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diff --git a/78977-h/78977-h.htm b/78977-h/78977-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..84d2998 --- /dev/null +++ b/78977-h/78977-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,2662 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> + <head> + <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> + <meta charset="UTF-8"> + <title>Symbolism, its meaning and effect | Project Gutenberg</title> + <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover"> + <style> + body { margin-left: 8%; margin-right: 10%; } + h1 { text-align: center; font-weight: normal; font-size: 1.4em; } + h2 { text-align: center; font-weight: normal; font-size: 1.2em; } + h3 { text-align: center; font-weight: normal; font-size: 1.2em; } + .pageno { right: 1%; font-size: x-small; background-color: inherit; color: silver; + text-indent: 0em; text-align: right; position: absolute; + border: thin solid silver; padding: .1em .2em; font-style: normal; + font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; } + p { text-indent: 0; margin-top: 0.5em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; text-align: justify; } + sup { vertical-align: top; font-size: 0.6em; } + .sc { font-variant: small-caps; } + .large { font-size: large; } + .xlarge { font-size: x-large; } + .xxlarge { font-size: xx-large; } + abbr { border-bottom-width: thin; border-bottom-style: dotted; } + abbr.spell { speak-as: spell-out; } + .lg-container-b { text-align: center; } + .x-ebookmaker .lg-container-b { clear: both; } + .linegroup { display: inline-block; text-align: left; } + .x-ebookmaker .linegroup { display: block; margin-left: 1.5em; } + .linegroup .group { margin: 1em auto; } + .linegroup .line { text-indent: -3em; padding-left: 3em; } + div.linegroup > :first-child { margin-top: 0; } + .linegroup .in12 { padding-left: 9.0em; } + .linegroup .in14 { padding-left: 10.0em; } + ul.ul_1 {padding-left: 0; margin-left: 2.78%; margin-top: .5em; + margin-bottom: .5em; list-style-type: disc; } + ul.ul_2 {padding-left: 0; margin-left: 6.94%; margin-top: .5em; + margin-bottom: .5em; list-style-type: circle; } + div.footnote {margin-left: 2.5em; } + div.footnote > :first-child { margin-top: 1em; } + div.footnote .label { display: inline-block; width: 0em; text-indent: -2.5em; + text-align: right; } + div.pbb { page-break-before: always; } + hr.pb { border: none; border-bottom: thin solid; margin-bottom: 1em; } + .x-ebookmaker hr.pb { display: none; } + .chapter { clear: both; page-break-before: always; } + .figcenter { clear: both; max-width: 100%; margin: 2em auto; text-align: center; } + .figcenter img { max-width: 100%; height: auto; } + .id001 { width:80%; } + .x-ebookmaker .id001 { margin-left:10%; width:80%; } + .ig001 { width:100%; } + .nf-center { text-align: center; } + .nf-center-c1 { text-align: left; margin: 1em 0; } + .c000 { margin-top: 1em; } + .c001 { page-break-before: always; margin-top: 1em; } + .c002 { margin-top: 4em; } + .c003 { margin-left: 5.56%; margin-top: 1em; font-size: 95%; } + .c004 { page-break-before:auto; margin-top: 4em; } + .c005 { margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; } + .c006 { margin-top: 0.5em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; } + .c007 { page-break-before: always; margin-top: 2em; } + .c008 { text-decoration: none; } + .c009 { margin-top: 1em; margin-bottom: 0.5em; } + div.tnotes { padding-left:1em;padding-right:1em;background-color:#E3E4FA; + border:1px solid silver;margin:1em 5% 0 5%;text-align:justify; } + abbr {border:none; text-decoration:none; font-variant:normal; } + </style> + </head> + + <body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78977 ***</div> + + +<div class='figcenter id001'> +<span class='pageno' id='Page_on'>on</span> +<img src='images/cover.jpg' alt='' class='ig001'> +</div> +<div class='pbb'> + <hr class='pb c000'> +</div> +<div> + <h1 class='c001'>Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect</h1> +</div> + +<div class='nf-center-c1'> +<div class='nf-center c002'> + <div><span class='pageno' id='Page_iii'>iii</span><span class='xxlarge'><b>SYMBOLISM</b></span></div> + <div class='c000'><span class='xlarge'><b>Its Meaning and Effect</b></span></div> + <div class='c000'><span class='large'>BY</span></div> + <div><span class='xxlarge'><b>ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD</b></span></div> + <div class='c000'><span class='large'><abbr class='spell'>F.R.S.</abbr>, <abbr class='spell'>SC.D.</abbr> (CAMBRIDGE),</span></div> + <div><span class='large'>HON. <abbr class='spell'>D.SC.</abbr> (MANCHESTER).</span></div> + <div><span class='large'>HON. <abbr class='spell'>LL.D.</abbr> (ST. ANDREWS),</span></div> + <div><span class='large'>HON. <abbr class='spell'>D.SC.</abbr> (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN),</span></div> + <div><span class='large'>HON. <abbr class='spell'>SC.D.</abbr> (HARVARD AND YALE).</span></div> + <div><span class='large'>FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE IN</span></div> + <div><span class='large'>THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE AND PROFESSOR</span></div> + <div><span class='large'>OF PHILOSOPHY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY</span></div> + <div class='c000'><span class='sc'>Barbour-Page Lectures</span></div> + <div><span class='sc'>University of Virginia</span></div> + <div>1927</div> + <div class='c000'>New York</div> + <div>THE MACMILLAN COMPANY</div> + <div>1927</div> + </div> +</div> + +<div class='lg-container-b c003'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'><span class='pageno' id='Page_iv'>iv</span>Copyright, 1927,</div> + <div class='line'>By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.</div> + </div> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>Set up and electrotyped.</div> + <div class='line'>Published November, 1927.</div> + </div> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'><i>Printed in the United States of America by</i></div> + <div class='line'><abbr class='spell'>J. J.</abbr> LITTLE AND IVES COMPANY, NEW YORK</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_v'>v</span> + <h2 class='c004'>DEDICATION</h2> +</div> +<p class='c005'>These chapters were written before I had seen +the Washington monument which faces the Capitol +in the City of Washington, and before I had +enjoyed the experience of crossing the borders of +the State of Virginia—a great experience for an +Englishman.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Virginia, that symbol for romance throughout +the world of English speech: Virginia, which was +captured for that world in the romantic period +of English history by Sir Walter Raleigh, its most +romantic figure: Virginia, which has been true +to its origin and has steeped its history in +romance.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Romance does not yield unbroken happiness: +Sir Walter Raleigh suffered for his romance. +Romance does not creep along the ground; like the +memorial to Washington, it reaches upward—a +silver thread uniting earth to the blue of heaven +above.</p> + +<p class='c006'>April 18, 1927.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_vii'>vii</span> + <h2 class='c004'>PREFACE</h2> +</div> +<p class='c005'>In accordance with the terms of the Barbour-Page +Foundation, these lectures are published by +the University of Virginia. The author owes his +thanks to the authorities of the university for +their courtesy in conforming to his wishes in respect +to some important details of publication. +With the exception of a few trifling changes the +lectures are printed as delivered.</p> + +<p class='c006'>These lectures will be best understood by +reference to some portions of Locke’s <i>Essay +Concerning Human Understanding</i>. The author’s +acknowledgments are due to <i>Locke’s +Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations</i> +by Professor James Gibson, to <i>Prolegomena +to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge</i> by +Professor Norman Kemp Smith, and to <i>Scepticism +and Animal Faith</i> by George Santayana.</p> + +<p class='c006'><abbr class='spell'>A. N. W.</abbr></p> + +<p class='c006'>Harvard University, June, 1927.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_ix'>ix</span> + <h2 class='c004'>CONTENTS</h2> +</div> +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap1'>CHAPTER <abbr title='one'>I</abbr></a> ... 1</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-01'>1. <span class='sc'>Kinds of Symbolism</span></a> ... 1</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-02'>2. <span class='sc'>Symbolism and Perception</span></a> ... 2</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-03'>3. <span class='sc'>On Methodology</span></a> ... 5</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-04'>4. <span class='sc'>Fallibility and Symbolism</span></a> ... 6</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-05'>5. <span class='sc'>Definition of Symbolism</span></a> ... 7</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-06'>6. <span class='sc'>Experience as Activity</span></a> ... 9</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-07'>7. <span class='sc'>Language</span></a> ... 10</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-08'>8. <span class='sc'>Presentational Immediacy</span></a> ... 13</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-09'>9. <span class='sc'>Perceptive Experience</span></a> ... 16</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-10'>10. <span class='sc'>Symbolic Reference in Perceptive Experience</span></a> ... 18</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-11'>11. <span class='sc'>Mental and Physical</span></a> ... 20</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-12'>12. <span class='sc'>Rôles of Sense-Data and Space in Presentational Immediacy</span></a> ... 21</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect1-13'>13. <span class='sc'>Objectification</span></a> ... 25</p> +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap2'>CHAPTER <abbr title='two'>II</abbr></a> ... 30</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect2-1'>1. <span class='sc'>Hume on Causal Efficacy</span></a> ... 30</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect2-2'>2. <span class='sc'>Kant and Causal Efficacy</span></a> ... 37</p> + +<p class='c006'><span class='pageno' id='Page_x'>x</span><a href='#sect2-3'>3. <span class='sc'>Direct Perception of Causal Efficacy</span></a> ... 39</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect2-4'>4. <span class='sc'>Primitiveness of Causal Efficacy</span></a> ... 43</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect2-5'>5. <span class='sc'>The Intersection of the Modes of Perception</span></a> ... 49</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect2-6'>6. <span class='sc'>Localization</span></a> ... 53</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect2-7'>7. <span class='sc'>The Contrast Between Accurate Definition and Importance</span></a> ... 56</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect2-8'>8. <span class='sc'>Conclusion</span></a> ... 59</p> +<p class='c005'><a href='#chap3'>CHAPTER <abbr title='three'>III</abbr></a> ... 60</p> + +<p class='c006'><a href='#sect3-1'><span class='sc'>Uses of Symbolism</span></a> ... 60</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_1'>1</span> + <h2 id='chap1' class='c004'>CHAPTER <abbr title='one'>I</abbr></h2> +</div> +<h3 id='sect1-01' class='c007'>1. <i>Kinds of Symbolism.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>The slightest survey of different epochs of +civilization discloses great differences in their attitude +towards symbolism. For example, during +the medieval period in Europe symbolism seemed +to dominate men’s imaginations. Architecture +was symbolical, ceremonial was symbolical, +heraldry was symbolical. With the Reformation +a reaction set in. Men tried to dispense with +symbols as ‘fond things, vainly invented,’ and +concentrated on their direct apprehension of the +ultimate facts.</p> + +<p class='c006'>But such symbolism is on the fringe of life. It +has an unessential element in its constitution. The +very fact that it can be acquired in one epoch and +discarded in another epoch testifies to its superficial +nature.</p> + +<p class='c006'><span class='pageno' id='Page_2'>2</span>There are deeper types of symbolism, in a sense +artificial, and yet such that we could not get on +without them. Language, written or spoken, is +such a symbolism. The mere sound of a word, +or its shape on paper, is indifferent. The word +is a symbol, and its meaning is constituted by the +ideas, images, and emotions, which it raises in +the mind of the hearer.</p> + +<p class='c006'>There is also another sort of language, purely +a written language, which is constituted by the +mathematical symbols of the science of algebra. +In some ways, these symbols are different to those +of ordinary language, because the manipulation +of the algebraical symbols does your reasoning +for you, provided that you keep to the algebraic +rules. This is not the case with ordinary language. +You can never forget the meaning of +language, and trust to mere syntax to help you +out. In any case, language and algebra seem to +exemplify more fundamental types of symbolism +than do the Cathedrals of Medieval Europe.</p> +<h3 id='sect1-02' class='c007'>2. <i>Symbolism and Perception.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>There is still another symbolism more fundamental +than any of the foregoing types. We look +up and see a coloured shape in front of us, and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_3'>3</span>we say,—there is a chair. But what we have +seen is the mere coloured shape. Perhaps an +artist might not have jumped to the notion of a +chair. He might have stopped at the mere contemplation +of a beautiful colour and a beautiful +shape. But those of us who are not artists are +very prone, especially if we are tired, to pass +straight from the perception of the coloured shape +to the enjoyment of the chair, in some way of use, +or of emotion, or of thought. We can easily explain +this passage by reference to a train of difficult +logical inference, whereby, having regard to +our previous experiences of various shapes and +various colours, we draw the probable conclusion +that we are in the presence of a chair. I am very +sceptical as to the high-grade character of the +mentality required to get from the coloured shape +to the chair. One reason for this scepticism Is +that my friend the artist, who kept himself to the +contemplation of colour, shape and position, was +a very highly trained man, and had acquired this +facility of ignoring the chair at the cost of great +labour. We do not require elaborate training +merely in order to refrain from embarking upon +intricate trains of inference. Such abstinence is +only too easy. Another reason for scepticism is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_4'>4</span>that if we had been accompanied by a puppy dog, +in addition to the artist, the dog would have acted +immediately on the hypothesis of a chair and +would have jumped onto it by way of using it as +such. Again, if the dog had refrained from such +action, it would have been because it was a well-trained +dog. Therefore the transition from a +coloured shape to the notion of an object which +can be used for all sorts of purposes which have +nothing to do with colour, seems to be a very +natural one; and we—men and puppy dogs—require +careful training if we are to refrain from +acting upon it.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Thus coloured shapes seem to be symbols for +some other elements in our experience, and when +we see the coloured shapes we adjust our actions +towards those other elements. This symbolism +from our senses to the bodies symbolized is often +mistaken. A cunning adjustment of lights and +mirrors may completely deceive us; and even when +we are not deceived, we only save ourselves by +an effort. Symbolism from sense-presentation to +physical bodies is the most natural and widespread +of all symbolic modes. It is not a mere tropism, +or automatic turning towards, because both men +and puppies often disregard chairs when they see +<span class='pageno' id='Page_5'>5</span>them. Also a tulip which turns to the light has +probably the very minimum of sense-presentation. +I shall argue on the assumption that sense-perception +is mainly a characteristic of more advanced +organisms; whereas all organisms have experience +of causal efficacy whereby their functioning +is conditioned by their environment.