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+} +.tdl-top { + text-align: left; + vertical-align: top; + } +.tdr-top { + text-align: right; + vertical-align: top; + } +.tdr-bot { + text-align: right; + vertical-align: bottom; + } +.tdr {text-align: right;} +.width5 { + width: 5em; +} +.width1 { + width: 1em; +} +div.figcenterplate { + margin: auto; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + text-align: center; + page-break-before: always; + max-width: 100%; +} +div.figdecor { + margin: auto; + margin-top: 0; + margin-bottom: 0; + text-align: center; + max-width: 100%; +} +figure { + display: inline-block; + margin: 0 auto; + text-align: center; + max-width: 100%; +} +figure p { + text-indent: 0; + margin-top: 0; + margin-bottom: 0; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + } +figure p.small { + text-align: center; + font-size: 70%; +} +img { + width: inherit; + max-width: 100%; +} +.iwdecor1 { + width: 80px; +} +.container { + text-align: center; + width: 6em; + margin: auto; + margin-top: 2em; +} +.decor2 { + width: 10px; + display:inline-block; + vertical-align:middle; +} +.decor2txt { + text-align: center; + text-indent: 0; + font-size: 60%; + display:inline-block; + vertical-align:middle; +} +.iw1 { width: 300px; } +</style> +</head> + +<body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78609 ***</div> + +<div class="margins"> +<div class="x-ebookmaker-drop figcenterplate iw1"> +<figure id="cover"><a href="images/cover.jpg"><img alt="[Cover]" +src="images/cover_thumb.jpg"></a> +</figure> +</div> + +<div class="page"> +<p class="center spaced15 space-above2">THE FIRST MOROCCAN +CRISIS<br> +<span class="less">1904-1906</span></p> +</div> + +<div class="page"> +<p class="center small spaced13 space-above2">THE UNIVERSITY OF +CHICAGO PRESS<br> +CHICAGO, ILLINOIS</p> + +<hr class="decor width1"> + +<p class="center"><span class="vsmall">THE BAKER & TAYLOR +COMPANY</span><br> +<span class="tiny">NEW YORK</span> +</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="vsmall">THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY +PRESS</span><br> +<span class="tiny">LONDON</span> +</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="vsmall">THE +MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA</span><br> +<span class="tiny">TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI</span> +</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="vsmall">THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, +LIMITED</span><br> +<span class="tiny">SHANGHAI</span> +</p> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<div class="titlepage"> +<h1>THE FIRST<br> +MOROCCAN CRISIS<br> +1904-1906</h1> + +<p class="center spaced15 space-below2"><span class= +"sc less">By</span><br> +EUGENE N. ANDERSON<br> +<span class="med"><em>The University of Chicago</em></span></p> + +<div class="figdecor iwdecor1"> +<figure><img src='images/logo.jpg' alt='[Decoration]'> +</figure> +</div> + +<p class="publisher">THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS<br> +CHICAGO, ILLINOIS</p> +</div> + +<div class="page"> +<p class="center space-above vsmall">COPYRIGHT 1930 BY THE +UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO<br> +ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. PUBLISHED JUNE 1930</p> + +<hr class="decor width5"> + +<p class="center tiny">COMPOSED AND PRINTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF +CHICAGO PRESS<br> +CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.</p> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<div class="page"> +<p class="center spaced17"><span class= +"letter-spaced">DEDICATED</span><br> +<span class="less">TO</span><br> +<span class="letter-spaced">MY MOTHER</span> +</p> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[vii]</span><a id= +"pref"></a>PREFACE</h2> + +<p>The fall of Morocco under European control marks the nadir in +the annals of Islam. The land was the last important Mohammedan +territory to be taken by the Christians. Thereafter began the +Islamic revival which is still in course. This volume, however, +deals not with that subject but with the history of a conflict in +European diplomacy, referring to Morocco proper only when necessary +to explain the moves of the Powers.</p> + +<p>The Moroccan crisis of 1904-6 contained all those elements that +were present at the other crises on the road to the great +war—desire for colonial acquisition, trade and investment +rivalries, national honor, diplomacy which contained the threat of +war, the principle of the balance of power, fears, and +counterfears. The special interest of this episode lies in the fact +that, as the first of the series, it shows the Powers choosing +sides and fixing their opinions and policies. It determined the +mental attitude of the players in the subsequent struggles and gave +direction and mind, so to speak, to the later events.</p> + +<p>In the history of the Moroccan affair from approximately 1898 to +1906, when the first crisis ended, are mirrored almost all the +important movements of the Powers with reference to one another. +The grouping of the Powers around France, the development of +Anglo-German rivalry, the failure of Germany’s policy of playing +between Great Britain and the Dual Alliance, Germany’s +<em>riposte</em> and attempts to restore her position—all are +either intimately connected with the Moroccan question or can be +explained in the light of it. The Moroccan problem was the +political barometer of Europe.</p> + +<p>In making this study I have relied chiefly upon the official +documents contained in <em>Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen +Kabinette, 1871-1914</em>, in <em>British Documents on the Origins +of the War, 1898-1914</em>, and in the two <em>Livres jaunes</em> +concerning the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">[viii]</span> +Moroccan affair from 1901-1906. The presence of so much new +material has rendered antiquated most of the older accounts of the +subject. I have therefore not cited all of this secondary +literature, preferring to give source references.</p> + +<p>In spite of this rich material, there are still obstacles to a +complete, impartial, and balanced account of this episode. The +outstanding one is the absence of adequate French documents. The +French policy has practically to be studied through British or +German eyes and on the basis of the accomplished fact. The British +and the German policies are thus treated with more understanding +and detail. But even here difficulties arise. History cannot be +written alone on the basis of the official diplomatic documents of +today. The variety and amount of information which Ranke found +condensed in the reports of the Venetian ambassadors of the +sixteenth century is now scattered in a hundred places. The +improved facilities for communication and transportation have +limited and specialized the correspondence of governments and their +foreign representatives. Information is now obtained as well from +personal interviews, newspapers, and all those means which create +governmental as well as public opinion. Much of great importance is +never written down at all. Foreign secretaries often give orders to +their ambassadors without explaining their reasons. This is +particularly true of the British, less true of the Germans. +Moreover, statesmen are at times inclined for reasons of policy to +write down how they wish a certain event to be viewed, not how they +actually view it. To check and supplement the official documents, +therefore, the intimate and more personal information in +biographies, autobiographies, and memoirs has been especially +valuable, although neither the number of those works, particularly +on the French side, nor the material in them is complete.</p> + +<p>While international relations were more complex in the pre-war +days than ever before in history, the study of them is facilitated +by the fact that diplomacy was still secret, that a relatively few +individuals guided it. By focusing attention upon these +individuals,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">[ix]</span> one can +interpret the motives which consciously or unconsciously determined +foreign policy. These men sublimated and represented the diplomatic +mind of the nations. A new actor had also made its appearance in +their midst, that combination of Proteus and Fata Morgana, public +opinion; but even it was given tangible shape in the minds of the +responsible statesmen who had to interpret it and respond to its +demands. I have tried to test these interpretations by checking +them against the opinions of contemporaries and by reading in the +contemporary newspapers, magazines, speeches, and letters.</p> + +<p>Diplomatic policies and situations cannot be explained in a +formula. Statesmen are all more or less opportunists; they usually +keep several alternatives in mind. To assert that one country is +bent on war and another on peace, one on revenge and aggression and +another on defense, is to give an incomplete view. In handling the +fluid and shifting materials of diplomacy, one must avoid both +oversimplicity and historical fatalism. Further information will +probably add or change many details in this study, but I believe +that the main lines of the history of this crisis are herein +explained.</p> + +<p>I wish especially to express my appreciation to Professor +Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Professor Ferdinand Schevill, Associate +Professor Arthur P. Scott, and Associate Professor Louis R. +Gottschalk—all of the University of Chicago—for much beneficial +advice and criticism in reading this work in manuscript, and to +thank my sister, Dr. Jesse May McFadyen, of the University of +Minnesota, for many hours of help in searching for the right +phrase.</p> + +<p class="right pad-right2"><span class="sc">Eugene N. +Anderson</span> +</p> + +<p class="less"><span class="sc">Chicago</span>, 1929</p> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2>TABLE OF CONTENTS</h2> + +<table class="toc"> +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c01">I.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">France and Morocco, 1898-1904</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">1</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c02">II.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">The Franco-Italian Entente, +1900-1902</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">19</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c03">III.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">The Franco-Spanish Entente, +1898-1903</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">35</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c04">IV.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">Delcassé’s Policy toward Great Britain +and Germany, 1898-1902</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">41</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c05">V.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">The Anglo-German Alliance +Negotiations, 1898-1901</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">52</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c06">VI.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">The Making of the Entente +Cordiale</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">81</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c07">VII.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">Anglo-Russian Relations after the +Making of the Entente Cordiale</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">110</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c08">VIII.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">French Policy after the Making of the +Entente Cordiale</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">117</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c09">IX.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">Germany and the Entente Cordiale, +1903-4</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">135</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c10">X.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">The Negotiations for a Russo-German +Alliance, 1904</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">159</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c11">XI.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">The Visit to Tangier</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">181</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c12">XII.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">The Moroccan Crisis from the Visit to +Tangier to the Fall of Delcassé</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">196</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c13">XIII.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">The Moroccan Crisis, June 6-July 8, +1905</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">234</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c14">XIV.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">The Moroccan Crisis, July-October, +1905</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">259</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c15">XV.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">The Treaty of Björkö and Its +Annulment</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">279</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c16">XVI.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">The Preliminaries to the Conference of +Algeciras</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">311</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c17">XVII.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">The Conference of Algeciras</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">348</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr-top"><a href="#c18">XVIII.</a> +</td> +<td class="tdl-top hang1 sc">Conclusion</td> +<td class="tdr-bot">397</td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td class="tdr sc"><a href="#ind">Index</a> +</td> +<td> +</td> +<td class="tdr">409</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[1]</span><a id= +"c01"></a>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<p class="sch2">FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1898-1904</p> + +<h3 class="space-above1">I. THE DECADENT MOROCCO</h3> + +<p>Morocco was one of the last of the “backward” countries to be +taken under control by a European state. It was a historic land +with a long record of wars against the Christians; but, like many +another, it had never adapted itself to the course of European +civilization, and by the end of the nineteenth century had +consequently become consigned by statesmen interested in colonial +conquest to the category of “dying states.” Hence it was qualified +for acquisition, division, or control.</p> + +<p>The execution of this work was beset with unusually grave +difficulties. Several centuries of more or less regular diplomatic +and commercial relations with European Powers had assured Morocco +international recognition as a sovereign and independent land. +Moreover, the rival interests of the Powers there were so firmly +established and so conflicting that they seemed irreconcilable. +Down to 1900 these Powers had jealously blocked each other from a +special position, and, in case of necessity, as in 1880, had +settled common problems concerning Morocco by means of an +international conference.<a id="FNanchor_1"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> And while this disunion +obtained, that country of eight million fanatical and warlike souls +able to play one potential enemy against the other was secure.</p> + +<p>At the opening of the twentieth century Morocco was one of the +least-known lands of the world. Insecurity of life, absence of +roads and means of transportation and communication of any but the +most primitive sort, undeveloped harbors poor by nature, and a +governmental policy designed to prevent any Power from gaining a +foothold in the land by the acquisition of property,<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_2">[2]</span> mining or other concessions had +excluded the “Christian dogs” and maintained Mohammedan +purity.<a id="FNanchor_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2" class= +"fnanchor">[2]</a></p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the country was reputed by Europeans to be rich in +natural resources, the “pearl of North Africa.”<a id= +"FNanchor_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The +plains and valleys, if irrigated and cultivated by modern methods, +would, it was held, produce vast supplies of foodstuffs and would +become one of the granaries of Europe. Other regions were declared +to be admirably suited for grazing; while the mountains, those +bulwarks against the encroachments of the desert, were envisaged as +teeming with minerals. Popular imagination glorified Morocco into +another Promised Land.<a id="FNanchor_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4" +class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> + +<p>However that might be, Europeans were doing very little business +there. Official French statistics reckoned the total amount of +foreign trade with Morocco in 1903 as 109,495,888 francs. Of this +small sum France and Algeria enjoyed 31 per cent; Great Britain, +41.6 per cent; Germany, 9 per cent; Spain, 8.4 per cent; and the +other Powers insignificant amounts.<a id="FNanchor_5"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> The contrast between +economic fact and economic possibility acted as a spur to the +groups desirous of political acquisition; but the smallness of +these economic interests and their substantial equality for a +number of the Powers made it difficult to determine which had the +dominant claim to develop Morocco.</p> + +<p>A conflict of strategic interests added to this +complication.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[3]</span> Morocco’s +geographic situation on the Straits of Gibraltar and on the route +to South Africa, her proximity to the French and Spanish +possessions in North Africa and to Spain, made the Sherifian Empire +a land coveted by all Powers with Western Mediterranean interests, +in particular Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy. +Since each state suspected that any rival would abuse its +advantages if it gained ascendancy, disagreement over the future of +Morocco persisted. However, in an era which was coming to be more +and more dominated by the urge for colonial control, this problem +would not long remain unsolved. At the close of the century a +favorable turn in international affairs and an accentuation of the +chronic state of anarchy in the land itself brought the question to +the fore.</p> + +<p>The period of strong rule in Morocco under Sultan +Mulai-el-Hassan (1873-94) and the grand vizier, Ba-Ahmed, came to +an end with the death of the latter in May, 1900, when the young, +inexperienced, and incompetent sultan, Abd-el-Aziz, assumed +authority in person. By his preference for foreign goods and +society he soon not only exhausted his treasury but also estranged +his subjects. He acquired a fantastic collection in which figured +cameras, coaches, bicycles, dolls, pianos by the dozen, and animals +for a menagerie. He amused himself lavishly with his European +friends. He listened to the advice of his two intimates, Kaid Sir +Harry Maclean, a former English soldier from Gibraltar who had been +in Moroccan service for almost two decades, and Mr. W. B. Harris, +correspondent in Morocco of the <em>London Times</em>; and by +promulgating a program of fiscal reform sought to replenish his +resources and reorganize his country in time to prevent the +intervention of the Powers, particularly of France, and the +consequent loss of his independence. But, while his intentions were +good, his actions proved disastrous for himself and his land.<a id= +"FNanchor_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> +Scandalized by the tales of his antics with the +Christians<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[4]</span> and outraged +by the new taxes that violated the Koran, the natives revolted in +1900.<a id="FNanchor_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7" class= +"fnanchor">[7]</a> The rebellions in the north and northeast +constituted a double menace since they might lead to attacks on the +French and Spanish possessions and bring on an intervention of +those two Powers.<a id="FNanchor_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8" +class="fnanchor">[8]</a> The Sultan had no money, therefore no +army; and without an army he could collect no taxes. The rumor +spread that he had actually turned Christian and sold the land to +the English. The political and religious ties with his people were +everywhere breaking.<a id="FNanchor_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9" +class="fnanchor">[9]</a> By 1903 his precarious authority was +confined to a few towns; and his capital, Fez, was itself +threatened by the rebels.<a id="FNanchor_10"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a></p> + +<p>As this situation was nothing unusual in Moroccan annals, the +natives were not greatly disturbed. If events had been permitted to +take their normal course, a revolution would probably have replaced +Abd-el-Aziz by some stronger man, and the country would have +returned to its usual condition of semianarchy. The tragedy for +Morocco lay in the fact that this disorder gave the opportunity for +the interested Powers to intervene. The increasing insecurity of +foreigners and the Sultan’s need for loans foreshadowed the end of +Moroccan independence. In 1899 Lord Salisbury, British prime +minister, had declared that Morocco was decaying and might collapse +at any moment.<a id="FNanchor_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11" class= +"fnanchor">[11]</a> Politicians elsewhere began to turn their +attention toward this corner of Africa. Among them the French +assumed the lead and solved the problem.</p> + +<h3><span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[5]</span>II. FRANCE AND THE +MOROCCAN PROBLEM, 1898-1904</h3> + +<p>By the end of the nineteenth century France’s North African +empire was assuming definitive form. In the 1890’s agreements with +Great Britain, Germany, and Spain (1900) consolidated France’s +possession and left only Morocco, a country almost inclosed on the +land side by French territory, as an object whose acquisition was +coming to be regarded by Frenchmen as essential to the completion +of their ambitions in that region.<a id="FNanchor_12"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> + +<p>To aid in the achievement of this goal a Comité de l’Afrique +française had been organized in 1889 to popularize African +questions with the French people, to exert pressure upon the +government, and to carry on a unified and consistent activity for +colonial expansion which the French cabinets could not do. Its +membership was relatively small—about seventy in all—but very +select. With the Prince d’Arenberg as its president, it numbered in +its ranks deputies, senators, military and naval officers, +officials in the government (although no cabinet members, of +course), members of the Academy, newspaper editors and owners, +members of the Institute, members of various geographical +societies, colonial societies, chambers of commerce—men such as M. +Gabriel Hanotaux, former minister of foreign affairs; M. Jules +Siegfried, who resigned temporarily when he became minister of +commerce in 1893; M. Paul Révoil, governor-general of Algeria; +General Joseph Galliéni, governor-general of Madagascar; M. Eugène +Etienne, former undersecretary of state for the colonies and future +cabinet member; M. Antoine Guillain, vice-president of the Chamber +for a time and former minister of the colonies; M. Paul Deschanel, +president of the committee for foreign and colonial affairs in the +Chamber. Through common membership and close co-operation the +Comité was assured of the active support of the other colonial, +geographical, and commercial organizations. The character and +position of its members in state affairs gave it an undeniably +great influence<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[6]</span> upon +the government as well as upon the nation. This influence was +enhanced by the organization of groups favoring colonial +acquisition in both the Chamber (1892) and Senate (1898), the +former of which under the presidency of M. Etienne boasted in 1902 +almost two hundred members.<a id="FNanchor_13"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a></p> + +<p>During the 1890’s the French advocated a policy of <em>status +quo</em> with reference to Morocco. They opposed permitting any +Power to gain undue influence there or allowing Morocco to reform +herself. They were suspicious of any individual or collective +intervention by the Powers, and wanted to hold the future +completely free. But the defeats of Italy by Abyssinia in 1896 and +of Spain by the United States in 1898 dampened the ardor of those +two rivals. Then, when British attention was claimed by the Boer +War and when the internal disintegration of Morocco increased the +possibilities of intervention, the proponents of aggression +demanded that France should act.</p> + +<p>Late in 1899 the official publication of the Comité declared +that the Moroccan question was of paramount importance in French +foreign policy.<a id="FNanchor_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14" +class="fnanchor">[14]</a> It promoted the campaign for the +acquisition of Morocco so successfully that by the end of 1903 +almost all parties in France, including even the Socialists under +M. Jaurès, had come to consider the French claims to predominance +in Morocco as superior to those of any other Power.<a id= +"FNanchor_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> +The popular arguments, based largely upon the proximity of Algeria +to Morocco, ranged from the theory of the “natural frontier” to +economic and strategic contentions. In Morocco rebellions and +religious wars could easily start, it was claimed, spreading thence +over the whole of North Africa and endangering France’s +possessions. If any other European Power established itself in that +land, it could utilize the native resources in troubling France. On +the other hand, by virtue of her experience in handling +and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[7]</span> employing +Mohammedans, France was better fitted to perform this work of +civilization than anyone else. These were, of course, the stock +arguments of all parties advocating the establishment of European +control over “backward” areas.</p> + +<p>The Comité formulated a policy for handling both the internal +and the international aspects of the question—a policy which M. +Delcassé, minister of foreign affairs from 1898 to 1905, was +actually to follow. It was the popular solution, and, for France, +the only possible one.<a id="FNanchor_16"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> As the Fashoda affair had +taught the French that the approval of the Powers was necessary for +the acquisition of colonial territory, the first requisite was to +make agreements with the interested states, among whom the +<em>Bulletin</em> included Germany. Moreover, the nature of the +problem demanded this approach. For Morocco’s international status, +the interests of the Powers there, the military strength of the +fanatical population, and the consequent need of having French +hands completely free from the danger of complications before +attempting to reform Morocco made this preliminary international +understanding imperative. The program contained four essential +points. The sovereignty of the sultan and the independence and +integrity of his land should be assured. Adequate guaranties for +the freedom of the straits should be provided. The legitimate +interests of the Powers, considered to be chiefly economic, should +be satisfied through the acceptance of the principle of full +commercial liberty. Lastly, Spain’s territorial claims should be +satisfied. By this course the Comité and its followers thought to +dispose of the international aspect.</p> + +<p>At the same time Morocco itself had to be won. The +<em>Bulletin</em> believed that a policy of “pacific penetration” +carried on through the agency of the sultan would solve this task. +The sultan was the sole source of authority, religious as well as +political, that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[8]</span> France +could properly utilize. By working through him she might further +her own interests and might introduce reforms without provoking the +natives to war. The sovereignty of the Sultan would not be touched +nor the independence and integrity of his land be violated. The +“pacific” aspect would prevent the other Powers from taking offence +and would satisfy the French people. The “penetrating” aspect would +give satisfactory reality. It was a masterful combination, with an +air of superficial plausibility so long as one did not attempt to +reconcile the phrases “pacific penetration” and “preponderant +influence” with those of “sovereignty of the sultan” and +“independence and integrity of the land.”<a id= +"FNanchor_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17" class= +"fnanchor">[17]</a></p> + +<p>The French minister of foreign affairs from 1898 to 1905 was, as +already said, M. Théophile Delcassé. Born in 1852, he was at a very +impressionable age when the Franco-Prussian War occurred. He became +so ardent a disciple of Gambetta that he could never speak +afterward of their friendship without emotion. Journalist, deputy, +colonial undersecretary, colonial minister—such was the course of +his rise. Uncommunicative by nature, he avoided Parliament as much +as possible. He was on intimate terms with M. Waldeck-Rousseau, +premier from 1899 to 1901; but with the latter’s successors, MM. +Combes and Rouvier, his relations were cool, and he asserted his +entire independence in the conduct of his office. In a short and +caustic sketch, November, 1900, Sir Edmund Monson, British +ambassador at Paris, wrote of him:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Delcassé is an unsatisfactory Minister to us diplomatists in +Paris. He is extremely uncommunicative, not to say secretive. +Consequently it is very rare that any one of us succeeds in +extracting information from him. He has plenty of commonplace +conversation, which flows glibly enough, and he will talk +eloquently in an academical fashion. But he hardly ever tells one +anything in the way of political news, and he has an adroit way of +feigning ignorance which took me in at first, until I convinced +myself that it was all shamming. He always urges that he is not a +diplomatist by profession, but he carries the practice of +subterfuge to an extent which I have hardly ever<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_9">[9]</span> met before in a Minister of +Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, he does not tell lies +systematically, as X did.<a id="FNanchor_18"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">His long tenure in office and the free scope given +him by the cabinet and Parliament, both engrossed in internal +affairs,<a id="FNanchor_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19" class= +"fnanchor">[19]</a> enabled him to put his own impress upon French +foreign policy and to give it a positive, constructive content. +Although a member of radical cabinets that reduced the military and +naval budgets and neglected the defenses of the land, he openly +disapproved of that policy and advocated rearing a virile, +patriotic generation of fighters. He courted and received the +support of all parties. He took as the sole objective in his +foreign policy the maintenance and development of French interests, +and avowed himself an opportunist in his method of diplomacy. He +was a <em>Realpolitiker</em> at a moment when the French people +seemed to be turning toward internationalism and pacifism. His +policy unfolded itself gradually, and, in the absence of adequate +documentary material, it has to be explained largely upon the basis +of its accomplishments.<a id="FNanchor_20"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a></p> + +<p>The new elements introduced into French policy by this minister +were associated almost altogether with the Moroccan question. He +seems from the start to have coveted that country.<a id= +"FNanchor_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> +He thought that since the Dual Alliance was firmly +established,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[10]</span> France +as well as Russia ought to reap some benefits therefrom. But, as +Russia was turning her energies more and more to the Far East and +was thereby weakening the effectiveness of the Alliance, he desired +some means of re-establishing the equilibrium of forces in Europe. +Particularly was this necessary since Germany had inaugurated her +<em>Weltpolitik</em>; for, with German power increasing at so fast +a pace, France had to seek new friends for the protection of +herself, her colonies, her interests, and for the realization of +her ambitions toward Morocco before it was too late.<a id= +"FNanchor_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> +This triple aim of better defense, of increased prestige, and of +colonial acquisition in Northwest Africa he saw could be realized +by the settlement of the international aspect of the Moroccan +question. Italy and Spain as Mediterranean neighbors and Great +Britain as a formidable colonial rival should be won to the French +plan by agreements which at the same time should create friendships +between them and fortify and aggrandize the French position in +Europe. Moreover, M. Delcassé hoped to reconcile Russia with Great +Britain, above all to prevent them from actual conflict. And, +depending upon circumstances, he was apparently willing to treat +with Germany. A colonial acquisition and a rearrangement in +international relations were to be achieved together, and the +Moroccan problem came to signify both.<a id= +"FNanchor_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23" class= +"fnanchor">[23]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[11]</span>The basis of the +Franco-Moroccan relations was laid by the treaty of 1845 regulating +the boundary between Algeria and her western neighbor.<a id= +"FNanchor_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> +However, the frontier remained in part indefinite; border raids +recurred; the possession of the oases, Touat, Gourara, and +Tidikelt, discovered after the treaty was made, remained +unsettled.<a id="FNanchor_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25" class= +"fnanchor">[25]</a> The consequence was chronic trouble, which +France tried to eliminate by occupying these oases late in 1899 and +in 1900 and by beginning to construct railroads toward them.</p> + +<p>Alarmed by this activity, the Sultan asked Queen Victoria in the +autumn of 1900 to obtain assurances from France which would +tranquilize his fears. Realizing that this would be impossible, the +British government refused, and Sir Edmund Monson, the British +ambassador at Paris, merely mentioned the Sultan’s anxieties to the +French Foreign Minister (October 17).<a id= +"FNanchor_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> +The Italian, Spanish, and German governments also showed some +concern over this action at Touat.<a id="FNanchor_27"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> M. Delcassé replied to +them all with the statement which he had made in the French Senate +on April 3, that in Africa France would honor all treaties signed +by her, that she would respect the frontiers of neighboring states, +and that she had no intention of changing the <em>status quo</em> +in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[12]</span> Mediterranean. +She was merely occupying territory manifestly belonging to +her.<a id="FNanchor_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28" class= +"fnanchor">[28]</a></p> + +<p>The number of attacks of the Moroccans upon Algeria increased. +After several particularly bold raids had occurred early in 1901, +the French government sent a sharply worded note to the Sultan +which he interpreted as threatening action against his ancestral +home, Tafilelt.<a id="FNanchor_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29" +class="fnanchor">[29]</a> He appealed to the British government for +protection,<a id="FNanchor_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30" class= +"fnanchor">[30]</a> and in June and July sent an embassy headed by +the minister of war, el-Menebhi, to London and Berlin to obtain aid +against France and to negotiate a loan.<a id= +"FNanchor_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a> +As the question of an alliance was then engrossing the attentions +of both the British and the German governments, neither felt +inclined to give the Moroccans anything but innocuous advice, and +this mission was a failure.<a id="FNanchor_32"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a></p> + +<p>The dispatch of that embassy just at the time when Anglo-German +relations were so cordial alarmed the French Foreign +Minister.<a id="FNanchor_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33" class= +"fnanchor">[33]</a> Through M. Révoil, governor-general of Algeria, +he<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[13]</span> warned the +Moroccan government against signing any political or commercial +agreement without French approval, and exacted a promise from a +Moroccan embassy then in Paris concerning the execution of any +accord which might be signed.<a id="FNanchor_34"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> Among the Powers, M. +Delcassé had little to fear from Spain, with whom he was on +intimate terms, or from Italy, with whom in the previous December +he had made an agreement about Morocco.<a id= +"FNanchor_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> +He assured the British government that France had no intention of +raising “serious questions in Morocco.” The Marquess of Lansdowne, +British foreign secretary, responded with a frank account of his +conversations with the Moroccan embassy.<a id= +"FNanchor_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> +It was Germany of whose reactions M. Delcassé was most uncertain. +In June, through his friend M. Leon y Castillo, the Spanish +ambassador, he suggested to Prince Radolin, the German ambassador +in Paris, that if the German government, as the victor in 1870, +would take the initiative, he would like to discuss various matters +with a view to arriving at an entente.<a id= +"FNanchor_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> +The German response to the Spanish Ambassador was that before +Germany could enter into an arrangement with France whereby the +hostility of a third Power might be incurred the two countries must +make a mutual guaranty of each other’s territorial integrity. Since +France would thereby have to guarantee the German +possession<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[14]</span> of +Alsace-Lorraine, the proposed negotiation was crushed.<a id= +"FNanchor_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> +None the less, in a conversation with Prince Radolin on June 23, +1901, M. Delcassé made and received an important statement about +Morocco. When the Ambassador mentioned the discussion in the French +newspapers of a French protectorate over that land, the Foreign +Minister replied:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>“If by that word protectorate one means that France, mistress of +Algeria and Tunis, has and must conserve toward Morocco an unique +situation [<em>une situation absolument à part</em>], it seems to +me that it is self-evident [<em>il me semble que c’est l’évidence +même</em>].” “Nothing is more just, every one takes account of that +situation [<em>tout le mond se rend compte de cette +situation</em>],” answered Prince Radolin.<a id= +"FNanchor_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39" class= +"fnanchor">[39]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Much or little could be read into either remark; but together +with the general diplomatic situation they enabled M. Delcassé in +the Senate on July 5 to declare that</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">if France, mistress of Algeria and through Algeria +neighbor of Morocco along an immense frontier, is forced to follow +what occurs there with a singular interest,—our vigilance does not +aim at other than the tranquillity, prosperity, and integrity of +the Sherifian empire. . . . .<a id="FNanchor_40"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The presence of an embassy in Paris simultaneously with the one +in London and Berlin<a id="FNanchor_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41" +class="fnanchor">[41]</a> gave the French Minister an opportunity +for taking the first steps toward “pacific penetration.” The +mission came to Paris to seek an agreement with the French +government upon a definite boundary line between Algeria and +Morocco which would assure Moroccan isolation. M. Delcassé, +however, aimed, by leaving the frontier line indefinite, to utilize +this geographic proximity as a means of creating a +community<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[15]</span> of +interests with the Sultan and his people and of familiarizing them +with things European.</p> + +<p>The French Minister succeeded partially in incorporating this +plan in an agreement with the Moroccan embassy in July, 1901, +supplementing that of 1845. Drawn “to consolidate the bonds of +amity existing between them [France and Morocco] and to develop +their reciprocal good relations,” the treaty provided that the +boundary should remain uncertain, but that France and Morocco +should each have the right to set up a line of posts for purposes +of defense and customs collection in the desert region on soil +which unquestionably belonged to them. The tribes living in the +territory between those two lines should be permitted to choose +which authority they preferred to reside under. Moroccans and +Algerians could enter that territory freely for commercial or other +purposes. Moroccan tribes who owned pastures in Algeria could +continue to use them, and vice versa. For the preservation of +amicable relations between the two countries each government agreed +to appoint two commissioners annually to settle future border +disputes.<a id="FNanchor_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42" class= +"fnanchor">[42]</a></p> + +<p>To Ben Sliman, the leader of the embassy to Paris, M. Delcassé +offered French friendship and aid, but added a veiled threat of the +trouble which France would make for Morocco if his offers were not +accepted. While the French Minister showed a nice regard for +Moroccan sensitiveness toward innovations, he voiced the +expectation that when the land should decide to “enter into new +ways” it would give France the preference for furnishing it with +the needed resources. In an important dispatch of July 27, 1901, M. +Delcassé instructed M. Saint-René Taillandier, the French +representative at Tangier, concerning his future conduct. The +French Minister was to assure the Sultan of French respect for the +integrity of his land and for his own sovereignty, to +affirm<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[16]</span> France’s +desire to give him friendly aid, and to point out the benefit which +the Sultan, as ruler, might derive therefrom. He was to warn the +latter against foreign innovations which might imperil the security +of Algeria.<a id="FNanchor_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43" class= +"fnanchor">[43]</a> Lastly he was to support all enterprises, +commercial, industrial, and philanthropic, calculated to increase +French influence in the land.<a id="FNanchor_44"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a></p> + +<p>Thus the French government could note with satisfaction that +whereas the Moroccan mission to London and Berlin had accomplished +nothing, the one to Paris had enabled France to feel out the Powers +on this question, to proclaim publicly her special interests, and +to begin the actual execution of her program. M. Delcassé was now +started upon a conscious policy of establishing French predominance +in the Sherifian Empire.</p> + +<p>When the French and Moroccan commissioners appointed to execute +the agreement of 1901 set to work, they found that its terms were +impracticable. The assassination of two French captains by +Moroccans in January, 1902, also showed that if order were ever to +obtain along the frontier, French power would have to strengthen +the Sultan’s efforts.<a id="FNanchor_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45" +class="fnanchor">[45]</a> The commissioners therefore negotiated in +April and May, 1902, two further treaties, the content of which was +much more in harmony with the French objective of loosening the +boundary instead of tightening it, of providing a complete program +of military, economic, and political co-operation between the two +governments as follows: In case of need the two states should +concert in pacifying and policing the frontier from Teniet-Sassi to +Figuig, but no guard or customs posts should be established between +those two points. In lieu of these customs duties, France agreed to +pay Morocco a lump sum annually. In the other frontier area the two +governments should establish markets and customs posts at +specified<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[17]</span> points in +order to develop commerce between Algeria and Morocco.<a id= +"FNanchor_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46" class= +"fnanchor">[46]</a></p> + +<p>It became impossible to carry out the commercial clauses of the +treaty because of anarchy on the Moroccan side of the border. But +the Sultan made immediate use of the military articles by +requesting permission of the French government to send Moroccan +troops and munitions to the frontier by way of Algeria, and by +asking it in July to furnish military instructors for these troops. +M. Delcassé readily agreed.<a id="FNanchor_47"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a></p> + +<p>Notwithstanding these requests, the Sultan was dissatisfied with +the course of affairs, and in September, 1902, sent Kaid Maclean to +Europe to seek aid in stemming the tide of the French advance. +Carrying personal letters from the Sultan to King Edward and to the +German Emperor, the Kaid went first to London. He proposed to the +King and to Lord Lansdowne that the integrity of Morocco be +guaranteed by Great Britain, or, failing that, by Great Britain and +Germany, for a period of seven years, and that, if at the end of +this period Morocco had not thoroughly reformed her government and +developed her natural resources, the guaranty should lapse. He +proposed also that a Moorish loan be made in England, France, and +Germany, and that all railway concessions be divided between those +three countries. The British government approved the method of +handling the project for a loan and for railroad construction; but, +as it was already in conversation with the French government over +the future of Morocco and was disinclined to tie its hands, it +refused to consider the other measure. Thus the mission was a +failure.<a id="FNanchor_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48" class= +"fnanchor">[48]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[18]</span>In 1903 the Sultan +was in dire straits. While the whole country was more or less in +rebellion, the main center of danger lay in the northeast near Taza +where the pretender to the throne, Bu-Hamara, “Father of the +She-Ass,” had acquired a large following late in 1902. He was in a +position to attack the French along the border or the Sultan in +Fez, and did so. His defeat of the Sherifian army endangered Fez +itself. Even in his capital the Sultan angered his subjects by +summarily executing the murderers of a British missionary. In this +plight, he turned to the obliging French for further aid. He +received permission for his troops and the loyal border tribes to +seek refuge in Algeria. After M. Delcassé had officially intervened +in his behalf, he was able to obtain a loan of 7,500,000 francs +from the French banking-house of Gautsch. By the time the +Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 1904, was made, the Sultan +seemed to be falling in line with the French policy of “pacific +penetration.”<a id="FNanchor_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49" class= +"fnanchor">[49]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc01"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1"><span class= +"label">[1]</span></a>This was the Conference of Madrid.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2"><span class= +"label">[2]</span></a>See among the numerous works on Morocco: +Albert Salmon, <em>Le Maroc. Son état économique et commercial</em> +(Paris, 1906); René Pinon, <em>L’empire de la Méditerranée</em> +(Paris, 1904), p. 96; Eugène Aubin, <em>Morocco of To-Day</em> +(London, 1906), p. 119.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3"><span class= +"label">[3]</span></a>Victor Piquet, <em>La colonisation française +dans l’Afrique du Nord: Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc</em> (Paris, 1912), +p. 15.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4"><span class= +"label">[4]</span></a>For typical reactions see Pinon, <em>L’empire +de la Médit.</em>; M. Aflalo, <em>The Truth about Morocco. An +Indictment of the Policy of the British Foreign Office with Regard +to the Anglo-French Agreement</em> (London, 1904); <em>Zwanzig +Jahre alldeutscher Arbeit und Kämpfe</em> (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 219 +ff. For a more scientific discussion see Piquet, pp. 514 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5"><span class= +"label">[5]</span></a>The statistics about Morocco are all +unreliable. They vary according to the persons taking them. The +Moroccan government took none itself. Those given above are quoted +in André Tardieu, <em>La conference d’Algésiras. Histoire +diplomatique de la crise marocaine (15 Janvier-7 Avril, 1906)</em> +(Paris, 1909), pp. 499 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6"><span class= +"label">[6]</span></a>On the new sultan see Pinon, <em>L’empire de +la Médit.</em>, pp. 150 ff.; Aubin, pp. 137 ff., 178; Walter B. +Harris, <em>Morocco That Was</em> (Edinburgh and London, 1921), +esp. pp. 65 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7"><span class= +"label">[7]</span></a>See Aubin, pp. 203 ff.; Auguste Lombard, +<em>La banque d’état du Maroc</em> (Montpellier, 1911), pp. 14 +ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8"><span class= +"label">[8]</span></a>On this disorder see Victor Bérard, +<em>L’affaire marocaine</em> (Paris, 1906), p. 82; Ministère des +Affaires Etrangères, <em>Documents diplomatiques. Affaires du +Maroc, 1901-1905</em> (Paris, 1905), Nos. 33 ff., 42 ff., 61 ff., +90, 98 ff. (This <em>Livre jaune</em> is hereafter cited as +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>.) See also <em>Bulletin du comité de +l’Afrique française, Supplément</em>, 1901, pp. 193 ff. (This +magazine is hereafter cited as <em>Bulletin</em>.)</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9"><span class= +"label">[9]</span></a>Aubin, p. 109.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10"><span class= +"label">[10]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, pp. 320-21.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11"><span class= +"label">[11]</span></a>Hatzfeldt to Bülow, Feb. 8, 1899, <em>Die +Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914. Sammlung der +diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes</em> (im Auftrage des +Auswärtigen Amtes herausgegeben von Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht +Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme; Berlin, 1922-27), XVII, +295 f., No. 5152 (hereafter cited as <em>G.P.</em>).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12"><span class= +"label">[12]</span></a>See Pinon, <em>Empire de la Médit.</em>; +speech by M. Etienne on June 16, 1903, reprinted in <em>Bulletin, +Supplément</em>, 1903, p. 179.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13"><span class= +"label">[13]</span></a><em>Bulletin</em>, July, 1902, p. 267.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14"><span class= +"label">[14]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, Dec., 1899, pp. 412, +429.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15"><span class= +"label">[15]</span></a>See the debates in the Chamber on this +subject, Nov., 1903, <em>Journal officiel de la République +française. Débats parlementaires</em> (Chambre des Députés, Nov., +1903); Tardieu, pp. 17 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16"><span class= +"label">[16]</span></a>See <em>Bulletin</em>, Dec., 1899, pp. 412, +429; Jan., 1900, p. 2; April, 1900, p. 140; June, 1901, p. 182; +March, 1902, p. 107; Oct., 1902, pp. 347, 350; Oct., 1903, pp. 301, +305; Jan., 1904, p. 3, etc. Also speech by M. Etienne, June 16, +1903, in <em>ibid., Supplément</em>, 1903, p. 179.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17"><span class= +"label">[17]</span></a>See <em>ibid.</em>, July, 1900, p. 257; +Aug., 1901, pp. 259 f.; April, 1903, p. 120; Pinon, <em>Empire de +la Médit.</em>, p. 182.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18"><span class= +"label">[18]</span></a>Lord Newton, <em>Lord Lansdowne, A +Biography</em> (London, 1929), p. 209.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19"><span class= +"label">[19]</span></a>Such as the Dreyfus case, the law of the +Congregations, the separation of church and state.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20"><span class= +"label">[20]</span></a>On Delcassé see Christian Schefer, <em>D’une +guerre à l’autre. Essai sur la politique extérieure de la Troisième +République (1871-1914)</em> (Paris, 1920), pp. 221 f.; Georges +Reynald, <em>La diplomatie française. L’œuvre de Delcassé</em> +(Paris, 1915); René Millet, <em>Notre politique extérieure de 1898 +à 1905</em> (Paris, 1905), p. 2; Robert Dell, <em>My Second +Country</em> (New York, 1920), p. 176; René Pinon, <em>France et +Allemagne, 1870-1913</em> (Paris, 1913), pp. 116 ff.; Delcassé’s +speeches; Monson to Lansdowne, Nov. 15, 1904, <em>British Documents +on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914</em> (ed. by G. P. Gooch and +Harold Temperley; London, 1927——), III, 14 f., No. 11 (hereafter +cited as <em>B.D.</em>).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21"><span class= +"label">[21]</span></a>See his speeches, <em>Journal officiel, +Debats parlem.</em>, Sénat, April 3, 1900, pp. 299 f.; Chambre, +Jan. 21, 1902, quoted in <em>Bulletin, Supplément</em>, 1902, pp. +46 f.; Chambre, March 11, 1903, <em>Journal officiel, Debats +parlem.</em>, p. 1356; especially his speech on Nov. 10, 1904, in +the Chambre, <em>ibid.</em>, pp. 2381, 2386; Sénat, Dec. 7, 1904, +pp. 1048 ff.; Reynald, p. 11.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22"><span class= +"label">[22]</span></a>André Mévil, <em>De la Paix de Francfort à +la Conférence d’Algésiras</em> (Paris, 1909), pp. 117 f. Mévil’s +book contains the official apology for Delcassé’s work.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23"><span class= +"label">[23]</span></a>See Mévil, pp. 120 f., and Delcassé’s +speeches. On Dec. 7, 1904, in the Senate and on Nov. 10, in the +Chamber, he spoke as follows: “The problem, in effect, was this: to +establish the preponderance of France in Morocco, thereby to +augment her power in the Mediterranean, not by alienating but +rather by conciliating the Powers whose position in the +Mediterranean brings them to our attention. . . . . In considering +the positions occupied not only by England, but by Italy and by +Spain in the Mediterranean, it is evident that if diplomacy +succeeds in resolving this problem [of Morocco] it will have at one +blow fortified and aggrandized the situation of France in Europe by +the friendships which it will have procured and by the +<em>rapprochements</em> of interests of which it will have been the +creator.”</p> + +<p>He further declared that this had been his conscious policy +during his six years of residency at the Quai d’Orsay (see +<em>Journal officiel, Debats parlem.</em>, Sénat, Dec. 7, 1904, pp. +1048 ff.; Chambre, Nov. 10, 1904, p. 386).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24"><span class= +"label">[24]</span></a>See Augustin Bernard, <em>Les confins +algéro-marocaine</em> (Paris, 1911). Treaty given in De Clercq, +<em>Recueil des traités de la France</em>, pp. 271 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25"><span class= +"label">[25]</span></a>See various articles in the +<em>Bulletin</em>; also Pinon, <em>Empire de la Médit.</em>; +Bérard, <em>L’affaire marocaine</em>; speech of Waldeck-Rousseau in +the Chamber, July 2, 1900, <em>Journal officiel, Debats +parlem.</em>, pp. 1739 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26"><span class= +"label">[26]</span></a>Exactly what the Sultan requested is not +known. Count Bülow, the German foreign minister, heard in June, +1900, from an Italian source that the Grand Vizier of Morocco just +before his death had proposed to Salisbury, the British premier, +that the Powers guarantee a new boundary to be made between Algeria +and Morocco, but that the British Minister had refused to consider +the matter. See Bülow to Tschirschky, June 5, 1900, <em>G.P.</em>, +XVII, 318, No. 5167. On the Sultan’s proposal of October see Monson +to Salisbury, Oct. 12, 17, 1900, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 259, Nos. 312 +f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27"><span class= +"label">[27]</span></a>We have positive evidence that the Spanish +and German governments did so; and as Italy was then in negotiation +with France over the question of Morocco (see below), it is safe to +say that her government did also. See Bülow to Münster, April 27, +1900, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 299 ff., No. 5156; Münster to Hohenlohe, +May 9, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 301 f., No. 5157.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28"><span class= +"label">[28]</span></a>See <em>Journal officiel, Debats +parlem.</em>, Sénat, April 3, 1900, p. 299. He also said in private +that France had no intention of attacking Morocco. Münster to +Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 301 f., No. 5157; +Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 17, 1900, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 259, No. +313.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29"><span class= +"label">[29]</span></a>See Bérard, p. 68; Aubin, p. 178; +<em>Bulletin</em>, Aug., 1901, p. 279; <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, Nos. +1, 3, 4, 6. For the note see Révoil to Delcassé, March 23, 1901, +Révoil to Si Mohamméd Torres and Ben Sliman, March 18, +<em>ibid.</em>, No. 2 and annexe.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30"><span class= +"label">[30]</span></a>So the British Minister at Tangier stated to +his German colleague (Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 13, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 326 f., No. 5173).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31"><span class= +"label">[31]</span></a>Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 13, 20, 1900, +<em>ibid.</em>, 326 f., No. 5173; 328, No. 5174.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32"><span class= +"label">[32]</span></a>See Cambon to Delcassé, July 4, 1901, +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 13 ff., No. 19 and annexe; Hatzfeldt to +foreign office, June 19, 1901, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 332 f., No. +5177 and note; Holstein to Eckardstein, July 8, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 333, No. 5178; memorandum by Mentzingen concerning +the conversations between Richthofen and the Moroccan Ambassador, +<em>ibid.</em>, 334 ff., No. 5179, undated though handed in to the +foreign office on July 19, 1901; Mühlberg to Mentzingen, July 19, +1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 336 f., No. 5180; Eckardstein to F. O., July +29, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 338 f., No. 5182.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33"><span class= +"label">[33]</span></a>On the cordiality of their relations see +below. Late in 1899 Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial +secretary, had made a speech at Leicester advocating an +Anglo-German-American alliance; an accord over China had been made +between them in 1900, and the Emperor had in January, 1901, hurried +to the bedside of the dying Queen Victoria.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34"><span class= +"label">[34]</span></a>Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 27, +1901, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 20, No. 21. What the promise was is +not related. Also editor’s note, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 332 f., No. +5177; Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 338 f., +No. 5182; Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, +XVIII, 781 f., No. 5872.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35"><span class= +"label">[35]</span></a>See below.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36"><span class= +"label">[36]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, July 3, 1901, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 261, No. 318; Cambon to Delcassé, July 4, 1901, +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 13 ff., No. 19.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37"><span class= +"label">[37]</span></a>On these conversations see Radolin to Bülow, +June 5, 1901, <em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 772 ff., No. 5868; June 15, +<em>ibid.</em>, 775 ff., No. 5869; <em>ibid.</em>, 777 f., No. +5870. Leon y Castillo declared that Delcassé had said to him that +“he wished for nothing better than to converse with the German +Ambassador on different points, that he would be very desirous of +arriving at an entente with him” (<em>ibid.</em>, 775 ff., No. +5869). At the same time leading articles appeared in <em>Temps</em> +and <em>Figaro</em>, papers in close touch with the foreign office, +to the effect that Germany had the opportunity in the Moroccan +affair to prove her good will toward France (Richthofen to +Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 781, No. 5872).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38"><span class= +"label">[38]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, June 19, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 778 ff., No. 5871; Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, +1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 781 f., No. 5872; Mühlberg to Mentzingen, +July 19, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, XVII, 336 f., No. 5180.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39"><span class= +"label">[39]</span></a>Delcassé to Noailles, June 23, 1901, +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 13, No. 18. No account of the conversation +is given in <em>G.P.</em></p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40"><span class= +"label">[40]</span></a><em>Journal officiel, Debats parlem.</em>, +Sénat, July 5, 1901, p. 1207.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41"><span class= +"label">[41]</span></a>The British government might have prevented +the sending of that mission. See Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 20, +1901, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 328, No. 5174. The German Minister at +Tangier reported that the Sultan had asked Mr. Nicolson, British +minister there, whether he should also send a mission to Paris and +St. Petersburg.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42"><span class= +"label">[42]</span></a>On these negotiations see Révoil to +Delcassé, April 27, 1901, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 5, No. 5; Delcassé +to Martiniére, July 20, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 15 ff., No. 20 and +annexe; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 27, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 18 ff., No. 21; Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, +Sept. 19, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 22, No. 22.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43"><span class= +"label">[43]</span></a>Such, for instance, as the recent tax +reforms.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44"><span class= +"label">[44]</span></a>Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 27, +1901, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 18 ff., No. 21.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45"><span class= +"label">[45]</span></a>Révoil to Delcassé, Feb. 22, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 31, No. 25.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46"><span class= +"label">[46]</span></a>Révoil to Delcassé, Jan. 18, April 26, May +17, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 26 ff., No. 24; 33 ff., Nos. 27 f.; +Graham H. Stuart, <em>French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to +Serajevo (1898-1914)</em> (New York, 1921), p. 144.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47"><span class= +"label">[47]</span></a>See especially Saint-René Taillandier to +Delcassé, July 22, Aug. 6, 1902, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 44 ff., +Nos. 29 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48"><span class= +"label">[48]</span></a>See memo. for Maclean, Oct. 24, 1902, by +Lansdowne, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 272 f., No. 328; Sir Sidney Lee, +<em>King Edward VII. A Biography</em> (London, 1925, 1927), II, 220 +f. Apparently Maclean did not go to Berlin at all, although he +threatened to do so if the British government refused his proposal. +See Lee, II, 220 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49"><span class= +"label">[49]</span></a>For instances of this co-operation see +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, Nos. 33, 39, 44-46, 57, 60, 68, 70-72, +77-79, 81-84, 86, 89, 91-107, 110-11, 119-26, 132; for Delcassé’s +part in assuring the loan see Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, +Jan. 5, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 53 ff., No. 39. The Sultan obtained +similar loans in Spain and in England.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[19]</span><a id= +"c02"></a>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<p class="sch1">THE FRANCO-ITALIAN ENTENTE, 1900-1902</p> + +<p>When M. Delcassé assumed office in 1898, the Bismarckian system +of agreements which had isolated France in Europe had already +crumbled away. The formation of the Franco-Russian alliance had +been followed by the lapse in 1896 of the ententes between +Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain for the +maintenance of the <em>status quo</em> in the Mediterranean.<a id= +"FNanchor_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a> +The way was clear for the enterprising French Foreign Minister +gradually to win the friendship of the last three Powers, +previously joined in enmity against France. The first of these +<em>rapprochements</em> to bear fruit was the one with Italy.</p> + +<p>During the nineties, Italian dissatisfaction with the foreign +policy had been steadily growing. Italian leaders complained that +Italy had suffered from a tariff war with France, that she had been +unable to restrain France from denouncing Italian treaty rights in +Tunis or from fortifying Bizerta, that she had failed to secure +colonial territory in North Africa, especially in Tripoli, and in +Abyssinia. They regarded the Triple Alliance and the good will of +Great Britain as inadequate to Italian needs. They asserted that +their country was the victim of the Triple Alliance, made to suffer +by France because of membership in it, and not even protected +against that Power, much less given compensatory benefits for these +undeserved injuries. The anger directed at Great Britain was hardly +less than that at Germany and Austria-Hungary.<a id= +"FNanchor_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51" class= +"fnanchor">[51]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[20]</span>To meet these +difficulties, the Marquis de Rudini, premier from 1896 to 1898, +inaugurated a policy of friendship toward France which his +successors in office continued. While remaining loyal to her +alliances, the Marquis said, Italy would henceforth endeavor to +prevent trouble with other Powers and to restore normal relations +with France.<a id="FNanchor_52"></a><a href="#Footnote_52" class= +"fnanchor">[52]</a></p> + +<p>In 1896 Italy and France settled their difficulties over Tunis. +In 1898 a commercial treaty put an end to ten years of tariff +warfare between them and opened the way to the flow of French +capital into Italy.<a id="FNanchor_53"></a><a href="#Footnote_53" +class="fnanchor">[53]</a> In the same year the two countries made a +settlement of the boundary line between their possessions on the +Red Sea. So when M. Delcassé visited Rome in 1898, he found that +both he and the Italian foreign minister, Marquis Visconti Venosta +(1896-98), thought necessary a durable entente between their two +countries which would respect the French possession of Tunis and +the Italian membership in the Triple Alliance; and they agreed that +the Mediterranean, which had previously divided their states, +should become the means of their <em>rapprochement</em>.<a id= +"FNanchor_54"></a><a href="#Footnote_54" class="fnanchor">[54]</a> +The Italian Minister was overthrown before any further steps could +be taken; but under his successor, Admiral Canevaro (1898-99), an +opportunity was offered to initiate the negotiations which finally +led to the consummation of the entente.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[21]</span>In March, 1899, +France and Great Britain settled the differences growing out of the +Fashoda affair by an agreement which assigned to the former the +hinterland of Tripoli. Since Italian leaders regarded the eventual +possession of Tripoli as vital to the welfare of their state, they +felt that Italy had been betrayed by her supposed friend, Great +Britain, and the Italian government appealed to its German ally for +advice.<a id="FNanchor_55"></a><a href="#Footnote_55" class= +"fnanchor">[55]</a> The latter remained noncommittal, Lord +Salisbury equally so.<a id="FNanchor_56"></a><a href="#Footnote_56" +class="fnanchor">[56]</a> It was France, the supposed enemy, who +applied balm to the wound. The French ambassador, M. Barrère, +assured Admiral Canevaro that Italy “need in no way fear that she +will find France in her path if she should ever have ambitions +toward Tripoli.” When the Italian Minister asked for a written +statement to that effect, M. Barrère replied that, although Tripoli +was Turkish territory, M. Delcassé would “under conditions” attempt +to find some way in which to satisfy this desire. Those conditions, +of course, had to do with Italy’s relations to Morocco. The +materials were thus at hand for an agreement.<a id= +"FNanchor_57"></a><a href="#Footnote_57" class= +"fnanchor">[57]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[22]</span>The negotiations +were long drawn out; for, as France had Italy at her mercy, she +drove a hard bargain. On December 14, 1900, Marquis Visconti +Venosta, Italian foreign minister (1899-1901), and M. Barrère +reached a secret agreement.<a id="FNanchor_58"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_58" class="fnanchor">[58]</a> By its terms Italy +received in writing a purely negative assurance that France +harbored no designs upon Tripoli. The <em>quid pro quo</em> for +France was more valuable.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>In that which concerns Morocco particularly, it is agreed . . . +. that the action of France has for its object to exercise and +safeguard the rights which result for her from the proximity of her +territory to that empire. Thus defined, I [Marquis Visconti +Venosta] have recognized that such action is not in our view of a +nature to prejudice the interests of Italy as a Mediterranean +Power. It has been likewise agreed that if there must result +therefrom a modification of the political or territorial status of +Morocco, Italy will reserve for herself, as a reciprocal measure, +the right of eventually developing her influence in the Cyrenaic +Tripolitaine.<a id="FNanchor_59"></a><a href="#Footnote_59" class= +"fnanchor">[59]</a></p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[23]</span>So vague a +statement could be variously interpreted. M. Barrère thought that +Italy had given France a free hand in dealing with Morocco so long +as her action did not modify the political or territorial integrity +of the land. Marquis Visconti Venosta declared later to the German +Ambassador that the accord had only permitted France to take +measures necessary for the defense of her frontier.<a id= +"FNanchor_60"></a><a href="#Footnote_60" class="fnanchor">[60]</a> +As either meaning could be read into the documents, the future +course of Franco-Italian relations would determine which one would +obtain.</p> + +<p>The <em>rapprochement</em>, attested by M. Delcassé in the +French Senate on February 11, 1901, and affirmed by a visit to +Italian waters of the French fleet in April, had been facilitated +by a number of circumstances. On the one hand, the Italian +government was angry with Austria-Hungary for having excluded it, +in violation of Article VII of their treaty of alliance, from the +negotiation in 1897 of an agreement with Russia over Balkan +affairs. Tariff difficulties with both allies were looming up, and +an occasional irredentist voice was being heard. On the other hand, +an anticlerical government in France made certain that in the near +future at least the republic would not attempt to restore Rome to +the pope. Moreover, King Victor Emmanuel, possibly influenced by +his Montenegrin wife, leaned decidedly away from his father’s +policy of strict adherence to the Triple Alliance toward one of +closer friendship with France, and, if possible, with Russia.<a id= +"FNanchor_61"></a><a href="#Footnote_61" class="fnanchor">[61]</a> +Italian public opinion was likewise showing itself markedly +pro-French, a tendency which M. Barrère’s courting of press and +public helped to develop;<a id="FNanchor_62"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_62" class="fnanchor">[62]</a> and when in 1901 the King +chose the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[24]</span> pro-French +M. Zanardelli to form a cabinet, the Italians applauded.<a id= +"FNanchor_63"></a><a href="#Footnote_63" class= +"fnanchor">[63]</a></p> + +<p>The affinity for France of the new cabinet and the greater +defiance toward Italy’s allies were foreseen from the political +past of some of its members. M. Zanardelli was a native of the +Trentino, and would have been foreign minister in 1893 if the +Austrian government had not objected.<a id= +"FNanchor_64"></a><a href="#Footnote_64" class="fnanchor">[64]</a> +M. Prinetti, the new foreign minister (1901-3), had spoken +energetically in 1891 against the renewal of the Triple Alliance. +M. de Martino, his undersecretary, had asked in the Italian +Chamber, December, 1899, “how this Triple Alliance is able to serve +Italy.”<a id="FNanchor_65"></a><a href="#Footnote_65" class= +"fnanchor">[65]</a> The attitude of these men was soon manifested. +Toward the end of the year the Premier was making veiled threats of +a tariff war with his allies;<a id="FNanchor_66"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_66" class="fnanchor">[66]</a> while M. Prinetti, +ambitious, inflammatory, and unreliable, was engaged in +negotiations with France which radically transformed the nature of +Italy’s international obligations.</p> + +<p>One of M. Prinetti’s first undertakings was to gain better terms +for Italy with reference to Tripoli. He proposed to France that +“each of the two Powers be able freely to develop its sphere of +influence in the regions Tripoli and Morocco at the moment that it +judges opportune and without the action of the one of them being +subordinated to that of the other.”<a id="FNanchor_67"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_67" class="fnanchor">[67]</a> The French government was +willing to accept his overture for the sake of obtaining a freer +hand in Morocco; it also saw an opportunity to win an even greater +advantage. As the Triple Alliance was to be renewed<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_25">[25]</span> in 1902, it determined to repeat +its former endeavor to nullify the clauses in that treaty referring +to France.<a id="FNanchor_68"></a><a href="#Footnote_68" class= +"fnanchor">[68]</a></p> + +<p>M. Barrère argued the French case to the Italian government as +follows: Italy had joined the Triple Alliance because of quarrels +with France about the Mediterranean. As the two countries were now +friends, with their difficulties already harmonized or capable of +becoming so, should not their friendship be assured for the future +by the removal of any aggressive point against France which the +Triple Alliance might contain? Were the clauses of that treaty +compatible with Franco-Italian friendship? “The alliance remains +defensive,” so he summarized his arguments later to his government. +“But it permits a very broad interpretation of the duties of the +allies; if France, openly provoked, should declare war, could Italy +regard this declaration as a defensive step on our part? It is +doubtful.” So he concluded that “under defensive appearances, the +Triple Alliance implied an eventually offensive character which +ought to be eliminated in the interest of our security and of the +relations of friendship between the two countries.” Above all, the +French government desired to bring about the suppression of the +anti-French military conventions or protocols between Italy and her +allies.<a id="FNanchor_69"></a><a href="#Footnote_69" class= +"fnanchor">[69]</a></p> + +<p>M. Prinetti acknowledged the force of these remarks. In June, +1901—that is, before Great Britain had turned away from Germany to +France, and while Austria-Hungary and Italy were still<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_26">[26]</span> on passable terms—he made a +verbal agreement with M. Barrère by which the rights of Italy +toward Tripoli were put on a par with those of France toward +Morocco. In return he promised that the renewed treaty of the +Triple Alliance should contain “nothing hostile” to France.<a id= +"FNanchor_70"></a><a href="#Footnote_70" class= +"fnanchor">[70]</a></p> + +<p>The problem of adjusting Italy’s alliance obligations to her new +international situation growing out of the Franco-Italian entente +was taken up at the end of the year when negotiations for the +renewal of the Triple Alliance were begun.<a id= +"FNanchor_71"></a><a href="#Footnote_71" class="fnanchor">[71]</a> +To strengthen Italy’s hand, MM. Prinetti, Delcassé, and Barrère all +attested publicly in December, 1901, and January, 1902, to the +complete harmony of Franco-Italian interests in the Mediterranean; +M. Delcassé referred pointedly to Tripoli and Morocco.<a id= +"FNanchor_72"></a><a href="#Footnote_72" class="fnanchor">[72]</a> +And the <em>Tribuna</em> gave bold notice, January 2, that “Italy +counts for something and can with her weight turn the scale one way +or the other.”<a id="FNanchor_73"></a><a href="#Footnote_73" class= +"fnanchor">[73]</a> In spite of his promises to France, however, M. +Prinetti made very feeble efforts to change the Triple Alliance in +accordance therewith. He said nothing to the German government +about revising or omitting Articles II, IX, X, and the +protocol<a id="FNanchor_74"></a><a href="#Footnote_74" class= +"fnanchor">[74]</a> which Italy herself had had incorporated in the +treaty.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[27]</span> His sole +proposal to Count Bülow, to whom he repeated his promise to M. +Barrère, was that an introductory statement, intended for +publication or for communication to France, should be included +affirming the purely defensive character of the alliance. Other +matters concerning Italy and her two allies were of far more +importance to the Italian Foreign Minister in these negotiations. +He wanted the allies officially to affirm Italy’s preponderant +rights in Tripoli; he wished for them to have a more binding +understanding about the Balkans; above all, he sought to make the +renewal of the alliance contingent upon the negotiation of tariff +treaties with Germany and Austria-Hungary favorable to Italy. In +discussing these questions with the German government he grew +excited, wept, threatened to resign or not to renew the alliance. +About those which concerned France he was more or less +apologetic.<a id="FNanchor_75"></a><a href="#Footnote_75" class= +"fnanchor">[75]</a></p> + +<p>German public opinion regarded the Franco-Italian +<em>rapprochement</em> with misgivings. But the Chancellor assumed +a nonchalant attitude, stating in the Reichstag, January 8, +1902:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The Triple Alliance still enjoys the best of health. . . . . The +Triple Alliance is not a society for acquisition but an insurance +company. It is not offensive but defensive; it is not aggressive +but peaceful to a high degree. The Triple Alliance does not bar +good relations between its members and other Powers, and I would +not consider it proper if even a small part of the German press +should show any uneasiness over Franco-Italian agreements. In a +happy marriage the husband must not become jealous if his wife +dances an innocent extra round with some one else. The main thing +is that she does not run away from him, and she will not do so if +she is best situated with him. . . . . The Franco-Italian +agreements over certain Mediterranean questions do not violate the +Triple Alliance. . . . . The goals of the present day +<em>Weltpolitik</em> extend to areas and objects which lie far from +Germany’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[28]</span> boundaries. +I name in this connection, for example, the north coast of Africa, +Persia, the Far East.<a id="FNanchor_76"></a><a href="#Footnote_76" +class="fnanchor">[76]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>That speech, however, did not reflect the Chancellor’s actual +feeling. He still assumed that, should any important change be made +in the Mediterranean area, for instance in Morocco, Germany would +be consulted;<a id="FNanchor_77"></a><a href="#Footnote_77" class= +"fnanchor">[77]</a> but he relied upon Russia’s retarding +influence, Great Britain’s hostility, and fear of Germany to +prevent France from taking action in that land.<a id= +"FNanchor_78"></a><a href="#Footnote_78" class="fnanchor">[78]</a> +He was dissatisfied with the turn of affairs, and blamed Great +Britain for having forced Italy into French arms by ignoring her +interests.<a id="FNanchor_79"></a><a href="#Footnote_79" class= +"fnanchor">[79]</a> He suspected that the Franco-Italian +understanding contained more than M. Prinetti admitted.<a id= +"FNanchor_80"></a><a href="#Footnote_80" class="fnanchor">[80]</a> +He recognized the improvement in Italy’s international relations, +and realized that her antagonism to Austria would thenceforth +become sharper, and that her Tripolitan ambitions would be so +zealous as possibly to cause trouble with Germany’s friend, the +Turkish Sultan.<a id="FNanchor_81"></a><a href="#Footnote_81" +class="fnanchor">[81]</a> As to renewing the alliance, which he +strongly desired, the Chancellor believed that self-interest and +the known antagonism of Great Britain to the Dual Alliance would +prevent Italy from changing camps.<a id="FNanchor_82"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_82" class="fnanchor">[82]</a> Under other circumstances +he might have been willing to make some further concessions to +Italy in return for the renewal.<a id="FNanchor_83"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_83" class="fnanchor">[83]</a><span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_29">[29]</span> In the previous March he had relieved her +from any obligations under the German-Italian military convention, +although permitting the military conversations to continue as +before.<a id="FNanchor_84"></a><a href="#Footnote_84" class= +"fnanchor">[84]</a> But the Franco-Italian entente, the lever with +which M. Prinetti expected to pry loose those concessions, was the +very cause for Count Bülow’s refusing to permit any change whatever +in the treaty. As the alliance was already defensive, he said, +there was no need for an introductory statement to that effect. +Pointing to the expectation voiced by the French press that +anti-French clauses would be dropped, he declared that any +modification would permit the French to draw the desired conclusion +and thereby to belie the true nature of the alliance. Before he +would renew the Triple Alliance he demanded of M. Prinetti an +assurance that Italy had made no agreements with other states which +could diminish its defensive forces. He even expressed his +willingness to drop the alliance rather than make any changes in +it, remarking that Italy’s adherence to it was of no fundamental +importance. The Chancellor’s adamantine attitude was effective. By +May, 1902, M. Prinetti agreed to the renewal.<a id= +"FNanchor_85"></a><a href="#Footnote_85" class= +"fnanchor">[85]</a></p> + +<p>In March, 1902, M. Prinetti had reported to M. Barrère the +probability of his failure. He had refused to communicate the text +of the treaty to the Ambassador, but had declared that the +protocols thereto must be abolished,<a id= +"FNanchor_86"></a><a href="#Footnote_86" class="fnanchor">[86]</a> +and that he was ready, so M. Barrère reported, to give France +“assurances of a nature to leave no doubt in our mind as to the +character and scope of this document” (the treaty of the Triple +Alliance).<a id="FNanchor_87"></a><a href="#Footnote_87" class= +"fnanchor">[87]</a> On May 7, M. Prinetti informed the French +Ambassador that “it will be necessary<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_30">[30]</span> for us to discuss the future of our relations +in regard to that treaty.” Under French pressure, he agreed that +“thenceforth it was in a direct understanding with us [France] that +he should find the means of fixing the interpretation with regard +to us which Italy intended to give to her obligations as an ally.” +He was willing to put this understanding into writing.<a id= +"FNanchor_88"></a><a href="#Footnote_88" class= +"fnanchor">[88]</a></p> + +<p>Before the proper negotiations were well under way, the actual +renewal of the alliance forced M. Prinetti to declare in the +Italian Chamber, May 22, 1902, as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The Triple Alliance as it is and as it will be, completely and +uniquely pacific and defensive, will remain in the future what it +has been for years: the most solid rampart in the cause of peace. . +. . . The Triple Alliance, containing nothing aggressive, either +directly or indirectly against France, nothing which menaces her +surety or tranquillity may not in any manner constitute an obstacle +to the conservation and development of cordial relations with our +Latin sister with whom we are and wish to remain friends. . . . . +And since it has been said that there exists between certain +Central Powers conventions and protocols adjoined to the Triple +Alliance which modify its pacific character and would even be +aggressive toward France, I hereby solemnly declare that there is +no convention and no protocol of that nature.<a id= +"FNanchor_89"></a><a href="#Footnote_89" class= +"fnanchor">[89]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Presumably even prior to this statement, which was repeated in a +formal note to the French government on June 4, M. Prinetti began +negotiations with M. Barrère over the written agreement. It was the +Ambassador’s intention that that agreement</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">would contain the engagement not to attack, not to +join in any aggression on the part of one or several Powers against +one of the contracting parties; not to consider as aggressive on +the part of the contracting Powers the obligation to declare war in +consequence of a manifest provocation [this was “the capital point” +of the project, wrote M. Delcassé]; finally to abandon the military +protocols and other dispositions of the same sort concerning us and +envisaging war with us. If we are able to arrive at that result +[wrote M. Barrère to his chief], we shall have obtained all that we +could hope and desire.<a id="FNanchor_90"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_90" class="fnanchor">[90]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[31]</span>The +negotiations were far enough along to permit M. Delcassé to declare +in the French Chamber, July 3, as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The declarations which have thus been made to us [by the Italian +government] have permitted us to feel assured that the policy of +Italy by virtue of her alliances is not aimed either directly or +indirectly against France; that she will not in any case be a +menace to us, either in a diplomatic form or through protocols or +in international military stipulations; and that in no case and in +no form will Italy become either the instrument or the auxiliary of +an aggression against our country.<a id="FNanchor_91"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_91" class="fnanchor">[91]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>That statement was stronger and more inclusive than the one by +M. Prinetti on May 22. It indicated the existence of a fuller +understanding than the public knew of. It caused M. Prinetti some +embarrassment when the German Ambassador brought up the subject. +The Foreign Minister declared himself “somewhat astonished” at the +speech; but after a feeble explanation in which he betrayed +nothing, he remarked that “so far as he was concerned, he regarded +the question as settled.”<a id="FNanchor_92"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_92" class="fnanchor">[92]</a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile the Franco-Italian negotiations continued. On November +1, in an exchange of notes an understanding was reached by which +Italy was given a free hand to develop her “sphere of influence” in +Tripoli, and France the same right with reference to Morocco. Nor +should the action of the one be necessarily subordinated to that of +the other. Then followed a clause which M. Delcassé was +particularly eager to have incorporated:<a id= +"FNanchor_93"></a><a href="#Footnote_93" class= +"fnanchor">[93]</a></p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>In case France [Italy] shall be the object of a direct or +indirect aggression on the part of one or several Powers, Italy +[France] will preserve a strict neutrality. The same will hold in +case France [Italy] as a result of direct provocation is forced to +take, for the defence of her honor or security, the initiative of a +declaration of war.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">A conditioning clause was added:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>In that eventuality the government of the Republic [the Royal +government] must communicate beforehand its intention to the Royal +government<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[32]</span> [the +government of the Republic], so that the latter may verify that it +is a case of direct provocation . . . . I am authorized to confirm +to you that there does not exist on the part of Italy [France] and +that there will not be concluded by her any protocol or military +disposition of an international contractual order which will be in +disagreement with the present declarations.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The Italian government asserted that these +declarations were in “complete harmony” with its existing +international engagements. The agreement was to be secret and to +obtain until the Italian government abrogated it. A supplementary +statement by M. Prinetti defined the term “direct provocation” to +mean one which concerned the “direct relations between the Power +provoking and the Power provoked.”<a id="FNanchor_94"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_94" class="fnanchor">[94]</a></p> + +<p>Was this accord compatible with the renewed and unchanged treaty +of the Triple Alliance? With Article II it could be made to agree. +Articles IX and X and the protocol it merely nullified but left +standing.<a id="FNanchor_95"></a><a href="#Footnote_95" class= +"fnanchor">[95]</a> It broke completely not the letter, but the +spirit of the alliance. The dishonesty of the Italian Foreign +Minister lay in three directions; toward the German government by +permitting it to continue in the belief that the old relations as +established in their treaty still obtained; toward the French +government by informing it that this treaty contained nothing +either directly or indirectly hostile to France, although Articles +II, IX, X, and XI and the protocol of that treaty had been retained +without any attempt to abolish them; toward Italy by not clarifying +the situation.<a id="FNanchor_96"></a><a href="#Footnote_96" class= +"fnanchor">[96]</a> The matter was so arranged that in the future +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[33]</span> Italian foreign +ministers would be able to determine whether or not the agreement +with France would be abrogated and the clauses of the Triple +Alliance, temporarily in abeyance, would again be called into +action. The Italian government was safeguarding its country on both +sides and giving up none of its securities, although its policy +looked toward two different international orientations. This was +the equivocal position between France and the Triple Alliance, +later between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, which +Italy was to occupy until she entered the World War.<a id= +"FNanchor_97"></a><a href="#Footnote_97" class="fnanchor">[97]</a> +The advantages of it lay in the fact that it gave greater mobility +to Italian policy, that it caused Great Britain to iron out her +differences with Italy early in 1902,<a id= +"FNanchor_98"></a><a href="#Footnote_98" class="fnanchor">[98]</a> +that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[34]</span> it opened up a +future of closer relations with Russia, and that it assured Italy +of the future possession of Tripoli.</p> + +<p>The French government profited most from these negotiations. M. +Delcassé had won his initial victory in the execution of his +policy.<a id="FNanchor_99"></a><a href="#Footnote_99" class= +"fnanchor">[99]</a> He had, at least for the time being, nullified +the anti-French clauses of the Triple Alliance and drawn Italy out +of that group into a middle position.<a id= +"FNanchor_100"></a><a href="#Footnote_100" class= +"fnanchor">[100]</a> He had also settled the important question of +Morocco with the most jealous of the Mediterranean Powers, and had +begun the process of pulling the Powers away from Germany and +drawing them around France.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc02"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50"><span class= +"label">[50]</span></a>Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Feb. 8, 1896, +<em>G.P.</em>, XI, 99 ff., No. 2664; Alfred Franzis Pribram (ed.), +<em>The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879-1914</em> (Eng. +ed. by Archibald Carey Coolidge; Cambridge, 1920-21), I, 124 ff., +142 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51"><span class= +"label">[51]</span></a>For manifestations of this feeling see +Pribram, II, 104, 106; <em>Memoirs of Francesco Crispi</em> (ed. by +Thomas Palamenghi-Crispi; trans. by Mary Prichard-Agnetti; London, +1914), III, 330 ff.; Hohenlohe to Bülow, Feb. 15, 1896, +<em>G.P.</em>, XI, 230 ff., No. 2766; Bülow to Hohenlohe, Feb. 5, +1896, <em>ibid.</em>, 89, No. 2657; Bülow to Hohenlohe, Feb. 18, +1896, <em>ibid.</em>, 89 ff., No. 2658; and in general the +documents in <em>ibid.</em>, chaps. lxviii, lxix. Currie to +Lansdowne, Jan. 15, 1902, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 285, No. 355; 286, No. +356; Currie to Lansdowne, Nov. 27, 1900, Lansdowne to Currie, Dec. +12, 1900, Newton, <em>Lord Lansdowne</em>, pp. 211 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_52"></a><a href="#FNanchor_52"><span class= +"label">[52]</span></a>Bülow to Hohenlohe, Nov. 26, 1896, +<em>G.P.</em>, XI, 285 f., No. 2813; Pückler to Hohenlohe, July 19, +1897, <em>ibid.</em>, 286, No. 2814; Bülow to Hohenlohe, March 17, +1896, <em>ibid.</em>, 293, No. 2819; Bülow to Hohenlohe, July 22, +1896, <em>ibid.</em>, 296 ff., No. 2821; Bülow to Hohenlohe, Oct. +23, 1896, <em>ibid.</em>, 299 f., No. 2823.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_53"></a><a href="#FNanchor_53"><span class= +"label">[53]</span></a><em>Política èstera italiana</em> (1916), p. +499; André Tardieu, <em>La France et les alliances</em> (Paris, +1910), pp. 97 ff.; Radolin to Bülow, April 19, 1901, <em>G.P.</em>, +XVIII, 716, No. 5833; Pinon, <em>Empire de la Médit.</em>, pp. 39, +44 f., 48.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_54"></a><a href="#FNanchor_54"><span class= +"label">[54]</span></a>Mévil, <em>De la Paix de Francfort à la +Conférence d’Algésiras</em> (Paris, 1909), p. 121; André Tardieu, +<em>Questions diplomatiques de l’année, 1904</em> (Paris, 1905), p. +14.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_55"></a><a href="#FNanchor_55"><span class= +"label">[55]</span></a>Canevaro called it an act of “perfidy,” of +“dishonesty,” a “sharp slap in the face.” See Saurma to F. O., +March 29, 1899, <em>G.P.</em>, XIV, 429, No. 3946; Saurma to F. O., +April 1, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 429 f., No. 3947; Saurma to +Hohenlohe, March 29, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 430 f., No. 3948; +Marschall to Hohenlohe, April 14, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 434 f., No. +3952; Bernhard Schwertfeger (ed.), <em>Zur europäischen +Politik</em> (Berlin, 1919), I, No. 12; Rumbold to Salisbury, March +31, 1899, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 203, No. 246; Currie to Salisbury, +April 4, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 203, No. 247.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_56"></a><a href="#FNanchor_56"><span class= +"label">[56]</span></a>Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 4, 1899, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIV, 432 f., No. 3950; Saurma to F. O., April 28, +1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 435, No. 3953; Bülow to Romberg, April 29, +1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 436, No. 3954; Romberg to F. O., April 30, +1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 436 f., No. 3955; Bülow to Saurma, April 30, +1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 437, No. 3956; Currie to Salisbury, Nov. 4, +1898, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 194, No. 236; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, +1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 204, No. 247; Currie to Salisbury, April 10, +1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 204 f., Nos. 248 f.; Salisbury to Currie, +April 25, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 206, No. 251; Salisbury to Currie, +May 13, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 207, No. 252; Salisbury to Currie, +Oct. 12, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 282, No. 350. In Sept., 1900, +Currie, apparently on his own initiative, appealed to his +government to give the Lateran “some proof of our determination to +stand by Italy in the event of her being attacked.” Lansdowne +refused (Newton, pp. 211 ff.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_57"></a><a href="#FNanchor_57"><span class= +"label">[57]</span></a>Saurma to F. O., April 28, 1899, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIV, 435, No. 3953; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, +1899, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 204, No. 247. See also Canevaro’s +declaration in the Italian Senate, April 24, 1899, Senato, +<em>Discussioni, XX Legislatura</em> (2d sess.), p. 946, quoted by +G. Salvemini, “La Triple Alliance,” <em>Revue des nationes +latines</em>, Oct., 1916, p. 250. Also see the interview between +Delcassé and Ojetta in <em>Giornale d’Italia</em>, Jan. 3, 1902, +reprinted in the <em>London Times</em>, Jan. 4, 1902.</p> + +<p>Italy had formerly thought that she had vital interests in +Morocco, and her hope to acquire the land had received expression +in a clause concerning its future in the treaty of the Triple +Alliance of 1891 (Pribram, I, 150 ff.; Vol. II, chap. iii). But the +Moroccan vogue had passed; her wishes had become more modest. To be +sure, the French occupation of Touat caused the Italian government +in April, 1900, to declare excitedly to its German ally that the +Moroccan question could become a reef upon which the House of Savoy +might suffer shipwreck; but, as M. Prinetti later explained, what +his predecessor in office had feared was that a French occupation +of Morocco might force Italy to seize Tripoli in order to maintain +the equilibrium of interests in the Mediterranean (Bülow to +Münster, April 27, 1900, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 300, No. 5156; Bülow +to Hatzfeldt, May 14, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 302 f., No. 5158; Wedel +to Bülow, Dec. 12, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 718, No. 5834).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_58"></a><a href="#FNanchor_58"><span class= +"label">[58]</span></a>On these negotiations, about which very +little is known, see Barrère to Delcassé, Jan. 10, 1901, Ministère +des Affaires Etrangères, <em>Documents diplomatiques. Les accords +franco-italiens, 1900-1902</em> (Paris, 1919), 1 f., No. 1. (This +<em>Livre jaune</em> is hereafter cited as <em>L.j., 1900-2</em>.) +Salvemini, Oct., 1916, p. 249; Wedel to Bülow, March 31, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 712 ff., No. 5831; Metternich to F. O., Dec. +21, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 726 f., No. 5840; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 5, +1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 738 f., No. 5845; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, +1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 747 f., No. 5851; Diplomaticus, “The Shifting +Foundations of European Peace,” <em>Fortnightly Review</em>, +LXXVIII (Sept. 1, 1902), 370 f.; Anonymous, “The Marquis of +Salisbury,” <em>Quarterly Review</em>, CXCVI (Oct., 1902), 664 +ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_59"></a><a href="#FNanchor_59"><span class= +"label">[59]</span></a>Terms of the accord given in <em>L.j., +1900-2</em>, 3 f., No. 1, Annexes I and II. See also Wedel to +Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, <em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 747 ff., No. 5851.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_60"></a><a href="#FNanchor_60"><span class= +"label">[60]</span></a>Barrère to Delcassé, Jan. 10, 1901, +<em>L.j., 1900-2</em>, 1 f., No. 1; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 747 f., No. 5851.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_61"></a><a href="#FNanchor_61"><span class= +"label">[61]</span></a>See Bülow to Wedel, Nov. 30, 1900, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 502 f., No. 5704. The King made his first +state visit to St. Petersburg in 1902 (A. Savinsky, +<em>Recollections of a Russian Diplomat</em> [London, ——], pp. 25 +f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_62"></a><a href="#FNanchor_62"><span class= +"label">[62]</span></a>On Barrère’s activity see Currie to +Salisbury, Jan. 18, 1899, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 281, No. 347; Currie to +Salisbury, April 24, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 205, No. 250; memo. by +Richthofen, Dec. 17, 1901, <em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 507 f., No. +5708.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_63"></a><a href="#FNanchor_63"><span class= +"label">[63]</span></a>Salvemini, Jan., 1917, p. 12; <em>London +Times</em>, Dec. 16, 1901, p. 5; <em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XVIII, chap. +xxii.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_64"></a><a href="#FNanchor_64"><span class= +"label">[64]</span></a>Salvemini, Jan., 1917, p. 12 f., quoting Un +Bresciano, “L’intervènto e le pressióni dell Austria nella crisi +ministeriale de 1893” (<em>Nuova antologia</em>, Oct. 16, +1915).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_65"></a><a href="#FNanchor_65"><span class= +"label">[65]</span></a>Salvemini, Jan., 1917, pp. 13 f.; Prinetti’s +explanation of this speech in the Chamber, June 14, 1901, is quoted +in <em>Política, èstera italiana</em>, pp. 536 f. See also +Zanardelli’s interview in the <em>New York World</em>, quoted in +<em>London Times</em>, March 27, 1901, p. 5.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_66"></a><a href="#FNanchor_66"><span class= +"label">[66]</span></a>Dispatch of Jan. 24, 1902, <em>Zur europ. +Politik</em>, I, 91.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_67"></a><a href="#FNanchor_67"><span class= +"label">[67]</span></a>Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, +<em>L.j., 1900-2</em>, 11 ff., No. 11.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_68"></a><a href="#FNanchor_68"><span class= +"label">[68]</span></a>It had attempted to do this or to break the +alliance in 1891 and 1896. See <em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XI, chap. lxix; +<em>ibid.</em>, Vol. VIII, chap. lxv.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_69"></a><a href="#FNanchor_69"><span class= +"label">[69]</span></a>These arguments are contained in Barrère to +Poincaré, March 10, 1912, <em>L.j., 1900-2</em>, 11 ff., No. 11. +One other argument, which, however, M. Barrère probably did not use +with Prinetti, he formulated as follows: “What is more, nothing +prevented her [Italy] from going beyond the actual text of the +treaty, if she should judge that her political interests demanded +it of her.” See also Salvemini, Feb., 1917, p. 197. The military +agreement of 1887 between the allies had become known to the French +government soon after its signing. See Salvemini, Feb., 1917, p. +198; also Jules Hansen, <em>L’alliance franco-russe</em> (Paris, +1897), p. 42. In March, 1901, <em>Matin</em> published a version of +it and demanded its annulment (quoted in the <em>London Times</em>, +March 27, 1901).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_70"></a><a href="#FNanchor_70"><span class= +"label">[70]</span></a>According to other reports from the German +Ambassador in Rome, Prinetti promised “nothing aggressive” (Wedel +to Bülow, Jan. 5, June 27, 1902, <em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 512, No. +5711; 757, No. 5858).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_71"></a><a href="#FNanchor_71"><span class= +"label">[71]</span></a>See Salvemini, Feb., 1917, p. 197.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_72"></a><a href="#FNanchor_72"><span class= +"label">[72]</span></a>The occasion for these statements was the +French occupation of Mytilene, which alarmed Italian public +opinion. See Prinetti’s speech in the Italian Chamber, Dec. 14, +1901, Cámera dei Depitatio, <em>Discussioni</em>, p. 6747; +Delcassé’s interview in <em>Giornale d’Italia</em>, Jan. 3, 1902, +quoted in the <em>London Times</em>, Jan. 4, 14, 1902; Barrère’s +speech on Jan. 1, 1902, before the French colony in Rome, quoted in +<em>ibid.</em>, Jan. 2, 1902; Delcassé’s speech before the French +Senate, March 20, 1902, <em>Journal officiel, Debats parlem.</em>, +p. 605.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_73"></a><a href="#FNanchor_73"><span class= +"label">[73]</span></a><em>London Times</em>, Jan. 4, 1902.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_74"></a><a href="#FNanchor_74"><span class= +"label">[74]</span></a>Article II of the Triple Alliance read as +follows: “In case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, is +attacked by France for any reason whatsoever, the two other +contracting parties will furnish to the party attacked aid and +assistance with all their forces. The same obligation is incumbent +upon Italy in case of an aggression not directly provoked by France +against Germany.” Articles IX, X, XI, and the protocol provided for +the maintenance of the <em>status quo</em> in the Cyrenaic, +Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco, and, in certain eventualities, for an +aggressive attack by Italy aided by her allies, upon France. See +the document given in <em>G.P.</em>, VII, 99 ff., No. 1426.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_75"></a><a href="#FNanchor_75"><span class= +"label">[75]</span></a>On these negotiations see <em>ibid.</em>, +Vol. XVIII, chaps. cxxii, cxxv.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_76"></a><a href="#FNanchor_76"><span class= +"label">[76]</span></a>Bernhard von Bülow, <em>Reden</em> (hrsg. +von Johannes Penzler; Leipzig, 1903), I, 243 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_77"></a><a href="#FNanchor_77"><span class= +"label">[77]</span></a>Bülow to Metternich, Dec. 18, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 721, No. 5835.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_78"></a><a href="#FNanchor_78"><span class= +"label">[78]</span></a>Alvensleben to F. O., Dec. 26, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 727 f., No. 5841; Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 508 ff., No. 5709.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_79"></a><a href="#FNanchor_79"><span class= +"label">[79]</span></a>Bülow to Metternich, Dec. 18, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 720 f., No. 5835.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_80"></a><a href="#FNanchor_80"><span class= +"label">[80]</span></a>Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 12, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 524, No. 5715; Mühlberg to Bülow, April 25, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 589, No. 5754; Bülow to F. O., April 26, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 590 f., No. 5755; Wedel to Bülow, Dec. 26, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 728 ff., No. 5852; memo. by Holstein, Dec. 31, +1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 735, No. 5844.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_81"></a><a href="#FNanchor_81"><span class= +"label">[81]</span></a>Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 508 ff., No. 5709.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_82"></a><a href="#FNanchor_82"><span class= +"label">[82]</span></a>Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 12, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 523 ff., No. 5715; Wedel to Bülow, April 10, Dec. +17, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 715 f., No. 5832; 723, No. 5836; Bülow to +Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 509 f., No. 5709.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_83"></a><a href="#FNanchor_83"><span class= +"label">[83]</span></a>Bülow to Wedel, Feb. 24, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 545, No. 5727.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_84"></a><a href="#FNanchor_84"><span class= +"label">[84]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, chap. cxxiv.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_85"></a><a href="#FNanchor_85"><span class= +"label">[85]</span></a>See the documents in <em>ibid.</em>, chaps. +cxxii, cxxiv, esp. Nos. 5712, 5727, 5749, 5755.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_86"></a><a href="#FNanchor_86"><span class= +"label">[86]</span></a>This was easily said since the German +government had in the previous year released Italy from her +obligations under the military convention (see above). Prinetti +made it appear as a special favor yet to be performed.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_87"></a><a href="#FNanchor_87"><span class= +"label">[87]</span></a>Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, +<em>L.j., 1900-2</em>, 12, No. 11.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_88"></a><a href="#FNanchor_88"><span class= +"label">[88]</span></a>Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 4 f., No. 3; Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, +<em>ibid.</em>, 12 f., No. 11.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_89"></a><a href="#FNanchor_89"><span class= +"label">[89]</span></a>Quoted in Salvemini, July, 1917, p. 321.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_90"></a><a href="#FNanchor_90"><span class= +"label">[90]</span></a>Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, <em>L.j., +1900-2</em>, 5, No. 3; Delcassé to Barrère, June 18, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 6, No. 5.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_91"></a><a href="#FNanchor_91"><span class= +"label">[91]</span></a><em>Journal officiel, Debats parlem.</em>, +Chambre, July 3, 1902, pp. 444 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_92"></a><a href="#FNanchor_92"><span class= +"label">[92]</span></a>Wedel to Bülow, July 6, 1902, <em>G.P.</em>, +XVIII, 758 f., No. 5859.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_93"></a><a href="#FNanchor_93"><span class= +"label">[93]</span></a>Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, <em>L.j., +1900-2</em>, 4 f., No. 3; Delcassé to Barrère, June 18, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 6, No. 5.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_94"></a><a href="#FNanchor_94"><span class= +"label">[94]</span></a>Terms given in <em>ibid.</em>, 7 ff., Nos. 7 +and 8. On July 20 Barrère reported that Prinetti regarded the +following cases as examples of direct provocation:</p> + +<p>“1. The publication of sharpened dispatches [<em>dépêches +maquillées</em>] by Prince Bismarck in 1870; King William’s refusal +to receive M. Benedetti.</p> + +<p>“2. The Schnaebele incident.”</p> + +<p>As examples of indirect provocation, Prinetti cited “Prince +Hohenzollern’s candidacy to the throne of Spain, and such indirect +initiative in Far Eastern affairs which do not aim at one of the +contracting Powers, although that initiative may displease it and +appear contrary to its direct interest” (Barrère to Delcassé, July +20, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 7, No. 6). The choice of examples is +significant.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_95"></a><a href="#FNanchor_95"><span class= +"label">[95]</span></a>See above.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_96"></a><a href="#FNanchor_96"><span class= +"label">[96]</span></a>For a severer criticism of his actions see +G. Lowes Dickinson, <em>The International Anarchy, 1904-1914</em> +(New York, 1926), pp. 94 ff. Dickinson asserts that the Italian +Minister broke both the letter and the spirit of the Triple +Alliance. The analogy of this agreement to that of Bismarck’s +reinsurance treaty with Russia of 1887 was remarked upon by Italian +statesmen at the time (see Lansdowne to Currie, Dec. 17, 1901, +<em>B.D.</em>, I, 284, No. 353). Bismarck’s pacific attitude toward +Russia was well known, however, and he was not responsible for the +inclusion of the anti-Russian clauses in the Austro-German treaty +of the Alliance. See Trützschler v. Falkenstein, <em>Bismarck und +die Kriegsgefahr von 1887</em> (Berlin, 1924), chap. v., and +<em>G.P.</em>, Vol. V. The Italian government, on the other hand, +had not only pursued an anti-French policy, but had been +responsible for including the clauses antagonistic to France in the +treaty of the Triple Alliance.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_97"></a><a href="#FNanchor_97"><span class= +"label">[97]</span></a>For analyses of the Italian policy see Rodd +to Lansdowne, July 9, 1902, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 292 ff., No. 364; +Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 20, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 295, No. 366. +For the German discussion see below. Mr. Bertie in October, 1903, +formulated his conception of the Italian King’s foreign policy as +follows: “His aim, I believe, is that Italy should be a link +between the several Powers of Europe and at the same time remain a +partner in the Triple Alliance: that France should have hopes of +drawing Italy away from Austria and Germany, and that those two +Powers should be made to feel that an understanding between Italy +and France and perhaps even with Russia also is possible. As to +England the King probably feels pretty sure that her interests will +not seriously clash with those of Italy, and he relies on England +standing in the way of French supremacy in the Mediterranean” +(Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 20, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 295, No. +366).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_98"></a><a href="#FNanchor_98"><span class= +"label">[98]</span></a>On the renewal of the Anglo-Italian entente +see Lansdowne to Currie, Dec. 17, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 284, No. +353; Currie to Lansdowne, Jan. 1, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 285, No. +355; Currie to Lansdowne, Jan. 5, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 286, No. +356; Lansdowne to Currie, Feb. 3, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 287, No. +359; Lansdowne to Currie, March 7, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 291, No. +361; Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 10, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 291, +No. 362.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_99"></a><a href="#FNanchor_99"><span class= +"label">[99]</span></a>This he realized. See <em>L.j., 1900-2</em>, +4 f., Nos. 2 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_100"><span class= +"label">[100]</span></a>Cf. Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, +<em>ibid.</em>, 13, No. 11.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[35]</span><a id= +"c03"></a>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<p class="sch1">THE FRANCO-SPANISH ENTENTE, 1898-1903</p> + +<p>The close of the nineteenth century found Spain at one of the +lowest points in her history. She was disorganized, isolated, +defeated in 1898 by the United States; her navy was destroyed; her +colonial empire was shattered. Spain was particularly embittered +toward Great Britain, whose Premier had openly spoken of “moribund +nations” with direct reference to her, and whose attitude during +the recent war had been strongly pro-American.<a id= +"FNanchor_101"></a><a href="#Footnote_101" class= +"fnanchor">[101]</a> Fearful that the British might seize a Spanish +port,<a id="FNanchor_102"></a><a href="#Footnote_102" class= +"fnanchor">[102]</a> M. Silvela, head of the Conservative +government, with the approval of the Liberal leaders, early in 1899 +determined upon a change of policy by which Spain would seek to +bring about a secret defensive alliance with France, Germany, and +Russia.<a id="FNanchor_103"></a><a href="#Footnote_103" class= +"fnanchor">[103]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[36]</span>The sympathy of +those Powers had been on the side of Spain during the recent war. +But when the Premier laid the plan before them,<a id= +"FNanchor_104"></a><a href="#Footnote_104" class= +"fnanchor">[104]</a> the German government was encouraging but +skeptical; the French government, dilatory; the Russian government +seemed not to favor it and advised Spain instead to hold closely to +France.<a id="FNanchor_105"></a><a href="#Footnote_105" class= +"fnanchor">[105]</a> Nevertheless, during the next few years the +Spanish government continued its effort to realize this program, +particularly a Franco-German <em>rapprochement</em>.</p> + +<p>One of the main objects of this grouping was the defense of +Spanish interests in Morocco. In spite of Spain’s colonial losses +in the war of 1898, her concern over the future of that Islamic +land remained active. Spain claimed a special position with +reference to it, just as France did. Economic interests, the number +of her subjects resident in Morocco (larger than that of any other +foreign nation), geographic proximity, historical attempts at +conquest, and Spanish pride were all advanced in support of this +claim. Strategic reasons, reinforced by her actual possession of +small bits of territory in Northern Morocco, also prompted Spain to +seek control of at least the northern part of the land and above +all to prevent that area from falling into the hands of France or +Great Britain.<a id="FNanchor_106"></a><a href="#Footnote_106" +class="fnanchor">[106]</a> The Spanish leaders recognized the +French interests in Morocco and the British right to participate in +any settlement of the problem of the straits. But, conscious of +their weakness in dealing with other Powers, they preferred to +maintain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[37]</span> the +<em>status quo</em> as long as possible unless the larger +Continental grouping was consummated.</p> + +<p>In 1899 and 1900, when M. Delcassé showed a willingness to +negotiate an accord over Morocco, the Spanish government evaded the +overture,<a id="FNanchor_107"></a><a href="#Footnote_107" class= +"fnanchor">[107]</a> and settled with him only the long standing +dispute over the boundary of Rio de Oro.<a id= +"FNanchor_108"></a><a href="#Footnote_108" class= +"fnanchor">[108]</a> During 1901 events moved faster. In March a +Liberal ministry under M. Sagasta with the Duke of Almodovar as +foreign minister came into office. It saw France, unchecked by +Great Britain, pushing her frontier steadily forward in the desert +region back of Morocco. So it suspected the existence of a secret +accord between those two Powers. The British government denied +it,<a id="FNanchor_109"></a><a href="#Footnote_109" class= +"fnanchor">[109]</a> but Spain feared that an accord might be made +to her exclusion and injury. The Franco-Italian entente also +aroused her alarm. In this uncertainty the Spanish government +endeavored to use the presence of the Moroccan missions in Europe +in June and July to bring about a <em>rapprochement</em> between +France and Germany.<a id="FNanchor_110"></a><a href="#Footnote_110" +class="fnanchor">[110]</a> The move failed. In August, M. Silvela +published an article in <em>La Lectura</em> advocating a solution +of the Moroccan problem by agreement with France. Encouraged by +this expression and urged on by M. Leon y Castillo, Spanish +ambassador in Paris, the Spanish government determined to open +direct negotiations with M. Delcassé on the subject.<a id= +"FNanchor_111"></a><a href="#Footnote_111" class= +"fnanchor">[111]</a> And that minister was ready to listen. The +negotiations<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[38]</span> +progressed slowly, not only because M. Delcassé was disinclined to +concede to Spain the territory which she desired,<a id= +"FNanchor_112"></a><a href="#Footnote_112" class= +"fnanchor">[112]</a> but also because he was treating with Italy +and, to the disgust of the Spanish Ambassador, with Great Britain +at the same time.<a id="FNanchor_113"></a><a href="#Footnote_113" +class="fnanchor">[113]</a> By September, 1902, the main lines of +the accord were agreed upon. Then came further discussion over +details; and, after a last effort (October, 1902) by M. Leon y +Castillo to bring France and Germany together had failed, the +accord was ready for signing early in December.</p> + +<p>By the terms of the agreement Spain was to receive the region of +the Sus in the south and almost all of the old kingdom of Fez, +including the capital and Tangier in the north, as her sphere of +influence, while the rest was to constitute that of France. The two +governments agreed upon a policy of pacific penetration of the +land, and the French government promised its diplomatic support to +Spain in the execution of the treaty.<a id= +"FNanchor_114"></a><a href="#Footnote_114" class= +"fnanchor">[114]</a></p> + +<p>The failure of this agreement was an accident. On +December<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[39]</span> 1 the Duke +of Almodovar was called away from Madrid. Before he could return +and issue instructions to sign the treaty, his government +unexpectedly fell (December 3).<a id="FNanchor_115"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_115" class="fnanchor">[115]</a> The incoming +Conservative ministry under M. Silvela with M. Abarzuza at the +foreign office refused to complete the accord. Although they +recognized its advantages to Spain, they feared the possible +attitude of Great Britain and decided to sound her out before +completing the treaty. Upon doing so they were informed by Lord +Lansdowne, early in January, 1903, that in case of a break-up of +Morocco, Spain “would be entitled to a voice in any new +international arrangements” over that land, but that the British +government was strongly opposed to any discussion of such an +eventuality at that moment.<a id="FNanchor_116"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_116" class="fnanchor">[116]</a> In February, 1903, M. +Abarzuza revealed the nature of the Franco-Spanish negotiations to +the British Ambassador, and asked for an official British objection +to it so that he (M. Abarzuza) would be in a firmer position to +refuse his signature.<a id="FNanchor_117"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_117" class="fnanchor">[117]</a> Lord Lansdowne replied +as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>We regard it as of the utmost importance that Spain and Great +Britain should act together in regard to Morocco. . . . . I have +more than once informed French Ambassador here that we deprecated +attempts to bring about a virtual partition of Morocco. . . . . We +should certainly not tolerate an attempt to deal with Morocco +without regard to British interests.<a id= +"FNanchor_118"></a><a href="#Footnote_118" class= +"fnanchor">[118]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[40]</span>Thus +while M. Delcassé was assuring the Spanish government that their +agreement could be concluded without fear since Great Britain was +interested only in Tangier,<a id="FNanchor_119"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_119" class="fnanchor">[119]</a> the Spanish Foreign +Minister was being informed to the contrary by Lord Lansdowne +himself. As M. Abarzuza did not believe in the possibility of an +Anglo-French agreement over Morocco, he let the negotiations with +France fall through.<a id="FNanchor_120"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_120" class="fnanchor">[120]</a></p> + +<p>Immediately thereafter, however, arose a report of Anglo-French +conversations for that very purpose. In alarm the Spanish +government questioned the British Foreign Secretary and received +the following assurance: “We are quite willing to enter into an +agreement with the Spanish Government that neither will commit +itself to any settlement of Moorish question without previously +consulting the other.”<a id="FNanchor_121"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_121" class="fnanchor">[121]</a></p> + +<p>As it developed later, Spain lost by relying upon Great Britain +and not concluding this accord. For the British promise was too +general to be of much value, and after the Anglo-French agreement +was made, Spain had to accept the territory which the two Powers +had reserved for her. Her portion was naturally not as large as +before, nor were the terms as favorable. For France and M. +Delcassé, on the other hand, it was fortunate that the project +failed. The resulting agreement would have been strongly opposed by +the French as too advantageous to Spain.<a id= +"FNanchor_122"></a><a href="#Footnote_122" class= +"fnanchor">[122]</a> France obtained better terms by first arriving +at a settlement with Great Britain. But the <em>rapprochement</em> +between the two Latin Powers was an actuality, and that had been +one of M. Delcassé’s main objects.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc03"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_101"><span class= +"label">[101]</span></a>In 1898 Chamberlain publicly advocated an +alliance with the United States. See Jerónimo Becker, <em>Historia +de Marruecos</em> (Madrid, 1915), pp. 414 f.; Wolff to Salisbury, +May 15, 1898, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 253, No. 300.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_102"><span class= +"label">[102]</span></a>Early in 1899 Silvela asserted to the +ambassadors of Germany, France, and Russia that if Great Britain +and France had gone to war in the previous year, the former had +intended to occupy Vigo (<em>G.P.</em>, XV, Vol. Nos. 4205-8). When +this fear was brought to the attention of the British government, +by an exchange of notes with the Spanish government it denied any +such intention. See Wolff to Salisbury, March 10, 1899, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 255 f., No. 305; Salisbury to Wolff, March 16, +1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 256, No. 306; Conde de Romanones, <em>Las +responsabilidades politicas del antique régimen de 1875 á 1923</em> +(Madrid, ——), p. 36; Becker, pp. 415 f. The British and Spanish +governments also found by an exchange of views in January, 1899, +that they both wished to maintain the <em>status quo</em> in +Morocco. The Spanish diplomat and historian, Becker, has written +that they were about to make an agreement to that effect when the +Liberal government in Spain fell from power (March, 1899) (<em>op. +cit.</em>, p. 415; Salisbury to Wolff, Jan. 11, 1899, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 255, No. 304).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_103"><span class= +"label">[103]</span></a>The plan was approved by Sagasta, leader of +the Liberals, by Leon y Castillo, the Liberal ambassador at Paris, +and by the Queen Regent. See Alberto Mousset, <em>La politica +exterior de España, 1873-1918</em> (Madrid, 1918), chap. v; +Radowitz to Hohenlohe, April 15, 1899, <em>G.P.</em>, XV, 115 ff., +No. 4205; Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 119 +ff., No. 4206; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, +125 ff., No. 4210; and others in <em>ibid.</em>, chap. ic. Cf. F. +de Leon y Castillo, <em>Mis tiempos</em> (Madrid, 1921), II, 255, +written after the World War.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_104"><span class= +"label">[104]</span></a>Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, +<em>G.P.</em>, XV, 125 ff., No. 4210; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Aug. +12, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 127 ff., No. 4211.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_105"><span class= +"label">[105]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1899, +<em>ibid.</em>, 119 ff., No. 4206; Bülow to Radowitz, May 16, 1899, +<em>ibid.</em>, 124 f., No. 4209; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Oct. 5, +1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 130 ff., No. 4214; Tschirschky to Hohenlohe, +Oct. 24, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 133 f., No. 4213; Radowitz to +Hohenlohe, Feb. 4, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 134 f., No. 4214.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_106"><span class= +"label">[106]</span></a>Romanones, pp. 34 f.; Gabriel Maura, <em>La +question du Maroc au point de vue espagnol</em> (Paris, 1911), pp. +1 ff.; Becker, pp. 446 ff., esp. chap. lxi; Pinon, <em>L’empire de +la Médit.</em>, pp. 123 ff.; Emile Vidal, <em>La politique de +l’Espagne au Maroc</em> (Montpellier, 1913), pp. 1 ff.; M. Ribera, +“L’Espagne et la question du Maroc,” <em>Questions diplomatiques et +coloniales</em>, Jan. 1, 1902, pp. 46 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_107"><span class= +"label">[107]</span></a>This is asserted by Becker although he does +not cite his authority. See Becker, pp. 414, 419; Radowitz to +Hohenlohe, May 10, 1899, <em>G.P.</em>, XV, 123 f., No. 4208; +Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Oct. 5, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 130 ff., No. +4212; Tschirschky to Hohenlohe, Oct. 23, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 133 +f., No. 4213; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, +XVIII, 301 f., No. 5157; Wolff to Salisbury, Oct. 11, 1900, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 258, No. 311; Becker, p. 426; Romanones, p. +39.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_108"><span class= +"label">[108]</span></a>Schefer, <em>D’une guerre à l’autre, +etc.</em>, p. 237; Mousset, pp. 121 ff.; Romanones, p. 38; +Delcassé’s statement in the French Senate, Feb. 11, 1901, +<em>Journal officiel, Debats parlem.</em>, p. 295; Leon y Castillo, +II, 143 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_109"><span class= +"label">[109]</span></a>Durand to Lansdowne, April 13, 1901, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 259 f., No. 314; Lansdowne to Durand, April 16, +1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 260, No. 315.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_110"><span class= +"label">[110]</span></a>See below.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_111"><span class= +"label">[111]</span></a>Romanones, pp. 40 ff.; Mousset, pp. 132 +ff.; Becker, pp. 425 ff.; Vidal, p. 138; Leon y Castillo, II, 173 +ff., 122 ff. See also a speech of the Duke of Almodovar in the +Spanish Chamber, June 8, 1904, <em>Diario de las sesiones de +Cortes, Legislatura de 1903</em> (Congreso de los Diputados), pp. +4919 ff.; speech by Romanones in the same, June 7, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, p. 4883; Radolin to Bülow, June 15, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 777 f., No. 5870.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_112"><span class= +"label">[112]</span></a>Romanones, p. 41.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_113"><span class= +"label">[113]</span></a><em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 343, editor’s note; +Becker, p. 427.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_114"><span class= +"label">[114]</span></a>Leon y Castillo was allowed a free hand in +those negotiations. See Romanones, pp. 41 f.; Becker, pp. 427 f.; +Mousset, p. 135; speeches by Almodovar and Romanones in the Spanish +Chamber, June 7, 8, 1904, <em>Sesiones del Congreso, +Legislatura</em>, pp. 4883, 4944 f., 4917 ff.; exchange of letters +between Silvela and Almodovar published in <em>L’Imparcial</em>, +June, 1904, and reprinted in Leon y Castillo, II, 185 ff. The +result was shown to Silvela early in September, 1902, and received +his entire approval, “provided one treats of a work of peace and +concord guaranteed against all suspicion and opposition of friendly +Powers.” The exact terms of the proposed accord are not known, only +the main points. See R. Gay de Montella, <em>España ante el +problema del Mediterráneo</em> (Barcelona, 1917), pp. 40 ff., +quoting an article by Leon y Castillo in <em>Mercurio</em>, May 27, +1917; André Tardieu, “France et Espagne, 1902-1912,” <em>Revue des +deux mondes</em>, Dec. 1, 1912, pp. 635 f.; Durand to Lansdowne, +Feb. 14, 1903, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 279, No. 336; Lansdowne to +Monson, Aug. 5, 1903, April 29, May 13, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 306 +ff., No. 364; III, 33, No. 34; 35, No. 37; Monson to Lansdowne, May +20, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 37, No. 41; Lansdowne to Egerton, April +27, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 31 f., No. 32; Leon y Castillo, II, 177 +ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_115"><span class= +"label">[115]</span></a>Mousset, p. 135; Leon y Castillo, II, +128.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_116"><span class= +"label">[116]</span></a>On this question see a speech by Maura, +minister of foreign affairs, in the Spanish Chamber, June 9, 1904, +<em>Sesiones del Congreso, Legislatura</em>, p. 4959; Becker, pp. +429 f.; Tardieu, p. 635; Durand to Lansdowne, Jan. 3, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 276 f., No. 332; Lansdowne to Durand, Jan. 5, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 277, No. 333; Durand to Lansdowne, Jan. 17, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 278, No. 335; Metternich to F. O., Dec. 31, +1902, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 247 f., No. 5192; Groeben to F. O., +Sept. 17, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 353 f., No. 5198 and note; Monson +to Lansdowne, April 22, 1904, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 30, No. 30; Leon +y Castillo, II, 179 f. There is a story that Silvela tried to +change the basis of the accord in such a way as also to obtain +Russian support for Spain against Great Britain and that he was +willing to enter the anti-British camp. His proposal to spend eight +hundred million <em>pesetas</em> in the building of a navy pointed +in this direction; but that there is anything to the tale seems +doubtful. See Mousset, pp. 137 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 635 f.; Anonymous, +“Una nouva alleanza,” <em>Nouva antologia</em>, Aug. 1, 1903, pp. +511.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_117"><span class= +"label">[117]</span></a>Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 14, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 279, No. 336.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_118"><span class= +"label">[118]</span></a>Lansdowne to Durand, Feb. 16, 21, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 279 f., No. 337; 280, No. 339.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_119"><span class= +"label">[119]</span></a>Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 21, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 280, No. 338.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_120"><span class= +"label">[120]</span></a>See Tardieu, p. 635; Leon y Castillo, II, +179 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_121"><span class= +"label">[121]</span></a>Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 21, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 280, No. 338; Lansdowne to Durand, Feb. 21, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 280, No. 339; Lansdowne to Durand, March 29, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 282, No. 334; Leon y Castillo, II, 180.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_122"><span class= +"label">[122]</span></a>Maura, p. 88; speeches by Ribot and +Deschanel in the French Chamber, March 11, Nov. 19, 1903, +<em>Journal officiel, Debats parlem.</em>, pp. 793, 1111 f.; +Millet, <em>Notre politique extérieure</em>, pp. 193 ff.; Pinon, +<em>France et Allemagne</em>, pp. 143 f.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[41]</span><a id= +"c04"></a>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<p class="sch1">DELCASSÉ’S POLICY TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY, +1898-1902</p> + +<p>M. Delcassé assumed office at a most unpropitious time for the +success of his policy with reference to Great Britain. On September +1, 1898, he remarked to Sir Edmund Monson, the British ambassador, +that “he had always . . . . regarded as eminently desirable a +cordial understanding between England, France, and Russia,” and +offered his service “in soothing the way both at St. Petersburgh +and Paris for the attainment of this object.”<a id= +"FNanchor_123"></a><a href="#Footnote_123" class= +"fnanchor">[123]</a> From then until March of the next year he +repeatedly urged Lord Salisbury, British premier and foreign +minister, to agree to a general understanding on all matters at +issue, so that Great Britain and France could exchange the old +relation of hostility for one of friendship.<a id= +"FNanchor_124"></a><a href="#Footnote_124" class= +"fnanchor">[124]</a> But in spite of the French Minister’s +cordiality the Fashoda crisis in the autumn and early winter of +1898 brought the two countries perilously close to war.<a id= +"FNanchor_125"></a><a href="#Footnote_125" class= +"fnanchor">[125]</a> Anglo-Russian difficulties in China and +elsewhere also remained acute.<a id="FNanchor_126"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_126" class="fnanchor">[126]</a> Furthermore, Lord +Salisbury replied to M. Delcassé that French ministries were too +unstable to deal with.<a id="FNanchor_127"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_127" class="fnanchor">[127]</a> Hence, instead of +improving, relations between the two countries became more +strained. In the late winter and early spring of 1899, the +bellicose<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[42]</span> stand on +the Fashoda affair taken by the British government and press +aroused a general fear in France of a British attack.<a id= +"FNanchor_128"></a><a href="#Footnote_128" class= +"fnanchor">[128]</a> By August, the French Foreign Minister +complained bitterly to the British Ambassador that “the conduct of +her Majesty’s Government seemed to show a deliberate intention of +being unfriendly to France in every possible way,” and added that +“he began to believe that the politicians who argue that there is +nothing to be done with England are right.”<a id= +"FNanchor_129"></a><a href="#Footnote_129" class= +"fnanchor">[129]</a></p> + +<p>During the period of the Boer War, the presence of Lord +Salisbury at the foreign office, the bitter feeling of the French +against the British, the continued Anglo-Russian trouble in China, +and the British attempt to align with Germany prevented M. Delcassé +from obtaining any results.<a id="FNanchor_130"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_130" class="fnanchor">[130]</a> In fact, conditions were +more favorable for the pursuance of a directly anti-British policy. +The Russian government wished it, and worked for closer concert +against Great Britain among the Continental Powers.<a id= +"FNanchor_131"></a><a href="#Footnote_131" class= +"fnanchor">[131]</a> The Spanish government had the more +far-reaching ambition of bringing about a definite Continental +union against Great Britain.<a id="FNanchor_132"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_132" class="fnanchor">[132]</a> Italy was at odds with +the latter. The German Emperor and his government had been wooing +France and making veiled proposals for co-operation since +1890.<a id="FNanchor_133"></a><a href="#Footnote_133" class= +"fnanchor">[133]</a> And French feeling<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_43">[43]</span> toward Germany had become more amicable than +at any time since 1870.</p> + +<p>The French Foreign Minister did not deviate from his original +purpose,<a id="FNanchor_134"></a><a href="#Footnote_134" class= +"fnanchor">[134]</a> but tried rather to be friendly to both Great +Britain and Germany, to play between them for the advantage of +France; and, warned by Mr. Chamberlain’s<a id= +"FNanchor_135"></a><a href="#Footnote_135" class= +"fnanchor">[135]</a> open advocacy in November, 1899, of an +alliance with Germany and the United States and by the signs of an +Anglo-German <em>rapprochement</em>, he sought to eliminate the +occasion for this alliance.<a id="FNanchor_136"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_136" class="fnanchor">[136]</a> This policy had been +foreshadowed during the Fashoda crisis.</p> + +<p>In December, 1898, immediately after France had retreated before +the British demands, M. Delcassé in a conversation with Herr Arthur +von Huhn, correspondent of the <em>Kölnische +Zeitung</em>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[44]</span> had +bitterly denounced the brutal threats of Great Britain against +France, had expressed his fear that that Power was seeking war in +order to have an excuse for destroying the French fleet, and had +proposed a <em>rapprochement</em> with Germany for pursuing a +common policy against British encroachments and for making colonial +accords.<a id="FNanchor_137"></a><a href="#Footnote_137" class= +"fnanchor">[137]</a> Simultaneously with this indirect overture, +which had never been followed up by either government, the French +Minister had threatened the British government with the acceptance +of indirect proposals from Germany for co-operation against it if +Great Britain did not change her attitude toward France and assent +to his offer of a general accord.<a id="FNanchor_138"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_138" class="fnanchor">[138]</a></p> + +<p>During 1899 M. Delcassé had turned farther away from Great +Britain and had sought means of holding her in check.<a id= +"FNanchor_139"></a><a href="#Footnote_139" class= +"fnanchor">[139]</a> But when the Boer War broke out, he held aloof +from any movements for intervention, even risked unpopularity by +publicly denouncing the expressions of rabid anti-British sentiment +on the part of the French people.<a id="FNanchor_140"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_140" class="fnanchor">[140]</a> Upon the retirement of +Lord Salisbury from the foreign office in November, 1900, he again +suggested a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[45]</span> general +understanding to the British government.<a id= +"FNanchor_141"></a><a href="#Footnote_141" class= +"fnanchor">[141]</a> He was accused of being Anglophile to the +detriment of French interests, particularly in Morocco;<a id= +"FNanchor_142"></a><a href="#Footnote_142" class= +"fnanchor">[142]</a> for many of the French writers advocated a +policy of co-operation with Germany for the settlement of colonial +questions (among which, of course, would be included the Moroccan), +while Great Britain could not effectively object.<a id= +"FNanchor_143"></a><a href="#Footnote_143" class= +"fnanchor">[143]</a> But M. Delcassé was willing merely to occupy +the Saharan oases back of Algeria during the war and to initiate +the French policy for the eventual acquisition of the Sherifian +Empire.</p> + +<p>Not that the French Foreign Minister was averse to any accord +with Germany. As already seen, he made an indirect overture to the +German government for an agreement while the Moroccan missions were +in Europe in 1901. Although rebuffed on that occasion, he made +another attempt in October of the same year at the urging of the +Spanish and the Russian governments.<a id= +"FNanchor_144"></a><a href="#Footnote_144" class= +"fnanchor">[144]</a> At this time M. Jules Hansen, a French agent, +stated to the German<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[46]</span> +Ambassador in Paris that M. Delcassé had recently expressed to him +the earnest wish to meet Count Bülow personally. The problem was +where and how to meet. The French Minister had said that if the +Count would come secretly and unofficially to Paris, he would greet +him most heartily and would make a public visit to Berlin in +return.<a id="FNanchor_145"></a><a href="#Footnote_145" class= +"fnanchor">[145]</a></p> + +<p>Although very much interested, Count Bülow refused to run the +risk. The time was inopportune, he said; the French government and +people must first be more solicitous of closer relations with +Germany.<a id="FNanchor_146"></a><a href="#Footnote_146" class= +"fnanchor">[146]</a> That reply postponed the matter to the Greek +calends.</p> + +<p>In 1902 M. Delcassé made a concentrated effort to establish the +French claim to ascendancy in Morocco. His negotiations with Italy, +which led to the agreement of November of that year, and those with +Spain, which in December proved abortive, have already been +considered. Simultaneously therewith, M. Delcassé again endeavored +to negotiate with Great Britain and, perhaps, with Germany on the +same question.</p> + +<p>On several occasions in January and February, M. Cambon, the +French ambassador at London, discussed Anglo-French differences, +including the Moroccan one, with Mr. Chamberlain, British colonial +minister, and with Lord Lansdowne, British foreign secretary since +November, 1900. While the British officials showed some interest, +no progress was made.<a id="FNanchor_147"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_147" class="fnanchor">[147]</a> For after +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[47]</span> publication of +the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance in February, France was +forced to declare with her ally that the Dual Alliance extended to +the Far East.<a id="FNanchor_148"></a><a href="#Footnote_148" +class="fnanchor">[148]</a> Under pressure from Russia<a id= +"FNanchor_149"></a><a href="#Footnote_149" class= +"fnanchor">[149]</a> and with the hope of obtaining support while +negotiating a treaty with Siam,<a id="FNanchor_150"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_150" class="fnanchor">[150]</a> the French government +drew closer to Germany.</p> + +<p>Late in June the French Ambassador, in asking the German views +on the Siamese question, remarked to Count Bülow that “the present +good relations between Germany and France justified the hope that +France would receive the support [<em>coup d’épaule</em>] of +Germany in the Siamese affair.”<a id="FNanchor_151"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_151" class="fnanchor">[151]</a> As the German government +ignored the suggestion, however, and as the French government was +alarmed at the growing influence of certain Englishmen, +particularly Kaid Maclean, over the Sultan of Morocco, M. Delcassé +determined, in spite of probable Russian objection,<a id= +"FNanchor_152"></a><a href="#Footnote_152" class= +"fnanchor">[152]</a> to open the Moroccan question with the British +government.</p> + +<p>On July 23, when M. Cambon asked Lord Lansdowne +about<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[48]</span> discussing +fully the Moroccan problem, the British Minister replied that he +would be ready to consider it “in the frankest possible +manner.”<a id="FNanchor_153"></a><a href="#Footnote_153" class= +"fnanchor">[153]</a> On August 6, therefore, the Ambassador +officially proposed an accord over the future of Siam and Morocco. +After a consideration of the former question, the two men took up +the latter one. While asserting that the French government +preferred that the Moroccan problem should not become acute, the +Ambassador desired that the two governments “frankly discuss the +action which they might be constrained to adopt in the event of +Morocco passing ‘into liquidation.’” Spain, he explained, could be +satisfied by a sufficient allowance of hinterland behind her +coastal possessions; Tangier could be converted into an +international and open port—for France could not allow it to pass +into the hands of any European Power; and beyond the Spanish line, +France would expect “exclusive influence.”</p> + +<p>Lord Lansdowne replied that although he listened to the French +proposal with great interest, yet since Italy, Spain, and Germany +had also at various times manifested a concern in the Moroccan +question, he regarded with the “greatest apprehension” any attempt +to deal prematurely with a liquidation of that land, which “would +be sure to lead to serious complications.” The Ambassador answered +that at any rate there could be no harm “in discussing these +eventualities in good time.” He pointed out that Spain and Germany +had both failed egregiously in their attempts to establish +themselves in Morocco, and that at present Germany was “not to the +front there or elsewhere in the Mediterranean.” But the British +Foreign Secretary, denying that his government had made any +difficulties in Morocco for France, postponed further consideration +of the proposal until after the government holiday.<a id= +"FNanchor_154"></a><a href="#Footnote_154" class= +"fnanchor">[154]</a> When in October M. Cambon returned to the +subject, Lord Lansdowne not only replied that the +French<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[49]</span> terms were +unsatisfactory, but he also refused to discuss the possibility of a +liquidation of Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_155"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_155" class="fnanchor">[155]</a></p> + +<p>In the meantime, M. Delcassé had been again seeking the +co-operation of Germany. In September the German government assured +France of its disinterestedness in Siam, provided German economic +interests remained uninjured. Although this reply contained no +mention of the larger request for support made by the French +Ambassador in June, yet the latter, in expressing the satisfaction +of his government with the German answer, added that this +opportunity had been used to emphasize the community of French and +German interests, and not only in Siam. To this broad hint the +German government made no response.<a id= +"FNanchor_156"></a><a href="#Footnote_156" class= +"fnanchor">[156]</a></p> + +<p>In the next month the Spanish Ambassador in Paris reported to +Prince Radolin that the French Foreign Minister had recently said +to him:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I do not believe that Germany wishes to come to an understanding +with France. . . . . Four years ago it was said to M. de Noailles +at Berlin that there were points upon which the two countries might +place themselves in accord. I found the matter so important that I +immediately took it to the president of the Republic and to the +premier. I was authorized by them to telegraph to M. de Noailles +that I was disposed to treat with Germany on all points on which +the two countries would be able to agree. M. de Noailles reported +that they had informed him in the <em>Wilhelmstrasse</em> that in +view of its importance the question deserved to be studied. That +was four years ago. Since then not a word more has been said on +that subject. Our ambassador still awaits a response.<a id= +"FNanchor_157"></a><a href="#Footnote_157" class= +"fnanchor">[157]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The German government replied to this overture with +recriminations against the French Minister. It complained that his +proposals had lacked in concreteness, that France had rejected +several<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[50]</span> German offers +of co-operation, and it accused M. Delcassé of consistent bias in +favor of Great Britain.<a id="FNanchor_158"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_158" class="fnanchor">[158]</a></p> + +<p>When this reply was passed on to M. Delcassé by the Spanish +Ambassador late in November, he remarked, “Then M. de Noailles is a +fool”; thereafter he had no business to transact with the German +representative.<a id="FNanchor_159"></a><a href="#Footnote_159" +class="fnanchor">[159]</a></p> + +<p>The refusal by both the British and the German governments of +the French overtures was followed in December by that of the +Spanish government to sign the agreement over Morocco. So M. +Delcassé’s campaign of 1902 terminated in failure. At the end of +the year he reverted to the policy of the <em>status quo</em>, and, +anxious about the situation in Morocco, proposed to Lord Lansdowne +that if disorders there should necessitate action “the Powers +interested should take counsel together as to its nature and scope, +and should agree that there should be no single-handed intervention +. . . . on the part of any one Power.” In approving this policy the +British Minister asked M. Cambon for a further explanation of the +phrase “interested Powers.” The latter replied that Great Britain, +France, and Spain were the ones referred to, that Italy had no +interest in Morocco, and that the French government was solicitous +of excluding the United States, and, above all, Germany from that +group. He thought that “it<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_51">[51]</span> would be most desirable that if Germany were +at any moment to come forward and attempt to assume a conspicuous +rôle, it should be intimated to her that she had no <em>locus +standi</em>.” Upon that point Lord Lansdowne refused to commit +himself.<a id="FNanchor_160"></a><a href="#Footnote_160" class= +"fnanchor">[160]</a></p> + +<p>M. Delcassé had shown a pro-British inclination from the start, +and it may be that his approaches to Germany had been intended +primarily to press Great Britain to an agreement. Certainly they +had been sufficiently vague to be in harmony with the traditional +French attitude of irreconcilability with the victor of 1870-71. +But they had also been concrete enough to show the difficulty, if +not the impossibility, of negotiating with Germany on acceptable +terms. Whether M. Delcassé was sincere in those overtures cannot be +said, although he seems to have been. At any rate, despairing of +Germany, he devoted his full energies in 1903 toward achieving an +accord with Great Britain, from whom no irredentist problem +separated France.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc04"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_123"><span class= +"label">[123]</span></a>Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 1, 1899, +<em>B.D.</em>, I, 216, No. 262.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_124"><span class= +"label">[124]</span></a>Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 163, No. 188, and other documents in chaps. iv, v. +Delcassé went so far as to state to Monson on Sept. 28, 1898, that +“he would much prefer an Anglo-French to a Franco-Russian +alliance.” See Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 28, 1898, <em>ibid.</em>, +171, No. 198.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_125"><span class= +"label">[125]</span></a>Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 22, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 169, No. 196, and other documents in the same +chapter.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_126"><span class= +"label">[126]</span></a>Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 37, No. 58; and others in <em>ibid.</em>, chap. +i.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_127"><span class= +"label">[127]</span></a>So stated by Paul Cambon in an interview in +the <em>London Times</em>, Dec. 22, 1920.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_128"><span class= +"label">[128]</span></a>Monson to Salisbury, Jan. 13, 1899, +<em>B.D.</em>, I, 199, No. 241.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_129"><span class= +"label">[129]</span></a>Monson to Salisbury, Aug. 14, 1899, +<em>ibid.</em>, 212, No. 259. Cambon had in March made similar +complaints to Salisbury (Salisbury to Monson, March 15, 1899, +<em>ibid.</em>, 211, No. 257).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_130"><span class= +"label">[130]</span></a>For expression of French public opinion +against Great Britain see two articles by Ernst Lavisse in the +<em>Revue de Paris</em>, Feb. 1, 1899, and Jan. 1, 1900. See also +Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 3, 1899, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 200 f., No. +242; Mévil, <em>De la paix de Francfort, etc.</em>, pp. 128 f.; Sir +Thomas Barclay, <em>Thirty Years; Anglo-French Reminiscences, +1876-1906</em> (London, 1914), pp. 193 f., 209 f.; J. A. Spender, +<em>Life, Journalism, and Politics</em> (London, 1927), I, 183 ff.; +Newton, <em>Lord Lansdowne</em>, p. 209.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_131"><span class= +"label">[131]</span></a>Romanones, <em>Las responsabilidades +politicas, etc.</em>, pp. 27, 36; Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 27, +1899, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 234 f., No. 287; Rumbold to Salisbury, Nov. +3, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 237, No. 291; <em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XV, +chaps. ic, ci, ciii.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_132"><span class= +"label">[132]</span></a>See above, chap. iii; also Emil Bourgeois +et Georges Pagès, <em>Les origines et les responsabilités de la +grande guerre</em> (Paris, 1922), p. 276.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_133"><span class= +"label">[133]</span></a>The German Emperor made a special endeavor +to win France; hence his numerous telegrams of congratulations or +condolence to French leaders, his toasts and decorations for French +officers, etc. The French called him the “new Lohengrin.” Both he +and Bülow made repeated hints to the French representatives for a +<em>rapprochement</em>; and one of the Emperor’s favorite schemes +to form a Continental grouping against Great Britain and the United +States was well known from his frequent references to it. See +Theodor Wolff, <em>Das Vorspiel</em> (Munich, 1924), pp. 110, 114, +117, 123 f.; <em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 5860-71; Bourgeois et +Pagès, pp. 277 ff., 256 f.; William II to Bülow, Oct. 29, 1899, +<em>G.P.</em>, XV, 406 ff., No. 4394; and the editor’s long note +thereto, pp. 406 ff. On June 4, 1899, the French Ambassador +reported a conversation between the French naval attaché, Buchard, +and the Emperor in which the latter said: “The hour is certainly +come when the Continent must defend itself against England and +America, and I think that it is necessary for Germany and France to +rely upon each other [<em>s’appuient l’une sur l’autre</em>].” And +Buchard added, “The Emperor is very desirous of establishing good +relations with you” (Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 279). See also Spring +Rice to Villiers, April 24, 1900, Stephen Gwynn (ed.), <em>The +Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice. A Record</em> +(Boston and New York, 1929), I, 220.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_134"><span class= +"label">[134]</span></a>How entirely alien to Delcassé’s mind was +the idea of a Continental alliance with Germany was shown by the +fact that in August, 1899, at his instigation the phrase “the +maintenance of the equilibrium between the forces of Europe” was +introduced into the Dual Alliance. See Ministère des Affaires +Etrangères, <em>Documents diplomatiques. L’alliance +franco-russe</em> (Paris, 1918), pp. 94 f.; Dickinson, <em>The +International Anarchy, 1904-1914</em> (New York, 1926), p. 108; +Georges Michon, <em>L’alliance franco-russe, 1891-1917</em> (Paris, +1927), pp. 87 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_135"><span class= +"label">[135]</span></a>Chamberlain was Colonial minister in the +Unionist cabinet.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_136"><span class= +"label">[136]</span></a>In September, 1898, Delcassé had spoken to +Monson of the rumors of an “alliance” between Great Britain and +Germany (Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 162, +No. 187).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_137"><span class= +"label">[137]</span></a>Memo. by Huhn, Dec. 5, 1898, <em>G.P.</em>, +XIII, 247 ff., No. 3558.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_138"><span class= +"label">[138]</span></a>Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 28, 1898, +<em>B.D.</em>, I, 185, No. 221; Monson to Salisbury, Dec. 9, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 196, No. 238.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_139"><span class= +"label">[139]</span></a>Count Witte writes in his <em>Memoirs</em> +(New York, 1921), p. 178, that when Delcassé came to St. Petersburg +in August, 1899, he sought means of accomplishing this end, and +urged the Russian government to push the construction of the +Orenburg-Tashkent Railway so that in emergency Russia could +threaten India. Leon y Castillo, Spanish ambassador at Paris and an +intimate friend of the Minister, likewise stated in round terms to +Radowitz, German ambassador at Madrid, in May, 1899, that Delcassé +belonged to the party desirous of a closer understanding with +Germany (Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, <em>G.P.</em>, XV, +125 ff., No. 4210. On the other hand, Sir Thomas Barclay records +that upon Delcassé’s departure for St. Petersburg in August, 1899, +the latter said to him that “there was nothing he [Delcassé] +personally would welcome more warmly than a state of feeling which +would permit the two Governments [French and British] to negotiate +a solution of their outstanding difficulties in a friendly +give-and-take spirit” (Barclay, p. 170).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_140"><span class= +"label">[140]</span></a>Barclay, pp. 169 f.; Monson to Salisbury, +Dec. 1, 1899, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 242, No. 300; Monson to Salisbury, +Nov. 7, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 239, No. 294; Wolff to Salisbury, +June 9, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, II, 258, No. 210.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_141"><span class= +"label">[141]</span></a>Lee, <em>King Edward VII</em>, II, 214.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_142"><span class= +"label">[142]</span></a>According to an anonymous article, “Quatre +ans de politique extérieure,” <em>Revue politique et +parlementaire</em>, Oct., 1902, pp. 24 f., 31, on one occasion +during the Boer War when a deputy asked Delcassé if he did not +think this an opportune time to settle the Moroccan affair with +Great Britain, the Minister replied, “How do you wish me to speak +with the English Government? It is so occupied that it has no time +to reply.”</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_143"><span class= +"label">[143]</span></a>Robert de Caix, writing in the +<em>Bulletin</em>, was one of these. Moreover, in March, 1901, not +long after the German Emperor’s visit to England, Delcassé took +advantage of the opportunity offered by the presence of the British +mission in Paris for announcing the accession of King Edward VII to +the throne, to let the British know that the French government +wanted a “good understanding” with them (Lee, II, 14 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_144"><span class= +"label">[144]</span></a>It must be remembered that Delcassé was +then discussing the Moroccan problem with the Spanish Ambassador, +who sought to use that question as the means for paving the way to +the new Continental combination. Moreover, the Czar and the German +Emperor, together with their foreign ministers, had an interview at +Danzig in September at which the Russian Minister openly advocated +a Russo-German alliance. From Danzig the Czar journeyed to France, +and a short time thereafter occurred Delcassé’s indirect overture +to Radolin. On the meeting at Danzig see Bülow’s account of the +conversations on Sept. 12, 14, 1901, in <em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 28 +ff., Nos. 5393-95; Savinsky, <em>Recollections of a Russian +Diplomat</em>, pp. 17 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_145"><span class= +"label">[145]</span></a>The identical project was also proposed to +Radolin by Pallain, governor of the Banque de France. Hansen also +remarked that an important Russian personage had told him +positively that Lamsdorff had spoken to Delcassé of the trip to +Berlin. The idea seems to have been suggested to the Russian +Minister by the German Emperor (Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 27, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 782 ff., No. 5873).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_146"><span class= +"label">[146]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, Nov. 6, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 785, No. 5874.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_147"><span class= +"label">[147]</span></a>Metternich to F. O., Jan. 30, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, XVII, 342 f., No. 5186; Hermann Freiherr von +Eckardstein, <em>Lebenserinnerungen und politische +Denkwürdigkeiten</em> (Leipzig, 1919, 1921), II, 379; Lansdowne to +Monson, Jan. 22, 1902, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 262 f., No. 320; +interview with Cambon published in the <em>London Times</em>, Dec. +22, 1920; Monson to Lansdowne, Feb. 6, 1902, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 274, +No. 339. Lansdowne was so much interested in the French +Ambassador’s ideas that the latter wrote him a letter enumerating +the differences which might be treated. King Edward read the letter +and declared to Cambon, “It is excellent. You must go on” +(interview with Cambon published in the <em>London Times</em>, Dec. +22, 1920).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_148"><span class= +"label">[148]</span></a>A few days later, however, Delcassé spoke +in the Chamber so vaguely of this declaration and emphasized so +strongly France’s pacific intentions that he cast great doubt upon +its value. See Mévil, pp. 81 f. n.; Tardieu, <em>La France et les +alliances</em>, pp. 21 f.; see also Newton, pp. 226 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_149"><span class= +"label">[149]</span></a>Memo. by Bülow of a conversation with the +French Ambassador, March 20, 1902, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 179 f., No. +5064. In February the Russian government urged the German +government to enter into an agreement against the new alliance, but +the offer was refused (<em>ibid.</em>, chap. cx, Part B).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_150"><span class= +"label">[150]</span></a>On Siamese affairs, an old cause of trouble +between Great Britain and France, see <em>ibid.</em>, XVIII, 795 +ff., Nos. 5881-83; Schefer, <em>D’une guerre à l’autre, etc.</em>, +p. 242; <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, Nov. 15, 1902, pp. 577 ff.; +and others.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_151"><span class= +"label">[151]</span></a>Richthofen to Metternich, June 30, 1902, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 795 f., No. 5881.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_152"><span class= +"label">[152]</span></a>Memo. by Bülow of a conversation with the +Russian Ambassador, Feb. 25, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, XVII, 160 ff., +No. 5051; Alvensleben to F. O., Feb. 25, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 349, +No. 5195.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_153"><span class= +"label">[153]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, July 23, 1902, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 263 f., No. 321.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_154"><span class= +"label">[154]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 6, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 264 ff., No. 322.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_155"><span class= +"label">[155]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 15, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 268 ff., No. 325; Newton, pp. 268 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_156"><span class= +"label">[156]</span></a>Mühlberg to Radolin, Aug. 18, 1902, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 795 f., No. 5882; Schlözer to F. O., Sept. +22, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 797, No. 5883.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_157"><span class= +"label">[157]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 15, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 797 ff., No. 5884.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_158"><span class= +"label">[158]</span></a>Richthofen to Radolin, Oct. 23, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 799 f., No. 5885. These accusations were unfair. In +the previous June in a dispatch to Metternich, ambassador at +London, two instances had been mentioned in which the French +government had tried to secure the co-operation of Germany. The +editors of <em>G.P.</em> admit that one of these proposals was +definite; and in August, 1901, Holstein of the German foreign +office had written that the French government was “not in itself +irreconcilable.” That admission speaks volumes. Moreover, the +German reply admitted that the French Ambassador had usually taken +the initiative in these attempts at co-operation. See Richthofen to +Metternich, June 30, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 795 f., No. 5881; +Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 8, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, XVII, 341, No. +5184.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_159"><span class= +"label">[159]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, Dec. 4, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, XVIII, 801, No. 5886. As an explanation for this +very marked attitude, Delcassé said to a third party that he had +tried to co-operate with Germany but had been refused (Memo. by +Klehmet, April 19, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 801 f., No. 5887). None +the less, up to Oct., 1903, the French government continued to +approve the investment of French capital in the Bagdad Railway +(memo. by Rosen, Oct. 29, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 456 ff., No. +5274).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_160"><span class= +"label">[160]</span></a>This conversation occurred on Dec. 31, +1902. Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 31, 1902, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 274 +ff., No. 330; Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 28, 1902, Monson to +Lansdowne, Dec. 31, 1902, Newton, pp. 269 f.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[52]</span><a id= +"c05"></a>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<p class="sch1">THE ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS, +1898-1901</p> + +<p>The international position of Great Britain at the end of the +nineteenth century was uncomfortable. The major Powers were all +busy in the colonial world more or less in opposition to her +interests; <em>Weltpolitik</em> was the order of the day; the +navies of all states were growing rapidly and by combining might be +able to threaten her maritime supremacy. On the Continent, the +German Emperor’s courtship of an apparently complaisant France, +cordial relations between Russia and Germany, an agreement in 1897 +between Russia and Austria-Hungary over Balkan affairs, and a +growing amity between France and Italy and between France and Spain +gave evidence of a developing <em>rapprochement</em> between the +two systems of alliance. Trouble in West Africa with France in 1897 +and early in 1898 made Anglo-French relations acute. Fashoda was on +the way; so was the Boer War. British markets in China were being +menaced by Russia, and the British feared that the Russian, French, +and German governments might co-operate on Chinese affairs to their +injury. Public opinion demanded that the government defend British +interests more actively.<a id="FNanchor_161"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_161" class="fnanchor">[161]</a> These were the more +important of the difficulties confronting the island empire.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[53]</span>To dispel these +dangers, two policies were advocated by members of the Unionist +cabinet. Lord Salisbury, prime minister and foreign secretary, did +not believe that a Continental alliance against Great Britain would +be made.<a id="FNanchor_162"></a><a href="#Footnote_162" class= +"fnanchor">[162]</a> He clung to the traditional position of +“splendid isolation,” of making special agreements with the various +Powers over specific issues. As he realized the inadequacy of this +policy if Great Britain attempted to expand her influence too +largely in China, South Africa, and elsewhere, he only +half-heartedly supported a vigorous program of aggression.<a id= +"FNanchor_163"></a><a href="#Footnote_163" class= +"fnanchor">[163]</a> In January, 1898, he proposed to the Russian +government a general agreement over China and Turkey.<a id= +"FNanchor_164"></a><a href="#Footnote_164" class= +"fnanchor">[164]</a> On March 8 he asked the United States +government to co-operate in maintaining the open door in +China.<a id="FNanchor_165"></a><a href="#Footnote_165" class= +"fnanchor">[165]</a> However, he was old, in poor health, and +inclined to permit Mr. Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, to +force his hand. In fact, the last five years of his administration +have been called the “Chamberlain period,” so great was the +latter’s influence.<a id="FNanchor_166"></a><a href="#Footnote_166" +class="fnanchor">[166]</a></p> + +<p>This “stormy petrel” from Birmingham favored an entirely new +policy.<a id="FNanchor_167"></a><a href="#Footnote_167" class= +"fnanchor">[167]</a> Determined to maintain and extend British +interests in the whole world, he sought to form a corporation for +directing world-affairs by close co-operation with the United +States and Germany. He was supported more or less fully by the +Prince<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[54]</span> of Wales (who +in 1901 became King Edward VII), in the cabinet by Mr. Balfour (who +in 1902 succeeded Lord Salisbury as prime minister), and by the +Duke of Devonshire;<a id="FNanchor_168"></a><a href="#Footnote_168" +class="fnanchor">[168]</a> while his influence with the masses and +with the business elements seemed to assure him of popular +approval.</p> + +<p>Various difficulties had in recent years arisen between Great +Britain and Germany. But Mr. Chamberlain thought that in view of +the German Emperor’s offers of alliance to the British government +at various times during the 1890’s, one as late as January, +1898,<a id="FNanchor_169"></a><a href="#Footnote_169" class= +"fnanchor">[169]</a> the German government would eagerly accept a +proposal to that effect. When Lord Salisbury’s policy toward Russia +failed and trouble with Russia<a id="FNanchor_170"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_170" class="fnanchor">[170]</a> and with France<a id= +"FNanchor_171"></a><a href="#Footnote_171" class= +"fnanchor">[171]</a> threatened, in March and April, 1898, the +British Colonial Minister declared to Count Hatzfeldt, the German +ambassador, that Great Britain would have to relinquish her +isolation. Under threat of coming to terms with Russia or France if +his overture were refused, he made an unofficial offer of defensive +alliance to Germany.<a id="FNanchor_172"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_172" class="fnanchor">[172]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[55]</span>Mr. Chamberlain’s +proposal was coolly received. Count Bülow, the German secretary of +state for foreign affairs, and his inspirer and guide, Herr von +Holstein, privy councilor (<em>vortragender Rat</em>) in the +foreign office, who with occasional interference from the Emperor +were the directors of the German foreign policy, not only were +mistrustful of British intentions, but also saw no reason for +dissatisfaction with the current international position and +prospects of their state.<a id="FNanchor_173"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_173" class="fnanchor">[173]</a> Besides, this overture +so increased the power of their situation that they were able to +lay down a policy of the “free hand” to be followed during the next +few years. A telegram from Emperor William II to Count Bülow on +April 10, 1898, together with the latter’s marginal notes, best +expressed this policy. After stating that Germany had less need of +a British alliance since Great Britain had turned her attention +from the Continent to the colonial world, the Emperor wrote:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>If the English need of support direct itself in the future +toward European affairs also, we could consider it more closely +than now. Nevertheless, it is<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_56">[56]</span> also of great significance for the present to +keep the official attitude in England favorable and hopeful toward +us [Bülow’s comment, “Yes”]. . . . . Through an England friendly to +us we hold another card in our hand toward Russia. [Bülow’s +comment, “Very true, we must remain independent between them, be +the tongue to the wagon, not the pendulum restlessly swinging +about.”] And we thereby have prospects of gaining colonial and +commercial advantages from England. [Bülow’s comment, “Also the +reverse. The calmer relations we have with Russia, the more will +England treat us with respect, not to say take great care with +respect to us.”]