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diff --git a/78609-0.txt b/78609-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3264db0 --- /dev/null +++ b/78609-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,18795 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78609 *** + THE FIRST MOROCCAN CRISIS + 1904-1906 + + + THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS + CHICAGO, ILLINOIS + + * * * * * + + THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY + NEW YORK + + THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS + LONDON + + THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA + TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI + + THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LIMITED + SHANGHAI + + + + + THE FIRST + MOROCCAN CRISIS + 1904-1906 + + BY + EUGENE N. ANDERSON + _The University of Chicago_ + +[Decoration] + + THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS + CHICAGO, ILLINOIS + + + COPYRIGHT 1930 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO + ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. PUBLISHED JUNE 1930 + * * * * * + COMPOSED AND PRINTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS + CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A. + + + + + DEDICATED + TO + MY MOTHER + + + + + PREFACE + + +The fall of Morocco under European control marks the nadir in the annals +of Islam. The land was the last important Mohammedan territory to be +taken by the Christians. Thereafter began the Islamic revival which is +still in course. This volume, however, deals not with that subject but +with the history of a conflict in European diplomacy, referring to +Morocco proper only when necessary to explain the moves of the Powers. + +The Moroccan crisis of 1904-6 contained all those elements that were +present at the other crises on the road to the great war—desire for +colonial acquisition, trade and investment rivalries, national honor, +diplomacy which contained the threat of war, the principle of the +balance of power, fears, and counterfears. The special interest of this +episode lies in the fact that, as the first of the series, it shows the +Powers choosing sides and fixing their opinions and policies. It +determined the mental attitude of the players in the subsequent +struggles and gave direction and mind, so to speak, to the later events. + +In the history of the Moroccan affair from approximately 1898 to 1906, +when the first crisis ended, are mirrored almost all the important +movements of the Powers with reference to one another. The grouping of +the Powers around France, the development of Anglo-German rivalry, the +failure of Germany’s policy of playing between Great Britain and the +Dual Alliance, Germany’s _riposte_ and attempts to restore her +position—all are either intimately connected with the Moroccan question +or can be explained in the light of it. The Moroccan problem was the +political barometer of Europe. + +In making this study I have relied chiefly upon the official documents +contained in _Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914_, +in _British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914_, and in the +two _Livres jaunes_ concerning the Moroccan affair from 1901-1906. The +presence of so much new material has rendered antiquated most of the +older accounts of the subject. I have therefore not cited all of this +secondary literature, preferring to give source references. + +In spite of this rich material, there are still obstacles to a complete, +impartial, and balanced account of this episode. The outstanding one is +the absence of adequate French documents. The French policy has +practically to be studied through British or German eyes and on the +basis of the accomplished fact. The British and the German policies are +thus treated with more understanding and detail. But even here +difficulties arise. History cannot be written alone on the basis of the +official diplomatic documents of today. The variety and amount of +information which Ranke found condensed in the reports of the Venetian +ambassadors of the sixteenth century is now scattered in a hundred +places. The improved facilities for communication and transportation +have limited and specialized the correspondence of governments and their +foreign representatives. Information is now obtained as well from +personal interviews, newspapers, and all those means which create +governmental as well as public opinion. Much of great importance is +never written down at all. Foreign secretaries often give orders to +their ambassadors without explaining their reasons. This is particularly +true of the British, less true of the Germans. Moreover, statesmen are +at times inclined for reasons of policy to write down how they wish a +certain event to be viewed, not how they actually view it. To check and +supplement the official documents, therefore, the intimate and more +personal information in biographies, autobiographies, and memoirs has +been especially valuable, although neither the number of those works, +particularly on the French side, nor the material in them is complete. + +While international relations were more complex in the pre-war days than +ever before in history, the study of them is facilitated by the fact +that diplomacy was still secret, that a relatively few individuals +guided it. By focusing attention upon these individuals, one can +interpret the motives which consciously or unconsciously determined +foreign policy. These men sublimated and represented the diplomatic mind +of the nations. A new actor had also made its appearance in their midst, +that combination of Proteus and Fata Morgana, public opinion; but even +it was given tangible shape in the minds of the responsible statesmen +who had to interpret it and respond to its demands. I have tried to test +these interpretations by checking them against the opinions of +contemporaries and by reading in the contemporary newspapers, magazines, +speeches, and letters. + +Diplomatic policies and situations cannot be explained in a formula. +Statesmen are all more or less opportunists; they usually keep several +alternatives in mind. To assert that one country is bent on war and +another on peace, one on revenge and aggression and another on defense, +is to give an incomplete view. In handling the fluid and shifting +materials of diplomacy, one must avoid both oversimplicity and +historical fatalism. Further information will probably add or change +many details in this study, but I believe that the main lines of the +history of this crisis are herein explained. + +I wish especially to express my appreciation to Professor Bernadotte E. +Schmitt, Professor Ferdinand Schevill, Associate Professor Arthur P. +Scott, and Associate Professor Louis R. Gottschalk—all of the University +of Chicago—for much beneficial advice and criticism in reading this work +in manuscript, and to thank my sister, Dr. Jesse May McFadyen, of the +University of Minnesota, for many hours of help in searching for the +right phrase. + + EUGENE N. ANDERSON + +CHICAGO, 1929 + + + + + TABLE OF CONTENTS + + + I. FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1898-1904 1 + + II. THE FRANCO-ITALIAN ENTENTE, 1900-1902 19 + + III. THE FRANCO-SPANISH ENTENTE, 1898-1903 35 + + IV. DELCASSÉ’S POLICY TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY, 41 + 1898-1902 + + V. THE ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS, 1898-1901 52 + + VI. THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 81 + + VII. ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE 110 + CORDIALE + + VIII. FRENCH POLICY AFTER THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE 117 + + IX. GERMANY AND THE ENTENTE CORDIALE, 1903-4 135 + + X. THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A RUSSO-GERMAN ALLIANCE, 1904 159 + + XI. THE VISIT TO TANGIER 181 + + XII. THE MOROCCAN CRISIS FROM THE VISIT TO TANGIER TO THE FALL 196 + OF DELCASSÉ + + XIII. THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JUNE 6-JULY 8, 1905 234 + + XIV. THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JULY-OCTOBER, 1905 259 + + XV. THE TREATY OF BJÖRKÖ AND ITS ANNULMENT 279 + + XVI. THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 311 + + XVII. THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS 348 + + XVIII. CONCLUSION 397 + + INDEX 409 + + + + + CHAPTER I + + FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1898-1904 + + I. THE DECADENT MOROCCO + + +Morocco was one of the last of the “backward” countries to be taken +under control by a European state. It was a historic land with a long +record of wars against the Christians; but, like many another, it had +never adapted itself to the course of European civilization, and by the +end of the nineteenth century had consequently become consigned by +statesmen interested in colonial conquest to the category of “dying +states.” Hence it was qualified for acquisition, division, or control. + +The execution of this work was beset with unusually grave difficulties. +Several centuries of more or less regular diplomatic and commercial +relations with European Powers had assured Morocco international +recognition as a sovereign and independent land. Moreover, the rival +interests of the Powers there were so firmly established and so +conflicting that they seemed irreconcilable. Down to 1900 these Powers +had jealously blocked each other from a special position, and, in case +of necessity, as in 1880, had settled common problems concerning Morocco +by means of an international conference.[1] And while this disunion +obtained, that country of eight million fanatical and warlike souls able +to play one potential enemy against the other was secure. + +At the opening of the twentieth century Morocco was one of the least- +known lands of the world. Insecurity of life, absence of roads and means +of transportation and communication of any but the most primitive sort, +undeveloped harbors poor by nature, and a governmental policy designed +to prevent any Power from gaining a foothold in the land by the +acquisition of property, mining or other concessions had excluded the +“Christian dogs” and maintained Mohammedan purity.[2] + +Nevertheless, the country was reputed by Europeans to be rich in natural +resources, the “pearl of North Africa.”[3] The plains and valleys, if +irrigated and cultivated by modern methods, would, it was held, produce +vast supplies of foodstuffs and would become one of the granaries of +Europe. Other regions were declared to be admirably suited for grazing; +while the mountains, those bulwarks against the encroachments of the +desert, were envisaged as teeming with minerals. Popular imagination +glorified Morocco into another Promised Land.[4] + +However that might be, Europeans were doing very little business there. +Official French statistics reckoned the total amount of foreign trade +with Morocco in 1903 as 109,495,888 francs. Of this small sum France and +Algeria enjoyed 31 per cent; Great Britain, 41.6 per cent; Germany, 9 +per cent; Spain, 8.4 per cent; and the other Powers insignificant +amounts.[5] The contrast between economic fact and economic possibility +acted as a spur to the groups desirous of political acquisition; but the +smallness of these economic interests and their substantial equality for +a number of the Powers made it difficult to determine which had the +dominant claim to develop Morocco. + +A conflict of strategic interests added to this complication. Morocco’s +geographic situation on the Straits of Gibraltar and on the route to +South Africa, her proximity to the French and Spanish possessions in +North Africa and to Spain, made the Sherifian Empire a land coveted by +all Powers with Western Mediterranean interests, in particular Great +Britain, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy. Since each state suspected +that any rival would abuse its advantages if it gained ascendancy, +disagreement over the future of Morocco persisted. However, in an era +which was coming to be more and more dominated by the urge for colonial +control, this problem would not long remain unsolved. At the close of +the century a favorable turn in international affairs and an +accentuation of the chronic state of anarchy in the land itself brought +the question to the fore. + +The period of strong rule in Morocco under Sultan Mulai-el-Hassan +(1873-94) and the grand vizier, Ba-Ahmed, came to an end with the death +of the latter in May, 1900, when the young, inexperienced, and +incompetent sultan, Abd-el-Aziz, assumed authority in person. By his +preference for foreign goods and society he soon not only exhausted his +treasury but also estranged his subjects. He acquired a fantastic +collection in which figured cameras, coaches, bicycles, dolls, pianos by +the dozen, and animals for a menagerie. He amused himself lavishly with +his European friends. He listened to the advice of his two intimates, +Kaid Sir Harry Maclean, a former English soldier from Gibraltar who had +been in Moroccan service for almost two decades, and Mr. W. B. Harris, +correspondent in Morocco of the _London Times_; and by promulgating a +program of fiscal reform sought to replenish his resources and +reorganize his country in time to prevent the intervention of the +Powers, particularly of France, and the consequent loss of his +independence. But, while his intentions were good, his actions proved +disastrous for himself and his land.[6] Scandalized by the tales of his +antics with the Christians and outraged by the new taxes that violated +the Koran, the natives revolted in 1900.[7] The rebellions in the north +and northeast constituted a double menace since they might lead to +attacks on the French and Spanish possessions and bring on an +intervention of those two Powers.[8] The Sultan had no money, therefore +no army; and without an army he could collect no taxes. The rumor spread +that he had actually turned Christian and sold the land to the English. +The political and religious ties with his people were everywhere +breaking.[9] By 1903 his precarious authority was confined to a few +towns; and his capital, Fez, was itself threatened by the rebels.[10] + +As this situation was nothing unusual in Moroccan annals, the natives +were not greatly disturbed. If events had been permitted to take their +normal course, a revolution would probably have replaced Abd-el-Aziz by +some stronger man, and the country would have returned to its usual +condition of semianarchy. The tragedy for Morocco lay in the fact that +this disorder gave the opportunity for the interested Powers to +intervene. The increasing insecurity of foreigners and the Sultan’s need +for loans foreshadowed the end of Moroccan independence. In 1899 Lord +Salisbury, British prime minister, had declared that Morocco was +decaying and might collapse at any moment.[11] Politicians elsewhere +began to turn their attention toward this corner of Africa. Among them +the French assumed the lead and solved the problem. + + + II. FRANCE AND THE MOROCCAN PROBLEM, 1898-1904 + + +By the end of the nineteenth century France’s North African empire was +assuming definitive form. In the 1890’s agreements with Great Britain, +Germany, and Spain (1900) consolidated France’s possession and left only +Morocco, a country almost inclosed on the land side by French territory, +as an object whose acquisition was coming to be regarded by Frenchmen as +essential to the completion of their ambitions in that region.[12] + +To aid in the achievement of this goal a Comité de l’Afrique française +had been organized in 1889 to popularize African questions with the +French people, to exert pressure upon the government, and to carry on a +unified and consistent activity for colonial expansion which the French +cabinets could not do. Its membership was relatively small—about seventy +in all—but very select. With the Prince d’Arenberg as its president, it +numbered in its ranks deputies, senators, military and naval officers, +officials in the government (although no cabinet members, of course), +members of the Academy, newspaper editors and owners, members of the +Institute, members of various geographical societies, colonial +societies, chambers of commerce—men such as M. Gabriel Hanotaux, former +minister of foreign affairs; M. Jules Siegfried, who resigned +temporarily when he became minister of commerce in 1893; M. Paul Révoil, +governor-general of Algeria; General Joseph Galliéni, governor-general +of Madagascar; M. Eugène Etienne, former undersecretary of state for the +colonies and future cabinet member; M. Antoine Guillain, vice-president +of the Chamber for a time and former minister of the colonies; M. Paul +Deschanel, president of the committee for foreign and colonial affairs +in the Chamber. Through common membership and close co-operation the +Comité was assured of the active support of the other colonial, +geographical, and commercial organizations. The character and position +of its members in state affairs gave it an undeniably great influence +upon the government as well as upon the nation. This influence was +enhanced by the organization of groups favoring colonial acquisition in +both the Chamber (1892) and Senate (1898), the former of which under the +presidency of M. Etienne boasted in 1902 almost two hundred members.[13] + +During the 1890’s the French advocated a policy of _status quo_ with +reference to Morocco. They opposed permitting any Power to gain undue +influence there or allowing Morocco to reform herself. They were +suspicious of any individual or collective intervention by the Powers, +and wanted to hold the future completely free. But the defeats of Italy +by Abyssinia in 1896 and of Spain by the United States in 1898 dampened +the ardor of those two rivals. Then, when British attention was claimed +by the Boer War and when the internal disintegration of Morocco +increased the possibilities of intervention, the proponents of +aggression demanded that France should act. + +Late in 1899 the official publication of the Comité declared that the +Moroccan question was of paramount importance in French foreign +policy.[14] It promoted the campaign for the acquisition of Morocco so +successfully that by the end of 1903 almost all parties in France, +including even the Socialists under M. Jaurès, had come to consider the +French claims to predominance in Morocco as superior to those of any +other Power.[15] The popular arguments, based largely upon the proximity +of Algeria to Morocco, ranged from the theory of the “natural frontier” +to economic and strategic contentions. In Morocco rebellions and +religious wars could easily start, it was claimed, spreading thence over +the whole of North Africa and endangering France’s possessions. If any +other European Power established itself in that land, it could utilize +the native resources in troubling France. On the other hand, by virtue +of her experience in handling and employing Mohammedans, France was +better fitted to perform this work of civilization than anyone else. +These were, of course, the stock arguments of all parties advocating the +establishment of European control over “backward” areas. + +The Comité formulated a policy for handling both the internal and the +international aspects of the question—a policy which M. Delcassé, +minister of foreign affairs from 1898 to 1905, was actually to follow. +It was the popular solution, and, for France, the only possible one.[16] +As the Fashoda affair had taught the French that the approval of the +Powers was necessary for the acquisition of colonial territory, the +first requisite was to make agreements with the interested states, among +whom the _Bulletin_ included Germany. Moreover, the nature of the +problem demanded this approach. For Morocco’s international status, the +interests of the Powers there, the military strength of the fanatical +population, and the consequent need of having French hands completely +free from the danger of complications before attempting to reform +Morocco made this preliminary international understanding imperative. +The program contained four essential points. The sovereignty of the +sultan and the independence and integrity of his land should be assured. +Adequate guaranties for the freedom of the straits should be provided. +The legitimate interests of the Powers, considered to be chiefly +economic, should be satisfied through the acceptance of the principle of +full commercial liberty. Lastly, Spain’s territorial claims should be +satisfied. By this course the Comité and its followers thought to +dispose of the international aspect. + +At the same time Morocco itself had to be won. The _Bulletin_ believed +that a policy of “pacific penetration” carried on through the agency of +the sultan would solve this task. The sultan was the sole source of +authority, religious as well as political, that France could properly +utilize. By working through him she might further her own interests and +might introduce reforms without provoking the natives to war. The +sovereignty of the Sultan would not be touched nor the independence and +integrity of his land be violated. The “pacific” aspect would prevent +the other Powers from taking offence and would satisfy the French +people. The “penetrating” aspect would give satisfactory reality. It was +a masterful combination, with an air of superficial plausibility so long +as one did not attempt to reconcile the phrases “pacific penetration” +and “preponderant influence” with those of “sovereignty of the sultan” +and “independence and integrity of the land.”[17] + +The French minister of foreign affairs from 1898 to 1905 was, as already +said, M. Théophile Delcassé. Born in 1852, he was at a very +impressionable age when the Franco-Prussian War occurred. He became so +ardent a disciple of Gambetta that he could never speak afterward of +their friendship without emotion. Journalist, deputy, colonial +undersecretary, colonial minister—such was the course of his rise. +Uncommunicative by nature, he avoided Parliament as much as possible. He +was on intimate terms with M. Waldeck-Rousseau, premier from 1899 to +1901; but with the latter’s successors, MM. Combes and Rouvier, his +relations were cool, and he asserted his entire independence in the +conduct of his office. In a short and caustic sketch, November, 1900, +Sir Edmund Monson, British ambassador at Paris, wrote of him: + + +Delcassé is an unsatisfactory Minister to us diplomatists in Paris. He +is extremely uncommunicative, not to say secretive. Consequently it is +very rare that any one of us succeeds in extracting information from +him. He has plenty of commonplace conversation, which flows glibly +enough, and he will talk eloquently in an academical fashion. But he +hardly ever tells one anything in the way of political news, and he has +an adroit way of feigning ignorance which took me in at first, until I +convinced myself that it was all shamming. He always urges that he is +not a diplomatist by profession, but he carries the practice of +subterfuge to an extent which I have hardly ever met before in a +Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, he does not tell lies +systematically, as X did.[18] + + +His long tenure in office and the free scope given him by the cabinet +and Parliament, both engrossed in internal affairs,[19] enabled him to +put his own impress upon French foreign policy and to give it a +positive, constructive content. Although a member of radical cabinets +that reduced the military and naval budgets and neglected the defenses +of the land, he openly disapproved of that policy and advocated rearing +a virile, patriotic generation of fighters. He courted and received the +support of all parties. He took as the sole objective in his foreign +policy the maintenance and development of French interests, and avowed +himself an opportunist in his method of diplomacy. He was a +_Realpolitiker_ at a moment when the French people seemed to be turning +toward internationalism and pacifism. His policy unfolded itself +gradually, and, in the absence of adequate documentary material, it has +to be explained largely upon the basis of its accomplishments.[20] + +The new elements introduced into French policy by this minister were +associated almost altogether with the Moroccan question. He seems from +the start to have coveted that country.[21] He thought that since the +Dual Alliance was firmly established, France as well as Russia ought to +reap some benefits therefrom. But, as Russia was turning her energies +more and more to the Far East and was thereby weakening the +effectiveness of the Alliance, he desired some means of re-establishing +the equilibrium of forces in Europe. Particularly was this necessary +since Germany had inaugurated her _Weltpolitik_; for, with German power +increasing at so fast a pace, France had to seek new friends for the +protection of herself, her colonies, her interests, and for the +realization of her ambitions toward Morocco before it was too late.[22] +This triple aim of better defense, of increased prestige, and of +colonial acquisition in Northwest Africa he saw could be realized by the +settlement of the international aspect of the Moroccan question. Italy +and Spain as Mediterranean neighbors and Great Britain as a formidable +colonial rival should be won to the French plan by agreements which at +the same time should create friendships between them and fortify and +aggrandize the French position in Europe. Moreover, M. Delcassé hoped to +reconcile Russia with Great Britain, above all to prevent them from +actual conflict. And, depending upon circumstances, he was apparently +willing to treat with Germany. A colonial acquisition and a +rearrangement in international relations were to be achieved together, +and the Moroccan problem came to signify both.[23] + +The basis of the Franco-Moroccan relations was laid by the treaty of +1845 regulating the boundary between Algeria and her western +neighbor.[24] However, the frontier remained in part indefinite; border +raids recurred; the possession of the oases, Touat, Gourara, and +Tidikelt, discovered after the treaty was made, remained unsettled.[25] +The consequence was chronic trouble, which France tried to eliminate by +occupying these oases late in 1899 and in 1900 and by beginning to +construct railroads toward them. + +Alarmed by this activity, the Sultan asked Queen Victoria in the autumn +of 1900 to obtain assurances from France which would tranquilize his +fears. Realizing that this would be impossible, the British government +refused, and Sir Edmund Monson, the British ambassador at Paris, merely +mentioned the Sultan’s anxieties to the French Foreign Minister (October +17).[26] The Italian, Spanish, and German governments also showed some +concern over this action at Touat.[27] M. Delcassé replied to them all +with the statement which he had made in the French Senate on April 3, +that in Africa France would honor all treaties signed by her, that she +would respect the frontiers of neighboring states, and that she had no +intention of changing the _status quo_ in the Mediterranean. She was +merely occupying territory manifestly belonging to her.[28] + +The number of attacks of the Moroccans upon Algeria increased. After +several particularly bold raids had occurred early in 1901, the French +government sent a sharply worded note to the Sultan which he interpreted +as threatening action against his ancestral home, Tafilelt.[29] He +appealed to the British government for protection,[30] and in June and +July sent an embassy headed by the minister of war, el-Menebhi, to +London and Berlin to obtain aid against France and to negotiate a +loan.[31] As the question of an alliance was then engrossing the +attentions of both the British and the German governments, neither felt +inclined to give the Moroccans anything but innocuous advice, and this +mission was a failure.[32] + +The dispatch of that embassy just at the time when Anglo-German +relations were so cordial alarmed the French Foreign Minister.[33] +Through M. Révoil, governor-general of Algeria, he warned the Moroccan +government against signing any political or commercial agreement without +French approval, and exacted a promise from a Moroccan embassy then in +Paris concerning the execution of any accord which might be signed.[34] +Among the Powers, M. Delcassé had little to fear from Spain, with whom +he was on intimate terms, or from Italy, with whom in the previous +December he had made an agreement about Morocco.[35] He assured the +British government that France had no intention of raising “serious +questions in Morocco.” The Marquess of Lansdowne, British foreign +secretary, responded with a frank account of his conversations with the +Moroccan embassy.[36] It was Germany of whose reactions M. Delcassé was +most uncertain. In June, through his friend M. Leon y Castillo, the +Spanish ambassador, he suggested to Prince Radolin, the German +ambassador in Paris, that if the German government, as the victor in +1870, would take the initiative, he would like to discuss various +matters with a view to arriving at an entente.[37] The German response +to the Spanish Ambassador was that before Germany could enter into an +arrangement with France whereby the hostility of a third Power might be +incurred the two countries must make a mutual guaranty of each other’s +territorial integrity. Since France would thereby have to guarantee the +German possession of Alsace-Lorraine, the proposed negotiation was +crushed.[38] None the less, in a conversation with Prince Radolin on +June 23, 1901, M. Delcassé made and received an important statement +about Morocco. When the Ambassador mentioned the discussion in the +French newspapers of a French protectorate over that land, the Foreign +Minister replied: + + +“If by that word protectorate one means that France, mistress of Algeria +and Tunis, has and must conserve toward Morocco an unique situation +[_une situation absolument à part_], it seems to me that it is self- +evident [_il me semble que c’est l’évidence même_].” “Nothing is more +just, every one takes account of that situation [_tout le mond se rend +compte de cette situation_],” answered Prince Radolin.[39] + + +Much or little could be read into either remark; but together with the +general diplomatic situation they enabled M. Delcassé in the Senate on +July 5 to declare that + + +if France, mistress of Algeria and through Algeria neighbor of Morocco +along an immense frontier, is forced to follow what occurs there with a +singular interest,—our vigilance does not aim at other than the +tranquillity, prosperity, and integrity of the Sherifian empire. . . . +.[40] + + +The presence of an embassy in Paris simultaneously with the one in +London and Berlin[41] gave the French Minister an opportunity for taking +the first steps toward “pacific penetration.” The mission came to Paris +to seek an agreement with the French government upon a definite boundary +line between Algeria and Morocco which would assure Moroccan isolation. +M. Delcassé, however, aimed, by leaving the frontier line indefinite, to +utilize this geographic proximity as a means of creating a community of +interests with the Sultan and his people and of familiarizing them with +things European. + +The French Minister succeeded partially in incorporating this plan in an +agreement with the Moroccan embassy in July, 1901, supplementing that of +1845. Drawn “to consolidate the bonds of amity existing between them +[France and Morocco] and to develop their reciprocal good relations,” +the treaty provided that the boundary should remain uncertain, but that +France and Morocco should each have the right to set up a line of posts +for purposes of defense and customs collection in the desert region on +soil which unquestionably belonged to them. The tribes living in the +territory between those two lines should be permitted to choose which +authority they preferred to reside under. Moroccans and Algerians could +enter that territory freely for commercial or other purposes. Moroccan +tribes who owned pastures in Algeria could continue to use them, and +vice versa. For the preservation of amicable relations between the two +countries each government agreed to appoint two commissioners annually +to settle future border disputes.[42] + +To Ben Sliman, the leader of the embassy to Paris, M. Delcassé offered +French friendship and aid, but added a veiled threat of the trouble +which France would make for Morocco if his offers were not accepted. +While the French Minister showed a nice regard for Moroccan +sensitiveness toward innovations, he voiced the expectation that when +the land should decide to “enter into new ways” it would give France the +preference for furnishing it with the needed resources. In an important +dispatch of July 27, 1901, M. Delcassé instructed M. Saint-René +Taillandier, the French representative at Tangier, concerning his future +conduct. The French Minister was to assure the Sultan of French respect +for the integrity of his land and for his own sovereignty, to affirm +France’s desire to give him friendly aid, and to point out the benefit +which the Sultan, as ruler, might derive therefrom. He was to warn the +latter against foreign innovations which might imperil the security of +Algeria.[43] Lastly he was to support all enterprises, commercial, +industrial, and philanthropic, calculated to increase French influence +in the land.[44] + +Thus the French government could note with satisfaction that whereas the +Moroccan mission to London and Berlin had accomplished nothing, the one +to Paris had enabled France to feel out the Powers on this question, to +proclaim publicly her special interests, and to begin the actual +execution of her program. M. Delcassé was now started upon a conscious +policy of establishing French predominance in the Sherifian Empire. + +When the French and Moroccan commissioners appointed to execute the +agreement of 1901 set to work, they found that its terms were +impracticable. The assassination of two French captains by Moroccans in +January, 1902, also showed that if order were ever to obtain along the +frontier, French power would have to strengthen the Sultan’s +efforts.[45] The commissioners therefore negotiated in April and May, +1902, two further treaties, the content of which was much more in +harmony with the French objective of loosening the boundary instead of +tightening it, of providing a complete program of military, economic, +and political co-operation between the two governments as follows: In +case of need the two states should concert in pacifying and policing the +frontier from Teniet-Sassi to Figuig, but no guard or customs posts +should be established between those two points. In lieu of these customs +duties, France agreed to pay Morocco a lump sum annually. In the other +frontier area the two governments should establish markets and customs +posts at specified points in order to develop commerce between Algeria +and Morocco.[46] + +It became impossible to carry out the commercial clauses of the treaty +because of anarchy on the Moroccan side of the border. But the Sultan +made immediate use of the military articles by requesting permission of +the French government to send Moroccan troops and munitions to the +frontier by way of Algeria, and by asking it in July to furnish military +instructors for these troops. M. Delcassé readily agreed.[47] + +Notwithstanding these requests, the Sultan was dissatisfied with the +course of affairs, and in September, 1902, sent Kaid Maclean to Europe +to seek aid in stemming the tide of the French advance. Carrying +personal letters from the Sultan to King Edward and to the German +Emperor, the Kaid went first to London. He proposed to the King and to +Lord Lansdowne that the integrity of Morocco be guaranteed by Great +Britain, or, failing that, by Great Britain and Germany, for a period of +seven years, and that, if at the end of this period Morocco had not +thoroughly reformed her government and developed her natural resources, +the guaranty should lapse. He proposed also that a Moorish loan be made +in England, France, and Germany, and that all railway concessions be +divided between those three countries. The British government approved +the method of handling the project for a loan and for railroad +construction; but, as it was already in conversation with the French +government over the future of Morocco and was disinclined to tie its +hands, it refused to consider the other measure. Thus the mission was a +failure.[48] + +In 1903 the Sultan was in dire straits. While the whole country was more +or less in rebellion, the main center of danger lay in the northeast +near Taza where the pretender to the throne, Bu-Hamara, “Father of the +She-Ass,” had acquired a large following late in 1902. He was in a +position to attack the French along the border or the Sultan in Fez, and +did so. His defeat of the Sherifian army endangered Fez itself. Even in +his capital the Sultan angered his subjects by summarily executing the +murderers of a British missionary. In this plight, he turned to the +obliging French for further aid. He received permission for his troops +and the loyal border tribes to seek refuge in Algeria. After M. Delcassé +had officially intervened in his behalf, he was able to obtain a loan of +7,500,000 francs from the French banking-house of Gautsch. By the time +the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 1904, was made, the Sultan seemed +to be falling in line with the French policy of “pacific +penetration.”[49] + + +[Footnote 1: This was the Conference of Madrid.] + +[Footnote 2: See among the numerous works on Morocco: Albert Salmon, _Le +Maroc. Son état économique et commercial_ (Paris, 1906); René Pinon, +_L’empire de la Méditerranée_ (Paris, 1904), p. 96; Eugène Aubin, +_Morocco of To-Day_ (London, 1906), p. 119.] + +[Footnote 3: Victor Piquet, _La colonisation française dans l’Afrique du +Nord: Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc_ (Paris, 1912), p. 15.] + +[Footnote 4: For typical reactions see Pinon, _L’empire de la Médit._; +M. Aflalo, _The Truth about Morocco. An Indictment of the Policy of the +British Foreign Office with Regard to the Anglo-French Agreement_ +(London, 1904); _Zwanzig Jahre alldeutscher Arbeit und Kämpfe_ (Leipzig, +1910), pp. 219 ff. For a more scientific discussion see Piquet, pp. 514 +ff.] + +[Footnote 5: The statistics about Morocco are all unreliable. They vary +according to the persons taking them. The Moroccan government took none +itself. Those given above are quoted in André Tardieu, _La conference +d’Algésiras. Histoire diplomatique de la crise marocaine (15 Janvier-7 +Avril, 1906)_ (Paris, 1909), pp. 499 ff.] + +[Footnote 6: On the new sultan see Pinon, _L’empire de la Médit._, pp. +150 ff.; Aubin, pp. 137 ff., 178; Walter B. Harris, _Morocco That Was_ +(Edinburgh and London, 1921), esp. pp. 65 ff.] + +[Footnote 7: See Aubin, pp. 203 ff.; Auguste Lombard, _La banque d’état +du Maroc_ (Montpellier, 1911), pp. 14 ff.] + +[Footnote 8: On this disorder see Victor Bérard, _L’affaire marocaine_ +(Paris, 1906), p. 82; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents +diplomatiques. Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905_ (Paris, 1905), Nos. 33 ff., +42 ff., 61 ff., 90, 98 ff. (This _Livre jaune_ is hereafter cited as +_L.j., 1901-5_.) See also _Bulletin du comité de l’Afrique française, +Supplément_, 1901, pp. 193 ff. (This magazine is hereafter cited as +_Bulletin_.)] + +[Footnote 9: Aubin, p. 109.] + +[Footnote 10: _Ibid._, pp. 320-21.] + +[Footnote 11: Hatzfeldt to Bülow, Feb. 8, 1899, _Die Grosse Politik der +Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des +Auswärtigen Amtes_ (im Auftrage des Auswärtigen Amtes herausgegeben von +Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme; +Berlin, 1922-27), XVII, 295 f., No. 5152 (hereafter cited as _G.P._).] + +[Footnote 12: See Pinon, _Empire de la Médit._; speech by M. Etienne on +June 16, 1903, reprinted in _Bulletin, Supplément_, 1903, p. 179.] + +[Footnote 13: _Bulletin_, July, 1902, p. 267.] + +[Footnote 14: _Ibid._, Dec., 1899, pp. 412, 429.] + +[Footnote 15: See the debates in the Chamber on this subject, Nov., +1903, _Journal officiel de la République française. Débats +parlementaires_ (Chambre des Députés, Nov., 1903); Tardieu, pp. 17 ff.] + +[Footnote 16: See _Bulletin_, Dec., 1899, pp. 412, 429; Jan., 1900, p. +2; April, 1900, p. 140; June, 1901, p. 182; March, 1902, p. 107; Oct., +1902, pp. 347, 350; Oct., 1903, pp. 301, 305; Jan., 1904, p. 3, etc. +Also speech by M. Etienne, June 16, 1903, in _ibid., Supplément_, 1903, +p. 179.] + +[Footnote 17: See _ibid._, July, 1900, p. 257; Aug., 1901, pp. 259 f.; +April, 1903, p. 120; Pinon, _Empire de la Médit._, p. 182.] + +[Footnote 18: Lord Newton, _Lord Lansdowne, A Biography_ (London, 1929), +p. 209.] + +[Footnote 19: Such as the Dreyfus case, the law of the Congregations, +the separation of church and state.] + +[Footnote 20: On Delcassé see Christian Schefer, _D’une guerre à +l’autre. Essai sur la politique extérieure de la Troisième République +(1871-1914)_ (Paris, 1920), pp. 221 f.; Georges Reynald, _La diplomatie +française. L’œuvre de Delcassé_ (Paris, 1915); René Millet, _Notre +politique extérieure de 1898 à 1905_ (Paris, 1905), p. 2; Robert Dell, +_My Second Country_ (New York, 1920), p. 176; René Pinon, _France et +Allemagne, 1870-1913_ (Paris, 1913), pp. 116 ff.; Delcassé’s speeches; +Monson to Lansdowne, Nov. 15, 1904, _British Documents on the Origins of +the War, 1898-1914_ (ed. by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley; London, +1927——), III, 14 f., No. 11 (hereafter cited as _B.D._).] + +[Footnote 21: See his speeches, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, +Sénat, April 3, 1900, pp. 299 f.; Chambre, Jan. 21, 1902, quoted in +_Bulletin, Supplément_, 1902, pp. 46 f.; Chambre, March 11, 1903, +_Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, p. 1356; especially his speech on +Nov. 10, 1904, in the Chambre, _ibid._, pp. 2381, 2386; Sénat, Dec. 7, +1904, pp. 1048 ff.; Reynald, p. 11.] + +[Footnote 22: André Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort à la Conférence +d’Algésiras_ (Paris, 1909), pp. 117 f. Mévil’s book contains the +official apology for Delcassé’s work.] + +[Footnote 23: See Mévil, pp. 120 f., and Delcassé’s speeches. On Dec. 7, +1904, in the Senate and on Nov. 10, in the Chamber, he spoke as follows: +“The problem, in effect, was this: to establish the preponderance of +France in Morocco, thereby to augment her power in the Mediterranean, +not by alienating but rather by conciliating the Powers whose position +in the Mediterranean brings them to our attention. . . . . In +considering the positions occupied not only by England, but by Italy and +by Spain in the Mediterranean, it is evident that if diplomacy succeeds +in resolving this problem [of Morocco] it will have at one blow +fortified and aggrandized the situation of France in Europe by the +friendships which it will have procured and by the _rapprochements_ of +interests of which it will have been the creator.” + +He further declared that this had been his conscious policy during his +six years of residency at the Quai d’Orsay (see _Journal officiel, +Debats parlem._, Sénat, Dec. 7, 1904, pp. 1048 ff.; Chambre, Nov. 10, +1904, p. 386).] + +[Footnote 24: See Augustin Bernard, _Les confins algéro-marocaine_ +(Paris, 1911). Treaty given in De Clercq, _Recueil des traités de la +France_, pp. 271 ff.] + +[Footnote 25: See various articles in the _Bulletin_; also Pinon, +_Empire de la Médit._; Bérard, _L’affaire marocaine_; speech of Waldeck- +Rousseau in the Chamber, July 2, 1900, _Journal officiel, Debats +parlem._, pp. 1739 f.] + +[Footnote 26: Exactly what the Sultan requested is not known. Count +Bülow, the German foreign minister, heard in June, 1900, from an Italian +source that the Grand Vizier of Morocco just before his death had +proposed to Salisbury, the British premier, that the Powers guarantee a +new boundary to be made between Algeria and Morocco, but that the +British Minister had refused to consider the matter. See Bülow to +Tschirschky, June 5, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 318, No. 5167. On the Sultan’s +proposal of October see Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 12, 17, 1900, _B.D._, +II, 259, Nos. 312 f.] + +[Footnote 27: We have positive evidence that the Spanish and German +governments did so; and as Italy was then in negotiation with France +over the question of Morocco (see below), it is safe to say that her +government did also. See Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, +299 ff., No. 5156; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _ibid._, 301 f., +No. 5157.] + +[Footnote 28: See _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Sénat, April 3, +1900, p. 299. He also said in private that France had no intention of +attacking Morocco. Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 301 +f., No. 5157; Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 17, 1900, _B.D._, II, 259, No. +313.] + +[Footnote 29: See Bérard, p. 68; Aubin, p. 178; _Bulletin_, Aug., 1901, +p. 279; _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6. For the note see Révoil to +Delcassé, March 23, 1901, Révoil to Si Mohamméd Torres and Ben Sliman, +March 18, _ibid._, No. 2 and annexe.] + +[Footnote 30: So the British Minister at Tangier stated to his German +colleague (Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 13, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 326 +f., No. 5173).] + +[Footnote 31: Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 13, 20, 1900, _ibid._, 326 +f., No. 5173; 328, No. 5174.] + +[Footnote 32: See Cambon to Delcassé, July 4, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 13 +ff., No. 19 and annexe; Hatzfeldt to foreign office, June 19, 1901, +_G.P._, XVII, 332 f., No. 5177 and note; Holstein to Eckardstein, July +8, 1901, _ibid._, 333, No. 5178; memorandum by Mentzingen concerning the +conversations between Richthofen and the Moroccan Ambassador, _ibid._, +334 ff., No. 5179, undated though handed in to the foreign office on +July 19, 1901; Mühlberg to Mentzingen, July 19, 1901, _ibid._, 336 f., +No. 5180; Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, 1901, _ibid._, 338 f., No. +5182.] + +[Footnote 33: On the cordiality of their relations see below. Late in +1899 Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary, had made a +speech at Leicester advocating an Anglo-German-American alliance; an +accord over China had been made between them in 1900, and the Emperor +had in January, 1901, hurried to the bedside of the dying Queen +Victoria.] + +[Footnote 34: Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 27, 1901, _L.j., +1901-5_, 20, No. 21. What the promise was is not related. Also editor’s +note, _G.P._, XVII, 332 f., No. 5177; Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, +1901, _ibid._, 338 f., No. 5182; Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901, +_ibid._, XVIII, 781 f., No. 5872.] + +[Footnote 35: See below.] + +[Footnote 36: Lansdowne to Monson, July 3, 1901, _B.D._, II, 261, No. +318; Cambon to Delcassé, July 4, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 13 ff., No. 19.] + +[Footnote 37: On these conversations see Radolin to Bülow, June 5, 1901, +_G.P._, XVIII, 772 ff., No. 5868; June 15, _ibid._, 775 ff., No. 5869; +_ibid._, 777 f., No. 5870. Leon y Castillo declared that Delcassé had +said to him that “he wished for nothing better than to converse with the +German Ambassador on different points, that he would be very desirous of +arriving at an entente with him” (_ibid._, 775 ff., No. 5869). At the +same time leading articles appeared in _Temps_ and _Figaro_, papers in +close touch with the foreign office, to the effect that Germany had the +opportunity in the Moroccan affair to prove her good will toward France +(Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901, _ibid._, 781, No. 5872).] + +[Footnote 38: Bülow to Radolin, June 19, 1901, _ibid._, 778 ff., No. +5871; Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901, _ibid._, 781 f., No. 5872; +Mühlberg to Mentzingen, July 19, 1901, _ibid._, XVII, 336 f., No. 5180.] + +[Footnote 39: Delcassé to Noailles, June 23, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 13, +No. 18. No account of the conversation is given in _G.P._] + +[Footnote 40: _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Sénat, July 5, 1901, +p. 1207.] + +[Footnote 41: The British government might have prevented the sending of +that mission. See Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 20, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, +328, No. 5174. The German Minister at Tangier reported that the Sultan +had asked Mr. Nicolson, British minister there, whether he should also +send a mission to Paris and St. Petersburg.] + +[Footnote 42: On these negotiations see Révoil to Delcassé, April 27, +1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 5, No. 5; Delcassé to Martiniére, July 20, 1901, +_ibid._, 15 ff., No. 20 and annexe; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, +July 27, 1901, _ibid._, 18 ff., No. 21; Saint-René Taillandier to +Delcassé, Sept. 19, 1901, _ibid._, 22, No. 22.] + +[Footnote 43: Such, for instance, as the recent tax reforms.] + +[Footnote 44: Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 27, 1901, _L.j., +1901-5_, 18 ff., No. 21.] + +[Footnote 45: Révoil to Delcassé, Feb. 22, 1902, _ibid._, 31, No. 25.] + +[Footnote 46: Révoil to Delcassé, Jan. 18, April 26, May 17, 1902, +_ibid._, 26 ff., No. 24; 33 ff., Nos. 27 f.; Graham H. Stuart, _French +Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo (1898-1914)_ (New York, 1921), +p. 144.] + +[Footnote 47: See especially Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July +22, Aug. 6, 1902, _L.j., 1901-5_, 44 ff., Nos. 29 f.] + +[Footnote 48: See memo. for Maclean, Oct. 24, 1902, by Lansdowne, +_B.D._, II, 272 f., No. 328; Sir Sidney Lee, _King Edward VII. A +Biography_ (London, 1925, 1927), II, 220 f. Apparently Maclean did not +go to Berlin at all, although he threatened to do so if the British +government refused his proposal. See Lee, II, 220 f.] + +[Footnote 49: For instances of this co-operation see _L.j., 1901-5_, +Nos. 33, 39, 44-46, 57, 60, 68, 70-72, 77-79, 81-84, 86, 89, 91-107, +110-11, 119-26, 132; for Delcassé’s part in assuring the loan see +Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, Jan. 5, 1903, _ibid._, 53 ff., No. +39. The Sultan obtained similar loans in Spain and in England.] + + + + + CHAPTER II + + THE FRANCO-ITALIAN ENTENTE, 1900-1902 + + +When M. Delcassé assumed office in 1898, the Bismarckian system of +agreements which had isolated France in Europe had already crumbled +away. The formation of the Franco-Russian alliance had been followed by +the lapse in 1896 of the ententes between Austria-Hungary, Great +Britain, Italy, and Spain for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the +Mediterranean.[50] The way was clear for the enterprising French Foreign +Minister gradually to win the friendship of the last three Powers, +previously joined in enmity against France. The first of these +_rapprochements_ to bear fruit was the one with Italy. + +During the nineties, Italian dissatisfaction with the foreign policy had +been steadily growing. Italian leaders complained that Italy had +suffered from a tariff war with France, that she had been unable to +restrain France from denouncing Italian treaty rights in Tunis or from +fortifying Bizerta, that she had failed to secure colonial territory in +North Africa, especially in Tripoli, and in Abyssinia. They regarded the +Triple Alliance and the good will of Great Britain as inadequate to +Italian needs. They asserted that their country was the victim of the +Triple Alliance, made to suffer by France because of membership in it, +and not even protected against that Power, much less given compensatory +benefits for these undeserved injuries. The anger directed at Great +Britain was hardly less than that at Germany and Austria-Hungary.[51] + +To meet these difficulties, the Marquis de Rudini, premier from 1896 to +1898, inaugurated a policy of friendship toward France which his +successors in office continued. While remaining loyal to her alliances, +the Marquis said, Italy would henceforth endeavor to prevent trouble +with other Powers and to restore normal relations with France.[52] + +In 1896 Italy and France settled their difficulties over Tunis. In 1898 +a commercial treaty put an end to ten years of tariff warfare between +them and opened the way to the flow of French capital into Italy.[53] In +the same year the two countries made a settlement of the boundary line +between their possessions on the Red Sea. So when M. Delcassé visited +Rome in 1898, he found that both he and the Italian foreign minister, +Marquis Visconti Venosta (1896-98), thought necessary a durable entente +between their two countries which would respect the French possession of +Tunis and the Italian membership in the Triple Alliance; and they agreed +that the Mediterranean, which had previously divided their states, +should become the means of their _rapprochement_.[54] The Italian +Minister was overthrown before any further steps could be taken; but +under his successor, Admiral Canevaro (1898-99), an opportunity was +offered to initiate the negotiations which finally led to the +consummation of the entente. + +In March, 1899, France and Great Britain settled the differences growing +out of the Fashoda affair by an agreement which assigned to the former +the hinterland of Tripoli. Since Italian leaders regarded the eventual +possession of Tripoli as vital to the welfare of their state, they felt +that Italy had been betrayed by her supposed friend, Great Britain, and +the Italian government appealed to its German ally for advice.[55] The +latter remained noncommittal, Lord Salisbury equally so.[56] It was +France, the supposed enemy, who applied balm to the wound. The French +ambassador, M. Barrère, assured Admiral Canevaro that Italy “need in no +way fear that she will find France in her path if she should ever have +ambitions toward Tripoli.” When the Italian Minister asked for a written +statement to that effect, M. Barrère replied that, although Tripoli was +Turkish territory, M. Delcassé would “under conditions” attempt to find +some way in which to satisfy this desire. Those conditions, of course, +had to do with Italy’s relations to Morocco. The materials were thus at +hand for an agreement.[57] + +The negotiations were long drawn out; for, as France had Italy at her +mercy, she drove a hard bargain. On December 14, 1900, Marquis Visconti +Venosta, Italian foreign minister (1899-1901), and M. Barrère reached a +secret agreement.[58] By its terms Italy received in writing a purely +negative assurance that France harbored no designs upon Tripoli. The +_quid pro quo_ for France was more valuable. + + +In that which concerns Morocco particularly, it is agreed . . . . that +the action of France has for its object to exercise and safeguard the +rights which result for her from the proximity of her territory to that +empire. Thus defined, I [Marquis Visconti Venosta] have recognized that +such action is not in our view of a nature to prejudice the interests of +Italy as a Mediterranean Power. It has been likewise agreed that if +there must result therefrom a modification of the political or +territorial status of Morocco, Italy will reserve for herself, as a +reciprocal measure, the right of eventually developing her influence in +the Cyrenaic Tripolitaine.[59] + + +So vague a statement could be variously interpreted. M. Barrère thought +that Italy had given France a free hand in dealing with Morocco so long +as her action did not modify the political or territorial integrity of +the land. Marquis Visconti Venosta declared later to the German +Ambassador that the accord had only permitted France to take measures +necessary for the defense of her frontier.[60] As either meaning could +be read into the documents, the future course of Franco-Italian +relations would determine which one would obtain. + +The _rapprochement_, attested by M. Delcassé in the French Senate on +February 11, 1901, and affirmed by a visit to Italian waters of the +French fleet in April, had been facilitated by a number of +circumstances. On the one hand, the Italian government was angry with +Austria-Hungary for having excluded it, in violation of Article VII of +their treaty of alliance, from the negotiation in 1897 of an agreement +with Russia over Balkan affairs. Tariff difficulties with both allies +were looming up, and an occasional irredentist voice was being heard. On +the other hand, an anticlerical government in France made certain that +in the near future at least the republic would not attempt to restore +Rome to the pope. Moreover, King Victor Emmanuel, possibly influenced by +his Montenegrin wife, leaned decidedly away from his father’s policy of +strict adherence to the Triple Alliance toward one of closer friendship +with France, and, if possible, with Russia.[61] Italian public opinion +was likewise showing itself markedly pro-French, a tendency which M. +Barrère’s courting of press and public helped to develop;[62] and when +in 1901 the King chose the pro-French M. Zanardelli to form a cabinet, +the Italians applauded.[63] + +The affinity for France of the new cabinet and the greater defiance +toward Italy’s allies were foreseen from the political past of some of +its members. M. Zanardelli was a native of the Trentino, and would have +been foreign minister in 1893 if the Austrian government had not +objected.[64] M. Prinetti, the new foreign minister (1901-3), had spoken +energetically in 1891 against the renewal of the Triple Alliance. M. de +Martino, his undersecretary, had asked in the Italian Chamber, December, +1899, “how this Triple Alliance is able to serve Italy.”[65] The +attitude of these men was soon manifested. Toward the end of the year +the Premier was making veiled threats of a tariff war with his +allies;[66] while M. Prinetti, ambitious, inflammatory, and unreliable, +was engaged in negotiations with France which radically transformed the +nature of Italy’s international obligations. + +One of M. Prinetti’s first undertakings was to gain better terms for +Italy with reference to Tripoli. He proposed to France that “each of the +two Powers be able freely to develop its sphere of influence in the +regions Tripoli and Morocco at the moment that it judges opportune and +without the action of the one of them being subordinated to that of the +other.”[67] The French government was willing to accept his overture for +the sake of obtaining a freer hand in Morocco; it also saw an +opportunity to win an even greater advantage. As the Triple Alliance was +to be renewed in 1902, it determined to repeat its former endeavor to +nullify the clauses in that treaty referring to France.[68] + +M. Barrère argued the French case to the Italian government as follows: +Italy had joined the Triple Alliance because of quarrels with France +about the Mediterranean. As the two countries were now friends, with +their difficulties already harmonized or capable of becoming so, should +not their friendship be assured for the future by the removal of any +aggressive point against France which the Triple Alliance might contain? +Were the clauses of that treaty compatible with Franco-Italian +friendship? “The alliance remains defensive,” so he summarized his +arguments later to his government. “But it permits a very broad +interpretation of the duties of the allies; if France, openly provoked, +should declare war, could Italy regard this declaration as a defensive +step on our part? It is doubtful.” So he concluded that “under defensive +appearances, the Triple Alliance implied an eventually offensive +character which ought to be eliminated in the interest of our security +and of the relations of friendship between the two countries.” Above +all, the French government desired to bring about the suppression of the +anti-French military conventions or protocols between Italy and her +allies.[69] + +M. Prinetti acknowledged the force of these remarks. In June, 1901—that +is, before Great Britain had turned away from Germany to France, and +while Austria-Hungary and Italy were still on passable terms—he made a +verbal agreement with M. Barrère by which the rights of Italy toward +Tripoli were put on a par with those of France toward Morocco. In return +he promised that the renewed treaty of the Triple Alliance should +contain “nothing hostile” to France.[70] + +The problem of adjusting Italy’s alliance obligations to her new +international situation growing out of the Franco-Italian entente was +taken up at the end of the year when negotiations for the renewal of the +Triple Alliance were begun.[71] To strengthen Italy’s hand, MM. +Prinetti, Delcassé, and Barrère all attested publicly in December, 1901, +and January, 1902, to the complete harmony of Franco-Italian interests +in the Mediterranean; M. Delcassé referred pointedly to Tripoli and +Morocco.[72] And the _Tribuna_ gave bold notice, January 2, that “Italy +counts for something and can with her weight turn the scale one way or +the other.”[73] In spite of his promises to France, however, M. Prinetti +made very feeble efforts to change the Triple Alliance in accordance +therewith. He said nothing to the German government about revising or +omitting Articles II, IX, X, and the protocol[74] which Italy herself +had had incorporated in the treaty. His sole proposal to Count Bülow, to +whom he repeated his promise to M. Barrère, was that an introductory +statement, intended for publication or for communication to France, +should be included affirming the purely defensive character of the +alliance. Other matters concerning Italy and her two allies were of far +more importance to the Italian Foreign Minister in these negotiations. +He wanted the allies officially to affirm Italy’s preponderant rights in +Tripoli; he wished for them to have a more binding understanding about +the Balkans; above all, he sought to make the renewal of the alliance +contingent upon the negotiation of tariff treaties with Germany and +Austria-Hungary favorable to Italy. In discussing these questions with +the German government he grew excited, wept, threatened to resign or not +to renew the alliance. About those which concerned France he was more or +less apologetic.[75] + +German public opinion regarded the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_ with +misgivings. But the Chancellor assumed a nonchalant attitude, stating in +the Reichstag, January 8, 1902: + + +The Triple Alliance still enjoys the best of health. . . . . The Triple +Alliance is not a society for acquisition but an insurance company. It +is not offensive but defensive; it is not aggressive but peaceful to a +high degree. The Triple Alliance does not bar good relations between its +members and other Powers, and I would not consider it proper if even a +small part of the German press should show any uneasiness over Franco- +Italian agreements. In a happy marriage the husband must not become +jealous if his wife dances an innocent extra round with some one else. +The main thing is that she does not run away from him, and she will not +do so if she is best situated with him. . . . . The Franco-Italian +agreements over certain Mediterranean questions do not violate the +Triple Alliance. . . . . The goals of the present day _Weltpolitik_ +extend to areas and objects which lie far from Germany’s boundaries. I +name in this connection, for example, the north coast of Africa, Persia, +the Far East.[76] + + +That speech, however, did not reflect the Chancellor’s actual feeling. +He still assumed that, should any important change be made in the +Mediterranean area, for instance in Morocco, Germany would be +consulted;[77] but he relied upon Russia’s retarding influence, Great +Britain’s hostility, and fear of Germany to prevent France from taking +action in that land.[78] He was dissatisfied with the turn of affairs, +and blamed Great Britain for having forced Italy into French arms by +ignoring her interests.[79] He suspected that the Franco-Italian +understanding contained more than M. Prinetti admitted.[80] He +recognized the improvement in Italy’s international relations, and +realized that her antagonism to Austria would thenceforth become +sharper, and that her Tripolitan ambitions would be so zealous as +possibly to cause trouble with Germany’s friend, the Turkish Sultan.[81] +As to renewing the alliance, which he strongly desired, the Chancellor +believed that self-interest and the known antagonism of Great Britain to +the Dual Alliance would prevent Italy from changing camps.[82] Under +other circumstances he might have been willing to make some further +concessions to Italy in return for the renewal.[83] In the previous +March he had relieved her from any obligations under the German-Italian +military convention, although permitting the military conversations to +continue as before.[84] But the Franco-Italian entente, the lever with +which M. Prinetti expected to pry loose those concessions, was the very +cause for Count Bülow’s refusing to permit any change whatever in the +treaty. As the alliance was already defensive, he said, there was no +need for an introductory statement to that effect. Pointing to the +expectation voiced by the French press that anti-French clauses would be +dropped, he declared that any modification would permit the French to +draw the desired conclusion and thereby to belie the true nature of the +alliance. Before he would renew the Triple Alliance he demanded of M. +Prinetti an assurance that Italy had made no agreements with other +states which could diminish its defensive forces. He even expressed his +willingness to drop the alliance rather than make any changes in it, +remarking that Italy’s adherence to it was of no fundamental importance. +The Chancellor’s adamantine attitude was effective. By May, 1902, M. +Prinetti agreed to the renewal.[85] + +In March, 1902, M. Prinetti had reported to M. Barrère the probability +of his failure. He had refused to communicate the text of the treaty to +the Ambassador, but had declared that the protocols thereto must be +abolished,[86] and that he was ready, so M. Barrère reported, to give +France “assurances of a nature to leave no doubt in our mind as to the +character and scope of this document” (the treaty of the Triple +Alliance).[87] On May 7, M. Prinetti informed the French Ambassador that +“it will be necessary for us to discuss the future of our relations in +regard to that treaty.” Under French pressure, he agreed that +“thenceforth it was in a direct understanding with us [France] that he +should find the means of fixing the interpretation with regard to us +which Italy intended to give to her obligations as an ally.” He was +willing to put this understanding into writing.[88] + +Before the proper negotiations were well under way, the actual renewal +of the alliance forced M. Prinetti to declare in the Italian Chamber, +May 22, 1902, as follows: + + +The Triple Alliance as it is and as it will be, completely and uniquely +pacific and defensive, will remain in the future what it has been for +years: the most solid rampart in the cause of peace. . . . . The Triple +Alliance, containing nothing aggressive, either directly or indirectly +against France, nothing which menaces her surety or tranquillity may not +in any manner constitute an obstacle to the conservation and development +of cordial relations with our Latin sister with whom we are and wish to +remain friends. . . . . And since it has been said that there exists +between certain Central Powers conventions and protocols adjoined to the +Triple Alliance which modify its pacific character and would even be +aggressive toward France, I hereby solemnly declare that there is no +convention and no protocol of that nature.[89] + + +Presumably even prior to this statement, which was repeated in a formal +note to the French government on June 4, M. Prinetti began negotiations +with M. Barrère over the written agreement. It was the Ambassador’s +intention that that agreement + + +would contain the engagement not to attack, not to join in any +aggression on the part of one or several Powers against one of the +contracting parties; not to consider as aggressive on the part of the +contracting Powers the obligation to declare war in consequence of a +manifest provocation [this was “the capital point” of the project, wrote +M. Delcassé]; finally to abandon the military protocols and other +dispositions of the same sort concerning us and envisaging war with us. +If we are able to arrive at that result [wrote M. Barrère to his chief], +we shall have obtained all that we could hope and desire.[90] + + +The negotiations were far enough along to permit M. Delcassé to declare +in the French Chamber, July 3, as follows: + + +The declarations which have thus been made to us [by the Italian +government] have permitted us to feel assured that the policy of Italy +by virtue of her alliances is not aimed either directly or indirectly +against France; that she will not in any case be a menace to us, either +in a diplomatic form or through protocols or in international military +stipulations; and that in no case and in no form will Italy become +either the instrument or the auxiliary of an aggression against our +country.[91] + + +That statement was stronger and more inclusive than the one by M. +Prinetti on May 22. It indicated the existence of a fuller understanding +than the public knew of. It caused M. Prinetti some embarrassment when +the German Ambassador brought up the subject. The Foreign Minister +declared himself “somewhat astonished” at the speech; but after a feeble +explanation in which he betrayed nothing, he remarked that “so far as he +was concerned, he regarded the question as settled.”[92] + +Meanwhile the Franco-Italian negotiations continued. On November 1, in +an exchange of notes an understanding was reached by which Italy was +given a free hand to develop her “sphere of influence” in Tripoli, and +France the same right with reference to Morocco. Nor should the action +of the one be necessarily subordinated to that of the other. Then +followed a clause which M. Delcassé was particularly eager to have +incorporated:[93] + + +In case France [Italy] shall be the object of a direct or indirect +aggression on the part of one or several Powers, Italy [France] will +preserve a strict neutrality. The same will hold in case France [Italy] +as a result of direct provocation is forced to take, for the defence of +her honor or security, the initiative of a declaration of war. + + +A conditioning clause was added: + + +In that eventuality the government of the Republic [the Royal +government] must communicate beforehand its intention to the Royal +government [the government of the Republic], so that the latter may +verify that it is a case of direct provocation . . . . I am authorized +to confirm to you that there does not exist on the part of Italy +[France] and that there will not be concluded by her any protocol or +military disposition of an international contractual order which will be +in disagreement with the present declarations. + + +The Italian government asserted that these declarations were in +“complete harmony” with its existing international engagements. The +agreement was to be secret and to obtain until the Italian government +abrogated it. A supplementary statement by M. Prinetti defined the term +“direct provocation” to mean one which concerned the “direct relations +between the Power provoking and the Power provoked.”[94] + +Was this accord compatible with the renewed and unchanged treaty of the +Triple Alliance? With Article II it could be made to agree. Articles IX +and X and the protocol it merely nullified but left standing.[95] It +broke completely not the letter, but the spirit of the alliance. The +dishonesty of the Italian Foreign Minister lay in three directions; +toward the German government by permitting it to continue in the belief +that the old relations as established in their treaty still obtained; +toward the French government by informing it that this treaty contained +nothing either directly or indirectly hostile to France, although +Articles II, IX, X, and XI and the protocol of that treaty had been +retained without any attempt to abolish them; toward Italy by not +clarifying the situation.[96] The matter was so arranged that in the +future the Italian foreign ministers would be able to determine whether +or not the agreement with France would be abrogated and the clauses of +the Triple Alliance, temporarily in abeyance, would again be called into +action. The Italian government was safeguarding its country on both +sides and giving up none of its securities, although its policy looked +toward two different international orientations. This was the equivocal +position between France and the Triple Alliance, later between the +Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, which Italy was to occupy until +she entered the World War.[97] The advantages of it lay in the fact that +it gave greater mobility to Italian policy, that it caused Great Britain +to iron out her differences with Italy early in 1902,[98] that it opened +up a future of closer relations with Russia, and that it assured Italy +of the future possession of Tripoli. + +The French government profited most from these negotiations. M. Delcassé +had won his initial victory in the execution of his policy.[99] He had, +at least for the time being, nullified the anti-French clauses of the +Triple Alliance and drawn Italy out of that group into a middle +position.[100] He had also settled the important question of Morocco +with the most jealous of the Mediterranean Powers, and had begun the +process of pulling the Powers away from Germany and drawing them around +France. + + +[Footnote 50: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Feb. 8, 1896, _G.P._, XI, 99 ff., +No. 2664; Alfred Franzis Pribram (ed.), _The Secret Treaties of Austria- +Hungary, 1879-1914_ (Eng. ed. by Archibald Carey Coolidge; Cambridge, +1920-21), I, 124 ff., 142 ff.] + +[Footnote 51: For manifestations of this feeling see Pribram, II, 104, +106; _Memoirs of Francesco Crispi_ (ed. by Thomas Palamenghi-Crispi; +trans. by Mary Prichard-Agnetti; London, 1914), III, 330 ff.; Hohenlohe +to Bülow, Feb. 15, 1896, _G.P._, XI, 230 ff., No. 2766; Bülow to +Hohenlohe, Feb. 5, 1896, _ibid._, 89, No. 2657; Bülow to Hohenlohe, Feb. +18, 1896, _ibid._, 89 ff., No. 2658; and in general the documents in +_ibid._, chaps. lxviii, lxix. Currie to Lansdowne, Jan. 15, 1902, +_B.D._, I, 285, No. 355; 286, No. 356; Currie to Lansdowne, Nov. 27, +1900, Lansdowne to Currie, Dec. 12, 1900, Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. +211 ff.] + +[Footnote 52: Bülow to Hohenlohe, Nov. 26, 1896, _G.P._, XI, 285 f., No. +2813; Pückler to Hohenlohe, July 19, 1897, _ibid._, 286, No. 2814; Bülow +to Hohenlohe, March 17, 1896, _ibid._, 293, No. 2819; Bülow to +Hohenlohe, July 22, 1896, _ibid._, 296 ff., No. 2821; Bülow to +Hohenlohe, Oct. 23, 1896, _ibid._, 299 f., No. 2823.] + +[Footnote 53: _Política èstera italiana_ (1916), p. 499; André Tardieu, +_La France et les alliances_ (Paris, 1910), pp. 97 ff.; Radolin to +Bülow, April 19, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 716, No. 5833; Pinon, _Empire de +la Médit._, pp. 39, 44 f., 48.] + +[Footnote 54: Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort à la Conférence +d’Algésiras_ (Paris, 1909), p. 121; André Tardieu, _Questions +diplomatiques de l’année, 1904_ (Paris, 1905), p. 14.] + +[Footnote 55: Canevaro called it an act of “perfidy,” of “dishonesty,” a +“sharp slap in the face.” See Saurma to F. O., March 29, 1899, _G.P._, +XIV, 429, No. 3946; Saurma to F. O., April 1, 1899, _ibid._, 429 f., No. +3947; Saurma to Hohenlohe, March 29, 1899, _ibid._, 430 f., No. 3948; +Marschall to Hohenlohe, April 14, 1899, _ibid._, 434 f., No. 3952; +Bernhard Schwertfeger (ed.), _Zur europäischen Politik_ (Berlin, 1919), +I, No. 12; Rumbold to Salisbury, March 31, 1899, _B.D._, I, 203, No. +246; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, 1899, _ibid._, 203, No. 247.] + +[Footnote 56: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 4, 1899, _G.P._, XIV, 432 +f., No. 3950; Saurma to F. O., April 28, 1899, _ibid._, 435, No. 3953; +Bülow to Romberg, April 29, 1899, _ibid._, 436, No. 3954; Romberg to F. +O., April 30, 1899, _ibid._, 436 f., No. 3955; Bülow to Saurma, April +30, 1899, _ibid._, 437, No. 3956; Currie to Salisbury, Nov. 4, 1898, +_B.D._, I, 194, No. 236; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, 1899, _ibid._, +204, No. 247; Currie to Salisbury, April 10, 1899, _ibid._, 204 f., Nos. +248 f.; Salisbury to Currie, April 25, 1899, _ibid._, 206, No. 251; +Salisbury to Currie, May 13, 1899, _ibid._, 207, No. 252; Salisbury to +Currie, Oct. 12, 1900, _ibid._, 282, No. 350. In Sept., 1900, Currie, +apparently on his own initiative, appealed to his government to give the +Lateran “some proof of our determination to stand by Italy in the event +of her being attacked.” Lansdowne refused (Newton, pp. 211 ff.).] + +[Footnote 57: Saurma to F. O., April 28, 1899, _G.P._, XIV, 435, No. +3953; Currie to Salisbury, April 4, 1899, _B.D._, I, 204, No. 247. See +also Canevaro’s declaration in the Italian Senate, April 24, 1899, +Senato, _Discussioni, XX Legislatura_ (2d sess.), p. 946, quoted by G. +Salvemini, “La Triple Alliance,” _Revue des nationes latines_, Oct., +1916, p. 250. Also see the interview between Delcassé and Ojetta in +_Giornale d’Italia_, Jan. 3, 1902, reprinted in the _London Times_, Jan. +4, 1902. + +Italy had formerly thought that she had vital interests in Morocco, and +her hope to acquire the land had received expression in a clause +concerning its future in the treaty of the Triple Alliance of 1891 +(Pribram, I, 150 ff.; Vol. II, chap. iii). But the Moroccan vogue had +passed; her wishes had become more modest. To be sure, the French +occupation of Touat caused the Italian government in April, 1900, to +declare excitedly to its German ally that the Moroccan question could +become a reef upon which the House of Savoy might suffer shipwreck; but, +as M. Prinetti later explained, what his predecessor in office had +feared was that a French occupation of Morocco might force Italy to +seize Tripoli in order to maintain the equilibrium of interests in the +Mediterranean (Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 300, No. +5156; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 14, 1900, _ibid._, 302 f., No. 5158; Wedel +to Bülow, Dec. 12, 1901, _ibid._, 718, No. 5834).] + +[Footnote 58: On these negotiations, about which very little is known, +see Barrère to Delcassé, Jan. 10, 1901, Ministère des Affaires +Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. Les accords franco-italiens, +1900-1902_ (Paris, 1919), 1 f., No. 1. (This _Livre jaune_ is hereafter +cited as _L.j., 1900-2_.) Salvemini, Oct., 1916, p. 249; Wedel to Bülow, +March 31, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 712 ff., No. 5831; Metternich to F. O., +Dec. 21, 1901, _ibid._, 726 f., No. 5840; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 5, 1902, +_ibid._, 738 f., No. 5845; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, _ibid._, 747 +f., No. 5851; Diplomaticus, “The Shifting Foundations of European +Peace,” _Fortnightly Review_, LXXVIII (Sept. 1, 1902), 370 f.; +Anonymous, “The Marquis of Salisbury,” _Quarterly Review_, CXCVI (Oct., +1902), 664 ff.] + +[Footnote 59: Terms of the accord given in _L.j., 1900-2_, 3 f., No. 1, +Annexes I and II. See also Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, +747 ff., No. 5851.] + +[Footnote 60: Barrère to Delcassé, Jan. 10, 1901, _L.j., 1900-2_, 1 f., +No. 1; Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 19, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 747 f., No. 5851.] + +[Footnote 61: See Bülow to Wedel, Nov. 30, 1900, _G.P._, XVIII, 502 f., +No. 5704. The King made his first state visit to St. Petersburg in 1902 +(A. Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian Diplomat_ [London, ——], pp. 25 +f.).] + +[Footnote 62: On Barrère’s activity see Currie to Salisbury, Jan. 18, +1899, _B.D._, I, 281, No. 347; Currie to Salisbury, April 24, 1899, +_ibid._, 205, No. 250; memo. by Richthofen, Dec. 17, 1901, _G.P._, +XVIII, 507 f., No. 5708.] + +[Footnote 63: Salvemini, Jan., 1917, p. 12; _London Times_, Dec. 16, +1901, p. 5; _G.P._, Vol. XVIII, chap. xxii.] + +[Footnote 64: Salvemini, Jan., 1917, p. 12 f., quoting Un Bresciano, +“L’intervènto e le pressióni dell Austria nella crisi ministeriale de +1893” (_Nuova antologia_, Oct. 16, 1915).] + +[Footnote 65: Salvemini, Jan., 1917, pp. 13 f.; Prinetti’s explanation +of this speech in the Chamber, June 14, 1901, is quoted in _Política, +èstera italiana_, pp. 536 f. See also Zanardelli’s interview in the _New +York World_, quoted in _London Times_, March 27, 1901, p. 5.] + +[Footnote 66: Dispatch of Jan. 24, 1902, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 91.] + +[Footnote 67: Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _L.j., 1900-2_, 11 +ff., No. 11.] + +[Footnote 68: It had attempted to do this or to break the alliance in +1891 and 1896. See _G.P._, Vol. XI, chap. lxix; _ibid._, Vol. VIII, +chap. lxv.] + +[Footnote 69: These arguments are contained in Barrère to Poincaré, +March 10, 1912, _L.j., 1900-2_, 11 ff., No. 11. One other argument, +which, however, M. Barrère probably did not use with Prinetti, he +formulated as follows: “What is more, nothing prevented her [Italy] from +going beyond the actual text of the treaty, if she should judge that her +political interests demanded it of her.” See also Salvemini, Feb., 1917, +p. 197. The military agreement of 1887 between the allies had become +known to the French government soon after its signing. See Salvemini, +Feb., 1917, p. 198; also Jules Hansen, _L’alliance franco-russe_ (Paris, +1897), p. 42. In March, 1901, _Matin_ published a version of it and +demanded its annulment (quoted in the _London Times_, March 27, 1901).] + +[Footnote 70: According to other reports from the German Ambassador in +Rome, Prinetti promised “nothing aggressive” (Wedel to Bülow, Jan. 5, +June 27, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 512, No. 5711; 757, No. 5858).] + +[Footnote 71: See Salvemini, Feb., 1917, p. 197.] + +[Footnote 72: The occasion for these statements was the French +occupation of Mytilene, which alarmed Italian public opinion. See +Prinetti’s speech in the Italian Chamber, Dec. 14, 1901, Cámera dei +Depitatio, _Discussioni_, p. 6747; Delcassé’s interview in _Giornale +d’Italia_, Jan. 3, 1902, quoted in the _London Times_, Jan. 4, 14, 1902; +Barrère’s speech on Jan. 1, 1902, before the French colony in Rome, +quoted in _ibid._, Jan. 2, 1902; Delcassé’s speech before the French +Senate, March 20, 1902, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, p. 605.] + +[Footnote 73: _London Times_, Jan. 4, 1902.] + +[Footnote 74: Article II of the Triple Alliance read as follows: “In +case Italy, without direct provocation on her part, is attacked by +France for any reason whatsoever, the two other contracting parties will +furnish to the party attacked aid and assistance with all their forces. +The same obligation is incumbent upon Italy in case of an aggression not +directly provoked by France against Germany.” Articles IX, X, XI, and +the protocol provided for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the +Cyrenaic, Tripoli, Tunis, and Morocco, and, in certain eventualities, +for an aggressive attack by Italy aided by her allies, upon France. See +the document given in _G.P._, VII, 99 ff., No. 1426.] + +[Footnote 75: On these negotiations see _ibid._, Vol. XVIII, chaps. +cxxii, cxxv.] + +[Footnote 76: Bernhard von Bülow, _Reden_ (hrsg. von Johannes Penzler; +Leipzig, 1903), I, 243 ff.] + +[Footnote 77: Bülow to Metternich, Dec. 18, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 721, +No. 5835.] + +[Footnote 78: Alvensleben to F. O., Dec. 26, 1901, _ibid._, 727 f., No. +5841; Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 5709.] + +[Footnote 79: Bülow to Metternich, Dec. 18, 1901, _ibid._, 720 f., No. +5835.] + +[Footnote 80: Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 12, 1902, _ibid._, 524, No. 5715; +Mühlberg to Bülow, April 25, 1902, _ibid._, 589, No. 5754; Bülow to F. +O., April 26, 1902, _ibid._, 590 f., No. 5755; Wedel to Bülow, Dec. 26, +1901, _ibid._, 728 ff., No. 5852; memo. by Holstein, Dec. 31, 1901, +_ibid._, 735, No. 5844.] + +[Footnote 81: Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. +5709.] + +[Footnote 82: Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 12, 1902, _ibid._, 523 ff., No. 5715; +Wedel to Bülow, April 10, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 715 f., No. 5832; 723, +No. 5836; Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 509 f., No. 5709.] + +[Footnote 83: Bülow to Wedel, Feb. 24, 1902, _ibid._, 545, No. 5727.] + +[Footnote 84: _Ibid._, chap. cxxiv.] + +[Footnote 85: See the documents in _ibid._, chaps. cxxii, cxxiv, esp. +Nos. 5712, 5727, 5749, 5755.] + +[Footnote 86: This was easily said since the German government had in +the previous year released Italy from her obligations under the military +convention (see above). Prinetti made it appear as a special favor yet +to be performed.] + +[Footnote 87: Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _L.j., 1900-2_, 12, +No. 11.] + +[Footnote 88: Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, _ibid._, 4 f., No. 3; +Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _ibid._, 12 f., No. 11.] + +[Footnote 89: Quoted in Salvemini, July, 1917, p. 321.] + +[Footnote 90: Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, _L.j., 1900-2_, 5, No. +3; Delcassé to Barrère, June 18, 1902, _ibid._, 6, No. 5.] + +[Footnote 91: _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Chambre, July 3, 1902, +pp. 444 f.] + +[Footnote 92: Wedel to Bülow, July 6, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 758 f., No. +5859.] + +[Footnote 93: Barrère to Delcassé, May 8, 1902, _L.j., 1900-2_, 4 f., +No. 3; Delcassé to Barrère, June 18, 1902, _ibid._, 6, No. 5.] + +[Footnote 94: Terms given in _ibid._, 7 ff., Nos. 7 and 8. On July 20 +Barrère reported that Prinetti regarded the following cases as examples +of direct provocation: + +“1. The publication of sharpened dispatches [_dépêches maquillées_] by +Prince Bismarck in 1870; King William’s refusal to receive M. Benedetti. + +“2. The Schnaebele incident.” + +As examples of indirect provocation, Prinetti cited “Prince +Hohenzollern’s candidacy to the throne of Spain, and such indirect +initiative in Far Eastern affairs which do not aim at one of the +contracting Powers, although that initiative may displease it and appear +contrary to its direct interest” (Barrère to Delcassé, July 20, 1902, +_ibid._, 7, No. 6). The choice of examples is significant.] + +[Footnote 95: See above.] + +[Footnote 96: For a severer criticism of his actions see G. Lowes +Dickinson, _The International Anarchy, 1904-1914_ (New York, 1926), pp. +94 ff. Dickinson asserts that the Italian Minister broke both the letter +and the spirit of the Triple Alliance. The analogy of this agreement to +that of Bismarck’s reinsurance treaty with Russia of 1887 was remarked +upon by Italian statesmen at the time (see Lansdowne to Currie, Dec. 17, +1901, _B.D._, I, 284, No. 353). Bismarck’s pacific attitude toward +Russia was well known, however, and he was not responsible for the +inclusion of the anti-Russian clauses in the Austro-German treaty of the +Alliance. See Trützschler v. Falkenstein, _Bismarck und die Kriegsgefahr +von 1887_ (Berlin, 1924), chap. v., and _G.P._, Vol. V. The Italian +government, on the other hand, had not only pursued an anti-French +policy, but had been responsible for including the clauses antagonistic +to France in the treaty of the Triple Alliance.] + +[Footnote 97: For analyses of the Italian policy see Rodd to Lansdowne, +July 9, 1902, _B.D._, I, 292 ff., No. 364; Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 20, +1903, _ibid._, 295, No. 366. For the German discussion see below. Mr. +Bertie in October, 1903, formulated his conception of the Italian King’s +foreign policy as follows: “His aim, I believe, is that Italy should be +a link between the several Powers of Europe and at the same time remain +a partner in the Triple Alliance: that France should have hopes of +drawing Italy away from Austria and Germany, and that those two Powers +should be made to feel that an understanding between Italy and France +and perhaps even with Russia also is possible. As to England the King +probably feels pretty sure that her interests will not seriously clash +with those of Italy, and he relies on England standing in the way of +French supremacy in the Mediterranean” (Bertie to Lansdowne, Oct. 20, +1903, _ibid._, 295, No. 366).] + +[Footnote 98: On the renewal of the Anglo-Italian entente see Lansdowne +to Currie, Dec. 17, 1901, _ibid._, 284, No. 353; Currie to Lansdowne, +Jan. 1, 1902, _ibid._, 285, No. 355; Currie to Lansdowne, Jan. 5, 1902, +_ibid._, 286, No. 356; Lansdowne to Currie, Feb. 3, 1902, _ibid._, 287, +No. 359; Lansdowne to Currie, March 7, 1902, _ibid._, 291, No. 361; +Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 10, 1902, _ibid._, 291, No. 362.] + +[Footnote 99: This he realized. See _L.j., 1900-2_, 4 f., Nos. 2 f.] + +[Footnote 100: Cf. Barrère to Poincaré, March 10, 1912, _ibid._, 13, No. +11.] + + + + + CHAPTER III + + THE FRANCO-SPANISH ENTENTE, 1898-1903 + + +The close of the nineteenth century found Spain at one of the lowest +points in her history. She was disorganized, isolated, defeated in 1898 +by the United States; her navy was destroyed; her colonial empire was +shattered. Spain was particularly embittered toward Great Britain, whose +Premier had openly spoken of “moribund nations” with direct reference to +her, and whose attitude during the recent war had been strongly pro- +American.[101] Fearful that the British might seize a Spanish port,[102] +M. Silvela, head of the Conservative government, with the approval of +the Liberal leaders, early in 1899 determined upon a change of policy by +which Spain would seek to bring about a secret defensive alliance with +France, Germany, and Russia.[103] + +The sympathy of those Powers had been on the side of Spain during the +recent war. But when the Premier laid the plan before them,[104] the +German government was encouraging but skeptical; the French government, +dilatory; the Russian government seemed not to favor it and advised +Spain instead to hold closely to France.[105] Nevertheless, during the +next few years the Spanish government continued its effort to realize +this program, particularly a Franco-German _rapprochement_. + +One of the main objects of this grouping was the defense of Spanish +interests in Morocco. In spite of Spain’s colonial losses in the war of +1898, her concern over the future of that Islamic land remained active. +Spain claimed a special position with reference to it, just as France +did. Economic interests, the number of her subjects resident in Morocco +(larger than that of any other foreign nation), geographic proximity, +historical attempts at conquest, and Spanish pride were all advanced in +support of this claim. Strategic reasons, reinforced by her actual +possession of small bits of territory in Northern Morocco, also prompted +Spain to seek control of at least the northern part of the land and +above all to prevent that area from falling into the hands of France or +Great Britain.[106] The Spanish leaders recognized the French interests +in Morocco and the British right to participate in any settlement of the +problem of the straits. But, conscious of their weakness in dealing with +other Powers, they preferred to maintain the _status quo_ as long as +possible unless the larger Continental grouping was consummated. + +In 1899 and 1900, when M. Delcassé showed a willingness to negotiate an +accord over Morocco, the Spanish government evaded the overture,[107] +and settled with him only the long standing dispute over the boundary of +Rio de Oro.[108] During 1901 events moved faster. In March a Liberal +ministry under M. Sagasta with the Duke of Almodovar as foreign minister +came into office. It saw France, unchecked by Great Britain, pushing her +frontier steadily forward in the desert region back of Morocco. So it +suspected the existence of a secret accord between those two Powers. The +British government denied it,[109] but Spain feared that an accord might +be made to her exclusion and injury. The Franco-Italian entente also +aroused her alarm. In this uncertainty the Spanish government endeavored +to use the presence of the Moroccan missions in Europe in June and July +to bring about a _rapprochement_ between France and Germany.[110] The +move failed. In August, M. Silvela published an article in _La Lectura_ +advocating a solution of the Moroccan problem by agreement with France. +Encouraged by this expression and urged on by M. Leon y Castillo, +Spanish ambassador in Paris, the Spanish government determined to open +direct negotiations with M. Delcassé on the subject.[111] And that +minister was ready to listen. The negotiations progressed slowly, not +only because M. Delcassé was disinclined to concede to Spain the +territory which she desired,[112] but also because he was treating with +Italy and, to the disgust of the Spanish Ambassador, with Great Britain +at the same time.[113] By September, 1902, the main lines of the accord +were agreed upon. Then came further discussion over details; and, after +a last effort (October, 1902) by M. Leon y Castillo to bring France and +Germany together had failed, the accord was ready for signing early in +December. + +By the terms of the agreement Spain was to receive the region of the Sus +in the south and almost all of the old kingdom of Fez, including the +capital and Tangier in the north, as her sphere of influence, while the +rest was to constitute that of France. The two governments agreed upon a +policy of pacific penetration of the land, and the French government +promised its diplomatic support to Spain in the execution of the +treaty.[114] + +The failure of this agreement was an accident. On December 1 the Duke of +Almodovar was called away from Madrid. Before he could return and issue +instructions to sign the treaty, his government unexpectedly fell +(December 3).[115] The incoming Conservative ministry under M. Silvela +with M. Abarzuza at the foreign office refused to complete the accord. +Although they recognized its advantages to Spain, they feared the +possible attitude of Great Britain and decided to sound her out before +completing the treaty. Upon doing so they were informed by Lord +Lansdowne, early in January, 1903, that in case of a break-up of +Morocco, Spain “would be entitled to a voice in any new international +arrangements” over that land, but that the British government was +strongly opposed to any discussion of such an eventuality at that +moment.[116] In February, 1903, M. Abarzuza revealed the nature of the +Franco-Spanish negotiations to the British Ambassador, and asked for an +official British objection to it so that he (M. Abarzuza) would be in a +firmer position to refuse his signature.[117] Lord Lansdowne replied as +follows: + + +We regard it as of the utmost importance that Spain and Great Britain +should act together in regard to Morocco. . . . . I have more than once +informed French Ambassador here that we deprecated attempts to bring +about a virtual partition of Morocco. . . . . We should certainly not +tolerate an attempt to deal with Morocco without regard to British +interests.[118] + + +Thus while M. Delcassé was assuring the Spanish government that their +agreement could be concluded without fear since Great Britain was +interested only in Tangier,[119] the Spanish Foreign Minister was being +informed to the contrary by Lord Lansdowne himself. As M. Abarzuza did +not believe in the possibility of an Anglo-French agreement over +Morocco, he let the negotiations with France fall through.[120] + +Immediately thereafter, however, arose a report of Anglo-French +conversations for that very purpose. In alarm the Spanish government +questioned the British Foreign Secretary and received the following +assurance: “We are quite willing to enter into an agreement with the +Spanish Government that neither will commit itself to any settlement of +Moorish question without previously consulting the other.”[121] + +As it developed later, Spain lost by relying upon Great Britain and not +concluding this accord. For the British promise was too general to be of +much value, and after the Anglo-French agreement was made, Spain had to +accept the territory which the two Powers had reserved for her. Her +portion was naturally not as large as before, nor were the terms as +favorable. For France and M. Delcassé, on the other hand, it was +fortunate that the project failed. The resulting agreement would have +been strongly opposed by the French as too advantageous to Spain.[122] +France obtained better terms by first arriving at a settlement with +Great Britain. But the _rapprochement_ between the two Latin Powers was +an actuality, and that had been one of M. Delcassé’s main objects. + + +[Footnote 101: In 1898 Chamberlain publicly advocated an alliance with +the United States. See Jerónimo Becker, _Historia de Marruecos_ (Madrid, +1915), pp. 414 f.; Wolff to Salisbury, May 15, 1898, _B.D._, II, 253, +No. 300.] + +[Footnote 102: Early in 1899 Silvela asserted to the ambassadors of +Germany, France, and Russia that if Great Britain and France had gone to +war in the previous year, the former had intended to occupy Vigo +(_G.P._, XV, Vol. Nos. 4205-8). When this fear was brought to the +attention of the British government, by an exchange of notes with the +Spanish government it denied any such intention. See Wolff to Salisbury, +March 10, 1899, _B.D._, II, 255 f., No. 305; Salisbury to Wolff, March +16, 1899, _ibid._, 256, No. 306; Conde de Romanones, _Las +responsabilidades politicas del antique régimen de 1875 á 1923_ (Madrid, +——), p. 36; Becker, pp. 415 f. The British and Spanish governments also +found by an exchange of views in January, 1899, that they both wished to +maintain the _status quo_ in Morocco. The Spanish diplomat and +historian, Becker, has written that they were about to make an agreement +to that effect when the Liberal government in Spain fell from power +(March, 1899) (_op. cit._, p. 415; Salisbury to Wolff, Jan. 11, 1899, +_B.D._, II, 255, No. 304).] + +[Footnote 103: The plan was approved by Sagasta, leader of the Liberals, +by Leon y Castillo, the Liberal ambassador at Paris, and by the Queen +Regent. See Alberto Mousset, _La politica exterior de España, 1873-1918_ +(Madrid, 1918), chap. v; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, April 15, 1899, _G.P._, +XV, 115 ff., No. 4205; Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1899, _ibid._, 119 +ff., No. 4206; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, _ibid._, 125 ff., +No. 4210; and others in _ibid._, chap. ic. Cf. F. de Leon y Castillo, +_Mis tiempos_ (Madrid, 1921), II, 255, written after the World War.] + +[Footnote 104: Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 125 ff., +No. 4210; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Aug. 12, 1899, _ibid._, 127 ff., No. +4211.] + +[Footnote 105: Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1899, _ibid._, 119 ff., No. +4206; Bülow to Radowitz, May 16, 1899, _ibid._, 124 f., No. 4209; +Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Oct. 5, 1899, _ibid._, 130 ff., No. 4214; +Tschirschky to Hohenlohe, Oct. 24, 1899, _ibid._, 133 f., No. 4213; +Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Feb. 4, 1900, _ibid._, 134 f., No. 4214.] + +[Footnote 106: Romanones, pp. 34 f.; Gabriel Maura, _La question du +Maroc au point de vue espagnol_ (Paris, 1911), pp. 1 ff.; Becker, pp. +446 ff., esp. chap. lxi; Pinon, _L’empire de la Médit._, pp. 123 ff.; +Emile Vidal, _La politique de l’Espagne au Maroc_ (Montpellier, 1913), +pp. 1 ff.; M. Ribera, “L’Espagne et la question du Maroc,” _Questions +diplomatiques et coloniales_, Jan. 1, 1902, pp. 46 ff.] + +[Footnote 107: This is asserted by Becker although he does not cite his +authority. See Becker, pp. 414, 419; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 10, +1899, _G.P._, XV, 123 f., No. 4208; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Oct. 5, 1899, +_ibid._, 130 ff., No. 4212; Tschirschky to Hohenlohe, Oct. 23, 1899, +_ibid._, 133 f., No. 4213; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _ibid._, +XVIII, 301 f., No. 5157; Wolff to Salisbury, Oct. 11, 1900, _B.D._, II, +258, No. 311; Becker, p. 426; Romanones, p. 39.] + +[Footnote 108: Schefer, _D’une guerre à l’autre, etc._, p. 237; Mousset, +pp. 121 ff.; Romanones, p. 38; Delcassé’s statement in the French +Senate, Feb. 11, 1901, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, p. 295; Leon +y Castillo, II, 143 ff.] + +[Footnote 109: Durand to Lansdowne, April 13, 1901, _B.D._, II, 259 f., +No. 314; Lansdowne to Durand, April 16, 1901, _ibid._, 260, No. 315.] + +[Footnote 110: See below.] + +[Footnote 111: Romanones, pp. 40 ff.; Mousset, pp. 132 ff.; Becker, pp. +425 ff.; Vidal, p. 138; Leon y Castillo, II, 173 ff., 122 ff. See also a +speech of the Duke of Almodovar in the Spanish Chamber, June 8, 1904, +_Diario de las sesiones de Cortes, Legislatura de 1903_ (Congreso de los +Diputados), pp. 4919 ff.; speech by Romanones in the same, June 7, 1904, +_ibid._, p. 4883; Radolin to Bülow, June 15, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 777 +f., No. 5870.] + +[Footnote 112: Romanones, p. 41.] + +[Footnote 113: _G.P._, XVII, 343, editor’s note; Becker, p. 427.] + +[Footnote 114: Leon y Castillo was allowed a free hand in those +negotiations. See Romanones, pp. 41 f.; Becker, pp. 427 f.; Mousset, p. +135; speeches by Almodovar and Romanones in the Spanish Chamber, June 7, +8, 1904, _Sesiones del Congreso, Legislatura_, pp. 4883, 4944 f., 4917 +ff.; exchange of letters between Silvela and Almodovar published in +_L’Imparcial_, June, 1904, and reprinted in Leon y Castillo, II, 185 ff. +The result was shown to Silvela early in September, 1902, and received +his entire approval, “provided one treats of a work of peace and concord +guaranteed against all suspicion and opposition of friendly Powers.” The +exact terms of the proposed accord are not known, only the main points. +See R. Gay de Montella, _España ante el problema del Mediterráneo_ +(Barcelona, 1917), pp. 40 ff., quoting an article by Leon y Castillo in +_Mercurio_, May 27, 1917; André Tardieu, “France et Espagne, 1902-1912,” +_Revue des deux mondes_, Dec. 1, 1912, pp. 635 f.; Durand to Lansdowne, +Feb. 14, 1903, _B.D._, II, 279, No. 336; Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 5, +1903, April 29, May 13, 1904, _ibid._, 306 ff., No. 364; III, 33, No. +34; 35, No. 37; Monson to Lansdowne, May 20, 1904, _ibid._, 37, No. 41; +Lansdowne to Egerton, April 27, 1904, _ibid._, 31 f., No. 32; Leon y +Castillo, II, 177 ff.] + +[Footnote 115: Mousset, p. 135; Leon y Castillo, II, 128.] + +[Footnote 116: On this question see a speech by Maura, minister of +foreign affairs, in the Spanish Chamber, June 9, 1904, _Sesiones del +Congreso, Legislatura_, p. 4959; Becker, pp. 429 f.; Tardieu, p. 635; +Durand to Lansdowne, Jan. 3, 1903, _B.D._, II, 276 f., No. 332; +Lansdowne to Durand, Jan. 5, 1903, _ibid._, 277, No. 333; Durand to +Lansdowne, Jan. 17, 1903, _ibid._, 278, No. 335; Metternich to F. O., +Dec. 31, 1902, _G.P._, XVII, 247 f., No. 5192; Groeben to F. O., Sept. +17, 1903, _ibid._, 353 f., No. 5198 and note; Monson to Lansdowne, April +22, 1904, _B.D._, III, 30, No. 30; Leon y Castillo, II, 179 f. There is +a story that Silvela tried to change the basis of the accord in such a +way as also to obtain Russian support for Spain against Great Britain +and that he was willing to enter the anti-British camp. His proposal to +spend eight hundred million _pesetas_ in the building of a navy pointed +in this direction; but that there is anything to the tale seems +doubtful. See Mousset, pp. 137 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 635 f.; Anonymous, “Una +nouva alleanza,” _Nouva antologia_, Aug. 1, 1903, pp. 511.] + +[Footnote 117: Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 14, 1903, _B.D._, II, 279, No. +336.] + +[Footnote 118: Lansdowne to Durand, Feb. 16, 21, 1903, _ibid._, 279 f., +No. 337; 280, No. 339.] + +[Footnote 119: Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 21, 1903, _ibid._, 280, No. +338.] + +[Footnote 120: See Tardieu, p. 635; Leon y Castillo, II, 179 f.] + +[Footnote 121: Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 21, 1903, _B.D._, II, 280, No. +338; Lansdowne to Durand, Feb. 21, 1903, _ibid._, 280, No. 339; +Lansdowne to Durand, March 29, 1903, _ibid._, 282, No. 334; Leon y +Castillo, II, 180.] + +[Footnote 122: Maura, p. 88; speeches by Ribot and Deschanel in the +French Chamber, March 11, Nov. 19, 1903, _Journal officiel, Debats +parlem._, pp. 793, 1111 f.; Millet, _Notre politique extérieure_, pp. +193 ff.; Pinon, _France et Allemagne_, pp. 143 f.] + + + + + CHAPTER IV + + DELCASSÉ’S POLICY TOWARD GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY, 1898-1902 + + +M. Delcassé assumed office at a most unpropitious time for the success +of his policy with reference to Great Britain. On September 1, 1898, he +remarked to Sir Edmund Monson, the British ambassador, that “he had +always . . . . regarded as eminently desirable a cordial understanding +between England, France, and Russia,” and offered his service “in +soothing the way both at St. Petersburgh and Paris for the attainment of +this object.”[123] From then until March of the next year he repeatedly +urged Lord Salisbury, British premier and foreign minister, to agree to +a general understanding on all matters at issue, so that Great Britain +and France could exchange the old relation of hostility for one of +friendship.[124] But in spite of the French Minister’s cordiality the +Fashoda crisis in the autumn and early winter of 1898 brought the two +countries perilously close to war.[125] Anglo-Russian difficulties in +China and elsewhere also remained acute.[126] Furthermore, Lord +Salisbury replied to M. Delcassé that French ministries were too +unstable to deal with.[127] Hence, instead of improving, relations +between the two countries became more strained. In the late winter and +early spring of 1899, the bellicose stand on the Fashoda affair taken by +the British government and press aroused a general fear in France of a +British attack.[128] By August, the French Foreign Minister complained +bitterly to the British Ambassador that “the conduct of her Majesty’s +Government seemed to show a deliberate intention of being unfriendly to +France in every possible way,” and added that “he began to believe that +the politicians who argue that there is nothing to be done with England +are right.”[129] + +During the period of the Boer War, the presence of Lord Salisbury at the +foreign office, the bitter feeling of the French against the British, +the continued Anglo-Russian trouble in China, and the British attempt to +align with Germany prevented M. Delcassé from obtaining any +results.[130] In fact, conditions were more favorable for the pursuance +of a directly anti-British policy. The Russian government wished it, and +worked for closer concert against Great Britain among the Continental +Powers.[131] The Spanish government had the more far-reaching ambition +of bringing about a definite Continental union against Great +Britain.[132] Italy was at odds with the latter. The German Emperor and +his government had been wooing France and making veiled proposals for +co-operation since 1890.[133] And French feeling toward Germany had +become more amicable than at any time since 1870. + +The French Foreign Minister did not deviate from his original +purpose,[134] but tried rather to be friendly to both Great Britain and +Germany, to play between them for the advantage of France; and, warned +by Mr. Chamberlain’s[135] open advocacy in November, 1899, of an +alliance with Germany and the United States and by the signs of an +Anglo-German _rapprochement_, he sought to eliminate the occasion for +this alliance.[136] This policy had been foreshadowed during the Fashoda +crisis. + +In December, 1898, immediately after France had retreated before the +British demands, M. Delcassé in a conversation with Herr Arthur von +Huhn, correspondent of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, had bitterly denounced +the brutal threats of Great Britain against France, had expressed his +fear that that Power was seeking war in order to have an excuse for +destroying the French fleet, and had proposed a _rapprochement_ with +Germany for pursuing a common policy against British encroachments and +for making colonial accords.[137] Simultaneously with this indirect +overture, which had never been followed up by either government, the +French Minister had threatened the British government with the +acceptance of indirect proposals from Germany for co-operation against +it if Great Britain did not change her attitude toward France and assent +to his offer of a general accord.[138] + +During 1899 M. Delcassé had turned farther away from Great Britain and +had sought means of holding her in check.[139] But when the Boer War +broke out, he held aloof from any movements for intervention, even +risked unpopularity by publicly denouncing the expressions of rabid +anti-British sentiment on the part of the French people.[140] Upon the +retirement of Lord Salisbury from the foreign office in November, 1900, +he again suggested a general understanding to the British +government.[141] He was accused of being Anglophile to the detriment of +French interests, particularly in Morocco;[142] for many of the French +writers advocated a policy of co-operation with Germany for the +settlement of colonial questions (among which, of course, would be +included the Moroccan), while Great Britain could not effectively +object.[143] But M. Delcassé was willing merely to occupy the Saharan +oases back of Algeria during the war and to initiate the French policy +for the eventual acquisition of the Sherifian Empire. + +Not that the French Foreign Minister was averse to any accord with +Germany. As already seen, he made an indirect overture to the German +government for an agreement while the Moroccan missions were in Europe +in 1901. Although rebuffed on that occasion, he made another attempt in +October of the same year at the urging of the Spanish and the Russian +governments.[144] At this time M. Jules Hansen, a French agent, stated +to the German Ambassador in Paris that M. Delcassé had recently +expressed to him the earnest wish to meet Count Bülow personally. The +problem was where and how to meet. The French Minister had said that if +the Count would come secretly and unofficially to Paris, he would greet +him most heartily and would make a public visit to Berlin in +return.[145] + +Although very much interested, Count Bülow refused to run the risk. The +time was inopportune, he said; the French government and people must +first be more solicitous of closer relations with Germany.[146] That +reply postponed the matter to the Greek calends. + +In 1902 M. Delcassé made a concentrated effort to establish the French +claim to ascendancy in Morocco. His negotiations with Italy, which led +to the agreement of November of that year, and those with Spain, which +in December proved abortive, have already been considered. +Simultaneously therewith, M. Delcassé again endeavored to negotiate with +Great Britain and, perhaps, with Germany on the same question. + +On several occasions in January and February, M. Cambon, the French +ambassador at London, discussed Anglo-French differences, including the +Moroccan one, with Mr. Chamberlain, British colonial minister, and with +Lord Lansdowne, British foreign secretary since November, 1900. While +the British officials showed some interest, no progress was made.[147] +For after the publication of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance in +February, France was forced to declare with her ally that the Dual +Alliance extended to the Far East.[148] Under pressure from Russia[149] +and with the hope of obtaining support while negotiating a treaty with +Siam,[150] the French government drew closer to Germany. + +Late in June the French Ambassador, in asking the German views on the +Siamese question, remarked to Count Bülow that “the present good +relations between Germany and France justified the hope that France +would receive the support [_coup d’épaule_] of Germany in the Siamese +affair.”[151] As the German government ignored the suggestion, however, +and as the French government was alarmed at the growing influence of +certain Englishmen, particularly Kaid Maclean, over the Sultan of +Morocco, M. Delcassé determined, in spite of probable Russian +objection,[152] to open the Moroccan question with the British +government. + +On July 23, when M. Cambon asked Lord Lansdowne about discussing fully +the Moroccan problem, the British Minister replied that he would be +ready to consider it “in the frankest possible manner.”[153] On August +6, therefore, the Ambassador officially proposed an accord over the +future of Siam and Morocco. After a consideration of the former +question, the two men took up the latter one. While asserting that the +French government preferred that the Moroccan problem should not become +acute, the Ambassador desired that the two governments “frankly discuss +the action which they might be constrained to adopt in the event of +Morocco passing ‘into liquidation.’” Spain, he explained, could be +satisfied by a sufficient allowance of hinterland behind her coastal +possessions; Tangier could be converted into an international and open +port—for France could not allow it to pass into the hands of any +European Power; and beyond the Spanish line, France would expect +“exclusive influence.” + +Lord Lansdowne replied that although he listened to the French proposal +with great interest, yet since Italy, Spain, and Germany had also at +various times manifested a concern in the Moroccan question, he regarded +with the “greatest apprehension” any attempt to deal prematurely with a +liquidation of that land, which “would be sure to lead to serious +complications.” The Ambassador answered that at any rate there could be +no harm “in discussing these eventualities in good time.” He pointed out +that Spain and Germany had both failed egregiously in their attempts to +establish themselves in Morocco, and that at present Germany was “not to +the front there or elsewhere in the Mediterranean.” But the British +Foreign Secretary, denying that his government had made any difficulties +in Morocco for France, postponed further consideration of the proposal +until after the government holiday.[154] When in October M. Cambon +returned to the subject, Lord Lansdowne not only replied that the French +terms were unsatisfactory, but he also refused to discuss the +possibility of a liquidation of Morocco.[155] + +In the meantime, M. Delcassé had been again seeking the co-operation of +Germany. In September the German government assured France of its +disinterestedness in Siam, provided German economic interests remained +uninjured. Although this reply contained no mention of the larger +request for support made by the French Ambassador in June, yet the +latter, in expressing the satisfaction of his government with the German +answer, added that this opportunity had been used to emphasize the +community of French and German interests, and not only in Siam. To this +broad hint the German government made no response.[156] + +In the next month the Spanish Ambassador in Paris reported to Prince +Radolin that the French Foreign Minister had recently said to him: + + +I do not believe that Germany wishes to come to an understanding with +France. . . . . Four years ago it was said to M. de Noailles at Berlin +that there were points upon which the two countries might place +themselves in accord. I found the matter so important that I immediately +took it to the president of the Republic and to the premier. I was +authorized by them to telegraph to M. de Noailles that I was disposed to +treat with Germany on all points on which the two countries would be +able to agree. M. de Noailles reported that they had informed him in the +_Wilhelmstrasse_ that in view of its importance the question deserved to +be studied. That was four years ago. Since then not a word more has been +said on that subject. Our ambassador still awaits a response.[157] + + +The German government replied to this overture with recriminations +against the French Minister. It complained that his proposals had lacked +in concreteness, that France had rejected several German offers of co- +operation, and it accused M. Delcassé of consistent bias in favor of +Great Britain.[158] + +When this reply was passed on to M. Delcassé by the Spanish Ambassador +late in November, he remarked, “Then M. de Noailles is a fool”; +thereafter he had no business to transact with the German +representative.[159] + +The refusal by both the British and the German governments of the French +overtures was followed in December by that of the Spanish government to +sign the agreement over Morocco. So M. Delcassé’s campaign of 1902 +terminated in failure. At the end of the year he reverted to the policy +of the _status quo_, and, anxious about the situation in Morocco, +proposed to Lord Lansdowne that if disorders there should necessitate +action “the Powers interested should take counsel together as to its +nature and scope, and should agree that there should be no single-handed +intervention . . . . on the part of any one Power.” In approving this +policy the British Minister asked M. Cambon for a further explanation of +the phrase “interested Powers.” The latter replied that Great Britain, +France, and Spain were the ones referred to, that Italy had no interest +in Morocco, and that the French government was solicitous of excluding +the United States, and, above all, Germany from that group. He thought +that “it would be most desirable that if Germany were at any moment to +come forward and attempt to assume a conspicuous rôle, it should be +intimated to her that she had no _locus standi_.” Upon that point Lord +Lansdowne refused to commit himself.[160] + +M. Delcassé had shown a pro-British inclination from the start, and it +may be that his approaches to Germany had been intended primarily to +press Great Britain to an agreement. Certainly they had been +sufficiently vague to be in harmony with the traditional French attitude +of irreconcilability with the victor of 1870-71. But they had also been +concrete enough to show the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of +negotiating with Germany on acceptable terms. Whether M. Delcassé was +sincere in those overtures cannot be said, although he seems to have +been. At any rate, despairing of Germany, he devoted his full energies +in 1903 toward achieving an accord with Great Britain, from whom no +irredentist problem separated France. + + +[Footnote 123: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 1, 1899, _B.D._, I, 216, No. +262.] + +[Footnote 124: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, _ibid._, 163, No. +188, and other documents in chaps. iv, v. Delcassé went so far as to +state to Monson on Sept. 28, 1898, that “he would much prefer an Anglo- +French to a Franco-Russian alliance.” See Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 28, +1898, _ibid._, 171, No. 198.] + +[Footnote 125: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 22, 1898, _ibid._, 169, No. +196, and other documents in the same chapter.] + +[Footnote 126: Monson to Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, _ibid._, 37, No. 58; +and others in _ibid._, chap. i.] + +[Footnote 127: So stated by Paul Cambon in an interview in the _London +Times_, Dec. 22, 1920.] + +[Footnote 128: Monson to Salisbury, Jan. 13, 1899, _B.D._, I, 199, No. +241.] + +[Footnote 129: Monson to Salisbury, Aug. 14, 1899, _ibid._, 212, No. +259. Cambon had in March made similar complaints to Salisbury (Salisbury +to Monson, March 15, 1899, _ibid._, 211, No. 257).] + +[Footnote 130: For expression of French public opinion against Great +Britain see two articles by Ernst Lavisse in the _Revue de Paris_, Feb. +1, 1899, and Jan. 1, 1900. See also Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 3, 1899, +_B.D._, I, 200 f., No. 242; Mévil, _De la paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. +128 f.; Sir Thomas Barclay, _Thirty Years; Anglo-French Reminiscences, +1876-1906_ (London, 1914), pp. 193 f., 209 f.; J. A. Spender, _Life, +Journalism, and Politics_ (London, 1927), I, 183 ff.; Newton, _Lord +Lansdowne_, p. 209.] + +[Footnote 131: Romanones, _Las responsabilidades politicas, etc._, pp. +27, 36; Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 27, 1899, _B.D._, I, 234 f., No. 287; +Rumbold to Salisbury, Nov. 3, 1899, _ibid._, 237, No. 291; _G.P._, Vol. +XV, chaps. ic, ci, ciii.] + +[Footnote 132: See above, chap. iii; also Emil Bourgeois et Georges +Pagès, _Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre_ (Paris, +1922), p. 276.] + +[Footnote 133: The German Emperor made a special endeavor to win France; +hence his numerous telegrams of congratulations or condolence to French +leaders, his toasts and decorations for French officers, etc. The French +called him the “new Lohengrin.” Both he and Bülow made repeated hints to +the French representatives for a _rapprochement_; and one of the +Emperor’s favorite schemes to form a Continental grouping against Great +Britain and the United States was well known from his frequent +references to it. See Theodor Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_ (Munich, 1924), pp. +110, 114, 117, 123 f.; _G.P._, Vol. XVIII, Nos. 5860-71; Bourgeois et +Pagès, pp. 277 ff., 256 f.; William II to Bülow, Oct. 29, 1899, _G.P._, +XV, 406 ff., No. 4394; and the editor’s long note thereto, pp. 406 ff. +On June 4, 1899, the French Ambassador reported a conversation between +the French naval attaché, Buchard, and the Emperor in which the latter +said: “The hour is certainly come when the Continent must defend itself +against England and America, and I think that it is necessary for +Germany and France to rely upon each other [_s’appuient l’une sur +l’autre_].” And Buchard added, “The Emperor is very desirous of +establishing good relations with you” (Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 279). See +also Spring Rice to Villiers, April 24, 1900, Stephen Gwynn (ed.), _The +Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice. A Record_ (Boston and +New York, 1929), I, 220.] + +[Footnote 134: How entirely alien to Delcassé’s mind was the idea of a +Continental alliance with Germany was shown by the fact that in August, +1899, at his instigation the phrase “the maintenance of the equilibrium +between the forces of Europe” was introduced into the Dual Alliance. See +Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. L’alliance +franco-russe_ (Paris, 1918), pp. 94 f.; Dickinson, _The International +Anarchy, 1904-1914_ (New York, 1926), p. 108; Georges Michon, +_L’alliance franco-russe, 1891-1917_ (Paris, 1927), pp. 87 ff.] + +[Footnote 135: Chamberlain was Colonial minister in the Unionist +cabinet.] + +[Footnote 136: In September, 1898, Delcassé had spoken to Monson of the +rumors of an “alliance” between Great Britain and Germany (Monson to +Salisbury, Sept. 8, 1898, _B.D._, I, 162, No. 187).] + +[Footnote 137: Memo. by Huhn, Dec. 5, 1898, _G.P._, XIII, 247 ff., No. +3558.] + +[Footnote 138: Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 28, 1898, _B.D._, I, 185, No. +221; Monson to Salisbury, Dec. 9, 1898, _ibid._, 196, No. 238.] + +[Footnote 139: Count Witte writes in his _Memoirs_ (New York, 1921), p. +178, that when Delcassé came to St. Petersburg in August, 1899, he +sought means of accomplishing this end, and urged the Russian government +to push the construction of the Orenburg-Tashkent Railway so that in +emergency Russia could threaten India. Leon y Castillo, Spanish +ambassador at Paris and an intimate friend of the Minister, likewise +stated in round terms to Radowitz, German ambassador at Madrid, in May, +1899, that Delcassé belonged to the party desirous of a closer +understanding with Germany (Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, _G.P._, +XV, 125 ff., No. 4210. On the other hand, Sir Thomas Barclay records +that upon Delcassé’s departure for St. Petersburg in August, 1899, the +latter said to him that “there was nothing he [Delcassé] personally +would welcome more warmly than a state of feeling which would permit the +two Governments [French and British] to negotiate a solution of their +outstanding difficulties in a friendly give-and-take spirit” (Barclay, +p. 170).] + +[Footnote 140: Barclay, pp. 169 f.; Monson to Salisbury, Dec. 1, 1899, +_B.D._, I, 242, No. 300; Monson to Salisbury, Nov. 7, 1899, _ibid._, +239, No. 294; Wolff to Salisbury, June 9, 1900, _ibid._, II, 258, No. +210.] + +[Footnote 141: Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 214.] + +[Footnote 142: According to an anonymous article, “Quatre ans de +politique extérieure,” _Revue politique et parlementaire_, Oct., 1902, +pp. 24 f., 31, on one occasion during the Boer War when a deputy asked +Delcassé if he did not think this an opportune time to settle the +Moroccan affair with Great Britain, the Minister replied, “How do you +wish me to speak with the English Government? It is so occupied that it +has no time to reply.”] + +[Footnote 143: Robert de Caix, writing in the _Bulletin_, was one of +these. Moreover, in March, 1901, not long after the German Emperor’s +visit to England, Delcassé took advantage of the opportunity offered by +the presence of the British mission in Paris for announcing the +accession of King Edward VII to the throne, to let the British know that +the French government wanted a “good understanding” with them (Lee, II, +14 f.).] + +[Footnote 144: It must be remembered that Delcassé was then discussing +the Moroccan problem with the Spanish Ambassador, who sought to use that +question as the means for paving the way to the new Continental +combination. Moreover, the Czar and the German Emperor, together with +their foreign ministers, had an interview at Danzig in September at +which the Russian Minister openly advocated a Russo-German alliance. +From Danzig the Czar journeyed to France, and a short time thereafter +occurred Delcassé’s indirect overture to Radolin. On the meeting at +Danzig see Bülow’s account of the conversations on Sept. 12, 14, 1901, +in _G.P._, XVIII, 28 ff., Nos. 5393-95; Savinsky, _Recollections of a +Russian Diplomat_, pp. 17 ff.] + +[Footnote 145: The identical project was also proposed to Radolin by +Pallain, governor of the Banque de France. Hansen also remarked that an +important Russian personage had told him positively that Lamsdorff had +spoken to Delcassé of the trip to Berlin. The idea seems to have been +suggested to the Russian Minister by the German Emperor (Radolin to +Bülow, Oct. 27, 1901, _ibid._, 782 ff., No. 5873).] + +[Footnote 146: Bülow to Radolin, Nov. 6, 1901, _ibid._, 785, No. 5874.] + +[Footnote 147: Metternich to F. O., Jan. 30, 1902, _ibid._, XVII, 342 +f., No. 5186; Hermann Freiherr von Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und +politische Denkwürdigkeiten_ (Leipzig, 1919, 1921), II, 379; Lansdowne +to Monson, Jan. 22, 1902, _B.D._, II, 262 f., No. 320; interview with +Cambon published in the _London Times_, Dec. 22, 1920; Monson to +Lansdowne, Feb. 6, 1902, _B.D._, I, 274, No. 339. Lansdowne was so much +interested in the French Ambassador’s ideas that the latter wrote him a +letter enumerating the differences which might be treated. King Edward +read the letter and declared to Cambon, “It is excellent. You must go +on” (interview with Cambon published in the _London Times_, Dec. 22, +1920).] + +[Footnote 148: A few days later, however, Delcassé spoke in the Chamber +so vaguely of this declaration and emphasized so strongly France’s +pacific intentions that he cast great doubt upon its value. See Mévil, +pp. 81 f. n.; Tardieu, _La France et les alliances_, pp. 21 f.; see also +Newton, pp. 226 f.] + +[Footnote 149: Memo. by Bülow of a conversation with the French +Ambassador, March 20, 1902, _G.P._, XVII, 179 f., No. 5064. In February +the Russian government urged the German government to enter into an +agreement against the new alliance, but the offer was refused (_ibid._, +chap. cx, Part B).] + +[Footnote 150: On Siamese affairs, an old cause of trouble between Great +Britain and France, see _ibid._, XVIII, 795 ff., Nos. 5881-83; Schefer, +_D’une guerre à l’autre, etc._, p. 242; _Quest. dipl. et col._, Nov. 15, +1902, pp. 577 ff.; and others.] + +[Footnote 151: Richthofen to Metternich, June 30, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, +795 f., No. 5881.] + +[Footnote 152: Memo. by Bülow of a conversation with the Russian +Ambassador, Feb. 25, 1902, _ibid._, XVII, 160 ff., No. 5051; Alvensleben +to F. O., Feb. 25, 1903, _ibid._, 349, No. 5195.] + +[Footnote 153: Lansdowne to Monson, July 23, 1902, _B.D._, II, 263 f., +No. 321.] + +[Footnote 154: Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 6, 1902, _ibid._, 264 ff., No. +322.] + +[Footnote 155: Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 15, 1902, _ibid._, 268 ff., No. +325; Newton, pp. 268 f.] + +[Footnote 156: Mühlberg to Radolin, Aug. 18, 1902, _G.P._, XVIII, 795 +f., No. 5882; Schlözer to F. O., Sept. 22, 1902, _ibid._, 797, No. +5883.] + +[Footnote 157: Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 15, 1902, _ibid._, 797 ff., No. +5884.] + +[Footnote 158: Richthofen to Radolin, Oct. 23, 1902, _ibid._, 799 f., +No. 5885. These accusations were unfair. In the previous June in a +dispatch to Metternich, ambassador at London, two instances had been +mentioned in which the French government had tried to secure the co- +operation of Germany. The editors of _G.P._ admit that one of these +proposals was definite; and in August, 1901, Holstein of the German +foreign office had written that the French government was “not in itself +irreconcilable.” That admission speaks volumes. Moreover, the German +reply admitted that the French Ambassador had usually taken the +initiative in these attempts at co-operation. See Richthofen to +Metternich, June 30, 1902, _ibid._, 795 f., No. 5881; Holstein to Bülow, +Aug. 8, 1901, _ibid._, XVII, 341, No. 5184.] + +[Footnote 159: Radolin to Bülow, Dec. 4, 1902, _ibid._, XVIII, 801, No. +5886. As an explanation for this very marked attitude, Delcassé said to +a third party that he had tried to co-operate with Germany but had been +refused (Memo. by Klehmet, April 19, 1903, _ibid._, 801 f., No. 5887). +None the less, up to Oct., 1903, the French government continued to +approve the investment of French capital in the Bagdad Railway (memo. by +Rosen, Oct. 29, 1903, _ibid._, 456 ff., No. 5274).] + +[Footnote 160: This conversation occurred on Dec. 31, 1902. Lansdowne to +Monson, Dec. 31, 1902, _B.D._, II, 274 ff., No. 330; Lansdowne to +Monson, Dec. 28, 1902, Monson to Lansdowne, Dec. 31, 1902, Newton, pp. +269 f.] + + + + + CHAPTER V + + THE ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE NEGOTIATIONS, 1898-1901 + + +The international position of Great Britain at the end of the nineteenth +century was uncomfortable. The major Powers were all busy in the +colonial world more or less in opposition to her interests; +_Weltpolitik_ was the order of the day; the navies of all states were +growing rapidly and by combining might be able to threaten her maritime +supremacy. On the Continent, the German Emperor’s courtship of an +apparently complaisant France, cordial relations between Russia and +Germany, an agreement in 1897 between Russia and Austria-Hungary over +Balkan affairs, and a growing amity between France and Italy and between +France and Spain gave evidence of a developing _rapprochement_ between +the two systems of alliance. Trouble in West Africa with France in 1897 +and early in 1898 made Anglo-French relations acute. Fashoda was on the +way; so was the Boer War. British markets in China were being menaced by +Russia, and the British feared that the Russian, French, and German +governments might co-operate on Chinese affairs to their injury. Public +opinion demanded that the government defend British interests more +actively.