</p> +<h3 id='sect1-03' class='c007'>3. <i>On Methodology.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>In fact symbolism is very largely concerned with +the use of pure sense-perceptions in the character +of symbols for more primitive elements in our experience. +Accordingly since sense-perceptions, of +any importance, are characteristic of high-grade +organisms, I shall chiefly confine this study of +symbolism to the influence of symbolism on human +life. It is a general principle that low-grade characteristics +are better studied first in connection +with correspondingly low-grade organisms, in +which those characteristics are not obscured by +more developed types of functioning. Conversely, +high-grade characters should be studied +first in connection with those organisms in which +they first come to full perfection.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Of course, as a second approximation to elicit +the full sweep of particular characters, we want +<span class='pageno' id='Page_6'>6</span>to know the embryonic stage of the high-grade +character, and the ways in which low-grade characters +can be made subservient to higher types of +functioning.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The nineteenth century exaggerated the power +of the historical method, and assumed as a matter +of course that every character should be +studied only in its embryonic stage. Thus, for +example, ‘Love’ has been studied among the +savages and latterly among the morons.</p> +<h3 id='sect1-04' class='c007'>4. <i>Fallibility of Symbolism.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>There is one great difference between symbolism +and direct knowledge. Direct experience +is infallible. What you have experienced, you +have experienced. But symbolism is very fallible, +in the sense that it may induce actions, feelings, +emotions, and beliefs about things which are mere +notions without that exemplification in the world +which the symbolism leads us to presuppose. I +shall develop the thesis that symbolism is an essential +factor in the way we function as the result +of our direct knowledge. Successful high-grade +organisms are only possible, on the condition that +their symbolic functionings are usually justified so +far as important issues are concerned. But the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_7'>7</span>errors of mankind equally spring from symbolism. +It is the task of reason to understand and purge +the symbols on which humanity depends.</p> + +<p class='c006'>An adequate account of human mentality requires +an explanation of (<abbr title='one'>i</abbr>) how we can know +truly, (<abbr title='two'>ii</abbr>) how we can err, and (<abbr title='three'>iii</abbr>) how we can +critically distinguish truth from error. Such an +explanation requires that we distinguish that type +of mental functioning which by its nature yields immediate +acquaintance with fact, from that type of +functioning which is only trustworthy by reason of +its satisfaction of certain criteria provided by the +first type of functioning.</p> + +<p class='c006'>I shall maintain that the first type of functioning +is properly to be called ‘Direct Recognition,’ +and the second type ‘Symbolic Reference.’ I shall +also endeavour to illustrate the doctrine that all +human symbolism, however superficial it may +seem, is ultimately to be reduced to trains of this +fundamental symbolic reference, trains which +finally connect percepts in alternative modes of direct +recognition.</p> +<h3 id='sect1-05' class='c007'>5. <i>Definition of Symbolism.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>After this prefatory explanation, we must start +from a formal definition of symbolism: The human +<span class='pageno' id='Page_8'>8</span>mind is functioning symbolically when some +components of its experience elicit consciousness, +beliefs, emotions, and usages, respecting other +components of its experience. The former set of +components are the ‘symbols,’ and the latter set +constitute the ‘meaning’ of the symbols. The organic +functioning whereby there is transition from +the symbol to the meaning will be called ‘symbolic +reference.’</p> + +<p class='c006'>This symbolic reference is the active synthetic +element contributed by the nature of the percipient. +It requires a ground founded on some community +between the natures of symbol and meaning. +But such a common element in the two +natures does not of itself necessitate symbolic reference, +nor does it decide which shall be symbol +and which shall be meaning, nor does it secure that +the symbolic reference shall be immune from producing +errors and disasters for the percipient. We +must conceive perception in the light of a primary +phase in the self-production of an occasion of actual +existence.</p> + +<p class='c006'>In defence of this notion of self-production arising +out of some primary given phase, I would remind +you that, apart from it, there can be no +moral responsibility. The potter, and not the pot, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_9'>9</span>is responsible for the shape of the pot. An actual +occasion arises as the bringing together into one +real context diverse perceptions, diverse feelings, +diverse purposes, and other diverse activities arising +out of those primary perceptions. Here activity +is another name for self-production.</p> +<h3 id='sect1-06' class='c007'>6. <i>Experience as Activity.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>In this way we assign to the percipient an activity +in the production of its own experience, although +that moment of experience, in its character +of being that one occasion, is nothing else than the +percipient itself. Thus, for the percipient at least, +the perception is an internal relationship between +itself and the things perceived.</p> + +<p class='c006'>In analysis the total activity involved in perception +of the symbolic reference must be referred +to the percipient. Such symbolic reference requires +something in common between symbol and +meaning which can be expressed without reference +to the perfected percipient; but it also requires +some activity of the percipient which can be considered +without recourse either to the particular +symbol or its particular meaning. Considered by +themselves the symbol and its meaning do not require +<i>either</i> that there shall be a symbolic reference +<span class='pageno' id='Page_10'>10</span>between the two, <i>or</i> that the symbolic +reference between the members of the couple +should be one way on rather than the other way +on. The nature of their relationship does not in +itself determine which is symbol and which is +meaning. There are no components of experience +which are only symbols or only meanings. The +more usual symbolic reference is from the less +primitive component as symbol to the more primitive +as meaning.</p> + +<p class='c006'>This statement is the foundation of a thoroughgoing +realism. It does away with any mysterious +element in our experience which is merely meant, +and thereby behind the veil of direct perception. +It proclaims the principle that symbolic reference +holds between two components in a complex experience, +each intrinsically capable of direct recognition. +Any lack of such conscious analytical recognition +is the fault of the defect in mentality on +the part of a comparatively low-grade percipient.</p> +<h3 id='sect1-07' class='c007'>7. <i>Language.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>To exemplify the inversion of symbol and meaning, +consider language and the things meant by +language. A word is a symbol. But a word can +be either written or spoken. Now on occasions +<span class='pageno' id='Page_11'>11</span>a written word may suggest the corresponding +spoken word, and that sound may suggest a +meaning.</p> + +<p class='c006'>In such an instance, the written word is a symbol +and its meaning is the spoken word, and the +spoken word is a symbol and its meaning is +the dictionary meaning of the word, spoken or +written.</p> + +<p class='c006'>But often the written word effects its purpose +without the intervention of the spoken word. Accordingly, +then, the written word directly symbolizes +the dictionary meaning. But so fluctuating +and complex is human experience that in general +neither of these cases is exemplified in the clear-cut +way which is set out here. Often the written +word suggests both the spoken word and also the +meaning, and the symbolic reference is made +clearer and more definite by the additional reference +of the spoken word to the same meaning. +Analogously we can start from the spoken word +which may elicit a visual perception of the written +word.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Further, why do we say that the word ‘tree’—spoken +or written—is a symbol to us for trees? +Both the word itself and trees themselves enter +into our experience on equal terms; and it would +<span class='pageno' id='Page_12'>12</span>be just as sensible, viewing the question abstractedly, +for trees to symbolize the word ‘tree’ as for +the word to symbolize the trees.</p> + +<p class='c006'>This is certainly true, and human nature sometimes +works that way. For example, if you are a +poet and wish to write a lyric on trees, you will +walk into the forest in order that the trees may +suggest the appropriate words. Thus for the poet +in his ecstasy—or perhaps, agony—of composition +the trees are the symbols and the words are the +meaning. He concentrates on the trees in order to +get at the words.</p> + +<p class='c006'>But most of us are not poets, though we read +their lyrics with proper respect. For us, the words +are the symbols which enable us to capture the +rapture of the poet in the forest. The poet is a +person for whom visual sights and sounds and +emotional experiences refer symbolically to words. +The poet’s readers are people for whom his words +refer symbolically to the visual sights and sounds +and emotions he wants to evoke. Thus in the use +of language there is a double symbolic reference:—from +things to words on the part of the speaker, +and from words back to things on the part of the +listener.</p> + +<p class='c006'>When in an act of human experience there is a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_13'>13</span>symbolic reference, there are in the first place two +sets of components with some objective relationship +between them, and this relationship will vary +greatly in different instances. In the second place +the total constitution of the percipient has to effect +the symbolic reference from one set of components, +the symbols, to the other set of components, +the meaning. In the third place, the question, +as to which set of components form the +symbols and which set the meaning, also depends +on the peculiar constitution of that act of experience.</p> +<h3 id='sect1-08' class='c007'>8. <i>Presentational Immediacy.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>The most fundamental exemplification of symbolism +has already been alluded to in the discussion +of the poet and the circumstances which elicit +his poetry. We have here a particular instance +of the reference of words to things. But this general +relation of words to things is only a particular +instance of a yet more general fact. Our perception +of the external world is divided into two +types of content: one type is the familiar immediate +presentation of the contemporary world, by +means of our projection of our immediate sensations, +determining for us characteristics of contemporary +<span class='pageno' id='Page_14'>14</span>physical entities. This type is the experience +of the immediate world around us, a +world decorated by sense-data dependent on the +immediate states of relevant parts of our own +bodies. Physiology establishes this latter fact conclusively; +but the physiological details are irrelevant +to the present philosophical discussion, and +only confuse the issue. ‘Sense-datum’ is a modern +term: Hume uses the word ‘impression.’</p> + +<p class='c006'>For human beings, this type of experience is +vivid, and is especially distinct in its exhibition of +the spatial regions and relationships within the +contemporary world.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The familiar language which I have used in +speaking of the ‘projection of our sensations’ is +very misleading. There are no bare sensations +which are first experienced and then ‘projected’ +into our feet as their feelings, or onto the opposite +wall as its colour. The projection is an integral +part of the situation, quite as original as the +sense-data. It would be just as accurate, and +equally misleading, to speak of a projection on the +wall which is then characterized as such-and-such a +colour. The use of the term ‘wall’ is equally misleading +by its suggestion of information derived +symbolically from another mode of perception. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_15'>15</span>This so-called ‘wall,’ disclosed in the pure mode of +presentational immediacy, contributes itself to our +experience only under the guise of spatial extension, +combined with spatial perspective, and combined +with sense-data which in this example reduce +to colour alone.</p> + +<p class='c006'>I say that the wall contributes <i>itself</i> under this +guise, in preference to saying that it contributes +these universal characters in combination. For the +characters are combined by their exposition of one +thing in a common world including ourselves, that +one thing which I call the ‘wall.’ Our perception +is not confined to universal characters; we do not +perceive disembodied colour or disembodied extensiveness: +we perceive <i>the wall’s</i> colour and extensiveness. +The experienced fact is ‘colour away +on the wall for us.’ Thus the colour and the spatial +perspective are abstract elements, characterizing +the concrete way in which the wall enters into +our experience. They are therefore relational elements +between the ‘percipient at that moment,’ +and that other equally actual entity, or set of entities, +which we call the ‘wall at that moment.’ +But the mere colour and the mere spatial perspective +are very abstract entities, because they are +only arrived at by discarding the concrete relationship +<span class='pageno' id='Page_16'>16</span>between the wall-at-that-moment and the percipient-at-that-moment. +This concrete relationship +is a physical fact which may be very unessential to +the wall and very essential to the percipient. The +spatial relationship is equally essential both to wall +and percipient: but the colour side of the relationship +is at that moment indifferent to the wall, +though it is part of the make-up of the percipient. +In this sense, and subject to their spatial relationship, +contemporary events happen independently. +I call this type of experience ‘presentational immediacy.’ +It expresses how contemporary events +are relevant to each other, and yet preserve a mutual +independence. This relevance amid independence +is the peculiar character of contemporaneousness. +This presentational immediacy is only +of importance in high-grade organisms, and is a +physical fact which may, or may not, enter into +consciousness. Such entry will depend on attention +and on the activity of conceptual functioning, +whereby physical experience and conceptual imagination +are fused into knowledge.</p> +<h3 id='sect1-09' class='c007'>9. <i>Perceptive Experience.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>The word ‘experience’ is one of the most deceitful +in philosophy. Its adequate discussion +<span class='pageno' id='Page_17'>17</span>would be the topic for a treatise. I can only +indicate those elements in my analysis of it +which are relevant to the present train of +thought.