are gone. Thus He destroyed Babylon the adulterous, the +violent city, and thus the empires of Persia and of Rome; and I grieve +with a great grief over the decline of the star of England caused by her +misdeeds in Egypt and in the Soudan. But God has heard the cry of the +oppressed and the voice of the blood which has been shed, and the +terrible cry of the widow and of the young children, and surely He has +taken His vengeance on the covetous. Yet, believe me, the people of +Egypt used to believe good of the English nation. It was they of all +others that they trusted, as the foremost among nations, and as the +chief hope of those who sought to obtain their freedom; and they grieve +now seeing their belief a deception, and their trust a delusion. + +And what has England gained by her invasion of Egypt, and what in the +Soudan? Rather let us say, what has she lost? For God knows she has +gained nothing. She has lost her good name, the friendship of all +Moslems, and of our Lord the Sultan. She has lost, too, Gordon Pasha, +through acting on false counsels, and Hicks and Earle, and how many +other officers; and she has lost the respect of all hearts by this war +against free men in the Soudan. When will she cease to rush forward on +her course, to send armies of revenge on men who are themselves avenging +their Egyptian brothers; on men defending their country, and who delight +to drink the cup of death rather than that they should see an enemy left +within its borders. I tell you, _fifteen_ millions of such as these +occupy at this moment the Soudan country and Darfur, and all of them are +partisans of the Mahdi, having made a convention with him unto death, +and in accordance with the precepts of our noble Koran. Thus the Mahdi +increases in strength with the English aggression, and this is God’s law +with his creatures, with all who have been given intelligence to see and +reflect and understand. + +“A decree has come forth from God. There is no escape from the judgement +of God. God shall exalt whom He will, and abase whom He will. The +oppressor shall repent when repentance shall not avail him. And God is +not unmindful of the deeds of the unjust.” (Quotations.) + +My son Mohammed Bey and the family send you a thousand thousand +greetings. From your friend and servant, + + AHMED ARABI. + + + SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT + +(_Translated from the Arabic._) + + Paris, _May_ 12, 1885. + +After salutations, etc. I say; I am not alone in gratitude for your +distinguished efforts which have forced the Government to evacuate the +Soudan. No, be certain that all Moslems, especially the Arabs, will be +grateful for this your action to the end of time and they will write +your name on tablets inlaid with precious stones and titles of glory and +honour for your zeal and courage. + +But there is left one thing still to be done and that is that you should +say to the Government, “How can you leave this land thus without a +treaty with the Mahdi and whose will be the duty of repelling the +Mahdi’s attacks? how also can the Government leave the roads of commerce +blocked? or does it desire the destruction of trade? Is it not incumbent +on the Government when it has determined to evacuate the Soudan to send +a man of trust, a Moslem, to the Mahdi that he may discuss with him as +to a peace and secure Egypt from his attacks and to close the gates of +conflict and reopen those of Commerce.” I think that if this question +were presented to parliament all opinions would agree with it. + +I see too that this would be easy, even apart from your own action and +that when the cost has been decided on you will be only needed to +complete it. But without a treaty of peace with the Mahdi the situation +cannot be brought to a final conclusion. This is what I have thought it +necessary to say to you. + +With salutations to you and your consort, + + Your friend, + JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSEYNI AFGHANI. + + + ARABI PASHA TO LADY ANNE BLUNT + +(_Translated from the Arabic._) + + Colombo, _August_ 14, 1885. + +To my lady, dear Lady Anne Blunt. May God preserve her. + +After best salutations to yourself and Mr. Blunt I was happy to receive +your letter dated July 17th, and thanked God that you are in good +health, of which I hope for the continuance. I sent you a telegram the +same day as to my willingness to serve the country even with Tewfik and +Sherif, and I now write this in confirmation. + +I can assure you that I am prepared to serve my country, to work hard at +reforms in it, and to labour for its advancement to the highest pitch of +honour and prosperity. + +Therefore I should not mind whether I served with Tewfik or another, my +one only object being the establishing of just law for all men alike, +giving to all security for their persons and for their civil and +religious rights, and putting an end to wrong and injustice between +class and class of (Egyptian) subjects, always bearing in mind the +claims on me of the English people (_nation_) to whom I shall be +grateful as long as I live. + +I have, too, a firm trust that the English Government would aid me in +carrying out reforms, and that, after establishing a strong, just, and +equitable Government, it will leave Egypt to the Egyptians, thus +fulfilling its promise and completing what it has commenced. + +As to Sherif, he is well disposed and anxious for the good of the +country, but Nubar is not really interested in the welfare of Egypt, and +the Egyptians are weary at his holding high office in the country. + +Now, therefore, since you and your friends, and my friends, are of +opinion that it would be fitting for me to take office even with Tewfik, +I would agree also to that. I should hope for success in making those +reforms of which we have already sown the seeds—notwithstanding Tewfik’s +remaining—if supported by the English Government, and in surmounting +those difficulties, both home and foreign, which have beset Egypt in +these latter times. + +And God is our Helper, and in Him our trust. + + Your sincere friend, + AHMED ARABI THE EGYPTIAN. + + + II. EVIDENCE AS TO THE MASSACRES AT ALEXANDRIA, TANTAH, AND ELSEWHERE, + IN 1882 + + + SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU TO LADY ANNE BLUNT + + (_Translated from the Arabic, received 5th August_, 1883, _from + Beyrout._) + +To the Lady Anne Blunt. May God show us her countenance, etc. + +Next, among those persons who have information about the riot in +Alexandria in particular, there is Mustafa Abd el Rahim, who was present +at the riot and stopped its rage with the regular soldiers with Suleyman +Sami (may God have mercy on him). And he is prepared to bear witness on +being requested to do so, as he has informed me this night. + +And of those who have complete information of the conduct of the Khedive +Tewfik and of his endeavours and the endeavours of his assistants to +disturb the peace and tranquillity of Egypt, and to excite the Muslems +against the Christians, and vice versa, there is here Ahmed Bey +Minshawi, one of the Notables of Egypt, a man of wealth and of +determination and of extreme straightforwardness. It was he who +protected Christians in the riots of Tantah, and in other massacres in +the province of Gharbiyeh, which Ibrahim Pasha Adhem, the Khedive’s +protégé, got up after the bombardment of Alexandria; and he is prepared +to bear witness against the Khedive and against his agents before any +Court or in any Tribunal—even in the Egyptian Tribunals—and he has no +fear of anything, and is not alarmed by any danger. He has been +intending to write a letter to Mr. Blunt, of his own accord, to express +his readiness and his earnest wish to put before Englishmen, and before +everyone inclined to justice and equity, the things known to him; and he +is now with us in Beyrut, and if you wish to summon him he is ready. + +Convey my salutations to Mr. Blunt and present to him on my behalf and +on behalf of every Egyptian—indeed of every Englishman—exceeding thanks +for his energy and noble deeds. And salute for me Mr. Sabunji. May God +protect you in his keeping. + + MOHAMMED ABDU. + +_13th Ramadan_, 1300. + + + AHMED BEY EL MINSHAWI TO MR. BLUNT + +(_Translated from the Arabic, received August_ 5, 1883.) + +To the high-minded Mr. Blunt. May God preserve him! + +After presenting salutations and praise and thanks: + +Also, I beg you will be my representative in presenting thanks from me +and from all Egyptians—indeed from all Eastern people, to Lord +(Randolph) Churchill and his companions—though they are all dependent on +you for what they accomplished in Parliament. + +Also I am prepared, with all preparation, to bear witness against the +Khedive and the men of his government as to their plan, which they +carried out, of shedding the blood of Christians and others. In so doing +I fear not the blame of any blamer, nor do I dread the authority of any +ignorant ruler in whatsoever country I may be, or before whatsoever +tribunal I may appear; and whenever the indictment against Tewfik is +officially brought forward and witnesses are wanted I am ready in +Beyrut, and if I went elsewhere I would let you know. And I pledge +myself in the name of God that I will also bring witnesses of the +Egyptians who will bear witness to the crimes of the Khedive and his +wicked accomplices. + +And my friend the Sheykh Mohammed Abdu knows that perfectly well, and +sends you salutations. Remain in God’s protection. + + AHMED MINSHAWI. + +_Beyrout, 15th Ramadan_, 1300. + + + TRANSLATION OF REMARKS BY SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU ON MAJOR MACDONALD’S + STATEMENT (RECEIVED _Aug._ 13, 1884) + + +We have read a statement by Major MacDonald, published in the Blue Book +(Egypt, 1884), in refutation of Mr. Blunt’s letter to the “Times” +newspaper, and have noticed in it certain things calling for remark. + +I do not know whether a ten weeks’ residence with Mr. Cameron at Tantah +could have enabled him to understand the true state of matters he has +written about, or not. + +I shall not here discuss the history of Ibrahim Adhem’s dismissal from +his office as Governor; but I assert that Ibrahim Adhem was in fact, on +the upper storey of the prefecture on the day of the massacre at Tantah, +and that he was looking on from the window of that upper storey at the +murderers and the murdered; and that these persons were murdered in the +court of the Mudirieh while he looked on at them; and that he himself +ordered the water carriers to wash the blood from the ground at the +Government House (of which evidence was given by the water carriers +before the Court of Inquiry). + +As to what Macdonald says about many of the Europeans finding safety in +the prefecture of police, it is true; only the person who protected them +was the chief of the city police, Ali effendi Lebîb, who saved many +lives, but was arrested after the war and kept in prison until the end +of the Inquiry, when the Court sentenced him to hard labour for a year, +after much intercession. Now what plea was there for the arrest of this +Zabit, a person worthy of confidence; whose protection of Christians is +testified to by Major Macdonald (who understood the whole truth in ten +weeks). + +Ibrahim Adhem is a Kurd—not a Circassian—and a man who, each time that +they gave him a post, stipulated with the Government that he should be +authorized to make use of the kurbaj on the fellahin and the omdehs of +the district. Ay, when he was Mudir of Mansourah at the time of Riaz +Pasha’s first Ministry, Riaz learned that he was ill-treating people +with the kurbaj, and wrote to him as follows: “You are bound to act +according to law, governing mercifully; if you use the kurbaj you will +incur the censure of the law.” On receiving this communication he chose +to resign his post rather than rule mercifully and according to law. + +His resignation under the Mahmud Samy Ministry took place for that +reason also; and when the Khedive reappointed him as Mudir of the +Gharbieh, after the war, he carried on his government with his habitual +severity; afterwards, when the number of his enemies increased and the +patience of the people of his province was so exhausted that they could +no longer bear with him, the Government disgraced him, and, dismissing +him, appointed Husseyn Pasha Sarai in his place. + +Ibrahim Adhem was one of the supporters of the first movement of Arabi, +but when the massacre occurred at Tantah, Arabi learned that he had +participated in it either by instigation or by deed, and ordered him to +be arrested. He was not arrested for not joining in the rebellion, in +fact he was arrested on the third day from the massacre, before it was +known whether he would give or refuse his support. Indeed, Ibrahim +Adhem’s sworn official despatches to the Ministry of the Interior +indicate sufficiently that he did not deserve the praises lavished on +him by Major Macdonald. Possibly some of the officers of the English +army may have praised him, but I do not consider this enough to +exculpate him from his deeds of violence. Let anyone who would like to +learn what measure of savagery Ibrahim Adhem attained, inquire of his +son—Ibrahim Hafzy Bey. + +As to the unhappy Yusuf Abu Diab—he arrived at the railway station on +the day of the massacre about three hours after the disturbance had +begun. He did not instigate riot (anything or any one), but saved a +Christian girl and took her to the Mudirieh; and reprimanded the Mudir, +taking him to task for sitting in the Mudirieh while he allowed people +to be massacred. And for this reason the unfortunate man was hanged. +Those Europeans of whom Macdonald testifies were in such consternation +that they did not even distinguish their own children, and were running +into every hole—how then could they know Yusuf Abu Diab, and distinguish +his face or his words? + +The chief of the station and telegraph at the first bore witness to the +innocence of Yusuf Abu Diab, but the Mudir Ibrahim Adhem threatened all +the people with arrest and death unless they bore witness according to +his desire; thus they altered their testimony under coercion. The +statements made by people subsequently have all been under fear. But +those Courts of Inquiry and their acts are part and parcel of the acts +of the Anglo-Egyptian Government after the war, into which it is +permissible to examine and investigate. We know indeed what has been its +course and its acts. No man in his senses will believe in it, for it has +been of that species in which the enemy sits in judgement on his enemy; +and if we would speak of it we would have to recount the whole of the +conduct of the Government after Tel-el-Kebir, and this would lead us +into too great length—without profit. + +Yusuf Abu Diab’s innocence was confessed by the blood relations of the +people massacred, and they begged his pardon from Lord Dufferin, who +asked it from the Khedive—and the pardon was granted, but the order was +issued secretly to hang him before the time fixed for the execution. The +news of the pardon did not arrive till after the execution. + +Possibly Macdonald can testify to the Europeans—French, English, and +others—but we know the value of such testimony, and if we had a free and +fair Government it would learn the truth through a different set of +people. + +Seyyid Osman has published a long article in the “Intransigeant” (French +newspaper), stating all the facts. It is also well known to a number of +people that the first President of the Court of Inquiry at Tantah wanted +to carry out the investigation equitably, and to interrogate the Mudir +Ibrahim Adhem on his culpability as to the riot, but the Government +perceiving him to be upright, dismissed him and appointed in his stead +Mahmud Pasha Fellaky, who was nominally at Tantah while his +administration was at Cairo. + +Thus the Mudir was saved from trial, while Yusuf Abu Diab was hanged in +his stead. + +I could show the object of silence as to past deeds, to speak of which +would open the door wide to censure on the Government of England, which +desires to establish justice in Egypt. + + + MR. BLUNT’S NOTE OF A CONVERSATION WITH ISMAÏL BEY JOWDAT AT + CONSTANTINOPLE, _Oct._ 24, 1884 + + +Ismaïl Jowdat spent 3 hours with me telling the events of the Egyptian +Revolution, much of it new, and very interesting. With regard to the +Khedive’s responsibility for the massacres he was very explicit. His +official position at the time of the war, as Chef du Bureau Européen de +la police du Caire, gave him every opportunity of knowing the facts, and +he knew them. The following is the account he gave me which I shall +transcribe from notes taken while he was speaking: + +The first intrigue that he knows of in which the Khedive was concerned +was in Boheyra where the Khedive employed Ibrahim Bey Towfik—he lived in +the house of Hassaneyn Abu Hamza at Damanhour, Governor of the +province—in the spring of 1882 to purchase the alliance of certain +Sheykhs of the Oulad Ali Bedouins against the National Ministry, to make +a civil war between the Bedouins and the army. They were engaged to make +disturbance, and a regular agreement was drawn up in which the Arabs +promised to support the Khedive against the army in the case of civil +war. For this they were to receive, and actually did receive £E13,000, +the signatories to the document being Ibrahim Bey Towfik, the Mudir, and +Mahmud abu Ismaïl el Aluani, Mahareb abu Keshik, Abd ed Dayim Hoteiteh, +Abu Shayib, Hassaneyn abu Hamza and five others (Sheykhs of the Oulad +Ali). + +Ismaïl Jowdat was sent down to Boheyra semi officially by Arabi to +inquire into this matter, and saw the Sheykhs and the document, and +persuaded them to rescind their promise to the Khedive, and obtained +from them an oath of allegiance to the National Government in Arabi’s +room at Cairo. This same Ibraham Tewfik was sent by the Khedive during +the war to Mansourah to stir up trouble, but did not succeed there. +There was a report made against him signed by all the Notables of +Dakhalieh under Mohammed Bey el Hantour sub Mudir of the province, after +which he was imprisoned by order of the National Assembly. + +With regard to the riots of the 11th June at Alexandria the details did +not come under Ismaïl Jowdat’s official notice. But he heard the main +facts at the time. He heard of the riots at 5 o’clock on the 11th, and +went at once to the Palace, and heard how it had been ordered, and about +the telegram sent by the Khedive, as we know them, viz.: that the +disturbance was arranged by Omar Pasha Lutfi with Seyd Kandil, who, +however, took to his bed to avoid being connected with its execution. He +also heard at the time of a telegram having been sent by the Khedive in +cypher to Omar Lutfi giving him his orders. But he did not see a copy of +the telegram. + +Of what happened during the war he had more certain knowledge, as he was +responsible for the safety of all the Europeans in the country, and had +spent some £E3,272 of his own money in finding and keeping them—sums +which have never been repaid him, though he has the highest testimonials +from M. de Martino the Italian Consul at Cairo of the care taken by him. + +The Khedive’s chief agent during the war was a certain Osman Raafat, +intendant des Ecuries, who is still employed by him on various secret +missions. Immediately after the evacuation at Alexandria he sent him in +disguise to the house of his brother-in-law, Mohammed Bey Hellál, to +concert measures with Ibrahim Pasha Adhem the Mudir; and they concerted +together the riots against the Christians in order to force on an +English intervention. Ismaïl Jowdat confirms my account given in my +letter to the “Times” with regard to Ibrahim Adhem’s conduct, except +that the Christians killed were killed at the Mudirieh, not at the +Prefecture; and Ibrahim shut himself inside the house and let the +killing continue. His words were: “Il était dans une chambre en bas de +la Mudirieh pendant le massacre. Les Chrétiens se sont réfugiés dans la +Moudirieh. Il s’est enfermé dans sa chambre et a laissé faire. Les +vagabonds et galériens d’Alexandrie ont fait le massacre.” Abu Diab did +his best to stop the trouble, and protested with the Mudir, and saved +many lives. He was condemned on false testimony produced by Ibrahim +Adhem, who afterwards, moved with remorse, asked his pardon before he +suffered, but Abu Diab refused to forgive him. The only other mistake +made by me is that I called Ibrahim a Circassian. He is a Kurd, son of +the head employée of Mohammed Ali’s stables. + +Osman Raafat also came to Giseh during the war to raise troubles again +with the Mufettish Feridun Bey. The details of this affair are known to +M. de Martins. Sir Charles Wilson took notes of the Tantah affair from +Ismaïl Jowdat. Osman Raafat then went to the Fayoum to stir up the +Herabi Bedouins under their chief Abd el Kawi el Jibali and Saadawi el +Jibali. + +Ismaïl Jowdat knew these affairs at the time of their happening; but he +gained positive proof of the Khedive’s connection with them in the +following manner: Not long ago Osman Raafat came to see him at +Constantinople, and he asked him to breakfast with Husseyn Pasha Ghaleb, +one of the Sultan’s A.D.C’s., the same who called on me yesterday; and +then having plied him with wine he told them the whole story. He went on +from Constantinople to Vienna, where he had a commission from the +Khedive to invest certain sums of money and dispose of certain jewels. +Osman Raafat was arrested at Wasta by a soldier, but was let go by a +Circassian official, and thence fled to Helouan and Suez. After the war +Osman Raafat was sent by the Khedive to get back the money taken from +Palmer by the Bedouins, and he kept £2,000 out of the £3,000. + + +NOTES OF CONVERSATION WITH DR. MUSTAFA BEY NEGDI. EXTRACT FROM JOURNAL, + _Oct._ 27, 1884 + + +He (Mustafa) then gave us the whole history of the Tantah massacre in +detail, which he knew first from the official inquiry made before Arabi +when it happened, and at which he assisted, and secondly from Ahmed +Minshawi, with whom he had lived afterwards at Beyrout, and who came +here with him, and who had repeatedly told him the story. The true facts +were these: + +The Mudir of Tantah, Ibrahim Adhem, with Osman Raafat, excited the +populace against the Christians, as Ismaïl Jowdat related, telling them +that Arabi had ordered it—and the Mudir shut himself up also as related. +Minshawi lived at a village called Koreyshiyeh, and happening to come in +that day by train with Abdallah Pasha’s son, Emin Bey, and Husseyn +Wasif, a magistrate, they found Christians being killed; and Minshawi +interfered. They called out to him that Arabi had ordered it, but +Minshawi had said to the effect of “damn Arabi,” and insisted on their +stopping. He had then gone with Abu Diab, who had also been trying to +stop the massacre, to the Mudirieh, and had kicked in the door of his +room, and expostulated with him for letting the thing go on, Abu Diab +using strong language, for he was very angry. Then they telegraphed to +Arabi at Kafr Dowar to send soldiers to stop the massacre, but the +telegram had to go round by Ramleh and was delayed. But at last the +massacre was stopped. The whole thing was inquired into at Kafr Dowar +immediately, and the Mudir was sent to Cairo and there imprisoned till +the end of the war, Dawish Pasha replacing him. After the war he was +reinstated, and when the Commission was sent to Tantah, Ismaïl Yusri, +the President, who was a comparatively honest man, ascertained the truth +and informed the Khedive that he should be obliged to find him guilty, +and so begged to be superseded on the Commission. This was done, and an +officer less scrupulous was appointed who accepted the false evidence +Ibrahim Adhem was allowed to trump up against Abu Diab. Ibrahim Adhem, +however, was deposed—and Huseyn Wasif (a Circassian, not the same as the +magistrate) was appointed. He it was who was made a scapegoat of for +Ibrahim Adhem’s sake, and was deprived by Clifford Lloyd and sent to the +Soudan. Mehariz Bey, formerly sub-Mudir, is now Mudir of Boheyra. +Minshawi is the son-in-law of Abdallah Pasha the English renegade, and +his son Emin still goes by the name of the Englishman. + +Mustafa Bey confirms all Ismaïl’s statements of the Khedive’s connection +with the Alexandrian massacres. He was at Alexandria at the time and was +the Doctor employed to examine the bodies. There were 51 Christian +bodies, 23 Mohammedan, of which 8 Mustafezzin, all the latter by pistol +shots. The English doctor wanted to make out that the Christian bodies +had wounds made by “des armes blanches,” but this was not the case. It +was certainly Omar Lutfi and Seyd Kandil (a blackguard he calls him), +who got up the riot, and Mustafa states his conviction that Cookson also +was concerned in it. About Malet he does not know—nor about Dervish. But +he feels sure of Cookson. His evidence will be most valuable, and he +will come to England to give it. He also says that Omar Lutfi certainly +gave orders to the Mustafezzin to come unarmed. I like this worthy +doctor much. In face and figure he is not unlike Lord Lyons. + + + DR. MUSTAFA BEY NEJDI’S FURTHER STATEMENT OF _Nov._ 5, 1884 + + +“Peu de jours après le bombardment nous avons appris à Kafr Dowar qu’il +y a eu des Chrétiens tués à Tantah; et Toulba Pacha, d’après l’ordre +d’Arabi, a envoyé chercher Ahmed Minshawi pour témoigner sur ce qui y +était arrivé. Celui-ci est venu avec un autre notable nommé El Arabi au +camp, et Arabi Pacha lui a demandé ce qui en était. J’étais présent avec +Toulba Pacha et quelques Colonels. Ahmed Minshawi a répondu qu’il était +venu à Tantah et qu’il y avait sauvé la vie à un Chrétien à la gare du +chemin de fer, et qu’après il a fait venir ses gens de son village et +qu’il a pu étouffer les massacres. Il nous a racconté que le Mudir +Ibrahim Adhem et Meheriz son adjoint s’étaient enfermés dans la +Moudirieh pendant qu’on tuait le monde, même chez le Mudir. Il nous a +aussi dit qu’il avait télégraphié au Khedive et à Arabi Pacha, et Arabi +a fait venir le télégraphiste de Kafr Dowar qui n’en savait rien mais il +a expliqué la chose en disant que les télégrammes de Tantah à Kafr Dowar +devaient d’abord passer à Alexandrie avant d’être remis à destination. +C’était la règle du service. Sur ce Arabi a fait une station nouvelle au +camp, pour que les dépêches pourraient lui venir directement de +l’intérieur. Arabi a remercié Minshawi de ce qu’il avait fait et il est +retourné chez lui.” + + + MINSHAWI’S EVIDENCE AS GIVEN BY HIM _Nov._ 3, 1884 + + +On the day of the massacre of Tantah I came in to Tantah by train from +my own village, Koreyshiyeh, two hours distant (half-hour by train) +partly to see my brother-in-law Emin Bey on his road to Cairo, partly to +learn the news; and while at the station we heard a great noise and were +told that it was the Christians being killed by the mob in Tantah; and +I, wishing to end this, telegraphed to the Khedive at Ramleh and to the +Ministry (that is to say Arabi at Kafr Dowar) asking an order to +interfere. I also telegraphed to my village for men to come and help me, +and I waited four hours (during that time Abu Diab arrived from +Damietta) for an answer and no answer came. And while we were there +waiting the tumult came near us, and a man, a Syrian Christian, the +cashier of Zananiri the interpreter of the Greek Consulate, ran towards +me pursued by a soldier of the Mudirieh and called to me for protection; +and taking a stick from one of the bystanders I drove the soldier away, +and with the help of others put a stop to what was happening at the +station. Then I went with these to the door of the Mudirieh to inquire +what the Mudir was doing, and to call upon him to interfere and put an +end to the bloodshed. And on my way I met Abu Diab at the door of the +Mudirieh who had come from Damietta and was also restoring order, and +who had under his protection a young Christian girl whom he was leading +by the hand, and we went together to the Mudirieh, and when we arrived +there we found in the courtyard three corpses of Christians who had just +been killed there; and we asked for the Mudir and were told that he was +in his room, one of the rooms adjoining the courtyard. And we called to +him, but there was no answer. Then Abu Diab kicked the door in, and we +found Ibrahim Adhem, the Mudir, with his wakil, Meheriz, sitting there. +And Abu Diab in a loud voice asked them what they were doing there +allowing these murders to be done in his house by his own men. And when +they made no answer he called to Ibrahim Adhem, calling him a dog and a +coward. I heard this with my ears. Next I went to the Khan where I heard +the Christians had shut themselves up, and I found a mob trying to force +the door, and my men having come an hour afterwards from Koreyshiyeh we +drove them away and found inside a large number of Christians, Syrians, +Jews, and others, huddled together like frightened sheep. And I put +guards, and the next day brought them out and took them to my village, +and after some days those that wished to leave the country I took by +train to Port Said, two trains full; and those (about 120) that chose to +remain I took to my own house and fed them there during the whole time +of the war. + +Some days later I went to Kafr Dowar and gave evidence as I now give it +before Arabi Pasha when he made an inquiry into the affair, and Ibrahim +Adhem was sent a prisoner to Cairo and another man (Dawish Pasha) +appointed by the Government in his place. I also gave my evidence after +the war when the first Commission came to Tantah (there was no +Englishman on this Commission), and afterwards they gave me a paper to +sign, purporting to be my evidence, but it was not what I had said but +the contrary, and I refused to sign it. Much pressure was put upon me to +make me do this; and one day in the Khedive’s palace at Cairo, on his +fête day, Bairam el Kebir, Takla Bey Bishara warned me that if I did not +sign I should suffer for it. I also refused Ahmed el Sherif, sent by +Sultan Pasha, when he came round the villages to take money for the +sword given to Wolseley. + +When a new Commission under Ismaïl Yusri and the English came to Tantah +they did not ask me for my evidence (Ismaïl Yusri warned me in private +not to mention that I had sent a telegram to the Khedive, of which the +copy has been found in the telegraph office, to ask for an order to +interfere) of what had happened at Tantah but only as to those killed at +Santah. They therefore did not take my evidence. + +I declare that Abu Diab was entirely innocent, and that of those hanged +at Tantah for this matter only 2 were guilty, Abu Salaam of Santah, and +a soldier of the Mudirieh. Ibrahim Adhem and Mehariz were the cause of +the bloodshed. The killing was done by the vagabonds from Alexandria and +the soldiers of the Mudirieh. The same thing happened at three other +places—at Tantah 49 killed; at Santah 3 were killed; at Mehallet el +Kebir 6 or 7; at Mehallet abu Ali jem el Suk 2 or 3. Also the same thing +would have happened at Dumanhour but for the Wakil Abd el Razak whom the +Khedive has sent in chains for 15 years to the Soudan. I heard of Osman +Raafat being at Tantah on the day of the massacre in the house of one of +his brothers-in-law. He has two brothers-in-law at Tantah, Mohammed +Hellal and Ibrahim Hellal. + +Ibrahim Adhem was restored as Mudir after the war, and he got up the +evidence against Abu Diab in revenge for the words spoken by him on the +day of the massacre. Abu Diab died an innocent man. He was not +discouraged to the last, but told his father not to weep and told the +executioner to make haste. At the last moment Ibrahim Adhem asked his +pardon. But Abu Diab said, “God will judge between us to-night, to-day +for me, to-morrow for you.” I assure you, Sir, by God, that Abu Diab +died unjustly. + +Before the Commission had left Tantah Ibrahim Adhem came one day to my +village with 4 English officers, and summoned all the notables of the +neighbourhood and declared to them that I was in disgrace with the +Khedive and the English, and warned them to have no dealings with me, +and that if any had a quarrel against me the Khedive would support him +against me, and four months passed and no one came. Until the day of the +massacre I was respected by all men. I had no quarrel with Ibrahim Adhem +nor any one; but my action that day has been the cause of my ruin. When +Ibrahim Adhem was removed from Tantah, Husseyn Pasha Wasif was appointed +in his place. He received me into favour, but the Khedive wrote to him +by his own secretary not to see me. Husseyn Pasha shewed me this +letter—I saw it with my eyes—and begged me to excuse him if he asked me +to come no more to his house. This drove me from my country. It is clear +that by saving the lives of the Christians that day I have gained only +anger from the Khedive and trouble. + + + PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT + + Balta-Liman, 15 _Décembre_, 1884. + +MON CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT, + +Je vous remercie d’avoir pensé à m’écrire; j’aurais voulu en vous +répondant vous donner des nouvelles de chez vous; malheureusement +heureusement dans notre paresseux Orient les choses ne changent pas +aussi souvent que dans votre actif Occident. Ici les jours se suivent et +se ressemblent, il n’y a donc rien qui vaille la peine de vous être +rapporté. Depuis quelques jours j’aperçois des signes non équivoques +d’une tendance de rapprochement avec l’Angleterre; des communications +ont eu lieu entre Monsieur Wyndham et la Porte en vu de trouver un +terrain propice qui permettrait aux deux partis de traiter les affaires +égyptiennes. Je crains que cette fois encore la Turquie et l’Angleterre +n’aient, par leur lenteur, manqué le moment favourable de pouvoir en +finir entre elles. Les puissances signataires du traité de 1841-42 +paraissent vouloir se mêler de la question; elles trouveraient peut-être +mauvais que la Porte traitât directement avec l’Angleterre; dans ce cas +le nouvel ambassadeur d’Angleterre, quel qu’il fût, il est très douteux +qu’il puisse réussir dans le sens du désir de son Gouvernement. Tout +dépend de la pression plus ou moins grande qu’exercera l’Europe. + +Je porterai à la connaissance du Sultan ce que je croirai lui être +utile, sans cependant m’illusioner sur le résultat, car il est inutile +de chercher de la vigueur, de la précision, dans les actes du +Gouvernement Impérial. La peur, plus que l’intérêt même, présidera à +toutes ses actions, quoiqu’on fasse. La bienveillance de Musurus Pacha +pour Tewfik est sans doute le resultât du mariage de son fils avec la +fille d’un certain Antoniadis, partisan d’Ismaïl, comme tous les +voleurs. + +A propos d’Ismaïl, je vous dirai qu’il dépense beaucoup d’argent ici, et +j’en sens les effets. Le brave homme donne son or contre de la parole +qu’emporte aussitôt le vent. Avant que cette lettre vous parvienne +Monsieur Whittaker sera à Londres, il vous communiquera une proposition +qui je crois aura votre pleine approbation. + + Recevez etc., + HALIM. + + + PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT + + Balta-Liman, 6 _Janvier_, 1885. + +CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT, + +C’est le 4 janvier seulement que j’ai reçu votre lettre du 19 Décembre. + +Je suis avec intérêt dans les journaux les péripéties de vos démarches, +tant près de l’association international d’arbitrage et de paix, que +près du Premier Ministre. Je suis tout à fait de votre opinion et je +dirai qu’une terminaison à l’amiable et sans violence de la question +égyptienne ne peut se faire sans le concours du Sultan parce qu’il est +la légalité, le droit; mais, si on veut passer outre, alors c’est +l’inconnu et on ne peut savoir comment et où on aboutira. Je trouve que +l’Angleterre a perdu comme la Turquie un temps précieux; ces deux +puissances pouvaient l’arranger à l’amiable entre elles sans laisser de +place à l’ingérance des autres puissances peut-être même de la France; +l’Angleterre aurait beaucoup gagné et la Turquie aurait eu aussi sa part +de bénéfice. Maintenant que les Puissances font mine de vouloir prendre +en main la question égyptienne sous prétexte qu’elle est internationale, +je crois que l’Angleterre et la Turquie ont perdu, toujours dans la +prévision que les Puissances s’occuperont sérieusement de la question. + + Recevez, etc., + HALIM. + + + PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT + + Balta-Liman, 19 _Janvier_, 1885. + +CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT, + +Votre lettre du 8 janvier m’est parvenue, je veux remercier pour les +nouvelles que vous voulez bien me donner. + +Il est probable que Hassan Fehmi Pacha sera à Londres avant que vous +receviez cette lettre. Je considère la mission de l’envoyé Ottoman comme +une preuve patente de la bonne volonté de sa Majesté le Sultan de relier +les bonnes vieilles rélations des deux gouvernements que les évènements +d’Egypte ont un peu terni. En tout cas, c’est un pas fait vers un +arrangement, mais je doute que Hassan Pacha puisse arriver à une +solution définitive. + +Les dernières nouvelles reçues du Soudan se montrent par l’état critique +de l’expédition anglaise, si les troupes qui traversent le désert entre +Korti et Mutamma arrivent sans encombre à cette dernière ville la ⅘ de +la besogne serait faite sans doute. Alors seulement le Gouvernement +Anglais