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visibility: hidden;} } + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} +h2.nobreak {page-break-before: avoid;} + +table { + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; +} + +.pagenum { /* uncomment the next line for invisible page numbers */ + /* visibility: hidden; */ + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: small; + text-align: right; + font-style: normal; + font-weight: normal; + font-variant: normal; + text-indent: 0; +} /* page numbers */ + +.center {text-align: center; text-indent: 0;} + +.allsmcap {font-variant: small-caps; text-transform: lowercase;} + +figcaption {font-weight: bold; font-family:sans-serif;} +figcaption p {margin-top: 0; margin-bottom: .2em; text-align: inherit;} + +/* Images */ + +img { + max-width: 100%; + height: auto; +} +img.w100 {width: 100%;} + + +.figcenter { + margin: auto; + text-align: center; + page-break-inside: avoid; + max-width: 100%; +} + +/* Transcriber's notes */ +.transnote {background-color: #E6E6FA; + color: black; + font-size:small; + padding:0.5em; + margin-bottom:5em; + font-family:sans-serif, serif; +} + +/* >>+++ START ADDITIONS +++<< */ + + +h2.nobreak {page-break-before: avoid; padding-top: 0em;} +.nobreak {page-break-before: avoid; padding-top: 0em;} + +/*Table of Contents format*/ +table.toc { max-width: 30em;} +td.tocchapter{ text-align: right; vertical-align: top; padding-right: 1em;} +td.toctitle { text-align: left; vertical-align: top; text-indent: -1.3em; padding-left: 1.3em;} +td.tocpage { text-align: right; vertical-align: bottom; padding-left: 1em;} + +.boxit{ + max-width: 22em; + padding: 1em; + border: 0em solid black; + margin: 0 auto; } + +.hangindent{ + text-indent: -1.5em; + padding-left: 1.5em; + text-align:left;} + +.hangindents{ + text-indent: -1.5em; + padding-left: 1.5em; + text-align:left; + font-family:sans-serif; + font-weight:bold;} + +/*CSS to set font sizes*/ +/*font sizes for non-header font changes*/ +.xlargefont{font-size: x-large} +.largefont{font-size: large} +.boldfont{font-weight:bold} +.sansseriffont{font-family:sans-serif} + +.numberitem2{ + text-align: left; + vertical-align: top; + margin-left:0.5em; + text-indent: -1.3em; + padding-left: 1.3em; } +/* End numbered indent */ +.sectiontitle{font-weight: bold; + font-family:sans-serif; + text-align:center; + text-indent:0; + font-size:large;} + +/* >>+++ END ADDITIONS +++<< */ + +/* Illustration classes */ +.illowp46 {width: 46%;} +.x-ebookmaker .illowp46 {width: 100%;} +.illowp51 {width: 51%;} +.x-ebookmaker .illowp51 {width: 100%;} +.illowp56 {width: 56%;} +.x-ebookmaker .illowp56 {width: 100%;} +.illowp90 {width: 90%;} +.x-ebookmaker .illowp90 {width: 100%;} +.illowp40 {width: 40%;} +.illowp88 {width: 88%;} +.x-ebookmaker .illowp88 {width: 100%;} +.illowp93 {width: 93%;} +.x-ebookmaker .illowp93 {width: 100%;} +.illowp100 {width: 100%;} +.illowp73 {width: 73%;} +.x-ebookmaker .illowp73 {width: 100%;} +.illowp92 {width: 92%;} +.x-ebookmaker .illowp92 {width: 100%;} +.illowp76 {width: 76%;} +.x-ebookmaker .illowp76 {width: 100%;} +.illowp81 {width: 81%;} +.x-ebookmaker .illowp81 {width: 100%;} +.illowp65 {width: 65%;} +.x-ebookmaker .illowp65 {width: 100%;} + </style> +</head> +<body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78440 ***</div> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp46" style="max-width: 100.0em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/cover.jpg" alt="Cover."> +</figure> + +<hr class="tb x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p class="center sansseriffont boldfont xlargefont">HEADLINE BOOKS</p> + +<p class="center p4 sansseriffont boldfont largefont">No. 29</p> +</div> + +<hr class="tb x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<div class="boxit"> + +<p class="center xlargefont sansseriffont boldfont">HEADLINE BOOKS</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>CHANGING GOVERNMENTS</b><br> +Amid New Social Problems</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>SHADOW OVER EUROPE</b><br> +The Challenge of Nazi Germany</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>BRICKS WITHOUT MORTAR</b><br> +The Story of International Cooperation</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>BATTLES WITHOUT BULLETS</b><br> +The Story of Economic Warfare</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>IN QUEST OF EMPIRE</b><br> +The Problem of Colonies</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>HUMAN DYNAMITE</b><br> +The Story of Europe’s Minorities</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>THE PEACE THAT FAILED</b><br> +How Europe Sowed the Seeds of War</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>NEW HOMES FOR OLD</b><br> +Public Housing in Europe and America</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>WAR ATLAS</b><br> +A Handbook of Maps and Facts</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>THE BRITISH EMPIRE UNDER FIRE</b></p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>SPOTLIGHT ON THE BALKANS</b></p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAS</b></p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>LOOK AT LATIN AMERICA</b><br> +With 25 Maps and Charts</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>AMERICA REARMS</b><br> +The Citizen’s Guide to National Defense</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>SHADOW OVER ASIA</b><br> +The Rise of Militant Japan</p> + +<p class="hangindents"><b>WAR ON THE SHORT WAVE</b><br> +(In preparation)</p> +</div></div> + +<hr class="tb x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp51" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_title.jpg" alt="Title page."> +</figure> +</div> + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h1 class="nobreak sansseriffont" style="word-spacing:0.25em"> + SHADOW OVER ASIA + </h1> + + +<p class="center sansseriffont boldfont xlargefont" style="word-spacing:0.1em">THE RISE OF MILITANT JAPAN</p> + +<p class="center p4 sansseriffont boldfont">by<br> +<span class="xlargefont">T. A. BISSON</span></p> + +<p class="center p4 sansseriffont boldfont">Illustrated by<br> +<span class="xlargefont">GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES</span></p> + +<p class="center p4 sansseriffont boldfont" style="word-spacing:0.25em">THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION</p> +</div> + +<hr class="tb x-ebookmaker-drop"> + + +<div class="chapter" style="line-height:1.25em"> +<p class="center">COPYRIGHT 1941</p> + +<p class="center">FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED<br> +22 EAST 38TH STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.<br> +ALL RIGHTS RESERVED</p> + +<p class="center p2"><em>Published April 1941</em></p> + +<p class="center p4"><em>Typography by Andor Braun</em></p> + +<p class="center p2">PRODUCED UNDER UNION CONDITIONS AND<br> +COMPOSED, PRINTED AND BOUND BY UNION LABOR</p> + +<p class="center">MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</p> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak"> + CONTENTS + </h2> + + +<div class="center"> +<table class="toc" style="border:0em; padding:0em; border-spacing:0em"> + +<tr><td class="tocchapter">I.</td><td class="toctitle">The Shadow</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_7">7</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter">II.</td><td class="toctitle">Introducing Imperial Japan</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_11">11</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter">III.</td><td class="toctitle">Imitating the Chinese</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_20">20</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter">IV.</td><td class="toctitle">Japan Bars Her Door</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_25">25</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter">V.</td><td class="toctitle">How the Door Was Opened</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_33">33</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter">VI.</td><td class="toctitle">Catching Up with the West</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_39">39</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter">VII.</td><td class="toctitle">Who Rules Modern Japan?</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_45">45</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter">VIII.</td><td class="toctitle">Creating a Modern Empire</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_53">53</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter">IX.</td><td class="toctitle">Japan and the First World War</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_59">59</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter">X.</td><td class="toctitle">Go Liberal, Go Fascist?</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_65">65</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter">XI.</td><td class="toctitle">The Shadow Deepens</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_73">73</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter">XII.</td><td class="toctitle">War with China</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_83">83</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter">XIII.</td><td class="toctitle">Shadow Over Asia</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_91">91</a></td></tr> +<tr><td class="tocchapter"></td><td class="toctitle">Suggested Reading</td><td class="tocpage"><a href="#Page_95">95</a></td></tr> +</table></div> +</div> + +<hr class="tb x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp56" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_006.jpg" alt="This map shows the extent of Japanese possessions and occupied territories."> + <figcaption> + <p>WHERE THE SHADOW LIES</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> +</div> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[7]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_7"> + I. The Shadow + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>On the morning of September 27, 1940 the cables hummed with +news of a momentous ceremony. Japanese diplomats in Berlin +had signed a military pact with Germany and Italy. That evening +in Tokyo the Japanese people received a message from +Emperor Hirohito. In their newspapers they read: “We are +deeply gratified that a pact has been concluded between these +three powers.” The Emperor had spoken. A new alliance had +been formed. And a lengthening shadow was spreading over +Asia.</p> + + +<h3>TEN YEARS AGO AND NOW</h3> + +<p>The shadow had first been cast on another September day +nearly ten years before, when a railway explosion at Mukden +had served as an excuse for the Japanese military to take over +Manchuria. As we look back now with the advantage of hindsight, +that day—September 18, 1931—looms up as an important +milestone. For Japan’s seizure of Manchuria ended one historic +era, and began another. It abruptly broke up the period of +comparative peace that had succeeded the first World War. +And it ushered in our present period of strife and unsettlement. +Its indirect effects on European developments were also very +great. We know that Japan’s defiance lowered the prestige and +authority of the League of Nations. It showed how hard it was +to secure international cooperation strong enough to check +determined aggression. Japan’s example undoubtedly influenced +Mussolini and Hitler in the bold moves they made later +on in Europe.</p> + +<p>After 1935 German and Italian expansion in Europe paralleled +Japan’s drive in the Far East. All of these movements +steadily widened their scope. Increasingly these three powers +played into one another’s hands, and helped one another’s +advance. The anti-Comintern pact of November 1936 drew +<span class="pagenum">[8]</span>them closer together. But they were not formally allied until +September 27, 1940, when Japan signed the military pact with +the Axis powers.</p> + +<p>This pact had startling implications. True, Germany and +Italy were separated from Japan by vast distances. As long as +Britain controlled the seas, the new allies could not actually +join military forces. But Germany had only to put pressure +on the French authorities at Vichy in order to help Japan win +control over Indo-China. An Axis break-through in the Mediterranean, +moreover, could swiftly bring her much greater aid.</p> + + +<h3>TOWARD A “NEW ORDER”</h3> + +<p>It was this possibility that made Japan’s aims, as outlined in the +alliance, so significant. Berlin and Rome waved Japan ahead +toward the conquest of “Greater East Asia.” Until 1940 +Tokyo’s official claims had reached out only to Manchuria and +China. But the new term brought southeast Asia into the picture +as well. This area would certainly include Indo-China, +Siam, Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. +On its outskirts lie Australia, New Zealand and India. +By formally announcing “Greater East Asia” as Tokyo’s sphere +of influence, the Axis-Japan pact served as a blueprint of the +Far Eastern sector of the world order which the Axis alliance +hoped to establish.</p> + + +<h3>WHAT IS “GREATER EAST ASIA”?</h3> + +<p>The new allies were seeking control over three continents. +Germany and Italy were bidding for domination over Europe, +Africa and the Near East, creating new and urgent problems +for us. Tokyo’s bid for supremacy in “Greater East Asia” +raised problems which were just as great. To many of us these +problems seemed far away—much more remote than those of +Europe, to which we are bound by so many close ties. Yet we +know now that we should be making a mistake if we tried to +close our eyes to them.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[9]</span></p> + +<p>More than one billion people, or half the earth’s population, +live in the area embraced by “Greater East Asia.” It is thus one +of the most populous regions of the globe. Its territorial spread +is equally large. Its outside limits range from northern Japan +to Australia, and from China and India to New Zealand. The +whole North and South American continents, excluding Canada, +could be fitted comfortably into this vast territory.</p> + +<p>It is, besides, an area of great contrasts—greater, probably, +than in any other region of the world. In a score of different +localities conditions vary widely—climate, people, language, +religion, economic life, government. Coolies working in Korean +rice fields are a far cry from English-speaking Australian sheep +ranchers, peasants in the remote interior of China from Malayan +tin miners or East Indian rubber planters, Indian bazaars under +a burning sun from Manchurian cities deep in their winter +snows.</p> + + +<h3>A COLONIAL REGION</h3> + +<p>Another feature of this region became especially important +after Germany had conquered several European powers with +Far Eastern possessions. For eastern Asia is one of the greatest +colonial areas of the world, not even excepting Africa. From +Korea to India runs a continuous chain of Japanese, French, +American, Dutch and British holdings. Only Japan in the +north, and Australia and New Zealand in the south, may be +counted as fully independent countries. So this region is the +scene not only of imperial rivalries, but of struggles for independence +on the part of native peoples.</p> + +<p>Thus many factors enter into the international developments +affecting this region. Countless threads of policy connect it +with Europe. They run to Berlin, and are woven into Hitler’s +plans; to London, where they tie in with the problem of what +naval and air forces the British can spare for the Far East; to +Vichy, and the attitude of the French Government there; and +<span class="pagenum">[10]</span>to the refugee Netherlands authorities in Britain taking counsel +on the fate of their colonies. Moscow is caught up in this diplomatic +network, and so is Washington—their moves can exert +decisive influence on the course of events.</p> + + +<h3>JAPAN PULLS THE STRINGS</h3> + +<p>Yet the main moving force in Far Eastern developments is +Japan. In fact, Japan has been pulling the strings ever since +September 18, 1931. The challenge to the <i lang="la">status quo</i> in East +Asia proceeds from Tokyo, just as in Europe it proceeds from +Berlin. Like Germany, but in even greater measure, Japan has +the strategic advantage of a central position. She need not take +too seriously the protests of European powers halfway across +the globe, and she is well aware that the main centers of +strength in the United States and the Soviet Union are almost +equally distant. Only Japan, of the major powers, has her +home bases wholly within the Far Eastern region.</p> + +<p>And so today we are forced to think more and more about +Japan. In large part we are concerned with the immediate +present. We want to know what Japan is doing, and what she +intends to do. Yet we can understand her present foreign policy +and form some idea of her probable future moves only if +we know something of her past as well. We must seek out the +forces that have shaped modern Japan.</p> + +<p>So in this book we shall go back to the legendary traditions +of the Japanese nation, today being revived by Japanese patriots +and preached as a state religion. We shall see how the belief in +hereditary power as the privilege of the few has been strong +in Japan from the earliest times, resisting the influence of democratic +ideas from both China and the West; how even when +Japan set up a constitutional government, the seats of ancient +privilege were preserved; and how Japan, with her military +leaders in the saddle, finally set out on the road to Empire.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[11]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_11"> + II. Introducing Imperial Japan + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Japan proper, consisting of four closely connected islands, has +often been compared to the British Isles. A map of the Eurasian +continent shows the similarity of their geographical position. +Japan’s island chain is much longer, but it clings to the Asiatic +mainland very much as the British Isles cling to the European +mainland. The Straits of Tsushima take the place of the English +Channel.</p> + +<p>Actually, however, Japan is much farther from the mainland +than Britain, even in the narrow waters of Tsushima. The +steamer from Shimonoseki takes nearly eight hours in crossing +over to Fusan, on the tip of the Korean peninsula. This fact +has had important historical results. The stretch of water has +been wide enough to make invasion difficult—at least until modern +times. Yet it has not been so wide as to bar cultural +exchanges with the mainland.</p> + + +<h3>JAPAN AND THE ASIATIC MAINLAND</h3> + +<p>During historic times, for roughly 2,000 years, Japan was never +successfully invaded. In 1066 William the Conqueror successfully +invaded England. But two centuries later, in 1274 and +1281, Kublai Khan’s Mongol-Chinese armies twice failed to +conquer Japan. For long periods, when Japan’s rulers so wished, +they were able to isolate their country more or less completely +from the Asiatic mainland.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, Japan was close enough to the continent +to benefit from the earlier growth of civilization there. From +the very beginning of Japanese national life, we can trace significant +advances to the coming of peoples and cultures from +the Korean peninsula. At times, notably in the seventh and +eighth centuries, the flood of cultural influences from China +almost swamped Japan and threatened to sweep away her +native institutions. During the past century Western influence +<span class="pagenum">[12]</span>has caused equally great changes in Japanese life. Each time, +however, a solid core of Japanese tradition resisted destruction, +and shaped the new elements into a social pattern characteristically +Japanese.</p> + + +<h3>JAPAN’S ISLAND HOME</h3> + +<p>Many local features of Japan’s island home are as important +as its geographical position. Its natural beauties have fed the +highly developed aesthetic sense of the Japanese people. No +one who has traveled the Inland Sea can forget its sparkling +waters, or the lovely islands which dot its surface. The majestic +beauty of Mt. Fuji is world famous. Hallowed associations +enhance its snow-capped splendor for the Japanese.</p> + +<p>Not all characteristics of the group of Japanese islands are so +favorable. Many of its mountains are volcanic in origin. Several +volcanoes are still active. Earthquakes occur frequently. +(The disastrous earthquake of 1923, with over 150,000 dead +and injured, is still fresh in our memories.) Typhoons, sweeping +in from the sea in destructive assault, are also common. So +nature contributes an element of insecurity to the life of the +Japanese, offsetting the protection their isolation gives them.</p> + +<p>Today other natural features give rise to a more serious insecurity. +Japan’s territory is small, barely the size of California, +the population is large and prolific. Four-fifths of the islands are +so mountainous that they are useless for the intensive rice cultivation +which is the principal Japanese agricultural pursuit. In +recent times, when modern industry became necessary, the +Japanese islands were found to lack most minerals. Water +power is abundant, and can be harnessed to produce electricity. +There are considerable reserves of coal, though not of good +coking quality. But there is little iron, and even less of the +minor but still important metals. To these factors, which have +not prevented the Japanese from becoming an industrial nation, +we shall have to return later on.