[161] These were the more important of the difficulties +confronting the island empire. + +To dispel these dangers, two policies were advocated by members of the +Unionist cabinet. Lord Salisbury, prime minister and foreign secretary, +did not believe that a Continental alliance against Great Britain would +be made.[162] He clung to the traditional position of “splendid +isolation,” of making special agreements with the various Powers over +specific issues. As he realized the inadequacy of this policy if Great +Britain attempted to expand her influence too largely in China, South +Africa, and elsewhere, he only half-heartedly supported a vigorous +program of aggression.[163] In January, 1898, he proposed to the Russian +government a general agreement over China and Turkey.[164] On March 8 he +asked the United States government to co-operate in maintaining the open +door in China.[165] However, he was old, in poor health, and inclined to +permit Mr. Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, to force his hand. In +fact, the last five years of his administration have been called the +“Chamberlain period,” so great was the latter’s influence.[166] + +This “stormy petrel” from Birmingham favored an entirely new +policy.[167] Determined to maintain and extend British interests in the +whole world, he sought to form a corporation for directing world-affairs +by close co-operation with the United States and Germany. He was +supported more or less fully by the Prince of Wales (who in 1901 became +King Edward VII), in the cabinet by Mr. Balfour (who in 1902 succeeded +Lord Salisbury as prime minister), and by the Duke of Devonshire;[168] +while his influence with the masses and with the business elements +seemed to assure him of popular approval. + +Various difficulties had in recent years arisen between Great Britain +and Germany. But Mr. Chamberlain thought that in view of the German +Emperor’s offers of alliance to the British government at various times +during the 1890’s, one as late as January, 1898,[169] the German +government would eagerly accept a proposal to that effect. When Lord +Salisbury’s policy toward Russia failed and trouble with Russia[170] and +with France[171] threatened, in March and April, 1898, the British +Colonial Minister declared to Count Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador, +that Great Britain would have to relinquish her isolation. Under threat +of coming to terms with Russia or France if his overture were refused, +he made an unofficial offer of defensive alliance to Germany.[172] + +Mr. Chamberlain’s proposal was coolly received. Count Bülow, the German +secretary of state for foreign affairs, and his inspirer and guide, Herr +von Holstein, privy councilor (_vortragender Rat_) in the foreign +office, who with occasional interference from the Emperor were the +directors of the German foreign policy, not only were mistrustful of +British intentions, but also saw no reason for dissatisfaction with the +current international position and prospects of their state.[173] +Besides, this overture so increased the power of their situation that +they were able to lay down a policy of the “free hand” to be followed +during the next few years. A telegram from Emperor William II to Count +Bülow on April 10, 1898, together with the latter’s marginal notes, best +expressed this policy. After stating that Germany had less need of a +British alliance since Great Britain had turned her attention from the +Continent to the colonial world, the Emperor wrote: + + +If the English need of support direct itself in the future toward +European affairs also, we could consider it more closely than now. +Nevertheless, it is also of great significance for the present to keep +the official attitude in England favorable and hopeful toward us +[Bülow’s comment, “Yes”]. . . . . Through an England friendly to us we +hold another card in our hand toward Russia. [Bülow’s comment, “Very +true, we must remain independent between them, be the tongue to the +wagon, not the pendulum restlessly swinging about.”] And we thereby have +prospects of gaining colonial and commercial advantages from England. +[Bülow’s comment, “Also the reverse. The calmer relations we have with +Russia, the more will England treat us with respect, not to say take +great care with respect to us.”] + + +The Emperor proposed that Count Hatzfeldt be instructed not to refuse +the overture abruptly, but rather to express pleasure at the prospect of +a profitable co-operation leading toward an alliance. To the Emperor’s +remark that the pro-German sentiment of the British cabinet would not +long remain concealed from Russia, Count Bülow wrote, “It does not +matter, if only the English cannot prove to the Russians and _vice +versa_ with the evidence in hand that we have played falsely.”[174] In +accordance with the Emperor’s suggestion, Mr. Chamberlain’s offer was +for the time refused.[175] + +The German leaders had found the policy by which they hoped to carry out +their program of _Weltpolitik_, already so resoundingly proclaimed in +their speeches and acts.[176] “I am the balance of power,” declared the +Emperor in 1901;[177] and by utilizing the advantages of that position, +he and his advisers hoped to gain colonial concessions from the Powers, +to construct the Bagdad Railway, and to build the German battle fleet. +It was a policy of finesse and at times of intrigue, one nicely suited +to Count Bülow’s ingratiating nature, but one full of pitfalls. Success +depended upon whether Anglo-Russian and Anglo-French hostility was +temporary or relatively permanent, upon whether Mr. Chamberlain was in +earnest in declaring that Great Britain must abandon her policy of +isolation,[178] upon whether German diplomacy would be competent to +force concessions from those Powers without driving them together. +Guided by Emperor William II, Count Bülow, and Herr von Holstein, the +policy of the “free hand” seemed almost foredoomed to failure. + +In 1898 the Emperor was thirty-nine years of age, but experience had +taught him very little caution, moderation, or political understanding. +He remained the spoiled sovereign of a spoiled country; each had risen +to power so rapidly as to be unable to take this position for granted +and not to demand explicit recognition of it, and as to be inclined +consequently to abuse its power. The Emperor’s belief in and practice of +his divine right to rule were not tempered by any consistent application +to his task. While not devoid of political intuition, he lacked most of +the qualities of a statesman. He was brilliant, but erratic and +impulsive. In spite of his seeming wide knowledge, he was mentally lazy +and devoid of profundity. Of a highly nervous temperament, he was guided +chiefly by his emotions. He appeared rigid, severe, and forbidding on +state occasions, but he loved to relax, to be jocose and sociable. He +could be cordial and wonderfully amiable and charming, like his mother, +and again, when his temper was aroused, he could be ruthless and +crushing. He spoke often and dramatically, and traveled as much and as +widely as he could. He frequently antagonized and angered people +unintentionally by his imperious obtuseness. Then he would feel +aggrieved and abused, for he expected all the understanding to come from +the other side. One could not take him at his word; one had to interpret +his meaning from his acts and intentions as well. At times his words +would leave exactly the opposite meaning from that which he intended. He +once remarked to Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador, that “the +noodles seem to have had a lucid interval,” when upon further +conversation it developed he had intended thereby to express his great +satisfaction with the communication from the British government.[179] He +loved to set countries at odds by his intrigues and gossip. His jealousy +of Great Britain, her empire, and her fleet was a cardinal reason both +for his being constantly attracted to England and for his desiring to +become her colonial and naval rival. Nevertheless, after twelve years of +personal contact with the Emperor, Sir Frank Lascelles came to the +following sane conclusion about him: + + +In spite of his habit of twirling his moustache and rattling his sabre +(I trust that this sentence may be taken in its metaphorical and not in +its literal sense, for, as a matter of fact, I have never either seen +him twirl his moustache or heard him rattle his sword), which he may +think a befitting attitude for the ruler of a mighty Empire, he is +really animated by the most pacific sentiments, and . . . . his great +ambition now is that his name should be handed down to posterity as that +of the German Emperor who kept the peace. It would seem that this is the +estimate which the Emperor has formed of his own character, as in a +recent conversation with Prince Radolin[180] he said he was at a loss to +understand how, with his well-known peaceful intentions, he had come to +be looked upon as a disturbing element—an instance, perhaps, of that +“inconscience” which M. Herbette[181] considered a characteristic of the +German nation, and concluded with the almost pathetic sentence, “Ich bin +doch kein böser Mensch” [I am really not a bad person].[182] + + +The Emperor’s deficiences were in part made up by Count Bülow, who had +been chosen secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1897 to execute +the program of _Weltpolitik_. Born in 1849 of an old North German +family, he had had diplomatic service at St. Petersburg, Vienna, Athens, +Paris, Bucharest, and Rome where he had been ambassador since 1894. He +came to his task at a crucial time in the history of Germany’s foreign +relations, but he lacked the farsightedness, decision, and firmness of +character necessary to deal with the problems adequately. Although he +learned with time, recognized his mistakes, and tried to readjust the +German foreign policy, he was then unable to do so. While his +cosmopolitan culture and knowledge enabled him to understand other +nations better than most Germans did, he seemed incapable of using this +understanding practically. Under him the German policy appeared to +demand something for nothing, anywhere or everywhere, merely because +Germany was so strong a Power. In 1907 Lord Sanderson, British permanent +undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1894-1906, a sane, +sympathetic witness, stigmatized the German method of handling foreign +affairs as follows: + + +The Germans are very tight bargainers, they have earned the nickname of +“_les Juifs de la diplomatie_.” The German Foreign Office hold to a +traditional view of negotiation that one of the most effective methods +of gaining your point is to show how intensely disagreeable you can make +yourself if you do not. They are surprised that the recollection of +these methods should rankle, and speaking generally the North Germans +combine intense susceptibility as regards themselves with a singular +inability to appreciate the susceptibilities of others.[183] + + +Under Count Bülow, German foreign policy lacked direction and stability. +It aroused the mistrust of the other Powers, who could not comprehend +what Germany wanted. The Count was abler at extricating himself from +difficulties than at avoiding them. A confirmed optimist at all times, +he was suave and reassuring; the French Ambassador complained that he +“was a fluent speaker but when one came to recall and note down what he +had said very little came out of it.” Sir Frank Lascelles called him a +perfect master at expressing vague generalities.[184] Count Bülow no +doubt had a difficult time keeping the Emperor within bounds and undoing +the latter’s mischief, but he was by no means an able statesman himself, +and he relied for advice upon a person whom many considered a +psychopath. + +Since Prince Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890, Herr von Holstein had been a +dominant influence in the German foreign office as the preserver of the +Bismarckian tradition. Strangely secretive, he avoided all publicity and +all responsible offices, yet he lusted after power behind the scenes. He +was irascible, morbidly suspicious, both timorous and bold, by nature +unfit to handle foreign affairs. He could not make up his mind to act. +He could not understand the other government’s viewpoint. He knew few of +the foreign representatives in Berlin personally, and rarely consulted +with any of them. He relied for information chiefly upon the dispatches +and upon newspapers, thus lacking the intimate contact with reality +which might have balanced his recluse judgment. His mobile mind could +make two plus two equal three, five, or seven and a half, but seldom +four. His training under Prince Bismarck had taught him that master’s +use of threats and force but not his caution and comprehensive sagacity. +His adroit and intricate analysis of diplomatic situations and policies +made him a power in the foreign office. The Emperor urged his dismissal, +but Count Bülow clung to him, consulted him on all matters, and +generally followed his advice.[185] + +During the next year the German plan worked. On the one hand, with +troubles coming to a head in China, the Sudan, and South Africa, the +British government was grudgingly compelled to play the German game by +agreeing to a division of the Samoan Islands and a prospective partition +of the Portuguese colonies and by acknowledging the utility of similar +accords.[186] On the other hand, an indirect bid for a _rapprochement_ +by M. Delcassé in December, 1898,[187] and a proposal from the Russian +government in 1899 for an agreement over Asia Minor[188] signified equal +success, although the German government refused both offers. Then when +the Boer War began late in 1899, Great Britain, surprised by the +universal outburst of hatred against her on the Continent and +apprehensive of German, French, and Russian intervention in favor of the +Boers, had urgent need of Germany’s friendship. Hence the pressing +invitation to the Emperor William II and his foreign secretary in the +autumn of 1899 to visit England.[189] + +As Count Bülow cared nothing about the fate of the Boers, the visit took +place (November 21-24). He and the Emperor were received +enthusiastically by government, court, and people. The British ministers +showed anger at France and Russia and a desire for co-operation with +Germany.[190] Mr. Chamberlain, who boldly asserted that the two +countries “must sooner or later come to a general understanding because +we need each other,” repeated his wish for a grouping of Germany, the +United States, and Great Britain. + +The German leaders responded as in the previous year that more intimate +relations between the two countries should be prepared for by special +agreements. The British Colonial Minister, readily accepting this +program, suggested two subjects for negotiation, the Bagdad Railway and +Morocco; whereupon it was agreed that he should take up the latter +question with the German Ambassador in the very near future.[191] + +The visit to Windsor was apparently a complete success. Both governments +were highly pleased with the results. The only discord in the harmony +was the expression of mutual antagonism on the part of the English and +German press. To counteract this opposition, Mr. Chamberlain, at Count +Bülow’s suggestion,[192] openly advocated his project in a speech at +Leicester on November 30 as follows: + + +The same sentiments which bring us into closer sympathy with the United +States of America may also be evoked to bring us into closer sympathy +and alliance with the Empire of Germany. . . . . If the union between +England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new +triple alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of +the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in the future +of the world.[193] + + +The Colonial Secretary’s act had the very reverse effect of that +intended, for the German people rejected with vituperation the idea of +allying with the oppressors of the Boers. The German Foreign Minister, +ambitious for the chancellorship when the aged Prince Hohenlohe should +retire, and inclined to follow the dictates of public opinion, felt +compelled to take cognizance of this feeling. Speaking before the +Reichstag on December 11, he made a cool rejoinder to Mr. Chamberlain’s +proposal. In a chauvinistic declaration of Germany’s need for colonies +and a navy, he proclaimed: “As for England we are gladly willing to live +with her in peace and harmony on a basis of complete reciprocity. But +since our international position is at present a favorable one, we must +utilize it in order to safeguard ourselves for the future.”[194] + +Mr. Chamberlain was indignant at this reply, even though the German +government made special efforts to explain it away.[195] Hence, as the +two presses were at each other’s throats and the governments were +wrangling over minor troubles arising out of the Boer War, he dropped +the idea of an alliance, presumably also that of a Moroccan accord, at +least until the close of the war.[196] + +In 1900, with the French advance on Touat, the Moroccan question became +acute. In April the German government for the first time weighed +carefully its ambitions with reference to Morocco and the means for +realizing them.[197] Count Bülow held that Germany had maritime +interests of her own in that land, and was no longer concerned merely +for the sake of Italy, as she had been ten years before. He coveted +particularly the southern area on the Atlantic Coast. A British seizure +of Moroccan territory without consideration for German interests, he +stated, “would within Germany greatly weaken and discredit the +Government and in its foreign relations make any future co-operation +with England impossible and force us to seek connection with Russia and +France at almost any price”; while an Anglo-French settlement of the +question to the exclusion or detriment of Germany “would have +incalculable results for the further course of German internal and +external policy.” In either case German foreign policy would be forced +to take another direction whether the government wished it or not; and +relations with Great Britain would become more strained than ever +before. In fact, the German government “could not possibly accept either +eventuality.”[198] + +In these words lies the key to the understanding of Germany’s +precipitation of the Moroccan crisis in 1905. + +To obviate those dangers, the German government preferred an agreement +with Great Britain. In May, 1900, it proposed to Mr. Chamberlain that +they negotiate a Moroccan accord. But the Colonial Minister, while +acknowledging that the only peaceful way to solve the Moroccan problem +was by an agreement between Great Britain and Germany, had become more +wary and requested the German government to make an official proposal +which he could submit to the cabinet. He felt sure, he said, that it +would be favorably received, and promised to support it, provided his +well-known desires were given due consideration.[199] + +Fearing a rejection, the German government deemed it inadvisable to +follow Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestion. Nor did Count Bülow warn the +British government that Germany must participate in any Moroccan +settlement, since he believed it possible to prevent the Moroccan affair +from becoming serious until the opportunity for an Anglo-German +agreement arose.[200] He held that an Anglo-French understanding about +Morocco was impossible because of the conflict of French and British +interests over the possession of the south shore of the straits. To +avert a crisis, he issued a discreet warning to M. Delcassé in May, +1900, not to go beyond treaty limits in the action against Touat;[201] +he incited the Russian Foreign Minister, who, he thought, would be +opposed to any Anglo-French agreement or to a European disturbance over +Morocco, to restrain the French Minister;[202] and he instructed the +German representative at Tangier to retard the collapse of the Sherifian +Empire.[203] Thereafter the Moroccan question remained in abeyance for a +time.[204] + +In November, 1900, Lord Salisbury resigned the secretaryship of foreign +affairs to Lord Lansdowne. Lord Lansdowne had had a varied life. Of high +aristocratic and wealthy family, he had entered politics as a matter of +course and had served as governor-general of Canada, viceroy of India, +and secretary of state for war. He fitted admirably into his new +position as foreign secretary, for he possessed patience, tact, and the +ability to inspire confidence, and he assumed responsibility with +decision and courage. While he entered office with very few +preconceptions, he wrote to Sir Frank Lascelles, he did believe that “we +should use every effort to maintain and, if we can, to strengthen the +good relations which at present exist between the Queen’s Government and +that of the Emperor” of Germany.[205] In his foreign policy he sided +with the new school, already represented by Mr. Balfour and Mr. +Chamberlain. When King Edward VII gave royal support to this group after +his accession to the throne in January, 1901, the Victorian policy of +“splendid isolation” definitely terminated. However, the old Marquess of +Salisbury remained premier until 1902; and the foreign policy eventually +adopted was a compromise between the old and the new. + +The international position of Great Britain remained bad. If anything, +it had grown worse since 1899; for the Boer War lingered on, and France +and Russia were endangering important British interests, the one by her +active policy with reference to Morocco, the other by her use of the +Boxer Rebellion to extend her power in China and by her activity in +Persia and Afghanistan. + +In the autumn of 1900, the British government had negotiated an accord +with Germany over China to hold Russia in check.[206] In January of the +next year Mr. Chamberlain, after repeating his assertion that Great +Britain must ally either with Germany and the Triple Alliance or with +France and Russia, proposed to Baron Eckardstein, first secretary of the +German embassy in London, that as an introduction to the project for an +alliance the two governments agree over Morocco. The subject could be +taken up with Lord Lansdowne, he said, as soon as Lord Salisbury, still +in feeble health, left for the south.[207] Before any negotiations were +begun, however, far eastern affairs, as more pressing and vital, brought +to the fore the question of alliance.[208] + +Early in 1901, reports were spread of a Russo-Chinese agreement which +would give Russia practically a protectorate in Southern Manchuria. The +problem which thereupon confronted the British government was +illuminatingly summed up by Mr. Bertie, undersecretary of state for +foreign affairs, as follows (March 11, 1901): + + +Germany has assured Japan that there is no secret understanding between +Germany and Russia respecting the Far East, and that, in the event of a +crisis, Germany will observe a benevolent neutrality, the effect of +which would be to keep the French fleet in check. + +The Japanese Government ask whether His Majesty’s Government have been +consulted by Germany, and whether they believe the assurances given to +Japan; and they further ask: “How far may Japan rely upon the support of +Great Britain in case Japan finds it necessary to approach Russia?” + +It is assumed by the Japanese Minister that “approach” in the context +means “resist,” which is war. + +Unless Japan can make sure of neither Germany nor France taking an +active part on the side of Russia, she will not fight Russia over the +Manchurian Agreement. If the possession of Corea by Russia were at +issue, Japan would fight, with or without support, and independently of +whether France or Germany would remain neutral. + +If Germany and England, in answer to the Japanese Government’s +inquiries, deprecated war, and said that if unfortunately war broke out +between Japan and Russia, it would be the object of England and Germany +to restrict as much as possible the theatre of it, and they would +consequently remain neutral, so long as no third Power attempted to take +a part in it, then I think that such an assurance might be sufficient to +satisfy Japan that France would not be allowed to join with Russia, and +that Japan might fight Russia single-handed. . . . . + +If France were allowed to side with Russia, and they crushed Japan, the +result might be a renewal of the triple understanding—viz., Russia, +France, and Germany. Those three Powers would become supreme in China, +and we should go to the wall. + +If Russia alone, or in combination with France, defeated Japan, and we +came to the rescue to prevent the obliteration of Japan, we should incur +the lasting enmity of Russia and France, and a defeated, and probably +ungrateful, Japan would not be of much use to us as against Russian +encroachments. + +It has been suggested that if Japan defeated Russia there would be grave +danger to European interests in the Far East. + +A great military and naval Power, with unbounded natural resources and +an immense population such as Russia, is not likely to accept defeat +permanently. She would reorganize for a further trial of strength, but +such a trial might be a long way off, and it would be greatly retarded +by Japan being allowed to take as the spoils of war the Liaotung +Peninsula. Its possession by Japan would be a guarantee that there would +be no reconciliation between Russia and Japan. This would be an +advantage to England and Europe. The yellow danger would be kept in +check by Russia and the Russian danger by Japan. + +If we do nothing to encourage Japan to look upon us as a friend and +possible ally against Russia and France, we may drive her to a policy of +despair, in which she may come to some sort of terms with Russia. I do +not say that it is probable, but it is possible, and our interests would +greatly suffer if she did.[209] + + +Therein lies the deciding reason why the British government tried to +secure the support of Germany; why it made the alliance with Japan when +this attempt came to naught; and why it subsequently established the +entente with France. An agreement with Germany, supplemented by one with +Japan, would have solved Great Britain’s difficulty of defending her +colonial interests by assuring the maintenance of the balance of power +in Europe. Failing this, an alliance with Japan and a policy of +reconciliation and entente with the other Powers furnished the best +solution. But in any case either alliance or close friendship with a +European Power was essential. + +At the time the prospect of obtaining German aid looked favorable. The +German Emperor had rushed impetuously to the bedside of the dying Queen +Victoria late in January, 1901, and had remained for her funeral. In his +talk with the British officials he had denounced Russia for her +aggressions in China, had informed them that Great Britain needed an +alliance, and, in a dinner speech at Marlborough House on February 5, +had declared: “We ought to form an Anglo-German alliance, you to keep +the seas while we would be responsible for the land.”[210] + +Late in January the British government tried to obtain German aid +against the Russian aggressions in Manchuria by calling into action the +Anglo-German agreement of the previous year; but the German government +refused to permit an interpretation of that accord which would embroil +it with its eastern neighbor.[211] Instead, it tried to persuade the +British government to connive at embroiling Russia and Japan in war +without binding themselves.[212] It assured Japan of the localization of +that conflict by remarking that Germany would remain neutral and would +thereby hold France neutral. In March, Lord Lansdowne, following up this +assertion, asked Baron Eckardstein if Germany would undertake to hold +France neutral in case of war (March 16). In violation of strict orders +from Herr von Holstein “not to breathe a word of alliance” to the +British government,[213] Baron Eckardstein replied that “if there were a +defensive alliance between Germany and Great Britain covering all +eventualities,” Germany would be able to do so.[214] Two days later Lord +Lansdowne declared to the Baron that “England now stands at a turning +point and must decide upon her future policy”; and in accordance with +the Baron’s strong hint, a defensive alliance was tentatively set forth +for consideration. By its terms each Power should preserve neutrality in +case of an attack upon the other by either France or Russia but should +come to its aid in case of an attack by those two Powers combined.[215] + +Baron Eckardstein reported the proposal as coming from the British +Minister, and his government looked upon it as a British offer. Lord +Lansdowne made the Baron responsible for the initiative. With the +existing evidence, the contradiction cannot be cleared up; yet as each +government was under the impression that the other had taken the first +step and was therefore more eager for the alliance than was really the +case, the negotiations endured longer than they might otherwise have +done.[216] + +In the next two and a half months the course of the negotiations was +checkered. On March 22, Baron Eckardstein unofficially brought up the +subject with Lord Lansdowne. During their discussion they agreed that it +would be best for the _casus foederis_ to arise when one of the Powers +was attacked by two or more Powers, and that the accord should be +ratified by the two parliaments. The British Secretary declared that the +Premier approved “in principle of a strictly defined defensive +alliance.”[217] On March 29 they again touched on the matter; but owing +to Lord Lansdowne’s inability to consult his chief, who was ill, and +owing to a flare-up between the two governments over a minor matter +connected with the Chinese customs, Baron Eckardstein postponed the +negotiations.[218] On April 9 he was ready to resume the discussion; and +for the first time he mentioned to the British Minister the +indispensable stipulation of his government, that Austria-Hungary and +Italy must also be included in the alliance.[219] + +From the start the attitude of the German government toward these +proposals was mistrustful. Since the British government had been +disinclined to execute the Anglo-German accord of 1898 for a future +division of the Portuguese Colonies, the German government was reluctant +to consider even Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestion for an accord over +Morocco, at least until events permitted its immediate execution.[220] +Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein refused to believe that the British +government would make an alliance so long as Lord Salisbury remained in +authority. Moreover, they feared that if the negotiations failed and +became known to France and Russia, owing to British perfidy or to +Parliament’s rejecting the treaty—and either outcome seemed likely to +them—Germany would be the one to suffer from the wrath of those two +Powers while Great Britain, protected by the sea, would enjoy greater +international security than before. + + +I am especially mistrustful of this present storm of friendship by +Chamberlain and comrades [wrote Herr von Holstein to Count Metternich] +because the threatened understanding with Russia and France is such +complete fraud. A retreat by England would postpone her struggle for +existence for a few years, but would then make it all the more certain, +because the opponents [France and Russia] will have been strengthened, +while the English will have been weakened in power and prestige. A +reasonable agreement with England, that is, one in which a proper +consideration is given to the almost certain danger of war to which we +should thereby expose ourselves, can in my opinion first be achieved +when the appreciation of her constrained position has become more +general in England than it is at present.[221] + + +Count Bülow, chancellor since the previous October, held the same view. +In fact, he was even more inclined to preserve the policy of the “free +hand.” “Facts, sir, facts,” he wrote in connection with this question of +alliance, and above all he wanted facts in the form of colonial +acquisitions in Africa.[222] So while sensible of the power of such an +alliance, these two would have it only on German terms, an alliance +between the British Empire, on the one hand, and the Triple Alliance, on +the other; or, as an alternative formulation, an alliance by which Great +Britain joined the Triple Alliance.[223] To obviate all possibility of +betrayal, they instructed Baron Eckardstein to demand of Lord Lansdowne +the acceptance of this basic condition before continuing the +negotiations. Not until then, they declared, should the terms of the +Triple Alliance be imparted to the British government.[224] + +Conversations were resumed in the second half of May. When, on May 23, +Count Hatzfeldt made clear to Lord Lansdowne the provision of his +government, an _impasse_ was soon reached. The British Foreign Secretary +approved the project of alliance in principle, but he had never expected +much to come of it. Upon ascertaining the German condition he foresaw a +breakdown when the time came to formulate the terms.[225] + +Moreover, Lord Salisbury persistently refused to admit that Great +Britain needed an alliance. He asserted that it would be a bad bargain +to join the Triple Alliance, for the “liability of having to defend the +German and the Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier than that of +having to defend the British Isles against France.” He opposed any +secret agreement on the grounds that Parliament had the right to decide +questions of war and peace; and he continued to favor isolation and +dependence on public opinion to determine governmental policy in a +crisis. Nor did he believe that German public opinion, so hostile to +Great Britain, would accept an Anglo-German defensive alliance.[226] +Thus while some of the members of the cabinet discussed the possible +terms of an alliance, and Sir Thomas Sanderson, permanent undersecretary +of state for foreign affairs, even drew up two trial drafts of a treaty, +the opposition of Lord Salisbury together with the German refusal to +communicate the terms of the Triple Alliance forced the negotiations to +a halt in June.[227] + +The German Chancellor readily accepted this turn of affairs. After +expressing a desire for a future alliance, he assured the British +government that Germany would continue the policy of the “free +hand.”[228] + +The visit of the Moroccan embassy to London and Berlin in June and July +afforded an opportunity to revive the Moroccan question. Lord +Lansdowne’s uneasiness about the French actions with reference to +Morocco was not allayed by the French Ambassador’s assertion to him on +July 3 that France had no intention of raising that problem.[229] But +nothing was done.[230] + +When el-Menebhi, the leader of that embassy, was dismissed in disgrace +on his return home, the British Foreign Secretary expressed the wish to +remain in constant touch with the German government on the Moroccan +question.[231] Each Power, however, acted separately in defending the +Moroccan Minister; and the German government looked on this as another +occasion in which Great Britain was trying to employ Germany to defend +British interests. The German leaders likewise thought that by refusing +to make any separate agreements with Great Britain they would eventually +force the latter to accept their terms for an alliance.[232] + +As soon as the negotiations with Germany showed no prospect of success, +the British government followed up Japan’s offer of an alliance and in +August began official conversations on that subject.[233] None the less +it continued its efforts to make some kind of agreement with Germany. +But on August 23, at Wilhelmshöhe, a meeting between Emperor William II +and King Edward VII, which the British leaders hoped would pave the way +for an understanding, had no result.[234] In November, Lord Lansdowne +regarded the difficulties in the way of an alliance as “at the present +moment virtually insuperable,” enumerating some of them as follows: + + +1. The impossibility of arriving at a definition of the _casus foederis_ +which would not be either so rigid as to greatly hamper our freedom of +action or so vague as to deprive the alliance of all practical value. + +2. The certainty of alienating France and Russia. + +3. Complications with the Colonies, which might not at all approve of +the idea of hanging on to the skirts of the Triple Alliance. + +4. The risk of entangling ourselves in a policy which might be hostile +to America. Without knowledge of the German Emperor’s views in regard to +the United States, this is to my mind a formidable obstacle. + +5. The difficulty of carrying Parliament with us at a moment when the +Parliamentary situation is as little satisfactory as it is at +present.[235] + + +But, he wrote, “the argument that, because we have in the past survived +in spite of our isolation, we need have no misgivings as to the effect +of that isolation in the future,” could be pushed too far. Besides, +since negotiations then in progress for an alliance with Japan virtually +signified that Great Britain did not wish to remain alone, he proposed +that the government seek “a much more limited understanding with Germany +as to our policy in regard to certain matters of interest to both +Powers”—for instance, they might agree to co-operate for the +preservation of the territorial _status quo_ on the shores of the +Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Aegean, and the Black Seas, for the +maintenance of the “freedom for the commerce and navigation . . . . in +the Persian Gulf, and the prevention of any territorial acquisitions on +its shores by other Powers which might interfere with that object.” But +only “whenever the occasion for it might arise” should the nature of +their co-operation be determined.[236] + +The Premier remained vigorously opposed to the project; but Lord +Lansdowne urged that the German government probably expected him to +reopen the negotiations, and that if he made this offer, that government +would be deprived of any grounds for complaining that Great Britain “had +treated it inconsiderately or brusquely rejected its overture.” As he +also suspected that “the German Gov’t. (or the German Emperor) desire +something much more precise and far-reaching . . . . and that they would +refuse an overture on the above lines,” he maintained that the proposal +could cause no damage.[237] + +On December 19 the British Foreign Minister recalled to Count +Metternich, the new German ambassador at London, the negotiations for an +alliance and stated that “while . . . . we certainly did not regard the +German proposal with an unfriendly or indifferent eye, I did not think +that for the moment we could afford to take it up.” Instead he suggested +that the two governments arrive at “an understanding with regard to the +policy which they might pursue in reference to particular questions or +in particular parts of the world in which they are alike interested.” +Count Metternich expressed surprise that the British government had not +“jumped at” this “magnificent opportunity” to end its isolation, and +replied that he did not expect his government to favor this restricted +proposal. “It was a case of the whole or none.”[238] + +There the matter rested. Lord Lansdowne and King Edward were both +dissatisfied with Count Metternich’s critical tone;[239] but they +continued to voice their solicitude, which the German Emperor and Count +Bülow reciprocated, that the two governments keep in close touch.[240] +However, public opinion in both countries remained bitterly hostile, and +when in October, 1901, Mr. Chamberlain spoke disparagingly of the +actions of the German army in the war of 1870-71, the protest of the +German press was so vehement that the Chancellor, on January 8, 1902, +declared in the Reichstag, “let the man go and do not become excited. He +bites on granite.”[241] The pleasant visit of the Prince of Wales to +Germany a short time later did not offset the discord resulting from +this war of words.[242] By March, Count Metternich wrote that he +“wouldn’t give two pence for Anglo-German relations”; while the +Chancellor admitted that so far as Great Britain was concerned the +Emperor was Germany’s “best card.”[243] It was a dismal fiasco for so +momentous a negotiation. + +The British government thought that by considering an alliance the +German leaders had manifested friendly feeling. Lord Lansdowne did not +believe that the animosity of Germany toward Great Britain would last +forever or that Germany would “let us ‘go under’ before a great European +coalition.” “Is it not more likely,” he wrote, April 22, 1902, to Sir +Frank Lascelles, “that she will stick to her rôle of the honest broker, +taking advantage, if you like, of our difficulties in order to pursue a +_politique de pourboire_ at our expense, but without pooling her +ironclads with those of France and Russia?” The Ambassador agreed with +him; but after talking to the British naval attaché in Berlin he pointed +out for the first time that the German navy was definitely aimed at +Great Britain.[244] The future for Anglo-German relations was therefore +none too bright for the British government, and British public opinion +cordially approved when on January 30, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance +was concluded. + +The German government was not at all alarmed by this failure. Its +relations with France and Russia were of the best. As a result of the +Anglo-German intimacy in 1901, M. Delcassé had twice endeavored to +approach Germany, while in September, during a meeting at Danzig of the +Russian and German rulers together with their foreign ministers, the +Russian Minister had asserted that “an alliance between Germany and +Russia would be the greatest blessing and is a goal to be striven for.” +The overtures were disregarded.[245] When the Anglo-Japanese Alliance +was concluded in February, 1902, the Russian government urged Germany to +enter a Continental combination against those Powers; but Count Bülow, +pleased to see obviated the possibility of an Anglo-Russian +understanding, bluntly rejected the proposal.[246] Nor did he believe +that, since Russia and Great Britain were so decisively at odds, France +would dare make an accord with the latter.[247] And Herr von Holstein +wrote on December 31, 1901, that “at the present day Germany with her +enormous strength on land and sea is a factor which no Power that wishes +to perform an important act dare leave in its rear without having +previously come to an understanding with her.”[248] + +Thus, the German apostles of _Weltpolitik_ guiding the destinies of an +acquisitive and chauvinistic nation, refused to co-operate with Great +Britain, France, or Russia. Apparently they did not know what they +wanted or how they might utilize their favorable situation; for they +derived no benefits whatever from any of the opportunities offered. An +Anglo-German agreement would have prevented the formation of the Entente +Cordiale and would very likely have brought about a settlement of the +Moroccan question to Germany’s advantage. By cultivating France and +encouraging her to draw closer, Germany might have come to some +agreement with that Power through which she could have prevented the +later Entente Cordiale from becoming so cordial, and through which she +might have shared in the general improvement of relations between the +Powers and in the settlement of the Moroccan question. The whole +Moroccan crisis and many others to follow might thereby have been +avoided. In a world of shifting friendships, of swiftly changing +policies, a world demanding resolute and judicious statesmanship, the +German Chancellor and Herr von Holstein refused to take risks. Toward +the British government they had showed themselves too sensitive, +suspicious, and peremptory in their demands.[249] The French and Russian +governments they had rebuffed even more brusquely. Deluded by wrong +preconceptions of international politics and overprudent in their +negotiations, they believed themselves entirely safe in playing their +favorite rôle of sphinx and of aligning with no one.[250] Their naval +program alarmed Great Britain; their construction of the Bagdad Railway +antagonized Russia; their Moroccan policy exasperated France. They +played against all three Powers, and still did not expect them to draw +together against a common opponent. Instead of alliances or ententes, +they reaped animosities. By their refusals and their clumsy diplomacy, +they paved the road for the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian ententes. +And when, a few years later, those Powers came to agreement, the German +leaders feared that their country was being encircled and isolated. + + +[Footnote 161: Memo. by Bertie, March 14, 1898, _B.D._, I, 17 f., No. +24; memo. by Tilley, on relations between Russia and Great Britain, +1892-1904, Jan. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 1 ff., No. 1; O’Conor to Salisbury, +March 15, 1898, _ibid._, 20, No. 29; Salisbury to O’Conor, March 24, +1898, _ibid._, 24 f., No. 38; Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 26, 1898, +_ibid._, 146, No. 172; Monson to Salisbury, March 6, 1898, _ibid._, 147, +No. 173; Monson to Salisbury, May 19, 1898, _ibid._, 154, No. 179; memo. +by Bertie, June 30, 1898, _ibid._, 54, No. 72; Erich Brandenburg, _Von +Bismarck zum Weltkriege_ (Berlin, 1924), chaps. iv, v; Sir A. W. Ward +and G. P. Gooch (eds.), _The Cambridge History of British Foreign +Policy, 1783-1919_ (Cambridge, 1923), Vol. III, chaps. iii, iv, +_passim_; _G.P._, Vol. XIV, chap. xci. The British were especially +concerned over maintaining the open door in China. See Alfred L. P. +Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906_ (New York, 1928), +pp. 179, 182 f.] + +[Footnote 162: For expressions of this fear see Gwynn, _The Letters and +Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 182 f., 225 f., 331 f.] + +[Footnote 163: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 221 +ff., No. 3793; dispatches from Hatzfeldt recounting conversations with +Salisbury, May 12, 15, 1898, _ibid._, 230 ff., and notes; Hatzfeldt to +F. O., May 15, 1898, _ibid._, 233 ff., No. 3797. The best exposition of +Salisbury’s views is given in a memorandum by him, May 29, 1901, _B.D._, +II, 68 f., No. 86. See also J. A. Spender, _The Public Life_ (New York, +1925), I, 79; Salisbury to Lansdowne, April 21, 1897, Newton, _Lord +Lansdowne, A Biography_, pp. 145 f. On Aug. 30, 1899, Salisbury wrote to +Lansdowne that the British army would not be needed for a Continental +war “in a blue moon” (_ibid._, p. 157).] + +[Footnote 164: Salisbury to O’Conor, Jan. 17, 25, 1898, _B.D._, I, 5, +No. 5; 8, No. 9; and others in _ibid._, chap. i.] + +[Footnote 165: Dennis, pp. 170 f.] + +[Footnote 166: Salisbury was prime minister from 1895 to 1902.] + +[Footnote 167: On Chamberlain see Spender, I, 79.] + +[Footnote 168: Hatzfeldt, German ambassador to London, also thought that +the Liberal leaders, Lord Rosebery and Sir William Harcourt, approved of +Chamberlain’s plan. Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 7, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, +209 ff., No. 3788. See also Gwynn, I, 188, 191.] + +[Footnote 169: Lieut. Col. Grierson, British military attaché at Berlin, +reported to the British Ambassador a conversation with the Emperor on +Jan. 15, 1898, as follows: “He [the Emperor] said that for eight years +he had striven to be friendly with Great Britain to gain her alliance, +and to work hand in hand with her, but had failed” (Grierson to +Lascelles, Jan. 19, 1898, _B.D._, I, 42, No. 62). The Emperor said the +same to Lascelles on Feb. 1. See Lascelles to Salisbury, Feb. 1, 1898, +_ibid._, 43 f., No. 63; memo. by Tilley on the relations between Germany +and Great Britain (1892-1904), Jan. 5, 1905, _ibid._, Appendix, 322 ff.; +Brandenburg, chaps. i-iv.] + +[Footnote 170: Russia had just occupied Port Arthur. In speaking to the +Russian Ambassador about that act on March 24, Balfour declared that the +British government regarded it with “grave objection,” as a “menace” to +the friendship of the two countries. See Salisbury to O’Conor, March 24, +1898, _B.D._, I, 24 f., No. 38.] + +[Footnote 171: Monson to Salisbury, March 6, 1898, _ibid._, 147, No. +173. Salisbury tried to obtain the support of the United States on +Chinese affairs (Dennis, p. 170).] + +[Footnote 172: It was on March 24 that Hatzfeldt reported that Alfred +Rothschild had arranged a meeting between him and Chamberlain and +Balfour. See Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 24, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 193 f., +No. 3779. For reports of the conversations between Hatzfeldt and Balfour +and Chamberlain see the following dispatches: Hatzfeldt to F. O., March +25, 29, April 1, 1898, _ibid._, 195 ff., Nos. 3781, 3782, 3784; +Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _ibid._, 221 ff., No. 3793. The +editors of the _British Documents_ could find “practically no evidence” +concerning this proposal in the archives of the British foreign office, +and have stated that Chamberlain apparently treated the affair as +private (_B.D._, Vol. I, Foreword). See also the dispatch from Lascelles +to Balfour, Aug. 23, 1898, _ibid._, 101, No. 122. That Chamberlain was +uncertain about the sort of agreement he wished was evident from the +different formulations of the proposal which he made. As to the American +aspect of his plan, Chamberlain was influenced by Ambassador John Hay, +who supported the idea of an Anglo-American alliance. On May 13, 1898, +at Birmingham the British Minister spoke publicly in favor of that +alliance (Dennis, pp. 117 f., 122). Nothing of course came of the +matter. The great affinity for the United States on the part of the +British government was shown in July, 1898, by its indirect warning to +Germany not to interfere in the Spanish-American War (Gwynn, I, 251, +253). On the Anglo-German negotiations for an alliance see Friedrich +Meinecke, _Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Bündnisproblems, 1890-1901_ +(München and Berlin, 1927); Eugen Fischer, _Holsteins Grosses Nein_ +(Berlin, 1925).] + +[Footnote 173: Holstein thought that the possibility for this alliance +would first enter “when (1) Russia threatens us; (2) England acts less +haughty than today.” See Holstein’s minute to a dispatch from Hatzfeldt +to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 223, No. 3793. On the German +reaction see also the dispatch from Bülow to Hatzfeldt, April 3, 1898, +_ibid._, 204 ff., No. 3785, and the following documents.] + +[Footnote 174: William II to F. O., April 10, 1898, _ibid._, 217 f., No. +3790.] + +[Footnote 175: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, April 3, 24, 1898, _ibid._, 207, No. +3785; 218 ff., No. 3792.] + +[Footnote 176: In January, 1896, the Emperor had sent the famous +telegram to President Krueger of the Transvaal which was regarded by the +British as showing a desire to take the Boers under Germany’s wing. On +Dec. 6, 1897, Bülow in his first speech before the Reichstag as +secretary of state for foreign affairs declared: “The days are past when +the German left to one neighbor the earth, to another the sea, and +reserved for himself the air. . . . . We do not wish to place anyone in +the shadow, but we demand also our place in the sun” (Bülow, _Reden_, I, +7 f.). In 1898 the first important navy bill was passed by the +Reichstag. On September 23, 1898, the Emperor declared, “Our future lies +on the sea” (G. P. Gooch, _History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919_ [New +York, 1923], pp. 225 ff.). These were merely a few examples of Germany’s +changed interests.] + +[Footnote 177: William II to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 28, No. +4987.] + +[Footnote 178: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _ibid._, 224, No. +3793.] + +[Footnote 179: The occasion for this remark was the conclusion of the +Anglo-Japanese Alliance early in 1902 (Lascelles to Lansdowne, Feb. 8, +1902, Newton, p. 247).] + +[Footnote 180: German ambassador at Paris at the time.] + +[Footnote 181: Formerly French ambassador at Berlin.] + +[Footnote 182: Extract from “General Report on Germany for 1906, May 24, +1907,” _B.D._, III, 437 f.] + +[Footnote 183: Memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _ibid._, p. 429.] + +[Footnote 184: Whitehead to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 108 f., +No. 135; extract from “General Report on Germany for 1906,” _ibid._, p. +435.] + +[Footnote 185: Emil Ludwig, _Wilhelm der Zweite_ (Berlin, 1926); G. P. +Gooch, “Baron von Holstein,” _Cambridge Historical Journal_, Vol. I; +Johannes Haller, _Die Ära Bülow; eine historisch-politische Studie_ +(Stuttgart and Berlin, 1922); Otto Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten +Kaiserzeit_ (Berlin, 1922); extract from “General Report on Germany for +1906,” _op. cit._, III, 434 ff.; Wilhelm Spickernagel, _Fürst Bülow_ +(Hamburg, 1921); André Tardieu, _Le Prince de Bülow_ (Paris, 1909).] + +[Footnote 186: _G.P._, Vol. XIV, chaps. xcii, xcvi; _B.D._, Vol. I, +chaps. ii, iii.] + +[Footnote 187: Memo. by Huhn, Dec. 5, 1898, _G.P._, XIII, 247 ff., No. +3558. See above.] + +[Footnote 188: Memo. by Bülow, April 18, 1899, _ibid._, XIV, 540 f., No. +4017, and the following documents. According to a memorandum by Bülow on +May 5, 1899, Count Osten-Sacken, the Russian ambassador, attempted “in +every way” to convince him that Germany “should hold in all questions to +Russia and France and take position against England.” “England is strong +only because Germany and France do not co-operate,” said the Ambassador +(_ibid._, 546 ff., No. 4020).] + +[Footnote 189: Hatzfeldt to F. O., Sept. 30, 1899, _ibid._, XV, 397, No. +4386; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 25, 1899, _ibid._, 396 f., No. 4385; Monson +to Salisbury, Aug. 14, 1899, _B.D._, I, 213, No. 259; Monson to +Salisbury, Oct. 1, 1899, _ibid._, 233, No. 285; and other documents in +_ibid._, chap. vii.; Dennis, pp. 125 ff.] + +[Footnote 190: Salisbury was absent on account of the death of his wife, +but the officials in the British foreign office assured Hatzfeldt that +the premier was not at all prejudiced against Germany, as the latter +supposed. See Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Dec. 2, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 423, No. +4401; cf. Gwynn, I, 351.] + +[Footnote 191: On this visit see Lee, _King Edward VII_, I, 747; +Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, Vol. +II, chaps. iv, v; memo. by Bülow, Nov. 24, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 413 f., No. +4398; Eckardstein to Hatzfeldt, Nov. 30, 1899, _ibid._, 421 f., No. +4400; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Dec. 2, 1899, _ibid._, 422 ff., No. 4401.] + +[Footnote 192: Eckardstein, II, 107.] + +[Footnote 193: _Annual Register_ (1899), p. 227. Salisbury agreed to +this act, but warned Chamberlain that Germany would very probably +disappoint him (Spring Rice to Miss Lascelles, April 17, 1902, Gwynn, I, +351).] + +[Footnote 194: Bülow, I, 88 ff.] + +[Footnote 195: Eckardstein, II, 126 ff., 133 ff.] + +[Footnote 196: _Ibid._, p. 125.] + +[Footnote 197: On several previous occasions Morocco had been the topic +of conversation between British and German officials. In January, 1897, +not to go back any farther, Lord Salisbury had sounded the German +government on that question, but the latter had not been interested +(_G.P._, XVII, No. 4979 n.). But when the subject was brought up in a +conversation between the Premier and Hatzfeldt in February and again in +June, 1899, the German policy, now launched on its career of +_Weltpolitik_, was different. Salisbury stated that in case of the +break-up of the Sherifian Empire, “Great Britain could not with +indifference see the Atlantic seaboard pass under any other dominion.” +Hatzfeldt replied that in his personal opinion his government would +approve a British acquisition of territory in that land only in case +Germany received her share; and he added that it would be very desirable +to exchange views and ideas on the subject whenever action should become +pressing. Salisbury, however, expressed the wish for the _status quo_ to +be indefinitely maintained, and refused to enter into details. See +Hatzfeldt to Bülow, Feb. 8, 1899, _ibid._, 295 f., No. 5152; Salisbury +to Lascelles, June 7, 1899, _B.D._, II, 256 f., No. 307. + +A short time before the visit to Windsor in Nov., 1899, Chamberlain +suggested to Eckardstein that the two governments make a secret +agreement over Morocco by which the Mediterranean coast should be left +free for Great Britain while Germany should receive far-reaching +concessions on the Atlantic seaboard. See Hatzfeldt to F. O., _G.P._, +XVII, 297, No. 5153. Eckardstein also states that in Jan., 1901, +Chamberlain and Devonshire both told him that in 1899 Salisbury had +approved the idea of a solution of the Moroccan problem with Germany +(Eckardstein, II, 359).] + +[Footnote 198: These remarks by Bülow were chiefly contained in his +minutes to the dispatches from Hatzfeldt. See Bülow to Münster, April +27, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 299 ff., No. 5156; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May +1, 1900, _ibid._, 303 ff., No. 5159; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900, +_ibid._, 309 ff., No. 5162; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 29, 1900, _ibid._, +313 f., No. 5165; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, June 1, 1900, _ibid._, 314 +ff., No. 5166.] + +[Footnote 199: Bülow’s plan was also to associate Italy later in the +Moroccan settlement. See Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 14, 1900, _ibid._, 302 +f., No. 5158; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 21, 1900, _ibid._, 303 ff., +No. 5159; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 23, 1900, _ibid._, 308 f., Nos. 5160 +f.; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900, _ibid._, 309 ff., No. 5162.] + +[Footnote 200: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 21, 1900, _ibid._, 303 ff., +No. 5159; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 23, 1900, _ibid._, 308, No. 5160; +Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900, _ibid._, 309 ff., No. 5162; Bülow to +Hatzfeldt, May 28, 1900, _ibid._, 311 f., No. 5163; Hatzfeldt to F. O., +May 29, 1900, _ibid._, 312 f., No. 5164; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, June 1, +1900, _ibid._, 314 ff., No. 5166.] + +[Footnote 201: Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _ibid._, 299 f., No. +5156; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _ibid._, 301 f., No. 5157.] + +[Footnote 202: Bülow to Tschirschky, June 5, 1900, _ibid._, 318 ff., No. +5167; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, June 13, 1900, _ibid._, 321 ff., No. 5168.] + +[Footnote 203: Derenthall to Mentzingen, Aug. 2, 1900, _ibid._, 324, No. +5170.] + +[Footnote 204: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, June 30, 1900, _ibid._, 323 ff., No. +5169 and note.] + +[Footnote 205: Newton, pp. 196 f.] + +[Footnote 206: _G.P._, Vol. XVI, chap. cv; _B.D._, Vol. II, chap. ix, +Part I.] + +[Footnote 207: Eckardstein, II, 235 ff.; Hatzfeldt to F. O., Jan. 18, +1901, _G.P._, XVII, 14 ff., No. 4979. In the same month Lansdowne +expressed to the German government the desire to remain in “complete +harmony” with it on Chinese affairs. See Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 4, +1901, _B.D._, II, 20 f., No. 25; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 18, 1901, +_ibid._, 21 f., No. 26.] + +[Footnote 208: On those far eastern troubles see _G.P._, Vol. XVI; +_B.D._, Vol. II, chap. ix.] + +[Footnote 209: _B.D._, II, 43, No. 54. On Anglo-Russian relations see +also Newton, pp. 215 f.] + +[Footnote 210: Quoted in Lee, II, 11. This was against Bülow’s advice +(Bülow to William II, Jan. 21, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 20 f., No. 4983). On +the Emperor’s visit see Eckardstein to F. O., Jan. 29, 1901, _ibid._, 23 +f., No. 4986; William II to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1901, _ibid._, 24 ff., No. +4987; Lansdowne’s memo., Jan., 1901, Newton, p. 199. The Emperor had +been given an enthusiastic welcome in England. The Harmsworth press had +called him “A Friend in Need” (Newton, p. 198).] + +[Footnote 211: Memo. by Mühlberg, Jan. 28, 1901, _G.P._, XVI, 286, No. +4785, and following documents.] + +[Footnote 212: Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18, 1901, Newton, pp. 199 +f.] + +[Footnote 213: Eckardstein, II, 279.] + +[Footnote 214: He naturally did not report this statement to Berlin +(_ibid._, pp. 280 f.).] + +[Footnote 215: _Ibid._, pp. 277 ff.; Eckardstein to F. O., March 19, +1901, _G.P._, XVII, 41 f., No. 4994; Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18, +1901, _B.D._, II, 61, No. 77; Newton, pp. 199 f. As the Ambassador was +ill during most of this time, Eckardstein carried on the negotiations.] + +[Footnote 216: Eckardstein has written in his memoirs that in his +private correspondence with Holstein he took the latter’s peculiarities +into account and used expressions that were adapted to his “complex +mentality.” “For instance, I very often avoided using the word +_alliance_ and spoke of a _defensive arrangement_; then I emphasized +that the whole affair was yet in embryo, although in fact the +negotiations progressed very smoothly and were on the point of +conclusion, etc. As soon as the negotiations began to run smoothly and +lightly, Holstein became suspicious, and if the other party were willing +to accede to our wishes, smelled a rat.” The truth seems to be that for +this very reason Eckardstein sent home not less but more favorable +reports of the British desire for an alliance than was really the case, +and by stretching his instructions to the utmost in his ardent desire to +ally the two Powers, may have been responsible for the contradiction +mentioned above (Eckardstein, II, 273).] + +[Footnote 217: Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 23, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 46 ff., +No. 4997; Eckardstein, II, 321 ff.] + +[Footnote 218: Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 29, 1901, _B.D._, II, 62, +No. 79; Eckardstein, II, 326 ff.] + +[Footnote 219: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 9, 1901, _B.D._, 62 f., No. +80; Eckardstein, II, 335.] + +[Footnote 220: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, Jan. 20, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 17 f., +No. 4981.] + +[Footnote 221: Holstein to Metternich, Jan. 21, 1901, _ibid._, 22, No. +4984. Metternich accompanied the Emperor to England at that time.] + +[Footnote 222: See his minutes to the dispatch from Holstein to +Hatzfeldt, Feb. 11, 1901, _ibid._, 37, No. 4989; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, +Jan. 20, 1901, _ibid._, 17 f., No. 4981; Bülow to William II, Jan. 21, +1901, 20 f., No. 4983.] + +[Footnote 223: The two formulations were in no way identical, but the +negotiations never proceeded far enough to permit their being +discussed.] + +[Footnote 224: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, March 24, 1901, _ibid._, 49, No. +4998; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 11, 1901, _ibid._, 54 ff., No. 5003; +Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, May 18, 1901, _ibid._, 60 ff., No. 5007; +Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, May 20, 1901, _ibid._, 64 f., No. 5009; and the +following documents.] + +[Footnote 225: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 13, 1901, _B.D._, II, 63, +No. 81; Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18, 1901, Newton, pp. 199 f.] + +[Footnote 226: Memo. by Salisbury, May 29, 1901, _B.D._, II, 68 f., No. +86.] + +[Footnote 227: Memo. by Sanderson, May 27, 1901, _ibid._, 66 ff., No. +85; Lansdowne to Eckardstein, May 24, 1901, _ibid._, 66, No. 84; +Lansdowne to Lascelles, May 30, 1901, _ibid._, 69 ff., No. 87 and +inclosures; Hatzfeldt to Lansdowne, May 30, 1901, _ibid._, 71, No. 88; +Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 68 f., No. 5012; and the +following documents.] + +[Footnote 228: Lascelles to Lansdowne, Aug. 25, 1901, _B.D._, II, 73, +No. 90; memo. by Holstein, June 14, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 83 ff., No. +5019. Late in October, 1901, Holstein and Bülow had long talks with +Valentine Chirol of the _London Times_ to a like effect. See memo. by +Holstein, Oct. 31, Nov. 1, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 101 ff., Nos. 5026 f.; +Sir Valentine Chirol, _Fifty Years in a Changing World_ (London, 1927), +pp. 288 ff.] + +[Footnote 229: On April 13, 1901, Lansdowne had written to Lascelles: +“Things in Morocco look ugly. Do you hear anything?” See _B.D._, II, 64, +No. 81; Lansdowne to Monson, July 3, 1901, _ibid._, 261, No. 318.] + +[Footnote 230: Eckardstein gives the following story: + +Early in July, soon after the arrival of the Moroccan embassy in London, +Sir Arthur Nicolson, British minister in Morocco, told him that France +was intriguing in that land for the establishment of a protectorate. At +Lansdowne’s request he suggested the co-operation of Great Britain and +Germany for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in Morocco. Then he +touched upon the subject of a common Anglo-German peaceful penetration +of that country, which should be inaugurated by a commercial treaty with +the Sultan. Between the two European states an agreement should be made +to determine which concessions each should receive. He proposed that +Germany be given, among others, the right of supplying all railway and +electrical materials and of installing them, and that all further +political, financial, or economic measures should be carried through by +the two Powers together. Eckardstein states that he sent a long telegram +to Berlin in regard to this conversation, but received no reply +(Eckardstein, II, 357 f.). The editors of _G.P._, however, found no such +telegram (_G.P._, XVII, 333 n.), nor is there any mention of the +proposal in any of the documents published by them or by the British. +Still the offer may have been made, as will be evident later. Hammann, +director of the press department in the German foreign office at that +time, has also written that on the dismissal of el-Menebhi, the British +government proposed common action to the German government, but that it +was refused (Otto Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges. +Erinnerungen aus den Jahren 1897-1906_ [Berlin, 1918], pp. 139 f.).] + +[Footnote 231: Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 338 +f., No. 5182.] + +[Footnote 232: Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 8, 1901, _ibid._, 339 f., No. +5183; Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 8, 1901, _ibid._, 341, No. 5184; Bülow to +F. O., Aug. 9, 1901, _ibid._, 341 f., No. 5185.] + +[Footnote 233: _B.D._, Vol. II, chap. x; Newton, pp. 221 ff.] + +[Footnote 234: On that meeting see Lee, II, 130 f.; Lascelles to +Lansdowne, Aug. 25, 1901, _B.D._, I, 259, No. 323; Lascelles to +Lansdowne, Aug. 23, 1901, _ibid._, II, 73, No. 90; memo. by William II, +Aug. 23, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 94 ff., No. 5023. For the meeting Lansdowne +gave to King Edward a memorandum on the questions which might be brought +up. “With regard to Morocco,” he wrote, “the policy of the German and +British Governments would appear to be identical. Both desire the +maintenance of the _status quo_, and both would probably resent any +indignity offered to the Moorish Envoy who lately visited, and was +received with honours at the German and British Courts” (_ibid._, 124, +No. 5033). By mistake King Edward gave a copy of this memorandum to the +Emperor, whose government responded with a similar communication to the +British government. The statement about Morocco was as follows: “In +Morocco we follow a policy of reserve. The Morocco question by itself is +not sufficiently important for us to justify a policy by which Germany +might incur the risk of serious international complications” (_ibid._, +129, No. 5025, Anlage).] + +[Footnote 235: Memo. by Lansdowne (very secret), Nov. 11, 1901, _B.D._, +II, 78, No. 92. Late in July, Lascelles had expressed to Eckardstein his +personal opinion that an alliance between Great Britain and the Triple +Alliance was hardly possible, that at most one between Great Britain and +Germany was all that could be expected (Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, +1901, _G.P._, XVII, 91, No. 5021).] + +[Footnote 236: Memo. by Lansdowne, Nov. 11 and Dec. 4, 1901, _B.D._, II, +76 ff., Nos. 92 f.] + +[Footnote 237: Memo. by Lansdowne, Dec. 4, 1901, _ibid._, 79 f., No. 93, +and Salisbury’s minutes.] + +[Footnote 238: Lansdowne to Lascelles, Dec. 19, 1901, _ibid._, 80 ff., +No. 94; memo. by Metternich, Dec. 28, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 111 ff., No. +5030.] + +[Footnote 239: Lee, II, 133 ff.] + +[Footnote 240: Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 16, 1902, _B.D._, I, 268, +No. 331; Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 11, 1902, _ibid._, 274 f., No. +340; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 3, 1902, _ibid._, II, 84, No. 95; +memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 27, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 109 f., No. 5028; +William II to Edward VII, Dec. 30, 1901, _ibid._, 110 f., No. 5029.] + +[Footnote 241: He was quoting Frederick the Great (Bülow, I, 242). See +Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 19, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 194 f., No. 5073; +Bülow to Metternich, Nov. 26, 1901, _ibid._, 195 ff., No. 5074; +Metternich to F. O., Nov. 26, 1901, _ibid._, 197 ff., No. 5075; Buchanan +to Lansdowne, Nov. 20, 1901, _B.D._, I, 263, No. 325; Lansdowne to +Buchanan, Nov. 26 and Dec. 3, 1901, _ibid._, 263, No. 326; 265, No. 328; +Lansdowne to Lascelles, Jan. 14, 1902, _ibid._, 266 f., Nos. 329 f.; +Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 16, 1902, _ibid._, 268 f., No. 332. Cf. +Chirol, p. 297; Gwynn, I, 350.] + +[Footnote 242: Lee, II, 138 ff.; _B.D._, I, Nos. 334 ff.] + +[Footnote 243: Bülow to Metternich, March 13, 1902, _G.P._, XVII, 149 +ff., No. 5046.] + +[Footnote 244: Newton, pp. 247 f.] + +[Footnote 245: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 12 and 14, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 28 +f., Nos. 5393 f.; memo. by Bülow, Sept. 14, 1901, _ibid._, 29 ff., No. +5395.] + +[Footnote 246: Alvensleben to F. O., Feb. 19, 1902, _ibid._, XVII, 156 +f., No. 5049; Bülow to Alvensleben, Feb. 22, 1902, _ibid._, 157 ff., No. +5050; memo. by Bülow, Feb. 25, 1902, _ibid._, 160 ff., No. 5051; and the +following documents.] + +[Footnote 247: See below.] + +[Footnote 248: Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 31, 1901, _ibid._, XVIII, 737, +No. 5844.] + +[Footnote 249: Eckardstein, III, 93.] + +[Footnote 250: Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, pp. 144 f.] + + + + + CHAPTER VI + + THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE + + I + + +The Boer War had revealed to Great Britain the depth of antagonism +toward her among the European nations and the haphazard inadequacy of +her defensive preparations. The British government had therefore sought +the support of Germany and of Japan. But the alliance with the second +had not compensated for the rebuff from the first; and in 1902 the +future direction of the British foreign policy, particularly with +reference to Europe, remained undecided. + +In February, 1903, Mr. Balfour, who succeeded Lord Salisbury as premier +in 1902, appointed as a permanent body a Committee of Imperial Defence, +whose duty, he said, was + + +to survey as a whole the strategical military needs of the Empire, to +deal with the complicated questions which are all essential elements in +that general problem, and to revise from time to time their own previous +decisions, so that the Cabinet shall always have at its disposal +information upon these important points.[251] + + +Great Britain also wanted to maintain peace, to settle her outstanding +international difficulties, and to form ententes. In the first part of +1903 the government tried to co-operate with the various Powers. In +January and February it asked the aid of Austria-Hungary and Italy in +preventing Russia from sending ships of war through the Dardanelles and +the Bosphorus. The two states refused although both were cordial friends +of Great Britain.[252] Moreover, the British government associated +itself with Germany in the Venezuela affair and expressed its +willingness to participate in the Bagdad Railway. British public opinion +protested strenuously, however, for it mistrusted Germany, regarding her +as so chauvinistic, so hungry for colonies, so bold in her naval +ambitions as to be not a friend but a rival. Hence the government had to +settle the one affair as quickly as possible and, in March, to recede +entirely from its stand on the other.[253] + +Anglo-Russian relations were most troublesome. Early in 1903 the +antagonism of these two Powers became acute all along the line from the +Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to Persia to Afghanistan to Tibet to +China. The British government offered in March to negotiate over +Afghanistan, but Russia refused.[254] Still more pressing for Great +Britain was the problem which resulted from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. +In April, 1903, the renewal of Russian activity in Manchuria and its +extension into the Yalu Valley caused a grave increase of tension +between Russia and Japan.[255] The revived danger of war between those +two states brought home to the British government the urgent need of +assurance that it would not become involved if hostilities did ensue. By +the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the _casus foederis_ would +arise only in case of an attack upon one of the allies by two or more +Powers. Manifestly it would depend upon France and upon the nature of +her obligations as ally to Russia whether Great Britain could preserve +neutrality in case of a conflict.[256] Hence the British government, +which in the previous year had refused to touch the dangerous Moroccan +question, now concluded to accept the French proposal for a Moroccan +accord and to liquidate the various differences with France. It would +thereby win a friend who could act as mediator between Great Britain and +Russia and would make certain that a Russo-Japanese war would not +involve the allies of those Powers. + +The way toward France instead of Germany was indicated clearly by the +drift of British public opinion; for while the animosity between the +British and German peoples had increased in 1902 and 1903, the flow of +vituperation between the British and French press over the Boer War and +the Dreyfus case[257] had practically ceased, and concerted movements +were on foot to create a popular basis for an “entente cordiale.” + +Political and business groups took the lead in this work. By 1903 King +Edward, who two years previously had desired an alliance with Germany, +advocated strongly a _rapprochement_ with France. His personal dislike +and mistrust of his nephew, William II, and of Germany, his wide +knowledge of men and of international affairs, his sensitiveness to +currents of public opinion, caused him to incline toward France.[258] +His willingness to take the initiative in clarifying public opinion and +in defending British interests enabled him to play an important rôle in +transforming British foreign relations.[259] One of his advisers was +Lord Esher, a man who held no official position but who exerted quiet +influence upon court, government, and press. Particularly interested in +naval and military problems, he was instrumental in creating the +Committee of Imperial Defence, of which he became a permanent member. +Through him the press leaders were kept informed about the needs of +defense and were guided toward friendship with France.[260] The +influence of the business world in the same direction was represented by +Mr. Thomas Barclay, former president of the British Chamber of Commerce +in Paris and an active worker for the improvement of international +relations. In 1901 he began a campaign in both France and England for a +_rapprochement_, to which during the next two years he devoted his +entire time and fortune.[261] In England these efforts had complete +success.[262] In France they encountered more difficulty, for France had +usually been the loser in Anglo-French diplomatic battles. However, the +_revanche_ anti-German group, the socialists and internationalists, and +the commercial and business elements approved. Then, after the French +people at large became convinced that Great Britain was not so +thoroughly egoistic and chauvinistic as they had supposed, and that she +really felt amicable toward France, they heartily welcomed a +_rapprochement_ as flattering and beneficial to their country.[263] +Nevertheless, they remained skeptical about the durability of any +entente with their old rival. The French press laid down as conditions +for one that the Dual Alliance should not be weakened thereby and that +Great Britain should convince France of her serious intentions by +treating her equitably in the settlement of their colonial differences, +particularly the Moroccan question.[264] This mistrust was not entirely +dispelled for several years. + +Informal conversations for an agreement were resumed in April, 1903, +between representatives of the two governments.[265] Then King Edward +visited Paris (May 1-5); and, although at first he was met with cold +silence, his felicity of speech and act soon won the French people. As a +French Anglophobe said to a friend: “I can’t think what has come over +the population of Paris. The first day they behaved well; the second +day, they merely displayed interest; but the third day, _c’était +attristant—ils ont acclamé le Roi!_”[266] This visit, so unexpectedly +successful, created a favorable atmosphere for further +negotiations.[267] Later in the month, at M. Cambon’s initiative, the +project of a treaty of arbitration was taken up.[268] In July, when +President Loubet, accompanied by M. Delcassé, returned the King’s visit, +the newspapers reported a statement by King Edward to the effect that M. +Loubet would be more heartily welcomed in England than any chief of +state had ever been. The President was able to speak of the Entente +Cordiale as established.[269] + +During the visit the foreign ministers agreed that the time was “in +every way propitious for a frank exchange of opinions.” They began that +long negotiation from which the Entente Cordiale was to result. They +discussed the question of the fishing rights off the coast of +Newfoundland, the question of Siam, of the New Hebrides, of Sokoto, of +the treatment of British firms in French Congo, and of Morocco. The +French Minister frankly stated that if they could come to terms over +Morocco, “all other difficulties would disappear, or become +comparatively easy to deal with.” While denying any desire “to get rid +of the Sultan or to annex his country” or to “force the pace,” he +declared that in view of the rapidly waning authority of the Sultan, +France could not regard with indifference the prevalence of chronic +disorder in Morocco or permit any other Power to undertake the task of +regenerating the land. What France wished, said M. Delcassé, was a +“reasonable assurance that their policy would not be obstructed by Great +Britain.” + +In reply, Lord Lansdowne made three conditions for an accord over +Morocco. First, British interests in the Mediterranean seaboard of +Morocco, particularly in Tangier and the neighboring coast, must be +protected. Second, Spanish ambitions must be fairly dealt with. Third, +complete equality of economic opportunity in Morocco must be assured. M. +Delcassé unhesitatingly accepted all three stipulations. Then the +British Minister proposed that they make the settlement a comprehensive +one by including the Egyptian question. Again the French Minister +agreed, provided they reached accord “as to the position of France and +Morocco.”[270] + +A few days later M. Cambon made to the British Minister a more detailed +statement of the French proposal. Concerning Morocco, he said, the two +governments could agree that the existing constitution _au point de vue +politique_ as well as _au point de vue territorial_ should be +maintained. But the British should acknowledge that France “has a +peculiar interest in maintaining peace within that country, and in +assisting the Moorish Government to bring about the administrative, +economical, and financial improvements of which Morocco stands so much +in need.” The French, in turn, should expressly attest that these +improvements would not infringe in any way upon the principle of +commercial liberty. The two governments, continued M. Cambon, might co- +operate in securing a free passage through the Straits of Gibraltar by +preventing the erection of any fortifications on the southern shore. +When Lord Lansdowne raised the objection that Great Britain was +interested in other parts of the Moorish littoral besides that abutting +on the straits, the Ambassador readily acknowledged this point, and +remarked that France wished to prevent any Power from establishing +itself at any strategic position on the Moroccan coast. + +As M. Cambon did not mention the Egyptian problem, the British Minister +immediately stated that its inclusion was an absolute condition to any +consideration of the Moorish question. The Ambassador proposed that they +leave Egypt alone for the present; but, when this suggestion was +refused, he declared that if the French government, by acknowledging the +permanency of the British hold upon that land, extracted this “big thorn +from the foot of Great Britain,” it would expect _une grosse +compensation_. This, he said, “might take the shape of greater liberty +of action in Morocco—something less remote and conjectural . . . . than +she [France] had yet asked for.”[271] + +After this agreement upon the questions to be included in the +negotiation there remained the other preliminary matter of how to deal +with Spain. Lord Lansdowne thought that “it would not be difficult for +us to come to terms with France if Spain were out of the way.”[272] But, +bound by the promise of the previous March to that Power and more +desirous of having weak and decadent Spain than powerful France control +the south shore of the straits, he upheld Spain’s interest in Morocco. +M. Cambon declared that his government acknowledged this position, +mentioning the Franco-Spanish negotiations of 1902 as proof. At his +suggestion they decided on August 5 that a subsequent settlement between +France and Spain in harmony with the proposed Anglo-French accord be +made and be communicated to the British government.[273] + +The negotiations over these complex problems lasted almost ten months. +Two months passed before the British answer was ready; for the members +of the cabinet were on their vacation, a ministerial crisis occurred in +September as a result of which several resigned,[274] and Lord Cromer, +British consul-general and agent in Egypt, had to be consulted. This +influential official had previously received permission to send Sir +Eldon Gorst, financial adviser to the Egyptian government, to Paris in +the autumn in order to sound the French government about converting the +Egyptian debt and abolishing the _caisse de la dette_. Foreseeing the +failure of that effort unless the British government made concessions in +Morocco, Lord Cromer urged it to do so. He realized that thereby Morocco +would “to all intents and purposes become before long a French +province”; none the less he supported the proposed accord fully to +strengthen British control in Egypt, and played a major rôle during the +negotiations in determining the British policy.[275] + +On October 1 Lord Lansdowne stated to M. Cambon the British conditions +for an arrangement.[276] He accepted the French proposal about Morocco +with slight modifications. He suggested that France should agree not to +erect any military or naval works along the Moroccan coast from Algeria +to Mazaghan, and that the two Powers should engage not to permit any +others to do so; that a certain amount of territory in Northern Morocco +“should be recognized as destined to fall under Spanish influence” and +that “in the event of a complete collapse of the Sultan’s authority,” +Spain should be intrusted with the administration of the Moroccan +seaboard as far south as Mazaghan. However, Spain was to “be precluded +from fortifying this portion of the coast, and also from alienating it +or her existing possessions in Morocco to another Power.” As the _quid +pro quo_ for these concessions to France, the British Minister required +in Egypt the lifting of the time limit to the British occupation and the +French sanction of the abolishment of the _caisse de la dette_, the +reorganization of the railway administration, and the conversion of the +Egyptian debt. He also requested the consent of the French government to +examine at some future time proposals abolishing the capitulations in +Egypt and “tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative and judicial +systems to those in force in other civilized countries.” “His Majesty’s +Government would, on their side,” he continued, “be ready to examine, in +consultation with the Government of the French Republic, similar +proposals with regard to Morocco, if at any future period France should +acquire so predominant a position in Morocco as to become outwardly +responsible for the good government of the country.” The other questions +considered in the Minister’s reply, those of Newfoundland, Siam, New +Hebrides, Nigeria, Zanzibar, and Madagascar, were less significant.[277] + +With the offers of each party known, the bargaining began. On October 27 +M. Cambon replied. He was still averse to dealing with the Egyptian +affair so fully, and declared that the terms offered were unequal; for, +whereas France received “hopes” alone in Morocco, Great Britain would +enjoy immediate and concrete benefits in Egypt. Moreover, France would +have to settle with Spain, and might even have to reckon with the +pretensions of Germany. So he suggested that the proposed changes in +Egypt be introduced _pari passu_ with correlative ones in Morocco. He +also objected to giving Spain control over any seacoast farther south +than the Sebou River. He further suggested that Great Britain and France +undertake “to maintain, save for the consequences of the present accord, +the territorial _status quo_ within a radius of 500 miles around the +straits.”[278] + +When these terms were submitted to Lord Cromer, he was pleased with the +progress that had been made. “Who would have imagined, only a short time +ago,” he wrote Lord Lansdowne, November 1, “that we should ever have got +so far? . . . . We _must_ manage to come to terms. . . . . I regard this +as by far the most important diplomatic affair that we have had in hand +for a long time past. . . . . _We must not fail_.” He added that Great +Britain was asking for much more in Egypt than she offered France in +return in Morocco. Lord Lansdowne agreed with him; but, he said, the +French “are extremely anxious to have their position in Morocco +recognized, and we must turn this feeling to account.” His suggestion to +Lord Cromer that consideration of the conversion of the Egyptian debt be +postponed so as to diminish the difficulties was not carried into +execution.[279] + +On November 19 Lord Lansdowne replied to M. Cambon that he was willing +to limit the Spanish and the neutralized portions of the Moroccan coast +to those between Melilla and Rabat; but he refused the French proposal +concerning the simultaneous introduction of changes in Egypt and +Morocco, particularly the change by which the “abandonment of financial +control by France in Egypt would proceed _pari passu_ with the +acquisition of financial control by France in Morocco.” He likewise +wished the French government to join Great Britain “in addressing the +other Powers for the purpose of securing their assent” to the suggested +British changes in Egypt. And he held out for absolute guaranties of +full economic liberty in Morocco.[280] + +In the French response of December 9 M. Cambon reported that his +government agreed to assist the British government in obtaining the +assent of the other Powers to the Egyptian changes; but he objected +strongly to the exclusion of Rabat from the French sphere. Moreover, he +desired that the period of commercial liberty in Morocco be limited to +fifteen or twenty years, and that the construction and administration of +railways and ports there be kept under governmental control. In +explaining the five-hundred-mile proposal, M. Cambon pointed out +Germany’s designs upon Morocco which had recently been renewed, in all +probability under the encouragement of Spain. He recalled the Spanish +proposal in 1887 for the assembly of a European conference to discuss +the Moroccan question, and added: + + +It was quite likely that some such proposal might now be revived. It was +in view of these circumstances that the French Government had proposed +the maintenance of the _status quo_ within a radius of 500 miles from +the Straits—a radius which would include the Balearic Islands, in which +Germany might perhaps desire to obtain a footing.[281] + + +Both Lord Lansdowne and Lord Cromer knew that Germany was interested in +the fate of Morocco, and they fully anticipated a request from her for +some territory there, for example, Rabat or some other port. They also +realized that the French expected Great Britain to help in keeping +Germany out of Morocco, and Lord Cromer gathered from conversations with +French officials in Egypt that the French would like to embroil Great +Britain and Germany, bring about an Anglo-Russian agreement, and isolate +Germany. As both statesmen felt that a demand on the part of Germany for +a coaling station would be very awkward to meet, Lord Lansdowne did +nothing to clarify the situation beyond refusing M. Cambon’s anti-German +project.[282] He thereby left to the French the possibility of forcing +Great Britain to aid them in case Germany did try to intervene in the +Moroccan question. + +In reply to M. Cambon on December 11 Lord Lansdowne signified his +apprehension that if Rabat were not neutralized France might later +transform it into a torpedo-boat station. The other points concerning +Morocco he agreed to, except that he extended the limit for commercial +equality to fifty years.[283] + +Thus far the negotiations had proceeded smoothly. The Anglo-French +arbitration treaty had been signed on October 14. Agreement over the two +main questions, those of Egypt and of Morocco, had practically been +reached.[284] And on November 23 M. Delcassé had been able to declare in +the French Chamber, with evident reference to Great Britain, that “when +one speaks today of a Moroccan problem, the idea that in the solution +the decisive word pertains to France has become almost familiar and +appears almost natural, even to those who in the past would have +believed themselves obliged to oppose it with the greatest vigor.”[285] + + + II + + +These discussions had been closely connected with another diplomatic +movement. The Anglo-French _rapprochement_ was logically followed by +attempts at an Anglo-Russian settlement which in turn would have an +alleviating effect upon Russo-Japanese relations. The British and French +governments immediately recognized this fact, as did also Count +Lamsdorff, Russian foreign minister. In July, just after M. Delcassé’s +visit to England, conversations began, at the instigation of the French +Foreign Minister,[286] between Lord Lansdowne and the Russian +Ambassador. The British Foreign Secretary remarked to Count +Benckendorff, July 29, as follows: “If Russia would put us in full +possession of her ideas, and if she would bear in mind that for any +concessions which she obtained from us we should expect corresponding +concessions from her, I believe that we might put an end to the +unfortunate rivalry which had so long prevailed between us in China and +in the other parts of Asia.” But he declared a few days later that until +he was “thoroughly satisfied” by Russia, especially as to Manchuria, he +“must remain observant and critical.” The Ambassador, who seemed +favorable toward a general agreement, left in August for a visit to St. +Petersburg, and did not see Lord Lansdowne again until November 7.[287] + +An understanding along the lines mentioned by Lord Lansdowne would have +settled both the Anglo-Russian and the Russo-Japanese problems. As an +inducement to a _rapprochement_ the British Foreign Secretary was +showing compliance with Russia’s policy in the Balkans, + + +even to the extent [wrote on October 26 Sir Louis Mallet, précis writer +to Lord Lansdowne] of suggesting reforms which will give them [Russia] a +foothold in the Balkans. H. M. G. are therefore committed to a certain +extent to a policy of not opposing Russia’s advance to Constantinople. +At least, I read it in that light. . . . . It’s a chance Russia will +never get again of buying off our opposition to their advance to +Constantinople.[288] + + +Russia, however, continued her Asiatic activity, so objectionable to +Great Britain and Japan. She dallied with the Japanese offer of +agreement over their Chinese differences while she made new demands on +China, extended her interests in the Yalu Valley and in Seoul itself, +and seemed on the way to take Korea.[289] She asserted her right to send +agents into Afghanistan at will, contrary to the old understanding with +Great Britain; and on October 5 made a communication to the British +government on that subject which Sir Charles Hardinge, assistant +undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, regarded as “peremptory in +tone, and almost discourteous in its terms.”[290] + +In this grave situation Lord Lansdowne besought the help of the French +government in restraining Russia. On October 26 he expressed regret to +M. Cambon over the absence of frankness in Anglo-Russian intercourse. +“Their conduct [the Russian government’s],” he complained, “placed us in +a very embarrassing position.” The pledges which they gave—for example, +with respect to the evacuation of Manchuria—remained unfulfilled. “We +were . . . . told that the obstructiveness of the Chinese was to blame. +There might be some truth in this, but it was impossible to test the +truth of the assertion unless the Russian Government would really tell +us what they wanted.” Lord Lansdowne expressed the hope that during +Count Lamsdorff’s forthcoming visit to Paris (October 29-31) his +conversations with M. Delcassé “might indirectly have an effect upon the +attitude of the Russian Government towards that of this country.”[291] + +M. Delcassé took the hint. Count Lamsdorff agreed with him on the value +of an arrangement with both Great Britain and with Japan.[292] He also +expressed publicly Russia’s satisfaction with the Anglo-French and the +Franco-Italian _rapprochements_.[293] + +This intercession had an immediate result. When Count Benckendorff +returned to London, Lord Lansdowne summed up his assertions, November 7, +as follows: + + +Count Lamsdorff felt strongly that it was of importance that an +endeavour should be made to remove all sources of misunderstanding +between the two Governments, and that there should be “a change for the +better” in our relations. Count Benckendorff was therefore instructed to +discuss frankly with me the various questions outstanding between Great +Britain and Russia, with the object of arriving at an agreement as to +the manner in which they should be dealt with. In the meantime, the +Russian Government would be careful to avoid any action bearing the +appearance of hostility to this country. + + +Lord Lansdowne was pleased at this response, for, as he said, he “had +been seriously concerned at the position into which the two Powers were +apparently drifting.” The two men then discussed in general terms the +questions dividing their countries.[294] On November 17 and 25 they +returned to the subject, and on November 22 King Edward and Sir Charles +Hardinge each had an interview with Count Benckendorff. The Count stated +that “the moment was riper now for a friendly understanding than at any +time during the past twenty years.” He said that the matters for +consideration “seemed naturally to group themselves into (1) questions +concerning China in which Russia had a special interest (2) questions +concerning India, in which Great Britain had a special interest and (3) +questions concerning Persia in which both Powers were interested.” But +it became clear from these conversations that the Ambassador was +instructed merely to discuss the problems, that he had no definite +proposals to make. Nor were the discussions satisfactory. The Ambassador +could make no statement about Russian aims in China. He objected to the +division of Persia into spheres of influence. He protested strongly +against the British expedition to Tibet announced in that month. He +refused to put anything on paper about Afghanistan. + +In order to make some headway, Lord Lansdowne made a frank exposition of +the British desires. On December 11 Count Lamsdorff voiced “much +satisfaction” with this “ready response.” The British Ambassador urged +him to make “an early and equally frank expression of the views of the +Russian Government,” which might “lead to a satisfactory understanding.” +Count Lamsdorff promised to try to reply before February 2, when +Parliament was to reassemble. And Count Benckendorff planned to go to +St. Petersburg early in 1904 for consultation.[295] + +Just as Lord Lansdowne had expected, the negotiations did not proceed +beyond that point; Russia would not limit her Asiatic ambitions. She +would not accept the British terms, which of course included +stipulations concerning China satisfactory to Japan, nor would she +settle with Japan alone. Count Lamsdorff was willing to do so; but, as +was well known by the other governments, he had no control over Russia’s +far eastern policy. Since August this policy had been directed by the +viceroy in the Far East, back of whom stood the Czar and the coterie +around him interested in Russian expansion into Manchuria and Korea. +Count Lamsdorff’s hands were tied; Russian activity made war with Japan +a certainty. Toward the end of 1903 this menace grew so ominous that on +December 11 Lord Lansdowne warned M. Cambon as follows: + + +H. E. [His Excellency] was no doubt aware that, under the Agreement with +Japan, our intervention could only be demanded in case that Power were +assailed by two others. On the other hand, public opinion here might +render it extremely difficult for us to remain inactive if Russia were +to find some pretext for attacking Japan and were to endeavour to crush +her out of existence. + +It seemed to me in these circumstances that it was the duty of our two +Governments, which were, I rejoiced to think, at this moment in such +friendly relations, to do all in their power to keep the peace.[296] + + +The French government reciprocated this wish, and let the British +government perceive that it would not enter a Russo-Japanese war. Early +in January the other Powers also asserted their intention of remaining +neutral.[297] + +Having been fully informed about Russo-Japanese relations, the British +government had recognized the danger of war since July and had in +consequence not let the negotiations with France lag or fail.[298] But +since it now felt reasonably certain of not being drawn into the +impending struggle, it allowed the transactions with France, on January +13, 1904, to come to a deadlock over a question hitherto cursorily +considered. M. Delcassé requested territorial indemnity for the +relinquishment of certain fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland; +and the British government refused to give the amount desired. The +difficulty imperiled the entire settlement since both sides were so +fearful of public opinion that they refused to make concessions.[299] +But on February 10 the Russo-Japanese War began. Admiral Fisher was +certain that Japan would be defeated.[300] Rumors were abroad concerning +Russo-German negotiations for closing the Baltic Straits,[301] and some +British officials had misgivings that a coalition of Russia, France, and +Germany might be formed against their country.[302] Moreover, the +British government feared that a Balkan war might break out in the +spring.[303] Under these circumstances the British government could not +afford to risk alienating France.[304] + +M. Delcassé was surprised by the outbreak of the war.[305] His ambition +had been for the Anglo-French _rapprochement_ to be supplemented by an +Anglo-Russian one. Then as Italy was also trying to approach Russia, a +more or less loose grouping of France, Russia, Great Britain, Italy, +Spain, and Japan would be created.[306] Busy with the Anglo-French +negotiations, he had been misled by the optimism of the Russian +government into thinking that war would not occur.[307] He had not +appreciated fully the weakness of Count Lamsdorff’s position. Not until +January, 1904, did he perceive the danger and make belated efforts to +maintain peace. But Great Britain refused to aid him.[308] Immediately +after the war began he tried again to secure British co-operation in +stopping it. When the British government again refused, M. Delcassé +became incensed, for he saw the defeat of his larger program.[309] His +better judgment soon calmed him, however, for with France’s ally +eliminated from European affairs, he needed British co-operation more +than ever in order to keep the war from spreading[310] and to offset the +increased power of Germany. Late in February both parties were therefore +ready to compromise.[311] And, after a threat by Lord Lansdowne on March +31 to break off negotiations when the French Foreign Minister, alarmed +by French public opinion, attempted to reopen the Newfoundland +question,[312] the accord was finally completed on April 8, 1904. + +This agreement consisted of three documents: first, a convention which +settled the Newfoundland question, modified certain boundaries between +French and British colonies in Africa, and gave the Iles de Los to +France; second, a declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar, and the New +Hebrides; and third, a declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco. Only +the convention had to be submitted to the two parliaments, since it +alone provided for territorial changes in the existing possessions of +the two states. While the solution of all these difficulties established +the Entente Cordiale, the last-named declaration gave to the entente its +great significance in international affairs; for through it two of the +old sore spots in Anglo-French diplomacy were healed, and the basis for +the future co-operation of the two Powers was laid. + +By the terms of this declaration France relinquished her rights and +interests in Egypt in favor of Great Britain; Great Britain, in favor of +France in Morocco. Only the clauses concerning Morocco are of interest +here. Article II read as follows: + + +The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no +intention of altering the political status of Morocco. + +His Britannic Majesty’s Government . . . . recognize that it appertains +to France . . . . to preserve order in that country, and to provide +assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, +and military reforms which it may require. + +They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for +this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights +which Great Britain, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, +enjoys in Morocco. . . . . + + +Article IV provided for full commercial liberty, which, however, should +obtain for only thirty years. Each government reserved the right “to see +that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc. [in Morocco and +Egypt], are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the +authority of the State over these great undertakings of public +interest.” By Article VII the free passage and non-fortification of the +south shore of the Straits of Gibraltar were assured. According to +Article VIII the interests of Spain in Morocco were to be respected, and +the compact over them to be worked out between the Spanish and French +governments was to be communicated to the British government. Article IX +was included at the insistence of the British government, which planned +thereby to enjoy French support in obtaining the acquiescence of the +other Powers to the proposed changes in Egypt. Although the French +reluctantly agreed to it, it eventually proved to be of the greatest +value to them. It read as follows: “The two Governments agree to afford +to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the +execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and +Morocco.” + +Five secret articles supplemented the public agreement. Article I was as +follows: + + +In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the +force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt and +Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards each other +by Articles IV, VI and VII of the Declaration of to-day’s date would +remain intact. + + +Article II was included at the wish of the British: + + +His Britannic Majesty’s Government have no present intention of +proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the Capitulations, +or in the judicial organization of Egypt. + +In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce into Egypt +reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in +force in other civilized countries, the Government of the French +Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the +understanding that His Britannic Majesty’s Government will agree to +entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may +have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in +Morocco. + + +Articles III and IV marked out the portion of Morocco which should come +within the “sphere of influence” of Spain “whenever the Sultan ceases to +exercise authority over it,” and provided for the validity of the Anglo- +French declaration in case Spain refused to make an agreement.[313] +Article V concerned the Egyptian debt. + +The contradictions in the accord are apparent. The “political status” in +Morocco was to be preserved, but it would take a statesman trained in +diplomatic casuistry to explain how this was possible with France alone +making all the proposed internal reforms. Of course, what was meant was +that the “international status” of the land should be respected. +However, the terms of the secret articles foresaw a future change even +in that; and it can hardly be called showing a nice regard for Morocco’s +international and sovereign independence for two alien Powers to set a +time limit to the right of commercial liberty in that land. The doctors +were agreeing upon a division of the patient’s property before they +began to operate. That Morocco, an independent state, would eventually +be partitioned into French and Spanish protectorates was evident to +anyone with an understanding of contemporary political practices. To +preserve peace and amity between themselves, Great Britain and France +had simply made a division of spoils at Morocco’s expense.[314] + +The new accord was most cordially welcomed by all parties in Great +Britain. In the House of Commons on June 1, Earl Percy, speaking for the +government, and Sir Edward Grey, speaking for the opposition, both +emphasized the need for Great Britain henceforth to follow a policy of +“administrative concentration and consolidation” of her empire, and +declared that similar agreements should be made with other Powers. Not +all troubles with France had been disposed of, said Earl Percy, but the +chief ones had been, and the others could now be more easily settled. As +to the terms dealing with Morocco, while he admitted that the Sultan had +not been consulted beforehand, he declared that Morocco needed setting +to rights and that France had a better claim to execute that work than +anyone else. He also emphasized the unique quality of the Entente +Cordiale. + + +The parties pledge themselves not merely to abstain from poaching on +each other’s preserves but to do all in their power to further one +another’s interests. We promise to give to one another, as friends, +advantages which are ordinarily given only to allies, and it is as a +pledge of friendship rather than as the terms of a compromise between +jealous and exacting litigants that we ask the House to consent to these +concessions. + + +Sir Edward Grey approved of the relinquishment of Morocco to France. +Together with other speakers, he praised the spirit of the agreement, +and he expressed the hope that Article IX would enable the two nations +to draw closer together by increasing the “opportunities for the +interchange of international courtesies between them.” + +During the debates Mr. Gibson Bowles declared that the agreement +amounted to a “partition of three new Polands” (Egypt, Morocco, and +Siam), “a compact of plunder.” But from a European point of view he +considered it of “the highest import,” for it signified a “return to the +. . . . system of the balance of power.” “There are stalking through +Europe,” he stated, “ambitions which must be curtailed and which may be +developed to a greater extent than seems at present. Against such it is +well to raise a visible barrier in England and France.” Mr. Balfour, the +premier, however, denied that there had been “any reversal of the +traditional policy of our party,” or that anything had been done +“prejudicial to the interests of Germany or any other Power.” + +The _Times_ did not agree with him. Its Paris correspondent wrote on +April 14 as follows: + + +The Triple Alliance has long since ceased to be the European bogey which +it once was. . . . . There is the Dual Alliance, the Anglo-French +Agreement, and the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_, with benevolent +diplomatic neutrality on the part of Russia. Now, in the midst of this +happy family, the Triple Alliance only appears as the ghost of its +former self. + + +The editorial comment of that paper was in a similar tone. + + +The days have gone by when the Germans could assume with some shadow of +plausibility that in the larger questions of international politics +Great Britain must follow in the wake of the Triple Alliance, and that +the attitude of France might be ignored. There is no alliance between +them, but there is a cordial understanding which will induce both to +discuss all subjects affecting them fairly and without jealousy or +suspicion, and which, combined with the relations in which they stand to +Italy, must exercise a great influence upon all States, and, it may be, +a great attraction upon some of them. + + +Events soon proved that the _Times’s_ estimate of that entente was more +accurate than that of Mr. Balfour.[315] + +Although happily surprised by the conclusion of the Anglo-French +agreement, French public opinion did not accept the accord as whole- +heartedly as did the British. Opposition to various parts of the +settlement was expressed by extremists who regretted the final +renunciation of French ambitions in Egypt and who thought that French +interests in Siam and elsewhere had not been adequately upheld; by those +in the maritime districts of Northern and Northwestern France who +criticized the terms concerning Newfoundland as disastrous to French +fishing interests in that region; and more or less openly by the enemies +of M. Combes, the premier, whose stringent anticlerical policy had +aroused bitter antagonism among the French. These critical forces, +however, were more than offset by the elements who praised the +agreement. “It is equitable, the equilibrium of the accord is +irreproachable,” wrote M. de Caix. The recognition of France’s special +interests in Morocco was especially commended by almost all parties. The +strengthening of France’s international position was also acknowledged +with satisfaction. In reporting the agreement to the Chamber of Deputies +on November 3 M. Deloncle declared: “We do not wish a . . . . passing +entente between our two countries. We think . . . . of the formation of +accords always more intimate and durable, which, loyally executed by +both parties, . . . . on the basis of reciprocal confidence, will cement +the community and solidarity of the two countries.” Alliance with +Russia, friendship with Great Britain, was the popular formula. + +Nevertheless, the convention over Newfoundland was accepted by the +Chamber only on condition that M. Delcassé attempt to reopen the +question with the British government. Many warned M. Delcassé not to +trust Great Britain too far, not to permit the entente to assume in any +way the character of an alliance, and not to involve France in the +Anglo-German rivalry. In the Chamber on November 8 M. Delafosse declared +that the accord signified a “detente,” not an “entente.” M. René Millet, +former governor of Tunis, wrote that the arrangement was “a retreat in +good order” which “does not justify the enthusiasm with which it has +been received.” M. Millet found insufficient the diplomatic preparation +for the French action in Morocco. + + +It is not possible [he wrote] for France to undertake anything without +knowing the thoughts of Germany. . . . . Our bad will toward the Germans +will only render them more imperious, and, without declaring war, they +will have more than one means of being disagreeable to us, especially at +the time when Russia . . . . is unable to help us. . . . . Of all +pretensions, the most foolish would be to wish to isolate the German +Empire, as certain musketeers of the press advise.[316] + + +Alarmed by the criticism of the Newfoundland convention, M. Delcassé +tried in June and July to obtain some further concessions from the +British government.[317] Although he had no success, he felt compelled +during the debates in the French Chamber, November 3-10, to promise to +reopen negotiations on the Newfoundland question. Otherwise, he feared a +rejection. This meaningless concession, together with the fact that the +entente had already proved its value by enabling M. Delcassé to mediate +between Great Britain and Russia in October for a peaceful settlement of +the Dogger Bank episode,[318] smoothed the path for parliamentary +approbation. Hence M. Delcassé, in his speech of defense, was able to +confine himself to generalities. He reviewed his achievement of the +ententes with Italy, Spain, and Great Britain, by which the Moroccan +question had been settled in favor of France and by which the French +position in the world had been elevated. He advocated a policy of peace +and conciliation, but he also declared that France must maintain her +defenses. + + +And this is what procures for France [he concluded], augmented in her +credit and prestige, the trust and sympathy of the world. The world is +convinced to-day that French policy does not seek the advantage for +France other than in the harmony of French interests with the interests +of others. And she is happy to affirm that that harmony, which no one +believes or pretends to believe unrealisable, is being realised each day +to the benefit of all. + +It will be the honor of our democracy to have practiced that policy. + + +He was roundly applauded, and his achievements were approved by both +Parliament and people. The accord was ratified in the Chamber by a vote +of 443 to 105, and in the Senate by one of 215 to 37.[319] + + +[Footnote 251: 4 Hansard, Vol. CXVIII, col. 1579.] + +[Footnote 252: See Rodd to Lansdowne, Jan. 9, 1903, _B.D._, IV, 41 f., +No. 32, and following documents. However, an extract from _Defence +Committee Paper 1b_ (Feb. 11, 1903), read as follows: “What difference +would it make to the balance of power in the Mediterranean if Russia +were to obtain, through possession of Constantinople, free egress from +the Black Sea through the Dardanelles, these remaining closed, as at +present, against other Powers? + +“The answer to this question unanimously accepted by the Committee was +that, while Russia would no doubt obtain certain naval advantages from +the change, it would not fundamentally alter the present strategic +position in the Mediterranean.” + +An extract from _Defence Committee Paper 2b_ of the same month read as +follows: “It may be stated generally that a Russian occupation of the +Dardanelles, or an arrangement for enabling Russia to freely use the +waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, such as her +dominating influence can extract from Turkey at her pleasure, would not +make any marked difference in our strategic dispositions as compared +with present conditions” (_B.D._, IV, 59 f.). This opinion was approved +on April 22, 1904, by King Edward and by Sir Charles Hardinge, who had +just been appointed ambassador at St. Petersburg (Lee, _King Edward +VII_, II, 289 f.). It apparently led to a change of policy in the autumn +of 1903 (see below).] + +[Footnote 253: Chirol, _Fifty Years in a Changing World_, pp. 276 ff.; +_G.P._, Vol. XVII, chaps. cxii, cxiv, Part A; _B.D._, Vol. II, chap. +xii. See also Lansdowne to Curzon, April 24, 1903, Newton, _Lord +Lansdowne_, p. 254.] + +[Footnote 254: See _B.D._, IV, 41 ff., Nos. 32 ff.; memo. on British +policy in Persia, Oct. 31, 1905, _ibid._, 365 ff., No. 321; memo. +respecting Russia and Afghanistan, Oct. 14, 1903, _ibid._, 512 ff., No. +465; Newton, pp. 271 ff.] + +[Footnote 255: The Japanese Foreign Minister, in communicating to the +British Minister on April 27 the Russian demands to China, spoke “with +unwonted seriousness” and asserted “that he considered the situation +exceedingly grave” (MacDonald to Lansdowne, April 27, 1903, _B.D._, II, +198 ff., No. 226. The dispatch was received first on June 2, but there +is no reason to doubt that the view expressed therein was immediately +known to the British government since the two governments were in +constant communication. See Lansdowne to MacDonald, April 29, 1903, +_ibid._, 200 f., No. 228; memo. communicated by Hayashi, Japanese +minister to London, to Lansdowne, April 27, 1903, _ibid._, 201 f., No. +228, inclosure; William L. Langer, “Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg,” +_Europäische Gespräche_, June, 1926, pp. 310 ff.; Tyler Dennett, +_Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_ (New York, 1925), pp. 139 f., 355 +ff.] + +[Footnote 256: When Russo-Japanese relations became strained early in +1901, Lansdowne asked Monson whether he thought “that France is under +any engagement to take part on the side of Russia in the event of war, +or that without such obligation she would attempt to do so” (Lansdowne +to Monson, March 8, 1901, _B.D._, II, 40, No. 49). Monson replied that +he did not know whether the Dual Alliance laid down the obligation of +military aid outside of Europe, and that while the French people showed +little zeal for far eastern affairs, yet nationalistic hatred against +Great Britain might be aroused at any time and might make the French +stand uncertain (Monson to Lansdowne, March 13, 1901, _ibid._, 44 f., +No. 56). The Franco-Russian declaration of 1902 in reply to the Anglo- +Japanese Alliance stated that the Dual Alliance was extended to the Far +East, although a few days later Delcassé cast doubt upon the +significance of this engagement. While French public opinion was opposed +to becoming involved in the Far East for the sake of Russia, yet this +ambiguity left the French position in case of a war in doubt (see +above).] + +[Footnote 257: See Pinon, _France et Allemagne_, pp. 79 f.; Jean Darcy, +_France et Angleterre. Cent années de rivalité coloniale: L’Afrique_ +(Paris, 1904); Barclay, _Thirty Years: Anglo-French Reminiscences, +1876-1906_, chaps. xiii-xvi.] + +[Footnote 258: Philippe Crozier, who in 1903 was French minister at +Copenhagen, states that to his intimate friends King Edward “even +foresaw the hypothesis of a positive alliance” with France (“L’Autriche +et l’avant guerre,” _Revue de France_, April 15, 1921, p. 271).] + +[Footnote 259: Lee, II; Newton, pp. 292 f. Early in 1915 Balfour wrote +to Lansdowne denying that King Edward was the author of the Entente +Cordiale. “Now, so far as I remember, during the years which you and I +were his Ministers, he [King Edward] never made an important suggestion +of any sort on large questions of policy” (Newton, p. 293). This +estimate may be true, but it does not give the King credit for what he +actually did.] + +[Footnote 260: Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 185 ff. +Esher had been furnishing information to Spender, who was editor of the +_Westminster Gazette_, a Liberal paper, since 1900. Spender denies that +the British foreign office inspired the newspapers (_op. cit._, I, +185).] + +[Footnote 261: J. L. de Lanessan, _Histoire de l’entente cordiale +franco-anglaise_ (Paris, 1916), pp. 218 ff., 229, 234; Barclay, chaps. +xvii-xx.] + +[Footnote 262: The _Times_, the Northcliffe Press, the Chamberlain +Press, the _National Review_, _Fortnightly Review_, _Contemporary +Review_, the Liberals as well as the Conservatives, supported the +movement. See _G.P._, XVII, Nos. 5081-83, 5087-88, 5094, 5026-27; +Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, pp. 175 f.; Wolff, _Das +Vorspiel_, p. 135; Barclay, pp. 177 f.] + +[Footnote 263: See Barclay, chaps. xvii, xx.] + +[Footnote 264: Reports from the Belgian ministers in Paris and London, +May 4, 1902, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 105 f. Impressed with the +unanimity of friendliness toward France among the British, M. Delcassé +expressed to Monson his regret that the French did not fully reciprocate +this feeling. See Monson to Lansdowne, July 24, 1903, _B.D._, II, 302 +f., No. 361; _Bulletin_, July, 1903, pp. 211 ff.; _Quest. dipl. et +col._, XV, 656 f., XVI, 147; articles from _Figaro_ and the _Temps_ +quoted in the _London Times_, May 5, 1903; article by Etienne in the +_National Review_, July 1, 1903, esp. p. 748_a_.] + +[Footnote 265: So Eckardstein asserts, _Lebenserinnerungen, etc._, II, +337; cf. Schefer, _D’une guerre à l’autre, etc._, p. 249.] + +[Footnote 266: King Edward’s trip was a bold move, for Paris was the +center of anti-British feeling, and some members of the British +government were doubtful about its success. But the King initiated the +visit and took the entire responsibility for it, feeling certain that he +would be well received. In his first public speech, more optimistically +than truthfully, he declared: “There may have been misunderstandings and +causes of dissension in the past [between the two countries], but all +such differences are, I believe, happily removed and forgotten, and I +trust that the friendship and admiration which we all feel for the +French nation and their glorious traditions may in the near future +develop into a sentiment of the warmest affection and attachment between +the peoples of the two countries. The achievement of this aim is my +constant desire.” Quoted in the _London Times_, May 2, 1903, M. Paul +Cambon’s estimate of the significance of the King’s visit is as follows: +“Of course, King Edward helped immensely. His visit to Paris in the +spring of 1903 really made it [the Anglo-French entente] possible. . . . +.” See interview with Cambon in _ibid._, Dec. 22, 1920. On the visit see +Captain the Hon. Sir Seymour Fortescue, _Looking Back_ (London, 1920), +pp. 279 ff.; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XV, 656 f.; Lee, II, 221 ff., 236 +ff.; Barclay, p. 218; Viscount Esher, _The Influence of King Edward and +Essays on Other Subjects_ (London, 1915), pp. 57 ff.; Pinon, p. 114; +Herbert H. Asquith, _The Genesis of the War_ (New York, 1923), p. 30; +Metternich to Bülow, June 2, 1903, _G.P._, XVII, 590 ff., No. 5376; +Crozier, pp. 272 ff.; Newton, pp. 275 f., 278 f.] + +[Footnote 267: Shortly before this visit Chamberlain remarked to +Eckardstein: “Here in England the King’s visit to Paris is very popular, +and if France gives him a good reception then everything will go well +between us in the future.” See Eckardstein to Bülow, May 10, 1903, +_G.P._, XVII, 568, No. 5369; Metternich to Bülow, June 2, 1903, _ibid._, +590 ff., No. 5376.] + +[Footnote 268: Monson to Lansdowne, Jan. 20, 1902, _B.D._, II, 261 f., +No. 319; Lansdowne to Monson, May 19, 1903, _ibid._, 289, No. 352; +Monson to Lansdowne, May 22, 1903, _ibid._, 290, No. 353; Monson to +Lansdowne, May 29, 1903, _ibid._, 290 f., No. 354; Lansdowne to Monson, +July 21, 1903, _ibid._, 301 f., No. 360, and inclosures; _Annual +Register_ (1903), pp. 216 f.; Barclay, pp. 235, 242; expressions of +public opinion on this project contained in _Quest. dipl. et col._, July +1 and 15, Aug. 1, Sept. 1 and 15, 1903.] + +[Footnote 269: King Edward’s assertion had direct reference to the +German Emperor, with whom he had never agreed (_Zur europ. Politik_, I, +110; Lee, II, 244 ff.; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XVI, 147 ff.).] + +[Footnote 270: On this interview see the dispatch from Lansdowne to +Monson, July 7, 1903, _B.D._, II, 294 ff., No. 357; also Delcassé’s +interview in _Petit Parisien_, April 10, 1904, reprinted in _Quest. +dipl. et col._, April 16, 1904, pp. 616 f. Delcassé’s conversation with +Lansdowne had been prefaced by the talks between Cambon and Lansdowne +during the previous year and also by a long talk on July 2, 1903, +between Lansdowne and Etienne. Etienne had stated one of the reasons for +an Anglo-French entente as follows (the account is from the hand of the +British minister): “M. Etienne expressed his belief that the most +serious menace to the peace of Europe lay in Germany, that a good +understanding between France and England was the only means of holding +German designs in check, and that if such an understanding could be +arrived at, England would find that France would be able to exercise a +salutary influence over Russia and thereby relieve us from many of our +troubles with that country” (Lansdowne to Monson, July 2, 1903, _B.D._, +II, 293, No. 356).] + +[Footnote 271: Lansdowne to de Bunsen, July 15, 1903, _ibid._, 298, No. +358; Lansdowne to Monson, July 29, Aug. 5, 1903, _ibid._, 304 ff., Nos. +363 f.] + +[Footnote 272: Lansdowne to Durand, July 14, 1903, Newton, p. 280.] + +[Footnote 273: Then Lansdowne notified the Spanish government of the +steps which he had taken and asked for a statement of its views on the +Moroccan question. Whether Spain replied is not evident. See Lansdowne +to Monson, Aug. 5, 1903, _B.D._, II, 306 f., No. 364; Lansdowne to +Durand, Aug. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 309 f., No. 366; Newton, p. 280.] + +[Footnote 274: J. A. Spender, _The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry +Campbell-Bannerman_ (London), Vol. II, chaps. xxiii-xxiv.] + +[Footnote 275: Cromer to Lansdowne, July 17, 1903, _B.D._, II, 298 ff., +No. 359; memo. by Cromer, Aug. 7, 1903, _ibid._, 307 ff., No. 365; +Newton, pp. 280 ff.] + +[Footnote 276: Lee, II, 245 f.; Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903, +_B.D._, II, 311 ff., No. 369; 400 n.] + +[Footnote 277: Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903, _ibid._, 311 ff., No. +369.] + +[Footnote 278: Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 7, 1903, _ibid._, 317 f., No. +370; Cambon to Lansdowne, Oct. 26, 1903, _ibid._, 320 ff., No. 373.] + +[Footnote 279: Cromer to Lansdowne, Nov. 1, 1903, Lansdowne to Cromer, +Nov. 17, 1903, Newton, pp. 283 ff.] + +[Footnote 280: Cromer to Lansdowne, Oct. 30, 1903, _B.D._, II, 323, No. +374; Lansdowne to Cambon, Nov. 19, 1903, _ibid._, 324 ff., No. 376.] + +[Footnote 281: The French government, Cambon said, knew that “the Queen +of Spain during her recent visit to the Continent had been in +communication with the German Emperor upon the subject of Morocco” +(Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 9, 1903, _ibid._, 329 ff., No. 378).] + +[Footnote 282: Lansdowne to Cromer, Nov. 17, 1903, Cromer to Lansdowne, +Nov. 27, 1903, Newton, pp. 285 f.] + +[Footnote 283: Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 11, 1903, _B.D._, II, 333 f., +No. 380. It was evident that in view of the monopolistic tendencies of +the French, British trade in Morocco would practically cease at the end +of the time limit (Cromer to Lansdowne, Dec. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 332 f., +No. 379).] + +[Footnote 284: Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 13, 1904, _ibid._, 338, No. +384; Cromer to Lansdowne, Dec. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 332, No. 379.] + +[Footnote 285: Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, Dec. 1, 1903, p. 821.] + +[Footnote 286: Delcassé had received the hint from Chamberlain (see next +reference).] + +[Footnote 287: Lansdowne to Scott, July 29, Aug. 12, 1903, _B.D._, II, +212 f., Nos. 242 f. In September, Lansdowne wrote in a memorandum for +the cabinet as follows: “A good understanding with France would not +improbably be the precursor of a better understanding with Russia” (Lee, +II, 246). In July, Lansdowne also sought the co-operation of the United +States in checking Russia in the Far East (Dennis, _Adventures in +American Diplomacy_, p. 359).] + +[Footnote 288: Mallet to Spring Rice, Oct. 26, 1903, Gwynn, _Letters and +Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 366 f.] + +[Footnote 289: Lansdowne to MacDonald, July 3, 13, 1903, _B.D._, II, 206 +ff., Nos. 237 f., and the following documents. See MacDonald to +Lansdowne, Sept. 4, Oct. 1, 1903, _ibid._, 214 ff., Nos. 246, 248; +Alfred von Hedenström, _Geschichte Russlands von 1878 bis 1918_ +(Stuttgart and Berlin, 1922), p. 170; _Cambridge History of British +Foreign Policy_, III, 324 f.; Langer, pp. 312 ff.] + +[Footnote 290: _B.D._, IV, 621; memo. respecting Russia and Afghanistan, +Oct. 14, 1903, _ibid._, 518 f., No. 465; memo. on Russo-Afghan +relations, Oct. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 519 f., No. 466; Hardinge to +Lansdowne, Nov. 22, 1903, _ibid._, 194, No. 181 (_b_). There was also +trouble over Tibet and the Persian Gulf (see Newton, p. 287).] + +[Footnote 291: Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 26, 1903, _B.D._, II, 217 f., +No. 250.] + +[Footnote 292: Lansdowne to Monson, Nov. 4, 1903, _ibid._, 221 f., No. +257.] + +[Footnote 293: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 12, 1906, _ibid._, IV, 224, No. +209; Bülow to F. O., Oct. 31, 1903, _G.P._, XVIII, 853, No. 5918.] + +[Footnote 294: Lansdowne to Spring Rice, Nov. 7, 1903, _B.D._, II, 222 +ff., No. 258.] + +[Footnote 295: Lansdowne to Spring Rice, Nov. 7, 17, 25, 1903, _ibid._, +222 ff., No. 258; IV, 183 ff., Nos. 181 f.; 306 f., No. 289; Scott to +Lansdowne, Dec. 22, 1903, _ibid._, II, 226, No. 262; Lee, II, 280 f.; +Lansdowne to Cromer, Dec. 7, 1903, Newton, p. 287.] + +[Footnote 296: Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 11, 1903, _B.D._, II, 224, No. +259.] + +[Footnote 297: In Dec., 1903, Delcassé informed the Japanese Minister in +Paris that he did not approve of all of Russia’s designs in the Far East +(Dennis, p. 385). Hayashi, Japanese minister in London, believed as +early as Dec. 23 that France would remain neutral. See Eckardstein, III, +62, 188; see also Metternich to F. O., Jan. 8, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 20 f., +No. 5931; memo. by Eckardstein, Jan. 17, 1904, _ibid._, 38 ff., No. +5945; Langer, p. 317; Bülow to William II, Jan. 12, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, +26, No. 5936.] + +[Footnote 298: Lee, II, 282; Langer, pp. 316 f.; Dennis, chap. xiii. +However, as late as Nov. 4, 1903, Lansdowne did not expect war, nor did +Sir Charles Hardinge as late as Dec. 25. By Jan. 5, the latter did +(Gwynn, I, 391 f.).] + +[Footnote 299: Cambon to Lansdowne, Dec. 27, 1903, _B.D._, II, 336, No. +382; and the following documents, particularly the dispatch from +Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 339, No. 386. The British +were also surprised to learn early in January that Delcassé had kept his +colleagues in the dark concerning the details of the arrangement, and +feared some trouble on that account. It seems that as late as March 2 +Delcassé had not consulted the French Colonial Minister (Lansdowne to +Cromer, Jan. 5, 1904, Monson to Lansdowne, Jan. 8, 1904, Newton, pp. 287 +ff.).] + +[Footnote 300: _Ibid._, p. 307.] + +[Footnote 301: _G.P._, XIX, 89 f., editor’s note, and the documents in +_G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxix; Gwynn, I, 391.] + +[Footnote 302: Spring Rice to Ferguson, Feb. 4, 1904, Spring Rice to +Roosevelt (no date given, though written in Feb. or March, 1904), Gwynn, +I, 392 ff.; Sternburg to F. O., March 21, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 112, No. +5992. See also the dispatch from Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1903, +_ibid._, 18, No. 5929. Sir Charles Dilke summed up the danger of the +situation as follows: “If Germany were to declare war on Japan, Great +Britain would be forced by her treaty engagement to declare war on +Russia and Germany; and France, it is understood, to declare war upon +Great Britain and Japan” (Dilke, “The War in the Far East,” _North +American Review_, April, 1904, quoted in Dennett, p. 94).] + +[Footnote 303: Lansdowne to Monson, Feb. 17, 1904, _B.D._, V, 67 f., and +following documents.] + +[Footnote 304: Lansdowne to Monson, Feb. 25, 1904, _ibid._, II, 346, No. +391, and following documents; on March 1, King Edward wrote to Balfour +strongly advising in favor of the territorial sacrifice asked by the +French on the Newfoundland question, for, he wrote, “_more than ever +now_ [in italics in the original] we must leave no bone of contention +between ourselves and the French Government” (Lee, II, 248). See also +Holstein’s keen analysis of the situation on Jan. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, +48 ff., No. 5951. Cromer also urged his government to make concessions +(Newton, p. 289).] + +[Footnote 305: Tardieu, _La France et les alliances_, p. 23; E. J. +Dillon, _The Eclipse of Russia_ (New York, 1918), pp. 330 ff.; +Eckardstein, III, 57 ff., 187 ff.; Crozier, pp. 282 f.; Mévil, _De la +paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 83 ff.; Radolin to F. O., Feb. 11, 1904, +_G.P._, XIX, 60 f., No. 5960.] + +[Footnote 306: Mévil, p. 82.] + +[Footnote 307: For an illustration of that optimism see Nicholas II to +William II, Jan. 24, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 53, No. 5952.] + +[Footnote 308: Lansdowne to Scott, Jan. 19, 1904, _B.D._, II, 237, No. +280; Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 27, 1904, _ibid._, 240, No. 283.] + +[Footnote 309: In July, 1905, Spring Rice reported to his friend +Roosevelt a conversation which he had recently had with Lansdowne, as +follows: “In speaking in general terms of our relations with Japan, he +[Lansdowne] pointed out that from the very first our political interest +had been to prevent the war [between Russia and Japan] which would not +only expose us to great dangers of loss in Asia itself, but would +seriously imperil our good understanding with France. . . . .” Then +after explaining why Great Britain refused to press Japan to maintain +peace, he continued: “As a result we all but lost our agreement with +France” . . . . (Dennett, pp. 213 f.). Cf. Eckardstein to Schwabach, +Feb. 10, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 60, No. 5959. Spring Rice’s assertion was no +doubt exaggerated in order to prove to Roosevelt that Great Britain +really desired peace between Russia and Japan.] + +[Footnote 310: See Radolin to Bülow, March 15, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 3 f., +No. 6366.] + +[Footnote 311: See Lansdowne to Monson, March 1, 1904, _B.D._, II, 347, +No. 393, and following documents.] + +[Footnote 312: See Monson to Lansdowne, March 30, 1904, _ibid._, 357, +No. 405; Lansdowne to Monson, March 30, 31, 1904, _ibid._, 358, No. 406; +359 f., No. 408; Newton, pp. 289 f.] + +[Footnote 313: The first two articles were kept secret at Delcassé’s +desire; the next two for obvious reasons.] + +[Footnote 314: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents +diplomatiques. Accords conclus, le 8 avril, 1904, entre la France et +l’Angleterre au sujet du Maroc, de l’Egypte, de Terre-Neuve, etc._ +(Paris, 1904); _Parliamentary Papers. Declaration between the United +Kingdom and France Respecting Egypt and Morocco, together with the +Secret Articles Signed at the Same Time. Signed at London, April 8, +1904_ (Cd. 5969), Vol. CIII (1911); _B.D._, II, 373 ff., No. 417. The +secret articles were first revealed in 1911.] + +[Footnote 315: On the reaction of the British people to the accord see +Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 188 ff.; _London Times_, +April 12 and 14, 1904; _Spectator_, quoted in Schulthess, _Europäischer +Geschichtskalendar 1904_, p. 223. For the debates in the British +Parliament see 4 Hansard, Vol. CXXXV, cols. 502 ff. Adverse opinion was +expressed by Lord Rosebery, the _Daily Chronicle_, the _Morning Post_, +and Mr. Aflalo who had lived in Morocco and was particularly interested +in the fate of the land; but their voices were lost in the general +applause (Metternich to Bülow, April 9, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 13 f., No. +6375).] + +[Footnote 316: _Bulletin_, April, 1904, p. 107: Millet, _Notre politique +extérieure 1898-1905_, pp. 168, 173. Millet was a follower of Hanotaux, +Delcassé’s predecessor at the foreign office, and a consistent critic of +the latter.] + +[Footnote 317: Count de Montferrand, who in company with M. Cambon +talked with Sanderson about the Newfoundland question, remarked that “if +M. Delcassé was not able to inform the French Chambers that they had +secured this right, the Convention would be rejected” (memo. by +Sanderson, June 30, 1904, _B.D._, III, 6, No. 5; see _ibid._, chap. xvi, +Part I).] + +[Footnote 318: See below.] + +[Footnote 319: For a summary see the article by Louis-Jaray, “L’Accord +entre la France et l’Angleterre. L’Opinion publique et le rapprochement +franco-anglais,” _Quest. dipl. et col._, XVIII (Nov. 16, 1904), 593 ff. +The debates in the Chamber, Nov. 3-10, 1904, and in the Senate, Dec. +5-7, 1904, are to be found in the _Journal officiel, Debats. parlem._ +(Chambre), pp. 2255 ff.; _ibid._ (Sénat), pp. 1013 ff. See also Monson’s +reports to Lansdowne, Nov. 9, Dec. 8, 1904, _B.D._, III, 11 ff., Nos. 8 +ff.] + + + + + CHAPTER VII + + ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AFTER THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE + + +After the Russo-Japanese War began, the British and Russian governments +decided that for the present nothing further could be done toward an +understanding.[320] Russian anger was directed as much against Great +Britain as against Japan for having caused the conflict;[321] while +Great Britain could hardly jeopardize her alliance with Japan by coming +to a settlement with the latter’s enemy. A few days after the signing of +the Anglo-French agreement, King Edward tried to revive the negotiations +in a talk at Copenhagen with M. Iswolski, Russian minister at the +capital. When Count Benckendorff mentioned the King’s conversation to +Lord Lansdowne, the latter reiterated his former opinion, adding that in +the meantime the two governments should so handle any differences which +might arise as to permit the renewal of the discussions for an agreement +after the conclusion of the war.[322] + +This suggestion was acted upon, for, even apart from other reasons, +Count Lamsdorff wished to hold Great Britain to the strictest neutrality +during the war with the lure of an understanding. The British government +assured him of its neutral intentions.[323] King Edward cultivated +assiduously the friendship of the Czar during the next months.[324] +Early in June the British government gave reassurances about its policy +toward Tibet, in return for which the Russian government approved the +Khedivial decree putting into execution the reforms in Egypt foreseen in +the Anglo-French declaration.[325] Fraught with more danger was the +possibility that Russia might send her Black Sea fleet through the +straits. Lord Lansdowne warned her that that act “could not be tolerated +by this country,” that it “might render conflict inevitable.”[326] So +the fleet was never sent. In spite of British protests, however, Russia +dispatched several vessels belonging to the volunteer fleet through the +Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. When, in July and August, two of these +ships seized some British merchant vessels suspected of carrying +contraband, British public opinion demanded that the government defend +British commerce. When Lord Lansdowne expressed indignation at the +depredations, the Russian government immediately agreed to a +conciliatory settlement.[327] In September the Russian government +objected strongly to the terms of the recent Anglo-Tibetan Treaty, but +without avail. Being in no position to follow up that protest, it had to +acquiesce in the British action.[328] + +In October the two countries came dangerously close to war over the +Dogger Bank affair. The Russian Baltic fleet, a makeshift, heterogeneous +collection of vessels, was on its way to the war zone. While passing +through the North Sea, it shot into a British fishing fleet off the +Dogger Bank in the night of October 21, sinking one vessel and damaging +others, killing two men and wounding members of the crews. The Russian +fleet thought that it had fired at two Japanese torpedo boats, and +continued its voyage without stopping to see what damage it had +inflicted. The previous mishandling of British merchant ships by the +Russians had already so irritated the British nation that it became +incensed at this latest act. Public opinion was bellicose. Sir Charles +Hardinge, British ambassador at St. Petersburg, described the fleet’s +conduct to Count Lamsdorff as “an unqualified and brutal outrage.” The +British government demanded a full investigation, punishment of those +culpable, “ample apology and complete and prompt reparation as well as +security against the recurrence of such intolerable incidents.” “The +matter is one which admits of no delay,” asserted Lord Lansdowne to the +Russian Ambassador; “if an attempt were made to fence with the question, +public feeling here would become uncontrollable.” Unless prompt action +were taken by the Russian government, he continued, “we should certainly +be obliged to take our own measures for guarding against a repetition of +these acts.”[329] The British admiralty mobilized the fleets at Portland +and at Malta, rushed reinforcements to the fleet at Gibraltar, and +advised the commander there that “it may become necessary for you to +stop the Baltic Fleet, by persuasion if possible, but by force if +necessary.”[330] + +This energetic procedure brought immediate results. The Russian +government agreed quickly to the British demands. With the help of +French mediation, the crisis passed within a week, and the final +settlement was left to international arbitration. But on October 29 Lord +Lansdowne warned the Russian Ambassador as follows: + + +I owned . . . . that I lived in dread of new troubles arising. . . . . +It had not been without the greatest difficulty that we had avoided a +conflict. . . . . I would not, in these circumstances, dwell upon the +results of a repetition of the North Sea incident. + +There was however another peril against which it was our duty to guard. +. . . . If, during its [the Russian fleet’s] long voyage, the Russian +captains considered themselves justified in the wholesale seizure of +vessels suspected of carrying contraband, public feeling in this country +would become uncontrollable.[331] + + +A few days later the British Foreign Secretary again warned the +Ambassador, somewhat more mildly to be sure, against permitting two +particularly predatory ships of the volunteer fleet which had just been +added to the Russian fleet itself to prey on neutral commerce.[332] No +more trouble arose. + +After events of this kind, an Anglo-Russian _rapprochement_ seemed far +off. The British and Russian presses were at each other’s throats. On +December 2 Sir Charles Hardinge reported his French colleague’s views as +follows: + + +He [M. Bompard] impressed upon me that the attitude of His Majesty’s +Government during the next year when the conditions of peace would be +under discussion would be decisive of the relations between England and +Russia for the next twenty five years. Thanks to the Japanese war the +German Government were only now recovering the position which they had +lost at the congress of Berlin. If His Majesty’s Government continued to +maintain the same strained relations during the forthcoming year as in +the past twelve months there would be no prospect of a rapprochement +between the two countries for another generation. He begged me to +remember that the many incidents which had occurred had redounded solely +to the advantage of the German Emperor who now had a position at the +Russian Court which a year ago would have been regarded as +impossible.[333] + + +In the next month M. Delcassé urged upon the British Ambassador the +desirability of an Anglo-Russian _rapprochement_ and asked about the +possibility of bringing Italy also into new quadruple grouping. + +Lord Lansdowne saw no reason why a permanent understanding with Russia +should be impossible, but he pointed out the difficulty. “The Russian +diplomatic currency has become debased and discredited,” he wrote to the +Ambassador at Paris, “and it will not be easy to restore it to its face +value.”[334] None the less he hardly needed the French warning and +advice, for he had already been acting in accordance with them. The +British government had shown as much consideration for Russian feeling +in the Dogger Bank affair as circumstances permitted. In February of the +next year it tried to reach accord on the Afghan question, but Count +Lamsdorff was too much occupied with other matters.[335] Great Britain +could well afford to be friendly since the Japanese victories were so +eminently satisfactory to her. Moreover, she wanted no war, for, apart +from her aversion to war as such, she feared what Germany might do in +case of one.[336] Rumors of a Russo-German treaty were already abroad +and spread rapidly toward the end of 1904.[337] British public opinion +was becoming more mistrustful of Germany than of Russia. Having regarded +the growing German navy, so near at hand in the North Sea, as a distinct +menace for over a year, it now feared that Germany might try a sudden +descent upon the English coast.[338] The British government viewed the +situation more sanely, but it appreciated the danger of the German navy. +As Mr. Spring Rice, first secretary of the British embassy in St. +Petersburg, had written to his friend, President Roosevelt, in the +summer of 1904: + + +We are trying our best to come to some sort of understanding with Russia +(when the war is over), so as to put an end to the continual régime of +panic in India, Persia, etc. The reason we are doing so is that with the +establishment of a strong German navy on our flanks we cannot afford to +have a life-and-death struggle in Asia and the Far East. Germany is +rapidly acquiring a very strong position in Russia. . . . . In any case, +if we were at war with Russia, Germany would either take Russia’s side, +or exact very hard terms from us for her neutrality. The German fleet +has really revolutionized politics.[339] + + +In August, 1904, Sir John Fisher, first sea lord of the British +admiralty, had warned the government that “‘instant readiness for war’ +was imperative, . . . . unless naval reforms were ‘ruthless and +remorseless, . . . . we may as well pack up and hand over to +Germany.’”[340] In accordance with his recommendation, the British +government reorganized and redistributed its fleet late in 1904 in such +a way as to concentrate the main strength in home waters. And at the +close of the year, when the German statesmen expressed fears of a +British attack on their country, Lord Lansdowne wrote to Sir Frank +Lascelles: + + +They cannot seriously believe that we are meditating a coup against +them. Are they perchance meditating one against us and are they seeking +to justify it in advance? All this talk about one driving them to lean +towards Russia looks a little like it. + + +The knowledge gained early in 1905, that Germany was making approaches +not only to Russia and the United States but to Japan as well, augmented +British mistrust of her policy.[341] + +The pressure of events and the insistence of such men as King Edward, +Admiral Fisher, and others were completing the change of policy which +Great Britain had been making since 1901. Great Britain had abandoned +her policy of splendid isolation; she was more and more taking an active +share in European international relations and assuming a definite +position in the Continental system of alliances. + + +[Footnote 320: Lansdowne to Spring Rice, April 22, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 188 +f., No. 183. The breakdown of the negotiations as a result of the war +had been anticipated early in January by Sir Charles Hardinge (Gwynn, +_The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 392).] + +[Footnote 321: Hardinge to Lansdowne, June 8, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 194 f., +No. 188; Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 28, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 165 ff., No. +6028, and following documents; Lansdowne to Scott, March 4, 1904, +_B.D._, V, 73; Spring Rice to Ferguson, March 2, 1904, Gwynn, I, 403 +ff.] + +[Footnote 322: Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 283 ff.; Lansdowne to Spring +Rice, May 4, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 189 f., No. 184, and following documents; +Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian Diplomat_, pp. 90 f.; Crozier, +_Revue de France_, April 1, 1921, pp. 275 ff.; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, +pp. 307 ff.; cf. _ibid._, pp. 243 f.] + +[Footnote 323: Hardinge to Lansdowne, June 8, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 194 f., +No. 188; Newton, pp. 310 ff.] + +[Footnote 324: Lee, II, 287 ff.] + +[Footnote 325: Lansdowne to Spring Rice, May 4, 10, 1904, _B.D._, IV, +189 f., No. 184; 307 ff., No. 291; Hardinge to Lansdowne, May 18, 1904, +_ibid._, 190, No. 185; Monson to Lansdowne May 27, 1904, _ibid._, 193, +No. 186.] + +[Footnote 326: Lansdowne to Monson, April 29, 1904, _ibid._, II, 401; +Lansdowne to O’Conor, June 7, 1904, _ibid._, IV, 51, No. 46; Metternich +to F. O., Aug. 18, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 240, No. 6070.] + +[Footnote 327: _B.D._, Vol. IV, chap. xxiii, Part III; _G.P._, Vol. XIX, +chap. cxxxii; Newton, pp. 313 ff.; Gwynn, I, 424 f. King Edward was in +favor of showing to Germany, whose commerce was also being molested by +those ships, a mark of friendship by co-operating with her in handling +the matter with Russia. Lansdowne disapproved the idea (Lee, II, 297 +f.).] + +[Footnote 328: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 23, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 317, +No. 299; Lansdowne to Hardinge, Sept. 27, 1904, _ibid._, 319 f., No. +301.] + +[Footnote 329: Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 24 and 25, 1904, _ibid._, 6, +No. 6; 7 f., No. 8; 10 f., No. 12; Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 24, 1904, +_ibid._, 7, No. 7.] + +[Footnote 330: Admiralty to F. O., Oct. 28, 1904, _ibid._, 18 f., No. 19 +and inclosures.] + +[Footnote 331: Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 29, 1904, _ibid._, 23 f., No. +23.] + +[Footnote 332: Lansdowne to Hardinge, Nov. 3, 1904, _ibid._, 55, No. 52. +On the Dogger Bank affair see _ibid._, chap. xxiii, Part 11; _G.P._, +Vol. XIX, chap. cxxxiv; Lee, II, 301 ff.; Newton, pp. 315 ff.; Gwynn, I, +432 f.] + +[Footnote 333: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Dec. 2, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 66 f., +No. 58.] + +[Footnote 334: Newton, pp. 339 f.] + +[Footnote 335: Lansdowne to Benckendorff, Feb. 17, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 520 +f., No. 466_a_; Lansdowne to Hardinge, March 8, 1905, _ibid._, 521, No. +466_b_.] + +[Footnote 336: On Nov. 5, 1904, Spring Rice wrote to Roosevelt as +follows: “Emperor William has got the ear of the Emperor here. . . . . +It is plain that Germany naturally enough wants to see Russia have a +free hand in Asia and hopes in exchange to have one in Europe; that if +England could be engaged in a war with Russia which would require her +fleet to be absent in the East, the German fleet, especially if France +would come in, would have a good chance for a sudden descent on England” +(quoted in Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, pp. 73 f.; +see also Gwynn, I, 414 ff., 436, 438 ff.).] + +[Footnote 337: Lascelles to Lansdowne, Sept. 23, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 4 f., +No. 4; Gwynn, I, 427 f.; see also below.] + +[Footnote 338: Bernadotte Everly Schmitt, _England and Germany, +1740-1914_ (Princeton, 1916), p. 180; _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxxvi. +Balfour denied in the House of Commons that an attack was likely or +would succeed if it were made. But the British fear continued. See 4 +Hansard, Vol. CXLII (March 7, 1907), col. 595; Vol. CXLVI (May 11, +1905), cols. 72 f.] + +[Footnote 339: Dennett, pp. 152 f.; Gwynn, I, 422 f. The letter was a +reply to one from Roosevelt dated June 13, 1904. The approximate date +given by Dennett is incorrect.] + +[Footnote 340: Fisher to Knollys, Aug. 19, 1904, Lee, II, 328.] + +[Footnote 341: Newton, p. 332.] + + + + + CHAPTER VIII + + FRENCH POLICY AFTER THE MAKING OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE + + +As friend of Great Britain and ally of Russia, France was in an uneasy +situation after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Hostility +between those two Powers was increasing. Thereby the influence of +Germany in St. Petersburg was greatly augmented, and Germany was +assiduously courting Russia. M. Delcassé had to show enough sympathy and +give enough help to Russia to prevent Germany from usurping France’s +position at St. Petersburg and at the same time hold to the Anglo-French +entente. + +The task did not prove to be unduly arduous, for Russia did not require +much of her ally. M. Delcassé sought to maintain harmony between Great +Britain and Russia by helping them settle their disputes.[342] He also +did what favors he could for Russia, such as permitting the Russian +Baltic fleet to use French ports on the way to the Far East. But +otherwise he left Russia to her own resources and devoted himself to +other tasks. + +The Anglo-French accord did not complete M. Delcassé’s work of +establishing France’s right to preponderance in Morocco and of elevating +her position in Europe, but it made the completion possible. The Foreign +Minister still had to negotiate an agreement with Spain, to exclude +Germany from the Moroccan settlement, and to execute the policy of +pacific penetration in the Sherifian Empire. During the succeeding +months he was occupied with these problems. + + + I. THE FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT, 1904 + + +When M. Delcassé, in accordance with Article VIII of the Anglo-French +declaration, proposed to the Spanish government in April, 1904, that +they negotiate over the Moroccan question, he immediately met with +difficulty. Relying upon promises by Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcassé, the +Spanish government had expected to be consulted before the conclusion of +the bargain. It therefore complained because the negotiations had not +been conducted _à trois_.[343] The Spanish Queen Mother branded the act +as an “unfriendliness” to Spain, and the Marquis del Muni (M. Leon y +Castillo), Spanish ambassador at Paris, “clinched his fist in his +pocket” at the two Powers.[344] When the Cortes met, the Liberals took +occasion on June 6, 7, and 9, to expose the main terms of the Franco- +Spanish accord of 1902 which the Conservatives had refused to sign, and +to accuse that party of having inadequately upheld Spain’s interests. As +the nation remained apathetic, M. Maura, the prime minister, had no +difficulty in defending his government.[345] Urged by the British +government,[346] he accepted M. Delcassé’s overture. + +The course of the negotiations, which began in April, was a rocky one. +The Spanish accused the French of being too-hard bargainers; the French +thought that the other party was too prone to alarm.[347] The Spanish +government, ignorant of the secret articles in the Anglo-French +agreement by which the Spanish sphere was already limited,[348] demanded +the territorial terms which had been informally agreed upon in 1902. But +M. Delcassé refused to give them, for, he asserted, Spain ought to bear +her part of the sacrifice which France had had to make to Great Britain. +Aroused by this reply, the Spanish government appealed late in April to +the German government for an “active expression” of “sympathy . . . . at +the opportune moment.” Although the German Chancellor was eager to give +it,[349] Spain aimed to use this intimacy merely as a threat. While +continuing the conversations more or less dilatorily with Germany, she +asked for and relied chiefly upon the support of Great Britain to obtain +satisfactory terms with France. + +Through Lord Lansdowne’s mediation, M. Delcassé agreed in May to extend +the Spanish sphere of influence in the north from Melilla to the mouth +of the Moulouya—a particularly sore spot with the Spanish since they +owned islands just off this coast—and to expand the limits of the +Spanish sphere in Southern Morocco. The French Minister made these +concessions dependent upon Spain’s accepting his other conditions, and +asserted to the Spanish Ambassador that “he was not prepared to prolong +the discussion of these details, and his offer was _à prendre ou à +laisser_.”[350] + +This bold speech did not impress the Spanish government, which, knowing +France’s need for an agreement with it, followed Count Bülow’s advice of +drawing out the negotiations.[351] Its views differed from those of M. +Delcassé in that it desired Spanish control in Tangier, full commercial +liberty throughout Morocco without any time limit, and the publication +of the agreement—all of which the French Minister refused.[352] However, +by the last of June accord was virtually reached, when M. Delcassé +brought forth a new condition to the effect that Spain should be +precluded from taking any action in her prospective sphere until the +_status quo_ in Morocco came to an end.[353] + +M. Delcassé was confronted with the problem of how to maintain a unified +Franco-Spanish policy in the peaceful penetration of Morocco, how to +retain the initiative in that work in French hands, how to minimize +Spain’s rights in Morocco in favor of France. Mistrusting Spain’s +competence to handle subject peoples, he wished to prevent her from +taking any action in her sphere that would arouse the Moroccans to a war +not only against Spain but also against France and thus ruin the work of +pacific penetration. He feared that Spain might precipitate the +liquidation of Morocco so as to obtain full control of her area. The +French policy was to postpone that event until a suitable occasion, in +the meantime undermining Morocco’s integrity and independence while +pretending to maintain them. He was legally within his rights in taking +this line toward Spain, and was fortified against British intervention +in the latter’s favor, because secret Article III of the Anglo-French +agreement provided that the specified area should come within the sphere +of influence of Spain and be administered by her “whenever the Sultan +ceases to exercise authority over it.”[354] + +The Spanish government, protesting that this proposal would reduce its +position to that of a subprotectorate, demanded the same rights in its +sphere of influence as France would enjoy in hers. It desired +particularly that Tangier be policed by Spanish altogether. The Spanish +Foreign Minister asserted that Spain was averse to disturbing the +_status quo_ in Morocco, but he and his colleagues suspected that France +would never acknowledge a change in the political status in Morocco and +would thus exclude Spain from any share in the land. The Spanish +Minister declared that he “would not sign an agreement which abandoned +Spanish rights,” and in complaining to the British government he +threatened to “appeal to the Powers.” + +Lord Lansdowne knew that by “Powers” was meant Germany, who was just +then showing marked interest in helping Spain in the Moroccan affair. +Wishing to obviate German intervention, he advised the Spanish to make +concrete proposals to France concerning ways of exercising an influence +in the proposed Spanish sphere—for instance, as to “the construction of +railways and other useful works.” He also cautioned Spain against +undertaking to police Tangier. At the same time he urged M. Delcassé to +be more conciliatory toward Spain so as to avoid the possibility of +“international difficulties.”[355] + +M. Delcassé was willing to permit Spanish participation in the economic +development of Morocco and also to associate Spanish officials with +French ones in two of the three ports whose customs revenues were to be +collected as security for the recent French loan. He refused to recede +on the other points.[356] This reply so excited the Spanish that when M. +Delcassé proposed a clause whereby Spain would be prohibited from +alienating the Moroccan territory over which she should have control, +the Spanish government rejected it as beneath its dignity. It offered +instead to give France a right of preference in case Spain wished to +alienate any or all of that area. Lord Lansdowne, who did not want +France to gain this preferential right, persuaded the Spanish to accept +the French proposal.[357] + +The main issue, however, that of Spain’s independence of action in her +sphere, remained unsolved. In the middle of July, while leaving the +impression that the cause of difference was the question of full +commercial freedom, the Spanish government informally asked the German +government to give Spain a _coup d’épaule_ in Paris. As the German +government desired a more definite proposal, it did not carry out the +request.[358] Nor was much support to be obtained from Great Britain. +But as both French and British governments knew of Germany’s interest in +the negotiations, M. Delcassé, in August, agreed to restrict Spain’s +action for fifteen years only.[359] The Spanish government rejected that +concession, but offered to take no action for that period without +previous accord with France, provided France recognized that she “ought +to proceed in accord with the Spanish Government in that which touches +the zone of influence reserved to Spain.” Lord Lansdowne supported this +proposal. So while M. Delcassé held to his previous stand, he agreed +that “France would take no steps within the Spanish Sphere without +giving previous notice to Spain.” Thus, although the Marquis del Muni +thought that the two parties had reached a deadlock, there was in +reality no great difference between the two demands. On October 3 the +agreement was signed.[360] + +The accord consisted of a published declaration and of sixteen secret +articles. The former merely expressed the fact that Spain adhered to the +Anglo-French declaration of April 8 concerning Morocco and Egypt and +that Spain and France were in agreement “to fix the extension of their +rights and guaranty of their interests” in Morocco.[361] The secret +articles were of a far different caliber. Spain received as her sphere +of influence not only the area from the Moulouya to Larache in Northern +Morocco but also the coastal territory and hinterland extending from her +possession Rio de Oro northward to the Wad Sus, just south of Agadir. +The rest of Morocco constituted the French sphere (Arts. II, IV, V). +Provision for a future change was included. + + +In case the political state of Morocco and of the Sherifian Government +are unable to subsist, or if by the feebleness of the Government and by +its continued impotence to introduce security and public order, or for +any other cause to be stated in a common accord, the maintenance of the +_status quo_ becomes impossible, Spain will be permitted freely to +exercise her action in . . . . her sphere of influence [Art. III]. + + +Although the same rights of action were permitted to Spain in her sphere +as to France in hers, yet for a period of not over fifteen years from +the date of signing the convention Spain was prohibited from taking +action in her sphere without previous understanding with France. The +latter, however, could take action unrestricted by Spain in the French +zone, and could also act in the Spanish zone after having notified Spain +of her intention. After that first period expired and as long as the +_status quo_ obtained, France could not act in the Spanish zone without +previous agreement with Spain (Art. II). By Articles VII and VIII Spain +agreed not to cede or to alienate in any form any of the territory +assigned to her or to seek the aid of a foreign Power other than France +in taking any military action in her sphere of influence. Article IX +preserved “the special character” of Tangier “which the presence of the +diplomatic corps and the municipal and sanitary institutions give it.” +Article X ran as follows: + + +So long as the actual political status continues, the enterprises for +public works, railroads, roads, canals . . . . shall be executed by such +companies as may be formed by French and Spanish. In the same manner it +will be permissible for French and Spanish in Morocco to co-operate for +the exploitation of mines, quarries, and, in general, of enterprises of +an economic order.[362] + + +The two Powers immediately communicated the agreement to the British +government, which accepted it.[363] The Spanish government thanked both +British and German governments for their aid during the negotiations, +and briefly informed the latter that by the treaty Tangier had been +neutralized and complete equality and freedom of commerce and trade had +been guaranteed.[364] + +In Spain the agreement, grudgingly approved by the government as the +best that it could obtain, was shown by the Premier to the various party +leaders, and received their indorsement.[365] M. Delcassé informed none +of the French politicians of the content of the treaty. During the +debates in the French Parliament on the Anglo-French accord in November +and December, however, the Franco-Spanish agreement was also accepted on +faith.[366] The convention was a logical extension of the accord of +April 8. Both agreements anticipated a change in the political status of +Morocco and made provisions for a future division of the land. The one +permitted commercial restriction at the end of thirty years; the other +arranged for a Franco-Spanish monopoly of all economic enterprises. Both +accords violated the principle of the open door. In fact, had the secret +articles of the two agreements been known, they would have proved that +the clauses concerning the independence and integrity of Morocco and the +sovereignty of the sultan were complete shams. In declaring to the other +Powers that commercial freedom would be absolutely respected, M. +Delcassé was equivocating and attempting to disarm suspicions concerning +his real intention of destroying economic freedom in Morocco.[367] + + + II. DELCASSÉ AND GERMANY, 1904 + + +It was manifest during the Anglo-French negotiations that the French +government planned to prevent Germany from gaining any foothold in +Morocco or the Western Mediterranean.[368] Fearing that that Power might +try to share in the Moroccan settlement when the Anglo-French accord +became known, M. Delcassé endeavored to avoid a discussion of the +agreement with it.[369] + +When, therefore, on March 23, Prince Radolin asked the French Minister +an “indiscreet question” about the reported Anglo-French negotiations, +the latter replied that they had been going on for some time and would +probably be successfully concluded. He said that they treated of +Newfoundland, Egypt, and Morocco (the other questions he did not +mention); and he explained the terms of the proposed agreement +concerning the last-named land. “You know already our point of view on +this subject. . . . . We wish to maintain in Morocco the existing +political and territorial status; but that status, to endure, must +manifestly be sustained and improved.” After citing the many occasions +for intervention of which France had taken no advantage, he stated that +the Sultan had already requested French aid. “It is now a matter of +continuing it to him,” he said, and he assured the Prince that +commercial liberty would be “rigorously and entirely respected. . . . . +France wishes no special rights in Morocco, but it should be her task in +the interest of all nations trading there to put an end, according to +her power, to the anarchy in that land.” Moreover, the free passage +through the straits should be secured by neutralizing their southern +shore. As for Spain, her “positive interests and legitimate ambitions” +in Morocco would be amicably treated. He did not mention either the +clause limiting commercial freedom to thirty years or Article IX +assuring mutual diplomatic support in the fulfilment of the accord. And +of course he gave no hint of the existence of the secret articles.[370] + +This informal and incomplete notification misrepresented the true aims +of the agreement with respect to Morocco. M. Delcassé expected that by +avoiding an official notification of the accord to the German government +and by omitting to request an expression of opinion from it he would +cause the German government either to permit him a diplomatic victory or +to take the initiative for a Franco-German understanding.[371] He felt +safe in his policy,[372] because France, in addition to her alliance +with Russia, whose victory over Japan M. Delcassé and the French people +confidently expected,[373] now enjoyed with her ally’s public +approval[374] the friendship of Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, whereas +the Triple Alliance was weakened by internal strife. Moreover, the +French Minister learned on March 30[375] that at Vigo a few days before +the Emperor William had denied having any territorial interests in +Morocco. Hence by shunning the word “protectorate” he hoped to avoid the +responsibility for endeavoring to establish one.[376] In October his +notification of the Franco-Spanish agreement to the German government +was even more perfunctory.[377] + + + III. “PACIFIC PENETRATION,” 1904 + + +After the signing of the Anglo-French agreement, the French Parliament +voted 600,000 francs with which to carry on the work of pacific +penetration in Morocco.[378] The French government immediately +dispatched a preliminary mission to Fez under Count de Saint-Aulaire, +first secretary of the legation in Tangier. The Count gave the Sultan an +exact Arabic translation of the published declaration of April 8; and, +after setting forth the need for progressive reforms in Morocco and the +special interest of France in executing them, he offered the friendly +co-operation of his government to that end.[379] Thus, in spite of the +persistent Moroccan raids across the Algerian border, the Sultan was +asked to believe that France was once more manifesting her patience and +good will.[380] + +The Sultan scarcely knew what line of policy to take toward the Anglo- +French agreement.[381] His subjects, from the religious groups to the +merchants of Fez, were all hostile to any form of foreign control. +Alarmed at the news of the agreement, they feared an immediate invasion +by the Christians. Suspecting their ruler of conniving with the French, +they became even more rebellious; many denied that he possessed the +_baraka_, the divine benediction. At court the Conservative party, led +by Si Feddoul Gharnet, grew stronger in its opposition to all French +actions and policies. The Sultan realized the precariousness of his +position, and was very anxious about the effects of his acts upon his +people. He was uneasy and angry at having been ignored in the +negotiations over his land. Nevertheless, as he did not comprehend the +full significance of the accord, particularly since the French had +explained it to him in soothing terms, he soon became calmer. Some of +his officials were not opposed to the French, as they realized that the +present conditions could not last and that the French had the power to +change them. Furthermore, certain practical considerations prevented him +from closing his ear to the French altogether. His ambition was, with +the help of Europeans selected by himself, so to strengthen his land as +to enable it to maintain its independence.[382] The Sultan had no funds; +the small French, English, and Spanish loans of the previous year were +exhausted, and he could not collect taxes or maintain an army. Forced to +seek foreign aid, he had begun negotiations with the Banque de Paris et +des Pays-Bas for a large loan late in January, and had besought the help +of the French government in obtaining it. M. Delcassé had readily +promised his support.[383] + +In this situation the Sultan neither accepted nor rejected the Anglo- +French agreement and Count de Saint-Aulaire’s explanation of it although +he showed favor toward them.[384] On June 12 with the aid of the French +government he concluded the transaction for the loan. + +The loan, made by a consortium of eleven French banks headed by the +Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, fulfilled political as well as economic +purposes, for it was backed by the French government and was admirably +adapted to the work of pacific penetration. The amount was 62,500,000 +francs (Art. I), of which 80 per cent was actually to be credited to the +Sultan (Art. XXIV). The interest was set at 5 per cent (Art. III). The +loan was to be redeemed within thirty-six years, but the schedule of +amortization was fixed and could not be hastened during the first +fifteen years (Arts. IV, VII). The loan, guaranteed by the customs +duties in all the ports of Morocco, was to have preference and priority +over all other loans which might be similarly guaranteed (Art. XI). +Sixty per cent of the customs revenues were reserved for the repayment +of the obligation. If the necessary amount was not obtained thereby, the +Moroccan government was to make up the deficit (Art. XVII). Two million +francs were left in the bank at Paris to cover short payments; if +withdrawn, this amount was to be re-established immediately by the +Sultan’s government (Art. XXI). The remainder, after the Sultan’s +outstanding loans were liquidated, was placed at the ruler’s disposal to +be drawn upon at will (Arts. XXV, XXXV). By Article XIV the existing +customs treaties and arrangements of Morocco with the Powers were +guaranteed. Article XXXII prohibited the Sultan from using the customs +receipts at his disposal to guarantee any other loan without a previous +agreement with the French banks. By Article XXXIII those banks were +given the right of preference in contracting new loans, coining money, +or buying and selling gold and silver for Morocco, provided the +conditions they offered were equal to those offered by others. The +collection of the customs was to be supervised by a special group of +French officials under the protection of the French legation. Their +director should communicate with the Moroccan government through the +French Minister at Tangier. Furthermore, if the stipulated funds were +not turned over to the supervisors, the agents could appeal to the +French Minister; and, with his consent and with due notification to the +Sultan, they could collect the sums themselves. Thus, when by the last +of July those officials were installed, the control of the customs was +practically lost to the Sultan.[385] + +In May an act of banditry occurred in Morocco which convinced public +opinion everywhere that reform in that land was immediately necessary +and which enabled France to take another step in her work of +penetration. On May 18, Raisouli, a sherif, ex-cattle thief, robber and +rebel, avenger of wrongs, opponent to Europeans—in short, a Moroccan +Robin Hood—took prisoner an American citizen, Ion Perdicaris, and his +English son-in-law, Varley, in their home near Tangier. As the price of +their release he demanded a large ransom, the dismissal and punishment +of certain of the Sultan’s loyal officials who were his enemies, and his +own appointment as pasha for the district around Tangier. The Sultan had +to accept his terms. On June 24, through the good offices of the French +government, working through some of its Algerian religious leaders with +followers in Morocco, the release was effected.[386] But the panic- +stricken foreigners in Tangier, fearing that Raisouli would continue +such lucrative business and that he would have imitators, demanded +protection.[387] Thereupon the French government stationed two warships +in Moroccan waters and secured the appointment of French and Algerian +officers over the Tangier police.[388] The work of “pacific penetration” +was most auspiciously under way. + +Private French enterprise did not lag behind that of the government. +Moroccan towns swarmed with hungry fortune-seekers eager to enjoy the +opportunities for quick wealth which the opening of Morocco was expected +to bring. The Comité du Maroc, formed in the preceding December from the +ranks of the larger Comité de l’Afrique française, engaged energetically +in directing and expanding the work of scientific exploration in the +Sherifian Empire and of disseminating propaganda in France.[389] It +received the financial support of the chief banks, maritime companies, +steel works, railway companies, and some of the leading newspapers of +France.[390] The list of guests present at a banquet held by it on June +15 to enlist public support reads like a French _Who’s Who_.[391] + +In the autumn and early winter the French government made preparations +to send a larger mission to Fez under the resident minister, M. Saint- +René Taillandier, to obtain the Sultan’s approval of the French program +of reforms. According to M. Delcassé’s instructions on December 15,[392] +the Minister’s foremost task should be to institute police reforms +similar to those inaugurated in Tangier, first in the towns already in +contact with Europeans and then gradually in the other areas. In the +border region order should be preserved by extending the co-operation of +the two governments. The establishment of a state bank, the construction +of means of transportation and of communication, the improvement of +harbors, the support of philanthropic works, the spread of the French +language, and the settlement of claims for damages inflicted on Algeria +by Moroccan raiders were the other matters to be taken up. It was a +comprehensive program, the achievement of which would end Moroccan +isolation and independence. + +The departure of the mission was delayed by the long negotiations for an +accord with Spain and by the fact that the French Chamber did not +approve the Moroccan accords until November. When the mission was +prepared to start in December, the situation in Morocco, apparently +favorable for France in the spring, had become adverse. The natives had +grown bolder in their attacks upon foreigners, venting their hatred upon +them even in Fez. The Sultan had begun to show signs of resisting. In +September he had disgraced the pro-foreign minister el Menebhi and +confiscated his property. Later in the year he had supplanted his pro- +French ministers by anti-foreign ones, such as Si Feddoul Gharnet. In +December he had dismissed all foreign employees at Fez and Rabat.[393] +These signs augured trouble for the French. While assuming an optimistic +manner publicly, M. Saint-René Taillandier acknowledged to his chief on +December 12 that he might “be powerless to make the Sultan accept the +minimum of reforms that the present state of Morocco demands.”[394] But +as firmness was the best means to “recall the Moroccan government to a +sense of reality,”[395] he immediately countered the dismissal of the +French officers by a sharply worded letter to the Moroccan Foreign +Minister. After reminding the latter of the _acte international_ by +which France had “assumed the task of aiding” the Makhzen[396] to reform +the land, he stated that the Sultan’s co-operation was expected and +desired, but that + + +if that co-operation were not forthcoming, France would know how to +accomplish the work alone. Dangerous counselors [he wrote] have led the +Sultan astray as to the true state of affairs. And in consequence the +French Government has decided to postpone the departure of the mission, +and to recall to Tangier from Fez within ten days the French military +mission, vice-consul, and all French subjects resident there.[397] + + +The Sultan’s opposition wilted immediately. The French vice-consul at +Fez reported that the Makhzen was “ready to welcome all French counsels +and to accept all the reforms,” that it “withdrew all the actions which +have offended us.”[398] But the Sultan’s submission was not so complete +as it seemed. Although France was the victor in this encounter, the +conflict had only begun. + + +[Footnote 342: On Oct. 28, 1904, at the height of the Dogger Bank +crisis, Lansdowne reported the following assertion by Cambon: “His +Excellency [M. Cambon] said that he did not himself know precisely what +obligations France had undertaken in virtue of that understanding [the +Dual Alliance]. He did not however believe that if there was a +collision, France would join Russia against us, but if a collision +occurred, and particularly if it were brought on by unreasonable demands +on our part, there would be a _revirement_ of public feeling, and the +Anglo-French _entente_ could not fail to suffer” (Lansdowne to Monson, +Oct. 28, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 22, No. 21).] + +[Footnote 343: According to a speech in the Spanish Senate on March 21, +1904, by M. Abarzuza, who had been a member of Silvela’s cabinet from +Dec. 6, 1902, to July 20, 1903, both the British and the French +governments promised Spain in the first half of 1903 not to touch the +Moroccan question or to make any alterations in North Africa without +Spain’s previous knowledge and acquiescence. The speech is quoted by +Becker, _Historia de Marruecos_ (Madrid, 1915), pp. 440 f. See above for +Lansdowne’s promise. The Spanish government did try to participate in +the Anglo-French negotiations by way of both London and Paris; but it +was put off with general assurances of friendship by both Lansdowne and +Delcassé. See Lansdowne to Durand, Aug. 11, 1903, _B.D._, II, 309 f., +No. 366; Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 23, 1904, _ibid._, 341, No. 388; +Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, III, 25 f., No. 24; Bülow to F. +O., Sept. 18, 1904, _G.P._, XVII, 354, No. 5199, and the following +documents. For expression of Spanish public opinion over the Anglo- +French accord see the _London Times_, April 11-16, 1904; Gay, _España +ante el problema del mediterráneo_, pp. 31 ff.; Maura, _La Question du +Maroc, etc._ (Paris, 1911), pp. 32 f.; Mousset, _La politica exterior de +España, 1873-1918_ (Madrid, 1918), pp. 149 ff.] + +[Footnote 344: _G.P._, XX, 169 f.] + +[Footnote 345: The debates in the Cortes are to be found in the _Diario +de las sesiones de Cortes_. Congreso de los Diputados (_Legislatura de +1903_), pp. 4883 ff., 4917 ff., 4944 ff., 4959 ff. Also see Maura, pp. +85 ff.] + +[Footnote 346: Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, _B.D._, III, 25 f., +No. 24; Egerton to Lansdowne, April 11, 1904, _ibid._, 26 f., No. 25.] + +[Footnote 347: Egerton to Lansdowne, May 6, 1904, _ibid._, 34, No. 35.] + +[Footnote 348: The British government kept these articles secret +(Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, _ibid._, 25 f., No. 24).] + +[Footnote 349: Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 169 f., +No. 6481, and following documents.] + +[Footnote 350: Lansdowne to Monson, April 20, 1904, _B.D._, III, 29, No. +28, and following documents.] + +[Footnote 351: Bülow to Radowitz, May 22, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 173 f., No. +6484. Bülow repeated his offer of aid on May 31. Bülow to Radowitz, May +31, 1904, _ibid._, 175 f., No. 6487. The Spanish Ambassador at Paris +remarked to Monson that if Great Britain did not help Spain the latter +“would be done out of half her rights in that country [Morocco]” (Monson +to Lansdowne, May 20, 1904, _B.D._, III, 37, No. 41).] + +[Footnote 352: Romanones, _Las responsabilidades politicas, etc._, pp. +49 ff.; reports from Madrid, June 15 and 21, 1904, _Zur europ. Politik_, +I, 121; see also _G.P._, Vol. XX, chap. cxliv.] + +[Footnote 353: Egerton to Lansdowne, July 1, 1904, _B.D._, III, 38, No. +43; Lansdowne to Egerton, July 2, 1904, _ibid._, 38 f., No. 44.] + +[Footnote 354: _Ibid._, II, 393 f.] + +[Footnote 355: Egerton to Lansdowne, July 1, 1904, _ibid._, III, 38, No. +43; Lansdowne to Egerton, July 2, 6, 1904, _ibid._, 38, No. 44; 40, No. +46; Lansdowne to Monson, July 4, 1904, _ibid._, 40, No. 45; Leon y +Castillo, _Mis tiempos_, II, 182 ff.] + +[Footnote 356: Lansdowne to Monson July 8, 1904, _B.D._, III, 41, No. +47.] + +[Footnote 357: Lansdowne to Monson, July 29, 1904, _ibid._, 42, No. 49; +Lansdowne to Egerton, July 29, 1904, _ibid._, 43, No. 50; Egerton to +Lansdowne, July 31, 1904, _ibid._, 44, No. 52.] + +[Footnote 358: Memo. by Richthofen, July 16, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 186 f., +No. 6503; and other documents in _ibid._, Vol. XX, chap. cxliv.] + +[Footnote 359: At first Delcassé said thirty years.] + +[Footnote 360: Egerton to Lansdowne, July 31, 1904, _B.D._, III, 44, No. +52, and following documents; also Leon y Castillo, II, 183 f.] + +[Footnote 361: _L.j., 1901-5_, 164, No. 187.] + +[Footnote 362: The text of the agreement, which became public in 1909, +is to be found in _British and Foreign State Papers_, CII (London, +1913), 432 ff.; and in _B.D._, III, 49 ff., No. 59.] + +[Footnote 363: Lansdowne to Adam, Oct. 5, 1904, _B.D._, III, 52, No. +60.] + +[Footnote 364: Radowitz to F. O., Oct. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 191 f., No. +6509.] + +[Footnote 365: Maura, p. 54; Radowitz to F. O., Oct. 7, 1904, _G.P._, +XX, 191 f., No. 6509.] + +[Footnote 366: Maura, p. 78; Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques_, 1904, +pp. 75 ff.; Millet, _Notre politique extérieure 1898-1905_, pp. 179 ff.; +and the French debates cited above.] + +[Footnote 367: For an estimate of this accord see Tardieu, _Revue des +deux mondes_, Dec. 1, 1912, pp. 637 ff.; Stuart, _French Foreign Policy +from Fashoda to Serajevo (1898-1914)_ (New York, 1921), pp. 154 ff.] + +[Footnote 368: See, among others, the dispatch from Lansdowne to Monson, +Dec. 9, 1903, _B.D._, III, 332, No. 378.] + +[Footnote 369: Lansdowne to Monson, March 11, 1904, _ibid._, II, 353, +No. 398. One day long after signing the accord Radolin remarked to +Delcassé that he “had heard of an apparent treaty with England but had +never read the text of it in any authentic form.” The Minister replied +that he could find it in the _Livre jaune_ (letter from Radolin, +apparently to Holstein, March 25, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 266 n.).] + +[Footnote 370: In repeating these assertions to the German government on +April 26 the French Ambassador added that “the Anglo-French entente was +directed against no other Power and in no way menaced the German +commercial interests.” See Delcassé to Bihourd, March 27, 1904, _L.j., +1901-5_, 122, No. 142; Radolin to Bülow, March 23, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 5 +ff., No. 6368; Bihourd to Delcassé, April 27, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 131, +No. 155.] + +[Footnote 371: See Bertie to Lansdowne, March 22, 1905, _B.D._, III, 60, +No. 67.] + +[Footnote 372: Bihourd, the French ambassador at Berlin, warned Delcassé +in April that Germany had not said her last word on the Moroccan +question and that more complete guaranties of commercial liberty should +be given to her; but Delcassé disregarded the warning. See Bihourd to +Delcassé, April 18, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 128, No. 151; Delcassé to +Bihourd, April 18, 1904, _ibid._, 129, No. 152; Bihourd to Delcassé, +April 21, 1904, _ibid._, 129 f., No. 153; cf. Lee, _King Edward VII_, +II, 338.] + +[Footnote 373: Michon, _L’alliance franco-russe, 1891-1917_, pp. 101 f.] + +[Footnote 374: Statement made by Nelidow, Russian ambassador to Paris, +to a reporter of the _Temps_, reprinted in _Quest. dipl. et. col._, +XVII, 607 f.] + +[Footnote 375: Radolin to Bülow, March 30, 1904, _G.P._, XVII, 365, No. +5210.] + +[Footnote 376: There is some evidence, however, that Delcassé did make +some vague attempts to approach the German government on the Moroccan +affair in 1904. Bülow, in a dispatch of March 22, 1905, stated that if +Delcassé should declare that he had discussed Moroccan affairs +“thoroughly with German diplomats passing through” Paris, Radolin was to +reply that those conversations were only private ones and showed plainly +the inclination to avoid the official and proper authorities. See Bülow +to Radolin, March 22, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 267, No. 6568. Theodor Wolff, +at that time Paris correspondent of the _Berliner Tageblatt_, also has +written that in the spring of 1904 Delcassé said to Lichnowsky, an +official in the German foreign office, that they should come to an +understanding over Morocco. According to Wolff, Holstein became furious +at the dispatch from Lichnowsky (Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, pp. 154 f.; cf. +Ludwig, _Wilhelm der Zweite_, p. 342). Lichnowsky may have been the +person to whom Bülow referred, although, if any such conversation +occurred, it was not mentioned later by either the French or the +Germans.] + +[Footnote 377: The French Ambassador merely left a copy of the published +declaration and added verbally that the accord in no way infringed upon +commercial liberty in Morocco. See Richthofen to Radowitz, Oct. 7, 1904, +_G.P._, XX, 191, No. 6508; memo. by Richthofen for Bülow, Oct. 7, 1904, +_ibid._, 230, No. 6534; Delcassé to Bihourd, Oct. 6, 1904, _L.j., +1901-5_, 164, No. 187; Bihourd to Delcassé, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 166, +No. 190; Delcassé to Bihourd, Oct. 8, 1904, _ibid._, 167 f., No. 193.] + +[Footnote 378: This was done on a motion by Jaurès, made on Nov., 1903, +and passed on April 25, 1904 (Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, p. 35).] + +[Footnote 379: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, April 14 and 24, +1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 124, No. 146; 130, No. 154; Delcassé to Saint-René +Taillandier, April 27, 1904, _ibid._, 131, No. 156; Saint-René +Taillandier to Delcassé, May 19, 1904, _ibid._, 133, No. 159 and annexe; +Lansdowne to Nicolson, April 19, 1904, _B.D._, III, 28, No. 27.] + +[Footnote 380: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 148, 157, 158, 183, 186, 189, +194-98, 202-7.] + +[Footnote 381: On the Moroccan reaction see report by A. Bernard, who +was in Morocco at the time, in _Bulletin_, June, 1904, pp. 203 f.; +Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Jan. 1 and 24, Feb. 22, April 24, +May 19, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 119 ff., Nos. 135, 137, 140, 154, 159.] + +[Footnote 382: Kühlmann to Bülow, Jan. 31, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 250, No. +6553.] + +[Footnote 383: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Jan. 29, 1904, _L.j. +1901-5_, 119, No. 138.] + +[Footnote 384: Ben Sliman, Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, wrote +to Saint-René Taillandier on June 17 as follows: “The Sultan . . . . has +instructed me to reply to you that he does not doubt your favorable +sentiments nor those of your Government, either the humanity of your +actions or the sincerity of your counsels. . . . . Your letter is an +argument the more in favor of the reaffirmation of that conviction and a +testimony of your good intentions, conforming to the desire of the two +countries. This is confirmed also by the conversations which we have had +with your secretary to clarify the difficult points of the accord. . . . +. I express to you in his [the Sultan’s] name the fullest thanks for +your happy efforts past and present which, we hope, will characterize +the conduct of our future relations” (_ibid._, 156 ff., No. 177, annex; +Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort, etc._ [Paris, 1909], pp. 172 f. n.).] + +[Footnote 385: The prominent part played by the French government in +making this loan is attested as follows: As already stated, in January, +at the Sultan’s request, Delcassé promised his help in making the loan. +Furthermore, Saint-Aulaire and his interpreter, in Fez at the time, took +an active part in bringing the negotiation to a satisfactory conclusion, +being consulted on various points and helping in the formulation of the +terms (Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July 30, 1904, _L.j., +1901-5_, 162 f., No. 184.). The contract was signed and sealed by the +French Consul at Fez (_ibid._, 142 f., No. 170, Annex I). And the terms +of the loan were such as could never have been obtained without the +approval of the French government. The contract is printed in _ibid._, +143 ff., No. 170, Annex II. On the instalment of customs officials see +the dispatches from Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July 24, and 30, +1904, _ibid._, 159 ff., Nos. 181, 184; also Tardieu, _Questions +diplomatiques, 1904_, pp. 60 ff.] + +[Footnote 386: On this episode see the various dispatches in _L.j., +1901-5_, 135 ff., Nos. 160 ff. On Raisouli see Rosita Forbes, _El +Raisuni, the Sultan of the Mountains_ (London, 1924). On June 22, 1904, +Secretary of State Hay cabled to the American Consul at Tangier, “We +want Perdicaris alive or Raizuli dead.” See William Roscoe Thayer, _The +Life and Letters of John Hay_ (Boston and New York, 1915), II, 383; +Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, pp. 443 ff. Both the British +and the American governments requested the good offices of the French +government in effecting the release. Mr. Hay, the American secretary of +state, gave assurance that if more serious action were subsequently +necessary in Morocco, it would not take place “without a previous +exchange of views” with France. Thus he acknowledged France’s special +position with reference to that country. See Saint-René Taillandier to +Delcassé, May 30, 1904, _ibid._, 137, No. 163; Delcassé to Saint-René +Taillandier, May 31, 1904, _ibid._, 137, No. 164; Jusserand to Delcassé, +June 20, 1904, _ibid._, 152, No. 171; Porter to Delcassé, June 27, 1904, +_ibid._, 155, No. 176; Mévil, pp. 172 f.] + +[Footnote 387: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, June 2 and 27, July +2, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 137 ff., Nos. 165, 175, 178.] + +[Footnote 388: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, June 11 and 27, July +2, 1904, _ibid._, 140 ff., Nos. 168, 175, 178; Delcassé to Saint-René +Taillandier, July 26, 1904, _ibid._, 160, No. 182; Saint-René +Taillandier to Delcassé, July 29, 1904, _ibid._, 160 f., No. 183, and +annex.] + +[Footnote 389: _Bulletin_, Dec., 1903, p. 377; Jan., 1904, pp. 3 ff.; +March, 1904, pp. 76 f.; and others.] + +[Footnote 390: See the list of the large subscribers in _ibid._, July, +1904, p. 224.] + +[Footnote 391: The names of those present, 355 in all, are given in +_Quest. dipl. et col._, XVIII, 62 ff. See also _Bulletin_, June, 1904, +p. 185.] + +[Footnote 392: Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, Dec. 15, 1904, _L.j., +1901-5_, 179 ff., No. 209. In October a conference had been held in +Paris with Jonnart, governor-general of Algeria; Gen. Lyauty, commander +of the French troops at Ain-Sefra in Southern Oran; and Saint-René +Taillandier, on the Moroccan question (Monson to Lansdowne, Oct. 7, +1904, _B.D._, III, 54 f., No. 63.)] + +[Footnote 393: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 199, 210-12, 215, 218-20, 222-24; +_B.D._, III, 55, No. 64; _Bulletin_, Sept. and Oct., 1904, pp. 279, +320.] + +[Footnote 394: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Dec. 12, 1904, +_ibid._, 179, No. 208; Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques, 1904_, pp. 78 +ff.] + +[Footnote 395: The words are Delcassé’s (Delcassé to Saint-René +Taillandier, Dec. 20, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 186, No. 213.)] + +[Footnote 396: The term is used to designate the Moroccan court and +government.] + +[Footnote 397: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Dec. 19 and 24, 1904, +_L.j., 1901-5_, 185 f., No. 212; 186 f., No. 214.] + +[Footnote 398: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Dec. 30, 1904, Jan. +2, 1905, _ibid._, 188 ff., No. 216 f.] + + + + + CHAPTER IX + + GERMANY AND THE ENTENTE CORDIALE, 1903-4 + + I + + +In the early part of 1903, although one of Germany’s allies was rent by +nationalistic conflicts[399] and the other was no longer reliable, and +although British and German public opinion remained so hostile that the +former prevented Anglo-German co-operation,[400] Count Bülow and Herr +von Holstein were untroubled about the international situation. Upon the +announcement of King Edward’s forthcoming visit to Paris, the latter +wrote to his chief, on April 2, that an Anglo-French alliance was “music +of the future,” and that the Franco-Russian alliance was slowly breaking +under the strain of conflicting interests in the Balkans. “We have +blocked M. Delcassé’s policy in Turkey as well as in Morocco,” he +stated. The Chancellor agreed with him. + + +Delcassé’s coquetting with England [he wrote] would become serious for +us only in case he should also succeed in bringing about a +_rapprochement_ between England and Russia. . . . . Otherwise his wooing +of England will . . . . strengthen Count Lamsdorff in the thought that +the former League of the Three Emperors is, all things considered, the +best combination for Russian autocracy. But the present groupings will +not change soon, and in my opinion, we cannot take things too +coolly.[401] + + +Soon after King Edward’s visit to Paris the equanimity of the German +government was somewhat disturbed by a dispatch of May 10 from Baron +Eckardstein, formerly first secretary of the German embassy in London. +The Baron expressed his belief that a general Anglo-French settlement of +colonial differences including that of Morocco was under way; and that +since the two nations were reconciled, it would very likely be +concluded. He denied that this agreement would cause a breach in the +Dual Alliance, as was supposed in Germany; rather, he wrote, “a new +Triple Alliance is being formed, which, although it may assume no +written form and perhaps may endure only for a number of years, will for +a time cause us everywhere at least economic and political +difficulties.”[402] + +This dispatch was referred by Count Bülow to the German ambassadors at +St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, and to the first secretary of the +embassy in London for consideration. Not one of these men believed +possible an Anglo-Russian settlement or the formation of a new Triple +Alliance. The Chancellor and Prince Radolin, the ambassador at Paris, +were both very skeptical about the prospects for an Anglo-French +agreement; but the German representatives in London thought that one +might be achieved. Count Metternich’s opinion was that Great Britain and +France were merely negotiating another colonial accord, which he +admitted might lead to closer co-operation between them, but which need +not cause alarm so long as Great Britain, already pacifically inclined, +enjoyed only the fickle friendship of France and was confronted by the +antagonism of Russia.[403] + +In September the German government believed that the Anglo-French +settlement was already far advanced;[404] and, learning from the Spanish +Queen Mother, who was visiting in Austria, that France and Spain were +also negotiating over Morocco,[405] it resolved to intervene. To that +end on September 24 it instructed Herr von Radowitz, German ambassador +at Madrid, as follows: + + +By virtue of our political international position and especially by +virtue of the great significance of our economic interests in Morocco, +we must seek to be considered also in a division of the land by +obtaining territorial compensation, for example in the region of the +Sus, or elsewhere in the colonial world, perhaps by the cession of +Fernando Po. Your Excellency should weigh thoroughly the means by which +we should best reach that goal, whether through direct negotiations with +Spain, through breaking the way for participation in the negotiations of +the most interested states, or through proposing a conference.[406] + + +Thus the German government, realizing the improvement in the diplomatic +position of France and the decline in its own, was apparently willing to +make a division of Morocco with Great Britain, France, and Spain. + +When Herr von Radowitz immediately unfolded the German desire to the +Spanish Foreign Minister, the latter, admitting the German right to a +share, agreed to study the proposal.[407] After this the conversations +appear to have ceased. + +Simultaneously with these efforts, in the autumn of 1903 the German +government planned by maintaining strict reserve to allow the Franco- +Russian antagonism about the Balkans and the Russo-Japanese hostility in +the Far East to grow. It thought that any German leanings toward Russia +would pull France back into line and cause Japan to recede before the +danger of a new Continental triple entente.[408] On the Chancellor’s +advice, William II, during his meeting with the Czar at Wiesbaden and +Wolfsgarten on November 4-5, 1903, kept Germany’s hands entirely free. +Nevertheless, after the Czar’s approval of the Anglo-French and the +Franco-Italian _rapprochements_ was made public late in October, the +Emperor began to suffer from the “nightmare of the coalitions.” During +the visit he sought to incite Nicholas II against France and Great +Britain and to urge him further into far eastern enterprises. In his +correspondence with the Czar in December and January he continued these +tactics.[409] Count Bülow remonstrated, but the Emperor, haughtily +replying that these were private letters, advised the Chancellor to mind +his own business.[410] + +To the satisfaction of the German government,[411] the Russo-Japanese +War broke out in February, 1904. In anger at Great Britain, Russia +immediately drew nearer to her neighbor;[412] and, with a war in +progress, the German statesmen planned by a wise manipulation of their +power to improve their international position and to gain concrete +advantages.[413] For the time, however, they endeavored by assuring the +British government that Germany would preserve strict neutrality to +obviate the need for Great Britain to come to terms with France, arguing +that a neutral Germany would entail a neutral France.[414] Moreover, +carrying out a suggestion of the Prince of Monaco, the _Wilhelmstrasse_ +sought to effect, through the mediation of the Italian government, a +meeting between the Emperor William and President Loubet of France +during their visits to Italy in March and April.[415] But on March 23 +Prince Radolin surprised his government[416] by reporting a conversation +with M. Delcassé which showed that the Anglo-French agreement was near +completion. By March 26 it became evident that the French had refused to +permit the proposed meeting.[417] So Count Bülow recommended to the +Emperor on March 30 the dispatch of three small warships to Tangier as a +direct intervention in the Moroccan affair. By thus arousing French +animosity, Germany would show Great Britain that the formation of a +Continental _bloc_ was impossible, that there was no cause for her to +sacrifice her interests in Morocco.[418] The Emperor regarded the move +as “entirely inopportune”; for, he argued, since France, Great Britain, +and Spain were about to settle the Moroccan question, “a one-sided +bellicose action by Germany . . . . would undoubtedly arouse the +suspicion of those Powers, would undermine belief in our repeatedly +expressed assurance, reiterated to the King of Spain at Vigo, that we +claim no exclusive rights in Morocco, and would put the stamp of +duplicity upon our policy.” He suggested that if the government wished +to take action in Morocco, it should first consult those three Powers +and secure their co-operation.[419] + +Without relinquishing the idea, Count Bülow had to content himself for +the time with a renewed declaration to the British Ambassador on April 6 +of neutrality during the Russo-Japanese War.[420] On April 8 the Anglo- +French accord was signed. + + + II + + +German public opinion was disquieted by the Anglo-French agreement and +by the Franco-Italian intimacy. Apart from the “lunatic fringe” as +represented by the Pan-German League, which demanded an immediate +seizure of a portion of Morocco,[421] no one expressed particular +concern over the loss of that country.[422] The scandals in the colonial +administration and the costly war with the natives of German Southwest +and German East Africa had momentarily turned the nation against further +colonial ventures.[423] The new international alignments, however, were +viewed by the nation with some alarm. In the Reichstag on April 12 Herr +Sattler, a National Liberal and a supporter of the government, expressed +satisfaction that the Triple Alliance remained firm; but, he continued, +“one has the feeling that otherwise a transformation has occurred in the +relations of the great Powers which can be of the gravest influence also +on German relations.” On the next day the Nationalist Count Reventlow +sarcastically remarked that he could not understand why Germany should +rejoice since France and Great Britain had settled their differences. +“If the world is divided, we must assume a somewhat different attitude +thereto,” he declared; “even in prudent circles of our people the course +of our foreign policy is being followed with national sorrow,” for the +government was trying to be overcordial to all without gaining anything. +Herr Bebel, the Social Democratic leader, greeted the Anglo-French +settlement on April 14; but he also regarded it as weakening the Triple +Alliance and strengthening the Dual Alliance. Like Count Reventlow, he +said that Germany’s international position in the last few years had in +no way improved, acknowledging with regret the increasing antipathy to +Germany in foreign lands.[424] + +Count Bülow endeavored to calm the public opinion by declaring in the +Reichstag, April 12 and 14, that “we have no reason to suppose that the +Anglo-French colonial accord is directed at any other Power.” To this +apparently “amicable understanding . . . . from the standpoint of German +interests we have nothing to object.” As to Morocco, “in the main” +Germany had economic interests which “we must and shall protect. . . . . +We have no cause to fear that these . . . . could be disregarded or +injured by any Power.” While scoffing at the allegation that Germany was +isolated, he added: “If we keep our sword sharp, we need not fear +isolation very much. Germany is too strong not to be able to make +alliances. Many combinations are possible for us.” Denying any thought +of waging a war over Morocco, he upheld a policy of “prudent quiet and +even of reserve”; but he concluded with the significant statement that +“if one wishes to arouse friction in the world, one does not shout it +from the house-tops. Frederick the Great may now and then have made a +Machiavellian move in politics, but he previously wrote the Anti- +Machiavelli.”[425] + +The Chancellor’s speech expressed only a temporary acquiescence in the +Anglo-French agreement, an intimation to France and Great Britain to +consult Germany over Morocco.[426] The German government liked that +accord less than the German people did, even though it knew nothing of +the content of the secret articles. The Emperor feared that now Great +Britain “would put every consideration for us more and more into the +background.”[427] And Count Bülow, who knew that the new alignment +placed Germany in no actual danger,[428] admitted that “doubtlessly both +Powers [France and Great Britain] win in international influence and in +freedom of movement by this accord and by their _rapprochement_, and +that the drawing force of the Anglo-French Entente on Italy will also be +strengthened.”[429] The prospective loss of Morocco to Germany and the +general dissatisfaction within Germany over the conduct of her foreign +affairs accentuated Count Bülow’s ill will toward the new agreement. + + + III + + +The Chancellor’s prophecy about Italy came true almost immediately. + +Italy’s policy was, of course, to play between the Triple Alliance and +France for her own advantage. Italian opinion interpreted the Anglo- +French _rapprochement_, following upon the Franco-Italian entente, as a +setback to Germany, and became more independent toward its allies. After +Italy’s special interest in the future of Tripoli was recognized, the +Italian people raised the irredentist question in the summer and autumn +of 1903. In the winter relations with Austria became so tense that war +clouds loomed up.[430] Count Goluchowski, the Austrian foreign minister, +desired to replace the Triple Alliance by the old League of the Three +Emperors, and declared that if the present relations with Italy +continued, Austria could not renew the alliance.[431] + +Count Bülow succeeded in patching up the raveling fabric of the Triple +Alliance.[432] He suspected that Italy had made a reinsurance treaty +with France after the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1902, by which +the alliance was nullified in case of a Franco-German war.[433] Neither +he nor General Schlieffen, German chief of staff, expected Italy to +support Germany in that instance or even to hold inactive the French +troops on the Italian frontier. None the less, at the request of the +Italian chief of staff, the Chancellor permitted the German-Italian +military conversations to continue as before.[434] He endeavored to +preserve at least the outward appearance of harmony.[435] + +But in the spring of 1904 the Triple Alliance almost went on the rocks +over an intrinsically insignificant affair—whether or not the +entertainment of the French and of the German chiefs of state, who were +both to visit Italy at about the same time in March and April, should be +on a similar scale. + +After the Emperor’s visit on March 26-27 had passed off quietly +enough[436] the French government sought to expand the program of +reception for President Loubet in order to demonstrate the great +popularity of France in Italy,[437] while the German government +endeavored to restrict it. Under threat of breaking the alliance, the +latter forced M. Tittoni, the Italian foreign minister, to promise that +Italy’s loyalty to the Triple Alliance would be warmly mentioned in the +toasts.[438] But when the visit occurred, April 24-28, the Italian King, +playing his own hand, helped the French to enjoy an unbroken +triumph.[439] On April 25 and 26 affection for them was extravagantly +displayed by the Italians while no mention of the Triple Alliance was +made.[440] In an endeavor to stop further exchange of toasts, the German +ambassador, Count Monts, complained bitterly to M. Luzzati, Italian +secretary of the treasury, of the pro-French attitude of the King, +government, and press; of the non-fulfilment of promises; of the King’s +ignoring him at the festivals; of the failure to mention the alliance in +the speeches. “My training and instructions prohibit me from using that +tone toward the _Consulta_ which would correspond with its behavior,” he +declared. He demanded that no more toasts be made.[441] + +Doubtless this peremptoriness would have produced the desired result if +at the crucial moment the German Emperor had not sent a telegram of warm +thanks for his reception to the Italian government and nullified the +entire effect of the Ambassador’s indignation.[442] At Naples the King +again exchanged toasts with M. Loubet without mentioning the alliance. + +Although the demands of the German government had been flouted, it could +not execute its threat; for a dissolution of the Triple Alliance, +occurring so soon after the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, would +have been too great a victory for France. “One would say,” wrote Count +Bülow, “that our policy since the retirement of Bismarck has lost us +first the alliance with Russia, then good relations with England, and +finally the Triple Alliance itself.”[443] So, feigning cool indifference +toward the renegade ally, he remarked to the Italian Ambassador that as +the conditions out of which the Triple Alliance had developed no longer +obtained, Germany had no need of Italy’s aid, nor, he supposed, had +Italy of Germany’s.[444] Then came apologies. On May 18 M. Tittoni +declared in the Italian Chamber that “the policy of Italy is not one of +balancing, which would be unworthy of a great state, but one of loyal +honesty. The alliance with Germany is not incompatible with friendly +relations with France.”[445] Although the German government did not +believe him, it accepted his excuses. The Triple Alliance resumed its +precarious course.[446] + +As a result of this episode, the anger of the German government at +France, already aroused over the diminution of German influence through +the Entente Cordiale, was increased. The Emperor, who had tarried near +the Italian coast in the persistent hope of a chance meeting with M. +Loubet,[447] returned home feeling like the poor kinsman uninvited to +the feast. On May 1, at the opening of the new Rhine bridge at Mainz, he +gave vent to his chagrin in the following warning: “I desire sincerely +that peace . . . . be kept. But I am convinced that if this bridge +should have to be used for more serious transports, it would stand the +test completely.”[448] + + + IV + + +“We need a success in our foreign policy,” wrote Prince Lichnowsky, +councilor in the German foreign office, on April 14, “because the Anglo- +French understanding as well as the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_ is +generally considered a defeat for us.”[449] The German government +immediately took steps toward obtaining that success. + +To manifest its dissatisfaction at being excluded from the Moroccan +settlement and to force M. Delcassé to agree with Germany on that +question, the German government first considered in April the project of +dispatching a warship to Tangier, ostensibly to settle certain +grievances against Morocco.[450] As a precaution, General Schlieffen, +chief of staff, was consulted, April 19, about the possibility of +success in case of a Franco-German war. Herr von Holstein summed up the +General’s reply as follows: “In case of the outbreak of a Franco-German +war at the present, Russia’s participation would be improbable, but +England’s attitude would be uncertain.”[451] + +The proposal was not executed at the time,[452] for Count Bülow had +other plans. The first one was to test the strength of the Entente +Cordiale, to weaken its force, and to include Germany among the Powers +making ententes by endeavoring to negotiate an arbitration treaty and a +general settlement with Great Britain similar to the Anglo-French ones. +If accord, even in principle, were reached on Anglo-German difficulties, +the Chancellor was willing to propose a naval agreement. He felt certain +that by careful handling he could win the Emperor’s approval of the +whole transaction.[453] + +The opportunity to make the proposal was afforded when about the first +of May the British government asked the other Powers interested in Egypt +to approve the changes which France had accepted in the declaration of +April 8. The German foreign office replied that Germany must receive the +same guaranty of her rights in Egypt that France had received, and +proposed to include in the negotiations the Anglo-German troubles +concerning Samoa, Transvaal indemnities, and the Canadian preferential +tariff. + +The British government refused to broaden the basis of negotiations, +declaring that the Egyptian affair must be settled on its own merits. +How Lord Lansdowne regarded the German proposal was shown in his letter +of May 6 to Sir Frank Lascelles. + + +The proposal of the German Government to make their concurrence in +regard to the Khedivial Decree dependent upon an all-round settlement +[he wrote] . . . . looks to an ordinary observer like a great piece of +effrontery. . . . . The suggestion that the consent of the German +Government to a perfectly innocuous arrangement in Egypt can only be +bought at the price of concessions elsewhere does not become more +palatable when we find it connected with an intimation that Germany is +hesitating whether “she shall turn to the East or to the West.” This is +a veiled threat of which I remember Hatzfeldt used to be fond.[454] + + +Pointing out the fact that Germany held only a very small per cent of +the Egyptian bonds (he said only ¼ per cent), that the other Powers had +agreed to the Egyptian changes unconditionally, and that France had made +reciprocal concessions to Great Britain in return for the guaranty of +her rights in Egypt, Lord Lansdowne refused to give Germany the special +guaranty which she requested.[455] + +Count Bülow agreed (May 28) to confine the negotiations to Egypt alone; +but he would not recede from the other demands. For, he argued, France +had been given large compensation in return for her renunciations in +Egypt while Germany merely asked an equal assurance of her rights and +interests in that land, particularly of her commercial interests. Thus +the two governments reached a deadlock. Each felt that it had a just +grievance.[456] Herr von Holstein, considering the occasion a “test of +strength,” thought that if Germany receded, the world would perceive +that sharp handling was sufficient to vanquish her.[457] Count +Metternich reported, however, that the British refusal was caused not by +any malign designs against Germany, but rather by the fact that the +government was opposed to weakening or endangering the Entente Cordiale +by treating Germany in the same way as France, and by the fact that it +saw no reason for making an exception of Germany after the other Powers +had unconditionally accepted the modifications. Above all, he wrote, the +British government feared another outburst of vituperation against +Germany from British public opinion and of indignation against the +British government itself for permitting Germany again to browbeat +it.[458] So about the middle of June at the Count’s suggestion, a +compromise was effected. The British government gave Germany a guaranty +of its Egyptian interests in return for an acceptance of the French +obligations in that land. The other Powers were to be asked to approve +this new agreement.[459] + +Late in June King Edward enjoyed a pleasant visit as the Emperor’s guest +at a naval review at Kiel; on July 10, at the King’s suggestion, some +German warships touched at Plymouth; and on July 12 an arbitration +treaty was signed between the two Powers. Their relations seemed to be +improving. At Kiel, Count Bülow once more assured the King that Germany +intended to guard strict neutrality during the Russo-Japanese War; and +Edward VII declared that “no special agreements were needed between +England and Germany since no conflict of political interests divided +them.” He also stated that he wished a settlement with Russia, in fact, +that he desired to diminish animosities among all Powers; but he added +that he had no thought thereby of isolating Germany.[460] + +In spite of the King’s cordial words, the fact remained that Germany was +still regarded with marked mistrust and antipathy by the British people, +while the British government had shown a preference, not yet appreciated +by Germany, for the friendship of France. Germany’s bid to participate +in the formation of ententes had failed. + + + V + + +Count Bülow’s second plan was to share in the settlement of the Moroccan +problem. He had made preparations to that end in the previous autumn, +but his policy had been repudiated by the German Emperor (who personally +had no interest in Morocco)[461] during an interview with the King of +Spain at Vigo on March 16, 1904. In one of his expansive and oracular +moods William II advised the youthful King to keep on good terms with +France and to make his first foreign visit to Paris, to be on his guard +against Great Britain and her satellite, Portugal, but to maintain +friendly personal relations with King Edward, and to come to an +agreement over the future of Morocco with the other nations, especially +France, interested in North Africa. Germany, he said, aimed at no +territorial acquisitions in North Africa, but only the maintenance of +the open door for, among others, “railway concessions, open ports, and +importation of manufactured articles.”[462] + +In spite of the Emperor’s renunciation, Count Bülow did not relinquish +his ambitions although the difficulty of realizing them was enormously +increased. The indefiniteness and apparent duplicity of the German +policy on the Moroccan question were caused by Count Bülow’s dilemma of +gaining a share in Morocco without violating the Emperor’s assertions. + +Late in April, 1904, the Chancellor was afforded an opportunity to +intervene through Spain, whose government asked for Germany’s sympathy +and “practical proof of it at the opportune moment” during the Franco- +Spanish negotiations then under way. Count Bülow was eager to fish in +troubled waters by lending aid, and in his optimism went so far as to +instruct Herr von Radowitz on April 29 as follows: + + +Port Mahon we leave entirely out of consideration. Primarily Fernando Po +interests us, for which under circumstances we would also pay well. If, +moreover, a harbor in West Morocco is obtainable, that would be very +useful. Perhaps Your Excellency can use the prevailing opinion in Spain +against the Anglo-French accord in this direction.[463] + + +The Chancellor advised the Spanish government to draw out the +negotiations; for, he argued, if Great Britain were given time in which +to recover from her fear that the far eastern entente of 1895 might be +renewed, she would begin to rue her bargain, and would at least +passively support Spain or acquiesce in the latter’s receiving better +terms from the more powerful France.[464] When the Chancellor heard of +difficulty between the two negotiating Powers over the control of +Tangier, he decided to give diplomatic support to Spain in obtaining +that port and its hinterland provided Great Britain was not obliged to +aid France diplomatically in acquiring them. In other words, he was +making it very easy for Great Britain to sin against her obligations to +France. When the German Ambassador sounded Lord Lansdowne early in June, +the latter, while not objecting, made it evident that he preferred and +expected a satisfactory settlement directly between the two Powers +themselves.[465] By June 10 the German government learned that this +matter had been arranged, but that trouble had arisen over the question +of publishing the agreement. Count Bülow immediately urged Spain in +favor of it.[466] On June 17 Herr von Radowitz reported that Spain was +insisting upon complete commercial freedom in Morocco without the thirty +years’ limitation. As this was also a sensitive point for Germany Count +Bülow on the next day instructed the Ambassador to advise Spain strongly +to insist upon the assurance of the fullest economic freedom even for +obtaining government contracts and concessions. He left it to Herr von +Radowitz to determine “whether it would be advantageous for the +achievement of the German goal to let the Spanish perceive that Germany +would assume and maintain the same standpoint at the proper moment.” +“Naturally,” he added for the Ambassador’s personal information, “it +would be . . . . a great help to us for Spain to take the lead.”[467] + +By July, however, there seemed little prospect of Germany’s profiting +from the Franco-Spanish negotiations.[468] German grievances against +Morocco remained unsettled. German firms trading there demanded +protection against the French monopolistic actions. In June, France +practically gained control over the Sultan’s finances, and she was +preparing an important mission to Fez in the autumn. Nor did M. Delcassé +show any inclination to open negotiations with Germany. Already +disgruntled at the French Foreign Minister, the German government came +to feel itself slighted and humiliated by his disregard. Its resentment +toward him became concentrated upon the one grievance which could be +best supported in public, that he was infringing upon Germany’s economic +interests in Morocco. It therefore decided to assume a more active +policy, and late in July held a discussion of ways and means. The +government did not follow up a hint from the Sultan for co-operation +because of its unsettled claims against Morocco. Nor could it tender him +financial support or begin an economic penetration of the land similar +to that of France because, as Baron Richthofen wrote late in July, “the +German banks all strike immediately when one mentions Morocco. The +German Foreign Secretary advised against keeping pace with every act of +the French in Morocco as too venturesome; while to take the initiative +directly with the French government by requesting guaranties for +economic freedom he regarded as both doubtful of success and beneath +German dignity. So at the Baron’s suggestion a “gradual, purely matter- +of-fact advance, ignoring as long as possible a special position of +France,” was decided upon. German warships should appear from time to +time in Moroccan waters, and during one of these visits the grievances +against Morocco should be settled.[469] + +The uncertain international situation also caused the German government +to proceed warily. On June 3 the Belgian Minister at Berlin had stated +to the German foreign office that he suspected the presence of a secret +article in the Anglo-French accord concerning the Rheinish frontier. +Although believing that the agreement did contain secret clauses +regarding Egypt, Count Metternich refused to credit this suspicion. Upon +mentioning the rumor to Lord Lansdowne on June 19, he received a full +denial that the accord contained any articles which concerned European +complications.[470] Nevertheless, the Chancellor realized that “any +attempt on the part of Germany to interfere in the Moroccan question in +its present phase can lead to an action with far-reaching consequences +and therefore deserves special precaution.”[471] For that reason he +first sought to learn how the British government regarded its +obligations to France with respect to Morocco.[472] + +On August 15 Count Metternich declared to Lord Lansdowne that “the +French effort aimed at a monopolization in Morocco. We could not permit +this.” Asserting that Germany was in no way bound by the Anglo-French +agreement, he said that Germany’s economic interests in regard to +governmental concessions and industrial enterprises in Morocco were +endangered by France. “We could very soon be put in a situation in which +we should have to protect our commercial interests [in the widest sense] +against France.” He asked Lord Lansdowne how the British government +interpreted the last part of Article IV of the Anglo-French declaration +stating that concessions for roads, etc., in Morocco were to be granted +“only on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the +State over these great undertakings of public interest,” and Article IX +obliging Great Britain to lend diplomatic aid to France. + +Lord Lansdowne denied that Great Britain had renounced her right to +share in the concessions in Morocco, but he refused to interpret Article +IX until a concrete instance arose. He declared that in the French +agreement + + +we [Great Britain] made no attempt to dispose of the rights of other +Powers, although we made certain concessions in respect of the rights +and opportunities to which we were ourselves entitled. I could at any +rate say that it was not at all probable that, if any third Power were +to have occasion to uphold its Treaty rights, we should use our +influence in derogation of them. + + +Count Metternich inferred from that interview that Lord Lansdowne would +limit the scope of Article IX, and that in case Germany’s actions did +not infringe upon the Sultan’s authority Germany would be safe in +opposing France in Morocco. However, he wrote, if Germany sought, for +instance, to acquire control of a harbor there, Great Britain would +support France. He warned his government that Great Britain would not +connive at blocking the French advance in Morocco or endanger her +friendship for the sake of that land. If a third Power disputed +politically the French position there, both government and people would +support France. Within those limits Germany could execute her Moroccan +policy. But, he continued, “in the present international situation, it +will be difficult for us to arrest the process of France’s establishing +herself in Morocco.”[473] + +Even before receiving Count Metternich’s reply, the Chancellor proposed +to dispatch an ultimatum to the Sultan demanding under threat of a naval +demonstration that he satisfy the German claims within three +months.[474] But the Emperor, who remained strongly opposed to active +interference in the Moroccan affair, refused his consent for the third +time, and upset the Chancellor’s policy.[475] In September the foreign +office discussed the plan to seize the Moroccan transport ship and even +Agadir, but nothing was done.[476] Early in October Baron Richthofen +suggested that since the Emperor was so averse to intervention the +government should take up the Moroccan question directly with the French +government. This project also came to naught.[477] + +While no action was taken German feeling continued to smolder. The +noncommittal communication from the French government about the +agreement with Spain early in October[478] and the repeated petitions of +German firms for the defense of their interests in Morocco[479] +augmented the bitterness against France. So while the German government +itself played the sphinx, it showed its resentment through the +semiofficial press and through conversations between German and French +officials in Morocco and elsewhere. By the end of the year the Moroccan +question was still very much alive. As an influential Moor remarked, +“Germany has not yet spoken, and so long as that has not occurred, we +cannot believe that anything definite has been decided.”[480] Before +Germany did speak, she endeavored to solve her difficulties by an effort +to ally with Russia. + + +[Footnote 399: See among others Richard Charmatz, _Österreichs äussere +und innere Politik von 1895 bis 1914_ (Leipzig and Berlin, 1918).] + +[Footnote 400: On the state of British public opinion see Eckardstein, +_Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, II, 397 f.; and +the various dispatches from Metternich and Eckardstein, _G.P._, XVII, +Nos. 5046, 5071, 5094, 5104, 5371, 5375, and others.] + +[Footnote 401: Holstein to Bülow, March 30, 1903, _G.P._, XVII, 573 n.; +memo. by Holstein, April, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 802 ff., No. 5888; +Holstein to Bülow, April 2, 1903, _ibid._, 838 f., No. 5910; Bülow to F. +O., April 3, 1903, _ibid._, 839 f., No. 5911.] + +[Footnote 402: An ardent advocate of the proposed Anglo-German alliance +and a sufferer from the “nightmare of coalitions,” Eckardstein had +resigned his position in October, 1902, because he disapproved of the +diplomatic method and the policy of his foreign office and “saw black +ahead” for his country; also perhaps because of personal pique at not +having been appointed ambassador in London upon the death of the aged +Count Hatzfeldt (Eckardstein, II, 412 f.). For his dispatch to Bülow see +_G.P._, XVII, 567 f., No. 5369; also published with minor changes in +Eckardstein, II, 425 f. The few changes from the original which occur in +some of the documents in Eckardstein’s memoirs are not of any great +importance. On the whole his judgments were sound.] + +[Footnote 403: The dispatches are to be found in _G.P._, Vol. XVII, +chap. cxv. In July, however, the German Emperor could not conceal from +the French Ambassador his irritation at Delcassé’s success in the Anglo- +French _rapprochement_. After expressing the wish that French vessels +might repeat the visit of 1895 to Kiel, he remarked to M. Bihourd, July +16: “‘I know well that nothing is to be accomplished with M. Delcassé. +The advances to England are the work of M. Delcassé and M. Cambon. . . . +. But the Russians are not content with that and some day they will make +you. . . . .’ Here a gesture of disappointment, concluded M. Bihourd, +made clear the prediction” (quoted from a dispatch from Bihourd in +Bourgeois et Pagès, _Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande +guerre_, p. 293).] + +[Footnote 404: Groeben to F. O., Sept. 17, 1903, _G.P._, XVII, 353 f., +No. 5198; Richthofen to Radowitz, Sept. 28, 1903, _ibid._, 357 ff., No. +5202.] + +[Footnote 405: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 18, 1903, _ibid._, 354, No. 5199; +Richthofen to Radowitz, Sept. 24, 1903, _ibid._, 354 ff., No. 5200.] + +[Footnote 406: Richthofen to Radowitz, Sept. 24, 1903, _ibid._, 355, No. +5200.] + +[Footnote 407: Radowitz to F. O., Sept. 29, Oct. 4, 1903, _ibid._, 359 +ff., Nos. 5203, 5205.] + +[Footnote 408: Radolin to F. O., Oct. 17, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 845 ff., +No. 5915; Bülow to William II, Oct. 19, 1903, _ibid._, 847 ff., No. +5916.] + +[Footnote 409: William II wrote to Nicholas II, Dec. 1, 1903, as +follows: “The visit of the hundred British Parliamentary—gentlemen and +ladies—to Paris shows how ‘the Crimean combination’ is warming to its +work. Your ally is making rather free with his flirt [with Great +Britain]. You should pull him up a little.” Again on Jan. 3, 1904, he +wrote to the same: “Therefore it is evident to every unbiassed mind that +Korea must and will be Russian. When and how that is nobody’s affair and +concerns only you and your country.” See Bülow to F. O., Oct. 31, 1903, +_ibid._, 853 f., No. 5918; memo. by Bülow, Nov. 7, 1903, _ibid._, 70 +ff., No. 5422; Walter Goetz (ed.), _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren, +1894-1914_ (Berlin, 1920), pp. 330 ff.; Savinsky, _Recollections of a +Russian Diplomat_, pp. 63 ff. William II addressed Nicholas in various +letters as “Admiral of the Pacific” and signed himself “Admiral of the +Atlantic.” In spite of these words, to hold the Emperor responsible for +the Russo-Japanese War is to underestimate the force of Russian foreign +policy.] + +[Footnote 410: See _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chaps. cxxviii, cxxix, especially +Bülow to William II, Jan. 4, 1904, _ibid._, 87 ff., No. 5972, and the +Emperor’s minutes; memo. by Bülow, Feb. 14, 1904, _ibid._, 62 f., No. +5961.] + +[Footnote 411: Bülow to Holstein, Jan. 15, 1904, _ibid._, 33 f., No. +5942; memo. by Eckardstein, Jan. 17, 1904, _ibid._, 38 ff., No. 5945, +and the Emperor’s minutes thereto.] + +[Footnote 412: Count Benckendorff, Russian ambassador at London, spoke +of the Dual Alliance as going to pieces, and there was talk among other +Russian diplomats of renewing the former League of the Three Emperors. +See Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 28, 1904, _ibid._, 165 ff., No. 6028; +Metternich to Bülow, March 14, 1904, _ibid._, 167 ff., No. 6029; +Alvensleben to Bülow, March 18, 1904, _ibid._, 172 ff., No. 6030; memo. +by Holstein, Jan. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 35 ff., No. 5944.] + +[Footnote 413: “Because of the importance of German neutrality we shall +perhaps find opportunity to utilize our central position in case of +further sharpening of the hostility in the same way that M. Delcassé +intends doing with reference to Morocco,” wrote Holstein in a memo. on +Jan. 23, 1904 (_ibid._, 48 ff., No. 5951). Also see memo. by Holstein, +Jan. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 48 ff., No. 5951.] + +[Footnote 414: Bülow to Metternich, Jan. 9, 1904, _ibid._, 22, No. 5932; +Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 8, 1904, _B.D._, II, 232, No. 273. Bülow +later complained that the British had offered very weak resistance to +the French demands (Bülow to Metternich, June 4, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 28, +No. 6383).] + +[Footnote 415: Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 4, 1904, _ibid._, 105 f., No. +6431; Bülow to Radolin, Feb. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 106 f., No. 6432, and +following documents.] + +[Footnote 416: For proof that the German government had not expected the +signing of the accord then see Eckardstein, II, 426 f.; Otto Hammann, +_Der misverstandene Bismarck. Zwanzig Jahre deutscher Weltpolitik_ +(Berlin, 1921), p. 110.] + +[Footnote 417: Monts to F. O., March 26, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 116, No. +6439.] + +[Footnote 418: Although Bülow did not say so, it is manifest that this +was one of his intentions (Bülow to William II, March 30, 1904, _ibid._, +197 ff., No. 6512).] + +[Footnote 419: Tschirschky to Bülow, April 3, 1904, _ibid._, 199 ff., +No. 6513. On the interview at Vigo see below.] + +[Footnote 420: Bülow to Tschirschky, April 3, 1904, _ibid._, 8 f. No. +6370; memo. by Bülow, April 6, 1904, _ibid._, 10 f., No. 6372; Bülow to +Tschirschky, April 6, 1904, _ibid._, 201 and note, No. 6514. The last +dispatch was not sent, for on April 8 the accord was signed.] + +[Footnote 421: _Zwanzig Jahre alldeutscher Arbeit und Kämpfe_, pp. 219, +233, 235, 238 f.] + +[Footnote 422: See, for instance, _Berliner Tageblatt_, April 17, 1904; +Dr. Th. Schiemann, _Deutschland und die grosse Politik, 1904_ (Berlin, +1905), p. 118, and others; _Grenzboten_, June 23, 1904, p. 668.] + +[Footnote 423: Alfred Zimmerman, _Deutsche Kolonialpolitik_ (Berlin, +1914), pp. 241 ff.] + +[Footnote 424: _Stenographische Berichte von den Behandlungen des +Reichstages_, CXCIX, 2019, 2053 f., 2058 f.; Hammann, _Bilder aus der +letzten Kaiserzeit_, p. 42; reports from the Berlin correspondent to the +_London Times_, April 11 and 16, 1904.] + +[Footnote 425: Bülow, _Reden_, II, 74, 84, 90 f.; see also Hammann, +_Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 42 f.] + +[Footnote 426: This was Sanderson’s opinion. He was at the time British +permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. See memo. by +Sanderson, Feb. 25, 1907, _B.D._, III, 421.] + +[Footnote 427: William II to Bülow, April 19, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 22 ff., +No. 6378.] + +[Footnote 428: From London, Bernstorff, first secretary of the embassy, +reported that the British were entirely pacific in their intentions and +inclinations (Bernstorff to Bülow, April 16, 1904, _ibid._, 14 ff., No. +6376). The Emperor considered this report “excellent.” Alvensleben also +wrote from St. Petersburg that Russia was not so well satisfied with the +Anglo-French accord as French newspapers would have one believe +(Alvensleben to Bülow, April 15, 1904, _ibid._, 21 f., No. 6377).] + +[Footnote 429: Bülow to William II, April 20, 1904, _ibid._, 24, No. +6379.] + +[Footnote 430: On Austro-Italian relations see Wedel to Bülow, Sept. 14, +1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 621 ff., No. 5779; memo. by Bülow, Sept. 20, 1903, +_ibid._, 624 ff., No. 5780; Monts to F. O., _ibid._, XX, 47 f., No. +6399; Monts to Bülow, April 25, 1904, _ibid._, 54 ff., No. 6404; Monts +to Bülow, April 30, 1904, _ibid._, 64 ff., No. 6412.] + +[Footnote 431: Memo. by Bülow of conversation with Goluchowski at +Vienna, Sept. 20, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 625 f., No. 5780; Wedel to +Bülow, Oct. 20, 1903, _ibid._, 627 f., No. 5783.] + +[Footnote 432: An interview between the Italian and the Austrian foreign +ministers at Abazzia on April 9, 1904, attested to this fact. See Wedel +to Bülow, April 14, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 50 ff., No. 6401; memo. by Bülow, +May 9, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 613 ff., No. 5775; Bülow to Monts, June 9, +1903, _ibid._, 616 ff., No. 5776; and following documents in _ibid._, +chap. cxxii, Anhang.] + +[Footnote 433: Monts to Bülow, April 30, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 64, No. +6412; memo. by Holstein, March 3, 1904, _ibid._, 37 ff., No. 6388.] + +[Footnote 434: Chelius to Schlieffen, Dec. 1, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 705 +ff., No. 5827; Richthofen to Schlieffen, Dec. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 707 f., +No. 5826; Schlieffen to Richthofen, Dec. 14, 1903, _ibid._, 708, No. +5829.] + +[Footnote 435: Memo. by Holstein, March 3, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 37 ff., +No. 6388; Monts to F. O., March 7, 1904, _ibid._, 41, No. 6390.] + +[Footnote 436: Bülow to William II, March 11, 1904, _ibid._, 46, No. +6397; Monts to F. O., March 26, 1904, _ibid._, 47 f., No. 6399; _Quest. +dipl. et col._, April 1, 1904, XVII, 524 f.] + +[Footnote 437: Monts to Bülow, April 16, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 53 f., No. +6403. Giovanni Giolitti, who was then Italian premier, has written as +follows about this visit: “In Delcassé I noticed particularly his +finesse and ability, as well as the insistence with which he attempted +to loosen or weaken our bonds with Germany, without however putting +forward anything at all in the nature of a definite proposal” (_Memoirs +of My Life_ [London, 1923], p. 183). On March 5, 1904, Sir Francis +Bertie, British ambassador in Rome, wrote to Lansdowne as follows: “M. +Ba[rrère] does all he can to create friction between Italy and Austria +to alienate Italy from her partner in the Triplice” (_B.D._, V, 74). In +contrast the British Ambassador in Vienna was in April, 1904, reassuring +his Italian colleague about Austrian intentions in the Balkans now that +Russia was in a far eastern war (Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 7, 1904, +_ibid._, V, 80, No. 41).] + +[Footnote 438: Memo. by Holstein, March 3, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 37 ff., No. +6388; Bülow to Monts, March 6, 1904, _ibid._, 39 ff., No. 6389, and +following documents.] + +[Footnote 439: Monts to F. O., March 17, 1904, _ibid._, 45, No. 6396; +Bülow to Monts, March 26, 1904, _ibid._, 46 f., No. 6398; Monts to +Bülow, April 2, 1904, _ibid._, 48 f., No. 6400; Monts to Bülow, April +16, 1904, _ibid._, 52 f., No. 6402; Monts to Bülow, April 16, 1904, +_ibid._, 53 f., No. 6403.] + +[Footnote 440: Monts to Bülow, April 25, 1904, _ibid._, 54 ff., No. +6404; Monts to F. O., April 26, 1904, _ibid._, 57 f., No. 6405; _Quest. +dipl. et col._, XVII, 688 ff.] + +[Footnote 441: Monts to Bülow, April 28, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 60 ff., No. +6410.] + +[Footnote 442: Monts to Bülow, April 29, 1904, _ibid._, 63 f., No. +6411.] + +[Footnote 443: Bülow’s minutes to a dispatch from Monts, May 21, 1904, +_ibid._, 78, No. 6419.] + +[Footnote 444: Holstein advised informing the Italian government that +the Triple Alliance “practically speaking has had its day,” while Monts +confined his relations with Tittoni to written communications. See +Richthofen to Monts, April 28, 1904, _ibid._, 59 f., No. 6409; Bülow to +Monts, May 7, 1904, _ibid._, 67 ff., No. 6414; memo. by Holstein, May +12, 1904, _ibid._, 71 f., No. 6416; memo. by Bülow, May 12, 1904, +_ibid._, 73 f., No. 6417.] + +[Footnote 445: Quoted in _ibid._, p. 75 nn.; Tommaso Tittoni, _Italy’s +Foreign and Colonial Policy. A Selection from the Speeches Delivered in +the Italian Parliament by Tommaso Tittoni_ (New York, 1915), pp. 12 f., +quoting a speech by Tittoni on May 14, 1904.] + +[Footnote 446: Memo. by Bülow, May 12, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 73 f., No. 6417 +and Anlage; Monts to Bülow, May 12, 1904, _ibid._, 74 ff., No. 6418; and +the following documents. At a personal meeting on Sept. 27, 1904, +Premier Giolitti affirmed to Bülow Italy’s loyalty to her alliance and +promised to show more reserve toward France (memo. by Bülow, Sept. 28, +1904, _ibid._, 81 ff., No. 6422).] + +[Footnote 447: The Emperor tarried so long that Bülow finally advised +him to come home; otherwise he would make himself ridiculous. See Monts +to F. O., April 17, 1904, _ibid._, 117, No. 6440; Bülow to William II, +April 17, 1904, _ibid._, 117 f., No. 6441.] + +[Footnote 448: The Emperor made similar speeches at Karlsruhe, April 28, +and at St. Johann-Saar-brücken, May 14 (Schulthess, _Europäischer +Geschichtskalender 1904_, pp. 76, 92). At Karlsruhe he declared: “I hope +that peace will not be disturbed and that the events which we see +occurring will have the effect of . . . . making our eyes clear, of +steeling our courage, and of uniting us if it should become necessary to +interfere in the _Weltpolitik_.”] + +[Footnote 449: Memo. by Lichnowsky, April 13, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 203, No. +6516.] + +[Footnote 450: Dr. Genthe of the _Kölnische Zeitung_ had recently been +murdered by some of the Moroccans; a native employee of a German firm +had been illegally imprisoned; and certain indemnities from the Moroccan +government had to be collected. See Mentzingen to Bülow, April 5 +(received April 11), 1904, _ibid._, 202, No. 6515; memo. by Lichnowsky, +April 13, 1904, _ibid._, 202 f., No. 6516; memo. by Bruning, April 23, +1904, _ibid._, 203 ff., No. 6517, and Richthofen’s minutes thereto.] + +[Footnote 451: Memo. by Lichnowsky, April 19, 1904, _ibid._, XIX, 174 +f., No. 6031; Schlieffen to Bülow, April 20, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 175 ff., +No. 6032.] + +[Footnote 452: On May 21, Mühlberg, of the German foreign office, +telegraphed to Mentzingen, German minister at Tangier, that since “a +forceful action could be easily misunderstood and lead to erroneous +conclusions about the German policy,” the ship would not be sent +(_ibid._, 206, No. 6502).] + +[Footnote 453: Memo. by Holstein, April 19, 1904, _ibid._, 123 f., No. +6443; Bülow to Richthofen, April 19, 1904, _ibid._, 124, No. 6444. All +three men approved of the idea.] + +[Footnote 454: Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 329 f.] + +[Footnote 455: Richthofen to Lascelles, May 4, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 127 f., +No. 6446. Whether or not the communication was sent in this form is not +known. See Rücker-Jenisch to F. O., May 18, 1904, _ibid._, 128 f., No. +6447; Villiers to Lascelles, May 24, 1904, _ibid._, 129 ff., No. 6448; +Lascelles to Lansdowne, May 18, 1904, _B.D._, III, 1, No. 1; Lansdowne +to Lascelles, May 4, 1904, _ibid._, 18, No. 16, and following +documents.] + +[Footnote 456: Memoir handed to Richthofen to Lascelles, May 28, 1904, +_G.P._, XX, 132 f., No. 6449; Metternich to F. O., June 1, 1904, +_ibid._, 147 f., No. 6454.] + +[Footnote 457: Memo. by Holstein, June 5, 1904, _ibid._, 144 f., No. +6461; William II to Bülow, June 6, 1904, _ibid._, 147 f., No. 6463.] + +[Footnote 458: Dispatches from Metternich to F. O., June 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, +1904 (_ibid._, 138 ff., Nos. 6455, 6458, 6460, 6464, 6466). Cf. Mallet +to Spring Rice, early summer, 1904 (Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships +of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 414). Mallet stated that the British +government did not want to weaken the advance toward France by a +settlement with Germany, especially since the Anglo-French accord had +not been definitely ratified.] + +[Footnote 459: _G.P._, XX, 148 ff., Nos. 6464-80; _B.D._, III, 21 ff., +Nos. 19-23.] + +[Footnote 460: Memo. by Bülow, June 26, 29, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 186 ff., +Nos. 6038, 6040; memo. by Richthofen (undated though probably written +about July 4, 1904), _ibid._, 194 ff., No. 6042; Richthofen to +Metternich, June 20, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 163, No. 6478; Lee, _King Edward +VII_, II, 292 ff. See also MacDonald to Lansdowne, June 23, 1904, +_B.D._, IV, 1, No. 1; Lansdowne to MacDonald, June 24, 1904, _ibid._, 2, +No. 2.] + +[Footnote 461: In 1896 the Emperor had shown a decided interest in +Morocco (_G.P._, XI, No. 2820). In the next years, however, his attitude +had changed. The motive force behind the German policy toward Morocco +was Bülow.] + +[Footnote 462: The Emperor thought of buying Fernando Po, but said +nothing of this to the King. On this incident and the Emperor’s attitude +toward Morocco see his minutes to Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 20, 1903, +_ibid._, XVII, 362, No. 5206; William II to Bülow, March 16, 1904; +_ibid._, 363, No. 5208; Radowitz to Richthofen, March 23, 1904, _ibid._, +364, No. 5209; Radolin to Bülow, March 30, 1904, _ibid._, 365, No. 5210. +On Oct. 20, 1903, Radolin had reported from Paris a conversation with +the Spanish Ambassador in which the latter, after admitting that France +and Spain were well on the way toward an accord over Morocco, remarked +to him, “I suppose that you have nothing to object to our entente.” +Radolin replied, “We have only commercial interests in those parts, +which, however, are of very great importance and which we must +safeguard” (Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 20, 1903, _ibid._, 361 f., No. +5206).] + +[Footnote 463: Bülow to Radowitz, April 29, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 169 f., +No. 6481.] + +[Footnote 464: Bülow to Radowitz, May 22, 1904, _ibid._, 173 f., No. +6484; Bülow to Radowitz, May 25, 1904, _ibid._, 174 f., No. 6486.] + +[Footnote 465: Bülow to Metternich, May 31, 1904, _ibid._, 176 f., No. +6488; Metternich to F. O., June 1, 1904, _ibid._, 177 f., No. 6489, and +following documents; also Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 1, 1904, _B.D._, +III, 53, No. 61.] + +[Footnote 466: Radowitz to F. O., June 10, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 180 f., No. +6494; Bülow to Radowitz, June 16, 1904, _ibid._, 181, No. 6496.] + +[Footnote 467: Radowitz to F. O., June 17, 1904, _ibid._, 182, No. 6497; +Bülow to Radowitz, June 18, 1904, _ibid._, 182 f., No. 6498 and +following documents.] + +[Footnote 468: Radolin to Bülow, July 27, 1904, _ibid._, 216, No. 6524; +memo. by Richthofen, July 16, 1904, _ibid._, 186, No. 6503; Radowitz to +F. O., July 21, 1904, _ibid._, 188, No. 6504.] + +[Footnote 469: Bülow to Radolin, July 21, 1904, _ibid._, 210 ff., No. +6523; Radolin to Bülow, July 27, 1904, _ibid._, 215 ff., No. 6524; memo. +by Richthofen, July 29, 1904, _ibid._, 217, No. 6525, and Bülow’s +minutes. In the negotiations with Germany over the acceptance of the +Khedivial decree, Lansdowne informed Metternich that France had agreed +to support Great Britain fully if at some future time the latter should +propose “a revision of the international agreements affecting the +position of the Powers in Egypt” (Lansdowne to Whitehead, June 19, 1904, +_B.D._, III, 22 f., No. 21). This was, of course, the content of one of +the secret articles in the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, although +naturally Lansdowne did not say so. Whether the German government +inferred therefrom that a reciprocal concession had been made by Great +Britain to France with respect to Morocco is not evident, but it +probably did. Lansdowne also stated to Metternich on June 1 what the +area was which should be supervised by Spain, although he spoke only of +having emphasized this point verbally to the French government and said +nothing of a secret article to that effect. So far as the documents +show, the German government does not seem to have recognized the import +of this statement, although this negative proof is not conclusive +(Metternich to F. O., June 1, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 177 f., No. 6489).] + +[Footnote 470: Bülow to Metternich, June 4, 1904, _ibid._, 27 f., No. +6383; Metternich to F. O., June 4, 1904, _ibid._, 29 f., Nos. 6384 f.] + +[Footnote 471: Bülow to Radolin, July 21, 1904, _ibid._, 210 f., No. +6523. Radolin also warned that if “English diplomatic support of France +does not signify much, we have a free hand, while an Anglo-French +resistance could easily force us to retreat” (Radolin to Bülow, July 27, +1904, _ibid._, 216 f., No. 6524).] + +[Footnote 472: Mühlberg to Metternich, Aug. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 217 ff., +No. 6526.] + +[Footnote 473: Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 15, 1904, _ibid._, 219 ff., No. +6527; Lansdowne to Lascelles, Aug. 15, 1904, _B.D._, III, 53 f., No. +62.] + +[Footnote 474: Metternich’s dispatch was sent on Aug. 18, although dated +Aug. 15. Bülow approved of the new measures on Aug. 17. See Mentzingen +to Bülow, Aug. 6, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 222 f., No. 6528; Mühlberg to Bülow, +Aug. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 223 f., No. 6529; Bülow to Tschirschky, Aug. 17, +1904, _ibid._, 224 f., No. 6530.] + +[Footnote 475: Mentzingen to F. O., Sept. 13, 18, 1904, _ibid._, 226 +ff., Nos. 6532 f.] + +[Footnote 476: See editor’s note, _ibid._, p. 225; also memo. by +Richthofen, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 228, No. 6534.] + +[Footnote 477: Memo. by Richthofen, _ibid._, 228 ff., No. 6534.] + +[Footnote 478: Richthofen to Radowitz, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 191, No. +6508; memo. by Richthofen for Bülow, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 228 ff., No. +6534.] + +[Footnote 479: Memo. by Kries, Oct. 22, 1904, _ibid._, 231 f., No. +6535.] + +[Footnote 480: Kühlmann to Bülow, Nov. 9, 1904, _ibid._, 232 ff., No. +6536.] + + + + + CHAPTER X + + THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A RUSSO-GERMAN ALLIANCE, 1904 + + +Early in July, 1904, Herr von Holstein offered his resignation because +of personal differences with Baron Richthofen. In doing so, he stated +that the prestige of Germany had diminished during the past years “while +our opponents and rivals are on the point of encircling us”; and as +“difficult situations” were to be anticipated, he was happy to be +relieved of responsibility. Count Bülow patched up the quarrel, but his +comment to Herr von Holstein’s remarks is illuminating: + + +Now he [Herr von Holstein] speaks of our shrunken prestige just as the +Bismarckian press does. But I cannot believe that Holstein, like that +press, attributes the decline of our authority to the dismissal of the +great Chancellor. Since that dismissal, from the non-renewal of the +Russian Reinsurance Treaty and the East Asiatic Triple Alliance to the +handling of the Moroccan and Egyptian questions, from the so-called +Urias letter to Vienna to the publication of the Swinemünde dispatch, +from the turn in 1896 against England to the Shanghai and Pauncefote +difference with that Power, nothing of significance has happened in our +foreign policy without Holstein’s advice.[481] + + +The results of those errors, so frankly confessed, were apparent: the +conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, the exclusion of Germany from the +entente movement and from the Moroccan settlement, the British efforts +to approach Russia,[482] animosity between Great Britain and Germany. +They all caused that attempt at a new orientation of policy which in +1900 Count Bülow had threatened in this eventuality. + +One of the most favorable aspects of the German foreign relations was +the _rapprochement_ with the United States in 1903 and 1904. There was +cordial friendship between President Roosevelt and Baron Sternburg, the +German ambassador,[483] and the two governments both desired to maintain +the integrity of China during the current war.[484] The President +mistrusted Russia, about whom he could say nothing good, and France in +their policy toward China, and he met difficulty in trying to co-operate +with Great Britain.[485] As he was ambitious to mediate peace between +Russia and Japan when the time came, he turned to Germany for aid, in +August expressing the wish “to go hand in hand with Germany in East +Asia.”[486] The German government perceived in this co-operation a means +of protecting its interests in China, of issuing from its relative +international isolation, and of preventing France and Great Britain from +mediating peace—an event which might enable them to form a triple +grouping with Russia or even a quadruple combination with Russia and +Japan.[487] Count Bülow therefore cordially responded to the President’s +invitation,[488] seeking at the same time to increase the latter’s +suspicion of France and Great Britain.[489] + +As the German government realized the limitations to this intimacy with +the United States, it sought a more effective association in an alliance +with Russia. In January, 1904, the Chancellor had been unconcerned about +such an alliance;[490] but by July he was waiting for the “psychological +moment” in which to propose a renewal of the former “League of the Three +Emperors.”[491] + +The advent of that moment seemed highly probable. Since the beginning of +the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian people, government, and sovereign +had drawn closer to Germany.[492] On June 1, “dearest Nicky” wrote to +his cousin “Willy” (so they addressed each other), “I know that you feel +for us in this serious time and it is a comfort to realize that one’s +_real friends_ think and sympathize with one.”[493] And “Willy,” in his +replies, overflowed with affection and advice—advice that varied from +directing “Nicky” upon how to conduct war to lecturing him on the +“piratical” practices of his ships, from urging him to send his Black +Sea fleet through the Dardanelles in spite of British opposition to +reporting gossip which would antagonize him against Great Britain and +France.[494] + +In October the opportunity arose for the German move toward an alliance. +A Russian company had given a contract to the Hamburg-American Line to +furnish coal for the Russian Baltic fleet which was to sail for the war +zone about the middle of that month.