pensera peut-être sérieusement à donner une solution à la +question égyptienne. Je ne serais pas étonné si Souakin et Masaoua ou +tout au moins un de ces deux ports resta définitivement entre les mains +de l’Angleterre. + + Recevez, etc., + HALIM. + + + PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT + + Balta-Liman, 13 _Février_, 1885. + +CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT, + +Selon votre désir j’ai remis la lettre en arabe adressée par vous à Sa +Majesté Impériale le Sultan; je l’ai fait accompagner par votre lettre +adressée à moi; aussitôt que j’aurai une réponse je ne manquerai pas de +vous le faire connaître immédiatement. Je n’ai pas jugé nécessaire de +présenter au Sultan votre rapport à Hassan Pacha Fehmi—Sa Majesté aimant +les primeurs en tout. Je n’ai pas reçu la pièce que vous m’annonciez +m’être envoyé par votre secretaire. + +Rien de nouveau ici si ce n’est l’entrée en scène de l’Italie d’une +manière extravagante, il en sera de même tant que la Turquie se bornera +à protester chaque fois qu’on lui marchera sur le pied. + + A vous, etc. + HALIM. + +P.S. Personne ne peut répondre de la fermeté du Gouvernement Ottoman. + + + LETTER TO H.M. THE SULTAN OF TURKEY (ABDUL HAMID) + +(_Sent also in Arabic._) + + Crabbet Park, Three Bridges, Sussex, _January_ 3, 1885. + +SIR, + +The grave perils which on every side menace the Mohammedan nation and +which cannot but distress Your Majesty in the discharge of your high +duties towards your people must be my excuse if I venture to address you +on certain points which appear to me of vital moment in the present +conjuncture of affairs for Islam. + +It will not be unknown to Your Majesty that for some years past I have +travelled widely in Mohammedan lands and that circumstances have placed +me in a position to learn the thoughts, the fears, and the aspirations +of those who under various governments acknowledge Your Majesty as their +chief, the supreme Head and Prince of their religion; and Your Majesty +also doubtless knows the active part I took three years ago in +endeavouring to prevent the great misfortune of the invasion of Egypt by +my countrymen, and afterwards to set in a true light the injustice of +their action and the supreme miseries which they have caused. I trust +therefore that Your Majesty will accept as the ideas of one devoted in +all his heart to Mohammedan interests and Your Majesty’s, the view of +policy which I now presume to lay before you. + +1. With regard to those Mohammedans who live under other rule than Your +Majesty’s,—I can assert without fear of mistake that at no other period +of modern history has the Caliphal authority exercised so powerful an +influence on their imagination as now. In all parts of the world +Mohammedans are conscious of the danger to them as a nation; and the +sacred office held by Your Majesty is regarded by them as the only +safeguard remaining of their political existence. Especially within the +last four years have they learned the necessity of closer union under +Your Majesty’s command, if they would not become altogether lost and +scattered; and they are willing as they never were before to put aside +the differences of opinion which have so long divided them and to accept +Your Majesty as the fountain for them of authority. On this subject I +have conversed with many learned men in many countries, and I find that +what they practically desire is this. The evils of which they complain +are a decay of sound education, a decay of morals and a decay of wealth; +and they attribute these misfortunes not indeed to a defect of the +sacred law, which they all hold to be sufficient, but to a defect of the +power to interpret it in accordance with modern necessities, and of the +authority which should enforce that interpretation and make it binding +on men’s practice. They desire therefore that Your Majesty should be +pleased to consider in what way it would be possible to encourage the +meeting of some general assembly of Ulemas of various lands under Your +Majesty’s supreme appointment to discuss all these matters, and devise +remedies for their very urgent needs. They think that by a common +agreement alone of the faithful of all lands under Your Majesty a true +result could be obtained. + +This they desire and also that Your Majesty should take a more open part +in the exercise of your high office by issuing from time to time and +publishing authoritative statements of your views regarding the many +public events which arise, gravely interesting to Mohammedans at large, +in order that these may be kept in closer sympathy with Your Majesty on +matters concerning all. Thus it seems to me that it would be of supreme +advantage at the present moment that Your Majesty should take the whole +Mohammedan world into your confidence with regard to the English +occupation of Egypt. The strength of Your Majesty’s position lies in the +moral influence you possess over the vast populations outside Your +Majesty’s own Empire, and this can only be exercised to its full extent +by making your wishes public. Advantage has too long been taken by +European Governments of Your Majesty’s silence to spread false reports +regarding Your Majesty’s ideas; and in these modern days no Power can +afford to dispense with publicity as a spiritual weapon. + +2. With regard to Your Majesty’s own dominions I am encouraged by the +high character Your Majesty bears as a sincere Reformer, to urge upon +you to take cognizance of the many abuses and breaches of the law which +afflict the remoter provinces of your Empire. These to my sorrow I have +noted on my many journeys; and I know that they are a scandal to the +world and a cause of National weakness. I could, if Your Majesty would +permit, explain in what way I think they could be remedied; and Your +Majesty may trust me not to recommend those European remedies which Your +Majesty rightly judges to be unsuited to the genius of Eastern lands and +subversive of the principles of their religion. I should ask Your +Majesty neither to grant concessions to Europeans, nor to employ +Europeans in your Government, nor to adopt European forms of +Administration. The reforms I would advocate are different from these, +and are on the contrary designed to establish Mohammedan Government on +its true national basis and in stricter accordance with its religious +law. In this way I am confident that, God aiding Your Majesty, a sound +political and financial basis could be secured for Your Empire. + +Lastly—I would urge upon Your Majesty a certain course of policy towards +the Great European Powers, who one and all covet your dominions. It is +essential for any plan of reform and recuperation that an interval of +peace should be secured you. The two Governments which most threaten the +Mohammedan nation at this moment are the Russian and I grieve to say my +own, and they must be dealt with vigorously each in its own manner. The +present is an opportunity of the most favourable for making terms with +England, but these can only be secured advantageously for Islam by +courage and determination. Your Majesty must declare yourself in clear +language according to certain terms as to which I could advise Your +Majesty; and I think that I can assure you of success. But I venture to +warn Your Majesty against any concession of principle which might +separate you from the full approval of Mohammedans in various lands. The +part which is yours to play in your dealings with our Government is that +of the fearless exponent of the Mohammedan will. As Sultan of Turkey +Your Majesty has undoubted rights in Egypt, but in this age of lawless +aggression it is necessary that sovereign rights should be backed by the +popular will and in Your Majesty’s instance by that full exercise of +your Caliphal authority which is yours as Prince of the Faithful. + +If Your Majesty on the perusal of this letter will deign to hear me +further I will make it my duty to lay my plan in detail before Your +Majesty. + +I am, with profound respect, Your Majesty, Your most faithful servant. + + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT + + Constantinople, 17 _Juillet_ 1885. + +CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT, + +J’ai reçu votre lettre du 3 courant qui m’annonce l’achat des chevaux. +Je vous remercie pour la peine que vous vous êtes donnée pour cela. + +Mr. Whitaker n’est pas encore de retour. En attendant, ce que je vois +dans le journaux ne me parait pas être très différent du passé. Lord +Salisbury dans l’exposé de la politique du nouveau cabinet, fait à la +chambre des Lords le 6 courant, déclare que l’Angleterre est liée +d’honneur au Khedive. Un premier Ministre ne s’engage au fond comme +cela, s’il avait l’intention de suivre une autre voie que ses +prédécesseurs. Le lien d’honneur n’est pas facile à briser, comme par +exemple le lien d’intérêt, où on a la faculté de se montrer désintéressé +même magnanime en le brisant. Lord Salisbury donne pour raison du lien +d’honneur, l’honêteté du Khédive, vis-à-vis du gouvernement Anglais et +il n’y a que quelques jours que Tewfik Pacha protestait de son dévoument +et de son inaltérable attachement à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, en +jettant sur la pression irrésistible des Anglais tout le passé. Ces +protestations du Khédive sont prises ici pour ce qu’elles valent et pour +la forme on se montre content. Le grand cordon du Schafcate à été envoyé +à sa femme comme preuve de la satisfaction Impériale, + + Je vous renouvelle, cher Monsieur Blunt, l’expression, etc. + HALIM. + + + + + APPENDIX C + + AUTHOR’S CORRESPONDENCE WITH DOWNING STREET + + + THE EARL OF DUFFERIN TO MR. BLUNT + +_Private._ + + Cairo, 16 _December_ ’82. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +Many thanks for your letter of December 8th, and especially for having +sent me the pamphlet, of which I had heard, and which I have studied +with the attention it seems to deserve. + +I am quite alive to the importance of the question you refer to of the +indebtedness of the peasantry. It is one of those evils which meet us +both in India and in Ireland, and you may depend upon my doing my best +to discover a remedy if any such there be. + +We have induced the Government to let out of prison at once, something +like 450 of those who have been shut up in jail. + + Yours sincerely, + DUFFERIN. + + + MR. BLUNT TO THE EARL OF DUFFERIN + + _January 23rd_, 1883. + +MY DEAR LORD DUFFERIN, + +I have delayed thanking you for your letter of the 16th December +informing me of the release of 450 of the political prisoners, until I +had seen Napier and learned from him a little more clearly than I could +by letter what were the terms of agreement come to with regard to them +when the trial was compromised. I had understood from Broadley that the +terms would include an amnesty, and I had hoped it would have been a +general one, and that the whole of the unfortunate people detained in +the prisons on charges rising out of the “rebellion” would have been set +free. Now, however, it seems that, though an amnesty has been decreed, +many exceptions to it have been made, that while some have been +released, others are being arrested, and that the Courts are still +trying and executing men on criminal charges connected with the events +of June and July. I trust that the interest I take in opposing this +particular form of injustice will excuse me with you if I say a few +words on the matter. The world, it is true, is full of injustice which +we cannot remedy, but here the remedy would seem within our hands, and +the injustice is one for which every Englishman who knows the facts is +responsible. + +First, as regards the exceptions made to the amnesty, it would seem most +unfair that the leaders of the “rebellion” having foregone their right +of being publicly defended, any of their followers or associates should +be punished for rebellion. Arabi’s defence included the defence of every +man in Egypt, and with the commutation of his sentence every other +sentence should have been commuted. The two strongest cases I have heard +of, of persons excepted from the amnesty, are Akkad’s and Awwam’s, men +charged with no crime, but who have nevertheless been exiled, the one to +Massowah and the other to the White Nile, punishments which Malet has, I +think, explained in his despatches to be equivalent to death. These two +cases I also recommend to your special attention from the fact that the +sufferers are men whose quarrel was originally with English, not +Egyptian, officials, and whose exception from the amnesty has +consequently a rather compromising appearance for them. Akkad’s original +offence lay in his having protested in 1879 against Rivers Wilson’s +confiscation of the Moukabalah claims, a thing he was perfectly +justified in doing, which, moreover, he had been invited to do by a +notice published by Wilson in the papers. For this he was sent by Riaz +on a false charge to the White Nile; the details, Napier tells me, he +has laid already before you. + +Awwam’s case is still stronger, and it affects Colvin. Awwam was an +employé under Colvin on the Cadastral survey, and was dismissed for +having drawn up a report showing the incapacity of the officers +conducting the survey and their waste of public money—all which is now +admitted. The wrong done him made a martyr of him with the Nationalists, +and when Arabi came into office in February he was appointed his +secretary. For this, and presumably at Colvin’s suggestion, he was +arrested by the English authorities on their landing at Alexandria in +July, and put in irons. He then wrote a letter to the Khedive demanding +to know the reason of his arrest, and was transferred, still in irons, +to the Borgho prison, where Ninet saw him seventy-four days afterwards. +Then, when the disclosures relating to that prison began to be made, +Awwam would seem to have been sent without trial to Khartoum, and is +probably there at the present moment. These are strong cases, but I have +little doubt there are many others quite as strong. + +Secondly. It is surely a mockery to decree an amnesty affecting only +persons who happen to be actually in prison, and omitting from its +operation both men already dealt with and men to be dealt with in the +future on charges connected with the past. From all I hear the reign of +terror has not been diminished in the provinces by the decree—whatever +may be the case at Cairo—the prisons are still full and men are being +arrested daily. + +Lastly. I cannot understand how it can be the wish of our Government to +make scapegoats of the rank and file of those charged with the criminal +acts of June and July while the chief offenders enjoy immunity. If one +thing has been proved to the satisfaction of the Government more than +another, it is that Omar Lutfi was responsible for the murderous +character of the riots of the 11th of June. Yet we read still of +executions at Alexandria for crimes committed on that day by others, the +chief culprit himself being the while at large, in honour, and holding +high office under the Khedive. I say nothing of the Khedive himself, +though you doubtless know how little his conduct on that day would have +borne investigation. + +Having thus discharged my conscience of what I consider a duty, let me +now allude to the other part of your letter, that relating to the debts +of the fellahin. It was the scheme of Arabi and the Nationalists last +February to solve the difficulty by making it illegal to lend money on +mortgage of land except with the consent of an officer to be appointed +for the purpose in the chief town of each district, and then only to an +amount small in proportion to land value. Thus the only borrowers would +have been persons able and intending to repay. I quite understand that +such a regulation might have checked the flow of capital into the +country and in consequence have reduced the public revenue, but the +object of the Nationalists was to prevent at all costs the passing of +the land into the hands of strangers; and I repeat that this _must_ be +prevented if there is to be a cessation of the popular discontent in +Egypt. This seems to me a far more vital matter than the form of +government of the country, or even the reform of the administration. But +probably it can only be effected by a reduction of the revenue, and +consequently of the rate of interest on the debt. The Nationalists also +intended to form a National Bank to make the required advances. But I +feel that very likely it is useless my saying anything on this head, for +I fear the Government at home has no serious desire to effect anything +but a makeshift arrangement agreeable to the European public, and strong +enough to last their time. I wish you could have seen Mohammed Abdu or +some others of the Nationalist leaders before they left Egypt. They +would have told you in an hour more than you could learn from all the +English officials at Cairo in a fortnight. Nevertheless I beg you to +believe that I still look confidently for a solution compatible with +Egyptian aspirations at your hands, and I remain yours truly, + + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + THE EARL OF DUFFERIN TO MR. BLUNT + +_Private and Confidential._ + + Cairo, _12th Feb._ ’83. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +I hasten to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd of +January. It must have been delayed en route. + +You are really under a wrong impression as to what is going on here, as +you will see by the enclosed memorandum from Sir Charles Wilson, to whom +I referred your letter. + +As for el Accad, he is quite unworthy of the interest you take in him. +His complicity with Arabi is beyond doubt, and he misappropriated some +funds which Halim Pasha entrusted to him for the purpose of bribing +Arabi to support his, Halim’s, candidature. + +I have sent home a report on the reorganization of Egypt, from which you +will see that I am doing what I can to promote the establishment of just +principles of Government in this country. + + Believe me, my dear Blunt, yours sincerely, + DUFFERIN. + +P.S.—I need not remind you that there is no man who has done more to +prevent this Government from exercising undue severity in the case of +the rebels than Sir Charles Wilson. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON + + 10, James Street, _January_ 16, 1883. + +MY DEAR EDDY, + +I think you will admit that the despatches published to-day, taken in +connection with Colvin’s reappointment as Controller in Egypt, absolve +me from any duty of reticence I may have had toward Mr. Gladstone on the +events of the past year. In spite of all that has been said and promised +and avowed, annexation stares us in the face as unmistakably as if the +word had been written. I am sorry, more than for Egypt, that it should +have come to this. + + Yours affec., + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Private._ + + 10, Downing Street, _12th March_ ’83. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +As Campbell Bannerman has to answer a question this afternoon founded on +your letter which will (I understand) amount to what he could tell you, +were he to see you, perhaps an interview would be of little good. He +tells me that every piece of fresh information they get at the Admiralty +(_e.g._ from Lord Alcester) fully confirms his account in the House of +Commons; and therefore it seems to resolve itself into a question of the +known intentions of the authorities in Egypt as well as of the +Government at home against what Gill and Palmer _fancied_ their mission +to have been. + +I apologize for having perhaps expressed myself too strongly yesterday. +But the Government have nothing in the world to conceal; and the +organisers of the Expedition surely ought to know better the objects of +it than the unfortunate men charged with the mission. + + Yours as always affec., + E. W. HAMILTON. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. EDWARD HAMILTON + + Paris, _Sep._ 14, 1883. + +DEAR EDDY, + +When I saw you on Wednesday I told you that I had thought of taking +Sabunji with me, but had given up the idea. Since then, however, I have +heard that the man I counted on to help me in Egypt is no longer there, +and I have consequently determined to take Sabunji. The fact is I should +be very helpless without him, and if it should so happen that I could be +of any good it would be as well to have him at hand. + +I shall leave him at Port Said or Suez till I have seen Baring, and as I +told you, I have no intention of doing anything without Baring’s +countenance. If Baring will not listen to anything I have to propose I +shall not waste any time in Egypt, but shall go on to Ceylon and India. +I shall caution Sabunji to get into no mischief, and he has always acted +as far as I am aware squarely in his service with me. We start to-night +for Marseilles, and so farewell. I will write to you from Egypt. + + Yours affec., + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON + + Cairo, _September 28th_, 1883. + +MY DEAR EDDY, + +I promised to write to you, and I will keep my promise, but you must not +expect me to say anything pleasant or flattering. I found Baring +extremely amiable and willing to listen to all I had to say, and I +believe he told me his own views frankly. Our ideas on many of the +reforms wanted in Egypt were the same. His scheme for relieving the +debts of the peasantry seemed a sound one—and he struck me generally as +being a man of sympathy and courage. But when I have said this I have +said all. On the main point of giving Egypt back her liberty we are +worlds apart. He neither wishes it, nor has the least idea of attempting +it. “What Egypt wants,” he told me, “is peace and order, not another +revolution; we have restored the Khedive and the Circassians to power, +and I shall do my best to keep them there.” + +With regard to Dufferin’s famous Charter I find neither he nor any one +else look upon it as in the least serious or in the least important—and +they are right. The elections are not serious, nor were ever intended to +be by those who drafted the Charter. The electoral lists are drawn up by +the Government, the voting takes place under the eye of the Governor and +in the Prefecture of Police—and in most instances the Governor or the +Prefect of Police are the candidates chosen. It could not have been +otherwise. The Circassians have been encouraged to re-establish their +rule by a reign of terror. There is no protection of any kind against +arbitrary arrest, arbitrary confiscation of property, and imprisonment +without trial. The prisons in the country districts are still full of +untried men. There is no liberty of speech, or of the press—and at +Alexandria they began the elections by hanging two more men charged with +instigating the riots of last year. How should any one but the Prefect +of Police be chosen? Mr. Gladstone, who knows everything, doubtless +knows that in India, where the people have been crushed for ages, they +worship Siva the god of destruction. Here they worship the Prefect of +Police. Yet less than two years ago there were both freedom of speech +and of the press, elections fairly representative, and the beginning of +a real Constitution. It may have been necessary for Imperial or +international reasons to destroy this and to revert to a system of +“peace and order” as Baring calls it, but it cannot be necessary to talk +of having given the Egyptians liberty! + +Baring himself is too honest to pretend that his system is anything but +“Egypt for the Turks.” But he fancies he can manage Tewfik and the half +dozen men who form his party, and give Egypt a mitigated and not +altogether inhuman despotism. If he succeeds in this he will have +accomplished something, but I cannot believe that he will at all +succeed. Tewfik and Sherif have no following in this country beyond the +palace walls, and, even supposing them to be the absolutely supple tools +Baring believes them to be, they have no kind of moral influence and +very little energy. The minor English officials tell me they are unable +to redress the least wrong or introduce the simplest reform in the +departments in which they serve; and that Baring and Maxwell should be +able, through the weak medium of Tewfik, and Sherif, and Fakri, to do +more than obtain a shadow of justice and compassion for the people I +cannot understand. You know how different this is from my own idea of +reforming the people through men of their own race whom they respect, +and are ready to work with, and you may imagine my disappointment at +getting from Baring nothing better than poor Malet’s stale idea of Egypt +for the Turks. + +I spoke to Sir Benson Maxwell, who is a really good man, about getting +some kind of protection for the people from arbitrary arrest, and he has +promised to do so. But he is going away on leave and nothing will be +even begun before Christmas. On the whole it seems to me that no fate +could possibly have been devised for Egypt more sad or more hopeless +than what I see before me, and it would have been far more merciful to +have put the Egyptians at once out of their misery by annexing their +country last year than to play at giving them “_native_ rule,” under +conditions which through much suffering will lead to exactly the same +result a year or two years hence. I consequently leave Egypt a sadder +and a wiser man than I came. I shall publish my poem—and make my protest +and set out “to-morrow for fresh fields and pastures new.” + + Yours, etc., + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + +PS.—I wonder whether Mr. Gladstone knows that there are still twelve +Bedouins in prison at Suez arrested for the Palmer murder and untried. +Among them a woman and two or three children kept as hostages!! + + + MR. BLUNT TO SIR EVELYN BARING + + Cairo, _Oct._ 1, 1883. + +MY DEAR SIR EVELYN, + +I have received a letter from Abd el Razak Bey, F.R.G.S., ex-director of +the Naval College, who with some four others has been in prison here for +the last three months on a charge originally of connection with a +political plot. He was, however, ordered to be dismissed by the +Commission appointed to inquire into the matter, but was nevertheless +retained by Osman Pasha Ghaleb through superior orders “on suspicion,” +and is still in the Zaptieh prison. He now asks me to come and see him, +and as I am leaving Cairo to-morrow I shall be much obliged to you if +you can kindly obtain me an order to enter the prison. + +Since seeing you on Wednesday I have had opportunities of ascertaining +the feelings of the people here, and I am convinced that unless +something is speedily done to relieve their sufferings you will have +trouble. + + I am, dear Sir Evelyn, yours truly, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + SIR EVELYN BARING TO MR. BLUNT + + Cairo, _Oct._ 1, 1883. + +DEAR MR. BLUNT, + +I regret that I am unable to accede to the request contained in your +letter. The decision as to permission being given to prisoners to +receive visits lies entirely within the competence of the Egyptian +Government. I must decline to interfere in the manner in which they +exercise their discretion in dealing with the subject. + + Very truly yours, + E. BARING. + + + MR. BLUNT TO SIR EVELYN BARING + +_Private._ + + Suez, _October 3rd_, 1883. + +MY DEAR SIR EVELYN, + +Your note by some accident was posted by your cavass instead of being +sent by hand, and so did not reach me till just as I was leaving Cairo +yesterday morning, and I think it is right you should know that +receiving no answer I had already gone to the prison, and seen Abd el +Razak Bey and the others. I found them comfortably lodged and in good +health, with the exception of Mustapha Bey Sidki, who seemed seriously +ill, and I received from them all the same account, that their release +had been ordered by the Commission (which included two of the Belgians +who came here as judges) more than three months ago, since which time no +further inquiries had been made into their case. Abd el Razak had +written to the Khedive, but without reply, and they believe themselves +to be detained by the order of Osman Pasha Ghaleb. No English inspector +had been to see them, and no inquiry had been made into their case. Now, +however, that I have got your letter I fear that, should my visit become +known to the Prefect of Police, or the fact that they wrote to me, the +prisoners might be made to suffer from their and my imprudence. They +believe themselves likely to be sent without further trial to the +Soudan, and, as so many have suffered that fate during the past year, I +trust that you will give them your protection. They were arrested on a +charge which would seem to have been false, for their release was +ordered by the court which examined it, and in any other country in the +world they would be now at liberty. + +As far as I can learn, Lord Dufferin interfered with these matters as +long as he was here, for he had promised a political amnesty at the time +of Arabi’s trial, but after his departure arrests were again made, and I +understand on very high authority that there are at the present moment +several thousand untried prisoners in the various towns of the Delta and +Upper Egypt. I can speak from experience of the terror in which +respectable people, in no way connected with the army, but known to have +sympathized with the Liberal party, are now living in Cairo, and, as I +said before, the excessive tyranny of the police and the Mudirs is +goading men to new disquiet. Trusting that you will forgive me for not +having waited for your answer, and that as far as the prisoners are +concerned the fact of their having written to me and of my having seen +them may be kept a secret, I remain, dear Sir Evelyn, + + Yours very truly, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON + + Suez, _October 3rd_, 1883. + +MY DEAR EDDY, + +You will have perceived that when I wrote the other day I was very +angry, and I think that I had cause. But that is no reason why I should +not write again. When I saw Baring I had not had any conversation with +my own political friends, and I could not guess the condition of +affairs. Now I have seen and talked to a great number of them, and I can +speak with certainty as to their feelings and, I believe, with equal +certainty as to the general feeling of the country. + +The first and only obstacle that I see to a peaceable settlement of the +country is the present Khedive. It is absolutely impossible he should +remain, unless it is intended to occupy the country permanently with our +troops—and I doubt if even that would altogether protect him. I have +asked people of every class about him and I have not found one that did +not despise him. The Circassians and the rest of the fanatical class +look upon him as a traitor to his religion, and the liberals as a +traitor to his country. You know that till the bombardment I supported +him with the National party as against Halim or Ismaïl or other +pretenders, but I am certain that no reconciliation is possible. You do +not believe in his culpability in the matter of the riots of June, but +all the Egyptians here do, and within the last three days I have had +very important evidence on that head offered me. Now, I don’t wish to +make too much of this—it was a stroke of party politics. But what the +Nationalists will never forgive is that he has had innocent men as well +as men who acted at his instigation hanged for these very acts. I have +now the evidence of two men of the highest respectability, one of whom +is Ahmed Bey Minshawi, the Sheykh who is so honourably mentioned in the +Blue Books as having saved the lives of several hundred Christians at +Tantah, to the effect that the riots there were equally the work of the +Khedive’s friends, and that Yusuf Abu Diab, who was hanged for the +affair, was not only innocent but did his best to save lives. Innocent +men have everywhere been arrested and imprisoned on charges connected +with these things to gratify the spite of the Khedive and his few +partisans. You will say perhaps that these tales are not true, but they +are certainly believed in—and in the belief lies all the difficulty of +reconciliation. For myself I believe so strongly in the Khedive’s +treachery that I would certainly not advise Arabi to return to Egypt, +were the option given him, under Tewfik’s rule. + +The Circassians of course do not quarrel with him on this account (for +they look on the fellahin as their proper scapegoats), but for his +conduct during the war and his feebleness of character. As you know, +they are very few in numbers in the country, only a few thousand, and +they say they want a _man_ not a woman to protect them against Europe +and against another rising of the fellahin. I believe there is a strong +party among them for Ismaïl Pasha, a few for Husseyn on account of his +extreme bigotry, and a few for Hassan, his brother. Among the more +liberal-minded Halim is a favourite, as he is among many of the +Egyptians through Abu Nadara’s advocacy, though very few people know +him. His enemies say he is not a politician and cares only for cats and +birds. Nobody will hear at all of Ibrahim on account of his letter to +the Duke of Cambridge. The Khedive of course has a party, though he has +no friends. This consists first of the Ministers who have come into +power through his restoration—though all these cannot be counted +on—secondly of Butros Pasha and other rich Copts, and I believe the +Coptic money-lenders of the Said. The Patriarch and the mass of the +Coptic clergy belong to the “Hesbu el Horiye,” the party of liberty, +which now occupies the place of the National party of two years ago. +Also, thirdly, of the financiers, bankers, and rich Syrian and Greek +merchants of Alexandria. It is, however, safe to say that there is +nobody of the Khedive’s party, except the Ministers, who do not support +him as a natural stepping-stone to annexation. + +The fellahin of the Delta, as far as I can gather, are divided in +opinion, those of the remoter districts caring nothing for politics, and +having still a traditional respect for Effendina—whoever he may be—the +other part believing that Arabi will return. Of this there has grown up +within the last few months a very strong belief in Cairo and the +towns—and there is no doubt in the world that he is popular in spite of +his misfortunes. I have heard people complain of him for his conduct in +the war, for his neglect of blocking the Suez Canal, for his praying +when he ought to have been fighting, and for his running away at Tel-el- +Kebir. But they talk kindly of him and are proud of him as the first +_fellah_ who ever held supreme power in Egypt, and I had abundant proofs +of their goodwill to myself as his friend. Except the Khedive I see no +obstacle to his recall. Sherif might, I believe, work with him again as +far as the Nationalists are concerned, and Ismaïl Eyoub certainly could. +But Ali Mubarak Pasha, Khairi Pasha, Omar Lutfi Pasha, and Osman Ghaleb, +the Prefect of Police, and Sultan Pasha would have to retire from power. +I cannot conceive their being any loss—and there are certain Mudirs, +too, in the provinces, who have been exceptionally bloodthirsty and +tyrannical, whose position would be incompatible with a return of the +liberal party to office. I am of opinion that the only prince of the +family of Mehemet Ali who could unite parties is Halim. But I think you +would do far better to make Arabi himself the chief of the state—Halim +after all is a Turk and the people only look to him as the alternative +to the present regime. + +The more I have seen of the people the more convinced I have become that +the present reign of terror cannot continue. If you withdraw the troops +without establishing something and somebody that the people like, you +must have trouble. The army may be as fond of Sir Evelyn Wood as he is +said to think, but that will not prevent them owning the first resolute +man who proposes to dethrone the Khedive—he is too unpopular with the +people to be popular with the army—and, if the Nationalists are too +crushed to turn on him yet awhile, the Circassians certainly will. You +will then find yourselves with some really unscrupulous adventurer at +the head of a revolution, and you or your successors will annex the +country. I am writing in the belief that you do not intend or wish for +such a result, but to persist in thrusting Tewfik on the Egyptians is to +invite annexation. + +I had intended to write this to the “Times,” but I write it instead to +you, hoping that you may show it to Mr. Gladstone. I would rather you +did not show it to the F. O., for they would only use it to my friends’ +disadvantage. The whole thing depends now on Mr. Gladstone. If he +insists on restoring liberty to Egypt nothing is easier—but not on the +present lines. + + Yours affectionately, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + + Haddo House, Aberdeen, + _21st October_, 1883. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Your two interesting letters written from Egypt, for which many thanks, +have both reached me while I am holiday making in Scotland; but I have +taken steps to secure their being seen by Mr. Gladstone. Your account of +affairs in Egypt is, to say the least of it, depressing. I won’t make +any comments on what you say. I will content myself with being the +receptacle of bad news and the conduit pipe of it to headquarters. I +will only say that I can’t conceive how it would be possible, without +the grossest breach of faith, for the English Government to countenance +the ousting of Tewfik, whatever sort of fellow he may be. + +Holiday making is neither conducive to letter writing, I find, nor to +the catering of news, so I am afraid I shall, as far as being a +correspondent is concerned, make a poor return for your budgets. Good +luck to you and a pleasant trip to India. + + Yours affectionately, + E. W. HAMILTON. + + + SIR EVELYN BARING TO MR. BLUNT + + Cairo, _December_ 31, 1883. + +SIR, + +I have received a letter from Chérif Pasha informing me that the +Egyptian Government intends to forbid your disembarkation in Egypt on +your return journey from India—His Excellency adds: “Par courtoisie, et +en vue d’empêcher tout incident facheux de se produire dans le cas où il +entrerait dans les intentions de Monsieur Blunt de s’arrêter en Egypte, +à son retour des Indes, je crois devoir vous demander Monsieur le +Ministre, de vouloir bien informer d’avance votre compatriote de cette +interdiction.” + +In compliance, therefore, with the request of the Egyptian Government, I +beg to communicate their decision to you. + +I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant, + + E. BARING. + + + MR. BLUNT TO SIR EVELYN BARING + + Delhi, _January_ 26, 1884. + +MY DEAR SIR EVELYN, + +I have to acknowledge the receipt, under flying seal from Mr. Primrose, +of your letter of the 31st December, which reached me yesterday. I +confess that the contents surprised me, not merely on account of the +nature of the message your letter contained for me from the Khedive’s +late Prime Minister, but still more from the fact that you should have +transmitted it in an official form without comment, explanation, or +expression of disapproval. + +That the Government of which Sherif Pasha was the head should have +disliked my presence in Egypt I can well understand, for I have been +more than once, as you know, instrumental in bringing their abuse of +power to official ears; but I am ignorant of having offended against any +law which should authorize my exclusion, as the subject of a friendly +Power, from Egypt; and still less am I conscious of having done what +should forfeit me my right to your diplomatic protection. Indeed, the +circumstances of my recent visit to Egypt would seem to entitle me to +this last in an especial manner; for you will not have forgotten that I +came there last September with special recommendation to you from the +highest official quarter, and that my renewed interest in Egyptian +politics was authorized by suggestions emanating from the same high +source. But for this, I believe I may say with truth that I should not +have stopped in Egypt at all on my way eastwards, and most certainly +that I should not have encouraged hopes there which the sequel might +fail to justify. + +With equal truth I can assure you that, had you informed me in a less +formal manner that the interests of Egypt would be best served by my not +returning to Cairo this spring, I would have willingly consented +inasmuch as at the moment of my receiving your letter I had all but +abandoned my intention of so doing, partly on account of quarantine +difficulties, partly because I recognized in Nubar Pasha’s accession to +office an adjournment by our Government of the special hopes which +interested me. + +Now, however, in face of your official communication, I feel myself +obliged to do something towards asserting the right, which is mine as a +British subject, of residing where I will abroad under British +protection, and especially, because I hold property there, in Egypt. +Nubar Pasha is an enlightened man, with whom I have the pleasure of +being personally acquainted, and he is not likely of his own motion to +renew his predecessor’s threat of excluding me from the country, but I +fear I must ask you, as I do most formally ask you, to be good enough to +give me your written assurance either that the prohibition forwarded by +you has ended with Sherif Pasha’s dismissal, or that you are prepared, +should I be so disposed as to wish to land in Egypt, to take all +necessary measures to protect me from annoyance. Less than this would be +equivalent to my abandoning a right which, as a matter of principle as +well as of convenience, I am not prepared to forego. + +I will only add that letters from you in this sense will reach me, if +addressed to the Rubattino Steamer “China,” at Aden on the 8th of March +or at Suez on the 12th, and will prevent further misunderstanding. + + I am, my dear Sir Evelyn, yours faithfully, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + +_Private._ + + Bombay, _January_ 30, 1884. + +MY DEAR EDDY, + +What, in the name of all that is blunder-headed, does Baring mean by +sending me _in official form_ and without explanation a threat of the +late Sherif Pasha’s that he would prevent my landing in Egypt? You +surely explained to him the meaning of my last visit and the +encouragement which had been given me (I don’t mean merely through +yourself) to make a move in Egyptian politics. Or what is the history of +it? Of course I have been obliged to answer, but as yet have done so +semi-officially only, and without putting all the dots upon the I’s, and +have left him a door of retreat from what you must see is quite a false +position. Please don’t let him force me to go any further. + +Seriously, would it not be better to work with me frankly at last by +telling me exactly what it is you want in Egypt. Unless you really mean +annexation, you will need every honest man’s help to get you out of your +difficulties, and the day will come when you will not despise mine. It +is only two years ago if I remember rightly that you told me Gordon was +mad. But you must not drive me too far. I have a serious work to do in +the East, a work of which the establishment of good government in Egypt +is only a small part, and one way or other, with God’s help, I mean to +do it. It is a good work and you could further it greatly in Downing +Street if you chose to trust me, but I am sure you cannot hinder it, +certainly not by shutting me out of Egypt. I had nearly given up the +idea of going back there this spring, for my thoughts were in another +direction, when I got Baring’s letter. But I shall most certainly fight +the matter out if he insists. Only I beg of you think it carefully over +and if possible let Baring be advised to send me a sensible reply. + +We leave Bombay on the 1st of March. + + Yours affectionately, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + SIR EVELYN BARING TO MR. BLUNT + + Cairo, _Feb._ 26, 1884. + +DEAR MR. BLUNT, + +On receipt of your letter of January 26th I placed myself in +communication with Nubar Pasha. I enclose for your information a copy of +my letter and of Nubar Pasha’s reply. + +You will observe that Nubar Pasha’s views are identical with those +entertained by Cherif Pasha. + + Very truly yours, + E. BARING. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + + 10, Downing Street, 28 _Feb._, 1884. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Thanks for writing to me. I know nothing whatever of the steps which the +Egyptian Government have taken with regard to yourself; and I am +certainly not aware that they were taken at the instance of the English +Government or of its representative at Cairo. + +I am afraid—and my fears are confirmed by what you say in your last +letter—that you have considered the fact of your corresponding with the +Prime Minister’s Private Secretary on Egyptian matters as an +encouragement, however intentionally guarded the correspondence may have +been on my side. This may lead to misunderstanding; and I feel bound to +consider not so much myself (for that matters little) as my master. +Moreover it is difficult for me in writing to show exactly how far I +write on my own account—a difficulty which is enhanced by the +impossibility of my devoting the time and care necessary for +corresponding on important subjects. + +Having regard then to these considerations I think it my duty not to +attempt to write about such subjects, and that it will be better for you +and me if we drop writing to one another on public questions. I daresay +I am to blame in this matter, as it has always been an interest and +pleasure to me to hear your views which you have the power of expressing +so well, and I have been tempted to egg you on. I hope you will not +misunderstand what I have said. I don’t think I need have any fear on +this account, for I am sure our friendship is strong enough not to be +affected by anything I may do from a sense of public and official duty. +I have been awfully busy of late, busier than ever. Whenever not wholly +absorbed in work, my thoughts have of late been mainly occupied by the +long and very serious illness of poor Pembroke. . . . I wish I had time +to send more news; but that is not possible. + +For the sake of your friends, if not for your own sake, I hope you won’t +act in the matter of the order of the Egyptian Government in such a way +as to bring yourself into trouble. I hope I have said nothing which will +annoy you, and you will make due allowance for the difficulties and +delicacy of my position. + + Yours affectionately, + E. W. HAMILTON. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + + 10, Downing Street, _April_ 4, 1884. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Welcome back. I am truly glad to hear of your and Lady Anne’s safe +return. I shall like of all things to arrange an early meeting, etc. +Thanks for taking my remarks in such good grace. + + Yours affectionately, + E. W. HAMILTON. + + + MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. + + Crabbet Park, _April_ 23, 1884. + +MY DEAR SIR, + +A few days ago some gentlemen of the many interested in the fate of +General Gordon called on me to ask my advice as to the best means of +extricating him from the imminent peril in which he lies, and they +suggested the formation of a band of volunteers which should endeavour +to run the gauntlet of their besiegers and having forced their way to +Khartoum should bring him back with them in safety by the same road. The +idea seemed to me a generous but wholly impracticable one, and I told +them so, frankly adding that much as I should wish to join in any +reasonable attempt to save General Gordon’s life, I could not with the +principles I hold, be a party to an armed attempt against the Arabs whom +I hold to be in the right as I hold General Gordon to be in the wrong. I +promised however that should anything in the shape of peaceful +negotiation be proposed I would willingly aid them to the full extent of +my power. + +Since then I have most opportunely received information which leads me +to feel certain that if properly approached not only could terms be +obtained from the besiegers of Khartoum which should include General +Gordon’s safe return with such of his companions as might choose to +accompany him, but that a general pacification of the Upper Nile might +at the same time and by the same means be effected. In view therefore of +the urgency of the situation (for believe me, Sir, it is urgent), I deem +it a duty to offer through you my services to H. M.’s Government as +mediator in this matter. I say to H. M. Government, because it is clear +that no merely private negotiations could be effectual in a case where +such large public interests are involved. But I do not apprehend that +any absolute departure from the general principles of policy announced +by the Government would be required in conducting them to a successful +termination. + +With regard to my own part in the matter I will only add that, although +I believe it would not be necessary for me to go myself to the Soudan, I +should be ready to do so if the circumstances of the case should +absolutely require it. + + I am, my dear Sir, yours faithfully, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Private._ + + 10, Downing Street, Whitehall. + _24th April_, 1884. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Mr. Gladstone is obliged for your letter. He must to-day confine himself +to saying that he is communicating its contents to his colleagues in the +Cabinet. + + Yours, + E. W. HAMILTON. + + +_Private._ + + Same date. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +I add a private line. Considering all that has gone before, I can’t help +thinking you would do well to approach the Government by other means +than those in Downing Street. Could you not take Harry Brand into +confidence with a view to your viewings sifting through him to Lord +Hartington? + + Yours aff. + E. W. H. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON + + 10, James Street, Buckingham Gate, + _April_ 24, 1884. 7 o’clock p.m. + +MY DEAR EDDY, + +If it was a matter concerning my own wishes or one of small importance I +would willingly consult Harry Brand, who would do all he could I know to +serve me. But this is the most serious step I have taken in my life and +one which involves consequences not to me only but to this country and +to many besides, and I dare not treat it except with those wholly +responsible. If Mr. Gladstone cannot see me now, perhaps he may be +willing to do so later. I was in the House this afternoon and listened +attentively to his declarations, and I gathered from them that he has +not yet closed the door to negotiations by any absolute decision of an +immediately warlike nature. So that I will wait his time, confident that +if I can be of use he will not scruple, on a point of formality in +connection with past events, to give me timely notice. Only I fear that +perhaps the time given us all may be shorter than he thinks, for already +according to my latest advices the tribes are gathering from every side +in arms, and though I still think it not too late it may well be so +soon. I shall be in London till Saturday when I go back to Crabbet but +shall be always within reach if required. + + Yours affectionately, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. HORACE SEYMOUR TO MR. BLUNT + + 10, Downing Street, 30 _April_ 1884. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +Mr. Gladstone desires me to thank you for your offer to act as mediator +in the Soudan, of which, however, Her Majesty’s Government are not able +to make use, inasmuch as it must already be known throughout that region +that they, in common with the Government of Egypt, have no other desire +than to promote the evacuation of the country and the restoration of its +liberties. + + Believe me, yours truly, + HORACE SEYMOUR. + + + SIR PHILIP CURRIE TO MR. BLUNT + + Foreign Office, _May_ 17, 1884. + +SIR, + +I am directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your +letter of the 1st instant in which you complain of the refusal of the +Egyptian Government to allow you to land in Egypt on your return from +India, which refusal was communicated to you through Her Majesty’s Agent +and Consul-General at Cairo. + +I am to inform you that the decision not to permit you to visit Egypt is +one with which Her Majesty’s Government are not prepared to interfere. + + I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant, + PHILIP W. CURRIE. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Private._ + + 10, Downing Street, _21st May_ 1884. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Rumours have reached me that you are about to found your complaint +against the Government for being excluded from Egypt partly on the +ground of certain “interviews” which you had with me last autumn. + +I feel bound to notice these rumours by writing you a line; but I may +say at the outset, knowing you as I do, that I wholly and entirely +discredit them for more than one reason. + +In the first place, I unfortunately saw so little of you before you left +England that I know we had no “interviews” with the solitary exception +of your coming to say good-bye to me, when I recollect that our +conversation was limited to wishing you “bon voyage,” adding as I +believe I did that letters from you abroad would continue to interest me +as they always had. + +In the second place, I studiously avoid ever attempting to quote Mr. +Gladstone’s views—(and his views alone have weight)—which I have no +title whatever to represent. + +In the third place, had I committed any indiscretions—as to which my +conscience is absolutely clear—any use of them by yourself could only +have one result; and that would be, to show that I was quite unfit for +my present post of confidence. Of doing this I am sure you have not the +smallest intention. + +You will I know excuse my bothering you on this matter. All that I want +is the shortest authority from yourself to deny the truth of the +rumours. For this purpose only do I ask for such an assurance, and not +for my own satisfaction, because I am convinced that you would be the +last person in the world to take at a disadvantage one of your oldest +and sincerest friends, who occupies a place of great trust and delicacy. + + Yours affectionately, + E. W. HAMILTON. + +I hope if fortune favours me to see you again soon. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON + + Crabbet Park, _May_ 22 1884. + +MY DEAR EDDY, + +I have no wish to make a scandal of this or any other matter, unless +absolutely forced into it, and still less to do you an injury; and so I +have decided, before going further, to lay the whole facts privately +before Mr. Gladstone. He will then be able to decide whether I have or +have not cause to complain. You may rely upon me to be scrupulous in not +exaggerating anything that passed between us, but I have a memorandum of +the circumstances written at the time, imperfect indeed but sufficient +to prove to me, if I had any doubt of the accuracy of my recollection, +that our conversation in Downing Street the day I saw you there before I +went abroad was by no means limited, as you suppose, to “wishing me bon +voyage.” I do not however rely wholly upon this for what I have all +along asserted, namely that I was encouraged to stop in Egypt on my way +Eastwards. Unless I was altogether deceived by another person, whom you +probably know, Mr. Gladstone was at that time desirous of a reasonable +excuse for restoring the Exiled Nationalists, and I went to Egypt and +called on Baring distinctly under this impression. You will say that I +have been the subject of a mystification, but I find this very difficult +to believe, and at any rate the doubt should be cleared up. I repeat, I +have no wish to have it done in public, if I can have it done in +private. I do not wish to make a scandal. I look upon Mr. Gladstone as +in reality a friend to most of my ideas, and I would far rather not be +driven into a position of antagonism to him. But the withdrawal of my +right of protection in Egypt is a violent proceeding and one that I +cannot accept without protest. The notice was served on me formally, +publicly and I may say brutally, and Lord Granville has refused me even +a reason. This is not fair, and my only resource is to force an answer +through Parliament, when the whole matter will be sifted. I have +fortunately made it a rule to have no political secrets as regards my +own acts, and so am prepared to argue it out. But I quite understand +that others are not in my free position; and, if you can assure me that +Mr. Gladstone will give the matter his serious private attention and not +merely put me off with an official reply I will write to him on the +subject. With regard to my really going to Egypt I have no wish in the +present position of affairs to do so. I could do no good there +politically nor could I even if I wished it make matters worse; and I am +far from well and want rest and not a new campaign. But my right to +protection is a matter of principle and I have certain real, if not very +large, material interests in Egypt which I may at any time require to +see to. Indeed Baring’s action in withdrawing his protection and +preventing my landing has already cost me perhaps a couple of hundred +pounds. This is exactly how things stand, and I await your answer, +before taking further steps. + + Yours ever, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Private._ + + 10, Downing Street, _24th May_ 1884. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Thanks for your letter. + +I am very sorry that your recollection of what took place last autumn +should be so entirely at variance with my own recollection of it. But I +cannot conceive that any private conversation between friends, whatever +complexion you may put upon it, can be construed into what you call “a +scandal”; and I recognize the kindness of your desire not to cause me +bother. + +Mr. Gladstone never fails to give his personal attention to every +communication made to him; so I need hardly assure you that a statement +coming from you will be fully considered by him. + +I am very sorry to be the cause of adding at all to your labours, etc. + + Yours as always, + E. W. H. + + + MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. + + Crabbet Park, _May_ 31, 1884. + +MY DEAR SIR, + +The privilege you have, at various times during the last three years, +accorded me of addressing you on public matters must be my excuse if I +now appeal to you on a matter mainly personal, namely my recent +exclusion from Egypt on my return from India, and the still more recent +refusal of H. M.’s Government to afford me protection there invariably +given to British subjects. The circumstances of my case are briefly as +follows: + +Towards the close of last session I received a visit from a gentleman +well known to yourself but not otherwise connected with political life +or at all with Egypt, during which he urged upon me the desirability of +my “making a new move” in Egyptian politics. His idea was that public +opinion in England had sufficiently changed during the previous twelve +months for it to be possible to propose with some chance of success a +restoration of the National party before the British troops were +withdrawn from Egypt; and he furthermore suggested that the matter might +best be brought forward if a popular demonstration should occur on the +occasion of the Elections under Lord Dufferin’s Charter. He thought that +the leaders of the liberal party if such there still were at Cairo might +be advised to propose Arabi as their Candidate and, if his election were +secured, that there would afterwards be no difficulty in bringing about +his recall from exile. The idea was a new one to me, and I confess that +at first it seemed to me a quite impracticable one; and I did not +encourage it, especially as at the time I had abandoned all immediate +thoughts of again taking an active part in Egyptian politics. It seemed +to me that, without the concurrence of H. M.’s Government, it would only +result in failure, and I knew how little real liberty of choice the +Electors would have and how certain would be the punishment imposed upon +the leaders in any such movement. I nevertheless on this suggestion +wrote to an intelligent friend at Cairo, on whom I believed I could +rely, to inform me what chance of success the plan would offer, and I +received his answer towards the end of August. He informed me that +“though there was no _party_ in favour of Arabi’s return, it was because +it was not thought of as possible. Many regretted him, but the +punishment inflicted on him and the spite wreaked on all who were mixed +up with his revolution, which continued daily to be exercised, prevented +any one from attempting to follow his example. There was a big party +which thought of him with regret, but until quite lately my +correspondent had hardly heard a word about his return at Cairo. Lord +Dufferin’s parliament had always been a mere toy and a thing to laugh at +by all who knew Egypt. With the existing system of Palace and +Ministerial supremacy, where no man dared do right because he instantly +made himself a marked man, the Parliament would be a convenient tool for +the Government. The bare idea of its showing independence under the +existing regime would be ridiculous. At the same time if Arabi returned +to Egypt, any constituency would return him, unless pressure were put on +the Electors. If the elections were left alone, pressure would certainly +be put on any constituency for which Arabi might present himself as +Candidate. But, if Englishmen watched the ballot, he might get returned, +although that constituency would most certainly be made to suffer in a +hundred ways for its temerity. . . . If the people thought that a new +era was dawning and they might vote fearlessly, of course Arabi would be +returned by any constituency in Egypt, but they had had a severe lesson +and ‘a burnt child dreads the fire.’” + +This letter, dated the 20th of August 1883, reached me if I am not +mistaken on the 29th; and on the same day, I again called, by his +invitation, on the gentleman already referred to, and he then told me +that since his last talk with me he had seen you and that he could now +assure me that it was your personal wish to find an excuse for restoring +the exiles, and he advised me strongly to go to Cairo, where I should be +well received by Sir Evelyn Baring and where I could talk the matter +over with him. “Sir Evelyn Baring,” he said, “will arrive in a few days +at Cairo and he had _carte blanche_ to begin a new policy in place of +Sir Edward Malet’s which had failed.” This put the matter in a more +hopeful light, and I at once determined to stop in Egypt on my way to +India, and, if I found Sir Evelyn Baring in reality favourable to the +idea, to propose Arabi’s Election to the Liberals of Cairo. Although I +will not say that the communication was delivered to me in terms as a +message from you, I certainly accepted it as in some sort such, and I +find it difficult to believe that it was wholly unauthorised by you or +at least that you were unaware that it would be made. Nor can I doubt +that a restoration of the National Party was a most natural and wise +resolve, for it was only by such a course that the promised evacuation +of Egypt could with any prudence have been effected, or the Charter of +Egyptian liberty been made a reality. + +I therefore began to prepare my plans of action, as well as it was +possible to do so beforehand, and arranged to leave England on the 12th +of September, for Suez, whence I could visit Cairo and learn how matters +really lay and whether my stay there could with any advantage be +prolonged. + +Moreover on the day of my departure I received a note from Mr. Hamilton, +your private secretary, asking to see me before I left, and I went to +call on him in Downing Street and talked the matter of my visit to Egypt +over with him. I told him of my plan with regard to the Cairo Elections, +and he approved of it or seemed to approve, and assured me of Sir Evelyn +Baring’s readiness to confer with me, and we discussed certain details +regarding my visit and he gave me advice on other political matters. +Although Mr. Hamilton and I are old friends, I had not seen him for some +time previously to this visit and we did not talk, as far as I am aware, +at all on private matters; nor had I been to Downing Street for nearly a +year, and, notwithstanding his reserve which I noticed as to yourself, I +remained distinctly under the impression that his language on the +occasion was authorised by you. You had left England some days before +for Norway; and Mr. Hamilton, if anyone, was there to represent you. +Thus I was and still am convinced that my journey was made with your +sanction, and that on that account I had special claims on Sir Evelyn +Baring for his protection in case my visit should give rise to +annoyance. + +As a matter of fact I only stayed ten days in Egypt, and meddled in no +way at Cairo with the Elections. I found them half over when I arrived; +and on calling on Sir Evelyn Baring found him with quite other views +from what I had been led to expect. He received me indeed most amiably +and discussed with me the whole situation; but when I talked of a +Nationalist restoration we no longer agreed. I spoke my mind perhaps +rather too freely to him about his policy which I felt certain must end, +as it has ended, in failure; but I have nothing else to reproach myself +with in my communications with him, and beyond giving some advice and a +very qualified encouragement to the friends and relations of the Exiles +as to their eventual return and ascertaining some valuable facts with +regard to the history of the previous two years, I did little while +there that had a political significance. It was therefore with real +surprise that I received Sir Evelyn’s notice delivered officially and +without explanation excuse or remark four months later that I was not to +disembark in Egypt on my return from India. + +This, Sir, is the principal point in the case which I would lay before +you. A second is that the decision to exclude me from Egypt seems to +have been come to simultaneously with a determination to inflict certain +petty annoyances on me in regard to a small property I have in Egypt, +annoyances which, reckoned only in money value, will represent a loss to +me of perhaps a couple of hundred pounds. It is equally difficult to +understand that these should have been entered on with or without Sir +Evelyn Baring’s knowledge, _with_, because they are an act unworthy of a +public servant towards a political opponent, _without_, because they +occurred precisely at the extreme plenitude of Sir Evelyn’s power, when +hardly a sparrow fell to the ground in Egypt without his knowledge. + +A third point is the refusal of the F.O. to _assign me any reason_ for +declining to support my demand of admission as a British Subject into +Egypt. Although I am advised that the Egyptian Government has a +technical right to refuse entrance into Egypt, as far as I have been +able to ascertain, it is a right which has never before been enforced +there against a British Subject; and the British Government have never +before refused protection _without assigning reason_. It seems to me +therefore that it is a public duty with me not to let this pass without +protest, for if it be admitted in my case that it depends upon the +arbitrary goodwill and pleasure of the Foreign Minister of the day to +decide who among British Subjects shall and shall not be protected +abroad, it surely establishes a dangerous precedent, limiting criticism +on foreign affairs to agreement with the Government. I have ventured to +disagree with Lord Granville on his policy in Egypt. _Without assigning +reason_ he excludes me from Egypt, the inference seems clear that I am +subjected to pains and penalties for my free speaking, a thing +altogether out of accordance with English political practice. Nor can I +think that the immediate convenience of excluding me from Egypt, which I +presume is the unavowed motive, can be worth so very new and +questionable a departure. + +Under all these circumstances I am induced to believe that by a personal +appeal to you I shall be best consulting the general interests as well +as my own. I have been advised that my remedy lies with Parliament and +the publicity which should oblige the Foreign Office to give me a fair +answer; but I have no wish, in the presence of such large public +questions as are at the present moment being debated with regard to +Egypt, to bring a personal grievance of my own in connection with that +country unnecessarily before the public; and I feel sure that you will +admit the soundness of my reasoning, and will so far favour me as to +place before Lord Granville my unofficial request that he will +reconsider his decision with regard to my recent application. + + I am, my dear Sir, yours very faithfully, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + +P.S.—I may add that should you feel any doubt as to the accuracy of my +recollection of the two conversations here recorded, I possess +reasonable proof of it in the shape of memorandums written at the time. +These I should be happy if you required them to show you privately. + +[N.B.—Sir Evelyn Baring subsequently, 1891, assured me that the +annoyances complained of in this letter in regard to my property were +none of his instigation, and I accepted and accept his assurance +implicitly. + +My correspondent in Egypt quoted in the letter was Mr. Ardern Beaman, +late official interpreter to the British Agency, and one well qualified +to give the opinion quoted. The friend of Mr. Gladstone referred to was +of course Sir James Knowles.] + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON + + St. James’ Club, Piccadilly, W., _May_ 31, 1884. + +DEAR EDDY, + +I send you my letter to Mr. Gladstone, which I have very carefully drawn +up, so as to be within the limit of things which I am quite sure of, and +which I could, if necessary, support by reasonable evidence. With regard +especially to my conversation with you, I have kept myself well within +the limit of things written. I am convinced that the little I quote will +remind you of much more that was said. As to the main fact of Mr. +Gladstone’s having last year the thought of restoring the Nationalist +party and of allowing it to be helped through my instrumentality, the +more I think it over the less I doubt it. Please then forward my letter +to him without delay, and let me have his answer before Parliament meets +again so that I may lose no further time, which in the present critical +position of affairs is becoming valuable. I am sure you cannot say that +I have shewn impatience. + + Yours affectionately, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. HORACE SEYMOUR TO MR. BLUNT + + 10, Downing Street, 10 _June_ 1884. + +DEAR BLUNT, + +Mr. Gladstone has received and considered your letter of the 31st ult., +and he desires me to say in reply that it is, in his opinion, impossible +that any friend of his could, without the grossest error of judgment, +have given you any ground for the suppositions that he was favourable +(_a_) to the restoration of the exiles to Egypt, and the election of +Arabi under Lord Dufferin’s scheme; or (_b_) to your stopping in Egypt +on your way to India for the purpose of promoting Arabi’s candidature. + +With regard to your account of your interview with Hamilton on the day +you started for Egypt, Mr. Gladstone is convinced that you entirely +mistook Hamilton. + +Without, however, questioning in any way your intentions or your honour, +Mr. Gladstone has deplored your proceedings in Egypt as alike injurious +to Egyptian and British interests, and he has entirely concurred in the +course which has been taken by the Foreign Office in reference to +yourself. + + I am, yours truly, + HORACE SEYMOUR. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. SEYMOUR + + James Street, _June_ 11, 1884. + +DEAR SEYMOUR, + +I beg you to thank Mr. Gladstone for me for the courteous form of his +answer to my letter, and to say that I do not propose bringing the +matter of my exclusion from Egypt before Parliament until after the +present crisis. + + Yours truly, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + + 10, Downing Street, 5 _Aug._ 1884. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Thanks for your friendly note. I did not, however, need to be assured +that, so far as you were yourself concerned, any allusion to our +conversation last September had no unfriendly intent towards me. I am +only sorry that our memories should not be more in accord; but I can +honestly say two things. One that my asking you to come and say good-bye +was merely the impulse of a friend who values the friendship of another. +The other, that I have no recollection whatever of any announcement of +your intentions in Egypt, and that the strictly private nature of our +goodbye meeting is confirmed by my own diary, and by my not having +reported any part of it to Mr. Gladstone. + +If I was incautious, I shall try to amend my ways in future. + +I am going off to Scotland almost immediately; and whatever your +movements may be, pray be assured that they will always carry with them +the best wishes of + + Yours affectionately, + E. W. HAMILTON. + + + MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. + + Crabbet, _Novr._ 18, 1884. + +MY DEAR SIR, + +I venture once again to address you on a matter of very large importance +connected with past events in Egypt, and which is still exercising a +powerful influence for evil on the prospects of Government in that +country and our own good name throughout the East. + +You will not have forgotten the charges brought by Lord Randolph +Churchill last year against the Khedive of complicity in organizing the +riots of Alexandria, or the opinion which I have more than once +expressed that they were well founded. My original knowledge of the +matter came through my connection with Arabi’s trial, and when I found +that in spite of the promised amnesty men were still being tried and +executed on accusations connected with that affair I did not hesitate to +put in Lord Randolph’s hands the few facts then at my command. At the +same time I took no leading part myself in bringing the matter before +the public. Since that time, however, a variety of accidents have put me +into possession of a complete chain of new evidence, giving me the right +to speak at last with absolute certainty on all the great events of that +time. I am able now not only to trace the history of the Alexandrian +riots with a sure hand, but to produce full evidence of the Khedive’s +orders having been given for the riots of Tantah, Dumanhour, and other +towns of the Delta a month later. Moreover (and this I consider the most +important feature of the case) I have ascertained and am prepared to +prove that there was a total miscarriage of justice under the Commission +instituted to try cases connected with these massacres after the war. +The chief offenders were not punished; in many instances innocent men +were put forward by the Khedive’s officers to suffer for the guilty; and +in others those condemned were not only innocent, but had taken an +active part in saving Christian life. In the case of Lord Randolph +Churchill’s indictment, the written statements it was objected were +unsigned. But the witnesses I can now bring forward are men of +acknowledged character, and much of their evidence was officially +acquired, while they are ready to appear in person either publicly or in +private in support of their assertions. + +Such being the case I feel that I cannot do better than lay the facts +privately before you, and request that you will personally examine the +value of my new evidence. I have as yet communicated it to none of my +political friends; and I can assure you that I had far rather keep it +remote from public dispute. It is a question of justice to be done and +reparation made; for there are innocent men still in prison, and the +families of others who have suffered death are in distress; and it is +you alone who can adequately repair the wrong or restore the honour of +English justice where it has been compromised. + +At the same time I am aware of the many calls upon your time, and should +you consent to an inquiry I should be satisfied if you would allow +yourself to be represented by deputy in all the details, begging you +only to retain the responsibility in your own hands, and not to refer me +to the Foreign Office, which has been throughout deaf to my +representations, also as it is a question of evidence and witnesses I +would suggest that persons of judicial training would best discharge the +duty of representing you in an inquiry. I should ask no better than that +the case should be referred for decision to ordinary English judges. + +Having said this, I need hardly add that I am myself absolutely certain +of all the main facts of which I propose to produce evidence, as certain +as I am of any in history; nor need I assure you that I have a perfect +confidence that when you too shall have been convinced of the deceptions +practised upon our agents in Egypt, you will hasten to do justice. It is +not too much to affirm that this initial failure of justice after the +war has been the cause of all subsequent failures, and that there is +little prospect of renewing honest life in Egypt through our +intervention as long as so great and notorious a treachery remains +unpunished. + + I am, my dear sir, yours very faithfully, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + + 10, Downing Street, _21st Nov._ 1884. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Your note was most welcome as it gave me tidings of your whereabouts, as +to which in spite of many inquiries of friends I could ascertain +nothing. I send this half line in anticipation of any reply Mr. +Gladstone may send you when he has been able to read your letter—which +was not feasible for him to do to-day. + +You don’t say where you have been betaking yourself; but I hope we may +soon meet. + + Yours affectionately, + E. W. H. + + + MR. HORACE SEYMOUR TO MR. BLUNT + + 10, Downing Street, 25 _November_, 1884. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +Mr. Gladstone desires me to say in reply to your letter of the 18th of +this month, that under your inhibition to communicate with the Foreign +Office, he cannot do more than acknowledge its receipt. + + Yours faithfully, + HORACE SEYMOUR. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. GLADSTONE + +(_Précis._) + + London, _March_ 12, 1885. + +A letter saying that since the fall of Khartoum he has put himself once +more in correspondence with those in Europe who are in correspondence +with the Mahdi, with the result that he has ascertained that the road to +peaceful negotiation is open. He is authorized by them to say that a +preliminary discussion might be opened in Egypt, but not through the +ordinary diplomatic or military channels—the basis of negotiation to be: +1. Release of captives. 2. Immunity for the tribes involved in the war. +3. Retirement of British or Egyptian forces to Wady Halfa and Souakin. +4. Evacuation of Souakin and Massowah in favour of the Sultan. 5. +Recognition of the Mahdi as sovereign within these limits. 6. +Establishment of diplomatic relations with England. 7. Freedom of +commercial intercourse. 8. Possibly a convention limiting the Slave +Trade. He is further authorized, in order to save further bloodshed, to +offer the services of an Arab gentleman to convey an immediate message +explaining the attitude of the English Government towards the Soudan. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Confidential._ + + 10, Downing Street, _March_ 14, 1885. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Mr. Gladstone is obliged to you for your letter, which he wishes me to +acknowledge on his behalf. + +You imply that the Mahdi would not deal with Lord Wolseley and Sir E. +Baring, our accredited representatives in Egypt. But why then does not +the Mahdi send either some representative of his own with his views +ready to be presented to the Government here, or some communication of +those views, which might come to head-quarters at once? One may almost +say that anything short of this is paltering with the case. + + Yours always, + E. W. HAMILTON. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON + +(_Précis._) + + London, _March_ 16, 1885. + +Explains the difficulty in the way of a representative being sent, the +road not being open and the Mahdi being unaware whether his +representative would be well received. Suggests sending an Arab +gentleman under a safe conduct to Khartoum. Will Mr. Gladstone be +disposed to facilitate the journey of such a gentleman, giving him a +sufficient knowledge of the disposition and ideas of the British +Government to enable him to arrange a formal embassy on the part of the +Mahdi? + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Private._ + + 10, Downing Street, _March_ 19, 1885. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Many thanks for your note. It did not occur to me to connect Drummond +Wolff’s Question with your letters. It is not my fault that you have not +had a further letter from me on the subject of your last communication. +All I can for the moment say is that it is the subject of consideration. +I am aware of what you consider the urgency of the matter to be. + + Yours affectionately, + E. W. H. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Confidential._ + + 21 _March_, 1885. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Your letter to me of the 16th has been taken into consideration. I am to +remind you that Lord Wolseley has been instructed to forward any +overtures which may be made by the Mahdi, for the immediate +consideration of the Government. If it is thought that the Mahdi is not +aware of these instructions, it might possibly be arranged that the Arab +gentleman should convey the information through the British lines. But +the Government would require to be satisfied as to the gentleman’s +character and intentions. + + Yours always, + E. W. HAMILTON. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. GLADSTONE + +(_Précis._) + + _March_ 24, 1885. + +Thanking for message received through Mr. Hamilton, which, however, is +not sufficiently definite to be acted on, but holds himself in readiness +to give any further explanations, and suggests doing it by word of +mouth. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Confidential._ + + 10, Downing Street, _March_ 28, 1885. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Mr. Gladstone cannot perceive that the last letter I wrote to you by his +direction was really indefinite. It practically conveyed to you an +intimation that, if the Government could be assured of the Arab +gentleman’s character and intentions, a passage through the British +lines might be arranged for him. Mr. Gladstone is afraid that he cannot +suggest any other mode of proceeding. + + Yours always, + E. W. HAMILTON. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Private._ + + 10, Downing Street, _March_ 28, 1885. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +I am sorry I cannot say more; but I must adhere to instructions. + + Yours affectionately, + E. W. H. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + + 10, Downing Street, _March_ 30, 1885. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Mr. Gladstone went out of town on Saturday night; and according to +present arrangements he will not return to London before the 9th of +April. Under these circumstances I am afraid any interview is out of all +question. + +All I can do for the moment is to communicate on the subject of your +letter received this morning with Lord Hartington, who is not only Mr. +Gladstone’s locum tenens, but who is now more directly concerned as War +Minister than any other member of the Cabinet in matters affecting the +Soudan. + + Yours affectionately, + E. W. H. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON + + _March_ 30. + +Saying it would not be worth while sending a special messenger to say +that Lord Wolseley would forward communications. What is required is an +explanation of what the terms might be if a mission was sent. While Mr. +Gladstone says there is no intention of restoring Egyptian rule in the +Soudan, Wolseley is appointing Prince Hassan Governor-General, Graham is +pounding the “rebels” at Souakin, and Baring is arresting Zebehr at +Cairo. Mr. Blunt is going abroad and will see those in communication +with the Mahdi, and will ascertain their further views. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Confidential._ + + 10, Downing Street, Whitehall, + _April 2nd_, 1885. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +All that I am at liberty further to say to you, before you go abroad, is +to remind you that H.M. Government have again and again declared their +objects to be the security of Egypt and the freedom of the Soudan; and +to point out to you that the Mahdi has indicated to them nothing +whatever. If it is thought that the objects of the British Government +are not known to the Mahdi, why cannot steps be taken to communicate +them to him? If they are known to him, surely it is for him then to make +some declaration upon them in return? + + Yours always, + E. W. HAMILTON. + +Bon voyage and au revoir. + + + MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. + + Paris, _April_ 8, 1885. + +MY DEAR SIR, + +Yesterday the Mahdi’s principal agent in Europe met me here, and I went +through the whole subject of our recent correspondence carefully with +him, and especially the draft of terms suggested in my first +communication, and read to him Mr. Hamilton’s last letter containing the +declaration that the Government policy is that of freedom for the Soudan +and security for Egypt. Of the draft of terms I am glad to say he fully +approves, as a possible basis of negotiation with the Mahdi, and he is +willing to accept the declaration of policy as generally compatible with +that basis. Also he is prepared to send the Arab gentleman as bearer of +a communication stating that England’s policy is one of “freedom for the +Soudan and security for Egypt,” and he assures me that the Mahdi will in +turn despatch a mission of peace to England, which may be expected to +arrive not later than September. The Arab gentleman will, moreover, if +the Government is willing, arrange in the interval for an armistice, for +the better treatment of captives, and for immunity for such tribes as +may have joined the English arms. + +The Mahdi’s agent also begged me to say that he trusted the Government +would not be deceived by the reports recently circulated of defection +from the Mahdi’s standard, and so delay despatching the messenger to +Khartoum. There was no truth at all in these reports, but on the +contrary, there was every certainty that as soon as the agricultural +season was over on the Upper Nile, hostilities would be resumed, nor +would these permanently cease as long as a British or Egyptian army +remained in the Soudan. With regard, however, to an advance upon Egypt +proper, he made the remark that the Mahdi was a reformer, not a +conqueror; that he had no quarrel with the Egyptians either there or +elsewhere, many thousands of them being actually gathered under his +flag; and that the establishment of a just and legal Egyptian Government +at Cairo would at once end any danger of such an advance by depriving it +of excuse in popular sympathy. The Mahdi was popular with the fellahin +of Egypt, because he had rid their brethren, the Soudanese, of an +intolerable tyranny, and they would continue to look on him as a +possible deliverer as long as their wrongs remained unredressed. If +through the means now placed at the Government’s disposal a truce of two +or three years was concluded, England would have time to do justice, and +it would be her fault if at the end of it the war was renewed. The Mahdi +had no mission of conquest in Egypt. + +Finally he requested me to explain that Ministerial declarations made in +England are not understood in the Soudan, and that there is a great +mistrust of all military communications. If the Mahdi had understood +General Gordon as having a really friendly mission towards the Soudanese +he would certainly have entered into friendly communications with him. +But, up to the present moment, it has been the universal belief in the +Soudan that England has no other object than to conquer and retain the +country. For this reason it is essential that the communication of a +contrary policy should be made through some one known to them and +promising credit with the people. + +From all I heard yesterday I am satisfied that it depends wholly now +upon the Government to prolong the Mahdi’s hostility, or change it into +friendship; and I therefore await with much hope your answer to this +letter. + + Believe me, my dear Sir, yours very faithfully, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Confidential._ + + 10, Downing Street, _April_ 11, 1885. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Mr. Gladstone is obliged for your letter, written from Paris on the 8th, +which I duly delivered to him. + +He does not well see how he can add anything material to the letter +which I wrote to you on the 2nd, and of which he himself was cognisant, +though he was away from London. In that letter there were reiterated the +declared objects of the British Government in the Soudan, objects which +they are as desirous as ever of securing, and which hardly need to be +enlarged upon. + +Let me add a word on my own account. I cannot help thinking you must +understand the delicacy and difficulty which the Government must feel +about holding communications with you, on matters relating to Egypt, +directly or indirectly, when it is believed that you mistrust and are +opposed to the Ruler of that country whom they are bound and likewise +intend to support. + + Yours always, + E. W. HAMILTON. + + + MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. + + 10, James Street, _April_ 14, 1885. + +MY DEAR SIR, + +I returned yesterday from Paris, and hasten to answer your last letter. +The Mahdi’s agent is ready now to send the messenger whenever it suits +you to give him the necessary facilities. But he has impressed very +strongly and repeatedly upon me the necessity there is of his having a +_written_ message in Arabic to deliver. This need not go beyond the +sense of the words Mr. Hamilton has already used in writing to me, but +it must be in a form intelligible to the Mahdi and others whom it +concerns. Without this, he says, it will be impossible to convince the +Mahdi that the message is quite sincere on the Government’s part, or at +any rate that his followers should be so convinced. My knowledge of Arab +ideas leads me to feel sure that in this he is only reasonable, nor do I +conceive that the Government, which has already sent written +communications through their Generals to Osman Digna and other chiefs, +would now find a difficulty in writing this message to their supreme +chief Mohammed Ahmed. It will not be necessary that the title “el Mahdi” +should be employed towards him in the letter, and I could, if desired, +suggest a form of address which would be considered friendly without +acknowledging this special pretension. The strictest secrecy would be +maintained by the messenger until his delivery of the letter at the +Mahdi’s camp. + +Thus the suggestion made in Mr. Hamilton’s first letter to me, that the +Mahdi should send a mission to England, can be conveyed to him in a way +he will understand as being sincerely offered; and all that need further +be done will be to instruct the military authorities to receive with +scrupulous courtesy the Envoys on their arrival at the British lines. + + I am, my dear Sir, yours very faithfully, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON + + St. James Street, _April_ 15, 1885. + +MY DEAR EDDY, + +I have replied to the first part of your letter in the enclosed to Mr. +Gladstone, and I add a few words in answer to your own remarks, as I +should be sorry there should be additional difficulty through +misunderstanding. For reasons which you know, and for others which you +do not know, I have of course, as you say, “mistrust” of the Khedive, +but the extent of my “opposition” to him you probably exaggerate. I have +had very little correspondence with Egypt since my last visit there +under circumstances which you will remember, and the failure of Baring’s +policy since has been due to its inherent weakness far more than to the +action of his opponents, certainly than to mine. I believe still what I +have always believed, that there is no course open to the Government, if +it would keep its pledges and have peace in Egypt, but to restore the +National party; and, if that is impossible, then annexation by Europe, +if not by England, is the only end. Tewfik has seemed to me up to the +present to stand in the way of such a possible arrangement, and on this +ground especially I have from time to time opposed him; but, if it could +be shown to me that the peace and happiness of Egypt was compatible with +his rule, I should not surely out of obstinacy refuse to be reconciled. + +The questions, however, of the Soudan and Egypt may for the immediate +present perfectly well be kept apart; and I see no reason why the +Government should hesitate to communicate with me on the former if not +on the latter. They have publicly declared the Soudan to be independent +of Egypt, and Mr. Gladstone has recently assured me through you that he +earnestly desires to maintain its freedom. + + Yours affectionately, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Confidential._ + + 10, Downing Street, _April_ 16, 1885. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Mr. Gladstone is afraid that he cannot draw a distinction for present +purposes between Egypt and the Soudan; and so I am obliged again to +point out the difficulty of his holding communications with yourself on +the subject of your correspondence with him. + +It is to be observed that H.M. Government has received no application +from any agent of the Mahdi to be allowed a pass through the British +lines to enable him to deliver a message. I cannot say with what +response such an application might meet. + + Yours always, + E. W. HAMILTON. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + +_Private._ + + 10, Downing Street, 25 _April_, 1885. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +My last note was not intended to invite further remarks. It aimed rather +at hinting that under altered circumstances the correspondence should +close. I am afraid this must be the case. I have no authority to +communicate further with you on the matter. + + Yours always, + E. W. H. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + + 10, Downing Street, 12 _May_, 1885. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Mr. Gladstone is much pleased by your kind gift. The little volume will +much interest him; and he hopes you will accept his best thanks. He says +it will be a pleasure to him to turn from the Soudan to Proteus. + + Yours affectionately, + E. W. HAMILTON. + + + MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT + + 10, Downing Street, Whitehall, 11 _June_ 1885. + +MY DEAR WILFRID, + +Many thanks for your kind note. I hope we have never met but as friends; +and that the only difference which pending changes will make will be +that I may see more of you in relations of “greater freedom and less +responsibility.” I am afraid for some little time to come I shall be +awfully pressed by the ordeal of packing. I have to turn out not only of +office, but of home. + +In haste. + + Yours affectionately, + E. W. H. + + + MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. ROBERT BOURKE, M.P. + + 10, James St., _July_ 3, 1885. + +MY DEAR BOURKE, + +As you are doubtless considering the Soudan question just now at the +F.O. I think it may be of assistance to you to know briefly what has +passed between me and the late Government in regard to possible +negociation with the Mahdi. + +It began in April, 1884, when I wrote to Mr. Gladstone in connection +with schemes then on foot for rescuing Gordon, and offering my services +as mediator. Mr. Gladstone seems himself to have had some inclination to +accept, but on reference to the rest of the Cabinet my offer was +declined. + +Secondly I made an attempt in December, through one of the Peace +Societies, to gain a hearing. I had ascertained that the Mahdi would be +accessible to offers of withdrawal for Gordon and the garrison from +Khartoum; and I went to Hawarden with the hope of seeing Mr. Gladstone +and explaining the position to him. But I was not received. + +Thirdly, after the fall of Khartoum, I again wrote to Mr. Gladstone +delivering a message I had received from a religio-political personage +in correspondence with the Mahdi proposing to open negociations for +peace or truce. It was just before Graham’s second campaign in March; +and this time Mr. Gladstone responded, and a correspondence followed +which led to my being authorised to give certain messages to the +personage in question, and I went abroad at Easter to deliver them. It +was then proposed to send a messenger through the British Lines to +explain the pacific views of the Government, and arrange for the opening +of more formal negociations, and it seemed as if the matter would be +arranged; when for some reason which I do not exactly know the thing +collapsed. I fancy it was on account of the news spread just at that +time of a rival Mahdi having sprung up in Kordofan and the idea that +Mohammed Ahmed was no longer in full power at Khartoum, but I am not +sure. In any case the correspondence suddenly came to an end. + +Although all this was more or less confidential as between myself and +Downing Street, there is no reason I think now that I should make any +mystery about it to you, especially as it would probably be open still +to Lord Salisbury if he liked to take the negociation up at the point +where Mr. Gladstone dropped it—and I should be glad if you would show +this letter to Lord Salisbury and offer him the confidential perusal of +the papers I have relating to it. I will not say more at present than +that I still think it would be possible as it would certainly be most +desirable to come to terms with the Mahdi. + + Yours very truly, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + +[N.B.—I cannot find any answer to this letter, nor do I remember its +purport. It led to nothing, the Mahdi’s death being shortly after +announced. But for this it is probable that Lord Salisbury would have +negotiated.] + + + MR. BLUNT TO THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY + + _September_, 1885. + +MY LORD, + +I have the honour to lay before your Lordship the fact that I have +received a summons through the Lords of H. M. Treasury to present myself +before the Tribunal of First Instance at Cairo on the 19th of October +next on a matter connected with a property I hold in Egypt, and to beg +your Lordship to inform me whether I shall receive there the protection +usually accorded to British subjects. I make this request in consequence +of a notification served on me two years ago by Sir Evelyn Baring with +Earl Granville’s approval to the effect that I should not then be +allowed to land at Suez on my passage from India. + +For further particulars regarding the case of my exclusion from Egypt by +the late Government I beg to refer your Lordship to Blue Book, Egypt, +No. 27, of 1884, containing my correspondence with the Foreign Office; +to the report of a debate in the House of Commons of the 4th August of +the same year; and to the enclosed memorandum. + +Your Lordship will observe that Sir Evelyn Baring’s action against me +seems to have been based originally upon a misstatement of Sherif Pasha +regarding a visit paid to Egypt in 1883, and afterwards to a fear +entertained by the late Government that my influence there would be +prejudicial to their policy. But I venture to hope that your Lordship +will not regard me with the same apprehension, and that, having inquired +into the facts, you will restore to me the protection generally accorded +to British subjects abroad. I may mention that my prolonged absence from +Egypt has occasioned and is occasioning me considerable money losses. + +I am, my Lord, your obedient humble servant, + + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY TO MR. BLUNT + + Foreign Office, _Oct._ 5, ’85. + +MY DEAR MR. BLUNT, + +We have applied to the Egyptian Government to obtain permission for you +to return—but we have received the most decided negative. Of course it +is in our power to apply pressure to the Egyptian Government. But if we +do so, we shall make ourselves responsible for the consequences. It is +therefore a matter of duty to us, first to ask you, whether you will +undertake not to meddle in any sense with political questions or +projects while you are there? If you will give us this undertaking we +will telegraph to Egerton to do his best. + + Yours very truly, + SALISBURY. + + + MR. BLUNT TO THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY + + 10, James St., _Oct._ 6, 1885. + +MY DEAR LORD SALISBURY, + +I most readily undertake not to meddle with political questions or +projects while in Egypt, my object in going there being first to look +after my property and secondly to assert the right I possess as an +Englishman of claiming the protection of my Government while travelling +abroad. + +Nor do I wish, if it can be arranged that the case I am cited to appear +on can be postponed so long as till December or January, to complicate +Sir Henry Drummond Wolff’s diplomacy by appearing at Cairo during his +special mission. I quite understand that my arriving there with him on +whatever errand might cause embarrassment. But, if I do not now insist +upon my right, I run the risk of being perpetually excluded from a +country where I have property and where I may one day desire to reside. + +I therefore hope that you will insist with the Egyptian Government on +the necessity of permitting my visit unmolested. + + Yours very truly, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY TO MR. BLUNT + + Châlet Cécil, _September 10th_, ’85. + +DEAR MR. BLUNT, + +I am much obliged to you for your letter. We are in communication with +Egypt upon the subject matter of it. I have no wish to cause you any +inconvenience, and I hope it will be possible for us to accede to your +wishes. Supposing, however, that we can do so, it will be necessary to +interpose some delay in the manner you suggest, because I am afraid that +your appearance and that of Sir Drummond Wolff at the same moment in +Egypt might lead to unauthorised and wholly exaggerated rumours upon +questions of future policy. + + Yours very truly, + SALISBURY. + + + THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY TO MR. BLUNT + + Foreign Office, _October_ 10, ’85. + +DEAR MR. BLUNT, + +I did not get your note till my return from Newport. I telegraphed +immediately and have received to-night the answer that the Khedive, as a +matter of deference to H. M. G. is willing to permit you to come to +Egypt, freely for the purpose of looking after your private affairs. The +permission is evidently given with much apprehension. I need only add +that now my honour as well as yours are involved in your abstaining from +any political action—but that I feel assured we may confidently count +upon. + + Believe me, yours very truly, + SALISBURY. + + + + + APPENDIX D + + AUTHOR’S CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL + + + Gastein, _August_ 3, 1883. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +Many thanks for your letter, also for the Cairo papers which amused me. +I am sorry to tell you I have not received your book, “The Future of +Islam.” I hope it will reach me as I have every opportunity of reading +so interesting a work with the care and attention which it deserves. +Have you done anything yet about getting into Parliament. Northcote has +come to awful grief over the Canal which has been much more fatal to him +than to Gladstone. I hope Gorst and Wolff will make long and damaging +speeches against the Khedive on Baring’s vote; Mind you egg them on. +This is a horrid dull place and we are badly lodged. I wish I had done +with it. + + Yrs. most sincerely, + RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL. + + + LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT + + Gastein, _August_ 14, 1883. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +I have to thank you for your two very interesting letters and +enclosures. I cannot see my way to doing anything myself in the matter, +for I am too far off to communicate effectually with you and secondly it +is a sine qua non of these baths that one should do absolutely nothing. +I hope you will write to the Times just to keep the thing alive, and in +the winter by one or two speeches in the country I shall try to rub it +all in. The awkward fact remains that the Government has made no answer +to my indictment and in all probability cannot make one. You appear to +have given up your intention of going to Ceylon to see Arabi which I am +sorry for. This a desperately dull place and time hangs heavily. The +Baths are lowering I think and one feels quite indisposed for any +exertion. I shall hope to be back in London by the 2nd week in September +in case you should still be there. We leave this on the 29th. + + Yrs. most sincerely, + RANDOLPH S. C. + +P.S. I have to thank you for your most interesting book which reached me +safely. When is Ninet’s book coming out? + + + LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT + + Innspruck, (end of) _August_ 1883. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +I arrived here this morning from Ischl and found your letter for which +many thanks. I have read your poem with pleasure and I need not say with +perfect sympathy. Publish it. Poetry often makes converts where prose +fails. I have no doubt that you are a Cassandra and that we shall pay +dearly for our freaks in Egypt. But it is a despairing task to try and +right the wrong. But I mean to do what I can in my little way when the +proper season for extra Parliamentary utterances may arrive. I have a +horrid idea that the advent of the opposition to office might be worse +for Egypt than any conceivable eventuality. I imagine from your last +letter that you are still decided on your journey to India, and I wish +you a safe and speedy return. + +The idea of having Arabi elected to the new Senate is ingenious, but to +be effective he should be elected in many districts. Otherwise it might +turn to ridicule. + + Believe me Yours most faithfully, + RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL. + + + LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT + + Blenheim Palace, _Dec._ 26, 1883. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +I have to thank you for three long and highly interesting letters. I +have not written before because I really did not know whether letters +had much chance of reaching you. However if I do not write you will +think I do not value your letters which would be a great error on your +part. I have not much to tell you. I hope by the time you get this that +you will have seen the speech I made at Edinbro’ on Egypt which is fully +reported in the Times of the 19th. I cannot tell you what effect it +produced as you would think me very conceited. All I can say is that I +am more than satisfied. Tewfik’s position grows more hopeless every day. +There is no Government in Egypt at all. I think we shall be able to make +it very hot for the G. O. M. when Parliament meets. Your poem was very +highly praised in the reviews. Gorst is in India at Hyderabad on legal +business of the Nizam. Please remember me most kindly to Lady Anne and +accept for her and yourself from me the warmest wishes of the season. Do +not delay your return too long. We must have stirring times in the +spring. + + Yours ever, + RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL. + + + WRITTEN BY MR. BLUNT AND APPROVED BY LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL + + + “AM I A TORY DEMOCRAT?” + + + _May_ 1885. + +With regard to English Home Politics I am prepared to support the +Conservative party. That is to say, I desire no change in the existing +Constitution or in the relations between Church and State. I am opposed +to merely secular Education. I am a strong supporter of the House of +Lords. On the land question I should like to see any measure introduced +which should make the acquisition of land easier for the man of the +people, believing this would be a popular, and in the truest sense, a +Conservative measure. I consider, however, that the principles of +liberty and property are closely connected, and I am altogether opposed +to the Radical views of State ownership in land. + +I am inclined to favour the idea of special commercial advantages being +given to the British Colonies and India; and I am anxious to see the +union between the Colonies and the Empire preserved. + +In India I am for large reforms in the direction of self-government, +believing these to be absolutely necessary on financial and political +grounds if India is to remain loyal. + +So, too, in Ireland I am in favour of Home Rule. I consider it urgent to +accept the principle of Nationalism, both for Ireland’s sake and for +England’s. My motto would be “Ireland for the Irish and England for the +English.” The plan has succeeded in Hungary and Galicia in reconciling +the Hungarians and Poles to the Austrian Crown. Why not, therefore, in +Ireland? + +Foreign politics are my strongest ground. With regard to these I am +quite clear in my opinion that what is required for England is a return +to plain dealing and respect for international law. These have been +grossly outraged during the last four years by Mr. Gladstone’s +Government, and it is we with our complicated commercial interests in +every part of the globe that will eventually suffer from the example +given. Our relations with the States of Europe should be based upon a +recognition of the fact that our system of parliamentary and popular +government makes special alliances and secret treaties impossible. Our +old-fashioned diplomacy, with its tortuous dealings, its equivocations +and its concealments, is out of date and needs reform; and I would have +the contrary to all these things introduced as a cardinal point of +policy. As towards Europe we should make the most of our insular +position, increase our navy and protect our shores. But in Asia we +cannot be insular, and we must submit to the conditions of Empire as +long as India remains in our charge. In this view we need the alliance +of the Mohammedan nations against Russia, and I am in favour of England +accepting the full responsibility of her position, as the heir of a +great Mohammedan Empire. My quarrel with Mr. Gladstone’s action in Egypt +was not based on any principle of non-intervention, for I am not a non- +interventionist, but because he intervened unjustly, unwisely and in +such a way as to alienate Mohammedan sympathies. I consider that a duty +of reparation is required of England for the wrong done to the Egyptians +and I advocate a reconciliation with the Sultan and a restoration of the +Egyptian National party. I need hardly say that I am in favour of +immediate peace with the Soudan. + +Lastly, I consider that justice, not mere expediency, should be the +determining law of our conduct towards all nations. I am strongly averse +to the Manchester doctrine which allows injustice to weaker nations in +the interests of finance and trade, though not of military glory. I +believe, on the contrary, that it is England’s duty to protect weaker +nations from injustice where they come in contact with her. Nor can I +convince myself that a high standard of national morality is +incompatible with the extremest Conservative principles. I believe, on +the contrary, that much of what was best in the so-called “Midlothian” +doctrines has more real affinity to Tory than to Whig instincts; and I +should be glad to see these adopted, now they have been discarded by the +Radicals, as part and parcel of Conservative ideas. Truth, justice, +liberty—these are great names, going at this moment in beggars’ weeds +about the world. Can these find an asylum in the new temple of Tory +Democracy? + + + WILFRID BLUNT TO LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL + + _June_ 8, 1885. + +MY DEAR CHURCHILL, + +I am glad you have stated so clearly the Conservative policy, in nearly +all of which I heartily agree, though on some points, such as Ireland, I +have larger views than you are prepared for of Home Rule. The necessity +for an inquiry into the working of the Indian Government is very urgent, +and the fact that you should have included it in your programme, and are +to support Mr. Slagg’s motion, gives me more hope than any thing else +which has happened regarding India during the past year. The truth is +that if India had to trust solely to the Whigs for reform it might wait +till eternity, or rather till that crash came which certainly will come +if the rigidity of the present bureaucratic system is not modified. The +Whigs are bureaucrats born and bred and will not stir a finger to help +us. + +With regard to Egypt too, I think you are right. The day for such a +policy as Mr. Chamberlain’s, which he has just announced, has gone by, +and the only agreement which France is likely to come to with Mr. +Gladstone is one which will put Egypt practically into France’s hands. +Two years ago, or even perhaps a year ago, before the conference and the +Nile campaign, Egypt’s complete independence, under a strong and popular +government might have been secured, but Mr. Gladstone would not hear of +it then, and by persisting in keeping Tewfik as the corner stone of his +policy he has thrown away his chance. Now France will not be content +with anything from him less than her own protectorate, or Europe with +anything less than the letter of her bond. To get back our right to give +Egypt liberty, the first condition will be that we guarantee her debt; +the second that we make peace with the Sultan and act under his +authority. Here, again, therefore, I look rather to you than to the +Whigs for practical help. One knows by experience so exactly what Mr. +Chamberlain’s arrangement would come to—an independent Egypt would be an +Egypt separated from the rest of the Mohammedan world, but governed +really in the sole interests of France and the bondholders. The form of +a “native” government would be preserved, perhaps, but the form only. +Egypt’s “independence by arrangement with Europe” means Egypt for the +bondholders, with France for their protector and Ismail for their king. +If Mr. Chamberlain had said a word about repentance for past errors I +could have better believed him; but we heard all the promises and +declarations he now makes, two years ago, and in far stronger language +from Mr. Gladstone himself, and with what result? No; I prefer your +programme for Egypt, though it seems to promise less. + +I will take this opportunity of giving you my view of what a +Conservative Government might do for Egypt and generally for Western +Asia. The Whigs will never do anything but harm, because they are Whigs +and because they hate the Mohammedans, and the Radicals will never do +anything at all, because they are Radicals and will undertake no +responsibility. You know that the Mohammedan faith is in solution—that +it is seeking to place itself on a new basis—to regenerate its political +and social life. Enormous abuses exist everywhere, enormous injustices. +The poor are ground down by the rich, the weak by the strong. The whole +earth, as Arabi used to say, is famished for justice, and calls out for +a deliverer. The recognition of this was the secret of his own +influence. It is the secret of the Mahdi’s. It may any day be the secret +of England’s. But in Mohammedan lands it is not sufficient to administer +an equal law for it to be accepted by the people even for their own +good. The law must be connected with their religious beliefs and +sanctioned by their religious authority. I am not arguing whether it is +best so—though I believe it is best—but am stating a fact. And it is the +perverse refusal to acknowledge facts which has made of Lord Granville’s +policy in Egypt so piteous a failure. His idea would seem to have been, +and Sir Evelyn Baring’s with him—if idea at all they had—that the +people’s faith and social traditions were a “negligeable quantity,” and +that, no matter what the law and no matter who administered it, it would +be accepted with thanks. For this reason, though Tewfik was notoriously +regarded as a traitor to his faith and nation, they placed him in +authority, and men with him for Ministers whose only merit was that they +had preferred their interests to their beliefs and were without moral +principle or religious prejudice. Even these, however, in later times +have refused to serve them, and they have been forced to take up with +Nubar and his speculating crew of Armenians as the element supple enough +to do their bidding. This has had its effect. The whole of the religious +forces of the country are against them, and the whole of the people. +Their reforms have remained sterile, their attempts to pacify, impotent. +The people have refused their friendship and their justice, and will +have none of their advice. The Liberal party of Mohammedan reform have +been driven out of the country, the honest men have been driven from the +Administration, and the mass of the people into the arms of the Mahdi. + +It is in the power of England, and England alone, to repair the evil +done—and, what is more, it is England’s duty. But it cannot be effected +except at the cost of assuming Egypt’s sole protection, and the +protection also of general Mohammedan interests. The Sultan must be +taken into confidence, peace must be made with the Mahdi, and Arabi must +be recalled. Europe, too, must be bought out by accepting Egypt’s debt. +These conditions observed, all difficulty, it will be found, will +disappear, and the regeneration of Egypt may at last be begun, and with +it gradually of all the Mohammedan East. + +It seems to me, therefore, that the Conservative Party, if it acts on +your idea, has a great and satisfactory work before it, which, if +honestly performed, and avoiding the snare of turning Egypt’s protection +into a means of providing Englishmen with places and pay, may yet redeem +the past and give reality to the dreams of reformers. You especially, +with your sympathy for popular causes, will know that the only +foundation of success in the East, as in the West, is the consent of the +people. Get the Egyptian people on your side, and all Mohammedans will +follow you, and with hardly an effort you will transform the world. + +I wish you, therefore, all success in your electoral campaign. You have +given too many proofs of your sincerity and steadfastness in this matter +of Egypt for me to doubt you, and I know that you will do your best for +her. Of the present Government I have long ceased to have any hope. + +[N.B.—This letter was read to and approved by Lord Randolph Churchill +for publication in the “Times,” with the alteration of a single phrase +concerning Ireland, the words “than you are prepared for of Home Rule” +being changed into “than you are apparently yet prepared for.”] + + + LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL TO MR. BLUNT + +_Most Private._ + + India Office, _Aug._ 13, 1885. + +DEAR BLUNT, + +The enclosed explains itself. Will you see to it? + + Yours ever, + RANDOLPH S. C. + + + COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF + +(_Enclosure._) + + Dated Vienna, 12 _August_, 1885. + + Received at London Office, 5.10 p.m. + +“I think it would be well for Jemal-ed-din Afghani to come. Have you +(any objection?),[135] if involving no responsibility or complicity on +my part, and if it can be done without his coming into collision with +Turkish authorities. I leave this probably to-morrow evening or Friday +morning.” + + + MR. A. W. MOORE TO MR. BLUNT + +_Private._ + + India Office, 15 _August_ /85. + +DEAR MR. BLUNT, + +I have just deciphered the enclosed from Sir H. Wolff. Lord Randolph is +unwell and in bed, but I shall see him during the afternoon. I think it +is best however to send you the telegram at once, as I understand the +present arrangement is that Jemal-ed-deen leaves to-morrow. + +Please let me hear from you what I am to reply to Sir H. Wolff. + + Yours very truly, + A. W. MOORE. + + + COPY OF A TELEGRAM FROM SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF + +(_Enclosure._) + + “Buda Pest, 15 _August_. + +“From something I have heard it would be well for Jemal-ed-deen not to +leave England till I can telegraph to you from Constantinople.” + + + LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT + + India Office, _November_ 1, 1885. + +DEAR BLUNT, + +Many thanks for your letter and enclosures which I return. I feel sure +that your lecture on Egypt at Newcastle must have been profoundly +interesting and instructive to the audience and a little more +circulation of such facts would do much good. You will certainly not +receive an encouraging reply from Lord Salisbury about Arabi. Even if he +was disposed (as I should be) to favour your views he would not dare +take such a step on the eve of the Elections. + + Yours ever, + RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL. + + + MR. BLUNT TO LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL + + Crabbet Park, _Dec._ 24, 1885. + +MY DEAR CHURCHILL, + +I am obliged to come to an immediate decision about continuing my +connection with Camberwell or indeed in any active form with party +politics, my pressing difficulty being Ireland. About this, now that Mr. +Gladstone has taken up Home Rule, it is necessary for me to speak and at +once to my Electors; and, unless I hear from you that there is still +hope of an agreement between Lord Salisbury and Mr. Parnell on a really +solid basis, I shall conclude, as everybody tells me it is, that +Conservatism and Home Rule are for the present incompatible terms and +give up trying to make them agree. I fear I have not in me the spirit of +a good party man, but I thought at one time I could help you +individually in the pursuit of better things. Egyptian affairs seem in +the same deadlock they were a year ago, and altogether I am far from +hopeful or disposed for further combat. + + Yours very truly, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + + LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL TO MR. BLUNT + +_Private._ + + India Office, _Dec._ 26, 1885. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +There is no question or doubt about the matter. If you want Home Rule +you must go to Gladstone for it. We cannot touch it. + + Yours ever, + RANDOLPH S. C. + + + + + APPENDIX E + + ARABI’S PROGRAMME OF 1883 AND MOHAMMED ABDU’S VIEWS + + + I. MR. BLUNT’S LETTER REPRINTED FROM THE “TIMES” OF 13TH DECEMBER 1883 + + + Colombo, _5th Nov._, 1883. + +SIR, + +I am sure the “Times” has many readers who will be interested to receive +an account from an authentic source of the manner of life and present +views of Arabi Pasha and his fellow exiles in the place of residence +which nearly a year ago was assigned to them by the British Government. + +I have been staying with them now for over three weeks, as their guest, +and am therefore able to speak with some authority as to their ideas; +and I think the time has come when these may be of service to the +public, and, if I may be allowed to suggest it, perhaps even to those +all-wise authorities who are still seeking to regenerate Egypt by +putting round men into square holes, and square into round from their +official chairs in Downing Street. + +With regard to the material welfare of the exiles, I am glad to have an +excellent account to give. Although some of them suffered at first from +the extreme dampness of the climate, all are now acclimatized; and even +Toulba Pasha, who six months ago was pronounced by the doctors to be +incurable with asthma, is enjoying perfect health. + +They are all, too, I think, contented in mind and grateful for the +treatment they receive from the Colonial authorities, which has been +throughout most courteous to them; and except for certain inequalities +in the amount of their allowances, with which I will not here trouble +you, they would have nothing to complain of beyond the unavoidable +bitterness which mingles with the bread of all exiles. + +The way of life of the exiles is simple. Each family occupies a separate +dwelling, and most of them have chosen to reside in a rather remote +suburb of Colombo, which has ceased to be fashionable, and where house +rent is proportionately low. They send their children to school, attend +the local mosques, pay visits to each other or to their neighbours, and +attempt, with more or less success, themselves to learn a little +English. Their society they find in the numerous Mohammedan community at +Colombo, which, unlike such communities in many parts of India, is +entirely mercantile, and possesses not a few men of substance, whose +commercial establishments the more practical of the exiles hope that +some day their sons will enter, and thus be enabled to earn an +independent livelihood. + +The Mohammedan community regard their Egyptian guests with feelings of +the highest respect, as martyrs to their religion, and especially Arabi, +as its late most famous champion; and so strong is this feeling +regarding him among the lower class in Colombo that on Fridays, whatever +mosque Arabi may choose to attend is sure to be thronged with a special +crowd of worshippers. Besides this, however, there are certain English +houses where the exiles are well received; and, on the whole, I think I +may say that they are as popular as their ignorance of English will +allow with the official community and the official residents. + +I have naturally had constant conversations with the exiles on political +matters, and more especially with Arabi, and have learned from him and +unlearned much as to the events of last year. We have spoken, too, not a +little of the future, and of the hopes which the national leader still +cherishes of being one day recalled to Egypt, there to work out to its +accomplishment the plan of reform he had conceived, and which I firmly +believe that he alone possesses the genius to realize. For, whatever may +have been his faults and failings (and they were doubtless great and +many in his conduct both of the political and of the military campaigns +of last year), I have been more than ever impressed during my present +visit with the reality of Arabi’s claim to be considered a patriot and a +man of genius. By a man of genius I understand one who is capable of +large and new ideas, who has the passion to impress these strongly upon +others, and who above all possesses the courage and persistence required +to work them to their end. These qualities Arabi certainly has, and I +know of no other Egyptian of whom anything corresponding can be said. + +His view of the present situation in Egypt is worth quoting: + +“The English Government is attempting,” he says, “an impossible task. +They wish to make Tewfik popular and they wish to introduce reforms. But +Tewfik will only remain popular as long as he is supported by the +English troops; and when these are withdrawn he will fall. Personally, +Tewfik is without a friend in Egypt. The Egyptians hate him for having +betrayed his country, and the Circassians despise him for having +betrayed his religion. The better friend he is to the English the less +chance he has of conciliating his countrymen. In one way or other he +will disappear. Then it will be for the Powers finally to decide what it +is they really intend for Egypt. If they mean to annex it, one or other +of them will do so at the cost of a new revolt. If not, they must allow +the Egyptians to choose their ruler and to work out their freedom for +themselves.” + +The choice of a ruler should be made, Arabi thinks, by the Notables. The +fellahin are not sufficiently instructed yet for a plebiscite. But the +Sheikhs of the villages with the Notables of the towns would form a +reasonable elective body. They would choose whom they would, a +Mohammedan, a man of mark, Arabi hopes an Egyptian. But before investing +him with power they would bind him by some Constitutional form which +should prevent the recurrence of mere arbitrary rule, the rule which has +ruined Egypt. Lord Dufferin’s charter, Arabi considers, is insufficient +for that purpose. It is a make believe, too weak to restrain the abuse +of power, and liable through its weakness to become itself an instrument +in the hands of despotism. Egypt, however, under a leader elected by the +Notables, would find Notables capable of asserting and maintaining their +rights; and a Constitutional Chamber would form itself without the need +of any more foreign assistance. The Liberal Party, it is true, is now +crushed and in hiding; but it would start from the ground with the least +encouragement and find life again. Arabi does not at all despair of his +countrymen, could the present unnatural regime be replaced by one +sanctioned by public approval. The approval of the people is the basis +of all stable government; and, whoever the new ruler of Egypt is, he +must be made to understand that Egypt is not given him as a property but +as a trust. Ismaïl Pasha thought all Egypt was his private garden. +Tewfik Pasha is being taught to think that there is no law but what +rests on his decree. This must not be in the future; the Prince must +obey the law, not make it. + +Again, the English Government is trying to introduce reforms, but +through what instruments? It has driven away all the real reformers. +They are in exile or in prison, or have been fined and otherwise +frightened by police persecution to live “underground.” The men who are +left are either those who are too timid or too indifferent to join the +party of liberty, or else the very men against whom the reformers rose. +“How,” asks Arabi, “can the English Government expect to establish +justice through the Pashas who served Ismaïl, or liberty for the +Egyptians through those very Turks and Circassians who have always hated +liberty, and who look upon the Egyptians as their natural servants?” + +With regard to finance, Arabi is of opinion that the best chance of +permanently saving the solvency of the country lies in a new arrangement +with the creditors. He says that the calculations of the Budget in +recent years have been made without reference to the periodical +recurrence of seasons of scarcity. There have been now five good Niles +in succession, and there must come soon a bad one, which will upset the +estimates. Also no allowance has been made for the recent great loss of +capital by the fellahin, the murrains which have destroyed their oxen, +the debts they have incurred, their now universal poverty. Unless the +burdens of the fellahin are made very light for them for several years +to come, they will never recover their prosperity and the land will +become deteriorated and impoverished. Arabi is of opinion that in the +interest of the creditors themselves it would therefore be prudent to +lower the rate of interest for a fixed number of years, full payment to +be resumed only at the end of the term when the country would be able to +afford it. He thinks this, with great economy everywhere, is the best +means of averting bankruptcy. The private debts of the fellahin should +be settled also without delay by an arrangement to be made with the +creditors by the Government; and I may say here that while I was +recently in Egypt I ascertained from some of the leading money lenders +that a composition would probably be accepted by them at from eight to +ten millions, the total debts being valued by the same persons at about +fifteen millions. + +The future of the Suez Canal we have thoroughly discussed together, and +it is Arabi’s opinion, as it has long been mine, that the Canal is +certain, sooner or later, to be internationalized. Arabi considers that +it would be far better for Egypt that she should abandon as soon as +possible all sovereign rights over it. The Isthmus of Suez, he says, is +not necessary to Egypt, and the connection as long as it exists will +form a pretext with Europe for intervention. If ceded to Europe this +danger would cease, and Egypt might even claim a money indemnity for the +rights yielded and so relieve herself of part of her financial +difficulties. + +Another important point on which the late national leader has distinct +views is the Soudan question. Although he is of opinion that a certain +connection will always be necessary between the lower and the upper +waters of the Nile, he holds that in the present military and financial +position of Egypt it is unwise to attempt the reconquest of all, or +perhaps any of the lost provinces. He believes that the movement of the +so-called Mahdi is not one merely of fanaticism, or that it is only a +revolt of the slave dealers. He thinks that Mohamed Ahmed commands the +goodwill of the inhabitants, and that it would be far wiser for the +Egyptian Government to come to terms with him than to continue their +military operations against him. The Soudan brings nothing into the +Cairo treasury, and if Egypt is to enjoy liberty at home she should +avoid ideas of conquest abroad. What terms could be made with the Mahdi +Arabi has been too long out of Egypt to judge; but from the +communications which reached him while in power, he does not believe a +friendly arrangement acknowledging Egypt’s suzerainty to be impossible. +The suzerainty of the ruler of Egypt the Soudanese would probably be +glad to acknowledge, for it would protect them against European +aggression. + +Lastly, Arabi suggests the following as the most urgent matters +requiring reform in his country: + +“1. That a settlement should be made by the Government of the existing +debts of the peasantry, accompanied with a return to the old laws +affecting the mortgaging of land and the recovery of debt so that the +peasantry shall be thenceforth protected against usury. + +“2. That the mixed tribunals should be abolished. + +“3. That there should be a reformed common law in Egypt for all who +reside there, placing Europeans and Egyptians on an equal footing in +civil and in criminal matters. + +“4. That there should be security against arbitrary arrest and +imprisonment (habeas corpus). + +“5. That the village Sheykhs should be chosen by the villages, not +appointed as now by the Mudirs. + +“6. That the abuses connected with forced labour should be reformed. + +“7. That education should be extended to girls as well as boys in Egypt. + +“8. That domestic slavery should be completely abolished. + +“9. That the position of officials in public offices should be made +independent of ministerial caprice. + +“10. That taxes should be made equal to all, foreigners alike with +Egyptians. + +“11. That a settlement should be made as soon as possible of the +Moukabala claims.” + + +Such are Arabi’s ideas. I believe many of his reforms will be found +identical with those contemplated by Sir Evelyn Baring, but I fear their +realization will have to wait the advent of a more enlightened policy +than any which now prevails at Cairo. As Arabi says, schemes of reform +are of value only when in the hands of reformers, and there is no sign +as yet in Egypt of any such being employed. Still, common sense will in +the long run assert itself over political experiment, and there is an +old proverb about the stone which the builders rejected, which may well +in the present instance prove itself a true one; and I cannot help +thinking that the day will come when the man who first proclaimed +Egyptian wrongs will be called upon to right them, and when Arabi, the +first fellah who ever gloried in the name “Egyptian,” will be brought +back with something more than his old prestige to Egypt. + +A rather severe attack of fever, from which I am hardly yet recovered, +prevents me from continuing this train of thought. But I hope on a +future occasion to renew it, and in the meanwhile I am sure that Arabi’s +friends may make themselves happy as to his present lot. He is not yet +forty-five years of age, and can well afford to wait a while for the +hour of his restoration, and till it comes he could hardly have a +pleasanter home or a more secure abode than that which Providence and +the humanity of the British public have chosen for him. + + I am your obedient servant, + WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT. + + +II. INTERVIEW WITH SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU, AS PUBLISHED IN THE “PALL MALL + GAZETTE,” AUGUST 17TH, 1884 + + +Sheykh Mohammed Abdu is, we are inclined to believe, the first real +Egyptian who has visited this country. We have had among us false +Egyptians in plenty—Turks, Circassians, Syrians, Armenians, Jews—all +claiming the nationality of the Nile; but a true son of the Ahl el Ful, +“the Race of Beans,” never. Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, however, is an +undoubted fellah. He wears a blue gown and a white turban, talks neither +French nor English nor even Turkish, but only his mother tongue, Arabic, +and is without the least varnish of western manners. He is a man of +middle height, dark-skinned, black-bearded, and keen-eyed, grave in his +general demeanour, but possessed of a pleasant smile, and, when excited, +speaking with much modest eloquence and cheerful vigour. His countenance +is decidedly an agreeable one, and brimful of intelligence. His father +was and is still a peasant of the Delta, cultivating forty acres of land +at Mehallet Nasr, and laying no claim to nobility of birth other than +that given by countless generations of peasant ownership on the same +plot of ground. But the son is far more now than a peasant. Sent twenty +years ago as a promising boy to Cairo, he received his education in the +ancient religious seminary of El Azhar, and is now one of the most +distinguished of its Ulema, or rather was, for, in common with the rest +of the Liberal religious party in the university, he is in disgrace with +the powers that be, and is now an exile both from it and from Egypt. +Although by temperament a moderate man, he joined Arabi and the popular +movement before the war, became one of its chief leaders, and was +involved in its ruin; and after Tel-el-Kebir he was singled out by his +eloquence no less than by his liberalism as a dangerous man, and having +narrowly escaped hanging was glad to reach Syria with his head safe upon +his shoulders, but condemned to three years’ exile and its attendant +penury. Now he is on his first visit to Europe, to see with his own eyes +the country which has been the ruin of his own. These particulars our +representative, who called two days since on the Sheykh at Mr. Wilfrid +Blunt’s house in James Street, learned from his lips, and being +acquainted with Arabic he was able to hold with him the following +conversation: + +_Our Representative_: Without discussing past history, which we all +admit to have contained fearful mistakes, what is your opinion of the +present state of Egypt and of the policy now to be pursued? + +_Sheykh Mohammed Abdu_: Since I have been in England all have asked me +the same question. Every Englishman says he wishes Egypt well; but which +of your statesmen has tried to prove his declarations? We Egyptians of +the Liberal party believed once in English Liberalism and English +sympathy; but we believe no longer, for facts are stronger than words. +Your liberality we see plainly is only for yourselves, and your sympathy +with us is that of the wolf for the lamb which he designs to eat. You +have ruined everything that was good in us so that you may have an +excuse for keeping possession of our country. + +_O. R._: Believe me, this is not true. It may appear to you so; but it +is not so. Neither Mr. Gladstone, nor any of the Ministers, wish +otherwise than to leave Egypt as soon and as absolutely as possible. No +one wishes to annex your country. + +_Sheykh_: If so, why not leave it at once? The only thing that the +English Government has taught us is to be united in the wish to see you +gone. Before the war and during the war we quarrelled with each other. +We wished to break down the tyranny of our rulers; we complained of the +Turks as foreigners; we wished to improve ourselves politically, and to +advance as the nations of Europe have advanced in the path of liberty. +Now we know that there are worse evils than despotism, and worse enemies +than the Turks. We see in them our brothers in religion, if not in race; +and if you would only leave us alone with them we should know how to get +on in peace. There is no Mohammedan in Egypt so oppressed as to wish for +any more of your help. We ask only one thing of you, and that is that +you will leave us at once and for ever. + +And Tewfik, do you include him in your forgiveness of the Turks? + +_Sheykh_: Tewfik Pasha did us a great wrong in bringing you into our +country. He joined the enemies of his religion at the time of the war, +and it is impossible he can command our respect. But if he should +repent, and especially if he should get rid of you, we might yet forgive +him. Only we desire no traitors with Egyptian faces and English hearts. + +And the French? Our leaving Egypt now would surely mean that they would +occupy your country in our place. + +_Sheykh_: We do not think so. The French know that they could not gain +our consent to their rule any more than you have gained it for your own. +We should resist them, as we have resisted you. We want no foreign +rulers from any country, and we know how to make all such rule +impossible. The French could not in any case do us more harm than you +have done. + +And the Mahdi? + +_Sheykh_: Mohammed Ahmed is only dangerous to Egypt through your +presence there. Were you to leave Egypt he would neither wish to attack +us nor would his doing so be any danger. At present he has the sympathy +of the masses, because they see in him a deliverer from Christian +aggression, and they will join him when he comes to them. + +And when will this be? + +_Sheykh_: The partisans of Mohammed Ahmed are already in the Saïd (Upper +Egypt), but he will only himself advance when Khartoum is taken. Your +Government are doing all they can to strengthen him. + +How so? + +_Sheykh_: By the treaty they have made with the King of Abyssinia. This +has made every man a fanatic, for it is written in our traditions, and +is known to all, that through the Abyssinians our Holy City, Mecca, will +be one day attacked and destroyed. The people everywhere see in this a +new danger to their religion. How can your statesmen have made an +alliance with this barbarous people? How can they have added this new +trouble to the rest? + +But were not all the Soudan people fanatics already? + +_Sheykh (laughing)_: The Soudani are no more fanatics than I am. When I +taught philosophy at Cairo many of the Egyptian students were afraid to +come to my lectures; but there were eighty-four students from the +Soudan, and every one of them came. When, however, they are threatened +with a foreign invasion they become fanatical, just as you would be if a +Mohammedan army were in the streets of London. + +And has this anything to do with the news of a rising in Arabia? + +_Sheykh_: The news is true. We had been expecting it for a long while; +and I do not doubt that your treaty with the Abyssinians has hastened +it. When they are threatened, the Moslems take up arms. The people of +Yemen are not fanatics more than the Soudani; but they love their +liberty, as all the Arabs do. + +And what ought we to do to allay the storm? + +_Sheykh_: Cease to threaten us, and leave our country. + +But what would become of the Christians in Egypt were our troops to +leave? Would there not be new massacres? + +_Sheykh_: There have been no massacres in Egypt except those caused by +yourselves. The arrival of your fleet at Alexandria made the riots there +begin. The landing of your troops brought on the riots at Tantah. There +was no loss of Christian life until you came; nor will there be any when +you go away. We have no quarrel with Christians as long as they abide by +our laws and do not attempt to interfere with our Government. + +There is then, you think, no obstacle to peace and prosperity in Egypt +except our presence there? Would you not wish to see the National party +restored before we go? Would you not like yourself to return to Egypt? + +_Sheykh_: If I believed that your Government had any serious wish for +our good I would propose a policy. But what is the use of my wasting +words? + +Speak, nevertheless. Whatever the Government may mean or wish, there are +many in England who would see justice done to Egypt at any cost. + +_Sheykh_: If England wanted to repair the wrong she has done us she +would, as I have said, give us a first proof of her sincerity by +ordering back her troops from Egypt. Next she would agree with the +Powers of Europe and his Majesty the Sultan, with regard to a new ruler +for us. It is not for me to say who this ruler should be. But whoever +may be chosen, he should be some one not distasteful to the people and +approved by the Sultan, and he should be named for a term of years, say +seven or ten, at the end of which term the people should be allowed to +elect their rulers finally for themselves. If he proved an honest man he +might then retain office. But if dishonest, the people would have the +comfort of thinking that he would not be there for ever, and so would +take patience. + +But how could we ascertain the wishes of the people? By what form of +election? + +_Sheykh_: Any new ruler now who should be a Moslem, and should come into +office as the deliverer of Egypt from the English troops, would be loved +by the Egyptians. Only he must be a Mohammedan, and, if possible, an +Egyptian by birth. It is essential, however, that he should be content +with limited power. What we want is not a new king, but a chief of our +Egyptian nation, acting under the religious sovereignty of the +caliphate. This kind of ruler the Egyptians understand, and they do not +want a king. + +And under such a ruler you and your fellow exiles could return to Egypt? +What do you say about Arabi? + +_Sheykh_: I should like to see his return. If he holds office Arabi’s +place is in the Council, which must always supplement and control the +ruler of Egypt. He speaks well. His ideas are noble. He is an honest +man. His influence would all be on the side of good. But he is too +careless of details to be a good administrator or a good general. Let +him return as President, if they choose him, of the Mejliss—that is his +place. + +And the Ministry? What our Government complains of is that they cannot +get a working set of men to rule the country. + +_Sheykh_: It is their fault if they have failed. Egypt is not wanting in +honourable men, or men of capacity. But you insist on having those who +will do your work; and no honest man in Egypt will work for the English +Government. Again, you insist that they must rule your way and speak +your language. The honest men generally do not speak English. They do +not love English ways. Let us have a ruler we like, and we will all join +to help him. We all want reform. We all want justice. We all want +instruction. But there is an old proverb which says that “if the fish +stinks at the head there is no freshness in the tail,” and we want a +ruler we can respect. Give us an honest chief for our nation, get him +the sanction of our Sovereign the Sultan, and leave us to ourselves. +With God’s blessing we will have peace. We will even try to pay our +debt. + +But do all the Egyptians think as you do? I am inclined to believe that +nine out of ten of the fellaheen would sooner have their taxes lessened +by a Christian Government than raised by a Mohammedan. + +_Sheykh_: Do not delude yourself. The fellaheen are overtaxed, but at +the present moment they do not complain of their taxes. They think first +of how to deliver their country from the stranger; and, if it were +possible, they would willingly pay more to see this end accomplished. I +know it, as I have correspondents everywhere in Egypt. You might abolish +all taxation, and they would not bless you if at the same time you took +it as an excuse to stay. No, no. Leave us now, and we will call on God +to reward you as our benefactors. But do not attempt to do us any more +good. Your good has done us too much harm already. + + + + + APPENDIX F + + EXTRACTS FROM LADY ANNE BLUNT’S DIARY + + +_Dec._ 8, 1882, _Friday_ [10, James Street].—General C. G. Gordon came +to breakfast at 9. I am only sorry, now I have made his acquaintance, +not to have known him sooner. He does not appear to be otherwise than in +perfect possession of perfect common sense. So much has been said to +imply his being “touched” in the head that I put this down as a very +distinct impression. But he is a man of ideas and in a prominent +position, and as such it is convenient to find his ideas utopian or +“mad.” He staid about two hours talking to Wilfrid—told us he believed +the Government now “sincerely” (because it suits them) intend to carry +out liberal policy—Chamber of Notables, etc.