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[13]</span></p> + + +<h3>WHO ARE THE JAPANESE?</h3> + +<p>Like all modern peoples, the Japanese of today are a mixed +race. In prehistoric times one migrant people after another +overran the islands. The ocean set a barrier to further migration. +So the invaders had to settle down, either exterminating +the people already there or else intermarrying with them.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp90" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_013.jpg" alt="This map shows Japan in relation to Korea, with major cities marked."> + <figcaption> + <p>JAPAN’S ISLAND HOME</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The last invasions must have occurred early in the Christian +era. Scholars are not agreed on the exact racial proportions of +the groups which mingled to form the modern Japanese people. +The basic stock is probably Mongolian, the result of migrations +through Korea from the north Asiatic continent. There is +apparently a southern admixture, coming from either southeast +China or Malaysia. Many of these groups were late invaders of +<span class="pagenum">[14]</span>the islands. They found there an +Ainu people, possibly of Caucasian +racial origin. Ainu remnants +still survive in Japan, but most of +them have been absorbed or exterminated +in the course of centuries +of warfare.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp88" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_015.jpg" alt="This map shows two main early migration routes into Japan, Mongols through Korea and possibly Malaysians through South China."> + <figcaption> + <p>EARLY INVADERS AND SETTLERS</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Three main racial elements thus +entered into the making of the +Japanese people. To the Mongol +strain is undoubtedly due the warlike +spirit of the Japanese, while +from southeast Asia comes a mythology +that has been interwoven +with Japan’s political institutions. Later, there were also many +Chinese and Korean immigrants. By the end of the seventh +century, according to one source, more than one-third of +Japan’s noble families claimed Chinese or Korean descent.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp40" style="max-width: 18.75em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_014.jpg" alt=""> + <figcaption> + <p>A Magatama, or bead + ornament, common in early + Japanese tombs. Often + made of jade, nephrite + or chrysoprase—materials + found not in Japan but in + the Ural-Baikal regions.</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + + +<h3>EARLY JAPANESE INSTITUTIONS</h3> + +<p>To understand modern Japan, we need to study the past even +more than in the case of most Western nations. For survivals +of ancient traditions play a large part in Japan’s national life +today. These beliefs and practices can be traced back for +nearly two thousand years. What were these institutions like +in their earliest form?</p> + +<p>Historians give only a partial answer to this question. The +latest island invaders, who became the dominant Japanese, were +a group of clans or tribes. Leadership in these clans was hereditary. +The clan elder was both chieftain and high priest. He +supervised or performed sacrifices to the clan god, who was +usually held to be his direct ancestor. All clansmen were supposedly +united by blood ties to the clan elder, and thus shared +in the divine descent.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[15]</span></p> + + +<h3>“THE WAY OF THE GODS”</h3> + +<p>Societies ruled by a priest-king, usually called “theocracies,” +have existed in many parts of the world. In Japan, however, +theocracy grew all the stronger because of a mythological tradition, +later called Shinto, or “Way of the Gods,” centering +about a Sun Goddess (Amaterasu). There were many aspects +to Shinto, including an early nature worship. But its main +feature came to be the story of the Sun Goddess, whose +descendants were the Japanese people. Early in their history the +rulers of Japan raised this myth to the dignity of a state cult. +The chieftain of the Yamato clan, the strongest of all, claimed +direct descent from the Sun Goddess. This claim was a very +<span class="pagenum">[16]</span>real thing in Japan. It was taken much more literally than our +vaguer Western idea of “the divine right of kings,” which persisted +until the eighteenth century in Europe.</p> + +<p>The clansmen were aristocrats who handed on their privileges +from father to son, and to whom war was second nature. +But agriculture, in the shape of the cultivation of rice, was +already a cornerstone in the economy of this early Japanese +society. Under the clansmen were “guilds” of farmers and artisans, +who did most of the productive work. Membership in +these producing units also passed from father to son. These +serfs, as well as a smaller number of actual slaves, were made +up largely of war captives, conquered natives, or immigrants +from Korea.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp93" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_017.jpg" alt="The clan ruler at the top of society, followed by warrior and priest, then guilds of artisans & farmers, with slaves at the bottom."> + <figcaption> + <p>JAPAN’S EARLY SOCIETY (5-6th CENTURIES)</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>The chief ideas of this primitive Shinto society are quite +clear. There was a strong emphasis on the hereditary principle. +The idea of an aristocracy of the blood was strengthened by +the idea of descent from the gods. Government was by men, +not by law. The clan or group, not the individual, was important. +The mass of the people lived to serve their rulers. We +shall see how these primitive ideas—so like the totalitarian ideas +of today—have influenced Japanese history through the +centuries.</p> + + +<h3>BEGINNINGS OF A NATION-STATE</h3> + +<p>At first the invading clans were not unified. There was little +centralized government. The Yamato chieftain had only a +shadowy authority over the other clans. He was “first among +equals,” rather than an overlord. He controlled directly the +territory held by his own clan, but not the lands of other clans. +Nor did his religious authority extend far beyond his own clan.</p> + +<p>During the first four or five centuries of the Christian era +this picture was steadily changing. Most of central and western +Japan was conquered and occupied as the result of a long series +of wars. The power of the Yamato clan was growing. Its +<span class="pagenum">[17]</span>chieftain was becoming the ruler of a centralized state. His +position was approaching that of a king. Lesser leaders were +being attached to this “Emperor,” and were assuming the role +of ministers at the “court.”</p> + +<p>In other ways, too, the various clans were merging into a +centralized state. The Emperor, as the direct descendant of the +Sun Goddess, came to be recognized as divine ruler of the +whole Japanese people. More and more the Japanese thought +of themselves as a single patriarchal family, headed by “the +Sovereign that is a manifest God.” Ancestors of the other clan +leaders, also divine, were brought into relation with those of the +Emperor, but in subordinate rank. The strongest clans were +able to claim descent from deities closely associated with the +Sun Goddess.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[18]</span></p> + + +<h3>CONQUESTS IN KOREA</h3> + +<p>These political and religious changes were the outward signs +of an underlying movement of growth and expansion. A larger +and larger area of the islands was being occupied. The population +was growing, and additional economic units, or “guilds,” +were being formed. Japanese armies were fighting in Korea, +where they dominated the southern region of the peninsula +for long periods. Through this contact with the mainland, a +stream of Korean immigrants, and even some Chinese, flowed +into Japan. Many of them were educated scribes, Buddhist +priests or expert artisans. By the fifth century the Japanese +had learned the rudiments of Chinese writing, and in the sixth +century Buddhism was officially introduced from Korea. The +wealth of Chinese civilization was thus opened up to the +Japanese people.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp93" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_019.jpg" alt="Korea transplanted Chinese culture to Japan through Korean immigrants to Japan and Japanese footholds in Korea."> + <figcaption> + <p>INTERCOURSE WITH KOREA 5-6th Centuries</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + + +<h3>THE OLD ORDER BREAKS DOWN</h3> + +<p>By the sixth century, Japan faced new and difficult problems. +Old forms of government were breaking down. The simple +clan rule, based on blood ties, was being upset by migrations +within, and immigration from without. New leaders were faking +their family trees, in order to claim divine descent. The +clan chieftains found their priestly control over the people +slipping, and had to try the use of political and military +power instead.</p> + +<p>Special difficulties arose when new areas were conquered, or +large numbers of immigrants arrived. There were disputes +between clans, some of which favored “guilds” and some a +freer order of serfs. The Imperial clan proved able to get the +richest of the new areas, and to extend the lands and increase +the people under its control. But this did not settle the problem. +For the leading clans tried to control the Emperor, and fought +over rival claimants to the throne.</p> + +<p>These bitter quarrels threatened to tear the new state apart. +<span class="pagenum">[19]</span>A more effective centralization, both of economic and political +power, had obviously become necessary. The groundwork had +been laid, and the times called for a drastic change. The model +was sought in China, then flourishing under the T’ang Dynasty +(618-907 A.D.).</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[20]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_20"> + III. Imitating the Chinese + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>One of the most dramatic episodes of modern history has been +Japan’s adoption of Western institutions and techniques. But +the interesting thing is that such wholesale borrowings were +not new in the history of Japan. More than a thousand years +earlier she had drawn similarly on Chinese civilization. That +earlier period, moreover, was akin to the later in one significant +respect—the old Japanese ways persisted under the new shell. +The changes were only skin-deep. And the more important +beliefs and practices that featured the early clan society we +have been studying continued to govern Japanese behavior.</p> + +<p>Japan’s contacts with China had begun well before the seventh +century, the period when they became so marked. At first +these contacts had been only secondhand, through Korea. +Direct relations with China had been established early in the +fifth century, but had remained unofficial. The first official +Japanese envoy was sent to the Sui Dynasty in 607 A.D., and +a second embassy followed in 608. In the two centuries after +630, no less than twelve Japanese embassies visited the T’ang +court at Ch’ang-an, located on the site of the modern city of +Sian (see <a href="#i_021">map opposite</a>). These two hundred years were +China’s golden age, when dazzling Ch’ang-an was the world’s +foremost civilized center. Japanese monks and scholars accompanied +the embassies, often remaining in China for long periods +of study. They brought back to Japan a thorough knowledge +of Chinese culture—much as Japanese students have returned +from Western countries with new knowledge and skills during +the past eighty years or so.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="i_021" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_021.jpg" alt="This map shows Japan interacted with the mainland both through Korea and directly to T’ang China."> + <figcaption> + <p>ROUTES TO THE CONTINENT 7-8th CENTURIES</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + + +<h3>CHINA BECOMES THE “GLASS OF FASHION”</h3> + +<p>Chinese civilization, during the seventh and eighth centuries, +was transplanted to Japan on a vast scale. Nara, the new Japanese +capital (see <a href="#i_021">map opposite</a>), was built on the lavish model +<span class="pagenum">[21]</span>of Ch’ang-an. Court society became highly sophisticated. The +ability to write a good Chinese hand, or turn a Chinese verse, +was the indispensable equipment of an educated man. The first +national histories of Japan were written—most of them in the +Chinese language. Buddhism flourished. Japanese artistic skill +expressed itself in masterpieces of sculpture and architecture, +modeled on T’ang examples but individual in genius and execution. +Native Japanese poetry flowered and, in general, this +was the classic age of Japanese culture.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp46" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_023.jpg" alt="This is a sculpture of a seated figure in a T’ang style."> + <figcaption> + <p>“Japanese artistic skill expressed itself in masterpieces of sculpture ... modeled on T’ang examples.”</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In the field of government the Japanese also imitated the +T’ang system. They declared the land “nationalized”—or subject +only to the Emperor’s control. They reorganized local government, +putting Imperial officials in direct control, especially +of tax revenues. In China such officials were chosen through an +examination system, so examinations were introduced in Japan. +<span class="pagenum">[22]</span>The Emperor was now, in theory at least, the all-powerful +head of the Japanese state.</p> + + +<h3>BUT IT’S CHINA—“WITH A DIFFERENCE”</h3> + +<p>These reforms were not amateurish. They were based on a +good knowledge of the principles and practices of the Chinese +system. Yet in their pure Chinese form they worked against +certain ingrained Japanese ideas, most of all the hereditary principle. +So, from the beginning, the Japanese changed the Chinese +system as they took it over. The changes may not have seemed +great at the time, but they were really basic. Within a few centuries, +the new institutions had produced an entirely different +result in Japan. Only in form did they bear any resemblance +to the institutions of China.</p> + +<p>The clearest example of such changes is the way Japan’s +statesmen treated the Chinese examination system. In China, at +its best, this was a real civil service system. For centuries the +path to public office lay through success in the examinations. +Sons of great families undoubtedly had a better chance of succeeding, +and bribery and favoritism were rife in decadent +periods. But the “success story” of the Horatio Alger type fills +Chinese literature. In not a few cases, the poor but brilliant +Chinese youth passes the examinations with honors, and +becomes a powerful and wealthy official.</p> + + +<h3>THE ARISTOCRAT’S PLACE IN THE SUN</h3> + +<p>This system was altogether too democratic for Japan’s clan +society, with its emphasis on aristocratic lineage. At the very +outset it was drastically modified. Training schools were set up, +but only nobles of a certain rank could enter them. These persons +alone could take the examinations, and qualify for high +office. After a time, even the examinations were discontinued. +Important government posts soon became hereditary again. +Lower posts in the provinces were usually taken by local leaders, +<span class="pagenum">[24]</span>instead of officers sent by the Imperial government. The +higher provincial officials meanwhile stayed at court, and +delegated their powers to personal followers in the various +localities.</p> + +<p>A similar development took place in the case of the land +reforms. The land was “nationalized,” but it proved impossible +to preserve the public domain. The great estates of the clan +leaders were returned to them in payment for their official services, +and then remained hereditary. Powerful individuals +encroached on the public lands, or impoverished peasants +escaped tax exactions by joining their lands to privately owned +manors, and becoming serfs. In practice, the public domain +was gradually taken over by private families, the court nobility +or the great monasteries.</p> + + +<h3>THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE</h3> + +<p>As these private estates were usually tax-free, the Imperial government +was soon deprived of its revenue. And so, as time went +on, the Emperor became a mere figurehead. Elaborate state +councils and ministries, patterned after those of China, became +nothing more than ceremonial forms. Yet centralization was +maintained for several centuries, with the great Fujiwara family +as the real power behind the throne. This family held vast +provincial estates, controlled many of the local officials, and +dominated the court. By wedding the Imperial princes to Fujiwara +ladies, it reduced the Emperors to puppets. The Fujiwara +dictatorship ruled a much more intricate and cultured society +than had existed in the early clan period. On the surface, this +new society was Chinese; in fact, it was still run in the old +Japanese way.</p> + +<p>Changes there had been, however. The courtier had replaced +the warrior. Instead of fighting clan chieftains, a bureaucracy +of civilians now ruled. Buddhism had pervaded Japanese society +from top to bottom. The teachings of Confucius had also been +<span class="pagenum">[25]</span>introduced from China. For a time the home-grown Shinto +religion was overshadowed, and lay dormant. But it was not +wholly eclipsed. The Emperor reigned, if he did not rule. +Though the Shinto ritual, playing up the Emperor’s descent +from the Sun Goddess, might be neglected, it was never lost. +Japanese government was still theocratic (centering on a priest-king), +even if a Fujiwara pulled the strings and bureaucrats +played all the active roles.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_25"> + IV. Japan Bars Her Door + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>We must now leap several centuries to about 1550, when the +first Western traders and missionaries reached Japan.</p> + +<p>The Japan of 1550 differed greatly from the Japan of the +Fujiwara era we left behind us five or six centuries earlier. +The Fujiwara power had passed away in the twelfth century. +Its civilian government had grown weak. It could not even +keep the peace. As disorder grew in the provinces, great independent +lords surrounded themselves with military retainers on +their private estates. A feudal society gradually emerged. In +1185 one of these feudal lords established his supremacy over +the others, and soon obtained Imperial appointment as “Shogun,” +or Generalissimo. The Emperor’s court still carried on +at Kyoto, but political control passed increasingly to the Shoguns, +who became military dictators. A military aristocracy—but +a rapidly shifting one—dominated Japan. As new feudal +lords grew in strength, they would challenge the Shogun’s +authority and bitter civil wars would follow. Strife and disorder +amounting to anarchy marked the century which preceded +1550.</p> + +<p>Then the trend was reversed. By 1590, through the work of +three great leaders—Nobunaga, Hideyoshi and Ieyasu—the +<span class="pagenum">[26]</span>country was unified again. In the brief period that followed—say, +until 1625—Japan was confronted with a fateful question. +Should it embark on a program of military and commercial +expansion, similar to that which Western nations were just +entering upon? For a time it seemed that the answer might be +“yes.” In the end, it was “no.” And that “no” changed the +whole course of Far Eastern and perhaps world history. In 1603 +Ieyasu established the Tokugawa Shogunate, destined to rule +Japan for more than 250 years. After 1616, under his successors, +the seclusion policy was gradually adopted, and Japan was +practically isolated from the outside world.</p> + +<p>Was this choice inevitable? We cannot really tell. We do +know that in the period just before she barred her door Japan +was reaching outward toward full intercourse with the West.</p> + + +<h3>REACHING OUTWARD</h3> + +<p>For the last thirty years of the sixteenth century were a +dynamic period in Japanese history. An excess of energy in +Japan seemed to match the urge for discovery and conquest +that stirred the rising nations of Europe.