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diff --git a/78440-0.txt b/78440-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9989db8 --- /dev/null +++ b/78440-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2990 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78440 *** + +Transcriber’s Notes: + +Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_), and text +enclosed by equal signs is in bold (=bold=). + +An additional Transcriber’s Note is at the end. + + * * * * * + +HEADLINE BOOKS + +No. 29 + + * * * * * + +HEADLINE BOOKS + + =CHANGING GOVERNMENTS= + Amid New Social Problems + + =SHADOW OVER EUROPE= + The Challenge of Nazi Germany + + =BRICKS WITHOUT MORTAR= + The Story of International Cooperation + + =BATTLES WITHOUT BULLETS= + The Story of Economic Warfare + + =IN QUEST OF EMPIRE= + The Problem of Colonies + + =HUMAN DYNAMITE= + The Story of Europe’s Minorities + + =THE PEACE THAT FAILED= + How Europe Sowed the Seeds of War + + =NEW HOMES FOR OLD= + Public Housing in Europe and America + + =WAR ATLAS= + A Handbook of Maps and Facts + + =THE BRITISH EMPIRE UNDER FIRE= + + =SPOTLIGHT ON THE BALKANS= + + =CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAS= + + =LOOK AT LATIN AMERICA= + With 25 Maps and Charts + + =AMERICA REARMS= + The Citizen’s Guide to National Defense + + =SHADOW OVER ASIA= + The Rise of Militant Japan + + =WAR ON THE SHORT WAVE= + (In preparation) + + + + +SHADOW OVER ASIA + + + THE RISE OF MILITANT JAPAN + + by + T. A. BISSON + + Illustrated by + GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES + + THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION + + * * * * * + + COPYRIGHT 1941 + + FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED + 22 EAST 38TH STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. + ALL RIGHTS RESERVED + + _Published April 1941_ + + _Typography by Andor Braun_ + + PRODUCED UNDER UNION CONDITIONS AND + COMPOSED, PRINTED AND BOUND BY UNION LABOR + + MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA + + + + +CONTENTS + + + I. The Shadow 7 + + II. Introducing Imperial Japan 11 + + III. Imitating the Chinese 20 + + IV. Japan Bars Her Door 25 + + V. How the Door Was Opened 33 + + VI. Catching Up with the West 39 + + VII. Who Rules Modern Japan? 45 + + VIII. Creating a Modern Empire 53 + + IX. Japan and the First World War 59 + + X. Go Liberal, Go Fascist? 65 + + XI. The Shadow Deepens 73 + + XII. War with China 83 + + XIII. Shadow Over Asia 91 + + Suggested Reading 95 + + * * * * * + +[Illustration: WHERE THE SHADOW LIES] + + + + +I. The Shadow + + +On the morning of September 27, 1940 the cables hummed with news of a +momentous ceremony. Japanese diplomats in Berlin had signed a military +pact with Germany and Italy. That evening in Tokyo the Japanese people +received a message from Emperor Hirohito. In their newspapers they +read: “We are deeply gratified that a pact has been concluded between +these three powers.” The Emperor had spoken. A new alliance had been +formed. And a lengthening shadow was spreading over Asia. + + +TEN YEARS AGO AND NOW + +The shadow had first been cast on another September day nearly ten +years before, when a railway explosion at Mukden had served as an +excuse for the Japanese military to take over Manchuria. As we look +back now with the advantage of hindsight, that day--September 18, +1931--looms up as an important milestone. For Japan’s seizure of +Manchuria ended one historic era, and began another. It abruptly broke +up the period of comparative peace that had succeeded the first World +War. And it ushered in our present period of strife and unsettlement. +Its indirect effects on European developments were also very great. We +know that Japan’s defiance lowered the prestige and authority of the +League of Nations. It showed how hard it was to secure international +cooperation strong enough to check determined aggression. Japan’s +example undoubtedly influenced Mussolini and Hitler in the bold moves +they made later on in Europe. + +After 1935 German and Italian expansion in Europe paralleled Japan’s +drive in the Far East. All of these movements steadily widened their +scope. Increasingly these three powers played into one another’s hands, +and helped one another’s advance. The anti-Comintern pact of November +1936 drew them closer together. But they were not formally allied +until September 27, 1940, when Japan signed the military pact with the +Axis powers. + +This pact had startling implications. True, Germany and Italy were +separated from Japan by vast distances. As long as Britain controlled +the seas, the new allies could not actually join military forces. But +Germany had only to put pressure on the French authorities at Vichy in +order to help Japan win control over Indo-China. An Axis break-through +in the Mediterranean, moreover, could swiftly bring her much greater +aid. + + +TOWARD A “NEW ORDER” + +It was this possibility that made Japan’s aims, as outlined in the +alliance, so significant. Berlin and Rome waved Japan ahead toward the +conquest of “Greater East Asia.” Until 1940 Tokyo’s official claims +had reached out only to Manchuria and China. But the new term brought +southeast Asia into the picture as well. This area would certainly +include Indo-China, Siam, Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the +Philippines. On its outskirts lie Australia, New Zealand and India. By +formally announcing “Greater East Asia” as Tokyo’s sphere of influence, +the Axis-Japan pact served as a blueprint of the Far Eastern sector of +the world order which the Axis alliance hoped to establish. + + +WHAT IS “GREATER EAST ASIA”? + +The new allies were seeking control over three continents. Germany +and Italy were bidding for domination over Europe, Africa and the +Near East, creating new and urgent problems for us. Tokyo’s bid for +supremacy in “Greater East Asia” raised problems which were just as +great. To many of us these problems seemed far away--much more remote +than those of Europe, to which we are bound by so many close ties. Yet +we know now that we should be making a mistake if we tried to close our +eyes to them. + +More than one billion people, or half the earth’s population, live in +the area embraced by “Greater East Asia.” It is thus one of the most +populous regions of the globe. Its territorial spread is equally large. +Its outside limits range from northern Japan to Australia, and from +China and India to New Zealand. The whole North and South American +continents, excluding Canada, could be fitted comfortably into this +vast territory. + +It is, besides, an area of great contrasts--greater, probably, than +in any other region of the world. In a score of different localities +conditions vary widely--climate, people, language, religion, economic +life, government. Coolies working in Korean rice fields are a far +cry from English-speaking Australian sheep ranchers, peasants in the +remote interior of China from Malayan tin miners or East Indian rubber +planters, Indian bazaars under a burning sun from Manchurian cities +deep in their winter snows. + + +A COLONIAL REGION + +Another feature of this region became especially important after +Germany had conquered several European powers with Far Eastern +possessions. For eastern Asia is one of the greatest colonial areas +of the world, not even excepting Africa. From Korea to India runs a +continuous chain of Japanese, French, American, Dutch and British +holdings. Only Japan in the north, and Australia and New Zealand in the +south, may be counted as fully independent countries. So this region +is the scene not only of imperial rivalries, but of struggles for +independence on the part of native peoples. + +Thus many factors enter into the international developments affecting +this region. Countless threads of policy connect it with Europe. They +run to Berlin, and are woven into Hitler’s plans; to London, where +they tie in with the problem of what naval and air forces the British +can spare for the Far East; to Vichy, and the attitude of the French +Government there; and to the refugee Netherlands authorities in +Britain taking counsel on the fate of their colonies. Moscow is caught +up in this diplomatic network, and so is Washington--their moves can +exert decisive influence on the course of events. + + +JAPAN PULLS THE STRINGS + +Yet the main moving force in Far Eastern developments is Japan. In +fact, Japan has been pulling the strings ever since September 18, +1931. The challenge to the _status quo_ in East Asia proceeds from +Tokyo, just as in Europe it proceeds from Berlin. Like Germany, but in +even greater measure, Japan has the strategic advantage of a central +position. She need not take too seriously the protests of European +powers halfway across the globe, and she is well aware that the main +centers of strength in the United States and the Soviet Union are +almost equally distant. Only Japan, of the major powers, has her home +bases wholly within the Far Eastern region. + +And so today we are forced to think more and more about Japan. In large +part we are concerned with the immediate present. We want to know what +Japan is doing, and what she intends to do. Yet we can understand her +present foreign policy and form some idea of her probable future moves +only if we know something of her past as well. We must seek out the +forces that have shaped modern Japan. + +So in this book we shall go back to the legendary traditions of the +Japanese nation, today being revived by Japanese patriots and preached +as a state religion. We shall see how the belief in hereditary power +as the privilege of the few has been strong in Japan from the earliest +times, resisting the influence of democratic ideas from both China and +the West; how even when Japan set up a constitutional government, the +seats of ancient privilege were preserved; and how Japan, with her +military leaders in the saddle, finally set out on the road to Empire. + + + + +II. Introducing Imperial Japan + + +Japan proper, consisting of four closely connected islands, has often +been compared to the British Isles. A map of the Eurasian continent +shows the similarity of their geographical position. Japan’s island +chain is much longer, but it clings to the Asiatic mainland very much +as the British Isles cling to the European mainland. The Straits of +Tsushima take the place of the English Channel. + +Actually, however, Japan is much farther from the mainland than +Britain, even in the narrow waters of Tsushima. The steamer from +Shimonoseki takes nearly eight hours in crossing over to Fusan, on the +tip of the Korean peninsula. This fact has had important historical +results. The stretch of water has been wide enough to make invasion +difficult--at least until modern times. Yet it has not been so wide as +to bar cultural exchanges with the mainland. + + +JAPAN AND THE ASIATIC MAINLAND + +During historic times, for roughly 2,000 years, Japan was never +successfully invaded. In 1066 William the Conqueror successfully +invaded England. But two centuries later, in 1274 and 1281, Kublai +Khan’s Mongol-Chinese armies twice failed to conquer Japan. For long +periods, when Japan’s rulers so wished, they were able to isolate their +country more or less completely from the Asiatic mainland. + +On the other hand, Japan was close enough to the continent to benefit +from the earlier growth of civilization there. From the very beginning +of Japanese national life, we can trace significant advances to the +coming of peoples and cultures from the Korean peninsula. At times, +notably in the seventh and eighth centuries, the flood of cultural +influences from China almost swamped Japan and threatened to sweep away +her native institutions. During the past century Western influence has +caused equally great changes in Japanese life. Each time, however, a +solid core of Japanese tradition resisted destruction, and shaped the +new elements into a social pattern characteristically Japanese. + + +JAPAN’S ISLAND HOME + +Many local features of Japan’s island home are as important as its +geographical position. Its natural beauties have fed the highly +developed aesthetic sense of the Japanese people. No one who has +traveled the Inland Sea can forget its sparkling waters, or the lovely +islands which dot its surface. The majestic beauty of Mt. Fuji is world +famous. Hallowed associations enhance its snow-capped splendor for the +Japanese. + +Not all characteristics of the group of Japanese islands are so +favorable. Many of its mountains are volcanic in origin. Several +volcanoes are still active. Earthquakes occur frequently. (The +disastrous earthquake of 1923, with over 150,000 dead and injured, is +still fresh in our memories.) Typhoons, sweeping in from the sea in +destructive assault, are also common. So nature contributes an element +of insecurity to the life of the Japanese, offsetting the protection +their isolation gives them. + +Today other natural features give rise to a more serious insecurity. +Japan’s territory is small, barely the size of California, the +population is large and prolific. Four-fifths of the islands are so +mountainous that they are useless for the intensive rice cultivation +which is the principal Japanese agricultural pursuit. In recent times, +when modern industry became necessary, the Japanese islands were found +to lack most minerals. Water power is abundant, and can be harnessed to +produce electricity. There are considerable reserves of coal, though +not of good coking quality. But there is little iron, and even less of +the minor but still important metals. To these factors, which have not +prevented the Japanese from becoming an industrial nation, we shall +have to return later on. + + +WHO ARE THE JAPANESE? + +Like all modern peoples, the Japanese of today are a mixed race. In +prehistoric times one migrant people after another overran the islands. +The ocean set a barrier to further migration. So the invaders had to +settle down, either exterminating the people already there or else +intermarrying with them. + +[Illustration: JAPAN’S ISLAND HOME] + +The last invasions must have occurred early in the Christian era. +Scholars are not agreed on the exact racial proportions of the groups +which mingled to form the modern Japanese people. The basic stock is +probably Mongolian, the result of migrations through Korea from the +north Asiatic continent. There is apparently a southern admixture, +coming from either southeast China or Malaysia. Many of these groups +were late invaders of the islands. They found there an Ainu people, +possibly of Caucasian racial origin. Ainu remnants still survive in +Japan, but most of them have been absorbed or exterminated in the +course of centuries of warfare. + +[Illustration: EARLY INVADERS AND SETTLERS] + +Three main racial elements thus entered into the making of the Japanese +people. To the Mongol strain is undoubtedly due the warlike spirit of +the Japanese, while from southeast Asia comes a mythology that has been +interwoven with Japan’s political institutions. Later, there were also +many Chinese and Korean immigrants. By the end of the seventh century, +according to one source, more than one-third of Japan’s noble families +claimed Chinese or Korean descent. + +[Illustration: A Magatama, or bead ornament, common in early Japanese +tombs. Often made of jade, nephrite or chrysoprase--materials found not +in Japan but in the Ural-Baikal regions.] + + +EARLY JAPANESE INSTITUTIONS + +To understand modern Japan, we need to study the past even more than in +the case of most Western nations. For survivals of ancient traditions +play a large part in Japan’s national life today. These beliefs and +practices can be traced back for nearly two thousand years. What were +these institutions like in their earliest form? + +Historians give only a partial answer to this question. The latest +island invaders, who became the dominant Japanese, were a group of +clans or tribes. Leadership in these clans was hereditary. The clan +elder was both chieftain and high priest. He supervised or performed +sacrifices to the clan god, who was usually held to be his direct +ancestor. All clansmen were supposedly united by blood ties to the clan +elder, and thus shared in the divine descent. + + +“THE WAY OF THE GODS” + +Societies ruled by a priest-king, usually called “theocracies,” have +existed in many parts of the world. In Japan, however, theocracy +grew all the stronger because of a mythological tradition, later +called Shinto, or “Way of the Gods,” centering about a Sun Goddess +(Amaterasu). There were many aspects to Shinto, including an early +nature worship. But its main feature came to be the story of the Sun +Goddess, whose descendants were the Japanese people. Early in their +history the rulers of Japan raised this myth to the dignity of a state +cult. The chieftain of the Yamato clan, the strongest of all, claimed +direct descent from the Sun Goddess. This claim was a very real thing +in Japan. It was taken much more literally than our vaguer Western idea +of “the divine right of kings,” which persisted until the eighteenth +century in Europe. + +The clansmen were aristocrats who handed on their privileges from +father to son, and to whom war was second nature. But agriculture, in +the shape of the cultivation of rice, was already a cornerstone in +the economy of this early Japanese society. Under the clansmen were +“guilds” of farmers and artisans, who did most of the productive work. +Membership in these producing units also passed from father to son. +These serfs, as well as a smaller number of actual slaves, were made up +largely of war captives, conquered natives, or immigrants from Korea. + +[Illustration: JAPAN’S EARLY SOCIETY (5-6th CENTURIES)] + +The chief ideas of this primitive Shinto society are quite clear. +There was a strong emphasis on the hereditary principle. The idea of +an aristocracy of the blood was strengthened by the idea of descent +from the gods. Government was by men, not by law. The clan or group, +not the individual, was important. The mass of the people lived to +serve their rulers. We shall see how these primitive ideas--so like the +totalitarian ideas of today--have influenced Japanese history through +the centuries. + + +BEGINNINGS OF A NATION-STATE + +At first the invading clans were not unified. There was little +centralized government. The Yamato chieftain had only a shadowy +authority over the other clans. He was “first among equals,” rather +than an overlord. He controlled directly the territory held by his own +clan, but not the lands of other clans. Nor did his religious authority +extend far beyond his own clan. + +During the first four or five centuries of the Christian era this +picture was steadily changing. Most of