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L. PESQUEIRA</p> +<p class="caption">First Chief and Minister of War</p> +</div> + +<hr class="full"> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<p class="c xxlarge sp"> +CARRANZA AND<br> +MEXICO</p> + + +<p class="c sp"> +BY<br> +<span class="xlarge">CARLO DE FORNARO</span></p> +<br> + +<p class="pad sp"> +[WITH CHAPTERS BY COLONEL I. C.<br> +ENRIQUEZ, CHARLES FERGUSON AND<br> +M. C. ROLLAND]</p> +<br> + +<div class="figcenter1"> +<img src="images/fig2.jpg" alt="decoration"> +</div> + +<p class="c large sp p2"> +NEW YORK · MITCHELL KENNERLEY · 1915 +</p> +</div> +<hr class="full"> + + +<div class="chapter"> +<p class="c more sp"> +COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY<br> +MITCHELL KENNERLEY</p> + +<p class="c more sp p6"> +PRINTED IN AMERICA +</p> +</div> +<hr class="full"> + + +<div class="chapter"> + +<p class="c sp xlarge"> +<i>TO</i></p> + +<p class="c sp xlarge"> +<i>PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON</i></p> + +<p class="c sp large"> +<i>who discovered</i></p> + +<p class="c sp large"> +<i>real Mexico to the Americans</i> +</p> +</div> + + +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p class="c xlarge">CONTENTS</p> +</div> + +<table> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><span class="more">CHAPTER</span></td> + <td class="tdl"></td> + <td class="tdr"><span class="more">PAGE</span></td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c1">I</a></td> + <td class="tdl">The Life of Don Venustiano Carranza</td> + <td class="tdr">9</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c2">II</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Conditions in Mexico During Diaz’ Régime</td> + <td class="tdr">34</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c3">III</a></td> + <td class="tdl">The Madero Revolution, Its Aims and Failures</td> + <td class="tdr">50</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c4">IV</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Plotting Which Overthrew Madero</td> + <td class="tdr">60</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdrt"><a href="#c5">V</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Huerta in Power. The Landing of American<br> +Marines in Vera Cruz</td> + <td class="tdrb">77</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c6">VI</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Financial Organization of the Revolution</td> + <td class="tdr">86</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c7">VII</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Civil Organization of the Revolution</td> + <td class="tdr">96</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c8">VIII</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Diplomatic Work in Washington</td> + <td class="tdr">99</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c9">IX</a></td> + <td class="tdl">The Constitutionalists in Paris</td> + <td class="tdr">102</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdrt"><a href="#c10">X</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Investigation Work in the United States. By<br> +M. C. Rolland</td> + <td class="tdrb">106</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c11">XI</a></td> + <td class="tdl">General Outline of Campaign Against Huerta</td> + <td class="tdr">114</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdrt"><a href="#c12">XII</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Campaign of General Obregon in the West.<br> +By Col. I. C. Enriquez</td> + <td class="tdrb">118</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c13">XIII</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Villa and His Campaign in the North</td> + <td class="tdr">132</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c14">XIV</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Campaign of Gen. Gonzalez in the East</td> + <td class="tdr">142</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c15">XV</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Zapata and His Campaign in the South</td> + <td class="tdr">146</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdrt"><a href="#c16">XVI</a></td> + <td class="tdl">One Hundred Years’ Struggle for Land and<br> +Democracy against Clericalism</td> + <td class="tdrb">157</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c17">XVII</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Attempts at the Solution of the Land Question</td> + <td class="tdr">166</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c18">XVIII</a></td> + <td class="tdl">Behind the Scenes of the Carranza-Villa Imbroglio</td> + <td class="tdr">176</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdrt"><a href="#c19">XIX</a></td> + <td class="tdl">The Need of a Democratic Finance in Mexico.<br> +By C. Ferguson</td> + <td class="tdrb">184</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c20">XX</a></td> + <td class="tdl">The Foreign Policy of Carranza</td> + <td class="tdr">192</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#c21">XXI</a></td> + <td class="tdl">President Wilson’s Mexican Policy</td> + <td class="tdr">205</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"></td> + <td class="tdl"><a href="#c22">Reflections</a></td> + <td class="tdr">214</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdr"></td> + <td class="tdl"><a href="#c23">Appendix</a></td> + <td class="tdr">219</td></tr> + + +</table> + + +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p class="c xlarge">ILLUSTRATIONS</p> +</div> + +<table> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Don Venustiano Carranza and General I. L.<br> Pesqueira</td> + <td class="tdrb"><a href="#f1"><i>Frontispiece</i></a></td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"></td> + <td class="tdr"><span class="more">FACING PAGE</span></td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Don Rafael Zubáran Capmany</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#f3">99</a></td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl">Modesto C. Rolland</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#f4">106</a></td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl">War Map of Mexico</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#f5">114</a></td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl">General Alvaro Obregon</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#f6">118</a></td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl">General S. Alvarado</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#f7">132</a></td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl">General Pablo Gonzalez</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#f8">142</a></td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl">General Benjamin Hill</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#f9">176</a></td></tr> + + +</table> + +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c1">CHAPTER I</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">LIFE OF CARRANZA</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">D</span>ON VENUSTIANO CARRANZA!</p> + +<p>Who is this man, practically unknown to +the American public a year and a half ago, who with +the help of the Mexican Constitutionalists, overthrew +the most cynical, murderous, grafting and +powerful military dictatorship that ever existed in +Mexico?</p> + +<p>Concentration of power in Mexico City, the support +of the foreigners, of the church, the bankers, +the landowners, the militarists, of foreign bankers +and most foreign nations, with the exception of the +United States Government, were at the disposal of +General Huerta and his régime, but Carranza and +the Constitutionalists eliminated this nefarious rule +after eighteen months of unbroken victories, sweeping +finally into Mexico City in a peaceful, orderly +manner.</p> + +<p>The American public is beginning to realize that +such a thorough victory could never have been +achieved without a popular movement, directed by +a fearless, statesmanlike chief.</p> + +<p>Venustiano Carranza, with the exception of Don +Fernando Iglesias Calderón, is the oldest of all the +Constitutionalists, who have fought for the last year<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</span> +and a half, with every means in their power, against +the rule of General Huerta and his governmental +camorra.</p> + +<p>Don Venustiano Carranza was born in the State +of Coahuila in 1859, and is therefore, fifty-five years +old. In spite of the assertion of one of the correspondents +who interviewed him six months ago for +the <i>Metropolitan</i> magazine, Mr. John Reed, we +claim that Carranza is anything but a “senile old +man,” for he rode over 1,500 miles on horseback, +through the States of Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Durango, +Chihuahua and Sonora, visiting the military +camps, organizing all the state and federal governments, +and finally settling down in Hermosillo, State +of Sonora, as his capital. Later, after Torreon +had been captured from the Federals, Carranza with +his staff and soldiers again crossed the State of +Sonora into Chihuahua on horseback, a distance of +nearly 300 miles.</p> + +<p>We must admit that unless Carranza had lived a +greater part of his life on his farm, he would not +have been able to stand the hardships and rigors +of that famous ride.</p> + +<p>His mental training was that of a lawyer, for he +studied in the schools of Coahuila and finished his +law course in Mexico City.</p> + +<p>A certain weakness of the eyesight prevented him +from practising law, so he retired on his farm, dedicating +his time to improving his “hacienda” and +studying history and political economy.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</span></p> + +<p>Like the President of the United States, Carranza +is one of the greatest authorities on the history of +his own country.</p> + +<p>Just as all student-statesmen, Carranza is the +type of man which makes no direct appeal to the +imagination of the public by a strenuous, romantic +life—it is the quiet, clear, thinking, organizing +brain which creates, commands and achieves, without +the blaze of trumpets, or the help of well-salaried +press-agents.</p> + +<p>One incident in his life stands out glaringly like +a solitary facet of a diamond struck by sunlight. +Very few Mexicans, and it can be safely said even +a lesser number of Americans, know that Carranza +was the only man who started a local revolution +against General Diaz, during the rule from 1876 +to 1910, and succeeded;—that is to say, continued +to live in Mexico, without sacrificing his life to his +bold attempt.</p> + +<p>This strange and seemingly incomprehensible incident +happened in the year 1893, when Don Venustiano +was only thirty-four years old.</p> + +<p>At that time there ruled over the State of Coahuila +a governor named Garza Galán. With the +exception of Mucio Martinez and General Cravioto, +he was the worst governor in Mexico. Garza +Galán used his great power to rob, expropriate +lands by all manner of tricks and stratagems, imprison, +kill those who stood in his way, and went +so far as to kidnap respectable girls.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</span></p> + +<p>Everybody expected that Garza Galán would be +eliminated after his two years of governorship, but +when it was discovered that Romero Rubio stood +sponsor for another two years of Garza Galán as +Governor of Coahuila, the inhabitants of that State +were in utter dismay and protested to the President.</p> + +<p>At that time Romero Rubio, the father-in-law of +President Diaz, was one of his closest advisers. +He is the originator of the party which later was +called the “Cientifico” party, and of which Limantour +became the successor.</p> + +<p>As Romero Rubio insisted on the candidacy of +Garza Galán for a second term, and as protests +were of no avail with General Diaz, Don Venustiano +Carranza arose in arms with the assistance of +his brother, Don Emilio, and started on the warpath +against Garza Galán. General Diaz sent +some federal troops to quell the revolt, but Don +Venustiano and his brother took particular care to +avoid coming into armed conflict with the federal +troops, while they attacked Garza Galán’s state +troops and defeated them repeatedly. This strange, +three-cornered fight lasted longer than was expected; +very soon, other wiser counsellors of General +Diaz pointed out to him that a continuation of +this armed revolt might communicate itself to the +other border States with disastrous effects to the +Federal Government. General Diaz then recalled +the candidacy of Garza Galán, and it was transformed +into the one of Señor Musquiz.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</span></p> + +<p>Peace followed, but strangest of all, was the immunity +of Venustiano Carranza and his brother to +persecutions and attempts on their lives.</p> + +<p>Carranza was not a novice in the politics of his +country; he served as a member of the legislature +of his native State, as Senator of the Federal Government +in Mexico City and even as a governor of +his State.</p> + +<p>Maybe the wily old dictator, Don Porfirio Diaz, +made a mistake in the case of Carranza. For sixteen +years after the revolt against Garza Galán, +Carranza gave further proof of his strength of +character, by accepting the gubernatorial candidacy +offered to him by the people of Coahuila and refusing +to renounce it in the face of the opposition +of the “cientifico” group in Mexico City, because +Carranza stood for the candidacy of General Reyes +as Vice-President, as against Ramon Corral who +was the Mephisto of the “cientifico” party.</p> + +<p>The answer of Carranza to the emissary of Diaz, +who suggested the advisability of his refusal to run +for Governor, was as follows: “Tell General Diaz, +that as long as there is a single person, who will +propose and work in favor of my candidacy, I shall +not renounce it, and I shall accept all the consequences +of my conduct.”</p> + +<p>After such an unequivocal answer, everybody expected +that either the door of the penitentiary would +close upon the bold candidate, or that he would mysteriously<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</span> +disappear, in accordance with the policy of +General Diaz.</p> + +<p>What saved Carranza from either of these fates, +was the publicity given to this incident in the American +press, especially a letter of protest against the +meeting which was to take place in El Paso, between +General Diaz and President Taft. The passage +referring to this incident says:</p> + +<p>“Even as I write these lines, the report is wired +from Mexico that General Diaz has ordered the demission +of the Governor of Coahuila, as the latter +showed a marked tendency in favor of General +Reyes’ candidacy. Imagine the Republican President +of the United States asking for the resignation +of Governor Johnson of Minnesota, because of his +democratic leanings.”<a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> + +<p>It is quite logical that a man of the stamp of +Carranza should view with great interest the movement +which culminated in the overthrow of General +Diaz in 1911.</p> + +<p>Francisco I. Madero wrote his famous book +“The Presidential Succession of 1910,” and published +it in San Pedro, Coahuila, in December, 1908.</p> + +<p>F. I. Madero, because of his innocence or his +fearlessness, tried to create a working candidacy, +with himself as presidential candidate and Dr. Vasquez +Gomez as Vice-President, in opposition to +General Diaz and Ramon Corral. There was however +no intention of rising to arms against the government<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</span> +of Diaz, but the policy of the President +made the opposing candidate realize the futility of +his efforts.</p> + +<p>F. I. Madero was placed in jail twice for his daring, +and after the second time, he was informed that +a third imprisonment would mean his complete elimination. +Madero took the tip, and fled to San +Antonio, Texas. The slogan of the Madero revolution +was “Effective suffrage and no re-election” +and not, as many Americans believe, “the land question.”</p> + +<p>If any one will take the trouble to peruse the long +document of San Luis Potosí, of October 5th, 1910, +signed F. I. Madero, which contains 2,500 words, +it will be noticed that the land question takes up +very little space, in comparison to the rest of the +Plan.<a id="FNanchor_2" href="#Footnote_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> + +<p>General Carranza never hesitated for one moment, +and was soon over the border to join Madero, +and formed part of his revolutionary junta. He +was appointed chief of the Military Division of the +States of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas, +and later Secretary of War in the provisional cabinet +of F. I. Madero.</p> + +<p>The premature cessation of hostilities and the installation +of the clerical candidate, L. de la Barra, +was strenuously opposed by Carranza, who said to +F. I. Madero, “You are delivering to the reactionaries<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</span> +a dead revolution, which will have to be +fought over again.” These prophetic words were +not heeded, so Don Venustiano went back to his +native State, and calmly awaited the course of +events, while he offered himself as a candidate and +was elected as Governor of Coahuila.</p> + +<p>One of the accusations which was published in the +American papers by the Huerta press agents was +that F. I. Madero, as President, had sent several +hundred thousand dollars to Governor Carranza, +for the purpose of arming and increasing the state +militia against the Orozco rebellion. About the +time of the overthrow of F. I. Madero, Don Venustiano +had been supposedly asked to give an accounting +of the expenditure of the money furnished from +Mexico City. As he could not account for it, it +was said, he had decided to start a revolution against +President Madero. When the Huerta treachery +took place and Madero was murdered, Carranza +took the opportunity to rebel against the provisional +presidency of General Huerta.</p> + +<p>This story may sound plausible to the Huerta +type of man, but the facts in the case dispose of it. +A few months before the plot which overthrew Madero, +Don Venustiano Carranza paid a visit to the +President. His watchful eyes and ears detected a +very complicated net of plots and counterplots brewing +against Madero. The President did not believe +that there were any plots, and doubted any one’s<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</span> +ability to overthrow him. Carranza went back to +his State and communicated his suspicions to a few +intimate friends. As soon as he heard of the release +of Felix Diaz and General Reyes from their +jails, he at once sent several hundred of the Coahuila +volunteers to the assistance of Madero. They +took part in the assault against the citadel, and the +reason why General Huerta lingered so long before +turning traitor is now clear.</p> + +<p>Besides the Coahuila riflemen, there were several +hundred Madero volunteers who were loyal to the +President. General Huerta could not arrest Madero +and Suarez, and make peace with Felix Diaz +until the loyal Madero troops had been eliminated.</p> + +<p>So he cautiously kept his own federal regiments +back, and sent the Madero volunteers and the Coahuila +riflemen to charge the citadel, manned by machine +guns, in close formation. The Coahuila volunteers +who were mostly mounted, and numbered +about 1,150, bravely attacked the guns, but none of +them came back alive; the same happened to the +Madero volunteers.</p> + +<p>As soon as Huerta had disposed of the volunteers, +he made his peace with Felix Diaz. What +remained of the Madero and Coahuila volunteers +fled to the standard of Zapata after Huerta came +into power.</p> + +<p>On the 18th of February, 1913, Madero and +Suarez were arrested by order of General Huerta.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</span> +On the 19th of February all Mexico had heard the +fateful news, and nobody doubted the outcome of +the imprisonment.</p> + +<p>Don Venustiano Carranza never hesitated one +hour, one minute; he convened at once the legislature +of the State of Coahuila, and the following +decree was the result:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p><i>Venustiano Carranza</i>, Constitutional Governor of the free +and Sovereign State of Coahuila of Zaragoza, informs its +inhabitants: That the Congress of the State has decreed +the following:</p> + +<p>The Constitutional Congress of the free, independent and +sovereign State of Coahuila of Zaragoza decrees:</p> + +<p>No. 1421: Article I.</p> + +<p>We disavow General Victoriano Huerta in his character +of chief of the Executive power of the Republic, which he +claims was conferred to him by the Senate, and we likewise +disown all the acts and resolutions which he may dictate +under such authority.</p> + +<p>Article II. Extraordinary powers are transmitted to the +Executive of this State in all the branches of Public Administration, +so that he may suppress what he may deem +convenient and that he shall proceed by the force of arms +to sustain the Constitutionalist order of the Republic.</p> + +<p>To arouse the Governments of the other States and the +Chiefs of the Federal, Rural and Auxiliary Forces, so that +they may assist the stand taken by the Governor of this +State.</p> + +<p>Decreed in the room of the Congress of the State, in +Saltillo, on the 19th of February, 1913. A. Barrera, President<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</span> +of the Legislature. J. Sanchez Herrera, Secretary. +Gabriel Calzada, Secretary.</p> + +<p>Let this be printed, communicated and observed.</p> + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap large">V. Carranza.</span></p> + +<p> +<span class="smcap">E. Garza Perez</span>,<br> +<span class="pad">Secretary.</span></p> + +<p> +Saltillo, 19 de Febrero de 1913. +</p> +</div> + +<p>After the imprisonment of President Madero +and Vice-President Suarez in February, 1913, a year +and a half ago, there were twenty-seven governors +in Mexico, who had the same opportunity to protest +against the usurper Huerta, and refuse to recognize +his “coup d’état,” his dictatorship and his cowardly +murders. None of the governors dared protest. +Had all the governors in Mexico arisen together +with their legislatures and refused to recognize +the authority of the czar in Mexico, Huerta +with all his money, all his soldiers, all his greed and +ruthlessness, could not have lasted more than three +months.</p> + +<p>Don Venustiano Carranza was the only governor +in Mexico who had the audacity and patriotism to +challenge the great pirate in Mexico City, who had +raised the black flag with the skull and the cross +bones over the national palace.</p> + +<p>The chiefs of the States were too terrorized, +cowed and frozen by the brutality, the cynicism, the +power of the man in the provisional presidency, and +were aghast at the suddenness of the events which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</span> +led to Madero’s downfall. They had not found out +what had happened behind the scenes, the horror +of the events and their natural consequence had not +dawned upon their paralyzed minds. Carranza as +a real leader and chief never faltered an instant. +Those are the rare and precious moments which +create the national hero.</p> + +<p>As soon as Felix Diaz and Victoriano Huerta +heard of the stand taken by Don Venustiano Carranza +as Governor of the State of Coahuila, they +realized that a formidable enemy had arisen to +spoil their crooked game. They put their heads +together and penned the following epistle to Carranza, +signed it together, and sent a trusted friend +as emissary to find him and convince him:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">Mexico</span>, D. F. 27 de Febrero 1913.</p> + +<p> +<span class="smcap">Don Venustiano Carranza</span>,<br> +Gov. of the Free and Sovereign State of Coahuila,</p> + +<p><i>Dear Sir</i>— +</p> + +<p>By letters of recent date we have informed you of the +plausible reasons which have inspired the army against the +dissolving régime of Don F. Madero, and we have likewise +justified the acts which placed General Huerta in the +office of President of the Republic.</p> + +<p>We have been informed that it was your intention to rebel +against the legal authority of the Government. We beg +to insist, in the name of the country and for its exclusive +benefit, that you change your announced attitude not to collaborate +with us in the work of peace which we intend to pursue +to the end, at any price. If for some personal reason<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</span> +you wish to leave the office which you occupy, and if that can +be done without offending or hurting our patriotic end, the +Government will give you all sorts of guarantees and will +pay your salary up to the end of your term.</p> + +<p>This letter, as you understand, must be absolutely of a +particular and private character. On this basis we beg to +inform you that on our part there will be no obstacles that +could arise between ourselves, which cannot be solved in +the manner most suitable to you. It would be advisable +for you to retire into the United States (for your greater +safety). We shall make all sorts of sacrifices (should you +demand them) so as to satisfy all your wishes and demands. +Our envoy (agent) will bring you instructions on the subject. +He is empowered to arrange matters on the spot.</p> + +<p>We beg you to accept our assurance of admiration and respect.</p> + +<p class="r"> +(Signed) <span class="smcap">Victoriano Huerta.</span><br> +<span class="smcap">Felix Diaz.</span> +</p> +</div> + +<p>Carranza’s answer follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p class="r"> +11th March, 1913.</p> +<p> +<span class="smcap">Messrs. V. Huerta y Felix Diaz</span>:<br> +</p> + +<p>My only answer to the despicable proposals offered to me +in your letter dated February 27th, is that I want to inform +you that men like myself do not betray, do not sell +themselves; that is your function, you who have no other +objects in life than the shameful satisfaction of ignoble ambitions.</p> + +<p>Raise the black flag of your tyranny, and over the country +the voice shouts: “Treason and Death.”</p> + +<p>On my part, with the help of the Mexican people, I shall +lift from the mud into which you have thrown it, the flag<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</span> +of the country. Should I fall defending it, I shall have obtained +for my small action in life, the greatest prize which +we honest men can aspire to.</p> + +<p class="r"> +(Signed) <span class="smcap">Venustiano Carranza</span>. +</p> +</div> + +<p>In the month of March, 1913, not satisfied with +having defied the powers in Mexico, General Carranza +published the “Plan of Guadalupe,” so called +from the fact that the revolutionary plan was +signed by the officers at the “hacienda” farm of +Guadalupe. The plan is the following:</p> + +<p class="c">DECLARATION TO THE NATION</p> + +<p>Considering that General Victoriano Huerta, to +whom the Constitutional President, Francisco I. +Madero, had confided the defence of the institutions +and the legality of his government, on uniting +with the rebel enemies in arms against that same +government, to restore the latest dictatorship, committed +the crime of treason to reach power, arresting +the President and Vice-President, as well as their +ministers, exacting from them by violent means the +resignation of their posts, which is proven by the +messages that the same General Huerta addressed +to the Governors of the States, advising them that +he had the Supreme Magistrates of the nation and +their cabinet prisoners.</p> + +<p>Considering that the legislative and judicial +powers have recognized and protected General Victoriano +Huerta and his illegal and anti-patriotic proceedings, +contrary to the constitutional laws and precepts,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</span> +and considering, finally, that some governors +of the States of the union have recognized the illegitimate +government, imposed by the part of the +army which consummated the treason, headed by the +same General Huerta, in spite of the fact that the +sovereignty of those same States whose governors +should have been the first in disowning it, had been +violated, those who subscribe, chiefs and officials, +in command of constitutional forces, we have accorded, +and shall sustain by arms the following:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>PLAN</p> + +<p>1. General Victoriano Huerta, as President of the +republic shall be disowned.</p> + +<p>2. The legislative and judicial powers of the federation +shall also be disowned.</p> + +<p>3. The governors of the states who still recognize +the federal powers forming the actual administration, +30 days after the publication of this +plan, shall be disowned.</p> + +<p>4. For the organization of the army in charge of +seeing that our purposes are carried out, we +name as first chief of the army, which will be +called Constitutionalist, Venustiano Carranza, +Governor of the State of Coahuila.</p> + +<p>5. The Constitutionalist army on occupying Mexico +City, the executive power will be provisionally +in charge of Venustiano Carranza, +first chief of the army, or in charge of that +person who might substitute him in command.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</span></p> + +<p>6. The provisional President of the Republic will +convene general elections as soon as peace may +have been consolidated, handing the power to +the citizen who may have been elected.</p> + +<p>7. The citizen who may act as first chief of the Constitutionalist +army in the States whose government +might have recognized that of Huerta, +will assume the charge of provisional governor +and will convoke local elections, after the citizens +elected to discharge the high powers of the +federation may have taken possession of their +office, as provided for in the foregoing basis.</p> +</div> + +<p>The plan was signed at the Hacienda of Guadalupe, +Coahuila, on the 26th of March, 1913. +Sixty-four officers of the state troops affixed their +signatures to the protest. Among the most famous +on the list was Lieut. Col. Lucio Blanco, who +fought in Tamaulipas and initiated the sale of lands +belonging to Felix Diaz, among Constitutionalist +soldiers, and Major J. B. Trevino.</p> + +<p>As Don Venustiano Carranza was leaving Saltillo +to take the field against the federals, he said to a +friend: “We are going to fight the three years’ +war over again.”</p> + +<p>A coincidence in atavism is that Don Venustiano’s +father, Colonel Carranza, fought in the north during +the three years’ war under the leadership of +Benito Juarez (1857-60) and assisted him financially +as well as politically in the struggle. Later,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</span> +after the Constitutionalist government had placed +Benito Juarez in the presidency through the elections, +Colonel Carranza was offered the reimbursement +of the sixteen thousand odd dollars which he +had contributed to the liberal cause. He refused +the money saying that the victory of the party was +sufficient payment to him.</p> + +<p>A further coincidence, amusing to students of history, +is found in the case of Gen. Victoriano Huerta, +whose father, Gen. Epitacio Huerta, fought under +the same banner as Colonel Carranza. The history +of the three years’ war mentions the name of three +generals: The Constitutionalist Generals Rocha, +Huerta and Arteaga.... After the clericals had +been defeated by the Constitutionalists under Benito +Juarez in 1860 they invited foreign intervention, +which ended in the courtmartial and shooting of +Emperor Maximilian and Generals Miramón and +Mejia.</p> + +<p>In the present instance, Don Victoriano Huerta, +when he perceived an early defeat, heaped indignities +and insults upon American citizens so as to invite +an intervention and a quick march of the American +troops into Mexico City. The clericals which +he represented preferred the presence of Americans +to that of the Constitutionalists in Mexico City. +Luckily for Mexico, the Chief Magistrate in Washington +foresaw the move and wisely refused to pull +the chestnut out of the fire for a Mexican monkey.</p> + +<p>The first battle of the revolution was fought between<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</span> +Saltillo and Monclova in a small place called +“Anhelo,” which, translated from the Spanish, +means a vehement desire.</p> + +<p>The reason for going into certain details of the +march of Carranza across the northern States, is for +the purpose of showing the physical endurance, the +mental activity, as well as the profound and implicit +faith that Venustiano Carranza had in the people +of Mexico.</p> + +<p>The personality of Carranza does not seem to +have been sympathetic to foreign newspapermen +who have visited him. His presence and manner +seem utterly cold, intellectual; extremely polite, +non-committal. When talking, his speech is devoid +of all the superlatives and amenities which made +New York reporters say of L. de la Barra, “He +talked incessantly for fifteen minutes without saying +one word for copy.”</p> + +<p>Carranza’s talent as a good listener made him +the despair of journalists, who preferred the generals +who fought, talked, gave orders to shoot a +few prisoners, and between snatches of food, dictated +incidents from their lives or told what their +plans were for the future of Mexico. Carranza is +more subtle if not sufficiently romantic. The careful +observer must read between the lines, when the +personality grows on one, like the taste for olives +or the magnitude of the Chief Magistrate in Washington. +Some leaders are unattractive because of +their very uprightness, their justice, their integrity,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</span> +their polish; their flawlessness offers no purchase to +a sly attack. Aristides asked an Athenian citizen, +who had voted to ostracize him, if Aristides had +personally offended him, “No, but I am tired of +hearing him called the Just!”</p> + +<p>Enemies of Carranza have accused him of being +too much of an aristocrat and a puppet in the hands +of his lawyers’ cabinet, or again a jingo for effect +and a rebel for power. His conduct towards his +general staff, his generals, his enemies, his attitude +towards the United States and the foreign powers, +his promises or silence on the question of interior +policy,—his words, speeches, letters and decrees +are his best witnesses to judge him by.</p> + +<p>After the defeat at Anhelo, Carranza went to +the border, passing through Cuatro Cienegas, which +is famous as his birthplace, to Eagle Pass.</p> + +<p>In the month of July, 1913, when the Arrietas +and Contreras were attacking Torreon, Carranza +joined them in the hope of success, but even the second +time when Villa attacked Torreon, the victories +were empty, except for the arms, ammunition and +money captured.</p> + +<p>Disconsolate but not discouraged, Carranza, accompanied +by about two hundred men, slowly +wended his way across the State of Durango. General +Huerta was at that period on the highest crest +of success and power,—orders had been telegraphed +all over the north, to the federal and counter-guerrilla +chiefs, to capture Carranza, dead or alive, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</span> +be rewarded with a bonus of $150,000. Abraham +Gonzalez, Governor of Chihuahua, had been arrested +and assassinated by order of Huerta. Venustiano +Carranza, therefore, travelled at night and +rested during the day; his only pilots were the stars, +a small compass and a pocket edition of “Mexico-Atlas.” +The chief himself recounts how often during +their night ride, they espied coming towards +them in the distance, the vaguely outlined forms of +peons, men and women carrying their children in +their arms. Scouts were sent ahead to discover if +the peasants were only disguised federals in a desperate +attempt to assassinate the brain of the revolution, +and capture a kingly reward.</p> + +<p>The phantom shadows were “pacificos,” who had +walked for miles to greet the chief who was going +to battle for their rights and their lands. They +only wanted to touch his hands, the hem of his coat, +to hear the voice of the great “Jefe,” and then they +turned their weary way sending back a salutation: +“May God protect you!” or “May God be with +you!” which rang in the silent night like the voice +of the people, the voice of God.</p> + +<p>As Carranza kept his itinerary secret, the first +encounter might have been accidental, but it happened +so frequently that it seemed almost uncanny +and supernatural, this triumphant procession accompanied +by the blessings, the wishes, the yearnings +of the Mexican peons. Carranza himself confessed +that no incident in his life made a more profound<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</span> +impression on him, and gave him a deeper insight +of the tremendous faith of the Mexican people in +their champions, pathfinders, and saviors.</p> + +<p>Across the mountains in Durango to Tepehuanes, +into Parral in Chihuahua, where he came in contact +with General Chao, and from there across the +Sierra Madre, a mountain range, dividing Chihuahua +from Sonora, into the small city of Fuerte, +where Carranza met for the first time General Obregon +and his soldiers.</p> + +<p>He reached Guaymas, in Sonora, about the middle +of September, 1913. The little band was tired, +and their clothes were in rags, their shoes in tatters, +but the goal was reached and they began the +work of organizing the capital of the Constitutional +government.</p> + +<p>In Mexico the presence of Carranza was known +only to the revolutionists, and as the federals could +not discover the whereabouts of the Chief at that +time, they heralded his disappearance and death. +Everywhere that Carranza had passed with his band +of followers in the small cities, away from the federals +who cautiously kept within the city limits and +near the railroads, he invariably organized small +local governments until he was able to communicate +with his chiefs in the middle and east. In the State +of Coahuila, his brother Don Jesus, and Gen. Don +Pablo Gonzalez, had come to an understanding as +to the great strategic outline of the campaign in +combination with General Villa in the north and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</span> +General Obregon on the west. In Guaymas a provisional +cabinet was organized with Don Rafael +Zubaran Capmany, one of the keenest intellects of +the revolution, a lawyer from Campeche, with Francisco +Escudero as Minister of Foreign Affairs, as +Minister of Finances F. I. Villareal, Engineer G. +Bonilla as Minister of Communications, and General +Angeles as Minister of War.</p> + +<p>Gen. J. B. Trevino was the chief of the general +staff of Carranza; the chief secretary was G. Espinosa +Mireles; there was also a staff of officers attached +to his person. It was in Hermosillo that the +great strategic campaign was outlined with the help +of General Angeles and the general staff. The orders +to the three chiefs, Obregon, Villa and Gonzalez, +came from Hermosillo.</p> + +<p>After the northern States were conquered slowly, +all the city and rural governments were organized, +and although the work was arduous and continuous, +it was not quite as strenuous as the classic ride across +the sierras and the deserts. The daily routine at +headquarters was very simple but efficient. The +chief usually got up between five and six in the morning, +and except when he rode across the mountain +took his bath and attended at once to the most important +work of the day. At 7 <span class="allsmcap">A. M.</span> there was a +light breakfast with whatever could be had, milk, +crackers with peach preserves, or honey and butter. +On the march everybody had to be satisfied with the +national tortilla, made of cornmeal and beans.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</span> +Sometimes they could get fresh eggs, sometimes not.</p> + +<p>In Hermosillo they fared better; Carranza had +two Indian attendants, one who did the cooking and +the other who attended to his horses and those of +the general staff. The Mexican cooks have the +most wonderful capacity for being able to light a +fire and cook anywhere under the most distressing +conditions.</p> + +<p>Thus they were able to get meals and a few luxuries +like boiled and fried meal, vegetables, and the +famous chile with cheese, and a powdered coffee +called “Washington coffee,” with milk. Sometimes +they drank a red wine which is grown in the north +of Mexico. Carranza invited at almost every meal, +some friends who had travelled many miles to see +him, or soldiers or civilians belonging to his immediate +surroundings.</p> + +<p>Between the hours of 7:30 and 1 <span class="allsmcap">P. M.</span> the whole +staff was again busy taking orders from the chief,—writing, +telegraphing and conferring. At one +o’clock there was a light luncheon and the work was +resumed until six, when the chief took his daily ride, +accompanied by an aide or a friend. Ten o’clock +was usually the time to retire, unless the “Jefe” +had been invited to a fiesta or a dance, which happened +quite frequently as Mexicans are very fond +of dancing, theatricals, speech-making, and are in +general very sociable. Unlike most Mexicans, the +chief does not smoke, or favor the national drink +“tequila,” or the Mexicanized cognac, or the excellent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</span> +Monterrey and Toluca beer which was advertised +in Mexico as “the beer that made Milwaukee +jealous.”</p> + +<p>By February the chief and his staff packed their +belongings, and the state papers, and crossed the +State of Sonora into Sinaloa in Culiacán, the capital, +which had been captured by General Obregon. +After the organization of Sinaloa, the peripatetic +government moved back to Hermosillo and towards +the border, to Nogales. By that time, Torreon had +been captured and Carranza, accompanied by 300 +cavalry and 400 infantry, crossed the Sierra Madre +range into Chihuahua, to Juarez, an excursion which +lasted twenty-five days and covered over 400 miles. +They had come from the tropical heat of the deserts +of Sonora to the snow on the Sierra Madre.</p> + +<p>From Juarez on, the procession of the Chief +rolled downward to Chihuahua, Torreon, Saltillo, +Monterrey, Tampico, down to Tepotzotlan near +Mexico City. The details of his slow organization +of the civil government of all the conquered States, +of his foreign attitude and of the other details of +his revolutionary rule, will be discussed in separate +chapters.</p> + +<p>Carranza at first sight makes the impression more +of a Saxon personality than of a Mexican type. The +Spanish blood, which flows in his veins three or +four generations back must have been of Basque +origin, which is pure northern European. He is +about five feet, eight inches high, proportionately<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</span> +built, neither too thin nor too stout, and he carries +himself erect and in a dignified manner. His white +hair and beard contrast with the very dark brown +complexion which is the result of an active, out-of-door +life. The eye-glasses give to his appearance +a slight professional mien. The professorial air is +rather disconcerting at first, for one expects to behold +a type of a man different from the quiet, unassuming, +very polite, gentleman farmer, and instead +of a deep, sonorous voice, a rather high and clear +tone of speech. His eyes are hazel, very open,—his +nose straight, his forehead very high, and he has +the high brow of an intellectual, rather than of a +fighter, his ears are quite large, denoting a strong +constitution and a long life. The whole impression +is of self-restraint, gentleness; nevertheless, the keen +observing eyes prove an alert intelligence, always +watching, weighing, judging and carefully registering +all the impressions for future use. As all men dealing +with people politically, Carranza has a very retentive +memory for faces and names. Being a comprehending +and patient listener he always hears a +great deal more than he says, but when an answer +is required, the words come out slowly, as if chosen +with extreme care to express a thought with as few +words as possible. While speaking in public, the +use of simple language denotes a clear mind which +can express complicated problems in first principles, +and Carranza makes himself understood by cultured +Mexicans as well as by peons.