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Our experience, so far as it is primarily concerned +with our direct recognition of a solid world +of other things which are actual in the same sense +that we are actual, has three main independent +modes each contributing its share of components +to our individual rise into one concrete moment of +human experience. Two of these modes of experience +I will call perceptive, and the third I will +call the mode of conceptual analysis. In respect +to pure perception, I call one of the two types concerned +the mode of ‘presentational immediacy,’ +and the other the mode of ‘causal efficacy.’ Both +‘presentational immediacy’ and ‘causal efficacy’ introduce +into human experience components which +are again analysable into actual things of the actual +world and into abstract attributes, qualities, +and relations, which express how those other actual +things contribute themselves as components to +our individual experience. These abstractions express +how other actualities are component objects +for us. I will therefore say that they ‘objectify’ +for us the actual things in our ‘environment.’ Our +<span class='pageno' id='Page_18'>18</span>most immediate environment is constituted by the +various organs of our own bodies, our more remote +environment is the physical world in the +neighbourhood. But the word ‘environment’ +means those other actual things, which are ‘objectified’ +in some important way so as to form +component elements in our individual experience.</p> +<h3 id='sect1-10' class='c007'>10. <i>Symbolic Reference in Perceptive Experience.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>Of the two distinct perceptive modes, one mode +‘objectifies’ actual things under the guise of presentational +immediacy, and the other mode, which +I have not yet discussed, ‘objectifies’ them under +the guise of causal efficacy. The synthetic activity +whereby these two modes are fused into one perception +is what I have called ‘symbolic reference.’ +By symbolic reference the various actualities disclosed +respectively by the two modes are either +identified, or are at least correlated together as +interrelated elements in our environment. Thus +the result of symbolic reference is what the actual +world is for us, as that datum in our experience +productive of feelings, emotions, satisfactions, actions, +and finally as the topic for conscious recognition +when our mentality intervenes with its conceptual +<span class='pageno' id='Page_19'>19</span>analysis. ‘Direct recognition’ is conscious +recognition of a percept in a pure mode, devoid of +symbolic reference.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Symbolic reference may be, in many respects, erroneous. +By this I mean that some ‘direct recognition’ +disagrees, in its report of the actual world, +with the conscious recognition of the fused product +resulting from symbolic reference. Thus error is +primarily the product of symbolic reference, and +not of conceptual analysis. Also symbolic reference +itself is not primarily the outcome of conceptual +analysis, though it is greatly promoted by it. +For symbolic reference is still dominant in experience +when such mental analysis is at a low ebb. +We all know Aesop’s fable of the dog who +dropped a piece of meat to grasp at its reflection +in the water. We must not, however, judge too +severely of error. In the initial stages of mental +progress, error in symbolic reference is the discipline +which promotes imaginative freedom. +Aesop’s dog lost his meat, but he gained a step on +the road towards a free imagination.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Thus symbolic reference must be explained antecedently +to conceptual analysis, although there is a +strong interplay between the two whereby they +promote each other.</p> +<div> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_20'>20</span> + <h3 id='sect1-11' class='c007'>11. <i>Mental and Physical.</i></h3> +</div> +<p class='c005'>By way of being as intelligible as possible we +might tacitly assign symbolic reference to mental +activity, and thereby avoid some detailed explanation. +It is a matter of pure convention as to which +of our experiential activities we term mental and +which physical. Personally I prefer to restrict +mentality to those experiential activities which include +concepts in addition to percepts. But much +of our perception is due to the enhanced subtlety +arising from a concurrent conceptual analysis. +Thus in fact there is no proper line to be drawn +between the physical and the mental constitution of +experience. But there is no conscious knowledge +apart from the intervention of mentality in the +form of conceptual analysis.</p> + +<p class='c006'>It will be necessary later on to make some slight +reference to conceptual analysis; but at present I +must assume consciousness and its partial analysis +of experience, and return to the two modes of pure +perception. The point that I want to make here +is, that the reason why low-grade purely physical +organisms cannot make mistakes is not primarily +their absence of thought, but their absence of presentational +immediacy. Aesop’s dog, who was a +<span class='pageno' id='Page_21'>21</span>poor thinker, made a mistake by reason of an erroneous +symbolic reference from presentational +immediacy to causal efficacy. In short, truth and +error dwell in the world by reason of synthesis: +every actual thing is synthetic: and symbolic reference +is one primitive form of synthetic activity +whereby what is actual arises from its given +phases.</p> +<h3 id='sect1-12' class='c007'>12. <i>Rôles of Sense-data and Space in Presentational Immediacy.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>By ‘presentational immediacy’ I mean what is +usually termed ‘sense-perception.’ But I am using +the former term under limitations and extensions +which are foreign to the common use of the latter +term.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Presentational immediacy is our immediate perception +of the contemporary external world, appearing +as an element constitutive of our own experience. +In this appearance the world discloses +itself to be a community of actual things, which +are actual in the same sense as we are.</p> + +<p class='c006'>This appearance is effected by the mediation of +qualities, such as colours, sounds, tastes, etc., +which can with equal truth be described as our +sensations or as the qualities of the actual things +<span class='pageno' id='Page_22'>22</span>which we perceive. These qualities are thus relational +between the perceiving subject and the +perceived things. They can be thus isolated only +by abstracting them from their implication in the +scheme of spatial relatedness of the perceived +things to each other and to the perceiving subject. +This relatedness of spatial extension is a complete +scheme, impartial between the observer and the +perceived things. It is the scheme of the morphology +of the complex organisms forming the community +of the contemporary world. The way in +which each actual physical organism enters into +the make-up of its contemporaries has to conform +to this scheme. Thus the sense-data, such as colours, +etc., or bodily feelings, introduce the extended +physical entities into our experience under +perspectives provided by this spatial scheme. The +spatial relations by themselves are generic abstractions, +and the sense-data are generic abstractions. +But the perspectives of the sense-data provided by +the spatial relations are the specific relations +whereby the external contemporary things are to +this extent part of our experience. These contemporary +organisms, thus introduced as ‘objects’ +into experience, include the various organs of our +body, and the sense-data are then called bodily +<span class='pageno' id='Page_23'>23</span>feelings. The bodily organs, and those other external +things which make important contributions +to this mode of our perception, together form the +contemporary environment of the percipient organism. +The main facts about presentational immediacy +are: (<abbr title='one'>i</abbr>) that the sense-data involved +depend on the percipient organism and its spatial +relations to the perceived organisms; (<abbr title='two'>ii</abbr>) that the +contemporary world is exhibited as extended and +as a plenum of organisms; (<abbr title='three'>iii</abbr>) that presentational +immediacy is an important factor in the experience +of only a few high-grade organisms, and +that for the others it is embryonic or entirely +negligible.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Thus the disclosure of a contemporary world by +presentational immediacy is bound up with the disclosure +of the solidarity of actual things by reason +of their participation in an impartial system of +spatial extension. Beyond this, the knowledge +provided by pure presentational immediacy is +vivid, precise, and barren. It is also to a large +extent controllable at will. I mean that one moment +of experience can predetermine to a considerable +extent, by inhibitions, or by intensifications, +or by other modifications, the characteristics of +the presentational immediacy in succeeding moments +<span class='pageno' id='Page_24'>24</span>of experience. This mode of perception, +taken purely by itself, is barren, because we may +not directly connect the qualitative presentations +of other things with any intrinsic characters of +those things. We see the image of a coloured +chair, presenting to us the space behind a mirror; +yet we thereby gain no knowledge concerning any +intrinsic characters of spaces behind the mirror. +But the image thus seen in a good mirror is just +as much an immediate presentation of colour qualifying +the world at a distance behind the mirror, as +is our direct vision of the chair when we turn round +and look at it. Pure presentational immediacy refuses +to be divided into delusions and not-delusions. +It is either all of it, or none of it, an immediate +presentation of an external contemporary +world as in its own right spatial. The sense-data +involved in presentational immediacy have a wider +relationship in the world than these contemporary +things can express. In abstraction from this wider +relationship, there is no means of determining the +importance of the apparent qualification of contemporary +objects by sense-data. For this reason +the phrase ‘mere appearance’ carries the suggestion +of barrenness. This wider relationship of the +sense-data can only be understood by examining +<span class='pageno' id='Page_25'>25</span>the alternative mode of perception, the mode of +causal efficacy. But in so far as contemporary +things are bound together by mere presentational +immediacy, they happen in complete independence +except for their spatial relations at the moment. +Also for most events, we presume that their intrinsic +experience of presentational immediacy is so +embryonic as to be negligible. This perceptive +mode is important only for a small minority of +elaborate organisms.</p> +<h3 id='sect1-13' class='c007'>13. <i>Objectification.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>In this explanation of Presentational Immediacy, +I am conforming to the distinction according +to which actual things are <i>objectively</i> in our +experience and <i>formally</i> existing in their own completeness. +I maintain that presentational immediacy +is that peculiar way in which contemporary +things are ‘objectively’ in our experience, and +that among the abstract entities which constitute +factors in the mode of introduction are those abstractions +usually called sense-data:—for example, +colours, sounds, tastes, touches, and bodily +feelings.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Thus ‘objectification’ itself is abstraction; since +no actual thing is ‘objectified’ in its ‘formal’ completeness. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_26'>26</span>Abstraction expresses nature’s mode of +interaction and is not merely mental. When it +abstracts, thought is merely conforming to nature—or +rather, it is exhibiting itself as an element in +nature. Synthesis and analysis require each other. +Such a conception is paradoxical if you will persist +in thinking of the actual world as a collection +of passive actual substances with their private +characters or qualities. In that case, it must be +nonsense to ask, how one such substance can form +a component in the make-up of another such substance. +So long as this conception is retained, the +difficulty is not relieved by calling each actual substance +an event, or a pattern, or an occasion. The +difficulty, which arises for such a conception, is to +explain how the substances can be actually together +in a sense derivative from that in which +each individual substance is actual. But the conception +of the world here adopted is that of functional +activity. By this I mean that every actual +thing is something by reason of its activity; +whereby its nature consists in its relevance to other +things, and its individuality consists in its synthesis +of other things so far as they are relevant to it. +In enquiring about any one individual we must +ask how other individuals enter ‘objectively’ into +<span class='pageno' id='Page_27'>27</span>the unity of its own experience. This unity of its +own experience is that individual existing <i>formally</i>. +We must also enquire how it enters into +the ‘formal’ existence of other things; and this +entrance is that individual existing <i>objectively</i>, +that is to say—existing abstractly, exemplifying +only some elements in its formal content.</p> + +<p class='c006'>With this conception of the world, in speaking +of any actual individual, such as a human being, +we must mean that man in one occasion of his experience. +Such an occasion, or act, is complex and +therefore capable of analysis into phases and +other components. It is the most concrete actual +entity, and the life of man from birth to death is +a historic route of such occasions. These concrete +moments are bound together into one society +by a partial identity of form, and by the peculiarly +full summation of its predecessors which each moment +of the life-history gathers into itself. The +man-at-one-moment concentrates in himself the +colour of his own past, and he is the issue of it. +The ‘man in his whole life history’ is an abstraction +compared to the ‘man in one such moment.’ +There are therefore three different meanings for +the notion of a particular man,—Julius Cæsar, for +example. The word ‘Cæsar’ may mean ‘Cæsar in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_28'>28</span>some one occasion of his existence’: this is the +most concrete of all the meanings. The word +‘Cæsar’ may mean ‘the historic route of Cæsar’s +life from his Cæsarian birth to his Cæsarian assassination.’ +The word ‘Cæsar’ may mean ‘the +common form, or pattern, repeated in each occasion +of Cæsar’s life.’ You may legitimately choose +any one of these meanings; but when you have +made your choice, you must in that context stick +to it.</p> + +<p class='c006'>This doctrine of the nature of the life-history +of an enduring organism holds for all types +of organisms, which have attained to unity of experience, +for electrons as well as for men. But +mankind has gained a richness of experiential content +denied to electrons. Whenever the ‘all or +none’ principle holds, we are in some way dealing +with one actual entity, and not with a society of +such entities, nor with the analysis of components +contributory to one such entity.</p> + +<p class='c006'>This lecture has maintained the doctrine of a +direct experience of an external world. It is impossible +fully to argue this thesis without getting +too far away from my topic. I need only refer +you to the first portion of Santayana’s recent book, +<i>Scepticism and Animal Faith</i>, for a conclusive +<span class='pageno' id='Page_29'>29</span>proof of the futile ‘solipsism of the present moment’—or, +in other words, utter scepticism—which +results from a denial of this assumption. +My second thesis, for which I cannot claim Santayana’s +authority, is that, if you consistently +maintain such direct individual experience, you will +be driven in your philosophical construction to a +conception of the world as an interplay of functional +activity whereby each concrete individual +thing arises from its determinate relativity to the +settled world of other concrete individuals, at +least so far as the world is past and settled.