</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The Emperor proposed that Count Hatzfeldt be +instructed not to refuse the overture abruptly, but rather to +express pleasure at the prospect of a profitable co-operation +leading toward an alliance. To the Emperor’s remark that the +pro-German sentiment of the British cabinet would not long remain +concealed from Russia, Count Bülow wrote, “It does not matter, if +only the English cannot prove to the Russians and <em>vice +versa</em> with the evidence in hand that we have played +falsely.”<a id="FNanchor_174"></a><a href="#Footnote_174" class= +"fnanchor">[174]</a> In accordance with the Emperor’s suggestion, +Mr. Chamberlain’s offer was for the time refused.<a id= +"FNanchor_175"></a><a href="#Footnote_175" class= +"fnanchor">[175]</a></p> + +<p>The German leaders had found the policy by which they hoped to +carry out their program of <em>Weltpolitik</em>, already so +resoundingly proclaimed in their speeches and acts.<a id= +"FNanchor_176"></a><a href="#Footnote_176" class= +"fnanchor">[176]</a> “I am the balance of power,” declared the +Emperor in 1901;<a id="FNanchor_177"></a><a href="#Footnote_177" +class="fnanchor">[177]</a> and by utilizing the advantages of that +position, he and his advisers hoped to gain colonial concessions +from the Powers, to construct the Bagdad<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_57">[57]</span> Railway, and to build the German battle +fleet. It was a policy of finesse and at times of intrigue, one +nicely suited to Count Bülow’s ingratiating nature, but one full of +pitfalls. Success depended upon whether Anglo-Russian and +Anglo-French hostility was temporary or relatively permanent, upon +whether Mr. Chamberlain was in earnest in declaring that Great +Britain must abandon her policy of isolation,<a id= +"FNanchor_178"></a><a href="#Footnote_178" class= +"fnanchor">[178]</a> upon whether German diplomacy would be +competent to force concessions from those Powers without driving +them together. Guided by Emperor William II, Count Bülow, and Herr +von Holstein, the policy of the “free hand” seemed almost +foredoomed to failure.</p> + +<p>In 1898 the Emperor was thirty-nine years of age, but experience +had taught him very little caution, moderation, or political +understanding. He remained the spoiled sovereign of a spoiled +country; each had risen to power so rapidly as to be unable to take +this position for granted and not to demand explicit recognition of +it, and as to be inclined consequently to abuse its power. The +Emperor’s belief in and practice of his divine right to rule were +not tempered by any consistent application to his task. While not +devoid of political intuition, he lacked most of the qualities of a +statesman. He was brilliant, but erratic and impulsive. In spite of +his seeming wide knowledge, he was mentally lazy and devoid of +profundity. Of a highly nervous temperament, he was guided chiefly +by his emotions. He appeared rigid, severe, and forbidding on state +occasions, but he loved to relax, to be jocose and sociable. He +could be cordial and wonderfully amiable and charming, like his +mother, and again, when his temper was aroused, he could be +ruthless and crushing. He spoke often and dramatically, and +traveled as much and as widely as he could. He frequently +antagonized and angered people unintentionally by his imperious +obtuseness. Then he would feel aggrieved and abused, for he +expected all the understanding to come from the other side. One +could not take him at his word; one had to interpret his meaning +from his acts and intentions as well. At<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_58">[58]</span> times his words would leave exactly the +opposite meaning from that which he intended. He once remarked to +Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador, that “the noodles seem +to have had a lucid interval,” when upon further conversation it +developed he had intended thereby to express his great satisfaction +with the communication from the British government.<a id= +"FNanchor_179"></a><a href="#Footnote_179" class= +"fnanchor">[179]</a> He loved to set countries at odds by his +intrigues and gossip. His jealousy of Great Britain, her empire, +and her fleet was a cardinal reason both for his being constantly +attracted to England and for his desiring to become her colonial +and naval rival. Nevertheless, after twelve years of personal +contact with the Emperor, Sir Frank Lascelles came to the following +sane conclusion about him:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>In spite of his habit of twirling his moustache and rattling his +sabre (I trust that this sentence may be taken in its metaphorical +and not in its literal sense, for, as a matter of fact, I have +never either seen him twirl his moustache or heard him rattle his +sword), which he may think a befitting attitude for the ruler of a +mighty Empire, he is really animated by the most pacific +sentiments, and . . . . his great ambition now is that his name +should be handed down to posterity as that of the German Emperor +who kept the peace. It would seem that this is the estimate which +the Emperor has formed of his own character, as in a recent +conversation with Prince Radolin<a id="FNanchor_180"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_180" class="fnanchor">[180]</a> he said he was at a loss +to understand how, with his well-known peaceful intentions, he had +come to be looked upon as a disturbing element—an instance, +perhaps, of that “inconscience” which M. Herbette<a id= +"FNanchor_181"></a><a href="#Footnote_181" class= +"fnanchor">[181]</a> considered a characteristic of the German +nation, and concluded with the almost pathetic sentence, “Ich bin +doch kein böser Mensch” [I am really not a bad person].<a id= +"FNanchor_182"></a><a href="#Footnote_182" class= +"fnanchor">[182]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The Emperor’s deficiences were in part made up by Count Bülow, +who had been chosen secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1897 +to execute the program of <em>Weltpolitik</em>. Born in 1849 of an +old North German family, he had had diplomatic service<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_59">[59]</span> at St. Petersburg, Vienna, +Athens, Paris, Bucharest, and Rome where he had been ambassador +since 1894. He came to his task at a crucial time in the history of +Germany’s foreign relations, but he lacked the farsightedness, +decision, and firmness of character necessary to deal with the +problems adequately. Although he learned with time, recognized his +mistakes, and tried to readjust the German foreign policy, he was +then unable to do so. While his cosmopolitan culture and knowledge +enabled him to understand other nations better than most Germans +did, he seemed incapable of using this understanding practically. +Under him the German policy appeared to demand something for +nothing, anywhere or everywhere, merely because Germany was so +strong a Power. In 1907 Lord Sanderson, British permanent +undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1894-1906, a sane, +sympathetic witness, stigmatized the German method of handling +foreign affairs as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The Germans are very tight bargainers, they have earned the +nickname of “<em>les Juifs de la diplomatie</em>.” The German +Foreign Office hold to a traditional view of negotiation that one +of the most effective methods of gaining your point is to show how +intensely disagreeable you can make yourself if you do not. They +are surprised that the recollection of these methods should rankle, +and speaking generally the North Germans combine intense +susceptibility as regards themselves with a singular inability to +appreciate the susceptibilities of others.<a id= +"FNanchor_183"></a><a href="#Footnote_183" class= +"fnanchor">[183]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Under Count Bülow, German foreign policy lacked +direction and stability. It aroused the mistrust of the other +Powers, who could not comprehend what Germany wanted. The Count was +abler at extricating himself from difficulties than at avoiding +them. A confirmed optimist at all times, he was suave and +reassuring; the French Ambassador complained that he “was a fluent +speaker but when one came to recall and note down what he had said +very little came out of it.” Sir Frank Lascelles called him a +perfect master at expressing vague generalities.<a id= +"FNanchor_184"></a><a href="#Footnote_184" class= +"fnanchor">[184]</a> Count Bülow no<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_60">[60]</span> doubt had a difficult time keeping the +Emperor within bounds and undoing the latter’s mischief, but he was +by no means an able statesman himself, and he relied for advice +upon a person whom many considered a psychopath.</p> + +<p>Since Prince Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890, Herr von Holstein had +been a dominant influence in the German foreign office as the +preserver of the Bismarckian tradition. Strangely secretive, he +avoided all publicity and all responsible offices, yet he lusted +after power behind the scenes. He was irascible, morbidly +suspicious, both timorous and bold, by nature unfit to handle +foreign affairs. He could not make up his mind to act. He could not +understand the other government’s viewpoint. He knew few of the +foreign representatives in Berlin personally, and rarely consulted +with any of them. He relied for information chiefly upon the +dispatches and upon newspapers, thus lacking the intimate contact +with reality which might have balanced his recluse judgment. His +mobile mind could make two plus two equal three, five, or seven and +a half, but seldom four. His training under Prince Bismarck had +taught him that master’s use of threats and force but not his +caution and comprehensive sagacity. His adroit and intricate +analysis of diplomatic situations and policies made him a power in +the foreign office. The Emperor urged his dismissal, but Count +Bülow clung to him, consulted him on all matters, and generally +followed his advice.<a id="FNanchor_185"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_185" class="fnanchor">[185]</a></p> + +<p>During the next year the German plan worked. On the one hand, +with troubles coming to a head in China, the Sudan, and South +Africa, the British government was grudgingly compelled to play the +German game by agreeing to a division of the Samoan Islands and a +prospective partition of the Portuguese colonies and<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_61">[61]</span> by acknowledging the utility of +similar accords.<a id="FNanchor_186"></a><a href="#Footnote_186" +class="fnanchor">[186]</a> On the other hand, an indirect bid for a +<em>rapprochement</em> by M. Delcassé in December, 1898,<a id= +"FNanchor_187"></a><a href="#Footnote_187" class= +"fnanchor">[187]</a> and a proposal from the Russian government in +1899 for an agreement over Asia Minor<a id= +"FNanchor_188"></a><a href="#Footnote_188" class= +"fnanchor">[188]</a> signified equal success, although the German +government refused both offers. Then when the Boer War began late +in 1899, Great Britain, surprised by the universal outburst of +hatred against her on the Continent and apprehensive of German, +French, and Russian intervention in favor of the Boers, had urgent +need of Germany’s friendship. Hence the pressing invitation to the +Emperor William II and his foreign secretary in the autumn of 1899 +to visit England.<a id="FNanchor_189"></a><a href="#Footnote_189" +class="fnanchor">[189]</a></p> + +<p>As Count Bülow cared nothing about the fate of the Boers, the +visit took place (November 21-24). He and the Emperor were received +enthusiastically by government, court, and people. The British +ministers showed anger at France and Russia and a desire for +co-operation with Germany.<a id="FNanchor_190"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_190" class="fnanchor">[190]</a> Mr. Chamberlain, who +boldly asserted that the two countries “must sooner or later come +to a general understanding because we need each other,” repeated +his wish for a grouping of Germany, the United States, and Great +Britain.</p> + +<p>The German leaders responded as in the previous year +that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[62]</span> more intimate +relations between the two countries should be prepared for by +special agreements. The British Colonial Minister, readily +accepting this program, suggested two subjects for negotiation, the +Bagdad Railway and Morocco; whereupon it was agreed that he should +take up the latter question with the German Ambassador in the very +near future.<a id="FNanchor_191"></a><a href="#Footnote_191" class= +"fnanchor">[191]</a></p> + +<p>The visit to Windsor was apparently a complete success. Both +governments were highly pleased with the results. The only discord +in the harmony was the expression of mutual antagonism on the part +of the English and German press. To counteract this opposition, Mr. +Chamberlain, at Count Bülow’s suggestion,<a id= +"FNanchor_192"></a><a href="#Footnote_192" class= +"fnanchor">[192]</a> openly advocated his project in a speech at +Leicester on November 30 as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The same sentiments which bring us into closer sympathy with the +United States of America may also be evoked to bring us into closer +sympathy and alliance with the Empire of Germany. . . . . If the +union between England and America is a powerful factor in the cause +of peace, a new triple alliance between the Teutonic race and the +two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more +potent influence in the future of the world.<a id= +"FNanchor_193"></a><a href="#Footnote_193" class= +"fnanchor">[193]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The Colonial Secretary’s act had the very reverse effect of that +intended, for the German people rejected with vituperation the idea +of allying with the oppressors of the Boers. The German Foreign +Minister, ambitious for the chancellorship when the aged Prince +Hohenlohe should retire, and inclined to follow the dictates of +public opinion, felt compelled to take cognizance of this feeling. +Speaking before the Reichstag on December 11, he made a cool +rejoinder to Mr. Chamberlain’s proposal. In a chauvinistic +declaration of Germany’s need for colonies and a navy,<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_63">[63]</span> he proclaimed: “As for England +we are gladly willing to live with her in peace and harmony on a +basis of complete reciprocity. But since our international position +is at present a favorable one, we must utilize it in order to +safeguard ourselves for the future.”<a id= +"FNanchor_194"></a><a href="#Footnote_194" class= +"fnanchor">[194]</a></p> + +<p>Mr. Chamberlain was indignant at this reply, even though the +German government made special efforts to explain it away.<a id= +"FNanchor_195"></a><a href="#Footnote_195" class= +"fnanchor">[195]</a> Hence, as the two presses were at each other’s +throats and the governments were wrangling over minor troubles +arising out of the Boer War, he dropped the idea of an alliance, +presumably also that of a Moroccan accord, at least until the close +of the war.<a id="FNanchor_196"></a><a href="#Footnote_196" class= +"fnanchor">[196]</a></p> + +<p>In 1900, with the French advance on Touat, the Moroccan question +became acute. In April the German government for the first time +weighed carefully its ambitions with reference to Morocco and the +means for realizing them.<a id="FNanchor_197"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_197" class="fnanchor">[197]</a> Count Bülow held +that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[64]</span> Germany had +maritime interests of her own in that land, and was no longer +concerned merely for the sake of Italy, as she had been ten years +before. He coveted particularly the southern area on the Atlantic +Coast. A British seizure of Moroccan territory without +consideration for German interests, he stated, “would within +Germany greatly weaken and discredit the Government and in its +foreign relations make any future co-operation with England +impossible and force us to seek connection with Russia and France +at almost any price”; while an Anglo-French settlement of the +question to the exclusion or detriment of Germany “would have +incalculable results for the further course of German internal and +external policy.” In either case German foreign policy would be +forced to take another direction whether the government wished it +or not; and relations with Great Britain would become more strained +than ever before. In fact, the German government “could not +possibly accept either eventuality.”<a id= +"FNanchor_198"></a><a href="#Footnote_198" class= +"fnanchor">[198]</a></p> + +<p>In these words lies the key to the understanding of Germany’s +precipitation of the Moroccan crisis in 1905.</p> + +<p>To obviate those dangers, the German government preferred an +agreement with Great Britain. In May, 1900, it proposed to Mr. +Chamberlain that they negotiate a Moroccan accord. But the Colonial +Minister, while acknowledging that the only peaceful way to solve +the Moroccan problem was by an agreement between Great Britain and +Germany, had become more wary and requested the German government +to make an official proposal which he could submit to the cabinet. +He felt sure, he said, that it would be favorably received, and +promised to support it, provided his well-known desires were given +due consideration.<a id="FNanchor_199"></a><a href="#Footnote_199" +class="fnanchor">[199]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[65]</span>Fearing a +rejection, the German government deemed it inadvisable to follow +Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestion. Nor did Count Bülow warn the British +government that Germany must participate in any Moroccan +settlement, since he believed it possible to prevent the Moroccan +affair from becoming serious until the opportunity for an +Anglo-German agreement arose.<a id="FNanchor_200"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_200" class="fnanchor">[200]</a> He held that an +Anglo-French understanding about Morocco was impossible because of +the conflict of French and British interests over the possession of +the south shore of the straits. To avert a crisis, he issued a +discreet warning to M. Delcassé in May, 1900, not to go beyond +treaty limits in the action against Touat;<a id= +"FNanchor_201"></a><a href="#Footnote_201" class= +"fnanchor">[201]</a> he incited the Russian Foreign Minister, who, +he thought, would be opposed to any Anglo-French agreement or to a +European disturbance over Morocco, to restrain the French +Minister;<a id="FNanchor_202"></a><a href="#Footnote_202" class= +"fnanchor">[202]</a> and he instructed the German representative at +Tangier to retard the collapse of the Sherifian Empire.<a id= +"FNanchor_203"></a><a href="#Footnote_203" class= +"fnanchor">[203]</a> Thereafter the Moroccan question remained in +abeyance for a time.<a id="FNanchor_204"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_204" class="fnanchor">[204]</a></p> + +<p>In November, 1900, Lord Salisbury resigned the secretaryship of +foreign affairs to Lord Lansdowne. Lord Lansdowne had had a varied +life. Of high aristocratic and wealthy family, he had entered +politics as a matter of course and had served as governor-general +of Canada, viceroy of India, and secretary of state for war. He +fitted admirably into his new position as foreign secretary, for he +possessed patience, tact, and the ability to inspire confidence, +and he assumed responsibility with decision and courage. While he +entered office with very few preconceptions,<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_66">[66]</span> he wrote to Sir Frank Lascelles, he did +believe that “we should use every effort to maintain and, if we +can, to strengthen the good relations which at present exist +between the Queen’s Government and that of the Emperor” of +Germany.<a id="FNanchor_205"></a><a href="#Footnote_205" class= +"fnanchor">[205]</a> In his foreign policy he sided with the new +school, already represented by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain. +When King Edward VII gave royal support to this group after his +accession to the throne in January, 1901, the Victorian policy of +“splendid isolation” definitely terminated. However, the old +Marquess of Salisbury remained premier until 1902; and the foreign +policy eventually adopted was a compromise between the old and the +new.</p> + +<p>The international position of Great Britain remained bad. If +anything, it had grown worse since 1899; for the Boer War lingered +on, and France and Russia were endangering important British +interests, the one by her active policy with reference to Morocco, +the other by her use of the Boxer Rebellion to extend her power in +China and by her activity in Persia and Afghanistan.</p> + +<p>In the autumn of 1900, the British government had negotiated an +accord with Germany over China to hold Russia in check.<a id= +"FNanchor_206"></a><a href="#Footnote_206" class= +"fnanchor">[206]</a> In January of the next year Mr. Chamberlain, +after repeating his assertion that Great Britain must ally either +with Germany and the Triple Alliance or with France and Russia, +proposed to Baron Eckardstein, first secretary of the German +embassy in London, that as an introduction to the project for an +alliance the two governments agree over Morocco. The subject could +be taken up with Lord Lansdowne, he said, as soon as Lord +Salisbury, still in feeble health, left for the south.<a id= +"FNanchor_207"></a><a href="#Footnote_207" class= +"fnanchor">[207]</a> Before any negotiations were<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_67">[67]</span> begun, however, far eastern +affairs, as more pressing and vital, brought to the fore the +question of alliance.<a id="FNanchor_208"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_208" class="fnanchor">[208]</a></p> + +<p>Early in 1901, reports were spread of a Russo-Chinese agreement +which would give Russia practically a protectorate in Southern +Manchuria. The problem which thereupon confronted the British +government was illuminatingly summed up by Mr. Bertie, +undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, as follows (March 11, +1901):</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Germany has assured Japan that there is no secret understanding +between Germany and Russia respecting the Far East, and that, in +the event of a crisis, Germany will observe a benevolent +neutrality, the effect of which would be to keep the French fleet +in check.</p> + +<p>The Japanese Government ask whether His Majesty’s Government +have been consulted by Germany, and whether they believe the +assurances given to Japan; and they further ask: “How far may Japan +rely upon the support of Great Britain in case Japan finds it +necessary to approach Russia?”</p> + +<p>It is assumed by the Japanese Minister that “approach” in the +context means “resist,” which is war.</p> + +<p>Unless Japan can make sure of neither Germany nor France taking +an active part on the side of Russia, she will not fight Russia +over the Manchurian Agreement. If the possession of Corea by Russia +were at issue, Japan would fight, with or without support, and +independently of whether France or Germany would remain +neutral.</p> + +<p>If Germany and England, in answer to the Japanese Government’s +inquiries, deprecated war, and said that if unfortunately war broke +out between Japan and Russia, it would be the object of England and +Germany to restrict as much as possible the theatre of it, and they +would consequently remain neutral, so long as no third Power +attempted to take a part in it, then I think that such an assurance +might be sufficient to satisfy Japan that France would not be +allowed to join with Russia, and that Japan might fight Russia +single-handed. . . . .</p> + +<p>If France were allowed to side with Russia, and they crushed +Japan, the result might be a renewal of the triple +understanding—viz., Russia, France, and Germany. Those three Powers +would become supreme in China, and we should go to the wall.</p> + +<p>If Russia alone, or in combination with France, defeated Japan, +and we came to the rescue to prevent the obliteration of Japan, we +should incur the lasting enmity of Russia and France, and a +defeated, and probably ungrateful,<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_68">[68]</span> Japan would not be of much use to us as +against Russian encroachments.</p> + +<p>It has been suggested that if Japan defeated Russia there would +be grave danger to European interests in the Far East.</p> + +<p>A great military and naval Power, with unbounded natural +resources and an immense population such as Russia, is not likely +to accept defeat permanently. She would reorganize for a further +trial of strength, but such a trial might be a long way off, and it +would be greatly retarded by Japan being allowed to take as the +spoils of war the Liaotung Peninsula. Its possession by Japan would +be a guarantee that there would be no reconciliation between Russia +and Japan. This would be an advantage to England and Europe. The +yellow danger would be kept in check by Russia and the Russian +danger by Japan.</p> + +<p>If we do nothing to encourage Japan to look upon us as a friend +and possible ally against Russia and France, we may drive her to a +policy of despair, in which she may come to some sort of terms with +Russia. I do not say that it is probable, but it is possible, and +our interests would greatly suffer if she did.<a id= +"FNanchor_209"></a><a href="#Footnote_209" class= +"fnanchor">[209]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Therein lies the deciding reason why the British government +tried to secure the support of Germany; why it made the alliance +with Japan when this attempt came to naught; and why it +subsequently established the entente with France. An agreement with +Germany, supplemented by one with Japan, would have solved Great +Britain’s difficulty of defending her colonial interests by +assuring the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. Failing +this, an alliance with Japan and a policy of reconciliation and +entente with the other Powers furnished the best solution. But in +any case either alliance or close friendship with a European Power +was essential.</p> + +<p>At the time the prospect of obtaining German aid looked +favorable. The German Emperor had rushed impetuously to the bedside +of the dying Queen Victoria late in January, 1901, and had remained +for her funeral. In his talk with the British officials he had +denounced Russia for her aggressions in China, had informed them +that Great Britain needed an alliance, and, in a dinner speech at +Marlborough House on February 5, had declared:<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_69">[69]</span> “We ought to form an Anglo-German +alliance, you to keep the seas while we would be responsible for +the land.”<a id="FNanchor_210"></a><a href="#Footnote_210" class= +"fnanchor">[210]</a></p> + +<p>Late in January the British government tried to obtain German +aid against the Russian aggressions in Manchuria by calling into +action the Anglo-German agreement of the previous year; but the +German government refused to permit an interpretation of that +accord which would embroil it with its eastern neighbor.<a id= +"FNanchor_211"></a><a href="#Footnote_211" class= +"fnanchor">[211]</a> Instead, it tried to persuade the British +government to connive at embroiling Russia and Japan in war without +binding themselves.<a id="FNanchor_212"></a><a href="#Footnote_212" +class="fnanchor">[212]</a> It assured Japan of the localization of +that conflict by remarking that Germany would remain neutral and +would thereby hold France neutral. In March, Lord Lansdowne, +following up this assertion, asked Baron Eckardstein if Germany +would undertake to hold France neutral in case of war (March 16). +In violation of strict orders from Herr von Holstein “not to +breathe a word of alliance” to the British government,<a id= +"FNanchor_213"></a><a href="#Footnote_213" class= +"fnanchor">[213]</a> Baron Eckardstein replied that “if there were +a defensive alliance between Germany and Great Britain covering all +eventualities,” Germany would be able to do so.<a id= +"FNanchor_214"></a><a href="#Footnote_214" class= +"fnanchor">[214]</a> Two days later Lord Lansdowne declared to the +Baron that “England now stands at a turning point and must decide +upon her future policy”; and in accordance with the Baron’s strong +hint, a defensive alliance was tentatively set forth for +consideration. By its terms each Power should preserve neutrality +in case of an attack upon the other by either France or<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_70">[70]</span> Russia but should come to its +aid in case of an attack by those two Powers combined.<a id= +"FNanchor_215"></a><a href="#Footnote_215" class= +"fnanchor">[215]</a></p> + +<p>Baron Eckardstein reported the proposal as coming from the +British Minister, and his government looked upon it as a British +offer. Lord Lansdowne made the Baron responsible for the +initiative. With the existing evidence, the contradiction cannot be +cleared up; yet as each government was under the impression that +the other had taken the first step and was therefore more eager for +the alliance than was really the case, the negotiations endured +longer than they might otherwise have done.<a id= +"FNanchor_216"></a><a href="#Footnote_216" class= +"fnanchor">[216]</a></p> + +<p>In the next two and a half months the course of the negotiations +was checkered. On March 22, Baron Eckardstein unofficially brought +up the subject with Lord Lansdowne. During their discussion they +agreed that it would be best for the <em>casus foederis</em> to +arise when one of the Powers was attacked by two or more Powers, +and that the accord should be ratified by the two parliaments. The +British Secretary declared that the Premier approved “in principle +of a strictly defined defensive alliance.”<a id= +"FNanchor_217"></a><a href="#Footnote_217" class= +"fnanchor">[217]</a> On March 29 they again touched on the matter; +but owing to Lord Lansdowne’s<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_71">[71]</span> inability to consult his chief, who was ill, +and owing to a flare-up between the two governments over a minor +matter connected with the Chinese customs, Baron Eckardstein +postponed the negotiations.<a id="FNanchor_218"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_218" class="fnanchor">[218]</a> On April 9 he was ready +to resume the discussion; and for the first time he mentioned to +the British Minister the indispensable stipulation of his +government, that Austria-Hungary and Italy must also be included in +the alliance.<a id="FNanchor_219"></a><a href="#Footnote_219" +class="fnanchor">[219]</a></p> + +<p>From the start the attitude of the German government toward +these proposals was mistrustful. Since the British government had +been disinclined to execute the Anglo-German accord of 1898 for a +future division of the Portuguese Colonies, the German government +was reluctant to consider even Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestion for an +accord over Morocco, at least until events permitted its immediate +execution.<a id="FNanchor_220"></a><a href="#Footnote_220" class= +"fnanchor">[220]</a> Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein refused to +believe that the British government would make an alliance so long +as Lord Salisbury remained in authority. Moreover, they feared that +if the negotiations failed and became known to France and Russia, +owing to British perfidy or to Parliament’s rejecting the +treaty—and either outcome seemed likely to them—Germany would be +the one to suffer from the wrath of those two Powers while Great +Britain, protected by the sea, would enjoy greater international +security than before.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I am especially mistrustful of this present storm of friendship +by Chamberlain and comrades [wrote Herr von Holstein to Count +Metternich] because the threatened understanding with Russia and +France is such complete fraud. A retreat by England would postpone +her struggle for existence for a few years, but would then make it +all the more certain, because the opponents [France and Russia] +will have been strengthened, while the English will have been +weakened in power and prestige. A reasonable agreement with +England, that is, one in which a proper consideration is given to +the almost certain danger of war to which we should thereby expose +ourselves, can in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[72]</span> my +opinion first be achieved when the appreciation of her constrained +position has become more general in England than it is at +present.<a id="FNanchor_221"></a><a href="#Footnote_221" class= +"fnanchor">[221]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Count Bülow, chancellor since the previous October, +held the same view. In fact, he was even more inclined to preserve +the policy of the “free hand.” “Facts, sir, facts,” he wrote in +connection with this question of alliance, and above all he wanted +facts in the form of colonial acquisitions in Africa.<a id= +"FNanchor_222"></a><a href="#Footnote_222" class= +"fnanchor">[222]</a> So while sensible of the power of such an +alliance, these two would have it only on German terms, an alliance +between the British Empire, on the one hand, and the Triple +Alliance, on the other; or, as an alternative formulation, an +alliance by which Great Britain joined the Triple Alliance.<a id= +"FNanchor_223"></a><a href="#Footnote_223" class= +"fnanchor">[223]</a> To obviate all possibility of betrayal, they +instructed Baron Eckardstein to demand of Lord Lansdowne the +acceptance of this basic condition before continuing the +negotiations. Not until then, they declared, should the terms of +the Triple Alliance be imparted to the British government.<a id= +"FNanchor_224"></a><a href="#Footnote_224" class= +"fnanchor">[224]</a></p> + +<p>Conversations were resumed in the second half of May. When, on +May 23, Count Hatzfeldt made clear to Lord Lansdowne the provision +of his government, an <em>impasse</em> was soon reached. The +British Foreign Secretary approved the project of alliance in +principle, but he had never expected much to come of it. Upon +ascertaining the German condition he foresaw a breakdown when the +time came to formulate the terms.<a id="FNanchor_225"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_225" class="fnanchor">[225]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[73]</span>Moreover, Lord +Salisbury persistently refused to admit that Great Britain needed +an alliance. He asserted that it would be a bad bargain to join the +Triple Alliance, for the “liability of having to defend the German +and the Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier than that of +having to defend the British Isles against France.” He opposed any +secret agreement on the grounds that Parliament had the right to +decide questions of war and peace; and he continued to favor +isolation and dependence on public opinion to determine +governmental policy in a crisis. Nor did he believe that German +public opinion, so hostile to Great Britain, would accept an +Anglo-German defensive alliance.<a id="FNanchor_226"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_226" class="fnanchor">[226]</a> Thus while some of the +members of the cabinet discussed the possible terms of an alliance, +and Sir Thomas Sanderson, permanent undersecretary of state for +foreign affairs, even drew up two trial drafts of a treaty, the +opposition of Lord Salisbury together with the German refusal to +communicate the terms of the Triple Alliance forced the +negotiations to a halt in June.<a id="FNanchor_227"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_227" class="fnanchor">[227]</a></p> + +<p>The German Chancellor readily accepted this turn of affairs. +After expressing a desire for a future alliance, he assured the +British government that Germany would continue the policy of the +“free hand.”<a id="FNanchor_228"></a><a href="#Footnote_228" class= +"fnanchor">[228]</a></p> + +<p>The visit of the Moroccan embassy to London and Berlin in June +and July afforded an opportunity to revive the Moroccan question. +Lord Lansdowne’s uneasiness about the French actions with reference +to Morocco was not allayed by the French Ambassador’s<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_74">[74]</span> assertion to him on July 3 that +France had no intention of raising that problem.<a id= +"FNanchor_229"></a><a href="#Footnote_229" class= +"fnanchor">[229]</a> But nothing was done.<a id= +"FNanchor_230"></a><a href="#Footnote_230" class= +"fnanchor">[230]</a></p> + +<p>When el-Menebhi, the leader of that embassy, was dismissed in +disgrace on his return home, the British Foreign Secretary +expressed the wish to remain in constant touch with the German +government on the Moroccan question.<a id= +"FNanchor_231"></a><a href="#Footnote_231" class= +"fnanchor">[231]</a> Each Power, however, acted separately in +defending the Moroccan Minister; and the German government looked +on this as another occasion in which Great Britain was trying to +employ Germany to defend British interests. The German leaders +likewise thought that by refusing to make any separate agreements +with Great Britain they would eventually force the latter to accept +their terms for an alliance.<a id="FNanchor_232"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_232" class="fnanchor">[232]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[75]</span>As soon as the +negotiations with Germany showed no prospect of success, the +British government followed up Japan’s offer of an alliance and in +August began official conversations on that subject.<a id= +"FNanchor_233"></a><a href="#Footnote_233" class= +"fnanchor">[233]</a> None the less it continued its efforts to make +some kind of agreement with Germany. But on August 23, at +Wilhelmshöhe, a meeting between Emperor William II and King Edward +VII, which the British leaders hoped would pave the way for an +understanding, had no result.<a id="FNanchor_234"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_234" class="fnanchor">[234]</a> In November, Lord +Lansdowne regarded the difficulties in the way of an alliance as +“at the present moment virtually insuperable,” enumerating some of +them as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>1. The impossibility of arriving at a definition of the +<em>casus foederis</em> which would not be either so rigid as to +greatly hamper our freedom of action or so vague as to deprive the +alliance of all practical value.</p> + +<p>2. The certainty of alienating France and Russia.</p> + +<p>3. Complications with the Colonies, which might not at all +approve of the idea of hanging on to the skirts of the Triple +Alliance.</p> + +<p>4. The risk of entangling ourselves in a policy which might be +hostile to America. Without knowledge of the German Emperor’s views +in regard to the United States, this is to my mind a formidable +obstacle.</p> + +<p>5. The difficulty of carrying Parliament with us at a moment +when the Parliamentary situation is as little satisfactory as it is +at present.<a id="FNanchor_235"></a><a href="#Footnote_235" class= +"fnanchor">[235]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[76]</span>But, +he wrote, “the argument that, because we have in the past survived +in spite of our isolation, we need have no misgivings as to the +effect of that isolation in the future,” could be pushed too far. +Besides, since negotiations then in progress for an alliance with +Japan virtually signified that Great Britain did not wish to remain +alone, he proposed that the government seek “a much more limited +understanding with Germany as to our policy in regard to certain +matters of interest to both Powers”—for instance, they might agree +to co-operate for the preservation of the territorial <em>status +quo</em> on the shores of the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the +Aegean, and the Black Seas, for the maintenance of the “freedom for +the commerce and navigation . . . . in the Persian Gulf, and the +prevention of any territorial acquisitions on its shores by other +Powers which might interfere with that object.” But only “whenever +the occasion for it might arise” should the nature of their +co-operation be determined.<a id="FNanchor_236"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_236" class="fnanchor">[236]</a></p> + +<p>The Premier remained vigorously opposed to the project; but Lord +Lansdowne urged that the German government probably expected him to +reopen the negotiations, and that if he made this offer, that +government would be deprived of any grounds for complaining that +Great Britain “had treated it inconsiderately or brusquely rejected +its overture.” As he also suspected that “the German Gov’t. (or the +German Emperor) desire something much more precise and far-reaching +. . . . and that they would refuse an overture on the above lines,” +he maintained that the proposal could cause no damage.<a id= +"FNanchor_237"></a><a href="#Footnote_237" class= +"fnanchor">[237]</a></p> + +<p>On December 19 the British Foreign Minister recalled to Count +Metternich, the new German ambassador at London, the negotiations +for an alliance and stated that “while . . . . we<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_77">[77]</span> certainly did not regard the +German proposal with an unfriendly or indifferent eye, I did not +think that for the moment we could afford to take it up.” Instead +he suggested that the two governments arrive at “an understanding +with regard to the policy which they might pursue in reference to +particular questions or in particular parts of the world in which +they are alike interested.” Count Metternich expressed surprise +that the British government had not “jumped at” this “magnificent +opportunity” to end its isolation, and replied that he did not +expect his government to favor this restricted proposal. “It was a +case of the whole or none.”<a id="FNanchor_238"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_238" class="fnanchor">[238]</a></p> + +<p>There the matter rested. Lord Lansdowne and King Edward were +both dissatisfied with Count Metternich’s critical tone;<a id= +"FNanchor_239"></a><a href="#Footnote_239" class= +"fnanchor">[239]</a> but they continued to voice their solicitude, +which the German Emperor and Count Bülow reciprocated, that the two +governments keep in close touch.<a id="FNanchor_240"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_240" class="fnanchor">[240]</a> However, public opinion +in both countries remained bitterly hostile, and when in October, +1901, Mr. Chamberlain spoke disparagingly of the actions of the +German army in the war of 1870-71, the protest of the German press +was so vehement that the Chancellor, on January 8, 1902, declared +in the Reichstag, “let the man go and do not become excited. He +bites on granite.”<a id="FNanchor_241"></a><a href="#Footnote_241" +class="fnanchor">[241]</a> The pleasant visit of the Prince of +Wales to Germany a short time later did not offset the discord +resulting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[78]</span> from this +war of words.<a id="FNanchor_242"></a><a href="#Footnote_242" +class="fnanchor">[242]</a> By March, Count Metternich wrote that he +“wouldn’t give two pence for Anglo-German relations”; while the +Chancellor admitted that so far as Great Britain was concerned the +Emperor was Germany’s “best card.”<a id="FNanchor_243"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_243" class="fnanchor">[243]</a> It was a dismal fiasco +for so momentous a negotiation.</p> + +<p>The British government thought that by considering an alliance +the German leaders had manifested friendly feeling. Lord Lansdowne +did not believe that the animosity of Germany toward Great Britain +would last forever or that Germany would “let us ‘go under’ before +a great European coalition.” “Is it not more likely,” he wrote, +April 22, 1902, to Sir Frank Lascelles, “that she will stick to her +rôle of the honest broker, taking advantage, if you like, of our +difficulties in order to pursue a <em>politique de pourboire</em> +at our expense, but without pooling her ironclads with those of +France and Russia?” The Ambassador agreed with him; but after +talking to the British naval attaché in Berlin he pointed out for +the first time that the German navy was definitely aimed at Great +Britain.<a id="FNanchor_244"></a><a href="#Footnote_244" class= +"fnanchor">[244]</a> The future for Anglo-German relations was +therefore none too bright for the British government, and British +public opinion cordially approved when on January 30, 1902, the +Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded.</p> + +<p>The German government was not at all alarmed by this failure. +Its relations with France and Russia were of the best. As a result +of the Anglo-German intimacy in 1901, M. Delcassé had twice +endeavored to approach Germany, while in September, during a +meeting at Danzig of the Russian and German rulers together with +their foreign ministers, the Russian Minister had asserted that “an +alliance between Germany and Russia would be the greatest blessing +and is a goal to be striven for.” The overtures were +disregarded.<a id="FNanchor_245"></a><a href="#Footnote_245" class= +"fnanchor">[245]</a> When the Anglo-Japanese Alliance +was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[79]</span> concluded in +February, 1902, the Russian government urged Germany to enter a +Continental combination against those Powers; but Count Bülow, +pleased to see obviated the possibility of an Anglo-Russian +understanding, bluntly rejected the proposal.<a id= +"FNanchor_246"></a><a href="#Footnote_246" class= +"fnanchor">[246]</a> Nor did he believe that, since Russia and +Great Britain were so decisively at odds, France would dare make an +accord with the latter.<a id="FNanchor_247"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_247" class="fnanchor">[247]</a> And Herr von Holstein +wrote on December 31, 1901, that “at the present day Germany with +her enormous strength on land and sea is a factor which no Power +that wishes to perform an important act dare leave in its rear +without having previously come to an understanding with her.”<a id= +"FNanchor_248"></a><a href="#Footnote_248" class= +"fnanchor">[248]</a></p> + +<p>Thus, the German apostles of <em>Weltpolitik</em> guiding the +destinies of an acquisitive and chauvinistic nation, refused to +co-operate with Great Britain, France, or Russia. Apparently they +did not know what they wanted or how they might utilize their +favorable situation; for they derived no benefits whatever from any +of the opportunities offered. An Anglo-German agreement would have +prevented the formation of the Entente Cordiale and would very +likely have brought about a settlement of the Moroccan question to +Germany’s advantage. By cultivating France and encouraging her to +draw closer, Germany might have come to some agreement with that +Power through which she could have prevented the later Entente +Cordiale from becoming so cordial, and through which she might have +shared in the general improvement of relations between the Powers +and in the settlement of the Moroccan question. The whole Moroccan +crisis and many others to follow might thereby have been avoided. +In a world of shifting friendships, of swiftly changing policies, a +world demanding resolute and judicious statesmanship, the German +Chancellor and Herr von Holstein refused to take risks.<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_80">[80]</span> Toward the British government +they had showed themselves too sensitive, suspicious, and +peremptory in their demands.<a id="FNanchor_249"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_249" class="fnanchor">[249]</a> The French and Russian +governments they had rebuffed even more brusquely. Deluded by wrong +preconceptions of international politics and overprudent in their +negotiations, they believed themselves entirely safe in playing +their favorite rôle of sphinx and of aligning with no one.<a id= +"FNanchor_250"></a><a href="#Footnote_250" class= +"fnanchor">[250]</a> Their naval program alarmed Great Britain; +their construction of the Bagdad Railway antagonized Russia; their +Moroccan policy exasperated France. They played against all three +Powers, and still did not expect them to draw together against a +common opponent. Instead of alliances or ententes, they reaped +animosities. By their refusals and their clumsy diplomacy, they +paved the road for the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian ententes. +And when, a few years later, those Powers came to agreement, the +German leaders feared that their country was being encircled and +isolated.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc05"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_161"><span class= +"label">[161]</span></a>Memo. by Bertie, March 14, 1898, +<em>B.D.</em>, I, 17 f., No. 24; memo. by Tilley, on relations +between Russia and Great Britain, 1892-1904, Jan. 14, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 1 ff., No. 1; O’Conor to Salisbury, March 15, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 20, No. 29; Salisbury to O’Conor, March 24, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 24 f., No. 38; Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 26, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 146, No. 172; Monson to Salisbury, March 6, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 147, No. 173; Monson to Salisbury, May 19, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 154, No. 179; memo. by Bertie, June 30, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 54, No. 72; Erich Brandenburg, <em>Von Bismarck zum +Weltkriege</em> (Berlin, 1924), chaps. iv, v; Sir A. W. Ward and G. +P. Gooch (eds.), <em>The Cambridge History of British Foreign +Policy, 1783-1919</em> (Cambridge, 1923), Vol. III, chaps. iii, iv, +<em>passim</em>; <em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XIV, chap. xci. The British +were especially concerned over maintaining the open door in China. +See Alfred L. P. Dennis, <em>Adventures in American Diplomacy, +1896-1906</em> (New York, 1928), pp. 179, 182 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_162"><span class= +"label">[162]</span></a>For expressions of this fear see Gwynn, +<em>The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice</em>, I, +182 f., 225 f., 331 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_163"><span class= +"label">[163]</span></a>Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIV, 221 ff., No. 3793; dispatches from Hatzfeldt +recounting conversations with Salisbury, May 12, 15, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 230 ff., and notes; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 15, +1898, <em>ibid.</em>, 233 ff., No. 3797. The best exposition of +Salisbury’s views is given in a memorandum by him, May 29, 1901, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 68 f., No. 86. See also J. A. Spender, <em>The +Public Life</em> (New York, 1925), I, 79; Salisbury to Lansdowne, +April 21, 1897, Newton, <em>Lord Lansdowne, A Biography</em>, pp. +145 f. On Aug. 30, 1899, Salisbury wrote to Lansdowne that the +British army would not be needed for a Continental war “in a blue +moon” (<em>ibid.</em>, p. 157).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_164"><span class= +"label">[164]</span></a>Salisbury to O’Conor, Jan. 17, 25, 1898, +<em>B.D.</em>, I, 5, No. 5; 8, No. 9; and others in <em>ibid.</em>, +chap. i.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_165"><span class= +"label">[165]</span></a>Dennis, pp. 170 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_166"><span class= +"label">[166]</span></a>Salisbury was prime minister from 1895 to +1902.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_167"><span class= +"label">[167]</span></a>On Chamberlain see Spender, I, 79.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_168"><span class= +"label">[168]</span></a>Hatzfeldt, German ambassador to London, +also thought that the Liberal leaders, Lord Rosebery and Sir +William Harcourt, approved of Chamberlain’s plan. Hatzfeldt to +Hohenlohe, April 7, 1898, <em>G.P.</em>, XIV, 209 ff., No. 3788. +See also Gwynn, I, 188, 191.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_169"><span class= +"label">[169]</span></a>Lieut. Col. Grierson, British military +attaché at Berlin, reported to the British Ambassador a +conversation with the Emperor on Jan. 15, 1898, as follows: “He +[the Emperor] said that for eight years he had striven to be +friendly with Great Britain to gain her alliance, and to work hand +in hand with her, but had failed” (Grierson to Lascelles, Jan. 19, +1898, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 42, No. 62). The Emperor said the same to +Lascelles on Feb. 1. See Lascelles to Salisbury, Feb. 1, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 43 f., No. 63; memo. by Tilley on the relations +between Germany and Great Britain (1892-1904), Jan. 5, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, Appendix, 322 ff.; Brandenburg, chaps. i-iv.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_170"><span class= +"label">[170]</span></a>Russia had just occupied Port Arthur. In +speaking to the Russian Ambassador about that act on March 24, +Balfour declared that the British government regarded it with +“grave objection,” as a “menace” to the friendship of the two +countries. See Salisbury to O’Conor, March 24, 1898, <em>B.D.</em>, +I, 24 f., No. 38.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_171"><span class= +"label">[171]</span></a>Monson to Salisbury, March 6, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 147, No. 173. Salisbury tried to obtain the support +of the United States on Chinese affairs (Dennis, p. 170).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_172"><span class= +"label">[172]</span></a>It was on March 24 that Hatzfeldt reported +that Alfred Rothschild had arranged a meeting between him and +Chamberlain and Balfour. See Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 24, 1898, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIV, 193 f., No. 3779. For reports of the +conversations between Hatzfeldt and Balfour and Chamberlain see the +following dispatches: Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 25, 29, April 1, +1898, <em>ibid.</em>, 195 ff., Nos. 3781, 3782, 3784; Hatzfeldt to +Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, <em>ibid.</em>, 221 ff., No. 3793. The +editors of the <em>British Documents</em> could find “practically +no evidence” concerning this proposal in the archives of the +British foreign office, and have stated that Chamberlain apparently +treated the affair as private (<em>B.D.</em>, Vol. I, Foreword). +See also the dispatch from Lascelles to Balfour, Aug. 23, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 101, No. 122. That Chamberlain was uncertain about +the sort of agreement he wished was evident from the different +formulations of the proposal which he made. As to the American +aspect of his plan, Chamberlain was influenced by Ambassador John +Hay, who supported the idea of an Anglo-American alliance. On May +13, 1898, at Birmingham the British Minister spoke publicly in +favor of that alliance (Dennis, pp. 117 f., 122). Nothing of course +came of the matter. The great affinity for the United States on the +part of the British government was shown in July, 1898, by its +indirect warning to Germany not to interfere in the +Spanish-American War (Gwynn, I, 251, 253). On the Anglo-German +negotiations for an alliance see Friedrich Meinecke, <em>Geschichte +des deutsch-englischen Bündnisproblems, 1890-1901</em> (München and +Berlin, 1927); Eugen Fischer, <em>Holsteins Grosses Nein</em> +(Berlin, 1925).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_173"><span class= +"label">[173]</span></a>Holstein thought that the possibility for +this alliance would first enter “when (1) Russia threatens us; (2) +England acts less haughty than today.” See Holstein’s minute to a +dispatch from Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIV, 223, No. 3793. On the German reaction see also +the dispatch from Bülow to Hatzfeldt, April 3, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 204 ff., No. 3785, and the following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_174"><span class= +"label">[174]</span></a>William II to F. O., April 10, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 217 f., No. 3790.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_175"><span class= +"label">[175]</span></a>Bülow to Hatzfeldt, April 3, 24, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 207, No. 3785; 218 ff., No. 3792.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_176"><span class= +"label">[176]</span></a>In January, 1896, the Emperor had sent the +famous telegram to President Krueger of the Transvaal which was +regarded by the British as showing a desire to take the Boers under +Germany’s wing. On Dec. 6, 1897, Bülow in his first speech before +the Reichstag as secretary of state for foreign affairs declared: +“The days are past when the German left to one neighbor the earth, +to another the sea, and reserved for himself the air. . . . . We do +not wish to place anyone in the shadow, but we demand also our +place in the sun” (Bülow, <em>Reden</em>, I, 7 f.). In 1898 the +first important navy bill was passed by the Reichstag. On September +23, 1898, the Emperor declared, “Our future lies on the sea” (G. P. +Gooch, <em>History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919</em> [New York, +1923], pp. 225 ff.). These were merely a few examples of Germany’s +changed interests.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_177"><span class= +"label">[177]</span></a>William II to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 28, No. 4987.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_178"><span class= +"label">[178]</span></a>Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, +<em>ibid.</em>, 224, No. 3793.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_179"><span class= +"label">[179]</span></a>The occasion for this remark was the +conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance early in 1902 (Lascelles +to Lansdowne, Feb. 8, 1902, Newton, p. 247).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_180"><span class= +"label">[180]</span></a>German ambassador at Paris at the time.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_181"><span class= +"label">[181]</span></a>Formerly French ambassador at Berlin.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_182"><span class= +"label">[182]</span></a>Extract from “General Report on Germany for +1906, May 24, 1907,” <em>B.D.</em>, III, 437 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_183"><span class= +"label">[183]</span></a>Memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, +<em>ibid.</em>, p. 429.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_184"><span class= +"label">[184]</span></a>Whitehead to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 108 f., No. 135; extract from “General Report on +Germany for 1906,” <em>ibid.</em>, p. 435.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_185"><span class= +"label">[185]</span></a>Emil Ludwig, <em>Wilhelm der Zweite</em> +(Berlin, 1926); G. P. Gooch, “Baron von Holstein,” <em>Cambridge +Historical Journal</em>, Vol. I; Johannes Haller, <em>Die Ära +Bülow; eine historisch-politische Studie</em> (Stuttgart and +Berlin, 1922); Otto Hammann, <em>Bilder aus der letzten +Kaiserzeit</em> (Berlin, 1922); extract from “General Report on +Germany for 1906,” <em>op. cit.</em>, III, 434 ff.; Wilhelm +Spickernagel, <em>Fürst Bülow</em> (Hamburg, 1921); André Tardieu, +<em>Le Prince de Bülow</em> (Paris, 1909).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_186"><span class= +"label">[186]</span></a><em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XIV, chaps. xcii, xcvi; +<em>B.D.</em>, Vol. I, chaps. ii, iii.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_187"><span class= +"label">[187]</span></a>Memo. by Huhn, Dec. 5, 1898, <em>G.P.</em>, +XIII, 247 ff., No. 3558. See above.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_188"><span class= +"label">[188]</span></a>Memo. by Bülow, April 18, 1899, +<em>ibid.</em>, XIV, 540 f., No. 4017, and the following documents. +According to a memorandum by Bülow on May 5, 1899, Count +Osten-Sacken, the Russian ambassador, attempted “in every way” to +convince him that Germany “should hold in all questions to Russia +and France and take position against England.” “England is strong +only because Germany and France do not co-operate,” said the +Ambassador (<em>ibid.</em>, 546 ff., No. 4020).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_189"><span class= +"label">[189]</span></a>Hatzfeldt to F. O., Sept. 30, 1899, +<em>ibid.</em>, XV, 397, No. 4386; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 25, 1899, +<em>ibid.</em>, 396 f., No. 4385; Monson to Salisbury, Aug. 14, +1899, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 213, No. 259; Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 1, +1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 233, No. 285; and other documents in +<em>ibid.</em>, chap. vii.; Dennis, pp. 125 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_190"><span class= +"label">[190]</span></a>Salisbury was absent on account of the +death of his wife, but the officials in the British foreign office +assured Hatzfeldt that the premier was not at all prejudiced +against Germany, as the latter supposed. See Hatzfeldt to +Hohenlohe, Dec. 2, 1899, <em>G.P.</em>, XV, 423, No. 4401; cf. +Gwynn, I, 351.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_191"><span class= +"label">[191]</span></a>On this visit see Lee, <em>King Edward +VII</em>, I, 747; Eckardstein, <em>Lebenserinnerungen und +politische Denkwürdigkeiten</em>, Vol. II, chaps. iv, v; memo. by +Bülow, Nov. 24, 1899, <em>G.P.</em>, XV, 413 f., No. 4398; +Eckardstein to Hatzfeldt, Nov. 30, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 421 f., +No. 4400; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Dec. 2, 1899, <em>ibid.</em>, 422 +ff., No. 4401.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_192"><span class= +"label">[192]</span></a>Eckardstein, II, 107.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_193"><span class= +"label">[193]</span></a><em>Annual Register</em> (1899), p. 227. +Salisbury agreed to this act, but warned Chamberlain that Germany +would very probably disappoint him (Spring Rice to Miss Lascelles, +April 17, 1902, Gwynn, I, 351).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_194"><span class= +"label">[194]</span></a>Bülow, I, 88 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_195"><span class= +"label">[195]</span></a>Eckardstein, II, 126 ff., 133 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_196"><span class= +"label">[196]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, p. 125.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_197"><span class= +"label">[197]</span></a>On several previous occasions Morocco had +been the topic of conversation between British and German +officials. In January, 1897, not to go back any farther, Lord +Salisbury had sounded the German government on that question, but +the latter had not been interested (<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, No. 4979 +n.). But when the subject was brought up in a conversation between +the Premier and Hatzfeldt in February and again in June, 1899, the +German policy, now launched on its career of <em>Weltpolitik</em>, +was different. Salisbury stated that in case of the break-up of the +Sherifian Empire, “Great Britain could not with indifference see +the Atlantic seaboard pass under any other dominion.” Hatzfeldt +replied that in his personal opinion his government would approve a +British acquisition of territory in that land only in case Germany +received her share; and he added that it would be very desirable to +exchange views and ideas on the subject whenever action should +become pressing. Salisbury, however, expressed the wish for the +<em>status quo</em> to be indefinitely maintained, and refused to +enter into details. See Hatzfeldt to Bülow, Feb. 8, 1899, +<em>ibid.</em>, 295 f., No. 5152; Salisbury to Lascelles, June 7, +1899, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 256 f., No. 307.</p> + +<p>A short time before the visit to Windsor in Nov., 1899, +Chamberlain suggested to Eckardstein that the two governments make +a secret agreement over Morocco by which the Mediterranean coast +should be left free for Great Britain while Germany should receive +far-reaching concessions on the Atlantic seaboard. See Hatzfeldt to +F. O., <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 297, No. 5153. Eckardstein also states +that in Jan., 1901, Chamberlain and Devonshire both told him that +in 1899 Salisbury had approved the idea of a solution of the +Moroccan problem with Germany (Eckardstein, II, 359).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_198"><span class= +"label">[198]</span></a>These remarks by Bülow were chiefly +contained in his minutes to the dispatches from Hatzfeldt. See +Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 299 ff., No. +5156; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 1, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 303 ff., +No. 5159; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 309 +ff., No. 5162; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 29, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, +313 f., No. 5165; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, June 1, 1900, +<em>ibid.</em>, 314 ff., No. 5166.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_199"><span class= +"label">[199]</span></a>Bülow’s plan was also to associate Italy +later in the Moroccan settlement. See Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 14, +1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 302 f., No. 5158; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May +21, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 303 ff., No. 5159; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, +May 23, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 308 f., Nos. 5160 f.; Hatzfeldt to F. +O., May 27, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 309 ff., No. 5162.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_200"><span class= +"label">[200]</span></a>Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 21, 1900, +<em>ibid.</em>, 303 ff., No. 5159; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 23, +1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 308, No. 5160; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, +1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 309 ff., No. 5162; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May +28, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 311 f., No. 5163; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May +29, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 312 f., No. 5164; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, +June 1, 1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 314 ff., No. 5166.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_201"><span class= +"label">[201]</span></a>Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, +<em>ibid.</em>, 299 f., No. 5156; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, +1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 301 f., No. 5157.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_202"><span class= +"label">[202]</span></a>Bülow to Tschirschky, June 5, 1900, +<em>ibid.</em>, 318 ff., No. 5167; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, June 13, +1900, <em>ibid.</em>, 321 ff., No. 5168.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_203"><span class= +"label">[203]</span></a>Derenthall to Mentzingen, Aug. 2, 1900, +<em>ibid.</em>, 324, No. 5170.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_204"><span class= +"label">[204]</span></a>Bülow to Hatzfeldt, June 30, 1900, +<em>ibid.</em>, 323 ff., No. 5169 and note.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_205"><span class= +"label">[205]</span></a>Newton, pp. 196 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_206"><span class= +"label">[206]</span></a><em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XVI, chap. cv; +<em>B.D.</em>, Vol. II, chap. ix, Part I.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_207"><span class= +"label">[207]</span></a>Eckardstein, II, 235 ff.; Hatzfeldt to F. +O., Jan. 18, 1901, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 14 ff., No. 4979. In the +same month Lansdowne expressed to the German government the desire +to remain in “complete harmony” with it on Chinese affairs. See +Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 4, 1901, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 20 f., No. +25; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 18, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 21 f., +No. 26.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_208"><span class= +"label">[208]</span></a>On those far eastern troubles see +<em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XVI; <em>B.D.</em>, Vol. II, chap. ix.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_209"><span class= +"label">[209]</span></a><em>B.D.</em>, II, 43, No. 54. On +Anglo-Russian relations see also Newton, pp. 215 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_210"><span class= +"label">[210]</span></a>Quoted in Lee, II, 11. This was against +Bülow’s advice (Bülow to William II, Jan. 21, 1901, <em>G.P.</em>, +XVII, 20 f., No. 4983). On the Emperor’s visit see Eckardstein to +F. O., Jan. 29, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 23 f., No. 4986; William II +to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 24 ff., No. 4987; +Lansdowne’s memo., Jan., 1901, Newton, p. 199. The Emperor had been +given an enthusiastic welcome in England. The Harmsworth press had +called him “A Friend in Need” (Newton, p. 198).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_211"><span class= +"label">[211]</span></a>Memo. by Mühlberg, Jan. 28, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVI, 286, No. 4785, and following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_212"><span class= +"label">[212]</span></a>Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18, 1901, +Newton, pp. 199 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_213"><span class= +"label">[213]</span></a>Eckardstein, II, 279.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_214"><span class= +"label">[214]</span></a>He naturally did not report this statement +to Berlin (<em>ibid.</em>, pp. 280 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_215"><span class= +"label">[215]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, pp. 277 ff.; Eckardstein to +F. O., March 19, 1901, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 41 f., No. 4994; +Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18, 1901, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 61, No. +77; Newton, pp. 199 f. As the Ambassador was ill during most of +this time, Eckardstein carried on the negotiations.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_216"><span class= +"label">[216]</span></a>Eckardstein has written in his memoirs that +in his private correspondence with Holstein he took the latter’s +peculiarities into account and used expressions that were adapted +to his “complex mentality.” “For instance, I very often avoided +using the word <em>alliance</em> and spoke of a <em>defensive +arrangement</em>; then I emphasized that the whole affair was yet +in embryo, although in fact the negotiations progressed very +smoothly and were on the point of conclusion, etc. As soon as the +negotiations began to run smoothly and lightly, Holstein became +suspicious, and if the other party were willing to accede to our +wishes, smelled a rat.” The truth seems to be that for this very +reason Eckardstein sent home not less but more favorable reports of +the British desire for an alliance than was really the case, and by +stretching his instructions to the utmost in his ardent desire to +ally the two Powers, may have been responsible for the +contradiction mentioned above (Eckardstein, II, 273).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_217"><span class= +"label">[217]</span></a>Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 23, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 46 ff., No. 4997; Eckardstein, II, 321 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_218"><span class= +"label">[218]</span></a>Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 29, 1901, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 62, No. 79; Eckardstein, II, 326 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_219"><span class= +"label">[219]</span></a>Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 9, 1901, +<em>B.D.</em>, 62 f., No. 80; Eckardstein, II, 335.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_220"><span class= +"label">[220]</span></a>Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Jan. 20, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 17 f., No. 4981.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_221"><span class= +"label">[221]</span></a>Holstein to Metternich, Jan. 21, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 22, No. 4984. Metternich accompanied the Emperor to +England at that time.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_222"><span class= +"label">[222]</span></a>See his minutes to the dispatch from +Holstein to Hatzfeldt, Feb. 11, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 37, No. 4989; +Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Jan. 20, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 17 f., No. 4981; +Bülow to William II, Jan. 21, 1901, 20 f., No. 4983.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_223"><span class= +"label">[223]</span></a>The two formulations were in no way +identical, but the negotiations never proceeded far enough to +permit their being discussed.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_224"><span class= +"label">[224]</span></a>Bülow to Hatzfeldt, March 24, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 49, No. 4998; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 11, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 54 ff., No. 5003; Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, May 18, +1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 60 ff., No. 5007; Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, +May 20, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 64 f., No. 5009; and the following +documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_225"><span class= +"label">[225]</span></a>Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 13, 1901, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 63, No. 81; Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18, +1901, Newton, pp. 199 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_226"><span class= +"label">[226]</span></a>Memo. by Salisbury, May 29, 1901, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 68 f., No. 86.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_227"></a><a href="#FNanchor_227"><span class= +"label">[227]</span></a>Memo. by Sanderson, May 27, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 66 ff., No. 85; Lansdowne to Eckardstein, May 24, +1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 66, No. 84; Lansdowne to Lascelles, May 30, +1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 69 ff., No. 87 and inclosures; Hatzfeldt to +Lansdowne, May 30, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 71, No. 88; Hatzfeldt to +F. O., May 27, 1901, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 68 f., No. 5012; and the +following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_228"></a><a href="#FNanchor_228"><span class= +"label">[228]</span></a>Lascelles to Lansdowne, Aug. 25, 1901, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 73, No. 90; memo. by Holstein, June 14, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 83 ff., No. 5019. Late in October, 1901, +Holstein and Bülow had long talks with Valentine Chirol of the +<em>London Times</em> to a like effect. See memo. by Holstein, Oct. +31, Nov. 1, 1901, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 101 ff., Nos. 5026 f.; Sir +Valentine Chirol, <em>Fifty Years in a Changing World</em> (London, +1927), pp. 288 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_229"></a><a href="#FNanchor_229"><span class= +"label">[229]</span></a>On April 13, 1901, Lansdowne had written to +Lascelles: “Things in Morocco look ugly. Do you hear anything?” See +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 64, No. 81; Lansdowne to Monson, July 3, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 261, No. 318.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_230"></a><a href="#FNanchor_230"><span class= +"label">[230]</span></a>Eckardstein gives the following story:</p> + +<p>Early in July, soon after the arrival of the Moroccan embassy in +London, Sir Arthur Nicolson, British minister in Morocco, told him +that France was intriguing in that land for the establishment of a +protectorate. At Lansdowne’s request he suggested the co-operation +of Great Britain and Germany for the maintenance of the <em>status +quo</em> in Morocco. Then he touched upon the subject of a common +Anglo-German peaceful penetration of that country, which should be +inaugurated by a commercial treaty with the Sultan. Between the two +European states an agreement should be made to determine which +concessions each should receive. He proposed that Germany be given, +among others, the right of supplying all railway and electrical +materials and of installing them, and that all further political, +financial, or economic measures should be carried through by the +two Powers together. Eckardstein states that he sent a long +telegram to Berlin in regard to this conversation, but received no +reply (Eckardstein, II, 357 f.). The editors of <em>G.P.</em>, +however, found no such telegram (<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 333 n.), nor +is there any mention of the proposal in any of the documents +published by them or by the British. Still the offer may have been +made, as will be evident later. Hammann, director of the press +department in the German foreign office at that time, has also +written that on the dismissal of el-Menebhi, the British government +proposed common action to the German government, but that it was +refused (Otto Hammann, <em>Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges. +Erinnerungen aus den Jahren 1897-1906</em> [Berlin, 1918], pp. 139 +f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_231"></a><a href="#FNanchor_231"><span class= +"label">[231]</span></a>Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 338 f., No. 5182.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_232"></a><a href="#FNanchor_232"><span class= +"label">[232]</span></a>Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 8, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 339 f., No. 5183; Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 8, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 341, No. 5184; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 9, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 341 f., No. 5185.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_233"></a><a href="#FNanchor_233"><span class= +"label">[233]</span></a><em>B.D.</em>, Vol. II, chap. x; Newton, +pp. 221 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_234"></a><a href="#FNanchor_234"><span class= +"label">[234]</span></a>On that meeting see Lee, II, 130 f.; +Lascelles to Lansdowne, Aug. 25, 1901, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 259, No. +323; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Aug. 23, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, II, 73, +No. 90; memo. by William II, Aug. 23, 1901, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 94 +ff., No. 5023. For the meeting Lansdowne gave to King Edward a +memorandum on the questions which might be brought up. “With regard +to Morocco,” he wrote, “the policy of the German and British +Governments would appear to be identical. Both desire the +maintenance of the <em>status quo</em>, and both would probably +resent any indignity offered to the Moorish Envoy who lately +visited, and was received with honours at the German and British +Courts” (<em>ibid.</em>, 124, No. 5033). By mistake King Edward +gave a copy of this memorandum to the Emperor, whose government +responded with a similar communication to the British government. +The statement about Morocco was as follows: “In Morocco we follow a +policy of reserve. The Morocco question by itself is not +sufficiently important for us to justify a policy by which Germany +might incur the risk of serious international complications” +(<em>ibid.</em>, 129, No. 5025, Anlage).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_235"></a><a href="#FNanchor_235"><span class= +"label">[235]</span></a>Memo. by Lansdowne (very secret), Nov. 11, +1901, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 78, No. 92. Late in July, Lascelles had +expressed to Eckardstein his personal opinion that an alliance +between Great Britain and the Triple Alliance was hardly possible, +that at most one between Great Britain and Germany was all that +could be expected (Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 91, No. 5021).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_236"></a><a href="#FNanchor_236"><span class= +"label">[236]</span></a>Memo. by Lansdowne, Nov. 11 and Dec. 4, +1901, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 76 ff., Nos. 92 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_237"></a><a href="#FNanchor_237"><span class= +"label">[237]</span></a>Memo. by Lansdowne, Dec. 4, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 79 f., No. 93, and Salisbury’s minutes.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_238"></a><a href="#FNanchor_238"><span class= +"label">[238]</span></a>Lansdowne to Lascelles, Dec. 19, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 80 ff., No. 94; memo. by Metternich, Dec. 28, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 111 ff., No. 5030.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_239"></a><a href="#FNanchor_239"><span class= +"label">[239]</span></a>Lee, II, 133 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_240"></a><a href="#FNanchor_240"><span class= +"label">[240]</span></a>Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 16, 1902, +<em>B.D.</em>, I, 268, No. 331; Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 11, +1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 274 f., No. 340; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. +3, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, II, 84, No. 95; memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. +27, 1901, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 109 f., No. 5028; William II to +Edward VII, Dec. 30, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 110 f., No. 5029.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_241"></a><a href="#FNanchor_241"><span class= +"label">[241]</span></a>He was quoting Frederick the Great (Bülow, +I, 242). See Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 19, 1901, <em>G.P.</em>, +XVII, 194 f., No. 5073; Bülow to Metternich, Nov. 26, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 195 ff., No. 5074; Metternich to F. O., Nov. 26, +1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 197 ff., No. 5075; Buchanan to Lansdowne, +Nov. 20, 1901, <em>B.D.</em>, I, 263, No. 325; Lansdowne to +Buchanan, Nov. 26 and Dec. 3, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 263, No. 326; +265, No. 328; Lansdowne to Lascelles, Jan. 14, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, 266 f., Nos. 329 f.; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. +16, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 268 f., No. 332. Cf. Chirol, p. 297; +Gwynn, I, 350.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_242"></a><a href="#FNanchor_242"><span class= +"label">[242]</span></a>Lee, II, 138 ff.; <em>B.D.</em>, I, Nos. +334 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_243"></a><a href="#FNanchor_243"><span class= +"label">[243]</span></a>Bülow to Metternich, March 13, 1902, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 149 ff., No. 5046.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_244"></a><a href="#FNanchor_244"><span class= +"label">[244]</span></a>Newton, pp. 247 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_245"></a><a href="#FNanchor_245"><span class= +"label">[245]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Sept. 12 and 14, 1901, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 28 f., Nos. 5393 f.; memo. by Bülow, Sept. +14, 1901, <em>ibid.</em>, 29 ff., No. 5395.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_246"></a><a href="#FNanchor_246"><span class= +"label">[246]</span></a>Alvensleben to F. O., Feb. 19, 1902, +<em>ibid.</em>, XVII, 156 f., No. 5049; Bülow to Alvensleben, Feb. +22, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 157 ff., No. 5050; memo. by Bülow, Feb. +25, 1902, <em>ibid.</em>, 160 ff., No. 5051; and the following +documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_247"></a><a href="#FNanchor_247"><span class= +"label">[247]</span></a>See below.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_248"></a><a href="#FNanchor_248"><span class= +"label">[248]</span></a>Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 31, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, XVIII, 737, No. 5844.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_249"></a><a href="#FNanchor_249"><span class= +"label">[249]</span></a>Eckardstein, III, 93.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_250"></a><a href="#FNanchor_250"><span class= +"label">[250]</span></a>Hammann, <em>Zur Vorgeschichte des +Weltkrieges</em>, pp. 144 f.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[81]</span><a id= +"c06"></a>CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<p class="sch2">THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE</p> + +<h3 class="space-above1">I</h3> + +<p>The Boer War had revealed to Great Britain the depth of +antagonism toward her among the European nations and the haphazard +inadequacy of her defensive preparations. The British government +had therefore sought the support of Germany and of Japan. But the +alliance with the second had not compensated for the rebuff from +the first; and in 1902 the future direction of the British foreign +policy, particularly with reference to Europe, remained +undecided.</p> + +<p>In February, 1903, Mr. Balfour, who succeeded Lord Salisbury as +premier in 1902, appointed as a permanent body a Committee of +Imperial Defence, whose duty, he said, was</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">to survey as a whole the strategical military needs +of the Empire, to deal with the complicated questions which are all +essential elements in that general problem, and to revise from time +to time their own previous decisions, so that the Cabinet shall +always have at its disposal information upon these important +points.<a id="FNanchor_251"></a><a href="#Footnote_251" class= +"fnanchor">[251]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Great Britain also wanted to maintain peace, to settle her +outstanding international difficulties, and to form ententes. In +the first part of 1903 the government tried to co-operate with the +various Powers. In January and February it asked the aid of +Austria-Hungary and Italy in preventing Russia from sending ships +of war through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The two states +refused although both were cordial friends of Great Britain.<a id= +"FNanchor_252"></a><a href="#Footnote_252" class= +"fnanchor">[252]</a> Moreover, the British government associated +itself with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[82]</span> Germany +in the Venezuela affair and expressed its willingness to +participate in the Bagdad Railway. British public opinion protested +strenuously, however, for it mistrusted Germany, regarding her as +so chauvinistic, so hungry for colonies, so bold in her naval +ambitions as to be not a friend but a rival. Hence the government +had to settle the one affair as quickly as possible and, in March, +to recede entirely from its stand on the other.<a id= +"FNanchor_253"></a><a href="#Footnote_253" class= +"fnanchor">[253]</a></p> + +<p>Anglo-Russian relations were most troublesome. Early in 1903 the +antagonism of these two Powers became acute all along the line from +the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to Persia to Afghanistan to Tibet +to China. The British government offered in March to negotiate over +Afghanistan, but Russia refused.<a id="FNanchor_254"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_254" class="fnanchor">[254]</a> Still more pressing for +Great Britain was the problem which resulted from the +Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In April, 1903, the renewal of Russian +activity in Manchuria and its extension into the Yalu Valley caused +a grave increase of tension between Russia<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_83">[83]</span> and Japan.<a id="FNanchor_255"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_255" class="fnanchor">[255]</a> The revived danger of +war between those two states brought home to the British government +the urgent need of assurance that it would not become involved if +hostilities did ensue. By the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, +the <em>casus foederis</em> would arise only in case of an attack +upon one of the allies by two or more Powers. Manifestly it would +depend upon France and upon the nature of her obligations as ally +to Russia whether Great Britain could preserve neutrality in case +of a conflict.<a id="FNanchor_256"></a><a href="#Footnote_256" +class="fnanchor">[256]</a> Hence the British government, which in +the previous year had refused to touch the dangerous Moroccan +question, now concluded to accept the French proposal for a +Moroccan accord and to liquidate the various differences with +France. It would thereby win a friend who could act as mediator +between Great Britain<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[84]</span> +and Russia and would make certain that a Russo-Japanese war would +not involve the allies of those Powers.</p> + +<p>The way toward France instead of Germany was indicated clearly +by the drift of British public opinion; for while the animosity +between the British and German peoples had increased in 1902 and +1903, the flow of vituperation between the British and French press +over the Boer War and the Dreyfus case<a id= +"FNanchor_257"></a><a href="#Footnote_257" class= +"fnanchor">[257]</a> had practically ceased, and concerted +movements were on foot to create a popular basis for an “entente +cordiale.”</p> + +<p>Political and business groups took the lead in this work. By +1903 King Edward, who two years previously had desired an alliance +with Germany, advocated strongly a <em>rapprochement</em> with +France. His personal dislike and mistrust of his nephew, William +II, and of Germany, his wide knowledge of men and of international +affairs, his sensitiveness to currents of public opinion, caused +him to incline toward France.<a id="FNanchor_258"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_258" class="fnanchor">[258]</a> His willingness to take +the initiative in clarifying public opinion and in defending +British interests enabled him to play an important rôle in +transforming British foreign relations.<a id= +"FNanchor_259"></a><a href="#Footnote_259" class= +"fnanchor">[259]</a> One of his advisers was Lord Esher, a man who +held no official position but who exerted quiet influence upon +court, government, and press. Particularly interested in naval and +military problems, he was instrumental in creating the Committee of +Imperial Defence, of which he became a permanent<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_85">[85]</span> member. Through him the press +leaders were kept informed about the needs of defense and were +guided toward friendship with France.<a id= +"FNanchor_260"></a><a href="#Footnote_260" class= +"fnanchor">[260]</a> The influence of the business world in the +same direction was represented by Mr. Thomas Barclay, former +president of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris and an active +worker for the improvement of international relations. In 1901 he +began a campaign in both France and England for a +<em>rapprochement</em>, to which during the next two years he +devoted his entire time and fortune.<a id= +"FNanchor_261"></a><a href="#Footnote_261" class= +"fnanchor">[261]</a> In England these efforts had complete +success.<a id="FNanchor_262"></a><a href="#Footnote_262" class= +"fnanchor">[262]</a> In France they encountered more difficulty, +for France had usually been the loser in Anglo-French diplomatic +battles. However, the <em>revanche</em> anti-German group, the +socialists and internationalists, and the commercial and business +elements approved. Then, after the French people at large became +convinced that Great Britain was not so thoroughly egoistic and +chauvinistic as they had supposed, and that she really felt +amicable toward France, they heartily welcomed a +<em>rapprochement</em> as flattering and beneficial to their +country.<a id="FNanchor_263"></a><a href="#Footnote_263" class= +"fnanchor">[263]</a> Nevertheless, they remained skeptical about +the durability of any entente with their old rival. The French +press laid down as conditions for one that the Dual Alliance should +not be weakened thereby and that Great Britain should convince +France of her serious intentions by treating her equitably in the +settlement of their colonial differences, particularly<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_86">[86]</span> the Moroccan question.<a id= +"FNanchor_264"></a><a href="#Footnote_264" class= +"fnanchor">[264]</a> This mistrust was not entirely dispelled for +several years.</p> + +<p>Informal conversations for an agreement were resumed in April, +1903, between representatives of the two governments.<a id= +"FNanchor_265"></a><a href="#Footnote_265" class= +"fnanchor">[265]</a> Then King Edward visited Paris (May 1-5); and, +although at first he was met with cold silence, his felicity of +speech and act soon won the French people. As a French Anglophobe +said to a friend: “I can’t think what has come over the population +of Paris. The first day they behaved well; the second day, they +merely displayed interest; but the third day, <em>c’était +attristant—ils ont acclamé le Roi!</em>”<a id= +"FNanchor_266"></a><a href="#Footnote_266" class= +"fnanchor">[266]</a> This visit, so unexpectedly +successful,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[87]</span> created a +favorable atmosphere for further negotiations.<a id= +"FNanchor_267"></a><a href="#Footnote_267" class= +"fnanchor">[267]</a> Later in the month, at M. Cambon’s initiative, +the project of a treaty of arbitration was taken up.<a id= +"FNanchor_268"></a><a href="#Footnote_268" class= +"fnanchor">[268]</a> In July, when President Loubet, accompanied by +M. Delcassé, returned the King’s visit, the newspapers reported a +statement by King Edward to the effect that M. Loubet would be more +heartily welcomed in England than any chief of state had ever been. +The President was able to speak of the Entente Cordiale as +established.<a id="FNanchor_269"></a><a href="#Footnote_269" class= +"fnanchor">[269]</a></p> + +<p>During the visit the foreign ministers agreed that the time was +“in every way propitious for a frank exchange of opinions.” They +began that long negotiation from which the Entente Cordiale was to +result. They discussed the question of the fishing rights off the +coast of Newfoundland, the question of Siam, of the New Hebrides, +of Sokoto, of the treatment of British firms in French Congo, and +of Morocco. The French Minister frankly stated that if they could +come to terms over Morocco, “all other difficulties would +disappear, or become comparatively easy to deal with.” While +denying any desire “to get rid of the Sultan or to annex his +country” or to “force the pace,” he declared that in view of the +rapidly waning authority of the Sultan, France could not regard +with indifference the prevalence of chronic disorder in Morocco or +permit any other Power to undertake the task of regenerating the +land. What France wished, said M. Delcassé,<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_88">[88]</span> was a “reasonable assurance that their +policy would not be obstructed by Great Britain.”</p> + +<p>In reply, Lord Lansdowne made three conditions for an accord +over Morocco. First, British interests in the Mediterranean +seaboard of Morocco, particularly in Tangier and the neighboring +coast, must be protected. Second, Spanish ambitions must be fairly +dealt with. Third, complete equality of economic opportunity in +Morocco must be assured. M. Delcassé unhesitatingly accepted all +three stipulations. Then the British Minister proposed that they +make the settlement a comprehensive one by including the Egyptian +question. Again the French Minister agreed, provided they reached +accord “as to the position of France and Morocco.”<a id= +"FNanchor_270"></a><a href="#Footnote_270" class= +"fnanchor">[270]</a></p> + +<p>A few days later M. Cambon made to the British Minister a more +detailed statement of the French proposal. Concerning Morocco, he +said, the two governments could agree that the existing +constitution <em>au point de vue politique</em> as well as <em>au +point de vue territorial</em> should be maintained. But the British +should acknowledge that France “has a peculiar interest in +maintaining peace within that country, and in assisting the Moorish +Government to bring about the administrative, economical, and +financial improvements of which Morocco stands so much in need.” +The French, in turn, should expressly attest that these +improvements would not infringe in any way upon the +principle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[89]</span> of +commercial liberty. The two governments, continued M. Cambon, might +co-operate in securing a free passage through the Straits of +Gibraltar by preventing the erection of any fortifications on the +southern shore. When Lord Lansdowne raised the objection that Great +Britain was interested in other parts of the Moorish littoral +besides that abutting on the straits, the Ambassador readily +acknowledged this point, and remarked that France wished to prevent +any Power from establishing itself at any strategic position on the +Moroccan coast.</p> + +<p>As M. Cambon did not mention the Egyptian problem, the British +Minister immediately stated that its inclusion was an absolute +condition to any consideration of the Moorish question. The +Ambassador proposed that they leave Egypt alone for the present; +but, when this suggestion was refused, he declared that if the +French government, by acknowledging the permanency of the British +hold upon that land, extracted this “big thorn from the foot of +Great Britain,” it would expect <em>une grosse compensation</em>. +This, he said, “might take the shape of greater liberty of action +in Morocco—something less remote and conjectural . . . . than she +[France] had yet asked for.”<a id="FNanchor_271"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_271" class="fnanchor">[271]</a></p> + +<p>After this agreement upon the questions to be included in the +negotiation there remained the other preliminary matter of how to +deal with Spain. Lord Lansdowne thought that “it would not be +difficult for us to come to terms with France if Spain were out of +the way.”<a id="FNanchor_272"></a><a href="#Footnote_272" class= +"fnanchor">[272]</a> But, bound by the promise of the previous +March to that Power and more desirous of having weak and decadent +Spain than powerful France control the south shore of the straits, +he upheld Spain’s interest in Morocco. M. Cambon declared that his +government acknowledged this position, mentioning the +Franco-Spanish negotiations of 1902 as proof. At his suggestion +they decided on August 5 that a subsequent settlement between +France and Spain in harmony with the proposed<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_90">[90]</span> Anglo-French accord be made and be +communicated to the British government.<a id= +"FNanchor_273"></a><a href="#Footnote_273" class= +"fnanchor">[273]</a></p> + +<p>The negotiations over these complex problems lasted almost ten +months. Two months passed before the British answer was ready; for +the members of the cabinet were on their vacation, a ministerial +crisis occurred in September as a result of which several +resigned,<a id="FNanchor_274"></a><a href="#Footnote_274" class= +"fnanchor">[274]</a> and Lord Cromer, British consul-general and +agent in Egypt, had to be consulted. This influential official had +previously received permission to send Sir Eldon Gorst, financial +adviser to the Egyptian government, to Paris in the autumn in order +to sound the French government about converting the Egyptian debt +and abolishing the <em>caisse de la dette</em>. Foreseeing the +failure of that effort unless the British government made +concessions in Morocco, Lord Cromer urged it to do so. He realized +that thereby Morocco would “to all intents and purposes become +before long a French province”; none the less he supported the +proposed accord fully to strengthen British control in Egypt, and +played a major rôle during the negotiations in determining the +British policy.<a id="FNanchor_275"></a><a href="#Footnote_275" +class="fnanchor">[275]</a></p> + +<p>On October 1 Lord Lansdowne stated to M. Cambon the British +conditions for an arrangement.<a id="FNanchor_276"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_276" class="fnanchor">[276]</a> He accepted the French +proposal about Morocco with slight modifications. He suggested that +France should agree not to erect any military or naval works along +the Moroccan coast from Algeria to Mazaghan, and that the two +Powers should engage not to permit any others to do so;<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_91">[91]</span> that a certain amount of +territory in Northern Morocco “should be recognized as destined to +fall under Spanish influence” and that “in the event of a complete +collapse of the Sultan’s authority,” Spain should be intrusted with +the administration of the Moroccan seaboard as far south as +Mazaghan. However, Spain was to “be precluded from fortifying this +portion of the coast, and also from alienating it or her existing +possessions in Morocco to another Power.” As the <em>quid pro +quo</em> for these concessions to France, the British Minister +required in Egypt the lifting of the time limit to the British +occupation and the French sanction of the abolishment of the +<em>caisse de la dette</em>, the reorganization of the railway +administration, and the conversion of the Egyptian debt. He also +requested the consent of the French government to examine at some +future time proposals abolishing the capitulations in Egypt and +“tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative and judicial +systems to those in force in other civilized countries.” “His +Majesty’s Government would, on their side,” he continued, “be ready +to examine, in consultation with the Government of the French +Republic, similar proposals with regard to Morocco, if at any +future period France should acquire so predominant a position in +Morocco as to become outwardly responsible for the good government +of the country.” The other questions considered in the Minister’s +reply, those of Newfoundland, Siam, New Hebrides, Nigeria, +Zanzibar, and Madagascar, were less significant.<a id= +"FNanchor_277"></a><a href="#Footnote_277" class= +"fnanchor">[277]</a></p> + +<p>With the offers of each party known, the bargaining began. On +October 27 M. Cambon replied. He was still averse to dealing with +the Egyptian affair so fully, and declared that the terms offered +were unequal; for, whereas France received “hopes” alone in +Morocco, Great Britain would enjoy immediate and concrete benefits +in Egypt. Moreover, France would have to settle with Spain, and +might even have to reckon with the pretensions of Germany. So he +suggested that the proposed changes<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_92">[92]</span> in Egypt be introduced <em>pari passu</em> +with correlative ones in Morocco. He also objected to giving Spain +control over any seacoast farther south than the Sebou River. He +further suggested that Great Britain and France undertake “to +maintain, save for the consequences of the present accord, the +territorial <em>status quo</em> within a radius of 500 miles around +the straits.”<a id="FNanchor_278"></a><a href="#Footnote_278" +class="fnanchor">[278]</a></p> + +<p>When these terms were submitted to Lord Cromer, he was pleased +with the progress that had been made. “Who would have imagined, +only a short time ago,” he wrote Lord Lansdowne, November 1, “that +we should ever have got so far? . . . . We <em>must</em> manage to +come to terms. . . . . I regard this as by far the most important +diplomatic affair that we have had in hand for a long time past. . +. . . <em>We must not fail</em>.” He added that Great Britain was +asking for much more in Egypt than she offered France in return in +Morocco. Lord Lansdowne agreed with him; but, he said, the French +“are extremely anxious to have their position in Morocco +recognized, and we must turn this feeling to account.” His +suggestion to Lord Cromer that consideration of the conversion of +the Egyptian debt be postponed so as to diminish the difficulties +was not carried into execution.<a id="FNanchor_279"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_279" class="fnanchor">[279]</a></p> + +<p>On November 19 Lord Lansdowne replied to M. Cambon that he was +willing to limit the Spanish and the neutralized portions of the +Moroccan coast to those between Melilla and Rabat; but he refused +the French proposal concerning the simultaneous introduction of +changes in Egypt and Morocco, particularly the change by which the +“abandonment of financial control by France in Egypt would proceed +<em>pari passu</em> with the acquisition of financial control by +France in Morocco.” He likewise wished the French government to +join Great Britain “in addressing the other Powers for the purpose +of securing their assent” to the<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_93">[93]</span> suggested British changes in Egypt. And he +held out for absolute guaranties of full economic liberty in +Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_280"></a><a href="#Footnote_280" class= +"fnanchor">[280]</a></p> + +<p>In the French response of December 9 M. Cambon reported that his +government agreed to assist the British government in obtaining the +assent of the other Powers to the Egyptian changes; but he objected +strongly to the exclusion of Rabat from the French sphere. +Moreover, he desired that the period of commercial liberty in +Morocco be limited to fifteen or twenty years, and that the +construction and administration of railways and ports there be kept +under governmental control. In explaining the five-hundred-mile +proposal, M. Cambon pointed out Germany’s designs upon Morocco +which had recently been renewed, in all probability under the +encouragement of Spain. He recalled the Spanish proposal in 1887 +for the assembly of a European conference to discuss the Moroccan +question, and added:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>It was quite likely that some such proposal might now be +revived. It was in view of these circumstances that the French +Government had proposed the maintenance of the <em>status quo</em> +within a radius of 500 miles from the Straits—a radius which would +include the Balearic Islands, in which Germany might perhaps desire +to obtain a footing.<a id="FNanchor_281"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_281" class="fnanchor">[281]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Both Lord Lansdowne and Lord Cromer knew that Germany was +interested in the fate of Morocco, and they fully anticipated a +request from her for some territory there, for example, Rabat or +some other port. They also realized that the French expected Great +Britain to help in keeping Germany out of Morocco, and Lord Cromer +gathered from conversations with French officials in Egypt that the +French would like to embroil Great Britain and Germany, bring about +an Anglo-Russian agreement, and isolate Germany. As both statesmen +felt that a demand on the part<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_94">[94]</span> of Germany for a coaling station would be +very awkward to meet, Lord Lansdowne did nothing to clarify the +situation beyond refusing M. Cambon’s anti-German project.<a id= +"FNanchor_282"></a><a href="#Footnote_282" class= +"fnanchor">[282]</a> He thereby left to the French the possibility +of forcing Great Britain to aid them in case Germany did try to +intervene in the Moroccan question.</p> + +<p>In reply to M. Cambon on December 11 Lord Lansdowne signified +his apprehension that if Rabat were not neutralized France might +later transform it into a torpedo-boat station. The other points +concerning Morocco he agreed to, except that he extended the limit +for commercial equality to fifty years.<a id= +"FNanchor_283"></a><a href="#Footnote_283" class= +"fnanchor">[283]</a></p> + +<p>Thus far the negotiations had proceeded smoothly. The +Anglo-French arbitration treaty had been signed on October 14. +Agreement over the two main questions, those of Egypt and of +Morocco, had practically been reached.<a id= +"FNanchor_284"></a><a href="#Footnote_284" class= +"fnanchor">[284]</a> And on November 23 M. Delcassé had been able +to declare in the French Chamber, with evident reference to Great +Britain, that “when one speaks today of a Moroccan problem, the +idea that in the solution the decisive word pertains to France has +become almost familiar and appears almost natural, even to those +who in the past would have believed themselves obliged to oppose it +with the greatest vigor.”<a id="FNanchor_285"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_285" class="fnanchor">[285]</a></p> + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>These discussions had been closely connected with another +diplomatic movement. The Anglo-French <em>rapprochement</em> was +logically followed by attempts at an Anglo-Russian +settlement<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[95]</span> which in +turn would have an alleviating effect upon Russo-Japanese +relations. The British and French governments immediately +recognized this fact, as did also Count Lamsdorff, Russian foreign +minister. In July, just after M. Delcassé’s visit to England, +conversations began, at the instigation of the French Foreign +Minister,<a id="FNanchor_286"></a><a href="#Footnote_286" class= +"fnanchor">[286]</a> between Lord Lansdowne and the Russian +Ambassador. The British Foreign Secretary remarked to Count +Benckendorff, July 29, as follows: “If Russia would put us in full +possession of her ideas, and if she would bear in mind that for any +concessions which she obtained from us we should expect +corresponding concessions from her, I believe that we might put an +end to the unfortunate rivalry which had so long prevailed between +us in China and in the other parts of Asia.” But he declared a few +days later that until he was “thoroughly satisfied” by Russia, +especially as to Manchuria, he “must remain observant and +critical.” The Ambassador, who seemed favorable toward a general +agreement, left in August for a visit to St. Petersburg, and did +not see Lord Lansdowne again until November 7.<a id= +"FNanchor_287"></a><a href="#Footnote_287" class= +"fnanchor">[287]</a></p> + +<p>An understanding along the lines mentioned by Lord Lansdowne +would have settled both the Anglo-Russian and the Russo-Japanese +problems. As an inducement to a <em>rapprochement</em> the British +Foreign Secretary was showing compliance with Russia’s policy in +the Balkans,</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">even to the extent [wrote on October 26 Sir Louis +Mallet, précis writer to Lord Lansdowne] of suggesting reforms +which will give them [Russia] a foothold in the Balkans. H. M. G. +are therefore committed to a certain extent to a policy of not +opposing Russia’s advance to Constantinople. At least,<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_96">[96]</span> I read it in that light. . . . . +It’s a chance Russia will never get again of buying off our +opposition to their advance to Constantinople.<a id= +"FNanchor_288"></a><a href="#Footnote_288" class= +"fnanchor">[288]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Russia, however, continued her Asiatic activity, so +objectionable to Great Britain and Japan. She dallied with the +Japanese offer of agreement over their Chinese differences while +she made new demands on China, extended her interests in the Yalu +Valley and in Seoul itself, and seemed on the way to take +Korea.<a id="FNanchor_289"></a><a href="#Footnote_289" class= +"fnanchor">[289]</a> She asserted her right to send agents into +Afghanistan at will, contrary to the old understanding with Great +Britain; and on October 5 made a communication to the British +government on that subject which Sir Charles Hardinge, assistant +undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, regarded as +“peremptory in tone, and almost discourteous in its terms.”<a id= +"FNanchor_290"></a><a href="#Footnote_290" class= +"fnanchor">[290]</a></p> + +<p>In this grave situation Lord Lansdowne besought the help of the +French government in restraining Russia. On October 26 he expressed +regret to M. Cambon over the absence of frankness in Anglo-Russian +intercourse. “Their conduct [the Russian government’s],” he +complained, “placed us in a very embarrassing position.” The +pledges which they gave—for example, with respect to the evacuation +of Manchuria—remained unfulfilled. “We were . . . . told that the +obstructiveness of the Chinese was to blame. There might be some +truth in this, but it was impossible to test the truth of the +assertion unless the Russian Government would really tell us what +they wanted.” Lord Lansdowne expressed the hope that during Count +Lamsdorff’s forthcoming visit to Paris (October 29-31) his +conversations with M.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[97]</span> +Delcassé “might indirectly have an effect upon the attitude of the +Russian Government towards that of this country.”<a id= +"FNanchor_291"></a><a href="#Footnote_291" class= +"fnanchor">[291]</a></p> + +<p>M. Delcassé took the hint. Count Lamsdorff agreed with him on +the value of an arrangement with both Great Britain and with +Japan.<a id="FNanchor_292"></a><a href="#Footnote_292" class= +"fnanchor">[292]</a> He also expressed publicly Russia’s +satisfaction with the Anglo-French and the Franco-Italian +<em>rapprochements</em>.<a id="FNanchor_293"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_293" class="fnanchor">[293]</a></p> + +<p>This intercession had an immediate result. When Count +Benckendorff returned to London, Lord Lansdowne summed up his +assertions, November 7, as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Count Lamsdorff felt strongly that it was of importance that an +endeavour should be made to remove all sources of misunderstanding +between the two Governments, and that there should be “a change for +the better” in our relations. Count Benckendorff was therefore +instructed to discuss frankly with me the various questions +outstanding between Great Britain and Russia, with the object of +arriving at an agreement as to the manner in which they should be +dealt with. In the meantime, the Russian Government would be +careful to avoid any action bearing the appearance of hostility to +this country.</p> +</div> + +<p>Lord Lansdowne was pleased at this response, for, as he said, he +“had been seriously concerned at the position into which the two +Powers were apparently drifting.” The two men then discussed in +general terms the questions dividing their countries.<a id= +"FNanchor_294"></a><a href="#Footnote_294" class= +"fnanchor">[294]</a> On November 17 and 25 they returned to the +subject, and on November 22 King Edward and Sir Charles Hardinge +each had an interview with Count Benckendorff. The Count stated +that “the moment was riper now for a friendly understanding than at +any time during the past twenty years.” He said that the matters +for consideration “seemed naturally to group themselves into (1) +questions concerning China in which Russia had a special interest +(2) questions concerning India, in which Great Britain had a +special interest and (3) questions concerning Persia<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_98">[98]</span> in which both Powers were +interested.” But it became clear from these conversations that the +Ambassador was instructed merely to discuss the problems, that he +had no definite proposals to make. Nor were the discussions +satisfactory. The Ambassador could make no statement about Russian +aims in China. He objected to the division of Persia into spheres +of influence. He protested strongly against the British expedition +to Tibet announced in that month. He refused to put anything on +paper about Afghanistan.</p> + +<p>In order to make some headway, Lord Lansdowne made a frank +exposition of the British desires. On December 11 Count Lamsdorff +voiced “much satisfaction” with this “ready response.” The British +Ambassador urged him to make “an early and equally frank expression +of the views of the Russian Government,” which might “lead to a +satisfactory understanding.” Count Lamsdorff promised to try to +reply before February 2, when Parliament was to reassemble. And +Count Benckendorff planned to go to St. Petersburg early in 1904 +for consultation.<a id="FNanchor_295"></a><a href="#Footnote_295" +class="fnanchor">[295]</a></p> + +<p>Just as Lord Lansdowne had expected, the negotiations did not +proceed beyond that point; Russia would not limit her Asiatic +ambitions. She would not accept the British terms, which of course +included stipulations concerning China satisfactory to Japan, nor +would she settle with Japan alone. Count Lamsdorff was willing to +do so; but, as was well known by the other governments, he had no +control over Russia’s far eastern policy. Since August this policy +had been directed by the viceroy in the Far East, back of whom +stood the Czar and the coterie around him interested in Russian +expansion into Manchuria and Korea. Count Lamsdorff’s hands were +tied; Russian activity made war with Japan a certainty. Toward the +end of 1903 this menace grew so ominous that on December 11 Lord +Lansdowne warned M. Cambon as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[99]</span>H. E. [His +Excellency] was no doubt aware that, under the Agreement with +Japan, our intervention could only be demanded in case that Power +were assailed by two others. On the other hand, public opinion here +might render it extremely difficult for us to remain inactive if +Russia were to find some pretext for attacking Japan and were to +endeavour to crush her out of existence.</p> + +<p>It seemed to me in these circumstances that it was the duty of +our two Governments, which were, I rejoiced to think, at this +moment in such friendly relations, to do all in their power to keep +the peace.<a id="FNanchor_296"></a><a href="#Footnote_296" class= +"fnanchor">[296]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The French government reciprocated this wish, and +let the British government perceive that it would not enter a +Russo-Japanese war. Early in January the other Powers also asserted +their intention of remaining neutral.<a id= +"FNanchor_297"></a><a href="#Footnote_297" class= +"fnanchor">[297]</a></p> + +<p>Having been fully informed about Russo-Japanese relations, the +British government had recognized the danger of war since July and +had in consequence not let the negotiations with France lag or +fail.<a id="FNanchor_298"></a><a href="#Footnote_298" class= +"fnanchor">[298]</a> But since it now felt reasonably certain of +not being drawn into the impending struggle, it allowed the +transactions with France, on January 13, 1904, to come to a +deadlock over a question hitherto cursorily considered. M. Delcassé +requested territorial indemnity for the relinquishment of certain +fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland; and the British +government refused to give the amount desired. The difficulty +imperiled the entire settlement since both sides were so fearful of +public opinion that they refused to make concessions.<a id= +"FNanchor_299"></a><a href="#Footnote_299" class= +"fnanchor">[299]</a> But on February<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_100">[100]</span> 10 the Russo-Japanese War began. Admiral +Fisher was certain that Japan would be defeated.<a id= +"FNanchor_300"></a><a href="#Footnote_300" class= +"fnanchor">[300]</a> Rumors were abroad concerning Russo-German +negotiations for closing the Baltic Straits,<a id= +"FNanchor_301"></a><a href="#Footnote_301" class= +"fnanchor">[301]</a> and some British officials had misgivings that +a coalition of Russia, France, and Germany might be formed against +their country.<a id="FNanchor_302"></a><a href="#Footnote_302" +class="fnanchor">[302]</a> Moreover, the British government feared +that a Balkan war might break out in the spring.<a id= +"FNanchor_303"></a><a href="#Footnote_303" class= +"fnanchor">[303]</a> Under these circumstances the British +government could not afford to risk alienating France.<a id= +"FNanchor_304"></a><a href="#Footnote_304" class= +"fnanchor">[304]</a></p> + +<p>M. Delcassé was surprised by the outbreak of the war.<a id= +"FNanchor_305"></a><a href="#Footnote_305" class= +"fnanchor">[305]</a> His<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_101">[101]</span> ambition had been for the Anglo-French +<em>rapprochement</em> to be supplemented by an Anglo-Russian one. +Then as Italy was also trying to approach Russia, a more or less +loose grouping of France, Russia, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and +Japan would be created.<a id="FNanchor_306"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_306" class="fnanchor">[306]</a> Busy with the +Anglo-French negotiations, he had been misled by the optimism of +the Russian government into thinking that war would not +occur.<a id="FNanchor_307"></a><a href="#Footnote_307" class= +"fnanchor">[307]</a> He had not appreciated fully the weakness of +Count Lamsdorff’s position. Not until January, 1904, did he +perceive the danger and make belated efforts to maintain peace. But +Great Britain refused to aid him.<a id="FNanchor_308"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_308" class="fnanchor">[308]</a> Immediately after the +war began he tried again to secure British co-operation in stopping +it. When the British government again refused, M. Delcassé became +incensed, for he saw the defeat of his larger program.<a id= +"FNanchor_309"></a><a href="#Footnote_309" class= +"fnanchor">[309]</a> His better judgment soon calmed him, however, +for with France’s ally eliminated from European affairs, he needed +British co-operation more than ever in order to keep the war from +spreading<a id="FNanchor_310"></a><a href="#Footnote_310" class= +"fnanchor">[310]</a> and to offset the increased power of Germany. +Late in February both parties were therefore ready to +compromise.<a id="FNanchor_311"></a><a href="#Footnote_311" class= +"fnanchor">[311]</a> And, after a threat by Lord +Lansdowne<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[102]</span> on March +31 to break off negotiations when the French Foreign Minister, +alarmed by French public opinion, attempted to reopen the +Newfoundland question,<a id="FNanchor_312"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_312" class="fnanchor">[312]</a> the accord was finally +completed on April 8, 1904.</p> + +<p>This agreement consisted of three documents: first, a convention +which settled the Newfoundland question, modified certain +boundaries between French and British colonies in Africa, and gave +the Iles de Los to France; second, a declaration concerning Siam, +Madagascar, and the New Hebrides; and third, a declaration +concerning Egypt and Morocco. Only the convention had to be +submitted to the two parliaments, since it alone provided for +territorial changes in the existing possessions of the two states. +While the solution of all these difficulties established the +Entente Cordiale, the last-named declaration gave to the entente +its great significance in international affairs; for through it two +of the old sore spots in Anglo-French diplomacy were healed, and +the basis for the future co-operation of the two Powers was +laid.</p> + +<p>By the terms of this declaration France relinquished her rights +and interests in Egypt in favor of Great Britain; Great Britain, in +favor of France in Morocco. Only the clauses concerning Morocco are +of interest here. Article II read as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no +intention of altering the political status of Morocco.</p> + +<p>His Britannic Majesty’s Government . . . . recognize that it +appertains to France . . . . to preserve order in that country, and +to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, +economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.</p> + +<p>They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by +France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave +intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of Treaties, +Conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco. . . . .</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[103]</span>Article IV +provided for full commercial liberty, which, however, should obtain +for only thirty years. Each government reserved the right “to see +that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc. [in Morocco +and Egypt], are only granted on such conditions as will maintain +intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of +public interest.” By Article VII the free passage and +non-fortification of the south shore of the Straits of Gibraltar +were assured. According to Article VIII the interests of Spain in +Morocco were to be respected, and the compact over them to be +worked out between the Spanish and French governments was to be +communicated to the British government. Article IX was included at +the insistence of the British government, which planned thereby to +enjoy French support in obtaining the acquiescence of the other +Powers to the proposed changes in Egypt. Although the French +reluctantly agreed to it, it eventually proved to be of the +greatest value to them. It read as follows: “The two Governments +agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order +to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration +regarding Egypt and Morocco.”</p> + +<p>Five secret articles supplemented the public agreement. Article +I was as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>In the event of either Government finding themselves +constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy +in respect to Egypt and Morocco, the engagements which they have +undertaken towards each other by Articles IV, VI and VII of the +Declaration of to-day’s date would remain intact.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Article II was included at the wish of the +British:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>His Britannic Majesty’s Government have no present intention of +proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the +Capitulations, or in the judicial organization of Egypt.</p> + +<p>In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce into +Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system +to that in force in other civilized countries, the Government of +the French Republic will not refuse to entertain any such +proposals, on the understanding that His Britannic<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_104">[104]</span> Majesty’s Government will +agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the +French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing +similar reforms in Morocco.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Articles III and IV marked out the portion of +Morocco which should come within the “sphere of influence” of Spain +“whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it,” and +provided for the validity of the Anglo-French declaration in case +Spain refused to make an agreement.<a id= +"FNanchor_313"></a><a href="#Footnote_313" class= +"fnanchor">[313]</a> Article V concerned the Egyptian debt.</p> + +<p>The contradictions in the accord are apparent. The “political +status” in Morocco was to be preserved, but it would take a +statesman trained in diplomatic casuistry to explain how this was +possible with France alone making all the proposed internal +reforms. Of course, what was meant was that the “international +status” of the land should be respected. However, the terms of the +secret articles foresaw a future change even in that; and it can +hardly be called showing a nice regard for Morocco’s international +and sovereign independence for two alien Powers to set a time limit +to the right of commercial liberty in that land. The doctors were +agreeing upon a division of the patient’s property before they +began to operate. That Morocco, an independent state, would +eventually be partitioned into French and Spanish protectorates was +evident to anyone with an understanding of contemporary political +practices. To preserve peace and amity between themselves, Great +Britain and France had simply made a division of spoils at +Morocco’s expense.<a id="FNanchor_314"></a><a href="#Footnote_314" +class="fnanchor">[314]</a></p> + +<p>The new accord was most cordially welcomed by all parties +in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[105]</span> Great Britain. +In the House of Commons on June 1, Earl Percy, speaking for the +government, and Sir Edward Grey, speaking for the opposition, both +emphasized the need for Great Britain henceforth to follow a policy +of “administrative concentration and consolidation” of her empire, +and declared that similar agreements should be made with other +Powers. Not all troubles with France had been disposed of, said +Earl Percy, but the chief ones had been, and the others could now +be more easily settled. As to the terms dealing with Morocco, while +he admitted that the Sultan had not been consulted beforehand, he +declared that Morocco needed setting to rights and that France had +a better claim to execute that work than anyone else. He also +emphasized the unique quality of the Entente Cordiale.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The parties pledge themselves not merely to abstain from +poaching on each other’s preserves but to do all in their power to +further one another’s interests. We promise to give to one another, +as friends, advantages which are ordinarily given only to allies, +and it is as a pledge of friendship rather than as the terms of a +compromise between jealous and exacting litigants that we ask the +House to consent to these concessions.</p> +</div> + +<p>Sir Edward Grey approved of the relinquishment of Morocco to +France. Together with other speakers, he praised the spirit of the +agreement, and he expressed the hope that Article IX would enable +the two nations to draw closer together by increasing the +“opportunities for the interchange of international courtesies +between them.”</p> + +<p>During the debates Mr. Gibson Bowles declared that the agreement +amounted to a “partition of three new Polands” (Egypt, Morocco, and +Siam), “a compact of plunder.” But from a European point of view he +considered it of “the highest import,” for it signified a “return +to the . . . . system of the balance of power.” “There are stalking +through Europe,” he stated, “ambitions which must be curtailed and +which may be developed to a greater extent than seems at present. +Against such it is well to raise a visible barrier in England and +France.” Mr. Balfour, the premier, however, denied that there had +been “any reversal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[106]</span> +of the traditional policy of our party,” or that anything had been +done “prejudicial to the interests of Germany or any other +Power.”</p> + +<p>The <em>Times</em> did not agree with him. Its Paris +correspondent wrote on April 14 as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The Triple Alliance has long since ceased to be the European +bogey which it once was. . . . . There is the Dual Alliance, the +Anglo-French Agreement, and the Franco-Italian +<em>rapprochement</em>, with benevolent diplomatic neutrality on +the part of Russia. Now, in the midst of this happy family, the +Triple Alliance only appears as the ghost of its former self.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The editorial comment of that paper was in a +similar tone.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The days have gone by when the Germans could assume with some +shadow of plausibility that in the larger questions of +international politics Great Britain must follow in the wake of the +Triple Alliance, and that the attitude of France might be ignored. +There is no alliance between them, but there is a cordial +understanding which will induce both to discuss all subjects +affecting them fairly and without jealousy or suspicion, and which, +combined with the relations in which they stand to Italy, must +exercise a great influence upon all States, and, it may be, a great +attraction upon some of them.</p> +</div> + +<p>Events soon proved that the <em>Times’s</em> estimate of that +entente was more accurate than that of Mr. Balfour.<a id= +"FNanchor_315"></a><a href="#Footnote_315" class= +"fnanchor">[315]</a></p> + +<p>Although happily surprised by the conclusion of the Anglo-French +agreement, French public opinion did not accept the accord as +whole-heartedly as did the British. Opposition to various parts of +the settlement was expressed by extremists who regretted the final +renunciation of French ambitions in Egypt and who thought that +French interests in Siam and elsewhere had not been adequately +upheld; by those in the maritime districts of Northern and +Northwestern France who criticized the terms<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_107">[107]</span> concerning Newfoundland as disastrous to +French fishing interests in that region; and more or less openly by +the enemies of M. Combes, the premier, whose stringent anticlerical +policy had aroused bitter antagonism among the French. These +critical forces, however, were more than offset by the elements who +praised the agreement. “It is equitable, the equilibrium of the +accord is irreproachable,” wrote M. de Caix. The recognition of +France’s special interests in Morocco was especially commended by +almost all parties. The strengthening of France’s international +position was also acknowledged with satisfaction. In reporting the +agreement to the Chamber of Deputies on November 3 M. Deloncle +declared: “We do not wish a . . . . passing entente between our two +countries. We think . . . . of the formation of accords always more +intimate and durable, which, loyally executed by both parties, . . +. . on the basis of reciprocal confidence, will cement the +community and solidarity of the two countries.” Alliance with +Russia, friendship with Great Britain, was the popular formula.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, the convention over Newfoundland was accepted by +the Chamber only on condition that M. Delcassé attempt to reopen +the question with the British government. Many warned M. Delcassé +not to trust Great Britain too far, not to permit the entente to +assume in any way the character of an alliance, and not to involve +France in the Anglo-German rivalry. In the Chamber on November 8 M. +Delafosse declared that the accord signified a “detente,” not an +“entente.” M. René Millet, former governor of Tunis, wrote that the +arrangement was “a retreat in good order” which “does not justify +the enthusiasm with which it has been received.” M. Millet found +insufficient the diplomatic preparation for the French action in +Morocco.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>It is not possible [he wrote] for France to undertake anything +without knowing the thoughts of Germany. . . . . Our bad will +toward the Germans will only render them more imperious, and, +without declaring war, they will have more than one means of being +disagreeable to us, especially at<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_108">[108]</span> the time when Russia . . . . is unable to +help us. . . . . Of all pretensions, the most foolish would be to +wish to isolate the German Empire, as certain musketeers of the +press advise.<a id="FNanchor_316"></a><a href="#Footnote_316" +class="fnanchor">[316]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Alarmed by the criticism of the Newfoundland convention, M. +Delcassé tried in June and July to obtain some further concessions +from the British government.<a id="FNanchor_317"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_317" class="fnanchor">[317]</a> Although he had no +success, he felt compelled during the debates in the French +Chamber, November 3-10, to promise to reopen negotiations on the +Newfoundland question. Otherwise, he feared a rejection. This +meaningless concession, together with the fact that the entente had +already proved its value by enabling M. Delcassé to mediate between +Great Britain and Russia in October for a peaceful settlement of +the Dogger Bank episode,<a id="FNanchor_318"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_318" class="fnanchor">[318]</a> smoothed the path for +parliamentary approbation. Hence M. Delcassé, in his speech of +defense, was able to confine himself to generalities. He reviewed +his achievement of the ententes with Italy, Spain, and Great +Britain, by which the Moroccan question had been settled in favor +of France and by which the French position in the world had been +elevated. He advocated a policy of peace and conciliation, but he +also declared that France must maintain her defenses.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>And this is what procures for France [he concluded], augmented +in her credit and prestige, the trust and sympathy of the world. +The world is convinced to-day that French policy does not seek the +advantage for France other than in the harmony of French interests +with the interests of others. And she is happy to affirm that that +harmony, which no one believes or pretends to believe unrealisable, +is being realised each day to the benefit of all.</p> + +<p>It will be the honor of our democracy to have practiced that +policy.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[109]</span>He +was roundly applauded, and his achievements were approved by both +Parliament and people. The accord was ratified in the Chamber by a +vote of 443 to 105, and in the Senate by one of 215 to 37.<a id= +"FNanchor_319"></a><a href="#Footnote_319" class= +"fnanchor">[319]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc06"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_251"></a><a href="#FNanchor_251"><span class= +"label">[251]</span></a>4 Hansard, Vol. CXVIII, col. 1579.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_252"></a><a href="#FNanchor_252"><span class= +"label">[252]</span></a>See Rodd to Lansdowne, Jan. 9, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 41 f., No. 32, and following documents. However, +an extract from <em>Defence Committee Paper 1b</em> (Feb. 11, +1903), read as follows: “What difference would it make to the +balance of power in the Mediterranean if Russia were to obtain, +through possession of Constantinople, free egress from the Black +Sea through the Dardanelles, these remaining closed, as at present, +against other Powers?</p> + +<p>“The answer to this question unanimously accepted by the +Committee was that, while Russia would no doubt obtain certain +naval advantages from the change, it would not fundamentally alter +the present strategic position in the Mediterranean.”</p> + +<p>An extract from <em>Defence Committee Paper 2b</em> of the same +month read as follows: “It may be stated generally that a Russian +occupation of the Dardanelles, or an arrangement for enabling +Russia to freely use the waterway between the Black Sea and the +Mediterranean, such as her dominating influence can extract from +Turkey at her pleasure, would not make any marked difference in our +strategic dispositions as compared with present conditions” +(<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 59 f.). This opinion was approved on April 22, +1904, by King Edward and by Sir Charles Hardinge, who had just been +appointed ambassador at St. Petersburg (Lee, <em>King Edward +VII</em>, II, 289 f.). It apparently led to a change of policy in +the autumn of 1903 (see below).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_253"></a><a href="#FNanchor_253"><span class= +"label">[253]</span></a>Chirol, <em>Fifty Years in a Changing +World</em>, pp. 276 ff.; <em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XVII, chaps. cxii, +cxiv, Part A; <em>B.D.</em>, Vol. II, chap. xii. See also Lansdowne +to Curzon, April 24, 1903, Newton, <em>Lord Lansdowne</em>, p. +254.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_254"></a><a href="#FNanchor_254"><span class= +"label">[254]</span></a>See <em>B.D.</em>, IV, 41 ff., Nos. 32 ff.; +memo. on British policy in Persia, Oct. 31, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, +365 ff., No. 321; memo. respecting Russia and Afghanistan, Oct. 14, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 512 ff., No. 465; Newton, pp. 271 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_255"></a><a href="#FNanchor_255"><span class= +"label">[255]</span></a>The Japanese Foreign Minister, in +communicating to the British Minister on April 27 the Russian +demands to China, spoke “with unwonted seriousness” and asserted +“that he considered the situation exceedingly grave” (MacDonald to +Lansdowne, April 27, 1903, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 198 ff., No. 226. The +dispatch was received first on June 2, but there is no reason to +doubt that the view expressed therein was immediately known to the +British government since the two governments were in constant +communication. See Lansdowne to MacDonald, April 29, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 200 f., No. 228; memo. communicated by Hayashi, +Japanese minister to London, to Lansdowne, April 27, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 201 f., No. 228, inclosure; William L. Langer, “Der +Russisch-Japanische Krieg,” <em>Europäische Gespräche</em>, June, +1926, pp. 310 ff.; Tyler Dennett, <em>Roosevelt and the +Russo-Japanese War</em> (New York, 1925), pp. 139 f., 355 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_256"></a><a href="#FNanchor_256"><span class= +"label">[256]</span></a>When Russo-Japanese relations became +strained early in 1901, Lansdowne asked Monson whether he thought +“that France is under any engagement to take part on the side of +Russia in the event of war, or that without such obligation she +would attempt to do so” (Lansdowne to Monson, March 8, 1901, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 40, No. 49). Monson replied that he did not know +whether the Dual Alliance laid down the obligation of military aid +outside of Europe, and that while the French people showed little +zeal for far eastern affairs, yet nationalistic hatred against +Great Britain might be aroused at any time and might make the +French stand uncertain (Monson to Lansdowne, March 13, 1901, +<em>ibid.</em>, 44 f., No. 56). The Franco-Russian declaration of +1902 in reply to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance stated that the Dual +Alliance was extended to the Far East, although a few days later +Delcassé cast doubt upon the significance of this engagement. While +French public opinion was opposed to becoming involved in the Far +East for the sake of Russia, yet this ambiguity left the French +position in case of a war in doubt (see above).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_257"></a><a href="#FNanchor_257"><span class= +"label">[257]</span></a>See Pinon, <em>France et Allemagne</em>, +pp. 79 f.; Jean Darcy, <em>France et Angleterre. Cent années de +rivalité coloniale: L’Afrique</em> (Paris, 1904); Barclay, +<em>Thirty Years: Anglo-French Reminiscences, 1876-1906</em>, +chaps. xiii-xvi.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_258"></a><a href="#FNanchor_258"><span class= +"label">[258]</span></a>Philippe Crozier, who in 1903 was French +minister at Copenhagen, states that to his intimate friends King +Edward “even foresaw the hypothesis of a positive alliance” with +France (“L’Autriche et l’avant guerre,” <em>Revue de France</em>, +April 15, 1921, p. 271).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_259"></a><a href="#FNanchor_259"><span class= +"label">[259]</span></a>Lee, II; Newton, pp. 292 f. Early in 1915 +Balfour wrote to Lansdowne denying that King Edward was the author +of the Entente Cordiale. “Now, so far as I remember, during the +years which you and I were his Ministers, he [King Edward] never +made an important suggestion of any sort on large questions of +policy” (Newton, p. 293). This estimate may be true, but it does +not give the King credit for what he actually did.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_260"></a><a href="#FNanchor_260"><span class= +"label">[260]</span></a>Spender, <em>Life, Journalism and +Politics</em>, I, 185 ff. Esher had been furnishing information to +Spender, who was editor of the <em>Westminster Gazette</em>, a +Liberal paper, since 1900. Spender denies that the British foreign +office inspired the newspapers (<em>op. cit.</em>, I, 185).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_261"></a><a href="#FNanchor_261"><span class= +"label">[261]</span></a>J. L. de Lanessan, <em>Histoire de +l’entente cordiale franco-anglaise</em> (Paris, 1916), pp. 218 ff., +229, 234; Barclay, chaps. xvii-xx.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_262"></a><a href="#FNanchor_262"><span class= +"label">[262]</span></a>The <em>Times</em>, the Northcliffe Press, +the Chamberlain Press, the <em>National Review</em>, +<em>Fortnightly Review</em>, <em>Contemporary Review</em>, the +Liberals as well as the Conservatives, supported the movement. See +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, Nos. 5081-83, 5087-88, 5094, 5026-27; Hammann, +<em>Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges</em>, pp. 175 f.; Wolff, +<em>Das Vorspiel</em>, p. 135; Barclay, pp. 177 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_263"></a><a href="#FNanchor_263"><span class= +"label">[263]</span></a>See Barclay, chaps. xvii, xx.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_264"></a><a href="#FNanchor_264"><span class= +"label">[264]</span></a>Reports from the Belgian ministers in Paris +and London, May 4, 1902, <em>Zur europ. Politik</em>, I, 105 f. +Impressed with the unanimity of friendliness toward France among +the British, M. Delcassé expressed to Monson his regret that the +French did not fully reciprocate this feeling. See Monson to +Lansdowne, July 24, 1903, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 302 f., No. 361; +<em>Bulletin</em>, July, 1903, pp. 211 ff.; <em>Quest. dipl. et +col.</em>, XV, 656 f., XVI, 147; articles from <em>Figaro</em> and +the <em>Temps</em> quoted in the <em>London Times</em>, May 5, +1903; article by Etienne in the <em>National Review</em>, July 1, +1903, esp. p. 748<em>a</em>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_265"></a><a href="#FNanchor_265"><span class= +"label">[265]</span></a>So Eckardstein asserts, +<em>Lebenserinnerungen, etc.</em>, II, 337; cf. Schefer, <em>D’une +guerre à l’autre, etc.</em>, p. 249.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_266"></a><a href="#FNanchor_266"><span class= +"label">[266]</span></a>King Edward’s trip was a bold move, for +Paris was the center of anti-British feeling, and some members of +the British government were doubtful about its success. But the +King initiated the visit and took the entire responsibility for it, +feeling certain that he would be well received. In his first public +speech, more optimistically than truthfully, he declared: “There +may have been misunderstandings and causes of dissension in the +past [between the two countries], but all such differences are, I +believe, happily removed and forgotten, and I trust that the +friendship and admiration which we all feel for the French nation +and their glorious traditions may in the near future develop into a +sentiment of the warmest affection and attachment between the +peoples of the two countries. The achievement of this aim is my +constant desire.” Quoted in the <em>London Times</em>, May 2, 1903, +M. Paul Cambon’s estimate of the significance of the King’s visit +is as follows: “Of course, King Edward helped immensely. His visit +to Paris in the spring of 1903 really made it [the Anglo-French +entente] possible. . . . .” See interview with Cambon in +<em>ibid.</em>, Dec. 22, 1920. On the visit see Captain the Hon. +Sir Seymour Fortescue, <em>Looking Back</em> (London, 1920), pp. +279 ff.; <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, XV, 656 f.; Lee, II, 221 +ff., 236 ff.; Barclay, p. 218; Viscount Esher, <em>The Influence of +King Edward and Essays on Other Subjects</em> (London, 1915), pp. +57 ff.; Pinon, p. 114; Herbert H. Asquith, <em>The Genesis of the +War</em> (New York, 1923), p. 30; Metternich to Bülow, June 2, +1903, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 590 ff., No. 5376; Crozier, pp. 272 ff.; +Newton, pp. 275 f., 278 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_267"></a><a href="#FNanchor_267"><span class= +"label">[267]</span></a>Shortly before this visit Chamberlain +remarked to Eckardstein: “Here in England the King’s visit to Paris +is very popular, and if France gives him a good reception then +everything will go well between us in the future.” See Eckardstein +to Bülow, May 10, 1903, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 568, No. 5369; +Metternich to Bülow, June 2, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 590 ff., No. +5376.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_268"></a><a href="#FNanchor_268"><span class= +"label">[268]</span></a>Monson to Lansdowne, Jan. 20, 1902, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 261 f., No. 319; Lansdowne to Monson, May 19, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 289, No. 352; Monson to Lansdowne, May 22, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 290, No. 353; Monson to Lansdowne, May 29, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 290 f., No. 354; Lansdowne to Monson, July +21, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 301 f., No. 360, and inclosures; +<em>Annual Register</em> (1903), pp. 216 f.; Barclay, pp. 235, 242; +expressions of public opinion on this project contained in +<em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, July 1 and 15, Aug. 1, Sept. 1 and +15, 1903.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_269"></a><a href="#FNanchor_269"><span class= +"label">[269]</span></a>King Edward’s assertion had direct +reference to the German Emperor, with whom he had never agreed +(<em>Zur europ. Politik</em>, I, 110; Lee, II, 244 ff.; <em>Quest. +dipl. et col.</em>, XVI, 147 ff.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_270"></a><a href="#FNanchor_270"><span class= +"label">[270]</span></a>On this interview see the dispatch from +Lansdowne to Monson, July 7, 1903, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 294 ff., No. +357; also Delcassé’s interview in <em>Petit Parisien</em>, April +10, 1904, reprinted in <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, April 16, +1904, pp. 616 f. Delcassé’s conversation with Lansdowne had been +prefaced by the talks between Cambon and Lansdowne during the +previous year and also by a long talk on July 2, 1903, between +Lansdowne and Etienne. Etienne had stated one of the reasons for an +Anglo-French entente as follows (the account is from the hand of +the British minister): “M. Etienne expressed his belief that the +most serious menace to the peace of Europe lay in Germany, that a +good understanding between France and England was the only means of +holding German designs in check, and that if such an understanding +could be arrived at, England would find that France would be able +to exercise a salutary influence over Russia and thereby relieve us +from many of our troubles with that country” (Lansdowne to Monson, +July 2, 1903, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 293, No. 356).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_271"></a><a href="#FNanchor_271"><span class= +"label">[271]</span></a>Lansdowne to de Bunsen, July 15, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 298, No. 358; Lansdowne to Monson, July 29, Aug. 5, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 304 ff., Nos. 363 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_272"></a><a href="#FNanchor_272"><span class= +"label">[272]</span></a>Lansdowne to Durand, July 14, 1903, Newton, +p. 280.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_273"></a><a href="#FNanchor_273"><span class= +"label">[273]</span></a>Then Lansdowne notified the Spanish +government of the steps which he had taken and asked for a +statement of its views on the Moroccan question. Whether Spain +replied is not evident. See Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 5, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 306 f., No. 364; Lansdowne to Durand, Aug. 11, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 309 f., No. 366; Newton, p. 280.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_274"></a><a href="#FNanchor_274"><span class= +"label">[274]</span></a>J. A. Spender, <em>The Life of the Right +Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman</em> (London), Vol. II, chaps. +xxiii-xxiv.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_275"></a><a href="#FNanchor_275"><span class= +"label">[275]</span></a>Cromer to Lansdowne, July 17, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 298 ff., No. 359; memo. by Cromer, Aug. 7, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 307 ff., No. 365; Newton, pp. 280 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_276"></a><a href="#FNanchor_276"><span class= +"label">[276]</span></a>Lee, II, 245 f.; Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. +1, 1903, <em>B.D.</em>, II, 311 ff., No. 369; 400 n.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_277"></a><a href="#FNanchor_277"><span class= +"label">[277]</span></a>Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 311 ff., No. 369.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_278"></a><a href="#FNanchor_278"><span class= +"label">[278]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 7, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 317 f., No. 370; Cambon to Lansdowne, Oct. 26, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 320 ff., No. 373.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_279"></a><a href="#FNanchor_279"><span class= +"label">[279]</span></a>Cromer to Lansdowne, Nov. 1, 1903, +Lansdowne to Cromer, Nov. 17, 1903, Newton, pp. 283 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_280"></a><a href="#FNanchor_280"><span class= +"label">[280]</span></a>Cromer to Lansdowne, Oct. 30, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 323, No. 374; Lansdowne to Cambon, Nov. 19, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 324 ff., No. 376.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_281"></a><a href="#FNanchor_281"><span class= +"label">[281]</span></a>The French government, Cambon said, knew +that “the Queen of Spain during her recent visit to the Continent +had been in communication with the German Emperor upon the subject +of Morocco” (Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 9, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 329 +ff., No. 378).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_282"></a><a href="#FNanchor_282"><span class= +"label">[282]</span></a>Lansdowne to Cromer, Nov. 17, 1903, Cromer +to Lansdowne, Nov. 27, 1903, Newton, pp. 285 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_283"></a><a href="#FNanchor_283"><span class= +"label">[283]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 11, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 333 f., No. 380. It was evident that in view of +the monopolistic tendencies of the French, British trade in Morocco +would practically cease at the end of the time limit (Cromer to +Lansdowne, Dec. 11, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 332 f., No. 379).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_284"></a><a href="#FNanchor_284"><span class= +"label">[284]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 13, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 338, No. 384; Cromer to Lansdowne, Dec. 11, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 332, No. 379.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_285"></a><a href="#FNanchor_285"><span class= +"label">[285]</span></a>Quoted in <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, +Dec. 1, 1903, p. 821.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_286"></a><a href="#FNanchor_286"><span class= +"label">[286]</span></a>Delcassé had received the hint from +Chamberlain (see next reference).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_287"></a><a href="#FNanchor_287"><span class= +"label">[287]</span></a>Lansdowne to Scott, July 29, Aug. 12, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 212 f., Nos. 242 f. In September, Lansdowne +wrote in a memorandum for the cabinet as follows: “A good +understanding with France would not improbably be the precursor of +a better understanding with Russia” (Lee, II, 246). In July, +Lansdowne also sought the co-operation of the United States in +checking Russia in the Far East (Dennis, <em>Adventures in American +Diplomacy</em>, p. 359).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_288"></a><a href="#FNanchor_288"><span class= +"label">[288]</span></a>Mallet to Spring Rice, Oct. 26, 1903, +Gwynn, <em>Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice</em>, +I, 366 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_289"></a><a href="#FNanchor_289"><span class= +"label">[289]</span></a>Lansdowne to MacDonald, July 3, 13, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 206 ff., Nos. 237 f., and the following +documents. See MacDonald to Lansdowne, Sept. 4, Oct. 1, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 214 ff., Nos. 246, 248; Alfred von Hedenström, +<em>Geschichte Russlands von 1878 bis 1918</em> (Stuttgart and +Berlin, 1922), p. 170; <em>Cambridge History of British Foreign +Policy</em>, III, 324 f.; Langer, pp. 312 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_290"></a><a href="#FNanchor_290"><span class= +"label">[290]</span></a><em>B.D.</em>, IV, 621; memo. respecting +Russia and Afghanistan, Oct. 14, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 518 f., No. +465; memo. on Russo-Afghan relations, Oct. 11, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 519 f., No. 466; Hardinge to Lansdowne, Nov. 22, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 194, No. 181 (<em>b</em>). There was also +trouble over Tibet and the Persian Gulf (see Newton, p. 287).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_291"></a><a href="#FNanchor_291"><span class= +"label">[291]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 26, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 217 f., No. 250.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_292"></a><a href="#FNanchor_292"><span class= +"label">[292]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, Nov. 4, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 221 f., No. 257.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_293"></a><a href="#FNanchor_293"><span class= +"label">[293]</span></a>Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 12, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, IV, 224, No. 209; Bülow to F. O., Oct. 31, 1903, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVIII, 853, No. 5918.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_294"></a><a href="#FNanchor_294"><span class= +"label">[294]</span></a>Lansdowne to Spring Rice, Nov. 7, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 222 ff., No. 258.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_295"></a><a href="#FNanchor_295"><span class= +"label">[295]</span></a>Lansdowne to Spring Rice, Nov. 7, 17, 25, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 222 ff., No. 258; IV, 183 ff., Nos. 181 f.; +306 f., No. 289; Scott to Lansdowne, Dec. 22, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, +II, 226, No. 262; Lee, II, 280 f.; Lansdowne to Cromer, Dec. 7, +1903, Newton, p. 287.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_296"></a><a href="#FNanchor_296"><span class= +"label">[296]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 11, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 224, No. 259.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_297"></a><a href="#FNanchor_297"><span class= +"label">[297]</span></a>In Dec., 1903, Delcassé informed the +Japanese Minister in Paris that he did not approve of all of +Russia’s designs in the Far East (Dennis, p. 385). Hayashi, +Japanese minister in London, believed as early as Dec. 23 that +France would remain neutral. See Eckardstein, III, 62, 188; see +also Metternich to F. O., Jan. 8, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 20 f., +No. 5931; memo. by Eckardstein, Jan. 17, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 38 +ff., No. 5945; Langer, p. 317; Bülow to William II, Jan. 12, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 26, No. 5936.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_298"></a><a href="#FNanchor_298"><span class= +"label">[298]</span></a>Lee, II, 282; Langer, pp. 316 f.; Dennis, +chap. xiii. However, as late as Nov. 4, 1903, Lansdowne did not +expect war, nor did Sir Charles Hardinge as late as Dec. 25. By +Jan. 5, the latter did (Gwynn, I, 391 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_299"></a><a href="#FNanchor_299"><span class= +"label">[299]</span></a>Cambon to Lansdowne, Dec. 27, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 336, No. 382; and the following documents, +particularly the dispatch from Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 18, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 339, No. 386. The British were also surprised to +learn early in January that Delcassé had kept his colleagues in the +dark concerning the details of the arrangement, and feared some +trouble on that account. It seems that as late as March 2 Delcassé +had not consulted the French Colonial Minister (Lansdowne to +Cromer, Jan. 5, 1904, Monson to Lansdowne, Jan. 8, 1904, Newton, +pp. 287 ff.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_300"></a><a href="#FNanchor_300"><span class= +"label">[300]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, p. 307.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_301"></a><a href="#FNanchor_301"><span class= +"label">[301]</span></a><em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 89 f., editor’s note, +and the documents in <em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxix; Gwynn, +I, 391.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_302"></a><a href="#FNanchor_302"><span class= +"label">[302]</span></a>Spring Rice to Ferguson, Feb. 4, 1904, +Spring Rice to Roosevelt (no date given, though written in Feb. or +March, 1904), Gwynn, I, 392 ff.; Sternburg to F. O., March 21, +1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 112, No. 5992. See also the dispatch from +Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 18, No. 5929. +Sir Charles Dilke summed up the danger of the situation as follows: +“If Germany were to declare war on Japan, Great Britain would be +forced by her treaty engagement to declare war on Russia and +Germany; and France, it is understood, to declare war upon Great +Britain and Japan” (Dilke, “The War in the Far East,” <em>North +American Review</em>, April, 1904, quoted in Dennett, p. 94).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_303"></a><a href="#FNanchor_303"><span class= +"label">[303]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, Feb. 17, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, V, 67 f., and following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_304"></a><a href="#FNanchor_304"><span class= +"label">[304]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, Feb. 25, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, II, 346, No. 391, and following documents; on March +1, King Edward wrote to Balfour strongly advising in favor of the +territorial sacrifice asked by the French on the Newfoundland +question, for, he wrote, “<em>more than ever now</em> [in italics +in the original] we must leave no bone of contention between +ourselves and the French Government” (Lee, II, 248). See also +Holstein’s keen analysis of the situation on Jan. 23, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 48 ff., No. 5951. Cromer also urged his +government to make concessions (Newton, p. 289).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_305"></a><a href="#FNanchor_305"><span class= +"label">[305]</span></a>Tardieu, <em>La France et les +alliances</em>, p. 23; E. J. Dillon, <em>The Eclipse of Russia</em> +(New York, 1918), pp. 330 ff.; Eckardstein, III, 57 ff., 187 ff.; +Crozier, pp. 282 f.; Mévil, <em>De la paix de Francfort, etc.</em>, +pp. 83 ff.; Radolin to F. O., Feb. 11, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 60 +f., No. 5960.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_306"></a><a href="#FNanchor_306"><span class= +"label">[306]</span></a>Mévil, p. 82.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_307"></a><a href="#FNanchor_307"><span class= +"label">[307]</span></a>For an illustration of that optimism see +Nicholas II to William II, Jan. 24, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 53, +No. 5952.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_308"></a><a href="#FNanchor_308"><span class= +"label">[308]</span></a>Lansdowne to Scott, Jan. 19, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 237, No. 280; Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 27, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 240, No. 283.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_309"></a><a href="#FNanchor_309"><span class= +"label">[309]</span></a>In July, 1905, Spring Rice reported to his +friend Roosevelt a conversation which he had recently had with +Lansdowne, as follows: “In speaking in general terms of our +relations with Japan, he [Lansdowne] pointed out that from the very +first our political interest had been to prevent the war [between +Russia and Japan] which would not only expose us to great dangers +of loss in Asia itself, but would seriously imperil our good +understanding with France. . . . .” Then after explaining why Great +Britain refused to press Japan to maintain peace, he continued: “As +a result we all but lost our agreement with France” . . . . +(Dennett, pp. 213 f.). Cf. Eckardstein to Schwabach, Feb. 10, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 60, No. 5959. Spring Rice’s assertion was no +doubt exaggerated in order to prove to Roosevelt that Great Britain +really desired peace between Russia and Japan.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_310"></a><a href="#FNanchor_310"><span class= +"label">[310]</span></a>See Radolin to Bülow, March 15, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, XX, 3 f., No. 6366.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_311"></a><a href="#FNanchor_311"><span class= +"label">[311]</span></a>See Lansdowne to Monson, March 1, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 347, No. 393, and following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_312"></a><a href="#FNanchor_312"><span class= +"label">[312]</span></a>See Monson to Lansdowne, March 30, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 357, No. 405; Lansdowne to Monson, March 30, 31, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 358, No. 406; 359 f., No. 408; Newton, pp. +289 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_313"></a><a href="#FNanchor_313"><span class= +"label">[313]</span></a>The first two articles were kept secret at +Delcassé’s desire; the next two for obvious reasons.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_314"></a><a href="#FNanchor_314"><span class= +"label">[314]</span></a>Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, +<em>Documents diplomatiques. Accords conclus, le 8 avril, 1904, +entre la France et l’Angleterre au sujet du Maroc, de l’Egypte, de +Terre-Neuve, etc.</em> (Paris, 1904); <em>Parliamentary Papers. +Declaration between the United Kingdom and France Respecting Egypt +and Morocco, together with the Secret Articles Signed at the Same +Time. Signed at London, April 8, 1904</em> (Cd. 5969), Vol. CIII +(1911); <em>B.D.</em>, II, 373 ff., No. 417. The secret articles +were first revealed in 1911.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_315"></a><a href="#FNanchor_315"><span class= +"label">[315]</span></a>On the reaction of the British people to +the accord see Spender, <em>Life, Journalism and Politics</em>, I, +188 ff.; <em>London Times</em>, April 12 and 14, 1904; +<em>Spectator</em>, quoted in Schulthess, <em>Europäischer +Geschichtskalendar 1904</em>, p. 223. For the debates in the +British Parliament see 4 Hansard, Vol. CXXXV, cols. 502 ff. Adverse +opinion was expressed by Lord Rosebery, the <em>Daily +Chronicle</em>, the <em>Morning Post</em>, and Mr. Aflalo who had +lived in Morocco and was particularly interested in the fate of the +land; but their voices were lost in the general applause +(Metternich to Bülow, April 9, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 13 f., No. +6375).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_316"></a><a href="#FNanchor_316"><span class= +"label">[316]</span></a><em>Bulletin</em>, April, 1904, p. 107: +Millet, <em>Notre politique extérieure 1898-1905</em>, pp. 168, +173. Millet was a follower of Hanotaux, Delcassé’s predecessor at +the foreign office, and a consistent critic of the latter.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_317"></a><a href="#FNanchor_317"><span class= +"label">[317]</span></a>Count de Montferrand, who in company with +M. Cambon talked with Sanderson about the Newfoundland question, +remarked that “if M. Delcassé was not able to inform the French +Chambers that they had secured this right, the Convention would be +rejected” (memo. by Sanderson, June 30, 1904, <em>B.D.</em>, III, +6, No. 5; see <em>ibid.</em>, chap. xvi, Part I).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_318"></a><a href="#FNanchor_318"><span class= +"label">[318]</span></a>See below.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_319"></a><a href="#FNanchor_319"><span class= +"label">[319]</span></a>For a summary see the article by +Louis-Jaray, “L’Accord entre la France et l’Angleterre. L’Opinion +publique et le rapprochement franco-anglais,” <em>Quest. dipl. et +col.</em>, XVIII (Nov. 16, 1904), 593 ff. The debates in the +Chamber, Nov. 3-10, 1904, and in the Senate, Dec. 5-7, 1904, are to +be found in the <em>Journal officiel, Debats. parlem.</em> +(Chambre), pp. 2255 ff.; <em>ibid.</em> (Sénat), pp. 1013 ff. See +also Monson’s reports to Lansdowne, Nov. 9, Dec. 8, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 11 ff., Nos. 8 ff.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[110]</span><a id= +"c07"></a>CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<p class="sch1">ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE MAKING OF THE +ENTENTE CORDIALE</p> + +<p>After the Russo-Japanese War began, the British and Russian +governments decided that for the present nothing further could be +done toward an understanding.<a id="FNanchor_320"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_320" class="fnanchor">[320]</a> Russian anger was +directed as much against Great Britain as against Japan for having +caused the conflict;<a id="FNanchor_321"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_321" class="fnanchor">[321]</a> while Great Britain +could hardly jeopardize her alliance with Japan by coming to a +settlement with the latter’s enemy. A few days after the signing of +the Anglo-French agreement, King Edward tried to revive the +negotiations in a talk at Copenhagen with M. Iswolski, Russian +minister at the capital. When Count Benckendorff mentioned the +King’s conversation to Lord Lansdowne, the latter reiterated his +former opinion, adding that in the meantime the two governments +should so handle any differences which might arise as to permit the +renewal of the discussions for an agreement after the conclusion of +the war.<a id="FNanchor_322"></a><a href="#Footnote_322" class= +"fnanchor">[322]</a></p> + +<p>This suggestion was acted upon, for, even apart from other +reasons, Count Lamsdorff wished to hold Great Britain to the +strictest neutrality during the war with the lure of an +understanding. The British government assured him of its neutral +intentions.<a id="FNanchor_323"></a><a href="#Footnote_323" class= +"fnanchor">[323]</a><span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_111">[111]</span> King Edward cultivated assiduously the +friendship of the Czar during the next months.<a id= +"FNanchor_324"></a><a href="#Footnote_324" class= +"fnanchor">[324]</a> Early in June the British government gave +reassurances about its policy toward Tibet, in return for which the +Russian government approved the Khedivial decree putting into +execution the reforms in Egypt foreseen in the Anglo-French +declaration.<a id="FNanchor_325"></a><a href="#Footnote_325" class= +"fnanchor">[325]</a> Fraught with more danger was the possibility +that Russia might send her Black Sea fleet through the straits. +Lord Lansdowne warned her that that act “could not be tolerated by +this country,” that it “might render conflict inevitable.”<a id= +"FNanchor_326"></a><a href="#Footnote_326" class= +"fnanchor">[326]</a> So the fleet was never sent. In spite of +British protests, however, Russia dispatched several vessels +belonging to the volunteer fleet through the Dardanelles and the +Bosphorus. When, in July and August, two of these ships seized some +British merchant vessels suspected of carrying contraband, British +public opinion demanded that the government defend British +commerce. When Lord Lansdowne expressed indignation at the +depredations, the Russian government immediately agreed to a +conciliatory settlement.<a id="FNanchor_327"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_327" class="fnanchor">[327]</a> In September the Russian +government objected strongly to the terms of the recent +Anglo-Tibetan Treaty, but without avail. Being in no position to +follow up that protest, it had to acquiesce in the British +action.<a id="FNanchor_328"></a><a href="#Footnote_328" class= +"fnanchor">[328]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[112]</span>In October the +two countries came dangerously close to war over the Dogger Bank +affair. The Russian Baltic fleet, a makeshift, heterogeneous +collection of vessels, was on its way to the war zone. While +passing through the North Sea, it shot into a British fishing fleet +off the Dogger Bank in the night of October 21, sinking one vessel +and damaging others, killing two men and wounding members of the +crews. The Russian fleet thought that it had fired at two Japanese +torpedo boats, and continued its voyage without stopping to see +what damage it had inflicted. The previous mishandling of British +merchant ships by the Russians had already so irritated the British +nation that it became incensed at this latest act. Public opinion +was bellicose. Sir Charles Hardinge, British ambassador at St. +Petersburg, described the fleet’s conduct to Count Lamsdorff as “an +unqualified and brutal outrage.” The British government demanded a +full investigation, punishment of those culpable, “ample apology +and complete and prompt reparation as well as security against the +recurrence of such intolerable incidents.” “The matter is one which +admits of no delay,” asserted Lord Lansdowne to the Russian +Ambassador; “if an attempt were made to fence with the question, +public feeling here would become uncontrollable.” Unless prompt +action were taken by the Russian government, he continued, “we +should certainly be obliged to take our own measures for guarding +against a repetition of these acts.”<a id= +"FNanchor_329"></a><a href="#Footnote_329" class= +"fnanchor">[329]</a> The British admiralty mobilized the fleets at +Portland and at Malta, rushed reinforcements to the fleet at +Gibraltar, and advised the commander there that “it may become +necessary for you to stop the Baltic Fleet, by persuasion if +possible, but by force if necessary.”<a id= +"FNanchor_330"></a><a href="#Footnote_330" class= +"fnanchor">[330]</a></p> + +<p>This energetic procedure brought immediate results. The Russian +government agreed quickly to the British demands. With the help of +French mediation, the crisis passed within a week, and<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_113">[113]</span> the final settlement was left +to international arbitration. But on October 29 Lord Lansdowne +warned the Russian Ambassador as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I owned . . . . that I lived in dread of new troubles arising. . +. . . It had not been without the greatest difficulty that we had +avoided a conflict. . . . . I would not, in these circumstances, +dwell upon the results of a repetition of the North Sea +incident.</p> + +<p>There was however another peril against which it was our duty to +guard. . . . . If, during its [the Russian fleet’s] long voyage, +the Russian captains considered themselves justified in the +wholesale seizure of vessels suspected of carrying contraband, +public feeling in this country would become uncontrollable.<a id= +"FNanchor_331"></a><a href="#Footnote_331" class= +"fnanchor">[331]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">A few days later the British Foreign Secretary +again warned the Ambassador, somewhat more mildly to be sure, +against permitting two particularly predatory ships of the +volunteer fleet which had just been added to the Russian fleet +itself to prey on neutral commerce.<a id= +"FNanchor_332"></a><a href="#Footnote_332" class= +"fnanchor">[332]</a> No more trouble arose.</p> + +<p>After events of this kind, an Anglo-Russian +<em>rapprochement</em> seemed far off. The British and Russian +presses were at each other’s throats. On December 2 Sir Charles +Hardinge reported his French colleague’s views as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>He [M. Bompard] impressed upon me that the attitude of His +Majesty’s Government during the next year when the conditions of +peace would be under discussion would be decisive of the relations +between England and Russia for the next twenty five years. Thanks +to the Japanese war the German Government were only now recovering +the position which they had lost at the congress of Berlin. If His +Majesty’s Government continued to maintain the same strained +relations during the forthcoming year as in the past twelve months +there would be no prospect of a rapprochement between the two +countries for another generation. He begged me to remember that the +many incidents which had occurred had redounded solely to the +advantage of the German Emperor who now had a position at the +Russian Court which a year ago would have been regarded as +impossible.