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c2">CHAPTER II</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">CONDITIONS IN MEXICO DURING DIAZ’ RÉGIME</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">I</span>T would appear after all that has been written +in the United States and Europe concerning +Mexico, that the people ought to possess a clearer +conception of the conditions which brought about +the Madero and the Constitutionalist revolutions, +especially when the latter is nothing more than a +continuation of the former. But the words of the +late Joseph Pulitzer, when he said that to instil +facts into the minds of the people there must be +constant repetition, seem undeniably true. It is not +sufficient to reiterate certain facts; the correlation +of these facts must be understood and explained.</p> + +<p>People heard about the peonage system in Mexico, +about the great power of Porfirio Diaz, about +the abuses of this power, but it was not realized +how vital, how deep, how intimate the solution of +the political problems was to the Mexicans themselves. +To foreigners the Mexican problem was +only interesting in so far as it affected their interests,—no +more.</p> + +<p>After all the cruelties perpetrated by the Diaz-Huerta +régimes, I have heard intelligent Americans +exclaim that the Mexicans needed a strong<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</span> +man like Huerta, and that Diaz after all had +brought railroads, schools, higher wages, money, +improvements and progress. It makes one almost +despair of human intelligence to hear such superficial +prattle, but it proves the axiom of Joseph Pulitzer +to be very profound and that Porfirio Diaz +had used it to its fullest extent.</p> + +<p>Known by few people, Porfirio Diaz used for +years a secret fund amounting to millions solely for +the purpose of advertising to the world that Diaz +was the creator of modern Mexico, that “peace” +and “progress” were his two watchwords, with +which he had put Mexico on a permanent basis of +greatness. Many small newspapers near the border +as far as San Antonio were paid as much as +$5,000 a year to speak in good terms about Diaz +and never to mention any trouble or agitation which +might be started along the border by anarchists who +might call themselves Mexican revolutionists.</p> + +<p>Great newspaper proprietors in the United +States were given concessions, others were offered +special inducements to publish special Mexican numbers, +which brought from $25,000 to $30,000 +worth of advertising; well-known individuals, such +as judges, congressmen and senators, were invited +in an indirect way to visit Mexico, were received +like princes, fêted, dined and were offered mining +or other concessions as one gives cigars to a guest +after dinner. When the concessions were not +needed or available, Don Porfirio took particular<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</span> +care to impress his famous visitor with a set of well +chosen phrases most apt to impress him favorably +as to his greatness, his patriotism and his democracy.</p> + +<p>One incident, which was related to me, illustrates +the Machiavellian talent of Diaz. A nationally famous +librarian paid his visit to General Diaz, who +received him very graciously. No concessions were +asked or wanted and the President did not mention +the great battles he had fought, which were unknown +to the gentle librarian, but he spoke at great +length of the extensive school system in vogue since +his ascension to the presidency, and ended the conversation +by declaring: “It is my greatest ambition +to be known as the great schoolmaster of Mexico.” +The phrase impressed the scholar and many +people heard the phrase, and many newspapers repeated +it until everybody believed it.</p> + +<p><i>Pearson’s Magazine</i> printed six years ago a fulsome +life of Diaz. What General Diaz thought +of it is told in an interview between Ireneo Paz, a +Mexican newspaperman and the President who were +friends for more than sixty years. Don Ireneo Paz +asked the President: “I have been wanting to ask +you if that interview which the papers published a +few months ago was authentic; that one which is +said to have taken place between yourself and one +Creelman, an American journalist?”</p> + +<p>“What surprises me is that sagacious men like +you should have been capable of giving credit to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</span> +such folly (à semejante paparrucha),” replied +Diaz.</p> + +<p>“Because I did not believe it, I asked you if it +was authentic.”</p> + +<p>“It’s as true as a dead child. You know me +too well to believe that I could stroll for hours upon +the terrace of Chapultepec, exhibiting the white of +my eyes and opening my nostrils excessively in order +that the Yankee reporter may be able to give wings +to his fancy. What happened was this: A friend +of mine, a member of my cabinet, came to read me +the article which was already manufactured (confeccionado) +for an American publication. It +didn’t seem bad to me, or rather it seemed very +good, because without compromising me much it lent +a lustre to my antecedents, and put me on a good +footing for the future, so that it gave me all the +facilities which I desired, whether to continue sacrificing +myself for the Fatherland, or to shake off +the dust thereof (zafarme) in time if things should +blow into a whirlwind (à ponerse turbias). I acknowledge +to you that I thought the writing was +so well dressed up, so much in conformity with what +are not but should be my profoundest thoughts, so +seemly for our luckless proletariat, that I accepted +it unhesitatingly as if it had been inspired by myself, +not making more than a very few modifications on +some entirely Yankee points of view which would +have put me in a very ridiculous position, and I gave +my consent to two things:—that it should be published<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</span> +in English and Spanish, and that it should +be amply paid for.”</p> + +<p>“About how much was the cost of this work?”</p> + +<p>“Some fifty thousand pesos.” (Como unos cincuenta +mil pesos.)<a id="FNanchor_3" href="#Footnote_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> + +<p>Toward the end of the Diaz régime and in an +effort to refute the attacks made in a book by the +present writer called, “Diaz, Czar of Mexico,” the +cientificos inspired James Creelman to write “Diaz, +Master of Mexico”; whole chapters were also +dedicated in an effort to discredit the exposé by +J. K. Turner in his “Barbarous Mexico.” Several +books published in the United States and England +were bought by Diaz. One was “Porfirio Diaz,” +by R. de Zayas Enriquez, and the other “Yucatan, +the American Egypt,” by Tabor and Frost. The +Mexican government inspired their consul in Cuba, +J. F. Godoy, to write a book, “Porfirio Diaz,” +which had “seventy pages of endorsements of Diaz +written by prominent Americans.” Here we have +the case of a man, Mr. Godoy, who actually went +about—or sent about—among senators, congressmen, +diplomats and cabinet officers, soliciting kind +words for President Diaz.<a id="FNanchor_4" href="#Footnote_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> Porfirio Diaz and his +cientifico supporters thought that they could keep +the Mexicans, peons, and the middle class workingmen +down if public opinion in Europe and in the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</span> +United States was misinformed about the real conditions +in Mexico.</p> + +<p>The great reputation of General Diaz in America +and Europe was essentially manufactured +through laudatory articles in the press, magazines, +weeklies and daily papers, by the publication of +books, interviews of prominent Americans who came +back from a visit to the “Great Old Man” in +Chapultepec, who could have said as Macbeth, +“And I have bought golden opinions from all sorts +of people.” Judges, congressmen, senators, governors, +members of cabinets, even presidents, princes +and kings spoke in reverence and admiration of +Don Porfirio Diaz.</p> + +<p>What chance had any patriotic, democratic, and +free loving Mexican against the avalanche of lies, +deliberate and unconscious falsehoods? Whoever +heard in the United States of the Massacre of +Papantla where 20,000 Mexican peasants, men, +women and children were shot down in cold blood, +and as a result half a dozen villages wiped off the +map of Mexico?</p> + +<p>What newspaper in America published the story +of the revolution of Tomochic, when 15,000 mountaineer +peasants in Chihuahua were destroyed and +only forty old men and women were left to tell the +tale? And the murder of 15,000 men, the whole +male population of Juchitan, State of Oaxaca, in +revenge for the death of Diaz’s brother, and the assassination<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</span> +of 750 workingmen of the Orizaba cotton +mills?</p> + +<p>Workingmen in Mexico were killed if they attempted +to unionize or to strike, the peasants were +slaughtered to take away from them their rights +under the law; the Yaqui Indians were deported +and sold into slavery in Yucatan to permit the great +landowners in Sonora to sell their land to American +syndicates. Anybody who protested orally or in +writing was thrown into jail, where imprisonment +was worse than death. We reproduce the description +by a Mexican of a night passed in the prison +of Belem, Mexico City.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>May 16.</p> + +<p>I dare not credit the testimony of my senses. I cannot +yet believe all that I have suffered in that horrible night +which has just passed; a night of horrible dreams, a succession +of repugnant nightmares, terrific, phantastic, demoniacal, +impossible, inconceivable and nevertheless perfectly +and completely real. I thought the night would be endless. +I fancied myself in the infernal regions, in a hell as +the heated phantasy of the poet of maniacal brain never conceived +it.</p> + +<p>The prison is a sort of a room of 50 yards in length by +6 broad and 5 in height, that is to say 1500 cubic yards. +Within its walls sleep 800 individuals according to my calculation. +The hygienists claim that 12 by 14 cubic yards of +air are necessary in a dwelling for each person: in that space +we did not even have 2 cubic yards each.</p> + +<p>All the ventilation consists in an iron grating at the entrance +at one extremity and a window at the other end.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</span></p> +<p>How could 800 persons stay in that small space? It is a +mystery to me; I have seen it and still I cannot explain it, +and I am almost willing to admit the penetrability of the +bodies.</p> + +<p>The men lie down in two rows, feet to feet and the head +against the wall. Those who arrive first or the strongest +lie on the ground, those who follow do as best they can by +lying between two bodies cradle-wise. Everybody must perforce +sleep sideways. For this reason quarrels and fights +are frequent and occasionally they end in wounds and sometimes +in death.</p> + +<p>In this prison there are some revolting W. C.’s. They +are cleaned in the morning, but as the night advances they +are used constantly and as there is no running water, the +fecal matter and the urine run over onto the ground soaking +those who sleep near them. Some wretches even sleep +seated on those barrels, and bitter fights take place when +somebody wants to use them and for that purpose they are +forced to disturb the sleepers on top of the barrels. Others +prefer to commit nuisance where they happen to be, against +the companions who happen to be near them and that occasions +new fights.</p> + +<p>The atmosphere is so fetid that it almost chokes and +asphyxiates you. It is so dense that you can almost cut it +with a knife.</p> + +<p>This dungeon is lighted by some electric lamps whose rays +can barely penetrate the atmosphere. Eight hundred men +habitually dirty, clad in pestilential rags, the respiration of +all those lungs, the emanations of all these bodies, the filth of +those barrels.... I am horrified at the remembrance of it +all and I am wondering that I am still alive.</p> + +<p>Soon after the prisoners have settled to sleep, from the +different walls there starts a downward immigration of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</span> +myriads of parasitical insects. One cannot possibly conceive +the innumerable number of bed-bugs, some of enormous size, +lice of all classes, fleas, mosquitoes and cock-roaches. They +assure me that the prisoners become accustomed to all these +parasites and they do not heed them. The truth is that besides +myself I did not notice anybody paying any attention +to them.</p> + +<p>Only three persons were privileged to use cots; the head +keeper and two head men. I could not find a place to lie +down. The head keeper saw me standing and understood +the reason of my perplexity and authorized me to sleep under +his cot. At first I took this offer as an insult; later I understood +the full value of that concession which was not +gratis but cost me 25 cents.</p> + +<p>It had just struck nine at the prison clock when suddenly +and accidentally all the electric lights went out. The darkness +was absolute. Immediately a formidable roar arose +from that mob and a fearful struggle began. There were +heard shouts of hatred, fearsome lamentations, blasphemies, +the voices of the head men trying to impose order and shouting +to the prisoners to keep silent, but without avail. It +was undescribable uproar.</p> + +<p>Soon afterwards footsteps of soldiers were heard nearing +the door. An employé arrived with the escort bringing +a lantern along. He opened the grated door with a great +deal of noise and gave order to the soldiers to fire in case +of further disorder. Then everything was silent as if by +incantation. The turnkey asked for the oil lamps hanging +on the walls, lighted them and distributed them to the head +men to place them in their corresponding places. From +time to time the silence was interrupted by some stifled +groans.</p> + +<p>The turnkey ordered the formation of rows to make ready<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</span> +for the roll call. They brought the register and the prisoners +going into the corridor after their names being called. +Some did not appear, others answered in a dying voice. All +the prisoners able to do so went back to rest. There were +three dead and seventeen wounded. Who are the authors +of these crimes? They have so far not discovered them, and +those who know the way of the prison claim that they +never will be found. The prisoners no matter how strict +the vigilance and how often they search them succeed in +hiding pieces of bones which form part of the meat rations, +and these bones they sharpen against the stones of the floor +until they become as sharp and pointed as daggers. +Those are the weapons used in their fights. They also employ +scissors, and spoons and other instruments which +are used in their different trades and which they manage to +steal.</p> + +<p>Every time that there is a riot as happens when the lights +go out then some of the most hardened prisoners take advantage +of this fact to revenge themselves or to wound those +nearest to them, without any provocation, and it is very +difficult to discover the author of the crime as many are +spattered with blood owing to the crowded conditions of +the dormitory.</p> + +<p>Many of the wounds result from the indiscriminate use +of the stick in the confusion and darkness by the head men, +who do so in self-defence or in fear.</p> + +<p>After the dead and wounded had been taken to the hospital +they locked us up again calling the names anew and leaving +two guards at the gate to fire at the first sign of disorder. +I went back to my place under the cot of the head +keeper thinking to myself that the solitary cell in spite of +the “incommunicacion” was preferable to this dangerous and +filthy galley. I did not sleep a wink all night long. At 6<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</span> +o’clock in the morning they opened the gate and all this sickening +lee contained was vomited forth.</p> + +<p>I was one of the first ones to go out and I nearly fainted +when I felt the fresh air of the morning. Mr. H.... was +waiting for me and he invited me to breakfast with him +in the department of distinction. Later he asked to see the +warden so as to get me a permit to go over to his department.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile I jotted down those notes although I did not +know how I managed to do so as my head seems to be a +vacuum. I think I have a beginning of fever.</p> +</div> + +<p>Not only were Mexicans persecuted in their own +country, but when Mexican liberals fled across the +border into the United States, thinking that they +could tell the truth and publish it in the American +press, they were persecuted and imprisoned through +the orders of the Mexican Ambassador in Washington +to the Attorney Generals under Theodore +Roosevelt, and William H. Taft. Some of the liberals +were even kidnapped across the Mexican border +and sent to rot in the fortress of San Juan de +Ulloa in Vera Cruz. Manuel Sarabia, F. Flores +Magon, L. Rivera and Antonio I. Villareal were +the pioneers of Mexican agitation against Diaz. +“Mother” Jones by suggestion of the writer before +his imprisonment for libel against a Diaz official, +induced Congressman W. B. Wilson of Pennsylvania +(Secretary of Labor in the Cabinet of Wilson), +to investigate the persecution of Mexican liberals +in the United States by American officials in +1910. The result was a cessation of these persecutions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</span> +and a renewal of agitation in the southwest +and along the border.</p> + +<p>The agitation against the blood and iron rule of +Porfirio Diaz was begun over six years before the +Madero revolution; it was the preliminary work of +untold numbers of martyrs who died unknown, +crushed by the ruthless hand of the half-breed Czar.</p> + +<p>In every State governors, jefes politicos, and cientificos +robbed the Indians of the land in their possession. +By the year 1892 all the great bodies of +agricultural land had passed from the possession of +more than a million small farmers into the hands +of less than fifty rich families and corporations of +the Diaz clique.</p> + +<p>The State of Morelos (2,734 square miles) and +a population of 179,614 inhabitants, became practically +the property of half a dozen families. In +the State of Chihuahua one family alone, the Terrazas, +owned as much land as the combined territory +of Switzerland, Belgium and Holland. +Towards the end of the Diaz régime nearly 3,000,000 +Indians had been despoiled of their native land +and General Diaz had sold over 83,000,000 acres +for the paltry sum of $3,000,000.</p> + +<p>The policy of General Diaz was to eliminate the +Mexican Indian peons from valuable land and from +an independent economic life into peonage in great +haciendas, in great mines and factories where they +could be more easily controlled by the rurales and +the soldiers. At the height of Diaz’s rule, in 1908,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</span> +when all the world was singing the pæans to the +glory of Porfirio Diaz, the writer found out by personal +investigation that the average salary for unskilled +labor in the mines near the city of Pachuca +(inh. 40,000) was three cents gold a day, and in +the haciendas six cents gold.</p> + +<p>What was the result of this policy of despoliation +and oppression? Simply that wages in the +great haciendas, mines, and factories were kept as +low as possible, while prices of food stuffs and necessities +went up by the help of a rigid system of high +tariff. The great haciendados, the foreign owners +of mines and industrial concerns, the same ones who +were reaping a golden harvest and singing the +praise of Diaz’s rule were buying labor in Mexico +at a very low Mexican silver rate and were selling +the result of this labor at a gold rate.</p> + +<p>The press agents of Diaz spoke of the perfect +school system inaugurated at the beginning of his +rule. General Diaz never could have crushed Mexico +in the iron grip of his hand if education had +been as general as was claimed. The percentage +of illiteracy in the thirty-five years of the czar’s +rule was lowered from ninety to eighty-six per cent. +but only in the cities. The rural school system was +almost completely neglected, or was turned over to +the care of priests and nuns.</p> + +<p>It was this fourteen per cent. of the people who +could read and write, which organized the agitation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</span> +in Mexico under tremendous difficulties and by unheard-of +sacrifices.</p> + +<p>The political advisers of Diaz never dreamed +that every Indian who was expatriated, every workingman +who saw the murders of his companions, +every Mexican who suffered from an unjust imprisonment, +became an incipient rebel, only awaiting the +time that a leader would show them their strength +and the way to break the chains of their economic +and political slavery.</p> + +<p>It could never be imagined by the rich foreign +investors in Mexico who had observed the patient +and ignorant peons, that no matter how pacific, how +miserable and subdued a race, the day would come +when they must rebel and evolve into a daring and +independent race.</p> + +<p>The same happened in France through the revolution. +Read the description written by Mirabeau’s +father of the savage-looking, long-haired, barefoot +peasants who came down from the mountains, and +the older Mirabeau’s prophetic reflections on the +subject.</p> + +<p>The worst offenders and the greatest enemies to +Mexican political and economic freedom were the +foreigners; they always stood by the oppressors +with their financial and moral influence in Mexico, +in the United States and in Europe. Without this +powerful help Diaz would never have lasted thirty-five +years. Foreigners in Mexico were treated with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</span> +a deference and were allowed privileges unknown +to the average Mexican. Porfirio Diaz always +raised the spectre of American intervention when +he wanted to frighten restless Mexicans.</p> + +<p>The only friends of liberal Mexico were the Socialists +and the organized workingmen in Europe +and especially in the United States who understood +from the beginning the danger of an enslaved, ill-paid +proletariat across the border. The great agitation +which exposed the iron rule of Diaz was +helped by Socialists and the proletariat in the +United States, and made it easy for Madero and +his friends to plot and organize a revolution across +the border.</p> + +<p>The foreign bankers, concessionaires, “friends +of the friends” of General Diaz, wanted a continuation +of peace at any price, even at the price of +subjugation of all Mexican liberties, or if that +failed, by American intervention, and as a result of +it either American conquest or of American police +rule as in Cuba.</p> + +<p>The successor of Diaz had been chosen by the +invisible rulers of Diaz, everything about it was cut +and dried, and even the list of members of the Cabinet +of the successor had been drawn up. When a +foreigner was asked about the economic and political +rights of the Mexicans, he shrugged his shoulders +and answered that Indians and niggers were +not fit to rule themselves. The self-same Americans +who would have started a revolution in their<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</span> +own country if political conditions had been as oppressive +as in Mexico, spoke contemptuously of the +valiant struggle of the middle class Mexicans. To +my utter amazement I heard an American clergyman +inform me after he had listened to a lecture +of mine in favor of the Constitutionalists and the +prophecy of a speedy downfall of Huerta, that he +nevertheless believed Mexico needed strong men +like Huerta and Diaz.</p> + +<p>Americans who invest money in Mexico cannot +be blamed for being ignorant of Mexican conditions, +but how about foreigners who live years in Mexico +and come in daily contact with the people? Is it +a wonder that Mexicans are suspicious of foreigners?</p> + +<p>Porfirio Diaz sold out his country to foreigners +for a pittance, he made them rich and prosperous, +and he used Mexican labor, freedom, and their suffering +to raise himself on a pinnacle of fame unheard +of to any other man of his times. Mexico +was only Mexico, but Diaz was its prophet, its +savior, its creator, its superman, and demi-god. +The Mexicans were an unknown, negligible quantity +and quality, and the fatal pseudo-greatness of +Diaz was trumpeted across the world by an army +corps of foreign concessionaries, exploiters and +grafters. But the great Diaz myth like a monstrous +Frankenstein destroyed itself in time.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c3">CHAPTER III</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">THE MADERO REVOLUTION, ITS AIMS AND FAILURES</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">I</span>N the summer of 1908, when the writer was in +Mexico he had heard that a man called F. I. +Madero was writing a book, in which he discussed +the advisability of contesting the seventh presidential +election of General Diaz. The book was supposed +to have been written in collaboration with a +journalist who later was rewarded with the Governorship +of Chiapas.</p> + +<p>“The Presidential Question of 1910,” the title +of the book, had about ninety thousand words of +written matter, and began with the War of Independence +down to General Diaz’s régime when he +tried to analyze the future political conduct of Diaz.</p> + +<p>Of the interview of General Diaz in <i>Pearson’s +Magazine</i> of 1908, he said: “We judge a study +of his declarations to Creelman useless, as we do +not believe they are sincere, for they are in manifest +contradiction with his past acts, as General +Diaz has always made promises which were never +kept, from the Plan of la Noria down to the last +one.”</p> + +<p>Although few intelligent Mexicans took General +Diaz at his word, they nevertheless caught him for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</span> +the first time in a flagrant political “faux pas” +for not having denied the interview. They saw a +chance to take him at his own words and start the +work of organizing an agitation of the political conscience +of Mexico.</p> + +<p>Madero’s book was a powerful factor in this +propaganda, which was followed by a national organization +of political clubs and speechmaking by +a few daring young men of the middle class. This +fearless, open propaganda copied the campaigning +methods of the United States and Madero was the +head of the movement.</p> + +<p>At first, Diaz, his political supporters and even +the foreigners laughed at their rash, foolish crusade +which they thought would soon be crushed and destroyed.</p> + +<p>The Diaz clique, the cientificos and the old supporters +of the czar, men like General Reyes, General +Naranjo, General Trevino, General Izabal, +General Torres, General Terrazas, Gen. Mucio +Martinez, T. Dehesa, R. Corral, J. Y. Limantour, +E. Creel, Gen. G. Cosio, O. Molina would all +have liked to be president, but they were too much +in awe of the power of the old man in Chapultepec. +Their political work was all done underground, they +were all getting ready for the moment when General +Diaz should step down gripped by the hand +of death. None of them imagined that any Mexican, +no matter how daring, could shake the foundation +of the Diaz throne without the help of the middle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</span> +class of Mexico. When the old guard observed +the impunity of the Madero propaganda +they guessed that it was going to be a repetition of +the events in the presidential elections of 1903-04 +when Diaz allowed his foolish enemies to come out +in the open and then destroyed them wholesale and +in detail.</p> + +<p>The great strength of Madero consisted in his +peaceful methods of propaganda and his constant +advice to Mexicans to be patient under the persecutions +of the government agents. He advised +them to suffer even imprisonment and death so as +to awaken the interest of the majority who would +soon follow their example.</p> + +<p>Madero was assisted in his campaign by his +brother Gustavo and a young lawyer Roque Estrada, +and was accompanied everywhere by his wife, +even in jail. Roque Estrada wrote about the evolution +of the Madero revolution and divided it into +four parts:</p> + +<p>1. The Awakening of the Mexican political soul.</p> + +<p>2. The Concentration of the revolutionary propaganda.</p> + +<p>3. The Destruction of the Diaz régime.</p> + +<p>4. The Reconstruction of the new government.<a id="FNanchor_5" href="#Footnote_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> + +<p>The campaign continued under difficulties, when +the supporters of Diaz awakened to the fact that +Madero was growing popular. Then on the 6th +of June, 1910, came the news of his arrest.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</span></p> + +<p>It must be added that one of the reasons for the +indifference of the authorities to the Madero propaganda +was the firm conviction that F. I. Madero +was a fool, an idiot, who was being used by powerful +enemies to initiate a counter campaign against +Diaz. A second reason was the fact that Madero +belonged to a wealthy and politically influential family +of which the head, Don Evaristo, had been Governor +of Coahuila during General Gonzalez’ term +(1880-84). Moreover, the Maderos had financial +connections in New York, Paris and London.</p> + +<p>Besides the head of the family, every member of +the Madero clan had disowned Francisco I. Madero’s +political activities with the exception of his +wife and Don Gustavo. It was a repetition of the +story of Joseph in the Old Testament: F. I. Madero +like Joseph was sold out by this brother’s family. +There was a radical wing in the Madero movement +headed by Gustavo Madero which believed +that all the peaceful methods of agitation were useless +and that the only successful method of overthrowing +the dictator was to be effected in the same +way by which he had come into power—by revolution.</p> + +<p>F. I. Madero insisted on peaceful methods, so +Gustavo without informing his brother went to +Paris ostensibly to organize a Mexican Railway of +the Centre. As soon as he cashed the first instalment +of the moneys for the construction ($375,000)<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</span><a id="FNanchor_6" href="#Footnote_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> +he used it to buy arms and ammunition for +the revolution which was certain to burst out in a +few months.</p> + +<p>In San Luis Potosí, October 5th, 1910, Don F. I. +Madero, who by this time had become convinced +of the futility of peaceful propaganda, wrote the +famous Plan. A few days later he was advised +that there was an order for his arrest which would +be followed by the application of the “Ley Fuga.” +Disguised as a common laborer he fled into the +United States on October 7th, and went to San Antonio. +Some New York papers had long accounts +of his flight and plans, sent by their correspondents +but the news was not published.</p> + +<p>The Plan of San Luis Potosí was a direct challenge +to Porfirio Diaz, and it used almost the same +slogan which General Diaz had written on the Plan +de la Noria against Juarez and later his Plan de +Tuxtepec and Palo Blanco which was: “Effective +suffrage and no re-election.”</p> + +<p>A great deal has been published about the great +promises of land reform and distribution of great +estates by F. I. Madero and which he could or would +not fulfil.</p> + +<p>The exact wording of that famous Article 3d of +the Plan has either been forgotten or misinterpreted. +We reproduce the Article:</p> + +<p><i>Article 3d</i>: “As a result of the abuses of the +lands, numerous small proprietors, mostly Indians,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</span> +have been despoiled of their lands by common consent +of the ministry of Fomento or by the decisions +of the Mexican courts. In justice to the old proprietors, +they should be given back lands which +have been taken away from them in such an arbitrary +manner. The decisions of the Ministry of +Fomento and of the courts will be subject to revision +and it will be demanded of those who acted in +such immoral fashion, to return the land to their +original owners, besides paying them an indemnity. +Only in case that the lands should have passed to a +third party before the publication of this plan, will +the original owners receive an indemnity from those +whose spoliation benefitted them.”<a id="FNanchor_7" href="#Footnote_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> + +<p>Thus it will be seen that the Plan of San Luis +Potosí aimed first of all to destroy the régime which +had made the land robbery possible.</p> + +<p>After the capture of Juarez the whole Diaz Government +was practically destroyed as a political +force and the Reconstruction would have been easy +with a new government. But the reactionary forces +were at work to arrest the impetus of the revolution. +Limantour came back from Paris and prepared +the way to an entrance of the reactionaries +by threatening to arrest Gustavo Madero for the +misappropriation of money to the use of the revolution.</p> + +<p>Madero’s father and brother had to accept his +conditions and went post haste to confer with F. I.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</span> +Madero at the border. Limantour’s conditions +were the cessation of hostilities and a constitutional +transfer of the presidential power on the shoulder +of the clerical L. de la Barra. Limantour’s clever, +strategic movement arrested the radical impulse, put +a few Maderistas in the Cabinet, and others in the +Governorship, but the inexperience of the new men +and the conscious inertia of ministers, like Ernesto +Madero, Secretary of Finance and Rafael Hernandez, +Secretary of Fomento, checked all effective attempts +at reforms. The two radical brothers, the +Vasquez Gomez, were eliminated. Limantour +went back to Paris to watch from a distance and +to direct the tactics of the policy of inertia.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile plots were hatched against the life +of Madero. One almost succeeded at this time. +While L. de la Barra was provisional President they +sent F. I. Madero to confer with Zapata who +agreed to meet him on condition that no federal +troops should accompany Madero in Cuautla. General +Huerta, who was in charge of the federal troops +in Morelos broke the promise, and attacked +Cuautla in hopes that Zapata would kill Madero for +his supposed treachery. The common sense of +Zapata saved Madero’s life.</p> + +<p>The first conspiracy against Madero happened +when he was in Juarez and the cientificos had plotted +his destruction by inciting the suspicious anger of +men like Orozco and Villa against him. But Madero’s +bravery saved him again. The cientifico<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</span> +plotters were said to be T. E. Obregon, F. Carbajal +and Oscar Braniff. T. E. Obregon later became a +member of Huerta’s cabinet and Carbajal the provisional +president following the flight of General +Huerta. As soon as Madero was elected the cientificos +captured Orozco with money and started him +as the head of a counter revolution before the President +had been seated a month. Then they pushed +General Reyes and later Felix Diaz and Vasquez +Gomez to revolt against Madero.</p> + +<p>These movements although they failed, were +kept up so as to show the world the incompetence +and lack of popularity of the Madero régime. +Zapata started on the war path incited by the cruelties +of the federal generals and all over the country +rich haciendados (ranchers) gave money to guerrilla +leaders to keep up the anarchy and by attacks on +American property and American citizens to invite +American intervention.</p> + +<p>Twice the Taft régime attempted or threatened +an invasion of Mexico and once they almost succeeded. +The failure was due to the exposé of the +little plot which resulted in the resignation of Dickinson, +then Secretary of War.<a id="FNanchor_8" href="#Footnote_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> + +<p>It must be remembered that the Attorney General +under Taft was a lawyer who had been a personal +representative of Diaz in the United States, and +among some of the lawyers who had been his partners<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</span> +was a brother of the President of the United +States. All were interested in Mexico financially +and politically.</p> + +<p>The threats of invasion by the Taft régime had +a disastrous effect on the reorganization of the new +government. Madero was surrounded by enemies +at home and abroad. The army, the cientificos and +the clericals were plotting at home. The Mexican +Ambassador Calero had formed an alliance with the +American Ambassador, hoping to step into the +presidency as L. de la Barra had done. Calero +went so far as to telegraph to some French bankers +who were negotiating a loan to Madero, to stop +until further orders; the further orders were supposed +to come from the new government which +Calero hoped to head.</p> + +<p>But meanwhile there should not come any financial +assistance to Madero. In Congress men like +F. Bulnes, Q. Moheno, J. M. Lozano headed the +opposition which interfered with any plans of reform, +by cutting off all financial help. Madero was +just beginning to reap the fruit of his policy of conciliation.</p> + +<p>With few exceptions all the old Diaz appointments +in the courts, in the States, in the consular +and diplomatic service were kept in their places, and +as a result the old methods were kept in vogue. All +the army officers who had ruthlessly fought the revolutionists +were left in their positions and the rebel +chiefs were dismissed with thanks.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</span></p> + +<p>With the new interests created by the Madero +ascension to power there sprang up a hungry crowd +of office seekers and a neo-cientifico régime headed +by Ernesto Madero and Rafael Hernandez. It +would not be supposed even as a fantastic flight of +a poetical imagination that the neo-cientificos would +sincerely attempt a reform of the government. E. +Madero is reported as having said that the financial +system left by Limantour worked like a Swiss watch. +The only reform to men of great interests can be +achieved in their favor, not against them.</p> + +<p>Zapata could only be induced to stop his rebellious +activity by a solution of the agrarian problem in +Morelos. The Cabinet Minister under Madero +only incited the exasperation by sending men of +Huerta’s stamp in their midst.</p> + +<p>It can be safely asserted that all the government +officials in Mexico were inimical to reforms beginning +with the Madero clan (excepting F. I. and +Gustavo Madero), down to the lowest officials. +The men who had fought for the revolution watched +in disgust and dismay the disintegration of the revolutionary +ideals.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c4">CHAPTER IV</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">PLOTTING WHICH OVERTHREW MADERO</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">W</span>E have seen in the foregoing chapter the mistakes +which had been made by Madero. +Being surrounded by enemies, he was too lenient +with them, and it proved disastrous.</p> + +<p>Orozco, one of his chiefs of guerrilla, should +have been court-martialled and shot in Juarez according +to military rule. The same drastic penalty +could have been applied without injustice against +two other high officers in the Mexican army, who +had rebelled against the authority—Felix Diaz and +General Reyes. But Madero, besides being too humane +for such methods, sincerely believed that +leniency was a sign of strength. Assuredly it was, +but only in case the cabinet and the government in +general had been loyal to him. Some cabinet members +plotted quite openly against him—A. G. +Granados, for instance. The headquarters of the +plotters were in Paris and Geneva, with a branch +office in the New York Consulate. In Mexico Rodolfo +Reyes was the soul of the movement. In +Paris, Limantour and L. de la Barra worked together +with General Mondragon to unravel the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</span> +threads of the conspiracy in favor of Felix Diaz, +who would represent the old Porfirista crowd, with +the assistance of the clericals and the great landowners, +and bankers, Americans as well as Mexican +and French.</p> + +<p>In New York the plotters supported General +Reyes as representing the army, especially the +younger element. To all appearances the conspiracy +was essentially a military mutiny backed by +the científicos, the landed interest and the clericals. +The most prominent army plotters were General +Mondragon, General Reyes, General Blanquet, Gen. +Felix Diaz, General Beltran, General Navarrete and +General Huerta. Among the civilians were: M. +Calero, A. G. Granados, T. E. Obregon, Vera Estañol, +A. R. Gil, L. de la Barra, J. M. Lozano, Q. +Moheno and Dr. Urrutia. The political and military +heads, exemplified in the above mentioned +names, represented the army, the científicos, the +clericals, the landed aristocracy,—in fact, all the +reactionary powers and none of the liberal or revolutionary +tendencies of the people.</p> + +<p>In utter blindness, innocence and optimism, call +it what you please, Madero scoffed at the idea of +a plot which could overthrow him. He firmly believed +that the Mexican people were behind him +and would support him. He forgot that all the +powers of reaction were well organized and that the +Mexican people who supported him were not organized,—that +they were at the mercy of a few<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</span> +political bandits without principles and without +country.</p> + +<p>These unpatriotic politicians knew from experience +that the foreign bankers, the foreign corporations, +the American government and especially the +American ambassador, were inimical to Madero, +and hostile to liberal ideas, and would help them to +resist any attempts to reform the land question or +change the financial “status quo” as left over by +J. Y. Limantour.</p> + +<p>When Gustavo Madero discovered the plot on +February 4th, and learned of the conspirators, he +took it to his brother, who laughed at him. The mutiny +started on Sunday morning, the 9th of February. +During five days Madero continued playing with +fate, and when the rebellion, which was dated for +the 16th of March, burst out on the 9th, he was +taken by surprise. The plotters were scared into action +six weeks before the date set, because they suspected +treachery in their own ranks. On one side +there existed the ambition of General Reyes, who +was under the political management of his son Rodolfo, +on the other side the ambition of Felix Diaz, +whose mentor was General Mondragon. General +Huerta’s ambitions were always latent, but were +kindled and managed by his political tutor, Dr. Urrutia, +who represented the clerical interests, as far +back as the Diaz time.</p> + +<p>In the year 1908 a young painter, Dr. Atl, had +to undergo an operation and went to the sanatorium<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</span> +of Dr. Urrutia. There he found General Huerta, +who was then unknown to anybody except his own +officers and soldiers. Dr. Atl was a “compadre” +of Dr. Urrutia, and although a radical of the extremest +type, Dr. Urrutia and General Huerta only +laughed at him, humored him, but took him into +their confidence. One afternoon as they were discussing +political events, Dr. Urrutia exclaimed that +ambitious and able men should prepare the way for +the presidency after the death of General Diaz. +Finally Dr. Urrutia said to General Huerta: “General, +you look like presidential timber, you are +capable and fearless and you control half of the +army. Why don’t you begin to get ready?” General +Huerta looked at Dr. Urrutia and Dr. Atl +through half closed eyes, expressionless as a graven +image, and after a long pause he said: “It is difficult, +but it is not impossible.”</p> + +<p>During the Reyes-Diaz mutiny in Mexico City, +General Huerta was in charge of the troops. He +was making a great noise and killing off as many +volunteers of Madero and non-combatants as possible. +His ambition was to sap the strength of the +Maderists and to terrorize the population of the +city into acquiescence to any future pact.