central and western Japan was +conquered and occupied as the result of a long series of wars. The +power of the Yamato clan was growing. Its chieftain was becoming the +ruler of a centralized state. His position was approaching that of a +king. Lesser leaders were being attached to this “Emperor,” and were +assuming the role of ministers at the “court.” + +In other ways, too, the various clans were merging into a centralized +state. The Emperor, as the direct descendant of the Sun Goddess, came +to be recognized as divine ruler of the whole Japanese people. More and +more the Japanese thought of themselves as a single patriarchal family, +headed by “the Sovereign that is a manifest God.” Ancestors of the +other clan leaders, also divine, were brought into relation with those +of the Emperor, but in subordinate rank. The strongest clans were able +to claim descent from deities closely associated with the Sun Goddess. + + +CONQUESTS IN KOREA + +These political and religious changes were the outward signs of an +underlying movement of growth and expansion. A larger and larger area +of the islands was being occupied. The population was growing, and +additional economic units, or “guilds,” were being formed. Japanese +armies were fighting in Korea, where they dominated the southern +region of the peninsula for long periods. Through this contact with +the mainland, a stream of Korean immigrants, and even some Chinese, +flowed into Japan. Many of them were educated scribes, Buddhist priests +or expert artisans. By the fifth century the Japanese had learned the +rudiments of Chinese writing, and in the sixth century Buddhism was +officially introduced from Korea. The wealth of Chinese civilization +was thus opened up to the Japanese people. + +[Illustration: INTERCOURSE WITH KOREA 5-6th Centuries] + + +THE OLD ORDER BREAKS DOWN + +By the sixth century, Japan faced new and difficult problems. Old +forms of government were breaking down. The simple clan rule, based on +blood ties, was being upset by migrations within, and immigration from +without. New leaders were faking their family trees, in order to claim +divine descent. The clan chieftains found their priestly control over +the people slipping, and had to try the use of political and military +power instead. + +Special difficulties arose when new areas were conquered, or large +numbers of immigrants arrived. There were disputes between clans, some +of which favored “guilds” and some a freer order of serfs. The Imperial +clan proved able to get the richest of the new areas, and to extend +the lands and increase the people under its control. But this did not +settle the problem. For the leading clans tried to control the Emperor, +and fought over rival claimants to the throne. + +These bitter quarrels threatened to tear the new state apart. A more +effective centralization, both of economic and political power, had +obviously become necessary. The groundwork had been laid, and the +times called for a drastic change. The model was sought in China, then +flourishing under the T’ang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.). + + + + +III. Imitating the Chinese + + +One of the most dramatic episodes of modern history has been Japan’s +adoption of Western institutions and techniques. But the interesting +thing is that such wholesale borrowings were not new in the history of +Japan. More than a thousand years earlier she had drawn similarly on +Chinese civilization. That earlier period, moreover, was akin to the +later in one significant respect--the old Japanese ways persisted under +the new shell. The changes were only skin-deep. And the more important +beliefs and practices that featured the early clan society we have been +studying continued to govern Japanese behavior. + +Japan’s contacts with China had begun well before the seventh century, +the period when they became so marked. At first these contacts had been +only secondhand, through Korea. Direct relations with China had been +established early in the fifth century, but had remained unofficial. +The first official Japanese envoy was sent to the Sui Dynasty in 607 +A.D., and a second embassy followed in 608. In the two centuries after +630, no less than twelve Japanese embassies visited the T’ang court +at Ch’ang-an, located on the site of the modern city of Sian (see +map opposite). These two hundred years were China’s golden age, when +dazzling Ch’ang-an was the world’s foremost civilized center. Japanese +monks and scholars accompanied the embassies, often remaining in China +for long periods of study. They brought back to Japan a thorough +knowledge of Chinese culture--much as Japanese students have returned +from Western countries with new knowledge and skills during the past +eighty years or so. + +[Illustration: ROUTES TO THE CONTINENT 7-8th CENTURIES] + + +CHINA BECOMES THE “GLASS OF FASHION” + +Chinese civilization, during the seventh and eighth centuries, was +transplanted to Japan on a vast scale. Nara, the new Japanese capital +(see map opposite), was built on the lavish model of Ch’ang-an. Court +society became highly sophisticated. The ability to write a good +Chinese hand, or turn a Chinese verse, was the indispensable equipment +of an educated man. The first national histories of Japan were +written--most of them in the Chinese language. Buddhism flourished. +Japanese artistic skill expressed itself in masterpieces of sculpture +and architecture, modeled on T’ang examples but individual in genius +and execution. Native Japanese poetry flowered and, in general, this +was the classic age of Japanese culture. + +[Illustration: “Japanese artistic skill expressed itself in +masterpieces of sculpture ... modeled on T’ang examples.”] + +In the field of government the Japanese also imitated the T’ang +system. They declared the land “nationalized”--or subject only to the +Emperor’s control. They reorganized local government, putting Imperial +officials in direct control, especially of tax revenues. In China such +officials were chosen through an examination system, so examinations +were introduced in Japan. The Emperor was now, in theory at least, the +all-powerful head of the Japanese state. + + +BUT IT’S CHINA--“WITH A DIFFERENCE” + +These reforms were not amateurish. They were based on a good knowledge +of the principles and practices of the Chinese system. Yet in their +pure Chinese form they worked against certain ingrained Japanese ideas, +most of all the hereditary principle. So, from the beginning, the +Japanese changed the Chinese system as they took it over. The changes +may not have seemed great at the time, but they were really basic. +Within a few centuries, the new institutions had produced an entirely +different result in Japan. Only in form did they bear any resemblance +to the institutions of China. + +The clearest example of such changes is the way Japan’s statesmen +treated the Chinese examination system. In China, at its best, this +was a real civil service system. For centuries the path to public +office lay through success in the examinations. Sons of great families +undoubtedly had a better chance of succeeding, and bribery and +favoritism were rife in decadent periods. But the “success story” of +the Horatio Alger type fills Chinese literature. In not a few cases, +the poor but brilliant Chinese youth passes the examinations with +honors, and becomes a powerful and wealthy official. + + +THE ARISTOCRAT’S PLACE IN THE SUN + +This system was altogether too democratic for Japan’s clan society, +with its emphasis on aristocratic lineage. At the very outset it was +drastically modified. Training schools were set up, but only nobles +of a certain rank could enter them. These persons alone could take +the examinations, and qualify for high office. After a time, even the +examinations were discontinued. Important government posts soon became +hereditary again. Lower posts in the provinces were usually taken by +local leaders, instead of officers sent by the Imperial government. +The higher provincial officials meanwhile stayed at court, and +delegated their powers to personal followers in the various localities. + +A similar development took place in the case of the land reforms. The +land was “nationalized,” but it proved impossible to preserve the +public domain. The great estates of the clan leaders were returned +to them in payment for their official services, and then remained +hereditary. Powerful individuals encroached on the public lands, or +impoverished peasants escaped tax exactions by joining their lands to +privately owned manors, and becoming serfs. In practice, the public +domain was gradually taken over by private families, the court nobility +or the great monasteries. + + +THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE + +As these private estates were usually tax-free, the Imperial government +was soon deprived of its revenue. And so, as time went on, the Emperor +became a mere figurehead. Elaborate state councils and ministries, +patterned after those of China, became nothing more than ceremonial +forms. Yet centralization was maintained for several centuries, with +the great Fujiwara family as the real power behind the throne. This +family held vast provincial estates, controlled many of the local +officials, and dominated the court. By wedding the Imperial princes +to Fujiwara ladies, it reduced the Emperors to puppets. The Fujiwara +dictatorship ruled a much more intricate and cultured society than had +existed in the early clan period. On the surface, this new society was +Chinese; in fact, it was still run in the old Japanese way. + +Changes there had been, however. The courtier had replaced the warrior. +Instead of fighting clan chieftains, a bureaucracy of civilians now +ruled. Buddhism had pervaded Japanese society from top to bottom. The +teachings of Confucius had also been introduced from China. For a time +the home-grown Shinto religion was overshadowed, and lay dormant. But +it was not wholly eclipsed. The Emperor reigned, if he did not rule. +Though the Shinto ritual, playing up the Emperor’s descent from the Sun +Goddess, might be neglected, it was never lost. Japanese government +was still theocratic (centering on a priest-king), even if a Fujiwara +pulled the strings and bureaucrats played all the active roles. + + + + +IV. Japan Bars Her Door + + +We must now leap several centuries to about 1550, when the first +Western traders and missionaries reached Japan. + +The Japan of 1550 differed greatly from the Japan of the Fujiwara era +we left behind us five or six centuries earlier. The Fujiwara power +had passed away in the twelfth century. Its civilian government had +grown weak. It could not even keep the peace. As disorder grew in +the provinces, great independent lords surrounded themselves with +military retainers on their private estates. A feudal society gradually +emerged. In 1185 one of these feudal lords established his supremacy +over the others, and soon obtained Imperial appointment as “Shogun,” +or Generalissimo. The Emperor’s court still carried on at Kyoto, but +political control passed increasingly to the Shoguns, who became +military dictators. A military aristocracy--but a rapidly shifting +one--dominated Japan. As new feudal lords grew in strength, they would +challenge the Shogun’s authority and bitter civil wars would follow. +Strife and disorder amounting to anarchy marked the century which +preceded 1550. + +Then the trend was reversed. By 1590, through the work of three great +leaders--Nobunaga, Hideyoshi and Ieyasu--the country was unified +again. In the brief period that followed--say, until 1625--Japan was +confronted with a fateful question. Should it embark on a program +of military and commercial expansion, similar to that which Western +nations were just entering upon? For a time it seemed that the answer +might be “yes.” In the end, it was “no.” And that “no” changed the +whole course of Far Eastern and perhaps world history. In 1603 Ieyasu +established the Tokugawa Shogunate, destined to rule Japan for more +than 250 years. After 1616, under his successors, the seclusion policy +was gradually adopted, and Japan was practically isolated from the +outside world. + +Was this choice inevitable? We cannot really tell. We do know that in +the period just before she barred her door Japan was reaching outward +toward full intercourse with the West. + + +REACHING OUTWARD + +For the last thirty years of the sixteenth century were a dynamic +period in Japanese history. An excess of energy in Japan seemed to +match the urge for discovery and conquest that stirred the rising +nations of Europe. + +Japan’s domestic and foreign trade had been increasing at a rapid pace. +Native industries had grown, and trade guilds had flourished. After +1550 this commercial development leaped forward. Sakai, a great trading +center, became virtually a free city, ruled by its merchant princes. +Nagasaki was opened to foreign trade in 1570, and soon developed into +a thriving port. At this time, too, Japanese ships, often on piratical +expeditions, were venturing into the waters of the Philippines and +Siam. In groups and as individuals, Japanese emigrants were found at +various ports in southeast Asia. Hideyoshi even conceived the project +of conquering China, but after overrunning Korea in 1592-93, his armies +(numbering 150,000 men) were defeated. + +After 1550 missionaries and traders from Portugal, Spain, Holland and +England came to Japan in growing numbers. The Japanese eagerly seized +upon Western products and technical advances, notably in firearms +and shipbuilding. These commercial contacts with the West modified +Japan’s economy and stimulated her industrial development. For several +decades Christianity, introduced by St. Francis Xavier in 1549-51, was +welcomed. Some of the feudal lords became Christians. By 1617 there +were some 300,000 Christian converts, or nearly as many as today. + +[Illustration: JAPAN’S OVERSEAS ADVENTURES 16-17th CENTURIES] + + +JAPAN SENDS ENVOYS TO SPAIN + +For a time, there was the possibility of even more extensive contacts +between Tokugawa Japan and the West. Ieyasu, the first Tokugawa Shogun, +deliberately sought to make Japan a great center of international +trade. China, mindful of Hideyoshi’s Korean invasions, rebuffed him. He +then turned to the West--that is, to Spain, then the richest trading +nation of Europe. In 1610 Ieyasu concluded a commercial treaty with the +Spanish governor of the Philippines. In 1610 and 1614 Japanese envoys +crossed the Pacific and visited some of the Spanish possessions in +America. Then they went on across the Atlantic. In Madrid the Japanese +envoy had an audience with King Philip III on January 30, 1615; later, +he saw the Pope at Rome. The Spanish king, however, influenced by +the anti-Christian persecutions that had already occurred in Japan, +rejected Ieyasu’s request for a treaty establishing trade relations +with Spain and the Spanish-American possessions. + + +BUT FINALLY PULLS IN HER LINES + +It was not until more than two centuries later that such an opportunity +presented itself again. For soon after Ieyasu’s death in 1616, the +policy of national seclusion was adopted. + +Many factors led to this decision. The narrow intolerance of the +missionaries, as well as conflicts between rival Jesuit and Franciscan +orders, had created difficulties almost from the beginning of their +stay in Japan. More important was the fear that estates of the +Christian lords might become centers of rebellion, and thus lay +Japan open to conquest by a foreign power. Persecution began under +Hideyoshi, and after 1616 a series of anti-Christian edicts was issued. +The Christian persecutions reached their height in 1622-24, although +Christianity was not fully stamped out until 1638. + +At this time Japanese were forbidden to go abroad, and the building +of large sea-going vessels was also prohibited. All foreign traders +and priests either left Japan or were expelled. A small Dutch trading +center, restricted after 1641 to the islet patch of Deshima, was all +that remained of the early period of intercourse with the West. By 1650 +the policy of national seclusion, introduced by the Shoguns of the +Tokugawa clan, was in full force. It was maintained until after the +middle of the nineteenth century, or well into the modern era. + + +THE DUTCH OASIS ON DESHIMA + +We should be on guard, however, against some common errors about this +important period in Japan’s history. The term “hermit nation” must +not be taken too literally. Seclusion was not complete. Through the +Dutch settlement on Deshima, ideas from Europe filtered into Japan. +A small group of Japanese scholars studied the Dutch language. In +1745 they prepared a Dutch-Japanese dictionary, and in 1774 a Dutch +textbook on anatomy was translated. Of course, Japan did not keep +abreast of Western technical progress during the Tokugawa epoch. But +valuable beginnings were made, especially in language study, medicine, +geography, map-making and military science. + +Another common error associated with the idea of a “hermit nation” is +that Tokugawa Japan remained static for two hundred years. In reality +great internal changes occurred during this period, some of which were +fundamental. By 1850 Japan was a very different country from what it +had been in 1650. + +The seeming lack of development was most evident in the Tokugawa +political system. Its broad outlines did not, in fact, change very +much. The Emperor and his court were kept secluded at Kyoto. The +real center of government lay in Tokyo, where the Shoguns and their +ministers ruled. Most of the land was owned by the Tokugawa family and +the great feudal lords (_daimyo_) closely associated with it. About +three-eighths, however, was owned by the “outer lords,” such as Choshu +and Satsuma. These “outer lords” were viewed as potential rebels, and +were denied posts in the central administration. All of the feudal +lords had to spend certain months in attendance on the Shogun at Tokyo, +and had to leave their families there as hostages when they went back +to their own lands. + + +FOUR CLASSES OF SOCIETY + +Efforts were made to draw strict class lines. The feudal lords and +their military retainers, or _samurai_, held the highest rank. The +farmers came next, but they were severely taxed and harshly treated. +The townspeople were looked upon as the lowest class of all. A +_samurai_ had the right to cut down a merchant with his sword, but very +early in the Tokugawa period he learned to respect the power of the +merchant’s purse. + +[Illustration: JAPAN’S PRE-RESTORATION SOCIETY + +DAIMYO (A Feudal Lord) Ruler but heavily in debt + +SAMURAI (Military Retainers) Poor but proud + +PEASANTS Poor and downtrodden + +MERCHANTS