</p> +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_30'>30</span> + <h2 id='chap2' class='c004'>CHAPTER <abbr title='two'>II</abbr></h2> +</div> +<h3 id='sect2-1' class='c007'>1. <i>Hume on Causal Efficacy.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>It is the thesis of this work that human symbolism +has its origin in the symbolic interplay between +two distinct modes of direct perception of +the external world. There are, in this way, two +sources of information about the external world, +closely connected but distinct. These modes do +not repeat each other; and there is a real diversity +of information. Where one is vague, the other is +precise: where one is important, the other is +trivial. But the two schemes of presentation have +structural elements in common, which identify +them as schemes of presentation of the same +world. There are however gaps in the determination +of the correspondence between the two +morphologies. The schemes only partially intersect, +and their true fusion is left indeterminate. +The symbolic reference leads to a transference of +emotion, purpose, and belief, which cannot be +justified by an intellectual comparison of the direct +information derived from the two schemes +<span class='pageno' id='Page_31'>31</span>and their elements of intersection. The justification, +such as it is, must be sought in a pragmatic +appeal to the future. In this way intellectual criticism +founded on subsequent experience can enlarge +and purify the primitive naïve symbolic +transference.</p> + +<p class='c006'>I have termed one perceptive mode ‘Presentational +Immediacy,’ and the other mode ‘Causal +Efficacy.’ In the previous lecture the mode of +presentational immediacy was discussed at length. +The present lecture must commence with the discussion +of ‘Causal Efficacy.’ It will be evident to +you that I am here controverting the most cherished +tradition of modern philosophy, shared +alike by the school of empiricists which derives +from Hume, and the school of transcendental +idealists which derives from Kant. It is unnecessary +to enter upon any prolonged justification of +this summary account of the tradition of modern +philosophy. But some quotations will summarize +neatly what is shared in common by the two types +of thought from which I am diverging. Hume<a id='r1'></a><a href='#f1' class='c008'><sup>[1]</sup></a> +writes:—“When both the objects are present to +the senses along with the relation, we call <i>this</i> +perception rather than reasoning; nor is there in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_32'>32</span>this case any exercise of the thought, or any action, +properly speaking, but a mere passive admission of +the impressions through the organs of sensation. +According to this way of thinking, we ought not to +receive as reasoning any of the observations we +may make concerning <i>identity</i> and the <i>relation</i> of +<i>time</i> and <i>place</i>; since in none of them can the mind +go beyond what is immediately present to the +senses, either to discover the real existence or the +relations of objects.”</p> + +<p class='c006'>The whole force of this passage depends upon +the tacit presupposition of the ‘mind’ as a passively +receptive substance and of its ‘impression’ +as forming its private world of accidents. There +then remains nothing except the immediacy of +these private attributes with their private relations +which are also attributes of the mind. Hume +explicitly repudiates this substantial view of mind.</p> + +<p class='c006'>But then, what is the force of the last clause of +the last sentence, “since ... objects?” The +only reason for dismissing ‘impressions’ from having +any demonstrative force in respect to ‘the <i>real</i> +existence or the relations of objects,’ is the implicit +notion that such impressions are mere private +attributes of the mind. Santayana’s book, +<i>Scepticism and Animal Faith</i>, to which I have already +<span class='pageno' id='Page_33'>33</span>referred, is in its earlier chapters a vigorous +and thorough insistence, by every manner of beautiful +illustration, that with Hume’s premises there +is no manner of escape from this dismissal of identity, +time, and place from having any reference +to a real world. There remains only what Santayana +calls ‘Solipsism of the Present Moment.’ +Even memory goes: for a memory-impression is +not an impression of memory. It is only another +immediate private impression.</p> + +<p class='c006'>It is unnecessary to cite Hume on Causation; for +the preceding quotation carries with it his whole +sceptical position. But a quotation<a id='r2'></a><a href='#f2' class='c008'><sup>[2]</sup></a> on substance +is necessary to explain the ground of his explicit—as +distinct from sporadic implicit presuppositions—doctrine +on this point:—“I would fain ask those +philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings +on the distinction of substance and accident, +and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether +the idea of substance be derived from the impressions +of sensation or reflection? If it be conveyed +to us by our senses, I ask, which of them, and after +what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it +must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by +the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But +<span class='pageno' id='Page_34'>34</span>I believe none will assert that substance is either +a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea of substance +must, therefore, be derived from an impression +of reflection, if it really exist. But the +impressions of reflection resolve themselves into +our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly +represent a substance. We have, therefore, +no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection +of particular qualities, nor have we any +other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning +it.”</p> + +<p class='c006'>This passage is concerned with a notion of +‘substance,’ which I do not entertain. Thus it +only indirectly controverts my position. I quote it +because it is the plainest example of Hume’s initial +assumptions that (<abbr title='one'>i</abbr>) presentational immediacy, +and relations between presentationally immediate +entities, constitute the only type of perceptive experience, +and that (<abbr title='two'>ii</abbr>) presentational immediacy +includes no demonstrative factors disclosing a contemporary +world of extended actual things.</p> + +<p class='c006'>He discusses this question later in his ‘Treatise’ +under the heading of the notion of ‘Bodies’; and +arrives at analogous sceptical conclusions. These +conclusions rest upon an extraordinary naïve assumption +of time as pure succession. The assumption +<span class='pageno' id='Page_35'>35</span>is naïve, because it is the natural thing to say; +it is natural because it leaves out that characteristic +of time which is so intimately interwoven that +it is natural to omit it.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Time is known to us as the succession of our +acts of experience, and thence derivatively as the +succession of events objectively perceived in those +acts. But this succession is not pure succession: +it is the derivation of state from state, with the +later state exhibiting conformity to the antecedent. +Time in the concrete is the conformation of state +to state, the later to the earlier; and the pure succession +is an abstraction from the irreversible relationship +of settled past to derivative present. +The notion of pure succession is analogous to the +notion of colour. There is no mere colour, but always +some particular colour such as red or blue: +analogously there is no pure succession, but always +some particular relational ground in respect to +which the terms succeed each other. The integers +succeed each other in one way, and events succeed +each other in another way; and, when we abstract +from these ways of succession, we find that pure +succession is an abstraction of the second order, a +generic abstraction omitting the temporal character +of time and the numerical relation of integers. +<span class='pageno' id='Page_36'>36</span>The past consists of the community of settled acts +which, through their objectifications in the present +act, establish the conditions to which that act +must conform.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Aristotle conceived ‘matter’—ὑλγ—as being +pure potentiality awaiting the incoming of form in +order to become actual. Hence employing Aristotelian +notions, we may say that the limitation of +pure potentiality, established by ‘objectifications’ +of the settled past, expresses that ‘natural potentiality’—or, +potentiality in nature—which is ‘matter’ +with that basis of initial, realized form presupposed +as the first phase in the self-creation of +the present occasion. The notion of ‘pure potentiality’ +here takes the place of Aristotle’s ‘matter,’ +and ‘natural potentiality’ is ‘matter’ with that +given imposition of form from which each actual +thing arises. All components which are <i>given</i> for +experience are to be found in the analysis of natural +potentiality. Thus the immediate present has +to conform to what the past is for it, and the +mere lapse of time is an abstraction from the more +concrete relatedness of ‘conformation.’ The ‘substantial’ +character of actual things is not primarily +concerned with the predication of qualities. It +expresses the stubborn fact that whatever is settled +<span class='pageno' id='Page_37'>37</span>and actual must in due measure be conformed +to by the self-creative activity. The phrase ‘stubborn +fact’ exactly expresses the popular apprehension +of this characteristic. Its primary phase, +from which each actual thing arises, is the stubborn +fact which underlies its existence. According +to Hume there are no stubborn facts. Hume’s +doctrine may be good philosophy, but it is certainly +not common sense. In other words, it fails +before the final test of obvious verification.</p> +<h3 id='sect2-2' class='c007'>2. <i>Kant and Causal Efficacy.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>The school of transcendental idealists, derived +from Kant, admit that causal efficacy is a factor in +the phenomenal world; but hold that it does not +belong to the sheer data presupposed in perception. +It belongs to our ways of thought about the +data. Our consciousness of the perceived world +yields us an objective system, which is a fusion of +mere data and modes of thought about those data.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The general Kantian reason for this position is +that direct perception acquaints us with particular +fact. Now particular fact is what simply occurs as +particular datum. But we believe universal principles +about all particular facts. Such universal +knowledge cannot be derived from any selection +<span class='pageno' id='Page_38'>38</span>of particular facts, each of which has just simply +occurred. Thus our ineradicable belief is only +explicable by reason of the doctrine that particular +facts, as consciously apprehended, are the fusion +of mere particular data with thought functioning +according to categories which import +their own universality in the modified data. Thus +the phenomenal world, as in consciousness, is a +complex of coherent judgments, framed according +to fixed categories of thought, and with a content +constituted by given data organized according to +fixed forms of intuition.</p> + +<p class='c006'>This Kantian doctrine accepts Hume’s naïve +presupposition of ‘simple occurrence’ for the mere +data. I have elsewhere called it the assumption of +‘simple location,’ by way of applying it to space as +well as to time.</p> + +<p class='c006'>I directly deny this doctrine of ‘simple occurrence.’ +There is nothing which ‘simply happens.’ +Such a belief is the baseless doctrine of time as +‘pure succession.’ The alternative doctrine, that +the pure succession of time is merely an abstract +from the fundamental relationship of conformation, +sweeps away the whole basis for the intervention +of constitutive thought, or constitutive intuition, +in the formation of the directly apprehended +<span class='pageno' id='Page_39'>39</span>world. Universality of truth arises from +the universality of relativity, whereby every particular +actual thing lays upon the universe the obligation +of conforming to it. Thus in the analysis +of particular fact universal truths are discoverable, +those truths expressing this obligation. The +given-ness of experience—that is to say, all its +data alike, whether general truths or particular +sensa or presupposed forms of synthesis—expresses +the specific character of the temporal relation +of that act of experience to the settled actuality +of the universe which is the source of all conditions. +The fallacy of ‘misplaced concreteness’ +abstracts from time this specific character, and +leaves time with the mere generic character of +pure succession.</p> +<h3 id='sect2-3' class='c007'>3. <i>Direct Perception of Causal Efficacy.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>The followers of Hume and the followers of +Kant have thus their diverse, but allied, objections +to the notion of any direct perception of causal +efficacy, in the sense in which direct perception is +antecedent to thought about it. Both schools find +‘causal efficacy’ to be the importation, into the +data, of a way of thinking or judging about those +data. One school calls it a habit of thought; the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_40'>40</span>other school calls it a category of thought. Also +for them the mere data are the pure sense-data.</p> + +<p class='c006'>If either Hume or Kant gives a proper account +of the status of causal efficacy, we should find that +our conscious apprehension of causal efficacy +should depend to some extent on the vividness of +the thought or of the pure intuitive discrimination +of sense-data at the moment in question. For +an apprehension which is the product of thought +should sink in importance when thought is in the +background. Also, according to this Humian-Kantian +account, the thought in question is +thought about the immediate sense-data. Accordingly +a certain vividness of sense-data in immediate +presentation should be favourable to apprehension +of causal efficacy. For according to these +accounts, causal efficacy is nothing else than a way +of thinking about sense-data, given in presentational +immediacy. Thus the inhibition of thought +and the vagueness of sense-data should be extremely +unfavourable to the prominence of causal +efficacy as an element in experience.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The logical difficulties attending the direct perception +of causal efficacy have been shown to depend +on the sheer assumption that time is merely +the generic notion of pure succession. This is an +<span class='pageno' id='Page_41'>41</span>instance of the fallacy of ‘misplaced concreteness.’ +Thus the way is now open to enquire empirically +whether in fact our apprehension of causal efficacy +does depend either on the vividness of sense-data +or on the activity of thought.</p> + +<p class='c006'>According to both schools, the importance of +causal efficacy, and of action exemplifying its presupposition, +should be mainly characteristic of +high-grade organisms in their best moments. Now +if we confine attention to long-range identification +of cause and effect, depending on complex reasoning, +undoubtedly such high-grade mentality and +such precise determination of sense-data are required. +But each step in such reasoning depends +on the primary presupposition of the immediate +present moment conforming itself to the settled +environment of the immediate past. We must not +direct attention to the inferences from yesterday +to today, or even from five minutes ago to the immediate +present. We must consider the immediate +present in its relationship to the immediate +past. The overwhelming conformation of fact, in +present action, to antecedent settled fact is to be +found here.