</p> + +<p>During these strenuous ten days Dr. Urrutia was +seen going back and forth constantly between the +house of the Bishop of Mexico and General Huerta. +He was advising the soldiers and tying the strings +which would lift the less experienced Huerta into<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</span> +the presidential chair, backed by the money and the +prestige of the Church. During the ten days of +constant bombardment, the citadel where Felix Diaz +was entrenched was touched but twice by the Huerta +guns, and the National Palace only twice also. An +American officer who happened to be in Mexico +City, backed the claim of General Angeles, that the +citadel could have been taken in a few hours if +Huerta had really been sincere in his attack. General +Angeles proposed to carry the citadel if F. I. +Madero would only place him at the head of the +government troops. Madero refused for fear of +hurting Huerta’s vanity, and hoped thus to prove +that he had faith in his loyalty.</p> + +<p>We publish the account of events which followed +the arrest of Madero and Suarez, by Mr. Marquez +Sterling, who tried his best to save Madero’s life.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p>DECLARATION made by the Minister of the Republic +of Cuba in Mexico, Mr. Manuel Marquez +Sterling, to the <i>Herald</i>.</p> + +<p>It was exactly twenty-nine days after I presented +my credentials to President Madero, when the revolt +in the City of Mexico started. I shall not refer +to the tragic scenes which took place during the +struggle in the city, from the 9th of February to +the ruin of the government, as the same are now +well known to all the world; I shall only refer to +the fall of Mr. Madero, after ten days of terrible<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</span> +disorder, during which, automobiles of diverse legations +constantly crossed the streets of the city.</p> + +<p>On the morning of February 18th, in a conference +which I had with the Secretary of Foreign Relations, +Pedro Lascurain, he assured me that in the +afternoon the revolt would receive a decisive blow, +and that the city would return to the hands of the +government. Precisely at two o’clock in the afternoon, +I received notice that General Blanquet had +made the President and his cabinet prisoners. A +short time later we were called to the American +Embassy by Mr. Henry Lane Wilson and informed +of this extraordinary event.</p> + +<p>General Blanquet verified the arrest by order of +General Huerta, and as a consequence, the sharpshooting +in the streets ceased. In the evening, the +Ministers of Chile, Brazil and I visited the American +Embassy, looking for further news. We there +met General Huerta and Gen. Felix Diaz, who for +several days had fought in the streets of Mexico. +They were accompanied by other persons, such as +the actual Minister of Justice, Lic. Rodolfo Reyes. +Reyes then read in a loud voice, in our presence, a +document in which both Generals agreed upon the +ceasing of hostilities. Huerta and Diaz later +signed this document, embracing immediately afterwards, +while their companions applauded; the diplomats +did not applaud, remaining as mute witnesses +of a scene which was unexplainable to us.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</span></p> + +<p>On the 19th, in the morning, I left the Cuban +Legation and went through several streets, in order +to get an idea of the popular sentiment. I heard +the death of Gustavo Madero discussed, of whose +capture I had already heard, they saying that he +had been assassinated in the arsenal, and that in the +afternoon Huerta would execute the president himself. +They also stated that the Vice-President, +Pino Suarez, had tried to escape. While I listened +to all this, a distinguished Mexican gentleman, whose +name I shall not state, detained me and said: “You +and the members of the Diplomatic Corps are the +only ones who can save Madero.”</p> + +<p>On returning to the Legation, this idea had taken +possession of my mind, and for that purpose I immediately +sent a note to the American Ambassador, +communicating the matter to him and proposing to +him that the Diplomatic Corps should take charge +of the same. In the name of my government, I offered +the services of the Cruiser <i>Cuba</i> (which some +days previous I had requested from my government, +and which was anchored in Vera Cruz) to save them +from danger, taking them away from the country, +in case they should obtain their liberty. I immediately +went to the Japanese Legation to see the parents +of the President, who had heard of the death +of their son, Gustavo, and which they did not credit. +They begged me therefore, to go to Mr. Wilson and +beg him to aid us with General Huerta, to save the +lives of their two sons. The Chargé d’Affaires of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</span> +the Japanese Legation accompanied me to the American +Embassy and we made our proposition known +to the Ambassador.</p> + +<p>We there met the Spanish Minister, and he and +I agreed that the situation was more serious than +we had thought, and therefore determined to personally +see General Huerta, asking him for the lives +of the prisoners. We went in my automobile, flying +the Cuban flag, but we were not able to see Huerta. +Instead, we were received by General Blanquet, who +treated us with great courtesy, assuring us that they +would respect the lives of the prisoners, and while +this was passing the Minister of Chile arrived, telling +us that Madero had consented to resign as +President of the Republic, and that the Secretaries +of State and other persons who had been made prisoners +with Madero and Pino Suarez, had been set +at liberty.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 19th nevertheless, a representative +of Huerta urged Madero to resign. +Madero replied to this messenger that he was +now resolved to resign, provided that he who had +usurped his place should govern according to the +Constitution. While they were explaining this, +Mr. Lascurain went to see Madero, as a mediator, +to whom Madero expressed the conditions under +which he would resign. Lascurain, in Huerta’s +name, accepted. These conditions were: that the +resignation should be delivered to the Minister of +Chile, who would retain it in his possession until<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</span> +Madero and Pino Suarez should be safely aboard +the <i>Cuba</i> in Vera Cruz. Madero stipulated also +that in the trip to Vera Cruz, they should be accompanied +by the Chargé d’Affaires of Japan and +myself, Madero insisting principally in that, before +delivering the resignation to Congress, Huerta +should sign a letter, in which he would promise to +comply with the terms of same.</p> + +<p>That same afternoon Madero signed his resignation, +and further, as Lascurain was present, he +granted, at his indication, that the affair should be +ventilated among Mexicans, handing the resignation +to Lascurain, instead of delivering it to the Minister +of Chili. It was then stipulated that at ten +o’clock that night Madero and Pino Suarez would +leave for Vera Cruz in a special train, together with +their families, and accompanied by myself and an +official of the Japanese legation, and escorted by a +powerful guard.</p> + +<p>Having communicated this arrangement to the office +of General Blanquet, I ascended to General +Huerta’s department to see him, but I was informed +that he was sleeping. I immediately returned to +the office of General Blanquet, where the Ministers +of Chile and Spain awaited me. We then asked +for permission to see Madero and same was immediately +conceded to us, going to the four first +rooms, in which he was confined.</p> + +<p>Madero warmly expressed his gratitude to me,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</span> +begging me to accompany him to Vera Cruz, which +request I was pleased to accede to.</p> + +<p>“When you are ready,” he told us, “come to the +palace in order to go to the station. It would be +well if you could come at eight, but at any rate I +shall wait for you until ten o’clock.”</p> + +<p>I then left, and immediately went to telegraph +to the Commander of the <i>Cuba</i> that he should expect +us, being ready to sail from Vera Cruz, and +that he should do what was necessary in order to +receive aboard the Heads of the Government and +their families.</p> + +<p>At eight o’clock I was punctually at the Palace, +making my proposition known to General Blanquet. +He ordered one of his aides to accompany me; the +four rooms occupied by Madero and Pino Suarez +were connecting. The door of one of the rooms +faced the yard, and there were many soldiers and +officials in the entrance; there were also sentinels in +the interior of the sparsely furnished rooms, sentinels +who, according to what I knew were replaced +each moment. General Angeles, one of the official +favorites of Madero, was also a prisoner in +these rooms. Ernesto Madero was there visiting +his nephew.</p> + +<p>Receiving us affectionately, Madero asked me if +I knew anything about his brother Gustavo, and it +could be seen that he did not know of his death. I +evaded the question to the best of my ability. Suddenly,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</span> +Madero asked about the letter that he had to +give to Huerta. None of us had it, and then Ernesto +Madero said that he would go and get it from +Huerta. Almost immediately he returned without +it, but with the news that Lascurain had gone to +present Madero’s resignation to Congress.</p> + +<p>On knowing this, Madero became very excited, +and from that moment lost all hope of salvation. +“I have fallen into a trap for the second time,” +he said, indicating to his uncle that he should go and +tell Lascurain that he wished him to come immediately. +Then Ernesto Madero confessed the truth +to him, telling him that the resignation had already +been presented and accepted by Congress. “This +is a felony of Lascurain,” said Madero. “The +agreement was that the resignation should not be +presented until I was aboard the <i>Cuba</i>.”</p> + +<p>In those moments, we knew by the conduct of +an official that Huerta had just been designated as +Provisional President by Congress.</p> + +<p>“This has been the second trap into which I have +fallen,” Madero finally said to me. “I am now +convinced that I shall not leave Mexico alive. They +will conduct me to prison this same night, and on +the trip, they will shoot me, or else they will assassinate +me right here, as soon as we are alone.”</p> + +<p>Ernesto Madero begged me to remain with him, +telling me that if they succeeded in surviving that +night, that probably the Diplomatic Corps would +be capable of saving them. I decided to accompany<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</span> +them, for how could I have the heart to take +my hat and leave them, being persuaded that these +men would be dead as soon as I was in the street? +Ernesto finally left us, Madero, Pino Suarez and +I remaining in these gloomy rooms.</p> + +<p>At one o’clock in the morning he invited me to +rest, indicating to me that he was very sleepy, and +without the least agitation, this man who had just +been deposed from the Presidency, commenced to +prepare two beds with chairs, one for himself and +the other for me.</p> + +<p>He had finished his labor, when an official sent +by General Huerta arrived, he having ordered him +to tell us that the train arranged to conduct the prisoners +out of the country was conveniently ready, but +on account of circumstances which he would explain +later, it had been impossible to despatch it. The +same official invited me to retire and wait. And +as, previously, something had been said in regard +to the train being ready to leave at five o’clock in +the morning, I asked the official if this was in the +programme, but he replied that he did not know +anything. As soon as I saw Madero sleep, I went +to keep company with Pino Suarez, first giving a +glance at Madero, who slept like a child. At this +moment, the guards entered and turned out the +lights.</p> + +<p>From the upper crevices of the windows some +rays of light penetrated, but they did not molest +us. We were so closely guarded, that any phrase<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</span> +which passed between Pino Suarez and myself had +to be spoken in a very low voice.</p> + +<p>At 9:30 in the morning breakfast was served to +us. Pino Suarez did not wish to take the coffee, +fearing that it might be poisoned, but Madero and +I took it. Then Madero gave the boy who had +served us a dollar, and told him to bring us the +morning papers. We did not permit this, fearing +that he might find out about Gustavo’s death. Madero +became resigned, lying down on his bed of +chairs, where he slept for twenty minutes.</p> + +<p>When he awakened, he said he was prepared for +everything that might happen, but he indicated to +me that I should approach the diplomats in order +to save him, which I promised to do with pleasure. +He also asked me if his wife had also made any +petition personally to Huerta.</p> + +<p>About ten o’clock in the morning, the wife of +Pino Suarez arrived, accompanied by a gentleman, +and I then took leave of them.</p> + +<p>The balance of that day, February 20th, and the +two following days, we worked to save Madero. I +asked Huerta why he had not given his consent in +this respect, to which he replied that he did not +dare send Madero to Vera Cruz, until he could have +confidence in the military authorities of that place. +I, in turn, indicated to him that he might be sent to +Tampico, where I could have the <i>Cuba</i> sent. He +further showed himself irresolute. Almost all the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</span> +foreign ministers saw Huerta personally that day, +and interceded for the life of Madero.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the 22d, the ministers thought +the lives of Madero and Pino Suarez to be out of +danger, although we had heard the rumor that they +schemed to place Madero in an insane asylum. At +night all the ministers approached the American Embassy +to celebrate the anniversary of the birth of +Washington. Huerta and all the Ministers in his +Cabinet were present and they all appeared very +calm.</p> + +<p>On the morning of the following day, Sunday, +I was very urgently called to the telephone. It +was Mrs. Madero, who was very excited on account +of the news she had received that her husband had +been wounded. I answered that this could not be +true, but a little later I read in the morning papers +the event of the death of Madero and Pino Suarez +at 11:15 the previous night, on being taken to the +penitentiary.</p> + +<p>Ambassador Wilson finally tried to obtain permission +for Mrs. Madero to see the body of her +husband. We then believed that the balance of the +family were in danger, and I hastily proposed to +take them from the country. I personally sent in +a secret manner to Vera Cruz, Francisco Madero, +father of the assassinated president, and his brother +Ernesto, and they embarked on the <i>Cuba</i>.</p> + +<p>I later conducted the mother, widow and sister<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</span> +of the President to the <i>Cuba</i>, leaving Vera Cruz +on February 25th.</p> +</div> + +<p>Mr. Marquez Sterling has belonged to the Diplomatic +Corps of the Republic of Cuba several +years, and has occupied the post of Minister in Argentine, +Peru and Brazil. During the administration +of President Palma, he was counsellor of the +Department of State. He presented his resignation +as Minister of Mexico after the murder of Madero +and Suarez.</p> + +<p>In the account of the events leading to the murder +of Madero and Suarez, Mr. Marquez Sterling +mentions the excitement of the prisoner-president +when he discovered that Don Pedro Lascurain had +turned over the written resignation of Madero into +Huerta’s hands.</p> + +<p>What happened was told by Lascurain himself. +As soon as General Huerta heard that Pedro Lascurain +had Madero’s resignation in his possession, he +asked to see him and begged him with great insistence +to give him the valuable paper. Don Pedro +Lascurain was obdurate, so the cunning old Indian, +knowing that Lascurain was a devout Catholic, +fished out the holy medallion hanging by a chain to +his neck. “See this medallion,” said Huerta. “It +is the most precious thing I possess; it was given +to me by my mother when I was a little boy. I +promise you on all that is holy and sacred to me, I +swear on the white head of my sainted mother, the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</span> +memory of this holy image, that if you give me the +President’s resignation, I shall guarantee his life,” +and as he finished the sentence he kissed the holy +medallion.</p> + +<p>Don Pedro Lascurain, convinced, handed him the +paper with the resignation of Madero and Suarez. +The next day General Huerta was visited by the +Belgian, Spanish and Japanese Ministers who asked +him to guarantee the life of the ex-President and +Vice-president. Huerta answered:</p> + +<p>“Gentlemen, will you guarantee to me that if I +permit Madero and Suarez to go out of Mexico, +that they will not start another revolution against +my government in the United States?” The three +diplomats declared that they could not give such +promises.</p> + +<p>“Then,” he exclaimed, “gentlemen, how can I +be made responsible for their lives?” The diplomats +left the general without answering.</p> + +<p>As the price of blood, the generals and the civilians +demanded the heads of Madero and Suarez; +the most insistent of all was Don Rodolfo Reyes, +who called for victims to avenge the death of his +father in front of the National Palace. Adolfo +Basso’s life was also sacrificed with that of Gustavo +Madero’s. The Huerta Cabinet went into power +like a Black Hand Cabinet, after the assassination +of its enemies. This infamous list should be remembered +by all who are interested in the reconstruction +of Mexico, and who speak of amnesty.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</span></p> + +<p class="pad"> +General Huerta, Provisional President.<br> +L. de la Barra, Foreign Affairs.<br> +A. García Granados, Interior.<br> +Rodolfo Reyes, Justice.<br> +T. Esquivel Obregon, Finance.<br> +General Mondragon, War.<br> +J. Vera Estañol, Instruction.<br> +A. Robles Gil, Fomento. +</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c5">CHAPTER V</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">HUERTA IN POWER—THE LANDING OF AMERICAN<br> +MARINES IN VERA CRUZ</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">W</span>HEN we speak of revolutions we must consider +three facts. First, that in Mexico’s +history there have been only three real revolutions: +the revolution which overthrew Spanish rule, the +three years’ war (1857-60), and the Madero revolution, +which began with the overturning of the +Diaz régime and was continued by the Carranza +revolution and the flight of Huerta. Secondly, it +must be remembered that all other political and +military upheavals, of long or short duration, cannot +be called revolutions but are in fact either mutinies +or revolts or coups d’état or as the Mexicans +call them “cuartelazos.” And lastly, that no revolution +can hope of success unless it is backed by the +majority of the middle class, and no successful revolution +can be organized with foreign and especially +American money with concessionary strings attached +to it.</p> + +<p>General Huerta with a soldier’s training and temperament, +and an unsympathetic knowledge of his +country’s history, thought that for the sake of getting +and staying in power the control of the army<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</span> +was the only possible road. Not only Huerta, but +his most prominent supporters made the mistake of +confusing cruelty, brutality and treachery with +power.</p> + +<p>Huerta’s cunning was believed to be statesmanship, +but very soon his Machiavellian “double +crossing” of Felix Diaz, Rodolfo Reyes and General +Mondragon, pointed to his methods of procedure. +The elimination of his more powerful enemies +and the mysterious disappearance of the less +known enemies, showed that wholesale assassinations +were as frequent as under Diaz’s rule. Nevertheless, +if Diaz was ruthless he was at least more +careful of public opinion. The foolish excuse that +a rescuing party had been responsible for the accidental +death of Madero and Suarez, laid bare to +the world the inner circumvolution of Huerta’s political +brain.</p> + +<p>A simpleton could have advised him that Madero +murdered was much more to be feared than Madero +alive. Madero the martyr was remembered +through his virtues and ideals, and all his faults, +weaknesses and blunders were forgotten. What +Madero alive could not achieve, Madero dead, +united under one idea, one effort, one banner.</p> + +<p>Huerta’s supporters lacked what is essential in +politics, psychological perception of public opinion. +Huerta, the double-edged sword of the clericals, destroyed +by his blunders the last vestige of clerical +power which supported the militarists and reactionaries.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</span> +Terrible sacrifices were enacted to strike terror +into the hearts of political opponents. Secret +agents lured the political victims into automobiles +to a solitary spot near Mexico City, close to Guadalupe; +then they were stabbed to death and hastily +buried on the spot.</p> + +<p>The Huerta executioners were themselves in danger +of being murdered for knowing too much, but +their suspicion enabled them to escape death, and +during Carbajal’s short rule they were caught and +lived to tell the details of their gruesome work.</p> + +<p>Dr. Urrutia, once minister of the interior in +Huerta’s cabinet was the chief executioner of the dictator. +Senator Dominguez because he had attacked +Huerta in the Senate and accused him of the +murder of Madero and Suarez, and Mr. Rendon +were driven gagged to Dr. Urrutia’s sanatorium in +the suburbs. They were put to sleep under the influence +of ether, their bodies were atrociously mutilated +and when awakened to consciousness, they +died of the loss of blood and the tremendous nervous +shock.</p> + +<p>Such savage methods accelerated the disruption +of the reign of terror and drove all elements into +active co-operation under the leadership of Carranza. +Secret agents were also sent to murder Carranza, +Villa, Obregon, Gonzalez, but the game was +too risky. The federal General Rabago succeeded +in catching Abraham Gonzalez, governor of Chihuahua +under Madero, and he was murdered by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</span> +being pushed under the wheels of a moving train.</p> + +<p>A supporter of General Huerta when he foresaw +the end of his friend went into exile. He claimed +that he had escaped two dangers by leaving Mexico, +one was a term in jail and the other a portfolio +in Huerta’s cabinet.</p> + +<p>There was never a period in the history of Mexico +when such a congregation of incompetents, of +grafters, and murderous fools held sway; even in the +world’s history there is difficulty in finding a parallel. +We have to go back to Nero and Caracalla +to find such a depth of infamy, cowardice and +Sadism.</p> + +<p>Victoriano Huerta appeared as a demoniacal +clown let loose on the political circus of Mexico +City, in an infernal saturnalia of gore, drunkenness +and prostitution. Huerta was the Avatar of +greed, lust and alcoholism, a moral hyena laughing +diabolically at the amazed world, a white-livered soldier +pickled in cognac, a mental baboon grinning +inanely at his own political antics.</p> + +<p>His own cabinet was chosen from among the best +saloons, in the houses of prostitution and from the +prisons. A meeting of the Cabinet was like a confab +between maniacs, idiots and drunkards. A +prominent Mexican who asked to be heard by the +members of the Cabinet reported that he was interrupted +by a minister before he could finish: +“This is no time for reforms,” said he; “we must +drown the whole country in blood.” Another suggested<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</span> +American intervention as the best method +of uniting the warring revolutionary elements. +“Then,” he added, smiling, “the fool gringos will +do the dirty work for us and our lives and property +will be respected.” A third member advised a +repetition of the system of reconcentration as was +inaugurated in Cuba by General Weyler.</p> + +<p>Cabinet meetings took place in a house several +miles from Mexico City and later in the red light +district and the famous Café Colon, whose proprietor +was made a general. All the ministers were +also made generals and had to appear in their uniforms. +Everybody in the employ of the government +was created an officer in uniform, even the +teachers and clerks. Bartenders were made sergeants +and it was reported that Doña Lupe of the +Salto del Agua was appointed honorary Rear-Admiral +of a squadron of cruisers. The sons of the +ministers, especially those of General Blanquet and +the sons and relatives of General Huerta received +concessions for running gambling houses, for the +sale of human beings into the army at so much per +head, and contracts for the sale of arms, ammunition, +uniforms and victuals to the War Department.</p> + +<p>A naturalized American named Ratner was indirectly +responsible for the landing of the marines in +Vera Cruz. Ratner was the president of the Tampico +News Co.; during Madero’s time he was caught +selling arms to Zapata and was deported under Article +33 of the Constitution.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</span></p> + +<p>When General Huerta became dictator Ratner +came back. Being fertile and unscrupulous in expedients, +he became a favorite of the general. One +day he advised the dictator to buy all the arms and +ammunition for sale then in the United States, and +for six months ahead so as to prevent the Constitutionalists +from getting any at any price. It was +discovered that the sum required for the purpose +was too great so the order was limited to machine +and field guns and ammunition. Twenty-five million +dollars in gold was the price for this corner +in war engines. Ratner engineered the whole +scheme and shipped the material to Odessa in Russia. +From Odessa they were sent to Hamburg and +there reshipped for Vera Cruz.</p> + +<p>The United States secret service agents, who had +been watching closely the sales of American manufacturers, +did not at first understand the meaning +of the elaborate and expensive shipping and reshipping.</p> + +<p>When the <i>Ypiranga</i> headed for Vera Cruz the +whole matter became clear. Huerta’s idea was to +get first all the field guns in the United States so +as to prevent the revolutionists from getting them; +thereupon to force the United States to intervene +in Mexico, counting on the patriotism of the Mexicans +to fight the invaders. His idea was to concentrate +all the revolutionary chiefs in the battles +against the Americans and to eliminate them one +by one when they could be reached more easily and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</span> +without arousing suspicion. If that plot did not +succeed, he had decided to permit the Americans +to occupy Mexico City, knowing that they +would respect the lives and properties of all factions.</p> + +<p>The Huerta conspiracy fell through because the +Constitutionalists believed in the word and friendship +of President Wilson and they mistrusted the +word and patriotism of Huerta. It was soon afterwards +that the dictator made up his mind to resign. +By the acceptance of the A.B.C. mediation, the game +was ended and he had decided to retire before it +was too late. Ratner had succeeded in his undertaking +and his commission was a million and a half +in gold.</p> + +<p>Señor Don Fernando Iglesias Calderón related +that while he was a prisoner in the castle of San +Juan de Ulloa he heard that an order had been +telephoned from the Commander of Vera Cruz to +the Commander of the fort, to release, arm and +dress about 300 convicts in civilian clothes. They +were landed in Vera Cruz the night before the +landing of American marines. In the morning +General Maas, his officers and soldiers hastily retreated +to the hills near Soledad.</p> + +<p>The blue jackets found no Federals, but the Mexican +snipers who made such a desperate resistance +were mostly ex-convicts who were promised their liberty +if they fought the Americans. The shooting +which emanated from the Naval Academy was directed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</span> +by ex-prisoners and a few cadets who fought +very bravely.</p> + +<p>Two days after the landing of the marines General +Navarrete of the staff of General Maas passed +through the American lines into the fort of Ulloa, +where he tried to induce F. Iglesias Calderón to +join Huerta in Mexico City and publish a manifesto +uniting all factions against the hated Americans.</p> + +<p>Don Fernando Iglesias answered that he could +not believe any promises made by Huerta and that +he was quite certain that the Constitutionalists +would not join the dictator even if they were forced +to resist an American invasion in the north. A few +days later the Commander of the fort under the advice +of Don Fernando Iglesias released all the political +prisoners.</p> + +<p>The Vera Cruz incident showed up the Federals +as a despicable, cowardly lot,—they had to arm a +few hundred ex-convicts and civilians to do the fighting +for them.</p> + +<p>The retirement of the Federals to Soledad likewise +proved that there was no serious intention to +resist an advance of American soldiers to Mexico +City, as the general line of march could never have +been taken by way of Soledad, but only through the +Cerro Gordo on the road to Jalapa by the Interoceanic +Railroad, the same itinerary used by Scott +in 1847. By advancing through the Cerro Gordo, +Jalapa, Perote and Puebla, the American troops +could have ignored or driven the Federals at Soledad<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</span> +into the mountains and by the capture of +Esperanza cut off their communications in the rear. +That would automatically have forced them to +evacuate Soledad, Cordoba, and Orizaba. The +whole campaign would have been a repetition of +the treachery of Santa Anna in 1847. Fortunately +for the Americans and Mexicans, President Wilson +was too wise to fall into such a trap, and the Constitutionalists +were too patriotic to play into the +hands of Huerta.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p><span class="smcap large">Note.</span>—<span class="less">The details about the arming of prisoners in Ulloa and +the landing of American marines in Vera Cruz were given to the +writer by Don Fernando Iglesias Calderón.</span></p> +</div> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c6">CHAPTER VI</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">THE FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE<br> +REVOLUTION</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">I</span>NTERESTED observers among the Americans +and foreigners were wondering how the Constitutionalists +could keep up a revolution against an +organized military dictatorship like Huerta which +had millions at its disposal; and strange to relate +instead of getting weaker the revolutionists grew +stronger and better organized; they seemed to have +money to buy arms and ammunition, to run their +local governments and even to send representatives +to the United States, and Paris, London, Madrid +and Barcelona, as well as social and political investigators +into America and Europe. The Huerta +Government was as surprised as the foreigners; +they were certain that after a year of fighting, the +backbone of the revolution would be broken, but +instead, the offensive became so dangerous that General +Huerta invited American intervention so as to +save himself as well as his partisans from complete +political annihilation.</p> + +<p>The Huerta agents in America accused the Constitutionalists +of having borrowed money from great +trusts or syndicates, and a New York paper published<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</span> +stolen letters to prove that Carranza had +succeeded in getting loans from corporations. The +letters served no other purpose than to advertise +the lawyer who had been in the service of the Madero +revolution, but as far as the source of financial +support, it was as mysterious as ever.</p> + +<p>“How can they fight, eat and dress without +money?” was asked. “How can they get the fighting +material across the border when it is patrolled +by American soldiers?” Everybody asked the +question and nobody could answer it satisfactorily. +But the suspicion was in the air that the revolutionists +with their agents in the United States had received +millions at a high rate and bartered in return +for it oil, mining and railroad concessions. The +senatorial investigation which had labored for +months and published its results in a voluminous report +did not prove that Madero had financed the +revolution of 1910 with the help of American +money. The money used by Gustavo Madero to +finance his brother’s revolution seemed so small that +the senators looked for greater sums borrowed from +the United States to convince them in their suspicion +that all Central American revolutions were started +in Wall Street. But they forgot that Madero’s +revolution was not initialed in New York’s financial +centre, and that no great movement can succeed unless +the lower or middle class fight for it.</p> + +<p>The fact is clear that no Mexican political leader +or military chief could afford to be linked in any<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</span> +shape or manner with any foreign corporation, as +that would have discredited him forever in the eyes +of his countrymen.</p> + +<p>As a convincing example illustrating this assertion, +the Madero revolutionary loan can be referred +to. When Francisco I. Madero came into power +his brother, Gustavo, put in a bill for 750,000 pesos +($375,000) for expenses incurred by him during +the revolution. As no vouchers or explanations +were offered as to the origin of the money, accusations +were made against Gustavo Madero that he +had borrowed money at a high rate of interest from +an American oil company and given in exchange valuable +oil concessions to the detriment of a British +oil company. After Gustavo’s death it was discovered +that he had misappropriated $375,000 from +the funds of a railroad company, organized in Mexico +and financed in Paris to build a railroad from +Camacho to Gomez Farias, and instead of using +the money for railroad construction he had sunk it +to buy arms and ammunition for his brother’s revolution. +By his desperate and bold action, Gustavo +Madero had risked his reputation and liberty and +was saved in the nick of time from extradition proceedings +by the success of the revolution.</p> + +<p>Later, instead of telling the truth, Gustavo Madero +kept silent and in Mexico his enemies went so +far as to accuse him of having practically delivered +his brother’s government into the hands of a Yankee +corporation. Those accusations cast a shadow on<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</span> +the whole Madero régime and were a great handicap +to its success.</p> + +<p>Carranza, who is an older man of political and +financial experience, realized from the beginning +that he could not borrow money from American or +foreign companies and decided to rely entirely on +the resources of his own country. Impoverished as +Mexico was by two successive revolutions, the work +was slower and entailed great loss of lives and foreign +property. Nevertheless, Carranza reasoned +that if Mexico could not organize a revolution without +foreign help it might as well give up the task +and bend under the yoke of the dictator. The faith +of Carranza in the resources of his country proved +that he was right.</p> + +<p>It demonstrated first, that Mexico would go to +any length rather than submit to the murderous +régime of Huerta; secondly by forcing his adherents +to organize local governments in every conquered +state and city for the purpose of contribution +and order, Carranza facilitated and accelerated +the final political reconstruction of the government +when his troops should enter Mexico City, and third +and last he would create for himself and his supporters +an impregnable position from the foreign +as well as the Mexican enemies of his cause.</p> + +<p>Carranza is fifty-five years old, young enough +to take the field personally and wise enough +not to walk into pitfalls and mistakes excusable but +not pardonable in a younger man. The blunders<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</span> +of the Madero régime were not lost upon him. Two +of the most grievous mistakes committed by the +Madero revolutionist leaders were the acceptance of +foreign financial assistance and a compromise with +the power which was being overthrown.</p> + +<p>As revolutions cost money and none was forthcoming +or could be had after the murder of President +Madero and Vice-president Suarez, Carranza +convened the state legislation of Coahuila demanding +from it the refusal of allegiance asked by General +Huerta, and a vote to turn over to him the +money of the state treasury for revolutionary purposes. +Then he rode with a few followers on +horseback through the federal lines across the +mountains of the States of Durango and Sinaloa +into Sonora, a State not connected directly by rail +with Mexico City. Being more free there from molestation +by federal soldiers than the other border +States he helped to organize the government and +made his headquarters for a while in Hermosillo, +Sonora. The seizure of the border towns of Nogales +and Agua Prieta opened the way to the importation +of arms and ammunition and to the receipts +of the custom houses. As the revolutionary +troops on the border States captured more custom +houses, as happened in Juarez, Ciudad P. Diaz, +Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros and finally the seaport +of Tampico, the revenues increased as well as the +facilities for the importation of foodstuffs, clothing +and ammunition.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</span></p> + +<p>Carranza and his sub-chiefs had five different +methods of acquiring financial support in northern +Mexico.</p> + +<p>1. The interior war tax, which was paid by Mexican +and foreign commercial mining and industrial +firms doing business in the northern States, besides +the taxes paid by the “haciendados” or land owners, +farmers.</p> + +<p>2. Custom house duties at all the border towns +on imports and exports, that is to say on foodstuffs, +cattle, ore, metal, clothing, etc., which were paid +in gold as arms and ammunition bought by the rebels +had to be paid in gold.</p> + +<p>3. Forced loans from the enemies of the Constitutionalists.</p> + +<p>4. Voluntary loans by the friends of the revolution +such as rich Mexican landowners, capitalists +and miners.</p> + +<p>5. The creation of an interior debt by the issue +of paper money to be circulated in all the territory +under the power of the revolution and the prohibition +to circulate the bills issued by the Banco Nacional +of Mexico City on February 18th, 1913, at +the order of General Huerta.</p> + +<p>In a pamphlet of recent date there will be found +the decrees and other transactions of the Constitutionalist +army. The official publication born in +Chihuahua, 1914, prints the date of each one of the +decrees permitting the printing of paper money. +The first issue of paper money was emitted for 5,000,000<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</span> +pesos on the 26th of April, 1913, the second +one for fifteen millions on February 28th, 1913, +and the third one for ten millions on February 12th, +1914, for bills of five, ten, fifty and hundred pesos +denominations. As the circulation of those three +issues tended to raise prices in general by paralyzing +the transactions with fractional money, Carranza authorized +three more issues of paper money. One +for two hundred thousand, the second for eight +hundred thousand and the third for one million, for +five and ten cents denominations, on the 26th of +April, 28th of December, 1913, and on February +12th, 1914.</p> + +<p>Up to May, 1914, altogether thirty-two million +pesos in paper money were issued to cover the expenses +of the revolution.</p> + +<p>The governors and military chiefs were empowered +to do the same in the States under their jurisdiction: +Generals Villa and Chao in the State of +Chihuahua, Governor Riveros in Sinaloa, General +Caballeros in Tamaulipas and Villareal in Nuevo +Leon.</p> + +<p>When it is considered that the Constitutionalists +had almost 100,000 men under arms, the Madero +revolution by comparison will seem an amateurish +and insignificant affair.</p> + +<p>General Obregon was supposed to have 20,000, +General Villa another 20,000, General Gonzalez +22,000, General Carrera 20,000, General Natera<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</span> +and the Arrietas 6,000, without counting the Zapatistas +with over 20,000 men.</p> + +<p>On an average and in fairly round figures the +revolution cost about $200,000 a week or $800,000 +a month. For a revolution which has lasted over +a year and three months the performance is quite +wonderful and shows remarkable organizing qualities +in Carranza and the amazing vitality of Mexico.</p> + +<p>When General Huerta waded through Madero’s +blood into the dictator’s chair he was able to get +over fifty million dollars in gold from American and +French bankers, besides voluntary and enforced contributions +from the Catholic clergy, foreign corporations +and commercial and industrial concerns with +headquarters in Mexico City and unwilling loans +from Mexican haciendados. Huerta had all the +power of the government concentrated in Mexico +City in his hands, the support of all the foreign +powers with the exception of the United States, and +in spite of all he failed.</p> + +<p>American bankers who had hastily but unwisely +loaned several millions to General Huerta in the +forlorn hope that he could prove a second Diaz to +subdue Mexico, lost faith in the dictator’s ability +and sent an agent to offer six million dollars to Carranza +if he would promise to guarantee Huerta’s +loans. It goes without saying that the offer was +rejected.</p> + +<p>Another committee of American bankers sent an<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</span> +emissary to Mexico City to offer General Huerta +three million dollars if he would only resign and +get out. In the first case the aforementioned +banker learned to his surprise that the revolutionary +chief was a man of principles and could not be +bought; the mistake would have been avoided if +the American financier had read the answer of Carranza +to Felix Diaz and General Huerta offering +him a huge bribe to retract his challenge against +the dictatorship. In the second instance they offered +Huerta three millions when he had decided +to throw up the sponge, and instead of accelerating +his exit from Mexico, only retarded it long enough +for Huerta to pocket their money.</p> + +<p>In both cases the American bankers have shown +a fundamental lack of knowledge of the Mexican +situation and of Mexican ways.</p> + +<p>The Mexican revolution was essentially a Mexican +affair and even a superficial review of Mexican +history would have revealed a great similarity between +it and the Three Years’ War. It took the +name of Constitutionalist Revolution from the Constitution +of 1857, for which the Liberals of that +period were fighting as against the clerical dictatorship.</p> + +<p>Even if General Huerta had been able to borrow +150 million dollars in Paris as he expected to do, +he would have been defeated in the end; it would +have taken longer to destroy his power, but the +result would have been the same. It would pay<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</span> +American bankers to seek the advice of unbiased +observers, men who are in sympathy with Mexican +aims and ambitions, who have a thorough knowledge +of the people and their history, and not from +agents or individuals who are interested concessionaires +and foreigners or Americans who in spite of +their long residence in the country are as ignorant +of Mexican conditions as on the first day of their +arrival in Mexico.