<a id="FNanchor_333"></a><a href="#Footnote_333" class= +"fnanchor">[333]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[114]</span>In +the next month M. Delcassé urged upon the British Ambassador the +desirability of an Anglo-Russian <em>rapprochement</em> and asked +about the possibility of bringing Italy also into new quadruple +grouping.</p> + +<p>Lord Lansdowne saw no reason why a permanent understanding with +Russia should be impossible, but he pointed out the difficulty. +“The Russian diplomatic currency has become debased and +discredited,” he wrote to the Ambassador at Paris, “and it will not +be easy to restore it to its face value.”<a id= +"FNanchor_334"></a><a href="#Footnote_334" class= +"fnanchor">[334]</a> None the less he hardly needed the French +warning and advice, for he had already been acting in accordance +with them. The British government had shown as much consideration +for Russian feeling in the Dogger Bank affair as circumstances +permitted. In February of the next year it tried to reach accord on +the Afghan question, but Count Lamsdorff was too much occupied with +other matters.<a id="FNanchor_335"></a><a href="#Footnote_335" +class="fnanchor">[335]</a> Great Britain could well afford to be +friendly since the Japanese victories were so eminently +satisfactory to her. Moreover, she wanted no war, for, apart from +her aversion to war as such, she feared what Germany might do in +case of one.<a id="FNanchor_336"></a><a href="#Footnote_336" class= +"fnanchor">[336]</a> Rumors of a Russo-German treaty were already +abroad and spread rapidly toward the end of 1904.<a id= +"FNanchor_337"></a><a href="#Footnote_337" class= +"fnanchor">[337]</a> British public opinion was becoming more +mistrustful of Germany than of Russia. Having regarded the growing +German navy, so near at hand in the North Sea, as a distinct menace +for over a year, it now feared<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_115">[115]</span> that Germany might try a sudden descent +upon the English coast.<a id="FNanchor_338"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_338" class="fnanchor">[338]</a> The British government +viewed the situation more sanely, but it appreciated the danger of +the German navy. As Mr. Spring Rice, first secretary of the British +embassy in St. Petersburg, had written to his friend, President +Roosevelt, in the summer of 1904:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>We are trying our best to come to some sort of understanding +with Russia (when the war is over), so as to put an end to the +continual régime of panic in India, Persia, etc. The reason we are +doing so is that with the establishment of a strong German navy on +our flanks we cannot afford to have a life-and-death struggle in +Asia and the Far East. Germany is rapidly acquiring a very strong +position in Russia. . . . . In any case, if we were at war with +Russia, Germany would either take Russia’s side, or exact very hard +terms from us for her neutrality. The German fleet has really +revolutionized politics.<a id="FNanchor_339"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_339" class="fnanchor">[339]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">In August, 1904, Sir John Fisher, first sea lord of +the British admiralty, had warned the government that “‘instant +readiness for war’ was imperative, . . . . unless naval reforms +were ‘ruthless and remorseless, . . . . we may as well pack up and +hand over to Germany.’”<a id="FNanchor_340"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_340" class="fnanchor">[340]</a> In accordance with his +recommendation, the British government reorganized and +redistributed its fleet late in 1904 in such a way as to +concentrate the main strength in home waters. And at the close of +the year, when the German statesmen expressed fears of a British +attack on their country, Lord Lansdowne wrote to Sir Frank +Lascelles:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>They cannot seriously believe that we are meditating a coup +against them. Are they perchance meditating one against us and are +they seeking to justify it in advance? All this talk about one +driving them to lean towards Russia looks a little like it.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[116]</span>The +knowledge gained early in 1905, that Germany was making approaches +not only to Russia and the United States but to Japan as well, +augmented British mistrust of her policy.<a id= +"FNanchor_341"></a><a href="#Footnote_341" class= +"fnanchor">[341]</a></p> + +<p>The pressure of events and the insistence of such men as King +Edward, Admiral Fisher, and others were completing the change of +policy which Great Britain had been making since 1901. Great +Britain had abandoned her policy of splendid isolation; she was +more and more taking an active share in European international +relations and assuming a definite position in the Continental +system of alliances.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc07"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_320"></a><a href="#FNanchor_320"><span class= +"label">[320]</span></a>Lansdowne to Spring Rice, April 22, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 188 f., No. 183. The breakdown of the +negotiations as a result of the war had been anticipated early in +January by Sir Charles Hardinge (Gwynn, <em>The Letters and +Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice</em>, I, 392).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_321"></a><a href="#FNanchor_321"><span class= +"label">[321]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, June 8, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 194 f., No. 188; Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 28, +1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 165 ff., No. 6028, and following +documents; Lansdowne to Scott, March 4, 1904, <em>B.D.</em>, V, 73; +Spring Rice to Ferguson, March 2, 1904, Gwynn, I, 403 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_322"></a><a href="#FNanchor_322"><span class= +"label">[322]</span></a>Lee, <em>King Edward VII</em>, II, 283 ff.; +Lansdowne to Spring Rice, May 4, 1904, <em>B.D.</em>, IV, 189 f., +No. 184, and following documents; Savinsky, <em>Recollections of a +Russian Diplomat</em>, pp. 90 f.; Crozier, <em>Revue de +France</em>, April 1, 1921, pp. 275 ff.; Newton, <em>Lord +Lansdowne</em>, pp. 307 ff.; cf. <em>ibid.</em>, pp. 243 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_323"></a><a href="#FNanchor_323"><span class= +"label">[323]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, June 8, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 194 f., No. 188; Newton, pp. 310 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_324"></a><a href="#FNanchor_324"><span class= +"label">[324]</span></a>Lee, II, 287 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_325"></a><a href="#FNanchor_325"><span class= +"label">[325]</span></a>Lansdowne to Spring Rice, May 4, 10, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 189 f., No. 184; 307 ff., No. 291; Hardinge to +Lansdowne, May 18, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 190, No. 185; Monson to +Lansdowne May 27, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 193, No. 186.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_326"></a><a href="#FNanchor_326"><span class= +"label">[326]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, April 29, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, II, 401; Lansdowne to O’Conor, June 7, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, IV, 51, No. 46; Metternich to F. O., Aug. 18, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 240, No. 6070.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_327"></a><a href="#FNanchor_327"><span class= +"label">[327]</span></a><em>B.D.</em>, Vol. IV, chap. xxiii, Part +III; <em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxxii; Newton, pp. 313 ff.; +Gwynn, I, 424 f. King Edward was in favor of showing to Germany, +whose commerce was also being molested by those ships, a mark of +friendship by co-operating with her in handling the matter with +Russia. Lansdowne disapproved the idea (Lee, II, 297 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_328"></a><a href="#FNanchor_328"><span class= +"label">[328]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 23, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 317, No. 299; Lansdowne to Hardinge, Sept. 27, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 319 f., No. 301.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_329"></a><a href="#FNanchor_329"><span class= +"label">[329]</span></a>Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 24 and 25, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 6, No. 6; 7 f., No. 8; 10 f., No. 12; +Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 24, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 7, No. 7.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_330"></a><a href="#FNanchor_330"><span class= +"label">[330]</span></a>Admiralty to F. O., Oct. 28, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 18 f., No. 19 and inclosures.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_331"></a><a href="#FNanchor_331"><span class= +"label">[331]</span></a>Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 29, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 23 f., No. 23.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_332"></a><a href="#FNanchor_332"><span class= +"label">[332]</span></a>Lansdowne to Hardinge, Nov. 3, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 55, No. 52. On the Dogger Bank affair see +<em>ibid.</em>, chap. xxiii, Part 11; <em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XIX, +chap. cxxxiv; Lee, II, 301 ff.; Newton, pp. 315 ff.; Gwynn, I, 432 +f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_333"></a><a href="#FNanchor_333"><span class= +"label">[333]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, Dec. 2, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 66 f., No. 58.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_334"></a><a href="#FNanchor_334"><span class= +"label">[334]</span></a>Newton, pp. 339 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_335"></a><a href="#FNanchor_335"><span class= +"label">[335]</span></a>Lansdowne to Benckendorff, Feb. 17, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 520 f., No. 466<em>a</em>; Lansdowne to +Hardinge, March 8, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 521, No. +466<em>b</em>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_336"></a><a href="#FNanchor_336"><span class= +"label">[336]</span></a>On Nov. 5, 1904, Spring Rice wrote to +Roosevelt as follows: “Emperor William has got the ear of the +Emperor here. . . . . It is plain that Germany naturally enough +wants to see Russia have a free hand in Asia and hopes in exchange +to have one in Europe; that if England could be engaged in a war +with Russia which would require her fleet to be absent in the East, +the German fleet, especially if France would come in, would have a +good chance for a sudden descent on England” (quoted in Dennett, +<em>Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War</em>, pp. 73 f.; see also +Gwynn, I, 414 ff., 436, 438 ff.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_337"></a><a href="#FNanchor_337"><span class= +"label">[337]</span></a>Lascelles to Lansdowne, Sept. 23, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 4 f., No. 4; Gwynn, I, 427 f.; see also +below.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_338"></a><a href="#FNanchor_338"><span class= +"label">[338]</span></a>Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, <em>England and +Germany, 1740-1914</em> (Princeton, 1916), p. 180; <em>G.P.</em>, +Vol. XIX, chap. cxxxvi. Balfour denied in the House of Commons that +an attack was likely or would succeed if it were made. But the +British fear continued. See 4 Hansard, Vol. CXLII (March 7, 1907), +col. 595; Vol. CXLVI (May 11, 1905), cols. 72 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_339"></a><a href="#FNanchor_339"><span class= +"label">[339]</span></a>Dennett, pp. 152 f.; Gwynn, I, 422 f. The +letter was a reply to one from Roosevelt dated June 13, 1904. The +approximate date given by Dennett is incorrect.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_340"></a><a href="#FNanchor_340"><span class= +"label">[340]</span></a>Fisher to Knollys, Aug. 19, 1904, Lee, II, +328.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_341"></a><a href="#FNanchor_341"><span class= +"label">[341]</span></a>Newton, p. 332.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[117]</span><a id= +"c08"></a>CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<p class="sch1">FRENCH POLICY AFTER THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE +CORDIALE</p> + +<p>As friend of Great Britain and ally of Russia, France was in an +uneasy situation after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. +Hostility between those two Powers was increasing. Thereby the +influence of Germany in St. Petersburg was greatly augmented, and +Germany was assiduously courting Russia. M. Delcassé had to show +enough sympathy and give enough help to Russia to prevent Germany +from usurping France’s position at St. Petersburg and at the same +time hold to the Anglo-French entente.</p> + +<p>The task did not prove to be unduly arduous, for Russia did not +require much of her ally. M. Delcassé sought to maintain harmony +between Great Britain and Russia by helping them settle their +disputes.<a id="FNanchor_342"></a><a href="#Footnote_342" class= +"fnanchor">[342]</a> He also did what favors he could for Russia, +such as permitting the Russian Baltic fleet to use French ports on +the way to the Far East. But otherwise he left Russia to her own +resources and devoted himself to other tasks.</p> + +<p>The Anglo-French accord did not complete M. Delcassé’s work of +establishing France’s right to preponderance in Morocco and of +elevating her position in Europe, but it made the completion +possible. The Foreign Minister still had to negotiate an agreement +with Spain, to exclude Germany from the Moroccan settlement, and to +execute the policy of pacific penetration in the<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_118">[118]</span> Sherifian Empire. During the +succeeding months he was occupied with these problems.</p> + +<h3>I. THE FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT, 1904</h3> + +<p>When M. Delcassé, in accordance with Article VIII of the +Anglo-French declaration, proposed to the Spanish government in +April, 1904, that they negotiate over the Moroccan question, he +immediately met with difficulty. Relying upon promises by Lord +Lansdowne and M. Delcassé, the Spanish government had expected to +be consulted before the conclusion of the bargain. It therefore +complained because the negotiations had not been conducted <em>à +trois</em>.<a id="FNanchor_343"></a><a href="#Footnote_343" class= +"fnanchor">[343]</a> The Spanish Queen Mother branded the act as an +“unfriendliness” to Spain, and the Marquis del Muni (M. Leon y +Castillo), Spanish ambassador at Paris, “clinched his fist in his +pocket” at the two Powers.<a id="FNanchor_344"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_344" class="fnanchor">[344]</a> When the Cortes met, the +Liberals took occasion on June 6, 7, and 9, to expose the main +terms of the Franco-Spanish accord of 1902 which the Conservatives +had refused to sign, and to accuse that party of having +inadequately upheld Spain’s interests. As the nation remained +apathetic, M. Maura, the prime minister, had no difficulty +in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[119]</span> defending his +government.<a id="FNanchor_345"></a><a href="#Footnote_345" class= +"fnanchor">[345]</a> Urged by the British government,<a id= +"FNanchor_346"></a><a href="#Footnote_346" class= +"fnanchor">[346]</a> he accepted M. Delcassé’s overture.</p> + +<p>The course of the negotiations, which began in April, was a +rocky one. The Spanish accused the French of being too-hard +bargainers; the French thought that the other party was too prone +to alarm.<a id="FNanchor_347"></a><a href="#Footnote_347" class= +"fnanchor">[347]</a> The Spanish government, ignorant of the secret +articles in the Anglo-French agreement by which the Spanish sphere +was already limited,<a id="FNanchor_348"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_348" class="fnanchor">[348]</a> demanded the territorial +terms which had been informally agreed upon in 1902. But M. +Delcassé refused to give them, for, he asserted, Spain ought to +bear her part of the sacrifice which France had had to make to +Great Britain. Aroused by this reply, the Spanish government +appealed late in April to the German government for an “active +expression” of “sympathy . . . . at the opportune moment.” Although +the German Chancellor was eager to give it,<a id= +"FNanchor_349"></a><a href="#Footnote_349" class= +"fnanchor">[349]</a> Spain aimed to use this intimacy merely as a +threat. While continuing the conversations more or less dilatorily +with Germany, she asked for and relied chiefly upon the support of +Great Britain to obtain satisfactory terms with France.</p> + +<p>Through Lord Lansdowne’s mediation, M. Delcassé agreed in May to +extend the Spanish sphere of influence in the north from Melilla to +the mouth of the Moulouya—a particularly sore spot with the Spanish +since they owned islands just off this coast—and to expand the +limits of the Spanish sphere in Southern Morocco. The French +Minister made these concessions dependent upon<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_120">[120]</span> Spain’s accepting his other conditions, +and asserted to the Spanish Ambassador that “he was not prepared to +prolong the discussion of these details, and his offer was <em>à +prendre ou à laisser</em>.”<a id="FNanchor_350"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_350" class="fnanchor">[350]</a></p> + +<p>This bold speech did not impress the Spanish government, which, +knowing France’s need for an agreement with it, followed Count +Bülow’s advice of drawing out the negotiations.<a id= +"FNanchor_351"></a><a href="#Footnote_351" class= +"fnanchor">[351]</a> Its views differed from those of M. Delcassé +in that it desired Spanish control in Tangier, full commercial +liberty throughout Morocco without any time limit, and the +publication of the agreement—all of which the French Minister +refused.<a id="FNanchor_352"></a><a href="#Footnote_352" class= +"fnanchor">[352]</a> However, by the last of June accord was +virtually reached, when M. Delcassé brought forth a new condition +to the effect that Spain should be precluded from taking any action +in her prospective sphere until the <em>status quo</em> in Morocco +came to an end.<a id="FNanchor_353"></a><a href="#Footnote_353" +class="fnanchor">[353]</a></p> + +<p>M. Delcassé was confronted with the problem of how to maintain a +unified Franco-Spanish policy in the peaceful penetration of +Morocco, how to retain the initiative in that work in French hands, +how to minimize Spain’s rights in Morocco in favor of France. +Mistrusting Spain’s competence to handle subject peoples, he wished +to prevent her from taking any action in her sphere that would +arouse the Moroccans to a war not only against Spain but also +against France and thus ruin the work of pacific penetration. He +feared that Spain might precipitate the liquidation of Morocco so +as to obtain full control of her area. The<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_121">[121]</span> French policy was to postpone that event +until a suitable occasion, in the meantime undermining Morocco’s +integrity and independence while pretending to maintain them. He +was legally within his rights in taking this line toward Spain, and +was fortified against British intervention in the latter’s favor, +because secret Article III of the Anglo-French agreement provided +that the specified area should come within the sphere of influence +of Spain and be administered by her “whenever the Sultan ceases to +exercise authority over it.”<a id="FNanchor_354"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_354" class="fnanchor">[354]</a></p> + +<p>The Spanish government, protesting that this proposal would +reduce its position to that of a subprotectorate, demanded the same +rights in its sphere of influence as France would enjoy in hers. It +desired particularly that Tangier be policed by Spanish altogether. +The Spanish Foreign Minister asserted that Spain was averse to +disturbing the <em>status quo</em> in Morocco, but he and his +colleagues suspected that France would never acknowledge a change +in the political status in Morocco and would thus exclude Spain +from any share in the land. The Spanish Minister declared that he +“would not sign an agreement which abandoned Spanish rights,” and +in complaining to the British government he threatened to “appeal +to the Powers.”</p> + +<p>Lord Lansdowne knew that by “Powers” was meant Germany, who was +just then showing marked interest in helping Spain in the Moroccan +affair. Wishing to obviate German intervention, he advised the +Spanish to make concrete proposals to France concerning ways of +exercising an influence in the proposed Spanish sphere—for +instance, as to “the construction of railways and other useful +works.” He also cautioned Spain against undertaking to police +Tangier. At the same time he urged M. Delcassé to be more +conciliatory toward Spain so as to avoid the possibility of +“international difficulties.”<a id="FNanchor_355"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_355" class="fnanchor">[355]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">[122]</span>M. Delcassé was +willing to permit Spanish participation in the economic development +of Morocco and also to associate Spanish officials with French ones +in two of the three ports whose customs revenues were to be +collected as security for the recent French loan. He refused to +recede on the other points.<a id="FNanchor_356"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_356" class="fnanchor">[356]</a> This reply so excited +the Spanish that when M. Delcassé proposed a clause whereby Spain +would be prohibited from alienating the Moroccan territory over +which she should have control, the Spanish government rejected it +as beneath its dignity. It offered instead to give France a right +of preference in case Spain wished to alienate any or all of that +area. Lord Lansdowne, who did not want France to gain this +preferential right, persuaded the Spanish to accept the French +proposal.<a id="FNanchor_357"></a><a href="#Footnote_357" class= +"fnanchor">[357]</a></p> + +<p>The main issue, however, that of Spain’s independence of action +in her sphere, remained unsolved. In the middle of July, while +leaving the impression that the cause of difference was the +question of full commercial freedom, the Spanish government +informally asked the German government to give Spain a <em>coup +d’épaule</em> in Paris. As the German government desired a more +definite proposal, it did not carry out the request.<a id= +"FNanchor_358"></a><a href="#Footnote_358" class= +"fnanchor">[358]</a> Nor was much support to be obtained from Great +Britain. But as both French and British governments knew of +Germany’s interest in the negotiations, M. Delcassé, in August, +agreed to restrict Spain’s action for fifteen years only.<a id= +"FNanchor_359"></a><a href="#Footnote_359" class= +"fnanchor">[359]</a> The Spanish government rejected that +concession, but offered to take no action for that period without +previous accord with France, provided France recognized that she +“ought to proceed in accord with the Spanish Government in that +which touches the zone of influence reserved<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_123">[123]</span> to Spain.” Lord Lansdowne supported this +proposal. So while M. Delcassé held to his previous stand, he +agreed that “France would take no steps within the Spanish Sphere +without giving previous notice to Spain.” Thus, although the +Marquis del Muni thought that the two parties had reached a +deadlock, there was in reality no great difference between the two +demands. On October 3 the agreement was signed.<a id= +"FNanchor_360"></a><a href="#Footnote_360" class= +"fnanchor">[360]</a></p> + +<p>The accord consisted of a published declaration and of sixteen +secret articles. The former merely expressed the fact that Spain +adhered to the Anglo-French declaration of April 8 concerning +Morocco and Egypt and that Spain and France were in agreement “to +fix the extension of their rights and guaranty of their interests” +in Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_361"></a><a href="#Footnote_361" class= +"fnanchor">[361]</a> The secret articles were of a far different +caliber. Spain received as her sphere of influence not only the +area from the Moulouya to Larache in Northern Morocco but also the +coastal territory and hinterland extending from her possession Rio +de Oro northward to the Wad Sus, just south of Agadir. The rest of +Morocco constituted the French sphere (Arts. II, IV, V). Provision +for a future change was included.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>In case the political state of Morocco and of the Sherifian +Government are unable to subsist, or if by the feebleness of the +Government and by its continued impotence to introduce security and +public order, or for any other cause to be stated in a common +accord, the maintenance of the <em>status quo</em> becomes +impossible, Spain will be permitted freely to exercise her action +in . . . . her sphere of influence [Art. III].</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Although the same rights of action were permitted +to Spain in her sphere as to France in hers, yet for a period of +not over fifteen years from the date of signing the convention +Spain was prohibited from taking action in her sphere without +previous understanding with France. The latter, however, could take +action unrestricted by Spain in the French zone, and could also act +in the Spanish zone after having notified Spain of her +intention.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[124]</span> After +that first period expired and as long as the <em>status quo</em> +obtained, France could not act in the Spanish zone without previous +agreement with Spain (Art. II). By Articles VII and VIII Spain +agreed not to cede or to alienate in any form any of the territory +assigned to her or to seek the aid of a foreign Power other than +France in taking any military action in her sphere of influence. +Article IX preserved “the special character” of Tangier “which the +presence of the diplomatic corps and the municipal and sanitary +institutions give it.” Article X ran as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>So long as the actual political status continues, the +enterprises for public works, railroads, roads, canals . . . . +shall be executed by such companies as may be formed by French and +Spanish. In the same manner it will be permissible for French and +Spanish in Morocco to co-operate for the exploitation of mines, +quarries, and, in general, of enterprises of an economic +order.<a id="FNanchor_362"></a><a href="#Footnote_362" class= +"fnanchor">[362]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The two Powers immediately communicated the agreement to the +British government, which accepted it.<a id= +"FNanchor_363"></a><a href="#Footnote_363" class= +"fnanchor">[363]</a> The Spanish government thanked both British +and German governments for their aid during the negotiations, and +briefly informed the latter that by the treaty Tangier had been +neutralized and complete equality and freedom of commerce and trade +had been guaranteed.<a id="FNanchor_364"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_364" class="fnanchor">[364]</a></p> + +<p>In Spain the agreement, grudgingly approved by the government as +the best that it could obtain, was shown by the Premier to the +various party leaders, and received their indorsement.<a id= +"FNanchor_365"></a><a href="#Footnote_365" class= +"fnanchor">[365]</a> M. Delcassé informed none of the French +politicians of the content of the treaty. During the debates in the +French Parliament on the Anglo-French accord in November and +December, however,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[125]</span> +the Franco-Spanish agreement was also accepted on faith.<a id= +"FNanchor_366"></a><a href="#Footnote_366" class= +"fnanchor">[366]</a> The convention was a logical extension of the +accord of April 8. Both agreements anticipated a change in the +political status of Morocco and made provisions for a future +division of the land. The one permitted commercial restriction at +the end of thirty years; the other arranged for a Franco-Spanish +monopoly of all economic enterprises. Both accords violated the +principle of the open door. In fact, had the secret articles of the +two agreements been known, they would have proved that the clauses +concerning the independence and integrity of Morocco and the +sovereignty of the sultan were complete shams. In declaring to the +other Powers that commercial freedom would be absolutely respected, +M. Delcassé was equivocating and attempting to disarm suspicions +concerning his real intention of destroying economic freedom in +Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_367"></a><a href="#Footnote_367" class= +"fnanchor">[367]</a></p> + +<h3>II. DELCASSÉ AND GERMANY, 1904</h3> + +<p>It was manifest during the Anglo-French negotiations that the +French government planned to prevent Germany from gaining any +foothold in Morocco or the Western Mediterranean.<a id= +"FNanchor_368"></a><a href="#Footnote_368" class= +"fnanchor">[368]</a> Fearing that that Power might try to share in +the Moroccan settlement when the Anglo-French accord became known, +M. Delcassé endeavored to avoid a discussion of the agreement with +it.<a id="FNanchor_369"></a><a href="#Footnote_369" class= +"fnanchor">[369]</a></p> + +<p>When, therefore, on March 23, Prince Radolin asked the French +Minister an “indiscreet question” about the reported<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_126">[126]</span> Anglo-French negotiations, the +latter replied that they had been going on for some time and would +probably be successfully concluded. He said that they treated of +Newfoundland, Egypt, and Morocco (the other questions he did not +mention); and he explained the terms of the proposed agreement +concerning the last-named land. “You know already our point of view +on this subject. . . . . We wish to maintain in Morocco the +existing political and territorial status; but that status, to +endure, must manifestly be sustained and improved.” After citing +the many occasions for intervention of which France had taken no +advantage, he stated that the Sultan had already requested French +aid. “It is now a matter of continuing it to him,” he said, and he +assured the Prince that commercial liberty would be “rigorously and +entirely respected. . . . . France wishes no special rights in +Morocco, but it should be her task in the interest of all nations +trading there to put an end, according to her power, to the anarchy +in that land.” Moreover, the free passage through the straits +should be secured by neutralizing their southern shore. As for +Spain, her “positive interests and legitimate ambitions” in Morocco +would be amicably treated. He did not mention either the clause +limiting commercial freedom to thirty years or Article IX assuring +mutual diplomatic support in the fulfilment of the accord. And of +course he gave no hint of the existence of the secret +articles.<a id="FNanchor_370"></a><a href="#Footnote_370" class= +"fnanchor">[370]</a></p> + +<p>This informal and incomplete notification misrepresented the +true aims of the agreement with respect to Morocco. M. Delcassé +expected that by avoiding an official notification of the accord to +the German government and by omitting to request an expression of +opinion from it he would cause the German government either to +permit him a diplomatic victory or to take the<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_127">[127]</span> initiative for a Franco-German +understanding.<a id="FNanchor_371"></a><a href="#Footnote_371" +class="fnanchor">[371]</a> He felt safe in his policy,<a id= +"FNanchor_372"></a><a href="#Footnote_372" class= +"fnanchor">[372]</a> because France, in addition to her alliance +with Russia, whose victory over Japan M. Delcassé and the French +people confidently expected,<a id="FNanchor_373"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_373" class="fnanchor">[373]</a> now enjoyed with her +ally’s public approval<a id="FNanchor_374"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_374" class="fnanchor">[374]</a> the friendship of Great +Britain, Italy, and Spain, whereas the Triple Alliance was weakened +by internal strife. Moreover, the French Minister learned on March +30<a id="FNanchor_375"></a><a href="#Footnote_375" class= +"fnanchor">[375]</a> that at Vigo a few days before the Emperor +William had denied having any territorial interests in Morocco. +Hence by shunning the word “protectorate” he hoped to avoid the +responsibility for endeavoring to establish one.<a id= +"FNanchor_376"></a><a href="#Footnote_376" class= +"fnanchor">[376]</a> In October his notification of the +Franco-Spanish agreement to the German government was even more +perfunctory.<a id="FNanchor_377"></a><a href="#Footnote_377" class= +"fnanchor">[377]</a></p> + +<h3><span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[128]</span>III. “PACIFIC +PENETRATION,” 1904</h3> + +<p>After the signing of the Anglo-French agreement, the French +Parliament voted 600,000 francs with which to carry on the work of +pacific penetration in Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_378"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_378" class="fnanchor">[378]</a> The French government +immediately dispatched a preliminary mission to Fez under Count de +Saint-Aulaire, first secretary of the legation in Tangier. The +Count gave the Sultan an exact Arabic translation of the published +declaration of April 8; and, after setting forth the need for +progressive reforms in Morocco and the special interest of France +in executing them, he offered the friendly co-operation of his +government to that end.<a id="FNanchor_379"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_379" class="fnanchor">[379]</a> Thus, in spite of the +persistent Moroccan raids across the Algerian border, the Sultan +was asked to believe that France was once more manifesting her +patience and good will.<a id="FNanchor_380"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_380" class="fnanchor">[380]</a></p> + +<p>The Sultan scarcely knew what line of policy to take toward the +Anglo-French agreement.<a id="FNanchor_381"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_381" class="fnanchor">[381]</a> His subjects, from the +religious groups to the merchants of Fez, were all hostile to any +form of foreign control. Alarmed at the news of the agreement, they +feared an immediate invasion by the Christians. Suspecting their +ruler of conniving with the French, they became even more +rebellious; many denied that he possessed the <em>baraka</em>, the +divine<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[129]</span> benediction. +At court the Conservative party, led by Si Feddoul Gharnet, grew +stronger in its opposition to all French actions and policies. The +Sultan realized the precariousness of his position, and was very +anxious about the effects of his acts upon his people. He was +uneasy and angry at having been ignored in the negotiations over +his land. Nevertheless, as he did not comprehend the full +significance of the accord, particularly since the French had +explained it to him in soothing terms, he soon became calmer. Some +of his officials were not opposed to the French, as they realized +that the present conditions could not last and that the French had +the power to change them. Furthermore, certain practical +considerations prevented him from closing his ear to the French +altogether. His ambition was, with the help of Europeans selected +by himself, so to strengthen his land as to enable it to maintain +its independence.<a id="FNanchor_382"></a><a href="#Footnote_382" +class="fnanchor">[382]</a> The Sultan had no funds; the small +French, English, and Spanish loans of the previous year were +exhausted, and he could not collect taxes or maintain an army. +Forced to seek foreign aid, he had begun negotiations with the +Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas for a large loan late in January, +and had besought the help of the French government in obtaining it. +M. Delcassé had readily promised his support.<a id= +"FNanchor_383"></a><a href="#Footnote_383" class= +"fnanchor">[383]</a></p> + +<p>In this situation the Sultan neither accepted nor rejected the +Anglo-French agreement and Count de Saint-Aulaire’s explanation of +it although he showed favor toward them.<a id= +"FNanchor_384"></a><a href="#Footnote_384" class= +"fnanchor">[384]</a> On June 12<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_130">[130]</span> with the aid of the French government he +concluded the transaction for the loan.</p> + +<p>The loan, made by a consortium of eleven French banks headed by +the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, fulfilled political as well as +economic purposes, for it was backed by the French government and +was admirably adapted to the work of pacific penetration. The +amount was 62,500,000 francs (Art. I), of which 80 per cent was +actually to be credited to the Sultan (Art. XXIV). The interest was +set at 5 per cent (Art. III). The loan was to be redeemed within +thirty-six years, but the schedule of amortization was fixed and +could not be hastened during the first fifteen years (Arts. IV, +VII). The loan, guaranteed by the customs duties in all the ports +of Morocco, was to have preference and priority over all other +loans which might be similarly guaranteed (Art. XI). Sixty per cent +of the customs revenues were reserved for the repayment of the +obligation. If the necessary amount was not obtained thereby, the +Moroccan government was to make up the deficit (Art. XVII). Two +million francs were left in the bank at Paris to cover short +payments; if withdrawn, this amount was to be re-established +immediately by the Sultan’s government (Art. XXI). The remainder, +after the Sultan’s outstanding loans were liquidated, was placed at +the ruler’s disposal to be drawn upon at will (Arts. XXV, XXXV). By +Article XIV the existing customs treaties and arrangements of +Morocco with the Powers were guaranteed. Article XXXII prohibited +the Sultan from using the customs receipts at his disposal to +guarantee any other loan without a previous agreement with the +French banks. By Article XXXIII those banks were given the right of +preference in contracting new loans, coining money, or buying and +selling gold and silver for Morocco, provided the conditions they +offered were equal to those offered by others. The collection of +the customs was to be supervised by a special group of French +officials under the protection of the French legation. Their +director should communicate with the Moroccan government through +the French Minister at Tangier. Furthermore, if the stipulated +funds were not turned over to the supervisors, the<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_131">[131]</span> agents could appeal to the +French Minister; and, with his consent and with due notification to +the Sultan, they could collect the sums themselves. Thus, when by +the last of July those officials were installed, the control of the +customs was practically lost to the Sultan.<a id= +"FNanchor_385"></a><a href="#Footnote_385" class= +"fnanchor">[385]</a></p> + +<p>In May an act of banditry occurred in Morocco which convinced +public opinion everywhere that reform in that land was immediately +necessary and which enabled France to take another step in her work +of penetration. On May 18, Raisouli, a sherif, ex-cattle thief, +robber and rebel, avenger of wrongs, opponent to Europeans—in +short, a Moroccan Robin Hood—took prisoner an American citizen, Ion +Perdicaris, and his English son-in-law, Varley, in their home near +Tangier. As the price of their release he demanded a large ransom, +the dismissal and punishment of certain of the Sultan’s loyal +officials who were his enemies, and his own appointment as pasha +for the district around Tangier. The Sultan had to accept his +terms. On June 24, through the good offices of the French +government, working through some of its Algerian religious leaders +with followers in Morocco, the release was effected.<a id= +"FNanchor_386"></a><a href="#Footnote_386" class= +"fnanchor">[386]</a> But the panic-stricken foreigners in +Tangier,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[132]</span> fearing +that Raisouli would continue such lucrative business and that he +would have imitators, demanded protection.<a id= +"FNanchor_387"></a><a href="#Footnote_387" class= +"fnanchor">[387]</a> Thereupon the French government stationed two +warships in Moroccan waters and secured the appointment of French +and Algerian officers over the Tangier police.<a id= +"FNanchor_388"></a><a href="#Footnote_388" class= +"fnanchor">[388]</a> The work of “pacific penetration” was most +auspiciously under way.</p> + +<p>Private French enterprise did not lag behind that of the +government. Moroccan towns swarmed with hungry fortune-seekers +eager to enjoy the opportunities for quick wealth which the opening +of Morocco was expected to bring. The Comité du Maroc, formed in +the preceding December from the ranks of the larger Comité de +l’Afrique française, engaged energetically in directing and +expanding the work of scientific exploration in the Sherifian +Empire and of disseminating propaganda in France.<a id= +"FNanchor_389"></a><a href="#Footnote_389" class= +"fnanchor">[389]</a> It received the financial support of the chief +banks, maritime companies, steel works, railway companies, and some +of the leading newspapers of France.<a id= +"FNanchor_390"></a><a href="#Footnote_390" class= +"fnanchor">[390]</a> The list of guests present at a banquet held +by it on June 15 to enlist public support reads like a French +<em>Who’s Who</em>.<a id="FNanchor_391"></a><a href="#Footnote_391" +class="fnanchor">[391]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[133]</span>In the autumn +and early winter the French government made preparations to send a +larger mission to Fez under the resident minister, M. Saint-René +Taillandier, to obtain the Sultan’s approval of the French program +of reforms. According to M. Delcassé’s instructions on December +15,<a id="FNanchor_392"></a><a href="#Footnote_392" class= +"fnanchor">[392]</a> the Minister’s foremost task should be to +institute police reforms similar to those inaugurated in Tangier, +first in the towns already in contact with Europeans and then +gradually in the other areas. In the border region order should be +preserved by extending the co-operation of the two governments. The +establishment of a state bank, the construction of means of +transportation and of communication, the improvement of harbors, +the support of philanthropic works, the spread of the French +language, and the settlement of claims for damages inflicted on +Algeria by Moroccan raiders were the other matters to be taken up. +It was a comprehensive program, the achievement of which would end +Moroccan isolation and independence.</p> + +<p>The departure of the mission was delayed by the long +negotiations for an accord with Spain and by the fact that the +French Chamber did not approve the Moroccan accords until November. +When the mission was prepared to start in December, the situation +in Morocco, apparently favorable for France in the spring, had +become adverse. The natives had grown bolder in their attacks upon +foreigners, venting their hatred upon them even in Fez. The Sultan +had begun to show signs of resisting. In September he had disgraced +the pro-foreign minister el Menebhi and confiscated his property. +Later in the year he had supplanted his pro-French ministers by +anti-foreign ones, such as Si Feddoul Gharnet. In December he had +dismissed all foreign<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_134">[134]</span> employees at Fez and Rabat.<a id= +"FNanchor_393"></a><a href="#Footnote_393" class= +"fnanchor">[393]</a> These signs augured trouble for the French. +While assuming an optimistic manner publicly, M. Saint-René +Taillandier acknowledged to his chief on December 12 that he might +“be powerless to make the Sultan accept the minimum of reforms that +the present state of Morocco demands.”<a id= +"FNanchor_394"></a><a href="#Footnote_394" class= +"fnanchor">[394]</a> But as firmness was the best means to “recall +the Moroccan government to a sense of reality,”<a id= +"FNanchor_395"></a><a href="#Footnote_395" class= +"fnanchor">[395]</a> he immediately countered the dismissal of the +French officers by a sharply worded letter to the Moroccan Foreign +Minister. After reminding the latter of the <em>acte +international</em> by which France had “assumed the task of aiding” +the Makhzen<a id="FNanchor_396"></a><a href="#Footnote_396" class= +"fnanchor">[396]</a> to reform the land, he stated that the +Sultan’s co-operation was expected and desired, but that</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">if that co-operation were not forthcoming, France +would know how to accomplish the work alone. Dangerous counselors +[he wrote] have led the Sultan astray as to the true state of +affairs. And in consequence the French Government has decided to +postpone the departure of the mission, and to recall to Tangier +from Fez within ten days the French military mission, vice-consul, +and all French subjects resident there.<a id= +"FNanchor_397"></a><a href="#Footnote_397" class= +"fnanchor">[397]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The Sultan’s opposition wilted immediately. The French +vice-consul at Fez reported that the Makhzen was “ready to welcome +all French counsels and to accept all the reforms,” that it +“withdrew all the actions which have offended us.”<a id= +"FNanchor_398"></a><a href="#Footnote_398" class= +"fnanchor">[398]</a> But the Sultan’s submission was not so +complete as it seemed. Although France was the victor in this +encounter, the conflict had only begun.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc08"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_342"></a><a href="#FNanchor_342"><span class= +"label">[342]</span></a>On Oct. 28, 1904, at the height of the +Dogger Bank crisis, Lansdowne reported the following assertion by +Cambon: “His Excellency [M. Cambon] said that he did not himself +know precisely what obligations France had undertaken in virtue of +that understanding [the Dual Alliance]. He did not however believe +that if there was a collision, France would join Russia against us, +but if a collision occurred, and particularly if it were brought on +by unreasonable demands on our part, there would be a +<em>revirement</em> of public feeling, and the Anglo-French +<em>entente</em> could not fail to suffer” (Lansdowne to Monson, +Oct. 28, 1904, <em>B.D.</em>, IV, 22, No. 21).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_343"></a><a href="#FNanchor_343"><span class= +"label">[343]</span></a>According to a speech in the Spanish Senate +on March 21, 1904, by M. Abarzuza, who had been a member of +Silvela’s cabinet from Dec. 6, 1902, to July 20, 1903, both the +British and the French governments promised Spain in the first half +of 1903 not to touch the Moroccan question or to make any +alterations in North Africa without Spain’s previous knowledge and +acquiescence. The speech is quoted by Becker, <em>Historia de +Marruecos</em> (Madrid, 1915), pp. 440 f. See above for Lansdowne’s +promise. The Spanish government did try to participate in the +Anglo-French negotiations by way of both London and Paris; but it +was put off with general assurances of friendship by both Lansdowne +and Delcassé. See Lansdowne to Durand, Aug. 11, 1903, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 309 f., No. 366; Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 23, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 341, No. 388; Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, +1904, III, 25 f., No. 24; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 18, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 354, No. 5199, and the following documents. +For expression of Spanish public opinion over the Anglo-French +accord see the <em>London Times</em>, April 11-16, 1904; Gay, +<em>España ante el problema del mediterráneo</em>, pp. 31 ff.; +Maura, <em>La Question du Maroc, etc.</em> (Paris, 1911), pp. 32 +f.; Mousset, <em>La politica exterior de España, 1873-1918</em> +(Madrid, 1918), pp. 149 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_344"></a><a href="#FNanchor_344"><span class= +"label">[344]</span></a><em>G.P.</em>, XX, 169 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_345"></a><a href="#FNanchor_345"><span class= +"label">[345]</span></a>The debates in the Cortes are to be found +in the <em>Diario de las sesiones de Cortes</em>. Congreso de los +Diputados (<em>Legislatura de 1903</em>), pp. 4883 ff., 4917 ff., +4944 ff., 4959 ff. Also see Maura, pp. 85 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_346"></a><a href="#FNanchor_346"><span class= +"label">[346]</span></a>Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 25 f., No. 24; Egerton to Lansdowne, April 11, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 26 f., No. 25.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_347"></a><a href="#FNanchor_347"><span class= +"label">[347]</span></a>Egerton to Lansdowne, May 6, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 34, No. 35.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_348"></a><a href="#FNanchor_348"><span class= +"label">[348]</span></a>The British government kept these articles +secret (Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 25 +f., No. 24).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_349"></a><a href="#FNanchor_349"><span class= +"label">[349]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 169 f., No. 6481, and following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_350"></a><a href="#FNanchor_350"><span class= +"label">[350]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, April 20, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 29, No. 28, and following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_351"></a><a href="#FNanchor_351"><span class= +"label">[351]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, May 22, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 173 f., No. 6484. Bülow repeated his offer of +aid on May 31. Bülow to Radowitz, May 31, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 175 +f., No. 6487. The Spanish Ambassador at Paris remarked to Monson +that if Great Britain did not help Spain the latter “would be done +out of half her rights in that country [Morocco]” (Monson to +Lansdowne, May 20, 1904, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 37, No. 41).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_352"></a><a href="#FNanchor_352"><span class= +"label">[352]</span></a>Romanones, <em>Las responsabilidades +politicas, etc.</em>, pp. 49 ff.; reports from Madrid, June 15 and +21, 1904, <em>Zur europ. Politik</em>, I, 121; see also +<em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XX, chap. cxliv.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_353"></a><a href="#FNanchor_353"><span class= +"label">[353]</span></a>Egerton to Lansdowne, July 1, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 38, No. 43; Lansdowne to Egerton, July 2, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 38 f., No. 44.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_354"></a><a href="#FNanchor_354"><span class= +"label">[354]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, II, 393 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_355"></a><a href="#FNanchor_355"><span class= +"label">[355]</span></a>Egerton to Lansdowne, July 1, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, III, 38, No. 43; Lansdowne to Egerton, July 2, 6, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 38, No. 44; 40, No. 46; Lansdowne to Monson, +July 4, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 40, No. 45; Leon y Castillo, <em>Mis +tiempos</em>, II, 182 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_356"></a><a href="#FNanchor_356"><span class= +"label">[356]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson July 8, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 41, No. 47.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_357"></a><a href="#FNanchor_357"><span class= +"label">[357]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, July 29, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 42, No. 49; Lansdowne to Egerton, July 29, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 43, No. 50; Egerton to Lansdowne, July 31, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 44, No. 52.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_358"></a><a href="#FNanchor_358"><span class= +"label">[358]</span></a>Memo. by Richthofen, July 16, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 186 f., No. 6503; and other documents in +<em>ibid.</em>, Vol. XX, chap. cxliv.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_359"></a><a href="#FNanchor_359"><span class= +"label">[359]</span></a>At first Delcassé said thirty years.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_360"></a><a href="#FNanchor_360"><span class= +"label">[360]</span></a>Egerton to Lansdowne, July 31, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 44, No. 52, and following documents; also Leon +y Castillo, II, 183 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_361"></a><a href="#FNanchor_361"><span class= +"label">[361]</span></a><em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 164, No. 187.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_362"></a><a href="#FNanchor_362"><span class= +"label">[362]</span></a>The text of the agreement, which became +public in 1909, is to be found in <em>British and Foreign State +Papers</em>, CII (London, 1913), 432 ff.; and in <em>B.D.</em>, +III, 49 ff., No. 59.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_363"></a><a href="#FNanchor_363"><span class= +"label">[363]</span></a>Lansdowne to Adam, Oct. 5, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 52, No. 60.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_364"></a><a href="#FNanchor_364"><span class= +"label">[364]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Oct. 7, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 191 f., No. 6509.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_365"></a><a href="#FNanchor_365"><span class= +"label">[365]</span></a>Maura, p. 54; Radowitz to F. O., Oct. 7, +1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 191 f., No. 6509.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_366"></a><a href="#FNanchor_366"><span class= +"label">[366]</span></a>Maura, p. 78; Tardieu, <em>Questions +diplomatiques</em>, 1904, pp. 75 ff.; Millet, <em>Notre politique +extérieure 1898-1905</em>, pp. 179 ff.; and the French debates +cited above.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_367"></a><a href="#FNanchor_367"><span class= +"label">[367]</span></a>For an estimate of this accord see Tardieu, +<em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, Dec. 1, 1912, pp. 637 ff.; Stuart, +<em>French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo (1898-1914)</em> +(New York, 1921), pp. 154 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_368"></a><a href="#FNanchor_368"><span class= +"label">[368]</span></a>See, among others, the dispatch from +Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 9, 1903, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 332, No. +378.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_369"></a><a href="#FNanchor_369"><span class= +"label">[369]</span></a>Lansdowne to Monson, March 11, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, II, 353, No. 398. One day long after signing the +accord Radolin remarked to Delcassé that he “had heard of an +apparent treaty with England but had never read the text of it in +any authentic form.” The Minister replied that he could find it in +the <em>Livre jaune</em> (letter from Radolin, apparently to +Holstein, March 25, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 266 n.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_370"></a><a href="#FNanchor_370"><span class= +"label">[370]</span></a>In repeating these assertions to the German +government on April 26 the French Ambassador added that “the +Anglo-French entente was directed against no other Power and in no +way menaced the German commercial interests.” See Delcassé to +Bihourd, March 27, 1904, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 122, No. 142; +Radolin to Bülow, March 23, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 5 ff., No. +6368; Bihourd to Delcassé, April 27, 1904, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, +131, No. 155.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_371"></a><a href="#FNanchor_371"><span class= +"label">[371]</span></a>See Bertie to Lansdowne, March 22, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 60, No. 67.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_372"></a><a href="#FNanchor_372"><span class= +"label">[372]</span></a>Bihourd, the French ambassador at Berlin, +warned Delcassé in April that Germany had not said her last word on +the Moroccan question and that more complete guaranties of +commercial liberty should be given to her; but Delcassé disregarded +the warning. See Bihourd to Delcassé, April 18, 1904, <em>L.j., +1901-5</em>, 128, No. 151; Delcassé to Bihourd, April 18, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 129, No. 152; Bihourd to Delcassé, April 21, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 129 f., No. 153; cf. Lee, <em>King Edward VII</em>, +II, 338.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_373"></a><a href="#FNanchor_373"><span class= +"label">[373]</span></a>Michon, <em>L’alliance franco-russe, +1891-1917</em>, pp. 101 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_374"></a><a href="#FNanchor_374"><span class= +"label">[374]</span></a>Statement made by Nelidow, Russian +ambassador to Paris, to a reporter of the <em>Temps</em>, reprinted +in <em>Quest. dipl. et. col.</em>, XVII, 607 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_375"></a><a href="#FNanchor_375"><span class= +"label">[375]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, March 30, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 365, No. 5210.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_376"></a><a href="#FNanchor_376"><span class= +"label">[376]</span></a>There is some evidence, however, that +Delcassé did make some vague attempts to approach the German +government on the Moroccan affair in 1904. Bülow, in a dispatch of +March 22, 1905, stated that if Delcassé should declare that he had +discussed Moroccan affairs “thoroughly with German diplomats +passing through” Paris, Radolin was to reply that those +conversations were only private ones and showed plainly the +inclination to avoid the official and proper authorities. See Bülow +to Radolin, March 22, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, XX, 267, No. 6568. +Theodor Wolff, at that time Paris correspondent of the <em>Berliner +Tageblatt</em>, also has written that in the spring of 1904 +Delcassé said to Lichnowsky, an official in the German foreign +office, that they should come to an understanding over Morocco. +According to Wolff, Holstein became furious at the dispatch from +Lichnowsky (Wolff, <em>Das Vorspiel</em>, pp. 154 f.; cf. Ludwig, +<em>Wilhelm der Zweite</em>, p. 342). Lichnowsky may have been the +person to whom Bülow referred, although, if any such conversation +occurred, it was not mentioned later by either the French or the +Germans.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_377"></a><a href="#FNanchor_377"><span class= +"label">[377]</span></a>The French Ambassador merely left a copy of +the published declaration and added verbally that the accord in no +way infringed upon commercial liberty in Morocco. See Richthofen to +Radowitz, Oct. 7, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 191, No. 6508; memo. by +Richthofen for Bülow, Oct. 7, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 230, No. 6534; +Delcassé to Bihourd, Oct. 6, 1904, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 164, No. +187; Bihourd to Delcassé, Oct. 7, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 166, No. +190; Delcassé to Bihourd, Oct. 8, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 167 f., No. +193.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_378"></a><a href="#FNanchor_378"><span class= +"label">[378]</span></a>This was done on a motion by Jaurès, made +on Nov., 1903, and passed on April 25, 1904 (Tardieu, <em>La Conf. +d’Algés.</em>, p. 35).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_379"></a><a href="#FNanchor_379"><span class= +"label">[379]</span></a>Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, April +14 and 24, 1904, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 124, No. 146; 130, No. 154; +Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, April 27, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, +131, No. 156; Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, May 19, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 133, No. 159 and annexe; Lansdowne to Nicolson, +April 19, 1904, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 28, No. 27.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_380"></a><a href="#FNanchor_380"><span class= +"label">[380]</span></a><em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, Nos. 148, 157, 158, +183, 186, 189, 194-98, 202-7.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_381"></a><a href="#FNanchor_381"><span class= +"label">[381]</span></a>On the Moroccan reaction see report by A. +Bernard, who was in Morocco at the time, in <em>Bulletin</em>, +June, 1904, pp. 203 f.; Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Jan. 1 +and 24, Feb. 22, April 24, May 19, 1904, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 119 +ff., Nos. 135, 137, 140, 154, 159.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_382"></a><a href="#FNanchor_382"><span class= +"label">[382]</span></a>Kühlmann to Bülow, Jan. 31, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 250, No. 6553.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_383"></a><a href="#FNanchor_383"><span class= +"label">[383]</span></a>Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Jan. +29, 1904, <em>L.j. 1901-5</em>, 119, No. 138.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_384"></a><a href="#FNanchor_384"><span class= +"label">[384]</span></a>Ben Sliman, Moroccan minister of foreign +affairs, wrote to Saint-René Taillandier on June 17 as follows: +“The Sultan . . . . has instructed me to reply to you that he does +not doubt your favorable sentiments nor those of your Government, +either the humanity of your actions or the sincerity of your +counsels. . . . . Your letter is an argument the more in favor of +the reaffirmation of that conviction and a testimony of your good +intentions, conforming to the desire of the two countries. This is +confirmed also by the conversations which we have had with your +secretary to clarify the difficult points of the accord. . . . . I +express to you in his [the Sultan’s] name the fullest thanks for +your happy efforts past and present which, we hope, will +characterize the conduct of our future relations” (<em>ibid.</em>, +156 ff., No. 177, annex; Mévil, <em>De la Paix de Francfort, +etc.</em> [Paris, 1909], pp. 172 f. n.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_385"></a><a href="#FNanchor_385"><span class= +"label">[385]</span></a>The prominent part played by the French +government in making this loan is attested as follows: As already +stated, in January, at the Sultan’s request, Delcassé promised his +help in making the loan. Furthermore, Saint-Aulaire and his +interpreter, in Fez at the time, took an active part in bringing +the negotiation to a satisfactory conclusion, being consulted on +various points and helping in the formulation of the terms +(Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July 30, 1904, <em>L.j., +1901-5</em>, 162 f., No. 184.). The contract was signed and sealed +by the French Consul at Fez (<em>ibid.</em>, 142 f., No. 170, Annex +I). And the terms of the loan were such as could never have been +obtained without the approval of the French government. The +contract is printed in <em>ibid.</em>, 143 ff., No. 170, Annex II. +On the instalment of customs officials see the dispatches from +Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July 24, and 30, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 159 ff., Nos. 181, 184; also Tardieu, <em>Questions +diplomatiques, 1904</em>, pp. 60 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_386"></a><a href="#FNanchor_386"><span class= +"label">[386]</span></a>On this episode see the various dispatches +in <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 135 ff., Nos. 160 ff. On Raisouli see +Rosita Forbes, <em>El Raisuni, the Sultan of the Mountains</em> +(London, 1924). On June 22, 1904, Secretary of State Hay cabled to +the American Consul at Tangier, “We want Perdicaris alive or +Raizuli dead.” See William Roscoe Thayer, <em>The Life and Letters +of John Hay</em> (Boston and New York, 1915), II, 383; Dennis, +<em>Adventures in American Diplomacy</em>, pp. 443 ff. Both the +British and the American governments requested the good offices of +the French government in effecting the release. Mr. Hay, the +American secretary of state, gave assurance that if more serious +action were subsequently necessary in Morocco, it would not take +place “without a previous exchange of views” with France. Thus he +acknowledged France’s special position with reference to that +country. See Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, May 30, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 137, No. 163; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, +May 31, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 137, No. 164; Jusserand to Delcassé, +June 20, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 152, No. 171; Porter to Delcassé, +June 27, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 155, No. 176; Mévil, pp. 172 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_387"></a><a href="#FNanchor_387"><span class= +"label">[387]</span></a>Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, June 2 +and 27, July 2, 1904, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 137 ff., Nos. 165, +175, 178.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_388"></a><a href="#FNanchor_388"><span class= +"label">[388]</span></a>Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, June 11 +and 27, July 2, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 140 ff., Nos. 168, 175, 178; +Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 26, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, +160, No. 182; Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July 29, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 160 f., No. 183, and annex.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_389"></a><a href="#FNanchor_389"><span class= +"label">[389]</span></a><em>Bulletin</em>, Dec., 1903, p. 377; +Jan., 1904, pp. 3 ff.; March, 1904, pp. 76 f.; and others.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_390"></a><a href="#FNanchor_390"><span class= +"label">[390]</span></a>See the list of the large subscribers in +<em>ibid.</em>, July, 1904, p. 224.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_391"></a><a href="#FNanchor_391"><span class= +"label">[391]</span></a>The names of those present, 355 in all, are +given in <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, XVIII, 62 ff. See also +<em>Bulletin</em>, June, 1904, p. 185.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_392"></a><a href="#FNanchor_392"><span class= +"label">[392]</span></a>Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, Dec. +15, 1904, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 179 ff., No. 209. In October a +conference had been held in Paris with Jonnart, governor-general of +Algeria; Gen. Lyauty, commander of the French troops at Ain-Sefra +in Southern Oran; and Saint-René Taillandier, on the Moroccan +question (Monson to Lansdowne, Oct. 7, 1904, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 54 +f., No. 63.)</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_393"></a><a href="#FNanchor_393"><span class= +"label">[393]</span></a><em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, Nos. 199, 210-12, +215, 218-20, 222-24; <em>B.D.</em>, III, 55, No. 64; +<em>Bulletin</em>, Sept. and Oct., 1904, pp. 279, 320.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_394"></a><a href="#FNanchor_394"><span class= +"label">[394]</span></a>Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Dec. +12, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 179, No. 208; Tardieu, <em>Questions +diplomatiques, 1904</em>, pp. 78 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_395"></a><a href="#FNanchor_395"><span class= +"label">[395]</span></a>The words are Delcassé’s (Delcassé to +Saint-René Taillandier, Dec. 20, 1904, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 186, +No. 213.)</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_396"></a><a href="#FNanchor_396"><span class= +"label">[396]</span></a>The term is used to designate the Moroccan +court and government.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_397"></a><a href="#FNanchor_397"><span class= +"label">[397]</span></a>Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Dec. 19 +and 24, 1904, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 185 f., No. 212; 186 f., No. +214.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_398"></a><a href="#FNanchor_398"><span class= +"label">[398]</span></a>Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Dec. +30, 1904, Jan. 2, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 188 ff., No. 216 f.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[135]</span><a id= +"c09"></a>CHAPTER IX</h2> + +<p class="sch2">GERMANY AND THE ENTENTE CORDIALE, 1903-4</p> + +<h3 class="space-above1">I</h3> + +<p>In the early part of 1903, although one of Germany’s allies was +rent by nationalistic conflicts<a id="FNanchor_399"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_399" class="fnanchor">[399]</a> and the other was no +longer reliable, and although British and German public opinion +remained so hostile that the former prevented Anglo-German +co-operation,<a id="FNanchor_400"></a><a href="#Footnote_400" +class="fnanchor">[400]</a> Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein were +untroubled about the international situation. Upon the announcement +of King Edward’s forthcoming visit to Paris, the latter wrote to +his chief, on April 2, that an Anglo-French alliance was “music of +the future,” and that the Franco-Russian alliance was slowly +breaking under the strain of conflicting interests in the Balkans. +“We have blocked M. Delcassé’s policy in Turkey as well as in +Morocco,” he stated. The Chancellor agreed with him.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Delcassé’s coquetting with England [he wrote] would become +serious for us only in case he should also succeed in bringing +about a <em>rapprochement</em> between England and Russia. . . . . +Otherwise his wooing of England will . . . . strengthen Count +Lamsdorff in the thought that the former League of the Three +Emperors is, all things considered, the best combination for +Russian autocracy. But the present groupings will not change soon, +and in my opinion, we cannot take things too coolly.<a id= +"FNanchor_401"></a><a href="#Footnote_401" class= +"fnanchor">[401]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Soon after King Edward’s visit to Paris the equanimity of the +German government was somewhat disturbed by a dispatch +of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[136]</span> May 10 from +Baron Eckardstein, formerly first secretary of the German embassy +in London. The Baron expressed his belief that a general +Anglo-French settlement of colonial differences including that of +Morocco was under way; and that since the two nations were +reconciled, it would very likely be concluded. He denied that this +agreement would cause a breach in the Dual Alliance, as was +supposed in Germany; rather, he wrote, “a new Triple Alliance is +being formed, which, although it may assume no written form and +perhaps may endure only for a number of years, will for a time +cause us everywhere at least economic and political +difficulties.”<a id="FNanchor_402"></a><a href="#Footnote_402" +class="fnanchor">[402]</a></p> + +<p>This dispatch was referred by Count Bülow to the German +ambassadors at St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, and to the first +secretary of the embassy in London for consideration. Not one of +these men believed possible an Anglo-Russian settlement or the +formation of a new Triple Alliance. The Chancellor and Prince +Radolin, the ambassador at Paris, were both very skeptical about +the prospects for an Anglo-French agreement; but the German +representatives in London thought that one might be achieved. Count +Metternich’s opinion was that Great Britain and France were merely +negotiating another colonial accord, which he admitted might lead +to closer co-operation between them, but which need not cause alarm +so long as Great Britain, already pacifically inclined, enjoyed +only the fickle friendship of France and was confronted by the +antagonism of Russia.<a id="FNanchor_403"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_403" class="fnanchor">[403]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">[137]</span>In September the +German government believed that the Anglo-French settlement was +already far advanced;<a id="FNanchor_404"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_404" class="fnanchor">[404]</a> and, learning from the +Spanish Queen Mother, who was visiting in Austria, that France and +Spain were also negotiating over Morocco,<a id= +"FNanchor_405"></a><a href="#Footnote_405" class= +"fnanchor">[405]</a> it resolved to intervene. To that end on +September 24 it instructed Herr von Radowitz, German ambassador at +Madrid, as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>By virtue of our political international position and especially +by virtue of the great significance of our economic interests in +Morocco, we must seek to be considered also in a division of the +land by obtaining territorial compensation, for example in the +region of the Sus, or elsewhere in the colonial world, perhaps by +the cession of Fernando Po. Your Excellency should weigh thoroughly +the means by which we should best reach that goal, whether through +direct negotiations with Spain, through breaking the way for +participation in the negotiations of the most interested states, or +through proposing a conference.<a id="FNanchor_406"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_406" class="fnanchor">[406]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Thus the German government, realizing the +improvement in the diplomatic position of France and the decline in +its own, was apparently willing to make a division of Morocco with +Great Britain, France, and Spain.</p> + +<p>When Herr von Radowitz immediately unfolded the German desire to +the Spanish Foreign Minister, the latter, admitting the German +right to a share, agreed to study the proposal.<a id= +"FNanchor_407"></a><a href="#Footnote_407" class= +"fnanchor">[407]</a> After this the conversations appear to have +ceased.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[138]</span>Simultaneously +with these efforts, in the autumn of 1903 the German government +planned by maintaining strict reserve to allow the Franco-Russian +antagonism about the Balkans and the Russo-Japanese hostility in +the Far East to grow. It thought that any German leanings toward +Russia would pull France back into line and cause Japan to recede +before the danger of a new Continental triple entente.<a id= +"FNanchor_408"></a><a href="#Footnote_408" class= +"fnanchor">[408]</a> On the Chancellor’s advice, William II, during +his meeting with the Czar at Wiesbaden and Wolfsgarten on November +4-5, 1903, kept Germany’s hands entirely free. Nevertheless, after +the Czar’s approval of the Anglo-French and the Franco-Italian +<em>rapprochements</em> was made public late in October, the +Emperor began to suffer from the “nightmare of the coalitions.” +During the visit he sought to incite Nicholas II against France and +Great Britain and to urge him further into far eastern enterprises. +In his correspondence with the Czar in December and January he +continued these tactics.<a id="FNanchor_409"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_409" class="fnanchor">[409]</a> Count Bülow +remonstrated, but the Emperor, haughtily replying that these were +private letters, advised the Chancellor to mind his own +business.<a id="FNanchor_410"></a><a href="#Footnote_410" class= +"fnanchor">[410]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[139]</span>To the +satisfaction of the German government,<a id= +"FNanchor_411"></a><a href="#Footnote_411" class= +"fnanchor">[411]</a> the Russo-Japanese War broke out in February, +1904. In anger at Great Britain, Russia immediately drew nearer to +her neighbor;<a id="FNanchor_412"></a><a href="#Footnote_412" +class="fnanchor">[412]</a> and, with a war in progress, the German +statesmen planned by a wise manipulation of their power to improve +their international position and to gain concrete advantages.<a id= +"FNanchor_413"></a><a href="#Footnote_413" class= +"fnanchor">[413]</a> For the time, however, they endeavored by +assuring the British government that Germany would preserve strict +neutrality to obviate the need for Great Britain to come to terms +with France, arguing that a neutral Germany would entail a neutral +France.<a id="FNanchor_414"></a><a href="#Footnote_414" class= +"fnanchor">[414]</a> Moreover, carrying out a suggestion of the +Prince of Monaco, the <em>Wilhelmstrasse</em> sought to effect, +through the mediation of the Italian government, a meeting between +the Emperor William and President Loubet of France during their +visits to Italy in March and April.<a id= +"FNanchor_415"></a><a href="#Footnote_415" class= +"fnanchor">[415]</a> But on March 23 Prince Radolin surprised his +government<a id="FNanchor_416"></a><a href="#Footnote_416" class= +"fnanchor">[416]</a> by reporting a conversation with M. Delcassé +which showed that the<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_140">[140]</span> Anglo-French agreement was near completion. +By March 26 it became evident that the French had refused to permit +the proposed meeting.<a id="FNanchor_417"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_417" class="fnanchor">[417]</a> So Count Bülow +recommended to the Emperor on March 30 the dispatch of three small +warships to Tangier as a direct intervention in the Moroccan +affair. By thus arousing French animosity, Germany would show Great +Britain that the formation of a Continental <em>bloc</em> was +impossible, that there was no cause for her to sacrifice her +interests in Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_418"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_418" class="fnanchor">[418]</a> The Emperor regarded the +move as “entirely inopportune”; for, he argued, since France, Great +Britain, and Spain were about to settle the Moroccan question, “a +one-sided bellicose action by Germany . . . . would undoubtedly +arouse the suspicion of those Powers, would undermine belief in our +repeatedly expressed assurance, reiterated to the King of Spain at +Vigo, that we claim no exclusive rights in Morocco, and would put +the stamp of duplicity upon our policy.” He suggested that if the +government wished to take action in Morocco, it should first +consult those three Powers and secure their co-operation.<a id= +"FNanchor_419"></a><a href="#Footnote_419" class= +"fnanchor">[419]</a></p> + +<p>Without relinquishing the idea, Count Bülow had to content +himself for the time with a renewed declaration to the British +Ambassador on April 6 of neutrality during the Russo-Japanese +War.<a id="FNanchor_420"></a><a href="#Footnote_420" class= +"fnanchor">[420]</a> On April 8 the Anglo-French accord was +signed.</p> + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>German public opinion was disquieted by the Anglo-French +agreement and by the Franco-Italian intimacy. Apart from the +“lunatic fringe” as represented by the Pan-German +League,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">[141]</span> which +demanded an immediate seizure of a portion of Morocco,<a id= +"FNanchor_421"></a><a href="#Footnote_421" class= +"fnanchor">[421]</a> no one expressed particular concern over the +loss of that country.<a id="FNanchor_422"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_422" class="fnanchor">[422]</a> The scandals in the +colonial administration and the costly war with the natives of +German Southwest and German East Africa had momentarily turned the +nation against further colonial ventures.<a id= +"FNanchor_423"></a><a href="#Footnote_423" class= +"fnanchor">[423]</a> The new international alignments, however, +were viewed by the nation with some alarm. In the Reichstag on +April 12 Herr Sattler, a National Liberal and a supporter of the +government, expressed satisfaction that the Triple Alliance +remained firm; but, he continued, “one has the feeling that +otherwise a transformation has occurred in the relations of the +great Powers which can be of the gravest influence also on German +relations.” On the next day the Nationalist Count Reventlow +sarcastically remarked that he could not understand why Germany +should rejoice since France and Great Britain had settled their +differences. “If the world is divided, we must assume a somewhat +different attitude thereto,” he declared; “even in prudent circles +of our people the course of our foreign policy is being followed +with national sorrow,” for the government was trying to be +overcordial to all without gaining anything. Herr Bebel, the Social +Democratic leader, greeted the Anglo-French settlement on April 14; +but he also regarded it as weakening the Triple Alliance and +strengthening the Dual Alliance. Like Count Reventlow, he said that +Germany’s international position in the last few years had in no +way improved, acknowledging with regret the increasing antipathy to +Germany in foreign lands.<a id="FNanchor_424"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_424" class="fnanchor">[424]</a></p> + +<p>Count Bülow endeavored to calm the public opinion by declaring +in the Reichstag, April 12 and 14, that “we have no +reason<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[142]</span> to suppose +that the Anglo-French colonial accord is directed at any other +Power.” To this apparently “amicable understanding . . . . from the +standpoint of German interests we have nothing to object.” As to +Morocco, “in the main” Germany had economic interests which “we +must and shall protect. . . . . We have no cause to fear that these +. . . . could be disregarded or injured by any Power.” While +scoffing at the allegation that Germany was isolated, he added: “If +we keep our sword sharp, we need not fear isolation very much. +Germany is too strong not to be able to make alliances. Many +combinations are possible for us.” Denying any thought of waging a +war over Morocco, he upheld a policy of “prudent quiet and even of +reserve”; but he concluded with the significant statement that “if +one wishes to arouse friction in the world, one does not shout it +from the house-tops. Frederick the Great may now and then have made +a Machiavellian move in politics, but he previously wrote the +Anti-Machiavelli.”<a id="FNanchor_425"></a><a href="#Footnote_425" +class="fnanchor">[425]</a></p> + +<p>The Chancellor’s speech expressed only a temporary acquiescence +in the Anglo-French agreement, an intimation to France and Great +Britain to consult Germany over Morocco.<a id= +"FNanchor_426"></a><a href="#Footnote_426" class= +"fnanchor">[426]</a> The German government liked that accord less +than the German people did, even though it knew nothing of the +content of the secret articles. The Emperor feared that now Great +Britain “would put every consideration for us more and more into +the background.”<a id="FNanchor_427"></a><a href="#Footnote_427" +class="fnanchor">[427]</a> And Count Bülow, who knew that the new +alignment placed Germany in no actual danger,<a id= +"FNanchor_428"></a><a href="#Footnote_428" class= +"fnanchor">[428]</a> admitted that “doubtlessly both<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_143">[143]</span> Powers [France and Great +Britain] win in international influence and in freedom of movement +by this accord and by their <em>rapprochement</em>, and that the +drawing force of the Anglo-French Entente on Italy will also be +strengthened.”<a id="FNanchor_429"></a><a href="#Footnote_429" +class="fnanchor">[429]</a> The prospective loss of Morocco to +Germany and the general dissatisfaction within Germany over the +conduct of her foreign affairs accentuated Count Bülow’s ill will +toward the new agreement.</p> + +<h3>III</h3> + +<p>The Chancellor’s prophecy about Italy came true almost +immediately.</p> + +<p>Italy’s policy was, of course, to play between the Triple +Alliance and France for her own advantage. Italian opinion +interpreted the Anglo-French <em>rapprochement</em>, following upon +the Franco-Italian entente, as a setback to Germany, and became +more independent toward its allies. After Italy’s special interest +in the future of Tripoli was recognized, the Italian people raised +the irredentist question in the summer and autumn of 1903. In the +winter relations with Austria became so tense that war clouds +loomed up.<a id="FNanchor_430"></a><a href="#Footnote_430" class= +"fnanchor">[430]</a> Count Goluchowski, the Austrian foreign +minister, desired to replace the Triple Alliance by the old League +of the Three Emperors, and declared that if the present relations +with Italy continued, Austria could not renew the alliance.<a id= +"FNanchor_431"></a><a href="#Footnote_431" class= +"fnanchor">[431]</a></p> + +<p>Count Bülow succeeded in patching up the raveling fabric +of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[144]</span> the Triple +Alliance.<a id="FNanchor_432"></a><a href="#Footnote_432" class= +"fnanchor">[432]</a> He suspected that Italy had made a reinsurance +treaty with France after the renewal of the Triple Alliance in +1902, by which the alliance was nullified in case of a +Franco-German war.<a id="FNanchor_433"></a><a href="#Footnote_433" +class="fnanchor">[433]</a> Neither he nor General Schlieffen, +German chief of staff, expected Italy to support Germany in that +instance or even to hold inactive the French troops on the Italian +frontier. None the less, at the request of the Italian chief of +staff, the Chancellor permitted the German-Italian military +conversations to continue as before.<a id= +"FNanchor_434"></a><a href="#Footnote_434" class= +"fnanchor">[434]</a> He endeavored to preserve at least the outward +appearance of harmony.<a id="FNanchor_435"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_435" class="fnanchor">[435]</a></p> + +<p>But in the spring of 1904 the Triple Alliance almost went on the +rocks over an intrinsically insignificant affair—whether or not the +entertainment of the French and of the German chiefs of state, who +were both to visit Italy at about the same time in March and April, +should be on a similar scale.</p> + +<p>After the Emperor’s visit on March 26-27 had passed off quietly +enough<a id="FNanchor_436"></a><a href="#Footnote_436" class= +"fnanchor">[436]</a> the French government sought to expand the +program of reception for President Loubet in order to demonstrate +the great popularity of France in Italy,<a id= +"FNanchor_437"></a><a href="#Footnote_437" class= +"fnanchor">[437]</a> while the German<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_145">[145]</span> government endeavored to restrict it. Under +threat of breaking the alliance, the latter forced M. Tittoni, the +Italian foreign minister, to promise that Italy’s loyalty to the +Triple Alliance would be warmly mentioned in the toasts.<a id= +"FNanchor_438"></a><a href="#Footnote_438" class= +"fnanchor">[438]</a> But when the visit occurred, April 24-28, the +Italian King, playing his own hand, helped the French to enjoy an +unbroken triumph.<a id="FNanchor_439"></a><a href="#Footnote_439" +class="fnanchor">[439]</a> On April 25 and 26 affection for them +was extravagantly displayed by the Italians while no mention of the +Triple Alliance was made.<a id="FNanchor_440"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_440" class="fnanchor">[440]</a> In an endeavor to stop +further exchange of toasts, the German ambassador, Count Monts, +complained bitterly to M. Luzzati, Italian secretary of the +treasury, of the pro-French attitude of the King, government, and +press; of the non-fulfilment of promises; of the King’s ignoring +him at the festivals; of the failure to mention the alliance in the +speeches. “My training and instructions prohibit me from using that +tone toward the <em>Consulta</em> which would correspond with its +behavior,” he declared. He demanded that no more toasts be +made.<a id="FNanchor_441"></a><a href="#Footnote_441" class= +"fnanchor">[441]</a></p> + +<p>Doubtless this peremptoriness would have produced the desired +result if at the crucial moment the German Emperor had not sent a +telegram of warm thanks for his reception to the Italian government +and nullified the entire effect of the Ambassador’s<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_146">[146]</span> indignation.<a id= +"FNanchor_442"></a><a href="#Footnote_442" class= +"fnanchor">[442]</a> At Naples the King again exchanged toasts with +M. Loubet without mentioning the alliance.</p> + +<p>Although the demands of the German government had been flouted, +it could not execute its threat; for a dissolution of the Triple +Alliance, occurring so soon after the conclusion of the Entente +Cordiale, would have been too great a victory for France. “One +would say,” wrote Count Bülow, “that our policy since the +retirement of Bismarck has lost us first the alliance with Russia, +then good relations with England, and finally the Triple Alliance +itself.”<a id="FNanchor_443"></a><a href="#Footnote_443" class= +"fnanchor">[443]</a> So, feigning cool indifference toward the +renegade ally, he remarked to the Italian Ambassador that as the +conditions out of which the Triple Alliance had developed no longer +obtained, Germany had no need of Italy’s aid, nor, he supposed, had +Italy of Germany’s.<a id="FNanchor_444"></a><a href="#Footnote_444" +class="fnanchor">[444]</a> Then came apologies. On May 18 M. +Tittoni declared in the Italian Chamber that “the policy of Italy +is not one of balancing, which would be unworthy of a great state, +but one of loyal honesty. The alliance with Germany is not +incompatible with friendly relations with France.”<a id= +"FNanchor_445"></a><a href="#Footnote_445" class= +"fnanchor">[445]</a> Although the German government did not believe +him, it accepted his excuses. The Triple Alliance resumed its +precarious course.<a id="FNanchor_446"></a><a href="#Footnote_446" +class="fnanchor">[446]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[147]</span>As a result of +this episode, the anger of the German government at France, already +aroused over the diminution of German influence through the Entente +Cordiale, was increased. The Emperor, who had tarried near the +Italian coast in the persistent hope of a chance meeting with M. +Loubet,<a id="FNanchor_447"></a><a href="#Footnote_447" class= +"fnanchor">[447]</a> returned home feeling like the poor kinsman +uninvited to the feast. On May 1, at the opening of the new Rhine +bridge at Mainz, he gave vent to his chagrin in the following +warning: “I desire sincerely that peace . . . . be kept. But I am +convinced that if this bridge should have to be used for more +serious transports, it would stand the test completely.”<a id= +"FNanchor_448"></a><a href="#Footnote_448" class= +"fnanchor">[448]</a></p> + +<h3>IV</h3> + +<p>“We need a success in our foreign policy,” wrote Prince +Lichnowsky, councilor in the German foreign office, on April 14, +“because the Anglo-French understanding as well as the +Franco-Italian <em>rapprochement</em> is generally considered a +defeat for us.”<a id="FNanchor_449"></a><a href="#Footnote_449" +class="fnanchor">[449]</a> The German government immediately took +steps toward obtaining that success.</p> + +<p>To manifest its dissatisfaction at being excluded from the +Moroccan settlement and to force M. Delcassé to agree with Germany +on that question, the German government first considered in April +the project of dispatching a warship to Tangier, ostensibly to +settle certain grievances against Morocco.<a id= +"FNanchor_450"></a><a href="#Footnote_450" class= +"fnanchor">[450]</a> As a precaution,<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_148">[148]</span> General Schlieffen, chief of staff, was +consulted, April 19, about the possibility of success in case of a +Franco-German war. Herr von Holstein summed up the General’s reply +as follows: “In case of the outbreak of a Franco-German war at the +present, Russia’s participation would be improbable, but England’s +attitude would be uncertain.”<a id="FNanchor_451"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_451" class="fnanchor">[451]</a></p> + +<p>The proposal was not executed at the time,<a id= +"FNanchor_452"></a><a href="#Footnote_452" class= +"fnanchor">[452]</a> for Count Bülow had other plans. The first one +was to test the strength of the Entente Cordiale, to weaken its +force, and to include Germany among the Powers making ententes by +endeavoring to negotiate an arbitration treaty and a general +settlement with Great Britain similar to the Anglo-French ones. If +accord, even in principle, were reached on Anglo-German +difficulties, the Chancellor was willing to propose a naval +agreement. He felt certain that by careful handling he could win +the Emperor’s approval of the whole transaction.<a id= +"FNanchor_453"></a><a href="#Footnote_453" class= +"fnanchor">[453]</a></p> + +<p>The opportunity to make the proposal was afforded when about the +first of May the British government asked the other Powers +interested in Egypt to approve the changes which France had +accepted in the declaration of April 8. The German foreign office +replied that Germany must receive the same guaranty of her rights +in Egypt that France had received, and proposed to include in the +negotiations the Anglo-German troubles concerning<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_149">[149]</span> Samoa, Transvaal indemnities, +and the Canadian preferential tariff.</p> + +<p>The British government refused to broaden the basis of +negotiations, declaring that the Egyptian affair must be settled on +its own merits. How Lord Lansdowne regarded the German proposal was +shown in his letter of May 6 to Sir Frank Lascelles.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The proposal of the German Government to make their concurrence +in regard to the Khedivial Decree dependent upon an all-round +settlement [he wrote] . . . . looks to an ordinary observer like a +great piece of effrontery. . . . . The suggestion that the consent +of the German Government to a perfectly innocuous arrangement in +Egypt can only be bought at the price of concessions elsewhere does +not become more palatable when we find it connected with an +intimation that Germany is hesitating whether “she shall turn to +the East or to the West.” This is a veiled threat of which I +remember Hatzfeldt used to be fond.<a id= +"FNanchor_454"></a><a href="#Footnote_454" class= +"fnanchor">[454]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Pointing out the fact that Germany held only a very +small per cent of the Egyptian bonds (he said only ¼ per cent), +that the other Powers had agreed to the Egyptian changes +unconditionally, and that France had made reciprocal concessions to +Great Britain in return for the guaranty of her rights in Egypt, +Lord Lansdowne refused to give Germany the special guaranty which +she requested.<a id="FNanchor_455"></a><a href="#Footnote_455" +class="fnanchor">[455]</a></p> + +<p>Count Bülow agreed (May 28) to confine the negotiations to Egypt +alone; but he would not recede from the other demands. For, he +argued, France had been given large compensation in return for her +renunciations in Egypt while Germany merely asked an equal +assurance of her rights and interests in that land, particularly of +her commercial interests. Thus the two governments reached a +deadlock. Each felt that it had a just grievance.<a id= +"FNanchor_456"></a><a href="#Footnote_456" class= +"fnanchor">[456]</a><span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_150">[150]</span> Herr von Holstein, considering the occasion +a “test of strength,” thought that if Germany receded, the world +would perceive that sharp handling was sufficient to vanquish +her.<a id="FNanchor_457"></a><a href="#Footnote_457" class= +"fnanchor">[457]</a> Count Metternich reported, however, that the +British refusal was caused not by any malign designs against +Germany, but rather by the fact that the government was opposed to +weakening or endangering the Entente Cordiale by treating Germany +in the same way as France, and by the fact that it saw no reason +for making an exception of Germany after the other Powers had +unconditionally accepted the modifications. Above all, he wrote, +the British government feared another outburst of vituperation +against Germany from British public opinion and of indignation +against the British government itself for permitting Germany again +to browbeat it.<a id="FNanchor_458"></a><a href="#Footnote_458" +class="fnanchor">[458]</a> So about the middle of June at the +Count’s suggestion, a compromise was effected. The British +government gave Germany a guaranty of its Egyptian interests in +return for an acceptance of the French obligations in that land. +The other Powers were to be asked to approve this new +agreement.<a id="FNanchor_459"></a><a href="#Footnote_459" class= +"fnanchor">[459]</a></p> + +<p>Late in June King Edward enjoyed a pleasant visit as the +Emperor’s guest at a naval review at Kiel; on July 10, at the +King’s suggestion, some German warships touched at Plymouth; and on +July 12 an arbitration treaty was signed between the two Powers. +Their relations seemed to be improving. At Kiel, Count Bülow once +more assured the King that Germany intended to guard strict +neutrality during the Russo-Japanese War; and<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_151">[151]</span> Edward VII declared that “no special +agreements were needed between England and Germany since no +conflict of political interests divided them.” He also stated that +he wished a settlement with Russia, in fact, that he desired to +diminish animosities among all Powers; but he added that he had no +thought thereby of isolating Germany.<a id= +"FNanchor_460"></a><a href="#Footnote_460" class= +"fnanchor">[460]</a></p> + +<p>In spite of the King’s cordial words, the fact remained that +Germany was still regarded with marked mistrust and antipathy by +the British people, while the British government had shown a +preference, not yet appreciated by Germany, for the friendship of +France. Germany’s bid to participate in the formation of ententes +had failed.</p> + +<h3>V</h3> + +<p>Count Bülow’s second plan was to share in the settlement of the +Moroccan problem. He had made preparations to that end in the +previous autumn, but his policy had been repudiated by the German +Emperor (who personally had no interest in Morocco)<a id= +"FNanchor_461"></a><a href="#Footnote_461" class= +"fnanchor">[461]</a> during an interview with the King of Spain at +Vigo on March 16, 1904. In one of his expansive and oracular moods +William II advised the youthful King to keep on good terms with +France and to make his first foreign visit to Paris, to be on his +guard against Great Britain and her satellite, Portugal, but to +maintain friendly personal relations with King Edward, and to come +to an agreement over the future of Morocco with the other nations, +especially France, interested in North Africa. Germany, he said, +aimed at no territorial acquisitions in North Africa, but only the +maintenance of the open door for, among others, +“railway<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[152]</span> +concessions, open ports, and importation of manufactured +articles.”<a id="FNanchor_462"></a><a href="#Footnote_462" class= +"fnanchor">[462]</a></p> + +<p>In spite of the Emperor’s renunciation, Count Bülow did not +relinquish his ambitions although the difficulty of realizing them +was enormously increased. The indefiniteness and apparent duplicity +of the German policy on the Moroccan question were caused by Count +Bülow’s dilemma of gaining a share in Morocco without violating the +Emperor’s assertions.</p> + +<p>Late in April, 1904, the Chancellor was afforded an opportunity +to intervene through Spain, whose government asked for Germany’s +sympathy and “practical proof of it at the opportune moment” during +the Franco-Spanish negotiations then under way. Count Bülow was +eager to fish in troubled waters by lending aid, and in his +optimism went so far as to instruct Herr von Radowitz on April 29 +as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Port Mahon we leave entirely out of consideration. Primarily +Fernando Po interests us, for which under circumstances we would +also pay well. If, moreover, a harbor in West Morocco is +obtainable, that would be very useful. Perhaps Your Excellency can +use the prevailing opinion in Spain against the Anglo-French accord +in this direction.<a id="FNanchor_463"></a><a href="#Footnote_463" +class="fnanchor">[463]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The Chancellor advised the Spanish government to draw out the +negotiations; for, he argued, if Great Britain were given time in +which to recover from her fear that the far eastern entente of 1895 +might be renewed, she would begin to rue her bargain, and would at +least passively support Spain or acquiesce<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_153">[153]</span> in the latter’s receiving better terms from +the more powerful France.<a id="FNanchor_464"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_464" class="fnanchor">[464]</a> When the Chancellor +heard of difficulty between the two negotiating Powers over the +control of Tangier, he decided to give diplomatic support to Spain +in obtaining that port and its hinterland provided Great Britain +was not obliged to aid France diplomatically in acquiring them. In +other words, he was making it very easy for Great Britain to sin +against her obligations to France. When the German Ambassador +sounded Lord Lansdowne early in June, the latter, while not +objecting, made it evident that he preferred and expected a +satisfactory settlement directly between the two Powers +themselves.<a id="FNanchor_465"></a><a href="#Footnote_465" class= +"fnanchor">[465]</a> By June 10 the German government learned that +this matter had been arranged, but that trouble had arisen over the +question of publishing the agreement. Count Bülow immediately urged +Spain in favor of it.<a id="FNanchor_466"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_466" class="fnanchor">[466]</a> On June 17 Herr von +Radowitz reported that Spain was insisting upon complete commercial +freedom in Morocco without the thirty years’ limitation. As this +was also a sensitive point for Germany Count Bülow on the next day +instructed the Ambassador to advise Spain strongly to insist upon +the assurance of the fullest economic freedom even for obtaining +government contracts and concessions. He left it to Herr von +Radowitz to determine “whether it would be advantageous for the +achievement of the German goal to let the Spanish perceive that +Germany would assume and maintain the same standpoint at the proper +moment.” “Naturally,” he added for the Ambassador’s personal +information, “it would be . . . . a great help to us for Spain to +take the lead.”<a id="FNanchor_467"></a><a href="#Footnote_467" +class="fnanchor">[467]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[154]</span>By July, +however, there seemed little prospect of Germany’s profiting from +the Franco-Spanish negotiations.<a id="FNanchor_468"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_468" class="fnanchor">[468]</a> German grievances +against Morocco remained unsettled. German firms trading there +demanded protection against the French monopolistic actions. In +June, France practically gained control over the Sultan’s finances, +and she was preparing an important mission to Fez in the autumn. +Nor did M. Delcassé show any inclination to open negotiations with +Germany. Already disgruntled at the French Foreign Minister, the +German government came to feel itself slighted and humiliated by +his disregard. Its resentment toward him became concentrated upon +the one grievance which could be best supported in public, that he +was infringing upon Germany’s economic interests in Morocco. It +therefore decided to assume a more active policy, and late in July +held a discussion of ways and means. The government did not follow +up a hint from the Sultan for co-operation because of its unsettled +claims against Morocco. Nor could it tender him financial support +or begin an economic penetration of the land similar to that of +France because, as Baron Richthofen wrote late in July, “the German +banks all strike immediately when one mentions Morocco. The German +Foreign Secretary advised against keeping pace with every act of +the French in Morocco as too venturesome; while to take the +initiative directly with the French government by requesting +guaranties for economic freedom he regarded as both doubtful of +success and beneath German dignity. So at the Baron’s suggestion a +“gradual, purely matter-of-fact advance, ignoring as long as +possible a special position of France,” was decided upon. German +warships should appear from time to time in Moroccan waters, and +during one of these visits the grievances against Morocco should be +settled.<a id="FNanchor_469"></a><a href="#Footnote_469" class= +"fnanchor">[469]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[155]</span>The uncertain +international situation also caused the German government to +proceed warily. On June 3 the Belgian Minister at Berlin had stated +to the German foreign office that he suspected the presence of a +secret article in the Anglo-French accord concerning the Rheinish +frontier. Although believing that the agreement did contain secret +clauses regarding Egypt, Count Metternich refused to credit this +suspicion. Upon mentioning the rumor to Lord Lansdowne on June 19, +he received a full denial that the accord contained any articles +which concerned European complications.<a id= +"FNanchor_470"></a><a href="#Footnote_470" class= +"fnanchor">[470]</a> Nevertheless, the Chancellor realized that +“any attempt on the part of Germany to interfere in the Moroccan +question in its present phase can lead to an action with +far-reaching consequences and therefore deserves special +precaution.”<a id="FNanchor_471"></a><a href="#Footnote_471" class= +"fnanchor">[471]</a> For that reason he first sought to learn how +the British government regarded its obligations to France with +respect to Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_472"></a><a href="#Footnote_472" +class="fnanchor">[472]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[156]</span>On August 15 +Count Metternich declared to Lord Lansdowne that “the French effort +aimed at a monopolization in Morocco. We could not permit this.” +Asserting that Germany was in no way bound by the Anglo-French +agreement, he said that Germany’s economic interests in regard to +governmental concessions and industrial enterprises in Morocco were +endangered by France. “We could very soon be put in a situation in +which we should have to protect our commercial interests [in the +widest sense] against France.” He asked Lord Lansdowne how the +British government interpreted the last part of Article IV of the +Anglo-French declaration stating that concessions for roads, etc., +in Morocco were to be granted “only on such conditions as will +maintain intact the authority of the State over these great +undertakings of public interest,” and Article IX obliging Great +Britain to lend diplomatic aid to France.</p> + +<p>Lord Lansdowne denied that Great Britain had renounced her right +to share in the concessions in Morocco, but he refused to interpret +Article IX until a concrete instance arose. He declared that in the +French agreement</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">we [Great Britain] made no attempt to dispose of +the rights of other Powers, although we made certain concessions in +respect of the rights and opportunities to which we were ourselves +entitled. I could at any rate say that it was not at all probable +that, if any third Power were to have occasion to uphold its Treaty +rights, we should use our influence in derogation of them.</p> +</div> + +<p>Count Metternich inferred from that interview that Lord +Lansdowne would limit the scope of Article IX, and that in case +Germany’s actions did not infringe upon the Sultan’s authority +Germany would be safe in opposing France in Morocco. However, he +wrote, if Germany sought, for instance, to acquire control of a +harbor there, Great Britain would support France. He warned his +government that Great Britain would not connive at blocking the +French advance in Morocco or endanger her friendship for the sake +of that land. If a third Power disputed politically the French +position there, both government and people<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_157">[157]</span> would support France. Within those limits +Germany could execute her Moroccan policy. But, he continued, “in +the present international situation, it will be difficult for us to +arrest the process of France’s establishing herself in +Morocco.”<a id="FNanchor_473"></a><a href="#Footnote_473" class= +"fnanchor">[473]</a></p> + +<p>Even before receiving Count Metternich’s reply, the Chancellor +proposed to dispatch an ultimatum to the Sultan demanding under +threat of a naval demonstration that he satisfy the German claims +within three months.<a id="FNanchor_474"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_474" class="fnanchor">[474]</a> But the Emperor, who +remained strongly opposed to active interference in the Moroccan +affair, refused his consent for the third time, and upset the +Chancellor’s policy.<a id="FNanchor_475"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_475" class="fnanchor">[475]</a> In September the foreign +office discussed the plan to seize the Moroccan transport ship and +even Agadir, but nothing was done.<a id="FNanchor_476"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_476" class="fnanchor">[476]</a> Early in October Baron +Richthofen suggested that since the Emperor was so averse to +intervention the government should take up the Moroccan question +directly with the French government. This project also came to +naught.<a id="FNanchor_477"></a><a href="#Footnote_477" class= +"fnanchor">[477]</a></p> + +<p>While no action was taken German feeling continued to smolder. +The noncommittal communication from the French government about the +agreement with Spain early in October<a id= +"FNanchor_478"></a><a href="#Footnote_478" class= +"fnanchor">[478]</a> and the repeated petitions of German firms for +the defense of their interests in Morocco<a id= +"FNanchor_479"></a><a href="#Footnote_479" class= +"fnanchor">[479]</a> augmented the bitterness against France. So +while the German government itself played the<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_158">[158]</span> sphinx, it showed its resentment through +the semiofficial press and through conversations between German and +French officials in Morocco and elsewhere. By the end of the year +the Moroccan question was still very much alive. As an influential +Moor remarked, “Germany has not yet spoken, and so long as that has +not occurred, we cannot believe that anything definite has been +decided.”<a id="FNanchor_480"></a><a href="#Footnote_480" class= +"fnanchor">[480]</a> Before Germany did speak, she endeavored to +solve her difficulties by an effort to ally with Russia.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc09"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_399"></a><a href="#FNanchor_399"><span class= +"label">[399]</span></a>See among others Richard Charmatz, +<em>Österreichs äussere und innere Politik von 1895 bis 1914</em> +(Leipzig and Berlin, 1918).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_400"></a><a href="#FNanchor_400"><span class= +"label">[400]</span></a>On the state of British public opinion see +Eckardstein, <em>Lebenserinnerungen und politische +Denkwürdigkeiten</em>, II, 397 f.; and the various dispatches from +Metternich and Eckardstein, <em>G.P.</em>, XVII, Nos. 5046, 5071, +5094, 5104, 5371, 5375, and others.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_401"></a><a href="#FNanchor_401"><span class= +"label">[401]</span></a>Holstein to Bülow, March 30, 1903, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 573 n.; memo. by Holstein, April, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, XVIII, 802 ff., No. 5888; Holstein to Bülow, April +2, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 838 f., No. 5910; Bülow to F. O., April 3, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 839 f., No. 5911.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_402"></a><a href="#FNanchor_402"><span class= +"label">[402]</span></a>An ardent advocate of the proposed +Anglo-German alliance and a sufferer from the “nightmare of +coalitions,” Eckardstein had resigned his position in October, +1902, because he disapproved of the diplomatic method and the +policy of his foreign office and “saw black ahead” for his country; +also perhaps because of personal pique at not having been appointed +ambassador in London upon the death of the aged Count Hatzfeldt +(Eckardstein, II, 412 f.). For his dispatch to Bülow see +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 567 f., No. 5369; also published with minor +changes in Eckardstein, II, 425 f. The few changes from the +original which occur in some of the documents in Eckardstein’s +memoirs are not of any great importance. On the whole his judgments +were sound.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_403"></a><a href="#FNanchor_403"><span class= +"label">[403]</span></a>The dispatches are to be found in +<em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XVII, chap. cxv. In July, however, the German +Emperor could not conceal from the French Ambassador his irritation +at Delcassé’s success in the Anglo-French <em>rapprochement</em>. +After expressing the wish that French vessels might repeat the +visit of 1895 to Kiel, he remarked to M. Bihourd, July 16: “‘I know +well that nothing is to be accomplished with M. Delcassé. The +advances to England are the work of M. Delcassé and M. Cambon. . . +. . But the Russians are not content with that and some day they +will make you. . . . .’ Here a gesture of disappointment, concluded +M. Bihourd, made clear the prediction” (quoted from a dispatch from +Bihourd in Bourgeois et Pagès, <em>Les origines et les +responsabilités de la grande guerre</em>, p. 293).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_404"></a><a href="#FNanchor_404"><span class= +"label">[404]</span></a>Groeben to F. O., Sept. 17, 1903, +<em>G.P.</em>, XVII, 353 f., No. 5198; Richthofen to Radowitz, +Sept. 28, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 357 ff., No. 5202.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_405"></a><a href="#FNanchor_405"><span class= +"label">[405]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Sept. 18, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 354, No. 5199; Richthofen to Radowitz, Sept. 24, +1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 354 ff., No. 5200.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_406"></a><a href="#FNanchor_406"><span class= +"label">[406]</span></a>Richthofen to Radowitz, Sept. 24, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 355, No. 5200.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_407"></a><a href="#FNanchor_407"><span class= +"label">[407]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Sept. 29, Oct. 4, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 359 ff., Nos. 5203, 5205.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_408"></a><a href="#FNanchor_408"><span class= +"label">[408]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., Oct. 17, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, XVIII, 845 ff., No. 5915; Bülow to William II, Oct. +19, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 847 ff., No. 5916.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_409"></a><a href="#FNanchor_409"><span class= +"label">[409]</span></a>William II wrote to Nicholas II, Dec. 1, +1903, as follows: “The visit of the hundred British +Parliamentary—gentlemen and ladies—to Paris shows how ‘the Crimean +combination’ is warming to its work. Your ally is making rather +free with his flirt [with Great Britain]. You should pull him up a +little.” Again on Jan. 3, 1904, he wrote to the same: “Therefore it +is evident to every unbiassed mind that Korea must and will be +Russian. When and how that is nobody’s affair and concerns only you +and your country.” See Bülow to F. O., Oct. 31, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 853 f., No. 5918; memo. by Bülow, Nov. 7, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 70 ff., No. 5422; Walter Goetz (ed.), <em>Briefe +Wilhelms II an den Zaren, 1894-1914</em> (Berlin, 1920), pp. 330 +ff.; Savinsky, <em>Recollections of a Russian Diplomat</em>, pp. 63 +ff. William II addressed Nicholas in various letters as “Admiral of +the Pacific” and signed himself “Admiral of the Atlantic.” In spite +of these words, to hold the Emperor responsible for the +Russo-Japanese War is to underestimate the force of Russian foreign +policy.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_410"></a><a href="#FNanchor_410"><span class= +"label">[410]</span></a>See <em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XIX, chaps. +cxxviii, cxxix, especially Bülow to William II, Jan. 4, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 87 ff., No. 5972, and the Emperor’s minutes; memo. +by Bülow, Feb. 14, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 62 f., No. 5961.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_411"></a><a href="#FNanchor_411"><span class= +"label">[411]</span></a>Bülow to Holstein, Jan. 15, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 33 f., No. 5942; memo. by Eckardstein, Jan. 17, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 38 ff., No. 5945, and the Emperor’s minutes +thereto.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_412"></a><a href="#FNanchor_412"><span class= +"label">[412]</span></a>Count Benckendorff, Russian ambassador at +London, spoke of the Dual Alliance as going to pieces, and there +was talk among other Russian diplomats of renewing the former +League of the Three Emperors. See Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 28, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 165 ff., No. 6028; Metternich to Bülow, March 14, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 167 ff., No. 6029; Alvensleben to Bülow, +March 18, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 172 ff., No. 6030; memo. by +Holstein, Jan. 16, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 35 ff., No. 5944.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_413"></a><a href="#FNanchor_413"><span class= +"label">[413]</span></a>“Because of the importance of German +neutrality we shall perhaps find opportunity to utilize our central +position in case of further sharpening of the hostility in the same +way that M. Delcassé intends doing with reference to Morocco,” +wrote Holstein in a memo. on Jan. 23, 1904 (<em>ibid.</em>, 48 ff., +No. 5951). Also see memo. by Holstein, Jan. 16, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 48 ff., No. 5951.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_414"></a><a href="#FNanchor_414"><span class= +"label">[414]</span></a>Bülow to Metternich, Jan. 9, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 22, No. 5932; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 8, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, II, 232, No. 273. Bülow later complained that the +British had offered very weak resistance to the French demands +(Bülow to Metternich, June 4, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 28, No. +6383).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_415"></a><a href="#FNanchor_415"><span class= +"label">[415]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 4, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 105 f., No. 6431; Bülow to Radolin, Feb. 18, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 106 f., No. 6432, and following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_416"></a><a href="#FNanchor_416"><span class= +"label">[416]</span></a>For proof that the German government had +not expected the signing of the accord then see Eckardstein, II, +426 f.; Otto Hammann, <em>Der misverstandene Bismarck. Zwanzig +Jahre deutscher Weltpolitik</em> (Berlin, 1921), p. 110.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_417"></a><a href="#FNanchor_417"><span class= +"label">[417]</span></a>Monts to F. O., March 26, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 116, No. 6439.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_418"></a><a href="#FNanchor_418"><span class= +"label">[418]</span></a>Although Bülow did not say so, it is +manifest that this was one of his intentions (Bülow to William II, +March 30, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 197 ff., No. 6512).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_419"></a><a href="#FNanchor_419"><span class= +"label">[419]</span></a>Tschirschky to Bülow, April 3, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 199 ff., No. 6513. On the interview at Vigo see +below.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_420"></a><a href="#FNanchor_420"><span class= +"label">[420]</span></a>Bülow to Tschirschky, April 3, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 8 f. No. 6370; memo. by Bülow, April 6, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 10 f., No. 6372; Bülow to Tschirschky, April 6, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 201 and note, No. 6514. The last dispatch was +not sent, for on April 8 the accord was signed.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_421"></a><a href="#FNanchor_421"><span class= +"label">[421]</span></a><em>Zwanzig Jahre alldeutscher Arbeit und +Kämpfe</em>, pp. 219, 233, 235, 238 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_422"></a><a href="#FNanchor_422"><span class= +"label">[422]</span></a>See, for instance, <em>Berliner +Tageblatt</em>, April 17, 1904; Dr. Th. Schiemann, <em>Deutschland +und die grosse Politik, 1904</em> (Berlin, 1905), p. 118, and +others; <em>Grenzboten</em>, June 23, 1904, p. 668.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_423"></a><a href="#FNanchor_423"><span class= +"label">[423]</span></a>Alfred Zimmerman, <em>Deutsche +Kolonialpolitik</em> (Berlin, 1914), pp. 241 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_424"></a><a href="#FNanchor_424"><span class= +"label">[424]</span></a><em>Stenographische Berichte von den +Behandlungen des Reichstages</em>, CXCIX, 2019, 2053 f., 2058 f.; +Hammann, <em>Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit</em>, p. 42; reports +from the Berlin correspondent to the <em>London Times</em>, April +11 and 16, 1904.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_425"></a><a href="#FNanchor_425"><span class= +"label">[425]</span></a>Bülow, <em>Reden</em>, II, 74, 84, 90 f.; +see also Hammann, <em>Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit</em>, pp. +42 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_426"></a><a href="#FNanchor_426"><span class= +"label">[426]</span></a>This was Sanderson’s opinion. He was at the +time British permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. +See memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 25, 1907, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 421.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_427"></a><a href="#FNanchor_427"><span class= +"label">[427]</span></a>William II to Bülow, April 19, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 22 ff., No. 6378.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_428"></a><a href="#FNanchor_428"><span class= +"label">[428]</span></a>From London, Bernstorff, first secretary of +the embassy, reported that the British were entirely pacific in +their intentions and inclinations (Bernstorff to Bülow, April 16, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 14 ff., No. 6376). The Emperor considered +this report “excellent.” Alvensleben also wrote from St. Petersburg +that Russia was not so well satisfied with the Anglo-French accord +as French newspapers would have one believe (Alvensleben to Bülow, +April 15, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 21 f., No. 6377).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_429"></a><a href="#FNanchor_429"><span class= +"label">[429]</span></a>Bülow to William II, April 20, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 24, No. 6379.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_430"></a><a href="#FNanchor_430"><span class= +"label">[430]</span></a>On Austro-Italian relations see Wedel to +Bülow, Sept. 14, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, XVIII, 621 ff., No. 5779; +memo. by Bülow, Sept. 20, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 624 ff., No. 5780; +Monts to F. O., <em>ibid.</em>, XX, 47 f., No. 6399; Monts to +Bülow, April 25, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 54 ff., No. 6404; Monts to +Bülow, April 30, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 64 ff., No. 6412.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_431"></a><a href="#FNanchor_431"><span class= +"label">[431]</span></a>Memo. by Bülow of conversation with +Goluchowski at Vienna, Sept. 20, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, XVIII, 625 +f., No. 5780; Wedel to Bülow, Oct. 20, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 627 +f., No. 5783.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_432"></a><a href="#FNanchor_432"><span class= +"label">[432]</span></a>An interview between the Italian and the +Austrian foreign ministers at Abazzia on April 9, 1904, attested to +this fact. See Wedel to Bülow, April 14, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, XX, +50 ff., No. 6401; memo. by Bülow, May 9, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, +XVIII, 613 ff., No. 5775; Bülow to Monts, June 9, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 616 ff., No. 5776; and following documents in +<em>ibid.</em>, chap. cxxii, Anhang.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_433"></a><a href="#FNanchor_433"><span class= +"label">[433]</span></a>Monts to Bülow, April 30, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, XX, 64, No. 6412; memo. by Holstein, March 3, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 37 ff., No. 6388.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_434"></a><a href="#FNanchor_434"><span class= +"label">[434]</span></a>Chelius to Schlieffen, Dec. 1, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, XVIII, 705 ff., No. 5827; Richthofen to Schlieffen, +Dec. 11, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 707 f., No. 5826; Schlieffen to +Richthofen, Dec. 14, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 708, No. 5829.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_435"></a><a href="#FNanchor_435"><span class= +"label">[435]</span></a>Memo. by Holstein, March 3, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, XX, 37 ff., No. 6388; Monts to F. O., March 7, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 41, No. 6390.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_436"></a><a href="#FNanchor_436"><span class= +"label">[436]</span></a>Bülow to William II, March 11, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 46, No. 6397; Monts to F. O., March 26, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 47 f., No. 6399; <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, +April 1, 1904, XVII, 524 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_437"></a><a href="#FNanchor_437"><span class= +"label">[437]</span></a>Monts to Bülow, April 16, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 53 f., No. 6403. Giovanni Giolitti, who was then +Italian premier, has written as follows about this visit: “In +Delcassé I noticed particularly his finesse and ability, as well as +the insistence with which he attempted to loosen or weaken our +bonds with Germany, without however putting forward anything at all +in the nature of a definite proposal” (<em>Memoirs of My Life</em> +[London, 1923], p. 183). On March 5, 1904, Sir Francis Bertie, +British ambassador in Rome, wrote to Lansdowne as follows: “M. +Ba[rrère] does all he can to create friction between Italy and +Austria to alienate Italy from her partner in the Triplice” +(<em>B.D.</em>, V, 74). In contrast the British Ambassador in +Vienna was in April, 1904, reassuring his Italian colleague about +Austrian intentions in the Balkans now that Russia was in a far +eastern war (Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 7, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, +V, 80, No. 41).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_438"></a><a href="#FNanchor_438"><span class= +"label">[438]</span></a>Memo. by Holstein, March 3, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 37 ff., No. 6388; Bülow to Monts, March 6, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 39 ff., No. 6389, and following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_439"></a><a href="#FNanchor_439"><span class= +"label">[439]</span></a>Monts to F. O., March 17, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 45, No. 6396; Bülow to Monts, March 26, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 46 f., No. 6398; Monts to Bülow, April 2, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 48 f., No. 6400; Monts to Bülow, April 16, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 52 f., No. 6402; Monts to Bülow, April 16, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 53 f., No. 6403.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_440"></a><a href="#FNanchor_440"><span class= +"label">[440]</span></a>Monts to Bülow, April 25, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 54 ff., No. 6404; Monts to F. O., April 26, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 57 f., No. 6405; <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, +XVII, 688 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_441"></a><a href="#FNanchor_441"><span class= +"label">[441]</span></a>Monts to Bülow, April 28, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 60 ff., No. 6410.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_442"></a><a href="#FNanchor_442"><span class= +"label">[442]</span></a>Monts to Bülow, April 29, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 63 f., No. 6411.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_443"></a><a href="#FNanchor_443"><span class= +"label">[443]</span></a>Bülow’s minutes to a dispatch from Monts, +May 21, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 78, No. 6419.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_444"></a><a href="#FNanchor_444"><span class= +"label">[444]</span></a>Holstein advised informing the Italian +government that the Triple Alliance “practically speaking has had +its day,” while Monts confined his relations with Tittoni to +written communications. See Richthofen to Monts, April 28, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 59 f., No. 6409; Bülow to Monts, May 7, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 67 ff., No. 6414; memo. by Holstein, May 12, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 71 f., No. 6416; memo. by Bülow, May 12, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 73 f., No. 6417.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_445"></a><a href="#FNanchor_445"><span class= +"label">[445]</span></a>Quoted in <em>ibid.</em>, p. 75 nn.; +Tommaso Tittoni, <em>Italy’s Foreign and Colonial Policy. A +Selection from the Speeches Delivered in the Italian Parliament by +Tommaso Tittoni</em> (New York, 1915), pp. 12 f., quoting a speech +by Tittoni on May 14, 1904.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_446"></a><a href="#FNanchor_446"><span class= +"label">[446]</span></a>Memo. by Bülow, May 12, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 73 f., No. 6417 and Anlage; Monts to Bülow, May +12, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 74 ff., No. 6418; and the following +documents. At a personal meeting on Sept. 27, 1904, Premier +Giolitti affirmed to Bülow Italy’s loyalty to her alliance and +promised to show more reserve toward France (memo. by Bülow, Sept. +28, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 81 ff., No. 6422).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_447"></a><a href="#FNanchor_447"><span class= +"label">[447]</span></a>The Emperor tarried so long that Bülow +finally advised him to come home; otherwise he would make himself +ridiculous. See Monts to F. O., April 17, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, +117, No. 6440; Bülow to William II, April 17, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, +117 f., No. 6441.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_448"></a><a href="#FNanchor_448"><span class= +"label">[448]</span></a>The Emperor made similar speeches at +Karlsruhe, April 28, and at St. Johann-Saar-brücken, May 14 +(Schulthess, <em>Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1904</em>, pp. 76, +92). At Karlsruhe he declared: “I hope that peace will not be +disturbed and that the events which we see occurring will have the +effect of . . . . making our eyes clear, of steeling our courage, +and of uniting us if it should become necessary to interfere in the +<em>Weltpolitik</em>.”</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_449"></a><a href="#FNanchor_449"><span class= +"label">[449]</span></a>Memo. by Lichnowsky, April 13, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 203, No. 6516.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_450"></a><a href="#FNanchor_450"><span class= +"label">[450]</span></a>Dr. Genthe of the <em>Kölnische +Zeitung</em> had recently been murdered by some of the Moroccans; a +native employee of a German firm had been illegally imprisoned; and +certain indemnities from the Moroccan government had to be +collected. See Mentzingen to Bülow, April 5 (received April 11), +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 202, No. 6515; memo. by Lichnowsky, April 13, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 202 f., No. 6516; memo. by Bruning, April 23, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 203 ff., No. 6517, and Richthofen’s minutes +thereto.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_451"></a><a href="#FNanchor_451"><span class= +"label">[451]</span></a>Memo. by Lichnowsky, April 19, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, XIX, 174 f., No. 6031; Schlieffen to Bülow, April +20, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, XX, 175 ff., No. 6032.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_452"></a><a href="#FNanchor_452"><span class= +"label">[452]</span></a>On May 21, Mühlberg, of the German foreign +office, telegraphed to Mentzingen, German minister at Tangier, that +since “a forceful action could be easily misunderstood and lead to +erroneous conclusions about the German policy,” the ship would not +be sent (<em>ibid.</em>, 206, No. 6502).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_453"></a><a href="#FNanchor_453"><span class= +"label">[453]</span></a>Memo. by Holstein, April 19, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 123 f., No. 6443; Bülow to Richthofen, April 19, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 124, No. 6444. All three men approved of the +idea.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_454"></a><a href="#FNanchor_454"><span class= +"label">[454]</span></a>Newton, <em>Lord Lansdowne</em>, pp. 329 +f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_455"></a><a href="#FNanchor_455"><span class= +"label">[455]</span></a>Richthofen to Lascelles, May 4, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 127 f., No. 6446. Whether or not the +communication was sent in this form is not known. See +Rücker-Jenisch to F. O., May 18, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 128 f., No. +6447; Villiers to Lascelles, May 24, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 129 ff., +No. 6448; Lascelles to Lansdowne, May 18, 1904, <em>B.D.</em>, III, +1, No. 1; Lansdowne to Lascelles, May 4, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 18, +No. 16, and following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_456"></a><a href="#FNanchor_456"><span class= +"label">[456]</span></a>Memoir handed to Richthofen to Lascelles, +May 28, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 132 f., No. 6449; Metternich to F. +O., June 1, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 147 f., No. 6454.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_457"></a><a href="#FNanchor_457"><span class= +"label">[457]</span></a>Memo. by Holstein, June 5, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 144 f., No. 6461; William II to Bülow, June 6, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 147 f., No. 6463.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_458"></a><a href="#FNanchor_458"><span class= +"label">[458]</span></a>Dispatches from Metternich to F. O., June +2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 1904 (<em>ibid.</em>, 138 ff., Nos. 6455, 6458, +6460, 6464, 6466). Cf. Mallet to Spring Rice, early summer, 1904 +(Gwynn, <em>The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring +Rice</em>, I, 414). Mallet stated that the British government did +not want to weaken the advance toward France by a settlement with +Germany, especially since the Anglo-French accord had not been +definitely ratified.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_459"></a><a href="#FNanchor_459"><span class= +"label">[459]</span></a><em>G.P.</em>, XX, 148 ff., Nos. 6464-80; +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 21 ff., Nos. 19-23.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_460"></a><a href="#FNanchor_460"><span class= +"label">[460]</span></a>Memo. by Bülow, June 26, 29, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 186 ff., Nos. 6038, 6040; memo. by Richthofen +(undated though probably written about July 4, 1904), +<em>ibid.</em>, 194 ff., No. 6042; Richthofen to Metternich, June +20, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, XX, 163, No. 6478; Lee, <em>King Edward +VII</em>, II, 292 ff. See also MacDonald to Lansdowne, June 23, +1904, <em>B.D.</em>, IV, 1, No. 1; Lansdowne to MacDonald, June 24, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 2, No. 2.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_461"></a><a href="#FNanchor_461"><span class= +"label">[461]</span></a>In 1896 the Emperor had shown a decided +interest in Morocco (<em>G.P.</em>, XI, No. 2820). In the next +years, however, his attitude had changed. The motive force behind +the German policy toward Morocco was Bülow.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_462"></a><a href="#FNanchor_462"><span class= +"label">[462]</span></a>The Emperor thought of buying Fernando Po, +but said nothing of this to the King. On this incident and the +Emperor’s attitude toward Morocco see his minutes to Radolin to +Bülow, Oct. 20, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, XVII, 362, No. 5206; William +II to Bülow, March 16, 1904; <em>ibid.</em>, 363, No. 5208; +Radowitz to Richthofen, March 23, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 364, No. +5209; Radolin to Bülow, March 30, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 365, No. +5210. On Oct. 20, 1903, Radolin had reported from Paris a +conversation with the Spanish Ambassador in which the latter, after +admitting that France and Spain were well on the way toward an +accord over Morocco, remarked to him, “I suppose that you have +nothing to object to our entente.” Radolin replied, “We have only +commercial interests in those parts, which, however, are of very +great importance and which we must safeguard” (Radolin to Bülow, +Oct. 20, 1903, <em>ibid.</em>, 361 f., No. 5206).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_463"></a><a href="#FNanchor_463"><span class= +"label">[463]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, April 29, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, XX, 169 f., No. 6481.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_464"></a><a href="#FNanchor_464"><span class= +"label">[464]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, May 22, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 173 f., No. 6484; Bülow to Radowitz, May 25, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 174 f., No. 6486.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_465"></a><a href="#FNanchor_465"><span class= +"label">[465]</span></a>Bülow to Metternich, May 31, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 176 f., No. 6488; Metternich to F. O., June 1, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 177 f., No. 6489, and following documents; +also Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 1, 1904, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 53, +No. 61.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_466"></a><a href="#FNanchor_466"><span class= +"label">[466]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., June 10, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 180 f., No. 6494; Bülow to Radowitz, June 16, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 181, No. 6496.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_467"></a><a href="#FNanchor_467"><span class= +"label">[467]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., June 17, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 182, No. 6497; Bülow to Radowitz, June 18, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 182 f., No. 6498 and following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_468"></a><a href="#FNanchor_468"><span class= +"label">[468]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, July 27, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 216, No. 6524; memo. by Richthofen, July 16, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 186, No. 6503; Radowitz to F. O., July 21, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 188, No. 6504.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_469"></a><a href="#FNanchor_469"><span class= +"label">[469]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, July 21, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 210 ff., No. 6523; Radolin to Bülow, July 27, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 215 ff., No. 6524; memo. by Richthofen, July 29, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 217, No. 6525, and Bülow’s minutes. In the +negotiations with Germany over the acceptance of the Khedivial +decree, Lansdowne informed Metternich that France had agreed to +support Great Britain fully if at some future time the latter +should propose “a revision of the international agreements +affecting the position of the Powers in Egypt” (Lansdowne to +Whitehead, June 19, 1904, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 22 f., No. 21). This +was, of course, the content of one of the secret articles in the +Anglo-French agreement of April 8, although naturally Lansdowne did +not say so. Whether the German government inferred therefrom that a +reciprocal concession had been made by Great Britain to France with +respect to Morocco is not evident, but it probably did. Lansdowne +also stated to Metternich on June 1 what the area was which should +be supervised by Spain, although he spoke only of having emphasized +this point verbally to the French government and said nothing of a +secret article to that effect. So far as the documents show, the +German government does not seem to have recognized the import of +this statement, although this negative proof is not conclusive +(Metternich to F. O., June 1, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 177 f., No. +6489).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_470"></a><a href="#FNanchor_470"><span class= +"label">[470]</span></a>Bülow to Metternich, June 4, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 27 f., No. 6383; Metternich to F. O., June 4, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 29 f., Nos. 6384 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_471"></a><a href="#FNanchor_471"><span class= +"label">[471]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, July 21, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 210 f., No. 6523. Radolin also warned that if +“English diplomatic support of France does not signify much, we +have a free hand, while an Anglo-French resistance could easily +force us to retreat” (Radolin to Bülow, July 27, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 216 f., No. 6524).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_472"></a><a href="#FNanchor_472"><span class= +"label">[472]</span></a>Mühlberg to Metternich, Aug. 7, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 217 ff., No. 6526.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_473"></a><a href="#FNanchor_473"><span class= +"label">[473]</span></a>Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 15, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 219 ff., No. 6527; Lansdowne to Lascelles, Aug. 15, +1904, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 53 f., No. 62.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_474"></a><a href="#FNanchor_474"><span class= +"label">[474]</span></a>Metternich’s dispatch was sent on Aug. 18, +although dated Aug. 15. Bülow approved of the new measures on Aug. +17. See Mentzingen to Bülow, Aug. 6, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 222 +f., No. 6528; Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 16, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 223 +f., No. 6529; Bülow to Tschirschky, Aug. 17, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, +224 f., No. 6530.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_475"></a><a href="#FNanchor_475"><span class= +"label">[475]</span></a>Mentzingen to F. O., Sept. 13, 18, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 226 ff., Nos. 6532 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_476"></a><a href="#FNanchor_476"><span class= +"label">[476]</span></a>See editor’s note, <em>ibid.</em>, p. 225; +also memo. by Richthofen, Oct. 7, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 228, No. +6534.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_477"></a><a href="#FNanchor_477"><span class= +"label">[477]</span></a>Memo. by Richthofen, <em>ibid.</em>, 228 +ff., No. 6534.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_478"></a><a href="#FNanchor_478"><span class= +"label">[478]</span></a>Richthofen to Radowitz, Oct. 7, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 191, No. 6508; memo. by Richthofen for Bülow, Oct. +7, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 228 ff., No. 6534.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_479"></a><a href="#FNanchor_479"><span class= +"label">[479]</span></a>Memo. by Kries, Oct. 22, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 231 f., No. 6535.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_480"></a><a href="#FNanchor_480"><span class= +"label">[480]</span></a>Kühlmann to Bülow, Nov. 9, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 232 ff., No. 6536.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[159]</span><a id= +"c10"></a>CHAPTER X</h2> + +<p class="sch1">THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A RUSSO-GERMAN ALLIANCE, +1904</p> + +<p>Early in July, 1904, Herr von Holstein offered his resignation +because of personal differences with Baron Richthofen. In doing so, +he stated that the prestige of Germany had diminished during the +past years “while our opponents and rivals are on the point of +encircling us”; and as “difficult situations” were to be +anticipated, he was happy to be relieved of responsibility. Count +Bülow patched up the quarrel, but his comment to Herr von +Holstein’s remarks is illuminating:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Now he [Herr von Holstein] speaks of our shrunken prestige just +as the Bismarckian press does. But I cannot believe that Holstein, +like that press, attributes the decline of our authority to the +dismissal of the great Chancellor. Since that dismissal, from the +non-renewal of the Russian Reinsurance Treaty and the East Asiatic +Triple Alliance to the handling of the Moroccan and Egyptian +questions, from the so-called Urias letter to Vienna to the +publication of the Swinemünde dispatch, from the turn in 1896 +against England to the Shanghai and Pauncefote difference with that +Power, nothing of significance has happened in our foreign policy +without Holstein’s advice.<a id="FNanchor_481"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_481" class="fnanchor">[481]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The results of those errors, so frankly confessed, were +apparent: the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, the exclusion of +Germany from the entente movement and from the Moroccan settlement, +the British efforts to approach Russia,<a id= +"FNanchor_482"></a><a href="#Footnote_482" class= +"fnanchor">[482]</a> animosity between Great Britain and Germany. +They all caused that attempt at a new orientation of policy which +in 1900 Count Bülow had threatened in this eventuality.</p> + +<p>One of the most favorable aspects of the German foreign +relations<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[160]</span> was the +<em>rapprochement</em> with the United States in 1903 and 1904. +There was cordial friendship between President Roosevelt and Baron +Sternburg, the German ambassador,<a id="FNanchor_483"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_483" class="fnanchor">[483]</a> and the two governments +both desired to maintain the integrity of China during the current +war.<a id="FNanchor_484"></a><a href="#Footnote_484" class= +"fnanchor">[484]</a> The President mistrusted Russia, about whom he +could say nothing good, and France in their policy toward China, +and he met difficulty in trying to co-operate with Great +Britain.<a id="FNanchor_485"></a><a href="#Footnote_485" class= +"fnanchor">[485]</a> As he was ambitious to mediate peace between +Russia and Japan when the time came, he turned to Germany for aid, +in August expressing the wish “to go hand in hand with Germany in +East Asia.”<a id="FNanchor_486"></a><a href="#Footnote_486" class= +"fnanchor">[486]</a> The German government perceived in this +co-operation a means of protecting its interests in China, of +issuing from its relative international isolation, and of +preventing France and Great Britain from mediating peace—an event +which might enable them to form a triple grouping with Russia or +even a quadruple combination with Russia and Japan.<a id= +"FNanchor_487"></a><a href="#Footnote_487" class= +"fnanchor">[487]</a> Count Bülow therefore cordially responded to +the President’s invitation,<a id="FNanchor_488"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_488" class="fnanchor">[488]</a> seeking at the same time +to increase the latter’s suspicion of France and Great +Britain.<a id="FNanchor_489"></a><a href="#Footnote_489" class= +"fnanchor">[489]</a></p> + +<p>As the German government realized the limitations to this +intimacy with the United States, it sought a more effective +association<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[161]</span> in an +alliance with Russia. In January, 1904, the Chancellor had been +unconcerned about such an alliance;<a id= +"FNanchor_490"></a><a href="#Footnote_490" class= +"fnanchor">[490]</a> but by July he was waiting for the +“psychological moment” in which to propose a renewal of the former +“League of the Three Emperors.”<a id="FNanchor_491"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_491" class="fnanchor">[491]</a></p> + +<p>The advent of that moment seemed highly probable. Since the +beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian people, +government, and sovereign had drawn closer to Germany.<a id= +"FNanchor_492"></a><a href="#Footnote_492" class= +"fnanchor">[492]</a> On June 1, “dearest Nicky” wrote to his cousin +“Willy” (so they addressed each other), “I know that you feel for +us in this serious time and it is a comfort to realize that one’s +<em>real friends</em> think and sympathize with one.”<a id= +"FNanchor_493"></a><a href="#Footnote_493" class= +"fnanchor">[493]</a> And “Willy,” in his replies, overflowed with +affection and advice—advice that varied from directing “Nicky” upon +how to conduct war to lecturing him on the “piratical” practices of +his ships, from urging him to send his Black Sea fleet through the +Dardanelles in spite of British opposition to reporting gossip +which would antagonize him against Great Britain and France.<a id= +"FNanchor_494"></a><a href="#Footnote_494" class= +"fnanchor">[494]</a></p> + +<p>In October the opportunity arose for the German move toward an +alliance. A Russian company had given a contract to the +Hamburg-American Line to furnish coal for the Russian +Baltic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[162]</span> fleet which +was to sail for the war zone about the middle of that month.<a id= +"FNanchor_495"></a><a href="#Footnote_495" class= +"fnanchor">[495]</a> As the German firm intended to use mainly +English coal, it had chartered a number of British ships and had +given a subcontract to a British firm to aid it in the +transportation. None the less, on learning of the transaction, the +British press bitterly attacked Germany for thus violating +neutrality. In view of this attack Count Bülow on October 4 +instructed Baron Romberg, first secretary of the German embassy in +St. Petersburg, to make a communication to the Russian government +as follows: Baron Romberg should state to Count Lamsdorff that this +press campaign might provoke a war but that the German government +would not prevent the execution of the coaling contract, that it +“would run the risk of having the English kindle fire-rockets in +Japan.” If war did occur with Japan and Great Britain, Germany +would hold France also responsible; for not only would a large +element among the French advocate grasping the opportunity for +revenge against Germany, but also the arousing of the British zeal +for war would be a direct result of the Entente Cordiale. “So if we +lose our colonies, trade, merchant marine, and perhaps also a part +of our war fleet in an unequal battle on the sea . . . . a +reckoning with France on land would become unavoidable for +us.”<a id="FNanchor_496"></a><a href="#Footnote_496" class= +"fnanchor">[496]</a></p> + +<p>Count Lamsdorff showed no inclination to respond to this feeler. +On October 19, while thanking the German government for its +friendship, he refused to credit either Great Britain or Japan with +bellicose intentions against Germany. He interrupted Baron Romberg +to assure him that nothing was to be feared from France; not a word +did he utter about an alliance.<a id="FNanchor_497"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_497" class="fnanchor">[497]</a></p> + +<p>Meantime, the Russian Baltic squadron sailed, and in the night +of October 21 occurred the Dogger Bank disaster which brought war +between Great Britain and Russia dangerously<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_163">[163]</span> close.<a id="FNanchor_498"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_498" class="fnanchor">[498]</a> The “psychological +moment” had come, reasoned Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein. +Defeated in the Far East, menaced by revolution, and excited by +this new danger, Russia should welcome the project of an alliance +with the strongest military power in Europe. So on October 24 Herr +von Holstein, who usually held aloof from all ambassadors, +explained the German proposition to Count Osten-Sacken,<a id= +"FNanchor_499"></a><a href="#Footnote_499" class= +"fnanchor">[499]</a> the Russian representative. Three days later +the Emperor’s influence with the Czar, who was thought to be more +pliable and more favorably inclined than his Foreign Minister, was +brought into play. In a letter to Nicholas II the Emperor +wrote:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>For some time English press has been threatening Germany, on no +account to allow coals to be sent to your Baltic Fleet now on its +way out. It is not impossible, that the Japanese and British +Governments may lodge a joint protest against our coaling your +ships coupled with a <em>sommation</em> to stop further work. The +result aimed at by such a threat of war would be absolute +immobility of your fleet and inability to proceed to its +destination from want of fuel. This new danger would have to be +faced in community by Russia and Germany together, who would both +have to remind your ally France of the obligations she has taken +over in the treaty of Dual Alliance with you, the <em>casus +foederis</em>. It is out of the question, that France on such an +invitation, would try to shirk her implicit duty towards her ally. +Though Delcassé is an Anglophile <em>énragé</em>, he will be wise +enough to understand that the British fleet is utterly unable to +save Paris! In this way a powerful combination of 3 of the +strongest continental Powers would be formed to attack, whom the +Anglo-Japanese group would think twice before acting. . . . . My +news from London say, that the Press and mob make a noise, the +Admiralty some fuss, but that Government, Court and Society look +with greatest calm at the event as an unhappy accident, arising +from to great nervousness.<a id="FNanchor_500"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_500" class="fnanchor">[500]</a></p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[164]</span>This broad hint, +amounting almost to a proposal of alliance itself, was immediately +effective. The Czar replied two days later:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>As you say . . . . Germany, Russia, and France should at once +unite upon an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and +insolence. Would you like to lay down and frame the outlines of +such a treaty and let me know it? As soon as accepted by us France +is bound to join her ally. This combination has often come to my +mind. It will mean peace and rest for the world.<a id= +"FNanchor_501"></a><a href="#Footnote_501" class= +"fnanchor">[501]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>On the next day a draft of a treaty and a long explanatory +letter, both composed by the Chancellor and Herr von +Holstein,<a id="FNanchor_502"></a><a href="#Footnote_502" class= +"fnanchor">[502]</a> were sent by the Emperor to the Czar. This +draft, which was intended to test how far the Russian government +would go, provided for a “defensive alliance . . . . to localize as +far as possible the Russo-Japanese War.” The first article was the +most important:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>In case one of the two Empires shall be attacked by a European +Power, its ally will aid it with all its force on land and sea. The +two allies, in that case, would make common cause for the purpose +of recalling to France the obligations which she has assumed by the +terms of the Franco-Russian treaty of Alliance.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">By the second article neither Power was to conclude +a separate peace with a common adversary. The third article was +designed to safeguard Germany in the coaling affair and to continue +the alliance after the current war was over. It read:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The engagement of mutual aid is equally valid in case acts +performed by one of the high contracting parties during the war +such as the delivery of coal to a belligerent should give place +after the war to reclamations of a third Power, as pretended +violations of the right of neutrality.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[165]</span>In +the letter the Emperor emphasized the defensive and the purely +European character of the alliance. “It is very essential that +America should not feel threatened by our agreement,” he wrote. He +denounced France, “this republic of miserable civilians,” “the +French radicals, Clemenceau and all the rest of the tag-rag and +bobtail” for not fulfilling France’s obligations to her ally.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I positively know that as far back as last December the French +Finance Minister Rouvier told the Finance Minister of another +power, France would on no account join in a Russo-Japanese war, +even though England sided with Japan. To make doubly sure, the +English have handed Morocco over to France. The certainty, that +France intends to remain neutral and even to lend her diplomatic +support to England, is the motive, which gives English policy its +present unwonted brutal assurance. This unheard of state of things +will change as soon as France finds herself face to face with the +necessity of eventually choosing sides. . . . . The radical party . +. . . abhors war and militarism, while the nationalist party while +not objecting to war in itself, hates fighting for England and +against Russia. Thus it will be in the interests of both parties to +bring pressure to bear on and warn England to keep the peace. The +main result will be, if you and I stand shoulder to shoulder, that +France must formally and openly join us, thereby fulfilling her +treaty-obligations toward Russia. . . . . This consummation once +reached, I expect to maintain peace and you will be left an +undisturbed and free hand to deal with Japan. . . . . Of course, +before we can take any steps in this question and approach France +that tiresome North Sea incident must first have been brought to a +close.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">For, he continued, the French foreign office had +already accepted the British view of the incident, and in case of +difficulty over this matter, France would choose the British side. +At the close of his letter the Emperor wrote that only he and Count +Bülow knew of the project, and that when they had finished the +draft the Chancellor had said: “May God’s blessings rest upon the +work of the two monarchs and may the mighty three-Power group, +Russia, Germany, France, preserve forever the peace of Europe. God +grant it!”<a id="FNanchor_503"></a><a href="#Footnote_503" class= +"fnanchor">[503]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[166]</span>The real object +of this extravagant show of devotion to Russia was of course to +inveigle her into an alliance. It did not signify a desire for a +general conflict; the German government appreciated the British +naval power too keenly for that.<a id="FNanchor_504"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_504" class="fnanchor">[504]</a> Moreover, since it knew +how averse the Russian government and especially the Czar were to +an extension of the war, it emphasized the pacifying influence +which the proposed alliance would exercise. The German leaders +doubtlessly realized, however, that they were running a big risk, +since Count Bernstorff, first secretary of the embassy in London, +had warned them that Great Britain would regard an alliance between +Germany and Russia, no matter how defensive in character, as an +aggression directed against the security of the British +Empire.<a id="FNanchor_505"></a><a href="#Footnote_505" class= +"fnanchor">[505]</a></p> + +<p>The Chancellor and Herr von Holstein considered the risk worth +while, because, if the alliance could be concluded, they expected +France, under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, to enter +the new grouping. If she did so, they no doubt reasoned, the +Entente Cordiale would be destroyed, the work of M. Delcassé would +be blocked, and, instead of Great Britain, Germany would be the +center of the new combination. France, as the weakest member of the +firm, would have to take orders from both her partners. In fact, +the German government openly expressed to the Czar the expectation +that in case of a war the control over the French army and navy +would be put into German hands. If France, refusing to enter the +alliance, elected to range herself with Great Britain and if the +Russo-German alliance alone were made, the German statesmen +apparently thought that the Dual Alliance would be broken, France +would again be at the mercy of the German military power, and the +possibility of an Anglo-Russian accord would be destroyed. The +gains, both positive and negative, to be derived by Germany from +such an<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[167]</span> alliance +would be enormous. Its completion would constitute a far-reaching +diplomatic revolution.<a id="FNanchor_506"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_506" class="fnanchor">[506]</a></p> + +<p>In Russian governmental circles opinion was divided. The Czar, +who had proposed the alliance without consulting his Foreign +Minister,<a id="FNanchor_507"></a><a href="#Footnote_507" class= +"fnanchor">[507]</a> was its staunchest supporter. Weak and +dependent, he usually agreed with his most recent adviser. His +imagination, which could be vivid at times, was given freer rein +because of his indolence. In 1903 he had succumbed to the arguments +and ambitions of the adventurer, M. Bezobrazov, about Manchuria and +Korea and had brought on the war with Japan. As the necessary +European part of that program, M. Bezobrazov had advocated an +understanding between the Dual and the Triple alliances. This +aspect had not been achieved, probably owing to Count Lamsdorff’s +opposition.<a id="FNanchor_508"></a><a href="#Footnote_508" class= +"fnanchor">[508]</a> But the war was taking a disastrous course for +Russia, revolution was threatening, and the German Emperor’s +telegram arrived while the crisis with Great Britain was still +acute and when Russia, according to the British Ambassador, would +have welcomed a war with that Power.<a id= +"FNanchor_509"></a><a href="#Footnote_509" class= +"fnanchor">[509]</a> The forlorn and troubled Czar returned readily +to the idea of an alliance when William II suggested it.</p> + +<p>Count Lamsdorff was wary of this move from the start. Not a very +strong personality, he was unable at times to maintain control of +the foreign policy, yet he was a capable and loyal official who, +when necessary, spoke frankly to his master. The Czar was actuated +chiefly by sentiment and emotion; his Minister by shrewd diplomatic +calculations. Although the one did not grasp<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_168">[168]</span> the German motives, the other did; and +the prospect of feeling “the heavy weight . . . . of the iron +bands” of a German alliance was not to his liking. Count Lamsdorff +did not believe that Russia needed this alliance as he felt certain +that Great Britain would not attack her.<a id= +"FNanchor_510"></a><a href="#Footnote_510" class= +"fnanchor">[510]</a> Furthermore, the conclusion of an agreement of +neutrality about Balkan affairs with Austria-Hungary late in +October relieved his country from danger in that quarter.<a id= +"FNanchor_511"></a><a href="#Footnote_511" class= +"fnanchor">[511]</a></p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>On the other hand [he wrote to Count Osten-Sacken], we +manifestly need the friendship of our powerful neighbor for the +security of our extensive frontier, for our provisioning with coal +and other contrabands, etc. All this must be seriously considered +and we must endeavor not to permit our relations with Berlin to +deteriorate, although Paris must also not be disregarded. Only +through the preservation of this balance will Russia succeed in +obtaining all possible advantages from both sides.<a id= +"FNanchor_512"></a><a href="#Footnote_512" class= +"fnanchor">[512]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>When the German draft of the treaty arrived, the Dogger Bank +crisis was over, but the Russian government remained embittered +because Great Britain had made special naval preparations and a +detachment of British cruisers, cleared for action, had followed +the Russian fleet from Vigo to Tangier.<a id= +"FNanchor_513"></a><a href="#Footnote_513" class= +"fnanchor">[513]</a> Still, that was no reason to assume the “iron +bands” of a German alliance. The Czar and his Foreign Minister +immediately set to work to make the terms more favorable for +Russia.<a id="FNanchor_514"></a><a href="#Footnote_514" class= +"fnanchor">[514]</a> They modified the<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_169">[169]</span> first and third articles.<a id= +"FNanchor_515"></a><a href="#Footnote_515" class= +"fnanchor">[515]</a> In the latter, to be kept secret, they +incorporated a <em>quid pro quo</em> by which Russia should receive +German support in the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace. The +revised first article was the more important. The first sentence +remained as before; but, instead of stipulating that Russia and +Germany both advise France to enter the alliance, the second +sentence was changed to read: “His Majesty the Emperor of all the +Russias will take the steps necessary to initiate France into this +accord and to invite her to associate herself in it as ally.” The +Czar told the Emperor that the revised Article I must stand without +change.<a id="FNanchor_516"></a><a href="#Footnote_516" class= +"fnanchor">[516]</a></p> + +<p>When the Russian government had been brought to this point, the +German leaders revealed their real aim. They were, of course, +obliged to accept the new first article; but the Emperor, in his +reply to Nicholas II, November 17, made it plain that France would +have to choose sides, even though, as he frankly wrote, “doubtless +the French would much prefer any other grouping of Powers to that +of the Alliance <em>a trois</em> as in 1895.” The chief revisions +asked by the German government were in the introduction and in +Article III. The former was changed to read: The Emperor and the +Czar “for the purpose of assuring the maintenance of peace in +Europe have agreed on the following articles of a treaty of +defensive alliance.” According to an entirely new Article III the +treaty should remain in force until denounced one year in advance; +however, it was left to the Czar to set any time limit he +wished.</p> + +<p>These revisions transformed the basis of the negotiation. They +made the alliance a general one to continue after the war. The +changes were explained on the ground that, in the previous version, +the treaty had been aimed too openly at Great Britain, and that, +while this was the case, it was not politic to make the fact too +evident.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[170]</span>The Russian +<em>quid pro quo</em> in Article III was also rejected. Germany +preferred not to help Russia in the negotiations for peace for fear +of antagonizing the United States and of driving her into British +arms, although the Emperor excused this refusal by explaining that +if this secret clause became known, public opinion might consider +the treaty an aggressive one binding Germany to defend the Russian +conquests. Instead, he proposed that the previous Article III be +made into an extra secret article in which the second sentence +should read: “It follows from the the terms of the first sentence +of Article I that Germany will associate herself with no action +whatever that might imply hostile tendencies to Russia.” That +clause, wrote the Emperor, would safeguard Russia against the +repetition of any such congress as that of 1878, whereby she had +been deprived of her Turkish conquests.</p> + +<p>In his accompanying letter to the Czar, for which Count Bülow +and Herr von Holstein furnished the rough draft, the Emperor urged +a quick signing of the agreement, adding the extraordinary proposal +that Russia make some military demonstration on the Persian-Afghan +frontier. “Even should the forces at your disposal not suffice for +a real attack on India itself,” he wrote, “they would do for +Persia—which has no army—and a pressure on the Indian frontier from +Persia will do wonders in England and have remarkably quieting +influence on the hot headed Jingoes in London.” He also warned the +Czar against Anglo-French ambitions to mediate at the desire of +Japan.<a id="FNanchor_517"></a><a href="#Footnote_517" class= +"fnanchor">[517]</a></p> + +<p>In St. Petersburg, Count Lamsdorff persuaded the Czar to proceed +slowly with the negotiations, and, more important still, to consult +France before concluding any agreement. So on November 23 Nicholas +II telegraphed the German Emperor to that effect, adding:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[171]</span>As long as it is +not signed one can make small modifications on the text; whereas if +allready approved by us both, it will seem as if we tried to +enforce the treaty on France. In this case a failure might easily +happen, which I think is neither your wish.<a id= +"FNanchor_518"></a><a href="#Footnote_518" class= +"fnanchor">[518]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The Germans realized that this answer spelled defeat for them; +because if the treaty became known to the French government that +government would of course strenuously resist its completion. In +fact, the Emperor was sure that M. Delcassé would at once publish +the news of the proposed alliance, that a war cry in England would +then burst forth, and that the timid Czar would back out. As he +aptly expressed it, Count Lamsdorff and M. Witte had “spat in the +German soup.”<a id="FNanchor_519"></a><a href="#Footnote_519" +class="fnanchor">[519]</a> On November 26 he replied with a refusal +to let France know a word of the affair; it would be better to drop +the whole matter until a more suitable moment, he declared. +Although disgusted at this display of “cold feet,” as he put it, +William II showed no especial anger or uneasiness in his answer and +asked Nicholas II to continue their intimacy as before.<a id= +"FNanchor_520"></a><a href="#Footnote_520" class= +"fnanchor">[520]</a></p> + +<p>On the receipt of that reply Count Lamsdorff had to persuade his +master all over again, because the latter was more anxious to make +the alliance than he was to be considerate of his ally.<a id= +"FNanchor_521"></a><a href="#Footnote_521" class= +"fnanchor">[521]</a> Certainly his letter of October 29 to William +II was such as to warrant confidence that he would be willing to +force the alliance upon France whether she wished it or not. Count +Lamsdorff argued that the relations of Russia and Germany were +sufficiently close to hold them together without an alliance. He +declared that France’s intimacy with Great Britain had not caused +her to be disloyal to her ally. While he doubted whether she could +be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">[172]</span> won to the +proposed combination, he urged her right to be consulted beforehand +and denied that she would disclose the secret. She must be won +gradually, he said, and not confronted with a <em>fait +accompli</em> which might force her back upon Great Britain.<a id= +"FNanchor_522"></a><a href="#Footnote_522" class= +"fnanchor">[522]</a></p> + +<p>It is obvious that Count Lamsdorff sought by this method to +quash the project or render it harmless. He succeeded only partly +in winning over his master. In the reply to the Emperor on December +7 Nicholas II once more asked permission to obtain the French +reaction to the main lines of the alliance, even though the +original document itself be kept secret from her. “In case of a +negative answer,” he wrote in conclusion, “the second phase of Art. +I of the draft of the treaty ought to be left out I think.”<a id= +"FNanchor_523"></a><a href="#Footnote_523" class= +"fnanchor">[523]</a> Thus, even in case Germany refused his +request, the Czar was still apparently willing to make an alliance +with her to the entire exclusion of France.</p> + +<p>While the Russian government was preparing this answer, the +Germans lost patience. Prospects for success seemed doubtful if not +entirely hopeless. The declarations of the French press that the +Dual Alliance remained as firm as ever and that Germany’s attempts +to win Russia had failed caused the Chancellor to suspect that news +of the negotiations had leaked out. Threats to seize the German +vessels coaling the Russian fleet appeared in the Japanese press; +the British government laid restrictions upon the shipping of coal +to that fleet. In November and December Germany began to fear a +British attack.<a id="FNanchor_524"></a><a href="#Footnote_524" +class="fnanchor">[524]</a></p> + +<p>Since October the British press had returned to its campaign of +calumniation against Germany, seeing a German plot behind every +British difficulty. In the autumn a redistribution of the British +naval forces had weakened the Mediterranean fleet and<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_173">[173]</span> concentrated the main strength +in home waters. Germany perceived in this rearrangement a tangible +proof of the new alignment of Great Britain with France and of the +growing British animosity toward her.<a id= +"FNanchor_525"></a><a href="#Footnote_525" class= +"fnanchor">[525]</a></p> + +<p>Hence when in November several articles appeared in <em>Vanity +Fair</em> and in the <em>Army and Navy Gazette</em> proposing that +the German fleet be “Copenhagened”<a id="FNanchor_526"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_526" class="fnanchor">[526]</a> as useless for any other +purpose than to attack Great Britain,<a id= +"FNanchor_527"></a><a href="#Footnote_527" class= +"fnanchor">[527]</a> German public opinion took these threats +seriously. The Emperor wrote to Count Bülow on November 23 that +“the situation assumes more and more the aspect of that immediately +preceding the Seven Years’ War.”<a id="FNanchor_528"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_528" class="fnanchor">[528]</a> The German navy +department began hurried measures to recall the vessels in foreign +waters.<a id="FNanchor_529"></a><a href="#Footnote_529" class= +"fnanchor">[529]</a> Taking a saner view, the Chancellor, by means +of an interview published in the <em>Nineteenth Century</em> for +December and a speech in the Reichstag on December 5, sought to +calm both his own and the British people by an absolute disclaimer +of the thought of war between the two countries and by a denial +that in the construction of her fleet Germany intended any +hostility toward Great Britain.