</p> + +<p class='c006'>My point is that this conformation of present +fact to immediate past is more prominent both in +<span class='pageno' id='Page_42'>42</span>apparent behaviour and in consciousness, when the +organism is low grade. A flower turns to the light +with much greater certainty than does a human being, +and a stone conforms to the conditions set by +its external environment with much greater certainty +than does a flower. A dog anticipates the +conformation of the immediate future to his present +activity with the same certainty as a human being. +When it comes to calculations and remote +inferences, the dog fails. But the dog never acts +as though the immediate future were irrelevant to +the present. Irresolution in action arises from +consciousness of a somewhat distant relevant future, +combined with inability to evaluate its precise +type. If we were not conscious of relevance, +why is there irresolution in a sudden crisis?</p> + +<p class='c006'>Again a vivid enjoyment of immediate sense-data +notoriously inhibits apprehension of the relevance +of the future. The present moment is then +all in all. In our consciousness it approximates to +‘simple occurrence.’</p> + +<p class='c006'>Certain emotions, such as anger and terror, are +apt to inhibit the apprehension of sense-data; but +they wholly depend upon a vivid apprehension of +the relevance of immediate past to the present, and +of the present to the future. Again an inhibition +<span class='pageno' id='Page_43'>43</span>of familiar sense-data provokes the terrifying +sense of vague presences, effective for good or evil +over our fate. Most living creatures, of daytime +habits, are more nervous in the dark, in the absence +of the familiar visual sense-data. But according +to Hume, it is the very familiarity of the +sense-data which is required for causal inference. +Thus the sense of unseen effective presences in the +dark is the opposite of what should happen.</p> +<h3 id='sect2-4' class='c007'>4. <i>Primitiveness of Causal Efficacy.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>The perception of conformation to realities in +the environment is the primitive element in our +external experience. We conform to our bodily +organs and to the vague world which lies beyond +them. Our primitive perception is that of ‘conformation’ +vaguely, and of the yet vaguer relata +‘oneself’ and ‘another’ in the undiscriminated background. +Of course if relationships are unperceivable, +such a doctrine must be ruled out on theoretic +grounds. But if we admit such perception, then +the perception of conformation has every mark of +a primitive element. One part of our experience +is handy, and definite in our consciousness; also it +is easy to reproduce at will. The other type of +experience, however insistent, is vague, haunting, +unmanageable. The former type, for all its decorative +<span class='pageno' id='Page_44'>44</span>sense-experience, is barren. It displays a +world concealed under an adventitious show, a +show of our own bodily production. The latter +type is heavy with the contact of the things gone +by, which lay their grip on our immediate selves. +This latter type, the mode of causal efficacy, is the +experience dominating the primitive living organisms, +which have a sense for the fate from which +they have emerged, and for the fate towards +which they go—the organisms which advance and +retreat but hardly differentiate any immediate display. +It is a heavy, primitive experience. The +former type, the presentational immediacy, is the +superficial product of complexity, of subtlety; it +halts at the present, and indulges in a manageable +self-enjoyment derived from the immediacy of +the show of things. Those periods in our lives—when +the perception of the pressure from a world +of things with characters in their own right, characters +mysteriously moulding our own natures, become +strongest—those periods are the product of +a reversion to some primitive state. Such a reversion +occurs when either some primitive functioning +of the human organism is unusually heightened, +or some considerable part of our habitual +sense-perception is unusually enfeebled.</p> + +<p class='c006'><span class='pageno' id='Page_45'>45</span>Anger, hatred, fear, terror, attraction, love, +hunger, eagerness, massive enjoyment, are feelings +and emotions closely entwined with the primitive +functioning of ‘retreat from’ and of ‘expansion +towards.’ They arise in the higher organism as +states due to a vivid apprehension that some such +primitive mode of functioning is dominating the +organism. But ‘retreat from’ and ‘expansion +towards,’ divested of any detailed spatial discrimination, +are merely reactions to the way externality +is impressing on us its own character. +You cannot retreat from mere subjectivity; for +subjectivity is what we carry with us. Normally, +we have almost negligible sense-presentations of +the interior organs of our own bodies.</p> + +<p class='c006'>These primitive emotions are accompanied by +the clearest recognition of other actual things reacting +upon ourselves. The vulgar obviousness of +such recognition is equal to the vulgar obviousness +produced by the functioning of any one of our five +senses. When we hate, it is a man that we hate +and not a collection of sense-data—a causal, efficacious +man. This primitive obviousness of the +perception of ‘conformation’ is illustrated by the +emphasis on the pragmatic aspect of occurrences, +which is so prominent in modern philosophical +<span class='pageno' id='Page_46'>46</span>thought. There can be no useful aspect of anything +unless we admit the principle of conformation, +whereby what is already made becomes a determinant +of what is in the making. The obviousness +of the pragmatic aspect is simply the obviousness +of the perception of the fact of conformation.</p> + +<p class='c006'>In practice we never doubt the fact of the conformation +of the present to the immediate past. +It belongs to the ultimate texture of experience, +with the same evidence as does presentational immediacy. +The present fact is luminously the outcome +from its predecessors, one quarter of a +second ago. Unsuspected factors may have intervened; +dynamite may have exploded. But, however +that may be, the present event issues subject +to the limitations laid upon it by the actual nature +of the immediate past. If dynamite explodes, then +present fact is that issue from the past which is +consistent with dynamite exploding. Further, we +unhesitatingly argue backwards to the inference, +that the complete analysis of the past must disclose +in it those factors which provide the conditions +for the present. If dynamite be now exploding, +then in the immediate past there was a +charge of dynamite unexploded.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The fact that our consciousness is confined to +<span class='pageno' id='Page_47'>47</span>an analysis of experience in the present is no difficulty. +For the theory of the universal relativity +of actual individual things leads to the distinction +between the present moment of experience, which +is the sole datum for conscious analysis, and perception +of the contemporary world, which is the +only one factor in this datum.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The contrast between the comparative emptiness +of Presentational Immediacy and the deep +significance disclosed by Causal Efficacy is at the +root of the pathos which haunts the world.</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c003'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>‘Pereunt et imputantur’</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c009'>is the inscription on old sundials in ‘religious’ +houses:</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c003'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>‘The hours perish and are laid to account.’</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c009'>Here ‘Pereunt’ refers to the world disclosed in +immediate presentation, gay with a thousand tints, +passing, and intrinsically meaningless. ‘Imputantur’ +refers to the world disclosed in its causal efficacy, +where each event infects the ages to come, +for good or for evil, with its own individuality. +Almost all pathos includes a reference to lapse of +time.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The final stanza of Keats’ <i>Eve of St. Agnes</i> +commences with the haunting lines:—</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c003'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'><span class='pageno' id='Page_48'>48</span>‘And they are gone: ay, ages long ago</div> + <div class='line'>Those lovers fled away into the storm.’</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c009'>There the pathos of the lapse of time arises from +the imagined fusion of the two perceptive modes +by one intensity of emotion. Shakespeare, in the +springtime of the modern world, fuses the two +elements by exhibiting the infectiousness of gay +immediacy:—</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c003'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line in14'>‘... daffodils,</div> + <div class='line'>That come before the swallow dares, and take</div> + <div class='line'>The winds of March with beauty; ...’</div> + </div> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>(<i>The Winter’s Tale</i>, <abbr title='four'>IV</abbr>, <abbr title='four'>iv</abbr>, 118-120.)</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c009'>But sometimes men are overstrained by their undivided +attention to the causal elements in the nature +of things. Then in some tired moment there +comes a sudden relaxation, and the mere presentational +side of the world overwhelms with the +sense of its emptiness. As William Pitt, the Prime +Minister of England through the darkest period +of the French Revolutionary wars, lay on his +death-bed at England’s worst moment in that +struggle, he was heard to murmur,</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c003'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>‘What shades we are, what shadows we pursue!’</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c009'>His mind had suddenly lost the sense of causal efficacy, +and was illuminated by the remembrance of +<span class='pageno' id='Page_49'>49</span>the intensity of emotion, which had enveloped his +life, in its comparison with the barren emptiness of +the world passing in sense-presentation.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The world, given in sense-presentation, is not +the aboriginal experience of the lower organisms, +later to be sophisticated by the inference to causal +efficacy. The contrary is the case. First the +causal side of experience is dominating, then the +sense-presentation gains in subtlety. Their mutual +symbolic reference is finally purged by consciousness +and the critical reason with the aid of +a pragmatic appeal to consequences.</p> +<h3 id='sect2-5' class='c007'>5. <i>The Intersection of the Modes of Perception.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>There cannot be symbolic reference between +percepts derived from one mode and percepts +from the other mode, unless in some way these +percepts intersect. By this ‘intersection’ I mean +that a pair of such percepts must have elements of +structure in common, whereby they are marked +out for the action of symbolic reference.</p> + +<p class='c006'>There are two elements of common structure, +which can be shared in common by a percept derived +from presentational immediacy and by another +derived from causal efficacy. These elements +are (1) sense-data, and (2) locality.</p> + +<p class='c006'><span class='pageno' id='Page_50'>50</span>The sense-data are ‘given’ for presentational +immediacy. This given-ness of the sense-data, as +the basis of this perceptive mode, is the great doctrine +common to Hume and Kant. But what is +already given for experience can only be derived +from that natural potentiality which shapes a particular +experience in the guise of causal efficacy. +Causal efficacy is the hand of the settled past in +the formation of the present. The sense-data +must therefore play a double rôle in perception. +In the mode of presentational immediacy they are +projected to exhibit the contemporary world in its +spatial relations. In the mode of causal efficacy +they exhibit the almost instantaneously precedent +bodily organs as imposing their characters on the +experience in question. We see the picture, and +we see it with our eyes; we touch the wood, and we +touch it with our hands; we smell the rose, and +we smell it with our nose; we hear the bell, and we +hear it with our ears; we taste the sugar, and +we taste it with our palate. In the case of bodily +feelings the two locations are identical. The foot +is both giving pain and is the seat of the pain. +Hume himself tacitly asserts this double reference +in the second of the quotations previously made. +He writes: “If it be perceived by the eyes, it must +<span class='pageno' id='Page_51'>51</span>be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, +a taste; and so of the other senses.” Thus +in asserting the lack of perception of causality, he +implicitly presupposes it. For what is the meaning +of ‘<i>by</i>’ in ‘<i>by</i> the eyes,’ ‘<i>by</i> the ears,’ ‘<i>by</i> the palate’? +His argument presupposes that sense-data, +functioning in presentational immediacy, are +‘given’ by reason of ‘eyes,’ ‘ears,’ ‘palates’ functioning +in causal efficacy. Otherwise his argument +is involved in a vicious regress. For it must begin +again over eyes, ears, palates; also it must explain +the meaning of ‘by’ and ‘must’ in a sense +which does not destroy his argument.</p> + +<p class='c006'>This double reference is the basis of the whole +physiological doctrine of perception. The details +of this doctrine are, in this discussion, philosophically +irrelevant. Hume with the clarity of genius +states the fundamental point, that sense-data functioning +in an act of experience demonstrate that +they are given <i>by</i> the causal efficacy of actual +bodily organs. He refers to this causal efficacy as +a component in direct perception. Hume’s argument +first tacitly presupposes the two modes of +perception, and then tacitly assumes that presentational +immediacy is the only mode. Also Hume’s +followers in developing his doctrine presuppose +<span class='pageno' id='Page_52'>52</span>that presentational immediacy is primitive, and +that causal efficacy is the sophisticated derivative. +This is a complete inversion of the evidence. So +far as Hume’s own teaching is concerned, there is, +of course, another alternative: it is that Hume’s +disciples have misinterpreted Hume’s final position. +On this hypothesis, his final appeal to ‘practice’ +is an appeal against the adequacy of the then +current metaphysical categories as interpretive of +obvious experience. This theory about Hume’s +own beliefs is in my opinion improbable: but, +apart from Hume’s own estimate of his philosophical +achievement, it is in this sense that we +must reverence him as one of the greatest of +philosophers.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The conclusion of this argument is that the intervention +of any sense-datum in the actual world +cannot be expressed in any simple way, such as +mere qualification of a region of space, or alternatively +as the mere qualification of a state of +mind. The sense-data, required for immediate +sense-perception, enter into experience in virtue of +the efficacy of the environment. This environment +includes the bodily organs. For example, in the +case of hearing sound the physical waves have +entered the ears, and the agitations of the nerves +<span class='pageno' id='Page_53'>53</span>have excited the brain. The sound is then heard +as coming from a certain region in the external +world. Thus perception in the mode of causal +efficacy discloses that the data in the mode of +sense-perception are provided by it. This is the +reason why there are such given elements. Every +such datum constitutes a link between the two perceptive +modes. Each such link, or datum, has a +complex ingression into experience, requiring a reference +to the two perceptive modes. These sense-data +can be conceived as constituting the character +of a many-termed relationship between the organisms +of the past environment and those of the +contemporary world.