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c7">CHAPTER VII</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">CIVIL ORGANIZATION OF THE REVOLUTION</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">O</span>NE of the causes which defeated the work of +the Madero revolution, was the lack of organization +of civil governments within the States +conquered by the Maderistas. Rebel bands wandered +hither and thither, taking anything they +needed and signing vouchers to be repaid at the end +of the revolution.</p> + +<p>The Judges, “Jefes Políticos” and minor officials, +with the exception of marked men, stayed in +office during the revolution, and after Madero came +into power. The machinery of Diaz remained, the +army and all the officials, with the exception of +the President, cabinet members and the governors.</p> + +<p>Carranza learned a lesson and decided to organize +the local government wherever he went and +wherever the Constitutionalists were masters of +States. As the chief of the revolution, Carranza +directed the movement of the three army divisions, +that is to say, the great strategic lines, and the generals +took care of the tactical movements. Thus +was the first chief able to devote his energy to the +creation of civil government, instead of personally +directing or fighting battles. Many critics have<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</span> +wondered what Carranza had done in the Revolution. +It is quite comprehensible that the patient, +unremitting task of organizing the civil government +of conquered States, does not appear in the same +romantic light as the attacking and storming of a +city, although it is as important and useful, and +more enduring work.</p> + +<p>In many States in the south—Morelos, Guerrero—where +the Huerta officials had all fled and +the only rulers were the Zapatista soldiers, the Indians +had instinctively organized a patriarchal and +tribal rule of their own. Very significant of the +patience, and law-abiding sentiment of the average +Mexican, is the fact that in those regions, where +for over two years no government existed, crimes +were less frequent than where the government held +sway.</p> + +<p>Carranza began to organize the postal and telegraph +systems in Durango, Sinaloa and Sonora. +Headquarters were in Hermosillo, as the federals +always kept either to border towns or seaports,—the +rest of the State was under the control of the +Constitutionalists. Wherever possible the trains +were run on schedule time,—telegrams and mail +were sent and received. Judges and all the municipal +governments of the larger and smaller cities +were created. When the border towns were taken, +a simple system of tariff was enacted working both +ways, for exports as well as imports. The Minister +who helped Carranza as Secretary of the Interior,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</span> +was Rafael Zubáran Capmany, who afterwards +was sent to Washington as a confidential +agent for the Constitutionalists.</p> + +<p>Those who have had an opportunity to follow +the operations of Carranza through the official +paper, <i>El Constitucionalista</i>, and the pamphlet +which contains his decrees, can pursue step by step +all his official acts and his reconstructive policy.</p> + +<p>Don F. Iglesias Calderón, after escaping from the +fortress of San Juan de Ulloa, told the writer that +he crossed the border at Juarez for Chihuahua, +Torreon, Saltillo, Monterey, and back to the border, +and very much to his surprise he travelled on +schedule time. At that time the whole north was +in the hands of the Constitutionalists.</p> + +<p>The foreign press could not understand why Carranza +did not hasten at once to Mexico City after +the flight of Huerta. Carranza could not leave a +single State between Mexico City and the border +unorganized, that is to say, without placing Constitutionalist +officials in charge. Otherwise the Huerta +officials would later have created local strife. The +first Chief had to put new wine in new bottles, +in order to succeed in any future reform which +might be enacted by Congress.</p> + +<p>With Carranza it was not only a question of +conquest. His idea was to rebuild, reconstruct +Mexico, not merely conquer it.</p> + +<div class="figcenter" id="f3"> +<img src="images/fig3.jpg" alt="capmany"> +<p class="caption">DON RAFAEL ZUBÁRAN CAPMANY</p> +<p class="caption">Minister of Foreign Affairs with Carranza, also Representative<br> +of Carranza in Washington</p> +</div> + +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c8">CHAPTER VIII</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">DIPLOMATIC WORK IN WASHINGTON</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">F</span>ROM the inception of the Constitutionalist revolution, +Carranza appreciated the necessity of +having a representative in Washington. Alberto +Pani and Roberto V. Pesqueira organized a junta +which would counteract the campaign waged against +the Constitutionalists by the Huerta agents in conjunction +with the American interests, in the vain +hope of a recognition of the Huerta régime by the +Democratic administration. Pesqueira paid the expenses +of the office out of his own pocket until Carranza +was able to devote some of the money at the +disposal of the revolution, to other purposes besides +the buying of arms and ammunition.</p> + +<p>The intelligent and effective work done by the +two constitutionalist ambassadors concentrated the +attention of the American public upon a struggle +which had appeared one-sided and hopeless.</p> + +<p>After a succession of defeats by the federal generals +in the north, Huerta recognized that the great +army at his disposal was swiftly crumbling to pieces, +and the three divisions under the Constitutionalist +generals were determinedly closing in upon him, he +became afraid, and with the same unscrupulousness<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</span> +of former reactionary despots in Mexico, he plucked +a leaf from the history of Mexico, attempting to +repeat the feat successfully carried out by the clericals +in 1847, when American intervention was +forced, and in 1861 when French intervention was +deliberately invited, to save clericalism from utter +annihilation.</p> + +<p>Carranza foresaw the move, as the members of +Huerta’s cabinet had openly boasted to bring about +American intervention to save their interests and +their lives. With Carranza in Hermosillo was a +Mr. Rafael Zubáran Capmany, a young Mexican +lawyer from Campeche, who acted as his Secretary +of the Interior in the Provisional Cabinet. Carranza +picked out Mr. Zubáran as the one man in +Mexico to play the diplomatic game in Washington +which would ward off American intervention, even +after the American troops had occupied Vera Cruz.</p> + +<p>It is quite true that the landing of American marines +meant intervention, but President Wilson had +declared that it was done against General Huerta, +the Dictator, and not against the Mexican people; +that American soldiers would be satisfied to occupy +the Mexican port until the usurper was driven out.</p> + +<p>To make the average Mexican understand this +complicated situation, and to convince the Americans +that Carranza’s protest was not only necessary +but was the only manly and patriotic act possible +for any Mexican leader, was the task which +befell Sr. Zubáran.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</span></p> + +<p>The lifting of the embargo on arms and ammunition +at the border, without arousing the hostility +of the War Department in Washington, was +another difficult mission.</p> + +<p>To prevent the Mexican constitutionalists from +crossing the American border, thereby playing into +the hands of Huerta, was as perilous and risky a +game as putting out a lighted fuse near a powder +magazine.</p> + +<p>A talented writer and lawyer, Don Luis Cabrera, +ably assisted Rafael Zubáran. The sympathetic attitude +of President Wilson and Secretary Bryan +helped to crown the efforts with success. Also, the +unofficial and friendly co-operation of ex-Governor +Lind was of incalculable value to the Mexican diplomats.</p> + +<p>But any other less experienced and less discreet +personality, a mind less acute, keen and masterly, +would have failed ignominiously. Americans as +well as Mexicans are discovering that diplomatic +victories, although silent and modest, are as effective +and useful as military achievements.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c9">CHAPTER IX</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS IN PARIS</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">A</span>LTHOUGH the diplomatic and financial battle +for great loans of the Huerta régime was +waged and lost in the United States, as a result of +the attitude of the Wilson administration, Huerta +was nevertheless enabled to make a loan in Wall +Street, ostensibly to pay the interest on the Railroad +Merger. The real battle for financial assistance, +however, was fought in Paris.</p> + +<p>The Parisian bankers were always favorably inclined +to the existing governments of Mexico. Diaz +had always been considered financially solvent, with +Limantour at his side.</p> + +<p>The French and English bankers, who had made +fortunes on Mexican loans, always spoke with regret +and almost pique at the overthrow of “the +grand old man.” Foreign bankers not being by +nature sentimental or radical, had no sympathy or +understanding for the tremendous popular upheaval +in Mexico. The whole great libertarian movement +was quite misunderstood or ignored. The +Huerta régime seemed like a reversion to the good +old fat times under Limantour. Huerta exhibited +all the ear-marks of the strong man on horseback.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</span> +To the superficial bankers, the Mexican Caracalla +was bound to stay and ask for more loans, and offer +more profits.</p> + +<p>In London, the press did not pay much attention +to the Constitutionalists, as the English oil interests +saw to it that stories were circulated about the bandits, +cut-throats and robbers who were infesting +Mexico under the excuse of fighting against the <i>de +facto</i> government.</p> + +<p>As the English oil interests were closely connected +with the English government, they having signed a +contract to supply the British navy with oil, Huerta +gladly gave all the concessions asked for, and confirmed +the previous ones. Although the English +oil interests denied in the press that they were involved +in politics, certain facts came to the notice +of the Constitutionalists in Paris, which proved the +contrary. Dr. Atl, who was living in Paris, vouches +for the data furnished.</p> + +<p>Dr. Atl had been very friendly to Dr. Urrutia +years ago, as the famous surgeon politician had +saved his life. While Dr. Atl was in the hospital, +he became intimate with General Huerta, and being +a “compadre” to Dr. Urrutia, there were no secrets +between them. After the assassination of +Madero and Suarez, Dr. Urrutia bethought himself +of the friendship and gratitude of his friend, +and without much ado telegraphed Dr. Atl that one +hundred and fifty thousand dollars were at his disposal +at the Mexican legation in Paris: he was to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</span> +use it to influence the French press. Although Dr. +Atl was broke, as befits a sincere artist, he sent an +answer which is not fit for publication, but which +does credit to his patriotism and his integrity.</p> + +<p>Dr. Atl discovered that in spite of the fact that +he was considered almost a confrère among the +French journalists, owing to the fact that he published +an art paper in French, and wrote for most +literary magazines and papers in Paris,—when it +came to offering material on the subject of the Constitutionalist +cause of Mexico, the pages of the periodicals +were without exception closed to him. +Finally reporters admitted to him that the English +oil interests had been paying enormous sums of +money, aggregating the sum of seven million francs. +He was even pointed out an agent of the same oil +interests, who had left to the editor of the paper the +sum of one hundred and fifty thousand francs as +a friendly reminder.</p> + +<p>After the refusal of Dr. Atl to work for the +Huerta régime, a brother of de la Barra took up the +task. Not a word could slip into the French papers +about the defeats of the Federals, and strenuous +efforts were being made to finance a loan of one +hundred and fifty million dollars for Huerta. Dr. +Atl had heard that the loan would be effected within +a week. In despair he walked from one office to +the other and succeeded only in getting snubs and +rebuffs. To make matters worse, it rained cats and +dogs. Our peripatetic artist, soaking wet, tired and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</span> +hungry, not having eaten a morsel of food for two +days, was on the point of giving up the struggle, +when he decided to try the only newspaper in Paris +which was above venality, the socialist paper, +<i>L’Humanité</i>. He presented himself at the office, +and insisted on speaking to Monsieur Jaurès, who +was the editor. The veteran socialist finally consented +to see him. “I am not representing any +financial interests,” spoke up Dr. Atl, “I am only a +poor Mexican artist, who expects you to tell the +truth about a matter of interest, not only to Mexico, +but especially to French investors. Huerta is expected +to wind up a loan of 750 million francs; I +want to inform you that Carranza, Chief of the +Constitutionalists, has communicated a letter to the +press in the United States, and to us, that if the +revolution is successful, the French loan to Huerta +will not be recognized by the successful Constitutionalists. +As I know that you are honest and do +not want to see the French investors risk losing their +money, I beg of you to publish the statement made +by Carranza.”</p> + +<p>Jaurès published the letter the next day. Mexican +bonds went down ten points, and the loan fell +through. Dr. Atl is now Director of the National +Art School in Mexico City.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c10">CHAPTER X</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">INVESTIGATION WORK INTO THE MUNICIPAL CITY<br> +GOVERNMENTS AND THE RURAL SCHOOL SYSTEM,<br> +FACTORIES AND INDUSTRIAL CENTRES IN THE<br> +UNITED STATES</p> + +<p class="c less sp">BY MODESTO C. ROLLAND</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">P</span>UTTING aside my humble personality, not of +much importance to the reader, I am going to +relate my life since the Mexican revolution, for in +this manner I can more clearly place in relief something +of the history and social conditions in Mexico, +which should be known by all who desire information +on what has taken place and what we +wish to do.</p> + +<p>Convinced as we were of the tremendous social +inequality that has existed in Mexico under the authority +of the capitalists and of the clerical party, +before the apparition of Madero, the idea was +launched of not permitting a re-election with a view +to compelling Porfirio Diaz to verify the necessary +evolution, fearing as we did the effects of a revolution.</p> + +<div class="figcenter" id="f4"> +<img src="images/fig4.jpg" alt="rolland"> +<p class="caption">MODESTO C. ROLLAND</p> +<p class="caption">Engineer, School Teacher, Member of the Cabinet</p> +</div> + +<p>We thought, inexperienced sociologists, that it +was possible to conquer a tyrant by persuasion, so +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</span>as to permit the democratic practices necessary to +choose the President. We made a mistake, and +the anti-re-electionists had to combat a revolution. +Madero expounded the doctrines which were spread +over the country, and was at the head of the revolution +that imperiously triumphed.</p> + +<p>Many of us Mexicans thinking it was time to +take part in public affairs, united and formed an +Engineers’ Club with a view to studying national +problems. In a word, we worked for the nationalization +of the National Railways, and for the establishment +of postal savings. Nearly all of our +efforts were shattered by reason of the inertia displayed +by the Secretary of the Treasury, headed by +Messrs. Ernesto Madero and Jaime Gurza.</p> + +<p>The Catholic party, seeing the approach of an +epoch of social reforms which they could not admit, +conspired with the army and taking advantage +through Huerta, for Felix Diaz turned out to be +weak, finally assassinated Madero and grasped the +power.</p> + +<p>Then they enjoyed their clerical rule and their +laws regarding public instruction. The army +served them to kill the people and to defend their +great estates. The war was kindled with more +fury, headed by Venustiano Carranza. We in the +capital suffered day by day from the insults of the +soldiery. All persons who did not favor the government +were known to the authorities, and at any +moment were likely to be detained.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</span></p> + +<p>After the ten days’ tragedy, I went to the Military +College, where I was a professor, with the +intention of speaking for the last time to my pupils. +I explained to them the course that the army would +pursue, and that they would be the instrument of a +traitor to shed the blood of Mexicans. That same +afternoon I was dismissed from my charge. From +that time on I was persecuted.</p> + +<p>Being independent and my ideas being known, I +could not long remain free. The idea contrary to +the dictatorial system was what they persecuted +most. At length one day they took me out of my +office and conveyed me to the penitentiary where +they held me in a dark dungeon for a month in +solitary confinement.</p> + +<p>My friends arranged for Minister Garza Aldape +to speak with me. I explained to him frankly why +I could not be with the Huertistas for I could not +conform with the politics of the outbreak, and the +consequences of the same. I made him understand +that I was not an active conspirator, for having to +keep in favor with two parties is truly crazy and +like throwing oneself into the wolf’s mouth.</p> + +<p>He permitted me to go out into the street, but +it was impossible for me to work. My business +affairs were shattered; every move was constantly +watched, and at any time I might be sent back to +the penitentiary, as were many others.</p> + +<p>I decided to get out of the country. I went to +Vera Cruz and with some difficulty boarded a boat<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</span> +as a contraband, and it was in the position of table-steward +that I finally arrived in this country.</p> + +<p>This is the history of thousands of men in Mexico. +Thousands of families remained until they +had nothing left to live on, and even the women +were in danger of being put in jail, as many were.</p> + +<p>With great eagerness I went toward the north +of the republic with a view to putting myself in contact +with the revolution. There I met many friends +who had travelled the path ahead of me, and under +various conditions were serving the cause. There +I could speak with Carranza, first chief of the revolution. +It was in Juarez City where I was presented +by the Hon. Mr. Zulara, Minister of Communications. +Mr. Carranza spoke with me of the +reconstruction of Mexico. At that period of the +struggle so much confidence was felt in the triumph +of the revolution that the first chief looked ahead +to prepare the era of reconstruction.</p> + +<p>He talked with me of the agrarian problem, as +a touchstone of all the social unbalance of our people, +and I was convinced that that serene man, +economist by experience and liberal by conviction +ought to be the personification of the national unity.</p> + +<p>He spoke to me above all else of the schools. +The great desire of Mr. Carranza is to develop a +school system in Mexico. He expressed himself +with the enthusiasm of the man who has long been +in contact with the needs of the people, and I was +convinced still further of the necessity of working<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</span> +without hesitation under the influence of such a man. +The supreme chief being convinced that another soldier +was not needed in the battlefield, and taking +advantage of my experience as a schoolmaster and +as an engineer, he arranged for me to go to the +United States with a view to studying municipal and +school systems. In this way I joined a body of +students of Administrative service, which Mr. Carranza +had been forming in this country and in +Europe. I have put my heart in my work, and happily +I have found in this nation the greatest facilities +for attaining our object. I have visited the +principal cities of the East. New York particularly +has served me practically.</p> + + +<p class="c">SCHOOLS</p> + +<p>The Department of Education furnished me with +all the methods for studying the schools, and in this +manner I obtained most interesting information regarding +the organization and educative systems of +these schools, where from the first step a child takes, +he is taught something about democracy. The impression +which this spirit of the American schools +made upon me will never be forgotten. The continued +effort of the teachers to form the free will +of the child is excellent. The soul of this nation +palpitates in its schools. There the body and the +mind are fortified, intensifying the customs of sociability. +These things are facts, not theories, in the +American schools. The way in which all this educative<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</span> +labor is consummated with ingenuity and +honesty, was what impressed me above everything.</p> + +<p>Regarding the material organization it is already +known how able Americans are. Organization is +nearly always the secret of success, and that is above +all what the Latins need to learn.</p> + +<p>The organization of the Department of Education +is notable, which makes possible the co-ordination +of an infinity of data, so as to see schematically +the working of the mechanism. I can judge at sight +of the weak point so that the same may be perfected. +The weak spot in the Mexican school system being +the rural school system, I was asked by Carranza +to investigate especially that phase in the United +States. The result of my inquiries brought forth +the fact that the States of Wisconsin and Massachusetts +have the best organized rural system for +schools in America. These two States are going to +be the pattern which will be used for Mexico’s Minister +of Education to work from.</p> + +<p>It is well-known that the scholastic family is amiable +over the entire world, but I believe that the +American teacher especially is a model of courtesy. +Wherever I went I was treated with such kindness +that I shall always remember my visits with +pleasure.</p> + + +<p class="c">MUNICIPAL SERVICES</p> + +<p>The revolution was eager to change the social +state of Mexico and that naturally comprised the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</span> +sanitary condition of the people. In Mexico it is +necessary to change the hygienic state of the people +who have been always treated with a spirit of exploitation +by the privileged castes.</p> + +<p>We know that sunshine on the earth does away +with the services of the doctor, for which we shall +work so that the sewers called <i>casas de vecindad</i> +may be dispensed with; in these tuberculosis prospers, +while the rich owner assisted through the +lenity of the laws is occupied only in collecting the +rents. Pure water, air and light,—the people +need these and Mexico will give them.</p> + +<p>New York has given me great experience and has +furnished a wide field of observation, in respect to +the Municipal services; and I wish to set forth my +report so as to profit by the many good subjects I +have studied. Naturally, here as in other places +there are many matters which have not yet been satisfactorily +settled, as for example that relative to +the “casas de vecindad,” but anyway the efforts of +this people, so materially progressive will help us +in a high degree.</p> + +<p>The resolution of the problem of the “casas de +vecindad” as it is understood in Glasgow, is our +ideal and we shall feel proud on the day that we +can present a city with comfort for the poor.</p> + +<p>In the conscience of all the revolutionaries is +the profound conviction that to guarantee the triumph +of the revolution it is necessary to change the +social status of Mexico, and for that reason they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</span> +will not hesitate to pass laws affecting the land to +further works of irrigation, to establish schools and +to contribute to hygienic homes.</p> + +<p>The example of this nation is valuable for us and +we shall not fail to utilize the same. We are anxious +to push our people forward through more democratic +paths, and are certain that this nation knows +how to appreciate our efforts.</p> + +<p>In Mexico, where it may be said that humanity +is making a trial of adaptation, we shall make a +trial of what this country has shown us, and if I +myself put into practice what I have learned here +I shall consider myself happy, welcoming all the +annoying details, for nothing is worth more than +the esteem of a nation.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c11">CHAPTER XI</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST<br> +HUERTA</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">T</span>O get a clear conception of the strategic work +achieved by the three divisions of the East, +North and West, it is advisable to look at the map +of Mexico.</p> + +<p>Mexico is broadest at the American border and +tapers exactly like a cornucopia at the Isthmus of +Tehuantepec. Mexico City lies in a valley 7,400 +feet high, within twelve hours’ ride from Vera Cruz, +and being the centre of all the railroads of Mexico, +is therefore of the utmost strategical importance.</p> + +<p>Huerta, from Mexico City, could reach all his +troops anywhere in Mexico, either by rail or water. +The Constitutionalists in Sonora were separated +from the Northern division by a high range of +mountains, and the Northern division from the +Eastern division by another range. Zapata could +not communicate very easily with the three northern +divisions, and was not able to assist them directly.</p> + +<div class="figcenter" id="f5"> +<a href="images/fig5big.jpg"> +<img src="images/fig5.jpg" alt="map"> +</a> +<p class="caption">WAR MAP<br> OF<br> MEXICO.</p> +<p class="caption">STRATEGIC R.R. LINES.<br> +<span class="greentext">(click image to enlarge)</span></p> +</div> + +<p>Huerta’s strategy consisted in keeping his soldiers +in the large cities, at the border towns, always +hugging the railroad lines. The federals very seldom +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</span>attacked in the open, as the lack of horses detracted +from their mobility.</p> + +<p>The Western division had for its object the control +of the railroad, starting from Nogales, through +Hermosillo to Guaymas in Sonora, then to Culiacán, +Mazatlán in Sinaloa, through San Blas, Tepic +into the State of Jalisco, to the capital Guadalajara. +Once Guadalajara was captured, the aim of the +campaign was achieved, and Obregon had only to +wait for the arrival and junction of the Northern +and Eastern division near Celaya, to march to Mexico +City. The difficulties encountered by the Western +and Eastern divisions were trebled by a condition +which did not exist in the case of the Northern +division under Villa, the fact that the seaports on +the Pacific and Atlantic which were always at the +mercy of the federals, could feed and supply and +augment the contingent of soldiers in the ports.</p> + +<p>On the Pacific side, the Federals controlled +Guaymas, Topolobampo, Altata, Mazatlán, San +Blas and Manzanillo,—and on the Atlantic side +they controlled Matamoros, Tampico, Tuxpan, +Vera Cruz and Puerto Mexico.</p> + +<p>The Western division, under Obregon, captured +one by one all the border towns, and later most of +the seaports,—and in spite of the fact that Guaymas +stuck to the last, the Western division had so +effectively cooped up the Federals in that port, that +they were not interfering with their downward +course towards Guadalajara. General Gonzalez<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</span> +acted on the same principle. He first captured the +border towns, and then Victoria the capital of Tamaulipas. +With the fall of Tampico, the Federals +in San Luis Potosí were outflanked.</p> + +<p>General Villa did the same. After he controlled +the border cities, he concentrated all his energies +on the capture of Torreon.</p> + +<p>The three chiefs of divisions, East, North and +West, co-operated with one another under the direction +of Carranza. They were supplied with +money, arms and ammunition by the organization +created by Carranza in the different States, and directed +by the efforts of the members of the provisional +cabinet.</p> + +<p>Zapata by his activity, aided by that of Genovevo +de la O and several other chiefs in the South, forced +Huerta to keep about forty thousand soldiers in the +South.</p> + +<p>The railroads created new strategic lines—</p> + +<p>1st. From Nogales at the border, the railroad +goes almost uninterruptedly through Sonora, Sinaloa +and Tepic, with the exception of a gap between +Tepic and Guadalajara.</p> + +<p>2d. From Juarez the railroad runs through Chihuahua, +Durango and Zacatecas into Aguascalientes.</p> + +<p>3d. From Ciudad Porfirio Diaz through Coahuila +into Nuevo Leon, and to San Luis Potosí, and +from Monterrey to Tampico.</p> + +<p>They represent the lines which had to be controlled<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</span> +by the three divisions. Then there were +lines connecting Torreon with Saltillo and Monterrey,—and +Aguascalientes with San Luis Potosí.</p> + +<p>The assertion that either one of the three chiefs +of the divisions was solely responsible for the success +of the revolution is absurd and inexact.</p> + +<p>Let us admit for instance, that Obregon had +reached Guadalajara, and tried to march through +Celaya to Mexico City alone, before Villa had +taken Aguascalientes, or General Gutierrez taken +San Luis Potosí. He would then have been attacked +in the rear by the Federals.</p> + +<p>In Villa’s case, if he had captured Aguascalientes +and tried to march south to Mexico City, without +waiting for Obregon to take Guadalajara, or General +Gutierrez, San Luis Potosí, he would have also +been attacked in the rear.</p> + +<p>General Gonzalez in his turn, could not march +south as long as San Luis Potosí was in the possession +of Federals.</p> + +<p>The three chiefs had to work together, and the +utter defeat of either of the three separately, spelled +disaster for the rest. It is fortunate for Mexico +that this campaign should have created four strong +soldiers “on horseback” for the danger to Mexico’s +liberties always appeared with one man as the hero, +who subsequently turned to be the “villain.” When +there is more than one savior or liberator, they are +apt to be so busy watching one another, that Mexico’s +liberties are more likely to be respected.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c12">CHAPTER XII</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL OBREGON IN THE WEST</p> + +<p class="c less sp">BY COL. I. C. ENRIQUEZ</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">P</span>ERHAPS the most interesting chapter of the +Constitutionalist revolt against the dictator +Huerta is the campaign of rebellion led by the brave +citizens of the State of Sonora. When they decided +to fight the bloody dictator and resist his +murderous deeds, they were confronted by a very +strong and well organized army. The Federal +troops were well equipped with ammunition and +guns. Their positions were well established, while +the Constitutionalists had nothing more than desire +of justice, backed by reckless bravery. They had +neither guns nor ammunition, and certainly no +trained army, and in spite of all this, they were the +victors.</p> + +<div class="figcenter" id="f6"> +<img src="images/fig6.jpg" alt="obregon"> +<p class="caption">GENERAL ALVARO OBREGON</p> +<p class="caption">Chief of the Western Division</p> +</div> + +<p>After the assassination of Señor Francisco I. +Madero and Señor José Maria Pino Suarez, a +dreadful feeling of fear spread through the country. +This was especially evident among the civilians. +What but death had they to expect from such a +brutal dictator as Huerta? For this reason alone, +there were at the beginning very few men who were +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</span>willing to take up arms against him. Even among +the governors, twenty-seven in number, only <i>one</i> +dared to throw down the glove of challenge to the +assassin. He was Don Venustiano Carranza, at +that time governor of the State of Coahuila. Half +an hour after the news of the assassination reached +him, he called the state legislature into session, denounced +the dictator Huerta and demanded that they +should not recognize Huerta’s authority. He was +the only man with sufficient moral courage to openly +revolt against Huerta.</p> + +<p>At that time, Carranza was not the only one who +had the historic opportunity of coming out as a defender +of his country’s honor. The same message +was transmitted to Señor José M. Maytorena, then +the governor of the State of Sonora, but unlike Carranza, +he did not take up the cause of his downtrodden +countrymen. He saw at a glance the danger +of such a move, and realized that the struggle +against Huerta would be a very unequal one. +Thinking of his own safety first, he left Deputy +Ignacio L. Pesqueira as acting governor, and fled to +the United States.</p> + +<p>At that time, in Hermosillo, capital of Sonora, +there were five hundred men under the command of +Lieutenant Colonel Obregon, who later in the campaign +became a famous general under Carranza. +Major Salvador Alvarado, now general, had command +of four hundred troops of the Yaqui region, +while in the southern part of the State, five hundred<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</span> +men were under the command of Generals Juan +Cabral, Benjamin Hill and Sosa. Many of the officers +and soldiers of this army had participated in +the revolution of 1910, consequently they were opposed +to the dictatorship of Huerta. This marked +the beginning of the Sonora revolution.</p> + +<p>Even before the assassination of Madero, there +were a number of chiefs who waged a relentless +war. They were Col. Pedro F. Bracamonte, Col. +Plutarco Elias Calles, and Major Campos. They +began to recruit people on their own authority in the +northern part of the State, and the cutting of railway +communication. They also began an open attack +on the Federals in many places. When the Sonora +revolution was started, the chiefs became united, +and opened hostilities.</p> + +<p>At the beginning of the Sonora revolution, the +Federals had a force of 2,650 troops distributed +throughout the State, from the frontier to the coast. +Bearing this in mind, the Constitutionalists mapped +out a careful campaign. General Obregon was appointed +to direct the military operations, as he had +distinguished himself in the campaign of 1912 +against the Orozquistas.</p> + +<p>The difficult task that the Constitutionalists were +confronted with, was the prevention of the concentration +and the union of the entire Federal army. +They knew that as long as the Federal army was +divided and spread throughout the State, their +chances were more than equal. Thus they had a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</span> +double task: first, to prevent the union of the Federal +troops, and secondly to fight them in small +groups. The main object of the Constitutionalists +was to secure the border positions of the State.</p> + +<p>As the revolution progressed and the fighting continued, +the Constitutionalists found their plans perfectly +suited to their needs. They marched from +one city to the next, sometimes under terrible difficulties, +but always victorious. All those in command, +and also the troops, fulfilled their duties admirably. +Soon, however, they were confronted with +new and unexpected troubles.</p> + +<p>The taking of Naco, as also the greater part of the +towns on the frontier, involved many unnecessary +dangers. As it was situated on the international +line, it could only be attacked from the east and +west,—if it was assailed from the south many projectiles +would pass over to the American side. The +Constitutionalist chiefs were always careful to respect +the rights of the American people, and avoided +as much as possible the damage and troubles that a +war waged at such close quarters, would be likely to +occasion them. The Federal generals, realizing the +position of the Constitutionals, took advantage of +their noble intentions and stuck close to the international +line. The Constitutionalists did not wish +to attack them in the town—but were anxious to +meet them in the open country, where there would be +no danger of inflicting suffering to families, especially +those of American citizens.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</span></p> + +<p>Knowing that the Federals intended to join their +comrades of Chihuahua, the Constitutionalists decided +to lay in wait for them. For more than a +week, they lay concealed behind ridges and in the +mountains, but the blow they had suffered a few days +before was a lesson General Ojeda could not forget, +and all the attempts of the Constitutionals to lure +them out in the open country failed.</p> + +<p>The chiefs of the Constitutionalists then decided +not to wait any longer. They demanded of General +Ojeda, who was in charge of the Huerta troops, +that he come out of the city. They explained to +him the injustice of fighting near a town, where many +innocent people and non-combatants might be injured, +but Ojeda’s reply was characteristic of all the +Huerta generals. As long as he was safe, General +Ojeda said, the whole human race might be slaughtered. +Furthermore, he would not come out of +his fortified town position—the Constitutionals +could attack him there if they wanted to.</p> + +<p>The Constitutionals, realizing that they would +have to attack, although he was entrenched in a +position very disadvantageous to such action on their +part, began preparations for the battle. The Federals +were located in a position occupying a semicircle. +Their six hundred men, cannon and rapid-fire +guns, could easily defend their positions. They +could sweep the open country with a deadly fire, +there being no protection for the assailants.</p> + +<p>After a few days of reconnoitring, during which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</span> +small skirmishes took place, the final decisive battle +took place, on the night of the 1st of April. It +lasted more than twenty-four hours, after which the +Federals were forced to their barracks for protection, +while General Ojeda fled to the American side. +The remaining troops surrendered, and the fighting +stopped. This victory gave the Constitutionals +complete control of the frontier towns, assuring +them a base of operations.</p> + +<p>One of the remarkable features of the Sonora +Campaign was the wonderful manner in which the +Federals after each battle, left behind ammunition, +guns and equipment which the Constitutionalists so +badly needed. The reply of the Constitutional +chiefs to their complaining soldiers usually was: +“Never mind, boys, Huerta himself will give us +arms and ammunition to fight him with.” This +statement has proved true all through the revolt.</p> + +<p>Before the Constitutionals had a chance to recover +from the hardships of the Naco victory, a still +greater danger threatened them. A strong force of +Federals, four thousand in number, well-equipped, +was coming from the south by way of the Pacific +coast, General Luis Medina Barron was in charge +of them. Before leaving Guaymas, he pledged on +his “military honor” that he would be in Hermosillo +in fifteen days. He said he would have the +head of Obregon stuck upon the point of his sword +and that he would banquet at the Hotel Arcadia. +But the Constitutional chiefs were not frustrated by<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</span> +the boastings of General Barron, and quickly reorganizing +their army, they took positions between +Ortiz and Guaymas at Santa Rosa, a flag station +on the Southern Pacific Railroad of Mexico.</p> + +<p>Confident of their ultimate victory, the Federals +marched towards the Constitutionalists. Early in +the morning of the 9th of May they opened a vigorous +fire. The attack lasted three days.</p> + +<p>The Constitutionalists realizing the value of the +springs and wells in that torrid zone, fought desperately +for their possession. Once the water supply +was captured, it meant the defeat of the Federals. +On the second day of the battle, this was accomplished +and the Federals were forced back to the +Railroad tanks, which could supply them with water +no longer than one day. After the third day’s fighting, +the Federals, worn out with thirst, retired, leaving +a large number of dead and wounded. In their +hasty retreat they left behind a great quantity of +armaments and provisions. The boasting General +Barron escaped to Guaymas, wounded by the +enemy, while many of his chiefs were taken to Hermosillo +as prisoners of war.</p> + +<p>While Obregon was fighting against General +Barron, General Hill had not remained idle. He +was appointed to carry on operations in the southern +part of the State. This he accomplished admirably, +especially the wiping out of the “Battalion +of Death.” This battalion carried a black flag, with +a skull and cross bones upon it and their method was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</span> +to terrorize the townspeople by killing innocent +women and children. When they met General Hill +in open battle they were completely wiped out.</p> + +<p>Later General Hill drove 450 from the town of +Torin, forcing them back to Guaymas, thus clearing +the southern part of the State. After his successes +in this locality, he joined General Obregon, +in the hope of attacking Generals Ojeda and Barron. +The following move of the Constitutionalists is one +of the most effective of the whole campaign. It +was a decisive battle for the main water supply, +which the troops were badly in need of and took +place at Santa Maria.</p> + +<p>The plans of Generals Obregon, Alvarado and +Dieguez once more proved very effective. The Federals, +finding the water supply taken, were forced to +assume the offensive. They felt confident of success, +and burdened themselves with all kinds of unnecessary +impediments. But the Constitutionalists were +not to be taken by surprise; instead of waiting for +the Federals to advance, they went out to meet +them: by this manœuvre the Federals found themselves +face to face with the Constitutionalists much +sooner than they had expected.</p> + +<p>For the Federals, it was a fight for existence. +They were face to face with death from thirst, and +felt that unless they regained the wells a miserable +death would be their lot. With them, it was not a +fight for the honor of Huerta—they fought from +sheer desperation. Under such conditions, the battle<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</span> +could not last long. Four desperate assaults +were made upon the Constitutionalists’ positions, +and were repulsed. One of these assaults lasted +more than twenty-four hours, resulting in a hand to +hand fight. In those hand to hand frays one could +not help admiring the remarkable way in which the +Yaquis handled their daggers. The Federal army +was wiped out completely in a very short time.</p> + +<p>While much credit is due to the soldiers who +fought in the ranks of the Constitutionalists, many +of their victories are due to the remarkable strategy +of the generals. One instance will illustrate this. +General Alvarado, realizing the terrible thirst of the +Federal soldiers, drove them into a watermelon +field. He knew fully well the result of such a move. +No sooner had they reached the watermelon field, +when all the fighting on their part ceased. The +Federal officers had to force them to fight at the +point of their bayonets, but even that did little good. +Once they had entered the melon field, they were the +easy victims of the Constitutional fire. At the close +of the battle, General Ojeda fled from the scene, +abandoning his officers and soldiers. He was followed +by the officers, while a small group of soldiers, +braver than their chiefs, kept on fighting till +they reached Guaymas.