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diff --git a/78616-0.txt b/78616-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..afd50c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/78616-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,9163 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78616 *** + + + The Social Basis of + Consciousness + + A Study in Organic Psychology + Based upon a Synthetic and Societal + Concept of the Neuroses + + BY + TRIGANT BURROW + M.D., Ph.D. + + + NEW YORK + HARCOURT, BRACE & COMPANY, INC. + LONDON: KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD. + 1927 + + + + + _THE SOCIAL BASIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS_ + + Chapter I, Part I, was first published in _The Journal of + Nervous and Mental Disease_, and Chapter II, Part I, in _The + Psychoanalytic Review_. Acknowledgment is made to the Editors + for permission to include these papers in the present volume. + + + PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY + THE EDINBURGH PRESS, 9 AND 11 YOUNG STREET, EDINBURGH + + + _I am that which began; + Out of me the years roll; + Out of me God and man; + I am equal and whole; + God changes, and man, and the form of them bodily; + I am the soul._ + “Hertha.”--Swinburne. + + + + + CONTENTS + + + PAGE + + Preface xv + + Introduction 1 + + Significance of Freud’s basic conception--Misconceptions + in psychoanalysis due to present personalistic + basis--Psychoanalysis entails the element of personal + differentiation and sponsorship presented in other therapeutic + systems--Need for abrogation of personal equation--Societal + concept an outgrowth of essential objective findings of + Freud--This thesis an initial presentation of an organismic + interpretation of human consciousness. + + + PART I + + THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEUROSES + + Chapter I 9 + + PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THEORY AND IN LIFE + + Theory of psychoanalysis rests upon conception that nervous + disorders are substitutive manifestation of repressed sexual + life--Sexuality itself, however, as now existing, symptomatic + of repression and quite preclusive of the organic instinct of + sex--Popular analytic view places a premium upon the reaction + embodied in normality but substitution and repression in + this collective reaction identical with the unconscious of + neurotic individuals--Substitution of self-image for reality, + present in reactions of normal, is not as yet recognized by + psychoanalysis--Psychoanalysis remains in so far a theory + only--In truth, the neurotic personality is index of the urge + toward an essential organic mode of consciousness--Continuity + with organic processes registered as subjective feeling cannot + be approached by objective methods--The insanity of the + individual not to be cured as long as there is the insanity of + the social mind about him. + + Chapter II 32 + + A RELATIVE CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ANALYSIS OF + CONSCIOUSNESS IN ITS ETHNIC ORIGIN + + The Newtonian system assumes an unqualified absolute and + fails to take account of factors operating within the larger + system in which it is itself an element--In the sphere of + psychic phenomena a similar system of absolutism dominates our + presumably conscious world--Analysis of our judgments reveals + the assumption that the position intrinsic to the observer + is all-inclusive and authentic--But our world of impressions + is artificial and reflects the artificial systematization + that fails to include our own organisms--This autocratic + interpretation of life is based on a bidimensional or image + system which in its arbitrary and personal evaluation distorts + the universe of reality--Normality is consensus comprising the + personal absolute vested in the unconscious of the collective + mind--Need to replace pictorial mode by organic coalescence + in common affectivity--Personal systems of men, single and + collective, are but relative with respect to an organic + societal consciousness--Concept of relativity of consciousness + abrogates absolute standard and embraces dimensional element of + the system, individual and social, of which we ourselves are a + component part--Transition from bidimensional (contemplation of + aspect) to tridimensional (participation in function) affords + basis for measuring deflections of personality, socially as + well as individually. + + Chapter III 50 + + THE ORIGIN OF OUR INDIVIDUAL UNCONSCIOUS + + Organic societal consciousness can be comprehended only + through subjective identification with it--Discussion of + the tridimensional reality of human consciousness with + its three determinants--Present phase of consciousness + admits only the bidimensional image--The position of the + bidimensional elements “right and wrong” as incorporated + in the life of the child--Advantage of the parent the real + motive underlying this moral bidimension--Long-continued + experiments with personal mood reactions as substantiation + of view that induced image of right and wrong is at the root + of human psychopathology--Non-inclusiveness of others is + meaning of unconsciousness, individual and social--Present + social adaptation is merely collective response, not societal + extension of consciousness--Substitution of the absolute of + personal interest for inclusive participation as relative + elements affords no basis for inclusion of larger whole in + which the individual is a contributing element. + + Chapter IV 63 + + THE UNCONSCIOUS FACTOR WITHIN THE SOCIAL SYSTEM + + Daily reactions betray state of anxiety in the social + mind--These anxieties, sponsored in earlier times by medical + and religious fetish, still substantiated by the systems of + medicine and religion--Organic analysis of the element of + social authority--The systems of psychoanalysis and the Roman + Church as paradigms--Factor of resistance in psychoanalysis + analogous to factor of doubt in religion--The systematization + comprising the social corporation of individuals as much an + aspect of the unconscious autocracy of the personal absolute as + the systematization of the individual--In the conflict between + these two mutually opposed absolutes (socially systematized + authority and the resistance of the individual) there is an + organic impasse. + + Chapter V 78 + + SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNCONSCIOUSNESS FROM A VIEWPOINT + OF RELATIVITY + + The established system demands conformity to its prescribed + norm--The limitation of life to a bidimensional alternative of + one’s own pleasure or one’s own pain results in division of + personality and in compulsion neurosis involving the entire + social consciousness--Bidimensional replacements in social + system found in art, science, education, marriage, etc.--The + mood alternations of the individual are but obverse aspects of + the same bidimensional portrait of personal advantage--This + element of unconscious alternation bars unbiased observation + of the personal absolute--In the field of preventive + medicine the personal cure of the individual subordinated to + safeguarding of community health--But within the subjective + sphere there is resistance to an approach that would consider + the individual’s position as part of a societal unity because + such an approach would menace the illusion of personal + prerogative--Psychopathologists equally involved unconsciously + in the social neurosis--In an objective study of the neurosis + the psychopathologist escapes the subjective acknowledgment + of its presence within himself--Possibility of fundamental + readjustment for dissociated personality lies only in surrender + socially of bidimensional or pictorial illusion in favour of + tridimensional actuality. + + + PART II + + THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NEUROSES + + Chapter I 107 + + ANALYSIS OF FREUD’S DYNAMIC AND INDIVIDUALISTIC CONCEPTION OF + THE NEUROSES + + Freud’s theory assumes breach in integrity of consciousness due + to effort of delimited area to establish itself as a separate + self-governing unit--Distinction of Freud’s work lies in + conception of central totality of consciousness; limitation of + Freud’s work consists in assigning totality of consciousness + to single individual--Conception of totality of personality + tenable only from point of view of inclusive societal + consciousness. + + Chapter II 114 + + FORMULATION OF AN ORGANIC OR SOCIETAL BASIS OF INTERPRETATION + + The mental life of the infant organism is wholly subjective + and is one with the organism’s inherent feeling--With + entrance of the ulterior motive appearing in the command and + prohibition of the parent there is the issue of personal + gain or loss (suggestion and repression)--Appearance of + self-consciousness and self-interest forces interruption + of the organism’s societal life and a separation from its + basic continuum--Maintenance of separativeness of individual + destroys organic integrity--There is need to stand apart + from self and view it as element within the larger organism + of mankind--Instinct of tribal preservation and not + self-preservation is the dominant urge among us. + + Chapter III 134 + + THE ORGANIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS + + Development of the idea of the parallel between individual and + phyletic trends in unconscious manifestations--Unconscious + worship of self-image source of suggestion and + repression--Because of this self-image what man assumes to be + cerebration is fictitious brain-state withdrawn from continuity + with organic life--Where there is individual lesion, separation + among elements is followed by pain and recourse to remedial + aids, i.e. the organism as a whole demands relief--In the + organic societal whole the individual as separated element is + source of lesion but seeks to escape through symbolic disguise + the pain of his societal separation--Conflict is between part + and whole wherein individual is embodiment of both. + + Chapter IV 154 + + ORGANIC ANALYSIS OF REPRESSION AND OF THE FACTOR OF RESISTANCE + FROM THE SOCIETAL VIEWPOINT + + The resolution of repression or resistance is regarded by Freud + as the essential problem of psychoanalysis--Neurosis, according + to Freud, is life’s repression of sexuality--According to an + organismic attitude repression and sexuality are concomitant + and are equally the results in the individual of organic + disunity and interruption of function--The biology of + resistance is found in the breach in individual’s continuity + with life as confluent, organic whole--Health or disease, + psychologically or physiologically, depends upon whether the + cell functions integrally or separatively, congruently or + resistantly--In social fabric each element is against each--In + our unconsciousness we deny the reality of this biological + phylum embodied in our organic consciousness and underlying the + processes of our individual mentation--Sexuality, currently + confused with sex, is egoistic, infantile expression and + antithesis of organic expression of sex--Only continuity of the + confluent subjective sphere can make possible an analysis that + will synthesize the scattered elements of personality. + + Chapter V 165 + + ORGANIC ANALYSIS OF REPRESSION AND OF THE FACTOR OF RESISTANCE + FROM THE INDIVIDUAL VIEWPOINT + + Transference is an unconscious condition which involves as + much the analyst as the analysand--Resistance and repression + are the factors in this mutual situation--Under present + personalistic procedure in psychoanalysis the analyst deals + objectively with an inherently subjective situation--He + regards only the disparity of the patient and so preserves the + apparent differentiation which is the underlying cause of the + patient’s disorder--There is a confusion in psychoanalysis due + to the failure to discriminate between the mother-image and + the mother-organism--The analyst, being socially dissociated, + seeks to reinstate the comfort of his own childhood through an + unconscious self-interested response (pleasure or displeasure) + to the analysand--The transference which is thus introduced + by the unconscious attitude of the analyst cannot be analyzed + because of the analyst’s own involvement--This is the impasse + of the individualistic analysis--From a societal viewpoint the + analyst can be interested only in the patient’s delusion of + separateness and will direct his endeavour to an understanding + of the social repression which dissociates them both from the + common, generic consciousness. + + Chapter VI 177 + + THE DREAM AND ITS ANALYSIS IN AN ORGANISMIC INTERPRETATION OF + THE NEUROSES + + To analyze the dream from a basis that is equally separative + and repressed is to exchange the symbols of the individual’s + repression for analogous symbols of the social repression--The + night’s reaction, being individual, and the day’s reaction, + being social, both represent an endeavour to adjust vicariously + man’s societal disunity--The affective or subjective life + cannot be adjusted through the study of the objective + mechanisms that merely reflect it but only through the + subjective (conscious) reabsorption within us of the affects to + whose suggestion the dream is the mirrored reaction--The drama + and the dream are identical in mechanism--An organic mode of + consciousness can regard with equally objective clarity the + vicarious processes of the day and of the night. + + Chapter VII 187 + + THE BIOLOGICAL SUBSTRATE OF THE NEUROTIC CONFLICT IN ITS + ORGANIC SIGNIFICANCE + + Two types of reaction: the _autocentric_ who withdraws + _in toto_ and has completely negative attitude toward + his congeners, and the _allocentric_ who makes effort at + social compromise or adaptation (“sublimation”)--Both reactions + equally self-centered: autocentric (precoid, psychasthenic) + showing adaptation through individual dream; allocentric + (hysteric, hypomanic) through social dream--Biological + substrate of these reactions lies in lack of balance between + cerebro-spinal and sympathetic systems--In the preconscious + form preserved among animals no break between the two systems; + there is maintained rhythmic and harmonious co-ordination of + response--Period of Greek thought essentially allocentric; + Christianity essentially autocentric. + + Chapter VIII 197 + + THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SEXUALITY AND SEX IN RELATION TO + UNIFICATION AND ORGANIC MATING + + Psychoanalysis, unconsciously influenced by a division based + on the bias of its own arbitrary alternatives, has assumed + contrasts of behaviour not warrantable from an organismic + conception--Such alternatives are “homosexuality” and + “heterosexuality”--The organic instinct of mating has become + distorted by the image system of “good” (conceding social + consensus) and “bad” (repudiating social consensus)--Both types + are response to social consensus and are ego-sexual--Sexuality + is effort of conjunction of peripheral and visceral spheres + while sex is effortless and non-personal conjugation + of organismic poles comprising male and female--Union + is of personality as realized in man and woman through + identification with life, the one embodying the peripheral, + allocentric component, the other the internal, autocentric + component--Organically, man is not opposite woman but each is + complement of other--Concept of intermediate sex is misnomer + for composite sex--Social demand of oppositeness necessitates + repression in male of female component and in female of male + component--In present stage of society’s development marriage + is mutual adjustment of ego-sexual claims, a pooling of the + private unconscious of each where each withdraws from an + organic place as a societal element--Biological significance + of unity of personality is conception of _principle of + primary identification_--Autocentric types as Buddha, Plato, + Christ, and allocentric personalities of Socrates, Napoleon and + Nietzsche equally manifest this urge of the inherent organism + of man--In organic integrity of personality is societal + instinct that is the composite life of the race. + + Chapter IX 221 + + ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF THE SOCIETAL NEUROSIS IN ITS SOCIAL + IMPLICATION + + Back of the pretence of the social mind lies a basis of social + fear and mistrust--The mutual accommodations of external + agreement used to cloak the introversion of the individual--The + development of group analysis permits study of the resistance + of the social consensus with respect to the individual as well + as the resistance of the individual with respect to the social + consensus--Group analysis, like individual analysis, presents + an unconscious and bidimensional situation involving reaction + clusters which constitute a pooling of the unconscious of + the several members--This group situation offers opportunity + to secure relative and societal background against which the + individual may view in impersonal perspective his habitual + arbitrary and personal evaluations--According to the group + or relative conception the causative element of the neurosis + is societal or phyletic and correction must proceed upon a + societal or phyletic basis. + + Chapter X 238 + + ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF THE SOCIETAL NEUROSIS IN ITS PERSONAL + IMPLICATION + + Demand for wider concept of organized consciousness of man + in order to replace disintegrating structures of present + social system--Need to dispel illusion of mental oppositeness + and the restraints of an alternative system of morality + which aims merely to establish temporary balance between + its opposites--Experimental basis for group conception here + formulated in practical experience of a few students--As the + societal and the individual are organically one in mode, the + unification of the individual is a step toward the unification + of the societal consciousness--Organismic (societal) group + differentiated from collective (social) cluster--The period + of man’s substitutive image-production first interrupted by + Darwin’s theory of evolution and further threatened by Freud’s + theory of the evolutionary processes of the unconscious--The + social basis of consciousness, however inadequately formulated, + invites an analytic approach to social or mass reactions, + exemplified in our national, political, industrial and + religious life. + + Index 253 + + + + +PREFACE + + +I do not know whether I can make clear in what manner the conception +embodied in the following pages first arose. Conceptions derived from +data of reason and observation necessarily proceed from a mental basis. +Scientific and philosophical treatises are the outcome primarily of +scientific or philosophical ideas. With both inductive and deductive +methods of reasoning the conclusions that flow from the assumptions are +our accepted basis of procedure. With the method of the present study, +however, we are upon other ground, for the inception of this work was +in no such wise; and yet to say that it is based upon no conceptual +premise would, of course, not be true. The difference is that what +follows here has been the outgrowth of events that were prior to and +independent of any conceptual formulation of them. Biological necessity +preceded and argument followed after. My meaning may for the moment +be best understood when it is considered that these events are the +processes of personal experience inseparable from the sequences here +embodied. While this is not the place for detailing personal history, +the presentation of a thesis as intimate as this would not be complete +without some concrete account of its origin. + +Having years ago been “analyzed” in preparation for my work in +psychopathology, I had been for years duly “analyzing” others. It +unexpectedly happened one day, however, that while I was interpreting a +dream of a student-assistant, he made bold to challenge the honesty of +my analytic position, insisting that, as far as he was concerned, the +test of my sincerity would be met only when I should myself be willing +to accept from him the same analytic exactions I was now imposing +upon others. As may be readily judged, such a proposition seemed to me +nothing short of absurd. Had I not been “analyzed”? Needless to say +I had heard this proposal from patients many times before, but while +my reaction to the suggestion in the present instance was chiefly +one of amusement, my pride was not a little piqued at the intimation +it conveyed. So with the thought that in the interest of experiment +it could at least do no harm to humour for a time the waywardness of +inexperience, I conceded the arrangement. + +Not many weeks after I had taken the patient’s chair and yielded him +mine I realized that a situation to which I had agreed with more or +less levity had assumed an aspect of the profoundest seriousness. My +“resistances” to my self-appointed analyst, far from being negligible, +were plainly insuperable, but there was now no turning back. The +analysis proceeded on its course from day to day and with it my +resistances took tighter hold upon me. The agreement to which I had +voluntarily lent myself was becoming painful beyond words. Whatever +empirical interest the situation may have held for me at the outset was +now wholly subordinated to the indignation and pain of the position to +which I had been brought. + +It is possible to indicate only in their broadest lines the progressive +events of these trying months. I need hardly record the growing +sense of self-limitation and defeat that went hand in hand with this +daily advancing personal challenge, nor the corresponding efforts +of concealment in unconscious symbolizations and distortions on my +part. What calls for more vital emphasis, however, is the fact that +along with the deepening, if reluctant, realization of my intolerance +of self-defeat, there came gradually to me the realization that +my analyst, in changing places with me, had merely shifted to the +authoritarian vantage-ground I had myself relinquished and that the +situation had remained essentially unaltered still. + +This was significant. It marked at once the opening of wholly new +vistas of experience. In the light of its discovery I began to sense +for the first time what had all along underlain my own analysis and +what, as I now see it, really underlies every analysis. I began to see +that the student before me, notwithstanding his undoubted sincerity of +purpose, presented a no less personal and proprietary attitude toward +me than I had held toward him and that all that had been needed was the +authoritarian background to bring this attitude to expression. With +the consciousness of this condition I saw what has been for me the +crucial revelation of the many years of my analytic work--that, in its +individualistic application, the attitude of the psychoanalyst and the +attitude of the authoritarian are inseparable. + +As from day to day this realization came more closely home to me, and +with it the growing acceptance of the limitation and one-sidedness +of the personalistic critique in psychoanalysis, my personal +self-vindication and resistances began in the same measure to abate. +At the same time the analyst too, Mr. Clarence Shields, came at +last into a position to sense the personalism and resistance that +had unconsciously all along actuated his own reaction. From now +forward the direction of the inquiry was completely altered. The +analysis henceforth consisted in the reciprocal effort of each of +us to recognize within himself his attitude of authoritarianism and +autocracy toward the other. With this automatic relinquishment of the +personalistic or private basis and its replacement by a more inclusive +attitude toward the problems of human consciousness, there has been not +alone for myself but also for students and patients a gradual clearing +of our entire analytic horizon. + +It will later become clearer how this newer formulation of +psychoanalysis on the wider basis of its more inclusive impersonal +meaning has occurred entirely apart from the commonly predicable +processes of logic. Only the accidental circumstance of a student’s +protest against my own personal bias, and my subsequent observation of +an identical personalism in himself, as empirically disclosed upon +our interchanging places, are answerable for the altered insight into +psychoanalysis that the recent years have afforded me--an insight +which the investigations of the small group of students working along +analytic lines identical with my own have more and more substantiated. +It was due, then, entirely to this unexpected turn of the tables, which +placed me in the rôle of the patient and the patient in the analytic +rôle, that I was fortuitously launched into six years of social +experimentation upon the discrepancies of an individualistic analysis. +If the outcome of the process has been the retraction of my earlier +analytic outlook, it has not been the expression of any personal acumen +or distinctive asset on my part. + +The chance eventuality I have mentioned is alone responsible for +enforcing the relinquishment of my habitual personalistic basis in +psychoanalysis and bringing me to feel the need of a more comprehensive +interpretation of the unconscious. Coming to sense, through a wider +recognition of the unconscious, the correspondingly larger meaning +of the consciousness of man, I have come to feel the need of its +more adequate interpretation in such an organismic view as I have +here attempted to outline under the theme of “The Social Basis of +Consciousness.” + +I cannot consistently cite authoritative reference in support of +this work. There is none. It is sponsored alone in the spirit of +common endeavour actuating the group of students who have united in +its common realization. But if I am loath to shift to others the +responsibility for my own venturesomeness, I need not forgo the +pleasure of acknowledging--as I do with whole-heartedness--the impetus +that was given me in the beginning of my psychoanalytic work through +the sympathy and encouragement of Dr. Adolf Meyer. + + TRIGANT BURROW. + + The Tuscany, + Baltimore, Maryland. + + + + +THE SOCIAL BASIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +After sixteen years devoted to psychoanalytic work based on the +principles of Freud, I have come to a position which differs so +essentially from the followers of Freud as well as from his dissenters, +that I am impelled to set down some account of the development through +which my conceptions have passed, and to state as clearly as I can the +position to which they have led. + +The conceptions which Freud has brought to the study of abnormal +and individual psychology have been of incalculable significance in +aiding us to understand the causes and mechanisms underlying mental +disharmonies. The personalistic basis, however, on which psychoanalysis +rests has not in my experience proved sufficiently broad to meet the +demands of a more inclusive societal psychology in its application +to the needs of human life. While, in reconstructing the mechanics +of the unconscious, psychoanalysis has given the impetus to a truer +comprehension of the many distorted expressions of individual +mentation, it has not as yet really uncovered the essential meaning +of our human problems as they touch the consciousness of man in its +organic reality. + +To speak, however, of the organic reality of life is to enter upon +a new universe of consciousness. It is to acquire a wholly altered +concept of the inherent consciousness of man. This concept is not one +that is interpretable upon our accustomed individualistic basis. As its +envisagement is societal, its realization must necessarily be societal +also. + +To-day it is not possible to contemplate the significance of +psychoanalysis without realizing the arbitrarily constricted point +of view that has come to characterize the popularizations of +psychoanalysis in their various phases. Psychoanalysis possesses +as yet no specific definition. Personalistic in conception, it is +personalistically interpreted, and its variations are to-day as +whimsical as they are many. By one process of handling, psychoanalysis +has become closely allied with Mysticism and New Thought, by another +with propagandist measures for scientific birth-control, by a third +with an authenticated programme of sexual licence, and with all it +is but a new form of application of the old programme of palliative +medication. + +If, however, the essential truth of Freudian psychology, like all vital +scientific movements, has been attended by personalistic misconception +and even by the cruder aims of individual exploitation, it has been +equally attended by a genuine scientific concurrence of spirit such +as alone animates the disinterested conscience of the laboratory +investigator. In the midst of the cheap and shifting divagations of a +day, there have remained the sounder interpretations of at least a few +outstanding investigators. While neither Freudian nor anti-Freudian, +there are those to whom I, as well as others, owe the inspiration of +those more thoughtful evaluations that are based upon a steadfast +fidelity to the inclusive spirit of an evolutionary interpretation +of human pathology, sociological as well as biological. It is these +few students who, I feel, will welcome an interpretation of our human +processes that offers a more inclusive, organic comprehension of our +mental life. + +But before undertaking the study of the organic psychology of man, it +will be necessary first to establish a position that is based upon +an organismic[1] or societal viewpoint as contrasted with a position +based upon a viewpoint that is systematized and personal. Many years of +psychoanalytic practice have led me to the conviction that the basis of +Freud’s psychology is inadequate to render completely conscious those +disorders of the personality the essential meaning of which is their +unconsciousness. The following essay, therefore, is an attempt to offer +a more adequate concept of the essential consciousness of man than I +feel has been attained through the interpretations of the unconscious +patterns embodied in the present system of psychoanalysis. I have come +to feel that what we have called analysis in the sense of our present +personalistic systems is just another application of the method of +suggestion, and that with us analysts, as with others, the method +involves a situation in which we are as truly the unconscious dupes of +the suggestive process we employ as are the unconscious subjects upon +whom we employ it. + +After all, it is the fallacy of personalism and of differentiation in +our human relations which is the essential element in our unconscious +agencies of suggestion, and I cannot doubt that this same fallacy +underlies no less the constructions upon which we rest our analytic +procedure. In the work of psychoanalysis as in our human endeavours +everywhere, there enters unavoidably the personal bias that is +inseparable from the position of observation concomitant to the +observer. It is to abrogate this prejudice of personal partisanship and +differentiation besetting the intrinsic system of psychoanalysis as +well as of our private dogmatizations elsewhere, that I have undertaken +the investigations of which this study is in part the outcome. + +With the growth of my experience in psychoanalysis, the factor that +has exerted the deepest influence in altering my outlook upon the +problems of the neuroses as upon the processes of life generally has +been the gradual, if reluctant, elimination of the personal equation +in relation to those problems. By the personal equation I mean the +unconscious and arbitrary tendency within us all to adopt _a personally +systematized mental attitude_ toward life in substitution for the +physiological reality of life itself. The technical procedure of Freud +necessarily rests upon this extrinsic mental attitude, whereas in +the work of my students and myself during the past several years our +position has tended increasingly toward the more inclusive fulfilment +of the personality as a whole. Only in an inclusive analysis are our +affects experienced upon a basis that is common and organic. Accidental +diversity cannot issue out of organic unity. When the elements of +consciousness will be truly unified, an association of conscious +personalities will be unified also. The reason why there are to-day as +many systems of psychoanalysis as there are psychoanalysts, is that +our assumed principle of conscious unity is in reality but a personal +principle of differentiation and unconsciousness. + +Let me say at once, however, to anyone who may have lacked the +opportunity or the candour to verify within himself the essential +objective findings of Freud, and who is disposed to read into this +thesis a vindication of his personal reaction against Freud’s +formulations, that he will find this study in nowise adapted to +assuage his sense of outrage to injured sensibilities. Whatever may +be the value of this work, in the spirit of its presentation it is +in no sense a personal discrimination against the teaching of Freud +but rather it is the acknowledged outgrowth of that teaching. If in +our widened outlook we have outgrown the personal interpretations of +psychoanalysis, there is due our full acknowledgment that it is to +those interpretations that our position owes its rise. Far, then, +from representing an antagonistic exclusion of Freud’s theory of the +unconscious, our position embodies the wider inclusion of it in what +I feel is its more comprehensive interpretation on the basis of a +societal concept of consciousness. + +In psychoanalysis as in the social systems amid which, unconsciously, +we are continually moving, we tend to gravitate toward an assumed +static centre or toward a so-called personal cause that is coincident +with our assumption of an absolute universe of consciousness. This +gravitation toward a personal centre of consciousness embodies, in +reality, a system that represents but the unconscious projection of +our own ego. We substitute this delusion of an artificial world of +causality for the reality of a universe of spontaneous sequence, not +realizing that we ourselves are the subjective expression of the same +organic sequence which we observe objectively in the world about +us. When we have learned to accept inherent sequence as organically +necessary, we shall no longer enforce unconscious causality as +presumably inevitable. + +It is this very general fallacy of personal sponsorship which +constitutes the intricate disguise of our social unconscious and which +in our personalistic outlook we have not yet begun to grasp. Ourselves +unwitting participants in this illusion of personal determinism, we +have not yet begun to compass the _system of unconsciousness_ that +lurks beneath its gratuitous assumption of personal agency. + +With a view to the analysis and replacement of this absolute or +self-determined attitude among us I have here offered what I conceive +to be the more universal and encompassing interpretation of the common +and organic consciousness of man. As, however, the field of Organic +Psychology has yet to take a recognized place among us, and as it is +a conception that is circumscribed only by the limits of life itself, +naturally this initial step toward its establishment offers but a +tentative view as to its real scope and meaning. Representing scarcely +more than a preliminary outline, this work will be seen to embody +but the merest syllabus in relation to further works based upon an +organismic theory of consciousness, that doubtless will gradually +be contributed to the increase of our understanding of life, both +individual and social. In its present form the thesis here developed +was first outlined in 1923. + + + + +PART I + +THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEUROSES + + + + +CHAPTER I + +PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THEORY AND IN LIFE + + +Now that the excitement following the inundation of psychoanalysis +has died down and the clinical territories most affected have been +once more built up and restocked, it is interesting to witness the +changes wrought in different quarters as a result of the general +havoc to habitual prepossessions. As we stand amid the debris of past +conceptions there is no question but that the sudden descent upon us of +Freud’s postulates has destroyed many old landmarks that shall not be +restored and that it has brought in a wealth of new material that has +altered no little the configuration of the old. + +As I happen to have been of those who were carried in upon the current +of the general onsweep of new interpretations ushered in by Freud, my +experience forms the record of a reaction to that movement that is +internal because it is from the vantage-ground of a participant in +it. Many of these interpretations are of epoch-making significance in +their approach to mental disharmonies, but many, being immature and +unsound, only obstruct the passage that psychoanalysis has contributed +so splendidly to open. And so my position may be of interest to others +who, like myself, have earnestly tried to bring order and a permanent +coherence out of the large mass of conceptions that cluster about +Freud’s dynamic idea. + +The theory of psychoanalysis rests on the conception that nervous +disorders are the substitutive manifestation of a repressed sexual +life; its basic position is that this substitutive factor is +responsible for neurotic processes and that it is the sexual impulse +for which recourse is sought in the process of substitution. This +position of psychoanalysis is, in its essential significance, now +generally accepted--the position, namely, which affirms the factor of +replacement as the essential account of nervous manifestations and +assumes the urge of the sexual instinct as the element replaced. + +While, with other psychoanalysts, I am in full accord with this thesis, +my finding in regard to the relation of these two propositions to one +another is so entirely at variance with the prevailing psychoanalytic +view, and alters so fundamentally for me the ultimate interpretation +of psychoanalysis in its bearing upon the problems of consciousness, +that I shall make clearer the ideas expressed in this work if, at the +outset, I may state briefly in what manner my interpretation of this +relation differs from the accepted conception. + +The difference lies in the fact that I do not regard this replacement +as _primarily_ a replacement for sexuality as we now know it. On the +contrary, sexuality, as manifested to-day amid the sophistications +of civilization, is itself a replacement for the organic unity of +personality arising naturally from the harmony of function that +pertains biologically to the primary infant psyche. This original mode +I have referred to in a previous work as the preconscious, and this +preconscious mode[2] I regard as the matrix of the mental life. The +spontaneous process of the organism’s unhindered growth through the +gradual development of experience or awareness from this unitary mode +as a basis is, in my interpretation, the meaning of consciousness. +The whole meaning of sexuality on the other hand is substitution, +compensation, repression. In a word, sexuality, as it has come to exist +socially to-day, is identical with the unconscious, while a unification +of personality is alone to be found through eliminating the recourses +of substitution and sexuality and thus reuniting the elements of the +conscious and organic modes now kept asunder through the interposition +of the unconscious. + +Hence the modern substitutions existing under the name of sexuality, +whether repressed or indulged, are but a symptom of this denial of +man’s organic affective life. Sexuality, as it now exists, is not only +utterly unrelated to sex but it is intrinsically exclusive of sex. Sex +is life. It is life in its deepest significance. Sex is the spontaneous +expression of a natural hunger. In the instinct of sex there is felt a +yearning from the depths of man’s organism for mating and reproduction, +while sexuality is the personal coveting of momentary satisfaction in +mere superficial sensation. By sexuality, then, I mean something very +different from sex. I mean the restless, obsessive, over-stimulated +quest for temporary self-gratification that everywhere masquerades as +sex and is everywhere substituted for the strong, simple, quiet flow +of feeling that unites the organic and the conscious life in a single +stream and is the expression of personality in its native inherency. + +With this altered conception other modifications have followed +which necessarily entail a distinct departure from certain accepted +psychoanalytic formulations. The organic denial and the restless +compensations and substitutions comprising the unconscious are, in +essence, the psychology of the mental reaction-average known as +normality. The popular analytic view places a premium upon this +manifestation of the collective unconscious and assigns the criterion +of normality as the desired goal of adaptation for the neurotically +repressed personality. + +I cannot accept this view. For an analysis of the social unconscious +shows that the collective reaction embodied in the adaptations commonly +accepted as normal betrays a tendency to repression and replacement +that is no less an indication of disease-process than is the reaction +presented in the individual neurosis. Indeed, from the point of view of +constructive consciousness and health, our so-called normality is, of +the two, the less progressive type of reaction. In truth, normality, +in evading the issues of the unconscious, envisages less the processes +of growth and a larger consciousness than the neurotic type of +reaction, which, however blind its motivation, at least comes to grips +with the actualities of the unconscious. + +It is the hall-mark of normality that, suspecting nothing, it takes +itself completely for granted. In the spirit of true conformity, it +accepts its expressions of the vicarious at their face value and +assumes the burden of its self-inflicted compensations with entire +complacency. The neurotic, on the other hand, at least senses the +inherent discrepancy in his life. He at least demurs in so far as to +withhold assent from the mass-compromise embodied in the substitutions +and connivances of the social unconscious. In a word, it is the +distinction of the neurotic personality that he is at least consciously +and confessedly “nervous.” + +This, as far as I can see, is the chief distinction between the +condition represented in normal adaptations and that represented in +the neurosis. The distinction lies merely in the greater weight of +numbers. Normality, in its numerical strength, concedes acceptance to +the average-reaction and so yields it right of way. In normality the +unconscious carries the day, while in the neurosis it is pushed to the +wall. The distinction psychologically lies in the successful compromise +of the one as contrasted with the enforced doubt and self-questioning +of the other. On the one hand there is the compact security of the +social polity; on the other, there is the more sensitive isolation and +uncertainty of the individual unit. + +From the point of view of life, therefore, many of our normal reactions +are psychologically as truly a manifestation of the distorted and +substitutive as are those more isolated manifestations we commonly +stigmatize as neurotic disharmonies. I cannot see but that the +element of the repressed and substitutive on which is based Freud’s +theory of the neuroses is an element that underlies the expression +of consciousness in all phases of its manifestation and that hence +underlies also the phase represented in normality. In brief, normality +too is nervous. Normality too, since it is actuated no less from +motives of the ulterior and vicarious, even though it supposedly +represents the criterion of adult consciousness, is no less an +expression of the distorted and symbolic. This distortion is to be seen +upon every hand in the restless greed and obsessive self-seeking that +underlie the national, industrial, political, social and religious +possessivism and competition which are the typical psychology of +the normal mind, notwithstanding its plausible exterior of human +progress and universal goodwill. Universality and goodwill are not +there. These are but the manifest symptoms embodied by the social +personality after it has undergone the distortion represented in the +substitutive reactions characteristic of the social neurosis, that is, +after it has been subjected to the mechanism of diplomatic repression +and modification. What is there, in reality, is the will-to-self and +the particular aim which best serves the narcistic advantages of the +individuals comprising the social unit in question. The mechanism is +identical with that which underlies the individual neurosis, namely, +the covert aim toward the satisfactions of self which constitute +unconsciousness. + +Normality too, then, is neurotic. Normality too has its repressions and +its substitutions, its secret symbols and equivocations. The difference +is that as normality possesses the warrant of the institutionalized +and current, it enjoys the protection of the consensus. And just +as the neurotic fails to comprehend the meaning of this vicarious +manifestation in its individual expression within himself and is a +prey to the inscrutable symptoms in which his organism finds its +compensations, so we, who are accounted normal, as little suspect the +meaning of this same symptomatology existing in its social expression +within ourselves. The neurotic resolutely defends his unconscious +duplicity behind an ingenious charade of unconscious symbolism, and +we no less resolutely defend ours through recourse to an identical +device. But if we will look beyond the narrower confine of the clinic +and face squarely the logical issue of Freud’s thesis, we cannot avoid +the conclusion that it is an indictment of man’s consciousness in its +entirety. Hence normality too must make answer for its complicity in +the unconscious ruse of substitution and evasion which we observe in +its more intense reaction as the introversions of personality presented +in the obviously arrested expression we call neurotic. + +If anyone is disposed to question this view, let him consider but +one symptomatic reaction recently manifested throughout the social +organism. Could there be anywhere imagined an unconscious reaction +more wasteful and destructive or one of wider scope or severer +intensity than the symptom-reaction represented by the war that has +recently convulsed the world? Or consider the equally unconscious +expression presented in the tendency to religious emotionalism that has +followed in the wake of this world-war, with the corresponding effort +towards compensation and self-propitiation through recourse to the +sentimental and spiritualistic. Yet all the while the existence and +the significance of the unconscious motives that are latent in the two +extremes of emotional reaction underlying these manifest expressions +have not yet begun to be suspected and reckoned with on any clear, +conscious, analytic basis. + +What, then, is the meaning of this tendency to substitution as shown +in the reaction of the social as well as of the individual organism? +If sexuality is the element substituted for, what is the psychology of +this factor called sexuality? What is its meaning? In analyzing the +unconscious of the neurotic personality it has become gradually clearer +to me that the factor underlying and actuating the conflict Freud +describes as repressed sexuality is nothing else than the personal +desire of ascendancy or the lust of acquisition _concomitant with the +organism’s unconscious reversion upon its own image_.[3] + +Sexuality, then, is but a larger word for self. Sexuality is the +effort to limit life to the ends of personal aggrandizement. It is +the greed of the self-limited personality to compass the whole, as +contrasted with the societal personality that is encompassed by the +whole. But, since the unconscious is the same under all forms, self +or sexuality, with its pride of possession, its lust of gain, is no +less the unconscious element underlying the psychology of the normal +reaction-average. And precisely as in the individual reaction these +unconscious wishes are manifested only in the disguised symbols and +substitutive equivalents portrayed in neurotic symptoms, so too +in the social organism these egocentric interests antagonistic to +consciousness and growth venture to express themselves only in the +corresponding substitutions of the mass unconscious. + +Thus the unconscious represented in the social reaction we call +normality is no whit different from the unconscious represented in +the individual reaction observable as the neurosis. We are habitually +deceived by the give-and-take policy of normal adaptation with its +secret covenant of good manners and outward forms. But the apparent +difference between the social and the individual neurosis consists +merely in the fact that the poignancy of the conflict underlying the +symptomatology of the social personality is largely mitigated and +condoned by reason of the wider numerical distribution of the social +organism and the consequent freer dissemination of the elements +involved. + +But, though of wider distribution, there underlies the expressions of +normality no less of conflict and repression than exists in the acuter +expression seen in the individual neurosis. In the personality of the +more sensitive or feeling type we think of as neurotic, this tendency +to self-acquisitiveness or sexuality and its organic incompatibility +with the physiological inherency of life become, as it were, stalled +and impacted within him; while in the social organism the discrepancy +of personality, occasioned by its sexuality or pride of ascendancy, +apparently entails no such organic blocking as that occurring in the +individual. But the pain and impaction are present nevertheless, and +are betrayed no less in the recourse to the substitutive and symbolic +manifestations, characteristic of our prevalent social hysterias, not +to mention the more violent disorders that crash upon the world in the +reactions of political and industrial dissension and in the fiercer +paroxysms of war. + +Such is the meaning of our so-called normality. To a degree that is +quite unsuspected by us its psychology is unconsciousness, and the +psychology of unconsciousness is the psychology of the self-image +secretly worshipped under the habitual guises of symbolism and +replacement. It is time we should recognize that this recourse to +the vicarious image is the psychology of many of the reactions of +the normal as well as of the neurotic, that in ourselves, no less +than in the neurotic, there is the putting forward of that which +_stands for_--the exploitation, under countless different aspects, of +that which may be adroitly put _instead of_ rather than the simple +acceptance of that which _is_. + +Part of the purpose of the present study, however, is to try to bring +into clearer light a substitutive reaction that is much nearer home. As +psychoanalysts we need to take into account a distortive process that +has a much closer bearing upon ourselves and our responsibility toward +the problems of our common social consciousness. For, of all the forms +of substitution to which normality has recourse, the form that seems +to me of deepest significance for us and that presents the most vital +need of analysis and understanding within ourselves, is the vicarious +expression growing out of the tendency to an extrinsic approach to +the problems of consciousness that has come to be embodied in the +formulated _system_ of psychoanalysis. + +In the whole symptomatology of normality with its social expression +of the vicarious there is no symptom-complex that is of greater +significance than that embodied in the attempt to apply to the reality +of human life the _system_ of human life offered in psychoanalysis as +it is to-day interpreted and applied. For a system of psychoanalysis is +itself but a substitution for life, a theory of life in place of life +itself. The theory of psychoanalysis sets out with a premise; life does +not. Psychoanalysis offers a solution; life is its own solution. + +It is not theory as theory at which I demur; it is theory as +application to the needs of human growth. From the point of view of the +theory of psychoanalysis this therapeutic recourse in the treatment of +nervous disorders seems to me completely adequate and true; but from +the point of view of life I have come to regard the application of the +system or theory of psychoanalysis to the problems of individual needs +as an utterly futile procedure. I have come to feel that what is here +of value in the text-book is utterly worthless in our daily relation to +human personality. + +I would not, of course, be understood as repudiating theory as such. +Seen clearly as the extrinsic expression it is, theory undoubtedly +has its place, but its place is not in the earnest relationship of +one human being to another such as obtains in the confidence and +communication offered in the actuality of psychoanalysis. It has +not yet been recognized, however, that we who are psychoanalysts +are ourselves theorists, that we also are very largely misled by an +unconscious that is social, that we too are neurotic, in so far as +every expression but that of life in its native simplicity is neurotic. +Our disharmony, however, is a phase of that widely diffused neurosis +that exists under the prevailing social consensus represented in the +normal adaptation.[4] + +And so, as I now see it, there is no more subtle form of substitution +or one that is more successful in its capacity to evade the censor of +consciousness and obtain the stamp of genuineness than the symptom +represented in the _theory_ of the reactions of human beings as a +replacement for the reality of these reactions in life itself. Personal +experience compels me to concede that it is such a symptom that is +comprised in the theory of psychoanalysis as it is widely operative in +the consultation rooms of psychoanalysts to-day. + +We have assumed that, in envisaging the unconscious, psychoanalysis +presupposes a more inclusive position than is generally characteristic +of the theoretical or systematized clinician. But it is a far-reaching +commentary upon the analyst’s capacity of discrimination that he still +presumes to analyze another on the basis of a system or theory, as +though a neurosis which is an essentially subjective condition were +of the nature of an objective bodily lesion. A dissociation within +the personality may find its analogy in a bodily lesion but never +its understanding. In the field of objective phenomena, theory is +entirely commensurate with its application. After all, the theory of +a mechanism is but the description of the principle of its operation. +In the objective world such an objective description presents no +discrepancy. It is the application of the objective method to an +objective principle. The theory of the hydraulic press is perfectly +consistent with its application. Between theory and application there +is here complete conjunction. No disparate element intervenes to mar +the transition from the descriptive to the practical. + +So too with the theory of psychoanalysis as long as it pertains to the +objective viewpoint of the text-book. But in the subjective sphere +a totally different situation is presented. In dealing with life in +its actuality, we are not dealing with the descriptive and objective. +Human life is subjective. It is something experienced, something felt. +Life is not theoretical; it is actual. It is not descriptive; it is +dynamic. Human life _is_; it is not a _theory_ of what is. Life, as +it is felt, is our ultimate subjective actuality. Subjectivity or +intrinsic feeling is the very basis of life. As such, feeling is life’s +reality and no theory of feeling is an adequate substitute for this +reality. And so the objective theory of psychoanalysis or the objective +theory of the motives of human life is wholly inapplicable to the +subjective experience or to the actuality of human life as it is felt +in individual personality. + +We have not begun to reckon in the least understandingly with the +nature of the subjective as contrasted with the objective sphere +of life. We are, in fact, quite naïve in our attitude toward the +whole subjective field, preferring to adopt toward it either a +mood of beatific reverence and mysticism, in which we conjure +unwarranted images of “psychic phenomena” that are allied with man’s +pseudo-religious vagaries, or we adopt a pseudo-scientific attitude +which repudiates as nonexistent or regards as unworthy of serious +thought any phenomena that do not lend themselves to objective +observation. Neither position seems to me tenable. We may dismiss +at once the attitude of the occultists, for mysticism entertains +no argument. But there is the need to consider very seriously the +subjective field of scientific reasoning and to keep clearly before +us the distinctive and impassable interval between the subjective and +objective domains of scientific inquiry. + +It is most true that objective observation is the sole method whereby +we may obtain knowledge concerning the phenomenal world. This is true +whether the knowledge concern substances themselves or the manner of +their interaction. But we forget that knowledge thus gained is always +knowledge _concerning_. If I consider any object--a book, a flower, +or a stone--all that my knowledge will ever yield me is restricted to +the attributes that pertain to the substance in hand. I observe that +the stone is smooth, hard, ovoid. Submitting it to certain physical +and chemical tests I learn still further about its qualities, and so, +little by little, bring myself into ever closer touch with the object +in question. But always my data furnish only _closer touch with_. The +essential matter informing the substance we recognize as stone remains +as inaccessible at the conclusion of an ultimate analysis as in the +beginning. It is still knowledge _concerning_ and my facts, however +widely accumulated, are but attributive. Thus the _essential_ nature +of the objects about us is not to be approached by a method that is +_unessential_ or attributive. + +The same circumstance confronts us in dealing with the phenomenal +world of our own experience. Here too we proceed upon the method of +objective inquiry--a perfectly legitimate field of “observation.” +We posit and collate all manner of phenomena and note no end of +“reactions.” But always we are restricted to a knowledge _concerning_, +to data _in regard to_. In brief, we remain apart from--are ever +outside of the reaction observed. Not that we may hold the attitude +of the philosophers and assume the “existence” of a “metaphysical +essence” that is inaccessible to us. We need rather to recognize +that the alleged essence is merely that organic condition of matter +with which our conscious processes are not organically continuous. +There are, however, organic conditions or processes with which our +consciousness is continuous--namely, the organic processes occurring +within our own bodies and registering themselves within us as feeling. +It is this continuity registered within us as feeling that is an +essentially subjective state of mind and that must not be confused with +the objective state of mind that merely registers impressions of the +observable action or outer condition of such feeling processes. This +subjective continuity is organic and inherent. True, it is possible +through a shunting of interest or attention (repression or misplaced +affect) to divert the course of our organic processes from their +natural perception in consciousness. But this artificial situation +through which we divert organic process from conscious participation +and acknowledgment is the condition of unconsciousness. + +My whole contention is precisely this: we are constantly attempting to +deal objectively or attributively with experiences that are subjective +and essential. We fail to understand that our knowledge _about_ our +feelings is but attributive, that it brings us no nearer the feelings +themselves; that our feelings are essential, physiological and that +we may no more know our essential feelings through _observation_ of +their _attributes_ than we may reach the essence of any object about us +through a knowledge of _its_ attributes. + +The basis of this essay is precisely the recognition of this impossible +breach between the condition of consciousness produced through a +knowledge _about_ feeling and the condition of consciousness that is +the feeling itself, between the state of mind that is _commentative_ +and the state of mind that is _functioning_. The former is objective, +the latter is subjective. The failure of our psychological methods to +recognize this intrinsic distinction is to my mind the failure of our +entire approach to the problems of mental and social disharmony. It is +this unwitting substitution of the _theory_ of human feelings for the +unannotated experience of the feelings themselves as recorded in our +interactive functioning as human beings that is the impossibility of +our present “method” of psychoanalysis. + +This position is for me an all-important one. Upon the acceptance +or rejection of it, I believe, depends the growth or the decline of +psychoanalysis as an agency of release for the intrinsic needs of the +neurotic personality. To-day, under the impetus of psychoanalysis in +its theoretical or vicarious form, we are carrying theory to the point +of absurdity. There is now, for example, the psychoanalytic theory of +the nursery. Anxious young mothers are running about looking for texts +which will serve them as guides in the love of their children. They are +diligently searching upon every hand for the latest approved theory +of maternal love. And in response to the demand the popular literature +is supplying them with full details. But there are no librettos of the +nursery. Baedekers to motherhood are not to be had. The motherhood that +is true is a subjective relationship, and it is only subjectively that +it can be felt and understood. + +I shall not forget the experience told me by a patient whose mother, +actuated by the theory of motherhood in its highest “scientific” +interpretation, undertook to enlighten her upon the significance of +sex. The incident left the most painful impression upon her. The +mother, having gathered courage for the performance of her maternal +duty, delivered her errand with a punctiliousness which from the point +of view of technique was irreproachable. She spoke out of the strictest +regard for the theory of motherhood. But unfortunately her theory left +out of account an item that needs to be reckoned with, namely, the +native simplicity of the consciousness of childhood. The woman spoke +out of the theory of a truth, but her child listened with the organic +susceptibility of truth itself. The mother had not accepted within +herself the actual significance of life, and so, in accordance with +the formality of a theory, was vicariously imposing its acceptance +upon her child. But childish perception pierces the veil of pedagogic +finesse. The rigid demeanour of her instructor readily disclosed the +discrepancy between the verbal recital and the utter lack of conscious +acceptance within herself. For the child, now a middle-aged woman, the +moment was an unforgettable one. She had witnessed in her mother an +outrage to organic truth, and the shock of that experience caused a +psychic disunity between mother and child from which there resulted an +introversion of personality that covered half a lifetime. And so, while +the theory of the nursery is from the point of view of theory wholly +irreproachable, it is from the point of view of the nursery wholly +absurd. + +A lesson which parents have yet to learn is that the child is closer +to the heart of things than the grown-up--that the consciousness of +childhood stands in a far more truthful relationship to the actuality +of life, as it is, than the consciousness of the conventionalized and +sophisticated adult. For years it has been my feeling that beneath the +conflict of the neurotic personality there is reiterated an urge toward +the expression of this primal inherency of consciousness. To-day, it is +more than ever my view that in the neurotic reaction there is expressed +an inherent plea for the native simplicity and truth of this organic +consciousness. It becomes more and more clear to me that the pain of +these personalities is due solely to the organic discrepancy of an +unconsciousness and indirection within themselves, and that essentially +their urge is to bring themselves again into harmony with the law of +their personality by reuniting the needs of their consciousness with +the needs of their organic life. + +As Nietzsche says: “May there not be--a question for +alienists--neuroses of health?”