</p> + +<p>Japan’s domestic and foreign trade had been increasing at a +rapid pace. Native industries had grown, and trade guilds had +flourished. After 1550 this commercial development leaped forward. +Sakai, a great trading center, became virtually a free city, +ruled by its merchant princes. Nagasaki was opened to foreign +trade in 1570, and soon developed into a thriving port. At this +time, too, Japanese ships, often on piratical expeditions, were +venturing into the waters of the Philippines and Siam. In groups +and as individuals, Japanese emigrants were found at various +ports in southeast Asia. Hideyoshi even conceived the project +of conquering China, but after overrunning Korea in 1592-93, +his armies (numbering 150,000 men) were defeated.</p> + +<p>After 1550 missionaries and traders from Portugal, Spain, +Holland and England came to Japan in growing numbers. The +<span class="pagenum">[27]</span>Japanese eagerly seized upon Western products and technical +advances, notably in firearms and shipbuilding. These commercial +contacts with the West modified Japan’s economy and +stimulated her industrial development. For several decades +Christianity, introduced by St. Francis Xavier in 1549-51, was +welcomed. Some of the feudal lords became Christians. By 1617 +there were some 300,000 Christian converts, or nearly as many +as today.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp73" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_027.jpg" alt="This map shows Japanese invaders, traders, pirates and settlers going to Korea, Ming China, Siam, and the Philippines."> + <figcaption> + <p>JAPAN’S OVERSEAS ADVENTURES 16-17th CENTURIES</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[28]</span></p> + + +<h3>JAPAN SENDS ENVOYS TO SPAIN</h3> + +<p>For a time, there was the possibility of even more extensive +contacts between Tokugawa Japan and the West. Ieyasu, the +first Tokugawa Shogun, deliberately sought to make Japan a +great center of international trade. China, mindful of Hideyoshi’s +Korean invasions, rebuffed him. He then turned to the +West—that is, to Spain, then the richest trading nation of +Europe. In 1610 Ieyasu concluded a commercial treaty with +the Spanish governor of the Philippines. In 1610 and 1614 Japanese +envoys crossed the Pacific and visited some of the Spanish +possessions in America. Then they went on across the Atlantic. +In Madrid the Japanese envoy had an audience with King +Philip III on January 30, 1615; later, he saw the Pope at Rome. +The Spanish king, however, influenced by the anti-Christian +persecutions that had already occurred in Japan, rejected +Ieyasu’s request for a treaty establishing trade relations with +Spain and the Spanish-American possessions.</p> + + +<h3>BUT FINALLY PULLS IN HER LINES</h3> + +<p>It was not until more than two centuries later that such an +opportunity presented itself again. For soon after Ieyasu’s death +in 1616, the policy of national seclusion was adopted.</p> + +<p>Many factors led to this decision. The narrow intolerance +of the missionaries, as well as conflicts between rival Jesuit and +Franciscan orders, had created difficulties almost from the +beginning of their stay in Japan. More important was the fear +that estates of the Christian lords might become centers of +rebellion, and thus lay Japan open to conquest by a foreign +power. Persecution began under Hideyoshi, and after 1616 a +series of anti-Christian edicts was issued. The Christian persecutions +reached their height in 1622-24, although Christianity +was not fully stamped out until 1638.</p> + +<p>At this time Japanese were forbidden to go abroad, and the +building of large sea-going vessels was also prohibited. All foreign +<span class="pagenum">[29]</span>traders and priests either left Japan or were expelled. A +small Dutch trading center, restricted after 1641 to the islet +patch of Deshima, was all that remained of the early period of +intercourse with the West. By 1650 the policy of national seclusion, +introduced by the Shoguns of the Tokugawa clan, was in +full force. It was maintained until after the middle of the nineteenth +century, or well into the modern era.</p> + + +<h3>THE DUTCH OASIS ON DESHIMA</h3> + +<p>We should be on guard, however, against some common errors +about this important period in Japan’s history. The term +“hermit nation” must not be taken too literally. Seclusion was +not complete. Through the Dutch settlement on Deshima, ideas +from Europe filtered into Japan. A small group of Japanese +scholars studied the Dutch language. In 1745 they prepared a +Dutch-Japanese dictionary, and in 1774 a Dutch textbook on +anatomy was translated. Of course, Japan did not keep abreast +of Western technical progress during the Tokugawa epoch. +But valuable beginnings were made, especially in language +study, medicine, geography, map-making and military science.</p> + +<p>Another common error associated with the idea of a “hermit +nation” is that Tokugawa Japan remained static for two hundred +years. In reality great internal changes occurred during +this period, some of which were fundamental. By 1850 Japan +was a very different country from what it had been in 1650.</p> + +<p>The seeming lack of development was most evident in the +Tokugawa political system. Its broad outlines did not, in fact, +change very much. The Emperor and his court were kept +secluded at Kyoto. The real center of government lay in +Tokyo, where the Shoguns and their ministers ruled. Most +of the land was owned by the Tokugawa family and the great +feudal lords (<em>daimyo</em>) closely associated with it. About three-eighths, +however, was owned by the “outer lords,” such as +Choshu and Satsuma. These “outer lords” were viewed as +<span class="pagenum">[30]</span>potential rebels, and were denied posts in the central administration. +All of the feudal lords had to spend certain months in +attendance on the Shogun at Tokyo, and had to leave their +families there as hostages when they went back to their own +lands.</p> + + +<h3>FOUR CLASSES OF SOCIETY</h3> + +<p>Efforts were made to draw strict class lines. The feudal lords +and their military retainers, or <em>samurai</em>, held the highest rank. +The farmers came next, but they were severely taxed and +harshly treated. The townspeople were looked upon as the +lowest class of all. A <em>samurai</em> had the right to cut down a +merchant with his sword, but very early in the Tokugawa +period he learned to respect the power of the merchant’s +purse.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp92" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_031.jpg" alt="This is an illustration of the dress and tools for the different classes"> + <figcaption> + <p>JAPAN’S PRE-RESTORATION SOCIETY</p> + <p>DAIMYO (A Feudal Lord) Ruler but heavily in debt</p> + <p>SAMURAI (Military Retainers) Poor but proud</p> + <p>PEASANTS Poor and downtrodden</p> + <p>MERCHANTS Despised but wealthy</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Yet all measures to preserve a rigid centralized feudalism, +and to maintain Tokugawa rule, proved futile. Halfway +through the period serious economic problems began to appear. +By 1850 the whole system was on the verge of collapse.</p> + + +<h3>THE SHOGUNS FAIL TO CONTROL THE MERCHANTS</h3> + +<p>In their attempts to prevent change, the Shoguns were unable +to master one basic element in their society—trade and industry. +Even before the Tokugawa regime was established, as we have +seen, Japan’s commerce had already grown sizable. Foreign +trade was then cut off. But internal trade, stimulated by a long +period of peace, continued to develop. New luxury goods of +many varieties were produced, and industry prospered. The +merchant class in the cities grew wealthy and powerful. Large +business houses, including the present Mitsui firm, were +founded. Money, instead of rice, became the medium of +exchange. The transition to a money economy was gradual, +but it worked a revolution in Japanese society.</p> + +<p>Incomes of the <em>daimyo</em> and <em>samurai</em> were in rice. The rice had +<span class="pagenum">[31]</span>to be changed into money, and great exchange marts—similar +to our modern commodity exchanges—grew up in Osaka. The +rice brokers “rigged” prices. Dizzy price fluctuations occurred. +The feudal lords and their <em>samurai</em> fell into debt to the +rice brokers and the money lenders. Government intervention +did not help matters. The Shogunate either debased the coinage, +or tried vainly to control prices by decree. The farmers +suffered most of all—from the change to money, from the +price fluctuations, and from still heavier taxes when the feudal +lords became indebted to the merchants. After 1725 the number +of farmers declined; after 1750 peasant uprisings were +frequent.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[32]</span></p> + + +<h3>AND FACE A RISING REVOLT</h3> + +<p>In other ways, too, loyalty to the Shogunate was undermined. +The luxury of the towns stimulated a type of life quite the +opposite from that inspired by the Spartan ethical code, called +Bushido, of the <em>samurai</em>. Rich townspeople craved amusement—and +painting, the drama, and the novel flourished. No laws +could prevent the <em>samurai</em> from being drawn to this life, nor +could executing a more than usually lavish merchant or +usurer turn back the tide of the new age.</p> + +<p>Other intellectual currents were more acutely dangerous +to the Shogunate. Ancient history, literature and religion were +studied, and there was a revival of interest in Shintoism. From +these historical and literary schools there grew a political movement, +aimed at restoring the Emperor to his former place as +ruler of the nation.</p> + +<p>Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the country +was ripe for revolt. In the background lay the misery and distress +of the farmer. But the active promoters of this revolutionary +overthrow of the Shogunate were discontented groups +within the ruling class. Four of these groups banded together +to bring about the Restoration: (1) the “outer lords” of Choshu, +Satsuma and the other western fiefs; (2) the lesser +<em>samurai</em>, ambitious and energetic; (3) the merchants, who +desired removal of feudal restrictions on their business activities; +and (4) the court nobles of ancient lineage who still +clung to the Emperor at Kyoto. This was a powerful coalition, +and sooner or later it would undoubtedly have brought +down the Shogunate through its own strength. As it happened, +pressure on Japan from Western nations came to its aid and +hastened the outbreak of the revolt that was brewing inside +the country.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[33]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_33"> + V. How the Door Was Opened + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>By the nineteenth century, a new flood of Western influence +was sweeping into the Far East. As in the age of exploration +and discovery, the West was knocking at the door.</p> + +<p>In those earlier days, we must remember, the West had had +little to offer in the way of progress. In fact, in the arts and +in the graces of civilized life, the East could have given +pointers to the West. But now the West came strong in the +might of the industrial revolution. Master of machine technique, +it was turning out manufactured products in larger and +larger quantities. It was extending international trade by leaps +and bounds. It was seeking new markets and sources of raw +materials throughout the world. And the most powerful of the +Western countries were staking out colonies wherever they +could.</p> + + +<h3>A PERIOD OF TRANSITION</h3> + +<p>1853 to 1868 were the years of transition for Japan. They +were crowded with events that laid the cornerstone of the +modern Japanese Empire.</p> + +<p>Two broad trends were uppermost during these years. First, +there was the coming of the Western powers with their demand +for diplomatic relations, trade and intercourse—in a word, +for the end of the seclusion policy and the opening of Japan’s +door. Of course, the Shogun, as the ruling power, had the +job of dealing with the Western nations. Too weak to resist, +he had to give way. And his enemies at home seized on this +opportunity to discredit him. The second main trend, therefore, +was the sharpening of Japan’s internal conflict.</p> + +<p>The extraordinary thing about this internal conflict in Japan +was this. The groups opposing the Shogunate were revolutionaries: +they rejected the existing system and fought for a +new one. They sought progress for Japan—and progress meant +opening the country to Western influence. Yet in their struggle +<span class="pagenum">[34]</span>with the Shoguns they were all against the foreigner. The +reason is not far to seek. Anti-foreign demonstrations provided +a handy weapon for attacking and discrediting the Shogunate. +As we shall see later on, when it had served its purpose, this +weapon was dropped.</p> + +<p>But, meanwhile, let us look a little more closely at the two +broad trends we have mentioned. Let us see first how, by a +series of steps taken between 1853 and 1867, Japan’s door was +gradually opened.</p> + + +<h3>THE “UNEQUAL” TREATIES</h3> + +<p>What happened to Japan in her relations with the Western +powers at this time had previously happened to China. For +a long time there had been a closely regulated Western trade +at Canton. During the early nineteenth century this trade had +steadily expanded. China’s last-minute efforts to keep real control +in her own hands were unsuccessful. The Anglo-Chinese +war of 1839-42, and further conflicts in 1857-60, ended China’s +seclusion and forced the Manchu authorities to treat with the +Western powers on terms of diplomatic equality. The treaties +signed at this time—later called the “unequal” treaties—actually +established China’s <em>in</em>equality. Not only were new ports +opened to Western trade. But a fixed schedule of Chinese tariff +dues, usually not exceeding 5 per cent, was also enforced. In +addition, Western nationals were exempted from trial under +Chinese law. Instead, they were to be tried in courts set up +by their own consuls in China. This was the system known +as “extraterritoriality.”</p> + +<p>These events in China did not pass unnoticed in Japan. +Many of the Japanese leaders, despite the Shogunate’s policy +of isolation, were aware of what was happening in China. +They began to be alarmed over Japan’s future, fearing that the +Western powers would soon be knocking at Japan’s door. +And sure enough, very soon they were.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[35]</span></p> + + +<h3>COMMODORE PERRY BRINGS A LETTER</h3> + +<p>The visits of Commodore Perry’s squadron to Japan in 1853 +and 1854, bearing President Fillmore’s letter asking for the +opening of trade relations, were the prelude. Commodore +Perry secured the first treaty, on March 31, 1854. More important +was the commercial treaty (July 29, 1858) negotiated +by Townsend Harris, first American Minister to Japan. This +treaty opened five Japanese ports to Americans for trade +and residence, and—like the treaties with China—provided for +a fixed tariff schedule and extraterritoriality. It was the model +for similar agreements, also concluded in 1858, with England, +France, Russia and Holland. All of these treaties were signed +by the Shogun, but not by the Emperor. Later, as the Emperor’s +power grew, the opposition sought to prevent application +of the treaties on the ground that the Emperor had not +ratified them. In November 1865, however, an Allied naval +demonstration off Osaka forced the Emperor to give his +signature. Finally, in June 1866, a tariff convention set 5 per +cent as the duty on practically all imports and exports.</p> + +<p>We shall have to return to these treaties a little later. +For soon after the Restoration of the Emperor, they became +a galling yoke to the Japanese. The tariff and extraterritorial +provisions, in particular, were resented as shackles on the full +exercise of Japan’s sovereignty. Three long decades were to +pass before Japan gained enough strength, toward the close +of the century, to revise these unequal treaties.</p> + + +<h3>THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN JAPAN</h3> + +<p>At the time the treaties were negotiated, however, the issue was +not one of equality. The issue was whether there should be +any treaties at all. For many Japanese wanted no opening of +Japan’s door. After the first treaties, nevertheless, a growing +number of Westerners began to live in the ports opened to +foreigners. The cry to “expel the foreigner” was then raised. +<span class="pagenum">[36]</span>Coupled with this slogan was the challenging demand to +“revere the Emperor”—a direct call to revolution against the +Shogun. The whole country was aroused. It seethed with +internal strife and dissension, with plots and counter-plots, +and even with armed conflict.</p> + +<p>The anti-foreign movement was merely the spark that +set off a bonfire that had been long in the making. By 1850 +the Shogunate was nearly bankrupt. The feudal lords, or +<em>daimyo</em>, were in the same position. Most of their landed property +was mortgaged to the merchant-bankers—the rising +capitalist class. Thousands of <em>samurai</em> were poverty-stricken. +The condition of the peasantry, taxed more and more heavily +to pay for the debts of the feudal lords, was desperate. Even +the wealthy merchants, irked by feudal restrictions and the +social and political inferiority that was forced upon them, were +dissatisfied. The demand for change was growing broader and +deeper.</p> + + +<h3>SUPPORTERS OF THE EMPEROR</h3> + +<p>In Kyoto the Emperor had become the center of an active +and determined political movement. Its platform—anti-foreign +and anti-Tokugawa—called for the restoration of the Imperial +power. The court nobles and a growing number of the <em>samurai</em> +and feudal lords supported it. Wealthy merchant-banker families, +such as the Mitsui house, provided it with cash. Above +all, the movement was eventually backed by a coalition of the +western clans, notably those of Choshu and Satsuma. The part +these clans played, both in the Restoration movement and in +the later Imperial government, was decisive.</p> + + +<h3>THE ROLE OF THE WESTERN CLANS</h3> + +<p>These clans, you will remember, were ruled by so-called “outer +lords,” who were denied a part in the Tokugawa administration. +The fact that they were so far from the center of government +at Tokyo encouraged them to be independent. Moreover, +<span class="pagenum">[37]</span>they were in many respects the strongest and most +progressive of the leading Japanese clans. In developing manufacture +and trade as a means of boosting clan revenue, Satsuma, +Choshu, Tosa and Hizen were far ahead of other clans. They +fostered not only handicrafts, porcelain manufacture, sugar-refining +and textile mills, but mining, iron foundries, gun-making, +shipbuilding and allied military industries. Choshu +also made a revolutionary change in its army, by including +commoners as well as the <em>samurai</em> in its ranks.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp76" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_037.jpg" alt="The map shows the locations of a few of the more important feudal lords."> + <figcaption> + <p>THE RISE OF THE WESTERN CLANS (Mid-19th Century)</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>In these western clans, the anti-foreign spirit was at first +intense. For some years, in defiance of the Shogunate, the +<span class="pagenum">[38]</span>clans carried on what was practically an independent war +against the Western powers and the new treaty rights of +Westerners in Japan. They frequently attacked foreigners +and their employees. Things came to a head in 1863-64, when +they tried to expel the foreigners. In August 1863, in retaliation +for the murder of an Englishman by Satsuma clansmen, a +British squadron bombarded the Satsuma port of Kagoshima. +And in September 1864 an Allied fleet (British, Dutch, French, +American) destroyed Choshu forts at Shimonoseki which had +been firing on Western vessels passing through the narrow +straits.</p> + +<p>These decisive proofs of Western military and naval superiority +gave Satsuma and Choshu pause. Both clans stopped their +anti-foreign activities. They had long seen the need of acquiring +modern armaments. This determination was now made +doubly strong. Many other leaders came to see that Japan could +not keep her door shut forever, and that her salvation lay in +mastering Western techniques. Once having grasped this principle, +they acted on it boldly and unhesitatingly.</p> + + +<h3>THE RESTORATION</h3> + +<p>The Emperor’s prestige—and, indeed, actual authority—had +grown steadily throughout this transition period. As early as +1858, recognizing the Emperor’s new importance, the Shogun +sought his approval of greater intercourse with the West. In +1863 the Shogun even obeyed an Imperial summons to Kyoto. +The advent of a new Shogun and a new Emperor in 1867 +made the transfer of authority all the easier. In November 1867 +the new Shogun resigned, and on January 3, 1868 the Emperor +Meiji, backed by the western clans, formally assumed control +of the nation. Six months later the Tokugawa forces, taking the +field in opposition to the seizure of power by the western +clans, were defeated in pitched battle. A new Empire had +been founded.