</p> + +<p>The Constitutionals did not realize how great a +victory they really had won, and waited a whole +day thinking that the retreat of the Federals was +nothing but a trap set for them. But when they<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</span> +marched forward they found nothing but dead and +wounded, and a great quantity of ammunition and +supplies. They had left behind all the cannons, +twelve rapid-firing guns and sixteen hundred rifles, +also a large number of horses and trappings. But +the Constitutionalists had no time to lose, and they +immediately went in pursuit of the enemy.</p> + +<p>While I was overjoyed at our tremendous victory, +pity and sorrow embittered the cup of joy. The +scenes of horror and misery which I saw are still +engraved in my memory. I saw the disastrous results +brought about by a tyrannical dictator who, in +his effort to perpetuate himself in absolute power, +was willing to sacrifice everything and everybody. +It was dreadful to see the battlefield littered with +the dead and wounded, men who meant well but who +understood little.</p> + +<p>On the other hand there were the patriotic, well-intentioned +men, full of self-sacrifice, willing to die +for liberty and the prosperity of their native country. +Alongside these sturdy young fighters were also the +poor women and children, innocent sufferers in the +great strife. They were the greatest sufferers,—they +bore the greater burden.</p> + +<p class="gtb">*****</p> + +<p>The campaign of General Obregon through the +State of Sonora, marks only the beginning of the +great struggle which led him victoriously to the city +of Mexico. This campaign, although never mentioned +by the newspaper correspondents, was nevertheless<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</span> +as important as the campaign of General +Villa. General Obregon not only had to fight an +army much larger than his own, but the geographical +location of his territory constantly endangered +his rear wings. Unlike Villa, he was constantly +compelled to guard from rear attacks, as well as +from frontal attacks. This ever existing danger +made the campaign much more difficult, multiplying +the dangers which constantly confronted him.</p> + +<p>The remark of General Obregon to Don Venustiano +Carranza when the First Chief marked out +the three lines of struggle, illustrates the nature of +the fighting General Obregon. When Carranza +was about to depart from Nogales, in February, +1914, Obregon said to him: “First Chief, tell +Generals Villa and Gonzales to hurry up in their +march, for I am going to get busy and get to Mexico.” +And true to his word, several months later, +although beset by many more difficulties than the +other generals, he reached Mexico City before any +of them. After the Federal troops were routed and +driven back in great disorder to Guaymas, the State +of Sonora was practically cleared from Huerta +troops. But that only meant the beginning of the +great fight.</p> + +<p>During the months of July and August, General +Obregon was preparing for his advance South. He +had little time to waste, for even before he was +through with his preparations, he was forced to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</span> +advance on San Blas, Sinaloa. A strong detachment +of Federals were sent up from Mexico City +to reinforce the defeated Huerta troops who landed +at Topolobampo. But General Obregon was not +taken by surprise. Having assigned Generals Hill +and Iturbe to proceed against the Federals, he himself +continued his march further south. His objective +point was the city of Sinaloa. In the meantime +Generals Hill and Iturbe had succeeded in defeating +the Federal troops which landed in Topolobampo, +and joined General Obregon in his attack +upon the city of Sinaloa.</p> + +<p>The storming of Sinaloa was one of the fiercest +battles of the entire campaign. It lasted nearly five +days and again, as in all the previous battles, the +Federals retreated so hastily that they did not have +time to take their guns and ammunition with them. +A great quantity of ammunition and provisions were +left behind by them, of which the Constitutionalists +were much in need.</p> + +<p>One of the great difficulties which constantly confronted +General Obregon was the guarding of the +frontier and the positions all along the coast. The +slightest error in the guarding of those positions +might have caused the annihilation of his entire +army by a rear attack. So that, whenever he took a +city from the Federals, he was confronted with the +question of protecting that point. He was forced +to always leave troops behind him, to guard those<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</span> +conquered cities. Had he not done so, the Federals +might have sent up new forces by way of the Pacific +and re-taken the conquered posts.</p> + +<p>The most important of all the battles of the entire +campaign was the storming of Culiacan. The +Federals, realizing the dangers of Obregon’s swift +march, massed a strong force of troops in that city, +numbering about seven thousand. Needless to say, +they were much better equipped than the Constitutionals, +who always had more men than rifles and +guns. When General Obregon, who personally conducted +the battle, reached the city, the Federals were +well fortified in their positions. The fight lasted a +whole week, and fighting continued day and night, +almost without cessation. At the end of that time, +the Federals were badly beaten and were forced to +retire to Mazatlan. The taking of Culiacan meant +to the Constitutionalists more than just an ordinary +victory. It meant the success of the operations towards +their goal, and the weakening and disintegration +of the Huerta troops. The winning of this +battle enabled the Constitutional forces to move +further south to the Territory of Tepic, where General +Obregon took the city of Acaponeta and San +Blas by storm.</p> + +<p>The rapidity with which he moved and the persistency +of his attacks won him most of his battles. +He lost no time,—he did not wait. As soon as he +had taken San Blas, he did not even wait long +enough to give his tired soldiers a good rest. He<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</span> +moved on to his destination immediately. With his +characteristic rapid fire action, he moved towards +Guadalajara in the State of Jalisco. The most interesting +thing about the storming of that city was +the capture of fifty-six train loads of supplies. +Never before had they had such luck. The trains +were packed with all kinds of provisions, guns, +rifles, cannon and ammunition. It was one of the +richest hauls they ever made.</p> + +<p>The conclusion of his march towards the capital +was marked by a series of successful battles, in spite +of the difficulties he had in guarding his base of supplies +and the frontier towns. After his victory at +Guadalajara, he marched on towards Irapuato, +where he again succeeded in routing the Federal +troops, and thence proceeded to the city of Mexico.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c13">CHAPTER XIII</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">VILLA AND HIS CAMPAIGN IN THE NORTH</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">S</span>O much has been written about Francisco Villa +that only a few preliminary remarks are necessary +to describe the personality of the famous general. +The enemies of Villa made the accusation +that the rebel chief was not respectable because he +had been an outlaw under the Diaz régime.</p> + +<p>Those who have studied the Diaz rule with a +mind unbiased by profits and interests, will have discovered +that if Villa was a bandit under the Diaz +reign, he certainly must have been an honest one; +for almost without exception all the officials from +the President down to the lowest Jefe Político, were +robbers, cut-throats and grafters.</p> + +<p>Villa is not better nor worse than the average +Mexican, but his weaknesses are those of his unfortunate +countrymen, and his strength is the latent +strength of his people.</p> + +<p>Villa, although directly responsible for the mutiny +at Juarez in 1911, when with Orozco he almost succeeded +in eliminating F. I. Madero, discovered that +the three cientifico agents in El Paso were the instigators +of the plot. Ever since then Villa remained +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</span>loyal to Madero and continued to fight +against Huerta, in memory of Madero.</p> + +<div class="figcenter" id="f7"> +<img src="images/fig7.jpg" alt="alvarado"> +<p class="caption">GENERAL S. ALVARADO</p> +<p class="caption">Second in Command under General Obregon</p> +</div> + +<p>All the biographers of Villa spoke of him as a +Napoleon, who had created an army out of nothing. +It must not be forgotten that out of one hundred +and thirty thousand soldiers who fought against the +military dictatorship, there were at least forty generals +who created armies out of nothing. They, +too, were without money, ammunition, arms and +with even less experience than Villa.</p> + +<p>During his ten or more years as an outlaw, Villa +was roaming all over the States of Chihuahua and +Durango, as a leader of lesser outlaws, and his guerrilla +experience was invaluable to him later.</p> + +<p>In the case of most other Generals, like Obregon, +Gonzales, Gutierrez, Natera, Herrera, Chao, Calles, +Hill, Caballero, their experience was insignificant. +Most of the chiefs who fought the Federals +were either farmers, lawyers, engineers, clerks who +had never before handled a gun in their lives till +the last revolution.</p> + +<p>When Villa crossed the American border into +Mexico in the spring of 1913, he marched up and +down the States of Chihuahua, Coahuila and Durango. +He gathered men, attacking small cities and +doing very much the same as other revolutionists +did—surprising small detachments of Federals in +outlying districts, and capturing the arms, ammunition, +and horses which were so badly needed. With +him were co-operating the Herrera brothers, Chao,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</span> +Rosalio Hernandez, and in Durango, the Arrieta +brothers, Contreras, Triana, Carrillo and Urbina. +They looted the banks to buy arms and ammunition +from the United States, and stole horses and saddles +to creat a mobile force and killed cattle to feed themselves.</p> + +<p>The first important battle won by Villa was fought +in San Andrés with eight hundred men against +fourteen hundred Federals, who were defeated on +October 4th, 1913. He attacked, captured and +sacked Torreon. Near Chihuahua he again defeated +the Federals, but as Juarez was still in their +power, he had to take the border towns before attempting +to fight towards the south.</p> + +<p>How he outwitted the commander of Juarez by +stealing a ride north of Chihuahua on a train loaded +with coal, and surprised and drove the commander +across the border, has been told before.</p> + +<p>The battle of Tierra Blanca, when he defeated +five thousand Federals who came from Chihuahua +to relieve Juarez, was his first important strategical +battle, and as far as the campaign is concerned, is +the most important, even without excepting the battle +of Torreon, in April, 1914. Without the battle +of Tierra Blanca, no other successes could have had +any decisive value. In Torreon, Villa had all the +men, arms and ammunition he wanted, and with +great recklessness, he sacrificed his men, counting +only upon results.</p> + +<p>After the capture of Torreon, Saltillo and Monterrey<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</span> +automatically fell into his power, for Torreon +was the strategic key which opened the way south +to his army, i. e., the Northern division.</p> + +<p>In another chapter, the causes and details of the +Carranza-Villa quarrel will be discussed. The +character of General Villa must be studied, in order +to understand the underlying causes of the quarrel.</p> + +<p>Villa, like Zapata, is a man of the peasant class. +Physically strong, with great will power and a good +deal of horse sense. In men of this type, due to +their utter lack of education, and inexperience in +politics, they are an easy prey to their secretaries, +friends, advisers and hangers-on. Being fundamentally +honest, they take it for granted that their +entourage is likewise, and being unable to read or +write, they are constantly deceived by their secretaries. +In the case of the other generals, like Obregon, +Gonzales, etc., their education and political +experience put them on their guard against petty, +scheming politicians, and unscrupulous tools of the +reactionaries.</p> + +<p>Villa’s ideas outside of stratagems, spoils and +the game of war, are primitive, and not always clear. +His appetites and his contempt for human life is +equal to that of the Apaches and Comanches; his attitude +toward life is anarchistic, rebellious. Towards +people he is cunning, suspicious, ostensibly good-natured +and at times tyrannical. An uncontrollable +temper is softened by a keen sense of humor, and a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</span> +lavish generosity is encouraged by a propensity to +acquisitiveness.</p> + +<p>Villa is so terribly suspicious of everything and +everybody, that he has been accused of being not +quite so brave as he wants to appear. General +Maclovio Herrera is admired for his courage and +is nicknamed “the Lion”: Villa has an unbounded +respect for him, tinged with a little envy. Villa’s +enemies claim that he went to Aguascalientes escorted +by eighteen thousand soldiers, because he was afraid,—although +the other generals had none but bodyguards.</p> + +<p>When Obregon was sent by Carranza to join +Villa in a solution of the Sonora controversy between +Maytorena and Hill, he went alone. Villa soon +lost his temper and had Obregon arrested, and +threatened to have him shot by his soldiers unless +he acceded to his demands. Obregon, calm and +cool, answered: “My life belongs to Mexico,—if +you believe that my death is necessary to the solution +of the question, I am ready to sacrifice it. I came +here to meet Villa the patriot: I find a savage +Villa who calls himself the savior of Mexico.” The +manly and courageous attitude of Obregon conquered +Villa, who instead of ordering an execution, +gave a ball in his honor.</p> + +<p>When Carranza was in Chihuahua with Villa +after the fall of Torreon, he heard that Villa had +ordered the execution of General Chao, Governor +of Chihuahua. Villa was asked to appear before<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</span> +Carranza, who demanded an explanation. “I have +shot Chao,” grinned Villa. Carranza was very indignant, +and protested vehemently. Then Villa +laughed, and admitted that the order had not been +carried out. Carranza ordered him to free Chao +immediately, and said to him: “You have no right +to arrest and shoot an official not under your immediate +command, without my authority, especially +a governor who is under my jurisdiction. Am I +the chief of the revolution or am I not?” Villa +was impressed and he ordered the release of Chao. +He excused himself by saying that Chao had +grafted. Later it was discovered that Villa’s secretary +had sent orders to Chao, Villa not being able to +read what he had signed, and the whole scheme was +engineered by Villa’s secretary to get rid of Chao, +who was his personal enemy. Villa embraced Chao +as a result.</p> + +<p>One of Villa’s many wives was enterprising +enough to induce Villa to let her sign some treasury +notes, which were honored by the officials, who did +not dare refuse.</p> + +<p>Once, Villa gave an order for the exportation +through Juarez of $5000 worth of material. The +Secretary changed the order from five, to fifty thousand, +which without his knowledge had been telegraphed +to the official in charge of the Custom +House in Juarez. The honest official refused to let +the goods pass the border, and the irate Villa almost +shot him for disobedience. Finally the matter was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</span> +cleared up, and Villa declared that he had ordered +five, and not fifty, thousand dollars’ worth. “But +here is the order signed by you,” said the official. +Villa had been deceived again, as he has been all +along by his secretaries. The two following telegrams, +one from Villa, and the answer of the Arrieta +Brothers, will throw a very clear light on the +attitude of Villa toward Carranza. It will also +prove that the majority of the generals do not sympathize +with Villa, as he is making a personal question, +or better said, an alleged insult to his division, +a pretext to overthrow Carranza, and become the +political dictator of Mexico.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p class="c">TELEGRAM.</p> + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">Chihuahua</span>, General Headquarters,<br> +Sept. 23d, 1914.</p> + +<p> +<i>Urgent.</i></p> + +<p> +<span class="smcap">Generals Mariano and Domingo Arrieta.</span></p> + +<p class="c"> +Durango, Dgo. +</p> + +<p>Venustiano Carranza having deeply offended the honor +and dignity of the Northern Division under my command, +and not being able to tolerate any longer his whims and +inconsequences, which would have sunk our country in +ruins, disseminating anarchy, while creating distrust with +foreign nations,—since yesterday, all my generals and +myself have decided to repudiate him as Chief of the Nation.</p> + +<p>For we are convinced that because of his alliance with the +cientificos and his noted tendencies to favor a certain personal +group which surrounded him, and prevented the solution<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</span> +of the real revolutionists, and to fulfil the promises +made to the people.</p> + +<p>As a consequence we have decided to fight only against +the personality of Venustiano Carranza, and to drive him +out of the country, without antagonizing or molesting the +other chiefs who have fought to overthrow the usurping +government which has just fallen. Therefore we repeat +that our movement is solely against the personality of +Venustiano Carranza.</p> + +<p>As we have always understood that you have been animated +by patriotic sentiments, like ourselves, we address +ourselves to you, showing you the matter clearly, and we +hope that in view of the right which is on our side, you will +be with us, and will help by offering your services to the +cause of the people.</p> + +<p>Already the Governor of the State of Sonora and his +forces, have repudiated Venustiano Carranza, and we hope +that you will act likewise and will define your position informing +us if you are with us or with Carranza.</p> + +<p>We beg you to answer as soon as possible. Greetings.</p> + +<p class="r"> +The General in Chief,<br> +<span class="smcap">Francisco Villa</span>. +</p> +</div> + +<p>Answer to the above telegram.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">Durango to Chihuahua</span>, Sept. 24th, 1914.</p> + +<p> +<span class="smcap">Señor General Don Francisco Villa</span>,</p> + +<p class="c"> +Chihuahua. +</p> + +<p>We are in receipt of your telegram, in which you declare +that the division under your command has repudiated the +authority as Provisional President, of Don Venustiano Carranza, +because of insults to the dignity of said Division and +for not having fulfilled the promises made to the people.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</span></p> +<p>We discover in your telegram a certain ambiguity, as +we have no knowledge of the insults to which you refer.</p> + +<p>Concerning the promises made to the people, we consider +your pretentions premature, as a convention has been +named to meet on the first of October, in which clearly and +explicitly the programme of the government will be discussed +and studied, so as to solve the various problems which +will benefit the proletariat.</p> + +<p>Therefore we would be grateful, if you would communicate +to us the nature of the insults to which you refer, and +the cause of the people which has been frustrated, so that we +can intelligently come to a decision.</p> + +<p>And lastly we appeal to your patriotism and the interest +of the country which through this break would be more +weakened, and be at the mercy of the American nation, +which has not retired its troops from Vera Cruz. We beg +of you if you are a real patriot, to calm your temper and +meditate on the evils which would befall our country with +this civil war—which would bring about as a consequence +a foreign war.</p> + +<p>1st. We are of the opinion that you should sacrifice +your self-love for the good of the country, and you should +not take notice of said insults, even if they existed.</p> + +<p>Secondly. That we hope that the Convention which is +to take place on the first of October, when all the Constitutionalist +forces will be represented, to solve the great +problems of our country, will put them into effect with the +assistance of the arms which we will not relinquish until +our ideals have been fulfilled.</p> + +<p>Hoping for an answer to give our definite resolution, we +salute you affectionately.</p> + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">General Domingo Arrieta</span>,<br> +<span class="smcap">General Mariano Arrieta</span>. +</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</span></p> + +<p>As an answer, Villa sent General Urbina against +the Arrieta Brothers. Urbina and his forces were +defeated, and the general badly wounded. Innocent, +well-meaning, but utterly deceived Villa! If +he only knew that the Cientifícos whom he accuses +of having affiliated with Carranza, are really pulling +their wires from New York, and using him +(Villa) as the tool to eliminate Carranza, and this +because the first chief intends to carry out all the +radical reforms of the revolution.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c14">CHAPTER XIV</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL GONZALEZ IN THE EAST</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">L</span>IKE most of the campaigns in the north of Mexico, +where the strategic objectives are the +border towns, so the campaign of General Gonzalez +was fought, first for the possession of Piedras Negras +(Ciudad Porfirio Diaz), Nuevo Laredo, Camargo +and Matamoros, and later for the control +of Tamaulipas.</p> + +<p>The first battle of the revolution against Huerta +was fought at Anhelo and ended in a defeat. Then +Venustiano Carranza, with his brother Jesus Carranza, +and Pablo Gonzalez, took Piedras Negras.</p> + +<p>Huerta, as well as his generals, were of the opinion +that if Carranza was captured and shot, it would +end the constitutionalist revolution then and there. +Therefore, they concentrated all their efforts upon +Piedras Negras, which was defended by four hundred +men. More than 9,000 Federals were sent +against them, and although the revolutionists were +forced to leave, the enemy did not succeed in capturing +the leaders.</p> + +<div class="figcenter" id="f8"> +<img src="images/fig8.jpg" alt="gonzalez"> +<p class="caption">GENERAL PABLO GONZALEZ</p> +<p class="caption">Chief of the Eastern Division</p> +</div> + +<p>Then Pablo Gonzalez, with the help of Jesus +Carranza, roamed all over the States of Coahuila<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</span> +and Nuevo Leon defeating over twenty Federal garrisons +and capturing the much needed arms and ammunition, +which were so scarce and hard to get at +the beginning of the struggle.</p> + +<p>It is a fact worth noticing that, in the three campaigns +in the North, Centre and South, the revolutionists +captured many cities, and then departed. +To the lay mind it seems absurd to fight so hard +to capture a city, and then to let it go almost immediately +without even waiting for the Federals to +retake it. Nevertheless, it was good tactics. The +Federal garrisons offered big stores of war material, +while the cities supplied them with food, clothing +and money.</p> + +<p>Monterrey was attacked twice without success, +and there was no chance of victory until Torreon, +Piedras Negras, Nuevo Laredo, Matamoros and +Tampico were in the hands of Pablo Gonzalez. +When that was done, Monterrey was automatically +evacuated by the Federals.</p> + +<p>Tampico was attacked several times and besieged +by Caballero. The Federals had a great advantage, +as they controlled the city with their gunboats. +Another drawback was the presence of foreign warships, +of foreign Consuls and representatives of +the great oil corporations. The Dutch, English and +American Oil Companies protested most vigorously +against the attack on Tampico, and the Federals +took good care to use this protection to great advantage.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</span></p> + +<p>When Pablo Gonzalez was ordered to take Tampico +at all costs, he did so after only four days’ battle. +When the Federals began their retreat, they +threatened to burn and destroy all the oil tanks and +property of the foreigners, if they were followed by +the Revolutionists.</p> + +<p>Like many of the important moves in the campaign +against Huerta, the great significance of the +capture of Tampico was pointed out by a civilian. +In this instance, the Secretary of the Interior in Carranza’s +revolutionary Cabinet, Don Rafael Zubáran, +was the wise counsellor.</p> + +<p>The first reason given was that Huerta had practically +given away many very valuable oil concessions +to an English company, in return for cash. +That the export tax on each barrel of oil was +doubled from sixty cents to $1.20 and calculating +that over half a million barrels of oil were exported +daily, it will be seen what a rich source of income +would have been taken away from Huerta.</p> + +<p>The second reason was that the seizure of Tampico +would eliminate a great source of friction between +the foreign powers and the revolutionary +government, besides relieving the anxiety felt in +Washington as to the constant danger of foreign +marines landing in Tampico to protect the interests +of their countrymen.</p> + +<p>The third reason was that Tampico, besides being +the most important seaport in Mexico after +Vera Cruz, was also a great strategic point. It cut<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</span> +off Monterrey and Saltillo from the coast, and +endangered and flanked their communications. +Huerta considered the possession of Tampico of +such value that when it was threatened by the rebels, +and he knew that it was lost to him, he decided to +force American intervention by arresting some marines +who had landed at the Tampico wharf on +routine business. The action was deliberate and +was meant to concentrate the attention of the revolutionists +on American aggression, so that they +would discontinue their attacks. The State and +Navy Department very wisely kept the American +warship outside of the Panuco River so as to offer +as few pretexts as possible for attacks. It can be +asserted that the fall of Tampico sounded the end +of Huerta’s rule in Mexico.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c15">CHAPTER XV</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">ZAPATA AND HIS CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">U</span>NDOUBTEDLY there is no Mexican who +has been talked about, described, praised and +vilified more than Emiliano Zapata, in the last four +years. Now everybody can pronounce his name in +America, for it has become a byword of the revolution +in Mexico.</p> + +<p>Innumerable articles have been written in America +on Zapata but I have only met two men who had +seen him,—one was a Mexican newspaperman and +the other was a federal major who slept in the same +room with him, unconscious of the fact that a few +feet from his bed there was the man he was supposed +to capture dead or alive for Huerta, with +three thousand soldiers. When he did discover this +interesting fact, Zapata was miles away. This incident +proved conclusively that the southern chief +could not be caught by force, and that the Indians +in Morelos would as soon think of committing suicide +as to betray him.</p> + +<p>The nature of the volcanic country in the State +of Morelos makes it very hard for a body of soldiers +to march through it without danger of being<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</span> +surprised and ambushed almost every hundred +yards. Every peon in Morelos and many other +southern States is a Zapatista.</p> + +<p>No man could have held such power as Zapata +over the population of almost three States, by offering +in return only the spoils of war or brigandage. +No bandit ever controlled thirty thousand men on +the mere results or promise of loot or theft. The +Zapatistas, with few exceptions, are all for the +abolition of all forms of slavery and for the distribution +of lands. Although Zapata is not the intellectual +leader of the Zapatistas, his name has become +a legend. Many people claim that he never +existed, others claim that Genovevo de la O was +the braver and more intelligent of the two, and the +real leader.</p> + +<p>There were several leaders who fought Diaz before +Zapata became prominent, but the Morelian +chief represented the deepest yearnings, the most +profound aspirations and all the unspoken desires +of a miserable, downtrodden, but patient, long-suffering +and kindly race. Any one who has visited +that Garden of Eden of Mexico, the State of Morelos, +will bear testimony to the simplicity, morality +and patience of the Morelian Indians, their love of +the soil which is almost a passion, their sterling +qualities.</p> + +<p>The injustices, robberies and cruelties perpetrated +on the Indians are almost incredible, and almost unbelievable +in our century. Until the European war<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</span> +started, civilized people did not believe that soldiers +could be so cruel, reckless and ruthless against +an enemy.</p> + +<p>Zapata’s and Villa’s wholesale shooting of prisoners, +the looting of haciendas, banks and stores in +captured cities, their retaliation against federal officers, +now seem like kid-glove, pink-tea affairs, after +the stories of German atrocities. In the light of +these atrocities, Villa might be a Mexican Chesterfield, +and Zapata a scrupulous Morelian hidalgo of +the most fastidious tastes. Strange to relate, the +most virulent attacks against Mexican civilization, +methods of warfare and revolutionary barbarities, +were written by German editorialists. The Mexicans +had no Treitschkes, Nietzsches, von Bernhardis +to sing the pæans of war, of the destruction +and annihilation of enemies, and inoffensive non-combatants +in the name of a higher culture and a +greater civilization.</p> + +<p>The precedents of cruelties and wanton destruction +were created by the federal officers under Diaz +and Huerta. Where the Federals passed, they left +a trail of death and desolation. To prove that they +had fought valiantly the Federals killed peaceful +peons and sent the ears of the Indians as vouchers +to the War Department.</p> + +<p>Whole villages passed through fire and sword—in +others all the men were impressed into the army, +and the women and children concentrated in the +cities. Thousands of fruit trees that had been<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</span> +growing for years, bearing fruit, and which were +the sole source of income of families of peons, were +ruthlessly cut down to be sold for firewood by +greedy Jefes Políticos. A whole population was +decimated because it would not stay under the leash +of the slave driver on the sugar and tobacco plantations +owned by half a dozen rich families.</p> + +<p>Their day of reckoning has almost arrived, and +no matter what Zapata or any other leader may do +politically, the peons of Morelos know that the lands +are theirs for the taking.</p> + +<p>Morelos is one of the smallest States in Mexico, +and one of the richest, and has an area of 2,734 +square miles and a population of 179,114. As +many as thirty thousand soldiers with machine guns +and cannon were sent to conquer Zapata and his +army, but Zapata remained unconquered. All the +generals, including Huerta, who had won laurels in +many battlefields, invariably lost them in Morelos. +The Federals fought according to book-strategy, +while Zapata and his chiefs fought with the same +fabian tactics which defeated Hannibal in Italy and +Napoleon in Spain. When the patient, ignorant, +but physically powerful Indians discovered that they +could shoot and fight as well as the trained Federals, +and that a few thousand Indians banded together +could keep at bay a whole army of Federals, +the struggle for land was won.</p> + +<p>But there is the reverse of the medal. As all +strong people have their compensation in some flaw,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</span> +so has Zapata a great weakness which prevents him +from becoming the greatest factor for good in his +country. His illiteracy, coupled with a lack of +knowledge of politicians of the middle and higher +class, make him an easy prey to all sorts of schemers +and intriguers.</p> + +<p>For years Zapata kept up his guerrilla warfare, +accompanied by a staff of officers and several secretaries. +One of the most famous was a certain Montaño, +a school-teacher who wrote the first plan which +Zapata endorsed. The second plan, which was +written by a certain Palafox, another secretary, and +was named the Plan of Ayala, which acknowledged +Orozco as the provisional president, when he rebelled +against Madero, assisted by Científico money.</p> + +<p>After Madero’s murder, Orozco joined the standard +of Huerta, who, true to his usual methods, tried +to use Orozco’s influence with Zapata, to eliminate +him. Orozco went to Morelos for the purpose of +conferring with Zapata, but the wily Morelian had +discovered that the meeting was not meant to bring +peace, but to facilitate his capture and murder. As +Orozco was not very brave, and his conscience not +very clear, instead of going personally to the meeting, +he sent instead his father and two other agents. +As an answer to the contemplated plot, Zapata took +Orozco’s father and his two agents as prisoners. +Later they were found dead, after an attack by the +Federals.</p> + +<p>Orozco vowed vengeance, but he left Cuernavaca<span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</span> +in great haste under the pretext of going North to +fight the Constitutionalists, where he was defeated +at every encounter. Any one who had read Mexican +newspapers would have known how discredited +Orozco’s personality was, but Zapata’s secretaries +wanted a continuation of conditions wherein they +would run the Morelian chief for their own benefit.</p> + +<p>When Carranza arrived in Mexico City with the +constitutionalist government, he sent two agents to +Zapata, with power to settle the agrarian question +in Morelos, once for all. The following letter by +Gen. A. I. Villareal will show how Zapata’s secretaries +spoiled the settlement.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p class="r"><span class="smcap">Mexico</span>, Sept. 5th, 1914.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">General Emiliano Zapata</span>:</p> + +<p>Cuernavaca, Mor.</p> + +<p><i>Esteemed General</i>:</p> + +<p>I had the pleasure of receiving the last letter, which +you were kind enough to send through Mr. Reyes and +in which you express the fact that you were to blame for +the incident at Huitzilac. I must advise you that this +matter was not one of much importance, and it seems that +they gave you exaggerated reports of the same. What we +consider a grave affair, and was really a sad one regarding +which we went to consult you with the object of arriving +at an agreement between the revolutionary elements of +the North and the South, was the unjustified conduct and +belligerent attitude of your secretary, Mr. Manuel Palafox, +in respect to whom I intend to speak in this letter with the +most absolute and honest frankness; believing in this way<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</span> +that I may do you a good turn, not alone yourself personally +but also the cause of the well-being of the public which +we must all defend and also the peace of the nation.</p> + +<p>If you critically analyze the happenings which occurred +during our visit in this city, and to which I beg to call +your attention, you will discover in a moment that all the +difficulties, all the petty misunderstandings, all the threats +of war, emanated principally from Mr. Palafox supported +by Mr. Serratos, who also in our opinion is carrying on +work right in your office that is very far from being patriotic +and loyal.</p> + +<p>It is always the case that when various people come together +to settle great or small differences which may exist +between them, it is understood if they work in good faith +and the matters treated of are thoroughly talked over, that +some points are ceded by one party and some by the other +party; there must be reciprocity in the arrangements, and +a definite conclusion reached regarding the subject under +discussion. To continue, conferences held with regard to +any matter must not be reduced to the party on one side +imposing a settlement and the parties on the other side +accepting the same without discussing the propositions for +and against and coming to a mutual agreement.</p> + +<p>Unfortunately, in our case this which was the rational +and just method of procedure did not take place, because +as you will remember Mr. Palafox, who was the spokesman +during the discussions almost prevented us from setting +forth our side of the subject, and attempted to impose upon +us certain conditions which would have to be accepted unconditionally +as preliminaries before arriving at a resolution.</p> + +<p>You will recollect that Mr. Palafox demanded as a first<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</span> +condition that as revolutionaries of the North we should +accept without discussion the Plan of Ayala as the Supreme +Law of the Republic, declaring that otherwise it would be +impossible to treat of other matters.</p> + +<p>This is in direct contradiction to your declarations, that +you had no ambition for power; for in one of the clauses +of the Plan of Ayala it states that General Pascual Orozco +is recognized as leader of the revolution, and in case he is +not able to discharge that task, you will be eligible; and as +our complete submission to the Plan of Ayala is demanded +it would intimate that we ought to place you in the position +of the Supreme Chief of the Nation and in a more +or less covert manner, you would be Provisional President +of the Republic.</p> + +<p>I believe in the sincerity of your words when you say +that you have no ambition to command, that all you want +is the settlement of the agrarian question and the economic +betterment of the lower classes for which you have struggled +so bravely. But back of this is Mr. Palafox, who has the +ambition to rule, and who is desirous to see you raised to +supreme power so that he may enjoy a privileged position +in your office in his character of Secretary and Councillor. +The same object animated Mr. Serratos more or less who +also enjoys a certain amount of influence regarding your +affairs, and doubtless awaits the auspicious moment of utilizing +the same for his own benefit.</p> + +<p>You will remember that Don Luis Cabrera and I set +forth very clearly that we were authorized to accept essentially +the Plan of Ayala; that is, the land question, the +satisfaction of the popular needs, the betterment of the +poor. We hereby declare that we agree fully with the +principles set forth in the Plan of Ayala, and only desire<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</span> +that its form may be modified, and that there may be added to +the gubernatorial programme which we might draw up some +clauses relative to the needs of the Northern States and the +States in the centre of the Republic, which are not in the +same condition as those of the south. Messrs. Palafox and +Serratos refused to accept our cordial and just propositions, +and insisted in a blind, unquestionable, despotic manner +that the Plan of Ayala be accepted, without the change of a +word or a comma.</p> + +<p>Convinced that the influence of Messrs. Palafox and +Serratos over you would make sterile all our efforts for +coming to an agreement in the form which we proposed, we +declined to start a discussion which only might have served +to embitter our souls and to give rise to more ill-feeling +than what we suffered in the course of our conversation with +you. For our part we found ourselves in a visibly hostile +atmosphere, and we lacked the liberty necessary for the +free expression of our opinions.</p> + +<p>When Mr. Sarabia spoke with you for the first time, he +wrote me stating that your attitude was cordial and that he +saw that your propositions of peace were sincere. On the +occasion of our meeting with you our surprise was great +to find you different from what Mr. Sarabia had represented. +This may be easily explained that the first time you +spoke with Mr. Sarabia you were guided by your own impulses +and by your good intentions, and the second time +you were under the influence of the unhealthy machinations +of Mr. Palafox.</p> + +<p>The question then is reduced to the following facts: +On our part the greatest and most sincere cordiality, the +recognition of the justice of your cause, the acceptance of the +principles of the plan of Ayala relating to the division of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</span> +lands and the social betterment; on your part, good impulses, +no ambition for power, and the exclusive desire for the +welfare of the public; and on the part of Mr. Palafox and +Mr. Serratos a spirit of intrigue that distorts the best intentions, +ambitions for power in your hands with a view +to thriving in your shadow, and a decided object of provoking +war if their ambitions should not be satisfied.</p> + +<p>Is not this sad, General Zapata? Is it not deeply to be +lamented that all the patriotic efforts of honorable men +shall go to pieces before the caprices of two intriguers? +Is it not bitter and even shameful that a movement as great +and unselfish as yours after four years of struggle should +degenerate by reason of an instrument of vile ambition and +in an ignoble weapon for bringing war a second time on a +country already exhausted in its struggle for independence?</p> + +<p>I make a supreme appeal to your honor, to your patriotism, +to your love of the people, who would be in the last +analysis those who would suffer most from a war, that you +take into consideration what we said when we were with +you, and which I again repeat in this letter, that we may +arrive at a good understanding with the revolutionaries of +the north and the south, who in reality are brothers.</p> + +<p>We know that we have done all in our power to arrive +at a peaceful solution, and if at length it might be found +impossible to reach it, it will not be through our fault.</p> + +<p>God grant that to-morrow I may not have to tell you +that through attending to the intrigues of an ambitious party +more than to the dictates of patriotism, you may be to +blame for the beginning of a war which would be thoroughly +unjustifiable, which no one wants and which would do no +one any good!</p> + +<p>I believe that after what I have said it is only necessary<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</span> +to add the following: That while Palafox continues at +your side enjoying the influence that he does, it will be +impossible for us to return to see you at Cuernavaca, nor +for us to send other representatives, for we consider that we +would not have, as we did not, the necessary liberty to treat +with frankness and amplitude the transcendental subject +which is under our discussion.</p> + +<p>We would be very thankful to know that you had resolved +to act independently of your harmful counsellor; and +in such a case we consider that it would be easy enough to +arrive at a settlement.</p> + +<p>In place of Mr. Palafox you should be able to consult +your principal chiefs, who have struggled faithfully for the +cause, and you will surely find among them better standards +and better counsel than from your ancient secretary.</p> + +<p>I know that the majority of your chieftains hold Mr. +Palafox in scant esteem and do not care for him; and if they +have not so expressed themselves to you it has been perhaps +through lack of opportunity or excess of discipline. Now +it would be convenient that you consult them regarding this +matter.</p> + +<p>I trust, Mr. General, in your good judgment and sense +of right, to kindly bear in mind with a spirit of serenity and +justice what we have set before you, and unite your efforts +to ours with a view to realizing the peace which our Republic +needs so much, without lessening the agrarian ideals +for which you have struggled for so long a time.