Despised but wealthy] + +Yet all measures to preserve a rigid centralized feudalism, and to +maintain Tokugawa rule, proved futile. Halfway through the period +serious economic problems began to appear. By 1850 the whole system was +on the verge of collapse. + + +THE SHOGUNS FAIL TO CONTROL THE MERCHANTS + +In their attempts to prevent change, the Shoguns were unable to master +one basic element in their society--trade and industry. Even before the +Tokugawa regime was established, as we have seen, Japan’s commerce had +already grown sizable. Foreign trade was then cut off. But internal +trade, stimulated by a long period of peace, continued to develop. New +luxury goods of many varieties were produced, and industry prospered. +The merchant class in the cities grew wealthy and powerful. Large +business houses, including the present Mitsui firm, were founded. +Money, instead of rice, became the medium of exchange. The transition +to a money economy was gradual, but it worked a revolution in Japanese +society. + +Incomes of the _daimyo_ and _samurai_ were in rice. The rice had to +be changed into money, and great exchange marts--similar to our modern +commodity exchanges--grew up in Osaka. The rice brokers “rigged” +prices. Dizzy price fluctuations occurred. The feudal lords and their +_samurai_ fell into debt to the rice brokers and the money lenders. +Government intervention did not help matters. The Shogunate either +debased the coinage, or tried vainly to control prices by decree. The +farmers suffered most of all--from the change to money, from the price +fluctuations, and from still heavier taxes when the feudal lords became +indebted to the merchants. After 1725 the number of farmers declined; +after 1750 peasant uprisings were frequent. + + +AND FACE A RISING REVOLT + +In other ways, too, loyalty to the Shogunate was undermined. The luxury +of the towns stimulated a type of life quite the opposite from that +inspired by the Spartan ethical code, called Bushido, of the _samurai_. +Rich townspeople craved amusement--and painting, the drama, and the +novel flourished. No laws could prevent the _samurai_ from being drawn +to this life, nor could executing a more than usually lavish merchant +or usurer turn back the tide of the new age. + +Other intellectual currents were more acutely dangerous to the +Shogunate. Ancient history, literature and religion were studied, and +there was a revival of interest in Shintoism. From these historical and +literary schools there grew a political movement, aimed at restoring +the Emperor to his former place as ruler of the nation. + +Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the country was ripe +for revolt. In the background lay the misery and distress of the +farmer. But the active promoters of this revolutionary overthrow of +the Shogunate were discontented groups within the ruling class. Four +of these groups banded together to bring about the Restoration: (1) +the “outer lords” of Choshu, Satsuma and the other western fiefs; (2) +the lesser _samurai_, ambitious and energetic; (3) the merchants, who +desired removal of feudal restrictions on their business activities; +and (4) the court nobles of ancient lineage who still clung to the +Emperor at Kyoto. This was a powerful coalition, and sooner or later +it would undoubtedly have brought down the Shogunate through its own +strength. As it happened, pressure on Japan from Western nations came +to its aid and hastened the outbreak of the revolt that was brewing +inside the country. + + + + +V. How the Door Was Opened + + +By the nineteenth century, a new flood of Western influence was +sweeping into the Far East. As in the age of exploration and discovery, +the West was knocking at the door. + +In those earlier days, we must remember, the West had had little to +offer in the way of progress. In fact, in the arts and in the graces +of civilized life, the East could have given pointers to the West. But +now the West came strong in the might of the industrial revolution. +Master of machine technique, it was turning out manufactured products +in larger and larger quantities. It was extending international trade +by leaps and bounds. It was seeking new markets and sources of raw +materials throughout the world. And the most powerful of the Western +countries were staking out colonies wherever they could. + + +A PERIOD OF TRANSITION + +1853 to 1868 were the years of transition for Japan. They were crowded +with events that laid the cornerstone of the modern Japanese Empire. + +Two broad trends were uppermost during these years. First, there was +the coming of the Western powers with their demand for diplomatic +relations, trade and intercourse--in a word, for the end of the +seclusion policy and the opening of Japan’s door. Of course, the +Shogun, as the ruling power, had the job of dealing with the Western +nations. Too weak to resist, he had to give way. And his enemies at +home seized on this opportunity to discredit him. The second main +trend, therefore, was the sharpening of Japan’s internal conflict. + +The extraordinary thing about this internal conflict in Japan was this. +The groups opposing the Shogunate were revolutionaries: they rejected +the existing system and fought for a new one. They sought progress for +Japan--and progress meant opening the country to Western influence. +Yet in their struggle with the Shoguns they were all against the +foreigner. The reason is not far to seek. Anti-foreign demonstrations +provided a handy weapon for attacking and discrediting the Shogunate. +As we shall see later on, when it had served its purpose, this weapon +was dropped. + +But, meanwhile, let us look a little more closely at the two broad +trends we have mentioned. Let us see first how, by a series of steps +taken between 1853 and 1867, Japan’s door was gradually opened. + + +THE “UNEQUAL” TREATIES + +What happened to Japan in her relations with the Western powers at this +time had previously happened to China. For a long time there had been a +closely regulated Western trade at Canton. During the early nineteenth +century this trade had steadily expanded. China’s last-minute +efforts to keep real control in her own hands were unsuccessful. The +Anglo-Chinese war of 1839-42, and further conflicts in 1857-60, ended +China’s seclusion and forced the Manchu authorities to treat with the +Western powers on terms of diplomatic equality. The treaties signed at +this time--later called the “unequal” treaties--actually established +China’s _in_equality. Not only were new ports opened to Western trade. +But a fixed schedule of Chinese tariff dues, usually not exceeding +5 per cent, was also enforced. In addition, Western nationals were +exempted from trial under Chinese law. Instead, they were to be tried +in courts set up by their own consuls in China. This was the system +known as “extraterritoriality.” + +These events in China did not pass unnoticed in Japan. Many of the +Japanese leaders, despite the Shogunate’s policy of isolation, were +aware of what was happening in China. They began to be alarmed over +Japan’s future, fearing that the Western powers would soon be knocking +at Japan’s door. And sure enough, very soon they were. + + +COMMODORE PERRY BRINGS A LETTER + +The visits of Commodore Perry’s squadron to Japan in 1853 and 1854, +bearing President Fillmore’s letter asking for the opening of trade +relations, were the prelude. Commodore Perry secured the first treaty, +on March 31, 1854. More important was the commercial treaty (July +29, 1858) negotiated by Townsend Harris, first American Minister to +Japan. This treaty opened five Japanese ports to Americans for trade +and residence, and--like the treaties with China--provided for a fixed +tariff schedule and extraterritoriality. It was the model for similar +agreements, also concluded in 1858, with England, France, Russia and +Holland. All of these treaties were signed by the Shogun, but not by +the Emperor. Later, as the Emperor’s power grew, the opposition sought +to prevent application of the treaties on the ground that the Emperor +had not ratified them. In November 1865, however, an Allied naval +demonstration off Osaka forced the Emperor to give his signature. +Finally, in June 1866, a tariff convention set 5 per cent as the duty +on practically all imports and exports. + +We shall have to return to these treaties a little later. For soon +after the Restoration of the Emperor, they became a galling yoke to the +Japanese. The tariff and extraterritorial provisions, in particular, +were resented as shackles on the full exercise of Japan’s sovereignty. +Three long decades were to pass before Japan gained enough strength, +toward the close of the century, to revise these unequal treaties. + + +THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN JAPAN + +At the time the treaties were negotiated, however, the issue was not +one of equality. The issue was whether there should be any treaties +at all. For many Japanese wanted no opening of Japan’s door. After +the first treaties, nevertheless, a growing number of Westerners +began to live in the ports opened to foreigners. The cry to “expel +the foreigner” was then raised. Coupled with this slogan was the +challenging demand to “revere the Emperor”--a direct call to revolution +against the Shogun. The whole country was aroused. It seethed with +internal strife and dissension, with plots and counter-plots, and even +with armed conflict. + +The anti-foreign movement was merely the spark that set off a +bonfire that had been long in the making. By 1850 the Shogunate +was nearly bankrupt. The feudal lords, or _daimyo_, were in the +same position. Most of their landed property was mortgaged to the +merchant-bankers--the rising capitalist class. Thousands of _samurai_ +were poverty-stricken. The condition of the peasantry, taxed more and +more heavily to pay for the debts of the feudal lords, was desperate. +Even the wealthy merchants, irked by feudal restrictions and the social +and political inferiority that was forced upon them, were dissatisfied. +The demand for change was growing broader and deeper. + + +SUPPORTERS OF THE EMPEROR + +In Kyoto the Emperor had become the center of an active and +determined political movement. Its platform--anti-foreign and +anti-Tokugawa--called for the restoration of the Imperial power. The +court nobles and a growing number of the _samurai_ and feudal lords +supported it. Wealthy merchant-banker families, such as the Mitsui +house, provided it with cash. Above all, the movement was eventually +backed by a coalition of the western clans, notably those of Choshu and +Satsuma. The part these clans played, both in the Restoration movement +and in the later Imperial government, was decisive. + + +THE ROLE OF THE WESTERN CLANS + +These clans, you will remember, were ruled by so-called “outer lords,” +who were denied a part in the Tokugawa administration. The fact that +they were so far from the center of government at Tokyo encouraged them +to be independent. Moreover, they were in many respects the strongest +and most progressive of the leading Japanese clans. In developing +manufacture and trade as a means of boosting clan revenue, Satsuma, +Choshu, Tosa and Hizen were far ahead of other clans. They fostered not +only handicrafts, porcelain manufacture, sugar-refining and textile +mills, but mining, iron foundries, gun-making, shipbuilding and allied +military industries. Choshu also made a revolutionary change in its +army, by including commoners as well as the _samurai_ in its ranks. + +[Illustration: THE RISE OF THE WESTERN CLANS (Mid-19th Century)] + +In these western clans, the anti-foreign spirit was at first intense. +For some years, in defiance of the Shogunate, the clans carried on +what was practically an independent war against the Western powers and +the new treaty rights of Westerners in Japan. They frequently attacked +foreigners and their employees. Things came to a head in 1863-64, when +they tried to expel the foreigners. In August 1863, in retaliation for +the murder of an Englishman by Satsuma clansmen, a British squadron +bombarded the Satsuma port of Kagoshima. And in September 1864 an +Allied fleet (British, Dutch, French, American) destroyed Choshu forts +at Shimonoseki which had been firing on Western vessels passing through +the narrow straits. + +These decisive proofs of Western military and naval superiority gave +Satsuma and Choshu pause. Both clans stopped their anti-foreign +activities. They had long seen the need of acquiring modern armaments. +This determination was now made doubly strong. Many other leaders came +to see that Japan could not keep her door shut forever, and that her +salvation lay in mastering Western techniques. Once having grasped this +principle, they acted on it boldly and unhesitatingly. + + +THE RESTORATION + +The Emperor’s prestige--and, indeed, actual authority--had grown +steadily throughout this transition period. As early as 1858, +recognizing the Emperor’s new importance, the Shogun sought his +approval of greater intercourse with the West. In 1863 the Shogun even +obeyed an Imperial summons to Kyoto. The advent of a new Shogun and +a new Emperor in 1867 made the transfer of authority all the easier. +In November 1867 the new Shogun resigned, and on January 3, 1868 the +Emperor Meiji, backed by the western clans, formally assumed control of +the nation. Six months later the Tokugawa forces, taking the field in +opposition to the seizure of power by the western clans, were defeated +in pitched battle. A new Empire had been founded. + + + + +VI. Catching up with the West + + +Great difficulties faced the early Meiji reformers. Their essential +task was to catch up with the West. For two centuries Japan had kept +to herself. During this period the Western world had made gigantic +technical advances, greater than man had achieved in all preceding +history. Japan had been left far behind. She was forced to do in +decades what the West had done in centuries. + +How could Japan accomplish such a task? In both economy and government +she was still largely feudal and decentralized. There was no real +national state, as we understand that term today. Instead, there were a +hundred competing clans, each with its own territorial lord. And over +all lay the shadow of Western aggression, dictating speed and more +speed. + + +TACKLING THE PROBLEM + +From the outset of the Meiji era, anti-foreignism was dropped. Emperor +Meiji’s famous Charter Oath (April 6, 1868) contained this statement: +“Knowledge and learning shall be sought for throughout the world in +order to establish the foundations of the Empire.” + +A period of borrowing from the West, comparable only to the earlier +imitation of China, set in. One after another, Japanese official +missions were sent abroad. Foreign advisers--British, French, Dutch, +German, American--were employed in many different fields. Large numbers +of Japanese students entered the universities of Western countries. +For a short time imitation of the West went to extremes; in many +externals, Western ways became a fad. On the whole, however, there was +strict control over the process of borrowing, and careful adaptation to +Japanese needs. + +In keeping with Japan’s traditions, a limited group maintained firm and +despotic power at all times. The Meiji political reforms clothed old +ideas of government in new garments. Emperor Meiji (1868-1912) reigned +again, and with some degree of authority. But actual power during his +long reign lay in the hands of the small group of men who surrounded +him. There was no thoroughgoing mass upheaval, forcing recognition of +popular rights. Reforms were dictated from the top down. + + +THREE NEW TRENDS + +The great changes which occurred during the Meiji era may be grouped +under three main headings. There were, in the first place, the economic +reforms which merged the old feudal lords and _samurai_ into a new +society, and laid the foundations of Japan’s modern industries. Then, +there was a political movement which led finally to the Emperor’s +proclamation of a written constitution. Finally, there was a cautious +development of foreign policy by which Japan, at first on the +defensive, later embarked on an expansionist program and fought its +wars with China and Russia. In this chapter we shall look at the first +of these trends. + + +ABOLITION OF FEUDAL RIGHTS + +Between 1868 and 1877 a series of basic reforms gave centralized +control to the Imperial government. The four western clans returned +their lands to the Emperor, thus enabling him to order the other clans +to do the same. In this way the government took over the land taxes, +the main source of revenue. But the lords, though they no longer +held the land registers, were still political rulers in their feudal +domains. So, in 1871, an Imperial decree established prefectures, +with Imperial governors, in place of the old clan divisions. Finally, +the feudal lords lost their private armies. At first, the Imperial +government’s army consisted mainly of the military forces of the +western clans. By 1873, however, the government was able to enforce +a system of universal military service, and thus build up a national +conscript army under its own absolute control. + +Why, you ask, did the feudal lords accept so easily this rapid loss of +their former powers? In large part, it was a result of the lead taken +by the western clans, whose _samurai_ statesmen held the reins in the +Imperial government. For they were prepared to back the new measures +with military action, if necessary. But a second factor was equally +important. The clan lords, especially the great _daimyo_, were well +paid for the surrender of their old privileges. Their lands were not +confiscated outright. Large annual grants of money were allotted them +out of central revenues. But the payments originally promised in this +huge pension scheme turned out to be too heavy for the central treasury +to meet. The government therefore first reduced the pensions and then, +in 1876, compulsorily ended them by means of lump-sum payments, in +cash or short-term bonds. Though this drastic scaling down of the +original pension scheme amounted to repudiating its earlier promises, +the government had no other way of avoiding bankruptcy. As it was, the +total cost of commuting the pensions came to nearly 211 million yen--a +large sum for that period. In many respects, this way of dealing with +the pensions laid the basis of the new Japanese society which has since +developed. + + +LORDS INTO CAPITALISTS + +The _daimyo_, or great feudal lords, did not fare so badly in the +financial settlement of 1876. They were relieved of all their debts, +and of their previous obligations to support their military retainers, +the _samurai_. They