[5] This question for alienists is +indeed a vital one but it is one which, as far as I am aware, has +not as yet even dimly occurred to us. There is nowhere, it may be +noted, a clearer argument for Nietzsche’s hypothesis than Nietzsche’s +own neurosis. Unfortunately, however, alienists are still as little +interested in the positive processes that bespeak the organism’s +conscious health, as physicians in general are interested in the +positive processes that insure the organism’s physical health. But, as +long as the collective social mind remains the collective unconscious +mind, it is not to be expected that we shall approach the unconscious +of the individual, in either its psychic or in its somatic aspect, from +the basis of an inclusive consciousness and health. The question is +often asked whether insanity will ever become curable. The answer can +only be that the insanity of the individual cannot be curable as long +as there exists the insanity of the social mind about him. It is not +humanly possible for the psychiatrist to remedy conditions of mental +disorganization as long as he himself is part of a disorganized social +mind. + +If the psychoanalyst, in applying to the lives of his patients a theory +of life, is himself unconsciously resorting to the self-protection +of the substitutive and symbolic; if the blocked personality of our +patients meets with a blocking in ourselves, with a compromise, a +theory, a something which stands as a _sign for_ rather than that +which _is_--a situation which offers a compromise mechanism identical +with that for which they have sought aid from us--then clearly the +way is not yet open for the release of the conflict within these +personalities. For a patient may be untrammelled only in so far as the +analyst is himself untrammelled. + +In taking this attitude I do not make any personal claim for myself. +This position is not one to which I have come through the success of +my work but rather through its failure. For in the measure in which +I have adhered to the dictates of a preconceived normality, in just +that measure has my work defeated itself. Though I have for some time +theoretically disavowed the mental status represented in the normal +reaction, I have tended unconsciously all the while to ally myself with +this standardized brand of unconsciousness and thus, in my own work, +have inclined to hold to a theory of life rather than to its actuality. +Not, then, with the neurotic alone, but with us all, it would seem that +consciousness is mainly employed in efforts of self-protection and +evasion. Truly, consciousness makes cowards of us all. But this is not +consciousness in the sense of life and growth; it is consciousness in +the sense of retention and self. It is not a free consciousness; it is +consciousness with a reservation. It is not true consciousness; it is +unconsciousness. + +In accordance with such a mode of consciousness each of us is elbowing +for a place for himself. Each is seeking more territory for his own +expansion. Each of us is an unconscious overlord striving to secure +the supremacy of his own “personality.” Universal and normal as this +reaction is, its tendency is obsessive and ill. I do not believe that +life is aggressive and that growth is concerned for itself. Personality +is impersonality. What is needed is the quiet acceptance of life in its +actuality. In this and this alone lies the opportunity for freedom and +growth. + +We hear much to-day of the technique of psychoanalysis. In truth +there is no such thing. It is just another defence mechanism, just +another resistance to the actualities of life. As in all instances +of therapeutic specialization, the technique of psychoanalysis has +become a fetish with us. It has become a veritable complex, a disorder +from which I find patients actually suffering. The situation is quite +ridiculous. The more I think of it, the more I am convinced that +the so-called technique of psychoanalysis is but another hobgoblin +wherewith the unconscious tendency of professionalism with its egoistic +striving for preferment contrives to preserve its own separateness +and distinction. I confess that, in my own unconsciousness, I have +more than once laid stress upon the importance of the analytic +technique. But let us not be misled by what is called the technique of +psychoanalysis. It is but another subterfuge for the reality of life. +A technique of psychoanalysis is no more possible than a technique of +love or of friendship or of motherhood. There is a technique and a +very difficult technique of the _theory_ of psychoanalysis. But that +is quite a different thing. Psychoanalysis itself or, as its name +implies, the loosening or freeing of consciousness is nothing else than +the conscious acceptance of life. As such, it is the exact contrary +of the objective and technical. Life is not a technique. It does +not express itself in terms of technique. Technique is an objective +instrument. Life is a subjective experience. It is a joy or a sorrow, +a disappointment or an aspiration, and it can no more be handled from +the point of view of technique than it can be handled with the scalpel +of the anatomist.[6] + +From these and similar reflections I have come to regard the formality +of applying a system of psychoanalysis to the life of an individual +as an actual hindrance rather than as an aid to the true expression +of his personality. It is but an added repression, blocking the very +way it attempts to open. For to meet the unconscious of a patient with +unconsciousness within oneself, is only to answer symbolic substitution +and indirection with the same substitution and indirection in an +altered, more subtle, socially plausible form. + +The whole meaning, therefore, of an analysis that is actual and not +theoretical is the realization and acceptance on the part of the +analyst of the utmost unconscious symbolization and distortion within +himself. The analysis of a patient is the analysis of oneself. It +cannot be otherwise. And when I say analysis, I do not mean an analysis +that is a mere unconscious concession to normality--a giving vent +to the egoistic erotism of the individual by diffusing it among the +widely distributed elements of the social personality in the manifold +distortions of sexuality. I mean an analysis of personality in its +widest expression--an analysis through which the individual comes into +the conscious acceptance not only of the repression or distortion that +is personal and that is comprised within the individual introversion +we know as the neurosis, but of the distortion or substitution of +personality that is social and that constitutes the confederacy of +unconsciousness popularly endorsed as normality. + +The prime requisite for clear, free, untrammelled work in the +analysis of human personality is the unqualified rejection of the +unconscious compromise embodied in the social reaction of normality. +The analyst who is not himself capitulating to the concession of the +social unconscious will repudiate the attitude of the psychotherapist +whose criterion is the restoration of his patient to a condition +of normality, and will take his stand against any recourse that is +based upon a programme of compromise and habituation. He will see +that normality is merely unconsciousness on a co-operative basis and +he will not be deceived by its insidious offers. It is only through +such an attitude of complete freedom within oneself that it is +possible to offer the opportunity of freedom to the personality of +the neurotic patient, the very heart of whose disharmony lies in an +inner repugnance, however bewildered and confused, to the untruth of +the social unconscious comprising his milieu. Viewed analytically, +normality is but the self-flattery through which we pretend we are not +unconscious. By so pretending, however, we are only furthering our +tendency to deeper unconsciousness. + +As long as there is self-protection, there is self-limitation; as long +as there is self-limitation, we are necessarily setting a limitation +to the possibility of growth and consciousness in others. Only through +rejecting such protection may we come to accept the testimony of the +unconscious within ourselves. Otherwise, we ourselves become the +inhibitors rather than the liberators of consciousness; we who are +psychoanalysts become mere guardians of disease-processes instead of +the willing repositories of these unconscious factors, as they exist +in others, through our understanding and acceptance of these processes +as they exist within ourselves. For consciousness grows upon the +medium of consciousness. It cannot be nourished upon an extraneous +soil. Theories of consciousness are extraneous. In the presence of +the actuality of life, theories of life become mere intellectual +snobbery. Being wise, sophisticated and remote, they are inadequate +to meet life in its native simplicity. Bearing the testimonials of +authority, the credentials of office, they do not come low enough. +These insignia of rank only tend to intimidate personality in its +natural simplicity. What is needed for the release of the neurotic +individual is the personality who imposes nothing of his own and thus +allows the completest opportunity for the unfolding of the repressed +and introverted personality of others. + +As psychoanalysis develops and our understanding deepens, it will be +seen that it is not scientific equipment alone but also directness +of outlook that make the psychoanalyst. It will be seen that the +personalities who are adapted to an understanding of the needs of +human life will not necessarily occupy places of importance amid the +distractions of affairs, but that their place may be an unobtrusive +one in which understanding for understanding’s sake will be their sole +concern. The various rules laid down by medical or other syndicates +with a view to determining what are the literal qualifications for a +psychoanalyst are wholly beside the point.[7] The qualifications for +understanding are not literal. Although we may formulate the most +meticulous of programmes setting forth the requirements of tuition, +it will be found that personality will, in the final count, override +them all. Besides, I cannot think that it is due entirely to the +accidents of chance that the spokesman for the adoption of this or +that recipe as a prerequisite to “sound training” in psychoanalysis +should unfailingly submit a menu that tallies in detail with his own +catalogue of merits. After all, psychoanalysis is a very large name +for a very simple thing. I well know that this statement offers a +delectable morsel to any who are disposed to misinterpret my meaning. +It will be readily regarded as recklessly casting aside as valueless +all the years of my own medical and psychological training. But the +responsibility for such a misinterpretation rests upon those who are +unable to distinguish between the culture that is applied academically +and the academy that is applied culturally. All that I mean is that +whosoever follows the calling of psychoanalysis is merely one who seeks +to understand and accept life as it is without intruding himself or +imposing his view or exerting his authority. Indeed psychoanalysis is +essentially the abrogation of authority. For the psychoanalyst is not +content but receptacle. Lacking method or design he offers nothing, but +is the recipient of all there is of human experience as subjectively +substantiated within himself. + +But there enters here a consideration of vital importance and one +that has not yet been adequately reckoned with and understood. If the +psychoanalyst is to be the recipient, there must be those who stand to +him as recipient also. If he is to understand, he must be understood. +If the life of the analyst is to be a reality and not a system, he +himself must in reality participate in the life in which he invites +others to participate. If it is his thesis that human life cannot +subsist alone, that communication is life, that it is the very meaning +of consciousness, neither can he subsist without communication. + +And so there need to be in the life of the analyst the personalities +with whom he may share, with whom he may communicate, who accept him +and are accepted by him in turn. For to analyze is to be analyzed, to +understand is to be understood. Needless to say these are conclusions +to which I have not come alone. I could not have. They are the outcome +of my own opportunity of participation and expression, as the need of +communication has come to unfold itself in my own experience. + +Clearly, then, we who stand as the promoters of a new and untrammelled +consciousness must look carefully into our own lives to discover +whether we ourselves, as part of the social consciousness, are not +theorists rather than unified personalities actuated solely by the law +of understanding and of growth within ourselves. Clearly, we ourselves +must realize the completely vicarious and repressed element underlying +the expression of unconsciousness embodied in the social unrest of +normality, and, fearlessly repudiating this collective reaction of +substitution and evasion, break completely with the popular policies of +compromise and untruth underlying it. In this course we shall take our +stand for the freedom and clarity of a mode of consciousness that aims +solely toward the growth of self-understanding and communication. For +life is not a system, it is not a technique. Life is simple, and its +course is one of quiet flow. In so far as psychoanalysis is technical, +it is not life. In so far as its aim is normality, it is not free. + +The choice is an unequivocal one. It is a choice between expediency +and truth, between fixity and growth. For the habitual or normal +mind whose criterion is expedience the choice is already determined; +but for the personality that is sensitive to the values of life, the +choice of growth is no less inevitable. It is organically so. Hence it +is for each of us to make his choice on which side he will take his +stand--whether, adhering to a theory of life, he will blindly protect +himself against the recognition and acknowledgment of the vicarious +element of normality and compromise within his own unconscious, or +whether he will stand for a mode of consciousness that flings away +every habitual protection and accepts only the conditions of life as +they unfold themselves in the development of his own personality as +well as in that of others. The outlook is really not ambiguous. The +question is whether life will be a theory or system corroborated by the +technical outfit of the consultation room or whether it will be the +deeply fulfilled experience that comprises consciousness in its organic +reality. + +The definite biological theory on which this thesis rests implies an +organic or societal continuum as the essential basis of consciousness. +To understand this theory we shall be helped if, in the beginning, +we will seek to replace the more or less arbitrary divergences of +personal outlook with a conception that attempts to stand far enough +removed from this personal mode to contemplate within its more +ample formulation the personal outlook as well. For this purpose we +must discover, as far as possible, our tendency to personalistic +delimitation--a tendency due to the unconscious systematization of the +restricted individual unit--and in this way approach consciousness anew +from the more inclusive basis of its societal meaning. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +A RELATIVE CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS--AN ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN +ITS ETHNIC ORIGIN + + +In presenting a psychological discussion that presupposes the altered +basis of the relativists, I am under no illusion as to the wide +disparity between the mathematical conception of the relativists +in regard to the universe and the clinical preoccupations of a +psychopathologist. It is now conceded, however, that the theory +of relativity is not without its revolutionary influence upon our +scientific thought processes generally. And so, although I am not +competent to an appreciation of the theory of relativity in the +objective sense of the physicists, I hope I shall not seem presumptuous +in attempting a discussion of consciousness that demands as its basis a +viewpoint that is analogous to theirs.[8] + +As I understand it, the inadequacy of the Newtonian system of astronomy +is its autogenous exclusion of data requisite to a principle which +presupposes a basis of universal applicability. Assuming an unqualified +absolute to reside within the limits of its own circumscribed area, it +posits a principle which fails to take account of factors operating +within the larger constellation wherein its own system is but a +contributory element. So that, in estimating the components requisite +to a more inclusive scale of computation, the Newtonian postulate +omits to reckon with the principle of the time-space element that +is constitutive of the extension intrinsic to itself and that is, +therefore, mathematically indispensable in an encompassment of the +universal and all-inclusive astronomical purview with respect to which +its own system becomes but relative and extrinsic. + +Little by little the necessities of a widening outlook have demanded +a gradual broadening of conceptual principles generally. Of late I +have been led to views that appear to warrant the conclusion that, in +the sphere of psychic phenomena no less than in the realm of physics, +a system of absolutism, preclusive of data existing outside its own +autogenously circumscribed principle, wholly dominates our presumably +conscious world. Accordingly, if we are to reckon with consciousness +upon a true and inclusive basis, it is required that the system of +absolutism thus embodied shall give way to a conception of relativity +in the conscious sphere comparable to the principle of relativity in +the physical universe.[9] + +I do not see why, in his mental and emotional reactions, man may not so +far free himself from the traditional superstitions of imbued inference +as to recognize at last that, even with respect to conceptions that are +the basis of his own mental operations, there is a difference between +the values that _seem_ and the values that _are_. I do not see why he +may not recognize that processes which he has hitherto regarded as +habitually inevitable are not by any means organically necessary, but +that the two may in fact be essentially contradictory one of the other. +If in the objective world man may ungird himself of the accustomed +limitations of a hitherto accepted Euclidean geometry, may he not +within the sphere of his subjective consciousness also rid himself of +prepossessions which, though they appear to us now as no less basic, +may ultimately prove equally non-essential? + +We have recently waged a world-war which, according to the _state of +mind_ of its participants prior to its occurrence, was the admittedly +inevitable recourse, but which, in the opinion of thinking men +subsequent to its enactment, is now equally admitted to have been a +wholly unnecessary eventuality. How then, upon our present basis of +mentation, may we conclude what is an adequate criterion by which +we may determine a dependable process of thinking? If we may know +our states of mind only after we have vented the emotions that first +incited them, of what use is it to know them? If states of mind can +produce calamities that gather their toll of human life by the millions +and we can, by subsequently taking thought, come to regard them as +unnecessary, what must be felt toward states of mind that have produced +such calamities? Surely it is not the part of intelligence to feel +regret of a disaster only after the disaster has befallen. If disaster +need not befall, would it not be wiser to deplore it beforehand and so +avert the disaster? This would seem the logical course, but the truth +is that the logical course is not accessible to man in his present +state of unconsciousness. Man may think logically but he cannot be +warranted to act logically. For, in his present stage of development, +his actions are predominantly under the guidance of his emotions and +his thought can therefore only follow after. + +Consciousness is the individual’s acquiescence in sequences that are +determined by the necessities of organic law. Unconsciousness is the +individual’s resistance to these organic processes. As consciousness +is anterior to its own realization, so unconsciousness ever follows +in the wake of its own event. We think to-day only in terms of what +ought to have been yesterday, and the event of to-morrow embodies +again the reaction to the issues of to-day. Thus our actions are +always but the unconscious reflections of the day preceding, and in +our unconsciousness it is only in the aftermath of the morrow that we +interpret the omens of to-day. + +If man’s judgment is competent to apprehend the data of events +subsequent to their occurrence, why may it not be equally possible, +through our prior apperception of the mental states leading up to them, +to envisage the same events with the same clarity anteriorly and thus +forestall the useless mistakenness and destruction that now follow +inevitably with their enactment? Surely it is clear that, in continuing +to preserve unaltered this same state of mind whose world-wide +consequences we have just witnessed, we may be, at the present moment, +preparing a similar if not a yet greater catastrophe, the while we +are at the same moment as completely oblivious of it. Indeed, from a +position that is anterior to the emotional inducements to which our +mental states are inevitably subject in our present absolute view, it +will be seen that an unconscious and destructive disposition toward +life is as inseparable from an absence of self-cognizance on the part +of the social mind as the factors of disintegration and unconsciousness +are inseparable within the life-sequences of the individual unit. + +In its necessary limitation with respect to the relativity of +consciousness in its universal compass, the constellated system of +processes which at present comprises the sphere of the mental life +will, in my view, ultimately appear analogous to the traditional +system of Newton with respect to the universe of relativity in the +encompassment of objective mathematics. As in the intrinsic principle +of absolutism comprising the Newtonian system of gravitation, so in the +self-determined principle of absolutism, comprising our present system +of psychology, a dimensional factor has been left out of account, the +inclusion of which completely shifts the basis of former calculations +and so distorts our habitual reckonings as to demand the fundamental +reconstruction of accepted values. + +But while the principle of relativity comprehended by the objective +formulae of the physicists is mathematically beyond my reach, the +conception of relativity within the subjective life appears to me not +only compellingly clear, but organically necessary. Indeed, in the +absence of this conception of the relativity of consciousness, it is no +longer possible for me to reckon adequately with the processes of the +mental life. For in default of a working basis broad enough to embrace +the dimensional element of the system, individual and social, whereof +we ourselves are a component part, there is lacking the scientific +comprehensiveness requisite to a universal principle of evaluation. + +It is worthy of note that between the objective or mathematical +theory of relativity of Einstein and the subjective or organismic +theory of relativity here considered there is to be traced, however +inconclusively, a philosophical parallelism that is significant.[10] +My feeling is, though as yet it is little more than an intimation +with me, that this cosmological parallel between the subjective and +objective spheres of relativity marks a concomitance that is consistent +throughout. I do not see how it could be otherwise since the subjective +and the objective spheres of life, embodying the bipolar aspects of +the phenomenal world, represent but obverse phases of one and the same +universe. The analogy that interests me here, however, has to do with +the feature that is equally the basis of the two modes of relativity, +namely, the feature which entails the abrogation of absolute standards +of evaluation and the recognition of the kinetic factor that is organic +to both. In the objective interpretation of astronomy this factor +comprises the mathematical space-time coefficient of the physicists’ +fourth dimension; and in a subjective interpretation of consciousness +it comprises correspondingly the kinetic element that determines the +functional coefficient of the organic life as a whole. + +The thought represented in “the organic life as a whole” is, like the +inclusive scheme of the physicists, to be understood only by exclusion, +that is, by exclusion of a point of view that is _not_ organic, or by +exclusion of the absolute system, individual and social, comprising our +present static basis of consciousness. As this organismic conception +of consciousness is relativity itself within the subjective sphere, +its encompassment can no more be apprehended in our present scheme of +psychological evaluation than the relativity of the physicists can be +apprehended on a static Newtonian basis. + +Einstein’s theory of relativity is not intelligible on the absolute +basis of the older system of astronomy, of which conception the newer +mathematical theory is, by reason of its wider inclusiveness, the +logical replacement. Likewise, the theory of subjective relativity or +the organismic conception of consciousness cannot be understood on the +basis of the absolute principle resident in the Freudian conception of +the unconscious, of which principle the organismic conception is, by +inclusion, the more encompassing formulation. + +Hence this organismic conception of consciousness, subsumed under +the postulate of relativity, will be understood only as we discard +entirely the absolute conception represented in our present system of +psychology. Because of our own absolutistic basis, we do not realize +that the absolutism intrinsic to the dynamic system of our present +individualistic conception of consciousness maintains a position that +is relatively not less static than the older descriptive systems of +consciousness in relation to the dynamic psychology of Freud. The +Freudian system is dynamic in respect to the system it has superseded +but static in respect to the principle by which it must now in turn, +I believe, be superseded, precisely as our own Newtonian system is +dynamic with respect to the older Ptolemaic system of astronomy it has +transcended but static with respect to the mathematical principle of +relativity which now in turn has transcended it. + +Of course, the fact that the intrinsic limitation of our astronomical +systematization has led us arbitrarily to regard time and space as +absolute entities, rather than as the functional co-ordinates of +matter, has no immediate bearing whatever beyond the need of adjusting +a quite infinitesimal error in the astronomical reading of certain +minimal deflections. It does not in the least alter the practical +conduct of human affairs. For the grocer and the apothecary our +standards remain undisturbed. So also in the more intimate adaptations +of our human relations, the absolute basis of mensuration that has +actuated our reckonings with respect to the objective world about us +has not for a moment touched our subjective mode or the affective +sphere of our living. But when this artificial basis of self-determined +absolutism operates within the organic sphere of man’s affective life, +wherein is the very centre of his being, there are recorded errors +whose consequences reach to the core of life itself. It is here, in the +absolute system of evaluations pertaining to the affective reactions +of human conduct, that there is needed the correcture in reading +the deflection, both individual and social, that comprises man’s +unconsciousness. + +We have yet to learn that it is in the common affects of men that there +resides the basis of their collective biology. Only in the affective +reactions comprising the native, organic continuum of life may we +trace the menstruum of our human consciousness. And so, in approaching +the affective or organic implications entailed through the arbitrary +systematization that is our own absolutism, we are entering upon the +study of the distorted sensations and reactions in which is embodied, +I believe, the essential pathology of consciousness represented in the +neuroses. + +In considering the conception of the relativity of consciousness we +shall acquire a clearer insight into the more comprehensive scheme +subsumed under it, if we will begin with an analysis of the rudimentary +processes comprising our personal judgments and consider the elements +into which our primary impressions may be resolved. + +Our judgments are formed from the material of our impressions or, as +we say, we reason from observation. This being so, what must be the +substance of our observations and what the nature of the processes +of reason thus derived? To observe is to stand apart from and record +the impressions reflected to us from the object observed. So that upon +consideration our observations are seen to consist of the _reflected +images_ or mental _pictures_ of the world of objects by which we are +surrounded. That is to say, impressions of objects consist of the +aspect or surface which is reflected to us from them and which is thus +mirrored in the reflecting surface of our own perceptions. + +But in this very process of observation an unwarranted assumption +has already been posited in advance--the assumption, namely, that +the position intrinsic to the observer is an all-inclusive and +authentic one. Already it presumes a universe of which the onlooker’s +own self-limited position is the basis. It does not account for the +integral component that is the observer’s own organic dimension. +In brief, the very point of view of the observer lays claim to the +prerogative of an absolute cosmogony whereof he is himself the +unconsciously static, self-determined centre. Whatever the point of +view, it is invariably “the point of view” of the observer. So that +in constituting ourselves perceptual foci from which, according to +our self-appointed terms, we look out as from a background upon the +phenomena of life, we have unconsciously become artificially detached +spectators of a merely static _aspect_ of life. This is what I mean +by the autogenous exclusion of data extrinsic to the self-determined +system of which we ourselves are only a part, but which, in the +light of the relativity of consciousness as a whole, is revealed, on +the contrary, as an arbitrary system determined by our own static +absolutism. Regarded from the point of view of relativity, to adopt +such a detached, observational outlook toward life is to view it in the +merely flat, bidimensional plane of the image. It is not to experience +life through participation in the extension of its full-dimensional +actuality. + +Upon analysis, then, our world of subjectively tabulated impressions +becomes but an artificial world reflecting the artificial +systematization that is our own detached observation of it. Our +unconsciousness is our failure to realize that bidimensional +reproductions of actuality are not actuality. Our own organisms as well +as the surrounding objects of actuality are elements that are equally +to be included in the organic continuum of our human experience. The +mental pictures comprising our bidimensional _impressions_ of objects, +however adequate as pictures, are not adequate as expressions of +actuality in the sense of the dynamic extension comprising our own +organic inclusion. + +Contrary, therefore, to the casual assumption current among us, we +do not apprehend the objects about us as they exist in their cubic +outline, but only in the bidimensional “foreshortening” that is our +own mental or pictorial impression of them. Our so-called objective +apperception of the world of actuality is in fact superficial and +unreal. Our alleged world composed of impressions is pictorial rather +than actual. It is static rather than kinetic. In consequence of the +bidimensional visual plane in which our objective fields are reflected, +it is inevitable that our environmental actuality should appear in +the form of pictures before us. Looking out upon the world from a +bidimensional basis, we can perceive it only in terms of the reflected +image formed upon our own bidimensional mental background. It is due +also, then, to this contributing factor of a flat or reflected visual +image within ourselves that there is registered within ourselves a +flat or reflected mental image of the world about us. For in virtue +of the bidimensional picture in which our impressions are necessarily +reflected, our mental perception of objects is likewise necessarily +pictorial and bidimensional.[11] + +Such is the probable ethnological account of this misconstruction +of actuality that underlies our mental world. The significance of +such a pictorial and artificially foreshortened representation of +the objective world and its mental influence in foreshortening the +tridimensions of actuality in general cannot be overstressed. We need +to realize the circumstance of our remote or bidimensional position +of merely mental or impressionistic observers. From this position the +mentally reflected and artificially pictorial outlook with which the +world of solidarity is individually viewed by us represents but the +portrait of life whereof the reality is the inclusiveness of life as +experienced through our subjective continuity as functional elements in +the organic whole. So that while it is most true that we reason from +observation, yet if our observation is imbued with a bidimensional +or superficial bias, then our reason is also influenced by this same +bidimensionally imbued bias. If our observation is not subjectively +inclusive of the objective world about us, in the same measure our +judgments are not inclusive of it. + +It is this non-inclusiveness of consciousness that constitutes our +mental systematization. In this perceptual relationship to life, due to +our detached basis of interpretation of it upon grounds of the apparent +aspect rather than of its solid actuality, consists the arbitrary +absolutism of our present system of consciousness. Due to this organic +misconception of consciousness, we habitually prefer the picturesque +semblance of the aspect to the pragmatic inclusiveness of the actual. +This is why we tend to explain life rather than to live it. This is why +the adduced hypothesis of life counts with us more than life itself. +But an account of life that does not include the consciousness that +is our own kinetic function and repudiate the static pictures of life +arbitrarily projected by us does not compass life in the full orb of +its rounded actuality. A principle of life that does not embrace the +principle arising out of the bias of our own self-made systems of +personal absolutism and unconsciousness is not adequate to encompass +life in the rounded sum of its functional inclusiveness. It is needful +to recognize that, in the unconscious absolute underlying the personal +relatedness of each of us to every other, there is involved an organic +_resistance_ or a mutual repulsion among the elements of the societal +personality that forms an impasse to its concerted function. On the +contrary, in the mutual inclusiveness of our individual organisms as +elements within the confluent sum we thus compose, there is embodied +the organic continuum that underlies the societal organism of man as +a whole. It is this homogeneous substrate of man’s consciousness in +its totality that is implied in the principle of the relativity of +consciousness. + +If, however, an ethnological account is adequate to explain the +remote, pictorial relation in which we stand with respect to the +world of objective actuality, such an account is not adequate to an +understanding of the pictorial view we have unconsciously come to +assume toward the world of subjective actuality or in relation to the +organisms with which we constitute a common species and with which, +being subjectively akin, we are organically identical. If phylogenetic +theory accounts for the deflections from reality of the reactions of +consciousness in the large, it does not account for the deflections +of consciousness in the particular reactions of the personality that +determine our relations to our individual fellows. Thus far we have +considered this absolute system comprising our personal basis only in +relation to the objective world or to the world of things; we have not +yet considered it subjectively or in relation to the individuals with +whom a common affectivity renders us organically identical. It is only +within the subjective sphere of our affects, representing man’s organic +racial continuum, that this distortion of our outlook is manifested in +its deepest poignancy. + +It is, therefore, only in its ontogenetic mode that we may fully +realize the organic deviations within the consciousness of man, due to +his bidimensional and unreal apperception of his fellows, and to his +consequently false inferences resultant upon an artificially remote +and pictorial attitude toward them. It is here alone, I believe, that +is to be traced the philosophy of the deflections observable in the +above-mentioned reaction of personal resistance as it appears not only +in the difform reaction characterizing the isolated personality of +the neurotic individual, but also in the uniform reactions presented +in the _relatively no less deflected group-expressions comprising the +collective personality of the social consensus_. It has become more +and more clear to me that it is this error of our mental refraction, +due to the subjective deflection comprising the bidimensional judgment +of each in assuming a pictorial rather than a real relationship to +others, that is the essence of our resistances. In this surface +reflection, that is the personal attitude of each toward every other +and that embodies the psychology of our resistances, is represented +man’s traditional systematization, both individual and social. For, in +judging or viewing life on the _absolute_ basis of how it appears to +_me_, I automatically render it beholden to my personal interpretation +of it. In my autocratic attitude of onlooker I necessarily repudiate +the inherency of the individual or object looked on. Thus, as the +self-assumed centre of the universe, the individual is completely +detached psychically from the organic actuality of everything within +his observation, and, in his present mental attitude, whatever he +thinks that he knows and feels is unconsciously constrained by the +illusory supremacy of his personal wish. This is the insidious fallacy +of the reflected aspect. This constitutes the personal absolute or +systematization which, in dominating our present mode of consciousness, +completely distorts the universe of reality. It is such a reflective +attitude of personalism and unconsciousness that is our exclusion of +data that lie outside the system intrinsic to ourselves and that may be +included only in the fuller comprehension of an organic relativity. + +This reflective attitude entails an autocratic interpretation of life +on the basis of one’s own personal evaluation, and its effect is to +sever the natural bond between the elements of the societal body. As +the inevitable concomitant of this habitually reflective attitude +toward life there is mental dissociation rather than an assimilative +participation such as may only be realized in the inclusiveness of +consciousness as an organic whole. Only an organic coalescence in +our common affectivity, as contrasted with our present attitude of +detached, bidimensional perception of one another, will open the course +to spontaneous development in yielding the natural way to the instinct +of mating and reproduction wherein alone is the basis of a constructive +societal life. For resistance is of the affective life. It is a +phenomenon that is essentially organic in that it marks an obstruction +within the societal personality of man in the relation _inter se_ of +the elements, individual and social, of which our societal personality +is composed. In our blind inversion of the essential processes of life, +we fail to recognize that there can be no healthful growth of the +organism apart from the soil to which it is indigenous. If isolation +and an artificial medium are death to the growth of vegetation, they +are death no less to the societal instinct of our common consciousness +in which is found the natural medium for the growth and activity of +man. In the measure in which we allow ourselves to participate in and +become intrinsic and contributory elements in the world of organic +actuality about us, will our pictorial mode of envisagement yield place +to the subjective experience of a dimensional inclusiveness that is +complete in its actuality. To view the world of actuality in its merely +static, cross-sectional appearance is to know only the photography of +life. Its kinetic reality may be known only through the subjective +inclusion of our organic participation in it. + +We cannot return too often to original sources in repudiating +conceptions whereof they are the basis. We experience reality only in +the measure in which we disavow the symbols of unreality. In proportion +as we apprehend subjective fallacy may we encompass the reality +underlying it. It is where our conceptual constructions of life leave +off that our constructive conceptions of life begin. We have seen that +the mathematicians have come to regard as theoretically worthless those +objective calculations whose standards of evaluation are not measured +in accordance with the principle of an inclusive relativity. Likewise +a formulation of values in the subjective sphere of consciousness +lacks an adequate principle of evaluation if it does not rest upon the +relative principle comprising the organic and inclusive conception of +consciousness in its societal totality. + +If, in the dissociation of the consciousness of man from his organic +individuality, he is unconsciously assuming a personal absolute that +is merely a reflection of the mass absolute assumed by the collective +social unconscious about him, then what we call the consciousness of +man with its presumable function of dependable evaluation is at all +times but a system of images, and his vaunted prerogative of a personal +absolute is only a dissociative reaction due to his own secondarily +adaptive systematization. Upon this basis, what we call our opinions +are, after all, not our opinions, and our so-called beliefs are not +beliefs at all. For all our formulations and systematizations with +respect to human consciousness are but rationalizations serving as +convenient foils for the blind assertion of the personal absolutism +that is but the autocratic prerogative of our own dissociation, both +individual and social. + +While theoretically, the objective findings of Freud are of +unquestionable validity throughout, as has been fully corroborated +through the repeated investigations of those of us who have studied +the manifestations of the unconscious in ourselves and in others, my +researches within the last years have convinced me that our objective +finding is not the point--that what we have called the objective +evidence has been all along but our personal or adaptive evidence +and that, being unconsciously based upon habitual bidimensional +inference, this basis has no relation whatever to life in its organic +inclusiveness. The system of Freud is thus adequate only on the +adaptive basis of normality. _By normality I mean the consensus +comprising the personal absolute vested in the unconscious of the +collective mind determining the social average_. + +It is disconcerting, I know, now that we have but recently settled +ourselves to enjoy in comfort the established principles of Freud’s +psychology, to think that we may be compelled through the requirements +of wider accommodation to seek other ground. Nevertheless, if the +position in which we have settled to study the complexes of men is +itself just another complex of the social mind whereof the individual +mind we would study is but a reproduction, it is clear that we have +no choice but to recognize the autonomy of our absolutistic values of +reckoning and to readjust our measures of consciousness in accordance. + +Surely, if the whole meaning of our mental orientation is a +disorientation, if our rationality is everywhere but irrationality, +if with all of us alike the vicarious image comprising the reflection +of our systematized selves takes precedence over the native reality +of our primary organic individuality, there is no other course than +that we wipe the board clean and approach the problem of consciousness +completely anew. For, clearly, since our present process of mentation +is not spontaneous or from within out, it is necessarily adaptive or +from without in. Hence, as the reflection of the absolute principle +that is the personal basis of each, it can never lead to a realization +of the relativity of our conscious life nor to the acceptance of the +organic individuality that is the all-embracing life of man in the +inclusive principle wherein alone his consciousness truly resides. + +It is the position of this thesis that, when we neglect to take account +of the _organic mass consciousness of man_ to which the personal +systems of men, single and collective, are but relative, we fail to +reckon with a significant dimension entering into the determination of +the subjective life of man. On the basis of the time-space extension +of the astronomers’ fourth dimension it is possible to compute errors +of deflection only through a conception of the universe which regards +our own planetary system as a function of and hence relative to a +more encompassing programme of planetary motion. Concomitantly, it +is possible to evaluate accurately man’s place in the subjective +scheme of consciousness only through a conception which regards +his present personal and social absolute as being itself relative +to a more comprehensive background comprising the relativity of +man’s consciousness as a whole. There is the need to recognize that +in the sphere of consciousness, as in the realm of physics, it is +in the kinetic dimension comprising the organic participation and +inclusiveness of life itself that consists the functional component +which actuates the other three dimensions and which, in uniting all, +embodies the relativity of consciousness as an organic reality. + +In this transition from bidimensional picture to tridimensional +actuality, from contemplation of aspect to participation of function, +a gulf is spanned that bridges a most significant hiatus in the course +of man’s evolution. It is no less an interval than that which separates +the mode of man’s unconsciousness from the mode of his consciousness. +For in this transition we are no longer dealing with the mere static +dimension of the pictorially reflected _image_ of actuality, but there +enters the kinetic extension of an organic inclusiveness corresponding +to the functional or space-time extension of the physicists’ universe +of relativity--a universe which, in the psychological no less than in +the physical sphere, entails the abrogation of our prevailing system of +absolutism and its replacement through the conception of the relativity +of the conscious life as a whole. + +With a view to measuring the deflections of personality, by and large, +in the light of the relativity of consciousness, it is necessary that +they be regarded first in the concrete expression of their individual +and social forms, and that subsequently we study these aberrations +of consciousness in the yet wider expression of their sociological +implications generally. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE ORIGIN OF OUR INDIVIDUAL UNCONSCIOUS + + +In the preceding chapter I attempted to indicate the analogy between +the principle of relativity as set forth by the physicists and +what I described as the principle of relativity in the sphere of +consciousness. If the bipolar concomitance there outlined in its +phylogenetic aspect possesses sufficient warrant, a no less consistent +parallelism should be traceable in an ontogenetic concurrence of the +two theories as we come to consider the principle of the relativity of +consciousness in its individual implications. + +If it is true in an ethnic comparison of mental values that a basis of +absolutism is no more tenable in computing aberrations occurring in the +sphere of consciousness than in the sphere of physics, it must also +be true that a basis of absolute evaluation is inadequate to account +for deflections of consciousness in its individual application. It +is admitted that in the physical universe a principle of absolutism +requires to be abandoned and a revaluation of standards established in +its stead because it fails to take account of data extrinsic to its own +static dimensions. Likewise, it would seem that, in the concomitant +sphere of consciousness, an absolute basis of determination would be +equally inadequate to reckon with data exclusive of its own absolute +principle of measure and that, accordingly, there is here too demanded +a restatement of values in terms of a more comprehensive conception. + +In such an outlook the requisite readjustment is of so wide a scope +that I do not find it easy to contemplate, far less to actualize. +It involves no less a task than that of placing the fulcrum of one’s +mental processes upon a basis that lies outside the habitual domain +of one’s individual consciousness. For this reason the conception of +the organic inclusiveness of consciousness, here understood, is, from +our present individualistic viewpoint, a most difficult and elusive +one. It is a conception that is not possible of comprehension on the +basis of the static and absolute principle of consciousness that is +our present mode of evaluation. In this conception, the evolution of +individual knowledge enters the organismic sphere of the relative +and subjective. It is only relatively, therefore, or through our +subjective identification with it that we may participate in its +meaning. As this subjective experience is the flux of life itself, as +it is this component that is consciousness in process--the organic +tide whose stream we ourselves are, the while we are carried along +upon it--this experience is an extension which is, of its essence, +inaccessible to objective cognition. This is the veil which life in +its subjective reality draws across its features, rendering their +meaning for ever imperceptible to objective observation. Except through +the faint intimations of analogy, I cannot, of course, claim to do +more than merely indicate the existence of this subjective extension. +So that I must ask the reader to concede me the fullest measure of +his hospitality by following my trend with the utmost intuitive +participation on his own part. It is, after all, only in common that we +may sense our common part in respect to the relativity of consciousness +as a whole. + +The child that is born amid the cultural influences of civilization +comes at an early age to learn the names of things. With these labels +he acquires his objective identification with the world about him. In +these symbols are the talismans that insure the safety of his future +wayfaring. They are indispensable to his proper equipment and an early +adeptness in their use is a wise and salutary provision. In this same +school in which the child is taught the handy designations for the +objects surrounding him, he learns also to recognize the nameless signs +of a certain immanent category called “right and wrong”--signs which, +through the accidental empiricism of spontaneous trial and error, he +comes likewise to sense and gradually to incorporate into the code of +his adaptation. + +As with others, who have been inured to a curriculum of daily +adaptation from the impressionable years of earliest childhood, so +with ourselves, it is well-nigh impossible to study the virgin soil of +consciousness from our present adaptive premise without vitiating our +conclusions with the bias of our own adaptation. And yet it is clear +that an analysis of the reactions of consciousness, which fails to +include the primary elements of which it is composed, leaves out of +reckoning the basic ingredients of a structure which we are supposedly +analyzing in its elementary content. + +For the past three years I have been occupied with the daily challenge +of my own habitual processes of adaptation--an inventorial procedure, +be it said, which proved of the utmost discomfort in the necessity it +disclosed for the fundamental reduction of personal assessments. The +outlook of these inquiries, even though they mark as yet but the merest +beginnings, will at least denote a tendency that cannot, I think, be +without interest nor, I hope, without incentive in the further approach +of others toward an envisagement of consciousness in its ultimate, +pre-adaptive composition. + +The present study, then, forms part of the altered conceptual insight +into consciousness that was gradually induced through the spontaneous +sequence of a long continued and uninterrupted experiment in individual +reaction. The experiment consisted in repeatedly testing the personal +reflex under the hourly present conditions of mood-variation due to the +accidental release of affective stimuli arising from circumstantial +and unpredictable sources both internal and external to the ego. The +unprepossessing details of this brief excursion into the underworld of +personal motivation must be reserved for some subsequent chapter. I am +now concerned with the complete shift of basis which these experiments +have forced me to take account of in my attempts to reckon with the +recurring problems of consciousness as they are presented in the daily +routine of my analytic work. + +Within the scope of the present thesis we shall have to do solely +with the mental reaction inculcated under the manifesto of our early +induced presentiment of “right and wrong” or of “good and bad” +with its concomitant incitement to _hope_ or _fear_ as reflected +in the unconscious attitude of _praise_ or _blame_ surrounding the +child. It is my conviction, based on the subjective test of personal +experimentation, _that the deeply entrenched root of our human +pathology is to be traced alone to the conflict incurred through +this suggestively induced image of right and wrong and that it is +profitless, therefore, to seek beyond the impasse of this unconscious +alternative for the ultimate source of neurotic reactions_.[12] + +Because of some element implicit in the behaviour determining the +“right” or “wrong” adaptation of the individuals surrounding the child +in the formative period of his early growth, something is imposed upon +him that operates to check spontaneous impulse. The check I am speaking +of does not consist in the interdiction itself. Our admonitory “do” or +“don’t” is in itself quite harmless. Indeed these positive and negative +commands may serve an undoubtedly useful end. I have never known of +untoward nervous manifestations occurring among animals because of the +restraining warnings of maternal solicitude. On the contrary, such +mediation commonly proves an effective safeguard against misadventure. +Of the inhibiting influence itself, therefore, I am not speaking. What +I have in mind is something far subtler than this. It will demand our +most searching scrutiny if we are clearly to apprehend its meaning. + +As I see this miscarriage of instinct incurred through our embargo of +good and bad, it is the cunning _pretence_ underlying the interdiction +which induces the reaction that works mischief in the child’s organism. +It is the insidious intimation of benefit or of harm inherent in the +tabooed act itself that is the pernicious instance. The destructive +occasion lies in the implied premium or forfeit appertaining to the +act as it recoils upon the child in automatic retaliation. I believe +that it is due to this enforced superstition of an arbitrary “good and +bad” that there have been wrought the spurious reactions of our human +consciousness. I believe that the utterly specious system of behaviour, +which surrounds us as social beings on every hand, is definitely due +to this falsely imbued suggestion of retributive sequence which, as +commonly inculcated in early childhood, has been prompted through the +implied mediation of invisible moral agencies. I furthermore believe +that it is this pretence, and its unconsciousness, that is the basis +of our adaptation, both individual and social, as embodied in the +artificial code of morality represented in the collective unconscious +of our present-day civilization. + +What the adult arbiter of the child really has up his sleeve is the +child’s conformity to _him_ and _his_ convenience. Accordingly, the +parent or guardian lays down the proposition that a good little boy +doesn’t destroy costly bric-à-brac or that only a bad little girl would +play in the mud with her nice clean rompers on. Both these postulates +are utterly false as every sponsor for them knows. But that is not the +point. The point is that such statements are incomparably adapted to +the ends of adult commodity. The truer rendering of the proposition +in either instance would be to the effect that the misdemeanour in +question would occasion inconvenience or chagrin to the parent. But +so sincere a statement on the part of the parent might alienate the +child’s jealously coveted affection, as we commonly term the infantile +dependence we secretly tend to beget. Hence, the real motive of +interdiction must be hidden from the child and a comprehensive edict +cunningly invoked such as will place an effectual check upon him and +yet amply safeguard the parental interest. It is this bogus morality +which, by our unconscious social consent, the conscripted phantom +called “good and bad” is unanimously commissioned to represent. + +Because of this attitude of pretence in others whereby the child is +tricked into complicity with the prevalent code about him, there +is begotten this self-same reaction of pretence within him. This +illusion that is in the air he learns to assimilate from others +through imitative affinity, and from now forward the ruse becomes +self-operative. What began as a social coup is continued as an +individual policy. The silent intimation of a mysteriously pervasive +immanence of “good and bad” having now been engendered, the child +henceforth responds automatically, not alone to the signals of +make-believe about him but to the signals of make-believe within him. +For in unconsciously succumbing to the contagion of the autocratic +system of “right and wrong” about him, this hobgoblin of arbitrary +make-believe becomes equally systematized within his own consciousness. +Accordingly, the pretence involved in interdictions of conduct +(fear-blame reaction) is accompanied by the mental suggestion of +“wrong” or “bad,” and the pretence underlying the inducements of +conduct (hope-praise reaction) is accompanied by the mental suggestion +of “right” or “good”--_that is, of good or bad as it reverts upon +the individual from the point of view of his personal advantage as +reflected in the image of the parent_. + +An analysis, however, does not reach elementary principles if it merely +discovers motives prompted by suggestion and repression corresponding +to the two opposed factors of inducement and interdiction actuating +human behaviour. It is not enough to invoke in explanation the +sweeping denominator “self-consciousness.” Such an account is historic +or psychological; it is not organic or biological. It is, I believe, +only as we unearth the mental reaction _intrinsic_ to the organism +when it responds to the subjective inference of right or wrong in its +personal inflection that we shall reach the basic element responsible +for the organism’s inhibited mental states.[13] + +One would think, as we look about us to-day at the utterly destructive +processes, social and political, that have been incited throughout +entire nations of individuals “brought up” in this vicarious fashion, +that the spectacle would give us pause. But we have had a too thorough +bringing-up ourselves. Our own bringing-up has seen to it that we +shall not look about us and learn what _is_ but that we shall only +respond to the suggestion about us and acquiesce in what _seems_. If +we should really look about us and see unflinchingly into the meaning +of things, our children would do so too, but that would be subversive +of their proper up-bringing. This is the self-contradictory element in +the adult’s “education” of the child. In truth, it is not possible to +“bring up” a child at all. One may let a child grow up, naturally, as +a plant, tending only the soil about its roots, or one may hinder its +growth. But to bring a child up by moulding its personality to one’s +own is organically contradictory. A child comes up, if at all, only of +himself or in accordance with the law of his own growth. + +If it is true, then, that this factor of pretence is the ultimate +element in the dissociations of consciousness, what is the nature of +this factor of pretence actuating our behaviour? As has been said, in +order to secure a substratum adequate to build upon, it is requisite +that we forgo at the outset our present conceptions based upon a system +of valuations which presupposes an absolute principle of consciousness. +It should be understood, therefore, that it is from the fundamentally +altered premise of a relative basis of consciousness that the present +thesis sets out. + +In an objective view of the components of man’s consciousness, it +may be seen that there are three determinants of the affective life, +namely, one’s own self, the selves by whom one is surrounded, and the +positive or negative reactions of the self in respect to other selves +such as comprise our progressive or regressive interrelationships one +to another. So that, to return to the analogy of the physical world, +a diagram outlining man’s affective life would represent a contour of +three components. There is first the dimension consisting of oneself; +second, the collateral dimension, with its extension backward to one’s +parents and forward to one’s offspring and comprising in general one’s +social congeners, singly and collectively; and third, the societal +extension representing the reactions that depend upon the co-ordination +or non-co-ordination of individuals in the assimilative processes +of their common activities. Thus our subjective or affective life, +statically considered, is as truly tridimensional in its actuality +as our cognitive or objective world, statically considered, is +tridimensional in its actuality. Nevertheless, as was pointed out in +the preceding chapter, our cognitive apprehension of the world of +objects about us invariably presents an outline corresponding to the +bidimensional or pictorial aspect that is our perceptual image of it. +So in the subjective sphere, it may also be shown that our affective +reactions invariably present a pictorial or bidimensional plane +analogous to the bidimensional impressions comprising our objective +perceptions, and that they are due in the subjective as in the +objective sphere to the unconscious factor of the personal equation. + +But, to adhere to the test of experiment, it has been my analytic +experience growing out of the study of personal reaction that, owing +to the distortion of affect within our actual daily life, we do not +in fact participate in the tridimensional actuality that truly +comprises our affective world. On the contrary, owing to the rebuff +to spontaneous impulse incurred through the system of self-conscious +diplomacy reflected in the social pretence of “right and wrong” as +first voiced by the parent and seconded on all sides by the community +about us, the real world of affects is unconsciously replaced by an +artificial cosmogony whose outline is limited to only two components, +namely, the self plus the immediate interest to the self as derived +from the selves (collateral dimension) by whom the individual is +surrounded (advantage or disadvantage, good or bad, praise or blame). +Thus our affective reactions invariably present a merely pictorial or +bidimensional area corresponding to the two extensions comprising the +personal element of the self plus the element of advantage for the +self from other selves. Because of this personal foreshortening of +our affects to the artificial dimensions of self and self-interest, +our subjective experience of tridimensional actuality is reported +not in the reality of its three essential determinants but in the +pictorial aspect of the two-dimensional plane that is our personal and +autogenous reflection of it. It is, then, the substance of these pages +that, just as the world of cubic actuality is mentally foreshortened +into a bidimensional aspect of actuality determined by our static and +autogenous perception of it, so our world of affects is correspondingly +reduced to the bidimensional or pictorial aspect that is our socially +reflected impression of it. + +This brings us again to the question we were speaking of--the reaction +of pretence into which the child is early inducted. It was to help +clear away the difficulties surrounding this early adaptive reaction +of our subjective life that I turned to the consideration of the +dimensional components that comprise our affective world. We have +seen that the essence of this element of pretence is its implication +of retroactive gain or loss intrinsic to the social act itself and +automatically returning upon its agent. Coming a little closer +still, we see that this attitude of behaviour imposed upon the child +upon grounds of its retributive sequence is induced in him through +the cunningly conveyed intimation that such has been the personal +experience of those about him--that they have learned from experience +and so are qualified to give warning that “good” behaviour is requited +in reward or pleasure to one’s self and conversely “bad” behaviour is +requited in penalty or pain to one’s self. + +My position is that an attitude toward the child which posits at the +outset of life a world of affective actuality, comprised of his own +_ego_ plus his own egoistic advantage, arbitrarily contracts life to +the unreal aspect of a mere two-dimensional image. It is to dispose the +mind of the child in such a way that its entire universe of feeling is +limited to a mere picture of life consisting of the flat and lifeless +image of his personal or social adaptation in the light of his personal +or social gain. It transforms the reality of life into a reflection of +oneself in a world of self-reflections like one’s own. In other words, +in falsely premising the bidimensional plane of one’s personal image as +the basis of actuality, we substitute at the outset a primary condition +of unreality for the inherent reality of life. + +From the altered angle of a relative and inclusive attitude toward the +problems of consciousness, I am led to think that this artificially +contracted outlook is the real crux of the dilemma of the unconscious. +I have come to think that these two factors--the factor of oneself and +the factor of social advantage for oneself--are insufficient, that +there is omitted a third factor essential to a completely rounded +consciousness and that in the absence of it the other two present but a +static and artificial image of life rather than life in the functional +inclusiveness of its full-dimensional reality. I refer to the component +of our societal co-ordination--to the factor of man’s organic continuum +in the functional extension of his interrelationship with others. I +believe that it is the miscarriage of instinct with respect to this +societal co-ordination that is answerable for the artificial recoil of +self-interest represented in our fancied apparitions of good or bad as +seen from the limited point of view of one’s individual advantage. In +the flat bidimensional plane which, in the absence of the inclusive +societal factor, only reflects the pictorial aspect of actuality in the +image of the self, there is lacking the rounded extension that is the +full complement of life in its inclusive, societal meaning. To what +degree we substitute this reflected aspect of life for the reality +of an all-inclusive participation in life in its full-dimensional +extension--if my own experience in this regard is any guide--has not as +yet begun to be suspected by us. + +This primary societal component of consciousness must not be confused +with our secondary and adaptive social relationships. Our social +adaptation is as self-reflective and unconscious as our individual +adaptation. By the societal component I mean the organic continuity +of consciousness that unites the individuals of the species into a +confluent whole. In the social adaptation of its members, on the +contrary, there is registered merely the collective response to +the reaction of pretence that we have just seen in its individual +expression as our personal foreshortening of life to the bidimensional +image. In the reduction of life to the image of self in the light +of one’s self-advantage, whether individual or social, consists the +adaptive system that is the personal pretence within and about us. +In this inversion of life that is the mirrored impression of each, +as reflected in the aspect of others, is the systematization that is +man’s unconsciousness. It is our non-inclusiveness of others that is +the systematization of each. It is this perceptual interpretation of +life on the basis of a reflected or bidimensional impression, limiting +life to self and self’s advantage that is, I repeat, the meaning of our +unconsciousness, both individual and social. + +In studying this reaction of pretence in the social mind as reflected +in the reactions of the individual, we are met with the need of a +fundamental reconstruction of values in our reckoning with human +personality as in our measures of consciousness generally. For, in +this artificial gauge of conduct measured by standards of personal +advantage, we find established in the individual a criterion of life +that rests upon an unwarranted assumption of personal supremacy. This +private criterion has become the arbitrarily assumed prerogative of +each of us with respect to every other. For, through this distortion +of the universe of reality into the unreal, bidimensional cosmogony +that is one’s self-reflection of it, there is unconsciously built up +within us a mental adaptation whose basis is an inflexible assumption +of personal absolutism and autocracy. + +In the ultimate reduction of analysis it may be seen that what we +have, through Freud’s teaching, come to recognize as the reaction +of _resistance_, within the individual personality, resolves itself +into nothing else than this private prerogative of the personal +absolute. The assumption of this personal principle of absolutism +in the subjective sphere embodying the psychology of resistance is +analogous to the absolute principle of evaluation applied to the +physical universe--a principle which the physicists have lately +shown is not competent to meet the test of universal applicability, +for the reason that, in the absolutism of its own premise, it fails +to account for data extrinsic to the static absolutism it embodies. +Correspondingly, in the sphere of consciousness the absolute principle +of personal evaluation comprising the adaptive basis of the individual +is inadequate to stand as the universal principle requisite to an +organismic inclusion of consciousness in its societal totality. + +As was pointed out in the last chapter, the social mind interprets its +objects of perception in the bidimensional aspect of its own pictorial +and flat reflection of them. Likewise, our individual mentation, in its +adaptive response to the retributive implications of so-called “right +and wrong” or “good and bad,” recoils no less upon a two-dimensional +plane in the affective reaction that is limited to the component of +self plus the component of pleasure or pain for oneself. This flat, +static impression of life, comprising the arbitrary systematization +that is the personal absolute of each, is inadequate to stand as +a universal principle whereby we may evaluate the phenomena of +consciousness in the full round of its organic compass. + +In substituting the judicial absolute of personal interest for our +inclusive participation as relative elements in the full-dimensional +reality of life as a whole, we have unconsciously adopted a basis which +fails to reckon with our individual selves as contributory elements +in the more encompassing unit which our individualistic basis now +mistakenly presumes to include. Our present basis is, therefore, not +an inclusive one. In so far as the individual rests his theory of +consciousness upon an individualistic basis, his theory cannot include +the larger whole wherein the individual is himself but a contributing +element. The consciousness of the isolated individual cannot encompass +consciousness in its societal inclusiveness. Only consciousness in +its societal inclusiveness can encompass the consciousness of the +individual. + +In the measure in which we, as an organic group, come to adopt the +conception of consciousness that accepts the intrinsic reality of +our common societal life, we shall learn to repudiate the personal +absolute that is our individual resistance and, correspondingly, to +participate in an inclusiveness of consciousness with respect to which +the individual is but a relative and adaptive component. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +THE UNCONSCIOUS FACTOR WITHIN THE SOCIAL SYSTEM + + +Whatever is true of the individual singly, is true of the individual +collectively. Whatever is observable as neurotic process within +the isolated personality of the hysteric or precoid, is equally +observable as neurotic process in the collective personality of the +social mind. The attitude of psychopathology, which ascribes to the +social consensus, represented in the average-reaction commonly called +“normality,” a criterion of constructive consciousness and health, and +which, accordingly, seeks to correct the deflections of the aberrant +neurotic personality in accordance with this limited outlook, is itself +an expression of the bidimensional limitation that bases its system +of consciousness upon an absolute principle of evaluation. After all, +normality, like gravitation, is a mental abstraction. Our consensual +normality is but the systematized abstraction embodying the absolute +of its own unconscious basis, and, in its personal absolutism, stands +opposed to a principle of relativity in the mental sphere. It is only +as we abrogate the absolute standards now vested in the prevailing +social systems about us and measure their dimensions in terms of +the principle of an organic relativity, that we shall be enabled to +challenge the element of personal systematization within ourselves +and so encompass life in the actuality of a universal and inclusive +consciousness. + +Personal survival has been, from the beginning of man’s history, the +chief concern of his self-interest. Inventing medicine with a view to +his security here, fabricating religion with a view to his security +hereafter, he has safeguarded his preservation for the moment through +recourse to “cure,” and for the future through recourse to “salvation.” +Even in the interchanges of our casual social relationships, there is +still preserved within the folk-mind the vestiges of this dualistic +self-interest. Upon our meeting, it is the accustomed reaction to make +mutual inquiry into the condition of health of one another. “How are +you?” or “How-do-you-do?” we ask. Similarly, in parting we commend each +other to the clemencies of the future with the expression, “Good-bye,” +that is, “God be with you.” In the obvious apprehensiveness underlying +this unconscious attitude of the social mind there is in one instance +the implicit conviction that we are wicked and in the other that we are +sick! Both these reactions, however, merely betray the state of anxiety +reflected in the fundamental condition of mind that is our ethnic +self-consciousness. + +In earlier times these two anxiety trends of the folk unconscious were +duly sponsored through the common rites of medical and religious fetish +under the combined auspices of a single functionary or guardian who, as +priest or soothsayer, dispensed the benefits accruing from both. The +fact is, I suppose, that the tribal medicine-man with his magic potion +and amulet is psychologically, as well as ethnologically, our true +progenitor. For to-day we observe the preservation of this concomitance +of function between the two systems, represented by the science of +medicine on the one hand and by the philosophy of religion on the +other, in the current social phenomenon of our widely flourishing +“sciences of mental healing” with their unescapable unconsciousness +in metaphysical and theosophical implications. Aside, however, from +historical analogies, the stupendous influence upon the societal mind +of ecclesiastical and therapeutic canon cannot be denied. + +Because of this preservation in our midst of such ancient repositories +of human thought and conduct as are represented in the affiliated +principles contained in the dogmas of church and psychotherapeutic +system, a consideration of the psychology common to both these forms +of our social adaptation cannot fail to help us understand the basic +elements that enter into the making of our social personality. As +illustration, let us consider on the one hand the Roman Church and on +the other the system of psychoanalysis. The Roman Church represents +at one and the same time both traditionally the longest established +and politically the most compact organization of the many religious +sects existing throughout our Western civilization. The system of +psychoanalysis, representing as it does the most modern conception of +medical psychology, possesses such scientific authority as only the +ablest students of philosophy and medicine are qualified to bring to +the substantiation of its principles. An analysis, therefore, of the +social psychology that equally underlies and actuates the position of +both these systems will not, I think, be without profit in the present +study. + +Due to the sophistication that was early begotten among the members of +our human species through the limitation of man’s consciousness to the +bidimensional alternative of a consensual “good and bad,” it is natural +that we should find this same tendency to personal systematization +expanded into the collective or social form we observe in the group +reaction that is embodied in state or sect. Thus, from an organismic +viewpoint, we should expect to discover the same resistances within +the social as within the individual organism. Nor need we be surprised +if, upon analysis, it should be disclosed that this social resistance +represents likewise the bidimensional impasse comprised of our personal +self-reflection. + +Throughout the unconscious period of man’s bidimensional arrest +commonly called ancient times, a period belonging chronologically to +the past but pertaining psychologically to the present as well as to +the future for probably an indefinite term, the attitude of the Church +toward incipient doubt or heresy was, is and for ever shall be to +apply the remedy of prayer and, failing this recourse, to apply the +penalty of excommunication. + +From the vantage point of the psychoanalyst’s disinterested and +extrinsic angle of vision, such a policy appears manifestly unsound +and without warrant. From his position of detached observer, it seems +to him arbitrary and presumptive. And yet it must be conceded that, +from the intrinsic viewpoint of a socially consolidated organization +compact with the autogenous authority of infallibility, such a position +is by no means inconsistent. A supremacy that is self-originated is +self-operative. Autocratic prerogative and unimpeachable authority are +here conterminous. Indeed the solidarity of the Church is unassailable +precisely in that its premise and its conclusion are mutually +inclusive. For inasmuch as both premise and conclusion are equally +based upon the assumption of the personal absolute or the private +prerogative of the system they embody, all access to it is summarily +barred. If the Church precludes all question, dismisses all opposition, +it is wholly within its self-determined rights. For by these same +tokens all question, all argument, being of its nature extrinsic to +its autogenic system, savours _de facto_ of the aforesaid heresy of +doubt and, as such, is automatically driven out of court as connoting +_a priori_ the presumptive fallacy of trespass. This relegation to +itself of divine and hence unquestionable authority is the theological +doctrine of self-actuative truth assumed by the Church to underlie +its official pronunciamentos when it formally declares them to be _ex +cathedra_. + +I offer this preamble not without advisement. In its intimation of +the heretical tendency of the present thesis, it will give to those +to whom such tendency is unwelcome the opportunity to seal their ears +against it. At the same time it will give to those of more pliant +sympathies due notice of the undisguised aim of the present inquiry +toward the adoption of a more comprehensive and open-minded outlook +among us. For the trend of this thesis is in its intention confessedly +subversive of the socially authorized version of truth now vested in +the autogenous systematization that has come to underlie the principle +of us psychoanalysts. + +I do not know to what extent it is humanly possible, but, in so far +as may be, let us adopt for the moment, at least mentally, a position +of impersonal disinterestedness toward the social consensus in which +we ourselves, as psychoanalysts, are also corporate elements. It will +then become clear, I think, that the socially authenticated system, +representative of us Freudians, embodies an unconscious attitude +closely analogous to that of the social system embodied in the attitude +of autogenous authority underlying the personal absolutism of the Roman +Church. + +To observe this element of social unconsciousness underlying the +principle of Roman Catholicism has for us all a certain invigorating +tang. With such a discovery there comes the refreshing release that +is the spur to renewed investigation. It is the heartening response +of the organism to its sense of conscious acumen. But, to observe +the operation of the social unconscious within the autogenous +systematization of principles which insures social coherence within +our own consensus, entails a contemplation that is not pleasant. This +contemplation disturbs the habitual repose of settled conviction that +is our own security. It is to apply the acid test of self-analysis to +our own socially systematized assumption of private prerogative and +authority. Yet an attitude of impersonal disinterestedness presupposes +that our inquiry shall proceed without regard to personal security. +This attitude, indeed, is one which we ourselves have demanded of our +patients as being an analytically basic one. It is, therefore, upon +this understanding alone that an inquiry, which in its disregard of the +personal equation is committed to a course equally unflattering to us +all, may hope to be accorded an unbiased consideration. Surely in any +other attitude the name of psychoanalyst can become only a term of +opprobrium among us. + +Let us, then, consider this factor of private prerogative or of the +personal absolute, inseparable from the mental attitude expressed in +the phenomenon of social systematization which we see in the Church’s +position of assumed infallibility toward its postulants, and seek to +discover whether this same tendency to social systematization may not +lurk within our own psychoanalytic ranks. Let us see whether we, too, +are not actuated by an unconscious element of personal absolutism that +obstructs the freer and more adult mode of consciousness such as it is +our avowed aim to attain. + +In mentioning the unconscious element of absolutism constituting the +closed compartment within a socially organized system of principles, I +have cited Catholicism merely as a convenient paradigm. Protestantism +or Mohammedanism are, in their assumption of self-appointed +prerogative, not less indefensible on the same ground, for the element +of the personal absolute underlies no less the private assumption +of each. By reason of its higher degree of organization, however, +Catholicism more fittingly illustrates the absolutism of its social +polity in relation to this phenomenon of doubt or defection occurring +among its members. This is its aptness in affording a convenient +position of comparison with our own socially organized system of +psychoanalysis in respect to the phenomenon of defection as envisaged +by us. + +Within the body of precepts comprising our own organization, the +accepted mark of defection is a _resistance_, and the remedy we apply +is analysis. For, with ourselves, analysis is explicitly the only +effective means of overcoming the intractable tendencies which, in the +determination of our organized principles of adjudication, constitute +the sole need of our patient. In the event that the patient should +remain so far recalcitrant as not to embrace the opportunity we offer +him to accept our socially systematized interpretation of truth as it +touches his own particular needs, he is automatically excluded from +participation in the agencies of regeneration such as it is our special +delegation to dispense. Whence there follows our regrettable but none +the less inevitable ultimatum of “inferior type of personality” and his +coincident elimination from the pale. + +It is, of course, clear that the actuality of the phenomenon of +resistance in the patient can no more be denied than the actuality of +the phenomenon of doubt in the penitent. Moreover, in accordance with +the ruling of psychoanalysis, our specification of the condition when +we posit a resistance is as indisputable as is the specification of +the Church when it posits a doubt as the underlying disorder of the +individual postulant. In either case there is the position that the +individual is impervious to the benefits of the system whose principles +he is, in the judgment of the system, in need of embracing. Indeed, +it is precisely this factor of doubt in the one case, as it is the +factor of resistance in the other, that is the whole occasion of the +individual’s quest of a means of adjusting this division within his +personality whereof doubt or resistance is the idiopathic index. + +The actual fact, then, of a resistance within the personality is +beyond question. The fact is one that is equally admitted on the +side of the individual as on the side of the organization, on the +side of the defendant as on the side of the arraignment. But what +is to be done about it does not as yet seem to me by far so clearly +determined. I know, of course, that it is our attitude, based upon the +repeated experience of us all, that any objection to psychoanalysis +is invariably traceable to the resistance of the objector. This is a +psychoanalytic corollary. It is accepted as universal among us all. +So that a resistance to psychoanalysis is very justly, in the view of +psychoanalysts, as self-convicting as is a doubt in the view of the +Church. And from the point of view of psychoanalysis no less than of +the Church the position of these two systems rests upon an undoubtedly +sound basis, if we may be guided by the consensus of their several +adherents as attested by the experience of each. + +But the question which has of late come to engross my interest is +_whether these points of view are sound as embodied in their respective +systems_--whether, from a broader basis of envisagement, the intrinsic +attitude of ourselves may not lend itself to an altered interpretation; +whether there may not exist a criterion that transcends the scope of +our present analytic outlook when we claim that the only possible +motive for questioning our psychoanalytic position is found to lie +in the resistance of the individual; whether, in brief, the socially +entrenched systematization comprising the psychoanalytic affiliation +possesses sufficient warrant for impugning the personally entrenched +systematization comprising the individual. For, if the fallacy of +the personal absolute underlies the systematization represented in +the social consensus, in what way does the rigidity of the social +prerogative differ from the systematized prerogative constituting the +resistance of the individual?[14] + +For the purposes of our inquiry we shall be obliged to dismiss for +the moment our habitual personalistic criteria of interpretation. We +shall have to recognize, first of all, that what we call the individual +is by no means the fresh and native expression of individuality pure +and simple that we are accustomed to assume, but rather that he is an +individuation resulting from the repressive forces acting upon him +from the environmental social aggregate in which he is himself but +an intrinsic and contributory element. For every individual arising +amid the influences of the social system is but a special application +of the social system about him. Whatever the code of the consensus, +the individual is necessarily but an offprint of it--a new impression +of the original by-laws. There is, therefore, the need to turn our +attention not to the individuated excerpt of the system but to the +original document wherein the system is primarily set forth. There is +the need to discard the individual form and to occupy ourselves with +the societal mould whereof the individual form is but the subsequent +reproduction. + +Assuming the broader outlook of this more encompassing sociological +position, I think we shall come to see that the difference between +the reaction of doubt, as interpreted by the Church, and the reaction +of resistance, as interpreted by psychoanalysis, is, after all, only +apparent--that the difference is by no means an inherent one, but that +it is due merely to the altered circumstance of shade and light, so to +speak, in which the two reactions are diversely reflected by reason of +the contrasting sociological settings amid which the two phenomena have +appeared among us. + +As regards the sociological manifestation embodied in the Church, +contrary to its age-old contention that doubt or question automatically +indicated apostasy which reflexly discredited its adherent, it has long +been shown experientially that such doubt or defection might be very +logically and honourably entertained. Not only this, but it has been +further made manifest that it is due precisely to the entertainment of +such an attitude of debate toward the socially systematized consensus, +represented in the Church, that there have arisen those far-reaching +investigations of science out of which has sprung the splendid +renaissance of modern thought with its accompanying incentive to human +progress. + +Hence the question that presents itself is this: May it not also +be that, quite beyond the scope of envisagement of those of us who +are intrinsic to the analytic consensus, there are motives inviting +question of our position which do not fall within the category of +resistance? May it not be that, from a position of extrinsic or +impersonal evaluation, we shall obtain so inclusive a survey of the +phenomenon of resistance on the one side and of the social phenomenon +of organized systematization representing the establishment on the +other, that the two reactions may be included in an encompassment that +is equally hospitable to both? Surely it cannot be denied that, laying +aside all consideration of personal involvement, the question of such a +possibility is not without its vista of interest. + +With a view to a fair appraisement of the contrast between the type +of defection manifesting itself as doubt and the type of defection +manifesting itself as resistance, there is first the need to take +account of the widely dissimilar sociological aspect of the period in +which doubt was originally viewed by the Church, as compared with the +sociological countenance of the times in which resistance is viewed by +ourselves, and, accordingly, to consider the difference between the +two phenomena in the light of the contrasting sociological backgrounds +surrounding each. + +From this sociological angle the factor that immediately attracts our +notice is the essentially negative, self-deprecatory character of +the doubt-reaction in respect to the ancient dogmas of the Church. +We note the sense of personal inadequacy that is its characteristic +sign. We mark its habitually shamefaced, self-depreciative mien. For +doubt, be it remembered, first arose as the self-accusing attitude of +the subservient individual who lived under the social domination of +monarchical forms of government in a period of man’s history when, +owing to his subjugation to the unconscious suzerainty of a fanciful +father-complex, he meekly bowed in servile obedience to the socially +systematized authority arbitrarily vested in Church and State, as +personified in the office of Pope and King. Under the prevalent +domination of this image of indisputable authority, men’s social +criterion resided in the apparent consensus of the _personal absolute_, +social and individual, representing the particular individuation of +a single man, rather than in the common supremacy of our impersonal +relativity comprising the generic individuality of mankind.[15] + +But the social mind has in the last few centuries undergone a +significant metamorphosis. To-day we have to reckon with this. We have +to take into account the tremendous expansion of the consciousness +of man sociologically and, from the point of view of the historical +record of man’s rapid sociological ascent, mark the characterological +difference in the temper of the individual’s defection to-day as +compared with his defection of yesterday. In the implication of the +rights of individual freedom of thought implied in the defection of +doubt, the predominant factor was the individual’s acknowledgment +of his personal remissness, of his unseemly presumptiveness toward +the social constitution about him. Under the socially systematized +autocracy of the Church’s absolutism, the individuality of man dared +not stand erect and maintain the freedom of his individual expression. + +But in the present hour the consciousness of man proclaims itself a +freer manifestation. Under the impetus of our sociological progress, +man’s individuality has more and more come into its own. And, though +the socially organized prerogative has still the upper hand in respect +to individuality, there are signs abroad to-day which are a significant +advertisement of man’s urge toward an expression of individuality that +is an earnest of yet wider sociological horizons ahead. I think that +it is due in no small measure to the advent of this factor of man’s +sociological rehabilitation that there is seen to-day the completely +altered character of the individual’s resistance as it recoils before +the element of personal absolutism embodied in the systematized +consensus of psychoanalysis. + +Despite its undoubted unconsciousness and personal systematization, +note the essentially ruddier countenance of resistance as compared +with doubt. A resistance, unlike doubt, is no admission of ineptitude. +Subsisting under the sponsorship of a new and freer sociological +order, resistance is fashioned of sterner stuff. It is no personal +deprecation; it is a sociological affirmation. Far from being an +abject confession of individual weakness, it is a proud assertion of +individual strength. For although in the phenomenon of resistance there +is to be seen the equally unconscious motive that is the protest of the +individual absolute against the arbitrary domination of the socially +systematized absolute comprising the popular consensus, there underlies +this protest something that is more virile than this. There is here, +I believe, a reaction that demands and that will ultimately have the +consideration that is its due. Though the Church, while pre-eminent, +might easily dispose of doubt, in our own democratic day it is doubt +that has disposed of the Church. It seems to me that, unless we +psychoanalysts recognize the group-form of unconsciousness underlying +the social systematization embodied in the position of psychoanalysis +when it pronounces the resistance of the individual as _de facto_ +anathema, without regard to the possible propriety of its remonstrance, +we, like our less conscious analogue, the Church, shall ultimately find +ourselves hoist with our own petard. + +While the fact of resistance and of its unconscious motivation is +admittedly true, yet to meet a patient’s assertion of individual right +with the mere assertion of the group-right, which is the unconscious +protectorate of the organized system, is certainly not to answer the +patient’s need from the point of view of a larger and more encompassing +mode of consciousness. If the assumption of arbitrary prerogative or +of the personal absolute represented in the reaction of individual +systematization is the meaning of resistance, then the private +prerogative or the personal absolute underlying the systematization +of the social consensus is no less a manifestation of resistance. For +the attitude of systematization and of absolutism in the individual +is necessarily but the reflection of a prior social systematization to +which the individual’s adaptation is but a secondary response. + +Clearly it is not possible for the socially systematized consensus +embodied in Church, State or psychotherapeutic system to afford the +requisite condition of release from a resistance thus constituted, +when its own systematization is itself the social or group embodiment +of this self-same reaction of resistance. In the nip-and-tuck attitude +between the resistance of the system comprising the single individual +and the resistance of the system comprising the social corporation of +individuals, there stands the organic impasse of two mutually opposed +absolutes. In the autocratic position of each neither may yield, +for in the absolutism of both each represents an identical state of +unconscious impaction. As neither the individual nor the consensus, in +its enfolded self-systematization, is as yet conscious of the process +in which it is the blindly contributing element, both factors represent +but altered aspects of the common delusion of the social adaptation of +man, single and collective, namely, the delusion of the supremacy of +the will-to-self or the unconscious autocracy of the personal absolute. + +Naturally, I cannot speak of these inadequacies of consciousness from +a remote or detached position. Needless to say, since I am at this +moment a contributing part of this social maelstrom comprising the +system about me, I am no less embroiled than others in its social +fallacy. So that what is here very inadequately apprehended by me as a +theory is, I confess, still less adequately accepted by me as a living, +integral experience. Let it not be thought, then, for a moment that, in +presenting the social basis of consciousness that is the substance of +this thesis, I am under any illusion as to my own inaptness to embody +in myself the personal expression of the conception whereof this essay +offers the organismic interpretation. + +It is, however, only in the measure in which this less personal mode +of approach becomes actual for me that my work with others grows in +significance and in constructiveness of purpose. In this light I have +come to feel more and more that it is only as we regard life from +the point of view of man’s generic individuality that we shall truly +encompass the meaning of the neurosis, either individual or social, +in its true organic assessment. In this more inclusive outlook we +shall gradually come to realize, I think, that the neurosis, whether +appearing in the arbitrary systematization of the individual or in +that of the group consensus, consists essentially in the substitution +of the personal absolute that is our secondary individuation for the +impersonal relativity that is our primary individuality. In this +outlook we shall come to see that it is only in the common inherency of +life that is comprised the consciousness of man in the fullness of its +meaning. + +Resistance, then, is the personal systematization of men as contrasted +with the unsponsored individuality of man. The individual unit like +the social unit is but an arbitrary system, and in the resistance +of each of us is to be seen the self-determined cosmogony that is +the individual fallacy of us all. Whether this personal prerogative +embodied in a resistance has its expression in the single individual or +in the collection of individuals comprising the social aggregate, the +factor of systematization holding its guarantee of inalienable rights +under the syndicate of our common unconscious, is, I believe, the very +kernel of the world-wide dissociation which we now diagnose as the +neurosis of the individual. + +Thus, through this systematization of each one, there is repudiated the +individuality of each other. In the personal absolute of the private +consciousness of each, there is denied the relativity of the common +consciousness of all. It is this systematization that is the meaning +of repression. It is this personal prerogative that is the essence of +resistance. And so, in the _unconscious system_ that is within and +about us there is summed up, I believe, the entire philosophy of the +neurosis. Being ourselves intrinsic to the system, both individual +and social, it is no more possible to deal with it objectively in +its social than in its individual phase. Our only approach is the +subjective approach. Only subjectively is it possible for each of us +to envisage completely the system of repression within him that is +his individual reflection of the social system of repression outside +him. In thus relinquishing the absolute principle that is merely +the autocracy of our privately arbitrated system of personalism and +unconsciousness, we are in a position to forgo the unconscious absolute +comprising our own resistance and to accept in its stead the relative +inclusiveness of our conscious life as a unified and organic whole. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNCONSCIOUSNESS FROM A VIEWPOINT OF +RELATIVITY + + +Oscar Wilde says in one of his plays: “There are in the world two +tragedies. One is not getting what one wants and the other is getting +it.” The epigram is peculiarly apt in telling us what appears, on the +surface, to be true. But what appears on the surface to be true is not +necessarily true inherently. Unquestionably there are these two fatal +antitheses in life and in them undoubtedly is summed up whatever there +is of tragedy in our human lot. But, in reducing life to these two +issues of getting and of not getting what one wants, we fail to realize +that these contrasting reactions are secondary to a condition of mind +artificially induced in ourselves at the expense of a prior state of +consciousness that is in its essence not antithetic but unitary. + +Each of us is born in the midst of an established system whose password +is conformity to its prescribed norm. Each of us becomes an automatic +compartment within the systematized consensus that comprises its basis. +The price of our initiation into this adaptive system is the forfeit of +our primary individuality, and by the terms of its automatic statutes +tuition is compulsory. Automatic obedience to traditional authority +is the retroactive principle of its constitution. “Right” or “wrong” +is the slogan of its guild. In the autogenous postulate of good or +bad that is its absolute basis, our adaptive system stands rigidly +opposed to a conception of truth such as comprises the relative and +all-inclusive principle of consciousness in its organismic significance. + +In the light of this ulterior motive of good or bad--of this adaptive +response that is the secondary and reflected impression of each--is +measured the conduct of us all. According as we see ourselves in this +mirror of the systematized and prescribed norm is conditioned our +happiness or unhappiness, our comfort or displeasure. But always the +mirror of each that is the criterion of others stands as a solid wall +confronting us. Reflected in the features of this one our bearing is +quite pleasing; mirrored in the reaction of that one our countenance +is not so prepossessing. And so it happens that, as we go on in life, +we tend more and more to place ourselves in positions in which we may +obtain the most flattering “likeness” of ourselves. Correspondingly, +we tend to avoid those reflectors that distort our features to our +own discomforting. In this way we come to “like” some people and to +“dislike” others. So that, according to this account of our adaptation, +what is called “ourselves” in the vernacular of the system about us is +merely the reflection of ourselves as reproduced by the system itself. + +In truth, because of the system of personal reflections amid which we +move, our judgments are throughout undependable. We have no opinions, +we merely reflect opinions. We have no perceptions, we have only +preperceptions. We do not verify feeling through senses that are +native to us, we imitate feeling by means of impressions that are +extraneous to us. Thus there are great gaps within the sphere of our +supposedly consistent experience--gaps involving wide intervals between +our feeling and our reason, between processes that are organic and +processes that are conscious. Our attempts to bridge these intervals +have constantly led us astray and thus has come to pass the system +of inconsistencies that is the unconscious. For, in this void of his +reality man can only substitute the images that are his unreality, +and no image may substitute for reality, no theory of life replace +the organic consistency of life itself. Yet in our dissociative +preferences we continually mistake the _image_ of that which is for +that which _really_ is. Nor do we at all realize to what extent the +actual masquerades as real. What is there, for example, more actual +than illusion, yet what is there less real? An individual actually has +a delusion but it is not on this account real. The voices he hears are +actual to him (do they not call him by name?) but we who are outside +his system know very well that they are not real.[16] + +My position is that, in our response to the impressions arising from +the social system about us, our inferences are no more dependable than +those arising from the private systems of the insane. Our confusion, +like theirs, is the unconscious breach between perceptions that are +true and impressions that are inferred, between life that is function +and life that is merely enactment. It is again the disparity between +life as a system or theory, and life itself. All of us are familiar +with the inconsistency of people who, in order that life may prove +comfortable in theory, devote their entire energies to making it +miserable in practice. It is the inconsistency of unconsciousness +with its inevitable alternation between the opposed extensions of a +bidimensional image of life in place of the all-inclusiveness of life +in its functional reality. It is the personal absolute underlying the +consensual social system within and about us. + +If this absolute embodied in the system is, then, a standard that is +but arbitrary and artificial, each of us, since he is a reflection of +such a specious criterion, is himself but a personal representation of +this same absolute. If the individual is but a reflection of the system +of rules representing the collection of individuals comprising the +social consensus about him, then the consciousness of man, in both its +social and individual manifestations, represents an absolute that is +throughout false and undependable. If, in brief, our standard of truth +rests upon our own self-reflection in a social system that is itself +self-reflected, then the evaluation of the individual, as of the social +organism about us, comprises throughout a merely fictitious image, and +our criteria of verity are everywhere spurious and without support. + +In the artificial pretence of “good and bad” or of “right and wrong” +that represents the arbitrarily reflected _aspect_ of life based upon +the personal absolute of each, life, as I have said, is henceforth +contracted into the opposite alternatives determined by the two +components that comprise one’s own pleasure or one’s own pain. This +shifting choice imposed by the contrary issues inseparable from our +bidimensional outlook confronts us on every hand, and it is this +limitation of us all to the artificial bidimension of personal loss or +gain that reduces life to the tragedy of getting or of not getting what +one wants. + +Such a division of personality as this personal bias unconsciously +entails, amounts to nothing short of a compulsion neurosis, the scope +of which involves our entire social consciousness. The symptomatology +of this mental division within the social personality finds its +projection in such familiar antitheses as heaven or hell, love or +hate, peace or war, idealist or materialist, Stoic or Hedonist, Jew or +Gentile, aristocrat or proletarian, and so on _ad infinitum_. For such +are our ever-shifting alternatives of getting or not getting as they +are reflected in the assumption of private advantage underlying the +so-called “good” and “bad” that is the preliminary outfit of us all. + +In this eternal whether-or-no that is our superstitious alternation +between good and bad lies the meaning of the social division +constituting the reaction unconsciously sponsored under the shifting +incertitudes of our popular forms and moralities. In our trembling +vacillations between the ever-pressing issues of personal advantage, +as apprehended through our superinduced images of “good” or “bad,” is +the substance of the obsessive oscillations of will commonly saluted +as man’s conscience, a reaction, however, in whose irresolutions an +eminent psychologist long ago discovered the element of hesitation that +tends to make cowards of us all. + +This perpetual reflection of the self in the mirror of self-interest so +operates as to invert completely the natural processes of life. Due to +this unconscious distortion of reality, our every experience is viewed +in the light of the fanciful image that is our own self-projection. +On the basis of the absolute premise of self, that is the result of +our own recoil upon the image of our own self-interest, everything is +subordinated to the bidimensional component comprising our own personal +aspect. For example, this inverted image of self, determining the +personal absolute of each, underlies the delusion commonly concealed +under what is popularly known as our “right.” After all, what is +held most dear within each of us is this private reservation that is +one’s own “right.” Indeed, it is no other factor than this alleged +prerogative or “right” of the individual based upon his autogenous +assumption of personal absolutism that, as already stated, is our +unconscious “resistance” both individual and social. Taking our +stand upon the inflexible basis that is the individual resistance or +personal absolute of each, we approach life wholly from the position +of this personal bias on the ground that it is our right. It is the +preservation of this personal right that is the sole propriety of +the law. But the laws of men as they appertain to personal claim and +title are the direct antithesis of the law of man as it pertains to +the organic unity of his life. In truth, what is called the rights of +private ownership is shown upon analysis to be the ownership of private +rights. + +We do not see--being wholly won over to a policy of unconscious +self-interest we will not see--that our so-called “right” is not a +reality inherent in the conditions of life itself, but that it is an +illusion secondarily derived from our personal reaction to the system +of autocracy that is the unconscious self-interest of the social +unconscious everywhere about us. Here we find the psychological +concomitance between the reaction of resistance and the process of +inversion, between the bidimensional aspect reflecting one’s own +image and the unconscious illusion of the personal absolute assumed +to be the private “right” of every individual. For, in the measure in +which one’s outlook upon reality is restricted to a bidimensional or +pictorial aspect of reality, one’s range of perception is necessarily +confined to alternations of self-advantage or to the issues of good +and bad such as are determined by the autocratic absolute of one’s own +personal right. From the fixed background of personal right we can +look out upon the world about us only from the angle of our personal +satisfaction. In this outlook the sole test of human experience narrows +itself to the question as to whether an issue bodes good or ill _for +me_. My personal right being my standard of measure, every value will +be weighed by me in accordance with its reading. Here, you see, is the +very essence of inversion. Here in this element of personal prerogative +the introversions of unconsciousness are to be traced to their +biological root. Thus, in this repercussion of consciousness embodied +in our assumption of personal right, we come upon the very nucleus of +the neurosis. + +I believe that in this bidimensional alternation of our unconscious +self-reflection existing within the societal personality lies the +basis of our social mania of competition, as it is the basis of our +tireless discussions and altercations within the various spheres of +man’s activity. It is again the obsessive shift of our compulsive +self-interest, and our social alternations of competition merely +reflect our own oppositeness. I believe that this delusion of +self-interest is the sole validity of our vaunted “opinions” as of +the endless wranglings and disputations and outstrivings that actuate +our social interests generally. The claim that we go to war because +our “right” is disputed is not true. We go to war because in the +fallacy of our personal absolutism our assumed right is held by us to +be indisputable. Far from possessing warrant for what is called our +“right” to institute war, it is precisely because of the presumptive +and illusory nature of our arrogated right that we are driven to this +alternative of immeasurable wrong. The fact is not that we are right +because we think such and such to be true, but that in our compulsive +response to unavoidable alternative we think such and such to be true +in vindication of our assumed right. In other words, our “rightness” +is not the natural result of our logic but our logic is the enforced +result of our “rightness.” By reason of this secret reservation of +personal prerogative within each of us, everything is made subservient +to this autocratic absolute of our individual right. If it is true, +then, that the self-assurance and inflexibility of the personal +absolute within each presents the true account of the mental and social +rigidity comprising our resistances, there is here a significant +commentary upon our so-called adult social consciousness.[17] + +This mechanism of unconscious autocracy underlies our sociological +reactions in a degree that is beyond our suspecting, and it is to the +social no less than to the individual consciousness that we must turn +for a solution. If we disregard the individual implications of the +social neurosis, it is not possible to envisage the social implications +of the individual neurosis. Due to the subjective concomitance between +the individual and the social aspects of consciousness, to attempt to +deal with one and not with the other entails a contradiction that is +organic. Just as in the individual personality there are alternations +of will entailing contrarieties of mood that correspond to getting or +not getting what one wants, so in the social personality there are +these same alternations of will with their corresponding antitheses of +mood depending upon our getting and not getting what we want. + +The element of failure in Christianity is the element of the +bidimensional in Christianity. Christ repudiates the consensus and +the consensus exacts his life in return. Judas betrays Christ and in +expiation exacts his own life. In the real motto of Christianity “Do +unto others as ye would have others do unto you” there is betrayed +the familiar alternative of secret self-interest. It reveals at once +the mark of arrangement, of bargain, of conduct-with-a-view-to that +here, as always, is the private guarantee of personal advantage. +In the note of reciprocity underlying the Lord’s prayer, with its +“Forgive _us_, as _we_ forgive,” the bidimensional is at a premium. +Only this bidimensional basis is adequate to account for the constant +dissensions--religious, national, political and economic--that exist +throughout the world of Christianity under the name of “right.” + +The truth is that the consciousness of man is not secure within itself, +and our right is the protection of our own insecurity. An insidious +division underlies the personality of man. Beneath his outer show of +amity and covenant there resides a restless self-doubt, an anxious +fear, a divided will. At the heart of his consciousness there is a +deep-seated uncertainty driving him to temporary appeasements which +can find issue only in the alternations of getting or of not getting +what he wants. It is everywhere the aspect of the personal advantage +under a new and altered guise. It is everywhere the alternation +of self-interest, with its bilateral illusion of advantage or +disadvantage, due to our fear-ridden obsession of “good and bad.” + +The vacillations of this illusive alternative likewise explain the +anxious fascination of the shifting incertitudes of “fate.” Here in +the uncertain eventualities of chance is the irresistible appeal of +our endless speculations in enterprise and game. In the indispensable +element of suspense that lends pith to the drama there is again echoed +this artificial note of self-division. For that which constitutes +dramatic suspense merely sustains the converse extension inseparable +from a bidimensional situation, and the interest of the drama, as +of all art-forms based upon the element of conflict or of periodic +alternation, is its unconscious projection of the dual issues that +reflect the shifting bidimensions of our social self-inversions. + +With the descent of the curtain upon the bidimensional situation +with which the accustomed drama invariably closes, there remains, +in essence unaltered, the same situation upon which it first arose. +This is why it is always necessary at the end to create an artificial +situation such as will temporarily satisfy the demands of a _seeming_ +conclusion and bring the episode to a halt. But a conclusion in the +sense of a resolution of elements is not possible. The drama that is +built upon the dilemma of the bidimensional is inevitably committed to +one or the other of its two horns. Thus the end can be designed only +with reference to one of the two alternatives in accordance with the +unconscious ambivalence of author as of onlooker. And so the question +of termination rests always upon the issue as to whether the audience +shall smile and be pleased with itself (comedy) or weep and feel sorry +for itself (tragedy) according as it gets or does not get what it wants. + +The art of the dramatist is, therefore, in the final accounting always +constrained. It is this exigency that causes to be perpetrated in the +name of dramatic precedent the unpardonable affronts to organic verity +which we are constantly witnessing. In real life a girl, who has had a +liaison with a man with whom her relationship has been wholly sexual +or self-interested, does not confide the secret of her inadvertence +to a subsequent suitor with whom she is now “in love” upon a no less +self-interested basis. Such a course involves an organic contradiction. +She knows in her heart that in the unconscious concealment of his +equally secret self-interest in her it is as intolerable to him to +have the secret of his illusion disturbed as it is intolerable to her +to disturb her own. But in the drama the psychological verities are +thrown to the winds, and the heroine, to the artificial delight of +a bilaterally disposed audience, tells everything that has been in +the “past” exactly as she would not tell it, and to the one person +who hears it exactly as he would not hear it. But with drama that is +bidimensional we must put an ending somewhere! + +Such are the organic discrepancies with which our ablest writers, +whether in the form of the drama, the novel or the screen, still +continue to banter us. The reason is to be sought in the unconscious +and compulsive bondage which they themselves are under with respect to +the illusion of the alternative that is their own self-reflective basis. + +It is this illusion of unconscious self-reflection that explains also +the greater fascination of the bidimensional _picture_ we see sketched +upon the wall or presented in the pages of literature as contrasted +with the inherent _experience_ that is the tridimensional actuality of +our daily life. It explains our greater pleasure in the surroundings +which one’s art may contemplate or portray than in the surroundings +which one’s life may by participation fill and render beautiful. +For art as image is the portrayal of unreality; art as life is the +expression of reality. Art to-day is merely the distinction of the +individual interpreter. It is unrelated to the conscious aims of days +and dreams that may be shared in common among all people. The truth +is that in our prepossession with the bidimensional and pictorial our +interest is centred far more in the distractions of art as image than +in the inclusiveness of art as life. + +This illusion of the pictorial aspect with which we replace the world +of tridimensional actuality finds nowhere a happier vehicle than in the +mechanical bidimension afforded through the medium of illusion achieved +by the motion-picture. There is no device better adapted to reproduce +the flat, scenic aspect such as gives the real zest to our dreams. For +through the device of the motion-picture there is reflected the social +drama that comprises our day, just as through the device of the dream +there is reflected the individual drama that comprises our night. It +is in this illusory _bidimension_ of the photo-play that we are so much +at home. We like its facile reproduction of ourselves. This is why we +can accept without remonstrance the childishly naïve sequences standing +for plot as represented in the bidimension of the screen. The same +narrative would appear too utterly obvious and banal to pass muster +in the solid perspective of the spoken drama, but presented upon the +screen it finds ready acceptance, because in the motion-picture there +is reproduced the pictorial aspect that corresponds to the habitual +aspect of self-reflection that is our own image. We like moving +pictures because we are moving pictures. + +This element of unconscious dramatization, prompting the activities of +the normal mind, we need somehow to realize within us. We need somehow +to realize that in the manifestations of the unconscious comprising +the collective enactment of the social drama around us there is this +same reduction of actuality to aspect. _For in the active motor images +of the social mind with its manifold gestures of a self-reflective +actuality there is inherently no less unreality than in the passive +sensory images of the individual mind in the private theatre of its +self-reflective phantasy-building._ Yet so involved are we now in +our retroactive processes that in our purblind efforts toward their +presumably conscious readjustment we still proceed retroactively. Such +is the futility of our personalistic methods of dream-analysis, as it +is the futility of our personalistic envisagement of the disorders of +affect comprising the neuroses. + +In view of this central defect of our mental vision, whereby it is +contracted into the artificial bidimension of the self- or dream-image, +our outlook is everywhere distorted. Being vitiated throughout with the +prejudice of the circumscribed and personal, our affective response is +not spontaneous and true. As our subjective feeling is self-reflective +or self-interested, our perception is necessarily pictorial and unreal. +So that in our presumable contemplation of the objective world +of reality, the experience that reaches us is not reality. On the +contrary, in the element of the wish or dream that is our bias toward +actuality, the aspect perceived is merely a foreshortened projection +of the fanciful image of self. It lacks the tridimensional depth and +solidarity of an inclusive reality. + +This habit of personal dogmatization and autocracy has induced in us +an autocracy of the mental processes generally. Our representations +of the aspect have become, throughout, the organic antithesis of our +participation in the real. From a basis of unreal images we can only +reproduce unreal images. Out of a mental system of false impressions +we can only elaborate impressions that are false. It is precisely this +flat unreality of the pictorial, whether fanciful or actual, that lends +to all our so-called “art” its obsessive fascination. Not only is there +a distortion of reality in the flat mental picture we form of it, but +in the necessarily detached adaptation of the mere onlooker each of us +becomes unconsciously an arbitrary centre of personal opinionativeness. +Each one stands as a sort of solar centre within a planetary system +comprising his own self-determined affects. He thus reflects the +universe surrounding him, and it is thus by him defined. And there has +come to be built up in each of us in respect also to the world of art a +system of personalism or unconsciousness that is well-nigh logic-proof +in its absolutism. + +Thus every stimulus--every impression that reaches our self-conscious +mental retina falls upon the flat, self-reflecting surface of the wish, +the dream or the personal _right_ of each. Of such is the supposedly +cognitive reaction underlying our “beliefs,” of such is the presumably +affective reaction we express as “love.” But belief and love trace +their etymology to a common organic root that unhappily betrays the +equally illusory origin of each. In the Anglo-Saxon _leof_, meaning +lief or wish or bias, both reactions are reduced to a single motivation +that is the tell-tale of their phantastic import. And as belief and +love (inverse cognition and inverse affect) are the very tissue of our +personalistic consciousness, we may begin to understand to what extent +the wish or the preconception comprising the bidimensional self-image +underlies our every perception! + +And so, after all, our world of “actuality” is not more real than our +world of phantasy, our day not less self-reflective and unconscious +than our night, our waking not less apparitional than our sleep. For +both alike are motivated by the arbitrary reflection that is the +inverted process of the will-to-self. As yet we do not realize that +the personal absolute embodying our so-called “right,” motivated +as it is by self-reflection and unconsciousness, is as truly the +product of our day-dream as the wish, motivated by unconscious +self-reflection, is the product of our night-dream. We do not as +yet see that the wish or self-satisfaction comprising the sleeping +dream of our individual unconscious is itself but a reproduction +of the wish or self-satisfaction comprising the waking dream of +our social unconscious. We have yet to recognize that here again +in the oscillations of its unconscious _form_ is to be traced the +bidimensional alternation of our own self-reflection as determined by +the “good” or “bad” aspect that is our social as well as our individual +advantage. + +Here, in the contrasting circumstances of its affiliation with the +social unconscious on the one hand and of its personal isolation within +the individual unconscious on the other, is doubtless the dynamic +element determining the vacillation of form that comprises the periodic +alternations of the sociological bidimension generally. After all, +what is “good” for me is that which is socially approved, what is +“bad” for me is that which brings me into disfavour with the social +consensus composing my environment. If the social unconscious about me +is willing to connive with my individual unconscious and applaud my +egoistic self-strivings, all is well. If, on the contrary, it withholds +acquiescence and repudiates my self-inverted interests, my state is +a correspondingly unhappy one. This accounts for our artificial +dependence upon the social give-and-take with which we hedge ourselves +about and is the basis of the periodic alternations of mood that +make up our day. Being unconscious, one is a prey to the unconscious +about him. Being self-reflective, one reacts to the impressions of a +self-reflective environment. This oscillation of mood, depending upon +whether our adaptation toward the social consensus is assimilative or +discordant, explains also the alternations of mood observable in the +contrasting reactions characteristic of certain pathological states, +as it is the basis of the daily variation of mood registered in the +neurotic and in the normal constitution. It is here, too, that is +found the basis of the pleasure-pain shift represented in our mood +alternations of elation and depression, whether existing in the diurnal +variations characterizing our normal mood alternations or in the more +pronounced reactions characterizing the extremes of affective tone +presented in manic-depressive insanity. + +It cannot be too strongly urged that, however intrinsically opposite +these extremes of mood may seem, they are in essence identical. For, +in reality, these seeming antitheses represent but the obverse aspects +of one and the same bidimensional portrait of personal advantage. +As regards this intrinsic identity between such seemingly opposite +mood-tones it is interesting to note the etymological concurrence in +the Anglo-Saxon root _saed_ (English sot, meaning filled), in which +we find alike the source of such apparently unrelated derivatives of +current usage as the words _sad_ and _satisfied_. There is, indeed, an +unescapable concomitance in the mental attitudes of joy and sorrow, of +elation and depression, of satisfaction and sadness. This coincidence +is but an altered form of the common alternative of good and bad, of +praise and blame, of getting and of not getting, and, as always, its +presence denotes the conflict involved in our inverted self-interest. + +Doubtless to this bidimensional alternation are also traceable such +sociological antitheses as one may witness in the contrary reactions +expressed in our various economic and political factions. This +one, failing to suspect the element of traditional self-reflection +determining his so-called party affiliation, registers his personal +allegiance under the socially augmented symbol or principle embodying +the standard that is _his_ private absolutism or right; that one, +no less oblivious of the part he is automatically enacting in his +character of party promoter, assumes the symbolic rôle that tends to +further the party principle representative of the absolute criterion +that is _his_ right. So, too, are to be explained the alternations +of reaction represented in the social antitheses of prohibition +and anti-prohibition. The anti-prohibitionists are by imputation +the ultra-liberal, the prohibitionists are by imputation the +ultra-conservative element, but both are in point of fact equally the +dupes of the personal reaction that is their own self-reflection. For +both, in their unconscious response to what is commonly called “early +training,” equally embody expressions of their original infantile +reaction to the opposed issues involved in the social pretence of +“good” and “bad.” + +Extending into every phase of our social life, it is this bilateral +motive that is likewise the failure of the schools. With credit, +praise or privilege and their opposites (depending upon whether the +child “succeeds” or “fails” as judged by the bidimensional standard of +good and bad, of praise or blame constituting the arbitrary _picture_ +of his personal conduct), it happens that, through an unconscious +substitution of the image of the child’s person for the function of +the child’s personality, the entire incentive of the schools becomes +ulterior and artificial. The so-called liberal schools of to-day are +in no better case. Despite their much ado about advanced methods that +will give greater freedom to the child they afford mere imitations of +freedom. But this is freedom in aspect, not in function. It is merely +the ideal of freedom contemplating its own image. Thus it is futile to +attempt to alter our situation through recourse to mere progressive +methods of education. The elimination of formal standards of efficiency +is likewise unavailing. For the ulterior is present still. We find +it present in the bidimensional attitude that actuates the entire +pedagogic system with its underlying idea of _preparation_. Apparently +it is not realized that this element of the preparatory or ulterior is +the criterion also of the teachers, being likewise the basis of their +own promotion as it is the standard of promotion in the world at large. +But whatever is preparatory is based upon the illusion of the personal +image. It is commentative, premeditated, moralistic, and substitutes +a mental impression of life in place of life itself. When we offer an +image of life for which we seek to “prepare” the child, the very basis +of our educational programme becomes pictorial and untrue. Life knows +naught of images in the personal sense. Life is the functioning of +interests in constructive activities. The rewards of such activities +flow naturally out of them and consist in a common earning for daily +needs in common daily pursuits. The child, if given the opportunity, +will learn to construct useful and beautiful things and his only reward +will be the natural reward accruing from the intrinsic value, social +and æsthetic, of the work produced. When schools will have become the +productive plants of natural childish industry, there will not any +longer be the absurd invention by the schools of ulterior rewards such +as now supply the artificial stimulus necessary to lend vitality to +their essential dullness. It will not be necessary for teachers to +stimulate the industry of their pupils through resort to extraneous +“merits” in palliation for their own lack of joy in the natural +creativeness of spontaneous childhood. + +There is, perhaps, no more subtle expression of the bidimensional +replacement than in the psychological counter-impaction of the marital +neurosis. In this conjugal vis-à-vis unconscious self-reflection +is at flood-tide. This is why, in the opposite extensions of the +conjugal conflict, there are presented concomitantly in husband +and wife such familiar antitheses as are presented alternately in +the single individual, as, for example, the opposed reactions of +mania and depression, the psychasthenic and hysterical extremes, +as well as the contrasts of homosexuality and paranoia. Where such +reciprocal conditions exist, the opposite rôles are in every instance +unconsciously assumed, of course, with entire consistency by the +opposite parties in question. This explains also the anomaly presented +in so seemingly contradictory a spectacle as that of a man of outwardly +serious deportment enjoying vicariously, through the cosmetics and +extravagances of self-adornment worn by a narcistically inverted wife, +the satisfactions of an unconscious exhibitionism. It is the law of +the marital neurosis, as of the balance-scale, that its termini are +diametrically opposite and that their variation is inverse one to +another. + +The unconscious mechanism described by Freud under the term “psychic +ambivalence” (Bleuler) is of all reactions perhaps the least +understood, but, because of its invariable association with neurotic +processes, it is as important biologically as any of the mechanisms +that psychoanalysis has disclosed to us. Yet again, in this quality +of contrast inherent in the manifestations of neurotic states, there +are represented merely the two opposed extremes of reaction due to the +division of impulse that is inseparable from the alternation of aspect +we have traced to the illusion of the bidimensional self-image. This +replacement, as we have seen, occurs normally as well as neurotically, +socially as well as individually. It is again the to-and-fro of the +pendulum of good and bad. It is again but the oscillation that is our +obsessive reaction to the make-believe of the self-reflective and +ulterior. + +The truth is that we prefer our impressions of life to an understanding +of life, and in the ambivalence of our response toward others, our +reaction is friendly or antagonistic only in the degree in which they +correspond or fail to correspond with our personally preconceived +impressions. In the present ambivalent scheme of things, the ultimate +poignancy of one’s grief is the element of secret pleasure it affords +to others. The daily newspapers, seeking unconsciously to make capital +of our human frailty in this regard, are ever alert to publish +under glaringly conspicuous head-lines the most startling crimes +and calamities. Under captions giving notice of some inexpressible +“Horror” (a term supposedly conveying a sense of repugnance) they +attain in fact their most intriguing effects. The newspapers are wise. +They have read us before giving themselves to us to read and so are +canny to supply the grim details we love to hear of another’s loss or +hurt.