</p> + +<p>I am happy to sign myself,</p> + +<p class="c"> +Yours affectionate and loyal friend,</p> + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">Antonio I. Villarreal</span>. +</p> +</div> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c16">CHAPTER XVI</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">ONE HUNDRED YEARS’ STRUGGLE FOR LAND AND<br> +DEMOCRACY, AGAINST CLERICALISM</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">I</span>N August, 1521, Cortez consummated the conquest +of New Spain and in August, 1821, under +Iturbide, the independence of Mexico was wrested +from the mother country.</p> + +<p>For exactly three hundred years Spain governed +Mexico with soldiers and priests. Ten prelates of +the Dominican order, out of a list of sixty-two viceroys, +had ruled New Spain, which was surrounded +with a ring that was mightier than a Chinese wall.</p> + +<p>Education, outside of religious teaching, was discouraged. +Communication with the outside world +was forbidden. Spain fed New Spain commercially, +politically and intellectually.</p> + +<p>The Mexican born was allowed no privileges, no +rights. The Spaniards, soldiers, priests and aristocrats +monopolized everything; all the offices, the +commerce, the property, were theirs. Four-fifths +of the lands were in the hands of the Church.</p> + +<p>In 1811 an ex-priest, Hidalgo, unfurled the banner +of the revolution by the shouts of: “Long live +Religion! Death to bad Government! Death to +the Gachupines!” (Spaniards).</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</span></p> + +<p>The revolution for freedom from Spanish rule +was initiated by an ex-priest. Morelos, Matamoros, +Dr. Cos, and Navarrete, who continued the +struggle, were all ex-priests. Great personalities +appeared in the ten years’ revolution, such as Alvarez, +Guerrero, Bravo, Victoria. The Mexican +revolutionists were battling for political liberty and +land.</p> + +<p>When the Church realized that Mexico was lost +to Spain, it put forward a Spanish officer, Iturbide, +as the Liberator. Iturbide betrayed his own king, +and after accepting the first Constitution, betrayed +the revolution and became emperor by means of a +military “cuartelazo” (mutiny).</p> + +<p>The Mexican liberals fought continuously the encroachments +of the Church, which used the army +to support it politically. The military strength created +by the Church and landowners was maintained, +not to protect the nation from foreign aggression, +but to guard the government from the assaults of +the people.</p> + +<p>The climax of the struggle took place during the +three years’ war, 1857-1860, when the liberal leaders +enforced the laws of the reform, which entitled +the nation to possess all the properties of the clergy, +both religious and secular, and the Church was denied +the right to own real estate.</p> + +<p>Religious orders as contrary to public welfare +were dissolved. Church and State were absolutely<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</span> +separated, and religious freedom was fully and +firmly established.</p> + +<p>Benito Juarez, a pure-blooded Indian, continued +the strife of the Liberals, initiated by Gomez Farias, +Melchior Ocampo and other martyrs of the cause. +After the three years’ war, the Church was ostensibly +eliminated as a political power. The land +which had been absorbed by the Church from the +Indians, and known as “egidos,” communal lands, +reverted to them, and over three million Indians became +small landowners.</p> + +<p>Defeated but not discouraged, the clericals then +brought about French intervention and placed on +the throne of Mexico a clerical, Emperor Maximilian, +who met his defeat and death in Queretaro +in 1867.</p> + +<p>Porfirio Diaz came into power as a liberal +through a revolution, and ended as a clerical. Under +his régime of spoliation, all the lands which belonged +to the Indians were taken away from them by trickery +and legal frauds, and distributed among Diaz’ +generals and political supporters. Government land +was sold to foreigners.</p> + +<p>Through the influence of Carmelita Diaz, the +wife of General Diaz, the religious orders, foreign +priests, friars and nuns, came back to Mexico and +acquired property, and the clericals began reorganizing +themselves and taking breath for another +struggle which they knew was coming soon. When<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</span> +Diaz was tottering to his fall, the Church placed the +clerical, De la Barra, in the provisional presidency. +The Madero cabinet was composed of clericals and +neo-Científicos who sat tight in a passive policy of +non-intervention in Mexican internal affairs, as if +the government reforms were none of their business.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, the clericals were very active politically +and financially; they contributed millions of +dollars to the downfall of the Madero government. +As usual, the clericals corrupted the army chiefs, +and succeeded in having the reform government +overthrown.</p> + +<p>Dr. Urrutia, a pupil of the Jesuit College, was +the instigator and chief plotter. He picked out +Huerta as the most convenient tool for the Church. +Huerta, although a Catholic, was a most unscrupulous +and ambitious man, and used the Church as a +stepping-stone. He received millions of dollars +from the clergy, from the landowners, and the foreigners, +such as bankers and mining and oil interests. +During Huerta’s régime, Dr. Urrutia was the +Mephisto and Iago of Huerta.</p> + +<p>As soon as Huerta was in power and the higher +clergy began to notice the unpopularity of the dictator, +they began plotting his assassination or overthrow. +Huerta, who trusted Dr. Urrutia more +than any other man in Mexico except General Blanquet, +made him Minister of the Interior, and upon +his shoulders fell the responsibility of the murder<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</span> +of scores, nay, hundreds, of political enemies of the +Huerta régime.</p> + +<p>As long as Dr. Urrutia and his friends, Mora +the Archbishop of Mexico, Jenaro Mendez, Archbishop +of Michoacan, Eulogio G. Gillow, Archbishop +of Oaxaca, Ramon, Archbishop of Puebla—in +fact, almost all the archbishops of Mexico, were +plotting with Dr. Urrutia for the elimination of +the enemies of the dictatorship, Huerta seems to +have made no objection. The following letter, addressed +to Dr. Urrutia, Minister of the Interior, by +the Archbishop of Mexico City, silences the statements +made by Catholics in America and Mexico, +that the Church was neutral and did not play +politics.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p class="less c">LETTER FROM ARCHBISHOP MORA TO URRUTIA</p> + + + +<p class="r"><span class="smcap">Mexico</span>, July 11th, 1913.</p> + +<p><i>My dear Minister and friend</i>:</p> + +<p>Thanking you for the kind terms of your favor of the +9th inst. which I received yesterday, I beg to assure you +once more <span class="allsmcap">THAT ALL THE CURATES AND PRIESTS UNDER +MY JURISDICTION</span>, in compliance with their duty, will make +every effort in order to bring about as soon as possible, the +fulfilment of the aspirations of all the good people in this +republic, who desire the peace and tranquillity of the beloved +country.</p> + +<p>I say that they do so in compliance with their duty because +the Church desires peace, and to avoid bloodshed, and +that all co-operate to the ultimate object of society, which is +the well-being of all its members.</p> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</span></p> +<p>In this sense, I shall continue to animate them to lose no +opportunity to exhort their parishioners to help to obtain +this great boon.</p> + +<p>In order to proceed in all justice, I would like, if you have +no objection, to know the name of the person who is working +against the government. <i>One word from you on the +subject will be sufficient.</i></p> + +<p>I enclose a Memo. of something which may be of use to +you, and which has come to my knowledge from trustworthy +sources.</p> + +<p>With kindest greetings, and assuring you of my thankfulness, +friendship and respect, I beg to remain,</p> + +<p class="c"> +Very respectfully,</p> + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">José</span>, <i>Archbishop of Mexico</i>. +</p> +</div> + +<p>Dr. Urruita, emboldened by his success in eliminating +so many enemies by assassination, and in his +formidable and terror-inspiring position as official +executioner of Huerta, became ambitious. The +high clergy of Mexico encouraged his pretentions, +and began sending out feelers to discover if he +would be willing and ready to oust Huerta and place +himself in Huerta’s stead as dictator. But Huerta +was wide-awake, and as soon as he discovered the +plot, he gave orders to have Urrutia arrested. +Urrutia escaped by the skin of his teeth; disguised +as an Indian peon he crossed the American lines to +Vera Cruz, where he was almost lynched by the infuriated +Mexicans.</p> + +<p>The following letter from the Archbishop of +Michoacan proves irrefutably that the Mexican<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</span> +clergy had plotted to place one of the most dastardly, +cruel and infamous men in Mexico, in the +culminating position of Chief Executive of the Republic, +as a protégé and tool of the Church in +Mexico.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + + +<p class="c less">LETTER OF THE ARCHBISHOP OF MICHOACAN TO<br> +MINISTER URRUTIA</p> + + + +<p class="r">September 11th, 1913.</p> + +<p><i>My dear compadre</i>:</p> + +<p>The timely measures taken by you saved this city from +being ravaged by the rebel gangs which have been concentrating +in these localities to the number of over a thousand +strong, but now, I think I can assure you that if the +detachment which has just arrived, pursues them, this part +of the State will soon be pacified.</p> + +<p>The principal object of this letter is to ask you to relieve +me of a great anxiety under which I am laboring, and which +has been caused by the aggressive and almost scandalous +attitude taken in public by Mr. Calero and a small group +of porristas, against your good self. I can well see that their +object is to tarnish the glory which you have so justly won, +and to alienate your adherents all over the republic.</p> + +<p>But they will not accomplish anything, because all the +sensible men know very well the envy and intrigues that +animate these degraded people. Although I am at ease +on that score, my profound sympathy and affection for you +make me fear that these men’s intrigues might put obstacles +on the path that Our Lord and His Blessed Mother <span class="allsmcap">HAVE +PUT BEFORE YOU TO CLIMB TO THE CULMINATING POSITION +OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE REPUBLIC</span>, which position<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</span> +will require of you the greatest sacrifice, but will at the +same time lay before you a vast field in which to exercise +your activity for the glory and honor of God, and for the +benefit of our beloved country.</p> + +<p>In the meantime I beg of you to tell me confidentially if +this threat of Calero is to be feared, or whether you think it +will be easy for you to humiliate the efforts of these upstarts.</p> + +<p class="c"> +Your compadre etc.,</p> + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">Jenaro Mendez</span>,<br> +<i>Archbishop of Michoacan</i>. +</p> +</div> + +<p>The flight of several archbishops from Mexico +was not due so much to their fear of the persecutions +of the Constitutionalists but more to the terror +of the retaliations of General Huerta. The Mexican +clergy enlisted the sympathy of the American +Catholics and of the Pope in Rome, in their appeals +for protection. The impression has been +given that the Mexican clergy is a victim of the +persecutions of the Constitutionalists, who want to +destroy religion.</p> + +<p>What the Mexican liberals, as well as the leaders +among the Indians, are after, is the elimination of +the clergy from the political arena. The political +activities of the clericals will only result in disastrous +effects—their abstention from it will only enhance +their spiritual supremacy.</p> + +<p>At Aguascalientes, one of the delegates of Zapata, +Paulino Martinez, said before the assembled +generals: “The Indian, the peon, the workingman<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</span> +of all the factories, the artisans in the cities, were +all exploited by that odious trinity formed by the +cacique, the military man and the priest.</p> + +<p>Carranza never said a more profound truth, than +when he stated, at the beginning of the revolution +against Huerta— “<span class="smcap">We are fighting the +Three Years’ War all over again.</span>”</p> + +<p>The religious question in Mexico has to be settled +once for all by the Mexicans themselves, and +the pernicious interferences by the Mexican clergy, +which tries to enlist the sympathy, influence and intervention +of the American or foreign Catholics, will +only revert to the disadvantage of all the fair thinking, +just Catholics, who, if they are sincere in their +claims that they do not mix in politics, will find that +the safest and most practical thing to do is to keep +neutral in a family quarrel. Otherwise they might +burn their fingers.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c17">CHAPTER XVII</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">ATTEMPTS AT THE SOLUTION OF THE LAND<br> +QUESTION</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">S</span>EVERAL attempts have been made during the +last four years to solve the land problem in the +States of Morelos, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua. Other +States have followed in the wake in a more or less +radical manner according to the conditions of the +peons and the necessity for cultivating the land to +feed the population.</p> + +<p>The most interesting of all attempts was initiated +by Gen. Lucio Blanco who was fighting under Gen. +Pablo Gonzalez in the division of the East. Any +one taking the trouble to look up the map of Mexico +will observe that the State of Tamaulipas +touches the border of the United States from the +mouth of the Rio Grande (Matamoros) to Nuevo +Laredo. Along the line of that strip, on the most +fertile parts which can be irrigated by the waters +of the Rio Grande, were lands which belonged to +small tenants and in many cases were communal +lands “egidos” belonging to Indians.</p> + +<p>Under the Diaz régime in the last ten years of +his rule, Felix Diaz, the nephew of the dictator,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</span> +was able to expropriate most of those lands with +the assistance of the governor and the jefes políticos +of Tamaulipas. The company which expropriated +the lands and paid the expenses was under the +patronage of Felix Diaz. Roughly speaking there +were about 75,000 acres under the control of that +company.</p> + +<p>As soon as Gonzalez’s and Blanco’s troops had +driven the Federals and the jefes políticos from the +border, Lucio Blanco originated the idea of selling +the lands of Felix Diaz to the peons of Tamaulipas.</p> + +<p>He asked the engineers fighting under him to +survey the land in question and divide it into small +lots from ten to sixty acres. Then he offered them +at public auction, giving the preference to the soldiers +under his command. The effect was surprising; +peons came from everywhere to watch the proceedings. +Most of the land was sold to the highest +bidder at a very low price, on the installment plan, +with a small sum to be paid in cash. The most astonishing +and significant result of the experiment +was that over 400 peons bought the land besides a +great many soldiers who, having acquired small +lots, refused to continue fighting. Their logic was +irrefutable: they had taken up arms to get back +the land and now that they were in possession of +it, why fight any longer?</p> + +<p>The problem was perplexing in the extreme. If +all the generals in the revolution acted on the same<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</span> +principle as Lucio Blanco then all the Constitutionalist +soldiers would stop fighting.</p> + +<p>This incident proves quite conclusively that the +revolution in Mexico is an economic more than a +political upheaval.</p> + +<p>Carranza was informed of this land distribution +and its disastrous results in as far as it touched the +military question and the result was that Gen. Lucio +Blanco had to shift his command to the western +division under General Obregon.</p> + +<p>In the State of Chihuahua General Villa began +a distribution of lands. Unlike General Blanco, +he went at the problem in a haphazard, personal +way.</p> + +<p>As the Terrazas were personal enemies of his +and owners of almost one-third of the State of Chihuahua, +he proclaimed the Terrazas estates confiscated. +The distribution was made among some of +his officers, civilians on his staff and personal friends.</p> + +<p>In Mexico wherever there is cultivation of any +kind there will be found a farmhouse (hacienda) +built like a fortress. The hacienda proper is a +small village, sometimes a small city in itself, containing +the house of the proprietor, the manager, +the servants and the peons, a church, buildings for +gathering the crops, often a factory, enclosures or +stables for horses, cattle, sheep. The whole is +surrounded by a high and very thick wall which can +stand a prolonged siege and can defy capture by +armed forces. Everything for its protection is<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</span> +found within its walls: gatling guns, rifles, ammunition, +food, clothing, and even wells of water.</p> + +<p>Formerly some of the haciendados were able to +arm and organize as many as 30,000 men under +their command from their haciendas.</p> + +<p>Most of the haciendas are now in the hands of +the Revolutionists, generals, officers and peons who +work the farms for their own benefit.</p> + +<p>Land without a farmhouse has not the same +value, as the farmer coming into a piece of land +would have to build a house, unless the land allotted +to him happened to be near his abode. Besides, +the haciendas contain everything needed for +the cultivation, such as plows, agricultural implements, +seeds, horses, cattle.</p> + +<p>When Villa gave land away he incorporated with +it a farmhouse. In that sense he was creating another +landed aristocracy to take the place of the +old one. Another factor which is important in the +land question is the climatic condition of the State. +In Chihuahua with the exception of the western part +the rest is dry and needs artificial irrigation to bring +satisfactory results. Artificial irrigation has to be +done by the State or the federal government and +cannot be carried on by private individuals unless +they are very rich or backed by capitalists or corporations.</p> + +<p>Most of the Terrazas estates thereupon fell into +the hands of a few scores of individuals instead of +one single family.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</span></p> + +<p>When it is taken into account that the population +of Chihuahua is about 405,500, it will be found that +the distribution of the land by Villa only touched +an infinitesimal percentage of the population. Even +if it is calculated that it is necessary that one-third +of the population of Chihuahua may be needed to +sustain the State by agriculture, then 135,000 people +or a third of the State would have to come +into possession of land. Admitting that Villa +should succeed in giving away land to all the soldiers +and officers who have fought under him or +about 25,000 men, still there would be left over +110,000 landless peons who very likely would have +to go to work for the fortunate soldiers of the northern +division. The peons could justly claim that the +revolution was fought for all the Mexicans and +especially for the peons and not solely for the soldiers +of the northern division.</p> + +<p>The solution of the land question by Villa is +therefore unequitable and is likely to bring further +trouble.</p> + +<p>Zapata on the other side solved the problem in +the most drastic and so far in the most practical +manner.</p> + +<p>The State of Morelos is a very small State and +has a population of about 180,000 inhabitants. The +land is very fertile, needing no irrigation, as the +periodical rainy season and the rivers irrigating +the whole State makes the growth of every kind +of fruit trees, vegetables, coffee, sugar cane, tobacco,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</span> +corn, etc., luxuriant in the highest degree. +In fact several crops can be gathered every year.</p> + +<p>Zapata did not only include the officers of his +staff and army in the land distribution but every soldier +who had fought for him and every peon and +every family of peons in the State of Morelos.</p> + +<p>In the case of the big sugar plantations Zapata +levied a ransom which was calculated on a certain +percentage of the profits; to feed, clothe and arm +his soldiers. The salaries of the workers were increased +and the proprietor of the plantation was +protected against depredations and destruction. If +the sugar planter refused to pay, then his machinery, +the buildings and the crops were burned. The +constant threat of and fear of Zapata’s army eliminated +the worst form of slavery: peonage.</p> + +<p>The rest of the population was empowered to +appropriate and cultivate the land surrounding the +villages or near their dwellings.</p> + +<p>In this fashion Zapata’s soldiers were fed, +clothed and armed—every ablebodied man, every +peon had his rifle and his ammunition and was always +ready to fight the aggressions of the federal +army. Practically the whole male population between +the ages of twenty and thirty was under +arms; when the Federals were away it attended to +the crops; when soldiers invaded its territory they +were driven out of it or forced to keep within the +limits of the cities.</p> + +<p>Without having any knowledge of French history<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</span> +the Zapatistas followed in the footsteps of the +French revolutionists.</p> + +<p>While the leaders Marat, Danton, Robespierre +were fighting their and their parties’ supremacy and +eliminating one another with the assistance of the +guillotine; while the French armies were fighting +the foreign invaders, the French peasants after +burning a few chateaux and driving away the aristocratic +landowners settled down to work the land +for their own profits. As long as the aristocrat +could not come back to claim the land, the peasant +cared not who ran the government. Napoleon was +able to become Emperor because he wisely left the +peasants in possession of lands which they had confiscated +from the aristocrats.</p> + +<p>In Mexico the identical thing has happened and +continues and will continue until some sort of government +will be created to satisfy the needs of the +country. The basis of future democracy in Mexico +will be founded on municipal self rule in all the +cities and rural settlements.</p> + +<p>When that is a fact there will be little trouble +with the other branches of the government. The +landowners in most of the States have been driven +out and meanwhile the peons are working on the +land in Morelos as well as in most of the other +States. The rich haciendados have left and the +poor peons have stayed behind.</p> + +<p>We hear only about battles, the capture of cities, +the ambitions of leaders, the quarrels among the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</span> +generals, but we hear nothing at all of the peons +working to feed the 15,000,000 inhabitants in Mexico, +of the thousands of artisans and workingmen +who help to complete the work of the farmer.</p> + +<p>There may be 140,000 or 150,000 men under +arms in Mexico, but what is that in comparison to +the 15,000,000 people who continue to live without +fighting, who have to be fed, clothed and even +amused? The longer the revolution lasts the happier +will be the lot of the average peons, for every +added day will decrease the chances of the reactionary +landowner to come back and through legal +means deprive the Indian of this land.</p> + +<p>The French revolution lasted almost ten years. +When the Bastille was stormed about 25,000 aristocrats +and prelates owned all the land in France. +When Napoleon came into power as Emperor over +half a million people owned land in France.</p> + +<p>In Mexico over 65,000 haciendados are in possession +of the country, but a great majority of them +are not on their haciendas, many are in exile. The +revolution has lasted about four years. The longer +it lasts the more chances there are that the original +proprietors will stay away and the latifundiæ will +be divided automatically. The peons are more interested +in the ownership of the land than the question +of peace, the ballot, or who is going to be president +or governor; they are indifferent as to who +will loan or will not loan money to the Mexican +government; if the Mexican consols are rising or<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</span> +dropping in value, as long as the haciendados keep +away long enough to give him a chance to claim +the land as his own. A little cultivation will give +him all the food he needs, what he does not need he +will sell and buy with it a few necessities.</p> + +<p>For the success of the revolution it is vital that +it should continue until every reactionary element, +the clergy, the landowner, the army chiefs have +been so thoroughly beaten that they will have no +opportunity to come back and play a political game +of which they know all the tricks. The reactionary +elements must be so fearful of the wrath of +the revolutionists, must be made so poor, that they +will never come back again.</p> + +<p>Carranza is right and so is Cabrera when they +say that the land must be taken wherever it can be +found; that the revolutionists must carry out the +reforms with the power of their bayonets or they +will never be consummated. That those who speak +of a constitutional government and of elections are +the reactionaries who want to play the game and +arrest the triumphant march of the revolution.</p> + +<p>Madero was elected constitutionally, so was a +congress, so were the senators and the governors. +The ministers sat in council. What happened to +the reforms of the plan of San Luis Potosí? Reactionaries +like Ernesto Madero and Rafael Hernandez +who sat in the cabinet for two years, very +effectively canned all the reforms. The revolution +had to be fought all over again.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</span></p> + +<p>If Villa backed by the reactionary elements +should control the destinies of Mexico, then it would +be only a question of a few months until a new +revolution would overthrow his régime.</p> + +<p>Revolutions are the maladies of nations, they cannot +be arrested in their course with impunity, for +then the disease will crop out in a more virulent +form.</p> + +<p>Mexico at the end of the Diaz régime was as +feudal as France under Louis XVI. Mexico had +the aristocratic landowner, the political clergy and +the military chiefs as well as in France. They will +have to be eradicated as thoroughly as noxious +weeds from a field before cultivation. After a +while order will come out of chaos. Meanwhile +the peon is slowly coming into his own.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c18">CHAPTER XVIII</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE CARRANZA-VILLA<br> +IMBROGLIO</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">T</span>O make the story very short we could say that +Mexican and American reactionary interests +were behind Villa, in an endeavor to exclude Carranza +as a factor in Mexican politics. But the +story will be more interesting and revealing if we +point out some of the methods used to engineer the +conspiracy.</p> + +<p>During the first six months of the revolution +against Huerta (1913), few authentic stories were +published about the revolution. Most of the news +came from Mexico City. There was no other political +personage who could get more space in the +first page of the newspapers than Victoriano +Huerta.</p> + +<p>In Europe, the oil interests very effectively silenced +the press as to the progress of the revolution; +in Paris the press was bought outright.</p> + +<div class="figcenter" id="f9"> +<img src="images/fig9.jpg" alt="hill"> +<p class="caption">GENERAL BENJAMIN HILL</p> +<p class="caption">(Defender of Naco), under General Obregon</p> +</div> + +<p>Although the American press cannot be bought, +there are ways of circumventing it and cheating it +of the truth. The Huertista press agents knowing +the curiosity of the American people, fed them with +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</span>stories about Huerta, and with details of his official +and unofficial actions, and more than once his +very thoughts were reported and published. The +refrain was always: No matter how bad Huerta +may be, he is nevertheless President de facto,—he +is the strongest man in Mexico and he should be +recognized. A Mexican and a foreign newspaperman +spent four thousand dollars a week on publicity +work, while another supporter of Huerta is +known to have spent ten thousand dollars for the +same purpose.</p> + +<p>The Huerta agents came in contact with the +felicista and científico agents, and they put their +heads together to devise a means of breaking up +the successful revolution. The reactionary junta +watched the events with keen interest. As soon as +Villa had proved his ability as a general, he was +chosen at once as the easiest and most convenient +tool to break up the harmony between the revolutionists.</p> + +<p>All the efforts were concentrated on Villa. He +was furnished with money, ammunition, friends +and advisers. Villa’s sincerity, impulsiveness, his +violent temper and cruelty, his utter lack of +scruples and his ignorance, were splendid instruments +in the hands of the past masters of intrigue. +On May 13th, 1911, during a mutiny, Pascual +Orozco and Villa almost succeeded in murdering +Francisco I. Madero. This incident pointed out +to the científico element, the man who might be induced<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</span> +to repeat, more successfully, the elimination +of another leader of the new revolution.</p> + +<p>The Villa press agents began to fill the magazines +and Sunday papers with romantic stories +about the bandit general, the Napoleon bandit, the +Washington, the Lincoln of Mexico. The life record +of Villa, his personality and ignorance, forbade +his ever becoming a presidential possibility. That +just suited the junta, as Villa’s presidency would +have been fraught with too many dangers for the +científico element. Huerta worked very hard to +bring about a break between Villa and Carranza, +while he was in power, but he did not succeed. +Nevertheless, the work of corrosion and strife was +continued by the exiled huertistas, felicistas and +científicos.</p> + +<p>During the summer of 1913, the Villa publicity +reached its zenith. As much as two hundred dollars +was paid to a writer to get a story on Villa +into a New York Sunday paper. At about that +time everybody began to suspect that Huerta would +resign. Carranza was approached by the interests +which had loaned money to Huerta, to discover if +he would recognize the loan, and as Carranza +would not countenance such a proposition, the foreign +interests united with the Huerta, felicista and +científico exiles, with the addition of some of the +Madero clan, to work together, against the Constitutionalists.</p> + +<p>Villa, with all his ability as a guerrilla general,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</span> +became a marionette in the hands of politicians who +pulled the strings. Even the Aguascalientes Convention +became a Punch & Judy show managed +from New York, and it was used as a convenient +lever to oust Carranza and place a puppet in his +stead. The original suggestion to acclaim Don F. +Iglesias Calderon as provisional president missed +fire, because of the refusal of that very fine and integral +personality to take orders from a single military +division. Suggestions were telegraphed from +New York to the junta’s representatives in Aguascalientes, +who, under the guise of radical counsellors, +were really dictating what Villa should do.</p> + +<p>In fact, all the interviews passed through the +hands of an American press agent of Villa, and his +manifestos, proclamations and letters were written +by the agents, and signed by Villa, who was absolutely +ignorant of the contents of the documents.</p> + +<p>The Aguascalientes convention was to be represented +by all the generals who had fought in the +revolution. Only one civilian was present: Luis +Cabrera. No soldiers outside of the personal +staffs of the generals were supposed to come near +Aguascalientes.</p> + +<p>Nevertheless, Villa sent ten thousand soldiers to +the city and had it surrounded by troops, while he +sat in a caboose on a railroad track at the outskirts. +For all practical and illegitimate purposes, the Convention +was imprisoned—the deliberations were +not free and independent, and were not meant to be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</span> +so. Many generals who tried to escape outside +of the ring formed by Villa’s soldiers were sent +back to the city; while others managed to slip +through and joined their commands.</p> + +<p>A perusal of the cabinet members supposed to +be named by E. Gutierrez, shows that the list was +drawn up in New York. F. Iglesias Calderon, although +perfectly honest and independent, stands +very high among the members of the Científico +Junta. He refused the honor of a portfolio. +José Vasconcelos is known to the American public +through the stolen Hopkins letters, where his name +was mentioned as a recipient of American oil money. +E. C. Llorente, who is to represent Gutierrez in +Washington, was a porfirista who plotted against +the Madero régime at the border.</p> + +<p>One of the most important reasons for Villa’s +caution in not rushing into a fight against Carranza’s +generals, is that he did not feel strong enough +to cope against the constitutionalist forces. Fighting +veteran Constitutionalists is a different proposition +from fighting Huerta’s raw recruits and ex-convicts, +or boys. The defection of Villa’s best +generals, Generals Luis and Maclovio Herrera, and +the Arrieta brothers, could not be supplanted by +the support of J. M. Maytorena.</p> + +<p>In his anxiety to fight Carranza, General Villa +went so far as to enlist many federal Huerta generals, +whom he had fought so bitterly and denounced +so roundly, and who had escaped from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</span> +Mexico in fear of Villa’s wrath. Poor Villa +seemed unconscious of the fact that he was slowly +being surrounded by all the reactionary elements in +Mexico—the same element of which he was a conspicuous +victim during the Diaz régime. When +these interests that now surround him have achieved +their purpose, they will try to corrupt him, and if +they cannot buy him they will assassinate him.</p> + +<p>Villa’s blindness could not go any farther. No +reasoning, no arguments, no sense of patriotism or +decency can rouse such an innocent fool, and therefore, +force will have to decide once more the question +of supremacy.</p> + +<p>As Luis Cabrera said in a speech before the Convention, +“In all probability, the only solution at +which the Aguascalientes Convention will arrive, +will be another war, another military action,” the +name of Aguascalientes (hot waters), is very significant +as to the trouble which the Convention has +brought Mexico face to face with.</p> + +<p>The Científico-Huerta-Madero junta in New +York decided a few months ago that if Carranza +could not be eliminated through the Convention, he +could be forced out by another revolution within the +revolution proper.</p> + +<p>When it was discovered that the appeal Villa had +sent out to the revolutionary generals on September +23d before the Convention, had not succeeded in +bringing about the desired result, it was decided to +induce the doubtful element in the Convention to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</span> +join in a supposedly legal procedure. After Carranza’s +resignation had been refused at the Convention +in Mexico, the delegates suggested the Aguascalientes +meeting as a means of settling all the questions +of reform. Villa’s supporters, instead of +keeping to the business on hand, jammed through +the Gutierrez election, published the list of the Cabinet +members, and sent Carranza an ultimatum.</p> + +<p>In this way they expected to give a legal appearance +to their action, and thus accelerate the secession, +throwing the loyal Constitutionalists on the side of +the Villa contingent.</p> + +<p>Neither Villa nor Zapata ever harbored the intention +of handing over their forces to the generals +designated by the convention—their hope was that +Carranza might resign, and then they would control +the situation by the mere threat of force, backed +by their success.</p> + +<p>It can be safely asserted that if Villa should succeed, +he would be the president maker, the virtual +dictator of Mexico. Then Villa and the científico +faction would fight for supremacy ... and destroy +each other.</p> + +<p>However, no matter what the result of the struggle +may be, the Mexican people are tired of +“strong men on horseback” and the succession of +a Villa tyranny would not be much more advantageous +than a Huerta or Diaz dictatorship.</p> + +<p>The Mexican people, the 15,000,000 who have +suffered so much from military liberators, will very<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</span> +effectively overthrow the pretorian rule of one or +more guerrilla czars, when they discover that the +strings are managed by Mexican and foreign reactionary +interests.</p> + +<p>Villa will only repeat Orozco’s treachery and defection, +and he will pay the price of his foolishness +and ignorance with the contempt and ostracism of +the real revolutionary element.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c19">CHAPTER XIX</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">THE NEED OF A DEMOCRATIC FINANCE IN MEXICO</p> + +<p class="c less sp">BY CHARLES FERGUSON</p> + +<div class="blockquot2"> + +<p>During the summer of 1914, while Mr. M. C. Rolland +was studying the financial system of the United States for +Carranza, he came in contact with Mr. Charles Ferguson, +who had devoted a year to investigating financial conditions +in Europe. Mr. Rolland suggested the need of a democratic +finance in Mexico, so as to liberate it from the financial +system left over by J. Y. Limantour. The Mexican and +the American investigators exchanged their views, and as +both were on mutual and sympathetic ground with a perfect +understanding of the subject, Mr. M. C. Rolland begged +Mr. Ferguson to crystallize his ideas into an article. The +following chapter is a simple outline of the idea which is +behind the revolutionary reforms of all vital questions in +Mexico.</p> + +<p>Mr. Charles Ferguson was for a time one of the leading +editorial writers of a well known Metropolitan paper. He +was sent abroad by President Wilson to investigate the +banking system of Europe. Mr. Ferguson is considered one +of the greatest authorities on the subject of finance and +banking in the United States.</p> +</div> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">U</span>NDER the conditions of capitalistic and corporate +organization and of universal banking +and exchange that have spread throughout the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</span> +world during the last two or three generations, the +problem of democratic politics has become an entirely +new problem. The old solutions, the ideas +of Rousseau, Jefferson, Juarez, have become, in +large part, inapplicable.</p> + +<p>The change is mainly due to the strength of the +modern business organization. The business organization +tends to become stronger than the democratic +state, because it deals more directly with the +forces of nature and with the every day interests +of ordinary men.</p> + +<p>Everywhere in Europe, in the modern States of +Asia and Africa, and in North and South America, +there is a struggle going on between the business +organization and the economic rights of the people.</p> + +<p>This world-wide struggle has shown its acutest +phases in Mexico.</p> + +<p>The Mexican problem cannot be solved merely +by the establishment of land reform, a wide suffrage +and a representative parliament. These +things are good and necessary, but they are not +enough. If the banking and credit system of Mexico +is left to settle back into the general lines approved +by Diaz and Limantour, or by the orthodox +financial opinion of Europe, the banks of Mexico +will contravene the work of the political revolution.</p> + +<p>And since the revolution cannot be wholly +crushed, Mexico will continue to be a house divided +against itself, and will utterly exhaust itself in a continuing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</span> +series of revolutions and counter-revolutions.</p> + +<p>The modern business system centres in the bank. +If the democratic revolution is to prevail and stand +fast, the business system of Mexico must be democratized. +It is impossible to make business +democratic otherwise than by making the bank +democratic.</p> + +<p>The leaders of the Mexican revolution shall seize +upon the control of the capitalistic forces of the +country. This can be done by improvising—perhaps +by executive decree, perhaps otherwise—a +central bank and a banking system that shall monopolize +the banking function.</p> + +<p>The existing banking systems of the world are in +general based upon public debts and are motived +in their operation by the interest of a creditor class. +Mexico should have a banking system based first, +upon the property rights of the nation—the sum +of the material values that belong not to individuals +but to the Commonwealth; second, upon a capitalization +of the productive powers of the people to +the extent that these can be developed by the civilizing +projects of the bank.</p> + +<p>Under existing banking systems the National estate +is either not represented at all or else stands +as debtor or claimant on a footing no higher than +that of private estates. But the bank of the revolution +should be the responsible legal trustee of the +public estate, exclusively devoted to the improvement<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</span> +of that estate—<i>i.e.</i>, to the betterment of the +material status of common citizenship.</p> + +<p>Under most banking systems the bankers have +no direct interest or concern with the development +of the natural and creative resources of a country. +Their interest in the processes of production is at +best indirect and incidental. What the bankers aim +at is the accumulation of certificates of indebtedness +against society at large. They are indeed concerned +that the assets of Society at large shall equal +its liabilities. But they make no effort and take no +risk for the enrichment of society beyond bare +solvency.</p> + +<p>The general tendency of their finance is to load +the working organization of the world with as heavy +a weight of bond and mortgage as it will stand, and +to vest the ownership of the securities in a comparatively +small class of creditors.</p> + +<p>The unsocial and unscientific character of the +world’s banking systems is the main cause of that +universal conflict between the business organization +and the democratic state, which has reached its most +poignant crisis in Mexico. If Mexico can work out +a congruity between modern business organization +and the economic rights of the people, it will solve +the essential social problem of our times. It will +win economic leadership in the family of nations. +It will achieve unparalleled wealth and power.</p> + +<p>The bank of the revolution should be governed +by a board of directors, got together with a minimum<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</span> +of racial bias in the spirit—let us say—of +the university—that is, of the arts and sciences.</p> + +<p>There should be a dozen men, more or less, having +the highest reputation and credit as engineers, +agriculturists, sanitarians, administrators, and so on. +They should be paid perhaps on the scale of Cabinet +Ministers, but should derive no other income +from Mexican sources. Their control of the bank +should be disinterested and impersonal—like that +of men in high public office.