</p> +<h3 id='sect2-6' class='c007'>6. <i>Localization.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>The partial community of structure, whereby +the two perceptive modes yield immediate demonstration +of a common world, arises from their +reference of sense-data, common to both, to localizations, +diverse or identical, in a spatio-temporal +system common to both. For example, colour +is referred to an external space and to the eyes +as organs of vision. In so far as we are dealing +with one or other of these pure perceptive modes, +such reference is direct demonstration; and, as isolated +<span class='pageno' id='Page_54'>54</span>in conscious analysis, is ultimate fact against +which there is no appeal. Such isolation, or at +least some approach to it, is fairly easy in the case +of presentational immediacy, but is very difficult in +the case of causal efficacy. Complete ideal purity +of perceptive experience, devoid of any symbolic +reference, is in practice unobtainable for either +perceptive mode.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Our judgments on causal efficacy are almost inextricably +warped by the acceptance of the symbolic +reference between the two modes as the completion +of our direct knowledge. This acceptance +is not merely in thought, but also in action, emotion, +and purpose, all precedent to thought. This +symbolic reference is a datum for thought in its +analysis of experience. By trusting this datum, +our conceptual scheme of the universe is in general +logically coherent with itself, and is correspondent +to the ultimate facts of the pure perceptive +modes. But occasionally, either the coherence +or the verification fails. We then revise +our conceptual scheme so as to preserve the general +trust in the symbolic reference, while relegating +definite details of that reference to the category +of errors. Such errors are termed ‘delusive +<span class='pageno' id='Page_55'>55</span>appearances.’ This error arises from the extreme +vagueness of the spatial and temporal perspectives +in the case of perception in the pure mode of +causal efficacy. There is no adequate definition of +localization, so far as what emerges into analytic +consciousness. The principle of relativity leads us +to hold that, with adequate conscious analysis, +such local relationships leave their faint impress in +experience. But in general such detailed analysis +is far beyond the capacity of human consciousness.</p> + +<p class='c006'>So far as concerns the causal efficacy of the +world external to the human body, there is the +most insistent perception of a circumambient efficacious +world of beings. But exact discrimination +of thing from thing, and of position from +position, is extremely vague, almost negligible. +The definite discrimination, which in fact we do +make, arises almost wholly by reason of symbolic +reference from presentational immediacy. The +case is different in respect to the human body. +There is still vagueness in comparison with the +accurate definition of immediate presentation; although +the locality of various bodily organs which +are efficacious in the regulation of the sense-data, +and of the feelings, are fairly well-defined in the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_56'>56</span>pure perceptive mode of causal efficacy. The symbolic +transference of course intensifies the definition. +But, apart from such transference, there is +some adequacy of definite demarcation.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Thus in the intersection of the two modes, the +spatial and temporal relationships of the human +body, as causally apprehended, to the external contemporary +world, as immediately presented, afford +a fairly definite scheme of spatial and temporal +reference whereby we test the symbolic use of +sense-projection for the determination of the positions +of bodies controlling the course of nature. +Ultimately all observation, scientific or popular, +consists in the determination of the spatial relation +of the bodily organs of the observer to the +location of ‘projected’ sense-data.</p> +<h3 id='sect2-7' class='c007'>7. <i>The Contrast Between Accurate Definition and Importance.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>The reason why the projected sense-data are in +general used as symbol, is that they are handy, +definite, and manageable. We can see, or not see, +as we like: we can hear, or not hear. There are +limits to this handiness of the sense-data: but they +are emphatically the manageable elements in our +perceptions of the world. The sense of controlling +<span class='pageno' id='Page_57'>57</span>presences has the contrary character: it is unmanageable, +vague, and ill-defined.</p> + +<p class='c006'>But for all their vagueness, for all their lack of +definition, these controlling presences, these +sources of power, these things with an inner life, +with their own richness of content, these beings, +with the destiny of the world hidden in their natures, +are what we want to know about. As we +cross a road busy with traffic, we see the colour +of the cars, their shapes, the gay colours of their +occupants; but at the moment we are absorbed in +using this immediate show as a symbol for the +forces determining the immediate future.</p> + +<p class='c006'>We enjoy the symbol, but we also penetrate to +the meaning. The symbols do not create their +meaning: the meaning, in the form of actual effective +beings reacting upon us, exists for us in its +own right. But the symbols discover this meaning +for us. They discover it because, in the long +course of adaptation of living organisms to their +environment, nature<a id='r3'></a><a href='#f3' class='c008'><sup>[3]</sup></a> taught their use. It developed +us so that our projected sensations indicate +in general those regions which are the seat of important +organisms.</p> + +<p class='c006'><span class='pageno' id='Page_58'>58</span>Our relationships to these bodies are precisely +our reactions to them. The projection of our sensations +is nothing else than the illustration of the +world in partial accordance with the systematic +scheme, in space and in time, to which these reactions +conform.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The bonds of causal efficacy arise from without +us. They disclose the character of the world from +which we issue, an inescapable condition round +which we shape ourselves. The bonds of presentational +immediacy arise from within us, and +are subject to intensifications and inhibitions and +diversions according as we accept their challenge +or reject it. The sense-data are not properly to be +termed ‘mere impressions’—except so far as any +technical term will do. They also represent the +conditions arising out of the active perceptive functioning +as conditioned by our own natures. But +our natures must conform to the causal efficacy. +Thus the causal efficacy <i>from</i> the past is at least +one factor giving our presentational immediacy in +the present. The <i>how</i> of our present experience +must conform to the <i>what</i> of the past in us.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Our experience arises out of the past: it enriches +with emotion and purpose its presentation +of the contemporary world: and it bequeaths its +<span class='pageno' id='Page_59'>59</span>character to the future, in the guise of an effective +element forever adding to, or subtracting from, +the richness of the world. For good or for evil,</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c003'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>‘Pereunt et Imputantur.’</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<h3 id='sect2-8' class='c007'>8. <i>Conclusion.</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>In this chapter, and in the former chapter, the +general character of symbolism has been discussed. +It plays a dominant part in the way in which all +higher organisms conduct their lives. It is the +cause of progress, and the cause of error. The +higher animals have gained a faculty of great +power, by means of which they can define with +some accuracy those distant features in the immediate +world by which their future lives are to +be determined. But this faculty is not infallible; +and the risks are commensurate with its importance. +It is the purpose of the next chapter to +illustrate this doctrine by an analysis of the part +played by this habit of symbolism in promoting +the cohesion, the progress, and the dissolution of +human societies.</p> + +<div class='chapter'> + <span class='pageno' id='Page_60'>60</span> + <h2 id='chap3' class='c004'>CHAPTER <abbr title='three'>III</abbr></h2> +</div> +<h3 id='sect3-1' class='c007'><i>Uses of Symbolism</i></h3> +<p class='c005'>The attitude of mankind towards symbolism +exhibits an unstable mixture of attraction and repulsion. +The practical intelligence, the theoretical +desire to pierce to ultimate fact, and ironic +critical impulses have contributed the chief motives +towards the repulsion from symbolism. +Hard-headed men want facts and not symbols. A +clear theoretic intellect, with its generous enthusiasm +for the exact truth at all costs and hazards, +pushes aside symbols as being mere make-believes, +veiling and distorting that inner sanctuary of +simple truth which reason claims as its own. The +ironic critics of the follies of humanity have performed +notable service in clearing away the lumber +of useless ceremony symbolizing the degrading +fancies of a savage past. The repulsion from +symbolism stands out as a well-marked element in +the cultural history of civilized people. There +can be no reasonable doubt but that this continuous +<span class='pageno' id='Page_61'>61</span>criticism has performed a necessary service +in the promotion of a wholesome civilization, +both on the side of the practical efficiency of organized +society, and on the side of a robust direction +of thought.</p> + +<p class='c006'>No account of the uses of symbolism is complete +without this recognition that the symbolic +elements in life have a tendency to run wild, like +the vegetation in a tropical forest. The life of +humanity can easily be overwhelmed by its symbolic +accessories. A continuous process of pruning, +and of adaptation to a future ever requiring +new forms of expression, is a necessary function +in every society. The successful adaptation of +old symbols to changes of social structure is the +final mark of wisdom in sociological statesmanship. +Also an occasional revolution in symbolism +is required.</p> + +<p class='c006'>There is, however, a Latin proverb upon which, +in our youth, some of us have been set to write +themes. In English it reads thus:—Nature, expelled +with a pitchfork, ever returns. This proverb +is exemplified by the history of symbolism. +However you may endeavour to expel it, it ever +returns. Symbolism is no mere idle fancy or corrupt +degeneration: it is inherent in the very texture +<span class='pageno' id='Page_62'>62</span>of human life. Language itself is a symbolism. +And, as another example, however you +reduce the functions of your government to their +utmost simplicity, yet symbolism remains. It may +be a healthier, manlier ceremonial, suggesting +finer notions. But still it is symbolism. You +abolish the etiquette of a royal court, with its +suggestion of personal subordination, but at official +receptions you ceremonially shake the hand of +the Governor of your State. Just as the feudal +doctrine of a subordination of classes, reaching +up to the ultimate overlord, requires its symbolism; +so does the doctrine of human equality obtain +its symbolism. Mankind, it seems, has to find a +symbol in order to express itself. Indeed ‘expression’ +is ‘symbolism.’</p> + +<p class='c006'>When the public ceremonial of the State has +been reduced to the barest simplicity, private +clubs and associations at once commence to reconstitute +symbolic actions. It seems as though +mankind must always be masquerading. This +imperative impulse suggests that the notion of an +idle masquerade is the wrong way of thought +about the symbolic elements in life. The function +of these elements is to be definite, manageable, +reproducible, and also to be charged with +<span class='pageno' id='Page_63'>63</span>their own emotional efficacity: symbolic transference +invests their correlative meanings with some +or all of these attributes of the symbols, and +thereby lifts the meanings into an intensity of +definite effectiveness—as elements in knowledge, +emotion, and purpose,—an effectiveness which +the meanings may, or may not, deserve on their +own account. The object of symbolism is the enhancement +of the importance of what is symbolized.</p> + +<p class='c006'>In a discussion of instances of symbolism, our +first difficulty is to discover exactly what is being +symbolized. The symbols are specific enough, but +it is often extremely difficult to analyse what lies +beyond them, even though there is evidently some +strong appeal beyond the mere ceremonial acts.</p> + +<p class='c006'>It seems probable that in any ceremonial which +has lasted through many epochs, the symbolic interpretation, +so far as we can obtain it, varies +much more rapidly than does the actual ceremonial. +Also in its flux a symbol will have different +meanings for different people. At any +epoch some people have the dominant mentality +of the past, some of the present, others of the +future, and others of the many problematic futures +which will never dawn. For these various +<span class='pageno' id='Page_64'>64</span>groups an old symbolism will have different +shades of vague meaning.</p> + +<p class='c006'>In order to appreciate the necessary function +of symbolism in the life of any society of human +beings we must form some estimate of the binding +and disruptive forces at work. There are +many varieties of human society, each requiring +its own particular investigation so far as details +are concerned. We will fix attention on nations, +occupying definite countries. Thus geographical +unity is at once presupposed. Communities with +geographical unity constitute the primary type of +communities which we find in the world. Indeed +the lower we go in the scale of being, the more +necessary is geographical unity for that close interaction +of individuals which constitutes society. +Societies of the higher animals, of insects, of +molecules, all possess geographical unity. A rock +is nothing else than a society of molecules, indulging +in every species of activity open to molecules. +I draw attention to this lowly form of society in +order to dispel the notion that social life is a peculiarity +of the higher organisms. The contrary +is the case. So far as survival value is concerned, +a piece of rock, with its past history of some eight +hundred millions of years, far outstrips the short +<span class='pageno' id='Page_65'>65</span>span attained by any nation. The emergence of +life is better conceived as a bid for freedom on +the part of organisms, a bid for a certain independence +of individuality with self-interests and +activities not to be construed purely in terms of +environmental obligations. The immediate effect +of this emergence of sensitive individuality +has been to reduce the term of life for societies +from hundreds of millions of years to hundreds +of years, or even to scores of years.