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diff --git a/78171-h/78171-h.htm b/78171-h/78171-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff39ae6 --- /dev/null +++ b/78171-h/78171-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,7963 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html> +<html lang="en"> +<head> + <meta charset="UTF-8"> + <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1"> + <meta name="format-detection" content="telephone=no,date=no,address=no,email=no,url=no"> + <title> + Liberty in the modern state | Project Gutenberg + </title> + <link rel="icon" href="images/cover.jpg" type="image/x-cover"> + <style> + +body { + margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; +} + +h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; + clear: both; +} + +p { + text-indent: 1.5em; + margin-top: .5em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .5em; +} + +.footnote p { + text-indent: 0; +} + +hr { + width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: 33.5%; + margin-right: 33.5%; + clear: both; + border: 0; + background: #ccc; + height: 2px; +} + +hr.chap {width: 30%; margin-left: 35%; margin-right: 35%;} +hr.front {width: 10%; margin-left: 45%; margin-right: 45%;} + +hr.chap {width: 50%; margin-left: 25%; margin-right: 25%;} +@media print { hr.chap {display: none; visibility: hidden;} } + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always;} +h2.nobreak {page-break-before: avoid;} + +table { + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; +} + +table td { padding: 0.25em; } + +.tdl {text-align: left;} +.tdr {text-align: right;} + +.pagenum { + position: absolute; + left: 92%; + font-size: small; + text-align: right; + font-style: normal; + font-weight: normal; + font-variant: normal; + text-indent: 0; +} + +.center {text-align: center; text-indent: 0;} + +.footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + +.footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + +.fnanchor { + vertical-align: super; + font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: + none; +} + </style> +</head> +<body> +<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78171 ***</div> + + +<h1> +LIBERTY<br> +<span style="font-size:smaller">IN THE</span><br> +MODERN STATE +</h1> + +<p class="center"> +<i>By</i><br> +<i style="font-size:x-large">HAROLD J. LASKI</i><br> +<br> +<i>Professor of Political Science</i><br> +<i>in the University of London</i><br> +<br> +<br> +1930<br> +PUBLISHERS<br> +<i>HARPER & BROTHERS</i><br> +NEW YORK AND LONDON +</p> + +<hr class="front"> + +<p class="center"> +LIBERTY<br> +IN THE<br> +MODERN<br> +STATE<br> +<br> +<i>Copyright, 1930,</i><br> +<i>by Harold J. Laski.</i><br> +<i>Printed in the</i><br> +<i>United States.</i><br> +<br> +FIRST EDITION +</p> + +<hr class="front"> + +<p class="center"> +TO<br> +FRIDA<br> +AND<br> +DIANA +</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[vii]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="CONTENTS"> + <i>CONTENTS</i> + </h2> +</div> + +<table> + <tr><td class="tdr">I.</td><td class="tdl">THE NATURE OF LIBERTY</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">II.</td><td class="tdl">FREEDOM OF THE MIND</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_80">80</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">III.</td><td class="tdl">LIBERTY AND SOCIAL POWER</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_195">195</a></td></tr> + <tr><td class="tdr">IV.</td><td class="tdl">THE OUTLOOK FOR LIBERTY</td><td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_279">279</a></td></tr> +</table> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter nobreak center" style="font-size:xx-large"> + LIBERTY IN THE MODERN STATE +</div> + + + + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[1]</span></p> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_I"> + CHAPTER I + <br> + THE NATURE OF LIBERTY + </h2> +</div> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>I mean by liberty the absence of restraint +upon the existence of those +social conditions which, in modern civilization, +are the necessary guarantees of individual +happiness. I seek to inquire into +the terms upon which it is attainable in +the Western world, and, more especially, +to find those rules of conduct to which political +authority must conform if its subjects +are, in a genuine sense, to be free.</p> + +<p>Already, therefore, I am maintaining a +thesis. I am arguing, first, that liberty is +essentially an absence of restraint. It implies +power to expand, the choice by the +individual of his own way of life without +imposed prohibitions from without. Men +cannot, as Rousseau claimed, be forced +into freedom. They do not, as Hegel insisted, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[2]</span>find their liberty in obedience to +the law. They are free when the rules under +which they live leave them without a +sense of frustration in realms they deem +significant. They are unfree whenever the +rules to which they have to conform compel +them to conduct which they dislike and +resent. I do not deny that there are types +of conduct against which prohibitions are +desirable: I ought, for instance, to be compelled, +even against my wish, to educate +my children. But I am arguing that any +rule which demands from me something I +would not otherwise give is a diminution +of my freedom.</p> + +<p>A second implication is important. My +thesis involves the view that if in any state +there is a body of men who possess unlimited +political power, those over whom they +rule can never be free. For the one assured +result of historical investigation is the lesson +that uncontrolled power is invariably +poisonous to those who possess it. They +are always tempted to impose their canon +of good upon others, and, in the end, they +assume that the good of the community depends +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[3]</span>upon the continuance of their +power. Liberty always demands a limitation +of political authority, and it is never +attained unless the rulers of a state can, +where necessary, be called to account. +That is why Pericles insisted that the secret +of liberty is courage.</p> + +<p>By making liberty the absence of restraint, +I make it, of course, a purely negative +condition. I do not thereby mean to +assume that a man will be the happier the +more completely restraints are absent from +the society to which he belongs. In a community +like our own, the pressure of numbers +and the diversity of desires, make +necessary both rules and compulsions. +Each of these is a limitation upon freedom. +Some of them are essential to happiness, +but that does not make them for a +moment less emphatically limitations. Our +business is to secure such a balance between +the liberty we need and the authority +that is essential as to leave the average +man with the clear sense that he has +elbow-room for the continuous expression +of his personality.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[4]</span></p> + +<p>Nor must we confound liberty with certain +other goods without which it has no +meaning. There may be absence of restraint +in the economic sphere, for example, +in the sense that a man may be free +to enter any vocation he may choose. Yet +if he is deprived of security in employment +he becomes the prey of a mental and physical +servitude incompatible with the very +essence of liberty. Nevertheless, economic +security is not liberty though it is a condition +without which liberty is never effective. +I do not mean that those who can take +their ease in Zion are thereby free men. +Once and for all, let us agree that property +alone does not make a man free. But those +who know the normal life of the poor, its +perpetual fear of the morrow, its haunting +sense of impending disaster, its fitful +search for beauty which perpetually eludes, +will realize well enough that, without economic +security, liberty is not worth having. +Men may well be free and yet remain +unable to realize the purposes of freedom.</p> + +<p>Again, we live in a big world, about +which, at our peril, we have to find our +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[5]</span>way. There can, under these conditions, be +no freedom that is worth while unless the +mind is trained to use its freedom. We +cannot, otherwise, make explicit our experience +of life, and so report the wants we +build upon that experience to the centre +of political decision. The right of the modern +man to education became fundamental +to his freedom once the mastery of Nature +by science transformed the sources of +power. Deprive a man of knowledge, and +the road to ever greater knowledge, and +you will make him, inevitably, the slave of +those more fortunate than himself. But +deprivation of knowledge is not a denial +of liberty. It is a denial of the power to +use liberty for great ends. An ignorant +man may be free even in his ignorance. In +our world he cannot employ his freedom so +as to give him assurance of happiness. A +compulsory training of the mind is still +compulsion. It is a sacrifice of some liberty +to a greater freedom when the compulsion +ceases.</p> + +<p>Two other preliminary remarks are important +to the thesis I am urging. Everyone +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[6]</span>knows the danger to freedom which +exists in any community where there is +either special privilege on the one hand or +what is termed the tyranny of the majority +on the other. John Stuart Mill long ago +pointed out that in the early history of +liberty it was normally and naturally conceived +as protection against the tyranny of +the political rulers. The latter disposed of +a power to which its subjects were compelled +to conform; and it became vital in +the interest of freedom to limit that power +either by the recognition of special immunities +or by the creation of constitutional +guarantees. But even in the modern +state the underlying substance of the argument +may not be neglected. Power as +such, when uncontrolled, is always the +natural enemy of freedom. It prevents the +exercise of those capacities which are released +for activity by the absence of restraint. +Wherever it is possessed in excess, +it tilts the balance of social action in favour +of its possessors. A franchise limited +to the owners of property means legislation +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[7]</span>in the interests of that class. The +exclusion of a race or creed from a share in +citizenship is, invariably, their exclusion +also from the benefits of social action. In +any state, therefore, where liberty is to +move to its appointed end, it is important +that there should be equality.</p> + +<p>Now equality is not the same thing as +liberty. I do not, indeed, agree with Lord +Acton’s famous dictum that the ‘passion for +equality makes vain the hope of freedom’;⁠<a id="FNanchor_1_1" href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> +liberty and equality are not so much +antithetic as complementary. Men might +be broadly equal under a despotism, and +yet unfree. But it is, I think, historically +true that in the absence of certain equalities +no freedom can ever hope for realization. +The acute mind of Aristotle long +ago saw that the craving for equality is one +of the most profound roots of revolution. +The reason is clear enough. The absence +of equality means special privilege for some +and not for others, a special privilege +which is not, so to say, in nature but in a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[8]</span>deliberate contrivance of the social environment. +Men like Harrington and Madison +and Marx all insisted, and with truth, that +whatever the forms of state, political power +will, in fact, belong to the owners of economic +power. We need not argue that our +happiness depends upon the possession of +political power; we can argue that exclusion +from it is likely to mean exclusion +from that which largely determines the +contours of happiness. And it follows that +the more equal are the social rights of citizens, +the more likely they are to be able +to utilize their freedom in realms worthy +of exploration. Certainly the history of +the abolition of special privilege has been, +also, the history of the expansion of what +in our inheritance was open to the common +man. The more equality there is in +a State, the more use, in general, we can +make of our freedom.</p> + +<p>Here, perhaps, it is worth while for a +moment to dwell upon the meaning of +equality. Nothing is easier than to make +it a notion utterly devoid of all common +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[9]</span>sense.⁠<a id="FNanchor_2_2" href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a> It does not mean identity of treatment. +The ultimate fact of the variety of +human nature, our differences of both +hereditary capacity and social nurture, +these are inescapable. To treat men so +different as Newton and Byron, Cromwell +and Rousseau, in a precisely similar way +is patently absurd. But equality does not +mean identity of treatment. It is an insistence +that there is no difference inherent +in nature between the claims of men to +happiness. It is therefore an argument +that society shall not construct barriers +against those claims which weigh more +heavily upon some than upon others. It +shall not exclude men from the legal profession +because they are black or Wesleyans +or freemasons. It shall not deny +access to the Courts to men of whose opinions +society in general disapproves. The +idea of equality is obviously an idea of levelling. +It is an attempt to give each man +as similar a chance as possible to utilize +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[10]</span>what powers he may possess. It means +that he is to count in the framing of decisions +where these affect him, that whatever +legal rights inhere in any other man +as a citizen, shall inhere in him also; that +where differences of treatment are meted +out by society to different persons, those +differences shall be capable of explanation +in terms of the common good. It means +the recognition of urgent need in all—food, +for instance, and clothing, and shelter—before +there is special recognition of +non-urgent claims in any.</p> + +<p>Equality, so regarded, seems to me inescapably +connected with freedom. For +equality, so regarded, seems, in the first +place, to mean the organization of opportunities; +and, in the second place, it means +that no man’s opportunities are sacrificed, +except on terms of social principle, to the +claims of another. In the view I am taking, +no child could be deprived of education +that another might receive it; but in a +choice of men say for a post in the Treasury, +one might be preferred to another on +the ground of ability or character or training. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[11]</span>The idea of equality, in a word, is such +an organization of opportunity that no +man’s personality suffers frustration to the +private benefit of others. He is given his +chance that he may use his freedom to experiment +with his powers. He knows that +in his effort to attain happiness no barriers +impede him differently from their incidence +upon others. He may not win his +objective, but, at least, he cannot claim +that society has so weighted the scale +against him as to assure his defeat.</p> + +<p>It is often argued that a theory of liberty +which starts from the effort of the individual +to attain happiness must break +down because it fails to remember that society +also has rights, and that these are +necessarily superior to those of its component +parts. Any organization, it is said, +is more than the units of which it is composed. +A nation-state like America or +England is not merely a body of Englishmen +or Americans, but something beyond +them. It has a life and a reality, needs and +purposes, which are not exhausted by the +sum of the needs and purposes of its individual +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[12]</span>members. The liberty of each citizen +is born of, and must be subordinated +to, the liberty of that greater whole from +which his whole meaning is derived. For +the rights of each of us depend upon the +protective rampart of social organization. +It is because the State enforces our rights +as obligations upon others that we have +the opportunity to enjoy them. We are +free, it is said, not for ourselves but for +the society which gives us meaning. Where +our interests conflict with the obviously +greater interest of the society, we ourselves +must give way.