[495] As the German firm intended to +use mainly English coal, it had chartered a number of British ships and +had given a subcontract to a British firm to aid it in the +transportation. None the less, on learning of the transaction, the +British press bitterly attacked Germany for thus violating neutrality. +In view of this attack Count Bülow on October 4 instructed Baron +Romberg, first secretary of the German embassy in St. Petersburg, to +make a communication to the Russian government as follows: Baron Romberg +should state to Count Lamsdorff that this press campaign might provoke a +war but that the German government would not prevent the execution of +the coaling contract, that it “would run the risk of having the English +kindle fire-rockets in Japan.” If war did occur with Japan and Great +Britain, Germany would hold France also responsible; for not only would +a large element among the French advocate grasping the opportunity for +revenge against Germany, but also the arousing of the British zeal for +war would be a direct result of the Entente Cordiale. “So if we lose our +colonies, trade, merchant marine, and perhaps also a part of our war +fleet in an unequal battle on the sea . . . . a reckoning with France on +land would become unavoidable for us.”[496] + +Count Lamsdorff showed no inclination to respond to this feeler. On +October 19, while thanking the German government for its friendship, he +refused to credit either Great Britain or Japan with bellicose +intentions against Germany. He interrupted Baron Romberg to assure him +that nothing was to be feared from France; not a word did he utter about +an alliance.[497] + +Meantime, the Russian Baltic squadron sailed, and in the night of +October 21 occurred the Dogger Bank disaster which brought war between +Great Britain and Russia dangerously close.[498] The “psychological +moment” had come, reasoned Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein. Defeated +in the Far East, menaced by revolution, and excited by this new danger, +Russia should welcome the project of an alliance with the strongest +military power in Europe. So on October 24 Herr von Holstein, who +usually held aloof from all ambassadors, explained the German +proposition to Count Osten-Sacken,[499] the Russian representative. +Three days later the Emperor’s influence with the Czar, who was thought +to be more pliable and more favorably inclined than his Foreign +Minister, was brought into play. In a letter to Nicholas II the Emperor +wrote: + + +For some time English press has been threatening Germany, on no account +to allow coals to be sent to your Baltic Fleet now on its way out. It is +not impossible, that the Japanese and British Governments may lodge a +joint protest against our coaling your ships coupled with a _sommation_ +to stop further work. The result aimed at by such a threat of war would +be absolute immobility of your fleet and inability to proceed to its +destination from want of fuel. This new danger would have to be faced in +community by Russia and Germany together, who would both have to remind +your ally France of the obligations she has taken over in the treaty of +Dual Alliance with you, the _casus foederis_. It is out of the question, +that France on such an invitation, would try to shirk her implicit duty +towards her ally. Though Delcassé is an Anglophile _énragé_, he will be +wise enough to understand that the British fleet is utterly unable to +save Paris! In this way a powerful combination of 3 of the strongest +continental Powers would be formed to attack, whom the Anglo-Japanese +group would think twice before acting. . . . . My news from London say, +that the Press and mob make a noise, the Admiralty some fuss, but that +Government, Court and Society look with greatest calm at the event as an +unhappy accident, arising from to great nervousness.[500] + + +This broad hint, amounting almost to a proposal of alliance itself, was +immediately effective. The Czar replied two days later: + + +As you say . . . . Germany, Russia, and France should at once unite upon +an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence. Would +you like to lay down and frame the outlines of such a treaty and let me +know it? As soon as accepted by us France is bound to join her ally. +This combination has often come to my mind. It will mean peace and rest +for the world.[501] + + +On the next day a draft of a treaty and a long explanatory letter, both +composed by the Chancellor and Herr von Holstein,[502] were sent by the +Emperor to the Czar. This draft, which was intended to test how far the +Russian government would go, provided for a “defensive alliance . . . . +to localize as far as possible the Russo-Japanese War.” The first +article was the most important: + + +In case one of the two Empires shall be attacked by a European Power, +its ally will aid it with all its force on land and sea. The two allies, +in that case, would make common cause for the purpose of recalling to +France the obligations which she has assumed by the terms of the Franco- +Russian treaty of Alliance. + + +By the second article neither Power was to conclude a separate peace +with a common adversary. The third article was designed to safeguard +Germany in the coaling affair and to continue the alliance after the +current war was over. It read: + + +The engagement of mutual aid is equally valid in case acts performed by +one of the high contracting parties during the war such as the delivery +of coal to a belligerent should give place after the war to reclamations +of a third Power, as pretended violations of the right of neutrality. + + +In the letter the Emperor emphasized the defensive and the purely +European character of the alliance. “It is very essential that America +should not feel threatened by our agreement,” he wrote. He denounced +France, “this republic of miserable civilians,” “the French radicals, +Clemenceau and all the rest of the tag-rag and bobtail” for not +fulfilling France’s obligations to her ally. + + +I positively know that as far back as last December the French Finance +Minister Rouvier told the Finance Minister of another power, France +would on no account join in a Russo-Japanese war, even though England +sided with Japan. To make doubly sure, the English have handed Morocco +over to France. The certainty, that France intends to remain neutral and +even to lend her diplomatic support to England, is the motive, which +gives English policy its present unwonted brutal assurance. This unheard +of state of things will change as soon as France finds herself face to +face with the necessity of eventually choosing sides. . . . . The +radical party . . . . abhors war and militarism, while the nationalist +party while not objecting to war in itself, hates fighting for England +and against Russia. Thus it will be in the interests of both parties to +bring pressure to bear on and warn England to keep the peace. The main +result will be, if you and I stand shoulder to shoulder, that France +must formally and openly join us, thereby fulfilling her treaty- +obligations toward Russia. . . . . This consummation once reached, I +expect to maintain peace and you will be left an undisturbed and free +hand to deal with Japan. . . . . Of course, before we can take any steps +in this question and approach France that tiresome North Sea incident +must first have been brought to a close. + + +For, he continued, the French foreign office had already accepted the +British view of the incident, and in case of difficulty over this +matter, France would choose the British side. At the close of his letter +the Emperor wrote that only he and Count Bülow knew of the project, and +that when they had finished the draft the Chancellor had said: “May +God’s blessings rest upon the work of the two monarchs and may the +mighty three-Power group, Russia, Germany, France, preserve forever the +peace of Europe. God grant it!”[503] + +The real object of this extravagant show of devotion to Russia was of +course to inveigle her into an alliance. It did not signify a desire for +a general conflict; the German government appreciated the British naval +power too keenly for that.[504] Moreover, since it knew how averse the +Russian government and especially the Czar were to an extension of the +war, it emphasized the pacifying influence which the proposed alliance +would exercise. The German leaders doubtlessly realized, however, that +they were running a big risk, since Count Bernstorff, first secretary of +the embassy in London, had warned them that Great Britain would regard +an alliance between Germany and Russia, no matter how defensive in +character, as an aggression directed against the security of the British +Empire.[505] + +The Chancellor and Herr von Holstein considered the risk worth while, +because, if the alliance could be concluded, they expected France, under +the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, to enter the new grouping. +If she did so, they no doubt reasoned, the Entente Cordiale would be +destroyed, the work of M. Delcassé would be blocked, and, instead of +Great Britain, Germany would be the center of the new combination. +France, as the weakest member of the firm, would have to take orders +from both her partners. In fact, the German government openly expressed +to the Czar the expectation that in case of a war the control over the +French army and navy would be put into German hands. If France, refusing +to enter the alliance, elected to range herself with Great Britain and +if the Russo-German alliance alone were made, the German statesmen +apparently thought that the Dual Alliance would be broken, France would +again be at the mercy of the German military power, and the possibility +of an Anglo-Russian accord would be destroyed. The gains, both positive +and negative, to be derived by Germany from such an alliance would be +enormous. Its completion would constitute a far-reaching diplomatic +revolution.[506] + +In Russian governmental circles opinion was divided. The Czar, who had +proposed the alliance without consulting his Foreign Minister,[507] was +its staunchest supporter. Weak and dependent, he usually agreed with his +most recent adviser. His imagination, which could be vivid at times, was +given freer rein because of his indolence. In 1903 he had succumbed to +the arguments and ambitions of the adventurer, M. Bezobrazov, about +Manchuria and Korea and had brought on the war with Japan. As the +necessary European part of that program, M. Bezobrazov had advocated an +understanding between the Dual and the Triple alliances. This aspect had +not been achieved, probably owing to Count Lamsdorff’s opposition.[508] +But the war was taking a disastrous course for Russia, revolution was +threatening, and the German Emperor’s telegram arrived while the crisis +with Great Britain was still acute and when Russia, according to the +British Ambassador, would have welcomed a war with that Power.[509] The +forlorn and troubled Czar returned readily to the idea of an alliance +when William II suggested it. + +Count Lamsdorff was wary of this move from the start. Not a very strong +personality, he was unable at times to maintain control of the foreign +policy, yet he was a capable and loyal official who, when necessary, +spoke frankly to his master. The Czar was actuated chiefly by sentiment +and emotion; his Minister by shrewd diplomatic calculations. Although +the one did not grasp the German motives, the other did; and the +prospect of feeling “the heavy weight . . . . of the iron bands” of a +German alliance was not to his liking. Count Lamsdorff did not believe +that Russia needed this alliance as he felt certain that Great Britain +would not attack her.[510] Furthermore, the conclusion of an agreement +of neutrality about Balkan affairs with Austria-Hungary late in October +relieved his country from danger in that quarter.[511] + + +On the other hand [he wrote to Count Osten-Sacken], we manifestly need +the friendship of our powerful neighbor for the security of our +extensive frontier, for our provisioning with coal and other +contrabands, etc. All this must be seriously considered and we must +endeavor not to permit our relations with Berlin to deteriorate, +although Paris must also not be disregarded. Only through the +preservation of this balance will Russia succeed in obtaining all +possible advantages from both sides.[512] + + +When the German draft of the treaty arrived, the Dogger Bank crisis was +over, but the Russian government remained embittered because Great +Britain had made special naval preparations and a detachment of British +cruisers, cleared for action, had followed the Russian fleet from Vigo +to Tangier.[513] Still, that was no reason to assume the “iron bands” of +a German alliance. The Czar and his Foreign Minister immediately set to +work to make the terms more favorable for Russia.[514] They modified the +first and third articles.[515] In the latter, to be kept secret, they +incorporated a _quid pro quo_ by which Russia should receive German +support in the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace. The revised first +article was the more important. The first sentence remained as before; +but, instead of stipulating that Russia and Germany both advise France +to enter the alliance, the second sentence was changed to read: “His +Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias will take the steps necessary to +initiate France into this accord and to invite her to associate herself +in it as ally.” The Czar told the Emperor that the revised Article I +must stand without change.[516] + +When the Russian government had been brought to this point, the German +leaders revealed their real aim. They were, of course, obliged to accept +the new first article; but the Emperor, in his reply to Nicholas II, +November 17, made it plain that France would have to choose sides, even +though, as he frankly wrote, “doubtless the French would much prefer any +other grouping of Powers to that of the Alliance _a trois_ as in 1895.” +The chief revisions asked by the German government were in the +introduction and in Article III. The former was changed to read: The +Emperor and the Czar “for the purpose of assuring the maintenance of +peace in Europe have agreed on the following articles of a treaty of +defensive alliance.” According to an entirely new Article III the treaty +should remain in force until denounced one year in advance; however, it +was left to the Czar to set any time limit he wished. + +These revisions transformed the basis of the negotiation. They made the +alliance a general one to continue after the war. The changes were +explained on the ground that, in the previous version, the treaty had +been aimed too openly at Great Britain, and that, while this was the +case, it was not politic to make the fact too evident. + +The Russian _quid pro quo_ in Article III was also rejected. Germany +preferred not to help Russia in the negotiations for peace for fear of +antagonizing the United States and of driving her into British arms, +although the Emperor excused this refusal by explaining that if this +secret clause became known, public opinion might consider the treaty an +aggressive one binding Germany to defend the Russian conquests. Instead, +he proposed that the previous Article III be made into an extra secret +article in which the second sentence should read: “It follows from the +the terms of the first sentence of Article I that Germany will associate +herself with no action whatever that might imply hostile tendencies to +Russia.” That clause, wrote the Emperor, would safeguard Russia against +the repetition of any such congress as that of 1878, whereby she had +been deprived of her Turkish conquests. + +In his accompanying letter to the Czar, for which Count Bülow and Herr +von Holstein furnished the rough draft, the Emperor urged a quick +signing of the agreement, adding the extraordinary proposal that Russia +make some military demonstration on the Persian-Afghan frontier. “Even +should the forces at your disposal not suffice for a real attack on +India itself,” he wrote, “they would do for Persia—which has no army—and +a pressure on the Indian frontier from Persia will do wonders in England +and have remarkably quieting influence on the hot headed Jingoes in +London.” He also warned the Czar against Anglo-French ambitions to +mediate at the desire of Japan.[517] + +In St. Petersburg, Count Lamsdorff persuaded the Czar to proceed slowly +with the negotiations, and, more important still, to consult France +before concluding any agreement. So on November 23 Nicholas II +telegraphed the German Emperor to that effect, adding: + + +As long as it is not signed one can make small modifications on the +text; whereas if allready approved by us both, it will seem as if we +tried to enforce the treaty on France. In this case a failure might +easily happen, which I think is neither your wish.[518] + + +The Germans realized that this answer spelled defeat for them; because +if the treaty became known to the French government that government +would of course strenuously resist its completion. In fact, the Emperor +was sure that M. Delcassé would at once publish the news of the proposed +alliance, that a war cry in England would then burst forth, and that the +timid Czar would back out. As he aptly expressed it, Count Lamsdorff and +M. Witte had “spat in the German soup.”[519] On November 26 he replied +with a refusal to let France know a word of the affair; it would be +better to drop the whole matter until a more suitable moment, he +declared. Although disgusted at this display of “cold feet,” as he put +it, William II showed no especial anger or uneasiness in his answer and +asked Nicholas II to continue their intimacy as before.[520] + +On the receipt of that reply Count Lamsdorff had to persuade his master +all over again, because the latter was more anxious to make the alliance +than he was to be considerate of his ally.[521] Certainly his letter of +October 29 to William II was such as to warrant confidence that he would +be willing to force the alliance upon France whether she wished it or +not. Count Lamsdorff argued that the relations of Russia and Germany +were sufficiently close to hold them together without an alliance. He +declared that France’s intimacy with Great Britain had not caused her to +be disloyal to her ally. While he doubted whether she could be won to +the proposed combination, he urged her right to be consulted beforehand +and denied that she would disclose the secret. She must be won +gradually, he said, and not confronted with a _fait accompli_ which +might force her back upon Great Britain.[522] + +It is obvious that Count Lamsdorff sought by this method to quash the +project or render it harmless. He succeeded only partly in winning over +his master. In the reply to the Emperor on December 7 Nicholas II once +more asked permission to obtain the French reaction to the main lines of +the alliance, even though the original document itself be kept secret +from her. “In case of a negative answer,” he wrote in conclusion, “the +second phase of Art. I of the draft of the treaty ought to be left out I +think.”[523] Thus, even in case Germany refused his request, the Czar +was still apparently willing to make an alliance with her to the entire +exclusion of France. + +While the Russian government was preparing this answer, the Germans lost +patience. Prospects for success seemed doubtful if not entirely +hopeless. The declarations of the French press that the Dual Alliance +remained as firm as ever and that Germany’s attempts to win Russia had +failed caused the Chancellor to suspect that news of the negotiations +had leaked out. Threats to seize the German vessels coaling the Russian +fleet appeared in the Japanese press; the British government laid +restrictions upon the shipping of coal to that fleet. In November and +December Germany began to fear a British attack.[524] + +Since October the British press had returned to its campaign of +calumniation against Germany, seeing a German plot behind every British +difficulty. In the autumn a redistribution of the British naval forces +had weakened the Mediterranean fleet and concentrated the main strength +in home waters. Germany perceived in this rearrangement a tangible proof +of the new alignment of Great Britain with France and of the growing +British animosity toward her.[525] + +Hence when in November several articles appeared in _Vanity Fair_ and in +the _Army and Navy Gazette_ proposing that the German fleet be +“Copenhagened”[526] as useless for any other purpose than to attack +Great Britain,[527] German public opinion took these threats seriously. +The Emperor wrote to Count Bülow on November 23 that “the situation +assumes more and more the aspect of that immediately preceding the Seven +Years’ War.”[528] The German navy department began hurried measures to +recall the vessels in foreign waters.[529] Taking a saner view, the +Chancellor, by means of an interview published in the _Nineteenth +Century_ for December and a speech in the Reichstag on December 5, +sought to calm both his own and the British people by an absolute +disclaimer of the thought of war between the two countries and by a +denial that in the construction of her fleet Germany intended any +hostility toward Great Britain.[530] But by December 5 Herr von Holstein +himself came to credit the possibility of a British attack.[531] + +While this situation seemed serious, the Chancellor was more concerned +by the fact that the completion of the coaling of the Russian fleet +would soon deprive Germany of her hold over Russia.[532] On December 6 +he instructed the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to inquire +peremptorily of the Russian government whether Germany could rely upon +its full support in case the coaling led to war. The Ambassador was to +state that if no satisfactory answer were received by the time the +Russian fleet reached Madagascar the Hamburg-American Line would be +forbidden to continue its task. This telegram, which was followed on the +next day by a similar one from the Emperor to Nicholas II,[533] forced +the negotiations back to the very point from which they had started. + +Upon receipt of this message the Czar, highly agitated, immediately +telegraphed that his letter of the same date (December 7) had evidently +crossed the other on the way and would explain everything.[534] But when +that letter arrived, William II demanded that they settle the coaling +affair by signing a convention concerning it at once.[535] Thus, Germany +herself destroyed the possibility of continuing the previous +negotiations and of concluding, perhaps, a defensive alliance with +Russia alone. The Czar could only acquiesce.[536] On December 12 Count +Lamsdorff gave written assurance to the German government that Russia +would make common cause with it in case the coaling led to war.[537] + +The promptness with which the Russian government agreed to the German +demand showed how essential to Russia was the continued coaling of her +fleet, which within about a week would reach Madagascar. Count Lamsdorff +felt entirely safe in making the assurance of support, for, as he +frankly said to the German Ambassador, he did not believe that either +Great Britain or Japan would let things come to war.[538] Also he +particularly wished to avoid antagonizing Germany while she was +permitting a Russian loan of 231,000,000 rubles to be made in +Berlin.[539] The Minister was elated over the turn which the Russo- +German negotiations had taken. By changing the basis of discussion from +that of a defensive alliance to that of a specific agreement limited to +a definite eventuality, the German government had adopted his own policy +of close friendship and co-operation without an alliance. His battle +with both Germany and the Czar was won by the German government itself. + +On riper thought the German foreign office perceived that this Russian +promise did not cover all cases in which war might arise as a result of +German friendliness. It had no doubt had time since the arrival of the +Czar’s letter of December 7 in which to appreciate its mistake in +hastily changing the basis of negotiation. Hence on December 12 it +instructed Count Alvensleben to propose to the Russian government a +general defensive agreement. By its terms Russia would be bound to aid +Germany in case of a conflict arising: first, because of any German act +of “benevolent neutrality” in favor of Russia during the current war; +or, second, because of the coaling affair during and after the war. The +Ambassador was to declare that if Russia did not accept this agreement +the coaling would be discontinued.[540] What was here proposed amounted +practically to Articles I and III of the first German treaty draft with +the parts pertaining to France omitted, and was in keeping with the +Czar’s letter of December 7. + +Since the instructions arrived after Count Lamsdorff had accepted the +earlier German demand, the exasperated Ambassador consulted his +government before executing them.[541] Count Bülow then realized that +the Russian Minister would not receive the proposal favorably and that +the German government would seem not to know its own desires if it +persisted in this new demand. Furthermore, on December 18, he was +assured by Count Metternich that, although a Dogger Bank affair between +Great Britain and Germany or the passage by Germany of a stronger naval +law might precipitate a crisis, the British did not seek a war and had +no intention of starting one.[542] Hence the Chancellor canceled the +instructions. Instead, he notified the Russian Minister, December 26, +that “within the limits which care for our own safety prescribes, we +shall be glad to aid Russia as previously.”[543] The coaling was +continued without mishap.[544] + +On December 21 William II repeated to the Czar his refusal to permit the +consultation of France about the project of alliance, hoping thereby to +reopen the discussion.[545] But Nicholas II, in his reply of December +25, did not mention the matter.[546] + +Just at this moment of profound disappointment to the German government +another outlet seemed to open up. On December 26 it learned that the +Japanese government was thinking of sending Viscount Aoki to Berlin in +the next year in order to establish closer contact with it on the +questions to be considered in the Russo-Japanese negotiations for +peace.[547] The German government reacted cordially to this project. The +Emperor William, still unable to comprehend the failure of the Russian +negotiations, had visions of Germany’s so mediating peace between Russia +and Japan as to form an agreement _à trois_ with them.[548] Apparently +without consulting the foreign office he appealed to the Czar on January +2 “as your faithful friend” for a statement of his plans for the future, +“so that if possible, I make myself useful to you and be enabled to +shape the course of my policy.”[549] As Nicholas II ignored this +request—the third rebuff from Russia within two months—the Emperor +wanted to cultivate Japan so zealously that Count Bülow had to hold him +back for fear of antagonizing Russia.[550] + +The German government, particularly Herr von Holstein, continued to +apprehend that France and Great Britain would endeavor to mediate peace +and form a new quadruple grouping with Russia and Japan by partitioning +China.[551] To obviate that possibility it had attempted during the past +months to draw closer to President Roosevelt[552] and to keep check upon +the Russian views about peace. But since Russia had rebuffed this +endeavor[553] as well as an alliance, Count Bülow turned late in +December, 1904, to Japan and the United States in order to escape from +“the sulking-corner in which not only England but also Russia is seeking +to hold us.”[554] In January, 1905, the German government intensified +its campaign to arouse President Roosevelt’s mistrust of Great Britain +and France. Articles in the semiofficial press in Paris, assertions by +M. Doumer, president of the French Chamber and intimate friend of M. +Delcassé, and discreet soundings by French, British, and Russian +diplomats gave body to the German fears. Count Bülow emphasized to the +President the menace of this new quadruple alliance to both the United +States and Germany. At the Count’s suggestion in January Mr. Roosevelt +obtained from the Powers an assurance of the territorial integrity of +China during the negotiations for peace.[555] This move brought the +German government and Mr. Roosevelt into greater intimacy. The latter +suspected France and Russia, but not Great Britain.[556] He refused to +believe rumors of a Russo-German agreement, and credited the German +denials of those reports.[557] With Japan, however, the German +government was not so successful; hearing those same rumors, the +Japanese government decided in February not to send Viscount Aoki to +Berlin.[558] + +In the same month the German government tried once more to make an +agreement with Russia, this time over Austria-Hungary. Torn by national +conflicts, that empire was not expected to survive the death of the aged +Emperor Francis Joseph. Count Bülow therefore proposed to the Russian +Foreign Minister that they sign a public treaty of territorial +disinterestedness in case of the disruption of the Hapsburg Empire. +While Count Lamsdorff agreed to make the accord, he stipulated that it +be kept secret, and left its formulation to the proposer. Thereupon the +German foreign office, fearing that the existence of a secret Russo- +German treaty might become known and might make Japan and the United +States mistrustful of Germany and doubting whether the Russian Minister +would really conclude the accord, decided to drop the project.[559] + +Thus the negotiations between Germany and Russia worked only to the +detriment of Germany’s international relations. They were in large part +responsible for the acuteness of British anger at Germany and for the +collapse of the proposed Aoki mission. And had it not been for President +Roosevelt’s ignorance of Continental affairs, they would no doubt have +turned him against Germany. Although protestations of friendship were +exchanged between the German and Russian rulers and governments, the +German Emperor and his government were greatly chagrined at their +failure.[560] They had found the bonds of the Dual Alliance tighter than +they had expected, and had suffered a rebuff by a Power in the very +worst straits. Believing that another opportunity to solve Germany’s +international problems in this way would likely not be offered, the +German foreign office next attempted the employment of force. + + +[Footnote 481: Both letters, the one by Holstein, the other by Bülow, +dated July 11 and July 13, respectively, are given in Hammann, _Bilder +aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 33 ff.] + +[Footnote 482: It is of course apparent that the German government +anticipated no immediate success from these British efforts. Signs of +Anglo-Russian antagonism were too numerous (see _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. +cxxxi).] + +[Footnote 483: Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, p. 36.] + +[Footnote 484: _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxx, A; Gwynn, _The Letters and +Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 397 f.] + +[Footnote 485: Dennett, pp. 36 ff., 42; Sternburg to F. O., Sept. 27, +1904, _G.P._, XIX, 542, No. 6266.] + +[Footnote 486: Bülow to William II, Aug. 31, 1904, _ibid._, 536, No. +6264.] + +[Footnote 487: Bülow to William II, Aug. 31, 1904, _ibid._, 535 ff., No. +6264; Bülow to Bernstorff, Sept. 1, 1904, _ibid._, 217 f., No. 6051; +Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 218 ff., No. 6052. +Eckardstein informed Bülow in August, 1904, of attempts being made by +Witte to introduce negotiations for peace with Hayashi. Bülow was not in +favor of an early peace. See Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und +politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 76 ff.; Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an +den Zaren 1894-1914_, p. 341; Dillon, _The Eclipse of Russia_, p. 297; +memo. by Bülow, Nov. 2, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 387 f., No. 6167.] + +[Footnote 488: Bülow to Sternburg, Sept. 5, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 541, No. +6265.] + +[Footnote 489: See _ibid._, Nos. 5977, 6259 ff.] + +[Footnote 490: Memo. by Bülow, Jan. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 34, No. 5943; +memo. by Holstein, Dec. 23, 1903, _ibid._, 73 ff., No. 5967.] + +[Footnote 491: Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, _ibid._, 202, No. +6043. Richthofen opposed the project (memo. by Richthofen, undated +although probably written early in July, 1904, _ibid._, 194 ff., No. +6042. This intention did not prevent Bülow from negotiating a commercial +treaty with Russia in July, 1904, which Witte, Russian minister, +declared exacted a tribute from Russia “much greater than any war +indemnity on record” (Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, _ibid._, 196 +ff., No. 6043; Dillon, pp. 323 ff.; Witte, _Memoirs_, pp. 413 f.).] + +[Footnote 492: Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 28, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 165 ff., +No. 6028; Metternich to Bülow, March 14, 1904, _ibid._, 167 ff., No. +6029; Alvensleben to Bülow, May 11, 1904, _ibid._, 177 ff., No. 6033, +and following documents.] + +[Footnote 493: Nicholas II to William II, June 1, 1904, _ibid._, 181, +No. 6034.] + +[Footnote 494: See their correspondence in Goetz, pp. 337 ff.; also in +_G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6028 n., 6034, 6035, 6037, 6039, 6056, 6057, 6062 and +n., 6064 and n., 6073 and n. The Emperor’s letters were dated Feb. 11, +March 29, June 6, June 12, June 28, July 17, July 23, Aug. 19, Oct. 8, +Oct. 10; the Czar’s replies were dated June 1, July 20, July 31, Sept. +28, 1904.] + +[Footnote 495: Bernhard Huldermann, _Albert Ballin_ (Berlin, 1922), pp. +146 ff.; _G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6077 ff.] + +[Footnote 496: Bülow to Romberg, Oct. 4, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 257 ff., No. +6084.] + +[Footnote 497: Romberg to F. O., Oct. 19, 1904, _ibid._, 259, No. 6085.] + +[Footnote 498: See above.] + +[Footnote 499: Osten-Sacken to Lamsdorff, Oct. 27, 1904, +_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 456 ff.; Savinsky, _Recollections +of a Russian Diplomat_, p. 97.] + +[Footnote 500: William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 27, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, +303 f., No. 6118. Their correspondence was entirely in English, in the +use of which they made frequent mistakes. Osten-Sacken reported on Nov. +4 a conversation with Bülow in which the latter, repeating the remarks +of Holstein, declared that in case the British government objected to +the coaling of the Russian ships by the German firm, “we should +apparently be forced to ask the St. Petersburg cabinet whether we should +refuse this objection and thus assume the risk of a war with England and +become your [Russia’s] ally; or would Russia prefer to dispense with . . +. . the coaling . . . . which in this case we should have to prohibit as +incompatible with Germany’s neutrality” (_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., +1924, p. 463).] + +[Footnote 501: Nicholas II to William II, Oct. 29, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, +305, No. 6119.] + +[Footnote 502: Bülow and Holstein were the proponents of the alliance. +Richthofen and Tirpitz, secretary of the Navy Department, opposed it +(Alfred von Tirpitz, _Erinnerungen_ [Leipzig, 1920], pp. 143 ff.).] + +[Footnote 503: William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 30, 1904, Goetz, pp. 346 +ff.; Bülow to William II, Oct. 30, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 305, No. 6120, and +Anlage I and II.] + +[Footnote 504: Mühlberg to Tschirschky, Aug. 10, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 238 +f., No. 6069; Bülow to William II, July 15, 1904, _ibid._, 204, No. +6043.] + +[Footnote 505: Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 220, No. +6052.] + +[Footnote 506: “It is a matter here of a really great and, for the +onlooking world, wholly unexpected transformation [_Weichenstellung_],” +wrote Bülow to the Emperor, Nov. 16, 1904 (_ibid._, 312, No. 6125).] + +[Footnote 507: See the report from Lamsdorff to the Czar of Holstein’s +conversation with Osten-Sacken on Oct. 24, and the Czar’s minute to it +(_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 455 f. and n.; cf. Savinsky, p. +97).] + +[Footnote 508: Langer, _Europ. Gespr._, June, 1926, pp. 397 f.; Dennis, +_Adventures in American Diplomacy_, pp. 354 f.] + +[Footnote 509: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Nov. 7, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 35, No. +26.] + +[Footnote 510: A. Savinsky, “Guillaume II et la Russie. Ses Dépêches à +Nicholas II, 1903-1905,” _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 790 f.; +_G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6044 ff.; Savinsky, p. 97. Savinsky was an official in +the Russian foreign office in the confidence of Lamsdorff, _G.P._, XIX, +505, editor’s note).] + +[Footnote 511: _Ibid._, Vol. XXII, chap. clviii.] + +[Footnote 512: Lamsdorff to Osten-Sacken, Nov. 10, 1904, +_Kreigsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 464 f.; cf. Savinsky, p. 99.] + +[Footnote 513: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 31, Nov. 7, 1904, _B.D._, IV, +25, No. 24; 34 f., No. 26.] + +[Footnote 514: On receipt of that draft the Czar wrote to Lamsdorff: +“To-day I received the Emperor’s letter with the treaty draft. As I read +it, I laughed aloud. The content of the three articles touches France +mostly. The last point concerns the particular object of dissatisfaction +of the German Government with the British action in the coaling +operation. This, however, is a private affair of both states. . . . . +The matter must be considered from all sides, and a more desirable +counterproposal for us must be composed” (_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., +1924, p. 461).] + +[Footnote 515: Lamsdorff to Nicholas II, Nov. 4, 1904, _ibid._, pp. 462 +f.] + +[Footnote 516: Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 310 +ff., No. 6124 and Anlage.] + +[Footnote 517: William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 17, 1904, Goetz, pp. 349 +ff.; Savinsky, p. 102; Bülow to William II, Nov. 16, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, +312 ff., No. 6125 and Anlage. The treaty draft is given in Goetz, pp. +146 f. See also Alexander Iswolsky, _Recollections of a Foreign +Minister_ (New York, 1921), pp. 34 f.] + +[Footnote 518: Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, +317, No. 6126, Anlage; Savinsky, pp. 102 f.] + +[Footnote 519: William II to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 316 f., +No. 6126.] + +[Footnote 520: Bülow to William II, Nov. 24, 1904, _ibid._, 318 f., No. +6127 and Anlage; William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 26, 1904, +_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 471 f.; Savinsky, pp. 103 f.] + +[Footnote 521: Iswolsky makes an attempt to exonerate the Czar of the +charge of disloyalty to France, but his argument is not convincing +(Iswolsky, pp. 27, 36 f.).] + +[Footnote 522: Report of Lamsdorff for Nicholas II, Nov. 23, 1904, +_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 473 ff.; Savinsky, _Revue des deux +mondes_, XII (1922), 789 ff.; Savinsky, pp. 104 ff.] + +[Footnote 523: He inclosed a draft of the proposed communication to +France. See Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 322 +ff., No. 6131.] + +[Footnote 524: Bülow to William II, Dec. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 263 ff., No. +6088; _ibid._, chap. cxxxvi.] + +[Footnote 525: Metternich to F. O., Oct. 20, 1904, _ibid._, 652, No. +6349, and following documents; Flotow to Bülow, Oct. 26, 1904, _ibid._, +286 f., No. 6105 and following documents.] + +[Footnote 526: This was the expression used.] + +[Footnote 527: Memo. by Metternich for Bülow, Dec. 25, 1904, _ibid._, +367 ff., No. 6156; report of Marine Attaché Coerper, Jan. 15, 1905, +_ibid._, 379 f., No. 6161; Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 329; Admiral Sir +Edward E. Bradford, _Life of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Knyvet +Wilson_ (London, 1923), p. 197.] + +[Footnote 528: William II to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 316 f., +No. 6126; Graf Robert Zedlitz-Trützschler, _Zwölf Jahre am deutschen +Kaiserhof_ (Stuttgart, 1925), pp. 86 f.] + +[Footnote 529: On this war scare see _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxxvi.] + +[Footnote 530: J. L. Bashford, “Great Britain and Germany: A +Conversation with Count von Bülow, German Chancellor,” _Nineteenth +Century_, Dec., 1904, pp. 873 ff.; Bülow, _Reden_, II, 123 ff.] + +[Footnote 531: Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 5, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 358 f., No. +6153.] + +[Footnote 532: Bülow to William II, Dec. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 263 ff., No. +6088.] + +[Footnote 533: Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 6, 1904, _ibid._, 320 f., No. +6129; William II to Nicholas II, Dec. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 322, No. 6130.] + +[Footnote 534: Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII ( 1922), 794 f.; +Savinsky, p. 107.] + +[Footnote 535: William II to Nicholas II, undated, _G.P._, XIX, 325, No. +6132.] + +[Footnote 536: Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 11, 1904, _ibid._, 325 +f., No. 6134.] + +[Footnote 537: On December 11 Lamsdorff stated to Alvensleben that as +soon as the Czar had made a decision he would be ready to agree with +Germany on the “modality of co-operation” in case of a conflict. On the +next day in his note to that government he did not mention this matter, +and as Germany seemed satisfied, he never returned to it. See +Alvensleben to F. O., Dec. 11 and 12, 1904, _ibid._, 325 ff., Nos. 6134 +ff.; Lamsdorff to Alvensleben, Dec. 13, 1904, _ibid._, 329, No. 6137; +Savinsky, p. 108.] + +[Footnote 538: Alvensleben, to F. O., Dec. 11, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 325 +f., No. 6134.] + +[Footnote 539: M. A. de Wolfe Howe, _George von Lengerke Meyer: His Life +and Public Services_ (New York, 1920), pp. 121 f.; Schulthess +(_Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_), p. 255.] + +[Footnote 540: Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 12, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 326 f., +No. 6135; Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 21, 1904, _ibid._, 342 f. Nos. 6142 +f.] + +[Footnote 541: Editor’s note giving a summary of a dispatch from +Alvensleben on Dec. 13, 1904, _ibid._, p. 342.] + +[Footnote 542: On Dec. 13 Metternich was called to Berlin for +consultation as to the effect which a Russo-German agreement of any sort +would have on Anglo-German relations. Schulenburg and Eulenburg, of the +German embassy in London, also were asked about the attitude of the +British toward Germany. They all believed that the British would not +tolerate as much from Germany as they would from Russia. See memo. by +Bülow, Dec. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 331 f., No. 6139, and editor’s note; +memo. by Metternich, Dec. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 332 ff., No. 6140; +Schulenburg to Bülow, Dec. 14, 1904, _ibid._, 359 ff., No. 6154; memo. +by Eulenburg, Dec. 15, 1904, _ibid._, 366 f., No. 6155; Alfred von +Tirpitz, _Politische Dokumente_, Band I; _Der Aufbau der deutschen +Weltmacht_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1924), pp. 13 f. A few days later +Lascelles tried to argue with both Bülow and Holstein that the British +fear of the German navy was more reasonable than the German fear of the +British navy. And on Dec. 26 Holstein declared to Lascelles as follows: +“In the present instance a situation had been created by the action of +the Press which was fraught with the gravest of all dangers, viz.: that +of two great nations being involved in war, for if any untoward incident +had arisen which gave rise to an acrimonious discussion between the two +Governments it would have been almost impossible to have settled it +owing to the atmosphere which the Press campaign had created.” +Nevertheless both parties agreed that Anglo-German relations had become +easier. See Lascelles to Lansdowne, Dec. 28, 1904, _B.D._, III, 56 ff., +No. 65. At about the same time King Edward, Lansdowne, and Balfour all +branded the German fears of a British attack as foolish; and the British +condemned them as hypocritical. But the press war continued into January +as bitterly as before. See Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _G.P._, +XIX, 372 f., No. 6157; and following documents. See also Schulthess +(1905), p. 3; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 331 f.; Friedrich Thimme, +“Auswärtige Politik und Hochfinanz: Aus den Papieren Paul H. von +Schwabach’s,” _Europäische Gespräche_, June, 1929, p. 307.] + +[Footnote 543: Bülow to Alvensleben, Dec. 21, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 342 f., +Nos. 6142 f.; Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 343 ff., No. +6144.] + +[Footnote 544: Mühlberg to Tirpitz, Jan. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 265 ff., No. +6089, and following documents.] + +[Footnote 545: William II to Nicholas II, Dec. 21, 1904, _ibid._, 340 +f., No. 6141; also Goetz, p. 354. The letter was written by the foreign +office.] + +[Footnote 546: Nicholas II to William II, Dec. 25, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, +346, No. 6145.] + +[Footnote 547: Memo. by Eckert, Nov. 18, 1904, Received Dec. 26, 1904, +_ibid._, 395 ff., No. 6176.] + +[Footnote 548: Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 400 ff., No. +6178.] + +[Footnote 549: William II to Nicholas II, Jan. 2, 1905, _ibid._, 404 f., +No. 6180.] + +[Footnote 550: William II to Bülow, March 11, 1905, _ibid._, 411, No. +6187; Bülow to William II, March 11, 1905, _ibid._, 412, No. 6188. On +Jan. 16, 1905, the Emperor wrote: “The action of Delcassé and Lamsdorff +is unspeakably treacherous and common. This trio [France, Great Britain, +and Russia, who he thought desired to divide China] must be opposed by a +German-American-Japanese league. That must be done quickly and +energetically. Above all America’s mistrust of France and Russia be +nourished” (Emperor’s minute to the dispatch from Bülow to William II, +Jan. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 562, No. 6280).] + +[Footnote 551: Memo. by Holstein, Dec. 29, 1904, _ibid._, 551 ff., No. +6275. The Emperor also suffered from the “nightmare of the coalitions,” +but his suffering assumed more varied forms. At one moment he feared a +Franco-Anglo-American-Japanese grouping; at another, an Anglo-Franco- +Russian grouping; at another, an Anglo-Franco-Russo-Japanese grouping +(see _ibid._, Nos. 5925, 5945, 6187, 6280).] + +[Footnote 552: See _ibid._, chap. cxxxix.] + +[Footnote 553: Romberg to Bülow, Dec. 1, 1904, _ibid._, 394 f., No. +6175.] + +[Footnote 554: Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 402 f., No. +6178.] + +[Footnote 555: See Dennett, pp. 77 ff., 162, 171 f.; Dennis, pp. 392 f., +397; Bülow to William II, Dec. 24, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 547 ff., No. 6274, +and following documents.] + +[Footnote 556: See, among others, Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 3 and 9, +1905, _G.P._, XIX, 567 f., No. 6285; 570, No. 6287.] + +[Footnote 557: Dennett, pp. 73 ff., 50; Dennis, pp. 367 f., 385 ff. The +anonymous document which Dennis quotes must have been written some time +early in 1905, for it refers to events which occurred in January, 1905.] + +[Footnote 558: Arco to F. O., Feb. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 407, No. 6183; +Arco to Bülow, March 16, 1905, _ibid._, 413 ff. No. 6190.] + +[Footnote 559: _Ibid._, Vol. XXII, chap. clix.] + +[Footnote 560: Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, XIX, 343 +f., No. 6144; William II to Bülow, Dec. 28, 1904, _ibid._, 346 f. No. +6146; Bülow to Alvensleben, Jan. 1, 1905, _ibid._, 347 f., No. 6147; +Bülow to William II, Dec. 26, 1904, _ibid._, 400 ff., No. 6178.] + + + + + CHAPTER XI + + THE VISIT TO TANGIER + + +Upon the refusal of an alliance by Russia, the German government, in the +early part of 1905, regarded its international situation and loss of +prestige with concern. The continued defeats of Russia by Japan in the +Far East, culminating in that at Mukden, February 23 to March 10, and +the outbreak of revolution in Russia had for the time neutralized the +effectiveness of the Dual Alliance. But the Anglo-German animosity +persisted. On February 2 at Eastleigh, Mr. Arthur Lee, first civil lord +of the British admiralty, frankly explained the redistribution of the +fleet as follows:[561] + + +The balance and center of naval power in Europe had been shifted during +the last few years. They [Great Britain] had not so much to keep their +eyes upon France and the Mediterranean as they had to look with more +anxiety, though not fear, towards the North Sea. It was for that reason +that the Fleets had been distributed to enable them to deal with any +danger in that direction. . . . . If war should unhappily be declared, +under existing conditions the British Navy would get its blow in first, +before the other side had time even to read in the papers that war had +been declared. + + +The German Emperor regarded those assertions as an “open threat of war” +by that “vengeance-breathing corsair.”[562] An Anglo-German press war +ensued. Count Bülow declared to Admiral Tirpitz that he would agree to +any sum for the German naval law for 1906.[563] + +The state of the Triple Alliance also worried the German foreign office; +Austria-Hungary was in internal turmoil, Italy more unreliable than +ever. Irredentist troubles, which had flamed up again in the previous +November,[564] and Balkan rivalries had so antagonized those two allies +that during 1904 the main military force of Italy had been transferred +from the French to the Austrian frontier. During the winter, reports of +a Franco-Italian agreement nullifying the Triple Alliance and of the +activity of Ambassador Barrère in attempting to foment difficulty +between Austria and Italy came to the German government.[565] But when, +toward the end of February, 1905, Count Bülow mentioned these rumors to +the Italian Ambassador, King Victor Emmanuel and his government both +formally denied that Italy had made any agreement “that is in +contradiction with the Triple Alliance or that may diminish the value of +our obligations toward our allies,” and asserted that M. Prinetti’s +declarations to France did not “vary, modify, or attenuate the bearing +or obligations that result from it [the Triple Alliance] for us.”[566] + +Although the Chancellor did not believe these asseverations, he +continued to hold to Italy. As he wrote to the Emperor on March 5 and 9: + + +For times of peace and for all international combinations it is to our +interest to maintain the façade of the Triple Alliance as intact as +possible, if only because the Italians, so long as they remain in it, +will meet with mistrust from hostile sides. In case of complications, +however, we need have no illusions concerning active Italian co- +operation. Still, it is an advantage if Italy remains neutral instead of +siding with France. . . . . The general international situation is so +tense that we must endeavor to sacrifice as few tricks as possible. + + +Therein was expressed the German policy toward Italy until the latter’s +final entry into the World War. Upon reading this confession, the +Emperor, who already feared that King Edward VII was trying to establish +a Franco-Russo-British alliance, summed up the international position of +his country as follows: “The Triple Alliance loosened by the antagonism +of Austria and Italy, Russia unchanged or indifferent toward us, England +hostile, France revengeful.” As to Italy, he wrote severely to the +Chancellor: “Your Excellency is easily satisfied. My grandfather and I +looked upon the co-operation of the Italian army as a matter of course. +In case of a French attack on us that must be adhered to.”[567] + +The diminution in Germany’s prestige was felt most acutely in her +relationship to France, whose Foreign Minister showed by the dispatch of +the French mission to Fez in January that he intended to establish +French control over Morocco without consulting Germany. Hence, after the +failure of the move toward Russia, the German government began, in +December, to turn its attention to the Moroccan question. Conveniently +disregarding its unsettled grievances against the Sultan, it responded +to certain overtures for a _rapprochement_ from that monarch by quietly +and unofficially encouraging him to resist the French demands.[568] + +This action could the more easily be taken since the Sultan had already +begun to oppose the French by convoking an assembly of Moroccan notables +to consider the French proposals for reform. The Sultan selected two men +from each town, who were moderate conservatives, more or less amenable +to his influence, hostile to French control but not in principle opposed +to foreigners or to reforms.[569] Count Bülow, much pleased, advised the +Sultan about the middle of February to unite with the rebel, Bou-Amama +[_sic_], and to threaten a holy war in case France tried to prevent the +meeting of the assembly.[570] Early in February a German warship +appeared casually in Moroccan waters. A few days later Herr von Holstein +instructed Herr von Kühlmann, first secretary of the German legation in +Tangier, to avoid official utterances toward France “until we are more +certain about the attitude of the Sultan”; for “according as the Sultan +shows himself firm or yielding, German policy will endeavor as much as +possible to strengthen his back or will confine itself to defending +German economic interests.”[571] + +The Moroccan government lived up to the German hopes by convening the +assembly of notables on February 22 and by requiring M. Saint-René +Taillandier to explain the French program to it. To stiffen the Moroccan +resistance against France, Herr von Kühlmann suggested that the German +government send a note to the Sultan manifesting its disapproval of the +French policy.[572] Before following that suggestion, however, the +German government endeavored to interest President Roosevelt in the +Moroccan question. + +As Mr. Roosevelt and the German government were co-operating so +cordially for the preservation of the open door in China, Count Bülow +sought to extend this effort to Morocco and to involve the United States +against France and Great Britain, or at least to prepare the President +for isolated German action on the Moroccan question. On February 25, +after calling Mr. Roosevelt’s attention to the Franco-Spanish +monopolistic plans, the Chancellor invited him to unite with Germany in +advising the Sultan that the calling of the assembly was a correct move +toward fortifying his government and inaugurating reforms. This action, +argued the Chancellor, would stop the French advance and make possible a +peaceful solution of the Moroccan question. Even if the United States +did not participate, he continued, France would scarcely risk a Moroccan +war with a silent Germany on her frontier.[573] + +Although not interested in Morocco, the President agreed to instruct the +American representative in Tangier to keep in close touch with his +German colleague.[574] The answer satisfied the German government, which +now felt assured of Mr. Roosevelt’s moral support in case Germany took +action alone. On March 10 the note was sent. + +Through this note and the supplementary statements of the German +representatives in Morocco the German government informed the Sultan +that, although he must reorganize his country, Germany + + +hopes that the rumors of a prospective change in the existing conditions +in Morocco—equal rights and freedom for all nations—are unfounded. +Germany would disapprove of such a change. Germany and the United States +are favorably inclined toward the maintenance of the present conditions; +. . . . the attitude of the other Powers is not definitely known. In +England the Government has bound itself to a certain extent in favor of +France, even though in the English commercial world a current in favor +of the maintenance of the independence of Morocco and in favor of equal +rights of the Powers is present.[575] + + +Germany here showed her strong disapproval of the whole French action +and sought to augment Moroccan resistance without committing herself to +any definite policy. + +Immediately after the dispatch of the note the German government heard +that at the opening session of the assembly of notables on February 22 +M. Saint-René Taillandier had claimed to have “the assent of other +foreign representatives at Tangier” to the French program of +reform.[576] Considering this a deliberate misrepresentation for the +purpose of overawing the Moroccans, the German government sought further +means for blocking French efforts. The Chancellor intimated in the +Reichstag on March 15 that Germany intended taking steps to defend her +economic interests in Morocco.[577] Five days later the newspapers +announced the forthcoming visit of the German Emperor to Tangier.[578] + +When Count Bülow saw the strong opposition which this proposed visit +aroused in the French and English press, he immediately determined to +put it to a political use.[579] He wrote to the Emperor: “Your Majesty’s +visit to Tangier will embarrass M. Delcassé, thwart his plans, and be of +benefit to our economic interests in Morocco.” For, he wrote a few days +later, + + +apart from the fact that the systematic exclusion of all non-French +merchants and promoters from Morocco according to the example in Tunis +would signify an important economic loss for Germany, it is also a want +of appreciation of our power when M. Delcassé has not considered it +worth the effort to negotiate with Germany over his Moroccan plans. M. +Delcassé has completely ignored us in this affair.[580] + + +William II was lukewarm about the project. He had persistently opposed +interfering in the Moroccan question both for reasons of general policy +and for lack of interest in Morocco itself. At the insistence of the +Chancellor he agreed to execute the _coup_; but Count Bülow had to +employ every means to hold him steady. When the Emperor learned from the +papers that the natives and the German and British colonies in Morocco +intended to exploit his visit against the French, he wrote to the +Chancellor on March 20 as follows: “Telegraph immediately to Tangier +that it is _highly_ doubtful whether I shall land and that I shall only +travel incog[nito] as a tourist, that is, no audiences, no +receptions.”[581] Count Bülow overcame his objections by arguing that +otherwise M. Delcassé would spread the rumor that the program of +reception for the Emperor had been curtailed after remonstrances had +been made in Berlin.[582] + +Aside from the communication with President Roosevelt, the German +government made no diplomatic preparation for this action.[583] Direct +contact with the French government was cut off as early as March +22.[584] Two days later the Chancellor issued general orders to play the +sphinx on the subject of Morocco.[585] A Franco-German press war alone +revealed the tension of the situation.[586] + +With the performance ready to start, the chief actor began to suffer +from stage fright. Learning of an attempt at Tangier a day or so before +to assassinate Mr. Harris of the _London Times_, the Emperor telegraphed +Count Bülow from Lisbon on March 28 as follows: “In Tangier the devil is +already loose. Yesterday an Englishman almost murdered. I consider the +affair there as very doubtful.”[587] Furthermore, he learned that at +Tangier he would have to disembark in an open boat, and that after he +was in the town he would have to walk through the narrow streets or be +carried in a sedan or ride some unknown Berber horse. The first two ways +were decidedly beneath imperial dignity, while the last one, on account +of the Emperor’s crippled left arm, might be too dangerous. Not only the +anxious sovereign, but members of his company as well, were inclined to +advise against the attempt. But Count Tattenbach, former minister at +Tangier and at the time minister at Lisbon, whom the Emperor had brought +along from Portugal, and Prince Eulenburg clung to the plan and kept up +their master’s courage,[588] while from Berlin the Chancellor sent one +telegram after the other to effect the visit. To the Emperor he +telegraphed that it would be a “historic act,” that the attention of the +world was focused on him, that “if the visit . . . . turns out as +desired, Delcassé with his anti-German policy will stand there as a +disgraced European,” and that the French Foreign Minister would probably +then be overthrown by his enemies in France. He agreed with Count +Tattenbach that since press and people were discussing the matter so +fully the Emperor could not recede without exposing himself to the +accusation of cowardice. He likewise sent a telegram of four pages to +the Emperor on March 26 with instructions about his speeches at Tangier. +It read in part as follows: + + +Naturally it is not to German interest for the Sultan to be discouraged +now at the beginning of the French negotiations and to place himself +under a French protectorate. To oppose this . . . . Your Majesty should +receive the Sultan’s representative expressly as a representative of a +sovereign, and should . . . . express the hope that he [the Sultan] +would soon suppress the rebellion of Bou-Amama. . . . . Your Majesty +might ask where the rebel Bou-Amama obtains the means for his long +resistance. If the representative should reply, “Probably from France,” +Your Majesty might answer, “It is difficult to believe the French +capable of such baseness.” + +. . . . Without saying an unfriendly word about France, Your Majesty +should ignore her in Morocco, should not mention at all the French +advance against Morocco, and should honor the French chargé d’affaires +with . . . . only a silent greeting. + +It is improbable that any diplomat will mention France’s Moroccan policy +to Your Majesty. If that subject should be brought up, Your Majesty +might reply that the French policy is entirely unknown to you. The case +is different, however, if the Sultan’s representative at his master’s +command . . . . asks Your Majesty’s advice. On the reply will depend +whether the Sultan will continue to defend the independence of Morocco +or will submit to France. The question whether Your Majesty can risk a +war with France for the sake of Morocco cannot be considered at all. But +on the other hand it is more than doubtful whether the present civil +Government of France . . . . would risk a war with Morocco so long as +the least possibility exists that Germany might sooner or later +interfere. Therefore we must for the present leave our goal uncertain. +We cannot conveniently make an alliance with the Sultan. But if we +withdraw our moral support entirely from him and destroy all hope, we +shall relinquish important German interests. Therefore I conceive Your +Majesty’s reply to the Sultan’s minister somewhat as follows: “It is +known that I desire no Morocco territory, but that I value equality of +treatment with other nations in trade and commerce with Morocco. Other +commercial nations have the same interest. As my view is known, the +English colony greeted me joyfully today. It is to the interest of the +Sultan as well as of almost all seafaring and commercial peoples that he +preserve his independence and therewith freedom to permit them all equal +rights in his empire. The main strength of every ruler lies in having +his people back of him at decisive moments. In that case no foreign +Power will attack him lightly. Therefore the Sultan should make certain +that the notables whom he has summoned to Fez for advice are of one mind +with him and should direct his policy in accordance therewith.” + +Since it is well known that the Moorish delegates at present assembled +at Fez are entirely hostile to the Sultan’s conciliation toward France, +definite advice would herewith be imparted to the Sultan. If the +representative should ask whether Your Majesty would support the Sultan +in a war against France, Your Majesty might reply: “In case I promised +today to support you, you would attack the French at once. But I desire, +if possible, to maintain peace, although I have a very strong army. +Therefore I must reserve decision until it really comes to war between +France and Morocco. I do not expect this event. France will try to see +how far she can advance with threats. But France knows that her +situation would be dangerous if she attacked Morocco without having +assured herself of Germany’s neutrality.” + +Next in importance to the conversation with the Sultan’s representative +is Your Majesty’s reply to a probable short English greeting. . . . . +There Your Majesty might well stress the common interest in equality for +all nations. By emphasizing this principle at that place Your Majesty +will make it half impossible for the English Government in later Franco- +German discussions about Morocco to place itself on the French side. + +Finally, in case Your Majesty has to reply to a question from a non- +Moroccan source about what attitude Germany would take in case of a +Franco-Moroccan war, Your Majesty might reply somewhat as follows: +“Germany has no obligations which would prevent her from being guided in +that case by her own interests.” This reply sounds disquieting for our +opponents but binds us to nothing. + + +Thus, Count Bülow instructed the Emperor to encourage the Moroccans in +their resistance to France, to make France uneasy by his actions and +words, but not to bind Germany to anything definite. + +At the same time, to assure his master’s safety, the Chancellor +telegraphed to Herr von Kühlmann that German and Spanish secret police +should be present in abundance, that the visit should perhaps be +shortened, and that “a horse, guaranteed gentle, which should be +exercised early in the morning for several hours by some trustworthy +rider in order to quiet it, would be best and could obviate all +difficulties as well as any curtailment of the program.”[589] Then, to +cut off any possibility of retreat, the Chancellor declared on March 29 +to the Reichstag that Germany had no aggressive intentions toward +Morocco, but that she did aim to defend her economic interests and the +open door. + + +The speech and attitude of a diplomat . . . . must vary according to +circumstances [he stated]. The moment suitable . . . . for the +preservation of our interests I shall choose as I think best. But in +this case the tendency of the German policy has not changed. Whoever +seeks a _fait nouveau_ will not find it in the German policy. In the +same degree as it is attempted to change the international position of +Morocco or to control the open door in the economic development of the +land, we must also to a greater degree than before be heedful that our +economic interests in Morocco remain safe. For this reason we are +entering into relations with the Sultan of Morocco.[590] + + +When the Emperor’s boat arrived at Tangier early in the morning of March +31, a stiff east wind made landing impossible.[591] Herr von Kühlmann +and the captain of one of the French warships stationed in the harbor +succeeded only with the greatest difficulty in coming aboard. The +Emperor immediately drew the latter into conversation about the weather +prospects. It looked as if the “historic act” would not occur. A few +hours later, however, the wind died down, and General Scholl, a member +of the Emperor’s party, went ashore to make a tour of inspection. He +returned with an enthusiastic report of the reception in view from the +natives, declared the horse to be trustworthy, and said that if one did +not mind getting wet, one could make the landing. So the Emperor +intrusted himself to the wind and the waves, the Moroccans, and a Berber +horse. The landing was made; the horse, which at first shied at the +splendor of the imperial costume, was quieted; and + + +followed by about twenty attendants all on horseback [according to Herr +von Schoen’s account], the Emperor entered the town, the narrow streets +of which, filled with the joyous, noisy masses, permitted only a slow +advance. The flat roofs of the houses were thickly packed with Moorish, +Christian, and Jewish women who hailed the Emperor in the most varied +tones and scattered flowers. Finally the procession arrived at the Soko, +the open place before the garden of the legation, filled with a +turbulent sea of human beings who expressed their enthusiasm in +deafening cries and wild shooting. The confused din was increased still +more by a military band sent by the Sultan which endeavored in vain to +drown out the uproar of the people. The restlessness of the horses +caused me to ask the French officer, apparently leading a command, +whether he could not stop the wild shooting. He replied dejectedly that +he had some influence only over the handful of regular troops entrusted +to his instruction but not the least over the sportively shooting, half- +wild Kabyle. + + +However, the company reached the legation in safety where the German +colony, the diplomatic corps, and the representative of the Sultan were +received. + +In the speeches which the excited Emperor delivered, he permitted his +tongue to become looser than usual. Whereas he had previously been +opposed to intervention in the Moroccan affair, he now fixed the German +policy with respect to Morocco more tightly than the Chancellor had +wished and exposed himself to the criticism of having taken another +backward monarch under his wing. In reply to the greeting of the +Sultan’s representative, Abd-el-Melik, the Emperor declared that + + +he . . . . had great interest in the welfare and prosperity of the +Moroccan Empire, that he visited the Sultan as an independent ruler, and +that he hoped that under the authority of the Sultan a free Morocco +would be opened to the peaceful competition of all nations without +monopoly or exclusion. + + +The Sultan’s representative read to the Emperor a message from his +master in which the latter stated that + + +he remembered the friendship which had always existed between his +predecessors and Germany and that he was filled with the wish to +strengthen and extend those friendly relations in every way. In reply +the Emperor William expressed his thanks for this cordial message. He +shared the feelings of the Sultan [he said] and agreed with Abd-el- +Melik’s assertations concerning the divine power and wisdom which +directs the fate of peoples. He wished sincerely for the development and +welfare of the Moroccan Empire for the sake of his subjects and for that +of the other European nations who traded there, as he hoped, on the +basis of full equality. + + +The Emperor then decorated Abd-el-Melik and his three companions. Later, +he said to Abd-el-Melik that + + +his visit to Tangier aimed to assert that German interests in Morocco +would be protected and preserved. Concerning the best means to achieve +this, he would enter into direct relations with the Sultan, whom he +regarded as an independent ruler. The Emperor closed with the remark +that prudence was necessary in the reforms which the Sultan planned and +that regard should be paid to the religious feelings of the Moroccan +people in order to avoid disturbing public order.[592] + + +After the speeches were over, the imperial party hurried back on +shipboard before some accident should occur or a contrary wind arise. +Count Bülow was so relieved upon learning that his master was safe on +board that, as he later confided to the Emperor, he had a “nervous fit +of tears.”[593] The Emperor himself did not at first realize the great +political significance of his act. When he met Prince Louis of +Battenberg at Gibraltar on April 1, he expressed the time-honored +shibboleth, that “Germany, Great Britain and the United States must make +common cause and march shoulder to shoulder.”[594] When he received the +reports from the press several days later, he awoke from his +illusions.[595] For, although the whole event smacked of a comic opera, +it none the less threw down the gauntlet to M. Delcassé and French +policy in Morocco[596] and ushered in a long period of crisis in +international relations. The echoes which the Emperor’s speeches aroused +in Europe reverberated like the distant rumblings of cannon. + + +[Footnote 561: Reported in the _London Times_, Feb. 4, 1905. When Lee +saw how the German press took offense at his words, he published a +“correct version” of these passages in a somewhat milder form (_ibid._, +Feb. 7, 1905; _Annual Register, 1905_, pp. 21 f.).] + +[Footnote 562: Von Tirpitz, _Politische Dokumente_, I, 14.] + +[Footnote 563: _Ibid._, pp. 17 ff.] + +[Footnote 564: Monts to Bülow, Nov. 19, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 85 ff., No. +6423.] + +[Footnote 565: Monts to Bülow, Dec. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 88 f. No. 6424; +report of Military Attaché Chelius to Schlieffen, Dec. 18, 1904, +_ibid._, 89 ff., No. 6424 Anlage; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 12, 1905, +_ibid._, 93, No. 6425. The relation of Italy to France and Germany was +well shown in the following incident. Shortly after Loubet’s visit to +Rome, an Italian officer was caught delivering to the French important +documents dealing with the Italian plan of mobilization. At about the +same time the Italian chief of staff gave to the German government +photographs of the French border fortifications (_ibid._, Nos. 6423-24, +6426).] + +[Footnote 566: Bülow to Monts, Feb. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 93 f., No. 6426; +Monts to F. O., Feb. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 94 f., No. 6427; Bülow to +William II, March 5, 1905, _ibid._, 95, No. 6428 and Anlage.] + +[Footnote 567: Bülow to William II, March 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 95 +ff., Nos. 6428 f., and the Emperor’s minutes.] + +[Footnote 568: The German representatives in Morocco unofficially +assured the Sultan early in February that Germany had a political +interest in the Moroccan question, that Germany as well as several other +Powers had not yet taken the question in its existing form into +consideration, that Germany would not actively support Morocco, but +that, with a silent Germany on her frontier, France would not attack the +latter (see _ibid._, Nos. 6538-40, 6544-47, 6550, 6553).] + +[Footnote 569: Kühlmann to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 248, No. +6552.] + +[Footnote 570: Bülow to Kühlmann, Feb. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 251 ff., No. +6554.] + +[Footnote 571: Bülow to Kühlmann, Feb. 16, 1905, _ibid._, 255, No. 6556. +The dispatch was written by Holstein.] + +[Footnote 572: Kühlmann to Bülow, Feb. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 255 f., No. +6557.] + +[Footnote 573: Bülow to Kühlmann, Jan. 16, 1905, _ibid._, 245, No. 6547; +Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 256 ff., No. 6558.] + +[Footnote 574: Sternburg to F. O., March 9, 1905, _ibid._, 258 f., No. +6559; Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, pp. 83 f.] + +[Footnote 575: Only a summary of the note is given in _G.P._, XX, 260 n. +The quotations are taken from this summary and from a telegram from +Bülow to Kühlmann, March 10, 1905, _ibid._, 260 f., No. 6561.] + +[Footnote 576: Report from Vassel, German vice-consul at Fez, Feb. 23, +1905. According to a second report from him, March 7, the French +Minister had claimed to have “the approval of his proposals by the +foreigners” (_ibid._, pp. 255 f. n.; Auswärtiger Amt, _Aktenstücke über +Marokko, 1905_ [Berlin, 1905], No. 3). The latest communication received +by the German government from Vassel, before the dispatch of the note of +March 10, was of Feb. 17. See Kühlmann to Bülow, Feb. 21, 1905, _G.P._, +XX, 255, No. 6557; Bülow to Kühlmann, March 10, 1905, _ibid._, 260, No. +6561.] + +[Footnote 577: The Chancellor declared as follows: “I understand +entirely the attention which is given here to the events in and about +Morocco. I regard it as a duty of the German Government to see that . . +. . our economic interests in Morocco are not injured. But the present +moment is unsuitable for further explanations” (Bülow, _Reden_, II, 186 +f.). As a matter of fact, German economic interests ran a very poor +third behind those of France and Great Britain (_Zeitschrift für +Kolonialpolitik_, Dec., 1904, pp. 885 ff.).] + +[Footnote 578: The information was given out to the _London Standard_, +_London Times_, and the _Kölnische Zeitung_, at Tangier on March 19. The +origin of the visit is obscure. Theodor Wolff relates that Kühlmann and +Hornung, correspondent in Tangier of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, were +responsible for proposing in February that the Emperor include Tangier +in his itinerary (Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, p. 156). The plan for the +Emperor’s voyage in the Mediterranean submitted to the Chancellor on +March 13 included a stay of four hours in Tangier (editor’s note, +_G.P._, XX, 263). Probably Bülow aimed to use this visit politically +from the start, just as he had intended using the dispatch of a warship +to Tangier in the previous year. But only after he saw the effect of the +announcement upon public opinion did he realize the full political +significance of the visit (cf. _ibid._, pp. 262 ff.). Crozier’s story of +the origin of this voyage is unsubstantiated by any evidence (_Revue de +France_, April 1, 1921, pp. 279 f.).] + +[Footnote 579: Editor’s note, _G.P._, XX, 263 f.; Bülow to William II, +March 20, 1905, _ibid._, 262, No. 6563; 264 f., No. 6565.] + +[Footnote 580: Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, _ibid._, 263, No. +6563; Bülow to William II, March 26, 1905, _ibid._, 274 f., No. 6576. It +was reported in the German foreign office soon after the Anglo-French +accord was made that Delcassé had said to some intimate friends: “Je +viens de rouler Radolin; il ne me reste plus qu’à rouler l’empereur +d’Allemagne” (Guibert et Ferrette, _Le conflit franco-allemand en 1905_ +[Paris, 1905], p. 83, quoted in Stuart, _French Foreign Policy from +Fashoda to Serajevo_, p. 136 n.). On Feb. 21, 1907, Lord Sanderson, +permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1894-1906, wrote +as follows: “M. Delcassé . . . . ignored Germany entirely when he +commenced operations in Morocco. The action of France and her demands on +the Sultan were undoubtedly much exaggerated and misrepresented. But in +addition there is no doubt that M. Delcassé was steadily pursuing a +series of manœuvres for the purpose of isolating Germany and weakening +her alliances. The German Gov[ernmen]t and the German nation are +extremely sensitive about being ignored or neglected in the discussion +of important questions, and it is not surprising that on this occasion +they should have been much exasperated, and determined on inflicting on +France a severe humiliation. That they also wished to separate us from +France, to prevent the Agreement from developing into an alliance, and +to obtain any share they could in the eventual development of Morocco is +no doubt also true. The methods adopted were characteristic of German +policy, and as on some other occasions they failed” (memo. by Lord +Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _B.D._, IV, 421). Whether the German +government knew the exact terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement is a +question. Tardieu says that it did know them (_La conf. d’Algés_, p. +156). Hammann has written, “One may assume that it learned the main +content” (_Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, p. 200). It also +suspected that the Moroccan accords contained stipulations for the +exclusion of Germany from any participation in the territorial division +of Morocco (_ibid._, p. 201). See also the dispatch from Stumm to Bülow, +Feb. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 191, No. 7024, and the Emperor’s minute +thereto: “And the rascals [the Spanish government] will not even admit +what sort of a pact they have made with the devil [France].” See also +Veit Valentin, _Deutschlands Aussenpolitik von Bismarcks Abgang bis zum +Ende des Weltkrieges_ (Berlin, 1921), p. 54; report from Madrid, Dec. +10, 1904, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 126 f. However, the German government +did know the terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement of Sept. 1, 1905, so +Ojeda of the Spanish foreign office admitted to Cartwright of the +British embassy (Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, +No. 252). The probability is therefore that it also learned in good time +the terms of the other secret accords. Failure to mention that knowledge +or even denials of being informed in the documents is not conclusive +proof that the secret articles were not known to the German foreign +office.] + +[Footnote 581: William II to Bülow, undated, _G.P._, XX, 263, No. 6564. +The editors of _G.P._ presume the date of this communication to have +been March 21; but Bülow’s reply to it was dated March 20. See Bülow to +William II, March 20, 1905, _ibid._, 264, No. 6565. The Emperor had +dined at the French embassy on March 17 and had said nothing about his +proposed visit. Furthermore, just before leaving on his trip he made at +Bremen one of his half-militaristic, half-pacific speeches which did not +indicate what was to follow (Schulthess, _Europäischer +Geschichtskalender 1905_, pp. 67 f.; Ludwig, _Wilhelm der Zweite_, p. +275; Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 193 ff.).] + +[Footnote 582: Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 264 f., +No. 6565.] + +[Footnote 583: The unexpectedness of this action was shown by the +remarks made on March 21 by Bernstorff, first secretary of the embassy +in London, to a reporter of the _Daily Chronicle_. He asserted that +Germany had only economic interests in Morocco over which it ought not +to be difficult for France and Germany to agree (Bülow to Metternich, +March 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 268 f., and note, No. 6569).] + +[Footnote 584: Bülow to Radolin, March 22, 1905, _ibid._, 267 f., No. +6568; Flotow to F. O., March 23, 1905, _ibid._, 269, No. 6570; Flotow to +F. O., March 28, 1905, _ibid._, 278, No. 6578; Bülow to Flotow, March +28, 1905, _ibid._, 278, No. 6579; Mévil, pp. 197 f.] + +[Footnote 585: Memo. by Bülow, March 24, 1905, _G.P._, 271, No. 6573.] + +[Footnote 586: Mévil, p. 205; _G.P._, XX, 262 f., n. 266 n., Nos. 6570, +6584, 6590; _Quest. dipl. et. col._, XIX, 442 ff.; Schulthess, _1905_, +pp. 78 f.] + +[Footnote 587: William II to Bülow, March 28, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 279, No. +6580.] + +[Footnote 588: Tattenbach to F. O., March 29, 1905, _ibid._, 283, No. +6585; Freiherr von Schoen, _Erlebtes. Beiträge zur politischen +Geschichte der neuesten Zeit_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1921), pp. 19 ff.] + +[Footnote 589: See his telegrams from March 26 to March 30, 1905, +_G.P._, XX, 272 ff., Nos. 6574 ff.] + +[Footnote 590: Bülow, II, 209 f.] + +[Footnote 591: For a description of the visit see Schoen, pp. 19 ff.; +Schoen to F. O., March 31, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 285 ff., Nos. 6588 ff.; +Tardieu, pp. 69 f.] + +[Footnote 592: The foregoing is the official version of the speeches +published in the German press (see _Allgemeine Zeitung_ [Munich], April +4, 1905). There were various versions of the speeches since the Emperor +spoke extemporaneously. Schoen on March 31 sent to the foreign office a +report of William II’s assertions as follows: When Count de Chérisey +attempted to greet the Emperor in the name of Delcassé in such a way as +to imply a French predominance in Morocco, William II replied sharply +that his visit “signified that Germany demanded free trade there and +full equality with other nations.” When the Count admitted this, the +Emperor remarked that “he would treat directly with the Sultan as a +peer, as a free ruler of an independent land, that he would know how to +assert his just claims and expected that these also be respected by +France.” Those words crushed the Count. To the Sultan’s representative +the Emperor spoke as follows: “He regarded the Sultan as the ruler of a +free and independent Empire, subject to no foreign suzerainty. He +expected for German trade and commerce the same advantages as for all +other commercial nations. He would always negotiate with the Sultan +directly. Reforms which the Sultan planned to introduce ought always to +be executed within the limits of the customs and views of his people and +without violation of the precepts of the Koran, in honest administration +and strengthening of peace and order that would make the best impression +outside. European customs and usages would not be taken over without +further consideration. Let the Sultan therein listen carefully to the +counsel of the great ones of his land” (Schoen to F. O., March 31, 1905, +_G.P._, XX, 286 f., No. 6589. It was also stated in the press, although +not in the official version of the speeches, that the Emperor replied to +the greetings from the German colony at Tangier that that colony “could +rely on the support of the German Government to prevent any obstacle in +that free country [Morocco] from hindering the success of its efforts in +favor of the national commerce” (Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, +504). Schoen made no mention of this assertion. Cf. Schoen, pp. 20 f.; +Mévil, pp. 210 ff.; _B.D._, III, 62 f., Nos. 71 f.; 64, No. 74; Prince +Louis of Battenberg’s report of a conversation with the Emperor, April +1, 1905, Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 333 f.] + +[Footnote 593: William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 497, No. +6237.] + +[Footnote 594: Memo. by Prince Louis of Battenberg, April 1, 1905, +Newton, p. 333.] + +[Footnote 595: Schoen, p. 22.] + +[Footnote 596: Mévil, p. 210.] + + + + + CHAPTER XII + + THE MOROCCAN CRISIS FROM THE VISIT TO TANGIER TO THE FALL OF DELCASSÉ + + I + + +The visit to Tangier, because of its very unexpectedness, did not at +first alarm the French, who refused to credit the German Emperor with +hostile intentions.[597] Better-informed personages in Paris, however, +interpreted the event more accurately. They were asking seriously +whether war would ensue and were declaring that “no such critical moment +has occurred since the Schnäbele affair.” The Austrian Ambassador was +reminded by the Franco-German press war of the days immediately +preceding the conflict of 1870.[598] + +The French government had been warned by both German and British +representatives of Germany’s interest in Morocco. As early as November, +1904, Herr von Kühlmann had declared to the French chargé d’affaires at +Tangier that Germany had expected France to acquaint her with the new +situation in Morocco created by the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish +accords, but that she had since realized that she was being +“systematically excluded.” “The Imperial Government is ignorant of all +the accords made over Morocco and does not consider itself bound in any +way on that question,” he said. The French chargé d’affaires had not +regarded these remarks as sufficiently significant to report until the +following February. Upon direct inquiry in Berlin the French government +had had them corroborated by the German foreign office.[599] On February +12, 1905, Sir Arthur Nicolson, British ambassador at Madrid, had +remarked to his French colleague that “the attitude assumed by the +German Government in response to the petition of their subjects in +Morocco was an invitation to the French Government to initiate some +discussion with a view to obtain their concurrence with the provisions +of the Convention.”[600] M. Delcassé had not heeded this advice. By +March 22 he had become uneasy over the German policy, about which he was +so uncertain.[601] He was determined, however, to maintain intact +France’s accords with the other Powers and her position in Morocco.[602] +Ascertaining on the eve of the voyage to Tangier that Great Britain, +Spain, and Italy would hold loyally to their agreements,[603] he +declared in the Senate on March 31, the same day on which William II +spoke at Tangier, that + + +nothing in our Moroccan policy, nothing in our execution of the accords +of April 8 and October 3, 1904, can explain the movements of the German +press. . . . . You may legitimately hope that in the western basin of +the Mediterranean . . . . France will succeed, without ignoring any +right, without injuring any interest, in assuring her future.[604] + + +The semiofficial French press threatened the formation of a new Dual +Alliance between France and Great Britain supported by Italy and Spain +in case Germany attempted to gain any special advantages in +Morocco.[605] At the same time, M. Delcassé instructed M. Saint-René +Taillandier, who since March 24 had been making substantial progress in +the negotiations with the Sultan,[606] to warn that monarch against +following the proposal of the German press for an international +conference over the Moroccan question.[607] He also informed the Italian +government, April 12, that France could not entertain such a +proposal.[608] + +The Emperor’s move nevertheless forced M. Delcassé to open negotiations +with Germany for an understanding regarding Morocco. From March 28 he +endeavored indirectly to approach the German government.[609] On April 7 +a threatened interpellation in the Chamber forced him to state publicly +that France was “ready to dissipate any misunderstanding which . . . . +may still exist.”[610] Under pressure from the French cabinet[611] as +well as from public opinion M. Delcassé, while dining at the German +embassy on April 13, repeated that statement directly to Prince Radolin. +He denied that M. Saint-René Taillandier had ever claimed before the +Sultan to have a mandate of Europe. He excused his failure to transmit +the Anglo-French agreement to the German government; and, while +admitting that the conversation of March 23, 1904, had been unofficial, +he declared that his intention had been to show special favor to Germany +by communicating the contents of the accord to her beforehand. He had +also believed, he said, that freedom of commerce for all nations had +been completely safeguarded in that agreement and in the one with +Spain.[612] Immediately thereafter the French government informally +asked the British government to “help to convince the Emperor that +German interests were in no way threatened” in Morocco.[613] + +To carry out his policy, M. Delcassé needed the loyal support of all +France. That he did not have. Political jealousy because of his long +tenure in office, dislike of his secretiveness, enmity between him and +M. Rouvier (the premier), hostility because of his defending the Russian +government in the massacre of January 22, 1905[614]—all these forces of +opposition were now strengthened by the fact that the Foreign Minister +had blundered and that, aroused by the fear of complications, France +sought a victim whose sacrifice might dispel the danger. Quickly +deserting M. Delcassé, the nation pressed him on too rapidly to take the +initiative with Germany. As time passed with nothing settled, nothing +known, the French grew more and more alarmed, until on April 19 the +Chamber denounced the Foreign Minister for having neglected to consult +Germany, and demanded information. M. Deschanel declared that the +Foreign Minister should have heeded Germany’s well-known imperialistic +ambitions by negotiating with that Power about Morocco. “There are not +lacking in England people who desire to utilize the French power against +Germany,” he said. “And there are not lacking in Germany people who will +try to utilize the French power against England. We should not offer +ourselves to that play.” M. Tournade accused M. Delcassé of having hoped +that if he “juggled the question with Germany” and confronted her with a +_fait accompli_, she would venture no opposition. M. de Pressensé, +charging him with deliberately having avoided an official notification +to Germany of the Moroccan accords, asserted: “You have not followed an +exact conception of the interests of France. Your policy is unworthy of +a great country.” M. Delafosse, sensing the reason for the German action +in the Anglo-French entente rather than in Morocco, expressed the +general demand that “it is necessary to ask Germany what she wishes of +us.” No one, however, believed that Germany would question France’s +special position in Morocco. + +Although not a voice was raised in his behalf, M. Delcassé refused to +impart any new intelligence in answer to these accusations and demands. +If M. Rouvier had not come to his rescue, he would have been repudiated +by all parties. In defending the Foreign Minister M. Rouvier declared +that not France but Germany had altered her Moroccan policy since the +previous year, attributing this change to the defeat of France’s +ally.[615] The initiative toward conversations with Germany, he said, +had already been made. “We have closed our ear to no proposal,” he +avowed; “anything which is in harmony with the formula . . . .: to +safeguard the honor of our country and to maintain peace, . . . . we are +ready to consider.” He made the retention of M. Delcassé a cabinet +question, but he assured the Chamber that in the future he would +supervise the foreign policy.[616] + +Upon receiving this check, M. Delcassé would have resigned had it not +been for the appeals of President Loubet and of MM. Paul Cambon and +Barrère, both of whom were in Paris at the time.[617] His policy of +treating with Germany on an equal footing was checkmated. French public +opinion had forced an almost complete surrender in the face of the +German menace. It remained to be seen how far M. Rouvier could yield +before French desire for peace would conflict with French national +honor. + + + II + + +The Emperor’s injudicious assertions at Tangier compelled the German +foreign office to take some positive action in Morocco instead of +leaving the initiative to the Sultan. Herr von Holstein contended that +“a retreat would stand on the same level with Olmütz and cause Fashoda +to be forgotten.”[618] By April 2 the Chancellor decided upon the +following policy:[619] first, to continue denying any territorial +ambitions in Morocco; second, to demand economic equality for all +nations, the open door “in the widest sense”; third, and this he +considered Germany’s “trump card,” to advocate calling an international +conference like that at Madrid in 1880 for deliberating upon the entire +question of Moroccan reform.[620] Of course no separate negotiations +with France would be considered. + +The Chancellor and Herr von Holstein believed that the proposal for a +conference would give Germany an unassailable position. Protected by the +appearance of absolute legality and disinterestedness, they hoped to +break the ententes and accords between France and the other Powers, +especially Great Britain, or at least to show that Germany could force +them to submit the results of their agreements to the consideration of a +general conference.[621] They did not doubt that the proposal would be +accepted and that the conference would refuse to turn Morocco over to +France. For, they argued, + + +in case a conference meets, we are already certain of the diplomatic +support of America in favor of the open door. . . . . Austria will not +quarrel with us over Morocco . . . . Russia is busy with herself.[622] . +. . . The English Government—between Roosevelt and those English groups +which think as the _Morning Post_, _Manchester Guardian_, and Lord +Rosebery[623]—will not stir. Spain is of no importance, and also has a +strong party in favor of the _status quo_. We shall certainly be able to +hold Italy in order, if necessary by a gentle hint that while we settle +with France, Austria will perhaps settle the irredentist question. . . . +. If France refuses the conference, she will put herself in the wrong +toward all the signatory Powers[624] and thereby will give England, +Spain, and Italy a probably welcome excuse to withdraw.[625] + + +Immediately after the Emperor’s speeches at Tangier, Herr von Holstein +proposed advocating a conference in the semiofficial press. The +Chancellor approved; but Herr Hammann, director of the press bureau in +the foreign office, objected. Inasmuch as the Emperor and the Chancellor +had both declared that Germany would next communicate directly with the +Sultan, he argued, this abrupt change would expose German policy to the +accusation of unsteadiness. He advised preparing public opinion for a +conference, for, he maintained, the government had “to combat a much +stronger aversion to a serious conflict with France and England over +Morocco in the public than in the press.”[626] On April 7 he predicted a +“press storm” if the menace of war arose.[627] So, for the time a milder +note was sounded in the press. The grievances against M. Delcassé, who +was made personally responsible for Germany’s action,[628] the necessity +for defending the German economic interests in Morocco, and the intimacy +of German-American relations were emphasized. Little by little the +proposal for a conference was brought to the fore.[629] + +The main basis for the optimism of the German government was its +friendship with President Roosevelt. Since the early part of the year +both the British and the German governments had been endeavoring to win +the President’s support and to arouse his suspicions by accusing each +other of aggressive intentions.[630] Needing the support of both to +effect peace between Russia and Japan, Mr. Roosevelt had refused to +believe the tales of either. He had diagnosed their trouble as a case of +“jumpy nerves,” and had tried in February and March, 1905, to bring them +together in a new triple entente.[631] The German government had +responded favorably to his suggestion; but the British government, +taxing the President with being hoodwinked by the Emperor, had replied +that better relations with that hostile Power were scarcely +possible.[632] This lack of success with Great Britain, combined with +mistrust of France, caused the President to draw closer to Germany.[633] + +On April 3 the German government confidently asked Mr. Roosevelt to lend +“moral support” for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in Morocco and +for the peaceful settlement of the Moroccan difficulty by speaking +“calmly and academically,” particularly to Great Britain, for the equal +treatment of all Powers in the Sherifian Empire.[634] Ten days later it +asked the President to speak to Great Britain in favor of an +international conference on the Moroccan question.[635] Not delaying for +a definite reply or heeding the signs of the drawing together of Great +Britain and France,[636] the German government, on April 9, determined +to send Count Tattenbach to Fez to combat the efforts of the French +mission and to win the Sultan’s approval of a conference. The Count had +telegraphed that this move was essential, since the Sultan was a +weakling, his advisers incompetent and venal, and since the French were +otherwise likely to gain the acceptance of their plans of reform.[637] + +On the same date (April 9) upon which the German government made this +decision, it began to sound the other Powers concerning a conference. +Austria-Hungary and Russia could be excluded from consideration although +both showed disapproval of Germany’s action.[638] When the Spanish +government was asked on April 12 to support the proposal for a +conference, the foreign minister, M. Villa-Urrutia, replied that he +could accept it only if France and Great Britain did so. He suggested +that the German desires be fulfilled not by a conference but by an +exchange of notes and declarations between the Powers.[639] + +With Italy the German government was more brusque. While reassuring that +Power that Germany had no intention of becoming a rival in the +Mediterranean, Count Bülow demanded under threat of breaking the +alliance that Italy support the German policy in the Moroccan affair. +But on April 12 the Italian government, evading a definite position, +urged a direct settlement of the Franco-German discord. Count Monts, +German ambassador at Rome, reported that only in case Great Britain +showed coolness toward France might Germany expect any support from her +ally, who would otherwise endeavor to remain neutral.[640] + +Since the German government thought that Great Britain had relinquished +her Moroccan interests, it intended to ignore her and deal solely with +France. On April 19 Count Metternich merely explained to Lord Lansdowne +the German views in the Moroccan affair without asking for any +expression of opinion. In this conversation he received the impression +that the British Foreign Minister disapproved of the German action and +that, against his desire, he could easily be forced to give France +diplomatic support.[641] + +Without waiting for either the British or the American reply, the German +government, on April 18, responded to M. Delcassé’s offer “to dissipate +any misunderstanding” with the suggestion that “the simplest and most +natural means” of settling the question of Moroccan reform would be to +bring about “an exchange of ideas between all the signatory Powers” of +the Convention of Madrid.[642] At the same time, through messages to the +Sultan the Chancellor sought to prevent him from making any decisions +before the German mission arrived, and he pressed Count Tattenbach to +hasten his departure for Fez. Count Bülow realized that if the French +succeeded in gaining the Sultan’s acceptance of their program of +reforms, the entire German action would be rendered absurd. In fact, +until Count Tattenbach could persuade the Sultan to issue an invitation +for a conference, the latter held the fate of Germany’s policy in his +hands.[643] + + + III + + +The German Emperor’s visit to Tangier aroused bitter antagonism in Great +Britain, where government and people believed that Germany had struck as +much at Great Britain as at France in an effort to break the Entente +Cordiale. Alarm over a possible German attack upon the British Isles was +revived.[644] Public feeling was well expressed by King Edward who, on +April 15, wrote indignantly to Lord Lansdowne: + + +The Tangier incident was the most mischievous and uncalled for event +which the German Emperor has ever been engaged in since he came to the +throne. It was also a political theatrical fiasco, and if he thinks he +has done himself good in the eyes of the world he is very much mistaken. +He is no more or less than a political “enfant terrible” and one can +have no faith in any of his assurances. His own pleasure seems to wish +to set every country by the ears.[645] + + +The Foreign Secretary’s criticism was also severe. + + +I am afraid that we can hardly regard this Tangier ebullition [he wrote, +on April 9, to Sir Frank Lascelles] as an isolated incident. There can +be no doubt that the Kaiser was much annoyed by the Anglo-French +Agreement, and probably even more so by our refusal to vamp up some +agreement of the same kind with Germany over the Egyptian question. + +We shall, I have little doubt, find that the Kaiser avails himself of +every opportunity to put spokes in our wheels. . . . .[646] + + +This staunch pro-French sentiment was not concealed. Early in April an +exchange of visits by the British and French fleets was announced for +the summer. King Edward had an interview with MM. Loubet and Delcassé on +April 6 while passing through Paris on his way south.[647] In Berlin at +the same time Sir Frank Lascelles spoke in private “very disapprovingly” +of the German action, and strongly opposed the idea of a +conference.[648] And British public opinion, the true guide of the +foreign policy, gave entire support to France.[649] So although the +British government admitted that M. Delcassé had blundered in his +handling of Germany[650] and although it knew that the secret articles +of the two Moroccan accords were not in keeping with the public ones, it +felt obliged both by honor and by interest to help France out of her +difficulty. Its official attitude was expressed by Lord Lansdowne to the +Ambassador at Berlin as follows: + + +My impression is that the German Government have really no cause for +complaint either of us or the French in regard to the Morocco part of +the Agreement. We made no secret of its existence. It dealt exclusively +with French and British interests in Morocco, and so far as the other +Powers were concerned, it provided adequate security for their +interests, and for the integrity of Morocco itself. What else does the +Kaiser want?[651] + + +Particularly since British policy aimed at preventing Germany from +obtaining ports anywhere in the colonial world[652] did the British +government desire to keep that Power out of Morocco. And, while Sir +Francis Bertie, British ambassador at Paris, reported the French +government as “solid on Morocco,” he added the ill-omened statement of +M. Delcassé, that the German government was “turning him out.”[653] Lord +Lansdowne did not follow up the French suggestion of intervening in +Berlin in favor of France for fear of doing more harm than good by +arousing the Emperor’s resentment.[654] But he did send the British +Minister at Tangier to Fez to offset the effects of the German +mission.[655] And on April 22 he instructed Sir Francis Bertie as +follows: + + +It seems not unlikely that German Government may ask for a port on the +Moorish coast. + +You are authorized to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that we should +be prepared to join French Government in offering strong opposition to +such a proposal and to beg that if question is raised French Government +will afford us a full opportunity to conferring with them as to steps +which might be taken in order to meet it. + +German attitude in this dispute seems to me most unreasonable having +regard to M. Delcassé’s attitude and we desire to give him all the +support we can. + + +On April 25 the Ambassador handed M. Delcassé the following _aide- +memoire_ (dated April 24): + + +The British Government finds that the conduct of Germany in the Moroccan +question is most unreasonable in view of M. Delcassé’s attitude, and it +desires to give to His Excellency all the support in its power. It seems +not improbable that the German Government may ask for a port on the +Moroccan coast. In that event the British Government would be willing to +join the French Government in offering strong opposition to such a +proposal, and it asks M. Delcassé, in case the question is raised, to +give to the British Government full opportunity to concert with the +French Government upon the measures which might be taken to meet that +demand.[656] + + +By inverting the order of the sentences, the Ambassador gave to Lord +Lansdowne’s communication a force and a meaning which were originally +lacking. He changed the emphasis from that of helping France to oppose +the German acquisition of a port to that of helping her to oppose +Germany in the whole Moroccan question. The one document limited the +scope of the support and stressed the point of conferring beforehand as +well as that of offering strong opposition. The other document began +with a blanket offer of aid, and then used the present instance as one +example of that offer. Moreover, the statement “to concert with the +French Government upon the measures which might be taken to meet that +demand” was stronger than the one used by Lord Lansdowne, “of conferring +with them as to steps which might be taken in order to meet it.” Sir +Francis Bertie’s _aide-memoire_ was so colored by his own very pro- +French feeling that it did not accurately reproduce his chief’s +proposal. + + + IV + + +M. Delcassé was “most grateful” for this support. He denied that Germany +had made any such request, although he remarked that some years ago +Count Hatzfeldt had approached the British government on the subject. He +promised to communicate with the latter if he heard of any German +aspirations for a port and to warn the Sultan against giving any +concession to Germany.[657] Thus, by virtue of the British offer, the +French Foreign Minister was able to hold to his policy in spite of +Germany’s refusal to consider his overture and in spite of his +unpopularity with the French Parliament. On May 2, he again attempted to +approach the German government, offering through M. Luzzati, Italian +minister of finance, to give “any satisfaction desired by Germany in +order to settle the Moroccan question in a way which would not wound +French honor too deeply.”[658] At the same time he continued the French +action at Fez. When on April 26 the Sultan, emboldened by the German +intervention, requested an international guaranty of the proposed +Franco-Moroccan agreement over military reforms, M. Delcassé immediately +refused. “You may declare peremptorily to Ben Sliman,” he instructed the +French Minister on May 3, “that there can no more be intermediate Powers +between France and Morocco than there are intermediate countries between +Morocco and Algeria.”[659] + +The Foreign Minister’s policy was disapproved by the French Premier, who +since April 19 had assumed general control over foreign affairs. Whereas +M. Delcassé, a skilled diplomat, was secretive, pro-British, and anti- +German, the inexperienced M. Rouvier, a business man who sought to +employ business methods in the conduct of foreign relations, suspected +Great Britain of attempting to use France as a cat’s-paw against +Germany. Realizing that the British navy “did not have wheels,” M. +Rouvier favored treating Great Britain and Germany alike.[660] When the +German government, instead of replying to M. Delcassé’s proposal of +April 13, prepared to send a mission to Fez and the German newspapers +advocated an international conference on the Moroccan affair, M. Rouvier +intervened personally in an effort to reach a settlement. + +On April 26, while Prince Radolin’s guest at dinner, the Premier brought +up the Moroccan question. Protesting that the French really preferred +the Germans to the English, he intimated that he appreciated Germany’s +defense of her Moroccan interests, and said: “We will do everything +possible and will give every desired explanation and satisfaction.” +Denying that France was seeking to change the _status quo_, he upheld +her right to suppress the anarchy in Morocco along the Algerian +frontier. He offered to drop the thirty-year limitation to freedom of +commerce, which, he added, was in fact already invalidated by the +existing treaties between Morocco and other states. At the close of the +conversation he exclaimed passionately: “It is impossible, it would be +criminal for two states that are intended to agree and to approach each +other to become embroiled, and especially over Morocco!” The Ambassador +coldly responded that a collective settlement of the question seemed to +him the simplest solution.[661] + +On the following day M. Rouvier proposed indirectly to Prince Radolin a +settlement of the Moroccan problem by an exchange of notes between +France and the other Powers. If the majority of the Powers opposed the +French program of reform, it would not be carried out. M. Rouvier had no +objection to Count Tattenbach’s making new commercial treaties with +Morocco. But he did ask that, in case Germany were satisfied by his +offer, the Emperor, on his return from the Mediterranean, should +announce publicly the forthcoming settlement of the Franco-German +dispute.[662] + +When these offers were made, the anxiety of the German government was +relieved. To be sure, on April 25, Prince Radolin heard from a “usually +well-informed person just returned from England” that King Edward would, +on his way home from the South, declare officially to the French +government that “Great Britain was ready to support the French policy in +Morocco and the execution of the Anglo-French accord with her whole +power.”[663] But at the same time the German government learned +definitely that the Sultan had made no final promises to the French and +that he had agreed to postpone all decisions until the arrival of Count +Tattenbach.[664] Equally satisfactory, the answer from Washington +arrived. + +As the President had been absent on a hunting trip in Colorado, he had +not replied until April 20, when he had explained his policy to Mr. +Taft, acting secretary of state, as follows: + + +I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the Morocco +matter. We have other fish to fry and we have no real interest in +Morocco. . . . . + +At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants I shall be glad to +oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely anxious to bring about a +better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each nation is +working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each +from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure that England +intends to attack him. The English Government and a large share of the +English people are equally sure that Germany intends to attack England. +Now, in my view this action of Germany in embroiling herself with France +over Morocco is positive proof that she has not the slightest intention +of attacking England. . . . . I do not wish to suggest anything whatever +as to England’s attitude in Morocco, but if we can find out that +attitude with propriety and inform the Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to +do so. . . . . If we find that it will make the English suspicious—that +is, will make them think we are acting as decoy ducks for Germany—why, +we shall have to drop the business. . . . . I should advise your being +absolutely frank with both Speck [von Sternburg] and the British people. +. . . . Remember . . . . that both parties are very suspicious. You +remember the King’s message to me through Harry White and his earnest +warning to me that I should remember that England was our real friend +and that Germany was only a make-believe friend. In just the same way +the Germans are always insisting that England is really on the point of +entering into a general coalition which would practically be inimical to +us—an act which apart from moral considerations I regard the British +Government as altogether too flabby to venture upon. + + +In a letter to the German Ambassador on the same date, Mr. Roosevelt had +reiterated that the United States had no direct interest in Morocco, had +offered to serve as mediator between Germany and Great Britain and to +advise the British “to arrive at an understanding over Morocco and to +work in harmony” with Germany.[665] + +The German Chancellor regarded this statement as “satisfactory to a high +degree.”[666] On April 27 he instructed Prince Radolin to uphold the +project for a collective settlement and to postpone further negotiations +with the French government until Count Tattenbach could send exact +information from Fez concerning the actions of the French Minister.[667] +In other words, he put the French off until the Count could block their +efforts in Fez and secure the Sultan’s acceptance of a conference. +Otherwise, he feared, M. Delcassé might try to break the Moroccan +resistance by intimating to the Sultan that his supposed friend, +Germany, was now deserting him for a direct understanding with +France.[668] + +This hazardous policy was not approved by either Prince Radolin or Count +Tattenbach. The former advised his chief to accept M. Delcassé’s offer +of April 13.[669] The Count also expressed his preference for a direct +agreement with France. “In my opinion,” he wrote to the Chancellor on +April 29, + + +the condition for a separate understanding with France would first be +given if the other Powers reject the idea of a conference and the Sultan +also acts unreliably and declines to heed our advice and wishes,—as is +to be expected. In this case we must receive Southern Morocco as our +sphere of influence. . . . . We must therefore decide whether we wish . +. . . to fight a long diplomatic battle of doubtful issue against +France, either through supporting the Sultan with money and weapons or +through relying upon the conservative, fanatically anti-French party in +Morocco, or whether we wish to gain through an understanding with France +a substantial pledge for a large-scale African colonial policy which +aims at the acquisition of all the French African possessions.[670] + + +The Chancellor’s reply to Count Tattenbach contained the explanation for +Germany’s proposal of a conference. He wrote: + + +Your last idea guided Germany’s Moroccan policy in the past and under +proper circumstances can guide it again in the future if you keep the +future free. For the present, the German policy must be governed by the +fact that His Majesty the Emperor . . . . declared to the King of Spain +that he has enough African possessions and wishes no territory in +Morocco but only the maintenance of commercial freedom. This declaration +naturally does not bind us forever; but in the year which has passed +since those remarks, the effect of the Southwest African events has been +of a nature to increase the antagonism to colonial acquisitions by +military force as well with His Majesty as with a great part of the +German people. Even if, therefore, France were inclined to permit us to +conquer a part of Morocco, we would for the present perhaps not be in a +position to take advantage of this overture. In reality, we are +confronted with the alternative either of relinquishing Morocco now to +France without adequate compensation to Germany or of working for the +extension of life of the Sherifian Empire in the expectation of a turn +of events favorable to us. Thus, I perceive your important task to be in +holding the future free for the profit of German interests. I sum it up +in stating that you should bring the Sultan to declare that he could +consider the French demands only if they were advised by a conference of +all the signatory Powers. The reference to the conference I consider for +the Sultan the easiest and for us the most favorable form of refusal. +That the Sultan refuse the French demands is naturally the main +thing.[671] + + +This frank document furnished the key to the German refusal of the +French offers and to the persistent demands for a conference. Count +Bülow’s embarrassment was caused by the Emperor’s renunciations at Vigo +and even more by the temporary apathy if not antagonism of the German +people toward further colonial acquisition. Pursuing an objective +undesired by German public opinion, the Chancellor was still bent on +acquiring a share in Morocco or compensation elsewhere. To delay and +postpone, to “hold the future free” until public opinion veered into a +more chauvinistic channel, to relieve Germany of the restrictions +imposed by the Emperor’s assertions, Count Bülow thought that a +conference was the best means. The continuation of the crisis was a +logical result of this ambition. + +On the same day upon which Count Bülow penned this dispatch M. Rouvier +made another offer. He was led to this move by the increasing excitement +in France. The lack of response from Germany and the uncertainty about +her objective, the publication of an article in the _Kreuzzeitung_ on +April 26 and of one in _Matin_ on the next day hinting at war,[672] +caused a panic on the Paris stock exchange on April 27.[673] M. Bihourd +telegraphed on April 28 of the presence of “bellicose counselors” in the +_entourage_ of the Emperor who would have an excellent opportunity “to +advocate the present time as propitious for war against France.”[674] So +in a conversation with Prince Radolin on April 30 M. Rouvier indorsed +the Emperor’s assertions at Tangier and the principles of the Convention +of Madrid, except with respect to the Algero-Moroccan frontier. He +offered to “make an agreement similar to the Anglo-French one, where all +doubtful points, including Morocco, would be settled.” The Ambassador +made no reply.[675] + +The next day an intermediary explained to Prince Radolin that the +Premier regarded a conference as hardly acceptable since France had +engaged herself so fully in the Moroccan affair. M. Rouvier would be +willing, however, to include in a general settlement such questions as +those of boundaries in Africa and the Bagdad Railway. In return, the two +governments should agree upon a mode of adjusting the Moroccan affair +directly with the Powers. The German government refused the offer.[676] + +On May 1 King Edward VII arrived in Paris where he remained for four +days. Strongly supporting M. Delcassé’s views, he assured the French +government that Germany would not dare a war; in case of conflict, he +said, France could rely on British support.[677] To the German +Ambassador he praised the French for seeking a direct settlement of the +Moroccan difficulty, abruptly demanding, “Why does not Berlin reply to +the last French overture?”[678] His interference, however, was of no +avail. In fact, French public opinion, suspecting the King and British +press of attempting to estrange France and Germany, was more than ever +anxious for an agreement with Germany.[679] + +Distressed by refusals and silence from the German government and +fearful of war, M. Rouvier sought to restore connections with Germany by +sending his friend, M. Betzold, to Berlin to interview Herr von +Holstein, and by persuading Baron Eckardstein, then living privately in +England, to lay the French proposals directly before Count Bülow and the +Emperor at Karlsruhe. These men were to inform the German officials that +the French cabinet, disapproving of M. Delcassé’s secretiveness, hoped +to bring about the Minister’s downfall over some domestic difficulty in +the next three or four weeks. They were to state that while in case of +war the French Government knew for a certainty that Great Britain would +interfere in France’s favor, the cabinet, except M. Delcassé, preferred +not to seek this support. As an inducement for a direct settlement, the +two emissaries were to offer Germany “a coaling station and eventually +also a strip of land on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.” They were +especially to urge the Emperor against making any inflammatory speeches +on his return from the Mediterranean.[680] + +Neither M. Betzold nor Baron Eckardstein had the least success. While +Herr von Holstein assured M. Betzold on May 2 of Germany’s desire for +good relations with France, he observed that for the time he saw no +possibility of making a direct agreement with her. For, even apart from +Germany’s official declaration in favor of a collective settlement of +the Moroccan question, the German government did not trust M. Delcassé +sufficiently to negotiate with France. That Minister’s policy toward +Germany, he asserted, had been “dishonest,” “hostile,” “insidious,” and +in this affair “disrespectful.” “Slow tempo, temporary truce, and +removal of Delcassé would be the next,” he concluded. In Karlsruhe, on +May 5, Count Bülow rebuffed Baron Eckardstein with the bold assertion: +“The English inciting does not impress us. In case of a conflict the +game would be played between Germany and France. . . . . We are in a +position to await further developments with composure.” The Baron was +not allowed to see William II at all.[681] + +Thus every offer for a direct settlement was refused.[682] Indeed, the +German government even suggested to M. Rouvier on May 7 that France take +the initiative in calling a conference, arguing that “the advantage of a +conference lies in that it can have no positive results. It will neither +divide Morocco nor check her continuing decay. It will fulfil its object +in removing the danger of an acute conflict, at the same time holding +the future open.”[683] + +M. Rouvier of course would not consider the suggestion. Nor was he any +longer so willing to eliminate M. Delcassé. On May 8 he informed the +German government through M. Betzold that while he had been unable to +convince the Foreign Minister of the faults of his policy, the latter +was needed in the work of mediating between Russia and Japan. It might, +therefore, take weeks or even months to achieve his dismissal. M. +Rouvier hoped, said M. Betzold, to settle the Moroccan and other +difficulties with Germany after Count Tattenbach convinced himself of +the French Minister’s proper conduct at Fez and after M. Delcassé had +been eliminated.[684] + +More unfortunate words could hardly have been chosen. The German +government was opposed to an early peace between the warring +Powers,[685] and its mistrust of M. Delcassé was increased by his +continued justification of his policy. Since French public opinion had +repudiated the Minister, since M. Rouvier, known to be weak and easily +influenced, had practically offered the Minister’s head, the German +government determined to press the frightened and pacifically inclined +French Premier until the objectionable Foreign Minister was overthrown. +To that end, on May 16, Prince Radolin announced to M. Rouvier “that the +prerequisite for the _rapprochement_ desired by him [M. Rouvier] is for +us [Germany] to have full trust in the foreign policy of France. . . . . +After what has happened, this trust is lacking.” The Premier replied, “I +understand you fully. Leave it to me.” But through M. Betzold he urged +the German government to wait until he could accomplish the act by some +internal crisis.[686] + +Meanwhile, the German government was pressing Spain, Italy, and the +United States for support. Early in May Herr von Radowitz warned the +Spanish government against sending a mission to Fez at that time, and +remarked that “it would be wise for Spain not to intervene in the +present Moorish difficulties, and that it was to her interest to be on +friendly terms with Germany, who could be of greater assistance to her +than any other Power.”[687] At the same time Count Monts in Rome was +using “menacing language,” hinting at “the possibility of war.”[688] In +both places this talk made a deep impression. + +To President Roosevelt the German government asserted that, although +certain voices had been raised in France in favor of a conference, Great +Britain still resisted the project. It asked the President to inform the +British government that its attitude justified the suspicion that “in +the accord with France they [the British] had wished to dispose not only +of English rights but also of the rights of the other signatory Powers.” +The German government further informed Mr. Roosevelt that if the +proposal for a conference became hopeless, it would then think of its +interests alone and would be forced to choose “between the possibility +of a conflict with France and the consideration of conditions which +France might perhaps propose to avoid a conflict.”[689] + +Criticizing sharply the British hostility to the conference, Mr. +Roosevelt promised to repeat his advice to the British government to +settle its differences with Germany. Upon doing so he was again accused +by the British leaders of being under German influence. He stoutly +denied this accusation, writing to Senator Lodge, then in England, on +May 15, as follows: + + +It always amuses me to find that the English think that I am under the +influence of the Kaiser. The heavy witted creatures do not understand +that nothing would persuade me to follow the lead of or enter into close +alliance with a man who is so jumpy, so little capable of continuity of +action, and therefore, so little capable of being loyal to his friends +or steadfastly hostile to an enemy. Undoubtedly with Russia weakened +Germany feels it can be fairly insolent within the borders of Europe. I +intend to do my best to keep on good terms with Germany, as with all +other nations, and so far as I can to keep them on good terms with one +another; and I shall be friendly to the Kaiser as I am friendly to every +one. But as for his having any special influence with me, the thought is +absurd.[690] + + +Nevertheless, the British government rejected his advice. On May 19 Mr. +Roosevelt had to report to Baron Sternburg that “the British Government +had given him to understand that it did not wish better relations with +Germany,” and that “it had even hinted broadly to the secretary of state +that Great Britain could take care of her affairs alone.” He could not +do more, he said, without exposing himself to an incivility.[691] The +German government was well pleased with the result, however, for it +placed Mr. Roosevelt on the German side. + +On May 13 Count Tattenbach arrived in Fez. He found that the French +party was still strong, with some of the Moroccan ministers bought over +to that side. He accomplished his object with some difficulty. He +reported immediately that the Sultan himself affirmed the accusation +against the French Minister of having claimed to enjoy a mandate of +Europe.[692] A few days later the Count telegraphed that upon his +arrival the French Minister, under instructions from M. Delcassé, had +issued a veiled threat of violence against Morocco if the Sultan agreed +to a conference.[693] Upon receiving these dispatches Count Bülow +immediately warned M. Rouvier against M. Delcassé’s “stormy and violent +. . . . Moroccan policy.”[694] As that Minister still remained in +office, the Chancellor instructed Herr von Miquel, councilor at the +German embassy in Paris, to inform M. Rouvier amicably but firmly that +the Foreign Minister would have to go, that Franco-German relations +would not improve as long as he remained in office. Indeed, if M. +Delcassé’s anti-German and bellicose policy became known to the German +people, he was to state, it would have an effect for which Count Bülow +refused to be responsible. “A change in the present situation is above +all to be made possible by a change in the direction of the French +foreign policy.” + +When Herr von Miquel carried out these instructions on May 30, the +Premier realized the necessity for eliminating the Foreign Minister. In +his despair he cried: “I cannot cause M. Delcassé to fall because +Germany frowns. I would be reproached always . . . . always.”