—in Egypt. Wilfrid replied +that he would believe it when he saw that on the Budget question they +act in such a manner, and he will judge them by what they settle about +taxation. If they lighten the taxes of the fellahin it will be a proof +of their sincerity. Nothing short of that will do, as the condition of +the poor people is too desperate to be otherwise mended. General Gordon +would not allow that any _party_ in Egypt could really abolish slavery. +It was in their nature to keep slaves—they could not change their +nature. He does not, I think, quite know the state of feeling in the +Mohammedan world or make allowance for the growth of a determination to +reform on the part of those who, not having great possessions of slaves +or anything else, will not be making great sacrifices in joining to +suppress it. + +He is going out to “Palestine,” he says, next week. He must be being +sent, though he did not say it, to inquire into the state of the +Mussulman world there. Wilfrid promised to send the papers about the +Sheykhs in Jerusalem to him (copies) and asked him to occupy himself +with their case, which he said he would inquire into. + +And so we parted. I hope we shall see him again. + +_August_ 18, 1883 [London].—At 1 o’clock Colonel [D.H.] Stewart came to +luncheon. He has become very official in his views, though not in his +manners. He spoke of the hanging of the Bedouins at Tantah, and said +that a friend of his who saw it remarked how easily they died; they had +hardly to be touched by the rope before they were dead. There would be +no fear of any Englishman being attacked in the desert, he thought, for +a long time owing to the terror spread by these executions. He seemed +surprised when I said on the contrary that anywhere in the Arabian +desert it would be very unsafe in consequence. Wilfrid added, of course +in the Sinai peninsula it would be safe—there it always was safe (the +danger had been from the war). In the end Colonel Stewart exclaimed, +“Ah, well, I see we shall never agree, I wish England to be successful, +justly if possible, and unjustly if it cannot be justly.” He went away +at 3. + +_Sept._ 30 [Cairo].—List of persons arrested in connection with the +pretended “Société des Vengeurs”: + + Huseyn Bey Fehmy + + Mustafa Bey Sidky + + Abd el Razak Bey + + Abd el Rahman Bey Hoja + + Mohammed Bey Fenni + + Ali Bey Fauzi + + Sheykh Ahmed Nur + + Mohammed Bey Shami + + Huseyn Eff. Sagr + + Saad Eff. Zaghloul + + Mustafa Eff. Nashaat + + Mahmud Eff. Soudani + + Mohammed Bey Tahir + + Osman Bey (his son) + + Ahmed Eff. Rashaat + + Mohammed Said (the French doctor) + + also one Iskander and five servants. + +_Sept._ 30.—Suleyman’s account of Yusuf Abu Diab’s death: Yusuf was a +great friend of his (Suleyman’s), and of Abd el Aal whose A.D.C. he was, +a very good fellow, and all that had been said against him was false. On +the day of the Tantah massacre Yusuf abu Diab arrived from Damietta at 4 +of the day. The massacre had begun at 1 of the day and was still going +on, for it lasted twelve hours or more. At the station on getting out of +the train Yusuf saw a poor Christian woman from Alexandria whom the +people were about to kill. Yusuf saved her and taking her by the hand +conducted her to the Governorat, to the Mudir Ibrahim Adhem, who was +sitting in his room. Yusuf placed her in the Mudir’s charge, and +afterwards reproached the Mudir for sitting still there while the +massacre was going on. He said, “You are Mudir and all the troops and +police are under your orders. You must take soldiers and go out and stop +this. I shall inform Arabi Pasha of what you have allowed to happen.” He +took the next train and went to inform Arabi. A few days after, Ali +Pasha Fehmi was sent to Tantah to arrest the Mudir and bring him to +Cairo where he was imprisoned in the Kasr en Nil for a few days and then +sent to his house and ordered to remain there. + +After the war Suleyman (the narrator) was for a month in prison with +Yusuf. He had been arrested with Abd el Aal saying, “If you are to die I +will die with you,” and he was with Abd el Aal in prison at Cairo. In +the meantime Ibrahim Adhem was reinstated by Tewfik at Tantah, and +hearing Yusuf was in prison at Cairo he had him sent for to be tried +before the Commission of Inquiry at Tantah. On his arrival Ibrahim came +to visit Yusuf. Suliman was present in the courtyard of the prison. +Ibrahim Adhem took Abu Diab by the moustache and said, “The day of the +massacre here you came and brought a _Nasranieh_ to me; you abused me +and you said you would inform Arabi Pasha. Was it you who did this?” “It +was I.” “_Inshallah_, you shall not come out of this but to be hanged.” +This was just outside the room in the courtyard. Ibrahim Adhem then +brought half-a-dozen men, Copts and Muslims, from the station and Abd er +Rahman the zabit of Tantah, and said to them, “You will go before the +_Mejliss Tahkik_, and say that on the day of the massacre I saw Yusuf +abu Diab saying to the people, “Kill the Christians,” and also that he +often told Arabi Pasha that he ought to “kill Tewfik or let me do so,” +but he was not willing. A certain Mahriz Bey of Alexandria also bore +witness against him falsely; these men swore through fear. The +Commission sent Yusuf back to the Court Martial at Cairo with the +_procès-verbal_, and the Court-Martial sentenced him to be hanged. Three +days later he was sent to Tantah and executed. He was brave. Suleyman +remained with him to the end. His last words to the people standing +round him were “O my brothers, I suffer injustice. But God grant you may +not see a day the like of this again and that I may be the last of those +unjustly condemned.” Then Ibrahim Adhem came up and said, “O Yusuf +Effendi, forgive me.” And Yusuf answered, “I do not forgive with my +tongue, for if I should forgive with my tongue my heart would not +forgive, and if my heart should forgive my children here would not +forgive, and if my children should forgive, our Lord (God) would not +forgive, for you are the cause of my being unjustly destroyed.” Then he +said, “Give me some water.” And they give it him and he drank a few +mouthfuls and said, “Put the rope on me.” + + + + + APPENDIX G + + LETTERS TO MR. BLUNT ALLUDED TO IN, AND EXEMPLIFYING, THE TEXT + + + I. FROM SIR WILLIAM AND LADY GREGORY (EXTRACTS) + + + (_From Lady Gregory._) + +Coole, _Sep._ 20, 1883 (received in Egypt). I am very glad you will stay +in Egypt, even long enough to let in a little ray of light on what is +going on. Moberly Bell is really excelling himself just now. I don’t +know if you have missed his accounts of the triumphal progress of the +“amiable and virtuous” (Tewfik). I am delighted at it, because, as I +wrote to Chenery, no one can say it is necessary to keep troops in the +country to keep up so popular a ruler! The account of the prisons also +would have been entertaining if they were not revolting—so many poor +wretches kept there for months and years, and then the door is opened +and they are shut up again, after having been allowed to kiss Moberly’s +boots! I am afraid Clifford Lloyd, the new “Adviser,” won’t be an +acquisition. I don’t know him, but by all accounts he is ambitious, +pretentious, and autocratic. He kept the country quiet here by driving +the whole population of a town into prison, on suspicion, and his +photograph reminds me of Colvin. There is not much to say of Ireland, +for there is a strange lull in the agitation of the last few years. The +people for the moment are busy with the harvest, and I fancy Parnell is +trying to keep things as quiet as possible until the next session, when +Gladstone has, I believe, promised him a very large measure of Home +Rule, much more than his colleagues approve of . . . I hope Arabi’s +election will take place, so that we may put M.P. after his name in +future. I hope they will think also of electing you, and that you will +become the Randolph of debate in the Cairo House of Commons. What a +farce the whole thing is! It will be as before. The wretched Notables +will be left alone until they speak of the Budget, and then will be +gagged. + +_Oct._ 4. Sir William writes to me from London that you are credited +with having gone to India with the intention of overturning English +supremacy and establishing Mohammedan rule and rapine throughout the +Peninsula. So I think you have still a chance of Tower Hill! Kinglake +especially has been lamenting over you. + +_Oct._ 17. Thank you for your letter from Suez. It gave me great +pleasure to hear of the success of your visit (to Cairo), for I call it +a success having seen so many of your friends, and learned that the +Khedive’s state is so hopeless. I was pretty sure Baring would not do +much for you; he has only just begun, and has not yet realized the +difficulty of his position, and I am sure the Government here are +trusting to him now as their last hope of helping them out of their +mess, and won’t take any new line till he fails. I am glad the poem +(“The Wind and the Whirlwind”) is to be published. It will make a more +lasting impression than any prose could do, and ever since it was +written I have felt it was pure waste of steam power keeping it shut up. +Sir William is very much struck with it, and I feel it must convert the +world. If this should reach you in Ceylon do homage to Arabi for me. + +_Nov._ 13. I see Moberly Bell takes Gladstone’s announcement of the +withdrawal of the troops calmly, as they will be quite as effective at +Alexandria, and easy to bring back at a moment’s notice. None the less, +I shall be glad when they are out of Cairo. I hate the idea of ever +seeing them there, and perhaps the Khedive may think they are really +going to let him be his own master, and commit some atrocity which +Gladstone will have to notice, and which will give England an excuse to +let him topple over. + +_December_ 18. Your letter in the “Times” (from Colombo) appeared the +same day I heard from you. Sir William tells me to say how extremely +good he thinks it. The time has nearly come when you will be appealed +to, the mess is so great, and the bankruptcy of the country seems within +measurable distance, and, indeed, is the first thing to hope for, and +every one is so much at sea about the Soudan, and all the +philanthrophists will be down on the Government for allowing Zebehr, the +king of the slave-dealers banished by Gordon, to be sent back at the +head of an army. It will be just the thing for those benevolent +beings—Randolph and Labouchere—to take up. + +_Jan._ 10, 1884. I saw in the “Times” that you had arrived and been +warmly received at Calcutta. I wonder how Colvin received you. I think +the time has come when you are wanted in Egypt. Dicey goes there to-day, +a fellow passenger of Sir William’s (on his way to Ceylon), evidently to +help to form the Nubar-Dicey Ministry, which I have always looked +forward to as the last possible combination before Arabi’s return. I am +glad old Sherif has gone. We shan’t hear much more of his enlightened +policy! If you could find any Nationalists in Egypt who would dare to +lift up their voice and call for Arabi’s return, I believe the English +Radicals would take up the cry. Both Labouchere and Randolph are +speaking out like men, but they must have some support from Egypt. Sir +William sails to-day for Colombo. He writes from London that Hayward is +very ill, shut up in his room and hardly expected to recover. Kinglake +says of him: “He is too weak to hold his cards at whist, but not too +weak to d—— his partner.” I am sorry Chinese Gordon goes to the Congo +instead of the Nile. + +_August_ 1. Many thanks for the printed correspondence, which is full of +interest. I have been looking over your letters to me of last year, and +have copied the only passage relating to Mr. Hamilton or Knowles, which +I enclose. I would lay as little stress as possible on the encouragement +you had from Downing Street, as the G.O.M. is capable of denying +everything, and as much as possible on the incontrovertible fact of your +threatened arrest. I hope the debate will come on soon. I was sure +Mohammed Abdu would create a good impression, between his graceful dress +and his graceful manner, which recalled Arabi’s. Mind you cultivate +Parnell, now you have broken the ice. He will be a great power in the +next Parliament, and his support will be worth a good deal. + +(Extract enclosed.) “_Sep._ 3, 1883. Both Knowles and Button encourage +me to try the elections, and say that Baring is sure to be delighted to +see me, and will perhaps help. It appears he has _carte blanche_ to make +another new policy for the Government, and as he is one of Lord Ripon’s +strongest supporters in India, it is supposed that he will favour +Arabi’s return, or, at any rate, the restoration of a National Party in +some form or other.” + +(Second extract enclosed) _Sep._ 21. “Everything up to the moment has +gone most prosperously. The morning we left I got a note from Mr. +Hamilton asking to see me before I went, and I accordingly went, after +nearly a year’s absence to Downing Street, and found him very amiable. I +told him exactly what I was going to do, and he approved and said he was +sure Baring would be very pleased to see me, and that he would write to +Lord Ripon’s private secretary to do all he could for me in India. About +Egypt I told him I should try and get Baring to restore the National +Party, but unless he would help me it was quite useless my trying, and I +should not stay in Egypt. So I shall know as soon as I get to Cairo +whether it is possible or not. I am certain Gladstone wants to restore, +but wants to have his hand forced by a manifestation of popular desire +in Egypt.” + + + (_From Sir William Gregory._) + + +Coole, _Aug._ 24, 1884. I have read with great interest Mohammed Abdu’s +replies to his interviewer. They are very valuable, and would be ten +times more so if anything could pierce the crust of our English +stupidity and self-complacency. But we have made up our minds that the +Egyptians whom we have been bombarding and slaughtering ought to love +us, and that if they don’t it is their perversity, which only time and +subjection can remove. I shall be at Dalmeny on the 27th, and I daresay +Gladstone will speak to me about Egypt, but he has made up his mind +about it, that all the troubles of Egypt are due to military mutineers +of whom Arabi was the instigator; that Tewfik is a virtuous and +enlightened young prince to whom the honour of England is pledged, and +that to secure him as Khedive the exile of Arabi and his friends must be +maintained. You know how intolerant he is of a difference of opinion. So +I daresay he will not allow me even to make an observation from a +different point of view. I do not see how Arabi is to return, but I am +of opinion, were he permitted to do so, it would be possible to +establish a fairly decent Government in Egypt, a far better one than +ours has been, and which would, at all events, suit the governed. + + + (_From Sir William Gregory._) + + +Coole, _Oct._ 5. Your second Indian article (on Race Hatred) is +admirable, and I fear too true. I had no idea things were as bad as you +describe, and I much fear there is little hope of improvement. The only +chance is the personal character of the Viceroy and publicity. I wish +our newspapers would take up the subject. The English second and third- +class women are, as you say, the worst offenders. They are generally +below their husbands, who are elevated by education and responsibility, +and make themselves odious by their vulgarities and pretentions. The +treatment of natives in Ceylon is very different. There the civil +servants are generally very courteous and friendly with them, and there +is no doubt that a most kindly feeling subsists between the races. It is +not so, however, universally; in Colombo and Kandy the planters and +merchants’ clerks give themselves most offensive airs to natives, but in +the purely native districts the relations are excellent. I hear from +Indians that the contrast is remarkable, like going into another +hemisphere. Still things are not as they ought to be. A young man of +high native family constantly goes to Oxford and Cambridge, and is there +received as a friend and an equal, is asked to all parties, and shares +in all amusements. When he returns to Ceylon he is not tabooed, it is +true, but he knows he is looked down upon as an inferior by merchants’ +clerks and planters, probably sons of pastrycooks and ladies’ maids. +This I always endeavoured to combat, and Sir Arthur Gordon is doing the +same. Mere civility and want of rudeness is not enough. A native +gentleman should be made to feel that you regard him as your equal, in +short, as an Englishman. He thoroughly understands and resents +condescending civility. I am going to write to Dufferin, and to +recommend your article to him. + +The chances for Arabi and his friends are not encouraging. I should like +to see National bankruptcy proclaimed as an answer to French threats. + + + (_From Lady Gregory._) + + +Coole, _March_ 29, 1885.—I wish a better fight could have been made on +the Egyptian Convention. My only hope for Egypt now is in the Mahdi. +Osman Digna seems to be profiting by all the good advice the “Times” has +been giving him as to the best mode of fighting. + +_April_ 14. We came here a little too soon and the landscape looked as +hard and dry as a Hobbema, but it is now as soft and mysterious as a +Corot. We spent last week in Dublin to manifest our loyalty. The Royal +visit has been so far a “great success”—that is to say, the “foreign +invaders” and also Lord Spencer were cheered through the streets all +through Dublin. Whether that means much I can’t say; it is an excitable +population and I saw a man who walked through the cleared space carrying +two large band boxes cheered as much as anyone. “St. Patrick’s Day,” +when played at the laying of a foundation stone, was cheered more than +all; but the Prince was equal to the occasion and waved his hat as if it +was meant for him. The Princess looked very pretty and not more than +five-and-twenty at the ball in her white dress and diamonds. The ball +the prettiest sight I ever saw. . . . I feel as if I had seen a +crystallization of the pomps and vanities of the wicked world. Enough of +that for a long time. + +As an antidote I spent to-day in visiting some of our own poor people. +It is the best part of living in Ireland that they are always bright and +amusing and intelligent and witty. One old woman asked me to come and +see an old man. “He was a real gentleman,” she said, “if I asked him for +five or seven shillings he never said, ‘I haven’t it,’ and if he went +out to cut his corn he never raised his back till the sun went down.” +She also told me, “If I had a little pig, I’d be in Heaven.” Another, I +hope meaning a compliment, said she had at first sight taken me for the +priest’s sister and was going to say, “How’s Father Considine?” Then, +when she recognized me, “Aren’t we happy to have such a plain lady?” You +will be tired of Ireland if I write any more. + +_May_ 5.—What a terrible indictment your letter is against the +Government, and how well deserved! Sir William desires me to say he goes +with you in every word of it, which he does not always do. How +ignominiously the whole affair is ending! It’s a comfort to think +Wolseley won’t have a triumphal procession down Piccadilly this time. I +am very anxious to know what Randolph advises you and what you make up +your mind to about Parliament. I believe you would get in as a Tory +Democrat easily enough. You could hit hard enough at the Government to +please an English mob which enjoys hard-hitting as a substitute for +prize fights. The only good thing that has reached me about the Prince’s +visit is that one spectator at his entry was heard to say to his +neighbours, “I see a good many Radical hats in the crowd.” “I suppose,” +said the other, “a Radical hat is a hat without a crown.” + +_May_ 15. Very many thanks for the sonnets and your long letter. I knew +you would be jubilant at the retreat and guessed you had been working +for it. What pleases me most is thinking of Lord Wolseley having to eat +his speech about the “hundred years,” and also to think what a “cheer- +up” this ignominious campaign must be to Arabi in Ceylon. It was +delightful your sending the sonnets to Gladstone. + +_June_ (?). I suppose any change must be good (alluding to the change of +Government), and yet I don’t think the G. O. M. has been sufficiently +punished for his evil deeds. I hope Randolph will hold to his present +principles, as far as the East is concerned, but the politician in and +out of power is generally as different as the patient Turkish peasant +and the tyrannical Turkish Pasha. As for you, you will never be able to +support any Government, but will always be in opposition. + +_June_ 19. Randolph for India! I can think of nothing else; it amuses me +so much the idea of Colvin’s face when he hears it, and Lord Dufferin +taking his orders from him, and Lord Reay, who went out in the strength +of Gladstone’s name. Will he be able to do any good, I wonder? One must +never expect too much of people in office. Was it not delightful Arabi +being cheered at St. James’s Hall? It is rather hard being so far away +from all the excitement. + +_July_ 21. I thought I recognized B.’s hand in the account of Wolseley’s +reception. What a parade would have been made if he had brought Gordon +back! Lord Wolseley and Baring have told a friend of mine that they look +on Drummond-Wolff’s appointment as disastrous for Egypt, which makes me +hopeful, as do the letters (in the “Times”) of the “Twenty years +Resident in Egypt,” in which one finds the flavour of Moberly Bell—“only +the old sea-serpent done up again.” + +_August_ 14. I think you ought to write a sonnet on the Mahdi’s death. +The central idea about him to me is that he is the only man of the +nineteenth century who is known by his deeds and not at all by his +words. I wrote some lines myself, with which I herewith present you, but +not expecting compliments: + + + SONNET ON THE MAHDI’S DEATH + + The Guide of Islam, silent, strong, world-known, + + Looked for peace won through battle’s bloody fame, + + His brave, rash adversary now o’erthrown + + Who blindly in the tyrant’s livery came. + + His ally, his foe’s enemy, the Sun + + Had struck as if in scorn the parting host, + + The task that made a nation almost done, + + A people freed but at most cruel cost. + + But hardly had he viewed the promised land + + When blasting sickness came and struck him low, + + And a scarred face was his and failing hand + + Who was so mighty but an hour ago, + + And a hushed army round the dim tent stood + + Wherein their Chief gave up his sword to God. + + +Write the sonnet yourself and use my last two lines, which I confess to +thinking good, and publish it in your name. I have a feeling that +something ought to be done to dignify the Mahdi’s memory, such efforts +have been made to vulgarize it. + + + II. FROM SIR ALFRED LYALL + + + Nainee Tal, _May 21st_, 1883. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +I must send a reply to your letter from Knebworth, though people in +England do not usually set much store by letters from India, which is +beyond the civilized world. What I want to say is that I am very glad +you are coming out to India to study the country—this time; and that I +much hope you will pay me a visit. I have some rather extensive +knowledge of Upper India, and of the leading natives, so that I may be +able to put you in the way of seeing things as they are. In regard to +the very curious point mentioned in your letter, why Rajputs are (to use +the technical words) exogamous and Arabs endogamous, I can’t offer an +explanation; save only by saying that Islam overrides and sweeps away +all the obsolete prejudices of blood or caste that are at the bottom of +exogamy. Read McLennan, Morgan, and Maine—but none of them will tell you +exactly whence comes the idea lying at the root of the term “incest,” +_i.e._, the offence of marrying within certain prohibited degrees. + +When you come out we will talk of Local Self-Government and the native +magistrates’ jurisdiction over Europeans. I am myself a consistent +liberal in these matters: I think, with you, that our best chance of +consolidating an Anglo-Indian empire out here lies in abolishing +privileges and bringing forward the leading natives to political +equality with ourselves. But we have been going so long on the other +tack that the operation of changing our course has to be managed with a +steady hand, and not too suddenly. Now there has been a lack of +political seamanship in high quarters; and the vessel has got broadside +to the wind, and has shipped a sea or two; I think we shall get right +soon, and I hope we shall not alter our policy. But it must be always +remembered that the whole business of governing India is an experiment +on a very large scale. I always maintain that it has not been attempted, +on this scale, since the days of the Romans; and no one can yet decide +whether the policy of taking the natives into our confidence, or of +keeping them out of all real power, is the better for the _English_. For +myself, having to choose between two risks, I would select the risk of +letting in the native; though if we do this in a hurry we may spoil +everything, and provoke confusion, with a sanguinary reaction—just as +things went too fast and led to a premature crisis in Egypt. + + Sincerely yours, + A. C. LYALL, + + + Camp, _January 16th_, 1884. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +The foolish and violent article about you in the “Pioneer” of this +morning moves one’s indignation for more reasons than one. These attacks +all emanate, to my knowledge, from Calcutta. + +I have hitherto written nothing whatever to officials in these provinces +regarding your movements, as I believed you would prefer this. But I +shall now send word to Allygarh, and to the Commissioner of Rohilcund, +who is in political charge of Ranpore, that it would be a total mistake +to suppose that in these provinces the Government takes any sinister +view of your proceedings. I am taking every opportunity of declaring +that I know you to have no intention whatever of propagating or +encouraging disloyalty. + +I hope you will keep me informed of your fortunes. + + Very sincerely yours, + A. C. LYALL. + + + Lieut.-Governor’s Camp, N.W. Provinces, + + _November 8th_, 1884. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +I am certainly doing what is possible on my part, to aid Amir Hassan’s +University project; but I fear he is beginning to discover sundry +difficulties, especially in the way of lukewarmness and jealousies among +his co-religionists. For myself, I am glad to assist any measure that +may tend to uplift the heads of the Mohammedans of these parts. I am not +at all afraid politically of Islam in India; if they were at any time +disposed to make themselves troublesome, they would have to take the +Hindus into very serious account. I mention this because people are +inclined to have fits of vague panic about the Mussulmans. If the +Russians ever find it worth while to make a strong demonstration against +India, they would make a mistake in letting loose the Affghans upon us, +for that would throw into our hands all the fighting power and +enthusiasm of the Hindus. But I doubt the Affghans being so shortsighted +as to help the Russians across the Indus, as the subjugation of +Affghanistan would be the inevitable result of Russian success. The “St. +James’s Gazette” makes a great cry over Macgregor’s “confidential” +memorandum, which seems to have been very freely circulated. I totally +dissent from the notion that we are on the brink of some great +catastrophe; though it is certain that our army is far too weak, and +that we could not enter upon a campaign against a European invader. +These military chiefs know little or nothing of the real state and +temper of the Indian people, or of the elements of internal trouble with +which we have to deal. And the articles in the “Times” upon the armies +of Native States are written upon second-rate information, and are +likely to be very mischievous if they have influence in high quarters. + +So much of Indian politics. I took no personal offence whatever at your +articles in the “Fortnightly.” They are not intended to be pleasant to +the Anglo-Indian official; and I may perhaps venture to say that here +and there they are unnecessarily unpleasant. But I do not conceal my +opinion, in discussing them out here, that there is truth in much of +what you say, though to my mind the paper on race hatred is rather +overstrained, and wants the strength of moderation. I wish you had given +your readers some momentary glimpse of the other side of the shield. +Nevertheless you have, as I tell the folk here, given us much that is +salutary criticism, and there is no doubt that we Anglo-Indians are +often a rough unpicturesque development of the contact between East and +West; some of us finding ourselves rather too suddenly placed in +unfamiliar situations, and having emerged unexpectedly into the fierce +light that beats upon office. On the other side, the Indians themselves +do see both sides of the shield, and do not object to abate much in the +matter of high politefulness, in consideration of a strong and +intelligent sort of administration, impartial among jarring races and +creeds. They are themselves not yet ready to supply this kind of +government, and they know its value. Also they know, much better than +most English, what a bad government, by exceedingly courteous Asiatics, +means. Moulvi Sami-ullah is just back from Egypt. I can see that he is +considerably impressed by the badness of administrative institutions in +Egypt; is rather inclined to ridicule them. As for such very +discreditable incidents as that of Patna, they _must_ occur now and then +until the natives themselves pluck up courage to hit back or otherwise +violently resent any personal insult. Laws and magistrates can do much, +but can never protect a whole people that does not stand up for itself. +Our magistrates are very fairly impartial between the two races in +Court; and the people are rather too fond of airing their grievances in +a helpless manner. + +However, Lord Ripon has done a good deal towards stirring up the natives +to a sense of independence and a desire to look after themselves—they +now begin to see that if they will only come forward the English nation +will meet them half way. Lord Dufferin has but to let the leaven work, +and not to give countenance to a reaction. + +In Egypt I can anticipate nothing but complications. I cannot see how we +can possibly stand balancing as we do at present, keeping everything in +suspense, without some final stumble; and yet it is becoming too late to +withdraw. Probably our abandonment of the Soudan (which I think is +necessary) will heighten the comparison and accelerate some crisis—the +Soudan is just the country that entangles the forces of a civilized +State, and where expeditions are as water poured into the sand. + + Yours sincerely, + A. C. LYALL. + + + Lieut.-Governor’s Camp, North-West Provinces, India. + + _February 23rd_, 1885. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +I am very sorry that my prediction as to the Soudan, quoted in your +letter to me of Jan. 23rd, seems likely to be verified, as well as many +predictions made by you. Never was such a demented policy followed so +blindly to inevitable failure and disrepute, in open disregard of all +the warnings of our Oriental experience, as that we see still being +pursued in Egypt. However, I find, to my great relief, that the _contre +coup_ of our Egyptian blunders is not much felt in India, where they are +mostly indifferent to the Mahdi and to our proceedings generally, though +of course there is much talk of our unlucky adventures in that country. +The Mahomedan generally is mainly interested in the Sultan; and Upper +India keeps its eyes fixed on Affghanistan and on Russia’s doings in +Central Asia. + +I have just read your “Fortnightly” article on Hyderabad affairs, which +article will, you fear, entirely finish Lord Lytton’s regard for you. I +think, on the contrary, that he ought to be very much obliged to you; +for instead of laying upon the Viceroy the whole burden of your +displeasure at Salar Jung’s treatment in 1876-77-78, you have discharged +all your wrath upon that anonymous bureau that you call the Calcutta +Foreign Office. Not Lord Lytton, it appears, but poor little Tommy +Thornton, who acted as Foreign Secretary at that time, and whom Lord +Lytton treated with scant ceremony, was the author of the policy of +curbing Salar Jung. I observe that throughout your paper you denounce +and convict of the highest crimes the Calcutta Foreign Office, and that +the Viceroys and Governor-Generals are represented as sinning mainly by +inadvertence. This peculiar tactic was introduced by the “Statesman” +newspaper, and is intelligible in a journal that selects an antagonist +who cannot hit back when attacked; for of course the Foreign Office, +being impersonal and bound to secrecy, is dumb. I tried to induce Lord +Ripon to let me roll over the “Statesman” when it once libelled me +directly, but he wouldn’t let me use confidential papers. I should +hardly have expected, however, that so fearless and honourable an +adversary as yourself would have adopted the same method. + +I suppose I ought not to see anything comic in being accused of being +“even more absolutely without moral scruple than” an English Foreign +Secretary, or in reading that the history of the doings of the Calcutta +Foreign Office, with which I was long connected about the time of which +you are treating, is one of the most scandalous in diplomatic annals; +that the Calcutta Foreign Office deliberately encouraged the Nizam in +vice and dissipation in order to retain power in his state; and, +finally, that it is indirectly responsible for Salar Jung being +poisoned; but the situation is so novel that its ridiculous side most +moves me. It seems clear to me that you are _not_ behind the scenes, or +you would see the thing in the same comic light; for it is quite in my +power to prove that all these wild accusations against gentlemen who are +just like yourself in honour and integrity, are unfounded and erroneous. +You must not reply that you are attacking a system, or a department, not +individuals; the policy of the Indian Foreign Office is distinctly +directed by the individuals, the Viceroy and his Foreign Secretary, from +time to time in office. And when you write that the policy of the +Calcutta Foreign Office is one of organized aggression with a view to +annexation—a policy carried on, you imply, in despite of well-meaning +Governors-General—you are not only wrong, but the reverse is far nearer +the truth. Take the instance of Berar, it is demonstrable by published +papers that the attempt to annex and the whole policy of seizure was +entirely Lord Dalhousie’s own. With Lord Dalhousie’s departure the whole +process of annexation (except for rebellion) ceased some thirty years +ago; his annexations were rather opposed than supported by the local +officials: and I challenge you to bring an instance in which the +Calcutta Foreign Office has since advocated Indian annexations. In +regard to the assertion for which, to my amazement, you vouch on your +personal testimony, that the Calcutta Foreign Office is responsible for +attempts made to corrupt the Nizam’s youth, I am quite sure you could +not prove it, for I know I could prove the contrary. + +I hope you will ponder these words, and consider whether such very +serious charges ought to be made, except when you are face to face with +men who can answer, or except when you actually produce, as you do +nowhere in your article, the evidence on which you rely. + +Lord R. Churchill stayed with me two days. I liked him much: he seemed +reasonable and moderate, and open-minded upon all Indian questions. +India is moving forward very fast—whither, the gods alone know; or +perhaps the gods are moving forward themselves too fast to have much +time for speculation on anything but their own future. The Russian scare +acts as a drag upon Indian radicalism; the advanced party does not want +to let in Russia, and is beginning to perceive that only the English can +keep her out long. + + I am yours sincerely, + A. C. LYALL. + + + Lieut.