[18] It is this isolation of sorrow that is its desolation and +its bitterness. Yet it may be traced wholly to the unconscious tyranny +of this bidimensional division within us that we find the pleasure we +do find, however adroitly repressed, in the unhappiness or calamity +of those about us. It is, of course, not another’s calamity that is +the real cause of our satisfaction, but in the ambivalence of our +attitude as we contemplate his misfortune we feel, by contrast, or in +a _comparative_ count so much _more_ fortunate than he. It is again +but the projection of the bidimensional division within each of us +individually as a reflection of the division within all of us socially. +In this comparison of ourselves with others there is again reflected +the bidimensional alternative that is the fanciful self-advantage of +the personal image. + +Turn where we will, this same phenomenon of mental alternation based +on the bidimensional image looms ineffaceably before us. Opposed to +the _mental image_ “male” we project the _mental image_ “female,” +in contrast to the _concept_ “religion” we place the _concept_ +“science,” against the _psychological attitude_ of the artist +stands the _psychological reaction_ of the critic. Because of this +mentally pictorial outlook among us, we fail to realize that in the +unconsciously objective approach of the artist there is embodied an +attitude that is as truly a criticism or evaluation of life as is the +objective attitude of the critic toward the expression of the artist. +We do not realize that in our unconscious personal alternation an +element of criticism or evaluation everywhere substitutes the fallacy +of a mental state toward life for the conscious reality of a state +of life itself. Our bidimensional self-reflection is thus equally +the impediment of art as of life. The insidious element of personal +self-reflection is the fatal decoy no less of portrayer than of +participant. + +On the other hand, in the spirit of the more subjective artist +what we sense is his insistent sway toward a self-realization that +is impersonal. We feel that in the measure in which he yields it +submission his expression becomes less and less a reproduction of life +and more and more an actualization of life itself. This is because +in the thought or feeling expressed through the art-forms of such a +personality, he is himself not so much the causative or self-conscious +agent reflecting a state of mind _in relation to_ life as it seems, but +rather the conscious link in a sequence that _identifies_ him with a +condition of life as it is. Thus again the truer the artist, the more +he tends to round the orbit of his personality in a conscious universe +of relativity; the more imitative the artist, the more he tends to +oscillate uncertainly between the alternate phases that merely reflect +the assumed absolute of his own ego. + +So it is with our alternations, social and individual, pathological +and normal, as they exist on every hand. There is the precoid and the +hysteric, the homosexual and the paranoiac, the religionist and the +sceptic, the moralist and the voluptuary. It is the world-old tragedy +of getting and not getting what one wants, and in the self-satisfaction +of the one as in the self-abnegation of the other the element of +self-consequence is equal and identical. It is the ineptitude of virtue +that it is but the bidimensional reverse of vice. Generosity, like +humility, contains its ambivalent element of pride. Though from time +to time we may dispense no slight favours, yet always we demand to +hold the reins of power within our own hands. Let our protégés presume +for a moment to assert their own individuality and straightway we rein +them in. Indeed, if we will look into this, we shall realize that it +is precisely the person toward whom we are most lavish of beneficence +that is the one of whose native and unsponsored expression we are most +jealously critical. The fact is that our virtues are really too good +to be true and that our amenities, after all, reflect only our own +self-advantage. Thus, from the point of view of good and bad, our lusts +and our repressions are but interchangeable adaptations of the central +theme of self, and in the alternations entailed in the popularly +conceded distinctions assumed as morality and immorality there is +preserved under merely reversed aspects this identical fetish of one’s +own self-image. + +Even in the sphere of psychology itself there is this same division +inseparable from the personal absolute or the private arrogation +that underlies the assumed right of each individual as reflected in +our social contrasts of good and bad. For example, the propriety +of studying the “merely motor expressions” of the behaviourists is +regarded with grave question by the introspectionists, while the +behaviourists as ardently doubt whether introspective studies are the +legitimate matter of psychology at all. The futility of dissension is +again its two-sidedness. What we omit to reckon with when we consider +the vying of these two schools with one another is the element of the +personal prerogative within them that unconsciously goads each to an +intolerance of the other. For all “rights” being mutually opposed to +and exclusive of one another, the “right,” or opinion, underlying +any system except the system that is one’s own is, of its nature, +inadmissible. In the irreconcilable assertions of the multifarious +opinions of men, whether occurring in group or in single expression, +there is always to be traced this underlying motive of personal right +corresponding to the private prerogative of each. By rights I do +not mean the natural rights that are universal and common, but the +personal rights that are autocratic and pre-emptive. But whether our +divisions be national, political, religious, economic, professional +or familial, their underlying meaning is the same. So that, in this +antithetical “response” characterizing the periodic alternations of +our bidimensional self-reflection, there is registered a reaction +of the organism that invariably escapes the attention of either +disputant--the reaction, namely, of the will-to-self or of the private +privilege coincident with an absolute basis of adjudication. As long +as there remains this element of unconscious alternation due to the +self-reflective interest that now actuates human motives, students of +science, also, are as powerless to bring to their problems an attitude +of disinterestedness as are our national delegates when they attempt to +consider the problems involving all the subtle self-interest of a peace +conference. + +The really classic division of opinion in the world--the division +that is of major importance even amid academic fields of thought--is +the conflict between Science and Religion. That the religionists, in +claiming the undoubted authenticity of sources confirmatory of the +truth of revealed religion, have offered indisputable “proof” of the +validity of their position, cannot be denied. That the scientists’ +assertion of the doctrine of spontaneous evolution as opposed to +the revealed truths of Theism rests equally upon the evidence of +incontrovertible “proof” leaves likewise no room for doubt. In both +instances, however, the proofs of each are acceptable only to the +advocates of their own particular view and not to the advocates of the +view that is opposite their own. But of what avail are the proofs of a +position which are valid only in the minds which have anteriorly set +out to prove it? What dependence is to be placed in the intellectual +verifications of truth which are acceptable only to intellects which +demonstrate them but which, in the view of those of an opposite trend, +remain for ever inaccessible? These are reflections which necessarily +force us to question very seriously our objective intellectualizations. +If, in so wide and vital a division as that between Religion and +Science, the “logic” on which is based the claim of each is so +completely without meaning, beyond its facility to flatter established +prepossessions, it is time that our “reasoning” upon all issues be +summoned to account on suspicion that our position is, in every +instance, merely the unconscious alternation due to the bidimensional +image of gain or loss that is one’s personal self-reflection. + +This blindness of the personal restriction within our subjective life +is the more interesting when one considers the far more impersonal +outlook that often characterizes man’s consciousness within the +sphere of his objective interests. With the growing expanse of man’s +consciousness there has arisen the widely inclusive and impersonal +field of preventive medicine with its essential preoccupation with +the communal weal. Through this wider sociological approach we have +come gradually to realize the incomparably greater significance of +activities directed toward safeguarding the health of the community +or of the group-life as contrasted with interests directed to the +personal cure of the individual as a single element within the social +group. We have begun to recognize that where, through recourse to +measures of public hygiene, it is possible to control the general +sources of disease, conditions are rendered such that there may be no +need to treat disease-process within the single individual. In Panama, +for example, where, through a far-reaching programme of civic hygiene, +the malaria-breeding organism has been almost wholly exterminated, +the medical and sociological functions of the community have become +so completely merged that with the appearance of the disease-bearing +Anopheles it is no longer the physician but the civic authorities who +are consulted. + +Such are the signs of the broadening communal spirit that is coming +to influence more and more the various measures of improvement amid +the objective conditions of life about us. But, within the subjective +sphere of man’s activities, his outlook is no whit more encompassing +to-day than in the moment of his earliest quickenings of consciousness. +The reason is not far to seek. Man’s subjective life is throughout +overlaid and oppressed by his inverted obsession of personal +acquisition. Viewing everything in the light of the reflection cast by +his own image, a broad communal programme of life is for him as yet +subjectively impossible. An outlook that would render his position a +relative one and reveal it as but contributory to the organic life as a +whole would straightway menace the illusion of his personal prerogative +and rob him of what is now for him the basis of all his experience and +the sum of his personality. He does not see that his “experience,” by +reason of its inverted absolutism, wholly lacks the support of reality. +He does not see that what he calls his personality is his successful +collusion in the collective unconscious about him at the price of his +habitual concession to impressions not primarily his own. This is why +the psychopathologist is still futilely endeavouring to understand +his patients from the static, personal standpoint of his own dogmatic +absolutism rather than from the position of a relative and inclusive +interpretation of consciousness. This is why the objective analyst +remains always outside the real problem of the social disharmony +represented in the nervous and mental disorders of the individuals +by whom he is confronted. The truth is, he is himself a part of the +disorder which in his unconscious absolutism he is presuming to treat +in others. The tendency is one that exists among us all. For the taint +of an absolutism within the social personality involves each of us +equally as a contributing element in its fictitious structure. Hence +the ultimate futility of our constantly shifting “methods.” Hence the +ever-recurring therapeutic fads that represent first one and then +another absolute system of cure. But though each such system may for +a while claim our support, in due course it fades again and is in +turn succeeded by another in accordance with the varying phases of +our social alternations. Our enthusiasm, as well as its decline, must +after all be reckoned merely as the alternate reverberations of the +social consciousness in response to the unconscious alternations of the +bidimensional absolute which has its existence in the individual and of +which the social manifestation is but a reproduction. + +As the neurosis is generic, involving the social system no less than +the individual element, the system of psychoanalysis, as well as the +individuals composing it, is equally included under its indictment. +From Freud, therefore, as from the rest of us there is due the +acknowledgment of the inevitable part occupied by psychoanalysis in +the systematization or unconsciousness that is the social neurosis. +The private assumption of each of us to the contrary notwithstanding, +we who have followed Freud could not possibly have been inspired in +our work by a conscious interest in the disorders of personality +represented in the social anomaly of the neurosis. Being ourselves +unconsciously involved in the social neurosis about us, we have been +urged forward through an unconscious or _personal_ interest in +order to divert our minds from our own implication in its _social_ +significance. To this end it has been unconsciously our endeavour to +direct assiduous attention only to the specific manifestations of the +neurosis as it exists in individuals supposedly other than ourselves. +_In brief, we have been diligently occupied with the objective study +of the neurosis in its obvious appearance in others as individuals +presumably separate from ourselves, in order to escape the subjective +acknowledgment of its actual presence within ourselves as contributory +and interrelated elements in our common social consciousness_. + +With each of us, the real motive has been the unconscious grudge of +our personal involvement in a world-wide enslavement to an artificial +precept such as can only oscillate between the alternations resultant +upon our self-limited bidimension of “good and bad.” When we can +lay aside the incentives of personal self-defence and view our own +reactions with impartial self-composure, we shall realize that it +has been our own unconscious that first quickened the compensative +defence-reactions which later culminated in the objective system we +know to-day as psychoanalysis. For, with psychoanalysis as with other +systems, its real incitement is found in the inevitable “come-back” +that is the organism’s response to its sense of affront before the +illusion of the self-image. Again, it is the automatic alternation +resultant upon a basis of counter-relatedness inseparable from the +delusion of the personal absolute as contrasted with the relativity of +the individual in respect to life as an organic whole. Again, it is the +artificial presupposition of our own “rightness” that is the strongest +determinative of our conduct, and to this secret autocracy that is our +own personal absolutism we have rendered everything subservient. + +Men like to say that God created them, but in truth it is they who +have created “God.” We like to employ this anthropomorphic image of +absolute authority to our personal advantage. Rewarding the good and +punishing the bad in accordance with the alternations coincident with +the bidimensional aspect of an absolute Deity, this image of supreme +authority represents merely the projection of the personal absolute +based on the alternations of our own self-reflection. I do not doubt +that beneath this vicarious image of a fanciful father-supremacy there +ever remains the true and abiding principle that is the underlying +reality of life. But, in the place of this principle of reality that is +the unsponsored soul of man, we have timidly substituted such temporary +cheats as are adapted only to lull our fancies with imperialistic +dreams of personal empire. Indeed, in the personal projection actuating +the social anomaly of religious belief the inverted bias comprising +our own self-image has its strongest lodgment. It is here that the +collective mind has tricked itself to its collective undoing. For +in the current expression of our social inversion resident in this +absolute arbiter of the moral law or of “good and bad” lies the +very nucleus of our human pathology. And it is my position that +the pretence, underlying the personal adjustment based upon early +inculcated issues of self-interest and concealed beneath our specious +determinants of “good” and “bad,” is no less the underlying fallacy of +psychoanalysis. For, in its attempt to offset neurotic disharmonies +due to an unconscious repression of the sexual life of the individual, +psychoanalysis has recourse to adjustments that are the mere +_alternative_ of repression--a repression legislated by the dictates +of an equally unconscious and repressed society, be its expression +opportunistic, sublimative, or _en règle_. + +Thus psychoanalysis, likewise, presents a policy that is but a +desperate alternation between the only two issues that are available +on the basis of the absolute criterion such as inevitably obtains +in our present bidimensional or pictorially constellated scheme of +consciousness, namely, a policy in which the reaction of the individual +can only be in the direction of the reverse or opposite extension. +Hence, however personally displeasing to us, there is the need that +we who are psychoanalysts somehow recognize that we, also, are +unconsciously subordinated to the moral dilemma that is the reflection +of our own self-interest. There is the need that we see clearly that +psychoanalysis, too, is still under the domination of a falsely imbued +impression of good and bad with its attendant issue in the alternations +of an unconscious social resistance. + +This illusory antithesis of getting or of not getting what one wants, +this irreconcilable ache of man’s unconscious is traceable again +and again to the false assumptions of a self-reflective absolutism +as arrogated by the individual as a single part or element in +contradistinction to our organic consciousness as a whole. It is in the +absolutism of the part that consists the dissociation of the whole; +it is in the relativity of the part that consists the integrity of +the whole. Within the sphere of man’s consciousness our fallacies of +observation lie in the absolutism of the observer. On the other hand, +in surrendering the bidimensional or pictorial illusion inseparable +from the fixed position of the observer for the tridimensional +actuality of our organic participation in life as an inclusive +totality, we automatically yield it the full-dimensional component +comprising the extension that is our confluent societal unity and +which, in abrogating the artificial image of a personal and unconscious +absolute, constitutes life in the encompassing scheme of the relativity +of consciousness. In such a scheme there is offered to the dissociated +personality, single and social, neurotic and normal, a readjustment +that is fundamental. I believe it is only in the acceptance of the +societal consciousness of man that there lies the ultimate step for +each of us. For the principle of the relativity of consciousness is an +organically unequivocal one. In its individual realization consists our +societal integrity. In its societal realization consists our individual +integrity. Only in the co-ordination of the two lies the fulfilment of +our organic personality. + + + + +PART II + +THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE NEUROSES + + + Personally, I am more and more convinced that the cure for + sentiment, as for all the weakened forms of strong things, is + not to refuse to feel it, but to get to feel _more_ in it. This + seems to me to make the whole difference between a true and a + false ‘asceticism.’ The false goes for getting rid of what one + is afraid of; the true goes for using it and making it serve. + The one empties, the other fills; the one abstracts, the other + concentrates. Don’t you think half the troubles of life come from + being wrongly _afraid_ of things--especially afraid of oneself? + (February, 1890.) + + Richard Lewis Nettleship. + + + + +CHAPTER I + +ANALYSIS OF FREUD’S DYNAMIC AND INDIVIDUALISTIC CONCEPTION OF THE +NEUROSES + + +The following pages are an endeavour to determine the conditions, +social and individual, that constitute the health of the mental +organism. What the health of the mental organism is, has not as +yet been adequately described. On the somatic side, of course, one +defines health as the harmonious functioning of the parts comprising +the organism as a whole. But, as regards the constitution of the +mental life in its totality, we have no such inclusive interpretation +of the condition requisite to harmonious functioning. Although the +psychopathologist is constantly engaged in efforts to restore the +distorted mind to a condition of harmony and health, one finds nowhere +a satisfactory statement as to just what constitutes the state of +harmony which it is his avowed purpose to establish. Health, of course, +is synonymous with the harmony of the whole. But from the point of +view of consciousness we have not even determined as yet what is the +organism as a whole or what are the parts constitutive of it. The +psychiatrist is habitually preoccupied with the outer features of +mental disharmony which the method of extrinsic observation has brought +to his personal notice. It is evident, therefore, that his conception +of consciousness is automatically withheld from a subjective inclusion +of the organism in its entirety, and that it compasses only the +particular aspect that falls within the limits of his own particular +observation. It is this discrepancy which I should like, if possible, +to isolate from its present personal involvement, with a view to the +possibility of a clearer understanding of our mental problems. To this +end my recourse can only be such an objective inquiry as may be the +more hospitable because of its subjective inclusiveness. + +In pre-Freudian days, as is well known, the psychopathologist who +had to do with a nervous disorder turned quite automatically in the +direction to which the patient pointed, or to the symptom indicated. +Whether a paralysis, an obsession, a phobia or what not, this symptom +or sign constituted for the physician no less than for the patient the +exclusive focus of interest. Thus in the domain of nervous and mental +disharmonies the entire field of inquiry occupied itself in earlier +times with a mere obvious index of disease rather than with the disease +itself. + +With the advent of Freud the situation became wholly changed. Through +his discovery that the disturbance was neither _what_ nor _where_ it +appeared to be from the clinical point of view, Freud came to explain +it upon grounds which led to a fundamentally altered conception of +the hysterias and their kindred manifestations. Viewing the situation +as a dynamic one, Freud regarded the symptom in question in the light +of an unruly element within the central personality, whence, in his +view, this central personality became, as it were, the controlling seat +of government. It was Freud’s position that this presiding principle +must be held amenable for fostering within its domain so discordant +an element as that whereof the symptom gave notice, and accordingly, +it was to this central principle that Freud henceforth addressed his +investigations. + +This position of Freud’s, in which he regards the essential mechanism +of the neurosis as a symptom-substitution representing in substance a +psychic transposition or a shift of affect from intrinsic source to +arbitrary aspect, embodies the whole significance of psychoanalysis. +It is a significance that marks the outset of our understanding of the +real nature of the neuroses. For it was this conception that first +posited as the background of consciousness an integral personality, +from which, as a basis, it was sought to discover the factors operative +in causing the division within it represented by the neurosis. But just +as the enduring distinction of Freud’s work lies in this conception of +a central totality of personality constituting the substrate of the +conscious life, so its limitation consists precisely in the erroneous +position to which Freud assigned this totality of consciousness. I +believe that the many inconsistencies and half-baked deductions of +psychoanalysis, with the consequent deadlock to a truly comprehensive +interpretation of the neuroses, are due precisely to this limitation +of the conception of the neurosis within the bounds of the individual +consciousness. When we have realized that this conception of a totality +of personality is biologically tenable only _from the point of view +of an inclusive societal consciousness and not of the circumscribed +individual consciousness_, we shall, I believe, have taken the +essential step toward dispelling the confusion and lack of coherence +within the psychoanalytic system as it now stands. + +As one looks back, it is not difficult to see how Freud’s necessarily +conventional, clinical point of view--the outgrowth of personal +inclination and tradition--unconsciously bound him to a conceptual +outlook that was necessarily circumscribed and limited, and how he was +thus unwittingly led into a contradiction of the ultimate significance +of the very conception which he had himself originated. + +In the nature of Freud’s postulate that a psychic transposition +is the basis of the neurosis, his thesis assumes a breach in the +integrity of consciousness. This breach within consciousness is due +to the effort of a delimited area within it to establish itself as +a separate, self-governing unit. His position envisages a conflict +entailing a dissociation of the personality due to the secession of +one or more of its integral constituents. Hence the real crux of +Freud’s thesis was the determination of the essential incompatibility +between an _independent part_ (dissociation) and the _coherent whole_ +(unification) within the sphere of consciousness--a conception which +seems to me as beautiful as it is true. But in the bias of Freud’s +own individualistically circumscribed consciousness, with the +inevitable separation or dissociation it entailed, Freud failed to +recognize the implication of his own thesis. He did not see that he +was himself unconsciously held within a position bearing the essential +feature of the very disorder which presumably he was regarding from +a non-partisan, unified point of view. He did not see that his own +position was precisely that of a separate, delimited unit, within the +totality of consciousness, represented in the dissociation of his own +personal bias. There is here a consideration which Freud, and the rest +of us along with Freud, have permitted to pass by completely unnoticed, +due to our own unconscious embroilment within the limitations of our +circumscribed individual consciousness. While theoretically advocating +unification as the basis of consciousness, Freud was himself actually +seeking unconsciously to reconcile with it a dissociation within +himself. It is this self-circumventing illusion of the restricted +individualistic consciousness which, if one may judge from the degree +to which it has underlain my own work and that of others, is the +essential fallacy of psychoanalysis. + +In reality, then, Freud set out to account for the seemingly actual +upon grounds of the seemingly actual. He did not see that the very +medium of human experience, as _seemingly_ actual and as commonly +accepted by us to be actual, is in truth already biased by impressions +that are only virtual. In short, Freud did not realize that our own +so-called consciousness is unconsciousness. He assumed that the +analysis or self-examination to which he subjected himself and his +patients was disinterested and authentic in its inclusiveness of the +personality as a whole. And all the while he failed to realize that the +personality as a whole, as embodied in the self-limited consciousness +of the individual, is itself imbued with all the prejudice of +self-interest and with all the bias of dissociation constitutive of +the habitual medium of our collective unconscious. As this habitual +medium is actuated by individual tradition and separativeness, it is +necessarily based throughout upon motives of personal preference. With +an outlook distorted by personal preference (the unconscious wish), it +is not possible to view the processes of life and its disharmonies with +freedom and clarity. From a standpoint of private prejudice it is not +possible to envisage private prejudice. Unconsciousness cannot compass +unconsciousness. The wish cannot assail the wish. In our present mode +of personalism and unconsciousness the attainment of consciousness +is of its nature an impossible task. Thus the bias of Freud renders +untenable the position of Freud when he assumes the abrogation of bias, +since his position has itself arisen from the unsuspected bias of his +own habituated or preferential mode. + +It is this unconsciousness within ourselves which we psychoanalysts +have let escape us and which necessarily gives to our work, for all +its impressiveness, the conventional curtailment of the vicarious and +unreal. As an illustration of what I mean, there is somewhere in the +“Traumdeutung” an amusingly acute psychoanalytic touch in Freud’s +interpretation of the dream of a patient. This patient had on one day +stoutly protested that dreams were not invariable wish-fulfilments, +and on the following day she brought to Freud a dream in which she was +represented planning a summer outing with her mother-in-law whom she +cordially disliked. Here, she said, was proof that dreams were not +necessarily wish-fulfilments, and a superficial glance would seem to +give her the decisive score. But Freud was alert. “Quite the contrary,” +he replied with analytic acuity, “you have only furnished additional +proof that dreams _are_ wish-fulfilments, for it is precisely in +your wish to prove to me that dreams are not wish-fulfilments that +you have dreamed that you are going summering with your detested +mother-in-law--a dream which could not more amply satisfy your wish to +prove the incorrectness of my theory.” So speaks Freud with triumphant +naïveté, and, with a complacency that is no less naïve, we who are +Freudians are still applauding with unstinted assent the subjective +fallacy of his objective logic. + +Like Freud, we have not seen that every dream of our own contains no +less the identical wish to prove ourselves right. Like Freud, we have +not seen that it is our wish that the dream shall contain the element +of a basic and invariable sexual factor in substantiation of the thesis +of us Freudians. It is the fallacy of the dreamer in the foregoing +incident that she sets out with the absolutism of the personal premise; +but so do we--the premise, namely, of personal “rightness.” Thus we are +in no different case from the patient whom Freud cites as manufacturing +a dream to prove her position right. But while the wish of this +dreamer--in its purpose in direct opposition to our own--stands out +in sharp, unmistakable outline before us, our own wish--in its nature +identical with hers, namely, the wish to prove ourselves right--remains +enveloped still in the obfuscating mists of our own unconscious. There +is here the organic inaccessibility of the wish to the wisher, of the +dream to the dreamer. There is here the blindness of the unconscious +preference with its basis in the personal absolute, and it is the need +of us Freudians to recognize that the blight of its inconsistency is +upon us all.[19] + +How dominant is Freud’s own individuating wish or personal preference +one may realize who reads his essay on “The History of the +Psychoanalytic Movement” and witnesses the bitterness of his feeling +toward any who gainsay him. How strongly we share with Freud the +influence of personal bias may be seen in our own bitterness when +others would gainsay us. It is so with us all. It is the morbid +compulsion of self-vindication that underlies all “rightness.” It is +the habitual illusion of our own self-centralization, a less wieldy but +more explicit term for what we have come to know theoretically--that +is, in other people and as in no way touching our own personal +feeling--as the unconscious wish-motive. For self-vindication and the +unconscious wish are one. + +And so, objectively, Freud is quite “right” in asserting that a basic +sexual factor underlies the dream. Do not his own and his patients’ +dreams prove him so? And Jung is, objectively, no less “right” in +claiming that Freud is mistaken--that dreams are not primarily +motivated by a sexual wish. Do not his dreams and those of his patients +equally corroborate _his_ view? And so with Adler and his theory, and +so with any of us and his theory. For notwithstanding that the theories +of all of us are severally opposed one to another, yet all of us are +equally “right,” as may be equally substantiated by the dreams of each. +The explanation is simple. The “rightness” of each is the wish of each +and the wish is father to the dream! + + + + +CHAPTER II + +FORMULATION OF AN ORGANIC OR SOCIETAL BASIS OF INTERPRETATION + + +Within the various fields of scientific investigation, there is the +established precept that we set out from the simplest assignable +elements as a basis for all future inquiry. Of such, for example, is +the ground-structure of the chemical and the biological sciences, and +it is likewise upon ultimately irreducible units that the furthest +abstractions of mathematics rest their foundation. But in our approach +to the biological elements of consciousness we have proceeded upon no +such soundly established principle. Unconsciously presupposing here +and taking for granted there, we have reasoned from premises that +have lacked the warrant of elementary support. Hence in the study of +consciousness we have, in our unconsciousness, unwittingly slurred our +obligations to the very first principle of scientific method. + +This circumstance, however, is not one toward which we need feel +scornful. Our blunder has been inevitable. In the study of the elements +of consciousness a factor is introduced into scientific reckoning that +completely reverses habitual perspectives, and to trace with scientific +conscientiousness this inexorable reversal of the personal mode +requires of the student very special laboratory qualification. For, in +turning to the study of the basis of consciousness, we are ourselves +the primary elements of our own inquiry. Ourselves unconscious, we have +attempted to fold back upon ourselves and, from a basis of prejudice, +to recapture our primary, unprejudiced basis. From a now sophisticated +personal _adaptation_ of consciousness we have sought to regain the +native, unsophisticated _principle_ of consciousness of which our +personal adaptation is the unconscious abrogation. Clearly, this task +is of its nature self-contradictory. Only in the measure in which we +realize that unconsciousness is our habitual mode and so allow it +to cease automatically to dominate our lives may we come to study +dispassionately the essential structure of consciousness through an +unbiased examination of the primary elements of which it is composed. + +Life has its beginnings in a continuous organic medium. Within this +common organic medium our original infant organisms constitute +identical elements. What we later regard as individuals are but +corpuscles in a homogeneous, societal tissue. Organically, or from +the point of view of their common and inherent affectivity, there +exists no discrimination among these elements. Race or national +separation, social or caste distinction have not entered into them. +These are divergences that have no place in the organic origins of +life. As integral members of an original organic matrix, the elements +representing our primary infant organisms are no more differentiated +psychically one from another than they are psychically differentiated +from the life-source or the maternal organisms from which they have +sprung. The mental life, being as yet wholly subjective and unaware, +is simple, unitary. It is one with the organism’s inherent feeling. +Subjective feeling, indeterminate and unqualified, is, in the primary +organism, the sum of experience, the compass of life. Primarily the +organism’s subjective feeling is its all. And as with the growing +perception of outer objects life enlarges, this subjective mode +is unaltered still. Our primary objective experience merges into +continuity with inherent feeling. It is added to, included in the +subjective life. So that in its incipient rapport with the world of +objectivity, life maintains still a fluid, undifferentiated, confluent +mode. For life is primarily affective. In the affect consists men’s +common ground. In the subjective affect lies organic bed-rock. Here in +the common inherency of native feeling is the primal menstruum of our +human consciousness. + +But there suddenly comes an interruption to this state of unification. +The parent, as spokesman of a world of unconscious collusion in the +defence of self or the exploitation of separativeness, strikes in +sharply upon this unitary mode of being with a wedge of interdiction +that marks the beginning of a cleavage within the personality which +the subsequent years tend increasingly to widen and secure.[20] With +the sudden arrest of this early, unified mode through the entrance of +the extraneous strictures of command and prohibition (suggestion or +repression), the personality of the organism becomes automatically +divided. For with command or reproof there is introduced the element +of the ulterior. Organic harmony and confluence are no more. Into the +life of confluence is now thrust the rude encroachment of personal +motive--of motive based upon the outcome of promise or threat, of +gain or forfeit. The inherent flow, the organic current of experience +is now artificially checked. Henceforward expression is no longer +spontaneous. Instead, a programme of conduct-with-a-view-to takes its +place and becomes the dominant order of our activities. In the face of +every summons the question must first be weighed--Will it be well or +ill with _me?_ Upon the issue of gain or loss depends the response--the +issue of gain or loss for the now separated, individuated organism. +An adjustment to the ends of self-interest is demanded. Everything is +at stake; a fitting policy must be devised and the proper combination +must be sought. Thus is obtruded self-consciousness, self-interest or +that separation from its basic continuum that is incidental to the +interruption of the organism’s essential life, and with it a new mode +of consciousness embodying a fundamental opposition to the primary +unity of life now takes its rise. + +Is it not clear that the condition here described is nothing other +than a dissociation of consciousness, that this interpolation of the +self-motive involves a division of the personality in which there is +presented the identical reaction that we have come to know as the +essential mechanism of the neurosis? If so, then life in our present +mode of adaptation is throughout a dissociation. That such is actually +the case is the position of the present thesis. For it maintains +that division of personality, or the neurosis, has its basis in this +incipient cleavage embodied in the separation of the individual element +from its original organic continuum through the interdiction of the +organism’s early unitary mode, while integrity of the personality, on +the other hand, is represented alone in the preservation throughout the +growth of the individual element of its primary organic confluence. + +Such a postulate is indeed very sweeping. It will be readily protested +that it is too sweeping--that in effect it claims that the whole +civilized world is in the grip of a mental dissociation, that it has +its being, founds its organization upon a basis of unconsciousness. I +can only answer that, however sweeping such a statement may seem in +theory, this social implication of the neurosis is amply supported +in actuality. For the unconscious reactions of the social mind about +oneself are reflected unconsciously within oneself, the individual +being but an element in our common consciousness. If one will permit +himself to be sufficiently subjective in his own life to view with +objective disinterestedness the reflections within himself of these +unconscious reactions of the social mind, there will be little ground +for protest against such an implication. + +This indictment of the entire social mind, however, may rest upon +no scant or uncertain foundation. We may not deal with so broad +an issue with the personal conclusiveness of a merely dynamic or +individualistic interpretation. Our approach must needs be genetic +in its scope. We must take account of those integrations which mark +the era of man’s first awareness and which reach back to the nebulous +sources of consciousness itself. For the thoughtful student will +demand to know the phylogenetic origin of this universal tendency to +interdiction toward her offspring on the part of the mother. Whence +_her_ self-consciousness, he will ask. One’s answer must be largely +intuitional, by which I suppose we mean that it must be gathered from +sources that are coloured by intimations arising from one’s own organic +life. + +It would appear that in his separativeness man has inadvertently fallen +a victim to the developmental exigencies of his own consciousness. +Captivated by the phylogenetically new and unwonted spectacle of his +own image, it would seem that he has been irresistibly arrested before +the mirror of his own likeness and that in the present self-conscious +phase of his mental evolution he is still standing spell-bound +before it. That such is the case with man is not remarkable. For +the appearance of the phenomenon of consciousness marked a complete +severance from all that was his past. Here was broken the chain of +evolutionary events whose links extended back through the nebulous +aeons of our remotest ancestry, and in this first moment of his +consciousness man stood, for the first time, _alone!_ It was in this +moment that he was “created,” as the legend runs, “in the image and +likeness of God.” For breaking with the teleological traditions of his +agelong biology, man now became suddenly _aware_. + +That man’s spirit should have quailed before the wonderment of +so complete an emancipation is not surprising. Sensing his utter +isolation in the face of so strange, so unwonted a realization, he +could only cling desperately to the one visible and concrete sign of +the prenascent world from which he had newly emerged--to the urgent +and ineradicable actuality of _himself_, the one and only link that +remained to bind man to the vast and hitherto uninterrupted continuum +of his primordial past. Yet turn where he would, the organic hiatus +had now been made and its inexorable breach yawned wide and inevitable +before him. Unable as yet to endure the contemplation of his new +freedom and the limitless expanse it spread before him, equally unable +to recross again the gulf he had lately spanned and recover the paths +of his original instinctiveness and automatism, the soul of man stood +divided against itself. For man could now neither venture forth nor +yet return again. In his division he could only grope blindly amid +uncertain ways. Before him stretched the stern demands of consciousness +and reality, behind him lay the fictitious decoys of a phantastic and +immemorial preconscious. His choice lay between the two, yet he was +incompetent to follow either. It is, it seems to me, the intermediate +stage in man’s development, comprised of these two contending issues +and entailing the irreconcilable conflict of which each individual’s +experience is a recapitulation, that is the phylogeny of the +unconscious. This is the experience of us all as it expresses itself in +the self-consciousness that underlies the personal adaptation of each, +through our gradually enforced awareness of the self. + +Considered also ontogenetically, the development of consciousness, +contrary to accepted tenets, has by no means proceeded upon a +fluent and harmonious course.[21] In its very birth consciousness +embodies a biological recoil--an organic impaction. Its very +unfolding is an infolding, its begetting a misbegetting. For the +rudiment of consciousness is self-consciousness. In its origin it +is self-reflexive, self-relational. That is, consciousness in its +inception entails the fallacy of _a self as over against other selves_. +It is in this inevitable _faux pas_ of man’s earliest awareness, of +his original self-consciousness (original sin), that consists the error +or lapse in the process of his evolution. In this factor of development +marked by the recoil of our self-consciousness or by the inference +of our counter-relatedness is to be traced the momentary decline in +the progressive curve of man’s organic evolution. Yet such temporary +recessions embody the operation of laws that are entirely within the +order of our developmental descent. In the first dawnings of new and +untried possibilities, it often happens that, as growth proceeds, +conditions that are later to become assets in the developmental scheme +are in their rudimentary phase very burdensome liabilities. The infant +that has not yet learned to walk is wont to crawl with much ease and +impunity, but with the finer adjustment of walking once acquired he may +now move about his world in an upright posture with far greater agility +and comfort than the movement of crawling could ever have afforded +him. And yet many are the rude impacts and ineptitudes that attend the +gradual acquisition of his new endowment. And so the developmental +possibility offered man through his attainment of the stage of +self-awareness is not less an onward stage in his evolution because in +his awkward unaccustomedness he employs it to his own undoing. It is +one of the glories of his growth which he may temporarily dim but not +permanently extinguish. + +With the further unfolding of the consciousness of man, or with his +increasing awareness, there followed the recognition of the objective +intervals between his congeners severally and between himself and +them. His external senses of their very nature apprised him of such +intervals, as, for example, those in relation to time and to space. +With growing experience his perception of interval between himself and +his fellows grew more and more insistent. It became indeed the basis +of his operations. Besides, there were intervals which were not only +spatial and temporal but intervals or differences that were attributive +or circumstantial in their nature, such as vocal and featural +differences, differences of sex, size, colour and of texture. + +With this constantly growing, steadily deepening impression of +difference, interval or separation in point of external characters, +with this habitual looking out upon external or objective +differentiation or _otherness_, something happened to the consciousness +of man. That which happened was the _faux pas_ in his evolution to +which I have just alluded. For, through the suggestive influence of +repeated observation of objective interval or discontinuity, man fell +a victim to a trick of his own consciousness, and, from implications +of disparity in the sphere of his peripheral contacts, he erroneously +_inferred_ differentiations in the sphere of his internal, nuclear, +organic life. From data of observation in the field of his objective +relationships he unconsciously drew analogous conclusions in regard to +the essential continuities of his common, subjective consciousness, +and so applied to the primary and inherent mode of his experience +deductions which were warranted only with respect to the mode of his +outer or objective awareness. From a difference of envelope he assumed +a difference of content. From a dissimilarity of outer and accidental +character he implied a disparity in the realm of his organic and +essential life. _Thus arose the initial confusion accruing from the +employment of objective method in terms of the subjective mode_. + +It is my position that the fallacy involved in confusing the separate +or objective with the confluent or subjective mode has become the very +warp and woof of the collective mind, as it is the biological basis +of the displacements characterizing the pathological references of +the insane. Dealing cognitively (objectively) with our affects and +affectively (subjectively) with our cognitions, we fail to envisage +what is actually before us. Where there are two individuals--oneself, +let us say, as compared with someone else--because of the dissociated +_feeling_ content with which each regards the other, our presumably +objective judgment rests upon a complete subjective misconception. +It is, of course, perfectly in order that people be demarcated +by us one from another and from ourselves by characters that are +external and accidental, and that this discrimination prevail even +when such distinguishing characteristics are of a mental nature. But +despite all such accidental differences, the original, inherent, +organic life that is the underlying essence of any two individuals is +common and identical. However different spatially, traditionally and +characterologically, there is between them the essential bond of an +inherent continuity, of an organic confluence. + +It is interesting how the folk mind betrays its need of this underlying +subjective unity in its effort to offset the objective tendencies of +differentiation. In its desire to express its feeling of amity, its +sense of mutual understanding, the habitual mind automatically employs +the phrase, “It makes no difference.” For example, if one has been +unintentionally thoughtless of another, he is at once put at ease with +the reassurance that “it makes no difference”--it being obviously felt +that difference is the essential condition against which the social +mind must preserve itself. Similarly we say, “It is no matter” or “It +is immaterial”--a material or objective basis of relationship being +evidently likewise sensed as an impediment to unity. There is the same +implication in the disparaging intimation contained in the phrase, +“He has an object in view.” And more telling still is the coalescence +of the two affiliated ideas of matter and disunity in the use of the +single stem-ending employed in the words “object” and “objection,” the +evident implication being that _object_ and _obstacle_, or _objection_, +are subjectively indistinguishable. + +It seems to me that even such seemingly trivial etymological evidences +betray the organic intolerance of differentiation within the sphere +of the subjective life. However habituated we may have become to the +subjective inferences of interval due to the objective report of our +external senses, beneath these outer and accidental demarcations there +is the persistent assertion of an underlying principle of unification +and continuity. In our own customary dissociated feeling we lose sight +of this completely, and, because of the confusion of modes within +ourselves, our judgment of others as being subjectively different from +us reaches the point of actual criticism and resentment. + +A child early illustrates this tendency to erroneous inference when he +refers to inanimate objects about him--a toy or household object--a +disposition to thwart his will. For example, he will grow angry at some +intractable plaything and strike or abuse it in peevish retaliation. +And it is the unfortunate habit of unwise parents--that is, of parents +generally--to encourage the child’s delusive tendency with some such +corroborative remark as “naughty chair” (or whatever the offending +instrument may be) and even to carry their complicity to the extent of +themselves inflicting punishment upon the object in question.[22] + +This tendency to erroneous inference in the mental sphere is the +fallacy of an objective method of psychiatry, as it is the underlying +misapprehension of the clinical approach of psychopathology +generally.[23] Indeed, this misconception is responsible for many of +the inadvertencies of reason that exist throughout our scientific +ranks. It would seem, after all, that the people who know most are +precisely those who suspect least. If the psychiatrist is asked what +is dementia præcox, his answer consists merely in recounting the signs +or symptoms “indicative” of the disorder. If he is directly confronted +with the symptoms or indications of the disorder, he will tell you that +they represent dementia præcox. With such a confusion in the mind of +the psychiatrist one may well judge the confusion existing in the minds +of people generally, and with this subjective confusion in ourselves +one gains readily an idea of the kind of instruction which the student +of psychiatry is now offered as a preparation for understanding the +psychology of insanity! It does not occur to the psychopathologist to +inquire what it is that constitutes the inherent condition whereof +the specific symptoms as well as the generic term for them are but +the pathological index. It does not occur to him to ask, in regard +to this and other disease-processes, what it is that underlies the +label as well as the appearances labelled. But unconsciously misled by +the superficial or cognitive _aspect_ of the real disharmony, he can +only shift uncertainly from sign to countersign. The reason is that, +lacking a societal encompassment of mental disorders, the psychiatrist +does not recognize that a subjective condition is to be found alone +within himself--that the condition for which, in his unconsciousness, +he is now seeking the objective account is accessible only within +the subjective processes of his own unconscious, as it is accessible +subjectively only within the unconscious of mankind at large. + +Because of this confusion within ourselves we fail to recognize that +delusion is essentially of the affective mode, that its cognitive +expression is but its secondary rationalization--a symbolic picture +presented in lieu of the corresponding affect denied. It is this +type of “reasoning” that is responsible for the tendency one sees +everywhere within philosophical circles to make dark the things that +are clear. Descartes’ dictum, “I think, therefore I am,” is the keynote +to this cognitive fallacy. The tendency, as I said, even of us who +are psychopathologists to evade the recognition of the element of +unconscious replacement here--confounding cognitive form with affective +actuality--is due, as always, to the bias of this self-same replacement +within ourselves. Being social participants in the transposition of +affect that is the societal neurosis, it cannot be otherwise. Hence +this confusion between our perceptual and our affective modes is +throughout a basic one, and as it is general in its origin it is +necessarily general in its results. + +We commonly accept the assumption that mysticism is an emanation of the +Hindoo consciousness, when in point of fact the Hindoo consciousness +is an emanation of mysticism. In truth, mysticism is a replacement +that is not more endemic to India than to England or to America. For +in mysticism there is expressed merely this underlying fallacy of +reference that is habitual to unconsciousness generally. Mysticism +is thus as symptomatic of our matter-of-fact normality as of the +most occult form of transcendentalism. Psychologically, the normal +mind is synonymous with the mystical mind. Such a replacement is, +then, no isolated eventuality signalized in some sporadic neurosis or +psychosis but, by reason of its ethnic scope, it underlies no less the +genial illusion of the collective social mind presented in the form +of amalgamated unconsciousness habitually disguised under the social +symptomatology of our so-called “normality.” Because of the automatic +and unconscious transposition of modes that characterizes our mental +processes at their present stage of development, the situation is one +that obtains among us all. In the organismic sense we are none of +us thinking clearly because we are none of us feeling clearly. This +fallacy of implied subjective differentiation is the whole meaning of +unconsciousness and the basis of all delusion. I believe that it is +upon this deep-seated fallacy of affect incident to the development in +man of consciousness or of self-awareness that rests the foundation of +the social as of the individual neurosis. + +The situation with us is indeed a serious one. Except for one’s +faith in the ultimate triumph of the forces of integration over +the disintegrative tendencies of our evolution, the mind could +only despair at the contemplation of the vicious circle of mutual +self-destructiveness in which our present attitude of unconsciousness +involves us. As difference or discrepancy in the subjective or organic +mode is, from the point of view of the continuity and cohesion of the +species, self-destructive, the maintenance of such separateness entails +for each individual a desperate loss of his sense of organic integrity. +Under the blindness of the retroactive self-defence to which his +erroneously assumed separateness inevitably drives him, he fights the +more desperately to maintain his artificial individualistic oneness, +and, the more desperately he contends, the further he defeats the +acceptance of his true organic oneness. It is the inevitable fallacy of +our disparate modes. + +Freud, then, is right when in seeking to solve the riddle of the +neuroses he addresses himself to the personality as a whole. But +he is wrong in positing a personal or preferential localization of +this central personality as he does when he places this integral +consciousness within the bounds of the separative individual. +This is to frustrate at the outset the aim of understanding the +processes of consciousness through succumbing oneself to the very +mode of unconsciousness which supposedly it is one’s purpose to +comprehend. It is an instance of one’s intentionally honest effort +toward self-understanding failing to escape the pitfall of personal +preference in its very outreaching toward the unprejudiced and true. +The separative or the personal _is_ unconsciousness. Discontinuity +and unconsciousness are conterminous. Thus we are again and again +brought back to the impasse which is our refusal to realize that the +individual, as a self-appointed, unconscious unit, is but a separate +and dissociated _part_, that only as the individual accepts his place +as an integral, confluent part in the common, societal personality does +he become a conscious, unified _whole_. + +There is, then, the need to clear our vision through adopting the +larger, more organismic viewpoint. There is the need to stand apart +from the self and view it as the element that it is within the larger +organism of mankind. From the organismic point of view the individual +is as truly an element in the larger co-ordinated total comprising the +ethnic organism of man, as the manifold cells comprising the individual +body are elements in the larger whole constituting his individual +organism. We have not as yet reckoned with the consolidated unity of +this common societal entity. We have not reckoned with its organic urge +in its influence upon human destiny. In our preoccupation with the +dynamic or individualistic conception of the libido or of individual +aggression, we have not reckoned with the genetic or organic urge that +actuates the unitary race consciousness in its societal cohesion. + +It is commonly taught by the schoolmen that self-preservation is +the first law of nature. I do not believe it. I believe that the +instinct of tribal preservation is by far the dominant urge among us. +I believe that this instinct takes precedence over the impulse of +self-maintenance to a degree that renders individual life insignificant +in comparison. In face of the reflex assertion of the impulse of +race-preservation the individual is brushed heedlessly aside. A +group of miners will without thought descend one after another into +a gas-filled chamber to rescue a fellow-workman from death and one +after another share the fate of their comrade. We all know countless +instances of this rescue-impulse as a response to the organic instinct +of race unity.[24] Nor is it confined to these more sensational +expressions of the impulse. The scientist in his laboratory toiling +daily with indefatigable energy, receiving usually a remuneration +that is not adequate to his actual needs and too often without even +the sympathetic appreciation on the part of his environment of the +significance of his quest, as it relates to the communal need he +would serve, expresses equally this same organic instinct of racial +solidarity. Yet I do not lose sight of the secret unconsciousness +and separativeness that actuate also the unconscious and adaptive +reactions of even the most earnest and gifted of these thoughtful, +patient investigators. I am not unaware of the delusions of competition +and petty jealousy existing even among the ranks of the scientific +student. I am not blinking the facts of his personal vanity, of his +pride of place and distinction. I will not deny how like a child +he is when, on the day of college commencement, he is afforded the +opportunity to parade to music in cap and gown and vari-coloured +academic emblems in order that, having assembled with his colleagues, +he may unite in praise of an archaic deity in thanksgiving for His +all-wise discrimination in having personally called him to the best of +conceivable institutions in the best of conceivable lands, etc., etc. +But, notwithstanding the obviously disparate regression observable in +these vestiges of obsolete nursery rudiments, there is yet, extending +beneath it all, the surge of an earnest, unifying purpose that embraces +the confluent needs of human growth as offered in interests pursuant of +common, social ends. + +It is the inherent urge actuating this common societal impulse, as +contrasted with the narrower motives of separateness and self, that +is envisaged in an organismic point of view. I believe that through +this organismic outlook alone we shall come to embody the meaning of +the neurosis in its true, impartial significance. In this conception +we shall be in a position to view differentiation, under whatsoever +form it manifests itself, as the fallacy of self-sufficiency, as the +delusion of separateness that it is. Whether presented in the more +restricted, individualistic expression of an hysterical hemiplegia, +for example, or under the wider social aspect, let us say, of national +militarism, we shall no longer study the mere manifest content embodied +in the obvious symptom or signal--a focal hemiplegia or a focal +militarism--but we shall address ourselves, in each instance, to the +societal personality as a whole that underlies each and that comprises +for both the organic totality of consciousness. We shall realize that +in that totality lies the responsibility for the division among its +elements expressed alike in both manifestations. We shall see that in +these two seemingly widely dissimilar instances, one expressing itself +within the individual man, the other within the nations of men, the +situation is the same. In one, differentiation is caused by a breach +in the neural continuity of the organism as symbolized by the inert, +functionally disaffected segment within the individual; in the other, +by a breach in the societal continuity of the organism represented +in the functional anomaly of manic self-assertion and segmentation +within the social body as symbolized in the separative reaction that +has lately so disorganized the Western World. However different in +outer form, in both reactions there is alike expressed an unconscious +assertion of autocracy or the will-to-self as opposed to the confluent +life of the organism as a whole. And it is only as we view these +expressions, one individual, the other social, as identical reactions +and study them in an identical spirit of interpretation, that we shall +recognize the essential principle of our biology exemplified in them, +namely, the inherent inviolability of the confluent life of the +organism, both individual and societal. Only in this organismic outlook +shall we come to understand the true significance of the neuroses in +the sense of really encompassing the disharmony embodied in them. + +_It should be clearly understood that in the view of this thesis it is +not a question of discrimination between the social and the individual, +but between the societal and the individual societally conceived on +the one hand and the social and the individual individualistically +conceived on the other._ + +From this position we have yet to encompass clearly the neurotic +disharmony, individual or societal. We have yet to encompass in its +real significance what is the most blatant expression of its societal +embodiment. Because of our dissociative, individualistic outlook we +have yet to consider the psychopathology underlying the phenomenon +of war. We have failed to interpret its psychology in the light of +the mental attitude that underlies and actuates it. We do not realize +that the settlement of war is properly the concern not of politics +but of psychiatry. Here, as elsewhere, we shrink from unearthing the +actuality of the interred affect, preferring to preserve its image +in the fanciful balm of our own illusions. Our horror of war is thus +centred solely upon the façade it presents and not upon the inherent +significance of war. Accordingly, our concern is merely to alter +the aspect, the cognitive form, the mental picture, and, under this +altered semblance due to our bidimensional alternation, we still retain +the same affect submerged in the unconscious grievance of national +separateness and antagonism. There is here the subjective fallacy of +the transposed affect and the ancient metonymy of all unconsciousness. + +A conspicuous symptom of our societal pathology is the subjective +illusion underlying the latent “belief” that diplomatic overtures +between nations are competent to cope with the essential disharmonies +which, from time to time, tend to issue in the social symptomatology +of war, but which are, in reality, due to causative factors deeply +rooted in the psychopathology of man’s societal disunity. While not +questioning the outstanding objective advantage of such superficial +covenants as may secure to the social confederacies of nations at least +a temporary cessation of their outward expressions of hostility, these +surface amenities touch in no way the essential disorder. The real +cause lies deeper and the real remedy must penetrate deeper. For the +delusion of difference between nations, like the delusion of difference +between individuals, is but the objective reflection of the subjective +differentiation existing within the nation itself--a differentiation +that is comparable to this same objective reflection existing within +the individual as a subjective component of the national organism. + +Just as the conflict underlying the neurosis of the individual is truly +understood only through an analysis in the individual of the vicarious +reactions that underlie it, so an understanding of the conflict +underlying the neurosis that is societal may be attained only through +an appreciation of the substitutive reactions of the group-mind as +disclosed through an analysis of the group-consciousness. + +Seen clearly, man’s restlessness to-day is, after all, the restlessness +of intercepted growth. The tremors we are experiencing at this moment +throughout the political and economic world undoubtedly owe their +impulse to the awakening of a new order of consciousness. In the +seething undercurrent of discontent throughout the social organism at +the present time there is seen the symptom of a repression that is no +longer reconcilable with the growing consciousness of that organism. As +in the individual personality a condition of repression that has become +too long pent must inevitably break forth in an ultimate overthrow of +reason, so in the collection of individuals comprising the societal +organism the ultimate response to a too long sustained repression can +issue only in a correspondingly overwhelming disruption of the social +personality. + +In what has just been experienced sociologically as the World War, man +is afforded an organic warning of the impending disintegration which +lurks unseen beneath the surface crust of immediate and temporary +social adaptations within the depths of his unconscious. In that +far-sweeping manifestation there are felt the first rumblings of a +sociological disturbance that bodes the utter destruction of our old +order of habituations, and in that desperate expression of man’s +social unconscious there is evident the need in which he stands of an +earnest and far-searching self-analysis. For as overwhelming as is the +catastrophe of the present war--and present it is--this catastrophe is +but the detonator preceding the crash that is to come--a crash that +has been gathering momentum within the unconscious of the race through +centuries past and that will descend upon the world with inevitable +fatality in the absence of a more societal and inclusive reckoning +among us. + +Without the recognition of the meaning of our disaffection, +sociological as well as personal, without a more conscious realization +of the social involvement of our personal separateness, it will not +be possible for the creative forces resident within the personality +of man to come into their natural fruition. But thus to encompass +the organic disaffection that actuates the neurosis is _to include +it within ourselves_. Thus to realize discrepancy is to make real +within ourselves, where they exist in all their completeness, the +division and antagonism of the disparate consciousness, be its +countenance individualistic or social. Such a realization--such a +comprehension of life in its manifold unconsciousness is a subjective, +organic experience. The process is one that entails the slow divorce +of self from the long habituations of our narrow domesticities, +personal, familial and national. It involves the gradual sundering +of the artificial sophistications of self-consciousness with which +our childhood has been enclosed and in which were early laid the +foundations of the dissociation that has now become automatic in the +overwhelming impetus of its social involvement. The essence, then, +of an understanding that truly encompasses the neurosis, consists +in the recognition of our collective unconsciousness through the +realization of a disaffection within and among ourselves as elements of +a dissociated body-social. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE ORGANIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS + + +In submitting a thesis which takes the position that the significance +of the neurosis is its societal implication, and which lays the burden +of its adjustment upon the societal mind at large, I fully realize +that I am offering no welcome thought. The illusion of the separate +self as all-sufficient and omnipotent is too obdurate not to regard +with suspicion any attempt to dislodge it. Whatever the postulate, +belief or argument, there lurks beneath it, in the mind of each of us, +the unconscious determination to preserve intact the secret illusion +of his own separateness. As long, however, as this affective fallacy +underlies the reactions of our collective mentality, all efforts toward +a reconstruction of society upon grounds of a more conscious and adult +adaptation are futile. The adaptive and compensatory nature of the +normal or collective mind occasions dissociation in all the activities +arising out of it. With our mental outlook based upon illusion, our +reactions are illusory. No matter how imposing in their manifest +content, they are fundamentally spurious and undependable. For having +been organically dissociated through the interdiction of the parent, +normality is necessarily self-conscious and vicarious. This accounts +for the ease with which the normal mind resorts to the replacements +represented in mysticism. In the manifold expressions of mysticism +the social mind finds its ulterior placations. This accounts for the +habitual self-propitiations underlying its cherished superstitions +and “beliefs,” and explains the whole meaning of the man-made +immanence represented in the vicariously projected image of invincible +omnipotence we call “God”--an image with which we childishly seek +to ally ourselves in order to sustain our impotent separateness. Men +are tenacious of the substitution that is their “God” in a degree far +beyond their suspecting. It is in vain that they pretend to throw Him +off in the mere insolence of their reactionary “disbelief.” In their +very challenge is His sovereignty reaffirmed. For wherever there is +dogmatism there is doubt, and beliefs that are denied are unconsciously +not less fixed and ineradicable than beliefs that are affirmed. As +long as there is unconsciousness so long will men be a prey to its +tyrannical alternatives. Though they break or kiss the rod, it is upon +them still. + +Man will be slow to relinquish this symbol of God popularly employed +by him as a defence against the free, unsponsored growth of his own +spirit. It is a symbol, as are all symbols of the unconscious, that +has been erected by us as a protection for the disparate self against +the confluent life of our common organism. Indeed it is precisely in +this collective illusion that is man’s most desperate recourse. Yet, +in our very extremity and in the very tenacity with which we cling to +this illusion, there is to be seen, as always, a symbol for which the +only warrant is the profound reality that underlies it. In so far as +the organically true is denied, there inevitably ensues the vicariously +false, and the insistence of the substituted equivalent is invariably +the more intense in proportion to the urge of the organic need +withheld. It is organic law. + +Recalling the past, it is interesting to consider how conscientiously +we have carried the biological method of research into the various +objective fields of scientific inquiry. Yet, in regard to the +subjective sphere wherein our own reality resides, we have persistently +befuddled our perceptions through an unconscious adherence to the +childish tenets of fear and superstition, instead of studying the +phylogenetic account of our inherent mental descent in the spirit +of objective disinterestedness. For, unconsciously yielding +habitual perceptions the supreme place even in the laboratories of +consciousness, as embodied in the researches of analysis itself, we +have continued to preserve the unconscious image of self habitually +disguised under our personal interpretation of God. Restoring the +form of the idol from time to time by covering the rent with a +temporarily stouter fabric whenever the straw has appeared, we have +continued to maintain the self-flattering programme of our vicarious +and self-protected image-worship. Men apparently do not yet begin +to recognize that the socially consolidated aberration constituting +their image of God is an illusion that is identical with the +individual expression long recognized by psychiatry under the clinical +characterization of “ideas of reference.” Still seriously discoursing +of the symbol called “God,” they assume that their _image_ possesses an +actuality apart from their own imagining. + +More significant still, however, is the fact that psychiatry too has +its God. Objectively defining ideas of reference in others, we have +failed to reckon with the subjective presence of this same replacement +within ourselves. While we psychiatrists would carefully note the +tendency to transposed affects within the arbitrary systems of the +insane, we have wholly missed count of this same tendency within our +own autocratic system. Among psychiatrists the favoured Deity is +Dementia Præcox. The symptoms, reactions and prognostications assigned +to the image implied in this arbitrary superscription attain with us +to a quite endless category. And such is the subtlety with which the +insidious tendency to the vicarious (affective displacement) secretly +insinuates itself even into the courts of the elect, that individual +personality is again and again led into the unsuspected trap that is +our habitual confusion of the symbol for the reality that underlies it. + +In truth “Dementia Præcox,” the disease, is but the symbolic +projection of dementia præcox, the actuality, ever resident in our +generic unconsciousness. As it is the primary state of the infant +psyche, its rudiment is preserved in the unconscious of us all.[25] +The understanding and acceptance of this biological substrate of +consciousness within oneself offers the only condition of its solution. +In this subjective course lies the whole significance of a really +organic analysis. To hold a theoretical, objective attitude toward the +insanities is to remain under the thrall of the social unconscious. To +preserve our own repressions by attempting to deny this preconscious +factor within ourselves is merely to perpetuate this regressive trend +under its present symbolic guise. Theoretical substitution is the +big-stick of normality of which an objective analysis is the butt-end. +To maintain the normal, psychiatric, adaptive outlook is to be +repressed, vicarious, theoretical. And by our attitude of aloofness we +merely preserve in unconscious form in ourselves the symptom-complex +we stigmatize as dementia præcox in others. But we cannot alleviate a +mental disorder from which we stand apart. It is only as we accept the +testimony of its rudimentary presence within our own consciousness that +its significance in the consciousness of others may become clear. + +Of dementia præcox, the disease, psychiatry is in fact more a cause +than a cure, just as mothers and doctors who habitually hold to a +mental attitude of personal ministration and concern, however handy +they may be in untoward emergency, are more an occasion than a remedy +for disease in general. And so the real disorder, after all, is not +dementia præcox but psychiatry. When the psychiatrist will have come +to understand dementia præcox or the preconscious within himself, +this objective figment of his own disordered consciousness will +spontaneously vanish. + +To-day, the symbol of the social mind that is called “God”--the symbol +under which man has worshipped himself so confidingly throughout the +ages--is gradually losing its symbolic adequacy and, as is typical when +the foothold of man’s unconscious threatens to be dislodged, he is +hastily replacing his shattered idol with an image that bears a new, +a subtler and a more plausible disguise. Even in schools representing +developments of the Freudian psychology and presumably devoted to +impartial analytic inquiry into man’s unconscious, we find this same +unconscious self-worship shifted from the broken image of “God” to a +merely revarnished symbol set up upon the same altar and called by +the newer name of “Love.” Though the form is altered, the substance +remains the same. It is again man’s self-love projected into the +spurious objective that best lends to it the flattering security of the +seemingly real. + +I do not say that there is not in life an essential unity or love. I do +not say that there is not for man an answer to the need he feels in his +relentless but misguided pursuit of such an underlying reality. What I +do say is that the unity he may find is the substance whereof the unity +he is seeking is but the shadow; that in his unconsciousness he has +not yet begun to seek the reality that is the need of his essential, +organic life; and that, failing the reality which resides alone in +the confluent, unified life of our common consciousness, he has +pursued the temporary and personal satisfactions whereof such fanciful +image-projections as “God” and “Love” are but hysterical replacements. + +What is significant is the fact that, under however subtle a guise +he may clothe it, every individual in the great confederacy of +“normality” entertains and is actuated by some form of “belief”--a +“belief” either in “God” or “Love” or in some other concept that is +the emotional equivalent of these more general fabrications of our +collective unconscious.[26] But in the image fashioned of belief +there is seen the inevitable process of compensation vicariously +exacted of us by virtue of our denying the fulfilment of the organic +reality of life. The dissociated mind can of necessity observe only +dissociatively. In its repudiation of reality it resorts perforce to +vicarious images of reality. It is for this reason that the normal mind +is the mystical mind. In its organic disunity it cannot be otherwise. +Although it seek under manifold signs and symptoms to conceal the +tell-tale of its stigma, its blight is betrayed by countless evidences +of its dissociation from the societal or organic personality. And it +is not in the nature of the _object_ that consists the element of +the mystical in our human pathology but in the _mode_ in which the +object is regarded.[27] The objects of man’s mystical devotion offer +an infinitely varied range. They may readily be presented by a host +of images expressing the widest discrepancy in manifest content--for +example, one’s conception of the cosmogony, “the true artist,” a +scientific discovery, the “error of mortal mind,” one’s exchequer, +“to-morrow” with its ever receding illusion of postponement, or a +cult of mental healing with texts setting forth the ultimate solution +of life; or, on the other hand, an autogenic sexual fetish, as one’s +body, the unreal image one causes to stand for one’s mother, a +favourite offspring, “God,” or “the superlative woman.” Among certain +people a very popular vehicle for the mystical mode is one’s “voice.” +To-day, too, there are people who talk in subdued whispers of the +spiritual virtues of raw foods and who dilate by the hour upon the +merits of lettuce--as though it were the millennium. Then there is +to be noted the high place in mystical sanctuaries which the family +escutcheon occupies among its votaries. There are people extant (I +confess I am one of them) who still tend to entertain the belief that +a reality underlies the social concept “good family.” And--comedy of +comedies!--such is the subtlety with which the element of the mystical +or of vicarious self-worship evades the reality of consciousness that +the very “sincerity” with which one comes to “relinquish” such objects +of infantile illusion may itself actually rank among the spurious +images of this identical category! Seriously fancying herself well +on toward the goal of her analysis, if not quite arrived, one of my +patients remarked to another: “I want nothing.” It was spoken very +gently, almost imperceptibly, so in keeping was the rendering with the +spirit of its author. But it is evident that at least she wanted to +be regarded as _not_ wanting anything, else she would have felt no +occasion to remark her detached state. But how exquisite the subtlety +here! Another says: “I want to get rid of _things_, that I may be +more free.” Getting rid of things or husbanding them may equally +fall within the mystical or dissociated mode. As for one’s “freedom” +there is no object, unless it be one’s “truth,” that constitutes a +more popular idol under which to hide the mystical fetish of one’s +secret self-worship. But whatever the vehicle, that which gives +to it the hall-mark of the mystical is its quality of an inner, +esoteric experience possessing an indefinable, transcendental meaning +revealed alone to the peculiarly favoured possessor. Observe here the +characteristic element of distinction, the factor of favouritism, the +inseparable paranoid element of special delegation. For the object, +after all, as every object of the unconscious, is no other than the +self or the parent from the point of view respectively of the parent +or the self, and our civilized world of boasted normality becomes upon +investigation but a nursery of ungrown childhood, filled to overflowing +with bogus Gods and goblins! + +As the child lost in the street anxiously scans the face of every +passer-by in the hope of discovering the features of his mother, so +the grown-up, who has lost the quiet continuity of his organic life +and flounders amid a world of dissociative habituations and ulterior +ends, eagerly searches the countenances of all whom he meets, in the +driving urge to incarnate anew the cherished image of _his_ mother. +The difference is that everywhere and in every one he finds her. And +not his mother alone but his father, his brothers, his sisters, uncles +and aunts, and with them (such is the magic of unconsciousness) the +whole array of traditional furnishings reminiscent of his childhood’s +scenery. For as his images are born of his fancy, his fancy may create +them at his will. Thus the world at large is but the family at large +and the social _genre_ but the mother. + +In contemplating this identification of “the world” with one’s mother +we come to sense more intimately the real significance in normality +of the widely featured phenomenon of suggestibility. As suggestion is +the affirmative expression whereof repression is the negative form, +suggestion, like repression, is but the operation upon the individual +of the will of the consensus, of which we all, of course, are the only +too willing dupes. For just as our succumbing to repression is the +individual’s rejection of the consensual mind, so our succumbing to +suggestion is the individual’s acquiescence in the consensual mind. So +that, whether the impetus be the factor of suggestion or of repression, +whether it be offered in the positive inducements to “good” behaviour +or in the negative disparagements to “bad” behaviour, in either case +one is but fancifully subjecting himself to the domination of the +parental will in the expanded guise of the consensual unconscious. +Contrary to popular belief, suggestion is no clinical specific; it is a +social pandemic. The doctor does not wield it, it wields him. So that +as suggestion and repression, or the will of normality (normality means +“accepted rule” by the way), are but the will of the parent, it is the +will of the parent that is really the “power” of suggestion. And as +the influence exerted by suggestion, like the influence exerted by the +parent, is based upon the mental precept of good and bad, suggestion +like repression is necessarily separative in its effect. For its +self-reflective tendency necessarily induces in us the inversion of +self-worship. Again it is the discontinuity of the dissociative self in +the separatism of its own unconsciously induced image. + +When we come to contemplate this childishness in ourselves, we are +naturally loath to admit that all our beliefs are but make-beliefs, and +our privately cherished convictions of certitude but the compensatory +assumptions of mysticism and dissociation. To the man who entertains +the inner conviction that the girl of his heart is just the one +woman in the whole world for him, it were futile to point out his +inconsistency by recalling an identical “belief” maintained no less +stoutly by him a few months ago in regard to his last year’s beloved. +It were as futile as to attempt to expound to a paranoiac, who has +proof that he is descended from Napoleon, that he is the unconscious +prey to unwarranted ideas of grandeur. Both of these esoterists will +only look you blandly in the face and explain to you compassionately +that “you just do not understand.” + +Truly, of the tissue of illusion is the fabric of unconsciousness, +whether presented under the form of hysteria, mysticism or suggestion. +All being alike dissociative, all are alike inaccessible to the +arguments of an organic logic. And more and more it seems to me that +when we who are psychoanalysts consider _our_ unconscious preoccupation +with the concept, the symbolic equivalent, the theory of consciousness +as a substitute for the daily lived actuality of man’s organic life +in its totality, there is due the admission that psychoanalysis too, +as it now exists among us, is itself no less an equivocation, a +“belief,” an hysterical replacement for the common, organic confluence +of our societal life. Indeed, precisely because of its high claim as +representing the court of ultimate conscious appeal, psychoanalysis +requires to be brought to book more than any other of the manifold +dissociative reactions coming under an indictment that envisages our +collective, social unconscious. We who are psychoanalysts talk of the +joyous enfranchisement of consciousness and growth as compared with +the palsying limitations of unconsciousness and regression, when all +the while we neglect to impeach the unconsciousness of our own lives +and the narrow interests of personalism and self that govern them. +Because in our own normality we are ourselves so comfortably ensconced +in the social security of the collective unconscious about us, we fail +to recognize our own embroilment in it. And so, in the impregnable +solidarity of mere mass supremacy, our own assumed validity passes +unchallenged by us. + +To cite an example that is closest to me: I have repeatedly held +forth to patients concerning the potential joy inherent in adult love +regarded in the light of the unifying principle of life, as though +I myself participated in its subjective actuality in the simple, +undifferentiated mode of my own daily living, when in fact I was only +unconsciously exploiting the vicarious concept or symbol or theory of +love, such as can only stand in the way of and obstruct the organic +significance of love in its actuality. Thus, in spite of ourselves, +unconsciousness makes disparate elements of us all. Indeed, it may +more truly be said “because of ourselves” rather than “in spite of +ourselves,” for, in an organic sense, self (the separative entity) and +disparity are synonymous. + +But, however serious a situation that involves a world-wide neurosis, +we may not take it tragically. The tragedy of it, after all, is only +the unconsciousness of it. When we shall have truly analyzed the drama +of the unconscious which now we but enact, there can be no tragedy, for +the fabric of tragedy is woven merely of the elements of human “fate” +in its embodiment of the unconscious. There is the need, however, to +view our situation thoughtfully. Consciousness, in the sense of a true +comprehension of life, will come into its own only when we have learned +to look upon the humiliating spectacle of our dissociated selves with +what enforced forbearance we can temporarily command. Our present +attitude will continue to endure until more and more the disheartening +sense of our disparities becomes accepted by us in an outlook that, +having grown inclusive, has become our automatic and habitual mode. + +Paradoxical as it may sound, consciousness has turned the heads of us +all! As it has turned them in a direction that has been inward upon +our own image, each of us, as a result, has built of his individual +organism a little separate entity unto himself--an entity which in +its organic dissociation from life as a whole is necessarily wrought +of a spurious fibre. Developmentally man is the biological snob +_par excellence_. Scorning the slower accretions of growth that +can alone imbue him with true biological culture, in his effort “to +attain” he has attempted to pass too hastily from his humble category +of vertebrate to the more socially elevated plane of “cerebrate.” +The result is that what he assumes to be cerebration is really but +a fictitious brain-state that has become entirely withdrawn from +continuity with his organic life. So that from the point of view of +consciousness in the sense of an integral mental life--the especial +mark whereby we claim prerogative over all other species--man is, by +this very token, the least integrant of them all! + +And yet, when we think of it, our predicament is really no shame to +us. Consciousness is, after all, a very recent asset among us. That +we should treasure it narrowly, personally, is but the inevitable +entail of its slow, laborious evolution. It is as if, in our societal +separativeness, our race had grown grey before its childhood had +begun and we were now out of breath keeping pace with ourselves. For +it is only our separativeness that has prematurely burdened us with +the crushing weight of self-imposed responsibilities such as are +the concomitant toll of our hallucinated self-sufficiency. Unlike +the adult, the spontaneous joy of children is their whole-hearted +participation in the free, impersonal radiation of life. Unlike +ourselves, their personal importance has not yet defeated their +impersonal significance. As yet they do not live under the curse of +a dogma of conduct. Theirs is no creed of behaviour that is of one +cloth with an enforced pretence of “goodness.” Their lives are not +a daily concession to fanciful needs of self-protection against an +arbitrarily predicated world of “evil.” Adult vigilance, however, early +inculcates its delusion of separateness--of a self to be defended +against other selves--and its dissociative influence is slowly imparted +to the confiding mind of childhood. In a world of dissociation this +universal suggestion acts with powerful effectiveness, and the child +of yesterday, having once been inducted into the general guild of +secret mistrust and compensatory behaviourism and grown to parenthood, +may be safely trusted to pass on without question the secret code of +differentiation, self-distinction and disharmony to the offspring by +which he is in turn succeeded. + +When God called Adam and took him to task for going about naked (for +eating of “the tree of the knowledge of good and evil”), asking him +if he felt no sense of shame, Adam’s prompt response was to betake +himself to the bushes overcome with embarrassment. Whereas obviously +the logical response on Adam’s part would have been: “By no means. I +am the outcome of your own handicraft and if there is any flaw in the +product it is not for me to feel chagrin.” As a matter of fact, Adam +was in nowise different from the rest of us. But there he crouched, +submissively answerable for the work of his creator and there he has +got us all crouching ever since! God, of course, employed the familiar +parental recourse and intimidated Adam, calling from afar to him in +his place of hiding. As was calculated, the strategy was completely +effective and promptly brought Adam to his knees. All of which legend +is but the allegorical statement of the simple organic truth that shame +has first to be artificially induced in us before it can be experienced +by us. Division or shame having been put into us, of course we feel +division or shame.[28] + +If we have become aware of ourselves and of our unprotectedness, it has +been quite in the order of our evolution. But by the same process it is +now high time for us to realize that there is no need of protection, +and accordingly to come out of hiding and recognize that our fear and +our self-protection, being alike identical with the myth of Adam’s +indiscretion, are alike induced in us by the identical process of an +external word of repression or command thrust in upon an essentially +inherent and consonant mode. + +In the absence of our realization of this blunder into which we have +fallen, from generation to generation we unconsciously repudiate the +natural unity of our common life in favour of a life prompted by +sophistication and disparity. Ourselves begotten of alien affects, +our feelings in turn breed diverse cross-strains which can issue +only in equally hybrid reactions. We refuse to see that the “evil,” +alike with the “good,” is naught but the delusion of separateness +extraneously induced in us through our artificial self-consciousness. +This subjective division within us is the essential meaning of +the all-pervasive bogey of our so-called incest-awe. As I see it, +incest-awe is the organic inconsistency of this division within the +organically indivisible sphere of man’s essential feeling. Normality +is unconsciously under its thrall because, through its organic +disunity, normality has unconsciously placed itself under its sentence. +Psychically normality _is_ incestuous and hence its awe. The degree +of its awe or guilt-revulsion is precisely the measure of its psychic +inbreeding. The more organically unwelcome the infolding, the more +organically outraged or neurotic the personality, and, accordingly, +the greater the awe or feeling-conflict resultant upon our unconscious +intimations of organic “guilt.” Our sexual self-consciousness is the +perennial fig-leaf of early tradition foliating anew in our critical +Twentieth Century. It is the division of the self of behaviour from +the self of spontaneity, of the self as disparate entity from the self +as an integral element in our common organic life that is the meaning +of the incest-awe as of the neurosis, in its social as well as in its +individual expression. + +When once we have assumed the broader organismic outlook, we shall see +that, beyond a more extended compass of vision, there is really nothing +of an innovation in this societal mode of envisagement. In respect to +all systems coming under scientific observation, we have habitually +entertained a biological conception of the relation _inter se_ of the +elements to their aggregate that is identical with the conception +offered in the present theme. Hitherto the area generally considered +has merely been circumscribed within narrower limits, that is all. When +we shall have learned to move aside from our personal involvement in +it, we shall see presented an organic phenomenon which upon examination +consists of a dissociation within the societal organism. We shall see +that this dissociation involves disharmony in respect to the mental +and social relationships of the unit-elements or individuals that +comprise ourselves and constitute _inter se_ the larger biological +aggregate of our common consciousness. Maintaining our impersonal +angle of envisagement and turning to the idea of the sum of the more +circumscribed biological aggregate constituting the individual, we see +that this dissociation is, in reality, identical with the dissociation +within the individual organism that manifests itself as impairment of +harmony in respect to the physiological or functional relationships of +the units or cells comprising _its_ ultimate elements. When we lose +sight of our place as common elements within the organic aggregate of +mankind--as in the absence of an encompassing organismic point of view +we must--we tend to separate arbitrarily the biological continuity of +the two spheres, the individual and the societal. Because of our own +subjective involvement we fail to recognize that the societal sphere, +in the more inclusive sense, is the aggregate whereof the individual is +the unit, precisely as in the more circumscribed physiological view +the body cells are the units of which the individual is himself the +aggregate. Between the two spheres there is a progressive continuity. +There is no interruption of the organic transition from one to the +other. For the psychological or the societal and the functional or +physiological are continuous.[29] + +It is evident that every bodily lesion consists of a _separation_ among +the elements of the impaired part. If among the cells of the liver, +for example, there is produced the condition of disharmony or disease +represented by a state of inflammation, there inevitably occurs some +partition, some breach in or interruption of their concerted function, +or of the function of the organism as a whole. The unfailing signal +wherewith the individual is apprised of the destructive process is the +reaction subjectively registered as _pain_ or a sympathetic awareness +on the part of the aggregate organism of the disordered condition of +these elements constituting a part of itself. Such a disordered state +or lesion being thus reported to the central system, as it were, the +immediate response is an outcry of pain and a prompt recourse to +remedial aids. The organism as a whole, experiencing pain, reflexly +demands relief, for the reason that impairment of the organism in +any of its parts is a menace to its integrity as a whole. That is to +say, when any one of us as an aggregate experiences pain in any part +whereof he is the whole--when he experiences some local inflammation or +separation within the elements of a part or organ within himself, he +promptly directs his efforts toward its alleviation. But in the organic +whole comprising the societal aggregate whereof he, as an individual, +is the contributive element or part, the situation, as we shall in a +moment see, is wholly altered. As related parts or elements within the +larger organic aggregate, it is we ourselves who are the separative +process--the circumscribed area of inflammation. + +It is essential to bear in mind that the organic pathology of this +biological lesion or separation that is the individual’s dissociation +from the inherent continuum of his organic, racial congeners is a +condition that is conterminous with the individual’s division or +separation within himself. For organically there is no difference +between himself and his congeners. Thus in respect to this societal +lesion the individual element bears a twofold relation, an intrinsic +and an extrinsic one. The element as an _individual_ within the +societal organism on the one hand is the _source_ of the lesion. And +on the other hand, as an organic _participant_ in the confluent race +consciousness, this same element or individual _experiences_ the lesion +as a menace to the integrity of his own organic consciousness or of his +confluent life as a whole. The individual is thus the contained and the +container, the stimulus and the response. Herein lies the unassuageable +poignancy of the neurotic conflict. It is a conflict between the part +and the whole, wherein the individual is the embodiment of both. +Since he is unconsciously the part while inherently the whole, his +conflict is one that is concomitantly individual and societal, for the +individual and the societal factors are organically inseparable. + +Just as in a comprehensive inquiry into the structural development +of the organism it is necessary to consider not only the biological +characters occurring in the development of the individual but also the +corresponding characters observable in the development of the race, +so in an organismic study of consciousness it is necessary that we +keep in mind the essential parallelism between its individual and its +phyletic trends. Analogous to what we know of the facts of comparative +biology in the structural sphere, the organic consciousness of man, +which we see expressed ontogenetically in the essential continuity +of the individual personality, finds its phylogenetic expression in +the inherent continuity of the societal organism. Accordingly, as the +miscarriage of this primary continuity of consciousness is to be seen +in the dissociation of the single personality, so the miscarriage +of man’s societal personality is correspondingly to be seen in the +social dissociation of the collective unconscious. After all, the +consciousness of the individual is but the consciousness of the race +in miniature, and the personal dissociation within the individual is, +therefore, only the miniature expression of the social dissociation +within our societal consciousness. In other words, as one’s individual +organism is a replica of the social organism, the dissociation of +the social mind is identical with the dissociation of the individual +mind. For, since the societal and the individual factors of evolution +are identical in their course, the social and the personal factors +of dissociation are also identical. Hence the dissociation that is +personal is necessarily social; the neurosis we study in the individual +is necessarily concomitant to a neurosis within the wider social polity. + +Let us now compare the difference in the subjective reaction of the +individual according as he is himself the aggregate experiencing pain +in any part of _his_ organism, or as he is himself a part unconsciously +contributing to the lesion within the organism comprising our common +societal aggregate. As central system presiding over his own +individual organism we have seen his prompt recourse to agencies of +relief at the least trespass upon the integrity of any organ or part +within himself. But observe the total reversal of reaction when he +himself, as a single individual element, is the pathological instance +threatening the integrity of the organic aggregate that encompasses +him as a single individual element. Mark how he struggles _in blind +collusion with_ the disruptive process he unconsciously or separatively +embodies. Such is precisely the behaviour of the neurotic individual +and such is precisely the meaning of his “resistance.” For in such a +situation he seeks recourse to every conceivable avenue of evasion and +of symbolic disguise in order to escape the protests of pain in the +central inherent system resident in the common societal consciousness +and experienced by him in its continuum with his own essential life. In +the spirit of his behaviour he is exactly comparable to an individual +who, on succumbing to a local disease-process, would seek to stifle +the organism’s premonitory pain in order to aid the toxic invasion +and further its ravage within his own tissues! Such, however, in our +unconsciousness is precisely the case with each of us. Each of us, in +his misguided, ingrown self-interest, constituting in himself the pain +and impairment that operate within and against the organic societal +aggregate, contends in his self-protection not against but in favour +of the disease-process which, from the point of view of the societal, +organic life, is his own destruction. He seeks not its interruption but +its continuance, not its remedy but its aggravation, precisely as the +inflammatory process in any organ within the body seeks to maintain its +separateness and prolong to a fatal issue the destructive process in +the individual. + +It is characteristic of separateness that it fights desperately for +its own separative ends. Separateness, being destructive, must operate +destructively. It would even seem that this self-destructive tendency +on the part of the isolated component is the penalty imposed by the +societal organism to safeguard itself against the tendency--among any +of its elements as parts--to infringe upon the integral sum of elements +constituting the organic whole. But if the separateness of the part +is its own destruction, concomitantly the confluence of the whole is +its own conservation. If the neurotic regarded individually, or as the +embodiment within himself of a societal lesion, is an expression of +separatism and pathology, the neurotic viewed organically, or as the +embodiment within himself of the societal continuum, is no less an +expression of confluence and health. If, in the first instance, he is +himself the disorder that is his own separatism and unconsciousness, +in the second he is the integration that is his own confluence and +consciousness. It is this constructive aspect of the neuroses of +which we have not yet taken account and of which we may take due +cognizance only upon the basis of a wider, organismic interpretation of +these disorders of the personality. It is the understanding of these +disharmonies in the light of their congeneric significance, and their +encompassment as morbid processes operating within the separative +individual organism to obstruct the function of the societal organism +as a whole, that is the significance of an organismic formulation of +the neuroses. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +ORGANIC ANALYSIS OF REPRESSION AND OF THE FACTOR OF RESISTANCE FROM THE +SOCIETAL VIEWPOINT + + +The psychic phenomenon with which Freud was confronted in the very +inception of his work was the element of repression and its concomitant +reflection in the objective reaction of resistance. The resolution of +this factor of repression or resistance Freud came very early to regard +as the essential problem of psychoanalysis. But, as we have seen, +Freud’s conception of resistance was inevitably coloured by his own +individualistic monocular, and in consequence it was not possible for +him to view the neurosis of the individual in its societal implication. +Lacking a societal basis of interpretation, he could not see that +the resentment toward one’s fellows comprising the individual’s +social resistance is merely the individual’s objective evasion of the +subjective disaffection within his own essential organism. Mistaking +the mere symbol of the individual for the inherent continuity of +individuality, Freud could not see the biology of resistance as the +breach it is in the individual’s continuity with life as a confluent, +organic whole. + +From an organismic viewpoint, the individual’s reaction of resistance +or his effort to project upon his fellows the pain of his subjective +curtailment and repression only illustrates further the essential +_sociology of the neuroses_. In the fuller light of a societal basis +it may be seen that the mechanism of social replacement embodying +resistance is purely symptomatic of the individual’s constraint +toward a surface rationalization of his own inherent grievance. His +grudge is not personal, it is societal. It is not logical, it is +biological. Residing wholly within himself, it involves only himself. +His tendency to _refer_ his grievance to the attitude of others is +due to his own separative habituation and to his consequent effort to +escape the _seeming_ isolation of his biological responsibility toward +it. And so the problem of resistance is central, not peripheral. Like +its close kin charity (if not its very self in the garb of religious +sentimentalism) the relinquishment of resistance is a benison that +begins at home. It may not be inculcated through theoretical precept +nor through the subtlest refinement of a technique based upon a +system of analysis, but only through our actual participation in the +societal confluence that is its underlying biology. Our very theory +of resistance as an impediment to life is itself a resistance. For no +formulation of life can function as life. It is only life itself in +its organic confluence that may abrogate the separateness that is the +essence of resistance. Whether in the societal or in the individual +sphere, whether in the sphere we arbitrarily designate as psychological +(mental) or in that we call functional (physiological), the question +of health or disease hangs solely upon the issue as to whether the +element--cell or system--functions integrally or separatively, +congruently or resistantly. Under the limitations of a dissociative +reaction toward the confluent, societal organism as a whole, such +as constitutes our present socially affective mode, the individual +organism cannot but react disaffectedly, and hence further the +disruptive tendencies that breed disharmony within its own life. The +dissociated organism can function only dissociatively. + +If it is true of the world at large that each is against each, +if throughout the tissue of the societal fabric every element is +maintaining its own separateness against every other element, where +may there be found a way to restore the condition of societal +confluence that is the basis of man’s inherent life? Clearly, if this +separation from the organic life takes place within the individual, its +reconcilement must take place also within the individual. As, however, +the individual is but a replica of every other individual--an organic +world in miniature in the complex of sensations and emotions comprising +his own personality--the reconcilement of the organic conflict within +himself, or his own unification of personality as an integral part +of the continuum uniting the whole, is also the reconcilement and +the unification of himself with his congeners. Naturally, such a +reconcilement cannot be the achievement of the individual as a separate +social unit, but only of the individual as an integral element in the +organic unit of our common life. + +It is just here that there needs to be unearthed the essential fallacy +of Freud, as of us all--a fallacy that has been the inevitable outcome +of a habit of reasoning that is inseparable from the disparate +social unit and its dissociative mode. Precluding within himself a +participation in the organic societal mode, it was, of course, not +possible that Freud should take account, in any inclusive organismic +sense, of causative elements lying within this mode. Reasoning from +the biased premises of an unconscious separatism, he could reckon only +with elements falling within the scope of the separative mode, that is, +he could only reckon personally--I mean in the sense of dissociatively +rather than integrally. + +In Freud’s conception of the neurosis the condition embodies a +repression of sexuality. That is, sexuality, regarded as synonymous +with the sexual instinct, is posited as the primary factor of which +the attitude of repression is a subsequent issue. In other words, +sexuality or the “libido,” as commonly understood (the separative +will-to-self[30] in the view of the present interpretation) is in +Freud’s formulation the basic, antecedent element, and repression +(whatever the occasion--lack of adequate outlet perhaps or the +inadmissible character of the sexual impulse) is the organism’s +automatic recourse operating as a result. So that Freud assigns the +cause of a mental disharmony to the subject’s repressed sexuality, +and the basis of his analytic procedure has been very logically the +endeavour to remedy the situation through an adjustment of the sexual +life. Accordingly, it is the essence of the individualistic position +of Freud that the neurosis is represented in life’s repression of +sexuality; while it is the essence of the organismic attitude here +defined that the neurosis consists in sexuality’s repression of life. +In brief, according to the dynamic conception of Freud, the basis +from which individual life takes its origin is represented in a +heterogeneous substrate that is biologically discrete and “polymorph +perverse”; whereas in the genetic conception of the present formulation +life traces its source to a homogeneous matrix that is organically +confluent and unitary.[31] + +In the light of a conception which assumed that the integrity of +consciousness resides within the personality of the individual, +Freud’s confusion was inevitable. Yet viewed even from the standpoint +of the individual, the factors of repression and sexuality can be +regarded only in the light of organic concomitants. Under whichever of +these alternate forms of reaction it may appear, both forms are the +inevitable extremes of the dilemma due to the conflict that has been +artificially created within the organism. Both are the individual’s +restless evasion and substitution following inevitably upon its +separation from its primary organic source. Although repression and +sexuality are organic concomitants, being simultaneous in their +occurrence and in their efficacy equal and contrary, the factor of +repression is dynamically the prior instance. This is true precisely in +the sense that the pressure of my hand as I lay it upon the table is +dynamically the prior stimulus, though the two elements involved--my +hand and the table--are from the point of view of the respective +pressures exerted by each, mutually coincident and equal. Considered +in the light of individualistic consciousness (unconsciousness), +repression with its actuation in the alternative of infantile fear +or “goodness” and sexuality with its compensatory reaction in the +alternative of infantile defiance or “badness” are inseparable and +conterminous. For repression and sexuality are equally the _result_ +in the individual of the factor of organic disunity in the societal +consciousness. There is the need to emphasize the fact that the +reaction of sexuality as it abounds among us is currently confused with +the basic instinct of sex. In point of fact sexuality is the direct +antithesis of this organic expression. + +The vast mass of the literature of sexuality embraced under sexology, +with its voluminous representation of man’s symbolic relation to life, +will some day undoubtedly appear comparable in value to the equally +formidable array of literary compilations that discourse of God and of +man’s extraordinarily complex relationship to Him included in a no less +voluminous theology. As articulate in form, as sympathetic in treatment +and as logical in development as both these themes undoubtedly are, +it will ultimately be seen, I believe, that both are equally open +to serious criticism and both on identical grounds, namely, that +in respect to the matter of each, there is no matter there. I mean +literally that, in default of the objective reality of the subjects +treated under the two discussions by their respective authors, both +treatises are in their nature utterly spurious. In Ellis as in Calvin, +in Freud as in Aquinas, the sexuality envisaged in one system no less +than the divinity envisaged in the other lacks a basis of reality. Both +are vicarious rationalizations of the collective unconscious due to the +effort to compensate its repression of the organic integrity of our +common, societal consciousness. The concept “God” in the one instance, +and its counterpart, obsessive sexuality in the other, are in the +meantime made to serve the expedience of temporary symbols. + +It is noteworthy that man is the only species of the animal world whose +communal life requires for its regulation a system either of sexology +or of theology. Concomitantly, one cannot but remark the far stronger +co-operative instinct existing among the animals and the consequently +incalculably greater societal solidarity of our less “conscious” +kinsfolk as compared with our own![32] + +Approaching the problem of the neurosis anew from the vantage coign +of a more inclusive, integral background, I have come to regard the +factors of sexuality and repression as standing to each other in a +relationship that is the exact reverse of that assumed by Freud--the +factor of repression being from this altered viewpoint the primary +_cause_ and sexuality the incidental _result_ entailed by it. + +To make clear what I mean, it is necessary to view the societal +aggregate, with its basis in our organic consciousness, as an entity +distinct from that of the separative individual unit with its basis +in our dissociated unconscious. The element of repression is incident +to the interruption of our functional participation in the unitary +race consciousness. The separative, dissociated attitude of mind that +precipitates the obsessive, dissociated and resistant individual is a +development consequent upon this interruption. So that it is only as +we come to recognize our need to include the sphere of man’s integral +organic life that the conception of repression as a factor anterior to +sexuality may be understood in its biological import. To this end our +conception of the organic societal consciousness needs to acquire the +coherency of clearer form and definition. We need to take account of +the original, racial solidarity of man’s consciousness and to consider +the interpenetrations of common instincts and habits that originally +ramified throughout the undifferentiated mental tissue of our common +species, knitting its contributing elements into a unitary, homogeneous +organism.[33] We need to form a clearer image of the uniform, +co-ordinated _one-mindedness_ of this primordial, “multi-cellular” +organism that was man. In brief, we need to recognize the _individual_ +that was originally the aggregate consciousness of the race. For, +to consider man’s phylogeny at this period of his evolution is to +consider a unitary organism. It is to break through the prejudice of +the separative mode of individual men and reckon immediately with the +unified principle of consciousness as a whole, from which only later +there diverged the separative elements represented in the dissociated +units we ourselves now comprise, but which unified principle survives +to-day unaltered in the common unity of our confluent societal +personality.[34] + +Such is the parent organism from which we trace the course of our +psychobiological descent. Such is the parent organism from which we +trace as well our psychobiological dissent! For it is evident that +at a certain stage in the growth of this nuclear, racial organism +there must have arisen those first faint stirrings which subsequently +entailed man’s earliest reckonings with the nebulous beginnings of +his self-awareness. This reaction whereby mind for the first time +grew aware of itself was thus a societal reaction. It involved the +aggregate, not the element. Its scope was ethnic, not individual. +It was the primal awareness of man’s organic consciousness. In our +unconsciousness we deny the reality of this biological phylum embodied +in our organic consciousness and underlying the processes of our +individual mentation. For this reason we seek perforce to appease our +organic need through the imaginary solaces of a fanciful immanence +that is but the unconscious _symbol_ of the immanent and encompassing +actuality of this common consciousness. In our unconsciousness we deny +the collateral immediacy of our societal inclusiveness and for this +reason we project the lineal image of indefinite extension composing +man’s dream of a personal life eternal. Denying our organic unity of +compass, we compensate in a fanciful unity of duration. Denied his +societal participation in a communal earth, man’s need can only vent +itself in the private illusion of a sectarian heaven. After all, life +in its reality is immediate. Philosophy _ad infinitum_ to the contrary +notwithstanding, there is no “time” like the present! When we can enter +heartily into the realization of the “pseudo” quality of our mental +unctions, we may begin to sense more closely the organic inevitableness +of such symbolic equivalents as the generic folk-image of “God” and +the infinite corps of His understudies, impressed one after another +into the service of man’s inverted narcism. We may, then, realize that +nowhere is nature’s abhorrence of a vacuum more vigorously asserted +than in the organic intolerance of consciousness toward the voids of +unreality. We may, then, understand how, upon the slightest suspension +of reality in the sphere of consciousness, a symbolic surrogate will +inevitably fill the rift with a punctuality that is automatic. This +is reality’s ultimate test of reality. It is the unfailing standard +of the organism in its measure of the actual. Here is truth’s organic +criterion. + +In their original organic commonness, individuals were complete and +sufficient. They were undisturbed by the separative attitude of mind +that mars our present development with competition and dissension. +They did not spend their days in self-interested comparison. They had +not yet come into the conflict of a self-conscious image-worship. +In this sense--that the mental tissue of our common species was +then undifferentiated--the aggregate consciousness of the race was +synonymous with the consciousness of the individual. It was an +organically unified consciousness. + +Through the organic violation on the other hand, involved in the primal +recoil of self-consciousness within this societal organism, there is to +be traced the biological history of our mental and social disharmonies. +Here, I believe, is to be traced the inception of man’s collective +unconscious and the phylogeny of the societal neurosis. Under the +authority of this long-standing and consolidated system of repression +the individual is born, and still under its shadow he enters upon the +course of his development as an individual. It is this organized Mafia +of societal repression, with its enormous weight of traditional and +conventional authority--this repression within the collective societal +unconscious, with its ready initiation of each new subject--that is +the causative factor in the secondary reaction which we observe in +the individual as “repression of sexuality.” In our own unconscious +fealty to the system about us we fail utterly to comprehend that _the +repression which we observe in the individual is the result of a prior +cause lying outside of the individual and that it consists of the +repression within the collective, racial unconscious acting concertedly +from without upon the now detached individual unit_. + +It is important to distinguish between the social prohibition +operating upon the discrete element or individual as a response to +popular covenant, and the societal prohibition that operates within +the confluent aggregate and is coincident with our organic separation +from man’s primary societal consciousness. The former is the result +collectively of the latter, just as the neurotic repression is the +result of it individually. For the societal repression is primary and +the social reaction is a repression subsidiary to it. + +To understand aright the essential conception of this thesis, it is +necessary to have clearly in mind the basis upon which it rests. This +basis is the distinction between the element that is societal and the +element that is social, between the factor that is sex and the factor +that is sexuality. It should be remembered that sexuality, whether +in its social or in its individual manifestation, is here throughout +regarded as an egoistic and infantile expression resultant upon the +alternatives of secret self-interest secondarily induced in the +individual in response to this same substitution and repression in the +mind of the consensus about him. It is here held that the neurosis is a +condition which indicts not the individual alone but society in general +and that it consists in the substitution of this obsessive reaction +of sexuality for the basic and inherent instinct of sex--that sex is +an instinct that pertains not only to mating but to the unity of our +congeneric life which, when unintercepted, is the function confluently +of man’s conscious and organic life. + +If it is true that the societal repression resident within the race +is the factor that is the cause of the individual’s sexuality, it +is evident that no amount of preoccupation with the individual +factor or with the element of sexuality will avail to release a +neurosis the source of which resides in the societal repression. The +causative factor, then, that resides within the societal unconscious +is the subjective factor to which the individual’s sexuality (or its +counterpart, the individual’s repression) is the resulting objective +response. As repression or sexuality of their nature constitute +division, clearly they can have no place in the confluent subjective +life. And as the neurosis is primarily a disharmony of the confluent +subjective sphere, it is upon the continuities of this sphere alone +that we must depend for the efficacy of an analysis that retains as its +aim--the only logical aim of analysis--the recomposition or synthesis +of the scattered elements of the personality into the organic unit of +their original aggregate. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +ORGANIC ANALYSIS OF REPRESSION AND OF THE FACTOR OF RESISTANCE FROM THE +INDIVIDUAL VIEWPOINT + + +As the causative element in the neuroses is societal or subjective, +an analysis that proceeds upon the objective tack of uncovering a +patient’s complexes is futile. If I am objectively interested in a +patient’s separative, dissociative expressions--in the infinite variety +of his sexualities or infantilisms, it is traceable alone to the +retention of this same unconscious mode within my own personality. In +this situation the analytic procedure is such as bids fair to extend to +an indefinite duration. But if, on the contrary, my own mode is organic +and inclusive, my interest in the patient and my whole relationship to +him will rest upon an organic, confluent basis. I shall be interested +not in the dark secrets of sexuality which he may bring himself to +divulge but in the delusion of separateness that leads him to suppose +that my own sexuality or the desperate recourses of separatism and +repression within myself are less dark than his own. Indeed, arguing +merely from presumptive evidence, my absorbing interest in the subject +of the neurosis would of itself make it a safe conjecture that my +own reaction to the societal repression or my own sexual conflicts +must have been by far the greater of the two. But neither is this the +point. The point is that our sins are common because our lives are not +common, and that the patient’s sole need is his understanding of the +causative factor in the reaction of separation and repression of the +collective mind as it may be realized by him in the relationship of his +personality to my own. My sole endeavour, then, will be directed to an +understanding on his part of the cause of his neurotic separatism or of +the societal repression which, in dissociating him from the congeneric +consciousness common to us both, artificially creates his illusion of +difference between us. + +Lacking this realization of the societal involvement of the neurosis, +there necessarily ensues a personal involvement in the analysis that +invites situations which not infrequently attain to an acute crisis. +The only remedy is the realization through one’s own analysis of one’s +own societal disaffection. The only recourse is the complete reversal +of one’s own pictorial or introverted habits of experience. It will +not be easy. To accept voluntary subjection to conditions involving +involuntary pain will not become a popular pastime. But it is the only +way in which we may be made aware of our social involvement in the +societal neurosis about us. It is the only way by which we may come +to take a conscious part _in_ and not be an unconscious part _of_ the +analysis. + +Never in the drama of human vicissitude has there been staged anything +more ironical than the spectacle of an analyst’s perplexity when the +patient, having become by implication a “cure,” fails to acquiesce +in the principle she is now understood to illustrate. For presumably +the time has arrived at which she (for the sake of dramatic interest +let us say “she”) should naturally wish to withdraw from treatment. +Unhappily, however, she entertains no such intention. On the contrary, +in implacable defiance of analytical canons, she still stoutly +maintains the unabated actuality of her neurosis and offers forthwith +irrefutable vindication of her position in the sudden recrudescence +of her incipient symptoms. In face of the undeniable testimony, the +situation is untoward in the extreme. For at this point the patient’s +attitude toward the analyst is such as can be only adequately expressed +by her in the language of the poet who wrote: “All the current of my +being sets to thee,” and in the interest of a busy practice, if to +no other end, it is urgent that a channel be promptly provided into +which to divert the stream! This is the real climax of the situation. +Its tenseness is further heightened at this point by the introduction +of that most delicate and difficult process in the technique called +“analyzing the transference”! The fact is the transference will not +analyze. It never does. That is the difficulty of this very delicate +phase. At this juncture we cast frantically about for an “interest” for +the patient, that is, an interest other than ourselves--marriage, art, +social service, something, anything! The truth is, our analysis has +failed of its aim, and in our extremity we are driven to seek shelter +under the cover of a subterfuge. It is this subterfuge which consists +in an effort toward what is called, in scientific phraseology, “the +sublimation of the patient’s sexuality” and is the closing act of our +little comedy. As the curtain is finally rung down (the management +is fortunate if it drops without a hitch), it descends upon a much +perplexed psychoanalyst. He feels distinctly that something went wrong. +He is not certain just what it was, but knows that, whatever it was, +the fault lay entirely with the patient. But the circumambient gods, +as one’s fancy pictures, who from their remote recesses have witnessed +until now with unsubdued mirth the transient episode of our unconscious +charade, observing the wretched fate of the patient in her unanswered +need, suddenly alter their mood from levity to grave concern as they +thoughtfully remark one to another in their own wise way that the +essential catastrophe, after all, is the unconscious of the analyst and +that the real drama has but just begun. + +However unpalatable the admission, here is the whole crux of the +matter. We have dealt objectively with an inherently subjective +situation. Our approach has been cognitive, not affective. It has been +personal, not inclusive. Again we have merely looked out, not in. Again +it is the illusion of the organic interval, and our problem has eluded +us in the common fallacy of objective reference. + +In a list of precepts for psychoanalysts (“precepts” for the +elimination of repressions scarcely requires comment!) there is offered +this naïve word of admonition: “Don’t forget that the neurotic’s chief +dictum is: ‘I am not as other men are.’” But here again the analyst +characteristically fails to recognize that such a dictum is by no means +the private monopoly of the “neurotic.” He overlooks the fact that it +is equally the tendency of us all and (what is of crucial importance) +most especially of the analyst himself in the very utterance of +his dictum. For in imputing to others this unconscious fallacy of +self-distinction, he is in the same breath necessarily assuming the +same distinction for himself--the distinction, namely, that he is +himself in so far “not like other men” as to be privileged to tell +them of the presence of this fallacy within themselves. Of course the +analyst will say: “Well with me, you see, it is different.” But this +is precisely what the patient says, as it is what every one says. And +here we come once more to the heart of the matter, namely, that as the +neurosis is societal the self-distinction underlying it is necessarily +the particular claim of every individual within the societal body. In +this situation the analyst inevitably regards only the disparity of +“the other fellow,” a result which I feel to be typical of the error +of the Freudian analysis.