</p> + +<p>It is, I think, true to say that an individual +abstracted from society and regarded +as entitled to freedom outside its environment +is devoid of meaning. None of us is +Crusoe or St. Simeon Stylites on his pillar. +We are born to live our lives in London or +New York, Paris or Berlin or Rome. Our +liberty has to be realized in a welter of +competing and co-operating interests which +only achieve rational co-ordination by +something not unlike a miracle. The need +to give way to others, to accept, that is, restraint +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[13]</span>upon our right to unfettered activity +is inherent in the nature of things. But +the surrender we make is a surrender not +for the sake of the society regarded as +something other than its members, but exactly +and precisely for men and women +whose totality is conveniently summarized +in a collective and abstract noun. I do +not understand how England, for instance, +can have an end or purpose different from, +or opposed to, the end or purpose of its +citizens. We strive to do our duty to England +for the sake of Englishmen; a duty +to England separate from them, and in +which they did not share, is surely inconceivable.</p> + +<p>Or, at least, would be inconceivable, +were it not that perhaps the most influential +theory of the state in our own time has +been built upon it. What is termed the +idealist theory of the state is broadly the +argument that individual freedom means +obedience to the law of the society to which +I belong. My personality, it is said, is +simply an expression of the organized +whole to which I belong. When I say that +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[14]</span>I am seeking to realize myself, I mean in +fact that I am seeking to be one with the +order of which I am a part. I am not independent +of, or isolated in, that order, but +one with it and of it. As it realizes itself, +so am I also realized. The greater and +more powerful it becomes, the greater and +more powerful do I become as a consequence. +The more fully, therefore, I serve +it, the more fully do I express myself. True +liberty is thus so far from being an absence +of restraint that it is essentially subordination +to a system of rational purposes which +receive their highest expression in the activity +of the state. To be one with that activity +may well then be regarded as the +highest freedom a citizen can know.</p> + +<p>In the whole history of political philosophy +there is nothing more subtle than the +skill with which the idealist school has +turned the flank of the classic antithesis +between liberty and authority. From the +Greeks to Rousseau it was always conceived +that a man’s freedom is born of a limitation +upon what his rulers may exact from +him; since Rousseau, and, more particularly, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[15]</span>since Hegel, it has been urged that +conformity to a code, and even compulsory +obedience to it, is the very essence of freedom. +So startling a paradox needs, at the +least, explanation. Liberty, it argues, is +not a mere negative thing like absence of +restraint. It is rather a positive self-determination +of the will which, in each of +us, seeks the fulfilment of rational purpose +as this lies behind, and gives unified meaning +to, the diversified chaos of purposes +in each of us. We desire freedom, that is +to say, in order that we may be ourselves +at our best. The right object of our wills, +the thing which, did we know all the facts, +we would truly desire, this is clearly that +for which we would seek freedom. This is +our real will, and the highest part of ourselves. +This will, moreover, is the same +in each member of society; for, at bottom, +the real will is a common will which finds +its highest embodiment in the state. In +this view, therefore, the state is the highest +part of ourselves. For it represents, in its +will, what each of us would seek to be if +the temporary, the immediate and the irrational, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[16]</span>were stripped from the objects we +desire. Its object is what alone we should +aim at were we free to will only our permanent +good. It is, so to say, the long and +permanent end that, in the ultimate analysis, +we come individually to will after +private experience of wrong direction and +erroneous desire. The more intimately, +therefore, we make our will one with that +of the state, the more completely are we +free. The nature of the social bond makes +service to its demands the very essence of +freedom.</p> + +<p>Before I seek to analyse this view, I +would point out how simply this argument +enables us to resolve the very difficult problem +of social obligation. When I obey the +state, I obey the best part of myself. The +more fully I discover its purposes the more +fully, also, there is revealed to me their +identity with that at which, in the long +view, I aim. So that when I obey it, I am, +in fact, obeying myself; in a real sense its +commands are my own. Its view is built +upon the innumerable intelligences from +the interplay of which social organization +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[17]</span>derives its ultimate form; obviously such a +view is superior in its wisdom to the result +my own petty knowledge can attain. My +true liberty is, therefore, a kind of permanent +tutelage to the state, a sacrifice of my +limited purpose to its larger end upon the +ground that, as this larger end is realized, +so I, too, am given realization. I may, in +fact, be most fully free when I am most +suffused with the sense of compulsion.</p> + +<p>To me, at least, this view contradicts all +the major facts of experience. It seems to +me to imply not only a paralysis of the +will, but a denial of that uniqueness of individuality, +that sense that each of us is +ultimately different from our fellows, that +is the ultimate fact of human experience. +For as I encounter the state, it is for me a +body of men issuing orders. Most of them +I can obey either with active good will or, +at least, with indifference. But I may encounter +some one order, a demand, for instance, +for military service, a compulsion +to abandon my religious faith, which seems +to me in direct contradiction to the whole +scheme of values I have found in life. How +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[18]</span>I can be the more free by subordinating +my judgment of right to one which directly +changes that judgment to its opposite, I +cannot understand. If the individual is not +to find the source of his decisions in the +contact between the outer world and himself, +in the experience, that is, which is the +one unique thing that separates him from +the rest of society, he ceases to have meaning +as an individual in any sense that is +creative. For the individual is real to himself +not by reason of the contacts he shares +with others, but because he reaches those +contacts through a channel which he alone +can know. His true self is the self that is +isolated from his fellows and contributes +the fruit of isolated meditation to the common +good, which, collectively, they seek to +bring into being.</p> + +<p>A true theory of liberty, I urge, is built +upon a denial of each of the assumptions of +idealism. My true self is not a selected system +of rational purposes identical with +those sought by every member of society. +We cannot split up the wholeness of personality +in this way. My true self is all that +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[19]</span>I am and do. It is the total impression produced +by the bewildering variety of my +acts, good and bad and indifferent. All of +them go to the formation of my view of the +universe; all of them are my expression of +my striving to fulfil my personality. Each, +while it is, is real, and each, as real, must +give way only in terms of a judgment I +make, not of one made for me by some +other will, if I am to remain a purposive +human being serving myself as an end. +This attempt, in a word, at the extraction +of a partial self from the whole of my being +as alone truly myself not only denies that +my experience is real, but, also, makes me +merely an instrument to the purpose of +others. Whatever that condition is, surely +it cannot be recognized as freedom.</p> + +<p>But we can go further than this. I see +no reason to suppose that this assumed real +will is identical in every member of society. +The ultimate and inescapable fact in politics +is the final variety of human wills. +There is no continuum which makes all of +them one. Experience suggests common objects +of desire, but each will that wills these +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[20]</span>common objects is a different will in every +sense not purely metaphorical. We all have +a will to international peace. But the unity +these make is not in the will but in the +fusion of separate wills to the attainment +of a common purpose. And we must remember +that in every society the objects +of wills cannot, in some mystic fashion, be +fused into a higher unity somehow compounded +of them all. I see no meaning, for +instance, in the statement that the antithetic +purposes of Jesuits and Freemasons +are somehow transcended in a higher purpose +which resumes them both; that is to +say that a Jesuit or a Freemason is most +truly himself when he ceases to be himself, +which, frankly, seems to me nonsense. +A member of the Praesidium of the Third +International, whose will aims supremely at +the overthrow of capitalism, is not somehow +at one with the will of the President of the +British Federation of Industries to whom +all the purposes of the Third International +are anathema. Both, doubtless, will the +good; but the point is that each wills the +good as he sees it, and each would regard +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[21]</span>the fulfilment of the other’s ideal of good +as a definite destruction of his own. There +is, therefore, no single and common will +in society, unless we mean thereby the +vague concept, entirely useless for political +philosophy, that men desire the good. Each +of us desires the good as he sees it; and +each of us sees a good derived from an +individual and separate experience into +which no other person can fully enter. Our +connection with others is, at the best, partial +and interstitial. Our pooling of experiences +to make a common purpose +somewhere is in no case other than fragmentary. +We remain ourselves even when +we join with others to attain some common +object of desire. The ultimate isolation of +the individual personality is the basis from +which any adequate theory of politics must +start.</p> + +<p>I reject, therefore, the idea of a real will, +and, still more, the idea that there is a common +will in society. It is a logical inference +therefrom that I should reject also the doctrine +that all state-action is, at bottom, the +exercise of the real will of society. For, first +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[22]</span>of all, I see no reason to suppose that social +life is ultimately the product of a single and +rational mind organizing its activities in +terms of a logical process. To speak of the +“mind of society”, seems to me merely a +metaphorical way of describing a course of +action which is made valid by translation +into fact. There are no governing principles +in social life deliberately emerging from +the interplay of its myriad constituent +parts. Governing principles emerge; but +they emerge through the wills of individual +minds. And the state is magnified to excess +when it is regarded as embodying a unified +will. The state is a complex of rulers and +subjects territorially organized and seeking, +by the conference of power upon those +rulers, effective co-ordination of social activities. +They exercise the right to use force, +if necessary, to that end. But no one, I +think, can examine the course of history and +say that the experience of any state indicates +a permanent embodiment of the highest +good we know in the purpose of the +state. Our rulers, doubtless, aim at the good +as they see it. Yet what they see as good +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[23]</span>may not be so recognizable to us, and may +well provoke in us the sense that life would +not be worth living if their view was to prevail. +The unity of the state, in a word, is +not inherently there. It is made by civic +acceptance of what its rulers propose. It is +not necessarily good because it is accepted; +it is not necessarily right because it is proposed. +Obedience ought always to be a +function of the substance contained in the +rules made by government; it is a permanent +essay in the conditional mood.⁠<a id="FNanchor_3_3" href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> + +<p>Here, of course, the idealist retorts that +he is dealing not with the states of history, +but with the state as such; he is concerned +with the “pure” instance and not with deviations +from the ideal.⁠<a id="FNanchor_4_4" href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> But it is with actual +states that we have to deal in everyday life +as we know it, with states the policy of +which is directed by men who are human +like ourselves. The policy they announce +must, obviously, be subject to our scrutiny; +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[24]</span>and the result of our judgment is necessarily +made out of an experience not identical +with, even though it be similar to, +theirs. I cannot believe that a theory fits the +facts of history which assumes that this +policy is going to be right, whatever it is; +and that freedom will be found only in acceptance +of it. I do not believe that the +Huguenot of 1685 was made the more free +by accepting, against his conscience, the +Revocation; nor do I believe that Luther +would have been more free had he accepted +the decrees of Rome and abandoned his +protest. Man is a one among many obstinately +refusing reduction to unity. His +separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; +indeed, they are so ultimate that they +are the basis out of which his civic obligations +are builded. He cannot abandon the +consequences of his isolation which are, +broadly speaking, that his experience is +private and the will built out of that experience +personal to himself. If he surrenders +it to others, he surrenders his personality. +If his will is set by the will of others, he +ceases to be master of himself. I cannot +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[25]</span>believe that a man no longer master of +himself is in any meaning sense free.</p> + + +<h3 id="II"> + II +</h3> + +<p>If we reject a view which, like that just +considered, seeks to dissolve the reality of +the individual into the society of which he +is a part, what are we left with as the +pattern within which a man seeks freedom? +Let us try to draw a picture of the place +of man in a community like our own. He +finds himself involved in a complex of relationships +out of which he must form such +a pattern of conduct as will give him happiness. +There are his family, his friends, +the church to which he may belong, his +voluntary association, trade union, or employers’ +association or whatever it may be, +and there is the state. All of these, save +the state, he may in greater or less degree +avoid. A man may cut himself off from +family or friends; he may refuse membership +of a church or vocational body; he +cannot refuse membership of the state. +Somewhere or other, he encounters it as +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[26]</span>a body of persons issuing orders, and he is +involved in the problem of deciding +whether or no he will obey those orders. +Every order issued is, in a final analysis, +issued by a person or persons to another +person or persons. When we say that, in +such a complex of relationships as this, that +a man is free, what do we mean? We know +that if his Church issues an order to him +of which he disapproves, he can leave his +church; so, too, with all other bodies save +the state. The latter can, if he seeks evasion +of its commands, use compulsion to secure +obedience to its orders. It makes, we say, +the law, and a member of the state is legally +compelled to obey the law.</p> + +<p>But he is not free merely because he +obeys the law. His freedom, in relation to +the law, depends on the effect of any particular +order upon his experience. He is +seeking happiness; some order seems to +him a wanton invasion of that happiness. +He may be right or wrong in so thinking; +the point of fact is that he has no alternative +but to go by his own moral certainties. +Now freedom exists in a state where a man +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[27]</span>knows that the decisions made by the ultimate +authority do not invade his personality. +The conditions of freedom are then +those which assure the absence of such invasion. +The citizen who asks for freedom +is entitled to the conditions which, collectively, +are the guarantees that he will be +able to go on the road to his happiness, as +he conceives it, unhindered. Neither conditions +nor guarantees will ever be perfect; +nor will they ever cover all upon which +happiness depends. The state, for instance, +may say that I may marry the woman I +love; it cannot say that she will marry me +if I so desire. The freedom it secures to +me is the absence of a barrier in the way +of marriage if I can win her consent.