retained great slices of their former lands, which +they now held as private owners--that is, with fewer responsibilities. +Moreover, they acquired large sums of money when the pensions were +commuted. These sums they invested in banks, stocks and industries, +as well as in landed estates. The _daimyo_ were thus merged into the +new society, no longer as territorial rulers but as wealthy financial +magnates, controlling the economic life of the countryside. + +So, from their own point of view, commutation of the pensions was +a master-stroke by Japan’s new rulers. It helped to throw caste +distinctions of the old feudal type into the melting pot. It won +the allegiance of the clan lords to the new order simply by making +allegiance worth their while. + + +THE LOT OF THE _SAMURAI_ + +But in other respects this bold reform created a number of serious +difficulties. The _samurai_ class as a whole was plunged into great +distress. A few of them, especially those from the western clans, +immediately won high positions in the new government. But most of them +were left to sink or swim in a strange new world. Their small pension +payments soon dribbled away, and it was hard for them to find means of +support. They had other grievances. A law of 1877 forbade them to wear +their two swords--traditional mark of honor of the _samurai_ class. +1877, too, was the year when the _samurai_ were replaced by the new +conscript army. During this critical year a serious military revolt, +centering in Satsuma but joined by all the forces opposed to the new +order, broke out. It was crushed by the Imperial government’s new army, +made up largely of commoners and partly modernized. Thus the last +challenge to the new order was defeated. + + +HARD TIMES FOR THE PEASANTS + +The peasants had an even harder time than the _samurai_. Many local +peasant revolts took place in the years up to 1877. Imperial forces +suppressed them, and so prevented the peasants from indulging in mass +confiscations of lands. + +Yet great changes were taking place. For the peasants were no longer +feudal serfs. They became landholders, and they could serve in the +army. But the individual peasant secured only a very small plot of +land. As a private owner, his situation was most precarious. He had +to face the risks of drought or flood, pay taxes in money instead of +rice, and cope with price changes in the market. His land soon had to +be mortgaged, and could then be taken away by foreclosure. Indeed, +many peasants quickly lost their lands in the early years of the new +order. By 1892 nearly 40 per cent of the total cultivated area was +worked by tenants. This proportion has persisted, while the number of +part-tenants has increased. + +Japanese agriculture, moreover, remained backward in technique and +social organization. The landlords became parasites. Instead of working +the land as a capitalist enterprise for profit, they were intent only +on drawing high rents--often as much as 60 per cent. This system had +far-reaching effects on Japan. + +As the number of tenants grew, and the land became divided into smaller +and smaller plots, the farm areas in Japan became overpopulated. Only +a part of the unneeded farm workers could find a place in industry. +Competing for jobs, they kept wages low. Low wages, of course, were a +boon to industrial development. But what industry gained in one way +it lost in another. For the farmers and the workers were too poor to +buy much. The country’s purchasing power grew only very slowly. Thus +the home market for factory products was limited, and industry did not +develop as fast as it might otherwise have done. Very early Japan’s +new factory industries had to turn to the foreign market. As the +limitations on Japan’s home market have persisted down to the present +time, the pressure for foreign trade expansion has grown steadily more +urgent. Here is one underlying cause for Japan’s current policy of +military expansion. + + +INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT + +But changes in agriculture, as we have seen, did help to make possible +the growth of a modern Japanese industry. Peasants who lost their +lands, or artisans thrown out of work, became available as factory +workers. Here was industry’s labor force. + +Many other changes helped industry along. Foreign trade, long +prohibited, had begun to grow rapidly in the ’sixties. Clan barriers +to internal trade were leveled. Hundreds of different kinds of money, +issued by the various clans, had circulated. These were now abolished, +and a single national currency instituted. Railways were built, and +telephone and telegraph systems laid down. These improvements made a +freer sale and exchange of goods throughout the country possible. Thus +a home market--even if a very limited one--was established. + +For the introduction of modern, large-scale industry, however, two +further things were needed--technique and capital. Foreign experts, +acting both as direct advisers in industry and as instructors in the +new technical schools, provided the first of these requirements. +The second was harder to fill. The banking-trader houses and the +pensioned-off lords had some capital. But it was not enough to finance +the big factory projects, especially where quick profits seemed +unlikely. So the Imperial government had to step in and supply the +capital in most of the larger enterprises. It paid special attention to +the armament industries--mining, metallurgy, shipbuilding. + + +NURSING INFANT INDUSTRIES + +The clan bureaucrats in the government nursed the construction of this +new industrial plant with extreme care and pride. Many of them fell in +love with machinery and engineering technique. They worked closely with +the great business houses, grafting industry on to firms that had been +mainly concerned with trade or banking. The budding capitalists were +not financially strong enough to develop industry by themselves. So the +clan statesmen took them into partnership. It was the clan statesmen, +however, who headed the combination--an important factor in Japan’s +political growth, then and later. + +But the clansmen did not wish to keep all industry under government +control. They only wanted to see that it developed quickly. Then +the businessmen could handle it, or at least all but the strategic +industries. The government kept control of railways, telephones, +telegraphs, arsenals and naval shipyards. But in the case of many other +industries, it supplied the capital and started their development, +then turned them back to the great business houses, often at very low +prices. In this way the capitalists were spoon-fed by the government. +Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and other houses obtained ready-made +facilities in many fields--cotton-spinning mills, glass and cement +factories, mining enterprises, shipyards. The giant Mitsubishi monopoly +in commercial shipping, for example, got its start through the gift and +cheap purchase of government vessels. + +By 1890 some 200 steam factories were in operation in Japan. The +development of a machine industry was making good headway. + + + + +VII. Who Rules Modern Japan? + + +We are now able to distinguish the main groups which were to rule the +modern Japanese Empire. Within the quarter century from 1853 to 1877 a +new leadership had emerged. + +True to Japan’s history and tradition, control was concentrated in +a few hands. The ruling group was composed of the clan leaders, +dominating the government bureaucracy (since grown to nearly 500,000 +office holders); the old feudal lords with great landed estates; and +the business group--bankers, traders and industrialists. + + +HAND IN GLOVE + +At the head of this partnership were the clan leaders, and a few +representatives of the old court nobility. The clan bureaucrats, as +they came to be called, held the influential posts in the new Imperial +government. To a large extent, their dictatorial powers carried on +the old feudal tradition. Many of them were civilians, but they also +controlled the army (Choshu) and the navy (Satsuma). The business +people, on the other hand, especially in the beginning, were definitely +in a subordinate position. It was the government which controlled most +of the early industrial enterprises, as we have seen. Not until much +later, after the World War of 1914-18, did trade and industry reach a +size which enabled the capitalists to make themselves felt politically. + +It was the existence of the “upper crust” and the inferior status of +business that largely determined the character of the new political +institutions established during the Meiji era. They were designed, +it is true, to serve the purposes of the whole combination of ruling +groups. But at the same time the clan bureaucrats took good care to set +up the machinery they needed to perpetuate their own supremacy. + + +CONSERVATIVES VS. LIBERALS + +For a decade after the Restoration of 1868, an outright dictatorship +functioned in Japan. The powers of the clansmen were almost unlimited. +Within the ruling group itself, however, there were wide differences of +opinion on some points. One important question was what institutional +forms the new government should adopt. Headed by Itagaki (a Tosa +_samurai_), the more liberal reformers wanted to set up a fully +representative government modeled on the advanced Western democracies. +But most of the clansmen opposed such a radical step. In the end, +however, the conservatives accepted the necessity of a _written_ +constitution--which they drew up themselves. + +Even this concession was made grudgingly, and only after it had become +absolutely necessary. But several factors worked in favor of the +liberals. The prestige of Western institutions was high at this period. +An article in the Emperor’s Charter Oath, moreover, was interpreted as +a pledge to inaugurate a “deliberative assembly.” Quoting this pledge, +the liberals started a political campaign which won considerable +support. Finally, the rising capitalists needed a representative system +in order to secure a real voice in the government. Despite all these +advantages, in the end the liberals were outmaneuvered in the political +arena. They obtained a constitution, it is true, but one which was +written and imposed by the conservative clansmen. The result was not a +democratic Bill of Rights but a highly autocratic document. With but +few exceptions, the liberals’ failure at this time was characteristic +of Japan’s later history. + + +THE LIBERALS LOSE + +The political struggle reached its climax in the second decade after +the Restoration. In the press and on the public platform, the liberals +waged their campaign. In 1878 they succeeded in getting provincial +assemblies with limited powers, and in 1880 local (town, city and +village) assemblies. In 1881, riots followed the exposure of graft in +the central administration. To save their position, the conservatives +had the Emperor issue a declaration promising a National Assembly in +1890--nine years ahead. + +But the political struggle did not abate. It now turned on what should +be the terms of the constitution which was to establish the elective +assembly. The conservatives meanwhile took strong measures against +the opposition. They strictly enforced laws curbing the press. They +suppressed Itagaki’s political party in 1884. In 1887 martial law was +proclaimed in Tokyo, and the opposition leaders were driven from the +capital. In this way the conservative bureaucrats got a free hand in +drafting the new constitution and putting it over. + +Hirobumi Ito, its main architect, had gone abroad in 1882 to study +Western constitutional practices. He was greatly impressed by +Bismarck, and took the Prussian Constitution as his model. First, +certain preparatory changes were made. A nobility of five orders +was established in 1884, and a Cabinet in 1885. A civil service was +started, and in 1887 a Supreme War Council was set up to advise the +Emperor on military and naval affairs. In 1888 Ito became president +of the Privy Council, which was given authority to revise the draft +constitution he had prepared. Ito’s work of framing the document was +carried out “in absolute secrecy.” After it had been read in private +to a small group of officials, the Emperor promulgated the new +constitution on February 11, 1889. The first elections to the Imperial +Diet were held in 1890. + + +A GIFT OF THE EMPEROR + +The Constitution was a “gift” of the Emperor. It was not intended +to establish popular government. Its preamble emphasized the old +theocratic (priest-king) traditions of Japan. The Emperor “inherited” +the right to rule “from Our Ancestors,” and ruled “in lineal +succession unbroken for ages eternal.” Ito and his colleagues not only +incorporated these traditional ideas into the Constitution. They made +them the cornerstone of the new system of universal education, and +thus instilled them in the mass of the Japanese people. Reverence for +the Emperor as a divine ruler helped enormously to keep the new regime +solidly in place. + +[Illustration: JAPAN’S RULING SYSTEM THE GOVERNMENT UNDER ITO’S +CONSTITUTION] + +Practically all the government’s powers, both civil and military, were +vested in the Emperor. Vast economic power bolstered his political +authority. No longer, as on occasion in feudal times, could the Emperor +become penniless. For court expenses, the Imperial Family receives +an annual grant of 4,500,000 yen (more than a million dollars). Its +holdings in lands and blocks of shares, estimated at over one billion +yen, provide a large additional income. So it is one of the wealthiest +families in Japan. + + +THE EMPEROR MUST BE “CONSTITUTIONAL” + +The Emperor’s powers are exercised on the advice of his ministers, +in accordance with constitutional practice. He is not supposed to +act on his own authority. Real power, therefore, resides not in the +Emperor but in his advisers, acting through the agencies set up by +the Constitution. On the surface, these agencies _seem_ to establish +a system of representative government. There is a Cabinet, and a Diet +with two houses--the House of Peers and the House of Representatives. +And political parties like those of the Western democracies soon formed +to contest elections in Japan. + +But there the resemblance ends. There is not only the supposedly +divine power of the Emperor. The democratic forms themselves are a +shell, empty of the real meat of popular government. In all effective +representative systems, as we well know, the legislature--particularly +its lower house--has real authority. Not so under Ito’s Constitution. +Ito ranged an overwhelming battery of aristocratic, bureaucratic and +militarist influence in five powerful agencies of government. You can +see from our chart on page 49 what these agencies were. They completely +eclipsed the House of Representatives. Moreover, they often dominated +the Cabinet, or disputed its authority. And through them, as much as +through the Cabinet, the clansmen ruled Japan with a tight rein. Let us +see how each worked out in practice. + + +NON-POPULAR AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT + +First, there were the Elder Statesmen (or _Genro_). They were a body +completely outside the Constitution. Survivors of the early Meiji +clansmen, they had prestige and experience. For several decades after +1900 they held the government in the hollow of their hands. They made +and unmade Cabinets, shuffled the Premiership among themselves, decided +on war and peace. Their last representative, Prince Saionji, died in +November 1940 at the age of 92. So from now on there will be no more +_Genro_ to be reckoned with. + +Next comes the Imperial Household Ministry. Two officials here occupy +key positions. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal holds the seals which +must be affixed to state documents. And the Minister of the Imperial +Household has charge of matters connected with the Imperial Family. +These men are not only themselves powerful advisers of the Emperor. But +appointments to see the Emperor must be made through them. So at times +they have been able to bar their political opponents from reaching the +Imperial ear. Usually they hold office for life or until they wish to +resign. + +The Privy Council is likewise a useful piece of machinery for Japan’s +ruling group. It is the supreme advisory body to the Emperor. It +consists of 26 life members, usually of great age. Cabinet Ministers +serve as members of the Council _ex-officio_, but are outvoted by +at least two to one. Among other things, the Privy Council ratifies +treaties, approves amendments to the Constitution, and passes on +Imperial ordinances. + +The House of Peers consists of about 400 members, of whom more than 200 +are drawn from the nobility, 125 are life appointees, and nearly 70 are +elected from the largest taxpayers. It is an extremely aristocratic and +conservative body. Yet its powers equal those of the lower house. And +its members can become Premiers or Cabinet Ministers. + +Lastly, the Army and Navy, with their General Staffs and their +representatives on the Supreme War Council, are largely independent +of civilian control. The chiefs of the General Staffs and the War and +Navy Ministers have direct access to the Emperor. This means that they +can go over the Premier’s head to appeal any decision of his to the +Emperor. The War and Navy Ministers cannot be civilians. They must be +ranking officers in active service. Since they are nominated by the +Supreme War Council, the latter body can overthrow a Cabinet by simply +ordering them to resign. Or it can prevent the formation of a new +Cabinet which it does not like by refusing to offer nominations for the +War and Navy Ministries. + + +THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATIVES + +As against these aristocratic, bureaucratic and military organs of +government, the popular will can be expressed only through the House of +Representatives. The position of the House is very weak, especially in +comparison with the normal legislature of a full-fledged democracy. + +For Ito saw fit to curb the powers of the Diet’s lower house by +a series of drastic restrictions. Large fixed, or non-votable, +expenditures limit its control over the public purse. If appropriations +are not voted, the Cabinet has the right to enforce the preceding +year’s budget. Most bills are introduced not by Diet members but by the +Cabinet, which also possesses an absolute veto. Moreover, the Cabinet +can issue Imperial ordinances which, with few qualifications, have +the force of law. It can dissolve the lower house, and thus force an +election--an expensive proceeding for the deputies. And for several +decades only part