[695] The +German pressure, however, did not cease. In a telegram on May 25 Count +Tattenbach reported French assertions to the Moroccans that in the face +of the united action of the Mediterranean Powers, “who would never +suffer an interference by Germany in Mediterranean questions,” Germany +would desert the Sultan. In sending this report to Rome, on May 31, the +German Chancellor requested the Italian government to favor publicly the +collective settlement of the Moroccan question. “No matter what turn +Moroccan affairs take, Germany will follow up the consequences of the +advice which His Majesty sent to the Sultan,” he wrote. “Thus the +possibility that the Sultan will remain isolated in this difficulty need +not be considered.” The Italian Foreign Minister immediately denied +France’s right to speak of a common policy of the Mediterranean Powers, +and, as Count Bülow probably intended, he passed on the German warning +to the French government.[696] + +On May 28 Count Tattenbach telegraphed the Sultan’s official rejection +of the French proposals and his approval of an international +conference.[697] Thereupon, through M. Betzold, the Chancellor warned +the French Premier, June 1, that in as much as the Sultan had accepted +the German point of view, Germany “would follow up the consequences if +France continued the policy of intimidation and violence hitherto +pursued by M. Delcassé.”[698] On June 3 Prince Radolin described the +situation to M. Dupuy, an intimate friend of M. Rouvier’s, as “very +serious.”[699] Thus the German government struck blow after blow to +force an immediate dismissal of the French Foreign Minister.[700] + +On the French side, M. Delcassé remained as adamantine as the Germans. +Fearing an intention on the part of Germany to force his dismissal, +hearing of Germany’s pressure on Spain and Italy and of bellicose talk +by the German Ambassador at Rome,[701] he made a bid on May 17 for +British support. On that date M. Cambon apprised Lord Lansdowne of +Germany’s endeavor to arouse discord between Great Britain and France +“all over the world.” Although he did not regard the relations with +Germany as “profoundly dangerous,” he pictured them as serious enough to +cause him “much preoccupation.” + +Lord Lansdowne wished to lend the pro-British Foreign Minister all +possible support. Late in April, for the sake of France and the Entente +Cordiale, he had run the risk of antagonizing President Roosevelt by +instructing the British Ambassador in Washington not to give him an +opportunity to mediate between Great Britain and Germany. He realized +that the President’s interference encouraged Germany and worked to the +detriment of France and Great Britain. He had therefore denied to the +President that there was any “subject of dispute” between Great Britain +and Germany, and had expressed his inability to see “why any +international complication should be created [over Morocco], unless +German Gov[ernmen]t is determined to take advantage of what was at most +a diplomatic oversight in order to make mischief or to disturb the +_status quo_, e.g. . . . ., by demanding cession of a Moorish +port.”[702] But Lord Lansdowne also sought to correct any erroneous +impression which Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide-memoire_ of April 25 may +have made. Lord Lansdowne said to M. Cambon: + + +The moral . . . . seemed to me to be that our two Governments should +continue to treat one another with the most absolute confidence, should +keep one another fully informed of everything which came to their +knowledge, and should, so far as possible, discuss in advance any +contingencies by which they might in the course of events find +themselves confronted. As an instance of our readiness to enter into +such timely discussions, I reminded H[is] E[xcellency] of the +communication which had recently been made to the French Gov[ernmen]t by +you [Sir Francis Bertie] at a moment when an idea prevailed that Germany +might be on the point of demanding the cession of a Moorish Port.[703] + + +To avoid all misunderstanding this communication was put in writing in +an exchange of notes between the British Foreign Secretary and M. Cambon +on May 24-25. When the former perceived that M. Cambon still interpreted +the British policy in the light of Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide- +memoire_,[704] he reiterated his correcting statement as follows: + + +I do not know that this account [of their conversation of May 17] +differs from that which you have given to M. Delcassé, but I am not sure +that I succeeded in making quite clear to you our desire that there +should be full and confidential discussion between the two +Gov[ernmen]ts, not so much in consequence of some acts of unprovoked +aggression on the part of another Power, as in anticipation of any +complications to be apprehended during the somewhat anxious period +through which we are at present passing.[705] + + +At some time in this crisis, the British fleet was commanded to be “in +readiness to make a descent on the German coast at short notice,”[706] +and conversations were begun between the French and British military and +naval officers looking toward active co-operation in case of war.[707] + +When news arrived of the Sultan’s proposal for a conference, M. Delcassé +opposed it vigorously. At his instigation the British government on June +5 ordered Mr. Lowther, who had just arrived in Fez, to advise the Sultan +against the idea and to refuse the invitation.[708] The French Minister +also reported Mr. Taft’s remark that the American government would +probably not be favorably disposed toward a conference. Thereupon Lord +Lansdowne on June 5 added his support in trying to convince the American +government that “the proposal was unsound and should not be +entertained.”[709] To bring Spain into closer intimacy with the Entente +Cordiale, the British Foreign Secretary offered early in June to effect +an understanding with her over the Spanish interests in the +Mediterranean and elsewhere.[710] + +In spite of Lord Lansdowne’s correcting statements about the British +policy, M. Delcassé apparently continued to interpret the British +communication of May 17 in the sense of Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide- +memoire_ of April 25. He was impressed by the practical identity of that +communication with the political clauses of the Franco-Russian +alliance.[711] Reassured by the British support and by the adverse +attitude of the British, Spanish, and American governments toward the +project of a conference, and believing with the British that Germany was +bluffing, he was in no mood to recede. M. Rouvier, who was receiving all +the German threats, took a different view of the situation. With some of +the other members of the cabinet, he prepared for the retirement of the +offending Minister.[712] During the visit of the King of Spain to Paris, +May 30-June 4, little could be done. But by June 3 M. Delcassé’s +resignation was anticipated in parliamentary circles.[713] On June 5 the +Chamber was thrown into excitement bordering on panic by the rumor of a +report from M. Barrère at Rome that if an Anglo-French alliance were +concluded Germany would attack France.[714] On the same day M. Rouvier +explained the gravity of the situation to President Loubet;[715] on June +6 he laid his controversy with M. Delcassé before the cabinet. + +At that meeting, although well aware of his isolation, M. Delcassé +valiantly defended his policy of the past seven years, a policy which he +declared had been opposed by Germany alone.[716] He claimed that in a +very recent exchange of notes, one of which he read, France had received +from Great Britain assurance of support in case of a German attack. +Asserting the possibility of a formal alliance with Great Britain, he +urged acceptance of the British offer.[717] He proposed that the French, +British, and Spanish governments should address identical notes to the +Sultan declining the conference. He assured the cabinet that Germany +confronted by this Anglo-French-Spanish opposition with Italy neutral +would not fight. But M. Rouvier declared that the German government had +threatened war if France accepted the British offers. Turning to the +ministers of war and of navy, he asked if France were prepared for that +contingency. They both replied emphatically “No.” As M. Delcassé was not +supported by a single minister, he resigned, and M. Rouvier took over +his position. Before leaving M. Delcassé prophetically warned the +cabinet that after this abdication before the demands of Germany, that +Power would become “more insolent and more exacting than ever”; it had +not opposed his person, he said, but rather the French policy of +accords. He declared that the cabinet’s pusillanimity would give rise to +new dangers.[718] + +French public opinion was almost unanimous in its approval of M. +Delcassé’s downfall. This approbation was noted by Herr von Flotow, +first secretary of the German embassy in Paris, who on June 7 reported +to his government as follows: + + +The history of the downfall of M. Delcassé shows that without a doubt +there is a latent under-current in France which wishes . . . . a +satisfactory understanding with Germany. It is after all significant +that in the entire press of all parties there is hardly a paper which +does not censure the anti-German policy of M. Delcassé. The second +interesting point in the history of the past few days is the fact that +in spite of the continued and almost importunate offers of English aid, +. . . . French public opinion has never shown a real inclination to +accept this support. Wherever one has opportunity here . . . . to +observe public feeling, one meets the view that England is only +endeavoring to engage the French power for her differences with Germany, +and that in case of a crisis France would have to pull the English +chestnuts out of the German fire.[719] + + +Great Britain was disgusted. The British government had made strenuous +endeavor to save M. Delcassé, for it was certain of his loyalty to the +entente, whereas it was dubious of the more pro-German M. Rouvier. It +had intimated its willingness to oppose by force the German +aggression;[720] but so far had met with no encouragement. + + +Delcassé’s dismissal or resignation under pressure from the German +Government [stated Mr. Balfour to King Edward on June 8] displayed a +weakness on the part of France which indicated that she could not at +present be counted on as an effective force in international politics. +She could no longer be trusted not to yield to threats at the crucial +moment of a negotiation. If, therefore, Germany is really desirous of +obtaining a port on the coast of Morocco, and if such a proceeding be a +menace to our interests, it must be to other means than French +assistance that we must look for our protection.[721] + + +In spite of M. Rouvier’s public assertion, June 6, that his policy +toward the Anglo-French understanding would remain the same as +before,[722] the Entente Cordiale had received a hard blow. + +While expressing satisfaction that France had repudiated the anti-German +Minister, the German press, under official guidance,[723] kept its +discussion of the affair within the bounds of propriety. But German +obtuseness to the feelings of other nations was manifested when on the +day of M. Delcassé’s fall the German Emperor made Count Bülow a prince. + +Thus, the first period of the crisis was closed. Germany had gained her +objective in winning the Sultan’s acceptance of the project of a +conference and in overthrowing M. Delcassé. While playing with war, the +German government had had no desire to start one, and, gauging correctly +French sentiment toward M. Delcassé and war, it had achieved success in +Paris merely by a liberal use of threats. In the Moroccan affair the +German foreign office had reached the peak of its power. But it had +aroused so many complications that the crisis continued as acutely as +before. + + +[Footnote 597: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 516.] + +[Footnote 598: Radolin to F. O., April 9, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 317, No. +6612; Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 330 ff., No. 6622. +After having talked with President Loubet early in April, Edward VII +wrote to Lansdowne as follows: “President Loubet was most amiable . . . +. but I could see from his manner that he considers the German conduct +at Tangier, if not a direct menace to France, at any rate a covert +insult” (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 341). The Schnäbele affair brought +France and Germany almost to war in 1887.] + +[Footnote 599: Kühlmann to Bülow, Nov. 9, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 232 ff., No. +6536; Chérisey to Delcassé, Feb. 11, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 196, No. 225; +Delcassé to Bihourd, Feb. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 196 f., No. 226; Bihourd to +Delcassé, Feb. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 197 f., No. 227; Lowther to Lansdowne, +April 26, 1905, _B.D._, III, 67, No. 81.] + +[Footnote 600: Nicolson to Lansdowne, D. Feb. 12, 1905, R. March 4, +1905, _B.D._, III, 59, No. 66.] + +[Footnote 601: Bertie to Lansdowne, March 22, 1905, _ibid._, 60, No. 67. +For the uncertainty about the Emperor’s proposed action see Lascelles to +Lansdowne, March 23, 1905, _ibid._, 61, No. 69; Nicolson to Lansdowne, +March 23, 1905, _ibid._, 62, No. 70.] + +[Footnote 602: Delcassé stated to Bertie, June 10, that “his policy had +been to be ready to make commercial concessions to Germany if she were +willing to discuss with the French Government the question of Morocco, +but not to yield anything politically or territorially” (Bertie to +Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 78, No. 96).] + +[Footnote 603: Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 206 f., 231; +Imperial Foreign Office, _Reports of the Belgian Representatives in +Berlin, London, and Paris to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in +Brussels, 1905-1914. European Politics during the Decade before the War +as Described by the Belgian Diplomatists_ (. . . ., 1915), No. 3 +(hereafter cited as _Belg. Docs., 1905-1914_); _Quest. dipl. et col._, +XIX, 517; Henry Wickham Steed, _Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922: A +Personal Narrative_ (London, 1924), I, 229. Delcassé also made strenuous +efforts during the succeeding weeks to mediate peace between Japan and +Russia so that the latter Power could resume its obligations as France’s +ally. See Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 345, No. 6635; +Lansdowne to MacDonald, April 19, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 76 f., No. 68; +Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, pp. 176 f.] + +[Footnote 604: _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._ (Sénat, March 31, +1905), pp. 540 f.] + +[Footnote 605: Articles in _Temps_ of April 3, and in the _Dépêche de +Toulouse_ of April 10. Mévil, the official apologist for Delcassé, +asserts that the latter article was based on the “best” information (pp. +218 ff.).] + +[Footnote 606: By April 13 the Sultan had expressed his general approval +of the French proposals, and the details for military reorganization in +six of the Moroccan towns were ready for final formulation and signature +(Mévil, p. 200 n.; Vassel to Tattenbach, April 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 339 +ff., No. 6631; and the various dispatches from Saint-René Taillandier to +Delcassé during Feb., March, April, 1905, in _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. +228-31, 233, 240, 243, 248, 266).] + +[Footnote 607: Delcassé instructed the Minister to make the following +statement to the Sultan: “We cannot conceive that, changing from the way +of accords which he [the Sultan] has followed for several years, he will +decide to assume an attitude which will oblige us to consider strict +right alone as the basis of our relation with him” (Delcassé to Saint- +René Taillandier, April 9, 1905, _ibid._, 208, No. 239).] + +[Footnote 608: Egerton to Lansdowne, April 12, 1905, _B.D._, III, 66, +No. 78. The French government was afraid that Spain would not loyally +uphold their agreement if some other Power intervened in Morocco +(Nicolson to Lansdowne, Feb. 12, 1905, _ibid._, 59, No. 66). But with M. +Villa-Urrutia at the foreign office, Spain remained entirely on the +French side (Nicolson to Lansdowne, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 66, No. +79).] + +[Footnote 609: On March 22 Bihourd advised Delcassé to “establish by an +exchange of notes the bearing of the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish +accords on the commercial and industrial interests of Germany,” adding +that “until then we shall remain under the menace, very clearly +formulated by the German press, of some inopportune surprise” (Bihourd +to Delcassé, March 22, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 202 f., No. 232). On March +28 an article by André Tardieu, a journalist with close governmental +connections, stated that the French Foreign Minister would give +satisfaction to Germany if she wished it on the subject of Morocco, +“provided it is a question solely of commercial interests” (Flotow to F. +O., March 28, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 282 f., No. 6584). On April 4 Billy, a +press writer in the French foreign office, sounded Theodor Wolff, Paris +correspondent for the _Berliner Tageblatt_, upon how the German +government would receive a French overture (_ibid._, p. 305 n.). On +April 7 Hedeman, London correspondent of _Matin_, talked with Hammann to +the same effect (memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 310 ff., Nos. +6608 f.).] + +[Footnote 610: Quoted in _Quest. dipl et col._, XIX, 511 f.] + +[Footnote 611: Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 331, No. +6622.] + +[Footnote 612: Radolin to F. O., April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 328 ff., No. +6621; Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 330 ff., No. 6622; +Mévil, pp. 238 ff.; Delcassé to Bihourd, April 14, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, +pp. 211 f., No. 244; Bihourd to Delcassé, April 18 and 25, 1905, +_ibid._, 214, Nos. 246 f.; memo. by Mühlberg, April 19, 1905, _G.P._, +XX, 332 f., No. 6623. Saint-René Taillandier’s denial that he had ever +claimed to have a mandate of Europe must be balanced against the +Sultan’s personal assertion that he had claimed it. The truth would seem +to be that the French Minister had sought to make more out of France’s +international accords over Morocco than the facts justified by speaking +vaguely and by not clearing up misunderstandings in the Sultan’s mind +(_L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 214, 231, 238, 263; _G.P._, XX, Nos. 6621, 6631, +6658, 6662, 6551 n.; _Aktenstücke über Marokko, 1905_, Nos. 1, 3). Cf. +the report from the Belgian Minister at Paris, Dec. 19, 1905, _Zur +europ. Politik_, II, 96.] + +[Footnote 613: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 67, +No. 80.] + +[Footnote 614: Michon, _L’alliance franco-russe 1891-1917_, pp. 117 ff.] + +[Footnote 615: As already shown, the Russian defeat at Mukden had +nothing to do with the change of Germany’s policy.] + +[Footnote 616: _Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ (Chambre, April 19, +1905), pp. 1543 ff. Cf. Bertie’s estimate on April 25: “The general +feeling in Paris is that the chief object which the German Emperor has +had in view in his recent proceedings is to show to the French people +that an understanding with England is of little value to them and that +they had much better come to an agreement with Germany. To this end ‘il +fait la guerre à l’Angleterre sur le dos de la France’ and the French +Public realizing that the Emperor’s wrath is against England for +enabling France to carry out her Morocco policy and not against France +for taking advantage of her agreement with England feel that if they +keep their heads nothing really serious will come of His Majesty’s ill +temper which they believe is not entirely shared by the German +Government and still less so by the German people” (Bertie to Lansdowne, +April 25, 1905, _B.D._, III, 75, No. 93).] + +[Footnote 617: Mévil, pp. 257 ff.] + +[Footnote 618: Memo. by Holstein, April 4, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 304, No. +6601. Olmütz signified the humiliation of Prussia by Austria in 1850; +Fashoda, that of France by Great Britain in 1898.] + +[Footnote 619: Memo. by Holstein, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 297 ff., No. +6597.] + +[Footnote 620: The suggestion of a conference was first made by Kühlmann +in a dispatch of March 2 (_ibid._, p. 293 n.). On March 27 Bülow still +thought it possible of execution only in case Great Britain accepted it +(Bülow to Kühlmann, March 27, 1905, _ibid._, 293 f., No. 6591). After +the Emperor’s visit, however, he accepted the proposal. In Feb., 1904, +Lascelles had reported a conversation with Bülow in which the latter had +opposed calling a conference on the Macedonian question, arguing as +follows: “A Congress was excellent at the end of a war when both +belligerents were more or less exhausted and desired peace, but it was a +most dangerous thing at any other time, and would only accentuate more +strongly any difference of opinion which might exist and thus cause +greater complications, unless indeed the Great Powers should have +decided beforehand exactly what was to be done, and should have appealed +to the Congress, to give the sanction of Europe to the decisions they +had already taken” (Lascelles to Lansdowne, Feb. 26, 1904, _B.D._, V, +72). A year later Bülow had apparently forgotten this very accurate +judgment. Or possibly he saw no other way out, and faced the facts with +his usual optimism.] + +[Footnote 621: In a memorandum by Hammann on April 7, this statement +appeared: “Naturally the result would be greater if there followed from +a conference a breach in the Anglo-French accord over Morocco.” Bülow’s +minute to that assertion was: “We do not desire that at all, or at least +we should in no instance show such an aim. We only wish to preserve our +rights in Morocco” (_ibid._, XX, 312 f., No. 6609; cf. Chirol, _Fifty +Years in a Changing World_, p. 300).] + +[Footnote 622: When the _Nowoje Wremja_ denounced the German action +Bülow, on March 27, protested strongly to Lamsdorff against this anti- +German attitude. Russia was expected to remain neutral in this affair, +he declared (Bülow to Alvensleben, March 27, _G.P._, XX, 277 f., No. +6577).] + +[Footnote 623: Those three had criticized the Anglo-French accord.] + +[Footnote 624: The signatory Powers were those which had participated in +the conference of Madrid in 1880 over Moroccan affairs.] + +[Footnote 625: Quoted from a dispatch from Bülow to William II, April 4, +1905, _ibid._, 303, No. 6599; and from a memo. by Holstein, April 4, +1905, _ibid._, 304 f., No. 6601.] + +[Footnote 626: Memo. by Hammann, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 300 f., No. +6598.] + +[Footnote 627: Memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 311 f., No. +6609.] + +[Footnote 628: On April 8 Bülow sent Hammann the following instructions +for directing the press: “All criticism and attacks should, under the +greatest possible consideration for the French national feeling, be +directed against the systematically anti-German, insolent, and inept +policy of Delcassé” (minute by Bülow to a memo. by Hammann, April 7, +1905, _ibid._, 313, No. 6609). On April 4 he had issued instructions to +restrain the German press from war with the British press (Mühlberg to +Metternich, April 4, 1905, _ibid._, 603 and note, No. 6839).] + +[Footnote 629: That Holstein wished to turn loose a _Kriegsfanfare_, as +Hammann later asserted, seems unlikely, for German policy at that time +was not bellicose. But Holstein did propose to exert great pressure by +vigorous words and threats, and his program might very likely have had +the result which Hammann foresaw. On this controversy between the two +men see Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 35 f.; Otto +Hammann, _Der neue Kurs. Erinnerungen_ (Berlin, 1918), pp. 104 ff.; +Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, pp. 210 f.; memo. by +Holstein, April 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 297 ff., No. 6597; memo. by +Hammann, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 300 f., No. 6598; memo. by Holstein, +April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 308 f., No. 6606; memo. by Hammann, April 7, +1905, _ibid._, 309 f., No. 6607.] + +[Footnote 630: Durand to Lansdowne, March, 1905, quoted in Brigadier +General Sir Percy Sykes, _The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand: A +Biography_ (London, 1926), p. 280; Spring Rice to Roosevelt, undated +though written in the first half of Jan., 1905, quoted in Dennett, pp. +152 f.; Sternburg to Bülow, Feb. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 573 ff., No. +6288; Sternburg to F. O., March 7, 1905, _ibid._, 580 f., No. 6293; +Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 576 ff., No. 6290; and +others in _ibid._, chap. cxxxix; Dennett, pp. 45, 73 ff.; Dennis, +_Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 393; Joseph B. Bishop, _Theodore +Roosevelt and His Times_ (New York, 1920), I, 378 f., 468 f., 473; +Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 406 +ff., and chap. xiii.] + +[Footnote 631: Sternburg to Bülow, Feb. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 573 f., +No. 6288; Sternburg to F. O., March 7, 1905, _ibid._, 580 f., No. 6293.] + +[Footnote 632: So Roosevelt asserted to Sternburg. See Sternburg to F. +O., April 1, 1905, _ibid._, 590, No. 6300; Sykes, p. 280; Dennis, pp. +397 f.; Gwynn, Vol. I, chap. xiii; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, p. 322.] + +[Footnote 633: On March 21 Roosevelt declared to Sternburg: “My earnest +wish is that we use as much as possible the four years which stand +before me in office to improve the relations between our countries. I +believe in the German people” (Sternburg to F. O., March 21, 1905, +_G.P._, XIX, 583, No. 6295).] + +[Footnote 634: Bülow to Sternburg, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 592 ff., No. +6302; Bishop, I, 468 f.] + +[Footnote 635: Bishop, I, 469.] + +[Footnote 636: See below.] + +[Footnote 637: In the absence of a regular minister at Tangier, +Tattenbach had remained there after the Emperor’s visit. See Tattenbach +to F. O., April 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 313 f., No. 6610; Bülow to +Tattenbach, April 9, 1905, _ibid._, 315 f., No. 6611. O’Conor, British +ambassador at Constantinople, reported to Lansdowne, May 1, 1905, that +Germany was trying to induce the Sultan to send a mission to Morocco +with a view to establishing closer relations. The Sultan eventually +refused. On Feb. 12, 1906, O’Conor was able to state why. The Sultan had +sent secret emissaries to Morocco, but the Sultan of Morocco became +suspicious and refused either to send a formal mission to Constantinople +or to receive one thence. O’Conor also heard that the Sultan had written +to Abd-el-Aziz recommending the German Emperor as the friend and +protector of Islam whose advice was well worth following. See O’Conor to +Grey, Feb. 12, 1906, _B.D._, III, 248, No. 277. Tardieu states that the +Sultan’s letters to his Moorish colleague were written in Feb.-March, +1906 (_La Conf. d’Algés_, p. 259 n.). Nothing further is known of this +affair.] + +[Footnote 638: No. 6612; Bülow to Alvensleben, March 27, 1905, _ibid._, +277 f., No. 6577.] + +[Footnote 639: Radowitz to F. O., April 12, 1905, _ibid._, 326 f. and +note, No. 6619; Mousset, _La politica exterior de España, 1873-1918_, p. +165.] + +[Footnote 640: Bülow to Monts, April 3, 11, 12, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 295 +f., No. 6594; 318 ff., No. 6613; 322 f., No. 6616; Monts to F. O., April +12, 1905, _ibid._, 324 ff. and notes, Nos. 6617 f. Tittoni, the Italian +foreign minister, had to feel his way carefully. On April 14 he sounded +the Spanish government on its attitude, and was informed that Spain +would remain loyal to her agreement with France and would accept the +conference only if France and Great Britain did (Nicolson to Lansdowne, +April 14, 1905, _B.D._, III, 66, No. 79).] + +[Footnote 641: Bülow to Metternich, April 11, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 605 ff., +No. 6843; Metternich to F. O., April 19, 1905, _ibid._, 608 f., No. +6845. On April 10, however, Radolin reported a statement by Eckardstein, +which he himself seemed to think correct, to the effect that “in case of +a serious Franco-German conflict England would undoubtedly stand +actively on the French side and would even advance with enthusiasm +against Germany” (_ibid._, 607 f., No. 6844).] + +[Footnote 642: By that answer Bülow aimed to show the French government +that “we do not consider separate Franco-German negotiations as adequate +to the situation.” See Radolin to F. O., April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 328 +ff., No. 6621; memo. by Mühlberg, April 19, 1905, _ibid._, 332 f., No. +6623; Bülow to Tattenbach, April 18, 1905, _ibid._, 333 f. and note, No. +6624.] + +[Footnote 643: Bülow to Tattenbach, April 18, 1905, _ibid._, 333 f., No. +6624; Tattenbach to F. O., April 21, 1905, _ibid._, 335, No. 6625; Bülow +to Tattenbach, April 22, 1905, _ibid._, 336 f., No. 6626; Tattenbach to +F. O., April 23, 1905, _ibid._, 337 f., No. 6627; Bülow to Tattenbach, +April 24, 1905, _ibid._, 338, No. 6628.] + +[Footnote 644: On April 3 Balfour repeated his denial in the House of +Commons of the likelihood of a German attack.] + +[Footnote 645: Lee, II, 340.] + +[Footnote 646: Newton, p. 334.] + +[Footnote 647: Radolin to F. O., April 6, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 311, No. +6608.] + +[Footnote 648: Mühlberg to Metternich, April 4, 1905, _ibid._, 604, No. +6840; Metternich to Bülow, April 6, 1905, _ibid._, 604, No. 6841; memo. +by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 311, No. 6608.] + +[Footnote 649: Metternich to Bülow, March 28, April 6, 1905, _ibid._, +601 ff., Nos. 6837, 6841.] + +[Footnote 650: Metternich to Bülow, March 28, 1905, _ibid._, 602, No. +6837; Kühlmann to Bülow, March 19, 1905, _ibid._, 261 f., No. 6562; +Lascelles to Lansdowne, March 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 61, No. 69.] + +[Footnote 651: April 9, 1904 (Newton, p. 334).] + +[Footnote 652: Viscount Grey of Falloden, _Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916_ +(New York, 1925), I, 115.] + +[Footnote 653: Lee, II, 342.] + +[Footnote 654: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 67, +No. 80; Lansdowne to Bertie, April 24, 1905, _ibid._, p. 73.] + +[Footnote 655: Tattenbach to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 348, No. +6639.] + +[Footnote 656: Lansdowne to Bertie, April 22, 1905, _B.D._, III, 72 f., +No. 90; and following documents; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, +II, 248; Grey, I, 106 f.] + +[Footnote 657: Bertie to Lansdowne, April 25, 1905, _B.D._, III, 74 f., +Nos. 92 f.] + +[Footnote 658: The offer was so stated by Monts (Monts to F. O., May 2, +1905, _G.P._, XX, 362, No. 6648).] + +[Footnote 659: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, April 26, 1905, +_L.j., 1901-5_, 215, No. 248; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, May 3, +1905, _ibid._, 217, No. 251; Bourgeois et Pagès, _Les origines et les +responsabilités de la grande guerre_, p. 309. Ben Sliman was Moroccan +minister of foreign affairs.] + +[Footnote 660: On Rouvier see Mévil, pp. 253 ff.; Victor Bérard, _La +France et Guillaume II_ (Paris, 1907), p. 296; Radolin to F. O., April +27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 345, No. 6635; Radolin to Bülow, May 8, 1905, +_ibid._, 373 f., No. 6657. Rouvier’s policy was certainly more in +keeping with French opinion.] + +[Footnote 661: Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _ibid._, 344 f., No. +6635. To Rouvier’s assertion that “France would do everything necessary +to live on the best terms with Germany” Bülow commented as follows: +“Then the French Government should cease its efforts to isolate us, to +break up the Triple Alliance, to incite England against us” (Bülow’s +minute to the foregoing dispatch).] + +[Footnote 662: Radolin to F. O., April 27 and 28, 1905, _ibid._, 346, +No. 6636; 348 f., No. 6640.] + +[Footnote 663: Radolin to Bülow, April 25, 1905, _ibid._, 615, No. +6847.] + +[Footnote 664: Tattenbach to F. O., April 23, 24, 25, 1905, _ibid._, 337 +f., No. 6627; 339, No. 6629; 341, No. 6632; Vassel to Tattenbach, April +21, 1905, _ibid._, 339 ff., No. 6631.] + +[Footnote 665: Bishop, I, 469 ff.; Sternburg to F. O., April 25, 1905, +_G.P._, XX, 342, No. 6633.] + +[Footnote 666: Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 342, No. +6634.] + +[Footnote 667: Bülow to Radolin, April 28, 29, 1905, _ibid._, 346 f., +No. 6637; 349 f., No. 6641.] + +[Footnote 668: Holstein to Mühlberg, April 24, 1905, _ibid._, 339, No. +6630; Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, 1905, _ibid._, 342 ff., No. 6634.] + +[Footnote 669: Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 330 ff., No. +6622. Monts also regarded Delcassé’s offer through Luzzati as signifying +victory for Germany in her Moroccan campaign and as giving the +opportunity “for a definitive friendly agreement with France” (Monts to +F. O., May 2, 1905, _ibid._, 362, No. 6648).] + +[Footnote 670: Tattenbach had on the previous day talked to Lowther, +British minister at Tangier, and had found him strongly opposed to a +conference and in favor of a direct Franco-German settlement (Tattenbach +to F. O., April 29, 1905, _ibid._, 251 f., No. 6642).] + +[Footnote 671: Bülow to Tattenbach, April 30, 1905, _ibid._, 352, No. +6643.] + +[Footnote 672: The article was by Professor Schiemann, who was known to +be in close touch with the German government (reprinted in Schiemann, +_Deutschland und die grosse Politik 1905_, pp. 110 f.).] + +[Footnote 673: Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 347, No. +6638; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 576 ff.] + +[Footnote 674: Bihourd to Delcassé, April 28, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 215, +No. 249.] + +[Footnote 675: Rouvier also assured Radolin that “he disapproved of much +that had happened” and that he himself had taken over the general +control of foreign affairs. It had cost him some effort to save Delcassé +in the Chamber, he said, but he had thought it wiser to do so (Radolin +to Bülow, April 30, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 360 ff., No. 6647).] + +[Footnote 676: Radolin to Bülow, May 1, 1905, _ibid._, 355 ff., No. +6645; Bülow to Radolin, May 1, 1905, _ibid._, 353 f., No. 6644.] + +[Footnote 677: Eckardstein was informed to this effect on May 4, 1905, +by Rouvier’s intimate friend, Armand Levy, a Parisian financier +(Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, +106; Lee, II, 342).] + +[Footnote 678: Radolin to Bülow, May 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 616 f., No. +6848. The King may have put this question to Radolin at the desire of +Delcassé, who was complaining of Germany’s lack of response (Bertie to +Lansdowne, April 27, 1905, _B.D._, III, 68, No. 84). On May 11, 1905, +Lansdowne wrote to Knollys, King Edward’s private secretary, as follows: +“The King’s Mediterranean tour left matters in excellent shape so far as +we are concerned” (Lee, II, 342).] + +[Footnote 679: _Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, No. 4.] + +[Footnote 680: Wilhelm Betzold was an international financier with wide +political connections (Eckardstein, I, 243 ff.). The instructions were +given to Eckardstein, May 4, by Armand Levy, like Betzold, an intimate +friend of Rouvier, just after an interview between the two and the +Premier, Levy had made a note of the various points which he now laid +before Eckardstein, explaining that naturally Rouvier could not speak +directly to him of these delicate affairs but adding that his statements +were “rigorously exact” (Eckardstein, III, 100 ff.). Only Eckardstein’s +account of the interview with Bülow contains anything about the Moroccan +proposal, but there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of his statement +(see also Prince Lichnowsky, _My Mission to London, 1912-1914_ [London, +1918], p. 3).] + +[Footnote 681: Memo. by Holstein, May 2, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 357 ff., No. +6646. Paul von Schwabach’s account of arranging the interview for +Betzold is given in _Berliner Tageblatt_, March 21, 1922. See also Bülow +to F. O., May 5 and 6, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 368 ff., Nos. 6652 f.] + +[Footnote 682: On May 2 the Chancellor also refused to consider +Delcassé’s offer through Luzzati; and when a few days later he heard +that Barrère wished to be sent to Berlin to arrange affairs, he +immediately advised Rouvier that he would not be received. See Bülow to +Monts, May 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 363 f., No. 6649; Radolin to Holstein, +May 8, 1905, _ibid._, p. 372 n.; Bülow to Radolin, May 9, 1905, _ibid._, +372, No. 6656.] + +[Footnote 683: Bülow to Radolin, May 4, 1905, _ibid._, 366 f., No. 6650; +Radolin to F. O., May 8, 1905, _ibid._, 371 f., No. 6655.] + +[Footnote 684: The British and the Russian governments were also +supporting Delcassé. See Radolin to Bülow, May 8, 1905, _ibid._, 373 +ff., No. 6657 f.; Betzold to Eckardstein, May 9, 1905, quoted in +Eckardstein, III, 204.] + +[Footnote 685: Sternburg to F. O., June 2, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 607, No. +6311, Bülow’s minute.] + +[Footnote 686: Radolin to Bülow, May 13 and 16, 1905, _ibid._, 376 f., +No. 6659; 378 f., No. 6661.] + +[Footnote 687: So related by the Spanish Foreign Minister to Nicolson +(Nicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _B.D._, III, 70 f., No. 87). +Although there is no account of the conversation in _G.P._, the language +is entirely in keeping with German policy. The episode referred to the +possible departure of Spain’s new minister in Morocco to Fez.] + +[Footnote 688: So reported by Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, +_ibid._, 71, No. 88. Cf. Bülow to Monts, May 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 363 +f., No. 6649; Bülow to F. O., May 6, 1905, _ibid._, 368, No. 6651.] + +[Footnote 689: Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, May 10 and 16, 1905, +_ibid._, 342 ff., No. 6634; 620 ff., No. 6851; XIX, 600 ff., No. 6306; +Bishop, I, 469 f.] + +[Footnote 690: _Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt +and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918_ (New York, 1925), II, 123. See also +Dennett, pp. 88 ff.] + +[Footnote 691: The President’s statements were so formulated by +Sternburg. See Sternburg to F. O., May 13 and 19, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 622 +f., No. 6852; _ibid._, XIX, 603 f., No. 6308; Dennett, pp. 184 f., 88 +ff., 75 f.] + +[Footnote 692: Tattenbach to F. O., May 15, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 379 f., +No. 6662.] + +[Footnote 693: Tattenbach’s version of the threat was as follows: “The +French Government would consider it an injury to France’s interests if +the French proposals for reform were submitted for consideration to the +signatory Powers. No Power possessed the right to intervene in the +Moroccan affair, especially in the frontier question. . . . . The French +Government would continue to watch sharply the affairs in Morocco, and +reserved the right to act according to circumstances.” See Tattenbach to +F. O., May 17, 1905, _ibid._, 380, No. 6663. Cf. with the original +threat quoted above. See also Tattenbach to F. O., May 31, 1905, +_ibid._, 399 f., No. 6676.] + +[Footnote 694: Bülow to Radolin, May 22, 1905, _ibid._, 382 f., No. +6665.] + +[Footnote 695: Miquel was chosen for this work because he was just being +transferred to St. Petersburg. See Bülow to Radolin, May 30, 1905, +_ibid._, 388 ff., No. 6669; memo. by Miquel, May 30 and 31, 1905, +_ibid._, 393 ff., Nos. 6674 f.] + +[Footnote 696: Bülow to Monts, May 31, 1905, _ibid._, 390 f., No. 6670, +and note citing a dispatch from Monts of June 2, 1905; Mévil, p. 272. +Egerton was informed by Barrère that Monts had said to Tittoni that “if +the French Minister maintained his threat of military measures against +the Sultan of Morocco, a German army would cross the French frontier” +(Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, _B.D._, III, 95, No. 122).] + +[Footnote 697: Tattenbach to F. O., May 28, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 392, No. +6672.] + +[Footnote 698: Bülow to Radolin, June 1, 1905, _ibid._, 392 f., No. +6673; Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 407, No. 6685.] + +[Footnote 699: Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, _ibid._, 401, No. 6678.] + +[Footnote 700: The _Gaulois_ published articles on June 9 and 17, 1905, +asserting that Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck had also been sent by the +German government to Paris about June 1 to warn Rouvier that Delcassé +must be dismissed (Mévil, pp. 273 ff.; Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 310). The +editors of _G.P._ state that this story is “exaggerated”; Donnersmarck +was mentioned only once in the documents, they assert—in a dispatch from +Radolin on June 17, 1905, describing the assertions of Donnersmarck +given in _Gaulois_ as apocryphal (_G.P._, XX, 390 n.). According to +Eckardstein, Rouvier declared to him on May 4 that some time previously +Donnersmarck had asserted to him, apparently at Bülow’s request, that +there were only two possibilities, a Franco-German alliance or war. On +the other hand, Eckardstein saw Donnersmarck in Berlin on June 6 and +found him eager for news from London and Paris (Eckardstein, III, 103 +f., 127 f.). It seems clear that Donnersmarck’s assertions, whatever +they were, were made on his own responsibility; that, as the editors of +_G.P._ state, Bülow issued his warnings directly to Rouvier (_G.P._, XX, +390 n.).] + +[Footnote 701: Nicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _B.D._, III, 70 f., +No. 87; Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _ibid._, 71, No. 88; +Lansdowne to Bertie, May 3, 1905, _ibid._, 69 f., No. 86.] + +[Footnote 702: Durand to Lansdowne, April 26, 1905, _ibid._, 67 f., No. +82; Lansdowne to Durand, April 27, 1905, _ibid._, 68, No. 83. Durand did +not follow that line exactly. He left the impression with Roosevelt that +the Anglo-German opposition was bitter, but that nevertheless Great +Britain did not want Roosevelt interfering—thus letting the latter think +that Great Britain was more bellicose than she was (see above). One +reason for the British government’s slowness about helping Roosevelt +mediate between Russia and Japan was, no doubt, that it wished to +exclude all opportunity for the President to mediate between Great +Britain and Germany. On April 26 Spring Rice asked Roosevelt not to +support the idea of a conference (Gwynn, I, 469).] + +[Footnote 703: Lansdowne added: “I had heard fears expressed that, in +order to put an end to a state of things which could not fail to be +highly inconvenient to them, the French Government might be induced to +purchase the acquiescence of Germany by concessions of a kind which we +were not likely to regard with favour, in other parts of the world. I +had myself no such misgivings, and felt convinced that each side might +continue to rely upon being treated with absolute frankness by the +other. His Excellency [M. Cambon] expressed his entire concurrence in +what I had said.” See Lansdowne to Bertie, May 17, 1905, _B.D._, III, +76, No. 94; Spender, II, 248; _Cambridge History of British Foreign +Policy_, III, 342 f.] + +[Footnote 704: “During our last conversation about Morocco you . . . . +added that . . . . if circumstances demanded it, if for example we had +serious reasons to believe in an unjustified aggression on the part of a +certain Power, the British Government would be entirely ready to concert +with the French Government on the measures to take” (Cambon to +Lansdowne, May 24, 1905, _B.D._, III, 77, No. 95, inclosure).] + +[Footnote 705: Lansdowne to Cambon, May 25, 1905, _ibid._, 77 f., No. +95, and inclosure.] + +[Footnote 706: Bradford, _Life of Wilson_, p. 199. Nothing more was +heard of this order, which probably came from Sir John Fisher. Fisher +was in favor of “Copenhagening” the German fleet and also of landing +soldiers in North Germany in case of a war (_Memories_; Newton, pp. 334 +f.). In 1922, Lord Sanderson wrote as follows concerning the events of +this time: “There were no doubt preparations by our military authorities +for defending Belgium in case of an attack by Germany on France through +Belgian territory, and these preparations must have been known to the +French military attaché in London. There was also a good deal of loose +talk in naval circles and some high quarters of a possible expedition to +Schleswig in the possible event of war. I do not believe such a measure +was ever seriously entertained, and I looked upon the report as put +about for the purpose of a warning” (Sanderson to Temperley, Aug. 17, +1922, _B.D._, III, 87, No. 105).] + +[Footnote 707: Grey, I, 74. The British press supported the French +loyally for the sake of maintaining the balance of power. See O. +Eltzbacher, “The Balance of Power in Europe,” _Nineteenth Century and +After_ (May, 1905); Steed, I, 230 ff. It is difficult to state exactly +what were the British motives for supporting France so whole-heartedly +in this crisis. One has to deduce them from acts, for, unlike the +Germans, the directors of the British policy did not write down their +reasons. As to King Edward’s view of the international situation, +especially of the German danger, see Spring Rice to Lansdowne, D. May 7, +1905, R. May 13, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 77 f., No. 69, and King Edward’s +minute thereto. On July 10 Spring Rice, in a memo. written after talking +with Lansdowne, stated that British policy aimed at maintaining the +balance of power (Gwynn, I, 476).] + +[Footnote 708: Tattenbach to F. O., May 31, June 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, +399, No. 6676; 400, No. 6677; Metternich to F. O., June 8, 1905, +_ibid._, 422, No. 6697; Lowther to Lansdowne, D. May 31, 1905, R. June +3, 1905, _B.D._, III, 88, No. 106; Lansdowne to Bertie, June 1 and 5, +1905, _ibid._, 88, No. 107; 89, No. 109; Lansdowne to Lowther, June 5, +1905, _ibid._, 89, No. 108.] + +[Footnote 709: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 5, 1905, _ibid._, 89, No. 109; +Lansdowne to Durand, June 5, 1905, _ibid._, 90, No. 110.] + +[Footnote 710: Nicolson to Lansdowne, June 29, 1905, _ibid._, 109, No. +136. The editors of _B.D._ promise to publish more information about +this offer in a later volume.] + +[Footnote 711: That treaty read in part as follows: “The two Governments +declare that they will take counsel together upon every question of a +nature to jeopardize the general peace; in case that peace should be +threatened with an aggression, the two parties undertake to reach an +understanding on the measures whose immediate and simultaneous adoption +would be imposed upon the two Governments by the realization of this +eventuality.” See _Livre jaune: L’alliance franco-russe_, p. 16, No. 17, +annexe; Pribram, _The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary_, II, 213; +Bernadotte E. Schmitt, “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902-1914,” +_American Historical Review_, XXIX, 459 f.] + +[Footnote 712: Thayer, _The Life and Letters of John Hay_, II, 404 f.; +Eckardstein, III, 115 ff.; Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _G.P._, XX, +497 ff., No. 6685; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _B.D._, III, 78, +No. 96, recounting a conversation with Delcassé on that date.] + +[Footnote 713: Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 400 f., No. +6678.] + +[Footnote 714: Delcassé’s formal denial of the rumor had no effect. See +Mévil, pp. 284 f.; Flotow to Bülow, June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 406, No. +6684.] + +[Footnote 715: Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 407 ff., No. +6685; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 770.] + +[Footnote 716: Delcassé informed Bertie, June 10, that the Spanish +Foreign Minister “had told him that he thought that Spain, France and +England, should reply to the Government of Morocco in identic terms +declining the proposal” (Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _B.D._, +III, 78, No. 96).] + +[Footnote 717: The report spread in 1905 that at the French cabinet +meeting on June 6 Delcassé had stated that the British government had +offered an alliance to France. Lansdowne and Sanderson denied to the +German government that Great Britain had ever done so. See Metternich to +F. O., June 16, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 630 ff., No. 6858; Metternich to F. +O., June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 635 ff., No. 6860; see also _B.D._, III, 87, +No. 105; Metternich to F. O., Oct. 9, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 663 f., No. +6873. According to Mévil, the official apologist for Delcassé, just +before the arrival of the King of Spain in Paris on May 30, the British +government assured Delcassé that “the British military forces were ready +to march with us [France] against Germany if that Power attacked us. +Moreover, the principle of defensive co-operation once admitted, the +English Government declared itself ready to sign in the shortest time an +accord which would definitely fix that co-operation” (Mévil, p. 268). In +a letter of March 20, 1922, Delcassé wrote as follows: “From the Entente +it was possible for us in 1905 to proceed to a formal alliance with +England. . . . . On June 6th the British offer of assistance had been +only forty-eight hours in my possession” (quoted in the _London Times_, +March 27, 1922). In connection with the Grey-Cambon correspondence of +1912, Poincaré has written: “Thus to make a joint study of the situation +was the sole engagement which was made [in that correspondence]. In +communicating to me the result obtained, M. Paul Cambon wrote me that at +the time of Lord Lansdowne an entente of that kind would have been only +a beginning. Now, however, it was the last word for the Liberal cabinet. +The forced resignation of M. Delcassé had perhaps made us lose in 1905, +stated M. Cambon, the opportunity for a real alliance with England. All +that we were able to obtain today was this engagement to confer in the +presence of danger and this hypothetical approval of the programs drawn +up by the general staff.” See also J. A. Farrer, _England under Edward +VII_ (London, 1922), pp. 127 f.; Mévil, pp. 269 f.; _G.P._, XX, 632 n., +664 n.; Raymond Poincaré, _Au service de la France. Neuf années de +souvenirs: I. Le lendemain d’Agadir, 1912_ (Paris, 1926), p. 221. Later +Lansdowne wrote on his dispatch to Bertie of May 17, 1905, as follows: +“I suppose this was the origin of the offensive and defensive alliance” +(_B.D._, III, 76, No. 94). His inference is probably correct only in +part. The exchange of notes between Cambon and Lansdowne was sent to +Bertie on May 31, 1905, and received by him on June 3. It is not +apparent whether he communicated that exchange to the French government, +although the “offer of assistance” which Delcassé has written of as +having received only forty-eight hours before the cabinet meeting on +June 6 may have been the notice of this exchange from Bertie. Word to +Delcassé through the Governor-General of Algeria from King Edward, who +was then cruising in the Mediterranean, urging the Foreign Minister not +to resign also strengthened the latter’s hand. The King took that step +on his own initiative (Newton, p. 342).] + +[Footnote 718: On that cabinet meeting see the following: Mévil, pp. 293 +ff.; Pinon, _France et Allemagne_, pp. 164 f.; Radolin to Bülow, June +11, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 407 ff., No. 6685; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 8, +1905, _B.D._, III, 91, No. 114; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, +_ibid._, 78, No. 96, recounting a conversation with Delcassé on that +date; Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, pp. 167 ff. Cf. Bertie’s explanation of +Delcassé’s fall (Bertie to Lansdowne, June 15, 1905, Newton, pp. 341 +f.).] + +[Footnote 719: Flotow to Bülow, June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 406, No. 6684; +625, No. 6854. Cf. the report from the Belgian Minister at Paris to his +government, June 8, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 62 f. See also +_Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 770 ff.] + +[Footnote 720: Cf. _Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy_, III, +341.] + +[Footnote 721: Quoted in Lee, II, 344. See also a letter from John Hay, +who was then in London, to Henry Adams, June 7, 1905, quoted in Thayer, +II, 405; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _B.D._, III, 78, No. 96. +Lansdowne’s reaction is expressed in Newton, p. 341.] + +[Footnote 722: Bertie to Lansdowne, June 6, 1905, _B.D._, III, 90, No. +111.] + +[Footnote 723: Bülow’s minute to a dispatch from Flotow, June 5, 1905, +_G.P._, XX, 403, No. 6681.] + + + + + CHAPTER XIII + + THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JUNE 6-JULY 8, 1905 + + +The downfall of M. Delcassé was merely an incident in Germany’s drive +toward a conference. Prince Bülow, believing that the Minister’s +resignation ended the acute phase of the crisis,[724] immediately +dispatched a circular note to the signatory Powers[725] informing them +of Germany’s acceptance of the Sultan’s invitation to a conference and +asking them also to accept. In this note he argued as follows: Since +Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid[726] guaranteed to every Power +the same treatment as the most favored nation, the Moroccan reforms had +to receive the approval of all the signatory Powers. If the proposal for +a conference were refused, the legal status of Morocco would remain +unchanged, for the opposition of one Power alone would suffice to block +the execution of any reforms proposed. But aside from these legal +arguments, the conference was the best means of introducing reforms +without endangering the existing political and commercial interests of +the signatory Powers by concession of special rights to individual +states. Moreover, since the Convention of Madrid was a compact between +the Powers, France would have to obtain their sanction for a special +position in Morocco. While the details of the French program of Moroccan +reforms were unknown, it was evident that France sought, in violation of +Article XVII, to control the land as she did Tunis. Thus, to oppose the +French action was merely to defend the existing legal status of +Morocco.[727] + +The attitude of the Powers toward this exposé was not at all +satisfactory to the German government. The Russian, Austrian, Italian, +Portuguese, and Danish governments evaded a reply, leaving the +initiative to the French and the British.[728] German relations with +Spain over the matter were complicated by reports that while M. Villa- +Urrutia, the Spanish foreign minister, had been in Paris during King +Alfonso’s visit, he had openly aligned himself with M. Delcassé’s +policy. After the French Minister’s downfall, the German government +notified the Spanish government on June 11 that, if M. Villa-Urrutia +remained in office, Germany would recall her Ambassador for an +indefinite leave of absence.[729] While waiting for the Minister to be +overthrown, the German government did not press Spain on the question of +the conference. + +The British attitude was even more adverse. When Count Metternich handed +the German note to Lord Lansdowne, the latter interpreted it as meaning +that “the Conference, if it were to meet, would be expected to deal not +only with the introduction of reforms, but with the maintenance of the +independence and integrity of Morocco, and the preservation of the open +door.”[730] The Ambassador’s affirmative reply enhanced Lord Lansdowne’s +suspicion that Germany was endeavoring to break the Anglo-French +understanding. While questioning strongly the propriety of a conference, +the Foreign Secretary gave no definite answer. This note, however, and +the passing of M. Delcassé caused the British government to recede on +June 8 from its original refusal of the Sultan’s invitation and to +postpone its decision until it could consult with France.[731] But on +June 7, Herr von Flotow reported from Paris a rumor that Great Britain +had offered to France “an offensive and defensive alliance aimed at +Germany” which the latter was still considering.[732] Hence, it was +manifest to the German government that Great Britain was in complete +opposition to its policy. + +President Roosevelt also gave a disappointing reply. On May 25 and 30 +Prince Bülow had told the President that “the decision in the question +of a conference depended to a great extent upon him.” He maintained that +if the conference were refused as a result of Great Britain’s pressure +upon France, Germany would be forced to choose between a war with France +and perhaps Great Britain and an agreement with the former which would +serve as a prelude to a strong Continental _bloc_. Declaring that he was +averse to making the choice, the Chancellor asked Mr. Roosevelt to favor +the conference to the signatory Powers.[733] But the President replied +on June 8 that he could hardly participate in a conference without +exposing himself to the sharpest attacks, since American opinion was +opposed to interfering in the Moroccan affair and inclined to approve +reform by one Power.[734] + +The attitude of M. Rouvier was equally unsatisfactory to the German +government. The Premier expressed to the German representative through +M. Betzold the hope that the fall of M. Delcassé would enable the two +countries to reach a direct understanding, and promised to show the +“greatest conciliation” toward Germany.[735] When the German note of +June 6 arrived, he immediately denied to the Powers the accusations made +therein.[736] He also instructed M. Saint-René Taillandier to suspend +action at Fez so as to avoid complications.[737] He endeavored to find +some way by which Germany could be satisfied, France’s position in +Morocco be preserved and her agreements with the other Powers be upheld, +and the humiliating conference be avoided. On June 7 he protested to +Herr von Flotow that France could hardly accept the conference, which +French public opinion rejected so completely, and remarked that Great +Britain, Spain, and Italy would probably refuse it.[738] Herr von Flotow +replied that Germany would not desert the Sultan. Two days later the +Premier offered through an intermediary to make a general agreement with +Germany not only over the Moroccan question but also over others, such +as those of the Bagdad Railway and far eastern affairs.[739] In a +conversation with the German Ambassador on June 10, M. Rouvier +persisted, in spite of threats, in his repugnance to the conference. Why +go there, he asked Prince Radolin, if Germany refused the reforms in +Morocco which France considered necessary? In the course of his defense +of France’s previous Moroccan policy, he said: “If an understanding +concerning the extension of permissible reforms could previously occur +with Germany, participation in the conference might be possible.” He was +so discouraged that he thought seriously of resigning, for, he declared +to the Prince, he could not defend before the French Chamber the German +demands as then formulated.[740] + +At home Prince Bülow’s policy was encountering disapproval from the +Emperor William II, then in a pacific mood. Toward the end of May the +Emperor had rebuked the German Navy League for criticizing the naval +program as inadequate.[741] On June 3 he had started the movement which +culminated in the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War and was co- +operating with President Roosevelt in that work—an act which Prince +Bülow would have prevented had he been aware of his master’s +intentions.[742] Even though the Emperor knew nothing of the French +offers,[743] he was entirely willing after the fall of M. Delcassé to +gratify M. Rouvier’s wish for an understanding.[744] At the wedding of +the German Crown Prince on June 6 he assured the French representative +that there would be no war over Morocco.[745] + +The beginning of Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace had no effect +upon the German policy, for Russia’s force was broken both by defeat and +by the rapidly developing revolution.[746] But the attitude of France +was so uncompromising and that of the other Powers so unfavorable that +Prince Bülow doubted whether he would succeed in launching the +conference.[747] He endeavored to do so by a show of boldness coupled +with real concessions to France. + +To bring President Roosevelt back into active participation in the +affair, Prince Bülow reported to him the rumor of the British offer of +alliance to France and pictured the possibility of a war with France and +Great Britain “not because we want too much but because we desire +nothing.” The Prince added that if this war did occur, a new Triple +Alliance between France, Great Britain, and Japan, with which Russia +might also be associated, might be formed. To preclude this event he +urged the President to advise the Powers in favor of a conference or to +prevent British participation in a possible Franco-German war brought on +by French aggression in Morocco. By confronting the President with the +choice of facing the outbreak of a new war just at the moment when he +was endeavoring to stop the Russo-Japanese conflict or of supporting the +proposal for a conference, Prince Bülow obtained the desired result. On +June 12 Mr. Roosevelt agreed to advise the French government in favor of +accepting the Sultan’s invitation and against concluding an Anglo-French +alliance.[748] + +At the same time the German government endeavored to restrain Great +Britain. Herr von Holstein asserted to the British Ambassador that “if +any one had told him two years ago that a war between England and +Germany was within the bounds of possibility he would have simply +laughed, but now things had reached such a point that it could no longer +be considered impossible.” Both he and the Chancellor cited the +bitterness of the British press toward Germany and the reported British +offer of a defensive and offensive alliance to France as proofs. Neither +of the two German officials believed that Great Britain would attack +Germany, but they argued that the popular fear of such an aggression in +their country was more plausible than that of a German invasion in Great +Britain. In like manner Sir Frank Lascelles credited Germany with +pacific intentions, but maintained that the British fears were more +justified than the German. Herr von Holstein assured the Ambassador that +“the Moroccan question would not lead to any serious complications,” and +Lord Lansdowne denied that Great Britain wanted war or had offered an +alliance to France. As neither side believed entirely the pacific +asseverations of the other, the tension in Anglo-German relations was +only slightly relaxed.[749] + +While making these efforts with the United States and Great Britain, +Prince Bülow yielded before the French resistance. Although he explained +away the Emperor’s conciliatory remarks to the French government with a +threat and although he warned M. Rouvier not to assume M. Delcassé’s +policy toward Morocco, he repeated his assurances that “the conference +can have no positive results which would injure the French future.” It +was “merely a question of etiquette and of delay,” he said, so that +Germany could hold faith with the Sultan and disengage herself from the +position into which M. Delcassé had forced her. Instead of demanding +that all consideration of the Moroccan question be left to the +conference, the Chancellor offered on June 12 to negotiate over the +program for that assembly if France would first accept the Sultan’s +invitation. In addition, he instructed Prince Radolin to state not +officially, but as his (Radolin’s) personal view, that from the very +nature of the affair the conference would have to adopt as fundamental +“for the present no prejudice to the independence of Morocco . . . . and +. . . . no injury to the prospects of France.” The Ambassador should +state that the items to be considered by that body, as logical +deductions from those two points were: police and military reforms, to +be limited in time and international in character; financial reforms, +likewise to be internationally executed; and the economic opening of the +land in accordance with the principle of the open door. He should warn +M. Rouvier against permitting Algerians to furnish the Moroccan +pretender with contraband supplies; for if the Sultan should request +German mediation in this affair, Germany would give it even at the risk +of grave difficulties.[750] + +When the Ambassador carried out these instructions two days later, he +found M. Rouvier “angry, discouraged, sick” but still defending France’s +Moroccan policy. Nor did the Ambassador’s remarks change his mood.[751] +On June 16, in response to the Premier’s request for further +information, the Ambassador explained unofficially as further logical +deductions from the two fundamental points: first, that the military +reforms should be internationally ordered by a division of the mandate +among the Powers in such a way that France would receive it for the area +along the Algerian frontier; second, that to give an international +character to the financial reforms, a state bank should be organized in +which the capital and management should be divided as equally as +possible among the banks representing the various Powers.[752] The +Premier’s apparent relief at these remarks encouraged the German +government to believe that a solution was near.[753] + +In the meantime, in accordance with Germany’s desires, President +Roosevelt intervened in Paris and London. Notwithstanding his conviction +that France was in the right, he advised her to avoid a war and help the +Emperor “save his face” by accepting the conference. He argued that +British support in case of a conflict would be of little value to +France, and predicted a French victory at the conference. He promised +the French government that if the United States participated, he “would +treat both sides with absolute justice, and would, if necessary, take +very strong grounds against any attitude of Germany which seemed . . . . +unjust and unfair.”[754] + +In handling Great Britain the President took another line. He suspected +her of wishing to make trouble. For he was receiving no support from her +in his mediation between Russia and Japan; he knew that Lord Lansdowne +was opposed to the conference; and, so far as he could tell from the +British Ambassador at Washington, Great Britain was anxious for France +to humiliate Germany by refusing the conference and was willing to face +the possibility of war. He thought this sagacious on her part, but not +valorous; she would be assured a victory on sea, while France would have +to bear the brunt of the battle on land. So he warned Great Britain not +to put difficulty in the way of a peaceful settlement between France and +Germany, and otherwise ignored her.[755] + +Neither Prince Radolin’s conciliatory remarks nor President Roosevelt’s +advice won the French Premier to accept the conference. While deeply +impressed by reports of German threats against France in other +capitals,[756] he inferred from his conversations with Prince Radolin +and from an assertion of the German Ambassador in Madrid that if France +agreed to the conference the German government would then be ready to +commence discussions with a view to an understanding which would make +the conference unnecessary.[757] M. Rouvier was also assured of the +entire support of the British government. On June 16 Lord Lansdowne, in +approving M. Paul Cambon’s returning to Paris to advise the +inexperienced Premier,[758] remarked to the Ambassador that he saw +nothing to be gained + + +by admitting the theoretical necessity of a Conference, except perhaps +to enable Germany, which had brought about M. Delcassé’s downfall, to +secure a further success. Our attitude must of course depend upon that +of the French Government, but if they maintained their refusal, so, most +certainly, should we.[759] + + +The French note to Germany of June 21 was therefore so composed by M. +Paul Cambon as to accept the conference in principle while at the same +time inviting Germany to negotiate further in order to obviate that +assembly—the position which M. Rouvier had taken for two weeks. Since +Prince Radolin’s explanations on June 14 and 18 had been made in such an +unofficial and confidential manner, the Premier did not know whether +they represented the German view or not, and did not mention them in the +note.[760] Hence that document of June 21 ran as follows: + + +The Imperial Government will not fail to recognize the inconvenience +which would result for it as for us from the acceptance of the +Conference without a previous accord, an accord which would not infringe +upon those already concluded and which would not harm in any way the +interests of which the Imperial Government is solicitous. . . . . The +Government of the Republic is deeply impressed by the double +consideration that the Conference may be dangerous if it is not preceded +by an entente, and useless if it follows one. [Nevertheless, the French +government did not refuse the conference.] It desires solely to know +what are, in the mind of the Imperial Government, the precise points +which will be treated at the Conference and the solutions which it will +offer there. + + +Thus they could arrive at the entente which both governments +wished.[761] + +The Premier acquainted the British and American governments with the +contents of the note and of the German threats, and asked them to +recommend this solution to Germany. He emphasized to Mr. Roosevelt +especially the menace of a German attack. Declaring that the President +could avert that danger, he urged him to exert influence with the +Emperor in favor of peace. Mr. Roosevelt immediately agreed to do so in +energetic terms.[762] + +The German reaction was hostile. As the Chancellor realized that the +crisis had arisen in Franco-German relations, he endeavored by a mixture +of enticements and threats to bring the impressionable and pacific M. +Rouvier to accept the German terms.[763] Refusing the French request, +Prince Bülow warned the Premier on June 21, 22, and 23 against resuming +M. Delcassé’s policy and against permitting the Algerians to aid the +Moroccan pretender. While promising the French government “seriously and +loyally” to work for a result satisfactory to all parties and especially +for an understanding with France at the conference, the Chancellor +declared to the French Ambassador: “The situation is serious. With a +little good will and decision we may emerge from it.” But “one should +not play with fire”; “it is a dangerous game which might lead further +than you and I wish.” Threatening to make a defensive alliance with the +Sultan if French policy forced him to, he refused the overture for +negotiation and advised a quick acceptance of the conference.[764] + +The German policy was not as successful as the Chancellor had expected. +By June 21 Italy had, in spite of German pressure, accepted the +conference only conditionally.[765] The British government, loyally +following the lead of France, fully approved the French note (June +23).[766] In Spain, although a ministerial crisis on June 20 had +eliminated M. Villa-Urrutia as Germany had demanded, the new Liberal +government refused Germany’s request for support; it declared on June 25 +that it would remain loyal to the Franco-Spanish accord.[767] +Furthermore, it was apparent that M. Rouvier would not accept the German +demands in their existing form.[768] The Premier was staunchly supported +by the French press, which was quickly coming to credit Germany with the +intention not of making friends with France but of teaching her a lesson +and of setting limits to her foreign policy.[769] More discouraging +still, on June 24 Baron Sternburg telegraphed the following statement +from President Roosevelt: + + +The French Government informs me unofficially . . . . that it has ceased +its opposition to a conference. . . . . It seems as a matter of course +that a program of the conference would be needed in advance in +accordance with the usual custom in such cases. I suggest that that be +arranged between France and Germany. . . . . Let me congratulate the +Emperor warmly on his diplomatic triumph of the first magnitude.[770] + + +The German government retreated. Replying to the French government on +June 24,[771] it asserted the right of the other Powers to participate +in the work of Moroccan reform. It refused to negotiate a program for +the conference beforehand, but admitted “that France has a very +legitimate interest in maintaining order in the territory bordering on +the frontier.” In the verbal explanations made upon the delivery of the +note, the Chancellor, denying that the conference was intended to +procure for Germany a “miserable satisfaction for her _amour-propre_” or +to humiliate France, declared that international reform should be +attempted in Morocco first. Then if this work broke down, he said, “the +future is free,” and “in that future, which is perhaps not so distant, +we shall again be able to become opportunists.” He was profoundly +surprised, he said, that the French note took no cognizance of the +overtures made by the German Ambassador. He urged the acceptance of the +conference so that the two countries might escape from this “perilous +and dangerous situation” into “a path which leads to appeasement, +conciliation, and peace.” + +The Chancellor also instructed Prince Radolin to inform M. Rouvier that +if France accepted the conference, Germany would then be willing to work +out an agreement with her on the bases mentioned previously (June 14 and +18) for a prospective program to be submitted to the Sultan.[772] If the +Ambassador thought that M. Rouvier would refuse to accept the conference +before the program was agreed upon, the Chancellor would permit him to +propose that the French and German representatives work out a program +with the Sultan in Fez. If M. Rouvier refused the conference altogether, +Prince Radolin should warn him that Germany would aid the Sultan against +any French aggressions. The Ambassador was to tell M. Rouvier that the +Moroccan government had made offers to Germany which would insure her a +leading position in that land, but that Germany would refuse them as +long as the possibility of an accord with France remained.[773] + +By June 27 the advantage again shifted to the German side. In Paris the +more anti-British and pro-German element, led by M. Dupuy, owner of +_Petit Parisien_ and an intimate friend of M. Rouvier, was gaining +greater influence. M. Dupuy informed the German Ambassador on June 26 +that M. Rouvier, whom he represented as a rather well-meaning simpleton, +now regretted having dispatched the French note and that he now sought +some phrase by which the German and French views could be harmonized and +the conference accepted. In fact, M. Dupuy stated that he expected the +French government to make the acceptance in a day or so. Both he and M. +Betzold said that the Premier still mistrusted Great Britain.[774] + +Even more valuable for the German government was Mr. Roosevelt’s change +in attitude. When the German government explained to Mr. Roosevelt that +France had not agreed to the conference except under conditions which +Germany had persistently refused,[775] the President immediately advised +France on June 26 to accept unconditionally. He stated that the question +of a program was a minor one, that the important thing was for the +conference to meet. In answer, the French Ambassador protested that in +view of the German Emperor’s erratic temperament France could not go to +the conference + + +without previously having drawn up a program, or at least without an +understanding, indicating that which we might have reason to expect and +guaranteeing in particular that solemn international undertakings, which +have for a long time been public property, should not be brought into +question.[776] + + +Thereupon Mr. Roosevelt proposed the following compromise: “Let France +and Germany go into the conference without any programme or agreement; +but to discuss all questions in regard to Morocco; save of course where +either is in honor bound by a previous agreement with another +power.”[777] + +In reporting to Baron Sternburg what he had done, the President said +that if France and Germany agreed upon this or any other compromise, he +himself would accept the invitation to the conference and would advise +Great Britain to do likewise. On June 27 he offered to telegraph his +greetings to the Emperor William II. He also expressed to the British +Ambassador his strong hope that Great Britain would drop her objections +to the conference.[778] + +The President’s intervention was beneficial to both the French and the +German governments; it brought them into a frame of mind which permitted +a compromise. The German government was elated over his action; for even +though it diminished any hope of breaking the French accords over +Morocco, it did seem to assure a peaceful issue of the crisis by the +acceptance of the conference. Hence Prince Bülow telegraphed to +Washington on June 27 that “if after the acceptance of the conference by +France we negotiate with the French and differences arise, I shall be +ready at all times to support before His Majesty the Emperor that +decision which President Roosevelt recommends as practical and +fair.”[779] + +This success, however, was offset by a report from Baron Eckardstein on +June 27 that M. Delcassé had received an offer of an offensive and +defensive alliance from Great Britain, but that M. Rouvier had refused +to consider it. Within the past ten days, the Baron continued, the +British government had informed the French Premier “that he could rely +upon its diplomatic support under all circumstances, but that if he +wished to make an alliance with England, the English fleet would also +uphold the French policy in case of necessity.”[780] After frankly +repeating those statements to Lord Lansdowne on the following day, Count +Metternich added that “at no moment had the German Government desired to +fasten a quarrel upon France,” as the British seemed to think. Lord +Lansdowne replied that “the language attributed to some of the German +representatives had certainly suggested the idea that it was desired to +do so.” He then made this important statement: + + +. . . . British diplomatic support was assured to the French by the +Anglo-French accord. . . . . As a natural result questions which +concerned that agreement would have been discussed between the two +Governments and proper ways and means conferred upon to maintain intact +the individual points of the accord. The question of an alliance with +France has never been discussed by the British cabinet nor has an +English alliance ever been offered to France. . . . . However, he would +not conceal his belief that in the event that Germany “lightheartedly” +made war upon France, which he considered entirely improbable, it was +not to be foreseen how far British public opinion would force the +Government to support France.[781] + + +To this alarming information was added the report from Paris that the +British were exerting all possible pressure to prevent France from +accepting the conference.[782] Furthermore, when Prince Radolin carried +out his instructions, June 27, M. Rouvier continued to refuse the +conference without a previous understanding. To that end he offered two +proposals. One, a suggestion which he took from a German newspaper, was +that the French and German representatives at Fez work out a program in +co-operation with the Sultan prior to French acceptance of the +conference. The other was that in providing for the international +regulation of the police and financial reforms France should be assured +the right to execute the police reforms along the Algerian frontier +while nothing definite should be stated about the organization of the +police in the rest of Morocco. This agreement, M. Rouvier added, could +become valid as soon as France officially accepted the conference. He +also desired the recall of the three ministers from Fez so as to prevent +complications.[783] + +As already seen, the Chancellor was willing to accept the first +proposal, although, fearing that upon further delay the Sultan might +throw over the project of a conference and undermine the entire German +policy, he preferred some other solution. Since he mistrusted the +Sultan, he refused to recall Count Tattenbach from Fez until the +conference actually met. He also held to his formula of “first +acceptance, then negotiations”; but to counteract the British pressure +he retreated further by agreeing on June 28 for the Premier to declare +publicly that + + +the French Government has dropped its objections to the conference after +becoming convinced from the declarations of Your Highness [Prince +Radolin] that Germany would pursue no goals at the conference which +would stand in opposition to the just interests of France. + + +He refused, however, to permit M. Rouvier to make public anything +further about the German concessions of June 14 and 18.[784] On the same +day he declared to M. Bihourd that once the conference met, Germany +would be freed from her obligations to the Sultan and could follow her +own interests. Let international reforms first be tried in Morocco, he +said; if they failed, Germany would have to consult only her own +interests, among which Morocco occupied “an infinitely small place.” If +France, in conformity with the views of the British government, refused +the conference, there would obtain a condition of _la paix armée_. If +she accepted, there would be “neither victor nor vanquished.”[785] + +Learning that the German government regarded Prince Radolin’s assertions +of June 14 and 18 as official and despairing of any other solution, M. +Rouvier was more inclined to accept the conference. He justified this +course to the British chargé d’affaires on June 28 as follows: + + +He [M. Rouvier] considered that under the conditions a conference was +perhaps the best way of arriving at a satisfactory solution. The Emperor +had made it a point of personal honour: France would go into it with the +support of England, Spain, and possibly Italy, whereas Germany would be +alone; Germany was prepared to admit the preponderance of French +interests on the Algerian frontier. It was absolutely necessary to +arrive at some solution as the present situation was excessively +dangerous. So long as the Conference was not accepted, Germany +considered that she was entitled to a free hand in Morocco, and she was +very very [_sic_] active. She would ask for all sorts of concessions, +ports, cables, etc., and were the Sultan to accede to such demands the +situation both for France and England would become far more critical. +Monsieur Rouvier hinted that once the present difficulties had been more +or less tided over at the Conference, it would be possible to see that +Germany did not get too much in Morocco.[786] + + +Before approving the proposal for a conference, however, M. Rouvier +intended to include in the agreement with Germany some mention of +France’s accords with Great Britain and Spain over Morocco.[787] + +While M. Rouvier delayed, the German government grew apprehensive. +Prince Radolin heard on June 29 that M. Paul Cambon, Sir Francis Bertie, +and the British government were making every effort to prevent the +French acceptance, arguing that Germany was endeavoring to nullify the +Anglo-French agreement. On the next day M. Dupuy informed the Ambassador +that the British “were sitting powerfully on M. Rouvier’s back” to +obstruct it and that Sir Francis Bertie was pressing the French Premier +to make a defensive and offensive alliance with Great Britain. When M. +Cambon reached Paris on June 30, M. Dupuy thought that there was grave +danger of M. Rouvier’s being overthrown.[788] + +In this situation the German government denied on June 30 to the French +government that it meant to question the Anglo-French accord. On the +next day it was prepared to give way still further, but M. Rouvier +accepted the conference.[789] The Premier proposed that he and the +German Ambassador make an exchange of notes and sign a declaration +incorporating the concessions which the German government had made to +France.[790] M. Rouvier then submitted the bases of the agreement to +Lord Lansdowne, who approved them.[791] After much bickering over the +formulation of the agreement, during which a liberal repetition of +German threats mixed with enticements was made, accord was finally +reached on July 8.[792] + +By that agreement Germany promised to pursue no goal at the conference +which would compromise the “legitimate interests” of France in Morocco +or + + +that would be contrary to the rights of France resulting from treaties +or arrangements and harmonizing with the following principles: +sovereignty and independence of the Sultan; integrity of his empire; +economic liberty without any inequality; utility of police and financial +reforms the introduction of which will be regulated for a short period +by way of an international accord; recognition of the situation created +for France with reference to Morocco by the contiguity, over a long +stretch, of Algeria and the Sherifian empire, by the particular +relations which result therefrom between the two neighboring countries, +as well as by the special interest which results therefrom for France +for order to obtain in the Sherifian empire. + + +The two governments agreed to work out a program for the conference +which they would submit to the Sultan for acceptance. The French and +German missions were to be recalled from Fez as soon as the conference +met. Prince Radolin also stated specifically that the Anglo-French and +Franco-Spanish agreements remained untouched by this understanding.[793] + +The French, British, and German presses greeted this accord with relief +and with the sincere hope that the crisis was past.[794] The Powers also +signified their acceptances.[795] + +The agreement marked Germany’s first reverse in her Moroccan campaign. +She had been compelled to recognize France’s special interest in Morocco +and had failed to nullify the French ententes. Germany could have placed +herself on the same basis with reference to France that Great Britain +occupied, both in regard to European and to colonial affairs. Instead, +however, of weakening the Entente Cordiale, instead of making a valuable +colonial accord by accepting the French offers, the German government +had preferred both to keep its promises to the Sultan and to free itself +from those promises by forcing a conference upon an unwilling world. +Caught in the toils of its own tangled policy and determined to have a +share in Morocco even though the German people were uninterested, it had +refused present offers of colonial gain with the hope of bringing about +their renewal in the future. Its virtue, not appreciated by any other +Power, was greater than its common sense. + +Although the German government had receded, it had done so only after +embittering the French nation and arousing it to the united defense of +its national honor. As Ambassador Jusserand wrote to Mr. Roosevelt on +July 11: + + +I leave greatly comforted by the news concerning Morocco. The agreement +arrived at is in substance the one which we had considered and the +acceptation of which you did so very much to secure. Letters just +received by me from Paris . . . . confirm what I guessed was the case, +that is, that there was a point where more yielding would have been +impossible; everybody in France felt it, and people braced up silently +in view of possible great events.[796] + + +Germany’s actions had antagonized M. Rouvier and converted him to the +Entente Cordiale. M. Rouvier remarked to the British chargé d’affaires +as follows: + + +His Majesty [the German Emperor] had expected a complete climb-down to +follow upon the change of direction of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, +but as His Excellency [M. Rouvier] said, there was no reason because he +parted with Monsieur Delcassé that he should throw himself “dans les +bras de l’Empereur et sur son cou.”[797] + + +M. Cambon informed Lord Lansdowne that + + +after all that had happened M. Rouvier was more convinced than ever of +the necessity of maintaining a close understanding with this country +[Great Britain]. It was, in his view, essential that the two Governments +should treat one another with the fullest confidence, and that no +further steps should be taken without previous discussion between us. +While holding this opinion, M. Rouvier thought it desirable to proceed +with caution in dealing with the German Government and thought we should +avoid parading a desire to run counter to them. + + +These assertions met with Lord Lansdowne’s entire approval, for they +signified the success of the British struggle to maintain the Entente +Cordiale and to keep Germany out of Morocco. The Foreign Secretary +assured M. Cambon that Great Britain had no intention of withdrawing her +support. But he added: “. . . . The apparent sacrifice of M. Delcassé in +the face of German pressure had created an unfavourable impression in +this country, and I therefore thought there was a good deal to be said +for M. Rouvier’s view that it would be as well to avoid any action +calculated to bring about fresh complications.”[798] In other words, +Lord Lansdowne intimated that British public opinion would not be so +willing to support France as it had been before that display of French +weakness. + +In spite of this remark, signs were not lacking of close intimacy +between the two countries. On July 12 _Gaulois_ published the +information that at the cabinet meeting on June 6 M. Delcassé had +favored an alliance with Great Britain in order to hold Germany in +check. Without definitely stating so, the article left the impression +that the Foreign Minister had been certain of an alliance.[799] When the +French and British fleets exchanged visits in July and August, the press +compared the visits to that of the Russian fleet to Toulon in 1893 which +had sealed the Franco-Russian alliance.[800] + +The German government was thus furthering that process which it called +Germany’s encirclement and isolation. + + +[Footnote 724: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 418 f., +No. 6692.] + +[Footnote 725: The signatory Powers were as follows: Austria-Hungary, +Italy, Spain, Great Britain, France, Russia, United States, the +Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Belgium, and Germany.] + +[Footnote 726: Art. XVII read as follows: “Le droit au traitement de la +nation la plus favorisée est reconnu par le Maroc à toutes les +Puissances representées à la Conférence de Madrid” (Leon Deloncle [ed.], +_Statut international du Maroc_ [Paris, 1912], p. 51). The French +refused to accept this interpretation of the Convention of Madrid and of +Art. XVII. Tardieu replied to the German arguments as follows: “That +convention aimed to limit at the demand of Morocco the right of +protection of the legations to certain Moroccan subjects which some +Powers tended to abuse. It had regulated the exercise of that right, +determined the conditions of naturalization for the Moroccans, those for +the acquisition of landed property by foreigners, and had established +the basis of the agricultural tax. Concerning general policy or +stipulations about the tariff, not a word. Article XVII, which Germany +invoked as the charter of international equality in Morocco, applied in +reality only to the right of protection. . . . . Article XVII is not a +promise of the Powers among themselves never to touch the diplomatic or +economic terrain. It is a promise by Morocco never to differentiate +between them within the limits of 1880 and within those limits alone, +that is (following the preamble of the convention) in the exercise of +protection” (Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés_, p. 39). Lansdowne also +challenged the German interpretation. “Any rights which other countries +may have to most-favoured-nation treatment in Morocco would not . . . . +preclude the possibility of a privileged position being in certain +respects accorded to France in her dealings with the Moorish Government. +Most-favoured-nation treatment is variously interpreted in different +countries. But no Power has, I believe, ever contended that the +obligation to give such treatment debars one country from invoking the +assistance of another in improving its domestic administration, and it +is obvious that such assistance can be most conveniently and effectually +given when the Power which affords it is the immediate neighbour of that +which receives it, nor was there any desire or intention on the part of +France to deprive other Powers of the rights and privileges to which +they were justly entitled under Treaty” (Lansdowne to Bertie, July 11, +1905, _B.D._, III, 117 f., No. 150; cf. Metternich to F. O., June 6, +1905, _G.P._, XX, 416 f., No. 6690). + +The German interpretation was based upon a loose construction of that +convention while the French interpretation was based upon a strict +construction. Although from a legal standpoint the French view was +correct, yet the precedent of an international conference over Moroccan +affairs, no matter what they were, favored the German argument. +Moreover, the fact remained that France had tried to change the existing +status in Morocco without consulting Powers who had as much right to be +considered as the three with whom she had come to terms.] + +[Footnote 727: Bülow to Flotow, June 5, dispatched June 6, 1905, _G.P._, +413 ff., No. 6687; _L.j., 1901-5_, 230 f., No. 268, annexe.] + +[Footnote 728: Alvensleben to F. O., June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 419, No. +6693; Wedel to F. O., June 6, 1905, _ibid._, 417 f., No. 6691; Monts to +F. O., June 6, 9, 12, 1905, _ibid._, 415 f., No. 6688; 424 f., No. 6699; +435 ff., No. 6709; de Bunsen to Lansdowne, June 8, 1905, _B.D._, III, 91 +f., No. 115; Smith to Lansdowne, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 101, No. 129; +Lansdowne to Goschen, June 21, 1905, _ibid._, 100, No. 127; Egerton to +Lansdowne, June 9, 10, 13, 1905, _ibid._, 94 f., Nos. 119 ff.; Hardinge +to Lansdowne, June 14, 1905, _ibid._, 96, No. 123.] + +[Footnote 729: Bülow to Radowitz, June 10, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 425 f., No. +6701.] + +[Footnote 730: Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 8, 1905, _B.D._, III, 92 f., +No. 117.] + +[Footnote 731: Metternich to F. O., June 6 and 8, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 416 +f., No. 6690; 422 ff., No. 6697 f. King Edward also refused to permit +the Prince of Wales to attend the wedding of the German Crown Prince on +June 6 (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 335 f.). Lowther had communicated +the British refusal to the Sultan when on June 8 new instructions +arrived for him to await further developments. See Lowther to Lansdowne, +June 9, 1905, _B.D._, III, 94, No. 118; Lansdowne to Lowther, June 8, +1905, _ibid._, 92, No. 116.] + +[Footnote 732: The information came from M. Bunau-Varilla, owner of +_Matin_ (_G.P._, XX, 623 f., No. 6853).] + +[Footnote 733: Bülow to Sternburg, May 25 and 30, 1905, _ibid._, 385 f., +Nos. 6667 f.; Bishop, _The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt_, I, 470 +f.] + +[Footnote 734: Sternburg to Bülow, June 8, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 421, No. +6696. Durand reported that Roosevelt had said to Sternburg that “so long +as the French Government object, the United States Government could not +adhere to the proposal for a Conference of the Powers” (Lansdowne to +Cambon, June 6, 1905, _B.D._, III, 90 f., No. 112).] + +[Footnote 735: Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 402 f., No. +6680; Flotow to F. O., June 6 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 404, No. 6682; 425, +No. 6700. In these negotiations Rouvier leaned on the advice of Révoil, +who in June without holding any office was given a desk in the foreign +office (Tardieu, p. 84).] + +[Footnote 736: _L.j., 1901-5_, 230, No. 268; 231, No. 269; 233, No. +271.] + +[Footnote 737: Rouvier to Saint-René Taillandier, June 10, 1905, +_ibid._, 230 f., No. 269.] + +[Footnote 738: Flotow to F. O., June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 420, No. +6694.] + +[Footnote 739: Flotow to F. O., June 9, 1905, _ibid._, 425, No. 6700.] + +[Footnote 740: Bülow to Radolin, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 427 f., No. +6702; Radolin to F. O., June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 430 f., No. 6705; +Rouvier to Bihourd, June 11, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 232, No. 270. +Immediately after that interview Rouvier declared to some of his +friends: “They are putting a knife to my throat. I do not know where +they wish to drive us” (Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, pp. 174 f.).] + +[Footnote 741: Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, p. +92.] + +[Footnote 742: Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1894-1914_, pp. +370 ff.; _G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6193, 6196 f., 6311 ff., 6318; _B.D._, Vol. +IV, chap. xxiii, Part. V.] + +[Footnote 743: The absence of minutes by him to the dispatches during +this crisis points to this fact (also see Eckardstein, +_Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 167). The +Emperor first learned of Rouvier’s offer of a general colonial agreement +at this time in 1907. His comment was as follows: “If I had known of +that, I would have accepted it and the whole stupid conference of +Algeciras would have been avoided” (Brandenburg, _Von Bismarck zum +Weltkriege_, p. 215).] + +[Footnote 744: See the Emperor’s minutes, one of the very few instances +in which they are to be found, to the dispatch from Radolin to Bülow, +June 11, 1905 (_G.P._, XX, 409, No. 6685).] + +[Footnote 745: On this episode see Eckardstein, II, 139 f.; Zedlitz- +Trützschler, _Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof_, p. 174; Bülow to +Radolin, June 10, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 429 f., No. 6704.] + +[Footnote 746: This was General Schlieffen’s opinion. Schlieffen +believed that the condition of the Russian army would grow worse instead +of better. See Bülow to Schlieffen, June 4, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 422, No. +6194; Schlieffen to Bülow, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 423 f., No. 6195.] + +[Footnote 747: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 7, 1905, _ibid._, 418 f., No. +6692.] + +[Footnote 748: Bülow to Sternburg, June 9 and 10, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 421 +f. n.; 626 ff., No. 6856; Bishop, I, 476 f.; Sternburg to F. O., June +12, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 433 f., No. 6707.] + +[Footnote 749: Metternich to Bülow, June 9, 1905, _ibid._, 625 f., No. +6855; Bülow to Metternich, June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 628 ff., No. 6857; +Metternich to F. O., June 15 and 16, 1905, _ibid._, 441 f., No. 6712; +630 ff., No. 6858; Lascelles to Lansdowne, June 12, 1905, _B.D._, III, +79 ff., Nos. 97 f.; Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 82 +f., No. 99. See also Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 335 f.] + +[Footnote 750: Bülow to Radolin, June 12, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 431 ff., No. +6706. The accusation that Algerians were helping the pretender was made +by a German army officer who in June returned from the Algerian border. +Governor Jonnart of Algeria denied it and asserted that the contraband +came, not from Algeria but from the Riff. Although Jonnart’s statement +was undoubtedly correct, yet the report came in so handily that the +German government used it as a weapon of intimidation against France +(_ibid._, Nos. 6724, 6746; _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 275 f., 281, 283 f.).] + +[Footnote 751: Radolin to F. O., June 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 438 f., No. +6710.] + +[Footnote 752: Bülow to Radolin, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 439 ff., No. +6711; Radolin to Rouvier, June 16, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 234 ff., No. +272.] + +[Footnote 753: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 448 ff., +No. 6718.] + +[Footnote 754: Sternburg to F. O., June 17, 1905, _ibid._, 442 f., No. +6713; Bishop, I, 477 f.] + +[Footnote 755: On Roosevelt and Great Britain see Bishop, I, 474 f., 481 +ff., 408; Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, 37 f., 210 +ff.; Sykes, _The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand_, p. 285; +Sternburg to F. O., June 12, 17, 25, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 433 f., No. 6707; +442 f., No. 6713; 473 ff., No. 6738; Lansdowne to Durand, June 16, July +12, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 89, No. 85; 91, No. 87; Spring Rice’s +correspondence with Roosevelt, June-July, 1905, Gwynn, _The Letters and +Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 472 ff.] + +[Footnote 756: Threats by the German ambassadors in Paris, Rome, and +Madrid (_B.D._, III, 97, No. 126).] + +[Footnote 757: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 96, No. 124; +Nicolson to Lansdowne, June 17, 1905, _ibid._, 97, No. 125.] + +[Footnote 758: Barrère, the two Cambons, and Jusserand, all firmly in +sympathy with Delcassé’s policy, were holding Rouvier in line. See +Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, _ibid._, 95, No. 122.] + +[Footnote 759: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 96 f., No. +124. In Rome Egerton was working to hold Italy in line with this policy. +See Egerton to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 94, No. 120.] + +[Footnote 760: Radolin to F. O., June 26, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 484, No. +6745.] + +[Footnote 761: Rouvier to Radolin, June 21, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 235 +ff., No. 273; Radolin to F. O., June 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 452 f., No. +6720. The note was composed mainly by Paul Cambon. See Radolin to F. O., +June 30, 1905, _ibid._, 494, No. 6752.] + +[Footnote 762: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 21, 1905, _B.D._, III, 97 f., +No. 126; Metternich to F. O., June 23, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 463 f., No. +6727; Rouvier to Jusserand, June 23 and 25, 1905, quoted in Bishop, I, +478 ff. Dennis relates that while in France in May, 1926, he heard a +story to the effect that Roosevelt had written to the German Emperor at +this crisis warning him that “it would be a crime against civilization +for Germany to declare war against France.” Dennis was unable to find +any such letter, and presumes that the one thought to have contained +this warning was one from Roosevelt to Sternburg on June 26 [_sic_], +1905 (Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 495). The truth +seems to be that Roosevelt, who had not been so schooled in diplomacy as +to choose his words carefully, spoke to Jusserand as if he would use +such language to the Emperor, and then softened down his words greatly +when he did write to Sternburg. Cf. Jusserand’s letter to Rouvier on +June 25, 1905, with Roosevelt’s letter to Sternburg on the same date, +quoted in Bishop, I, 480 f., 483 ff. Rouvier gave Roosevelt credit for +his acceptance in principle of the conference. The French Premier also +asked Eckardstein to intervene again, but the latter refused since he +was in such bad odor with his government (Eckardstein, III, 147 ff.).] + +[Footnote 763: “Rouvier . . . . we know does not wish a conflict with +us,” . . . . “the Chamber of Deputies wishes above all to avoid war” +(quoted from a dispatch from Bülow to William II, June 22, 1905, _G.P._, +XX, 456, No. 6723). “The sooner we make it clear to him [Rouvier] what +results the French refusal of the conference and the further support of +the pretender must have, the more we diminish the dangers of the +situation” (Bülow to Radolin, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 466, No. 6730). +That the German government was playing with war but did not intend to +start one is also evident from a confidential letter from Holstein to +the editor of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, June 28, 1905, which expresses +completely the nature of the German policy. “. . . . In brief, I +consider the danger of war for Germany at the present moment vanishingly +small. It will be still more diminished if a conviction of our firmness +prevails. We know now for certain that in the last ministerial council +Delcassé declared: ‘Germany will not dare to fight, it is all bluff.’ +This doubt about our determination could have led to a conflict if the +other ministers had shared Delcassé’s views” (reprinted in _Kölnische +Zeitung_, April 2, 1922).] + +[Footnote 764: Radolin to F. O., June 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 457 ff., No. +6724; memo. by Bülow, June 23, 1905, _ibid._, 459 ff., No. 6725; Bülow +to William II, June 22 and 24, 1905, _ibid._, 455 ff., No. 6723; 464 f., +No. 6729; Bülow to Radolin, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 465 f., No. 6730; +Bihourd to Rouvier, June 23, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 240 f., No. 277; +Lansdowne to Lister, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 105 ff., No. 133; +Whitehead to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 108 f., No. 135.] + +[Footnote 765: Monts to Bülow, June 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 454 f., No. +6722.] + +[Footnote 766: Metternich to F. O., June 23, 1905, _ibid._, 463 f., No. +6727; Lee, II, 344; Lansdowne to Bertie, June 21, 1905, _B.D._, III, 97 +f., No. 126.] + +[Footnote 767: Bülow held out prospects of aiding Spain to acquire +Tangier and the surrounding territory in case of a future break-up of +Morocco if Spain would uphold the German policy. The insincerity of the +statement is proved by a letter from Holstein to Radolin on July 2, +1905. In regard to the Moroccan affair he wrote: “We need have no +consideration for the wishes of others, at any rate not for those of +Spain who has never caused other than anger or embarrassment for us.” +See Bülow to Radowitz, June 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 453 f., No. 6721; +Radowitz to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 473, No. 6737; Holstein to +Radolin, July 2, 1905, _ibid._, 503, No. 6757.] + +[Footnote 768: See Rouvier’s reply to the Prince of Monaco, which the +latter immediately handed to the German government (William II to Bülow, +June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 464, No. 6728).] + +[Footnote 769: Eckardstein, III, 147 ff.; report from Paris, June 18, +1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 60; _Bulletin_, June, 1905, pp. 235 ff. +“There appear to me to be indications that the feeling is growing in +France that it is necessary to treat the Morocco question in as +conciliatory a spirit as possible, but that when further demands are +made by Germany they should be met by a firm refusal. . . . . The +feeling of resentment against Germany on account of her present action +is very strong and the spirit of the ‘revanche’ is reawakening; the +French have pulled themselves together wonderfully after their first +panic and they now seem prepared to face calmly the contingency of war +in the future should the pretensions of Germany continue. + +“There is I think no doubt that Monsieur Rouvier could at present +command a very large majority in the Chamber on any question of Foreign +policy, and his efforts to preserve peace by conciliation so far as +conciliation can go without loss of dignity, will only enhance his +position in the eyes of his countrymen, and assure him their unanimous +support in the event of such a policy being rendered impossible” (Lister +to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 107 f., No. 134).] + +[Footnote 770: Sternburg to F. O., June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 466 f., No. +6731; Bishop, I, 482.] + +[Footnote 771: The note was dated June 24, but was handed by Bülow to +Bihourd on June 25 and by Radolin to Rouvier on June 27, 1905. See +Radolin to Rouvier, June 24, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 242 ff., No. 278; +Bihourd to Rouvier, June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 244 f., No. 279; Bülow to +Radolin, June 25 and 26, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 470 f., No. 6734; 472, No. +6736; Bülow to William II, June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 476 ff., No. 6740.] + +[Footnote 772: However, the Sultan and the other Powers should not be +precluded thereby from proposing other matters for the consideration of +that body.] + +[Footnote 773: Bülow to Radolin, June 25, dispatched June 26, 1905, +_ibid._, 470 f., No. 6734.] + +[Footnote 774: Radolin to F. O., June 25 and 26, 1905, _ibid._, 472, No. +6735; 479, No. 6741; Radolin to Bülow, June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 483 f., +No. 6743.] + +[Footnote 775: Bülow to William II, June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 467 ff., No. +6732; Sternburg to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 473 ff., No. 6738; +Bülow to Sternburg, June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 475 f., No. 6739; Bishop, I, +483 f.] + +[Footnote 776: Bishop, I, 485 f.] + +[Footnote 777: Sternburg to F. O., June 26, 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 479 +ff., No. 6742 f.; Bishop, I, 485.] + +[Footnote 778: Sternburg to F. O., June 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 480 f., +No. 6743.] + +[Footnote 779: Bülow to Sternburg, June 27, 1905, _ibid._, 481, No. +6744. Sternburg inadvertently changed the wording of that promise to +read as follows: “The Emperor has requested me [Sternburg] to tell you +that if during the coming conference differences of opinion should arise +between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up +the decision which you should consider to be most fair and most +practical” (Sternburg to Roosevelt, June 28, 1905, quoted in Bishop, I, +487). The latter promise bound the German government more tightly than +did the former, and was to cause it embarrassment later.] + +[Footnote 780: Metternich to F. O., June 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 634 f., +No. 6859.] + +[Footnote 781: Metternich to F. O., June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 636, No. +6860; Lansdowne to Whitehead, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 103, No. +132_a_.] + +[Footnote 782: Radolin to F. O., June 26, dispatched June 27, 1905, +_G.P._, XX, 479, No. 6741.] + +[Footnote 783: Radolin to F. O., June 27, dispatched June 28, 1905, +_ibid._, 485 f., No. 6746.] + +[Footnote 784: Bülow to Radolin, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 487 f., No. +6748; Bülow to William II, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 488 ff., No. 6749.] + +[Footnote 785: Bülow to Radolin, July 1, 1905, _ibid._, 495 ff., No. +6753 and Appendix; Holstein to Radolin, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 490 ff., +No. 6750.] + +[Footnote 786: Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 107 f., +No. 134.] + +[Footnote 787: Lansdowne entirely approved of this suggestion, remarking +that “it [the Anglo-French declaration] might be usefully cited for the +purpose of showing that the policy of both France and Great Britain had +been in favour of maintaining the independence and integrity of Morocco +and preserving commercial equality” (Lansdowne to Bertie, July 1, 1905, +_ibid._, 110 f., No. 137). The rancor back of Lansdowne’s statement is +apparent.] + +[Footnote 788: Radolin to F. O., June 29 and 30, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 492 +ff., Nos. 6751 f.; Lee, II, 344.] + +[Footnote 789: Bülow to Radolin, July 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 495 ff., No. +6753 and Anlage; Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 249, +No. 285.] + +[Footnote 790: Radolin to Bülow, July 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 499, No. +6754; 501 f., No. 6756; Radolin to F. O., July 1, 1905, _ibid._, 499 f., +No. 6755.] + +[Footnote 791: Lansdowne to Bertie, July 1, 1905, _B.D._, III, 110 f., +No. 137.] + +[Footnote 792: On those negotiations see _G.P._, XX, Nos. 6754 ff.; +Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 249, No. 285.] + +[Footnote 793: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 287 f.; _G.P._, XX, Nos. 6767 f.; +_B.D._, III, 115 f., No. 147.] + +[Footnote 794: See Rouvier’s speech in the Chamber on July 10, 1905 +(_Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ [Chambre, July 10, 1905], pp. 2825 +f.). Lansdowne’s speech of acceptance in the House of Lords, July 11, +1905, 4 Hansard, Vol. CIXL, col. 241. Richthofen to Radolin, July 9, +1905, _G.P._, XX, 516 f., No. 6769. The German government prohibited +Jaurès from coming to Berlin to speak before a socialist congress on +July 9, but as the prohibition was based on internal reasons, it had +little effect upon Franco-German relations (Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 104 +f.; _L’année politique, 1905_, p. 388).] + +[Footnote 795: The French and British governments were particularly +anxious for Russia and the United States to attend. See Lansdowne to +Lister, July 6, 1905, _B.D._, III, 114, No. 143; see also _ibid._, Nos. +149 ff., 154, 159 f., 164.] + +[Footnote 796: Quoted in Bishop, I, 488.] + +[Footnote 797: Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 108, No. +134.] + +[Footnote 798: Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, _ibid._, 118 f., No. +152. On June 28 Lowther reported a conversation with Tattenbach in which +the latter gave him to understand that “what he [Tattenbach] desired the +Conference should do, would be to bring about an amendment of the Anglo- +French Convention of April 8th, 1904.” King Edward’s minute to this +dispatch was, “In plain English—Germany ousts France fr[om] Morocco and +puts herself in her place!” See Lowther to Lansdowne, D. June 28, 1905, +R. July 10, 1905, _ibid._, 101 f., No. 191.] + +[Footnote 799: Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 217 f.] + +[Footnote 800: Lee, II, 344 f.] + + + + + CHAPTER XIV + + THE MOROCCAN CRISIS, JULY-OCTOBER, 1905 + + +After Germany had forced France to lay the Moroccan problem before an +international conference, M. Rouvier was no longer willing to give +Germany a share in Morocco. Confident of British support and heartened +by the friendly assertions of the German officials, he hoped to obtain a +general mandate from the conference for executing the military, police, +and financial reforms.[801] Thus resuming the original French policy +toward Morocco, he took steps to fulfil it by way of that assembly. + +Before negotiating with Germany over a program for the conference, M. +Rouvier obtained the approval of his proposals from Great Britain and +Spain.[802] He also felt it necessary to affirm and supplement the +Franco-Spanish agreement of 1904 in accordance with the new situation +and to make certain of Spain’s loyalty at the conference. + +The new government formed in Madrid late in June showed immediately a +more independent spirit toward France than its predecessor had done. +Both M. Montero Rios, the premier, and M. Roman, the foreign minister, +reiterated to the British Ambassador that “the chief aim of their +foreign policy was to be on specially intimate terms with Great Britain, +and to strengthen as far as possible the good understanding at present +existing.” But they established closer contacts with Germany, and +informed the British and French governments that while Spain would abide +by the Franco-Spanish Agreement she had not “abnegated her personality,” +and was free to take any course, in matters outside that agreement, “as +might be dictated by her interests.” Spanish public opinion reflected +the same sentiment. Some elements even wished to use the acceptance of +the conference as an excuse for withdrawing from the Franco-Spanish +agreement entirely. With the help of the British government and the +blunders of Germany, that antagonized Spain, M. Rouvier ironed out the +differences.[803] On September 1 the French and Spanish governments +signed a secret agreement.[804] Its terms were as follows: + +All officers and underofficers charged with the instruction and command +of the native troops in Larache and Tetouan were to be Spanish, while +those in Rabat and Casablanca were to be French. The policing of Tangier +should be intrusted for fifteen years to a Franco-Spanish corps +commanded by a Frenchman. Contraband traffic in arms should be +suppressed by France and Spain, individually in certain areas, co- +operatively in others. The two governments were to work together to the +end that “the participation in the capital and the works of all public +enterprises will be offered to subjects of the two nations.” In the +state bank or in any other institution to be created the presidency +should be reserved to France, while the degree of participation of Spain +should be superior to that of any other Power except France. + + +The two Powers engage to observe this accord even in case where the +stipulations of Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid of 1880 come to +be extended to all economic and financial questions; they will aid each +other before the Sultan . . . . to assure the loyal accomplishment of +all that the present accord stipulates. Moreover, Spain being firmly +resolved to act in complete accord with France . . . . and France +proposing to act in the same way with Spain, it is agreed . . . . that +the two Governments will assist each other and will proceed in common +accord in the deliberations [at the conference] in that which concerns +the stipulations of the convention of October 3, 1904, in its broadest +and most amicable interpretation as well as in that which concerns the +different objects of the present accord. They engage to extend to each +other the most complete pacific aid on all questions of a general order +concerning Morocco in harmony with the cordial and friendly entente +between them with reference to the affairs of the Sherifian Empire.[805] + + +Both governments were well pleased with the terms. The British +government also readily approved them. The transaction marked another +step in drawing the three Powers closer together and in handing Morocco +over to the charge of France and Spain.[806] + +At the same time M. Rouvier began negotiations with the German +government over the program for the conference. The two were at +loggerheads from the start, for the German views of what constituted a +just consideration of France’s interests in Morocco were different from +those of the French. When, late in June, the Moroccan government offered +to give various economic contracts to Germany and to appoint a few +German officers for creating a small Moroccan army, Count Tattenbach was +enthusiastically in favor of accepting the proposals.[807] Prince Bülow +refused, and on July 11 instructed the Minister as follows: + + +As for your further deportment in Fez, . . . . keep in mind that you +will soon have to co-operate with the French representative. We regard +the concessions offered by the Sultan as desirable, but can accept them +only if they are not in contradiction to the future decisions of the +conference. Therefore . . . . delay making a decision about these +offers. . . . .[808] + + +Nevertheless, the Chancellor planned for the conference to divide the +police and military mandate in Morocco among the Powers in such a way +that France would receive the mandate for the frontier region only, +while Germany would receive it for “the western coastal towns from Rabat +south . . . . as suitable for a future German sphere of interest.”[809] +Furthermore, he expected Germany to receive her share of the economic +advantages in the development of the entire land.[810] + +To achieve these ends the German foreign office appointed Count +Tattenbach as its representative at the conference,[811] even though he +was highly objectionable to the French. It also instructed Prince +Radolin on July 10 to inform M. Rouvier either directly or indirectly +that “the desired understanding would be placed seriously in doubt” if +he did not exclude M. Delcassé’s followers, such as M. Paul Cambon and +M. Georges Louis,[812] from influence upon French foreign policy, or if +he should appoint M. Révoil, former governor of Algeria and a reputed +Germanophobe, as a delegate to the conference.[813] Prince Radolin was +also to uphold Tangier as a meeting place for the assembly; for the +German government believed that the anti-French and pro-German influence +of the Moroccans would be more strongly exerted there than in some +European town.[814] When the Ambassador stated his government’s requests +to MM. Dupuy and Léon, both men begged him “not to put the pistol to M. +Rouvier’s breast too sharply.” M. Rouvier was having enough difficulty +with public opinion, they said.[815] The German government asked +President Roosevelt to support its views about M. Révoil and about +Tangier, but this time, after consulting the French government, the +President refused.[816] M. Rouvier chose M. Révoil in spite of German +opposition. Furthermore, asserting that Tangier was a dangerous hotbed +of intrigue, he urged the choice of some European town.[817] By the end +of July the German government was willing to acquiesce, although for +bargaining purposes it reserved its public consent until later.[818] + +It was not M. Rouvier’s determined stand which induced this +acquiescence, but rather the unexpected signing by the German and +Russian rulers of the Björkö treaty of alliance on July 24.[819] This +treaty, which provided for the later association of France in the +alliance, was signed by both sovereigns under the impression that the +Franco-German agreement of July 8 had settled the Moroccan affair and +had cleared the way for a _rapprochement_. In view of this changed +situation Prince Bülow, on July 31, instructed the foreign office as +follows: + + +1. We must reserve the possibility of permitting France a free hand in +Morocco at the moment in which she has to decide about joining the +Russo-German understanding. A better use of Morocco we could hardly find +and that would be by far the most favorable close of our Moroccan +campaign. 2. To attain this we need not relinquish too early our general +position on the Moroccan question. But the French need not believe that +our aim was ultimately to set foot in Morocco. It appears to me more +advisable to permit the Moroccan question to rest for a time rather than +to hasten it. Pushing or threatening at this moment on account of +Morocco would only press France still closer to England and at the same +time cause the Emperor Nicholas to suspect that directly after Björkö he +is to be forced to choose between us and France.[820] + + +In keeping with this policy, Prince Bülow, Baron Richthofen, and Herr +von Mühlberg all absented themselves from Berlin during the succeeding +days, and left Count Pourtales, Prussian minister in Munich, in charge +of the foreign office. As he was not in touch with the negotiations, +Herr von Holstein and Dr. Kriege, the legal adviser, directed affairs. +While the “Grey Eminence” approved the new direction to be given to the +Moroccan policy,[821] he seemed entirely unable to relinquish a stand +once taken or to sacrifice details for the achievement of a larger end. +When his blunders brought him to the point of having to retreat or +fight, he preferred _Machtpolitik_. Neither he nor his chief realized +that some form of settlement of the Moroccan affair was necessary to +allay French and British mistrust, and that their new policy of delay +would prolong the period of crisis. This was particularly the case since +the policy continued to lack unity. Herr von Holstein, Dr. Kriege, the +Emperor, Count Tattenbach—each had his particular addition to make, +whether it harmonized with the whole or not; and the gracious Prince +Bülow, successor to Bismarck, accepted all contributions. + +The most striking example of this lack of harmony was manifested by +Count Tattenbach at Fez. Early in August the news spread that the Count +had been instrumental in persuading the Moroccan government to grant to +the German firm of Bourgeaud-Hansemann on July 30 a contract for +building a mole in the harbor of Tangier at the price of 1,300,000 +marks. It was also rumored that he was aiding negotiations between the +Sultan and a group of German banks for a loan of 10,000,000 marks.[822] + +The French press indignantly accused the German government of double- +dealing. _Le Temps_ noted that Count Tattenbach had been recalled from +Morocco several years before for a similar indiscretion. Germany had +accused France, it said, of wishing to make a second Tunis of Morocco; +but France did not intend to let Germany make a second Turkey of it. It +asked that Germany again deal severely with Count Tattenbach. M. +Clémenceau in _L’Aurore_ spoke bluntly in an article entitled “No +Dupery,” and a few days later, even more strongly in one headed “C’est +trop.” The press also attacked M. Rouvier for permitting the Germans to +hoodwink him. If Parliament had been sitting, his position might have +been precarious.[823] + +These criticisms were undeserved. M. Rouvier had made every effort to +prevent the concessions from being given. Both he and the British +government had tried to block the negotiations as soon as reports of +them came through. When the definite fact of the mole concession became +known, M. Rouvier, supported by Lord Lansdowne, immediately strengthened +his protests to the German government against Count Tattenbach’s +actions. He declared that they infringed upon French rights,[824] that +they were a breach of faith and a violation of the spirit of the accord +of July 8, that they endangered the success of the conference, the +harmony of Franco-German relations, and his own position as minister. It +was not his fault, he said angrily, that Franco-German relations +continued to be strained. He urged that the project for a loan be +blocked, or if this were impossible, that the German government agree to +repayment of the loan with funds from the Moroccan state bank to be +established. The question whether the German or a French firm had a +prior right to the contract for the mole, he asserted, should be left in +abeyance until the conference should regulate the method of granting +contracts for public works.[825] The Spanish government was equally +angry at Germany because of Count Tattenbach’s acts. On August 23 M. +Montero Rios poured out his wrath to the French Ambassador over +Germany’s trampling on Spanish interests in Morocco. It was generally +understood, he said, that Northern Morocco was reserved to Spain. Yet, +he continued indignantly, Germany had acquired concessions in that area +and had obtained a mortgage on the lands around Tangier. + + +Under all these provocations . . . . Spain had to remain mute [so the +British ambassador reported his remarks]. France was the mouthpiece of +the three Powers who were working together to save the situation in +Morocco and His Excellency [M. Montero Rios] expressed an earnest hope +that she would not yield all along the line to German pressure and would +bear in mind what were the modest but real interests of Spain in +Morocco. Señor Montero Rios concluded . . . . by bringing down his fist +upon the table and saying, “we shall not forget what Germany has done to +us on this occasion.” + + +When M. Jules Cambon warned the German Ambassador in Madrid on August 23 +that “it might become necessary for the Powers mainly interested in +Morocco to insist that all concessions recently obtained should be +examined by the Conference before they were finally ratified,” M. +Montero Rios heartily approved and volunteered to speak in like manner +to Herr von Radowitz.[826] + +The German government itself supported the loan in order to strengthen +its hold over the Sultan and to calm his fears about Germany’s separate +negotiations with France. The contract for the mole surprised and +embarrassed Prince Bülow. He reprimanded Count Tattenbach for having +transgressed his instructions and warned him to abide by them in the +future.[827] Nevertheless, he upheld both transactions against the +French complaints. He asserted to M. Rouvier that the negotiations for +the contract had been under way for several months.[828] He claimed that +the loan was not a “loan” but a harmless temporary “advance” which could +be repaid at any time. Repeating the assurances of Germany’s +disinterestedness in Morocco and of friendship for France, the German +government refused M. Rouvier’s suggestions for an understanding about +these two affairs and was unable to comprehend the French +excitement.[829] As M. Rouvier felt that the facts spoke otherwise, the +two governments reached an _impasse_ by the first of September. + +At the same time the two governments came to a deadlock over the choice +of a meeting place and the terms of the program for the conference. +Although M. Rouvier submitted proposals about military and financial +reforms on July 20 and August 1, respectively,[830] Germany did not +reply until August 26. The delay was caused by the necessity of +consulting Count Tattenbach, but the French government and press +suspected that Germany was uneasy about possible defeat at the +conference and was therefore putting France off so as to gain +concessions from the Sultan.[831] In its answer the German government +accepted the main lines of the French proposal, but refused to permit +France to settle directly with Morocco the regulation of the police in +the region of the frontier, and also declined to give way on the choice +of Tangier as a meeting place. The German government planned for the +conference to restrict France’s interest in Morocco to this frontier +region.