-Governor’s Camp, N.W. Provinces, India. + + _May 4th_, 1885. + +MY DEAR BLUNT, + +I was very glad to see from your letter of March 25th, that you are +quite ready to exchange explanations upon the disputable points in your +article to which our correspondence refers. I will not go farther into +the entangled questions of Hyderabad politics, except to say that I am +prepared, if necessary, absolutely to prove all that I have averred. For +example, I will prove that I, as Foreign Secretary, wrote letters +insisting that greater care should be taken of the young Nizam’s +training and education, and that I pressed the point orally and by +writing much more closely than Sir Salar Jung quite liked. Also I can +prove, undeniably, that at my instance the Government of India proposed +to bring to an issue the “Statesman” attacks upon Sir R. Meade by +authorizing, indeed ordering, Sir R. Meade to prosecute the “Statesman” +in London. It was the _India Office_ which refused to allow the +prosecution; the Calcutta Foreign Office and Meade were quite ready and +resolute. But I cannot quote documents, much less publish them, without +the consent of the Foreign Office and the India Office, so I cannot +answer public attacks. + +As you write in such friendly strain you will perhaps excuse me for +expressing regret that the force and benefit of your articles on Indian +affairs should be so much diminished (as they really are) by incautious +use of unverified information. I have nothing whatever to say against +the position you take up as an advanced Liberal and a Reformer in Indian +politics, though I may not agree with all your views, or as to ways, +means, and opportunities of reform: but it seems to me that your ends +would be more likely to be met if you assumed a more impartial attitude. +You will never persuade the English nation that Anglo-Indian officials +are all fools or knaves. You were quite right to quote my letter in +writing to the India Office. I intended it as a manifesto on your side, +but I should guess you could afford to pass by Lepel Griffin. He is down +on his luck just now, having lost the Foreign Secretaryship, and having +been excluded from Raoulpindi Durbar, and he is consequently very sore +indeed after such a tumble. I am inclined to be sorry for him as he is +an able fellow in his way; but never did man more completely write +himself down. He has a vaunting and exaggerated style that irritates +people generally, and alarms the cautious officials in high places. His +letter in the “Times” (early in April) for instance, about his having +been intimately acquainted with one hundred ruling princes of India, is +absurd grandiloquence; he only knows half a dozen worth mention +politically. + +It is hardly worth while that I should write to you about the present +state of Indian feeling; for I fear you agree with Lord R. Churchill’s +dictum that the English official knows less than nothing about what the +natives think. Nevertheless, I may say that to me the Indian people at +large appears to have come out wonderfully well during the critical +suspense we have been going through as to war or peace with Russia. If +war came, I believe we should have the country well behind us, and +supporting us against the Russians, and I have little fear of internal +tumults or disorders so long as we hold our own beyond or on the North- +West frontier. The Russians are, I think, entirely mistaken in their +notion that they could stir up any trouble against us in India, where, +on the contrary, they have a very bad reputation; and I fancy the +natives do not worry themselves so much as you imagine about our +bureaucratic manners and blunders, so long as they feel they have a +strong and honest government to keep the peace and keep out invaders. +This is not, of course, the view of the advanced Liberal native, who +naturally wants to rise, but the great Conservative propertied classes +have this feeling just now. + +I thought war was coming. Russia gave us a fair challenge by seizing +Panjdeh; but now I suspect that Gladstone is only easing us down, and +had never any intention of incurring more bloodguiltiness. His foreign +policy has been most unlucky. He evidently has no head for this part of +government, and his dealings with the Soudan have been lamentable. +Apparently he will fulfil your prediction that “it will end by their +absconding without making any arrangements at all.” + +I wish you would stand for a good Radical constituency and join John +Morley. I believe you are at heart much nearer the extreme left than the +extreme right; and you could arrange to say nothing about the game laws +until you had saved your common country, abolished the Foreign Office +and the Indian Council, and given India a dozen provincial parliaments. +Sincerely yours, + + A. C. LYALL. + + + III. LIEUT.-GENERAL GLOAG TO MR. BLUNT + + + 2, Tanfield Court, Inner Temple, E.C. + _August 19th_, 1886. + +DEAR SIR, + +I read your letter in the “Times” of yesterday with great satisfaction, +on the subject of Burmah. As I have been all over that country, I know a +great deal about it, and will not fail from time to time, as heretofore, +to do my best to expose those who have befooled Lord Dufferin. + +1. Inquiry must be held into the real causes of the Annexation. + +2. I long ago pointed out that Young Thibô, reputed son of the late King +Mengdom Meng, was neither a drunkard nor a debauchee, nor yet cruel. Sir +Grant Duff can tell now what he is, as he has had him in charge. + +3. An inquiry must be held into the method of making the Contracts +entered into by Mengdom Meng with the Bombay Burmah Trading Company _in +re_ the Teak Forests; and maps and plans of the forests furnished, as +also the number of trees cut down, and the number of young trees +planted. + +4. A general inquiry into the conditions of trade in force between us +and the late Mengdom Meng, for the present King Thibô is a mere youth, +crassly ignorant of most things. + +I fully anticipate that independent members will take the question up in +the House, and you should do your utmost to help them as I also will do. +I wrote long ago (1878) that annexation was wrong commercially and +morally, as well as quite unnecessary. A strong Resident, well +supported, with a well-appointed establishment should have been located +at Mandalay in 1879 when Mengdom Meng died, the slave question for ever +settled, and order made to prevail, and the laws remodelled and +respected—quietly; if not, under gentle but strong means. I shall be +glad to see you continuing along the paths of reason, truth, honesty and +justice in this matter. + + Yours sincerely, + A. K. GLOAG, Lieut.-General, late Comr. R.A. in British Burmah. + + + National Liberal Club, _August 25th_, 1886. + + * * * * * * + +The whole affair has been a monstrous wicked thing _ab initio_. I did +write to the “Times,” but probably my letters were more truthful than +they would have been agreeable to the mercantile bodies at Calcutta and +Rangoon who I believe have been in the main the sole cause of our policy +in Burmah. Yours truly, + + A. K. GLOAG. + + + + + INDEX + +_For the convenience of readers the public position of each principal +person here named is given with a biography in brief._ + + + AARIF, MOHAMMED BEY, 326, 330, 332, 333, 334, 339. + + Abbas, Khedive, the present, proposal of appointing him still a minor + with a Regency, 6, 8, 15, Appendix B. + + Abbasi, Sheykh Mohammed el, Sheykh-el-Islam at Cairo, 70. + + Abd-el-Aal Pasha, fellah Colonel, exiled with Arabi, 21, 68, 69, 276, + 323, Appendix F. + + Abd-el-Kader Pasha, Governor of the Soudan in 1882, reason of his + refusing to return there in 1884, Appendix A. _Also_ 15, 16, 77, 81, + 170, 171, 189, 208. + + Abd-el-Mutalleb, Sherif of Mecca, 333. + + Abd-el-Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, 264, 396, 397, 409, 444, 466. + + Abd-el-Rasul, of Cashmere, 494, 500. + + Abd-el-Razak Bey, F.R.G.S., ex-director of Naval College, imprisoned + at Cairo in 1883, 70, 71, Appendix F. + + Abdallah-el-Taishi, the Khalifa, successor to the Mahdi, 505. + + Abdallah Ibn Saoud, Nejdi, living at Constantinople, 327. + + Abdu, Sheykh Mohammed, religious reformer, afterwards Egyptian Grand + Mufti, living in exile at Paris in 1884, 208, 284, 286; in England in + 1884, 270; interviewed for “Pall Mall Gazette,” 277, Appendix E; + author’s correspondence with, 219, 277, 279, 284, 286, Appendix B; at + the House of Commons, 272; his talk with Labouchere and Lawson, 273; + with Churchill, 274. _Also_ 66, 71, 98, 207, 208, 215, 219, 224, 270, + 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278. + + Abdul Aziz, Ottoman Sultan, 329, 339. + + Abdul Hamid, Ottoman Sultan, his character, 238, 302, 308, 309, 317, + 318, 326, 327, 328, 337, 338; he favours Halim, 302, 321; his spies, + 309; “un misérable et un fou,” 309; his horses, 303, 305, 341, 389; + his Selamlik, 318; his attitude towards the Grand Duke Nicholas, 308; + he only trusts the Germans, 322, 333; his relations with Dufferin, + 302, 303, 305, 322, 348; with other ambassadors, 305, 316, 317, 322; + his manœuvres, 327; his women, 329, 337; his dislike of the ex-Khedive + Ismaïl, 378, 447; author’s letter to, 360, 389, Appendix B; proposed + revolt against in 1885, 490, 491, 493. _Also_ 15, 44, 50, 53, 80, 155, + 177, 208, 238, 242, 248, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, + 310, 311, 312, 314, 321, 322, 329, 332, 333, 338, 339, 340, 341, 358, + 361, 363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 375, 378, 387, 398, 399, 403, 405, 417, + 418, 434, 436, 441, 449, 451, 454, 455, 474, 475, 476, 477, 480, 485, + 486, 487, 488, 492, 501. + + Abu Diab, Yusuf Bey, aide-de-camp to Abd-el-Aal, unjustly hanged at + Tantah, 21, 24, 69, 325, 335, Appendices B and F. + + “Abu Naddara,” an Arabic journal published at Paris. _See_ Sanua. + + Adhem, Ibrahim Bey, adherent of Tewfik and Mudir of Tantah, his + responsibility for the massacres at Tantah, 21, 324, 325, 335. _Also_ + Appendices B and F. + + Ahmed Assad, Sheykh, secret agent of the Sultan sent to Egypt in 1882, + 327. + + Ahmed, Mohammed. _See_ the Mahdi. + + Ala-ed-Din Pasha, adherent of Tewfik, appointed Governor-General of + Soudan in 1883, 81. + + Aleysh, Sheykh Mohammed el, Sheykh of the Malekite rite at Cairo, + imprisoned by Tewfik in 1882, and died in prison, 81. + + Alexandria, bombardment of, 2, 24, 63; riots at, 19, 20, 21, 52, 73, + 83. _Also_ Appendix B. + + Amir Ali, Mr. Justice, now member of Privy Council, 242, 348. + + Ali Fehmi Pasha, fellah Colonel of the Guards, A.D.C. to Khedive, + exiled with Arabi, 65, 276, 324. + + Ali Yusuf Bey, traitor at Tel-el-Kebir, 275, 323. + + Allnatt, Mrs., 387; correspondence with, Appendix A. + + Amir Hassan, Rajah of Mahmudabad, 297, 413. + + Amnesty promised by Dufferin in 1882, but broken in 1883, 19, Appendix + C. + + Anderson, Mary, Miss, 419, 420. + + Appleton, Mr., 353. + + Arab race at Newmarket, 262, 263, 264, 265, 272; at Cairo, 315. + + Arab studs in Poland, 221, 295, 296. + + Arabi, Ahmed Pasha, leader of the Egyptian revolution of 1882, his + recall to Egypt contemplated, 7, 8, 11, 12, 41, 42; Gordon’s opinion + of, 9; his memorandum sent to Dufferin, 13, 33, 76, 77, Appendix B; + his views on the Soudan, 16, 35, 77, 78, Appendix E; author’s + correspondence with, Appendix B; account of his behaviour at Tel-el- + Kebir, 69, 323. _Also_ 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 21, 29, + 31, 40, 41, 42, 49, 51, 52, 53, 61, 68, 69, 72, 76, 77, 78, 79, 83, + 98, 140, 170, 211, 212, 213, 224, 228, 230, 234, 235, 237, 238, 242, + 245, 246, 249, 251, 253, 254, 257, 260, 268, 270, 276, 281, 305, 310, + 313, 323, 325, 379, 381, 387, 440, 454, 461, 477, 503. + + Argyll, Duke of, 437, 450, 456. + + Armenia, 337, 338, 342. + + Atlee, Mr. Falconer, Consul at Paris, 284, 289. + + Austin, Alfred, Poet Laureate, friend of the author, 392. + + Awwam, Effendi, Arabi’s secretary, said to have betrayed Gordon, 421, + Appendix C. + + Azarian, Monseigneur, Patriarch of the Catholic Armenians at + Constantinople, 337; his opinion of Sultan Abdul Hamid, 338. + + Baker, Sir Samuel, well-known traveller, preceded Gordon as Governor + of Equatorial Province of the Nile, 95, 97; his high salary, 100; his + letter to the “Times” of 1st January, 1884, 161; Gordon’s visit to, in + 1884, 172. _Also_ 100, 102, 104, 153, 161, 171, 172, 176. + + Baker, Valentine Pasha, brother of Sir Samuel, head of Egyptian + gendarmerie, formerly Colonel of the 10th Hussars, 201; his defeat at + Teb, 5th February, 203. _Also_ 54, 161, 177, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, + 386; author’s personal recollection of, 201. + + Bakir, Mirza, exiled Persian Sufi living in London, 273, 274; engaged + as Oriental secretary to author, 276, 499. + + Balfour, Arthur, Rt. Hon., M.P., afterwards Prime Minister, 410, 424, + 435, 450. + + Bannerman, Henry Campbell-, Rt. Hon. Sir, M.P., Undersecretary at the + Admiralty, afterwards Prime Minister, his strange denial in the Palmer + case, 23. + + Barnes, Rev. Dr., vicar of Heavitree, Gordon’s religious adviser, 138, + 139, 171, 172. + + Baring, Sir Evelyn. _See_ Cromer. + + Barttelot, Sir Walter, M.P., 489. + + Belkis, Queen, 314. + + Bell, Moberly, Mr., “Times” correspondent at Alexandria, 348; same as + “Twenty Years’ Resident,” 456. _Also_ Appendix G. + + Beresford, Charles, Admiral Lord, M.P., 63, 365. + + Berzati, Gordon’s secretary in the Soudan, afterwards killed with + Hicks, 191. + + Bible, Gordon’s, correspondence about the recovery of, 387, 389, + Appendix A. + + Bilgrami, Seyd Huseyn, afterwards member of the Indian Council, 371. + + “Bitters,” Francis Gore Currie, author’s cousin living in Paris, 284, + 287, 410. + + Bismarck, Prince, author’s recollection of, 286; his connection with + the Rothschilds, 260, 350, 395. _Also_ 1, 220, 222, 255, 260, 262, + 345, 350, 357, 371, 391, 394, 395, 400. + + Bismarck, Count Herbert, 395. + + Black Art, the, 259. + + Blignières, M. de, French Financial Controller in Egypt, 51. + + Blind, Karl, German revolutionist living in exile in London, 354, 356. + + Blount, Sir Edward, formerly British Consul at Paris, 389. + + Bourke, Rt. Hon. Robert, M.P., Under-Secretary of State for Foreign + Affairs, afterwards Lord Connemara, Governor of Madras, 28, 220, 226, + 278, 349, 388, 450. + + Bowen, Lord Justice, 451. + + Bowles, Thomas Gibson, M.P., editor of “Vanity Fair,” 343, 361, 369. + + Brand, Hon. Henry, M.P., Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, 1883-1885, + afterwards 2nd Viscount Hampden and Governor of New South Wales, + friend of the author, 228, 239, 241, 247, 248, 249, 255, 259, 374, + 443, 446, 452. + + Brett, Hon. Reginald, M.P., private secretary to Lord Hartington, + afterwards Lord Esher, his friendship with Gordon, 8, 12, 150; his + connection with the press, 162, 164. _Also_ 173, 174, 227, 351, 369, + 375. + + Broadley, Mr. A. M., Arabi’s Counsel in 1882, 67, 257, 270; his + connection with the ex-Khedive Ismaïl, 353. + + Brocklehurst, General, intimate friend of Gordon, 173, 174; author’s + talk with, 225. + + Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John, M.P., afterwards Lord Midleton and Chief + Secretary for India, 494. + + Buckle, Mr. G. E., editor of the “Times” in succession to Mr. Chenery, + 210, 219, 220, 250, 271, 348, 367. + + Buller, General Sir Redvers, 379, 384. + + “Bungo,” the Hon. Sir Michael Herbert, of the Paris Embassy, + afterwards Ambassador at Washington, friend of the author, 387. + + Burmese War, 497, 498, 499, 501, 502, 503. _Also_ Appendix G; author + protests against, 502. + + Burnaby, Colonel Fred, author of “The Ride to Khiva,” 213, 232; killed + at Abu Klea, 362, 406. + + Burne, Sir Owen, head of the Secret Department at India Office, 250. + + Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas, M.P., working man member, 248, 428. + + Burton, Sir Richard, the well-known explorer, 101; Gordon’s letter to, + 137. + + Burton, Lady, Gordon’s letter to, 130. + + Butler, General Sir William, in command of the garrison at Alexandria, + his testimony about the bombardment of Alexandria, 475; as to Gordon’s + being refused permission to land in Egypt, 146. + + Butros Pasha Ghali, Coptic Notable, afterwards Prime Minister in + Egypt, assassinated in 1910, 69. + + “Button,” Hon. Algernon Bourke, on the staff of the “Times,” cousin + and friend of the author, 25, 209, 210, 212, 214, 216, 219, 220, 222, + 223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 235, 236, 238, 241, 242, 243, 245, + 248, 249, 250, 254, 255, 257, 259, 260, 261, 262, 264, 269, 283, 352, + 359, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376, + 384, 385, 389, 391, 393, 394, 395, 397, 402, 406, 409, 412, 418, 425, + 445, 450, 452, 478. + + Buxton, Mr. Francis, M.P., 405, 438. + + Buxton, Rt. Hon. Sydney, M.P., 405. + + Camberwell Election, Chapter XII, 471, 472; author is defeated at, + 504, Appendix D. + + Cambridge, H.R.H. George, Duke of, 180, 205, 206, 239. + + Campbell, Sir George, M.P., Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, 235. + + Campbell, Lady Archibald, 446. + + Campbell, Lady Colin, 478. + + Carmichael, Sir James, M.P., private secretary to Gladstone, 268. + + Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, M.P., President of the Board of Trade in + Gladstone’s Cabinet, 2, 251, 254, 274, 369, 370, 384, 440, 441, 489. + + Chandler, Rev. Dr. Arthur, Bishop of Blomfontein, cousin of the + author, 479. + + Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry, M.P., 386. + + Chapman, Rev. Hugh, Vicar of St. Luke’s, Camberwell, afterwards + Chaplain of the Savoy, 504. + + Charmes, Gabriel, French journalist, his legends about the author, 67; + reason of his quarrel with Nationalist Government in 1882, 67. _Also_ + 243. + + Charter, Lord Dufferin’s, 29, 32, 33, 62, 76; letter to author, + Appendix C. + + Chenery, Mr., editor of the “Times,” 30, 31, 32, 210, 349; account of + his death, 210. + + Cherif Pacha. _See_ Sherif. + + Churchill, Rt. Hon. Lord Randolph, M.P., Chief Secretary for India + under Salisbury, afterwards Chancellor of the Exchequer, personally + described, 26, 213; his indictment of Tewfik, 28, 29, 211, Appendix B; + Morley’s opinion of, 252; his popularity with Orientals, 274, 276, + 465, 468, 496; his ideas about India, 211, 350, 370, 412, 413, 439, + 444; would recall Arabi, 238, 260, 414, 454; his ideas about Egypt, + 414, 444, 454, 455, 461, 486; on Tory Democracy, 429; he promises to + support a Parliamentary inquiry into the Indian Government, 439, 496, + 497; at the India Office, 452, 453, 456, 457, 460, 461, 464, 485, 491, + 494; his views on Irish Home Rule, 445, 465, 469, 483; his connection + with the Drummond Wolff mission, 454, 461, 475, 478, 480, 481, 485, + 486, 487, 491, 503; his discussion with Jemal-ed-Din, 466; on a + proposed revolution at Constantinople, 491, 493; his share in the + annexation of Burmah, 497, 498, 501, 503. _Also_ 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, + 32, 38, 210, 211, 213, 218, 219, 235, 238, 245, 259, 262, 266, 278, + 349, 350, 370, 371, 390, 408, 412, 413, 418, 419, 424, 429, 432, 435, + 438, 440, 441, 443, 446, 447, 448, 450, 452, 453, 464, 466, 467, 468, + 469, 479, 480, 481, 482, 492, 494, 495, 496, 500; author’s + correspondence with, Appendix D. + + Clark, Dr., M.P., 356, 435. + + Coetlogon, Colonel, in command of Khartoum garrison, 1883, 85, 155, + 186. + + Colvin, Sir Auckland, Anglo-Indian official, English Financial + Controller in Egypt, afterwards Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West + Provinces of India, 12, 38, 41, 44, 51, 52, 282, 421, 452. + + Connaught, H.R.H. the Duke of, 372. + + Cookson, Sir Charles, British Consul at Alexandria, 63. + + Coptic Patriarch, 69. + + Cordery, Mr., Anglo-Indian official, resident at Hyderabad, 239, 250, + 348, 486, Appendix G. + + Corti, Count, Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, 300; author’s + conversations with, 301, 305, 315, 320, 321, 327; his account of the + Berlin Congress, 320. _Also_ 319, 341, 364. + + Cotton, Sir Henry, M.P., 478. + + Courtney, Rt. Hon. Leonard, M.P., now Lord Courtney of Penwith, 359, + 377, 397, 399, 402, 420, 428, 432. + + Cowper, Hon. Henry, friend of the author, 483, 484. + + Cromer, Earl of, formerly Sir Evelyn Baring, his appointment to Cairo + in 1883, 38; his “Nineteenth Century” article, 42; his views in 1883, + 42, 59, 60; his reputation in Egypt, 51, 55, 57; his character, 54, + 59, 60, 61; his early career, 58; author’s talks with in 1883, 58, 60, + 61; his connection with Lord Northbrook, 58; his untrustworthiness as + an historian, 61, 151, 152, 157; his responsibility for Hicks, 84; his + quarrel with Gordon in 1879, 124, 125, 247; his “Modern Egypt,” v, + viii, 144, 152, 155; his antagonism to Gordon, 151, 152, 167; his + misquotation of a dispatch, 157, 171; his complaint as to the “Pall + Mall Gazette,” 152, 153, 154, 161, 162, 166, 167, 176; his + responsibility for Gordon’s failure, 157, 192, 193, 197, 198, 199, + 202, 214; his unpublished letter to Gordon (date, 22nd January 1884), + 194; is considered a failure, 223, 231, 344, 410; Lord Hardinge’s + opinion of, 374; to be recalled, 449, 450, 451. _Also_ 38, 39, 40, 42, + 43, 44, 45, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 70, 74, 75, + 76, 83, 84, 85, 102, 122, 124, 125, 144, 148, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, + 156, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 166, 167, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, + 178, 182, 186, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 214, 215, 219, + 222, 223, 224, 225, 228, 231, 247, 254, 257, 321, 344, 345, 374, 393, + 410, 429, Appendices A and C. + + “Curly,” Colonel George Knox, 231. + + Currie, Mr. Bertram, banker, member of the Indian Council, cousin of + the author, and friend of Gladstone, 214, 352, 419, 420, 421. + + Currie, Sir Donald, M.P., ship-owner, friend of Gladstone, 44, 235. + + Currie, Mr. George, cousin of the author, 365, 370. + + Currie, Sir Philip, afterwards Lord, private secretary to Lord + Salisbury, head of Foreign Office and Ambassador, cousin of the + author, 130, 227, 373, 378, 386, 438, Appendix C. + + Curzon, Rt. Hon. George, M.P., afterwards Lord Curzon of Kedleston, + friend of the author, 451. + + Dalhousie, Earl of, 431. + + De la Warr, Earl of, political ally of author, 223, 225, 257. + + Deli Nuzret, 327. + + Dervish Pasha, the Sultan’s envoy to Egypt in 1882, he accepted + bribes, 327, 328. + + Dickenson, Dr., of the Constantinople Embassy, 338. + + Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles, M.P., Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs + in Gladstone’s Ministry, 10, 31, 169, 179, 247, 251, 254, 257, 330, + 345, 346, 352, 360, 369, 371, 374, 383, 391, 390; his saying that + Egypt would be “annexed under another name,” 406. _Also_ 440, 445, + 452. + + Dillon, John, M.P., his letter to Morley, 252. + + Disraeli, Benjamin, Lord Beaconsfield, story of, 244. _Also_ 412. + + Drummond, Sir Victor, K.C.M.G., afterwards Her Majesty’s Minister at + Munich, friend of the author, 287. + + Dufferin, Earl of, Ambassador at Constantinople, afterwards Viceroy of + India, author’s personal recollection of, 4; his Egyptian settlement, + 4, 7, 18, 29, 30, 31, 32, 49, 62, 68, 141; his opinion of Arabi, 7, 8, + 13; author’s correspondence with, 20, Appendix C; his relations with + Sultan Abdul Hamid, 303, 305, 322, 333, 344, 348; his responsibility + for Burmah, 497, 498. _Also_ 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, + 22, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 49, 62, 68, 73, 76, 81, 141, 145, 146, + 148, 149, 152, 161, 222, 236, 238, 283, 302, 305, 318, 322, 333, 344, + 409, 454, 486, 497, 498. + + Earle, General, killed in the Soudan, 377, 386. + + Earle, Mrs., 399. + + Egerton, Sir Edwin, _chargé d’affaires_ at Cairo, afterwards + Ambassador at Madrid, 223, 495. + + Elections, Egyptian, how managed, 52, 56, 68, 72, 73. + + Elliot, Sir Henry, formerly Ambassador at Constantinople, 301. + + Escott, Mr. T. H. S., editor of “Fortnightly,” 392. + + Europe, responsible for the ruin of the Soudan, 79, 80. + + Exclusion from Egypt, the author’s, 75, 207, 218, 222, 245, 246, 247, + 256, 274, 275, 278, 487, 492, 495. _Also_ Chapter VIII and Appendix C. + + Executions at Alexandria and Tantah, 22, 24, 26, 29, 53. _Also_ + Appendix B. + + Faris, Selim Effendi, journalist at Constantinople, author’s talks + with, 304, 305, 317, 321, 327, 329, 332, 339, 341, 358, 489, 490, 493. + + Fehmy, Hassan Pasha, Sultan’s envoy to London in 1885, 358, 359, 360, + 361, 363, 366, 367, 368, 372, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 382, 389, 394, + 407, 425. + + Fenni, Mohammed Effendi, 71. + + Ferid Bey, first Secretary of Turkish Embassy, 385, 448; his + communication as to proposed revolution in Turkey, 489. _Also_ 493. + + Ferry, M. Jules, French Prime Minister, 229, 262, 351. + + Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmund, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, + afterwards Lord Fitzmaurice, 144, 150, 164, 174, 189, 203. + + Flower, Mr. Cyril, M.P., afterwards Lord Battersea, 438. + + Ford, Sir Clare, afterwards Ambassador at Constantinople, 436. + + Forster, Rt. Hon. W. G., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland 1880-1882, + 257, 261. + + Fowzi, Ibrahim Bey, with Gordon in the Soudan, Arabist in 1882, + accompanies Gordon to Khartoum in 1884, 175, 196, Appendix A. + + Gessi Pasha, served in the Soudan under Gordon, 116, 117, 119, 191; + Suliman Zebehr shot by, 191. + + Ghose, Mr. Lal Mohun, Indian delegate, 496, 497. + + Giegler Pasha, German official in the Khedivial service, 154. + + Gladstone, Rt. Hon. Herbert, M.P., afterwards Lord Gladstone, made use + of by his father politically, 213, 250, 379. + + Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., M.P., Prime Minister, his intention of + restoring Arabi, 7, 11, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 57, 381; author’s + correspondence with through Sir E. Hamilton, 75, 76, 223, 228, 234, + 246, 247, 249, 256, 347, 349, 393, 399, 400, 408, 433, 487, 489, + Appendix C; Hartington’s intrigue against, 160, 161, 164, 167, 168, + 169, 177, 205, 352; was he responsible towards Gordon? 175, 182, 183, + 184, 203; he uses his son Herbert, 213, 250, 379; a political gambler, + 215; his speeches, 226, 240, 278, 385, 386, 405, 425; at Hawarden on + Christmas Eve, 356; violent language about, 362; at the play, 377; his + defeat in the House, 9th June 1885, 443; Bright’s letter to, 445; + Cardinal Manning’s opinion of, 500; he pronounces for Home Rule, 504. + _Also_ 1, 2, 3, 9, 17, 19, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 38, 40, 49, 56, 67, 72, + 134, 171, 173, 179, 210, 212, 214, 217, 222, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, + 232, 235, 237, 239, 242, 245, 249, 251, 252, 255, 259, 260, 261, 269, + 273, 276, 283, 345, 346, 357, 359, 360, 364, 369, 378, 379, 380, 389, + 390, 391, 392, 407, 424, 425, 426, 431, 436, 445, 472, 488, and + Appendices A and C. + + Gobineau, Count, author of “Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines,” + friend of the author, 288. + + Godley, Sir Arthur, K.C.B., Under-Secretary of State for India, 225, + 239, 250, 391, 392. + + Gordon, General Charles George, Pasha, “Chinese Gordon,” vii, viii; + his letters to author, 9, 10, 11, 12, 140; he calls on author, 10, + 135; his testimony about Arabi, 9, 11, 12, 140; his character + examined, 87, 88-94; his early work in the Soudan, 87-121; his Bible, + Christianity, 91; his chastity, 93; “Hailing the tram of the world,” + 94; he enters Ismaïl’s service, 95; his interview with Sherif, 101; he + is considered mad, 8, 94, 103, 122, 132, 136; his fatalism, 108-112; + on the financial inquiry, 123; his quarrel with Cromer in 1878, 124, + 151; Gordon and Lesseps, 125; his quarrel with Nubar, 129, 131; at the + Foreign Office, 130; Rivers Wilson’s recollection of, 132; in India, + 133, Appendix A; at Jerusalem, 136-143; his religious monomania, 136, + 138; his last mission to Khartoum, 144-206; “an unfit person,” 151; he + resigns his commission, 163; interviewed by Stead, 164; to have _carte + blanche_, 166; to Sarawak the Soudan, 169; he visits Barnes, 171; his + fighting plan, 177; Gordon and the Ministers, 179; was he disobedient? + 181-206; his Foreign Office instructions, 182; his mistake about the + Mahdi, 185, 191; Gordon and Zebehr, 190; the change of plan at Cairo, + 188, 194; his mission extended by Cromer, 194-199; was help promised + him? 204-206; at Khartoum, 207-209, 212. _Also_ 213, 214, 216, 218, + 221, 223, 224, 225, 226, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 240, 243, 247, + 248, 283, 287, 299, 348, 364, 370, 373, 374, 376, 387, 389, 392, 416, + 452, 453. + + Gordon Papers, Appendices A and C. + + Gordon, Sir Henry, brother of General Gordon, 174; his correspondence + with Gladstone and others, Appendix A. + + Gordon, Colonel Louis, viii, Appendix A. + + Gorst, Rt. Hon. Sir John, M.P., 28, 211, 213, 219. + + Goschen, Rt. Hon. George Joachim, M.P., afterwards Lord, 126, 261, + 267, 269, 270, 322, 375, 390. + + Gower, Mr. George Leveson, private secretary to Mr. Gladstone, + 1880-1885, friend of the author, 210. + + Gower, Hon. Frederick Leveson, M.P., Lord Granville’s brother and + private secretary, 237, 451. + + Graham, General Sir Gerald, 203, 213, 214, 402, 416, 427, 428, 430; + his letters about Gordon, Appendix A. + + Granville, Earl, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1880-1885, + chief obstacle to an honest settlement in Egypt, 17, 18, 31; his + position in Gladstone’s Cabinet, 168; his letters to Gladstone and + Baring proposing Gordon, 150, 173, 175; confirms author’s exclusion + from Egypt, 245; Morley’s opinion of, 252; Staal’s description of, + 398; his assurance to Bright about Alexandria, 445; out of office, + 445. _Also_ 2, 8, 17, 31, 67, 72, 74, 75, 85, 150, 154, 155, 163, 167, + 168, 169, 170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 182, 189, 192, 194, 195, 206, + 207, 235, 237, 254, 351, 359, 361, 365, 367, 374, 375, 378, 385, 391, + 394, 395, 455, and Appendix G. + + Gregory, Sir William, friend and political ally of author, 29, 32, + 242, 245, 266, 282, 347, 349, 378, 440, 476; his letters to author, + Appendix G. + + Gregory, Lady, friend and political ally of author, 25; letter from, + 29. _Also_ 30, 31, 32, 242, 245, 247, 253, 257, 265, 266, 373, 380, + 389, 400, 486; extracts from her letters, Appendix G. + + Griffin, Sir Lepel, high Anglo-Indian official, 391, 413, 414, 444, + 465. + + Gros Bois, 285. + + Hafiz Behram Agha, Sultan’s chief eunuch, 318. + + Hake, Mr. Egmont, author of “Chinese Gordon,” 159, 439; employed to + lecture on Gordon by Lord Salisbury, 475. + + Halim Pasha, Prince, legitimate successor to the Khedive Ismaïl, + Pretender to Khedivate, his conversation with the author, 337; his + correspondence with the author, 389, Appendix B. _Also_ 6, 13, 14, 15, + 36, 50, 230, 249, 302, 310, 313, 315, 321, 336, 440. + + Halim, Princess, 314, 336. + + Hamilton, Sir Edward, Gladstone’s chief private secretary, 1880-1885, + friend of the author, his correspondence with the author, 278, 331, + 340, 400, 401, 407, 420, 433, Appendix C. _Also_ 45, 65, 75, 76, 134, + 216, 217, 218, 223, 224, 227, 228, 231, 246, 247, 252, 254, 259, 275, + 451. + + Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Sir William Vernon, M.P., Home Secretary in + Gladstone’s Cabinet, 229, 378, 390, 448. + + Hardinge, Hon. Charles, of the Diplomatic Service, private secretary + to Lord Dufferin at Constantinople, afterwards Ambassador at St. + Petersburg and Viceroy of India, 363, 364, 374, 489; his opinion of + Baring, 374. + + Harrison, Mr. Frederic, Head of the Positivist Society, and friend of + author, his conversations with the author, 248, 371, 431, 436; his + speech at Westminster Town Hall, 4th March, 392. _Also_ 251, 253, 254, + 256, 383, 451, 497. + + Hartington, Marquess of, afterwards Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of + State for India in Gladstone’s Cabinet, his responsibility for the + Gordon mission, 247, 248; his intrigue against Gladstone, 164, 165, + 167, 369, 370. _Also_ 2, 8, 150, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 173, + 177, 178, 179, 203, 204, 214, 241, 252, 254, 276, 345, 390, 407, 408, + 429, 432, 440, 445, 472, 473, 486. + + Haymerlé, Baron, Prime Minister of Austria, early friend of author, + 300. + + Henderson, Consul at Aleppo, 303, 323. + + Herbert, the Hon. Auberon, friend of the author, 213, 353; his + individualist ideas, 483. + + Herbert, Hon. Sir Michael, friend of author. _See_ “Bungo.” + + Herbert, Hon. Sidney, M.P., afterwards Earl of Pembroke, friend of + author, 450. + + Hicks Pasha, General, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 141, 146, 149, 150, 152, + 153, 154, 159, 191, 200, 214, 386. + + Hicks Beach, Sir Michael, M.P., afterwards Lord St. Aldwyn, 239, 240, + 252, 390. + + Hill, Mr., editor of “Daily News,” 232. + + Hobart Pasha, Admiral the Hon. Augustus, in the Turkish service, + author’s conversations with at Constantinople, 302; sent as Sultan’s + private envoy to London, 364. _Also_ 304, 366, 368, 378, 398, 416, + 417, 441. + + Holkar, Maharajah, 454. + + Holland, the Rev. Scott, Canon of St. Paul’s, 240. + + Hope, Edward, author’s private secretary, 283, 469. + + Howard, George, M.P., afterwards Earl of Carlisle, friend of author, + 237, 255, 259, 261, 267, 272, 404, 417, 462. + + Howard, Mrs. George, afterwards Countess of Carlisle, friend of + author, 42, 215, 232, 237, 246, 249, 255, 259, 261, 265, 282, 402, + 405, 415, 416, 418, 419, 425, 434, 440, 445, 462. + + Hughes, Tom, author of “Tom Brown’s Schooldays,” 361. + + Hunter, Professor, 400. + + Husseyn Pasha, aide-de-camp to the Sultan, 319, 403. + + Ibrahim Adhem Bey, Mudir of Tantah, partisan of Khedive Tewfik, 324; + his connection with riots at Tantah. _See_ Tantah. + + Ibrahim-el-Senoussi, Sheykh, 403. + + Ibrahim Bey. _See_ Moelhy. + + Inglefield, Colonel, 415. + + Ismaïl, ex-Khedive, his connection with Gordon, 89, 96, 98-104, 112, + 118, 120, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130; his intrigues in London, + 245, 257, 277, 279, 377, 447; author’s talk with, 279, 280; Ismaïl as + a boy, 311, 312; he lends money to the King of Italy, 315; his + deposition in 1879, 329; is patronized by Bismarck, 358; Arabi refuses + to have anything to do with, Appendix B. _Also_ 50, 230, 239, 249, + 281, 301, 359, 378. + + Jamil Pasha, 303. + + James, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry, M.P., afterwards Lord James of Hereford, + 278. + + Jemal-ed-Din Afghani, Seyyid, well-known Moslem reformer living in + exile at Paris, proposed mediation with the Mahdi through, 224, 226, + 228, 286, 287, 338, 389, 409, 410, 411, Appendix B; his correspondence + with author, Appendix B; in England, 464; his talks with Churchill, + 465-468; his talks with Drummond Wolff, 473, 478; he is to help Wolff + in his mission, 480, 481, 482, 486, 487; he leaves England angry, 500, + 501; his death in 1902, 501. _Also_ 40, 45, 46, 47, 208, 237, 272, + 358, 368, 376, 386, 387, 388, 412, 444, 449, 457, 458, 461, 473, 474, + 475, 476, 477, 479, 485, 488, 489, 491, 492, 499. + + Jews in Poland, 290, 293. + + Jowdat, Ismaïl Bey, head of Cairo police during the war, in exile at + Constantinople in 1884, 310, 313, 319; his evidence on the Alexandria + and Cairo massacres, 319, 323, 330, 339, 340, Appendix B; in London, + 342, 343, 356, 357; ordered to Constantinople, 358. _Also_ 434, 486, + 487, 488. + + Jung, Nawab Salar, Prime Minister to the Nizam, 55, 239, 371, 413. + + Kandil, Seyd, Chief of Police at Alexandria in 1882, condemned to + prison for asserted connection with Alexandria riot, 69, 71. _Also_ + Appendix B. + + Khalil, Sheykh Mohammed, disciple of Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, 66. + + Kerr, General Lord Mark, 370, 371, 372. + + Khair-ed-Din Pasha, ex-Vizier, 242, 245, 302, 303, 305, 307, 329. + + Kiamyl, Prince, cousin of the Khedive, 326. + + Kimberley, Earl of, Chief Secretary for India in the Gladstone + Cabinet, 452. + + Knowles, Sir James, editor of the “Nineteenth Century Review,” friend + of Gladstone, 40, 41, 42, 44, 209, 210, 246, 247, 249, 275, 359. + + Kurds, proposed rising of, 330, 342, 343. + + Labouchere, Rt. Hon. Henry, M.P., friend of author, 28, 213, 214, 230, + 252, 261, 271, 272, 273, 274; his conversations with the author, 379, + 380, 393, 399, 424, 427, 429. + + Lagergren, Mr., Swedish traveller, 299. + + Laing, Mr., Director of the Regie at Constantinople, 326. + + Laing, Miss, formerly companion to Princess Nazli, 313. + + Lamb, Lady Caroline, 483. + + Lambert, professional tennis player, 434. + + Lampson, Sir Curtis, Bart., neighbour and friend of author, 401. + + Langiewitz, General, Polish patriot, 316. + + Lascelles, Sir Frank, G.C.B., Acting Diplomatic Agent in Egypt, + afterwards Ambassador at Berlin, friend of author, 243, 254, 257, 259, + 261, 281. + + Lavison, Mr., secretary to ex-Khedive Ismaïl, 279. + + Lawson, Sir Wilfrid, Bart., M.P., 28, 212, 213, 219, 232, 240, 252, + 255, 259, 266, 271, 273, 274, 275, 276, 279, 282. + + Layard, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry, ex-Ambassador at Constantinople, 317, 365. + + Leconfield, Henry, Lord, cousin of author, 347, 357, 448. + + Lee, Sir Henry Austin, K.C.M.G., private secretary to Lord E. + Fitzmaurice at the Foreign Office, afterwards English representative + on the Suez Canal Committee, 373. + + Leigh, Mr., of the Diplomatic Service, afterwards Lord Newton, 287. + + Leitner, Dr., Orientalist, 236. + + Leopold, King of the Belgians, 101, 136, 143, 150, 158, 159, 163, 164, + 178, 182, 187. + + Lesseps, Count Ferdinand de, his connection with Gordon, 122, 123, + 124, 125, 126. + + Lloyd, Mr. Clifford, Chief of Police in Ireland, employed in Egypt in + 1884, 14, 267, 325. + + Locker-Lampson, Mr. Frederick, poet and friend of the author, 498. + + Long, Colonel Chaillé, American Colonel, served with Gordon in the + Soudan, 178. + + Lords, the House of, 266, 271. + + Lorne, Marquess of, afterwards Duke of Argyll, 