</p> + +<p>From this angle, liberty may appropriately +be resolved into a system of liberties. +There are realms of conduct within +which, to be free, I must be permitted to act +as I please; to be denied self-expression +there, is to be denied freedom. What we +need to know is, I suggest, first what those +realms of conduct are, and, second, what +my duty as a citizen is when I am, in any +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[28]</span>one of them, prohibited from acting as I +please. The difficulty here, of course, it is +impossible to exaggerate. It is the problem +of knowing when a man ought deliberately +to make up his mind to break the law or +to refuse obedience to it. In the idealist +theory, this problem does not arise; it is +answered <i>a priori</i> by the definition of freedom +as obedience to the law. But because +we have rejected this view, we have to admit +that there will be occasional disobedience, +at the least, and that this may be +justified. We have to discover the principles +of its justification.</p> + +<p>Liberty may be resolved into a system +of liberties; and from this angle it may be +said that it is the purpose of social organization +to see to it that this system is adequately +safeguarded. How can the state, +which charges itself with the function of +supreme co-ordination, properly fulfil this +task? How can it guarantee to me such an +environment to my activity that I do not +suffer frustration in my search for happiness?</p> + +<p>There have been many answers to this +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[29]</span>question, some of them of the highest interest +and importance. One or two I wish +to consider partly because of their significance +in themselves, and partly because, +from that consideration, I wish to make the +inference that no merely mechanical arrangements +will ever secure freedom in +permanence to the citizens of a state. While +there are certain constitutional forms which +are, as I think, essential to freedom, their +mere presence as forms will not, of themselves, +suffice to make men free. I shall +seek, further, to draw the conclusion that, +whatever the forms of social organization, +liberty is essentially an expression of an +impalpable atmosphere among men. It is a +sense that in the things we deem significant +there is the opportunity of continuous initiative, +the knowledge that we can, so to +speak, experiment with ourselves, think +differently or act differently, from our +neighbours without danger to our happiness +being involved therein. We are not +free, that is, unless we can form our plan +of conduct to suit our own character without +social penalties. Freedom is in an important +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[30]</span>degree a matter of law; but in a +degree not less important it is a matter, +also, of the <i>mores</i> of the society outside the +sphere within which law can operate.</p> + +<p>You will observe that I am still, from the +angle of political organization, thinking of +liberty as a safeguard of the individual +against those who rule him. I do so for the +best of reasons. Whoever exerts power in +a community is tempted to the abuse of +power. Even in a democracy, we must have +ways and means of protecting the minority +against a majority which seeks to invade +its freedom. Mankind has suffered much +from the assumption that, once the people +had become master in its own house, there +was no limit to its power. You have only +to remember the history of racial minorities +like the negroes, of religious or national +minorities like Jews and Czechs, to +realize that democracy, of itself, is no guarantee +of freedom. This raises the larger +question of whether freedom in the modern +state can ever be satisfactorily secured by +internal sanctions, and whether, in fact, it +is ever durably possible save in the terms +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[31]</span>of a strong and stable international organization. +For, clearly, we must not think +of freedom as involving only an individual +set over against the community; it involves +also the freedom of groups, racial, ecclesiastical, +vocational, set over against the community +and the state; it involves also the +relation of states to one another, as, for instance, +in the problem of annexation. No +Englishman would think himself free if his +domestic life were defined for him by another +state; and no German but has had a +bitter sense of unfreedom during the foreign +occupation of the Rhineland. Our +generation, at least, is unlikely to under-estimate +the problem of what limits may be +set to the demand for freedom by a national +group.</p> + + +<h3 id="III"> + III +</h3> + +<p>Everyone who considers the relation of +liberty to the institutions of a state will, I +think, find it difficult to resist the conclusion +that without democracy there cannot +be liberty. That is not an over-popular +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[32]</span>thesis in our time. A reaction against democratic +ideals is the fashion, and the dictatorships +which proliferate over half +Europe are earnest in maintaining their +obsolescence. Yet consider, for a moment, +what democracy implies. It involves a +frame of government in which, first, men +are given the chance of making the government +under which they live, in which, +also, the laws that government promulgates +are binding equally upon all. I do not think +the average man can be made happy merely +by living in a democracy: I do not see how +he can avoid a sense of continuous frustration +unless he does. For if he does not share +in making the government, if he cannot, +where his fellows so choose, be himself +made one of the rulers of the state, he is +excluded from that which secures him the +certainty that his experience counts. To +read the history of England before the enfranchisement +of the wage-earner is to +realize that however small is the value of +the franchise it still assures the attention of +government to grievance. The right, therefore, +to the franchise is essential to liberty; +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[33]</span>and a citizen excluded from it is unfree. +Unfree for the simple reason that the rulers +of the state will not regard his will as entitled +to consideration in the making of +policy. They will do things for him, but +not those things he himself regards as +urgent; as Parliament a hundred years ago +met the grim problem of urban want by +building more churches to the glory of the +Lord. Whatever is to be said against the +democratic form of state, it seems to me unquestionable +that it has forced the needs of +humble men on the attention of government +in a way impossible under any other +form.</p> + +<p>To be free a people must be able to +choose its rulers at stated intervals simply +because there is no other way in which +their wants, as they experience those wants, +will receive attention. It is fundamental to +the conference of power that it should +never be permanent. If it is so, it ceases +to give attention to the purposes for which +it is conferred and thinks only of the well-being +of those who can exercise it. That +has been, notably, the history of monarchy +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[34]</span>and aristocracy, and in general, of the practice +of colonial dominion. Power that is +unaccountable makes instruments of men +who should be ends in themselves. Responsible +government in a democracy lives +always in the shadow of coming defeat; +and this makes it eager to satisfy those +with whose destinies it is charged.</p> + +<p>That is a general principle which, stated +as baldly as this, does not adequately illustrate +the substance it implies. The history +of the struggle for popular freedom has +given us knowledge of certain rules in the +organization of a state the presence of +which is fundamental to freedom. It can, +I think, be shown that no citizen is secure +in liberty unless certain rights are guaranteed +to him, rights which the government +of the state cannot hope to overthrow; and +unless, to secure the maintenance of those +rights, there is a separation of the judicial +from the executive power.</p> + +<p>The citizens of a state choose men to +make the laws under which they are to live. +It is urgent that they should be binding +upon all without fear or favour; that I, for +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[35]</span>instance, should be able to live secure in +the knowledge that they will not apply to +me differently from their incidence upon +others. Clearly enough, in the modern +state, the application of law to life demands +a vast body of civil servants to administer +it. Not the least important +problem of our time is that which arises +when the legality of their administration is +in question. In Anglo-Saxon communities +it has been regarded as elementary that +the interpretation of law should be entrusted +to an independent body of officials—the +judges—who can arbitrate impartially +between government and citizens. +That view I take to be of the first importance +to freedom; and its acceptance involves +considerations which we must +examine in some detail.</p> + +<p>The business of a judiciary, broadly +speaking, is the impartial interpretation of +the law as between government and citizen, +or between classes of citizens who dispute +with one another. The government, for instance, +charges a man with treason; obviously +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[36]</span>he is deprived of something +essential to his freedom if the law is +strained so as to make of treason something +it in fact is not in order to cover the +acts which the government seeks to have +accepted as treason. Here, obviously, the +judge must be assured that his independence +may be maintained with safety to +himself. He must not suffer in his person +or position because of the view he takes. +It must not be within the power either of +the government or other persons to deprive +him of his authority because, as best he +may, he applies the law. This, as I think, +makes it essential that all judicial appointments +should be held during good behaviour. +There may be an age-limit of +service, of course; but, this apart, nothing +should permit the removal of a judge from +the bench except corruption or physical +unfitness. I do not, therefore, believe that +a judicial system founded upon popular +election is a satisfactory way of choosing +judges, the more so if submission to re-election +is involved; and the system, abandoned +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[37]</span>in England in 1701, of making +judicial appointment dependent upon the +pleasure of government is equally indefensible. +Once a man has been appointed +to judicial office nothing must stand in the +way of his complete independence of mind. +Election, re-election, a power in the government +to dismiss, are all of them incompatible +with the function the judge is to +perform. They will not, as a general rule, +either give us the men we want, or enable +us to keep them when we have found them.</p> + +<p>But we must, I think, go further than +this. Judicial independence is not merely +a matter of mechanical technique; it is also +psychological in character. The judge +whose promotion is dependent upon the +will of the executive, even more, the judge +who may look to a political career as a +source of future distinction, neither of these +is adequately protected in that independence +of mind which is the pivot of his function. +No less a person than Mr Chief +Justice Taft has told us that he appointed +a predecessor to that eminent position at +least partly because he approved of one of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[38]</span>his decisions.⁠<a id="FNanchor_5_5" href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> No one could, I think, have +confidence in the Bench if it were known +that decisions pleasing to a given political +party might lead either to promotion or to +choice as either a presidential candidate or +as Lord Chancellor. It seems to me, therefore, +that we must so organize the method +of judicial promotion as to prevent the executive +from choosing men of its own +outlook, and, further, see to it that appointment +to the Bench is definitely taken as the +end of a political career. These are problems +of detailed technique into which I +cannot now enter;⁠<a id="FNanchor_6_6" href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> here I am only concerned +to point out that the problem of independence +which they raise is one that it +is necessary to meet with frankness.</p> + +<p>But the judge’s authority as a safeguard +of our freedom is in the modern state +threatened in another way. Modern legislation +is so huge both in volume and extent +that the average assembly has neither time +nor energy to scrutinize its details. The +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[39]</span>modern habit is, therefore, to pass Acts +which confer a general power, and to leave +the filling in of details to the discretion of +the department concerned. To this, I think, +no one can really take exception. The state +must do its work; and it must develop the +agencies necessary to that end. But I think +we have grave reason for fear when the +growth of this delegated legislative authority +is accompanied with, or followed by, the +conference of powers upon government departments +themselves to determine the +question of whether the powers they take +are legal or no. I regard the growth of delegated +legislation as both necessary and desirable; +but if it is not gravely to impair +our freedom, it should, I think, be developed +only under the amplest safeguards.</p> + +<p>Decisions, for instance, like that on the +<i>Fu Toy</i> case⁠<a id="FNanchor_7_7" href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> in the United States, and in +<i>Arlidge</i> v. <i>Local Government Board</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_8_8" href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> in +England, are clearly a real menace to the +liberty of the subject. They suggest a type +of executive justice for which the methods +of the Star Chamber are the nearest analogy. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[40]</span>No body of civil servants, however +liberal-minded they may be, ought to be +free both to make the law and to devise the +procedure by which its legality may be +tested; and that, be it remembered, without +a power of appeal from their decision. +It may be taken for granted that the modern +state needs an administrative law; in +matters, for instance, like rate-fixing in +public utilities, in workmen’s compensation +cases, in matters concerning public health, +the views of a body of experts in a public +department are generally at least as valid +as that of the judicial body. But one wants +to be certain that in arriving at his decision +the expert has been compelled to +take account of all the relevant evidence; +that the parties to his decision have had +their day in court. This seems to me to +involve the organization of a procedure for +all administrative tribunals which takes account +of the lessons we have learned both +from the procedure of ordinary courts and +from the history of the law of evidence; +and it involves an appeal from administrative +tribunals to the ordinary courts on all +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[41]</span>questions where denial of proper procedure +is held to involve a denial of proper consideration. +Something of this, if I understand +the matter aright, has been granted to the +American citizen by the Supreme Court in +<i>McCall</i> &c. v. <i>New York</i>;⁠<a id="FNanchor_9_9" href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> and I should +feel happier about the future of administrative +law if I were certain that the principles +of that decision applied to all +governmental activities of the kind.</p> + +<p>Another safeguard is not less essential. +We agree, for the most part, in ordinary +legal matters that the opinion of a single +judge, even when reinforced by the verdict +of a jury, ought not to be final in either +criminal or civil cases. I should like to see +that agreement extended to the sphere of +administrative law. Where, that is to say, a +departmental tribunal has rendered its decision +I should like an appeal to lie to a +higher administrative tribunal composed +not only of officials, but, also, of laymen of +experience in the matters involved who +could be trusted to bring an independent +mind to the settlement of the matter in dispute. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[42]</span>English experience of tribunals like +the civil service division of the Industrial +Court, and the Commissioners of Income +Tax, convinces me that the common sense +of a good lay mind is, in this realm, an +immense safeguard against departmental +error. And we must remember that, however +great be the good will of the public +services, what, to them, may seem a simple +matter of administrative routine, may be +to the citizens involved a denial of the very +substance of freedom. Certainly a case like +<i>ex parte O’Brien</i>⁠<a id="FNanchor_10_10" href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> makes one see how real +would be the threat to public liberty if departmental +legislation grew without proper +judicial scrutiny at every stage of its development.</p> + +<p>The problem, however, does not merely +end here. There are two other sides of administrative +action in which the uncontrolled +power of the state is an implicit +threat to civic freedom. Of the first, I would +say here only a word, since I have treated +it fully elsewhere.⁠<a id="FNanchor_11_11" href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> The modern state is a +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[43]</span>sovereign state and, as such, there are +large realms of its conduct where wrong +on its part cannot imply the invocation by +the citizen of penalty. The right to sue the +state in tort seems to me quite fundamental +to freedom. The modern state is in essence +a public service corporation. Like any other +body, it acts through servants who take decisions +in its name. I can see no reason +in the world why, like any other body serving +the public, it should not be responsible +for the torts of its agents. If I am run over +by the negligent driver of a railway truck, +I can secure damages: I do not see why I +am not equally entitled to damages if the +truck is the property of, and is driven for, +the Postmaster-General of His Majesty.⁠<a id="FNanchor_12_12" href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a></p> + +<p>But, still in the context of administration, +the needs of liberty go yet further. +There has accreted today about the departments +of state a type of discretionary power +which seems to me full of danger unless it +is exercised under proper safeguards. Examples +of it are the power of the Postmaster-General +in the United States over +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[44]</span>the mails and of the Home Secretary in +England over requests from aliens for naturalization. +An alien applies to the Home +Secretary for naturalization. He answers innumerable +questions, and presents certificates +of good character from citizens who +testify on oath to his standing. He has resided +in the country for at least five years +and he will not, of course, normally venture +to apply unless his record is adequate. +A request is published in the press for any +information about him and, after a due interval, +the Home Secretary makes a decision +about his case. He has, of course, +pursued his own inquiries, and he has, presumably, +received information about the +applicant upon which his action is based. +Now the point that disturbs me is the fact +that where a certificate of naturalization is +refused, the grounds for rejection are +never, even privately to the applicant, +made known. He is refused privileges +which may be vital to him and his family +in the background of accusations which +may, doubtless, be true, but may also be +completely without foundation and capable, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[45]</span>were opportunity afforded, of being +immediately and decisively refuted. And so +great is the discretionary power of the +Minister that he may even substitute his +own will for that of the legislature: the +Act, for instance, demands a five-year +period of residence. The late Home Secretary, +Lord Brentford, announced that while +he was in office he would grant no certificate +unless the applicant had resided in +England continuously for a period of thirteen +years. It seems to me that this power +to deny admission to citizenship, as it is +exercised, is a complete denial of natural +justice. No person ought to be condemned +by accusations he is not given the opportunity +to refute. Anyone who wishes to give +testimony in a case of this kind ought +surely to prove his <i>bona fides</i> by submitting +to cross-examination by the applicant or +his representative. I should like, therefore, +to see the possibility of an appeal from the +decision of the Home Secretary to a judge +in chambers where the latter would, on a +case stated by the Department, hear such +evidence as the applicant chose to bring +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[46]</span>for its refutation and then only make a +final decision. Anything less than this +seems to me a wanton abuse of freedom; +and, <i>mutatis mutandis</i>, this type of safeguard +seems to me urgent wherever a Minister +is given a discretionary power which +affects the liberty of the subject.</p> + +<p>I accept, therefore, the traditional notion +that the separation of the judicial from +the executive power, the right of the former +to determine the legality of executive +decision, is the basis of freedom. I do not, +however, believe that the separation of the +executive from the legislature is either necessary +or desirable. The origin of the idea, +as you know, is in the historic misinterpretation +of the British Constitution by Montesquieu;⁠<a id="FNanchor_13_13" href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> +and this, in its turn, was due to +his misapplication of certain classic dicta +of Locke.⁠<a id="FNanchor_14_14" href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> The fact is that a separation in +this realm results in a complete and undesirable +erosion of responsibility. The +British system, in which the executive, as +a committee of the legislative, formulates +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[47]</span>its plans for acceptance or rejection, has, +I think, the clear advantage of showing the +electorate exactly where responsibility for +action must lie. Where mistakes are made, +where there is corruption, or dishonesty, or +abuse, it can be brought home forthwith +to its authors. In the American system, that +is not the case. The President is neither +the master nor the servant of the legislature. +The latter can make its own schemes; +where its views, more, where its party complexion, +are different from his, there is a +constant tendency to paralysis of administration. +Each can blame the other for failure. +No clear policy emerges upon which +the electorate can form a straightforward +judgment. Independence makes for antagonism +and antagonism, in its turn, makes +for confusion. Such a separation means, +almost invariably, the construction of a +separate quasi-executive in the legislature, +which has an interest of its own distinct +from, and often hostile to, that of the President.⁠<a id="FNanchor_15_15" href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> +I can see no necessary safeguard of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[48]</span>liberty in this. On the contrary, the British +system, where the executive may be at any +moment destroyed by the legislature as a +penalty for error or wrong, where, also, +there lies always the prospect of an immediate +and direct appeal to the people as +the ultimate and only arbiter of difference, +seems to me far more satisfactory.</p> + + +<h3 id="IV"> + IV +</h3> + +<p>Another institutional mechanism for the +safeguarding of freedom is that of a Bill +of Rights. Certain principles, freedom of +speech, protection from arbitrary arrest, +and the like, are regarded as especially +sacred. They are enshrined in a document +which cannot, constitutionally, be invaded +either by the legislature or the executive, +save by a special procedure to which access +is difficult. The first Amendment to the +American Constitution, for example, lays it +down that Congress shall pass no law +abridging freedom of speech; and any Act +of Congress which touches upon the matter +can be challenged for unconstitutionality +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[49]</span>before the Supreme Court. The Amendment, +moreover, cannot be attacked save by +the usual process of constitutional change +in America; and that means that, except in +the event of an American Revolution, it +is unlikely ever to be directly attacked at +all.</p> + +<p>My own years of residence in the United +States have convinced me that there is a +real value in Bills of Rights which it is +both easy, and mistaken, to under-estimate. +Granted that the people are educated to +the appreciation of their purpose, they serve +to draw attention, as attention needs to be +drawn, to the fact that vigilance is essential +in the realm of what Cromwell called fundamentals. +Bills of Rights are, quite undoubtedly, +a check upon possible excess in +the government of the day. They warn us +that certain popular powers have had to +be fought for, and may have to be fought +for again. The solemnity they embody +serves to set the people on their guard. It +acts as a rallying-point in the state for all +who care deeply for the ideals of freedom. +I believe, for instance, that the existence +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[50]</span>of the First Amendment has drawn innumerable +American citizens to defend +freedom of speech who have no atom of +sympathy with the purposes for which it is +used. A Bill of Rights, so to say, canonizes +the safeguards of freedom; and, thereby, +it persuades men to worship at the altar +who might not otherwise note its existence.</p> + +<p>All this, I think, is true; but it does not +for a moment imply that a Bill of Rights +is an automatic guarantee of liberty. For +the relationship of legislation to its substance +has to be measured by the judiciary. +Its members, after all, are human beings, +likely, as the rest of us, to be swept off +their feet by gusts of popular passion. The +first Amendment to the American Constitution +guarantees freedom of speech and +peaceable assembly; the fourth Amendment +legally secures to the citizen that his house +shall not be searched except upon a warrant +of probable cause; the eighth Amendment +legally secures him against excessive +bail. Yet you will remember how, in one +hysterical week in 1919, the action of the +executive power rendered all these amendments +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[51]</span>worthless;⁠<a id="FNanchor_16_16" href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> and you will not forget +that the fifteenth Amendment, which +sought political freedom for the coloured +citizens of the South, has never been effectively +applied either by the executive +or by the Courts.</p> + +<p>The fact is that any Bill of Rights depends +for its efficacy on the determination +of the people that it shall be maintained. +It is just as strong, and no more, than the +popular will to freedom. No one now +doubts that the Espionage Acts were +strained so as to destroy almost all that the +first Amendment was intended to cover; +that most of the charges preferred under it +were, on their face, ludicrous. Yet you will +remember that, in <i>Abrams</i> v. <i>United +States</i>,⁠<a id="FNanchor_17_17" href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> two judges stood alone in their insistence +that the first Amendment really +meant something; the judgment of the +others was caught in the meshes of war hysteria. +No principle is better established +than the right of the citizen, under proper +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[52]</span>circumstances, to a writ of <i>habeas corpus</i>; +that is, perhaps, the ark of the covenant in +the Anglo-American conception of freedom. +But who can ever forget the noble +and pathetic words of Chief Justice Taney, +in <i>ex parte Merryman</i>,⁠<a id="FNanchor_18_18" href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> where he insists +that the applicant is entitled to the writ +and that, in view of President Lincoln’s +suspension of it—a suspension entirely illegal +in character—he could not secure to +Mr Merryman his due rights? And let us +remember, also, that even where the judge +is prepared to do his duty, he cannot, in a +period of excitement, count upon public +opinion. Nothing is clearer than the fact +that those who hanged Mr Gordon during +the Jamaica riots were guilty of murder. +The opinion of Chief Justice Cockburn +could not have made the issue more clear; +it is a landmark in the judicial history of +freedom. Yet the jury at once, in its despite, +acquitted the accused. There have been, +further, many occasions when breaches +of fundamental principles of freedom, +breaches which, on any showing, have been +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[53]</span>quite indefensible, have been followed at +once by Acts of Indemnity. I know only of +one case in England in the last hundred +years in which such an Act has been refused. +Yet it is, I think, obvious that +unless such breaches are definitely and +deliberately punished, they will always occur +on critical occasions. At such times, it +is impossible to trust those who are charged +with the exercise of power; and only the +knowledge that swift and certain punishment +will follow its abuse will make our +rulers attentive to the needs of freedom.</p> + +<p>I speak the language of severity; and I +am anxious that you should not think that +the language of severity is that of the extremist. +I invite you, as the proof of what +I say, to read, in the light of cold reason +a decade after the close of the war, the +history of the tribunals in England which +were charged with examining conscientious +objectors to military service and on the +military authorities to whom some of those +objectors were handed over.⁠<a id="FNanchor_19_19" href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> No one can go +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[54]</span>through the record without the sense that +some of the tribunals deliberately evaded +the purposes of the exemption clause; and +it is clear that in the administration of +punishment for refusal to obey orders, +there was wanton cruelty, a deliberate +pleasure in the infliction of pain, for which +no words can be too strong. Nor is that all. +The record shows occasions when Ministers +of the Crown, when responding to questions +in the House of Commons, used evasions +of a kind which showed a complete +contempt of truth;⁠<a id="FNanchor_20_20" href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> and they were supported +in their attitude by the majority of +the members there. I note, also, at least +one occasion when a number of conscientious +objectors were taken from England +to France for the purpose of execution by +the military authorities; and it was only +the accident that Professor Gilbert Murray +was able to appeal on their behalf to the +Prime Minister, which prevented the sentence +from being carried out.⁠<a id="FNanchor_21_21" href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> These are +worse than the methods of the Inquisition; +for, at least, the members of that tribunal +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[55]</span>believed that they were rescuing their victims +from eternal damnation. Those of +whom I speak had no excuse save ignorant +prejudice and the blindness of passion.</p> + +<p>You will see, therefore, why I cannot believe +that constitutional expedients alone, +however substantial, will prevent the invasion +of liberty. They will work just so long +as people are determined they shall work, +and no longer. They are valuable because, +since they have been consecrated by tradition, +their invasion tends to awaken, at +least in some of us, a prejudice to which +we have become habituated. But to keep +them active and alive, requires a deliberate +and purposive effort it is by no means easy +to make when the result of doing so conflicts +with some other object keenly desired. +That is, I think, capable of a simple demonstration. +No class of men is so carefully +trained as the judiciary to the habit of a +balanced mind. Yet if you examine the observations +of judges in cases where their +passions are deeply involved you will note +how great is the effort they have to make +to show tolerance to antagonistic views. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[56]</span>Nor do they always succeed. In most of the +classic English blasphemy cases, for example, +the judge has too often been, either +consciously or unconsciously, an additional +counsel for the prosecution.⁠<a id="FNanchor_22_22" href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a> In many of +the American Espionage Acts cases what +chiefly emerges from the summing up of +the judge is a desire, at all costs, to see +that the prisoner does not secure an acquittal.