</p> + +<p>Every detail of the banking business will undergo +a marked change because of this change of motive. +Yet there need be no serious division of opinion as +to the financial technique that will best promote the +new purpose.</p> + +<p>The changes of practice concerning discount rates, +note issues, metallic reserves, etc., will follow logically +and obviously from the conception that the +business of the bank is not the accumulation of enforceable +claim against the public, but rather the +husbanding of the public estate.</p> + +<p>Banking, under any and all systems, is chiefly +a matter of exchanging specific personal claims for +general social claims. The bank receives personal +debt-certificates and gives back certificates of social-debt +or documentary claims against society at large. +Personal credits at the bank are, in effect, charges +against the public. Sound banking consists in not +overcharging the public.</p> + +<p>The mystery that shrouds all banking problems<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</span> +is due to the obscuring of the fundamental fact that +banking has become, under modern conditions, the +most vital social function; it determines the obligations +owed by society to the individual and so fixes +every man’s status and power.</p> + +<p>It is absurd that such a social function should be +performed without social responsibility and solely +for the sake of a speculative private profit. The +proposal is, therefore, that the revolution shall establish +in Mexico the first banking system in the +world deserving to be called modern. For no excellence +of banking machinery can atone for the +fact that throughout the whole circle of commerce, +private credits and the corresponding public obligations +are being measured and registered by men +whose interest is quite separate from that of the +public.</p> + +<p>The proposed identification of the banking interest +with the public interest does not necessarily +imply that banks should be administered by political +officials. It is indeed necessary, as an exigency of the +revolution, that the new bank of Mexico should be +backed by the highest political authority. But the +real point is that modern banking will reach a normal +development only when banking has become a +responsible profession—in the analogy of law and +medicine at their highest level. In the long run it +will be found that a sound, democratic, financial system +is to be regarded as the creator rather than the +creature of democratic government.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</span></p> + +<p>The new Mexican government should take its +bank managers from any quarter—as one might +choose world-famous engineers or physicians to conquer +a devastating plague, or to accomplish a constructive +public work of extraordinary difficulty. +These men should be chartered as directors of a +corporation to set up a central banking institution +in the City of Mexico and a system of branch banks +in provincial towns. The basic capital of the bank +should be a trust deed executed by the Mexican +Government and conveying to the banking corporation +such portions of the national estate as are not +needed for the administrative uses of the government. +The State would, of course, retain its right +to annul if necessary the bank charter and trust +deed—after reasonable notice and with due adjustment +of the equities involved.</p> + +<p>The Bank should be the general fiscal and economic +agent of the Government for the enhancement +of its revenues, the funding and amortizing of outstanding +public debts and the development of the +wealth of the country.</p> + +<p>Through the bank, the government should take +good care of the soldiers of the revolution—giving +them possession of lands on easy terms and assistance +in capitalizing farms and small business undertakings.</p> + +<p>Legal means should be taken to cancel or compound +uneconomic commercial concessions made to +foreigners and other private persons by reactionary<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</span> +governments in the past. The inordinate foreign +profits derivable from such concessions might be +scaled down by a system of export duties.</p> + +<p>It should be understood that the new bank in all +its branches is not to be regarded as a passive or +merely regulative factor in the economics of Mexico. +It should, on the contrary, embody the highest +possible organization of intelligence and will for +the expansion of the productive life of the people. +Much may be learned for this purpose from a study +of the working methods of the Deutsche Bank of +Berlin.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c20">CHAPTER XX</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">CARRANZA’S FOREIGN POLICY REPRESENTATIVE OF<br> +THE NATIONAL SPIRIT</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">F</span>ROM the beginning of the Constitutionalist revolution +the attitude of Carranza as the first +Chief toward the Foreign Powers, was very bitterly +criticised. His uncompromising stand as regards +the European nations was corroborated by interviews +given out to the press. Several reasons can +be given for Carranza’s conduct as well as for the +criticisms. The first one is that Foreign Cabinets, +Ministers and Consuls have been so used to the +servile, cowardly and undignified behavior of Diaz +and his Ministers toward Foreign Representatives +that the proud, independent behavior of Carranza +and his Ministers was a shock to European courts.</p> + +<p>The foreign policy of the Great Powers towards +small and weak nations, with the exception of the +United States, has been as a rule, that of polite bullies +and buccaneers. Great nations committed political +acts, which private individuals would not dare +perpetrate. If the average standard of the individual +has been raised, that of the nations in their +international policy, has advanced very little from +the times of the cave dwellers.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</span></p> + +<p>Mexico being weak and torn by civil war since +the inception of her independence, has always suffered +as much, if not more, from foreigners, than +from her own enemies. The French in the thirties +and sixties, the Americans in the forties, the Spaniards +intermittently, have brought trouble to Mexico. +The Mexicans are always suspicious of the +international policy of the European powers.</p> + +<p>When Huerta committed murder in the persons +of the President and Vice-President of Mexico, +France, England, Germany and Spain rushed to +recognize him, so anxious were they to get in at the +trough of concessions. It was this conscienceless, +greedy, sordid behavior which disgusted Carranza +in particular, and Mexicans in general. No action +in the history of the United States has created more +sympathy for the feared Yankees in Mexico and +South America, than the refusal of the recognition +of Huerta on moral grounds. Carranza’s refusal +to give an account or to allow Villa to permit an +investigation into the murders of Benton and +Bauche, was correct from an international standpoint. +England, who had so hastily recognized the +murderer of a Mexican President and Vice-President, +became very indignant at the murder of a naturalized +Britisher who got into trouble through his +own fault, and expected the United States to demand +satisfaction for it. Carranza, as the first +Chief, insisted that England should protest to him, +as the representative of the revolution, not to Villa<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</span> +or the United States. The attitude of England, +France, Germany and Spain towards Mexico, was +very arrogant and insulting; their protests to the +United States were quite expressive of their anxiety +to have the United States intervene and police +Mexico in the same manner as had been done in +Cuba.</p> + +<p>The European powers were quite too busy watching +their own frontiers to embark on a foolish expedition +like the threatened march and occupation of +Mexico City by the allied powers. The American +papers came out time after time announcing the landing +of European marines in Mexico, in case that the +United States should not deem it expedient to protect +their interests. Any one familiar with European +politics could have guessed that the alarmist’s +warning came either from the innermost circles of +the American military clique which had been itching +for intervention for the last four years, or from foreign +chancellorships who wanted to frighten the +United States into a war with Mexico.</p> + +<p>The European powers foreboded a general conflagration +at the end of 1914. Some of them felt +that the northern republic should do their police +work in Mexico while they would be busy fighting +for their own existence in Europe; others more charitably +inclined, hoped that the United States might +easily get into a wasps’ nest, by intervening in Mexico,—especially +as Japan stood on the other side of +the Pacific, as a warning of the brown peril, and as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</span> +a sympathetic, though selfish supporter of Mexican +integrity. In spite of contrary assertions, Mexican +statesmen and level-headed thinkers dread an American +invasion into their country; be it for the purpose +of conquest or an unselfish police-work.</p> + +<p>A military offensive or defensive alliance with +Japan is much more dreaded by the Mexicans than +an American intervention. The American Colossus, +as the United States is called, does not represent +the brutal, military, imperialistic methods of the +Japanese, but a danger of elimination by military +conquest or absorption by political, commercial, and +financial attrition and suction.</p> + +<p>All the Mexican politicians, writers and statesmen +fear American meddling in their internal affairs, +and although their admiration for the United +States and its greatness is unbounded, nevertheless, +their patriotism is still greater than their neighborly +love. The whole spirit of South America, south of +the Rio Grande, is not Spanish nor Indian—the +spirit is essentially latin and gallic. The mental attitude +of the Zapotec Indian Juarez was neither +Iberian nor Aztec, but essentially of the roman type +of the republic.</p> + +<p>The intellectual radicalism of the liberals, Gomez +Farias, Melchior Ocampo, Leandro del Valle, was +of the same pattern as that of the French revolutionary +Jacobins—the clearest, most advanced and +progressive ideas in politics have been absorbed from +Gallic and Latin sources. The French revolution,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</span> +the Napoleonic epos, are the text books of the liberals +and the ambitious politicians. Roman and +French history was admired and unconsciously imitated. +The one for the civic virtues, courage and +greatness of its citizens,—the other for the daring, +patriotism and intellectual clearness of its most +prominent men.</p> + +<p>Spanish history and philosophy is a closed book to +Mexican thinkers—for Spanish thought was always +in the rear guard of intellectual Europe. The +Spanish spirit is found in reactionary types, like Lucas +Alaman,—the Don Quixotic characteristic in a +Lopez de Santa Ana,—the Castilian cruelty in a +Miguel Marquez. As a Mexican writer once said: +“Spain has brought us only priests, money-lenders, +bull-fighters and dancers.”</p> + +<p>Americans were astonished at the outburst of +hatred made manifest in the persecution of Spanish +priests in Mexico, and Spaniards in general, especially +in the State of Morelos, by Zapata, and the +deportation of Spaniards in Chihuahua by Villa. +They do not know that the Spaniards have always +been on the side of the dictators, the oppressors, +never with the liberators, and that the active co-operation +of Spaniards in politics has outlawed them. +After the assassination of Madero and Suarez, the +Spaniards in Vera Cruz gave a banquet in honor of +the tragedy. The Mexicans are not likely to forget +this incident. The Mexicans of the middle class and +the Indians despise the Spaniards. On the other<span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</span> +hand, they do not dislike the Americans, but they +dread the proximity of the Colossus, and the constant +threats of American armed invasion.</p> + +<p>The American public was shocked by the reported +cruelties of the revolutionists in Durango, and other +captured cities. Many reports were exaggerated, +but the Durango stories were utterly false. Several +Americans who came to New York after the capture +of Durango declared that they had witnessed the +entry of the Constitutionalist soldiers, and their behavior +in Durango, and could vouch for the inaccuracy +of the news—not only in the general outline, +but in all its details.</p> + +<p>The American public, as well as the editors in the +American press, did not suspect then that Huerta +had press agents in New York, who made it a point +of disseminating false reports about the revolutionists, +so as to discredit the movement and pave the +way for recognition of Huerta. Governor Hunt, of +Arizona, wrote a letter to the first Chief, protesting +against the alleged cruelties. Venustiano Carranza +answered, and the following letter is quoted +as a fair example of the attitude of the Chief and the +Mexican revolutionists on the question of retaliations +and shooting of prisoners.</p> + +<div class="blockquot"> + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">Hermosillo</span>, November 27th, 1913.</p> + +<p> +<span class="smcap">Governor George W. P. Hunt</span>,</p> + +<p class="c"> +Phoenix, Arizona.</p> + +<p> +<i>Esteemed Sir and Friend</i>: +</p> + +<p>I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of your interesting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</span> +letter of the 17th inst., written on account of the occupation +of Ciudad Juarez by the Constitutional forces under the +immediate command of General Francisco Villa,—and to +manifest to you my gratitude for the kind phrases which +you express in same, regarding myself.</p> + +<p>Recognizing with pleasure in the spirit of frank friendship +which animated your letter, the personal sympathy of +yourself and of the people of the United States for the struggle +of civilization and justice, which we are sustaining, I +can only lament that a not entirely perfect knowledge of +the peculiar conditions of the Mexican problems may be +propitious in certain cases (and in spite of that excellent +disposition) to a bad intelligence of some of our acts.</p> + +<p>This is probably due to the fact that the criminal acts +with which the struggle was initiated, and the cruel proceedings +employed to sustain it, have been forgotten. When +Mexico had realized the highest democratic prerogative to +elect its mandataries, and we had the right to expect in the +midst of peace and tranquillity, the periodical renovation of +the public powers, for the expression of the national will +only, the most corrupt balance of the conquered classes have +tried to destroy our political institutions for all time and +by violence or force only have they disposed of the life, the +rights and interests of our countrymen. They have perpetrated +bloody executions without subjection to any law; they +assassinate the Constitutionalists who fall wounded, battling +with arms for the liberty of the people,—and deputies +and senators who defend our democratic institutions by +word, they drag peaceful men and even children from their +homes, obliging them to take up arms against us, and instil +terror throughout, burning entire towns. It has been crimes +of this nature which have made the cause that I represent, +constitute not only a corrective political revolution but also<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</span> +that it should have the character of an act of peace, and +severe justice which will chastise the guilty, and provide for +the salvation of the Mexican family.</p> + +<p>To fill these purposes, within the spirit of our Constitution, +without any sentiment of passion, but meditating with +reflection up to what point clemency and magnanimity can +arrive, before an imperious duty of justice and the high necessity +of assuring peace and the future of the nation, I have +determined that the law of Juarez of January 25th, 1862, +which defines and chastises crimes against the public peace, +shall be put into force.</p> + +<p>With strict subjection to that pre-existent law, the Huerta +officials were tried and executed, among whom were some +who had been apprehended in Torreon by the same General +Villa who, in addition to pardoning them, then acceded to +the fact that they should become incorporated in our forces, +in which they tried later, but in vain, to make the men +whose command was entrusted to them, desert—they finally +running away, in order to relapse into their crimes.</p> + +<p>It is true that the principles established in international +wars agree to give pardon and immunity to the prisoners, +but in civil struggles the most civilized nations in all epochs +have employed proceedings still more rigorous and bloody +than those which we have been obliged to adopt. In the +case of executions of officials in Ciudad Juarez, the chastisement +according to the law, of delinquents against peace and +public security must be viewed, as a just punishment, rather +than a cruelty to prisoners of war.</p> + +<p>The Mexican people, exhausted in the first phase of this +civil war, headed by Francisco I. Madero, all their clemency +and all their pardon, experiencing as only fruits of this +magnanimity, tyranny in the interior and the loss of prestige +in the exterior. To-day it wishes to assure the operation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</span> +of its institutions and re-establish peace for all time, +by means of a definite and official guarantee of a national +organism.</p> + +<p>The events of Ciudad Juarez have been very far from +revesting the individual importance which the intemperance +of our enemies have wished to give it, in the same manner +as was calumnious the statement published by them, that in +Durango more than forty women and young girls committed +suicide, for fear of the excesses of the Constitutionalists, +as I could personally verify that in Durango, as in all parts, +our forces have been disciplined and respectable, giving guarantees +to the towns which have fallen into their power.</p> + +<p>Before concluding, it gives me great satisfaction to advise +you that I am animated by the same sentiments of humanity +that you possess, and that if I have placed the law of Juarez +in force, in respect to an exigency of national sentiment, of +justice, of public convenience, and the necessity of bringing +peace to my country,—I have at the same time tried to have +this law applied to unscrupulous enemies within the limits of +the most absolute necessity, always authorizing pardon and +immunity to the unconscious ones.</p> + +<p>I hope the preceding declarations will be sufficient to establish +the attitude of the well understood justice and humanity +of the Constitutionalists, in order not to detract the +personal sympathy and favorable opinion of the North American +people from our cause, and you may be sure that I shall +take into consideration your noble ideas, in order to recommend +greater clemency toward our enemies, always within +the respect of the law.</p> + +<p>Assuring you of my highest estimation and respect, and +asking that you will consider me an affectionate and sincere +friend, I remain,</p> + +<p>(Signed)</p> + +<p class="r"><span class="smcap">V. Carranza</span>.</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</span></p> + +<p>It would be too much to have asked of the revolutionists +to pardon and release the federal officers +captured by them. The experiment was tried, and +every time they repeated their treacheries, cruelties +and infamies. They were trained in the school of +Diaz and Huerta—with few exceptions they were +men without conscience, honor or patriotism. They +represented militarism in its lowest, most despicable +and sordid form. A federal officer who had been +fighting in Morelos against Zapata was interviewed +on his arrival in New York. He asserted candidly +that the only manner to eradicate the land problem +in Morelos consisted in killing the whole male population +of the State and that any other solution was +Utopian.</p> + +<p>When the American marines landed in Vera Cruz, +the news caused a sensation in Mexico. A gentleman +who was present at the headquarters of Carranza +describes the excitement of all the Mexican +civilians as well as the soldiers in the camp. Without +a doubt it was the most critical moment of the +revolution; everybody was discussing the news and +the agitation was intense. The only calm and cool +person was Carranza; he was sitting immobile and +silent, looking straight ahead, without seeing anybody +or paying attention to the noise, bustle, gesticulations +and the shouts of the people.</p> + +<p>He was thinking very hard and the only gesture +which gave a clue to his agitation was a slow movement +of the hand, stroking his beard in a mechanical<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</span> +fashion. When the Carranza protest was published +there was like an universal sigh of relief after a tense +situation.</p> + +<p>The Mexicans felt that Carranza had embodied +in his protest their outraged sense of national dignity +and pride.</p> + +<p>The protest was a safety valve which prevented a +dangerous national explosion. Huerta, who had +cunningly contrived to bring about American intervention, +worked feverishly to use this patriotic +wave, and to attract it under his guidance in a foreign +war, which would save him and his army from +annihilation.</p> + +<p>In the United States many persons were disgusted +at what they called the ingratitude of Carranza. +They forgot to enquire if Carranza had asked for intervention, +and that an unbidden gift is an unwelcome +gift. They should have demanded the thanks of +Huerta instead. Subsequent events have proven the +assertion of Mexican observers that the occupation +of Vera Cruz by the Americans, instead of helping +the revolution, assisted in keeping Huerta several +months longer in power.</p> + +<p>Vera Cruz could easily have been captured by the +revolutionists, and Huerta would have hastened to +flee by the way of Puerto Mexico. The occupation +of Vera Cruz by the Americans prevented the revolutionists +from attacking the railroad connecting +Mexico City with Puerto Mexico,—as Vera Cruz +had to be used as a base. If the occupation of Vera<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</span> +Cruz was achieved to prevent the cargo of war material +of the Ypiranga from reaching Huerta, then it +failed in the purpose. It did not accelerate the resignation +of the dictator, nor did it calm the Mexican +troubled waters.</p> + +<p>If, as it is claimed, the occupation of Vera Cruz +was the climax or punishment for a series of insults +to Americans, and the upholding of national honor, +would it not have been more in keeping with military +traditions to capture or sink Mexican gunboats +in the Atlantic and Pacific without attempting to land +marines in any port, and to blockade both coasts of +Mexico?</p> + +<p>The A B C Peace Commission would have arrived +at Niagara Falls by the same road and +achieved the same results. The meddling in Mexico +would not have cost the American tax payers five +million dollars. The most charitable description of +the incident is that it was a hasty and costly blunder +of the Navy Department.</p> + +<p>Let us put ourselves in the place of the Mexicans +themselves. The touchiness of their national pride +and their dignity is well known, as well as that their +patriotism and love of country is as great as that of +the greatest nation. Why criticise a characteristic +of a weak nation which is considered a virtue in a +strong one?</p> + +<p>Consider for instance the question as applied to +the United States. If during the Civil War British +marines had landed and occupied New Orleans for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</span> +some reason or other, what would have happened? +Would the northerners have protested against British +intervention, or acclaimed it? Would not the +northerners as well as the southerners have fought +British occupation?</p> + +<p>If it is a question of the Monroe Doctrine, we beg +to differ—the Monroe Doctrine, to reach its highest +value as a political tenet, should work both ways,—in +the interests of the United States as well as +Central and South America. If the Monroe Doctrine +is expedient, in the case of the United States, +it should be acceptable to Latin America. Latin +America rebels against a one-sided view of the Monroe +Doctrine.</p> + +<p>When Villa gave out his interview on the occupation +of Vera Cruz, he was evidently inspired by +his American adviser and Mephisto. He was giving +out the American side of the question,—not the +Mexican. Unconsciously Villa acted as Porfirio +Diaz or any other Cientificos would have done, if +they had been in his place. Carranza represents the +Mexican people, although Carranza has never been +anything but a friend and admirer of the United +States. It must be considered that no true friendship +can exist without self-respect on Mexico’s side +and mutual respect on both sides.</p> + +<p>The occupation of Vera Cruz has been a source +of irritation for the Mexican and American, and a +constant element of danger. It was a mistake which +turned into a costly blunder.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c21">CHAPTER XXI</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c less sp">PRESIDENT WILSON’S MEXICAN POLICY</p> + + +<p><span class="dropcap">T</span>HE attitude of President Wilson towards the +Huerta régime was attacked not only in the +European press but likewise in the American newspapers. +The French, German, English and Spanish +daily and weekly papers sneered at what they +dubbed the moral policy of a puritan school teacher.</p> + +<p>The American papers were divided in their opinion; +the Republican organs laughed at the reversal +of their beloved “dollar diplomacy,” and many so-called +Democratic papers attempted to uphold the +blustering “big stick” policy. With the exception +of the labor and socialistic press there was a great +deal of doubt and misgivings expressed as to the outcome +of the new diplomacy.</p> + +<p>Even the average American, who is always on the +side of justice and fair play, was rather taken back +by this radical departure in American and foreign +relations. For American diplomacy, although usually +equitable, always took into consideration the interests +of the Americans in a foreign country first +and last, even if they clashed with the fundamental +rights of the natives.</p> + +<p>In the case of American interests in Mexico, it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</span> +was long suspected they had been playing politics +and throwing their all powerful influence in favor +of the government which could give them the best +advantages in a business way, which were in opposite +relation to the liberal principles and the welfare +of the majority of the Mexicans.</p> + +<p>The great corporations have always received extraordinary +favors from dishonest governments. +The mining and oil syndicates, the railroad and land +concessionaires, acquired great privileges and gave +very little in return for them. For example, an +American oil company in Mexico made as high +as 450 per cent. profit on its original investment +and doubled the selling price of oil and gasoline. +As soon as an English company invaded the +field they fought each other for a while, then realizing +that it was an expensive affair which redounded +to the benefit of the Mexican consumer, they came +to an agreement by dividing the territory among +themselves and right away the price of oil and gasoline +went up again.</p> + +<p>Scores of cases can be cited to prove that all the +advantages are in favor of foreign investors. The +salaries of the Mexican workingman or peons are +not raised, but the prices of commodities are never +lowered. The great Orizaba cotton mills, all the +factories, the great mining corporations have always +paid the lowest salaries. Whenever there was a +strike for higher wages or for better conditions, the +Diaz and Huerta régimes always protected the foreigners<span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</span> +and at the slightest pretext massacred the +strikers. In the rare cases when the government was +fair to the strikers, as happened under Madero and +Carranza, then the foreign investors protested to +their governments that their interests were in danger +of destruction.</p> + +<p>With the Mexican laborer and peons it has become +a conviction that foreign interests are always +on the side of dictators as against the Mexican people. +In Central and South America the new democratic +policy was watched with keen interest; the +Latin Americans shrewdly guessed that the attitude +of the Democratic administration would be a test +stone of their relations with the State Department.</p> + +<p>So much had been written about the famous Monroe +Doctrine by successive American statesmen that +the original meaning of this doctrine had been entirely +lost to view.</p> + +<p>The original Monroe doctrine was uttered as a +warning to the Holy Alliance in its well known designs +to attempt the reconquest of the provinces lost +by Spain.</p> + +<p>The Monroe doctrine was never meant to be an +excuse to collect debts for American or foreigners +or a pretext to police unruly republics.</p> + +<p>With the exception of some Central American +States there has never been a case in a hundred years +when South America and Mexico could not cope successfully +against foreign invaders.</p> + +<p>As far back as 1806-07 England attempted to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</span> +conquer Argentina and Uruguay when they were still +under Spanish rule. The Spaniards and the natives +fought very bravely and repelled the invaders, who +had already occupied Buenos-Ayres. The native +South Americans did not intend to exchange masters +and soon afterwards they overthrew the Spaniards.</p> + +<p>In the early forties France fought the Argentinian +dictator Rozas, but after a two years’ war she was +defeated. Later, in 1845, France and England pretended +that Rozas should open the interior rivers to +international navigation. Buenos-Ayres was blockaded +and the war lasted for five years; but England +and France were defeated.</p> + +<p>Brazil and Argentina tried to conquer the little +republic of Paraguay. The war lasted five years +(1865-70). The result was that forty-five per cent. +of the male population was killed in battle, but +Paraguay was not conquered.</p> + +<p>The Latin American republics feel that they can +take care of themselves, and their nationality against +their neighbors as well as against Europe. No matter +what the ambitions, intentions or plans of conquests +of certain European powers may be they know +fully well that there is not the slightest chance for a +permanent occupation by European armies, and that +any conquest by any Asiatic or European nation is +an absurd dream.</p> + +<p>It is understood that the Monroe doctrine was +once a very useful moral protection, but it did +not prevent attacks and occupation of South American<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</span> +territory by Spain, France and England. The +only reason which interfered with the territorial designs +of European powers was not the help of the +United States, when it was most needed, but the +heroic resistance of the Latin American nations +themselves. The fear is rampant that the Monroe +doctrine might be used as a pretext for aggression by +the United States.</p> + +<p>Latin Americans follow this line of argument; the +great American corporations can invest a great deal +of money in South America. They can very easily +send agents to foment revolutions which necessarily +would destroy American property and then a pretext +would be found for American intervention, as +happened in Nicaragua.</p> + +<p>There is a very short step from temporary to +permanent occupation, tending to create a very dangerous +precedent in favor of American occupation +in any country where there is a great deal of invested +American capital.</p> + +<p>The thought was expressed by a great many South +American statesmen that President Wilson’s Mexican +policy would be a good illustration of the future +policy towards South America. At the beginning +the expressions of neutrality and non-intervention in +the internal affairs of Mexico were considered rather +suspiciously.</p> + +<p>Had the President of the United States declared +war on Mexico and sent troops to Mexico City on +any pretext whatsoever, the Latin American nations<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</span> +would have closed their doors to American capital, +commerce, and would have boycotted American +goods. The thought would have always been present +that the Americans would always use their interests +as a wedge for interference in their national +affairs.</p> + +<p>The entrance of Argentina, Brazil and Chile in +a solution of the Mexican-American incident at Tampico +was a characteristic move exemplifying the new +trend of thought on statesmanship in Washington.</p> + +<p>Under a republican administration, England, +France and Germany would have been asked to settle +the question with the United States instead of the +A B C powers. Without fear of contradiction it +can be stated that Argentina, Brazil and Chile’s entrance +into Pan American affairs with the co-operation +of the United States proves that the State Department +has finally learned the A B C of Pan American +statesmanship. Likewise, that the Monroe +doctrine can only reach its highest efficiency in co-operation +with the whole of America from Patagonia +to Canada.</p> + +<p>When the Americans create a Pan American doctrine, +then there is no doubt that Europe will not +dare to challenge it.</p> + +<p>At present a challenge to the Monroe doctrine +is in reality a challenge to the American navy. With +a new Pan American doctrine the challenge would +include all Latin American countries, with the United +States and Canada in an offensive and defensive alliance<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</span> +against one or more European powers. At +present it appears as if the defence of the territorial +integrity of all America was shouldered upon the +United States alone. The Latin Americans feel that +they should have a share of this responsibility, for +they believe themselves capable and ready to do +so.</p> + +<p>There was a great deal of excitement and indignation +in South America when the American marines +landed in Vera Cruz. Huerta was not made more +popular by this incident, but the national instinct of +preservation of the Latin races made them unconsciously +understand that the landing of American +blue jackets was only a wedge to achieve American +occupation and that as long as Vera Cruz was occupied, +it was only a question of time until American +soldiers would march to Mexico City.</p> + +<p>When Roosevelt was in South America he was +fêted and banqueted by the most prominent men in +the A B C republics. They were too polite to inform +him what they thought of his speeches on the +Monroe doctrine. The articles and editorials commenting +Roosevelt’s theories were very plain if +courteous: that either Mr. Roosevelt had forgotten +the original meaning of the Monroe doctrine or that +he was deceiving himself into an imperialistic meaning +of the doctrine.</p> + +<p>The Latin Americans and Mexico hope fervently +that the unselfish, humanitarian and democratic +diplomacy of President Wilson will bear the brunt<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</span> +of the tremendous influences that are brought to +bear upon it.</p> + +<p>It is a well known platitude that certain American +mining, railroad and oil interests are subterraneously +working against this idealistic policy; that the War +Department has been itching for a war of conquest +or police work in Mexico. An officer of the United +States army in an expansive moment volunteered +the information that intervention in Mexico would +mean an increase from 80 to 350,000 men in the +American army and make it possible to organize it +more in proportion with its population. That there +being always a danger of a war with Japan, and the +United States not being ready for it, a war with +Mexico would prepare the army for that eventuality.</p> + +<p>President Wilson has more admirers in Mexico +and South America than any other President or +statesman in the whole history of the United States +has ever had, not even excepting the martyr President +Lincoln, or Washington.</p> + +<p>The popular thought has been deeply imbedded +with the conviction that if the dictator Huerta could +not exasperate and inveigle President Wilson into a +war with Mexico, that no power for evil can achieve +the purpose in the future.</p> + +<p>Far seeing Mexicans did not expect a prompt solution +of the vital problems after the elimination of +Huerta. The dictator was only the greatest impedimenta +to a realization of liberal ideals; once<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</span> +Huerta eliminated the work was a little less arduous, +but still of tremendous purport.</p> + +<p>The participation of England, France and Germany +in a struggle for life in Europe has luckily relieved +Mexico of three great mischief makers. The +great and sombre powers which have kept Mexico in +a turmoil for a hundred years are still at work: the +clericals, the landowners and the militarists; in the +last twenty years the American interests have been +added to the list.</p> + +<p>A Mexican thinker concreted the thought thus: +“The great powers for evil in Mexico are: The +Church, the Latifundiæ and the Trusts; their great +victims will be President Wilson, Carranza and the +Mexican people.”</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c22">REFLECTIONS</h2> +</div> + + +<p>In the beginning of the revolution against Diaz, +as public opinion seemed to be favorable to what +was called “The Great Constructive Work of +Diaz,” there was a vague and superficial impression +that the United States should repeat the policy which +had been inaugurated toward Cuba; a sort of political +tutelage which left the independence of the +island in the hands of the natives.</p> + +<p>Subsequent events have revealed to the Americans +that although the Mexicans were still groping for +a Constitution more in keeping with their racial characteristics, +that they had had, in opposition to Cuba, +which gained its independence from Spain in 1908, +a national history for one hundred years, with great +national heroes, martyrs and political ideals which +could not be infringed and trespassed upon by an +uncalled for intervention in their internal affairs.</p> + +<p>Thoughtful and well-informed statesmen and politicians +have come to the conclusion that a political +tutelage as in Cuba will never be tolerated in Mexico, +any more than military aggression for the sake +of conquest, or under the hypocritical name of peace.</p> + +<p>The average American knows that a Mexican war +would be a war without heroes or glory for American +arms.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</span></p> + +<p>The Mexicans are intensely grateful to President +Wilson for insisting on keeping hands off in Mexico. +The internal struggle of the liberals fighting against +the reactionary powers in Mexico must be settled by +the Mexicans themselves, or it will have to be settled +all over again.</p> + +<p class="gtb">*****</p> + +<p>The impression of a great many Americans is +that Mexico is going towards political disruption, +that is to say, a secession into three entities: the +North, the Centre and the South.</p> + +<p>Northern secession is encouraged by the great mining, +oil, railroad, and land interests in the United +States and by the reactionaries in Mexico. Southern +secession is not only encouraged, but fomented, +by the ambitious and able dictator of Guatemala.</p> + +<p>The northern republic would comprise the border +states, as well as Lower California, which, even +if independent, would be more friendly to the United +States than a united Mexico. That is the conviction +of those interested in a Northern secession.</p> + +<p>A Southern republic would mean the absorption +of the States of Yucatan, Campeche, Tabasco, Chiapas, +and the Territory of Quintana Roo, under the +leadership and hegemony of Guatemala.</p> + +<p>Working towards that end, and in co-operation +with the Guatemalan dictator, is a gentleman in the +State Department, who was once U. S. representative +in Guatemala.</p> + +<p>American interests are allied with the Mexican interests,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</span> +whereas, the American radicals, socialists +and the labor party are in sympathy with the Mexican +liberals. The American and Mexican capitalists +are opposed to the American and Mexican middle +class and proletariat.</p> + +<p class="gtb">*****</p> + +<p>The same class trouble is going on in the Church +in Mexico. The native Mexican clergy is opposed +to the high or foreign clergy. All the oppressions, +cruelties, and treacheries in the fight of the clericals +against the liberals have emanated from the foreign +or high clergy, which used the military element for +that purpose. The unselfish, libertarian struggle on +the other hand, was always actively assisted by the +native priests; by men like Morelos and Hidalgo. +The poor Mexican priest, or better said, the low +Mexican clergy, is first a Mexican, and if that agrees +with his belief, he will be a good Catholic; but if +his faith is pitted against the welfare of his country, +then he will invariably prefer to be a good Mexican +and a poor Catholic, to being a poor Mexican and +an obedient Catholic.</p> + +<p>The higher clergy in the United States, by attacking +the liberal policies in Mexico, and waging an active +campaign against the Mexican revolutionists, +is placing itself in direct opposition to the lower +Mexican clergy.</p> + +<p class="gtb">*****</p> + +<p>From the Mexican point of view, three principles +have been laid down to face and combat American<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</span> +aggression, or absorption. The elimination of +predatory American capital, the curtailment of American +immigration schemes, and the advancement of +European immigration. American methods, on the +other hand, will be encouraged in all the active expressions +of life, such as business organizations, +farming and school methods.</p> + +<p class="gtb">*****</p> + +<p>There is no doubt that ten years of a complete +and practical rural school system in Mexico will +change the whole social and political character of the +republic. The advancement of woman in life will +also gain a decided advantage for the Mexican, for +no nation can be greater or better than its women.</p> + +<p class="gtb">*****</p> + +<p>Oriental immigration cannot be encouraged, as +being dangerous to the best interests of Mexico, not +because of the inferiority of the Orientals, but because +of their superiority, which would tend to segregate +them into colonies.</p> + +<p class="gtb">*****</p> + +<p>A Mexican engineer suggested a plan to cut a +canal in Lower California, from Enseñada to the +Rio Colorado, a distance of ninety miles. By this +method Lower California would be made into an +island, and the passage of ships from the Pacific +Ocean at Enseñada, through the Canal into the Gulf +of California would double the importance, commercially +and politically, of the States of Sonora, +Sinaloa and the Eastern side of Lower California.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</span> +Irrigation, and later immigration, in Lower California, +would change the barren island into a garden.</p> + +<p class="gtb">*****</p> + +<p>The Mexican revolutionists are socialists without +knowing it; their actions in the economical and political +field have proven it; the Marxian theorists in +Europe showed by their attitude in the war, that they +were not socialists, but political trimmers.</p> + +<p class="gtb">*****</p> + +<p>The French revolution is being repeated in Mexico. +Bare feet are pattering up on one side of the +stairway, while patent leathers are descending on +the opposite side.</p> + +<p class="gtb">*****</p> + +<p>The Mexican problem is like a sand-bar in the +path of the American Ship of State.