[35] But “who decries the loved decries the +lover.” In the true sense--in the sense of our organic life--there is +no other fellow. Our interpretation of his apparent differentiation +from us is but our own projection of the differentiation within +ourselves, just as his interpretation of our apparent differentiation +from him is but his projection of the division within himself. It +is this unadmitted division within each of us that has created the +illusion of our organic separateness from one another. For this reason +it is only as we accept the subjective task of realizing the spurious +fabric of our own separateness and self-sufficiency that we may come to +realize it within our patient by virtue of our inherent identification +with him. Thus, to realize our division through participation with +another is to pierce the delusion of our mutual separateness and +unconsciousness and so to become mutually united again through the +acceptance of our common organic life. + +Based upon the organismic conception here outlined, clearly this +subjective recourse can be the only logical position of the analyst. +For, in the light of this conception, the neurosis or the separate mode +was originally induced in the immature organism through the external +suggestion of the individual in closest contact with it operating to +dissociate it from its primary, organic mode. In consequence, the +dissociated consciousness thus artificially induced can be restored to +the mode of unification and confluence only by substituting for the +superimposed suggestive contact--the predominant social repression +embodied in the parent--the presence of a personality whose tendency +is preponderantly of the confluent, societal mode. It is clear that +in this conception the analysis of a patient, in the sense of his +realization and acceptance of life, presupposes as a rigid organic +condition the prior analysis and acceptance of life on the part of the +analyst. In impaling the cause of this separatism, delusionally assumed +by the patient to reside within himself alone but in reality having its +residence in our common social repression, the analyst’s preoccupation +can only be with this same delusional arrogation of separateness as it +occurs within himself. This means nothing less than that the life of +the analyst must in its consciousness completely encompass the life of +the analysand in its unconsciousness. This, I know, is a large demand. +It is to realize in oneself a breadth of consciousness that embraces +in its scope nothing less than the totality of unconsciousness in its +entire social aspect. It is to include within oneself the collective +unconscious or the far span of normality in all its separateness +and sexuality. In brief, it is to open the way to a reversal of the +unconscious situation now prevailing in which societal men encompass +individual man, and to achieve the mode of consciousness in which +societal man encompasses individual men. + +I remember a young woman journalist coming one day into my study on +the pretext of illness but in reality to look me over. She had been +the rounds of the New York analysts, she said, having been “analyzed” +by first one and then another, though I doubt whether any of the able +physicians cited by her would have dignified the interviews in any +such terms. But while herself unconscious, indeed quite paranoid, +she made a remark which has since seemed to me highly significant. +She said that we psychoanalysts appear actuated by an unconscious +attitude of antagonism toward our patients, that we seem motivated by +a determination “to get even.” In the spirit in which it was made, the +remark was obviously a projection and not a judgment, but I think the +criticism is in general true--certainly it has proved true in my own +case. For the analyst is either unconsciously pleased with the patient +who gives him his confidence or he is unconsciously displeased at his +withholding it. In other words, the attitude of the analyst is not +uninfluenced by personal or egoistic predilection.[36] Here, then, is +straightway the factor of unconsciousness, of separation and hence +antagonism in the analyst. + +But if the analyst consciously senses the patient’s situation, he sees +without bias that the patient--being of a separative, unconscious +mode--will, and inevitably must, act in every instance from motives of +unconsciousness. If he confides in the analyst, he does so solely in +the hope of winning for himself the good-will of the analyst (positive +infantile affect or suggestion); if he is silent or evasive, it is +because he doubts the advantage to himself of sharing his confidence +(negative infantile affect or repression). The psychoanalyst who would +reckon consciously with a patient’s life may be moved by neither one +nor the other manifestation. Both are outside the mode of reality. +Both are expressions of dissociation. Neither attitude will touch +the analyst affectively if he is truly within his own life. If, +on the other hand, he is himself dissociated, whether normally or +neurotically--in the collusion of the group-expression or in single +isolation--and is ever seeking to reinstate in the present moment +the mother-comfort of his own childhood, he will necessarily either +receive the unconsciously motivated confidence of his patient with +the unconscious satisfaction of self-interest (infantile egotism) or +he will respond to his patient’s unconsciously withheld confidence +with the no less unconscious dissatisfaction of self-interest +defeated (infantile egotism thwarted). In one case he manifests the +sentimentality of unconscious sympathy and approbation, in the other +the equally sentimental reaction of unconscious resentment and hate. In +either case it is to be partisan, separative, personal, unconscious. +This unsuspected personalism or unconsciousness within ourselves makes +it easier for us to condone the personalism or unconsciousness in +another, rather than understand it. Because of the greater significance +to us of our own personal grievance as compared with our understanding +of the impersonal needs of life as a unitary experience, our sympathy +is automatically enlisted on the side of the patient’s personal +grievance. In brief, we prefer to sympathize with the suffering +of an organism rather than with the organism that suffers. This +characterological weakness in our analytic system renders the analyst +an easy mark for the sentimentalizing reveries of the neurotic patient. +It is thus a far cry from “Freud,” the psychological conception as it +tends toward the more unitary formulation and co-ordination of the +problem of neurotic disharmonies, to “Freud” the father-complex as it +tends unconsciously to dominate the consciousness of patient as of +follower. + +_The admission that has eventually to be made without qualifying +reservation is that the transference upon which we have laid such +stress as an objective scientific phenomenon is in truth a state of +mind subjectively induced in the patient in direct response to the +attitude of unconsciousness on the part of the analyst himself_. +It is just here, in the dissociated attitude of analyst toward +analysand, that there stands the inevitable impasse to the personal +or individualistic analysis of Freud. Here is the futile revolution +within a vicious circle that is the fallacy of its individualistic +viewpoint. It needs to be repeated that the sexual or the personal, +in the sense of the separative, is itself unconscious. Its primary +source is the reaction originally induced in the organism by the +disunity of the social unconscious as voiced by the parent. We shall be +helped if we keep in mind that much of the confusion of psychoanalysis +is due to the failure of psychoanalysts to realize that there is a +distinction between the mother-image and the mother-organism. We must +ultimately come to see that, due to the dissociative or bidimensional +attitude on the part of the mother, the child automatically replaces +the biological reality of the parent organism with the artificial +_image_ of the parent[37] induced by the parental command. Following +the investigations of the last years it has come to be my definite +conviction that it is this element of the pictorial and statutory, +as reflected in the parent-image, that is the real impediment to +consciousness and the sole meaning of “unconsciousness.” + +The suggestive instance (image) of the parental organism, due to +the early influence of separatism operating upon it, savours wholly +of a repressive, non-confluent attitude. It necessarily tends, +therefore, through the gradual inculcation of the ulterior, separative, +behaviouristic mode, to dissociate more and more from its original +biology, the immature organism within its range. As the neurotic +diathesis is induced through the surface diversifications of external +suggestion infringing upon the original consonance of the organism, +as unconsciousness is diversity of outer aspect in contrast with +the concentration of consciousness and personality in its inner +confluence, the resolving of the neurotic conflict lies in recalling +the personality from its precipitation into the manifold quests of +external compensations to the original integrity of its essential +unitary life. In this process of rehabilitation there is abrogated +the ceaseless urge toward the unconscious fulfilment of the _wish_, +through the restoration of the native impetus of life in a conscious +fulfilment of _function_. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that +the original incitement to the neurosis is, from an individualistic +basis, external. This reaction within the individual to a prohibition +acting from without constitutes the whole significance of the attitude +of separatism, of self-seeking and of self-defence that are synonymous +with the repressed sexuality of the neurotic personality. But there is +the need to recognize that this same attitude is also synonymous with +the released sexuality which is “normally” regarded at the present +time as a true expression of life. This so-called normal expression, +however, in its obsessive self-seeking and in its obvious kinship with +secondary dissociative reactions, stands at the very opposite pole to +sex as the instinct of life in its organic significance. + +The automatic release of the reaction of self-defence that is the +reflex response to the irritant of organic prohibition is biologically +significant. For with the extraneous interception of the organic +mode or at the instance of prohibition, the individual is reflexly +stimulated to a compensatory effort to replace this mode with the +vicarious mode of self-defence. There is here the psychological +concomitance between organic interdiction and organic recoil, between +repression or curtailment of personality and sexuality or the +retroactive impulse to individual aggression. In this connection it is +interesting to note the etymological agreement of the ideas of defence +and prohibition in the French word _défense_ meaning prohibition. There +is psychological warrant for assuming that the relation between these +two words is more innate than accidental. + +This psychological parallelism between repression or self-love and +sexuality or self-defence, between the egoistic wish and the suspicion +of interference with its fulfilment, underlies the identity of +the phenomenon of homosexuality and that of paranoia. Students of +psychoanalysis have tended to regard the reflections of these reactions +as distinct manifestations, viewing them as contradictions rather than +as concomitants, as opposites rather than as alternatives, as different +phases of reaction rather than as different aspects of the same phase. +Freud, for example, lays emphasis upon the factor of sexuality, giving +it the place of dominant importance in the neurotic conflict, while +Adler asserts that it is the factor of the individual’s egotism that +is of central importance in the causation of the disharmony. These +seemingly opposed views are, in reality, the same. One envisages +the somatic, the other the psychic aspect of a condition that is +nuclear and common. Their seeming difference is merely the inevitable +limitation of an objective and absolute mode of approach. In either +case it is the symbolic manifestation that is confronted. Whether +the reaction is represented in lust of body (homosexuality) or in +pride of mind (paranoia), in both conditions the aspect contemplated +is again the mere symptomatic index. In each is expressed but the +secondary response to a deeper, more encompassing factor that has its +substrate in our common consciousness. In each it is the semblance of +the individual personality replacing the actuality of the societal +personality. Each is the objective resultant of a subjective impediment +to the confluent, organic life. In both there is represented but the +superficial aspect, one expressing itself clinically in the symbolic +anomaly of homosexuality, the other, in the symbolic anomaly of +paranoia. + +Thus far the interest of these anomalies, as far as psychoanalysts are +concerned, has been their implication as it touches the psychopathology +of the isolated or neurotic personality. Far more significant, however, +is the bearing of these manifestations upon the psychobiology of the +social organism as a whole. That these distortions of personality +exist in a larval stage in the group-neurosis of “normality” is a +circumstance with which the psychopathologist needs yet to reckon +in his wider office of clinical sociologist. Naturally we have not +yet begun to suspect the presence of these unsavoury elements, +homosexuality and paranoia, in the unconscious of “normality,” and as +normality enjoys the security of mutual protective agreement among its +constituents, the existence of these unseemly maladjustments within +its ranks will long be treated by us with stolid disavowal. It is the +distinguishing feature of the naïve countenance of normality that it +experiences no need of self-questioning. A delusion that has become +socially buttressed in the mutual reciprocities of its unconscious +adherents is indeed impregnable. + +Human consciousness, however, will not be understood nor a clearer, +saner life opened to man until he has repudiated the unconscious, +vicarious or separative as it exists in its securest, most widespread +and most aggressive form, that is, in the _socially systematized +delusion comprising the collective unconscious of our vaunted +“normality.”_ For if normality, so-called, is in reality a dissociation +existing under the protective mask of society, how can we who are +normal or collectively dissociated comprehend dissociation in the +neurotic personality? How can the actor be at the same time onlooker? +How can subject and object co-exist in the selfsame content? How, in +brief, is it possible for unawareness to envisage unawareness? Surely +it is clear that the dreamer is of necessity partisan to his dream, and +that the contemplation of a dream from within a dream is subversive of +the very principle of consciousness. For knowledge being awareness _of_ +or _in regard to_, demands as its condition the two contrasting factors +of a subject looking upon and an object looked upon. If normality is +mere collective unconsciousness and therefore itself an artificially +induced neurosis--if it is a condition of unconsciousness produced +through the influence of external suggestion and therefore represents +in itself a secondary dissociative state, how is it possible to fulfil +the requisite condition of consciousness in respect to the two factors +of subject and object in the matter of our consideration of the dreams +of our patients? As my own work has in the last years come to adopt a +more and more inclusive organismic viewpoint, I have become convinced +that what we psychoanalysts _in our present personal and objective +interpretation_ consider “dream-analysis,” and in regard to which we +have taken ourselves and our patients so seriously, is utterly futile +and invalid. I am convinced that, in the mood in which dream-analysis +is now applied, it is itself the expression of an hysterical symptom--a +cognitive replacement within the social unconscious comprising the +arbitrarily assumed group-differentiation “psychoanalyst.” + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +THE DREAM AND ITS ANALYSIS IN AN ORGANISMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE +NEUROSES + + +The dream of the individual together with the individualistic +analysis of the dream presents a most difficult and as yet untried +field. There is here required a technique that is as elusive as it +is unprecedented. For such a technique must include the unconscious +complicity of the analyst in the social or image basis from which he +analyzes. For it is only impersonally and confluently that we may +understand what is personal and separative in another. To approach the +dreamer’s separative attitude of repression and self-defence toward +the elements of his dream, in an attitude of our own that is socially +no less separative and repressed, is to invite a situation in which +we merely exchange the dissociative symbols of the sleep state for +analogous symbols in the waking state. It is to replace refraction +and distortion as they occur in the individual repression, with its +symbolic wish-fulfilment in dreams, for refraction and distortion as +they occur in the social repression, with its symbolic wish-fulfilment +in “beliefs.” For this reason, having come to view the unconscious in +its waking and in its sleeping expression from the point of view of the +common, organic mode, I have reached the conviction that the conception +of dream-analysis as it has been entertained by us is throughout a +misconception, that to speak at all of dream “analysis” from the +personal or separative viewpoint is self-delusive. For our so-called +dreams of the night are but the unaccepted realities of the day, the +so-called realities of our day but the unaccepted dreams of the night. +The night’s reaction is individualistic, the day’s reaction is social. +Both are identical in their method as in their aim. Both represent the +endeavour, through futile recourse to symbolic or “would-be” measures +of recommunication, to adjust vicariously and upon a separative basis +the organic outrage to life’s inherent unity. It is the self-determined +illusion of our societal disaffection. It is the lure of the symbolic +in its mock pursuits of the personal and separative. It is the vicious +circle of all unconsciousness vainly rotating upon the phantom axis of +its own unreality. + +In view of the repercussion of consciousness that is the essence of +man’s unconsciousness, the attitude that will best liberate us from our +infolding tendencies of mentation lies in a conception that regards +unconsciousness as a self-reflexive mode throughout. Such an attitude +will clearly demarcate our tendency toward the peripheral or social +distribution of the mental images comprising our _mirrored_ affects +as contrasted with the societal conservation of our _real_ affects +in the conscious fulfilment of our common personality. As long as we +fail to realize this generic basis we shall continue to suffer from +the delusion of our own organic disunity, and there will necessarily +persist the vicarious shunting of affect into the distributive +expressions of anger, duplicity and antagonism constitutive of +resistance. Since our affects are organically common, if we do not +permit them expression in universal confluence, they must inevitably +seek an expression that is scattered and random. And so we need to +recognize that we may not adjust our affective or subjective life +through the study of the objective mechanism of the images or dreams +that merely reflect it, but only through the subjective (conscious) +reabsorption within us of the displaced and socially distributed +affects to whose suggestion the dream, by day or by night, is the +mirrored reaction.[38] + +In an organismic view _differentiation is unconsciousness_. That is, +the dissociated self or the separative element is, by reason of its +organic anomalousness, necessarily at odds with self. For this reason +there is inevitably entailed the universal conflict of unconsciousness, +collective and single, that is man’s disunity, social as well as +individualistic, “normal” as well as “neurotic.” Such is the disparity +that is reflected in his dreams, sleeping and waking. The diversity +of our fabrications, social and individual, is the diversity of our +_selves_. Our complex is our complexity. In very truth “_our_ little +life is rounded with a sleep.” We waken only to alter the form of our +dream. Throughout the diurnal cycle the dream-state remains unbroken, +and all efforts of analysis in our unconscious, separative mode are +helpful only in accentuating the powerlessness of consciousness in its +present state of differentiation. In the separative mode the elements +of the personality are unassembled, and the result is an absence of +organic coherence, of an essential unity such as may alone be the +basis of a truthful inquiry into the unconscious processes of man’s +inversion. In my own case (the only case upon which any of us may +occupy himself profitably is one’s own) it has become clear that my +attitude toward the night is predetermined by my attitude toward the +day. If I have kept personal and repressed my real feeling during the +day, the secret of my dissociation will be kept faithfully throughout +the night, and upon waking in the morning such camouflage as will +successfully hide my separativeness will have been already established +by my own order prior to the waking moment. + +It would seem that sleep is the beneficent leveller, that mentally as +well as physically its function is restorative, that it is the solvent +and the dissolvent of our fancied differentiations, of our artificial, +fear-begotten defences against one another. It would seem that it is +for man the opportunity of organic rehabilitation, that in this period +of withdrawal and quiescence after the restless day of self-seeking and +antagonism there is a palliative and conciliatory process at work.[39] +After all, diplomacy and lying are wearying in their exactions, and +in this period marked by an absence of social pretences and of the +strain of our separative adjustments, consciousness undoubtedly tends +to reassert its common, primal mode with images that promote and do not +impede organic function--joyous images, expressive of common need, of +organic participation, of concerted, confluent function. After all, our +dreams are but the shadows our lives cast behind them when we stand in +the light of our own personality. + +It is only as we become one with this inherent personality through +an acceptance of the unity of life in its entirety that the shadows +comprising our dreams, sleeping and waking, may be truly resolved. +Since our dreams of the night only tend to restore the equilibrium +which the day has destroyed, our dreams are only in so far distorted +as our day is distorted. In so far as the day is an evasion of the +recognition of the infantile wish, with its corresponding entail of +over-compensation and atonement, in so far does the dream reproduce +again the identical wish of the day after having recourse to the +extravagance and distortion requisite to its disguise. When in our +day’s reactions we shall have entered upon an organic, confluent mode +of consciousness, our dreams will be one with the organic confluence +of the day, furthering in their harmonious imagery the quiet process +of the day’s constructiveness. It will then be realized that sleep is +but the day’s diastole, that just as the period of diastolic relax +following the rhythmic contraction of the heart has a function that +is reciprocal and harmonious in relation to the systolic impulse, so +in the rhythmic cycle of our day its period of rest is reciprocal and +continuous with, not contradictory and opposed to, the constructive +function of the day’s activities. The dreams of the separative mode, +on the other hand, only occlude and congest the avenues of our +sleep-consciousness. These obstructive travesties effect a complete +deadlock due to the confluent organism’s ineffectual effort to arrest +and clarify these separative trends that are reflections even in +sleep of the unlived, fear-ridden, organically discordant experience +comprising the day. + +With our present habitually tutored day, the very approach of our +awaking automatically prompts us to don a costume of disguise before +we rise to move again amid the tedious maze of masked players who, +like ourselves, have lost the reality of life’s organic meaning. As +long as one’s feeling is thus resolutely set against the surrender of +his artificial defences, as long as one fears to remove the mask of +pretence covering his personality, no amount of intellectualization, +of mental analysis, of theoretical “truths” (I have tried them all!) +will avail to lift his repression and admit him to the simple reality +of his common, organic feeling. It is in vain that we seek the truth. +Truth, as it is customarily conceived, is but the theory whereof life, +as it may be lived, is the reality. To seek the truth is again to +pursue the phantom of our own mental imagery. For reality disappoints +all formulation. No symbol may stand for equivalence but only for +equivocation. The lesson the psychoanalyst has yet to learn is that +reality has no substitutes, that no _seeming_, however plausible, may +replace that which _is_. It is this lesson--the very lesson we presume +to teach our patients--of which all our work is as yet but an empty +recitation. Accordingly, no amount of intuitional or theoretical acumen +on the part of the analyst can do other than thwart a patient’s need of +self-realization. Such intellectualism on the part of the analyst is +the substitution that is _his_ neurosis. Recourse to intellectuality +is his concession to the socially current repression and substitution +which in our collective unconsciousness we credit as normality, never +once suspecting, in the strength of our numerical security, that +_normality is but the collective dream-state of man’s waking life_. + +Because of the psychological identity between the dream that is +our day, with its dramatization in the objective furniture of +cubic actuality, and the dream that is our night, with its scenic +reproduction in flat, pictorial outline, an individualistic analysis +in the sense of an encompassing realization is of its nature precluded. +Only as we can come to stand apart from both, and view them in their +proper light as symbolic phenomena divorced from life, may they be +assessed in their true relation and thus analyzed in the only sense +that gives meaning to the term. But this is not a merely mental +process. This is to actualize organic life in our daily experience +with such sincerity as to realize within ourselves the spuriousness +of our habitual, dissociated mode. It is so to include the dream +outside the dream, constituted of the separative day with which the +separative night is enclosed, that we shall have automatically entered +upon the mode of self-unification which is one with a societally +unified, confluent consciousness. The essential mark of such a mode of +consciousness is that, in its subjective consonance, it regards with an +equally objective clarity the vicarious processes of the day and of the +night. + +Our attitude of the day is amply illustrated by our attitude toward +our dramas. As our lives are based upon unconsciousness, our dramas as +well as our dreams are also necessarily based upon unconsciousness. +Since the logic of the dream is inverted, it is essential to reverse +the dream’s unconscious motive in order to understand its fallacious +sequences. The drama equally represents the interplay of unconscious +motives. Based thus upon the inverse processes of unconsciousness, its +logic is also necessarily inverse. And so in order to understand the +drama, its motive must likewise be observed in its reverse trend. In +other words, the drama and the dream are identical in their essential +mechanism. When the psychopathologist is confronted with the drama of +_actual life_--the inverse process represented in the neurosis--his +immediate recourse should be to intercept as far as possible the +inharmonious development of the patient’s life history and, having +completely reversed its underlying motive in the light of conscious +perspectives, to unravel its meaning through carefully retracing +discoverable inadvertencies of development to their logical source. + +In this function the analyst’s attitude toward the human drama +presented in the neurosis of his patient becomes identical with his +attitude toward the dreams of his patient. One would naturally expect +that his attitude toward the drama of the stage would be equally +logical. But a societal analysis fails to justify this expectation. For +such is the elusive tenacity of the seemingly actual, as it appears in +the dissociative recourses of the social mind, that the psychoanalyst, +too, continues to regard the bidimensional _aspect_ of life presented +in the drama as a conscious form of art. In consequence it comes to +pass that a train of unconsciously destructive events which he deplores +as an expression of life in the clinic is applauded by him as an +expression of art in the theatre. The same untoward sequences, which in +clinical retrospect are _viewed_ with compassion, are in the process of +their theatrical portrayal _experienced_ with delight. + +I do not see how such inconsistencies between our collective and our +individual reactions to unconsciousness are separable from the present +confusion that exists between the objective and the subjective spheres +of consciousness. Because of this confusion, in our dissociation we +take pleasure in participating in the dramatic representation of the +identical processes of unconsciousness which, subsequently contemplated +as actuality, we interpret only as pain. This inconsistency between +our subjective and objective reactions accounts also for the many +discrepancies in the psychiatrist’s personal attitude toward the dramas +of the clinic and the drama within his own home. It explains how it +happens that we, who are seemingly competent to trace an individual’s +neurosis directly to the influences that have unconsciously surrounded +him as a child, will yet unconsciously surround our own children with +these selfsame influences. Surely never was the “other fellow” so +abused and ourselves so tricked as in our psychiatric clinics when, in +our self-conscious formulation of the occasion of his confusion, we +deem ourselves less unconscious than he. + +As it is the especial métier of the unconscious to convert the actual +into the seeming, its subtlest attainment is the conversion of what +is most actual into what is most seeming. If of realization itself it +may effect a semblance, it is the ultimate achievement in unconscious +ventriloquy. If of analysis itself it may make a pseudo-analysis, it +has secured its entrenchment through a technical recourse that is +wellnigh impregnable. Through such a strategic manœuvre one often +attains a quite faultless analysis of a dream, when all the while +the realization is but seeming. As the dream is but the reflected +image or “negative” of yesterday’s duplicities and introversions, an +attempt to capture and “analyze” it from the retrospective standpoint +of the replacement and introversion of the day, is but to retain +unaltered and unalterable the unconscious embroilment of one’s +self-delusive introversion. Yet, with the practised dexterity of our +habitual sleight-of-hand methods of analysis, we still pursue the +futile industry of our objective dream-trapping, idly endeavouring +to drag the travesty of the day’s distortions embodied in the dream +into the self-conscious analytic dissecting-room. In truth, the +real need is that we surrender the analytic dissecting-room and all +its paraphernalia of symbolic technique to the common reality which +underlies it, realizing that its artificial displacements constitute +the sole function of the dream parody. For set what snare we will, a +dream cannot be taken alive. The chasing of dreams is like the chasing +of rainbows. One may no more behold his _real_ self in the mirror of +the dream than in any other reflecting surface. The image reproduced +may be never so lifelike but it is not life. As with birds on the wing, +so with our dreams; we cannot capture them except we destroy them. The +attempt to do so is to repeat without end our habitual offence against +the organic grammar of life constitutive of the double negative of all +unconsciousness. Again it is unconsciousness within unconsciousness, +personal preference within personal preference, unconsciousness +_unconscious_ that is the baffling complicity in our self-dissociation. + +This self-involvement of the neurosis, this _unconsciousness of the +totality of self_ makes of our individual enfoldment a wellnigh +inscrutable situation. In such a situation the individual’s efforts +of self-help--the recourses of personal rather than of societal +outlooks--become comparable to the efforts of a man who would attempt +to lift himself by his own boot-straps. This it is that comprises the +dream within the dream of all individuation--of all separateness. Of +course, it quite naturally seems to us, in our now differentiated +mode, that the attainment of a position of relative inclusiveness is a +humanly impossible task. Yet, if we are to attain to a true recognition +of our _societal dissociation_, we may do so only through the +acceptance of the basic actuality of our common, organic confluence. +Such alone is the essential recourse of a fully awakened consciousness. + +Whether we will or no, we are thus brought back again and again to +the essential fallacy of our day’s dreams as of our night’s--to the +illusion of personal causation or of individual sponsorship that is +at the heart of man’s dissociation, both neurotic and normal. In the +presumption of his self-determined hypothesis of good and bad, of hope +and fear, the individual is assuming unconsciously the supervision of +the universe, and the constant endeavour of his thoughts as of his +dreams is to keep secret the traces of his personal presumption through +the subtle projections of the disguised image. Some call it God, some +call it evolution, but no matter what the collective title under which +our private prerogative is symbolized, it is in reality but the cheat +that is the personal illusion of a central causality resident within +ourselves. + +I know that in this subjective statement of the disharmony of +consciousness there is presented a trend that is wholly unacceptable +to the symbolic or absolute logician; but, on the other hand, +the objective statements of the absolute logician are with equal +validity unacceptable to the relativist. According to the objective +logic of the mental absolutist the fact of our very existence is +theoretically untenable. In the unconscious determinism of men’s +personal prerogative, the postulate, as is generally known, is that +the universe in which we have our being was either created by some +agency existing outside itself or it was self-creative. Of the two +alternatives either is impossible, but the vital fact remains that +here we are! The logical untenability of a position that limits itself +to these commonly accepted alternatives may some day offer sobering +consideration to our unconscious absolutism. For the present there is +grave need that our absolute or theoretical logic yield place to the +relative logic of a more organismic point of view. In the world of +physical phenomena prior to Einstein it was impossible for physicists +to proceed with further creative extensions because of the limitation +of their underlying conception. So in the sphere of human activities +around us, as long as we continue in our present objective fixity of +thought, it will not be possible for life to unfold because of the set +limitations of unessential attitudes of mind that block all essential +creative expression. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE BIOLOGICAL SUBSTRATE OF THE NEUROTIC CONFLICT IN ITS ORGANIC +SIGNIFICANCE + + +In studying the neurotic diathesis one recognizes the existence of two +marked reaction-types more or less clearly delineated one from another +in mood and _tempo_, though they equally sustain the same central +_motif_. The vicarious method of dream-analysis described in the last +chapter as having all the appearance of adequacy, when inherently it +is invalid, is especially characteristic of one of these two types +of personality. The two types may be distinguished by the contrast +between their specific reactions to the original repressive incident +occasioning the organism’s primary dissociation. + +I am not in sympathy, however, with the _implication_ in the +discrimination of types demarcated as “introvert” and “extravert.” +These terms imply, as they are meant to imply, an essential difference +of type rather than a circumstantial difference of reaction. In general +the extravert is rather approvingly regarded in the light of a “jolly +good fellow,” as contrasted with the introvert whose disaffectivity, +on the contrary, tends to be regarded with an undisguised slant. +As if the jolly good-fellowship of the hysterical type, with all +its aggressiveness and ebullience, were not as truly a substitutive +alternative resultant upon repression as is the reaction of his more +silent, ingrown confrère of the opposite type! As if the affable, +effervescent type were not as truly “shut-out” as his psychological +vis-à-vis is “shut-in”! Psychiatry has a great deal to say about +the shut-in type of personality but it has nothing to say about the +shut-out type of personality. Yet of the two the latter is by no means +a less serious form of dissociation, and certainly it is by far the +more widespread in its results. + +There are, then, two types of reaction to be discriminated. There is +the type of individual who upon the initial stimulus to defence has +recourse to a tactic of unconditional retreat. He simply withdraws +_in toto_, and his attitude toward his congeners is thenceforward +completely negative. He no longer sees nor is seen by them. They +are so far outside his ken that their existence is not for a moment +admitted by him. Excluded from the range of his actualities he does not +even concede them an hypothetical status. Such is the _autocentric_ +individual. This personality is the subsequent precoid, if in his +withdrawal he does not even so much as pretend acknowledgment of +the external world; he is the later psychasthenic, or normal of the +socially detached type, if he adopts the more temperate policy of a +seeming _rapprochement_. In either case, enclosed within a system all +his own, he lives entirely apart from the world of actuality, ruling +alone (and of course supreme) over his self-determined cosmogony. + +Then there is the type of personality whose course is the exact +opposite of that just described, the difference of reaction being due +to the modifying conditions, “constitutional” for aught I know, that +attend the repressive occasion. With this type of personality, due +to the fact that the arresting instance overtakes him, as it were, +in the open, retreat is automatically barred. He is surprised in +the act, discovered with the goods in his possession. Detection and +apprehension are here simultaneous. Unable to deny the actuality of the +situation, his instinctive recourse is in the direction of a desperate +effort to palliate the attending circumstances. Resort to an alibi +being out of the question, he seeks to exculpate himself by adopting +a policy of a more or less truckling servility. He would atone his +offence by propitiating his accusers and so winning a recommendation +of leniency. Such is the _allocentric_ type of personality. This type +may be seen either in the so-called normal individual of the socially +adaptive reaction or in the definitely efflorescent or hysterical +neurotic, according respectively as he succeeds in conniving in the +social pretence and unconsciousness about him and thus saves his +own neck, or as he fails in his effort at social compromise--the +process flatteringly known to-day as “sublimation.” In this event his +failure of adaptation is due to the stronger urge within him of the +factors that are allied with the underlying communism of his organic +consciousness but which in his mental dissociation he is unable to +co-ordinate with his innate experience. + +Viewed biologically these two types represent, as I see them, a +functional over-emphasis _in the individual_ of the reactions +pertaining to one or the other of the two fundamental co-ordinated +systems underlying the biology of man’s confluent life and determining, +when in balanced relation to one another, the integral health of the +organism. I refer to the cerebro-spinal and the sympathetic nervous +systems. The opposite recourses of behaviour, manifested in the two +psychological types just cited, represent, I believe, the two extremes +of reaction resultant upon the disturbed balance between these two +systems coincident with the factor of repression. + +In the preconscious form of life[40] preserved among the animals, there +has occurred no break between these two fundamental systems. In the +feline series, for example, one observes the same graceful, organic +undulations in the movements actuated by the voluntary muscles or in +the reactions presided over by the cerebro-spinal system, as occur +in the rhythmic and harmonious co-ordinations that characterize the +function of the internal viscera controlled by the sympathetic ganglia. +With man the picture is a very different one. Upon the introduction +of suggestion or repression and their concomitant interdiction to +his inherent feeling, there resulted an organic cleavage within his +personality. Coincident with this artificial summons to an adaptive +and ulterior response, the spheres of reaction corresponding to these +two systems within the organism of man were henceforth divided. +Affective responses within the organism’s subjective nuclear life, with +its physiological substrate in the vasomotor and visceral reactions +(sympathetic system), were no longer correlated with affective +responses which, having their substrate in the nuclei of the brain and +spinal cord (cerebro-spinal system), pertain to the objective, external +adaptations observable in the organism’s voluntary activities. Hence, +from this moment forward the co-ordination between the two systems +became automatically impaired, and there could no longer be the smooth, +uninterrupted confluence of function that originally united the two +systems into a single co-ordinated unit. + +The disintegrating effect of this artificial cleavage between these +two reciprocal systems occurs only in the constituent that marks the +adaptive cerebral reactions or in the segment or terminal mediating +the relationships _socially_ of the individual elements _inter +se_. In the central or visceral system the organic unities remain +intact. Here in the depths of man’s organic being, actuated by his +involuntary, instinctive life, the disparity of separateness cannot +enter. Here is unbroken continuum. Here the organism is susceptible +to no interstitial flaw. In this central, involuntary system which is +organically common and confluent throughout the species, the extraneous +element of repression with its reaction in disparate, ulterior quests +is automatically excluded, for in its native inherency the organism +is one and indivisible. It is the peripheral portion of our organisms +with its specialization into the external sense-organs, through which +is mediated our recognition of objective difference or interval and +through which occurs, as has been said, our consequent inference of +intrinsic differentiation. In the peripheral system, therefore, the +fallacy of separateness due to this biological fission may be enforced +with seeming success. In a word, it is only in our social and external +relations that the fallacy of organic differentiation works havoc in +any positive or active sense. + +In this generic schema is probably represented the physiological +substrate of the schism within the organism caused by the impact from +without of the trauma of repression, and there is represented as well +the basis of the resultant contrast of reaction-types in accordance as +the repression tends more strongly toward one or the other side of the +divided reaction. + +Replacing essential continuity with mere contiguity, or the unity of +our organic life with the superficial gestures of an outer code, the +_normal_ of the hysterical type may rub surfaces, as it were, and play +desperately at the game of vicarious unity. We see this everywhere +exemplified among the devotees of normality in reactions that are +apparently confluent but that are, in reality, determined cerebrally or +peripherally in response to the division within the unitary organism +of man. Such are the expressions to be seen, for example, in our +religious hobnobbings, our spurious social covenants, our ingenious +political and economic affiliations, and in the superficial flatteries +and connivances common to normality generally. How definitely such +vicarious reactions are an infringement upon man’s organic life is +readily seen in the unfailing equalization that follows swiftly upon +them, exacting their inevitable toll in the ultimate retributive +penalties of national and industrial wars, of social and political +dissension and in the world-wide expression of disaffection that marks +the social periphery of our self-plumed “civilization.” + +On the other hand the _neurotic_ of the hysterical type, by reason +of the greater sensitiveness of his organism, is held within the +grip of this organic conflict. It permits him neither to fawn nor to +defy whole-heartedly, but because of the irreconcilable urge of this +inner conflict it keeps him ever torn between its two extremes. As an +expression of the allocentric reaction he lives within a system that +is divided against itself, sensing throughout life, only intuitively, +the unassuageable pain of his division. + +In direct contrast with this reaction the autocentric type lives within +a system that is completely dissociated from the common, congeneric +life. But, though the system is in itself uniform throughout, he +suffers no less the affliction of his life’s incompleted cycle +because of his organic separation from the socially reciprocal, +peripheral system. The allocentric seeks in vain to atone to +himself for his extradition from the co-ordinated organism in the +spurious compensations of a peripherally (socially) separative +system. The autocentric would annul the pain of his separation from +the co-ordinated organism in the futile appeasements of a central +(individual) system which, in its insulation, represents no less his +complete dissociation from the world of actuality. The one would repair +the organic breach within him through recourse to conciliations that +lie exclusively within the social sphere (peripheral dissociation). +The other would resort to reparations, which, being wholly enclosed +within the _ego_, embody exclusively the individual factor (central +dissociation). In brief, the allocentric sees himself as _picture_ +in the world outside of him. The autocentric sees the world outside +of him as picture _within_ himself. If the conduct of the latter +personifies the smoke-screen, the conduct of the former is typical of +the red-herring! + +Here again we witness the vacillations between the social consensus and +our personal resistance to its behests, between the opposed factors of +suggestion and of repression, of personal advantage and of personal +disadvantage, due to our unconscious alternatives of good and bad. In +the disorganization pertaining to these two reciprocally dissociated +spheres--the cerebral and the visceral--our unconsciousness consists, +in either case, in the individual’s inability to realize a unification +of personality comprised of the balanced inclusion of the two through +the co-ordination of the organic and the conscious spheres of his +experience. + +It is my view that in the phenomena of repression or of sexuality +artificial symbols are substituted for the natural gestures represented +in the innate feelings of life and sex. In substituting the manifold +symbols of expression for the natural gestures of spontaneous feeling, +there is manifested a dissociation of the consciousness of man of which +the union of his nuclear and peripheral fields of feeling (affectivity) +is the biological basis. Just as the gesture is the motor expression of +its concomitant sensory reaction, so is the symbol the motor expression +of the sensory _repression_ concomitant to it. As the gesture is +the organic accompaniment of reality, the symbol is the vicarious +barrier against reality. We find the sponsorship for the symbol in +unconsciousness or in a mode that is personal, systematized, repressed, +while the gesture has its sponsorship in a mode of consciousness or in +a confluence of feeling that is impersonal, societal, organic. + +If one may speak of ethnic modes, it may be said that in what is called +the period of Greek thought--with its preference for form to substance, +for “the good” conceived rather as beauty than as truth, for life felt +more in its outward line than in its inner meaning--there is ethnically +reflected the allocentric or peripheral type of reaction. A close +sympathy with all that pertains to this early period of Greek culture +is certainly characteristic of the strongly marked types of this +reaction. + +On the other hand, the era of Christ and of the psychasthenic reaction +of Christianity, with its lugubrious reversal of the Greek _motif_, +is a mode one finds pre-eminently adapted to the autocentric type +of character, with its apotheosis of the symbols of love, of truth +and of the spirit. Said Christ: “The spirit is more than flesh,” +thus controverting the tendency of the Greek ideal, and an ascetic +Christianity has flocked to him. But in the eidolon of Greek as of +Christian there is offered again but the symbol. In the organic +incompleteness of each there is presented only the inadequacy of the +letter, of that which serves as a sign. In the first it is form, +colour, substance; in the second it is the word, the concept, the +spirit. To-day there are not wanting indications that there awaits +man a period that is confluent of the two in which these symbolic or +separative racial modes shall become absorbed in a unification of word +and of substance. This moment of man’s organic realization within +himself of the integrity of life in its totality will usher in a +sociological renascence when man’s life will embody a mode in which the +spirit _is_ flesh.[41] + +The contrasting systems here denoted as allocentric and autocentric, +corresponding to the contrast between the cerebral, peripheral or +social mode of reaction on the one hand and the visceral, central +or nuclear reaction-type on the other, merely mark anew a very old +and commonly recognized division. Here in this more physiological +envisagement of it there is offered merely a different conceptual +basis. There is an analogous division in the experimental +psychologists’ discrimination between motor and sensory. Doubtless also +in the contrast more rhetorically defined as romantic and classical +there is contemplated the same division of types, not to mention +the contrasted reaction-types popularly known as temperamental and +phlegmatic.[42] + +It is needful to remember that the allocentric type of individual +is, within the peripheral division of his cerebro-social system, as +truly self-centred as is the autocentric type within the central, +visceral division of his sympathetic system. The difference is that +the allocentric embodies dissociation in his seeming adaptation toward +the social dream that is his day, and the autocentric in his seeming +adaptation toward the individual dream that is his night. Every +psychiatrist is familiar with the facility with which the dementia +præcox patient may analyze his own dreams. But what avails his +facility? He is by very virtue of it not less but rather more shut in, +for his “analysis” is but the trick through which he subtly evades the +social demands existing outside his own centrally dissociated mode. At +all times he holds the stage of his self-determined drama, viewing the +spectacle of it not as onlooker but as producer. What he permits you +to see is but a play within a play, conceived and enacted within the +theatre of his own mind. And so in the autocentric type embodied in +the psychasthenic personality--the reaction of the type of normal or +neurotic that is related to the precoid in its extreme expression--one +may be led quite far from the touchstone of reality by reason of the +very simplicity and quite genuine correctness of his “analysis.” And +so no less with the allocentric type and the equally plausible decoys +of _his_ illusory system. What is needed is our realization that in +the projections of one as in the _intrajections_ of the other there +is equally embodied the identical purpose of self-withdrawal from the +common medium of reality. + +Most significant of all is the need that the psychoanalyst realize, +on the one hand, the peripherally determined tendencies of his own +socially compensative reactions or of his own allocentric normality, +and, on the other, the centrally biased trends of his own insularly +compensative adjustments or of his own autocentric adaptation. Failing +to accept, through his own analysis, the possibility of the completely +theatrical or symbolic nature of the so-called actualities of his own +day as they tend to be expressed in the immediate moment at hand, he +may himself easily succumb to the fallacy of a too ready credence +(analyst’s wish-fulfilment) in judging the validity of a patient’s +presumable self-envisagement. This unconscious alternative which we +trace again and again throughout the varying manifestations of the +mind of man, whether in its single or in its collective expression, +whether in the immediate reaction of the individual or in the remoter +adaptations of the race mind, is equally the unconscious actuation +underlying the system of psychoanalysis. + +It would seem to mark some strange miscarriage in our sociological +progress that a dualistic system, such as psychoanalysis, should have +arisen as an emanation of Jewish thought, when one considers the +essentially monotheistic tradition of the Hebrew consciousness. In this +sense the sociological reaction of the Hebrew mind manifested in the +dualistic principle of Freud, as exemplified in his basic theory of +psychic ambivalence, would seem to denote some inadvertence in racial +perception. Monotheism with its principle of a universal immanence +of good is clearly a sublimation of the unitary preconscious mode +(autocentric), just as the dualistic theism of the Gentiles, with its +basis in the alternatives of good and evil, is the sublimation of an +irreconcilable unconscious mode (allocentric). May it not be that +unconsciously psychoanalysis is a Semitic repudiation of the basal law +of Moses and of its preconscious principle of an underlying unity, +precisely as Christianity is an unconscious repudiation of the same +unitary precept as exemplified preconsciously in the teachings of +Christ? May it not be, too, that these unconscious alternatives now +actuating the dualistic systems of Jew and Gentile will ultimately +resolve themselves into an organic monism of accord which, in the +societal encompassment of each, will become equally understanding and +inclusive through the united consciousness of both? + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SEXUALITY AND SEX IN RELATION TO UNIFICATION +AND ORGANIC MATING + + +In the impatience of the industrial laboratory to meet the public +need, it happens not infrequently that, through an omission of +adequate qualitative tests due to the unusual haste of production, +an inferior grade of material is distributed such as would not have +been produced under more temperate circumstances. The time has come to +acknowledge that through a like inadvertence many of the products of +psychoanalysis are seriously open to criticism upon the same grounds. +Owing to overhasty construction and to a lack of requisite tests of +their genuineness, an appreciable deficiency has occurred in the +quality of the material produced. Due to this occasion psychoanalysis +is answerable for engendering in the public mind certain conceptions +which are utterly without a basis in fact. Coupled with this want of +moderation, certain publicity experts have disseminated a wide range +of literature embodying a mass of disastrous misapprehension. In mere +zeal for a market they have circulated it broadcast amid all manner +of suggestible, because unconscious, individuals and communities. +Unconscious doctrines, however, cannot be promulgated except from +unconscious sources. When psychoanalysis has achieved a sufficiently +impersonal and far-reaching outlook to apply to itself in reality +the same tests which it is now applying to others in theory, it +will realize the need of recalling, as far as is possible, the many +conceptual products of its overhasty output and of offering instead a +more scientifically controlled and a more adequately tested summation +of views such as are suited to serve as an ultimate interpretation of +human consciousness.[43] + +There is a characterological aspect of human consciousness which +psychoanalysis has yet to consider. By character I do not mean the +habituations of personal bigotry. I have in mind a characterology +that is racial and that furthers the conscious integrations of man +as expressive of his societal life as a whole. Thus far, instead of +regarding the personality of man as a societal aggregate assembled of +the elements comprising individual men, psychoanalysis has tended to +create artificial divisions within this organic unity. Unconsciously +influenced by a division based upon the bias of its own arbitrary +alternatives, psychoanalysis has assumed contrasts of behaviour which +completely lack the foundations of an organismic inclusiveness. + +Perhaps the most unwarranted of such conceptual contrasts, because +most harmful and far-reaching in the confusion it entails, is the +artificial discrimination connoted under the terms homosexuality +and heterosexuality. From an organismic viewpoint the alternatives +presupposed in such a distinction are traceable alone to the +unconscious ambivalence within the psychoanalytic system itself. From +an inclusive position it will be seen that in the systematization +underlying the contrasting concepts homo- and heterosexuality, the +psychoanalyst himself has fallen a prey to the contrasting images of +hope and fear, “good” and “bad,” underlying the alternatives of his own +absolute system. + +In a situation that is organically false, an organically false reaction +is the inevitable response. As long as sentimentality--the unconscious +projection of the flattering likeness of one’s own ego--dominates, +as now, all clinical procedure, the tendency to inversion or +image-substitution that underlies the psychoanalytic system itself will +necessarily render what is now the purely fanciful isolation of the +so-called homosexual complex inaccessible to consciousness. + +It is the tacit assumption among psychoanalysts as among sexologists +generally that the condition described by Freud as unconscious +“homosexuality” deserves recognition as a true biological phenomenon, +and accordingly they tend to concede it place in the social scheme. +Since the analytic approach is not societal, the analyst necessarily +gives to the homosexual inversion a position that is positive and +static. Whether the case is regarded as “curable” or “incurable” it +is customarily treated as an objective disease-entity. Many instances +of so-called “analysis” that I have known have consisted in nothing +else than overcoming through suggestion (consensual assurance) a +patient’s social resistance to this type of adaptation, notwithstanding +that to this end there were pressed into clinical service the +external adjustments of active heterosexuality. This conception is as +unfortunate as it is unnecessary. The adaptation of the homosexual +disorientation within the societal consciousness is organically as +impossible as is the adaptation of the disorientations of paranoia in +the organically societal aggregate. “Normally” the adaptation of both +phases of inversion are a commonplace, but that it is so is but an +added commentary on normality and its collective unconsciousness. + +That the natural expression of sex is the union between man and woman +is indisputable. The concomitance between the sex of man and the sex of +woman is self-evident. Being organic, this reproductive convergence of +the male and female of a species is a process that occurs spontaneously +and without intervention. No dissertation is required to establish +this view. There is, however, the need to set forth clearly a factor +entering into human behaviour that is not spontaneous and to render +conscious the conditions now obtaining unconsciously among us through +the artificial intervention of this extraneous factor. When we spoke +of the reactions of the child to the early influences of inducement +and prohibition (suggestion and repression) corresponding respectively +to the mental images of good and bad, we saw that “good” coincides +with the individual’s personal advantage as reflected in the social +approval about him, and that “bad” represents his personal disadvantage +as likewise reflected in his social surroundings. In the presumptive +absolute of our arbitrary images of good and bad, the system of +behaviour thus unconsciously begotten in us assumes sponsorship even of +the primary and organic instinct of mating. Not even this fundamental +impulse of our human behaviour is safe from the infringements of our +self-reflective alternatives of good and bad with their attendant +measures of individual advantage. Accordingly, the organic and inherent +impulse of mating is henceforward seen from the point of view of +personal self-interest. A common, societal instinct of reproduction +experiences thus the inversion of a secret, personal aim. + +This secret element of personal advantage and acquisitiveness that has +come to mar the free and natural expression of man’s mating impulse +is fully attested in the covert self-consciousness that characterizes +his “in-love” attitude. In the alternative attitude of good and bad +that necessarily limits him to the issues of advantage or disadvantage +for himself, man no longer approaches the essentially unitary instinct +of love with unity in himself. Either there is the response in the +individual that is “good” in that it concedes the social exaction +(positive suggestion of self-advantage), or the response that is +“bad” in that it repudiates the social consensus (negative suggestion +of self-disadvantage, i.e., repression). In the first instance the +individual accepts the alternative of the socially approved adaptation +of heterosexuality, in the second the individual’s reaction issues in +the alternative of the socially repudiated adaptation of homosexuality. +In either alternative the factor of psychic inversion and self-interest +is equally decisive. In the first it is presented in the form that is +the individual’s response to the consensual suggestion, in the second +it is presented in the form that is his response to the consensual +repression. What is significant is the fact that, as each type of +response is an alternation on the basis of the social suggestion or the +social repression answering, in the first instance, to the desire of +personal gain or approval and, in the second, to the fear of personal +loss or disfavour, both types of response, in returning upon self and +self-interest for their satisfaction, are equally _ego-sexual_. + +As is universally the case with reactions based on the unconscious +contrasts of good and bad, in the choice of either alternative there +are preserved the elements actuating both. In the heterosexual +alternative there is the unconscious presence of the homosexual +component, in the homosexual alternative there is the unconscious +presence of the heterosexual component. The reason is that the +underlying factor that equally determines each of these seemingly +opposed reactions is the deeper unconscious inversion of man’s +ego-sexuality with its inevitable alternatives of self-advantage based +upon our artificial differentiations of good and bad. + +The conclusion is unavoidable that we shall have to reconstruct +entirely our conception of the interrelationship of man and woman +in respect to the instinct of sex. As has been said before, hetero- +and homosexuality are purely fictitious discriminations. Like the +distinctions presumably expressed by the conception extravert and +introvert, they embody no discrimination _in kind_ whatever, but are +terms for the alternative aspects of one and the same thing. As the +concept connoted by these terms may with advantage be replaced by the +concept connoted by the terms allocentric and autocentric, so the +concept expressed by the terms heterosexuality and homosexuality may +with propriety give way to a concept such as we may correspondingly +express by the terms _allosexual_ and _autosexual_--terms which do not +indicate a difference of content between two reactions but merely an +alternation of aspect in one and the same reaction. With a view, then, +to what I feel will afford a clearer and more encompassing outlook +upon the problems of our human adjustment, both individual and social, +I shall, wherever convenient, dispense with the term “homosexuality,” +because of the needlessly misleading stigma it imposes upon the +individual, and use instead of _homosexual_ the term _autosexual_; +correspondingly, instead of the term _heterosexual_, with its equally +misleading social implication of “right” comportment, the expression +_allosexual_ will be used, it being understood that by these contrasts +I mean the dual alternations of self-love due to man’s unconscious +repudiation of the organic instinct of sex in favour of the personal +inversions of sexuality. + +Sexuality is the _effort_ of conjunction of peripheral and visceral +spheres, but because of the interposition of the personal or +self-reflexive element, with its necessarily inverse aim, there results +on the one hand (socially) the mere apposition of periphery with +periphery, entailing an inverse erotism or autosexuality in the form +of narcism (self-reflection), or unconscious homosexuality proper; +and on the other (centrally) the mere (psychic) enfolding of visceral +with visceral, entailing an inverse erotism in the form of autoerotism +or ego-sexuality proper. Sex, on the contrary, is the spontaneous, +effortless and non-personal conjugation of the organismic poles +comprising male and female. This distinction between sexuality and sex +explains the ulterior quality of a sophisticated and self-conscious +“in-love” state representing _contrast_, in replacement for the +organismic love-state representing _identification_. Hence sexuality is +but the temporary self-appeasement of a reciprocal adjustment, whereas +sex is the permanent self-realization of a mutual co-ordination.