404, 408, 409. + + Lothian, Schomberg, 9th Marquess of, Chief Secretary for Scotland in + Salisbury’s Cabinet, friend of author, 437, 449, 452, 472. + + Lowther, Rt. Hon. James, M.P., 226, 263, 379, 392. + + Lucan, Field-Marshal Lord, 426, 427. + + Lubienski, Rev. Father, a Polish priest, 292, 293. + + Lumsden, Sir Peter, 370, 396. + + Lyall, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred, Lieutenant-Governor of North-West + Provinces of India, afterwards member of Indian Council, friend of + author, 252; his letters to author, Appendix G. + + Lymington, Lord, M.P., now Earl of Portsmouth, 242, 377. + + Lyons, Lord, Ambassador at Paris, 132, 209, 344, 359. + + Lytton, Earl of, ex-Viceroy of India, afterwards Ambassador at Paris, + friend of the author, 133, 222, 257, 258, 390, 399, 451. + + Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed, the, 13, 15, 16, 70, 77, 78, 80, 82, 86, 149, + 153, 155, 156, 161, 176, 182, 185, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 198, + 200, 203, 204, 208, 209, 212, 215, 217, 218, 221, 223, 224, 225, 227, + 230, 231, 234, 235, 237, 240, 257, 261, 266, 267, 269, 272, 348; his + character, 351, 442; his death, 459, 472, 505. _Also_ 355, 362, 368, + 369, 373, 379, 380, 384, 386, 387, 388, 393, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, + 403, 411, 413, 416, 434, 438, 442, 444, 455, 466. + + Malet, Sir Edward, Consul-General at Cairo, afterwards Ambassador at + Berlin, 15, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 63, 73, 82, 83, 84, 146, 286, + 374, 393, 422; his position with Bismarck, 346, 395. + + Malkum Khan, Prince, Persian Ambassador in London, 277. + + Manning, Cardinal, 383, 384, 462, 469, 497. + + Massowa, 376, 387. + + Maxwell, Sir Benson, Adviser to the Egyptian Government in the + department of Justice, 62, 63, 265. + + McCarthy, Mr. Huntley, M.P., 422, 423, 461. + + McCarthy, Mr. Justin, M.P., author’s conversations with, 422, 423, + 469, 476. + + McGrath, Canon, 469. + + Mediation proposed by author in the Soudan, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, + 234, 352, 354, 355, 356, 384, 386, 387, 388, 389, 444, 455, Appendices + B and C. + + Mehariz Bey, Deputy Mudir at Tantah, his part in the riots, 325, 335. + _Also_ Appendix B. + + Merv, the Russians at, 467, 468. + + Metemmeh, 365, 368, 372, 373. _Also_ Appendix A. + + Meynell, Mr. Wilfrid, friend of the author, 475, 478, 504. + + Midhat Pasha, his character, according to Vefyk Pasha, 314; his death, + 339. + + Milner, Alfred, journalist, afterwards Governor of South Africa and + Lord, 61, 487. + + Minshawi, Ahmed Bey, afterwards Minshawi Pasha, 21; his visits to the + author, 334, 338; his evidence as to the Tantah massacre, 335, 336, + 339, 340, 341; his letter to author, Appendix B. + + Mirza Bakir. _See_ Bakir. + + “Modern Egypt,” v, viii; its unreliable character as history, 61. + + Moelhy, Ibrahim Bey, at one time private secretary to ex-Khedive + Ismaïl, living as an exile in London in 1885, 354, 355, 357, 358, 359, + 368, 381, 385, 401, 403, 408, 409, 434, 458, 459, 480, 487, 488, 491, + 494. + + Moffitt, Mrs., Gordon’s sister, viii, Appendix A. + + Mohammed Assad Bey, Muteserif of Candia, uncle-in-law of Aarif Bey, + 342. + + Moore, Mr. A. W., Lord Randolph Churchill’s private secretary, 485, + 495, 498. + + Moore, Mr. Lionel, Oriental secretary at Constantinople, and friend of + the Prince of Wales, his conversations with the author, 63, 64, 65, + 67. + + Morier, Sir Robert, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 346, 385. + + Morley, Rt. Hon. John, M.P., formerly editor of the “Pall Mall + Gazette,” afterwards Cabinet Minister and Lord, his prediction about + Lord Cromer, 39; his repentance for bringing about the war of 1882, + 152; his “Life of Gladstone,” 169; his conversations with the author, + 232, 233, 234, 251, 260, 383, 420; his opinion of certain public men, + 251, 252, 253; he is for “strong government, the cutting off of + heads,” 251. _Also_ 144, 221, 252, 254, 256, 377, 385, 390, 402. + + Morocco, French plan to annex, opposed by Communists, 353. + + Morris, William, poet and friend of the author, 408, 488, 496, 499. + + Munir Pasha, Chamberlain to the Sultan, 328, 332, 339. + + Mustafa Bey Nejdi, Arabi’s doctor, living in exile at Constantinople, + 313; his account of Tel-el-Kebir, 323; as to Alexandrian riots, 325. + _Also_ 336, 339, 341, Appendix B. + + Musurus Pasha, Turkish Ambassador, 322, 341, 491. + + Nadir Shah gives Arab horses to the Turcomans, 479. + + Napier, Major, now Lord Napier of Magdala, 225. + + Napier, Hon. Mark, Counsel with Broadley at Arabi’s trial, friend of + author, 221, 372, 373, 456, 478; proposes with others to rescue + Gordon, 221. + + Naworth Castle, 288. + + Nazleh, Princess, cousin of Khedive Tewfik, 42. + + Nebbi Ullah, Seyd, Khan of Lucknow, 382, 473. + + Nélidoff, M. de, Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, early friend of + author, 300, 316, 339, 398. + + Neville, Lady Dorothy, 436. + + Nicholas, Grand Duke, commanding the Russian army before + Constantinople in 1878, 388. + + Ninet, Swiss patriot who sided with the Egyptian Nationalists in 1882, + 313. + + “Nineteenth Century Review,” author’s article on Egyptian Revolution + in, 9, 11; article by Sir E. Baring on Lord Ripon’s policy in India, + 42, 43; author’s article on proposed Arab race at Newmarket in, 237. + + Nizam, the, of the Deccan, 388, 397, Appendix G. + + Noailles, M. de, French Ambassador at Constantinople, 301, 320. + + Northcote, Sir Stafford, afterwards Earl of Iddesleigh, leader of the + Opposition, Chief Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Salisbury, 219, + 220, 252, 261, 262. + + Northbrook, Earl of, First Lord of the Admiralty in Gladstone’s + Cabinet, his financial proposals, 344, 345, 346, 352, 370; with regard + to native evidence, 347; his letter to Gordon, Appendix A. _Also_ 8, + 22, 23, 58, 133, 134, 150, 169, 179, 247, 278, 284, 299, 359, 410, + 429, 447, 458. + + Novikoff, Madame de, 245, 277, 373, 447. + + Nubar Pasha, Armenian Prime Minister in Egypt, 30, 95, 102, 103, 118, + 122, 129, 131, 140, 141, 170, 171, 175, 176, 178, 190, 194, 195, 197, + 199, 214, 223, 243, 268, 287; his quarrel with Gordon in 1878, 129, + 247. + + Obeyd, Mohammed Bey, fellah officer killed at Tel-el-Kebir, 355. + + Odessa, 297. + + O’Kelly, James, M.P., Parnellite member, correspondent of the “Daily + News” during Dongola Expedition, 231, 272. + + Omar Pasha Lutfi, partisan of ex-Khedive Ismaïl, Governor of + Alexandria, later War Minister, his connection with the Alexandrian + riots, 19, 20, 21, 24, 52, 63, 71, 73, 83, Appendices B and C. + + Omdurman taken by the Mahdi, January 1885, 363. + + Osborn, Colonel, friend of Native India, 220. + + O’Shea, Captain William, M.P., 429. + + Osman, Prince, cousin of the Khedive, 326. + + Osman Digna, the Emir, Mahdist leader, 54, 161, 200, 203, 394, 400, + 426, 437. + + Paget, Sir Augustus, Ambassador at Vienna, and Lady Paget, 287. + + Pain, Olivier, French Socialist, reward offered for him dead or alive, + 442, 486. + + “Pall Mall Gazette,” the, 152, 154; its change of front about Egypt, + 161. _Also_ 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 183, 223, 227, 247, 253, + 255, 274, 350, 351, 353, 354. + + Palmer, Mr. Edward, Professor of Arabic at Cambridge, vengeance taken + on Bedouins for his death, 22, 23; debates in Parliament, 28; Consul + West on the Palmer case, 53; Northbrook’s responsibility for, 179. + + Parnell, Mr. Charles Stuart, M.P., 251, 270, 272, 273, 379, 412, 414, + 415, 422, 423, 429; author’s talk with, 427, 428. + + Pauncefote, Sir Julian, permanent Under-Secretary of State, afterwards + Ambassador in America, 495. + + Peace and Arbitration Association, 352, 353, 354, 356, 431. + + Penjdeh, 467. + + Petitt, match between Lambert and, professional tennis player, 435. + + Poles and Ruthenians, 290, 294. + + Policy, Prussian, of claiming the old Dutch colonies, 396. + + Pollen, Mr. John Hungerford, secretary to Lord Ripon, friend of the + author, 363, 432, 465. + + Poore, Major R., disciple of Urquhart, 377. + + Potocki, Count Alfred, at Crabbet, 221, 222; author’s visit to him at + Lançut, 289, 290, 291, 292; at Antonine, 293, 294; his Arab stud, 295, + 296. + + Pratt, Mr. Hodgson, philanthropist, organizer of the Peace and + Arbitration Society, 352, 353. + + Press, use made of by Governments, 117, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 250, + 369. + + Primrose Day with Churchill, 418. + + Proteus, Love sonnets of, “Mr. Gladstone turns to with delight,” 433. + + Punch Dinner, 275. + + Quakers against peace, 378. + + Queen. _See_ Victoria. + + Ragheb Nashid, 276. + + Ragunath Rao, Rajah, a letter from, 494. + + Rafaat, Osman Bey, secret agent of the Khedive, 324, Appendix B. + + Rama Swami, Indian delegate, 494, 499. + + Raouf Pasha, Governor-General of Soudan in succession to Gordon, 10, + 15. + + Red Sea, origin of the name, 314. + + Reform in _Foreign Policy_, author’s lecture on, 497. + + Reign of Terror at Cairo, 66. + + Riaz Pasha, Prime Minister in Egypt, 11, 30, 55, 73, 126, 131, 146, + 243, 251, 336. + + Ripon, Marquess of, Viceroy of India, 58, 133, 134, 239, 251, 349, + 363, 375, 397, 412, 413, 432, 450, 452, 465. + + Roberts, General Sir Frederic, now Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, 430. + + Rosebery, Earl of, afterwards Prime Minister, his connection with the + Rothschilds, 395; his connection with the Turf, 237. + + Rothschild, Nathaniel Lord, 229, 242, 255, 272. + + Rothschilds, Messieurs, their connection with the “Times,” 213; + Bismarck’s quarrel with, in Frankfort, 260; holders of Egyptian Stock, + 160, 212, 214, 350. + + Russia and Afghanistan, 444, 466. + + Russia and India, 444, 466, 467. + + Saad-el-Zaglool Effendi, assistant editor of the “Wakaya” under + Mohammed Abdu, Minister of Public Instruction under Cromer, 1906, now + Minister of Justice, in prison, 71; author procures his release, 74, + 75. + + Sabit Pasha, Tewfik’s agent at Constantinople, 305. + + Sabunji, Rev. Louis, editor of “Nahlek,” Oriental secretary to author, + 45, 50, 51, 52, 66, 74, 76, Appendix B. + + Salisbury, Marquess of, 73, 132, 235, 252, 255, 320, 321, 332, 391, + 446, 452, 465, 468, 472, 478, 486, 487, 493, 495, 501, 502, 503, 505; + takes office, 448, 449; engages to support Tewfik, 457; author’s + correspondence with, Appendix C. + + Sami, Mahmoud Pasha, el Barodi, Nationalist ex-Prime Minister, exiled + with Arabi, 64, 72, 276, 324. + + Sanguscko, Prince, 294. + + Sanua, James (Sheykh Abu Naddara), Egyptian Nationalist living in + exile at Paris, and editor of “Abu Naddara,” author visits him at + Paris, 45; his puppet show and newspapers, 46. _Also_ 47, 65, 208, + 219, 387, 388. + + Saoud el Tihawi, Sheykh, Bedouin Sheykh, his action at Tel-el-Kebir, + “in the pay of both sides,” 323. + + Saracens, Arab chivalry inherited from, 362. + + Selborne, Lord Chancellor, 406. + + Seljukian Sultans, descendants of, at Konia, 301. + + Seymour, Admiral Sir Beauchamp, Lord Alcester, his proclamation after + bombarding Alexandria, 2, 475. + + Seymour, Mr. Walter, friend of the author, 370, 382, 456. + + Shaftesbury, Lord, his warning to the Prince of Wales, 282. + + Shakespeare, “As You Like It” in open air, 446. + + Sheffield, Mr. George, private secretary to Lord Lyons at Paris, + considers Gordon’s case hopeless, 209; author’s conversations with, + 344, 345, 346, 410. _Also_ 284, 359. + + Shemsi, Emin Bey, Nationalist deputy in 1882, 71, 72, 73. + + Sherif Pasha, Prime Minister in 1883, 30, 62, 71, 72, 101, 102, 124, + 125, 126, 128, 151, 156, 160, 233, 243. + + Sidki, Mustafa Bey, landed proprietor at Shubra, imprisoned in 1883, + 71. + + Sinadino, M. Ambroise, Greek banker at Alexandria and agent of the + Rothschilds, “Mecca pilgrims kept without water,” 298. + + Sinnett, Mr. A. P., well-known Theosophist, he explains the black art, + 258, 259. + + Siva Prasad, Rajah, says a royal order would override caste + difficulties, 496. + + Slavery, two ways of dealing with, 96-99. + + Slagg, Mr., M.P., his motion for an inquiry into Indian Government, + 439. + + Souakin, 376, 380, 400, 402, 409, 416, 426, 427, 455. + + Spencer, Earl, 391; a born administrator, 268. + + Staal, M. de, Russian Ambassador in London, friend of author, 222, + 269, 298, 436, 445, 446, 452, 454. + + Stanley of Alderley, Henry, Lord, friend of the author, 24, 242, 245, + 302, 308, 310, 342, 345, 361, 367, 372, 377, 394, 407, 416, 452. + + Stanley, Lady, of Alderley, 364, 371. + + Stanley, Hon. Lyulph, M.P., afterwards Lord Sheffield, friend of + author, 212. + + Stead, Mr. William, editor of the “Pall Mall Gazette,” 1883-1885, + Gordon’s mission unjustly attributed to by Cromer in “Modern Egypt,” + 152, 153, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168; he interviews Gordon at + Southampton, 164, 171; used by the Whigs, 169; his “scream of + triumph,” 183; author interviewed by, 220, 221, 351, 353, 354, 355; + described by Morley, 253. _Also_ 158, 170, 176, 369, 426, 447, 484. + + Stewart, Colonel D. H., 81, 146, 147, 148, 179, 181, 187, 189, 196, + 365; author’s recollection of, 287, 299, Appendix F. + + Stewart, General Sir Herbert, in command of the relief column, killed + at Abu Klea, 362, 364, 367, 368, 379, 406. + + Suliman Sami Bey, Nationalist Colonel of the Alexandria garrison, + hanged by the Khedive, 23, 24; refused to give up certain papers + incriminating the Khedive, 69, Appendix B. + + Sullivan, Sir Arthur, musical composer, 413. + + Sullivan, Sir Edward, Bart., 419. + + Sultan, the Ottoman. _See_ Abdul Hamid. + + Sultan Pasha, fellah Notable and Constitutionalist, betrayed the + Nationalists to the Khedive in 1882, and accompanied Wolseley on the + campaign of Tel-el-Kebir; received £10,000 and a knighthood from the + British Government, 46, 50, 71, 72, 275, 324, Appendix B. + + Talbot, General the Hon. Sir Reginald, 367. + + Tamai, battle of, 409. + + Tantah, riots at, evidence in regard to, 19, 21, 28, 324, 325, 334. + _Also_ Appendices B, C, F. + + Taschaud, M., 381. + + Tebbutt, Mr. Charles, banker of St. Ives, political friend of author, + 504. + + Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 3, 6, 16, 36, 46, 49, 65, 74, 75, 77, 79, + 201; traitors at, 275; described by Arabi’s doctor, 323. + + Temple, Dr., Bishop of Exeter, afterwards Bishop of London, Gordon’s + visit to, 172; party at Fulham, 451. _Also_ 139, 172, 243. + + Temple, Sir Richard, ex-Indian official, afterwards M.P., 498. + + Tennis at Hampton Court, 434, 435. + + Tewfik, Khedive, an impediment to an honest settlement in Egypt, 5, 7, + 8, 17, 32, 56, 65, 68, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 141, 217, 369, 414, 454, + 457; his connection with the riots, 28, 31, 52, 211, 347, Appendices + B, C; his weak and treacherous character, 49, 50, 249, 411; Gordon’s + quarrel with, 122; he makes peace with Gordon, 197; his firman to + Gordon, 197; Arabi’s attitude towards, Appendix B. _Also_ 1, 4, 11, + 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 30, 33, 47, 48, 51, 55, 62, 64, 67, 69, + 70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 120, 122, 130, 131, 140, 151, 153, 156, 157, 160, + 162, 169, 170, 187, 189, 190, 194, 201, 212, 214, 218, 225, 228, 230, + 232, 234, 253, 254, 266, 268, 284, 328, 336, 349, 360, 365, 366, 456. + + Thebaw, King of Burmah, 497, 502; General Gloag’s letters about, + Appendix G. + + “Times,” the, 1, 25, 30, 32, 76, 99, 153, 160, 161, 162, 166, 172, + 175, 211, 213, 216, 219, 230, 231, 246, 248, 249, 253, 254, 257, 265, + 274, 275, 354, 360, 361, 365, 367, 385, 397, 399, 426, 435, 445, 447, + 455, 459. + + Tory Democracy, “Am I a Tory Democrat?” 429, 443, 444, 445, Appendix + D; old Tories, 439. _Also_ 414, 441, 463, 465. + + Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. George, Bart., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland, + his description of Clifford Lloyd in Ireland, 268. _Also_ 267, 391. + + Tulba Pasha, commander of garrison at Alexandria in 1882, afterwards + at Kafr Dawar, exiled with Arabi, 63, 64, 324. + + Turkey, dying, 305; ruined by commercial treaties, 307; in Asia, 342; + intended revolution in, 490, 491, 493. + + Urquhart, David, author of “Spirit of the East,” 377; Cardinal + Manning’s opinion of, 500. + + Varkar, Mr. Chandra, 496, 499. + + Vefyk Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier, 242, 245, 302; “a man of crotchets,” + 303; author’s visit to “a most remarkable man,” 306; “our Sultans + worthless,” 307; “the English have lost their political sense,” 308; + on the Sultan, 309; on Egypt, 310, 311; author breakfasts with him, + 313; on Arabian history, 314; Count Corti’s opinion of, 315; his son, + 340. + + “Vengeurs, Les,” 70, Appendix F. + + Victoria, Queen, speech on opening Parliament, 32; her letter to Miss + Gordon, 204, 205, 206, Appendix A; Hassan Fehmy’s audience with, 369. + + Villayet Ali, Nawab, 296. + + Villiers, Hon. Frank, Lord Salisbury’s private secretary, afterwards + Sir Francis Villiers, Ambassador at Lisbon, 495. + + Vivian, Hon. Crespigny, afterwards Lord, and Ambassador at Rome, 123, + 127, 128. + + Volhynia, condition of peasantry in, 298. + + Waddington, M., French Ambassador in London, 254; at the Congress of + Berlin, 320, 321. + + Wagram, Prince, friend of author, author’s visit to, at Gros Bois, + 284, 285; visits Windsor, 479. + + Wales, Prince of, afterwards King Edward VII, 211, 235, 347, 348, 360, + 368, 371, 392, 427, 447. + + Wallace, Sir Mackenzie, 318. + + Walsham, Sir John, Bart., of the Diplomatic Service, 287, 289. + + Warren, Colonel, 22, 23; his method of dealing with Bedouins, 53. + + Watson, General Sir Charles, friend of Gordon, 150, 194, 197; his + letters about Gordon, Appendix A. + + Webb, Mr. Godfrey, clerk of the House of Lords, cousin of the author, + 410. + + Wentworth, Lord, afterwards Earl of Lovelace, brother-in-law of + author, 432, 456. + + West, Mr., British Consul at Suez, 52, 53. + + Whittaker, Mr., editor of the “Levant Herald,” conversation with + author, 303, 304; on the Sultan’s method of dealing with Ambassadors, + 316; he explains Dufferin’s failure, 322. _Also_ 368, 441. + + Wilson, General Sir Charles, Consul in Asia Minor, afterwards at Cairo + and Khartoum, 15, 20, 146, 170, 416; author’s recollection of, 147, + 149; his letters relating to Gordon, Appendix A. + + Wilson, Sir Rivers, Finance Minister in Egypt, friend of author, 93, + 127, 128, 129, 132, 226, 229, 230, 495, 496; his recollection of + Gordon, 132. + + Windsor Park, 439. + + Winton, Mr. De, Anglo-Egyptian official, his talk with the author on + Egypt, 277. + + Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond, afterwards Ambassador, 28, 211, 219, 220, + 262; his mission to Constantinople and Egypt, 456; his plans in Egypt, + 473; his conversations with Jemal-ed-Din, 474, 475, 476, 477. _Also_ + 360, 382, 390, 408, 413, 418, 436, 448, 449, 451, 454, 455, 458, 461, + 480, 481, 488, 489, 490, 491, 494, 504. + + Wolseley, Sir Garnet, afterwards Lord, 1, 4, 5, 8, 50, 78, 150, 159, + 173, 174, 177, 203, 204, 205, 226, 228, 236, 238, 275, 299, 342, 346, + 347, 348, 349, 363, 364, 366, 374, 375, 386, 394, 400, 461; his + position at the Horse Guards, 393; his plan of campaign, 406; is angry + with the Government, 406; and the Nile Expedition, 415, 416; wants to + renew Soudan campaign, 425, 429; resolution for recall of, 431; his + return from Soudan, 459. + + Wood, General Sir Evelyn, in command of the army of occupation, 49, + 51, 150, 194, 197, 201. + + Wood, Mr. Martin, of the Arbitration and Peace Society, he accompanies + author to Hawarden, 356, 357; at the National Liberal Club, 435. + + Wortley, Stuart, Colonel, 373. + + Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George, M.P., afterwards Chief Secretary for + Ireland, cousin of author, 376, 419, 438, 442. + + Wyndham, Sir Hugh, K.C.B., Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, + 298, 299, 301, 363, 364, 374. + + Wyndham, Hon. Percy, M.P. for Cockermouth, cousin of the author, 236, + 266, 271, 274, 298, 299, 363, 364, 375. + + Wynford, Lord, 353. + + Yildiz Palace, the Sultan at, 327; horses paraded at, 341. + + Yusri, Ismaíl, President of the Commission on the Tantah massacres, + 325. + + Zanzibar, Bismarck’s designs on, 394, 395. + + Zebehr Pasha, chief of the slave traders, 116, 119; recruits a + Soudanese force, 190, 200; would he have betrayed Gordon? 191; would + have saved Gordon many mistakes, 192; real reason for his arrest, 403. + _Also_ 200, 494, 495. + + Zogheb Naghib, Syrian merchant of Alexandria, conversations with the + author on board ship, 47, 49, 50, 51. + + + * * * * * + CHISWICK PRESS: PRINTED BY CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO. + TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON. + + + + +FOOTNOTES: + + +[Footnote 1: I find the following in my diary of 11th December 1891: +“Anne called on Princess Nazleh who told her that she did not think the +Khedive Abbas would hear of Arabi’s return. Others say the contrary. She +repeated what we already knew from her that after Tel-el-Kebir Tewfik +ordered two guillotines from France for the execution of the ‘rebels.’ . +. . Dufferin told Princess Nazleh once in an unguarded moment that, if +he had earlier known the kind of man Tewfik was, he would have made the +other (meaning Arabi) Khedive.”] + +[Footnote 2: See “Secret History.”] + +[Footnote 3: See Lord Esher’s “To-day and To-morrow.”] + +[Footnote 4: This is an allusion to certain Sheykhs of the Teaha and +Terrabin tribes in whom I was interested and who were in prison at +Jerusalem.] + +[Footnote 5: Raouf was afterwards named, in contempt of equity, one of +the judges on Arabi’s trial.] + +[Footnote 6: The Hon. Mark Napier, who, with Mr. A. M. Broadley, had +been counsel for Arabi at the trial.] + +[Footnote 7: The Rt. Hon. Robert Bourke, M.P., afterwards Lord +Connemara.] + +[Footnote 8: For Sir William and Lady Gregory see “Secret History.”] + +[Footnote 9: Mr. Chenery, then Editor of the “Times.”] + +[Footnote 10: See “Secret History” and Appendix C.] + +[Footnote 11: Sir Evelyn Wood in command of the Army of Occupation.] + +[Footnote 12: Gabriel Charmes, the well-known French journalist, was the +propounder of most of the fictions current about my action before and +during the war. He was angry with the Nationalists for having knocked +off the subsidies formerly allotted to the foreign press at Cairo. The +rifles were Winchester rifles intended in reality for a new journey we +thought of making to Nejd but never set out on. The Reuter’s telegrams +of the day mentioned them as “seventeen _cases_ of arms.” Several years +afterwards, while being shown over the citadel at Cairo by the then +English Commandant, I found my brass cannon and the rest of the things +that had been taken out of my house in store in the arsenal, and having +identified them got them restored to me.] + +[Footnote 13: Butros Pasha Ghali, the same who, having served English +interests in Egypt for many years, became in 1908 Prime Minister, and +was assassinated on the 20th of February 1910. (See Appendix as to the +Patriarch.)] + +[Footnote 14: This is the same Saad Zagloul who was made Minister of +Public Instruction by Cromer in 1906, and is now (1911) Minister of +Justice.] + +[Footnote 15: Examples of Gordon’s little judgement of individuals he +came personally in contact with may be found in Samuel Baker, King +Leopold, Henry Stanley, and Richard Burton, in all of whom Gordon +thought he had discovered elements of unselfish humanitarian zeal akin +to his own.] + +[Footnote 16: The “Duke of This,” who wanted a steamer, and the “Duke of +That,” who wanted a house, are not difficult of recognition by those who +remember the Egypt of that day. The Duke of Sutherland especially, with +his house speculations, must have been in Gordon’s mind.] + +[Footnote 17: At one moment there was an idea of Gordon’s going to +Zanzibar, where there were points of difficulty needing solution. I +recollect something of this, and that a question had been raised by the +Sultan of Zanzibar in regard to the abolition of slavery in his +dominions. The Sultan was a very enlightened prince, and would have +willingly emancipated the whole of his slaves could he have replaced +them with free labourers, and he had made application to the India +Office for their consent to employ coolies from Bombay to take their +place, and I had some correspondence at the time with Lord Lytton on the +matter, though it led to no result.] + +[Footnote 18: See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 19: See “Secret History.”] + +[Footnote 20: The MS. of Sir William Butler’s Autobiography, recently +published, contained, I am told, a passage which was struck out of the +printed volume in the editing, to the effect that not only did the Cairo +Government of the day reject the proposal of Gordon’s services, but that +he was to have been refused permission to land in Egypt had he proposed +to do so on his way to Jerusalem.] + +[Footnote 21: M. Biovès, in absolving our diplomacy of the charge made +against it by most Egyptian writers that the abandonment of the Soudan +was forced on the Khedive by Cromer with an intention of taking the +abandoned provinces for England later, missed this point. The idea in +1883 was not perhaps of a full acquisition by England of the Soudan, but +certainly of a region ruled by Englishmen in English interests, what +Stead called “Sarawaking the Soudan” after the model of Rajah Brooke’s +government in Borneo.] + +[Footnote 22: Compare “Secret History,” and also later page.] + +[Footnote 23: See “Secret History.”] + +[Footnote 24: See Fitzmaurice.] + +[Footnote 25: See “Secret History.”] + +[Footnote 26: Colonel Chailé-Long, who served under Gordon on the White +Nile from 1874 to 1877, maintains with some show of probability that it +was arranged at this time between Gordon and King Leopold that, although +he was to go as Queen’s officer to sever the Soudan from Egypt, he was +ultimately to make over Khartoum and the Upper Nile Provinces to the +King as part of the King’s Congo State.] + +[Footnote 27: It is worth noticing that these four Ministers were +precisely the four that had had most to do with the original armed +intervention in Egypt in 1882. Northbrook’s name is especially ominous +when we recollect that he was at the head of the Admiralty at the time +of the bombardment of Alexandria, and that it was he who had dispatched +Palmer, as he was now dispatching Gordon, on his fatal mission, a +mission which, like Gordon’s, was to begin with an attempt to bribe +Bedouin tribes, and was to lead to the betrayal of the missioner and his +repudiation by those who sent him. There is extant a letter from +Northbrook to Gordon (see Appendix), written just as he was starting, +telling him that he had ordered a man-of-war to carry him to Souakin, +and that there were £1,000 for his purposes which were being entrusted +for him to Admiral Hewett at Souakin, the very same Admiral to whom +Palmer had been sent, and from whom he had received the money for buying +up the tribes east of the Suez Canal.] + +[Footnote 28: The Hon. Lyulph Stanley, now Lord Sheffield.] + +[Footnote 29: Colonel Burnaby, M.P., author of “The Ride to Khiva,” +afterwards killed at Abu Klea.] + +[Footnote 30: A retired Indian official and well-known friend of native +India, but out of favour with the India Office.] + +[Footnote 31: The Hon. John and Mark Napier (see “Secret History”). Also +see Mrs. Allnatt’s letters in Appendix A.] + +[Footnote 32: M. de Staal, for twenty years Russian Ambassador in +London.] + +[Footnote 33: Berber surrendered to the Mahdi on 19th May; after this +Gordon had no chance of extricating himself from Khartoum.] + +[Footnote 34: Edwin Egerton of the diplomatic service, afterwards Sir +Edwin Egerton, G.C.M.G., His Majesty’s Ambassador at Madrid.] + +[Footnote 35: See Appendix C.] + +[Footnote 36: A political ally during the Arabi trial (see “Secret +History”).] + +[Footnote 37: Compare Lord Cromer’s “Modern Egypt” as to my position +with the Foreign Office and at 10, Downing Street.] + +[Footnote 38: M.P. for Horsham.] + +[Footnote 39: The present Lord Napier of Magdala.] + +[Footnote 40: The Right Hon. James Lowther, M.P.] + +[Footnote 41: Sir C. Rivers Wilson (see “Secret History”).] + +[Footnote 42: The Hon. Henry Brand, M.P., Surveyor-General of the +Ordnance, afterwards 2nd Viscount Hampden.] + +[Footnote 43: The Right Hon. Sir William Harcourt, M.P., Home Secretary, +always a good friend to Egypt.] + +[Footnote 44: M. Jules Ferry, French Prime Minister.] + +[Footnote 45: Mr. O’Kelly, M.P., one of the Parnellite members who had +gone to Dongola as correspondent to the “Daily News.” His article, “The +Mahdi and his Men,” was much the best account of the Mahdist movement +yet published.] + +[Footnote 46: See Appendix B.] + +[Footnote 47: John Morley, M.P., now Lord Morley of Blackburn.] + +[Footnote 48: Sir Donald Currie, an intimate friend of Gladstone.] + +[Footnote 49: Sir George Campbell, M.P., had been formerly Lieutenant- +Governor of Bengal, a Liberal, and a strong friend of native India.] + +[Footnote 50: The Hon. Percy Wyndham, M.P. for Cockermouth.] + +[Footnote 51: The well-known Orientalist and friend of Islam.] + +[Footnote 52: The Hon. Frederick Leveson-Gower, M.P.] + +[Footnote 53: Of the diplomatic service, now Sir Hugh Wyndham, K.C.B.] + +[Footnote 54: See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 55: See “India Under Ripon.”] + +[Footnote 56: See _ibid._] + +[Footnote 57: Sir Michael Hicks Beach, now Lord St. Aldwyn.] + +[Footnote 58: The Rev. Scott Holland, Canon of St. Paul’s.] + +[Footnote 59: Henry, 2nd Lord Stanley of Alderley (see “Secret +History”).] + +[Footnote 60: Lord Lymington, M.P., now Earl of Portsmouth.] + +[Footnote 61: Afterwards Sir Frank Lascelles, G.C.B., ambassador at +Berlin (see “Secret History”).] + +[Footnote 62: Compare page 172.] + +[Footnote 63: Thomas Gibson Bowles, M.P.] + +[Footnote 64: Montague Corry, Lord Beaconsfield’s private secretary, +afterwards Lord Rowton.] + +[Footnote 65: Thomas Burt, M.P., the first Labour Member in the House of +Commons.] + +[Footnote 66: See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 67: The Right Hon. W. G. Forster, M.P.] + +[Footnote 68: Leigh of Lyme, in the diplomatic service, now Lord +Newton.] + +[Footnote 69: The Right Hon. George Wyndham, M.P.] + +[Footnote 70: A Conservative M.P.] + +[Footnote 71: The Right Hon. Sir George Trevelyan, Chief Secretary for +Ireland. He had been Under Secretary to the Admiralty during the +bombardment of Alexandria.] + +[Footnote 72: Sir James Carmichael, M.P.] + +[Footnote 73: The well-known philanthropist.] + +[Footnote 74: This is the portrait which forms the frontispiece of my +“Secret History,” a very excellent likeness.] + +[Footnote 75: See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 76: This is where Lord Stanley was afterwards buried.] + +[Footnote 77: My cousin, Francis Gore Currie.] + +[Footnote 78: Consul and keeper of the Embassy archives.] + +[Footnote 79: My recollection of Bismarck on this occasion is of a tall +thin man making himself very agreeable to Lady Malet and me—there was no +one else present—and talking excellent English.] + +[Footnote 80: Sir John Walsham, Bart.] + +[Footnote 81: Sir Victor Drummond, K.C.M.G., afterwards Her Majesty’s +Minister at Munich.] + +[Footnote 82: See “India Under Ripon.”] + +[Footnote 83: Admiral the Hon. Augustus Hobart, for many years in the +Sultan’s service.] + +[Footnote 84: See “India under Ripon.”] + +[Footnote 85: So, too, the Red Sea, or Phoenician Sea, as to the meaning +of which there have been so many conjectures. The name Bahr el Ahmar was +formerly applied both to the Red Sea and to the Persian Gulf, both of +them originally the homes of the Phoenicians, whose Arabic tribe name, +Beni Himyar, Children of the Red, was turned by the Greeks into +Phoenicians from the Greek word _phoenix_, red. I offer this solution of +the name puzzle to philologists, having no pretension to be one myself.] + +[Footnote 86: Also see Appendix.] + +[Footnote 87: Compare Appendix to “Secret History” (Second edition).] + +[Footnote 88: Mohammed Aarif Bey, afterwards well known at Cairo where +he played many parts, among others that of private secretary to Mukhtar +Pasha Ghazi.] + +[Footnote 89: See “Secret History.”] + +[Footnote 90: See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 91: See Appendix C.] + +[Footnote 92: This relates to a personal explanation made by Lord +Northbrook on the 19th, in which he had treated the “Times” +correspondent in Egypt, Moberly Bell, with the greatest severity, and +the “Times” also as a publisher of false news.] + +[Footnote 93: See “India under Ripon.”] + +[Footnote 94: The report of Mohammed Bey Obeyd’s having escaped to the +Soudan was long prevalent. But it is certain now that he was killed at +Tel-el-Kebir.] + +[Footnote 95: Khartoum fell on 26th January. The news reached London on +5th February; Gordon’s death not known till the 10th February.] + +[Footnote 96: General Sir Herbert Stewart in command of the relief +column.] + +[Footnote 97: The Hon. Charles Hardinge, of the diplomatic service, +private secretary to Lord Dufferin at Constantinople, now Lord Hardinge +of Penshurst, Viceroy of India.] + +[Footnote 98: Field Marshal Lord Lucan, an ancient Crimean hero.] + +[Footnote 99: I leave this epithet as it stands in my diary, explaining +only that of course it does not apply to Lord Esher’s private character, +but only to his official intrigues as Lord Hartington’s private +secretary.] + +[Footnote 100: General Lord Mark Kerr.] + +[Footnote 101: Seyd Huseyn Bilgrami, afterwards Member of Council.] + +[Footnote 102: General Sir Charles Wilson, who on the death of General +Stewart had taken command of the relief expedition.] + +[Footnote 103: Sir Henry Austin Lee, K.C.M.G., private secretary to Lord +E. Fitzmaurice at the Foreign Office, now English representative on the +Suez Canal Committee.] + +[Footnote 104: The Sultan at no time wished to restore Ismaïl; but +Ismaïl had come to London to push on the interests of his restoration to +Egypt in the English press. He was helped in this by Broadley, Stead, +and Madame de Novikof.] + +[Footnote 105: Seyd Nebbi Ullah Khan of Lucknow.] + +[Footnote 106: The Hon. Sir Michael Herbert, of the Paris Embassy, +afterwards Ambassador at Washington.] + +[Footnote 107: Sir Edward and Lady Blount of Paris.] + +[Footnote 108: Now Lord Courtney of Penwith.] + +[Footnote 109: See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 110: See Appendix B.] + +[Footnote 111: The Right Hon. Sydney Buxton, M.P.] + +[Footnote 112: See Appendix G.] + +[Footnote 113: Compare Sir Charles Wilson and also Sir William Butler.] + +[Footnote 114: This is interesting as showing that the idea of what was +afterwards Wolff’s Convention was already being thought of in +Gladstone’s time.] + +[Footnote 115: Compare the Marchand mission of a dozen years later.] + +[Footnote 116: Compare Gordon’s diary at Khartoum and my letter to Lord +Dufferin in Appendix C.] + +[Footnote 117: Captain William O’Shea, M.P., of lugubrious memory. I had +been at school with him.] + +[Footnote 118: Compare his book “Modern Egypt.”] + +[Footnote 119: See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 120: The Conservative Party agent.] + +[Footnote 121: Field-Marshal Lord Roberts.] + +[Footnote 122: Schomberg, 9th Marquess of Lothian. I had been with him +as his fellow _attaché_ at the Frankfort Legation in 1861-2, when we had +been close friends.] + +[Footnote 123: Lady Archibald Campbell.] + +[Footnote 124: See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 125: See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 126: Stafford Northcote had just been created Earl of +Iddesleigh.] + +[Footnote 127: Afterwards Sir Henry Cotton, K.C.S.I., Chief Commissioner +in Assam and M.P.] + +[Footnote 128: Sally Shackle, daughter of the Duke of Somerset’s +warrener at Bulstrode, entered my father’s service at Crabbet in 1823 as +cook and housekeeper, having just married Henry Sellwood, my father’s +valet, and lived on at Crabbet, with the exception of the few years of +my elder brother’s minority, till 1894, when she died, after seventy +years of honourable service spent, almost all of it, in one house.] + +[Footnote 129: Alfred Milner, now Lord Milner. He was at that time +assistant editor to Mr. Stead, who was for the moment in prison in +connection with the “Purity Campaign” he had been carrying on in the +“Pall Mall Gazette.” My letter, if I remember rightly, was on Tory +Socialism.] + +[Footnote 130: These entries about Ferid Bey are extremely interesting +now in connection with what happened on precisely the same lines in +Turkey twenty-three years later in 1908.] + +[Footnote 131: Afterwards the Right Hon. St. John Brodrick, M.P., now +Lord Midleton.] + +[Footnote 132: Permanent Under-Secretary of State, afterwards ambassador +in America.] + +[Footnote 133: Lord Salisbury’s private secretary, now Sir Francis +Villiers, ambassador at Lisbon.] + +[Footnote 134: See Appendix.] + +[Footnote 135: This is necessary to the sense, but the group or some +equivalent has been omitted in cyphering.—A. W. M. 12/8] + + + + +Transcriber's note: + + +Some minor orthographic and punctuation changes have been done silently. + +Spelling inconsistencies have been left unchanged. + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78995 *** |