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[39]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_39"> + VI. Catching up with the West + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Great difficulties faced the early Meiji reformers. Their essential +task was to catch up with the West. For two centuries +Japan had kept to herself. During this period the Western +world had made gigantic technical advances, greater than man +had achieved in all preceding history. Japan had been left +far behind. She was forced to do in decades what the West +had done in centuries.</p> + +<p>How could Japan accomplish such a task? In both economy +and government she was still largely feudal and decentralized. +There was no real national state, as we understand that term +today. Instead, there were a hundred competing clans, each +with its own territorial lord. And over all lay the shadow of +Western aggression, dictating speed and more speed.</p> + + +<h3>TACKLING THE PROBLEM</h3> + +<p>From the outset of the Meiji era, anti-foreignism was dropped. +Emperor Meiji’s famous Charter Oath (April 6, 1868) contained +this statement: “Knowledge and learning shall be sought +for throughout the world in order to establish the foundations +of the Empire.”</p> + +<p>A period of borrowing from the West, comparable only to +the earlier imitation of China, set in. One after another, Japanese +official missions were sent abroad. Foreign advisers—British, +French, Dutch, German, American—were employed in +many different fields. Large numbers of Japanese students +entered the universities of Western countries. For a short +time imitation of the West went to extremes; in many externals, +Western ways became a fad. On the whole, however, there +was strict control over the process of borrowing, and careful +adaptation to Japanese needs.</p> + +<p>In keeping with Japan’s traditions, a limited group maintained +firm and despotic power at all times. The Meiji political +reforms clothed old ideas of government in new garments. +<span class="pagenum">[40]</span>Emperor Meiji (1868-1912) reigned again, and with some +degree of authority. But actual power during his long reign +lay in the hands of the small group of men who surrounded +him. There was no thoroughgoing mass upheaval, forcing +recognition of popular rights. Reforms were dictated from the +top down.</p> + + +<h3>THREE NEW TRENDS</h3> + +<p>The great changes which occurred during the Meiji era may +be grouped under three main headings. There were, in the first +place, the economic reforms which merged the old feudal +lords and <em>samurai</em> into a new society, and laid the foundations +of Japan’s modern industries. Then, there was a political movement +which led finally to the Emperor’s proclamation of a written +constitution. Finally, there was a cautious development of +foreign policy by which Japan, at first on the defensive, later +embarked on an expansionist program and fought its wars +with China and Russia. In this chapter we shall look at the +first of these trends.</p> + + +<h3>ABOLITION OF FEUDAL RIGHTS</h3> + +<p>Between 1868 and 1877 a series of basic reforms gave centralized +control to the Imperial government. The four western +clans returned their lands to the Emperor, thus enabling +him to order the other clans to do the same. In this way the +government took over the land taxes, the main source of +revenue. But the lords, though they no longer held the land +registers, were still political rulers in their feudal domains. +So, in 1871, an Imperial decree established prefectures, with +Imperial governors, in place of the old clan divisions. Finally, +the feudal lords lost their private armies. At first, the Imperial +government’s army consisted mainly of the military forces of +the western clans. By 1873, however, the government was able +to enforce a system of universal military service, and thus build +up a national conscript army under its own absolute control.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[41]</span></p> + +<p>Why, you ask, did the feudal lords accept so easily this +rapid loss of their former powers? In large part, it was a result +of the lead taken by the western clans, whose <em>samurai</em> statesmen +held the reins in the Imperial government. For they were prepared +to back the new measures with military action, if necessary. +But a second factor was equally important. The clan lords, +especially the great <em>daimyo</em>, were well paid for the surrender +of their old privileges. Their lands were not confiscated outright. +Large annual grants of money were allotted them out +of central revenues. But the payments originally promised in +this huge pension scheme turned out to be too heavy for the +central treasury to meet. The government therefore first reduced +the pensions and then, in 1876, compulsorily ended them +by means of lump-sum payments, in cash or short-term bonds. +Though this drastic scaling down of the original pension +scheme amounted to repudiating its earlier promises, the government +had no other way of avoiding bankruptcy. As it was, +the total cost of commuting the pensions came to nearly 211 +million yen—a large sum for that period. In many respects, this +way of dealing with the pensions laid the basis of the new +Japanese society which has since developed.</p> + + +<h3>LORDS INTO CAPITALISTS</h3> + +<p>The <em>daimyo</em>, or great feudal lords, did not fare so badly in the +financial settlement of 1876. They were relieved of all their +debts, and of their previous obligations to support their military +retainers, the <em>samurai</em>. They retained great slices of their +former lands, which they now held as private owners—that is, +with fewer responsibilities. Moreover, they acquired large sums +of money when the pensions were commuted. These sums +they invested in banks, stocks and industries, as well as in +landed estates. The <em>daimyo</em> were thus merged into the new +society, no longer as territorial rulers but as wealthy financial +magnates, controlling the economic life of the countryside.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[42]</span></p> + +<p>So, from their own point of view, commutation of the pensions +was a master-stroke by Japan’s new rulers. It helped to +throw caste distinctions of the old feudal type into the melting +pot. It won the allegiance of the clan lords to the new order +simply by making allegiance worth their while.</p> + + +<h3>THE LOT OF THE <em>SAMURAI</em></h3> + +<p>But in other respects this bold reform created a number of +serious difficulties. The <em>samurai</em> class as a whole was plunged +into great distress. A few of them, especially those from the +western clans, immediately won high positions in the new government. +But most of them were left to sink or swim in a +strange new world. Their small pension payments soon dribbled +away, and it was hard for them to find means of support. +They had other grievances. A law of 1877 forbade them +to wear their two swords—traditional mark of honor of the +<em>samurai</em> class. 1877, too, was the year when the <em>samurai</em> were +replaced by the new conscript army. During this critical year +a serious military revolt, centering in Satsuma but joined by all +the forces opposed to the new order, broke out. It was crushed +by the Imperial government’s new army, made up largely of +commoners and partly modernized. Thus the last challenge +to the new order was defeated.</p> + + +<h3>HARD TIMES FOR THE PEASANTS</h3> + +<p>The peasants had an even harder time than the <em>samurai</em>. +Many local peasant revolts took place in the years up to +1877. Imperial forces suppressed them, and so prevented the +peasants from indulging in mass confiscations of lands.</p> + +<p>Yet great changes were taking place. For the peasants were +no longer feudal serfs. They became landholders, and they +could serve in the army. But the individual peasant secured +only a very small plot of land. As a private owner, his situation +was most precarious. He had to face the risks of drought +<span class="pagenum">[43]</span>or flood, pay taxes in money instead of rice, and cope with +price changes in the market. His land soon had to be mortgaged, +and could then be taken away by foreclosure. Indeed, many +peasants quickly lost their lands in the early years of the new +order. By 1892 nearly 40 per cent of the total cultivated area +was worked by tenants. This proportion has persisted, while the +number of part-tenants has increased.</p> + +<p>Japanese agriculture, moreover, remained backward in technique +and social organization. The landlords became parasites. +Instead of working the land as a capitalist enterprise for profit, +they were intent only on drawing high rents—often as much as +60 per cent. This system had far-reaching effects on Japan.</p> + +<p>As the number of tenants grew, and the land became divided +into smaller and smaller plots, the farm areas in Japan became +overpopulated. Only a part of the unneeded farm workers +could find a place in industry. Competing for jobs, they kept +wages low. Low wages, of course, were a boon to industrial +development. But what industry gained in one way it lost in +another. For the farmers and the workers were too poor to +buy much. The country’s purchasing power grew only very +slowly. Thus the home market for factory products was limited, +and industry did not develop as fast as it might otherwise +have done. Very early Japan’s new factory industries had +to turn to the foreign market. As the limitations on Japan’s +home market have persisted down to the present time, the +pressure for foreign trade expansion has grown steadily more +urgent. Here is one underlying cause for Japan’s current policy +of military expansion.</p> + + +<h3>INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT</h3> + +<p>But changes in agriculture, as we have seen, did help to make +possible the growth of a modern Japanese industry. Peasants +who lost their lands, or artisans thrown out of work, became +available as factory workers. Here was industry’s labor force.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[44]</span></p> + +<p>Many other changes helped industry along. Foreign trade, +long prohibited, had begun to grow rapidly in the ’sixties. Clan +barriers to internal trade were leveled. Hundreds of different +kinds of money, issued by the various clans, had circulated. +These were now abolished, and a single national currency +instituted. Railways were built, and telephone and telegraph +systems laid down. These improvements made a freer sale and +exchange of goods throughout the country possible. Thus a +home market—even if a very limited one—was established.</p> + +<p>For the introduction of modern, large-scale industry, however, +two further things were needed—technique and capital. +Foreign experts, acting both as direct advisers in industry and +as instructors in the new technical schools, provided the first +of these requirements. The second was harder to fill. The banking-trader +houses and the pensioned-off lords had some capital. +But it was not enough to finance the big factory projects, +especially where quick profits seemed unlikely. So the Imperial +government had to step in and supply the capital in most of +the larger enterprises. It paid special attention to the armament +industries—mining, metallurgy, shipbuilding.</p> + + +<h3>NURSING INFANT INDUSTRIES</h3> + +<p>The clan bureaucrats in the government nursed the construction +of this new industrial plant with extreme care and pride. +Many of them fell in love with machinery and engineering +technique. They worked closely with the great business houses, +grafting industry on to firms that had been mainly concerned +with trade or banking. The budding capitalists were not financially +strong enough to develop industry by themselves. So +the clan statesmen took them into partnership. It was the clan +statesmen, however, who headed the combination—an important +factor in Japan’s political growth, then and later.</p> + +<p>But the clansmen did not wish to keep all industry under +government control. They only wanted to see that it developed +<span class="pagenum">[45]</span>quickly. Then the businessmen could handle it, or at least +all but the strategic industries. The government kept control +of railways, telephones, telegraphs, arsenals and naval shipyards. +But in the case of many other industries, it supplied +the capital and started their development, then turned them +back to the great business houses, often at very low prices. +In this way the capitalists were spoon-fed by the government. +Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and other houses obtained ready-made +facilities in many fields—cotton-spinning mills, glass and +cement factories, mining enterprises, shipyards. The giant Mitsubishi +monopoly in commercial shipping, for example, got its +start through the gift and cheap purchase of government +vessels.</p> + +<p>By 1890 some 200 steam factories were in operation in +Japan. The development of a machine industry was making +good headway.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_45"> + VII. Who Rules Modern Japan? + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>We are now able to distinguish the main groups which were to +rule the modern Japanese Empire. Within the quarter century +from 1853 to 1877 a new leadership had emerged.</p> + +<p>True to Japan’s history and tradition, control was concentrated +in a few hands. The ruling group was composed of the +clan leaders, dominating the government bureaucracy (since +grown to nearly 500,000 office holders); the old feudal lords +with great landed estates; and the business group—bankers, +traders and industrialists.</p> + + +<h3>HAND IN GLOVE</h3> + +<p>At the head of this partnership were the clan leaders, and a +few representatives of the old court nobility. The clan bureaucrats, +as they came to be called, held the influential posts in +<span class="pagenum">[46]</span>the new Imperial government. To a large extent, their dictatorial +powers carried on the old feudal tradition. Many of +them were civilians, but they also controlled the army (Choshu) +and the navy (Satsuma). The business people, on the other +hand, especially in the beginning, were definitely in a subordinate +position. It was the government which controlled +most of the early industrial enterprises, as we have seen. Not +until much later, after the World War of 1914-18, did trade +and industry reach a size which enabled the capitalists to +make themselves felt politically.</p> + +<p>It was the existence of the “upper crust” and the inferior +status of business that largely determined the character of +the new political institutions established during the Meiji era. +They were designed, it is true, to serve the purposes of the +whole combination of ruling groups. But at the same time +the clan bureaucrats took good care to set up the machinery +they needed to perpetuate their own supremacy.</p> + + +<h3>CONSERVATIVES VS. LIBERALS</h3> + +<p>For a decade after the Restoration of 1868, an outright dictatorship +functioned in Japan. The powers of the clansmen +were almost unlimited. Within the ruling group itself, however, +there were wide differences of opinion on some points. One +important question was what institutional forms the new government +should adopt. Headed by Itagaki (a Tosa <em>samurai</em>), the +more liberal reformers wanted to set up a fully representative +government modeled on the advanced Western democracies. +But most of the clansmen opposed such a radical step. In the +end, however, the conservatives accepted the necessity of a +<em>written</em> constitution—which they drew up themselves.</p> + +<p>Even this concession was made grudgingly, and only after +it had become absolutely necessary. But several factors worked +in favor of the liberals. The prestige of Western institutions +was high at this period. An article in the Emperor’s Charter +<span class="pagenum">[47]</span>Oath, moreover, was interpreted as a pledge to inaugurate a +“deliberative assembly.” Quoting this pledge, the liberals +started a political campaign which won considerable support. +Finally, the rising capitalists needed a representative system in +order to secure a real voice in the government. Despite all +these advantages, in the end the liberals were outmaneuvered +in the political arena. They obtained a constitution, it is true, +but one which was written and imposed by the conservative +clansmen. The result was not a democratic Bill of Rights +but a highly autocratic document. With but few exceptions, the +liberals’ failure at this time was characteristic of Japan’s later +history.</p> + + +<h3>THE LIBERALS LOSE</h3> + +<p>The political struggle reached its climax in the second decade +after the Restoration. In the press and on the public platform, +the liberals waged their campaign. In 1878 they succeeded in +getting provincial assemblies with limited powers, and in +1880 local (town, city and village) assemblies. In 1881, riots +followed the exposure of graft in the central administration. +To save their position, the conservatives had the Emperor issue +a declaration promising a National Assembly in 1890—nine +years ahead.</p> + +<p>But the political struggle did not abate. It now turned on +what should be the terms of the constitution which was to +establish the elective assembly. The conservatives meanwhile +took strong measures against the opposition. They strictly +enforced laws curbing the press. They suppressed Itagaki’s +political party in 1884. In 1887 martial law was proclaimed in +Tokyo, and the opposition leaders were driven from the capital. +In this way the conservative bureaucrats got a free hand in +drafting the new constitution and putting it over.</p> + +<p>Hirobumi Ito, its main architect, had gone abroad in 1882 to +study Western constitutional practices. He was greatly impressed +<span class="pagenum">[48]</span>by Bismarck, and took the Prussian Constitution as his +model. First, certain preparatory changes were made. A +nobility of five orders was established in 1884, and a Cabinet +in 1885. A civil service was started, and in 1887 a Supreme +War Council was set up to advise the Emperor on military +and naval affairs. In 1888 Ito became president of the Privy +Council, which was given authority to revise the draft constitution +he had prepared. Ito’s work of framing the document +was carried out “in absolute secrecy.” After it had been read +in private to a small group of officials, the Emperor promulgated +the new constitution on February 11, 1889. The first elections +to the Imperial Diet were held in 1890.</p> + + +<h3>A GIFT OF THE EMPEROR</h3> + +<p>The Constitution was a “gift” of the Emperor. It was not +intended to establish popular government. Its preamble emphasized +the old theocratic (priest-king) traditions of Japan. +The Emperor “inherited” the right to rule “from Our Ancestors,” +and ruled “in lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal.” +Ito and his colleagues not only incorporated these traditional +ideas into the Constitution. They made them the cornerstone +of the new system of universal education, and thus instilled +them in the mass of the Japanese people. Reverence for the +Emperor as a divine ruler helped enormously to keep the new +regime solidly in place.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp81" id="i_049" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_049.jpg" alt="This is a diagram of the ruling system described in the text."> + <figcaption> + <p>JAPAN’S RULING SYSTEM<br> THE GOVERNMENT UNDER ITO’S CONSTITUTION</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Practically all the government’s powers, both civil and military, +were vested in the Emperor. Vast economic power +bolstered his political authority. No longer, as on occasion in +feudal times, could the Emperor become penniless. For court +expenses, the Imperial Family receives an annual grant of +4,500,000 yen (more than a million dollars). Its holdings in +lands and blocks of shares, estimated at over one billion yen, +provide a large additional income. So it is one of the wealthiest +families in Japan.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[49]</span></p> + + +<h3>THE EMPEROR MUST BE “CONSTITUTIONAL”</h3> + +<p>The Emperor’s powers are exercised on the advice of his +ministers, in accordance with constitutional practice. He is not +supposed to act on his own authority. Real power, therefore, +resides not in the Emperor but in his advisers, acting through +the agencies set up by the Constitution. On the surface, these +agencies <em>seem</em> to establish a system of representative government. +There is a Cabinet, and a Diet with two houses—the +<span class="pagenum">[50]</span>House of Peers and the House of Representatives. And political +parties like those of the Western democracies soon formed to +contest elections in Japan.</p> + +<p>But there the resemblance ends. There is not only the supposedly +divine power of the Emperor. The democratic forms +themselves are a shell, empty of the real meat of popular +government. In all effective representative systems, as we well +know, the legislature—particularly its lower house—has real +authority. Not so under Ito’s Constitution. Ito ranged an overwhelming +battery of aristocratic, bureaucratic and militarist +influence in five powerful agencies of government. You can see +from our chart on <a href="#i_049">page 49</a> what these agencies were. They +completely eclipsed the House of Representatives. Moreover, +they often dominated the Cabinet, or disputed its authority. +And through them, as much as through the Cabinet, the clansmen +ruled Japan with a tight rein. Let us see how each worked +out in practice.