[832] But, on August 30, M. Rouvier met rejection with rejection. +To permit the conference to decide upon the reorganization of the +frontier region would, he wrote in a note to Prince Radolin, mean +sacrificing an advantage and a right which France had enjoyed for sixty +years.[833] + +On the question of a meeting place M. Rouvier urged the Spanish +government early in August to propose formally to the Powers that the +conference be held in Spain. Thereby he would exert pressure on Germany +to relinquish Tangier. M. Montero Rios was eager to obtain the honor for +his country, but fearing a rejection of the proposal, he hesitated to +make it. Under French and British persuasion, however, he dispatched a +verbal note to France and Germany offering some town in Southwest Spain +for the conference. As the German government made no reply, M. Montero +Rios was “deeply hurt” at the “high-handed and discourteous manner” in +which Germany was treating Spain.[834] + +With affairs so confused, the Chancellor interfered. He sent Dr. Rosen, +the future minister at Tangier, to Paris for direct negotiations. In +reporting this intention to M. Bihourd on September 4, Prince Bülow +expressed in general terms his desire for an entente and spoke of the +mole and the loan as insignificant. But he declared that there was a +line beyond which “German dignity” would not permit him to go and that +if this attempt failed “we would be placed again in the situation which +obtained before the accord of July 8.”[835] + +Dr. Rosen, who was entirely unfamiliar with the history of the +negotiations when he started to Paris, soon concluded that a change of +policy was necessary. In France he found that both government and people +were mistrustful, fast becoming embittered, and yet strongly desirous of +a speedy settlement of the controversy. On September 8 he telegraphed to +the Chancellor his opinion that the German government had already given +assurances to France which entitled her to expect that the regulation of +the frontier region would be excluded from the deliberations of the +conference, and that to move her from this view would require “the +speech of cannons” and not “juristic deductions.” He therefore proposed +to regard this point as lost and to prevent France from spreading her +influence further into Morocco by obtaining an exact definition of the +limits of the frontier region. On the choice of a meeting place, he +advised making concessions after all else was settled; the contract for +the mole he would handle as a “bagatelle.” He foresaw greater difficulty +in regard to the loan, which the French considered an act of duplicity; +but he stated to Prince Bülow that he would endeavor to uphold it even +though he regarded as untenable the German distinction between a “loan” +and an “advance.”[836] + +Dr. Rosen’s opinion, which Prince Radolin had held for some time, turned +the scales. “As it appears to me,” wrote the Chancellor to Baron +Richthofen on September 8, “we need above all to extricate ourselves +from this Moroccan affair, which has apparently become confused, in such +a way as to maintain our prestige in the world and to preserve the +German economic and financial interests intact as much as possible.” He +accepted Dr. Rosen’s proposals. Germany should yield on the questions of +the frontier and the meeting place, and France on those of the mole and +the loan.[837] + +The ensuing negotiations, carried on by Dr. Rosen mainly with M. Révoil, +were replete with dramatic moments.[838] By September 16, the two men +reached agreement on most of the points. But when Dr. Rosen learned from +M. Révoil that France expected to obtain at the conference a general +mandate for the financial and police reforms in the whole of Morocco, he +made the concession on the frontier question contingent upon an official +French disclaimer of that intention.[839] + +M. Rouvier rejected this demand. He offered several times to compensate +Germany for her renunciation in Morocco by including other questions in +the negotiations, such as those of the Bagdad and the Camerun +railways.[840] Dr. Rosen declined to broaden the basis of the +negotiations, however, and threatened to break them off (although in +reality he had no intention of doing so) if the French persisted in +their denial of his request.[841] When the French press began to attack +Germany, the Chancellor warned M. Rouvier repeatedly that “if the French +imagine that they can intimidate us or even publicly humiliate us, they +are playing a dangerous game which can lead to war.” Conditions were +much as they had been three months before.[842] Then the sudden +intervention of M. Witte changed the situation. + +Returning from Portsmouth, where he had represented Russia in the +negotiations for peace with Japan, M. Witte stopped in Paris to arrange +a loan for Russia. In discussing the project with M. Rouvier, he was +told that France could not consider the loan until the conflict with +Germany was settled.[843] Since he was interested in a quick solution of +the Moroccan difficulty and since he favored a _rapprochement_ between +Russia, Germany, and France against Great Britain,[844] M. Witte +discussed matters with his friend Prince Radolin on the morning of +September 23. Immediately after this conversation M. Witte saw the +French Premier, and at the latter’s request returned that afternoon to +urge the French views upon the German Ambassador. M. Rouvier was +willing, M. Witte said to Prince Radolin, to give verbally the most +formal declaration that he would not seek a mandate for Western Morocco +at the conference, but since M. Rouvier believed that French public +opinion would never accept a written one, he would rather resign than +give it. Germany was sufficiently protected against that possibility in +any case, the Premier had argued to M. Witte, by the requirement of +unanimity in the conference. M. Rouvier had also promised, said M. +Witte, to co-operate harmoniously with Germany at the assembly. M. Witte +found a sympathetic listener in Prince Radolin, who was disgusted with +Dr. Rosen’s policy. When later in the same afternoon the Prince, Dr. +Rosen, and M. Rouvier met for further discussion, the Ambassador openly +supported the French side. Hence Dr. Rosen had to yield.[845] + +From Paris M. Witte went to Germany. At Berlin on September 25 he +persuaded the Chancellor to accept M. Rouvier’s views;[846] and at +Rominten on September 27-28 he was even more successful with the Emperor +William II, who immediately telegraphed to Prince Bülow as follows: + + +Bring Rosen to reason so that that disgusting quarreling in Paris will +cease. I am completely fed up on it . . . . [_Ich habe es gründlich +satt_]. France must now . . . . be shown friendship and be permitted to +save her face so that she will remain without rancour and will complete +the turn necessary to bring her into our alliance.[847] + + +As a result of M. Witte’s intervention, the two Powers reached an +understanding on September 28.[848] They agreed that the program for the +conference should provide for police reform and the suppression of +contraband traffic in arms by way of an international accord, except in +the frontier region where the execution of that action should remain +“the exclusive affair” of France and Morocco. A Moroccan state bank +should be created, the Moroccan monetary system be stabilized, and funds +be advanced for paying the police and for carrying out certain urgent +public works. Improved methods of collecting the customs and of raising +revenues should be provided. The Sultan should engage not to alienate +any public service to the profit of particular interests. The principle +of adjudication without regard to nationality should be followed in +giving contracts for the construction of public works. The conference +should meet at Algeciras in Spain. In a supplementary understanding the +French government acknowledged the German “loan” to be an “advance”; +but, while the control of that transaction should remain in German +hands, the French banks were permitted to furnish one-half the sum +necessary.[849] The German government also agreed that an investigation +of the relative rights of the French and German firms to the contract +for the mole should be made, although it was tacitly understood that the +German firm would win.[850] + +To make doubly sure that, apart from this agreement, France would have +her hands free at the conference, M. Rouvier made the following +declaration to the German government: + + +Aside from the agreement to be signed between the two governments, I am +not bound on any point. I renew my affirmation that I have to the same +degree as the Imperial Government the desire to avoid all open discord +between us at the conference and to co-operate in effecting the +solutions that respect best the interests and _amours propres_, in such +a way that there will be neither victor nor vanquished. . . . . The +guarantee for Germany lies in the fact that, since the decisions of the +conference must be unanimous, her opposition will suffice to prevent the +general mandate from being given to us.[851] + + +M. Rouvier thereby changed the statement transmitted by M. Witte to +Prince Radolin that France would not strive for a mandate for Western +Morocco to a less binding one which would leave France free to seek a +mandate if she thought that Germany could be coerced into agreeing. This +ambiguity was to cause trouble later. + +The Sultan’s approval of this program was obtained with some difficulty. +The monarch and his advisers were very diffident about reforms and +feared what the outcome of the conference might be. They besieged Count +Tattenbach with questions about the program, wanting to know why Morocco +had been excluded from the negotiations, what the various clauses in it +would result in, whether France would after all succeed in her object by +way of the conference. Count Tattenbach, who was practically unsupported +by the French Minister, replied that Morocco could not survive without +reforms, that Germany would defend Morocco’s independence and integrity. +As none of the Sultan’s advisers would shoulder the risk of approving +the program to their master, Count Tattenbach had to do so. By October +22 he succeeded in his work. On December 1 the Sultan issued a circular +letter inviting the signatory Powers to the conference.[852] The +invitations were accepted. + +On September 29, in reporting the conclusion of the Franco-German +agreement, Dr. Rosen mentioned to his government for the first time the +offers which M. Rouvier had made to include in the settlement the +difficulties over the Bagdad and Camerun railways. Prince Bülow was +immediately eager to open negotiations. + + +At the present time we must use every opportunity to create solidarity +of interest between France and us [he instructed the foreign office on +the next day]. Under the present circumstances every African agreement +with France is useful to us. Naturally far more useful would be an +understanding over the Bagdad Railway. We must always take into +consideration the inclination of the English to come to terms with +Russia over Asia Minor, whereby we would eventually be placed in the +dilemma of suffering a defeat on the question of the Bagdad Railway or +of arousing acute antagonism between Russia and us. + + +But, the Chancellor added, Germany must not show undue eagerness in the +matter.[853] + +When Prince Radolin broached the subject to the French Premier on +October 18, the latter replied that he had offered “an even more far- +reaching agreement” at a time when he had hoped to settle the Moroccan +affair without a conference, but that under the circumstances he would +consider the project only after the conference.[854] That the Chancellor +could have expected any other reply showed how little understanding he +had of the French state of mind. + +Prince Bülow manifested the same obtuseness in an interview with M. +Tardieu of _Le Temps_ on October 3 as a bid for friendlier relations +with France. Repeating all the German criticisms of the French policy, +the Chancellor declared: + + +I think that the conference, far from dividing us, ought to contribute +to a _rapprochement_ between us. For that _rapprochement_, however, one +condition is necessary: that French public opinion thoroughly recognize +that the policy of isolating Germany is an object of the past. . . . . +Today as yesterday, provided your colonial policy respects our +commercial interests . . . . we will not obstruct you, but in case of +need will aid you in Morocco and elsewhere. + + +He denied that Germany sought to force upon France an anti-British +policy and that Germany had any ulterior motives in her friendship with +Russia. He summed up the international situation as follows: + + +A double system of alliances, both pacific, assures equilibrium in +Europe. On those alliances we can and must superimpose friendships. You +are friends with Italy: nothing is better. We are friends of Russia: it +is perfect. But we must not give to the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_ +an anti-German character or to the Russo-German _rapprochement_ an anti- +French character.[855] + + +In spite of the Chancellor’s attempt at conciliation, French public +opinion did not like the “schoolmaster” tone of his remarks and saw +therein “the proof that the Moroccan incident had been only a pretext to +intervene in the direction given to France’s foreign policy and to force +France to modify it.”[856] In fact, not a single French newspaper spoke +well of the German policy.[857] Rather, _Le Matin_ took occasion on +October 5 to publish revelations to the effect that at the crucial +French cabinet meeting of June 6 M. Delcassé had declared that + + +England was ready, whatever might happen, to aid France if the latter +were the object of an unforeseen and improbable aggression. [It was +further asserted in the article that] England, in effect, informed the +Government of the Republic verbally that if France were attacked, she +was ready to mobilize her fleet, to seize the Kiel Canal, and to land +100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. The French Government was even told +later that if it so desired, that offer would be made in writing.[858] + + +The reports were denied by M. Delcassé and by the French and British +governments.[859] But the _London Times_ and the French press believed +the first part of the revelations, although the _Times_ regarded the +latter part as gossip.[860] + +In Germany these revelations provoked an outburst of indignation. Still +at odds with King Edward VII, the Emperor wanted to recall Count +Metternich for an indefinite leave of absence unless the British +government gave a satisfactory explanation of the disclosures.[861] But +Prince Bülow knew that the Emperor’s suggestion could not be carried out +merely on the basis of newspaper talk. In fact, he did not believe that +the revelations were accurate.[862] Still he seized the opportunity to +relieve his own position with German public opinion by giving +instructions for the German press to accept the revelations as true. By +these means M. Delcassé should be represented as having used the +Moroccan affair to bring on a war with Germany, while Great Britain +should be accused of inciting the French to unleash a world-war. The +press should state that Germany had never thought of attacking France, +of drawing France to her by force, or of playing France against Great +Britain. “It is important that the German public understand how grave +the international situation is, how necessary it is to be armed, and how +wretched, in view of the seriousness of the world situation, party +conflicts and the usual Philistine pettifogging appear.” By so using the +press, the Chancellor wrote, “we embarrass our enemies in England and +bring advantage to our naval proposals.”[863] Moreover, on October 26, +when the Emperor dedicated a statue to Field-Marshal Count Moltke, he +declared: “How we stand in the world you have seen. Therefore, the +powder dry, the sword sharp, the goal known, the forces braced, and the +pessimist banished, I drink to our nation in arms.”[864] + +Here were the fruits of two months and a half of tedious and irritating +negotiations. Starting with the assurance that the conference would meet +and that the reforms would be internationally executed, Germany ended +with the same assurance, a half-share in a loan of 10,000,000 marks and +a petty contract for a mole. She began with the intention of winning +France for the sake of completing a continental alliance with Russia; +but by her blundering mismanagement of the Moroccan affair she ruined +any chance for doing so. In June the victorious Germany had confronted a +France fearful of war and subject to pressure. Since then Germany +herself had been constantly receding before the determination of a +united French nation. In June M. Rouvier had endeavored to “save +France’s face”; by September, Prince Bülow was trying to “save Germany’s +face.” The tables were turned. + + +[Footnote 801: Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 249, +No. 285.] + +[Footnote 802: It was Lansdowne’s suggestion that Spain be included. See +Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12 and 13, 1905, _B.D._, III, 118 ff., Nos. +152 f.; Cambon to Lansdowne, July 20, 1905, _ibid._, 121 f., No. 157; +Lansdowne to Manneville, July 21, 1905, _ibid._, 122, No. 158.] + +[Footnote 803: Nicolson to Lansdowne, D. June 29, 1905, R. July 10, +1905, D. July 1, 1905, R. July 10, 1905, July 7 and 11, 1905, _ibid._, +109 f., No. 136; 111 f., No. 138; 114, No. 144; 116, No. 148; Lansdowne +to Nicolson, July 8, 1905, _ibid._, 114 f., No. 145; Lansdowne to +Bertie, July 12, 1905, _ibid._, 119, No. 152.] + +[Footnote 804: Nothing is known of these negotiations. See Vidal, _La +politique de l’Espagne au Maroc_, pp. 172 ff.; Mousset, _La politica +exterior de España 1873-1918_, pp. 162 f.; Tardieu, _Revue des deux +mondes_, Dec., 1912, p. 640; _La Conf. d’Algés._, pp. 58 ff., 156.] + +[Footnote 805: The accord is reprinted in _Archives diplomatiques_, CXX +(1911), 15 ff.] + +[Footnote 806: Lansdowne to Lister, Aug. 30, 1905, _B.D._, III, 131, No. +173; Cartwright to Lansdowne, Sept. 4 and 7, 1905, _ibid._, 136, No. +175; 137 f., No. 177; Cambon to Lansdowne, Sept. 6, 1905, _ibid._, 136 +f., No. 176; Lansdowne to Cambon, Sept. 9, 1907, _ibid._, 138, No. 179.] + +[Footnote 807: Tattenbach to F. O., June 16, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 444 f., +Nos. 6714 f; Tattenbach to F. O., June 23 and 25, 1905, _ibid._, pp. 524 +f. n.] + +[Footnote 808: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19 and 20, 1905, _ibid._, 448 +ff., No. 6718 f.; Bülow to Tattenbach, July 11, 1905, _ibid._, 524 ff., +No. 6774.] + +[Footnote 809: Tattenbach to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, p. 525 n.; +Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19, July 11, 1905, _ibid._, 450, No. 6718; 525 +f., No. 6774.] + +[Footnote 810: Tattenbach had visions of persuading the Sultan to +transfer his residence from Fez to Marrakech where he would be under +German influence after Morocco was divided, and where Germany could then +secure the appointment of Germans as the Sultan’s military instructors +(Tattenbach to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, p. 525 n.).] + +[Footnote 811: Bülow to Tattenbach, July 11, 1905, _ibid._, 524, No. +6774.] + +[Footnote 812: Georges Louis was the political director of the French +foreign office.] + +[Footnote 813: Richthofen to Radolin, July 10, 1905, _ibid._, 521 f., +No. 6771; Holstein to Radolin, July 10, 1905, _ibid._, 523, No. 6772.] + +[Footnote 814: Mühlberg to Wedel, July 13, 1905, _ibid._, 526 f., No. +6775; Bülow to William II, Aug. 3, 1905, _ibid._, 537, No. 6786. This +choice was also desired by the Moroccan government for its own +convenience (Lowther to Lansdowne, July 24, 1905, _B.D._, III, 123, No. +161).] + +[Footnote 815: Radolin to F. O., July 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 527, No. +6776.] + +[Footnote 816: Bussche-Haddenhausen to F. O., July 25 and 30, 1905, +_ibid._, 528 f., No. 6778; 529, No. 6779; Bishop, _The Life and Times of +Theodore Roosevelt_, I, 488.] + +[Footnote 817: His view was actively supported by the British +government. Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, _B.D._, III, 119, No. +152; Lansdowne to Lowther, July 28, 1905, _ibid._, 123, No. 163.] + +[Footnote 818: Bülow to William II, Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 537, No. +6786.] + +[Footnote 819: See next chapter.] + +[Footnote 820: Bülow to F. O., July 31, 1905, _ibid._, 531 f., No. 6782. +Holstein expressed the same opinion.] + +[Footnote 821: Holstein to Bülow, July 26, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 468 ff., +No. 6223.] + +[Footnote 822: The loan was proposed to the German banking house, +Mendelssohn & Co., by an English firm in Tangier, Moses Pariente, in +April, 1905. A syndicate of German banks, among them the Bleichröder +group, the Mendelssohn group, the Disconto Gesellschaft, the Berliner +Handels-Gesellschaft, was formed to make it. The loan, under negotiation +during the summer and early autumn of 1905, was concluded on Oct. 4, +1905 (Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, p. 306). It +was a purely temporary one to be guaranteed by some of the Sultan’s +personal property in land, a fact which alarmed the French even more +because it denoted a possible German design to acquire possession of +territory in Morocco. On the matters of the mole and loan see the +following: Chérisey to Rouvier, Aug. 1, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 260, No. +295; Saint-Aulaire to Rouvier, Aug. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 267 f., No. 304; +note signed by the French and German representatives, Sept. 28, 1905, +_ibid._, 307 f., No. 352; Holstein to Radolin, Aug. 14, 1905, _G.P._, +XX, 540 ff., No. 6789; Pourtales to Radolin, Aug. 19, 1905, _ibid._, 542 +f., No. 6790; _Bulletin_, Aug., 1905, p. 299.] + +[Footnote 823: Radolin to Bülow, Aug. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 549 ff., +Nos. 6794 f.; Lister to Lansdowne, Aug. 2 and 15, 1905, _B.D._, III, +126, No. 167; 128 f., No. 170.] + +[Footnote 824: A French firm had been surveying and making estimates for +some months with a view to obtaining that same contract as well as other +contracts for the improvement of the Moroccan harbors. The French +claimed that by Art. XXXIII of the contract between the Sultan and the +French consortium of banks in the previous year the latter had been +given a priority right to make all future loans to Morocco.] + +[Footnote 825: Rouvier to Radolin, July 29, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 254 +f., No. 292, and following documents; Bülow to Radolin, Aug. 3, 1905, +_G.P._, XX, 533 ff., No. 6784, and following documents; Lansdowne to +Whitehead, Aug. 1, 1905, _B.D._, III, 125 f., No. 166; Lansdowne to +Lowther, June 23 and 26, July 19 and 31, 1905, _ibid._, 100, No. 128; +101, No. 130; 120 f., No. 155; 124 f., No. 165.] + +[Footnote 826: So Cambon informed Cartwright (Cartwright to Lansdowne, +Aug. 24, 1905, _ibid._, 130, No. 172).] + +[Footnote 827: Mühlberg to Tattenbach, Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 535 f., +No. 6786.] + +[Footnote 828: Tattenbach and Kühlmann both supported the contract for +the mole, which, it was found, the Emperor had also approved. See +Holstein to Radolin, Aug. 18, 1905, _ibid._, 540, No. 6789; telegram +from Tattenbach, June 25, 1905, _ibid._, p. 525 n.; Lowther to +Lansdowne, June 23 and 25, July 19 and 31, 1905, _B.D._, III, 100, No. +128; 101, No. 130; 120 f., No. 155; 124 f., No. 165.] + +[Footnote 829: Bülow to Radolin, Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 533 ff., No. +6784, and the following documents. Also Bihourd to Rouvier, Aug. 1, +1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 260 f., No. 296; note handed by Radolin to the +French government, Aug. 4, 1905, _ibid._, 262 f., No. 298 and following +documents.] + +[Footnote 830: Rouvier to Radolin, July 20, Aug. 1, 1905, _L.j., +1901-5_, 253 f., No. 290; 253 f., No. 294; 256 ff., No. 294; Radolin to +F. O., July 20, Aug. 2, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 528, No. 6777; 532 f., No. +6783.] + +[Footnote 831: Lister to Lansdowne, Aug. 15, 1905, _B.D._, III, 128, No. +170.] + +[Footnote 832: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 537 f., No. +6787; Mühlberg to Tattenbach, Aug. 6, 1905, _ibid._, 538 ff., No. 6788; +Bülow to Radolin, Aug. 22, dispatched Aug. 24, 1905, _ibid._, 544 ff., +No. 6792; Radolin to Rouvier, Aug. 26, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 283 ff., +No. 323; memo. by Kriege, Sept. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 554 ff., No. 6798.] + +[Footnote 833: Rouvier to Radolin, Aug. 30, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 290 +ff., No. 331; Radolin to Bülow, Aug. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 549 ff., No. +6794; Radolin to F. O., Aug. 31, 1905, _ibid._, 552 ff., Nos. 6796 f.; +papers communicated by M. Geoffray, Sept. 1, 1905, _B.D._, III, 131 ff., +No. 174. In one matter during August the German government had, to its +embarrassment, to support France. The Moroccan government seized +illegally an Algerian subject. With the approval of the Powers, the +French government demanded and soon obtained his release. See _L.j., +1901-5_, Nos. 301 ff.; _G.P._, XX, 552 n.; 559, No. 6801; _B.D._, III, +138, No. 178.] + +[Footnote 834: Cartwright to Lansdowne, Aug. 8 and 24, 1905, _B.D._, +III, 127 f., No. 169; 130, No. 172; Leon y Castillo, _Mis Tiempos_, II, +253.] + +[Footnote 835: Bülow to Radolin, Sept. 4, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 557, No. +6799; 558 f., No. 6801; Bihourd to Rouvier, Sept. 4, 1905, _L.j., +1901-5_, 297 f., No. 339.] + +[Footnote 836: Memo. by Kriege, Sept. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 554 ff., No. +6798; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 8, 1905, inclosing a telegram from Rosen, +_ibid._, 559 ff., No. 6802; Radolin to F. O., Sept. 9, 1905, _ibid._, +563 f., No. 6804. Radowitz acknowledged on Sept. 7 to Jules Cambon that +Germany would defend the selection of Tangier “only for form’s sake” +(Cartwright to Lansdowne, Sept. 7, 1905, _B.D._, III, 138, No. 178).] + +[Footnote 837: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 8, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 562 f., No. +6803; Richthofen to Radolin, Sept. 10, 1905, _ibid._, 564 ff., No. 6805; +Richthofen to Bülow, Sept. 10, 1905, _ibid._, 566 f., No. 6806.] + +[Footnote 838: On these negotiations, apart from the references cited +below, see Bertie to Lansdowne, Sept. 24, 1905, _B.D._, III, 140, No. +182; Lansdowne to Bertie, Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 140 ff., No. 183.] + +[Footnote 839: He demanded an exchange of notes to the following effect: +“Neither France nor Germany will propose exclusive candidatures to +execute the military reforms at the conference. It is understood that +for the execution of the reforms (except in the frontier region) Germany +and France will remain on a basis of equality.” See Radolin to Bülow, +Sept. 16, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 568 ff., No. 6808 and following documents; +Radolin to F. O., Sept. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 577, No. 6817.] + +[Footnote 840: Radolin to F. O., Sept. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 593 f., No. +6833.] + +[Footnote 841: Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 16, 1905, _ibid._, 568 ff., No. +6808.] + +[Footnote 842: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 18 and 19, 1905, _ibid._, 571 ff., +Nos. 6810 ff.] + +[Footnote 843: Witte, _Memoirs_, p. 416.] + +[Footnote 844: See below.] + +[Footnote 845: Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 23, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 503 f., +No. 6241; Rosen to Bülow, Sept. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 579 ff., No. 6819 and +following documents; also Witte, pp. 416 ff. Cf. Tardieu, _La Conf. +d’Algés._, p. 77.] + +[Footnote 846: Bülow to William II, Sept. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 505 +ff., No. 6243.] + +[Footnote 847: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508, No. 6245; +William II to Bülow, Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 6246; Witte, +pp. 417 ff.] + +[Footnote 848: Witte’s claim in his memoirs to have prevented a Franco- +German war was hardly justified. Germany did not intend war, but only +intimidation (Witte, pp. 424 f.).] + +[Footnote 849: The German government in turn admitted that this +“advance” did not place in question the right of preference of the +French banking consortium to make loans to Morocco.] + +[Footnote 850: The accord is given in _L.j., 1901-5_, 307 ff., Nos. 351 +f.; _G.P._, XX, 592, No. 6832; _B.D._, III, 142 ff., No. 184; 146 f., +No. 188.] + +[Footnote 851: Rouvier to Bihourd, Sept. 25, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 305 +f., Nos. 349 f.; Radolin to F. O., Sept. 26, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 589, No. +6828; Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, pp. 44 f. In December, M. Louis told +Bertie that the German government had replied to Rouvier’s declaration +by asserting that “though bound by their Agreement, they [Germany] +reserved to themselves the faculty of supporting in the Conference any +proposals made by another Government which they might consider good” +(Bertie to Grey, Dec. 15, 1905, _B.D._, III, 158, No. 195). There is no +reference to this statement in _G.P._] + +[Footnote 852: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 357 f., 362 ff., 367, 313 ff.; +_G.P._, XXI, Nos. 6889 ff., 6898; _B.D._, III, Nos. 165, 186 ff.] + +[Footnote 853: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 30, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 595, No. +6834; Richthofen to Bülow, Oct. 6, 1905, _ibid._, XXV, 196 f., No. 8622; +Bülow to F. O., Oct. 7, 1905, _ibid._, 197, No. 8623. It was at this +time that the question of including France in the alliance made at +Björkö was coming to the fore (Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, p. 136).] + +[Footnote 854: Radolin to F. O., Oct. 18, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 596 f., No. +6836.] + +[Footnote 855: Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 497 ff., Radolin to +F. O., Sept. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 593 f., No. 6833; Bülow to F. O., +Sept. 30, 1905, _ibid._, 594 f., No. 6834.] + +[Footnote 856: Quoted from the report of the Belgian Minister at Paris +to his government, Oct. 14, 1905 (_Zur europ. Politik_, II, 72). See +also the article by De Caix in _Journal des debats_, quoted in _Quest. +dipl. et col._, XX, 500.] + +[Footnote 857: _G.P._, XXI, 16, No. 6901.] + +[Footnote 858: Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 500 f. The +revelations were made by Stéphane Lauzanne, a journalist. Lauzanne +denied that he had received his information from Delcassé. He stated +that he had written the articles three months ago. See Lister to +Lansdowne, Oct. 11, 1905, _B.D._, III, 83 f., No. 100; Bertie to +Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 84, No. 101. His assertions were in +the main corroborated by two other French journalists, Eugène Lautier +and Alexandre Ular, in _Figaro_, Oct. 13, 1905, and by Jaurès (_G.P._, +XX, 666 n.).] + +[Footnote 859: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 504; Lascelles to Lansdowne, +Oct. 15, 16, 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 84 ff., Nos. 102 ff.; Metternich to +F. O., Oct. 9, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 663 f., No. 6873.] + +[Footnote 860: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 500, 503 f.; Mévil, _De la +Paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 269 ff. n.] + +[Footnote 861: Bülow to F. O., Oct. 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 666, No. +6876.] + +[Footnote 862: Bülow to F. O., Oct. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 667 f., No. +6877.] + +[Footnote 863: Bülow to F. O., Oct. 10 and 12, 1905, _ibid._, 664 f., +Nos. 6874 f.] + +[Footnote 864: Schulthess, _1905_, p. 127.] + + + + + CHAPTER XV + + THE TREATY OF BJÖRKÖ AND ITS ANNULMENT + + I + + +By forcing France in July to submit the Moroccan question to an +international conference, the German government asserted its power and +restored its country’s prestige; but it had had to employ means which +could not often be repeated with impunity. The future of Germany’s +international position remained uncertain. While the Entente Cordiale +had become firmer, the Triple Alliance was still unsteady and +unreliable. King Edward and his nephew, the Emperor William, were having +one of their numerous quarrels.[865] The German government believed +positively that in case of a Franco-German war Great Britain would +actively support France.[866] Although relations with President +Roosevelt and with Russia remained intimate, these close friendships did +not give Germany the security and power which she had enjoyed before the +conclusion of the Entente Cordiale. Then suddenly, out of a clear sky, +came the possibility of Germany’s becoming master of the situation +again. The Emperor William and Czar Nicholas arranged a meeting at +Björkö, and the Emperor requested that a copy of the projected Russo- +German treaty of the previous autumn be sent to him. + +In the latter half of July the Emperor and the Czar were both cruising: +the one in the Baltic Sea, the other in the Finnish Gulf. As it was the +hope of both the Chancellor[867] and the Emperor that a meeting with the +Czar might occur during these cruises, William II suddenly telegraphed +to his cousin on July 18 that he would shortly pass the entrance to the +gulf. “Should it give you any pleasure to see me . . . ., I of course am +always at your disposal.” Nicholas immediately replied: “Delighted with +your proposal. Would it suit you meet at Bjoerkoe-sund . . . .? . . . . +Look forward with intense pleasure to seeing you.” Upon receiving this +answer the Emperor requested Prince Bülow to send him the draft. + +The Chancellor, who was at Norderney at the time, forwarded the request +to Herr von Holstein. While he was dubious about the affair, he wrote to +Herr von Holstein that the meeting would at least be a useful means of +keeping in close touch with Russia and finding out something about her +future foreign and internal policy. Germany could not intervene in favor +of Russia during the peace negotiations, he stated, but it would be +advantageous to engage the Czar so far that M. Witte and Count Lamsdorff +would be unable to prepare for a Franco-Russo-British entente +immediately after peace was established.[868] + +Herr von Holstein’s long replies to the Chancellor were not very +hopeful. The final draft of the treaty of the previous autumn was +acceptable, he thought, if the clause added by Russia—“Their entente +cordiale will also hold in the case of difficulties which may arise at +the time of the negotiations of peace between Russia and Japan”—were +omitted. In fact, he was willing to accept a change in Article I making +the alliance valid in case of an attack by two Powers instead of by one. +He no longer believed it necessary for Russia and Germany to be in +complete accord before negotiations with France were begun, because M. +Rouvier’s cabinet would not “so absolutely oppose Germany’s joining [the +Dual Alliance] as Delcassé had,” and because, as Russia was more +dependent upon France for loans than she had been six months previously, +she would take no step without the latter’s approval. Herr von Holstein +expected M. Witte, Count Lamsdorff, the mother and wife of the Czar, and +the French government to oppose the project and to favor an Anglo-Russo- +French grouping. In his opinion almost the only reason for Russia to +prefer a German alliance to the other grouping was that it could be +concluded in time to be of value to Russia in the forthcoming +negotiations for peace with Japan. Herr von Holstein therefore advised +that if the treaty were concluded it be published immediately. Fearing +rejection of the German proposal by Count Lamsdorff and an exploitation +of the Russian refusal, he wished the Emperor not to take the initiative +in proposing an alliance, at least until Nicholas II manifested a desire +to pursue a common policy with Germany. Herr von Holstein’s telegrams +formed the basis for the instructions sent to the Emperor on July +22.[869] + +The story of Björkö is one of drama and mystery. The two sovereigns +agreed that their meeting should be kept secret until it occurred; and, +although the news immediately leaked out in the Russian press, the +company on the Emperor’s yacht did not know where it was going or for +what purpose. The rulers met, July 23-24, in Björkö Bay, far away from +civilization, with only the sea and the forest-clad shore around them. +The Emperor prepared himself for the interview by lifting up his hands +and asking God to guide and aid him, or at least not to aid the Czar. +When his yacht steamed into the bay, the Czar had already arrived. The +Emperor immediately went on board the “Polar Star.” After a touching +exchange of embraces the two monarchs withdrew for a long conversation. +“Willy” found “Nicky” feeling discouraged, forlorn, and friendless +except for him; and Count Lamsdorff was not there to give him backbone. +The gathering force of the Russian revolution, the defeat by Japan, +anger at Great Britain and France, and deep appreciation for the +friendly attitude of Germany and William II toward him and his country +during their troubles had prepared this weak monarch to throw himself +into the arms of the far stronger, confident, and brilliantly seductive +Emperor. As William II asserted later, the Czar was in a mood to +subscribe to almost anything. + +In the first conversation between the two rulers[870] they both relieved +themselves of their anger at Great Britain and King Edward VII. Nicholas +II was particularly enraged at the British, whose unfriendliness toward +Russia during the current war was fresh in his mind. When he described +King Edward as “the greatest mischief-maker and most insincere as well +as the most dangerous intriguer in the world,” the Emperor agreed with +him heartily. King Edward “has a passion to begin something with every +Power, to make ‘a little agreement,’” said William. The Czar replied as +he struck the table with his fist, “Well I can only say, he shall not +get one from me, and never in my life against Germany or you, my word of +honor on it.” When they brought up the Moroccan affair, the Czar, +pleased with the Franco-German agreement, strongly seconded the +Emperor’s hope that out of that agreement a permanent understanding with +France might develop. When the Emperor remarked that “in spite of +English incitements France has absolutely refused to go to war with us +[Germany], and so has shown that she will no longer fight for the sake +of the lost provinces,” Nicholas II replied incisively: “Yes that I saw, +it is quite clear the Alsace-Lorraine question is closed once for all, +thank God.” As they were going on deck again the Czar once more embraced +the Emperor and thanked him for coming.[871] + +That night the two groups celebrated together until daybreak. During the +festivities some of the Russian officials in close touch with their +master spoke openly in favor of a Continental alliance. The Emperor +therefore concluded that the ground was prepared for his project. Before +going to breakfast with the Czar and Grand Duke Michael the next +morning, William II opened his _Losungen der Brüdergemeinde für +1905_[872] upon the following text: “Each will receive his reward +according to his work.” So, full of hope, he put a copy of the treaty in +his pocket and set out. He found the Czar in the same mood as before. +They spoke of the Anglo-French fraternization, behind which the Emperor +suspected lay a “little agreement.” The Czar’s head drooped in +dejection. “That is too bad,” he grieved. “What shall I do in this +disagreeable situation.” “I felt that the moment had come,” wrote the +Emperor later to Prince Bülow, in reporting this interview. + + +Since the ally has preserved the policy of the free hand and of +reinsurance without consulting or informing the Czar [he said to +Nicholas II], it is quite permissible for him . . . . to do the same. +How would it be if we also made a little agreement? We discussed one in +the previous winter, but it failed because of Delcassé and tension with +France. Now that is all past, we shall be good friends with the French. +So does not every obstacle fall? “Oh yes to be sure, I remember well, +but I forgot the contents of it, what a pity I havent got it here.” I +possess a copy which by chance I have in my pocket. The Czar seized me +by the arm, drew me into his father’s cabin, and closed all the doors. +“Show it me please.” The dreamy eyes sparkled. I drew the envelope from +my pocket, unfolded the sheet on the writing desk of Alexander III +before the pictures of the Czar’s mother, between photographs from +Fredensborg and Copenhagen, and laid it before the Czar. He read the +text once, twice, thrice. . . . . I prayed the dear God to be with us +and guide the young ruler. It was deathly still; only the sea murmured +and the sun shone joyfully and clear in the cozy cabin, and directly +before me lay the Hohenzollern and high in the morning air waved the +imperial standard. I was just reading the letters on the black cross, +God with us, when the Czar said, “That is quite excellent. I quite +agree!” My heart beat so loudly that I could hear it. I pulled myself +together and said casually, “Should you like to sign it? It would be a +very nice souvenir of our entrevue.” He read it once more and replied, +“Yes I will.” I opened the ink-well, extending to him the pen, and he +wrote with a firm hand “Nicolas.” Then he passed it to me, I signed it, +and as I arose he, deeply moved, folded me in his arms and said, “I +thank God and I thank you, it will be of most beneficial consequences +for my country and Yours; You are Russia’s only real friend in the whole +world, I have felt that through the whole war and I know it.” Tears of +joy stood in my eyes—to be sure the sweat poured from my brow and +back—and I thought of Frederick William III, Queen Louise, Grandfather +and Nicholas I. Were they near at that moment? At any rate they saw it +all and were overjoyed. + + +The terms of the treaty were as follows: The Czar and the Emperor, “to +assure the maintenance of peace in Europe, have agreed upon the +following articles of a treaty of defensive alliance.” Article I read: +“In case one of the two Empires is attacked by an European Power, its +ally will aid it in Europe with all its forces on land and sea.” +According to Article II, “The high contracting parties engage not to +conclude a separate peace with a common enemy.” Article III was as +follows: “The present treaty becomes valid as soon as peace is concluded +between Russia and Japan and will remain valid until it is denounced a +year in advance.” By Article IV the Czar agreed “after the coming into +force of the treaty” to take “the steps necessary to initiate France +into the accord and to associate herself in it as ally.”[873] + +Thus the act was accomplished. How was it possible? The Emperor’s +explanation was simple and satisfying—God did it.[874] For he was +present, as were various spirits and shades of dead and departed +kinsmen. A humble and depressed Czar and an inspired Emperor with his +_Losungen der Brüdergemeinde_, tears and sighs and embraces, many a +dainty dish and flask of old wine, many a satisfying outburst of anger +at absent enemies—no wonder the Björkö treaty was signed! + +The Emperor had visions of illimitable possibilities for the alliance. +On July 27 he wrote to Nicholas II as follows: + + +In times to come it may not be impossible that even Japan may feel +inclined to join it [the alliance]. This would cool down English self- +assertion and impertinence, as she is her ally too. The 24th of July +1905 is a cornerstone in European Politics and turns over a new leaf in +the history of the world; which will be a chapter of peace and goodwill +among the great Powers of the European Continent, respecting each other +in friendship, confidence and in pursuing the general Policy on the +lines of a community of interests. The moment the news of the new +“groupement” will have become known in the world, the smaller nations, +Holland, Belgium, Danmark, Sweden, Norway will all be attracted to this +new great centre of gravity, by quite natural laws of the attraction of +smaller bodies by the larger and compacter ones. They will revolve in +the orbit of the great block of powers (Russia, Germany, France, +Austria, Italy) and feel confidence in leaning on and revolving around +this mass. The dual Alliance combining with the Triple Alliance gives a +Quintupel Alliance, well able to hold all unruly neighbours in order, to +impose peace even by force, if there should be a power hairbrained +enough to wish to disturb it.[875] + + +Notwithstanding this optimism, the treaty caused difficulty from the +start. The absence of a countersignature by the Chancellor was not +considered serious.[876] But against the advice of Herr von Tschirschky, +the representative of the foreign office on the cruise, the Emperor had +without consulting the Chancellor introduced very important changes in +the draft of the treaty. In the first article he had added the words “en +Europe,” while he had re-worded the third article so that the alliance +should not become effective before the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese +War.[877] Prince Bülow was very dubious about the value of the treaty +after those changes were made, particularly the change in Article I, +“because in Europe,” he wrote to Herr von Holstein, “Russia can be of no +use at all to us against England.” He requested the latter’s advice +before acting.[878] + +Herr von Holstein approved decidedly of the treaty even in its changed +form, although he regretted that the Emperor had not obtained more while +the Czar was so pliant. He said that the treaty should be kept +absolutely secret.[879] Otherwise he feared that Great Britain and +perhaps also France would seek to prolong the Russo-Japanese War with +the result that the Czar would be deposed, and that Great Britain, if +she had aggressive plans, might hurriedly attack Germany before the +alliance came into operation. He thought that the suspensive clause was +especially disadvantageous to Germany in that the treaty, if effective +at once, would have a calming effect upon any bellicose spirit on the +part of both France and Great Britain. Moreover, he believed that France +could be brought to join the alliance at the time; whereas if the action +to bring her in were postponed, she would align herself more closely +with Great Britain. The inclusion of the phrase “en Europe” he also +regretted as being advantageous only to Russia. + + +In case of an Anglo-German war, Russia need not advance against India. . +. . . But even with the best will Russia will not be able to help us in +Europe. . . . . The only positive value from the changed treaty is the +assurance that Russia can no longer enter the Quadruple Alliance.[880] +The circle around Germany can no longer close. That is something. But we +could have obtained more and we must expect that the publication of this +treaty will cause little disquietude in England and will not be +considered as a great success of German diplomacy.[881] + + +The Chancellor regarded the inclusion of the suspensive clause as an +advantage under the circumstances; but he had grave objections to the +inclusion of the phrase “en Europe.”[882] When he telegraphed these to +the Emperor, the latter replied that he had made the change “after ripe +deliberation” in order to prevent Germany from being obliged to aid +Russia in Asia. He did not believe possible an attack by Russia on +India, nor did anyone else, he stated. The advantage from the treaty +lay, not in the expectation of any active help from Russia in case of a +war with Great Britain but rather in the assurance that Germany would +enjoy full freedom and security on her eastern frontier, that she would +be able to throw all her forces against one front, that is, France, +instead of against two—“naturally provided France mobilizes to help +England, which is not impossible.” He and General Moltke looked upon the +situation in this way: + + +If England declares or otherwise begins war with us, you [the +Chancellor] must immediately send dispatches to Brussels and Paris with +a demand to state within six hours whether for or against us. We must +immediately march into Belgium no matter what the reply. As to France it +depends upon whether she remains neutral,—which I do not consider +entirely impossible even if the probability is small;—in that case the +Russian _casus foederis_ does not enter into effect. If she [France] +mobilizes, that is a war-threat against us in favor of England, and then +the Russian regiments must march with ours. . . . . It should eventually +be considered whether France could not be offered as an enticement for +good behavior toward us perhaps a part of Belgium as compensation for +the lost provinces.[883] + + +The Chancellor fully approved the Emperor’s remarks concerning Belgium; +but neither he nor Herr von Holstein thought that it would be possible +to permit French neutrality in case of a British attack on Germany.[884] +Nor was he convinced by the Emperor’s other arguments. He continued to +regard the inclusion of the phrase “en Europe” as “pernicious.” He +declared that he could not uphold the treaty before the German people +unless Russia were bound to give aid in both Asia and Europe, and sought +ways of bringing about a change to that effect.[885] While he had +accepted the treaty at first and had congratulated the Emperor upon +achieving it, and while he had thought that there was plenty of time in +which to eliminate the objectionable phrase,[886] he suddenly reversed +his attitude. On August 3 he stated that he could not accept the +responsibility for the treaty in the present form or for bringing about +the necessary changes. He therefore offered his resignation.[887] + +Knowing that he had his master in a quandary, since German public +opinion was already complaining about too much imperial initiative in +foreign affairs, the Chancellor apparently did not expect his +resignation to be accepted. He continued as before to seek means of +altering the treaty without ruining it entirely.[888] And, as a matter +of fact, the Emperor collapsed, agreed to anything, and on August 11 +wrote a hysterical letter to his Chancellor. + + +I thought that I had worked and had accomplished something special for +you. Then you send me a couple of cold lines and your resignation!!! +Please excuse me, dear Bülow, from depicting the condition of my soul to +you. To be so treated by my best, most intimate friend, without giving a +single plausible reason, has been such a fearful blow to me that I have +completely collapsed and fear a grave nervous sickness. You say that the +situation has become so serious because of the treaty with “en Europe” +that you cannot assume responsibility; before whom? And in the same +breath you believe that before God you can assume responsibility of +deserting your Emperor and master to whom you have sworn fidelity, who +has loaded you with love and honors, your fatherland and, as I believed, +your truest friend, in the situation regarded by you as critical and +serious!? No, dear Bülow, that you will not do! We have both been called +by God and created for each other to work for our dear German +fatherland. If in your opinion a graver situation has really been made +by my error—which I do not believe—, it has been done with the best +intentions. You know me well enough to recognize that. Your person is +100,000 times more valuable to me and our country than all the treaties +in the world. I have immediately taken steps with the Czar which shall +weaken or eliminate those words. Do not forget that you sent me to +Tangier against my will in order to achieve a success in your Moroccan +policy. Read my telegrams before the visit to Tangier. You have admitted +to me yourself that you were so anxious that when you received the +announcement of my safe departure you had a nervous fit of weeping. For +your sake because the fatherland needed it I landed, mounted a strange +horse in spite of my crippled left arm, and the horse nearly caused my +death—all of which was your affair! I rode through Spanish anarchists +because you wished it and your policy would profit thereby! and now you +want abruptly to desert me, when I have done everything—and, as I +honestly believe, far more—for you, because my situation appears to you +too serious. Bülow, I have not deserved that of you. No, my friend, you +remain in office and with me and shall continue to work with me _ad +majorem Germaniae gloriam_. You plainly owe me that because of my +service this year. You can and dare not forsake me. Therewith your whole +policy of this year would be disavowed by you yourself and I blamed +forever. That I cannot survive. Grant me a few days to rest and collect +myself before you come, for the nervous excitement caused by your letter +is too great, I am now unable to argue in quiet. . . . . I appeal to +your friendship for me, and let us hear no more of your intention to +resign. Telegraph me “all right” after this letter; then I shall know +that you will remain! For the morning after the arrival of your +resignation will find the emperor no longer alive! Think of my poor wife +and children![889] + + +How were the mighty fallen! The Chancellor had won, and of course +telegraphed “All right.” + +In the meantime various proposals to eliminate the phrase “en +Europe”[890] were being combated by Herr von Holstein, who feared that +the opponents of the treaty in Russia, particularly Count Lamsdorff, +might use such opportunity to propose changes on their side, to annul +the treaty entirely, or at least to undermine its prestige. He wrote: + + +The treaty even in its present crippled form is still too valuable to +risk in hazardous play. Its value lies in the crushing effect which it +will have upon France and in the indirect reaction through France upon +England. . . . . Through the inclusion of “en Europe” and through the +introduction of the suspensive article, the value of the treaty is +lowered 50 per cent. But this 50 per cent remains to us and should not +be risked. + + +He urged against proposal for a change until time for the treaty to come +into effect or until the Emperor and the Czar had another meeting. +Prince Bülow acceded to these views.[891] + + + II + + +Occurring at a crisis in world-affairs, when the Moroccan difficulty was +still unsettled, when the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace were +about to begin, when the choice of a king by Norway was not yet made, +the news of the unexpected and secret interview at Björkö caused a furor +in the diplomatic world and in the press.[892] Especial alarm was shown +by the British, jealous and mistrustful as they were of Russo-German +intimacy. The English press suspected the German Emperor of seeking the +Norwegian crown for a Hohenzollern and of endeavoring to close the +Baltic Sea to all except the Baltic nations.[893] Sir Francis Bertie, +British ambassador at Paris, was reported to have remarked that Germany +seemed to harbor Napoleonic tendencies, which Great Britain would oppose +as she had the original ones.[894] Mr. Spring Rice, after consulting +Lord Lansdowne, wrote to President Roosevelt as follows: + + +The most serious aspect of the question is the general balance of power +in Europe. . . . . Two of the great powers have practically disappeared +so far as active intervention in European affairs is concerned, Russia +and Austria. Germany is by far the most powerful of the remaining +powers, and she has an old feud to settle with France. If France is +attacked, there is no Russia to help her and the English Army is at +present practically negligible for a continental campaign. If France is +forced to accept German hegemony, England remains the only independent +great power, and we are in much the same position as during the +Napoleonic wars. We consider it therefore our duty to prepare for +contingencies. + +. . . . Of course, nobody here, except the small body of hot-heads who +exist everywhere, desires to attack Germany. Our interest in peace is +supreme and in fact perhaps too dominant. But we all have an +uncomfortable feeling that always and everywhere we encounter the fixed +and determined hostility of Germany, and that, when opportunity offers, +this hostility will take an active form.[895] + + +Late in July, forthcoming British maneuvers in the Baltic Sea were +suddenly announced in the press without any previous notification to the +various governments. Following so closely after the meeting at Björkö, +that announcement had a sinister significance which the Russian and the +German presses interpreted as a warning to their countries that Great +Britain was still mistress of the seas and that no change should occur +against her will. Germany feared a British attack and, without an +adequate fleet, felt herself defenseless.[896] + +The British press denounced these fears as preposterous. In the House of +Commons, Earl Percy, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, +declared on August 3 that “the situation in Europe presented no special +cause for anxiety” and would present even less cause if certain +“irresponsible persons were not perpetually attributing to this country +Machiavellian motives of which we were quite innocent and who were +always imagining that we could not enter into arrangements with one +country for mutual convenience without having a hostile intent against +some other country.”[897] Lord Lansdowne immediately explained to the +German and Russian governments that the lack of notification had been an +oversight; he denied that the maneuvers were intended as a demonstration +in any way.[898] + +As neither side wanted trouble, this explanation cleared up the +difficulty. The press became calmer and the visit of the British fleet +to Swinemünde and Neufahrwasser, August 27-September 1, was used by both +the British and the Germans for demonstrations of good will.[899] Yet +the fact that for the first time in years the British fleet was +practicing in the Baltic was not without significance. Furthermore, King +Edward VII was still at odds with the German Emperor. In August and +September, with the approval of his government, he refused to meet his +nephew until Franco-German relations improved.[900] And at some time in +August the British government learned from a member of the German +Emperor’s party at Björkö that at that meeting William II had seemed +nervous and preoccupied, that he had been seized by sudden fits of +talkativeness and of silence, and that he had advocated his ideas of a +coalition of Germany, Russia, and France to the exclusion of Great +Britain. Lord Lansdowne’s comment to that information was as follows: +“The description of the Kaiser’s language and demeanour fills me with +disquiet. What may not a man in such a frame of mind do next?”[901] + + + III + + +When the report reached Paris on July 23 that the interview at Björkö +was to occur, M. Rouvier immediately asked M. Witte, who was in Paris on +his way to Portsmouth, whether it was true. M. Witte, equally in the +dark, replied that he did not believe the rumor.[902] When the authentic +news of the meeting came a few hours later, the French government and +people were alarmed, for the Czar’s meeting with the German Emperor +signified a lack of regard for French feeling and seemed to belie M. +Witte’s assurances of Russia’s devotion to the Dual Alliance.[903] +Moreover, M. Witte’s private advocacy of closer co-operation between the +three great Continental Powers against the great naval Powers, that is, +against France’s friend, Great Britain, no doubt increased the concern +of the French government.[904] + +On July 22 M. Bompard, French ambassador in St. Petersburg, demanded an +explanation from Count Lamsdorff of the report of the forthcoming +meeting. The Foreign Minister assured the French government that it was +a strictly private interview, devoid of any political character.[905] +Nevertheless, after the meeting occurred the French government continued +to feel uneasy.[906] Although M. Bompard believed that Count Lamsdorff, +faithful to the Dual Alliance, hoped that the meeting had had no +significance, the Ambassador strongly suspected that the Minister had +again not been consulted beforehand by his master.[907] Believing that +the Emperor William II was trying through his personal relations with +the Czar to destroy the Dual Alliance, he feared the results of an +interview between the two sovereigns. When he learned that some sort of +document had been signed by the two rulers, he surmised that it was a +personal agreement of friendship by which they promised not to +participate in any enterprise directed against the other and to exchange +any information which came to their knowledge.[908] + +Faced by the immense possibilities of the meeting at Björkö, M. Rouvier +determined to forestall any Russian initiative looking toward a change +in the Dual Alliance by frankly explaining his foreign policy to the +Russian ambassador, M. Nelidow. On August 9, the Ambassador reported the +Minister’s words as follows: + + +The Minister assured me that the basis of his policy must remain the +alliance with Russia; France needs no other. “Wherein does my policy +differ from that of my predecessor?” he said to me. “Therein that I wish +to establish good relations with England and Germany; but we do not +intend thereby to make a closer agreement with the latter, just as on +the other hand we do not desire to weaken the understanding already +existing with England.” Upon my remarking that several newspapers have +gone so far as to speak of a German alliance, M. Rouvier replied +emphatically that that would be “absolutely impossible.”[909] + + + + IV + + +The Czar, who probably felt guilty about not having consulted his +Foreign Minister before signing the Björkö treaty, did not tell Count +Lamsdorff of it until September 12.[910] He probably did so then because +peace with Japan, signed on September 6 and soon to be officially +ratified, would bring the Björkö accord into force.[911] Count Lamsdorff +was horrified at the news. On October 9 he wrote to his friend M. +Nelidow that the German Emperor had endeavored in the previous year to +persuade “our poor monarch” to sign a treaty of defensive alliance with +the obligation for France to join it. He continued: + + +I succeeded in preventing this crude attempt. But during the fateful +meeting at Björkö, the Emperor William was able with the aid of base +flattery to convince our dear Emperor that he alone was his true friend +and his support, and that the only salvation for Russia and for Europe +lay in a new Triple Alliance which in his opinion France would gladly +join. + + +After informing M. Nelidow of the treaty signed at Björkö, he went on: +“There you have the new mess into which we have been plunged after so +many unusual adventures during the past two years. You can imagine how +comforting this is.”[912] + +From the first Count Lamsdorff was determined to destroy the treaty. +After comparing it with the terms of the Dual Alliance, he concluded +that the one was a flagrant violation of the other.[913] In fact, he +thought that in case of a Franco-German war arising out of the Moroccan +affair, Russia was bound by this treaty to support Germany against her +own ally. He wrote to M. Nelidow: + + +From long years of experience I have become convinced that the alliance +with France is necessary in order to have really good relations with +Germany. Otherwise we lose our independence; for I know nothing heavier +than the German yoke. Without sacrificing the most intimate relations +with Berlin, we have very tactfully repulsed all attempts to compromise +us. + + +Not only did he expect France to refuse flatly to enter the new +grouping, but he also considered it bad policy to give up the Dual +Alliance in favor of a doubtful combination _à trois_. He considered the +treaty to be altogether in favor of Germany, for she was bound to aid +Russia only in Europe although Russia had most cause to fear Asiatic +conflicts. Count Lamsdorff held that this alliance might involve Russia +in the Anglo-German rivalry and might draw her into a war in which she +had no interest. Preferring a policy of peace and good will with all +Powers, he believed that Russia should next settle her difficulties with +Great Britain, in spite of the fact that the renewal of the Anglo- +Japanese Alliance in August had angered him. He was determined to +extricate Russia from this situation with the least possible damage to +Russo-German relations but above all without a breach in the Dual +Alliance.[914] + +When the Russian Foreign Minister marshaled these arguments before the +Czar, the latter refused to yield. Without showing much consideration +for French interest in the matter, Nicholas II replied that the alliance +would be of benefit to both Russia and France and maintained that the +latter would join it.[915] Although he was strongly skeptical about this +possibility, the Foreign Minister was forced to inquire of M. Nelidow on +September 14 whether or not France would do so.[916] + +Without consulting anyone, M. Nelidow replied decidedly no. The Dual +Alliance, together with the Entente Cordiale, every day becoming more +intimate, he wrote, formed the foundation of the French foreign policy, +whereas Franco-German relations were far from satisfactory. This new +triple alliance, manifestly aimed at Great Britain, might, he continued, +involve France in a war, which she wished above all to avoid, especially +a war against Great Britain for the defense of German interests. +Furthermore, such an alliance would mean the renunciation of all hopes +of revenge for France. In fact, he thought that the slightest hint in +favor of a Continental grouping would only shake France’s trust in her +ally. Nevertheless, he promised to investigate further.[917] + +Not convinced by these arguments, the Czar clung to his plan. Just at +this juncture M. Witte arrived in St. Petersburg with a letter from +William II which forced a decision about the alliance. + +M. Witte’s ideas on foreign policy were confused. Early in May, 1905, he +spoke of Germany to Mr. Spring Rice in hostile terms. In July, +immediately before he left St. Petersburg for Portsmouth to negotiate +peace with Japan, he was upholding among his friends and to the Czar the +plan that at Portsmouth he should not only make peace but should also +negotiate an “all-round arrangement” with Japan which Great Britain and +France should adhere to or at least recognize.[918] A few days later at +Paris he advocated the formation of a Continental grouping against the +overseas Powers.[919] The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance +increased his antagonism to Great Britain.[920] On his return to Paris +in September, he refused an invitation from King Edward to visit England +as well as an offer of British participation in the proposed Russian +loan, and aided in settling the Moroccan difficulty in order to make +possible a Franco-German _rapprochement_.[921] + +As M. Witte had to pass through Germany on his trip home, the Emperor +William obtained permission from the Czar for him to stop over and to be +initiated into the secret of Björkö.[922] After a cordial interview with +Prince Bülow at Berlin,[923] M. Witte journeyed to Rominten where he +received an almost royal welcome from the Emperor (September 26). When +William II informed him of the signing of the alliance at Björkö, the +Russian statesman, according to the Emperor, wept tears of joy. M. Witte +proposed that the German and the Russian ambassadors be given +instructions to co-operate on all possible questions as a means of +persuading France to enter the new grouping voluntarily and of preparing +the world for this momentous event. In the meantime, he advised that the +accord be kept closely secret. He promised to do his part in “using this +foundation for the construction of a good house.” Overjoyed at his +success, William II accepted these suggestions. In a letter to the Czar +carried by M. Witte he made this proposal for the co-operation of their +foreign representatives:[924] “This common exposal of a common cause,” +he wrote, “will not fail to impress the world that our relations have +become closer and thus slowly prepare your Allies the French for the new +orientation which their policy must take for the entry into our +treaty.”[925] + +In the conversations with M. Witte, who was not shown a copy of the +treaty itself, the Emperor represented the accord as much less binding +upon Franco-Russian relations than was really the case.[926] On his +side, M. Witte, anxious to have the support of William II in regaining +the good graces of the Czar and harboring some vague ideas about the +desirability of a Continental grouping, was easily charmed by the +Emperor into approval of the project. When he reached St. Petersburg, +September 28, he urged upon the French Ambassador the need of a Dual +Alliance-German coalition as a reply to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. M. +Bompard naturally rejected the idea.[927] When Count Witte (he had just +been ennobled) protested to him the Emperor William’s love for France +and his attachment to the Dual Alliance, the Ambassador significantly +asked, “Does not the Emperor’s love for the Dual Alliance extend so far +that he wished to join it?”[928] Count Lamsdorff, even less sympathetic, +showed to Count Witte the actual treaty and wrathfully denounced it. The +latter began to recover from the social intoxication of his visit to +Germany and to perceive that the treaty would have to be annulled.[929] + +Count Lamsdorff, Count Witte, M. Nelidow, and the Grand Duke Nicholas, +who was initiated into the secret, all joined forces in persuading the +Czar. By appealing to their master’s sense of honor and loyalty to the +alliance made by his revered father, they succeeded in winning the +unhappy ruler’s consent to a compromise. He acknowledged that the treaty +of Björkö and the terms of the Dual Alliance were in contradiction, and +agreed that before the former became operative either Germany should be +brought to change it in such a way that it would not affect France or +that the French government should be moved to a scrutiny of the terms of +the Dual Alliance “in the sense of a more or less close association with +this defensive Triple Alliance.” Thus, simultaneous attempts were to be +made to persuade either France or Germany to change the terms of her +alliance.[930] + +It very soon became apparent that the French government would never +accept the Björkö treaty. When M. Nelidow broached to M. Rouvier on +October 4 the idea of alliance with Germany which his government claimed +President Roosevelt also favored, the Premier repeated his former +assertions on this question. He, in turn, stated his complete approval +of an Anglo-Russian accord.[931] Again on October 18 the Russian +Ambassador reported that during a most intimate conversation with M. +Rouvier he had pressed the arguments in favor of a Continental alliance +against Great Britain only to receive from the Premier the following +emphatic reply: + + +We have aggressive intentions toward no one. We have given clear proof +of our love of peace. Thirty-five years ago after a war unfortunate for +us two provinces were taken away and we had to pay several billion +francs for peace. Our nation submitted, and since then we have +endeavored to avoid any cause for conflict or misunderstanding. To avoid +difficulties which threatened to come to a head, I recently ventured to +wound the pride of my country a little. But one cannot demand more of +us. The nation would not tolerate a closer _rapprochement_ with Germany. +It cannot forget what it has suffered from her, of which suffering it +has just been reminded in a careless and purposeless way. An alliance +with Germany is impossible. The government is obliged to regard the +feelings of the country. + + +As M. Nelidow commented in his dispatch, this was M. Rouvier’s final +reaction. It destroyed the possibility of France’s entering a +Continental alliance so completely that even the Czar had to acknowledge +the fact.[932] + +In the meantime, the Czar’s letter of October 7 to William II arrived in +Berlin. It read as follows: + + +The great question is to draw France into our new defensive Alliance. . +. . . But if France were to refuse to join us, then, not only would Art. +IV drop away, but also the meaning of Art. I would change radically, +because its obligations in the _present wording_ point at any European +Power and France too—Russia’s ally. During your stay at Bjorkoe I did +not have with me the documents signed by my Father. . . . . The first +steps taken with the object of trying to find out, whether the French +Government could be induced to join our new treaty, showed us that it is +a difficult task and that it will take a long time to prepare to bring +it over of its free will. . . . . Therefore I think that the coming into +force of the Bjorkoe treaty ought to be _put off until_ we know how +France will look upon it. In case she absolutely refuses to join our two +countries, it will be necessary to change the wordings of articles I and +IV so as to bring them into full accordance with Russia’s obligations +towards France, since the formation of the Triple Alliance in 1890. I +shall do my best to get France to join us.[933] + + +Without consulting the Chancellor, William II replied on October 12 with +a refusal: + + +I fully agree with you, that it will cost time, labour and patience to +induce France to join us both, but the reasonable people will in future +make themselves heard and felt! Our Moroccan business is regulated to +entire satisfaction so that the air is free for better understanding +between us. Our treaty is a very good base to build upon. We joined +hands and signed _before God_ who heard our vows! I therefore think that +the treaty can well come into existence. But if you wish any changes in +the wording or clauses or provisions for the future or different +emergencies—as for instance the absolute refusal of France, which is +improbable—I gladly await any proposal you will think fit to lay before +me. Till these have been laid before me and are agreed upon, the Treaty +must be adhered to by us as it is.[934] + + +The Czar, who had expected an acquiescence,[935] was in an unhappy +plight; no matter which way he turned he would be accused of breaking +his word. Since France had the prior claim and since the pressure upon +him in St. Petersburg was pro-French, he wrote to William II on November +23 that to fulfil with equal loyalty the clauses of the Dual Alliance +and those of the treaty of Björkö he would have to add the following +declaration to the latter: + + +In view of the difficulties in the way of an immediate adhesion by the +French Government to the treaty of defensive alliance signed at Björkoe +. . . . it is understood that Article I of that act shall not have any +application in the eventuality of a war with France and that the mutual +engagements which unite the latter to Russia will be maintained in full +until the establishment of an accord _à trois_. + + +To soften his refusal the Czar reported that Great Britain was “trying +hard to get us round for an understanding about Asiatic frontier +questions”; but he assured William II that he had not “the slightest +intention of opening negotiations with her.”[936] + +This reply destroyed the entire force of the treaty; it spelled the +failure of Germany’s second effort to ally with Russia. The German +Emperor and his government were bitterly disappointed. In the answer to +the Czar on November 28, based upon a memorandum by Herr von Holstein, +William II did not absolutely say yes or no, but left it to be +understood that Germany still considered the treaty as binding in spite +of the Czar’s declaration.[937] On December 2 the Czar refused to accept +the accord without the proposed declaration.[938] There the matter +rested. + +On January 21, 1906, the Czar wrote to William II that in keeping with +“the real sense of our Bjorkoe treaty,” he had accepted a proposal of +President Loubet’s to attach a French general to his person. + + +I think that this courtesy to France will bring her still closer to +Russia. As long as I can hold her tight she will remain peaceful and +quiet. It seems to me therefore that the continent’s interests and still +more so the interests of Germany can only gain from it. And with God’s +help some day Your right idea of forming a new “triple alliance” will +become a solid reality. + + +In sending this letter to Prince Bülow on January 23 the Emperor +wrote:[939] + + +I am sending you herewith another precious, bungling effort from the +youthful idealist on the Russian throne! The latest phase of the Russo- +Gallic Alliance borders on the ridiculous, but show’s how in Paris—at +London’s suggestion?—a counter blow is immediately struck against every +_rapprochement_ between the two Emperors; every time, the little Czar by +reason of the “ancient alliance” immediately falls or is won over by +Lamsdorff. That he speaks on “my” idea of a triple alliance, as if I +were receiving a special favor thereby, is really more than childish or +naïve! . . . . And all that is served to me from behind a tear-drenched +mask of eternal, most intimate friendship! How long will it be until he +will have an “English general” at his side, naturally only in order to +realize “my” ideal of world peace, and then a Japanese general to calm +the oriental peoples, and finally an American general! His Majesty ought +to be ashamed before his and my ancestors and before me to do such +things, to write such letters to me, which Lamsdorff has dictated to +him! + + +Thus the results of Björkö upon Russo-German relations were entirely +different from those anticipated by the two rulers. By overreaching +himself, by seeking a too-brilliant success without adequate +preparation, the German Emperor alienated the Czar, who felt that he had +played an ignominious rôle.[940] The consequence was that Russia again +drew nearer to France[941] and began to look with more favor upon +British overtures. Germany’s effort to restore her dominant position in +Europe and to prevent the dreaded encirclement by means of a Russian +alliance resulted, therefore, in preparing the ground for the very act +which Germany most feared, the formation of an Anglo-Russo-French +entente. + + + V + + +The German bid at Björkö for Russia’s friendship and the rumors of what +had happened there—approaching more and more nearly the truth by +October[942]—inevitably aroused rival efforts by Great Britain. The +British policy of obtaining an understanding with Russia was complex. +Defeat by Japan and revolution within made Russia discouraged and +powerless, and broke the prestige of the chauvinistic, militaristic +groups for the time being.[943] To complete the prophylactic work of +fixing adequate restraints to the Russian expansive energy, Great +Britain renewed prematurely her alliance with Japan in August, 1905, +modifying the terms so that the alliance became effective in case of an +attack by one Power and not only China specifically but also the +“regions of Eastern Asia and of India” were included within its +scope.[944] Then the British government hoped that Russia, with no other +alternative, would make a satisfactory settlement of their Asiatic +differences.[945] + +In the previous May, Sir Charles Hardinge, British ambassador at St. +Petersburg, had carried King Edward’s most cordial greetings to the +Russian Foreign Minister. With marked pleasure, Count Lamsdorff had +replied that the maintenance of peace and good relations with Great +Britain was _mon culte et ma religion_. Remarking to the Ambassador that +“interested parties” were trying to stir up discord between their +countries, the Count said that these endeavors must be frustrated. Count +Lamsdorff, wrote the Ambassador to his government, + + +thoroughly realized the actual difficulties of the situation, but he was +full of confidence that at the end of this miserable war both +Governments would find a means of arriving at a satisfactory arrangement +of all outstanding differences in the same manner as the Anglo-French +arrangement had been made.[946] + + +Russia and Japan agreed upon terms of peace on September 5. Three days +later, Sir Charles Hardinge notified Count Lamsdorff of the new Anglo- +Japanese Alliance, and assured him most earnestly that it was one of +national insurance, that Great Britain was absolutely sincere in her +desire for peace and friendly relations, and that she had no wish “to +interfere with the legitimate activity of Russia” or “to seek a policy +of aggrandizement at her expense.” Count Lamsdorff replied that he +remained convinced of the value of an agreement and repeated that a +third party was trying to arouse hostility between Great Britain and +Russia. However, when Sir Charles Hardinge alluded to the possibility of +resuming the previous negotiations at a future date, the Foreign +Minister responded “that he was most anxious that they should be brought +to a successful issue but that they should not be unduly hastened.”[947] + +This cool reply to the British sounding was caused partly by the +pressing need at that time to annul the Björkö treaty, but primarily by +the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, whose renewal at that moment Russia had not +expected. Interpreting it as another blow to a state already humiliated +by defeat, Russian public opinion denounced the treaty.[948] Thinking +that the Russian animosity would pass, Lord Lansdowne proposed on +October 3 a way of bringing the two countries closer together. + + +My own feeling was [he said to the Russian ambassador] that it would be +a mistake to attempt too much, or to allow it to be understood that the +two countries were on the eve of a comprehensive transaction analogous +to that which had taken place between France and Great Britain. My idea +of the procedure to be followed was rather that we should take up in +detail any outstanding points as to which differences of opinion had +manifested themselves and endeavour to dispose of these, and that we +should then pass on to others, if we found that our work proceeded +successfully. + + +Although the Russian Foreign Minister was gratified at the expression of +British good will, he replied that + + +he could give no answer of a definite character, but, speaking +privately, he could say that the Treaty had had a very bad effect and +had left an unpleasant impression upon the mind of the Emperor, and he +would recommend our Ambassador, as a friend, not to press for an answer +as it might be a disagreeable one, nor to open negotiations as to a +definite treaty between England and Russia as to their interests in +Asia. + + +Count Benckendorff even remarked that “any arrangement . . . . should +not be conceived in a spirit of hostility towards Germany”—an +implication which the British Foreign Secretary repudiated with +force.[949] + +Greatly alarmed at Russian soundings about a Continental coalition +against Great Britain, the French government in October tried several +times to bring Russia and Great Britain together, even on any minor +question.[950] In view of the Russian reserve, no definite proposals +were made.[951] By October 21, however, the French and British +governments were certain that the danger of a Russo-German combination +was past.[952] Shortly thereafter President Roosevelt, to the content of +those governments, entirely denied that he favored a Continental +grouping against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.[953] When King Edward +learned the truth about the Björkö affair in the autumn, he could with +some relief describe his nephew, the Emperor William, as “the most +brilliant failure in history.”[954] + +While these conversations were unsuccessful, Sir Charles Hardinge +thought that “the improvement which has already shown itself in the +relations between England and Russia only requires careful fostering to +bear fruit in due season.”[955] To that end it was necessary for the two +governments to find some opportunity for disinterested co-operation—an +opportunity which the Conference of Algeciras was to afford—and for +Russian public opinion to reciprocate the amicable feelings of the +British so that an Anglo-Russian understanding would be built upon a +durable basis, like that of the Entente Cordiale. The British press was +doing its share in bringing about this change of attitude. In fact, +British public opinion felt more relieved than it had in months. The +conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese +Alliance, the signing of the Franco-German agreement of September 28—all +cleared the diplomatic atmosphere. The _Matin_ revelations on October 5 +concerning the supposed British offer of alliance to France in the +previous summer placed Great Britain in a somewhat embarrassing position +before the world as a disturber of peace. Moreover, it was recognized +that Anglo-German animosity had almost caused a Russo-German alliance, +and that, to make a settlement with Russia, Great Britain should restore +better relations with Germany.[956] So British public opinion was ready +to be friendly with Russia, and, in part, with Germany. During the +autumn, sections of the British people, although not the government, +tried to smooth over the animosities with Germany. A meeting was held in +London early in December for that purpose at which eminent politicians, +business men, representatives of the press, clergymen, and others were +present to further the work.[957] As German public opinion responded to +these efforts, a general _détente_ set in.[958] + + +[Footnote 865: On these differences see Mühlberg to Metternich, July 18, +1905, _G.P._, XX, 638, No. 6863 and following documents; Lee, _King +Edward VII_, II, 334 ff., 346 ff.] + +[Footnote 866: Even Lascelles, British ambassador at Berlin, admitted to +Metternich that “in a Franco-German war in view of the prevailing +opinion here [in England] England would be actively on the French side.” +See Metternich to Bülow, July 19 and 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 639 f., No. +6864; 646 ff., No. 6867; Bülow to Metternich, July 22, 1905, _ibid._, +641 ff., No. 6866.] + +[Footnote 867: William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, _ibid._, XXX, 497, +No. 6237.] + +[Footnote 868: Bülow to F. O., July 20, 1905, _ibid._, 435 f., No. 6206. +The telegrams between the two rulers were in English.] + +[Footnote 869: See the correspondence between Holstein and Bülow, July +21-24, 1905, _ibid._, 436 ff., Nos. 6203-14. It was Holstein who +determined the whole policy of the German foreign office on this +question. Bülow served only as his mouthpiece. Richthofen and +Metternich, and also General Moltke (who in 1906 became chief of staff), +were all opposed to the project of alliance, but their opinions were +either not asked or were disregarded. See Bülow to F. O., Aug. 9, 1905, +_ibid._, 488, No. 6235; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 2, 1905, _ibid._, XX, +659 ff., No. 6871; Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische +Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 167.] + +[Footnote 870: They conversed in English. In the Emperor’s account of +the interview he gives the Czar’s statements in that language.] + +[Footnote 871: The Czar was also unpleasantly surprised to learn that +King Edward VII was supporting the candidacy of his son-in-law, Prince +Carl of Denmark, for the Norwegian throne. Nicholas II favored Prince +Waldemar, Carl’s younger brother, while the Emperor favored choosing a +member of the House of Bernadotte. It looked to him, said Nicholas, as +if Great Britain were endeavoring thereby to get her fingers on Norway +with the possible purpose of acquiring the port of Christiansund from +which to block the Skaggerrack. See the references given in the +succeeding footnote.] + +[Footnote 872: “Watchwords of the Common Brethren for 1905.” It was a +book of proverbs.] + +[Footnote 873: There is another account of the meeting written by Bülow +on Aug. 18 immediately after a talk with the Emperor which does not +agree in all details with this one written by the Emperor on the day +after the meeting occurred. The two versions supplement each other. But +the one of July 25 reproduces better the atmosphere in which the affair +took place. The other version is as follows: The Czar declared that he +wished to go hand in hand with the Emperor, his only friend. The latter +asked why the treaty had not been signed in the previous autumn. The +reply was that France had opposed it, that he (the Czar) had had to +maintain the Dual Alliance, and that France and Germany had been +hostile. The Emperor then said that those relations were better, that he +wished France and Germany to become friends, that the Moroccan question +was to be used for that purpose, and that an understanding over it would +certainly be reached. The Czar replied that if that were the case then +nothing stood in the way of a Russo-German treaty. The Emperor then +produced a copy of the treaty and it was signed immediately. See memo. +by Bülow, Aug. 18, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 502 f., No. 6240. The other +accounts of the Björkö interview are as follows: Tschirschky to Bülow, +July 24, 1905, _ibid._, 454 ff., No. 6218; William II to Bülow, July 25, +1905, _ibid._, 458 ff., No. 6220; Bülow to F. O., July 24, 1905, +_ibid._, 452, No. 6215; Witte, _Memoirs_, p. 428; Savinsky, _Revue des +deux mondes_, XII (1922), 798 f.; Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian +Diplomat_, p. 115; Helmuth von Moltke, _Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente, +1877-1916_ (Stuttgart, 1922), pp. 325 ff. The treaty was countersigned +by Grand Duke Michael, Tschirschky, and Admiral Birileff, the last two +apparently without reading it. The Grand Duke was asked to sign it +because William II feared that Nicholas II might be deposed and Michael +made czar. Naturally he did not mention his reason. + +The Czar wished to consider an agreement guaranteeing to the King of +Denmark the possession of his territory, so that in case of war Russia +and Germany would be sure of being able to defend the Baltic Sea north +of the Belt. A declaration of Danish neutrality would not suffice, +Nicholas argued to the Emperor, because in case the opponent did not +respect it and seized the territory as a base of operation, Germany and +Russia would be in a difficult situation. But the Emperor, who together +with his government was opposed to touching this important question, put +Nicholas off with a promise to consider the matter with Bülow. + +The Emperor also urged the Czar at this interview to grant to the +Russian people a habeas corpus act which would guarantee their civil +liberties, and to call a general council of state to consider the +question of a constitution.] + +[Footnote 874: _G.P._, XIX, 459.] + +[Footnote 875: Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1894-1914_, p. +374.] + +[Footnote 876: Bülow to F. O., July 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 453 f., No. +6217; Holstein to Bülow, July 25, 1905, _ibid._, 457 f., No. 6219.] + +[Footnote 877: Bülow to F. O., July 27, Aug. 9, 1905, _ibid._, 470 f., +Nos. 6224 f.; 488 ff., No. 6235.] + +[Footnote 878: Bülow to F. O., July 26, 1905, _ibid._, 467 f., No. 6222; +476 f., No. 6228.] + +[Footnote 879: The German government was particularly concerned lest +Roosevelt become mistrustful on account of this interview and the +conclusion of an alliance with Russia. It even considered imparting the +terms of the treaty to him, but in view of the need for secrecy decided +not to. Instead, on July 28, the Emperor wrote personally to Roosevelt +making it appear that the interview dealt only with matters pertaining +to the Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace (Mühlberg to Bussche- +Haddenhausen, July 28, 1905, _ibid._, 614, No. 6319). On this discussion +about whether to notify Roosevelt of the accord see _ibid._, Nos. 6203, +6206-8, 6221, 6223.] + +[Footnote 880: He meant the one Germany feared of Russia, France, Great +Britain, and Japan.] + +[Footnote 881: Holstein to Bülow, July 26, 1905, _ibid._, 468 ff., No. +6223; memo. by Holstein, July 28, 1905, _ibid._, 474 ff., No. 6227.] + +[Footnote 882: Bülow to F. O., July 28, Aug. 5, 1905, _ibid._, 476 f., +No. 6228; 482 f., No. 6231.] + +[Footnote 883: Bülow to F. O., July 30, Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 477 +ff., No. 6229; 485 ff., No. 6233; 488 ff., No. 6235.] + +[Footnote 884: Bülow to William II, July 30, 1905, _ibid._, 477 ff., No. +6229; Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 5, 1905, _ibid._, 483 f., No. 6232.] + +[Footnote 885: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 2, 5, 9, 1905, _ibid._, 481 ff., +Nos. 6230 f.; 488 ff., No. 6235.] + +[Footnote 886: Bülow to William II, July 24, 27, 1905, _ibid._, 452, No. +6216; 471 ff., No. 6226; Bülow to F. O., July 27-29, 1905, _ibid._, 471, +No. 6225; 476 ff., Nos. 6228 f.] + +[Footnote 887: It is highly probable that Bülow took this step not so +much because of defects in the treaty, but rather because the Emperor +had disregarded his authority by making those important changes without +consulting him. Under the persuasion of Richthofen he took this course +in order to uphold his authority and to teach the Emperor a lesson +(Eckardstein, III, 166; editor’s note in _G.P._, XIX, 481 f., note).] + +[Footnote 888: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 482 f., No. +6231; 488 ff., No. 6235.] + +[Footnote 889: William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 496 ff., No. +6237.] + +[Footnote 890: Bülow to F. O., Aug. 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 482 f., No. +6231; 485 ff., No. 6233; 488 ff., No. 6235.] + +[Footnote 891: Holstein to Bülow, Aug. 5, 6, 14, 1905, _ibid._, 483 f., +No. 6232; 487 f., No. 6234; 501, No. 6239; Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 10, +1905, _ibid._, 493 ff., No. 6236; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 12, 1905, +_ibid._, 498 ff., No. 6238; memo. by Bülow, Aug. 18, 1905, _ibid._, 502 +f., No. 6240.] + +[Footnote 892: Meyer to Roosevelt, Aug. 1, 1905, quoted in Howe, _George +von Lengerke Meyer_, p. 188.] + +[Footnote 893: Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, p. +195.] + +[Footnote 894: Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 495, No. +6236.] + +[Footnote 895: Memo. by Spring Rice for a letter to Roosevelt, July 10, +1905, Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Aug. 10, 1905, quoted in Gwynn, +_The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 476, 484.] + +[Footnote 896: Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 648 f., No. +6868; Mühlberg to William II, Aug. 4, 1905, _ibid._, 649 ff., No. 6869; +Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 651 ff., No. 6870. The +Emperor did not fear an attack at the time, but certainly at some later +date. He thought that the maneuvers were meant to remind Denmark that +she was an outpost for Great Britain just as Portugal was and that she +must not be too familiar with Germany. And with an English princess +married into the Swedish royal family and King Edward’s son-in-law +seeking the Norwegian throne, he feared that Norway would also become a +British satellite (William II to Bülow, July 30, 1905, quoted in a +dispatch from Bülow to F. O., July 30, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 477 ff., No. +6229). Even so sane a person as General Moltke, who in the next year +became chief of staff, confided to his diary on July 30, 1905: “The +visit of the Channel Fleet in the Baltic announced by England is to be +regarded as a demonstration. . . . . The English are inciting in the +most unbelievable fashion, they are telling the most despicable lies +about us, and are representing Germany as the evil spirit in the whole +world. . . . . The future lies dark before us. May Germany have the +strength to bear difficult times” (Moltke, p. 331).] + +[Footnote 897: 4 Hansard, Vol. CLI, cols. 113, 122, 136 ff., 143.] + +[Footnote 898: Memo. by Mühlberg, Aug. 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 648 f., No. +6868; Mühlberg to William II, Aug. 4, 1905, _ibid._, 649 ff., No. 6869. +As a matter of fact, the maneuvers had been planned for some time, and +to begin with had no political significance. No direct connection +existed between their inception and the meeting at Björkö, but it is +very probable that the British government was not at all averse to their +occurring at the time (cf. Bradford, _Life of Wilson_, p. 200). Wilson +was in command of the British fleet (see also _G.P._, XIX, 478, editor’s +note).] + +[Footnote 899: Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 109, 113; Bradford, p. 205.] + +[Footnote 900: The German government learned of this fact in August but +not of its approval by the British government. See Metternich to Bülow, +Aug. 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 658, No. 6870; Lee, II, 348, 353. On the +quarrels of King Edward and his German nephew see Lee, II, 346 ff.; +_G.P._, 648 ff., Nos. 6868, 6870; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, p. 330.] + +[Footnote 901: William II to Nicholas II, Aug. 22, 1905, Goetz, p. 377; +Hardinge to Lansdowne, Aug. 1, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 95 f., No. 91 and +editor’s note; Newton, pp. 337 f.] + +[Footnote 902: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, +Nov., 1924, p. 477.] + +[Footnote 903: _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 65 f.] + +[Footnote 904: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, Oct. 15, 1905, +_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 477, 491; Radolin to Bülow, July +25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 426 ff., No. 6198; M. Bompard states that Witte +used the word “alli” (Bompard, “Le traité de Bjoerkoe,” _Revue de +Paris_, XXV [May 15, 1918], 438).] + +[Footnote 905: Bompard, XXV, 432; Witte, p. 415; _Quest. dipl. et col._, +XX, 174 f.] + +[Footnote 906: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, +Nov., 1924, p. 477.] + +[Footnote 907: Bompard, XXV, 432 f.; Bourgeois et Pagès, _Les origines +et les responsabilités de la grande guerre_, p. 313.] + +[Footnote 908: Bompard, XXV, 424 f. Just when Bompard learned this fact +is not evident, but apparently he did so soon after the interview. Cf. +Hardinge to Lansdowne, Aug. 3, 1905, _B.D._, III, 127, No. 168.] + +[Footnote 909: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Aug. 9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, +Nov., 1924, pp. 477 f.] + +[Footnote 910: There are various statements about the date upon which +Lamsdorff learned of the treaty. See Iswolsky, _Recollections of a +Foreign Minister_, pp. 49 f.; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII +(1922), 798; A. Nekludow, “Autour de l’entrevue de Bjoerkoe,” _Revue des +deux mondes_, March 1, 1918, p. 139; Nekludow was a secretary in the +Russian embassy in Paris in 1905 (Witte, p. 426; Savinsky, p. 114). The +correct date is given in a dispatch from Lamsdorff to Nelidow on Oct. 9, +where the Foreign Minister stated that he was first told of the treaty +by the Czar just before the latter’s departure for Finland on Aug. 30 +(or Sept. 12, according to the new calendar). See _Kriegsschuldfrage_, +Nov., 1924, p. 487. The Czar excused his delay to Lamsdorff on the +grounds that he had promised William II to preserve secrecy. See +_ibid._, p. 487; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 798 f.; +cf. Iswolsky, pp. 49 f.] + +[Footnote 911: There is no substantiation in _G.P._ for the assertion by +Savinsky that the Czar told Lamsdorff that William II had asked him then +to make known the accord to the French government (Savinsky, _Revue des +deux mondes_, XII [1922], 799; Savinsky, p. 115).] + +[Footnote 912: Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 799; +Savinsky, pp. 115 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 49 f.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. +9, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 486 ff.] + +[Footnote 913: This was certainly the case. Even apart from the fact +that the military clauses of the Dual Alliance provided for a war +against Germany, the political clauses as revised in 1899 stated the aim +of the alliance to be “the maintenance of the general peace and of the +European balance of power” (Pribram, _The Secret Treaties of Austria- +Hungary_, II, 206 ff.).] + +[Footnote 914: Nekludow, _Revue des deux mondes_, March 1, 1918, pp. 137 +f.; Savinsky, _ibid._, XII (1922), 799 ff.; Witte, p. 425; Savinsky, pp. +115 ff.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 9, Sept. 28, 1905, +_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 480 f., 486 ff.; Nelidow to +Lamsdorff, Oct. 5, 1905, _ibid._, p. 483.] + +[Footnote 915: Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 800 ff.; +Savinsky, pp. 118 ff., 126 f.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 6 and 9, 1905, +_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 485 ff.; Witte, pp. 415 ff.; +Iswolsky, pp. 44, 49.] + +[Footnote 916: Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Sept. 14, 1905, +_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 478.] + +[Footnote 917: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Sept. 21, 1905, _ibid._, pp. 479 +f.] + +[Footnote 918: Hardinge to Lansdowne, July 25, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 93 f., +No. 89; Spring Rice to G. Balfour, July 29, 1905, and Spring Rice to +Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905, Gwynn, I, 481 f., 496.] + +[Footnote 919: Radolin to Bülow, July 22, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 426 ff., +No. 6198. On July 26 the German government was about to inaugurate a +press campaign against Witte, thinking that he was pro-British (Bülow to +F. O., July 26, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 468, No. 6222).] + +[Footnote 920: See Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 4, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 205, +No. 195.] + +[Footnote 921: Witte, pp. 293 f., 416 f.; Dillon, _The Eclipse of +Russia_, pp. 350 f.; Radolin to Bülow, Sept. 23, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 503 +f., No. 6241; Witte’s interview in _Le Temps_, reprinted in _Quest. +dipl. et col._, XX, 439; Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Oct. 15, 1905, +_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, p. 491; Lee, II, 307 f.] + +[Footnote 922: William II to Bülow, Sept. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 505, +No. 6242.] + +[Footnote 923: At the Emperor’s request Bülow said nothing to him about +the Björkö treaty. See Bülow to William II, Sept. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 505 +ff., No. 6243.] + +[Footnote 924: On the meeting at Rominten see the following: Witte, pp. +416 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 50 ff.; Dillon, pp. 396 f.; Goetz, pp. 379 ff.; +Bülow to F. O., Sept. 27, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 507 f., Nos. 6244 f.; +William II to Bülow, Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. 6246.] + +[Footnote 925: William II to Nicholas II, Sept. 26, 1905, Goetz, pp. 379 +ff.] + +[Footnote 926: Bülow instructed the Emperor to that effect. See Bülow to +William II, Sept. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 506, No. 6243. See the dispatch +from the Emperor to Bülow on Sept. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 508 ff., No. +6246.] + +[Footnote 927: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1 and 4, 1905, _B.D._, IV, +202 f., No. 193; 205 f., No. 195.] + +[Footnote 928: Bompard, XXV, 441 f.; Bourgeois et Pagès, pp. 318 f.] + +[Footnote 929: In his memoirs Witte represented himself the dupe of the +two rulers; when he read the document itself, he wrote, he was +horrified. He claimed that he was largely responsible for the annulment +of the treaty (Witte, pp. 425 ff.; Dillon, pp. 358 ff., 354, 413 f.; cf. +Savinsky, p. 125). These accounts by him were both of a much later date, +when he had been out of favor for several years and held a deep grudge +against his master. Consequently he wanted to paint the latter’s perfidy +toward France as black as possible. That Witte thought the treaty so +harmful at the time is difficult to believe. See his letter to +Eulenburg, Oct. 8, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 519 f., No. 6250, Anlage; Witte, +p. 424; Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1 and 4, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 202 f., +No. 193; 205 ff., No. 195; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905, +Gwynn, I, 496 f.] + +[Footnote 930: See the following: Witte, pp. 427 ff.; Iswolsky, pp. 54 +ff.; Savinsky, _Revue des deux mondes_, XII (1922), 801; Dillon, pp. 361 +ff.; Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 9 and 27, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, +Nov., 1924, pp. 487, 495; Bompard, XXV, 422 ff.; Savinsky, pp. 120 ff.] + +[Footnote 931: Lamsdorff met with a similar response from Bompard. +According to the latter, Lamsdorff suggested a combination of Russia, +France, Germany, and the United States as a counterpoise to the Anglo- +Japanese Alliance, “in the same manner that the political equilibrium of +Europe was maintained by the Dual and Triple Alliances.” See Hardinge to +Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 211 f., No. 198; Spring Rice to +Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5 and 15, 1905, Gwynn, I, 497, 501 f.] + +[Footnote 932: Nelidow to Lamsdorff, Oct. 5, 15, 18, 1905, +_Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., 1924, pp. 481 f., 489 f.] + +[Footnote 933: Nicholas II to William II, Oct. 7, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 512 +f., No. 6247.] + +[Footnote 934: William II to Nicholas II, Oct. 12, 1905, _ibid._, 514, +No. 6248; William II to Bülow, Oct. 12 and 17, 1905, _ibid._, 515 ff., +Nos. 6249 f. The reply to Witte was made by Eulenburg at the same time. +See Bülow to Eulenburg, Oct. 18, 1905, _ibid._, 520 f., No. 6251; +Eulenburg to Witte, Oct., 1905, _ibid._, 521, No. 6252. Cf. Bompard, +XXV, 443 ff. Bülow approved of the line taken by his master, for he +earnestly desired to continue the negotiations (Bülow to Eulenburg, Oct. +18, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 520, No. 6251).] + +[Footnote 935: Lamsdorff to Nelidow, Oct. 12, 1905, _Kriegsschuldfrage_, +Nov., 1924, p. 488.] + +[Footnote 936: The letter was delivered by Osten-Sacken, Russian +ambassador at Berlin, to give it full official character. See _G.P._, +XIX, 522 ff., No. 6254 and Anlage. The Czar approved this reply as early +as Nov. 10. Lamsdorff to Osten-Sacken, undated though bearing the date +of approval by Nicholas II of Nov. 10. See _Kriegsschuldfrage_, Nov., +1924, pp. 495 f.; Iswolsky, pp. 55 f.; Bompard, XXV, 443 ff.; Witte, p. +429; Savinsky, pp. 123 f.] + +[Footnote 937: William II to Bülow, Nov. 26, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 524 f., +No. 6255. The Emperor thought that Russia had shown little appreciation +of German friendship during the recent war, and he declared to Bülow +that the coalition of Russia, France, and Great Britain was _de facto_ +already existent. In the same letter he stated that Germany alone, since +Russia refused her aid, must win France to the new project. For the +reply to the Czar see William II to Nicholas II, Nov. 26 and 28, 1905, +_ibid._, 526 f., Nos. 6256 f. That the German government continued to +hold the alliance as valid is seen from a memorandum composed by the +foreign office for the Emperor just before the latter’s meeting with the +Czar at Swinemünde, July, 1907 (_ibid._, p. 528 n.).] + +[Footnote 938: _Ibid._, 527 f., No. 6528. See also Bompard, XXV, 447; +Witte, p. 429; Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 313.] + +[Footnote 939: Both letters are quoted in _G.P._, XIX, 528 n.] + +[Footnote 940: Nekludow, _Revue des deux mondes_, March 1, 1918, pp. +142, 144. See also the correspondence between the two rulers, Jan. 21 +and 29, 1906, _G.P._, XIX, 528 n.; Goetz, p. 386.] + +[Footnote 941: Iswolsky, p. 56.] + +[Footnote 942: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 1, 4, 14, 1905, _B.D._, IV, +202 f., No. 193; 205 ff., No. 195; 211 f., No. 198; Lansdowne to Bertie, +Oct. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 217 f., No. 203.] + +[Footnote 943: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 6, 1905, _ibid._, 198 f., +No. 191.] + +[Footnote 944: _Ibid._, chap. xxiv.] + +[Footnote 945: Cf. Bertie to Lansdowne, Sept. 9, 1905, _ibid._, 177, No. +172_a_; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 5, 1905, Gwynn, I, 498.] + +[Footnote 946: Hardinge to Knollys, May, 1905, Lee, II, 306; Hardinge to +Lansdowne, May 30, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 195 f., No. 189.] + +[Footnote 947: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 9, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 178 f., +No. 172 (_b_); Lansdowne to Hardinge, Sept. 4, 1905, Newton, pp. 327 f.] + +[Footnote 948: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Sept. 2, 9, 26, 1905, _B.D._, IV, +170 f., No. 159; 178 f., No. 172 (_b_); 199 ff., No. 192 and following +documents.] + +[Footnote 949: Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 3 and 5, 1905, _ibid._, 204 +f., No. 194; 207 f., No. 196; Spring Rice to Mrs. Roosevelt, Oct. 15, +1905, Gwynn, I, 501.] + +[Footnote 950: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 4, 8, 14, 1905, _B.D._, IV, +205 ff., No. 195; 208 ff., Nos. 197 f.; Lansdowne to Bertie, Oct. 17 and +25, 1905, _ibid._, 212 f., No. 199; 217 f., No. 203.] + +[Footnote 951: See Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 211 +f., No. 198, Lansdowne’s minute; _ibid._, pp. 521 f.; report from +London, Oct. 30, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, No. 22; report from St. +Petersburg, Nov. 8, 1905, _ibid._, No. 23; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 22, +1905, _G.P._, XIX, 663 ff., No. 6360; Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, +1905, _ibid._, XXV, No. 8501; Richthofen to Bülow, Oct. 24, 1905, +_ibid._, XIX, 665, No. 6361; Schoen to Bülow, Jan. 28, 1906, _ibid._, +XXV, 5 f., No. 8502; Miquel to Bülow, Oct. 24, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 666 +ff., No. 6362; Nicholas II to William II, Nov. 23, 1905, _ibid._, 523, +No. 6254. On Oct. 21, 1905, King Edward instructed Hardinge to express +to the Czar “my earnest desire that the best and most durable relations +should be established between the two countries, and that all important +points should be discussed in the most amicable spirit and arranged as +soon as possible” (Edward VII to Hardinge, quoted in Lee, II, 310). On +Oct. 12 Lord Sydenham received a letter from Balfour stating that “the +time is propitious for an understanding with Russia.” Lord Sydenham, a +member of the Defence Committee, wrote a draft of an agreement with +Russia and sent it to the Premier, Oct. 20. On Nov. 1 he discussed +Persian railways with Balfour and Sir Charles Hardinge, and, after +Balfour had left, he (Sydenham) and Hardinge talked over the draft +agreement. Hardinge believed that the Russians would accept it (Colonel +Lord Sydenham, _My Working Life_ [London, 1927], p. 182).] + +[Footnote 952: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 21, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 214, +No. 201; Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 521 f., No. +6253.] + +[Footnote 953: Roosevelt to Spring Rice, Nov. 1, 1905, Gwynn, II, 8; G. +Balfour to Spring Rice, Oct. 25, 1905, _ibid._, I, 503.] + +[Footnote 954: Eckardstein, I, 218 f.] + +[Footnote 955: Hardinge to Lansdowne, Oct. 24, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 216, +No. 202.] + +[Footnote 956: Metternich to F. O., Nov. 15, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 521 f., +No. 6253; Howe, p. 209.] + +[Footnote 957: Report from London, Oct. 23, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, +II, 80 f.; Bernstorff to Bülow, Sept. 8, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 636 ff., No. +6340. Party leaders, magazines, newspapers, and various societies in +England took up the work. The _Times_, however, continued its anti- +German campaign. In December, Colonel Repington published an article +therein, warning the public against friendliness with Germany +(Lieutenant Colonel Charles à Court Repington, _Vestigia_ [London, +1919], pp. 262 f.). See also E. T. Raymond, _The Life of Lord Rosebery_ +(New York, 1923), p. 211; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, +208; Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 198 ff.; Metternich to Bülow, Oct. 18 and +22, Nov. 2, Dec. 3 and 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 669 ff., Nos. 6879 ff.; +Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 191 f.] + +[Footnote 958: See Metternich to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 690, +No. 6886.] + + + + + CHAPTER XVI + + THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS + + I. GERMAN PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS + + +After the Björkö treaty had been annulled by the Russian government, the +Moroccan affair once more held the chief attention of the German foreign +office. Already important, it became more so; for there was no longer +any reason for the German government to use the Moroccan affair as a +means of conciliating France and there was added need for it to justify +to the German people and to the world the long diplomatic campaign over +Morocco by checkmating France at the Conference. + + +Our chief object [wrote Prince Bülow on November 23] must be to avoid +isolation at the conference. If we have the majority or all the other +Powers against us on a question upon which we have engaged ourselves, +boldness and threats will be of no use since after all that has +occurred, our situation would be almost ludicrous.[959] + + +At almost the same moment the French Premier sounded the German +government as to whether it would agree for France and Spain together to +receive a police mandate from the Conference.[960] The inclusion of +Spain, he said, would prevent the concession from appearing one-sided in +favor of France and would enable the latter to keep her promise not to +seek a general mandate. He added that Germany might be forced to agree +to that solution. Replying doubtfully to these overtures, Herr von +Flotow advised the French government to make the proposal directly in +Berlin in accordance with diplomatic form. A few days later (November +30) Herr von Kühlmann reported that M. Vaffier-Pollet, representative of +the Comité du Maroc in Tangier, and Count de Chérisey, former secretary +of the French legation in Tangier, had proposed to him in Paris that the +German and French governments make a secret agreement before the +Conference to the following effect: The _status quo_ in Morocco should +be maintained for three or four years, after which, if conditions had +not improved, Germany should not oppose the bestowal upon France of the +police mandate for all of Morocco; in return, Germany should be assured +of the open door and of the right for German capital to participate to +the extent of 45 per cent in all governmental enterprises in Morocco, of +territorial compensation in the French Congo region, and of the cession +of the French right of preference to acquire the Belgian Congo.[961] +Although M. Rouvier stood behind this offer, the German government did +not know it and did not reply. It was much disposed to consider the +overture made through Herr von Flotow; but this fact the French Premier +could not know, and, misled by the German silence, he never returned to +the subject.[962] + +The German Chancellor’s willingness to negotiate directly with France +showed that he was beginning to appreciate Germany’s increasingly +unfavorable position in international relations. He knew that the German +government faced a hard campaign and that its public opinion, which had +no particular interest in Morocco and was averse to war, must be +convinced of the justice of the German cause and aroused to the +seriousness of the international situation. In the Reichstag on December +6 the Chancellor therefore warned the nation that while animosities had +been overcome, new ones were possible, and that the British were +particularly anti-German. Repeating all the German accusations against +the French Moroccan policy, he justified at length Germany’s defense of +her interests. He avowed his strong desire for the maintenance of +friendly relations with all nations. He assured his hearers that Italy +remained loyal to the Triple Alliance. But he urged his country to be +prepared for any emergency.[963] The speech was widely approved.[964] + +The Chancellor’s utterances were soon answered by M. Rouvier through the +publication of a French _Livre jaune_ of over three hundred pages, which +was supplemented by a speech in the Chamber on December 16.[965] +Therein, to the satisfaction of the French, the German accusations were +denied and the national policy of France toward Morocco was +exonerated.[966] According to the reports of the German representatives +in Paris in December and January, France was firmly resolved not to +recede further, and the French government was making military +preparations.[967] + +These manifestations did not augur well for the German government. Nor +did the terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement of September 1, 1905, +which it learned of at some time before the Conference opened.[968] The +knowledge of the terms gave a concrete basis to the mistrust of France’s +intentions toward Morocco, and stiffened German resistance. On December +25 the German government envisaged three ways in which the Conference +might end: first, a provisorium of about three years might be agreed +upon, at the end of which each Power would recover its freedom of +action; second, a separate agreement with France might be made, but only +in case the latter offered suitable terms; third, a general police +mandate for Western Morocco might be given to France. This last result, +equivalent to a French victory, the German government was determined not +to permit, holding a conflict as preferable.[969] In fact, none of these +solutions was very palatable to the government. But it was determined to +hold firm,[970] and the instructions to Herr von Radowitz and Count +Tattenbach, the German delegates at the Conference, were optimistic. + +The delegates were to uphold the open door and economic equality for +all. They should combat the monopoly for making loans to Morocco claimed +by the French banks. As Germany had already recognized the legitimate +interests of France by permitting her to regulate the frontier, the +mandate for police reforms in the west should be given to a number of +Powers and should be internationally organized for a limited number of +years. If a division of mandated areas were made, Germany should receive +her share—one with a port advantageously located for later expansion +into the interior; however, Germany was ready to agree with the others +not to draw any advantage for herself from this mandate. All the +signatory Powers should participate equally in establishing and +directing the proposed state bank, for which adequate international +organization and control should be provided. Above all, the delegates +should not permit themselves to be isolated or to stand alone with +Morocco. Thus, in general, they were to work for the +internationalization of Morocco.[971] + +Prince Bülow became more and more optimistic as the Conference +approached.[972] At his urging, the Sultan promised to select carefully +his delegates to the assembly and to co-operate with the Powers +there.[973] The Chancellor expected the neutral Powers to support +Germany against the monopolistic desires of France. He particularly +courted President Roosevelt; for, although he knew that Mr. White, the +American delegate, would not be permitted to take the initiative at the +Conference, the Chancellor thought that the President and his delegate +would be able, behind the scenes, to exert a powerful influence.[974] +From Russia, Prince Bülow anticipated no interference. The Austrian +Foreign Minister stated his government’s readiness to go hand in hand +with Germany at the Conference.[975] Spanish mistrust and jealousy of +France with reference to Morocco might be aroused and used.[976] To that +end the German government prevented the selection of the anti-German M. +Villa-Urrutia as delegate.[977] + +Toward Italy, embarrassed by her situation as Germany’s ally and +France’s friend through an agreement over Morocco, the Chancellor +modified his former tactics. He offered to support her as a candidate +for the general police mandate at the Conference.[978] But the Italian +government refused. Sending the aged and experienced Marquis Visconti +Venosta as delegate, it gave him permission to act as he saw fit in +order to keep his head out of the noose.[979] The German Chancellor +approved this choice and welcomed the Marquis’ statement that he would +endeavor to mediate between France and Germany and to bring the +Conference to a successful conclusion.[980] Prince Bülow planned to +exploit Italy’s position by laying down a flat _non possumus_ on the +question of permitting France to receive the mandate for the police, +with the expectation that the Italian government would then press France +to accept the German terms in order to prevent a conflict wherein it +would be forced to choose sides.[981] + +The Chancellor instructed Prince Radolin to impress French official +circles with the fact that Germany would never permit France to obtain a +general police mandate or a special position in the state bank, that if +France persisted in refusing to agree to the open door in Morocco, a +“very critical situation would arise” which “would lead inevitably to a +grave conflict” between the two states.[982] Prince Bülow was pleased to +learn that the French people were growing nervous and that M. Rouvier, +M. Jules Cambon, French ambassador in Madrid, and others were asserting +France’s wish for a peaceful and satisfactory solution.[983] + +The main reason for the Chancellor’s growing optimism was the fact that +in December a Liberal government had come to power in England and that +British public opinion was more friendly to Germany. Prince Bülow and +the Emperor both expected an improvement in Anglo-German relations, and +exerted their influence in achieving it.[984] The Chancellor did not +believe that the new Liberal government would stiffen the French +resistance by holding out the prospect of active aid in case of war as +the Unionist cabinet had done. He interpreted the overwhelming Liberal +victory at the elections in January as a clear rejection of chauvinism +and an equally clear expression by the nation of an earnest desire for +peace and for further improvement in Anglo-German relations. He learned +that Edward VII had spoken in favor of a peaceful settlement.[985] Then, +just after the Conference opened, the King and the Emperor entered into +personal correspondence once more.[986] The Chancellor therefore +expected the British government to play the rôle of mediator instead of +active French partisan, and he endeavored to impress this duty upon +it.[987] In view of this situation he believed that France would accept +the German solution of the Moroccan problem.[988] + +Although the Chancellor knew that France was improving her defenses, he +did not anticipate a war.[989] He notified General Moltke, the new chief +of staff, that he need take no precautionary measures.[990] The Emperor +also regarded the French fears of war as “ludicrous, bordering on +insanity.” Late in December he roundly declared to Mr. Werner Beit, a +friend of Edward VII, and to the Marquis de Laguiche, French military +attaché in Berlin, that “there is absolutely no cause for any war or for +any concern about an attack from us,” adding, however, these more +ominous words: + + +Even if we had the best intentions and were loyal and wished to remain +peaceful, there would be danger that in case of continued inciting of +France by London, she [France] might, relying on certain aid from +England, conduct herself toward us so ill-manneredly and provocatively +that finally our national honor would come into question, for the sake +of which we should have to resort to arms; then we would have to strike +and therewith, through our “illegal attack” on France, give the occasion +for England’s aid. And it is monstrous perfidy [for England] to work +toward such.[991] + + +Thus, hopeful for peace but not entirely averse to war, the German +leaders saw the Conference begin. + + + II. FRENCH PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS + + +In spite of the failure of his overtures to the German government in +November, the French Premier assured the _Wilhelmstrasse_ on the eve of +the Conference that he wished to reach an understanding at that assembly +on the basis of “no victor, no vanquished.” Nevertheless, both he and +the French nation were determined to uphold France’s ambitions and +claims toward Morocco. On January 8, 1906, Prince Radolin wrote that +there prevailed in France “grave anxiety over the possibility of warlike +complications. . . . . In press and public it is said that Germany +wishes war, that France has receded . . . . on all points, but without +satisfying Germany.” At the Conference, thus Prince Radolin interpreted +French opinion, “proposals would be made which would be contrary to her +honor and her traditional policy in Morocco. France must defend herself +and be prepared for any eventuality. . . . . Germany makes no secret of +her armaments, and therefore it is imperative for France also to keep +her powder dry.”[992] + +In this state of mind the French Parliament during the latter half of +1905 investigated French defences and put 200,000,000 francs at the +disposal of the war Minister for repairing them, particularly on the +eastern frontier. That work was actively begun; food and munitions were +brought in; the frontier forces were increased by reserves; drilling and +trial mobilizations were held.[993] As M. Delcassé had prophesied, M. +Rouvier returned completely to the international policy of the fallen +Minister in order to achieve victory at the Conference. The French +government realized that the opposition of the French and German +policies was so complete as to make retreat difficult for either party. +Preparing for the worst, M. Rouvier yet hoped to exert sufficient moral +pressure on Germany at the Conference to gain a French victory without +precipitating a war.[994] To that end he supplemented the military +measures by diplomatic work. He was certain of Russia’s support because, +aside from the alliance, Russia had urgent need of a French loan, which +M. Rouvier would not permit until after a satisfactory conclusion of the +Moroccan affair.[995] Russia’s influence was restricted by the +revolution and by a lack of interest in Morocco. But a promise from the +Czar to exercise his personal power with Emperor William II in favor of +conciliation would be of eminent value, and M. Rouvier sought to obtain +it.[996] He also wished to have President Roosevelt act similarly at the +proper moment. This plan was to bear fruit later; but at the time the +American government replied that it had small concern in the Moroccan +conference and that, while standing for the open door and exerting its +influence for peace, it would interfere as little as possible in the +deliberations. Mr. Root, the secretary of state, told the British +Ambassador that the American delegate would “avoid any action which +could tend to weaken Anglo-French entente.”[997] M. Rouvier also +received “satisfactory assurances” from the Austro-Hungarian government; +he did not expect opposition from it or from Belgium.[998] Far more +important was the continuation of British aid, both for its own sake and +for holding Italy and Spain in line.[999] From the new Liberal +government that came in early in December, the French Premier was +immediately assured of diplomatic aid by word and act. + + + III. BRITISH PRELIMINARIES TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS + + +When internal disputes over the question of tariff reform finally forced +the resignation of the Unionist government on December 4, the Liberals, +with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as prime minister, entered office. In +response to the popular demand they were pledged to continue the foreign +policy of their predecessor, and the presence at the foreign office of +Sir Edward Grey assured the fulfilment of that pledge. The Foreign +Secretary was a Liberal Imperialist, a follower of Lord Rosebery. He had +been one of the rebels against the leadership of Sir Henry Campbell- +Bannerman, a Gladstonian Liberal, because of the latter’s denunciation +of the Boer War. Regretting that Lord Rosebery would not enter the +cabinet, Sir Edward Grey at first refused office unless the Premier +would accept a peerage and leave the leadership in the House of Commons +to Mr. Asquith, another Liberal Imperialist. After much persuasion from +his friends and after the influence of the Liberal Imperialists had been +increased by the appointment of Mr. Haldane as secretary of war, Sir +Edward receded from his demand.[1000] + +The new Foreign Secretary found the “mud of foreign politics” deeper +than any he had ever been in; but he was soon steering himself through +it as nimbly as his predecessors. Although an idealist who hated war, he +was not afraid of it, for, he wrote to Sir Francis Bertie, January 15, +1906, “We can protect ourselves . . . . for we are more supreme at sea +than we have ever been.”