of the people could vote. Not until 1925 was full +manhood suffrage (age 25) adopted. During elections the Home Ministry +has often intimidated the voters. And popular rights are further curbed +by a controlled press, a strong centralized police force, a large +degree of central domination of local government, and the possibility +that one may be arrested and held indefinitely without trial (because +Japan has no _habeas corpus_ law). + +The development of a Cabinet with independent power, responsible +to the lower house of the Diet, would seem impossible under these +circumstances. Entrenched positions were held by the aristocrats, +the bureaucrats and the militarists. For if they did not control the +Cabinet, always a necessary citadel of power, they could be sure of +bringing about its downfall. A responsible Cabinet did emerge in the +post-war years. But, as we shall see, this period was short-lived. +After 1930, largely through the pressure of the militarists, the +pendulum swung back. + + + + +VIII. Creating a Modern Empire + + +By 1890, when the first Diet elections were held, the foundations of a +new Empire had been laid. In the few short years since 1868, the old +feudal society had undergone a profound change. Agriculture was still +the key to Japan’s economy, but factory industry and foreign trade were +growing in importance. A strong centralized state had come into being. +Modern methods were revolutionizing science, education, medicine, law +and many other fields. There was an army recruited through universal +service and trained in Western ways, and the beginnings of a modern +navy. + + +JAPAN LOOKS ABROAD + +The Meiji statesmen were now ready to turn their attention to foreign +policy. Even before the Restoration many of the Japanese leaders had +favored territorial expansion. During the years of internal reform, +however, they had cautiously refrained from rash adventures abroad. +A strong movement in favor of a punitive expedition to Korea had +developed in 1871-73, but the dominant clan bureaucrats had skilfully +prevented the outbreak of war. They had permitted a Formosan expedition +in 1874, but had settled the resulting issues peacefully with China. +Some small gains had been made. The Bonin Islands were annexed in 1876, +and the Liuchiu Islands in 1879. A naval demonstration in 1876 secured +to Japan special treaty rights in Korea, which led to more and more +intervention in Korean affairs. + +But these were not the foreign problems which chiefly occupied the +early Meiji leaders. First and foremost, they were trying to change the +unequal treaties concluded with the Western powers at the end of the +Tokugawa period. These treaties, you will remember, permitted Western +nationals to be tried in their own consular courts (the system of +extraterritoriality), and fixed Japan’s tariff at the low rate of 5 +per cent. The struggle to throw off these irksome restrictions was the +central issue in Japan’s foreign relations down to 1894. + + +FIGHTING THE UNEQUAL TREATIES + +The Japanese made many efforts to regain control of both tariffs +and courts before they finally won success. An official mission +under Prince Iwakura toured Western capitals in 1871-73 but failed +to gain treaty revision. As other attempts also came to nothing, an +intense popular resentment developed in Japan. In 1889, just when his +negotiations for treaty revision were progressing favorably, a bomb +tore off Count Okuma’s leg. Success was not won, however, until a new +treaty was concluded with Great Britain on July 16, 1894. The other +powers soon followed suit. Japan’s law courts had been modernized, and +she now enforced new civil, commercial and criminal codes. In 1899, +when the new treaties went into effect, all Westerners became subject +to Japanese law. These treaties thus brought the extraterritorial +system to an end. But they all contained tariff schedules that lasted +for 12 years, so that Japan did not secure full control over her own +tariffs until the treaties expired in 1911. + + +WAR WITH CHINA + +On July 25, 1894, nine days after signature of the “equal” treaty with +Great Britain, Japanese naval forces suddenly attacked and sank a +transport carrying Chinese troops to Korea. War was formally declared +on August 1. Thus, by an unusual coincidence, Japan was at war with +China two weeks after she had won her twenty-five-year campaign for +treaty revision. + +[Illustration: IN QUEST OF EMPIRE (1876-1923)] + +Japan’s statesmen had correctly estimated the weakness of China, as +well as their own degree of preparedness. They did not plunge into war +on a hasty impulse. The army and navy were tuned for action. With +harsh realism, the Japanese leaders unhesitatingly adopted a program of +expansion by force as soon as conditions seemed favorable. Their fight +for treaty revision had been a fight for equality with the Western +powers. They believed that even fuller recognition of equality would +come after a successful war. They were also driven by strong economic +considerations. The restrictions of the narrow home market were already +irking Japan’s youthful cotton textile export houses, and they were +trying to pry their way into the Korean and Chinese markets. Victory in +the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 opened both these markets to Japanese +manufacturers. It was a significant omen of the future that the new +Japan should have discovered, so early in its career, that resort to +the sword might help to overcome the handicaps of its late appearance +on the international scene. + +We should also take note of several other results of Japan’s first +modern war. The territorial gains--Formosa and the Pescadores +Islands--were a welcome prize. More important was China’s formal +recognition of Korean independence, which left Japan practically a free +hand in the peninsula. By its new commercial treaty with China, Japan +also gained the benefits of extraterritoriality and low tariff rates +in that country--the system she hated so heartily when it was applied +against herself, as it still was at that time. The war indemnity of +nearly $180,000,000, moreover, helped Japan to expand its armaments +still further in preparation for the war with Russia in 1904. + + +THUS FAR AND NO FARTHER + +An episode which heightened Japan’s sensitiveness in her foreign +relations marked the peace settlement. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki, +China had agreed to cede Japan the Liaotung Peninsula in South +Manchuria. Germany, Russia and France objected to this territorial +cession, and backed their objections by an ultimatum to Tokyo +threatening war. Japan was forced to submit, and in exchange for +a slight increase in the indemnity, the territory was returned to +China. More than the pre-Restoration bombardments of Kagoshima and +Shimonoseki, more even than the galling yoke of the unequal treaties, +this “tripartite intervention” rankled in Japanese hearts. This sense +of humiliation was not lessened in 1898, when Russia secured from China +a 25-year lease of the southern tip of the disputed Liaotung Peninsula +and proceeded to fortify Port Arthur and join Harbin to Dairen by a new +railway line. + + +WAR WITH RUSSIA + +On the whole, however, the gains of the war had proved sufficient to +justify the calculations of Japan’s leaders, and to strengthen the +forces within Japan that were working toward expansion. In 1900 Japan +took part as an equal with the Western powers in quelling the famous +Boxer Uprising, in China, and shared in the returns from the Boxer +Indemnity which they later imposed as a punishment on the Chinese. The +fact that the British thought it worth while to sign an alliance with +Japan in 1902 was an additional testimony to her growing prestige. +Fortified by this alliance, and by strenuous efforts to build up her +military and naval forces, Japan emerged successfully from her clash +with Tsarist Russia in 1904-05. + +The peace terms did not include the indemnity Japan coveted, largely +because she was too exhausted to continue the struggle. But still there +were substantial gains. Japan won a protectorate over Korea, which +she converted to full annexation in 1910. The Russian leasehold at +the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula was transferred to Japan, and also +the Russian railway lines in South Manchuria. Finally, Russia ceded +the southern half of Sakhalin Island to Japan, and granted important +fishing rights in northern Pacific waters to Japanese interests. + +The Treaty of Portsmouth, which set forth these terms and in which +President Theodore Roosevelt mediated, established Japan as the rising +power in the Far East. In 1905, three weeks before the treaty was +signed, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was extended for ten years, with +provisions sanctioning Japan’s paramount interests in Korea. + + +END OF THE MEIJI ERA + +In the decade spanned by the two wars, Japan had forged rapidly ahead +in her economic development. Her foreign trade, which totaled only 265 +million yen in 1895, had jumped to 810 million in 1905 (see chart, +page 61). Her steam shipping had shown an even more extraordinary +spurt--from 15,000 tons in 1893 to 1,552,000 tons in 1905. + +[Illustration: HOW JAPAN’S FOREIGN TRADE HAS GROWN] + +On the political side, the new constitution worked out pretty much as +the clan statesmen had expected. For a short time the bureaucrats had +some difficulty with the Diet, where a liberal opposition threatened +to develop. But they soon checked this tendency. They intimidated +or bought off opposition leaders. They embarked on a policy of war +and expansion--which the liberals supported. And, eventually, they +organized parties headed by members of the bureaucracy itself--in the +first instance, Prince Ito. + +The Meiji Emperor died on July 30, 1912. During his long reign of +nearly 45 years, all the great changes which we have been considering +had taken place. From a weak feudal state, Japan had been transformed +into a great power. Two years after Emperor Meiji’s passing, the +outbreak of the World War ushered in a period of still more ambitious +expansion and growth. + + + + +IX. Japan and the First World War + + +The World War gave Japan her great opportunity, which her leaders were +quick to seize. The conditions created by World War No. 1 might have +been made to order for Japan. They brought all her strategic advantages +into play, and were ideally adapted to meet her economic necessities. + +Japan was not compelled to fight a full-dress war. The Western powers +were more than occupied on the European battlefields, so Japan was +given pretty much of a free hand in the Far East. And the line-up of +powers in 1914-18 added greatly to the strategic advantage of her +geographic location. Britain and Russia were Japan’s allies from the +outset, while the United States could not offer firm opposition to +Japanese expansion. Thus Japan was able to achieve a great deal with +very little effort. + +Conditions on the economic side were no less favorable. As Japan’s +military and naval operations during the war were relatively slight, +the costs were small. On the other hand, her economic gains were +exceedingly large. For next to the United States, Japan was the +greatest supplier of the warring nations. + + +MAKING HAY WHILE THE SUN SHINES + +It was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, renewed for the third time in 1911, +which gave Japan formal diplomatic cause for entering the war. On +August 23, 1914 she declared war on Germany. + +After a brief struggle, the German forces at the leasehold of Tsingtao, +in Shantung province, surrendered on November 7. A month later the +whole of Shantung province was in Japanese hands. Then followed the +famous Twenty-One Demands on China. On May 25, 1915, at the point of +a gun, China signed treaties and notes incorporating many of these +Twenty-One Demands. Among other things these treaties confirmed +Japan’s newly won position in Shantung province, and extended her +railway and territorial rights in South Manchuria to the end of the +century. American protests helped to block the most sweeping demands, +which would have made China a Japanese protectorate. Meanwhile the +Japanese navy had scoured the Pacific, and had occupied all the German +islands north of the equator. + + +THE SECRET TREATIES OF 1917 + +During the early months of 1917, Japan turned to diplomacy in order to +be sure that she would be able to keep her territorial gains after the +war. The United States had not yet entered the war, and the military +fortunes of the Allied powers in Europe were at a low ebb. Making good +use of this situation, Japan negotiated secret treaties with Britain, +France, Russia and Italy. Signed in February and March 1917, these +agreements pledged that Japan’s claims to the German islands north +of the equator and to the former German rights in Shantung would be +supported at the peace conference. But the Japanese did not secure +American support of these claims. In the Lansing-Ishii agreement +of November 2, 1917, the United States offered merely a qualified +recognition of Japan’s “special interests in China.” + +The secret treaties with the Allied powers were shrewdly drawn and +enabled Japan to come off victorious at the Paris Peace Conference. +Her newly established position in Shantung province, as well as the +extensions of her rights in South Manchuria, were accepted and written +into the Versailles Treaty. The German islands north of the equator +were awarded Japan as a Class C mandate, the kind of mandate which +came closest to annexation. American opposition to these decisions cut +no ice, mainly because of Japan’s secret agreements with the Allies. +On only one big issue was Japan defeated at the conference. Her +statesmen had demanded that a clause on racial equality be inserted in +the peace treaty. This demand was rejected, largely because the Western +powers were afraid that it would let down the bars against Japanese +immigration to their countries. + + +FLIES IN THE OINTMENT + +But despite the acceptance of her territorial gains at the peace +conference, by 1919 Japan’s difficulties were increasing. A student +uprising in Peking drove out the pro-Japanese Anfu clique that had +controlled the Chinese government. Opposition to the Shantung award +was growing in the United States, and the American navy was rapidly +becoming the most powerful in the world. Two years later Japan’s +position had become still weaker. A boycott was severely reducing +Japanese trade in China. The costs of the naval-building race with the +United States were a heavy burden. Japanese intervention in Siberia, +which continued after the armed forces of the Western powers had +been withdrawn, was not succeeding. And expenditure on the Siberian +occupation, ultimately totaling about 800 million yen, together with +the naval-building costs, was straining the Japanese budget. These +various factors were discrediting the Japanese militarists at home, and +liberal Japanese were beginning to speak out against them. + + +SLOWING DOWN JAPAN’S DRIVE + +Under these conditions, the United States was able to summon the +Washington Conference, at which important agreements on naval +limitation and Pacific questions were reached early in 1922. By +accepting a battleship ratio of 3 tons as against 5 each for Britain +and the United States, Japan was relieved of the costs of the naval +race. Her security in Far Eastern waters was further increased by the +provision restricting fortification of island bases in the Pacific. The +Four-Power Pact, signed by Britain, France, the U. S. and Japan, and +pledging respect for insular possessions in the Pacific, replaced the +Anglo-Japanese Alliance. + +In return for these contributions to her security in Far Eastern +waters, Japan made a number of important concessions. By an agreement +with China, she restored Shantung province to Chinese control. Japan +also signed the Nine-Power Treaty, which pledged all its signatories to +respect China’s territorial and administrative integrity and the “open +door”--or equal commercial opportunity for all nations--in China. + +In later days, some of the provisions of these Washington Conference +agreements came to be bitterly attacked in Japan, especially by +military and naval extremists. It is an open question as to how far +these criticisms were justified. It was chiefly the effectiveness of +the Chinese boycott that forced the restoration of Shantung province. +Japan’s major concession was in the Nine-Power Treaty, by which she +agreed to lay down the sword and accept the results of peaceful +commercial competition in China. But there was no machinery provided to +enforce this treaty. The naval limitation treaty relieved Japan of the +heavy costs of the 1921 naval race and at the same time, even under the +5-5-3 ratio, left her able to dominate the China coast. She was thus in +a strategic position to renew her expansionist program--which she did +in 1931. + + +WORLD WAR GAINS + +Moreover, the World War settlement for Japan, as finally reached at +Washington, was no empty achievement. Japan had not obtained her larger +ambitions in China or Siberia, it is true. But the former German +islands north of the equator--of great strategic, if not economic, +importance--were now a Japanese mandate. Japan’s rights in South +Manchuria had become much more firmly established. Her naval and +commercial fleets had greatly expanded, she occupied a permanent seat +on the Council of the League of Nations, and she was recognized as one +of the half-dozen Great Powers. Japan had also made important economic +gains, to which we must now turn our attention. + + +THE WAR BOOM + +It was in the economic field, perhaps, that Japan reaped her greatest +gains from the World War. For her shops and factories were kept busy +supplying the belligerent countries, their colonial populations, and +the American market. Her allies controlled the seas, and Japanese ships +sailed all of them. This freedom of the seas was an important factor +for Japan, who had become increasingly dependent on international trade. + +Japan’s war boom was, in many respects, very similar to that enjoyed +by the United States. The relative increase in trade was even greater. +Between 1914 and 1920 Japan’s total foreign trade increased from 1,187 +million yen to 4,285 million, or by nearly four times (see chart, +page 61). Through 1918, moreover, exports increased much faster than +imports. For Japan this meant a chance to stock up on her reserves +of gold and foreign currencies, which had always been low. In the +1914-18 period, exports outran imports by 1,460 million yen. This +figure contrasted with an import excess of 1,158 million