<a id="FNanchor_530"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_530" class="fnanchor">[530]</a> But by December 5 Herr +von Holstein himself came to credit the possibility of a British +attack.<a id="FNanchor_531"></a><a href="#Footnote_531" class= +"fnanchor">[531]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[174]</span>While this +situation seemed serious, the Chancellor was more concerned by the +fact that the completion of the coaling of the Russian fleet would +soon deprive Germany of her hold over Russia.<a id= +"FNanchor_532"></a><a href="#Footnote_532" class= +"fnanchor">[532]</a> On December 6 he instructed the German +Ambassador at St. Petersburg to inquire peremptorily of the Russian +government whether Germany could rely upon its full support in case +the coaling led to war. The Ambassador was to state that if no +satisfactory answer were received by the time the Russian fleet +reached Madagascar the Hamburg-American Line would be forbidden to +continue its task. This telegram, which was followed on the next +day by a similar one from the Emperor to Nicholas II,<a id= +"FNanchor_533"></a><a href="#Footnote_533" class= +"fnanchor">[533]</a> forced the negotiations back to the very point +from which they had started.</p> + +<p>Upon receipt of this message the Czar, highly agitated, +immediately telegraphed that his letter of the same date (December +7) had evidently crossed the other on the way and would explain +everything.<a id="FNanchor_534"></a><a href="#Footnote_534" class= +"fnanchor">[534]</a> But when that letter arrived, William II +demanded that they settle the coaling affair by signing a +convention concerning it at once.<a id="FNanchor_535"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_535" class="fnanchor">[535]</a> Thus, Germany herself +destroyed the possibility of continuing the previous negotiations +and of concluding, perhaps, a defensive alliance with Russia alone. +The Czar could only acquiesce.<a id="FNanchor_536"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_536" class="fnanchor">[536]</a> On December 12 Count +Lamsdorff gave written assurance to the German government that +Russia would make common cause with it in case the coaling led to +war.<a id="FNanchor_537"></a><a href="#Footnote_537" class= +"fnanchor">[537]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[175]</span>The promptness +with which the Russian government agreed to the German demand +showed how essential to Russia was the continued coaling of her +fleet, which within about a week would reach Madagascar. Count +Lamsdorff felt entirely safe in making the assurance of support, +for, as he frankly said to the German Ambassador, he did not +believe that either Great Britain or Japan would let things come to +war.<a id="FNanchor_538"></a><a href="#Footnote_538" class= +"fnanchor">[538]</a> Also he particularly wished to avoid +antagonizing Germany while she was permitting a Russian loan of +231,000,000 rubles to be made in Berlin.<a id= +"FNanchor_539"></a><a href="#Footnote_539" class= +"fnanchor">[539]</a> The Minister was elated over the turn which +the Russo-German negotiations had taken. By changing the basis of +discussion from that of a defensive alliance to that of a specific +agreement limited to a definite eventuality, the German government +had adopted his own policy of close friendship and co-operation +without an alliance. His battle with both Germany and the Czar was +won by the German government itself.</p> + +<p>On riper thought the German foreign office perceived that this +Russian promise did not cover all cases in which war might arise as +a result of German friendliness. It had no doubt had time since the +arrival of the Czar’s letter of December 7 in which to appreciate +its mistake in hastily changing the basis of negotiation. Hence on +December 12 it instructed Count Alvensleben to propose to the +Russian government a general defensive agreement. By its terms +Russia would be bound to aid Germany in case of a conflict arising: +first, because of any German act of “benevolent neutrality” in +favor of Russia during the current war; or, second, because of the +coaling affair during and after the war. The Ambassador was to +declare that if Russia did not accept this agreement the coaling +would be discontinued.<a id="FNanchor_540"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_540" class="fnanchor">[540]</a> What<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_176">[176]</span> was here proposed amounted +practically to Articles I and III of the first German treaty draft +with the parts pertaining to France omitted, and was in keeping +with the Czar’s letter of December 7.</p> + +<p>Since the instructions arrived after Count Lamsdorff had +accepted the earlier German demand, the exasperated Ambassador +consulted his government before executing them.<a id= +"FNanchor_541"></a><a href="#Footnote_541" class= +"fnanchor">[541]</a> Count Bülow then realized that the Russian +Minister would not receive the proposal favorably and that the +German government would seem not to know its own desires if it +persisted in this new demand. Furthermore, on December 18, he was +assured by Count Metternich that, although a Dogger Bank affair +between Great Britain and Germany or the passage by Germany of a +stronger naval law might precipitate a crisis, the British did not +seek a war and had no intention of starting one.<a id= +"FNanchor_542"></a><a href="#Footnote_542" class= +"fnanchor">[542]</a> Hence the Chancellor canceled<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_177">[177]</span> the instructions. Instead, he +notified the Russian Minister, December 26, that “within the limits +which care for our own safety prescribes, we shall be glad to aid +Russia as previously.”<a id="FNanchor_543"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_543" class="fnanchor">[543]</a> The coaling was +continued without mishap.<a id="FNanchor_544"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_544" class="fnanchor">[544]</a></p> + +<p>On December 21 William II repeated to the Czar his refusal to +permit the consultation of France about the project of alliance, +hoping thereby to reopen the discussion.<a id= +"FNanchor_545"></a><a href="#Footnote_545" class= +"fnanchor">[545]</a> But Nicholas II, in his reply of December 25, +did not mention the matter.<a id="FNanchor_546"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_546" class="fnanchor">[546]</a></p> + +<p>Just at this moment of profound disappointment to the German +government another outlet seemed to open up. On December 26 it +learned that the Japanese government was thinking of sending +Viscount Aoki to Berlin in the next year in order to establish +closer contact with it on the questions to be considered in the +Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace.<a id= +"FNanchor_547"></a><a href="#Footnote_547" class= +"fnanchor">[547]</a> The German government reacted cordially to +this project. The Emperor William, still unable to comprehend the +failure of the Russian negotiations, had visions of Germany’s so +mediating peace between Russia and Japan as to form an agreement +<em>à trois</em> with them.<a id="FNanchor_548"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_548" class="fnanchor">[548]</a> Apparently without +consulting the foreign office he appealed to the Czar on January 2 +“as your faithful friend” for a statement of his plans for the +future, “so that if possible, I make myself<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_178">[178]</span> useful to you and be enabled to shape +the course of my policy.”<a id="FNanchor_549"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_549" class="fnanchor">[549]</a> As Nicholas II ignored +this request—the third rebuff from Russia within two months—the +Emperor wanted to cultivate Japan so zealously that Count Bülow had +to hold him back for fear of antagonizing Russia.<a id= +"FNanchor_550"></a><a href="#Footnote_550" class= +"fnanchor">[550]</a></p> + +<p>The German government, particularly Herr von Holstein, continued +to apprehend that France and Great Britain would endeavor to +mediate peace and form a new quadruple grouping with Russia and +Japan by partitioning China.<a id="FNanchor_551"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_551" class="fnanchor">[551]</a> To obviate that +possibility it had attempted during the past months to draw closer +to President Roosevelt<a id="FNanchor_552"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_552" class="fnanchor">[552]</a> and to keep check upon +the Russian views about peace. But since Russia had rebuffed this +endeavor<a id="FNanchor_553"></a><a href="#Footnote_553" class= +"fnanchor">[553]</a> as well as an alliance, Count Bülow turned +late in December, 1904, to Japan and the United States in order to +escape from “the sulking-corner in which not only England but also +Russia is seeking to hold us.”<a id="FNanchor_554"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_554" class="fnanchor">[554]</a> In January, 1905, the +German government intensified its campaign to arouse President +Roosevelt’s mistrust of Great Britain and France. Articles in the +semiofficial press in Paris, assertions by M. Doumer, president of +the French Chamber and intimate friend of M. Delcassé, and discreet +soundings by French, British, and Russian diplomats +gave<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[179]</span> body to the +German fears. Count Bülow emphasized to the President the menace of +this new quadruple alliance to both the United States and Germany. +At the Count’s suggestion in January Mr. Roosevelt obtained from +the Powers an assurance of the territorial integrity of China +during the negotiations for peace.<a id="FNanchor_555"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_555" class="fnanchor">[555]</a> This move brought the +German government and Mr. Roosevelt into greater intimacy. The +latter suspected France and Russia, but not Great Britain.<a id= +"FNanchor_556"></a><a href="#Footnote_556" class= +"fnanchor">[556]</a> He refused to believe rumors of a Russo-German +agreement, and credited the German denials of those reports.<a id= +"FNanchor_557"></a><a href="#Footnote_557" class= +"fnanchor">[557]</a> With Japan, however, the German government was +not so successful; hearing those same rumors, the Japanese +government decided in February not to send Viscount Aoki to +Berlin.<a id="FNanchor_558"></a><a href="#Footnote_558" class= +"fnanchor">[558]</a></p> + +<p>In the same month the German government tried once more to make +an agreement with Russia, this time over Austria-Hungary. Torn by +national conflicts, that empire was not expected to survive the +death of the aged Emperor Francis Joseph. Count Bülow therefore +proposed to the Russian Foreign Minister that they sign a public +treaty of territorial disinterestedness in case of the disruption +of the Hapsburg Empire. While Count Lamsdorff agreed to make the +accord, he stipulated that it be kept secret, and left its +formulation to the proposer. Thereupon the German foreign office, +fearing that the existence of a secret Russo-German treaty might +become known and might make Japan and the United States mistrustful +of Germany and doubting whether the Russian Minister would really +conclude the accord, decided to drop the project.<a id= +"FNanchor_559"></a><a href="#Footnote_559" class= +"fnanchor">[559]</a></p> + +<p>Thus the negotiations between Germany and Russia +worked<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">[180]</span> only to the +detriment of Germany’s international relations. They were in large +part responsible for the acuteness of British anger at Germany and +for the collapse of the proposed Aoki mission. And had it not been +for President Roosevelt’s ignorance of Continental affairs, they +would no doubt have turned him against Germany. Although +protestations of friendship were exchanged between the German and +Russian rulers and governments, the German Emperor and his +government were greatly chagrined at their failure.<a id= +"FNanchor_560"></a><a href="#Footnote_560" class= +"fnanchor">[560]</a> They had found the bonds of the Dual Alliance +tighter than they had expected, and had suffered a rebuff by a +Power in the very worst straits. Believing that another opportunity +to solve Germany’s international problems in this way would likely +not be offered, the German foreign office next attempted the +employment of force.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc10"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_481"></a><a href="#FNanchor_481"><span class= +"label">[481]</span></a>Both letters, the one by Holstein, the +other by Bülow, dated July 11 and July 13, respectively, are given +in Hammann, <em>Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit</em>, pp. 33 +ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_482"></a><a href="#FNanchor_482"><span class= +"label">[482]</span></a>It is of course apparent that the German +government anticipated no immediate success from these British +efforts. Signs of Anglo-Russian antagonism were too numerous (see +<em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxxi).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_483"></a><a href="#FNanchor_483"><span class= +"label">[483]</span></a>Dennett, <em>Roosevelt and the +Russo-Japanese War</em>, p. 36.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_484"></a><a href="#FNanchor_484"><span class= +"label">[484]</span></a><em>G.P.</em>, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxx, A; +Gwynn, <em>The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring +Rice</em>, I, 397 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_485"></a><a href="#FNanchor_485"><span class= +"label">[485]</span></a>Dennett, pp. 36 ff., 42; Sternburg to F. +O., Sept. 27, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 542, No. 6266.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_486"></a><a href="#FNanchor_486"><span class= +"label">[486]</span></a>Bülow to William II, Aug. 31, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 536, No. 6264.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_487"></a><a href="#FNanchor_487"><span class= +"label">[487]</span></a>Bülow to William II, Aug. 31, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 535 ff., No. 6264; Bülow to Bernstorff, Sept. 1, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 217 f., No. 6051; Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. +6, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 218 ff., No. 6052. Eckardstein informed +Bülow in August, 1904, of attempts being made by Witte to introduce +negotiations for peace with Hayashi. Bülow was not in favor of an +early peace. See Eckardstein, <em>Lebenserinnerungen und politische +Denkwürdigkeiten</em>, III, 76 ff.; Goetz, <em>Briefe Wilhelms II +an den Zaren 1894-1914</em>, p. 341; Dillon, <em>The Eclipse of +Russia</em>, p. 297; memo. by Bülow, Nov. 2, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, +XIX, 387 f., No. 6167.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_488"></a><a href="#FNanchor_488"><span class= +"label">[488]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, Sept. 5, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 541, No. 6265.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_489"></a><a href="#FNanchor_489"><span class= +"label">[489]</span></a>See <em>ibid.</em>, Nos. 5977, 6259 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_490"></a><a href="#FNanchor_490"><span class= +"label">[490]</span></a>Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 16, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 34, No. 5943; memo. by Holstein, Dec. 23, 1903, +<em>ibid.</em>, 73 ff., No. 5967.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_491"></a><a href="#FNanchor_491"><span class= +"label">[491]</span></a>Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 202, No. 6043. Richthofen opposed the project +(memo. by Richthofen, undated although probably written early in +July, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 194 ff., No. 6042. This intention did +not prevent Bülow from negotiating a commercial treaty with Russia +in July, 1904, which Witte, Russian minister, declared exacted a +tribute from Russia “much greater than any war indemnity on record” +(Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 196 ff., No. +6043; Dillon, pp. 323 ff.; Witte, <em>Memoirs</em>, pp. 413 +f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_492"></a><a href="#FNanchor_492"><span class= +"label">[492]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 28, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 165 ff., No. 6028; Metternich to Bülow, March +14, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 167 ff., No. 6029; Alvensleben to Bülow, +May 11, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 177 ff., No. 6033, and following +documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_493"></a><a href="#FNanchor_493"><span class= +"label">[493]</span></a>Nicholas II to William II, June 1, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 181, No. 6034.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_494"></a><a href="#FNanchor_494"><span class= +"label">[494]</span></a>See their correspondence in Goetz, pp. 337 +ff.; also in <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, Nos. 6028 n., 6034, 6035, 6037, +6039, 6056, 6057, 6062 and n., 6064 and n., 6073 and n. The +Emperor’s letters were dated Feb. 11, March 29, June 6, June 12, +June 28, July 17, July 23, Aug. 19, Oct. 8, Oct. 10; the Czar’s +replies were dated June 1, July 20, July 31, Sept. 28, 1904.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_495"></a><a href="#FNanchor_495"><span class= +"label">[495]</span></a>Bernhard Huldermann, <em>Albert Ballin</em> +(Berlin, 1922), pp. 146 ff.; <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, Nos. 6077 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_496"></a><a href="#FNanchor_496"><span class= +"label">[496]</span></a>Bülow to Romberg, Oct. 4, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 257 ff., No. 6084.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_497"></a><a href="#FNanchor_497"><span class= +"label">[497]</span></a>Romberg to F. O., Oct. 19, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 259, No. 6085.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_498"></a><a href="#FNanchor_498"><span class= +"label">[498]</span></a>See above.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_499"></a><a href="#FNanchor_499"><span class= +"label">[499]</span></a>Osten-Sacken to Lamsdorff, Oct. 27, 1904, +<em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, pp. 456 ff.; Savinsky, +<em>Recollections of a Russian Diplomat</em>, p. 97.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_500"></a><a href="#FNanchor_500"><span class= +"label">[500]</span></a>William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 27, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 303 f., No. 6118. Their correspondence was +entirely in English, in the use of which they made frequent +mistakes. Osten-Sacken reported on Nov. 4 a conversation with Bülow +in which the latter, repeating the remarks of Holstein, declared +that in case the British government objected to the coaling of the +Russian ships by the German firm, “we should apparently be forced +to ask the St. Petersburg cabinet whether we should refuse this +objection and thus assume the risk of a war with England and become +your [Russia’s] ally; or would Russia prefer to dispense with . . . +. the coaling . . . . which in this case we should have to prohibit +as incompatible with Germany’s neutrality” +(<em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, p. 463).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_501"></a><a href="#FNanchor_501"><span class= +"label">[501]</span></a>Nicholas II to William II, Oct. 29, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 305, No. 6119.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_502"></a><a href="#FNanchor_502"><span class= +"label">[502]</span></a>Bülow and Holstein were the proponents of +the alliance. Richthofen and Tirpitz, secretary of the Navy +Department, opposed it (Alfred von Tirpitz, <em>Erinnerungen</em> +[Leipzig, 1920], pp. 143 ff.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_503"></a><a href="#FNanchor_503"><span class= +"label">[503]</span></a>William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 30, 1904, +Goetz, pp. 346 ff.; Bülow to William II, Oct. 30, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 305, No. 6120, and Anlage I and II.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_504"></a><a href="#FNanchor_504"><span class= +"label">[504]</span></a>Mühlberg to Tschirschky, Aug. 10, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 238 f., No. 6069; Bülow to William II, July 15, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 204, No. 6043.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_505"></a><a href="#FNanchor_505"><span class= +"label">[505]</span></a>Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 6, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 220, No. 6052.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_506"></a><a href="#FNanchor_506"><span class= +"label">[506]</span></a>“It is a matter here of a really great and, +for the onlooking world, wholly unexpected transformation +[<em>Weichenstellung</em>],” wrote Bülow to the Emperor, Nov. 16, +1904 (<em>ibid.</em>, 312, No. 6125).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_507"></a><a href="#FNanchor_507"><span class= +"label">[507]</span></a>See the report from Lamsdorff to the Czar +of Holstein’s conversation with Osten-Sacken on Oct. 24, and the +Czar’s minute to it (<em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, pp. +455 f. and n.; cf. Savinsky, p. 97).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_508"></a><a href="#FNanchor_508"><span class= +"label">[508]</span></a>Langer, <em>Europ. Gespr.</em>, June, 1926, +pp. 397 f.; Dennis, <em>Adventures in American Diplomacy</em>, pp. +354 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_509"></a><a href="#FNanchor_509"><span class= +"label">[509]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, Nov. 7, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 35, No. 26.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_510"></a><a href="#FNanchor_510"><span class= +"label">[510]</span></a>A. Savinsky, “Guillaume II et la Russie. +Ses Dépêches à Nicholas II, 1903-1905,” <em>Revue des deux +mondes</em>, XII (1922), 790 f.; <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, Nos. 6044 ff.; +Savinsky, p. 97. Savinsky was an official in the Russian foreign +office in the confidence of Lamsdorff, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 505, +editor’s note).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_511"></a><a href="#FNanchor_511"><span class= +"label">[511]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, Vol. XXII, chap. +clviii.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_512"></a><a href="#FNanchor_512"><span class= +"label">[512]</span></a>Lamsdorff to Osten-Sacken, Nov. 10, 1904, +<em>Kreigsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, pp. 464 f.; cf. Savinsky, +p. 99.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_513"></a><a href="#FNanchor_513"><span class= +"label">[513]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 31, Nov. 7, +1904, <em>B.D.</em>, IV, 25, No. 24; 34 f., No. 26.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_514"></a><a href="#FNanchor_514"><span class= +"label">[514]</span></a>On receipt of that draft the Czar wrote to +Lamsdorff: “To-day I received the Emperor’s letter with the treaty +draft. As I read it, I laughed aloud. The content of the three +articles touches France mostly. The last point concerns the +particular object of dissatisfaction of the German Government with +the British action in the coaling operation. This, however, is a +private affair of both states. . . . . The matter must be +considered from all sides, and a more desirable counterproposal for +us must be composed” (<em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, p. +461).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_515"></a><a href="#FNanchor_515"><span class= +"label">[515]</span></a>Lamsdorff to Nicholas II, Nov. 4, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, pp. 462 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_516"></a><a href="#FNanchor_516"><span class= +"label">[516]</span></a>Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 7, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 310 ff., No. 6124 and Anlage.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_517"></a><a href="#FNanchor_517"><span class= +"label">[517]</span></a>William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 17, 1904, +Goetz, pp. 349 ff.; Savinsky, p. 102; Bülow to William II, Nov. 16, +1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 312 ff., No. 6125 and Anlage. The treaty +draft is given in Goetz, pp. 146 f. See also Alexander Iswolsky, +<em>Recollections of a Foreign Minister</em> (New York, 1921), pp. +34 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_518"></a><a href="#FNanchor_518"><span class= +"label">[518]</span></a>Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 23, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 317, No. 6126, Anlage; Savinsky, pp. 102 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_519"></a><a href="#FNanchor_519"><span class= +"label">[519]</span></a>William II to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 316 f., No. 6126.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_520"></a><a href="#FNanchor_520"><span class= +"label">[520]</span></a>Bülow to William II, Nov. 24, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 318 f., No. 6127 and Anlage; William II to Nicholas +II, Nov. 26, 1904, <em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, pp. 471 +f.; Savinsky, pp. 103 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_521"></a><a href="#FNanchor_521"><span class= +"label">[521]</span></a>Iswolsky makes an attempt to exonerate the +Czar of the charge of disloyalty to France, but his argument is not +convincing (Iswolsky, pp. 27, 36 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_522"></a><a href="#FNanchor_522"><span class= +"label">[522]</span></a>Report of Lamsdorff for Nicholas II, Nov. +23, 1904, <em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, pp. 473 ff.; +Savinsky, <em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, XII (1922), 789 ff.; +Savinsky, pp. 104 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_523"></a><a href="#FNanchor_523"><span class= +"label">[523]</span></a>He inclosed a draft of the proposed +communication to France. See Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 7, +1904, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 322 ff., No. 6131.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_524"></a><a href="#FNanchor_524"><span class= +"label">[524]</span></a>Bülow to William II, Dec. 6, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 263 ff., No. 6088; <em>ibid.</em>, chap. +cxxxvi.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_525"></a><a href="#FNanchor_525"><span class= +"label">[525]</span></a>Metternich to F. O., Oct. 20, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 652, No. 6349, and following documents; Flotow to +Bülow, Oct. 26, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 286 f., No. 6105 and +following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_526"></a><a href="#FNanchor_526"><span class= +"label">[526]</span></a>This was the expression used.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_527"></a><a href="#FNanchor_527"><span class= +"label">[527]</span></a>Memo. by Metternich for Bülow, Dec. 25, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 367 ff., No. 6156; report of Marine Attaché +Coerper, Jan. 15, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 379 f., No. 6161; Lee, +<em>King Edward VII</em>, II, 329; Admiral Sir Edward E. Bradford, +<em>Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson</em> +(London, 1923), p. 197.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_528"></a><a href="#FNanchor_528"><span class= +"label">[528]</span></a>William II to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 316 f., No. 6126; Graf Robert +Zedlitz-Trützschler, <em>Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof</em> +(Stuttgart, 1925), pp. 86 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_529"></a><a href="#FNanchor_529"><span class= +"label">[529]</span></a>On this war scare see <em>G.P.</em>, Vol. +XIX, chap. cxxxvi.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_530"></a><a href="#FNanchor_530"><span class= +"label">[530]</span></a>J. L. Bashford, “Great Britain and Germany: +A Conversation with Count von Bülow, German Chancellor,” +<em>Nineteenth Century</em>, Dec., 1904, pp. 873 ff.; Bülow, +<em>Reden</em>, II, 123 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_531"></a><a href="#FNanchor_531"><span class= +"label">[531]</span></a>Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 5, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 358 f., No. 6153.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_532"></a><a href="#FNanchor_532"><span class= +"label">[532]</span></a>Bülow to William II, Dec. 6, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 263 ff., No. 6088.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_533"></a><a href="#FNanchor_533"><span class= +"label">[533]</span></a>Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 6, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 320 f., No. 6129; William II to Nicholas II, Dec. +7, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 322, No. 6130.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_534"></a><a href="#FNanchor_534"><span class= +"label">[534]</span></a>Savinsky, <em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, +XII ( 1922), 794 f.; Savinsky, p. 107.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_535"></a><a href="#FNanchor_535"><span class= +"label">[535]</span></a>William II to Nicholas II, undated, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 325, No. 6132.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_536"></a><a href="#FNanchor_536"><span class= +"label">[536]</span></a>Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 11, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 325 f., No. 6134.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_537"></a><a href="#FNanchor_537"><span class= +"label">[537]</span></a>On December 11 Lamsdorff stated to +Alvensleben that as soon as the Czar had made a decision he would +be ready to agree with Germany on the “modality of co-operation” in +case of a conflict. On the next day in his note to that government +he did not mention this matter, and as Germany seemed satisfied, he +never returned to it. See Alvensleben to F. O., Dec. 11 and 12, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 325 ff., Nos. 6134 ff.; Lamsdorff to +Alvensleben, Dec. 13, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 329, No. 6137; +Savinsky, p. 108.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_538"></a><a href="#FNanchor_538"><span class= +"label">[538]</span></a>Alvensleben, to F. O., Dec. 11, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 325 f., No. 6134.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_539"></a><a href="#FNanchor_539"><span class= +"label">[539]</span></a>M. A. de Wolfe Howe, <em>George von +Lengerke Meyer: His Life and Public Services</em> (New York, 1920), +pp. 121 f.; Schulthess (<em>Europäischer Geschichtskalender +1905</em>), p. 255.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_540"></a><a href="#FNanchor_540"><span class= +"label">[540]</span></a>Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 12, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 326 f., No. 6135; Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. +21, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 342 f. Nos. 6142 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_541"></a><a href="#FNanchor_541"><span class= +"label">[541]</span></a>Editor’s note giving a summary of a +dispatch from Alvensleben on Dec. 13, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, p. +342.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_542"></a><a href="#FNanchor_542"><span class= +"label">[542]</span></a>On Dec. 13 Metternich was called to Berlin +for consultation as to the effect which a Russo-German agreement of +any sort would have on Anglo-German relations. Schulenburg and +Eulenburg, of the German embassy in London, also were asked about +the attitude of the British toward Germany. They all believed that +the British would not tolerate as much from Germany as they would +from Russia. See memo. by Bülow, Dec. 16, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 331 +f., No. 6139, and editor’s note; memo. by Metternich, Dec. 18, +1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 332 ff., No. 6140; Schulenburg to Bülow, Dec. +14, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 359 ff., No. 6154; memo. by Eulenburg, +Dec. 15, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 366 f., No. 6155; Alfred von +Tirpitz, <em>Politische Dokumente</em>, Band I; <em>Der Aufbau der +deutschen Weltmacht</em> (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1924), pp. 13 f. A +few days later Lascelles tried to argue with both Bülow and +Holstein that the British fear of the German navy was more +reasonable than the German fear of the British navy. And on Dec. 26 +Holstein declared to Lascelles as follows: “In the present instance +a situation had been created by the action of the Press which was +fraught with the gravest of all dangers, viz.: that of two great +nations being involved in war, for if any untoward incident had +arisen which gave rise to an acrimonious discussion between the two +Governments it would have been almost impossible to have settled it +owing to the atmosphere which the Press campaign had created.” +Nevertheless both parties agreed that Anglo-German relations had +become easier. See Lascelles to Lansdowne, Dec. 28, 1904, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 56 ff., No. 65. At about the same time King +Edward, Lansdowne, and Balfour all branded the German fears of a +British attack as foolish; and the British condemned them as +hypocritical. But the press war continued into January as bitterly +as before. See Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, <em>G.P.</em>, +XIX, 372 f., No. 6157; and following documents. See also Schulthess +(1905), p. 3; Newton, <em>Lord Lansdowne</em>, pp. 331 f.; +Friedrich Thimme, “Auswärtige Politik und Hochfinanz: Aus den +Papieren Paul H. von Schwabach’s,” <em>Europäische Gespräche</em>, +June, 1929, p. 307.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_543"></a><a href="#FNanchor_543"><span class= +"label">[543]</span></a>Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 21, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 342 f., Nos. 6142 f.; Alvensleben to Bülow, +Dec. 26, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 343 ff., No. 6144.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_544"></a><a href="#FNanchor_544"><span class= +"label">[544]</span></a>Mühlberg to Tirpitz, Jan. 27, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 265 ff., No. 6089, and following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_545"></a><a href="#FNanchor_545"><span class= +"label">[545]</span></a>William II to Nicholas II, Dec. 21, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 340 f., No. 6141; also Goetz, p. 354. The letter +was written by the foreign office.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_546"></a><a href="#FNanchor_546"><span class= +"label">[546]</span></a>Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 25, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 346, No. 6145.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_547"></a><a href="#FNanchor_547"><span class= +"label">[547]</span></a>Memo. by Eckert, Nov. 18, 1904, Received +Dec. 26, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 395 ff., No. 6176.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_548"></a><a href="#FNanchor_548"><span class= +"label">[548]</span></a>Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 400 ff., No. 6178.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_549"></a><a href="#FNanchor_549"><span class= +"label">[549]</span></a>William II to Nicholas II, Jan. 2, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 404 f., No. 6180.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_550"></a><a href="#FNanchor_550"><span class= +"label">[550]</span></a>William II to Bülow, March 11, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 411, No. 6187; Bülow to William II, March 11, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 412, No. 6188. On Jan. 16, 1905, the Emperor wrote: +“The action of Delcassé and Lamsdorff is unspeakably treacherous +and common. This trio [France, Great Britain, and Russia, who he +thought desired to divide China] must be opposed by a +German-American-Japanese league. That must be done quickly and +energetically. Above all America’s mistrust of France and Russia be +nourished” (Emperor’s minute to the dispatch from Bülow to William +II, Jan. 15, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 562, No. 6280).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_551"></a><a href="#FNanchor_551"><span class= +"label">[551]</span></a>Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 29, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 551 ff., No. 6275. The Emperor also suffered from +the “nightmare of the coalitions,” but his suffering assumed more +varied forms. At one moment he feared a +Franco-Anglo-American-Japanese grouping; at another, an +Anglo-Franco-Russian grouping; at another, an +Anglo-Franco-Russo-Japanese grouping (see <em>ibid.</em>, Nos. +5925, 5945, 6187, 6280).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_552"></a><a href="#FNanchor_552"><span class= +"label">[552]</span></a>See <em>ibid.</em>, chap. cxxxix.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_553"></a><a href="#FNanchor_553"><span class= +"label">[553]</span></a>Romberg to Bülow, Dec. 1, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 394 f., No. 6175.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_554"></a><a href="#FNanchor_554"><span class= +"label">[554]</span></a>Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 402 f., No. 6178.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_555"></a><a href="#FNanchor_555"><span class= +"label">[555]</span></a>See Dennett, pp. 77 ff., 162, 171 f.; +Dennis, pp. 392 f., 397; Bülow to William II, Dec. 24, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 547 ff., No. 6274, and following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_556"></a><a href="#FNanchor_556"><span class= +"label">[556]</span></a>See, among others, Sternburg to F. O., Feb. +3 and 9, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 567 f., No. 6285; 570, No. +6287.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_557"></a><a href="#FNanchor_557"><span class= +"label">[557]</span></a>Dennett, pp. 73 ff., 50; Dennis, pp. 367 +f., 385 ff. The anonymous document which Dennis quotes must have +been written some time early in 1905, for it refers to events which +occurred in January, 1905.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_558"></a><a href="#FNanchor_558"><span class= +"label">[558]</span></a>Arco to F. O., Feb. 10, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 407, No. 6183; Arco to Bülow, March 16, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 413 ff. No. 6190.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_559"></a><a href="#FNanchor_559"><span class= +"label">[559]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, Vol. XXII, chap. clix.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_560"></a><a href="#FNanchor_560"><span class= +"label">[560]</span></a>Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 26, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, XIX, 343 f., No. 6144; William II to Bülow, Dec. +28, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 346 f. No. 6146; Bülow to Alvensleben, +Jan. 1, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 347 f., No. 6147; Bülow to William +II, Dec. 26, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 400 ff., No. 6178.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[181]</span><a id= +"c11"></a>CHAPTER XI</h2> + +<p class="sch1">THE VISIT TO TANGIER</p> + +<p>Upon the refusal of an alliance by Russia, the German +government, in the early part of 1905, regarded its international +situation and loss of prestige with concern. The continued defeats +of Russia by Japan in the Far East, culminating in that at Mukden, +February 23 to March 10, and the outbreak of revolution in Russia +had for the time neutralized the effectiveness of the Dual +Alliance. But the Anglo-German animosity persisted. On February 2 +at Eastleigh, Mr. Arthur Lee, first civil lord of the British +admiralty, frankly explained the redistribution of the fleet as +follows:<a id="FNanchor_561"></a><a href="#Footnote_561" class= +"fnanchor">[561]</a></p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The balance and center of naval power in Europe had been shifted +during the last few years. They [Great Britain] had not so much to +keep their eyes upon France and the Mediterranean as they had to +look with more anxiety, though not fear, towards the North Sea. It +was for that reason that the Fleets had been distributed to enable +them to deal with any danger in that direction. . . . . If war +should unhappily be declared, under existing conditions the British +Navy would get its blow in first, before the other side had time +even to read in the papers that war had been declared.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The German Emperor regarded those assertions as an +“open threat of war” by that “vengeance-breathing corsair.”<a id= +"FNanchor_562"></a><a href="#Footnote_562" class= +"fnanchor">[562]</a> An Anglo-German press war ensued. Count Bülow +declared to Admiral Tirpitz that he would agree to any sum for the +German naval law for 1906.<a id="FNanchor_563"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_563" class="fnanchor">[563]</a></p> + +<p>The state of the Triple Alliance also worried the German foreign +office; Austria-Hungary was in internal turmoil, Italy more +unreliable than ever. Irredentist troubles, which had flamed +up<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[182]</span> again in the +previous November,<a id="FNanchor_564"></a><a href="#Footnote_564" +class="fnanchor">[564]</a> and Balkan rivalries had so antagonized +those two allies that during 1904 the main military force of Italy +had been transferred from the French to the Austrian frontier. +During the winter, reports of a Franco-Italian agreement nullifying +the Triple Alliance and of the activity of Ambassador Barrère in +attempting to foment difficulty between Austria and Italy came to +the German government.<a id="FNanchor_565"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_565" class="fnanchor">[565]</a> But when, toward the end +of February, 1905, Count Bülow mentioned these rumors to the +Italian Ambassador, King Victor Emmanuel and his government both +formally denied that Italy had made any agreement “that is in +contradiction with the Triple Alliance or that may diminish the +value of our obligations toward our allies,” and asserted that M. +Prinetti’s declarations to France did not “vary, modify, or +attenuate the bearing or obligations that result from it [the +Triple Alliance] for us.”<a id="FNanchor_566"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_566" class="fnanchor">[566]</a></p> + +<p>Although the Chancellor did not believe these asseverations, he +continued to hold to Italy. As he wrote to the Emperor on March 5 +and 9:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>For times of peace and for all international combinations it is +to our interest to maintain the façade of the Triple Alliance as +intact as possible, if only because the Italians, so long as they +remain in it, will meet with mistrust from hostile sides. In case +of complications, however, we need have no illusions concerning +active Italian co-operation. Still, it is an advantage if Italy +remains neutral instead of siding with France. . . . . The general +international situation is so tense that we must endeavor to +sacrifice as few tricks as possible.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_183">[183]</span>Therein was expressed the German policy +toward Italy until the latter’s final entry into the World War. +Upon reading this confession, the Emperor, who already feared that +King Edward VII was trying to establish a Franco-Russo-British +alliance, summed up the international position of his country as +follows: “The Triple Alliance loosened by the antagonism of Austria +and Italy, Russia unchanged or indifferent toward us, England +hostile, France revengeful.” As to Italy, he wrote severely to the +Chancellor: “Your Excellency is easily satisfied. My grandfather +and I looked upon the co-operation of the Italian army as a matter +of course. In case of a French attack on us that must be adhered +to.”<a id="FNanchor_567"></a><a href="#Footnote_567" class= +"fnanchor">[567]</a></p> + +<p>The diminution in Germany’s prestige was felt most acutely in +her relationship to France, whose Foreign Minister showed by the +dispatch of the French mission to Fez in January that he intended +to establish French control over Morocco without consulting +Germany. Hence, after the failure of the move toward Russia, the +German government began, in December, to turn its attention to the +Moroccan question. Conveniently disregarding its unsettled +grievances against the Sultan, it responded to certain overtures +for a <em>rapprochement</em> from that monarch by quietly and +unofficially encouraging him to resist the French demands.<a id= +"FNanchor_568"></a><a href="#Footnote_568" class= +"fnanchor">[568]</a></p> + +<p>This action could the more easily be taken since the Sultan had +already begun to oppose the French by convoking an assembly of +Moroccan notables to consider the French proposals for reform. The +Sultan selected two men from each town, who were moderate +conservatives, more or less amenable to his influence,<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_184">[184]</span> hostile to French control but +not in principle opposed to foreigners or to reforms.<a id= +"FNanchor_569"></a><a href="#Footnote_569" class= +"fnanchor">[569]</a> Count Bülow, much pleased, advised the Sultan +about the middle of February to unite with the rebel, Bou-Amama +[<em>sic</em>], and to threaten a holy war in case France tried to +prevent the meeting of the assembly.<a id= +"FNanchor_570"></a><a href="#Footnote_570" class= +"fnanchor">[570]</a> Early in February a German warship appeared +casually in Moroccan waters. A few days later Herr von Holstein +instructed Herr von Kühlmann, first secretary of the German +legation in Tangier, to avoid official utterances toward France +“until we are more certain about the attitude of the Sultan”; for +“according as the Sultan shows himself firm or yielding, German +policy will endeavor as much as possible to strengthen his back or +will confine itself to defending German economic interests.”<a id= +"FNanchor_571"></a><a href="#Footnote_571" class= +"fnanchor">[571]</a></p> + +<p>The Moroccan government lived up to the German hopes by +convening the assembly of notables on February 22 and by requiring +M. Saint-René Taillandier to explain the French program to it. To +stiffen the Moroccan resistance against France, Herr von Kühlmann +suggested that the German government send a note to the Sultan +manifesting its disapproval of the French policy.<a id= +"FNanchor_572"></a><a href="#Footnote_572" class= +"fnanchor">[572]</a> Before following that suggestion, however, the +German government endeavored to interest President Roosevelt in the +Moroccan question.</p> + +<p>As Mr. Roosevelt and the German government were co-operating so +cordially for the preservation of the open door in China, Count +Bülow sought to extend this effort to Morocco and to involve the +United States against France and Great Britain, or at least to +prepare the President for isolated German action on the Moroccan +question. On February 25, after calling Mr. Roosevelt’s attention +to the Franco-Spanish monopolistic plans, the Chancellor invited +him to unite with Germany in advising the<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_185">[185]</span> Sultan that the calling of the assembly was +a correct move toward fortifying his government and inaugurating +reforms. This action, argued the Chancellor, would stop the French +advance and make possible a peaceful solution of the Moroccan +question. Even if the United States did not participate, he +continued, France would scarcely risk a Moroccan war with a silent +Germany on her frontier.<a id="FNanchor_573"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_573" class="fnanchor">[573]</a></p> + +<p>Although not interested in Morocco, the President agreed to +instruct the American representative in Tangier to keep in close +touch with his German colleague.<a id="FNanchor_574"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_574" class="fnanchor">[574]</a> The answer satisfied the +German government, which now felt assured of Mr. Roosevelt’s moral +support in case Germany took action alone. On March 10 the note was +sent.</p> + +<p>Through this note and the supplementary statements of the German +representatives in Morocco the German government informed the +Sultan that, although he must reorganize his country, Germany</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">hopes that the rumors of a prospective change in +the existing conditions in Morocco—equal rights and freedom for all +nations—are unfounded. Germany would disapprove of such a change. +Germany and the United States are favorably inclined toward the +maintenance of the present conditions; . . . . the attitude of the +other Powers is not definitely known. In England the Government has +bound itself to a certain extent in favor of France, even though in +the English commercial world a current in favor of the maintenance +of the independence of Morocco and in favor of equal rights of the +Powers is present.<a id="FNanchor_575"></a><a href="#Footnote_575" +class="fnanchor">[575]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Germany here showed her strong disapproval of the +whole French action and sought to augment Moroccan resistance +without committing herself to any definite policy.</p> + +<p>Immediately after the dispatch of the note the German +government<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">[186]</span> heard +that at the opening session of the assembly of notables on February +22 M. Saint-René Taillandier had claimed to have “the assent of +other foreign representatives at Tangier” to the French program of +reform.<a id="FNanchor_576"></a><a href="#Footnote_576" class= +"fnanchor">[576]</a> Considering this a deliberate +misrepresentation for the purpose of overawing the Moroccans, the +German government sought further means for blocking French efforts. +The Chancellor intimated in the Reichstag on March 15 that Germany +intended taking steps to defend her economic interests in +Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_577"></a><a href="#Footnote_577" class= +"fnanchor">[577]</a> Five days later the newspapers announced the +forthcoming visit of the German Emperor to Tangier.<a id= +"FNanchor_578"></a><a href="#Footnote_578" class= +"fnanchor">[578]</a></p> + +<p>When Count Bülow saw the strong opposition which this proposed +visit aroused in the French and English press, he +immediately<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[187]</span> +determined to put it to a political use.<a id= +"FNanchor_579"></a><a href="#Footnote_579" class= +"fnanchor">[579]</a> He wrote to the Emperor: “Your Majesty’s visit +to Tangier will embarrass M. Delcassé, thwart his plans, and be of +benefit to our economic interests in Morocco.” For, he wrote a few +days later,</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">apart from the fact that the systematic exclusion +of all non-French merchants and promoters from Morocco according to +the example in Tunis would signify an important economic loss for +Germany, it is also a want of appreciation of our power when M. +Delcassé has not considered it worth the effort to negotiate with +Germany over his Moroccan plans. M. Delcassé has completely ignored +us in this affair.<a id="FNanchor_580"></a><a href="#Footnote_580" +class="fnanchor">[580]</a></p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">[188]</span>William II was +lukewarm about the project. He had persistently opposed interfering +in the Moroccan question both for reasons of general policy and for +lack of interest in Morocco itself. At the insistence of the +Chancellor he agreed to execute the <em>coup</em>; but Count Bülow +had to employ every means to hold him steady. When the Emperor +learned from the papers that the natives and the German and British +colonies in Morocco intended to exploit his visit against the +French, he wrote to the Chancellor on March 20 as follows: +“Telegraph immediately to Tangier that it is <em>highly</em> +doubtful whether I shall land and that I shall only travel +incog[nito] as a tourist, that is, no audiences, no +receptions.”<a id="FNanchor_581"></a><a href="#Footnote_581" class= +"fnanchor">[581]</a> Count Bülow overcame his objections by arguing +that otherwise M. Delcassé would spread the rumor that the program +of reception for the Emperor had been curtailed after remonstrances +had been made in Berlin.<a id="FNanchor_582"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_582" class="fnanchor">[582]</a></p> + +<p>Aside from the communication with President Roosevelt, the +German government made no diplomatic preparation for this +action.<a id="FNanchor_583"></a><a href="#Footnote_583" class= +"fnanchor">[583]</a> Direct contact with the French government was +cut off as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[189]</span> early as +March 22.<a id="FNanchor_584"></a><a href="#Footnote_584" class= +"fnanchor">[584]</a> Two days later the Chancellor issued general +orders to play the sphinx on the subject of Morocco.<a id= +"FNanchor_585"></a><a href="#Footnote_585" class= +"fnanchor">[585]</a> A Franco-German press war alone revealed the +tension of the situation.<a id="FNanchor_586"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_586" class="fnanchor">[586]</a></p> + +<p>With the performance ready to start, the chief actor began to +suffer from stage fright. Learning of an attempt at Tangier a day +or so before to assassinate Mr. Harris of the <em>London +Times</em>, the Emperor telegraphed Count Bülow from Lisbon on +March 28 as follows: “In Tangier the devil is already loose. +Yesterday an Englishman almost murdered. I consider the affair +there as very doubtful.”<a id="FNanchor_587"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_587" class="fnanchor">[587]</a> Furthermore, he learned +that at Tangier he would have to disembark in an open boat, and +that after he was in the town he would have to walk through the +narrow streets or be carried in a sedan or ride some unknown Berber +horse. The first two ways were decidedly beneath imperial dignity, +while the last one, on account of the Emperor’s crippled left arm, +might be too dangerous. Not only the anxious sovereign, but members +of his company as well, were inclined to advise against the +attempt. But Count Tattenbach, former minister at Tangier and at +the time minister at Lisbon, whom the Emperor had brought along +from Portugal, and Prince Eulenburg clung to the plan and kept up +their master’s courage,<a id="FNanchor_588"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_588" class="fnanchor">[588]</a> while from Berlin the +Chancellor sent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[190]</span> one +telegram after the other to effect the visit. To the Emperor he +telegraphed that it would be a “historic act,” that the attention +of the world was focused on him, that “if the visit . . . . turns +out as desired, Delcassé with his anti-German policy will stand +there as a disgraced European,” and that the French Foreign +Minister would probably then be overthrown by his enemies in +France. He agreed with Count Tattenbach that since press and people +were discussing the matter so fully the Emperor could not recede +without exposing himself to the accusation of cowardice. He +likewise sent a telegram of four pages to the Emperor on March 26 +with instructions about his speeches at Tangier. It read in part as +follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Naturally it is not to German interest for the Sultan to be +discouraged now at the beginning of the French negotiations and to +place himself under a French protectorate. To oppose this . . . . +Your Majesty should receive the Sultan’s representative expressly +as a representative of a sovereign, and should . . . . express the +hope that he [the Sultan] would soon suppress the rebellion of +Bou-Amama. . . . . Your Majesty might ask where the rebel Bou-Amama +obtains the means for his long resistance. If the representative +should reply, “Probably from France,” Your Majesty might answer, +“It is difficult to believe the French capable of such +baseness.”</p> + +<p>. . . . Without saying an unfriendly word about France, Your +Majesty should ignore her in Morocco, should not mention at all the +French advance against Morocco, and should honor the French chargé +d’affaires with . . . . only a silent greeting.</p> + +<p>It is improbable that any diplomat will mention France’s +Moroccan policy to Your Majesty. If that subject should be brought +up, Your Majesty might reply that the French policy is entirely +unknown to you. The case is different, however, if the Sultan’s +representative at his master’s command . . . . asks Your Majesty’s +advice. On the reply will depend whether the Sultan will continue +to defend the independence of Morocco or will submit to France. The +question whether Your Majesty can risk a war with France for the +sake of Morocco cannot be considered at all. But on the other hand +it is more than doubtful whether the present civil Government of +France . . . . would risk a war with Morocco so long as the least +possibility exists that Germany might sooner or later interfere. +Therefore we must for the present leave our goal uncertain. We +cannot conveniently make an alliance with the Sultan. But if we +withdraw our moral support entirely from him and +destroy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[191]</span> all hope, +we shall relinquish important German interests. Therefore I +conceive Your Majesty’s reply to the Sultan’s minister somewhat as +follows: “It is known that I desire no Morocco territory, but that +I value equality of treatment with other nations in trade and +commerce with Morocco. Other commercial nations have the same +interest. As my view is known, the English colony greeted me +joyfully today. It is to the interest of the Sultan as well as of +almost all seafaring and commercial peoples that he preserve his +independence and therewith freedom to permit them all equal rights +in his empire. The main strength of every ruler lies in having his +people back of him at decisive moments. In that case no foreign +Power will attack him lightly. Therefore the Sultan should make +certain that the notables whom he has summoned to Fez for advice +are of one mind with him and should direct his policy in accordance +therewith.”</p> + +<p>Since it is well known that the Moorish delegates at present +assembled at Fez are entirely hostile to the Sultan’s conciliation +toward France, definite advice would herewith be imparted to the +Sultan. If the representative should ask whether Your Majesty would +support the Sultan in a war against France, Your Majesty might +reply: “In case I promised today to support you, you would attack +the French at once. But I desire, if possible, to maintain peace, +although I have a very strong army. Therefore I must reserve +decision until it really comes to war between France and Morocco. I +do not expect this event. France will try to see how far she can +advance with threats. But France knows that her situation would be +dangerous if she attacked Morocco without having assured herself of +Germany’s neutrality.”</p> + +<p>Next in importance to the conversation with the Sultan’s +representative is Your Majesty’s reply to a probable short English +greeting. . . . . There Your Majesty might well stress the common +interest in equality for all nations. By emphasizing this principle +at that place Your Majesty will make it half impossible for the +English Government in later Franco-German discussions about Morocco +to place itself on the French side.</p> + +<p>Finally, in case Your Majesty has to reply to a question from a +non-Moroccan source about what attitude Germany would take in case +of a Franco-Moroccan war, Your Majesty might reply somewhat as +follows: “Germany has no obligations which would prevent her from +being guided in that case by her own interests.” This reply sounds +disquieting for our opponents but binds us to nothing.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Thus, Count Bülow instructed the Emperor to +encourage the Moroccans in their resistance to France, to make +France uneasy by his actions and words, but not to bind Germany to +anything definite.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">[192]</span>At the same +time, to assure his master’s safety, the Chancellor telegraphed to +Herr von Kühlmann that German and Spanish secret police should be +present in abundance, that the visit should perhaps be shortened, +and that “a horse, guaranteed gentle, which should be exercised +early in the morning for several hours by some trustworthy rider in +order to quiet it, would be best and could obviate all difficulties +as well as any curtailment of the program.”<a id= +"FNanchor_589"></a><a href="#Footnote_589" class= +"fnanchor">[589]</a> Then, to cut off any possibility of retreat, +the Chancellor declared on March 29 to the Reichstag that Germany +had no aggressive intentions toward Morocco, but that she did aim +to defend her economic interests and the open door.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The speech and attitude of a diplomat . . . . must vary +according to circumstances [he stated]. The moment suitable . . . . +for the preservation of our interests I shall choose as I think +best. But in this case the tendency of the German policy has not +changed. Whoever seeks a <em>fait nouveau</em> will not find it in +the German policy. In the same degree as it is attempted to change +the international position of Morocco or to control the open door +in the economic development of the land, we must also to a greater +degree than before be heedful that our economic interests in +Morocco remain safe. For this reason we are entering into relations +with the Sultan of Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_590"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_590" class="fnanchor">[590]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>When the Emperor’s boat arrived at Tangier early in the morning +of March 31, a stiff east wind made landing impossible.<a id= +"FNanchor_591"></a><a href="#Footnote_591" class= +"fnanchor">[591]</a> Herr von Kühlmann and the captain of one of +the French warships stationed in the harbor succeeded only with the +greatest difficulty in coming aboard. The Emperor immediately drew +the latter into conversation about the weather prospects. It looked +as if the “historic act” would not occur. A few hours later, +however, the wind died down, and General Scholl, a member of the +Emperor’s party, went ashore to make a tour of inspection. He +returned with an enthusiastic report of the reception in view +from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[193]</span> the natives, +declared the horse to be trustworthy, and said that if one did not +mind getting wet, one could make the landing. So the Emperor +intrusted himself to the wind and the waves, the Moroccans, and a +Berber horse. The landing was made; the horse, which at first shied +at the splendor of the imperial costume, was quieted; and</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">followed by about twenty attendants all on +horseback [according to Herr von Schoen’s account], the Emperor +entered the town, the narrow streets of which, filled with the +joyous, noisy masses, permitted only a slow advance. The flat roofs +of the houses were thickly packed with Moorish, Christian, and +Jewish women who hailed the Emperor in the most varied tones and +scattered flowers. Finally the procession arrived at the Soko, the +open place before the garden of the legation, filled with a +turbulent sea of human beings who expressed their enthusiasm in +deafening cries and wild shooting. The confused din was increased +still more by a military band sent by the Sultan which endeavored +in vain to drown out the uproar of the people. The restlessness of +the horses caused me to ask the French officer, apparently leading +a command, whether he could not stop the wild shooting. He replied +dejectedly that he had some influence only over the handful of +regular troops entrusted to his instruction but not the least over +the sportively shooting, half-wild Kabyle.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">However, the company reached the legation in safety +where the German colony, the diplomatic corps, and the +representative of the Sultan were received.</p> + +<p>In the speeches which the excited Emperor delivered, he +permitted his tongue to become looser than usual. Whereas he had +previously been opposed to intervention in the Moroccan affair, he +now fixed the German policy with respect to Morocco more tightly +than the Chancellor had wished and exposed himself to the criticism +of having taken another backward monarch under his wing. In reply +to the greeting of the Sultan’s representative, Abd-el-Melik, the +Emperor declared that</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">he . . . . had great interest in the welfare and +prosperity of the Moroccan Empire, that he visited the Sultan as an +independent ruler, and that he hoped that under the authority of +the Sultan a free Morocco would be opened to the peaceful +competition of all nations without monopoly or exclusion.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[194]</span>The +Sultan’s representative read to the Emperor a message from his +master in which the latter stated that</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">he remembered the friendship which had always +existed between his predecessors and Germany and that he was filled +with the wish to strengthen and extend those friendly relations in +every way. In reply the Emperor William expressed his thanks for +this cordial message. He shared the feelings of the Sultan [he +said] and agreed with Abd-el-Melik’s assertations concerning the +divine power and wisdom which directs the fate of peoples. He +wished sincerely for the development and welfare of the Moroccan +Empire for the sake of his subjects and for that of the other +European nations who traded there, as he hoped, on the basis of +full equality.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The Emperor then decorated Abd-el-Melik and his +three companions. Later, he said to Abd-el-Melik that</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">his visit to Tangier aimed to assert that German +interests in Morocco would be protected and preserved. Concerning +the best means to achieve this, he would enter into direct +relations with the Sultan, whom he regarded as an independent +ruler. The Emperor closed with the remark that prudence was +necessary in the reforms which the Sultan planned and that regard +should be paid to the religious feelings of the Moroccan people in +order to avoid disturbing public order.<a id= +"FNanchor_592"></a><a href="#Footnote_592" class= +"fnanchor">[592]</a></p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[195]</span>After the +speeches were over, the imperial party hurried back on shipboard +before some accident should occur or a contrary wind arise. Count +Bülow was so relieved upon learning that his master was safe on +board that, as he later confided to the Emperor, he had a “nervous +fit of tears.”<a id="FNanchor_593"></a><a href="#Footnote_593" +class="fnanchor">[593]</a> The Emperor himself did not at first +realize the great political significance of his act. When he met +Prince Louis of Battenberg at Gibraltar on April 1, he expressed +the time-honored shibboleth, that “Germany, Great Britain and the +United States must make common cause and march shoulder to +shoulder.”<a id="FNanchor_594"></a><a href="#Footnote_594" class= +"fnanchor">[594]</a> When he received the reports from the press +several days later, he awoke from his illusions.<a id= +"FNanchor_595"></a><a href="#Footnote_595" class= +"fnanchor">[595]</a> For, although the whole event smacked of a +comic opera, it none the less threw down the gauntlet to M. +Delcassé and French policy in Morocco<a id= +"FNanchor_596"></a><a href="#Footnote_596" class= +"fnanchor">[596]</a> and ushered in a long period of crisis in +international relations. The echoes which the Emperor’s speeches +aroused in Europe reverberated like the distant rumblings of +cannon.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc11"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_561"></a><a href="#FNanchor_561"><span class= +"label">[561]</span></a>Reported in the <em>London Times</em>, Feb. +4, 1905. When Lee saw how the German press took offense at his +words, he published a “correct version” of these passages in a +somewhat milder form (<em>ibid.</em>, Feb. 7, 1905; <em>Annual +Register, 1905</em>, pp. 21 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_562"></a><a href="#FNanchor_562"><span class= +"label">[562]</span></a>Von Tirpitz, <em>Politische Dokumente</em>, +I, 14.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_563"></a><a href="#FNanchor_563"><span class= +"label">[563]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, pp. 17 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_564"></a><a href="#FNanchor_564"><span class= +"label">[564]</span></a>Monts to Bülow, Nov. 19, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 85 ff., No. 6423.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_565"></a><a href="#FNanchor_565"><span class= +"label">[565]</span></a>Monts to Bülow, Dec. 18, 1904, +<em>ibid.</em>, 88 f. No. 6424; report of Military Attaché Chelius +to Schlieffen, Dec. 18, 1904, <em>ibid.</em>, 89 ff., No. 6424 +Anlage; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 12, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 93, No. +6425. The relation of Italy to France and Germany was well shown in +the following incident. Shortly after Loubet’s visit to Rome, an +Italian officer was caught delivering to the French important +documents dealing with the Italian plan of mobilization. At about +the same time the Italian chief of staff gave to the German +government photographs of the French border fortifications +(<em>ibid.</em>, Nos. 6423-24, 6426).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_566"></a><a href="#FNanchor_566"><span class= +"label">[566]</span></a>Bülow to Monts, Feb. 21, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 93 f., No. 6426; Monts to F. O., Feb. 25, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 94 f., No. 6427; Bülow to William II, March 5, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 95, No. 6428 and Anlage.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_567"></a><a href="#FNanchor_567"><span class= +"label">[567]</span></a>Bülow to William II, March 5 and 9, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 95 ff., Nos. 6428 f., and the Emperor’s +minutes.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_568"></a><a href="#FNanchor_568"><span class= +"label">[568]</span></a>The German representatives in Morocco +unofficially assured the Sultan early in February that Germany had +a political interest in the Moroccan question, that Germany as well +as several other Powers had not yet taken the question in its +existing form into consideration, that Germany would not actively +support Morocco, but that, with a silent Germany on her frontier, +France would not attack the latter (see <em>ibid.</em>, Nos. +6538-40, 6544-47, 6550, 6553).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_569"></a><a href="#FNanchor_569"><span class= +"label">[569]</span></a>Kühlmann to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 248, No. 6552.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_570"></a><a href="#FNanchor_570"><span class= +"label">[570]</span></a>Bülow to Kühlmann, Feb. 11, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 251 ff., No. 6554.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_571"></a><a href="#FNanchor_571"><span class= +"label">[571]</span></a>Bülow to Kühlmann, Feb. 16, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 255, No. 6556. The dispatch was written by +Holstein.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_572"></a><a href="#FNanchor_572"><span class= +"label">[572]</span></a>Kühlmann to Bülow, Feb. 21, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 255 f., No. 6557.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_573"></a><a href="#FNanchor_573"><span class= +"label">[573]</span></a>Bülow to Kühlmann, Jan. 16, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 245, No. 6547; Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 25, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 256 ff., No. 6558.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_574"></a><a href="#FNanchor_574"><span class= +"label">[574]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., March 9, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 258 f., No. 6559; Dennett, <em>Roosevelt and the +Russo-Japanese War</em>, pp. 83 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_575"></a><a href="#FNanchor_575"><span class= +"label">[575]</span></a>Only a summary of the note is given in +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 260 n. The quotations are taken from this +summary and from a telegram from Bülow to Kühlmann, March 10, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 260 f., No. 6561.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_576"></a><a href="#FNanchor_576"><span class= +"label">[576]</span></a>Report from Vassel, German vice-consul at +Fez, Feb. 23, 1905. According to a second report from him, March 7, +the French Minister had claimed to have “the approval of his +proposals by the foreigners” (<em>ibid.</em>, pp. 255 f. n.; +Auswärtiger Amt, <em>Aktenstücke über Marokko, 1905</em> [Berlin, +1905], No. 3). The latest communication received by the German +government from Vassel, before the dispatch of the note of March +10, was of Feb. 17. See Kühlmann to Bülow, Feb. 21, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 255, No. 6557; Bülow to Kühlmann, March 10, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 260, No. 6561.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_577"></a><a href="#FNanchor_577"><span class= +"label">[577]</span></a>The Chancellor declared as follows: “I +understand entirely the attention which is given here to the events +in and about Morocco. I regard it as a duty of the German +Government to see that . . . . our economic interests in Morocco +are not injured. But the present moment is unsuitable for further +explanations” (Bülow, <em>Reden</em>, II, 186 f.). As a matter of +fact, German economic interests ran a very poor third behind those +of France and Great Britain (<em>Zeitschrift für +Kolonialpolitik</em>, Dec., 1904, pp. 885 ff.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_578"></a><a href="#FNanchor_578"><span class= +"label">[578]</span></a>The information was given out to the +<em>London Standard</em>, <em>London Times</em>, and the +<em>Kölnische Zeitung</em>, at Tangier on March 19. The origin of +the visit is obscure. Theodor Wolff relates that Kühlmann and +Hornung, correspondent in Tangier of the <em>Kölnische +Zeitung</em>, were responsible for proposing in February that the +Emperor include Tangier in his itinerary (Wolff, <em>Das +Vorspiel</em>, p. 156). The plan for the Emperor’s voyage in the +Mediterranean submitted to the Chancellor on March 13 included a +stay of four hours in Tangier (editor’s note, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, +263). Probably Bülow aimed to use this visit politically from the +start, just as he had intended using the dispatch of a warship to +Tangier in the previous year. But only after he saw the effect of +the announcement upon public opinion did he realize the full +political significance of the visit (cf. <em>ibid.</em>, pp. 262 +ff.). Crozier’s story of the origin of this voyage is +unsubstantiated by any evidence (<em>Revue de France</em>, April 1, +1921, pp. 279 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_579"></a><a href="#FNanchor_579"><span class= +"label">[579]</span></a>Editor’s note, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 263 f.; +Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 262, No. 6563; +264 f., No. 6565.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_580"></a><a href="#FNanchor_580"><span class= +"label">[580]</span></a>Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 263, No. 6563; Bülow to William II, March 26, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 274 f., No. 6576. It was reported in the German +foreign office soon after the Anglo-French accord was made that +Delcassé had said to some intimate friends: “Je viens de rouler +Radolin; il ne me reste plus qu’à rouler l’empereur d’Allemagne” +(Guibert et Ferrette, <em>Le conflit franco-allemand en 1905</em> +[Paris, 1905], p. 83, quoted in Stuart, <em>French Foreign Policy +from Fashoda to Serajevo</em>, p. 136 n.). On Feb. 21, 1907, Lord +Sanderson, permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, +1894-1906, wrote as follows: “M. Delcassé . . . . ignored Germany +entirely when he commenced operations in Morocco. The action of +France and her demands on the Sultan were undoubtedly much +exaggerated and misrepresented. But in addition there is no doubt +that M. Delcassé was steadily pursuing a series of manœuvres for +the purpose of isolating Germany and weakening her alliances. The +German Gov[ernmen]t and the German nation are extremely sensitive +about being ignored or neglected in the discussion of important +questions, and it is not surprising that on this occasion they +should have been much exasperated, and determined on inflicting on +France a severe humiliation. That they also wished to separate us +from France, to prevent the Agreement from developing into an +alliance, and to obtain any share they could in the eventual +development of Morocco is no doubt also true. The methods adopted +were characteristic of German policy, and as on some other +occasions they failed” (memo. by Lord Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 421). Whether the German government knew the +exact terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement is a question. Tardieu +says that it did know them (<em>La conf. d’Algés</em>, p. 156). +Hammann has written, “One may assume that it learned the main +content” (<em>Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges</em>, p. 200). It +also suspected that the Moroccan accords contained stipulations for +the exclusion of Germany from any participation in the territorial +division of Morocco (<em>ibid.</em>, p. 201). See also the dispatch +from Stumm to Bülow, Feb. 20, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 191, No. +7024, and the Emperor’s minute thereto: “And the rascals [the +Spanish government] will not even admit what sort of a pact they +have made with the devil [France].” See also Veit Valentin, +<em>Deutschlands Aussenpolitik von Bismarcks Abgang bis zum Ende +des Weltkrieges</em> (Berlin, 1921), p. 54; report from Madrid, +Dec. 10, 1904, <em>Zur europ. Politik</em>, I, 126 f. However, the +German government did know the terms of the Franco-Spanish +agreement of Sept. 1, 1905, so Ojeda of the Spanish foreign office +admitted to Cartwright of the British embassy (Cartwright to Grey, +Jan. 22, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 233, No. 252). The probability +is therefore that it also learned in good time the terms of the +other secret accords. Failure to mention that knowledge or even +denials of being informed in the documents is not conclusive proof +that the secret articles were not known to the German foreign +office.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_581"></a><a href="#FNanchor_581"><span class= +"label">[581]</span></a>William II to Bülow, undated, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 263, No. 6564. The editors of <em>G.P.</em> +presume the date of this communication to have been March 21; but +Bülow’s reply to it was dated March 20. See Bülow to William II, +March 20, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 264, No. 6565. The Emperor had +dined at the French embassy on March 17 and had said nothing about +his proposed visit. Furthermore, just before leaving on his trip he +made at Bremen one of his half-militaristic, half-pacific speeches +which did not indicate what was to follow (Schulthess, +<em>Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905</em>, pp. 67 f.; Ludwig, +<em>Wilhelm der Zweite</em>, p. 275; Mévil, <em>De la Paix de +Francfort, etc.</em>, pp. 193 ff.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_582"></a><a href="#FNanchor_582"><span class= +"label">[582]</span></a>Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 264 f., No. 6565.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_583"></a><a href="#FNanchor_583"><span class= +"label">[583]</span></a>The unexpectedness of this action was shown +by the remarks made on March 21 by Bernstorff, first secretary of +the embassy in London, to a reporter of the <em>Daily +Chronicle</em>. He asserted that Germany had only economic +interests in Morocco over which it ought not to be difficult for +France and Germany to agree (Bülow to Metternich, March 22, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 268 f., and note, No. 6569).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_584"></a><a href="#FNanchor_584"><span class= +"label">[584]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, March 22, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 267 f., No. 6568; Flotow to F. O., March 23, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 269, No. 6570; Flotow to F. O., March 28, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 278, No. 6578; Bülow to Flotow, March 28, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 278, No. 6579; Mévil, pp. 197 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_585"></a><a href="#FNanchor_585"><span class= +"label">[585]</span></a>Memo. by Bülow, March 24, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, 271, No. 6573.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_586"></a><a href="#FNanchor_586"><span class= +"label">[586]</span></a>Mévil, p. 205; <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 262 f., +n. 266 n., Nos. 6570, 6584, 6590; <em>Quest. dipl. et. col.</em>, +XIX, 442 ff.; Schulthess, <em>1905</em>, pp. 78 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_587"></a><a href="#FNanchor_587"><span class= +"label">[587]</span></a>William II to Bülow, March 28, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 279, No. 6580.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_588"></a><a href="#FNanchor_588"><span class= +"label">[588]</span></a>Tattenbach to F. O., March 29, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 283, No. 6585; Freiherr von Schoen, <em>Erlebtes. +Beiträge zur politischen Geschichte der neuesten Zeit</em> +(Stuttgart and Berlin, 1921), pp. 19 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_589"></a><a href="#FNanchor_589"><span class= +"label">[589]</span></a>See his telegrams from March 26 to March +30, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 272 ff., Nos. 6574 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_590"></a><a href="#FNanchor_590"><span class= +"label">[590]</span></a>Bülow, II, 209 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_591"></a><a href="#FNanchor_591"><span class= +"label">[591]</span></a>For a description of the visit see Schoen, +pp. 19 ff.; Schoen to F. O., March 31, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 285 +ff., Nos. 6588 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 69 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_592"></a><a href="#FNanchor_592"><span class= +"label">[592]</span></a>The foregoing is the official version of +the speeches published in the German press (see <em>Allgemeine +Zeitung</em> [Munich], April 4, 1905). There were various versions +of the speeches since the Emperor spoke extemporaneously. Schoen on +March 31 sent to the foreign office a report of William II’s +assertions as follows: When Count de Chérisey attempted to greet +the Emperor in the name of Delcassé in such a way as to imply a +French predominance in Morocco, William II replied sharply that his +visit “signified that Germany demanded free trade there and full +equality with other nations.” When the Count admitted this, the +Emperor remarked that “he would treat directly with the Sultan as a +peer, as a free ruler of an independent land, that he would know +how to assert his just claims and expected that these also be +respected by France.” Those words crushed the Count. To the +Sultan’s representative the Emperor spoke as follows: “He regarded +the Sultan as the ruler of a free and independent Empire, subject +to no foreign suzerainty. He expected for German trade and commerce +the same advantages as for all other commercial nations. He would +always negotiate with the Sultan directly. Reforms which the Sultan +planned to introduce ought always to be executed within the limits +of the customs and views of his people and without violation of the +precepts of the Koran, in honest administration and strengthening +of peace and order that would make the best impression outside. +European customs and usages would not be taken over without further +consideration. Let the Sultan therein listen carefully to the +counsel of the great ones of his land” (Schoen to F. O., March 31, +1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 286 f., No. 6589. It was also stated in +the press, although not in the official version of the speeches, +that the Emperor replied to the greetings from the German colony at +Tangier that that colony “could rely on the support of the German +Government to prevent any obstacle in that free country [Morocco] +from hindering the success of its efforts in favor of the national +commerce” (Quoted in <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, XIX, 504). +Schoen made no mention of this assertion. Cf. Schoen, pp. 20 f.; +Mévil, pp. 210 ff.; <em>B.D.</em>, III, 62 f., Nos. 71 f.; 64, No. +74; Prince Louis of Battenberg’s report of a conversation with the +Emperor, April 1, 1905, Newton, <em>Lord Lansdowne</em>, pp. 333 +f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_593"></a><a href="#FNanchor_593"><span class= +"label">[593]</span></a>William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 497, No. 6237.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_594"></a><a href="#FNanchor_594"><span class= +"label">[594]</span></a>Memo. by Prince Louis of Battenberg, April +1, 1905, Newton, p. 333.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_595"></a><a href="#FNanchor_595"><span class= +"label">[595]</span></a>Schoen, p. 22.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_596"></a><a href="#FNanchor_596"><span class= +"label">[596]</span></a>Mévil, p. 210.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[196]</span><a id= +"c12"></a>CHAPTER XII</h2> + +<p class="sch2">THE MOROCCAN CRISIS FROM THE VISIT TO TANGIER TO +THE FALL OF DELCASSÉ</p> + +<h3 class="space-above1">I</h3> + +<p>The visit to Tangier, because of its very unexpectedness, did +not at first alarm the French, who refused to credit the German +Emperor with hostile intentions.<a id="FNanchor_597"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_597" class="fnanchor">[597]</a> Better-informed +personages in Paris, however, interpreted the event more +accurately. They were asking seriously whether war would ensue and +were declaring that “no such critical moment has occurred since the +Schnäbele affair.” The Austrian Ambassador was reminded by the +Franco-German press war of the days immediately preceding the +conflict of 1870.<a id="FNanchor_598"></a><a href="#Footnote_598" +class="fnanchor">[598]</a></p> + +<p>The French government had been warned by both German and British +representatives of Germany’s interest in Morocco. As early as +November, 1904, Herr von Kühlmann had declared to the French chargé +d’affaires at Tangier that Germany had expected France to acquaint +her with the new situation in Morocco created by the Anglo-French +and Franco-Spanish accords, but that she had since realized that +she was being “systematically excluded.” “The Imperial Government +is ignorant of all the accords made over Morocco and does not +consider itself bound in any way on that question,” he said. The +French chargé d’affaires had not regarded these remarks as +sufficiently significant to report<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_197">[197]</span> until the following February. Upon direct +inquiry in Berlin the French government had had them corroborated +by the German foreign office.<a id="FNanchor_599"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_599" class="fnanchor">[599]</a> On February 12, 1905, +Sir Arthur Nicolson, British ambassador at Madrid, had remarked to +his French colleague that “the attitude assumed by the German +Government in response to the petition of their subjects in Morocco +was an invitation to the French Government to initiate some +discussion with a view to obtain their concurrence with the +provisions of the Convention.”<a id="FNanchor_600"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_600" class="fnanchor">[600]</a> M. Delcassé had not +heeded this advice. By March 22 he had become uneasy over the +German policy, about which he was so uncertain.<a id= +"FNanchor_601"></a><a href="#Footnote_601" class= +"fnanchor">[601]</a> He was determined, however, to maintain intact +France’s accords with the other Powers and her position in +Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_602"></a><a href="#Footnote_602" class= +"fnanchor">[602]</a> Ascertaining on the eve of the voyage to +Tangier that Great Britain, Spain, and Italy would hold loyally to +their agreements,<a id="FNanchor_603"></a><a href="#Footnote_603" +class="fnanchor">[603]</a> he declared in the Senate on March 31, +the same day on which William II spoke at Tangier, that</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">nothing in our Moroccan policy, nothing in our +execution of the accords of April 8 and October 3, 1904, can +explain the movements of the German<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_198">[198]</span> press. . . . . You may legitimately hope +that in the western basin of the Mediterranean . . . . France will +succeed, without ignoring any right, without injuring any interest, +in assuring her future.<a id="FNanchor_604"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_604" class="fnanchor">[604]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The semiofficial French press threatened the +formation of a new Dual Alliance between France and Great Britain +supported by Italy and Spain in case Germany attempted to gain any +special advantages in Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_605"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_605" class="fnanchor">[605]</a> At the same time, M. +Delcassé instructed M. Saint-René Taillandier, who since March 24 +had been making substantial progress in the negotiations with the +Sultan,<a id="FNanchor_606"></a><a href="#Footnote_606" class= +"fnanchor">[606]</a> to warn that monarch against following the +proposal of the German press for an international conference over +the Moroccan question.<a id="FNanchor_607"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_607" class="fnanchor">[607]</a> He also informed the +Italian government, April 12, that France could not entertain such +a proposal.<a id="FNanchor_608"></a><a href="#Footnote_608" class= +"fnanchor">[608]</a></p> + +<p>The Emperor’s move nevertheless forced M. Delcassé to open +negotiations with Germany for an understanding regarding +Morocco.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[199]</span> From March +28 he endeavored indirectly to approach the German +government.<a id="FNanchor_609"></a><a href="#Footnote_609" class= +"fnanchor">[609]</a> On April 7 a threatened interpellation in the +Chamber forced him to state publicly that France was “ready to +dissipate any misunderstanding which . . . . may still +exist.”<a id="FNanchor_610"></a><a href="#Footnote_610" class= +"fnanchor">[610]</a> Under pressure from the French cabinet<a id= +"FNanchor_611"></a><a href="#Footnote_611" class= +"fnanchor">[611]</a> as well as from public opinion M. Delcassé, +while dining at the German embassy on April 13, repeated that +statement directly to Prince Radolin. He denied that M. Saint-René +Taillandier had ever claimed before the Sultan to have a mandate of +Europe. He excused his failure to transmit the Anglo-French +agreement to the German government; and, while admitting that the +conversation of March 23, 1904, had been unofficial, he declared +that his intention had been to show special favor to Germany by +communicating the contents of the accord to her beforehand. He had +also believed, he said, that freedom of commerce for all nations +had been completely safeguarded in that agreement and in the one +with Spain.<a id="FNanchor_612"></a><a href="#Footnote_612" class= +"fnanchor">[612]</a> Immediately thereafter the French +government<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[200]</span> +informally asked the British government to “help to convince the +Emperor that German interests were in no way threatened” in +Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_613"></a><a href="#Footnote_613" class= +"fnanchor">[613]</a></p> + +<p>To carry out his policy, M. Delcassé needed the loyal support of +all France. That he did not have. Political jealousy because of his +long tenure in office, dislike of his secretiveness, enmity between +him and M. Rouvier (the premier), hostility because of his +defending the Russian government in the massacre of January 22, +1905<a id="FNanchor_614"></a><a href="#Footnote_614" class= +"fnanchor">[614]</a>—all these forces of opposition were now +strengthened by the fact that the Foreign Minister had blundered +and that, aroused by the fear of complications, France sought a +victim whose sacrifice might dispel the danger. Quickly deserting +M. Delcassé, the nation pressed him on too rapidly to take the +initiative with Germany. As time passed with nothing settled, +nothing known, the French grew more and more alarmed, until on +April 19 the Chamber denounced the Foreign Minister for having +neglected to consult Germany, and demanded information. M. +Deschanel declared that the Foreign Minister should have heeded +Germany’s well-known imperialistic ambitions by negotiating with +that Power about Morocco. “There are not lacking in England people +who desire to utilize the French power against Germany,” he said. +“And there are not lacking in Germany people who will try to +utilize the French power against England. We should not offer +ourselves to that play.” M. Tournade accused M. Delcassé of having +hoped that if he “juggled the question with Germany” and confronted +her with a <em>fait accompli</em>, she would venture no opposition. +M. de Pressensé, charging him with deliberately having avoided an +official notification<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_201">[201]</span> to Germany of the Moroccan accords, +asserted: “You have not followed an exact conception of the +interests of France. Your policy is unworthy of a great country.” +M. Delafosse, sensing the reason for the German action in the +Anglo-French entente rather than in Morocco, expressed the general +demand that “it is necessary to ask Germany what she wishes of us.” +No one, however, believed that Germany would question France’s +special position in Morocco.</p> + +<p>Although not a voice was raised in his behalf, M. Delcassé +refused to impart any new intelligence in answer to these +accusations and demands. If M. Rouvier had not come to his rescue, +he would have been repudiated by all parties. In defending the +Foreign Minister M. Rouvier declared that not France but Germany +had altered her Moroccan policy since the previous year, +attributing this change to the defeat of France’s ally.<a id= +"FNanchor_615"></a><a href="#Footnote_615" class= +"fnanchor">[615]</a> The initiative toward conversations with +Germany, he said, had already been made. “We have closed our ear to +no proposal,” he avowed; “anything which is in harmony with the +formula . . . .: to safeguard the honor of our country and to +maintain peace, . . . . we are ready to consider.” He made the +retention of M. Delcassé a cabinet question, but he assured the +Chamber that in the future he would supervise the foreign +policy.<a id="FNanchor_616"></a><a href="#Footnote_616" class= +"fnanchor">[616]</a></p> + +<p>Upon receiving this check, M. Delcassé would have resigned had +it not been for the appeals of President Loubet and of +MM.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[202]</span> Paul Cambon and +Barrère, both of whom were in Paris at the time.<a id= +"FNanchor_617"></a><a href="#Footnote_617" class= +"fnanchor">[617]</a> His policy of treating with Germany on an +equal footing was checkmated. French public opinion had forced an +almost complete surrender in the face of the German menace. It +remained to be seen how far M. Rouvier could yield before French +desire for peace would conflict with French national honor.</p> + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>The Emperor’s injudicious assertions at Tangier compelled the +German foreign office to take some positive action in Morocco +instead of leaving the initiative to the Sultan. Herr von Holstein +contended that “a retreat would stand on the same level with Olmütz +and cause Fashoda to be forgotten.”<a id= +"FNanchor_618"></a><a href="#Footnote_618" class= +"fnanchor">[618]</a> By April 2 the Chancellor decided upon the +following policy:<a id="FNanchor_619"></a><a href="#Footnote_619" +class="fnanchor">[619]</a> first, to continue denying any +territorial ambitions in Morocco; second, to demand economic +equality for all nations, the open door “in the widest sense”; +third, and this he considered Germany’s “trump card,” to advocate +calling an international conference like that at Madrid in 1880 for +deliberating upon the entire question of Moroccan reform.<a id= +"FNanchor_620"></a><a href="#Footnote_620" class= +"fnanchor">[620]</a> Of course no separate negotiations with France +would be considered.</p> + +<p>The Chancellor and Herr von Holstein believed that the +proposal<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[203]</span> for a +conference would give Germany an unassailable position. Protected +by the appearance of absolute legality and disinterestedness, they +hoped to break the ententes and accords between France and the +other Powers, especially Great Britain, or at least to show that +Germany could force them to submit the results of their agreements +to the consideration of a general conference.<a id= +"FNanchor_621"></a><a href="#Footnote_621" class= +"fnanchor">[621]</a> They did not doubt that the proposal would be +accepted and that the conference would refuse to turn Morocco over +to France. For, they argued,</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">in case a conference meets, we are already certain +of the diplomatic support of America in favor of the open door. . . +. . Austria will not quarrel with us over Morocco . . . . Russia is +busy with herself.<a id="FNanchor_622"></a><a href="#Footnote_622" +class="fnanchor">[622]</a> . . . . The English Government—between +Roosevelt and those English groups which think as the <em>Morning +Post</em>, <em>Manchester Guardian</em>, and Lord Rosebery<a id= +"FNanchor_623"></a><a href="#Footnote_623" class= +"fnanchor">[623]</a>—will not stir. Spain is of no importance, and +also has a strong party in favor of the <em>status quo</em>. We +shall certainly be able to hold Italy in order, if necessary by a +gentle hint that while we settle with France, Austria will perhaps +settle the irredentist question. . . . . If France refuses the +conference, she will put herself in the wrong toward all the +signatory Powers<a id="FNanchor_624"></a><a href="#Footnote_624" +class="fnanchor">[624]</a> and thereby will give England, Spain, +and Italy a probably welcome excuse to withdraw.<a id= +"FNanchor_625"></a><a href="#Footnote_625" class= +"fnanchor">[625]</a></p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[204]</span>Immediately +after the Emperor’s speeches at Tangier, Herr von Holstein proposed +advocating a conference in the semiofficial press. The Chancellor +approved; but Herr Hammann, director of the press bureau in the +foreign office, objected. Inasmuch as the Emperor and the +Chancellor had both declared that Germany would next communicate +directly with the Sultan, he argued, this abrupt change would +expose German policy to the accusation of unsteadiness. He advised +preparing public opinion for a conference, for, he maintained, the +government had “to combat a much stronger aversion to a serious +conflict with France and England over Morocco in the public than in +the press.”<a id="FNanchor_626"></a><a href="#Footnote_626" class= +"fnanchor">[626]</a> On April 7 he predicted a “press storm” if the +menace of war arose.<a id="FNanchor_627"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_627" class="fnanchor">[627]</a> So, for the time a +milder note was sounded in the press. The grievances against M. +Delcassé, who was made personally responsible for Germany’s +action,<a id="FNanchor_628"></a><a href="#Footnote_628" class= +"fnanchor">[628]</a> the necessity for defending the German +economic interests in Morocco, and the intimacy of German-American +relations were emphasized. Little by little the proposal for a +conference was brought to the fore.<a id= +"FNanchor_629"></a><a href="#Footnote_629" class= +"fnanchor">[629]</a></p> + +<p>The main basis for the optimism of the German +government<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[205]</span> was its +friendship with President Roosevelt. Since the early part of the +year both the British and the German governments had been +endeavoring to win the President’s support and to arouse his +suspicions by accusing each other of aggressive intentions.<a id= +"FNanchor_630"></a><a href="#Footnote_630" class= +"fnanchor">[630]</a> Needing the support of both to effect peace +between Russia and Japan, Mr. Roosevelt had refused to believe the +tales of either. He had diagnosed their trouble as a case of “jumpy +nerves,” and had tried in February and March, 1905, to bring them +together in a new triple entente.<a id="FNanchor_631"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_631" class="fnanchor">[631]</a> The German government +had responded favorably to his suggestion; but the British +government, taxing the President with being hoodwinked by the +Emperor, had replied that better relations with that hostile Power +were scarcely possible.<a id="FNanchor_632"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_632" class="fnanchor">[632]</a> This lack of success +with Great Britain, combined with mistrust of France, caused the +President to draw closer to Germany.<a id= +"FNanchor_633"></a><a href="#Footnote_633" class= +"fnanchor">[633]</a></p> + +<p>On April 3 the German government confidently asked Mr. Roosevelt +to lend “moral support” for the maintenance of the <em>status +quo</em> in Morocco and for the peaceful settlement of the Moroccan +difficulty by speaking “calmly and academically,” +particularly<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[206]</span> to +Great Britain, for the equal treatment of all Powers in the +Sherifian Empire.<a id="FNanchor_634"></a><a href="#Footnote_634" +class="fnanchor">[634]</a> Ten days later it asked the President to +speak to Great Britain in favor of an international conference on +the Moroccan question.<a id="FNanchor_635"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_635" class="fnanchor">[635]</a> Not delaying for a +definite reply or heeding the signs of the drawing together of +Great Britain and France,<a id="FNanchor_636"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_636" class="fnanchor">[636]</a> the German government, +on April 9, determined to send Count Tattenbach to Fez to combat +the efforts of the French mission and to win the Sultan’s approval +of a conference. The Count had telegraphed that this move was +essential, since the Sultan was a weakling, his advisers +incompetent and venal, and since the French were otherwise likely +to gain the acceptance of their plans of reform.<a id= +"FNanchor_637"></a><a href="#Footnote_637" class= +"fnanchor">[637]</a></p> + +<p>On the same date (April 9) upon which the German government made +this decision, it began to sound the other Powers concerning a +conference. Austria-Hungary and Russia could be excluded from +consideration although both showed disapproval of Germany’s +action.<a id="FNanchor_638"></a><a href="#Footnote_638" class= +"fnanchor">[638]</a> When the Spanish government was asked on April +12 to support the proposal for a conference, the foreign minister, +M. Villa-Urrutia, replied that he could accept it only if France +and Great Britain did so. He suggested that the German<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_207">[207]</span> desires be fulfilled not by a +conference but by an exchange of notes and declarations between the +Powers.<a id="FNanchor_639"></a><a href="#Footnote_639" class= +"fnanchor">[639]</a></p> + +<p>With Italy the German government was more brusque. While +reassuring that Power that Germany had no intention of becoming a +rival in the Mediterranean, Count Bülow demanded under threat of +breaking the alliance that Italy support the German policy in the +Moroccan affair. But on April 12 the Italian government, evading a +definite position, urged a direct settlement of the Franco-German +discord. Count Monts, German ambassador at Rome, reported that only +in case Great Britain showed coolness toward France might Germany +expect any support from her ally, who would otherwise endeavor to +remain neutral.<a id="FNanchor_640"></a><a href="#Footnote_640" +class="fnanchor">[640]</a></p> + +<p>Since the German government thought that Great Britain had +relinquished her Moroccan interests, it intended to ignore her and +deal solely with France. On April 19 Count Metternich merely +explained to Lord Lansdowne the German views in the Moroccan affair +without asking for any expression of opinion. In this conversation +he received the impression that the British Foreign Minister +disapproved of the German action and that, against his desire, he +could easily be forced to give France diplomatic support.<a id= +"FNanchor_641"></a><a href="#Footnote_641" class= +"fnanchor">[641]</a></p> + +<p>Without waiting for either the British or the American reply, +the German government, on April 18, responded to M. +Delcassé’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[208]</span> offer +“to dissipate any misunderstanding” with the suggestion that “the +simplest and most natural means” of settling the question of +Moroccan reform would be to bring about “an exchange of ideas +between all the signatory Powers” of the Convention of +Madrid.<a id="FNanchor_642"></a><a href="#Footnote_642" class= +"fnanchor">[642]</a> At the same time, through messages to the +Sultan the Chancellor sought to prevent him from making any +decisions before the German mission arrived, and he pressed Count +Tattenbach to hasten his departure for Fez. Count Bülow realized +that if the French succeeded in gaining the Sultan’s acceptance of +their program of reforms, the entire German action would be +rendered absurd. In fact, until Count Tattenbach could persuade the +Sultan to issue an invitation for a conference, the latter held the +fate of Germany’s policy in his hands.<a id= +"FNanchor_643"></a><a href="#Footnote_643" class= +"fnanchor">[643]</a></p> + +<h3>III</h3> + +<p>The German Emperor’s visit to Tangier aroused bitter antagonism +in Great Britain, where government and people believed that Germany +had struck as much at Great Britain as at France in an effort to +break the Entente Cordiale. Alarm over a possible German attack +upon the British Isles was revived.<a id= +"FNanchor_644"></a><a href="#Footnote_644" class= +"fnanchor">[644]</a> Public feeling was well expressed by King +Edward who, on April 15, wrote indignantly to Lord Lansdowne:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The Tangier incident was the most mischievous and uncalled for +event which the German Emperor has ever been engaged in since he +came to the throne. It was also a political theatrical fiasco, and +if he thinks he has done himself good in the eyes of the world he +is very much mistaken. He is no<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_209">[209]</span> more or less than a political “enfant +terrible” and one can have no faith in any of his assurances. His +own pleasure seems to wish to set every country by the ears.<a id= +"FNanchor_645"></a><a href="#Footnote_645" class= +"fnanchor">[645]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The Foreign Secretary’s criticism was also +severe.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I am afraid that we can hardly regard this Tangier ebullition +[he wrote, on April 9, to Sir Frank Lascelles] as an isolated +incident. There can be no doubt that the Kaiser was much annoyed by +the Anglo-French Agreement, and probably even more so by our +refusal to vamp up some agreement of the same kind with Germany +over the Egyptian question.</p> + +<p>We shall, I have little doubt, find that the Kaiser avails +himself of every opportunity to put spokes in our wheels. . . . +.<a id="FNanchor_646"></a><a href="#Footnote_646" class= +"fnanchor">[646]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>This staunch pro-French sentiment was not concealed. Early in +April an exchange of visits by the British and French fleets was +announced for the summer. King Edward had an interview with MM. +Loubet and Delcassé on April 6 while passing through Paris on his +way south.<a id="FNanchor_647"></a><a href="#Footnote_647" class= +"fnanchor">[647]</a> In Berlin at the same time Sir Frank Lascelles +spoke in private “very disapprovingly” of the German action, and +strongly opposed the idea of a conference.<a id= +"FNanchor_648"></a><a href="#Footnote_648" class= +"fnanchor">[648]</a> And British public opinion, the true guide of +the foreign policy, gave entire support to France.<a id= +"FNanchor_649"></a><a href="#Footnote_649" class= +"fnanchor">[649]</a> So although the British government admitted +that M. Delcassé had blundered in his handling of Germany<a id= +"FNanchor_650"></a><a href="#Footnote_650" class= +"fnanchor">[650]</a> and although it knew that the secret articles +of the two Moroccan accords were not in keeping with the public +ones, it felt obliged both by honor and by interest to help France +out of her difficulty. Its official attitude was expressed by Lord +Lansdowne to the Ambassador at Berlin as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>My impression is that the German Government have really no cause +for complaint either of us or the French in regard to the Morocco +part of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">[210]</span> +Agreement. We made no secret of its existence. It dealt exclusively +with French and British interests in Morocco, and so far as the +other Powers were concerned, it provided adequate security for +their interests, and for the integrity of Morocco itself. What else +does the Kaiser want?<a id="FNanchor_651"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_651" class="fnanchor">[651]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Particularly since British policy aimed at +preventing Germany from obtaining ports anywhere in the colonial +world<a id="FNanchor_652"></a><a href="#Footnote_652" class= +"fnanchor">[652]</a> did the British government desire to keep that +Power out of Morocco. And, while Sir Francis Bertie, British +ambassador at Paris, reported the French government as “solid on +Morocco,” he added the ill-omened statement of M. Delcassé, that +the German government was “turning him out.”<a id= +"FNanchor_653"></a><a href="#Footnote_653" class= +"fnanchor">[653]</a> Lord Lansdowne did not follow up the French +suggestion of intervening in Berlin in favor of France for fear of +doing more harm than good by arousing the Emperor’s +resentment.<a id="FNanchor_654"></a><a href="#Footnote_654" class= +"fnanchor">[654]</a> But he did send the British Minister at +Tangier to Fez to offset the effects of the German mission.<a id= +"FNanchor_655"></a><a href="#Footnote_655" class= +"fnanchor">[655]</a> And on April 22 he instructed Sir Francis +Bertie as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>It seems not unlikely that German Government may ask for a port +on the Moorish coast.</p> + +<p>You are authorized to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that +we should be prepared to join French Government in offering strong +opposition to such a proposal and to beg that if question is raised +French Government will afford us a full opportunity to conferring +with them as to steps which might be taken in order to meet it.</p> + +<p>German attitude in this dispute seems to me most unreasonable +having regard to M. Delcassé’s attitude and we desire to give him +all the support we can.</p> +</div> + +<p>On April 25 the Ambassador handed M. Delcassé the following +<em>aide-memoire</em> (dated April 24):</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The British Government finds that the conduct of Germany in the +Moroccan question is most unreasonable in view of M. Delcassé’s +attitude, and it desires<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_211">[211]</span> to give to His Excellency all the support +in its power. It seems not improbable that the German Government +may ask for a port on the Moroccan coast. In that event the British +Government would be willing to join the French Government in +offering strong opposition to such a proposal, and it asks M. +Delcassé, in case the question is raised, to give to the British +Government full opportunity to concert with the French Government +upon the measures which might be taken to meet that demand.<a id= +"FNanchor_656"></a><a href="#Footnote_656" class= +"fnanchor">[656]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>By inverting the order of the sentences, the Ambassador gave to +Lord Lansdowne’s communication a force and a meaning which were +originally lacking. He changed the emphasis from that of helping +France to oppose the German acquisition of a port to that of +helping her to oppose Germany in the whole Moroccan question. The +one document limited the scope of the support and stressed the +point of conferring beforehand as well as that of offering strong +opposition. The other document began with a blanket offer of aid, +and then used the present instance as one example of that offer. +Moreover, the statement “to concert with the French Government upon +the measures which might be taken to meet that demand” was stronger +than the one used by Lord Lansdowne, “of conferring with them as to +steps which might be taken in order to meet it.” Sir Francis +Bertie’s <em>aide-memoire</em> was so colored by his own very +pro-French feeling that it did not accurately reproduce his chief’s +proposal.</p> + +<h3>IV</h3> + +<p>M. Delcassé was “most grateful” for this support. He denied that +Germany had made any such request, although he remarked that some +years ago Count Hatzfeldt had approached the British government on +the subject. He promised to communicate with the latter if he heard +of any German aspirations for a port and to warn the Sultan against +giving any concession to Germany.<a id="FNanchor_657"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_657" class="fnanchor">[657]</a> Thus, by virtue of the +British offer, the French Foreign Minister was able to hold to his +policy in spite of Germany’s refusal<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_212">[212]</span> to consider his overture and in spite of +his unpopularity with the French Parliament. On May 2, he again +attempted to approach the German government, offering through M. +Luzzati, Italian minister of finance, to give “any satisfaction +desired by Germany in order to settle the Moroccan question in a +way which would not wound French honor too deeply.”<a id= +"FNanchor_658"></a><a href="#Footnote_658" class= +"fnanchor">[658]</a> At the same time he continued the French +action at Fez. When on April 26 the Sultan, emboldened by the +German intervention, requested an international guaranty of the +proposed Franco-Moroccan agreement over military reforms, M. +Delcassé immediately refused. “You may declare peremptorily to Ben +Sliman,” he instructed the French Minister on May 3, “that there +can no more be intermediate Powers between France and Morocco than +there are intermediate countries between Morocco and +Algeria.”<a id="FNanchor_659"></a><a href="#Footnote_659" class= +"fnanchor">[659]</a></p> + +<p>The Foreign Minister’s policy was disapproved by the French +Premier, who since April 19 had assumed general control over +foreign affairs. Whereas M. Delcassé, a skilled diplomat, was +secretive, pro-British, and anti-German, the inexperienced M. +Rouvier, a business man who sought to employ business methods in +the conduct of foreign relations, suspected Great Britain of +attempting to use France as a cat’s-paw against Germany. Realizing +that the British navy “did not have wheels,” M. Rouvier favored +treating Great Britain and Germany alike.<a id= +"FNanchor_660"></a><a href="#Footnote_660" class= +"fnanchor">[660]</a> When the German government, instead of +replying to M. Delcassé’s proposal of April 13, prepared to send a +mission to Fez and the German newspapers advocated an international +conference on the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[213]</span> +Moroccan affair, M. Rouvier intervened personally in an effort to +reach a settlement.</p> + +<p>On April 26, while Prince Radolin’s guest at dinner, the Premier +brought up the Moroccan question. Protesting that the French really +preferred the Germans to the English, he intimated that he +appreciated Germany’s defense of her Moroccan interests, and said: +“We will do everything possible and will give every desired +explanation and satisfaction.” Denying that France was seeking to +change the <em>status quo</em>, he upheld her right to suppress the +anarchy in Morocco along the Algerian frontier. He offered to drop +the thirty-year limitation to freedom of commerce, which, he added, +was in fact already invalidated by the existing treaties between +Morocco and other states. At the close of the conversation he +exclaimed passionately: “It is impossible, it would be criminal for +two states that are intended to agree and to approach each other to +become embroiled, and especially over Morocco!” The Ambassador +coldly responded that a collective settlement of the question +seemed to him the simplest solution.<a id= +"FNanchor_661"></a><a href="#Footnote_661" class= +"fnanchor">[661]</a></p> + +<p>On the following day M. Rouvier proposed indirectly to Prince +Radolin a settlement of the Moroccan problem by an exchange of +notes between France and the other Powers. If the majority of the +Powers opposed the French program of reform, it would not be +carried out. M. Rouvier had no objection to Count Tattenbach’s +making new commercial treaties with Morocco. But he did ask that, +in case Germany were satisfied by his offer, the Emperor, on his +return from the Mediterranean, should announce publicly the +forthcoming settlement of the Franco-German dispute.<a id= +"FNanchor_662"></a><a href="#Footnote_662" class= +"fnanchor">[662]</a></p> + +<p>When these offers were made, the anxiety of the German +government<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[214]</span> was +relieved. To be sure, on April 25, Prince Radolin heard from a +“usually well-informed person just returned from England” that King +Edward would, on his way home from the South, declare officially to +the French government that “Great Britain was ready to support the +French policy in Morocco and the execution of the Anglo-French +accord with her whole power.”<a id="FNanchor_663"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_663" class="fnanchor">[663]</a> But at the same time the +German government learned definitely that the Sultan had made no +final promises to the French and that he had agreed to postpone all +decisions until the arrival of Count Tattenbach.<a id= +"FNanchor_664"></a><a href="#Footnote_664" class= +"fnanchor">[664]</a> Equally satisfactory, the answer from +Washington arrived.</p> + +<p>As the President had been absent on a hunting trip in Colorado, +he had not replied until April 20, when he had explained his policy +to Mr. Taft, acting secretary of state, as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the +Morocco matter. We have other fish to fry and we have no real +interest in Morocco. . . . .</p> + +<p>At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants I shall be +glad to oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely anxious to bring +about a better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each +nation is working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of +the other; each from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead +sure that England intends to attack him. The English Government and +a large share of the English people are equally sure that Germany +intends to attack England. Now, in my view this action of Germany +in embroiling herself with France over Morocco is positive proof +that she has not the slightest intention of attacking England. . . +. . I do not wish to suggest anything whatever as to England’s +attitude in Morocco, but if we can find out that attitude with +propriety and inform the Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to do so. . +. . . If we find that it will make the English suspicious—that is, +will make them think we are acting as decoy ducks for Germany—why, +we shall have to drop the business. . . . . I should advise your +being absolutely frank with both Speck [von Sternburg] and the +British people. . . . . Remember . . . . that both parties are very +suspicious. You remember the King’s message to me through Harry +White and his earnest<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_215">[215]</span> warning to me that I should remember that +England was our real friend and that Germany was only a +make-believe friend. In just the same way the Germans are always +insisting that England is really on the point of entering into a +general coalition which would practically be inimical to us—an act +which apart from moral considerations I regard the British +Government as altogether too flabby to venture upon.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">In a letter to the German Ambassador on the same +date, Mr. Roosevelt had reiterated that the United States had no +direct interest in Morocco, had offered to serve as mediator +between Germany and Great Britain and to advise the British “to +arrive at an understanding over Morocco and to work in harmony” +with Germany.<a id="FNanchor_665"></a><a href="#Footnote_665" +class="fnanchor">[665]</a></p> + +<p>The German Chancellor regarded this statement as “satisfactory +to a high degree.”<a id="FNanchor_666"></a><a href="#Footnote_666" +class="fnanchor">[666]</a> On April 27 he instructed Prince Radolin +to uphold the project for a collective settlement and to postpone +further negotiations with the French government until Count +Tattenbach could send exact information from Fez concerning the +actions of the French Minister.<a id="FNanchor_667"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_667" class="fnanchor">[667]</a> In other words, he put +the French off until the Count could block their efforts in Fez and +secure the Sultan’s acceptance of a conference. Otherwise, he +feared, M. Delcassé might try to break the Moroccan resistance by +intimating to the Sultan that his supposed friend, Germany, was now +deserting him for a direct understanding with France.<a id= +"FNanchor_668"></a><a href="#Footnote_668" class= +"fnanchor">[668]</a></p> + +<p>This hazardous policy was not approved by either Prince Radolin +or Count Tattenbach. The former advised his chief to accept M. +Delcassé’s offer of April 13.<a id="FNanchor_669"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_669" class="fnanchor">[669]</a> The Count also +expressed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">[216]</span> his +preference for a direct agreement with France. “In my opinion,” he +wrote to the Chancellor on April 29,</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">the condition for a separate understanding with +France would first be given if the other Powers reject the idea of +a conference and the Sultan also acts unreliably and declines to +heed our advice and wishes,—as is to be expected. In this case we +must receive Southern Morocco as our sphere of influence. . . . . +We must therefore decide whether we wish . . . . to fight a long +diplomatic battle of doubtful issue against France, either through +supporting the Sultan with money and weapons or through relying +upon the conservative, fanatically anti-French party in Morocco, or +whether we wish to gain through an understanding with France a +substantial pledge for a large-scale African colonial policy which +aims at the acquisition of all the French African +possessions.<a id="FNanchor_670"></a><a href="#Footnote_670" class= +"fnanchor">[670]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The Chancellor’s reply to Count Tattenbach contained the +explanation for Germany’s proposal of a conference. He wrote:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Your last idea guided Germany’s Moroccan policy in the past and +under proper circumstances can guide it again in the future if you +keep the future free. For the present, the German policy must be +governed by the fact that His Majesty the Emperor . . . . declared +to the King of Spain that he has enough African possessions and +wishes no territory in Morocco but only the maintenance of +commercial freedom. This declaration naturally does not bind us +forever; but in the year which has passed since those remarks, the +effect of the Southwest African events has been of a nature to +increase the antagonism to colonial acquisitions by military force +as well with His Majesty as with a great part of the German people. +Even if, therefore, France were inclined to permit us to conquer a +part of Morocco, we would for the present perhaps not be in a +position to take advantage of this overture. In reality, we are +confronted with the alternative either of relinquishing Morocco now +to France without adequate compensation to Germany or of working +for the extension of life of the Sherifian Empire in the +expectation of a turn of events favorable to us. Thus, I perceive +your important task to be in holding the future free for the profit +of German interests. I sum it up in stating that you should bring +the Sultan to declare that he could consider the French demands +only if they were advised by a conference of all the<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_217">[217]</span> signatory Powers. The +reference to the conference I consider for the Sultan the easiest +and for us the most favorable form of refusal. That the Sultan +refuse the French demands is naturally the main thing.<a id= +"FNanchor_671"></a><a href="#Footnote_671" class= +"fnanchor">[671]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>This frank document furnished the key to the German refusal of +the French offers and to the persistent demands for a conference. +Count Bülow’s embarrassment was caused by the Emperor’s +renunciations at Vigo and even more by the temporary apathy if not +antagonism of the German people toward further colonial +acquisition. Pursuing an objective undesired by German public +opinion, the Chancellor was still bent on acquiring a share in +Morocco or compensation elsewhere. To delay and postpone, to “hold +the future free” until public opinion veered into a more +chauvinistic channel, to relieve Germany of the restrictions +imposed by the Emperor’s assertions, Count Bülow thought that a +conference was the best means. The continuation of the crisis was a +logical result of this ambition.</p> + +<p>On the same day upon which Count Bülow penned this dispatch M. +Rouvier made another offer. He was led to this move by the +increasing excitement in France. The lack of response from Germany +and the uncertainty about her objective, the publication of an +article in the <em>Kreuzzeitung</em> on April 26 and of one in +<em>Matin</em> on the next day hinting at war,<a id= +"FNanchor_672"></a><a href="#Footnote_672" class= +"fnanchor">[672]</a> caused a panic on the Paris stock exchange on +April 27.<a id="FNanchor_673"></a><a href="#Footnote_673" class= +"fnanchor">[673]</a> M. Bihourd telegraphed on April 28 of the +presence of “bellicose counselors” in the <em>entourage</em> of the +Emperor who would have an excellent opportunity “to advocate the +present time as propitious for war against France.”<a id= +"FNanchor_674"></a><a href="#Footnote_674" class= +"fnanchor">[674]</a> So in a conversation with Prince Radolin on +April 30 M. Rouvier indorsed the Emperor’s assertions at Tangier +and the principles<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">[218]</span> +of the Convention of Madrid, except with respect to the +Algero-Moroccan frontier. He offered to “make an agreement similar +to the Anglo-French one, where all doubtful points, including +Morocco, would be settled.” The Ambassador made no reply.<a id= +"FNanchor_675"></a><a href="#Footnote_675" class= +"fnanchor">[675]</a></p> + +<p>The next day an intermediary explained to Prince Radolin that +the Premier regarded a conference as hardly acceptable since France +had engaged herself so fully in the Moroccan affair. M. Rouvier +would be willing, however, to include in a general settlement such +questions as those of boundaries in Africa and the Bagdad Railway. +In return, the two governments should agree upon a mode of +adjusting the Moroccan affair directly with the Powers. The German +government refused the offer.<a id="FNanchor_676"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_676" class="fnanchor">[676]</a></p> + +<p>On May 1 King Edward VII arrived in Paris where he remained for +four days. Strongly supporting M. Delcassé’s views, he assured the +French government that Germany would not dare a war; in case of +conflict, he said, France could rely on British support.<a id= +"FNanchor_677"></a><a href="#Footnote_677" class= +"fnanchor">[677]</a> To the German Ambassador he praised the French +for seeking a direct settlement of the Moroccan difficulty, +abruptly demanding, “Why does not Berlin reply to the last French +overture?”<a id="FNanchor_678"></a><a href="#Footnote_678" class= +"fnanchor">[678]</a> His interference, however, was of no avail. In +fact, French public opinion, suspecting the King and British press +of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[219]</span> attempting to +estrange France and Germany, was more than ever anxious for an +agreement with Germany.<a id="FNanchor_679"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_679" class="fnanchor">[679]</a></p> + +<p>Distressed by refusals and silence from the German government +and fearful of war, M. Rouvier sought to restore connections with +Germany by sending his friend, M. Betzold, to Berlin to interview +Herr von Holstein, and by persuading Baron Eckardstein, then living +privately in England, to lay the French proposals directly before +Count Bülow and the Emperor at Karlsruhe. These men were to inform +the German officials that the French cabinet, disapproving of M. +Delcassé’s secretiveness, hoped to bring about the Minister’s +downfall over some domestic difficulty in the next three or four +weeks. They were to state that while in case of war the French +Government knew for a certainty that Great Britain would interfere +in France’s favor, the cabinet, except M. Delcassé, preferred not +to seek this support. As an inducement for a direct settlement, the +two emissaries were to offer Germany “a coaling station and +eventually also a strip of land on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.” +They were especially to urge the Emperor against making any +inflammatory speeches on his return from the Mediterranean.<a id= +"FNanchor_680"></a><a href="#Footnote_680" class= +"fnanchor">[680]</a></p> + +<p>Neither M. Betzold nor Baron Eckardstein had the least success. +While Herr von Holstein assured M. Betzold on May 2 of Germany’s +desire for good relations with France, he observed that for the +time he saw no possibility of making a direct agreement with her. +For, even apart from Germany’s official declaration<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_220">[220]</span> in favor of a collective +settlement of the Moroccan question, the German government did not +trust M. Delcassé sufficiently to negotiate with France. That +Minister’s policy toward Germany, he asserted, had been +“dishonest,” “hostile,” “insidious,” and in this affair +“disrespectful.” “Slow tempo, temporary truce, and removal of +Delcassé would be the next,” he concluded. In Karlsruhe, on May 5, +Count Bülow rebuffed Baron Eckardstein with the bold assertion: +“The English inciting does not impress us. In case of a conflict +the game would be played between Germany and France. . . . . We are +in a position to await further developments with composure.” The +Baron was not allowed to see William II at all.<a id= +"FNanchor_681"></a><a href="#Footnote_681" class= +"fnanchor">[681]</a></p> + +<p>Thus every offer for a direct settlement was refused.<a id= +"FNanchor_682"></a><a href="#Footnote_682" class= +"fnanchor">[682]</a> Indeed, the German government even suggested +to M. Rouvier on May 7 that France take the initiative in calling a +conference, arguing that “the advantage of a conference lies in +that it can have no positive results. It will neither divide +Morocco nor check her continuing decay. It will fulfil its object +in removing the danger of an acute conflict, at the same time +holding the future open.”<a id="FNanchor_683"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_683" class="fnanchor">[683]</a></p> + +<p>M. Rouvier of course would not consider the suggestion. Nor was +he any longer so willing to eliminate M. Delcassé. On May 8 he +informed the German government through M. Betzold that while he had +been unable to convince the Foreign Minister of the faults of his +policy, the latter was needed in the work of mediating<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_221">[221]</span> between Russia and Japan. It +might, therefore, take weeks or even months to achieve his +dismissal. M. Rouvier hoped, said M. Betzold, to settle the +Moroccan and other difficulties with Germany after Count Tattenbach +convinced himself of the French Minister’s proper conduct at Fez +and after M. Delcassé had been eliminated.<a id= +"FNanchor_684"></a><a href="#Footnote_684" class= +"fnanchor">[684]</a></p> + +<p>More unfortunate words could hardly have been chosen. The German +government was opposed to an early peace between the warring +Powers,<a id="FNanchor_685"></a><a href="#Footnote_685" class= +"fnanchor">[685]</a> and its mistrust of M. Delcassé was increased +by his continued justification of his policy. Since French public +opinion had repudiated the Minister, since M. Rouvier, known to be +weak and easily influenced, had practically offered the Minister’s +head, the German government determined to press the frightened and +pacifically inclined French Premier until the objectionable Foreign +Minister was overthrown. To that end, on May 16, Prince Radolin +announced to M. Rouvier “that the prerequisite for the +<em>rapprochement</em> desired by him [M. Rouvier] is for us +[Germany] to have full trust in the foreign policy of France. . . . +. After what has happened, this trust is lacking.” The Premier +replied, “I understand you fully. Leave it to me.” But through M. +Betzold he urged the German government to wait until he could +accomplish the act by some internal crisis.<a id= +"FNanchor_686"></a><a href="#Footnote_686" class= +"fnanchor">[686]</a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile, the German government was pressing Spain, Italy, and +the United States for support. Early in May Herr von Radowitz +warned the Spanish government against sending a mission to Fez at +that time, and remarked that “it would be wise for Spain not to +intervene in the present Moorish difficulties, and that it was to +her interest to be on friendly terms with Germany, who<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_222">[222]</span> could be of greater assistance +to her than any other Power.”<a id="FNanchor_687"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_687" class="fnanchor">[687]</a> At the same time Count +Monts in Rome was using “menacing language,” hinting at “the +possibility of war.”<a id="FNanchor_688"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_688" class="fnanchor">[688]</a> In both places this talk +made a deep impression.</p> + +<p>To President Roosevelt the German government asserted that, +although certain voices had been raised in France in favor of a +conference, Great Britain still resisted the project. It asked the +President to inform the British government that its attitude +justified the suspicion that “in the accord with France they [the +British] had wished to dispose not only of English rights but also +of the rights of the other signatory Powers.” The German government +further informed Mr. Roosevelt that if the proposal for a +conference became hopeless, it would then think of its interests +alone and would be forced to choose “between the possibility of a +conflict with France and the consideration of conditions which +France might perhaps propose to avoid a conflict.”<a id= +"FNanchor_689"></a><a href="#Footnote_689" class= +"fnanchor">[689]</a></p> + +<p>Criticizing sharply the British hostility to the conference, Mr. +Roosevelt promised to repeat his advice to the British government +to settle its differences with Germany. Upon doing so he was again +accused by the British leaders of being under German influence. He +stoutly denied this accusation, writing to Senator Lodge, then in +England, on May 15, as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>It always amuses me to find that the English think that I am +under the influence of the Kaiser. The heavy witted creatures do +not understand that nothing would persuade me to follow the lead of +or enter into close alliance with a man who is so jumpy, so little +capable of continuity of action, and therefore, so little capable +of being loyal to his friends or steadfastly hostile to an enemy. +Undoubtedly with Russia weakened Germany feels it can +be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[223]</span> fairly insolent +within the borders of Europe. I intend to do my best to keep on +good terms with Germany, as with all other nations, and so far as I +can to keep them on good terms with one another; and I shall be +friendly to the Kaiser as I am friendly to every one. But as for +his having any special influence with me, the thought is +absurd.<a id="FNanchor_690"></a><a href="#Footnote_690" class= +"fnanchor">[690]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Nevertheless, the British government rejected his advice. On May +19 Mr. Roosevelt had to report to Baron Sternburg that “the British +Government had given him to understand that it did not wish better +relations with Germany,” and that “it had even hinted broadly to +the secretary of state that Great Britain could take care of her +affairs alone.” He could not do more, he said, without exposing +himself to an incivility.<a id="FNanchor_691"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_691" class="fnanchor">[691]</a> The German government +was well pleased with the result, however, for it placed Mr. +Roosevelt on the German side.</p> + +<p>On May 13 Count Tattenbach arrived in Fez. He found that the +French party was still strong, with some of the Moroccan ministers +bought over to that side. He accomplished his object with some +difficulty. He reported immediately that the Sultan himself +affirmed the accusation against the French Minister of having +claimed to enjoy a mandate of Europe.<a id= +"FNanchor_692"></a><a href="#Footnote_692" class= +"fnanchor">[692]</a> A few days later the Count telegraphed that +upon his arrival the French Minister, under instructions from M. +Delcassé, had issued a veiled threat of violence against Morocco if +the Sultan agreed to a conference.<a id="FNanchor_693"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_693" class="fnanchor">[693]</a> Upon receiving these +dispatches Count Bülow immediately<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_224">[224]</span> warned M. Rouvier against M. Delcassé’s +“stormy and violent . . . . Moroccan policy.”<a id= +"FNanchor_694"></a><a href="#Footnote_694" class= +"fnanchor">[694]</a> As that Minister still remained in office, the +Chancellor instructed Herr von Miquel, councilor at the German +embassy in Paris, to inform M. Rouvier amicably but firmly that the +Foreign Minister would have to go, that Franco-German relations +would not improve as long as he remained in office. Indeed, if M. +Delcassé’s anti-German and bellicose policy became known to the +German people, he was to state, it would have an effect for which +Count Bülow refused to be responsible. “A change in the present +situation is above all to be made possible by a change in the +direction of the French foreign policy.”</p> + +<p>When Herr von Miquel carried out these instructions on May 30, +the Premier realized the necessity for eliminating the Foreign +Minister. In his despair he cried: “I cannot cause M. Delcassé to +fall because Germany frowns. I would be reproached always . . . . +always.”<a id="FNanchor_695"></a><a href="#Footnote_695" class= +"fnanchor">[695]</a> The German pressure, however, did not cease. +In a telegram on May 25 Count Tattenbach reported French assertions +to the Moroccans that in the face of the united action of the +Mediterranean Powers, “who would never suffer an interference by +Germany in Mediterranean questions,” Germany would desert the +Sultan. In sending this report to Rome, on May 31, the German +Chancellor requested the Italian government to favor publicly the +collective settlement of the Moroccan question. “No matter what +turn Moroccan affairs take, Germany will follow up the consequences +of the advice which His Majesty sent to the Sultan,” he wrote. +“Thus the possibility that the Sultan will remain isolated in this +difficulty need not be considered.” The Italian Foreign Minister +immediately denied France’s right to speak of a common policy of +the Mediterranean Powers, and,<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_225">[225]</span> as Count Bülow probably intended, he passed +on the German warning to the French government.<a id= +"FNanchor_696"></a><a href="#Footnote_696" class= +"fnanchor">[696]</a></p> + +<p>On May 28 Count Tattenbach telegraphed the Sultan’s official +rejection of the French proposals and his approval of an +international conference.<a id="FNanchor_697"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_697" class="fnanchor">[697]</a> Thereupon, through M. +Betzold, the Chancellor warned the French Premier, June 1, that in +as much as the Sultan had accepted the German point of view, +Germany “would follow up the consequences if France continued the +policy of intimidation and violence hitherto pursued by M. +Delcassé.”<a id="FNanchor_698"></a><a href="#Footnote_698" class= +"fnanchor">[698]</a> On June 3 Prince Radolin described the +situation to M. Dupuy, an intimate friend of M. Rouvier’s, as “very +serious.”<a id="FNanchor_699"></a><a href="#Footnote_699" class= +"fnanchor">[699]</a> Thus the German government struck blow after +blow to force an immediate dismissal of the French Foreign +Minister.<a id="FNanchor_700"></a><a href="#Footnote_700" class= +"fnanchor">[700]</a></p> + +<p>On the French side, M. Delcassé remained as adamantine +as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">[226]</span> the Germans. +Fearing an intention on the part of Germany to force his dismissal, +hearing of Germany’s pressure on Spain and Italy and of bellicose +talk by the German Ambassador at Rome,<a id= +"FNanchor_701"></a><a href="#Footnote_701" class= +"fnanchor">[701]</a> he made a bid on May 17 for British support. +On that date M. Cambon apprised Lord Lansdowne of Germany’s +endeavor to arouse discord between Great Britain and France “all +over the world.” Although he did not regard the relations with +Germany as “profoundly dangerous,” he pictured them as serious +enough to cause him “much preoccupation.”</p> + +<p>Lord Lansdowne wished to lend the pro-British Foreign Minister +all possible support. Late in April, for the sake of France and the +Entente Cordiale, he had run the risk of antagonizing President +Roosevelt by instructing the British Ambassador in Washington not +to give him an opportunity to mediate between Great Britain and +Germany. He realized that the President’s interference encouraged +Germany and worked to the detriment of France and Great Britain. He +had therefore denied to the President that there was any “subject +of dispute” between Great Britain and Germany, and had expressed +his inability to see “why any international complication should be +created [over Morocco], unless German Gov[ernmen]t is determined to +take advantage of what was at most a diplomatic oversight in order +to make mischief or to disturb the <em>status quo</em>, e.g. . . . +., by demanding cession of a Moorish port.”<a id= +"FNanchor_702"></a><a href="#Footnote_702" class= +"fnanchor">[702]</a> But Lord Lansdowne also sought to correct any +erroneous impression which Sir Francis<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_227">[227]</span> Bertie’s <em>aide-memoire</em> of April 25 +may have made. Lord Lansdowne said to M. Cambon:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The moral . . . . seemed to me to be that our two Governments +should continue to treat one another with the most absolute +confidence, should keep one another fully informed of everything +which came to their knowledge, and should, so far as possible, +discuss in advance any contingencies by which they might in the +course of events find themselves confronted. As an instance of our +readiness to enter into such timely discussions, I reminded H[is] +E[xcellency] of the communication which had recently been made to +the French Gov[ernmen]t by you [Sir Francis Bertie] at a moment +when an idea prevailed that Germany might be on the point of +demanding the cession of a Moorish Port.<a id= +"FNanchor_703"></a><a href="#Footnote_703" class= +"fnanchor">[703]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">To avoid all misunderstanding this communication +was put in writing in an exchange of notes between the British +Foreign Secretary and M. Cambon on May 24-25. When the former +perceived that M. Cambon still interpreted the British policy in +the light of Sir Francis Bertie’s <em>aide-memoire</em>,<a id= +"FNanchor_704"></a><a href="#Footnote_704" class= +"fnanchor">[704]</a> he reiterated his correcting statement as +follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I do not know that this account [of their conversation of May +17] differs from that which you have given to M. Delcassé, but I am +not sure that I succeeded in making quite clear to you our desire +that there should be full and confidential discussion between the +two Gov[ernmen]ts, not so much in consequence of some acts of +unprovoked aggression on the part of another Power, as in +anticipation of any complications to be apprehended during the +somewhat anxious period through which we are at present +passing.<a id="FNanchor_705"></a><a href="#Footnote_705" class= +"fnanchor">[705]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[228]</span>At +some time in this crisis, the British fleet was commanded to be “in +readiness to make a descent on the German coast at short +notice,”<a id="FNanchor_706"></a><a href="#Footnote_706" class= +"fnanchor">[706]</a> and conversations were begun between the +French and British military and naval officers looking toward +active co-operation in case of war.<a id= +"FNanchor_707"></a><a href="#Footnote_707" class= +"fnanchor">[707]</a></p> + +<p>When news arrived of the Sultan’s proposal for a conference, M. +Delcassé opposed it vigorously. At his instigation the British +government on June 5 ordered Mr. Lowther, who had just arrived in +Fez, to advise the Sultan against the idea and to refuse the +invitation.<a id="FNanchor_708"></a><a href="#Footnote_708" class= +"fnanchor">[708]</a> The French Minister also reported Mr. Taft’s +remark that the American government would probably not be favorably +disposed toward a conference. Thereupon Lord Lansdowne on June 5 +added his support in trying to convince the<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_229">[229]</span> American government that “the proposal +was unsound and should not be entertained.”<a id= +"FNanchor_709"></a><a href="#Footnote_709" class= +"fnanchor">[709]</a> To bring Spain into closer intimacy with the +Entente Cordiale, the British Foreign Secretary offered early in +June to effect an understanding with her over the Spanish interests +in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.<a id= +"FNanchor_710"></a><a href="#Footnote_710" class= +"fnanchor">[710]</a></p> + +<p>In spite of Lord Lansdowne’s correcting statements about the +British policy, M. Delcassé apparently continued to interpret the +British communication of May 17 in the sense of Sir Francis +Bertie’s <em>aide-memoire</em> of April 25. He was impressed by the +practical identity of that communication with the political clauses +of the Franco-Russian alliance.<a id="FNanchor_711"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_711" class="fnanchor">[711]</a> Reassured by the British +support and by the adverse attitude of the British, Spanish, and +American governments toward the project of a conference, and +believing with the British that Germany was bluffing, he was in no +mood to recede. M. Rouvier, who was receiving all the German +threats, took a different view of the situation. With some of the +other members of the cabinet, he prepared for the retirement of the +offending Minister.<a id="FNanchor_712"></a><a href="#Footnote_712" +class="fnanchor">[712]</a> During the visit of the King of Spain to +Paris, May 30-June 4, little could be done. But by June 3 M. +Delcassé’s resignation was anticipated in parliamentary +circles.<a id="FNanchor_713"></a><a href="#Footnote_713" class= +"fnanchor">[713]</a> On June 5 the Chamber was thrown into +excitement<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[230]</span> +bordering on panic by the rumor of a report from M. Barrère at Rome +that if an Anglo-French alliance were concluded Germany would +attack France.<a id="FNanchor_714"></a><a href="#Footnote_714" +class="fnanchor">[714]</a> On the same day M. Rouvier explained the +gravity of the situation to President Loubet;<a id= +"FNanchor_715"></a><a href="#Footnote_715" class= +"fnanchor">[715]</a> on June 6 he laid his controversy with M. +Delcassé before the cabinet.</p> + +<p>At that meeting, although well aware of his isolation, M. +Delcassé valiantly defended his policy of the past seven years, a +policy which he declared had been opposed by Germany alone.<a id= +"FNanchor_716"></a><a href="#Footnote_716" class= +"fnanchor">[716]</a> He claimed that in a very recent exchange of +notes, one of which he read, France had received from Great Britain +assurance of support in case of a German attack. Asserting the +possibility of a formal alliance with Great Britain, he urged +acceptance of the British offer.<a id="FNanchor_717"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_717" class="fnanchor">[717]</a> He proposed that the +French, British, and Spanish governments should address identical +notes to the Sultan<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">[231]</span> +declining the conference. He assured the cabinet that Germany +confronted by this Anglo-French-Spanish opposition with Italy +neutral would not fight. But M. Rouvier declared that the German +government had threatened war if France accepted the British +offers. Turning to the ministers of war and of navy, he asked if +France were prepared for that contingency. They both replied +emphatically “No.” As M. Delcassé was not supported by a single +minister, he resigned, and M. Rouvier took over his position. +Before leaving M. Delcassé prophetically warned the cabinet that +after this abdication before the demands of Germany, that Power +would become “more insolent and more exacting than ever”; it had +not opposed his person, he said, but rather the French policy of +accords. He declared that the cabinet’s pusillanimity would give +rise to new dangers.<a id="FNanchor_718"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_718" class="fnanchor">[718]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[232]</span>French public +opinion was almost unanimous in its approval of M. Delcassé’s +downfall. This approbation was noted by Herr von Flotow, first +secretary of the German embassy in Paris, who on June 7 reported to +his government as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The history of the downfall of M. Delcassé shows that without a +doubt there is a latent under-current in France which wishes . . . +. a satisfactory understanding with Germany. It is after all +significant that in the entire press of all parties there is hardly +a paper which does not censure the anti-German policy of M. +Delcassé. The second interesting point in the history of the past +few days is the fact that in spite of the continued and almost +importunate offers of English aid, . . . . French public opinion +has never shown a real inclination to accept this support. Wherever +one has opportunity here . . . . to observe public feeling, one +meets the view that England is only endeavoring to engage the +French power for her differences with Germany, and that in case of +a crisis France would have to pull the English chestnuts out of the +German fire.<a id="FNanchor_719"></a><a href="#Footnote_719" class= +"fnanchor">[719]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Great Britain was disgusted. The British government had made +strenuous endeavor to save M. Delcassé, for it was certain of his +loyalty to the entente, whereas it was dubious of the more +pro-German M. Rouvier. It had intimated its willingness to oppose +by force the German aggression;<a id="FNanchor_720"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_720" class="fnanchor">[720]</a> but so far had met with +no encouragement.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Delcassé’s dismissal or resignation under pressure from the +German Government [stated Mr. Balfour to King Edward on June 8] +displayed a weakness on the part of France which indicated that she +could not at present be counted on as an effective force in +international politics. She could no longer be trusted not to yield +to threats at the crucial moment of a negotiation. If, therefore, +Germany is really desirous of obtaining a port on the coast of +Morocco, and if such a proceeding be a menace to our interests, it +must be to other means than French assistance that we must look for +our protection.<a id="FNanchor_721"></a><a href="#Footnote_721" +class="fnanchor">[721]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[233]</span>In +spite of M. Rouvier’s public assertion, June 6, that his policy +toward the Anglo-French understanding would remain the same as +before,<a id="FNanchor_722"></a><a href="#Footnote_722" class= +"fnanchor">[722]</a> the Entente Cordiale had received a hard +blow.</p> + +<p>While expressing satisfaction that France had repudiated the +anti-German Minister, the German press, under official +guidance,<a id="FNanchor_723"></a><a href="#Footnote_723" class= +"fnanchor">[723]</a> kept its discussion of the affair within the +bounds of propriety. But German obtuseness to the feelings of other +nations was manifested when on the day of M. Delcassé’s fall the +German Emperor made Count Bülow a prince.</p> + +<p>Thus, the first period of the crisis was closed. Germany had +gained her objective in winning the Sultan’s acceptance of the +project of a conference and in overthrowing M. Delcassé. While +playing with war, the German government had had no desire to start +one, and, gauging correctly French sentiment toward M. Delcassé and +war, it had achieved success in Paris merely by a liberal use of +threats. In the Moroccan affair the German foreign office had +reached the peak of its power. But it had aroused so many +complications that the crisis continued as acutely as before.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc12"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_597"></a><a href="#FNanchor_597"><span class= +"label">[597]</span></a><em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, XIX, +516.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_598"></a><a href="#FNanchor_598"><span class= +"label">[598]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., April 9, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 317, No. 6612; Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 330 ff., No. 6622. After having talked with +President Loubet early in April, Edward VII wrote to Lansdowne as +follows: “President Loubet was most amiable . . . . but I could see +from his manner that he considers the German conduct at Tangier, if +not a direct menace to France, at any rate a covert insult” (Lee, +<em>King Edward VII</em>, II, 341). The Schnäbele affair brought +France and Germany almost to war in 1887.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_599"></a><a href="#FNanchor_599"><span class= +"label">[599]</span></a>Kühlmann to Bülow, Nov. 9, 1904, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 232 ff., No. 6536; Chérisey to Delcassé, Feb. +11, 1905, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 196, No. 225; Delcassé to Bihourd, +Feb. 14, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 196 f., No. 226; Bihourd to +Delcassé, Feb. 15, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 197 f., No. 227; Lowther +to Lansdowne, April 26, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 67, No. 81.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_600"></a><a href="#FNanchor_600"><span class= +"label">[600]</span></a>Nicolson to Lansdowne, D. Feb. 12, 1905, R. +March 4, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 59, No. 66.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_601"></a><a href="#FNanchor_601"><span class= +"label">[601]</span></a>Bertie to Lansdowne, March 22, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 60, No. 67. For the uncertainty about the Emperor’s +proposed action see Lascelles to Lansdowne, March 23, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 61, No. 69; Nicolson to Lansdowne, March 23, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 62, No. 70.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_602"></a><a href="#FNanchor_602"><span class= +"label">[602]</span></a>Delcassé stated to Bertie, June 10, that +“his policy had been to be ready to make commercial concessions to +Germany if she were willing to discuss with the French Government +the question of Morocco, but not to yield anything politically or +territorially” (Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, +78, No. 96).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_603"></a><a href="#FNanchor_603"><span class= +"label">[603]</span></a>Mévil, <em>De la Paix de Francfort, +etc.</em>, pp. 206 f., 231; Imperial Foreign Office, <em>Reports of +the Belgian Representatives in Berlin, London, and Paris to the +Minister of Foreign Affairs in Brussels, 1905-1914. European +Politics during the Decade before the War as Described by the +Belgian Diplomatists</em> (. . . ., 1915), No. 3 (hereafter cited +as <em>Belg. Docs., 1905-1914</em>); <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, +XIX, 517; Henry Wickham Steed, <em>Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922: +A Personal Narrative</em> (London, 1924), I, 229. Delcassé also +made strenuous efforts during the succeeding weeks to mediate peace +between Japan and Russia so that the latter Power could resume its +obligations as France’s ally. See Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 345, No. 6635; Lansdowne to MacDonald, April 19, +1905, <em>B.D.</em>, IV, 76 f., No. 68; Dennett, <em>Roosevelt and +the Russo-Japanese War</em>, pp. 176 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_604"></a><a href="#FNanchor_604"><span class= +"label">[604]</span></a><em>Journal officiel, Debats parlem.</em> +(Sénat, March 31, 1905), pp. 540 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_605"></a><a href="#FNanchor_605"><span class= +"label">[605]</span></a>Articles in <em>Temps</em> of April 3, and +in the <em>Dépêche de Toulouse</em> of April 10. Mévil, the +official apologist for Delcassé, asserts that the latter article +was based on the “best” information (pp. 218 ff.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_606"></a><a href="#FNanchor_606"><span class= +"label">[606]</span></a>By April 13 the Sultan had expressed his +general approval of the French proposals, and the details for +military reorganization in six of the Moroccan towns were ready for +final formulation and signature (Mévil, p. 200 n.; Vassel to +Tattenbach, April 21, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 339 ff., No. 6631; +and the various dispatches from Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé +during Feb., March, April, 1905, in <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, Nos. +228-31, 233, 240, 243, 248, 266).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_607"></a><a href="#FNanchor_607"><span class= +"label">[607]</span></a>Delcassé instructed the Minister to make +the following statement to the Sultan: “We cannot conceive that, +changing from the way of accords which he [the Sultan] has followed +for several years, he will decide to assume an attitude which will +oblige us to consider strict right alone as the basis of our +relation with him” (Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, April 9, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 208, No. 239).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_608"></a><a href="#FNanchor_608"><span class= +"label">[608]</span></a>Egerton to Lansdowne, April 12, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 66, No. 78. The French government was afraid +that Spain would not loyally uphold their agreement if some other +Power intervened in Morocco (Nicolson to Lansdowne, Feb. 12, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 59, No. 66). But with M. Villa-Urrutia at the +foreign office, Spain remained entirely on the French side +(Nicolson to Lansdowne, April 14, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 66, No. +79).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_609"></a><a href="#FNanchor_609"><span class= +"label">[609]</span></a>On March 22 Bihourd advised Delcassé to +“establish by an exchange of notes the bearing of the Anglo-French +and Franco-Spanish accords on the commercial and industrial +interests of Germany,” adding that “until then we shall remain +under the menace, very clearly formulated by the German press, of +some inopportune surprise” (Bihourd to Delcassé, March 22, 1905, +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 202 f., No. 232). On March 28 an article by +André Tardieu, a journalist with close governmental connections, +stated that the French Foreign Minister would give satisfaction to +Germany if she wished it on the subject of Morocco, “provided it is +a question solely of commercial interests” (Flotow to F. O., March +28, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 282 f., No. 6584). On April 4 Billy, a +press writer in the French foreign office, sounded Theodor Wolff, +Paris correspondent for the <em>Berliner Tageblatt</em>, upon how +the German government would receive a French overture +(<em>ibid.</em>, p. 305 n.). On April 7 Hedeman, London +correspondent of <em>Matin</em>, talked with Hammann to the same +effect (memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 310 ff., +Nos. 6608 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_610"></a><a href="#FNanchor_610"><span class= +"label">[610]</span></a>Quoted in <em>Quest. dipl et col.</em>, +XIX, 511 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_611"></a><a href="#FNanchor_611"><span class= +"label">[611]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 331, No. 6622.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_612"></a><a href="#FNanchor_612"><span class= +"label">[612]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., April 14, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 328 ff., No. 6621; Radolin to Bülow, April 14, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 330 ff., No. 6622; Mévil, pp. 238 ff.; +Delcassé to Bihourd, April 14, 1905, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, pp. 211 +f., No. 244; Bihourd to Delcassé, April 18 and 25, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 214, Nos. 246 f.; memo. by Mühlberg, April 19, +1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 332 f., No. 6623. Saint-René Taillandier’s +denial that he had ever claimed to have a mandate of Europe must be +balanced against the Sultan’s personal assertion that he had +claimed it. The truth would seem to be that the French Minister had +sought to make more out of France’s international accords over +Morocco than the facts justified by speaking vaguely and by not +clearing up misunderstandings in the Sultan’s mind (<em>L.j., +1901-5</em>, Nos. 214, 231, 238, 263; <em>G.P.</em>, XX, Nos. 6621, +6631, 6658, 6662, 6551 n.; <em>Aktenstücke über Marokko, 1905</em>, +Nos. 1, 3). Cf. the report from the Belgian Minister at Paris, Dec. +19, 1905, <em>Zur europ. Politik</em>, II, 96.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_613"></a><a href="#FNanchor_613"><span class= +"label">[613]</span></a>Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 23, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 67, No. 80.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_614"></a><a href="#FNanchor_614"><span class= +"label">[614]</span></a>Michon, <em>L’alliance franco-russe +1891-1917</em>, pp. 117 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_615"></a><a href="#FNanchor_615"><span class= +"label">[615]</span></a>As already shown, the Russian defeat at +Mukden had nothing to do with the change of Germany’s policy.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_616"></a><a href="#FNanchor_616"><span class= +"label">[616]</span></a><em>Journal officiel. Debats parlem.</em> +(Chambre, April 19, 1905), pp. 1543 ff. Cf. Bertie’s estimate on +April 25: “The general feeling in Paris is that the chief object +which the German Emperor has had in view in his recent proceedings +is to show to the French people that an understanding with England +is of little value to them and that they had much better come to an +agreement with Germany. To this end ‘il fait la guerre à +l’Angleterre sur le dos de la France’ and the French Public +realizing that the Emperor’s wrath is against England for enabling +France to carry out her Morocco policy and not against France for +taking advantage of her agreement with England feel that if they +keep their heads nothing really serious will come of His Majesty’s +ill temper which they believe is not entirely shared by the German +Government and still less so by the German people” (Bertie to +Lansdowne, April 25, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 75, No. 93).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_617"></a><a href="#FNanchor_617"><span class= +"label">[617]</span></a>Mévil, pp. 257 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_618"></a><a href="#FNanchor_618"><span class= +"label">[618]</span></a>Memo. by Holstein, April 4, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 304, No. 6601. Olmütz signified the humiliation +of Prussia by Austria in 1850; Fashoda, that of France by Great +Britain in 1898.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_619"></a><a href="#FNanchor_619"><span class= +"label">[619]</span></a>Memo. by Holstein, April 3, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 297 ff., No. 6597.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_620"></a><a href="#FNanchor_620"><span class= +"label">[620]</span></a>The suggestion of a conference was first +made by Kühlmann in a dispatch of March 2 (<em>ibid.</em>, p. 293 +n.). On March 27 Bülow still thought it possible of execution only +in case Great Britain accepted it (Bülow to Kühlmann, March 27, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 293 f., No. 6591). After the Emperor’s visit, +however, he accepted the proposal. In Feb., 1904, Lascelles had +reported a conversation with Bülow in which the latter had opposed +calling a conference on the Macedonian question, arguing as +follows: “A Congress was excellent at the end of a war when both +belligerents were more or less exhausted and desired peace, but it +was a most dangerous thing at any other time, and would only +accentuate more strongly any difference of opinion which might +exist and thus cause greater complications, unless indeed the Great +Powers should have decided beforehand exactly what was to be done, +and should have appealed to the Congress, to give the sanction of +Europe to the decisions they had already taken” (Lascelles to +Lansdowne, Feb. 26, 1904, <em>B.D.</em>, V, 72). A year later Bülow +had apparently forgotten this very accurate judgment. Or possibly +he saw no other way out, and faced the facts with his usual +optimism.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_621"></a><a href="#FNanchor_621"><span class= +"label">[621]</span></a>In a memorandum by Hammann on April 7, this +statement appeared: “Naturally the result would be greater if there +followed from a conference a breach in the Anglo-French accord over +Morocco.” Bülow’s minute to that assertion was: “We do not desire +that at all, or at least we should in no instance show such an aim. +We only wish to preserve our rights in Morocco” (<em>ibid.</em>, +XX, 312 f., No. 6609; cf. Chirol, <em>Fifty Years in a Changing +World</em>, p. 300).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_622"></a><a href="#FNanchor_622"><span class= +"label">[622]</span></a>When the <em>Nowoje Wremja</em> denounced +the German action Bülow, on March 27, protested strongly to +Lamsdorff against this anti-German attitude. Russia was expected to +remain neutral in this affair, he declared (Bülow to Alvensleben, +March 27, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 277 f., No. 6577).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_623"></a><a href="#FNanchor_623"><span class= +"label">[623]</span></a>Those three had criticized the Anglo-French +accord.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_624"></a><a href="#FNanchor_624"><span class= +"label">[624]</span></a>The signatory Powers were those which had +participated in the conference of Madrid in 1880 over Moroccan +affairs.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_625"></a><a href="#FNanchor_625"><span class= +"label">[625]</span></a>Quoted from a dispatch from Bülow to +William II, April 4, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 303, No. 6599; and from +a memo. by Holstein, April 4, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 304 f., No. +6601.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_626"></a><a href="#FNanchor_626"><span class= +"label">[626]</span></a>Memo. by Hammann, April 3, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 300 f., No. 6598.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_627"></a><a href="#FNanchor_627"><span class= +"label">[627]</span></a>Memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 311 f., No. 6609.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_628"></a><a href="#FNanchor_628"><span class= +"label">[628]</span></a>On April 8 Bülow sent Hammann the following +instructions for directing the press: “All criticism and attacks +should, under the greatest possible consideration for the French +national feeling, be directed against the systematically +anti-German, insolent, and inept policy of Delcassé” (minute by +Bülow to a memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 313, +No. 6609). On April 4 he had issued instructions to restrain the +German press from war with the British press (Mühlberg to +Metternich, April 4, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 603 and note, No. +6839).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_629"></a><a href="#FNanchor_629"><span class= +"label">[629]</span></a>That Holstein wished to turn loose a +<em>Kriegsfanfare</em>, as Hammann later asserted, seems unlikely, +for German policy at that time was not bellicose. But Holstein did +propose to exert great pressure by vigorous words and threats, and +his program might very likely have had the result which Hammann +foresaw. On this controversy between the two men see Hammann, +<em>Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit</em>, pp. 35 f.; Otto +Hammann, <em>Der neue Kurs. Erinnerungen</em> (Berlin, 1918), pp. +104 ff.; Hammann, <em>Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges</em>, pp. +210 f.; memo. by Holstein, April 3, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 297 +ff., No. 6597; memo. by Hammann, April 3, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 300 +f., No. 6598; memo. by Holstein, April 7, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 308 +f., No. 6606; memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 309 +f., No. 6607.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_630"></a><a href="#FNanchor_630"><span class= +"label">[630]</span></a>Durand to Lansdowne, March, 1905, quoted in +Brigadier General Sir Percy Sykes, <em>The Right Honourable Sir +Mortimer Durand: A Biography</em> (London, 1926), p. 280; Spring +Rice to Roosevelt, undated though written in the first half of +Jan., 1905, quoted in Dennett, pp. 152 f.; Sternburg to Bülow, Feb. +10, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 573 ff., No. 6288; Sternburg to F. +O., March 7, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 580 f., No. 6293; Bülow to +Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 576 ff., No. 6290; and +others in <em>ibid.</em>, chap. cxxxix; Dennett, pp. 45, 73 ff.; +Dennis, <em>Adventures in American Diplomacy</em>, p. 393; Joseph +B. Bishop, <em>Theodore Roosevelt and His Times</em> (New York, +1920), I, 378 f., 468 f., 473; Gwynn, <em>The Letters and +Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice</em>, I, 406 ff., and chap. +xiii.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_631"></a><a href="#FNanchor_631"><span class= +"label">[631]</span></a>Sternburg to Bülow, Feb. 10, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 573 f., No. 6288; Sternburg to F. O., March 7, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 580 f., No. 6293.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_632"></a><a href="#FNanchor_632"><span class= +"label">[632]</span></a>So Roosevelt asserted to Sternburg. See +Sternburg to F. O., April 1, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 590, No. 6300; +Sykes, p. 280; Dennis, pp. 397 f.; Gwynn, Vol. I, chap. xiii; +Newton, <em>Lord Lansdowne</em>, p. 322.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_633"></a><a href="#FNanchor_633"><span class= +"label">[633]</span></a>On March 21 Roosevelt declared to +Sternburg: “My earnest wish is that we use as much as possible the +four years which stand before me in office to improve the relations +between our countries. I believe in the German people” (Sternburg +to F. O., March 21, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 583, No. 6295).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_634"></a><a href="#FNanchor_634"><span class= +"label">[634]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, April 3, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 592 ff., No. 6302; Bishop, I, 468 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_635"></a><a href="#FNanchor_635"><span class= +"label">[635]</span></a>Bishop, I, 469.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_636"></a><a href="#FNanchor_636"><span class= +"label">[636]</span></a>See below.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_637"></a><a href="#FNanchor_637"><span class= +"label">[637]</span></a>In the absence of a regular minister at +Tangier, Tattenbach had remained there after the Emperor’s visit. +See Tattenbach to F. O., April 7, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 313 f., +No. 6610; Bülow to Tattenbach, April 9, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 315 +f., No. 6611. O’Conor, British ambassador at Constantinople, +reported to Lansdowne, May 1, 1905, that Germany was trying to +induce the Sultan to send a mission to Morocco with a view to +establishing closer relations. The Sultan eventually refused. On +Feb. 12, 1906, O’Conor was able to state why. The Sultan had sent +secret emissaries to Morocco, but the Sultan of Morocco became +suspicious and refused either to send a formal mission to +Constantinople or to receive one thence. O’Conor also heard that +the Sultan had written to Abd-el-Aziz recommending the German +Emperor as the friend and protector of Islam whose advice was well +worth following. See O’Conor to Grey, Feb. 12, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, +III, 248, No. 277. Tardieu states that the Sultan’s letters to his +Moorish colleague were written in Feb.-March, 1906 (<em>La Conf. +d’Algés</em>, p. 259 n.). Nothing further is known of this +affair.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_638"></a><a href="#FNanchor_638"><span class= +"label">[638]</span></a>No. 6612; Bülow to Alvensleben, March 27, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 277 f., No. 6577.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_639"></a><a href="#FNanchor_639"><span class= +"label">[639]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., April 12, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 326 f. and note, No. 6619; Mousset, <em>La politica +exterior de España, 1873-1918</em>, p. 165.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_640"></a><a href="#FNanchor_640"><span class= +"label">[640]</span></a>Bülow to Monts, April 3, 11, 12, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 295 f., No. 6594; 318 ff., No. 6613; 322 f., No. +6616; Monts to F. O., April 12, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 324 ff. and +notes, Nos. 6617 f. Tittoni, the Italian foreign minister, had to +feel his way carefully. On April 14 he sounded the Spanish +government on its attitude, and was informed that Spain would +remain loyal to her agreement with France and would accept the +conference only if France and Great Britain did (Nicolson to +Lansdowne, April 14, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 66, No. 79).