</p> + + +<h3>NON-POPULAR AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT</h3> + +<p>First, there were the Elder Statesmen (or <em>Genro</em>). They were a +body completely outside the Constitution. Survivors of the +early Meiji clansmen, they had prestige and experience. For +several decades after 1900 they held the government in the hollow +of their hands. They made and unmade Cabinets, shuffled +the Premiership among themselves, decided on war and peace. +Their last representative, Prince Saionji, died in November +1940 at the age of 92. So from now on there will be no more +<em>Genro</em> to be reckoned with.</p> + +<p>Next comes the Imperial Household Ministry. Two officials +here occupy key positions. The Lord Keeper of the Privy +Seal holds the seals which must be affixed to state documents. +And the Minister of the Imperial Household has charge of +matters connected with the Imperial Family. These men are +not only themselves powerful advisers of the Emperor. But +<span class="pagenum">[51]</span>appointments to see the Emperor must be made through them. +So at times they have been able to bar their political opponents +from reaching the Imperial ear. Usually they hold office for +life or until they wish to resign.</p> + +<p>The Privy Council is likewise a useful piece of machinery +for Japan’s ruling group. It is the supreme advisory body to +the Emperor. It consists of 26 life members, usually of great +age. Cabinet Ministers serve as members of the Council <i lang="la">ex-officio</i>, +but are outvoted by at least two to one. Among other +things, the Privy Council ratifies treaties, approves amendments +to the Constitution, and passes on Imperial ordinances.</p> + +<p>The House of Peers consists of about 400 members, of whom +more than 200 are drawn from the nobility, 125 are life appointees, +and nearly 70 are elected from the largest taxpayers. +It is an extremely aristocratic and conservative body. Yet its +powers equal those of the lower house. And its members can +become Premiers or Cabinet Ministers.</p> + +<p>Lastly, the Army and Navy, with their General Staffs and +their representatives on the Supreme War Council, are largely +independent of civilian control. The chiefs of the General +Staffs and the War and Navy Ministers have direct access to +the Emperor. This means that they can go over the Premier’s +head to appeal any decision of his to the Emperor. The War +and Navy Ministers cannot be civilians. They must be ranking +officers in active service. Since they are nominated by the +Supreme War Council, the latter body can overthrow a Cabinet +by simply ordering them to resign. Or it can prevent the formation +of a new Cabinet which it does not like by refusing to +offer nominations for the War and Navy Ministries.</p> + + +<h3>THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATIVES</h3> + +<p>As against these aristocratic, bureaucratic and military organs +of government, the popular will can be expressed only through +the House of Representatives. The position of the House is +<span class="pagenum">[52]</span>very weak, especially in comparison with the normal legislature +of a full-fledged democracy.</p> + +<p>For Ito saw fit to curb the powers of the Diet’s lower house +by a series of drastic restrictions. Large fixed, or non-votable, +expenditures limit its control over the public purse. If appropriations +are not voted, the Cabinet has the right to enforce +the preceding year’s budget. Most bills are introduced not by +Diet members but by the Cabinet, which also possesses an +absolute veto. Moreover, the Cabinet can issue Imperial ordinances +which, with few qualifications, have the force of law. +It can dissolve the lower house, and thus force an election—an +expensive proceeding for the deputies. And for several +decades only part of the people could vote. Not until 1925 was +full manhood suffrage (age 25) adopted. During elections the +Home Ministry has often intimidated the voters. And popular +rights are further curbed by a controlled press, a strong centralized +police force, a large degree of central domination of +local government, and the possibility that one may be arrested +and held indefinitely without trial (because Japan has no <i lang="la">habeas +corpus</i> law).</p> + +<p>The development of a Cabinet with independent power, +responsible to the lower house of the Diet, would seem impossible +under these circumstances. Entrenched positions were +held by the aristocrats, the bureaucrats and the militarists. +For if they did not control the Cabinet, always a necessary +citadel of power, they could be sure of bringing about its +downfall. A responsible Cabinet did emerge in the post-war +years. But, as we shall see, this period was short-lived. After +1930, largely through the pressure of the militarists, the +pendulum swung back.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[53]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_53"> + VIII. Creating a Modern Empire + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>By 1890, when the first Diet elections were held, the foundations +of a new Empire had been laid. In the few short years +since 1868, the old feudal society had undergone a profound +change. Agriculture was still the key to Japan’s economy, +but factory industry and foreign trade were growing in importance. +A strong centralized state had come into being. +Modern methods were revolutionizing science, education, +medicine, law and many other fields. There was an army recruited +through universal service and trained in Western ways, +and the beginnings of a modern navy.</p> + + +<h3>JAPAN LOOKS ABROAD</h3> + +<p>The Meiji statesmen were now ready to turn their attention +to foreign policy. Even before the Restoration many of the +Japanese leaders had favored territorial expansion. During the +years of internal reform, however, they had cautiously refrained +from rash adventures abroad. A strong movement in +favor of a punitive expedition to Korea had developed in 1871-73, +but the dominant clan bureaucrats had skilfully prevented +the outbreak of war. They had permitted a Formosan expedition +in 1874, but had settled the resulting issues peacefully +with China. Some small gains had been made. The Bonin +Islands were annexed in 1876, and the Liuchiu Islands in 1879. +A naval demonstration in 1876 secured to Japan special treaty +rights in Korea, which led to more and more intervention in +Korean affairs.</p> + +<p>But these were not the foreign problems which chiefly +occupied the early Meiji leaders. First and foremost, they were +trying to change the unequal treaties concluded with the +Western powers at the end of the Tokugawa period. These +treaties, you will remember, permitted Western nationals to +be tried in their own consular courts (the system of extraterritoriality), +<span class="pagenum">[54]</span>and fixed Japan’s tariff at the low rate of 5 per cent. +The struggle to throw off these irksome restrictions was the +central issue in Japan’s foreign relations down to 1894.</p> + + +<h3>FIGHTING THE UNEQUAL TREATIES</h3> + +<p>The Japanese made many efforts to regain control of both +tariffs and courts before they finally won success. An official +mission under Prince Iwakura toured Western capitals in 1871-73 +but failed to gain treaty revision. As other attempts also came +to nothing, an intense popular resentment developed in Japan. +In 1889, just when his negotiations for treaty revision were +progressing favorably, a bomb tore off Count Okuma’s leg. +Success was not won, however, until a new treaty was concluded +with Great Britain on July 16, 1894. The other powers +soon followed suit. Japan’s law courts had been modernized, +and she now enforced new civil, commercial and criminal +codes. In 1899, when the new treaties went into effect, all +Westerners became subject to Japanese law. These treaties +thus brought the extraterritorial system to an end. But they +all contained tariff schedules that lasted for 12 years, so that +Japan did not secure full control over her own tariffs until +the treaties expired in 1911.</p> + + +<h3>WAR WITH CHINA</h3> + +<p>On July 25, 1894, nine days after signature of the “equal” +treaty with Great Britain, Japanese naval forces suddenly +attacked and sank a transport carrying Chinese troops to +Korea. War was formally declared on August 1. Thus, by an +unusual coincidence, Japan was at war with China two weeks +after she had won her twenty-five-year campaign for treaty +revision.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp56" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_055.jpg" alt="This map shows Japan and its tributaries."> + <figcaption> + <p>IN QUEST OF EMPIRE (1876-1923)</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>Japan’s statesmen had correctly estimated the weakness of +China, as well as their own degree of preparedness. They did +not plunge into war on a hasty impulse. The army and navy +<span class="pagenum">[56]</span>were tuned for action. With harsh realism, the Japanese leaders +unhesitatingly adopted a program of expansion by force as +soon as conditions seemed favorable. Their fight for treaty +revision had been a fight for equality with the Western powers. +They believed that even fuller recognition of equality would +come after a successful war. They were also driven by strong +economic considerations. The restrictions of the narrow home +market were already irking Japan’s youthful cotton textile +export houses, and they were trying to pry their way into the +Korean and Chinese markets. Victory in the Sino-Japanese +War of 1894-95 opened both these markets to Japanese manufacturers. +It was a significant omen of the future that the new +Japan should have discovered, so early in its career, that resort +to the sword might help to overcome the handicaps of its late +appearance on the international scene.</p> + +<p>We should also take note of several other results of Japan’s +first modern war. The territorial gains—Formosa and the Pescadores +Islands—were a welcome prize. More important was +China’s formal recognition of Korean independence, which left +Japan practically a free hand in the peninsula. By its new +commercial treaty with China, Japan also gained the benefits +of extraterritoriality and low tariff rates in that country—the +system she hated so heartily when it was applied against herself, +as it still was at that time. The war indemnity of nearly +$180,000,000, moreover, helped Japan to expand its armaments +still further in preparation for the war with Russia in 1904.</p> + + +<h3>THUS FAR AND NO FARTHER</h3> + +<p>An episode which heightened Japan’s sensitiveness in her +foreign relations marked the peace settlement. In the Treaty +of Shimonoseki, China had agreed to cede Japan the Liaotung +Peninsula in South Manchuria. Germany, Russia and France +objected to this territorial cession, and backed their objections +by an ultimatum to Tokyo threatening war. Japan was forced +<span class="pagenum">[57]</span>to submit, and in exchange for a slight increase in the indemnity, +the territory was returned to China. More than the pre-Restoration +bombardments of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki, +more even than the galling yoke of the unequal treaties, this +“tripartite intervention” rankled in Japanese hearts. This sense +of humiliation was not lessened in 1898, when Russia secured +from China a 25-year lease of the southern tip of the disputed +Liaotung Peninsula and proceeded to fortify Port Arthur and +join Harbin to Dairen by a new railway line.</p> + + +<h3>WAR WITH RUSSIA</h3> + +<p>On the whole, however, the gains of the war had proved sufficient +to justify the calculations of Japan’s leaders, and to +strengthen the forces within Japan that were working toward +expansion. In 1900 Japan took part as an equal with the Western +powers in quelling the famous Boxer Uprising, in China, +and shared in the returns from the Boxer Indemnity which they +later imposed as a punishment on the Chinese. The fact that +the British thought it worth while to sign an alliance with +Japan in 1902 was an additional testimony to her growing +prestige. Fortified by this alliance, and by strenuous efforts +to build up her military and naval forces, Japan emerged successfully +from her clash with Tsarist Russia in 1904-05.</p> + +<p>The peace terms did not include the indemnity Japan coveted, +largely because she was too exhausted to continue the +struggle. But still there were substantial gains. Japan won a protectorate +over Korea, which she converted to full annexation in +1910. The Russian leasehold at the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula +was transferred to Japan, and also the Russian railway lines in +South Manchuria. Finally, Russia ceded the southern half of +Sakhalin Island to Japan, and granted important fishing rights +in northern Pacific waters to Japanese interests.</p> + +<p>The Treaty of Portsmouth, which set forth these terms and +in which President Theodore Roosevelt mediated, established +<span class="pagenum">[58]</span>Japan as the rising power in the Far East. In 1905, three weeks +before the treaty was signed, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was +extended for ten years, with provisions sanctioning Japan’s +paramount interests in Korea.</p> + + +<h3>END OF THE MEIJI ERA</h3> + +<p>In the decade spanned by the two wars, Japan had forged +rapidly ahead in her economic development. Her foreign trade, +which totaled only 265 million yen in 1895, had jumped to 810 +million in 1905 (see chart, <a href="#i_061">page 61</a>). Her steam shipping had +shown an even more extraordinary spurt—from 15,000 tons in +1893 to 1,552,000 tons in 1905.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="i_061" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_061.jpg" alt="This graph shows Japan's foreign trade growing exponentially until the Great Depression, and then moving both up and down."> + <figcaption> + <p>HOW JAPAN’S FOREIGN TRADE HAS GROWN</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p>On the political side, the new constitution worked out pretty +much as the clan statesmen had expected. For a short time the +bureaucrats had some difficulty with the Diet, where a liberal +opposition threatened to develop. But they soon checked this +tendency. They intimidated or bought off opposition leaders. +They embarked on a policy of war and expansion—which the +liberals supported. And, eventually, they organized parties +headed by members of the bureaucracy itself—in the first +instance, Prince Ito.</p> + +<p>The Meiji Emperor died on July 30, 1912. During his long +reign of nearly 45 years, all the great changes which we have +been considering had taken place. From a weak feudal state, +Japan had been transformed into a great power. Two years +after Emperor Meiji’s passing, the outbreak of the World War +ushered in a period of still more ambitious expansion and +growth.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[59]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_59"> + IX. Japan and the First World War + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>The World War gave Japan her great opportunity, which her +leaders were quick to seize. The conditions created by World +War No. 1 might have been made to order for Japan. They +brought all her strategic advantages into play, and were ideally +adapted to meet her economic necessities.</p> + +<p>Japan was not compelled to fight a full-dress war. The +Western powers were more than occupied on the European +battlefields, so Japan was given pretty much of a free hand +in the Far East. And the line-up of powers in 1914-18 added +greatly to the strategic advantage of her geographic location. +Britain and Russia were Japan’s allies from the outset, while the +United States could not offer firm opposition to Japanese expansion. +Thus Japan was able to achieve a great deal with +very little effort.</p> + +<p>Conditions on the economic side were no less favorable. +As Japan’s military and naval operations during the war were +relatively slight, the costs were small. On the other hand, her +economic gains were exceedingly large. For next to the United +States, Japan was the greatest supplier of the warring nations.</p> + + +<h3>MAKING HAY WHILE THE SUN SHINES</h3> + +<p>It was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, renewed for the third +time in 1911, which gave Japan formal diplomatic cause for +entering the war. On August 23, 1914 she declared war on +Germany.</p> + +<p>After a brief struggle, the German forces at the leasehold +of Tsingtao, in Shantung province, surrendered on November +7. A month later the whole of Shantung province was in +Japanese hands. Then followed the famous Twenty-One Demands +on China. On May 25, 1915, at the point of a gun, +China signed treaties and notes incorporating many of these +<span class="pagenum">[60]</span>Twenty-One Demands. Among other things these treaties +confirmed Japan’s newly won position in Shantung province, +and extended her railway and territorial rights in South Manchuria +to the end of the century. American protests helped +to block the most sweeping demands, which would have made +China a Japanese protectorate. Meanwhile the Japanese navy +had scoured the Pacific, and had occupied all the German +islands north of the equator.</p> + + +<h3>THE SECRET TREATIES OF 1917</h3> + +<p>During the early months of 1917, Japan turned to diplomacy in +order to be sure that she would be able to keep her territorial +gains after the war. The United States had not yet entered the +war, and the military fortunes of the Allied powers in Europe +were at a low ebb. Making good use of this situation, Japan +negotiated secret treaties with Britain, France, Russia and +Italy. Signed in February and March 1917, these agreements +pledged that Japan’s claims to the German islands north of +the equator and to the former German rights in Shantung +would be supported at the peace conference. But the Japanese +did not secure American support of these claims. In the Lansing-Ishii +agreement of November 2, 1917, the United States offered +merely a qualified recognition of Japan’s “special interests in +China.”</p> + +<p>The secret treaties with the Allied powers were shrewdly +drawn and enabled Japan to come off victorious at the Paris +Peace Conference. Her newly established position in Shantung +province, as well as the extensions of her rights in South +Manchuria, were accepted and written into the Versailles +Treaty. The German islands north of the equator were +awarded Japan as a Class C mandate, the kind of mandate +which came closest to annexation. American opposition to these +decisions cut no ice, mainly because of Japan’s secret agreements +with the Allies. On only one big issue was Japan defeated +<span class="pagenum">[62]</span>at the conference. Her statesmen had demanded that +a clause on racial equality be inserted in the peace treaty. +This demand was rejected, largely because the Western powers +were afraid that it would let down the bars against Japanese +immigration to their countries.</p> + + +<h3>FLIES IN THE OINTMENT</h3> + +<p>But despite the acceptance of her territorial gains at the peace +conference, by 1919 Japan’s difficulties were increasing. A +student uprising in Peking drove out the pro-Japanese Anfu +clique that had controlled the Chinese government. Opposition +to the Shantung award was growing in the United States, and +the American navy was rapidly becoming the most powerful +in the world. Two years later Japan’s position had become still +weaker. A boycott was severely reducing Japanese trade in +China. The costs of the naval-building race with the United +States were a heavy burden. Japanese intervention in Siberia, +which continued after the armed forces of the Western powers +had been withdrawn, was not succeeding. And expenditure on +the Siberian occupation, ultimately totaling about 800 million +yen, together with the naval-building costs, was straining the +Japanese budget. These various factors were discrediting the +Japanese militarists at home, and liberal Japanese were beginning +to speak out against them.</p> + + +<h3>SLOWING DOWN JAPAN’S DRIVE</h3> + +<p>Under these conditions, the United States was able to summon +the Washington Conference, at which important agreements +on naval limitation and Pacific questions were reached early +in 1922. By accepting a battleship ratio of 3 tons as against +5 each for Britain and the United States, Japan was relieved +of the costs of the naval race. Her security in Far Eastern +waters was further increased by the provision restricting fortification +of island bases in the Pacific. The Four-Power Pact, +<span class="pagenum">[63]</span>signed by Britain, France, the U. S. and Japan, and pledging +respect for insular possessions in the Pacific, replaced the +Anglo-Japanese Alliance.