[1001] He followed the ways of _Realpolitik_, +playing the “grand game” of prestige politics in the ordinary way with +national interest as his ultimate guide. He impressed other men with +whom he had personal contact as trying to be entirely frank and honest +and sympathetic. Yet his insularity, his lack of knowledge of the +Continent, really prevented him from appreciating any other state’s +point of view. Combining the limitations of a “downright Britisher” with +high moral and political rectitude, he usually believed that Great +Britain was in the right and acted accordingly. Then he was unable to +comprehend why other Powers misinterpreted her policy.[1002] + +With regard to Russia, Sir Edward Grey immediately stated to the +Ambassador his hope for a settlement of the outstanding questions. Count +Benckendorff thought that negotiations were impossible “while things in +Russia were in their present condition.” Appreciating this fact, Sir +Edward Grey answered that “during this inevitable delay, it would be the +policy of our Government not to do anything which would make the +resumption of negotiations or a settlement more difficult later +on.”[1003] In January of the next year, Count Witte, Russian premier, +proposed to the British government that Czar Nicholas and King +Edward—diplomats he distrusted as being too slow—should at a personal +meeting conclude a general agreement in return for which Great Britain +should make a loan to Russia. The British Ambassador soon showed him the +impracticability of the idea.[1004] In the same month Count Benckendorff +talked vaguely and informally with Mr. Spring Rice of the Bosphorus and +the Dardanelles and of Persia—all to no object, for, as the British +government perceived, Russia was indifferent to an agreement.[1005] But +some progress was made toward a _rapprochement_. The two governments co- +operated on the Cretan and Macedonian questions.[1006] Treating each +other more frankly,[1007] each refused to take advantage of the other +early in 1906 by making a loan to Persia.[1008] The British government +renewed its assurances about Tibet in January.[1009] British bankers +agreed to participate in a forthcoming loan to Russia.[1010] The Czar +and King Edward were on cordial terms, the former late in January even +intimated to his uncle that he would be pleased with a visit from +him.[1011] And the two governments were in harmony in their policy of +helping France at Algeciras. So while the work of achieving the entente +was slow, the British government did not let it cease. + +The British Foreign Secretary also continued the previous policy toward +Germany. He knew very little of that Power, did not understand it,[1012] +and nursed a deep suspicion of it from his experiences as undersecretary +of state for foreign affairs from 1892 to 1895. He was determined not to +let Great Britain fall again into that state of trouble with other +Powers, which he thought had enabled Germany to treat her so high- +handedly at that time and to make demands upon her inimical to her +interests.[1013] His advisers in the foreign office, Sir Charles +Hardinge and Mr. Eyre Crowe, were of a similar mind, lacking the +balanced and comprehensive judgment characteristic of Lord Sanderson, +who after years of service retired from his position as permanent +undersecretary of state for foreign affairs in January, 1906.[1014] + +Sir Edward Grey was now confronted with the same kind of action on the +part of Germany which had previously angered him. He saw a conference +approaching at which the new friendship with France would be tested, at +which it would be either broken or confirmed. He was resolved that if +possible it should not be broken, though he did not necessarily intend +that it should become stronger. “It was a matter of interest,” he said +on August 3, 1914, with reference to this crisis, “to preserve it [the +Entente] as well as a point of honour to act up to the diplomatic +obligations contained in it.”[1015] At the time (December 21, 1905) he +expressed himself more concretely to Sir Arthur Nicolson as follows: + + +The Morocco Conference is going to be difficult if not critical. As far +as I can discover the Germans will refuse altogether to concede to +France the special position in Morocco, which we have promised France +not only to concede to her but to help her by diplomatic methods to +obtain. + +If she can succeed in getting this with our help it will be a great +success for the Anglo-French _Entente_; if she fails the prestige of the +_Entente_ will suffer and its vitality will be diminished. + +Our main object therefore must be to help France to carry her point at +the Conference.[1016] + + +Thus for the sake of interest and honor, that invincible pair, Sir +Edward Grey based British policy upon the matter of prestige. Whereas +Lord Lansdowne had admitted that the Anglo-French declaration over +Morocco did not bind Germany, the new British Foreign Secretary was +determined that Germany should formally recognize France’s preponderant +position in Morocco. It is to be inferred from his statement that +Germany had the alternative of accepting France’s monopolization of the +Sherifian Empire passively or of challenging it and then being forced to +accept it. + +That this ominous feeling was not peculiar to Sir Edward Grey was shown +early in January by a letter which Lord Ripon, one of the older members +of the cabinet, wrote to Lord Fitzmaurice, parliamentary undersecretary +of state for foreign affairs. It read in part as follows: + + +One cannot help being anxious about this Morocco business. I am sorry +though not surprised to hear that you think the Germans intend to make +the Conference a failure. That a European war should arise out of the +matter seems almost impossible, but when one has to deal with a +potentate like the German Emperor one can feel no real security.[1017] + + +On December 19 Count Metternich gave to Sir Edward Grey a general +explanation of Germany’s policy on the Moroccan question, expressing the +hope that the British government would play the part of conciliator at +the Conference.[1018] The British Minister replied on January 3. The +Conference filled him with concern, he said. After having studied the +documents more thoroughly, he had found that Lord Lansdowne had stated +to Count Metternich “that, in the event of war between Germany and +France, public feeling in England would be such that, in his opinion, it +would be impossible for England to remain neutral.” This statement, he +went on, he made his own; for, while the British government “wanted to +avoid trouble between Germany and France,” and would not “egg” France on +at the Conference, yet since the entente was very popular in England he +“really thought that if there was trouble, we [Great Britain] should be +involved in it. . . . . It was not a question of the policy of the +Government,” he told the Ambassador; “what made a nation most likely to +take part in war was not policy or interest, but sentiment, and if the +circumstances arose, public feeling in England would be so strong that +it would be impossible to be neutral.” British opinion, he declared, +would be moved not by hostility to Germany but by the wish to preserve +friendship with France. He made an Anglo-German _rapprochement_ +contingent upon a happy outcome of the Conference, an improvement in +Franco-German relations and the assurance thereby that the Entente +Cordiale would not be endangered. He spoke frankly, he said, because the +situation might later become such as to make openness more difficult. +When Count Metternich reminded him that Lord Lansdowne had qualified his +statement concerning the possibility of active British aid by the +further assertion, “in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany upon +France,” Sir Edward Grey made no reply. But the meaning of his statement +was clear to the Ambassador, who accepted it as an honest rendition of +the British position.[1019] + +The bluntness of these remarks seemed justified immediately by the +varying reports about Germany’s intentions which came to the British +foreign office. The German Emperor was in a friendlier mood although +angry at the tone of the British press. Baron Richthofen and Herr von +Radowitz both spoke of a desire for conciliation.[1020] The British +Consul in Hamburg, however, learned from Herr von Tschirschky of the +German foreign office on New Year’s Day that “Germany’s policy always +had been and would be to try to frustrate any coalition between two +States which might result in damaging Germany’s interests and prestige, +and Germany would, if she thought that such a coalition was being +formed, even if its actual results had not been carried into practical +effect, not hesitate to take such steps as she thought proper to break +the combination.”[1021] And Prince Bülow’s brother, minister at Berne, +remarked to his British colleague on December 31: + + +No doubt the sudden intervention of Germany [in Morocco] had not been +dictated by the desire to safeguard German interests in that region. The +object had been a higher one. Germany was bound in self-defense to +emancipate herself from the isolation with which she was threatened. +First Russia, then Italy, and lastly England had been won over by +France. The cordon must be broken, and the penultimate defeat of Russia +had furnished the propitious moment. . . . . He thought that a _détente_ +would make itself felt when once the Conference was over.[1022] + + +It was becoming more and more apparent that Anglo-German antagonism +would accentuate the difficulties of the Conference. Prince Bülow +informed the British government on January 11 that he advocated reforms +on an international basis. Stating that M. Rouvier had promised not to +seek a general police mandate for France,[1023] the Chancellor made it +understood that Germany could not accept that solution. In talking to +the British Ambassador on the next day Herr von Holstein foresaw danger +since France, relying upon British aid, might, if dissatisfied with the +results of the Conference, “seek to create a _fait accompli_ by invading +Morocco. The Sultan would appeal to the Emperor, and war would be the +result.” Asseverating that France was preparing for war, Herr von +Holstein said that the danger could be averted if the British government +would hint to the French that in the event of their invading Morocco it +was doubtful whether British opinion would approve of supporting France +by force of arms. + +Upon being consulted, Sir Francis Bertie denied that France had any such +intention, and asserted that + + +any communication to the French Gov[ernmen]t such as the Baron +[Holstein] suggests would shake the confidence of the French +Gov[ernmen]t in H[is] M[ajesty’s] present Gov[ernmen]t resulting from +their assurances as to policy of England (and) might lead France either +to make concessions to Germany in Morocco injurious to us or bring her +out of Morocco by concessions elsewhere detrimental to our interests but +not greatly to those of France. + + +After this Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Frank Lascelles, January +15, the following curt response to Herr von Holstein’s suggestion: + + +I hope the result of Morocco conference will prevent the contingency, +which Herr von Holstein contemplates, from arising. Should it however be +otherwise we cannot deprecate any action on the part of France which +comes within the terms of the Anglo-French declarations of April 1904. +Herr von Holstein should know this.[1024] + + +In these negotiations the British Foreign Secretary tried to impress the +German government with the fact that Great Britain placed herself +squarely on the French side. This was one facet of his policy. The other +had to do with France. + +The British government was as eager for France to win at the conference +as was the French government. To that end Sir Francis Bertie informed M. +Rouvier on December 22 that his government + + +would loyally act up to the engagements taken by their predecessors and +. . . . would give to France their unreserved support in the Conference +on Morocco within the four corners of the Anglo-French Agreement and the +programme arranged between the French and German Governments; but in +order to enable them to do so effectively, and to put them in a position +to act in concert with France, it would be desirable that His Majesty’s +Government should be made acquainted with the views of the French +Government on the matters to be discussed, and as to the concessions, if +any, which might be made for the satisfaction of Germany. + + +The British government, he said, wished to avoid the accusation of being +more French than the French. Going farther still, the Ambassador assured +M. Rouvier that his government was in no way associated with the +friendly manifestations toward Germany then being made in England. While +the British government wanted friendly relations with Germany, he +stated, an improvement in those relations “would depend on the attitude +of the German Government in regard to Morocco and other questions in +which England was interested.” The cordiality with which M. Rouvier +agreed to respect this wish showed how conscious both governments were +of the mutual advantages in loyal co-operation.[1025] + +The need therefor was manifested at once in the case of Spain. While +King Alfonso was regarded as entirely loyal,[1026] M. Moret, the Spanish +premier who supplanted M. Montero Rios in December, was mistrusted by +the British and French governments as being too friendly toward Germany +and uncertain in his attitude toward the Moroccan agreements. Both +governments knew of German efforts to win Spain, both learned of the +German Emperor’s offer in November of a military convention to the King +of Spain, and both learned that at Germany’s request the Spanish +government had not appointed M. Villa-Urrutia as delegate to the +Conference.[1027] At the French initiative the two governments late in +December pressed M. Moret to remain loyal to them. These efforts won +over the Spanish Premier. He frankly admitted that the Emperor had made +the offer, but denied that he had ever considered it. He stated that +Spain would support the French policy during the Conference, and hoped +that the three Powers would work harmoniously together. And he told the +French that “it will facilitate his support of them at the Conference if +they will provide money to quiet the Spanish Opposition.”[1028] +Nevertheless, the British government suspected that the Duke of +Almodovar, the Spanish delegate and proposed president of the +Conference, would be “in the hands of the German Ambassador [Herr von +Radowitz].” Sir Edward Grey also feared that Spain might, to the +detriment of British interests, be induced to cede a part of her +possessions along the north coast of Morocco or elsewhere to +Germany.[1029] So Spain remained under constant observation and pressure +by the Entente Cordiale.[1030] The British government put similar +pressure upon Italy. In informing the Italian Ambassador on December 27 +of the British policy, Sir Edward Grey remarked that the four Powers +most interested in the Mediterranean were all good friends now and that +he “hoped we should all come out of the Conference as good friends as we +went in.” The Italian government protested that it had “not only +friendship but also an alliance to be considered.” This item Sir Edward +Grey ignored, and in Rome Sir Edwin Egerton repeatedly asserted that “a +European political combination did not appear to regard special +agreements respecting a local question, such as that of Morocco.” This +veiled threat and curious interpretation of the Triple Alliance were +valuable aids to M. Barrère in urging Italy to the Anglo-French side. +The selection as delegates of the Marquis Visconti Venosta, who had made +the agreement with France in 1900, was regarded as insuring a pro-French +policy. But the Italian government could make no promises of support, +and Sir Edward Grey feared that the Marquis might, by trying to play the +“fine” but “dangerous” rôle of mediator at the Conference, suggest some +solution which would be altogether unacceptable.[1031] + +The Anglo-French co-operation extended to planning the procedure at the +Conference and to drawing up instructions for the French delegates. +Every precaution was taken for victory. The British were as sensitive to +alarms as were the French. About the middle of December both governments +heard that the proposed Austrian delegate thought it possible to bring +matters before the Conference not mentioned in the program. M. Rouvier +took immediate steps in Vienna to prevent that danger.[1032] +Furthermore, the two governments planned that the less difficult +problems should be considered first and the police question last. M. +Rouvier proposed that the published Anglo-French, Anglo-Spanish, and +Franco-German agreements over Morocco should be laid before the +Conference, but Sir Edward Grey objected that they might then be +discussed and questioned by the Powers. The British Foreign Secretary +thought that “it should appear that the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish +Agreements of 1904 were rather intended to give a formal sanction to a +_de facto_ state of affairs than to create a new situation.” M. Rouvier +accepted this suggestion. It was also in accordance with a British +proposal that the French delegate was instructed to refuse to argue the +matter of France’s right in the Algero-Moroccan frontier region, since +it might lead to an “embarrassing discussion.”[1033] + +The main problem which the British and French governments had to solve +was that of the police. For, as they learned from Prince Bülow,[1034] +Germany would propose either that Morocco be divided into sectors, each +one under the police power of a different state, or that the policing be +done by a lesser Power disinterested in Morocco. While the first +solution could be easily rejected, the second one would be more +difficult for France to combat without exposing herself to the +accusation of selfishness. If the Conference broke up because of a +refusal, France would be blamed. At this point the two governments +received a suggestion from M. Bacheracht, Russian minister at Tangier +and a delegate at the Conference, to the following effect: “All +considerations of a political character and all references to ‘special +interests,’ etc., should not be touched upon in discussion” of the +police question. The problem should be considered solely from a +practical point of view, of how to assure protection and safety to the +foreigners. Clearly that work could be done best by France and Spain, +who had had experience in handling Mohammedans, who were already +policing portions of Moroccan soil, and who could employ Mohammedans +from their North African territories to aid them. The policing might be +regarded as experimental and temporary so as to mollify German +opposition. If Germany rejected the plan, she would receive the +discredit for breaking up the Conference. The British and French +authorities accepted this proposal at once, for, as MM. Paul and Jules +Cambon said, it would be “difficult to combat.”[1035] + +After this thorough preparatory discussion, M. Rouvier sent the +following instructions to M. Révoil, a copy of which he also gave to the +British government: The repression of contraband trade should be +committed to France and Spain alone. A state bank should be established +in which French participation in capital and in personnel should be in +harmony with France’s superior rights in Morocco resulting from the loan +contract of June, 1904, and from the high percentage of trade +(approximately 80 per cent) which France together with Great Britain and +Spain had with that country as compared with that (approximately 10 per +cent) of Germany. The bank should be under the French legal system and +its president a Frenchman. Moroccan revenues should be augmented, but +not merely by an increase in customs duties. The thirty-year limitation +to commercial freedom might be extended. “In a general manner it is in +the economic program that we are disposed to accord the most complete +satisfaction. But you will avoid a definitive acquiescence in those +solutions until you are certain that the delegates do not aim to adopt +unacceptable solutions relative to the organization of the police.” This +question should refer solely to the policing of the coastal towns and +should not concern the Moroccan army. Any internationalization of the +police should be refused. The plan of dividing Morocco into sectors +among the Powers, that of selecting a minor Power to accomplish the +task, and that of selecting officers from neutral Powers should be +absolutely refused. The policing should be conferred upon France and +Spain alone. + + +In case the proposals conforming to our desires on that matter meet with +insurmountable opposition . . . ., we would consider that, the economic +questions being regulated according to our views, an accord for the +maintenance of the _status quo_ in that which concerns the police would +be an acceptable solution, if that accord respects our rights and +implies the renunciation by the other contracting parties to all action +tending to reopen the question with the Sultan without previous +agreement with us. . . . . In résumé . . . . no one will expect of us an +adhesion to any solution of a nature to compromise the future of our +national interests. Under that condition, you will show on all occasions +our sincere desire to respect the rights of other countries, to open +Morocco to the free competition of commercial interests, and you will +affirm at the same time our desire to maintain our rights and interests +only with the most formal guarantees of the sovereign rights of the +Sultan, the independence and the established traditions of his +Empire.[1036] + + +A few days later, with the approval of Spain, M. Rouvier advised the +French delegate to reject as “absolutely inacceptable” any plan to +neutralize Morocco.[1037] + +These instructions denoted a determination to defeat +internationalization, by all means to exclude Germany from Morocco, and +to divide Morocco between France and Spain. + +While these negotiations were in progress, the French government was +sounding Great Britain as to a defensive agreement against Germany. +Toward the middle of December Major Huguet, French military attaché in +London, spoke to General Grierson, director of military operations in +the British war office, about the French fears of a German attack, and +questioned him about the British organization for war. When he asked +whether the British general staff had ever considered operations in +Belgium, General Grierson replied that “as a strategical exercise” he +had worked out a plan for them last spring.[1038] + +On December 28 Major Huguet dined with Colonel Repington, a retired +officer serving as military correspondent on the _London Times_. The +conversation turned immediately to the Colonel’s article of the previous +day, in which he had denounced the attempts being made toward an Anglo- +German _rapprochement_, expressed anxiety over the international +situation, and advised full loyalty to France. The two men found +themselves in entire agreement over the possibility of complications and +over the need for France and Great Britain to be prepared for co- +operation in case of a German aggression. Major Huguet said that the +French embassy was worried because Sir Edward Grey, the new British +foreign minister, had not renewed the assurances given by his +predecessor.[1039] Time was pressing, he said, for the Conference of +Algeciras would open on January 16. He wished that Sir Edward Grey would +broach the subject at the next diplomatic reception. The French “knew +that our sympathies were with them,” so Colonel Repington has recorded +the military attaché’s words, “but they wanted to know what we should do +in case Germany confronted them with a crisis.” + +Colonel Repington immediately communicated the conversation to the +British Foreign Secretary, who was then electioneering in +Northumberland. The latter replied on December 30 as follows: “I can +only say that I have not receded from anything which Lord Lansdowne said +to the French, and have no hesitation in affirming it.” The Colonel also +reported Major Huguet’s words to Sir George Clarke, secretary of the +Defence Committee, and to Lord Esher, a member of that Committee. They +agreed that in view of the German menace, active steps toward co- +operation should be taken. As Colonel Repington was a free-lance, they +suggested that he open unofficial conversations with Major Huguet and +communicate the results to the British officials. The Colonel prepared a +set of questions which Major Huguet took to Paris on January 7. These +questions were considered by M. Rouvier, M. Etienne, minister of war, M. +Thomson, minister of marine, his naval staff, General Brun, and General +Brugère. On January 12 a cordial reply was returned to Colonel Repington +who then imparted it to the Defence Committee.[1040] + +When Major Huguet related these incidents to his ambassador, M. Cambon +was so struck by the fact that British as well as French authorities +were studying the problem of how quickly the British forces could be +mobilized for action on the Continent that he went immediately to Paris +to consult M. Rouvier.[1041] The latter approved of the plan to broach +Sir Edward Grey for a closer and more definite understanding. + +Before returning to London, M. Cambon visited his brother in Madrid. +There the two prepared the ground for later discussion by a conversation +with Sir Arthur Nicolson which the latter reported (January 2) as +follows: + + +They [MM. Cambon] asked me, supposing, as they considered probable, that +the Conference failed, what did I think would be the consequences? I +replied that in my opinion it was quite possible that the Sultan would +then apply to Germany to take in hand the military, financial and police +administration. They remarked that that would mean war. I said that I +did not consider that this would necessarily follow; but I did think +that they would have to take up a very firm attitude at Fez, and prevent +the Sultan from handing himself over to the Germans.[1042] + + +This alarming forecast, together with the staunch diplomatic support +which the British government was rendering France, strengthened the +French authorities in their resolve. When M. Cambon reached London, he +had a long conversation with Sir Edward Grey on January 10 which the +latter recorded as follows: + + +M. Cambon said that he did not believe that the German Emperor desired +war, but that His Majesty was pursuing a very dangerous policy. He had +succeeded in inciting public opinion and military opinion in Germany, +and there was a risk that matters might be brought to a point in which a +pacific issue would be difficult. During the previous discussions on the +subject of Morocco, Lord Lansdowne had expressed his opinion that the +British and French Governments should frankly discuss any eventualities +that might seem possible, and by his instructions your Excellency [Sir +Francis Bertie, ambassador in Paris] had communicated a Memorandum to M. +Delcassé to the same effect. It had not been considered necessary at the +time to discuss the eventuality of war, but it now seemed desirable that +this eventuality should also be considered. + +M. Cambon said that he had spoken to this effect to M. Rouvier, who +agreed in his view. It was not necessary, nor, indeed, expedient, that +there should be any formal alliance, but it was of great importance that +the French Government should know beforehand whether, in the event of +aggression against France by Germany, Great Britain would be prepared to +render to France armed assistance.[1043] + + +The British statesman, embarrassed by the question, replied that he +personally could give the French government no promise of active aid. He +put the Ambassador off by pointing out that the Prime Minister was away, +that the members of the cabinet were all electioneering, and that the +verdict of the elections was doubtful. He said that he could only state +as his personal opinion that “if France were to be attacked by Germany +in consequence of a question arising out of the Agreement [of April 8, +1904] . . . . public opinion in England would be strongly moved in +favour of France.” When he added that Great Britain earnestly desired +“that the conference should have a pacific issue favourable to France,” +M. Cambon replied that “nothing would have a more pacific influence on +the Emperor of Germany than the conviction that, if Germany attacked +France, she would find England allied against her.” Sir Edward Grey +answered that he thought that “the German Emperor did believe this, but +that it was one thing that this opinion should be held in Germany and +another that we should give a positive assurance to France on the +subject.” He could give no assurance, he said, of which he was +uncertain. He “did not believe that any Minister could, in present +circumstances, say more than I had done, and, however strong the +sympathy of Great Britain might be with France in the case of a rupture +with Germany, the expression which might be given to it and the action +which might follow must depend largely upon the circumstances in which +the rupture took place.”[1044] + +As Sir Edward Grey thus postponed a definitive answer until after the +elections, M. Cambon replied that he would repeat his request at that +time. But he asked that in the meantime the “unofficial communications” +between the British admiralty and war office and the French naval and +military attachés “as to what action might advantageously be taken in +case the two countries found themselves in alliance in such a war” might +be permitted to continue. “They did not pledge either Government,” he +said.[1045] + +Sir Edward Grey immediately sent a report of this conversation to the +Prime Minister and to Lord Ripon, and he met his friend, Mr. Haldane, at +Berwick on January 12 to discuss the matter, particularly the French +request concerning the military conversations.[1046] He had learned that +under the Unionist cabinet in the previous year such military and naval +conversations had taken place, and that at the present time official +conversations were going on between Admiral Sir John Fisher and the +French naval attaché while the military conversations were being held +unofficially between the French military attaché and Colonel Repington. +When consulted on January 11, General Grierson replied that “if there is +even a chance of our having to give armed assistance on land to France +or to take the field on her side in Belgium in consequence of a +violation of Belgian territory by the Germans, we should have as soon as +possible informal communication between the military authorities of +France and/or Belgium and the General Staff.”[1047] Neither Sir Edward +Grey nor Mr. Haldane saw any reason why these conversations should not +be carried on officially also. As the former argued: + + +It was quite clear that no Cabinet could undertake any obligation to go +to war, but the Anglo-French Agreement was popular in Britain. It was +certain that if Germany forced a quarrel on France upon the very matter +of that Agreement, the pro-French feeling in Britain would be very +strong, so strong probably as to justify a British Government in +intervening on the side of France or even to insist on its doing so. We +must, therefore, be free to go to the help of France as well as free to +stand aside. But modern war may be an affair of days. If there were no +military plans made beforehand we should be unable to come to the +assistance of France in time, however strongly public opinion in Britain +might desire it. We should in effect not have preserved our freedom to +help France, but have cut ourselves off from the possibility of doing +so, unless we had allowed the British and French staffs to concert plans +for common action.[1048] + + +The Prime Minister feared the interpretation that would be put upon +these conversations. “I do not like the stress laid upon joint +preparations,” he wrote to Lord Ripon on February 2. “It comes very +close to an honourable undertaking; and it will be known on both sides +of the Rhine.” However, he considered them to be merely “provisional and +precautionary measures” not binding the government, “raising no new +question of policy and therefore within the competence of the War +Office.” So he agreed to them.[1049] It was definitely understood that +these military conversations did not bind the governments.[1050] On +January 17 they were begun between the French military attaché and +General Grierson and continued uninterrupted between the French and +British general staffs until the outbreak of the World War.[1051] + +The same reasoning applied to Belgium, for both the French and the +British authorities expected Germany to violate Belgian neutrality in +order to strike France suddenly from the northeast.[1052] On January 15 +Sir Edward Grey therefore instructed General Grierson to open +conversations with the Belgian military authorities “as to the manner in +which, in case of need, British assistance could be most effectually +afforded to Belgium for the defence of her neutrality. Such +communications,” he continued, “must be solely provisional and +noncommittal.”[1053] Colonel Barnardiston, the British military attaché +in Brussels, broached the subject on January 18 to General Ducarne, +Belgian chief of staff, remarking that the British Minister would bring +up the matter with the Belgian Foreign Minister.[1054] After consulting +the Minister of War, General Ducarne agreed to the conversations.[1055] +This decision was anticipated by Colonel Barnardiston, who had learned +that the Belgian military authorities were quietly making preparations +for instant mobilization.[1056] The Anglo-Belgian negotiations continued +at least until the end of April.[1057] + +These conversations, both military and naval, were kept secret. The +Anglo-Belgian negotiations were known to only half-a-dozen persons; the +ones with France were not known to all the members of the British +cabinet although reports of them leaked out in the press about the +middle of 1906.[1058] Sir Edward Grey wanted to prevent either these +conversations or any military or naval action from being regarded as +provocations. In informing Lord Tweedmouth, first lord of the admiralty, +of the Anglo-French conversations, he wrote, January 16: + + +Meanwhile the mood of the German Emperor is said to be pacific; the tone +of German diplomacy is quiet and not aggressive. Any movement of our +ships which could be interpreted as a threat to Germany would be very +undesirable at this moment and most unfortunate so long as there is a +prospect or even a chance that things may go smoothly at the Morocco +Conference which meets today. I hope therefore that the Admiralty won’t +plan any special cruises or visits to Foreign ports or unusual movements +of squadrons without consulting the F[oreign] O[ffice] as to the +possible political effect. + +I assume that the present disposition of the Fleet is satisfactory as +regards possibilities between Germany and France; if so the quieter we +keep for the present the better.[1059] + + +With the opening of these conversations a new military problem +confronted the British which Mr. Haldane, then minister of war, has +described as follows: + + +It was, how to mobilize and concentrate at a place of assembly to be +opposite the Belgian frontier, a force calculated as adequate (with the +assistance of Russian pressure in the East) to make up for the +inadequacy of the French armies for their great task of defending the +entire French frontier from Dunkirk down to Belfort, or even further +south, if Italy should join the Triple Alliance in an attack.[1060] + + +At the time, in January, the Committee of Imperial Defence, although not +all of its members knew of the military conversations then beginning, +studied the question. It decided that “four Divisions and a Cavalry +Division” could be landed at the nearest French port in case of a sudden +outbreak of hostilities.[1061] The admiralty was prepared “to bar the +Channel against the German squadrons.”[1062] The Minister of War began a +thorough reorganization of the army in order to make British aid +effective at the desired moment in the future.[1063] + +Having settled this matter, Sir Edward Grey had the difficult problem of +how to answer M. Cambon’s question about a formal agreement.[1064] As it +was inconvenient then to hold a cabinet meeting, Sir Edward Grey talked +over the reply to be given with the Premier and Mr. Haldane, who were +both in London after January 26, and asked Sir Francis Bertie to write +his opinion.[1065] + +The Ambassador wrote that France did not desire war at all, but that if +a conflict did arise over Morocco either then or later she expected +active British support. He warned his chief that if his answer did not +assure to France + + +more than a continuance of diplomatic support, or of neutrality in the +event of a war provoked by Germany, there is serious danger of a +complete revulsion of feeling on the part of the French Government and +of public opinion in France. The Government would consider that they had +been deserted and might, in order to avoid the risks of a war without +ally, deem it advisable to make great concessions to Germany outside +Morocco in order to obtain liberty of action in that country. + +Such concessions might not be very great sacrifices for France but they +might well be very detrimental to the interests of the British Empire, +for, in the temper in which France would then be, it could not be +expected that she would give them much consideration.[1066] + + +Sir Edward Grey’s personal opinion was that “if France is let in for a +war with Germany arising out of our agreement with her about Morocco, we +cannot stand aside, but must take part with France.” While pondering the +question of an alliance, he saw the great difficulties in making +one.[1067] He decided to adapt the policy of his predecessor in office +to the new situation created by M. Cambon’s request. This policy is best +explained in the long dispatch which Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir +Francis Bertie about his interview with the French Ambassador on January +31: + + +The French Ambassador asked me again to-day whether France would be able +to count upon the assistance of England in the event of an attack upon +her by Germany. + +I said that I had spoken on the subject to the Prime Minister and +discussed it with him, and that I had three observations to submit. + +In the first place, since the Ambassador had spoken to me a good deal of +progress has been made. Our military and naval authorities had been in +communication with the French, and I assumed that all preparations were +ready, so that, if a crisis arose, no time would have been lost for want +of a formal engagement. + +In the second place, a week or more before Monsieur Cambon had spoken to +me, I had taken an opportunity of expressing to Count Metternich my +personal opinion, which I understood Lord Lansdowne had also expressed +to him as a personal opinion, that, in the event of an attack upon +France by Germany arising out of our Moroccan Agreement, public feeling +in England would be so strong that no British Government could remain +neutral. I urged upon Monsieur Cambon that this, which I had reason to +know had been correctly reported at Berlin, had produced there the moral +effect which Monsieur Cambon had urged upon me as being one of the great +securities of peace and the main reason for a formal engagement between +England and France with regard to armed co-operation. + +In the third place, I pointed out to Monsieur Cambon that at present +French policy in Morocco, within the four corners of the Declaration +exchanged between us, was absolutely free, that we did not question it, +that we suggested no concessions and no alterations in it, that we left +France a free hand and gave unreservedly our diplomatic support on which +she could count; but that, should our promise extend beyond diplomatic +support, and should we take an engagement which might involve us in a +war, I was sure my colleagues would say that we must from that time be +consulted with regard to French policy in Morocco, and, if need be, be +free to press upon the French Government concessions or alterations of +their policy which might seem to us desirable to avoid a war. + +I asked Monsieur Cambon to weigh these considerations in his mind, and +to consider whether the present situation as regards ourselves and +France was not so satisfactory that it was unnecessary to alter it by a +formal declaration as he desired. + + +M. Cambon replied that a war might break out over some Moroccan incident +so quickly that if it were necessary for the British government “to +consult, and to wait for manifestations of English public opinion, it +might be too late to be of use.” He repeated his request for some form +of verbal assurance. Sir Edward Grey pointed out the difficulties of +giving this assurance—that it would be a “solemn undertaking,” that it +would have to be put in writing and submitted to the cabinet and also to +Parliament. He said that it would constitute the transformation of the +entente into a defensive alliance, that it could not be given +unconditionally, and that the conditions “would be difficult to +describe.” He again asked M. Cambon “whether the force of circumstances +bringing England and France together was not stronger than any assurance +in words which could be given at this moment.” He added that German +pressure “might eventually transform the ‘Entente’ into a defensive +alliance,” yet at the time he did not think that the change was needed. +When M. Cambon emphasized the fact that Sir Edward Grey had expressed +his personal opinion that in case of a German attack upon France, no +British government could remain neutral, the latter replied that he had +said this first to Count Metternich and not to him, + + +because, supposing it appeared that I had overestimated the strength of +feeling of my countrymen, there could be no disappointment in Germany; +but I could not express so decidedly my personal opinion to France, +because a personal opinion was not a thing upon which, in so serious a +matter, a policy could be founded. In speaking to him, therefore, I must +keep well within the mark. Much depended as to the manner in which the +war broke out between Germany and France. + + +Sir Edward Grey believed that the British people would be unwilling to +fight in order to put France into possession of Morocco. But if “it +appeared that the war was forced upon France by Germany to break up the +Anglo-French ‘Entente,’ public opinion would undoubtedly be very strong +on the side of France.” He said, however, that British sentiment was +much averse to war, and that it was not certain whether this aversion +would be overcome by the desire to aid France. While he was ready to +reopen the conversation at any time in the future, he did not think that +the situation justified such a radical change at that time.[1068] M. +Cambon appeared to be satisfied with that answer.[1069] + +Thus, Sir Edward Grey laid down the policy which he followed until the +outbreak of the World War. He was open and frank with both France and +Germany. To the German government he emphasized the probability of +British intervention in favor of France in case of war. To the French +government he gave the promise of full diplomatic support; while +permitting preparations for any emergency, he refused to give to the +French assurance of active aid in case of war or even to speak as firmly +on that score as he did to the German government. Instead of binding +Great Britain and France in an alliance—an act which would have forced +him to keep a hand on France’s policy toward Morocco and Germany—Sir +Edward Grey kept British hands free. In giving France sufficient +assurance to maintain Anglo-French intimacy and co-operation, he +depended upon the uncertainty of British support in a crisis to hold +France back. He relied upon the same uncertainty—this time, however, +that Great Britain might enter a Franco-German conflict—to restrain +Germany. By this apparently simple but really intricate policy he sought +to satisfy the needs of British foreign relations. + + +[Footnote 959: Memo. by Bülow, Nov. 23, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 14 f., No. +6900.] + +[Footnote 960: Rouvier was apparently led astray by William II’s +instructions to the Prince of Monaco in October to tell Rouvier that “he +would lay no hindrances whatever in the way of the French policy” +(Radolin to F. O., Oct. 18, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 596 f. and note, No. +6836). Rouvier sounded the German embassy first through a third person +and then unofficially through M. Louis of the foreign office.] + +[Footnote 961: Memo. by Mühlberg, Nov. 30, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 20 ff., +No. 6906.] + +[Footnote 962: On this episode see _ibid._, Nos. 6901, 6903 ff. The +editors of _G.P._ assure us that there is no indication in the documents +that Rouvier followed up the subject (_ibid._, p. 23). Joseph Caillaux +states that Rouvier was back of the overture made through Vaffier- +Pollet. He also asserts that in Nov., 1905, Rouvier offered the port of +Mogador and its hinterland to Germany, but that the latter refused +(_Agadir, ma politique extérieure_ [Paris, 1919], p. 25). There is no +reference to this proposal in _G.P._ Caillaux is probably referring to +the offer made through Eckardstein in May, 1905.] + +[Footnote 963: Bülow, _Reden_, II, 250 ff., 272 ff.; see also Hammann, +_Bilder_, pp. 43 f. At the opening of the Reichstag on Nov. 28 the +Emperor declared that Germany stood with all Powers in “correct +relations” and with the most of them in “good and friendly relations” +(Schulthess _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, pp. 132 f.).] + +[Footnote 964: Report from the Belgian Minister at Berlin, Dec. 2 and +11, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 92 ff.] + +[Footnote 965: _Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ (Chambre), pp. 4034 +ff. Rouvier received a vote of confidence of 501 to 51 (_ibid._, p. +4050).] + +[Footnote 966: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 662 ff.] + +[Footnote 967: William II to Bülow, Dec. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 693, No. +6887; Flotow to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 15 ff., No. 6901; +Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 52, No. 6924.] + +[Footnote 968: So Ojeda, Spanish undersecretary of state for foreign +affairs, declared to Cartwright on Jan. 22, 1906 (Cartwright to Grey, +Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252). There is no indication in +_G.P._ that those terms were known.] + +[Footnote 969: Memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 28 f., No. +6914. It contained the conclusions of a conference by Bülow with +Richthofen, Mühlberg, and Klehmet.] + +[Footnote 970: On Jan. 8 the government published a _Weissbuch_ on +Morocco of thirty-nine pages substantiating the German accusations +against the French policy. According to Bülow it was intended to +supplement the French _Livre jaune_ (_G.P._, XXI, 24 n.). Its appearance +made a painful impression in France. Rouvier found it “scarcely +courteous” and hardly indicative of the conciliatory spirit which +Germany professed to have (report from Paris, Jan. 11, 1906, _Zur europ. +Politik_, II, 99 f.). It was well received by the German press +(Lascelles to Grey, Jan. 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 215 f., No. 235.).] + +[Footnote 971: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 38 ff., No. +6922 and Anlage.] + +[Footnote 972: Metternich was very pessimistic about the outcome. See +Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 2, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 672 ff., No. 6881; Bülow +to Metternich, Nov. 6, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 673, No. 6364.] + +[Footnote 973: Tattenbach to Bülow, Nov. 4, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 12, No. +6898.] + +[Footnote 974: Bülow to Sternburg, Oct. 29, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 641 f., +No. 6341 and note; Sternburg to F. O., Nov. 3, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 9 f., +No. 6896; Bülow to Sternburg, Nov. 7, 1905, _ibid._, 11 f., No. 6897; +memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 23 f., No. 6909; Dennis, +_Adventures in American Diplomacy_, pp. 398 f., 499. Mr. Choate, +ambassador in London, had been selected as American delegate in August +(_Roosevelt-Lodge Correspondence_, II, 172 ff.); but the final choice +rested on Mr. White, ambassador at Rome.] + +[Footnote 975: Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 22, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 27 n.; cf. +Steed, _Through Thirty Years_, I, 234.] + +[Footnote 976: According to a minute by the Emperor William to a +dispatch from Stumm on Feb. 20, 1906 (the only reference to this +incident which _G.P._ contains), during the visit of the King of Spain +to Germany in the previous November the Emperor had “proposed to the +Spanish King to renew the agreement with his father and a convention +regarding the common action of our armies! Whereupon the King said that +he knew nothing of that matter, but would look into it upon his return.” +Nothing came of the matter. See _G.P._, XXI, 191, No. 7024. See also +Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 160, No. 197; Nicolson to +Grey, Dec. 26 and 27, 1905, _ibid._, 165, No. 205; 167, No. 208.] + +[Footnote 977: Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 14, 1906, _B.D._, III, 150 f., No. +192.] + +[Footnote 978: Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 54, No. 6925.] + +[Footnote 979: So expressed by San Giuliano, Italian foreign minister. +(Monts to Bülow, Jan. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 34 ff., No. 6921).] + +[Footnote 980: Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 53 f., No. 6925; +Monts to Bülow, Jan 6, 1906, _ibid._, 56 ff., No. 6928.] + +[Footnote 981: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 59, No. 6929.] + +[Footnote 982: Bülow to Radolin, Dec. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 30 f., No. +6916; memo. by Radolin, Dec. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 31, No. 6917; memo. by +Bülow, Dec. 30, 1905, _ibid._, 32, No. 6918.] + +[Footnote 983: Flotow to F. O., Dec. 20, 1905; _ibid._, 25 f., No. 6911; +Radolin to F. O., Jan. 8 and 10, 1906, _ibid._, 60 f., No. 6931; 64 f., +No. 6934; Radolin to Bülow, Jan. 16, 1906, _ibid._, XX, 697 f., 6888; +Radowitz to Bülow, Dec. 27, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 32 f., No. 6919 f.; +Bülow also remained willing to negotiate directly with the French +government over the Moroccan affair (Bülow to Radolin, Jan. 16, 1906, +_ibid._, 67, No. 6936).] + +[Footnote 984: Report from Berlin, Dec. 24, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, +II, 97 f.; report from Berlin, Dec. 31, 1905, _Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, +No. 14; Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 2, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 672 ff., +No. 6881; 685 ff., No. 6886; Bülow, II, 434; Schulthess, _1905_, p. 154. +The Emperor refused twice to help before Bülow won him over. See Bülow +to William II, Dec. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 679 ff., No. 6882, and the +Emperor’s minutes.] + +[Footnote 985: So D. M. Wallace, special representative of the _London +Times_ at the conference, asserted to Radowitz (Radowitz to F. O., Jan. +21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 95 n.).] + +[Footnote 986: Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 524 ff.; Edward VII to +William II, Jan. 23, Feb. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 108 f., No. 6961; 111 +f., No. 6963; William II to Edward VII, Feb. 1, 1906, _ibid._, 110 f., +No. 6962.] + +[Footnote 987: “If England restricts herself to the diplomatic support +of the French claims, peace and the permanent open door are assured. But +as soon as France has reason to count on the armed help of England for +the conquest of Morocco and for any results therefrom, then both peace +and the open door will be endangered” (Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 17, 1906, +_ibid._, 94, No. 6950). A similar thought was expressed by Bülow to +Lascelles, Jan. 24, to Sir Edgar Speyer, London banker and friend of +Grey’s, on Jan. 18, by Metternich to Grey, Dec. 20, Jan. 23, and was +given out to the press. See _ibid._, 96 ff., Nos. 6953 f.; 106 ff., No. +6960; 103 ff., No. 6959; _ibid._, XX, 685 ff., No. 6886.] + +[Footnote 988: For Bülow’s reasoning see his dispatch to Moltke, Jan. +24, 1906, _ibid._, XXI, 77 ff., No. 6943.] + +[Footnote 989: A report of a partial French mobilization on the eastern +frontier did alarm Bülow, but it was immediately proved to be untrue +(_ibid._, 71 ff., Nos. 6937 ff.).] + +[Footnote 990: The German government had announced a new navy bill, +which would have been proposed anyway, and was only hastened because the +visit of the British fleet to the Baltic and the revelations in _Le +Matin_ insured it a favorable reception by the German public. Aside from +that Germany took special pains to avoid leaving the impression that she +was preparing for a conflict. Moltke, at his own suggestion, postponed +his visit to Vienna to announce himself as the new chief of staff until +after the conference closed so as to avoid suspicion. See Moltke to +Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 79 and note, No. 6944. See also Philip +Fürst zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, _Aus 50 Jahren. Erinnerungen, Tagebücher, +und Briefe_ (ed. Johannes Haller; Berlin, 1923), p. 311. Moltke, +however, did not expect the French to recede, writing to Bülow on +January 23 as follows: “In my opinion the French now consider further +concession on the Moroccan question as incompatible with the honor of +their land, after they have already receded once and have let Delcassé +fall. + +“They fear therefore that as a result of their firm stand the conference +may not only end without result but may also lead to war. They +themselves wish no war and do not think of attacking. But they wish to +be armed against an attack from Germany” (_G.P._, XXI, 75, No. 6942).] + +[Footnote 991: William II to Bülow, Dec. 29, 1906, _ibid._, XX, 690 ff., +No. 6887. The account of the Emperor’s conversation with Laguiche was +published in _Le Temps_ on Dec. 28. Richthofen spoke to a similar effect +to the Belgian minister (_Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, No. 14).] + +[Footnote 992: Radolin to Bülow, Jan. 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 60 f., No. +6931; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 51 f., No. 6924; _Zur +europ. Politik_, II, 95 f., 99; Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, pp. 92 ff. +See also Bompard’s analysis of the German policy toward France (Spring +Rice to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir +Cecil Spring Rice_, II, 58 f.).] + +[Footnote 993: According to Moltke, France was making military and +financial preparations for defensive purposes. “The fortifications on +the eastern frontier are being strengthened and put in a more defensive +condition. Their provisions in munitions and food are being replenished. +The forces of the frontier defence troops are apparently being brought +approximately to the legal number for peace time by the addition of +troops from the interior. Moreover, reserves are here and there being +called up to undergo their legal drilling. + +“The training of the troops on the frontier is being furthered in every +way. Numerous trial mobilizations by the various garrisons and drilling +of the border troops by day and night are occurring. + +“But all these preparations are not to be regarded as preparations for +an intended mobilization but only as precautionary measures, which are +easily explained” (Moltke to Bülow, Jan. 23, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 75, No. +6942). + +According to the Belgian Minister at Paris, Jan. 16, 1906, the sum of +270,000,000 francs was being devoted to the defenses (_Zur europ. +Politik_, II, 103).] + +[Footnote 994: Meyer to Root, Jan. 9, 1906, Dennis, _Adventures in +American Diplomacy_, p. 498; _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 99 f.] + +[Footnote 995: The Russian delegate, Count Cassini, declared that in +forty years he had never received such positive instructions (Tardieu, +p. 88; Witte, _Memoirs_, p. 298; Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, +_B.D._, III, 204, No. 223). Rouvier repeated the refusal of that loan +just before the conference (Witte, pp. 295 ff., 429 f.; Nicholas II to +William II, Jan. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 125 f., and note). Concerning +that loan Sir Edward Grey wrote to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, as follows: “. +. . . Russia has demanded a loan on improper terms as the price of her +support [at the conference]” (_B.D._, III, 178, No. 216).] + +[Footnote 996: Meyer to Root, Jan. 9, 1906, Dennis, p. 498. Witte +apparently offered to obtain this promise in return for an immediate +French loan, but the Czar refused to give it—at least, that was Spring +Rice’s inference (Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, II, 57 +f.).] + +[Footnote 997: Dennis, pp. 498 f.; Durand to Grey, Jan. 11, 1905, +_B.D._, III, 217, No. 236.] + +[Footnote 998: Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905; _B.D._, III, 165, No. +204.] + +[Footnote 999: See Rouvier’s assertion to Hardinge on Jan. 15, 1906, +_ibid._, 227 and inclosure, No. 245.] + +[Footnote 1000: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 193 ff.; +Grey, _Twenty-five Years_, I, 60 ff., Richard Burdon Haldane, _An +Autobiography_ (London, 1929), pp. 157 ff., 168 ff.] + +[Footnote 1001: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 178, No. +216.] + +[Footnote 1002: Cf. Spender, _The Public Life_ (1925), I, 112 ff.; +Haldane, _An Autobiography_, pp. 215 f.; cf. Hermann Lutz, _Lord Grey +und der Weltkrieg_ (Berlin, 1927).] + +[Footnote 1003: Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 13, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 218, No. +204; Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 22, 1905, Gwynn, II, 53 f.] + +[Footnote 1004: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3 and 16, 1906, _B.D._, IV, +219 f., No. 205; 221, No. 207; and Gwynn, II, 54 f., 57; Spring Rice to +Knollys, Jan. 3 and 16, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 22, 26.] + +[Footnote 1005: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, Gwynn, II, 55 f.] + +[Footnote 1006: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 26, 1906, _B.D._, IV, 222 ff., +No. 208; Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 22, 1905, Gwynn, II, 53 f.] + +[Footnote 1007: See Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 20, 1905, _B.D._, IV, +213 f., No. 200; Hardinge to Grey, Jan. 6, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 622 f.] + +[Footnote 1008: _Ibid._, chap. xxvii, Part III. Nicolson suspected that +Russia acted so loyally because she had no money with which to make the +loan (Nicolson to Grey, Sept. 12, 1906, _ibid._, 242, No. 228).] + +[Footnote 1009: Grey to Spring Rice, Jan. 3, 1906, _ibid._, 323, No. +304.] + +[Footnote 1010: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, _ibid._, 220, No. +205.] + +[Footnote 1011: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 223, No. +208; Lee, II, 564; Spring Rice to Mallet, Jan. 31, 1906, Gwynn, II, 61 +f.] + +[Footnote 1012: Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 215.] + +[Footnote 1013: Grey, I, 100 f.] + +[Footnote 1014: Cf. memo. by Crowe, Jan. 1, 1907, _B.D._, III, 397 ff.; +memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _ibid._, pp. 420 ff.; Haldane, _An +Autobiography_, p. 215.] + +[Footnote 1015: Grey, I, 100 f.] + +[Footnote 1016: _B.D._, III, 162, No. 200.] + +[Footnote 1017: Lucien Wolf, _Life of the First Marquess of Ripon_ +(London, 1921), II, 292 f.; see also Spring Rice to Mallet, Jan. 31, +1906, Gwynn, II, 61.] + +[Footnote 1018: Metternich gives the date of the conversation as Dec. +18. See Grey to Whitehead, Dec. 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 160 f., No. 198; +Metternich to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 685 ff., No. 6886.] + +[Footnote 1019: On this conversation between Grey and Metternich see the +following: Grey to Lascelles Jan. 9, 1906, Grey to Campbell-Bannerman, +Jan. 9, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 80 ff., 114, and in _B.D._, III, 209 +ff., No. 229; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 3 and 4, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 45 +ff., Nos. 6923 f. Grey repeated his statement to Metternich on Jan. 10, +1906. See Metternich to F. O., Jan. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 64, No. 6933. See +also Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 24, 1906, quoting a dispatch from +Metternich, _ibid._, 103 ff., No. 6959. However, Van Grooten, secretary +of the Belgian ministry in London, reported to his government on Jan. 14 +as follows: “Of late the Minister of Foreign Affairs has repeated at +various occasions to the different Ambassadors accredited in London that +Great Britain has engaged herself towards France in the Moroccan +question and that she will meet her obligations fully even in case of a +Franco-German war and at all costs. The press and public opinion give +proof of the same sentiments” (_Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, p. 19). The +report is exaggerated, but it is significant that it was current.] + +[Footnote 1020: Lascelles to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, _B.D._, III, 206 ff., +Nos. 225 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 163, No. 203.] + +[Footnote 1021: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 257 f.] + +[Footnote 1022: Acton to Grey, Dec. 31, 1905, _B.D._, III, 167 f., No. +209.] + +[Footnote 1023: Rouvier denied that he had done so. Notes by Hardinge, +Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226 and inclosure, No. 245 (see above).] + +[Footnote 1024: On this episode see Lascelles to Grey, D. Jan. 3, R. +Jan. 6, 1905, D. Jan. 11, R. Jan. 15; dated Jan. 12, D. Jan. 13, R. Jan. +15, 1906, _ibid._, 207 f., No. 226; 217 ff., Nos. 237 f.; 222 f., Nos. +240 f.; Grey to Lascelles, Jan. 9 and 15, 1906, _ibid._, 211 f., No. +230; 225, No. 243; Bertie to Grey, Jan. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 224, No. 242; +memo. by Holstein, Jan. 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 96 f., No. 6953.] + +[Footnote 1025: Bertie to Grey, D. Dec. 22, R. Dec. 27, 1905, _B.D._, +III, 163 ff., No. 204; Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 162, +No. 200. “Nous serons biens sûrement avec vous,” Grey stated to Cambon +(Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _ibid._, 160, No. 197).] + +[Footnote 1026: Tardieu, pp. 81 f.] + +[Footnote 1027: Nicolson thought that he would have been “an admirable +selection.” King Edward’s comment to the report of Germany’s veto was, +“a case of bullying as usual!” See Nicolson to Grey, D. Dec. 14, R. Dec. +23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 150 f., No. 192.] + +[Footnote 1028: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 178, No. 216.] + +[Footnote 1029: Minutes to dispatch from Nicolson to Grey, D. Jan. 5, R. +Jan. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 209, No. 227.] + +[Footnote 1030: Grey stated to the Spanish Ambassador, Jan. 3, 1906, as +follows: “All the four Powers most directly interested in the +Mediterranean had made arrangements with each other which were +satisfactory to themselves and it was most undesirable that they should +allow these arrangements to be disturbed” (Grey to Nicolson, Jan. 10, +1906, _ibid._, 215, No. 234). On this Spanish affair see also Grey to +Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _ibid._, 160, No. 197; Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 14, +20, 21, 1905, _ibid._, 151, No. 193; 161 f., Nos. 199 ff.; Nicolson to +Grey, Dec. 22, 25, 27, 1905, Jan. 5 and 9, 1906, _ibid._, 163, No. 202; +165, No. 205; 167, No. 208; 208 f., No. 227; 212, No. 231; Bertie to +Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 163 ff., No. 204.] + +[Footnote 1031: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 225, No. 244; +Grey to Egerton, Dec. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 166, No. 206; Egerton to Grey, +Dec. 27, 1905, Jan. 9, 1906, _ibid._, 166 f., No. 207; 212 f., No. 232.] + +[Footnote 1032: Gorst to Bertie, Dec. 13, 1905, _ibid._, 149 f. and +inclosure, No. 191; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 158 f., No. +195.] + +[Footnote 1033: Memo. by Cambon, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226, No. 244 +and inclosure; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 17, 1906, _ibid._, 228 f., No. +247.] + +[Footnote 1034: Lascelles to Grey, D. Jan. 11, R. Jan. 15, 1906, +_ibid._, 217 ff., No. 237.] + +[Footnote 1035: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 205 f., No. +224; Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 213 ff., No. 233. See also +Bompard’s conversation with Spring Rice as reported by the latter to +Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, II, 59 f.] + +[Footnote 1036: Rouvier to Révoil, Jan. 12, 1906, _B.D._, III, 220 ff., +No. 239; Tardieu, pp. 101 ff., 244; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, +_B.D._, III, 164, No. 204. In talking to Sir Charles Hardinge on Jan. 15 +Rouvier added a third alternative—“a mandate to France, Spain and a +third Power to study and elaborate a scheme for submission to the +Powers” (notes by Hardinge, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226 f., No. 245 and +inclosure).] + +[Footnote 1037: Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 233 f., No. +253.] + +[Footnote 1038: Grierson to Sanderson, Jan. 11, 1906; _ibid._, 172, No. +211.] + +[Footnote 1039: This display of doubt about Great Britain’s loyalty was +one of France’s best means of gaining that Power’s support. See +Bompard’s assertions as reported by Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 31, +1906, Gwynn, II, 62; also see below.] + +[Footnote 1040: The story is given in Lieutenant-Colonel Charles à Court +Repington, _The First World War, 1914-1918: Personal Experiences_ +(London, 1920), I, 2 ff.] + +[Footnote 1041: Général Huguet, _L’intervention militaire britannique en +1914_ (Paris, 1928), p. 15.] + +[Footnote 1042: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, _B.D._, III, 206, No. +224.] + +[Footnote 1043: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, quoted in Spender, _Life +of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 249 ff.; Grey, I, 70 f.; _B.D._, III, 170 +f., No. 210_a_.] + +[Footnote 1044: This document is sufficient proof against the accusation +of the editors of _G.P._ that Grey went further in his assertions to the +French Ambassador in his first conversation with the latter, and that +afterward, apparently restrained by the more pacific Premier, he +qualified his position in the interview of Jan. 31. It is apparent that +Grey’s statements of Jan. 10 and 31 do not differ in kind or degree, +except that in the latter the Foreign Secretary expanded the conditions +which he had already formulated in the earlier interview (see _G.P._, +XXI, 48 f. note; see also below).] + +[Footnote 1045: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 70 +ff., in Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 249 ff., and in +_B.D._, III, 170 f., No. 210. Cambon’s account to Rouvier of the +conversation is given in _ibid._, 173 f., No. 212. Sanderson was present +at that interview.] + +[Footnote 1046: Grey, I, 72, 114; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, +II, 251 f.; Repington, I, 12 f.] + +[Footnote 1047: Grierson to Sanderson, Jan. 11, 1906, _B.D._, III, 172, +No. 211.] + +[Footnote 1048: Grey, I, 72 f.] + +[Footnote 1049: “C-B was a fine old Tory in Army matter” (Repington, I, +13). On this affair see Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253, +256 f.; Repington, I, 12 f.; Viscount Haldane, _Before the War_ (London, +1920), p. 184; Grey, I, 70 ff., 83; Haldane, _An Autobiography_, pp. 189 +f.] + +[Footnote 1050: Grey, I, 70 ff.] + +[Footnote 1051: _Ibid._, pp. 73 f.; Repington, I, 13; _B.D._, III, 169, +editor’s note, 438 ff. In 1911 Grey wrote to Asquith that he never knew +anything more of the course of those conversations (Grey, I, 92).] + +[Footnote 1052: Sydenham, _My Working Life_, pp. 186 f., 190; Haldane, +_Before the War_, p. 45; Repington, I, 3. The British based their belief +on the German construction of obviously unnecessary railroads to the +Belgian frontier (_Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the +Outbreak of the European War_ [1915], pp. 365 f.).] + +[Footnote 1053: Sanderson to Grierson, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 176 +f., No. 214; Grierson to Barnardiston, Jan. 16, 1906, _ibid._, 179, No. +217_b_.] + +[Footnote 1054: In a dispatch to Grierson on Jan. 19 Barnardiston wrote +that he had told Ducarne at their first meeting that Sir C. Phipps, the +British minister in Brussels, had already mentioned the matter to the +Belgian Foreign Minister (_ibid._, III, 188). In some notes by +Barnardiston deposited in the war office, he stated that Phipps would +speak to the Belgian Foreign Minister. The Belgian government asserts +that there is no record of such a communication; rather, that the +Foreign Minister learned of the military conversations from the Belgian +Minister of War. There is no report of any conversation on this subject +between Phipps and the Belgian Minister in the papers in the British +foreign office, nor is there any record of instructions on it being sent +to Phipps. On March 17 Barnardiston wrote to Grierson that both the +Belgian Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign Affairs knew of the +conversation (editor’s note, _ibid._, p. 203; _Collected Diplomatic +Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War_, p. 355; +Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 201 f.). There is no doubt but that the +conversations were approved by both foreign ministers.] + +[Footnote 1055: Barnardiston to Grierson, Jan. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, +187 f.] + +[Footnote 1056: Barnardiston to Phipps, Jan. 17, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 179 +f.] + +[Footnote 1057: On these negotiations see the correspondence between +Grierson and Barnardiston in _ibid._, pp. 187 ff.; _Collected Diplomatic +Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War_, pp. 350 ff.; +Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 201 ff.] + +[Footnote 1058: Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 193; +Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 191.] + +[Footnote 1059: _B.D._, III, 203.] + +[Footnote 1060: Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 45 f.] + +[Footnote 1061: Statement written by Lord Sydenham, July 19, 1927, +_B.D._, III, 185, No. 221_a_; memo. by Brigadier General Nicholson, Nov. +6, 1911, _ibid._, pp. 186 f.; Admiral Ottley to First Sea Lord, Jan. 13, +1906, _ibid._, p. 186; Sydenham, p. 186.] + +[Footnote 1062: Memo. by Cambon, Jan. 31, 1906; _B.D._, III, 193, No. +220_a_.] + +[Footnote 1063: Haldane, _Before the War_, chap. iv.] + +[Footnote 1064: Grey informed Cambon of the approval of the naval and +military conversations on Jan. 15, but postponed answering the larger +question (Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 177, No. 215; 225, +No. 244.)] + +[Footnote 1065: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253, 256 ff.; +Grey, I, 84. Grey’s omission to consult the entire cabinet has been +severely criticized. He has admitted in his memoirs that he did wrong. +See especially Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 191; Earl Loreburn, _How +the War Came_ (London, 1919), pp. 80 f.; cf. Spender, _Life, Journalism +and Politics_, I, 193.] + +[Footnote 1066: Bertie to Grey, D. Jan. 13, R. Jan. 18, 1906, _B.D._, +III, 174 ff., No. 213.] + +[Footnote 1067: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 177 f., No. 216; +Grey, I, 75.] + +[Footnote 1068: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253 ff.; +Grey, II, 76 ff.; _B.D._, III, 180 ff., No. 219. Cambon and Grey +exchanged memoranda of that conversation. According to Mr. Eyre Crowe, +senior clerk in the British foreign office, Cambon’s account differed +from Grey’s on the following points: “(A) The French note alludes to the +intention of the British Admiralty in case of a conflict with Germany, +to bar the Channel against the German squadrons. This passage does not +occur in Sir E. Grey’s draft. . . . . (B) The French note contains no +allusion to the argument given in the following passage of Sir E. Grey’s +draft: ‘I did not think people in England would be prepared to fight in +order to put France in possession of Morocco. They would say that France +should wait for opportunities and be content to take time, and that it +was unreasonable to hurry matters to the point of war’” (Crowe’s minute +to the memo. by Cambon, Jan. 31, 1906, _ibid._, 183 f., No. 220_a_). On +Feb. 1 Sanderson talked over the two drafts with Cambon, who made some +changes in his. Sanderson again emphasized the reasons why the British +government could not give the desired assurance, speaking in part as +follows: “I told him [Cambon] that I thought that if the Cabinet were to +give a pledge which would morally bind the country to go to war in +certain circumstances, and were not to mention this pledge to +Parliament, and if at the expiration of some months the country suddenly +found itself pledged to war in consequence of this assurance, the case +would be one which would justify impeachment, and which might even +result in that course unless at the time the feeling of the country were +very strongly in favour of the course to which the Government was +pledged” (memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 184 f., No. +220_b_).] + +[Footnote 1069: So thought Sanderson, and Grey’s secretary (Grey, I, 85; +Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 257; memo. by Sanderson, Feb. +2, 1906, _B.D._, III, 185, No. 220_b_). Grey was absent from the foreign +office for some time owing to the sudden death of his wife, Feb. 1.] + + + + + CHAPTER XVII + + THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS + + +The Conference of Algeciras opened formally on January 16, 1906.[1070] +The place was badly adapted to such a purpose. It was small, +inadequately prepared to house and entertain the one hundred and fifty +delegates, secretaries, and newspaper correspondents who had to remain +there for over two months and a half. The delegates were quartered at +one of the two hotels and the journalists at the other. They were thrown +into constant contact with each other. The place swarmed with newspaper +correspondents, most of them from France. There were about fifty +principal ones, not to speak of the minor ones. They saw or heard or +surmised about everything. They brought public opinion to the door of +the Conference, and the French particularly were able at times of crisis +or of important decisions to exercise a marked influence on the course +of the deliberations.[1071] + +Among the delegates there were three important groups, the German, the +American-Italian-Austrian, and the British-French-Spanish-Russian. The +representatives of Morocco and the smaller states took practically no +part in the proceedings. In the first group Herr von Radowitz was a +nonentity—old, feeble, so elusive and cautious as to be difficult to +negotiate with. Count Tattenbach was the positive force, described by +his British colleague as “a rasping, disagreeable man, not +straightforward or truthful and evidently has to exercise much effort to +control his temper.”[1072] He made a bad impression on the delegates by +his blunt aggressiveness. Although he knew the Moroccan problem +thoroughly, he was unsuited for the delicate negotiations required at +the Conference. By his personality and methods he injured his country’s +interests. He was more influential with his government than was Herr von +Radowitz, but as a rule both men merely carried out orders from Berlin. +Mr. White (the American delegate), Marquis Visconti Venosta, and Count +Welsersheimb (the Austrian delegate) acted as mediators. M. Révoil and +Sir Arthur Nicolson were the leaders of the third group. Both had served +their respective countries as minister at Tangier. M. Révoil was a +supple, subtle reasoner, inclined like Herr von Holstein to lose sight +of his objective in the mazes of his argument. He was oversensitive, +overcautious, and very mistrustful of Germany. His obstinacy proved in +the end of advantage to France, but he would have made a number of +mistakes serious for his country and for the success of the Conference +if he had not had the advice of Sir Arthur Nicolson. The latter was the +most astute member taking an active part in the assembly, although he +played his rôle so quietly that the other delegates, particularly the +Germans, did not perceive his significance. A true diplomat, he carried +out the difficult British policy admirably. It was primarily his work +that the Conference thrashed the fundamental problems through to a +definite conclusion. + +When the Conference was organized, it was decided that the formal +session should be reserved for ratification of matters already agreed +upon unanimously in the committee of the whole, composed of all the +delegates sitting unofficially and engaging in free debate. There was +also to be a special committee of formulation to draft the propositions +agreed upon.[1073] Naturally the work was done in these two bodies. More +important were the direct negotiations between the delegates of France +and Germany, which after January 25, at the urging of the other +delegates, were almost constantly in progress. + +The basic principles governing the work of the Conference in preparing a +program of reform for Morocco were laid down by the president, the Duke +of Almodovar, in his opening speech. After previous agreement with the +French and German delegates,[1074] he stated that everyone wished +“reforms based on the triple principle of the sovereignty of the Sultan, +integrity of his empire, and equality of treatment in matters +commercial, that is, the open door.” It was not the mission of the +conference, he said, to work out a complete plan for the administrative +transformation of Morocco, but rather to “study together the means of +applying measures which at present appear to be the most urgent and the +easiest to introduce.” + +The Conference, pessimistic at the beginning, took up first the +questions which could be easily settled. Since these were considered +primarily from the standpoint of practicality, agreement was soon +reached on the following: “Regulation concerning the surveillance and +repression of contraband of arms”; “declaration concerning the better +collection of taxes and the creation of new revenues”; “regulation +concerning the customs duties of the empire and the repression of fraud +and of contraband”; “declaration relating to public services and to +public works.” The discussion of these matters was unimportant.[1075] +The troublesome problems were those of the organization of the police +and the establishment of a state bank. The solution of these would +determine whether France or Germany should emerge victorious. After the +initial success on the minor matters, the delegates confronted these two +questions with more hope.[1076] + +Marquis Visconti Venosta and Mr. White first tried to mediate upon the +basis that Germany should make concessions on the bank, France on the +police. M. Révoil was willing, being ready, so he privately informed the +British delegate, to associate Italy with France and Spain on the +police, but he asked for definite proposals.[1077] At the instigation of +the other delegates, Herr von Radowitz and M. Révoil began direct +conversations on these matters on January 25.[1078] Puzzled by so many +reports of different German projects on the police,[1079] M. Révoil +assumed the defensive. But on Sir Arthur Nicolson’s advice he laid his +proposals frankly before the German representatives a few days +later.[1080] On January 29 M. Regnault, French adviser at the +Conference, outlined for Count Tattenbach the French plan on the bank as +follows: The bank should be subject to French law and to the French +judicial system; the capital should be so divided that France should +receive 27 per cent, Spain 23 per cent, Great Britain 20 per cent, +Germany 20 per cent, Italy 10 per cent; an administrative council of ten +members should be chosen according to nationality by the shareholders; a +directory should be named by this council; a committee of discount in +Tangier selected from the resident shareholders should be established +and a committee of examination should be chosen by the future +subscribers; the preferential right to make loans held by the French +banks should continue, but perhaps be relinquished in return for an +increase in the per cent of capital given to France. M. Regnault +justified the project on the grounds that “the preponderance of French +economic interests in Morocco must be given expression therein,” that it +was a question of maintaining the open door without destroying acquired +interests, and that “the open door does not signify that those who are +in the house must leave it.”[1081] + +On February 3 M. Révoil proposed to Herr von Radowitz that the mandate +for the police be given to France and Spain together. “Over its form, +extension and control all desirable international agreements could be +made,” he said, so as to prevent any other right from being deduced +therefrom and to guarantee complete commercial equality. He declared +that France pursued no special political aims in Morocco, but that she +must demand protection in proportion to her preponderant material +interests. He also informed the German delegate indirectly that France +might agree to the addition of a third Power to control the execution of +the mandate.[1082] + +In the end the German government was to accept practically these terms, +but at the moment it was averse to making any concessions, believing +that the Conference, “so far as grouping and general course are +concerned, is turning out favorably for us.”[1083] Since it regarded the +bank as more influential in the long run than the police, it rejected +the French claim to preference for making loans on the grounds that that +claim violated Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid, and proposed +the use of the Egyptian mixed codes and the equal division of the +capital among the Powers. Thus internationalism instead of a French +preponderant control would be established in the bank.[1084] + +On the question of the police, which was the more important, the German +government offered various plans to prevent France from obtaining +military control. It endeavored particularly to interest President +Roosevelt in this problem. In a long dispatch to Washington on January +20, it laid three different proposals before the President: First, the +individual Powers might participate on a basis of equality in the +reorganization of the police by having each one, or at least the more +important ones, assume a mandate for a certain port. A time limit should +be set, and the Powers should renounce any idea of giving to their +occupation a permanent character. For unity of policy the Powers could +come to a general agreement on various questions like those of arming +and training. Second, one or several smaller Powers, such as +Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, or Holland might assume the duty. +(Belgium was excluded as being too liable to French influence.) Third, +no mandate should be given, but the obligation should be imposed upon +the Sultan to maintain at certain points police trained and commanded by +foreign officers. The choice of these officers could either be left to +the Sultan completely or be confined to certain nationalities, perhaps +the smaller Powers. The Chancellor offered to accept any other solution +in harmony with the principle of equality and the open door.[1085] On +January 24 M. de Lanessan, a French writer, published in the _Siècle_ a +solution practically identical with No. 3. The article read in part as +follows: + + +There remains only one admissible solution; to charge the Sultan with +the policing of his empire while determining the means over which he +should have control and while instituting an international control over +the organisation and employment of those means.[1086] + + +The Chancellor immediately seized upon it with greatest favor and +advocated it to President Roosevelt. + +The proposal at once called forth vehement opposition in the French +press. When Herr von Radowitz mentioned the article to M. Révoil on +February 3, the latter replied emphatically that in view of the +incompetence of the Sultan the plan was not acceptable.[1087] Thus the +issue was joined on the questions of both the bank and the police. In +this situation, which had been anticipated by both parties, the French +and German governments sought to win the Powers to their respective +views. + +The German government wished the Austrian, the Italian, and above all +the American delegates to mediate in favor of its proposals.[1088] When +on January 23 Baron Sternburg explained to Mr. Root, the American +secretary of state, the German proposals on the police and asked for the +American views, Mr. Root replied that the United States could not +participate in any work of Moroccan police but that he personally +approved most of proposal No. 3. He said that he would consult the +President about the question.[1089] + +This reply was eminently satisfactory to Prince Bülow, who immediately +urged the American government to mediate upon the basis of M. de +Lanessan’s proposals. On January 30 he telegraphed to Washington that +the Austrian cabinet had instructed its representative at Algeciras to +that effect, that the Italian Foreign Minister had spoken favorably of +it, that the Czar had expressed his entire approval of the German +position on the open door, that therefore the American government would +run no risk in making such a proposal. The time was ripe for it, he +stated.[1090] He also sought to influence the President against the +French proposal on the bank.[1091] + +At Algeciras, however, Herr von Radowitz found that the Italian, +American, and Russian delegates all approved the French proposal of +February 3 as moderate and practical.[1092] When Count Tattenbach tried +on February 3 to persuade Sir Arthur Nicolson to desert France and +support Germany, he met with total failure.[1093] As a result Herr von +Radowitz again advised his government to compromise.[1094] But in view +of the apparently favorable attitudes of the Austrian, Italian, +Spanish,[1095] and American governments toward M. de Lanessan’s +proposal, Prince Bülow refused.[1096] + +Before talking with M. Révoil again, Herr von Radowitz consulted the +American, Italian, and Austrian delegates concerning the chances of +success of the German proposal on the police. All three declared that +France would never accept it, that mediation on the basis of it would be +futile. They urged Germany to agree to the French plan, with +modifications, in order to prevent a break-up of the Conference.[1097] +Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, correspondent for the _London Times_, said +the same.[1098] Furthermore, Baron Sternburg reported on February 8 that +Mr. Root had promised again that he would consult the President about +mediating on the German proposal but that he would not undertake any +move unless assured of a definite result. When the Ambassador had listed +the Powers in favor of the plan, Mr. Root had asked significantly what +was the attitude of Great Britain.[1099] + +Continuing to rely upon the mediation of the American delegate and to +hope for the support of the American and Italian delegates, the German +government instructed Herr von Radowitz on February 9 and 12 to hold to +plan No. 3 with the two alternatives of choosing the instructors from +some minor Power or of permitting the Sultan free play in the choice of +them. In case the three delegates refused to mediate, Herr von Radowitz +was to talk directly with M. Révoil. If the French delegate refused both +the German proposals, Herr von Radowitz should request him to offer a +proposal in keeping with the fundamental principle of the equality of +all nations in Morocco. If M. Révoil held to his project of February 3, +Herr von Radowitz should return to proposal No. 1, dividing Morocco into +sectors each under the charge of a single Power.[1100] + +As the three delegates advised Herr von Radowitz to speak directly with +the French delegate, he did so on February 13. M. Révoil grudgingly +agreed to transmit the following offer to his government: + + +It is proposed that the conference request the Sultan to undertake the +organization of the police. He will have the duty of maintaining in the +places determined upon, a troop of police which will be formed and +commanded by foreign officers chosen freely by the Sultan. The funds +necessary to maintain the troops will be placed at the disposal of the +Sultan by the new state bank. The diplomatic corps at Tangier will +exercise control over the actions of that organization; a foreign +officer of one of the secondary Powers will be charged with the +inspection and will report to the diplomatic corps at Tangier. This +entire organization will be a tentative one to endure from three to five +years.[1101] + + +The German stand on the police was meeting with the more or less openly +expressed disapproval of all the important Powers. Sir Arthur Nicolson +had taken the French side from the start.[1102] The pro-French attitude +of Count Cassini, the Russian delegate, was confirmed by Count +Lamsdorff, who on February 12 expressed to Herr von Schoen, the new +German ambassador in St. Petersburg, his and the Czar’s entire approval +of the French proposal on the police and advised the German government +to accept it.[1103] Even the Austrian government urged the German +government to compromise. Count Welsersheimb reported that mediation on +the German project No. 3 was futile; and on February 12 Count +Goluchowski, Austrian foreign minister, declared to the German +Ambassador that the German proposal No. 1 was impracticable and +hopeless. Regarding the situation as “rather serious,” the Austrian +Foreign Minister stated that “Morocco was not worth a war,” and advised +that in case of necessity the Conference be permitted to break up +without result. Count Wedel, German ambassador at Vienna, warned the +_Wilhelmstrasse_ that because of domestic troubles Austria had no desire +to become involved in a conflict.[1104] + +Although in danger of becoming a minority of one, the German government +hoped to win its point by a show of determination.[1105] It complained +vigorously to the new Italian government of the pro-French position +taken by its delegate, and endeavored to persuade it to support the +German views.[1106] It sought to exert direct pressure upon M. Rouvier +by instructing Prince Radolin to inform him that Germany had made +concessions on the frontier under the expectation that France would +agree to the German terms with regard to the rest of Morocco. If the +Conference failed, the Ambassador was to assert, the legal status of +1880 in Morocco would again obtain. The Ambassador should also state to +the Premier that if he did not stop the anti-German campaign of the +French press “we [Germany] must conclude that M. Rouvier has reconciled +himself to the idea of assuming the responsibility for the results of +this activity.”[1107] On February 13 the German government, in telegrams +to Rome, Washington, Vienna, London, and St. Petersburg, declared as +follows: + + +No reason for a further retreat is evident. The principle of sacrificing +one’s own interests merely because they block the way for another Power +could lead to such serious consequences that we consider a disruption of +the conference as the lesser evil.[1108] + + +That is, if the Powers wished to prevent a break-up of the assembly, +they should persuade France to show more conciliation, for Germany would +not recede. A newspaper campaign against the French views on the police +accompanied these efforts.[1109] + +This defiance did not have the effect desired, for it was based upon an +erroneous conception of the determination of France and the views of the +Powers. So vehement was the opposition of the French press to the German +plan, which was of course known in spite of attempts at secrecy, that +the French government could not have accepted it at all. Nor did M. +Rouvier have any intention of doing so. The British government, although +suspecting that Germany meant to make the Conference fail, was ready to +support the French proposals actively by exerting pressure upon the +other Powers. On February 14 Sir Edward Grey replied to the defiant +German manifesto by arguing to Count Metternich in behalf of the French +views.[1110] + +In Russia, Count Lamsdorff, who had at the opening of the Conference +anticipated a conciliatory policy from Germany, soon became +disillusioned, and early in February again promised Russia’s entire +support to France. Several of the delegates suspected that while the +German representatives realized the necessity of concessions, they were +not informing their government of the gravity of the situation.[1111] So +Count Lamsdorff advised the French government that the only way in which +to make Germany recede was by inducing the other Powers, especially +Great Britain, the United States, and Italy to aid Russia in exerting +moral pressure upon her and to show her that she was isolated.[1112] He +approached the British government with a view to co-operation in favor +of France. His friendly expressions were most cordially reciprocated by +Sir Edward Grey.[1113] Furthermore, Mr. White and the French and British +ambassadors in Washington persuaded President Roosevelt to yield to the +French arguments concerning the special interest of France in Morocco, +her unique fitness to execute the reforms, her honest desire to maintain +the open door. Considering the downfall of M. Delcassé and the +acceptance of the Conference as great concessions to Germany, Mr. +Roosevelt thought that the latter should now recede in favor of the more +practical French proposal about the police. His opinion was confirmed by +expressions to the same effect from the Italian, Russian, and even the +Austrian governments. The last two urged him to exert his influence with +the Emperor for a moderation of the German demands.[1114] The President +was coming to suspect Germany of wishing to divide Morocco into sectors +and to regard France as the protector of Morocco’s integrity.[1115] He +and Mr. Root both thought that Germany, believing herself able to defeat +both Great Britain and France since Russia was out of the way, was +playing the “big bully”; and the President had visions of the weak +German navy’s defeating the British fleet, landing fifty thousand men in +England, and taking the island from that guileless Power.[1116] Hence +when M. Jusserand asked the President early in February to intervene +with the Emperor in favor of the French plan, Mr. Roosevelt agreed to do +so.[1117] + +With the support of Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, the +French government was almost certain of success. When on February 13 and +15 Prince Radolin complained about the tone of the French press and +about the French proposal for the police, the French Premier, denying +any responsibility for the press, handed the Ambassador the following +memorandum: + + +. . . . If M. Rouvier agreed last July that the solution of the question +of the Moroccan police should be international in principle, namely by +conference, he was not of the opinion that it would be so in execution. +As to the mandate for the police, at no moment has the French Government +engaged not to ask for it. . . . . Moreover, it is not a question of +organizing the police outside of the coastal towns, and it has always +been understood that the principal object would be to guard the security +of foreigners. . . . . The proposals ought to be examined at Algeciras, +France having agreed at the demand of Germany to submit them to the +conference.[1118] + + +At the same time the French reply to the German proposal of February 13 +was ready. Urged by Marquis Visconti Venosta and others, who feared a +break-up of the Conference, the French government attempted to harmonize +the German plan about the police with the French demands. Then Mr. White +transmitted the project to President Roosevelt, who in turn would +recommend it to the German government as his own, while M. Révoil would +reply directly with a more general statement. Although the latter +despaired of any success, this plan was carried out.[1119] On February +16 M. Révoil handed the following memorandum to Herr von Radowitz: + + +There is no opposition to the organization of the police in the ports by +the Sultan, or to the payment of the troops and officers by the Bank of +State, or to the short duration of that institution, but under the +condition that the foreign officers chosen by His Sherifian Majesty be +French and Spanish. The point of the German proposition relative to a +surveillance of the execution of that organization may be examined if +the question of the nationality of the officers has been agreed upon as +indicated above.[1120] + + +On February 19 Mr. Root, declaring to the German Ambassador that +Germany’s persistence in her plan about the police would break up the +Conference, proposed the following solution:[1121] + + +1. That the organization and maintenance of police forces in all the +ports be entrusted to the Sultan, the men and officers to be Moors. + +2. That the money to maintain the force be furnished by the proposed +international bank, the stock of which shall be allotted to all the +powers in equal shares (except for some small preference claimed by +France, which he [the President] considers immaterial). + +3. That duties of instruction, discipline, pay and assisting in +management and control be entrusted to French and Spanish officers and +non-commissioned officers, to be appointed by the Sultan on presentation +of names by their Legations. + +That the senior French and Spanish instructing officers report annually +to the government of Morocco, and to the government of Italy,[1122] the +Mediterranean Power, which shall have the right of inspection and +verification, and to demand further reports in behalf of and for the +information of the Powers. The expense of such inspection, etc., etc., +to be deemed a part of the cost of police maintenance. + +4. That full assurances be given by France and Spain, and made +obligatory upon all their officers who shall be appointed by the Sultan, +for the open door, both as to trade, equal treatment and opportunity in +competition for public works and concessions. + + +These terms, which the French government clung to notwithstanding the +opposition of the French press, were unsatisfactory to the German +government. At first Prince Bülow refused completely the proposal of +February 16, and requested the French delegate to make an offer in +keeping with the fundamental principle of the equality for all nations +in Morocco.[1123] When the authority of President Roosevelt was added to +it, however, the Chancellor receded on some points.[1124] He still held +that the Sultan should be permitted to choose the military instructors +freely from others besides the French and Spanish nations. But he was +willing to limit the nations to those participating in the bank, or, in +case France feared that the Sultan might favor German officers, to at +least four nationalities. In order to recognize the special rights of +France in Morocco, he even agreed that the Sultan might place Tangier +and perhaps some other port under the control of France alone; that in +the other ports the officers of various nationalities should co-operate. +Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Root realized that this reply would be +totally unacceptable to France, and they refused the German request to +mediate on that basis.[1125] + +On the question of the bank, the situation was just as bad. Since early +in February negotiations on it had been neglected in favor of the more +important problem of the police. But to keep the Conference going, the +German delegates took it up again on February 19. The next day both +theirs and the French plans were submitted to the committee of the +whole. The German plan provided that: an equal division of capital among +the Powers should be made; the Egyptian mixed codes should be used for +the bank; a mixed consular court with the addition of a Moroccan +delegate to try cases involving the bank should be established at +Tangier; the bank should be supervised by a Conseil de Surveillance +composed of the diplomatic representatives at Tangier, and managed by a +Conseil d’Administration composed of two delegates from each national +group and by a director appointed by the Conseil d’Administration; +statutes should be drawn up by this latter body and ratified by the +Conseil de Surveillance; customs duties, perhaps with the deduction of +the sums necessary for the service of the French loan, should be +received by the bank; funds for the police organization and for certain +needed public works should be furnished by the bank, which should also +be charged with the service of the public debt, especially the French +loan and the German advance, and should be the financial agent of the +state and have priority right to make loans; the Conseil de Surveillance +should have the right to reserve funds necessary for the police +organization and for the execution of necessary public works independent +of the Sultan’s power, to fix the budget, and to advise the Sultan in +deciding on public works.[1126] + +The French plan contained the following provisions: the capital should +be divided into fifteen parts, of which eleven should be subscribed by +financial groups in Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Belgium, Spain, the +United States, France, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Russia, and Sweden, +with no Power having more than one part; the other four were to be given +to the French group of banks that made the Moroccan loan in 1904 in +return for relinquishment of the right of preference for making loans to +Morocco; the bank was to be directed by a Conseil d’Administration of +fifteen members selected by the shareholders, each chosen from the +nationality of the subscribing group; a high commissioner selected by +the Moroccan government should watch over the bank for the Sultan; the +Conseil d’Administration should select the bank officers and determine +their powers; an international committee of discount chosen among the +chief merchants and bankers of Tangier possessing at least twenty-five +shares should be formed for consultative purposes on credit and +discount; the bank should be subject to the French law and to the French +judicial system; the statutes should be drawn up by a committee chosen +from the various subscribing groups and submitted to the stockholders. +France wanted the central office of the bank located at Paris, whereas +Germany preferred Tangier.[1127] + +The main points of difference between the two projects related to the +choice of the central office of the bank, the choice of legislation and +jurisdiction, the surveillance of the bank, the division of the capital, +and the right of preference. The one side complained that the other +project would make the bank into a French institution; the other side +complained that the opposing project would create, not an economic +institution, but a political one aimed at France—that it disregarded +recognized French rights and interests and that it was +impracticable.[1128] M. Regnault became indignant at the presumption of +the German proposal; Count Tattenbach answered him in kind.[1129] The +plans were so divergent that their discussion in committee was postponed +until March 3 so that time could be given for further direct +negotiations.[1130] + +Thus, discussion on both questions reached a crisis. Fear of imminent +failure pervaded the Conference. The issue was one of victory or defeat +in the whole Moroccan episode. To break the deadlock the pro-French +Powers again exerted moral pressure on the German government to force +its retreat.[1131] + +When the French reply on the police was made to Germany, the Russian +government approved it to the German authorities. Count Lamsdorff +declared frankly to Herr von Schoen on February 19 his belief that +Germany would be isolated in her refusal of the French proposals and +that if the Conference broke up she would be blamed, particularly in +Russia, for the continuation of the political and economic tension in +Europe. If the Björkö ideal were to be realized, he said, France and +Germany must become friends.[1132] + +On February 20, at French request, Count Witte urged the German +government and Emperor William personally to permit a speedy settlement +of the Moroccan affair. Until then, he argued, the Continental grouping +could not be formed nor could Russia obtain the loan which she so +greatly needed for suppressing the revolution.[1133] The German +government replied that if Russia wanted the loan quickly, she should +advise the French government to be more conciliatory.[1134] On February +23 occurred another conversation between Herr von Schoen and Count +Lamsdorff, whose assertions the Ambassador reported as follows: + + +It is difficult to understand why we [Germany] defend so obstinately an +international right on the police question at the Conference which all +other Powers, in view of the practical solution offered by the French, +are ready to give up. The pessimistic impression has spread throughout +the Conference that we aim to frustrate an understanding. + +The results of a failure would be incalculable. In France, where +feelings are already very much excited and M. Rouvier would be accused +of too great conciliation, a crisis with the downfall of M. Rouvier and +his replacement by an intransigent person could scarcely be avoided. The +continued anarchy in Morocco might bring forth bellicose complications +at any moment, in which case England would certainly enter on France’s +side while Russia would remain an inactive witness, but at the worst +would be affected sympathetically. A European war would enkindle new +revolutionary outbreaks which would also lead to difficult times for +Germany. But the worst would be that the foundation for the peace +program agreed upon by the two monarchs would be destroyed. . . . . + + +Denying that the outlook was so pessimistic, Herr von Schoen replied +that even though the addition of the third Power to the Björkö accord +might have to be postponed, that treaty would remain valid; whereupon +Count Lamsdorff answered that the Dual Alliance still held good, that if +France became involved in a war with Germany, the Björkö accord would +collapse.[1135] + +When this warning had no apparent effect, Count Lamsdorff hesitated to +use the Czar’s influence with the German Emperor.[1136] But as a final +effort he had an article published on March 2 in the semiofficial +journal, _L’Etat russe_, denouncing the German policy at the Conference +and upholding the French.[1137] + +Great Britain also gave her fullest support to the French, not only in +Algeciras and London, but in the various capitals of the other Powers. +In upholding the French proposal to Count Metternich on February 19 the +British Minister repeated his belief that British public opinion would +point the way to active support of France in case of a war with Germany +and would thus force the postponement of an Anglo-German +_rapprochement_. The Ambassador answered that if Germany had to give in +to every French pretension which arose from the Entente Cordiale in +order to gain British friendship, he feared that the price was too high. +The German people would come inevitably to look upon the British as +their chief enemy. Sir Edward Grey assured him, however, that if the +Moroccan affair were settled permanently, he would carry out his promise +to work for a _rapprochement_.[1138] He also kept in close touch with +the Russian government on Moroccan affairs. While refusing on February +22 Count Lamsdorff’s suggestion to intervene in Berlin in favor of +France, he urged Russia to do so.[1139] + +The British Foreign Secretary was pessimistic over the outlook for the +Conference. He was especially desirous for the onus of the disruption +not to rest upon France. To prevent that he was even willing for the +Moroccan police to be temporarily organized under the Sultan by officers +taken from a neutral minor Power with a French officer selected by the +French government in general control. But he hesitated to suggest this +solution to France for fear of hurting the Entente Cordiale.[1140] On +February 20 he recorded his reactions to the situation as follows: + + +If the Conference breaks up without result the situation will be very +dangerous. Germany will endeavour to establish her influence in Morocco +at the expense of France. France to counteract this or even simply to +protect herself and a neighbour from the state of disturbance, which is +now chronic in Morocco, will be driven to take action in Morocco, which +Germany may make a _casus belli_. + +If there is war between France and Germany it will be very difficult for +us to keep out of it. The _Entente_ and still more the constant and +emphatic demonstrations of affection . . . . have created in France a +belief that we should support her in war. . . . . If this expectation is +disappointed the French will never forgive us. + +There would also I think be a general feeling in every country that we +had behaved meanly and left France in the lurch. The United States would +despise us, Russia would not think it worth while to make a friendly +arrangement with us about Asia, Japan would prepare to re-insure herself +elsewhere, we should be left without a friend and without the power of +making a friend and Germany would take some pleasure, after what has +passed, in exploiting the whole situation to our disadvantage, very +likely by stirring up trouble through the Sultan of Turkey in Egypt. As +a minor matter the position of any Foreign Secretary here, who had made +it an object to maintain the _entente_ with France, would become +intolerable. + +On the other hand the prospect of a European War and of our being +involved in it is horrible. + +I propose therefore, if unpleasant symptoms develop after the Conference +is over, to tell the French Ambassador that a great effort and if need +be some sacrifice should in our opinion be made to avoid war. To do this +we should have to find out what compensation Germany would ask or accept +as the price of her recognition of the French claims in Morocco. There +is also a point about Egypt, which might be worked in on our behalf. I +should myself be in favour of allowing Germany a port or coaling +station, if that would ensure peace; but it would be necessary to +consult the Admiralty about this, and to find out whether the French +would entertain the idea, and if so what port? + +The real objection to the course proposed is that the French may think +it pusillanimous and a poor result of the _Entente_. I should have to +risk this. I hope the French would recognize that in a war with Germany +our liabilities would be much less than theirs. We should risk little or +nothing on land, and at sea we might shut the German fleet up in Kiel +and keep it there without losing a ship or a man or even firing a shot. +The French would have a life and death struggle and that expenditure of +blood and treasure with a doubtful issue. They ought therefore not to +think it pusillanimous on our part to wish to avoid a war in which our +danger was so much less than theirs. + +I have also a further point of view. The door is being kept open by us +for a _rapprochement_ with Russia; there is at least a prospect that +when Russia is re-established we shall find ourselves on good terms with +her. An _entente_ between Russia, France and ourselves would be +absolutely secure. If it is necessary to check Germany it could then be +done. The present is the most unfavourable moment for attempting to +check her. Is it not a grave mistake, if there must be a quarrel with +Germany for France or ourselves to let Germany choose the moment, which +best suits her. + +There is a possibility that war may come before these suggestions of +mine can be developed in diplomacy. If so it will only be because +Germany has made up her mind that she wants war and intends to have it +anyhow, which I do not believe is the case. But I think we ought in our +minds to face the question now, whether we can keep out of war, if war +breaks out between France and Germany. The more I review the situation +the more it appears to me that we cannot, without losing our good name +and our friends and wrecking our policy and position in the world.[1141] + + +Thus Sir Edward Grey intended to do his utmost to preserve peace even at +the risk of antagonizing France. He desired to postpone the Moroccan +settlement if necessary until the Anglo-Russian entente could be +consummated, believing that then France would be in a far stronger +position with reference to Germany. But if war did arise, he was +determined to throw his entire influence in favor of active +participation.[1142] + +In Rome, M. Barrère, loyally seconded by Sir Edwin Egerton, endeavored +to interpret the Franco-Italian accords in such a way as to induce the +Italian government to take the French side openly in case of a vote at +the Conference. The Italian government refused. It also refused to +support Germany, and left matters in the hands of its delegate.[1143] + +Similarly, the French and British representatives co-operated to prevent +Spain, somewhat disgruntled over the Moroccan accords, from refusing to +live up to its obligations. The Spanish government promised complete +loyalty. But when it appeared that the conference would fail, the +Spanish government felt that as host it should endeavor to prevent that +issue. On February 19 the Duke of Almodovar read to Mr. Révoil a note in +which he said that for the sake of a settlement Spain was willing to +accept the following plan as a sort of truce: The police should be +organized by the Sultan under the control of the diplomatic corps for +three years; the instructors should be exclusively Moroccan except at +Tetouan, where they should be Spanish, and at Oudjda, where they should +be French; France and Spain might renew their claims after the three +years if they saw fit.[1144] + +Horrified at the idea, the Anglo-French combination immediately busied +itself to bring Spain back into line. At Madrid the British and French +representatives informed the foreign office that if Spain deserted her +friends the Anglo-French opposition to the German projects would +continue anyway. They argued that a break-up of the Conference with the +maintenance of the Franco-Spanish accords was preferable to the success +of the Conference through the ruin of those accords, in which lay their +sole guaranty for the morrow. M. Ojeda, acting minister of foreign +affairs, acknowledged to the British representative that “he hated +France and French influence in Morocco, and that he had no confidence in +and personal dislike for French Ambassador,” but he added that “he would +act faithfully in accordance with Spain’s engagements, although he +disliked them.” M. Moret, the Spanish premier, also protested his +loyalty to the accords. The Duke of Almodovar was instructed to abstain +in the future from all initiative not previously concerted with his +French colleague.[1145] To prevent any bad feelings from this episode, +the British and French governments thanked Spain for her loyalty. Thus +the danger from Spain was averted.[1146] + +M. Rouvier consulted the smaller governments represented at the +Conference with a view to obtaining their open support in case matters +were forced to a vote. But they remained neutral.[1147] + +The French government, again sustained by Great Britain,[1148] even +sought to influence Austria in its favor, and with some success. Finding +Count Goluchowski of the opinion that after France’s concessions on +February 3 and 16 Germany should show moderation, the French Ambassador +hinted discreetly that the Foreign Minister speak to the German +government to that effect.[1149] Count Goluchowski, who on February 14 +had suggested a compromise to the German government very similar to the +French offer of February 16, urged it to accept the offer and to seek +compensation in the settlement of the bank question. Both the American +and the Italian delegates approved it, he argued, and he predicted that +if the Conference broke up Germany would be blamed.[1150] On February 23 +Emperor Francis Joseph himself intervened. Calling the German Ambassador +to him, he said that Austria would act with Germany at the Conference, +but that according to all reports from Algeciras they would be isolated +in case of a vote. Such an isolation would be unpleasant for both +Powers, but far graver, he said, was the possibility that out of a +failure of the Conference might develop a new grouping of the Powers +separating Russia from the two monarchies and associating her with Great +Britain and France. He declared that it was necessary to avoid that +turn.[1151] + +The French party at the Conference knew that Germany was isolated, that +even her ally, Austria, opposed her policy.[1152] On February 26 M. +Révoil, refusing to make any further proposal, asserted to the German +delegates: “If the Conference recognizes the utility of new guarantees, +we will not refuse to examine them. It belongs to the Conference . . . . +to determine the solution.” In other words, he told Germany that, having +demanded the Conference, she might permit it to settle the matter.[1153] +He and Sir Arthur Nicolson were devising some means by which a rupture +of the Conference should not occur over the bank question and by which +the responsibility for a rupture should not fall on France and Great +Britain. The issue on the bank was not as clear cut as on the police, +and public opinion would not understand why financial differences could +not be harmonized. So the two men planned to bring the police question +up first for decision. They did not favor taking a formal vote on that +matter, as Count Lamsdorff suggested,[1154] for they perceived that the +American, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, and Swedish delegates would very +probably not vote. But they intended in some way to make plain to +Germany the preference of the Conference for the French police proposal. +Then if Germany remained adamantine, she would receive the blame for the +break-up of the assembly.[1155] + +The opportunity came on March 3. During the discussion of the bank in +the official session of the Conference, Germany’s views were supported +solely by Austria and Morocco and were opposed, for the first time, by a +firm British-French-Spanish-Russian group.[1156] That same day, on the +motion of Sir Arthur Nicolson and with the aid of the Duke of Almodovar, +the Conference voted to take up the question of the police on February 5 +instead of that of the bank. The German and Austrian delegates alone +opposed the motion, even the Italian representative siding openly +against them.[1157] At the session on March 5 Germany was again +isolated. Her policy in regard to the police was not even defended by +Austria, while the French plan was openly approved by Great Britain, +Russia, Spain, and Portugal.[1158] + +All the delegates were pessimistic. As direct negotiations had proved +futile, M. Révoil and Sir Arthur Nicolson both expected that the +antagonism would come to a head at the next session and the Conference +would break up.[1159] Herr von Radowitz reported to his government that +agreement was impossible if Germany held to her present terms, for +France would not recede, and that the other representatives, anxious to +conclude the Conference, were in favor of the French police proposal. +Even Count Tattenbach thought that his government was too +obstinate.[1160] In Berlin, however, Herr von Holstein, misjudging the +French feeling, planned to meet the crisis by disregarding the +Conference and making a direct temporary agreement with the French +government. The visit to Berlin of Baron de Courcel, former ambassador +at Berlin, on February 20-22, afforded him the opportunity to propose +the following terms: In regard to the police the two governments should +make a temporary settlement for four or five years; France, in +consideration of her special interests in Morocco, should be given one +port to police alone, while officers in equal numbers of the various +nationalities, including French and German, should co-operate in each of +the other seven ports; in the bank France should also be given a slight +advantage. Let France accept this internationalization for the time +being, he said, and in a few years she and Germany could come to a +direct permanent settlement of the Moroccan question by which Germany, +in return for concessions elsewhere, would leave the land entirely to +France. These concessions he declared to be the utmost that Germany +would make; she preferred to let the Conference disband rather than +recede further. Baron de Courcel seemed favorable to the plan; but, on +March 6, M. Rouvier refused to consider it or any other direct +negotiations with Germany.[1161] So that channel was definitely closed. + +While this effort was being made, Prince Bülow took personal charge of +all the details concerning the Moroccan affair.[1162] The Chancellor had +no idea of permitting a disruption of the Conference,[1163] and began to +consider a proposal suggested by the Austrian delegate on February 26 +for a way out. In its final form this project provided that the +organization of police in Tangier, Saffi, Rabat, and Tetouan should be +intrusted to the French; in Mogador, Larache, and Mazagan to the +Spanish; in Casablanca to the command of a Swiss or Dutch officer with +powers of inspection over all the police. It further proposed that this +inspector should report to the diplomatic corps at Tangier, which should +exercise general control over the reorganization of the police. Herr von +Radowitz, Count Welsersheimb, and Marquis Visconti Venosta all declared +this to be the least that the French would accept.[1164] The German +government endeavored first to have Austria and Italy mediate on the +basis of the plan outlined to Baron de Courcel;[1165] but on March 4 +Count Goluchowski, the Austrian foreign minister, regarding the step as +futile, refused to do so. Instead he urged that either Count +Welsersheimb’s project be accepted _in toto_ or that the selection of +officers be left to the Sultan with the understanding that he choose +only French and Spanish ones.[1166] From Italy also came a negative +response.[1167] When Count Tattenbach himself favored the Austrian plan, +the Chancellor accepted it on March 6 with the proviso that the +commander at Casablanca choose his officers from other nationalities +than French and Spanish, and also that France accede to the German +demands on the bank. Then the Chancellor sought to obtain a combined +Austro-Italian mediation for the plan.[1168] + +On March 8 Count Welsersheimb’s project and the French plan of February +16 were formally introduced in the Conference.[1169] On March 10 both +were referred to the committee for formulation on a motion by Herr von +Radowitz, who said: + + +It seems to me that accord ought to be reached on the basis of the two +projects. . . . . That of the French delegation certainly contains +proposals which deserve the most serious examination. They ought to be +completed by those of the Austro-Hungarian project.[1170] + + +The Austro-German proposal was a welcome surprise to the Conference, +which recognized it as a great concession. Sir Arthur Nicolson found +that “members of the Conference, with the exception of French and +Spanish, are unanimous in favour of” it. He as well as the other +delegates did not hesitate to inform M. Révoil frankly of this view. In +Algeciras, London, and Paris the British government on March 9-10 stated +to the French authorities that Germany’s concessions “had brought an +agreement so near that it would not do to let the Conference break up +now without a settlement.” “I would,” said Sir Arthur Nicolson to M. +Révoil, “support him [M. Révoil] to the best of my ability in whatever +course he might take, but I must tell him that in the event of the +Conference ending in a failure we should be placed in an exceedingly +false position with all the public feeling of Europe against us.”[1171] +Sir Edward Grey thought that “Germany has conceded the substance and it +would be a great pity, if France sacrificed the substance to the +shadow.”[1172] + +M. Révoil, whose views were also valid for the Spanish delegates, was +totally unwilling to accept the Austrian proposal. He was handicapped by +the unexpected fall of the French government on March 7 over a minor +question concerning relations with the church. A week before the French +Premier would have accepted the Spanish proposal of February 19 as a +means of last resort.[1173] Now out of power, though remaining at the +foreign office until the new government was formed, M. Rouvier of course +could not make concessions even had he so desired. Staunchly supported +by the French press, which on March 13 published the instructions to M. +Révoil,[1174] he and the French delegate demanded the following +modifications in the Austrian plan: + + +The police instructors at Casa Blanca to be, like at the other seven +ports, French or Spanish. + +Distribution of ports to French or Spanish instructors to be a matter +for agreement between French and Spanish Gov[ernmen]ts. The Inspector +General to be a subject of neutral state and to have powers of +inspection at all eight ports without right to command or give orders to +French and Spanish instructors, and to make his reports to the Sultan of +Morocco and not to the diplomatic body at Tangier. + + +He also preferred as inspector a Swiss or, even better, a Dane to a +Dutchman for fear the latter might be too much under German +influence.[1175] + +Both MM. Rouvier and Révoil believed that Germany would recede on these +points, for on about March 8 the Prince of Monaco arrived in Paris from +Berlin with a message for M. Rouvier from Prince Bülow to the effect +that Germany would accept a French and Spanish police “under the most +discreet control of an officer from a lesser Power.”[1176] The message +was undoubtedly misleading and the French hope unjustified.[1177] When +Marquis Visconti Venosta, Mr. White, and Sir Arthur Nicolson, at M. +Révoil’s request, asked the German delegates March 9, 10, whether they +would give way, the latter assured them that Germany had spoken her last +word, that “the establishment of the inspector at a port as instructor +was a _sine qua non_ condition.”[1178] + +M. Révoil was “greatly disappointed” and “a little unstrung.” He told +Sir Arthur Nicolson that his government would not accept such a +solution. “He said with much bitterness that the Germans had +internationalized the finances, and they now intended to introduce the +principle throughout Morocco. France would leave the Conference having +yielded everything and gained nothing.” His chief concern was that if +France were forced to accept the Austrian plan, “the outcry which would +be raised against it in France might be utilized to weaken the Anglo- +French understanding.” Sir Arthur Nicolson replied that he “would always +support him [M. Révoil], but I had given warnings as a friend should.” +And Sir Arthur added “that he must face the situation as it stood, and +that there could be no question of breaking down the Conference on that +point, and at a moment when a favourable end was so nearly +reached.”[1179] + +In Paris, M. Rouvier + + +rather demurred [to the British Ambassador] to the supposition that the +conference was so favourably impressed by the Austrian scheme. He said +that France still counted on her side Spain, England, Russia, Portugal, +and others had only been gained over by the German Delegates having +persuaded them that Germany would make no further concessions.[1180] + + +Mr. Eyre Crowe was alarmed for the Entente Cordiale; he urged the +greatest caution in advising France to recede. But Sir Edward Grey on +March 12 repeated to M. Cambon that in his opinion France “should accept +the Swiss at Casa Blanca rather than let the Conference break up.”[1181] + +As the pressure of the delegates was so strong, M. Révoil and the Duke +of Almodovar began on March 11 to consider tentatively the plan of +associating actively a Swiss inspector with the French and Spanish in +the policing of Tangier.[1182] Nothing could be decided until the new +French government was formed. Meanwhile, the opposition of views became +public in the Conference session of March 11 when two matters remaining +unsolved on the question of the bank were taken up. In a previous +sitting Sir Arthur Nicolson, in agreement with M. Révoil, had proposed +that three censors be chosen to oversee the bank. In accepting this +proposal Herr von Radowitz stipulated that in order to preserve the +principle of internationality the censors should be chosen by the +respective governments from the personnel of the banks interested in the +Moroccan state bank and that a copy of the censors’ reports should be +sent to the governments of the signatory Powers. The French delegates, +however, desired that the first censors be selected by the committee +drawing up the statutes of the bank and should thereafter be chosen by +co-optation and that their reports should be sent to the council of +administrators of the bank. The French continued to demand four shares, +while Germany was willing to concede them only three.