[44] + +A consideration that cannot fail to be of interest to the psychoanalyst +is the obviously complementary relation of the two types, the +allocentric and the autocentric, in respect to one another, and its +undoubted significance as regards the instinct of mating among the more +conscious personalities such as we should expect to follow the unifying +process of analysis. The marked unconscious affinities observable +between the two types I take to be a fact of general recognition +among psychoanalysts if not among the laity itself. But unconscious +affinities, being infantile or adaptive in character, are obviously +attachments of an ego-sexual nature. It is an organic corollary, +however, which in its social implication is unconsciously blinked by +psychopathologists, that an individual who is infantile or unweaned +or ego-sexual is in his objective sexual interest also _de facto_ +ego-sexual--ego-sexuality here being nothing else than the extension +of the ego-sexual or autoerotic mode into the sexual objective of +another individual. If, as would appear, normality is the expression of +the unweaned and unconscious mode of society generally, it is not to +be wondered at that the admission of this fact has been so generally +suppressed, since there follows logically the distasteful conclusion +that, unconsciously, normality or society in general, which includes us +all, is ego-sexually constellated. + +Accustomed as we are to think so much more readily in objective than in +subjective terms, the conception of ego-sexuality as the determinant of +the relationship between persons of the opposite sex, or the conception +of our supposedly “normal” or “heterosexual” society as being in +essence ego-sexual, has not yet entered the analytic consciousness, nor +is it likely to do so without a violent storm of social protest and +“resistance.” But the typical expression of sexual union, as it exists +among “normals,” is redolent of this inverted bias. The folk-reaction +of the social mind represented in the custom of marriage, if clearly +confronted, reveals throughout the unmistakable signs of this +alternative. If we note carefully the countenance of this social +reaction, we cannot fail to observe that its instigation is based upon +the mutual desire to mollify, to “please.” + +Hence, marriage is for the most part a process of mutual adjustment +of the ego-sexual claims upon one another of the two parties +involved. After all, the “oneness” of marriage is an achievement +due to the pooling of the private unconscious of the two parties to +the arrangement. It is the permanent coalition of the unconscious +of both, collectively, with a view to the temporary guarantees of +each, severally. For marriage is an arrangement in accordance with +the terms of which each party to the covenant secretly withdraws +from his organic place as a societal element, in exchange for his +fanciful sovereignty as a circumscribed domestic aggregate! That +is, in marriage two unconscious elements have merged into a single +unconscious entity. Through the self-reflection one achieves in his +unconscious mate, through the self-reduplication he achieves in his +unconsciously begotten offspring, one’s family is again but the +unconscious of the individual freshly reinforced through a subtle +recourse to symbolic replacement. It is the substitution of the single, +self-limited social group for the all-inclusive, organic consonance +of the societal aggregate. Thus the social cluster comprising the +family is but the _symbol_ of the societal unity comprising one’s own +confluent life. The transaction is, in reality, nothing else than the +unconscious reinstatement of the early childish mode of separateness, +fear and dependence, such as actuated the mental bias of one’s own +domestic traditions. In the marriage and homemaking of each of us +there is but the unconscious transmission of the marriage and home +of our parents.[45] For as the child is nurtured amid a codified +system of opinionativeness, this self-reflective (suggestive) habit +about him engenders a self-reflective habit within him. Having early +formed an image of himself in the social reflection with which he is +surrounded, he begins early to examine his own reactions from the +sector of this habitual self-reflection. It is in this reflection of +the self that consists the repercussion of consciousness constitutive +of self-consciousness or the manifestation we unconsciously personify +as _behaviour_--an off-hand term for a reaction which we have not yet +begun half adequately to analyze. + +As self-consciousness is of its nature personal and adaptive, it +does not lend itself to analysis on the static basis of a merely +adaptive and personal premise. Its true analysis is the realization +on an inclusive basis of a genetic and relativistic principle of +consciousness. In the mere match-making of our pictorial affects, human +relationship has become throughout artificial. It is this private +impersonation of affects which we have substituted for the common +unity of our real affects. In this mutual comparison of reflected +impressions our relation to one another becomes a superficial and +meaningless balancing of one affect against another. This artificial +substitutive quality has entered even into the expression of man’s +mating and reproductive impulse, and it is blindly venting itself +to-day in the merely mutual attritions of our so-called sexual life. +But this suggestive, substitutive image-systematization of sexuality +is the direct antithesis to the unification and spontaneity of sex. +Where there is unity of spirit, the symbol of unity expressed in +bodily congress assumes a totally different significance. Sexuality is +the mere apposition of bodies in place of a unity of spirit. In this +apposition of the personal is the very abrogation of personality. It +is the mark of sexuality that it is autocratic and exclusive; it is +the mark of sex that it is relative and inclusive. This bidimension or +image-substitution of sexuality is the psychological mechanism of our +sexual resistances. For resistances, after all, are but the irksome +oppression of our habitually enforced adjacencies. For this reason +marriage is habituative, suggestive, inverted. + +Wherever conditions require the isolation together of any two normal +individuals though of the same sex, over a protracted period, there +appear very unexpected phenomena in the mental reactions of the two +with respect to one another. These reactions may be noted not only +where their isolation is due to the accidents of circumstance, but also +where it is due to voluntary withdrawal from habitual associations +in the mutual interest of a common pursuit. The observation is +noteworthy that, in such instances, the dreams of each individual show +a persistently autosexual trend whose invariable object is the other, +while, on the other hand, the fancies of their days’ dreams disclose a +no less persistent criticism and repugnance on the part of each toward +the other. It is the more interesting that this identical ego-sexual +reaction (secret antagonism) is found also in two persons of unlike +sex under the mental conditions of isolation involved in the mutual +pursuance of self-interests represented in the bilateral attitude of +marriage. + +It is not inevitable that marriage should be the expression of +inversion we make of it at present. Marriage is inverted or ego-centred +not because of an organic necessity but because, in its mistakenness of +form or its violation of the organic inherencies, marriage, like all +mere external forms, is not biological but symbolic. In the present +stage of society’s arrested growth marriage is not the outcome of a +mode of societal confluence but of a mode of personal preference. +It is the unconscious enforcement of a self-predicated want, not +the conscious acceptance of an organically determined need. When I +speak of marriage, I have not in mind the permanent union of man and +woman that is biological and true and that is the natural basis of +our human society. I refer to the _mental attitude_ toward marriage +that we have come to substitute unconsciously for marriage itself. In +place of the bipolar position of man and woman, we have substituted +the bidimensional attitude of male and female. Because of this mental +attitude of “marriage,” people whose lives might be mutually necessary +become, on the contrary, merely inevitable to one another. It is again +our paramount image of self with its resultant reflection in the +bidimensional picture. But whatever is pictorial is personal, whatever +is personal is factional, and wherever there lurks the unconscious +element of the factional or separative, union is organically +interdicted. + +Glancing even superficially at the obvious aim toward the mutual +exchange of egoistic satisfactions and at the give-and-take of +superficial coquetries and accommodations generally characterizing +the marriage relationship, there is ample evidence of the completely +infantile, undeveloped, ego-sexual nature of the motives determining +such unions. If one considers the large number of women who are +supported by men in the capacity of sexual partners, and observes their +obsessive self-ornamentation, their voluptuous exaggerations of dress +and manner, their liberal use of perfume and cosmetics with which to +enhance their personal appeal, and considers correspondingly the large +sums of money contributed annually by their votaries in maintenance +of such sexual commodities, the ego-sexual character of such mutual +arrangements is not far to seek. + +In contrast with this state of affairs in the sexual life of “normals,” +it has for some time interested me to observe the unconscious +autosexuality invariably presented by neurotic individuals. The +unconscious character of it, whether latent or actual, always manifests +itself in a privately repressed, unsatisfactory form or in a form +that invariably entails conflict. It has long seemed to me that this +repressed and tormenting expression of the tendency to the enfolded +satisfactions of autosexuality, or to the unconscious extension of +one’s ego-sexuality to others of one’s own sex, is but the aim of +the personality toward an organic unification deflected into the +symbolic form represented in _bodily_ identification or in objective +likeness.[46] It has further seemed to me that such a symbolically +distorted urge, if converted into its true meaning, would issue in +an organic identification representing a completer, more conscious +order of union. I am not unmindful that in the fixity of our own +symbolic substitutions our tendency is to make such organic conceptions +needlessly difficult of assimilation. In a paper read before a +psychoanalytic meeting several years ago[47] I gave expression to this +same view, and my meaning was so completely misconceived that I was +actually quoted subsequently as having said that I considered neurotic +autosexuality (I then suggested the use of the term homo-phyllism) +to embody a “higher expression of love” than that represented in +allosexuality. Such a statement could not be otherwise interpreted +than as an outspoken advocacy of homosexuality! It is, of course, not +to be denied that the union _typified_ in the allosexual relationship +is alone an adequate expression of sex-unity. But it is adequate only +as organic unity or conscious love, not as sexuality or self-love, the +basis on which at present it very generally rests. + +Biologically, autosexuality cannot be other than essentially infantile +and regressive in character and as such it runs counter to the basic +aims of analysis. But emphasis should be placed upon our need of +recognizing to what a very large extent actual autosexuality exists +under the objective symbols of allosexuality. Marriage, I repeat, as +it largely obtains in the present stage of society, fairly teems with +this infantile mode of sexuality. As the dominant impulse between +“lovers” with their coy, infantile aim of secret self-satisfaction +amply attests, the relationship, under whatever guise of exterior +circumstance it may be concealed, is necessarily egoistic or autosexual. + +I feel sure that sooner or later it will be recognized that +allosexuality and autosexuality are synonymous, that these seemingly +contrary adaptations are really but alternate aspects of one and +the same thing. Sooner or later it will be seen that, while the +neurosis entails in every instance an autosexual undercurrent, it +is an expression of autosexuality that is organically intolerable, +and that the social adaptation underlying normality is equally +the unconscious expression of a collectively assimilated ego- or +autosexuality. Thus our pseudo-normality is an unconsciously conceded +(socially assimilated) inversion to this infantile mode of sexuality in +substitution for the original organic instinct of sex. This is why it +has seemed to me that in the neurotic reaction, for all its distortion, +there is presented a progressive urge of evolution--that in the very +distortion of the neurotic personality there is the premonition of a +type of a clearer, more conscious social order. In his distorted effort +to assimilate to himself a vicarious, objective (bodily) likeness, +the neurotic expresses symbolically, unconsciously, an inherent urge +toward a subjective, organic identification. In this view normality +with its allosexual reaction is psychologically more autosexual than +the reaction we recognize as unconscious or neurotic autosexuality. +Although this repressed expression is symbolically the more infantile +and regressive of the two, yet, of the two, it is potentially far the +more competent to the truly complemental relationship whose fulfilment +is merely symbolized in the allosexual adaptation as it commonly exists +among us. What really underlies the conflict of the neurotic or the +unconsciously autosexual is his organic urge toward a completer oneness +of life. His autosexuality is but symbolic. It is a disposition the +essence of which is what I have elsewhere called “homophyllic”[48] +and the organic culmination of which can be realized only in the +unification of the complementary systems embodied in a corresponding +monophyllic union. + +In the beginning of my analytic work I fully believed with other +psychoanalysts that there was a condition of neurotic or “unconscious +homosexuality” distinguishable from what I then believed to exist +conversely as “heterosexuality.” I was too theoretical, habituative, +academic, too limited in the freedom of unsystematized observation to +recognize that sexuality, as it now exists socially, is everywhere +of one cloth, that all sexuality being narcistic is “homosexuality,” +that it is of its nature an expression of the infantile desire of +self-supremacy, of self-seeking, of self-gratification, that, in a +word, sexuality is synonymous with autosexuality or ego-erotism. As +homosexuality is but the projection socially of what is ego-sexuality +individually, sexuality or ego-erotism is the very essence of +homosexuality or homo-erotism. But, like the rest of my confrères, it +was my habit to refer the question of health or disorder of adaptation +to the artificial distinction between heterosexuality and “unconscious +homosexuality” respectively. In other words, my criterion of health +and growth was formerly the merely unconscious conventionalization of +sex, the mere procuring for it, as it were, the external formality of +the social blessing. It is only in the last years that I have seen in +its fuller clarity that health is essentially unity and identity of +personality as contrasted with the introversions of an unconsciously +alternative adaptation. Only in the last years have I seen that as +life and sex are one, so are self-worship and sexuality one, and that +the real contrast as seen in the light of the health and growth of +the organism, whether individual or societal, is the contrast between +the organic instinct of sex on the one hand and the introversions of +sexuality on the other.[49] + +It is the unerring test of unconscious autosexuality that the quest +that manifestly registers itself under this artificial form of +expression can find its answer only in a realization which, in its +true sex determination (love), is latently the precise reverse of this +expression. In the attitude of lust and autosexuality toward the male +there is presaged love or sex toward the woman; in the attitude of lust +or autosexuality toward the female is the earnest of love or sex toward +the man. On the contrary, it is the unfailing test of the delusionally +systematized autosexuality (ego-sexuality), which is social or +“normal,” that the quest thus recorded in its manifest content can +find its satisfaction only in the no less manifest “reliefs” of a +_seemingly_ opposite sexual determination (allosexuality). In the +self-lusts (autosexuality) of the male, his objective is the body of +the female with her autosexuality or self-lusts; in the self-lusts +(autosexuality) of the female, her objective is the body of the male +and his self-lusts or autosexuality. In the satisfactions of these +objective conquests lies the whole meaning of sexuality, as in the +inclusiveness of a subjective unification lies the meaning of love. + +The type of union biologically natural and fitting is that between +man and woman as unified personalities. But in the present repressed, +vicarious, infantile state of the individual and society, such a union +is as yet in very large measure merely a type. To make of the union +of personalities something more than a type--to make of it an organic +reality--there is needed some such unification within each through +the personality of the other as would be realized in a relationship +representing the union of the two complementary systems, the peripheral +and central, the societal and individual. The separation of these +two systems we have seen to be the response to external repression +from without, and in the re-uniting of these artificially separated +complements there would be re-established the originally confluent +organism, individual and societal, such as alone embodies the free and +unified personality. + +Union is not a thing of body in the contrasts of male and female with +their artificial dissociation from life. The female in her rôle of +costly _objet d’art_ and the male as collector of such wares do not +approach in this mere surface affinity a consummation even remotely +akin to any such organic reality. No man or woman ever understood the +other’s body who has not understood the other’s mind; no man or woman +ever understood the other’s mind, who has not understood the body of +the other. It is only in an organic identification such as is inclusive +of both that there is fulfilled the united understanding, in both, +of the mind and body of each. Union is of personality as realized in +man and woman through the fulfilment in each of their identification +with life in its totality, the one (male or female) embodying the +peripheral, societal, allocentric complement, the other (male or +female) the internal, central, autocentric complement, the two divided +personalities realizing in the welding of each with each the organic +unity of both. + +In saying “male or female” I am advisedly avoiding assigning +specifically either sex element to either organic rôle. In general the +societal or peripheral rôle and the visceral or central rôle would +seem analogous to the respective rôles of male and female, in the +fact that the former is more fittingly adapted biologically to the +external demands of life as hunter and provider and the latter to the +more retired, enclosed conditions of life pertaining to the functions +of conservation and maternity. There is the further parallel that in +the female the reproductive organs are organs of receptivity, lying +deeper, more centrally within her organism, while those of the male +are more contiguous to the external skeletal tissues and are invasive +in function. Nevertheless, because of the frequent transposition +between the two sexes of the traits supposedly specific of each--a far +more frequent transposition than the conventional division between +the sexes affords opportunity to observe, the woman being often the +more aggressive, the man the more retired of the two--to assign +forehandedly one or the other complement to one or the other sex is +arbitrary and without warrant. This is true particularly in respect to +the distinction between the neurotic exaggerations of type described +as auto- and allocentric, in which the conventional psychosexual +differentiations are practically indeterminable. + +These and kindred reflections lead me to feel that the term +“opposite” sex is subjectively an unfortunate misnomer. To the +neurotic especially, whose life has been crippled through repression +in response to external opposition, all “oppositeness” is felt as +a menace. Consider the inhibiting intimidations to the subjective +child, resulting from the implied oppositeness between teacher and +pupil, that characterizes the attitude of our prevailing pedagogical +systems. Consider to what extent our systems of education are really +barriers to education. In the very idea of oppositeness the child is +instinctively revolted. His organism shrinks from it as from a blow. +It is under such circumstances that, in his sense of the oppositeness +of the sexes, the individual’s unconscious recourse is to the sex that +is not opposite his own. Yet here too, as we have seen, he has only +turned to the objective symbol of unity, and the inherent opposition +remains. For the symbol of unity or that which stands instead of unity +is itself opposition. Thus in the neurotic’s unconscious recourse to +this symbolic or autosexual form of identification the opposition or +separation is only accented anew. + +Organically, or from the point of view of personality, woman is not +opposite to man but each is the complement of the other. As in a +current of electricity the flow between its two termini is dependent +not upon their opposition but upon the functional confluence between +its positive and negative poles, each being incomplete in the absence +of the other, so is the relationship of sex between two organisms; it +is confluent and not opposite, it is of the nature of complement and +not of contrast. And so the need of the neurotic, as of the normal +individual, is such a completion of his personality in the organic +complement of his mate as is co-extensive with his unification with +life in its organic compass. + +In the symbolic unification or unconscious autosexuality represented +in an objective likeness or bodily identification there is but +the short-circuiting of a true organic unification. Where it has +occurred in personalities of a high intellectual or social order, +the phenomenon has tended to be accounted for through recourse to +a conceptual accommodation that is more generous than scientific. +A plea has been advanced for the acceptance of the comrade-love of +such individuals on grounds of the high character of the expression +of their inverted tendency. To this end there has been invoked the +conception of an “intermediate sex.” But in this undoubtedly hospitable +envisagement there is to be seen the sentimentality that is as always +but inverted sentiment. The conception of an intermediate sex is +the creation of an intermediate imagination. An intermediate sex is +a biological solecism. It represents the attempt of a divided mind +to reconcile a divided state of feeling that is prior to it. It is +again the arbitrary assumption of opposition and the vicious circle +of separateness and unconsciousness. As for the high order of many +of its representatives, there is no high order of infantilism or +autosexuality. The existence of a high order, moral and intellectual, +of this type only imposes upon its representatives the greater societal +obligation to understand and encompass its meaning. Their need is to +relinquish the infantile distortion of life symbolized in this inverted +bias of their unconscious autosexuality, and concurrently to enter into +the organic realization of their innate consonance. It is only when +this organic inherency has become disturbed, whether neurotically or +normally, singly or societally, that there occurs the reflex effort +toward vicarious restitution, resulting either in the exaggerations +of self-assertiveness or in an over-emphasized self-derogation +representing respectively the spurious bravadoes of an alternative +maleness on the one hand and the artificial propitiations of an +alternative femaleness on the other. + +As has been said, because of our objective, perceptual attitude toward +one another, our contacts, whether mediated through visual, auditory, +tactile or other stimuli, are necessarily superficial and attributive. +This superficial registry of stimuli includes also the sphere of our +sexological responses. Thus in civilized man the sexual reaction, in +both male and female, is restricted to the superficial sexual zones. +Because of man’s repression of this essential sphere of his feeling, +the natural flow of the sexual impulse is artificially intercepted. +Hence the genital stimulus in man is limited to the superficial +tactile organs. It does not radiate to the deeper visceral structures +constituting its nuclear terminus--in the male the rectal, prostatic +and crural zones, in the female the rectal, the deeper vaginal zones +and the cervix uteri (the homologue in the female of the prostate in +the male). It is because of this intercepted radiation of the natural +sexual response that there has arisen the necessity for the formulation +of an “anal complex”--a complex that is regarded by psychoanalysts as +existing quite sporadically in certain neurotic individuals and that is +by no means recognized as a condition common to the race of civilized +man! For naturally with the interception of the sexual impulse at its +nuclear pole, or with repression of the visceral sex zone, there can +only result in its stead a “complex” and along with it such artificial +sexual adaptations as have been described as intermediate. In addition +to this repression of our organic sex feeling there has occurred a +corresponding compensation in the sphere of the mental and social +life, which in the woman has led to the social adoption of the rôle +corresponding to the _mental image_ female and in the man to the +_mental image_ male. + +Among the lower orders of animals the distinction between male and +female entails no organic opposition. In one and the same organism this +bipolar condition is undifferentiated and self-contained. On the other +hand, with the mental sophistication connoted under the distinction +man and woman we have come to assume the presence of an artificial +opposition between the male and female organism. With the male element +or organism we demand the mental and physical attributes we arbitrarily +posit as “man,” with the female element or organism we demand the +mental and physical attributes we arbitrarily posit as “woman.” Thus +we repudiate the polarity that is confluent of the two elements male +and female and exact of the organism we discriminate as man that it +repudiate the characteristics we discriminate as woman, and of the +organism we discriminate as woman that it repudiate the characteristics +we distinguish as man. + +This arbitrary, unbiological dictum necessitates that a “man” shall +repress the female component within him notwithstanding that his +organism is compounded of it along with the male element. Conversely, +it makes obligatory upon the woman that she repress the male element +within her notwithstanding that it is a no less constituent factor than +the female element in composing the bipolar quality essential to the +unity of her organism. + +With this artificial condition and its edict of enforced repression +there often occurs such a one-sided development within the organism +that the result is the exaggerated reaction we see in the bilateral +extremes we have described as good and bad, as saint and sinner. It is +interesting to observe, though, that upon analysis one discovers within +the repressed sphere of the sinner’s personality all the factors that +constitute the personality of the saint, and that within the repressed +sphere of the saint’s personality, there are disclosed all the elements +that constitute the personality of the sinner. + +Such findings as we owe to our deeper penetration into individual +psychology make clearer the superficiality of our normal, social +distinctions. They afford us reason to believe that when psychiatry +has loosed itself of its superficial acceptations we shall find +that wherever the bipolar life of the organism, male or female, is +permitted to fulfil its natural expression there will be no longer the +repressed or unconscious instigation to such exaggerated distortions or +over-compensations as now issue as a result of the organic repression +of these artificially dual phases. We shall then recognize that the +“intermediate sex” is a fallacy due to discriminations that arise from +a disregard of the inclusive nature of sex. What is really apprehended +by the term intermediate sex is the _composite sex_ whereof the +unification of personality within every individual, normal as well as +neurotic, is the inherent embodiment. It is in this concomitance of the +social and nuclear systems that consists the organic co-ordination +of the individual element. Without it there is lacking the organic +correlation of the societal aggregate such as is the essential biology +of man. + +The organismic postulate here proposed sets out from the conception of +a _principle of primary identification_ within the original psychic +organism as the biological basis of consciousness.[50] Upon this +principle rests the biological significance of the unity of personality +that comprises the consonance of life, individual and societal. The +essence of the neurotic diathesis, socially and singly, is merely the +reflection within the individual of these surface diversifications of +external suggestion or repression, as more and more they infringe upon +this original consonance of the organism. This gradual replacement +of our original unity and inherency by the external inducements +of the extraneous and alternative is the whole significance of +unconsciousness. This, in reality, is the meaning of the manifold +dissimilitudes of men as compared with the unified personality of man. + +If, in the androgynous personalities represented in such autocentric +types as Buddha, Plato or Christ, there is manifested this unifying +urge of the inherent organism of man, so the allocentric personalities +of Socrates, of Napoleon and of Nietzsche are equally expressive of +this same composite urge. If this unifying urge of man’s common sex +incited the genius of an Hypatia in centuries past, it has directed +no less in our own times the creative impulse underlying the genius +of George Eliot or of Olive Schreiner. In the contemplation of such +genius we see presented the unity and concentration of personality that +is the real meaning of the artist as contrasted with the extraneous +dissipations and diversities of the average reaction-type. It is this +unity of personality that is the source of the artist’s creativeness +as it is the inspiration of his genius. This composite quality of +the sex life explains the gentler intuitions we often find in the +personality of a man. There is undoubtedly the feminine in man though +as yet he stands in fear of it. It does not wrangle or contend. It +does not calculate success. The feminine in man is the artist in man. +It is because of this that there can be in the societal unity of the +artist’s intuitive instinct no place for the illusion that is called +“the public.” To him “the public” is but the collective repudiation +of the common soul of man--a repudiation that corresponds to this +same disavowal within the private soul of each of us. Unmoved by its +clamorous demands, the artist feels within these manifestations of the +public mind the common soul that underlies it, and senses within it +the pain of denied needs identical with his own. This is the unfailing +intuition of the artist. It is because of this sense of the unity of +life that no artist was ever yet successful, that his triumph or his +failure are above all public concern. + +And so by “the artist” I mean the quality of personality that is +enticed by no external advantage, that entertains no indirection, is +unmoved by the inverse compensations of egoism and the unconscious +wish. Such a quality is organically, societally self-contained and +subsists without object. It does not sue for favour nor seek to +please. In this confluence of the personality of the artist as of the +neurotic, in this creative concentration of man’s genius, whether +articulate or denied, is embodied the societal instinct that is the +composite life of the race. This organic integrity of personality that +is the composite life of man and that is organically inseparable from +the unifying urge embodied in the impulse of mating has its clearest +intimations in the affirmations of the artist as in the frustrations of +the neurotic. In the unifying urge represented in these two opposite +extremes of reaction--an urge which shall neither impose nor accept an +adjustment extraneous to the inherent personality--is expressed the +demand for a self-realization in a unification which, being organic, +is all-inclusive.[51] + +Only in such a conjunction will man realize his original mode of +societal confluence. When such a conjunction will enable him truly +to realize in the instinct of mating the deepest need of his being, +union will no longer as now be _represented_ through juxtaposition in +the mere physical symbol of bodily interpenetration, but it will _be_ +through unification the societal reality of an organic intussusception. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF THE SOCIETAL NEUROSIS IN ITS SOCIAL IMPLICATION + + +The first demand of our organic completion through a unification with +another is a unification within oneself. From a basis of a divided self +one can look out only dividedly. From a separative mode one can judge +only separatively. If the individual embodies a symbolic replacement +within himself, others about him appear to him necessarily also as +symbolic replacements, and the degree of his resentment toward his own +separateness is the measure of his resentment toward theirs. After all, +the only implacable enemy of man is his own unconsciousness, and the +reconcilement of himself to himself the severest test of his essential +personality. Its realization is born of a patience that is not virtue +but encompassment. + +Man, in his unconsciousness, stands ever by himself and for himself. +In the separateness of his personal resistances toward the societal +organism as a whole, the individual has become marooned within his +own insular habituations. But this isolated attitude of mind is a +condition which, in our interpretation, is societally anomalous. Though +originally imposed, this condition now automatically imposes itself +upon the social personality. Thus far this organic disaffection of man +has sought alleviation in the social convivialities that are but the +syndicate of men’s collective unconscious. Men have sought to appease +their personal isolation through the accommodations of mere objective +agreement. They have substituted the symbols of social fraternization +for the actuality of man’s organic consonance. Within the unconscious +of man his secret disaffection has remained unaltered still. + +So often this statement that every man is for himself alone has +brought the rejoinder: “But why may he not be? Surely such selfishness +is natural to man.” But is it? I do not think so. Of course I +have not in mind the individual’s effort of preservation in the +interests of his natural life and growth. I have in mind the private +differentiations due to man’s _mental attitude of self-distinction_. +In the conservation of interests incident to the individual’s instinct +of physical preservation, man’s native experience entails no secret +_self-conscious_ design. But it is the tell-tale of man’s mental +attitude of personal separatism that he is constantly under the +necessity to _pretend_ that he is not separative or for himself. This +universal pretence reveals a biologically specious condition of life +for which we feel a universal need of concealment. For whatsoever +attitude of mind is not openly compatible with the personality imposes +a division of the personality. A socially divided personality is a +socially insecure personality. Back of the social mind that pretends +it is not concerned exclusively for self lies a basis of social fear +and distrust. Pretence is division of personality, and division of +personality is fear. If the pretence and the division are social, the +fear is social. The effort of numbers or of the social consensus to +combine in support of their mutual fear is unavailing, for a consensus +begotten of fear is an organically spurious consensus. At the heart of +it lies a secret division. This is the travesty of normality with its +secret soviet of fear. + +The analyst or the psychiatrist whose outlook is objective fails +to regard this consensual fallacy in its social as in its personal +implication. Being of the social unconscious he cannot contemplate +the social unconscious. Being himself divided he cannot realize his +own division. We all prefer the satisfaction of seeming together +socially to the reality of being together organically. We like the +seeming integrity of the social unconscious because it conceals +our own disaffection. It is only this seeming security of numerical +preponderance, however, that affords us comfortable protection +against the aberrations of the isolated, non-conformable or neurotic +personality. Nowhere is the autocracy of unconsciousness more blindly +cruel than in the mass impetus of our social consolidation. We are not +unaware of the resistance of the individual to the social consensus, +but we have yet to discover the resistance of the social consensus +to the individual. The psychopathologist has offered interesting +formulations regarding delusions of persecution, but none whatever +regarding delusions that persecute. + +The group work that has been gradually developing among my students +and myself has consisted essentially in a reversal of this habitually +objective course of the psychiatrist. Instead of studying ideas of +reference objectively as expressed in the individual, we have studied +ideas of reference subjectively as they occur socially among ourselves. +Our experience as a group has led us inevitably to the conclusion that +the personal analysis is a self-contradictory process, that only as +the individual realizes through his societal experience the futility +of the personal or private basis is it biologically possible to be +truly in harmony with a healthy and constructive environment. If our +position has any value and significance it is because it has come to +us through the daily test of an actual living experience, and because +as a societal experience it cannot fail to extend itself societally to +others also. + +Let it not be thought, however, that our efforts toward a social +analysis have proceeded upon a smooth and untroubled course. If +the individual has his “ups and downs” in the effort to unify his +consciousness on the basis of a personal analysis, he meets no less +with alternations of satisfaction and depression according as his +resistances surge or ebb in his efforts toward a social unification of +consciousness. If the individual analysis presents a situation that is +unconscious and bidimensional, a group analysis presents a condition +that is equally unconscious and bidimensional. In the bidimensional +reaction of the individual toward the personal analysis, he tends, as +we have seen, toward a permanent fixation upon the analyst which shows +itself alternately in the mental reaction of “love” or of “hate.” But +in either the personal or social situation he tends to hold tenaciously +to this new object of his infantile affect in the secret hope of +ultimately reconciling and amalgamating it with the love that underlies +still the original mother-image. Unhappily, it is the invariable +failure of the personal analysis that the patient carries his secret +purpose to a successful issue. For either he remains fastened between +the old and the new love-objects in a consolidated image-fixation upon +the analyst, or else he returns to the original love-image afforded by +the parent or to its surrogates, with or without the collateral aids of +sublimation. + +In the actual experience of our group analysis the tendency was +essentially no different. But there was an additional recourse in the +group analysis that is precluded in the personal analysis. In the +personal analysis there is a bidimensional attitude toward the analyst +that alternates constantly between infantile docility and infantile +resentment, between sentimental approbation at one time and outraged +disillusionment at another. But this alternation always occurs, of +course, within one and the same individual. In the social analysis +the situation is expressed quite differently. It was my experience +that this diversity of reaction within the group led at first to the +formation of reaction-clusters within the group, so that one unit +became consistently docile toward the analyst and resentful among +themselves, while the other unit became hostile toward the analyst and +docile toward one another. Both alternations (resentment or docility) +were, of course, equally spurious within each group of reactions. + +The practical outcome in each sub-group was very different however. In +the cluster that united against the analyst, a confederacy was formed +that presented all the features of unconsciousness we have seen to +characterize the collective reactions occurring everywhere throughout +the domain of our normal adaptation. The psychology of this reaction, +as we know, is the collective pooling of the unconscious of its members +severally, with a view to the mass support afforded each individual +within the unit separately. The result as it occurred in this cluster +was a temporary deadlock and a corresponding re-adoption of the normal +level of bidimensional standards, personal and social. + +In the cluster in which the sense of resentment was limited to +inter-reactions among its own members, while as a unit all held an +attitude of friendliness toward the analyst, there was offered a form +of group-unconsciousness that at least lent itself to progressive +analysis and resolution. But here again there was discoverable the +secret pooling of unconscious motives of personal interest and +self-protection that in no way differentiated this group division from +the former, that did not separate the “faithful” from the “unfaithful,” +nor absolve the “docile” any more than the “resentful” from a secret +complicity in the collective reaction that is the mass neurosis of +normality. + +It should be remembered that the plan of group analysis was adopted +not because I had _a priori_ found in it the logical solution of +the neurosis. Not by any means. Neither had I inductively reached +conclusions that led to any such logical determination. Not even +theoretically was there at hand anything of the nature of a _logical_ +solution. A dissociation is not logical and its solution could +not be logical. The neurosis is not a matter of the intellect and +the process of its unravelling could not have been intellectually +predetermined. As thought and affect are processes that occupy +essentially different spheres, to _think out_ a solution for a disorder +of affect is self-contradictory. To attempt to do so is beyond the +range of organic possibility. All that I had in mind in our group +undertaking was _to obtain affective conditions shared in common that +might afford a basis for the observation of affective conditions +withheld separately_. It seemed to offer the opportunity to secure a +relative and societal background against which the individual would be +enabled to view in impersonal perspective his own hitherto absolute +and personal evaluations. Up to this time I had for years worked on +the group conception in the absence of any tangible background of +experimentation. There was now needed the practical substantiation +of this group conception in the actual assembling of “analyzed” +individuals into an organized social aggregate. While the programme +of group analysis entered upon by my students and myself came into an +intensive application with the beginning of the year 1923,[52] it was +actually the summer of that year that marked the active inception of +our experiment as an organized unit, our group having then its first +opportunity of a practical test in the daily contact of its members; +so that we were still at this time only feeling our way toward the +ultimate outcome of an analysis involving more than two or three +individuals. + +In my view the really significant finding that has resulted from +our close mental association as a group has been the opportunity of +demonstrating through group experience the practical significance of +the very unexpected disclosure upon which I chanced some years ago in +my conception of the bidimensional image and its influence upon the +reactions of consciousness at large. It is this conception which has +proved to be the real foundation of our work. I am convinced that an +adjustment of consciousness, whether analytic or conventional, whether +of the laboratory or of the street, will ultimately demand that we +bring to book the very origins of our mental and social systems of +“thinking,” that we challenge our customary values of mental adaptation +at their very foundation. Our problem resolves itself into one that +shall challenge in every detail the fixed basis of an arbitrary and +unconscious position of absolutism as contrasted with the fluent +evaluations that alone pertain to a basis of conscious relativity. + +Upon the basis of our prevailing personal criterion first inculcated +through the alternative precept of good and bad, the mind of every +individual existing under our present social system is disposed +toward a dualism of outlook that renders every affective judgment of +the individual irreconcilable and self-contradictory. For a basis +that rests upon a mental _standard_ or criterion of evaluations is +necessarily moralistic and divided. A moralistic command entails a +moralistic interdiction. Every affirmation contains _in itself_ a +negation that is equal and contrary. That is, every criterion _of its +nature_ entertains its opposite. Whatsoever I must be or think or feel, +I must at the same time also not be or think or feel. Whatsoever I +believe, to that precise degree I likewise disbelieve.[53] + +This is not so simple. It is not by any means so simple as we tend to +make it. It does not merely mean, as we would like to think, that if +I love good people I do not love bad people. Not at all. That would +be obvious and a matter of fact. It would leave our absolutism quite +intact and our criteria quite unchallenged in their fallacy. It means +something far subtler than this. It means that if I love good people I +_do not_ love good people. It means that in the measure in which I love +an object, in that measure I hate that object. It means, in sum, that, +within a system of absolute measures, my concept “love” as my concept +“good” is throughout fanciful and artificial, that, in disturbing the +natural equilibrium of the organism, my mental criterion is resisted +by a counter-judgment, which, being fanciful and artificial, tends +in a precisely reverse direction at one and the same time. It means +that every mental image, arising on the basis of our present absolute +criterion, possesses unconsciously an ambivalent value. _Stating the +proposition in psycho-dynamic terms, every affective mental image is +counterbalanced by an opposite image having an attractive force that +possesses the quality of all bidimensional (or pendular) motion and +accordingly it acts with a momentum the direction of which is at every +moment precisely equal and reverse to its own impulse._ + +After many years in which I have been delving into the processes of +the unconscious and striving to unearth its intricate mechanisms, +I have come upon no phenomenon that has seemed to me of such basic +significance as this illusory mechanism of unconscious dualism and +conflict that underlies our absolute criteria of values, individual +and social. Through Freud we have learned that a psychic ambivalence +underlies the neurotic processes of the individual, but we have not yet +learned that an equal ambivalence underlies the processes of the social +unconscious. Furthermore, while Freud has shown that there is this +ambivalence of motive underlying the individual process represented +by the neurotic conflict, it remains to be seen that each term within +this ambivalent outlook is itself likewise ambivalent--that psychic +ambivalence necessarily presupposes at all times an essential condition +of ambivalence that repeatedly doubles upon itself. For, if we will +examine either term of our ambivalent proposition, we shall find that +it too is based on opposed valences. That is, on our present absolute +basis of evaluation, every term of our subjective judgment necessarily +divides and re-divides with its very inception. Not only does the +contrast between love and hate represent ambivalence, but love contains +in itself an ambivalent motive, and hate contains in itself a motive +that is equally ambivalent. And so, to whatever subjective determinant +we may turn, there is inevitably this inseparable element of contrast +due to our own subjectively bidimensional basis. + +As regards the neurosis of the individual, we have learned through +Freud that an unconscious system of images, operating to inhibit +spontaneous thought and action, is the essential meaning of this +disorder. Of course, Freud attributes such disorders of development +to an associative inadequacy resident in the individual organism. But +in the study of the social unconscious upon the inclusive basis of +a relative method of approach, we shall recognize that an identical +system of images operates to hinder the spontaneous expression of the +social organism; that as there exists a neurosis of the individual that +is due to an unconscious system of personal images, so there exists a +neurosis of the social mind due to an equally unconscious system of +social images; and finally that the latter condition within the social +consciousness as a whole is the primary and essential disorder of +which the individual manifestation is but a subsequent and secondary +symptom.[54] + +It is not possible to speak of the group basis of analysis that has +become the central feature of my own work without calling attention to +a bidimensional situation that has made itself felt within the ranks +of psychoanalysts themselves. Moreover, this situation has forced into +prominence a hitherto unrecognized impasse within our psychoanalytic +interpretations, precisely because of the inevitable conditions of an +individualistic basis of analysis. The outstanding theoretical feature +of Freud’s position toward his patients has always been a policy of +“hands off.” With the inception of psychoanalysis it has been the +signal position of Freud, and subsequently of us all, that the patient +shall be left free of all domination or direction or suggestion, that +in order that he come into a sense of adult responsibility toward his +social environment generally he must come into a responsibility toward +his own mental processes as they relate directly to the analyst. This +policy of non-interference is one which those of us who have attempted +to follow the psychoanalytic programme have adhered to with strict +conformity. But it is clear that the analyst becomes automatically the +all-engrossing criterion (transference) of the patient’s unconscious +and that unconsciously the analyst assumes toward his patient a +corresponding position of personal criterion. So that, however sincere +our intention, there has resulted what is perhaps the weakest point +in our psychoanalytic technique, a point that has warranted the most +severe criticism of our work, namely, that treatment by psychoanalysis +continues for a far too long and indefinite term. + +To offset this embarrassment recourse is now had to a procedure whereby +the analysis is brought to a conclusion at a certain definitely +assigned period--a period to be determined by the analyst according +to the circumstances in each case. The change proposed, then, is +from a course of indefinite to a course of definite duration; from +a procedure that, at least theoretically, places upon the patient +the responsibility of terminating the analysis to a procedure that +definitely takes this responsibility from him and places it in the +hands of the analyst. But, in proposing that the analyst shall at +an assignable moment in the analysis peremptorily determine upon a +definite period at which the analysis shall cease, and in formally +pronouncing that from this moment on the patient shall be cured, +we are confronted again with the deadlock of the bidimensional and +alternative. In this recourse we are merely resorting again to the +legislation of suggestion and, unconsciously falling a victim to the +pictorial concept “cure,” we are in no sense meeting the issue. For +in the criterion of the suddenly achieved “cure” we are not less the +unconscious victims of an illusory and absolute criterion than we +were victims of a criterion that is illusory and absolute when we +presumed the position that the patient must at all hazards be left in a +position of freedom toward the analysis.[55] In my view, this proposal +of psychoanalysts themselves that we no longer assume a policy of +non-interference but that we offer instead the arbitrary suggestion of +spontaneous “cure,” there is sounded the death-knell of psychoanalysis +as administered on the basis of the personal analysis. This does not +mean, however, the death-knell of the basic position of psychoanalysis +as deducible from the principle first enunciated by Freud. On the +contrary, if we would enlarge the application of psychoanalysis to +include the wider scope of our societal personality, there would be +realized the necessary advance toward the full significance of Freud’s +essential principle. + +It is admittedly a part of the purpose of the present thesis to show +that there do exist conditions which make treatment through the method +of psychoanalysis, as it is at present, needlessly long. But to reduce +the length of treatment calculated to adjust the distorted mind would +seem as unreasonable as to curtail the length of treatment intended to +adjust the distorted limb. As Freud remarked long ago, no one would +question the validity of the orthopaedist’s method because of the +length of time it requires. Why then all the outcry because of the +length of time often required by the psychoanalyst’s method? It is +my own feeling that if there are conditions which make the method of +psychoanalysis needlessly long, what is required is the analysis of +these conditions. I believe that under these circumstances the method +will automatically adjust itself. But to shorten a course of treatment +because it is long seems unintelligent to me. It seems merely shifting +from one unconscious condition to its equally unconscious alternative. + +Let us examine more closely the real alternative here. The fact +is that by reason of the dualistic basis existing in the personal +analysis, the analyst necessarily invites the indefinite continuation +of the analysis on the part of the patient, no matter what he may +theoretically say or do to the contrary. For the analyst is himself +the victim of an unconscious criterion represented in his personal +standard of “cure.” That is, he entertains for the patient an image +of self-dependence obtainable alone through psychoanalysis. But +in this standard of “cure” he entertains a wish-motive that is +self-contradictory. For, in wishing to cure a patient through a +process of self-dependence, the analyst, because of the involvement of +his personal wish toward the patient, necessarily presents his cure +through processes that interfere with self-dependence. It is again +the bidimensional dilemma of the absolute or personal criterion, and +an absolute criterion necessarily involves a wish-motive of two terms +either of which unconsciously invites its opposite. In his personal +criterion the analyst would both release a patient with a view to +the patient’s self-dependence and at the same time retain a patient +in order to make sure that his self-dependence is complete. With one +gesture he would detain him while with the other he would set him free. +This is undoubtedly an awkward deadlock. This is the very contrary +of a cure that aims at self-dependence. For the analyst, whether in +detaining or dismissing a patient, is acting for him. But, on the +basis of the criterion of the personal image, there is inevitably this +alternative. It is unescapable. + +This solicitous attitude of mind, I concede, has undoubtedly tended to +extend the course of the analysis to an indefinite duration. But does +the alternative--the arbitrary manifesto that a certain time limit +shall peremptorily conclude the analysis--really settle the issue? Does +it not rather sustain than remove the dilemma? Of course, a theoretical +assumption has been invoked that is calculated to warrant this +procedure upon psychological premises--the premises, namely, that the +analysis consists in the fanciful reproduction of the birth experience, +that the trauma in which the birth culminates physiologically must +be psychically reproduced through the trauma of sudden separation of +the personality of the patient from that of the analyst. But does +corroborating the illusory and symbolic dramatization occurring within +the neurotic mind assist such a patient in disabusing his mind of +the fallacy of the illusory and symbolic? In this alternative of a +predetermined period for a patient’s withdrawal from analysis are we +not merely having recourse to the more decisive position of the father +as contrasted with the more lenient and compromising attitude of the +mother-image? Further, in what we call the mother-father alternation +are we not again merely projecting the dualistic criterion that is our +own personal and contrasting basis of evaluation? + +In my own work I have had an opportunity to realize convincingly the +completely illusory and arbitrary character of this mother-father +alternation. This has been shown in the fact that patients undergoing +analysis with me have turned to my assistant, Mr. Shields, in the +thought that they would find in him a less severe analyst than in +myself, while patients who were being analyzed by Mr. Shields have +turned to me in a similar hope. Needless to say, in either case, the +patients were equally disappointed in their quest. Yet this alternation +would have continued indefinitely had not a solution been found +elsewhere, namely, under conditions of a social analysis in which +a personal attachment is not permitted the conditions of lodgment +necessary for completing the personal illusion of permanence and +fixation. + +I have come to the definite conclusion that in the individual analysis +the neurotic patient pulls the wool over the eyes of the analyst and +inevitably comes out the victor, because unconsciously the analyst is +inevitably on the patient’s side. Besides, to show sufficient interest +in an individual to sit with him in personal conference daily or three +times weekly (whatever the routine may be) is to indicate to the very +susceptible emotions of the neurotic patient that his presence is +personally desirable. The situation is only interpretable on the part +of the neurotic patient, with his unfulfilled personal emotions, as +the implication that those emotions are fully reciprocated personally +on the part of the analyst. For with whomsoever we enter into a +personal situation of mutual secrecy we are in a situation of mutual +complicity. In the secrecy and confidence of the individual analysis, +in which there is the close, private, specialized relationship of one +individual to another, there is the tacit disavowal in each of the +commonness of the socially prevalent quality of all unconsciousness. +As long as there is a private and personal system resident within the +analyst, he necessarily corroborates the private and personal system +resident within the patient in front of him. The fallacy of the private +system is the illusion of personal secrecy. Clinically, it is the +secrecy of unconsciousness that is the backbone of unconsciousness. +Though a patient divulge in minutest detail all the data entering into +his unconscious experience, he yet retains his unconsciousness if he +retains a sense of secrecy toward it. + +In our group activity, as we have seen, there were several, who in +refusing to meet the organic demand for a social amalgamation of +their personality, were forced unconsciously to seek the protective +regression afforded either in family, in friends, or in some form of +defence-reaction that led to the isolated activities of mere social +or normal connivance. On the other hand, others, with no less motive +of personal defence-reaction, sought protection in the alternative +of family union which they contrived to secure among themselves, and +unconsciously assumed collectively that I, as the analyst, could be +arbitrarily delegated by them to the rôle of _pater-mater noster!_ As +I have said, there was thus formed once more an unconscious cluster, +a cluster, however, that was no less an unconscious form of social +encapsulation than the first. + +Biologically it is the natural process that with the growth of their +strength offspring become less and less attached or dependent upon +the parent and that concomitantly there is more and more aptitude for +equal give-and-take activities or play with their fellows, at first +with brothers and sisters and later with those of their congeners with +whom chance affords association. Of course, though, if the parent has a +mental background that attaches the child artificially to him through +the image-suggestion of omnipotence, then, on the basis of our present +individual and social adaptation, the child cannot find in any of his +contacts a natural medium of association. Although the child may leave +his natural parent and associate objectively with his congeners, he +carries with him the image of the parent, and naturally he foists this +image upon all with whom he comes in contact. At the same time all who +come in contact with him equally foist upon him the image of _their_ +omnipotent parent. Our position is that _as this image is not personal +but social it cannot be personally but only socially resolved_. + +The point would seem to be that the child cannot look for companionship +in the mother or father as long as he holds the mother or father in +the light of an image or criterion. Neither can he come into simpler +relationships with his fellows on the basis of this criterion of the +mother-image without investing the personalities of his associates with +an equal image or criterion. The difficulty of the personal analysis +is the preservation of an image-situation the while one endeavours +theoretically to dispel the image. But in the natural give-and-take +of human beings in their work and play activities under conditions of +social analysis, there is afforded the reality of a social equalization +that renders untenable the secret and obsessive fixation with which we +merely _look on_ one another from the background of the bidimensional +picture. + +The result of our group affiliation, to express it symbolically, has +been a family of “good” and “bad” children, of whom some desired to +run away from home while others were content to remain beside the +family hearth. Socially, the result was a bidimensional division or +alternative that exactly parallels the division or alternative within +the individual. But there is this significant difference between the +personal and the social analysis. In the individual the component that +is unwelcome may be permanently repressed, while in the alternatives +represented socially it is possible to stimulate these components into +repeated recognition through the constant clashing resultant upon +placing the opposed elements, represented by the alternate issues, +under conditions of socially irritating contrast or competition. +In the social analysis there is no letting sleeping dogs lie. Once +the unconscious of one alternative reaction has been set upon the +other, the fight is to the finish. There is not the private recess +of personal secrecy into which one may retreat. There is not the +recourse to self-partiality that allows a smoothing over of unpleasant +reminiscences and a successful substituting of more flattering +condolences. + +According to our group or social conception of the neurosis it is +assumed that the causative element in the production of these disorders +is social or phyletic and that the correction of these disorders must +proceed upon a social or phyletic basis. Our position is that the +individual cannot be healthy whose consciousness is the outgrowth of +an unhealthy social mind about him. It, therefore, becomes the essence +of our group conception that the disorder of the individual presented +_manifestly_ in the individual’s “symptoms” may only be corrected +through the analysis of the social processes constituting _latently_ +the individual’s collective medium.[56] + +As we first learned from Freud and as has been corroborated through +researches in psychoanalysis made independently of Freud, the neurosis +is synonymous with the repression of the instinctive life of man, and +in the prevailing interpretation of psychoanalysis the remedy lies in +the successful adaptation of the personal satisfaction of sexuality +expressed both in direct physiological release and in the equivalents +of sublimation. It is our position that this interpretation is far +too narrow, that in interpreting the neurosis as due primarily to +disorders within the sphere of man’s reproductive instinct, there is +left out of account the disorders of instinct due to the obstruction +of man’s tribal or congeneric life and to the consequent interruption +of the creative expression of his personality as a societal unit. +Our feeling is that sexuality, as it now exists, is very generally +of an over-stimulated or obsessive character, owing to the undue +and greatly aggravated insistence that has been vicariously brought +to bear upon this sphere. In the absence of the natural outlets of +man’s societally instinctive expressions through the common avenues +of concerted work and play, the function natural to the physiological +process of reproduction has been overburdened and inflated out of all +proportion to its primary significance. While, as a consonant part of +the congeneric instinct of man, sex is an undoubtedly powerful urge, in +the self-interested and bidimensional bias of its autosexual, personal +quest, this manifestation has become but a symbolic exaggeration of the +natural instinct of sex. This exaggerated condition is due secondarily, +however, to a repression of the reproductive faculty of man as +naturally expressed in the creative interests of his common societal +activities. As our give-and-take expressions among our fellows develop +into activities that are reciprocally creative, in the same measure +our obsessive drive toward the satisfactions of sexuality, whether +repressed or indulged, will cease to dominate human personality in its +present completely unconscious and bidimensional image insistence.