⁠<a id="FNanchor_23_23" href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> +Recent injunction cases in America +show a desire, no doubt unconscious, +on the part of the Court, to lend aid and +countenance to a social philosophy of +which it happens to approve.</p> + +<p>I conclude, therefore, that in general +we shall not allow, as a society, the mechanisms +of the state to serve the cause of freedom +unless we approve the objects at +which freedom aims. In a time of crisis, +particularly, when the things we hold most +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[57]</span>dear are threatened, we shall find the desire +to throw overboard the habits of tolerance, +almost irresistible. For those habits +are not in Nature, which teaches us that +opinions we deem evil are fraught with +death. They come from our social heritage, +and are part of a process the value of which +we must relearn continuously if we are to +preserve it. That is the meaning of the +famous maxim that eternal vigilance is the +price of liberty. It is why, also, it becomes +necessary in each age to restate the case for +freedom, if it is to be maintained.</p> + + +<h3 id="V"> + V +</h3> + +<p>There is one other general part of this +political aspect of liberty that I wish to +consider before I turn to a different portion +of my theme. I have argued that resistance +to the encroachments of power is +essential to freedom because it is the habit +of power continuously, if it can, to enlarge +the boundaries of its authority. Is there any +specific rule by which men can be trained +to such resistance? Is there, that is, a way +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[58]</span>in which the average citizen of the modern +state can be persuaded that it is in his interest +to be vigilant against those who +would invade his rights? Can it, further, +be shown that such a temper in the citizen +is likely, as it grows, to confer benefit upon +the community as a whole?</p> + +<p>Broadly speaking, I think the answer to +these questions is in the affirmative. I hazard +the generalization that the more widespread +the distribution of power in the +state, the more decentralized its character, +the more likely men are to be zealous for +freedom. That is, of course, a large statement +to make. It is the thesis that, in terms +of historic experience, good government is +always, in the end, both less valuable and +less efficient than self-government. I mean +that, in general, rules imposed upon a society +from above for its benefit are less effective +to the end that they seek than rules +which have grown naturally from below. I +believe that to be true both of the individual +and the group in society. Its full +realization is, of course, an impossibility +since it would make the uniformities we +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[59]</span>need in social life unattainable. But the +greater the degree in which we can realize +it, the better for the community to which +we belong.</p> + +<p>I do not mean to imply that there is +any rigid principle which enables us to +mark off the lines of demarcation between +what is individual and what is social, between +what belongs to the group and what +belongs to the state, between the sphere +of central, and the sphere of local government. +The only possible approach to that +problem is a pragmatic one, as anyone can +see who tries to make common sense out +of John Stuart Mill’s famous attempt, with +its list of exceptions⁠<a id="FNanchor_24_24" href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> by which he reduced +it to something like absurdity. Most of us, +I think, could draw up lists of governmental +subjects in which central and local topics +could be demarcated without undue +disagreement. We should fairly universally +say that foreign policy and defence, fiscal +technique and commercial regulation were +naturally within the sphere of the central, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[60]</span>and playing fields, were within the sphere +of the local, authority. We should agree +that crime is a matter for the state, and sin +a matter for the churches. We should admit +that there must be uniform regulations +for marriage and divorce, but that individuals +only could make up their minds +when, within the regulations, either to +marry or divorce.</p> + +<p>This, I think, is pretty straightforward. +The points I wish to emphasize are different. +They are, first, that in the making of +public decisions, it is desirable that as +many persons as possible who are affected +by the result should share in reaching it; +and, secondly, that whenever the decision +to make some rule of conduct a matter of +governmental regulation arouses widespread +and ardent dissent, the probability +is that the case against the decision is +stronger than the case in its favour.</p> + +<p>My first point I may perhaps best make +by the statement that all creative authority +is essentially federal in character. The purpose +for which authority is exercised is the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[61]</span>maximum satisfaction of desire. To achieve +that end, it is in the long run vital to take +account of the wills of those who will be +affected by the decision. For, otherwise, +their desires are unexplored, and there is +substituted for the full experience that +should be available, the partial experience, +perhaps suffused with a sinister interest, +which is able to influence the legal source +of decision. Maximum satisfaction, in other +words, is a function of maximum consultation; +and the greater the degree in which +the citizen shares in making the rules under +which he lives, the more likely is his +allegiance to those rules to be free and unfettered. +Nor is this all. The process of +being consulted gives him a sense of being +significant in the state. It makes him feel +that he is more than the mete recipient of +orders. He realizes that the state exists for +his ends and not for its own. He comes to +see that his needs will be met only as he +contributes his instructed judgment to the +experience out of which decisions are compounded. +He gains the expectation of being +consulted, the sense that he must form an +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[62]</span>opinion on public affairs. He learns to dislike +orders which are issued without regard +being paid to his will. He comes to have +a sense of frustration when decisions are +made arbitrarily, and without an attempt +to build them from the consent of those +affected. He learns vigilance about the ways +of power. Those who are trained to that +vigilance become the conscious guardians +of liberty.</p> + +<p>For they will protest against what they +regard as the invasion of their rights, and +tribute will have to be paid to their protest. +In any community, fortunately for +ourselves, power is always upon the defensive; +and when men are vigilant to expose +its encroachments it is urgent to seek their +good opinion. Those active-minded enough +to fight for their rights will, doubtless, be +always in a minority; but they prick the +indifferent multitude into thought and they +thus act as the gadflies of liberty. The handful +of American lawyers who protested +against the methods of the Department of +Justice in 1920 forced its officials to a +change of their ways. The little group of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[63]</span>men who, in season and out of season, have +protested that the white man’s burden +ought not, in justice, to be borne by the +black, have the Mandates’ system of the +League of Nations to their credit: what E. +D. Morel did for the Congo, what H. W. +Nevinson did for Portuguese Angola, these +are lessons in the service of citizenship to +liberty. And it is the peculiar value of this +habit of mind that it grows by what it feeds +on. To accustom the average man to regard +himself as a person who must be +consulted is, in the long run, to assure him, +through consultation, of satisfaction. For +the holders of power are always desirous +of finding the convenient routine; and if +they are driven by pressure to give the people +freedom, they will discover that this +is the object they have set before themselves.</p> + +<p>Into the institutional pattern which such +a federalization of authority requires I cannot +here enter.⁠<a id="FNanchor_25_25" href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> It must suffice to say that +it makes totally inadequate the traditional +forms even of the democratic state. For +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[64]</span>the notion that, when the citizen has chosen +his representatives for Parliament or his +local authority, he can sit back in the comfortable +knowledge that his wants are +known, his interests safeguarded, has not +one jot of evidence to support it. We need, +of a certainty, a much more complex +scheme. We have not only to provide for +more adequate relationships between Parliament +and the administrative process; we +have also to integrate the latter with the +public it serves on a much ampler scale +than any we have hitherto imagined. I have +elsewhere tried to show how vital in this +context is the device of the advisory committee. +Its value both as a check upon +bureaucracy, and as a means of making +decision genuinely representative in character, +becomes the more clear the wider +our experience of its functioning.</p> + +<p>But even this is not enough. There will +never be liberty in any state where there +is an excessive concentration of power at +the centre. The need for a wide conference +of authority away from that centre becomes +more obvious with the growth of our experience. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[65]</span>If the decisions to be made are to +embody the needs of those affected by +them, the latter must have major responsibility +for their making. All of our problems +are not central problems; and to leave +to the central government the decision of +questions which affect only a portion of the +community is to destroy in that portion the +sense of responsibility and the habit of inventiveness. +The inhabitants of any given +area have a consciousness of common purposes, +a sense of the needs of their neighbourhood, +which only they can fully know. +They find that the power to satisfy them +of themselves gives to them a quality of +vigour far greater in the happiness it produces +than would be the case if satisfaction +were always provided by, or controlled +from, without. For administration from +without always lacks the vitalizing ability +to be responsive to local opinion; it misses +shades and expressions of thought and +want which are urgent to successful government. +It lacks the genius of place. It +does not elicit creative support from those +over whom it rules. It makes for mechanical +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[66]</span>uniformity, an effort to apply similar +rules to unsimilar things. It is too distant +from the thing to be done to awaken interest +from those concerned in the process of +doing it. Centralized government in local +matters may be more efficient than a decentralized +system; but that superior efficiency +will never, as Mill long ago pointed out, +compensate for an inferior interest in the +result.</p> + +<p>I believe, therefore, that, with all its difficulties +and dangers, the area of local government +should be as little circumscribed +as possible. The German system, of laying +down what a local authority may not do, +and leaving it free to experiment outside +that realm of prohibition, seems to me superior +both in principle and result to its +Anglo-American antithesis. Thereby we +gain not only the knowledge which comes +from varied social experiment, but the +freedom born of citizenship trained in the +widest degree to think for itself and to solve +its own problems. Most imposed solutions +of a uniform character only succeed where +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[67]</span>their material is genuinely uniform. That +is rarely the case in these matters. And +even the impatient reformer ought sometimes +to think whether, say, forcing a +child-labour law on Georgia by federal +amendment will lead to a genuine and +whole-hearted application of its terms; +whether, in fact, it will not persuade to hatred +of the law, even contempt for the law, +by encouraging evasion of it. Successful +legislation is almost always legislation for +which the minds of men are anxious; the +channels of assent to it can rarely be dug +too deep.</p> + +<p>All, moreover, that I am saying of territorial +locality, seems to me to apply, with +no less emphasis, to what may be termed +functional areas also. Everyone acquainted +with the history of churches realizes the +necessity of leaving them free to develop +their own internal life. On matters like +ecclesiastical government, dogma, ceremonial, +interference by the state is almost +invariably disastrous in its results. What +is true of churches is true also, <i>mutatis +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[68]</span>mutandis</i>, of other associations. Bodies like +the legal and medical professions are much +better able to direct their own internal life +than to have it directed for them by the +state. It is necessary, of course, to prevent +them from developing into monopolies; +and to that end it is essential to devise a +framework of principle within which they +must work, to retain, also, the right to its +revision from without from time to time. +But that said, few would, I think, deny that +what we call professional standards, the +jealousy for the honour of the profession, +the sense of <i>esprit de corps</i>, the realization +that its members owe to the community +something more than the qualities for +which payment can be exacted, these things +are born of the large degree of freedom to +define their own life the professions enjoy.</p> + +<p>It is, I think, important to extend that +notion of self-government beyond the professions. +We ought to learn to think of industries +like cotton and coal as entities not +less real than Lancashire or New York, as +capable, therefore, of being organized for +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[69]</span>the purpose of government. Most of the +plans as current today for national economic +councils are not, in my judgment, +of great value; the satisfactory weighting +of the different elements is really insoluble, +and any problem that concerns industry +as a whole seems to me at once civic in +its nature and, therefore, the proper province +of the legislative assembly of the state.⁠<a id="FNanchor_26_26" href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a> +But these considerations do not apply to +industries taken individually, or linked together +at special points of intimate contact. +It does not seem to me inconceivable that +we should create a Parliament for the mining +industry, in which capital, management, +labour and the consumer, should +each have their due representation, and +to which should be confided the determination +of industrial standards on the model +of professional self-government. I should +give to this Parliament a power of delegated +legislation which would enable it to +frame rules of conduct binding upon all +the members of the industry. Thus, while +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[70]</span>Georgia might refuse to pass a child-labour +law, a particular industry in Georgia might +refuse to allow its members to engage child +labour in field or factory. There might be +developed in this way a body of industrial +legislation and jurisprudence growing naturally +out of the experience of those who +participate in the operation of the industry, +and imposed with a real sense of freedom +because it has been developed from within +and is not the outcome of an external control. +The help this system would give to +the creative-minded employer, on the one +hand, and the adventurous trade-union, on +the other, needs no emphasis from me. +Something of what it might effect, if +planned in a wholesale way, the experiments +of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers +and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad +have amply demonstrated. They show +clearly, I venture to suggest, that an authority +born of consent is always definitely +superior to an authority born of coercion. +And the reason is the simple but vital one +that creative energy is liberated only in the +atmosphere of freedom.