</p> + +<p>In return for these contributions to her security in Far Eastern +waters, Japan made a number of important concessions. +By an agreement with China, she restored Shantung province +to Chinese control. Japan also signed the Nine-Power Treaty, +which pledged all its signatories to respect China’s territorial +and administrative integrity and the “open door”—or equal +commercial opportunity for all nations—in China.</p> + +<p>In later days, some of the provisions of these Washington +Conference agreements came to be bitterly attacked in Japan, +especially by military and naval extremists. It is an open question +as to how far these criticisms were justified. It was chiefly +the effectiveness of the Chinese boycott that forced the restoration +of Shantung province. Japan’s major concession was in +the Nine-Power Treaty, by which she agreed to lay down the +sword and accept the results of peaceful commercial competition +in China. But there was no machinery provided to enforce +this treaty. The naval limitation treaty relieved Japan of the +heavy costs of the 1921 naval race and at the same time, even +under the 5-5-3 ratio, left her able to dominate the China coast. +She was thus in a strategic position to renew her expansionist +program—which she did in 1931.</p> + + +<h3>WORLD WAR GAINS</h3> + +<p>Moreover, the World War settlement for Japan, as finally +reached at Washington, was no empty achievement. Japan had +not obtained her larger ambitions in China or Siberia, it is true. +But the former German islands north of the equator—of great +strategic, if not economic, importance—were now a Japanese +mandate. Japan’s rights in South Manchuria had become much +more firmly established. Her naval and commercial fleets had +greatly expanded, she occupied a permanent seat on the Council +<span class="pagenum">[64]</span>of the League of Nations, and she was recognized as one +of the half-dozen Great Powers. Japan had also made important +economic gains, to which we must now turn our attention.</p> + + +<h3>THE WAR BOOM</h3> + +<p>It was in the economic field, perhaps, that Japan reaped her +greatest gains from the World War. For her shops and factories +were kept busy supplying the belligerent countries, their +colonial populations, and the American market. Her allies controlled +the seas, and Japanese ships sailed all of them. This freedom +of the seas was an important factor for Japan, who had +become increasingly dependent on international trade.</p> + +<p>Japan’s war boom was, in many respects, very similar to that +enjoyed by the United States. The relative increase in trade +was even greater. Between 1914 and 1920 Japan’s total foreign +trade increased from 1,187 million yen to 4,285 million, or by +nearly four times (see chart, <a href="#i_061">page 61</a>). Through 1918, moreover, +exports increased much faster than imports. For Japan +this meant a chance to stock up on her reserves of gold and +foreign currencies, which had always been low. In the 1914-18 +period, exports outran imports by 1,460 million yen. This figure +contrasted with an import excess of 1,158 million yen during +the preceding 20 years.</p> + +<p>What we have said so far applies only to trade in goods. But +returns on invisible trade items, such as shipping services, were +also high—totaling more than 1,500 million yen for the 1914-18 +period. The wartime balances for both types of trade came to +more than 3,000 million yen—on the right side of the ledger. +As a result, Japan’s financial reserves greatly increased. Extensive +loans and investments were made in foreign countries, and +large holdings in gold and foreign exchange were piled up.</p> + +<p>Japan emerged from the war stronger financially and economically +than she had ever been before. Nevertheless, she was +to suffer a series of economic setbacks in the post-war period.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[65]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_65"> + X. Go Liberal, Go Fascist? + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Even before the war ended, there had been signs of economic +distress within Japan. While the profits from the war boom +were going into the pockets of a small group, a sharp rise in +the cost of living had caused suffering among the masses of the +people. Speculators were profiteering in rice, which soared +from 20 or 25 yen to more than 50 yen on the five-bushel unit. +In the summer of 1918 there were serious “rice riots,” and +troops were called out to suppress the demonstrations. During +the war, moreover, trade union and socialist ideas had taken +root in Japan, paving the way for the growth of labor unions +and left-wing parties in the post-war years.</p> + + +<h3>UPS AND DOWNS</h3> + +<p>Then came the world slump in 1920-21, which led to a sudden +collapse of Japan’s war boom. Partial recovery had no sooner +set in than it received a sharp jolt from the disastrous earthquake +of 1923. To meet these setbacks, Japan drew heavily +on the financial reserves accumulated during the war. Reconstruction +after the earthquake created another short-lived boom—ended +by a bank panic in 1927.</p> + +<p>Despite post-war difficulties, however, Japan managed to +keep her industry on the up grade. The great advances made +during the war were maintained and consolidated. In the post-war +slump the number of factory workers had declined, but +in 1927-28 they reached the wartime level of 2,000,000 again. +Throughout the ’twenties, except for a sharp drop in 1921, +Japan’s total foreign trade continued to hold the new average +level of 4,000 million yen. Population leaped forward, from +about 50 million persons in 1914 to 56 million in 1920, and to +nearly 65 million in 1930 (see chart, <a href="#i_069">page 69</a>).</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp76" id="i_069" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_069.jpg" alt="This diagram shows stick figures illustrating Japan proper’s steady growth from 1850 to 1940, and colonial growth from 1920."> + <figcaption> + <p>A GROWING POPULATION</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[66]</span></p> + + +<h3>BIG BUSINESS TO THE FORE</h3> + +<p>During and after the war, Japan’s business groups had come +of age. They were no longer subordinate to the other ruling +forces in the state. Japan’s effort to overtake the West, as we +noticed, had led to a close tie-up between government and +industry. This relationship had made it easy for Japan’s great +business houses to become monopolies. From the beginning +they had united banking, trade and industry under one roof. +Post-war developments, such as the financial crisis of 1927, had +carried the process of financial concentration beyond even +what was characteristic of Western countries. By this time +half-a-dozen of Japan’s huge family combines, such as Mitsui +and Mitsubishi, dominated Japanese economy. They had +become one of the most powerful financial ruling groups in +the world.</p> + +<figure class="figcenter illowp65" style="max-width: 40.625em;"> + <img class="w100" src="images/i_067.jpg" alt="This shows some key enterprises across multiple industries controlled by the House of Mitsui"> + <figcaption> + <p>ONE OF JAPAN’S FAMILY EMPIRES</p> + </figcaption> +</figure> + + +<h3>BUT INDUSTRY DEPENDS ON FOREIGN TRADE</h3> + +<p>And here we have to point out the striking paradox in Japan’s +new economic society. It was still largely agricultural. In 1925 +more than half the people were dependent on agriculture for +their livelihood. But the peasants were too poor to buy the +typical consumption goods (automobiles, for example) that +were staples in the home markets of Western countries. Thus +it was impossible for Japan to develop modern factory industries +turning out <em>all</em> lines of consumption goods. Only in cotton +textiles, with their special export market, and in shipbuilding +and metallurgy, serving the army and navy, were large-scale +factories practical. In 1928 the greater part of Japan’s +manufactured goods was produced in industrial units employing +ten, five or even fewer workers. Firms like Mitsui and Mitsubishi, +however, contracted for the output of these small-scale +industrial units and then sold it, often in foreign markets.</p> + +<p>Thus Japan, although she had made great strides in some +lines of industry, had become dangerously dependent on international +<span class="pagenum">[67]</span>trade. After 1929, with the onset of the world depression, +the difficulties of this situation were plain to see. Quotas +and tariffs barred even Japan’s low-priced goods. Old sores +rankled, particularly those affecting immigration. The Exclusion +Act, passed by the American Congress over the President’s +<span class="pagenum">[68]</span>disapproval in 1924, cut the deepest. In fact, it undid most of +the good effects of the generous aid America gave Japan after +the earthquake in 1923.</p> + + +<h3>THE LIBERALS TAKE A HAND</h3> + +<p>These post-war years, especially after 1921, witnessed a brief +flowering of parliamentary democracy in Japan. None of the +architects of the Constitution, least of all Ito, had foreseen this +possibility. Yet in the late ’twenties it seemed as if the Cabinet +might win unchallenged power, that party government would +reign supreme, and that the House of Representatives would +become the true seat of authority.</p> + +<p>This change came about quite naturally, through the increasing +influence of the great business houses. By 1925 the industrialists +and the bankers, or their representatives, held many of +the leading offices which the clansmen had formerly made their +own. They held the presidency of the Privy Council, and the +key posts in the Imperial Household Ministry. They were influential +in the House of Peers, in the bureaucracy and even in +the Army and Navy. Generals and admirals could actually be +found to support the policies of party governments. All the +Elder Statesmen except Prince Saionji had died. And even he, +being related to the Sumitomo banking house, was in sympathy +with the capitalist outlook. As Prince Saionji was the Emperor’s +chief adviser on the choice of a new Premier, he occupied the +most strategic position in the state. In the 1925-31 period, on +his nomination, six consecutive governments were formed by +party Premiers holding majorities in the Diet’s lower house.</p> + + +<h3>POLITICAL PARTIES</h3> + +<p>Party influence, increasing with the growth of capitalism in +Japan, reached its height during these years. At an earlier period +the clan bureaucrats had manipulated the parties to suit themselves—usually +with little difficulty. But as time passed, the +<span class="pagenum">[69]</span>parties formed closer and closer ties with the great business +houses. Mitsubishi interests were linked with the Minseito +party, Mitsui with the Seiyukai party. The Election Law was +gradually amended, increasing the number of voters, until in +1925 manhood suffrage was adopted. This change forced Diet +members to spend large sums in electioneering, and made +them more dependent on capitalist support. Consequently, it +strengthened the capitalists’ control over the Minseito and the +Seiyukai. At the same time it made possible the rise of labor +and left-wing parties, which began to win Diet seats.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[70]</span></p> + +<p>After 1925 the Cabinets formed by the Minseito and Seiyukai +parties began to have to account directly to their majorities +in the House of Representatives for what they did. Parliamentary +government was by no means fully established, however. +An adverse vote in the lower house did not, as a rule, +overthrow these Cabinets. More often they fell because of +backstage maneuvers in the Privy Council or the House of +Peers. Nor were their leaders and policies always liberal. For +a time General Baron Tanaka was president of the Seiyukai. +He represented the aggressive, militarist wing of the Choshu +clan. The Seiyukai Cabinet of 1927-29, formed under his +Premiership, carried out a “positive policy” of military intervention +in China. Tanaka had to be a party leader in order to +become Premier. But his policy showed the strength of old +tendencies, even in a generally liberal era.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, the succeeding Minseito Cabinet (1929-31) +was the strongest and most liberal party government which +has ever held office in Japan. It came the nearest to establishing +democracy there. It also had to meet the first onslaught of the +military-fascist forces that have since become so powerful. In +the story of Japan’s political development, it thus represents a +critical turning point of unusual significance.</p> + + +<h3>SWAN SONG OF THE JAPANESE LIBERALS</h3> + +<p>The Minseito Cabinet of 1929-31 was liberal, but by no means +radical. It was, in reality, a government of “big business.” Its +liberalism stood out mainly in its moderate foreign policy, +which contrasted sharply with Tanaka’s earlier aggressive +moves. It was headed by distinguished leaders: Hamaguchi +(Premier), Shidehara (Foreign Minister) and Inouye (Finance +Minister).</p> + +<p>This Cabinet labored, however, under a fatal handicap, similar +to that which confronted President Hoover in our own +country. For it entered office in July 1929, at the height of the +<span class="pagenum">[71]</span>post-war boom. The Wall Street crash, and the spreading +world depression, immediately followed. The swift change in +economic conditions during its period in office had much to do +with its final overthrow.</p> + +<p>Hamaguchi and his Cabinet aides began with a great victory +on the issue of the London Naval Treaty of 1930. This treaty +extended limitations to cruisers and destroyers, as well as capital +ships. The army and navy die-hards opposed it bitterly. The +people and the press supported the Cabinet’s fight for it. On +October 1, 1930 the Privy Council ratified the treaty. The +Cabinet and the people had won.</p> + +<p>For the moment it seemed as if the Cabinet had brought the +army and navy under control. Real democracy seemed possible. +But the triumph was short-lived. It was the swan song of parliamentary +government in Japan. In November 1930 Premier +Hamaguchi was shot by an assassin; eight months later he died +from his wounds. His loss seriously weakened the Cabinet, and +cut down its chance of success on new issues which were +developing.</p> + + +<h3>THE DEPRESSION STRIKES JAPAN</h3> + +<p>By the end of 1930 the depression had struck Japan with full +force. It laid the Cabinet open to attack by the rising military-fascist +forces.</p> + +<p>The most serious consequences of the depression were felt +in Japan’s foreign trade. In 1929 Japan’s export-import trade +stood at 4,365 million yen. In 1930 it fell to 3,016 million, and +in 1931 to 2,383 million. In two years Japan’s trade was cut +nearly in half. Even at that period, few Western countries suffered +such a rapid and severe contraction of their foreign trade.</p> + +<p>The effects of this decline on Japan’s economy were catastrophic. +Agriculture and industry were both hard hit. The +income from rice and silk declined until there was actual famine +in some rural districts. Industrial unemployment mounted to +<span class="pagenum">[72]</span>three million, higher than ever before in Japan. The middle-class +professionals and wage-earners suffered wage cuts, or +were thrown out of work. There was general social unrest, and +Marxist doctrines won a wide acceptance. Strikes in industry, +and tenant conflicts in rural areas, became commonplace.</p> + +<p>In the light of these conditions, the weaknesses of Japan’s +economy stood out in bold relief. Fully half the home market +consisted of poverty-stricken peasants. To put the rural population +back on its feet and enable it to buy the products of +industry, drastic social reforms, such as rent reductions and +debt moratoria for the farmers, were obviously needed. Neither +the landowners nor the great business houses were prepared to +embark on such a “new deal.” The army had a different solution—aggressive +expansion abroad and military-fascist repression +at home.</p> + +<p>This army program led to a finish fight with the Minseito +Cabinet. And the army leaders fought—and won—their campaign +in Manchuria.</p> + + +<h3>THE ARMY STRIKES IN MANCHURIA</h3> + +<p>The Minseito Cabinet had been trying to pursue a “friendly +policy” toward China. Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister, +wanted friendly relations with all countries. In this way he +sought to foster Japan’s foreign trade, and thus solve Japan’s +economic problems. But he could not control the army, especially +after the depression had cut down trade and brought +unrest to Japan.</p> + +<p>During the summer of 1931 a series of “incidents” occurred +in Manchuria, in which the hand of the military was plainly to +be seen. At home in Japan the army used these incidents to +arouse popular support for “positive” action in defense of supposedly +threatened Japanese interests. General Minami, new +War Minister in the Cabinet, openly supported this propaganda +campaign. Baron Shidehara attempted to reach a peaceful +<span class="pagenum">[73]</span>settlement of the Manchurian issues. But in vain. On September +18, 1931—the historic date we mentioned at the beginning +of this book—the army struck in Manchuria. The “Mukden +incident”—alleged blowing up of a section of the South Manchuria +Railway track—served as an excuse for the Japanese +army to occupy the chief Manchurian cities.</p> + +<p>This independent <i lang="fr">coup d’état</i> by the army dealt a fatal blow +to the Minseito Cabinet. Baron Shidehara was forced into the +position of apologizing for the army’s actions, though he must +have heartily detested them. On December 11, 1931 the Cabinet +resigned.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_73"> + XI. The Shadow Deepens + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>The fall of the Minseito Cabinet marked the end of an era. +The crisis of 1930-31 had unleashed new forces. And these +forces were destined to mold Japan’s policy in the decade that +followed.</p> + +<p>At their head was the army. Not <em>all</em> of the army leaders, +however. At times the “army extremists” seemed to be only a +small minority. Their power rose and fell. Yet they took command +of Japan’s foreign policy, and gained more and more control +over her domestic policy. And as time passed, their outlook +was increasingly stamped on the army as a whole.</p> + + +<h3>THE ARMY EXTREMISTS</h3> + +<p>Who were the army extremists? Names are not important, +except as labels of a whole group. There has been no outstanding +fascist leader in Japan, such as Mussolini in Italy or Hitler +in Germany. It is enough for us to note that, in the 1930-32 +period, the high army leadership centered in three generals—Araki, +<span class="pagenum">[74]</span>Muto and Mazaki. This trio was supported by a powerful +group of “young officers,” such as Doihara and Itagaki, +who have since become ranking generals.</p> + +<p>These men were not from the old clan aristocracy. They +came mostly from the lesser clans, or from the middle classes +in town and village. They knew at first hand the sufferings of +the farmers and the small tradesmen. Like Mussolini and Hitler, +they claimed to be the friend of the common man. They bitterly +denounced the “corrupt alliance” of the political parties +and the capitalists.</p> + +<p>All this was part of their fight for political control at home. +They wanted a “national socialist” reformation in Japan. By +this they meant that the army, under the Emperor, should run +the government. They wanted the political parties suppressed +and industry run by the state—all, as they said, for the benefit +of the common man.</p> + +<p>On the home front, the army extremists have had little success. +None of their glowing promises of economic “reforms” +has been carried out. In the foreign field, however, their program +has been largely adopted. We must now see what their +aims in foreign policy were.</p> + + +<h3>THE DEMAND FOR “LIVING SPACE”</h3> + +<p>At the heart of the military-fascist program in Japan, just as +in Germany and Italy, lay a demand for territorial expansion. +The army extremists made careful plans for a series of bold +moves. First, Manchuria and Mongolia were to be conquered, +then China, then the rest of Asia. In the past decade we have +seen this seemingly wild and visionary program translated into +reality to an extraordinary degree. In fact, the actual course +of Japan’s foreign policy has followed it very closely.</p> + +<p>With territorial expansion was linked an economic idea—that +of regional self-sufficiency, or the “bloc economy.” In +1931, Manchuria was called Japan’s “economic life-line.” In +<span class="pagenum">[75]</span>1932-33 the watchword was the “Japan-Manchoukuo economic +bloc.” After 1937 the demand was for a “Japan-China-Manchoukuo +bloc.” Finally, the slogan today is for a “Greater East +Asia,” to include the rich territories of Indo-China, Malaya, +the East Indies and the Philippines.