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_641"></a><a href="#FNanchor_641"><span class= +"label">[641]</span></a>Bülow to Metternich, April 11, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 605 ff., No. 6843; Metternich to F. O., April +19, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 608 f., No. 6845. On April 10, however, +Radolin reported a statement by Eckardstein, which he himself +seemed to think correct, to the effect that “in case of a serious +Franco-German conflict England would undoubtedly stand actively on +the French side and would even advance with enthusiasm against +Germany” (<em>ibid.</em>, 607 f., No. 6844).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_642"></a><a href="#FNanchor_642"><span class= +"label">[642]</span></a>By that answer Bülow aimed to show the +French government that “we do not consider separate Franco-German +negotiations as adequate to the situation.” See Radolin to F. O., +April 14, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 328 ff., No. 6621; memo. by +Mühlberg, April 19, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 332 f., No. 6623; Bülow +to Tattenbach, April 18, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 333 f. and note, No. +6624.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_643"></a><a href="#FNanchor_643"><span class= +"label">[643]</span></a>Bülow to Tattenbach, April 18, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 333 f., No. 6624; Tattenbach to F. O., April 21, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 335, No. 6625; Bülow to Tattenbach, April 22, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 336 f., No. 6626; Tattenbach to F. O., April +23, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 337 f., No. 6627; Bülow to Tattenbach, +April 24, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 338, No. 6628.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_644"></a><a href="#FNanchor_644"><span class= +"label">[644]</span></a>On April 3 Balfour repeated his denial in +the House of Commons of the likelihood of a German attack.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_645"></a><a href="#FNanchor_645"><span class= +"label">[645]</span></a>Lee, II, 340.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_646"></a><a href="#FNanchor_646"><span class= +"label">[646]</span></a>Newton, p. 334.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_647"></a><a href="#FNanchor_647"><span class= +"label">[647]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., April 6, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 311, No. 6608.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_648"></a><a href="#FNanchor_648"><span class= +"label">[648]</span></a>Mühlberg to Metternich, April 4, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 604, No. 6840; Metternich to Bülow, April 6, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 604, No. 6841; memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 311, No. 6608.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_649"></a><a href="#FNanchor_649"><span class= +"label">[649]</span></a>Metternich to Bülow, March 28, April 6, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 601 ff., Nos. 6837, 6841.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_650"></a><a href="#FNanchor_650"><span class= +"label">[650]</span></a>Metternich to Bülow, March 28, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 602, No. 6837; Kühlmann to Bülow, March 19, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 261 f., No. 6562; Lascelles to Lansdowne, March 23, +1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 61, No. 69.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_651"></a><a href="#FNanchor_651"><span class= +"label">[651]</span></a>April 9, 1904 (Newton, p. 334).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_652"></a><a href="#FNanchor_652"><span class= +"label">[652]</span></a>Viscount Grey of Falloden, <em>Twenty-five +Years, 1892-1916</em> (New York, 1925), I, 115.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_653"></a><a href="#FNanchor_653"><span class= +"label">[653]</span></a>Lee, II, 342.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_654"></a><a href="#FNanchor_654"><span class= +"label">[654]</span></a>Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 23, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 67, No. 80; Lansdowne to Bertie, April 24, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, p. 73.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_655"></a><a href="#FNanchor_655"><span class= +"label">[655]</span></a>Tattenbach to F. O., April 27, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 348, No. 6639.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_656"></a><a href="#FNanchor_656"><span class= +"label">[656]</span></a>Lansdowne to Bertie, April 22, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 72 f., No. 90; and following documents; +Spender, <em>Life of Campbell-Bannerman</em>, II, 248; Grey, I, 106 +f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_657"></a><a href="#FNanchor_657"><span class= +"label">[657]</span></a>Bertie to Lansdowne, April 25, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 74 f., Nos. 92 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_658"></a><a href="#FNanchor_658"><span class= +"label">[658]</span></a>The offer was so stated by Monts (Monts to +F. O., May 2, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 362, No. 6648).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_659"></a><a href="#FNanchor_659"><span class= +"label">[659]</span></a>Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, April +26, 1905, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 215, No. 248; Delcassé to +Saint-René Taillandier, May 3, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 217, No. 251; +Bourgeois et Pagès, <em>Les origines et les responsabilités de la +grande guerre</em>, p. 309. Ben Sliman was Moroccan minister of +foreign affairs.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_660"></a><a href="#FNanchor_660"><span class= +"label">[660]</span></a>On Rouvier see Mévil, pp. 253 ff.; Victor +Bérard, <em>La France et Guillaume II</em> (Paris, 1907), p. 296; +Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 345, No. 6635; +Radolin to Bülow, May 8, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 373 f., No. 6657. +Rouvier’s policy was certainly more in keeping with French +opinion.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_661"></a><a href="#FNanchor_661"><span class= +"label">[661]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 344 f., No. 6635. To Rouvier’s assertion that +“France would do everything necessary to live on the best terms +with Germany” Bülow commented as follows: “Then the French +Government should cease its efforts to isolate us, to break up the +Triple Alliance, to incite England against us” (Bülow’s minute to +the foregoing dispatch).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_662"></a><a href="#FNanchor_662"><span class= +"label">[662]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., April 27 and 28, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 346, No. 6636; 348 f., No. 6640.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_663"></a><a href="#FNanchor_663"><span class= +"label">[663]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, April 25, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 615, No. 6847.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_664"></a><a href="#FNanchor_664"><span class= +"label">[664]</span></a>Tattenbach to F. O., April 23, 24, 25, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 337 f., No. 6627; 339, No. 6629; 341, No. +6632; Vassel to Tattenbach, April 21, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 339 +ff., No. 6631.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_665"></a><a href="#FNanchor_665"><span class= +"label">[665]</span></a>Bishop, I, 469 ff.; Sternburg to F. O., +April 25, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 342, No. 6633.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_666"></a><a href="#FNanchor_666"><span class= +"label">[666]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 342, No. 6634.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_667"></a><a href="#FNanchor_667"><span class= +"label">[667]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, April 28, 29, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 346 f., No. 6637; 349 f., No. 6641.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_668"></a><a href="#FNanchor_668"><span class= +"label">[668]</span></a>Holstein to Mühlberg, April 24, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 339, No. 6630; Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 342 ff., No. 6634.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_669"></a><a href="#FNanchor_669"><span class= +"label">[669]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 330 ff., No. 6622. Monts also regarded Delcassé’s +offer through Luzzati as signifying victory for Germany in her +Moroccan campaign and as giving the opportunity “for a definitive +friendly agreement with France” (Monts to F. O., May 2, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 362, No. 6648).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_670"></a><a href="#FNanchor_670"><span class= +"label">[670]</span></a>Tattenbach had on the previous day talked +to Lowther, British minister at Tangier, and had found him strongly +opposed to a conference and in favor of a direct Franco-German +settlement (Tattenbach to F. O., April 29, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, +251 f., No. 6642).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_671"></a><a href="#FNanchor_671"><span class= +"label">[671]</span></a>Bülow to Tattenbach, April 30, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 352, No. 6643.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_672"></a><a href="#FNanchor_672"><span class= +"label">[672]</span></a>The article was by Professor Schiemann, who +was known to be in close touch with the German government +(reprinted in Schiemann, <em>Deutschland und die grosse Politik +1905</em>, pp. 110 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_673"></a><a href="#FNanchor_673"><span class= +"label">[673]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 347, No. 6638; <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, +XIX, 576 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_674"></a><a href="#FNanchor_674"><span class= +"label">[674]</span></a>Bihourd to Delcassé, April 28, 1905, +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 215, No. 249.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_675"></a><a href="#FNanchor_675"><span class= +"label">[675]</span></a>Rouvier also assured Radolin that “he +disapproved of much that had happened” and that he himself had +taken over the general control of foreign affairs. It had cost him +some effort to save Delcassé in the Chamber, he said, but he had +thought it wiser to do so (Radolin to Bülow, April 30, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 360 ff., No. 6647).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_676"></a><a href="#FNanchor_676"><span class= +"label">[676]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, May 1, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 355 ff., No. 6645; Bülow to Radolin, May 1, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 353 f., No. 6644.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_677"></a><a href="#FNanchor_677"><span class= +"label">[677]</span></a>Eckardstein was informed to this effect on +May 4, 1905, by Rouvier’s intimate friend, Armand Levy, a Parisian +financier (Eckardstein, <em>Lebenserinnerungen und politische +Denkwürdigkeiten</em>, III, 106; Lee, II, 342).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_678"></a><a href="#FNanchor_678"><span class= +"label">[678]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, May 1, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 616 f., No. 6848. The King may have put this +question to Radolin at the desire of Delcassé, who was complaining +of Germany’s lack of response (Bertie to Lansdowne, April 27, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 68, No. 84). On May 11, 1905, Lansdowne wrote +to Knollys, King Edward’s private secretary, as follows: “The +King’s Mediterranean tour left matters in excellent shape so far as +we are concerned” (Lee, II, 342).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_679"></a><a href="#FNanchor_679"><span class= +"label">[679]</span></a><em>Belg. Docs., 1905-14</em>, No. 4.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_680"></a><a href="#FNanchor_680"><span class= +"label">[680]</span></a>Wilhelm Betzold was an international +financier with wide political connections (Eckardstein, I, 243 +ff.). The instructions were given to Eckardstein, May 4, by Armand +Levy, like Betzold, an intimate friend of Rouvier, just after an +interview between the two and the Premier, Levy had made a note of +the various points which he now laid before Eckardstein, explaining +that naturally Rouvier could not speak directly to him of these +delicate affairs but adding that his statements were “rigorously +exact” (Eckardstein, III, 100 ff.). Only Eckardstein’s account of +the interview with Bülow contains anything about the Moroccan +proposal, but there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of his +statement (see also Prince Lichnowsky, <em>My Mission to London, +1912-1914</em> [London, 1918], p. 3).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_681"></a><a href="#FNanchor_681"><span class= +"label">[681]</span></a>Memo. by Holstein, May 2, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 357 ff., No. 6646. Paul von Schwabach’s account +of arranging the interview for Betzold is given in <em>Berliner +Tageblatt</em>, March 21, 1922. See also Bülow to F. O., May 5 and +6, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 368 ff., Nos. 6652 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_682"></a><a href="#FNanchor_682"><span class= +"label">[682]</span></a>On May 2 the Chancellor also refused to +consider Delcassé’s offer through Luzzati; and when a few days +later he heard that Barrère wished to be sent to Berlin to arrange +affairs, he immediately advised Rouvier that he would not be +received. See Bülow to Monts, May 3, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 363 +f., No. 6649; Radolin to Holstein, May 8, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, p. +372 n.; Bülow to Radolin, May 9, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 372, No. +6656.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_683"></a><a href="#FNanchor_683"><span class= +"label">[683]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, May 4, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 366 f., No. 6650; Radolin to F. O., May 8, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 371 f., No. 6655.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_684"></a><a href="#FNanchor_684"><span class= +"label">[684]</span></a>The British and the Russian governments +were also supporting Delcassé. See Radolin to Bülow, May 8, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 373 ff., No. 6657 f.; Betzold to Eckardstein, May +9, 1905, quoted in Eckardstein, III, 204.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_685"></a><a href="#FNanchor_685"><span class= +"label">[685]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., June 2, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 607, No. 6311, Bülow’s minute.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_686"></a><a href="#FNanchor_686"><span class= +"label">[686]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, May 13 and 16, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 376 f., No. 6659; 378 f., No. 6661.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_687"></a><a href="#FNanchor_687"><span class= +"label">[687]</span></a>So related by the Spanish Foreign Minister +to Nicolson (Nicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, +III, 70 f., No. 87). Although there is no account of the +conversation in <em>G.P.</em>, the language is entirely in keeping +with German policy. The episode referred to the possible departure +of Spain’s new minister in Morocco to Fez.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_688"></a><a href="#FNanchor_688"><span class= +"label">[688]</span></a>So reported by Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 71, No. 88. Cf. Bülow to Monts, May 3, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 363 f., No. 6649; Bülow to F. O., May 6, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 368, No. 6651.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_689"></a><a href="#FNanchor_689"><span class= +"label">[689]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, May 10 and +16, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 342 ff., No. 6634; 620 ff., No. 6851; +XIX, 600 ff., No. 6306; Bishop, I, 469 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_690"></a><a href="#FNanchor_690"><span class= +"label">[690]</span></a><em>Selections from the Correspondence of +Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918</em> (New York, +1925), II, 123. See also Dennett, pp. 88 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_691"></a><a href="#FNanchor_691"><span class= +"label">[691]</span></a>The President’s statements were so +formulated by Sternburg. See Sternburg to F. O., May 13 and 19, +1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 622 f., No. 6852; <em>ibid.</em>, XIX, 603 +f., No. 6308; Dennett, pp. 184 f., 88 ff., 75 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_692"></a><a href="#FNanchor_692"><span class= +"label">[692]</span></a>Tattenbach to F. O., May 15, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 379 f., No. 6662.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_693"></a><a href="#FNanchor_693"><span class= +"label">[693]</span></a>Tattenbach’s version of the threat was as +follows: “The French Government would consider it an injury to +France’s interests if the French proposals for reform were +submitted for consideration to the signatory Powers. No Power +possessed the right to intervene in the Moroccan affair, especially +in the frontier question. . . . . The French Government would +continue to watch sharply the affairs in Morocco, and reserved the +right to act according to circumstances.” See Tattenbach to F. O., +May 17, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 380, No. 6663. Cf. with the original +threat quoted above. See also Tattenbach to F. O., May 31, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 399 f., No. 6676.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_694"></a><a href="#FNanchor_694"><span class= +"label">[694]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, May 22, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 382 f., No. 6665.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_695"></a><a href="#FNanchor_695"><span class= +"label">[695]</span></a>Miquel was chosen for this work because he +was just being transferred to St. Petersburg. See Bülow to Radolin, +May 30, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 388 ff., No. 6669; memo. by Miquel, +May 30 and 31, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 393 ff., Nos. 6674 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_696"></a><a href="#FNanchor_696"><span class= +"label">[696]</span></a>Bülow to Monts, May 31, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 390 f., No. 6670, and note citing a dispatch from +Monts of June 2, 1905; Mévil, p. 272. Egerton was informed by +Barrère that Monts had said to Tittoni that “if the French Minister +maintained his threat of military measures against the Sultan of +Morocco, a German army would cross the French frontier” (Egerton to +Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 95, No. 122).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_697"></a><a href="#FNanchor_697"><span class= +"label">[697]</span></a>Tattenbach to F. O., May 28, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 392, No. 6672.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_698"></a><a href="#FNanchor_698"><span class= +"label">[698]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, June 1, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 392 f., No. 6673; Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 407, No. 6685.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_699"></a><a href="#FNanchor_699"><span class= +"label">[699]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 401, No. 6678.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_700"></a><a href="#FNanchor_700"><span class= +"label">[700]</span></a>The <em>Gaulois</em> published articles on +June 9 and 17, 1905, asserting that Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck +had also been sent by the German government to Paris about June 1 +to warn Rouvier that Delcassé must be dismissed (Mévil, pp. 273 +ff.; Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 310). The editors of <em>G.P.</em> +state that this story is “exaggerated”; Donnersmarck was mentioned +only once in the documents, they assert—in a dispatch from Radolin +on June 17, 1905, describing the assertions of Donnersmarck given +in <em>Gaulois</em> as apocryphal (<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 390 n.). +According to Eckardstein, Rouvier declared to him on May 4 that +some time previously Donnersmarck had asserted to him, apparently +at Bülow’s request, that there were only two possibilities, a +Franco-German alliance or war. On the other hand, Eckardstein saw +Donnersmarck in Berlin on June 6 and found him eager for news from +London and Paris (Eckardstein, III, 103 f., 127 f.). It seems clear +that Donnersmarck’s assertions, whatever they were, were made on +his own responsibility; that, as the editors of <em>G.P.</em> +state, Bülow issued his warnings directly to Rouvier +(<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 390 n.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_701"></a><a href="#FNanchor_701"><span class= +"label">[701]</span></a>Nicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 70 f., No. 87; Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 71, No. 88; Lansdowne to Bertie, May 3, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 69 f., No. 86.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_702"></a><a href="#FNanchor_702"><span class= +"label">[702]</span></a>Durand to Lansdowne, April 26, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 67 f., No. 82; Lansdowne to Durand, April 27, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 68, No. 83. Durand did not follow that line +exactly. He left the impression with Roosevelt that the +Anglo-German opposition was bitter, but that nevertheless Great +Britain did not want Roosevelt interfering—thus letting the latter +think that Great Britain was more bellicose than she was (see +above). One reason for the British government’s slowness about +helping Roosevelt mediate between Russia and Japan was, no doubt, +that it wished to exclude all opportunity for the President to +mediate between Great Britain and Germany. On April 26 Spring Rice +asked Roosevelt not to support the idea of a conference (Gwynn, I, +469).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_703"></a><a href="#FNanchor_703"><span class= +"label">[703]</span></a>Lansdowne added: “I had heard fears +expressed that, in order to put an end to a state of things which +could not fail to be highly inconvenient to them, the French +Government might be induced to purchase the acquiescence of Germany +by concessions of a kind which we were not likely to regard with +favour, in other parts of the world. I had myself no such +misgivings, and felt convinced that each side might continue to +rely upon being treated with absolute frankness by the other. His +Excellency [M. Cambon] expressed his entire concurrence in what I +had said.” See Lansdowne to Bertie, May 17, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, +III, 76, No. 94; Spender, II, 248; <em>Cambridge History of British +Foreign Policy</em>, III, 342 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_704"></a><a href="#FNanchor_704"><span class= +"label">[704]</span></a>“During our last conversation about Morocco +you . . . . added that . . . . if circumstances demanded it, if for +example we had serious reasons to believe in an unjustified +aggression on the part of a certain Power, the British Government +would be entirely ready to concert with the French Government on +the measures to take” (Cambon to Lansdowne, May 24, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 77, No. 95, inclosure).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_705"></a><a href="#FNanchor_705"><span class= +"label">[705]</span></a>Lansdowne to Cambon, May 25, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 77 f., No. 95, and inclosure.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_706"></a><a href="#FNanchor_706"><span class= +"label">[706]</span></a>Bradford, <em>Life of Wilson</em>, p. 199. +Nothing more was heard of this order, which probably came from Sir +John Fisher. Fisher was in favor of “Copenhagening” the German +fleet and also of landing soldiers in North Germany in case of a +war (<em>Memories</em>; Newton, pp. 334 f.). In 1922, Lord +Sanderson wrote as follows concerning the events of this time: +“There were no doubt preparations by our military authorities for +defending Belgium in case of an attack by Germany on France through +Belgian territory, and these preparations must have been known to +the French military attaché in London. There was also a good deal +of loose talk in naval circles and some high quarters of a possible +expedition to Schleswig in the possible event of war. I do not +believe such a measure was ever seriously entertained, and I looked +upon the report as put about for the purpose of a warning” +(Sanderson to Temperley, Aug. 17, 1922, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 87, No. +105).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_707"></a><a href="#FNanchor_707"><span class= +"label">[707]</span></a>Grey, I, 74. The British press supported +the French loyally for the sake of maintaining the balance of +power. See O. Eltzbacher, “The Balance of Power in Europe,” +<em>Nineteenth Century and After</em> (May, 1905); Steed, I, 230 +ff. It is difficult to state exactly what were the British motives +for supporting France so whole-heartedly in this crisis. One has to +deduce them from acts, for, unlike the Germans, the directors of +the British policy did not write down their reasons. As to King +Edward’s view of the international situation, especially of the +German danger, see Spring Rice to Lansdowne, D. May 7, 1905, R. May +13, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, IV, 77 f., No. 69, and King Edward’s +minute thereto. On July 10 Spring Rice, in a memo. written after +talking with Lansdowne, stated that British policy aimed at +maintaining the balance of power (Gwynn, I, 476).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_708"></a><a href="#FNanchor_708"><span class= +"label">[708]</span></a>Tattenbach to F. O., May 31, June 3, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 399, No. 6676; 400, No. 6677; Metternich to F. +O., June 8, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 422, No. 6697; Lowther to +Lansdowne, D. May 31, 1905, R. June 3, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, +88, No. 106; Lansdowne to Bertie, June 1 and 5, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 88, No. 107; 89, No. 109; Lansdowne to Lowther, +June 5, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 89, No. 108.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_709"></a><a href="#FNanchor_709"><span class= +"label">[709]</span></a>Lansdowne to Bertie, June 5, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 89, No. 109; Lansdowne to Durand, June 5, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 90, No. 110.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_710"></a><a href="#FNanchor_710"><span class= +"label">[710]</span></a>Nicolson to Lansdowne, June 29, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 109, No. 136. The editors of <em>B.D.</em> promise +to publish more information about this offer in a later volume.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_711"></a><a href="#FNanchor_711"><span class= +"label">[711]</span></a>That treaty read in part as follows: “The +two Governments declare that they will take counsel together upon +every question of a nature to jeopardize the general peace; in case +that peace should be threatened with an aggression, the two parties +undertake to reach an understanding on the measures whose immediate +and simultaneous adoption would be imposed upon the two Governments +by the realization of this eventuality.” See <em>Livre jaune: +L’alliance franco-russe</em>, p. 16, No. 17, annexe; Pribram, +<em>The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary</em>, II, 213; +Bernadotte E. Schmitt, “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, +1902-1914,” <em>American Historical Review</em>, XXIX, 459 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_712"></a><a href="#FNanchor_712"><span class= +"label">[712]</span></a>Thayer, <em>The Life and Letters of John +Hay</em>, II, 404 f.; Eckardstein, III, 115 ff.; Radolin to Bülow, +June 11, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 497 ff., No. 6685; Bertie to +Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 78, No. 96, +recounting a conversation with Delcassé on that date.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_713"></a><a href="#FNanchor_713"><span class= +"label">[713]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 400 f., No. 6678.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_714"></a><a href="#FNanchor_714"><span class= +"label">[714]</span></a>Delcassé’s formal denial of the rumor had +no effect. See Mévil, pp. 284 f.; Flotow to Bülow, June 7, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 406, No. 6684.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_715"></a><a href="#FNanchor_715"><span class= +"label">[715]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 407 ff., No. 6685; <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, +XIX, 770.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_716"></a><a href="#FNanchor_716"><span class= +"label">[716]</span></a>Delcassé informed Bertie, June 10, that the +Spanish Foreign Minister “had told him that he thought that Spain, +France and England, should reply to the Government of Morocco in +identic terms declining the proposal” (Bertie to Lansdowne, June +10, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 78, No. 96).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_717"></a><a href="#FNanchor_717"><span class= +"label">[717]</span></a>The report spread in 1905 that at the +French cabinet meeting on June 6 Delcassé had stated that the +British government had offered an alliance to France. Lansdowne and +Sanderson denied to the German government that Great Britain had +ever done so. See Metternich to F. O., June 16, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 630 ff., No. 6858; Metternich to F. O., June 28, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 635 ff., No. 6860; see also <em>B.D.</em>, +III, 87, No. 105; Metternich to F. O., Oct. 9, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, +XX, 663 f., No. 6873. According to Mévil, the official apologist +for Delcassé, just before the arrival of the King of Spain in Paris +on May 30, the British government assured Delcassé that “the +British military forces were ready to march with us [France] +against Germany if that Power attacked us. Moreover, the principle +of defensive co-operation once admitted, the English Government +declared itself ready to sign in the shortest time an accord which +would definitely fix that co-operation” (Mévil, p. 268). In a +letter of March 20, 1922, Delcassé wrote as follows: “From the +Entente it was possible for us in 1905 to proceed to a formal +alliance with England. . . . . On June 6th the British offer of +assistance had been only forty-eight hours in my possession” +(quoted in the <em>London Times</em>, March 27, 1922). In +connection with the Grey-Cambon correspondence of 1912, Poincaré +has written: “Thus to make a joint study of the situation was the +sole engagement which was made [in that correspondence]. In +communicating to me the result obtained, M. Paul Cambon wrote me +that at the time of Lord Lansdowne an entente of that kind would +have been only a beginning. Now, however, it was the last word for +the Liberal cabinet. The forced resignation of M. Delcassé had +perhaps made us lose in 1905, stated M. Cambon, the opportunity for +a real alliance with England. All that we were able to obtain today +was this engagement to confer in the presence of danger and this +hypothetical approval of the programs drawn up by the general +staff.” See also J. A. Farrer, <em>England under Edward VII</em> +(London, 1922), pp. 127 f.; Mévil, pp. 269 f.; <em>G.P.</em>, XX, +632 n., 664 n.; Raymond Poincaré, <em>Au service de la France. Neuf +années de souvenirs: I. Le lendemain d’Agadir, 1912</em> (Paris, +1926), p. 221. Later Lansdowne wrote on his dispatch to Bertie of +May 17, 1905, as follows: “I suppose this was the origin of the +offensive and defensive alliance” (<em>B.D.</em>, III, 76, No. 94). +His inference is probably correct only in part. The exchange of +notes between Cambon and Lansdowne was sent to Bertie on May 31, +1905, and received by him on June 3. It is not apparent whether he +communicated that exchange to the French government, although the +“offer of assistance” which Delcassé has written of as having +received only forty-eight hours before the cabinet meeting on June +6 may have been the notice of this exchange from Bertie. Word to +Delcassé through the Governor-General of Algeria from King Edward, +who was then cruising in the Mediterranean, urging the Foreign +Minister not to resign also strengthened the latter’s hand. The +King took that step on his own initiative (Newton, p. 342).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_718"></a><a href="#FNanchor_718"><span class= +"label">[718]</span></a>On that cabinet meeting see the following: +Mévil, pp. 293 ff.; Pinon, <em>France et Allemagne</em>, pp. 164 +f.; Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 407 ff., +No. 6685; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 8, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, +91, No. 114; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, +78, No. 96, recounting a conversation with Delcassé on that date; +Wolff, <em>Das Vorspiel</em>, pp. 167 ff. Cf. Bertie’s explanation +of Delcassé’s fall (Bertie to Lansdowne, June 15, 1905, Newton, pp. +341 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_719"></a><a href="#FNanchor_719"><span class= +"label">[719]</span></a>Flotow to Bülow, June 7, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 406, No. 6684; 625, No. 6854. Cf. the report +from the Belgian Minister at Paris to his government, June 8, 1905, +<em>Zur europ. Politik</em>, II, 62 f. See also <em>Quest. dipl. et +col.</em>, XIX, 770 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_720"></a><a href="#FNanchor_720"><span class= +"label">[720]</span></a>Cf. <em>Cambridge History of British +Foreign Policy</em>, III, 341.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_721"></a><a href="#FNanchor_721"><span class= +"label">[721]</span></a>Quoted in Lee, II, 344. See also a letter +from John Hay, who was then in London, to Henry Adams, June 7, +1905, quoted in Thayer, II, 405; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, +1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 78, No. 96. Lansdowne’s reaction is +expressed in Newton, p. 341.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_722"></a><a href="#FNanchor_722"><span class= +"label">[722]</span></a>Bertie to Lansdowne, June 6, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 90, No. 111.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_723"></a><a href="#FNanchor_723"><span class= +"label">[723]</span></a>Bülow’s minute to a dispatch from Flotow, +June 5, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 403, No. 6681.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[234]</span><a id= +"c13"></a>CHAPTER XIII</h2> + +<p class="sch1">THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JUNE 6-JULY 8, 1905</p> + +<p>The downfall of M. Delcassé was merely an incident in Germany’s +drive toward a conference. Prince Bülow, believing that the +Minister’s resignation ended the acute phase of the crisis,<a id= +"FNanchor_724"></a><a href="#Footnote_724" class= +"fnanchor">[724]</a> immediately dispatched a circular note to the +signatory Powers<a id="FNanchor_725"></a><a href="#Footnote_725" +class="fnanchor">[725]</a> informing them of Germany’s acceptance +of the Sultan’s invitation to a conference and asking them also to +accept. In this note he argued as follows: Since Article XVII of +the Convention of Madrid<a id="FNanchor_726"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_726" class="fnanchor">[726]</a> guaranteed to every +Power the same treatment as the<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_235">[235]</span> most favored nation, the Moroccan reforms +had to receive the approval of all the signatory Powers. If the +proposal for a conference were refused, the legal status of Morocco +would remain unchanged, for the opposition of one Power alone would +suffice to block the execution of any reforms proposed. But aside +from these legal arguments, the conference was the best means of +introducing reforms without endangering the existing political and +commercial interests of the signatory Powers by concession of +special rights to individual states. Moreover, since the Convention +of Madrid was a compact between the Powers, France would have to +obtain their sanction for a special position in Morocco. While the +details of the French program of Moroccan reforms were unknown, it +was evident that France sought, in violation of Article XVII, to +control the land as she did Tunis. Thus, to oppose the French +action was merely to defend the existing legal status of +Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_727"></a><a href="#Footnote_727" class= +"fnanchor">[727]</a></p> + +<p>The attitude of the Powers toward this exposé was not at all +satisfactory to the German government. The Russian, Austrian, +Italian, Portuguese, and Danish governments evaded a reply, leaving +the initiative to the French and the British.<a id= +"FNanchor_728"></a><a href="#Footnote_728" class= +"fnanchor">[728]</a> German relations<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_236">[236]</span> with Spain over the matter were complicated +by reports that while M. Villa-Urrutia, the Spanish foreign +minister, had been in Paris during King Alfonso’s visit, he had +openly aligned himself with M. Delcassé’s policy. After the French +Minister’s downfall, the German government notified the Spanish +government on June 11 that, if M. Villa-Urrutia remained in office, +Germany would recall her Ambassador for an indefinite leave of +absence.<a id="FNanchor_729"></a><a href="#Footnote_729" class= +"fnanchor">[729]</a> While waiting for the Minister to be +overthrown, the German government did not press Spain on the +question of the conference.</p> + +<p>The British attitude was even more adverse. When Count +Metternich handed the German note to Lord Lansdowne, the latter +interpreted it as meaning that “the Conference, if it were to meet, +would be expected to deal not only with the introduction of +reforms, but with the maintenance of the independence and integrity +of Morocco, and the preservation of the open door.”<a id= +"FNanchor_730"></a><a href="#Footnote_730" class= +"fnanchor">[730]</a> The Ambassador’s affirmative reply enhanced +Lord Lansdowne’s suspicion that Germany was endeavoring to break +the Anglo-French understanding. While questioning strongly the +propriety of a conference, the Foreign Secretary gave no definite +answer. This note, however, and the passing of M. Delcassé caused +the British government to recede on June 8 from its original +refusal of the Sultan’s invitation and to postpone its decision +until it could consult with France.<a id= +"FNanchor_731"></a><a href="#Footnote_731" class= +"fnanchor">[731]</a> But on June 7, Herr von Flotow reported from +Paris a rumor that Great Britain had offered to France “an +offensive and defensive alliance aimed at Germany”<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_237">[237]</span> which the latter was still +considering.<a id="FNanchor_732"></a><a href="#Footnote_732" class= +"fnanchor">[732]</a> Hence, it was manifest to the German +government that Great Britain was in complete opposition to its +policy.</p> + +<p>President Roosevelt also gave a disappointing reply. On May 25 +and 30 Prince Bülow had told the President that “the decision in +the question of a conference depended to a great extent upon him.” +He maintained that if the conference were refused as a result of +Great Britain’s pressure upon France, Germany would be forced to +choose between a war with France and perhaps Great Britain and an +agreement with the former which would serve as a prelude to a +strong Continental <em>bloc</em>. Declaring that he was averse to +making the choice, the Chancellor asked Mr. Roosevelt to favor the +conference to the signatory Powers.<a id= +"FNanchor_733"></a><a href="#Footnote_733" class= +"fnanchor">[733]</a> But the President replied on June 8 that he +could hardly participate in a conference without exposing himself +to the sharpest attacks, since American opinion was opposed to +interfering in the Moroccan affair and inclined to approve reform +by one Power.<a id="FNanchor_734"></a><a href="#Footnote_734" +class="fnanchor">[734]</a></p> + +<p>The attitude of M. Rouvier was equally unsatisfactory to the +German government. The Premier expressed to the German +representative through M. Betzold the hope that the fall of M. +Delcassé would enable the two countries to reach a direct +understanding, and promised to show the “greatest +conciliation”<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">[238]</span> +toward Germany.<a id="FNanchor_735"></a><a href="#Footnote_735" +class="fnanchor">[735]</a> When the German note of June 6 arrived, +he immediately denied to the Powers the accusations made +therein.<a id="FNanchor_736"></a><a href="#Footnote_736" class= +"fnanchor">[736]</a> He also instructed M. Saint-René Taillandier +to suspend action at Fez so as to avoid complications.<a id= +"FNanchor_737"></a><a href="#Footnote_737" class= +"fnanchor">[737]</a> He endeavored to find some way by which +Germany could be satisfied, France’s position in Morocco be +preserved and her agreements with the other Powers be upheld, and +the humiliating conference be avoided. On June 7 he protested to +Herr von Flotow that France could hardly accept the conference, +which French public opinion rejected so completely, and remarked +that Great Britain, Spain, and Italy would probably refuse +it.<a id="FNanchor_738"></a><a href="#Footnote_738" class= +"fnanchor">[738]</a> Herr von Flotow replied that Germany would not +desert the Sultan. Two days later the Premier offered through an +intermediary to make a general agreement with Germany not only over +the Moroccan question but also over others, such as those of the +Bagdad Railway and far eastern affairs.<a id= +"FNanchor_739"></a><a href="#Footnote_739" class= +"fnanchor">[739]</a> In a conversation with the German Ambassador +on June 10, M. Rouvier persisted, in spite of threats, in his +repugnance to the conference. Why go there, he asked Prince +Radolin, if Germany refused the reforms in Morocco which France +considered necessary? In the course of his defense of France’s +previous Moroccan policy, he said: “If an understanding concerning +the extension of permissible reforms could previously occur with +Germany, participation in the conference might be possible.” He was +so discouraged that he thought seriously of resigning, for, he +declared to the Prince, he could not defend before the French +Chamber the German demands as then formulated.<a id= +"FNanchor_740"></a><a href="#Footnote_740" class= +"fnanchor">[740]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[239]</span>At home Prince +Bülow’s policy was encountering disapproval from the Emperor +William II, then in a pacific mood. Toward the end of May the +Emperor had rebuked the German Navy League for criticizing the +naval program as inadequate.<a id="FNanchor_741"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_741" class="fnanchor">[741]</a> On June 3 he had started +the movement which culminated in the conclusion of the +Russo-Japanese War and was co-operating with President Roosevelt in +that work—an act which Prince Bülow would have prevented had he +been aware of his master’s intentions.<a id= +"FNanchor_742"></a><a href="#Footnote_742" class= +"fnanchor">[742]</a> Even though the Emperor knew nothing of the +French offers,<a id="FNanchor_743"></a><a href="#Footnote_743" +class="fnanchor">[743]</a> he was entirely willing after the fall +of M. Delcassé to gratify M. Rouvier’s wish for an +understanding.<a id="FNanchor_744"></a><a href="#Footnote_744" +class="fnanchor">[744]</a> At the wedding of the German Crown +Prince on June 6 he assured the French representative that there +would be no war over Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_745"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_745" class="fnanchor">[745]</a></p> + +<p>The beginning of Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace had no +effect upon the German policy, for Russia’s force was broken both +by defeat and by the rapidly developing revolution.<a id= +"FNanchor_746"></a><a href="#Footnote_746" class= +"fnanchor">[746]</a> But<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_240">[240]</span> the attitude of France was so +uncompromising and that of the other Powers so unfavorable that +Prince Bülow doubted whether he would succeed in launching the +conference.<a id="FNanchor_747"></a><a href="#Footnote_747" class= +"fnanchor">[747]</a> He endeavored to do so by a show of boldness +coupled with real concessions to France.</p> + +<p>To bring President Roosevelt back into active participation in +the affair, Prince Bülow reported to him the rumor of the British +offer of alliance to France and pictured the possibility of a war +with France and Great Britain “not because we want too much but +because we desire nothing.” The Prince added that if this war did +occur, a new Triple Alliance between France, Great Britain, and +Japan, with which Russia might also be associated, might be formed. +To preclude this event he urged the President to advise the Powers +in favor of a conference or to prevent British participation in a +possible Franco-German war brought on by French aggression in +Morocco. By confronting the President with the choice of facing the +outbreak of a new war just at the moment when he was endeavoring to +stop the Russo-Japanese conflict or of supporting the proposal for +a conference, Prince Bülow obtained the desired result. On June 12 +Mr. Roosevelt agreed to advise the French government in favor of +accepting the Sultan’s invitation and against concluding an +Anglo-French alliance.<a id="FNanchor_748"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_748" class="fnanchor">[748]</a></p> + +<p>At the same time the German government endeavored to restrain +Great Britain. Herr von Holstein asserted to the British Ambassador +that “if any one had told him two years ago that a war between +England and Germany was within the bounds of possibility he would +have simply laughed, but now things had reached such a point that +it could no longer be considered impossible.” Both he and the +Chancellor cited the bitterness of the British press toward Germany +and the reported British offer of<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_241">[241]</span> a defensive and offensive alliance to +France as proofs. Neither of the two German officials believed that +Great Britain would attack Germany, but they argued that the +popular fear of such an aggression in their country was more +plausible than that of a German invasion in Great Britain. In like +manner Sir Frank Lascelles credited Germany with pacific +intentions, but maintained that the British fears were more +justified than the German. Herr von Holstein assured the Ambassador +that “the Moroccan question would not lead to any serious +complications,” and Lord Lansdowne denied that Great Britain wanted +war or had offered an alliance to France. As neither side believed +entirely the pacific asseverations of the other, the tension in +Anglo-German relations was only slightly relaxed.<a id= +"FNanchor_749"></a><a href="#Footnote_749" class= +"fnanchor">[749]</a></p> + +<p>While making these efforts with the United States and Great +Britain, Prince Bülow yielded before the French resistance. +Although he explained away the Emperor’s conciliatory remarks to +the French government with a threat and although he warned M. +Rouvier not to assume M. Delcassé’s policy toward Morocco, he +repeated his assurances that “the conference can have no positive +results which would injure the French future.” It was “merely a +question of etiquette and of delay,” he said, so that Germany could +hold faith with the Sultan and disengage herself from the position +into which M. Delcassé had forced her. Instead of demanding that +all consideration of the Moroccan question be left to the +conference, the Chancellor offered on June 12 to negotiate over the +program for that assembly if France would first accept the Sultan’s +invitation. In addition, he instructed Prince Radolin to state not +officially, but as his (Radolin’s) personal view, that from the +very nature of the affair the conference would have to adopt as +fundamental “for the present no prejudice to the +independence<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[242]</span> of +Morocco . . . . and . . . . no injury to the prospects of France.” +The Ambassador should state that the items to be considered by that +body, as logical deductions from those two points were: police and +military reforms, to be limited in time and international in +character; financial reforms, likewise to be internationally +executed; and the economic opening of the land in accordance with +the principle of the open door. He should warn M. Rouvier against +permitting Algerians to furnish the Moroccan pretender with +contraband supplies; for if the Sultan should request German +mediation in this affair, Germany would give it even at the risk of +grave difficulties.<a id="FNanchor_750"></a><a href="#Footnote_750" +class="fnanchor">[750]</a></p> + +<p>When the Ambassador carried out these instructions two days +later, he found M. Rouvier “angry, discouraged, sick” but still +defending France’s Moroccan policy. Nor did the Ambassador’s +remarks change his mood.<a id="FNanchor_751"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_751" class="fnanchor">[751]</a> On June 16, in response +to the Premier’s request for further information, the Ambassador +explained unofficially as further logical deductions from the two +fundamental points: first, that the military reforms should be +internationally ordered by a division of the mandate among the +Powers in such a way that France would receive it for the area +along the Algerian frontier; second, that to give an international +character to the financial reforms, a state bank should be +organized in which the capital and management should be divided as +equally as possible among the banks representing the various +Powers.<a id="FNanchor_752"></a><a href="#Footnote_752" class= +"fnanchor">[752]</a> The Premier’s apparent relief at these remarks +encouraged<span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[243]</span> the +German government to believe that a solution was near.<a id= +"FNanchor_753"></a><a href="#Footnote_753" class= +"fnanchor">[753]</a></p> + +<p>In the meantime, in accordance with Germany’s desires, President +Roosevelt intervened in Paris and London. Notwithstanding his +conviction that France was in the right, he advised her to avoid a +war and help the Emperor “save his face” by accepting the +conference. He argued that British support in case of a conflict +would be of little value to France, and predicted a French victory +at the conference. He promised the French government that if the +United States participated, he “would treat both sides with +absolute justice, and would, if necessary, take very strong grounds +against any attitude of Germany which seemed . . . . unjust and +unfair.”<a id="FNanchor_754"></a><a href="#Footnote_754" class= +"fnanchor">[754]</a></p> + +<p>In handling Great Britain the President took another line. He +suspected her of wishing to make trouble. For he was receiving no +support from her in his mediation between Russia and Japan; he knew +that Lord Lansdowne was opposed to the conference; and, so far as +he could tell from the British Ambassador at Washington, Great +Britain was anxious for France to humiliate Germany by refusing the +conference and was willing to face the possibility of war. He +thought this sagacious on her part, but not valorous; she would be +assured a victory on sea, while France would have to bear the brunt +of the battle on land. So he warned Great Britain not to put +difficulty in the way of a peaceful settlement between France and +Germany, and otherwise ignored her.<a id= +"FNanchor_755"></a><a href="#Footnote_755" class= +"fnanchor">[755]</a></p> + +<p>Neither Prince Radolin’s conciliatory remarks nor President +Roosevelt’s advice won the French Premier to accept the +conference.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">[244]</span> While +deeply impressed by reports of German threats against France in +other capitals,<a id="FNanchor_756"></a><a href="#Footnote_756" +class="fnanchor">[756]</a> he inferred from his conversations with +Prince Radolin and from an assertion of the German Ambassador in +Madrid that if France agreed to the conference the German +government would then be ready to commence discussions with a view +to an understanding which would make the conference +unnecessary.<a id="FNanchor_757"></a><a href="#Footnote_757" class= +"fnanchor">[757]</a> M. Rouvier was also assured of the entire +support of the British government. On June 16 Lord Lansdowne, in +approving M. Paul Cambon’s returning to Paris to advise the +inexperienced Premier,<a id="FNanchor_758"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_758" class="fnanchor">[758]</a> remarked to the +Ambassador that he saw nothing to be gained</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">by admitting the theoretical necessity of a +Conference, except perhaps to enable Germany, which had brought +about M. Delcassé’s downfall, to secure a further success. Our +attitude must of course depend upon that of the French Government, +but if they maintained their refusal, so, most certainly, should +we.<a id="FNanchor_759"></a><a href="#Footnote_759" class= +"fnanchor">[759]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The French note to Germany of June 21 was therefore so composed +by M. Paul Cambon as to accept the conference in principle while at +the same time inviting Germany to negotiate further in order to +obviate that assembly—the position which M. Rouvier had taken for +two weeks. Since Prince Radolin’s explanations on June 14 and 18 +had been made in such an unofficial and confidential manner, the +Premier did not know whether they represented the German view or +not, and did not mention them in the note.<a id= +"FNanchor_760"></a><a href="#Footnote_760" class= +"fnanchor">[760]</a> Hence that document of June 21 ran as +follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[245]</span>The Imperial +Government will not fail to recognize the inconvenience which would +result for it as for us from the acceptance of the Conference +without a previous accord, an accord which would not infringe upon +those already concluded and which would not harm in any way the +interests of which the Imperial Government is solicitous. . . . . +The Government of the Republic is deeply impressed by the double +consideration that the Conference may be dangerous if it is not +preceded by an entente, and useless if it follows one. +[Nevertheless, the French government did not refuse the +conference.] It desires solely to know what are, in the mind of the +Imperial Government, the precise points which will be treated at +the Conference and the solutions which it will offer there.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Thus they could arrive at the entente which both +governments wished.<a id="FNanchor_761"></a><a href="#Footnote_761" +class="fnanchor">[761]</a></p> + +<p>The Premier acquainted the British and American governments with +the contents of the note and of the German threats, and asked them +to recommend this solution to Germany. He emphasized to Mr. +Roosevelt especially the menace of a German attack. Declaring that +the President could avert that danger, he urged him to exert +influence with the Emperor in favor of peace. Mr. Roosevelt +immediately agreed to do so in energetic terms.<a id= +"FNanchor_762"></a><a href="#Footnote_762" class= +"fnanchor">[762]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[246]</span>The German +reaction was hostile. As the Chancellor realized that the crisis +had arisen in Franco-German relations, he endeavored by a mixture +of enticements and threats to bring the impressionable and pacific +M. Rouvier to accept the German terms.<a id= +"FNanchor_763"></a><a href="#Footnote_763" class= +"fnanchor">[763]</a> Refusing the French request, Prince Bülow +warned the Premier on June 21, 22, and 23 against resuming M. +Delcassé’s policy and against permitting the Algerians to aid the +Moroccan pretender. While promising the French government +“seriously and loyally” to work for a result satisfactory to all +parties and especially for an understanding with France at the +conference, the Chancellor declared to the French Ambassador: “The +situation is serious. With a little good will and decision we may +emerge from it.” But “one should not play with fire”; “it is a +dangerous game which might lead further than you and I wish.” +Threatening to make a defensive alliance with the Sultan if French +policy forced him to, he refused the overture for negotiation and +advised a quick acceptance of the conference.<a id= +"FNanchor_764"></a><a href="#Footnote_764" class= +"fnanchor">[764]</a></p> + +<p>The German policy was not as successful as the Chancellor +had<span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[247]</span> expected. By +June 21 Italy had, in spite of German pressure, accepted the +conference only conditionally.<a id="FNanchor_765"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_765" class="fnanchor">[765]</a> The British government, +loyally following the lead of France, fully approved the French +note (June 23).<a id="FNanchor_766"></a><a href="#Footnote_766" +class="fnanchor">[766]</a> In Spain, although a ministerial crisis +on June 20 had eliminated M. Villa-Urrutia as Germany had demanded, +the new Liberal government refused Germany’s request for support; +it declared on June 25 that it would remain loyal to the +Franco-Spanish accord.<a id="FNanchor_767"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_767" class="fnanchor">[767]</a> Furthermore, it was +apparent that M. Rouvier would not accept the German demands in +their existing form.<a id="FNanchor_768"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_768" class="fnanchor">[768]</a> The Premier was +staunchly supported by the French press, which was quickly coming +to credit Germany with the intention not of making friends with +France but of teaching her a lesson and of setting limits to her +foreign policy.<a id="FNanchor_769"></a><a href="#Footnote_769" +class="fnanchor">[769]</a> More<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_248">[248]</span> discouraging still, on June 24 Baron +Sternburg telegraphed the following statement from President +Roosevelt:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The French Government informs me unofficially . . . . that it +has ceased its opposition to a conference. . . . . It seems as a +matter of course that a program of the conference would be needed +in advance in accordance with the usual custom in such cases. I +suggest that that be arranged between France and Germany. . . . . +Let me congratulate the Emperor warmly on his diplomatic triumph of +the first magnitude.<a id="FNanchor_770"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_770" class="fnanchor">[770]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The German government retreated. Replying to the French +government on June 24,<a id="FNanchor_771"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_771" class="fnanchor">[771]</a> it asserted the right of +the other Powers to participate in the work of Moroccan reform. It +refused to negotiate a program for the conference beforehand, but +admitted “that France has a very legitimate interest in maintaining +order in the territory bordering on the frontier.” In the verbal +explanations made upon the delivery of the note, the Chancellor, +denying that the conference was intended to procure for Germany a +“miserable satisfaction for her <em>amour-propre</em>” or to +humiliate France, declared that international reform should be +attempted in Morocco first. Then if this work broke down, he said, +“the future is free,” and “in that future, which is perhaps not so +distant, we shall again be able to become opportunists.” He was +profoundly surprised, he said, that the French note took no +cognizance of the overtures made by the German Ambassador. He urged +the acceptance of the conference so that the two countries might +escape from this “perilous and dangerous situation” into “a path +which leads to appeasement, conciliation, and peace.”</p> + +<p>The Chancellor also instructed Prince Radolin to inform +M.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[249]</span> Rouvier that if +France accepted the conference, Germany would then be willing to +work out an agreement with her on the bases mentioned previously +(June 14 and 18) for a prospective program to be submitted to the +Sultan.<a id="FNanchor_772"></a><a href="#Footnote_772" class= +"fnanchor">[772]</a> If the Ambassador thought that M. Rouvier +would refuse to accept the conference before the program was agreed +upon, the Chancellor would permit him to propose that the French +and German representatives work out a program with the Sultan in +Fez. If M. Rouvier refused the conference altogether, Prince +Radolin should warn him that Germany would aid the Sultan against +any French aggressions. The Ambassador was to tell M. Rouvier that +the Moroccan government had made offers to Germany which would +insure her a leading position in that land, but that Germany would +refuse them as long as the possibility of an accord with France +remained.<a id="FNanchor_773"></a><a href="#Footnote_773" class= +"fnanchor">[773]</a></p> + +<p>By June 27 the advantage again shifted to the German side. In +Paris the more anti-British and pro-German element, led by M. +Dupuy, owner of <em>Petit Parisien</em> and an intimate friend of +M. Rouvier, was gaining greater influence. M. Dupuy informed the +German Ambassador on June 26 that M. Rouvier, whom he represented +as a rather well-meaning simpleton, now regretted having dispatched +the French note and that he now sought some phrase by which the +German and French views could be harmonized and the conference +accepted. In fact, M. Dupuy stated that he expected the French +government to make the acceptance in a day or so. Both he and M. +Betzold said that the Premier still mistrusted Great Britain.<a id= +"FNanchor_774"></a><a href="#Footnote_774" class= +"fnanchor">[774]</a></p> + +<p>Even more valuable for the German government was Mr. Roosevelt’s +change in attitude. When the German government explained to Mr. +Roosevelt that France had not agreed to the conference except under +conditions which Germany had persistently<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_250">[250]</span> refused,<a id="FNanchor_775"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_775" class="fnanchor">[775]</a> the President +immediately advised France on June 26 to accept unconditionally. He +stated that the question of a program was a minor one, that the +important thing was for the conference to meet. In answer, the +French Ambassador protested that in view of the German Emperor’s +erratic temperament France could not go to the conference</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">without previously having drawn up a program, or at +least without an understanding, indicating that which we might have +reason to expect and guaranteeing in particular that solemn +international undertakings, which have for a long time been public +property, should not be brought into question.<a id= +"FNanchor_776"></a><a href="#Footnote_776" class= +"fnanchor">[776]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Thereupon Mr. Roosevelt proposed the following +compromise: “Let France and Germany go into the conference without +any programme or agreement; but to discuss all questions in regard +to Morocco; save of course where either is in honor bound by a +previous agreement with another power.”<a id= +"FNanchor_777"></a><a href="#Footnote_777" class= +"fnanchor">[777]</a></p> + +<p>In reporting to Baron Sternburg what he had done, the President +said that if France and Germany agreed upon this or any other +compromise, he himself would accept the invitation to the +conference and would advise Great Britain to do likewise. On June +27 he offered to telegraph his greetings to the Emperor William II. +He also expressed to the British Ambassador his strong hope that +Great Britain would drop her objections to the conference.<a id= +"FNanchor_778"></a><a href="#Footnote_778" class= +"fnanchor">[778]</a></p> + +<p>The President’s intervention was beneficial to both the French +and the German governments; it brought them into a frame of mind +which permitted a compromise. The German government was elated over +his action; for even though it diminished any hope of breaking the +French accords over Morocco, it did seem to assure a peaceful issue +of the crisis by the acceptance of the<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_251">[251]</span> conference. Hence Prince Bülow telegraphed +to Washington on June 27 that “if after the acceptance of the +conference by France we negotiate with the French and differences +arise, I shall be ready at all times to support before His Majesty +the Emperor that decision which President Roosevelt recommends as +practical and fair.”<a id="FNanchor_779"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_779" class="fnanchor">[779]</a></p> + +<p>This success, however, was offset by a report from Baron +Eckardstein on June 27 that M. Delcassé had received an offer of an +offensive and defensive alliance from Great Britain, but that M. +Rouvier had refused to consider it. Within the past ten days, the +Baron continued, the British government had informed the French +Premier “that he could rely upon its diplomatic support under all +circumstances, but that if he wished to make an alliance with +England, the English fleet would also uphold the French policy in +case of necessity.”<a id="FNanchor_780"></a><a href="#Footnote_780" +class="fnanchor">[780]</a> After frankly repeating those statements +to Lord Lansdowne on the following day, Count Metternich added that +“at no moment had the German Government desired to fasten a quarrel +upon France,” as the British seemed to think. Lord Lansdowne +replied that “the language attributed to some of the German +representatives had certainly suggested the idea that it was +desired to do so.” He then made this important statement:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>. . . . British diplomatic support was assured to the French by +the Anglo-French accord. . . . . As a natural result questions +which concerned that agreement would have been discussed between +the two Governments and proper ways and means conferred upon to +maintain intact the individual points of the accord. The question +of an alliance with France has never been discussed by the British +cabinet nor has an English alliance ever been offered<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_252">[252]</span> to France. . . . . However, he +would not conceal his belief that in the event that Germany +“lightheartedly” made war upon France, which he considered entirely +improbable, it was not to be foreseen how far British public +opinion would force the Government to support France.<a id= +"FNanchor_781"></a><a href="#Footnote_781" class= +"fnanchor">[781]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>To this alarming information was added the report from Paris +that the British were exerting all possible pressure to prevent +France from accepting the conference.<a id= +"FNanchor_782"></a><a href="#Footnote_782" class= +"fnanchor">[782]</a> Furthermore, when Prince Radolin carried out +his instructions, June 27, M. Rouvier continued to refuse the +conference without a previous understanding. To that end he offered +two proposals. One, a suggestion which he took from a German +newspaper, was that the French and German representatives at Fez +work out a program in co-operation with the Sultan prior to French +acceptance of the conference. The other was that in providing for +the international regulation of the police and financial reforms +France should be assured the right to execute the police reforms +along the Algerian frontier while nothing definite should be stated +about the organization of the police in the rest of Morocco. This +agreement, M. Rouvier added, could become valid as soon as France +officially accepted the conference. He also desired the recall of +the three ministers from Fez so as to prevent complications.<a id= +"FNanchor_783"></a><a href="#Footnote_783" class= +"fnanchor">[783]</a></p> + +<p>As already seen, the Chancellor was willing to accept the first +proposal, although, fearing that upon further delay the Sultan +might throw over the project of a conference and undermine the +entire German policy, he preferred some other solution. Since he +mistrusted the Sultan, he refused to recall Count Tattenbach from +Fez until the conference actually met. He also held to his formula +of “first acceptance, then negotiations”; but to counteract the +British pressure he retreated further by agreeing on June 28 for +the Premier to declare publicly that</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">the French Government has dropped its objections to +the conference after becoming convinced from the declarations of +Your Highness [Prince Radolin]<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_253">[253]</span> that Germany would pursue no goals at the +conference which would stand in opposition to the just interests of +France.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">He refused, however, to permit M. Rouvier to make +public anything further about the German concessions of June 14 and +18.<a id="FNanchor_784"></a><a href="#Footnote_784" class= +"fnanchor">[784]</a> On the same day he declared to M. Bihourd that +once the conference met, Germany would be freed from her +obligations to the Sultan and could follow her own interests. Let +international reforms first be tried in Morocco, he said; if they +failed, Germany would have to consult only her own interests, among +which Morocco occupied “an infinitely small place.” If France, in +conformity with the views of the British government, refused the +conference, there would obtain a condition of <em>la paix +armée</em>. If she accepted, there would be “neither victor nor +vanquished.”<a id="FNanchor_785"></a><a href="#Footnote_785" class= +"fnanchor">[785]</a></p> + +<p>Learning that the German government regarded Prince Radolin’s +assertions of June 14 and 18 as official and despairing of any +other solution, M. Rouvier was more inclined to accept the +conference. He justified this course to the British chargé +d’affaires on June 28 as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>He [M. Rouvier] considered that under the conditions a +conference was perhaps the best way of arriving at a satisfactory +solution. The Emperor had made it a point of personal honour: +France would go into it with the support of England, Spain, and +possibly Italy, whereas Germany would be alone; Germany was +prepared to admit the preponderance of French interests on the +Algerian frontier. It was absolutely necessary to arrive at some +solution as the present situation was excessively dangerous. So +long as the Conference was not accepted, Germany considered that +she was entitled to a free hand in Morocco, and she was very very +[<em>sic</em>] active. She would ask for all sorts of concessions, +ports, cables, etc., and were the Sultan to accede to such demands +the situation both for France and England would become far more +critical. Monsieur Rouvier hinted that once the present +difficulties had been more or less tided over at the Conference, it +would be possible to see that Germany did not get too much in +Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_786"></a><a href="#Footnote_786" class= +"fnanchor">[786]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_254">[254]</span>Before approving the proposal for a +conference, however, M. Rouvier intended to include in the +agreement with Germany some mention of France’s accords with Great +Britain and Spain over Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_787"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_787" class="fnanchor">[787]</a></p> + +<p>While M. Rouvier delayed, the German government grew +apprehensive. Prince Radolin heard on June 29 that M. Paul Cambon, +Sir Francis Bertie, and the British government were making every +effort to prevent the French acceptance, arguing that Germany was +endeavoring to nullify the Anglo-French agreement. On the next day +M. Dupuy informed the Ambassador that the British “were sitting +powerfully on M. Rouvier’s back” to obstruct it and that Sir +Francis Bertie was pressing the French Premier to make a defensive +and offensive alliance with Great Britain. When M. Cambon reached +Paris on June 30, M. Dupuy thought that there was grave danger of +M. Rouvier’s being overthrown.<a id="FNanchor_788"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_788" class="fnanchor">[788]</a></p> + +<p>In this situation the German government denied on June 30 to the +French government that it meant to question the Anglo-French +accord. On the next day it was prepared to give way still further, +but M. Rouvier accepted the conference.<a id= +"FNanchor_789"></a><a href="#Footnote_789" class= +"fnanchor">[789]</a> The Premier proposed that he and the German +Ambassador make an exchange of notes and sign a declaration +incorporating the concessions which the German government had made +to France.<a id="FNanchor_790"></a><a href="#Footnote_790" class= +"fnanchor">[790]</a> M. Rouvier then submitted the bases of the +agreement to Lord Lansdowne, who approved them.<a id= +"FNanchor_791"></a><a href="#Footnote_791" class= +"fnanchor">[791]</a> After much bickering over the<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_255">[255]</span> formulation of the agreement, +during which a liberal repetition of German threats mixed with +enticements was made, accord was finally reached on July 8.<a id= +"FNanchor_792"></a><a href="#Footnote_792" class= +"fnanchor">[792]</a></p> + +<p>By that agreement Germany promised to pursue no goal at the +conference which would compromise the “legitimate interests” of +France in Morocco or</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">that would be contrary to the rights of France +resulting from treaties or arrangements and harmonizing with the +following principles: sovereignty and independence of the Sultan; +integrity of his empire; economic liberty without any inequality; +utility of police and financial reforms the introduction of which +will be regulated for a short period by way of an international +accord; recognition of the situation created for France with +reference to Morocco by the contiguity, over a long stretch, of +Algeria and the Sherifian empire, by the particular relations which +result therefrom between the two neighboring countries, as well as +by the special interest which results therefrom for France for +order to obtain in the Sherifian empire.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The two governments agreed to work out a program +for the conference which they would submit to the Sultan for +acceptance. The French and German missions were to be recalled from +Fez as soon as the conference met. Prince Radolin also stated +specifically that the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish agreements +remained untouched by this understanding.<a id= +"FNanchor_793"></a><a href="#Footnote_793" class= +"fnanchor">[793]</a></p> + +<p>The French, British, and German presses greeted this accord with +relief and with the sincere hope that the crisis was past.<a id= +"FNanchor_794"></a><a href="#Footnote_794" class= +"fnanchor">[794]</a> The Powers also signified their +acceptances.<a id="FNanchor_795"></a><a href="#Footnote_795" class= +"fnanchor">[795]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[256]</span>The agreement +marked Germany’s first reverse in her Moroccan campaign. She had +been compelled to recognize France’s special interest in Morocco +and had failed to nullify the French ententes. Germany could have +placed herself on the same basis with reference to France that +Great Britain occupied, both in regard to European and to colonial +affairs. Instead, however, of weakening the Entente Cordiale, +instead of making a valuable colonial accord by accepting the +French offers, the German government had preferred both to keep its +promises to the Sultan and to free itself from those promises by +forcing a conference upon an unwilling world. Caught in the toils +of its own tangled policy and determined to have a share in Morocco +even though the German people were uninterested, it had refused +present offers of colonial gain with the hope of bringing about +their renewal in the future. Its virtue, not appreciated by any +other Power, was greater than its common sense.</p> + +<p>Although the German government had receded, it had done so only +after embittering the French nation and arousing it to the united +defense of its national honor. As Ambassador Jusserand wrote to Mr. +Roosevelt on July 11:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I leave greatly comforted by the news concerning Morocco. The +agreement arrived at is in substance the one which we had +considered and the acceptation of which you did so very much to +secure. Letters just received by me from Paris . . . . confirm what +I guessed was the case, that is, that there was a point where more +yielding would have been impossible; everybody in France felt it, +and people braced up silently in view of possible great +events.<a id="FNanchor_796"></a><a href="#Footnote_796" class= +"fnanchor">[796]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Germany’s actions had antagonized M. Rouvier and +converted him to the Entente Cordiale. M. Rouvier remarked to the +British chargé d’affaires as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>His Majesty [the German Emperor] had expected a complete +climb-down to follow upon the change of direction of the Ministry +for Foreign Affairs, but as His Excellency [M. Rouvier] said, there +was no reason because he<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_257">[257]</span> parted with Monsieur Delcassé that he +should throw himself “dans les bras de l’Empereur et sur son +cou.”<a id="FNanchor_797"></a><a href="#Footnote_797" class= +"fnanchor">[797]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">M. Cambon informed Lord Lansdowne that</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">after all that had happened M. Rouvier was more +convinced than ever of the necessity of maintaining a close +understanding with this country [Great Britain]. It was, in his +view, essential that the two Governments should treat one another +with the fullest confidence, and that no further steps should be +taken without previous discussion between us. While holding this +opinion, M. Rouvier thought it desirable to proceed with caution in +dealing with the German Government and thought we should avoid +parading a desire to run counter to them.</p> +</div> + +<p>These assertions met with Lord Lansdowne’s entire approval, for +they signified the success of the British struggle to maintain the +Entente Cordiale and to keep Germany out of Morocco. The Foreign +Secretary assured M. Cambon that Great Britain had no intention of +withdrawing her support. But he added: “. . . . The apparent +sacrifice of M. Delcassé in the face of German pressure had created +an unfavourable impression in this country, and I therefore thought +there was a good deal to be said for M. Rouvier’s view that it +would be as well to avoid any action calculated to bring about +fresh complications.”<a id="FNanchor_798"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_798" class="fnanchor">[798]</a> In other words, Lord +Lansdowne intimated that British public opinion would not be so +willing to support France as it had been before that display of +French weakness.</p> + +<p>In spite of this remark, signs were not lacking of close +intimacy between the two countries. On July 12 <em>Gaulois</em> +published the information that at the cabinet meeting on June 6 M. +Delcassé had favored an alliance with Great Britain in order to +hold Germany in check. Without definitely stating so, the article +left<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">[258]</span> the impression +that the Foreign Minister had been certain of an alliance.<a id= +"FNanchor_799"></a><a href="#Footnote_799" class= +"fnanchor">[799]</a> When the French and British fleets exchanged +visits in July and August, the press compared the visits to that of +the Russian fleet to Toulon in 1893 which had sealed the +Franco-Russian alliance.<a id="FNanchor_800"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_800" class="fnanchor">[800]</a></p> + +<p>The German government was thus furthering that process which it +called Germany’s encirclement and isolation.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc13"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_724"></a><a href="#FNanchor_724"><span class= +"label">[724]</span></a>Bülow to Tattenbach, June 7, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 418 f., No. 6692.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_725"></a><a href="#FNanchor_725"><span class= +"label">[725]</span></a>The signatory Powers were as follows: +Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, France, Russia, +United States, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Belgium, and +Germany.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_726"></a><a href="#FNanchor_726"><span class= +"label">[726]</span></a>Art. XVII read as follows: “Le droit au +traitement de la nation la plus favorisée est reconnu par le Maroc +à toutes les Puissances representées à la Conférence de Madrid” +(Leon Deloncle [ed.], <em>Statut international du Maroc</em> +[Paris, 1912], p. 51). The French refused to accept this +interpretation of the Convention of Madrid and of Art. XVII. +Tardieu replied to the German arguments as follows: “That +convention aimed to limit at the demand of Morocco the right of +protection of the legations to certain Moroccan subjects which some +Powers tended to abuse. It had regulated the exercise of that +right, determined the conditions of naturalization for the +Moroccans, those for the acquisition of landed property by +foreigners, and had established the basis of the agricultural tax. +Concerning general policy or stipulations about the tariff, not a +word. Article XVII, which Germany invoked as the charter of +international equality in Morocco, applied in reality only to the +right of protection. . . . . Article XVII is not a promise of the +Powers among themselves never to touch the diplomatic or economic +terrain. It is a promise by Morocco never to differentiate between +them within the limits of 1880 and within those limits alone, that +is (following the preamble of the convention) in the exercise of +protection” (Tardieu, <em>La Conf. d’Algés</em>, p. 39). Lansdowne +also challenged the German interpretation. “Any rights which other +countries may have to most-favoured-nation treatment in Morocco +would not . . . . preclude the possibility of a privileged position +being in certain respects accorded to France in her dealings with +the Moorish Government. Most-favoured-nation treatment is variously +interpreted in different countries. But no Power has, I believe, +ever contended that the obligation to give such treatment debars +one country from invoking the assistance of another in improving +its domestic administration, and it is obvious that such assistance +can be most conveniently and effectually given when the Power which +affords it is the immediate neighbour of that which receives it, +nor was there any desire or intention on the part of France to +deprive other Powers of the rights and privileges to which they +were justly entitled under Treaty” (Lansdowne to Bertie, July 11, +1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 117 f., No. 150; cf. Metternich to F. O., +June 6, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 416 f., No. 6690).</p> + +<p>The German interpretation was based upon a loose construction of +that convention while the French interpretation was based upon a +strict construction. Although from a legal standpoint the French +view was correct, yet the precedent of an international conference +over Moroccan affairs, no matter what they were, favored the German +argument. Moreover, the fact remained that France had tried to +change the existing status in Morocco without consulting Powers who +had as much right to be considered as the three with whom she had +come to terms.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_727"></a><a href="#FNanchor_727"><span class= +"label">[727]</span></a>Bülow to Flotow, June 5, dispatched June 6, +1905, <em>G.P.</em>, 413 ff., No. 6687; <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 230 +f., No. 268, annexe.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_728"></a><a href="#FNanchor_728"><span class= +"label">[728]</span></a>Alvensleben to F. O., June 7, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 419, No. 6693; Wedel to F. O., June 6, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 417 f., No. 6691; Monts to F. O., June 6, 9, 12, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 415 f., No. 6688; 424 f., No. 6699; 435 ff., +No. 6709; de Bunsen to Lansdowne, June 8, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, +91 f., No. 115; Smith to Lansdowne, June 24, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, +101, No. 129; Lansdowne to Goschen, June 21, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, +100, No. 127; Egerton to Lansdowne, June 9, 10, 13, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 94 f., Nos. 119 ff.; Hardinge to Lansdowne, June +14, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 96, No. 123.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_729"></a><a href="#FNanchor_729"><span class= +"label">[729]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, June 10, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 425 f., No. 6701.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_730"></a><a href="#FNanchor_730"><span class= +"label">[730]</span></a>Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 8, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 92 f., No. 117.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_731"></a><a href="#FNanchor_731"><span class= +"label">[731]</span></a>Metternich to F. O., June 6 and 8, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 416 f., No. 6690; 422 ff., No. 6697 f. King +Edward also refused to permit the Prince of Wales to attend the +wedding of the German Crown Prince on June 6 (Lee, <em>King Edward +VII</em>, II, 335 f.). Lowther had communicated the British refusal +to the Sultan when on June 8 new instructions arrived for him to +await further developments. See Lowther to Lansdowne, June 9, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 94, No. 118; Lansdowne to Lowther, June 8, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 92, No. 116.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_732"></a><a href="#FNanchor_732"><span class= +"label">[732]</span></a>The information came from M. Bunau-Varilla, +owner of <em>Matin</em> (<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 623 f., No. 6853).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_733"></a><a href="#FNanchor_733"><span class= +"label">[733]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, May 25 and 30, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 385 f., Nos. 6667 f.; Bishop, <em>The Life and +Times of Theodore Roosevelt</em>, I, 470 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_734"></a><a href="#FNanchor_734"><span class= +"label">[734]</span></a>Sternburg to Bülow, June 8, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 421, No. 6696. Durand reported that Roosevelt +had said to Sternburg that “so long as the French Government +object, the United States Government could not adhere to the +proposal for a Conference of the Powers” (Lansdowne to Cambon, June +6, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 90 f., No. 112).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_735"></a><a href="#FNanchor_735"><span class= +"label">[735]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 402 f., No. 6680; Flotow to F. O., June 6 and 9, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 404, No. 6682; 425, No. 6700. In these +negotiations Rouvier leaned on the advice of Révoil, who in June +without holding any office was given a desk in the foreign office +(Tardieu, p. 84).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_736"></a><a href="#FNanchor_736"><span class= +"label">[736]</span></a><em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 230, No. 268; 231, +No. 269; 233, No. 271.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_737"></a><a href="#FNanchor_737"><span class= +"label">[737]</span></a>Rouvier to Saint-René Taillandier, June 10, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 230 f., No. 269.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_738"></a><a href="#FNanchor_738"><span class= +"label">[738]</span></a>Flotow to F. O., June 7, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 420, No. 6694.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_739"></a><a href="#FNanchor_739"><span class= +"label">[739]</span></a>Flotow to F. O., June 9, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 425, No. 6700.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_740"></a><a href="#FNanchor_740"><span class= +"label">[740]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, June 10, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 427 f., No. 6702; Radolin to F. O., June 11, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 430 f., No. 6705; Rouvier to Bihourd, June 11, +1905, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 232, No. 270. Immediately after that +interview Rouvier declared to some of his friends: “They are +putting a knife to my throat. I do not know where they wish to +drive us” (Wolff, <em>Das Vorspiel</em>, pp. 174 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_741"></a><a href="#FNanchor_741"><span class= +"label">[741]</span></a>Schulthess, <em>Europäischer +Geschichtskalender 1905</em>, p. 92.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_742"></a><a href="#FNanchor_742"><span class= +"label">[742]</span></a>Goetz, <em>Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren +1894-1914</em>, pp. 370 ff.; <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, Nos. 6193, 6196 +f., 6311 ff., 6318; <em>B.D.</em>, Vol. IV, chap. xxiii, Part. +V.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_743"></a><a href="#FNanchor_743"><span class= +"label">[743]</span></a>The absence of minutes by him to the +dispatches during this crisis points to this fact (also see +Eckardstein, <em>Lebenserinnerungen und politische +Denkwürdigkeiten</em>, III, 167). The Emperor first learned of +Rouvier’s offer of a general colonial agreement at this time in +1907. His comment was as follows: “If I had known of that, I would +have accepted it and the whole stupid conference of Algeciras would +have been avoided” (Brandenburg, <em>Von Bismarck zum +Weltkriege</em>, p. 215).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_744"></a><a href="#FNanchor_744"><span class= +"label">[744]</span></a>See the Emperor’s minutes, one of the very +few instances in which they are to be found, to the dispatch from +Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905 (<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 409, No. +6685).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_745"></a><a href="#FNanchor_745"><span class= +"label">[745]</span></a>On this episode see Eckardstein, II, 139 +f.; Zedlitz-Trützschler, <em>Zwölf Jahre am deutschen +Kaiserhof</em>, p. 174; Bülow to Radolin, June 10, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 429 f., No. 6704.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_746"></a><a href="#FNanchor_746"><span class= +"label">[746]</span></a>This was General Schlieffen’s opinion. +Schlieffen believed that the condition of the Russian army would +grow worse instead of better. See Bülow to Schlieffen, June 4, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, XIX, 422, No. 6194; Schlieffen to Bülow, June +10, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 423 f., No. 6195.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_747"></a><a href="#FNanchor_747"><span class= +"label">[747]</span></a>Bülow to Tattenbach, June 7, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 418 f., No. 6692.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_748"></a><a href="#FNanchor_748"><span class= +"label">[748]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, June 9 and 10, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, XX, 421 f. n.; 626 ff., No. 6856; Bishop, I, 476 +f.; Sternburg to F. O., June 12, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 433 f., +No. 6707.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_749"></a><a href="#FNanchor_749"><span class= +"label">[749]</span></a>Metternich to Bülow, June 9, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 625 f., No. 6855; Bülow to Metternich, June 11, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 628 ff., No. 6857; Metternich to F. O., June +15 and 16, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 441 f., No. 6712; 630 ff., No. +6858; Lascelles to Lansdowne, June 12, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 79 +ff., Nos. 97 f.; Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 16, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 82 f., No. 99. See also Newton, <em>Lord +Lansdowne</em>, pp. 335 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_750"></a><a href="#FNanchor_750"><span class= +"label">[750]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, June 12, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 431 ff., No. 6706. The accusation that Algerians +were helping the pretender was made by a German army officer who in +June returned from the Algerian border. Governor Jonnart of Algeria +denied it and asserted that the contraband came, not from Algeria +but from the Riff. Although Jonnart’s statement was undoubtedly +correct, yet the report came in so handily that the German +government used it as a weapon of intimidation against France +(<em>ibid.</em>, Nos. 6724, 6746; <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, Nos. 275 +f., 281, 283 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_751"></a><a href="#FNanchor_751"><span class= +"label">[751]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., June 14, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 438 f., No. 6710.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_752"></a><a href="#FNanchor_752"><span class= +"label">[752]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, June 16, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 439 ff., No. 6711; Radolin to Rouvier, June 16, +1905, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 234 ff., No. 272.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_753"></a><a href="#FNanchor_753"><span class= +"label">[753]</span></a>Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 448 ff., No. 6718.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_754"></a><a href="#FNanchor_754"><span class= +"label">[754]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., June 17, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 442 f., No. 6713; Bishop, I, 477 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_755"></a><a href="#FNanchor_755"><span class= +"label">[755]</span></a>On Roosevelt and Great Britain see Bishop, +I, 474 f., 481 ff., 408; Dennett, <em>Roosevelt and the +Russo-Japanese War</em>, 37 f., 210 ff.; Sykes, <em>The Right +Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand</em>, p. 285; Sternburg to F. O., +June 12, 17, 25, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 433 f., No. 6707; 442 f., +No. 6713; 473 ff., No. 6738; Lansdowne to Durand, June 16, July 12, +1905, <em>B.D.</em>, IV, 89, No. 85; 91, No. 87; Spring Rice’s +correspondence with Roosevelt, June-July, 1905, Gwynn, <em>The +Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice</em>, I, 472 +ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_756"></a><a href="#FNanchor_756"><span class= +"label">[756]</span></a>Threats by the German ambassadors in Paris, +Rome, and Madrid (<em>B.D.</em>, III, 97, No. 126).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_757"></a><a href="#FNanchor_757"><span class= +"label">[757]</span></a>Lansdowne to Bertie, June 16, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 96, No. 124; Nicolson to Lansdowne, June 17, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 97, No. 125.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_758"></a><a href="#FNanchor_758"><span class= +"label">[758]</span></a>Barrère, the two Cambons, and Jusserand, +all firmly in sympathy with Delcassé’s policy, were holding Rouvier +in line. See Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, +95, No. 122.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_759"></a><a href="#FNanchor_759"><span class= +"label">[759]</span></a>Lansdowne to Bertie, June 16, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 96 f., No. 124. In Rome Egerton was working to hold +Italy in line with this policy. See Egerton to Lansdowne, June 10, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 94, No. 120.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_760"></a><a href="#FNanchor_760"><span class= +"label">[760]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., June 26, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 484, No. 6745.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_761"></a><a href="#FNanchor_761"><span class= +"label">[761]</span></a>Rouvier to Radolin, June 21, 1905, +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 235 ff., No. 273; Radolin to F. O., June 21, +1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 452 f., No. 6720. The note was composed +mainly by Paul Cambon. See Radolin to F. O., June 30, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 494, No. 6752.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_762"></a><a href="#FNanchor_762"><span class= +"label">[762]</span></a>Lansdowne to Bertie, June 21, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 97 f., No. 126; Metternich to F. O., June 23, +1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 463 f., No. 6727; Rouvier to Jusserand, +June 23 and 25, 1905, quoted in Bishop, I, 478 ff. Dennis relates +that while in France in May, 1926, he heard a story to the effect +that Roosevelt had written to the German Emperor at this crisis +warning him that “it would be a crime against civilization for +Germany to declare war against France.” Dennis was unable to find +any such letter, and presumes that the one thought to have +contained this warning was one from Roosevelt to Sternburg on June +26 [<em>sic</em>], 1905 (Dennis, <em>Adventures in American +Diplomacy</em>, p. 495). The truth seems to be that Roosevelt, who +had not been so schooled in diplomacy as to choose his words +carefully, spoke to Jusserand as if he would use such language to +the Emperor, and then softened down his words greatly when he did +write to Sternburg. Cf. Jusserand’s letter to Rouvier on June 25, +1905, with Roosevelt’s letter to Sternburg on the same date, quoted +in Bishop, I, 480 f., 483 ff. Rouvier gave Roosevelt credit for his +acceptance in principle of the conference. The French Premier also +asked Eckardstein to intervene again, but the latter refused since +he was in such bad odor with his government (Eckardstein, III, 147 +ff.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_763"></a><a href="#FNanchor_763"><span class= +"label">[763]</span></a>“Rouvier . . . . we know does not wish a +conflict with us,” . . . . “the Chamber of Deputies wishes above +all to avoid war” (quoted from a dispatch from Bülow to William II, +June 22, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 456, No. 6723). “The sooner we +make it clear to him [Rouvier] what results the French refusal of +the conference and the further support of the pretender must have, +the more we diminish the dangers of the situation” (Bülow to +Radolin, June 24, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 466, No. 6730). That the +German government was playing with war but did not intend to start +one is also evident from a confidential letter from Holstein to the +editor of the <em>Kölnische Zeitung</em>, June 28, 1905, which +expresses completely the nature of the German policy. “. . . . In +brief, I consider the danger of war for Germany at the present +moment vanishingly small. It will be still more diminished if a +conviction of our firmness prevails. We know now for certain that +in the last ministerial council Delcassé declared: ‘Germany will +not dare to fight, it is all bluff.’ This doubt about our +determination could have led to a conflict if the other ministers +had shared Delcassé’s views” (reprinted in <em>Kölnische +Zeitung</em>, April 2, 1922).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_764"></a><a href="#FNanchor_764"><span class= +"label">[764]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., June 22, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 457 ff., No. 6724; memo. by Bülow, June 23, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 459 ff., No. 6725; Bülow to William II, June +22 and 24, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 455 ff., No. 6723; 464 f., No. +6729; Bülow to Radolin, June 24, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 465 f., No. +6730; Bihourd to Rouvier, June 23, 1905, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 240 +f., No. 277; Lansdowne to Lister, June 28, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, +III, 105 ff., No. 133; Whitehead to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 108 f., No. 135.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_765"></a><a href="#FNanchor_765"><span class= +"label">[765]</span></a>Monts to Bülow, June 21, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 454 f., No. 6722.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_766"></a><a href="#FNanchor_766"><span class= +"label">[766]</span></a>Metternich to F. O., June 23, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 463 f., No. 6727; Lee, II, 344; Lansdowne to +Bertie, June 21, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 97 f., No. 126.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_767"></a><a href="#FNanchor_767"><span class= +"label">[767]</span></a>Bülow held out prospects of aiding Spain to +acquire Tangier and the surrounding territory in case of a future +break-up of Morocco if Spain would uphold the German policy. The +insincerity of the statement is proved by a letter from Holstein to +Radolin on July 2, 1905. In regard to the Moroccan affair he wrote: +“We need have no consideration for the wishes of others, at any +rate not for those of Spain who has never caused other than anger +or embarrassment for us.” See Bülow to Radowitz, June 21, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 453 f., No. 6721; Radowitz to F. O., June 25, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 473, No. 6737; Holstein to Radolin, July 2, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 503, No. 6757.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_768"></a><a href="#FNanchor_768"><span class= +"label">[768]</span></a>See Rouvier’s reply to the Prince of +Monaco, which the latter immediately handed to the German +government (William II to Bülow, June 24, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, +464, No. 6728).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_769"></a><a href="#FNanchor_769"><span class= +"label">[769]</span></a>Eckardstein, III, 147 ff.; report from +Paris, June 18, 1905, <em>Zur europ. Politik</em>, II, 60; +<em>Bulletin</em>, June, 1905, pp. 235 ff. “There appear to me to +be indications that the feeling is growing in France that it is +necessary to treat the Morocco question in as conciliatory a spirit +as possible, but that when further demands are made by Germany they +should be met by a firm refusal. . . . . The feeling of resentment +against Germany on account of her present action is very strong and +the spirit of the ‘revanche’ is reawakening; the French have pulled +themselves together wonderfully after their first panic and they +now seem prepared to face calmly the contingency of war in the +future should the pretensions of Germany continue.</p> + +<p>“There is I think no doubt that Monsieur Rouvier could at +present command a very large majority in the Chamber on any +question of Foreign policy, and his efforts to preserve peace by +conciliation so far as conciliation can go without loss of dignity, +will only enhance his position in the eyes of his countrymen, and +assure him their unanimous support in the event of such a policy +being rendered impossible” (Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 107 f., No. 134).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_770"></a><a href="#FNanchor_770"><span class= +"label">[770]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., June 24, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 466 f., No. 6731; Bishop, I, 482.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_771"></a><a href="#FNanchor_771"><span class= +"label">[771]</span></a>The note was dated June 24, but was handed +by Bülow to Bihourd on June 25 and by Radolin to Rouvier on June +27, 1905. See Radolin to Rouvier, June 24, 1905, <em>L.j., +1901-5</em>, 242 ff., No. 278; Bihourd to Rouvier, June 25, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 244 f., No. 279; Bülow to Radolin, June 25 and 26, +1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 470 f., No. 6734; 472, No. 6736; Bülow to +William II, June 26, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 476 ff., No. 6740.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_772"></a><a href="#FNanchor_772"><span class= +"label">[772]</span></a>However, the Sultan and the other Powers +should not be precluded thereby from proposing other matters for +the consideration of that body.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_773"></a><a href="#FNanchor_773"><span class= +"label">[773]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, June 25, dispatched June +26, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 470 f., No. 6734.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_774"></a><a href="#FNanchor_774"><span class= +"label">[774]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., June 25 and 26, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 472, No. 6735; 479, No. 6741; Radolin to Bülow, +June 26, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 483 f., No. 6743.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_775"></a><a href="#FNanchor_775"><span class= +"label">[775]</span></a>Bülow to William II, June 25, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 467 ff., No. 6732; Sternburg to F. O., June 25, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 473 ff., No. 6738; Bülow to Sternburg, June +26, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 475 f., No. 6739; Bishop, I, 483 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_776"></a><a href="#FNanchor_776"><span class= +"label">[776]</span></a>Bishop, I, 485 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_777"></a><a href="#FNanchor_777"><span class= +"label">[777]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., June 26, 27, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 479 ff., No. 6742 f.; Bishop, I, 485.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_778"></a><a href="#FNanchor_778"><span class= +"label">[778]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., June 27, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 480 f., No. 6743.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_779"></a><a href="#FNanchor_779"><span class= +"label">[779]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, June 27, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 481, No. 6744. Sternburg inadvertently changed the +wording of that promise to read as follows: “The Emperor has +requested me [Sternburg] to tell you that if during the coming +conference differences of opinion should arise between France and +Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision +which you should consider to be most fair and most practical” +(Sternburg to Roosevelt, June 28, 1905, quoted in Bishop, I, 487). +The latter promise bound the German government more tightly than +did the former, and was to cause it embarrassment later.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_780"></a><a href="#FNanchor_780"><span class= +"label">[780]</span></a>Metternich to F. O., June 27, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 634 f., No. 6859.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_781"></a><a href="#FNanchor_781"><span class= +"label">[781]</span></a>Metternich to F. O., June 28, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 636, No. 6860; Lansdowne to Whitehead, June 28, +1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 103, No. 132<em>a</em>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_782"></a><a href="#FNanchor_782"><span class= +"label">[782]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., June 26, dispatched June +27, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 479, No. 6741.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_783"></a><a href="#FNanchor_783"><span class= +"label">[783]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., June 27, dispatched June +28, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 485 f., No. 6746.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_784"></a><a href="#FNanchor_784"><span class= +"label">[784]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, June 28, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 487 f., No. 6748; Bülow to William II, June 28, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 488 ff., No. 6749.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_785"></a><a href="#FNanchor_785"><span class= +"label">[785]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, July 1, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 495 ff., No. 6753 and Appendix; Holstein to +Radolin, June 28, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 490 ff., No. 6750.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_786"></a><a href="#FNanchor_786"><span class= +"label">[786]</span></a>Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 107 f., No. 134.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_787"></a><a href="#FNanchor_787"><span class= +"label">[787]</span></a>Lansdowne entirely approved of this +suggestion, remarking that “it [the Anglo-French declaration] might +be usefully cited for the purpose of showing that the policy of +both France and Great Britain had been in favour of maintaining the +independence and integrity of Morocco and preserving commercial +equality” (Lansdowne to Bertie, July 1, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 110 +f., No. 137). The rancor back of Lansdowne’s statement is +apparent.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_788"></a><a href="#FNanchor_788"><span class= +"label">[788]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., June 29 and 30, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 492 ff., Nos. 6751 f.; Lee, II, 344.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_789"></a><a href="#FNanchor_789"><span class= +"label">[789]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, July 1, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 495 ff., No. 6753 and Anlage; Rouvier to +Bihourd, July 9, 1905, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 249, No. 285.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_790"></a><a href="#FNanchor_790"><span class= +"label">[790]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, July 1, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 499, No. 6754; 501 f., No. 6756; Radolin to F. +O., July 1, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 499 f., No. 6755.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_791"></a><a href="#FNanchor_791"><span class= +"label">[791]</span></a>Lansdowne to Bertie, July 1, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 110 f., No. 137.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_792"></a><a href="#FNanchor_792"><span class= +"label">[792]</span></a>On those negotiations see <em>G.P.</em>, +XX, Nos. 6754 ff.; Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, <em>L.j., +1901-5</em>, 249, No. 285.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_793"></a><a href="#FNanchor_793"><span class= +"label">[793]</span></a><em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, Nos. 287 f.; +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, Nos. 6767 f.; <em>B.D.</em>, III, 115 f., No. +147.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_794"></a><a href="#FNanchor_794"><span class= +"label">[794]</span></a>See Rouvier’s speech in the Chamber on July +10, 1905 (<em>Journal officiel. Debats parlem.</em> [Chambre, July +10, 1905], pp. 2825 f.). Lansdowne’s speech of acceptance in the +House of Lords, July 11, 1905, 4 Hansard, Vol. CIXL, col. 241. +Richthofen to Radolin, July 9, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 516 f., No. +6769. The German government prohibited Jaurès from coming to Berlin +to speak before a socialist congress on July 9, but as the +prohibition was based on internal reasons, it had little effect +upon Franco-German relations (Schulthess, <em>1905</em>, pp. 104 +f.; <em>L’année politique, 1905</em>, p. 388).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_795"></a><a href="#FNanchor_795"><span class= +"label">[795]</span></a>The French and British governments were +particularly anxious for Russia and the United States to attend. +See Lansdowne to Lister, July 6, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 114, No. +143; see also <em>ibid.</em>, Nos. 149 ff., 154, 159 f., 164.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_796"></a><a href="#FNanchor_796"><span class= +"label">[796]</span></a>Quoted in Bishop, I, 488.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_797"></a><a href="#FNanchor_797"><span class= +"label">[797]</span></a>Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 108, No. 134.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_798"></a><a href="#FNanchor_798"><span class= +"label">[798]</span></a>Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 118 f., No. 152. On June 28 Lowther reported a +conversation with Tattenbach in which the latter gave him to +understand that “what he [Tattenbach] desired the Conference should +do, would be to bring about an amendment of the Anglo-French +Convention of April 8th, 1904.” King Edward’s minute to this +dispatch was, “In plain English—Germany ousts France fr[om] Morocco +and puts herself in her place!” See Lowther to Lansdowne, D. June +28, 1905, R. July 10, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 101 f., No. 191.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_799"></a><a href="#FNanchor_799"><span class= +"label">[799]</span></a>Schulthess, <em>1905</em>, pp. 217 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_800"></a><a href="#FNanchor_800"><span class= +"label">[800]</span></a>Lee, II, 344 f.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">[259]</span><a id= +"c14"></a>CHAPTER XIV</h2> + +<p class="sch1">THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JULY-OCTOBER, 1905</p> + +<p>After Germany had forced France to lay the Moroccan problem +before an international conference, M. Rouvier was no longer +willing to give Germany a share in Morocco. Confident of British +support and heartened by the friendly assertions of the German +officials, he hoped to obtain a general mandate from the conference +for executing the military, police, and financial reforms.<a id= +"FNanchor_801"></a><a href="#Footnote_801" class= +"fnanchor">[801]</a> Thus resuming the original French policy +toward Morocco, he took steps to fulfil it by way of that +assembly.</p> + +<p>Before negotiating with Germany over a program for the +conference, M. Rouvier obtained the approval of his proposals from +Great Britain and Spain.<a id="FNanchor_802"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_802" class="fnanchor">[802]</a> He also felt it +necessary to affirm and supplement the Franco-Spanish agreement of +1904 in accordance with the new situation and to make certain of +Spain’s loyalty at the conference.</p> + +<p>The new government formed in Madrid late in June showed +immediately a more independent spirit toward France than its +predecessor had done. Both M. Montero Rios, the premier, and M. +Roman, the foreign minister, reiterated to the British Ambassador +that “the chief aim of their foreign policy was to be on specially +intimate terms with Great Britain, and to strengthen as far as +possible the good understanding at present existing.” But they +established closer contacts with Germany, and informed the British +and French governments that while Spain would abide by the +Franco-Spanish Agreement she had not “abnegated her personality,” +and was free to take any course, in matters outside<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_260">[260]</span> that agreement, “as might be +dictated by her interests.” Spanish public opinion reflected the +same sentiment. Some elements even wished to use the acceptance of +the conference as an excuse for withdrawing from the Franco-Spanish +agreement entirely. With the help of the British government and the +blunders of Germany, that antagonized Spain, M. Rouvier ironed out +the differences.<a id="FNanchor_803"></a><a href="#Footnote_803" +class="fnanchor">[803]</a> On September 1 the French and Spanish +governments signed a secret agreement.<a id= +"FNanchor_804"></a><a href="#Footnote_804" class= +"fnanchor">[804]</a> Its terms were as follows:</p> + +<p>All officers and underofficers charged with the instruction and +command of the native troops in Larache and Tetouan were to be +Spanish, while those in Rabat and Casablanca were to be French. The +policing of Tangier should be intrusted for fifteen years to a +Franco-Spanish corps commanded by a Frenchman. Contraband traffic +in arms should be suppressed by France and Spain, individually in +certain areas, co-operatively in others. The two governments were +to work together to the end that “the participation in the capital +and the works of all public enterprises will be offered to subjects +of the two nations.” In the state bank or in any other institution +to be created the presidency should be reserved to France, while +the degree of participation of Spain should be superior to that of +any other Power except France.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The two Powers engage to observe this accord even in case where +the stipulations of Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid of +1880 come to be extended to all economic and financial questions; +they will aid each other before the Sultan . . . . to assure the +loyal accomplishment of all that the present accord stipulates. +Moreover, Spain being firmly resolved to act in complete accord +with France . . . . and France proposing to act in the same way +with Spain, it is agreed . . . . that the two Governments +will<span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">[261]</span> assist each +other and will proceed in common accord in the deliberations [at +the conference] in that which concerns the stipulations of the +convention of October 3, 1904, in its broadest and most amicable +interpretation as well as in that which concerns the different +objects of the present accord. They engage to extend to each other +the most complete pacific aid on all questions of a general order +concerning Morocco in harmony with the cordial and friendly entente +between them with reference to the affairs of the Sherifian +Empire.<a id="FNanchor_805"></a><a href="#Footnote_805" class= +"fnanchor">[805]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Both governments were well pleased with the terms. The British +government also readily approved them. The transaction marked +another step in drawing the three Powers closer together and in +handing Morocco over to the charge of France and Spain.<a id= +"FNanchor_806"></a><a href="#Footnote_806" class= +"fnanchor">[806]</a></p> + +<p>At the same time M. Rouvier began negotiations with the German +government over the program for the conference. The two were at +loggerheads from the start, for the German views of what +constituted a just consideration of France’s interests in Morocco +were different from those of the French. When, late in June, the +Moroccan government offered to give various economic contracts to +Germany and to appoint a few German officers for creating a small +Moroccan army, Count Tattenbach was enthusiastically in favor of +accepting the proposals.<a id="FNanchor_807"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_807" class="fnanchor">[807]</a> Prince Bülow refused, +and on July 11 instructed the Minister as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>As for your further deportment in Fez, . . . . keep in mind that +you will soon have to co-operate with the French representative. We +regard the concessions offered by the Sultan as desirable, but can +accept them only if they are not in contradiction to the future +decisions of the conference. Therefore . . . . delay making a +decision about these offers. . . . .<a id= +"FNanchor_808"></a><a href="#Footnote_808" class= +"fnanchor">[808]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_262">[262]</span>Nevertheless, the Chancellor planned for the +conference to divide the police and military mandate in Morocco +among the Powers in such a way that France would receive the +mandate for the frontier region only, while Germany would receive +it for “the western coastal towns from Rabat south . . . . as +suitable for a future German sphere of interest.”<a id= +"FNanchor_809"></a><a href="#Footnote_809" class= +"fnanchor">[809]</a> Furthermore, he expected Germany to receive +her share of the economic advantages in the development of the +entire land.<a id="FNanchor_810"></a><a href="#Footnote_810" class= +"fnanchor">[810]</a></p> + +<p>To achieve these ends the German foreign office appointed Count +Tattenbach as its representative at the conference,<a id= +"FNanchor_811"></a><a href="#Footnote_811" class= +"fnanchor">[811]</a> even though he was highly objectionable to the +French. It also instructed Prince Radolin on July 10 to inform M. +Rouvier either directly or indirectly that “the desired +understanding would be placed seriously in doubt” if he did not +exclude M. Delcassé’s followers, such as M. Paul Cambon and M. +Georges Louis,<a id="FNanchor_812"></a><a href="#Footnote_812" +class="fnanchor">[812]</a> from influence upon French foreign +policy, or if he should appoint M. Révoil, former governor of +Algeria and a reputed Germanophobe, as a delegate to the +conference.<a id="FNanchor_813"></a><a href="#Footnote_813" class= +"fnanchor">[813]</a> Prince Radolin was also to uphold Tangier as a +meeting place for the assembly; for the German government believed +that the anti-French and pro-German influence of the Moroccans +would be more strongly exerted there than in some European +town.<a id="FNanchor_814"></a><a href="#Footnote_814" class= +"fnanchor">[814]</a> When the Ambassador stated his government’s +requests to MM. Dupuy and<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_263">[263]</span> Léon, both men begged him “not to put the +pistol to M. Rouvier’s breast too sharply.” M. Rouvier was having +enough difficulty with public opinion, they said.<a id= +"FNanchor_815"></a><a href="#Footnote_815" class= +"fnanchor">[815]</a> The German government asked President +Roosevelt to support its views about M. Révoil and about Tangier, +but this time, after consulting the French government, the +President refused.<a id="FNanchor_816"></a><a href="#Footnote_816" +class="fnanchor">[816]</a> M. Rouvier chose M. Révoil in spite of +German opposition. Furthermore, asserting that Tangier was a +dangerous hotbed of intrigue, he urged the choice of some European +town.<a id="FNanchor_817"></a><a href="#Footnote_817" class= +"fnanchor">[817]</a> By the end of July the German government was +willing to acquiesce, although for bargaining purposes it reserved +its public consent until later.<a id="FNanchor_818"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_818" class="fnanchor">[818]</a></p> + +<p>It was not M. Rouvier’s determined stand which induced this +acquiescence, but rather the unexpected signing by the German and +Russian rulers of the Björkö treaty of alliance on July 24.<a id= +"FNanchor_819"></a><a href="#Footnote_819" class= +"fnanchor">[819]</a> This treaty, which provided for the later +association of France in the alliance, was signed by both +sovereigns under the impression that the Franco-German agreement of +July 8 had settled the Moroccan affair and had cleared the way for +a <em>rapprochement</em>. In view of this changed situation Prince +Bülow, on July 31, instructed the foreign office as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>1. We must reserve the possibility of permitting France a free +hand in Morocco at the moment in which she has to decide about +joining the Russo-German understanding. A better use of Morocco we +could hardly find and that would be by far the most favorable close +of our Moroccan campaign. 2. To attain this we need not relinquish +too early our general position on the Moroccan question. But the +French need not believe that our aim was ultimately to set foot in +Morocco. It appears to me more advisable to permit the Moroccan +question to rest for a time rather than to hasten it. Pushing or +threatening at this moment on account of Morocco would only +press<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">[264]</span> France still +closer to England and at the same time cause the Emperor Nicholas +to suspect that directly after Björkö he is to be forced to choose +between us and France.<a id="FNanchor_820"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_820" class="fnanchor">[820]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>In keeping with this policy, Prince Bülow, Baron Richthofen, and +Herr von Mühlberg all absented themselves from Berlin during the +succeeding days, and left Count Pourtales, Prussian minister in +Munich, in charge of the foreign office. As he was not in touch +with the negotiations, Herr von Holstein and Dr. Kriege, the legal +adviser, directed affairs. While the “Grey Eminence” approved the +new direction to be given to the Moroccan policy,<a id= +"FNanchor_821"></a><a href="#Footnote_821" class= +"fnanchor">[821]</a> he seemed entirely unable to relinquish a +stand once taken or to sacrifice details for the achievement of a +larger end. When his blunders brought him to the point of having to +retreat or fight, he preferred <em>Machtpolitik</em>. Neither he +nor his chief realized that some form of settlement of the Moroccan +affair was necessary to allay French and British mistrust, and that +their new policy of delay would prolong the period of crisis. This +was particularly the case since the policy continued to lack unity. +Herr von Holstein, Dr. Kriege, the Emperor, Count Tattenbach—each +had his particular addition to make, whether it harmonized with the +whole or not; and the gracious Prince Bülow, successor to Bismarck, +accepted all contributions.</p> + +<p>The most striking example of this lack of harmony was manifested +by Count Tattenbach at Fez. Early in August the news spread that +the Count had been instrumental in persuading the Moroccan +government to grant to the German firm of Bourgeaud-Hansemann on +July 30 a contract for building a mole in the harbor of Tangier at +the price of 1,300,000 marks. It was also rumored that he was +aiding negotiations between the Sultan and a group of German banks +for a loan of 10,000,000 marks.<a id="FNanchor_822"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_822" class="fnanchor">[822]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">[265]</span>The French press +indignantly accused the German government of double-dealing. <em>Le +Temps</em> noted that Count Tattenbach had been recalled from +Morocco several years before for a similar indiscretion. Germany +had accused France, it said, of wishing to make a second Tunis of +Morocco; but France did not intend to let Germany make a second +Turkey of it. It asked that Germany again deal severely with Count +Tattenbach. M. Clémenceau in <em>L’Aurore</em> spoke bluntly in an +article entitled “No Dupery,” and a few days later, even more +strongly in one headed “C’est trop.” The press also attacked M. +Rouvier for permitting the Germans to hoodwink him. If Parliament +had been sitting, his position might have been precarious.<a id= +"FNanchor_823"></a><a href="#Footnote_823" class= +"fnanchor">[823]</a></p> + +<p>These criticisms were undeserved. M. Rouvier had made every +effort to prevent the concessions from being given. Both he and the +British government had tried to block the negotiations as soon as +reports of them came through. When the definite fact of the mole +concession became known, M. Rouvier, supported by Lord Lansdowne, +immediately strengthened his protests to the German government +against Count Tattenbach’s actions. He declared that they infringed +upon French rights,<a id="FNanchor_824"></a><a href="#Footnote_824" +class="fnanchor">[824]</a> that they were a breach of faith and a +violation of the spirit of the accord<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_266">[266]</span> of July 8, that they endangered the success +of the conference, the harmony of Franco-German relations, and his +own position as minister. It was not his fault, he said angrily, +that Franco-German relations continued to be strained. He urged +that the project for a loan be blocked, or if this were impossible, +that the German government agree to repayment of the loan with +funds from the Moroccan state bank to be established. The question +whether the German or a French firm had a prior right to the +contract for the mole, he asserted, should be left in abeyance +until the conference should regulate the method of granting +contracts for public works.<a id="FNanchor_825"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_825" class="fnanchor">[825]</a> The Spanish government +was equally angry at Germany because of Count Tattenbach’s acts. On +August 23 M. Montero Rios poured out his wrath to the French +Ambassador over Germany’s trampling on Spanish interests in +Morocco. It was generally understood, he said, that Northern +Morocco was reserved to Spain. Yet, he continued indignantly, +Germany had acquired concessions in that area and had obtained a +mortgage on the lands around Tangier.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Under all these provocations . . . . Spain had to remain mute +[so the British ambassador reported his remarks]. France was the +mouthpiece of the three Powers who were working together to save +the situation in Morocco and His Excellency [M. Montero Rios] +expressed an earnest hope that she would not yield all along the +line to German pressure and would bear in mind what were the modest +but real interests of Spain in Morocco. Señor Montero Rios +concluded . . . . by bringing down his fist upon the table and +saying, “we shall not forget what Germany has done to us on this +occasion.”</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">When M. Jules Cambon warned the German Ambassador +in Madrid on August 23 that “it might become necessary for +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">[267]</span> Powers mainly +interested in Morocco to insist that all concessions recently +obtained should be examined by the Conference before they were +finally ratified,” M. Montero Rios heartily approved and +volunteered to speak in like manner to Herr von Radowitz.<a id= +"FNanchor_826"></a><a href="#Footnote_826" class= +"fnanchor">[826]</a></p> + +<p>The German government itself supported the loan in order to +strengthen its hold over the Sultan and to calm his fears about +Germany’s separate negotiations with France. The contract for the +mole surprised and embarrassed Prince Bülow. He reprimanded Count +Tattenbach for having transgressed his instructions and warned him +to abide by them in the future.<a id="FNanchor_827"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_827" class="fnanchor">[827]</a> Nevertheless, he upheld +both transactions against the French complaints. He asserted to M. +Rouvier that the negotiations for the contract had been under way +for several months.<a id="FNanchor_828"></a><a href="#Footnote_828" +class="fnanchor">[828]</a> He claimed that the loan was not a +“loan” but a harmless temporary “advance” which could be repaid at +any time. Repeating the assurances of Germany’s disinterestedness +in Morocco and of friendship for France, the German government +refused M. Rouvier’s suggestions for an understanding about these +two affairs and was unable to comprehend the French +excitement.<a id="FNanchor_829"></a><a href="#Footnote_829" class= +"fnanchor">[829]</a> As M. Rouvier felt that the facts spoke +otherwise, the two governments reached an <em>impasse</em> by the +first of September.</p> + +<p>At the same time the two governments came to a deadlock over the +choice of a meeting place and the terms of the program for the +conference. Although M. Rouvier submitted proposals<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_268">[268]</span> about military and financial +reforms on July 20 and August 1, respectively,<a id= +"FNanchor_830"></a><a href="#Footnote_830" class= +"fnanchor">[830]</a> Germany did not reply until August 26. The +delay was caused by the necessity of consulting Count Tattenbach, +but the French government and press suspected that Germany was +uneasy about possible defeat at the conference and was therefore +putting France off so as to gain concessions from the Sultan.<a id= +"FNanchor_831"></a><a href="#Footnote_831" class= +"fnanchor">[831]</a> In its answer the German government accepted +the main lines of the French proposal, but refused to permit France +to settle directly with Morocco the regulation of the police in the +region of the frontier, and also declined to give way on the choice +of Tangier as a meeting place. The German government planned for +the conference to restrict France’s interest in Morocco to this +frontier region.<a id="FNanchor_832"></a><a href="#Footnote_832" +class="fnanchor">[832]</a> But, on August 30, M. Rouvier met +rejection with rejection. To permit the conference to decide upon +the reorganization of the frontier region would, he wrote in a note +to Prince Radolin, mean sacrificing an advantage and a right which +France had enjoyed for sixty years.<a id= +"FNanchor_833"></a><a href="#Footnote_833" class= +"fnanchor">[833]</a></p> + +<p>On the question of a meeting place M. Rouvier urged the Spanish +government early in August to propose formally to the Powers that +the conference be held in Spain. Thereby he would exert pressure on +Germany to relinquish Tangier. M. Montero Rios<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_269">[269]</span> was eager to obtain the honor for his +country, but fearing a rejection of the proposal, he hesitated to +make it. Under French and British persuasion, however, he +dispatched a verbal note to France and Germany offering some town +in Southwest Spain for the conference. As the German government +made no reply, M. Montero Rios was “deeply hurt” at the +“high-handed and discourteous manner” in which Germany was treating +Spain.<a id="FNanchor_834"></a><a href="#Footnote_834" class= +"fnanchor">[834]</a></p> + +<p>With affairs so confused, the Chancellor interfered. He sent Dr. +Rosen, the future minister at Tangier, to Paris for direct +negotiations. In reporting this intention to M. Bihourd on +September 4, Prince Bülow expressed in general terms his desire for +an entente and spoke of the mole and the loan as insignificant. But +he declared that there was a line beyond which “German dignity” +would not permit him to go and that if this attempt failed “we +would be placed again in the situation which obtained before the +accord of July 8.”<a id="FNanchor_835"></a><a href="#Footnote_835" +class="fnanchor">[835]</a></p> + +<p>Dr. Rosen, who was entirely unfamiliar with the history of the +negotiations when he started to Paris, soon concluded that a change +of policy was necessary. In France he found that both government +and people were mistrustful, fast becoming embittered, and yet +strongly desirous of a speedy settlement of the controversy. On +September 8 he telegraphed to the Chancellor his opinion that the +German government had already given assurances to France which +entitled her to expect that the regulation of the frontier region +would be excluded from the deliberations of the conference, and +that to move her from this view would require “the speech of +cannons” and not “juristic deductions.” He therefore proposed to +regard this point as lost and to prevent France from spreading her +influence further into Morocco by obtaining an exact definition of +the limits of the frontier region. On the choice of a meeting +place, he advised making<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_270">[270]</span> concessions after all else was settled; the +contract for the mole he would handle as a “bagatelle.” He foresaw +greater difficulty in regard to the loan, which the French +considered an act of duplicity; but he stated to Prince Bülow that +he would endeavor to uphold it even though he regarded as untenable +the German distinction between a “loan” and an “advance.”<a id= +"FNanchor_836"></a><a href="#Footnote_836" class= +"fnanchor">[836]</a></p> + +<p>Dr. Rosen’s opinion, which Prince Radolin had held for some +time, turned the scales. “As it appears to me,” wrote the +Chancellor to Baron Richthofen on September 8, “we need above all +to extricate ourselves from this Moroccan affair, which has +apparently become confused, in such a way as to maintain our +prestige in the world and to preserve the German economic and +financial interests intact as much as possible.” He accepted Dr. +Rosen’s proposals. Germany should yield on the questions of the +frontier and the meeting place, and France on those of the mole and +the loan.<a id="FNanchor_837"></a><a href="#Footnote_837" class= +"fnanchor">[837]</a></p> + +<p>The ensuing negotiations, carried on by Dr. Rosen mainly with M. +Révoil, were replete with dramatic moments.<a id= +"FNanchor_838"></a><a href="#Footnote_838" class= +"fnanchor">[838]</a> By September 16, the two men reached agreement +on most of the points. But when Dr. Rosen learned from M. Révoil +that France expected to obtain at the conference a general mandate +for the financial and police reforms in the whole of Morocco, he +made the concession on the frontier question contingent upon an +official French disclaimer of that intention.<a id= +"FNanchor_839"></a><a href="#Footnote_839" class= +"fnanchor">[839]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">[271]</span>M. Rouvier +rejected this demand. He offered several times to compensate +Germany for her renunciation in Morocco by including other +questions in the negotiations, such as those of the Bagdad and the +Camerun railways.<a id="FNanchor_840"></a><a href="#Footnote_840" +class="fnanchor">[840]</a> Dr. Rosen declined to broaden the basis +of the negotiations, however, and threatened to break them off +(although in reality he had no intention of doing so) if the French +persisted in their denial of his request.<a id= +"FNanchor_841"></a><a href="#Footnote_841" class= +"fnanchor">[841]</a> When the French press began to attack Germany, +the Chancellor warned M. Rouvier repeatedly that “if the French +imagine that they can intimidate us or even publicly humiliate us, +they are playing a dangerous game which can lead to war.” +Conditions were much as they had been three months before.<a id= +"FNanchor_842"></a><a href="#Footnote_842" class= +"fnanchor">[842]</a> Then the sudden intervention of M. Witte +changed the situation.</p> + +<p>Returning from Portsmouth, where he had represented Russia in +the negotiations for peace with Japan, M. Witte stopped in Paris to +arrange a loan for Russia. In discussing the project with M. +Rouvier, he was told that France could not consider the loan until +the conflict with Germany was settled.<a id= +"FNanchor_843"></a><a href="#Footnote_843" class= +"fnanchor">[843]</a> Since he was interested in a quick solution of +the Moroccan difficulty and since he favored a +<em>rapprochement</em> between Russia, Germany, and France against +Great Britain,<a id="FNanchor_844"></a><a href="#Footnote_844" +class="fnanchor">[844]</a> M. Witte discussed matters with his +friend Prince Radolin on the morning of September 23. Immediately +after this conversation M. Witte saw the French Premier, and at the +latter’s request returned that afternoon to urge the French views +upon the German Ambassador. M. Rouvier was willing, M. Witte said +to Prince Radolin, to give verbally the most formal declaration +that he would not seek a mandate for<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_272">[272]</span> Western Morocco at the conference, but +since M. Rouvier believed that French public opinion would never +accept a written one, he would rather resign than give it. Germany +was sufficiently protected against that possibility in any case, +the Premier had argued to M. Witte, by the requirement of unanimity +in the conference. M. Rouvier had also promised, said M. Witte, to +co-operate harmoniously with Germany at the assembly. M. Witte +found a sympathetic listener in Prince Radolin, who was disgusted +with Dr. Rosen’s policy. When later in the same afternoon the +Prince, Dr. Rosen, and M. Rouvier met for further discussion, the +Ambassador openly supported the French side. Hence Dr. Rosen had to +yield.<a id="FNanchor_845"></a><a href="#Footnote_845" class= +"fnanchor">[845]</a></p> + +<p>From Paris M. Witte went to Germany. At Berlin on September 25 +he persuaded the Chancellor to accept M. Rouvier’s views;<a id= +"FNanchor_846"></a><a href="#Footnote_846" class= +"fnanchor">[846]</a> and at Rominten on September 27-28 he was even +more successful with the Emperor William II, who immediately +telegraphed to Prince Bülow as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Bring Rosen to reason so that that disgusting quarreling in +Paris will cease. I am completely fed up on it . . . . [<em>Ich +habe es gründlich satt</em>]. France must now . . . . be shown +friendship and be permitted to save her face so that she will +remain without rancour and will complete the turn necessary to +bring her into our alliance.<a id="FNanchor_847"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_847" class="fnanchor">[847]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>As a result of M. Witte’s intervention, the two Powers reached +an understanding on September 28.<a id="FNanchor_848"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_848" class="fnanchor">[848]</a> They agreed that the +program for the conference should provide for police reform and the +suppression of contraband traffic in arms by way of an +international accord, except in the frontier region where the +execution of that action should remain “the exclusive affair” of +France<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">[273]</span> and Morocco. +A Moroccan state bank should be created, the Moroccan monetary +system be stabilized, and funds be advanced for paying the police +and for carrying out certain urgent public works. Improved methods +of collecting the customs and of raising revenues should be +provided. The Sultan should engage not to alienate any public +service to the profit of particular interests. The principle of +adjudication without regard to nationality should be followed in +giving contracts for the construction of public works. The +conference should meet at Algeciras in Spain. In a supplementary +understanding the French government acknowledged the German “loan” +to be an “advance”; but, while the control of that transaction +should remain in German hands, the French banks were permitted to +furnish one-half the sum necessary.<a id= +"FNanchor_849"></a><a href="#Footnote_849" class= +"fnanchor">[849]</a> The German government also agreed that an +investigation of the relative rights of the French and German firms +to the contract for the mole should be made, although it was +tacitly understood that the German firm would win.<a id= +"FNanchor_850"></a><a href="#Footnote_850" class= +"fnanchor">[850]</a></p> + +<p>To make doubly sure that, apart from this agreement, France +would have her hands free at the conference, M. Rouvier made the +following declaration to the German government:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Aside from the agreement to be signed between the two +governments, I am not bound on any point. I renew my affirmation +that I have to the same degree as the Imperial Government the +desire to avoid all open discord between us at the conference and +to co-operate in effecting the solutions that respect best the +interests and <em>amours propres</em>, in such a way that there +will be neither victor nor vanquished. . . . . The guarantee for +Germany lies in the fact that, since the decisions of the +conference must be unanimous, her opposition will suffice to +prevent the general mandate from being given to us.<a id= +"FNanchor_851"></a><a href="#Footnote_851" class= +"fnanchor">[851]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_274">[274]</span>M. +Rouvier thereby changed the statement transmitted by M. Witte to +Prince Radolin that France would not strive for a mandate for +Western Morocco to a less binding one which would leave France free +to seek a mandate if she thought that Germany could be coerced into +agreeing. This ambiguity was to cause trouble later.</p> + +<p>The Sultan’s approval of this program was obtained with some +difficulty. The monarch and his advisers were very diffident about +reforms and feared what the outcome of the conference might be. +They besieged Count Tattenbach with questions about the program, +wanting to know why Morocco had been excluded from the +negotiations, what the various clauses in it would result in, +whether France would after all succeed in her object by way of the +conference. Count Tattenbach, who was practically unsupported by +the French Minister, replied that Morocco could not survive without +reforms, that Germany would defend Morocco’s independence and +integrity. As none of the Sultan’s advisers would shoulder the risk +of approving the program to their master, Count Tattenbach had to +do so. By October 22 he succeeded in his work. On December 1 the +Sultan issued a circular letter inviting the signatory Powers to +the conference.<a id="FNanchor_852"></a><a href="#Footnote_852" +class="fnanchor">[852]</a> The invitations were accepted.</p> + +<p>On September 29, in reporting the conclusion of the +Franco-German agreement, Dr. Rosen mentioned to his government for +the first time the offers which M. Rouvier had made to include in +the settlement the difficulties over the Bagdad and Camerun +railways. Prince Bülow was immediately eager to open +negotiations.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>At the present time we must use every opportunity to create +solidarity of interest between France and us [he instructed the +foreign office on the next day]. Under the present circumstances +every African agreement with France is useful to us. Naturally far +more useful would be an understanding over<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_275">[275]</span> the Bagdad Railway. We must always take +into consideration the inclination of the English to come to terms +with Russia over Asia Minor, whereby we would eventually be placed +in the dilemma of suffering a defeat on the question of the Bagdad +Railway or of arousing acute antagonism between Russia and us.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">But, the Chancellor added, Germany must not show +undue eagerness in the matter.<a id="FNanchor_853"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_853" class="fnanchor">[853]</a></p> + +<p>When Prince Radolin broached the subject to the French Premier +on October 18, the latter replied that he had offered “an even more +far-reaching agreement” at a time when he had hoped to settle the +Moroccan affair without a conference, but that under the +circumstances he would consider the project only after the +conference.<a id="FNanchor_854"></a><a href="#Footnote_854" class= +"fnanchor">[854]</a> That the Chancellor could have expected any +other reply showed how little understanding he had of the French +state of mind.</p> + +<p>Prince Bülow manifested the same obtuseness in an interview with +M. Tardieu of <em>Le Temps</em> on October 3 as a bid for +friendlier relations with France. Repeating all the German +criticisms of the French policy, the Chancellor declared:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I think that the conference, far from dividing us, ought to +contribute to a <em>rapprochement</em> between us. For that +<em>rapprochement</em>, however, one condition is necessary: that +French public opinion thoroughly recognize that the policy of +isolating Germany is an object of the past. . . . . Today as +yesterday, provided your colonial policy respects our commercial +interests . . . . we will not obstruct you, but in case of need +will aid you in Morocco and elsewhere.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">He denied that Germany sought to force upon France +an anti-British policy and that Germany had any ulterior motives in +her friendship with Russia. He summed up the international +situation as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>A double system of alliances, both pacific, assures equilibrium +in Europe. On those alliances we can and must superimpose +friendships. You are<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_276">[276]</span> friends with Italy: nothing is better. We +are friends of Russia: it is perfect. But we must not give to the +Franco-Italian <em>rapprochement</em> an anti-German character or +to the Russo-German <em>rapprochement</em> an anti-French +character.<a id="FNanchor_855"></a><a href="#Footnote_855" class= +"fnanchor">[855]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>In spite of the Chancellor’s attempt at conciliation, French +public opinion did not like the “schoolmaster” tone of his remarks +and saw therein “the proof that the Moroccan incident had been only +a pretext to intervene in the direction given to France’s foreign +policy and to force France to modify it.”<a id= +"FNanchor_856"></a><a href="#Footnote_856" class= +"fnanchor">[856]</a> In fact, not a single French newspaper spoke +well of the German policy.<a id="FNanchor_857"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_857" class="fnanchor">[857]</a> Rather, <em>Le +Matin</em> took occasion on October 5 to publish revelations to the +effect that at the crucial French cabinet meeting of June 6 M. +Delcassé had declared that</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">England was ready, whatever might happen, to aid +France if the latter were the object of an unforeseen and +improbable aggression. [It was further asserted in the article +that] England, in effect, informed the Government of the Republic +verbally that if France were attacked, she was ready to mobilize +her fleet, to seize the Kiel Canal, and to land 100,000 men in +Schleswig-Holstein. The French Government was even told later that +if it so desired, that offer would be made in writing.<a id= +"FNanchor_858"></a><a href="#Footnote_858" class= +"fnanchor">[858]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The reports were denied by M. Delcassé and by the French and +British governments.<a id="FNanchor_859"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_859" class="fnanchor">[859]</a> But the <em>London +Times</em> and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">[277]</span> +French press believed the first part of the revelations, although +the <em>Times</em> regarded the latter part as gossip.<a id= +"FNanchor_860"></a><a href="#Footnote_860" class= +"fnanchor">[860]</a></p> + +<p>In Germany these revelations provoked an outburst of +indignation. Still at odds with King Edward VII, the Emperor wanted +to recall Count Metternich for an indefinite leave of absence +unless the British government gave a satisfactory explanation of +the disclosures.<a id="FNanchor_861"></a><a href="#Footnote_861" +class="fnanchor">[861]</a> But Prince Bülow knew that the Emperor’s +suggestion could not be carried out merely on the basis of +newspaper talk. In fact, he did not believe that the revelations +were accurate.<a id="FNanchor_862"></a><a href="#Footnote_862" +class="fnanchor">[862]</a> Still he seized the opportunity to +relieve his own position with German public opinion by giving +instructions for the German press to accept the revelations as +true. By these means M. Delcassé should be represented as having +used the Moroccan affair to bring on a war with Germany, while +Great Britain should be accused of inciting the French to unleash a +world-war. The press should state that Germany had never thought of +attacking France, of drawing France to her by force, or of playing +France against Great Britain. “It is important that the German +public understand how grave the international situation is, how +necessary it is to be armed, and how wretched, in view of the +seriousness of the world situation, party conflicts and the usual +Philistine pettifogging appear.” By so using the press, the +Chancellor wrote, “we embarrass our enemies in England and bring +advantage to our naval proposals.”<a id="FNanchor_863"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_863" class="fnanchor">[863]</a> Moreover, on October 26, +when the Emperor dedicated a statue to Field-Marshal Count Moltke, +he declared: “How we stand in the world you have seen. Therefore, +the powder dry, the sword sharp, the goal known, the forces braced, +and the pessimist banished, I drink to our nation in arms.”<a id= +"FNanchor_864"></a><a href="#Footnote_864" class= +"fnanchor">[864]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">[278]</span>Here were the +fruits of two months and a half of tedious and irritating +negotiations. Starting with the assurance that the conference would +meet and that the reforms would be internationally executed, +Germany ended with the same assurance, a half-share in a loan of +10,000,000 marks and a petty contract for a mole. She began with +the intention of winning France for the sake of completing a +continental alliance with Russia; but by her blundering +mismanagement of the Moroccan affair she ruined any chance for +doing so. In June the victorious Germany had confronted a France +fearful of war and subject to pressure. Since then Germany herself +had been constantly receding before the determination of a united +French nation. In June M. Rouvier had endeavored to “save France’s +face”; by September, Prince Bülow was trying to “save Germany’s +face.” The tables were turned.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc14"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_801"></a><a href="#FNanchor_801"><span class= +"label">[801]</span></a>Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, <em>L.j., +1901-5</em>, 249, No. 285.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_802"></a><a href="#FNanchor_802"><span class= +"label">[802]</span></a>It was Lansdowne’s suggestion that Spain be +included. See Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12 and 13, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 118 ff., Nos. 152 f.; Cambon to Lansdowne, July +20, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 121 f., No. 157; Lansdowne to Manneville, +July 21, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 122, No. 158.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_803"></a><a href="#FNanchor_803"><span class= +"label">[803]</span></a>Nicolson to Lansdowne, D. June 29, 1905, R. +July 10, 1905, D. July 1, 1905, R. July 10, 1905, July 7 and 11, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 109 f., No. 136; 111 f., No. 138; 114, No. +144; 116, No. 148; Lansdowne to Nicolson, July 8, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 114 f., No. 145; Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 119, No. 152.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_804"></a><a href="#FNanchor_804"><span class= +"label">[804]</span></a>Nothing is known of these negotiations. See +Vidal, <em>La politique de l’Espagne au Maroc</em>, pp. 172 ff.; +Mousset, <em>La politica exterior de España 1873-1918</em>, pp. 162 +f.; Tardieu, <em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, Dec., 1912, p. 640; +<em>La Conf. d’Algés.</em>, pp. 58 ff., 156.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_805"></a><a href="#FNanchor_805"><span class= +"label">[805]</span></a>The accord is reprinted in <em>Archives +diplomatiques</em>, CXX (1911), 15 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_806"></a><a href="#FNanchor_806"><span class= +"label">[806]</span></a>Lansdowne to Lister, Aug. 30, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 131, No. 173; Cartwright to Lansdowne, Sept. 4 +and 7, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 136, No. 175; 137 f., No. 177; Cambon +to Lansdowne, Sept. 6, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 136 f., No. 176; +Lansdowne to Cambon, Sept. 9, 1907, <em>ibid.</em>, 138, No. +179.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_807"></a><a href="#FNanchor_807"><span class= +"label">[807]</span></a>Tattenbach to F. O., June 16, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 444 f., Nos. 6714 f; Tattenbach to F. O., June +23 and 25, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, pp. 524 f. n.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_808"></a><a href="#FNanchor_808"><span class= +"label">[808]</span></a>Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19 and 20, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 448 ff., No. 6718 f.; Bülow to Tattenbach, July 11, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 524 ff., No. 6774.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_809"></a><a href="#FNanchor_809"><span class= +"label">[809]</span></a>Tattenbach to F. O., June 25, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, p. 525 n.; Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19, July 11, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 450, No. 6718; 525 f., No. 6774.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_810"></a><a href="#FNanchor_810"><span class= +"label">[810]</span></a>Tattenbach had visions of persuading the +Sultan to transfer his residence from Fez to Marrakech where he +would be under German influence after Morocco was divided, and +where Germany could then secure the appointment of Germans as the +Sultan’s military instructors (Tattenbach to F. O., June 25, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, p. 525 n.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_811"></a><a href="#FNanchor_811"><span class= +"label">[811]</span></a>Bülow to Tattenbach, July 11, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 524, No. 6774.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_812"></a><a href="#FNanchor_812"><span class= +"label">[812]</span></a>Georges Louis was the political director of +the French foreign office.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_813"></a><a href="#FNanchor_813"><span class= +"label">[813]</span></a>Richthofen to Radolin, July 10, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 521 f., No. 6771; Holstein to Radolin, July 10, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 523, No. 6772.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_814"></a><a href="#FNanchor_814"><span class= +"label">[814]</span></a>Mühlberg to Wedel, July 13, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 526 f., No. 6775; Bülow to William II, Aug. 3, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 537, No. 6786. This choice was also desired +by the Moroccan government for its own convenience (Lowther to +Lansdowne, July 24, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 123, No. 161).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_815"></a><a href="#FNanchor_815"><span class= +"label">[815]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., July 14, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 527, No. 6776.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_816"></a><a href="#FNanchor_816"><span class= +"label">[816]</span></a>Bussche-Haddenhausen to F. O., July 25 and +30, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 528 f., No. 6778; 529, No. 6779; Bishop, +<em>The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt</em>, I, 488.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_817"></a><a href="#FNanchor_817"><span class= +"label">[817]</span></a>His view was actively supported by the +British government. Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 119, No. 152; Lansdowne to Lowther, July 28, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 123, No. 163.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_818"></a><a href="#FNanchor_818"><span class= +"label">[818]</span></a>Bülow to William II, Aug. 3, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 537, No. 6786.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_819"></a><a href="#FNanchor_819"><span class= +"label">[819]</span></a>See <a href="#c15">next chapter.</a></p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_820"></a><a href="#FNanchor_820"><span class= +"label">[820]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., July 31, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 531 f., No. 6782. Holstein expressed the same +opinion.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_821"></a><a href="#FNanchor_821"><span class= +"label">[821]</span></a>Holstein to Bülow, July 26, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, XIX, 468 ff., No. 6223.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_822"></a><a href="#FNanchor_822"><span class= +"label">[822]</span></a>The loan was proposed to the German banking +house, Mendelssohn & Co., by an English firm in Tangier, Moses +Pariente, in April, 1905. A syndicate of German banks, among them +the Bleichröder group, the Mendelssohn group, the Disconto +Gesellschaft, the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, was formed to make +it. The loan, under negotiation during the summer and early autumn +of 1905, was concluded on Oct. 4, 1905 (Schulthess, +<em>Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905</em>, p. 306). It was a +purely temporary one to be guaranteed by some of the Sultan’s +personal property in land, a fact which alarmed the French even +more because it denoted a possible German design to acquire +possession of territory in Morocco. On the matters of the mole and +loan see the following: Chérisey to Rouvier, Aug. 1, 1905, +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 260, No. 295; Saint-Aulaire to Rouvier, Aug. +14, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 267 f., No. 304; note signed by the +French and German representatives, Sept. 28, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, +307 f., No. 352; Holstein to Radolin, Aug. 14, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, +XX, 540 ff., No. 6789; Pourtales to Radolin, Aug. 19, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 542 f., No. 6790; <em>Bulletin</em>, Aug., 1905, p. +299.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_823"></a><a href="#FNanchor_823"><span class= +"label">[823]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, Aug. 29, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 549 ff., Nos. 6794 f.; Lister to Lansdowne, Aug. +2 and 15, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 126, No. 167; 128 f., No. +170.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_824"></a><a href="#FNanchor_824"><span class= +"label">[824]</span></a>A French firm had been surveying and making +estimates for some months with a view to obtaining that same +contract as well as other contracts for the improvement of the +Moroccan harbors. The French claimed that by Art. XXXIII of the +contract between the Sultan and the French consortium of banks in +the previous year the latter had been given a priority right to +make all future loans to Morocco.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_825"></a><a href="#FNanchor_825"><span class= +"label">[825]</span></a>Rouvier to Radolin, July 29, 1905, +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 254 f., No. 292, and following documents; +Bülow to Radolin, Aug. 3, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 533 ff., No. +6784, and following documents; Lansdowne to Whitehead, Aug. 1, +1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 125 f., No. 166; Lansdowne to Lowther, +June 23 and 26, July 19 and 31, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 100, No. 128; +101, No. 130; 120 f., No. 155; 124 f., No. 165.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_826"></a><a href="#FNanchor_826"><span class= +"label">[826]</span></a>So Cambon informed Cartwright (Cartwright +to Lansdowne, Aug. 24, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 130, No. 172).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_827"></a><a href="#FNanchor_827"><span class= +"label">[827]</span></a>Mühlberg to Tattenbach, Aug. 3, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 535 f., No. 6786.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_828"></a><a href="#FNanchor_828"><span class= +"label">[828]</span></a>Tattenbach and Kühlmann both supported the +contract for the mole, which, it was found, the Emperor had also +approved. See Holstein to Radolin, Aug. 18, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, +540, No. 6789; telegram from Tattenbach, June 25, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, p. 525 n.; Lowther to Lansdowne, June 23 and 25, +July 19 and 31, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 100, No. 128; 101, No. +130; 120 f., No. 155; 124 f., No. 165.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_829"></a><a href="#FNanchor_829"><span class= +"label">[829]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, Aug. 3, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 533 ff., No. 6784, and the following documents. +Also Bihourd to Rouvier, Aug. 1, 1905, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 260 +f., No. 296; note handed by Radolin to the French government, Aug. +4, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 262 f., No. 298 and following +documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_830"></a><a href="#FNanchor_830"><span class= +"label">[830]</span></a>Rouvier to Radolin, July 20, Aug. 1, 1905, +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 253 f., No. 290; 253 f., No. 294; 256 ff., +No. 294; Radolin to F. O., July 20, Aug. 2, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, +XX, 528, No. 6777; 532 f., No. 6783.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_831"></a><a href="#FNanchor_831"><span class= +"label">[831]</span></a>Lister to Lansdowne, Aug. 15, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 128, No. 170.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_832"></a><a href="#FNanchor_832"><span class= +"label">[832]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Aug. 3, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 537 f., No. 6787; Mühlberg to Tattenbach, Aug. +6, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 538 ff., No. 6788; Bülow to Radolin, Aug. +22, dispatched Aug. 24, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 544 ff., No. 6792; +Radolin to Rouvier, Aug. 26, 1905, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 283 ff., +No. 323; memo. by Kriege, Sept. 3, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 554 +ff., No. 6798.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_833"></a><a href="#FNanchor_833"><span class= +"label">[833]</span></a>Rouvier to Radolin, Aug. 30, 1905, +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 290 ff., No. 331; Radolin to Bülow, Aug. 29, +1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 549 ff., No. 6794; Radolin to F. O., Aug. +31, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 552 ff., Nos. 6796 f.; papers +communicated by M. Geoffray, Sept. 1, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 131 +ff., No. 174. In one matter during August the German government +had, to its embarrassment, to support France. The Moroccan +government seized illegally an Algerian subject. With the approval +of the Powers, the French government demanded and soon obtained his +release. See <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, Nos. 301 ff.; <em>G.P.</em>, +XX, 552 n.; 559, No. 6801; <em>B.D.</em>, III, 138, No. 178.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_834"></a><a href="#FNanchor_834"><span class= +"label">[834]</span></a>Cartwright to Lansdowne, Aug. 8 and 24, +1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 127 f., No. 169; 130, No. 172; Leon y +Castillo, <em>Mis Tiempos</em>, II, 253.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_835"></a><a href="#FNanchor_835"><span class= +"label">[835]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, Sept. 4, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 557, No. 6799; 558 f., No. 6801; Bihourd to +Rouvier, Sept. 4, 1905, <em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 297 f., No. 339.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_836"></a><a href="#FNanchor_836"><span class= +"label">[836]</span></a>Memo. by Kriege, Sept. 3, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 554 ff., No. 6798; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 8, +1905, inclosing a telegram from Rosen, <em>ibid.</em>, 559 ff., No. +6802; Radolin to F. O., Sept. 9, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 563 f., No. +6804. Radowitz acknowledged on Sept. 7 to Jules Cambon that Germany +would defend the selection of Tangier “only for form’s sake” +(Cartwright to Lansdowne, Sept. 7, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 138, +No. 178).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_837"></a><a href="#FNanchor_837"><span class= +"label">[837]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Sept. 8, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 562 f., No. 6803; Richthofen to Radolin, Sept. +10, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 564 ff., No. 6805; Richthofen to Bülow, +Sept. 10, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 566 f., No. 6806.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_838"></a><a href="#FNanchor_838"><span class= +"label">[838]</span></a>On these negotiations, apart from the +references cited below, see Bertie to Lansdowne, Sept. 24, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 140, No. 182; Lansdowne to Bertie, Sept. 27, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 140 ff., No. 183.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_839"></a><a href="#FNanchor_839"><span class= +"label">[839]</span></a>He demanded an exchange of notes to the +following effect: “Neither France nor Germany will propose +exclusive candidatures to execute the military reforms at the +conference. It is understood that for the execution of the reforms +(except in the frontier region) Germany and France will remain on a +basis of equality.” See Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 16, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 568 ff., No. 6808 and following documents; +Radolin to F. O., Sept. 21, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 577, No. +6817.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_840"></a><a href="#FNanchor_840"><span class= +"label">[840]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., Sept. 29, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 593 f., No. 6833.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_841"></a><a href="#FNanchor_841"><span class= +"label">[841]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 16, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 568 ff., No. 6808.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_842"></a><a href="#FNanchor_842"><span class= +"label">[842]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Sept. 18 and 19, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 571 ff., Nos. 6810 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_843"></a><a href="#FNanchor_843"><span class= +"label">[843]</span></a>Witte, <em>Memoirs</em>, p. 416.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_844"></a><a href="#FNanchor_844"><span class= +"label">[844]</span></a>See below.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_845"></a><a href="#FNanchor_845"><span class= +"label">[845]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 23, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 503 f., No. 6241; Rosen to Bülow, Sept. 22, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 579 ff., No. 6819 and following documents; +also Witte, pp. 416 ff. Cf. Tardieu, <em>La Conf. d’Algés.</em>, p. +77.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_846"></a><a href="#FNanchor_846"><span class= +"label">[846]</span></a>Bülow to William II, Sept. 25, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 505 ff., No. 6243.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_847"></a><a href="#FNanchor_847"><span class= +"label">[847]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Sept. 27, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 508, No. 6245; William II to Bülow, Sept. 27, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 508 ff., No. 6246; Witte, pp. 417 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_848"></a><a href="#FNanchor_848"><span class= +"label">[848]</span></a>Witte’s claim in his memoirs to have +prevented a Franco-German war was hardly justified. Germany did not +intend war, but only intimidation (Witte, pp. 424 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_849"></a><a href="#FNanchor_849"><span class= +"label">[849]</span></a>The German government in turn admitted that +this “advance” did not place in question the right of preference of +the French banking consortium to make loans to Morocco.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_850"></a><a href="#FNanchor_850"><span class= +"label">[850]</span></a>The accord is given in <em>L.j., +1901-5</em>, 307 ff., Nos. 351 f.; <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 592, No. +6832; <em>B.D.</em>, III, 142 ff., No. 184; 146 f., No. 188.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_851"></a><a href="#FNanchor_851"><span class= +"label">[851]</span></a>Rouvier to Bihourd, Sept. 25, 1905, +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, 305 f., Nos. 349 f.; Radolin to F. O., Sept. +26, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 589, No. 6828; Tardieu, <em>La Conf. +d’Algés.</em>, pp. 44 f. In December, M. Louis told Bertie that the +German government had replied to Rouvier’s declaration by asserting +that “though bound by their Agreement, they [Germany] reserved to +themselves the faculty of supporting in the Conference any +proposals made by another Government which they might consider +good” (Bertie to Grey, Dec. 15, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 158, No. +195). There is no reference to this statement in <em>G.P.</em></p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_852"></a><a href="#FNanchor_852"><span class= +"label">[852]</span></a><em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, Nos. 357 f., 362 +ff., 367, 313 ff.; <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, Nos. 6889 ff., 6898; +<em>B.D.</em>, III, Nos. 165, 186 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_853"></a><a href="#FNanchor_853"><span class= +"label">[853]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Sept. 30, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 595, No. 6834; Richthofen to Bülow, Oct. 6, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, XXV, 196 f., No. 8622; Bülow to F. O., Oct. +7, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 197, No. 8623. It was at this time that +the question of including France in the alliance made at Björkö was +coming to the fore (Tardieu, <em>La Conf. d’Algés.</em>, p. +136).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_854"></a><a href="#FNanchor_854"><span class= +"label">[854]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., Oct. 18, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 596 f., No. 6836.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_855"></a><a href="#FNanchor_855"><span class= +"label">[855]</span></a>Quoted in <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, +XX, 497 ff., Radolin to F. O., Sept. 29, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, +593 f., No. 6833; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 30, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, +594 f., No. 6834.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_856"></a><a href="#FNanchor_856"><span class= +"label">[856]</span></a>Quoted from the report of the Belgian +Minister at Paris to his government, Oct. 14, 1905 (<em>Zur europ. +Politik</em>, II, 72). See also the article by De Caix in +<em>Journal des debats</em>, quoted in <em>Quest. dipl. et +col.</em>, XX, 500.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_857"></a><a href="#FNanchor_857"><span class= +"label">[857]</span></a><em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 16, No. 6901.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_858"></a><a href="#FNanchor_858"><span class= +"label">[858]</span></a>Quoted in <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, +XX, 500 f. The revelations were made by Stéphane Lauzanne, a +journalist. Lauzanne denied that he had received his information +from Delcassé. He stated that he had written the articles three +months ago. See Lister to Lansdowne, Oct. 11, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, +III, 83 f., No. 100; Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 84, No. 101. His assertions were in the main +corroborated by two other French journalists, Eugène Lautier and +Alexandre Ular, in <em>Figaro</em>, Oct. 13, 1905, and by Jaurès +(<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 666 n.