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[71]</span></p> + + +<h3 id="VI"> + VI +</h3> + +<p>In all that I have so far said there is implied +a theory of the nature of law upon +which, perhaps, I ought to say a word. The +view I am taking suggests that law is not +simply a body of commands justifiable by +virtue of their origin. Laws are rules seeking +to satisfy human desires. They are +the more certain of acceptance the more +fully they seek to inquire what desires it is +urgent to satisfy, and the best way of inquiry +is to associate men with each stage +of the process of law-making. For men, in +fact, will not obey law which goes counter +to what they regard as fundamental. Their +notion of what is fundamental may be +wrong, or unwise, or limited; but it is their +notion, and they do not feel free unless +they can act by their own moral certainties. +It is useless to tell them that an assumption +on their part that they are entitled +to forgo obedience will result in anarchy. +Every generation contains examples +of men who, in the context of ultimate experience, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[72]</span>deliberately decide that an anarchy +in which they seek to maintain some +principle is preferable to an order in which +that principle must be surrendered. The +South in 1861, Ulster in 1914, the Communist +in the context of a capitalist society, +these are but variations on the great theme +of Luther’s classic <i>Ich Kann nicht anders</i>. +They illustrate the inescapable truth that +law must make its way to acceptance +through the channel of consenting minds.</p> + +<p>Let me put this in a different way. Law +is not merely a command; it is also an appeal. +It is a search for the embodiment of +my experience in the rule it imposes. The +best way, therefore, to make that search +creative is to consult me who can alone +fully report what my experience is. There +can be no guarantee that law will be accepted +save in the degree that this is done. +Legal right is so made as the individual +recipient of a command invests it with +right; he gives it his sanction by relating +it successfully to his own experience. When +that relation cannot be made, the authority +of law is always in doubt. And it is in doubt +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[73]</span>because, by contradicting the experience of +those whom it seeks to control, it seems to +them a frustration of their personality. To +accept the control would be to become +unfree.</p> + +<p>An extreme way of putting this view +would be to say that law is made by the individual’s +acceptance of it, that the essence +of the law-making process, is the consent +of interested minds. At points of marginal +significance, that is, I think, true; and the +consequences of the truth are obviously important. +Authority, if my view is right, is +always acting at its peril. It lives not by its +power to command but by its power to convince. +And conviction is born of consent for +the simple reason that the real field of social +action is in the individual mind. Somewhere, +inevitably, the power to coerce that +mind to ways of thoughts of which it does +not approve, breaks down; man, as Tyrrell +said, is driven on “to follow the dominant +influence of his life even if it should +break the heart of all the world”. That is +the stark fact which conditions the loyalty +any authority seeks to secure. At some +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[74]</span>point, it cannot be imposed but must be +won from us. And the greater the degree +in which it springs from that persuasion, +the greater, also, is the success of authority +in imposing its solutions. No power can +ever hope for successful permanence, no +power, either, is entitled to it, which does +not make its way, in vital matters, through +the channels of consent.</p> + +<p>From this two conclusions seem to me +to flow. Ours is not a universe in which the +principles of a unified experience are unfolded. +It is a multiverse embodying an +ultimate variety of experiences, never identical, +and always differently interpreted. +There is enough similarity of view to enable +us, if we have patience and goodwill, +to make enough of unity to achieve order +and peace. But that similarity is not identity. +It does not entitle us to affirm that +one man’s experience can be taken as the +representation of another’s. It does not justify +the inference that I shall find what I +most truly desire in the desire of another. +I am not a part of some great symphony in +which I realize myself only as an incident +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[75]</span>in the <i>motif</i> of the whole. I am unique, +I am separate, I am myself; out of these +qualities I must build my own principles +of action. These are mine only, and cannot +be made for me, at least creatively, by +others. For their authority as principles +comes from the fact that I recognize them +as mine. Into them, as principles, I pour +my personality, and life, for me, derives its +meaning from their unique texture. To accept +the forcible imposition of other principles +upon me, which I do not recognize +as the expression of my experience, is to +make of me who might be free, a slave. I +become an instrument of alien purposes, +devoted to an end which denies my self-hood. +Law, therefore, as coercion is always +an invasion of personality, an abridgement +of the moral stature of those whom it invades. +To be true to its purpose, it must +reduce the imperative element to a minimum +if it is to release creativeness and not +destroy it.</p> + +<p>The individual, therefore, is entitled to +act upon the judgment of his conscience in +public affairs. He is entitled to assume that +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[76]</span>he will not find the rules of the conduct he +ought to pursue objectified in any institution +or set of institutions. I agree that, for +most of us, conscience is a poor guide. It +is perverse, it is foolish, the little knowledge +it has is small alongside the worth of +the social tradition. But perverse, foolish, +ignorant, it is the only guide we have. Perverse, +foolish, ignorant, it is at least ours; +and our freedom comes from acting upon +its demands. We ought, doubtless, to convince +ourselves that the path it indicates +is one we have no alternative but to follow. +We ought to seek the best possible +means for its instruction and enlightenment. +We should remember that civilization +is, at best, a fragile thing, and that to +embark upon a challenge to order is to +threaten what little security it has. It may +even be wise, as T. H. Greene once put it, +to assume that we should approach the +state in fear and trembling, remembering +constantly the high mission with which it +is charged.</p> + +<p>All this may be true, and yet it seems to +me to leave the individual no option but to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[77]</span>follow conscience as the guide to civic action. +To do otherwise is to betray freedom. +Those who accept commands they know to +be wrong, make it easier for wrong commands +to be accepted. Those who are silent +in the presence of injustice are in fact +part-authors of it. It is to be remembered +that even a decision to acquiesce is a decision, +that what shapes the substance of +authority is what it encounters. If it meets +always with obedience, sooner or later it +will assume its own infallibility. When that +moment comes, whatever its declared purpose, +the good it will seek will be its own +good and not that of those involved in its +operations. Liberty means being faithful +to oneself, and it is maintained by the courage +to resist. This, and this only, gives life +to the safeguards of liberty; and this only +is the clue to the preservation of genuine +integrity in the individual life.</p> + +<p>If it is objected that this is a doctrine +of contingent anarchy, that it admits the +right of men to rebellion, my answer is that +the accusation is true. But is its truth important? +Order, surely, is not the supreme +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[78]</span>wrong. Power is not conferred upon men +for the sake of power, but to enable them +to achieve ends which win happiness for +each of us. If what they do is a denial of +the purpose they serve; if, as we meet their +acts, there appears in them an absence of +goodwill, a blindness to experience alien +from their own, an incapacity imaginatively +to meet the wants of others, what alternatives +have we save a challenge to power or +a sacrifice of the end of our life? We do +not condemn Washington because there +came a moment in his career when he was +compelled to recognize that the time for +compromise with England had passed. We +do not, even more notably, condemn those +early Christians who refused to offer incense +to the Gods. We have to act by the +dictates of our conscience knowing, as +Washington knew, as the early Christians +recognized, that the penalties of failure are +terrible. But we can so act, also, knowing +that there is a sense in which no man who +serves his conscience ever fails.</p> + +<p>For by that service he becomes a free +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[79]</span>man, and his freedom is a condition of +other men’s freedom. There is immense +significance in the fact that those who +fought for religious liberty were the unconscious +progenitors of civil liberty also. +When they demanded the right to worship +the God they knew, in their own mind they +were insisting that in one sphere, at least, +of human experience, their own perception +must count as ultimate. They consecrated +freedom to the service of God. But that, +after all, is only one aspect of freedom. Its +consecration to the service of man is, for +some of us, not less vital and pervasive. To +fight for the assurance that a man may do +his duty as he conceives it is not only to +fight for freedom, but for all the ends which +the emancipation of mankind seeks to attain. +I do not know whether liberty is the +highest objective we can serve. I do assert +that no other great purpose is possible of +achievement save in the terms of fellowship +with freedom.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[80]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_II"> + CHAPTER II + <br> + FREEDOM OF THE MIND + </h2> +</div> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>I have sought, so far, to show that, +however important be the political +mechanisms on which liberty depends, they +will not work of themselves. They depend +for their creativeness upon the presence in +any given society of a determination to +make them work. The knowledge that an +invasion of liberty will always meet with +resistance from men determined upon its +repulsion, this, in the last analysis, is the +only true safeguard that we have. It means, +I have admitted, that a certain penumbra +of contingent anarchy always confronts the +state; but I have argued that this is entirely +desirable since the secret of liberty is always, +in the end, the courage to resist.</p> + +<p>The most important aspect of this atmosphere +is undoubtedly freedom of the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[81]</span>mind. The citizen seeks for happiness, and +the state, for him, is an institution which +exists to make his happiness possible. He +judges it, I have urged, by its capacity to +respond to the needs he infers from the +experience he encounters. That experience, +I have insisted, is private to himself. Its +predominant quality is its uniqueness. +Either it is his own, or it is nothing. The +substitution for it of someone else’s experience, +however much wider or wiser than +his, is, where it is based upon constraint, +a denial of freedom. What the citizen, quite +rightly, expects from the state is to have +his experience counted in the making of +policy, and to have it counted as he, and +he only, expresses its import.</p> + +<p>Obviously enough, if his experience is +to count, a man must be able to state it +freely. The right to speak it, to print it, to +seek in concert with others its translation +into the event, is fundamental to liberty. +If he is driven, in this realm, to silence and +inactivity, he becomes a dumb and inarticulate +creature, whose personality is neglected +in the making of policy. Without +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[82]</span>freedom of the mind and of association a +man has no means of self-protection in our +social order. He may speak wrongly or +foolishly; he may associate with others for +purposes that are abhorrent to the majority +of men. Yet a denial of his right to do these +things is a denial of his happiness. Thereby, +he becomes an instrument of other peoples +ends, not himself an end. That is the +essential condition of the perversion of +power. Once we inhibit freedom of speech, +we inhibit criticism of social institutions. +The only opinions of which account is then +taken are the opinions which coincide with +the will of those in authority. Silence is +taken for consent; and the decisions that +are registered as law reflect, not the total +needs of the society, but the powerful +needs which have been able to make themselves +felt at the source of power. Historically, +the road to tyranny has always lain +through a denial of freedom in this realm.</p> + +<p>I desire here to maintain a twofold thesis. +I shall seek to show, first, that liberty +of thought and association—the two things +are inextricably intertwined—is good in itself, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[83]</span>and second, that its denial is always +a means to the preservation of some special +and, usually, sinister interest which cannot +maintain itself in an atmosphere of +freedom. I shall then discuss what restrictions, +if any, must be placed upon this +right, and the conditions it demands for +its maximum realization. I shall, in particular, +maintain that all restrictions upon +freedom of expression upon the ground +that they are seditious or blasphemous are +contrary to the well-being of society.</p> + +<p>The case for the view that freedom of +thought and speech is a good in itself is +fairly easy to make. If it is the business of +those who exercise authority in the state +to satisfy the wants of those over whom +they rule, it is plain that they should be +informed of those wants; and, obviously, +they cannot be truly informed about them +unless the mass of men is free to report +their experience. No state, for instance, +could rightly legislate about the hours of +labour if only business men were free to +offer their opinion upon industrial conditions. +We could not develop an adequate +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[84]</span>law of divorce if only those happily married +were entitled to express an opinion +upon its terms. Law must take account of +the totality of experience and this can only +be known to it as that experience is unfettered +in its opportunity of expression.</p> + +<p>Most people are prepared to agree with +this view when it is made as a general statement; +most people, also, recoil from it +when its implications are made fully +known. For it implies not only the right to +beatify the present social order, but the +right, also, to condemn it with vigour and +completeness. A man may say that England +or America will never be genuinely democratic +unless equality of income is established +there; that equality of income may +never be established except by force; that, +accordingly, the way to a genuine democracy +lies through a bloody revolution. Or +he may argue that eternal truth is the sole +possession of the Roman Catholic Church; +that men can only be persuaded to understand +this by the methods of the Inquisition; +that, therefore, the re-establishment +of the Inquisition is in the highest interest +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[85]</span>of society. To most of us, these views will +seem utterly abhorrent. Yet they represent +the generalizations of an experience that +some one has felt. They point to needs +which are seeking satisfaction, and the society +gains nothing by prohibiting their +expression.</p> + +<p>For no one really ceases to be a revolutionary +Communist or a passionate Roman +Catholic by being forbidden to be either of +these. His conviction that society is rotten +at its base is only the more ardently held, +his search for alternative ways of expressing +his conviction becomes only the more +feverish as a result of suppression. Terror +does not alter opinion. On the one hand it +reinforces it, on the other it makes the substance +of opinion a matter of interest to +many who would, otherwise, have had no +interest whatever in it. When the United +States Customs Department suppressed +<i>Candide</i> on the ground that it was an obscene +book, they merely stimulated the perverse +curiosity of thousands to whom +<i>Candide</i> would have remained less than a +name. When the British Government prosecuted +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[86]</span>the Communists for sedition in 1925 +the daily reports of the trial, the editorial +discussion of its result, made the principles +of Communism known to innumerable +readers who would never, under other circumstances, +have troubled to acquaint +themselves with its nature. No state can +suppress the human impulse of curiosity, +and there is always a special delight, a kind +of psychological scarcity-value, in knowledge +of the forbidden. No technique of suppression +has so far been discovered which +does not have the effect of giving wider +currency to the thing suppressed than can +be attained in any other fashion.