</p> + +<p>What the army leaders were chiefly seeking through this +program was to overcome Japan’s dependence on the international +market. They were proposing a basic alternative to +Shidehara’s plan for the peaceful development of international +trade. In 1930-31 they had seen Japan’s foreign trade suddenly +collapse, plunging the country into an economic crisis. They +were determined that this should not happen again. The +answer, they felt, lay in extending Japan’s political control +over a vast region. The markets and raw materials of such an +area, they thought, would make Japan economically independent +of the rest of the world.</p> + + +<h3>WEIGHTING THE SCALES</h3> + +<p>The army extremists were not the only ones to share these +views. They had supporters in the bureaucracy, even in the +highest positions. Many naval officers also supported them, +although the navy as a whole was more conservative than the +army. And, despite their anti-capitalist propaganda, they had +close relations with some business groups who hoped to profit +from the expansion program.</p> + +<p>Though the military-fascist leaders did not succeed in +organizing a unified mass fascist party, they wielded extraordinary +powers. They influenced public opinion through the +Ex-Servicemen’s Association, with its three million members. +They also had a host of reactionary societies to work through. +Some of them were dignified patriotic societies, with members +from the highest ranks of Japanese society. Others went in for +espionage, strike-breaking, or outright terrorism. Finally, the +army had its special powers under the Constitution, such as +<span class="pagenum">[76]</span>dictating the choice of War Minister, and going direct to the +Emperor over the head of the Premier.</p> + +<p>To all these powers the extremists now added two special +techniques and used them for all they were worth. One was +resorting directly to military action, without waiting for +authorization from the Cabinet. Underlings in the field could +plot “incidents” which committed their superior officers and +the government to certain courses of action. The Manchurian +occupation was largely brought about in this way.</p> + +<p>The second technique was terrorism, or direct action, against +political opponents at home. Public opinion in Japan does not +automatically condemn assassination, especially if it appears to +have been inspired by patriotic or disinterested motives. The +list of distinguished Japanese who have been assassinated is +very long—Okubo, Ito, Hara (the first commoner to become +Premier), Hamaguchi, to mention a few. Since 1931 many +others have been added to this list, and their deaths have all +helped the military-fascists to rise to power.</p> + + +<h3>AGAINST THE ARMY?</h3> + +<p>On the surface it has often seemed that the capitalists were the +chief opponents of the army extremists in the political struggle +of the past decade. This is only partly true. These two groups +have been the strongest political forces in Japan. They have +both sought to win the bureaucrats and public opinion to their +side. On the other hand, they are in agreement on many points.</p> + +<p>For the capitalists, as well as the military, are interested in +territorial expansion, and have taken advantage of its results +in China. Many of them favored the Manchurian invasion, +because they saw that it would give the widespread social discontent +in Japan a safe outlet. But at the same time, the capitalists +tend to be more cautious than the army leaders in foreign +policy. They do not want to take risks, or to plunge recklessly +into a big war if the chances of success are slight.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[77]</span></p> + +<p>Even on the home front, there is an area of agreement +between the army extremists and the business men. Both wish +to maintain their ruling position against the threat of social +revolution. The Minseito government took measures to stamp +out revolutionary groups as early as 1929-30. There is full +agreement on regimentation of this kind. But the capitalists +have bitterly opposed the army’s efforts to take over <em>all</em> political +power, or to seize control of their business enterprises.</p> + +<p>Keeping these general tendencies in mind, we can now turn +to a consideration of the events of the past decade.</p> + + +<h3>THE EXTREMISTS TAKE DIRECT ACTION</h3> + +<p>The “Mukden incident” of September 18, 1931 marked the +halfway point in the sharp political struggle which was then +convulsing Japan. Its violent phase lasted for eight months +longer, until May 15, 1932.</p> + +<p>We have already seen the first result of this struggle—the +overthrow of the Minseito Cabinet. The Seiyukai party took +up the reins of power in mid-December 1931. It proved to be +the last one-party government to hold office during that +decade. Inukai, its Premier, was a moderate; so also was Takahashi, +the aged Finance Minister. General Araki, symbol and +titular leader of the army extremists, was the Minister of War.</p> + +<p>Not content with having forced a change of Cabinet, the +extremists still pressed the attack on party government. Inouye, +Finance Minister in the previous Minseito Cabinet, was assassinated +on February 9, and Baron Dan, head of the Mitsui +interests, was shot on March 5. Both were victims of the +Blood Brotherhood League, organized to use terrorism against +the “corrupt political parties, slaves of the capitalists.” More +plots followed. Then, on May 15, 1932, Premier Inukai in turn +was assassinated. His death was the climax of an outbreak supported +by high army officers, who had planned to seize control +of the government.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[78]</span></p> + + +<h3>CONQUEST IN MANCHURIA</h3> + +<p>After this affair, things quieted down a little at home. But the +extremists had meanwhile had their way in the sphere of foreign +policy. Japanese troops had spread over most of Manchuria. +In February the Japanese attack on Shanghai had +occurred. In March the “independent” state of Manchoukuo +was established. Far from being independent, it was really the +plaything of Japan’s army extremists who had planned the +“Mukden incident.”</p> + +<p>Another year passed before the Manchurian issues were fully +ironed out. In September 1932 the Japanese government formally +recognized Manchoukuo. Early in 1933, on basis of +the Lytton Report, the League of Nations passed judgment +on Japan. The army at once moved again in Manchuria. In +March 1933 Japanese troops occupied Jehol province, and +added it to Manchoukuo. In May these troops advanced to the +gates of Peiping and Tientsin, and enforced “demilitarization” +of the region immediately south of the Great Wall of China. +Meanwhile, Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations. +For the time, her conquest of Manchuria had been made good +in her own eyes, if not in the eyes of the world.</p> + + +<h3>PEACEFUL INTERLUDE (1933-35)</h3> + +<p>The period from the middle of 1933 to the end of 1935 was +“peaceful” only by contrast with the years before and after. +The contrast is sufficiently striking, however, to justify our +using the term.</p> + +<p>Two strong Cabinets, headed in turn by Admirals Saito and +Okada, old-line naval administrators opposed to extremism, +governed Japan during these years. The Saito Cabinet had +entered office in May 1932, after the death of Inukai. Party +men held only a few of the lesser Ministries. Nevertheless, the +Cabinet was in the main moderate. The key Finance Ministry, +in particular, was in the capable hands of Takahashi, who +<span class="pagenum">[79]</span>allowed only limited increases in the defense budgets. Early +in 1934 the fiery Araki resigned from the War Ministry. +Araki’s successor carried out a partial “purge” of the army +extremists.</p> + + +<h3>KEEPING THE ARMY QUIET</h3> + +<p>There were several reasons for this moderate trend. For one +thing, foreign trade had turned upwards in 1932, and by 1935 +Japan was again enjoying a trade boom which soon overcame +the worst effects of the economic crisis and tended to calm +the political waters.</p> + +<p>In the second place, the army extremists were kept busy +with their experiment in Manchoukuo, where they were trying +to realize their goal of “state socialism.” They were building +strategic railways, and fostering the growth of Manchurian +industry. They met with opposition from business interests at +home, and found it hard to raise sufficient capital for their +projects in Manchuria. In order to secure greater influence +over these economic questions, the extremists forced the establishment +inside the Cabinet of a Manchoukuo Affairs Board. +Here the army was in the saddle. And the extremists did secure +enough capital for their projects to provoke the wise old +Takahashi into issuing a warning that Japan’s finances could +not stand such a large and continuing investment drain to +Manchoukuo.</p> + +<p>On the whole, however, the army men were disappointed +with the economic results in Manchoukuo. By 1935 they were +trying to bring North China into their Manchurian realm, and +thus enlarge their economic bloc. In November 1935 Doihara, +the “Lawrence of Manchuria,” tried to detach five of the +northern provinces from Chinese control. The extremists also +planned these moves as part of an effort to strengthen their +position at home. For there they were being steadily pushed +into the background.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[80]</span></p> + + +<h3>DYING FLICKERS OF DEMOCRACY</h3> + +<p>Plots were still being hatched within Japan, even during this +“peaceful” period. But the moderates were reasserting their +control. They kept the high posts in the Privy Council and +the Imperial Household Ministry. The Cabinet was firmly set +for a moderate course. Even the parties’ strength was reviving. +The climax of this trend came with the general election of +February 1936. For the voting showed that the people had +swung decisively away from the extremists. Japan’s labor party +elected eighteen Diet members, while three left-wing proletarians +won Diet seats. It was thought that a new Cabinet, with +much greater party influence, might now be formed.</p> + +<p>But the extremists were unwilling to admit defeat. Their +answer came in the military uprising of February 26, 1936—known +in Japan as the “2-26” affair.</p> + + +<h3>THE “2-26” UPRISING</h3> + +<p>The direct participants in this historic revolt were some 1,400 +troops, with their lower officers. No upper officers openly +joined them. Yet the insurgents had contact with the highest +army quarters. And General Mazaki, an outstanding army +extremist, was kept under detention for a year after the +outbreak.</p> + +<p>A long death list had been prepared. Actually only three +high officials were killed: Takahashi, the moderate Finance +Minister; Admiral Saito, the former Premier, then Lord Privy +Seal; and General Watanabe, who had been responsible for +shifts in army officerships. Premier Okada escaped, but his +brother, who resembled him, was killed. Outside of Tokyo +both Count Makino, former Lord Privy Seal, and Prince +Saionji, the last Elder Statesman, managed to escape attacks +directed against them.</p> + +<p>For three days the insurgents occupied the center of Tokyo. +They were finally disarmed when it became clear that the +<span class="pagenum">[81]</span>revolt was not taking hold anywhere else. Once again, an +attempt to seize the government had failed. Nevertheless, the +uprising caused an important shift in the balance of political +power. The trend toward moderation was reversed. Under +succeeding Cabinets, new policies were adopted which led +directly toward the war with China in 1937.</p> + + +<h3>PRELUDE TO WAR (1936-37)</h3> + +<p>The chief result of the “2-26” uprising was to give greater +power over government policy to the army leaders. This power +was not exercised by the extremists in person, because the military +revolt had temporarily discredited them in the people’s +eyes. A new set of army leaders adopted most of their platform, +however, and succeeded in putting it across. The public +strongly opposed the expansionist and military-fascist tendencies +of the new program, but could do no more than delay +its realization.</p> + +<p>The new program took definite shape under the Cabinet +headed by Hirota, a bureaucrat with extremist leanings. It +called for stronger pressure on China, expressed in demands for +“Sino-Japanese cooperation.” The anti-Comintern pact was +concluded with Germany in November 1936. On the home +front, there were efforts to amend the Election Law in such +a way as to curb the political influence of the parties. The new +budget included large increases in defense expenditure. Sections +of heavy industry, interested in the profits to be reaped +from supplying armaments for the defense services, threw their +support to the enlarged arms program. On the other hand, popular +opposition to the Hirota Cabinet grew steadily. Following +strong attacks in the Diet, Hirota resigned in January 1937.</p> + +<p>General Hayashi, the next Premier, barred the recognized +Minseito and Seiyukai party leaders from his Cabinet. Within +two months he had carried through the economic planks of +Hirota’s platform. Ikeda and Yuki, representing the business +<span class="pagenum">[82]</span>houses, took official posts in order to handle the financial problems. +Premier Hayashi also instituted a Cabinet Planning Board, +which became an economic general staff for the army program.</p> + + +<h3>THE PEOPLE VS. THE MILITARY</h3> + +<p>These rapid steps toward a “wartime economy” met with bitter +opposition from the parties and even more from the public at +large. A wide breach opened up between the Hayashi Cabinet +and the people. When Hayashi dissolved the Diet, he was overwhelmingly +defeated in the general election of April 1937. +Out of 466 members in the Diet’s lower house, the government +elected less than 50 supporters. It tried to stay in office, but +finally, on May 31, had to resign.</p> + +<p>The popular disapproval of the military-fascist program was +shown quite unmistakably in this election—even more unmistakably +than in the earlier election of February 1936. At that +time, the extremists had defeated the will of the people by the +“2-26” uprising. This time they used new methods.</p> + +<p>Under the Konoye Cabinet, national unity was restored—at +least to all outward appearances. Party members were included +in the Cabinet, and Prince Konoye was made the symbol of +unity. But the party men chosen for Cabinet posts were in sympathy +with the military-fascist program, and in any case held +only minor offices. The chief Ministries were cornered by the +army leaders and by bureaucrats who supported them.</p> + +<p>But merely setting up a new Cabinet was not enough to quell +the widespread suspicion of the army’s aims. It was necessary +to quiet opposition voices, reestablish the army’s prestige and +really get somewhere with the “controlled economy” plans.</p> + +<p>How could all this be done? Two months after the Konoye +Cabinet entered office, Japan was at war with China.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[83]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_83"> + XII. War with China + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Few of Japan’s leaders expected that the war with China would +last for years. Their original plans called for a short campaign +of five or six months. North China, Shanghai and Nanking +would be occupied. Chiang Kai-shek’s crack divisions would +be destroyed in the Shanghai-Nanking operations. By Christmas, +at the latest, a dictated peace could be imposed at Nanking.</p> + + +<h3>VICTORIES WITHOUT PEACE</h3> + +<p>On the military side, these calculations proved surprisingly +accurate. The victorious Japanese troops <em>were</em> entering Nanking +in mid-December. And all the strategic railways in North +China <em>were</em> under Japan’s control. But these military successes +did not lead to the expected peace settlement. China’s national +unity held firm, and Chinese resistance continued. If Japan +wished to dictate peace terms, she would have to wage further +battle.</p> + +<p>This she proceeded to do. Two big campaigns were fought +during 1938. In May, after a bitter struggle in Shantung province, +Japan’s northern and southern armies were able to join +forces. In October, after an exhausting advance up the Yangtze +River, the Japanese captured Hankow. A lightning blow in the +south led to the occupation of Canton.</p> + +<p>China’s main cities, and much of her railway system, were +now in Japanese hands. But still there was no sign of peace. +By the end of 1938, it was clear that, despite her military triumphs, +Japan had not won victory. The war had lasted +eighteen months, instead of six. In lives and money, it had cost +Japan far more than the original reckoning. And the end was +not in sight.</p> + +<p>What was happening at home during these first eighteen +months of the war? Three main trends were clear. First, all +popular opposition to the war was suppressed. Second, the +<span class="pagenum">[84]</span>military took over conduct of affairs in China, allowing the +Cabinet little or no say. And third, a “controlled economy” +was set up, although the army leaders did not succeed in getting +it into their hands. The business houses either pared down +the controls, or decided how they were to be applied.</p> + + +<h3>MAKING THE PUBLIC TOE THE LINE</h3> + +<p>Various measures to gain public support of the war were +adopted. The most spectacular was a campaign for “national +spiritual mobilization.” It began on September 11, 1937 with +a patriotic rally in Tokyo, addressed by the Premier and other +Cabinet Ministers and broadcast throughout the country. In +the Diet the parties expressed their support of the war. Even +Japan’s labor party, which had elected 36 Diet members in +April 1937, swung behind the war policy. The authorities were +not content, however. In December 1937, the Home Ministry +carried out large-scale police raids, in which hundreds of persons +were arrested. Two left-wing labor and party groups, both +headed by Kanju Kato, were disbanded without notice. Kato +himself, who had been elected to the Diet by a proletarian constituency +in Tokyo, was jailed. The arrests also included +Baroness Ishimoto, a noted feminist leader, and a great many +liberals and pacifists.</p> + +<p>All sections of Japan’s ruling circles were united in this program +of suppressing popular opposition to the war. There was +more scope for disagreement, however, over how the war in +China should be conducted. But in this dispute the army held +all the points of vantage, and soon reigned supreme.</p> + + +<h3>THE ARMY WINS A FREE HAND IN CHINA</h3> + +<p>Control of military and naval operations in and off China was +given in November 1937 to Imperial Headquarters. This +special organ included all the high army and navy officers. +Since it decided military policy under the direct authority of +<span class="pagenum">[85]</span>the Emperor, it neatly sidetracked Cabinet control. Non-military +phases of policy in China, however, were not so easily +disposed of. Here the army used a technique which it had tried +and tested in Manchuria. In September 1938 army leaders +forced the establishment of a China Affairs Board, set up within +the Cabinet but run by military men. Through this board the +army kept economic and political affairs in China pretty well +under its thumb, despite some continued opposition from the +Foreign Ministry. In the broader field of international policy +the struggle for power was more acute. It still continues, +although the army eventually became strong enough to put +through the alliance with Germany and Italy.</p> + + +<h3>THE ECONOMIC WAR MACHINE</h3> + +<p>The third main trend of which we spoke was the establishment +of a wartime “controlled economy” in Japan. The state took +over more and more control of the economic life of the country. +Both army and businessmen agreed that such control was +necessary, but bitterly disagreed as to how it should be applied. +On the whole, the businessmen managed to keep the most +important economic regulations in their own hands.</p> + +<p>The fiercest political struggle during 1938 was waged over +the National Mobilization Bill. Drafted by the Planning Board +under army influence, this measure called for drastic economic +conscription. The government was to have practically unlimited +control of social and economic life, including finance, +industry, trade, labor and the press. With respect to labor, the +bill provided for compulsory allocation of workers to their +jobs, prohibited strikes and lockouts, and empowered the government +to fix wages, hours and working conditions.</p> + +<p>This bill met with determined opposition in the Diet. Army +supporters, using pressure and intimidation, including terroristic +attacks on Diet members and on party headquarters in +Tokyo, pushed it through. Nevertheless, the opposition did +<span class="pagenum">[86]</span>force certain modifications in the original plan. Premier +Konoye pledged that it would be applied only during a wartime +emergency and not invoked in the Sino-Japanese conflict, +which was still referred to in Japan as an “incident.” The +Premier also agreed to appoint a majority of Diet members +to the National Mobilization Council. This Council was to be +consulted before Imperial ordinances applying various sections +of the bill were issued.