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The emergence of living beings cannot be ascribed +to the superior survival value either of the +individuals, or of their societies. National life +has to face the disruptive elements introduced by +these extreme claims for individual idiosyncrasies. +We require both the advantages of social preservation, +and the contrary stimulus of the heterogeneity +derived from freedom. The society is to +run smoothly amidst the divergencies of its individuals. +There is a revolt from the mere causal +obligations laid upon individuals by the social +character of the environment. This revolt first +takes the form of blind emotional impulse; and +later, in civilized societies, these impulses are criticized +and deflected by reason. In any case, there +are individual springs of action which escape from +<span class='pageno' id='Page_66'>66</span>the obligations of social conformity. In order to +replace this decay of secure instinctive response, +various intricate forms of symbolic expression of +the various purposes of social life have been introduced. +The response to the symbol is almost +automatic but not quite; the reference to the +meaning is there, either for additional emotional +support, or for criticism. But the reference is not +so clear as to be imperative. The imperative instinctive +conformation to the influence of the environment +has been modified. Something has replaced +it, which by its superficial character invites +criticism, and by its habitual use generally escapes +it. Such symbolism makes connected thought possible +by expressing it, while at the same time it +automatically directs action. In the place of the +force of instinct which suppresses individuality, +society has gained the efficacy of symbols, at once +preservative of the commonweal and of the individual +standpoint.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Among the particular kinds of symbolism which +serve this purpose, we must place first Language. +I do not mean language in its function of a bare +indication of abstract ideas, or of particular actual +things, but language clothed with its complete +influence for the nation in question. In addition +<span class='pageno' id='Page_67'>67</span>to its bare indication of meaning, words +and phrases carry with them an enveloping suggestiveness +and an emotional efficacy. This function +of language depends on the way it has been +used, on the proportionate familiarity of particular +phrases, and on the emotional history associated +with their meanings and thence derivatively +transferred to the phrases themselves. If two +nations speak the same language, this emotional +efficacy of words and phrases will in general differ +for the two. What is familiar for one nation +will be strange for the other nation; what is +charged with intimate associations for the one is +comparatively empty for the other. For example, +if the two nations are somewhat widely sundered, +with a different fauna and flora, the nature-poetry +of one nation will lack its complete directness of +appeal to the other nation—compare Walt Whitman’s +phrase,</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c003'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line'>‘The wide unconscious scenery of my land’</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c009'>for an American, with Shakespeare’s</p> + +<div class='lg-container-b c003'> + <div class='linegroup'> + <div class='group'> + <div class='line in12'>‘... this little world,</div> + <div class='line'>This precious stone set in the silver sea,’</div> + </div> + </div> +</div> + +<p class='c009'>for an Englishman. Of course anyone, American +or English, with the slightest sense for history +and kinship, or with the slightest sympathetic +<span class='pageno' id='Page_68'>68</span>imagination, can penetrate to the feelings conveyed +by both phrases. But the direct first-hand +intuition, derived from earliest childhood memories, +is for the one nation that of continental +width, and for the other nation that of the little +island world. Now the love of the sheer geographical +aspects of one’s country, of its hills, its +mountains, and its plains, of its trees, its flowers, +its birds, and its whole nature-life, is no small +element in that binding force which makes a nation. +It is the function of language, working +through literature and through the habitual +phrases of early life, to foster this diffused feeling +of the common possession of a treasure infinitely +precious.</p> + +<p class='c006'>I must not be misunderstood to mean that this +example has any unique importance. It is only +one example of what can be illustrated in a hundred +ways. Also language is not the only symbolism +effective for this purpose. But in an especial +manner, language binds a nation together by +the common emotions which it elicits, and is yet +the instrument whereby freedom of thought and +of individual criticism finds its expression.</p> + +<p class='c006'>My main thesis is that a social system is kept +together by the blind force of instinctive actions, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_69'>69</span>and of instinctive emotions clustered around habits +and prejudices. It is therefore not true that +any advance in the scale of culture inevitably tends +to the preservation of society. On the whole, the +contrary is more often the case, and any survey +of nature confirms this conclusion. A new element +in life renders in many ways the operation of the +old instincts unsuitable. But unexpressed instincts +are unanalysed and blindly felt. Disruptive +forces, introduced by a higher level of existence, +are then warring in the dark against an +invisible enemy. There is no foothold for the +intervention of ‘rational consideration’—to use +Henry Osborn Taylor’s admirable phrase. The +symbolic expression of instinctive forces drags +them out into the open: it differentiates them and +delineates them. There is then opportunity for +reason to effect, with comparative speed, what +otherwise must be left to the slow operation of +the centuries amid ruin and reconstruction. Mankind +misses its opportunities, and its failures are +a fair target for ironic criticism. But the fact +that reason too often fails does not give fair +ground for the hysterical conclusion that it never +succeeds. Reason can be compared to the force +of gravitation, the weakest of all natural forces, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_70'>70</span>but in the end the creator of suns and of stellar +systems:—those great societies of the Universe. +Symbolic expression first preserves society by adding +emotion to instinct, and secondly it affords a +foothold for reason by its delineation of the particular +instinct which it expresses. This doctrine +of the disruptive tendency due to novelties, even +those involving a rise to finer levels, is illustrated +by the effect of Christianity on the stability of the +Roman Empire. It is also illustrated by the three +revolutions which secured liberty and equality for +the world—namely the English revolutionary period +of the seventeenth century, the American +Revolution, and the French Revolution. England +barely escaped a disruption of its social system; +America was never in any such danger; France, +where the entrance of novelty was most intense, +did for a time experience this collapse. Edmund +Burke, the Whig statesman of the eighteenth century, +was the philosopher who was the approving +prophet of the two earlier revolutions, and the +denunciatory prophet of the French Revolution. +A man of genius and a statesman, who has immediately +observed two revolutions, and has meditated +deeply on a third, deserves to be heard +when he speaks on the forces which bind and +<span class='pageno' id='Page_71'>71</span>disrupt societies. Unfortunately statesmen are +swayed by the passions of the moment, and Burke +shared this defect to the full, so as to be carried +away by the reactionary passions aroused by the +French Revolution. Thus the wisdom of his general +conception of social forces is smothered by +the wild unbalanced conclusions which he drew +from them: his greatness is best shown by his +attitude towards the American Revolution. His +more general reflections are contained first, in his +youthful work <i>A Vindication of Natural Society</i>, +and secondly, in his <i>Reflections on the French +Revolution</i>. The earlier work was meant ironically; +but, as is often the case with genius, he +prophesied unknowingly. This essay is practically +written round the thesis that advances in the +art of civilization are apt to be destructive of the +social system. Burke conceived this conclusion +to be a <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>. But it is the truth. +The second work—a work which in its immediate +effect was perhaps the most harmful ever written—directs +attention to the importance of ‘prejudice’ +as a binding social force. There again I +hold that he was right in his premises and wrong +in his conclusions.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Burke surveys the standing miracle of the existence +<span class='pageno' id='Page_72'>72</span>of an organised society, culminating in +the smooth unified action of the state. Such a +society may consist of millions of individuals, each +with its individual character, its individual aims, +and its individual selfishness. He asks what is +the force which leads this throng of separate +units to coöperate in the maintenance of an organised +state, in which each individual has his +part to play—political, economic, and Æsthetic. +He contrasts the complexity of the functionings of +a civilised society with the sheer diversities of its +individual citizens considered as a mere group or +crowd. His answer to the riddle is that the magnetic +force is ‘prejudice,’ or in other words, ‘use +and wont.’ Here he anticipates the whole modern +theory of ‘herd psychology,’ and at the same +time deserts the fundamental doctrine of the +Whig party, as formed in the seventeenth century +and sanctioned by Locke. This conventional +Whig doctrine was that the state derived its origin +from an ‘original contract’ whereby the mere +crowd voluntarily organised itself into a society. +Such a doctrine seeks the origin of the state in a +baseless historical fiction. Burke was well ahead +of his time in drawing attention to the importance +of precedence as a political force. Unfortunately, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_73'>73</span>in the excitement of the moment, Burke +construed the importance of precedence as implying +the negation of progressive reform.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Now, when we examine how a society bends its +individual members to function in conformity +with its needs, we discover that one important operative +agency is our vast system of inherited +symbolism. There is an intricate expressed symbolism +of language and of act, which is spread +throughout the community, and which evokes +fluctuating apprehension of the basis of common +purposes. The particular direction of individual +action is directly correlated to the particular +sharply defined symbols presented to him at the +moment. The response of action to symbol may +be so direct as to cut out any effective reference +to the ultimate thing symbolized. This elimination +of meaning is termed reflex action. Sometimes +there does intervene some effective reference +to the meaning of the symbol. But this +meaning is not recalled with the particularity and +definiteness which would yield any rational enlightenment +as to the specific action required to secure +the final end. The meaning is vague but insistent. +Its insistence plays the part of hypnotizing the +individual to complete the specific action associated +<span class='pageno' id='Page_74'>74</span>with the symbol. In the whole transaction, +the elements which are clear-cut and definite are +the specific symbols and the actions which should +issue from the symbols. But in themselves the +symbols are barren facts whose direct associative +force would be insufficient to procure automatic +conformity. There is not sufficient repetition, or +sufficient similarity of diverse occasions, to secure +mere automatic obedience. But in fact the symbol +evokes loyalties to vaguely conceived notions, +fundamental for our spiritual natures. The result +is that our natures are stirred to suspend all antagonistic +impulses, so that the symbol procures +its required response in action. Thus the social +symbolism has a double meaning. It means pragmatically +the direction of individuals to specific +actions; and it also means theoretically the vague +ultimate reasons with their emotional accompaniments, +whereby the symbols acquire their power +to organize the miscellaneous crowd into a +smoothly running community.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The contrast between a state and an army +illustrates this principle. A state deals with a +greater complexity of situation than does its army. +In this sense it is a looser organization, and in +regard to the greater part of its population the +<span class='pageno' id='Page_75'>75</span>communal symbolism cannot rely for its effectiveness +on the frequent recurrence of almost identical +situations. But a disciplined regiment is trained +to act as a unit in a definite set of situations. The +bulk of human life escapes from the reach of this +military discipline. The regiment is drilled for +one species of job. The result is that there is +more reliance on automatism, and less reliance +on the appeal to ultimate reasons. The trained +soldier acts automatically on receiving the word +of command. He responds to the sound and cuts +out the idea; this is reflex action. But the appeal +to the deeper side is still important in an army; +although it is provided for in another set of symbols, +such as the flag, and the memorials of the +honourable service of the regiment, and other +symbolic appeals to patriotism. Thus in an army +there is one set of symbols to produce automatic +obedience in a limited set of circumstances, and +there is another set of symbols to produce a general +sense of the importance of the duties performed. +This second set prevents random reflection +from sapping automatic response to the +former set.</p> + +<p class='c006'>For the greater number of citizens of a state +there is in practice no reliable automatic obedience +<span class='pageno' id='Page_76'>76</span>to any symbol such as the word of command +for soldiers, except in a few instances such as the +response to the signals of the traffic police. Thus +the state depends in a very particular way upon +the prevalence of symbols which combine direction +to some well-known course of action with +some deeper reference to the purpose of the state. +The self-organisation of society depends on commonly +diffused symbols evoking commonly diffused +ideas, and at the same time indicating commonly +understood actions. Usual forms of verbal +expression are the most important example of +such symbolism. Also the heroic aspect of the +history of the country is the symbol for its immediate +worth.</p> + +<p class='c006'>When a revolution has sufficiently destroyed +this common symbolism leading to common actions +for usual purposes, society can only save itself +from dissolution by means of a reign of +terror. Those revolutions which escape a reign +of terror have left intact the fundamental efficient +symbolism of society. For example, the English +revolutions of the seventeenth century and the +American revolution of the eighteenth century +left the ordinary life of their respective communities +nearly unchanged. When George Washington +<span class='pageno' id='Page_77'>77</span>had replaced George <abbr title='the third'>III</abbr>, and Congress had +replaced the English Parliament, Americans were +still carrying on a well-understood system so far +as the general structure of their social life was +concerned. Life in Virginia must have assumed +no very different aspect from that which it had +exhibited before the revolution. In Burke’s +phraseology, the prejudices on which Virginian +society depended were unbroken. The ordinary +signs still beckoned people to their ordinary actions, +and suggested the ordinary common-sense +justification.</p> + +<p class='c006'>One difficulty of explaining my meaning is that +the intimate effective symbolism consists of the +various types of expression which permeate society +and evoke a sense of common purpose. No +one detail is of much importance. The whole +range of symbolic expression is required. A national +hero, such as George Washington or Jefferson, +is a symbol of the common purpose which +animates American life. This symbolic function +of great men is one of the difficulties in obtaining +a balanced historical judgment. There is the +hysteria of depreciation, and there is the opposite +hysteria which dehumanises in order to exalt. +It is very difficult to exhibit the greatness without +<span class='pageno' id='Page_78'>78</span>losing the human being. Yet we know that at +least <i>we</i> are human beings; and half the inspiration +of our heroes is lost when we forget that +<i>they</i> were human beings.