[57] + + + + +CHAPTER X + +ULTIMATE RESOLUTION OF THE SOCIETAL NEUROSIS IN ITS PERSONAL IMPLICATION + + +I well recognize that in its matter this essay offers little that is +new. What I have sought to do is rather to speak of our human reactions +in the large from the basis of the altered consciousness of the handful +of men and women whose group experience, as gradually it has grown +and gathered strength and cohesion among us, has permitted the more +subjective or societal realization of these reactions. But though it +is true that there is little that is new in the matter of this essay, +yet, in so far as the collective differences existing among us as a +group have been allowed slowly to diffuse themselves gradually into the +solution of our common acceptance of one another, it seems to me that +in its mode at least our position offers an approach that brings us a +step closer to the increasingly urgent problem of our human adjustment. + +After all, the intrinsic mode underlying our conception is the real +significance of our conception. To understand our position the +reader’s only recourse is to repudiate the bidimensional alternatives +of extrinsic moralities based upon precepts of a personalistic or +self-restricted behaviourism. For the position of this thesis will be +little understood in the light of the accustomed interpretations of +the conventional social mind. Because of the unconscious bias of its +own mental absolute it will appear to the social polity that, in the +altered attitude here outlined, the social polity is threatened at its +very foundations. In its tenacious hold upon habitual prepossessions +the organized consensus does not realize that these foundations are +already tottering. It will not see that in order to further the +replacement of the already disintegrating structures of our present +social system, a more widely envisioning concept of the organized +consciousness of man must needs be invoked. In some way, though, there +must first be brought home to each of us the realization that there +can be no true unity within the societal organism as long as we are a +prey to impressions that are but the give-and-take reflection of mental +attitudes existing mutually in one another. As long as we fail to +identify the tyranny of mental attitudes within the social unconscious +with the reflection of similar tyrannical mental attitudes within the +personalism and defection of each of us, man cannot rise to the reality +of an organized social consciousness. As long, for example, as we fail +to understand that when a mental attitude in others pleases or incenses +us, it is necessarily but the reflection of a corresponding mental +attitude in ourselves, we shall continue to praise or punish such +mental attitudes, together with the acts resulting from them, with the +mere retaliative measures of personal reward or redress. So that our +attitude will continue to be, as now, the mere pro-and-con reaction to +impressions determined by the unconscious self-reflection of our own +“good and bad.” + +It is precisely this illusion of mental oppositeness that we need +to dispel. Harmony will follow automatically once we have accepted +in its societal significance the affective unity of life. With this +realization there will be no further need of the restraints of +an alternative principle of morality which, in its bidimensional +legislation, aims to establish merely a temporary balance between +essential opposites. With the elimination of the individual hope-fear +alternation the whole incitement to personal infringement will have +been removed. What inducement will I have to cheat a man if he is +myself? Or betray a woman if she is I? To what purpose will I seek +to enslave another to my whim (call it love, marriage or what you +will) if between us there is the acceptance of an organic compliance +that allows the realization in each of the common unity of both? Why +would I seek to outdo anyone in the invidious competitions of what is +called “success,” if I know clearly that success comprises only the +self-reflective distinctions existing within the unconscious of the +social mind in response to the spurious incentives of the personal +alternative as it exists within the unconscious of the individual mind? + +Our prevailing personalistic basis is not applicable to an organismic +viewpoint, because a policy that is self-reflective in the unconscious +is self-contradictory in consciousness. Unity or consciousness of +personality is organically preclusive of whatever is personal or +unconscious in the personality. For every wish that is attained an +equal disappointment is incurred. For every satisfaction that is +secured a corresponding denial is imposed. To fulfil one’s wish +is to abjure one’s reality. Asking is its own postponement, as +striving is its own defeat. This inner homology between desire and +its non-attainment is alike the hope and the despair of atoning to +oneself unconsciously or personally for what is one’s need consciously +or societally. As with compulsion-replacements elsewhere, the real +occasion of prayer is one’s unanswerable attitude of mind in prayer. +In the self-compensation of man’s want as an individual organism, he +necessarily repudiates his inherent consonance as a societal organism. +Thus our personal dearth and our personal plenty are organically the +same. As the part embodied in one’s personal wish (unconsciousness) +is intrinsically opposed to the whole embodied in one’s societal +unity (consciousness), to desire is at the same time to fail of +attainment as well as to covet. This is the paradox of our personalism +and unconsciousness, as it is the impasse of the personal absolute +underlying it. In the personal opportunism of the unconscious wish we +would fancifully summon the processes of life to ourselves in place +of contributing our individual function as common participants in +the reality of these processes. Our contradiction, after all, is the +division within ourselves, and the real impasse as always is the +self-image embodied in the delusive alternative of good and bad. + +I know, of course, that much that I have tried to set down in these +pages has been said many times before and by those more competent +of expression than I. Indeed, in its objective envisagement, +the recognition among us of differences, personal, national and +international, has become a commonplace. Even in the columns of our +daily news items, these conditions of societal defection are mentioned +time and again in the casual tone of the matter of course. Among +the current comments one reads, for example: “The task of saving +civilization seems rather hopeless when it doesn’t promise an immediate +and private profit”; “When a statesman says he despairs of the world +he means that he despairs of getting what he wants”; “All nations seem +agreed that chaos may result unless other nations forsake their evil +ways”; “Civilization is just a slow process of envisioning more rights +to fight for”; and so on without end. + +But no amount of objective observation, however astute, will +avail in clearing personal outlooks. Too easily is one’s mere +observation, however right and seemingly true, the embodiment of +secret self-satisfaction and detachment. Personalistic observation, +far from resolving the affective illusion of the onlooker, serves +only to accentuate it. Dissociation within another individual that +is observed by us but that does not quicken us to a realization of +our own implication, automatically embeds us still deeper in the +fixity of our own unconscious personalism. There is need to withdraw +from our accustomed observations and to include within ourselves the +dissociation that seems to lie outside of us but that is, in fact, +the unconscious projection of our own dissociation. In this affective +illusion of the onlooker, we are ever hoping merely to convince others +of the disinterestedness of our interference with them. A disinterested +interference is biologically impossible. To wish to convince others is +to be unconvinced ourselves. True disinterestedness consists alone in +our own self-realization. + +The familiar French saying, “Tout comprendre est tout pardonner” is, +like so much that is proverbial, _almost_ true. It has assembled the +right elements but in the wrong order. It gives to the letter dynamic +priority over the spirit.[58] It is hysterical replacement refurbished +in the condensation of the epigram. It is but the literature of the +neurosis. If we transpose the equation in such manner as to convert +intellectual values into their organic terms, the proposition +resolves itself into a form that is, I believe, much nearer the +answer to the problem of our human pathology: To forgive all is to +understand all. I have only this in mind in saying that the neurosis +is societal, that it is common. This is what I mean in saying that +differentiation is unconsciousness and that the factor of societal +repression or the societal factor of separatism is anterior to the +separatism of sexuality or to the factor of our individual repression. +As the societal and the individual are organically one in mode, the +unification of the individual is at least a step toward the unification +of our societal consciousness. This is all I have in mind in speaking +of consciousness as the encompassment of life. It is a mode of +consciousness that is inclusive and that reconciles within itself the +disparity that is social. + +All this I had at first “in mind” only. It was, I confess, a theory +with me and, like all such substitutive replacements, the theory +held for me only an unconscious or symbolic significance. There was +lacking in myself the recognition that the theoretical is identical +with the symbolic. And so my position in stating that the theory +of analysis is the neurosis of the analyst has lacked its personal +acknowledgment within my own consciousness. Truly, unconsciousness +cannot envisage unconsciousness. Secret separateness cannot encompass +secret separateness. The division of each of us is the division within +himself. The real grudge is one’s own grudge. After all, there is only +one vice and that, paradoxically, is the virtue of being better than +other people. Yet so tenacious are we of this our solitary shortcoming, +that we will acknowledge all other “faults” rather than disclaim this +one. But the task of ourselves as the task of our patients is the +recognition of our own personalism and resentment. It is to forgive all +_within ourselves_, that we may understand all within others who are +societally no less ourselves. It is to realize that the whole intricate +problem of our “understanding” is but the retributive fabrication of +our own unforgiveness. + +It is just here that the repressed and isolated individual resolutely +balks. Such a solution, he declares, offers nothing for him. He does +not discover in it an advantage for himself. Quite true. In his +unconscious sense, there is nothing for him. His self-seeking is itself +the very kernel of his delusion. It is only in the disparate bias of +his arbitrary individualism (I do not say individuality) that he can +apprehend anything so dissociative as an advantage for himself as a +separate individual. It is only as the wilful, defiant, separative +child that he is, that he would seek the treasure of life for himself, +that he comes demanding a governmental form embodying a system of +monarchical autocracy whereof he is to be the supreme ruler, when, +in truth, life is of its very essence an organic democracy and the +individual an element in its societal confluence. In the quandary of +his organic involution the neurotic, if one might so crudely express +it, is literally “hell-bent” on attaining heaven. He does not see, +for he will not see, that life and self are irreconcilable. On the +contrary, with every available device, with every recourse of subtlety +and with ever more enticing symbols, he seeks to decoy the common, free +gift of life into the circumscribed and artificial confines of his own +self-bias. + +In this deflection of his mental outlook he is far from the basis from +which his experience originally set out--the organic basis in which +the secret of life is its commonness and in which the commonness and +the joy of it are one. As the analysis proceeds, synchronous with the +gradual acceptance on the part of the patient of his mistakenness and +of his growing responsibility toward this mistakenness through the +widening of his societal outlook, there comes his automatic awakening +to the realization of the inherent confluence of life in its utmost +fulfilment. It is a slow process this that demands our reversal from an +habitual attitude of disparity and separation to one of participation +and confluence, from self and unconsciousness to consciousness and +life, but it is the inevitable task of an analysis that bases its +procedure upon an organismic conception of consciousness in its +relative inclusiveness. + +I am under no illusion as to the futility of reckoning upon any +far-reaching assent to such a thesis as this. I know well that a +thesis which confronts the securely entrenched ranks of the social +unconscious is, in general, predetermined to defeat. In this +unpromising outlook, however, I am not dismayed. Were I guided solely +by personal inclination I would endeavour at least to narrow the scope +of a challenge such as this. I would, for instance, absolve myself from +the obligation of recording so sweeping and unwelcome an indictment as +that which lays to the door of normality in the large the imputation +of autosexuality and infantilism. To many, such a statement will seem +extravagant, bizarre, unwarranted. So that, if I would propitiate my +readers through the presentation of a more acceptable thesis, I should +naturally wish, if I may not wholly withdraw this statement, at least +to palliate its implications. + +But as this statement seems to me essentially true, as it is the very +crux of this thesis that unconsciousness is social and not individual, +that the collective unconscious is the anterior factor to which the +individual factor involving the neurosis is but the reflex response; +as the central issue upon which my entire position must stand or fall +is the conviction that the _responsibility for the neurosis rests +upon the societal consciousness in its ontogenetic phase within each +of us_; and above all, since my indictment of the social unconscious +is one from which I am no more exempted than others, to withhold such +a statement would be nothing other than the hesitation to affirm my +real conviction and so retain the servility and introversion of my own +social unconsciousness. This position is precisely the expression of +what I believe to be the essential embodiment of the neurosis, and my +wish to keep silent would be nothing else than my own unconscious wish +not to relinquish the neurosis in which I share as a social element +within it. Upon closer view, my unconscious fear becomes merely my wish +to save my own individuation and unconsciousness at the expense of the +participatory, societal confluence that alone constitutes consciousness. + +This, as I think of it, is interesting, for upon reflection it grows +still clearer that my reluctance would be again the neurosis within +myself or the retention of the very separateness I am presumably +undertaking to observe. After all, my irresolution would amount to +my withholding not the statement but myself. It would represent my +preference (as always it is my preference unconsciously) to withhold +myself from my organic place as a confluent part in the societal +aggregate. Instead of being one, therefore, with every other element +comprising it, it would mean that I preferred to retain the illusion +of my own disparateness, phantastically hoping in my dissociative mode +thus to comprise in my individual self the self-possession that alone +pertains to the acceptance of one’s share in our common, societal +aggregate. + +And so I have come to believe that, however unwelcome the imputation, +it is only the societal indictment as it applies to oneself personally +that affords the real opportunity of release from the neurosis of +society. It is the illusion of differentiation that is the essence +of the neurosis. It is the fallacy of our personal separateness that +is the meaning of our societal discord. Through our mutual analyses +and also in the contacts of our daily living as a subjectively +organized group, we have come to realize that this subtle attitude of +disaffection is extraneous to the essential life of man. Affective +conditions recognized as results outside of us are affective conditions +unrecognized as causes within us. Subjectively, societally, they are +the same. From a relative or organismic basis there is no difference. +Just as cosmically or in the objective universe there is no absolute +time and space, so organically or in the subjective universe there +is no absolute cause and effect. As objectively time and space are +“relative to moving systems,” so subjectively cause and effect are +relative to organic sequences. Accordingly, our need is to recognize +the implication of the unconscious not as directed against others +nor against oneself, but as including oneself equally with others in +constituting together in our common life a single, societal unit. + +There will, I know, be much misunderstanding in regard to what has +been set down in these pages. If, by chance, the conventional artist +should read this thesis, he will tell you that he understands and that +he accepts it fully, on the ground that he finds its full realization +within his own intuitions. But the artist will be mistaken. Should +the conventional scientist read it, he will tell you that it is not +possible to find substantiation for such a thesis within the scope of +his authenticated formulations and that therefore he cannot understand +or accept it. But the scientist will also be mistaken. Both will be +quite right objectively, but this is, in itself, to miss the meaning of +a conception that is essentially subjective.[59] This thesis has been +felt and written from an intrinsically relative mode, and it is only +from an intrinsically relative mode that it can be felt and understood. +As yet the artist knows feeling only in the absolute form of the images +that exist within himself; as yet the scientist knows feeling only in +the absolute form of the images that exist outside himself. The one +lives within the dreams (fanciful formulations) arising within the +personal system that is individual; the other lives within the concepts +(theoretical formulations) transmitted to him from the personal +system that is social. Yet I do not doubt that among both artists and +scientists, as well as among many people who are technically neither +artist nor scientist, there will be those who will partake more or +less consciously of what is here more or less consciously partaken of. +In the form of its presentation it is inevitably restricted to the +objective symbol of the written word; nevertheless, in the subjective +encompassment of each that is its common inclusion of both, it may +equally reach and unite the basic personalities of poet and craftsman, +of male and female, of artist and scientist. + +In this sense and in this spirit of a common involvement in the +unconscious of my fellows, I feel that to some, at least, my meaning +will seem clear and my motive not untoward. For there are those +who, like myself, are only “normal” under duress and who secretly +revolt against the compromising yoke of the social as well as of the +individual unconscious. It is for these that I have written. To speak +fearlessly and with freedom to the few, who are fearless and free +enough to understand, means far more to me and will, I believe, prove +ultimately far more fruitful in making clear the real meaning of our +human need than half-hearted statements muttered with bated breath and +trimmed to suit the fear-ridden prepossessions of the collective mind +as it tends in its blind autocracy to dominate the clearer vision of us +all. + +The more I consider the factor of one’s personal hesitancy to entrust +himself unreservedly to the societal aggregate through unbosoming +his own unconscious wish to repress his share in its collective +dissociation, the more it is clear to me that in this very symptom of +one’s own--for such it is--lies the strongest corroboration of the +impersonal or societal interpretation of the neurosis. For, as I have +said, it is the acceptance of the oneness of each of us individually +within the encompassing societal organism as an aggregate that alone +points the way to our release from the fear or separateness that is the +neurosis of the societal organism. + +To consider the instinct of the societal bond without mentioning its +influence in the development of the formulations that have resulted +from the conceptions of Freud, would be to waive acknowledgment of +the very determinants which have made possible the present societal +interpretation. Abstract truths are the personal relics of genius; +their vindication in the concrete text of experience is the heritage of +our common consciousness. If the significance of personality lies in +the organismic consciousness of man, the springs of all creative genius +are to be traced to this common source. This organic consanguinity is +the very essence of genius. Holding its incisive course against all +obstacle, this societal urge makes of genius the socially solitary +expression that it is. The source of genius is nuclear, original, +essential. Moving amid the surface crusts of “types” which in their +restriction of outer contact may only absorb or reflect the impressions +about them, genius eradiates from the common centre of our societal +organism sustained by an impulse that is cosmic. For this reason, it is +the unalterable sentence of genius that it break with every accustomed +adherence. It is its law that it raise itself out of habitual inertias +and see straight and clear, beyond all temporary immediacies, into the +unfurbished truth of things. In this wise, in face of the personal +criticism and resentment of the very world whose progress it was the +all-engrossing effort of his genius to further, Sigmund Freud saw and +reported what he saw, fearless, determined and alone. There is no more +isolated appointment than this to which genius is summoned. It is in +this appointment and in the societal implication of it, that lies +the real significance of Freud. Should we fail to realize this, we +would ourselves be overlooking the societal urge that is phyletically +inherent in Freud’s psychology. + +In the course of our development the period of men’s substitutive +image-production was first interrupted through the return to reality +inaugurated by Darwin’s theory of evolution. What still remained over +in man’s mental life has been further threatened by Freud’s theory of +the evolutionary processes of the unconscious. When the evolutionary +theories of Darwin and Freud are carried to their ultimate social +conclusion, the result will be the entire repudiation of man’s +image-production and a re-uniting of his organic and conscious life +into a single constructive whole. + +In an essentially psychological study of this kind in which the effort +has been made to trace the mechanisms of unconscious processes in their +social application, there is not place for discussing the practical +outcome, political, economic and industrial, that must follow through +the very altered position of man’s conscious outlook as a result of +a more inclusive interpretation of our societal background. It is +impossible to conjecture the influence upon man’s behaviour socially +and nationally that would result from a complete dispelling from his +mind of the images that now occupy the place of his organic reality. +How much the reaction that is ostensibly the most disastrous in our +social life--the reaction of war--is due to the obsession of the social +mind with mere images having no reality, it would only be extravagant +to attempt to surmise. But these are practical considerations that must +occupy us in subsequent discussions if the basis here outlined in its +fundamental biology shall be found of value amid the growing processes +of man’s thought. + +There is a further statement I wish to make. In this statement I should +like to be understood as speaking in the fullest sincerity of which +I am capable, my feeling being uninfluenced either by sentimental +modesty or by any deprecatory wish to refer to extraneous agencies +the sponsorship for this record. This thesis in a very true sense is +not my thesis--it represents no intellectual achievement of mine. +On consideration it will readily be seen that of its very nature it +could not be my thesis. The outgrowth of automatic conditions stoutly +resisted by me, it is the product of environmental circumstances over +which I had no control. It was exacted under pain of repudiating +in actuality the theoretical interpretations for which my work has +stood. It is the outcome of inevitable concession to the ordeal of +facing in its grim detail the fabric of substitution and disparity +composing the structure of my own daily living. Convictions have been +wrung from me against my own personal will, against every tradition +about me and in spite of every effort of subtlety on my part to escape +their exactions. Through many months I have fought their acceptance +over every step of the way. As, little by little, a more relative and +societal conviction has been borne in upon me, it has proved that the +realization I have so long and so resolutely resisted has been the +actuality of my own separatism and unconsciousness, as contrasted +with the undifferentiated, organic life of which my personal work has +been but the theory. It is because this work in its actuality is the +expression of an urge common to life, sweeping aside in the strength of +its organic tide every claim to personal consideration, that there is +due the acknowledgment that it has come to expression unbeholden to me, +that its motive has been, as far as humanly possible, not personal but +societal. + +The organic theory here offered has been advanced by me hitherto on +grounds of mere conceptual intuitions. Its present form embodies +in its spirit of an impersonal, affective participation, however +imperfectly fulfilled, the subjective record of an organic experience. +In its plea for a wider acceptance of the common fellowship of man’s +native consciousness, I well realize that it is only with the years +that we may hope to yield it fuller accord. + +I shall be glad if this embodiment of whatever societal acceptance may +have found expression in these pages may bring a clearer meaning, a +quieter understanding to any whose need has been deep and unfulfilled. +For my own part, this expression is the response to what is the +deepest demand of my own life--the need for the organic unification of +personality that I feel resides alone in the common consciousness of +man. + + + + +INDEX + + + Absolutism-- + in affects, 39, 227 + in present system of consciousness, 33, 43, 63, 104, 227 + in psychoanalysis, 67, 68, 73, 101 + in the Church, 66-68, 73 + _see also_ Personal absolute + + Adler, 113, 174 + + Affects, 115, 121, 130, 178, 205, 227 + + Affective life, 115, 125 + components, 57, 58, 62 + + Allocentric and autocentric-- + complementary, 203, 213 + definition, 188 + reactions, 191-196, 218 + + Allosexuality-- + and autosexuality, 207, 208, 211 + definition, 201, 202 + identical basis, 209 + _see also_ Sex + + Alternative-- + bidimensional, 80-85, 93, 96, 97, 226-228, 239 + in art and drama, 85-87, 96 + in psychoanalysis, psychology, and psychopathology, 97, 100-103, + 229-233 + individual expressions of, 88-91 + occurrence in group analysis, 223, 224, 236 + social expressions of, 85, 92-95, 99, 102, 207 + _see also_ “Good and bad” + + Ambivalence, 86, 94, 196, 228 + _see also_ Alternative + + “Anal complex,” 216 + + Analysis-- + aim of, 26, 137, 164, 165, 166 + _see also_ Dream; Group analysis; Psychoanalysis + + Aquinas, 158 + + Art, 87, 96, 183 + + Artist, 96, 218, 219 + + Autocentric-- + _see_ Allocentric + + Autosexuality, 206, 215, 244 + _see also_ Allosexuality + + + Besant, Annie, 139 + + Belief, 47, 143 + + Bidimensional plane, 41, 42, 58, 60, 62, 104 + _see also_ Alternative; Relativity of consciousness + + Bleuler, 94 + + Buddha, 218 + + + Calvin, 158 + + Cerebro-spinal nervous system, 189-192, 194 + + Childhood-- + consciousness of, 22, 23, 145 + imposition of social images upon, 52-55, 58, 59, 92, 93, 116, 123, + 132, 145, 213 + + Christ, 218 + + Christianity, 85, 193, 196 + + Church-- + as social systematization, 65-75 + + Claparède, 156 + + Collective unconscious-- + _see_ Social unconscious + + Complexes, 47, 72 + + Compulsion neurosis, 81 + + Consciousness-- + absolutism of present system, 43, 44 + as unconsciousness, 24, 110, 111, 114, 115, 119, 143 + definition, 119 + individualistic compared with societal, 51, 62, 109, 144 + ontogenesis, 119-121 + phylogenesis, 118, 160, 162 + relativity of, 32-40, 48 + unification of, 122, 126, 169, 173, 212, 218, 242 + _see also_ Dissociation; Self-consciousness; Societal concept of + consciousness + + + Darwin, 249 + + Dementia præcox, 124, 136, 137, 195, 203 + + Depression, 91, 94 + + Descartes, 124 + + Differentiation, 129, 169, 178, 242 + delusion of, 120-122, 125, 131 + + Dissociation-- + individual and social, 45-47, 76, 109, 110, 132, 144, 148-153, 155, + 176, 185, 241 + + Division of personality, 81, 85, 95, 147, 222 + genesis of, 116-119 + physiological substrate, 189-191 + _see also_ Dissociation; Neurosis; Repression + + Doubt-- + attitude of Church toward, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71 + compared with resistance, 71-74 + + Drama, 85-88, 182, 183 + + Dream, 178-183, 185, 195 + analysis, 88, 176, 177, 184 + and personal absolute, 90, 111-113 + and wish, 89 + + + Eddington, A. S., 32 + + Education, 92, 93, 214 + _see also_ Childhood + + Ego-sexuality, 201-203, 206-208 + _see also_ Sex + + Einstein, 32, 36, 37, 38, 186 + + Eliot, George, 218 + + Ellis, Havelock, 158 + + Extravert, 187, 201 + + + Family, 204, 234, 235 + + Feeling-- + as subjective experience, 20, 21, 115 + + Freud, 1, 4, 5, 9, 14, 38, 47, 101, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, + 126, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 174, 199, 204, 236, 248, 249 + + Freudian analysis, 1-5, 38, 47, 138, 168, 172, 231 + + Freud’s theory-- + of the neuroses, 12, 14, 37, 94, 108, 109, 126, 156, 157, 196, + 228, 229, 236, 237 + of resistance, 61, 154 + + + “Good and bad”-- + as image of personal advantage, 55, 59, 62, 81, 85, 90, 192, 200 + bidimensional alternative, 53, 58, 62, 65, 78, 81, 91, 102, 103, + 201, 227, 239 + pretence underlying, 54-56, 58, 92 + _see also_ Image + + Group analysis, 131, 223-226, 234-238, 246 + + + Heterosexuality-- + _see_ Allosexuality; Homosexuality; Sex + + Homophyllic, 208, 210 + + Homosexuality, 94, 97, 199, 211 + and heterosexuality, 198, 200-202, 210 + and paranoia, 174, 175 + _see also_ Sex + + Hysteria, 63, 97, 143, 189, 191 + social, 16 + + + Ideas of reference, 136, 223 + + Image, 40-42 + as substitution, 16 + basis of marriage, 207 + basis of sexuality, 14, 15 + bidimensional, 53, 57-59, 226-228 + contrasted with reality, 41, 79 + of male and female, 96, 216 + of parent, 55, 103, 173, 235 + _see also_ “Good and bad”; Mother-image; Social images + + Incest-Awe, 147, 148 + + Individual-- + as systematization, 70, 76 + as separative element, 126, 150, 152, 153, 160, 243 + as societal element, 115, 117, 127, 130, 148, 156 + + Infantilism, 215, 244 + + Insanity, 23, 24, 91, 124, 137 + _see also_ Neurosis; Social neurosis + + Instinct, 60, 127 + common societal, 200 + organic instinct of sex, 202 + + Introvert, 187, 201 + + + Jung, 113, 156, 204, 205 + + + Kropotkin, P., 159 + + + Libido, 156 + + + Mania, 91, 94 + + Marriage, 93, 94, 204, 206-209 + + Masturbation, 211 + + Meyer, Adolf, xx + + Mood-alternation, 91, 94 + + Mother-image, 141, 172, 234 + + Mysticism, 125, 134, 139-142 + + + Napoleon, 218 + + Narcism, 157, 202 + + Nettleship, Richard Lewis, 106 + + Neurosis, 15, 76, 77, 83, 102, 117 + and sexuality, 157, 173, 174, 209, 237 + marital, 93, 94 + source, 53, 125, 169, 173 + _see also_ Normality; Social neurosis + + Neurotic personality, 13-16, 24, 44, 168, 191, 214, 243, 244 + and organic consciousness, 11, 12, 23, 153, 209 + + Newton, 35, 36 + Newtonian system, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38 + + Nietzsche, 23, 130, 218, 247 + + Normality-- + and personal absolute, 47, 63 + and sexuality, 173, 203, 209, 244 + as criterion, 11, 27, 30 + as neurotic manifestation, 12-16, 175, 176, 191 + mysticism in, 125, 134, 139-141 + unconsciousness of, 26, 27, 147, 179, 181, 203 + + + Objective observation, 18 + within subjective sphere, 19-21, 51, 121-124, 167, 176, 178 + + Organismic-- + definition, 3 + _see also_ Societal concept of consciousness + + + Paranoia-- + and homosexuality, 174, 175 + + Paranoiac, 94, 97, 143, 199 + + Personal absolute, 102, 103 + and war, 83 + as resistance, 61, 62, 76, 82, 84 + as right, 82, 83, 90, 92, 98, 112 + in psychoanalysis, 73, 101, 102 + underlying social system, 45-48, 63, 70, 72-76, 80-84, 240 + _see also_ Absolutism; Resistance; Will-to-self + + Personal equation, 4 + + Plato, 218 + + Precoid, 63, 97, 195 + + Preconscious mode, 10, 119, 137, 189, 196 + + Primary identification, 115, 116 + principle of, 218 + + Psychasthenic, 94, 193, 195 + + Psychiatrist, 107, 124, 136, 223 + + Psychiatry, 123, 136, 137, 183, 187 + + Psychoanalysis-- + alternative in, 103, 196, 198, 229-233 + as social systematization, 65, 67-76, 101 + as theory, 17-19, 21, 25 + duration of treatment, 230-233 + impasse in, 109, 172, 223, 224 + misconceptions, 2, 197 + personal absolute in, 3, 73, 101, 102 + position of, 9, 10, 229 + unconscious element in, 3, 143, 167, 234 + _see also_ Analysis; Group analysis + + Psychoanalyst-- + attitude toward patient, 24, 166-172, 181, 183, 195, 229, 230, + 232-234 + involvement in social unconscious, 110, 111, 183, 184, 222, 223 + qualifications of, 28, 29 + + Psychology, 5, 33, 36, 38, 65, 97 + + Psychopathology, 63, 100, 101, 123, 124, 223 + of war, 130 + + Ptolemaic system, 38 + + + Relativity of consciousness, 32-40, 43, 45, 48, 51, 57-62, 104, 246 + + Religion, 64, 96, 98, 99 + + Repression-- + and bipolarity, 216, 217 + and sexuality, 156-159, 162, 163, 174, 193, 215, 242 + and suggestion, 55, 142, 189, 192, 200, 201, 218 + individual and social, 7, 13, 15, 30, 76, 77, 131, 154, 162, 163 + physiological substrate, 189-193 + + Resistance-- + as personal absolute, 61, 62, 76, 82, 84, 230 + attitude of psychoanalysis toward, 69-76 + compared with doubt, 71-74 + individual and social, 43-45, 65, 75, 76, 152, 154, 155 + + + Schreiner, Olive, 218 + + Self-- + and sexuality, 15, 173, 200, 201, 210, 211 + image of, 16, 58-61, 79, 82, 83, 141 + preservation and race-preservation, 127 + + Self-consciousness, 116, 118-120, 125, 132, 147, 161, 162, 205 + + Sex-- + and sexuality, 11, 156-159, 163, 193, 200-217, 237 + as organic unity, 11, 163, 199, 208-212, 220 + intermediate, 214, 215, 217 + oppositeness in, 211, 213, 214, 216 + + Sexuality, 15 + as replacement, 10, 163 + _see also_ Repression; Sex + + Shields, Clarence, xix, 233 + + Social images, 96, 102, 135-138, 161, 229 + and childhood, 51-55, 58, 59, 92, 93 + as distortion of reality, 87-90 + _see also_ Image; Mother-image + + Social neurosis, 101, 125, 130-133, 162, 245 + and images, 229 + individual implication, 84, 246 + + Social unconscious, 117, 133, 162, 222, 223, 228, 245 + as basis of normality, 11-14, 26, 27, 44, 47, 176 + _see also_ Unconsciousness + + Societal concept of consciousness, 31, 45, 46, 127-131, 148, 149, + 160-163 + _see also_ Relativity of consciousness + + Socrates, 218 + + Subjective sphere-- + _see_ Feeling; Objective observation + + Sublimation, 189 + + Suggestion-- + _see_ Repression + + Sympathetic nervous system, 189-192, 194 + + + Transference, 167, 172, 230 + + + Unconsciousness, 5, 15, 111, 126, 135, 144, 173, 178, 183-185, 192, + 193, 204, 234 + as resistance, 34, 76 + underlying normality, 47, 125 + _see also_ Consciousness; Dissociation; Social unconscious + + + War, 14, 16, 34, 35, 83, 129-132, 249 + + Wilde, Oscar, 78 + + Will-to-self, 13, 75, 90, 98, 129, 156 + + Wish, 89, 111-113, 173, 180, 195, 232 + + + PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY + THE EDINBURGH PRESS, 9 AND 11 YOUNG STREET, EDINBURGH + + + + +FOOTNOTES + + +[1] The word “organismic” refers to the feelings and reactions common +to the social body regarded as a coherent, integral organism. The term +organismic, as I use it in its social application, is identical with +the term organic in its individual application. The difference is that +the term organismic is employed in a more generic sense. But in general +the usages, organic and organismic, are interchangeable. + +[2] “The Preconscious or the Nest Instinct,” a thesis presented in +outline at the Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic +Association, Boston, Mass., May 25, 1917. + +[3] “Social Images versus Reality,” _The Journal of Abnormal Psychology +and Social Psychology_, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Oct.-Dec., 1924. + +[4] “Our Social Evasion,” _Medical Journal and Record_, Vol. CXXIII, +No. 12, June 16, 1926. + +[5] “Giebt es vielleicht--eine Frage für Irrenärzte--Neurosen der +Gesundheit?”--Nietzsche’s _Werke_. Erste Abt., Band I. _Die Geburt der +Tragödie._ Leipzig, 1903. + +[6] An instance of this inversion of natural expression is seen in +the system of technique that is the obsession _par excellence_ of +singers. In the art of singing, as correspondingly in any art of life, +technique is applicable only to the theory of vocalization but not to +the actuality of spontaneous musical expression. + +[7] I realize that a patient should have the protection of the medical +expert’s knowledge. This means that the analyst, if not himself +a physician, should be directly associated with the office of a +physician. We know, of course, that charlatanry exists no less within +the medical profession than elsewhere; yet while a medical degree is in +no sense a certificate of personal sincerity, it is a social surety of +professional responsibility. On the other hand, I have yet to hear the +suggestion offered that a physician who is not himself a psychoanalyst +should be closely associated with the office of a psychoanalyst. It +seems odd, as one thinks of it, that this provision should not have +been offered by those who have been conscientious enough to recognize +the reverse need. As a matter of fact, the number of instances in which +mental disorders are mistaken for somatic conditions is incomparably +greater than those in which there is failure to recognize the existence +of the somatic component. If it is important that the analyst should +be competent to trace the source of structural diseases, the internist +should be equally competent to trace the source of mental disharmonies. + +[8] “To free our thought from the fetters of space and time is an +aspiration of the poet and the mystic, viewed somewhat coldly by +the scientist who has too good reason to fear the confusion of +loose ideas likely to ensue. If others have had a suspicion of the +end to be desired it has been left to Einstein to show the way to +rid ourselves of these ‘terrestrial adhesions to thought.’ And in +removing our fetters he leaves us, not (as might have been feared) +vague generalities for the ecstatic contemplation of the mystic, +but a precise scheme of world-structure to engage the mathematical +physicist.”--A. S. Eddington, F.R.S., “The Theory of Relativity and its +Influence on Scientific Thought,” _The Scientific Monthly_, Vol. XVI, +No. 1, Jan. 1923. + +[9] It is, of course, not possible to trace through mathematical +intricacies a detailed analogy between the cosmic theory of relativity, +as it bears upon the objective data of an abstruse calculus, and the +organic theory of relativity, as it bears upon the subjective data of +the all-inclusive principle of psychology here regarded as the basis of +a universally comprehensive scheme of consciousness. The comparison has +significance for me merely in the aptness of its theoretical alignment +with a conception of consciousness which includes data extrinsic to our +habitual psychological system, i.e. the system intrinsic to ourselves +and commonly accepted as the totality of consciousness. + +[10] Newton observed the universe from the point of view of his fixed +position upon the earth. Einstein observes the universe from the point +of view of all possible positions within the universe. Likewise our +present-day systems of psychology regard the conditions of life from +the position of observation that is one’s individual point of view +toward them. In the conception here advanced these conditions, on the +contrary, are regarded from points of view that are socially relative +to and inclusive of all possible positions of observation. + +The reader will recall that the conceptions of the physicists first +led them to a theory of special relativity through their calculations +of uniform motion, while their deductions came only later to embrace +data pertaining to difform motion, or to motion that is not uniform, +as contained under the conception of general relativity. With regard +to the theory of relativity in the subjective sphere, it was upon +noting the habitual deflections from a predictable organic constant, +observable in the erratic reactions of the neurotic personality, +that the conception of relativity in the sphere of consciousness +first occurred to me. It was only subsequently that the relativity of +consciousness as applied to the uniform reactions characteristic of +the collective social mind came to shape itself into the organismic +conception of relativity here outlined as the underlying principle of +consciousness. + +While representing in no sense a detailed correlation between them, +there is nevertheless a certain analogy, not only in the manner of +inception of the objective and subjective theories with respect to +the observation first of difform or abnormal deviation, and later +of discrepancies of normal or uniform reactions; but there is also +this further concomitance between the two aspects of the principle. +The Newtonian hypothesis takes account of motion or reaction in the +planetary system only in the large, while the theory of Einstein is +adequate in contemplating the motion of planets both in the large +and in the small. Conversely, our present Freudian theory of the +unconscious takes care of the reactions of the personality in the +small or in an individual or particular sense, while the theory of the +relativity of consciousness regards personality not only individually +or particularly (whether regarded singly or in its collective social +expression) but also societally or in the sense of consciousness in its +universal or organismic meaning. + +[11] This psychobiological misconception is doubtless also aided +in large measure by the physiological conditions of our visual +organs of perception and by the bidimensional surface upon which +our impressions of objects are received. Because of the disposition +of the nerve terminals of the retina upon a flat or bidimensional +area, our visual perception of objects is limited to impressions of a +flat or bidimensional plane. If by means of binocular accommodation +objects present to us the appearance of “depth,” it is of course not +to direct visual perception that we owe our sense of perspective but +to stereoscopic inference, seconded by our stereognostic experience +of tridimensional solidity. Hence, what is actually “perceived” upon +looking at an object of three dimensions is a visual facet, as it +were, due to our own mentally flattened “cross-section” of the solid +object before us as determined by the particular aspect of it that +is momentarily presented to view. I think it cannot be doubted that +this mechanism of our visual perception is a contributing factor in +influencing our tendency to “see” mentally. One says “I see” when he +means “I understand.” There is the same implication in saying that one +“sees” the logic of such and such a statement. So, too, we speak of +a “mental point of view” or of “intellectual vision.” This illusory +character of our mental percepts probably owes its explanation also in +part to the fact that our visual sense is the sense that best permits a +distant and detached observation _of_ rather than a contact _with_ the +surrounding world. + +[12] “Our Mass Neurosis,” _The Psychological Bulletin_, Vol. 23, No. 6, +June, 1926. + +[13] “The Reabsorbed Affect and Its Elimination,” _British Journal of +Medical Psychology_, Vol. VI, Part 3. + +[14] “Speaking of Resistances,” address before the Sixteenth Annual +Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, New York City, June +10, 1926. _Psyche_, No. 27, January, 1927. + +[15] “The Heroic Rôle--An Historical Retrospect,” _Psyche_, No. 25, +July, 1926. + +[16] Needless to say the distinction here made between “actual” and +“real” is used very specifically. + +[17] “Insanity a Social Problem,” _The American Journal of Sociology_, +Vol. XXXII, No. I, Part I, July, 1926. + +[18] I recall an incident that occurred several years ago in the office +of a prominent newspaper that well illustrates this point. A member of +the staff was called to the phone to receive the details of a drowning, +word of which had just been reported. One can picture the professional +zeal with which he turned to the phone, alert with the eagerness of +expectant acquisition. If a moment later he dropped the receiver +and drew back with a sudden cry of horror, his whole face gradually +altering to a look of dejection and pain, it was not because he had +been disappointed in the expectation of a thrilling item of news. Not +at all. The item was as tragic in its details as one could wish. The +disappointment lay only in the fact that, on inquiring the name of +the boy who had been drowned, he learned that it was his own son. It +was only this circumstance, then, that explained why his countenance +suddenly changed from satisfaction to pain. A matter of information +which was to have been sold to his readers as a delectable item of +news concerning the drowning of another man’s son became a poignant +sorrow when the self-same news related to his own son. And so, upon +examination, it may be seen that what really happened was an unexpected +shift of affect due to the sudden alternation of the personal motive +through the reversal of the bidimensional vantage. + +[19] “Psychoanalytic Improvisations and the Personal Equation,” _The +Psychoanalytic Review_, Vol. XIII, No. 2, April, 1926. + +[20] Consider the legend of the origin of the life of man as symbolized +through the intuitions of the folk unconscious recorded in the Book of +Genesis. For its discussion see “The Origin of the Incest-Awe,” _The +Psychoanalytic Review_, Vol. V, No. 3, July, 1918. + +[21] The term “consciousness” is used by the writer in two different +senses, the one having to do with the mental sophistication of +individual awareness, the other with consciousness regarded as an +inclusive racial principle. The reader must rely upon the context for +the distinction between the restricted individualistic interpretation +on the one hand and the organismic interpretation on the other. + +[22] This mistaken tendency of inference has so far laid hold upon us +as to mislead our perceptions even in respect to judgments concerning +data which lie altogether within the objective mode. To cite an +instance of homely type quite remote from the present argument:--when +we speak of two buckets of water, drawn from a common source, in +reality our concept is buckets of two waters. For the accident of their +separation in space and of the demarcation of the bulk of each by the +outline of its container leads the mind, habituated to the fallacy of +subjective inference, to posit a difference or a _twoness of essence_ +where there is but a difference or twoness of outer circumstance or +accidental condition. Hence there results a concept not of two buckets +but of two waters, whereas the apparently two waters dipped from the +same source are essentially one. + +[23] “The Need of an Analytic Psychiatry,” _The American Journal of +Psychiatry_, Vol. VI, No. 3, January, 1927. + +[24] An example of the blindly impulsive character of this instinct +often recurs to me. I was standing with a lady on the shore of Lake +Zürich. A sudden storm arose and we could see plainly that two young +men in a sail-boat well out in the middle of the lake had lost complete +control of their craft. To the crowd that had gathered on the quays it +was evident from the way the sail was jibing from side to side that the +boat would overturn. A number of launches began hurrying toward it. +As the boat capsized, throwing the men into the lake, my companion, +suddenly tearing off her gloves, dashed toward the water. I managed to +seize her just as she reached the water’s edge. On my rallying her and +inquiring just what might be her plans with reference to two men a full +quarter of a mile out in the lake and closely surrounded by competent +rescue parties, she was unable to account for her impulsive reaction +beyond declaring that she “just couldn’t let them drown like that!” +Here was an individual with as goodly a share of unconscious egotism +as the rest of us, but in whom at the sight of danger to others the +self-instinct was completely subordinated to the organic behests of our +common societal instinct. + +[25] “Character and the Neuroses,” _The Psychoanalytic Review_, Vol. I, +No. 2, February, 1914. + +[26] We overlook the fact that it is not the content of a belief but +rather the mere condition of believing that determines its errancy or +truth. The word _belief_, as has been said, is a derivative of the +Anglo-Saxon _leof_, meaning _preference_, but we do not recognize that +what one “believes” is merely what one _wants to think_. There are +undoubtedly as many devout believers among the devotees of Science +as of Religion, and upon inquiry we should probably find that the +pet _beliefs_ of the scientist rest upon as unreasoning an attitude +of mind as those of the religionist. The point is that whatever is +thus believed in response to personal preference is arbitrary and +doctrinaire, be it evolution, relativity, or God. + +[27] It is really the element of secret emotionalism that constitutes +mysticism. It is again a phase of the private alternative whereby +we get what we want. What is called “intellectual mysticism” is but +a secondary rationalization of this emotional element. But there is +need of discrimination. While it is true that conceptions arising +from intuitional inference may readily be begotten of emotionalism, +yet the same inferences when based upon biological analogy cease to +be mystical. Nietzsche’s “primordial unity,” because biologically +inferred, seems to me a quite unemotional and inclusive conception. In +the biological consistency that unites the most highly differentiated +species with the lowest single unicellular organism, the mind +straightway finds substantiation for Nietzsche’s conception. Whereas +the “metaphysical unity” of the religionists is, on the contrary, +a wholly mystical conception. Through this postulate the mind is +immediately involved in such vagaries as one connects with the doctrine +of transubstantiation or with the flights of Annie Besant and her +astral bodies! + +But one can perhaps still more aptly illustrate the distinction +in question by considering the totally opposed meanings--the one +intellectual, the other emotional--contained in the word “vibrations” +according as it is used by the scientist in regard to mathematically +mensurable physical wave-lengths or as it is employed by the +“hypersensitive personality” to describe certain sensations presumably +recorded somewhere in the region of the epigastrium in response to +subtle but invisible “psychic communications.” In defining the term +mystical one must not fail to include the attitude of mind that leads +one scientist, who has failed to understand the investigations of +another, to refer to those investigations as mystical. I am inclined +to feel somewhat strongly on this point because of the fact that my +conception of the primary biological unity of the organism and its +influence upon the subsequent development of the personality has +tended to be regarded quite arbitrarily in the light of a mystical +interpretation. (See note 1, page 10.) + +[28] There is a story reminiscent of juvenile days in my own home that +is to the point. An older brother, then between four and five years of +age, was being given his bath in the nursery as was customary in those +days. Hanging above the mantel was a picture of the Sistine Madonna. +The youngster being freed of his clothing ran skipping about the room. +His governess happened to be present, and being duly horrified or, +what is more probable as I remember her, acting in response to a sense +of duty, she gently chid him for his lack of modesty, saying “Jesus +doesn’t love little boys who go about that way.” The child looked up +at the picture of the nude infant with doubtless a more discerning +sympathy with Jesus’ views than grown-ups are wont to attribute to the +wisdom of childhood, and looking his would-be instructress quietly in +the eyes he replied incontrovertibly: “He does it hisse’f!” + +If the story of my brother’s life should ever be fully told, as some +day I hope it may, it will help us realize the unerring fatality of an +early enforced system of repression and its logical effect upon the +individual’s subsequent life as upon its close. + +[29] The biological (organic) continuity between the societal +or psychological and the functional or physiological spheres is +interesting in view of their obvious homologies as shown in the +marked suggestive influences which we see passing over from the +psychological sphere and affecting the processes pertaining to the +functional or physiological sphere and doubtless operating no less in +the reverse direction. One wonders without undue presumption how many +so-called “organic” diseases are not primarily functional and hence +functionally modifiable through the integral, societal agency of an +organic analysis, provided, of course, that the separative process +has not already crystallized into the static condition of structural +alteration. At least it is clear that many so-called physical +derangements need to be frankly regarded in the light of sheer somatic +hysterias. See “The Psychological Analysis of So-called Neurasthenic +and Allied States,” _The Journal of Abnormal Psychology_, Vol. VIII, +1913-14, page 246, note 1. + +An analogous condition is demonstrable in the physical universe in the +fact that the phenomena of gravitation (such as planetary motion) and +the phenomena of electricity (including the motion of light) have been +proved to be so intimately related to one another as to be regarded now +by the physicists “as parts of one vast system embracing all Nature.” + +[30] The Southern negro has a definition of libido that is biologically +truer than that of either Freud, Jung or Claparède. He refers to +inadequacy of the sexual life as a lack of “ambition.” + +[31] It should be recalled that in the view of the present thesis +sexuality as it exists socially among us is, in essence, narcistic +throughout and that hence sexuality, including so-called _normal_ +sexuality, is, in my conception, a repression, and must be definitely +discriminated from the spontaneous and biological expression embodied +in the native instinct of sex. (See p. 10.) + +[32] One may find the objective evidence of this statement amply set +forth in P. Kropotkin’s _Mutual Aid, a Factor of Evolution_. Here +Kropotkin traces in a very conclusive way the presence of the societal +instinct in the lower animals and in primitive man. Kropotkin errs, +however, when he reaches the levels of development expressed in the +social organizations of man. For he fails to discriminate between the +instinct of societal solidarity that is the natural cohesion of a +species and the quite premeditated and ulterior expressions of social +accord represented in the mutual self-interests of man’s collective +adaptations. + +[33] “An Ethnic Aspect of Consciousness,” _The Sociological Review_, +Vol. XIX, No. 1, January, 1927. + +[34] If, in the flash of so brief an interval of time (speaking +ethnologically) as fifty years or so, a plan were effected involving +the complete segregation from one another of all the individuals +comprising the societal organism of the species, the result, +notwithstanding the many millions of years required for the gradual +evolution of the race up to the present time, would be its complete +extermination! Such a consideration allows us to realize, at least +objectively, how closely interwoven are the elements comprising our +societal organism and how dependent is the integrity of the whole upon +the organic participation of its parts. + +[35] A striking instance of psychoanalytic unconsciousness may be +seen in the analyst’s quite naïve attitude toward his own unconscious +need for such infantile pacifiers as he finds in the obsessive use of +tobacco. That such diversions are no more adult than the use of the +rubber ring or nipple of his infancy he does not for a moment suspect, +the concomitance of such practices with the oral eroticism of his +childhood having only a _theoretical_ significance for him. The truth +is, the psychoanalyst _wants to smoke_. Of course, it is not consistent +with his teaching and if he is to have his way in the matter some +process must be devised that will make it consistent. And so in his +authoritarian suzerainty he forthwith decrees that the patient who +objects to a smoke-filled room is a prey to unseemly resistances, and +that his or her attitude of mind, not the analyst’s, must be promptly +looked into with a view to summary treatment. + +[36] Let me say at once that this nomadic young lady did me the +honour to remark that she sensed immediately upon meeting me that +_my_ attitude was entirely different from that of other analysts. Of +this she made haste to assure me at the outset. In thinking of it, a +wince gives place to a smile as I recall the trustful complacency with +which I benignly accepted as a statement of fact the cunning decoys of +this seraphically unconscious individual, her flattering reassurances +seeming to me at the time clearly to indicate the very rare perceptions +of this unusually discerning young person! The aftermath as it has come +to pass in the brief succeeding years enables me unhesitatingly to aver +that my severely reproved colleagues were at least not more unconscious +than I. + +[37] See note 1, page 15. + +[38] See note 1, page 56. + +[39] See note 1, page 10. + +[40] See note 1, page 10. + +[41] Perhaps this distinction of type has its societal counterpart +also in the opposite psychological reactions embodied in the esoteric +tendencies of Catholicism with its markedly autocentric organization, +as compared with Protestantism’s more allocentric trends. The +difference between the two types of reaction is also seen in the broad +geographical contrast that separates the consciousness of Asia from +that of Europe. + +[42] See discussion of opposed reaction-types independently determined +by M. Geiger, “Neue Complicationsversuche,” _Philos. Studien_, +XVIII, 1903, pp. 347-436 and also by myself, _The Determination of +the Position of a Momentary Impression in the Temporal Course of a +Moving Visual Impression_, The Johns Hopkins Studies in Philosophy and +Psychology, No. 3, The Psychological Review, Psychological Monographs, +Vol. XI, No. 4, September, 1909. + +[43] “Psychiatry as an Objective Science,” _British Journal of Medical +Psychology_, Vol. V, Part 4. + +[44] Narcism (homo-erotism) is a reversion of interest representing +a sexual reaction to the pictorial affect or to the personal image. +Autoerotism (ego-erotism) represents an arrest of the individual’s +sexuality due to its impact with the personal image or with the social +self-reflection about him. Narcism embodies the reflection of the +individual’s erotism in its social phase. Autoerotism is the absorption +of the individual’s erotism in its personal phase. Autoerotism is +thus central and represents the retroversion or interception by the +organism of its efferent interests. This occurs in the individual +inversion expressed in the sensory images of dementia præcox. Narcism +is peripheral and is expressed in the social inversion pertaining +equally to the motor images of homosexuality as to the sensory images +of paranoia. + +[45] While a student of Jung’s in the early days of psychoanalysis, +at the time when Jung was the very organ of Freud’s genius, the clear +emanation of his spirit, I remarked to him one day that I had come to +the conclusion that the neurotic individual inevitably married his +mother. Jung’s reply, alert as a flash, was characteristic of his +brilliant, inclusive scope of vision. “I have come to the conclusion,” +he said, “that _every_ individual inevitably marries his mother.” + +[46] The word _like_ is from Anglo-Saxon _gelic_, compounded of _ge_, +meaning together, and _lic_, meaning body. + +[47] “Convention in Psychoanalysis and Its Interpretative Inhibitions,” +a paper read at the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American +Psychoanalytic Association, Atlantic City, May 10, 1918. + +[48] See note 2, page 208. + +[49] In a recent meeting of psychopathologists a paper was presented +which described the results of a questionnaire that had been +distributed among the students of one of our prominent American +universities, the object of which was to learn the nature of the sexual +life of the college students. The figures compiled from the answers +submitted showed in the author’s view a surprisingly high percentage +of masturbation and homosexuality. But what is of interest is the fact +that in the interpretation of the author of the paper, as well as in +that of every member who participated in the discussion, the concept +of masturbation was restricted solely to personal practices on the +part of the single individual, while the concept of homosexuality +was confined entirely to the manifestation of sexual interests or +activities occurring between persons of the same sex! Apparently it +was not suspected that these manifest expressions of autoerotism or +homosexuality are the least widespread or significant forms of its +occurrence, that the really important and far-reaching expression of +these disorders of instinct occurs in the latent form represented in +the symbolic substitutions of heterosexuality as commonly practised, +for example, in houses of prostitution. Yet these latter expressions +were avowedly regarded as real expressions of heterosexuality and, +accordingly, its devotees were naïvely interpreted as presenting a +psychological adaptation which showed a frank contrast to that of +their “homosexual” confrères! It is hopeless to expect any scientific +understanding of anomalies of reaction that pertain to our subjective +life as long as scientists themselves persist in confusing the +objective appearances under which these anomalies are disguised for the +subjective actuality of these anomalies themselves. + +[50] “The Genesis and Meaning of ‘Homosexuality’”--a development of +_the principle of identification or the primary subjective phase of +consciousness_. See _The Psychoanalytic Review_, Vol. IV, No. 3, July, +1917. + +[51] It is not by accident but by some inner, intuitive design that +man has adopted the symbol he employs as the sign of infinity. In +the mark of the mathematicians--consisting of two circles that are +one, one circle that is two, wherein is neither beginning nor end--is +expressed the character of the infinite and all-inclusive in a form of +conjunction so complete as not to be susceptible of possible increment. + +[52] The reader is reminded that this book was outlined in 1923. From +that time to the time of publication (1927), the group analysis, +proceeding along the lines indicated in this chapter, has further +substantiated the thesis here stated. + +[53] See note 1, page 53. + +[54] See note 1, page 15. + +[55] We are warned, of course, that this new shift of technique will +arouse in us unprecedented resistances. But let us be wary lest we +capitulate too easily to this ready-to-hand ogre of “resistances”; for +by the same token we have been warned throughout these analytic years +that we must expect unprecedented resistances to the former dictum of +psychoanalysis--a dictum which imposed without parley or mitigation a +rigid analytic policy of non-interference. Our inconsistency is but +another instance of the automatic illogic of the alternative, of the +inevitable compulsion of the personal criterion. + +[56] “The Group Method of Analysis,” _The Psychoanalytic Review_, Vol. +XIV, 1927, “The Laboratory Method in Psychoanalysis,” _The American +Journal of Psychiatry_, Vol. V, No. 3, January, 1926. + +[57] It should be clearly explained that _group analysis is not my +analysis of the group but that it is the group’s analysis of me or +of any other individual_. In our laboratory usage, “group” does not +mean a collection of individuals. It means a phyletic principle of +observation. This phyletic principle of observation as applied to the +individual and to the aggregate is the whole significance of group +analysis. + +[58] I hold that the word “spirit” employed in its biological +connotation belongs to the legitimate equipment of the laboratory. +Because the religionists have carried it off and perverted it to +sentimental uses, I shall not surrender the claim of the scientist upon +it. And so by “spirit” I do not wish to indicate anything akin to the +ghostly itinerants reputed to stalk o’ nights, nor to that beneficent +impulse that moves people to cheer the afternoon of life by “doing +good” when the infelicities of age or infirmity have dulled the edge of +less salutary proclivities. Neither have I in mind any philosophical +concept whatever, nor least of all a conception savouring of a +religious purport, all of which seem to me equally apparitional. I mean +merely man’s innate, unprompted or unchecked feeling as expressive of +his organic life. That which in man responds to natural beauty, actual +or inferred, is of the sphere of the spirit as I use the term. + +[59] “There are ages, when the rational and the intuitive man stand +side by side, the one full of fear of the intuition, the other full of +scorn for the abstraction; the latter just as irrational as the former +is inartistic.” Nietzsche, _Early Greek Philosophy and Other Essays_. + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78616 *** |