</p> + +<p>But on May 5, 1938, despite Konoye’s pledge to the Diet, +several of the main provisions of the bill <em>were</em> applied, and new +ordinances issued since have put many others into effect. +Before Premier Konoye’s resignation in January 1939, a broad +series of control measures was in operation. Foreign exchange +was strictly licensed. To make up the huge war budgets the +government had taken over control of capital, and restricted +new investment to a list of so-called “essential” industries. It +also rigidly regulated trade, limiting the export and import of +several hundred commodities. It put the labor control provisions +of the National Mobilization Act into effect. In June +1938 it instituted nation-wide price control for certain commodities, +and has since steadily increased the list of such goods. +The Home Ministry enrolled several thousand “economic +police” officers to enforce the price schedules and other features +of the economic program.</p> + + +<h3>THE MEN AT THE CONTROLS</h3> + +<p>But despite the sweeping nature of these provisions, the +business houses managed to keep a fair amount of independence. +Their own men took key positions in many of the +agencies that were enforcing the control measures. In the field +of capital investment, they could still tip the scales. They successfully +resisted army pressure for outright state control and +operation of industry. Nationalization of the vital electric +power industry, for instance, over which they fought long and +<span class="pagenum">[87]</span>bitterly, was finally put through only part way, and has been +a subject of continued dispute.</p> + +<p>So it was not the military leaders alone, but the military leaders +in an uneasy partnership with the businessmen and the +party heads, who carried out the wartime economic program. +The army fascists charted the program, it is true, but they were +not allowed to run it in their own sweet way. The army ruled +in China, as it had in Manchuria. But it was not the unchallenged +dictator at home. There, it shared power with “big business.” +And big business, despite war restrictions, still operated +its own enterprises and still reaped its dividends.</p> + + +<h3>STALEMATE IN CHINA</h3> + +<p>A Cabinet under Prince Konoye had held office throughout the +first phase of the war in China. It resigned in January 1939, +when China’s refusal to accept a dictated peace had become +unmistakable. For Japan now no longer won spectacular victories. +A stalemate had developed, and the war had become +a war of attrition. This second phase of the war lasted for +another eighteen months—until June 1940, when Hitler’s victories +in Europe shifted the balance of power in the Far East.</p> + +<p>The costs to Japan of this second period were no less than +before. She had to maintain the same number of troops in +China, totaling 800,000 or 1,000,000. Heavy fighting was taking +place almost continuously. But the hostilities, ranging from +Canton to Inner Mongolia, led to no decisive results. In some +cases Japan occupied new cities, such as Nanchang, Nanning +and Ichang. In other cases Japanese offensives were disastrously +routed. Chinese guerrillas, ranging far and wide, limited Japan’s +area of effective control, even in the so-called “occupied” territory. +Moreover, the economic gains were not as great as the +army had expected. Sales of Japanese goods to China steadily +increased, but imports of Chinese raw materials either declined +or rose very slowly.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[88]</span></p> + + +<h3>STEPPING ON WESTERN TOES</h3> + +<p>At the same time Japan’s interference with the interests of the +Western powers in China became much more direct, and created +serious friction. Difficulties were most acute at Tientsin, +Shanghai and Amoy. The Japanese army imposed various +restrictions. It kept Western shipping off the Yangtze River +above Shanghai, and the Pearl River below Canton. Western +traders had to face many practices—tariffs, exchange controls, +import and export controls—which were put into effect especially +to hamper their trade. The Japanese enforced a blockade +of the British and French Concessions at Tientsin, and stripped +British citizens for examination before allowing them to enter +or leave their Concession. Although the Western powers +resented these Japanese actions, they limited their opposition +mainly to protests. In July 1939 the United States abrogated +its trade treaty with Japan, but did not follow up this step by +imposing trade penalties.</p> + + +<h3>THREE JAPANESE WAR CABINETS</h3> + +<p>Difficulties on Japan’s home front mounted steadily during the +second phase of the war. The strain was shown in many ways. +One was the rapidity with which Cabinets succeeded one +another. The first Konoye Cabinet, as we have seen, had held +office for nineteen months—from June 1937 to January 1939. +In the second period (January 1939 to July 1940), there were +no less than three Cabinets. Their average length of life was +only six months. These Cabinets, with their Premiers, held +office as follows:</p> + +<p class="numberitem2">1. Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, January 5, 1939 to August +29, 1939</p> + +<p class="numberitem2">2. General Nobuyuki Abe, August 30, 1939 to January +15, 1940</p> + +<p class="numberitem2">3. Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, January 16, 1940 to July +16, 1940.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[89]</span></p> + + +<h3>HIRANUMA AND THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT</h3> + +<p>Many of the decisive events of this period were closely related +to the Cabinet changes. Hiranuma, for example, was forced +out of office by the Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939. +During that summer the Hiranuma Cabinet had been dickering +with Germany over the details of a proposed military pact, +while the Japanese army had been fighting a minor war with +the Soviet Union on the Outer Mongolian frontier. So the +Soviet-German pact came as a stunning blow to Tokyo, and +for a time feelings against Germany ran high. The army +extremists, who had strongly advocated an alliance with Germany, +were discredited along with Hiranuma. Consequently, +extremist influence was not so great in the next two Cabinets, +headed by General Abe and Admiral Yonai.</p> + + +<h3>ABE AND THE PRICE OF RICE</h3> + +<p>The Abe Cabinet was overthrown five months later for reasons +entirely different, but equally significant. Here the issue turned +mainly on Japan’s growing economic difficulties. During the +winter of 1939-40 a rice shortage developed, and “bootleg” +prices soared toward 50 yen per <em>koku</em> (the five bushel unit)—dangerously +close to the level which stimulated the “rice riots” +of 1918. In September 1938 the Abe Cabinet had fixed ceilings +on all prices. When the rice shortage developed, it had to back +down on its own ruling. In November it raised the official +price from 38 to 43 yen per <em>koku</em>. By this time, however, the +farmers had already sold their crops, and the gains were reaped +by the rice dealers.</p> + +<p>Outspoken criticisms were expected in the Diet and, rather +than meet them, the Abe Cabinet resigned in mid-January. The +incoming Yonai Cabinet had to face the music. One outspoken +member of the Minseito party, Takao Saito, challenged not +only economic conditions, but the war itself. His striking +speech of February 2, 1940 attacked Wang Ching-wei’s proposed +<span class="pagenum">[90]</span>regime (Japan’s puppet government) in China as nothing +more than a “central government in name.” After casting +doubt on the prospects of achieving the “new order in East +Asia,” he asked what the Japanese people had received in +return for their great sacrifices in the war. Even more serious, +in the eyes of Japan’s army leaders, was Saito’s declaration that, +in view of China’s large territory and army, it “is doubtful +whether Japan can overthrow” Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. A +critical electric power “famine” which developed at this time, +and forced many factories to shut down, underlined the truth +in Saito’s remarks. The Japanese people backed Saito so +strongly that several months passed before the authorities +dared to expel him from the Diet.</p> + + +<h3>YONAI TRAILS TOO FAR BEHIND NAZI PUSH</h3> + +<p>But Hitler’s military victories in the spring of 1940, and especially +the defeat of France, swiftly altered Japan’s position in +the Far East. The “moderation” which the Abe and Yonai +Cabinets had shown in foreign policy suddenly vanished. +Intense pressure was brought to bear on the French authorities +in the Far East. In June the French Ambassador at Tokyo +agreed to stop shipments of goods to China over the Indo-China +Railway. Less than a month later, the British government +also bowed to the Japanese demand that the Burma Road +be closed for three months. But these gains were not enough +for the extremist elements within Japan. They had received +a fresh impetus from Hitler’s successes, and were prepared to +move far more boldly both on the home and foreign fronts. +The War Minister, maneuvering for the set-up of an equally +bold and impetuous Cabinet, suddenly offered his resignation. +Thus, on July 16, 1940, the Yonai Cabinet crumbled.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[91]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_91"> + XIII. Shadow Over Asia + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Under the second Konoye Cabinet, formed July 22, 1940, +the flood that had been sweeping over Japan since 1931 reached +a new high. Territorial aims were enlarged. Expansion was no +longer to be confined to China. The goal was now a “Greater +East Asia,” including all the rich colonial territories in southern +Asiatic waters. At home, also, the pace quickened. The army +leaders moved toward full suppression of the parties, and a +reduction of the Diet’s powers. Obstacles to foreign expansion +and internal regimentation continued to exist, however, and +slowed down the fascist advance.</p> + +<p>In foreign policy, the Konoye Cabinet made two far-reaching +moves. On September 27, 1940 it concluded a military alliance +with Germany and Italy. By this alliance, as we have seen, +Japan was allotted “Greater East Asia” for her “living space.” +This sphere, however, was not yet under Japanese control. It +had to be won. So the second move was a step in the direction +of winning it. It was a move into Indo-China.</p> + +<p>In September 1940, a French-Japanese agreement admitted +a limited number of Japanese troops to northern districts of the +French colony of Indo-China. These troops were the entering +wedge. Then Japan pushed her control southward to Saigon. +Early in 1941, Tokyo dictated a settlement of the Thailand-Indo-China +conflict, which she hoped would eventually yield +her full control of Indo-China, and still greater powers over +Thailand, where Japanese influence was already strong. And +Saigon, we should add, is only 650 miles north of Singapore.</p> + + +<h3>A HARD ROW TO HOE</h3> + +<p>In other respects, however, the Konoye Cabinet’s expansionist +program—like that of its predecessors—did not enjoy easy +going. For the war in China was still not won. In November +1940 Japan formally recognized Wang Ching-wei’s Nanking +<span class="pagenum">[92]</span>regime (the puppet government she herself had created). But +this step merely spotlighted Japan’s failure to secure peace in +China. Tokyo also undertook negotiations with the Soviet +Union, but with little immediate result. Finally, the British +and the Dutch strengthened the defenses of both Malaya and +the Netherlands Indies, and the American fleet at Hawaii served +as an eloquent warning against any move by Japan on Singapore, +strategic key to southeast Asia.</p> + + +<h3>THE HOME FRONT</h3> + +<p>On the home front, the Konoye Cabinet clamped down even +firmer dictatorial control. All political parties “voluntarily” +dissolved in the summer of 1940. There was a plan afoot to +curb the Diet’s influence by amending the Election Law to +give fewer people votes. And the extremists began to organize +a mass fascist party, with local units throughout the country.</p> + +<p>These efforts achieved some practical results. The outspoken +criticism marking previous Diet sessions was less apparent in +1940-41. The “near neighbor” groups, set up by the new fascist +party, gave the authorities a means of checking up closely on +popular opinion, and taking measures to suppress opposition as +soon as it appeared. Economic difficulties were piling up, and +the need for repression was becoming greater. Rationing of +sugar, charcoal and matches, begun in 1940, was extended to +rice early in 1941.</p> + + +<h3>A HORSE TRADE</h3> + +<p>But the political struggle within Japan, even among its ruling +circles, was not settled by the Konoye government’s actions. +On the contrary, it continued as strong as ever. A characteristic +“deal” indicated the lines along which the struggle was +being fought. The military-fascist groups were unwilling to +permit a general election, due in 1941, to take place. On the +other hand, the moderates opposed moves to revise the Election +<span class="pagenum">[93]</span>Law and to strengthen state control over industry. In January +1941, a deal was made in which the extremists agreed to drop +these moves, while the moderates consented to let the Diet run +on without an election for one year, and to support the government’s +program in the meantime.</p> + + +<h3>EXPANSION OR DEFEAT?</h3> + +<p>In the early months of 1941, Tokyo increasingly committed +itself to a policy dictated by the results of a decade of aggression. +Since 1937 Japan had spent nearly 20 billion yen on the +war in China, or twice the total national debt in 1936. She had +suffered more than a million casualties, in killed, wounded and +diseased. In return for these great losses, she expected vast gains.</p> + +<p>Thus “Greater East Asia” became the avowed goal of Japan’s +foreign policy. To Japan’s rulers, it represented the full flowering +of the “bloc economy” idea. They now considered not +only Manchuria and China, but the whole of East Asia, necessary +for such a bloc. The raw materials of southeast Asia, especially +the oil, tin and rubber of the Indies and Malaya, were +needed to make up the deficiencies of a “Japan-China-Manchoukuo” +bloc. But even with these rich prizes Japan would +not be entirely self-sufficient economically. She would still lack +high-grade machinery and certain other products. Nevertheless, +with the raw materials of East Asia firmly under her control, +Japan believed she would have sufficient bargaining power to +secure the foreign currency necessary for buying all she needed +in the world market.</p> + +<p>Japanese statesmen continually stressed this idea of an East +Asiatic bloc in their speeches. To make its realization possible, +they concluded the alliance with Germany. Barring an outright +German victory in Europe, however, the difficulties +which confront Tokyo’s advance toward mastery of East Asia +are still formidable.</p> + +<p>For Japan’s economic resources are at a low ebb. Industrial +<span class="pagenum">[94]</span>production has begun to decline. Foreign trade is falling off, +and reserves of foreign currency are low. China is unconquered, +and relations with the Soviet Union are uncertain. +The British Empire and the United States, which stand guard +over southeast Asia, are the mainstays of Japan’s foreign trade. +By moving against them in that region, Japan might risk everything +gained thus far. For the first time, she would be staking +her future on a war with powers that control the seas and +access to world markets. She would be facing all the dangers +that she successfully avoided in the World War of 1914-18.</p> + +<p>Japan’s geographical location, close to the scene of action in +the Far East, is still her great strategic advantage. Her economic +deficiencies have been, and continue to be, her main source +of weakness. The ratio between these two controlling factors +may well determine the immediate future. Is Japan’s new +Empire to reach out over immensely larger areas, or is it to +suffer its first great defeat?</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[95]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="Page_95"> + SUGGESTED READING + </h2> +</div> + + +<p class="hangindent">BORTON, HUGH. <cite>Japan Since 1931.</cite> New York. Institute of Pacific Relations. +1940. Political and social developments within Japan during the +past decade. Rather technical.</p> + +<p class="hangindent">COLEGROVE, KENNETH W. <cite>Militarism in Japan.</cite> New York. World +Peace Foundation. 1936. The army’s role in Japan, and a study of the +military-fascist movement. Fairly advanced but readable.</p> + +<p class="hangindent">CROW, CARL. <cite>He Opened the Door of Japan.</cite> New York. Harper. 1939. +The life of Townsend Harris, first American Minister to Japan (1856-62). +Very readable.</p> + +<p class="hangindent">ISHIMOTO, BARONESS. <cite>Facing Two Ways.</cite> New York. Farrar and Rinehart. +1935. A noted Japanese feminist leader tells the story of her life. +Popular and readable.</p> + +<p class="hangindent">NORMAN, E. HERBERT. <cite>Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State.</cite> New +York. Institute of Pacific Relations. 1940. Discussion of Japan’s political +and economic reforms during the Meiji era. Technical.</p> + +<p class="hangindent">OMURA, BUNJI. <cite>The Last Genro.</cite> Philadelphia. Lippincott. 1938. The +story of Prince Saionji’s life, covering the whole period of Japan’s modern +development. Entertaining narrative style.</p> + +<p class="hangindent">REISCHAUER, ROBERT K. <cite>Japan: Government—Politics.</cite> New York. +Nelson. 1939. Sketches the growth of Japanese government from earliest +times. Fairly advanced but readable.</p> + +<p class="hangindent">RUSSEL, OLAND D. <cite>The House of Mitsui.</cite> Boston. Little Brown. 1939. +Three centuries of the Mitsui family’s history, beginning in Tokugawa +times. Readable.</p> + +<p class="hangindent">SANSOM, G. B. <cite>Japan: A Short Cultural History.</cite> New York. Century. +1931. The best recent history of Japan, covering events up to 1868. +Technical.</p> + +<p class="hangindent">YOUNG, A. MORGAN. <cite>Imperial Japan, 1926-1938.</cite> New York. Morrow. +1939. Also <cite>Japan in Recent Times, 1912-1926</cite>. New York. Morrow. 1931. +Narrative accounts of more recent phases of Japanese history. +Readable.</p> + +<p class="hangindent">SUGGESTED PERIODICALS: <cite>Amerasia</cite>; <cite>Asia</cite>; <cite>Far Eastern Survey</cite>; and +<cite>Pacific Affairs</cite>.</p> + +<hr class="tb x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<p><span class="pagenum">[96]</span></p> + +<p class="sectiontitle">A NOTE ON HEADLINE BOOKS</p> + +<p><cite>Shadow Over Asia</cite> is one of the Foreign Policy Association’s +<span class="allsmcap">HEADLINE BOOKS</span>. The object of the series is to provide sufficient +unbiased background information to enable readers to +reach intelligent and independent conclusions on the important +international problems of the day. <span class="allsmcap">HEADLINE BOOKS</span> are +prepared under the supervision of the Department of Popular +Education of the Foreign Policy Association with the cooperation +of the Association’s Research Staff of experts.</p> + +<p>The Foreign Policy Association is a non-profit American +organization founded “to carry on research and educational +activities to aid in the understanding and constructive development +of American foreign policy.” It is an impartial research +organization and does not seek to promote any one point +of view toward international affairs. Such views as may be +expressed or implied in any of its publications are those of the +author and not of the Association.</p> + +<p>For further information about <span class="allsmcap">HEADLINE BOOKS</span> and the other +publications of the Foreign Policy Association, write to the +Department of Popular Education, Foreign Policy Association, +22 East 38th Street, New York, N. Y.</p> + +<hr class="tb"> + +<p class="sectiontitle">ABOUT THE AUTHOR</p> + +<p>T. A. Bisson has been the Foreign Policy Association’s specialist +on Far Eastern affairs since 1929. He has taught in China and +travelled widely in the Far East. In addition to writing numerous +Foreign Policy Reports, he is the author of <cite>Japan in China</cite>, +published by the Macmillan Company in 1938, and <cite>American +Policy in the Far East, 1931-1940</cite>, published by Institute of +Pacific Relations in 1940.</p> +</div> + +<hr class="tb x-ebookmaker-drop"> + +<div class="chapter"> +<div class="transnote"> +<h2 style="margin-top: 0em">Transcriber’s Notes:</h2> + +<p>New original cover art included with this eBook is granted to the public domain.</p> + +<p>Illustrations have been moved to paragraph breaks near where they are +mentioned, except for the frontispiece.</p> +</div></div> + +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78440 ***</div> +</body> +</html> |