</p> + +<p class='c006'>I mention great Americans, because I am speaking +in America. But exactly the same truth holds +for the great men of all countries and ages.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The doctrine of symbolism developed in these +lectures enables us to distinguish between pure instinctive +action, reflex action, and symbolically +conditioned action. Pure instinctive action is +that functioning of an organism which is wholly +analysable in terms of those conditions laid upon +its development by the settled facts of its external +environment, conditions describable without any +reference to its perceptive mode of presentational +immediacy. This pure instinct is the response of +an organism to pure causal efficacy.</p> + +<p class='c006'>According to this definition, pure instinct is the +most primitive type of response which is yielded +by organisms to the stimulus of their environment. +All physical response on the part of inorganic +matter to its environment is thus properly to be +termed instinct. In the case of organic matter, +its primary difference from inorganic nature is +its greater delicacy of internal mutual adjustment +<span class='pageno' id='Page_79'>79</span>of minute parts and, in some cases, its emotional +enhancement. Thus instinct, or this immediate +adjustment to immediate environment, becomes +more prominent in its function of directing action +for the purposes of the living organism. The +world is a community of organisms; these organisms +in the mass determine the environmental influence +on any one of them; there can only be a +persistent community of persistent organisms +when the environmental influence in the shape of +instinct is favourable to the survival of the individuals. +Thus the community as an environment +is responsible for the survival of the separate individuals +which compose it; and these separate +individuals are responsible for their contributions +to the environment. Electrons and molecules survive +because they satisfy this primary law for a +stable order of nature in connection with given +societies of organisms.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Reflex action is a relapse towards a more complex +type of instinct on the part of organisms +which enjoy, or have enjoyed, symbolically conditioned +action. Thus its discussion must be postponed. +Symbolically conditioned action arises in +the higher organisms which enjoy the perceptive +mode of presentational immediacy, that is to say, +<span class='pageno' id='Page_80'>80</span>sense-presentation of the contemporary world. +This sense-presentation symbolically promotes an +analysis of the massive perception of causal efficacy. +The causal efficacy is thereby perceived as +analysed into components with the locations in +space primarily belonging to the sense-presentations. +In the case of perceived organisms external +to the human body, the spatial discrimination involved +in the human perception of their pure +causal efficacy is so feeble, that practically there +is no check on this symbolic transference, apart +from the indirect check of pragmatic consequences,—in +other words, either survival-value, or self-satisfaction, +logical and Æsthetic.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Symbolically conditioned action is action which +is thus conditioned by the analysis of the perceptive +mode of causal efficacy effected by symbolic +transference from the perceptive mode of presentational +immediacy. This analysis may be right +or wrong, according as it does, or does not, conform +to the actual distribution of the efficacious +bodies. In so far as it is sufficiently correct under +normal circumstances, it enables an organism to +conform its actions to long-ranged analysis of the +particular circumstances of its environment. So +far as this type of action prevails, pure instinct is +<span class='pageno' id='Page_81'>81</span>superseded. This type of action is greatly promoted +by thought, which uses the symbols as referent +to their meanings. There is no sense in +which pure instinct can be wrong. But symbolically +conditioned action can be wrong, in the sense +that it may arise from a false symbolic analysis +of causal efficacy.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Reflex action is that organic functioning which +is wholly dependent on sense-presentation, unaccompanied +by any analysis of causal efficacy via +symbolic reference. The conscious analysis of +perception is primarily concerned with the analysis +of the symbolic relationship between the two +perceptive modes. Thus reflex action is hindered +by thought, which inevitably promotes the prominence +of symbolic reference.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Reflex action arises when by the operation of +symbolism the organism has acquired the habit of +action in response to immediate sense-perception, +and has discarded the symbolic enhancement of +causal efficacy. It thus represents the relapse +from the high-grade activity of symbolic reference. +This relapse is practically inevitable in the +absence of conscious attention. Reflex action cannot +in any sense be said to be wrong, though it +may be unfortunate.</p> + +<p class='c006'><span class='pageno' id='Page_82'>82</span>Thus the important binding factor in a community +of insects probably falls under the notion +of pure instinct, as here defined. For each individual +insect is probably such an organism that the +causal conditions which it inherits from the immediate +past are adequate to determine its social +actions. But reflex action plays its subordinate +part. For the sense-perceptions of the insects +have in certain fields of action assumed an automatic +determination of the insects’ activities. +Still more feebly, symbolically conditioned action +intervenes for such situations when the sense-presentation +provides a symbolically defined specification +of the causal situation. But only active +thought can save symbolically conditioned action +from quickly relapsing into reflex action. The +most successful examples of community life exist +when pure instinct reigns supreme. These examples +occur only in the inorganic world; among +societies of active molecules forming rocks, planets, +solar systems, star clusters.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The more developed type of living communities +requires the successful emergence of sense-perception +to delineate successfully causal efficacy in the +external environment; and it also requires its relapse +into a reflex suitable to the community. We +<span class='pageno' id='Page_83'>83</span>thus obtain the more flexible communities of low-grade +minds, or even living cells, which possess +some power of adaptation to the chance details +of remote environment.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Finally mankind also uses a more artificial +symbolism, obtained chiefly by concentrating on a +certain selection of sense-perceptions, such as +words for example. In this case, there is a chain +of derivations of symbol from symbol whereby +finally the local relations, between the final symbol +and the ultimate meaning, are entirely lost. +Thus these derivative symbols, obtained as it were +by arbitrary association, are really the results of +reflex action suppressing the intermediate portions +of the chain. We may use the word ‘association’ +when there is this suppression of intermediate +links.</p> + +<p class='c006'>This derivative symbolism, employed by mankind, +is not in general mere indication of meaning, +in which every common feature shared by symbol +and meaning has been lost. In every effective +symbolism there are certain Æsthetic features +shared in common. The meaning acquires emotion +and feeling directly excited by the symbol. +This is the whole basis of the art of literature, +namely that emotions and feelings directly excited +<span class='pageno' id='Page_84'>84</span>by the words should fitly intensify our emotions +and feelings arising from contemplation of +the meaning. Further in language there is a +certain vagueness of symbolism. A word has a +symbolic association with its own history, its +other meanings, and with its general status in +current literature. Thus a word gathers emotional +signification from its emotional history in +the past; and this is transferred symbolically to +its meaning in present use.</p> + +<p class='c006'>The same principle holds for all the more artificial +sorts of human symbolism:—for example, +in religious art. Music is particularly adapted for +this symbolic transfer of emotions, by reason of +the strong emotions which it generates on its own +account. These strong emotions at once overpower +any sense that its own local relations are +of any importance. The only importance of the +local arrangement of an orchestra is to enable us +to hear the music. We do not listen to the music +in order to gain a just appreciation of how the +orchestra is situated. When we hear the hoot of +a motor car, exactly the converse situation arises. +Our only interest in the hoot is to determine a +definite locality as the seat of causal efficacy determining +the future.</p> + +<p class='c006'><span class='pageno' id='Page_85'>85</span>This consideration of the symbolic transference +of emotion raises another question. In the case +of sense-perception, we may ask whether the Æsthetic +emotion associated with it is derivative +from it or merely concurrent with it. For example, +the sound waves by their causal efficacy +may produce in the body a state of pleasurable +Æsthetic emotion, which is then symbolically +transferred to the sense-perception of the sounds. +In the case of music, having regard to the fact +that deaf people do not enjoy music, it seems that +the emotion is almost entirely the product of the +musical sounds. But the human body is causally +affected by the ultra-violet rays of the solar spectrum +in ways which do not issue in any sensation +of colour. Nevertheless such rays produce a decided +emotional effect. Also even sounds, just below +or just above the limit of audibility, seem to +add an emotional tinge to a volume of audible +sound. This whole question of the symbolic +transfer of emotion lies at the base of any theory +of the Æsthetics of art. For example, it gives the +reason for the importance of a rigid suppression +of irrelevant detail. For emotions inhibit each +other, or intensify each other. Harmonious emotion +means a complex of emotions mutually intensifying; +<span class='pageno' id='Page_86'>86</span>whereas the irrelevant details supply +emotions which, because of their irrelevance, inhibit +the main effect. Each little emotion directly +arising out of some subordinate detail refuses to +accept its status as a detached fact in our consciousness. +It insists on its symbolic transfer to +the unity of the main effect.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Thus symbolism, including the symbolic transference +by which it is effected, is merely one exemplification +of the fact that a unity of experience +arises out of the confluence of many components. +This unity of experience is complex, so as to be +capable of analysis. The components of experience +are not a structureless collection indiscriminately +brought together. Each component by its +very nature stands in a certain potential scheme +of relationships to the other components. It is +the transformation of this potentiality into real +unity which constitutes that actual concrete fact +which is an act of experience. But in transformation +from potentiality to actual fact inhibitions, +intensifications, directions of attention toward, directions +of attention away from, emotional outcomes, +purposes, and other elements of experience +may arise. Such elements are also true components +of the act of experience; but they are not +<span class='pageno' id='Page_87'>87</span>necessarily determined by the primitive phases of +experience from which the final product arises. +An act of experience is what a complex organism +comes to, in its character of being one thing. Also +its various parts, its molecules, and its living cells, +as they pass on to new occasions of their existence, +take a new colour from the fact that in their immediate +past they have been contributory elements +to this dominant unity of experience, which in its +turn reacts upon them.</p> + +<p class='c006'>Thus mankind by means of its elaborate system +of symbolic transference can achieve miracles +of sensitiveness to a distant environment, and to +a problematic future. But it pays the penalty, by +reason of the dangerous fact that each symbolic +transference may involve an arbitrary imputation +of unsuitable characters. It is not true, that the +mere workings of nature in any particular organism +are in all respects favorable either to the existence +of that organism, or to its happiness, or +to the progress of the society in which the organism +finds itself. The melancholy experience +of men makes this warning a platitude. No elaborate +community of elaborate organisms could +exist unless its systems of symbolism were in general +successful. Codes, rules of behaviour, canons +<span class='pageno' id='Page_88'>88</span>of art, are attempts to impose systematic action +which on the whole will promote favourable symbolic +interconnections. As a community changes, +all such rules and canons require revision in the +light of reason. The object to be obtained has +two aspects; one is the subordination of the community +to the individuals composing it, and the +other is the subordination of the individuals to +the community. Free men obey the rules which they +themselves have made. Such rules will be found +in general to impose on society behaviour in reference +to a symbolism which is taken to refer to the +ultimate purposes for which the society exists.</p> + +<p class='c006'>It is the first step in sociological wisdom, to +recognize that the major advances in civilization +are processes which all but wreck the societies in +which they occur:—like unto an arrow in the +hand of a child. The art of free society consists +first in the maintenance of the symbolic code; and +secondly in fearlessness of revision, to secure that +the code serves those purposes which satisfy an +enlightened reason. Those societies which cannot +combine reverence to their symbols with freedom +of revision, must ultimately decay either +from anarchy, or from the slow atrophy of a life +stifled by useless shadows.</p> + +<div class='nf-center-c1'> +<div class='nf-center c002'> + <div><span class='large'>Footnotes</span></div> + </div> +</div> + +<div class='footnote' id='f1'> +<p class='c006'><span class='label'><a href='#r1'>1</a>.  </span>‘Treatise’, Part <abbr title='three'>III</abbr>, Section <abbr title='two'>II</abbr>.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f2'> +<p class='c006'><span class='label'><a href='#r2'>2</a>.  </span><abbr class='spell'>Cf.</abbr> Hume’s ‘Treatise’, Part <abbr title='one'>I</abbr>, Section <abbr title='six'>VI</abbr>.</p> +</div> +<div class='footnote' id='f3'> +<p class='c006'><span class='label'><a href='#r3'>3</a>.  </span><abbr class='spell'>Cf.</abbr> <i>Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge</i>, by +Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan and Co., London, 1924.</p> +</div> +<div> + + <ul class='ul_1 c002'> + <li>Transcriber’s Notes: + <ul class='ul_2'> + <li>Footnotes have been collected at the end of the text, and are linked for ease of + reference. + </li> + </ul> + </li> + </ul> + +</div> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78977 ***</div> +</body> +<!-- created with ppgen.py 3.57i on 2026-06-18 21:50:03 GMT --> +</html> diff --git a/78977-h/images/cover.jpg b/78977-h/images/cover.jpg Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e93967 --- /dev/null +++ b/78977-h/images/cover.jpg |