</p> + +<p>But this is only the beginning of the +case for freedom of speech. The heresies +we may suppress today are the orthodoxies +of tomorrow. New truth begins always in a +minority of one; it must be someone’s perception +before it becomes a general perception. +The world gains nothing from a +refusal to entertain the possibility that a +new idea may be true. Nor can we pick and +choose among our suppressions with any +prospect of success. It would, indeed, be +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[87]</span>hardly beyond the mark to affirm that a +list of the opinions condemned as wrong +or dangerous would be a list of the commonplaces +of our time. Most people can +see that Nero and Diocletian accomplished +nothing by their persecution of Christianity. +But every argument against their attitude +is an argument also against a similar +attitude in other persons. Upon what +grounds can we infer prospective gain from +persecution of opinion? If the view held +is untrue, experience shows that conviction +of its untruth is invariably a matter of +time; it does not come because authority +announces that it is untrue. If the view is +true in part only, the separation of truth +and falsehood is accomplished most successfully +in a free intellectual competition, +a process of dissociation by rational criticism, +in which those who hold the false +opinion are driven to defend their position +on rational grounds. If, again, the view +held is wholly true, nothing whatever is +gained by preventing its expression. +Whether it relates to property, or marriage, +to religion or the form of the state, by +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[88]</span>being true it demands a corresponding +change in individual outlook and social organization. +For untrue opinions do not permanently +work. They impede discovery and +they diminish happiness. They enable, of +course, those to whom they are profitable, +to benefit by their maintenance, but it is at +the cost of society as a whole.</p> + +<p>There is the further question, moreover, +of the persons to whom the task of selecting +what should be suppressed to be confided. +What qualifications are they to possess for +their task? What tests are they to apply +from which the desirability of suppression +is to be inferred? A mere zeal for the well-being +of society is an utterly inadequate +qualification; for most persons who have +played the part of censor have possessed +this and have yet been utterly unfit for their +task. The self-appointed person, Mr Comstock, +for instance, merely identifies his +private view of moral right with the ultimate +principles of ethics; and only the +intellectually blind would ask that the citizen +be fitted to his vicious bed of Procrustes. +The official censor, a man like the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[89]</span>famous Pobedonostev, normally assumes +that any thorough criticism of the existing +social order is dangerous and destructive; +and, thereby, he transforms what might +be creative demand into secret attack which +is ten times more dangerous in its attack. +If you take almost any of those who are +appointed to work of this kind, you discover +that association with it seems necessarily +to unfit them for their task. For +it turns them into men who see undesirability +in work which the average man +reads without even a suspicion that it is not +the embodiment of experience with which +he ought to be acquainted. Anyone who +looks through the list of prohibited publications +enforced by the Dominion of Canada +will, I think, get a sense that the office +of censorship is the avenue to folly.⁠<a id="FNanchor_27_27" href="#Footnote_27_27" class="fnanchor">[27]</a> No +one with whom I am acquainted seems wise +enough or good enough to control the intellectual +nutrition of the human mind.</p> + +<p>What tests, further, are they to apply? +Broadly speaking, we suppress publications +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[90]</span>on the ground that they are obscene +or dangerous. But no one has ever arrived +at a working definition of obscenity, even +for legal purposes. Take, for instance, two +books suppressed by the English magistrates +for obscenity in 1929. One, Miss +Radclyffe Hall’s <i>Well of Loneliness</i>, +seemed to men like Mr Arnold Bennett and +Mr Bernard Shaw a work which treated of +a theme of high importance to society in a +sober and high-minded way. They saw no +reason to suppose that the treatment of its +difficult subject—sexual perversion—could +be regarded by any normal person as +offensive. The magistrate, Sir Chartres Biron, +took a different view. I, certainly, am +not prepared, on <i>a priori</i> grounds, to say +that a lawyer, however well-trained in the +law, has a better sense of what is likely to +produce moral depravity than Mr Bennett +or Mr Shaw; and a reading of Miss Hall’s +dull and sincere pamphlet only reinforces +that impression. Another book was distributed +privately and secretly—Mr D. H. +Lawrence’s <i>Lady Chatterly’s Lover</i>—in a +limited and expensive special edition. I +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[91]</span>gather that its public sale would have been +definitely prohibited. Yet I observe that +some of the most eminent American critics +have praised it as the finest example of a +novel seeking the truth about the sexual +relations of men and women that an Englishman +has published in the twentieth +century. That may be—I am not competent +to say—excessive praise. My point is +that in a choice, say, between the average +police magistrate and Mr Robert Morss +Lovett, I am not prepared to accept the +former’s opinion of what I may be safely +left to read.</p> + +<p>Let me remind you, moreover, of what +cannot too often be pointed out, that the +rigorous application of the legal tests of +obscenity would prohibit the circulation of +a very considerable part of the great literature +of the world. The Bible, Shakespeare, +Rabelais, Plato, Horace, Catullus, +to take names at random, would all come +under the ban. It is worth while pointing +out that those most concerned with the suppression +of “obscene” books are religious +people. On their tests of obscenity the Bible +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[92]</span>certainly could not hope to escape; yet +they believe, in general, that the Bible is +the inspired word of God, a position which, +I venture to suggest, should at the least +give them pause. I do not know, indeed, +how we are to create a healthy social attitude +to the problems of sex, if all that deals +with it from a new point of view, and with +a frankness that admits the experimental +nature of our contemporary solutions, is to +be dismissed as “obscene”. Questions like +those of birth control, extra-marital love, +companionate marriage, sexual perversion, +cannot really be faced in a scientific fashion +by applying to them the standards of +a nomadic Eastern people which drew up +its rules more than two thousand years +ago. Virtuous people who shrink from +frank discussion in this realm seem to me +responsible for probably more gratuitous +suffering than any other group of human +beings. The thing they call “innocence” I +believe to be quite wanton ignorance, and, +by its abridgment of freedom, it imprisons +human personality in a fashion that is quite +unpardonable.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[93]</span></p> + +<p>The same seems to me to be the case in +the realm that is called blasphemy. I have +no sort of sympathy with that attitude of +mind which finds satisfaction in wanton insult +to the religious convictions of others. +But I am not prepared for its suppression. +For I note that, historically, there are no +limits to the ideas which religious persons +will denounce as blasphemous; and, especially, +that in an age of comparative +religious indifference, the hand of persecution +almost invariably chooses to fall only +on humble men.⁠<a id="FNanchor_28_28" href="#Footnote_28_28" class="fnanchor">[28]</a> It attacks Mr G. W. +Foote, but it leaves Lord Morley free to do +infinitely more damage than any for which +Mr Foote can ever have been responsible. +I cannot, moreover, forget that what is +blasphemy in Tennessee is common sense +in New York, that the works of Wollaston +and Toland and Chubb, which seemed entirely +blasphemous to their generation, +seem commonplace to ourselves. Every religious +body really means by blasphemy an +attack upon its fundamental principles. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[94]</span>Such attacks are, of course, necessarily circulated +to bring them into contempt. We +who read Paine’s <i>Age of Reason</i> with admiration +for its cogency of argument, its +trenchant style, its fearless appetite for +truth, can hardly avoid a sense of dismay +when we remember the days when it was +secretly passed from hand to hand as an +outrageous production, the possession of +which was itself an indication of social indecency.</p> + +<p>And here let me remind you of certain +facts on the other side. We denominate as +blasphemous works calculated to bring the +principles of Christianity into hatred, ridicule, +or contempt. As I have said, I entirely +dislike the type of work which finds pleasure +in offensiveness to Christians. But if +we are to suppress works, and punish their +authors, because they cause grief to certain +of our fellow-citizens, exactly how far are +we to carry the principle? A very large part +of propagandist religious literature is +highly offensive to sincere and serious-minded +persons who are unable, in their +conscience, to subscribe to any particular +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[95]</span>creed. When you remember the descriptions +applied by Mr William Sunday to +those who do not accept Christianity, you +cannot, I think, avoid a sense that there is +a religious blasphemy for which, at least +from the angle of good manners, nothing +whatever can be said. Mr Sunday is only +one of the worse offenders in a whole tribe +of preachers and writers to whom belief, +however sincere, that is alien from their +own, is normally and naturally described +in the language it is a euphemism to call +Billingsgate; and charges of immorality +are brought against unbelievers by them +for which not an atom of proof exists. Are +we to suppress all such publications also? +And if we are to continue this campaign of +prohibition to its appointed and logical +end, shall we have time for any other social +adventure?</p> + +<p>Nor is this all. In the world of education +we are continually presented with the problem +of text-books which are offensive to +a particular denomination. We are asked, +for instance, to prohibit their use in +schools. I sit as an appointed member of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[96]</span>the Education Committee of the London +County Council. I have been presented +there with a requisitory, drawn up by a +Catholic body, against the use of certain +books on the ground that they contain untrue +statements about questions like the +Reformation, in which Catholics are particularly +interested. But I have not observed +in the same Catholic body a desire only to +use those text-books in their own denominational +schools which Protestants are prepared +to accept as a true picture of the +Reformation. Nor is this problem of school +text-books merely religious in character. +Americans of our own generation have seen +passionate controversy over the view of the +War of Independence, of the Constitution, +of the motives and responsibility in the war +of 1914, which are to be presented not +merely to school children, but also to university +students; there is a heresy-hunt in +the fields of politics and economics, a desire +to have only “true” opinions taught +to the immature mind. But “true” opinions, +on examination, usually turn out to +be the opinions which suit the proponents +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[97]</span>of some particular cause. In London we +think that a “true” theory of value is best +obtained from the works of Professor Cannan; +in Cambridge they pin their faith to +Marshall and Pigou; in the Labour Colleges +ultimate wisdom is embodied in the +writings of Marx, and Cannan, Marshall +and Pigou are all dismissed as the pathetic +servants of bourgeois capitalism. Is anything +gained for anyone by insisting that +truth resides on one side only of a particular +Pyrenees? Is it not wisdom to begin +by an admission of its many-sidedness? +And does not that admission involve an +unlimited freedom of expression in the interpretation +of facts? For facts, as William +James said, are not born free and equal. +They have to be interpreted in the light of +our experience; and to suppress someone’s +experience is to suppress someone’s personality, +to impose upon him our view of +what his life implies to the forcible exclusion +of that in which alone he can find +meaning. I see neither wisdom nor virtue +in action of this kind.</p> + +<p>So far, I have restricted my discussion +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[98]</span>to the non-political field, and before I enter +this area, I want, for a moment, both to +summarize the position we have reached +and to admit the one limitation on freedom +of expression I am prepared to concede. +I have denied that prohibitions +arising from blasphemy or obscenity, or +historical or social unfairness, have any +justification. They seem to me unworkable. +They are bad because they prevent +necessary social ventilation. They are bad +because they exclude the general public +from access to facts and ideas which are +often of vital importance. They are bad +because no one is wise or virtuous enough +to stand in judgment upon what another +man is to think or say or write. They are +bad because they are incapable of commonsense +application; there is never any possibility +of a wise discrimination in their +application. They give excessive protection +to old traditions; they make excessively difficult +the entrance of new. They confer +power in a realm where qualifications for +the exercise of power, and tests for its application, +are, almost necessarily, non-existent. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[99]</span>For the decision of every question +of this kind is a matter of opinion in which +there is no prospect of certainty. Suppression +here means not the prohibition of +the untrue or the unjust or the immoral, +but of opinions unpleasing to those who +exercise the censorship. Historically, no +evidence exists to suggest that it has ever +been exercised for other ends.</p> + +<p>I do not see any rational alternative to +this view. But here I should emphasize my +own belief that, broadly speaking, such +freedom of expression as I have discussed +means freedom to express one’s ideas on +general subjects, on themes of public importance, +rather than on the character of +particular persons. I have not, I think, a +right to suggest that Jones beats his wife, +or that Brown continually cheats his employer, +unless I can prove, first that the +suggestions are true, and, second, that they +have a definite public import. I have not +a right to create scandal because I find +pleasure or profit in speaking ill of my +neighbour. But if Brown, for instance, is a +candidate for public office, my view that he +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[100]</span>cheats his employer is directly relevant to +the question of his fitness to be elected; +and if I can prove that my view is true, +it is in the public interest that I should +make it known. I cannot, that is to say, regard +my freedom of expression as unlimited. +I ought not to be permitted to inflict +unnecessary pain on any person unless +there is relevant social welfare in that infliction.