[1183] At the +session on the next day M. Révoil refused the Austrian proposal to give +the command in Casablanca to an officer of a third Power, but agreed to +the inspection by one, preferably a Swiss.[1184] + +In reporting M. Révoil’s pertinacity to Berlin on March 11, Herr von +Radowitz stated: “I have been told by all my colleagues, even the +English, that after our action they would no longer consider justified +the French adherence to the points declared inacceptable by us and they +have so expressed themselves to M. Révoil.”[1185] On the next day +Marquis Visconti Venosta said in confidence to Herr von Radowitz that +the latter would “not be able to come to an arrangement with M. Révoil +without a positive intervention of the government at Paris. . . . +.”[1186] The same day the _Lokalanzeiger_ published an exaggerated +report from its correspondent at Algeciras in which the “complete +isolation” of France in the committee was spoken of; Italy, Russia, the +United States, and even Great Britain, the article read, had put +themselves on the German side.[1187] + +Instead of maintaining a dignified silence while public opinion and the +persuasion of the Powers compelled France to give way or break up the +Conference, Prince Bülow tried to increase the pressure by beginning a +diplomatic and press campaign against France. With German thoroughness +he overdid the thing. On March 12 he sent telegrams to the German +ambassadors at Vienna, London, St. Petersburg, Rome, Washington, and +Paris in which he stated that the generous concessions granted by +Germany on March 10 had made agreement seem possible. Then all had been +placed in doubt again by sudden and unexpected opposition from the +French delegates. The other delegates, including the British, he +continued, had expressed to Herr von Radowitz and to M. Révoil their +opinion that France should now recede; and, after repeating Marquis +Visconti Venosta’s statement, he asked the various governments to +intervene at Paris “so that the voice of reason will again rule there +and further opposition be given up.”[1188] + +The Russian, Italian, and Austrian governments agreed to advise France +to accept the Austrian compromise. Sir Edward Grey, whom Count +Metternich did not ask to intercede in behalf of the plan as he believed +that the British Minister would refuse, welcomed the German concessions +but loyally upheld the French proposals.[1189] Mr. Roosevelt +unexpectedly replied most adversely. + +In a letter on March 7 the President advised the Emperor to accept his +proposal of February 19. He justified his interference by quoting a +passage from Baron Sternburg’s letter to him on June 28, 1905, to the +effect that “the Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case, +during the coming conference, differences of opinion should arise +between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up +the decision which you should consider to be most fair and most +practical.” He warned the German government that it would lose “credit” +and “moral power” in the world if the Conference failed.[1190] In his +reply on March 12 the Emperor announced his acceptance of the Austrian +plan, and urged the President to support it.[1191] + +Upon receiving that reply Mr. Roosevelt on March 14 denounced the +Austrian project to Baron Sternburg as “absurd because it favors the +very ideas the conference has been trying to eliminate namely partition +and spheres of influence,” and also because it was impracticable. On the +other hand, “placing French and Spanish officers in the same ports gives +according to my view a safer guarantee than placing them separately in +single ports,” he said. In spite of that reply, however, Prince Bülow +regarded the German position as “at present not at all +unfavorable.”[1192] + +Meanwhile, the French were restoring their front. In Paris a new +government was formed by M. Sarrien on March 14 with M. Bourgeois at the +foreign office. M. Bourgeois, with whom Prince Radolin was on cordial +terms, was known to be a conciliatory statesman interested in +harmonizing international differences. But he could hardly begin his +career in office with an unpopular concession on the Moroccan question. +He renewed M. Révoil’s instructions, refusing to compromise on the +police in any manner whatever. + +It was a bold act. The French government knew that the Russian, Italian, +British, and Austrian governments disapproved. Several influential +members of the French Parliament tried to persuade M. Bourgeois that the +British government, influenced by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, would +withdraw its support from France. The new cabinet was alarmed by the +British advice to accept a neutral police in Casablanca rather than +break up the Conference, and some of the ministers suspected that Great +Britain and Germany were about to come to an arrangement leaving France +in the lurch. In a French cabinet meeting M. Clémenceau was at first the +only minister to combat these doubts.[1193] + +But the move succeeded. M. Bourgeois quickly repulsed the intervention, +half-hearted as it was, of the Russian, Italian, and Austrian +ambassadors in Paris in favor of the Austrian plan; he even gathered +from his conversation with the Austrian representative that the latter’s +government would try to persuade Germany to relinquish her stand on the +policing of Casablanca.[1194] In addition, as soon as the French +instructions were published, Sir Edward Grey immediately informed the +French government that Great Britain would “of course” support it.[1195] + +When he learned of the French doubts about the continuation of British +aid, he rather indignantly replied that the French leaders, MM. +Bourgeois, Etienne, and Clémenceau, + + +should be told that there has never been any question here of +discontinuing our support to France. We have given it throughout at +Algeciras and in every capital in Europe where required and shall +continue this so long as the French wish it and trust us. Cordial co- +operation with France in all parts of the world remains a cardinal point +of British policy and in some respects we have carried it further than +the late Government here were required to do. + +Any advice Nicolson has given to Révoil has been on the understanding +that this support would be continued, and if he has given advice freely +it has been because of his complete confidence that this was understood +by his French colleague. The same is true of my conversations with +Cambon. . . . . The Prime Minister has been cognizant of all I have said +and has cordially approved of it. + + +Sir Arthur Nicolson denied that either directly or indirectly had he +ever said to the German delegates that France ought to give way on any +point.[1196] Sir Edward Grey informed the other governments that the +British fidelity to France would continue as before. And on March 18 _Le +Temps_ published the instructions to Sir Arthur Nicolson so that public +opinion could see how complete that support was.[1197] + +If the French leaders intended to bring Great Britain back unreservedly +into line by expressing these doubts about British support, they +succeeded. M. Bourgeois could with more assurance inform the German +Ambassador that France had receded as far as she would. On March 17 +Prince Radolin reported his words as follows: + + +The Minister added that he stood on the defensive, that he supported +entirely the previous policy of Rouvier and Révoil, . . . . that he had +agreed in principle with the appointment of a general inspector from +some lesser state “subject to agreement on details” but that under no +circumstances would he permit the inspector to exercise a command or a +collaboration. That is a question of principle, a vital question for +France and her prestige in Algeria. Moreover in case the conference ends +without result, the _status quo_ is no disadvantage for France. Germany, +not France, had demanded the conference. “It is your turn now to speak, +but not of the police. It is lost effort.” + + +He accused the German government of being responsible for the pressure +of the other Powers on France. According to instructions, Prince Radolin +replied in a serious tone but without threat that the steps taken by +those governments were caused by Germany’s great concessions of March +10.[1198] But the vote of confidence given without debate to the new +cabinet by the Chamber on March 19 showed that M. Bourgeois interpreted +French feeling correctly.[1199] + +There were signs at Paris and Algeciras as early as March 17 that +Austria was seeking some new way out of the deadlock, and that Germany +might accept the French view about Casablanca.[1200] Before the Austrian +mediation had time to materialize, however, the renewed intervention of +the American government turned the scales in favor of France. On March +16 Prince Bülow had replied to Mr. Roosevelt with arguments showing that +the Austrian plan would preserve the unity and integrity of Morocco +whereas the French plan would divide the country into spheres of +influence.[1201] The President remained unconvinced. Thinking that the +whole German action was intended to humiliate France, he and American +public opinion took the French side. While he no longer believed that +Germany aimed at war with her western neighbor, he and his advisers did +suspect her of intending by the Austrian proposal to gain a port and a +sphere of influence in the Mediterranean. Germany’s extreme demands were +arousing dissatisfaction among the other delegates at Algeciras, he told +Baron Sternburg, and Austria and Russia had already asked him to advise +Germany to moderate them. So, while he declared that he would not hold +out if the other Powers accepted the Austrian plan, he remained hostile +to it. He threatened to publish the entire correspondence on the subject +if the Conference failed. Baron Sternburg learned that Mr. Root had said +privately that Germany’s attitude at the Conference was “petty and +unworthy of a great nation,” that she was fast losing the confidence of +the world. In reiterating the American stand, Mr. Root wrote to the +Ambassador: “If we had sufficient interest in Morocco to make it worth +our while, we should seriously object, on our own account, to the +adoption of any such arrangement [as the Austrian plan].”[1202] + +With the net drawing tighter around Germany, Prince Bülow notified +President Roosevelt on March 19 that Germany would accept the American +plan of having French and Spanish officers in about equal numbers co- +operate in each of the ports, supervised by a general inspector from +another nation.[1203] President Roosevelt was jubilant over Germany’s +acceptance of his plan. He immediately proposed it to the French +government and asked the British to support him.[1204] + +From this side the President met with strenuous opposition. France and +Spain would have nothing to do with the idea of mixed police, except if +necessary in Tangier and Casablanca. Complaining of too many +peacemakers,[1205] Sir Edward Grey supported the Franco-Spanish view. +Mr. Roosevelt suddenly grew timid and refused to defend his project +before the Conference.[1206] The German government was therefore forced +to fall back on Austrian mediation.[1207] + +In a private conversation on March 23 Count Welsersheimb informed M. +Révoil that Germany might sacrifice her demand for a neutral police at +Casablanca if France would make reciprocal concessions. M. Révoil was +willing to limit the number of French shares in the bank to three. But +for the other unsettled problems of determining how much international +control should be established over the police and bank and how the +police should be divided among the various ports, the two men failed to +find a solution. On the first question the German government demanded as +a _conditio sine qua non_ that the inspector should be made responsible +to the diplomatic corps at Tangier, which should exercise a general +supervision over the police. M. Révoil, on the other hand, supported by +the British and Spanish delegates, desired that the diplomatic corps be +excluded from intervening in this matter at all. On the question of the +bank the Germans wanted the various governments and the diplomatic corps +at Tangier to have some authority over the censors while the French did +not. As to the division of ports the French formally requested that the +settlement of this problem and of other details should be left for +France and Spain to determine later with the Sultan; the Germans +preferred to have the Conference itself divide the ports between these +two Powers.[1208] + +At that point the Conference again reached a deadlock. With victory in +view the French, on March 26, refused to give way;[1209] while the +Germans, who had already made the great concession, sought to save as +much as they could. They felt compelled to be firmer because the +publication in _Le Temps_ on March 21 of the very pro-French +instructions to the Russian delegate at Algeciras, succeeding the +publication of the French and British instructions, made it appear as if +the German government were being coerced into retreat.[1210] With one or +two exceptions, the delegates, anxious to conclude the Conference and +attributing little importance to these matters, were inclined to think +that France ought to recede on the question of the responsibility of the +inspector.[1211] President Roosevelt was once more urging that both +France and Spain be given a joint mandate and that they accept from the +Conference a joint responsibility for every port no matter how the ports +were divided.[1212] After the session on March 26, the mediators again +set to work. Germany agreed for France and Spain to divide the ports as +they wished and to submit their decision to the Conference for approval. +Both Powers made concessions on the question of the control of the bank. +On the most difficult problem of the responsibility of the police +inspector, the French, British, Spanish, Russian, and Italian first +delegates met privately at M. Révoil’s suggestion and worked out a +formula. Then Mr. White submitted it to the German delegates, and the +latter accepted it (March 27).[1213] The difficulties were thereby +settled. + +In the meantime trouble, which did not come to the surface, had arisen +between France and Spain. The Franco-Spanish accord of 1905 had provided +for the policing of only five ports, whereas the Conference had dealt +with all eight. France wanted the other three left to her; but Spain +refused. On March 18 she requested that Tangier be given to her, but the +French government rejected the suggestion, offering instead to agree +that Casablanca as well as Tangier should be policed by French and +Spanish together. This offer was refused by Spain, who on about March 25 +made the additional request that she should be given an extra share in +the bank by the Conference instead of receiving it later from France +according to agreement. The French would not accede to this, but by +March 31 the two Powers decided that the officers should be Spanish in +Tetouan and Larache, French and Spanish in Casablanca and Tangier, and +French in the other four ports.[1214] + +The Conference accepted this division, together with the following terms +on the police: They should function for five years; they should be +inspected at least once a year by a Swiss officer stationed at +Tangier[1215] who should report to the Sultan; this officer was also +empowered to make as many special reports as he saw fit; he should +likewise send a copy of these reports to the dean of the diplomatic +corps in order that that body might + + +confirm that the Moroccan police is functioning in conformity with the +decisions taken by the Conference and that it may see whether it +guarantees in an efficacious manner and in conformity with the treaties +the security of persons and of the property of foreigners as well as +that of commercial transactions; . . . . in case of demand before it by +an interested legation the diplomatic corps may, after advising the +representatives of the Sultan of its action, request the inspector to +make an inquiry and draw up a report on the complaint made. + + +On the question of the bank it was stipulated that the censors should be +chosen with the approval of their governments by the various state banks +of the countries involved. Instead of using the expression that the +censors should exercise “the supervision of the administration of the +Bank in the name of the signatory Powers,” a phrase to which the French +objected as smacking of internationalization again, the delegates +substituted the less colorful one that the censors should exercise “the +supervision of which they are invested by the present Act in that which +concerns the administration of the bank.”[1216] + +Thus, formulas were found. Details were cleared up; minor points +settled. On April 7 the delegates signed the general act. The Conference +of Algeciras was ended.[1217] + +The conclusions of the Conference were determined by the exigencies of +international relations and the interests of European Powers, not by the +needs of Morocco. The less interested Powers had aimed chiefly at +preserving peace in Europe. France and her satellite, Spain, had been +concerned with maintaining their interests in Morocco and with +preventing any other Power from gaining a foothold there. Germany alone +had endeavored to defend Moroccan rights, and she had done so only +because that policy had been in accord with her interests. The Moroccan +delegates had in general been disregarded by the Conference, which +assumed that the Sultan would under pressure accept its decisions. +Although the assembly had formally acknowledged the independence and +integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of the Sultan, it had shown +little more regard for them than had the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish +agreements of 1904-5. While the open door had been allowed, the French +and Spanish military control in Morocco assured to those two Powers the +main economic advantages. In view of the terms of the Franco-Spanish +accord of 1905, it was certain that those Powers would not preserve +equality of economic treatment. France and Spain had both fought +internationalization so effectively that the international supervision +established was entirely inadequate to command respect. The idea that a +Power might be charged by the other Powers with the exercise of a +mandate for the sake of the “backward people” had not as yet been +seriously considered by any government. In February and March President +Roosevelt and the German government had discussed the proposal of +granting to France and Spain a mandate in Morocco “from all the Powers, +under responsibility to all of them for the maintenance of equal rights +and opportunities”[1218]—that is, for the advantage of the Western +Powers not for that of Morocco—but the trouble lay in the absence of any +existing machinery which would have enabled it to be put into effect. + +The reforms provided for were hardly more than a beginning. They were +unsatisfactory both to the Moroccans and to the French and the Spanish. +The Moroccan government was surprised at the outcome of the Conference, +having expected that France would be arraigned before that body as +before a tribunal. The mass of the Moroccan people remained hostile to +reform; they were turning their homage more to the pretender and to +Raisouli. Even those ministers who recognized the necessity for change +denounced the Conference proposals as benefiting the Europeans and +European trade in Morocco but not the Moroccan government. “The +conference has turned Morocco over to the French,” said El Tores, a +delegate to that assembly, to Dr. Rosen. He thought that either +acceptance or rejection of the Conference act by the Sultan would be a +misfortune.[1219] Ben Sliman, the Moroccan foreign minister, was equally +despondent. + + +He regarded the outlook after the decision of the Conference as simply +hopeless [so Mr. Lowther reported his assertions]. If the Makhzen +assented to the Conference’s decision there was an end to the Moorish +Government, as a Government. The ports were thereby practically handed +over for ever to the Powers. These were of importance to Europeans and +of a certain financial value to the Sultan although they were but a +small part of the country and their populations a mere handful of those +of the Sultan’s subjects, who, in normal times, had acknowledged His +Majesty’s rule, and paid taxes. But the decisions of the Conference Ben +Sliman considered, in practice if not in theory, left the Sultan no +means or hopes of doing anything to re-establish order and restore +prosperity to the vast mass of his people, to whose needs at large the +proposed reforms were totally inadequate and he was deeply disappointed +with them. + +His Excellency would therefore infinitely have preferred the reforms to +have been so framed that the Powers would have exercised some kind of +direction, assistance and advice at the Court itself, the influence of +which would have been, in course of time, felt throughout the country to +the great advantage of all concerned. As it was, the Makhzen seemed to +be left in as impotent and ridiculous a position as ever in the eyes of +its subjects.[1220] + + +Opinion at court was divided upon whether to accept the decisions of the +Conference or not. When the dean of the diplomatic corps in Tangier +officially communicated the Conference act to the Sultan, the latter +tried to delay a decision and to discuss certain points. But on June 18 +he reluctantly signed the act with reservations. All indications pointed +to the opposition of the Moroccan government to any serious efforts at +reforms.[1221] + +The Conference had made inadequate provisions for coping with Moroccan +opposition. There could be no half-measures in handling Morocco. Europe +had to leave her alone entirely or give the mandatory Powers complete +freedom to “shoot” reforms into the land. The right to police eight +towns would just suffice to involve France and Spain in a series of +petty, indecisive clashes with the natives. If they wished to employ +more military authority, they would have either to obtain the permission +of the Powers or to risk another international crisis by taking an +unauthorized initiative. As soon as the execution of the reforms should +begin, the inadequacy of all this diplomatic activity would become +evident. The Moroccan problem had not been solved. + + +[Footnote 1070: The Conference opened later than was originally planned, +the immediate cause being the marriage of the Infanta Maria Theresa, +sister of King Alfonso, to Prince Ferdinand of Bavaria, on Jan. 12. The +King of Spain had wanted in December to move the meeting place to +Madrid, and both the French and German governments had agreed; but as +the Sultan opposed, the proposal had been dropped. Bülow’s opinion was +that it made no difference to Germany whether the Conference met at +Madrid or Algeciras or elsewhere. “It was a mistake that we originally +settled ourselves on Tangier,” he wrote, Dec. 25, 1905. See _G.P._, XXI, +25 ff., Nos. 6911, 6913 ff.; _B.D._, III, 160, No. 196; _L.j., 1901-5_, +No. 368; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. +Affaires du Maroc, 1906, Protocols et comptes rendus de la Conférence +d’Algéciras_ (1906), 5, No. 2 (hereafter referred to as _L.j., 1906_).] + +[Footnote 1071: Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés_, pp. 90 ff., 503 f.; +Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 17, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 96, No. 6952. Tardieu’s +book contains almost an official account of the Conference from the +French side. He was present as representative of _Le Temps_ and had +access to the fullest information, as his articles showed. His book is +an excellent example of patriotic historiography carried almost to a +hysterical extreme, and his interpretations have to be read with the +greatest caution. Dr. Hammann criticized the work when it appeared in +1907 in two articles, one in _Grenzboten_, 1907, p. 12, the other in the +_Kölnische Zeitung_, March 30, 1907 (editor’s note, _G.P._, XXI, 92 f.). +See also the masterly criticism of French policy by Dickinson, _The +International Anarchy 1904-1914_, pp. 134 ff.] + +[Footnote 1072: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 5, 1906, _B.D._, III, 243, No. +268; Tardieu, pp. 85 f.] + +[Footnote 1073: Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 16, 1906, +_G.P._, XXI, 92 f., No. 6949; Révoil to Rouvier, Jan. 18, 1906, _L.j., +1906_, 11, No. 4.] + +[Footnote 1074: Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 92 f., +No. 6949; Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 9 f.; Nicolson to +Grey, Jan. 18, 1906, _B.D._, III, 229, No. 248.] + +[Footnote 1075: _L.j., 1906_, 264 ff., No. 37.] + +[Footnote 1076: _Ibid._, 5 ff., No. 3, and following documents; Radowitz +to F. O., Jan. 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 91, No. 6947; Bülow to Radowitz, +Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 92, No. 6948; Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, +_ibid._, 119 ff., No. 6967; Tardieu, pp. 100 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. +19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 230 f., No. 249.] + +[Footnote 1077: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 21, 1906, _B.D._, III, 231 ff., +Nos. 250 f.; Monts to F. O., Jan. 28, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 126, No. 6970; +Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 31, 1906, _ibid._, 130 f., No. 6975.] + +[Footnote 1078: Révoil wished to push matters into the open sessions of +the Conference as much as possible, where he would have more support +(Tardieu, pp. 136 ff.; Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, +119 f., No. 6967).] + +[Footnote 1079: As seen below, the German government was proposing +several alternative solutions of that question, and the German delegates +seem also to have been discussing others on their own initiative. See +Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 25 and 27, 1906, _B.D._, III, 235, No. 256; 239 +f., Nos. 262 f.; Tardieu, pp. 144 ff.] + +[Footnote 1080: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 24, 25, 26, 1906, _B.D._, III, +234, No. 254; 235 f., Nos. 256 f.; 236 ff., Nos. 259 f.; 239 f., Nos. +262 f.; Tardieu, pp. 136 ff.] + +[Footnote 1081: Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 29, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 128 ff., +No. 6974.; Tardieu, pp. 141 ff.] + +[Footnote 1082: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 136 f., +No. 6980; Tardieu, pp. 148 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 4 and 5, 1906, +_B.D._, III, 242, No. 266; 243 f., No. 268.] + +[Footnote 1083: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 114, No. +6965.] + +[Footnote 1084: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 30, 1906, _ibid._, 128, No. +6973; Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 29 and 31, 1906, _ibid._, 128 ff., Nos. +6974 f.; Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 132 ff., No. 6977; +Tardieu, p. 142.] + +[Footnote 1085: Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 99 ff., +No. 6956; Tardieu, pp. 160 ff. A proposal similar to No. 1 had been made +to Roosevelt by Bülow earlier in January (Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 6, +1906, _G.P._, XXI, 54 f., No. 6926). Bülow also offered to support Italy +in seeking a general mandate on the police, manifestly in order to +create antagonism between Italy and France. The offer was rejected and +was soon dropped by Bülow who feared that Italy might later help France +penetrate Morocco in return for French aid to Italy in Tripoli. See +Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 53 f., No. 6925; Bülow to +Radowitz, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 114 f., No. 6965; Tardieu, pp. 146 f. +There is no proof in the published British and German documents of +Tardieu’s assertion that in January the German government also offered +to support Spain in seeking this general mandate. See _ibid._, pp. 145, +155 f. Cf. Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252; +Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6, 1906, _ibid._, 244, No. 270.] + +[Footnote 1086: Tardieu, p. 146 n.; Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 27, 1906, +_G.P._, XXI, 123 ff., No. 6968.] + +[Footnote 1087: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 136 f., +No. 6980; Tardieu, pp. 148 ff.] + +[Footnote 1088: The German government did not desire British mediation, +as it feared that Great Britain might try to pose as the protector of +France and strengthen the Entente Cordiale (Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 26, +1906, _G.P._, XXI, 114 f., No. 6965).] + +[Footnote 1089: Sternburg to F. O., Jan. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 102 f., No. +6958.] + +[Footnote 1090: Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 123 ff., No. +6968; 127, No. 6972. On Feb. 3 Goluchowski declared to the German +Ambassador that Austria would go with her ally on the questions of the +police and the bank “through thick and thin” (Holstein to Wedel, Feb. 4, +1906, _ibid._, 137, No. 6981). Dr. Kriege, of the German foreign office, +was sent on a special mission to Vienna on Feb. 2 to gain the Austrian +support (memo. by Kriege, Feb. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 137 ff., No. 6982; +Wedel to F. O., Feb. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 140, No. 6983). A cabinet crisis +in Italy on Feb. 1 prevented the German government from taking any +immediate steps to gain Italy’s active support. But Bülow expected +Visconti Venosta to be willing to mediate. On Feb. 8 a new government +was formed in Rome under Sonnino (Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, +_ibid._, 143 ff., No. 6987).] + +[Footnote 1091: Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 1, 1906, _ibid._, 131, No. +6976. Bülow also instructed Sternburg to interest the American +financiers in the Moroccan state bank so that they would press their +government to oppose the French plan and to favor the German one. At the +Chancellor’s request, the German banker, Mendelssohn, who was to take +charge of German interests in the Moroccan bank, endeavored to arouse +the Dutch, American, and Austrian bankers in the same way. See Bülow to +Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _ibid._, 145 f., No. 6987; Sternburg to F. O., +Feb. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 148, No. 6989.] + +[Footnote 1092: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 140 f., No. +6984; Tardieu, pp. 152 f.; Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, +p. 500; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 27, 1906, _B.D._, III, 239, No. 262.] + +[Footnote 1093: Nicolson reported that Tattenbach argued as follows: “He +observed that situation had completely changed since Conference had been +agreed upon, and that now _vis-a-vis_ to France I was exactly in the +same position as the other delegates. He continued that if I urged my +French colleague to make all required concessions on police question, my +words would be decisive; while if I declined to say those words, I +should be practically encouraging my French colleague to resist; and he +hinted that if the Conference fell through a great deal of the +responsibility would fall on me.” See Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 4, 1906, +_B.D._, III, 241, No. 265; 242 f., No. 267; Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 13, +1906, _ibid._, 251 f., No. 281; Tardieu, pp. 147 f.] + +[Footnote 1094: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 6, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 141 f., +No. 6985; Tardieu, pp. 153 f.] + +[Footnote 1095: The Spanish undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, +M. Ojeda, had approved it. See Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _G.P._, +XXI, 145 and note, No. 6987. On the German attempts to win over Spain +see Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252; +Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6, 1906, _ibid._, 244, No. 270.] + +[Footnote 1096: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 143 ff., +No. 6987.] + +[Footnote 1097: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 10, 1906, _ibid._, 148 f., +No. 6990; 155, No. 6996; Dennis, pp. 501 f.] + +[Footnote 1098: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 151, No. +6992.] + +[Footnote 1099: Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 147 f., No. +6989.] + +[Footnote 1100: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 9, 12, 1906, _ibid._, 149 ff., +No. 6991; 155 f., No. 6997; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 10, 1906, _ibid._, +155, No. 6996; Tardieu, p. 172.] + +[Footnote 1101: Quoted from a memorandum given by Radowitz to Révoil on +that date. See Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 162 f., +No. 7004; Tardieu, pp. 175 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 14, 1906, _B.D._, +III, 253, No. 284.] + +[Footnote 1102: Radowitz to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 122, No. +6967; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 9, 1906, _ibid._, 151, No. 6992. See the +documents in _B.D._, III, 227 ff., Nos. 246 ff.] + +[Footnote 1103: Schoen to F. O., Feb. 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 156 f., No. +6998; Tardieu, pp. 158 f., 194 ff.; Witte, _Memoirs_, pp. 298 ff.; +Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 249 f., No. 279.] + +[Footnote 1104: Wedel to F. O., Feb. 12 and 14, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 157 +ff., No. 6999; 166 f., No. 7007.] + +[Footnote 1105: Holstein to Radolin, Feb. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 152 ff., +No. 6994.] + +[Footnote 1106: Tardieu, pp. 198 ff.; Bülow to Monts, Feb. 10, 1906, +_G.P._, XXI, 154, No. 6995.] + +[Footnote 1107: Bülow to Radolin, Feb. 7 and 10, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 146 +f., No. 6988; 152, No. 6993. Holstein was the inspirer of these +dispatches. See Holstein to Radolin, Feb. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 152 ff., +No. 6994. On the press war see also Tardieu, pp. 167 ff.] + +[Footnote 1108: Bülow to Monts, Feb. 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 159 f. and +note, No. 7000; Tardieu, p. 195. The telegram to Washington, dispatched +the next day, was not of identical wording with the others but to the +same effect (Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 14, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 163 f., No. +7005).] + +[Footnote 1109: Tardieu, pp. 74, 163, 167, 176 f., 196; _G.P._, XXI, 152 +n.] + +[Footnote 1110: Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 12, 1906, _B.D_, III, 248 f., No. +278; Grey to Lascelles, Feb. 14, 1906, _ibid._, 254 f., No. 285; +Metternich to F. O., Feb. 14, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 164 ff., No. 7006.] + +[Footnote 1111: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 6 and 7, 1906, _B.D._, III, 244, +No. 269; 245, No. 271; Tardieu, p. 154. The accusation was not +deserved.] + +[Footnote 1112: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 249 f., +No. 279; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 253, No. 283; +Tardieu, pp. 79 f., 158 ff., 204 f., 246 ff.; Witte, pp. 298 ff.; +_G.P._, XXI, 125 f. n.; Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren +1894-1914_, pp. 386 f.] + +[Footnote 1113: According to Bompard, the Russian government was not +certain that the Liberal government in London would support France as +whole-heartedly as its predecessor had done. Grey’s assertions early in +February reassured it entirely (Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 31, 1906, +and Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 16, 1906, Gwynn, _The Letters and +Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, II, 62 ff.; Spring Rice to Grey, +Feb. 7 and 8, 1906, _B.D._, III, 245 f., Nos. 272 f.; Grey to Spring +Rice, Feb. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 246, No. 274).] + +[Footnote 1114: Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, +300 ff., Nos. 7112 f.; Bishop, _The Life and Times of Theodore +Roosevelt_, I, 489.] + +[Footnote 1115: Tardieu, pp. 160 ff.; Bishop, I, 489.] + +[Footnote 1116: Roosevelt to Reid, March 1, 1906, quoted in Royal +Cortissoz, _The Life of Whitelaw Reid_ (New York, 1921), II, 329 f., +347; Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 300 ff., +Nos. 7112 f.] + +[Footnote 1117: Tardieu, pp. 161 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 11, 1906, +_B.D._, III, 246 ff., Nos. 275 f.] + +[Footnote 1118: Radolin to F. O., Feb. 13 and 15, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 160 +f., No. 7001; 171 f., No. 7010; Tardieu, pp. 200 f.; Grey to Bertie, +Feb. 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 250 f., No. 280; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 16, +1906, _ibid._, 259 f., No. 290.] + +[Footnote 1119: Tardieu, pp. 179 f., 249 ff. White was very critical of +the German tactics in his dispatches to Washington, especially of the +German attempt to negotiate directly with the Quai d’Orsay while the +Conference was going on (White to Root, Feb. 11, 1905, Dennis, p. 502 +and note; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 257 f., No. +287).] + +[Footnote 1120: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 172, No. +7011; Tardieu, p. 181; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 17, 1906, _B.D._, III, 260 +f., No. 292. Révoil was contemplating an involved, vague reply when he +talked to Nicolson. At the latter’s advice it was made concise and +straightforward (Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 256 ff., No. +287).] + +[Footnote 1121: Root to Sternburg, Feb. 19, 1906, quoted in Bishop, I, +489 ff., _G.P._, XXI, 181 ff., No. 7019; Tardieu, pp. 249 f., 180.] + +[Footnote 1122: Italy had been chosen for obvious reasons, for she was +bound to France by the accords of 1900 and 1902 and to Germany by the +Triple Alliance. As such, her choice might be acceptable to both Powers +(Tardieu, p. 181).] + +[Footnote 1123: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 173 f., +No. 7013; Tardieu, pp. 187, 249 ff.] + +[Footnote 1124: Bülow’s minute to _G.P._, XXI, 183, No. 7019; Sternburg +to Roosevelt, Feb. 22, 1906, in Bishop, I, 491 ff.; Bülow to Sternburg, +Feb. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 183 f., No. 7020; Tardieu, p. 250.] + +[Footnote 1125: Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 183 f., +No. 7020; Sternburg to F. O., Feb. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 213, No. 7038.] + +[Footnote 1126: The plan was drawn up with the aid of Glasenapp of the +Deutsche Bank and of Mendelssohn, who was to take over the German shares +in the bank. See Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 27, 1906; _ibid._, 115 ff., No. +6966; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 114 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 186, 221 ff.] + +[Footnote 1127: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 117 f.; Tardieu, pp. 184 f., 221 ff.] + +[Footnote 1128: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 113 f., 120 ff., 136 ff.; Radowitz to +F. O., Feb. 20, 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 204, No. 7031; 205, No. 7033; +Tardieu, pp. 186, 221 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, _B.D._, III, +265 f., No. 298.] + +[Footnote 1129: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 176 f., +No. 7015.] + +[Footnote 1130: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 113 ff.] + +[Footnote 1131: Rouvier suggested to Révoil that the representative of +France, Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Spain, Russia, Italy, +and Austria-Hungary meet informally and try to find a solution on the +police. Nicolson and White opposed the idea as impracticable, and it was +soon dropped (Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 16, 1906, _B.D._, III, 260, No. +291).] + +[Footnote 1132: Schoen to F. O., Feb. 19, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 178 f., No. +7017; Tardieu, pp. 194 f., 204 f.] + +[Footnote 1133: Tardieu, pp. 246 ff.; Schoen to F. O., Feb. 20, 1906, +_G.P._, XXI, 192, No. 7025; Eulenburg to William II, Feb. 22, 1906, +_ibid._, 194, No. 7027 and Anlage, Witte to Eulenburg, Feb. 20, 1906; +Witte, p. 301.] + +[Footnote 1134: Bülow to Schoen, Feb. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 193, No. +7026; memo. by Bülow, Feb. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 197 f., No. 7028; +Eulenburg to Witte, Feb. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 202 ff., No. 7030; Tardieu, +pp. 195, 295.] + +[Footnote 1135: Schoen to F. O., Feb. 23, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 211 ff., +No. 7037; Witte, p. 301; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _B.D._, +III, 271 f., No. 308; 273 f., No. 311.] + +[Footnote 1136: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 279, +No. 320; Spring Rice to Knollys, March 1, 1906, Gwynn, II, 65 f.] + +[Footnote 1137: Tardieu, pp. 247, 249; Schoen to F. O., March 3, 1906, +_G.P._, XXI, 234 f., No. 7052; Schoen to Bülow, March 4, 1906, _ibid._, +251 ff., No. 7068. The article so embittered the German government that +Bülow would not show it directly to the Emperor but informed him of it +personally so as to take away the sting (see the minutes to the dispatch +from Schoen to F. O., March 3, 1906, _ibid._, 235, No. 7052).] + +[Footnote 1138: A visit of the London City Council to Paris, Feb. 8, +gave occasion for confirming the Entente Cordiale (_G.P._, XXI, 185 ff. +and note, No. 7021). Grey also intimated to Metternich that France would +be willing to eliminate the thirty-year limitation to commercial freedom +in Morocco as provided for in the Anglo-French accord. See Metternich to +F. O., Feb. 19 and 20, 1906, _ibid._, 179 ff., No. 7018; 185 ff., Nos. +7021 f.; Grey to Lascelles, Feb. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 263 f., No. +296.] + +[Footnote 1139: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 22, 24, 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, +269, No. 303; 271 f., No. 308; 273 f., No. 311; 278 f., No. 320; Grey to +Spring Rice, Feb. 20, 22, 1906, _ibid._, 264 f., No. 297; 270, No. 304; +Grey to Spring Rice, Feb. 19, 1906, Gwynn, II, 65.] + +[Footnote 1140: Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 258, No. +288. Apparently it was not mentioned to the French at all.] + +[Footnote 1141: Memo. by Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, _ibid._, 266 f., No. 299.] + +[Footnote 1142: Sir Charles Hardinge, permanent undersecretary of state +for foreign affairs, believed that the way to prevent Germany from +attacking France because of some French action in Morocco was for Great +Britain to inform Germany that she is “absolutely ‘solidaire’ with +France as far as the Moroccan question is concerned.” He feared that if +Great Britain did leave France in the lurch, “an agreement or alliance +between France, Germany and Russia in the near future is certain” (memo. +by Grey, Feb. 20, 1906, and Hardinge’s minute, _ibid._, 266 ff., No. +299). Mr. Eyre Crowe, senior clerk in the British foreign office, a +prejudiced, bitter opponent of Germany, suspected that Germany might +demand and seize a port in Morocco or obtain a lease as she had done at +Kiaouchau in China. He advised warning the Sultan against Germany. Sir +Edward Grey regarded the proposal as premature so long as the Conference +was sitting, but said that the eventualities referred to should be kept +in mind (minutes to dispatch from Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, +_ibid._, 272, No. 308).] + +[Footnote 1143: Monts to Bülow, Feb. 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 168 f., No. +7008; Monts to F. O., Feb. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 161 f., No. 7002; Bülow to +Monts, Feb. 14, 1906, _ibid._, 162 and note, No. 7003; Monts to Bülow, +Feb. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 230 ff., No. 7050; Monts to Bülow, March 11, +1906, _ibid._, 286 ff., No. 7103; Monts to Bülow, Feb. 24, 1906, +_ibid._, 216 f., No. 7043; Tardieu, pp. 198 f., 205 f.; Grey to Egerton, +Feb. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 262, No. 295; Egerton to Grey, March 3, +1906, _ibid._, 283, No. 325.] + +[Footnote 1144: “C’est la pire des solutions,” wrote Tardieu, p. 155 and +elsewhere. See the conversation between Ojeda and Stumm reported by the +latter on Feb. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 189 ff., No. 7024; Tardieu, pp. +155 ff., 199 f.; Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22 and 26, 1906, _B.D._, III, +233, No. 252; 236, No. 258.] + +[Footnote 1145: Tardieu writes that the instructions were “all that +France wished” (Tardieu, pp. 207 f., 255).] + +[Footnote 1146: Tardieu has a long story about German threats and +intimidations toward Spain between Feb. 11 and 20. The King of Spain, he +writes, was angry, but Ojeda listened to the siren voice of Stumm, first +secretary of the German embassy in Madrid. According to the German +documents, Stumm had at least two conversations with Ojeda during +February, one on Feb. 20, trying without success to influence Spain to +support the German proposals (_G.P._, XXI, 145, 189 ff.). On the Spanish +proposal see Tardieu, pp. 199 f., 188 ff., 207 ff.; Grey to Cartwright, +Feb. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 262 n., No. 295; 271, No. 307; Cartwright to +Grey, Feb. 21, 22, 24, 1906, _ibid._, 268 f., No. 301; 270 f., No. 305; +273, No. 310; Grey to Nicolson, Feb. 22, 1906, _ibid._, 269, No. 302; +Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 271, No. 306.] + +[Footnote 1147: The Belgian government informed him that its delegate +had orders to abstain from voting in case of a conflict, and to +participate actively in the Conference only when the commercial +interests of Belgium were involved. The Dutch government said that its +delegate would vote with the majority. Sweden replied that she would +abstain from voting in case of disagreement (Tardieu, p. 257).] + +[Footnote 1148: As Sir Edward Grey knew how interested Austria was in +keeping Great Britain and Germany friendly, he impressed upon the +Austrian government, Feb. 26, “how unfortunate” was the German stand on +the police, and “how impossible it was to improve the relations between +England and Germany as long as there was this dispute between Germany +and France about a matter on which we had an Agreement with France which +was publicly known to the whole world, and which had been the very +beginning of our friendship with France” (Grey to Goschen, Feb. 26, +1906, _B.D._, III, 276 f., No. 316).] + +[Footnote 1149: Tardieu, pp. 202 f.] + +[Footnote 1150: Wedel to F. O., Feb. 14 and 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 166 +f., No. 7007; 175 f., No. 7014. To the Italian and American governments +Goluchowski openly censured the German attitude (Tardieu, p. 203, and +above; Goschen to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _B.D._, III, 273, No. 309).] + +[Footnote 1151: Memo. by Bülow, Feb. 24, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 213 f., No. +7039; Tardieu, pp. 257 ff.; Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, _B.D._, +III, 279, No. 320.] + +[Footnote 1152: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 28, 1906, _ibid._, 278, No. +318; 279, No. 320.] + +[Footnote 1153: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 26, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 177 f., +No. 7016; Tardieu, pp. 187, 266 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 26, 1906, +_B.D._, III, 276, No. 315.] + +[Footnote 1154: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 24, 1906, _B.D._, III, 274, +No. 311.] + +[Footnote 1155: Nicolson to Grey, Feb. 25 and 26, 1906, _ibid._, 274 +ff., Nos. 312 f.; Tardieu, Part III, chap. ii, _passim_, pp. 268 ff.] + +[Footnote 1156: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 21, March 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, +204 f., No. 7032; 233 f., No. 7051; Tardieu, pp. 143 ff., 227, 223 ff.] + +[Footnote 1157: Tardieu, pp. 275 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 159 ff.; +Radowitz to F. O., March 3 and 9, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 233 f. and note, +No. 7051; Nicolson to Grey, March 3, 1906, _B.D._, III, 282, No. 323; +283 f., No. 326. The French press played up that vote as a great +victory; the German press and government took the opposite view. +Nevertheless, the German delegates complained to the Italian, Belgian, +Spanish, and even the Austrian delegates about their actions; and the +vote undoubtedly helped to accomplish the object of Nicolson and +Révoil.] + +[Footnote 1158: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 168 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, March 7, +1906, _B.D._, III, 285 ff., No. 330; Tardieu, pp. 283 ff.] + +[Footnote 1159: Nicolson to Grey, March 3 and 7, 1906, _B.D._, III, 282 +f., No. 324; 285, No. 328. On March 7 Grey again advised the Spanish +government to stand firmly with France and Great Britain (Grey to de +Bunsen, March 7, 1906, _ibid._, 285, No. 329).] + +[Footnote 1160: Tardieu states that on March 5 Tattenbach openly said so +to several of the delegates (p. 291). Bülow also found it necessary to +bolster up the courage of the German delegates. See memo. by Bülow, +March 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 256, No. 7069. See also Metternich to F. O., +Feb. 20, 1906, _ibid._, 188, No. 7023; Radowitz to Bülow, Feb. 26, 1906, +_ibid._, 217 ff., No. 7044; Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 27, March 5, 1906, +_ibid._, 226, No. 7048; 243 ff., Nos. 7061 f. King Edward’s visit to +Paris, March 4-5, at which time he showed special favor to Delcassé, was +also a significant sign to the Germans (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 510; +Bertie to Grey, March 5, 1906, _B.D._, III, 284, No. 327).] + +[Footnote 1161: On this episode see Tardieu, pp. 241 ff., 296; Grey to +Bertie, Feb. 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 278, No. 319; Bertie to Grey, March +5, 1906, _ibid._, 284, No. 327; Nicolson to Grey, March 8, 1906, +_ibid._, 288, No. 331; memos. by Holstein, Feb. 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, +206 ff., and note, Nos. 7034 f.; Holstein to Radolin, March 4, 1906, +_ibid._, 237, No. 7055; Radolin to F. O., Feb. 27, March 5 and 6, 1906, +_ibid._, 225, No. 7047; 240 f., No. 7059; 250 f., No. 7067; Bülow to +Radolin, March 5, 1906, _ibid._, 240, No. 7058. Courcel spoke to Louis, +of the French foreign office, about the project on March 5. On the next +day Rouvier mentioned it to Radolin, only to refuse it. On Holstein’s +views see also Lascelles to Grey, March 1, 1906, _B.D._, III, 280 f. and +inclosure, No. 321.] + +[Footnote 1162: Hammann, _Bilder_, pp. 37 f.; memo. by Holstein, Feb. +22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 208 f., No. 7035; Holstein to Radolin, March 4, +1906, _ibid._, 237, No. 7055; _ibid._ p. 338, editor’s note.] + +[Footnote 1163: See the conversation with Tschirschky on March 16 +recorded by Zedlitz-Trützschler, _Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof_, +pp. 146 f.] + +[Footnote 1164: Radowitz to F. O., Feb. 26, March 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, +233 f., No. 7045; 262 f., No. 7077; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 187 f.] + +[Footnote 1165: Bülow to Radowitz, Feb. 28, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 224 f., +No. 7046.] + +[Footnote 1166: Goluchowski reluctantly agreed to mediate on that basis +at first, but after learning of the vote of March 3 and after consulting +Welsersheimb he changed his mind (Wedel to F. O. March 1 and 4, 1906, +_ibid._, 228 ff., No. 7049; 238 f., No. 7056).] + +[Footnote 1167: Monts to Bülow, Feb. 27, 1906, _ibid._, 230 ff., No. +7050; Radowitz to F. O., March 3, 1906, _ibid._, 235 f., No. 7053.] + +[Footnote 1168: Bülow to Radowitz, March 6 and 7, 1906, _ibid._, 245 f. +and note, No. 7063; Bülow to Wedel, Bülow to Monts, March 6, 1906, +_ibid._, XXI, 248 f. and note, No. 7065.] + +[Footnote 1169: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 183 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 8, +1906, _G.P._, XXI, 261 ff., Nos. 7076 ff., Nicolson to Grey, March 8 and +9, 1906, _B.D._, III, 288, No. 331; 289 ff., No. 334. Visconti Venosta, +informed at the last minute of the proposed Austrian mediation, refused +angrily to co-operate in it. Why he did so is difficult to see. He +claimed that the Austrian project was not in keeping with the German +view which he represented. This, however, seems a poor excuse, for he +had approved the project when it was first suggested. It seems more +likely that Visconti Venosta was seeking to avoid taking the Austro- +German side publicly against France. The Austrian government was more +alarmed at his refusal than was the German government, which consoled +itself with the fact that the Italian delegate was performing useful +work under cover. See Wedel to F. O., March 9 and 11, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, +269, No. 7083; 271 f., No. 7087; Monts to F. O., March 7, 1906, _ibid._, +257, No. 7070; Radowitz to F. O., March 11, 1906, _ibid._, 272 and note, +No. 7088.] + +[Footnote 1170: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 189 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 10, +1906, _G.P._, XXI, 270, No. 7085; Tardieu, p. 293; Nicolson to Grey, +March 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 292 f., No. 337. By these words Radowitz +did not mean that Germany would accept the French terms, as Tardieu +imagines (Tardieu, pp. 308 ff., 313).] + +[Footnote 1171: Nicolson to Grey, March 9 and 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 288 +f., No. 332; 294, No. 338; Grey to Bertie, March 9, 1906, _ibid._, 289, +No. 333; Bertie to Grey, March 10, 1906, _ibid._, 292, No. 336; Radowitz +to F. O., March 8 and 10, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 261, No. 7075; 264 f., No. +7079; 269 f., No. 7084; Dennis, p. 503. Cf. Tardieu, pp. 297 f., 308 f.] + +[Footnote 1172: Grey to Nicolson, March 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 292, No. +335.] + +[Footnote 1173: Bertie to Grey, March 2, 1906, _ibid._, 281 f., No. +322.] + +[Footnote 1174: Tardieu, pp. 299 f., 309 f., 321, 328; Grey, _Twenty- +five Years_, I, 103.] + +[Footnote 1175: Nicolson to Grey, March 9, 1906, _B.D._, III, 288 f., +No. 322; Bertie to Grey, March 10, 1906, _ibid._, 292, No. 336.] + +[Footnote 1176: Radolin to F. O., March 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 265 f., +No. 7080.] + +[Footnote 1177: On March 5, 6, and 7, Bülow showed no inclination to +accept the French plan, but held firmly to the Austrian one. See Bülow +to Wedel, March 5 and 6, 1906, _ibid._, 239, No. 7057; 248 f., No. 7065; +memo. by Bülow, March 7, 1906, _ibid._, 256, No. 7069. He may, however, +have made this statement to the Prince of Monaco without explaining that +by “the most discreet control of an officer from a lesser Power” he +really meant the Austrian plan and did not intend an acceptance of the +French plan. Tardieu’s assumption that Bülow made the surrender and then +receded from his concession after the fall of the French government on +March 7, hoping to exploit this embarrassing situation, is, so far as we +can tell, devoid of foundation (Tardieu, pp. 293 ff., 314 f.).] + +[Footnote 1178: Germany also refused to recede on the police in return +for French concessions on the bank (Nicolson to Grey, March 10 and 11, +1906, _B.D._, III, 294 f., Nos. 338 f.).] + +[Footnote 1179: Nicolson to Grey, March 11 and 12, 1906, _ibid._, 295 +f., No. 339; 297 ff., Nos. 341 f.] + +[Footnote 1180: Bertie to Grey, March 11, 1906, _ibid._, 296 f., No. +340.] + +[Footnote 1181: Crowe’s minutes to the dispatch from Nicolson to Grey, +March 12, 1906, _ibid._, 299, No. 342; Grey to Nicolson, March 12, 1906, +_ibid._, 300, No. 344.] + +[Footnote 1182: Nicolson to Grey, March 11, 12, 14, 1906, _ibid._, 295, +No. 339; 298, No. 341; 303, No. 349. Rouvier also approved this plan. +See Hardinge to Nicolson, March 15, 1906, _ibid._, 305, No. 354.] + +[Footnote 1183: The number of censors was later increased to four, one +each from Great Britain, Spain, France, and Germany. See Radowitz to F. +O., March 8 and 11, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 263 f., No. 7078; 272 f., No. +7089; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 152 f., 182, 189 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 291 f.] + +[Footnote 1184: Radowitz to F. O., March 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 279, No. +7094.] + +[Footnote 1185: Radowitz to F. O., March 11, 1906, _ibid._, 273, No. +7089.] + +[Footnote 1186: Radowitz to F. O., March 12, 1906, _ibid._, 274, No. +7090.] + +[Footnote 1187: Quoted in _ibid._, p. 274 n.; and in Tardieu, p. 316.] + +[Footnote 1188: _G.P._, XXI, 274 ff., Nos. 7091 ff.; Tardieu, p. 318; +Bishop, I, 495 ff. Bülow also sent a condensed telegram to the German +banker, Mendelssohn, then in St. Petersburg negotiating a loan with +Witte.] + +[Footnote 1189: Schoen to F. O., March 13, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 279 f., +No. 7095; Monts to F. O., March 13, 1906, _ibid._, 280 f., No. 7097; +Wedel to F. O., March 13, 1906, _ibid._, 281 f., No. 7099; Metternich to +F. O., March 13, 1906, _ibid._, 282 ff., No. 7100; Grey to Lascelles, +March 13, 1906, _B.D._, III, 301 f., Nos. 347 f.] + +[Footnote 1190: Sternburg to F. O., March 7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 259 ff., +No. 7074; Bishop, I, 493 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 251 f., 297.] + +[Footnote 1191: Bülow to Sternburg, March 12, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, No. +7093; Bishop, I, 495 ff.; Tardieu, p. 335. The President’s intervention +was extremely embarrassing to Bülow, who, after calling Sternburg’s +attention to the difference between the original wording of the promise +to Roosevelt sent from Berlin in the previous June and that sent to the +President by Sternburg, threatened to disavow the Ambassador (_G.P._, +XXI, 277 f., No. 7093). However, he did not do so.] + +[Footnote 1192: Sternburg to F. O., March 14, 1906, _ibid._, 285 f., No. +7102.] + +[Footnote 1193: Bertie to Grey, March 15, 16, 17, 1906, _B.D._, III, +306, Nos. 355 f.; 307 f., No. 358; 309 f., No. 361; Grey, I, 102 ff.] + +[Footnote 1194: Tardieu, pp. 327 f., 343; Radolin to F. O., March 14 and +15, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 291 f., No. 7104; 295 ff., No. 7107; Bertie to +Grey, March 16, 1906, _B.D._, III, 307 f., No. 358.] + +[Footnote 1195: Grey to Bertie, March 14, 1906, _B.D._, III, 303, No. +350; 304, No. 352. In private both Sir Edward Grey and Sir Charles +Hardinge greatly deplored the French refusal. On March 15 the former +wrote to Sir Francis Bertie as follows: “I think the French made a great +mistake in not closing at once with the German concession at Algeciras; +they could have made it appear to be a diplomatic victory for +themselves. . . . . Even the _Times_ correspondent of Algeciras thinks +France ought not to break off on such a wretched point as Casa Blanca, +which I believe is a useless hole. However, if she does, we shall back +her up” (_ibid._, 304 f., No. 353). And on the same day Sir Charles +Hardinge wrote to Sir Arthur Nicolson as follows: “. . . . If the +Conference breaks up over such an absurd point as the Casablanca +proposal _we_ shall be in a disagreeable position, as I remember well +your opinion that the French position will not be difficult for Germany +to undermine in Morocco and we shall then be exposed to any violent +action which the French may take to retrieve their losses and shall find +ourselves compelled to support France in a war against Germany. If the +Conference is broken off I shall not like the outlook. I felt very +strong about telling Cambon that in our opinion the Austrian proposal +should be accepted rather than allow the Conference to fall through” +(_ibid._, 305, No. 354).] + +[Footnote 1196: Grey to Bertie, March 15, 1905, _ibid._, 307, No. 357; +Grey to Nicolson, March 14, 1906, _ibid._, 304, No. 351; Nicolson to +Grey, March 15, 1906, _ibid._, 304 n., No. 351; Spring Rice to +Lamsdorff, March 17, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 107 f.; Tardieu, pp. 311 +f.] + +[Footnote 1197: Grey, I, 107 f.; Tardieu, pp. 329 f., 347.] + +[Footnote 1198: Radolin to F. O., March 17, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 303 f., +No. 7114; Tardieu, pp. 343 f.; Nicolson to Grey, March 18, 1906, _B.D._, +III, 311, No. 363.] + +[Footnote 1199: _Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ (Chambre, March 14 +and 19, 1906), pp. 1290, 1438 f.] + +[Footnote 1200: The conversation on March 15 between Bourgeois and the +Austrian Ambassador also pointed in this direction. See Bertie to Grey, +March 16, 1906, _B.D._, III, 307 f., No. 358. See also Nicolson to Grey, +March 17, 18, 21, 1906, _ibid._, 308, No. 359; 310 f., No. 362; 311 f., +No. 364; 314 f., No. 368; Grey to Bertie, March 17, 1906, _ibid._, 308 +f., No. 360.] + +[Footnote 1201: Bülow to Sternburg, March 16, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 293 +ff., No. 7106.] + +[Footnote 1202: Sternburg to F. O., March 17 and 18, 1906, _ibid._, 300 +ff., Nos. 7112 f.; 305 ff., No. 7115; Bishop, I, 497 ff.] + +[Footnote 1203: Bülow to Radowitz, March 16, 19, 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, +298 f., No. 7110; 307 ff., No. 7117; 311, No. 7120; Radowitz to F. O., +March 17, 18, 21, 1906, _ibid._, 299 f., No. 7111; 306 f., No. 7116; 310 +f., No. 7119; Tardieu, pp. 344 ff.; Bülow to Sternburg, March 19, 1906, +_G.P._, XXI, 309 f., No. 7118.] + +[Footnote 1204: Dennis, pp. 505 f.; Grey to Durand, March 22, 1906, +_B.D._, III, 317, No. 374.] + +[Footnote 1205: Grey to Goschen, March 21, 1906, _B.D._, III, 315 f., +No. 371.] + +[Footnote 1206: On this episode see Nicolson to Grey, March 19, 21, 23, +1906, _ibid._, 312 ff., Nos. 365 ff.; 315, No. 370; 318, No. 376; 319 +f., No. 379; Grey to de Bunsen, March 21, 1906, _ibid._, 316, No. 372; +Bertie to Grey, March 22, 1906, _ibid._, 317 f., No. 375; Grey to +Durand, March 22 and 23, 1906, _ibid._, 317, No. 374; 318, No. 377; +Durand to Grey, March 24, 1906, _ibid._, 320 f., Nos. 380 f.; de Bunsen +to Grey, March 27, 1906, _ibid._, 325 f., No. 385; Tardieu, pp. 385 ff.; +Sternburg to F. O., March 21 and 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 311 f., No. +7121; 321, No. 7126; Radowitz to F. O., March 21, 1906, _ibid._, 310 f., +No. 7119.] + +[Footnote 1207: The Austrian government was opposed to trying to mediate +upon the basis of Roosevelt’s proposal (unsigned and undated memoir +handed by Szogyeny to the German government, March 23, 1906, _G.P._, +XXI, 321, No. 7127).] + +[Footnote 1208: France could afford to make the concession on the bank +because she had assured herself of the votes of Italy, Great Britain, +Spain, Belgium, and the United States, which with her own three votes +would constitute a majority. On this discussion see Tardieu, pp. 297, +342, 347 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, pp. 196 ff.; Bülow to Radowitz, March 24, +1906, _G.P._, XXI, 322 f., No. 7129; Radowitz to F. O., March 16, 23, +25, 26, 1906, _ibid._, 297, No. 7109; 322, No. 7128; 324 ff., No. 7131; +326 f., Nos. 7132 f.; Nicolson to Grey, March 23, 1906, _B.D._, III, 319 +f., No. 379.] + +[Footnote 1209: Tardieu, pp. 362, 365 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 26, +1906, _G.P._, XXI, Nos. 7132 f.; Nicolson to Grey, March 26, 27, 1906, +_B.D._, III, 321, No. 382; 322 ff., No. 383.] + +[Footnote 1210: This publication, which was another answer to the +exaggerated article in the _Lokalanzeiger_ on March 12, angered the +German government. A short time previously Bülow had asked the Russian +government to use its influence in moderating the anti-German campaign +of the French press, especially of Tardieu in _Le Temps_. Instead of +doing so, the Russian government issued this denial that it had ever +advised France to accept the Austrian police proposal and asserted that +Russia had never ceased and would not cease from acting toward France as +a faithful ally. The German government complained to the Russian +government against its so manifestly taking the French side, and +threatened to refuse German participation in the forthcoming Russian +loan. Both Lamsdorff and Witte were impressed by the vigor of the +complaints, and tried to explain the affair away. Nelidow had endeavored +to influence Tardieu, they said, and had spoken to him in general terms +of the instructions which he had just received. To the Ambassador’s +amazement, he had discovered an entirely false account of these +instructions published in _Le Temps_. On demanding an explanation from +Tardieu, the latter said that he had obtained his information in the +French foreign office. Both ministers as well as the Ambassador +expressed their regrets over the affair, and Lamsdorff published a +correct version of the instructions. But as Schoen said, the latter +version did not change the previous one much. Osten-Sacken weakened the +Russian explanation by admitting to Tschirschky that Nelidow himself had +given an “excerpt” of the instructions to the offending journalist. So +the German government was not appeased by the excuses (see Bülow to +Schoen, March 22, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 312 f., No. 7122, and following +documents). As a matter of fact, those instructions were published on +purpose to impress upon Germany that Russia held to the Dual Alliance +and did not regard the Björkö accord as binding. See Witte, pp. 298 ff.; +Iswolsky, _Recollections of a Foreign Minister_, pp. 23 f.; Tardieu, pp. +330 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, March 21, 1906, _B.D._, III, 315, No. 369; +Spring Rice to Grey, March 21, 1906, _ibid._, 316 f., No. 373.] + +[Footnote 1211: Even the Russian and Spanish delegates considered this +matter of no importance. See Tardieu, pp. 361 ff.; Radowitz to Bülow, +March 28, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 330 f., No. 7137.] + +[Footnote 1212: Sternburg to F. O., March 24, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 324, +No. 7130.] + +[Footnote 1213: Radowitz to F. O., March 26 and 27, 1906, _ibid._, 326 +ff., Nos. 7132 ff.; Radowitz to Bülow, March 28, 1906, _ibid._, 330 f., +No. 7137; Nicolson to Grey, March 27, 1906, _B.D._, 324 f., No. 384; +Tardieu, pp. 371 ff.] + +[Footnote 1214: On these negotiations see Tardieu, pp. 378 ff. Almodovar +tried to reopen the question of Tangier with the French on April 1 but +had no success (_ibid._, pp. 394 ff.; see also _L.j., 1906_, p. 239).] + +[Footnote 1215: A Swiss was selected at France’s wish because +Switzerland was so little interested in Morocco. See Nicolson to Grey, +March 28, 1906, _B.D._, III, 326 f., No. 386.] + +[Footnote 1216: Tardieu, pp. 396 ff.; _L.j., 1906_, p. 210; Lee, II, +362.] + +[Footnote 1217: _L.j., 1906_, pp. 196 ff.; Radowitz to F. O., March 27 +and 31, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 328 ff., Nos. 7134 ff.; 331 f., No. 7138; +Radowitz to Bülow, March 28, 1906, _ibid._, 330 f., No. 7137; Tardieu, +pp. 396 ff. The final act is found in _L.j., 1906_, pp. 262 ff.] + +[Footnote 1218: Bishop, I, 492, 494, 496 ff.] + +[Footnote 1219: Rosen to Bülow, May 17, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 601 f., No. +7276.] + +[Footnote 1220: Lowther to Grey, April 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 338, No. +402.] + +[Footnote 1221: Grey to Nicolson, March 12, 1906, _ibid._, 299 f., No. +343; Nicolson to Grey, March 13, April 3, 1906, _ibid._, 301, No. 346; +330, No. 392; Lowther to Grey, April 17 and 22, 1906, _ibid._, 337 ff., +Nos. 401 f.; 346 f. and inclosure, No. 412; memo. by Geoffray, Aug. 31, +1906, _ibid._, 341 ff., No. 405; Tardieu, pp. 425 ff.] + + + + + CHAPTER XVIII + + CONCLUSION + + +The conclusion of the Conference relaxed the tension in Europe and +cleared the way for a gradual improvement in the relations of the +Powers. Both sides expressed satisfaction with the results, which, +according to official interpretation, left behind neither victor nor +vanquished.[1222] None the less it was evident that Germany had been +defeated. She had tried to obtain a material interest in Morocco; she +had endeavored to break the Entente Cordiale and therewith the other +French ententes; she had sought to disrupt or to modify the Dual +Alliance. And she had failed in every effort. In attempting to restore +her dominating position of the time before the formation of the Entente +Cordiale, Germany had only driven France, Great Britain, and Russia into +closer intimacy and had furthered the very alignment of the Powers which +she had feared. By defending an international right which no one else +valued she had permitted her isolation, except for the support of +Austria, to be exposed to all the world. At the Conference she had +forced Russia, Italy, and even the United States reluctantly to take the +French side. Germany had entirely miscalculated the situation.[1223] + +The German statesmen realized that their international position had +grown more serious. Italy’s meager support at the Conference was further +proof that Germany could not rely upon that ally.[1224] The increased +importance of Austria to Germany was tacitly admitted when, on April 13, +the Emperor William thanked Count Goluchowski for playing the “brilliant +second” at the Conference and promised him: “You can also be certain of +similar service from me in a similar case.”[1225] Prince Bülow, whom his +master had not consulted beforehand, warned him, however, “(1) that our +relations with Austria have now become more important than ever, since +that state is our only reliable ally; (2) that we must let our relative +political isolation be noticed by the Austrians as little as +possible.”[1226] And in September the Emperor commented sarcastically: +“Fine prospects! In the future we can count on the Franco-Russian +Alliance, Anglo-French Entente Cordiale and Anglo-Russian Entente, with +Spain, Italy, and Portugal as appendages thereto in the second +line!”[1227] + +To counteract this isolation the German government could do little for +the time being except remain quiet.[1228] It permitted relations with +Italy to continue as before.[1229] It assumed a “correct but reserved +attitude toward France.”[1230] It refused to sanction German +participation in the Russian loan, but otherwise remained on friendly +terms with that Power.[1231] Its main desire was to reach some kind of +an understanding with Great Britain so as to share in the entente +movement.[1232] Anglo-German relations did improve, but the British +government replied to German soundings that more time should elapse +before the two governments should attempt any concerted efforts to bring +their countries closer together.[1233] + +German public opinion was dissatisfied with the way in which its foreign +affairs were being conducted; its alarm over the international situation +increased as the year progressed. When the debate in the Reichstag on +that subject, delayed because of the Chancellor’s illness, was held on +November 14, Herr Bassermann of the National Liberal party remarked as +follows: + + +Today the Triple Alliance has no further practical utility. The Italian +press and population lean more and more towards France. Austria has been +too much praised for this rôle of “brilliant second” which she herself +declined. The Franco-Russian Alliance remains intact, and the +disposition of France towards us is less friendly than formerly. The +explanations at Cronberg between the English and German sovereigns does +not prevent England from pursuing her old policy of isolating us. We +live in an era of alliances between other nations. . . . . Our policy +lacks tranquillity and consistency, and we see brutal hands derange well +prepared plans.[1234] + + +As these criticisms were widespread, Prince Bülow replied in a long and +carefully prepared speech. Admitting the deep hostility of France to +Germany, he expressed the hope that the two nations would live +peacefully together. As to Anglo-German relations he declared: “A long +period of misunderstanding lies behind us. The needle of the political +barometer has happily gone from rain and wind to changing.” He denied +that any deep antagonisms divided the two countries and that the German +fleet was a menace to Great Britain. He suggested that time should be +allowed for the two nations to approach each other. “We have no +thought,” he said, “of wishing to push ourselves in between France and +Russia or France and England.” He announced that “for some time +negotiations between Russia and England have been under way which +promise that an understanding will be reached over certain Central +Asiatic regions. . . . .” He added: “We have no reason at all to disturb +these negotiations or to regard their probable result with mistrustful +eyes.” But he issued the following warning: “The Entente Cordiale +without good relations between the Powers and Germany would be a danger +to European peace. . . . . Such an encirclement is not possible without +the exercise of a certain pressure. Pressure produces counter-pressure, +from pressure and counter-pressure explosions may finally arise.” He +denied that Germany was isolated and testified to the loyalty of her two +allies; but he declared that Germany was strong enough to defend herself +alone. Urging the nation not to be uneasy, he said: “More than once we +have been in situations where the danger of a general grouping against +us lay nearer than today. . . . . The political world is still agitated +by a certain excitement which calls for carefulness and prudence, but +gives no cause for pusillanimity.” He concluded with a vigorous defense +of his own and the Emperor’s methods of conducting foreign affairs. His +words were widely applauded, even though they did not assuage German +fears or stop criticism.[1235] + +The satisfaction of the French and British governments with the results +of the Conference was real. Although France had had to recognize the +international character of Moroccan reforms, she had practically +asserted her position in that land. She had also preserved her ententes +and alliance against Germany’s attacks, and had herself shown a +determined spirit hitherto lacking in the Third Republic. The British +government had had no direct interest in the Moroccan crisis except from +the point of view of general policy, but it was well pleased that the +Entente Cordiale had stood the test, that it had grown firmer than +before.[1236] + +Out of this crisis the Entente Cordiale emerged as a lasting dynamic +combination for checking Germany. As Sir Edward Grey remarked to the +French Ambassador, July 9, 1906, “If we [Great Britain] were called on +to take sides [between France and Germany], we must take sides with +France as at Algeciras. As long, however, as Germany kept quiet, there +was no reason for trouble, and things would go on quietly.”[1237] The +British Foreign Secretary did not thereby give France a blank check +against Germany, nor had he done so during the crisis. He had cautioned +the French that British support would in last analysis depend upon +public opinion. But as the crisis at the Conference in March had shown, +he could be forced to take the French side even though he disapproved of +it. + +The Entente Cordiale was so necessary to both Powers and yet so loose in +form that it acquired a peculiar character. Dependent not upon the +written word but upon feeling, it had constantly to be kept warm. It +partook more of the nature of a jealous engagement than of a trustworthy +and tolerant marriage. Each party was particularly mistrustful of any +playing by the other with Germany. Still other causes divided them from +Germany. They regarded the latter’s interference in the Moroccan affair +as gratuitous and unjustified. “All that is necessary,” wrote Sir Edward +Grey in May, 1906, “is for the Germans to realize that they have got +nothing to complain of.”[1238] France and Great Britain feared that +Germany might attempt another aggression. As the British Foreign +Secretary stated in June, 1906, implying an accusation in doing so, “The +Germans do not realize that England has always drifted or deliberately +gone into opposition to any Power which establishes a hegemony in +Europe.”[1239] The French and English believed so firmly that German +diplomacy called for the arousing of discord between Powers at every +opportunity that they were almost reluctant to have any dealings with +the _Wilhelmstrasse_. They saw German intrigues everywhere—in Persia, in +Abyssinia,[1240] in Paris, in London. When the German Ambassador in +Paris spoke in July of a detente in Anglo-German relations, the French +and British governments suspected therein an attempt to weaken the +Entente Cordiale.[1241] Each government, therefore, was cool toward the +renegade Power. “When one recovers from a year’s sickness,” stated the +semiofficial _Le Temps_ with reference to Franco-German relations, “the +convalescence cannot be immediate.”[1242] Sir Edward Grey appeared +friendlier; in July he described Anglo-German relations as again normal. +But he refused Germany’s bid for an understanding because public opinion +was not prepared and especially because France would object. Count +Metternich remarked to him on July 31 that M. Delcassé’s policy had been +to encircle Germany and that at present the British and French press +also asserted that this aim should be accomplished with the help of +Russia. The Count warned Sir Edward Grey that that dangerous game might +call forth a situation which would make it necessary for Germany to +break the circle. + + +A peaceful policy on the other hand is [he said] to extend the hand to +Germany and to draw her into the circle of the others. . . . . But so +long as in England the German attempts at _rapprochement_ are repulsed +through fear of arousing displeasure among the French, it appears to me +that the policy of creating a balance of power is preferred here to that +of drawing Germany into the circle of friendship. + + +The Foreign Secretary denied that the policy of agreement with Russia +was directed in any way against Germany. But when the Ambassador asked +“Are, openly avowed, friendly relations with Germany compatible with +England’s friendship with France?” he replied, “That depends on German +politics.” The Ambassador immediately countered, “No, it rather seems to +depend on French interpretation of German politics.”[1243] The British +Foreign Secretary, however, was not to be moved by German criticisms. +The British as well as the French put Germany on her good behavior. + +Notwithstanding Sir Edward Grey’s denial, this mistrust of the Central +Power was an important inducement for Great Britain and France to +complete the Entente Cordiale by an entente between Great Britain and +Russia.[1244] Conditions were more favorable for success than they had +ever been. The Moroccan affair no longer occupied international +attention. The domestic situation in Russia was more stable with the +calling of the Duma. And M. Iswolsky, who succeeded Count Lamsdorff in +the Russian foreign office in 1906, brought new vigor into the Russian +policy. As a partisan of an agreement with Great Britain, he took up the +negotiations, and after an intermittent pursuit of them, brought them to +completion in the next year.[1245] Thus the work of insuring against +Germany was continued. + +What the entente Powers regarded as insurance, Germany called +encirclement. Both sides had been playing the game of the balance of +power. France had tried to abandon this game in the previous year, but +Germany’s refusal of her offers had driven her back into the play. +Neither side appreciated the other’s point of view; neither heeded the +other’s warnings. Each side accused the other of aiming at its defeat, +of being a menace. Each scoffed at the other’s fears, but each continued +to arm and to broaden and tighten the policy which each warned the other +was leading to trouble. Neither side had learned anything from this +episode except to be more cautious. Neither changed its method. + +The motives that caused this crisis still obtained as guiding forces. +Prestige and national interests were at stake on both sides. Having +become deeply engaged in the Moroccan affair, Germany, France, and Great +Britain could not easily back out of it, especially since the Conference +of Algeciras had given a better sanction than ever to both sides. That +France and Spain would give Germany opportunities for intervening was, +in view of the difficulty which they would encounter in reforming +Morocco, just as certain as that Germany would take advantage of those +opportunities. The Moroccan problem both in its local and in its +international aspects left behind plenty of raw material from which +future conflicts could arise. The crisis was only the first of these +episodes born of the clashings of mutual fears and ambitions, nurtured +on hazardous playing with war and on diplomatic blunderings. The road to +Armageddon lay open. + + +[Footnote 1222: On April 5 Bülow declared in the Reichstag as follows: +“A time of alarm lies behind us. There were weeks when the thought of +armed complications occupied our minds. . . . . We wished to show that +Germany does not let herself be handled as a _quantité negligeable_. . . +. . We may now look into the future with more calmness. The Conference +of Algeciras has, I believe, had a result equally satisfactory to +Germany and France and useful to all nations” (_Reden_, II, 303 ff.). On +April 12 Bourgeois spoke in the French Chamber in a similar vein: “. . . +. All the work of the conference has aimed to harmonize the three +essential conditions of Moroccan reform [the sovereignty of the Sultan, +the integrity of his empire, and commercial liberty] with the rights and +the special interests that France has the duty of defending. . . . . +That result has been obtained, thanks to the reciprocal concessions +seriously weighed and loyally consented to in terms absolutely honorable +for all and without the abandonment of the fruits of our country’s past +efforts, of the dignity of its present situation, or of the safeguards +of its future. . . . . France has been able to put to the test the +solidarity of her alliance and friendships to which precious sympathies +have been joined” (quoted in _L.j., 1906_, pp. 290 ff.). The act was +accepted by the French Parliament and by the German Reichstag in Dec., +1906 (Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1906_, pp. 219, 328 +ff.; Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés_, pp. 415 ff.).] + +[Footnote 1223: Cf. Stuart, _French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to +Serajevo_, pp. 221 ff.; Tardieu, _La France et les alliances_, pp. 239 +ff. Schoen reported that his French colleague, Bompard, had expressed +his opinion as follows: “What has resulted . . . . from the Conference +of Algeciras? First, a welding together of France and England which the +former did not at all wish in this measure. Then an almost complete +isolation of Germany and probably no small amount of ill-humor among all +the Powers, who saw themselves compelled to take an open stand on +questions in which they really had little interest. Finally, apparent +discord between Russia and Germany. True, the Conference has left behind +neither victor nor vanquished; Germany has achieved +internationalization; France, a certain recognition of her special +position. But the existing sources of friction do not appear to have +been destroyed, but rather new ones to have been created. . . . . The +Conference, together with its previous history, has left in the French +nation a certain mistrust which may not disappear quickly and which will +for years stand in the way of a genuine friendly _rapprochement_, which +is desired on both sides and which was so near” (Schoen to Bülow, April +7, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 341, No. 7144).] + +[Footnote 1224: Monts was so disgusted with Italy that he wished the +terms of the Triple Alliance to be radically modified at the next +renewal (Monts to Tschirschky, June 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 364 ff., No. +7156). The Austrian Ambassador reported that the German Emperor said +that “it would give him great satisfaction for us at a suitable moment, +which in view of the unreliable policy of the kingdom is not impossible, +to teach the latter [Italy] a wholesome lesson, even by arms” (Pribram, +_The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary_, II, 138).] + +[Footnote 1225: Schulthess, _1906_, p. 92.] + +[Footnote 1226: Bülow to William II, May 31, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 360, No. +7154.] + +[Footnote 1227: Minute by William II to a dispatch from Miquel to Bülow, +Sept. 19, 1906, _ibid._, XXV, 23, No. 8518.] + +[Footnote 1228: Tschirschky to William II, May 12, 1906, _ibid._, XXI, +433 f., No. 7184; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 449, No. 7193. +The resignation of Holstein from the foreign office in April was also +considered as significant of a change of policy. On that episode see +_ibid._, pp. 338 f., editor’s note.] + +[Footnote 1229: Bülow to Monts, Nov. 16, 1906, _ibid._, 387 f., No. +7165, and others in chap. cliv.] + +[Footnote 1230: Tschirschky to Metternich, July 7, 1906, _ibid._, 439, +No. 7188.] + +[Footnote 1231: Tschirschky to Metternich, July 7, 1906, _ibid._, 439, +No. 7188. + +10 Schoen to Bülow, May 14, 1906, _ibid._, XXII, 21 ff., No. 7355, and +other documents in chap. clx. On the question of the loan see the report +from the Belgian Minister at Berlin, April 11, 1906, _Zur europ. +Politik_, II, pp. 110 ff.; Witte, _Memoirs_, pp. 304 ff.] + +[Footnote 1232: “Our relations with England have for a long time been of +a very delicate nature. It is the object of my serious care to bring +about an improvement herein.” See Tschirschky to General von Einem, July +9, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 440, No. 7190. See also the Emperor’s remark to a +similar effect in a memorandum by him, Aug. 15, 1906, _ibid._, XXIII, +84, No. 7815.] + +[Footnote 1233: The improvement in Anglo-German relations was manifested +by visits of German burgomasters in May, of German journalists to +England in June, by a visit of Edward VII to his nephew at Cronberg in +August, and by the presence of Mr. Haldane at the German maneuvers later +in the same month. See Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 528 ff.; Haldane, +_Before the War_, pp. 37 ff., 57 ff.; Metternich to Bülow, May 8, 1906, +_G.P._, XXI, 427 ff., No. 7181; Mühlberg to Radolin, June 27, 1906, +_ibid._, 437 f., No. 7187; Bülow to F. O., Aug. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 449, +No. 7193 and following documents; memo. by William II, Aug. 15, 1906, +_ibid._, XXIII, 84 ff., No. 7815; Tschirschky to Metternich, Sept. 4, +1906, _ibid._, 86 f., No. 7816. See also the documents in _B.D._, Vol. +III, chap. xxii; Grey, _Twenty-five Years_, I, 110 ff. During Grey’s +absence the foreign office at first opposed Haldane’s visit for fear of +alienating the French (Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 202; Spender, +_Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 260).] + +[Footnote 1234: _Stenogr. Berichte_, Reichtag (1906), p. 4238; Tardieu, +_La France et les alliances_, pp. 243 f.] + +[Footnote 1235: Bülow’s speech is given in Bülow, II, 306 ff.; see also +Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 45 ff.] + +[Footnote 1236: Bertie to Grey, April 4, 1906, _B.D._, III, 330 f., No. +395; Grey to Bertie, April 4, 1906, _ibid._, 331, No. 396; Grey to +Spring Rice, Feb. 19, 1906, Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir +Cecil Spring Rice_, II, 65.] + +[Footnote 1237: Grey to Bertie, July 9, 1906, _B.D._, III, 361, No. +420.] + +[Footnote 1238: Grey’s minute to a dispatch from Lascelles to Grey, May +24, 1906, _ibid._, 358, No. 416.] + +[Footnote 1239: Minute by Grey, June 9, 1906, _ibid._, 359, No. 418.] + +[Footnote 1240: _Ibid._, p. 356; IV, 381 f., No. 328.] + +[Footnote 1241: The German instructions to Radolin used _detente_. +Bourgeois used _rapprochement_ in his memorandum of the conversation +with the German Ambassador. In talking to Grey, Cambon spoke of +_entente_. There may have been point to this change, for Grey, who was +sensitive about Anglo-French relations, immediately assured the French +that Anglo-German relations were not and would not become too intimate, +and that an entente did not exist. See Grey to Bertie, July 9, 1906, +_ibid._, III, 361 f., No. 420; Bertie to Grey, July 12, 1906, _ibid._, +362 f., No. 421; Mühlberg to Radolin, June 27, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 438, +No. 7187; Tschirschky to Metternich, July 7, 1906, _ibid._, 438 f., No. +7188.] + +[Footnote 1242: Bertie to Grey, March 31, 1906, _B.D._, III, 328, No. +387.] + +[Footnote 1243: Metternich to Bülow, July 31, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 441 +ff., No. 7191; Grey to Lascelles, July 31, 1906, _B.D._, III, 363 f., +No. 422.] + +[Footnote 1244: On Feb. 20, 1906, Grey wrote: “The door is being kept +open by us for a _rapprochement_ with Russia; there is at least a +prospect that when Russia is re-established we shall find ourselves on +good terms with her. An _entente_ between Russia, France and ourselves +would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary to check Germany it could +then be done” (_B.D._, III, 267, No. 299).] + +[Footnote 1245: _Ibid._, Vol. IV, chap. xxv, Part IV; Gwynn, Vol. II, +chaps. xiv ff.; William L. Langer, “Russia, the Straits Question, and +the European Powers, 1904-8,” _English History Review_, Jan., 1929; and +others.] + + + + + INDEX + + + INDEX + + + Abarzuza, 118 n.; refuses to sign Franco-Spanish accord, 39-40; and + Great Britain, 39 + + Abazzia, 144 n. + + Abd-el-Aziz, 3-4, 7, 8, 11, 18, 128-29, 133-34, 184-85, 190-94, 198 + and n., 199 and n., 206 and n., 208, 214, 216, 223, 249, 252-53, 274, + 315, 348 n., 364, 394-96; sends Maclean to London, 17; requests of + French government, 17-18; asks German co-operation in 1904, 154; + convokes assembly of notables, 183; opposition to France in 1905, 212; + accepts Conference conclusions, 396 + + Abd-el-Melik, 193-94 + + Afghanistan, 66, 82, 96, 98, 114, 170 + + Aflalo, 106 n. + + Agadir, 157 + + Alfonso XIII, King, 140, 151, 229, 316 n., 330, 348 n. + + Algeciras, 348 + + Algeria, 2, 5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 16-18, 133; report of military aid to + Moroccan pretender, 241-42 and n. + + Almodovar, Duke of, 37, 38 n., 39, 331, 350, 372, 375, 382, 393 + + Alsace-Lorraine, 14, 282 + + Alvensleben, Count, 143 n., 174 and n., 175-76 + + Anglo-Belgian military conversations in 1906, 341 n., 342 + + Anglo-French agreement in 1899, 20-21 + + Anglo-French agreement on April 8, 1904, 135, 140-42, 155 n., 156, + 196, 199, 340; terms, 102-4; criticism of, 104; British opinion on, + 104-6; French opinion on, 106-9 + + Anglo-French alliance, 230-31 n. + + Anglo-French arbitration treaty, 87, 94 + + Anglo-French military and naval conversations in 1906, 335-37, 339-40 + + Anglo-French _rapprochement_, 84-86 + + Anglo-German agreements, 66, 69, 71, 150 + + Anglo-German alliance negotiations in 1901, 69-77 + + Anglo-German arbitration treaty, 150 + + Anglo-German conversations on Morocco, 63 n. + + Anglo-German press war, 63, 77, 176 n. + + Anglo-Japanese alliance, 47, 75, 78-79, 82, 83, 99, 299-300, 306-7 + + Anglo-Russian relations, 41, 54 and n.; Chinese difficulties, 52; + difficulties in 1903, 82-83; attempts at _rapprochement_, 94-98; + negotiations for agreement, 110; difficulty over Russian seizure of + vessels in 1904, 111; proposed Afghan agreement, 114; _rapprochement_ + of 1906, 404-5; _see_ Dogger Bank Affair + + Aoki, Viscount, 177, 179-80 + + d’Arenberg, Prince, 5 + + _Army and Navy Gazette_, 173 + + _L’Aurore_, 265 + + Austria-Hungary: 143, 358, 361, 373 and n.; compromise proposal in + March, 1906, 377-78; seeks to mediate again in March, 1906, 388 + + Austro-Italian relations in 1904-5, 181-82 + + Austro-Russian agreements, 23, 52, 168 + + Ba-Ahmed, grand vizier, 3, 11 n. + + Bacheracht, 333 + + Bagdad Railway, 50 n., 56-57, 62, 80, 82, 218, 238, 271, 274-75 + + Balance of power, 56, 81 n., 181, 228 n. + + Balearic Islands, 93 + + Balfour, Arthur J., 54 and n., 66, 84 n., 105-6, 115 n., 176 n., 208 + n., 232, 309 n. + + Baltic Sea, 291, 292 and n., 293 and n. + + Baltic Straits, 100 + + Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, 129-31 + + Barclay, Sir Thomas, 44 n., 85 + + Barnardiston, Colonel, 341 and n. + + Barrère, 21-23, 25-26, 29-32, 181, 202, 230, 244 n., 332, 371; + arguments to Italy for accord in 1901-2, 25; and renewal of Triple + Alliance, 25-26; anti-German activity, 145 n. + + Bassermann, 400 + + Bebel, 141 + + Becker, Jeronimo, 35 + + Beit, Werner, 319 + + Belgium, 373 n. + + Benckendorff, Count, 95, 97-98, 110, 139 n., 308, 323-24 + + Ben Sliman, 15, 129 n., 212, 395 + + Bernstorff, Count, 142 n.; interview in _Daily Chronicle_, 166 + + Bertie, Sir Francis, 145 n., 197 n., 201 n., 210, 291, 329-30, 343-4; + on Italian policy, 33 n.; memo on Chinese situation on March 11, 1901, + 67-68; _aide-mémoire_ to France, 210-11 + + Betzold, 219 and n., 220 and n., 221, 225, 237, 249, 254 + + Bezobrazov, 167 + + Bihourd, 137 n., 199 n., 217; warning to Delcassé in 1904, 127 n. + + Billy, 199 n. + + Birileff, Admiral, 285 n. + + Bismarck, 33 n.; system of alliances, 19 + + Bizerta, 19 + + Björkö meeting, 281-85, 284-85 n.; alarms Europe, 291 + + Björkö Treaty, 263, 367-68, 391 n.; terms, 284; annulment, 303-4; + results, 305-6 + + Boer War, 6, 42, 44, 61, 81 + + Bompard, 113, 294-95, 295 n., 300, 302 and n., 360 n., 398 n. + + Bou-Amama, 184, 190 + + Bourgeaud-Hansemann, 264 and n. + + Bourgeois, 386, 388 n., 403 n.; renews instructions to Révoil in + March, 1906, 385; declaration to Radolin on March 17, 1906, 387; + speech in Chamber on April 12, 1906, 397 n. + + Bowles, Gibson, 105 + + Boxer Rebellion, 66 + + Buchard, 43 + + Bülow, Herr von, 328 + + Bülow, Count (Prince after June, 1905), 11 and n., 43 n., 47, 57, + 61-65, 69 n., 71-73, 78-79, 127 n., 135-44, 147 n., 160 n., 163 n., + 164 and n., 165-67, 170, 172-74, 176 n., 181-82, 188-90, 195, 203 and + n., 204 and n., 208 n., 220 n., 234, 251-52, 261-64, 269-72, 274-78, + 288, 314 n., 317 n., 333, 348, 354 n., 355 and n., 368 n., 376 n., + 377; and Franco-Italian relations, 27-28; renewal of Triple Alliance + in 1902, 27-29; relieves Italy of military obligations, 29; and French + overture, 46; policy of free hand, 55-56; rejects Chamberlain’s + overture in 1898, 56; character of, 57-60; on Morocco, 63-65; on + Anglo-French agreement, 61; on Anglo-German alliance in 1901, 71-72; + on German position in 1902, 79; and Spain, 119-20, 152-55; and Morocco + in 1904, 140, 148-58; and Italy, 143-44, 146; desires Anglo-German + accord in 1904, 148; and Moroccan settlement in 1904, 151-57; on + German mistakes, 159; and Roosevelt in 1904, 160; and Russia in 1904, + 161-63, 175-77; interview in _Nineteenth Century_ (1904), 173; + approaches Japan and United States, 178; proposal to Russia about + Austria in 1905, 179; and Morocco in 1905, 181-95; on Italy in 1905, + 182; and Sultan in 1905, 184-85; and Roosevelt in 1905, 184-85, 237, + 240; Tangier visit, 187, 202-8; instructions to William II on March + 26, 1905, 190-91; policy after Tangier visit, 202 and n., 203 and n., + 216-17; on Delcassé in 1905, 213 n., 215; rejects French overtures in + 1905, 215, 219-20; and Russo-Japanese peace negotiations, 221; warns + Rouvier, 223-25, 246 and n., 271; on Delcassé’s fall, 234; note to + Powers in June, 1905, 234-35; on conference, 240; and Great Britain in + 1905, 240-41; concessions to France in June, 1905, 241-42; and Spain + in 1905, 247 n.; and France in June, 1905, 248-49; instructions to + Tattenbach on July 11, 1905, 261; ambitions toward Morocco in July, + 1905, 262; Moroccan policy on July 31, 1905, 263-64; and Moroccan + concessions in 1905, 267; on Franco-German relations in Sept., 1905, + 269-70; desires Franco-German colonial accord in Oct., 1905, 274-75; + interview in _Le Temps_ on Oct. 3, 1905, 275-76; and German press in + Oct., 1905, 277; Björkö affair, 279-81, 286-91, 299, 303, 305; offers + resignation, 289 and n.; on the Conference, 311; optimistic about + Conference, 315-16; diplomatic preparations for Conference, 315-19; + offer to Italy in Jan., 1906, 316; and Great Britain in Jan., 1906, + 318, 328; on American proposal in Feb., 1906, 363-64; accepts Austrian + proposal in March, 1906, 377-78; diplomatic campaign against France in + March, 1906, 383-84; and Roosevelt in March, 1906, 384 n., 388-89; and + Russia in March, 1906, 391 n.; on the international situation in 1906, + 398-99; speeches in Reichstag: Dec. 6, 1897, 56 n.; Dec. 11, 1899, + 62-63; Jan. 8, 1902, 27-28, 77; April 12 and 14, 1904, 141-42; Dec. 5, + 1904, 173; March 15, 1905, 186 and n.; March 29, 1905, 192; Dec. 6, + 1905, 313; April 5, 1906, 397 n.; Nov. 14, 1906, 400-401 + + Bu-Hamara, 18 + + _Bulletin_, 7 + + Caillaux, Joseph, 312 n. + + Caix, M. de, 45, 107 + + Cambon, Jules, 244 n.; 267, 270 n.; 317, 333 + + Cambon, Paul, 46-48, 50, 86 n., 87-94, 96, 98, 117 n., 202, 226-27, + 231 n., 244 and n., 254, 257, 262, 333; conversations of, with Grey on + Jan. 10 and 31, 1906, 337-39, 338 n., 344-46, 346 n. + + Camerun railways, 271, 274 + + Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 322, 338-39 n., 339-40 and n., 343, + 385, 387 + + Canevaro, Admiral, 20-21 + + Cartwright, 188 n. + + Cassini, Count, 321 n., 358 + + Chamberlain, Joseph, 43, 46, 63-66, 63 n., 71, 77, 87 n., 95 n.; + speech of, at Leicester, 12, 62; foreign policy of, 53-54; proposals + of, to Germany, 54, 55 n., 61-62 + + “Chamberlain period,” 53 + + Chérisey, Count de, 194 n., 312 + + China, 52-53, 66-68, 82, 95-98, 160, 179 + + Chirol, Valentine, 73 n. + + Choate, Joseph, 315 n. + + Clarke, Sir George, 336 + + Clemenceau, 165, 265, 385-86 + + Combes, 8, 107 + + Comité de l’Afrique française, 5-7, 132 + + Comité du Maroc, 132 + + Committee of Imperial Defence, 81, 84, 336, 343 + + Conference of Algeciras, chap. xvii; organization of, 350; importance + of police and bank questions at, 351; crisis of, 366; sessions of, on + March 3 and 5, 1906, 375; the Act of, 393; criticism of work of, + 394-96; results of, 397-98 + + Conference of Madrid, 1 + + Continental war, 53 n. + + Convention of Madrid, 208, 218, 235, 353; Art. XVII of, 234-35; + interpretations of, 234-35 n. + + Courcel, Baron de, 376-77 and n. + + Cromer, Lord, 90, 92, 100 n. + + Crowe, Eyre, 325, 346 n., 371 n., 382 + + Crozier, Philippe, 84 n., 186 n. + + Currie, 21 + + Danzig interview, 45 n., 78 + + Dardanelles, 81, 82 n., 111, 161, 324 + + Delafosse, 107, 201 + + Delcassé, Théophile, 7, 10 n., 11, 12 n., 13 n., 17, 19, 22 n., 23, + 34, 37, 45 n., 47 n., 50 and n., 51, 61, 86 n., 87-88, 97, 100 and n., + 104 n., 129, 133, 139, 144 n., 166, 171, 178 and n., 188, 190, 195, + 197 n., 198 n., 200-201, 209, 220-21 n., 230-31 n., 257, 276 and n.; + career and character of, 8-9; interest of, in Morocco, 9-10; French + action in Sahara in 1900, 11; sounds Germany in 1901, 13; and Radolin + in 1901, 14; and Moroccan embassy in 1901, 14-15; instructions of, to + Saint-René Taillandier in 1901, 15-16; visit of, to Rome, 20; and + Italy, 21, 26, 30-31; and Spain, 37-38, 40; overture of, to Great + Britain, 41-42, 44-45, 47, 50-51; policy of, toward Great Britain and + Germany, 43; conversation of, with Huhn, 43-44; overture of, to + Germany, 43-46, 47, 49-50; at St. Petersburg in 1899, 44; and Morocco + in 1902, 46, 50; and Anglo-Russian conversations in 1903, 95 and n.; + on Russia’s far eastern policy in 1903, 99 n.; surprised by outbreak + of Russo-Japanese War, 100-101; anger of, at Great Britain in 1904, + 101; Newfoundland question in 1904, 108 and n.; urges Anglo-Russian + _rapprochement_ in 1904, 114; policy of, in 1904, 117; and Spain in + 1904, 117-25 and n.; conversation of, with Radolin on March 23, 1904, + 125-26; and Germany in 1904, 126-27, 154, 187 and n.; policy of, in + March, 1905, 197-98; overtures of, to Germany in 1905, 199 and n., + 212; says Germany is “turning him out,” 210; and Moroccan question in + 1905, 211-22; warns Sultan in 1905, 223 and n.; adheres to policy, + 225; asks British support in May, 1905, 226; opposes conference, + 228-30; defends his policy on June 6, 1905, 230-31; resignation of, + 231; speeches: Senate in July, 1901, 14; Chamber on July 3, 1902, 31; + Chamber on Nov. 23, 1903, 94; Chamber and Senate in Nov.-Dec., 1904, + 10 n., 108; Senate on March 31, 1905, 197 + + Deloncle, 107 + + Dennis, Alfred L. P., 245 n. + + Deschanel, Paul, 5, 200 + + Devonshire, Duke of, 54, 63 n. + + Dilke, Sir Charles, 100 n. + + Dogger Bank affair, 108, 112-13, 162, 168 + + Donnersmarck, Prince Henckel von, 225 n. + + Doumer, 178 + + Dual Alliance, 9-10, 19, 28, 43 n., 47, 83 n., 85, 106, 135-36, 141, + 163, 166, 172, 180, 229 and n., 284 n., 286, 297 and n., 298, 300-301, + 303, 391 n., 397, 399-400 + + Ducarne, General, 341 and n. + + Dupuy, 225, 249, 254, 262 + + Durand, Sir Mortimer, 226 n., 243 + + Eckardstein, Baron, 63 n., 66, 69, 70 and n., 71-72, 136, 160 n., 207 + n., 218-19 and nn., 220, 225 n., 245 n.; on British offer of alliance + to France, 251 + + Edward VII, King, 17, 45, 47 n., 54, 66, 75 and n., 77, 82 n., 84 and + n., 86 and n., 87 and n., 97, 100 n., 111 and n., 135, 150-51, 176 n., + 183, 196 n., 208-9, 214, 218, 231 n., 236 n., 257 n., 279, 282, 293, + 299, 308-9 n., 309, 318, 324, 330 n., 376 n., 400 n.; conversation of, + with Iswolsky in April, 1904, 110 + + Egerton, Sir Edwin, 244 n., 331, 371 + + Egypt, 88-94, 102-4, 106, 148-49 + + Entente Cordiale, 84 n., 102, 117 n., 143, 146, 150, 162, 166, 226, + 229, 233, 256-57, 279, 298, 325, 346, 355 n., 368-69, 382, 397, 399, + 401-4; negotiation of, 86-94, 99-102 + + Esher, Lord, 84-85, 336 + + _L’Etat russe_, 368 and n. + + Etienne, 5, 6, 88 n., 336, 386 + + Eulenburg, Prince, 176 n., 189 + + Fashoda crisis, 7, 41-42, 52 + + Fernando Po, 137, 152 and n. + + Fez, 18; threatened by rebels, 4 + + _Figaro_, 13 n., 276 n. + + Figuig, 16 + + Fisher, Admiral, 100, 115-16, 228 n., 339 + + Flotow, 232, 238, 311; reports British offer of alliance to France on + June 7, 1905, 236-37 + + France, 36-38, 40-51, 67-68, 73-74, 95-97, 99, 104, 276, 384, 390 n.; + trade of, with Morocco, 2; and Morocco, 2-18; North African empire, 5; + Parliament, 5, 6, 107-8, 128, 199-200, 229-30; Moroccan policy of, + 5-6; claims of, to Morocco, 6-7; occupies oases, 11; note of, to + Sultan, 12; and Italy, 20-34; fleet of, visits Italy, 23; effort of, + to break Triple Alliance, 25; press of, 29, 85-86, 172, 198 and n., + 247, 265, 271, 354, 359-60, 375 n., 380; and Great Britain, 84-94; and + Germany, 93-94; international situation in Feb., 1904, 117; and Spain, + 118-25; and Morocco in 1904, 128-34; Mission of, to Fez, 183; Tangier + visit, 196-202; and Germany in 1905, 196, 211-33, 237-38, 240-57, + 261-78; and Spain in 1905, 198 n., 259-61; cabinet of, 199; public + opinion of, 199-200, 202, 276, 232; deserts Delcassé, 200, 247-48 n.; + fleet visits England in 1905, 209, 258; fear of war in 1905, 217; + cabinet meeting on June 6, 1905, 230-31 and n.; note on June 21, 1905, + 244-45; and Great Britain in 1905, 256-58; and Björkö, 294-95; efforts + to bring Russia and Great Britain together in 1905, 308-9; _Livre + jaune_ (1905), 313; preliminaries to Conference, 319-22, 329-40, + 343-47; military defense in 1905, 320 and n.; and Spain, 330-31, 372, + 392-93; pressure on Italy in Dec., 1905, 331-32; sounds Great Britain + about agreement in Jan., 1906, 335; plan for Moroccan police and bank, + 351-52, 365-66; seeks Austrian support in Feb., 1906, 373-74; and + Great Britain in March, 1906, 385; cabinet and Parliament in March, + 1906, 388; opposes Roosevelt’s proposal in March, 1906, 389; satisfied + with results of Conference, 401-2; mistrusts Germany in 1906, 402-3 + + Francis Joseph I, Emperor, 179, 374 + + Franco-German agreement on July 8, 1905, 255 + + Franco-German agreement on Sept. 28, 1905, 272-73 + + Franco-German détente, 42-43 + + Franco-German press war in 1905, 189, 196 + + Franco-Italian agreements, 20, 22, 27, 31-32, 182 + + Franco-Italian entente, 29, 37, 143 + + Franco-Moroccan agreements, 11, 15-17 + + Franco-Spanish agreements, 37, 118-25, 188 n., 196, 259-61, 372, 392 + + Franco-Spanish negotiations in 1902-3, 37-40, 89 + + Franco-Spanish proposed accord in 1902, 38; its failure, 38-40 + + Franco-Spanish _rapprochement_, 40 + + Galliéni, Joseph, 5 + + Gambetta, 8 + + _Gaulois_, 225 n., 257 + + Gautsch, 18 + + Genthe, Dr., 147 n. + + German-American _rapprochement_, 160 + + German-Italian military convention, 29, 144 + + German Navy League, 239 + + Germany, 3, 5, 7, 10-11 and n., 17, 25-28, 36, 47 and n., 51, 81-82, + 88 n., 93, 116-17, 119, 122, 125, 171, 254-56, 258, 261, 355 n., 359, + 367, 375 n., 381 n., 390-91, 400 n.; trade with Morocco, 2; reply to + France in 1901, 13-14; and Delcassé in 1902, 49-50 n.; and Great + Britain, 53-80; proposal to Chamberlain in 1900, 64-65; warning to + Delcassé in 1900, 65; efforts to maintain _status quo_ in Morocco in + 1900, 65; and Japan in 1901, 69; criticism of foreign policy, 79-80; + public opinion of, 135, 400; policy of, in 1903-4, 138-39; and Morocco + in 1904, 140-42, 154, 157-58, 183 and n.; and Italy in 1904, 143-47; + anger at France, 147; contemplates intervening in Morocco in 1904, + 147, 148 n.; and Great Britain in 1904, 148-51, 155-57, 173, 176 and + n.; secret articles in Anglo-French agreement, 155 and n.; and United + States in 1904, 160; and Russia in 1904, 160-80; and Russian alliance + in 1904, 166-67; fears British attack, 172-73; fears Quadruple + Alliance, 178; international situation in 1905, 181; and Morocco in + 1905, 183-95; secret articles of Franco-Spanish agreements, 187 n., + 188 n., 313-14; Tangier visit, 202-8; and Roosevelt in 1905, 205-6; + Tattenbach to Fez, 206; and Turkish Sultan, 206 n.; sounds Powers + about conference, 206-7; reply of, to Delcassé’s overtures, 207-8; + rejects French offers in 1905, 218; and France in 1905, 211-25, + 237-56, 261-78; suggests to Rouvier to call conference, 220; + determines to overthrow Delcassé, 221; presses the Powers for support, + 221; seeks Roosevelt’s support in May, 1905, 222; and Italy in May, + 1905, 224; press of, on Delcassé’s downfall, 233; forces Villa-Urrutia + from office, 236; reply to France on June 24, 1905, 248-49; criticism + of her policy in 1905, 256; presses Rouvier in July, 1905, 262; asks + Roosevelt’s aid in July, 1905, 263; Moroccan loan in 1905, 267; and + Tattenbach in Aug., 1905, 267; reply to Rouvier in Sept., 1905, 273-74 + n.; anger at Great Britain in 1905, 277; international situation in + July, 1905, 279; and Russia in 1905, 279-91; and Roosevelt about + Björkö, 287 n.; press of, angry at Great Britain in 1905, 292; and + annulment of Björkö Treaty, 304 and n.; and Moroccan affair in 1905, + 311; preliminaries to Conference of Algeciras, 311-19; French + overtures in Nov., 1905, 312; international situation in winter of + 1905-6, 312-13; Weissbuch in 1906, 314 n.; on conference in Dec., + 1905, 314; instructions to delegates, 314-15; warnings to France in + Jan., 1906, 317; improvement in Anglo-German relations in 1906, + 317-18; navy bill in 1906, 318 n.; refuses French proposals on police + and bank, 352-53; proposals on police, 353-54, 354 n., 357-58; policy + of, at Conference in Feb., 1906, 359-60; presses Rouvier in Feb., + 1906, 359; declaration of, to Powers in Feb., 1906, 359; proposal of, + on banks, 364-65; defeat of, 397; policy of, after Conference, 399-400 + + Gharnet, S. Feddoul, 129, 133 + + Giolitti, Giovanni, 144 n., 146 n. + + Glasenapp, 365 n. + + Goluchowski, Count, 143, 355 n., 358, 373-74, 374 n., 378 and n., 398 + + Gorst, Sir Eldon, 90 + + Gourara, 11 + + Great Britain, 2, 3, 5, 10, 13, 14 n., 17, 28, 39 n., 40, 50-56, 104, + 209, 276; trade of, with Morocco, 2; and Italy, 19, 33; and Spain over + Morocco, 35 n.; antagonism to, 42; international situation of, at + close of nineteenth century, 52, 66; and Germany, 60-80; change of + policy of, in 1901, 68; seeks aid of Austria and Italy in 1903, 81; + policy of, in 1902, 81; and Russia, 81 n., 82 and n., 110-16, 81-102; + and France, 81-102, 225-29, 232-33; public opinion of, hostile to + Germany, 82, 151, 162, 172-73, 291-92, 309-10, 310 n.; press, 85, 228 + n.; public opinion of, 135; cabinet crisis of, in 1903, 90; and + Russia’s policy in Balkans in 1903, 95-96; fear of Continental + coalition in 1904, 100; Parliament, 105-6; fear of German navy in + 1904, 114-15; redistribution of naval forces of, 115, 172-73; and + Franco-Spanish agreement in 1904, 124; asks Powers to approve + Khedivial decree, 148; refuses German proposal for agreement in 1904, + 148-49; and Germany, 148-51; fears German attack in 1905, 208 and n.; + Tangier visit, 208-11; fleet of, visits France in 1905, 209, 258; + prevents Germany from obtaining ports, 210; offers aid to France in + April, 1905, 210-11; rejects Roosevelt’s advice in May, 1905, 223; + naval preparations in 1905, 228; Anglo-French military and naval + conversations in 1905, 228 and n.; and Delcassé’s downfall, 232; and + Germany in 1905, 236-37, 240-41, 291-94, 309-10; not supporting + Roosevelt in 1905, 243; and Russia, 291-92, 309-10; naval maneuvers + of, in the Baltic in 1905, 292-93 and nn.; visit of fleet to German + ports in Aug.-Sept., 1905, 293; efforts of, to approach Russia in + 1905, 306-10; renewal of Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905, 306; + preliminaries to Conference, 322-47; promises support to France at the + Conference, 329-30; pressure of, on Spain in Dec., 1905, 330-31; + pressure of, on Italy in Dec., 1905, 331-32; and Belgium in 1906, + 340-41 and n.; supports France in Feb., 1906, 368; pressure of, on + Spain in Feb., 1906, 372; favors Austrian proposal in March, 1906, + 379; and Germany in 1906, 399-400; satisfied with results of + Conference, 401-2 + + Grey, Sir Edward, 105, 321 n., 322-23, 327 n., 329, 331 and n., 332, + 336-37, 342-43, 343 n., 360 and n., 371 n., 379, 384, 386 and n., 387, + 389, 400 n., 403 n.; and Russia, 323-24; and Germany, 324-27; + conversations of, with Cambon on Jan. 10 and 31, 1906, 337-39, 338 n., + 344-46, 346 n.; approves military and naval conversations in 1906, 340 + and n.; instructions of, to Grierson in Jan., 1906, 341; summary of + policy of, 347; conversation with Metternich on Feb. 19, 1906, 368-69; + and Austria in Feb., 1906, 373 n.; and Spain in March, 1906, 376 n.; + advises France to accept Austrian proposal, 382; and Germany in 1906, + 402-4; and Russia in 1906, 404 n. + + Grierson, General, 54 n., 335, 339-41 + + Guillain, Antoine, 5 + + Haldane, Richard, 339-40, 342-43, 400 n. + + Hamburg-American Line, 161, 174 + + Hammann, Otto, 74 n., 187 n., 199 n., 203 n., 348 n.; dispute with + Holstein, 204 and n. + + Hanotaux, Gabriel, 5 + + Hansen, Jules, 45, 46 n. + + Harcourt, Sir William, 54 n. + + Hardinge, Sir Charles, 82 n., 96, 97, 110 n., 112-13, 306-7, 309 and + n., 325, 371 n., 386 n. + + Harmsworth, 69 n. + + Harris, W. B., 3 + + Hatzfeldt, Count, 54 and n., 63 n., 72 + + Hay, John, 131-32 n. + + Hayashi, Count, 160 n. + + Hedeman, 100 n. + + Holland, 373 n. + + Holstein, Herr von, 50 and n., 55 and n., 57, 60, 69, 70 n., 71, 135, + 139 n., 146 n., 148, 150, 159, 163 and n., 164 and n., 166, 170, 176 + n., 178, 184, 202-3, 219-20, 240-41, 264, 304, 328-29, 376; on German + position in Dec., 1901, 79; fears British attack in 1904, 173; dispute + with Hammann, 204 and n.; letter on June 28, 1905, 246 n.; on alliance + with Russia in July, 1905, 280-81 and n.; on Björkö Treaty, 286-87, + 290-91; resignation in 1906, 399 n. + + Hornung, 186 n. + + Huguet, Major, 335-36 + + Huhn, Arthur von, 43-44 + + _L’Imparcial_, 38 n. + + India, 170 + + Irredentism, 23, 143, 181 + + Iswolsky, Count, 110, 171 n., 404 + + Italy, 3, 10-11 and n., 19-34, 42, 50, 101; defeat of, by Abyssinia, + 6; international situation of, 19; relations of, with France, 19-20; + and Anglo-French agreement in 1899, 21; Moroccan interest of, 22; and + Austria, 23; and Triple Alliance, 143-47, 182-83; and Conference, 207 + and n., 247, 316, 332 + + Japan, 67-68; relations of, with Russia in 1903, 82-83; proposal of, + to send Aoki to Berlin, 177, 179 + + Jaurès, 276 n.; approves French claims to Morocco, 6 + + Jonnart, Governor, 133 n., 242 n. + + Jusserand, 244 n., 250, 256, 361 + + Khedivial decree, 111, 148-49 + + Kiel, naval review in 1904, 150 + + _Kölnische Zeitung_, 43 + + _Kreuzzeitung_, 217 + + Kriege, Dr., 264, 355 n. + + Krueger telegram, 56 n. + + Kühlmann, 184, 186 n., 192, 196, 202 n., 267 n., 312 + + Laguiche, Marquis de, 319 + + Lamsdorff, Count, 46 n., 95-98, 101, 110, 112, 114, 135, 162, 167-72, + 168 n., 174 n., 178 n., 294-95, 302 n., 369; and Germany in 1904, + 162-63, 174-79; character and policy of, toward Germany, 167-68; and + Germany in 1905, 282, 300-302; reaction of, to Björkö Treaty, 296-97; + cordiality of, to Great Britain in May, 1905, 306-7; refuses British + overtures in Sept.-Oct., 1905, 307-8; and Germany in 1906, 358, 360, + 367-69; co-operation of, with Great Britain, 360; urges Germany to + accept French propositions at conference, 360, 367-69, 375, 391 n. + + Lanessan, M. de, 354-56 + + Lansdowne, Lord, 13, 21 and n., 46, 48, 50-51, 66 n., 69-78, 75 n., + 96-98, 110-14, 153, 155 and n., 209-10, 218 n., 232 n., 254 and n., + 291, 293, 337, 344; refuses Sultan’s request in 1902, 17; and Spain + over Morocco, 39-40; conversation of, with Cambon in 1902, 48-51; + character of, 65-66; policy of, toward Germany, 66; and Germany over + China, 66 n.; on possibility of Anglo-German Alliance, 75-76; on + failure of negotiations for Anglo-German alliance, 78; and France, + 87-102; favors agreement with Russia in 1903, 95 and n.; appeals to + France to restrain Russia in 1903, 96-97; warns Cambon of possibility + of Russo-Japanese war, 98-99; and Russia, 110-16; Anglo-Russian + _rapprochement_, in 1904, 114; on German fear of British attack, 115; + mediates between France and Spain in 1904, 121-23; on German proposal + in 1904, 149; interprets Anglo-French accord, 156; on Anglo-German + hostility in 1904, 176 n.; opposed to Conference, 207, 236, 244; on + the visit to Tangier, 209; offers aid to France, 210; rejects + Roosevelt’s offer to mediate in May, 1905, 226; policy of, toward + France in May, 1905, 226-27 and nn.; advises United States against + conference, 228-29; offers Mediterranean accord to Spain in June, + 1905, 229; denies offer of alliance to France, 230-31 n., 241, 251-52; + interpretation of Art. XVII of Convention of Madrid, 234-35 n.; + assurance to France in July, 1905, 257; on William II and Björkö, 294 + + Lascelles, Sir Frank, 176 n., 202 n., 241, 279; on the German Emperor, + 58; on Bülow, 59; on possibility of Anglo-German alliance, 75-76 n.; + against idea of a conference, 209 + + Lautier, Eugène, 276 n. + + Lauzanne, Stéphane, 276 n. + + League of the Three Emperors, 135, 139 n., 143, 161 + + Lee, Arthur, 181 and n. + + Léon, 263 + + Leon y Castillo, 13, 35 n., 37-38, 44, 49, 120 n., 123, 152 n. + + Levy, Armand, 218-19 nn. + + Lichnowsky, Prince, 127 n., 147 + + Lister, 248 n., 253 + + Lodge, Senator, 222 + + _Lokalanzeiger_, 383 + + London City Council, visit of, to Paris on Feb. 8, 1906, 369 n. + + _London Times_, 3, 106, 186 n., 189, 276-77, 310 n., 386 n. + + Loubet, President, 87, 139, 146, 182 n., 196 n., 201, 209, 230, 305; + visit of, to Italy in 1904, 144-45 + + Louis, Georges, 262 and n., 273-74 n., 311 n., 377 n. + + Louis of Battenberg, Prince, 195 + + Lowther, 216 n., 228, 257 n. + + Luzzati, 145, 212, 220 n. + + Lyauty, General, 133 n. + + Maclean, Kaid Sir Harry, 3, 17, 47 + + Mallet, Louis, 95, 150 n. + + _Manchester Guardian_, 203 + + Manchuria, 69, 82, 95-96, 98 + + Martino, M. de, 24 + + _Matin_, 217, 276, 310 + + Maura, Gabriel, 118-19 + + Mediterranean ententes, 19 + + Mendelssohn & Co., 264 n., 265 n., 355-56 n., 365 n., 384 n. + + el-Menebhi, 12, 74, 133 + + Metternich, Count, 71, 76-77, 136, 150, 155 and n., 207, 251, 281 n., + 315 n., 344-45; on Anglo-German relations in 1902, 78; warns + government in 1904, 156-57; on British danger, 176 and n.; explains + German policy to Grey, 326-27; warns Grey in 1906, 403-4 + + Mévil, 198 n., 230 n. + + Michael, Grand Duke, 285 n. + + Millet, René, 107-8 + + Miquel, Herr von, 244 and n. + + Moltke, General, 281 n., 288, 292 n., 318 and n., 319 and n., 320 n. + + Monson, Sir Edmund, 11, 41, 83 n.; character sketch of Delcassé, 8 + + Montero Rios, 259, 266, 268-69 + + Montferrand, Count de, 108 n. + + Monts, Count, 145, 207, 222, 398 n. + + Moret, 330-31, 372 + + _Morning Post_, 203 + + Morocco, 1-18, 2 n., 22-23, 28, 31, 36, 45 and n., 46, 48, 50, 62-65, + 63 n., 71, 74 and n., 83, 87-94, 102-5, 107-8, 119-26, 140-42, 147, + 154, 157-58, 255, 260, 272-73; loans, 12, 17-18, 264-65 and n.; + embassy in Paris, 13-16; embassy in London and Berlin, 16, 73; and + France, 128-34, 183-84, 191; offers concessions to Germany in 1905, + 261; seizure of Algerian in 1905, 268 n.; criticism of results of + Conference, 395-96; results of crisis, 405 + + Mühlberg, Herr von, 148 n., 264 + + Mukden, 181, 201 n. + + Mulai-el-Hassan, 3 + + Mytilene, 26 n. + + Nelidow, 295-96, 298, 302 + + Newfoundland, 99, 100 n., 102, 107-8 and n. + + Nicholas, Grand Duke, 301 + + Nicholas II, Czar, 45, 98, 138 and n., 161-72, 168 n., 296-306, 321 + and n., 324, 368; proposes alliance to Germany in 1904, 164; and + Germany in 1904, 174-75, 177-78; Björkö meeting, 279-86, 284-85 n.; + and Danish question, 285 n.; repudiates Björkö Treaty, 303-4 and n. + + Nicholson, Sir Arthur, 14, 74 n., 197, 324 n., 330 n., 337, 349-51, + 356 and n., 358, 374-76, 375 n., 379; favors Austrian proposition, + 381-82, 386-87 + + _Nineteenth Century_, 173 + + Noailles, M. de, 49, 50 + + Norway, throne question in 1905, 282-83 n., 291, 292 n. + + _Nowoje Wremja_, 203 n. + + O’Conor, Sir Nicholas, 206 n. + + Ojeda, 188 n., 314 n., 356 n., 372, 373 n. + + Osten-Sacken, Count, 61 n., 163 and n., 391 n. + + Pacific penetration, 7, 8, 14, 18, 74 n., 117, 120, 128-34 + + Pallain, 46 n. + + Pan-German League, 140 + + Pariente, Moses, 264 + + Percy, Earl, 105, 292-93 + + Perdicaris, Ion, 131 and n. + + Persia, 66, 82, 98, 170, 324 and n. + + Phipps, Sir Charles, 341 n. + + Plymouth, visit at, of German warships in 1904, 150 + + Poincaré, 230-31 n. + + Port Arthur, 54 n. + + Portuguese colonies, 60 + + Pourtales, Count, 264 + + Pressensé, M. de, 200 + + Prince of Monaco, 139, 247 n., 311 n., 380 and n. + + Prinetti, 22, 24-32, 182; speech in Italian Chamber on May 22, 1902, + 30; negotiations with France in 1902, 30-31 + + Rabat, 92-94, 134 + + Radolin, Prince, 46 n., 125 n., 136, 139, 152 n., 155 n., 199, 213-14, + 225, 238, 248-49, 254, 362, 387, 403 and n.; disapproves German policy + in 1905, 215; warning to Rouvier on May 16, 1905, 221; on public + opinion in France in Jan., 1906, 319-20 + + Radowitz, Herr von, 137, 153, 221, 267, 270 n., 327, 331, 349, 351, + 353, 356-57, 376-78, 382-83 + + Raisouli, 131 and n., 132 + + Regnault, 351-52, 366 + + Repington, Colonel, 335-36, 339 + + Reventlow, Count, 141 + + Révoil, Paul, 5, 12-13, 238 n., 262-63, 270, 334, 349, 351 and n., + 353, 356-57, 372, 374, 375 n., 376, 380-83, 386, 390, 392; memo. to + Radowitz on Feb. 16, 1906, 362-63; opposes Austrian proposal, 379 + + Richthofen, Baron, 154, 157, 159, 161 n., 164 n., 264, 281 n., 289 n., + 319 n., 327 + + Ripon, Lord, 326, 339-40 + + Roman, 259 + + Romberg, Baron, 162 + + Rominten, 272, 299-300 + + Roosevelt, President, 101 n., 115, 178-80, 184-85, 188, 203, 226 and + n., 239-40, 245 and n., 248, 287 n., 301, 309, 321, 353-54, 357, + 361-62, 392; draws closer to Germany in 1904-5, 160, 205 and n., 206; + tries to calm Anglo-German hostility in 1905, 205 and n., 215, 222-23; + policy of, on Moroccan conflict on April 20, 1905, 214-15; hesitates + about accepting invitation to conference in June, 1905, 237; + intervenes in Paris and London in June, 1905, 243; advises France to + accept conference in June, 1905, 249-50; beneficial result of his + intervention in June, 1905, 250-51; refuses German request in July, + 1905, 263; mistrusts Germany in 1906, 361; compromise proposal in + 1906, 363-64; opposes Austrian proposal in March, 1906, 384-85, + 388-89; proposal in March, 1906, 389 + + Root, 321, 355, 357, 361, 363-64, 389 + + Rosebery, Lord, 54 n., 106 n., 203, 322 + + Rosen, Dr., 274; his proposal for Franco-German accord in Sept., 1905, + 269-70 and n.; negotiations in Paris in Sept., 1905, 269-72 + + Rothschild, Alfred, 54 n. + + Rouvier, 8, 165, 200, 202, 224, 225 n., 229-31, 243-44 and n., 246 and + n., 247 and n., 248 n., 249, 251-54, 256-57, 259-63, 267-69, 271-75, + 278, 295, 314 n., 317, 328 n., 330, 332-34, 337, 367, 373, 377 and n., + 381, 382 n.; speech in Chamber on April 17, 1905, 201; foreign policy + of, 212 and n.; overtures to Germany, 212-13, 217-19 and nn., 220-21; + opposed to conference in June, 1905, 237-38; offers direct agreement + to Germany in June, 1905, 238; despair over Germany’s policy in June, + 1905, 238-39 and n.; discouraged at German replies in June, 1905, 242; + asks Roosevelt’s support in June, 1905, 245; accepts conference, 254; + policy of, toward Germany on Morocco in July, 1905, 259; negotiates + with Spain in 1905, 259-60; protests to Germany about Moroccan + concessions in 1905, 265-66; offers colonial agreement to Germany in + Sept., 1905, 271; declaration to Germany in Sept., 1905, 273; + statement to Germany in Sept., 1905, 274; refuses to negotiate + colonial agreement with Germany in Oct., 1905, 275; alarm over Björkö + meeting, 294; on Continental alliance in 1905, 301-2; overtures to + Germany in Nov., 1905, 311-12, 311 n.; speech in Chamber on Dec. 16, + 1905, 313; determined to uphold French interests in Morocco at the + Conference, 319; assumes Delcassé’s policy, 320; diplomatic + preparations for Conference, 320-22; instructions to Révoil, 334-35, + 335 n.; clings to policy in Feb., 1906, 360; declaration to Germany on + Feb. 15, 1906, 362; downfall of, 379-80 + + Rudini, Marquis de, 20 + + Russia, 23, 36, 39 n., 41, 47 n., 54 n., 67-69, 94-102, 110-16, 117, + 323-24, 361; interest of, in the Far East, 10; favors Continental + _bloc_ against Great Britain, 42; proposal to Germany in 1899, 61; + proposal to Germany in 1902, 79; far eastern aggressions in 1903, 96; + anger of, at Great Britain in 1904, 110, 168; Black Sea fleet of, 111; + draws closer to Germany in 1904, 139, 161; and Germany in 1904, + 160-72; Baltic fleet of, 161-63; divided opinion about alliance with + Germany in 1904, 167-68; need of German aid in 1904, 175; negotiates + loan in Berlin in 1904-5, 175; revolution, 181; press angry at Great + Britain in 1905, 292; anger over renewal of Anglo-Japanese alliance in + 1905, 307; loan in 1906, 321 and n., 323-24, 367, 391 n., 399; + publication of instructions to Cassini in March, 1906, 391 and n. + + Russo-Chinese agreement, 67 + + Russo-German commercial treaty of 1904, 161 n. + + Russo-German negotiations for alliance in 1904, 114; proposed terms, + 164-65, 169-70; results of, 179-80 + + Russo-Japanese relations, 67-68, 82-83 and n., 96; as affecting + British interests, 67-68; and Germany, 67-68; and France, 67-68 + + Russo-Japanese War, 100, 110, 117, 139-40, 150, 161, 164-65, 239 + + Sagasta, 35 n., 37 + + Saint-Aulaire, Count de, 128, 129, 131 n. + + Saint-René Taillandier, 15, 134, 184, 186 and n., 198 and n., 199 and + n., 238; prepares mission to Fez in 1904, 133; his instructions, 133 + + Salisbury, Lord, 4, 11, 21, 35, 44, 61 n., 62 n., 63 n., refuses + Delcassé’s overture, 41-42; policy of, 53; asks co-operation of United + States in 1898, 53; proposes agreement to Russia in 1898, 53-54; + opposes Anglo-German alliance, 73, 76 + + Samoan Islands, 60 + + Sanderson, Lord, 73, 108 n., 142 n., 228 n., 230 n.; on German policy, + 59; on Delcassé’s anti-German policy, 187 n. + + Sarrien, 385 + + Sattler, 141 + + Savinsky, 168 n., 296 n. + + Schiemann, 217 n. + + Schlieffen, General, 144, 148, 239 n. + + Schoen, Herr von, 193, 367-68, 391 n. + + Scholl, General, 192 + + Schulenburg, Count, 176 n. + + Siam, 47-49, 87, 91, 106 + + Siegfried, Jules, 5 + + Signatory Powers, 203 and n., 234 and n. + + Silvela, 35-36, 38 n., 39 and n.; article in _La Lectura_, 37 + + Sonnino, Baron, 355 n. + + Spain, 3, 5, 10-11 and n., 45, 50, 90 n., 89-93, 118 n., 152-54, 247 + and n., 266-69; trade with Morocco, 2; defeat of, by United States, 6, + 35; anger at Great Britain, 35; internal and international situation, + 35; and France, 35-40, 118-25, 259-61; interest in Morocco, 36-37; + endeavors to bring about Franco-German _rapprochement_, 37; Cortes, + debates in 1904, 118; support from Great Britain in 1904, 119; appeals + to Germany for aid in 1904, 119, 122; Franco-Spanish agreement in + 1904, 127 and n.; public opinion, 260; anger at Germany in Aug., 1905, + 266; compromise proposal in Feb., 1906, 372-73; opposes Austrian + proposal in March, 1906, 379; opposes Roosevelt’s proposal in March, + 1906, 389; trouble with France in March, 1906, 392-93 + + Spain, Queen Mother of, 35 n., 93 n., 118, 137 + + “Splendid isolation,” 53 + + Spring Rice, Cecil, 101 n., 114 n., 115, 228 n., 291-92, 324 + + Sternburg, Baron, 160, 250, 251 n., 355, 384 n., 385 + + Straits of Gibraltar, 3 + + Stumm, Herr von, 373 n. + + Sultan of Turkey, 28, 206 n. + + Sweden, 373 n. + + Switzerland, 393 n. + + Sydenham, Lord, 309 n. + + Tafilelt, 12 + + Taft, 214, 228 + + Tangier, 47-48, 65, 88, 120-21, 124, 130-34, 140, 153, 181-89, 186 n., + 190, 196-97, 202, 247 n., 262-63, 270 n.; visit to, 192-95 + + Tardieu, André, 187 n., 199 n., 206 n., 234 n., 275, 348 n., 354 n., + 372 n., 373 nn., 376 n., 381 n., 391 n. + + Tattenbach, Count, 189-90, 206 n., 208, 213-15, 216 n., 223-25, 252, + 257 n., 261-62 and n., 264-68, 274, 349, 352, 356 and n., 366, 376 and + n.; proposal to Bülow on April 29, 1905, 215-16; favors Austrian + proposal in 1906, 378 + + _Temps, Le_, 13 n., 265, 275, 387, 391 and n., 403 + + Teniet-Sassi, 16 + + Tibet, 82, 111 + + Tidikelt, 11 + + Tirpitz, Admiral, 164 n., 181 + + Tittoni, 145-46, 207 n., 224-25, and n. + + Tores, El, 395 + + Touat, 11, 22, 63, 65 + + Tournade, 200 + + _Tribuna_, 26 + + Triple Alliance, 19-20, 22 n., 23-30, 32-34, 72-73, 75, 76 n., 106, + 136, 141, 143-46, 181-83, 213 n., 279, 286, 398 n., 400 + + Triple entente, 138 + + Tripoli, 21-22, 24, 26, 143 + + Tschirschky, Herr von, 285 n., 286, 328, 399 n. + + Tunis, 14, 19 + + Tweedmouth, Lord, 342 + + Ular, Alexandre, 276 n. + + United States, 43, 50, 53, 62, 95 n., 160, 170, 178, 215 + + Vaffier-Pollet, 312 and n. + + Van Grooten, 327 n. + + _Vanity Fair_, 173 + + Varley, 131 + + Vassel, 186 n. + + Venezuela affair, 82 + + Victor Emmanuel II, King, 23, 33 n., 145-46, 182 + + Victoria, Queen, 11 + + Vigo, 35 n., 127, 140, 151, 217 + + Villa-Urrutia, 198 n., 206, 236, 247, 316, 330 and n. + + Visconti-Venosta, Marquis, 22, 23, 316, 332, 349, 351, 362, 377, 378 + n., 381; policy of, toward France, 20 + + Waldeck-Rousseau, 8 + + Wallace, D. M., 357 + + Wedel, Count, 358 + + Welsersheimb, Count, 349, 358, 377-78, 378 n., 390 + + _Weltpolitik_, 10, 27-28, 52, 56-58 + + White, Henry, 214, 349, 351, 362 and n., 381, 392 + + Wiesbaden, 138 + + Wilhelmshöhe, 75 + + William II, Emperor, 17, 45, 46 n., 55-58, 56 n., 68-69, 75 and n., 93 + n., 161, 165, 167, 169-74, 181-82, 186 and n., 187-88 and n., 193, + 195-96, 198, 201 n., 202, 214, 222, 250, 267 n., 272, 300, 309, 317 + and n., 318-19, 326; cordiality toward France, 42, 43 and n.; offers + alliance to Great Britain, 54; aversion of, to Holstein, 60; visit of, + to England in 1899, 61-62; visit of, to England in 1901, 68-69; at + Vigo, 127, 151; on Moroccan question, 140; visit to Italy in 1904, + 144-45; speeches in May, 1904, 147 and n.; lack of interest in + Morocco, 151-52 and n.; opposes intervention in Morocco in 1904, 157; + letter to Czar on Oct. 27, 1904, 163; failure of alliance negotiations + in 1904, 177-78 and n., 180; and Japan in 1905, 178; speech at Bremen + in 1905, 188 n.; opposes Tangier visit, 188-89; speeches at Tangier, + 193-94 and n., 195 n.; initiates Russo-Japanese negotiations for + peace, 239; opposes Bülow’s policy in June, 1905, 239 and n.; anger + of, at Delcassé and Great Britain in Oct., 1905, 277; speech on Oct. + 26, 1905, 277; Björkö meeting, 279-85 and n.; advice to Czar in July, + 1905, 285 n.; letter to Czar on July 27, 1905, 285-86; changes + phrasing of Björkö Treaty, 286, 288; on French and Belgian neutrality + in case of Anglo-German war, 288; letter to Bülow on Aug. 11, 1905, + 289-90; on British naval maneuvers in the Baltic in 1905, 292 n.; and + Witte in 1905, 299 and n.; and Czar in Sept., 1905, 299-300; and Czar + on Björkö Treaty, 303-4, 304 n.; disappointment over annulment of + Björkö Treaty, 305; speech in Reichstag on Nov. 28, 1905, 313 n.; + offer to Spanish King in Nov., 1905, 316 n., 330; protests pacific + intentions in Dec., 1905, 318-19; “Brilliant second,” 398; on Italy in + 1906, 398 n.; on international situation in 1906, 399 + + Windsor, 62 + + Witte, Count, 44, 160 n., 161 n., 271-72, 294 and n., 301 n., 321 n., + 324, 367, 384 n., 391 n.; ideas on foreign policy in 1905, 298-99; + visit to Rominten in Sept., 1905, 299-300; and annulment of Björkö + Treaty, 300-301 + + Wolff, Theodor, 127 n., 186 n., 199 n. + + Zanardelli, 24 + + + [ PRINTED ] + [IN U·S·A·] + + + + +Transcriber's note + + + pg 25, footnote 69, Changed: "military agreement of 1887 beween" to: + "between" + + pg 37-38, footnote 111, Changed: "_Diario de la sesiónes de Cortes_" + to: "_las sesiones_" + + pg 131-132, footnote 386, Changed: "Saint-René Taillander, May 31, + 1904" to: "Taillandier" + + pg 153, Changed: "to let the Spanish percieve that" to: "perceive" + + pg 168, footnote 512, Changed: "_Kreigsschuldfrage_" to: + "_Kriegsschuldfrage_" + + pg 187, footnote 580, Changed: "_zum Ende des Welkkrieges_" to: + "_Weltkrieges_" + + pg 264, footnote 820, Changed: "Bülow to F. O., July 31, 1903" to: + "1905" + + pg 410, Changed: "Bibourd" to: "Bihourd" + + pg 417, [Révoil] Changed: "meno. to Radowitz" to: "memo." + + Minor changes in punctuation have been done silently. + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78609 *** |