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_859"></a><a href="#FNanchor_859"><span class= +"label">[859]</span></a><em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, XX, 504; +Lascelles to Lansdowne, Oct. 15, 16, 20, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, +84 ff., Nos. 102 ff.; Metternich to F. O., Oct. 9, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 663 f., No. 6873.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_860"></a><a href="#FNanchor_860"><span class= +"label">[860]</span></a><em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, XX, 500, 503 +f.; Mévil, <em>De la Paix de Francfort, etc.</em>, pp. 269 ff. +n.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_861"></a><a href="#FNanchor_861"><span class= +"label">[861]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Oct. 14, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 666, No. 6876.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_862"></a><a href="#FNanchor_862"><span class= +"label">[862]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Oct. 15, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 667 f., No. 6877.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_863"></a><a href="#FNanchor_863"><span class= +"label">[863]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Oct. 10 and 12, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 664 f., Nos. 6874 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_864"></a><a href="#FNanchor_864"><span class= +"label">[864]</span></a>Schulthess, <em>1905</em>, p. 127.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">[279]</span><a id= +"c15"></a>CHAPTER XV</h2> + +<p class="sch2">THE TREATY OF BJÖRKÖ AND ITS ANNULMENT</p> + +<h3 class="space-above1">I</h3> + +<p>By forcing France in July to submit the Moroccan question to an +international conference, the German government asserted its power +and restored its country’s prestige; but it had had to employ means +which could not often be repeated with impunity. The future of +Germany’s international position remained uncertain. While the +Entente Cordiale had become firmer, the Triple Alliance was still +unsteady and unreliable. King Edward and his nephew, the Emperor +William, were having one of their numerous quarrels.<a id= +"FNanchor_865"></a><a href="#Footnote_865" class= +"fnanchor">[865]</a> The German government believed positively that +in case of a Franco-German war Great Britain would actively support +France.<a id="FNanchor_866"></a><a href="#Footnote_866" class= +"fnanchor">[866]</a> Although relations with President Roosevelt +and with Russia remained intimate, these close friendships did not +give Germany the security and power which she had enjoyed before +the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale. Then suddenly, out of a +clear sky, came the possibility of Germany’s becoming master of the +situation again. The Emperor William and Czar Nicholas arranged a +meeting at Björkö, and the Emperor requested that a copy of the +projected Russo-German treaty of the previous autumn be sent to +him.</p> + +<p>In the latter half of July the Emperor and the Czar were both +cruising: the one in the Baltic Sea, the other in the Finnish Gulf. +As it was the hope of both the Chancellor<a id= +"FNanchor_867"></a><a href="#Footnote_867" class= +"fnanchor">[867]</a> and the Emperor that<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_280">[280]</span> a meeting with the Czar might occur during +these cruises, William II suddenly telegraphed to his cousin on +July 18 that he would shortly pass the entrance to the gulf. +“Should it give you any pleasure to see me . . . ., I of course am +always at your disposal.” Nicholas immediately replied: “Delighted +with your proposal. Would it suit you meet at Bjoerkoe-sund . . . +.? . . . . Look forward with intense pleasure to seeing you.” Upon +receiving this answer the Emperor requested Prince Bülow to send +him the draft.</p> + +<p>The Chancellor, who was at Norderney at the time, forwarded the +request to Herr von Holstein. While he was dubious about the +affair, he wrote to Herr von Holstein that the meeting would at +least be a useful means of keeping in close touch with Russia and +finding out something about her future foreign and internal policy. +Germany could not intervene in favor of Russia during the peace +negotiations, he stated, but it would be advantageous to engage the +Czar so far that M. Witte and Count Lamsdorff would be unable to +prepare for a Franco-Russo-British entente immediately after peace +was established.<a id="FNanchor_868"></a><a href="#Footnote_868" +class="fnanchor">[868]</a></p> + +<p>Herr von Holstein’s long replies to the Chancellor were not very +hopeful. The final draft of the treaty of the previous autumn was +acceptable, he thought, if the clause added by Russia—“Their +entente cordiale will also hold in the case of difficulties which +may arise at the time of the negotiations of peace between Russia +and Japan”—were omitted. In fact, he was willing to accept a change +in Article I making the alliance valid in case of an attack by two +Powers instead of by one. He no longer believed it necessary for +Russia and Germany to be in complete accord before negotiations +with France were begun, because M. Rouvier’s cabinet would not “so +absolutely oppose Germany’s joining [the Dual Alliance] as Delcassé +had,” and because, as Russia was more dependent upon France for +loans than she had been six months previously, she would take no +step without the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">[281]</span> +latter’s approval. Herr von Holstein expected M. Witte, Count +Lamsdorff, the mother and wife of the Czar, and the French +government to oppose the project and to favor an Anglo-Russo-French +grouping. In his opinion almost the only reason for Russia to +prefer a German alliance to the other grouping was that it could be +concluded in time to be of value to Russia in the forthcoming +negotiations for peace with Japan. Herr von Holstein therefore +advised that if the treaty were concluded it be published +immediately. Fearing rejection of the German proposal by Count +Lamsdorff and an exploitation of the Russian refusal, he wished the +Emperor not to take the initiative in proposing an alliance, at +least until Nicholas II manifested a desire to pursue a common +policy with Germany. Herr von Holstein’s telegrams formed the basis +for the instructions sent to the Emperor on July 22.<a id= +"FNanchor_869"></a><a href="#Footnote_869" class= +"fnanchor">[869]</a></p> + +<p>The story of Björkö is one of drama and mystery. The two +sovereigns agreed that their meeting should be kept secret until it +occurred; and, although the news immediately leaked out in the +Russian press, the company on the Emperor’s yacht did not know +where it was going or for what purpose. The rulers met, July 23-24, +in Björkö Bay, far away from civilization, with only the sea and +the forest-clad shore around them. The Emperor prepared himself for +the interview by lifting up his hands and asking God to guide and +aid him, or at least not to aid the Czar. When his yacht steamed +into the bay, the Czar had already arrived. The Emperor immediately +went on board the “Polar Star.” After a touching exchange of +embraces the two monarchs withdrew for a long conversation. “Willy” +found “Nicky” feeling<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_282">[282]</span> discouraged, forlorn, and friendless except +for him; and Count Lamsdorff was not there to give him backbone. +The gathering force of the Russian revolution, the defeat by Japan, +anger at Great Britain and France, and deep appreciation for the +friendly attitude of Germany and William II toward him and his +country during their troubles had prepared this weak monarch to +throw himself into the arms of the far stronger, confident, and +brilliantly seductive Emperor. As William II asserted later, the +Czar was in a mood to subscribe to almost anything.</p> + +<p>In the first conversation between the two rulers<a id= +"FNanchor_870"></a><a href="#Footnote_870" class= +"fnanchor">[870]</a> they both relieved themselves of their anger +at Great Britain and King Edward VII. Nicholas II was particularly +enraged at the British, whose unfriendliness toward Russia during +the current war was fresh in his mind. When he described King +Edward as “the greatest mischief-maker and most insincere as well +as the most dangerous intriguer in the world,” the Emperor agreed +with him heartily. King Edward “has a passion to begin something +with every Power, to make ‘a little agreement,’” said William. The +Czar replied as he struck the table with his fist, “Well I can only +say, he shall not get one from me, and never in my life against +Germany or you, my word of honor on it.” When they brought up the +Moroccan affair, the Czar, pleased with the Franco-German +agreement, strongly seconded the Emperor’s hope that out of that +agreement a permanent understanding with France might develop. When +the Emperor remarked that “in spite of English incitements France +has absolutely refused to go to war with us [Germany], and so has +shown that she will no longer fight for the sake of the lost +provinces,” Nicholas II replied incisively: “Yes that I saw, it is +quite clear the Alsace-Lorraine question is closed once for all, +thank God.” As they were going on deck again the Czar once more +embraced the Emperor and thanked him for coming.<a id= +"FNanchor_871"></a><a href="#Footnote_871" class= +"fnanchor">[871]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">[283]</span>That night the +two groups celebrated together until daybreak. During the +festivities some of the Russian officials in close touch with their +master spoke openly in favor of a Continental alliance. The Emperor +therefore concluded that the ground was prepared for his project. +Before going to breakfast with the Czar and Grand Duke Michael the +next morning, William II opened his <em>Losungen der Brüdergemeinde +für 1905</em><a id="FNanchor_872"></a><a href="#Footnote_872" +class="fnanchor">[872]</a> upon the following text: “Each will +receive his reward according to his work.” So, full of hope, he put +a copy of the treaty in his pocket and set out. He found the Czar +in the same mood as before. They spoke of the Anglo-French +fraternization, behind which the Emperor suspected lay a “little +agreement.” The Czar’s head drooped in dejection. “That is too +bad,” he grieved. “What shall I do in this disagreeable situation.” +“I felt that the moment had come,” wrote the Emperor later to +Prince Bülow, in reporting this interview.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Since the ally has preserved the policy of the free hand and of +reinsurance without consulting or informing the Czar [he said to +Nicholas II], it is quite permissible for him . . . . to do the +same. How would it be if we also made a little agreement? We +discussed one in the previous winter, but it failed because of +Delcassé and tension with France. Now that is all past, we shall be +good friends with the French. So does not every obstacle fall? “Oh +yes to be sure, I remember well, but I forgot the contents of it, +what a pity I havent got it here.” I possess a copy which by chance +I have in my pocket. The Czar seized me by the arm, drew me into +his father’s cabin, and closed all the doors. “Show it me please.” +The dreamy eyes sparkled. I drew the envelope from my pocket, +unfolded the sheet on the writing desk of Alexander III before the +pictures of the Czar’s mother, between photographs from Fredensborg +and Copenhagen, and laid it before the Czar. He read the text once, +twice, thrice. . . . . I prayed the dear God to be with us and +guide the young ruler. It was deathly still; only the sea murmured +and the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">[284]</span> sun shone +joyfully and clear in the cozy cabin, and directly before me lay +the Hohenzollern and high in the morning air waved the imperial +standard. I was just reading the letters on the black cross, God +with us, when the Czar said, “That is quite excellent. I quite +agree!” My heart beat so loudly that I could hear it. I pulled +myself together and said casually, “Should you like to sign it? It +would be a very nice souvenir of our entrevue.” He read it once +more and replied, “Yes I will.” I opened the ink-well, extending to +him the pen, and he wrote with a firm hand “Nicolas.” Then he +passed it to me, I signed it, and as I arose he, deeply moved, +folded me in his arms and said, “I thank God and I thank you, it +will be of most beneficial consequences for my country and Yours; +You are Russia’s only real friend in the whole world, I have felt +that through the whole war and I know it.” Tears of joy stood in my +eyes—to be sure the sweat poured from my brow and back—and I +thought of Frederick William III, Queen Louise, Grandfather and +Nicholas I. Were they near at that moment? At any rate they saw it +all and were overjoyed.</p> +</div> + +<p>The terms of the treaty were as follows: The Czar and the +Emperor, “to assure the maintenance of peace in Europe, have agreed +upon the following articles of a treaty of defensive alliance.” +Article I read: “In case one of the two Empires is attacked by an +European Power, its ally will aid it in Europe with all its forces +on land and sea.” According to Article II, “The high contracting +parties engage not to conclude a separate peace with a common +enemy.” Article III was as follows: “The present treaty becomes +valid as soon as peace is concluded between Russia and Japan and +will remain valid until it is denounced a year in advance.” By +Article IV the Czar agreed “after the coming into force of the +treaty” to take “the steps necessary to initiate France into the +accord and to associate herself in it as ally.”<a id= +"FNanchor_873"></a><a href="#Footnote_873" class= +"fnanchor">[873]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">[285]</span>Thus the act was +accomplished. How was it possible? The Emperor’s explanation was +simple and satisfying—God did it.<a id="FNanchor_874"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_874" class="fnanchor">[874]</a> For he was present, as +were various spirits and shades of dead and departed kinsmen. A +humble and depressed Czar and an inspired Emperor with his +<em>Losungen der Brüdergemeinde</em>, tears and sighs and embraces, +many a dainty dish and flask of old wine, many a satisfying +outburst of anger at absent enemies—no wonder the Björkö treaty was +signed!</p> + +<p>The Emperor had visions of illimitable possibilities for the +alliance. On July 27 he wrote to Nicholas II as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>In times to come it may not be impossible that even Japan may +feel inclined to join it [the alliance]. This would cool down +English self-assertion and impertinence, as she is her ally too. +The 24th of July 1905 is a cornerstone<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_286">[286]</span> in European Politics and turns over a new +leaf in the history of the world; which will be a chapter of peace +and goodwill among the great Powers of the European Continent, +respecting each other in friendship, confidence and in pursuing the +general Policy on the lines of a community of interests. The moment +the news of the new “groupement” will have become known in the +world, the smaller nations, Holland, Belgium, Danmark, Sweden, +Norway will all be attracted to this new great centre of gravity, +by quite natural laws of the attraction of smaller bodies by the +larger and compacter ones. They will revolve in the orbit of the +great block of powers (Russia, Germany, France, Austria, Italy) and +feel confidence in leaning on and revolving around this mass. The +dual Alliance combining with the Triple Alliance gives a Quintupel +Alliance, well able to hold all unruly neighbours in order, to +impose peace even by force, if there should be a power hairbrained +enough to wish to disturb it.<a id="FNanchor_875"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_875" class="fnanchor">[875]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Notwithstanding this optimism, the treaty caused difficulty from +the start. The absence of a countersignature by the Chancellor was +not considered serious.<a id="FNanchor_876"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_876" class="fnanchor">[876]</a> But against the advice +of Herr von Tschirschky, the representative of the foreign office +on the cruise, the Emperor had without consulting the Chancellor +introduced very important changes in the draft of the treaty. In +the first article he had added the words “en Europe,” while he had +re-worded the third article so that the alliance should not become +effective before the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War.<a id= +"FNanchor_877"></a><a href="#Footnote_877" class= +"fnanchor">[877]</a> Prince Bülow was very dubious about the value +of the treaty after those changes were made, particularly the +change in Article I, “because in Europe,” he wrote to Herr von +Holstein, “Russia can be of no use at all to us against England.” +He requested the latter’s advice before acting.<a id= +"FNanchor_878"></a><a href="#Footnote_878" class= +"fnanchor">[878]</a></p> + +<p>Herr von Holstein approved decidedly of the treaty even in its +changed form, although he regretted that the Emperor had not +obtained more while the Czar was so pliant. He said that +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">[287]</span> treaty should +be kept absolutely secret.<a id="FNanchor_879"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_879" class="fnanchor">[879]</a> Otherwise he feared that +Great Britain and perhaps also France would seek to prolong the +Russo-Japanese War with the result that the Czar would be deposed, +and that Great Britain, if she had aggressive plans, might +hurriedly attack Germany before the alliance came into operation. +He thought that the suspensive clause was especially +disadvantageous to Germany in that the treaty, if effective at +once, would have a calming effect upon any bellicose spirit on the +part of both France and Great Britain. Moreover, he believed that +France could be brought to join the alliance at the time; whereas +if the action to bring her in were postponed, she would align +herself more closely with Great Britain. The inclusion of the +phrase “en Europe” he also regretted as being advantageous only to +Russia.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>In case of an Anglo-German war, Russia need not advance against +India. . . . . But even with the best will Russia will not be able +to help us in Europe. . . . . The only positive value from the +changed treaty is the assurance that Russia can no longer enter the +Quadruple Alliance.<a id="FNanchor_880"></a><a href="#Footnote_880" +class="fnanchor">[880]</a> The circle around Germany can no longer +close. That is something. But we could have obtained more and we +must expect that the publication of this treaty will cause little +disquietude in England and will not be considered as a great +success of German diplomacy.<a id="FNanchor_881"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_881" class="fnanchor">[881]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The Chancellor regarded the inclusion of the suspensive clause +as an advantage under the circumstances; but he had grave +objections to the inclusion of the phrase “en Europe.”<a id= +"FNanchor_882"></a><a href="#Footnote_882" class= +"fnanchor">[882]</a> When he<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_288">[288]</span> telegraphed these to the Emperor, the +latter replied that he had made the change “after ripe +deliberation” in order to prevent Germany from being obliged to aid +Russia in Asia. He did not believe possible an attack by Russia on +India, nor did anyone else, he stated. The advantage from the +treaty lay, not in the expectation of any active help from Russia +in case of a war with Great Britain but rather in the assurance +that Germany would enjoy full freedom and security on her eastern +frontier, that she would be able to throw all her forces against +one front, that is, France, instead of against two—“naturally +provided France mobilizes to help England, which is not +impossible.” He and General Moltke looked upon the situation in +this way:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>If England declares or otherwise begins war with us, you [the +Chancellor] must immediately send dispatches to Brussels and Paris +with a demand to state within six hours whether for or against us. +We must immediately march into Belgium no matter what the reply. As +to France it depends upon whether she remains neutral,—which I do +not consider entirely impossible even if the probability is +small;—in that case the Russian <em>casus foederis</em> does not +enter into effect. If she [France] mobilizes, that is a war-threat +against us in favor of England, and then the Russian regiments must +march with ours. . . . . It should eventually be considered whether +France could not be offered as an enticement for good behavior +toward us perhaps a part of Belgium as compensation for the lost +provinces.<a id="FNanchor_883"></a><a href="#Footnote_883" class= +"fnanchor">[883]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The Chancellor fully approved the Emperor’s remarks concerning +Belgium; but neither he nor Herr von Holstein thought that it would +be possible to permit French neutrality in case of a British attack +on Germany.<a id="FNanchor_884"></a><a href="#Footnote_884" class= +"fnanchor">[884]</a> Nor was he convinced by the Emperor’s other +arguments. He continued to regard the inclusion of the phrase “en +Europe” as “pernicious.” He declared that he could not uphold the +treaty before the German people unless Russia were bound to give +aid in both Asia and Europe, and sought ways of bringing about a +change to that effect.<a id="FNanchor_885"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_885" class="fnanchor">[885]</a> While<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_289">[289]</span> he had accepted the treaty at +first and had congratulated the Emperor upon achieving it, and +while he had thought that there was plenty of time in which to +eliminate the objectionable phrase,<a id= +"FNanchor_886"></a><a href="#Footnote_886" class= +"fnanchor">[886]</a> he suddenly reversed his attitude. On August 3 +he stated that he could not accept the responsibility for the +treaty in the present form or for bringing about the necessary +changes. He therefore offered his resignation.<a id= +"FNanchor_887"></a><a href="#Footnote_887" class= +"fnanchor">[887]</a></p> + +<p>Knowing that he had his master in a quandary, since German +public opinion was already complaining about too much imperial +initiative in foreign affairs, the Chancellor apparently did not +expect his resignation to be accepted. He continued as before to +seek means of altering the treaty without ruining it +entirely.<a id="FNanchor_888"></a><a href="#Footnote_888" class= +"fnanchor">[888]</a> And, as a matter of fact, the Emperor +collapsed, agreed to anything, and on August 11 wrote a hysterical +letter to his Chancellor.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I thought that I had worked and had accomplished something +special for you. Then you send me a couple of cold lines and your +resignation!!! Please excuse me, dear Bülow, from depicting the +condition of my soul to you. To be so treated by my best, most +intimate friend, without giving a single plausible reason, has been +such a fearful blow to me that I have completely collapsed and fear +a grave nervous sickness. You say that the situation has become so +serious because of the treaty with “en Europe” that you cannot +assume responsibility; before whom? And in the same breath you +believe that before God you can assume responsibility of deserting +your Emperor and master to whom you have sworn fidelity, who has +loaded you with love and honors, your fatherland and, as I +believed, your truest friend, in the situation regarded by you as +critical and serious!? No, dear Bülow, that you will not do! We +have both been called by God and created for each other to work for +our dear German fatherland. If in your opinion a graver situation +has really been made by my error—which I do not believe—, it has +been done<span class="pagenum" id="Page_290">[290]</span> with the +best intentions. You know me well enough to recognize that. Your +person is 100,000 times more valuable to me and our country than +all the treaties in the world. I have immediately taken steps with +the Czar which shall weaken or eliminate those words. Do not forget +that you sent me to Tangier against my will in order to achieve a +success in your Moroccan policy. Read my telegrams before the visit +to Tangier. You have admitted to me yourself that you were so +anxious that when you received the announcement of my safe +departure you had a nervous fit of weeping. For your sake because +the fatherland needed it I landed, mounted a strange horse in spite +of my crippled left arm, and the horse nearly caused my death—all +of which was your affair! I rode through Spanish anarchists because +you wished it and your policy would profit thereby! and now you +want abruptly to desert me, when I have done everything—and, as I +honestly believe, far more—for you, because my situation appears to +you too serious. Bülow, I have not deserved that of you. No, my +friend, you remain in office and with me and shall continue to work +with me <em>ad majorem Germaniae gloriam</em>. You plainly owe me +that because of my service this year. You can and dare not forsake +me. Therewith your whole policy of this year would be disavowed by +you yourself and I blamed forever. That I cannot survive. Grant me +a few days to rest and collect myself before you come, for the +nervous excitement caused by your letter is too great, I am now +unable to argue in quiet. . . . . I appeal to your friendship for +me, and let us hear no more of your intention to resign. Telegraph +me “all right” after this letter; then I shall know that you will +remain! For the morning after the arrival of your resignation will +find the emperor no longer alive! Think of my poor wife and +children!<a id="FNanchor_889"></a><a href="#Footnote_889" class= +"fnanchor">[889]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>How were the mighty fallen! The Chancellor had won, and of +course telegraphed “All right.”</p> + +<p>In the meantime various proposals to eliminate the phrase “en +Europe”<a id="FNanchor_890"></a><a href="#Footnote_890" class= +"fnanchor">[890]</a> were being combated by Herr von Holstein, who +feared that the opponents of the treaty in Russia, particularly +Count Lamsdorff, might use such opportunity to propose changes on +their side, to annul the treaty entirely, or at least to undermine +its prestige. He wrote:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The treaty even in its present crippled form is still too +valuable to risk in hazardous play. Its value lies in the crushing +effect which it will have upon France and in the indirect reaction +through France upon England.<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_291">[291]</span> . . . . Through the inclusion of “en +Europe” and through the introduction of the suspensive article, the +value of the treaty is lowered 50 per cent. But this 50 per cent +remains to us and should not be risked.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">He urged against proposal for a change until time +for the treaty to come into effect or until the Emperor and the +Czar had another meeting. Prince Bülow acceded to these +views.<a id="FNanchor_891"></a><a href="#Footnote_891" class= +"fnanchor">[891]</a></p> + +<h3>II</h3> + +<p>Occurring at a crisis in world-affairs, when the Moroccan +difficulty was still unsettled, when the Russo-Japanese +negotiations for peace were about to begin, when the choice of a +king by Norway was not yet made, the news of the unexpected and +secret interview at Björkö caused a furor in the diplomatic world +and in the press.<a id="FNanchor_892"></a><a href="#Footnote_892" +class="fnanchor">[892]</a> Especial alarm was shown by the British, +jealous and mistrustful as they were of Russo-German intimacy. The +English press suspected the German Emperor of seeking the Norwegian +crown for a Hohenzollern and of endeavoring to close the Baltic Sea +to all except the Baltic nations.<a id="FNanchor_893"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_893" class="fnanchor">[893]</a> Sir Francis Bertie, +British ambassador at Paris, was reported to have remarked that +Germany seemed to harbor Napoleonic tendencies, which Great Britain +would oppose as she had the original ones.<a id= +"FNanchor_894"></a><a href="#Footnote_894" class= +"fnanchor">[894]</a> Mr. Spring Rice, after consulting Lord +Lansdowne, wrote to President Roosevelt as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The most serious aspect of the question is the general balance +of power in Europe. . . . . Two of the great powers have +practically disappeared so far as active intervention in European +affairs is concerned, Russia and Austria. Germany is by far the +most powerful of the remaining powers, and she has an old feud to +settle with France. If France is attacked, there is no Russia to +help her and the English Army is at present practically +negligible<span class="pagenum" id="Page_292">[292]</span> for a +continental campaign. If France is forced to accept German +hegemony, England remains the only independent great power, and we +are in much the same position as during the Napoleonic wars. We +consider it therefore our duty to prepare for contingencies.</p> + +<p>. . . . Of course, nobody here, except the small body of +hot-heads who exist everywhere, desires to attack Germany. Our +interest in peace is supreme and in fact perhaps too dominant. But +we all have an uncomfortable feeling that always and everywhere we +encounter the fixed and determined hostility of Germany, and that, +when opportunity offers, this hostility will take an active +form.<a id="FNanchor_895"></a><a href="#Footnote_895" class= +"fnanchor">[895]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Late in July, forthcoming British maneuvers in the Baltic Sea +were suddenly announced in the press without any previous +notification to the various governments. Following so closely after +the meeting at Björkö, that announcement had a sinister +significance which the Russian and the German presses interpreted +as a warning to their countries that Great Britain was still +mistress of the seas and that no change should occur against her +will. Germany feared a British attack and, without an adequate +fleet, felt herself defenseless.<a id="FNanchor_896"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_896" class="fnanchor">[896]</a></p> + +<p>The British press denounced these fears as preposterous. In the +House of Commons, Earl Percy, undersecretary of state +for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_293">[293]</span> foreign +affairs, declared on August 3 that “the situation in Europe +presented no special cause for anxiety” and would present even less +cause if certain “irresponsible persons were not perpetually +attributing to this country Machiavellian motives of which we were +quite innocent and who were always imagining that we could not +enter into arrangements with one country for mutual convenience +without having a hostile intent against some other country.”<a id= +"FNanchor_897"></a><a href="#Footnote_897" class= +"fnanchor">[897]</a> Lord Lansdowne immediately explained to the +German and Russian governments that the lack of notification had +been an oversight; he denied that the maneuvers were intended as a +demonstration in any way.<a id="FNanchor_898"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_898" class="fnanchor">[898]</a></p> + +<p>As neither side wanted trouble, this explanation cleared up the +difficulty. The press became calmer and the visit of the British +fleet to Swinemünde and Neufahrwasser, August 27-September 1, was +used by both the British and the Germans for demonstrations of good +will.<a id="FNanchor_899"></a><a href="#Footnote_899" class= +"fnanchor">[899]</a> Yet the fact that for the first time in years +the British fleet was practicing in the Baltic was not without +significance. Furthermore, King Edward VII was still at odds with +the German Emperor. In August and September, with the approval of +his government, he refused to meet his nephew until Franco-German +relations improved.<a id="FNanchor_900"></a><a href="#Footnote_900" +class="fnanchor">[900]</a> And at some time in August the British +government learned from a member of the German Emperor’s party at +Björkö that at that meeting William II<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_294">[294]</span> had seemed nervous and preoccupied, that he +had been seized by sudden fits of talkativeness and of silence, and +that he had advocated his ideas of a coalition of Germany, Russia, +and France to the exclusion of Great Britain. Lord Lansdowne’s +comment to that information was as follows: “The description of the +Kaiser’s language and demeanour fills me with disquiet. What may +not a man in such a frame of mind do next?”<a id= +"FNanchor_901"></a><a href="#Footnote_901" class= +"fnanchor">[901]</a></p> + +<h3>III</h3> + +<p>When the report reached Paris on July 23 that the interview at +Björkö was to occur, M. Rouvier immediately asked M. Witte, who was +in Paris on his way to Portsmouth, whether it was true. M. Witte, +equally in the dark, replied that he did not believe the +rumor.<a id="FNanchor_902"></a><a href="#Footnote_902" class= +"fnanchor">[902]</a> When the authentic news of the meeting came a +few hours later, the French government and people were alarmed, for +the Czar’s meeting with the German Emperor signified a lack of +regard for French feeling and seemed to belie M. Witte’s assurances +of Russia’s devotion to the Dual Alliance.<a id= +"FNanchor_903"></a><a href="#Footnote_903" class= +"fnanchor">[903]</a> Moreover, M. Witte’s private advocacy of +closer co-operation between the three great Continental Powers +against the great naval Powers, that is, against France’s friend, +Great Britain, no doubt increased the concern of the French +government.<a id="FNanchor_904"></a><a href="#Footnote_904" class= +"fnanchor">[904]</a></p> + +<p>On July 22 M. Bompard, French ambassador in St. Petersburg, +demanded an explanation from Count Lamsdorff of the report of the +forthcoming meeting. The Foreign Minister assured the French +government that it was a strictly private interview, devoid of any +political character.<a id="FNanchor_905"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_905" class="fnanchor">[905]</a> Nevertheless, after +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_295">[295]</span> meeting +occurred the French government continued to feel uneasy.<a id= +"FNanchor_906"></a><a href="#Footnote_906" class= +"fnanchor">[906]</a> Although M. Bompard believed that Count +Lamsdorff, faithful to the Dual Alliance, hoped that the meeting +had had no significance, the Ambassador strongly suspected that the +Minister had again not been consulted beforehand by his +master.<a id="FNanchor_907"></a><a href="#Footnote_907" class= +"fnanchor">[907]</a> Believing that the Emperor William II was +trying through his personal relations with the Czar to destroy the +Dual Alliance, he feared the results of an interview between the +two sovereigns. When he learned that some sort of document had been +signed by the two rulers, he surmised that it was a personal +agreement of friendship by which they promised not to participate +in any enterprise directed against the other and to exchange any +information which came to their knowledge.<a id= +"FNanchor_908"></a><a href="#Footnote_908" class= +"fnanchor">[908]</a></p> + +<p>Faced by the immense possibilities of the meeting at Björkö, M. +Rouvier determined to forestall any Russian initiative looking +toward a change in the Dual Alliance by frankly explaining his +foreign policy to the Russian ambassador, M. Nelidow. On August 9, +the Ambassador reported the Minister’s words as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The Minister assured me that the basis of his policy must remain +the alliance with Russia; France needs no other. “Wherein does my +policy differ from that of my predecessor?” he said to me. “Therein +that I wish to establish good relations with England and Germany; +but we do not intend thereby to make a closer agreement with the +latter, just as on the other hand we do not desire to weaken the +understanding already existing with England.” Upon my remarking +that several newspapers have gone so far as to speak of a German +alliance, M. Rouvier replied emphatically that that would be +“absolutely impossible.”<a id="FNanchor_909"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_909" class="fnanchor">[909]</a></p> +</div> + +<h3><span class="pagenum" id="Page_296">[296]</span>IV</h3> + +<p>The Czar, who probably felt guilty about not having consulted +his Foreign Minister before signing the Björkö treaty, did not tell +Count Lamsdorff of it until September 12.<a id= +"FNanchor_910"></a><a href="#Footnote_910" class= +"fnanchor">[910]</a> He probably did so then because peace with +Japan, signed on September 6 and soon to be officially ratified, +would bring the Björkö accord into force.<a id= +"FNanchor_911"></a><a href="#Footnote_911" class= +"fnanchor">[911]</a> Count Lamsdorff was horrified at the news. On +October 9 he wrote to his friend M. Nelidow that the German Emperor +had endeavored in the previous year to persuade “our poor monarch” +to sign a treaty of defensive alliance with the obligation for +France to join it. He continued:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I succeeded in preventing this crude attempt. But during the +fateful meeting at Björkö, the Emperor William was able with the +aid of base flattery to convince our dear Emperor that he alone was +his true friend and his support, and that the only salvation for +Russia and for Europe lay in a new Triple Alliance which in his +opinion France would gladly join.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">After informing M. Nelidow of the treaty signed at +Björkö, he went on: “There you have the new mess into which we have +been plunged after so many unusual adventures during the past two +years. You can imagine how comforting this is.”<a id= +"FNanchor_912"></a><a href="#Footnote_912" class= +"fnanchor">[912]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_297">[297]</span>From the first +Count Lamsdorff was determined to destroy the treaty. After +comparing it with the terms of the Dual Alliance, he concluded that +the one was a flagrant violation of the other.<a id= +"FNanchor_913"></a><a href="#Footnote_913" class= +"fnanchor">[913]</a> In fact, he thought that in case of a +Franco-German war arising out of the Moroccan affair, Russia was +bound by this treaty to support Germany against her own ally. He +wrote to M. Nelidow:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>From long years of experience I have become convinced that the +alliance with France is necessary in order to have really good +relations with Germany. Otherwise we lose our independence; for I +know nothing heavier than the German yoke. Without sacrificing the +most intimate relations with Berlin, we have very tactfully +repulsed all attempts to compromise us.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Not only did he expect France to refuse flatly to +enter the new grouping, but he also considered it bad policy to +give up the Dual Alliance in favor of a doubtful combination <em>à +trois</em>. He considered the treaty to be altogether in favor of +Germany, for she was bound to aid Russia only in Europe although +Russia had most cause to fear Asiatic conflicts. Count Lamsdorff +held that this alliance might involve Russia in the Anglo-German +rivalry and might draw her into a war in which she had no interest. +Preferring a policy of peace and good will with all Powers, he +believed that Russia should next settle her difficulties with Great +Britain, in spite of the fact that the renewal of the +Anglo-Japanese Alliance in August had angered him. He was +determined to extricate Russia from this situation with the least +possible damage to Russo-German relations but above all without a +breach in the Dual Alliance.<a id="FNanchor_914"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_914" class="fnanchor">[914]</a></p> + +<p>When the Russian Foreign Minister marshaled these arguments +before the Czar, the latter refused to yield. Without +showing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_298">[298]</span> much +consideration for French interest in the matter, Nicholas II +replied that the alliance would be of benefit to both Russia and +France and maintained that the latter would join it.<a id= +"FNanchor_915"></a><a href="#Footnote_915" class= +"fnanchor">[915]</a> Although he was strongly skeptical about this +possibility, the Foreign Minister was forced to inquire of M. +Nelidow on September 14 whether or not France would do so.<a id= +"FNanchor_916"></a><a href="#Footnote_916" class= +"fnanchor">[916]</a></p> + +<p>Without consulting anyone, M. Nelidow replied decidedly no. The +Dual Alliance, together with the Entente Cordiale, every day +becoming more intimate, he wrote, formed the foundation of the +French foreign policy, whereas Franco-German relations were far +from satisfactory. This new triple alliance, manifestly aimed at +Great Britain, might, he continued, involve France in a war, which +she wished above all to avoid, especially a war against Great +Britain for the defense of German interests. Furthermore, such an +alliance would mean the renunciation of all hopes of revenge for +France. In fact, he thought that the slightest hint in favor of a +Continental grouping would only shake France’s trust in her ally. +Nevertheless, he promised to investigate further.<a id= +"FNanchor_917"></a><a href="#Footnote_917" class= +"fnanchor">[917]</a></p> + +<p>Not convinced by these arguments, the Czar clung to his plan. +Just at this juncture M. Witte arrived in St. Petersburg with a +letter from William II which forced a decision about the +alliance.</p> + +<p>M. Witte’s ideas on foreign policy were confused. Early in May, +1905, he spoke of Germany to Mr. Spring Rice in hostile terms. In +July, immediately before he left St. Petersburg for Portsmouth to +negotiate peace with Japan, he was upholding among his friends and +to the Czar the plan that at Portsmouth he should not only make +peace but should also negotiate an “all-round arrangement” with +Japan which Great Britain and France should adhere to or at least +recognize.<a id="FNanchor_918"></a><a href="#Footnote_918" class= +"fnanchor">[918]</a> A few days later at Paris<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_299">[299]</span> he advocated the formation of a +Continental grouping against the overseas Powers.<a id= +"FNanchor_919"></a><a href="#Footnote_919" class= +"fnanchor">[919]</a> The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance +increased his antagonism to Great Britain.<a id= +"FNanchor_920"></a><a href="#Footnote_920" class= +"fnanchor">[920]</a> On his return to Paris in September, he +refused an invitation from King Edward to visit England as well as +an offer of British participation in the proposed Russian loan, and +aided in settling the Moroccan difficulty in order to make possible +a Franco-German <em>rapprochement</em>.<a id= +"FNanchor_921"></a><a href="#Footnote_921" class= +"fnanchor">[921]</a></p> + +<p>As M. Witte had to pass through Germany on his trip home, the +Emperor William obtained permission from the Czar for him to stop +over and to be initiated into the secret of Björkö.<a id= +"FNanchor_922"></a><a href="#Footnote_922" class= +"fnanchor">[922]</a> After a cordial interview with Prince Bülow at +Berlin,<a id="FNanchor_923"></a><a href="#Footnote_923" class= +"fnanchor">[923]</a> M. Witte journeyed to Rominten where he +received an almost royal welcome from the Emperor (September 26). +When William II informed him of the signing of the alliance at +Björkö, the Russian statesman, according to the Emperor, wept tears +of joy. M. Witte proposed that the German and the Russian +ambassadors be given instructions to co-operate on all possible +questions as a means of persuading France to enter the new grouping +voluntarily and of preparing the world for this momentous event. In +the meantime, he advised that the accord be kept closely secret. He +promised to do his part in “using this foundation for the +construction of a good house.” Overjoyed at his success, William II +accepted these suggestions. In a letter to the Czar carried by M. +Witte he made<span class="pagenum" id="Page_300">[300]</span> this +proposal for the co-operation of their foreign +representatives:<a id="FNanchor_924"></a><a href="#Footnote_924" +class="fnanchor">[924]</a> “This common exposal of a common cause,” +he wrote, “will not fail to impress the world that our relations +have become closer and thus slowly prepare your Allies the French +for the new orientation which their policy must take for the entry +into our treaty.”<a id="FNanchor_925"></a><a href="#Footnote_925" +class="fnanchor">[925]</a></p> + +<p>In the conversations with M. Witte, who was not shown a copy of +the treaty itself, the Emperor represented the accord as much less +binding upon Franco-Russian relations than was really the +case.<a id="FNanchor_926"></a><a href="#Footnote_926" class= +"fnanchor">[926]</a> On his side, M. Witte, anxious to have the +support of William II in regaining the good graces of the Czar and +harboring some vague ideas about the desirability of a Continental +grouping, was easily charmed by the Emperor into approval of the +project. When he reached St. Petersburg, September 28, he urged +upon the French Ambassador the need of a Dual Alliance-German +coalition as a reply to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. M. Bompard +naturally rejected the idea.<a id="FNanchor_927"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_927" class="fnanchor">[927]</a> When Count Witte (he had +just been ennobled) protested to him the Emperor William’s love for +France and his attachment to the Dual Alliance, the Ambassador +significantly asked, “Does not the Emperor’s love for the Dual +Alliance extend so far that he wished to join it?”<a id= +"FNanchor_928"></a><a href="#Footnote_928" class= +"fnanchor">[928]</a> Count Lamsdorff, even less sympathetic, showed +to Count Witte the actual treaty and wrathfully denounced it. The +latter began to recover from the social intoxication<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_301">[301]</span> of his visit to Germany and to +perceive that the treaty would have to be annulled.<a id= +"FNanchor_929"></a><a href="#Footnote_929" class= +"fnanchor">[929]</a></p> + +<p>Count Lamsdorff, Count Witte, M. Nelidow, and the Grand Duke +Nicholas, who was initiated into the secret, all joined forces in +persuading the Czar. By appealing to their master’s sense of honor +and loyalty to the alliance made by his revered father, they +succeeded in winning the unhappy ruler’s consent to a compromise. +He acknowledged that the treaty of Björkö and the terms of the Dual +Alliance were in contradiction, and agreed that before the former +became operative either Germany should be brought to change it in +such a way that it would not affect France or that the French +government should be moved to a scrutiny of the terms of the Dual +Alliance “in the sense of a more or less close association with +this defensive Triple Alliance.” Thus, simultaneous attempts were +to be made to persuade either France or Germany to change the terms +of her alliance.<a id="FNanchor_930"></a><a href="#Footnote_930" +class="fnanchor">[930]</a></p> + +<p>It very soon became apparent that the French government would +never accept the Björkö treaty. When M. Nelidow broached to M. +Rouvier on October 4 the idea of alliance with Germany which his +government claimed President Roosevelt also favored, the Premier +repeated his former assertions on this question. He, in turn, +stated his complete approval of an Anglo-Russian<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_302">[302]</span> accord.<a id= +"FNanchor_931"></a><a href="#Footnote_931" class= +"fnanchor">[931]</a> Again on October 18 the Russian Ambassador +reported that during a most intimate conversation with M. Rouvier +he had pressed the arguments in favor of a Continental alliance +against Great Britain only to receive from the Premier the +following emphatic reply:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>We have aggressive intentions toward no one. We have given clear +proof of our love of peace. Thirty-five years ago after a war +unfortunate for us two provinces were taken away and we had to pay +several billion francs for peace. Our nation submitted, and since +then we have endeavored to avoid any cause for conflict or +misunderstanding. To avoid difficulties which threatened to come to +a head, I recently ventured to wound the pride of my country a +little. But one cannot demand more of us. The nation would not +tolerate a closer <em>rapprochement</em> with Germany. It cannot +forget what it has suffered from her, of which suffering it has +just been reminded in a careless and purposeless way. An alliance +with Germany is impossible. The government is obliged to regard the +feelings of the country.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">As M. Nelidow commented in his dispatch, this was +M. Rouvier’s final reaction. It destroyed the possibility of +France’s entering a Continental alliance so completely that even +the Czar had to acknowledge the fact.<a id= +"FNanchor_932"></a><a href="#Footnote_932" class= +"fnanchor">[932]</a></p> + +<p>In the meantime, the Czar’s letter of October 7 to William II +arrived in Berlin. It read as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The great question is to draw France into our new defensive +Alliance. . . . . But if France were to refuse to join us, then, +not only would Art. IV drop away, but also the meaning of Art. I +would change radically, because its obligations in the <em>present +wording</em> point at any European Power and France too—Russia’s +ally. During your stay at Bjorkoe I did not have with me the +documents signed by my Father. . . . . The first steps taken with +the object of trying to find out, whether the French Government +could be induced to join our new treaty, showed us that it is a +difficult task and that<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_303">[303]</span> it will take a long time to prepare to +bring it over of its free will. . . . . Therefore I think that the +coming into force of the Bjorkoe treaty ought to be <em>put off +until</em> we know how France will look upon it. In case she +absolutely refuses to join our two countries, it will be necessary +to change the wordings of articles I and IV so as to bring them +into full accordance with Russia’s obligations towards France, +since the formation of the Triple Alliance in 1890. I shall do my +best to get France to join us.<a id="FNanchor_933"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_933" class="fnanchor">[933]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Without consulting the Chancellor, William II replied on October +12 with a refusal:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I fully agree with you, that it will cost time, labour and +patience to induce France to join us both, but the reasonable +people will in future make themselves heard and felt! Our Moroccan +business is regulated to entire satisfaction so that the air is +free for better understanding between us. Our treaty is a very good +base to build upon. We joined hands and signed <em>before God</em> +who heard our vows! I therefore think that the treaty can well come +into existence. But if you wish any changes in the wording or +clauses or provisions for the future or different emergencies—as +for instance the absolute refusal of France, which is improbable—I +gladly await any proposal you will think fit to lay before me. Till +these have been laid before me and are agreed upon, the Treaty must +be adhered to by us as it is.<a id="FNanchor_934"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_934" class="fnanchor">[934]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The Czar, who had expected an acquiescence,<a id= +"FNanchor_935"></a><a href="#Footnote_935" class= +"fnanchor">[935]</a> was in an unhappy plight; no matter which way +he turned he would be accused of breaking his word. Since France +had the prior claim and since the pressure upon him in St. +Petersburg was pro-French, he wrote to William II on November 23 +that to fulfil with equal loyalty the clauses of the Dual Alliance +and those of the treaty of Björkö he would have to add the +following declaration to the latter:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>In view of the difficulties in the way of an immediate adhesion +by the French Government to the treaty of defensive alliance signed +at Björkoe<span class="pagenum" id="Page_304">[304]</span> . . . . +it is understood that Article I of that act shall not have any +application in the eventuality of a war with France and that the +mutual engagements which unite the latter to Russia will be +maintained in full until the establishment of an accord <em>à +trois</em>.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">To soften his refusal the Czar reported that Great +Britain was “trying hard to get us round for an understanding about +Asiatic frontier questions”; but he assured William II that he had +not “the slightest intention of opening negotiations with +her.”<a id="FNanchor_936"></a><a href="#Footnote_936" class= +"fnanchor">[936]</a></p> + +<p>This reply destroyed the entire force of the treaty; it spelled +the failure of Germany’s second effort to ally with Russia. The +German Emperor and his government were bitterly disappointed. In +the answer to the Czar on November 28, based upon a memorandum by +Herr von Holstein, William II did not absolutely say yes or no, but +left it to be understood that Germany still considered the treaty +as binding in spite of the Czar’s declaration.<a id= +"FNanchor_937"></a><a href="#Footnote_937" class= +"fnanchor">[937]</a> On December 2 the Czar refused to accept the +accord without the proposed declaration.<a id= +"FNanchor_938"></a><a href="#Footnote_938" class= +"fnanchor">[938]</a> There the matter rested.</p> + +<p>On January 21, 1906, the Czar wrote to William II that in +keeping with “the real sense of our Bjorkoe treaty,” he had +accepted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_305">[305]</span> a proposal +of President Loubet’s to attach a French general to his person.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I think that this courtesy to France will bring her still closer +to Russia. As long as I can hold her tight she will remain peaceful +and quiet. It seems to me therefore that the continent’s interests +and still more so the interests of Germany can only gain from it. +And with God’s help some day Your right idea of forming a new +“triple alliance” will become a solid reality.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">In sending this letter to Prince Bülow on January +23 the Emperor wrote:<a id="FNanchor_939"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_939" class="fnanchor">[939]</a></p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I am sending you herewith another precious, bungling effort from +the youthful idealist on the Russian throne! The latest phase of +the Russo-Gallic Alliance borders on the ridiculous, but show’s how +in Paris—at London’s suggestion?—a counter blow is immediately +struck against every <em>rapprochement</em> between the two +Emperors; every time, the little Czar by reason of the “ancient +alliance” immediately falls or is won over by Lamsdorff. That he +speaks on “my” idea of a triple alliance, as if I were receiving a +special favor thereby, is really more than childish or naïve! . . . +. And all that is served to me from behind a tear-drenched mask of +eternal, most intimate friendship! How long will it be until he +will have an “English general” at his side, naturally only in order +to realize “my” ideal of world peace, and then a Japanese general +to calm the oriental peoples, and finally an American general! His +Majesty ought to be ashamed before his and my ancestors and before +me to do such things, to write such letters to me, which Lamsdorff +has dictated to him!</p> +</div> + +<p>Thus the results of Björkö upon Russo-German relations were +entirely different from those anticipated by the two rulers. By +overreaching himself, by seeking a too-brilliant success without +adequate preparation, the German Emperor alienated the Czar, who +felt that he had played an ignominious rôle.<a id= +"FNanchor_940"></a><a href="#Footnote_940" class= +"fnanchor">[940]</a> The consequence was that Russia again drew +nearer to France<a id="FNanchor_941"></a><a href="#Footnote_941" +class="fnanchor">[941]</a> and began to look with more favor upon +British overtures. Germany’s effort to restore her dominant +position in Europe and to prevent<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_306">[306]</span> the dreaded encirclement by means of a +Russian alliance resulted, therefore, in preparing the ground for +the very act which Germany most feared, the formation of an +Anglo-Russo-French entente.</p> + +<h3>V</h3> + +<p>The German bid at Björkö for Russia’s friendship and the rumors +of what had happened there—approaching more and more nearly the +truth by October<a id="FNanchor_942"></a><a href="#Footnote_942" +class="fnanchor">[942]</a>—inevitably aroused rival efforts by +Great Britain. The British policy of obtaining an understanding +with Russia was complex. Defeat by Japan and revolution within made +Russia discouraged and powerless, and broke the prestige of the +chauvinistic, militaristic groups for the time being.<a id= +"FNanchor_943"></a><a href="#Footnote_943" class= +"fnanchor">[943]</a> To complete the prophylactic work of fixing +adequate restraints to the Russian expansive energy, Great Britain +renewed prematurely her alliance with Japan in August, 1905, +modifying the terms so that the alliance became effective in case +of an attack by one Power and not only China specifically but also +the “regions of Eastern Asia and of India” were included within its +scope.<a id="FNanchor_944"></a><a href="#Footnote_944" class= +"fnanchor">[944]</a> Then the British government hoped that Russia, +with no other alternative, would make a satisfactory settlement of +their Asiatic differences.<a id="FNanchor_945"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_945" class="fnanchor">[945]</a></p> + +<p>In the previous May, Sir Charles Hardinge, British ambassador at +St. Petersburg, had carried King Edward’s most cordial greetings to +the Russian Foreign Minister. With marked pleasure, Count Lamsdorff +had replied that the maintenance of peace and good relations with +Great Britain was <em>mon culte et ma religion</em>. Remarking to +the Ambassador that “interested parties” were trying to stir up +discord between their countries, the Count<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_307">[307]</span> said that these endeavors must be +frustrated. Count Lamsdorff, wrote the Ambassador to his +government,</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">thoroughly realized the actual difficulties of the +situation, but he was full of confidence that at the end of this +miserable war both Governments would find a means of arriving at a +satisfactory arrangement of all outstanding differences in the same +manner as the Anglo-French arrangement had been made.<a id= +"FNanchor_946"></a><a href="#Footnote_946" class= +"fnanchor">[946]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Russia and Japan agreed upon terms of peace on September 5. +Three days later, Sir Charles Hardinge notified Count Lamsdorff of +the new Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and assured him most earnestly +that it was one of national insurance, that Great Britain was +absolutely sincere in her desire for peace and friendly relations, +and that she had no wish “to interfere with the legitimate activity +of Russia” or “to seek a policy of aggrandizement at her expense.” +Count Lamsdorff replied that he remained convinced of the value of +an agreement and repeated that a third party was trying to arouse +hostility between Great Britain and Russia. However, when Sir +Charles Hardinge alluded to the possibility of resuming the +previous negotiations at a future date, the Foreign Minister +responded “that he was most anxious that they should be brought to +a successful issue but that they should not be unduly +hastened.”<a id="FNanchor_947"></a><a href="#Footnote_947" class= +"fnanchor">[947]</a></p> + +<p>This cool reply to the British sounding was caused partly by the +pressing need at that time to annul the Björkö treaty, but +primarily by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, whose renewal at that +moment Russia had not expected. Interpreting it as another blow to +a state already humiliated by defeat, Russian public opinion +denounced the treaty.<a id="FNanchor_948"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_948" class="fnanchor">[948]</a> Thinking that the +Russian animosity would pass, Lord Lansdowne proposed on October 3 +a way of bringing the two countries closer together.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_308">[308]</span>My own feeling +was [he said to the Russian ambassador] that it would be a mistake +to attempt too much, or to allow it to be understood that the two +countries were on the eve of a comprehensive transaction analogous +to that which had taken place between France and Great Britain. My +idea of the procedure to be followed was rather that we should take +up in detail any outstanding points as to which differences of +opinion had manifested themselves and endeavour to dispose of +these, and that we should then pass on to others, if we found that +our work proceeded successfully.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Although the Russian Foreign Minister was gratified +at the expression of British good will, he replied that</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">he could give no answer of a definite character, +but, speaking privately, he could say that the Treaty had had a +very bad effect and had left an unpleasant impression upon the mind +of the Emperor, and he would recommend our Ambassador, as a friend, +not to press for an answer as it might be a disagreeable one, nor +to open negotiations as to a definite treaty between England and +Russia as to their interests in Asia.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Count Benckendorff even remarked that “any +arrangement . . . . should not be conceived in a spirit of +hostility towards Germany”—an implication which the British Foreign +Secretary repudiated with force.<a id="FNanchor_949"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_949" class="fnanchor">[949]</a></p> + +<p>Greatly alarmed at Russian soundings about a Continental +coalition against Great Britain, the French government in October +tried several times to bring Russia and Great Britain together, +even on any minor question.<a id="FNanchor_950"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_950" class="fnanchor">[950]</a> In view of the Russian +reserve, no definite proposals were made.<a id= +"FNanchor_951"></a><a href="#Footnote_951" class= +"fnanchor">[951]</a> By October 21, however, the<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_309">[309]</span> French and British governments +were certain that the danger of a Russo-German combination was +past.<a id="FNanchor_952"></a><a href="#Footnote_952" class= +"fnanchor">[952]</a> Shortly thereafter President Roosevelt, to the +content of those governments, entirely denied that he favored a +Continental grouping against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.<a id= +"FNanchor_953"></a><a href="#Footnote_953" class= +"fnanchor">[953]</a> When King Edward learned the truth about the +Björkö affair in the autumn, he could with some relief describe his +nephew, the Emperor William, as “the most brilliant failure in +history.”<a id="FNanchor_954"></a><a href="#Footnote_954" class= +"fnanchor">[954]</a></p> + +<p>While these conversations were unsuccessful, Sir Charles +Hardinge thought that “the improvement which has already shown +itself in the relations between England and Russia only requires +careful fostering to bear fruit in due season.”<a id= +"FNanchor_955"></a><a href="#Footnote_955" class= +"fnanchor">[955]</a> To that end it was necessary for the two +governments to find some opportunity for disinterested +co-operation—an opportunity which the Conference of Algeciras was +to afford—and for Russian public opinion to reciprocate the +amicable feelings of the British so that an Anglo-Russian +understanding would be built upon a durable basis, like that of the +Entente Cordiale. The British press was doing its share in bringing +about this change of attitude. In fact, British public opinion felt +more relieved than it had in months. The conclusion of the +Russo-Japanese War, the renewal of the<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_310">[310]</span> Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the signing of the +Franco-German agreement of September 28—all cleared the diplomatic +atmosphere. The <em>Matin</em> revelations on October 5 concerning +the supposed British offer of alliance to France in the previous +summer placed Great Britain in a somewhat embarrassing position +before the world as a disturber of peace. Moreover, it was +recognized that Anglo-German animosity had almost caused a +Russo-German alliance, and that, to make a settlement with Russia, +Great Britain should restore better relations with Germany.<a id= +"FNanchor_956"></a><a href="#Footnote_956" class= +"fnanchor">[956]</a> So British public opinion was ready to be +friendly with Russia, and, in part, with Germany. During the +autumn, sections of the British people, although not the +government, tried to smooth over the animosities with Germany. A +meeting was held in London early in December for that purpose at +which eminent politicians, business men, representatives of the +press, clergymen, and others were present to further the +work.<a id="FNanchor_957"></a><a href="#Footnote_957" class= +"fnanchor">[957]</a> As German public opinion responded to these +efforts, a general <em>détente</em> set in.<a id= +"FNanchor_958"></a><a href="#Footnote_958" class= +"fnanchor">[958]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc15"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_865"></a><a href="#FNanchor_865"><span class= +"label">[865]</span></a>On these differences see Mühlberg to +Metternich, July 18, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 638, No. 6863 and +following documents; Lee, <em>King Edward VII</em>, II, 334 ff., +346 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_866"></a><a href="#FNanchor_866"><span class= +"label">[866]</span></a>Even Lascelles, British ambassador at +Berlin, admitted to Metternich that “in a Franco-German war in view +of the prevailing opinion here [in England] England would be +actively on the French side.” See Metternich to Bülow, July 19 and +22, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 639 f., No. 6864; 646 ff., No. 6867; +Bülow to Metternich, July 22, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 641 ff., No. +6866.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_867"></a><a href="#FNanchor_867"><span class= +"label">[867]</span></a>William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, XXX, 497, No. 6237.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_868"></a><a href="#FNanchor_868"><span class= +"label">[868]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., July 20, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 435 f., No. 6206. The telegrams between the two +rulers were in English.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_869"></a><a href="#FNanchor_869"><span class= +"label">[869]</span></a>See the correspondence between Holstein and +Bülow, July 21-24, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 436 ff., Nos. 6203-14. It +was Holstein who determined the whole policy of the German foreign +office on this question. Bülow served only as his mouthpiece. +Richthofen and Metternich, and also General Moltke (who in 1906 +became chief of staff), were all opposed to the project of +alliance, but their opinions were either not asked or were +disregarded. See Bülow to F. O., Aug. 9, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 488, +No. 6235; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 2, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, XX, +659 ff., No. 6871; Eckardstein, <em>Lebenserinnerungen und +politische Denkwürdigkeiten</em>, III, 167.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_870"></a><a href="#FNanchor_870"><span class= +"label">[870]</span></a>They conversed in English. In the Emperor’s +account of the interview he gives the Czar’s statements in that +language.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_871"></a><a href="#FNanchor_871"><span class= +"label">[871]</span></a>The Czar was also unpleasantly surprised to +learn that King Edward VII was supporting the candidacy of his +son-in-law, Prince Carl of Denmark, for the Norwegian throne. +Nicholas II favored Prince Waldemar, Carl’s younger brother, while +the Emperor favored choosing a member of the House of Bernadotte. +It looked to him, said Nicholas, as if Great Britain were +endeavoring thereby to get her fingers on Norway with the possible +purpose of acquiring the port of Christiansund from which to block +the Skaggerrack. See the references given in the succeeding +footnote.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_872"></a><a href="#FNanchor_872"><span class= +"label">[872]</span></a>“Watchwords of the Common Brethren for +1905.” It was a book of proverbs.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_873"></a><a href="#FNanchor_873"><span class= +"label">[873]</span></a>There is another account of the meeting +written by Bülow on Aug. 18 immediately after a talk with the +Emperor which does not agree in all details with this one written +by the Emperor on the day after the meeting occurred. The two +versions supplement each other. But the one of July 25 reproduces +better the atmosphere in which the affair took place. The other +version is as follows: The Czar declared that he wished to go hand +in hand with the Emperor, his only friend. The latter asked why the +treaty had not been signed in the previous autumn. The reply was +that France had opposed it, that he (the Czar) had had to maintain +the Dual Alliance, and that France and Germany had been hostile. +The Emperor then said that those relations were better, that he +wished France and Germany to become friends, that the Moroccan +question was to be used for that purpose, and that an understanding +over it would certainly be reached. The Czar replied that if that +were the case then nothing stood in the way of a Russo-German +treaty. The Emperor then produced a copy of the treaty and it was +signed immediately. See memo. by Bülow, Aug. 18, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 502 f., No. 6240. The other accounts of the +Björkö interview are as follows: Tschirschky to Bülow, July 24, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 454 ff., No. 6218; William II to Bülow, July +25, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 458 ff., No. 6220; Bülow to F. O., July +24, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 452, No. 6215; Witte, <em>Memoirs</em>, +p. 428; Savinsky, <em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, XII (1922), 798 +f.; Savinsky, <em>Recollections of a Russian Diplomat</em>, p. 115; +Helmuth von Moltke, <em>Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente, +1877-1916</em> (Stuttgart, 1922), pp. 325 ff. The treaty was +countersigned by Grand Duke Michael, Tschirschky, and Admiral +Birileff, the last two apparently without reading it. The Grand +Duke was asked to sign it because William II feared that Nicholas +II might be deposed and Michael made czar. Naturally he did not +mention his reason.</p> + +<p>The Czar wished to consider an agreement guaranteeing to the +King of Denmark the possession of his territory, so that in case of +war Russia and Germany would be sure of being able to defend the +Baltic Sea north of the Belt. A declaration of Danish neutrality +would not suffice, Nicholas argued to the Emperor, because in case +the opponent did not respect it and seized the territory as a base +of operation, Germany and Russia would be in a difficult situation. +But the Emperor, who together with his government was opposed to +touching this important question, put Nicholas off with a promise +to consider the matter with Bülow.</p> + +<p>The Emperor also urged the Czar at this interview to grant to +the Russian people a habeas corpus act which would guarantee their +civil liberties, and to call a general council of state to consider +the question of a constitution.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_874"></a><a href="#FNanchor_874"><span class= +"label">[874]</span></a><em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 459.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_875"></a><a href="#FNanchor_875"><span class= +"label">[875]</span></a>Goetz, <em>Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren +1894-1914</em>, p. 374.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_876"></a><a href="#FNanchor_876"><span class= +"label">[876]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., July 25, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 453 f., No. 6217; Holstein to Bülow, July 25, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 457 f., No. 6219.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_877"></a><a href="#FNanchor_877"><span class= +"label">[877]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., July 27, Aug. 9, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 470 f., Nos. 6224 f.; 488 ff., No. 6235.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_878"></a><a href="#FNanchor_878"><span class= +"label">[878]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., July 26, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 467 f., No. 6222; 476 f., No. 6228.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_879"></a><a href="#FNanchor_879"><span class= +"label">[879]</span></a>The German government was particularly +concerned lest Roosevelt become mistrustful on account of this +interview and the conclusion of an alliance with Russia. It even +considered imparting the terms of the treaty to him, but in view of +the need for secrecy decided not to. Instead, on July 28, the +Emperor wrote personally to Roosevelt making it appear that the +interview dealt only with matters pertaining to the Russo-Japanese +negotiations for peace (Mühlberg to Bussche-Haddenhausen, July 28, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 614, No. 6319). On this discussion about +whether to notify Roosevelt of the accord see <em>ibid.</em>, Nos. +6203, 6206-8, 6221, 6223.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_880"></a><a href="#FNanchor_880"><span class= +"label">[880]</span></a>He meant the one Germany feared of Russia, +France, Great Britain, and Japan.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_881"></a><a href="#FNanchor_881"><span class= +"label">[881]</span></a>Holstein to Bülow, July 26, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 468 ff., No. 6223; memo. by Holstein, July 28, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 474 ff., No. 6227.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_882"></a><a href="#FNanchor_882"><span class= +"label">[882]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., July 28, Aug. 5, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 476 f., No. 6228; 482 f., No. 6231.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_883"></a><a href="#FNanchor_883"><span class= +"label">[883]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., July 30, Aug. 5 and 9, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 477 ff., No. 6229; 485 ff., No. 6233; 488 +ff., No. 6235.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_884"></a><a href="#FNanchor_884"><span class= +"label">[884]</span></a>Bülow to William II, July 30, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 477 ff., No. 6229; Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 5, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 483 f., No. 6232.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_885"></a><a href="#FNanchor_885"><span class= +"label">[885]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Aug. 2, 5, 9, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 481 ff., Nos. 6230 f.; 488 ff., No. 6235.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_886"></a><a href="#FNanchor_886"><span class= +"label">[886]</span></a>Bülow to William II, July 24, 27, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 452, No. 6216; 471 ff., No. 6226; Bülow to F. O., +July 27-29, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 471, No. 6225; 476 ff., Nos. 6228 +f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_887"></a><a href="#FNanchor_887"><span class= +"label">[887]</span></a>It is highly probable that Bülow took this +step not so much because of defects in the treaty, but rather +because the Emperor had disregarded his authority by making those +important changes without consulting him. Under the persuasion of +Richthofen he took this course in order to uphold his authority and +to teach the Emperor a lesson (Eckardstein, III, 166; editor’s note +in <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 481 f., note).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_888"></a><a href="#FNanchor_888"><span class= +"label">[888]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 482 f., No. 6231; 488 ff., No. 6235.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_889"></a><a href="#FNanchor_889"><span class= +"label">[889]</span></a>William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 496 ff., No. 6237.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_890"></a><a href="#FNanchor_890"><span class= +"label">[890]</span></a>Bülow to F. O., Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 482 f., No. 6231; 485 ff., No. 6233; 488 ff., No. +6235.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_891"></a><a href="#FNanchor_891"><span class= +"label">[891]</span></a>Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 5, 6, 14, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 483 f., No. 6232; 487 f., No. 6234; 501, No. 6239; +Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 10, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 493 ff., No. +6236; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 12, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 498 ff., No. +6238; memo. by Bülow, Aug. 18, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 502 f., No. +6240.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_892"></a><a href="#FNanchor_892"><span class= +"label">[892]</span></a>Meyer to Roosevelt, Aug. 1, 1905, quoted in +Howe, <em>George von Lengerke Meyer</em>, p. 188.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_893"></a><a href="#FNanchor_893"><span class= +"label">[893]</span></a>Schulthess, <em>Europäischer +Geschichtskalender 1905</em>, p. 195.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_894"></a><a href="#FNanchor_894"><span class= +"label">[894]</span></a>Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 10, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 495, No. 6236.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_895"></a><a href="#FNanchor_895"><span class= +"label">[895]</span></a>Memo. by Spring Rice for a letter to +Roosevelt, July 10, 1905, Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Aug. 10, +1905, quoted in Gwynn, <em>The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil +Spring Rice</em>, I, 476, 484.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_896"></a><a href="#FNanchor_896"><span class= +"label">[896]</span></a>Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 1, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 648 f., No. 6868; Mühlberg to William II, Aug. +4, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 649 ff., No. 6869; Metternich to Bülow, +Aug. 14, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 651 ff., No. 6870. The Emperor did +not fear an attack at the time, but certainly at some later date. +He thought that the maneuvers were meant to remind Denmark that she +was an outpost for Great Britain just as Portugal was and that she +must not be too familiar with Germany. And with an English princess +married into the Swedish royal family and King Edward’s son-in-law +seeking the Norwegian throne, he feared that Norway would also +become a British satellite (William II to Bülow, July 30, 1905, +quoted in a dispatch from Bülow to F. O., July 30, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, XIX, 477 ff., No. 6229). Even so sane a person as +General Moltke, who in the next year became chief of staff, +confided to his diary on July 30, 1905: “The visit of the Channel +Fleet in the Baltic announced by England is to be regarded as a +demonstration. . . . . The English are inciting in the most +unbelievable fashion, they are telling the most despicable lies +about us, and are representing Germany as the evil spirit in the +whole world. . . . . The future lies dark before us. May Germany +have the strength to bear difficult times” (Moltke, p. 331).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_897"></a><a href="#FNanchor_897"><span class= +"label">[897]</span></a>4 Hansard, Vol. CLI, cols. 113, 122, 136 +ff., 143.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_898"></a><a href="#FNanchor_898"><span class= +"label">[898]</span></a>Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 1, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 648 f., No. 6868; Mühlberg to William II, Aug. +4, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 649 ff., No. 6869. As a matter of fact, +the maneuvers had been planned for some time, and to begin with had +no political significance. No direct connection existed between +their inception and the meeting at Björkö, but it is very probable +that the British government was not at all averse to their +occurring at the time (cf. Bradford, <em>Life of Wilson</em>, p. +200). Wilson was in command of the British fleet (see also +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 478, editor’s note).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_899"></a><a href="#FNanchor_899"><span class= +"label">[899]</span></a>Schulthess, <em>1905</em>, pp. 109, 113; +Bradford, p. 205.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_900"></a><a href="#FNanchor_900"><span class= +"label">[900]</span></a>The German government learned of this fact +in August but not of its approval by the British government. See +Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 14, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 658, No. +6870; Lee, II, 348, 353. On the quarrels of King Edward and his +German nephew see Lee, II, 346 ff.; <em>G.P.</em>, 648 ff., Nos. +6868, 6870; Newton, <em>Lord Lansdowne</em>, p. 330.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_901"></a><a href="#FNanchor_901"><span class= +"label">[901]</span></a>William II to Nicholas II, Aug. 22, 1905, +Goetz, p. 377; Hardinge to Lansdowne, Aug. 1, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, +IV, 95 f., No. 91 and editor’s note; Newton, pp. 337 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_902"></a><a href="#FNanchor_902"><span class= +"label">[902]</span></a>Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, +<em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, p. 477.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_903"></a><a href="#FNanchor_903"><span class= +"label">[903]</span></a><em>Zur europ. Politik</em>, II, 65 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_904"></a><a href="#FNanchor_904"><span class= +"label">[904]</span></a>Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, Oct. 15, +1905, <em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, pp. 477, 491; Radolin +to Bülow, July 25, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 426 ff., No. 6198; M. +Bompard states that Witte used the word “alli” (Bompard, “Le traité +de Bjoerkoe,” <em>Revue de Paris</em>, XXV [May 15, 1918], +438).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_905"></a><a href="#FNanchor_905"><span class= +"label">[905]</span></a>Bompard, XXV, 432; Witte, p. 415; +<em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, XX, 174 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_906"></a><a href="#FNanchor_906"><span class= +"label">[906]</span></a>Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, +<em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, p. 477.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_907"></a><a href="#FNanchor_907"><span class= +"label">[907]</span></a>Bompard, XXV, 432 f.; Bourgeois et Pagès, +<em>Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre</em>, +p. 313.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_908"></a><a href="#FNanchor_908"><span class= +"label">[908]</span></a>Bompard, XXV, 424 f. Just when Bompard +learned this fact is not evident, but apparently he did so soon +after the interview. Cf. Hardinge to Lansdowne, Aug. 3, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 127, No. 168.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_909"></a><a href="#FNanchor_909"><span class= +"label">[909]</span></a>Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, +<em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, pp. 477 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_910"></a><a href="#FNanchor_910"><span class= +"label">[910]</span></a>There are various statements about the date +upon which Lamsdorff learned of the treaty. See Iswolsky, +<em>Recollections of a Foreign Minister</em>, pp. 49 f.; Savinsky, +<em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, XII (1922), 798; A. Nekludow, +“Autour de l’entrevue de Bjoerkoe,” <em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, +March 1, 1918, p. 139; Nekludow was a secretary in the Russian +embassy in Paris in 1905 (Witte, p. 426; Savinsky, p. 114). The +correct date is given in a dispatch from Lamsdorff to Nelidow on +Oct. 9, where the Foreign Minister stated that he was first told of +the treaty by the Czar just before the latter’s departure for +Finland on Aug. 30 (or Sept. 12, according to the new calendar). +See <em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, p. 487. The Czar +excused his delay to Lamsdorff on the grounds that he had promised +William II to preserve secrecy. See <em>ibid.</em>, p. 487; +Savinsky, <em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, XII (1922), 798 f.; cf. +Iswolsky, pp. 49 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_911"></a><a href="#FNanchor_911"><span class= +"label">[911]</span></a>There is no substantiation in <em>G.P.</em> +for the assertion by Savinsky that the Czar told Lamsdorff that +William II had asked him then to make known the accord to the +French government (Savinsky, <em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, XII +[1922], 799; Savinsky, p. 115).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_912"></a><a href="#FNanchor_912"><span class= +"label">[912]</span></a>Savinsky, <em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, +XII (1922), 799; Savinsky, pp. 115 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 49 f.; +Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 9, 1905, <em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, +Nov., 1924, pp. 486 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_913"></a><a href="#FNanchor_913"><span class= +"label">[913]</span></a>This was certainly the case. Even apart +from the fact that the military clauses of the Dual Alliance +provided for a war against Germany, the political clauses as +revised in 1899 stated the aim of the alliance to be “the +maintenance of the general peace and of the European balance of +power” (Pribram, <em>The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary</em>, +II, 206 ff.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_914"></a><a href="#FNanchor_914"><span class= +"label">[914]</span></a>Nekludow, <em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, +March 1, 1918, pp. 137 f.; Savinsky, <em>ibid.</em>, XII (1922), +799 ff.; Witte, p. 425; Savinsky, pp. 115 ff.; Lamsdorff to +Nelidow, Oct. 9, Sept. 28, 1905, <em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., +1924, pp. 480 f., 486 ff.; Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Oct. 5, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, p. 483.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_915"></a><a href="#FNanchor_915"><span class= +"label">[915]</span></a>Savinsky, <em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, +XII (1922), 800 ff.; Savinsky, pp. 118 ff., 126 f.; Lamsdorff to +Nelidow, Oct. 6 and 9, 1905, <em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., +1924, pp. 485 ff.; Witte, pp. 415 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 44, 49.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_916"></a><a href="#FNanchor_916"><span class= +"label">[916]</span></a>Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Sept. 14, 1905, +<em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, p. 478.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_917"></a><a href="#FNanchor_917"><span class= +"label">[917]</span></a>Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Sept. 21, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, pp. 479 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_918"></a><a href="#FNanchor_918"><span class= +"label">[918]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, July 25, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 93 f., No. 89; Spring Rice to G. Balfour, July +29, 1905, and Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905, Gwynn, +I, 481 f., 496.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_919"></a><a href="#FNanchor_919"><span class= +"label">[919]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, July 22, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 426 ff., No. 6198. On July 26 the German +government was about to inaugurate a press campaign against Witte, +thinking that he was pro-British (Bülow to F. O., July 26, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 468, No. 6222).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_920"></a><a href="#FNanchor_920"><span class= +"label">[920]</span></a>See Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 4, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 205, No. 195.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_921"></a><a href="#FNanchor_921"><span class= +"label">[921]</span></a>Witte, pp. 293 f., 416 f.; Dillon, <em>The +Eclipse of Russia</em>, pp. 350 f.; Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 23, +1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 503 f., No. 6241; Witte’s interview in +<em>Le Temps</em>, reprinted in <em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, XX, +439; Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Oct. 15, 1905, +<em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, p. 491; Lee, II, 307 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_922"></a><a href="#FNanchor_922"><span class= +"label">[922]</span></a>William II to Bülow, Sept. 25, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 505, No. 6242.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_923"></a><a href="#FNanchor_923"><span class= +"label">[923]</span></a>At the Emperor’s request Bülow said nothing +to him about the Björkö treaty. See Bülow to William II, Sept. 25, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 505 ff., No. 6243.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_924"></a><a href="#FNanchor_924"><span class= +"label">[924]</span></a>On the meeting at Rominten see the +following: Witte, pp. 416 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 50 ff.; Dillon, pp. +396 f.; Goetz, pp. 379 ff.; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 27, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 507 f., Nos. 6244 f.; William II to Bülow, +Sept. 27, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 508 ff., No. 6246.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_925"></a><a href="#FNanchor_925"><span class= +"label">[925]</span></a>William II to Nicholas II, Sept. 26, 1905, +Goetz, pp. 379 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_926"></a><a href="#FNanchor_926"><span class= +"label">[926]</span></a>Bülow instructed the Emperor to that +effect. See Bülow to William II, Sept. 25, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, +XIX, 506, No. 6243. See the dispatch from the Emperor to Bülow on +Sept. 27, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 508 ff., No. 6246.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_927"></a><a href="#FNanchor_927"><span class= +"label">[927]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1 and 4, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 202 f., No. 193; 205 f., No. 195.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_928"></a><a href="#FNanchor_928"><span class= +"label">[928]</span></a>Bompard, XXV, 441 f.; Bourgeois et Pagès, +pp. 318 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_929"></a><a href="#FNanchor_929"><span class= +"label">[929]</span></a>In his memoirs Witte represented himself +the dupe of the two rulers; when he read the document itself, he +wrote, he was horrified. He claimed that he was largely responsible +for the annulment of the treaty (Witte, pp. 425 ff.; Dillon, pp. +358 ff., 354, 413 f.; cf. Savinsky, p. 125). These accounts by him +were both of a much later date, when he had been out of favor for +several years and held a deep grudge against his master. +Consequently he wanted to paint the latter’s perfidy toward France +as black as possible. That Witte thought the treaty so harmful at +the time is difficult to believe. See his letter to Eulenburg, Oct. +8, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 519 f., No. 6250, Anlage; Witte, p. +424; Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1 and 4, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, IV, +202 f., No. 193; 205 ff., No. 195; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, +Oct. 5, 1905, Gwynn, I, 496 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_930"></a><a href="#FNanchor_930"><span class= +"label">[930]</span></a>See the following: Witte, pp. 427 ff.; +Iswolsky, pp. 54 ff.; Savinsky, <em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, XII +(1922), 801; Dillon, pp. 361 ff.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 9 and +27, 1905, <em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, pp. 487, 495; +Bompard, XXV, 422 ff.; Savinsky, pp. 120 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_931"></a><a href="#FNanchor_931"><span class= +"label">[931]</span></a>Lamsdorff met with a similar response from +Bompard. According to the latter, Lamsdorff suggested a combination +of Russia, France, Germany, and the United States as a counterpoise +to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, “in the same manner that the +political equilibrium of Europe was maintained by the Dual and +Triple Alliances.” See Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 211 f., No. 198; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, +Oct. 5 and 15, 1905, Gwynn, I, 497, 501 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_932"></a><a href="#FNanchor_932"><span class= +"label">[932]</span></a>Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Oct. 5, 15, 18, 1905, +<em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, pp. 481 f., 489 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_933"></a><a href="#FNanchor_933"><span class= +"label">[933]</span></a>Nicholas II to William II, Oct. 7, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 512 f., No. 6247.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_934"></a><a href="#FNanchor_934"><span class= +"label">[934]</span></a>William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 12, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 514, No. 6248; William II to Bülow, Oct. 12 and 17, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 515 ff., Nos. 6249 f. The reply to Witte was +made by Eulenburg at the same time. See Bülow to Eulenburg, Oct. +18, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 520 f., No. 6251; Eulenburg to Witte, +Oct., 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 521, No. 6252. Cf. Bompard, XXV, 443 +ff. Bülow approved of the line taken by his master, for he +earnestly desired to continue the negotiations (Bülow to Eulenburg, +Oct. 18, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 520, No. 6251).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_935"></a><a href="#FNanchor_935"><span class= +"label">[935]</span></a>Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 12, 1905, +<em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, p. 488.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_936"></a><a href="#FNanchor_936"><span class= +"label">[936]</span></a>The letter was delivered by Osten-Sacken, +Russian ambassador at Berlin, to give it full official character. +See <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 522 ff., No. 6254 and Anlage. The Czar +approved this reply as early as Nov. 10. Lamsdorff to Osten-Sacken, +undated though bearing the date of approval by Nicholas II of Nov. +10. See <em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>, Nov., 1924, pp. 495 f.; +Iswolsky, pp. 55 f.; Bompard, XXV, 443 ff.; Witte, p. 429; +Savinsky, pp. 123 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_937"></a><a href="#FNanchor_937"><span class= +"label">[937]</span></a>William II to Bülow, Nov. 26, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 524 f., No. 6255. The Emperor thought that +Russia had shown little appreciation of German friendship during +the recent war, and he declared to Bülow that the coalition of +Russia, France, and Great Britain was <em>de facto</em> already +existent. In the same letter he stated that Germany alone, since +Russia refused her aid, must win France to the new project. For the +reply to the Czar see William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 26 and 28, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 526 f., Nos. 6256 f. That the German +government continued to hold the alliance as valid is seen from a +memorandum composed by the foreign office for the Emperor just +before the latter’s meeting with the Czar at Swinemünde, July, 1907 +(<em>ibid.</em>, p. 528 n.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_938"></a><a href="#FNanchor_938"><span class= +"label">[938]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, 527 f., No. 6528. See also +Bompard, XXV, 447; Witte, p. 429; Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 313.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_939"></a><a href="#FNanchor_939"><span class= +"label">[939]</span></a>Both letters are quoted in <em>G.P.</em>, +XIX, 528 n.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_940"></a><a href="#FNanchor_940"><span class= +"label">[940]</span></a>Nekludow, <em>Revue des deux mondes</em>, +March 1, 1918, pp. 142, 144. See also the correspondence between +the two rulers, Jan. 21 and 29, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 528 n.; +Goetz, p. 386.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_941"></a><a href="#FNanchor_941"><span class= +"label">[941]</span></a>Iswolsky, p. 56.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_942"></a><a href="#FNanchor_942"><span class= +"label">[942]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1, 4, 14, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 202 f., No. 193; 205 ff., No. 195; 211 f., No. +198; Lansdowne to Bertie, Oct. 25, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 217 f., +No. 203.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_943"></a><a href="#FNanchor_943"><span class= +"label">[943]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 6, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 198 f., No. 191.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_944"></a><a href="#FNanchor_944"><span class= +"label">[944]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, chap. xxiv.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_945"></a><a href="#FNanchor_945"><span class= +"label">[945]</span></a>Cf. Bertie to Lansdowne, Sept. 9, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 177, No. 172<em>a</em>; Spring Rice to Mrs. +Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905, Gwynn, I, 498.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_946"></a><a href="#FNanchor_946"><span class= +"label">[946]</span></a>Hardinge to Knollys, May, 1905, Lee, II, +306; Hardinge to Lansdowne, May 30, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, IV, 195 +f., No. 189.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_947"></a><a href="#FNanchor_947"><span class= +"label">[947]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 9, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 178 f., No. 172 (<em>b</em>); Lansdowne to +Hardinge, Sept. 4, 1905, Newton, pp. 327 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_948"></a><a href="#FNanchor_948"><span class= +"label">[948]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 2, 9, 26, +1905, <em>B.D.</em>, IV, 170 f., No. 159; 178 f., No. 172 +(<em>b</em>); 199 ff., No. 192 and following documents.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_949"></a><a href="#FNanchor_949"><span class= +"label">[949]</span></a>Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 3 and 5, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 204 f., No. 194; 207 f., No. 196; Spring Rice to +Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 15, 1905, Gwynn, I, 501.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_950"></a><a href="#FNanchor_950"><span class= +"label">[950]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 4, 8, 14, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 205 ff., No. 195; 208 ff., Nos. 197 f.; +Lansdowne to Bertie, Oct. 17 and 25, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 212 f., +No. 199; 217 f., No. 203.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_951"></a><a href="#FNanchor_951"><span class= +"label">[951]</span></a>See Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 211 f., No. 198, Lansdowne’s minute; +<em>ibid.</em>, pp. 521 f.; report from London, Oct. 30, 1905, +<em>Zur europ. Politik</em>, II, No. 22; report from St. +Petersburg, Nov. 8, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, No. 23; Metternich to +Bülow, Oct. 22, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 663 ff., No. 6360; +Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, XXV, No. 8501; +Richthofen to Bülow, Oct. 24, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, XIX, 665, No. +6361; Schoen to Bülow, Jan. 28, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, XXV, 5 f., +No. 8502; Miquel to Bülow, Oct. 24, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, XIX, 666 +ff., No. 6362; Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 23, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 523, No. 6254. On Oct. 21, 1905, King Edward +instructed Hardinge to express to the Czar “my earnest desire that +the best and most durable relations should be established between +the two countries, and that all important points should be +discussed in the most amicable spirit and arranged as soon as +possible” (Edward VII to Hardinge, quoted in Lee, II, 310). On Oct. +12 Lord Sydenham received a letter from Balfour stating that “the +time is propitious for an understanding with Russia.” Lord +Sydenham, a member of the Defence Committee, wrote a draft of an +agreement with Russia and sent it to the Premier, Oct. 20. On Nov. +1 he discussed Persian railways with Balfour and Sir Charles +Hardinge, and, after Balfour had left, he (Sydenham) and Hardinge +talked over the draft agreement. Hardinge believed that the +Russians would accept it (Colonel Lord Sydenham, <em>My Working +Life</em> [London, 1927], p. 182).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_952"></a><a href="#FNanchor_952"><span class= +"label">[952]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 21, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 214, No. 201; Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, +1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 521 f., No. 6253.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_953"></a><a href="#FNanchor_953"><span class= +"label">[953]</span></a>Roosevelt to Spring Rice, Nov. 1, 1905, +Gwynn, II, 8; G. Balfour to Spring Rice, Oct. 25, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, I, 503.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_954"></a><a href="#FNanchor_954"><span class= +"label">[954]</span></a>Eckardstein, I, 218 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_955"></a><a href="#FNanchor_955"><span class= +"label">[955]</span></a>Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 24, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 216, No. 202.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_956"></a><a href="#FNanchor_956"><span class= +"label">[956]</span></a>Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 521 f., No. 6253; Howe, p. 209.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_957"></a><a href="#FNanchor_957"><span class= +"label">[957]</span></a>Report from London, Oct. 23, 1905, <em>Zur +europ. Politik</em>, II, 80 f.; Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 8, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XIX, 636 ff., No. 6340. Party leaders, magazines, +newspapers, and various societies in England took up the work. The +<em>Times</em>, however, continued its anti-German campaign. In +December, Colonel Repington published an article therein, warning +the public against friendliness with Germany (Lieutenant Colonel +Charles à Court Repington, <em>Vestigia</em> [London, 1919], pp. +262 f.). See also E. T. Raymond, <em>The Life of Lord Rosebery</em> +(New York, 1923), p. 211; Spender, <em>Life of +Campbell-Bannerman</em>, II, 208; Schulthess, <em>1905</em>, pp. +198 ff.; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 18 and 22, Nov. 2, Dec. 3 and +20, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 669 ff., Nos. 6879 ff.; Spender, +<em>Life, Journalism and Politics</em>, I, 191 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_958"></a><a href="#FNanchor_958"><span class= +"label">[958]</span></a>See Metternich to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 690, No. 6886.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_311">[311]</span><a id= +"c16"></a>CHAPTER XVI</h2> + +<p class="sch2">THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF +ALGECIRAS</p> + +<h3 class="space-above1">I. GERMAN PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE +OF ALGECIRAS</h3> + +<p>After the Björkö treaty had been annulled by the Russian +government, the Moroccan affair once more held the chief attention +of the German foreign office. Already important, it became more so; +for there was no longer any reason for the German government to use +the Moroccan affair as a means of conciliating France and there was +added need for it to justify to the German people and to the world +the long diplomatic campaign over Morocco by checkmating France at +the Conference.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Our chief object [wrote Prince Bülow on November 23] must be to +avoid isolation at the conference. If we have the majority or all +the other Powers against us on a question upon which we have +engaged ourselves, boldness and threats will be of no use since +after all that has occurred, our situation would be almost +ludicrous.<a id="FNanchor_959"></a><a href="#Footnote_959" class= +"fnanchor">[959]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>At almost the same moment the French Premier sounded the German +government as to whether it would agree for France and Spain +together to receive a police mandate from the Conference.<a id= +"FNanchor_960"></a><a href="#Footnote_960" class= +"fnanchor">[960]</a> The inclusion of Spain, he said, would prevent +the concession from appearing one-sided in favor of France and +would enable the latter to keep her promise not to seek a general +mandate. He added that Germany might be forced to agree to that +solution. Replying doubtfully to these overtures, Herr von +Flotow<span class="pagenum" id="Page_312">[312]</span> advised the +French government to make the proposal directly in Berlin in +accordance with diplomatic form. A few days later (November 30) +Herr von Kühlmann reported that M. Vaffier-Pollet, representative +of the Comité du Maroc in Tangier, and Count de Chérisey, former +secretary of the French legation in Tangier, had proposed to him in +Paris that the German and French governments make a secret +agreement before the Conference to the following effect: The +<em>status quo</em> in Morocco should be maintained for three or +four years, after which, if conditions had not improved, Germany +should not oppose the bestowal upon France of the police mandate +for all of Morocco; in return, Germany should be assured of the +open door and of the right for German capital to participate to the +extent of 45 per cent in all governmental enterprises in Morocco, +of territorial compensation in the French Congo region, and of the +cession of the French right of preference to acquire the Belgian +Congo.<a id="FNanchor_961"></a><a href="#Footnote_961" class= +"fnanchor">[961]</a> Although M. Rouvier stood behind this offer, +the German government did not know it and did not reply. It was +much disposed to consider the overture made through Herr von +Flotow; but this fact the French Premier could not know, and, +misled by the German silence, he never returned to the +subject.<a id="FNanchor_962"></a><a href="#Footnote_962" class= +"fnanchor">[962]</a></p> + +<p>The German Chancellor’s willingness to negotiate directly with +France showed that he was beginning to appreciate Germany’s +increasingly unfavorable position in international relations. He +knew that the German government faced a hard campaign and that its +public opinion, which had no particular interest in Morocco and was +averse to war, must be convinced of the<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_313">[313]</span> justice of the German cause and aroused to +the seriousness of the international situation. In the Reichstag on +December 6 the Chancellor therefore warned the nation that while +animosities had been overcome, new ones were possible, and that the +British were particularly anti-German. Repeating all the German +accusations against the French Moroccan policy, he justified at +length Germany’s defense of her interests. He avowed his strong +desire for the maintenance of friendly relations with all nations. +He assured his hearers that Italy remained loyal to the Triple +Alliance. But he urged his country to be prepared for any +emergency.<a id="FNanchor_963"></a><a href="#Footnote_963" class= +"fnanchor">[963]</a> The speech was widely approved.<a id= +"FNanchor_964"></a><a href="#Footnote_964" class= +"fnanchor">[964]</a></p> + +<p>The Chancellor’s utterances were soon answered by M. Rouvier +through the publication of a French <em>Livre jaune</em> of over +three hundred pages, which was supplemented by a speech in the +Chamber on December 16.<a id="FNanchor_965"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_965" class="fnanchor">[965]</a> Therein, to the +satisfaction of the French, the German accusations were denied and +the national policy of France toward Morocco was exonerated.<a id= +"FNanchor_966"></a><a href="#Footnote_966" class= +"fnanchor">[966]</a> According to the reports of the German +representatives in Paris in December and January, France was firmly +resolved not to recede further, and the French government was +making military preparations.<a id="FNanchor_967"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_967" class="fnanchor">[967]</a></p> + +<p>These manifestations did not augur well for the German +government. Nor did the terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement of +September 1, 1905, which it learned of at some time before +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_314">[314]</span> Conference +opened.<a id="FNanchor_968"></a><a href="#Footnote_968" class= +"fnanchor">[968]</a> The knowledge of the terms gave a concrete +basis to the mistrust of France’s intentions toward Morocco, and +stiffened German resistance. On December 25 the German government +envisaged three ways in which the Conference might end: first, a +provisorium of about three years might be agreed upon, at the end +of which each Power would recover its freedom of action; second, a +separate agreement with France might be made, but only in case the +latter offered suitable terms; third, a general police mandate for +Western Morocco might be given to France. This last result, +equivalent to a French victory, the German government was +determined not to permit, holding a conflict as preferable.<a id= +"FNanchor_969"></a><a href="#Footnote_969" class= +"fnanchor">[969]</a> In fact, none of these solutions was very +palatable to the government. But it was determined to hold +firm,<a id="FNanchor_970"></a><a href="#Footnote_970" class= +"fnanchor">[970]</a> and the instructions to Herr von Radowitz and +Count Tattenbach, the German delegates at the Conference, were +optimistic.</p> + +<p>The delegates were to uphold the open door and economic equality +for all. They should combat the monopoly for making loans to +Morocco claimed by the French banks. As Germany had already +recognized the legitimate interests of France by permitting her to +regulate the frontier, the mandate for police reforms in the west +should be given to a number of Powers and should be internationally +organized for a limited number of years. If a division of mandated +areas were made, Germany<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_315">[315]</span> should receive her share—one with a port +advantageously located for later expansion into the interior; +however, Germany was ready to agree with the others not to draw any +advantage for herself from this mandate. All the signatory Powers +should participate equally in establishing and directing the +proposed state bank, for which adequate international organization +and control should be provided. Above all, the delegates should not +permit themselves to be isolated or to stand alone with Morocco. +Thus, in general, they were to work for the internationalization of +Morocco.<a id="FNanchor_971"></a><a href="#Footnote_971" class= +"fnanchor">[971]</a></p> + +<p>Prince Bülow became more and more optimistic as the Conference +approached.<a id="FNanchor_972"></a><a href="#Footnote_972" class= +"fnanchor">[972]</a> At his urging, the Sultan promised to select +carefully his delegates to the assembly and to co-operate with the +Powers there.<a id="FNanchor_973"></a><a href="#Footnote_973" +class="fnanchor">[973]</a> The Chancellor expected the neutral +Powers to support Germany against the monopolistic desires of +France. He particularly courted President Roosevelt; for, although +he knew that Mr. White, the American delegate, would not be +permitted to take the initiative at the Conference, the Chancellor +thought that the President and his delegate would be able, behind +the scenes, to exert a powerful influence.<a id= +"FNanchor_974"></a><a href="#Footnote_974" class= +"fnanchor">[974]</a> From Russia, Prince Bülow anticipated no +interference. The Austrian Foreign Minister stated his government’s +readiness to go hand in hand with Germany at the Conference.<a id= +"FNanchor_975"></a><a href="#Footnote_975" class= +"fnanchor">[975]</a> Spanish mistrust<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_316">[316]</span> and jealousy of France with reference to +Morocco might be aroused and used.<a id="FNanchor_976"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_976" class="fnanchor">[976]</a> To that end the German +government prevented the selection of the anti-German M. +Villa-Urrutia as delegate.<a id="FNanchor_977"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_977" class="fnanchor">[977]</a></p> + +<p>Toward Italy, embarrassed by her situation as Germany’s ally and +France’s friend through an agreement over Morocco, the Chancellor +modified his former tactics. He offered to support her as a +candidate for the general police mandate at the Conference.<a id= +"FNanchor_978"></a><a href="#Footnote_978" class= +"fnanchor">[978]</a> But the Italian government refused. Sending +the aged and experienced Marquis Visconti Venosta as delegate, it +gave him permission to act as he saw fit in order to keep his head +out of the noose.<a id="FNanchor_979"></a><a href="#Footnote_979" +class="fnanchor">[979]</a> The German Chancellor approved this +choice and welcomed the Marquis’ statement that he would endeavor +to mediate between France and Germany and to bring the Conference +to a successful conclusion.<a id="FNanchor_980"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_980" class="fnanchor">[980]</a> Prince Bülow planned to +exploit Italy’s position by laying down a flat <em>non +possumus</em> on the question of permitting France to receive the +mandate for the police, with the expectation that the Italian +government would then press France to accept the German terms in +order to prevent a conflict wherein it would be forced to choose +sides.<a id="FNanchor_981"></a><a href="#Footnote_981" class= +"fnanchor">[981]</a></p> + +<p>The Chancellor instructed Prince Radolin to impress +French<span class="pagenum" id="Page_317">[317]</span> official +circles with the fact that Germany would never permit France to +obtain a general police mandate or a special position in the state +bank, that if France persisted in refusing to agree to the open +door in Morocco, a “very critical situation would arise” which +“would lead inevitably to a grave conflict” between the two +states.<a id="FNanchor_982"></a><a href="#Footnote_982" class= +"fnanchor">[982]</a> Prince Bülow was pleased to learn that the +French people were growing nervous and that M. Rouvier, M. Jules +Cambon, French ambassador in Madrid, and others were asserting +France’s wish for a peaceful and satisfactory solution.<a id= +"FNanchor_983"></a><a href="#Footnote_983" class= +"fnanchor">[983]</a></p> + +<p>The main reason for the Chancellor’s growing optimism was the +fact that in December a Liberal government had come to power in +England and that British public opinion was more friendly to +Germany. Prince Bülow and the Emperor both expected an improvement +in Anglo-German relations, and exerted their influence in achieving +it.<a id="FNanchor_984"></a><a href="#Footnote_984" class= +"fnanchor">[984]</a> The Chancellor did not believe that the new +Liberal government would stiffen the French resistance by holding +out the prospect of active aid in case of war as the Unionist +cabinet had done. He interpreted the overwhelming Liberal victory +at the elections in January as a clear rejection of chauvinism and +an equally clear expression by the nation of an earnest desire for +peace and for further improvement in<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_318">[318]</span> Anglo-German relations. He learned that +Edward VII had spoken in favor of a peaceful settlement.<a id= +"FNanchor_985"></a><a href="#Footnote_985" class= +"fnanchor">[985]</a> Then, just after the Conference opened, the +King and the Emperor entered into personal correspondence once +more.<a id="FNanchor_986"></a><a href="#Footnote_986" class= +"fnanchor">[986]</a> The Chancellor therefore expected the British +government to play the rôle of mediator instead of active French +partisan, and he endeavored to impress this duty upon it.<a id= +"FNanchor_987"></a><a href="#Footnote_987" class= +"fnanchor">[987]</a> In view of this situation he believed that +France would accept the German solution of the Moroccan +problem.<a id="FNanchor_988"></a><a href="#Footnote_988" class= +"fnanchor">[988]</a></p> + +<p>Although the Chancellor knew that France was improving her +defenses, he did not anticipate a war.<a id= +"FNanchor_989"></a><a href="#Footnote_989" class= +"fnanchor">[989]</a> He notified General Moltke, the new chief of +staff, that he need take no precautionary measures.<a id= +"FNanchor_990"></a><a href="#Footnote_990" class= +"fnanchor">[990]</a> The Emperor also regarded the French fears of +war<span class="pagenum" id="Page_319">[319]</span> as “ludicrous, +bordering on insanity.” Late in December he roundly declared to Mr. +Werner Beit, a friend of Edward VII, and to the Marquis de +Laguiche, French military attaché in Berlin, that “there is +absolutely no cause for any war or for any concern about an attack +from us,” adding, however, these more ominous words:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Even if we had the best intentions and were loyal and wished to +remain peaceful, there would be danger that in case of continued +inciting of France by London, she [France] might, relying on +certain aid from England, conduct herself toward us so +ill-manneredly and provocatively that finally our national honor +would come into question, for the sake of which we should have to +resort to arms; then we would have to strike and therewith, through +our “illegal attack” on France, give the occasion for England’s +aid. And it is monstrous perfidy [for England] to work toward +such.<a id="FNanchor_991"></a><a href="#Footnote_991" class= +"fnanchor">[991]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Thus, hopeful for peace but not entirely averse to +war, the German leaders saw the Conference begin.</p> + +<h3>II. FRENCH PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS</h3> + +<p>In spite of the failure of his overtures to the German +government in November, the French Premier assured the +<em>Wilhelmstrasse</em> on the eve of the Conference that he wished +to reach an understanding at that assembly on the basis of “no +victor, no vanquished.” Nevertheless, both he and the French nation +were determined to uphold France’s ambitions and claims toward +Morocco. On January 8, 1906, Prince Radolin wrote that +there<span class="pagenum" id="Page_320">[320]</span> prevailed in +France “grave anxiety over the possibility of warlike +complications. . . . . In press and public it is said that Germany +wishes war, that France has receded . . . . on all points, but +without satisfying Germany.” At the Conference, thus Prince Radolin +interpreted French opinion, “proposals would be made which would be +contrary to her honor and her traditional policy in Morocco. France +must defend herself and be prepared for any eventuality. . . . . +Germany makes no secret of her armaments, and therefore it is +imperative for France also to keep her powder dry.”<a id= +"FNanchor_992"></a><a href="#Footnote_992" class= +"fnanchor">[992]</a></p> + +<p>In this state of mind the French Parliament during the latter +half of 1905 investigated French defences and put 200,000,000 +francs at the disposal of the war Minister for repairing them, +particularly on the eastern frontier. That work was actively begun; +food and munitions were brought in; the frontier forces were +increased by reserves; drilling and trial mobilizations were +held.<a id="FNanchor_993"></a><a href="#Footnote_993" class= +"fnanchor">[993]</a> As M. Delcassé had prophesied, M. Rouvier +returned completely to the international policy of the fallen +Minister in order to achieve victory at the Conference. The French +government<span class="pagenum" id="Page_321">[321]</span> realized +that the opposition of the French and German policies was so +complete as to make retreat difficult for either party. Preparing +for the worst, M. Rouvier yet hoped to exert sufficient moral +pressure on Germany at the Conference to gain a French victory +without precipitating a war.<a id="FNanchor_994"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_994" class="fnanchor">[994]</a> To that end he +supplemented the military measures by diplomatic work. He was +certain of Russia’s support because, aside from the alliance, +Russia had urgent need of a French loan, which M. Rouvier would not +permit until after a satisfactory conclusion of the Moroccan +affair.<a id="FNanchor_995"></a><a href="#Footnote_995" class= +"fnanchor">[995]</a> Russia’s influence was restricted by the +revolution and by a lack of interest in Morocco. But a promise from +the Czar to exercise his personal power with Emperor William II in +favor of conciliation would be of eminent value, and M. Rouvier +sought to obtain it.<a id="FNanchor_996"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_996" class="fnanchor">[996]</a> He also wished to have +President Roosevelt act similarly at the proper moment. This plan +was to bear fruit later; but at the time the American government +replied that it had small concern in the Moroccan conference and +that, while standing for the open door and exerting its influence +for peace, it would interfere as little as possible in the +deliberations. Mr. Root, the secretary of state, told the British +Ambassador that the American delegate would “avoid any action which +could tend to weaken Anglo-French entente.”<a id= +"FNanchor_997"></a><a href="#Footnote_997" class= +"fnanchor">[997]</a> M. Rouvier also received<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_322">[322]</span> “satisfactory assurances” from the +Austro-Hungarian government; he did not expect opposition from it +or from Belgium.<a id="FNanchor_998"></a><a href="#Footnote_998" +class="fnanchor">[998]</a> Far more important was the continuation +of British aid, both for its own sake and for holding Italy and +Spain in line.<a id="FNanchor_999"></a><a href="#Footnote_999" +class="fnanchor">[999]</a> From the new Liberal government that +came in early in December, the French Premier was immediately +assured of diplomatic aid by word and act.</p> + +<h3>III. BRITISH PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS</h3> + +<p>When internal disputes over the question of tariff reform +finally forced the resignation of the Unionist government on +December 4, the Liberals, with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as +prime minister, entered office. In response to the popular demand +they were pledged to continue the foreign policy of their +predecessor, and the presence at the foreign office of Sir Edward +Grey assured the fulfilment of that pledge. The Foreign Secretary +was a Liberal Imperialist, a follower of Lord Rosebery. He had been +one of the rebels against the leadership of Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman, a Gladstonian Liberal, because of the latter’s +denunciation of the Boer War. Regretting that Lord Rosebery would +not enter the cabinet, Sir Edward Grey at first refused office +unless the Premier would accept a peerage and leave the leadership +in the House of Commons to Mr. Asquith, another Liberal +Imperialist. After much persuasion from his friends and after the +influence of the Liberal Imperialists had been increased by the +appointment of Mr. Haldane as secretary of war, Sir Edward receded +from his demand.<a id="FNanchor_1000"></a><a href="#Footnote_1000" +class="fnanchor">[1000]</a></p> + +<p>The new Foreign Secretary found the “mud of foreign politics” +deeper than any he had ever been in; but he was soon steering +himself through it as nimbly as his predecessors. +Although<span class="pagenum" id="Page_323">[323]</span> an +idealist who hated war, he was not afraid of it, for, he wrote to +Sir Francis Bertie, January 15, 1906, “We can protect ourselves . . +. . for we are more supreme at sea than we have ever been.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1001"></a><a href="#Footnote_1001" class= +"fnanchor">[1001]</a> He followed the ways of <em>Realpolitik</em>, +playing the “grand game” of prestige politics in the ordinary way +with national interest as his ultimate guide. He impressed other +men with whom he had personal contact as trying to be entirely +frank and honest and sympathetic. Yet his insularity, his lack of +knowledge of the Continent, really prevented him from appreciating +any other state’s point of view. Combining the limitations of a +“downright Britisher” with high moral and political rectitude, he +usually believed that Great Britain was in the right and acted +accordingly. Then he was unable to comprehend why other Powers +misinterpreted her policy.<a id="FNanchor_1002"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1002" class="fnanchor">[1002]</a></p> + +<p>With regard to Russia, Sir Edward Grey immediately stated to the +Ambassador his hope for a settlement of the outstanding questions. +Count Benckendorff thought that negotiations were impossible “while +things in Russia were in their present condition.” Appreciating +this fact, Sir Edward Grey answered that “during this inevitable +delay, it would be the policy of our Government not to do anything +which would make the resumption of negotiations or a settlement +more difficult later on.”<a id="FNanchor_1003"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1003" class="fnanchor">[1003]</a> In January of the next +year, Count Witte, Russian premier, proposed to the British +government that Czar Nicholas and King Edward—diplomats he +distrusted as being too slow—should at a personal meeting conclude +a general agreement in return for which Great Britain should make a +loan to Russia. The British Ambassador soon showed him the +impracticability of the idea.<a id="FNanchor_1004"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1004" class="fnanchor">[1004]</a> In the +same<span class="pagenum" id="Page_324">[324]</span> month Count +Benckendorff talked vaguely and informally with Mr. Spring Rice of +the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and of Persia—all to no object, +for, as the British government perceived, Russia was indifferent to +an agreement.<a id="FNanchor_1005"></a><a href="#Footnote_1005" +class="fnanchor">[1005]</a> But some progress was made toward a +<em>rapprochement</em>. The two governments co-operated on the +Cretan and Macedonian questions.<a id="FNanchor_1006"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1006" class="fnanchor">[1006]</a> Treating each other +more frankly,<a id="FNanchor_1007"></a><a href="#Footnote_1007" +class="fnanchor">[1007]</a> each refused to take advantage of the +other early in 1906 by making a loan to Persia.<a id= +"FNanchor_1008"></a><a href="#Footnote_1008" class= +"fnanchor">[1008]</a> The British government renewed its assurances +about Tibet in January.<a id="FNanchor_1009"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1009" class="fnanchor">[1009]</a> British bankers agreed +to participate in a forthcoming loan to Russia.<a id= +"FNanchor_1010"></a><a href="#Footnote_1010" class= +"fnanchor">[1010]</a> The Czar and King Edward were on cordial +terms, the former late in January even intimated to his uncle that +he would be pleased with a visit from him.<a id= +"FNanchor_1011"></a><a href="#Footnote_1011" class= +"fnanchor">[1011]</a> And the two governments were in harmony in +their policy of helping France at Algeciras. So while the work of +achieving the entente was slow, the British government did not let +it cease.</p> + +<p>The British Foreign Secretary also continued the previous policy +toward Germany. He knew very little of that Power, did not +understand it,<a id="FNanchor_1012"></a><a href="#Footnote_1012" +class="fnanchor">[1012]</a> and nursed a deep suspicion of it from +his experiences as undersecretary of state for foreign affairs from +1892 to 1895. He was determined not to let Great Britain fall again +into that state of trouble with other Powers, which he thought had +enabled Germany to treat her so high-handedly at<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_325">[325]</span> that time and to make demands +upon her inimical to her interests.<a id= +"FNanchor_1013"></a><a href="#Footnote_1013" class= +"fnanchor">[1013]</a> His advisers in the foreign office, Sir +Charles Hardinge and Mr. Eyre Crowe, were of a similar mind, +lacking the balanced and comprehensive judgment characteristic of +Lord Sanderson, who after years of service retired from his +position as permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs +in January, 1906.<a id="FNanchor_1014"></a><a href="#Footnote_1014" +class="fnanchor">[1014]</a></p> + +<p>Sir Edward Grey was now confronted with the same kind of action +on the part of Germany which had previously angered him. He saw a +conference approaching at which the new friendship with France +would be tested, at which it would be either broken or confirmed. +He was resolved that if possible it should not be broken, though he +did not necessarily intend that it should become stronger. “It was +a matter of interest,” he said on August 3, 1914, with reference to +this crisis, “to preserve it [the Entente] as well as a point of +honour to act up to the diplomatic obligations contained in +it.”<a id="FNanchor_1015"></a><a href="#Footnote_1015" class= +"fnanchor">[1015]</a> At the time (December 21, 1905) he expressed +himself more concretely to Sir Arthur Nicolson as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The Morocco Conference is going to be difficult if not critical. +As far as I can discover the Germans will refuse altogether to +concede to France the special position in Morocco, which we have +promised France not only to concede to her but to help her by +diplomatic methods to obtain.</p> + +<p>If she can succeed in getting this with our help it will be a +great success for the Anglo-French <em>Entente</em>; if she fails +the prestige of the <em>Entente</em> will suffer and its vitality +will be diminished.</p> + +<p>Our main object therefore must be to help France to carry her +point at the Conference.<a id="FNanchor_1016"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1016" class="fnanchor">[1016]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Thus for the sake of interest and honor, that invincible pair, +Sir Edward Grey based British policy upon the matter of prestige. +Whereas Lord Lansdowne had admitted that the Anglo-French +declaration over Morocco did not bind Germany, the<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_326">[326]</span> new British Foreign Secretary +was determined that Germany should formally recognize France’s +preponderant position in Morocco. It is to be inferred from his +statement that Germany had the alternative of accepting France’s +monopolization of the Sherifian Empire passively or of challenging +it and then being forced to accept it.</p> + +<p>That this ominous feeling was not peculiar to Sir Edward Grey +was shown early in January by a letter which Lord Ripon, one of the +older members of the cabinet, wrote to Lord Fitzmaurice, +parliamentary undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. It read +in part as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>One cannot help being anxious about this Morocco business. I am +sorry though not surprised to hear that you think the Germans +intend to make the Conference a failure. That a European war should +arise out of the matter seems almost impossible, but when one has +to deal with a potentate like the German Emperor one can feel no +real security.<a id="FNanchor_1017"></a><a href="#Footnote_1017" +class="fnanchor">[1017]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>On December 19 Count Metternich gave to Sir Edward Grey a +general explanation of Germany’s policy on the Moroccan question, +expressing the hope that the British government would play the part +of conciliator at the Conference.<a id="FNanchor_1018"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1018" class="fnanchor">[1018]</a> The British Minister +replied on January 3. The Conference filled him with concern, he +said. After having studied the documents more thoroughly, he had +found that Lord Lansdowne had stated to Count Metternich “that, in +the event of war between Germany and France, public feeling in +England would be such that, in his opinion, it would be impossible +for England to remain neutral.” This statement, he went on, he made +his own; for, while the British government “wanted to avoid trouble +between Germany and France,” and would not “egg” France on at the +Conference, yet since the entente was very popular in England he +“really thought that if there was trouble, we [Great Britain] +should be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_327">[327]</span> involved +in it. . . . . It was not a question of the policy of the +Government,” he told the Ambassador; “what made a nation most +likely to take part in war was not policy or interest, but +sentiment, and if the circumstances arose, public feeling in +England would be so strong that it would be impossible to be +neutral.” British opinion, he declared, would be moved not by +hostility to Germany but by the wish to preserve friendship with +France. He made an Anglo-German <em>rapprochement</em> contingent +upon a happy outcome of the Conference, an improvement in +Franco-German relations and the assurance thereby that the Entente +Cordiale would not be endangered. He spoke frankly, he said, +because the situation might later become such as to make openness +more difficult. When Count Metternich reminded him that Lord +Lansdowne had qualified his statement concerning the possibility of +active British aid by the further assertion, “in case of an +unprovoked attack by Germany upon France,” Sir Edward Grey made no +reply. But the meaning of his statement was clear to the +Ambassador, who accepted it as an honest rendition of the British +position.<a id="FNanchor_1019"></a><a href="#Footnote_1019" class= +"fnanchor">[1019]</a></p> + +<p>The bluntness of these remarks seemed justified immediately by +the varying reports about Germany’s intentions which came to the +British foreign office. The German Emperor was in a friendlier mood +although angry at the tone of the British press. Baron Richthofen +and Herr von Radowitz both spoke of a desire<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_328">[328]</span> for conciliation.<a id= +"FNanchor_1020"></a><a href="#Footnote_1020" class= +"fnanchor">[1020]</a> The British Consul in Hamburg, however, +learned from Herr von Tschirschky of the German foreign office on +New Year’s Day that “Germany’s policy always had been and would be +to try to frustrate any coalition between two States which might +result in damaging Germany’s interests and prestige, and Germany +would, if she thought that such a coalition was being formed, even +if its actual results had not been carried into practical effect, +not hesitate to take such steps as she thought proper to break the +combination.”<a id="FNanchor_1021"></a><a href="#Footnote_1021" +class="fnanchor">[1021]</a> And Prince Bülow’s brother, minister at +Berne, remarked to his British colleague on December 31:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>No doubt the sudden intervention of Germany [in Morocco] had not +been dictated by the desire to safeguard German interests in that +region. The object had been a higher one. Germany was bound in +self-defense to emancipate herself from the isolation with which +she was threatened. First Russia, then Italy, and lastly England +had been won over by France. The cordon must be broken, and the +penultimate defeat of Russia had furnished the propitious moment. . +. . . He thought that a <em>détente</em> would make itself felt +when once the Conference was over.<a id= +"FNanchor_1022"></a><a href="#Footnote_1022" class= +"fnanchor">[1022]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>It was becoming more and more apparent that Anglo-German +antagonism would accentuate the difficulties of the Conference. +Prince Bülow informed the British government on January 11 that he +advocated reforms on an international basis. Stating that M. +Rouvier had promised not to seek a general police mandate for +France,<a id="FNanchor_1023"></a><a href="#Footnote_1023" class= +"fnanchor">[1023]</a> the Chancellor made it understood that +Germany could not accept that solution. In talking to the British +Ambassador on the next day Herr von Holstein foresaw danger since +France, relying upon British aid, might, if dissatisfied with the +results of the Conference, “seek to create a <em>fait accompli</em> +by invading Morocco. The Sultan would appeal to the Emperor, and +war would be the result.” Asseverating that France was<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_329">[329]</span> preparing for war, Herr von +Holstein said that the danger could be averted if the British +government would hint to the French that in the event of their +invading Morocco it was doubtful whether British opinion would +approve of supporting France by force of arms.</p> + +<p>Upon being consulted, Sir Francis Bertie denied that France had +any such intention, and asserted that</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">any communication to the French Gov[ernmen]t such +as the Baron [Holstein] suggests would shake the confidence of the +French Gov[ernmen]t in H[is] M[ajesty’s] present Gov[ernmen]t +resulting from their assurances as to policy of England (and) might +lead France either to make concessions to Germany in Morocco +injurious to us or bring her out of Morocco by concessions +elsewhere detrimental to our interests but not greatly to those of +France.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">After this Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Frank +Lascelles, January 15, the following curt response to Herr von +Holstein’s suggestion:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>I hope the result of Morocco conference will prevent the +contingency, which Herr von Holstein contemplates, from arising. +Should it however be otherwise we cannot deprecate any action on +the part of France which comes within the terms of the Anglo-French +declarations of April 1904. Herr von Holstein should know +this.<a id="FNanchor_1024"></a><a href="#Footnote_1024" class= +"fnanchor">[1024]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>In these negotiations the British Foreign Secretary tried to +impress the German government with the fact that Great Britain +placed herself squarely on the French side. This was one facet of +his policy. The other had to do with France.</p> + +<p>The British government was as eager for France to win at the +conference as was the French government. To that end Sir Francis +Bertie informed M. Rouvier on December 22 that his government</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">would loyally act up to the engagements taken by +their predecessors and . . . . would give to France their +unreserved support in the Conference on Morocco within the four +corners of the Anglo-French Agreement and the<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_330">[330]</span> programme arranged between the French +and German Governments; but in order to enable them to do so +effectively, and to put them in a position to act in concert with +France, it would be desirable that His Majesty’s Government should +be made acquainted with the views of the French Government on the +matters to be discussed, and as to the concessions, if any, which +might be made for the satisfaction of Germany.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The British government, he said, wished to avoid +the accusation of being more French than the French. Going farther +still, the Ambassador assured M. Rouvier that his government was in +no way associated with the friendly manifestations toward Germany +then being made in England. While the British government wanted +friendly relations with Germany, he stated, an improvement in those +relations “would depend on the attitude of the German Government in +regard to Morocco and other questions in which England was +interested.” The cordiality with which M. Rouvier agreed to respect +this wish showed how conscious both governments were of the mutual +advantages in loyal co-operation.<a id="FNanchor_1025"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1025" class="fnanchor">[1025]</a></p> + +<p>The need therefor was manifested at once in the case of Spain. +While King Alfonso was regarded as entirely loyal,<a id= +"FNanchor_1026"></a><a href="#Footnote_1026" class= +"fnanchor">[1026]</a> M. Moret, the Spanish premier who supplanted +M. Montero Rios in December, was mistrusted by the British and +French governments as being too friendly toward Germany and +uncertain in his attitude toward the Moroccan agreements. Both +governments knew of German efforts to win Spain, both learned of +the German Emperor’s offer in November of a military convention to +the King of Spain, and both learned that at Germany’s request the +Spanish government had not appointed M. Villa-Urrutia as delegate +to the Conference.<a id="FNanchor_1027"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1027" class="fnanchor">[1027]</a> At the French +initiative the two governments<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_331">[331]</span> late in December pressed M. Moret to remain +loyal to them. These efforts won over the Spanish Premier. He +frankly admitted that the Emperor had made the offer, but denied +that he had ever considered it. He stated that Spain would support +the French policy during the Conference, and hoped that the three +Powers would work harmoniously together. And he told the French +that “it will facilitate his support of them at the Conference if +they will provide money to quiet the Spanish Opposition.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1028"></a><a href="#Footnote_1028" class= +"fnanchor">[1028]</a> Nevertheless, the British government +suspected that the Duke of Almodovar, the Spanish delegate and +proposed president of the Conference, would be “in the hands of the +German Ambassador [Herr von Radowitz].” Sir Edward Grey also feared +that Spain might, to the detriment of British interests, be induced +to cede a part of her possessions along the north coast of Morocco +or elsewhere to Germany.<a id="FNanchor_1029"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1029" class="fnanchor">[1029]</a> So Spain remained +under constant observation and pressure by the Entente +Cordiale.<a id="FNanchor_1030"></a><a href="#Footnote_1030" class= +"fnanchor">[1030]</a> The British government put similar pressure +upon Italy. In informing the Italian Ambassador on December 27 of +the British policy, Sir Edward Grey remarked that the four Powers +most interested in the Mediterranean were all good friends now and +that he “hoped we should all come out of the Conference as good +friends as we went in.” The Italian government protested that it +had “not only friendship but also an alliance to be considered.” +This item Sir Edward Grey ignored, and in Rome Sir Edwin Egerton +repeatedly asserted that “a European political +combination<span class="pagenum" id="Page_332">[332]</span> did not +appear to regard special agreements respecting a local question, +such as that of Morocco.” This veiled threat and curious +interpretation of the Triple Alliance were valuable aids to M. +Barrère in urging Italy to the Anglo-French side. The selection as +delegates of the Marquis Visconti Venosta, who had made the +agreement with France in 1900, was regarded as insuring a +pro-French policy. But the Italian government could make no +promises of support, and Sir Edward Grey feared that the Marquis +might, by trying to play the “fine” but “dangerous” rôle of +mediator at the Conference, suggest some solution which would be +altogether unacceptable.<a id="FNanchor_1031"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1031" class="fnanchor">[1031]</a></p> + +<p>The Anglo-French co-operation extended to planning the procedure +at the Conference and to drawing up instructions for the French +delegates. Every precaution was taken for victory. The British were +as sensitive to alarms as were the French. About the middle of +December both governments heard that the proposed Austrian delegate +thought it possible to bring matters before the Conference not +mentioned in the program. M. Rouvier took immediate steps in Vienna +to prevent that danger.<a id="FNanchor_1032"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1032" class="fnanchor">[1032]</a> Furthermore, the two +governments planned that the less difficult problems should be +considered first and the police question last. M. Rouvier proposed +that the published Anglo-French, Anglo-Spanish, and Franco-German +agreements over Morocco should be laid before the Conference, but +Sir Edward Grey objected that they might then be discussed and +questioned by the Powers. The British Foreign Secretary thought +that “it should appear that the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish +Agreements of 1904 were rather intended to give a formal sanction +to a <em>de facto</em> state of affairs than to create a new +situation.” M. Rouvier accepted this suggestion. It was also in +accordance with a British proposal<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_333">[333]</span> that the French delegate was instructed to +refuse to argue the matter of France’s right in the Algero-Moroccan +frontier region, since it might lead to an “embarrassing +discussion.”<a id="FNanchor_1033"></a><a href="#Footnote_1033" +class="fnanchor">[1033]</a></p> + +<p>The main problem which the British and French governments had to +solve was that of the police. For, as they learned from Prince +Bülow,<a id="FNanchor_1034"></a><a href="#Footnote_1034" class= +"fnanchor">[1034]</a> Germany would propose either that Morocco be +divided into sectors, each one under the police power of a +different state, or that the policing be done by a lesser Power +disinterested in Morocco. While the first solution could be easily +rejected, the second one would be more difficult for France to +combat without exposing herself to the accusation of selfishness. +If the Conference broke up because of a refusal, France would be +blamed. At this point the two governments received a suggestion +from M. Bacheracht, Russian minister at Tangier and a delegate at +the Conference, to the following effect: “All considerations of a +political character and all references to ‘special interests,’ +etc., should not be touched upon in discussion” of the police +question. The problem should be considered solely from a practical +point of view, of how to assure protection and safety to the +foreigners. Clearly that work could be done best by France and +Spain, who had had experience in handling Mohammedans, who were +already policing portions of Moroccan soil, and who could employ +Mohammedans from their North African territories to aid them. The +policing might be regarded as experimental and temporary so as to +mollify German opposition. If Germany rejected the plan, she would +receive the discredit for breaking up the Conference. The British +and French authorities accepted this proposal at once, for, as MM. +Paul and Jules Cambon said, it would be “difficult to +combat.”<a id="FNanchor_1035"></a><a href="#Footnote_1035" class= +"fnanchor">[1035]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_334">[334]</span>After this +thorough preparatory discussion, M. Rouvier sent the following +instructions to M. Révoil, a copy of which he also gave to the +British government: The repression of contraband trade should be +committed to France and Spain alone. A state bank should be +established in which French participation in capital and in +personnel should be in harmony with France’s superior rights in +Morocco resulting from the loan contract of June, 1904, and from +the high percentage of trade (approximately 80 per cent) which +France together with Great Britain and Spain had with that country +as compared with that (approximately 10 per cent) of Germany. The +bank should be under the French legal system and its president a +Frenchman. Moroccan revenues should be augmented, but not merely by +an increase in customs duties. The thirty-year limitation to +commercial freedom might be extended. “In a general manner it is in +the economic program that we are disposed to accord the most +complete satisfaction. But you will avoid a definitive acquiescence +in those solutions until you are certain that the delegates do not +aim to adopt unacceptable solutions relative to the organization of +the police.” This question should refer solely to the policing of +the coastal towns and should not concern the Moroccan army. Any +internationalization of the police should be refused. The plan of +dividing Morocco into sectors among the Powers, that of selecting a +minor Power to accomplish the task, and that of selecting officers +from neutral Powers should be absolutely refused. The policing +should be conferred upon France and Spain alone.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>In case the proposals conforming to our desires on that matter +meet with insurmountable opposition . . . ., we would consider +that, the economic questions being regulated according to our +views, an accord for the maintenance of the <em>status quo</em> in +that which concerns the police would be an acceptable solution, if +that accord respects our rights and implies the renunciation by the +other contracting parties to all action tending to reopen the +question with the Sultan without previous agreement with us. . . . +. In résumé . . . . no one will expect of us an adhesion to any +solution of a nature to compromise the future of our national +interests. Under that condition, you will show on all occasions our +sincere desire to respect the rights of other<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_335">[335]</span> countries, to open Morocco to the free +competition of commercial interests, and you will affirm at the +same time our desire to maintain our rights and interests only with +the most formal guarantees of the sovereign rights of the Sultan, +the independence and the established traditions of his +Empire.<a id="FNanchor_1036"></a><a href="#Footnote_1036" class= +"fnanchor">[1036]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">A few days later, with the approval of Spain, M. +Rouvier advised the French delegate to reject as “absolutely +inacceptable” any plan to neutralize Morocco.<a id= +"FNanchor_1037"></a><a href="#Footnote_1037" class= +"fnanchor">[1037]</a></p> + +<p>These instructions denoted a determination to defeat +internationalization, by all means to exclude Germany from Morocco, +and to divide Morocco between France and Spain.</p> + +<p>While these negotiations were in progress, the French government +was sounding Great Britain as to a defensive agreement against +Germany. Toward the middle of December Major Huguet, French +military attaché in London, spoke to General Grierson, director of +military operations in the British war office, about the French +fears of a German attack, and questioned him about the British +organization for war. When he asked whether the British general +staff had ever considered operations in Belgium, General Grierson +replied that “as a strategical exercise” he had worked out a plan +for them last spring.<a id="FNanchor_1038"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1038" class="fnanchor">[1038]</a></p> + +<p>On December 28 Major Huguet dined with Colonel Repington, a +retired officer serving as military correspondent on the <em>London +Times</em>. The conversation turned immediately to the Colonel’s +article of the previous day, in which he had denounced the attempts +being made toward an Anglo-German <em>rapprochement</em>, expressed +anxiety over the international situation, and advised full loyalty +to France. The two men found themselves in entire agreement over +the possibility of complications and<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_336">[336]</span> over the need for France and Great Britain +to be prepared for co-operation in case of a German aggression. +Major Huguet said that the French embassy was worried because Sir +Edward Grey, the new British foreign minister, had not renewed the +assurances given by his predecessor.<a id= +"FNanchor_1039"></a><a href="#Footnote_1039" class= +"fnanchor">[1039]</a> Time was pressing, he said, for the +Conference of Algeciras would open on January 16. He wished that +Sir Edward Grey would broach the subject at the next diplomatic +reception. The French “knew that our sympathies were with them,” so +Colonel Repington has recorded the military attaché’s words, “but +they wanted to know what we should do in case Germany confronted +them with a crisis.”</p> + +<p>Colonel Repington immediately communicated the conversation to +the British Foreign Secretary, who was then electioneering in +Northumberland. The latter replied on December 30 as follows: “I +can only say that I have not receded from anything which Lord +Lansdowne said to the French, and have no hesitation in affirming +it.” The Colonel also reported Major Huguet’s words to Sir George +Clarke, secretary of the Defence Committee, and to Lord Esher, a +member of that Committee. They agreed that in view of the German +menace, active steps toward co-operation should be taken. As +Colonel Repington was a free-lance, they suggested that he open +unofficial conversations with Major Huguet and communicate the +results to the British officials. The Colonel prepared a set of +questions which Major Huguet took to Paris on January 7. These +questions were considered by M. Rouvier, M. Etienne, minister of +war, M. Thomson, minister of marine, his naval staff, General Brun, +and General Brugère. On January 12 a cordial reply was returned to +Colonel Repington who then imparted it to the Defence +Committee.<a id="FNanchor_1040"></a><a href="#Footnote_1040" class= +"fnanchor">[1040]</a></p> + +<p>When Major Huguet related these incidents to his +ambassador,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_337">[337]</span> M. +Cambon was so struck by the fact that British as well as French +authorities were studying the problem of how quickly the British +forces could be mobilized for action on the Continent that he went +immediately to Paris to consult M. Rouvier.<a id= +"FNanchor_1041"></a><a href="#Footnote_1041" class= +"fnanchor">[1041]</a> The latter approved of the plan to broach Sir +Edward Grey for a closer and more definite understanding.</p> + +<p>Before returning to London, M. Cambon visited his brother in +Madrid. There the two prepared the ground for later discussion by a +conversation with Sir Arthur Nicolson which the latter reported +(January 2) as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>They [MM. Cambon] asked me, supposing, as they considered +probable, that the Conference failed, what did I think would be the +consequences? I replied that in my opinion it was quite possible +that the Sultan would then apply to Germany to take in hand the +military, financial and police administration. They remarked that +that would mean war. I said that I did not consider that this would +necessarily follow; but I did think that they would have to take up +a very firm attitude at Fez, and prevent the Sultan from handing +himself over to the Germans.<a id="FNanchor_1042"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1042" class="fnanchor">[1042]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>This alarming forecast, together with the staunch diplomatic +support which the British government was rendering France, +strengthened the French authorities in their resolve. When M. +Cambon reached London, he had a long conversation with Sir Edward +Grey on January 10 which the latter recorded as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>M. Cambon said that he did not believe that the German Emperor +desired war, but that His Majesty was pursuing a very dangerous +policy. He had succeeded in inciting public opinion and military +opinion in Germany, and there was a risk that matters might be +brought to a point in which a pacific issue would be difficult. +During the previous discussions on the subject of Morocco, Lord +Lansdowne had expressed his opinion that the British and French +Governments should frankly discuss any eventualities that might +seem possible, and by his instructions your Excellency [Sir Francis +Bertie, ambassador in Paris] had communicated a Memorandum to M. +Delcassé to the same effect. It had not been considered necessary +at the time to discuss<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_338">[338]</span> the eventuality of war, but it now seemed +desirable that this eventuality should also be considered.</p> + +<p>M. Cambon said that he had spoken to this effect to M. Rouvier, +who agreed in his view. It was not necessary, nor, indeed, +expedient, that there should be any formal alliance, but it was of +great importance that the French Government should know beforehand +whether, in the event of aggression against France by Germany, +Great Britain would be prepared to render to France armed +assistance.<a id="FNanchor_1043"></a><a href="#Footnote_1043" +class="fnanchor">[1043]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The British statesman, embarrassed by the question, replied that +he personally could give the French government no promise of active +aid. He put the Ambassador off by pointing out that the Prime +Minister was away, that the members of the cabinet were all +electioneering, and that the verdict of the elections was doubtful. +He said that he could only state as his personal opinion that “if +France were to be attacked by Germany in consequence of a question +arising out of the Agreement [of April 8, 1904] . . . . public +opinion in England would be strongly moved in favour of France.” +When he added that Great Britain earnestly desired “that the +conference should have a pacific issue favourable to France,” M. +Cambon replied that “nothing would have a more pacific influence on +the Emperor of Germany than the conviction that, if Germany +attacked France, she would find England allied against her.” Sir +Edward Grey answered that he thought that “the German Emperor did +believe this, but that it was one thing that this opinion should be +held in Germany and another that we should give a positive +assurance to France on the subject.” He could give no assurance, he +said, of which he was uncertain. He “did not believe that any +Minister could, in present circumstances, say more than I had done, +and, however strong the sympathy of Great Britain might be with +France in the case of a rupture with Germany, the expression which +might be given to it and the action which might follow must depend +largely upon the circumstances in which the rupture took +place.”<a id="FNanchor_1044"></a><a href="#Footnote_1044" class= +"fnanchor">[1044]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_339">[339]</span>As Sir Edward +Grey thus postponed a definitive answer until after the elections, +M. Cambon replied that he would repeat his request at that time. +But he asked that in the meantime the “unofficial communications” +between the British admiralty and war office and the French naval +and military attachés “as to what action might advantageously be +taken in case the two countries found themselves in alliance in +such a war” might be permitted to continue. “They did not pledge +either Government,” he said.<a id="FNanchor_1045"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1045" class="fnanchor">[1045]</a></p> + +<p>Sir Edward Grey immediately sent a report of this conversation +to the Prime Minister and to Lord Ripon, and he met his friend, Mr. +Haldane, at Berwick on January 12 to discuss the matter, +particularly the French request concerning the military +conversations.<a id="FNanchor_1046"></a><a href="#Footnote_1046" +class="fnanchor">[1046]</a> He had learned that under the Unionist +cabinet in the previous year such military and naval conversations +had taken place, and that at the present time official +conversations were going on between Admiral Sir John Fisher and the +French naval attaché while the military conversations were being +held unofficially between the French military attaché and Colonel +Repington. When consulted on January 11, General Grierson replied +that “if there is even a chance of our having to give armed +assistance on land to France or to take the field on her side in +Belgium in consequence of a violation of Belgian territory by the +Germans, we should have as soon as possible informal communication +between the military authorities of France and/or Belgium and the +General Staff.”<a id="FNanchor_1047"></a><a href="#Footnote_1047" +class="fnanchor">[1047]</a> Neither Sir Edward Grey nor<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_340">[340]</span> Mr. Haldane saw any reason why +these conversations should not be carried on officially also. As +the former argued:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>It was quite clear that no Cabinet could undertake any +obligation to go to war, but the Anglo-French Agreement was popular +in Britain. It was certain that if Germany forced a quarrel on +France upon the very matter of that Agreement, the pro-French +feeling in Britain would be very strong, so strong probably as to +justify a British Government in intervening on the side of France +or even to insist on its doing so. We must, therefore, be free to +go to the help of France as well as free to stand aside. But modern +war may be an affair of days. If there were no military plans made +beforehand we should be unable to come to the assistance of France +in time, however strongly public opinion in Britain might desire +it. We should in effect not have preserved our freedom to help +France, but have cut ourselves off from the possibility of doing +so, unless we had allowed the British and French staffs to concert +plans for common action.<a id="FNanchor_1048"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1048" class="fnanchor">[1048]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The Prime Minister feared the interpretation that +would be put upon these conversations. “I do not like the stress +laid upon joint preparations,” he wrote to Lord Ripon on February +2. “It comes very close to an honourable undertaking; and it will +be known on both sides of the Rhine.” However, he considered them +to be merely “provisional and precautionary measures” not binding +the government, “raising no new question of policy and therefore +within the competence of the War Office.” So he agreed to +them.<a id="FNanchor_1049"></a><a href="#Footnote_1049" class= +"fnanchor">[1049]</a> It was definitely understood that these +military conversations did not bind the governments.<a id= +"FNanchor_1050"></a><a href="#Footnote_1050" class= +"fnanchor">[1050]</a> On January 17 they were begun between the +French military attaché and General Grierson and continued +uninterrupted between the French and British general staffs until +the outbreak of the World War.<a id="FNanchor_1051"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1051" class="fnanchor">[1051]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_341">[341]</span>The same +reasoning applied to Belgium, for both the French and the British +authorities expected Germany to violate Belgian neutrality in order +to strike France suddenly from the northeast.<a id= +"FNanchor_1052"></a><a href="#Footnote_1052" class= +"fnanchor">[1052]</a> On January 15 Sir Edward Grey therefore +instructed General Grierson to open conversations with the Belgian +military authorities “as to the manner in which, in case of need, +British assistance could be most effectually afforded to Belgium +for the defence of her neutrality. Such communications,” he +continued, “must be solely provisional and noncommittal.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1053"></a><a href="#Footnote_1053" class= +"fnanchor">[1053]</a> Colonel Barnardiston, the British military +attaché in Brussels, broached the subject on January 18 to General +Ducarne, Belgian chief of staff, remarking that the British +Minister would bring up the matter with the Belgian Foreign +Minister.<a id="FNanchor_1054"></a><a href="#Footnote_1054" class= +"fnanchor">[1054]</a> After consulting the Minister of War, General +Ducarne agreed to the conversations.<a id= +"FNanchor_1055"></a><a href="#Footnote_1055" class= +"fnanchor">[1055]</a> This decision was anticipated by Colonel +Barnardiston, who had learned that the Belgian military authorities +were quietly making<span class="pagenum" id="Page_342">[342]</span> +preparations for instant mobilization.<a id= +"FNanchor_1056"></a><a href="#Footnote_1056" class= +"fnanchor">[1056]</a> The Anglo-Belgian negotiations continued at +least until the end of April.<a id="FNanchor_1057"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1057" class="fnanchor">[1057]</a></p> + +<p>These conversations, both military and naval, were kept secret. +The Anglo-Belgian negotiations were known to only half-a-dozen +persons; the ones with France were not known to all the members of +the British cabinet although reports of them leaked out in the +press about the middle of 1906.<a id="FNanchor_1058"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1058" class="fnanchor">[1058]</a> Sir Edward Grey wanted +to prevent either these conversations or any military or naval +action from being regarded as provocations. In informing Lord +Tweedmouth, first lord of the admiralty, of the Anglo-French +conversations, he wrote, January 16:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Meanwhile the mood of the German Emperor is said to be pacific; +the tone of German diplomacy is quiet and not aggressive. Any +movement of our ships which could be interpreted as a threat to +Germany would be very undesirable at this moment and most +unfortunate so long as there is a prospect or even a chance that +things may go smoothly at the Morocco Conference which meets today. +I hope therefore that the Admiralty won’t plan any special cruises +or visits to Foreign ports or unusual movements of squadrons +without consulting the F[oreign] O[ffice] as to the possible +political effect.</p> + +<p>I assume that the present disposition of the Fleet is +satisfactory as regards possibilities between Germany and France; +if so the quieter we keep for the present the better.<a id= +"FNanchor_1059"></a><a href="#Footnote_1059" class= +"fnanchor">[1059]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>With the opening of these conversations a new military problem +confronted the British which Mr. Haldane, then minister of war, has +described as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>It was, how to mobilize and concentrate at a place of assembly +to be opposite the Belgian frontier, a force calculated as adequate +(with the assistance of Russian pressure in the East) to make up +for the inadequacy of the French armies for their great task of +defending the entire French frontier from Dunkirk down to Belfort, +or even further south, if Italy should join the Triple Alliance in +an attack.<a id="FNanchor_1060"></a><a href="#Footnote_1060" class= +"fnanchor">[1060]</a></p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_343">[343]</span>At the time, in +January, the Committee of Imperial Defence, although not all of its +members knew of the military conversations then beginning, studied +the question. It decided that “four Divisions and a Cavalry +Division” could be landed at the nearest French port in case of a +sudden outbreak of hostilities.<a id="FNanchor_1061"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1061" class="fnanchor">[1061]</a> The admiralty was +prepared “to bar the Channel against the German squadrons.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1062"></a><a href="#Footnote_1062" class= +"fnanchor">[1062]</a> The Minister of War began a thorough +reorganization of the army in order to make British aid effective +at the desired moment in the future.<a id= +"FNanchor_1063"></a><a href="#Footnote_1063" class= +"fnanchor">[1063]</a></p> + +<p>Having settled this matter, Sir Edward Grey had the difficult +problem of how to answer M. Cambon’s question about a formal +agreement.<a id="FNanchor_1064"></a><a href="#Footnote_1064" class= +"fnanchor">[1064]</a> As it was inconvenient then to hold a cabinet +meeting, Sir Edward Grey talked over the reply to be given with the +Premier and Mr. Haldane, who were both in London after January 26, +and asked Sir Francis Bertie to write his opinion.<a id= +"FNanchor_1065"></a><a href="#Footnote_1065" class= +"fnanchor">[1065]</a></p> + +<p>The Ambassador wrote that France did not desire war at all, but +that if a conflict did arise over Morocco either then or later she +expected active British support. He warned his chief that if his +answer did not assure to France</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">more than a continuance of diplomatic support, or +of neutrality in the event of a war provoked by Germany, there is +serious danger of a complete revulsion of feeling on the part of +the French Government and of public opinion in France. The +Government would consider that they had been deserted and might, in +order to avoid the risks of a war without ally, deem it advisable +to make great concessions to Germany outside Morocco in order to +obtain liberty of action in that country.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_344">[344]</span>Such concessions +might not be very great sacrifices for France but they might well +be very detrimental to the interests of the British Empire, for, in +the temper in which France would then be, it could not be expected +that she would give them much consideration.<a id= +"FNanchor_1066"></a><a href="#Footnote_1066" class= +"fnanchor">[1066]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Sir Edward Grey’s personal opinion was that “if France is let in +for a war with Germany arising out of our agreement with her about +Morocco, we cannot stand aside, but must take part with France.” +While pondering the question of an alliance, he saw the great +difficulties in making one.<a id="FNanchor_1067"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1067" class="fnanchor">[1067]</a> He decided to adapt +the policy of his predecessor in office to the new situation +created by M. Cambon’s request. This policy is best explained in +the long dispatch which Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir Francis Bertie +about his interview with the French Ambassador on January 31:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The French Ambassador asked me again to-day whether France would +be able to count upon the assistance of England in the event of an +attack upon her by Germany.</p> + +<p>I said that I had spoken on the subject to the Prime Minister +and discussed it with him, and that I had three observations to +submit.</p> + +<p>In the first place, since the Ambassador had spoken to me a good +deal of progress has been made. Our military and naval authorities +had been in communication with the French, and I assumed that all +preparations were ready, so that, if a crisis arose, no time would +have been lost for want of a formal engagement.</p> + +<p>In the second place, a week or more before Monsieur Cambon had +spoken to me, I had taken an opportunity of expressing to Count +Metternich my personal opinion, which I understood Lord Lansdowne +had also expressed to him as a personal opinion, that, in the event +of an attack upon France by Germany arising out of our Moroccan +Agreement, public feeling in England would be so strong that no +British Government could remain neutral. I urged upon Monsieur +Cambon that this, which I had reason to know had been correctly +reported at Berlin, had produced there the moral effect which +Monsieur Cambon had urged upon me as being one of the great +securities of peace and the main reason for a formal engagement +between England and France with regard to armed co-operation.</p> + +<p>In the third place, I pointed out to Monsieur Cambon that at +present French policy in Morocco, within the four corners of the +Declaration exchanged between us, was absolutely free, that we did +not question it, that<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_345">[345]</span> we suggested no concessions and no +alterations in it, that we left France a free hand and gave +unreservedly our diplomatic support on which she could count; but +that, should our promise extend beyond diplomatic support, and +should we take an engagement which might involve us in a war, I was +sure my colleagues would say that we must from that time be +consulted with regard to French policy in Morocco, and, if need be, +be free to press upon the French Government concessions or +alterations of their policy which might seem to us desirable to +avoid a war.</p> + +<p>I asked Monsieur Cambon to weigh these considerations in his +mind, and to consider whether the present situation as regards +ourselves and France was not so satisfactory that it was +unnecessary to alter it by a formal declaration as he desired.</p> +</div> + +<p>M. Cambon replied that a war might break out over some Moroccan +incident so quickly that if it were necessary for the British +government “to consult, and to wait for manifestations of English +public opinion, it might be too late to be of use.” He repeated his +request for some form of verbal assurance. Sir Edward Grey pointed +out the difficulties of giving this assurance—that it would be a +“solemn undertaking,” that it would have to be put in writing and +submitted to the cabinet and also to Parliament. He said that it +would constitute the transformation of the entente into a defensive +alliance, that it could not be given unconditionally, and that the +conditions “would be difficult to describe.” He again asked M. +Cambon “whether the force of circumstances bringing England and +France together was not stronger than any assurance in words which +could be given at this moment.” He added that German pressure +“might eventually transform the ‘Entente’ into a defensive +alliance,” yet at the time he did not think that the change was +needed. When M. Cambon emphasized the fact that Sir Edward Grey had +expressed his personal opinion that in case of a German attack upon +France, no British government could remain neutral, the latter +replied that he had said this first to Count Metternich and not to +him,</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">because, supposing it appeared that I had +overestimated the strength of feeling of my countrymen, there could +be no disappointment in Germany; but I could not express so +decidedly my personal opinion to France, because<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_346">[346]</span> a personal opinion was not a +thing upon which, in so serious a matter, a policy could be +founded. In speaking to him, therefore, I must keep well within the +mark. Much depended as to the manner in which the war broke out +between Germany and France.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Sir Edward Grey believed that the British people +would be unwilling to fight in order to put France into possession +of Morocco. But if “it appeared that the war was forced upon France +by Germany to break up the Anglo-French ‘Entente,’ public opinion +would undoubtedly be very strong on the side of France.” He said, +however, that British sentiment was much averse to war, and that it +was not certain whether this aversion would be overcome by the +desire to aid France. While he was ready to reopen the conversation +at any time in the future, he did not think that the situation +justified such a radical change at that time.<a id= +"FNanchor_1068"></a><a href="#Footnote_1068" class= +"fnanchor">[1068]</a> M. Cambon appeared to be satisfied with that +answer.