</p> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</span></p> + +<h2 class="nobreak" id="c23">APPENDIX</h2> +</div> + +<p class="c">THE PLAN OF SAN LUIS POTOSÍ</p> + +<p class="c">By <span class="smcap">F. I. Madero</span>.</p> + +<p class="c">DECLARATION TO THE NATION</p> + + +<p>The people, in their constant effort to bring about the +triumph of their ideals of liberty and justice, have deemed it +necessary at certain historical moments to make the greatest +sacrifices.</p> + +<p>Our dear country has arrived at one of these times; a +tyranny which the Mexicans had not been accustomed to endure, +since we gained our independence, oppresses us in such +a manner that it has become intolerable. In exchange for +that tyranny, peace has been offered us, but a shameful peace +for the Mexican people, as it is not based on right but on +might; for it does not have as an object the advancement +and prosperity of the country, but only the enrichment of +a small group who, abusing their influence, have converted +the public positions into fountains of benefit exclusively personal, +exploiting without scruples all the concessions and +lucrative contracts.</p> + +<p>The legislative power as well as the judicial are completely +under the executive; the division of power, the State +sovereignty, the liberty of the municipal government and the +rights of the citizen only exist as they are written in our +Magna Charta; but as a fact, in Mexico it can almost be +said that martial law reigns constantly; justice instead of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</span> +imparting protection to the weak, only serves to legalize +the plundering committed by the strong; the judges instead +of being the representatives of justice are agents of the executive, +whose interests they serve faithfully; the House of +Congress of the Union has no other will than that of the +dictator; the State Governors are appointed by him, and +they in their turn appoint and tax in the same way the municipal +authorities.</p> + +<p>From this it results that the administrative gear, judicial +and legislative, obeys with one will the caprice of Gen. +Porfirio Diaz, who during his long administration has demonstrated +that the principal motive that guides him is to maintain +himself in power at all costs.</p> + +<p>For many years deep uneasiness has been felt throughout +the republic, due to the above form of management of the +Government, but General Diaz, with great astuteness and +perseverance, had well-nigh crushed out all independent elements, +so that it was impossible to organize any kind of a +movement to deprive him of the power, which he had so misused. +The mischief was constantly aggravated, and the +decided eagerness of General Diaz to impose on the nation +a successor in the person of Mr. Ramón Corral, brought +matters to a crisis and determined many Mexicans, although +lacking political affiliations because it had been impossible to +form them during the thirty-six years of dictatorship, to +throw themselves into a struggle, intending to regain the +sovereignty of the people and their purely democratic right +to the land.</p> + +<p>Among other parties which had the same object, the National +Anti-Re-electionist Party was organized, proclaiming +the principles of <span class="allsmcap">EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE AND NO RE-ELECTION</span> +as the only ones capable of saving the republic from +the imminent danger which menaced from the prolongation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</span> +of a dictatorship each day becoming more and more onerous, +more despotic and more immoral.</p> + +<p>The Mexican people actively seconded that party and responded +to the call which was made, sending its representatives +to a convention, in which also was represented the +National Democratic Party, which also interpreted the popular +desires. The said convention appointed its candidates +for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the republic, those +nominations devolving upon Dr. Francisco Vásquez Gomez +and on me, for the respective charges of Vice-President and +President of the republic.</p> + +<p>Although our situation was extremely disadvantageous +owing to the fact that our adversaries received the sanction +of all the official element, on which they did not hesitate to +rely, we believe it our duty to accept an honorable appointment +like this in order to best serve the cause of the people. +In imitation of the wise customs of republican countries, I +travelled over a portion of the republic, calling upon my +compatriots. My passing from one town to another was +like a real triumphal march, for everywhere the people, electrified +by the magic words Effective Suffrage and No Re-election, +gave evident proofs of their irrevocable resolution +to obtain the conquest of such secure principles. At length, +the moment arrived when General Diaz began to notice the +true situation of the republic, and understood that he could +not advantageously struggle with me in the field of democracy, +and sent me to prison before the elections, which were +consummated while excluding the public from the primaries +through violence, filling the prisons with independent citizens +and committing the most shameful frauds.</p> + +<p>In Mexico, as a democratic republic, the public power +cannot have any other origin or base than the national will,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</span> +and this cannot be subordinated to formulas consummated +in a fraudulent manner.</p> + +<p>For this reason the Mexican people have protested against +the illegality of the last elections, and wishing to employ +successively all the recourses which the laws of the republic +offer, in due form they requested the annulment of the elections +before the Chamber of Deputies, notwithstanding the +fact that in that body a legitimate origin was not recognized, +and it being known beforehand that the members of the same +were not representatives of the people and only respected +the will of General Diaz, to whom exclusively they owed +their investiture.</p> + +<p>In such a state of affairs the people, who are the only +sovereign, also protested in an energetic manner against the +elections, in imposing manifestations consummated in different +parts of the republic, and if these did not spread through +all the national territory, it was due to the terrible pressure +exercised by the government, which always smothers in blood +any democratic demonstration, such as passed in Puebla, +Vera Cruz, Tlaxcala, Mexico and other parts.</p> + +<p>But this situation so violent and illegal could not last +long.</p> + +<p>I have understood very well that if the people have appointed +me as their candidate for President it is not because +there may have been an opportunity of discovering in me the +faculties of a statesman or a governor, but only the virility +of a patriot resolved to sacrifice himself if necessary in the +cause of liberty, and to help the public free itself from the +odious tyranny which oppresses the nation.</p> + +<p>From the time when I threw myself into the democratic +struggle I knew very well that General Diaz had no respect +for the freewill of the nation and the noble Mexican people, +and upon attending the primaries I knew also very well the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</span> +attacks that awaited them; but notwithstanding these facts, +the public gave to the cause of liberty a numerous contingent +of martyrs when these were necessary, and with admirable +stoicism met at the polls to receive all sorts of annoyances.</p> + +<p>But such conduct was indispensable to demonstrate to the +world at large that the Mexican people are ready for democracy, +that they are thirsty for liberty, and that their +present governors do not meet their aspirations.</p> + +<p>Besides, the attitude of the people before and during the +elections, as well as after them, demonstrates clearly that +they opposed with energy the government of General Diaz, +and that if their electoral rights had been respected I might +have been elected as President of the republic.</p> + +<p>Taking this into consideration and echoing the public +sentiment, I declare illegal the past elections, and as the +republic for that reason is without legitimate governors, I +assume provisionally the Presidency of the republic, while +the people appoint according to law their governors. To +attain this object it is necessary to hurl from power the audacious +usurpers, who for all the titles of legality boast a +scandalous and immoral fraud.</p> + +<p>With all honor I declare that I would consider it a sign +of weakness on my part and treason to the public who have +confided in me, not to place myself in front of my fellow-citizens +who anxiously call upon me from all parts of the +country, to compel General Diaz by force of arms to respect +the national will.</p> + +<p>The present Government, although it originated in violence +and fraud from the moment that it was tolerated by +the people, yet can hold for foreign nations certain titles of +legality up to the 30th of the coming month, in which their +tenure expires; but as it is possible that the new government +emanating from the last fraud, may not by that time be in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</span> +power, at least because the greater part of the nation is +making an armed protest against that usurpation, I have +appointed SUNDAY, the 20th of next November, from 6 +o’clock in the afternoon on, for all the towns and villages +in the republic to take up arms against the government under +the following</p> + + +<p class="c">PLAN.</p> + + +<p>1st. The elections for President and Vice-President of +the republic, Magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice +of the Nation and Deputies and Senators, held in June and +July of the present year, are hereby declared null and void.</p> + +<p>2nd. The present government of General Diaz is not +recognized, nor the power of any authority emanating from +the popular vote, for not having been elected by the people, +they have lost what little title they did have of legality, +aiding and favoring for their own interests the most scandalous +electoral fraud ever known in the history of Mexico, +with the money placed at their disposal by the public.</p> + +<p>3d. To avoid as much as possible the upheavals incident +to all revolutionary movements, all the laws promulgated by +the present administration and the rules pertaining to the +same, with the exception of those which are found to be +decidedly opposed to the principles set forth by this plan, are +declared to be in force, until such as require adjustment may +be reformed according to constitutional methods. Also, exception +is made of laws, sentences of courts, and decrees +which may have been sanctioned regarding the accounts and +handling of funds of all the functionaries of the Porfirista +administration, in all their branches. For as soon as the +revolution triumphs the formation of commissions of investigation +will be initiated to decide on the responsibilities which<span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</span> +the functionaries of the State and city federations may be +able to incur.</p> + +<p>In all cases the obligations contracted by the Porfirista administration +with foreign governments and corporations before +the 20th of the coming month, will be respected.</p> + +<p>Abusing the law of waste land, numerous small proprietors, +mostly all quite poor, have been despoiled of their possessions, +through the connivance of the Secretary of Public +Welfare, or by decrees of the courts of the republic. It +being only just to restore to their former owners the lands +of which they have been despoiled in such an arbitrary manner, +such dispositions and decrees have been declared subject +to revision, and there will be demanded of those who acquire +them in such a lawless manner, or of their heirs, to +make restitution to their former proprietors, who will also +pay an indemnity for the injuries suffered. Only in cases +where such lands have passed to a third person before the +promulgation of this plan, the former owners will receive +indemnity from those in whose benefit the spoliation was +accomplished.</p> + +<p>4th. Besides the constitution and laws in force, the supreme +law of the republic is declared to be the principle of +<span class="allsmcap">NO RE-ELECTION</span> of the President and Vice-President of the +republic, Governors of the States and Municipal Presidents, +while the respective constitutional reforms may be made.</p> + +<p>5th. I assume the character of Provisional President of +the United States of Mexico, with the necessary faculties +to make war on the usurping government of General +Diaz.</p> + +<p>As soon as the capital of the republic and half of the +States of the Federation may be in the power of the army +of the nation, the Provisional President will call for extra +general elections for a month thereafter, and will deliver<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</span> +the power to the President who may be elected, as soon as +the result of such election may be known.</p> + +<p>6th. The Provisional President, before handing over the +authority, will give account to the Congress of the Union +of the use which has been made of the faculties which the +present plan confers upon him.</p> + +<p>7th. The 20th day of the month of November, from the +6th of the afternoon on, all the citizens of the republic will +take up arms to hurl from power the authorities which at +present govern them. (The towns which are situated away +from the railway lines will take up arms from the evening +on.)</p> + +<p>8th. When the authorities present armed resistance, they +will be compelled by force of arms to respect the popular +will; but in this case the laws of war will be rigorously observed, +attention being specially called to the prohibitions +relative to not using expansive balls, nor shooting prisoners. +Also attention is called respecting the duty of all Mexicans +to have consideration for all foreigners and their interests.</p> + +<p>9th. The authorities who oppose resistance to this plan +will be sent to prison so that they may be judged by the +courts of the republic, when the revolution may be over. +As soon as each city or town recovers its liberty, there will +be recognized as legitimate temporary authority the principal +chief at arms, with the faculty of delegating his functions to +any other citizen, who may be confirmed in his charge or +removed by the Provisional Governor.</p> + +<p>One of the first measures of the provisional government +will be to put at liberty all the political prisoners.</p> + +<p>10th. The nomination of Provisional Governor of each +State that may have been occupied by revolutionary troops, +will be made by the Provisional President. This Governor<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</span> +will be under strict obligation to convoke the elections for +the Provisional Governor of the State, as soon as it may be +possible to do so, according to the judgment of the Provisional +President. There is excepted from these rulings the +States that for two years have sustained democratic campaigns +for a change of government, for in these the man who +was the candidate of the people will be considered as Provisional +Governor, of course it being understood that he +is expected to adhere strictly to this plan.</p> + +<p>In case that the Provisional President has not made a +nomination of Governor, or the nominee has not arrived to +take charge of his position, or if the person so honored does +not accept for any reason, then the Governor will appoint +by vote among all the chiefs of the army who may operate +in the territory of the respective State, with the understanding +that his nomination may be ratified by the Provisional +President as soon as it may be convenient.</p> + +<p>11th. The new authorities will dispose of all the funds +that are found in the public offices for the ordinary expenses +of the administration and for the expenses of the war, keeping +account scrupulously. In case that these funds may not +be sufficient to meet the expenses of the war, loans are to be +contracted, either voluntary or forced. These last to be +consummated only with citizens or national institutions. Account +will also be carefully kept of these loans, and receipts +will be tendered in due form to the interested parties, with +a view to making restitution to those who have loaned, the +revolution having triumphed.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Transitory.</span> A. The chiefs of the volunteer army will +hold the rank which may correspond to the numbers of forces +on hand. In case of operating military forces and volunteers +together, the chief of the highest rank will take command +of them, because in the event of both chiefs holding<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</span> +the same rank, the command will be for the military chieftain.</p> + +<p>The civil heads will profit by said rank while the war lasts, +and once terminated, these appointments on petition of the +parties interested, will be revised by the Secretary of War, +who will confirm the various ones in their charges, or remove +such as he may see fit.</p> + +<p>B. All the chiefs, civil as well as military, will keep their +troops under the strictest discipline, as they will be held responsible +by the Provisional Government for any misbehavior +of which the soldiers under their command may be +guilty; excepting in such cases where they may justify themselves +by proving that it was impossible to restrain the troops, +and to have imposed on the offenders the merited punishment.</p> + +<p>The severest punishments will be inflicted on any soldiers +who sack any town or kill defenceless prisoners.</p> + +<p>C. If the army and the authorities sustained by General +Diaz shoot prisoners of war, the same procedure will not +be observed with those who fall into our hands, as reprisals; +but on the contrary, the civil or military authorities in +the service of General Diaz, who may, after the initiation +of the revolution, have ordered, decreed in any form, sent +an order, or shot any of our soldiers, will be shot within +twenty-four hours after a court-martial.</p> + +<p>From this sentence the highest functionaries will not be +exempted; the only exception will be that of General Diaz +and his ministers, who in case of their ordering shootings or +permitting them, will receive the same punishment, though +after having judged them in the courts of the republic, when +the revolution may have terminated.</p> + +<p>In such cases where General Diaz may decree that the +laws of war may be respected, and the prisoners who fall<span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</span> +into his hands are treated with humanity, his life will be +safe, but he must explain in the courts as to how he has +handled the funds of the nation, and as to how he has complied +with the law.</p> + +<p>D. As it is an indispensable requisite of the laws of war +that the belligerent troops may wear some uniform of distinction, +and as it would be difficult to uniform the numerous +forces of the people who are going to take part in the +contest, there will be adopted as distinctive of all the liberating +army, whether they be volunteers or regular soldiers, +a tricolored ribbon, in the cap or on the arm.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Fellow Citizens.</span> If we are called to take up arms +and overturn the government of General Diaz, it is not only +for the offence committed during the last elections, but only +to save the country from the dark future which awaits her, +if she continues under his dictatorship, and under the government +of the abominable scientific oligarchy, that unscrupulously +and with great rapidity are absorbing and wasting +the national resources; and if we permit them to continue +in power, within a very brief space of time they will have +completed their work; they will have carried the nation to +ignominy and degradation; they will have absorbed all of +her riches and left her in total misery; they will have +caused the bankruptcy of our finances and the dishonor +of our country, which, weak, impoverished and manacled, +will find herself unable to defend her frontiers, her honor +and her institutions.</p> + +<p>With respect to me, I have a tranquil conscience, and no +one can accuse me of promoting the revolution for personal +interests, for the whole nation understands that I did all +that was possible to arrive at a peaceful arrangement, and +was disposed even to renounce my candidacy if General Diaz +would only have permitted the people to appoint the Vice-President<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</span> +of the republic; but dominated by incomprehensible +pride and by unheard of haughtiness he was deaf to the +voice of the country, and preferred to precipitate the nation +in a revolution before conceding one jot toward returning +to the people an atom of their rights, before executing, although +it might be in the last stages of his life, a part of the +promises he made in Noria and Tuxtepec.</p> + +<p>The present revolution was justified when he said: “That +no citizen may be charged with and perpetuated in the exercise +of power, and this will be the last revolution.”</p> + +<p>If in the mind of General Diaz there had been more attention +paid to the interest of the country than the sordid +interests of himself and his counsellors, this revolution might +have been avoided by making some concessions to the people; +but it has not been so—so much the better! The change +will be rapid and more radical, for the Mexican public in +place of lamenting like a coward, will accept the challenge +like a hero, and even if General Diaz pretends to depend +upon brute force to imposing his ignominious yoke, +the public will rely on the same force for throwing aside +this yoke, for hurling this dismal man from power and for +reconquering liberty.</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Fellow Citizens.</span> Do not hesitate a moment: Seize +the arms, throw the usurpers from power, recover your +rights as free men, and remember that our predecessors bequeathed +us an inheritance of glory which we must not +stain. Remember how they acted: invincible in war, magnanimous +in victory.</p> + + +<p class="c sp">EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE.  NO RE-ELECTION.</p> + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">San Luis Potosí</span>, October 5, 1910.</p> + +<p> +(Signed) <span class="pad3"><span class="smcap">Fco. I. Madero</span></span>. +</p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Note.</span> The present plan will circulate only among the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</span> +co-religionists of the greatest confidence up to November +15th, from which date it will be re-printed; the plan +will be prudently divulged from the 18th and profusely +from the 20th on.</p> + + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p class="c sp">PROTEST AGAINST MEETING OF DIAZ AND<br> +TAFT</p> + +<p class="c">(Reprinted from <i>The Evening World</i>, September 3, 1909.)</p> + + + +<p><i>To the President of the United States.</i></p> + +<p><span class="smcap">Sir</span>: The national press has lately startled thoughtful +men with the most unusual of announcements. We are told +we may shortly expect to witness the meeting of the popularly +elected President of this great Republic with the uncrowned +Czar of Mexico. Calculated to inspire enthusiasm +in the minds of the ignorant or the falsely informed, this +piece of news brings dismay to those who know the truth +and honor American traditions. For the last thirty years +the world has only heard unchallenged reports of the genius, +the equity and the kindness of Porfirio Diaz. All this being +true, it would only be fitting and proper that the two neighboring +chiefs should exchange international courtesies.</p> + +<p>But as a matter of history Porfirio Diaz represents in +Mexico what Abdul Hamid was to Turkey. On his white +head rests the responsibility for the massacres of over 50,000 +Mexican Christians; the slavery of thousands of Yaqui and +Maya Indians who escaped fire and sword; the destruction +of all liberties, personal as well as public; the corruption of +the judiciary; the creation of a financial system which has +mortgaged Mexico to European and American bankers; for +the persecution of all the Mexican liberals in the United +States, which reached a climax of brazenness and impudence +when a Mexican liberal was kidnapped across the Rio<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</span> +Grande from an American jail by the help of American +detectives in the payroll of the Czar.</p> + +<p>Therefore, I protest in the name of humanity, common +decency and national dignity as distinguished from political +expediency and international courtesy against such an exchange +between the deeply trusted and patriotic President of +the United States and the treacherous, unpopular and bloody-handed +Nero of Mexico.</p> + +<p>You might retort that it is no business of mine to couple +your name with an attack seemingly so unwarranted.</p> + +<p>My answer is that I speak no more than truth and not +otherwise than I have spoken in a recent book on the real +political conditions in Mexico. I am moved to repeat these +truthful characterizations of Mexico’s president and the +rule he stands for, because this pamphlet has been suppressed +by an indictment against me in an American court brought +about by the Mexican Government, which used your own +brother, Henry W. Taft, as their lawyer against me, transparently +to gain for their case the weight of an implied connection +between it and the Administration.</p> + +<p>You might reply that the American Government cares +nothing about the internal policy of the Mexican government +as long as it behaves and protects American interests.</p> + +<p>I answer that if a neighbor be a good neighbor it might +be sufficient unto you; but if your neighbor should torture +or attempt to kill his children would it not be your duty to +protest?</p> + +<p>If the excuse for meddling in another nation’s affairs is +only found in the destruction of American lives and their +property, under what pretext did the American Government +protest against the Armenian massacres? What brought +about armed intervention in Cuba? Why did the State Department<span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</span> +undertake to refund the unjust Chinese indemnity? +And how are you to explain the wherefore of the tremendous +struggle to stamp out slavery?</p> + +<p>The reason for this system of intervention lies deeper than +in financial and political interests. It proves to the civilized +world that the American nation is something mightier than +a rich, powerful and progressive republic; that it is likewise +a moral entity backed by the conscience of a people.</p> + +<p>The propaganda about Mexico has its source in the knowledge +of the real history of Porfirio Diaz. At the beginning +of his career he concealed his real political face, but the +higher he rises in power and statecraft, the more he uncovers +his fundamental lack of principle.</p> + +<p>Even as I write these lines the report is wired from +Mexico that General Diaz has ordered the demission of the +Governor of Coahuila as the latter showed a marked tendency +in favor of General Reyes’s candidacy. Imagine the +Republican President of the United States asking for the +resignation of Governor Johnson of Minnesota because of +his Democratic leanings!</p> + +<p>Political evolution in Mexico will move faster in the next +twelve months, inasmuch as the new generation is impelled +by cleaner, more honest and patriotic motives than those of +the malevolent Czar and his infamous camarilla. Porfirio +Diaz is fashioning the tools of his own destruction and as +a last resort is using the handshake across the Rio Grande +to countenance in advance the arbitrary repressions and assassinations +which are sure to take place in the false elections +of next year.</p> + +<p>When that period is passed the mask of this master +Machiavelli will have been torn aside. The American people +will then realize with humiliation that their honored<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</span> +President has exchanged an intimate greeting with the basest +slave-driver of modern times.</p> + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">Carlo de Fornaro</span>,<br> +National Arts Club. +</p> +</div> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p class="c"><i>Translation.</i></p> + +<p class="c">LETTER FROM ARCHBISHOP GILLOW TO<br> +URRUTIA.</p> + + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">Hacienda de Chautla</span>, July 11th, 1913.</p> + +<p> +<span class="smcap">Sr. Dr. Aureliano Urrutia</span>,<br> +Minister of the Interior, Mexico.</p> +<p><i>Esteemed Sir and Friend</i>: +</p> + +<p>I returned to this hacienda yesterday and was informed +that up around Huejotzingo, capital of this District, things +are rather unsettled, due to a few disturbers who molest +the authorities, and consequently disturb public peace. Having +in mind the kind offers which you made to me during +my recent visit in that city, I now take the liberty of addressing +you.</p> + +<p>The disturbers of Huejotzingo are a certain Luis Pinto +and his brother. They own real estate and small houses +to the amount of may be Three Thousand Dollars each, in +that locality. They put on airs of caciques, and have for +some time even gone so far as to pretend to subordinate +the local authorities. They have become more overbearing +since the time of Madero.</p> + +<p>While Mr. Alberto García Granados was Minister of the +Interior, the referred-to Pinto brothers attempted to overthrow +Mr. Enrique Acevedo from his position as Governor +of the Province. Mr. Acevedo has maintained the peace +and well-being in this district ever since he came into office. +As Mr. Granados, owner of the Hacienda de Chagua,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</span> +near Huejotzingo, knows Mr. Acevedo, he maintained Mr. +Acevedo as Governor, and the Pinto brothers did not molest +him any more until Mr. Granados resigned the secretaryship.</p> + +<p>As Mr. Acevedo is well acquainted with the intrigues of +the Pinto brothers, he has kept them well watched, and +they, resenting this, have hostilized him, to the degree of +having trumped up false accusations against him before the +municipality of Puebla. They did not however, obtain their +end, for they were unable to obtain his removal, though he +was for a time suspended from office, much to the regret +of the honest contingent of Huejotzingo. The Mayor replaced +him during this time.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, Mr. Ramon Vargas, Judge of the +Primary Court of Claims of Huejotzingo, has been for +three months working unceasingly to put to date all pending +cases, which had been accumulating, due to the fact that his +predecessors, partly due to indifference and partly to fear +of the Revolution, often absented themselves, abandoning +their offices. Among those who most distinguished themselves +of these last mentioned, was a certain Felipe Ramirez, +whose wife is a Huejotzingo woman, on which account he +was of course interested in holding that position in Huejotzingo. +The mother of the lady in question also found a +way to take advantage of the situation, and arranged things +so that those who wished their cases attended to, had to +have a recommendation from her, if they wanted a favorable +judgment. For this she was of course paid a certain +sum, and she managed to derive quite a fine income.</p> + +<p>This by-play came to the knowledge of Mr. García +Granados, and he managed to obtain the Puebla Municipality +to offer the Judge Felipe Ramirez to transfer him +to Matamoros, which offer he declined, staying in Huejotzingo<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</span> +and exercising his profession of lawyer. This Mr. +Ramirez works in harmony with the Pinto brothers, and +the three of them, openly antagonize Acevedo the Governor, +Ramon Vargas, the Judge and Sidronio Primo, Commissioner +of the Ministry, who is an old employé in this locality +and who works together with the other two last mentioned.</p> + +<p>With the foregoing details, and prompted by the desire +to maintain order and peace in this district, I beg you to +exert your good influence with the government of Puebla, +to have Mr. Acevedo return to his post, and to have Mr. +Ramon Vargas the present Judge, and also Mr. Sidronio +Primo, stay in their positions. The presence of Mr. Felipe +Ramirez, who still pretends to occupy the position of Judge +in this District, is very harmful to public interests, as is also +the presence of the Pinto brothers, so that although I harbor +no feelings of personal enmity towards them for I do +not know them except from hearsay, I beg to suggest the advantage +of their being removed from this locality, in whatever +way you may deem most appropriate.</p> + +<p>Kindly forgive the length of this letter, but I feel justified +in giving you all these details, for the sake of the +preservation of peace in this region, which has some importance +due to its relations to Puebla and Mexico.</p> + +<p>Thanking you in advance for whatever you may deem fit +to do in the interests of the honest citizens who have given +me the above information, and which I transmit to you confidentially, +I beg to remain,</p> + +<p class="c"> +Very respy., etc., etc.,</p> + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">Eulogio G. Gillow</span>,<br> +Archbishop of Oaxaca. +</p> +</div> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</span></p> + +<div class="blockquot"> +<p class="c sp">LETTER FROM MINISTER URRUTIA TO<br> +ARCHBISHOP MORA.</p> + + +<p class="r"> +<span class="smcap">Mexico</span>, July 9th, 1913.</p> + +<p> +<i>Very illustrious Sir</i>— +</p> + +<p>Kindly allow me to acquit myself of the pleasant duty of +expressing, to you, very sincere thanks for the good assistance +you have been lending to the Government in the re-establishment +of peace,—a task the more useful because +accomplishing it, as you are doing, with intelligence and +common sense, it might be able to effect a durable benefit +to the country.</p> + +<p>In the name of the government to which I belong and +with which you are happily connected, I earnestly beg of +you to continue your good work, if possible, with more +energy than before.</p> + +<p>In this connection and prompted by the confidence which +your kindness invites, I take the liberty of telling you that +some memorial services held in honor of the Madero +brothers, made a bad impression in social circles, and especially +on the Government, and therefore I would ask of +you to take such measures as you may deem necessary, to +prevent a repetition of demonstrations of this nature, which +might contribute to retard the success of the work undertaken +by the Government in order to put an end to our +internal wars.</p> + +<p>I also must call your attention to the necessity of stopping +at all costs, a certain person in the clergy, from continuing +his propaganda against the Government, and this +for the same reasons as above expressed. With your intelligence +and tact, I am sure you will find an efficacious means +to put a stop to the workings of the person in question.</p> + +<p class="r"> +I remain, etc., etc.,<br> +<span class="smcap">Urrutia</span>. +</p> +</div> +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</span></p> + +<p class="c xlarge sp">GLOSSARY OF SPANISH WORDS.</p> +</div> + +<table> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Carranzista</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Political follower of Venustiano Carranza.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Casas de Vecindad</span></td> + <td class="tdlt">Tenement houses.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Cientifico</span></td> + <td class="tdl">A group of politicians headed by J. I. +Limantour, who took as a basis of +their political party some of the Comte +theories. They believed in a scientific +government. The term cientifico +is now applied to political +exponents of graft in politics.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Ciudadela</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Citadel.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Colorados</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Reds, red-flaggers. Name given to the +guerrilla troops under Orozco, because +besides carrying a red flag they +carried destruction everywhere by fire +and sword.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Compadre</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Godfather, an expression which means +protector, benefactor,—and implies +great obligations and great sacrifices.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Cuartelazo</span></td> + <td class="tdl">A military mutiny. From cuartel, a +military barrack.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Don</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Title of courtesy given to people of the +better class. Formerly in Spain, +when addressing a person of aristocratic +lineage, it was customary to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</span>write before the name,—De origen +noble—(of noble origin). It was +afterwards abbreviated to D. O. N. +One should be careful to use the Don +only before the first name, or together +with first and second names, for instance—Don +Porfirio Diaz, never +Don Diaz, as it implies an insulting +meaning.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Egidos</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Communal lands surrounding villages and cities in Mexico.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Felicista</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Political follower of Felix Diaz.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Fiesta</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Holiday, merry-making.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Fomento</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Excite, encourage. Ministerio de Fomento: +the department for the development +of the country, industrially +and commercially.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Gachupines</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Nickname given to Spaniards.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Gringo</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Nickname used in Mexico and South +America to designate Americans.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Hacienda</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Plantation, ranch, farm.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Huertista</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Political follower of Victoriano Huerta.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Incomunicacion</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Incommunication. The position of a +man in prison who is not permitted to +communicate with his friends, lawyers +or any one from the outside.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Jefe</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Chief.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Jefe Politico</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Political chief. Head of a district +under the jurisdiction of the Governor. +Under Diaz they had almost unlimited +power for mischief.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Ley Fuga</span></td> + <td class="tdl">The Runaway Law—which was resorted +to for the purpose of doing +away with obnoxious political enemies +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</span>or agitators; while they were +taken from one prison to the other, +they were shot from the back, and +the pretext was that they had tried +to run away.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Maderista</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Political follower of F. I. Madero.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Mocho</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Contemptible term to designate members +of the clerical party in Mexico.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Neo-Cientifico</span></td> + <td class="tdl">New scientist. A political party which +was a continuation of the old cientifico +party. They came into power +under Madero, and were headed by +Ernesto Madero, uncle of Don F. I. +Madero, and by Rafael Hernandez, a +cousin of the president.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Pacifico</span></td> + <td class="tdl">A peaceful Indian, one that cultivates +the land and does not carry arms.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Pelado</span></td> + <td class="tdl">“Skinned.” Term applied to a very +poor Indian.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Peon</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Indian worker on plantation or mines.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Plan De Ayala</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Written by a school-teacher, Montaño, +for Zapata. It was aimed against +the neo-cientificos in the Madero cabinet,—the +provisional president was +supposed to be P. Orozco, and in case +of his absence Emiliano Zapata. The +Plan was essentially an agrarian plan, +local in its ideas of reforms.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Plan De Guadalupe</span></td> + <td class="tdl">A Manifest written by V. Carranza to +rally the Mexicans in the overthrow +of the Huerta dictatorship. It did +not attempt to bring about any reforms,—only +the elimination of +Huerta and his supporters.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Plan De San Luis Potosí</span><span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Was the political plan written by F. I. +Madero against the Diaz régime on +October 5th, 1910.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Porfirista</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Political follower of Porfirio Diaz.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Porrista</span></td> + <td class="tdl">A member of the Porra, a political club +created by the friends of F. I. Madero, +supposed to be headed by Gustavo +Madero, to fight and intimidate the +enemies of the Maderistas.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdlt"><span class="smcap">Religion y Fueros</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Battle-cry of the clericals since the revolution. +“Religion & Privileges.” +The Church and the army under +Spanish rule had special courts composed +of either religious clerics or of +soldiers, which judged members of +the church or soldiers in criminal +cases. The Clericals now demand a +return of their old privileges.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Villista</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Political follower of F. Villa.</td></tr> + +<tr> + <td class="tdl"><span class="smcap">Zapatista</span></td> + <td class="tdl">Political follower of Zapata.</td></tr> + +</table> + +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> Full text of letter will be found in Index.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_2" href="#FNanchor_2" class="label">[2]</a> Full text of the Plan of San Luis Potosí will be found in +Index.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_3" href="#FNanchor_3" class="label">[3]</a> From “Mexico the Land of Unrest,” by Henry Baerlein.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_4" href="#FNanchor_4" class="label">[4]</a> “Barbarous Mexico,” J. K. Turner.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_5" href="#FNanchor_5" class="label">[5]</a> “The Revolution and F. I. Madero,” Roque Estrada, 1912.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_6" href="#FNanchor_6" class="label">[6]</a> “The Political Shame of Mexico,” E. I. Bell, 1914.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_7" href="#FNanchor_7" class="label">[7]</a> See Plan in Index.</p> + +</div> + +<div class="footnote"> + +<p><a id="Footnote_8" href="#FNanchor_8" class="label">[8]</a> The New York <i>Call</i> published the first article of the exposé, May +5, 1911.</p> + +</div> +</div> + +<hr class="full"> + +<div class="transnote"> + +<p class="c">Transcriber’s Notes:</p> + +<p>Variations in spelling and hyphenation are retained.</p> + +<p>Perceived typographical errors have been changed.</p> + +</div> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78600 ***</div> +</body> +</html> |