yen during the +preceding 20 years. + +What we have said so far applies only to trade in goods. But returns +on invisible trade items, such as shipping services, were also +high--totaling more than 1,500 million yen for the 1914-18 period. +The wartime balances for both types of trade came to more than 3,000 +million yen--on the right side of the ledger. As a result, Japan’s +financial reserves greatly increased. Extensive loans and investments +were made in foreign countries, and large holdings in gold and foreign +exchange were piled up. + +Japan emerged from the war stronger financially and economically than +she had ever been before. Nevertheless, she was to suffer a series of +economic setbacks in the post-war period. + + + + +X. Go Liberal, Go Fascist? + + +Even before the war ended, there had been signs of economic distress +within Japan. While the profits from the war boom were going into the +pockets of a small group, a sharp rise in the cost of living had caused +suffering among the masses of the people. Speculators were profiteering +in rice, which soared from 20 or 25 yen to more than 50 yen on the +five-bushel unit. In the summer of 1918 there were serious “rice +riots,” and troops were called out to suppress the demonstrations. +During the war, moreover, trade union and socialist ideas had taken +root in Japan, paving the way for the growth of labor unions and +left-wing parties in the post-war years. + + +UPS AND DOWNS + +Then came the world slump in 1920-21, which led to a sudden collapse +of Japan’s war boom. Partial recovery had no sooner set in than it +received a sharp jolt from the disastrous earthquake of 1923. To +meet these setbacks, Japan drew heavily on the financial reserves +accumulated during the war. Reconstruction after the earthquake created +another short-lived boom--ended by a bank panic in 1927. + +Despite post-war difficulties, however, Japan managed to keep her +industry on the up grade. The great advances made during the war were +maintained and consolidated. In the post-war slump the number of +factory workers had declined, but in 1927-28 they reached the wartime +level of 2,000,000 again. Throughout the ’twenties, except for a sharp +drop in 1921, Japan’s total foreign trade continued to hold the new +average level of 4,000 million yen. Population leaped forward, from +about 50 million persons in 1914 to 56 million in 1920, and to nearly +65 million in 1930 (see chart, page 69). + +[Illustration: A GROWING POPULATION] + + +BIG BUSINESS TO THE FORE + +During and after the war, Japan’s business groups had come of age. +They were no longer subordinate to the other ruling forces in the +state. Japan’s effort to overtake the West, as we noticed, had led to +a close tie-up between government and industry. This relationship had +made it easy for Japan’s great business houses to become monopolies. +From the beginning they had united banking, trade and industry under +one roof. Post-war developments, such as the financial crisis of 1927, +had carried the process of financial concentration beyond even what +was characteristic of Western countries. By this time half-a-dozen of +Japan’s huge family combines, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, dominated +Japanese economy. They had become one of the most powerful financial +ruling groups in the world. + +[Illustration: ONE OF JAPAN’S FAMILY EMPIRES] + + +BUT INDUSTRY DEPENDS ON FOREIGN TRADE + +And here we have to point out the striking paradox in Japan’s new +economic society. It was still largely agricultural. In 1925 more than +half the people were dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. +But the peasants were too poor to buy the typical consumption goods +(automobiles, for example) that were staples in the home markets +of Western countries. Thus it was impossible for Japan to develop +modern factory industries turning out _all_ lines of consumption +goods. Only in cotton textiles, with their special export market, +and in shipbuilding and metallurgy, serving the army and navy, were +large-scale factories practical. In 1928 the greater part of Japan’s +manufactured goods was produced in industrial units employing ten, +five or even fewer workers. Firms like Mitsui and Mitsubishi, however, +contracted for the output of these small-scale industrial units and +then sold it, often in foreign markets. + +Thus Japan, although she had made great strides in some lines of +industry, had become dangerously dependent on international trade. +After 1929, with the onset of the world depression, the difficulties +of this situation were plain to see. Quotas and tariffs barred even +Japan’s low-priced goods. Old sores rankled, particularly those +affecting immigration. The Exclusion Act, passed by the American +Congress over the President’s disapproval in 1924, cut the deepest. +In fact, it undid most of the good effects of the generous aid America +gave Japan after the earthquake in 1923. + + +THE LIBERALS TAKE A HAND + +These post-war years, especially after 1921, witnessed a brief +flowering of parliamentary democracy in Japan. None of the architects +of the Constitution, least of all Ito, had foreseen this possibility. +Yet in the late ’twenties it seemed as if the Cabinet might win +unchallenged power, that party government would reign supreme, and that +the House of Representatives would become the true seat of authority. + +This change came about quite naturally, through the increasing +influence of the great business houses. By 1925 the industrialists +and the bankers, or their representatives, held many of the leading +offices which the clansmen had formerly made their own. They held the +presidency of the Privy Council, and the key posts in the Imperial +Household Ministry. They were influential in the House of Peers, in +the bureaucracy and even in the Army and Navy. Generals and admirals +could actually be found to support the policies of party governments. +All the Elder Statesmen except Prince Saionji had died. And even he, +being related to the Sumitomo banking house, was in sympathy with the +capitalist outlook. As Prince Saionji was the Emperor’s chief adviser +on the choice of a new Premier, he occupied the most strategic position +in the state. In the 1925-31 period, on his nomination, six consecutive +governments were formed by party Premiers holding majorities in the +Diet’s lower house. + + +POLITICAL PARTIES + +Party influence, increasing with the growth of capitalism in Japan, +reached its height during these years. At an earlier period the clan +bureaucrats had manipulated the parties to suit themselves--usually +with little difficulty. But as time passed, the parties formed closer +and closer ties with the great business houses. Mitsubishi interests +were linked with the Minseito party, Mitsui with the Seiyukai party. +The Election Law was gradually amended, increasing the number of +voters, until in 1925 manhood suffrage was adopted. This change forced +Diet members to spend large sums in electioneering, and made them more +dependent on capitalist support. Consequently, it strengthened the +capitalists’ control over the Minseito and the Seiyukai. At the same +time it made possible the rise of labor and left-wing parties, which +began to win Diet seats. + +After 1925 the Cabinets formed by the Minseito and Seiyukai parties +began to have to account directly to their majorities in the House of +Representatives for what they did. Parliamentary government was by no +means fully established, however. An adverse vote in the lower house +did not, as a rule, overthrow these Cabinets. More often they fell +because of backstage maneuvers in the Privy Council or the House of +Peers. Nor were their leaders and policies always liberal. For a time +General Baron Tanaka was president of the Seiyukai. He represented the +aggressive, militarist wing of the Choshu clan. The Seiyukai Cabinet of +1927-29, formed under his Premiership, carried out a “positive policy” +of military intervention in China. Tanaka had to be a party leader in +order to become Premier. But his policy showed the strength of old +tendencies, even in a generally liberal era. + +On the other hand, the succeeding Minseito Cabinet (1929-31) was the +strongest and most liberal party government which has ever held office +in Japan. It came the nearest to establishing democracy there. It +also had to meet the first onslaught of the military-fascist forces +that have since become so powerful. In the story of Japan’s political +development, it thus represents a critical turning point of unusual +significance. + + +SWAN SONG OF THE JAPANESE LIBERALS + +The Minseito Cabinet of 1929-31 was liberal, but by no means radical. +It was, in reality, a government of “big business.” Its liberalism +stood out mainly in its moderate foreign policy, which contrasted +sharply with Tanaka’s earlier aggressive moves. It was headed by +distinguished leaders: Hamaguchi (Premier), Shidehara (Foreign +Minister) and Inouye (Finance Minister). + +This Cabinet labored, however, under a fatal handicap, similar to that +which confronted President Hoover in our own country. For it entered +office in July 1929, at the height of the post-war boom. The Wall +Street crash, and the spreading world depression, immediately followed. +The swift change in economic conditions during its period in office had +much to do with its final overthrow. + +Hamaguchi and his Cabinet aides began with a great victory on the issue +of the London Naval Treaty of 1930. This treaty extended limitations to +cruisers and destroyers, as well as capital ships. The army and navy +die-hards opposed it bitterly. The people and the press supported the +Cabinet’s fight for it. On October 1, 1930 the Privy Council ratified +the treaty. The Cabinet and the people had won. + +For the moment it seemed as if the Cabinet had brought the army and +navy under control. Real democracy seemed possible. But the triumph was +short-lived. It was the swan song of parliamentary government in Japan. +In November 1930 Premier Hamaguchi was shot by an assassin; eight +months later he died from his wounds. His loss seriously weakened the +Cabinet, and cut down its chance of success on new issues which were +developing. + + +THE DEPRESSION STRIKES JAPAN + +By the end of 1930 the depression had struck Japan with full force. It +laid the Cabinet open to attack by the rising military-fascist forces. + +The most serious consequences of the depression were felt in Japan’s +foreign trade. In 1929 Japan’s export-import trade stood at 4,365 +million yen. In 1930 it fell to 3,016 million, and in 1931 to 2,383 +million. In two years Japan’s trade was cut nearly in half. Even at +that period, few Western countries suffered such a rapid and severe +contraction of their foreign trade. + +The effects of this decline on Japan’s economy were catastrophic. +Agriculture and industry were both hard hit. The income from rice and +silk declined until there was actual famine in some rural districts. +Industrial unemployment mounted to three million, higher than ever +before in Japan. The middle-class professionals and wage-earners +suffered wage cuts, or were thrown out of work. There was general +social unrest, and Marxist doctrines won a wide acceptance. Strikes in +industry, and tenant conflicts in rural areas, became commonplace. + +In the light of these conditions, the weaknesses of Japan’s economy +stood out in bold relief. Fully half the home market consisted of +poverty-stricken peasants. To put the rural population back on its feet +and enable it to buy the products of industry, drastic social reforms, +such as rent reductions and debt moratoria for the farmers, were +obviously needed. Neither the landowners nor the great business houses +were prepared to embark on such a “new deal.” The army had a different +solution--aggressive expansion abroad and military-fascist repression +at home. + +This army program led to a finish fight with the Minseito Cabinet. And +the army leaders fought--and won--their campaign in Manchuria. + + +THE ARMY STRIKES IN MANCHURIA + +The Minseito Cabinet had been trying to pursue a “friendly policy” +toward China. Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister, wanted friendly +relations with all countries. In this way he sought to foster Japan’s +foreign trade, and thus solve Japan’s economic problems. But he could +not control the army, especially after the depression had cut down +trade and brought unrest to Japan. + +During the summer of 1931 a series of “incidents” occurred in +Manchuria, in which the hand of the military was plainly to be seen. At +home in Japan the army used these incidents to arouse popular support +for “positive” action in defense of supposedly threatened Japanese +interests. General Minami, new War Minister in the Cabinet, openly +supported this propaganda campaign. Baron Shidehara attempted to reach +a peaceful settlement of the Manchurian issues. But in vain. On +September 18, 1931--the historic date we mentioned at the beginning of +this book--the army struck in Manchuria. The “Mukden incident”--alleged +blowing up of a section of the South Manchuria Railway track--served as +an excuse for the Japanese army to occupy the chief Manchurian cities. + +This independent _coup d’état_ by the army dealt a fatal blow to +the Minseito Cabinet. Baron Shidehara was forced into the position +of apologizing for the army’s actions, though he must have heartily +detested them. On December 11, 1931 the Cabinet resigned. + + + + +XI. The Shadow Deepens + + +The fall of the Minseito Cabinet marked the end of an era. The crisis +of 1930-31 had unleashed new forces. And these forces were destined to +mold Japan’s policy in the decade that followed. + +At their head was the army. Not _all_ of the army leaders, however. At +times the “army extremists” seemed to be only a small minority. Their +power rose and fell. Yet they took command of Japan’s foreign policy, +and gained more and more control over her domestic policy. And as time +passed, their outlook was increasingly stamped on the army as a whole. + + +THE ARMY EXTREMISTS + +Who were the army extremists? Names are not important, except as labels +of a whole group. There has been no outstanding fascist leader in +Japan, such as Mussolini in Italy or Hitler in Germany. It is enough +for us to note that, in the 1930-32 period, the high army leadership +centered in three generals--Araki, Muto and Mazaki. This trio was +supported by a powerful group of “young officers,” such as Doihara and +Itagaki, who have since become ranking generals. + +These men were not from the old clan aristocracy. They came mostly +from the lesser clans, or from the middle classes in town and village. +They knew at first hand the sufferings of the farmers and the small +tradesmen. Like Mussolini and Hitler, they claimed to be the friend of +the common man. They bitterly denounced the “corrupt alliance” of the +political parties and the capitalists. + +All this was part of their fight for political control at home. They +wanted a “national socialist” reformation in Japan. By this they +meant that the army, under the Emperor, should run the government. +They wanted the political parties suppressed and industry run by the +state--all, as they said, for the benefit of the common man. + +On the home front, the army extremists have had little success. None of +their glowing promises of economic “reforms” has been carried out. In +the foreign field, however, their program has been largely adopted. We +must now see what their aims in foreign policy were. + + +THE DEMAND FOR “LIVING SPACE” + +At the heart of the military-fascist program in Japan, just as in +Germany and Italy, lay a demand for territorial expansion. The army +extremists made careful plans for a series of bold moves. First, +Manchuria and Mongolia were to be conquered, then China, then the +rest of Asia. In the past decade we have seen this seemingly wild and +visionary program translated into reality to an extraordinary degree. +In fact, the actual course of Japan’s foreign policy has followed it +very closely. + +With territorial expansion was linked an economic idea--that of +regional self-sufficiency, or the “bloc economy.” In 1931, Manchuria +was called Japan’s “economic life-line.” In 1932-33 the watchword was +the “Japan-Manchoukuo economic bloc.” After 1937 the demand was for +a “Japan-China-Manchoukuo bloc.” Finally, the slogan today is for a +“Greater East Asia,” to include the rich territories of Indo-China, +Malaya, the East Indies and the Philippines. + +What the army leaders were chiefly seeking through this program was +to overcome Japan’s dependence on the international market. They were +proposing a basic alternative to Shidehara’s plan for the peaceful +development of international trade. In 1930-31 they had seen Japan’s +foreign trade suddenly collapse, plunging the country into an economic +crisis. They were determined that this should not happen again. The +answer, they felt, lay in extending Japan’s political control over +a vast region. The markets and raw materials of such an area, they +thought, would make Japan economically independent of the rest of the +world. + + +WEIGHTING THE SCALES + +The army extremists were not the only ones to share these views. They +had supporters in the bureaucracy, even in the highest positions. Many +naval officers also supported them, although the navy as a whole was +more conservative than the army. And, despite their anti-capitalist +propaganda, they had close relations with some business groups who +hoped to profit from the expansion program. + +Though the military-fascist leaders did not succeed in organizing a +unified mass fascist party, they wielded extraordinary powers. They +influenced public opinion through the Ex-Servicemen’s Association, +with its three million members. They also had a host of reactionary +societies to work through. Some of them were dignified patriotic +societies, with members from the highest ranks of Japanese society. +Others went in for espionage, strike-breaking, or outright terrorism. +Finally, the army had its special powers under the Constitution, such +as dictating the choice of War Minister, and going direct to the +Emperor over the head of the Premier. + +To all these powers the extremists now added two special techniques +and used them for all they were worth. One was resorting directly to +military action, without waiting for authorization from the Cabinet. +Underlings in the field could plot “incidents” which committed their +superior officers and the government to certain courses of action. The +Manchurian occupation was largely brought about in this way. + +The second technique was terrorism, or direct action, against political +opponents at home. Public opinion in Japan