<a id="FNanchor_1069"></a><a href="#Footnote_1069" class= +"fnanchor">[1069]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_347">[347]</span>Thus, Sir Edward +Grey laid down the policy which he followed until the outbreak of +the World War. He was open and frank with both France and Germany. +To the German government he emphasized the probability of British +intervention in favor of France in case of war. To the French +government he gave the promise of full diplomatic support; while +permitting preparations for any emergency, he refused to give to +the French assurance of active aid in case of war or even to speak +as firmly on that score as he did to the German government. Instead +of binding Great Britain and France in an alliance—an act which +would have forced him to keep a hand on France’s policy toward +Morocco and Germany—Sir Edward Grey kept British hands free. In +giving France sufficient assurance to maintain Anglo-French +intimacy and co-operation, he depended upon the uncertainty of +British support in a crisis to hold France back. He relied upon the +same uncertainty—this time, however, that Great Britain might enter +a Franco-German conflict—to restrain Germany. By this apparently +simple but really intricate policy he sought to satisfy the needs +of British foreign relations.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc16"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_959"></a><a href="#FNanchor_959"><span class= +"label">[959]</span></a>Memo. by Bülow, Nov. 23, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 14 f., No. 6900.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_960"></a><a href="#FNanchor_960"><span class= +"label">[960]</span></a>Rouvier was apparently led astray by +William II’s instructions to the Prince of Monaco in October to +tell Rouvier that “he would lay no hindrances whatever in the way +of the French policy” (Radolin to F. O., Oct. 18, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, XX, 596 f. and note, No. 6836). Rouvier sounded the +German embassy first through a third person and then unofficially +through M. Louis of the foreign office.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_961"></a><a href="#FNanchor_961"><span class= +"label">[961]</span></a>Memo. by Mühlberg, Nov. 30, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, XXI, 20 ff., No. 6906.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_962"></a><a href="#FNanchor_962"><span class= +"label">[962]</span></a>On this episode see <em>ibid.</em>, Nos. +6901, 6903 ff. The editors of <em>G.P.</em> assure us that there is +no indication in the documents that Rouvier followed up the subject +(<em>ibid.</em>, p. 23). Joseph Caillaux states that Rouvier was +back of the overture made through Vaffier-Pollet. He also asserts +that in Nov., 1905, Rouvier offered the port of Mogador and its +hinterland to Germany, but that the latter refused (<em>Agadir, ma +politique extérieure</em> [Paris, 1919], p. 25). There is no +reference to this proposal in <em>G.P.</em> Caillaux is probably +referring to the offer made through Eckardstein in May, 1905.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_963"></a><a href="#FNanchor_963"><span class= +"label">[963]</span></a>Bülow, <em>Reden</em>, II, 250 ff., 272 +ff.; see also Hammann, <em>Bilder</em>, pp. 43 f. At the opening of +the Reichstag on Nov. 28 the Emperor declared that Germany stood +with all Powers in “correct relations” and with the most of them in +“good and friendly relations” (Schulthess <em>Europäischer +Geschichtskalender 1905</em>, pp. 132 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_964"></a><a href="#FNanchor_964"><span class= +"label">[964]</span></a>Report from the Belgian Minister at Berlin, +Dec. 2 and 11, 1905, <em>Zur europ. Politik</em>, II, 92 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_965"></a><a href="#FNanchor_965"><span class= +"label">[965]</span></a><em>Journal officiel. Debats parlem.</em> +(Chambre), pp. 4034 ff. Rouvier received a vote of confidence of +501 to 51 (<em>ibid.</em>, p. 4050).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_966"></a><a href="#FNanchor_966"><span class= +"label">[966]</span></a><em>Quest. dipl. et col.</em>, XX, 662 +ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_967"></a><a href="#FNanchor_967"><span class= +"label">[967]</span></a>William II to Bülow, Dec. 29, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XX, 693, No. 6887; Flotow to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, XXI, 15 ff., No. 6901; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 4, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 52, No. 6924.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_968"></a><a href="#FNanchor_968"><span class= +"label">[968]</span></a>So Ojeda, Spanish undersecretary of state +for foreign affairs, declared to Cartwright on Jan. 22, 1906 +(Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 233, No. +252). There is no indication in <em>G.P.</em> that those terms were +known.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_969"></a><a href="#FNanchor_969"><span class= +"label">[969]</span></a>Memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 25, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 28 f., No. 6914. It contained the conclusions +of a conference by Bülow with Richthofen, Mühlberg, and +Klehmet.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_970"></a><a href="#FNanchor_970"><span class= +"label">[970]</span></a>On Jan. 8 the government published a +<em>Weissbuch</em> on Morocco of thirty-nine pages substantiating +the German accusations against the French policy. According to +Bülow it was intended to supplement the French <em>Livre jaune</em> +(<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 24 n.). Its appearance made a painful +impression in France. Rouvier found it “scarcely courteous” and +hardly indicative of the conciliatory spirit which Germany +professed to have (report from Paris, Jan. 11, 1906, <em>Zur europ. +Politik</em>, II, 99 f.). It was well received by the German press +(Lascelles to Grey, Jan. 10, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 215 f., No. +235.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_971"></a><a href="#FNanchor_971"><span class= +"label">[971]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 3, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 38 ff., No. 6922 and Anlage.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_972"></a><a href="#FNanchor_972"><span class= +"label">[972]</span></a>Metternich was very pessimistic about the +outcome. See Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 2, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, XX, +672 ff., No. 6881; Bülow to Metternich, Nov. 6, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, XIX, 673, No. 6364.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_973"></a><a href="#FNanchor_973"><span class= +"label">[973]</span></a>Tattenbach to Bülow, Nov. 4, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, XXI, 12, No. 6898.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_974"></a><a href="#FNanchor_974"><span class= +"label">[974]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, Oct. 29, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, XIX, 641 f., No. 6341 and note; Sternburg to F. O., +Nov. 3, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, XXI, 9 f., No. 6896; Bülow to +Sternburg, Nov. 7, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 11 f., No. 6897; memo. by +Mühlberg, Dec. 11, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 23 f., No. 6909; Dennis, +<em>Adventures in American Diplomacy</em>, pp. 398 f., 499. Mr. +Choate, ambassador in London, had been selected as American +delegate in August (<em>Roosevelt-Lodge Correspondence</em>, II, +172 ff.); but the final choice rested on Mr. White, ambassador at +Rome.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_975"></a><a href="#FNanchor_975"><span class= +"label">[975]</span></a>Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 22, 1905, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 27 n.; cf. Steed, <em>Through Thirty +Years</em>, I, 234.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_976"></a><a href="#FNanchor_976"><span class= +"label">[976]</span></a>According to a minute by the Emperor +William to a dispatch from Stumm on Feb. 20, 1906 (the only +reference to this incident which <em>G.P.</em> contains), during +the visit of the King of Spain to Germany in the previous November +the Emperor had “proposed to the Spanish King to renew the +agreement with his father and a convention regarding the common +action of our armies! Whereupon the King said that he knew nothing +of that matter, but would look into it upon his return.” Nothing +came of the matter. See <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 191, No. 7024. See also +Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 160, No. 197; +Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 26 and 27, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 165, No. +205; 167, No. 208.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_977"></a><a href="#FNanchor_977"><span class= +"label">[977]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 14, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 150 f., No. 192.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_978"></a><a href="#FNanchor_978"><span class= +"label">[978]</span></a>Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 54, No. 6925.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_979"></a><a href="#FNanchor_979"><span class= +"label">[979]</span></a>So expressed by San Giuliano, Italian +foreign minister. (Monts to Bülow, Jan. 2, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 34 +ff., No. 6921).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_980"></a><a href="#FNanchor_980"><span class= +"label">[980]</span></a>Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 53 f., No. 6925; Monts to Bülow, Jan 6, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 56 ff., No. 6928.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_981"></a><a href="#FNanchor_981"><span class= +"label">[981]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 8, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 59, No. 6929.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_982"></a><a href="#FNanchor_982"><span class= +"label">[982]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, Dec. 29, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 30 f., No. 6916; memo. by Radolin, Dec. 29, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 31, No. 6917; memo. by Bülow, Dec. 30, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 32, No. 6918.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_983"></a><a href="#FNanchor_983"><span class= +"label">[983]</span></a>Flotow to F. O., Dec. 20, 1905; +<em>ibid.</em>, 25 f., No. 6911; Radolin to F. O., Jan. 8 and 10, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 60 f., No. 6931; 64 f., No. 6934; Radolin to +Bülow, Jan. 16, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, XX, 697 f., 6888; Radowitz to +Bülow, Dec. 27, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, XXI, 32 f., No. 6919 f.; +Bülow also remained willing to negotiate directly with the French +government over the Moroccan affair (Bülow to Radolin, Jan. 16, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 67, No. 6936).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_984"></a><a href="#FNanchor_984"><span class= +"label">[984]</span></a>Report from Berlin, Dec. 24, 1905, <em>Zur +europ. Politik</em>, II, 97 f.; report from Berlin, Dec. 31, 1905, +<em>Belg. Docs., 1905-14</em>, No. 14; Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 2, +Dec. 20, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 672 ff., No. 6881; 685 ff., No. +6886; Bülow, II, 434; Schulthess, <em>1905</em>, p. 154. The +Emperor refused twice to help before Bülow won him over. See Bülow +to William II, Dec. 3, 1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 679 ff., No. 6882, +and the Emperor’s minutes.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_985"></a><a href="#FNanchor_985"><span class= +"label">[985]</span></a>So D. M. Wallace, special representative of +the <em>London Times</em> at the conference, asserted to Radowitz +(Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 21, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 95 n.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_986"></a><a href="#FNanchor_986"><span class= +"label">[986]</span></a>Lee, <em>King Edward VII</em>, II, 524 ff.; +Edward VII to William II, Jan. 23, Feb. 5, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, +XXI, 108 f., No. 6961; 111 f., No. 6963; William II to Edward VII, +Feb. 1, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 110 f., No. 6962.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_987"></a><a href="#FNanchor_987"><span class= +"label">[987]</span></a>“If England restricts herself to the +diplomatic support of the French claims, peace and the permanent +open door are assured. But as soon as France has reason to count on +the armed help of England for the conquest of Morocco and for any +results therefrom, then both peace and the open door will be +endangered” (Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 17, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 94, +No. 6950). A similar thought was expressed by Bülow to Lascelles, +Jan. 24, to Sir Edgar Speyer, London banker and friend of Grey’s, +on Jan. 18, by Metternich to Grey, Dec. 20, Jan. 23, and was given +out to the press. See <em>ibid.</em>, 96 ff., Nos. 6953 f.; 106 +ff., No. 6960; 103 ff., No. 6959; <em>ibid.</em>, XX, 685 ff., No. +6886.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_988"></a><a href="#FNanchor_988"><span class= +"label">[988]</span></a>For Bülow’s reasoning see his dispatch to +Moltke, Jan. 24, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, XXI, 77 ff., No. 6943.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_989"></a><a href="#FNanchor_989"><span class= +"label">[989]</span></a>A report of a partial French mobilization +on the eastern frontier did alarm Bülow, but it was immediately +proved to be untrue (<em>ibid.</em>, 71 ff., Nos. 6937 ff.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_990"></a><a href="#FNanchor_990"><span class= +"label">[990]</span></a>The German government had announced a new +navy bill, which would have been proposed anyway, and was only +hastened because the visit of the British fleet to the Baltic and +the revelations in <em>Le Matin</em> insured it a favorable +reception by the German public. Aside from that Germany took +special pains to avoid leaving the impression that she was +preparing for a conflict. Moltke, at his own suggestion, postponed +his visit to Vienna to announce himself as the new chief of staff +until after the conference closed so as to avoid suspicion. See +Moltke to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 79 and note, No. +6944. See also Philip Fürst zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, <em>Aus 50 +Jahren. Erinnerungen, Tagebücher, und Briefe</em> (ed. Johannes +Haller; Berlin, 1923), p. 311. Moltke, however, did not expect the +French to recede, writing to Bülow on January 23 as follows: “In my +opinion the French now consider further concession on the Moroccan +question as incompatible with the honor of their land, after they +have already receded once and have let Delcassé fall.</p> + +<p>“They fear therefore that as a result of their firm stand the +conference may not only end without result but may also lead to +war. They themselves wish no war and do not think of attacking. But +they wish to be armed against an attack from Germany” +(<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 75, No. 6942).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_991"></a><a href="#FNanchor_991"><span class= +"label">[991]</span></a>William II to Bülow, Dec. 29, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, XX, 690 ff., No. 6887. The account of the Emperor’s +conversation with Laguiche was published in <em>Le Temps</em> on +Dec. 28. Richthofen spoke to a similar effect to the Belgian +minister (<em>Belg. Docs., 1905-14</em>, No. 14).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_992"></a><a href="#FNanchor_992"><span class= +"label">[992]</span></a>Radolin to Bülow, Jan. 8, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 60 f., No. 6931; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 4, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 51 f., No. 6924; <em>Zur europ. Politik</em>, +II, 95 f., 99; Tardieu, <em>La Conf. d’Algés.</em>, pp. 92 ff. See +also Bompard’s analysis of the German policy toward France (Spring +Rice to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, <em>The Letters and Friendships +of Sir Cecil Spring Rice</em>, II, 58 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_993"></a><a href="#FNanchor_993"><span class= +"label">[993]</span></a>According to Moltke, France was making +military and financial preparations for defensive purposes. “The +fortifications on the eastern frontier are being strengthened and +put in a more defensive condition. Their provisions in munitions +and food are being replenished. The forces of the frontier defence +troops are apparently being brought approximately to the legal +number for peace time by the addition of troops from the interior. +Moreover, reserves are here and there being called up to undergo +their legal drilling.</p> + +<p>“The training of the troops on the frontier is being furthered +in every way. Numerous trial mobilizations by the various garrisons +and drilling of the border troops by day and night are +occurring.</p> + +<p>“But all these preparations are not to be regarded as +preparations for an intended mobilization but only as precautionary +measures, which are easily explained” (Moltke to Bülow, Jan. 23, +1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 75, No. 6942).</p> + +<p>According to the Belgian Minister at Paris, Jan. 16, 1906, the +sum of 270,000,000 francs was being devoted to the defenses +(<em>Zur europ. Politik</em>, II, 103).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_994"></a><a href="#FNanchor_994"><span class= +"label">[994]</span></a>Meyer to Root, Jan. 9, 1906, Dennis, +<em>Adventures in American Diplomacy</em>, p. 498; <em>Zur europ. +Politik</em>, II, 99 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_995"></a><a href="#FNanchor_995"><span class= +"label">[995]</span></a>The Russian delegate, Count Cassini, +declared that in forty years he had never received such positive +instructions (Tardieu, p. 88; Witte, <em>Memoirs</em>, p. 298; +Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 204, No. +223). Rouvier repeated the refusal of that loan just before the +conference (Witte, pp. 295 ff., 429 f.; Nicholas II to William II, +Jan. 21, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 125 f., and note). Concerning +that loan Sir Edward Grey wrote to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, as +follows: “. . . . Russia has demanded a loan on improper terms as +the price of her support [at the conference]” (<em>B.D.</em>, III, +178, No. 216).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_996"></a><a href="#FNanchor_996"><span class= +"label">[996]</span></a>Meyer to Root, Jan. 9, 1906, Dennis, p. +498. Witte apparently offered to obtain this promise in return for +an immediate French loan, but the Czar refused to give it—at least, +that was Spring Rice’s inference (Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 16, +1906, Gwynn, II, 57 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_997"></a><a href="#FNanchor_997"><span class= +"label">[997]</span></a>Dennis, pp. 498 f.; Durand to Grey, Jan. +11, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 217, No. 236.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_998"></a><a href="#FNanchor_998"><span class= +"label">[998]</span></a>Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905; +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 165, No. 204.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_999"></a><a href="#FNanchor_999"><span class= +"label">[999]</span></a>See Rouvier’s assertion to Hardinge on Jan. +15, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 227 and inclosure, No. 245.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1000"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1000"><span class= +"label">[1000]</span></a>Spender, <em>Life of +Campbell-Bannerman</em>, II, 193 ff.; Grey, <em>Twenty-five +Years</em>, I, 60 ff., Richard Burdon Haldane, <em>An +Autobiography</em> (London, 1929), pp. 157 ff., 168 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1001"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1001"><span class= +"label">[1001]</span></a>Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 178, No. 216.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1002"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1002"><span class= +"label">[1002]</span></a>Cf. Spender, <em>The Public Life</em> +(1925), I, 112 ff.; Haldane, <em>An Autobiography</em>, pp. 215 f.; +cf. Hermann Lutz, <em>Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg</em> (Berlin, +1927).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1003"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1003"><span class= +"label">[1003]</span></a>Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 13, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 218, No. 204; Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 22, +1905, Gwynn, II, 53 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1004"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1004"><span class= +"label">[1004]</span></a>Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3 and 16, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 219 f., No. 205; 221, No. 207; and Gwynn, II, 54 +f., 57; Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 3 and 16, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, pp. 22, 26.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1005"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1005"><span class= +"label">[1005]</span></a>Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, Gwynn, +II, 55 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1006"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1006"><span class= +"label">[1006]</span></a>Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 26, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 222 ff., No. 208; Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 22, +1905, Gwynn, II, 53 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1007"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1007"><span class= +"label">[1007]</span></a>See Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 20, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, IV, 213 f., No. 200; Hardinge to Grey, Jan. 6, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, pp. 622 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1008"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1008"><span class= +"label">[1008]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, chap. xxvii, Part III. +Nicolson suspected that Russia acted so loyally because she had no +money with which to make the loan (Nicolson to Grey, Sept. 12, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 242, No. 228).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1009"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1009"><span class= +"label">[1009]</span></a>Grey to Spring Rice, Jan. 3, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 323, No. 304.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1010"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1010"><span class= +"label">[1010]</span></a>Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 220, No. 205.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1011"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1011"><span class= +"label">[1011]</span></a>Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 26, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 223, No. 208; Lee, II, 564; Spring Rice to Mallet, +Jan. 31, 1906, Gwynn, II, 61 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1012"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1012"><span class= +"label">[1012]</span></a>Haldane, <em>An Autobiography</em>, p. +215.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1013"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1013"><span class= +"label">[1013]</span></a>Grey, I, 100 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1014"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1014"><span class= +"label">[1014]</span></a>Cf. memo. by Crowe, Jan. 1, 1907, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 397 ff.; memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, +<em>ibid.</em>, pp. 420 ff.; Haldane, <em>An Autobiography</em>, p. +215.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1015"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1015"><span class= +"label">[1015]</span></a>Grey, I, 100 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1016"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1016"><span class= +"label">[1016]</span></a><em>B.D.</em>, III, 162, No. 200.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1017"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1017"><span class= +"label">[1017]</span></a>Lucien Wolf, <em>Life of the First +Marquess of Ripon</em> (London, 1921), II, 292 f.; see also Spring +Rice to Mallet, Jan. 31, 1906, Gwynn, II, 61.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1018"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1018"><span class= +"label">[1018]</span></a>Metternich gives the date of the +conversation as Dec. 18. See Grey to Whitehead, Dec. 20, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 160 f., No. 198; Metternich to Bülow, Dec. 20, +1905, <em>G.P.</em>, XX, 685 ff., No. 6886.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1019"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1019"><span class= +"label">[1019]</span></a>On this conversation between Grey and +Metternich see the following: Grey to Lascelles Jan. 9, 1906, Grey +to Campbell-Bannerman, Jan. 9, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 80 ff., +114, and in <em>B.D.</em>, III, 209 ff., No. 229; Metternich to +Bülow, Jan. 3 and 4, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 45 ff., Nos. 6923 f. +Grey repeated his statement to Metternich on Jan. 10, 1906. See +Metternich to F. O., Jan. 10, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 64, No. 6933. +See also Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 24, 1906, quoting a dispatch from +Metternich, <em>ibid.</em>, 103 ff., No. 6959. However, Van +Grooten, secretary of the Belgian ministry in London, reported to +his government on Jan. 14 as follows: “Of late the Minister of +Foreign Affairs has repeated at various occasions to the different +Ambassadors accredited in London that Great Britain has engaged +herself towards France in the Moroccan question and that she will +meet her obligations fully even in case of a Franco-German war and +at all costs. The press and public opinion give proof of the same +sentiments” (<em>Belg. Docs., 1905-14</em>, p. 19). The report is +exaggerated, but it is significant that it was current.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1020"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1020"><span class= +"label">[1020]</span></a>Lascelles to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 206 ff., Nos. 225 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Dec. +22, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 163, No. 203.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1021"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1021"><span class= +"label">[1021]</span></a>Spender, <em>Life of +Campbell-Bannerman</em>, II, 257 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1022"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1022"><span class= +"label">[1022]</span></a>Acton to Grey, Dec. 31, 1905, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 167 f., No. 209.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1023"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1023"><span class= +"label">[1023]</span></a>Rouvier denied that he had done so. Notes +by Hardinge, Jan. 15, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 226 and inclosure, No. +245 (see above).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1024"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1024"><span class= +"label">[1024]</span></a>On this episode see Lascelles to Grey, D. +Jan. 3, R. Jan. 6, 1905, D. Jan. 11, R. Jan. 15; dated Jan. 12, D. +Jan. 13, R. Jan. 15, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 207 f., No. 226; 217 +ff., Nos. 237 f.; 222 f., Nos. 240 f.; Grey to Lascelles, Jan. 9 +and 15, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 211 f., No. 230; 225, No. 243; Bertie +to Grey, Jan. 14, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 224, No. 242; memo. by +Holstein, Jan. 18, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 96 f., No. 6953.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1025"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1025"><span class= +"label">[1025]</span></a>Bertie to Grey, D. Dec. 22, R. Dec. 27, +1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 163 ff., No. 204; Grey to Nicolson, Dec. +21, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 162, No. 200. “Nous serons biens sûrement +avec vous,” Grey stated to Cambon (Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 160, No. 197).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1026"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1026"><span class= +"label">[1026]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 81 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1027"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1027"><span class= +"label">[1027]</span></a>Nicolson thought that he would have been +“an admirable selection.” King Edward’s comment to the report of +Germany’s veto was, “a case of bullying as usual!” See Nicolson to +Grey, D. Dec. 14, R. Dec. 23, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 150 f., No. +192.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1028"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1028"><span class= +"label">[1028]</span></a>Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 178, No. 216.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1029"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1029"><span class= +"label">[1029]</span></a>Minutes to dispatch from Nicolson to Grey, +D. Jan. 5, R. Jan. 13, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 209, No. 227.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1030"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1030"><span class= +"label">[1030]</span></a>Grey stated to the Spanish Ambassador, +Jan. 3, 1906, as follows: “All the four Powers most directly +interested in the Mediterranean had made arrangements with each +other which were satisfactory to themselves and it was most +undesirable that they should allow these arrangements to be +disturbed” (Grey to Nicolson, Jan. 10, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 215, +No. 234). On this Spanish affair see also Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, +1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 160, No. 197; Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 14, 20, +21, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 151, No. 193; 161 f., Nos. 199 ff.; +Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 22, 25, 27, 1905, Jan. 5 and 9, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 163, No. 202; 165, No. 205; 167, No. 208; 208 f., +No. 227; 212, No. 231; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 163 ff., No. 204.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1031"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1031"><span class= +"label">[1031]</span></a>Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 225, No. 244; Grey to Egerton, Dec. 27, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 166, No. 206; Egerton to Grey, Dec. 27, 1905, Jan. +9, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 166 f., No. 207; 212 f., No. 232.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1032"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1032"><span class= +"label">[1032]</span></a>Gorst to Bertie, Dec. 13, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 149 f. and inclosure, No. 191; Bertie to Grey, Dec. +15, 1905, <em>ibid.</em>, 158 f., No. 195.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1033"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1033"><span class= +"label">[1033]</span></a>Memo. by Cambon, Jan. 15, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 226, No. 244 and inclosure; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. +17, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 228 f., No. 247.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1034"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1034"><span class= +"label">[1034]</span></a>Lascelles to Grey, D. Jan. 11, R. Jan. 15, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 217 ff., No. 237.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1035"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1035"><span class= +"label">[1035]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 205 f., No. 224; Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 213 ff., No. 233. See also Bompard’s conversation +with Spring Rice as reported by the latter to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, +Gwynn, II, 59 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1036"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1036"><span class= +"label">[1036]</span></a>Rouvier to Révoil, Jan. 12, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 220 ff., No. 239; Tardieu, pp. 101 ff., 244; +Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 164, No. 204. In +talking to Sir Charles Hardinge on Jan. 15 Rouvier added a third +alternative—“a mandate to France, Spain and a third Power to study +and elaborate a scheme for submission to the Powers” (notes by +Hardinge, Jan. 15, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 226 f., No. 245 and +inclosure).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1037"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1037"><span class= +"label">[1037]</span></a>Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 23, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 233 f., No. 253.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1038"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1038"><span class= +"label">[1038]</span></a>Grierson to Sanderson, Jan. 11, 1906; +<em>ibid.</em>, 172, No. 211.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1039"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1039"><span class= +"label">[1039]</span></a>This display of doubt about Great +Britain’s loyalty was one of France’s best means of gaining that +Power’s support. See Bompard’s assertions as reported by Spring +Rice to Knollys, Jan. 31, 1906, Gwynn, II, 62; also see below.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1040"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1040"><span class= +"label">[1040]</span></a>The story is given in Lieutenant-Colonel +Charles à Court Repington, <em>The First World War, 1914-1918: +Personal Experiences</em> (London, 1920), I, 2 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1041"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1041"><span class= +"label">[1041]</span></a>Général Huguet, <em>L’intervention +militaire britannique en 1914</em> (Paris, 1928), p. 15.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1042"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1042"><span class= +"label">[1042]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 206, No. 224.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1043"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1043"><span class= +"label">[1043]</span></a>Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, quoted in +Spender, <em>Life of Campbell-Bannerman</em>, II, 249 ff.; Grey, I, +70 f.; <em>B.D.</em>, III, 170 f., No. 210<em>a</em>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1044"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1044"><span class= +"label">[1044]</span></a>This document is sufficient proof against +the accusation of the editors of <em>G.P.</em> that Grey went +further in his assertions to the French Ambassador in his first +conversation with the latter, and that afterward, apparently +restrained by the more pacific Premier, he qualified his position +in the interview of Jan. 31. It is apparent that Grey’s statements +of Jan. 10 and 31 do not differ in kind or degree, except that in +the latter the Foreign Secretary expanded the conditions which he +had already formulated in the earlier interview (see <em>G.P.</em>, +XXI, 48 f. note; see also below).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1045"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1045"><span class= +"label">[1045]</span></a>Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, quoted in +Grey, I, 70 ff., in Spender, <em>Life of Campbell-Bannerman</em>, +II, 249 ff., and in <em>B.D.</em>, III, 170 f., No. 210. Cambon’s +account to Rouvier of the conversation is given in <em>ibid.</em>, +173 f., No. 212. Sanderson was present at that interview.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1046"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1046"><span class= +"label">[1046]</span></a>Grey, I, 72, 114; Spender, <em>Life of +Campbell-Bannerman</em>, II, 251 f.; Repington, I, 12 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1047"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1047"><span class= +"label">[1047]</span></a>Grierson to Sanderson, Jan. 11, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 172, No. 211.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1048"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1048"><span class= +"label">[1048]</span></a>Grey, I, 72 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1049"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1049"><span class= +"label">[1049]</span></a>“C-B was a fine old Tory in Army matter” +(Repington, I, 13). On this affair see Spender, <em>Life of +Campbell-Bannerman</em>, II, 253, 256 f.; Repington, I, 12 f.; +Viscount Haldane, <em>Before the War</em> (London, 1920), p. 184; +Grey, I, 70 ff., 83; Haldane, <em>An Autobiography</em>, pp. 189 +f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1050"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1050"><span class= +"label">[1050]</span></a>Grey, I, 70 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1051"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1051"><span class= +"label">[1051]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, pp. 73 f.; Repington, I, +13; <em>B.D.</em>, III, 169, editor’s note, 438 ff. In 1911 Grey +wrote to Asquith that he never knew anything more of the course of +those conversations (Grey, I, 92).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1052"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1052"><span class= +"label">[1052]</span></a>Sydenham, <em>My Working Life</em>, pp. +186 f., 190; Haldane, <em>Before the War</em>, p. 45; Repington, I, +3. The British based their belief on the German construction of +obviously unnecessary railroads to the Belgian frontier +(<em>Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the +European War</em> [1915], pp. 365 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1053"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1053"><span class= +"label">[1053]</span></a>Sanderson to Grierson, Jan. 15, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 176 f., No. 214; Grierson to Barnardiston, Jan. +16, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 179, No. 217<em>b</em>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1054"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1054"><span class= +"label">[1054]</span></a>In a dispatch to Grierson on Jan. 19 +Barnardiston wrote that he had told Ducarne at their first meeting +that Sir C. Phipps, the British minister in Brussels, had already +mentioned the matter to the Belgian Foreign Minister +(<em>ibid.</em>, III, 188). In some notes by Barnardiston deposited +in the war office, he stated that Phipps would speak to the Belgian +Foreign Minister. The Belgian government asserts that there is no +record of such a communication; rather, that the Foreign Minister +learned of the military conversations from the Belgian Minister of +War. There is no report of any conversation on this subject between +Phipps and the Belgian Minister in the papers in the British +foreign office, nor is there any record of instructions on it being +sent to Phipps. On March 17 Barnardiston wrote to Grierson that +both the Belgian Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign +Affairs knew of the conversation (editor’s note, <em>ibid.</em>, p. +203; <em>Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of +the European War</em>, p. 355; Haldane, <em>Before the War</em>, +pp. 201 f.). There is no doubt but that the conversations were +approved by both foreign ministers.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1055"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1055"><span class= +"label">[1055]</span></a>Barnardiston to Grierson, Jan. 19, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 187 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1056"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1056"><span class= +"label">[1056]</span></a>Barnardiston to Phipps, Jan. 17, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, pp. 179 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1057"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1057"><span class= +"label">[1057]</span></a>On these negotiations see the +correspondence between Grierson and Barnardiston in <em>ibid.</em>, +pp. 187 ff.; <em>Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the +Outbreak of the European War</em>, pp. 350 ff.; Haldane, <em>Before +the War</em>, pp. 201 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1058"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1058"><span class= +"label">[1058]</span></a>Spender, <em>Life, Journalism and +Politics</em>, I, 193; Haldane, <em>An Autobiography</em>, p. +191.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1059"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1059"><span class= +"label">[1059]</span></a><em>B.D.</em>, III, 203.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1060"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1060"><span class= +"label">[1060]</span></a>Haldane, <em>Before the War</em>, pp. 45 +f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1061"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1061"><span class= +"label">[1061]</span></a>Statement written by Lord Sydenham, July +19, 1927, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 185, No. 221<em>a</em>; memo. by +Brigadier General Nicholson, Nov. 6, 1911, <em>ibid.</em>, pp. 186 +f.; Admiral Ottley to First Sea Lord, Jan. 13, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, p. 186; Sydenham, p. 186.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1062"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1062"><span class= +"label">[1062]</span></a>Memo. by Cambon, Jan. 31, 1906; +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 193, No. 220<em>a</em>.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1063"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1063"><span class= +"label">[1063]</span></a>Haldane, <em>Before the War</em>, chap. +iv.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1064"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1064"><span class= +"label">[1064]</span></a>Grey informed Cambon of the approval of +the naval and military conversations on Jan. 15, but postponed +answering the larger question (Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 177, No. 215; 225, No. 244.)</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1065"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1065"><span class= +"label">[1065]</span></a>Spender, <em>Life of +Campbell-Bannerman</em>, II, 253, 256 ff.; Grey, I, 84. Grey’s +omission to consult the entire cabinet has been severely +criticized. He has admitted in his memoirs that he did wrong. See +especially Haldane, <em>An Autobiography</em>, p. 191; Earl +Loreburn, <em>How the War Came</em> (London, 1919), pp. 80 f.; cf. +Spender, <em>Life, Journalism and Politics</em>, I, 193.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1066"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1066"><span class= +"label">[1066]</span></a>Bertie to Grey, D. Jan. 13, R. Jan. 18, +1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 174 ff., No. 213.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1067"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1067"><span class= +"label">[1067]</span></a>Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 177 f., No. 216; Grey, I, 75.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1068"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1068"><span class= +"label">[1068]</span></a>Spender, <em>Life of +Campbell-Bannerman</em>, II, 253 ff.; Grey, II, 76 ff.; +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 180 ff., No. 219. Cambon and Grey exchanged +memoranda of that conversation. According to Mr. Eyre Crowe, senior +clerk in the British foreign office, Cambon’s account differed from +Grey’s on the following points: “(A) The French note alludes to the +intention of the British Admiralty in case of a conflict with +Germany, to bar the Channel against the German squadrons. This +passage does not occur in Sir E. Grey’s draft. . . . . (B) The +French note contains no allusion to the argument given in the +following passage of Sir E. Grey’s draft: ‘I did not think people +in England would be prepared to fight in order to put France in +possession of Morocco. They would say that France should wait for +opportunities and be content to take time, and that it was +unreasonable to hurry matters to the point of war’” (Crowe’s minute +to the memo. by Cambon, Jan. 31, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 183 f., No. +220<em>a</em>). On Feb. 1 Sanderson talked over the two drafts with +Cambon, who made some changes in his. Sanderson again emphasized +the reasons why the British government could not give the desired +assurance, speaking in part as follows: “I told him [Cambon] that I +thought that if the Cabinet were to give a pledge which would +morally bind the country to go to war in certain circumstances, and +were not to mention this pledge to Parliament, and if at the +expiration of some months the country suddenly found itself pledged +to war in consequence of this assurance, the case would be one +which would justify impeachment, and which might even result in +that course unless at the time the feeling of the country were very +strongly in favour of the course to which the Government was +pledged” (memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 2, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 184 f., +No. 220<em>b</em>).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1069"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1069"><span class= +"label">[1069]</span></a>So thought Sanderson, and Grey’s secretary +(Grey, I, 85; Spender, <em>Life of Campbell-Bannerman</em>, II, +257; memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 2, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 185, No. +220<em>b</em>). Grey was absent from the foreign office for some +time owing to the sudden death of his wife, Feb. 1.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_348">[348]</span><a id= +"c17"></a>CHAPTER XVII</h2> + +<p class="sch1">THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS</p> + +<p>The Conference of Algeciras opened formally on January 16, +1906.<a id="FNanchor_1070"></a><a href="#Footnote_1070" class= +"fnanchor">[1070]</a> The place was badly adapted to such a +purpose. It was small, inadequately prepared to house and entertain +the one hundred and fifty delegates, secretaries, and newspaper +correspondents who had to remain there for over two months and a +half. The delegates were quartered at one of the two hotels and the +journalists at the other. They were thrown into constant contact +with each other. The place swarmed with newspaper correspondents, +most of them from France. There were about fifty principal ones, +not to speak of the minor ones. They saw or heard or surmised about +everything. They brought public opinion to the door of the +Conference, and the French particularly were able at times of +crisis or of important decisions to exercise a marked influence on +the course of the deliberations.<a id="FNanchor_1071"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1071" class="fnanchor">[1071]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_349">[349]</span>Among the +delegates there were three important groups, the German, the +American-Italian-Austrian, and the British-French-Spanish-Russian. +The representatives of Morocco and the smaller states took +practically no part in the proceedings. In the first group Herr von +Radowitz was a nonentity—old, feeble, so elusive and cautious as to +be difficult to negotiate with. Count Tattenbach was the positive +force, described by his British colleague as “a rasping, +disagreeable man, not straightforward or truthful and evidently has +to exercise much effort to control his temper.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1072"></a><a href="#Footnote_1072" class= +"fnanchor">[1072]</a> He made a bad impression on the delegates by +his blunt aggressiveness. Although he knew the Moroccan problem +thoroughly, he was unsuited for the delicate negotiations required +at the Conference. By his personality and methods he injured his +country’s interests. He was more influential with his government +than was Herr von Radowitz, but as a rule both men merely carried +out orders from Berlin. Mr. White (the American delegate), Marquis +Visconti Venosta, and Count Welsersheimb (the Austrian delegate) +acted as mediators. M. Révoil and Sir Arthur Nicolson were the +leaders of the third group. Both had served their respective +countries as minister at Tangier. M. Révoil was a supple, subtle +reasoner, inclined like Herr von Holstein to lose sight of his +objective in the mazes of his argument. He was oversensitive, +overcautious, and very mistrustful of Germany. His obstinacy proved +in the end of advantage to France, but he would have made a number +of mistakes serious for his country and for the success of the +Conference if he had not had the advice of Sir Arthur Nicolson. The +latter was the most astute member taking an active part in the +assembly, although he played his rôle so quietly that the other +delegates, particularly the Germans, did not perceive his +significance. A true diplomat, he carried out the difficult British +policy admirably. It was primarily his work that<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_350">[350]</span> the Conference thrashed the +fundamental problems through to a definite conclusion.</p> + +<p>When the Conference was organized, it was decided that the +formal session should be reserved for ratification of matters +already agreed upon unanimously in the committee of the whole, +composed of all the delegates sitting unofficially and engaging in +free debate. There was also to be a special committee of +formulation to draft the propositions agreed upon.<a id= +"FNanchor_1073"></a><a href="#Footnote_1073" class= +"fnanchor">[1073]</a> Naturally the work was done in these two +bodies. More important were the direct negotiations between the +delegates of France and Germany, which after January 25, at the +urging of the other delegates, were almost constantly in +progress.</p> + +<p>The basic principles governing the work of the Conference in +preparing a program of reform for Morocco were laid down by the +president, the Duke of Almodovar, in his opening speech. After +previous agreement with the French and German delegates,<a id= +"FNanchor_1074"></a><a href="#Footnote_1074" class= +"fnanchor">[1074]</a> he stated that everyone wished “reforms based +on the triple principle of the sovereignty of the Sultan, integrity +of his empire, and equality of treatment in matters commercial, +that is, the open door.” It was not the mission of the conference, +he said, to work out a complete plan for the administrative +transformation of Morocco, but rather to “study together the means +of applying measures which at present appear to be the most urgent +and the easiest to introduce.”</p> + +<p>The Conference, pessimistic at the beginning, took up first the +questions which could be easily settled. Since these were +considered primarily from the standpoint of practicality, agreement +was soon reached on the following: “Regulation concerning the +surveillance and repression of contraband of arms”; “declaration +concerning the better collection of taxes and the creation of new +revenues”; “regulation concerning the customs duties of +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_351">[351]</span> empire and the +repression of fraud and of contraband”; “declaration relating to +public services and to public works.” The discussion of these +matters was unimportant.<a id="FNanchor_1075"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1075" class="fnanchor">[1075]</a> The troublesome +problems were those of the organization of the police and the +establishment of a state bank. The solution of these would +determine whether France or Germany should emerge victorious. After +the initial success on the minor matters, the delegates confronted +these two questions with more hope.<a id= +"FNanchor_1076"></a><a href="#Footnote_1076" class= +"fnanchor">[1076]</a></p> + +<p>Marquis Visconti Venosta and Mr. White first tried to mediate +upon the basis that Germany should make concessions on the bank, +France on the police. M. Révoil was willing, being ready, so he +privately informed the British delegate, to associate Italy with +France and Spain on the police, but he asked for definite +proposals.<a id="FNanchor_1077"></a><a href="#Footnote_1077" class= +"fnanchor">[1077]</a> At the instigation of the other delegates, +Herr von Radowitz and M. Révoil began direct conversations on these +matters on January 25.<a id="FNanchor_1078"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1078" class="fnanchor">[1078]</a> Puzzled by so many +reports of different German projects on the police,<a id= +"FNanchor_1079"></a><a href="#Footnote_1079" class= +"fnanchor">[1079]</a> M. Révoil assumed the defensive. But on Sir +Arthur Nicolson’s advice he laid his proposals frankly before the +German representatives a few days later.<a id= +"FNanchor_1080"></a><a href="#Footnote_1080" class= +"fnanchor">[1080]</a> On January 29 M. Regnault, French adviser at +the Conference,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_352">[352]</span> +outlined for Count Tattenbach the French plan on the bank as +follows: The bank should be subject to French law and to the French +judicial system; the capital should be so divided that France +should receive 27 per cent, Spain 23 per cent, Great Britain 20 per +cent, Germany 20 per cent, Italy 10 per cent; an administrative +council of ten members should be chosen according to nationality by +the shareholders; a directory should be named by this council; a +committee of discount in Tangier selected from the resident +shareholders should be established and a committee of examination +should be chosen by the future subscribers; the preferential right +to make loans held by the French banks should continue, but perhaps +be relinquished in return for an increase in the per cent of +capital given to France. M. Regnault justified the project on the +grounds that “the preponderance of French economic interests in +Morocco must be given expression therein,” that it was a question +of maintaining the open door without destroying acquired interests, +and that “the open door does not signify that those who are in the +house must leave it.”<a id="FNanchor_1081"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1081" class="fnanchor">[1081]</a></p> + +<p>On February 3 M. Révoil proposed to Herr von Radowitz that the +mandate for the police be given to France and Spain together. “Over +its form, extension and control all desirable international +agreements could be made,” he said, so as to prevent any other +right from being deduced therefrom and to guarantee complete +commercial equality. He declared that France pursued no special +political aims in Morocco, but that she must demand protection in +proportion to her preponderant material interests. He also informed +the German delegate indirectly that France might agree to the +addition of a third Power to control the execution of the +mandate.<a id="FNanchor_1082"></a><a href="#Footnote_1082" class= +"fnanchor">[1082]</a></p> + +<p>In the end the German government was to accept +practically<span class="pagenum" id="Page_353">[353]</span> these +terms, but at the moment it was averse to making any concessions, +believing that the Conference, “so far as grouping and general +course are concerned, is turning out favorably for us.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1083"></a><a href="#Footnote_1083" class= +"fnanchor">[1083]</a> Since it regarded the bank as more +influential in the long run than the police, it rejected the French +claim to preference for making loans on the grounds that that claim +violated Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid, and proposed the +use of the Egyptian mixed codes and the equal division of the +capital among the Powers. Thus internationalism instead of a French +preponderant control would be established in the bank.<a id= +"FNanchor_1084"></a><a href="#Footnote_1084" class= +"fnanchor">[1084]</a></p> + +<p>On the question of the police, which was the more important, the +German government offered various plans to prevent France from +obtaining military control. It endeavored particularly to interest +President Roosevelt in this problem. In a long dispatch to +Washington on January 20, it laid three different proposals before +the President: First, the individual Powers might participate on a +basis of equality in the reorganization of the police by having +each one, or at least the more important ones, assume a mandate for +a certain port. A time limit should be set, and the Powers should +renounce any idea of giving to their occupation a permanent +character. For unity of policy the Powers could come to a general +agreement on various questions like those of arming and training. +Second, one or several smaller Powers, such as Switzerland, Norway, +Sweden, Denmark, or Holland might assume the duty. (Belgium was +excluded as being too liable to French influence.) Third, no +mandate should be given, but the obligation should be imposed upon +the Sultan to maintain at certain points police trained and +commanded by foreign officers. The choice of these officers could +either be left to the Sultan completely or be confined to certain +nationalities, perhaps the smaller Powers. The Chancellor offered +to accept any other solution<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_354">[354]</span> in harmony with the principle of equality +and the open door.<a id="FNanchor_1085"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1085" class="fnanchor">[1085]</a> On January 24 M. de +Lanessan, a French writer, published in the <em>Siècle</em> a +solution practically identical with No. 3. The article read in part +as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>There remains only one admissible solution; to charge the Sultan +with the policing of his empire while determining the means over +which he should have control and while instituting an international +control over the organisation and employment of those means.<a id= +"FNanchor_1086"></a><a href="#Footnote_1086" class= +"fnanchor">[1086]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The Chancellor immediately seized upon it with +greatest favor and advocated it to President Roosevelt.</p> + +<p>The proposal at once called forth vehement opposition in the +French press. When Herr von Radowitz mentioned the article to M. +Révoil on February 3, the latter replied emphatically that in view +of the incompetence of the Sultan the plan was not +acceptable.<a id="FNanchor_1087"></a><a href="#Footnote_1087" +class="fnanchor">[1087]</a> Thus the issue was joined on the +questions of both the bank and the police. In this situation, which +had been anticipated by both parties, the French and German +governments sought to win the Powers to their respective views.</p> + +<p>The German government wished the Austrian, the Italian, and +above all the American delegates to mediate in favor of its +proposals.<a id="FNanchor_1088"></a><a href="#Footnote_1088" class= +"fnanchor">[1088]</a><span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_355">[355]</span> When on January 23 Baron Sternburg +explained to Mr. Root, the American secretary of state, the German +proposals on the police and asked for the American views, Mr. Root +replied that the United States could not participate in any work of +Moroccan police but that he personally approved most of proposal +No. 3. He said that he would consult the President about the +question.<a id="FNanchor_1089"></a><a href="#Footnote_1089" class= +"fnanchor">[1089]</a></p> + +<p>This reply was eminently satisfactory to Prince Bülow, who +immediately urged the American government to mediate upon the basis +of M. de Lanessan’s proposals. On January 30 he telegraphed to +Washington that the Austrian cabinet had instructed its +representative at Algeciras to that effect, that the Italian +Foreign Minister had spoken favorably of it, that the Czar had +expressed his entire approval of the German position on the open +door, that therefore the American government would run no risk in +making such a proposal. The time was ripe for it, he stated.<a id= +"FNanchor_1090"></a><a href="#Footnote_1090" class= +"fnanchor">[1090]</a> He also sought to influence the President +against the French proposal on the bank.<a id= +"FNanchor_1091"></a><a href="#Footnote_1091" class= +"fnanchor">[1091]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_356">[356]</span>At Algeciras, +however, Herr von Radowitz found that the Italian, American, and +Russian delegates all approved the French proposal of February 3 as +moderate and practical.<a id="FNanchor_1092"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1092" class="fnanchor">[1092]</a> When Count Tattenbach +tried on February 3 to persuade Sir Arthur Nicolson to desert +France and support Germany, he met with total failure.<a id= +"FNanchor_1093"></a><a href="#Footnote_1093" class= +"fnanchor">[1093]</a> As a result Herr von Radowitz again advised +his government to compromise.<a id="FNanchor_1094"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1094" class="fnanchor">[1094]</a> But in view of the +apparently favorable attitudes of the Austrian, Italian, +Spanish,<a id="FNanchor_1095"></a><a href="#Footnote_1095" class= +"fnanchor">[1095]</a> and American governments toward M. de +Lanessan’s proposal, Prince Bülow refused.<a id= +"FNanchor_1096"></a><a href="#Footnote_1096" class= +"fnanchor">[1096]</a></p> + +<p>Before talking with M. Révoil again, Herr von Radowitz consulted +the American, Italian, and Austrian delegates concerning the +chances of success of the German proposal on the police. All three +declared that France would never accept it, that mediation on the +basis of it would be futile. They urged Germany to agree to the +French plan, with modifications, in order to prevent a<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_357">[357]</span> break-up of the +Conference.<a id="FNanchor_1097"></a><a href="#Footnote_1097" +class="fnanchor">[1097]</a> Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, +correspondent for the <em>London Times</em>, said the same.<a id= +"FNanchor_1098"></a><a href="#Footnote_1098" class= +"fnanchor">[1098]</a> Furthermore, Baron Sternburg reported on +February 8 that Mr. Root had promised again that he would consult +the President about mediating on the German proposal but that he +would not undertake any move unless assured of a definite result. +When the Ambassador had listed the Powers in favor of the plan, Mr. +Root had asked significantly what was the attitude of Great +Britain.<a id="FNanchor_1099"></a><a href="#Footnote_1099" class= +"fnanchor">[1099]</a></p> + +<p>Continuing to rely upon the mediation of the American delegate +and to hope for the support of the American and Italian delegates, +the German government instructed Herr von Radowitz on February 9 +and 12 to hold to plan No. 3 with the two alternatives of choosing +the instructors from some minor Power or of permitting the Sultan +free play in the choice of them. In case the three delegates +refused to mediate, Herr von Radowitz was to talk directly with M. +Révoil. If the French delegate refused both the German proposals, +Herr von Radowitz should request him to offer a proposal in keeping +with the fundamental principle of the equality of all nations in +Morocco. If M. Révoil held to his project of February 3, Herr von +Radowitz should return to proposal No. 1, dividing Morocco into +sectors each under the charge of a single Power.<a id= +"FNanchor_1100"></a><a href="#Footnote_1100" class= +"fnanchor">[1100]</a></p> + +<p>As the three delegates advised Herr von Radowitz to speak +directly with the French delegate, he did so on February 13. M. +Révoil grudgingly agreed to transmit the following offer to his +government:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>It is proposed that the conference request the Sultan to +undertake the organization of the police. He will have the duty of +maintaining in the places determined upon, a troop of police which +will be formed and commanded<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_358">[358]</span> by foreign officers chosen freely by the +Sultan. The funds necessary to maintain the troops will be placed +at the disposal of the Sultan by the new state bank. The diplomatic +corps at Tangier will exercise control over the actions of that +organization; a foreign officer of one of the secondary Powers will +be charged with the inspection and will report to the diplomatic +corps at Tangier. This entire organization will be a tentative one +to endure from three to five years.<a id= +"FNanchor_1101"></a><a href="#Footnote_1101" class= +"fnanchor">[1101]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The German stand on the police was meeting with the more or less +openly expressed disapproval of all the important Powers. Sir +Arthur Nicolson had taken the French side from the start.<a id= +"FNanchor_1102"></a><a href="#Footnote_1102" class= +"fnanchor">[1102]</a> The pro-French attitude of Count Cassini, the +Russian delegate, was confirmed by Count Lamsdorff, who on February +12 expressed to Herr von Schoen, the new German ambassador in St. +Petersburg, his and the Czar’s entire approval of the French +proposal on the police and advised the German government to accept +it.<a id="FNanchor_1103"></a><a href="#Footnote_1103" class= +"fnanchor">[1103]</a> Even the Austrian government urged the German +government to compromise. Count Welsersheimb reported that +mediation on the German project No. 3 was futile; and on February +12 Count Goluchowski, Austrian foreign minister, declared to the +German Ambassador that the German proposal No. 1 was impracticable +and hopeless. Regarding the situation as “rather serious,” the +Austrian Foreign Minister stated that “Morocco was not worth a +war,” and advised that in case of necessity the Conference be +permitted to break up without result. Count Wedel, German +ambassador at Vienna, warned the <em>Wilhelmstrasse</em> that +because of domestic troubles Austria had no desire to become +involved in a conflict.<a id="FNanchor_1104"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1104" class="fnanchor">[1104]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_359">[359]</span>Although in +danger of becoming a minority of one, the German government hoped +to win its point by a show of determination.<a id= +"FNanchor_1105"></a><a href="#Footnote_1105" class= +"fnanchor">[1105]</a> It complained vigorously to the new Italian +government of the pro-French position taken by its delegate, and +endeavored to persuade it to support the German views.<a id= +"FNanchor_1106"></a><a href="#Footnote_1106" class= +"fnanchor">[1106]</a> It sought to exert direct pressure upon M. +Rouvier by instructing Prince Radolin to inform him that Germany +had made concessions on the frontier under the expectation that +France would agree to the German terms with regard to the rest of +Morocco. If the Conference failed, the Ambassador was to assert, +the legal status of 1880 in Morocco would again obtain. The +Ambassador should also state to the Premier that if he did not stop +the anti-German campaign of the French press “we [Germany] must +conclude that M. Rouvier has reconciled himself to the idea of +assuming the responsibility for the results of this +activity.”<a id="FNanchor_1107"></a><a href="#Footnote_1107" class= +"fnanchor">[1107]</a> On February 13 the German government, in +telegrams to Rome, Washington, Vienna, London, and St. Petersburg, +declared as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>No reason for a further retreat is evident. The principle of +sacrificing one’s own interests merely because they block the way +for another Power could lead to such serious consequences that we +consider a disruption of the conference as the lesser evil.<a id= +"FNanchor_1108"></a><a href="#Footnote_1108" class= +"fnanchor">[1108]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">That is, if the Powers wished to prevent a break-up +of the assembly, they should persuade France to show more +conciliation, for Germany would not recede. A newspaper campaign +against the French views on the police accompanied these +efforts.<a id="FNanchor_1109"></a><a href="#Footnote_1109" class= +"fnanchor">[1109]</a></p> + +<p>This defiance did not have the effect desired, for it was +based<span class="pagenum" id="Page_360">[360]</span> upon an +erroneous conception of the determination of France and the views +of the Powers. So vehement was the opposition of the French press +to the German plan, which was of course known in spite of attempts +at secrecy, that the French government could not have accepted it +at all. Nor did M. Rouvier have any intention of doing so. The +British government, although suspecting that Germany meant to make +the Conference fail, was ready to support the French proposals +actively by exerting pressure upon the other Powers. On February 14 +Sir Edward Grey replied to the defiant German manifesto by arguing +to Count Metternich in behalf of the French views.<a id= +"FNanchor_1110"></a><a href="#Footnote_1110" class= +"fnanchor">[1110]</a></p> + +<p>In Russia, Count Lamsdorff, who had at the opening of the +Conference anticipated a conciliatory policy from Germany, soon +became disillusioned, and early in February again promised Russia’s +entire support to France. Several of the delegates suspected that +while the German representatives realized the necessity of +concessions, they were not informing their government of the +gravity of the situation.<a id="FNanchor_1111"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1111" class="fnanchor">[1111]</a> So Count Lamsdorff +advised the French government that the only way in which to make +Germany recede was by inducing the other Powers, especially Great +Britain, the United States, and Italy to aid Russia in exerting +moral pressure upon her and to show her that she was +isolated.<a id="FNanchor_1112"></a><a href="#Footnote_1112" class= +"fnanchor">[1112]</a> He approached the British government with a +view to co-operation in favor of France. His friendly expressions +were most cordially reciprocated by Sir Edward Grey.<a id= +"FNanchor_1113"></a><a href="#Footnote_1113" class= +"fnanchor">[1113]</a> Furthermore, Mr. White<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_361">[361]</span> and the French and British ambassadors +in Washington persuaded President Roosevelt to yield to the French +arguments concerning the special interest of France in Morocco, her +unique fitness to execute the reforms, her honest desire to +maintain the open door. Considering the downfall of M. Delcassé and +the acceptance of the Conference as great concessions to Germany, +Mr. Roosevelt thought that the latter should now recede in favor of +the more practical French proposal about the police. His opinion +was confirmed by expressions to the same effect from the Italian, +Russian, and even the Austrian governments. The last two urged him +to exert his influence with the Emperor for a moderation of the +German demands.<a id="FNanchor_1114"></a><a href="#Footnote_1114" +class="fnanchor">[1114]</a> The President was coming to suspect +Germany of wishing to divide Morocco into sectors and to regard +France as the protector of Morocco’s integrity.<a id= +"FNanchor_1115"></a><a href="#Footnote_1115" class= +"fnanchor">[1115]</a> He and Mr. Root both thought that Germany, +believing herself able to defeat both Great Britain and France +since Russia was out of the way, was playing the “big bully”; and +the President had visions of the weak German navy’s defeating the +British fleet, landing fifty thousand men in England, and taking +the island from that guileless Power.<a id= +"FNanchor_1116"></a><a href="#Footnote_1116" class= +"fnanchor">[1116]</a> Hence when M. Jusserand asked the President +early in February to intervene with the Emperor in favor of the +French plan, Mr. Roosevelt agreed to do so.<a id= +"FNanchor_1117"></a><a href="#Footnote_1117" class= +"fnanchor">[1117]</a></p> + +<p>With the support of Great Britain, Russia, and the United +States, the French government was almost certain of +success.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_362">[362]</span> When on +February 13 and 15 Prince Radolin complained about the tone of the +French press and about the French proposal for the police, the +French Premier, denying any responsibility for the press, handed +the Ambassador the following memorandum:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>. . . . If M. Rouvier agreed last July that the solution of the +question of the Moroccan police should be international in +principle, namely by conference, he was not of the opinion that it +would be so in execution. As to the mandate for the police, at no +moment has the French Government engaged not to ask for it. . . . . +Moreover, it is not a question of organizing the police outside of +the coastal towns, and it has always been understood that the +principal object would be to guard the security of foreigners. . . +. . The proposals ought to be examined at Algeciras, France having +agreed at the demand of Germany to submit them to the +conference.<a id="FNanchor_1118"></a><a href="#Footnote_1118" +class="fnanchor">[1118]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>At the same time the French reply to the German proposal of +February 13 was ready. Urged by Marquis Visconti Venosta and +others, who feared a break-up of the Conference, the French +government attempted to harmonize the German plan about the police +with the French demands. Then Mr. White transmitted the project to +President Roosevelt, who in turn would recommend it to the German +government as his own, while M. Révoil would reply directly with a +more general statement. Although the latter despaired of any +success, this plan was carried out.<a id= +"FNanchor_1119"></a><a href="#Footnote_1119" class= +"fnanchor">[1119]</a> On February 16 M. Révoil handed the following +memorandum to Herr von Radowitz:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>There is no opposition to the organization of the police in the +ports by the Sultan, or to the payment of the troops and officers +by the Bank of State, or to the short duration of that institution, +but under the condition that the foreign officers chosen by His +Sherifian Majesty be French and Spanish. The point of the German +proposition relative to a surveillance of the execution +of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_363">[363]</span> that +organization may be examined if the question of the nationality of +the officers has been agreed upon as indicated above.<a id= +"FNanchor_1120"></a><a href="#Footnote_1120" class= +"fnanchor">[1120]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>On February 19 Mr. Root, declaring to the German Ambassador that +Germany’s persistence in her plan about the police would break up +the Conference, proposed the following solution:<a id= +"FNanchor_1121"></a><a href="#Footnote_1121" class= +"fnanchor">[1121]</a></p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="hang1">1. That the organization and maintenance of police +forces in all the ports be entrusted to the Sultan, the men and +officers to be Moors.</p> + +<p class="hang1">2. That the money to maintain the force be +furnished by the proposed international bank, the stock of which +shall be allotted to all the powers in equal shares (except for +some small preference claimed by France, which he [the President] +considers immaterial).</p> + +<p class="hang1">3. That duties of instruction, discipline, pay and +assisting in management and control be entrusted to French and +Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers, to be appointed by +the Sultan on presentation of names by their Legations.</p> + +<p>That the senior French and Spanish instructing officers report +annually to the government of Morocco, and to the government of +Italy,<a id="FNanchor_1122"></a><a href="#Footnote_1122" class= +"fnanchor">[1122]</a> the Mediterranean Power, which shall have the +right of inspection and verification, and to demand further reports +in behalf of and for the information of the Powers. The expense of +such inspection, etc., etc., to be deemed a part of the cost of +police maintenance.</p> + +<p class="hang1">4. That full assurances be given by France and +Spain, and made obligatory upon all their officers who shall be +appointed by the Sultan, for the open door, both as to trade, equal +treatment and opportunity in competition for public works and +concessions.</p> +</div> + +<p>These terms, which the French government clung to +notwithstanding the opposition of the French press, were +unsatisfactory to the German government. At first Prince Bülow +refused completely<span class="pagenum" id="Page_364">[364]</span> +the proposal of February 16, and requested the French delegate to +make an offer in keeping with the fundamental principle of the +equality for all nations in Morocco.<a id= +"FNanchor_1123"></a><a href="#Footnote_1123" class= +"fnanchor">[1123]</a> When the authority of President Roosevelt was +added to it, however, the Chancellor receded on some points.<a id= +"FNanchor_1124"></a><a href="#Footnote_1124" class= +"fnanchor">[1124]</a> He still held that the Sultan should be +permitted to choose the military instructors freely from others +besides the French and Spanish nations. But he was willing to limit +the nations to those participating in the bank, or, in case France +feared that the Sultan might favor German officers, to at least +four nationalities. In order to recognize the special rights of +France in Morocco, he even agreed that the Sultan might place +Tangier and perhaps some other port under the control of France +alone; that in the other ports the officers of various +nationalities should co-operate. Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Root +realized that this reply would be totally unacceptable to France, +and they refused the German request to mediate on that basis.<a id= +"FNanchor_1125"></a><a href="#Footnote_1125" class= +"fnanchor">[1125]</a></p> + +<p>On the question of the bank, the situation was just as bad. +Since early in February negotiations on it had been neglected in +favor of the more important problem of the police. But to keep the +Conference going, the German delegates took it up again on February +19. The next day both theirs and the French plans were submitted to +the committee of the whole. The German plan provided that: an equal +division of capital among the Powers should be made; the Egyptian +mixed codes should be used for the bank; a mixed consular court +with the addition of a Moroccan delegate to try cases involving the +bank should be established at Tangier; the bank should be +supervised by a Conseil de Surveillance composed of the diplomatic +representatives at Tangier,<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_365">[365]</span> and managed by a Conseil d’Administration +composed of two delegates from each national group and by a +director appointed by the Conseil d’Administration; statutes should +be drawn up by this latter body and ratified by the Conseil de +Surveillance; customs duties, perhaps with the deduction of the +sums necessary for the service of the French loan, should be +received by the bank; funds for the police organization and for +certain needed public works should be furnished by the bank, which +should also be charged with the service of the public debt, +especially the French loan and the German advance, and should be +the financial agent of the state and have priority right to make +loans; the Conseil de Surveillance should have the right to reserve +funds necessary for the police organization and for the execution +of necessary public works independent of the Sultan’s power, to fix +the budget, and to advise the Sultan in deciding on public +works.<a id="FNanchor_1126"></a><a href="#Footnote_1126" class= +"fnanchor">[1126]</a></p> + +<p>The French plan contained the following provisions: the capital +should be divided into fifteen parts, of which eleven should be +subscribed by financial groups in Germany, Great Britain, Austria, +Belgium, Spain, the United States, France, Italy, Holland, +Portugal, Russia, and Sweden, with no Power having more than one +part; the other four were to be given to the French group of banks +that made the Moroccan loan in 1904 in return for relinquishment of +the right of preference for making loans to Morocco; the bank was +to be directed by a Conseil d’Administration of fifteen members +selected by the shareholders, each chosen from the nationality of +the subscribing group; a high commissioner selected by the Moroccan +government should watch over the bank for the Sultan; the Conseil +d’Administration should select the bank officers and determine +their powers; an international committee of discount chosen among +the chief merchants and bankers of Tangier possessing at least +twenty-five<span class="pagenum" id="Page_366">[366]</span> shares +should be formed for consultative purposes on credit and discount; +the bank should be subject to the French law and to the French +judicial system; the statutes should be drawn up by a committee +chosen from the various subscribing groups and submitted to the +stockholders. France wanted the central office of the bank located +at Paris, whereas Germany preferred Tangier.<a id= +"FNanchor_1127"></a><a href="#Footnote_1127" class= +"fnanchor">[1127]</a></p> + +<p>The main points of difference between the two projects related +to the choice of the central office of the bank, the choice of +legislation and jurisdiction, the surveillance of the bank, the +division of the capital, and the right of preference. The one side +complained that the other project would make the bank into a French +institution; the other side complained that the opposing project +would create, not an economic institution, but a political one +aimed at France—that it disregarded recognized French rights and +interests and that it was impracticable.<a id= +"FNanchor_1128"></a><a href="#Footnote_1128" class= +"fnanchor">[1128]</a> M. Regnault became indignant at the +presumption of the German proposal; Count Tattenbach answered him +in kind.<a id="FNanchor_1129"></a><a href="#Footnote_1129" class= +"fnanchor">[1129]</a> The plans were so divergent that their +discussion in committee was postponed until March 3 so that time +could be given for further direct negotiations.<a id= +"FNanchor_1130"></a><a href="#Footnote_1130" class= +"fnanchor">[1130]</a></p> + +<p>Thus, discussion on both questions reached a crisis. Fear of +imminent failure pervaded the Conference. The issue was one of +victory or defeat in the whole Moroccan episode. To break the +deadlock the pro-French Powers again exerted moral pressure on the +German government to force its retreat.<a id= +"FNanchor_1131"></a><a href="#Footnote_1131" class= +"fnanchor">[1131]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_367">[367]</span>When the French +reply on the police was made to Germany, the Russian government +approved it to the German authorities. Count Lamsdorff declared +frankly to Herr von Schoen on February 19 his belief that Germany +would be isolated in her refusal of the French proposals and that +if the Conference broke up she would be blamed, particularly in +Russia, for the continuation of the political and economic tension +in Europe. If the Björkö ideal were to be realized, he said, France +and Germany must become friends.<a id="FNanchor_1132"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1132" class="fnanchor">[1132]</a></p> + +<p>On February 20, at French request, Count Witte urged the German +government and Emperor William personally to permit a speedy +settlement of the Moroccan affair. Until then, he argued, the +Continental grouping could not be formed nor could Russia obtain +the loan which she so greatly needed for suppressing the +revolution.<a id="FNanchor_1133"></a><a href="#Footnote_1133" +class="fnanchor">[1133]</a> The German government replied that if +Russia wanted the loan quickly, she should advise the French +government to be more conciliatory.<a id= +"FNanchor_1134"></a><a href="#Footnote_1134" class= +"fnanchor">[1134]</a> On February 23 occurred another conversation +between Herr von Schoen and Count Lamsdorff, whose assertions the +Ambassador reported as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>It is difficult to understand why we [Germany] defend so +obstinately an international right on the police question at the +Conference which all other Powers, in view of the practical +solution offered by the French, are ready to give up. The +pessimistic impression has spread throughout the Conference that we +aim to frustrate an understanding.</p> + +<p>The results of a failure would be incalculable. In France, where +feelings are already very much excited and M. Rouvier would be +accused of too great conciliation, a crisis with the downfall of M. +Rouvier and his replacement by an intransigent person could +scarcely be avoided. The continued anarchy in Morocco might bring +forth bellicose complications at any moment, in which case England +would certainly enter on France’s side while<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_368">[368]</span> Russia would remain an inactive witness, +but at the worst would be affected sympathetically. A European war +would enkindle new revolutionary outbreaks which would also lead to +difficult times for Germany. But the worst would be that the +foundation for the peace program agreed upon by the two monarchs +would be destroyed. . . . .</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Denying that the outlook was so pessimistic, Herr +von Schoen replied that even though the addition of the third Power +to the Björkö accord might have to be postponed, that treaty would +remain valid; whereupon Count Lamsdorff answered that the Dual +Alliance still held good, that if France became involved in a war +with Germany, the Björkö accord would collapse.<a id= +"FNanchor_1135"></a><a href="#Footnote_1135" class= +"fnanchor">[1135]</a></p> + +<p>When this warning had no apparent effect, Count Lamsdorff +hesitated to use the Czar’s influence with the German +Emperor.<a id="FNanchor_1136"></a><a href="#Footnote_1136" class= +"fnanchor">[1136]</a> But as a final effort he had an article +published on March 2 in the semiofficial journal, <em>L’Etat +russe</em>, denouncing the German policy at the Conference and +upholding the French.<a id="FNanchor_1137"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1137" class="fnanchor">[1137]</a></p> + +<p>Great Britain also gave her fullest support to the French, not +only in Algeciras and London, but in the various capitals of the +other Powers. In upholding the French proposal to Count Metternich +on February 19 the British Minister repeated his belief that +British public opinion would point the way to active support of +France in case of a war with Germany and would thus force the +postponement of an Anglo-German <em>rapprochement</em>. The +Ambassador answered that if Germany had to give in to every French +pretension which arose from the Entente Cordiale in order to gain +British friendship, he feared that the price was too high. The +German people would come inevitably to look upon the British as +their chief enemy. Sir Edward Grey assured him,<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_369">[369]</span> however, that if the Moroccan +affair were settled permanently, he would carry out his promise to +work for a <em>rapprochement</em>.<a id= +"FNanchor_1138"></a><a href="#Footnote_1138" class= +"fnanchor">[1138]</a> He also kept in close touch with the Russian +government on Moroccan affairs. While refusing on February 22 Count +Lamsdorff’s suggestion to intervene in Berlin in favor of France, +he urged Russia to do so.<a id="FNanchor_1139"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1139" class="fnanchor">[1139]</a></p> + +<p>The British Foreign Secretary was pessimistic over the outlook +for the Conference. He was especially desirous for the onus of the +disruption not to rest upon France. To prevent that he was even +willing for the Moroccan police to be temporarily organized under +the Sultan by officers taken from a neutral minor Power with a +French officer selected by the French government in general +control. But he hesitated to suggest this solution to France for +fear of hurting the Entente Cordiale.<a id= +"FNanchor_1140"></a><a href="#Footnote_1140" class= +"fnanchor">[1140]</a> On February 20 he recorded his reactions to +the situation as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>If the Conference breaks up without result the situation will be +very dangerous. Germany will endeavour to establish her influence +in Morocco at the expense of France. France to counteract this or +even simply to protect herself and a neighbour from the state of +disturbance, which is now chronic in Morocco, will be driven to +take action in Morocco, which Germany may make a <em>casus +belli</em>.</p> + +<p>If there is war between France and Germany it will be very +difficult for us to keep out of it. The <em>Entente</em> and still +more the constant and emphatic demonstrations of affection . . . . +have created in France a belief that we should support her in war. +. . . . If this expectation is disappointed the French will never +forgive us.</p> + +<p>There would also I think be a general feeling in every country +that we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_370">[370]</span> had behaved +meanly and left France in the lurch. The United States would +despise us, Russia would not think it worth while to make a +friendly arrangement with us about Asia, Japan would prepare to +re-insure herself elsewhere, we should be left without a friend and +without the power of making a friend and Germany would take some +pleasure, after what has passed, in exploiting the whole situation +to our disadvantage, very likely by stirring up trouble through the +Sultan of Turkey in Egypt. As a minor matter the position of any +Foreign Secretary here, who had made it an object to maintain the +<em>entente</em> with France, would become intolerable.</p> + +<p>On the other hand the prospect of a European War and of our +being involved in it is horrible.</p> + +<p>I propose therefore, if unpleasant symptoms develop after the +Conference is over, to tell the French Ambassador that a great +effort and if need be some sacrifice should in our opinion be made +to avoid war. To do this we should have to find out what +compensation Germany would ask or accept as the price of her +recognition of the French claims in Morocco. There is also a point +about Egypt, which might be worked in on our behalf. I should +myself be in favour of allowing Germany a port or coaling station, +if that would ensure peace; but it would be necessary to consult +the Admiralty about this, and to find out whether the French would +entertain the idea, and if so what port?</p> + +<p>The real objection to the course proposed is that the French may +think it pusillanimous and a poor result of the <em>Entente</em>. I +should have to risk this. I hope the French would recognize that in +a war with Germany our liabilities would be much less than theirs. +We should risk little or nothing on land, and at sea we might shut +the German fleet up in Kiel and keep it there without losing a ship +or a man or even firing a shot. The French would have a life and +death struggle and that expenditure of blood and treasure with a +doubtful issue. They ought therefore not to think it pusillanimous +on our part to wish to avoid a war in which our danger was so much +less than theirs.</p> + +<p>I have also a further point of view. The door is being kept open +by us for a <em>rapprochement</em> with Russia; there is at least a +prospect that when Russia is re-established we shall find ourselves +on good terms with her. An <em>entente</em> between Russia, France +and ourselves would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary to +check Germany it could then be done. The present is the most +unfavourable moment for attempting to check her. Is it not a grave +mistake, if there must be a quarrel with Germany for France or +ourselves to let Germany choose the moment, which best suits +her.</p> + +<p>There is a possibility that war may come before these +suggestions of mine can be developed in diplomacy. If so it will +only be because Germany has made up her mind that she wants war and +intends to have it anyhow, which<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_371">[371]</span> I do not believe is the case. But I think +we ought in our minds to face the question now, whether we can keep +out of war, if war breaks out between France and Germany. The more +I review the situation the more it appears to me that we cannot, +without losing our good name and our friends and wrecking our +policy and position in the world.<a id="FNanchor_1141"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1141" class="fnanchor">[1141]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Thus Sir Edward Grey intended to do his utmost to preserve peace +even at the risk of antagonizing France. He desired to postpone the +Moroccan settlement if necessary until the Anglo-Russian entente +could be consummated, believing that then France would be in a far +stronger position with reference to Germany. But if war did arise, +he was determined to throw his entire influence in favor of active +participation.<a id="FNanchor_1142"></a><a href="#Footnote_1142" +class="fnanchor">[1142]</a></p> + +<p>In Rome, M. Barrère, loyally seconded by Sir Edwin Egerton, +endeavored to interpret the Franco-Italian accords in such a way as +to induce the Italian government to take the French side openly in +case of a vote at the Conference. The Italian government refused. +It also refused to support Germany, and left matters in the hands +of its delegate.<a id="FNanchor_1143"></a><a href="#Footnote_1143" +class="fnanchor">[1143]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_372">[372]</span>Similarly, the +French and British representatives co-operated to prevent Spain, +somewhat disgruntled over the Moroccan accords, from refusing to +live up to its obligations. The Spanish government promised +complete loyalty. But when it appeared that the conference would +fail, the Spanish government felt that as host it should endeavor +to prevent that issue. On February 19 the Duke of Almodovar read to +Mr. Révoil a note in which he said that for the sake of a +settlement Spain was willing to accept the following plan as a sort +of truce: The police should be organized by the Sultan under the +control of the diplomatic corps for three years; the instructors +should be exclusively Moroccan except at Tetouan, where they should +be Spanish, and at Oudjda, where they should be French; France and +Spain might renew their claims after the three years if they saw +fit.<a id="FNanchor_1144"></a><a href="#Footnote_1144" class= +"fnanchor">[1144]</a></p> + +<p>Horrified at the idea, the Anglo-French combination immediately +busied itself to bring Spain back into line. At Madrid the British +and French representatives informed the foreign office that if +Spain deserted her friends the Anglo-French opposition to the +German projects would continue anyway. They argued that a break-up +of the Conference with the maintenance of the Franco-Spanish +accords was preferable to the success of the Conference through the +ruin of those accords, in which lay their sole guaranty for the +morrow. M. Ojeda, acting minister of foreign affairs, acknowledged +to the British representative that “he hated France and French +influence in Morocco, and that he had no confidence in and personal +dislike for French Ambassador,” but he added that “he would act +faithfully in accordance with Spain’s engagements, although he +disliked them.” M. Moret, the Spanish premier, also protested his +loyalty to the accords. The Duke of Almodovar was instructed to +abstain in the future from all initiative not previously concerted +with his French colleague.<a id="FNanchor_1145"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1145" class="fnanchor">[1145]</a><span class="pagenum" +id="Page_373">[373]</span> To prevent any bad feelings from this +episode, the British and French governments thanked Spain for her +loyalty. Thus the danger from Spain was averted.<a id= +"FNanchor_1146"></a><a href="#Footnote_1146" class= +"fnanchor">[1146]</a></p> + +<p>M. Rouvier consulted the smaller governments represented at the +Conference with a view to obtaining their open support in case +matters were forced to a vote. But they remained neutral.<a id= +"FNanchor_1147"></a><a href="#Footnote_1147" class= +"fnanchor">[1147]</a></p> + +<p>The French government, again sustained by Great Britain,<a id= +"FNanchor_1148"></a><a href="#Footnote_1148" class= +"fnanchor">[1148]</a> even sought to influence Austria in its +favor, and with some success. Finding Count Goluchowski of the +opinion that after France’s concessions on February 3 and 16 +Germany should show moderation, the French Ambassador hinted +discreetly that the Foreign Minister speak to the German government +to that effect.<a id="FNanchor_1149"></a><a href="#Footnote_1149" +class="fnanchor">[1149]</a> Count Goluchowski, who on February 14 +had suggested<span class="pagenum" id="Page_374">[374]</span> a +compromise to the German government very similar to the French +offer of February 16, urged it to accept the offer and to seek +compensation in the settlement of the bank question. Both the +American and the Italian delegates approved it, he argued, and he +predicted that if the Conference broke up Germany would be +blamed.<a id="FNanchor_1150"></a><a href="#Footnote_1150" class= +"fnanchor">[1150]</a> On February 23 Emperor Francis Joseph himself +intervened. Calling the German Ambassador to him, he said that +Austria would act with Germany at the Conference, but that +according to all reports from Algeciras they would be isolated in +case of a vote. Such an isolation would be unpleasant for both +Powers, but far graver, he said, was the possibility that out of a +failure of the Conference might develop a new grouping of the +Powers separating Russia from the two monarchies and associating +her with Great Britain and France. He declared that it was +necessary to avoid that turn.<a id="FNanchor_1151"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1151" class="fnanchor">[1151]</a></p> + +<p>The French party at the Conference knew that Germany was +isolated, that even her ally, Austria, opposed her policy.<a id= +"FNanchor_1152"></a><a href="#Footnote_1152" class= +"fnanchor">[1152]</a> On February 26 M. Révoil, refusing to make +any further proposal, asserted to the German delegates: “If the +Conference recognizes the utility of new guarantees, we will not +refuse to examine them. It belongs to the Conference . . . . to +determine the solution.” In other words, he told Germany that, +having demanded the Conference, she might permit it to settle the +matter.<a id="FNanchor_1153"></a><a href="#Footnote_1153" class= +"fnanchor">[1153]</a> He and Sir Arthur Nicolson were devising some +means by which a rupture of the Conference should not occur over +the bank question and by which the responsibility for a rupture +should not fall on France and Great Britain. The issue on the bank +was not as clear<span class="pagenum" id="Page_375">[375]</span> +cut as on the police, and public opinion would not understand why +financial differences could not be harmonized. So the two men +planned to bring the police question up first for decision. They +did not favor taking a formal vote on that matter, as Count +Lamsdorff suggested,<a id="FNanchor_1154"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1154" class="fnanchor">[1154]</a> for they perceived +that the American, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, and Swedish delegates +would very probably not vote. But they intended in some way to make +plain to Germany the preference of the Conference for the French +police proposal. Then if Germany remained adamantine, she would +receive the blame for the break-up of the assembly.<a id= +"FNanchor_1155"></a><a href="#Footnote_1155" class= +"fnanchor">[1155]</a></p> + +<p>The opportunity came on March 3. During the discussion of the +bank in the official session of the Conference, Germany’s views +were supported solely by Austria and Morocco and were opposed, for +the first time, by a firm British-French-Spanish-Russian +group.<a id="FNanchor_1156"></a><a href="#Footnote_1156" class= +"fnanchor">[1156]</a> That same day, on the motion of Sir Arthur +Nicolson and with the aid of the Duke of Almodovar, the Conference +voted to take up the question of the police on February 5 instead +of that of the bank. The German and Austrian delegates alone +opposed the motion, even the Italian representative siding openly +against them.<a id="FNanchor_1157"></a><a href="#Footnote_1157" +class="fnanchor">[1157]</a> At the session on March 5 Germany was +again isolated. Her policy in regard to the police was not even +defended by Austria, while the French plan was openly approved by +Great Britain, Russia, Spain, and Portugal.<a id= +"FNanchor_1158"></a><a href="#Footnote_1158" class= +"fnanchor">[1158]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_376">[376]</span>All the +delegates were pessimistic. As direct negotiations had proved +futile, M. Révoil and Sir Arthur Nicolson both expected that the +antagonism would come to a head at the next session and the +Conference would break up.<a id="FNanchor_1159"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1159" class="fnanchor">[1159]</a> Herr von Radowitz +reported to his government that agreement was impossible if Germany +held to her present terms, for France would not recede, and that +the other representatives, anxious to conclude the Conference, were +in favor of the French police proposal. Even Count Tattenbach +thought that his government was too obstinate.<a id= +"FNanchor_1160"></a><a href="#Footnote_1160" class= +"fnanchor">[1160]</a> In Berlin, however, Herr von Holstein, +misjudging the French feeling, planned to meet the crisis by +disregarding the Conference and making a direct temporary agreement +with the French government. The visit to Berlin of Baron de +Courcel, former ambassador at Berlin, on February 20-22, afforded +him the opportunity to propose the following terms: In regard to +the police the two governments should make a temporary settlement +for four or five years; France, in consideration of her special +interests in Morocco, should be given one port to police alone, +while officers in equal numbers of the various nationalities, +including French and German, should co-operate in each of the other +seven ports; in the bank France should also be given a slight +advantage. Let France accept this internationalization for the time +being, he said, and in a few years she and Germany could come to a +direct permanent settlement of the Moroccan question by which +Germany, in return for concessions elsewhere, would leave the land +entirely to France. These concessions he declared to be the +utmost<span class="pagenum" id="Page_377">[377]</span> that Germany +would make; she preferred to let the Conference disband rather than +recede further. Baron de Courcel seemed favorable to the plan; but, +on March 6, M. Rouvier refused to consider it or any other direct +negotiations with Germany.<a id="FNanchor_1161"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1161" class="fnanchor">[1161]</a> So that channel was +definitely closed.</p> + +<p>While this effort was being made, Prince Bülow took personal +charge of all the details concerning the Moroccan affair.<a id= +"FNanchor_1162"></a><a href="#Footnote_1162" class= +"fnanchor">[1162]</a> The Chancellor had no idea of permitting a +disruption of the Conference,<a id="FNanchor_1163"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1163" class="fnanchor">[1163]</a> and began to consider +a proposal suggested by the Austrian delegate on February 26 for a +way out. In its final form this project provided that the +organization of police in Tangier, Saffi, Rabat, and Tetouan should +be intrusted to the French; in Mogador, Larache, and Mazagan to the +Spanish; in Casablanca to the command of a Swiss or Dutch officer +with powers of inspection over all the police. It further proposed +that this inspector should report to the diplomatic corps at +Tangier, which should exercise general control over the +reorganization of the police. Herr von Radowitz, Count +Welsersheimb, and Marquis Visconti Venosta all declared this to be +the least that the French would accept.<a id= +"FNanchor_1164"></a><a href="#Footnote_1164" class= +"fnanchor">[1164]</a> The German government endeavored first to +have Austria and Italy mediate on the basis of the plan +outlined<span class="pagenum" id="Page_378">[378]</span> to Baron +de Courcel;<a id="FNanchor_1165"></a><a href="#Footnote_1165" +class="fnanchor">[1165]</a> but on March 4 Count Goluchowski, the +Austrian foreign minister, regarding the step as futile, refused to +do so. Instead he urged that either Count Welsersheimb’s project be +accepted <em>in toto</em> or that the selection of officers be left +to the Sultan with the understanding that he choose only French and +Spanish ones.<a id="FNanchor_1166"></a><a href="#Footnote_1166" +class="fnanchor">[1166]</a> From Italy also came a negative +response.<a id="FNanchor_1167"></a><a href="#Footnote_1167" class= +"fnanchor">[1167]</a> When Count Tattenbach himself favored the +Austrian plan, the Chancellor accepted it on March 6 with the +proviso that the commander at Casablanca choose his officers from +other nationalities than French and Spanish, and also that France +accede to the German demands on the bank. Then the Chancellor +sought to obtain a combined Austro-Italian mediation for the +plan.<a id="FNanchor_1168"></a><a href="#Footnote_1168" class= +"fnanchor">[1168]</a></p> + +<p>On March 8 Count Welsersheimb’s project and the French plan of +February 16 were formally introduced in the Conference.<a id= +"FNanchor_1169"></a><a href="#Footnote_1169" class= +"fnanchor">[1169]</a> On March 10 both were referred to the +committee for formulation on a motion by Herr von Radowitz, who +said:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_379">[379]</span>It seems to me +that accord ought to be reached on the basis of the two projects. . +. . . That of the French delegation certainly contains proposals +which deserve the most serious examination. They ought to be +completed by those of the Austro-Hungarian project.<a id= +"FNanchor_1170"></a><a href="#Footnote_1170" class= +"fnanchor">[1170]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>The Austro-German proposal was a welcome surprise to the +Conference, which recognized it as a great concession. Sir Arthur +Nicolson found that “members of the Conference, with the exception +of French and Spanish, are unanimous in favour of” it. He as well +as the other delegates did not hesitate to inform M. Révoil frankly +of this view. In Algeciras, London, and Paris the British +government on March 9-10 stated to the French authorities that +Germany’s concessions “had brought an agreement so near that it +would not do to let the Conference break up now without a +settlement.” “I would,” said Sir Arthur Nicolson to M. Révoil, +“support him [M. Révoil] to the best of my ability in whatever +course he might take, but I must tell him that in the event of the +Conference ending in a failure we should be placed in an +exceedingly false position with all the public feeling of Europe +against us.”<a id="FNanchor_1171"></a><a href="#Footnote_1171" +class="fnanchor">[1171]</a> Sir Edward Grey thought that “Germany +has conceded the substance and it would be a great pity, if France +sacrificed the substance to the shadow.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1172"></a><a href="#Footnote_1172" class= +"fnanchor">[1172]</a></p> + +<p>M. Révoil, whose views were also valid for the Spanish +delegates, was totally unwilling to accept the Austrian proposal. +He was handicapped by the unexpected fall of the French government +on March 7 over a minor question concerning relations with the +church. A week before the French Premier would have accepted the +Spanish proposal of February 19 as a means of last<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_380">[380]</span> resort.<a id= +"FNanchor_1173"></a><a href="#Footnote_1173" class= +"fnanchor">[1173]</a> Now out of power, though remaining at the +foreign office until the new government was formed, M. Rouvier of +course could not make concessions even had he so desired. Staunchly +supported by the French press, which on March 13 published the +instructions to M. Révoil,<a id="FNanchor_1174"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1174" class="fnanchor">[1174]</a> he and the French +delegate demanded the following modifications in the Austrian +plan:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The police instructors at Casa Blanca to be, like at the other +seven ports, French or Spanish.</p> + +<p>Distribution of ports to French or Spanish instructors to be a +matter for agreement between French and Spanish Gov[ernmen]ts. The +Inspector General to be a subject of neutral state and to have +powers of inspection at all eight ports without right to command or +give orders to French and Spanish instructors, and to make his +reports to the Sultan of Morocco and not to the diplomatic body at +Tangier.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">He also preferred as inspector a Swiss or, even +better, a Dane to a Dutchman for fear the latter might be too much +under German influence.<a id="FNanchor_1175"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1175" class="fnanchor">[1175]</a></p> + +<p>Both MM. Rouvier and Révoil believed that Germany would recede +on these points, for on about March 8 the Prince of Monaco arrived +in Paris from Berlin with a message for M. Rouvier from Prince +Bülow to the effect that Germany would accept a French and Spanish +police “under the most discreet control of an officer from a lesser +Power.”<a id="FNanchor_1176"></a><a href="#Footnote_1176" class= +"fnanchor">[1176]</a> The message was undoubtedly misleading and +the French hope unjustified.<a id="FNanchor_1177"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1177" class="fnanchor">[1177]</a> When +Marquis<span class="pagenum" id="Page_381">[381]</span> Visconti +Venosta, Mr. White, and Sir Arthur Nicolson, at M. Révoil’s +request, asked the German delegates March 9, 10, whether they would +give way, the latter assured them that Germany had spoken her last +word, that “the establishment of the inspector at a port as +instructor was a <em>sine qua non</em> condition.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1178"></a><a href="#Footnote_1178" class= +"fnanchor">[1178]</a></p> + +<p>M. Révoil was “greatly disappointed” and “a little unstrung.” He +told Sir Arthur Nicolson that his government would not accept such +a solution. “He said with much bitterness that the Germans had +internationalized the finances, and they now intended to introduce +the principle throughout Morocco. France would leave the Conference +having yielded everything and gained nothing.” His chief concern +was that if France were forced to accept the Austrian plan, “the +outcry which would be raised against it in France might be utilized +to weaken the Anglo-French understanding.” Sir Arthur Nicolson +replied that he “would always support him [M. Révoil], but I had +given warnings as a friend should.” And Sir Arthur added “that he +must face the situation as it stood, and that there could be no +question of breaking down the Conference on that point, and at a +moment when a favourable end was so nearly reached.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1179"></a><a href="#Footnote_1179" class= +"fnanchor">[1179]</a></p> + +<p>In Paris, M. Rouvier</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">rather demurred [to the British Ambassador] to the +supposition that the conference was so favourably impressed by the +Austrian scheme. He said that France still counted on her side +Spain, England, Russia, Portugal, and others had only been gained +over by the German Delegates having persuaded them that Germany +would make no further concessions.<a id= +"FNanchor_1180"></a><a href="#Footnote_1180" class= +"fnanchor">[1180]</a></p> +</div> + +<p class="nind"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_382">[382]</span>Mr. +Eyre Crowe was alarmed for the Entente Cordiale; he urged the +greatest caution in advising France to recede. But Sir Edward Grey +on March 12 repeated to M. Cambon that in his opinion France +“should accept the Swiss at Casa Blanca rather than let the +Conference break up.”<a id="FNanchor_1181"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1181" class="fnanchor">[1181]</a></p> + +<p>As the pressure of the delegates was so strong, M. Révoil and +the Duke of Almodovar began on March 11 to consider tentatively the +plan of associating actively a Swiss inspector with the French and +Spanish in the policing of Tangier.<a id= +"FNanchor_1182"></a><a href="#Footnote_1182" class= +"fnanchor">[1182]</a> Nothing could be decided until the new French +government was formed. Meanwhile, the opposition of views became +public in the Conference session of March 11 when two matters +remaining unsolved on the question of the bank were taken up. In a +previous sitting Sir Arthur Nicolson, in agreement with M. Révoil, +had proposed that three censors be chosen to oversee the bank. In +accepting this proposal Herr von Radowitz stipulated that in order +to preserve the principle of internationality the censors should be +chosen by the respective governments from the personnel of the +banks interested in the Moroccan state bank and that a copy of the +censors’ reports should be sent to the governments of the signatory +Powers. The French delegates, however, desired that the first +censors be selected by the committee drawing up the statutes of the +bank and should thereafter be chosen by co-optation and that their +reports should be sent to the council of administrators of the +bank. The French continued to demand four shares, while Germany was +willing to concede them only three.<a id= +"FNanchor_1183"></a><a href="#Footnote_1183" class= +"fnanchor">[1183]</a> At the session on the next day M. Révoil +refused the Austrian<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_383">[383]</span> proposal to give the command in Casablanca +to an officer of a third Power, but agreed to the inspection by +one, preferably a Swiss.<a id="FNanchor_1184"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1184" class="fnanchor">[1184]</a></p> + +<p>In reporting M. Révoil’s pertinacity to Berlin on March 11, Herr +von Radowitz stated: “I have been told by all my colleagues, even +the English, that after our action they would no longer consider +justified the French adherence to the points declared inacceptable +by us and they have so expressed themselves to M. Révoil.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1185"></a><a href="#Footnote_1185" class= +"fnanchor">[1185]</a> On the next day Marquis Visconti Venosta said +in confidence to Herr von Radowitz that the latter would “not be +able to come to an arrangement with M. Révoil without a positive +intervention of the government at Paris. . . . .”<a id= +"FNanchor_1186"></a><a href="#Footnote_1186" class= +"fnanchor">[1186]</a> The same day the <em>Lokalanzeiger</em> +published an exaggerated report from its correspondent at Algeciras +in which the “complete isolation” of France in the committee was +spoken of; Italy, Russia, the United States, and even Great +Britain, the article read, had put themselves on the German +side.<a id="FNanchor_1187"></a><a href="#Footnote_1187" class= +"fnanchor">[1187]</a></p> + +<p>Instead of maintaining a dignified silence while public opinion +and the persuasion of the Powers compelled France to give way or +break up the Conference, Prince Bülow tried to increase the +pressure by beginning a diplomatic and press campaign against +France. With German thoroughness he overdid the thing. On March 12 +he sent telegrams to the German ambassadors at Vienna, London, St. +Petersburg, Rome, Washington, and Paris in which he stated that the +generous concessions granted by Germany on March 10 had made +agreement seem possible. Then all had been placed in doubt again by +sudden and unexpected opposition from the French delegates. The +other delegates, including the British, he continued, had expressed +to Herr von Radowitz and to M. Révoil their opinion that France +should now recede; and, after repeating Marquis Visconti +Venosta’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_384">[384]</span> +statement, he asked the various governments to intervene at Paris +“so that the voice of reason will again rule there and further +opposition be given up.”<a id="FNanchor_1188"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1188" class="fnanchor">[1188]</a></p> + +<p>The Russian, Italian, and Austrian governments agreed to advise +France to accept the Austrian compromise. Sir Edward Grey, whom +Count Metternich did not ask to intercede in behalf of the plan as +he believed that the British Minister would refuse, welcomed the +German concessions but loyally upheld the French proposals.<a id= +"FNanchor_1189"></a><a href="#Footnote_1189" class= +"fnanchor">[1189]</a> Mr. Roosevelt unexpectedly replied most +adversely.</p> + +<p>In a letter on March 7 the President advised the Emperor to +accept his proposal of February 19. He justified his interference +by quoting a passage from Baron Sternburg’s letter to him on June +28, 1905, to the effect that “the Emperor has requested me to tell +you that in case, during the coming conference, differences of +opinion should arise between France and Germany, he, in every case, +will be ready to back up the decision which you should consider to +be most fair and most practical.” He warned the German government +that it would lose “credit” and “moral power” in the world if the +Conference failed.<a id="FNanchor_1190"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1190" class="fnanchor">[1190]</a> In his reply on March +12 the Emperor announced his acceptance of the Austrian plan, and +urged the President to support it.<a id= +"FNanchor_1191"></a><a href="#Footnote_1191" class= +"fnanchor">[1191]</a></p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_385">[385]</span>Upon receiving +that reply Mr. Roosevelt on March 14 denounced the Austrian project +to Baron Sternburg as “absurd because it favors the very ideas the +conference has been trying to eliminate namely partition and +spheres of influence,” and also because it was impracticable. On +the other hand, “placing French and Spanish officers in the same +ports gives according to my view a safer guarantee than placing +them separately in single ports,” he said. In spite of that reply, +however, Prince Bülow regarded the German position as “at present +not at all unfavorable.”<a id="FNanchor_1192"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1192" class="fnanchor">[1192]</a></p> + +<p>Meanwhile, the French were restoring their front. In Paris a new +government was formed by M. Sarrien on March 14 with M. Bourgeois +at the foreign office. M. Bourgeois, with whom Prince Radolin was +on cordial terms, was known to be a conciliatory statesman +interested in harmonizing international differences. But he could +hardly begin his career in office with an unpopular concession on +the Moroccan question. He renewed M. Révoil’s instructions, +refusing to compromise on the police in any manner whatever.</p> + +<p>It was a bold act. The French government knew that the Russian, +Italian, British, and Austrian governments disapproved. Several +influential members of the French Parliament tried to persuade M. +Bourgeois that the British government, influenced by Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman, would withdraw its support from France. The new +cabinet was alarmed by the British advice to accept a neutral +police in Casablanca rather than break up the Conference, and some +of the ministers suspected that Great Britain and Germany were +about to come to an arrangement leaving France in the lurch. In a +French cabinet meeting M. Clémenceau was at first the only minister +to combat these doubts.<a id="FNanchor_1193"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1193" class="fnanchor">[1193]</a></p> + +<p>But the move succeeded. M. Bourgeois quickly repulsed +the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_386">[386]</span> intervention, +half-hearted as it was, of the Russian, Italian, and Austrian +ambassadors in Paris in favor of the Austrian plan; he even +gathered from his conversation with the Austrian representative +that the latter’s government would try to persuade Germany to +relinquish her stand on the policing of Casablanca.<a id= +"FNanchor_1194"></a><a href="#Footnote_1194" class= +"fnanchor">[1194]</a> In addition, as soon as the French +instructions were published, Sir Edward Grey immediately informed +the French government that Great Britain would “of course” support +it.<a id="FNanchor_1195"></a><a href="#Footnote_1195" class= +"fnanchor">[1195]</a></p> + +<p>When he learned of the French doubts about the continuation of +British aid, he rather indignantly replied that the French leaders, +MM. Bourgeois, Etienne, and Clémenceau,</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">should be told that there has never been any +question here of discontinuing our support to France. We have given +it throughout at Algeciras and in every capital in Europe where +required and shall continue this so long as the French wish it and +trust us. Cordial co-operation with France in all parts of the +world remains a cardinal point of British policy and in some +respects we have carried it further than the late Government here +were required to do.</p> + +<p>Any advice Nicolson has given to Révoil has been on the +understanding that this support would be continued, and if he has +given advice freely it has<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_387">[387]</span> been because of his complete confidence +that this was understood by his French colleague. The same is true +of my conversations with Cambon. . . . . The Prime Minister has +been cognizant of all I have said and has cordially approved of +it.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">Sir Arthur Nicolson denied that either directly or +indirectly had he ever said to the German delegates that France +ought to give way on any point.<a id="FNanchor_1196"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1196" class="fnanchor">[1196]</a> Sir Edward Grey +informed the other governments that the British fidelity to France +would continue as before. And on March 18 <em>Le Temps</em> +published the instructions to Sir Arthur Nicolson so that public +opinion could see how complete that support was.<a id= +"FNanchor_1197"></a><a href="#Footnote_1197" class= +"fnanchor">[1197]</a></p> + +<p>If the French leaders intended to bring Great Britain back +unreservedly into line by expressing these doubts about British +support, they succeeded. M. Bourgeois could with more assurance +inform the German Ambassador that France had receded as far as she +would. On March 17 Prince Radolin reported his words as +follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>The Minister added that he stood on the defensive, that he +supported entirely the previous policy of Rouvier and Révoil, . . . +. that he had agreed in principle with the appointment of a general +inspector from some lesser state “subject to agreement on details” +but that under no circumstances would he permit the inspector to +exercise a command or a collaboration. That is a question of +principle, a vital question for France and her prestige in Algeria. +Moreover in case the conference ends without result, the <em>status +quo</em> is no disadvantage for France. Germany, not France, had +demanded the conference. “It is your turn now to speak, but not of +the police. It is lost effort.”</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">He accused the German government of being +responsible for the pressure of the other Powers on France. +According to instructions, Prince Radolin replied in a serious tone +but without threat that the steps taken by those governments were +caused by Germany’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_388">[388]</span> +great concessions of March 10.<a id="FNanchor_1198"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1198" class="fnanchor">[1198]</a> But the vote of +confidence given without debate to the new cabinet by the Chamber +on March 19 showed that M. Bourgeois interpreted French feeling +correctly.<a id="FNanchor_1199"></a><a href="#Footnote_1199" class= +"fnanchor">[1199]</a></p> + +<p>There were signs at Paris and Algeciras as early as March 17 +that Austria was seeking some new way out of the deadlock, and that +Germany might accept the French view about Casablanca.<a id= +"FNanchor_1200"></a><a href="#Footnote_1200" class= +"fnanchor">[1200]</a> Before the Austrian mediation had time to +materialize, however, the renewed intervention of the American +government turned the scales in favor of France. On March 16 Prince +Bülow had replied to Mr. Roosevelt with arguments showing that the +Austrian plan would preserve the unity and integrity of Morocco +whereas the French plan would divide the country into spheres of +influence.<a id="FNanchor_1201"></a><a href="#Footnote_1201" class= +"fnanchor">[1201]</a> The President remained unconvinced. Thinking +that the whole German action was intended to humiliate France, he +and American public opinion took the French side. While he no +longer believed that Germany aimed at war with her western +neighbor, he and his advisers did suspect her of intending by the +Austrian proposal to gain a port and a sphere of influence in the +Mediterranean. Germany’s extreme demands were arousing +dissatisfaction among the other delegates at Algeciras, he told +Baron Sternburg, and Austria and Russia had already asked him to +advise Germany to moderate them. So, while he declared that he +would not hold out if the other Powers accepted the Austrian plan, +he remained hostile to it. He threatened to publish the entire +correspondence on the subject if the Conference failed.<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_389">[389]</span> Baron Sternburg learned that +Mr. Root had said privately that Germany’s attitude at the +Conference was “petty and unworthy of a great nation,” that she was +fast losing the confidence of the world. In reiterating the +American stand, Mr. Root wrote to the Ambassador: “If we had +sufficient interest in Morocco to make it worth our while, we +should seriously object, on our own account, to the adoption of any +such arrangement [as the Austrian plan].”<a id= +"FNanchor_1202"></a><a href="#Footnote_1202" class= +"fnanchor">[1202]</a></p> + +<p>With the net drawing tighter around Germany, Prince Bülow +notified President Roosevelt on March 19 that Germany would accept +the American plan of having French and Spanish officers in about +equal numbers co-operate in each of the ports, supervised by a +general inspector from another nation.<a id= +"FNanchor_1203"></a><a href="#Footnote_1203" class= +"fnanchor">[1203]</a> President Roosevelt was jubilant over +Germany’s acceptance of his plan. He immediately proposed it to the +French government and asked the British to support him.<a id= +"FNanchor_1204"></a><a href="#Footnote_1204" class= +"fnanchor">[1204]</a></p> + +<p>From this side the President met with strenuous opposition. +France and Spain would have nothing to do with the idea of mixed +police, except if necessary in Tangier and Casablanca. Complaining +of too many peacemakers,<a id="FNanchor_1205"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1205" class="fnanchor">[1205]</a> Sir Edward Grey +supported the Franco-Spanish view. Mr. Roosevelt suddenly grew +timid and refused to defend his project before the +Conference.<a id="FNanchor_1206"></a><a href="#Footnote_1206" +class="fnanchor">[1206]</a><span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_390">[390]</span> The German government was therefore forced +to fall back on Austrian mediation.<a id= +"FNanchor_1207"></a><a href="#Footnote_1207" class= +"fnanchor">[1207]</a></p> + +<p>In a private conversation on March 23 Count Welsersheimb +informed M. Révoil that Germany might sacrifice her demand for a +neutral police at Casablanca if France would make reciprocal +concessions. M. Révoil was willing to limit the number of French +shares in the bank to three. But for the other unsettled problems +of determining how much international control should be established +over the police and bank and how the police should be divided among +the various ports, the two men failed to find a solution. On the +first question the German government demanded as a <em>conditio +sine qua non</em> that the inspector should be made responsible to +the diplomatic corps at Tangier, which should exercise a general +supervision over the police. M. Révoil, on the other hand, +supported by the British and Spanish delegates, desired that the +diplomatic corps be excluded from intervening in this matter at +all. On the question of the bank the Germans wanted the various +governments and the diplomatic corps at Tangier to have some +authority over the censors while the French did not. As to the +division of ports the French formally requested that the settlement +of this problem and of other details should be left for France and +Spain to determine later with the Sultan; the Germans preferred to +have the Conference itself divide the ports between these two +Powers.<a id="FNanchor_1208"></a><a href="#Footnote_1208" class= +"fnanchor">[1208]</a></p> + +<p>At that point the Conference again reached a deadlock. +With<span class="pagenum" id="Page_391">[391]</span> victory in +view the French, on March 26, refused to give way;<a id= +"FNanchor_1209"></a><a href="#Footnote_1209" class= +"fnanchor">[1209]</a> while the Germans, who had already made the +great concession, sought to save as much as they could. They felt +compelled to be firmer because the publication in <em>Le Temps</em> +on March 21 of the very pro-French instructions to the Russian +delegate at Algeciras, succeeding the publication of the French and +British instructions, made it appear as if the German government +were being coerced into retreat.<a id="FNanchor_1210"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1210" class="fnanchor">[1210]</a> With one or two +exceptions, the delegates, anxious to conclude the Conference and +attributing little importance to these matters, were inclined to +think that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_392">[392]</span> France +ought to recede on the question of the responsibility of the +inspector.<a id="FNanchor_1211"></a><a href="#Footnote_1211" class= +"fnanchor">[1211]</a> President Roosevelt was once more urging that +both France and Spain be given a joint mandate and that they accept +from the Conference a joint responsibility for every port no matter +how the ports were divided.<a id="FNanchor_1212"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1212" class="fnanchor">[1212]</a> After the session on +March 26, the mediators again set to work. Germany agreed for +France and Spain to divide the ports as they wished and to submit +their decision to the Conference for approval. Both Powers made +concessions on the question of the control of the bank. On the most +difficult problem of the responsibility of the police inspector, +the French, British, Spanish, Russian, and Italian first delegates +met privately at M. Révoil’s suggestion and worked out a formula. +Then Mr. White submitted it to the German delegates, and the latter +accepted it (March 27).<a id="FNanchor_1213"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1213" class="fnanchor">[1213]</a> The difficulties were +thereby settled.</p> + +<p>In the meantime trouble, which did not come to the surface, had +arisen between France and Spain. The Franco-Spanish accord of 1905 +had provided for the policing of only five ports, whereas the +Conference had dealt with all eight. France wanted the other three +left to her; but Spain refused. On March 18 she requested that +Tangier be given to her, but the French government rejected the +suggestion, offering instead to agree that Casablanca as well as +Tangier should be policed by French and Spanish together. This +offer was refused by Spain, who on about March 25 made the +additional request that she should be given an extra share in the +bank by the Conference instead of receiving it later from France +according to agreement. The French would not accede to this, but by +March 31 the two Powers decided that<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_393">[393]</span> the officers should be Spanish in Tetouan +and Larache, French and Spanish in Casablanca and Tangier, and +French in the other four ports.<a id="FNanchor_1214"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1214" class="fnanchor">[1214]</a></p> + +<p>The Conference accepted this division, together with the +following terms on the police: They should function for five years; +they should be inspected at least once a year by a Swiss officer +stationed at Tangier<a id="FNanchor_1215"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1215" class="fnanchor">[1215]</a> who should report to +the Sultan; this officer was also empowered to make as many special +reports as he saw fit; he should likewise send a copy of these +reports to the dean of the diplomatic corps in order that that body +might</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p class="nind">confirm that the Moroccan police is functioning in +conformity with the decisions taken by the Conference and that it +may see whether it guarantees in an efficacious manner and in +conformity with the treaties the security of persons and of the +property of foreigners as well as that of commercial transactions; +. . . . in case of demand before it by an interested legation the +diplomatic corps may, after advising the representatives of the +Sultan of its action, request the inspector to make an inquiry and +draw up a report on the complaint made.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">On the question of the bank it was stipulated that +the censors should be chosen with the approval of their governments +by the various state banks of the countries involved. Instead of +using the expression that the censors should exercise “the +supervision of the administration of the Bank in the name of the +signatory Powers,” a phrase to which the French objected as +smacking of internationalization again, the delegates substituted +the less colorful one that the censors should exercise “the +supervision of which they are invested by the present Act in that +which concerns the administration of the bank.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1216"></a><a href="#Footnote_1216" class= +"fnanchor">[1216]</a></p> + +<p>Thus, formulas were found. Details were cleared up; +minor<span class="pagenum" id="Page_394">[394]</span> points +settled. On April 7 the delegates signed the general act. The +Conference of Algeciras was ended.<a id= +"FNanchor_1217"></a><a href="#Footnote_1217" class= +"fnanchor">[1217]</a></p> + +<p>The conclusions of the Conference were determined by the +exigencies of international relations and the interests of European +Powers, not by the needs of Morocco. The less interested Powers had +aimed chiefly at preserving peace in Europe. France and her +satellite, Spain, had been concerned with maintaining their +interests in Morocco and with preventing any other Power from +gaining a foothold there. Germany alone had endeavored to defend +Moroccan rights, and she had done so only because that policy had +been in accord with her interests. The Moroccan delegates had in +general been disregarded by the Conference, which assumed that the +Sultan would under pressure accept its decisions. Although the +assembly had formally acknowledged the independence and integrity +of Morocco and the sovereignty of the Sultan, it had shown little +more regard for them than had the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish +agreements of 1904-5. While the open door had been allowed, the +French and Spanish military control in Morocco assured to those two +Powers the main economic advantages. In view of the terms of the +Franco-Spanish accord of 1905, it was certain that those Powers +would not preserve equality of economic treatment. France and Spain +had both fought internationalization so effectively that the +international supervision established was entirely inadequate to +command respect. The idea that a Power might be charged by the +other Powers with the exercise of a mandate for the sake of the +“backward people” had not as yet been seriously considered by any +government. In February and March President Roosevelt and the +German government had discussed the proposal of granting to France +and Spain a mandate in Morocco “from all the Powers, under +responsibility to all of them for the<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_395">[395]</span> maintenance of equal rights and +opportunities”<a id="FNanchor_1218"></a><a href="#Footnote_1218" +class="fnanchor">[1218]</a>—that is, for the advantage of the +Western Powers not for that of Morocco—but the trouble lay in the +absence of any existing machinery which would have enabled it to be +put into effect.</p> + +<p>The reforms provided for were hardly more than a beginning. They +were unsatisfactory both to the Moroccans and to the French and the +Spanish. The Moroccan government was surprised at the outcome of +the Conference, having expected that France would be arraigned +before that body as before a tribunal. The mass of the Moroccan +people remained hostile to reform; they were turning their homage +more to the pretender and to Raisouli. Even those ministers who +recognized the necessity for change denounced the Conference +proposals as benefiting the Europeans and European trade in Morocco +but not the Moroccan government. “The conference has turned Morocco +over to the French,” said El Tores, a delegate to that assembly, to +Dr. Rosen. He thought that either acceptance or rejection of the +Conference act by the Sultan would be a misfortune.<a id= +"FNanchor_1219"></a><a href="#Footnote_1219" class= +"fnanchor">[1219]</a> Ben Sliman, the Moroccan foreign minister, +was equally despondent.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>He regarded the outlook after the decision of the Conference as +simply hopeless [so Mr. Lowther reported his assertions]. If the +Makhzen assented to the Conference’s decision there was an end to +the Moorish Government, as a Government. The ports were thereby +practically handed over for ever to the Powers. These were of +importance to Europeans and of a certain financial value to the +Sultan although they were but a small part of the country and their +populations a mere handful of those of the Sultan’s subjects, who, +in normal times, had acknowledged His Majesty’s rule, and paid +taxes. But the decisions of the Conference Ben Sliman considered, +in practice if not in theory, left the Sultan no means or hopes of +doing anything to re-establish order and restore prosperity to the +vast mass of his people, to whose needs at large the proposed +reforms were totally inadequate and he was deeply disappointed with +them.</p> + +<p>His Excellency would therefore infinitely have preferred the +reforms to have been so framed that the Powers would have exercised +some kind of direction, assistance and advice at the Court itself, +the influence of which<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_396">[396]</span> would have been, in course of time, felt +throughout the country to the great advantage of all concerned. As +it was, the Makhzen seemed to be left in as impotent and ridiculous +a position as ever in the eyes of its subjects.<a id= +"FNanchor_1220"></a><a href="#Footnote_1220" class= +"fnanchor">[1220]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>Opinion at court was divided upon whether to accept the +decisions of the Conference or not. When the dean of the diplomatic +corps in Tangier officially communicated the Conference act to the +Sultan, the latter tried to delay a decision and to discuss certain +points. But on June 18 he reluctantly signed the act with +reservations. All indications pointed to the opposition of the +Moroccan government to any serious efforts at reforms.<a id= +"FNanchor_1221"></a><a href="#Footnote_1221" class= +"fnanchor">[1221]</a></p> + +<p>The Conference had made inadequate provisions for coping with +Moroccan opposition. There could be no half-measures in handling +Morocco. Europe had to leave her alone entirely or give the +mandatory Powers complete freedom to “shoot” reforms into the land. +The right to police eight towns would just suffice to involve +France and Spain in a series of petty, indecisive clashes with the +natives. If they wished to employ more military authority, they +would have either to obtain the permission of the Powers or to risk +another international crisis by taking an unauthorized initiative. +As soon as the execution of the reforms should begin, the +inadequacy of all this diplomatic activity would become evident. +The Moroccan problem had not been solved.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc17"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1070"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1070"><span class= +"label">[1070]</span></a>The Conference opened later than was +originally planned, the immediate cause being the marriage of the +Infanta Maria Theresa, sister of King Alfonso, to Prince Ferdinand +of Bavaria, on Jan. 12. The King of Spain had wanted in December to +move the meeting place to Madrid, and both the French and German +governments had agreed; but as the Sultan opposed, the proposal had +been dropped. Bülow’s opinion was that it made no difference to +Germany whether the Conference met at Madrid or Algeciras or +elsewhere. “It was a mistake that we originally settled ourselves +on Tangier,” he wrote, Dec. 25, 1905. See <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 25 +ff., Nos. 6911, 6913 ff.; <em>B.D.</em>, III, 160, No. 196; +<em>L.j., 1901-5</em>, No. 368; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, +<em>Documents diplomatiques. Affaires du Maroc, 1906, Protocols et +comptes rendus de la Conférence d’Algéciras</em> (1906), 5, No. 2 +(hereafter referred to as <em>L.j., 1906</em>).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1071"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1071"><span class= +"label">[1071]</span></a>Tardieu, <em>La Conf. d’Algés</em>, pp. 90 +ff., 503 f.; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 17, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, +96, No. 6952. Tardieu’s book contains almost an official account of +the Conference from the French side. He was present as +representative of <em>Le Temps</em> and had access to the fullest +information, as his articles showed. His book is an excellent +example of patriotic historiography carried almost to a hysterical +extreme, and his interpretations have to be read with the greatest +caution. Dr. Hammann criticized the work when it appeared in 1907 +in two articles, one in <em>Grenzboten</em>, 1907, p. 12, the other +in the <em>Kölnische Zeitung</em>, March 30, 1907 (editor’s note, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 92 f.). See also the masterly criticism of +French policy by Dickinson, <em>The International Anarchy +1904-1914</em>, pp. 134 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1072"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1072"><span class= +"label">[1072]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 5, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 243, No. 268; Tardieu, pp. 85 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1073"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1073"><span class= +"label">[1073]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., +Jan. 16, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 92 f., No. 6949; Révoil to +Rouvier, Jan. 18, 1906, <em>L.j., 1906</em>, 11, No. 4.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1074"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1074"><span class= +"label">[1074]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 16, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 92 f., No. 6949; Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; +<em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. 9 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 18, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 229, No. 248.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1075"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1075"><span class= +"label">[1075]</span></a><em>L.j., 1906</em>, 264 ff., No. 37.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1076"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1076"><span class= +"label">[1076]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, 5 ff., No. 3, and +following documents; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 12, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 91, No. 6947; Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 15, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 92, No. 6948; Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 119 ff., No. 6967; Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; Nicolson +to Grey, Jan. 19, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 230 f., No. 249.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1077"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1077"><span class= +"label">[1077]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 21, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 231 ff., Nos. 250 f.; Monts to F. O., Jan. 28, +1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 126, No. 6970; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. +31, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 130 f., No. 6975.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1078"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1078"><span class= +"label">[1078]</span></a>Révoil wished to push matters into the +open sessions of the Conference as much as possible, where he would +have more support (Tardieu, pp. 136 ff.; Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. +26, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 119 f., No. 6967).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1079"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1079"><span class= +"label">[1079]</span></a>As seen below, the German government was +proposing several alternative solutions of that question, and the +German delegates seem also to have been discussing others on their +own initiative. See Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 25 and 27, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 235, No. 256; 239 f., Nos. 262 f.; Tardieu, pp. +144 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1080"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1080"><span class= +"label">[1080]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 24, 25, 26, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 234, No. 254; 235 f., Nos. 256 f.; 236 ff., +Nos. 259 f.; 239 f., Nos. 262 f.; Tardieu, pp. 136 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1081"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1081"><span class= +"label">[1081]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 29, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 128 ff., No. 6974.; Tardieu, pp. 141 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1082"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1082"><span class= +"label">[1082]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 3, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 136 f., No. 6980; Tardieu, pp. 148 ff.; +Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 4 and 5, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 242, No. +266; 243 f., No. 268.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1083"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1083"><span class= +"label">[1083]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 114, No. 6965.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1084"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1084"><span class= +"label">[1084]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 30, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 128, No. 6973; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 29 and 31, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 128 ff., Nos. 6974 f.; Bülow to Radowitz, +Feb. 2, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 132 ff., No. 6977; Tardieu, p. +142.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1085"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1085"><span class= +"label">[1085]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 20, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 99 ff., No. 6956; Tardieu, pp. 160 ff. A +proposal similar to No. 1 had been made to Roosevelt by Bülow +earlier in January (Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 6, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 54 f., No. 6926). Bülow also offered to support +Italy in seeking a general mandate on the police, manifestly in +order to create antagonism between Italy and France. The offer was +rejected and was soon dropped by Bülow who feared that Italy might +later help France penetrate Morocco in return for French aid to +Italy in Tripoli. See Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, +XXI, 53 f., No. 6925; Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 114 f., No. 6965; Tardieu, pp. 146 f. There is no +proof in the published British and German documents of Tardieu’s +assertion that in January the German government also offered to +support Spain in seeking this general mandate. See <em>ibid.</em>, +pp. 145, 155 f. Cf. Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 233, No. 252; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 244, No. 270.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1086"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1086"><span class= +"label">[1086]</span></a>Tardieu, p. 146 n.; Bülow to Sternburg, +Jan. 27, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 123 ff., No. 6968.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1087"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1087"><span class= +"label">[1087]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 3, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 136 f., No. 6980; Tardieu, pp. 148 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1088"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1088"><span class= +"label">[1088]</span></a>The German government did not desire +British mediation, as it feared that Great Britain might try to +pose as the protector of France and strengthen the Entente Cordiale +(Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 114 f., No. +6965).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1089"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1089"><span class= +"label">[1089]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., Jan. 23, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 102 f., No. 6958.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1090"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1090"><span class= +"label">[1090]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 27, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 123 ff., No. 6968; 127, No. 6972. On Feb. 3 +Goluchowski declared to the German Ambassador that Austria would go +with her ally on the questions of the police and the bank “through +thick and thin” (Holstein to Wedel, Feb. 4, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, +137, No. 6981). Dr. Kriege, of the German foreign office, was sent +on a special mission to Vienna on Feb. 2 to gain the Austrian +support (memo. by Kriege, Feb. 4, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 137 ff., +No. 6982; Wedel to F. O., Feb. 5, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 140, No. +6983). A cabinet crisis in Italy on Feb. 1 prevented the German +government from taking any immediate steps to gain Italy’s active +support. But Bülow expected Visconti Venosta to be willing to +mediate. On Feb. 8 a new government was formed in Rome under +Sonnino (Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 143 ff., +No. 6987).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1091"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1091"><span class= +"label">[1091]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 1, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 131, No. 6976. Bülow also instructed Sternburg to +interest the American financiers in the Moroccan state bank so that +they would press their government to oppose the French plan and to +favor the German one. At the Chancellor’s request, the German +banker, Mendelssohn, who was to take charge of German interests in +the Moroccan bank, endeavored to arouse the Dutch, American, and +Austrian bankers in the same way. See Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 145 f., No. 6987; Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 8, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 148, No. 6989.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1092"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1092"><span class= +"label">[1092]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 5, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 140 f., No. 6984; Tardieu, pp. 152 f.; Dennis, +<em>Adventures in American Diplomacy</em>, p. 500; Nicolson to +Grey, Jan. 27, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 239, No. 262.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1093"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1093"><span class= +"label">[1093]</span></a>Nicolson reported that Tattenbach argued +as follows: “He observed that situation had completely changed +since Conference had been agreed upon, and that now +<em>vis-a-vis</em> to France I was exactly in the same position as +the other delegates. He continued that if I urged my French +colleague to make all required concessions on police question, my +words would be decisive; while if I declined to say those words, I +should be practically encouraging my French colleague to resist; +and he hinted that if the Conference fell through a great deal of +the responsibility would fall on me.” See Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 4, +1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 241, No. 265; 242 f., No. 267; Grey to +Nicolson, Feb. 13, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 251 f., No. 281; Tardieu, +pp. 147 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1094"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1094"><span class= +"label">[1094]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 6, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 141 f., No. 6985; Tardieu, pp. 153 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1095"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1095"><span class= +"label">[1095]</span></a>The Spanish undersecretary of state for +foreign affairs, M. Ojeda, had approved it. See Bülow to Radowitz, +Feb. 7, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 145 and note, No. 6987. On the +German attempts to win over Spain see Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, +1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 233, No. 252; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 244, No. 270.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1096"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1096"><span class= +"label">[1096]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 143 ff., No. 6987.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1097"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1097"><span class= +"label">[1097]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 10, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 148 f., No. 6990; 155, No. 6996; Dennis, pp. 501 +f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1098"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1098"><span class= +"label">[1098]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 151, No. 6992.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1099"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1099"><span class= +"label">[1099]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 8, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 147 f., No. 6989.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1100"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1100"><span class= +"label">[1100]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 9, 12, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 149 ff., No. 6991; 155 f., No. 6997; Radowitz to F. +O., Feb. 10, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 155, No. 6996; Tardieu, p. +172.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1101"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1101"><span class= +"label">[1101]</span></a>Quoted from a memorandum given by Radowitz +to Révoil on that date. See Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 13, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 162 f., No. 7004; Tardieu, pp. 175 f.; Nicolson +to Grey, Feb. 14, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 253, No. 284.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1102"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1102"><span class= +"label">[1102]</span></a>Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 122, No. 6967; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 151, No. 6992. See the documents in <em>B.D.</em>, +III, 227 ff., Nos. 246 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1103"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1103"><span class= +"label">[1103]</span></a>Schoen to F. O., Feb. 12, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 156 f., No. 6998; Tardieu, pp. 158 f., 194 ff.; +Witte, <em>Memoirs</em>, pp. 298 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 13, +1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 249 f., No. 279.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1104"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1104"><span class= +"label">[1104]</span></a>Wedel to F. O., Feb. 12 and 14, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 157 ff., No. 6999; 166 f., No. 7007.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1105"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1105"><span class= +"label">[1105]</span></a>Holstein to Radolin, Feb. 10, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 152 ff., No. 6994.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1106"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1106"><span class= +"label">[1106]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 198 ff.; Bülow to Monts, Feb. +10, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 154, No. 6995.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1107"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1107"><span class= +"label">[1107]</span></a>Bülow to Radolin, Feb. 7 and 10, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 146 f., No. 6988; 152, No. 6993. Holstein was +the inspirer of these dispatches. See Holstein to Radolin, Feb. 10, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 152 ff., No. 6994. On the press war see also +Tardieu, pp. 167 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1108"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1108"><span class= +"label">[1108]</span></a>Bülow to Monts, Feb. 13, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 159 f. and note, No. 7000; Tardieu, p. 195. The +telegram to Washington, dispatched the next day, was not of +identical wording with the others but to the same effect (Bülow to +Sternburg, Feb. 14, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 163 f., No. +7005).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1109"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1109"><span class= +"label">[1109]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 74, 163, 167, 176 f., 196; +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 152 n.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1110"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1110"><span class= +"label">[1110]</span></a>Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 12, 1906, +<em>B.D</em>, III, 248 f., No. 278; Grey to Lascelles, Feb. 14, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 254 f., No. 285; Metternich to F. O., Feb. +14, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 164 ff., No. 7006.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1111"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1111"><span class= +"label">[1111]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6 and 7, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 244, No. 269; 245, No. 271; Tardieu, p. 154. +The accusation was not deserved.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1112"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1112"><span class= +"label">[1112]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 249 f., No. 279; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 13, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 253, No. 283; Tardieu, pp. 79 f., 158 ff., +204 f., 246 ff.; Witte, pp. 298 ff.; <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 125 f. n.; +Goetz, <em>Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1894-1914</em>, pp. 386 +f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1113"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1113"><span class= +"label">[1113]</span></a>According to Bompard, the Russian +government was not certain that the Liberal government in London +would support France as whole-heartedly as its predecessor had +done. Grey’s assertions early in February reassured it entirely +(Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 31, 1906, and Spring Rice to Grey, +Feb. 16, 1906, Gwynn, <em>The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil +Spring Rice</em>, II, 62 ff.; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 7 and 8, +1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 245 f., Nos. 272 f.; Grey to Spring Rice, +Feb. 8, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 246, No. 274).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1114"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1114"><span class= +"label">[1114]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 300 ff., Nos. 7112 f.; Bishop, <em>The Life and +Times of Theodore Roosevelt</em>, I, 489.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1115"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1115"><span class= +"label">[1115]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 160 ff.; Bishop, I, 489.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1116"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1116"><span class= +"label">[1116]</span></a>Roosevelt to Reid, March 1, 1906, quoted +in Royal Cortissoz, <em>The Life of Whitelaw Reid</em> (New York, +1921), II, 329 f., 347; Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 300 ff., Nos. 7112 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1117"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1117"><span class= +"label">[1117]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 161 f.; Nicolson to Grey, +Feb. 11, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 246 ff., Nos. 275 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1118"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1118"><span class= +"label">[1118]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., Feb. 13 and 15, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 160 f., No. 7001; 171 f., No. 7010; Tardieu, +pp. 200 f.; Grey to Bertie, Feb. 13, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 250 +f., No. 280; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 16, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 259 +f., No. 290.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1119"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1119"><span class= +"label">[1119]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 179 f., 249 ff. White was +very critical of the German tactics in his dispatches to +Washington, especially of the German attempt to negotiate directly +with the Quai d’Orsay while the Conference was going on (White to +Root, Feb. 11, 1905, Dennis, p. 502 and note; Nicolson to Grey, +Feb. 15, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 257 f., No. 287).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1120"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1120"><span class= +"label">[1120]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 16, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 172, No. 7011; Tardieu, p. 181; Nicolson to +Grey, Feb. 17, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 260 f., No. 292. Révoil +was contemplating an involved, vague reply when he talked to +Nicolson. At the latter’s advice it was made concise and +straightforward (Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 15, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, +256 ff., No. 287).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1121"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1121"><span class= +"label">[1121]</span></a>Root to Sternburg, Feb. 19, 1906, quoted +in Bishop, I, 489 ff., <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 181 ff., No. 7019; +Tardieu, pp. 249 f., 180.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1122"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1122"><span class= +"label">[1122]</span></a>Italy had been chosen for obvious reasons, +for she was bound to France by the accords of 1900 and 1902 and to +Germany by the Triple Alliance. As such, her choice might be +acceptable to both Powers (Tardieu, p. 181).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1123"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1123"><span class= +"label">[1123]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 19, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 173 f., No. 7013; Tardieu, pp. 187, 249 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1124"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1124"><span class= +"label">[1124]</span></a>Bülow’s minute to <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 183, +No. 7019; Sternburg to Roosevelt, Feb. 22, 1906, in Bishop, I, 491 +ff.; Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 183 f., +No. 7020; Tardieu, p. 250.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1125"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1125"><span class= +"label">[1125]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 183 f., No. 7020; Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 23, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 213, No. 7038.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1126"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1126"><span class= +"label">[1126]</span></a>The plan was drawn up with the aid of +Glasenapp of the Deutsche Bank and of Mendelssohn, who was to take +over the German shares in the bank. See Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 27, +1906; <em>ibid.</em>, 115 ff., No. 6966; <em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. +114 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 186, 221 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1127"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1127"><span class= +"label">[1127]</span></a><em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. 117 f.; Tardieu, +pp. 184 f., 221 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1128"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1128"><span class= +"label">[1128]</span></a><em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. 113 f., 120 ff., +136 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 20, 22, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, +204, No. 7031; 205, No. 7033; Tardieu, pp. 186, 221 ff.; Nicolson +to Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 265 f., No. 298.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1129"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1129"><span class= +"label">[1129]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 19, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 176 f., No. 7015.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1130"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1130"><span class= +"label">[1130]</span></a><em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. 113 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1131"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1131"><span class= +"label">[1131]</span></a>Rouvier suggested to Révoil that the +representative of France, Germany, Great Britain, the United +States, Spain, Russia, Italy, and Austria-Hungary meet informally +and try to find a solution on the police. Nicolson and White +opposed the idea as impracticable, and it was soon dropped +(Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 16, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 260, No. +291).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1132"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1132"><span class= +"label">[1132]</span></a>Schoen to F. O., Feb. 19, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 178 f., No. 7017; Tardieu, pp. 194 f., 204 +f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1133"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1133"><span class= +"label">[1133]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 246 ff.; Schoen to F. O., +Feb. 20, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 192, No. 7025; Eulenburg to +William II, Feb. 22, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 194, No. 7027 and +Anlage, Witte to Eulenburg, Feb. 20, 1906; Witte, p. 301.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1134"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1134"><span class= +"label">[1134]</span></a>Bülow to Schoen, Feb. 21, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 193, No. 7026; memo. by Bülow, Feb. 23, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 197 f., No. 7028; Eulenburg to Witte, Feb. 27, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 202 ff., No. 7030; Tardieu, pp. 195, 295.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1135"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1135"><span class= +"label">[1135]</span></a>Schoen to F. O., Feb. 23, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 211 ff., No. 7037; Witte, p. 301; Spring Rice +to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 271 f., No. 308; 273 +f., No. 311.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1136"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1136"><span class= +"label">[1136]</span></a>Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 279, No. 320; Spring Rice to Knollys, March 1, +1906, Gwynn, II, 65 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1137"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1137"><span class= +"label">[1137]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 247, 249; Schoen to F. O., +March 3, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 234 f., No. 7052; Schoen to +Bülow, March 4, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 251 ff., No. 7068. The +article so embittered the German government that Bülow would not +show it directly to the Emperor but informed him of it personally +so as to take away the sting (see the minutes to the dispatch from +Schoen to F. O., March 3, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 235, No. 7052).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1138"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1138"><span class= +"label">[1138]</span></a>A visit of the London City Council to +Paris, Feb. 8, gave occasion for confirming the Entente Cordiale +(<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 185 ff. and note, No. 7021). Grey also +intimated to Metternich that France would be willing to eliminate +the thirty-year limitation to commercial freedom in Morocco as +provided for in the Anglo-French accord. See Metternich to F. O., +Feb. 19 and 20, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 179 ff., No. 7018; 185 ff., +Nos. 7021 f.; Grey to Lascelles, Feb. 19, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, +263 f., No. 296.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1139"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1139"><span class= +"label">[1139]</span></a>Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 22, 24, 28, +1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 269, No. 303; 271 f., No. 308; 273 f., +No. 311; 278 f., No. 320; Grey to Spring Rice, Feb. 20, 22, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 264 f., No. 297; 270, No. 304; Grey to Spring Rice, +Feb. 19, 1906, Gwynn, II, 65.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1140"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1140"><span class= +"label">[1140]</span></a>Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 15, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 258, No. 288. Apparently it was not mentioned +to the French at all.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1141"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1141"><span class= +"label">[1141]</span></a>Memo. by Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 266 f., No. 299.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1142"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1142"><span class= +"label">[1142]</span></a>Sir Charles Hardinge, permanent +undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, believed that the way +to prevent Germany from attacking France because of some French +action in Morocco was for Great Britain to inform Germany that she +is “absolutely ‘solidaire’ with France as far as the Moroccan +question is concerned.” He feared that if Great Britain did leave +France in the lurch, “an agreement or alliance between France, +Germany and Russia in the near future is certain” (memo. by Grey, +Feb. 20, 1906, and Hardinge’s minute, <em>ibid.</em>, 266 ff., No. +299). Mr. Eyre Crowe, senior clerk in the British foreign office, a +prejudiced, bitter opponent of Germany, suspected that Germany +might demand and seize a port in Morocco or obtain a lease as she +had done at Kiaouchau in China. He advised warning the Sultan +against Germany. Sir Edward Grey regarded the proposal as premature +so long as the Conference was sitting, but said that the +eventualities referred to should be kept in mind (minutes to +dispatch from Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, +272, No. 308).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1143"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1143"><span class= +"label">[1143]</span></a>Monts to Bülow, Feb. 13, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 168 f., No. 7008; Monts to F. O., Feb. 13, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 161 f., No. 7002; Bülow to Monts, Feb. 14, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 162 and note, No. 7003; Monts to Bülow, Feb. +27, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 230 ff., No. 7050; Monts to Bülow, March +11, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 286 ff., No. 7103; Monts to Bülow, Feb. +24, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 216 f., No. 7043; Tardieu, pp. 198 f., +205 f.; Grey to Egerton, Feb. 19, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 262, +No. 295; Egerton to Grey, March 3, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 283, No. +325.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1144"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1144"><span class= +"label">[1144]</span></a>“C’est la pire des solutions,” wrote +Tardieu, p. 155 and elsewhere. See the conversation between Ojeda +and Stumm reported by the latter on Feb. 20, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, +XXI, 189 ff., No. 7024; Tardieu, pp. 155 ff., 199 f.; Cartwright to +Grey, Jan. 22 and 26, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 233, No. 252; 236, +No. 258.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1145"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1145"><span class= +"label">[1145]</span></a>Tardieu writes that the instructions were +“all that France wished” (Tardieu, pp. 207 f., 255).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1146"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1146"><span class= +"label">[1146]</span></a>Tardieu has a long story about German +threats and intimidations toward Spain between Feb. 11 and 20. The +King of Spain, he writes, was angry, but Ojeda listened to the +siren voice of Stumm, first secretary of the German embassy in +Madrid. According to the German documents, Stumm had at least two +conversations with Ojeda during February, one on Feb. 20, trying +without success to influence Spain to support the German proposals +(<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 145, 189 ff.). On the Spanish proposal see +Tardieu, pp. 199 f., 188 ff., 207 ff.; Grey to Cartwright, Feb. 19, +1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 262 n., No. 295; 271, No. 307; Cartwright +to Grey, Feb. 21, 22, 24, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 268 f., No. 301; +270 f., No. 305; 273, No. 310; Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 22, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 269, No. 302; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 23, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 271, No. 306.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1147"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1147"><span class= +"label">[1147]</span></a>The Belgian government informed him that +its delegate had orders to abstain from voting in case of a +conflict, and to participate actively in the Conference only when +the commercial interests of Belgium were involved. The Dutch +government said that its delegate would vote with the majority. +Sweden replied that she would abstain from voting in case of +disagreement (Tardieu, p. 257).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1148"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1148"><span class= +"label">[1148]</span></a>As Sir Edward Grey knew how interested +Austria was in keeping Great Britain and Germany friendly, he +impressed upon the Austrian government, Feb. 26, “how unfortunate” +was the German stand on the police, and “how impossible it was to +improve the relations between England and Germany as long as there +was this dispute between Germany and France about a matter on which +we had an Agreement with France which was publicly known to the +whole world, and which had been the very beginning of our +friendship with France” (Grey to Goschen, Feb. 26, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 276 f., No. 316).