does not automatically +condemn assassination, especially if it appears to have been inspired +by patriotic or disinterested motives. The list of distinguished +Japanese who have been assassinated is very long--Okubo, Ito, Hara (the +first commoner to become Premier), Hamaguchi, to mention a few. Since +1931 many others have been added to this list, and their deaths have +all helped the military-fascists to rise to power. + + +AGAINST THE ARMY? + +On the surface it has often seemed that the capitalists were the chief +opponents of the army extremists in the political struggle of the +past decade. This is only partly true. These two groups have been the +strongest political forces in Japan. They have both sought to win the +bureaucrats and public opinion to their side. On the other hand, they +are in agreement on many points. + +For the capitalists, as well as the military, are interested in +territorial expansion, and have taken advantage of its results in +China. Many of them favored the Manchurian invasion, because they saw +that it would give the widespread social discontent in Japan a safe +outlet. But at the same time, the capitalists tend to be more cautious +than the army leaders in foreign policy. They do not want to take +risks, or to plunge recklessly into a big war if the chances of success +are slight. + +Even on the home front, there is an area of agreement between the +army extremists and the business men. Both wish to maintain their +ruling position against the threat of social revolution. The Minseito +government took measures to stamp out revolutionary groups as early as +1929-30. There is full agreement on regimentation of this kind. But the +capitalists have bitterly opposed the army’s efforts to take over _all_ +political power, or to seize control of their business enterprises. + +Keeping these general tendencies in mind, we can now turn to a +consideration of the events of the past decade. + + +THE EXTREMISTS TAKE DIRECT ACTION + +The “Mukden incident” of September 18, 1931 marked the halfway point +in the sharp political struggle which was then convulsing Japan. Its +violent phase lasted for eight months longer, until May 15, 1932. + +We have already seen the first result of this struggle--the overthrow +of the Minseito Cabinet. The Seiyukai party took up the reins of power +in mid-December 1931. It proved to be the last one-party government to +hold office during that decade. Inukai, its Premier, was a moderate; so +also was Takahashi, the aged Finance Minister. General Araki, symbol +and titular leader of the army extremists, was the Minister of War. + +Not content with having forced a change of Cabinet, the extremists +still pressed the attack on party government. Inouye, Finance Minister +in the previous Minseito Cabinet, was assassinated on February 9, and +Baron Dan, head of the Mitsui interests, was shot on March 5. Both were +victims of the Blood Brotherhood League, organized to use terrorism +against the “corrupt political parties, slaves of the capitalists.” +More plots followed. Then, on May 15, 1932, Premier Inukai in turn was +assassinated. His death was the climax of an outbreak supported by high +army officers, who had planned to seize control of the government. + + +CONQUEST IN MANCHURIA + +After this affair, things quieted down a little at home. But the +extremists had meanwhile had their way in the sphere of foreign policy. +Japanese troops had spread over most of Manchuria. In February the +Japanese attack on Shanghai had occurred. In March the “independent” +state of Manchoukuo was established. Far from being independent, it was +really the plaything of Japan’s army extremists who had planned the +“Mukden incident.” + +Another year passed before the Manchurian issues were fully ironed +out. In September 1932 the Japanese government formally recognized +Manchoukuo. Early in 1933, on basis of the Lytton Report, the League +of Nations passed judgment on Japan. The army at once moved again in +Manchuria. In March 1933 Japanese troops occupied Jehol province, and +added it to Manchoukuo. In May these troops advanced to the gates of +Peiping and Tientsin, and enforced “demilitarization” of the region +immediately south of the Great Wall of China. Meanwhile, Japan had +withdrawn from the League of Nations. For the time, her conquest of +Manchuria had been made good in her own eyes, if not in the eyes of the +world. + + +PEACEFUL INTERLUDE (1933-35) + +The period from the middle of 1933 to the end of 1935 was “peaceful” +only by contrast with the years before and after. The contrast is +sufficiently striking, however, to justify our using the term. + +Two strong Cabinets, headed in turn by Admirals Saito and Okada, +old-line naval administrators opposed to extremism, governed Japan +during these years. The Saito Cabinet had entered office in May 1932, +after the death of Inukai. Party men held only a few of the lesser +Ministries. Nevertheless, the Cabinet was in the main moderate. The key +Finance Ministry, in particular, was in the capable hands of Takahashi, +who allowed only limited increases in the defense budgets. Early in +1934 the fiery Araki resigned from the War Ministry. Araki’s successor +carried out a partial “purge” of the army extremists. + + +KEEPING THE ARMY QUIET + +There were several reasons for this moderate trend. For one thing, +foreign trade had turned upwards in 1932, and by 1935 Japan was again +enjoying a trade boom which soon overcame the worst effects of the +economic crisis and tended to calm the political waters. + +In the second place, the army extremists were kept busy with their +experiment in Manchoukuo, where they were trying to realize their +goal of “state socialism.” They were building strategic railways, and +fostering the growth of Manchurian industry. They met with opposition +from business interests at home, and found it hard to raise sufficient +capital for their projects in Manchuria. In order to secure greater +influence over these economic questions, the extremists forced the +establishment inside the Cabinet of a Manchoukuo Affairs Board. Here +the army was in the saddle. And the extremists did secure enough +capital for their projects to provoke the wise old Takahashi into +issuing a warning that Japan’s finances could not stand such a large +and continuing investment drain to Manchoukuo. + +On the whole, however, the army men were disappointed with the economic +results in Manchoukuo. By 1935 they were trying to bring North China +into their Manchurian realm, and thus enlarge their economic bloc. In +November 1935 Doihara, the “Lawrence of Manchuria,” tried to detach +five of the northern provinces from Chinese control. The extremists +also planned these moves as part of an effort to strengthen their +position at home. For there they were being steadily pushed into the +background. + + +DYING FLICKERS OF DEMOCRACY + +Plots were still being hatched within Japan, even during this +“peaceful” period. But the moderates were reasserting their control. +They kept the high posts in the Privy Council and the Imperial +Household Ministry. The Cabinet was firmly set for a moderate course. +Even the parties’ strength was reviving. The climax of this trend came +with the general election of February 1936. For the voting showed that +the people had swung decisively away from the extremists. Japan’s labor +party elected eighteen Diet members, while three left-wing proletarians +won Diet seats. It was thought that a new Cabinet, with much greater +party influence, might now be formed. + +But the extremists were unwilling to admit defeat. Their answer came +in the military uprising of February 26, 1936--known in Japan as the +“2-26” affair. + + +THE “2-26” UPRISING + +The direct participants in this historic revolt were some 1,400 troops, +with their lower officers. No upper officers openly joined them. Yet +the insurgents had contact with the highest army quarters. And General +Mazaki, an outstanding army extremist, was kept under detention for a +year after the outbreak. + +A long death list had been prepared. Actually only three high officials +were killed: Takahashi, the moderate Finance Minister; Admiral Saito, +the former Premier, then Lord Privy Seal; and General Watanabe, who +had been responsible for shifts in army officerships. Premier Okada +escaped, but his brother, who resembled him, was killed. Outside of +Tokyo both Count Makino, former Lord Privy Seal, and Prince Saionji, +the last Elder Statesman, managed to escape attacks directed against +them. + +For three days the insurgents occupied the center of Tokyo. They were +finally disarmed when it became clear that the revolt was not taking +hold anywhere else. Once again, an attempt to seize the government had +failed. Nevertheless, the uprising caused an important shift in the +balance of political power. The trend toward moderation was reversed. +Under succeeding Cabinets, new policies were adopted which led directly +toward the war with China in 1937. + + +PRELUDE TO WAR (1936-37) + +The chief result of the “2-26” uprising was to give greater power +over government policy to the army leaders. This power was not +exercised by the extremists in person, because the military revolt +had temporarily discredited them in the people’s eyes. A new set of +army leaders adopted most of their platform, however, and succeeded in +putting it across. The public strongly opposed the expansionist and +military-fascist tendencies of the new program, but could do no more +than delay its realization. + +The new program took definite shape under the Cabinet headed by Hirota, +a bureaucrat with extremist leanings. It called for stronger pressure +on China, expressed in demands for “Sino-Japanese cooperation.” The +anti-Comintern pact was concluded with Germany in November 1936. On +the home front, there were efforts to amend the Election Law in such +a way as to curb the political influence of the parties. The new +budget included large increases in defense expenditure. Sections of +heavy industry, interested in the profits to be reaped from supplying +armaments for the defense services, threw their support to the enlarged +arms program. On the other hand, popular opposition to the Hirota +Cabinet grew steadily. Following strong attacks in the Diet, Hirota +resigned in January 1937. + +General Hayashi, the next Premier, barred the recognized Minseito and +Seiyukai party leaders from his Cabinet. Within two months he had +carried through the economic planks of Hirota’s platform. Ikeda and +Yuki, representing the business houses, took official posts in order +to handle the financial problems. Premier Hayashi also instituted a +Cabinet Planning Board, which became an economic general staff for the +army program. + + +THE PEOPLE VS. THE MILITARY + +These rapid steps toward a “wartime economy” met with bitter opposition +from the parties and even more from the public at large. A wide breach +opened up between the Hayashi Cabinet and the people. When Hayashi +dissolved the Diet, he was overwhelmingly defeated in the general +election of April 1937. Out of 466 members in the Diet’s lower house, +the government elected less than 50 supporters. It tried to stay in +office, but finally, on May 31, had to resign. + +The popular disapproval of the military-fascist program was shown quite +unmistakably in this election--even more unmistakably than in the +earlier election of February 1936. At that time, the extremists had +defeated the will of the people by the “2-26” uprising. This time they +used new methods. + +Under the Konoye Cabinet, national unity was restored--at least to all +outward appearances. Party members were included in the Cabinet, and +Prince Konoye was made the symbol of unity. But the party men chosen +for Cabinet posts were in sympathy with the military-fascist program, +and in any case held only minor offices. The chief Ministries were +cornered by the army leaders and by bureaucrats who supported them. + +But merely setting up a new Cabinet was not enough to quell the +widespread suspicion of the army’s aims. It was necessary to quiet +opposition voices, reestablish the army’s prestige and really get +somewhere with the “controlled economy” plans. + +How could all this be done? Two months after the Konoye Cabinet entered +office, Japan was at war with China. + + + + +XII. War with China + + +Few of Japan’s leaders expected that the war with China would last for +years. Their original plans called for a short campaign of five or six +months. North China, Shanghai and Nanking would be occupied. Chiang +Kai-shek’s crack divisions would be destroyed in the Shanghai-Nanking +operations. By Christmas, at the latest, a dictated peace could be +imposed at Nanking. + + +VICTORIES WITHOUT PEACE + +On the military side, these calculations proved surprisingly accurate. +The victorious Japanese troops _were_ entering Nanking in mid-December. +And all the strategic railways in North China _were_ under Japan’s +control. But these military successes did not lead to the expected +peace settlement. China’s national unity held firm, and Chinese +resistance continued. If Japan wished to dictate peace terms, she would +have to wage further battle. + +This she proceeded to do. Two big campaigns were fought during 1938. +In May, after a bitter struggle in Shantung province, Japan’s northern +and southern armies were able to join forces. In October, after an +exhausting advance up the Yangtze River, the Japanese captured Hankow. +A lightning blow in the south led to the occupation of Canton. + +China’s main cities, and much of her railway system, were now in +Japanese hands. But still there was no sign of peace. By the end of +1938, it was clear that, despite her military triumphs, Japan had +not won victory. The war had lasted eighteen months, instead of six. +In lives and money, it had cost Japan far more than the original +reckoning. And the end was not in sight. + +What was happening at home during these first eighteen months of the +war? Three main trends were clear. First, all popular opposition to +the war was suppressed. Second, the military took over conduct of +affairs in China, allowing the Cabinet little or no say. And third, +a “controlled economy” was set up, although the army leaders did not +succeed in getting it into their hands. The business houses either +pared down the controls, or decided how they were to be applied. + + +MAKING THE PUBLIC TOE THE LINE + +Various measures to gain public support of the war were adopted. The +most spectacular was a campaign for “national spiritual mobilization.” +It began on September 11, 1937 with a patriotic rally in Tokyo, +addressed by the Premier and other Cabinet Ministers and broadcast +throughout the country. In the Diet the parties expressed their support +of the war. Even Japan’s labor party, which had elected 36 Diet members +in April 1937, swung behind the war policy. The authorities were not +content, however. In December 1937, the Home Ministry carried out +large-scale police raids, in which hundreds of persons were arrested. +Two left-wing labor and party groups, both headed by Kanju Kato, were +disbanded without notice. Kato himself, who had been elected to the +Diet by a proletarian constituency in Tokyo, was jailed. The arrests +also included Baroness Ishimoto, a noted feminist leader, and a great +many liberals and pacifists. + +All sections of Japan’s ruling circles were united in this program of +suppressing popular opposition to the war. There was more scope for +disagreement, however, over how the war in China should be conducted. +But in this dispute the army held all the points of vantage, and soon +reigned supreme. + + +THE ARMY WINS A FREE HAND IN CHINA + +Control of military and naval operations in and off China was given in +November 1937 to Imperial Headquarters. This special organ included +all the high army and navy officers. Since it decided military policy +under the direct authority of the Emperor, it neatly sidetracked +Cabinet control. Non-military phases of policy in China, however, were +not so easily disposed of. Here the army used a technique which it had +tried and tested in Manchuria. In September 1938 army leaders forced +the establishment of a China Affairs Board, set up within the Cabinet +but run by military men. Through this board the army kept economic and +political affairs in China pretty well under its thumb, despite some +continued opposition from the Foreign Ministry. In the broader field of +international policy the struggle for power was more acute. It still +continues, although the army eventually became strong enough to put +through the alliance with Germany and Italy. + + +THE ECONOMIC WAR MACHINE + +The third main trend of which we spoke was the establishment of a +wartime “controlled economy” in Japan. The state took over more and +more control of the economic life of the country. Both army and +businessmen agreed that such control was necessary, but bitterly +disagreed as to how it should be applied. On the whole, the businessmen +managed to keep the most important economic regulations in their own +hands. + +The fiercest political struggle during 1938 was waged over the National +Mobilization Bill. Drafted by the Planning Board under army influence, +this measure called for drastic economic conscription. The government +was to have practically unlimited control of social and economic life, +including finance, industry, trade, labor and the press. With respect +to labor, the bill provided for compulsory allocation of workers +to their jobs, prohibited strikes and lockouts, and empowered the +government to fix wages, hours and working conditions. + +This bill met with determined opposition in the Diet. Army supporters, +using pressure and intimidation, including terroristic attacks on +Diet members and on party headquarters in Tokyo, pushed it through. +Nevertheless, the opposition did force certain modifications in +the original plan. Premier Konoye pledged that it would be applied +only during a wartime emergency and not invoked in the Sino-Japanese +conflict, which was still referred to in Japan as an “incident.” The +Premier also agreed to appoint a majority of Diet members to the +National Mobilization Council. This Council was to be consulted before +Imperial ordinances applying various sections of the bill were issued. + +But on May 5, 1938, despite Konoye’s pledge to the Diet, several of +the main provisions of the bill _were_ applied, and new ordinances +issued since have put many others into effect. Before Premier Konoye’s +resignation in January 1939, a broad series of control measures was +in operation. Foreign exchange was strictly licensed. To make up the +huge war budgets the government had taken over control of capital, +and restricted new investment