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1149"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1149"><span class= +"label">[1149]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 202 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1150"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1150"><span class= +"label">[1150]</span></a>Wedel to F. O., Feb. 14 and 18, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 166 f., No. 7007; 175 f., No. 7014. To the +Italian and American governments Goluchowski openly censured the +German attitude (Tardieu, p. 203, and above; Goschen to Grey, Feb. +24, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 273, No. 309).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1151"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1151"><span class= +"label">[1151]</span></a>Memo. by Bülow, Feb. 24, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 213 f., No. 7039; Tardieu, pp. 257 ff.; Spring +Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 279, No. 320.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1152"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1152"><span class= +"label">[1152]</span></a>Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 278, No. 318; 279, No. 320.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1153"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1153"><span class= +"label">[1153]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 26, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 177 f., No. 7016; Tardieu, pp. 187, 266 f.; +Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 26, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 276, No. +315.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1154"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1154"><span class= +"label">[1154]</span></a>Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 274, No. 311.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1155"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1155"><span class= +"label">[1155]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 25 and 26, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 274 ff., Nos. 312 f.; Tardieu, Part III, chap. ii, +<em>passim</em>, pp. 268 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1156"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1156"><span class= +"label">[1156]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 21, March 3, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 204 f., No. 7032; 233 f., No. 7051; Tardieu, +pp. 143 ff., 227, 223 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1157"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1157"><span class= +"label">[1157]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 275 ff.; <em>L.j., 1906</em>, +pp. 159 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 3 and 9, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, +XXI, 233 f. and note, No. 7051; Nicolson to Grey, March 3, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 282, No. 323; 283 f., No. 326. The French press +played up that vote as a great victory; the German press and +government took the opposite view. Nevertheless, the German +delegates complained to the Italian, Belgian, Spanish, and even the +Austrian delegates about their actions; and the vote undoubtedly +helped to accomplish the object of Nicolson and Révoil.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1158"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1158"><span class= +"label">[1158]</span></a><em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. 168 ff.; Nicolson +to Grey, March 7, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 285 ff., No. 330; +Tardieu, pp. 283 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1159"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1159"><span class= +"label">[1159]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, March 3 and 7, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 282 f., No. 324; 285, No. 328. On March 7 Grey +again advised the Spanish government to stand firmly with France +and Great Britain (Grey to de Bunsen, March 7, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 285, No. 329).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1160"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1160"><span class= +"label">[1160]</span></a>Tardieu states that on March 5 Tattenbach +openly said so to several of the delegates (p. 291). Bülow also +found it necessary to bolster up the courage of the German +delegates. See memo. by Bülow, March 7, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, +256, No. 7069. See also Metternich to F. O., Feb. 20, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 188, No. 7023; Radowitz to Bülow, Feb. 26, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 217 ff., No. 7044; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 27, +March 5, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 226, No. 7048; 243 ff., Nos. 7061 f. +King Edward’s visit to Paris, March 4-5, at which time he showed +special favor to Delcassé, was also a significant sign to the +Germans (Lee, <em>King Edward VII</em>, II, 510; Bertie to Grey, +March 5, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 284, No. 327).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1161"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1161"><span class= +"label">[1161]</span></a>On this episode see Tardieu, pp. 241 ff., +296; Grey to Bertie, Feb. 28, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 278, No. +319; Bertie to Grey, March 5, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 284, No. 327; +Nicolson to Grey, March 8, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 288, No. 331; +memos. by Holstein, Feb. 22, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 206 ff., and +note, Nos. 7034 f.; Holstein to Radolin, March 4, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 237, No. 7055; Radolin to F. O., Feb. 27, March 5 +and 6, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 225, No. 7047; 240 f., No. 7059; 250 +f., No. 7067; Bülow to Radolin, March 5, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 240, +No. 7058. Courcel spoke to Louis, of the French foreign office, +about the project on March 5. On the next day Rouvier mentioned it +to Radolin, only to refuse it. On Holstein’s views see also +Lascelles to Grey, March 1, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 280 f. and +inclosure, No. 321.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1162"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1162"><span class= +"label">[1162]</span></a>Hammann, <em>Bilder</em>, pp. 37 f.; memo. +by Holstein, Feb. 22, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 208 f., No. 7035; +Holstein to Radolin, March 4, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 237, No. 7055; +<em>ibid.</em> p. 338, editor’s note.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1163"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1163"><span class= +"label">[1163]</span></a>See the conversation with Tschirschky on +March 16 recorded by Zedlitz-Trützschler, <em>Zwölf Jahre am +deutschen Kaiserhof</em>, pp. 146 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1164"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1164"><span class= +"label">[1164]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 26, March 8, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 233 f., No. 7045; 262 f., No. 7077; <em>L.j., +1906</em>, pp. 187 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1165"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1165"><span class= +"label">[1165]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 28, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 224 f., No. 7046.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1166"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1166"><span class= +"label">[1166]</span></a>Goluchowski reluctantly agreed to mediate +on that basis at first, but after learning of the vote of March 3 +and after consulting Welsersheimb he changed his mind (Wedel to F. +O. March 1 and 4, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 228 ff., No. 7049; 238 f., +No. 7056).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1167"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1167"><span class= +"label">[1167]</span></a>Monts to Bülow, Feb. 27, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 230 ff., No. 7050; Radowitz to F. O., March 3, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 235 f., No. 7053.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1168"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1168"><span class= +"label">[1168]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, March 6 and 7, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 245 f. and note, No. 7063; Bülow to Wedel, Bülow to +Monts, March 6, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, XXI, 248 f. and note, No. +7065.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1169"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1169"><span class= +"label">[1169]</span></a><em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. 183 ff.; Radowitz +to F. O., March 8, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 261 ff., Nos. 7076 +ff., Nicolson to Grey, March 8 and 9, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, +288, No. 331; 289 ff., No. 334. Visconti Venosta, informed at the +last minute of the proposed Austrian mediation, refused angrily to +co-operate in it. Why he did so is difficult to see. He claimed +that the Austrian project was not in keeping with the German view +which he represented. This, however, seems a poor excuse, for he +had approved the project when it was first suggested. It seems more +likely that Visconti Venosta was seeking to avoid taking the +Austro-German side publicly against France. The Austrian government +was more alarmed at his refusal than was the German government, +which consoled itself with the fact that the Italian delegate was +performing useful work under cover. See Wedel to F. O., March 9 and +11, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 269, No. 7083; 271 f., No. 7087; +Monts to F. O., March 7, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 257, No. 7070; +Radowitz to F. O., March 11, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 272 and note, +No. 7088.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1170"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1170"><span class= +"label">[1170]</span></a><em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. 189 ff.; Radowitz +to F. O., March 10, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 270, No. 7085; +Tardieu, p. 293; Nicolson to Grey, March 10, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, +III, 292 f., No. 337. By these words Radowitz did not mean that +Germany would accept the French terms, as Tardieu imagines +(Tardieu, pp. 308 ff., 313).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1171"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1171"><span class= +"label">[1171]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, March 9 and 10, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 288 f., No. 332; 294, No. 338; Grey to Bertie, +March 9, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 289, No. 333; Bertie to Grey, March +10, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 292, No. 336; Radowitz to F. O., March 8 +and 10, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 261, No. 7075; 264 f., No. 7079; +269 f., No. 7084; Dennis, p. 503. Cf. Tardieu, pp. 297 f., 308 +f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1172"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1172"><span class= +"label">[1172]</span></a>Grey to Nicolson, March 10, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 292, No. 335.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1173"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1173"><span class= +"label">[1173]</span></a>Bertie to Grey, March 2, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 281 f., No. 322.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1174"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1174"><span class= +"label">[1174]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 299 f., 309 f., 321, 328; +Grey, <em>Twenty-five Years</em>, I, 103.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1175"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1175"><span class= +"label">[1175]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, March 9, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 288 f., No. 322; Bertie to Grey, March 10, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 292, No. 336.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1176"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1176"><span class= +"label">[1176]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., March 8, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 265 f., No. 7080.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1177"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1177"><span class= +"label">[1177]</span></a>On March 5, 6, and 7, Bülow showed no +inclination to accept the French plan, but held firmly to the +Austrian one. See Bülow to Wedel, March 5 and 6, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 239, No. 7057; 248 f., No. 7065; memo. by Bülow, +March 7, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 256, No. 7069. He may, however, have +made this statement to the Prince of Monaco without explaining that +by “the most discreet control of an officer from a lesser Power” he +really meant the Austrian plan and did not intend an acceptance of +the French plan. Tardieu’s assumption that Bülow made the surrender +and then receded from his concession after the fall of the French +government on March 7, hoping to exploit this embarrassing +situation, is, so far as we can tell, devoid of foundation +(Tardieu, pp. 293 ff., 314 f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1178"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1178"><span class= +"label">[1178]</span></a>Germany also refused to recede on the +police in return for French concessions on the bank (Nicolson to +Grey, March 10 and 11, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 294 f., Nos. 338 +f.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1179"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1179"><span class= +"label">[1179]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, March 11 and 12, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 295 f., No. 339; 297 ff., Nos. 341 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1180"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1180"><span class= +"label">[1180]</span></a>Bertie to Grey, March 11, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 296 f., No. 340.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1181"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1181"><span class= +"label">[1181]</span></a>Crowe’s minutes to the dispatch from +Nicolson to Grey, March 12, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 299, No. 342; +Grey to Nicolson, March 12, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 300, No. 344.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1182"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1182"><span class= +"label">[1182]</span></a>Nicolson to Grey, March 11, 12, 14, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 295, No. 339; 298, No. 341; 303, No. 349. Rouvier +also approved this plan. See Hardinge to Nicolson, March 15, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 305, No. 354.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1183"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1183"><span class= +"label">[1183]</span></a>The number of censors was later increased +to four, one each from Great Britain, Spain, France, and Germany. +See Radowitz to F. O., March 8 and 11, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, +263 f., No. 7078; 272 f., No. 7089; <em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. 152 +f., 182, 189 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 291 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1184"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1184"><span class= +"label">[1184]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., March 12, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 279, No. 7094.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1185"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1185"><span class= +"label">[1185]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., March 11, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 273, No. 7089.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1186"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1186"><span class= +"label">[1186]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., March 12, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 274, No. 7090.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1187"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1187"><span class= +"label">[1187]</span></a>Quoted in <em>ibid.</em>, p. 274 n.; and +in Tardieu, p. 316.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1188"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1188"><span class= +"label">[1188]</span></a><em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 274 ff., Nos. 7091 +ff.; Tardieu, p. 318; Bishop, I, 495 ff. Bülow also sent a +condensed telegram to the German banker, Mendelssohn, then in St. +Petersburg negotiating a loan with Witte.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1189"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1189"><span class= +"label">[1189]</span></a>Schoen to F. O., March 13, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 279 f., No. 7095; Monts to F. O., March 13, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 280 f., No. 7097; Wedel to F. O., March 13, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 281 f., No. 7099; Metternich to F. O., March +13, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 282 ff., No. 7100; Grey to Lascelles, +March 13, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 301 f., Nos. 347 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1190"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1190"><span class= +"label">[1190]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., March 7, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 259 ff., No. 7074; Bishop, I, 493 ff.; Tardieu, +pp. 251 f., 297.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1191"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1191"><span class= +"label">[1191]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, March 12, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, No. 7093; Bishop, I, 495 ff.; Tardieu, p. 335. +The President’s intervention was extremely embarrassing to Bülow, +who, after calling Sternburg’s attention to the difference between +the original wording of the promise to Roosevelt sent from Berlin +in the previous June and that sent to the President by Sternburg, +threatened to disavow the Ambassador (<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 277 f., +No. 7093). However, he did not do so.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1192"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1192"><span class= +"label">[1192]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., March 14, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 285 f., No. 7102.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1193"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1193"><span class= +"label">[1193]</span></a>Bertie to Grey, March 15, 16, 17, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 306, Nos. 355 f.; 307 f., No. 358; 309 f., No. +361; Grey, I, 102 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1194"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1194"><span class= +"label">[1194]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 327 f., 343; Radolin to F. +O., March 14 and 15, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 291 f., No. 7104; +295 ff., No. 7107; Bertie to Grey, March 16, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, +III, 307 f., No. 358.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1195"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1195"><span class= +"label">[1195]</span></a>Grey to Bertie, March 14, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 303, No. 350; 304, No. 352. In private both Sir +Edward Grey and Sir Charles Hardinge greatly deplored the French +refusal. On March 15 the former wrote to Sir Francis Bertie as +follows: “I think the French made a great mistake in not closing at +once with the German concession at Algeciras; they could have made +it appear to be a diplomatic victory for themselves. . . . . Even +the <em>Times</em> correspondent of Algeciras thinks France ought +not to break off on such a wretched point as Casa Blanca, which I +believe is a useless hole. However, if she does, we shall back her +up” (<em>ibid.</em>, 304 f., No. 353). And on the same day Sir +Charles Hardinge wrote to Sir Arthur Nicolson as follows: “. . . . +If the Conference breaks up over such an absurd point as the +Casablanca proposal <em>we</em> shall be in a disagreeable +position, as I remember well your opinion that the French position +will not be difficult for Germany to undermine in Morocco and we +shall then be exposed to any violent action which the French may +take to retrieve their losses and shall find ourselves compelled to +support France in a war against Germany. If the Conference is +broken off I shall not like the outlook. I felt very strong about +telling Cambon that in our opinion the Austrian proposal should be +accepted rather than allow the Conference to fall through” +(<em>ibid.</em>, 305, No. 354).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1196"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1196"><span class= +"label">[1196]</span></a>Grey to Bertie, March 15, 1905, +<em>ibid.</em>, 307, No. 357; Grey to Nicolson, March 14, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 304, No. 351; Nicolson to Grey, March 15, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 304 n., No. 351; Spring Rice to Lamsdorff, March +17, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 107 f.; Tardieu, pp. 311 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1197"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1197"><span class= +"label">[1197]</span></a>Grey, I, 107 f.; Tardieu, pp. 329 f., +347.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1198"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1198"><span class= +"label">[1198]</span></a>Radolin to F. O., March 17, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 303 f., No. 7114; Tardieu, pp. 343 f.; Nicolson +to Grey, March 18, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 311, No. 363.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1199"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1199"><span class= +"label">[1199]</span></a><em>Journal officiel. Debats parlem.</em> +(Chambre, March 14 and 19, 1906), pp. 1290, 1438 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1200"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1200"><span class= +"label">[1200]</span></a>The conversation on March 15 between +Bourgeois and the Austrian Ambassador also pointed in this +direction. See Bertie to Grey, March 16, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, +307 f., No. 358. See also Nicolson to Grey, March 17, 18, 21, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 308, No. 359; 310 f., No. 362; 311 f., No. 364; 314 +f., No. 368; Grey to Bertie, March 17, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 308 +f., No. 360.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1201"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1201"><span class= +"label">[1201]</span></a>Bülow to Sternburg, March 16, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 293 ff., No. 7106.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1202"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1202"><span class= +"label">[1202]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 300 ff., Nos. 7112 f.; 305 ff., No. 7115; Bishop, +I, 497 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1203"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1203"><span class= +"label">[1203]</span></a>Bülow to Radowitz, March 16, 19, 22, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 298 f., No. 7110; 307 ff., No. 7117; 311, No. +7120; Radowitz to F. O., March 17, 18, 21, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, +299 f., No. 7111; 306 f., No. 7116; 310 f., No. 7119; Tardieu, pp. +344 ff.; Bülow to Sternburg, March 19, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, +309 f., No. 7118.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1204"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1204"><span class= +"label">[1204]</span></a>Dennis, pp. 505 f.; Grey to Durand, March +22, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 317, No. 374.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1205"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1205"><span class= +"label">[1205]</span></a>Grey to Goschen, March 21, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 315 f., No. 371.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1206"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1206"><span class= +"label">[1206]</span></a>On this episode see Nicolson to Grey, +March 19, 21, 23, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 312 ff., Nos. 365 ff.; 315, +No. 370; 318, No. 376; 319 f., No. 379; Grey to de Bunsen, March +21, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 316, No. 372; Bertie to Grey, March 22, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 317 f., No. 375; Grey to Durand, March 22 and +23, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 317, No. 374; 318, No. 377; Durand to +Grey, March 24, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 320 f., Nos. 380 f.; de +Bunsen to Grey, March 27, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 325 f., No. 385; +Tardieu, pp. 385 ff.; Sternburg to F. O., March 21 and 22, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 311 f., No. 7121; 321, No. 7126; Radowitz to F. +O., March 21, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 310 f., No. 7119.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1207"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1207"><span class= +"label">[1207]</span></a>The Austrian government was opposed to +trying to mediate upon the basis of Roosevelt’s proposal (unsigned +and undated memoir handed by Szogyeny to the German government, +March 23, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 321, No. 7127).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1208"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1208"><span class= +"label">[1208]</span></a>France could afford to make the concession +on the bank because she had assured herself of the votes of Italy, +Great Britain, Spain, Belgium, and the United States, which with +her own three votes would constitute a majority. On this discussion +see Tardieu, pp. 297, 342, 347 ff.; <em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. 196 +ff.; Bülow to Radowitz, March 24, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 322 f., +No. 7129; Radowitz to F. O., March 16, 23, 25, 26, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 297, No. 7109; 322, No. 7128; 324 ff., No. 7131; +326 f., Nos. 7132 f.; Nicolson to Grey, March 23, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 319 f., No. 379.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1209"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1209"><span class= +"label">[1209]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 362, 365 ff.; Radowitz to F. +O., March 26, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, Nos. 7132 f.; Nicolson to +Grey, March 26, 27, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 321, No. 382; 322 +ff., No. 383.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1210"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1210"><span class= +"label">[1210]</span></a>This publication, which was another answer +to the exaggerated article in the <em>Lokalanzeiger</em> on March +12, angered the German government. A short time previously Bülow +had asked the Russian government to use its influence in moderating +the anti-German campaign of the French press, especially of Tardieu +in <em>Le Temps</em>. Instead of doing so, the Russian government +issued this denial that it had ever advised France to accept the +Austrian police proposal and asserted that Russia had never ceased +and would not cease from acting toward France as a faithful ally. +The German government complained to the Russian government against +its so manifestly taking the French side, and threatened to refuse +German participation in the forthcoming Russian loan. Both +Lamsdorff and Witte were impressed by the vigor of the complaints, +and tried to explain the affair away. Nelidow had endeavored to +influence Tardieu, they said, and had spoken to him in general +terms of the instructions which he had just received. To the +Ambassador’s amazement, he had discovered an entirely false account +of these instructions published in <em>Le Temps</em>. On demanding +an explanation from Tardieu, the latter said that he had obtained +his information in the French foreign office. Both ministers as +well as the Ambassador expressed their regrets over the affair, and +Lamsdorff published a correct version of the instructions. But as +Schoen said, the latter version did not change the previous one +much. Osten-Sacken weakened the Russian explanation by admitting to +Tschirschky that Nelidow himself had given an “excerpt” of the +instructions to the offending journalist. So the German government +was not appeased by the excuses (see Bülow to Schoen, March 22, +1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 312 f., No. 7122, and following +documents). As a matter of fact, those instructions were published +on purpose to impress upon Germany that Russia held to the Dual +Alliance and did not regard the Björkö accord as binding. See +Witte, pp. 298 ff.; Iswolsky, <em>Recollections of a Foreign +Minister</em>, pp. 23 f.; Tardieu, pp. 330 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, +March 21, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 315, No. 369; Spring Rice to +Grey, March 21, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 316 f., No. 373.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1211"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1211"><span class= +"label">[1211]</span></a>Even the Russian and Spanish delegates +considered this matter of no importance. See Tardieu, pp. 361 ff.; +Radowitz to Bülow, March 28, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 330 f., No. +7137.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1212"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1212"><span class= +"label">[1212]</span></a>Sternburg to F. O., March 24, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 324, No. 7130.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1213"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1213"><span class= +"label">[1213]</span></a>Radowitz to F. O., March 26 and 27, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 326 ff., Nos. 7132 ff.; Radowitz to Bülow, March +28, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 330 f., No. 7137; Nicolson to Grey, March +27, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, 324 f., No. 384; Tardieu, pp. 371 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1214"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1214"><span class= +"label">[1214]</span></a>On these negotiations see Tardieu, pp. 378 +ff. Almodovar tried to reopen the question of Tangier with the +French on April 1 but had no success (<em>ibid.</em>, pp. 394 ff.; +see also <em>L.j., 1906</em>, p. 239).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1215"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1215"><span class= +"label">[1215]</span></a>A Swiss was selected at France’s wish +because Switzerland was so little interested in Morocco. See +Nicolson to Grey, March 28, 1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 326 f., No. +386.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1216"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1216"><span class= +"label">[1216]</span></a>Tardieu, pp. 396 ff.; <em>L.j., 1906</em>, +p. 210; Lee, II, 362.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1217"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1217"><span class= +"label">[1217]</span></a><em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. 196 ff.; Radowitz +to F. O., March 27 and 31, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 328 ff., Nos. +7134 ff.; 331 f., No. 7138; Radowitz to Bülow, March 28, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 330 f., No. 7137; Tardieu, pp. 396 ff. The final +act is found in <em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. 262 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1218"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1218"><span class= +"label">[1218]</span></a>Bishop, I, 492, 494, 496 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1219"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1219"><span class= +"label">[1219]</span></a>Rosen to Bülow, May 17, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 601 f., No. 7276.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1220"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1220"><span class= +"label">[1220]</span></a>Lowther to Grey, April 22, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 338, No. 402.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1221"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1221"><span class= +"label">[1221]</span></a>Grey to Nicolson, March 12, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 299 f., No. 343; Nicolson to Grey, March 13, April +3, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 301, No. 346; 330, No. 392; Lowther to +Grey, April 17 and 22, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 337 ff., Nos. 401 f.; +346 f. and inclosure, No. 412; memo. by Geoffray, Aug. 31, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 341 ff., No. 405; Tardieu, pp. 425 ff.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_397">[397]</span><a id= +"c18"></a>CHAPTER XVIII</h2> + +<p class="sch1">CONCLUSION</p> + +<p>The conclusion of the Conference relaxed the tension in Europe +and cleared the way for a gradual improvement in the relations of +the Powers. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the results, +which, according to official interpretation, left behind neither +victor nor vanquished.<a id="FNanchor_1222"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1222" class="fnanchor">[1222]</a> None the less it was +evident that Germany had been defeated. She had tried to obtain a +material interest in Morocco; she had endeavored to break the +Entente Cordiale and therewith the other French ententes; she had +sought to disrupt or to modify the Dual Alliance. And she had +failed in every effort. In attempting to restore her dominating +position of the time before the formation of the Entente Cordiale, +Germany had only driven France, Great Britain, and Russia into +closer intimacy and had furthered the very alignment of the Powers +which she had feared. By defending an international<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_398">[398]</span> right which no one else valued +she had permitted her isolation, except for the support of Austria, +to be exposed to all the world. At the Conference she had forced +Russia, Italy, and even the United States reluctantly to take the +French side. Germany had entirely miscalculated the +situation.<a id="FNanchor_1223"></a><a href="#Footnote_1223" class= +"fnanchor">[1223]</a></p> + +<p>The German statesmen realized that their international position +had grown more serious. Italy’s meager support at the Conference +was further proof that Germany could not rely upon that ally.<a id= +"FNanchor_1224"></a><a href="#Footnote_1224" class= +"fnanchor">[1224]</a> The increased importance of Austria to +Germany was tacitly admitted when, on April 13, the Emperor William +thanked Count Goluchowski for playing the “brilliant second” at the +Conference and promised him: “You can also be certain of similar +service from me in a similar case.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1225"></a><a href="#Footnote_1225" class= +"fnanchor">[1225]</a> Prince Bülow, whom his master had not +consulted beforehand, warned him, however, “(1) that our relations +with Austria have now become<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_399">[399]</span> more important than ever, since that state +is our only reliable ally; (2) that we must let our relative +political isolation be noticed by the Austrians as little as +possible.”<a id="FNanchor_1226"></a><a href="#Footnote_1226" class= +"fnanchor">[1226]</a> And in September the Emperor commented +sarcastically: “Fine prospects! In the future we can count on the +Franco-Russian Alliance, Anglo-French Entente Cordiale and +Anglo-Russian Entente, with Spain, Italy, and Portugal as +appendages thereto in the second line!”<a id= +"FNanchor_1227"></a><a href="#Footnote_1227" class= +"fnanchor">[1227]</a></p> + +<p>To counteract this isolation the German government could do +little for the time being except remain quiet.<a id= +"FNanchor_1228"></a><a href="#Footnote_1228" class= +"fnanchor">[1228]</a> It permitted relations with Italy to continue +as before.<a id="FNanchor_1229"></a><a href="#Footnote_1229" class= +"fnanchor">[1229]</a> It assumed a “correct but reserved attitude +toward France.”<a id="FNanchor_1230"></a><a href="#Footnote_1230" +class="fnanchor">[1230]</a> It refused to sanction German +participation in the Russian loan, but otherwise remained on +friendly terms with that Power.<a id="FNanchor_1231"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1231" class="fnanchor">[1231]</a> Its main desire was to +reach some kind of an understanding with Great Britain so as to +share in the entente movement.<a id="FNanchor_1232"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1232" class="fnanchor">[1232]</a> Anglo-German relations +did improve, but the British government replied to German soundings +that more time should elapse before the two governments<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_400">[400]</span> should attempt any concerted +efforts to bring their countries closer together.<a id= +"FNanchor_1233"></a><a href="#Footnote_1233" class= +"fnanchor">[1233]</a></p> + +<p>German public opinion was dissatisfied with the way in which its +foreign affairs were being conducted; its alarm over the +international situation increased as the year progressed. When the +debate in the Reichstag on that subject, delayed because of the +Chancellor’s illness, was held on November 14, Herr Bassermann of +the National Liberal party remarked as follows:</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>Today the Triple Alliance has no further practical utility. The +Italian press and population lean more and more towards France. +Austria has been too much praised for this rôle of “brilliant +second” which she herself declined. The Franco-Russian Alliance +remains intact, and the disposition of France towards us is less +friendly than formerly. The explanations at Cronberg between the +English and German sovereigns does not prevent England from +pursuing her old policy of isolating us. We live in an era of +alliances between other nations. . . . . Our policy lacks +tranquillity and consistency, and we see brutal hands derange well +prepared plans.<a id="FNanchor_1234"></a><a href="#Footnote_1234" +class="fnanchor">[1234]</a></p> +</div> + +<p>As these criticisms were widespread, Prince Bülow replied in a +long and carefully prepared speech. Admitting the deep hostility of +France to Germany, he expressed the hope that the two nations would +live peacefully together. As to Anglo-German relations he declared: +“A long period of misunderstanding lies behind us. The needle of +the political barometer has happily gone from rain and wind to +changing.” He denied that any deep antagonisms<span class="pagenum" +id="Page_401">[401]</span> divided the two countries and that the +German fleet was a menace to Great Britain. He suggested that time +should be allowed for the two nations to approach each other. “We +have no thought,” he said, “of wishing to push ourselves in between +France and Russia or France and England.” He announced that “for +some time negotiations between Russia and England have been under +way which promise that an understanding will be reached over +certain Central Asiatic regions. . . . .” He added: “We have no +reason at all to disturb these negotiations or to regard their +probable result with mistrustful eyes.” But he issued the following +warning: “The Entente Cordiale without good relations between the +Powers and Germany would be a danger to European peace. . . . . +Such an encirclement is not possible without the exercise of a +certain pressure. Pressure produces counter-pressure, from pressure +and counter-pressure explosions may finally arise.” He denied that +Germany was isolated and testified to the loyalty of her two +allies; but he declared that Germany was strong enough to defend +herself alone. Urging the nation not to be uneasy, he said: “More +than once we have been in situations where the danger of a general +grouping against us lay nearer than today. . . . . The political +world is still agitated by a certain excitement which calls for +carefulness and prudence, but gives no cause for pusillanimity.” He +concluded with a vigorous defense of his own and the Emperor’s +methods of conducting foreign affairs. His words were widely +applauded, even though they did not assuage German fears or stop +criticism.<a id="FNanchor_1235"></a><a href="#Footnote_1235" class= +"fnanchor">[1235]</a></p> + +<p>The satisfaction of the French and British governments with the +results of the Conference was real. Although France had had to +recognize the international character of Moroccan reforms, she had +practically asserted her position in that land. She had also +preserved her ententes and alliance against Germany’s attacks, and +had herself shown a determined spirit hitherto lacking<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_402">[402]</span> in the Third Republic. The +British government had had no direct interest in the Moroccan +crisis except from the point of view of general policy, but it was +well pleased that the Entente Cordiale had stood the test, that it +had grown firmer than before.<a id="FNanchor_1236"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1236" class="fnanchor">[1236]</a></p> + +<p>Out of this crisis the Entente Cordiale emerged as a lasting +dynamic combination for checking Germany. As Sir Edward Grey +remarked to the French Ambassador, July 9, 1906, “If we [Great +Britain] were called on to take sides [between France and Germany], +we must take sides with France as at Algeciras. As long, however, +as Germany kept quiet, there was no reason for trouble, and things +would go on quietly.”<a id="FNanchor_1237"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1237" class="fnanchor">[1237]</a> The British Foreign +Secretary did not thereby give France a blank check against +Germany, nor had he done so during the crisis. He had cautioned the +French that British support would in last analysis depend upon +public opinion. But as the crisis at the Conference in March had +shown, he could be forced to take the French side even though he +disapproved of it.</p> + +<p>The Entente Cordiale was so necessary to both Powers and yet so +loose in form that it acquired a peculiar character. Dependent not +upon the written word but upon feeling, it had constantly to be +kept warm. It partook more of the nature of a jealous engagement +than of a trustworthy and tolerant marriage. Each party was +particularly mistrustful of any playing by the other with Germany. +Still other causes divided them from Germany. They regarded the +latter’s interference in the Moroccan affair as gratuitous and +unjustified. “All that is necessary,” wrote Sir Edward Grey in May, +1906, “is for the Germans to realize that they have got nothing to +complain of.”<a id="FNanchor_1238"></a><a href="#Footnote_1238" +class="fnanchor">[1238]</a> France and Great Britain feared that +Germany might attempt another aggression. As the<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_403">[403]</span> British Foreign Secretary +stated in June, 1906, implying an accusation in doing so, “The +Germans do not realize that England has always drifted or +deliberately gone into opposition to any Power which establishes a +hegemony in Europe.”<a id="FNanchor_1239"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1239" class="fnanchor">[1239]</a> The French and English +believed so firmly that German diplomacy called for the arousing of +discord between Powers at every opportunity that they were almost +reluctant to have any dealings with the <em>Wilhelmstrasse</em>. +They saw German intrigues everywhere—in Persia, in Abyssinia,<a id= +"FNanchor_1240"></a><a href="#Footnote_1240" class= +"fnanchor">[1240]</a> in Paris, in London. When the German +Ambassador in Paris spoke in July of a detente in Anglo-German +relations, the French and British governments suspected therein an +attempt to weaken the Entente Cordiale.<a id= +"FNanchor_1241"></a><a href="#Footnote_1241" class= +"fnanchor">[1241]</a> Each government, therefore, was cool toward +the renegade Power. “When one recovers from a year’s sickness,” +stated the semiofficial <em>Le Temps</em> with reference to +Franco-German relations, “the convalescence cannot be +immediate.”<a id="FNanchor_1242"></a><a href="#Footnote_1242" +class="fnanchor">[1242]</a> Sir Edward Grey appeared friendlier; in +July he described Anglo-German relations as again normal. But he +refused Germany’s bid for an understanding because public opinion +was not prepared and especially because France would object. Count +Metternich remarked to him on July 31 that M. Delcassé’s policy had +been to encircle Germany and that at present the British and French +press also asserted that this aim should be accomplished with the +help of Russia. The Count warned Sir Edward Grey that that +dangerous game<span class="pagenum" id="Page_404">[404]</span> +might call forth a situation which would make it necessary for +Germany to break the circle.</p> + +<div class="quote"> +<p>A peaceful policy on the other hand is [he said] to extend the +hand to Germany and to draw her into the circle of the others. . . +. . But so long as in England the German attempts at +<em>rapprochement</em> are repulsed through fear of arousing +displeasure among the French, it appears to me that the policy of +creating a balance of power is preferred here to that of drawing +Germany into the circle of friendship.</p> +</div> + +<p class="nind">The Foreign Secretary denied that the policy of +agreement with Russia was directed in any way against Germany. But +when the Ambassador asked “Are, openly avowed, friendly relations +with Germany compatible with England’s friendship with France?” he +replied, “That depends on German politics.” The Ambassador +immediately countered, “No, it rather seems to depend on French +interpretation of German politics.”<a id= +"FNanchor_1243"></a><a href="#Footnote_1243" class= +"fnanchor">[1243]</a> The British Foreign Secretary, however, was +not to be moved by German criticisms. The British as well as the +French put Germany on her good behavior.</p> + +<p>Notwithstanding Sir Edward Grey’s denial, this mistrust of the +Central Power was an important inducement for Great Britain and +France to complete the Entente Cordiale by an entente between Great +Britain and Russia.<a id="FNanchor_1244"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1244" class="fnanchor">[1244]</a> Conditions were more +favorable for success than they had ever been. The Moroccan affair +no longer occupied international attention. The domestic situation +in Russia was more stable with the calling of the Duma. And M. +Iswolsky, who succeeded Count Lamsdorff in the Russian foreign +office in 1906, brought new vigor into the Russian policy. As a +partisan of an agreement with Great Britain, he took up the +negotiations, and after an intermittent pursuit of<span class= +"pagenum" id="Page_405">[405]</span> them, brought them to +completion in the next year.<a id="FNanchor_1245"></a><a href= +"#Footnote_1245" class="fnanchor">[1245]</a> Thus the work of +insuring against Germany was continued.</p> + +<p>What the entente Powers regarded as insurance, Germany called +encirclement. Both sides had been playing the game of the balance +of power. France had tried to abandon this game in the previous +year, but Germany’s refusal of her offers had driven her back into +the play. Neither side appreciated the other’s point of view; +neither heeded the other’s warnings. Each side accused the other of +aiming at its defeat, of being a menace. Each scoffed at the +other’s fears, but each continued to arm and to broaden and tighten +the policy which each warned the other was leading to trouble. +Neither side had learned anything from this episode except to be +more cautious. Neither changed its method.</p> + +<p>The motives that caused this crisis still obtained as guiding +forces. Prestige and national interests were at stake on both +sides. Having become deeply engaged in the Moroccan affair, +Germany, France, and Great Britain could not easily back out of it, +especially since the Conference of Algeciras had given a better +sanction than ever to both sides. That France and Spain would give +Germany opportunities for intervening was, in view of the +difficulty which they would encounter in reforming Morocco, just as +certain as that Germany would take advantage of those +opportunities. The Moroccan problem both in its local and in its +international aspects left behind plenty of raw material from which +future conflicts could arise. The crisis was only the first of +these episodes born of the clashings of mutual fears and ambitions, +nurtured on hazardous playing with war and on diplomatic +blunderings. The road to Armageddon lay open.</p> + +<div class="footnotes" id="ftc18"> +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1222"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1222"><span class= +"label">[1222]</span></a>On April 5 Bülow declared in the Reichstag +as follows: “A time of alarm lies behind us. There were weeks when +the thought of armed complications occupied our minds. . . . . We +wished to show that Germany does not let herself be handled as a +<em>quantité negligeable</em>. . . . . We may now look into the +future with more calmness. The Conference of Algeciras has, I +believe, had a result equally satisfactory to Germany and France +and useful to all nations” (<em>Reden</em>, II, 303 ff.). On April +12 Bourgeois spoke in the French Chamber in a similar vein: “. . . +. All the work of the conference has aimed to harmonize the three +essential conditions of Moroccan reform [the sovereignty of the +Sultan, the integrity of his empire, and commercial liberty] with +the rights and the special interests that France has the duty of +defending. . . . . That result has been obtained, thanks to the +reciprocal concessions seriously weighed and loyally consented to +in terms absolutely honorable for all and without the abandonment +of the fruits of our country’s past efforts, of the dignity of its +present situation, or of the safeguards of its future. . . . . +France has been able to put to the test the solidarity of her +alliance and friendships to which precious sympathies have been +joined” (quoted in <em>L.j., 1906</em>, pp. 290 ff.). The act was +accepted by the French Parliament and by the German Reichstag in +Dec., 1906 (Schulthess, <em>Europäischer Geschichtskalender +1906</em>, pp. 219, 328 ff.; Tardieu, <em>La Conf. d’Algés</em>, +pp. 415 ff.).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1223"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1223"><span class= +"label">[1223]</span></a>Cf. Stuart, <em>French Foreign Policy from +Fashoda to Serajevo</em>, pp. 221 ff.; Tardieu, <em>La France et +les alliances</em>, pp. 239 ff. Schoen reported that his French +colleague, Bompard, had expressed his opinion as follows: “What has +resulted . . . . from the Conference of Algeciras? First, a welding +together of France and England which the former did not at all wish +in this measure. Then an almost complete isolation of Germany and +probably no small amount of ill-humor among all the Powers, who saw +themselves compelled to take an open stand on questions in which +they really had little interest. Finally, apparent discord between +Russia and Germany. True, the Conference has left behind neither +victor nor vanquished; Germany has achieved internationalization; +France, a certain recognition of her special position. But the +existing sources of friction do not appear to have been destroyed, +but rather new ones to have been created. . . . . The Conference, +together with its previous history, has left in the French nation a +certain mistrust which may not disappear quickly and which will for +years stand in the way of a genuine friendly +<em>rapprochement</em>, which is desired on both sides and which +was so near” (Schoen to Bülow, April 7, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, +341, No. 7144).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1224"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1224"><span class= +"label">[1224]</span></a>Monts was so disgusted with Italy that he +wished the terms of the Triple Alliance to be radically modified at +the next renewal (Monts to Tschirschky, June 8, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 364 ff., No. 7156). The Austrian Ambassador +reported that the German Emperor said that “it would give him great +satisfaction for us at a suitable moment, which in view of the +unreliable policy of the kingdom is not impossible, to teach the +latter [Italy] a wholesome lesson, even by arms” (Pribram, <em>The +Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary</em>, II, 138).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1225"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1225"><span class= +"label">[1225]</span></a>Schulthess, <em>1906</em>, p. 92.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1226"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1226"><span class= +"label">[1226]</span></a>Bülow to William II, May 31, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 360, No. 7154.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1227"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1227"><span class= +"label">[1227]</span></a>Minute by William II to a dispatch from +Miquel to Bülow, Sept. 19, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, XXV, 23, No. +8518.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1228"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1228"><span class= +"label">[1228]</span></a>Tschirschky to William II, May 12, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, XXI, 433 f., No. 7184; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 13, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 449, No. 7193. The resignation of Holstein +from the foreign office in April was also considered as significant +of a change of policy. On that episode see <em>ibid.</em>, pp. 338 +f., editor’s note.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1229"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1229"><span class= +"label">[1229]</span></a>Bülow to Monts, Nov. 16, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 387 f., No. 7165, and others in chap. cliv.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1230"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1230"><span class= +"label">[1230]</span></a>Tschirschky to Metternich, July 7, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 439, No. 7188.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1231"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1231"><span class= +"label">[1231]</span></a>Tschirschky to Metternich, July 7, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 439, No. 7188. 10 Schoen to Bülow, May 14, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, XXII, 21 ff., No. 7355, and other documents in +chap. clx. On the question of the loan see the report from the +Belgian Minister at Berlin, April 11, 1906, <em>Zur europ. +Politik</em>, II, pp. 110 ff.; Witte, <em>Memoirs</em>, pp. 304 +ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1232"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1232"><span class= +"label">[1232]</span></a>“Our relations with England have for a +long time been of a very delicate nature. It is the object of my +serious care to bring about an improvement herein.” See Tschirschky +to General von Einem, July 9, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 440, No. +7190. See also the Emperor’s remark to a similar effect in a +memorandum by him, Aug. 15, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, XXIII, 84, No. +7815.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1233"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1233"><span class= +"label">[1233]</span></a>The improvement in Anglo-German relations +was manifested by visits of German burgomasters in May, of German +journalists to England in June, by a visit of Edward VII to his +nephew at Cronberg in August, and by the presence of Mr. Haldane at +the German maneuvers later in the same month. See Lee, <em>King +Edward VII</em>, II, 528 ff.; Haldane, <em>Before the War</em>, pp. +37 ff., 57 ff.; Metternich to Bülow, May 8, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, +XXI, 427 ff., No. 7181; Mühlberg to Radolin, June 27, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 437 f., No. 7187; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 13, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 449, No. 7193 and following documents; memo. by +William II, Aug. 15, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, XXIII, 84 ff., No. 7815; +Tschirschky to Metternich, Sept. 4, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 86 f., +No. 7816. See also the documents in <em>B.D.</em>, Vol. III, chap. +xxii; Grey, <em>Twenty-five Years</em>, I, 110 ff. During Grey’s +absence the foreign office at first opposed Haldane’s visit for +fear of alienating the French (Haldane, <em>An Autobiography</em>, +p. 202; Spender, <em>Life of Campbell-Bannerman</em>, II, 260).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1234"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1234"><span class= +"label">[1234]</span></a><em>Stenogr. Berichte</em>, Reichtag +(1906), p. 4238; Tardieu, <em>La France et les alliances</em>, pp. +243 f.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1235"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1235"><span class= +"label">[1235]</span></a>Bülow’s speech is given in Bülow, II, 306 +ff.; see also Hammann, <em>Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit</em>, +pp. 45 ff.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1236"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1236"><span class= +"label">[1236]</span></a>Bertie to Grey, April 4, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 330 f., No. 395; Grey to Bertie, April 4, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 331, No. 396; Grey to Spring Rice, Feb. 19, 1906, +Gwynn, <em>The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring +Rice</em>, II, 65.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1237"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1237"><span class= +"label">[1237]</span></a>Grey to Bertie, July 9, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 361, No. 420.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1238"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1238"><span class= +"label">[1238]</span></a>Grey’s minute to a dispatch from Lascelles +to Grey, May 24, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 358, No. 416.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1239"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1239"><span class= +"label">[1239]</span></a>Minute by Grey, June 9, 1906, +<em>ibid.</em>, 359, No. 418.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1240"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1240"><span class= +"label">[1240]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, p. 356; IV, 381 f., No. +328.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1241"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1241"><span class= +"label">[1241]</span></a>The German instructions to Radolin used +<em>detente</em>. Bourgeois used <em>rapprochement</em> in his +memorandum of the conversation with the German Ambassador. In +talking to Grey, Cambon spoke of <em>entente</em>. There may have +been point to this change, for Grey, who was sensitive about +Anglo-French relations, immediately assured the French that +Anglo-German relations were not and would not become too intimate, +and that an entente did not exist. See Grey to Bertie, July 9, +1906, <em>ibid.</em>, III, 361 f., No. 420; Bertie to Grey, July +12, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 362 f., No. 421; Mühlberg to Radolin, +June 27, 1906, <em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 438, No. 7187; Tschirschky to +Metternich, July 7, 1906, <em>ibid.</em>, 438 f., No. 7188.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1242"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1242"><span class= +"label">[1242]</span></a>Bertie to Grey, March 31, 1906, +<em>B.D.</em>, III, 328, No. 387.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1243"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1243"><span class= +"label">[1243]</span></a>Metternich to Bülow, July 31, 1906, +<em>G.P.</em>, XXI, 441 ff., No. 7191; Grey to Lascelles, July 31, +1906, <em>B.D.</em>, III, 363 f., No. 422.</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1244"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1244"><span class= +"label">[1244]</span></a>On Feb. 20, 1906, Grey wrote: “The door is +being kept open by us for a <em>rapprochement</em> with Russia; +there is at least a prospect that when Russia is re-established we +shall find ourselves on good terms with her. An <em>entente</em> +between Russia, France and ourselves would be absolutely secure. If +it is necessary to check Germany it could then be done” +(<em>B.D.</em>, III, 267, No. 299).</p> +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> +<p><a id="Footnote_1245"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1245"><span class= +"label">[1245]</span></a><em>Ibid.</em>, Vol. IV, chap. xxv, Part +IV; Gwynn, Vol. II, chaps. xiv ff.; William L. Langer, “Russia, the +Straits Question, and the European Powers, 1904-8,” <em>English +History Review</em>, Jan., 1929; and others.</p> +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="chap"> + +<div class="page"> +<p class="center med"><span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_407">[407]</span>INDEX</p> +</div> + +<h2><span class="pagenum" id="Page_409">[409]</span><a id= +"ind"></a>INDEX</h2> + +<ul class="index"> +<li>Abarzuza, <a href="#Page_118">118</a> n.; refuses to sign +Franco-Spanish accord, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>-40; and Great +Britain, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> + +<li>Abazzia, <a href="#Page_144">144</a> n.</li> + +<li>Abd-el-Aziz, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>-4, <a href= +"#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href= +"#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>, <a href= +"#Page_128">128</a>-29, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>-34, <a href= +"#Page_184">184</a>-85, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>-94, <a href= +"#Page_198">198</a> and n., <a href="#Page_199">199</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_206">206</a> and n., <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, +<a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href="#Page_216">216</a>, <a href= +"#Page_223">223</a>, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, <a href= +"#Page_252">252</a>-53, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, <a href= +"#Page_315">315</a>, <a href="#Page_348">348</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_364">364</a>, <a href="#Page_394">394</a>-96; sends Maclean +to London, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>; requests of French +government, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>-18; asks German co-operation +in 1904, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>; convokes assembly of +notables, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>; opposition to France in +1905, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>; accepts Conference conclusions, +<a href="#Page_396">396</a></li> + +<li>Abd-el-Melik, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>-94</li> + +<li>Afghanistan, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href= +"#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href= +"#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>, <a href= +"#Page_170">170</a></li> + +<li>Aflalo, <a href="#Page_106">106</a> n.</li> + +<li>Agadir, <a href="#Page_157">157</a></li> + +<li>Alfonso XIII, King, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href= +"#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>, <a href= +"#Page_316">316</a> n., <a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href= +"#Page_348">348</a> n.</li> + +<li>Algeciras, <a href="#Page_348">348</a></li> + +<li>Algeria, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, +<a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href= +"#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href= +"#Page_16">16</a>-18, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>; report of +military aid to Moroccan pretender, <a href="#Page_241">241</a>-42 +and n.</li> + +<li>Almodovar, Duke of, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href= +"#Page_38">38</a> n., <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href= +"#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>, <a href= +"#Page_372">372</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href= +"#Page_382">382</a>, <a href="#Page_393">393</a></li> + +<li>Alsace-Lorraine, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href= +"#Page_282">282</a></li> + +<li>Alvensleben, Count, <a href="#Page_143">143</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_174">174</a> and n., <a href="#Page_175">175</a>-76</li> + +<li>Anglo-Belgian military conversations in 1906, <a href= +"#Page_341">341</a> n., <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li> + +<li>Anglo-French agreement in 1899, <a href= +"#Page_20">20</a>-21</li> + +<li>Anglo-French agreement on April 8, 1904, <a href= +"#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>-42, <a href= +"#Page_155">155</a> n., <a href="#Page_156">156</a>, <a href= +"#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href= +"#Page_340">340</a>; terms, <a href="#Page_102">102</a>-4; +criticism of, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>; British opinion on, +<a href="#Page_104">104</a>-6; French opinion on, <a href= +"#Page_106">106</a>-9</li> + +<li>Anglo-French alliance, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>-31 n.</li> + +<li>Anglo-French arbitration treaty, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, +<a href="#Page_94">94</a></li> + +<li>Anglo-French military and naval conversations in 1906, <a href= +"#Page_335">335</a>-37, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>-40</li> + +<li>Anglo-French <em>rapprochement</em>, <a href= +"#Page_84">84</a>-86</li> + +<li>Anglo-German agreements, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href= +"#Page_69">69</a>, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href= +"#Page_150">150</a></li> + +<li>Anglo-German alliance negotiations in 1901, <a href= +"#Page_69">69</a>-77</li> + +<li>Anglo-German arbitration treaty, <a href= +"#Page_150">150</a></li> + +<li>Anglo-German conversations on Morocco, <a href= +"#Page_63">63</a> n.</li> + +<li>Anglo-German press war, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href= +"#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_176">176</a> n.</li> + +<li>Anglo-Japanese alliance, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href= +"#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>-79, <a href= +"#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>, <a href= +"#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>-300, <a href= +"#Page_306">306</a>-7</li> + +<li>Anglo-Russian relations, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href= +"#Page_54">54</a> and n.; Chinese difficulties, <a href= +"#Page_52">52</a>; difficulties in 1903, <a href= +"#Page_82">82</a>-83; attempts at <em>rapprochement</em>, <a href= +"#Page_94">94</a>-98; negotiations for agreement, <a href= +"#Page_110">110</a>; difficulty over Russian seizure of vessels in +1904, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>; proposed Afghan agreement, +<a href="#Page_114">114</a>; <em>rapprochement</em> of 1906, +<a href="#Page_404">404</a>-5; <em>see</em> Dogger Bank Affair</li> + +<li>Aoki, Viscount, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href= +"#Page_179">179</a>-80</li> + +<li>d’Arenberg, Prince, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li> + +<li><em>Army and Navy Gazette</em>, <a href= +"#Page_173">173</a></li> + +<li><em>L’Aurore</em>, <a href="#Page_265">265</a></li> + +<li>Austria-Hungary: <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href= +"#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>, <a href= +"#Page_373">373</a> and n.; compromise proposal in March, 1906, +<a href="#Page_377">377</a>-78; seeks to mediate again in March, +1906, <a href="#Page_388">388</a></li> + +<li>Austro-Italian relations in 1904-5, <a href= +"#Page_181">181</a>-82</li> + +<li>Austro-Russian agreements, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href= +"#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Ba-Ahmed, grand vizier, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, +<a href="#Page_11">11</a> n.</li> + +<li>Bacheracht, <a href="#Page_333">333</a></li> + +<li>Bagdad Railway, <a href="#Page_50">50</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_56">56</a>-57, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>, <a href= +"#Page_80">80</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href= +"#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>, <a href= +"#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>-75</li> + +<li>Balance of power, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>, <a href= +"#Page_81">81</a> n., <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href= +"#Page_228">228</a> n.</li> + +<li>Balearic Islands, <a href="#Page_93">93</a></li> + +<li>Balfour, Arthur J., <a href="#Page_54">54</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_105">105</a>-6, <a href="#Page_115">115</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_176">176</a> n., <a href="#Page_208">208</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_232">232</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a> n.</li> + +<li>Baltic Sea, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href= +"#Page_292">292</a> and n., <a href="#Page_293">293</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Baltic Straits, <a href="#Page_100">100</a></li> + +<li>Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, <a href= +"#Page_129">129</a>-31</li> + +<li>Barclay, Sir Thomas, <a href="#Page_44">44</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_85">85</a></li> + +<li>Barnardiston, Colonel, <a href="#Page_341">341</a> and n.</li> + +<li><span class="pagenum" id="Page_410">[410]</span>Barrère, +<a href="#Page_21">21</a>-23, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>-26, +<a href="#Page_29">29</a>-32, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href= +"#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>, <a href= +"#Page_244">244</a> n., <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href= +"#Page_371">371</a>; arguments to Italy for accord in 1901-2, +<a href="#Page_25">25</a>; and renewal of Triple Alliance, <a href= +"#Page_25">25</a>-26; anti-German activity, <a href= +"#Page_145">145</a> n.</li> + +<li>Bassermann, <a href="#Page_400">400</a></li> + +<li>Bebel, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li>Becker, Jeronimo, <a href="#Page_35">35</a></li> + +<li>Beit, Werner, <a href="#Page_319">319</a></li> + +<li>Belgium, <a href="#Page_373">373</a> n.</li> + +<li>Benckendorff, Count, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href= +"#Page_97">97</a>-98, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href= +"#Page_139">139</a> n., <a href="#Page_308">308</a>, <a href= +"#Page_323">323</a>-24</li> + +<li>Ben Sliman, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href= +"#Page_129">129</a> n., <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href= +"#Page_395">395</a></li> + +<li>Bernstorff, Count, <a href="#Page_142">142</a> n.; interview in +<em>Daily Chronicle</em>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li>Bertie, Sir Francis, <a href="#Page_145">145</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_197">197</a> n., <a href="#Page_201">201</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_210">210</a>, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href= +"#Page_329">329</a>-30, <a href="#Page_343">343</a>-4; on Italian +policy, <a href="#Page_33">33</a> n.; memo on Chinese situation on +March 11, 1901, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>-68; <em>aide-mémoire</em> +to France, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>-11</li> + +<li>Betzold, <a href="#Page_219">219</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_220">220</a> and n., <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href= +"#Page_225">225</a>, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href= +"#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> + +<li>Bezobrazov, <a href="#Page_167">167</a></li> + +<li>Bihourd, <a href="#Page_137">137</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_199">199</a> n., <a href="#Page_217">217</a>; warning to +Delcassé in 1904, <a href="#Page_127">127</a> n.</li> + +<li>Billy, <a href="#Page_199">199</a> n.</li> + +<li>Birileff, Admiral, <a href="#Page_285">285</a> n.</li> + +<li>Bismarck, <a href="#Page_33">33</a> n.; system of alliances, +<a href="#Page_19">19</a></li> + +<li>Bizerta, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li> + +<li>Björkö meeting, <a href="#Page_281">281</a>-85, <a href= +"#Page_284">284</a>-85 n.; alarms Europe, <a href= +"#Page_291">291</a></li> + +<li>Björkö Treaty, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>, <a href= +"#Page_367">367</a>-68, <a href="#Page_391">391</a> n.; terms, +<a href="#Page_284">284</a>; annulment, <a href= +"#Page_303">303</a>-4; results, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>-6</li> + +<li>Boer War, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, +<a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>, <a href= +"#Page_81">81</a></li> + +<li>Bompard, <a href="#Page_113">113</a>, <a href= +"#Page_294">294</a>-95, <a href="#Page_295">295</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_360">360</a> n., <a href="#Page_398">398</a> n.</li> + +<li>Bou-Amama, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href= +"#Page_190">190</a></li> + +<li>Bourgeaud-Hansemann, <a href="#Page_264">264</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Bourgeois, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>, <a href= +"#Page_388">388</a> n., <a href="#Page_403">403</a> n.; renews +instructions to Révoil in March, 1906, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>; +declaration to Radolin on March 17, 1906, <a href= +"#Page_387">387</a>; speech in Chamber on April 12, 1906, <a href= +"#Page_397">397</a> n.</li> + +<li>Bowles, Gibson, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> + +<li>Boxer Rebellion, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> + +<li>Buchard, <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li> + +<li>Bülow, Herr von, <a href="#Page_328">328</a></li> + +<li>Bülow, Count (Prince after June, 1905), <a href= +"#Page_11">11</a> and n., <a href="#Page_43">43</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_47">47</a>, <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href= +"#Page_61">61</a>-65, <a href="#Page_69">69</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_71">71</a>-73, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>-79, <a href= +"#Page_127">127</a> n., <a href="#Page_135">135</a>-44, <a href= +"#Page_147">147</a> n., <a href="#Page_160">160</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_163">163</a> n., <a href="#Page_164">164</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_165">165</a>-67, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, +<a href="#Page_172">172</a>-74, <a href="#Page_176">176</a> n., +<a href="#Page_181">181</a>-82, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>-90, +<a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_204">204</a> and n., <a href="#Page_208">208</a> n., +<a href="#Page_220">220</a> n., <a href="#Page_234">234</a>, +<a href="#Page_251">251</a>-52, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>-64, +<a href="#Page_269">269</a>-72, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>-78, +<a href="#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a> n., +<a href="#Page_317">317</a> n., <a href="#Page_333">333</a>, +<a href="#Page_348">348</a>, <a href="#Page_354">354</a> n., +<a href="#Page_355">355</a> and n., <a href="#Page_368">368</a> n., +<a href="#Page_376">376</a> n., <a href="#Page_377">377</a>; and +Franco-Italian relations, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>-28; renewal of +Triple Alliance in 1902, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>-29; relieves +Italy of military obligations, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>; and +French overture, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>; policy of free hand, +<a href="#Page_55">55</a>-56; rejects Chamberlain’s overture in +1898, <a href="#Page_56">56</a>; character of, <a href= +"#Page_57">57</a>-60; on Morocco, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>-65; on +Anglo-French agreement, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>; on Anglo-German +alliance in 1901, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>-72; on German position +in 1902, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>; and Spain, <a href= +"#Page_119">119</a>-20, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>-55; and Morocco +in 1904, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href= +"#Page_148">148</a>-58; and Italy, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>-44, +<a href="#Page_146">146</a>; desires Anglo-German accord in 1904, +<a href="#Page_148">148</a>; and Moroccan settlement in 1904, +<a href="#Page_151">151</a>-57; on German mistakes, <a href= +"#Page_159">159</a>; and Roosevelt in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_160">160</a>; and Russia in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_161">161</a>-63, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>-77; interview +in <em>Nineteenth Century</em> (1904), <a href="#Page_173">173</a>; +approaches Japan and United States, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>; +proposal to Russia about Austria in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_179">179</a>; and Morocco in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_181">181</a>-95; on Italy in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_182">182</a>; and Sultan in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_184">184</a>-85; and Roosevelt in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_184">184</a>-85, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>, <a href= +"#Page_240">240</a>; Tangier visit, <a href="#Page_187">187</a>, +<a href="#Page_202">202</a>-8; instructions to William II on March +26, 1905, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>-91; policy after Tangier +visit, <a href="#Page_202">202</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_203">203</a> and n., <a href="#Page_216">216</a>-17; on +Delcassé in 1905, <a href="#Page_213">213</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_215">215</a>; rejects French overtures in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_215">215</a>, <a href="#Page_219">219</a>-20; and +Russo-Japanese peace negotiations, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>; +warns Rouvier, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>-25, <a href= +"#Page_246">246</a> and n., <a href="#Page_271">271</a>; on +Delcassé’s fall, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>; note to Powers in +June, 1905, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>-35; on conference, <a href= +"#Page_240">240</a>; and Great Britain in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_240">240</a>-41; concessions to France in June, 1905, +<a href="#Page_241">241</a>-42; and Spain in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_247">247</a> n.; and France in June, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_248">248</a>-49; instructions to Tattenbach on July 11, +1905, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>; ambitions toward Morocco in +July, 1905, <a href="#Page_262">262</a>; Moroccan policy on July +31, 1905, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>-64; and Moroccan concessions +in 1905, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>; on Franco-German relations in +Sept., 1905, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>-70; desires Franco-German +colonial accord in Oct., 1905, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>-75; +interview in <em>Le Temps</em> on Oct. 3,<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_411">[411]</span> 1905, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>-76; and +German press in Oct., 1905, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>; Björkö +affair, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>-81, <a href= +"#Page_286">286</a>-91, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href= +"#Page_303">303</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>; offers +resignation, <a href="#Page_289">289</a> and n.; on the Conference, +<a href="#Page_311">311</a>; optimistic about Conference, <a href= +"#Page_315">315</a>-16; diplomatic preparations for Conference, +<a href="#Page_315">315</a>-19; offer to Italy in Jan., 1906, +<a href="#Page_316">316</a>; and Great Britain in Jan., 1906, +<a href="#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>; on +American proposal in Feb., 1906, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>-64; +accepts Austrian proposal in March, 1906, <a href= +"#Page_377">377</a>-78; diplomatic campaign against France in +March, 1906, <a href="#Page_383">383</a>-84; and Roosevelt in +March, 1906, <a href="#Page_384">384</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_388">388</a>-89; and Russia in March, 1906, <a href= +"#Page_391">391</a> n.; on the international situation in 1906, +<a href="#Page_398">398</a>-99; speeches in Reichstag: Dec. 6, +1897, <a href="#Page_56">56</a> n.; Dec. 11, 1899, <a href= +"#Page_62">62</a>-63; Jan. 8, 1902, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>-28, +<a href="#Page_77">77</a>; April 12 and 14, 1904, <a href= +"#Page_141">141</a>-42; Dec. 5, 1904, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>; +March 15, 1905, <a href="#Page_186">186</a> and n.; March 29, 1905, +<a href="#Page_192">192</a>; Dec. 6, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_313">313</a>; April 5, 1906, <a href="#Page_397">397</a> n.; +Nov. 14, 1906, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>-401</li> + +<li>Bu-Hamara, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> + +<li><em>Bulletin</em>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Caillaux, Joseph, <a href="#Page_312">312</a> +n.</li> + +<li>Caix, M. de, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href= +"#Page_107">107</a></li> + +<li>Cambon, Jules, <a href="#Page_244">244</a> n.; <a href= +"#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a> n.; <a href= +"#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a></li> + +<li>Cambon, Paul, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>-48, <a href= +"#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_87">87</a>-94, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>, <a href= +"#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>-27, <a href= +"#Page_231">231</a> n., <a href="#Page_244">244</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href= +"#Page_262">262</a>, <a href="#Page_333">333</a>; conversations of, +with Grey on Jan. 10 and 31, 1906, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>-39, +<a href="#Page_338">338</a> n., <a href="#Page_344">344</a>-46, +<a href="#Page_346">346</a> n.</li> + +<li>Camerun railways, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href= +"#Page_274">274</a></li> + +<li>Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>, +<a href="#Page_338">338</a>-39 n., <a href="#Page_339">339</a>-40 +and n., <a href="#Page_343">343</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>, +<a href="#Page_387">387</a></li> + +<li>Canevaro, Admiral, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>-21</li> + +<li>Cartwright, <a href="#Page_188">188</a> n.</li> + +<li>Cassini, Count, <a href="#Page_321">321</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_358">358</a></li> + +<li>Chamberlain, Joseph, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href= +"#Page_46">46</a>, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>-66, <a href= +"#Page_63">63</a> n., <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href= +"#Page_77">77</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_95">95</a> n.; speech of, at Leicester, <a href= +"#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>; foreign policy of, +<a href="#Page_53">53</a>-54; proposals of, to Germany, <a href= +"#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_55">55</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_61">61</a>-62</li> + +<li>“Chamberlain period,” <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> + +<li>Chérisey, Count de, <a href="#Page_194">194</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_312">312</a></li> + +<li>China, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>-53, <a href= +"#Page_66">66</a>-68, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href= +"#Page_95">95</a>-98, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href= +"#Page_179">179</a></li> + +<li>Chirol, Valentine, <a href="#Page_73">73</a> n.</li> + +<li>Choate, Joseph, <a href="#Page_315">315</a> n.</li> + +<li>Clarke, Sir George, <a href="#Page_336">336</a></li> + +<li>Clemenceau, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, <a href= +"#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_385">385</a>-86</li> + +<li>Combes, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href= +"#Page_107">107</a></li> + +<li>Comité de l’Afrique française, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>-7, +<a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li>Comité du Maroc, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li>Committee of Imperial Defence, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, +<a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href= +"#Page_343">343</a></li> + +<li>Conference of Algeciras, <a href="#c17">chap. xvii</a>; +organization of, <a href="#Page_350">350</a>; importance of police +and bank questions at, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>; crisis of, +<a href="#Page_366">366</a>; sessions of, on March 3 and 5, 1906, +<a href="#Page_375">375</a>; the Act of, <a href= +"#Page_393">393</a>; criticism of work of, <a href= +"#Page_394">394</a>-96; results of, <a href= +"#Page_397">397</a>-98</li> + +<li>Conference of Madrid, <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li> + +<li>Continental war, <a href="#Page_53">53</a> n.</li> + +<li>Convention of Madrid, <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href= +"#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_235">235</a>, <a href= +"#Page_353">353</a>; Art. XVII of, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>-35; +interpretations of, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>-35 n.</li> + +<li>Courcel, Baron de, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>-77 and n.</li> + +<li>Cromer, Lord, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>, <a href= +"#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a> n.</li> + +<li>Crowe, Eyre, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href= +"#Page_346">346</a> n., <a href="#Page_371">371</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_382">382</a></li> + +<li>Crozier, Philippe, <a href="#Page_84">84</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_186">186</a> n.</li> + +<li>Currie, <a href="#Page_21">21</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Danzig interview, <a href="#Page_45">45</a> n., +<a href="#Page_78">78</a></li> + +<li>Dardanelles, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>, <a href= +"#Page_82">82</a> n., <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, <a href= +"#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a></li> + +<li>Delafosse, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>, <a href= +"#Page_201">201</a></li> + +<li>Delcassé, Théophile, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href= +"#Page_10">10</a> n., <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href= +"#Page_12">12</a> n., <a href="#Page_13">13</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href= +"#Page_22">22</a> n., <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href= +"#Page_34">34</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href= +"#Page_45">45</a> n., <a href="#Page_47">47</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_50">50</a> and n., <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href= +"#Page_61">61</a>, <a href="#Page_86">86</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_87">87</a>-88, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href= +"#Page_100">100</a> and n., <a href="#Page_104">104</a> n., +<a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>, <a href= +"#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_144">144</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>, <a href= +"#Page_178">178</a> and n., <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href= +"#Page_190">190</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>, <a href= +"#Page_197">197</a> n., <a href="#Page_198">198</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_200">200</a>-201, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href= +"#Page_220">220</a>-21 n., <a href="#Page_230">230</a>-31 n., +<a href="#Page_257">257</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a> and n.; +career and character of, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>-9; interest of, in +Morocco, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>-10; French action in Sahara in +1900, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>; sounds Germany in 1901, <a href= +"#Page_13">13</a>; and Radolin in 1901, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>; +and Moroccan embassy in 1901, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>-15; +instructions of, to Saint-René Taillandier in 1901, <a href= +"#Page_15">15</a>-16; visit of, to Rome, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>; +and Italy, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, +<a href="#Page_30">30</a>-31; and Spain, <a href= +"#Page_37">37</a>-38, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>; overture of, to +Great Britain, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>-42, <a href= +"#Page_44">44</a>-45, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href= +"#Page_50">50</a>-51; policy of, toward Great Britain and Germany, +<a href="#Page_43">43</a>; conversation of, with Huhn, <a href= +"#Page_43">43</a>-44; overture of, to Germany, <a href= +"#Page_43">43</a>-46, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href= +"#Page_49">49</a>-50; at St. Petersburg in 1899, <a href= +"#Page_44">44</a>; and Morocco<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_412">[412]</span> in 1902, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, +<a href="#Page_50">50</a>; and Anglo-Russian conversations in 1903, +<a href="#Page_95">95</a> and n.; on Russia’s far eastern policy in +1903, <a href="#Page_99">99</a> n.; surprised by outbreak of +Russo-Japanese War, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>-101; anger of, at +Great Britain in 1904, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>; Newfoundland +question in 1904, <a href="#Page_108">108</a> and n.; urges +Anglo-Russian <em>rapprochement</em> in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_114">114</a>; policy of, in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_117">117</a>; and Spain in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_117">117</a>-25 and n.; conversation of, with Radolin on +March 23, 1904, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>-26; and Germany in +1904, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>-27, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, +<a href="#Page_187">187</a> and n.; policy of, in March, 1905, +<a href="#Page_197">197</a>-98; overtures of, to Germany in 1905, +<a href="#Page_199">199</a> and n., <a href="#Page_212">212</a>; +says Germany is “turning him out,” <a href="#Page_210">210</a>; and +Moroccan question in 1905, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>-22; warns +Sultan in 1905, <a href="#Page_223">223</a> and n.; adheres to +policy, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>; asks British support in May, +1905, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>; opposes conference, <a href= +"#Page_228">228</a>-30; defends his policy on June 6, 1905, +<a href="#Page_230">230</a>-31; resignation of, <a href= +"#Page_231">231</a>; speeches: Senate in July, 1901, <a href= +"#Page_14">14</a>; Chamber on July 3, 1902, <a href= +"#Page_31">31</a>; Chamber on Nov. 23, 1903, <a href= +"#Page_94">94</a>; Chamber and Senate in Nov.-Dec., 1904, <a href= +"#Page_10">10</a> n., <a href="#Page_108">108</a>; Senate on March +31, 1905, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> + +<li>Deloncle, <a href="#Page_107">107</a></li> + +<li>Dennis, Alfred L. P., <a href="#Page_245">245</a> n.</li> + +<li>Deschanel, Paul, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href= +"#Page_200">200</a></li> + +<li>Devonshire, Duke of, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>, <a href= +"#Page_63">63</a> n.</li> + +<li>Dilke, Sir Charles, <a href="#Page_100">100</a> n.</li> + +<li>Dogger Bank affair, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>, <a href= +"#Page_112">112</a>-13, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href= +"#Page_168">168</a></li> + +<li>Donnersmarck, Prince Henckel von, <a href="#Page_225">225</a> +n.</li> + +<li>Doumer, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>Dual Alliance, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>-10, <a href= +"#Page_19">19</a>, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href= +"#Page_43">43</a> n., <a href="#Page_47">47</a>, <a href= +"#Page_83">83</a> n., <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href= +"#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>-36, <a href= +"#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href= +"#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href= +"#Page_180">180</a>, <a href="#Page_229">229</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_284">284</a> n., <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href= +"#Page_297">297</a> and n., <a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href= +"#Page_300">300</a>-301, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>, <a href= +"#Page_391">391</a> n., <a href="#Page_397">397</a>, <a href= +"#Page_399">399</a>-400</li> + +<li>Ducarne, General, <a href="#Page_341">341</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Dupuy, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href= +"#Page_249">249</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href= +"#Page_262">262</a></li> + +<li>Durand, Sir Mortimer, <a href="#Page_226">226</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_243">243</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Eckardstein, Baron, <a href="#Page_63">63</a> n., +<a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href= +"#Page_70">70</a> and n., <a href="#Page_71">71</a>-72, <a href= +"#Page_136">136</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_207">207</a> n., <a href="#Page_218">218</a>-19 and nn., +<a href="#Page_220">220</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a> n., +<a href="#Page_245">245</a> n.; on British offer of alliance to +France, <a href="#Page_251">251</a></li> + +<li>Edward VII, King, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href= +"#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_54">54</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href= +"#Page_75">75</a> and n., <a href="#Page_77">77</a>, <a href= +"#Page_82">82</a> n., <a href="#Page_84">84</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_86">86</a> and n., <a href="#Page_87">87</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href="#Page_100">100</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_111">111</a> and n., <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href= +"#Page_150">150</a>-51, <a href="#Page_176">176</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_183">183</a>, <a href="#Page_196">196</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_208">208</a>-9, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href= +"#Page_218">218</a>, <a href="#Page_231">231</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_236">236</a> n., <a href="#Page_257">257</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>, <a href= +"#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>, <a href= +"#Page_308">308</a>-9 n., <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href= +"#Page_318">318</a>, <a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href= +"#Page_330">330</a> n., <a href="#Page_376">376</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_400">400</a> n.; conversation of, with Iswolsky in April, +1904, <a href="#Page_110">110</a></li> + +<li>Egerton, Sir Edwin, <a href="#Page_244">244</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_331">331</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a></li> + +<li>Egypt, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>-94, <a href= +"#Page_102">102</a>-4, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>, <a href= +"#Page_148">148</a>-49</li> + +<li>Entente Cordiale, <a href="#Page_84">84</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_102">102</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href= +"#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>, <a href= +"#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>, <a href= +"#Page_229">229</a>, <a href="#Page_233">233</a>, <a href= +"#Page_256">256</a>-57, <a href="#Page_279">279</a>, <a href= +"#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_325">325</a>, <a href= +"#Page_346">346</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_368">368</a>-69, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>, <a href= +"#Page_397">397</a>, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>, <a href= +"#Page_401">401</a>-4; negotiation of, <a href= +"#Page_86">86</a>-94, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>-102</li> + +<li>Esher, Lord, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>-85, <a href= +"#Page_336">336</a></li> + +<li><em>L’Etat russe</em>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Etienne, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, +<a href="#Page_88">88</a> n., <a href="#Page_336">336</a>, <a href= +"#Page_386">386</a></li> + +<li>Eulenburg, Prince, <a href="#Page_176">176</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_189">189</a></li> + +<li>Fashoda crisis, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href= +"#Page_41">41</a>-42, <a href="#Page_52">52</a></li> + +<li>Fernando Po, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href= +"#Page_152">152</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Fez, <a href="#Page_18">18</a>; threatened by rebels, <a href= +"#Page_4">4</a></li> + +<li><em>Figaro</em>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_276">276</a> n.</li> + +<li>Figuig, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> + +<li>Fisher, Admiral, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href= +"#Page_115">115</a>-16, <a href="#Page_228">228</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_339">339</a></li> + +<li>Flotow, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>, <a href= +"#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>; reports British +offer of alliance to France on June 7, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_236">236</a>-37</li> + +<li>France, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>-38, <a href= +"#Page_40">40</a>-51, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>-68, <a href= +"#Page_73">73</a>-74, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>-97, <a href= +"#Page_99">99</a>, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href= +"#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>, <a href= +"#Page_390">390</a> n.; trade of, with Morocco, <a href= +"#Page_2">2</a>; and Morocco, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>-18; North +African empire, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>; Parliament, <a href= +"#Page_5">5</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>, <a href= +"#Page_107">107</a>-8, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href= +"#Page_199">199</a>-200, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>-30; Moroccan +policy of, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>-6; claims of, to Morocco, +<a href="#Page_6">6</a>-7; occupies oases, <a href= +"#Page_11">11</a>; note of, to Sultan, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>; +and Italy, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>-34; fleet of, visits Italy, +<a href="#Page_23">23</a>; effort of, to break Triple Alliance, +<a href="#Page_25">25</a>; press of, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, +<a href="#Page_85">85</a>-86, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>, <a href= +"#Page_198">198</a> and n., <a href="#Page_247">247</a>, <a href= +"#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href= +"#Page_354">354</a>, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>-60, <a href= +"#Page_375">375</a> n., <a href="#Page_380">380</a>; and Great +Britain, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>-94; and Germany, <a href= +"#Page_93">93</a>-94; international situation in Feb., 1904, +<a href="#Page_117">117</a>; and Spain, <a href= +"#Page_118">118</a>-25; and Morocco in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_128">128</a>-34; Mission of, to Fez, <a href= +"#Page_183">183</a>; Tangier visit, <a href= +"#Page_196">196</a>-202; and Germany in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_211">211</a>-33, <a href= +"#Page_237">237</a>-38, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>-57, <a href= +"#Page_261">261</a>-78; and Spain in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_198">198</a> n., <a href="#Page_259">259</a>-61; cabinet of, +<a href="#Page_199">199</a>; public opinion of, <a href= +"#Page_199">199</a>-200, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href= +"#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_232">232</a>; deserts Delcassé, +<a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_247">247</a>-48 n.; +fleet visits England in<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_413">[413]</span> 1905, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href= +"#Page_258">258</a>; fear of war in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_217">217</a>; cabinet meeting on June 6, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_230">230</a>-31 and n.; note on June 21, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_244">244</a>-45; and Great Britain in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_256">256</a>-58; and Björkö, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>-95; +efforts to bring Russia and Great Britain together in 1905, +<a href="#Page_308">308</a>-9; <em>Livre jaune</em> (1905), +<a href="#Page_313">313</a>; preliminaries to Conference, <a href= +"#Page_319">319</a>-22, <a href="#Page_329">329</a>-40, <a href= +"#Page_343">343</a>-47; military defense in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_320">320</a> and n.; and Spain, <a href= +"#Page_330">330</a>-31, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>, <a href= +"#Page_392">392</a>-93; pressure on Italy in Dec., 1905, <a href= +"#Page_331">331</a>-32; sounds Great Britain about agreement in +Jan., 1906, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>; plan for Moroccan police +and bank, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>-52, <a href= +"#Page_365">365</a>-66; seeks Austrian support in Feb., 1906, +<a href="#Page_373">373</a>-74; and Great Britain in March, 1906, +<a href="#Page_385">385</a>; cabinet and Parliament in March, 1906, +<a href="#Page_388">388</a>; opposes Roosevelt’s proposal in March, +1906, <a href="#Page_389">389</a>; satisfied with results of +Conference, <a href="#Page_401">401</a>-2; mistrusts Germany in +1906, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>-3</li> + +<li>Francis Joseph I, Emperor, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>, +<a href="#Page_374">374</a></li> + +<li>Franco-German agreement on July 8, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_255">255</a></li> + +<li>Franco-German agreement on Sept. 28, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_272">272</a>-73</li> + +<li>Franco-German détente, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>-43</li> + +<li>Franco-German press war in 1905, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>, +<a href="#Page_196">196</a></li> + +<li>Franco-Italian agreements, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href= +"#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_27">27</a>, <a href= +"#Page_31">31</a>-32, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> + +<li>Franco-Italian entente, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, <a href= +"#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li> + +<li>Franco-Moroccan agreements, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href= +"#Page_15">15</a>-17</li> + +<li>Franco-Spanish agreements, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href= +"#Page_118">118</a>-25, <a href="#Page_188">188</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>-61, <a href= +"#Page_372">372</a>, <a href="#Page_392">392</a></li> + +<li>Franco-Spanish negotiations in 1902-3, <a href= +"#Page_37">37</a>-40, <a href="#Page_89">89</a></li> + +<li>Franco-Spanish proposed accord in 1902, <a href= +"#Page_38">38</a>; its failure, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>-40</li> + +<li>Franco-Spanish <em>rapprochement</em>, <a href= +"#Page_40">40</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Galliéni, Joseph, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li> + +<li>Gambetta, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li><em>Gaulois</em>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_257">257</a></li> + +<li>Gautsch, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li> + +<li>Genthe, Dr., <a href="#Page_147">147</a> n.</li> + +<li>German-American <em>rapprochement</em>, <a href= +"#Page_160">160</a></li> + +<li>German-Italian military convention, <a href="#Page_29">29</a>, +<a href="#Page_144">144</a></li> + +<li>German Navy League, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> + +<li>Germany, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, +<a href="#Page_7">7</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>-11 and n., +<a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_25">25</a>-28, <a href= +"#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>-82, <a href= +"#Page_88">88</a> n., <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href= +"#Page_116">116</a>-17, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href= +"#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a>, <a href= +"#Page_171">171</a>, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>-56, <a href= +"#Page_258">258</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href= +"#Page_355">355</a> n., <a href="#Page_359">359</a>, <a href= +"#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_381">381</a> n., <a href="#Page_390">390</a>-91, <a href= +"#Page_400">400</a> n.; trade with Morocco, <a href= +"#Page_2">2</a>; reply to France in 1901, <a href= +"#Page_13">13</a>-14; and Delcassé in 1902, <a href= +"#Page_49">49</a>-50 n.; and Great Britain, <a href= +"#Page_53">53</a>-80; proposal to Chamberlain in 1900, <a href= +"#Page_64">64</a>-65; warning to Delcassé in 1900, <a href= +"#Page_65">65</a>; efforts to maintain <em>status quo</em> in +Morocco in 1900, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>; and Japan in 1901, +<a href="#Page_69">69</a>; criticism of foreign policy, <a href= +"#Page_79">79</a>-80; public opinion of, <a href= +"#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_400">400</a>; policy of, in +1903-4, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>-39; and Morocco in 1904, +<a href="#Page_140">140</a>-42, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, +<a href="#Page_157">157</a>-58, <a href="#Page_183">183</a> and n.; +and Italy in 1904, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>-47; anger at France, +<a href="#Page_147">147</a>; contemplates intervening in Morocco in +1904, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a> n.; +and Great Britain in 1904, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>-51, <a href= +"#Page_155">155</a>-57, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>, <a href= +"#Page_176">176</a> and n.; secret articles in Anglo-French +agreement, <a href="#Page_155">155</a> and n.; and United States in +1904, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>; and Russia in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_160">160</a>-80; and Russian alliance in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_166">166</a>-67; fears British attack, <a href= +"#Page_172">172</a>-73; fears Quadruple Alliance, <a href= +"#Page_178">178</a>; international situation in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_181">181</a>; and Morocco in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_183">183</a>-95; secret articles of Franco-Spanish +agreements, <a href="#Page_187">187</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_188">188</a> n., <a href="#Page_313">313</a>-14; Tangier +visit, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>-8; and Roosevelt in 1905, +<a href="#Page_205">205</a>-6; Tattenbach to Fez, <a href= +"#Page_206">206</a>; and Turkish Sultan, <a href= +"#Page_206">206</a> n.; sounds Powers about conference, <a href= +"#Page_206">206</a>-7; reply of, to Delcassé’s overtures, <a href= +"#Page_207">207</a>-8; rejects French offers in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_218">218</a>; and France in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_211">211</a>-25, <a href="#Page_237">237</a>-56, <a href= +"#Page_261">261</a>-78; suggests to Rouvier to call conference, +<a href="#Page_220">220</a>; determines to overthrow Delcassé, +<a href="#Page_221">221</a>; presses the Powers for support, +<a href="#Page_221">221</a>; seeks Roosevelt’s support in May, +1905, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>; and Italy in May, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_224">224</a>; press of, on Delcassé’s downfall, <a href= +"#Page_233">233</a>; forces Villa-Urrutia from office, <a href= +"#Page_236">236</a>; reply to France on June 24, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_248">248</a>-49; criticism of her policy in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_256">256</a>; presses Rouvier in July, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_262">262</a>; asks Roosevelt’s aid in July, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_263">263</a>; Moroccan loan in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_267">267</a>; and Tattenbach in Aug., 1905, <a href= +"#Page_267">267</a>; reply to Rouvier in Sept., 1905, <a href= +"#Page_273">273</a>-74 n.; anger at Great Britain in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_277">277</a>; international situation in July, 1905, +<a href="#Page_279">279</a>; and<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_414">[414]</span> Russia in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_279">279</a>-91; and Roosevelt about Björkö, <a href= +"#Page_287">287</a> n.; press of, angry at Great Britain in 1905, +<a href="#Page_292">292</a>; and annulment of Björkö Treaty, +<a href="#Page_304">304</a> and n.; and Moroccan affair in 1905, +<a href="#Page_311">311</a>; preliminaries to Conference of +Algeciras, <a href="#Page_311">311</a>-19; French overtures in +Nov., 1905, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>; international situation in +winter of 1905-6, <a href="#Page_312">312</a>-13; Weissbuch in +1906, <a href="#Page_314">314</a> n.; on conference in Dec., 1905, +<a href="#Page_314">314</a>; instructions to delegates, <a href= +"#Page_314">314</a>-15; warnings to France in Jan., 1906, <a href= +"#Page_317">317</a>; improvement in Anglo-German relations in 1906, +<a href="#Page_317">317</a>-18; navy bill in 1906, <a href= +"#Page_318">318</a> n.; refuses French proposals on police and +bank, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>-53; proposals on police, <a href= +"#Page_353">353</a>-54, <a href="#Page_354">354</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_357">357</a>-58; policy of, at Conference in Feb., 1906, +<a href="#Page_359">359</a>-60; presses Rouvier in Feb., 1906, +<a href="#Page_359">359</a>; declaration of, to Powers in Feb., +1906, <a href="#Page_359">359</a>; proposal of, on banks, <a href= +"#Page_364">364</a>-65; defeat of, <a href="#Page_397">397</a>; +policy of, after Conference, <a href="#Page_399">399</a>-400</li> + +<li>Gharnet, S. Feddoul, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>, <a href= +"#Page_133">133</a></li> + +<li>Giolitti, Giovanni, <a href="#Page_144">144</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_146">146</a> n.</li> + +<li>Glasenapp, <a href="#Page_365">365</a> n.</li> + +<li>Goluchowski, Count, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href= +"#Page_355">355</a> n., <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href= +"#Page_373">373</a>-74, <a href="#Page_374">374</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_378">378</a> and n., <a href="#Page_398">398</a></li> + +<li>Gorst, Sir Eldon, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li> + +<li>Gourara, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li>Great Britain, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href= +"#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href= +"#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href= +"#Page_14">14</a> n., <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href= +"#Page_28">28</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>-56, <a href= +"#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href= +"#Page_276">276</a>; trade of, with Morocco, <a href= +"#Page_2">2</a>; and Italy, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>, <a href= +"#Page_33">33</a>; and Spain over Morocco, <a href= +"#Page_35">35</a> n.; antagonism to, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>; +international situation of, at close of nineteenth century, +<a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>; and Germany, +<a href="#Page_60">60</a>-80; change of policy of, in 1901, +<a href="#Page_68">68</a>; seeks aid of Austria and Italy in 1903, +<a href="#Page_81">81</a>; policy of, in 1902, <a href= +"#Page_81">81</a>; and Russia, <a href="#Page_81">81</a> n., +<a href="#Page_82">82</a> and n., <a href="#Page_110">110</a>-16, +<a href="#Page_81">81</a>-102; and France, <a href= +"#Page_81">81</a>-102, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>-29, <a href= +"#Page_232">232</a>-33; public opinion of, hostile to Germany, +<a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>, <a href= +"#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>-73, <a href= +"#Page_291">291</a>-92, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>-10, <a href= +"#Page_310">310</a> n.; press, <a href="#Page_85">85</a>, <a href= +"#Page_228">228</a> n.; public opinion of, <a href= +"#Page_135">135</a>; cabinet crisis of, in 1903, <a href= +"#Page_90">90</a>; and Russia’s policy in Balkans in 1903, <a href= +"#Page_95">95</a>-96; fear of Continental coalition in 1904, +<a href="#Page_100">100</a>; Parliament, <a href= +"#Page_105">105</a>-6; fear of German navy in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_114">114</a>-15; redistribution of naval forces of, <a href= +"#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>-73; and +Franco-Spanish agreement in 1904, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>; asks +Powers to approve Khedivial decree, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>; +refuses German proposal for agreement in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_148">148</a>-49; and Germany, <a href= +"#Page_148">148</a>-51; fears German attack in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_208">208</a> and n.; Tangier visit, <a href= +"#Page_208">208</a>-11; fleet of, visits France in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_209">209</a>, <a href="#Page_258">258</a>; prevents Germany +from obtaining ports, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>; offers aid to +France in April, 1905, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>-11; rejects +Roosevelt’s advice in May, 1905, <a href="#Page_223">223</a>; naval +preparations in 1905, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>; Anglo-French +military and naval conversations in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_228">228</a> and n.; and Delcassé’s downfall, <a href= +"#Page_232">232</a>; and Germany in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_236">236</a>-37, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>-41, <a href= +"#Page_291">291</a>-94, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>-10; not +supporting Roosevelt in 1905, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>; and +Russia, <a href="#Page_291">291</a>-92, <a href= +"#Page_309">309</a>-10; naval maneuvers of, in the Baltic in 1905, +<a href="#Page_292">292</a>-93 and nn.; visit of fleet to German +ports in Aug.-Sept., 1905, <a href="#Page_293">293</a>; efforts of, +to approach Russia in 1905, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>-10; renewal +of Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>; +preliminaries to Conference, <a href="#Page_322">322</a>-47; +promises support to France at the Conference, <a href= +"#Page_329">329</a>-30; pressure of, on Spain in Dec., 1905, +<a href="#Page_330">330</a>-31; pressure of, on Italy in Dec., +1905, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>-32; and Belgium in 1906, <a href= +"#Page_340">340</a>-41 and n.; supports France in Feb., 1906, +<a href="#Page_368">368</a>; pressure of, on Spain in Feb., 1906, +<a href="#Page_372">372</a>; favors Austrian proposal in March, +1906, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>; and Germany in 1906, <a href= +"#Page_399">399</a>-400; satisfied with results of Conference, +<a href="#Page_401">401</a>-2</li> + +<li>Grey, Sir Edward, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href= +"#Page_321">321</a> n., <a href="#Page_322">322</a>-23, <a href= +"#Page_327">327</a> n., <a href="#Page_329">329</a>, <a href= +"#Page_331">331</a> and n., <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href= +"#Page_336">336</a>-37, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>-43, <a href= +"#Page_343">343</a> n., <a href="#Page_360">360</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_371">371</a> n., <a href="#Page_379">379</a>, +<a href="#Page_384">384</a>, <a href="#Page_386">386</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_389">389</a>, <a href= +"#Page_400">400</a> n., <a href="#Page_403">403</a> n.; and Russia, +<a href="#Page_323">323</a>-24; and Germany, <a href= +"#Page_324">324</a>-27; conversations of, with Cambon on Jan. 10 +and 31, 1906, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>-39, <a href= +"#Page_338">338</a> n., <a href="#Page_344">344</a>-46, <a href= +"#Page_346">346</a> n.; approves military and naval conversations +in 1906, <a href="#Page_340">340</a> and n.; instructions of, to +Grierson in Jan., 1906, <a href="#Page_341">341</a>; summary of +policy of, <a href="#Page_347">347</a>; conversation with +Metternich on Feb. 19, 1906, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>-69; and +Austria in Feb., 1906, <a href="#Page_373">373</a> n.; and Spain in +March, 1906, <a href="#Page_376">376</a> n.; advises France to +accept Austrian proposal, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>; and Germany +in 1906, <a href="#Page_402">402</a>-4; and Russia in 1906, +<a href="#Page_404">404</a> n.</li> + +<li>Grierson, General, <a href="#Page_54">54</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_335">335</a>, <a href="#Page_339">339</a>-41</li> + +<li>Guillain, Antoine, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_415">[415]</span>Haldane, Richard, <a href= +"#Page_339">339</a>-40, <a href="#Page_342">342</a>-43, <a href= +"#Page_400">400</a> n.</li> + +<li>Hamburg-American Line, <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href= +"#Page_174">174</a></li> + +<li>Hammann, Otto, <a href="#Page_74">74</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_187">187</a> n., <a href="#Page_199">199</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_203">203</a> n., <a href="#Page_348">348</a> n.; dispute +with Holstein, <a href="#Page_204">204</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Hanotaux, Gabriel, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li> + +<li>Hansen, Jules, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href= +"#Page_46">46</a> n.</li> + +<li>Harcourt, Sir William, <a href="#Page_54">54</a> n.</li> + +<li>Hardinge, Sir Charles, <a href="#Page_82">82</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_96">96</a>, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>, <a href= +"#Page_110">110</a> n., <a href="#Page_112">112</a>-13, <a href= +"#Page_306">306</a>-7, <a href="#Page_309">309</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_325">325</a>, <a href="#Page_371">371</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_386">386</a> n.</li> + +<li>Harmsworth, <a href="#Page_69">69</a> n.</li> + +<li>Harris, W. B., <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> + +<li>Hatzfeldt, Count, <a href="#Page_54">54</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_63">63</a> n., <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> + +<li>Hay, John, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>-32 n.</li> + +<li>Hayashi, Count, <a href="#Page_160">160</a> n.</li> + +<li>Hedeman, <a href="#Page_100">100</a> n.</li> + +<li>Holland, <a href="#Page_373">373</a> n.</li> + +<li>Holstein, Herr von, <a href="#Page_50">50</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_55">55</a> and n., <a href="#Page_57">57</a>, <a href= +"#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href= +"#Page_70">70</a> n., <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href= +"#Page_135">135</a>, <a href="#Page_139">139</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_146">146</a> n., <a href="#Page_148">148</a>, <a href= +"#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href= +"#Page_163">163</a> and n., <a href="#Page_164">164</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_166">166</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href= +"#Page_176">176</a> n., <a href="#Page_178">178</a>, <a href= +"#Page_184">184</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>-3, <a href= +"#Page_219">219</a>-20, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>-41, <a href= +"#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_304">304</a>, <a href= +"#Page_328">328</a>-29, <a href="#Page_376">376</a>; on German +position in Dec., 1901, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>; fears British +attack in 1904, <a href="#Page_173">173</a>; dispute with Hammann, +<a href="#Page_204">204</a> and n.; letter on June 28, 1905, +<a href="#Page_246">246</a> n.; on alliance with Russia in July, +1905, <a href="#Page_280">280</a>-81 and n.; on Björkö Treaty, +<a href="#Page_286">286</a>-87, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>-91; +resignation in 1906, <a href="#Page_399">399</a> n.</li> + +<li>Hornung, <a href="#Page_186">186</a> n.</li> + +<li>Huguet, Major, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>-36</li> + +<li>Huhn, Arthur von, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>-44</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><em>L’Imparcial</em>, <a href="#Page_38">38</a> +n.</li> + +<li>India, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li> + +<li>Irredentism, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href= +"#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a></li> + +<li>Iswolsky, Count, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href= +"#Page_171">171</a> n., <a href="#Page_404">404</a></li> + +<li>Italy, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>-11 +and n., <a href="#Page_19">19</a>-34, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>, +<a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>; defeat of, +by Abyssinia, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>; international situation of, +<a href="#Page_19">19</a>; relations of, with France, <a href= +"#Page_19">19</a>-20; and Anglo-French agreement in 1899, <a href= +"#Page_21">21</a>; Moroccan interest of, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>; +and Austria, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>; and Triple Alliance, +<a href="#Page_143">143</a>-47, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>-83; and +Conference, <a href="#Page_207">207</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href= +"#Page_332">332</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Japan, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>-68; relations +of, with Russia in 1903, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>-83; proposal of, +to send Aoki to Berlin, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>, <a href= +"#Page_179">179</a></li> + +<li>Jaurès, <a href="#Page_276">276</a> n.; approves French claims +to Morocco, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li> + +<li>Jonnart, Governor, <a href="#Page_133">133</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_242">242</a> n.</li> + +<li>Jusserand, <a href="#Page_244">244</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>, <a href= +"#Page_361">361</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Khedivial decree, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>, +<a href="#Page_148">148</a>-49</li> + +<li>Kiel, naval review in 1904, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li> + +<li><em>Kölnische Zeitung</em>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li> + +<li><em>Kreuzzeitung</em>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> + +<li>Kriege, Dr., <a href="#Page_264">264</a>, <a href= +"#Page_355">355</a> n.</li> + +<li>Krueger telegram, <a href="#Page_56">56</a> n.</li> + +<li>Kühlmann, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href= +"#Page_186">186</a> n., <a href="#Page_192">192</a>, <a href= +"#Page_196">196</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_267">267</a> n., <a href="#Page_312">312</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Laguiche, Marquis de, <a href= +"#Page_319">319</a></li> + +<li>Lamsdorff, Count, <a href="#Page_46">46</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_95">95</a>-98, <a href="#Page_101">101</a>, <a href= +"#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a>, <a href= +"#Page_114">114</a>, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, <a href= +"#Page_162">162</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>-72, <a href= +"#Page_168">168</a> n., <a href="#Page_174">174</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_178">178</a> n., <a href="#Page_294">294</a>-95, <a href= +"#Page_302">302</a> n., <a href="#Page_369">369</a>; and Germany in +1904, <a href="#Page_162">162</a>-63, <a href= +"#Page_174">174</a>-79; character and policy of, toward Germany, +<a href="#Page_167">167</a>-68; and Germany in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_282">282</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>-302; reaction of, +to Björkö Treaty, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>-97; cordiality of, to +Great Britain in May, 1905, <a href="#Page_306">306</a>-7; refuses +British overtures in Sept.-Oct., 1905, <a href= +"#Page_307">307</a>-8; and Germany in 1906, <a href= +"#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href= +"#Page_367">367</a>-69; co-operation of, with Great Britain, +<a href="#Page_360">360</a>; urges Germany to accept French +propositions at conference, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>, <a href= +"#Page_367">367</a>-69, <a href="#Page_375">375</a>, <a href= +"#Page_391">391</a> n.</li> + +<li>Lanessan, M. de, <a href="#Page_354">354</a>-56</li> + +<li>Lansdowne, Lord, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href= +"#Page_21">21</a> and n., <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href= +"#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>-51, <a href= +"#Page_66">66</a> n., <a href="#Page_69">69</a>-78, <a href= +"#Page_75">75</a> n., <a href="#Page_96">96</a>-98, <a href= +"#Page_110">110</a>-14, <a href="#Page_153">153</a>, <a href= +"#Page_155">155</a> and n., <a href="#Page_209">209</a>-10, +<a href="#Page_218">218</a> n., <a href="#Page_232">232</a> n., +<a href="#Page_254">254</a> and n., <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, +<a href="#Page_293">293</a>, <a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href= +"#Page_344">344</a>; refuses Sultan’s request in 1902, <a href= +"#Page_17">17</a>; and Spain over Morocco, <a href= +"#Page_39">39</a>-40; conversation of, with Cambon in 1902, +<a href="#Page_48">48</a>-51; character of, <a href= +"#Page_65">65</a>-66; policy of, toward Germany, <a href= +"#Page_66">66</a>; and Germany over China, <a href= +"#Page_66">66</a> n.; on possibility of Anglo-German Alliance, +<a href="#Page_75">75</a>-76; on failure of negotiations for +Anglo-German alliance, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>; and France, +<a href="#Page_87">87</a>-102; favors agreement with Russia in +1903, <a href="#Page_95">95</a> and n.; appeals to France to +restrain Russia in 1903, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>-97; warns Cambon +of possibility of Russo-Japanese war, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>-99; +and Russia, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>-16; Anglo-Russian +<em>rapprochement</em>, in 1904, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>; on +German fear of British attack, <a href="#Page_115">115</a>; +mediates between France and<span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_416">[416]</span> Spain in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_121">121</a>-23; on German proposal in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_149">149</a>; interprets Anglo-French accord, <a href= +"#Page_156">156</a>; on Anglo-German hostility in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_176">176</a> n.; opposed to Conference, <a href= +"#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href= +"#Page_244">244</a>; on the visit to Tangier, <a href= +"#Page_209">209</a>; offers aid to France, <a href= +"#Page_210">210</a>; rejects Roosevelt’s offer to mediate in May, +1905, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>; policy of, toward France in May, +1905, <a href="#Page_226">226</a>-27 and nn.; advises United States +against conference, <a href="#Page_228">228</a>-29; offers +Mediterranean accord to Spain in June, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_229">229</a>; denies offer of alliance to France, <a href= +"#Page_230">230</a>-31 n., <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href= +"#Page_251">251</a>-52; interpretation of Art. XVII of Convention +of Madrid, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>-35 n.; assurance to France +in July, 1905, <a href="#Page_257">257</a>; on William II and +Björkö, <a href="#Page_294">294</a></li> + +<li>Lascelles, Sir Frank, <a href="#Page_176">176</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_202">202</a> n., <a href="#Page_241">241</a>, <a href= +"#Page_279">279</a>; on the German Emperor, <a href= +"#Page_58">58</a>; on Bülow, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>; on +possibility of Anglo-German alliance, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>-76 +n.; against idea of a conference, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li> + +<li>Lautier, Eugène, <a href="#Page_276">276</a> n.</li> + +<li>Lauzanne, Stéphane, <a href="#Page_276">276</a> n.</li> + +<li>League of the Three Emperors, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>, +<a href="#Page_139">139</a> n., <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, +<a href="#Page_161">161</a></li> + +<li>Lee, Arthur, <a href="#Page_181">181</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Léon, <a href="#Page_263">263</a></li> + +<li>Leon y Castillo, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href= +"#Page_35">35</a> n., <a href="#Page_37">37</a>-38, <a href= +"#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href= +"#Page_120">120</a> n., <a href="#Page_123">123</a>, <a href= +"#Page_152">152</a> n.</li> + +<li>Levy, Armand, <a href="#Page_218">218</a>-19 nn.</li> + +<li>Lichnowsky, Prince, <a href="#Page_127">127</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_147">147</a></li> + +<li>Lister, <a href="#Page_248">248</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_253">253</a></li> + +<li>Lodge, Senator, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> + +<li><em>Lokalanzeiger</em>, <a href="#Page_383">383</a></li> + +<li>London City Council, visit of, to Paris on Feb. 8, 1906, +<a href="#Page_369">369</a> n.</li> + +<li><em>London Times</em>, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href= +"#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_186">186</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_189">189</a>, <a href="#Page_276">276</a>-77, <a href= +"#Page_310">310</a> n., <a href="#Page_386">386</a> n.</li> + +<li>Loubet, President, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href= +"#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>, <a href= +"#Page_182">182</a> n., <a href="#Page_196">196</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_201">201</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a>, <a href= +"#Page_230">230</a>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a>; visit of, to +Italy in 1904, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>-45</li> + +<li>Louis, Georges, <a href="#Page_262">262</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_273">273</a>-74 n., <a href="#Page_311">311</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_377">377</a> n.</li> + +<li>Louis of Battenberg, Prince, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> + +<li>Lowther, <a href="#Page_216">216</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_228">228</a>, <a href="#Page_257">257</a> n.</li> + +<li>Luzzati, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href= +"#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_220">220</a> n.</li> + +<li>Lyauty, General, <a href="#Page_133">133</a> n.</li> + +<li class="ifrst">Maclean, Kaid Sir Harry, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, +<a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_47">47</a></li> + +<li>Mallet, Louis, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>, <a href= +"#Page_150">150</a> n.</li> + +<li><em>Manchester Guardian</em>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> + +<li>Manchuria, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>, <a href= +"#Page_82">82</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>-96, <a href= +"#Page_98">98</a></li> + +<li>Martino, M. de, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> + +<li><em>Matin</em>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>, <a href= +"#Page_276">276</a>, <a href="#Page_310">310</a></li> + +<li>Maura, Gabriel, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>-19</li> + +<li>Mediterranean ententes, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li> + +<li>Mendelssohn & Co., <a href="#Page_264">264</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_265">265</a> n., <a href="#Page_355">355</a>-56 n., <a href= +"#Page_365">365</a> n., <a href="#Page_384">384</a> n.</li> + +<li>el-Menebhi, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href= +"#Page_74">74</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li> + +<li>Metternich, Count, <a href="#Page_71">71</a>, <a href= +"#Page_76">76</a>-77, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href= +"#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_155">155</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a>, <a href= +"#Page_281">281</a> n., <a href="#Page_315">315</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_344">344</a>-45; on Anglo-German relations in 1902, <a href= +"#Page_78">78</a>; warns government in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_156">156</a>-57; on British danger, <a href= +"#Page_176">176</a> and n.; explains German policy to Grey, +<a href="#Page_326">326</a>-27; warns Grey in 1906, <a href= +"#Page_403">403</a>-4</li> + +<li>Mévil, <a href="#Page_198">198</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_230">230</a> n.</li> + +<li>Michael, Grand Duke, <a href="#Page_285">285</a> n.</li> + +<li>Millet, René, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>-8</li> + +<li>Miquel, Herr von, <a href="#Page_244">244</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Moltke, General, <a href="#Page_281">281</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_288">288</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_318">318</a> and n., <a href="#Page_319">319</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_320">320</a> n.</li> + +<li>Monson, Sir Edmund, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href= +"#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_83">83</a> n.; character sketch +of Delcassé, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li>Montero Rios, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>, <a href= +"#Page_266">266</a>, <a href="#Page_268">268</a>-69</li> + +<li>Montferrand, Count de, <a href="#Page_108">108</a> n.</li> + +<li>Monts, Count, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>, <a href= +"#Page_207">207</a>, <a href="#Page_222">222</a>, <a href= +"#Page_398">398</a> n.</li> + +<li>Moret, <a href="#Page_330">330</a>-31, <a href= +"#Page_372">372</a></li> + +<li><em>Morning Post</em>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> + +<li>Morocco, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>-18, <a href="#Page_2">2</a> +n., <a href="#Page_22">22</a>-23, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, +<a href="#Page_31">31</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href= +"#Page_45">45</a> and n., <a href="#Page_46">46</a>, <a href= +"#Page_48">48</a>, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href= +"#Page_62">62</a>-65, <a href="#Page_63">63</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_71">71</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_83">83</a>, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>-94, <a href= +"#Page_102">102</a>-5, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>-8, <a href= +"#Page_119">119</a>-26, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>-42, <a href= +"#Page_147">147</a>, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href= +"#Page_157">157</a>-58, <a href="#Page_255">255</a>, <a href= +"#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>-73; loans, +<a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>-18, <a href= +"#Page_264">264</a>-65 and n.; embassy in Paris, <a href= +"#Page_13">13</a>-16; embassy in London and Berlin, <a href= +"#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>; and France, <a href= +"#Page_128">128</a>-34, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>-84, <a href= +"#Page_191">191</a>; offers concessions to Germany in 1905, +<a href="#Page_261">261</a>; seizure of Algerian in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_268">268</a> n.; criticism of results of Conference, +<a href="#Page_395">395</a>-96; results of crisis, <a href= +"#Page_405">405</a></li> + +<li>Mühlberg, Herr von, <a href="#Page_148">148</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li>Mukden, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href= +"#Page_201">201</a> n.</li> + +<li>Mulai-el-Hassan, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> + +<li>Mytilene, <a href="#Page_26">26</a> n.</li> + +<li class="ifrst"><span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_417">[417]</span>Nelidow, <a href="#Page_295">295</a>-96, +<a href="#Page_298">298</a>, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> + +<li>Newfoundland, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>, <a href= +"#Page_100">100</a> n., <a href="#Page_102">102</a>, <a href= +"#Page_107">107</a>-8 and n.</li> + +<li>Nicholas, Grand Duke, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> + +<li>Nicholas II, Czar, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, <a href= +"#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_138">138</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_161">161</a>-72, <a href="#Page_168">168</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_296">296</a>-306, <a href="#Page_321">321</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_368">368</a>; proposes +alliance to Germany in 1904, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>; and +Germany in 1904, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>-75, <a href= +"#Page_177">177</a>-78; Björkö meeting, <a href= +"#Page_279">279</a>-86, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>-85 n.; and +Danish question, <a href="#Page_285">285</a> n.; repudiates Björkö +Treaty, <a href="#Page_303">303</a>-4 and n.</li> + +<li>Nicholson, Sir Arthur, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href= +"#Page_74">74</a> n., <a href="#Page_197">197</a>, <a href= +"#Page_324">324</a> n., <a href="#Page_330">330</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>-51, <a href= +"#Page_356">356</a> and n., <a href="#Page_358">358</a>, <a href= +"#Page_374">374</a>-76, <a href="#Page_375">375</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_379">379</a>; favors Austrian proposition, <a href= +"#Page_381">381</a>-82, <a href="#Page_386">386</a>-87</li> + +<li><em>Nineteenth Century</em>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li> + +<li>Noailles, M. de, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>, <a href= +"#Page_50">50</a></li> + +<li>Norway, throne question in 1905, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>-83 +n., <a href="#Page_291">291</a>, <a href="#Page_292">292</a> +n.</li> + +<li><em>Nowoje Wremja</em>, <a href="#Page_203">203</a> n.</li> + +<li class="ifrst">O’Conor, Sir Nicholas, <a href= +"#Page_206">206</a> n.</li> + +<li>Ojeda, <a href="#Page_188">188</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_314">314</a> n., <a href="#Page_356">356</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_372">372</a>, <a href="#Page_373">373</a> n.</li> + +<li>Osten-Sacken, Count, <a href="#Page_61">61</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_163">163</a> and n., <a href="#Page_391">391</a> n.</li> + +<li class="ifrst">Pacific penetration, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>, +<a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href= +"#Page_18">18</a>, <a href="#Page_74">74</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_117">117</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>, <a href= +"#Page_128">128</a>-34</li> + +<li>Pallain, <a href="#Page_46">46</a> n.</li> + +<li>Pan-German League, <a href="#Page_140">140</a></li> + +<li>Pariente, Moses, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li>Percy, Earl, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href= +"#Page_292">292</a>-93</li> + +<li>Perdicaris, Ion, <a href="#Page_131">131</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Persia, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, +<a href="#Page_98">98</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href= +"#Page_324">324</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Phipps, Sir Charles, <a href="#Page_341">341</a> n.</li> + +<li>Plymouth, visit at, of German warships in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_150">150</a></li> + +<li>Poincaré, <a href="#Page_230">230</a>-31 n.</li> + +<li>Port Arthur, <a href="#Page_54">54</a> n.</li> + +<li>Portuguese colonies, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> + +<li>Pourtales, Count, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li>Pressensé, M. de, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> + +<li>Prince of Monaco, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href= +"#Page_247">247</a> n., <a href="#Page_311">311</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_380">380</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Prinetti, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, <a href= +"#Page_24">24</a>-32, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>; speech in +Italian Chamber on May 22, 1902, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>; +negotiations with France in 1902, <a href="#Page_30">30</a>-31</li> + +<li class="ifrst">Rabat, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>-94, <a href= +"#Page_134">134</a></li> + +<li>Radolin, Prince, <a href="#Page_46">46</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_125">125</a> n., <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href= +"#Page_139">139</a>, <a href="#Page_152">152</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_155">155</a> n., <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href= +"#Page_213">213</a>-14, <a href="#Page_225">225</a>, <a href= +"#Page_238">238</a>, <a href="#Page_248">248</a>-49, <a href= +"#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>, <a href= +"#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_403">403</a> and n.; +disapproves German policy in 1905, <a href="#Page_215">215</a>; +warning to Rouvier on May 16, 1905, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>; on +public opinion in France in Jan., 1906, <a href= +"#Page_319">319</a>-20</li> + +<li>Radowitz, Herr von, <a href="#Page_137">137</a>, <a href= +"#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_221">221</a>, <a href= +"#Page_267">267</a>, <a href="#Page_270">270</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_327">327</a>, <a href="#Page_331">331</a>, <a href= +"#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href= +"#Page_353">353</a>, <a href="#Page_356">356</a>-57, <a href= +"#Page_376">376</a>-78, <a href="#Page_382">382</a>-83</li> + +<li>Raisouli, <a href="#Page_131">131</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li>Regnault, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>-52, <a href= +"#Page_366">366</a></li> + +<li>Repington, Colonel, <a href="#Page_335">335</a>-36, <a href= +"#Page_339">339</a></li> + +<li>Reventlow, Count, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li>Révoil, Paul, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, <a href= +"#Page_12">12</a>-13, <a href="#Page_238">238</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_262">262</a>-63, <a href="#Page_270">270</a>, <a href= +"#Page_334">334</a>, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href= +"#Page_351">351</a> and n., <a href="#Page_353">353</a>, <a href= +"#Page_356">356</a>-57, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>, <a href= +"#Page_374">374</a>, <a href="#Page_375">375</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_376">376</a>, <a href="#Page_380">380</a>-83, <a href= +"#Page_386">386</a>, <a href="#Page_390">390</a>, <a href= +"#Page_392">392</a>; memo. to Radowitz on Feb. 16, 1906, <a href= +"#Page_362">362</a>-63; opposes Austrian proposal, <a href= +"#Page_379">379</a></li> + +<li>Richthofen, Baron, <a href="#Page_154">154</a>, <a href= +"#Page_157">157</a>, <a href="#Page_159">159</a>, <a href= +"#Page_161">161</a> n., <a href="#Page_164">164</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_264">264</a>, <a href="#Page_281">281</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_289">289</a> n., <a href="#Page_319">319</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_327">327</a></li> + +<li>Ripon, Lord, <a href="#Page_326">326</a>, <a href= +"#Page_339">339</a>-40</li> + +<li>Roman, <a href="#Page_259">259</a></li> + +<li>Romberg, Baron, <a href="#Page_162">162</a></li> + +<li>Rominten, <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href= +"#Page_299">299</a>-300</li> + +<li>Roosevelt, President, <a href="#Page_101">101</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_115">115</a>, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>-80, <a href= +"#Page_184">184</a>-85, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>, <a href= +"#Page_203">203</a>, <a href="#Page_226">226</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_239">239</a>-40, <a href="#Page_245">245</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_248">248</a>, <a href="#Page_287">287</a> n., +<a href="#Page_301">301</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href= +"#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_353">353</a>-54, <a href= +"#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>-62, <a href= +"#Page_392">392</a>; draws closer to Germany in 1904-5, <a href= +"#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_206">206</a>; tries to calm Anglo-German hostility in 1905, +<a href="#Page_205">205</a> and n., <a href="#Page_215">215</a>, +<a href="#Page_222">222</a>-23; policy of, on Moroccan conflict on +April 20, 1905, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>-15; hesitates about +accepting invitation to conference in June, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_237">237</a>; intervenes in Paris and London in June, 1905, +<a href="#Page_243">243</a>; advises France to accept conference in +June, 1905, <a href="#Page_249">249</a>-50; beneficial result of +his intervention in June, 1905, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>-51; +refuses German request in July, 1905, <a href="#Page_263">263</a>; +mistrusts Germany in 1906, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>; compromise +proposal in 1906, <a href="#Page_363">363</a>-64; opposes Austrian +proposal in March, 1906, <a href="#Page_384">384</a>-85, <a href= +"#Page_388">388</a>-89; proposal in March, 1906, <a href= +"#Page_389">389</a></li> + +<li>Root, <a href="#Page_321">321</a>, <a href="#Page_355">355</a>, +<a href="#Page_357">357</a>, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>, <a href= +"#Page_363">363</a>-64, <a href="#Page_389">389</a></li> + +<li>Rosebery, Lord, <a href="#Page_54">54</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_106">106</a> n., <a href="#Page_203">203</a>, <a href= +"#Page_322">322</a></li> + +<li><span class="pagenum" id="Page_418">[418]</span>Rosen, Dr., +<a href="#Page_274">274</a>; his proposal for Franco-German accord +in Sept., 1905, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>-70 and n.; negotiations +in Paris in Sept., 1905, <a href="#Page_269">269</a>-72</li> + +<li>Rothschild, Alfred, <a href="#Page_54">54</a> n.</li> + +<li>Rouvier, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>, +<a href="#Page_200">200</a>, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href= +"#Page_224">224</a>, <a href="#Page_225">225</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_229">229</a>-31, <a href="#Page_243">243</a>-44 and n., +<a href="#Page_246">246</a> and n., <a href="#Page_247">247</a> and +n., <a href="#Page_248">248</a> n., <a href="#Page_249">249</a>, +<a href="#Page_251">251</a>-54, <a href="#Page_256">256</a>-57, +<a href="#Page_259">259</a>-63, <a href="#Page_267">267</a>-69, +<a href="#Page_271">271</a>-75, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, +<a href="#Page_295">295</a>, <a href="#Page_314">314</a> n., +<a href="#Page_317">317</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a> n., +<a href="#Page_330">330</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>-34, +<a href="#Page_337">337</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href= +"#Page_373">373</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_381">381</a>, <a href="#Page_382">382</a> n.; speech in +Chamber on April 17, 1905, <a href="#Page_201">201</a>; foreign +policy of, <a href="#Page_212">212</a> and n.; overtures to +Germany, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>-13, <a href= +"#Page_217">217</a>-19 and nn., <a href="#Page_220">220</a>-21; +opposed to conference in June, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_237">237</a>-38; offers direct agreement to Germany in June, +1905, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>; despair over Germany’s policy in +June, 1905, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>-39 and n.; discouraged at +German replies in June, 1905, <a href="#Page_242">242</a>; asks +Roosevelt’s support in June, 1905, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>; +accepts conference, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>; policy of, toward +Germany on Morocco in July, 1905, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>; +negotiates with Spain in 1905, <a href="#Page_259">259</a>-60; +protests to Germany about Moroccan concessions in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_265">265</a>-66; offers colonial agreement to Germany in +Sept., 1905, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>; declaration to Germany in +Sept., 1905, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>; statement to Germany in +Sept., 1905, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>; refuses to negotiate +colonial agreement with Germany in Oct., 1905, <a href= +"#Page_275">275</a>; alarm over Björkö meeting, <a href= +"#Page_294">294</a>; on Continental alliance in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_301">301</a>-2; overtures to Germany in Nov., 1905, <a href= +"#Page_311">311</a>-12, <a href="#Page_311">311</a> n.; speech in +Chamber on Dec. 16, 1905, <a href="#Page_313">313</a>; determined +to uphold French interests in Morocco at the Conference, <a href= +"#Page_319">319</a>; assumes Delcassé’s policy, <a href= +"#Page_320">320</a>; diplomatic preparations for Conference, +<a href="#Page_320">320</a>-22; instructions to Révoil, <a href= +"#Page_334">334</a>-35, <a href="#Page_335">335</a> n.; clings to +policy in Feb., 1906, <a href="#Page_360">360</a>; declaration to +Germany on Feb. 15, 1906, <a href="#Page_362">362</a>; downfall of, +<a href="#Page_379">379</a>-80</li> + +<li>Rudini, Marquis de, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> + +<li>Russia, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, +<a href="#Page_39">39</a> n., <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href= +"#Page_47">47</a> n., <a href="#Page_54">54</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_67">67</a>-69, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>-102, <a href= +"#Page_110">110</a>-16, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href= +"#Page_323">323</a>-24, <a href="#Page_361">361</a>; interest of, +in the Far East, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>; favors Continental +<em>bloc</em> against Great Britain, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>; +proposal to Germany in 1899, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>; proposal to +Germany in 1902, <a href="#Page_79">79</a>; far eastern aggressions +in 1903, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>; anger of, at Great Britain in +1904, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>; +Black Sea fleet of, <a href="#Page_111">111</a>; draws closer to +Germany in 1904, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>, <a href= +"#Page_161">161</a>; and Germany in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_160">160</a>-72; Baltic fleet of, <a href= +"#Page_161">161</a>-63; divided opinion about alliance with Germany +in 1904, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>-68; need of German aid in +1904, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>; negotiates loan in Berlin in +1904-5, <a href="#Page_175">175</a>; revolution, <a href= +"#Page_181">181</a>; press angry at Great Britain in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_292">292</a>; anger over renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance +in 1905, <a href="#Page_307">307</a>; loan in 1906, <a href= +"#Page_321">321</a> and n., <a href="#Page_323">323</a>-24, +<a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a> n., +<a href="#Page_399">399</a>; publication of instructions to Cassini +in March, 1906, <a href="#Page_391">391</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Russo-Chinese agreement, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> + +<li>Russo-German commercial treaty of 1904, <a href= +"#Page_161">161</a> n.</li> + +<li>Russo-German negotiations for alliance in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_114">114</a>; proposed terms, <a href= +"#Page_164">164</a>-65, <a href="#Page_169">169</a>-70; results of, +<a href="#Page_179">179</a>-80</li> + +<li>Russo-Japanese relations, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>-68, +<a href="#Page_82">82</a>-83 and n., <a href="#Page_96">96</a>; as +affecting British interests, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>-68; and +Germany, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>-68; and France, <a href= +"#Page_67">67</a>-68</li> + +<li>Russo-Japanese War, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>, <a href= +"#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>, <a href= +"#Page_139">139</a>-40, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href= +"#Page_161">161</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>-65, <a href= +"#Page_239">239</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Sagasta, <a href="#Page_35">35</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_37">37</a></li> + +<li>Saint-Aulaire, Count de, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href= +"#Page_129">129</a>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a> n.</li> + +<li>Saint-René Taillandier, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href= +"#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>, <a href= +"#Page_186">186</a> and n., <a href="#Page_198">198</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_199">199</a> and n., <a href="#Page_238">238</a>; +prepares mission to Fez in 1904, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>; his +instructions, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li> + +<li>Salisbury, Lord, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href= +"#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href= +"#Page_35">35</a>, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href= +"#Page_61">61</a> n., <a href="#Page_62">62</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_63">63</a> n., refuses Delcassé’s overture, <a href= +"#Page_41">41</a>-42; policy of, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>; asks +co-operation of United States in 1898, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>; +proposes agreement to Russia in 1898, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>-54; +opposes Anglo-German alliance, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href= +"#Page_76">76</a></li> + +<li>Samoan Islands, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li> + +<li>Sanderson, Lord, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>, <a href= +"#Page_108">108</a> n., <a href="#Page_142">142</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_228">228</a> n., <a href="#Page_230">230</a> n.; on German +policy, <a href="#Page_59">59</a>; on Delcassé’s anti-German +policy, <a href="#Page_187">187</a> n.</li> + +<li>Sarrien, <a href="#Page_385">385</a></li> + +<li>Sattler, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + +<li>Savinsky, <a href="#Page_168">168</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_296">296</a> n.</li> + +<li>Schiemann, <a href="#Page_217">217</a> n.</li> + +<li>Schlieffen, General, <a href="#Page_144">144</a>, <a href= +"#Page_148">148</a>, <a href="#Page_239">239</a> n.</li> + +<li>Schoen, Herr von, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href= +"#Page_367">367</a>-68, <a href="#Page_391">391</a> n.</li> + +<li><span class="pagenum" id="Page_419">[419]</span>Scholl, +General, <a href="#Page_192">192</a></li> + +<li>Schulenburg, Count, <a href="#Page_176">176</a> n.</li> + +<li>Siam, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>-49, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, +<a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li> + +<li>Siegfried, Jules, <a href="#Page_5">5</a></li> + +<li>Signatory Powers, <a href="#Page_203">203</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_234">234</a> and n.</li> + +<li>Silvela, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>-36, <a href= +"#Page_38">38</a> n., <a href="#Page_39">39</a> and n.; article in +<em>La Lectura</em>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li> + +<li>Sonnino, Baron, <a href="#Page_355">355</a> n.</li> + +<li>Spain, <a href="#Page_3">3</a>, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>, +<a href="#Page_10">10</a>-11 and n., <a href="#Page_45">45</a>, +<a href="#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_89">89</a>-93, <a href="#Page_118">118</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_152">152</a>-54, <a href="#Page_247">247</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_266">266</a>-69; trade with Morocco, <a href= +"#Page_2">2</a>; defeat of, by United States, <a href= +"#Page_6">6</a>, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>; anger at Great Britain, +<a href="#Page_35">35</a>; internal and international situation, +<a href="#Page_35">35</a>; and France, <a href= +"#Page_35">35</a>-40, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>-25, <a href= +"#Page_259">259</a>-61; interest in Morocco, <a href= +"#Page_36">36</a>-37; endeavors to bring about Franco-German +<em>rapprochement</em>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>; Cortes, debates +in 1904, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>; support from Great Britain in +1904, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>; appeals to Germany for aid in +1904, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>; +Franco-Spanish agreement in 1904, <a href="#Page_127">127</a> and +n.; public opinion, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>; anger at Germany +in Aug., 1905, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>; compromise proposal in +Feb., 1906, <a href="#Page_372">372</a>-73; opposes Austrian +proposal in March, 1906, <a href="#Page_379">379</a>; opposes +Roosevelt’s proposal in March, 1906, <a href="#Page_389">389</a>; +trouble with France in March, 1906, <a href= +"#Page_392">392</a>-93</li> + +<li>Spain, Queen Mother of, <a href="#Page_35">35</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_93">93</a> n., <a href="#Page_118">118</a>, <a href= +"#Page_137">137</a></li> + +<li>“Splendid isolation,” <a href="#Page_53">53</a></li> + +<li>Spring Rice, Cecil, <a href="#Page_101">101</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_114">114</a> n., <a href="#Page_115">115</a>, <a href= +"#Page_228">228</a> n., <a href="#Page_291">291</a>-92, <a href= +"#Page_324">324</a></li> + +<li>Sternburg, Baron, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href= +"#Page_250">250</a>, <a href="#Page_251">251</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_355">355</a>, <a href="#Page_384">384</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_385">385</a></li> + +<li>Straits of Gibraltar, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li> + +<li>Stumm, Herr von, <a href="#Page_373">373</a> n.</li> + +<li>Sultan of Turkey, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>, <a href= +"#Page_206">206</a> n.</li> + +<li>Sweden, <a href="#Page_373">373</a> n.</li> + +<li>Switzerland, <a href="#Page_393">393</a> n.</li> + +<li>Sydenham, Lord, <a href="#Page_309">309</a> n.</li> + +<li class="ifrst">Tafilelt, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li> + +<li>Taft, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href= +"#Page_228">228</a></li> + +<li>Tangier, <a href="#Page_47">47</a>-48, <a href= +"#Page_65">65</a>, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href= +"#Page_120">120</a>-21, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>, <a href= +"#Page_130">130</a>-34, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href= +"#Page_153">153</a>, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>-89, <a href= +"#Page_186">186</a> n., <a href="#Page_190">190</a>, <a href= +"#Page_196">196</a>-97, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href= +"#Page_247">247</a> n., <a href="#Page_262">262</a>-63, <a href= +"#Page_270">270</a> n.; visit to, <a href= +"#Page_192">192</a>-95</li> + +<li>Tardieu, André, <a href="#Page_187">187</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_199">199</a> n., <a href="#Page_206">206</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_234">234</a> n., <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href= +"#Page_348">348</a> n., <a href="#Page_354">354</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_372">372</a> n., <a href="#Page_373">373</a> nn., <a href= +"#Page_376">376</a> n., <a href="#Page_381">381</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_391">391</a> n.</li> + +<li>Tattenbach, Count, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>-90, <a href= +"#Page_206">206</a> n., <a href="#Page_208">208</a>, <a href= +"#Page_213">213</a>-15, <a href="#Page_216">216</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_223">223</a>-25, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href= +"#Page_257">257</a> n., <a href="#Page_261">261</a>-62 and n., +<a href="#Page_264">264</a>-68, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>, +<a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_352">352</a>, <a href= +"#Page_356">356</a> and n., <a href="#Page_366">366</a>, <a href= +"#Page_376">376</a> and n.; proposal to Bülow on April 29, 1905, +<a href="#Page_215">215</a>-16; favors Austrian proposal in 1906, +<a href="#Page_378">378</a></li> + +<li><em>Temps, Le</em>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_265">265</a>, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>, <a href= +"#Page_387">387</a>, <a href="#Page_391">391</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_403">403</a></li> + +<li>Teniet-Sassi, <a href="#Page_16">16</a></li> + +<li>Tibet, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>, <a href= +"#Page_111">111</a></li> + +<li>Tidikelt, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li>Tirpitz, Admiral, <a href="#Page_164">164</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_181">181</a></li> + +<li>Tittoni, <a href="#Page_145">145</a>-46, <a href= +"#Page_207">207</a> n., <a href="#Page_224">224</a>-25, and n.</li> + +<li>Tores, El, <a href="#Page_395">395</a></li> + +<li>Touat, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>, +<a href="#Page_63">63</a>, <a href="#Page_65">65</a></li> + +<li>Tournade, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> + +<li><em>Tribuna</em>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li> + +<li>Triple Alliance, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>-20, <a href= +"#Page_22">22</a> n., <a href="#Page_23">23</a>-30, <a href= +"#Page_32">32</a>-34, <a href="#Page_72">72</a>-73, <a href= +"#Page_75">75</a>, <a href="#Page_76">76</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_106">106</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>, <a href= +"#Page_141">141</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>-46, <a href= +"#Page_181">181</a>-83, <a href="#Page_213">213</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_279">279</a>, <a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href= +"#Page_398">398</a> n., <a href="#Page_400">400</a></li> + +<li>Triple entente, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> + +<li>Tripoli, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>-22, <a href= +"#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>, <a href= +"#Page_143">143</a></li> + +<li>Tschirschky, Herr von, <a href="#Page_285">285</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_328">328</a>, <a href= +"#Page_399">399</a> n.</li> + +<li>Tunis, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href= +"#Page_19">19</a></li> + +<li>Tweedmouth, Lord, <a href="#Page_342">342</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Ular, Alexandre, <a href="#Page_276">276</a> +n.</li> + +<li>United States, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href= +"#Page_50">50</a>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href= +"#Page_62">62</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_170">170</a>, <a href= +"#Page_178">178</a>, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Vaffier-Pollet, <a href="#Page_312">312</a> and +n.</li> + +<li>Van Grooten, <a href="#Page_327">327</a> n.</li> + +<li><em>Vanity Fair</em>, <a href="#Page_173">173</a></li> + +<li>Varley, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> + +<li>Vassel, <a href="#Page_186">186</a> n.</li> + +<li>Venezuela affair, <a href="#Page_82">82</a></li> + +<li>Victor Emmanuel II, King, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href= +"#Page_33">33</a> n., <a href="#Page_145">145</a>-46, <a href= +"#Page_182">182</a></li> + +<li>Victoria, Queen, <a href="#Page_11">11</a></li> + +<li>Vigo, <a href="#Page_35">35</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_127">127</a>, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>, <a href= +"#Page_151">151</a>, <a href="#Page_217">217</a></li> + +<li>Villa-Urrutia, <a href="#Page_198">198</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_206">206</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>, <a href= +"#Page_247">247</a>, <a href="#Page_316">316</a>, <a href= +"#Page_330">330</a> and n.</li> + +<li><span class="pagenum" id= +"Page_420">[420]</span>Visconti-Venosta, Marquis, <a href= +"#Page_22">22</a>, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href= +"#Page_316">316</a>, <a href="#Page_332">332</a>, <a href= +"#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href= +"#Page_362">362</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>, <a href= +"#Page_378">378</a> n., <a href="#Page_381">381</a>; policy of, +toward France, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> + +<li class="ifrst">Waldeck-Rousseau, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li>Wallace, D. M., <a href="#Page_357">357</a></li> + +<li>Wedel, Count, <a href="#Page_358">358</a></li> + +<li>Welsersheimb, Count, <a href="#Page_349">349</a>, <a href= +"#Page_358">358</a>, <a href="#Page_377">377</a>-78, <a href= +"#Page_378">378</a> n., <a href="#Page_390">390</a></li> + +<li><em>Weltpolitik</em>, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href= +"#Page_27">27</a>-28, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href= +"#Page_56">56</a>-58</li> + +<li>White, Henry, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href= +"#Page_349">349</a>, <a href="#Page_351">351</a>, <a href= +"#Page_362">362</a> and n., <a href="#Page_381">381</a>, <a href= +"#Page_392">392</a></li> + +<li>Wiesbaden, <a href="#Page_138">138</a></li> + +<li>Wilhelmshöhe, <a href="#Page_75">75</a></li> + +<li>William II, Emperor, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href= +"#Page_45">45</a>, <a href="#Page_46">46</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_55">55</a>-58, <a href="#Page_56">56</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_68">68</a>-69, <a href="#Page_75">75</a> and n., <a href= +"#Page_93">93</a> n., <a href="#Page_161">161</a>, <a href= +"#Page_165">165</a>, <a href="#Page_167">167</a>, <a href= +"#Page_169">169</a>-74, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>-82, <a href= +"#Page_186">186</a> and n., <a href="#Page_187">187</a>-88 and n., +<a href="#Page_193">193</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>-96, +<a href="#Page_198">198</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a> n., +<a href="#Page_202">202</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>, <a href= +"#Page_222">222</a>, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>, <a href= +"#Page_267">267</a> n., <a href="#Page_272">272</a>, <a href= +"#Page_300">300</a>, <a href="#Page_309">309</a>, <a href= +"#Page_317">317</a> and n., <a href="#Page_318">318</a>-19, +<a href="#Page_326">326</a>; cordiality toward France, <a href= +"#Page_42">42</a>, <a href="#Page_43">43</a> and n.; offers +alliance to Great Britain, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>; aversion of, +to Holstein, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>; visit of, to England in +1899, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>-62; visit of, to England in 1901, +<a href="#Page_68">68</a>-69; at Vigo, <a href="#Page_127">127</a>, +<a href="#Page_151">151</a>; on Moroccan question, <a href= +"#Page_140">140</a>; visit to Italy in 1904, <a href= +"#Page_144">144</a>-45; speeches in May, 1904, <a href= +"#Page_147">147</a> and n.; lack of interest in Morocco, <a href= +"#Page_151">151</a>-52 and n.; opposes intervention in Morocco in +1904, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>; letter to Czar on Oct. 27, 1904, +<a href="#Page_163">163</a>; failure of alliance negotiations in +1904, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>-78 and n., <a href= +"#Page_180">180</a>; and Japan in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_178">178</a>; speech at Bremen in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_188">188</a> n.; opposes Tangier visit, <a href= +"#Page_188">188</a>-89; speeches at Tangier, <a href= +"#Page_193">193</a>-94 and n., <a href="#Page_195">195</a> n.; +initiates Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace, <a href= +"#Page_239">239</a>; opposes Bülow’s policy in June, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_239">239</a> and n.; anger of, at Delcassé and Great Britain +in Oct., 1905, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>; speech on Oct. 26, +1905, <a href="#Page_277">277</a>; Björkö meeting, <a href= +"#Page_279">279</a>-85 and n.; advice to Czar in July, 1905, +<a href="#Page_285">285</a> n.; letter to Czar on July 27, 1905, +<a href="#Page_285">285</a>-86; changes phrasing of Björkö Treaty, +<a href="#Page_286">286</a>, <a href="#Page_288">288</a>; on French +and Belgian neutrality in case of Anglo-German war, <a href= +"#Page_288">288</a>; letter to Bülow on Aug. 11, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_289">289</a>-90; on British naval maneuvers in the Baltic in +1905, <a href="#Page_292">292</a> n.; and Witte in 1905, <a href= +"#Page_299">299</a> and n.; and Czar in Sept., 1905, <a href= +"#Page_299">299</a>-300; and Czar on Björkö Treaty, <a href= +"#Page_303">303</a>-4, <a href="#Page_304">304</a> n.; +disappointment over annulment of Björkö Treaty, <a href= +"#Page_305">305</a>; speech in Reichstag on Nov. 28, 1905, <a href= +"#Page_313">313</a> n.; offer to Spanish King in Nov., 1905, +<a href="#Page_316">316</a> n., <a href="#Page_330">330</a>; +protests pacific intentions in Dec., 1905, <a href= +"#Page_318">318</a>-19; “Brilliant second,” <a href= +"#Page_398">398</a>; on Italy in 1906, <a href="#Page_398">398</a> +n.; on international situation in 1906, <a href= +"#Page_399">399</a></li> + +<li>Windsor, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li> + +<li>Witte, Count, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href= +"#Page_160">160</a> n., <a href="#Page_161">161</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_271">271</a>-72, <a href="#Page_294">294</a> and n., +<a href="#Page_301">301</a> n., <a href="#Page_321">321</a> n., +<a href="#Page_324">324</a>, <a href="#Page_367">367</a>, <a href= +"#Page_384">384</a> n., <a href="#Page_391">391</a> n.; ideas on +foreign policy in 1905, <a href="#Page_298">298</a>-99; visit to +Rominten in Sept., 1905, <a href="#Page_299">299</a>-300; and +annulment of Björkö Treaty, <a href="#Page_300">300</a>-301</li> + +<li>Wolff, Theodor, <a href="#Page_127">127</a> n., <a href= +"#Page_186">186</a> n., <a href="#Page_199">199</a> n.</li> + +<li class="ifrst">Zanardelli, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> +</ul> + +<div class="container"><img src='images/decor1.jpg' alt='[' class= +"decor2" style=""> +<div class="decor2txt">PRINTED<br> +IN U·S·A·</div> +<img src='images/decor2.jpg' alt=']' class="decor2"> +</div> + +<p class="space-above2 x-ebookmaker-drop"> +</p> + +<div class="transnote"> +<h2>Transcriber's note</h2> + +<ul> +<li>pg <a href="#Page_25">25,</a> footnote <a href= +"#Footnote_69">69,</a> Changed: "military agreement of 1887 beween" +to: "between"</li> + +<li>pg <a href="#Page_37">37</a>-38, footnote <a href= +"#Footnote_111">111,</a> Changed: "<em>Diario de la sesiónes de +Cortes</em>" to: "<em>las sesiones</em>"</li> + +<li>pg <a href="#Page_131">131</a>-132, footnote <a href= +"#Footnote_386">386,</a> Changed: "Saint-René Taillander, May 31, +1904" to: "Taillandier"</li> + +<li>pg <a href="#Page_153">153,</a> Changed: "to let the Spanish +percieve that" to: "perceive"</li> + +<li>pg <a href="#Page_168">168,</a> footnote <a href= +"#Footnote_512">512,</a> Changed: "<em>Kreigsschuldfrage</em>" to: +"<em>Kriegsschuldfrage</em>"</li> + +<li>pg <a href="#Page_187">187,</a> footnote <a href= +"#Footnote_580">580,</a> Changed: "<em>zum Ende des +Welkkrieges</em>" to: "<em>Weltkrieges</em>"</li> + +<li>pg <a href="#Page_264">264,</a> footnote <a href= +"#Footnote_820">820,</a> Changed: "Bülow to F. O., July 31, 1903" +to: "1905"</li> + +<li>pg <a href="#Page_410">410,</a> Changed: "Bibourd" to: +"Bihourd"</li> + +<li>pg <a href="#Page_417">417,</a> [Révoil] Changed: "meno. to +Radowitz" to: "memo."</li> + +<li>Minor changes in punctuation have been done silently.</li> +</ul> +</div> +</div> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78609 ***</div> +</body> +</html> |