to a list of so-called “essential” +industries. It also rigidly regulated trade, limiting the export +and import of several hundred commodities. It put the labor control +provisions of the National Mobilization Act into effect. In June 1938 +it instituted nation-wide price control for certain commodities, and +has since steadily increased the list of such goods. The Home Ministry +enrolled several thousand “economic police” officers to enforce the +price schedules and other features of the economic program. + + +THE MEN AT THE CONTROLS + +But despite the sweeping nature of these provisions, the business +houses managed to keep a fair amount of independence. Their own men +took key positions in many of the agencies that were enforcing the +control measures. In the field of capital investment, they could still +tip the scales. They successfully resisted army pressure for outright +state control and operation of industry. Nationalization of the vital +electric power industry, for instance, over which they fought long +and bitterly, was finally put through only part way, and has been a +subject of continued dispute. + +So it was not the military leaders alone, but the military leaders in +an uneasy partnership with the businessmen and the party heads, who +carried out the wartime economic program. The army fascists charted the +program, it is true, but they were not allowed to run it in their own +sweet way. The army ruled in China, as it had in Manchuria. But it was +not the unchallenged dictator at home. There, it shared power with “big +business.” And big business, despite war restrictions, still operated +its own enterprises and still reaped its dividends. + + +STALEMATE IN CHINA + +A Cabinet under Prince Konoye had held office throughout the first +phase of the war in China. It resigned in January 1939, when China’s +refusal to accept a dictated peace had become unmistakable. For Japan +now no longer won spectacular victories. A stalemate had developed, +and the war had become a war of attrition. This second phase of the +war lasted for another eighteen months--until June 1940, when Hitler’s +victories in Europe shifted the balance of power in the Far East. + +The costs to Japan of this second period were no less than before. She +had to maintain the same number of troops in China, totaling 800,000 +or 1,000,000. Heavy fighting was taking place almost continuously. +But the hostilities, ranging from Canton to Inner Mongolia, led to no +decisive results. In some cases Japan occupied new cities, such as +Nanchang, Nanning and Ichang. In other cases Japanese offensives were +disastrously routed. Chinese guerrillas, ranging far and wide, limited +Japan’s area of effective control, even in the so-called “occupied” +territory. Moreover, the economic gains were not as great as the army +had expected. Sales of Japanese goods to China steadily increased, but +imports of Chinese raw materials either declined or rose very slowly. + + +STEPPING ON WESTERN TOES + +At the same time Japan’s interference with the interests of the Western +powers in China became much more direct, and created serious friction. +Difficulties were most acute at Tientsin, Shanghai and Amoy. The +Japanese army imposed various restrictions. It kept Western shipping +off the Yangtze River above Shanghai, and the Pearl River below Canton. +Western traders had to face many practices--tariffs, exchange controls, +import and export controls--which were put into effect especially to +hamper their trade. The Japanese enforced a blockade of the British +and French Concessions at Tientsin, and stripped British citizens for +examination before allowing them to enter or leave their Concession. +Although the Western powers resented these Japanese actions, they +limited their opposition mainly to protests. In July 1939 the United +States abrogated its trade treaty with Japan, but did not follow up +this step by imposing trade penalties. + + +THREE JAPANESE WAR CABINETS + +Difficulties on Japan’s home front mounted steadily during the second +phase of the war. The strain was shown in many ways. One was the +rapidity with which Cabinets succeeded one another. The first Konoye +Cabinet, as we have seen, had held office for nineteen months--from +June 1937 to January 1939. In the second period (January 1939 to July +1940), there were no less than three Cabinets. Their average length of +life was only six months. These Cabinets, with their Premiers, held +office as follows: + + 1. Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, January 5, 1939 to August 29, 1939 + + 2. General Nobuyuki Abe, August 30, 1939 to January 15, 1940 + + 3. Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, January 16, 1940 to July 16, 1940. + + +HIRANUMA AND THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT + +Many of the decisive events of this period were closely related to +the Cabinet changes. Hiranuma, for example, was forced out of office +by the Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939. During that summer the +Hiranuma Cabinet had been dickering with Germany over the details of +a proposed military pact, while the Japanese army had been fighting a +minor war with the Soviet Union on the Outer Mongolian frontier. So +the Soviet-German pact came as a stunning blow to Tokyo, and for a +time feelings against Germany ran high. The army extremists, who had +strongly advocated an alliance with Germany, were discredited along +with Hiranuma. Consequently, extremist influence was not so great in +the next two Cabinets, headed by General Abe and Admiral Yonai. + + +ABE AND THE PRICE OF RICE + +The Abe Cabinet was overthrown five months later for reasons entirely +different, but equally significant. Here the issue turned mainly on +Japan’s growing economic difficulties. During the winter of 1939-40 a +rice shortage developed, and “bootleg” prices soared toward 50 yen per +_koku_ (the five bushel unit)--dangerously close to the level which +stimulated the “rice riots” of 1918. In September 1938 the Abe Cabinet +had fixed ceilings on all prices. When the rice shortage developed, it +had to back down on its own ruling. In November it raised the official +price from 38 to 43 yen per _koku_. By this time, however, the farmers +had already sold their crops, and the gains were reaped by the rice +dealers. + +Outspoken criticisms were expected in the Diet and, rather than meet +them, the Abe Cabinet resigned in mid-January. The incoming Yonai +Cabinet had to face the music. One outspoken member of the Minseito +party, Takao Saito, challenged not only economic conditions, but the +war itself. His striking speech of February 2, 1940 attacked Wang +Ching-wei’s proposed regime (Japan’s puppet government) in China +as nothing more than a “central government in name.” After casting +doubt on the prospects of achieving the “new order in East Asia,” he +asked what the Japanese people had received in return for their great +sacrifices in the war. Even more serious, in the eyes of Japan’s +army leaders, was Saito’s declaration that, in view of China’s large +territory and army, it “is doubtful whether Japan can overthrow” Chiang +Kai-shek’s regime. A critical electric power “famine” which developed +at this time, and forced many factories to shut down, underlined the +truth in Saito’s remarks. The Japanese people backed Saito so strongly +that several months passed before the authorities dared to expel him +from the Diet. + + +YONAI TRAILS TOO FAR BEHIND NAZI PUSH + +But Hitler’s military victories in the spring of 1940, and especially +the defeat of France, swiftly altered Japan’s position in the Far East. +The “moderation” which the Abe and Yonai Cabinets had shown in foreign +policy suddenly vanished. Intense pressure was brought to bear on the +French authorities in the Far East. In June the French Ambassador at +Tokyo agreed to stop shipments of goods to China over the Indo-China +Railway. Less than a month later, the British government also bowed to +the Japanese demand that the Burma Road be closed for three months. But +these gains were not enough for the extremist elements within Japan. +They had received a fresh impetus from Hitler’s successes, and were +prepared to move far more boldly both on the home and foreign fronts. +The War Minister, maneuvering for the set-up of an equally bold and +impetuous Cabinet, suddenly offered his resignation. Thus, on July 16, +1940, the Yonai Cabinet crumbled. + + + + +XIII. Shadow Over Asia + + +Under the second Konoye Cabinet, formed July 22, 1940, the flood +that had been sweeping over Japan since 1931 reached a new high. +Territorial aims were enlarged. Expansion was no longer to be confined +to China. The goal was now a “Greater East Asia,” including all the +rich colonial territories in southern Asiatic waters. At home, also, +the pace quickened. The army leaders moved toward full suppression of +the parties, and a reduction of the Diet’s powers. Obstacles to foreign +expansion and internal regimentation continued to exist, however, and +slowed down the fascist advance. + +In foreign policy, the Konoye Cabinet made two far-reaching moves. On +September 27, 1940 it concluded a military alliance with Germany and +Italy. By this alliance, as we have seen, Japan was allotted “Greater +East Asia” for her “living space.” This sphere, however, was not yet +under Japanese control. It had to be won. So the second move was a step +in the direction of winning it. It was a move into Indo-China. + +In September 1940, a French-Japanese agreement admitted a limited +number of Japanese troops to northern districts of the French colony of +Indo-China. These troops were the entering wedge. Then Japan pushed her +control southward to Saigon. Early in 1941, Tokyo dictated a settlement +of the Thailand-Indo-China conflict, which she hoped would eventually +yield her full control of Indo-China, and still greater powers over +Thailand, where Japanese influence was already strong. And Saigon, we +should add, is only 650 miles north of Singapore. + + +A HARD ROW TO HOE + +In other respects, however, the Konoye Cabinet’s expansionist +program--like that of its predecessors--did not enjoy easy going. For +the war in China was still not won. In November 1940 Japan formally +recognized Wang Ching-wei’s Nanking regime (the puppet government +she herself had created). But this step merely spotlighted Japan’s +failure to secure peace in China. Tokyo also undertook negotiations +with the Soviet Union, but with little immediate result. Finally, the +British and the Dutch strengthened the defenses of both Malaya and +the Netherlands Indies, and the American fleet at Hawaii served as an +eloquent warning against any move by Japan on Singapore, strategic key +to southeast Asia. + + +THE HOME FRONT + +On the home front, the Konoye Cabinet clamped down even firmer +dictatorial control. All political parties “voluntarily” dissolved in +the summer of 1940. There was a plan afoot to curb the Diet’s influence +by amending the Election Law to give fewer people votes. And the +extremists began to organize a mass fascist party, with local units +throughout the country. + +These efforts achieved some practical results. The outspoken criticism +marking previous Diet sessions was less apparent in 1940-41. The “near +neighbor” groups, set up by the new fascist party, gave the authorities +a means of checking up closely on popular opinion, and taking measures +to suppress opposition as soon as it appeared. Economic difficulties +were piling up, and the need for repression was becoming greater. +Rationing of sugar, charcoal and matches, begun in 1940, was extended +to rice early in 1941. + + +A HORSE TRADE + +But the political struggle within Japan, even among its ruling circles, +was not settled by the Konoye government’s actions. On the contrary, +it continued as strong as ever. A characteristic “deal” indicated the +lines along which the struggle was being fought. The military-fascist +groups were unwilling to permit a general election, due in 1941, to +take place. On the other hand, the moderates opposed moves to revise +the Election Law and to strengthen state control over industry. In +January 1941, a deal was made in which the extremists agreed to drop +these moves, while the moderates consented to let the Diet run on +without an election for one year, and to support the government’s +program in the meantime. + + +EXPANSION OR DEFEAT? + +In the early months of 1941, Tokyo increasingly committed itself to a +policy dictated by the results of a decade of aggression. Since 1937 +Japan had spent nearly 20 billion yen on the war in China, or twice +the total national debt in 1936. She had suffered more than a million +casualties, in killed, wounded and diseased. In return for these great +losses, she expected vast gains. + +Thus “Greater East Asia” became the avowed goal of Japan’s foreign +policy. To Japan’s rulers, it represented the full flowering of the +“bloc economy” idea. They now considered not only Manchuria and +China, but the whole of East Asia, necessary for such a bloc. The raw +materials of southeast Asia, especially the oil, tin and rubber of +the Indies and Malaya, were needed to make up the deficiencies of a +“Japan-China-Manchoukuo” bloc. But even with these rich prizes Japan +would not be entirely self-sufficient economically. She would still +lack high-grade machinery and certain other products. Nevertheless, +with the raw materials of East Asia firmly under her control, Japan +believed she would have sufficient bargaining power to secure the +foreign currency necessary for buying all she needed in the world +market. + +Japanese statesmen continually stressed this idea of an East Asiatic +bloc in their speeches. To make its realization possible, they +concluded the alliance with Germany. Barring an outright German victory +in Europe, however, the difficulties which confront Tokyo’s advance +toward mastery of East Asia are still formidable. + +For Japan’s economic resources are at a low ebb. Industrial production +has begun to decline. Foreign trade is falling off, and reserves of +foreign currency are low. China is unconquered, and relations with +the Soviet Union are uncertain. The British Empire and the United +States, which stand guard over southeast Asia, are the mainstays of +Japan’s foreign trade. By moving against them in that region, Japan +might risk everything gained thus far. For the first time, she would +be staking her future on a war with powers that control the seas and +access to world markets. She would be facing all the dangers that she +successfully avoided in the World War of 1914-18. + +Japan’s geographical location, close to the scene of action in the Far +East, is still her great strategic advantage. Her economic deficiencies +have been, and continue to be, her main source of weakness. The ratio +between these two controlling factors may well determine the immediate +future. Is Japan’s new Empire to reach out over immensely larger areas, +or is it to suffer its first great defeat? + + + + +SUGGESTED READING + + +BORTON, HUGH. _Japan Since 1931._ New York. Institute of Pacific +Relations. 1940. Political and social developments within Japan during +the past decade. Rather technical. + +COLEGROVE, KENNETH W. _Militarism in Japan._ New York. World Peace +Foundation. 1936. The army’s role in Japan, and a study of the +military-fascist movement. Fairly advanced but readable. + +CROW, CARL. _He Opened the Door of Japan._ New York. Harper. 1939. The +life of Townsend Harris, first American Minister to Japan (1856-62). +Very readable. + +ISHIMOTO, BARONESS. _Facing Two Ways._ New York. Farrar and Rinehart. +1935. A noted Japanese feminist leader tells the story of her life. +Popular and readable. + +NORMAN, E. HERBERT. _Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State._ New York. +Institute of Pacific Relations. 1940. Discussion of Japan’s political +and economic reforms during the Meiji era. Technical. + +OMURA, BUNJI. _The Last Genro._ Philadelphia. Lippincott. 1938. The +story of Prince Saionji’s life, covering the whole period of Japan’s +modern development. Entertaining narrative style. + +REISCHAUER, ROBERT K. _Japan: Government--Politics._ New York. Nelson. +1939. Sketches the growth of Japanese government from earliest times. +Fairly advanced but readable. + +RUSSEL, OLAND D. _The House of Mitsui._ Boston. Little Brown. 1939. +Three centuries of the Mitsui family’s history, beginning in Tokugawa +times. Readable. + +SANSOM, G. B. _Japan: A Short Cultural History._ New York. Century. +1931. The best recent history of Japan, covering events up to 1868. +Technical. + +YOUNG, A. MORGAN. _Imperial Japan, 1926-1938._ New York. Morrow. 1939. +Also _Japan in Recent Times, 1912-1926_. New York. Morrow. 1931. +Narrative accounts of more recent phases of Japanese history. Readable. + +SUGGESTED PERIODICALS: _Amerasia_; _Asia_; _Far Eastern Survey_; and +_Pacific Affairs_. + + * * * * * + +A NOTE ON HEADLINE BOOKS + +_Shadow Over Asia_ is one of the Foreign Policy Association’s HEADLINE +BOOKS. The object of the series is to provide sufficient unbiased +background information to enable readers to reach intelligent and +independent conclusions on the important international problems of +the day. HEADLINE BOOKS are prepared under the supervision of the +Department of Popular Education of the Foreign Policy Association with +the cooperation of the Association’s Research Staff of experts. + +The Foreign Policy Association is a non-profit American organization +founded “to carry on research and educational activities to aid in the +understanding and constructive development of American foreign policy.” +It is an impartial research organization and does not seek to promote +any one point of view toward international affairs. Such views as may +be expressed or implied in any of its publications are those of the +author and not of the Association. + +For further information about HEADLINE BOOKS and the other publications +of the Foreign Policy Association, write to the Department of Popular +Education, Foreign Policy Association, 22 East 38th Street, New York, +N. Y. + + * * * * * + +ABOUT THE AUTHOR + +T. A. Bisson has been the Foreign Policy Association’s specialist on +Far Eastern affairs since 1929. He has taught in China and travelled +widely in the Far East. In addition to writing numerous Foreign +Policy Reports, he is the author of _Japan in China_, published by +the Macmillan Company in 1938, and _American Policy in the Far East, +1931-1940_, published by Institute of Pacific Relations in 1940. + + * * * * * + +Transcriber’s Note: + +Illustrations have been moved to paragraph breaks near where they are +mentioned, except for the frontispiece. + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78440 *** |