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, I would make one +remark here that seems to me of increasing +importance in a society like our own. +The public interest in the habits of individuals +is real, and we must be careful to +give it its proper protection. It is, I think, +reasonable to doubt whether the Anglo-American +law of libel, in its present state, +does not push too far the right of the individual +citizen to be protected from comment. +Outrageous damages, which bear no +measurable relation to anything, are often +claimed and not seldom awarded. Where +a political flavour enters into a case, it is +difficult, and sometimes impossible, to persuade +a jury to consider the issue on its +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[101]</span>merits. I have myself sat on a jury in a +political libel case of which I can only say +that I was almost persuaded to doubt the +validity of the jury-system altogether by +the habits there displayed. I am tempted +to suggest that, criminal libel apart, it +would be worth while considering the abolition +of damages in all political or quasi-political +cases, and the concentration, as an +alternative, upon proper publicity for the +form of apology where the libel is held to +be proved. We have, for instance, got into +the bad habit in England of thinking that +the social position of the plaintiff is a measure +of the damages he should receive; and +it is well known that there are places where, +for instance, a socialist could hardly hope +even for a verdict from any average jury. +The case for careful inquiry, at any rate, +seems to me to be made out. As the law at +present stands and works, I do not think +I could even say of a candidate for the +House of Commons that he was not likely +to be more than a permanent back-bencher +without having to pay heavily for my +opinion.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[102]</span></p> + + +<h3 id="II_1"> + II +</h3> + +<p>But I turn from these relatively simple +matters to the political aspect of freedom +of expression which is, of course, the pith +of the whole problem. How far is a man +entitled to go in an attack upon the social +order? What opinions, if any, are to be +prohibited on the ground that they incite +to subversive conduct? Is there a distinction +between the printed word and the +spoken word? Is there a distinction between +speech in one place, and speech in +another? Is there a difference between normal +times and a time of crisis like, let us +say, a war or a general strike? At what +point, if any, do words become acts of +which authority must take account to fulfil +its primary duty of maintaining the peace?</p> + +<p>It will, I think, be universally agreed +that all criticism of social institutions is a +matter of degree. Let us take the problem +first as we meet it in normal times and let +us view it from the angle of the English +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[103]</span>law of sedition.⁠<a id="FNanchor_29_29" href="#Footnote_29_29" class="fnanchor">[29]</a> Here it may be said at once +that were that law enforced in its literal +terms, political controversy in England +would be impossible. For the declared purpose +of the law is to prevent the established +institutions of the state from being brought +into hatred or contempt, and every leader +of the opposition is seeking to do precisely +that thing when he makes a political +speech. Anyone who reads, for instance, the +utterances of Lord Carson at the time of +the Home Rule fight in 1914, or of Mr +Ramsay MacDonald in the General Election +of 1929, cannot avoid the conclusion +that, taken literally, they were seditious. +Yet all of us agree that it is not the purpose +of the law to prevent such speeches being +made. When, therefore, if ever, is that law +to be brought into operation?</p> + +<p>We must, I think, begin by a distinction +between the written and the spoken word. +If an English Communist leader writes a +book or pamphlet, whatever its substance, +and to whomever it is addressed, I do not +think the law ought to be used against him. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[104]</span>For it is the history of these matters that +if governments once begin to prohibit men +from seeking to prove in writing that violent +revolution is desirable, they will, +sooner or later, prohibit them from saying +that the social order they represent is not +divine. In Italy, at the moment, for example, +papers are actually suppressed not for +anything positive that they say, but because +there is absent from their pages frequent +and emphatic eulogy of the present +régime; there have even been calls for suppression +because particular papers, while +saying no word against Mussolini, have +been too insistently eulogistic of the +Papacy. I yield to no one in my dissent +from, say, Lenin’s analysis of the nature +of the modern state. But I think it urgent +that his criticism should be available to +society. For it represents the impress made +upon him by experience of political life, +and a government which remains unaware +of that criticism has lost its chance of seeking +to satisfy the critic. If it begins by +assuming that the exposition of Revolutionary +Communism is undesirable, it will +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[105]</span>end, as the record shows, that language +classes to teach English to Russians are a +form of Communist propaganda. There is +never any such certitude in matters of social +constitution as to justify us in saying that +any exposition of principles must be suppressed. +No authority has ever a capacity +for wise discrimination in these matters; +and, even if it had, I do not see why it is +justified in the exercise of discrimination.</p> + +<p>For suppression, in the first place, never +convinces. What it does is to drive a small +body of men to desperation and to reduce +the masses to complete apathy in political +matters. Most men who are prohibited from +thinking as their experience teaches them +soon cease to think at all. Men who cease +to think cease also in any genuine sense to +be citizens. They become the mere inert recipients +of orders which they obey without +scrutiny of any kind. And their inertia surrounds +the acts of authority with that false +glamour of confidence which mistakes silence +for consent. The government which is +not criticized at its base never truly knows +the sentiments to which its activity gives +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[106]</span>rise among its subjects. It ultimately must +fail to satisfy them because it does not know +what desires it has to satisfy. Political +thought, after all, however unwise or mistaken, +is never born in a vacuum. Lenin’s +view of capitalist society is just as relevant +to its habits as the view of the Duke of +Northumberland or of Judge Gary; each +is born of contact with it, and each, as it is +expressed, has lessons to teach from which, +as these are scrutinized, a wise policy can +be born.</p> + +<p>Here, I think, it is relevant to say a word +upon one special aspect of freedom of expression +for printed matter. I have argued +that no limit of any kind is to be placed +upon it, at any rate in normal times. The +book, the pamphlet, the newspaper, ought +to circulate with unimpeded freedom in +whatever direction they can move. Many +people who sympathize with this view will, +however, except from this freedom printed +material which is addressed to the armed +forces of the state; and most governments, +of course, have special legislation, with +specially severe penalties, against any attempt +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[107]</span>at interference with their loyalty. I +cannot myself see that this exception is +justified. The armed forces of the state consist +of citizens. The government has quite +exceptional opportunities to retain their allegiance. +If a printed document is able to +sow disaffection amongst them, there must +be something very wrong with the government. +And, in fact, whenever agitation has +produced military or naval disloyalty that +has been the outcome not of affection for +the principles upon which the agitators lay +emphasis, but of grievances which have +made either soldiers or sailors responsive +to a plea for their disloyalty. That was the +case with the Spithead mutinies of 1797; +with the French troops in 1789; with the +Russian troops in 1917. If the army or +the navy is prepared to turn upon the government, +the likelihood is great that the +government is unfit to retain power. For +anyone who can disturb the allegiance of +a mind as trained to obedience as that of +the soldier or the sailor has, I believe, an +<i>a priori</i> case for insisting that his particular +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[108]</span>philosophy corresponds to an urgent +human need.</p> + +<p>It is said that ideas are explosive and +dangerous. To allow them unfettered freedom +is, in fact, to invite disorder. But, to +this position, there are at least two final +answers. It is impossible to draw a line +round dangerous ideas, and any attempt at +their definition involves monstrous folly. +If views, moreover, which imply disorder +are able to disturb the foundations of the +state, there is something supremely wrong +with the governance of that state. For disorder +is not a habit of mankind. We cling +so eagerly to our accustomed ways that, as +even Burke insisted, popular violence is +always the outcome of a deep popular sense +of wrong. The common man can only be +persuaded to outbreak, granted his general +habits, when the government of the taste +has lost its hold upon his affections; and +that loss is always the reflection of a profound +moral cause. We may, indeed, go +further and argue that the best index to the +quality of a state is the degree in which it +is able to permit free criticism of itself. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[109]</span>For that implies an alertness to public opinion, +a desire to remedy grievance, which +enables the state to gain ground in the +allegiance of its citizens. Almost always +freedom of speech results in a mitigation +which renders disorder unnecessary; almost +always, also, prohibition of that freedom +merely makes the agitation more +dangerous because it drives it underground. +Rousseau was infinitely more dangerous as +a persecuted wanderer, because infinitely +more interesting and, therefore, infinitely +more persuasive, than he would have been +when unfettered in Paris. Lenin did far +more harm to Russia as an exile in Switzerland +than he could ever have accomplished +as an opposition leader in the Duma. The +right freely to publish the written word is, +in fact, the supreme Katharsis of discontent. +Governments that are wise can always +learn more from the criticism of their +opponents than they can hope to discover +in the eulogies of their friends. When they +stifle that criticism, they prepare the way +for their own destruction.</p> + +<p>There is, I think, an undeniable difference +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[110]</span>between freedom of written and freedom +of spoken, expression. In the one case, +a man attempts conviction by individual +persuasion; he seeks, by argument which +he believes to be rational, to move the mind +of those who read what he has written. To +speak at a meeting raises different problems. +No one with experience of a great +crowd under the sway of a skilled orator +can doubt his power deliberately to create +disorder if he so desires. A speaker at Trafalgar +Square, for instance, who urged a +vast meeting of angry unemployed to march +on Downing Street, could do so with a fair +assurance that they would obey his behest. +I do not think a government can be left +to the not always tender mercies of an orator +with a grievance to exploit. The state, +clearly, has the right to protection against +the kind of public utterance which is bound +to result in disorder.</p> + +<p>But no government is entitled itself to +assume that disorder is imminent: the +proof must be offered to an independent +authority. And the proof so offered must +be evidence that the utterance to which it +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[111]</span>takes exception was, at the time and in the +circumstances in which it was made, definitely +calculated to result in a breach of +the peace. Its prohibitions must not be +preventive prohibitions. It must not prohibit +a meeting before it is held on the +ground that the speaker is likely to preach +sedition there. It must not seek conviction +for sedition where the utterance might, +under other circumstances, have had the +tendency to result in a breach of the peace. +To use my earlier illustration, I think a +government would be justified in prosecution +of the Trafalgar Square orator; but +I do not think it would be entitled to prosecute +the same speaker if he made the same +speech on Calton Hill in Edinburgh. For +we know that when men in Edinburgh are +incited to march on London, they have a +habit of turning back at Derby. I conclude, +therefore, that the test adopted by Mr Justice +Holmes, in his deservedly famous dissent +in <i>Abrams</i> v. U.S.,⁠<a id="FNanchor_30_30" href="#Footnote_30_30" class="fnanchor">[30]</a> is the maximum +prohibition a government can be permitted. +If it is in fact demonstrable that the speech +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[112]</span>made had a direct tendency to incite immediate +disorder, the punishment of the +accused is justified. I think such cases +should always be tried before a jury. Experience +suggests that a random sample of +popular opinion is more likely to do justice +in this type of case than is a judge. I have +myself been present at such trials before +a magistrate where the whole case for the +prosecution quite obviously broke down +and where, nevertheless, a conviction was +secured. I do not for a moment suggest +that we can be confident that a jury will +act wisely; but my sense of our experience +is that there is less chance of its acting +unwisely than persons who occupy an official +position of any kind. With the best +will in the world, their tendency is to be +unduly responsive to executive opinion.</p> + +<p>You will see that my anxiety is to maximize +the difficulties of any government +which desires to initiate prosecutions in this +realm. My reason for this view is the quite +simple one that I do not trust the executive +power to act wisely in the presence of any +threat, nor assumed threat, to public order. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[113]</span>Anyone who studies the treason trials of +1794, or, even more striking, the cases under +the Espionage Act in America during +1917–20, will be convinced of the unwisdom +of allowing the executive an undue +latitude. Every state contains innumerable +and stupid men who see in unconventional +thought the imminent destruction of social +peace. They become Ministers; and they +are quite capable of thinking that a society +of Tolstoyan anarchists is about to attempt +a new gunpowder plot. If you think of men +like Lord Eldon, like Sir William Joynson-Hicks, +like Attorney-General Palmer, you +will realize how natural it is for them to +believe that the proper place for Thoreau +or Tolstoy, for William Morris or Mr Bernard +Shaw, is a prison. I am unable to take +that view; and I am therefore anxious that +they should not be able to make it prevail +without finding that there are barriers in +their path.</p> + + +<h3 id="III_1"> + III +</h3> + +<p>Views such as I have put forward are +often regarded with sympathy when their +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[114]</span>validity is limited to normal times. In a +crisis, it is argued, different considerations +prevail. When the safety of a state is +threatened it is bound to take, and is justified +in taking, all action to end the crisis. +To suggest that it should be then bound +by principles which weaken its effective +striking power, is, it is said, to ask it to +fight with one hand tied behind its back. +The first objective of any society must be +organized security; it is only when this has +been obtained, that freedom of speech is +within the pale of discussion.</p> + +<p>I am unable to share this view. We have +really to examine two quite different positions. +There is, first, the question of the +principles to be applied in a period of internal +violence; there is, next, the quite +special question of limitation upon utterance +in a period of war. I agree at once that +it is entirely academic to demand freedom +of speech in a time of civil war, for the +simple reason that no one will pay the +slightest attention to the demand; violence +and freedom are, <i>a priori</i>, contradictory +terms. But I would point out two things. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[115]</span>In general, revolutions fail because those +who make them deny freedom to their opponents. +Losing criticism, they do not know +the limits within which they can safely +operate; they lose their power because they +are not told when they are abusing it. I can +think of no revolutionary period in history +when a government has gained by stifling +the opinion of men who did not see eye to +eye with it; and I suggest that the revolutionary +insistence that persuasion is futile +finds little creative evidence in its support.</p> + +<p>But when once the question has been +settled of who is to possess power other +questions of urgent delicacy arise in which, +as I think, the principles I have laid down +possess an irresistible force. There is the +problem of how the rebel and the disaffected +are to be treated; of whether the +resumption of order is to be followed by +free discussion; of the power to be exercised +by the military authority over ordinary +citizens not engaged in armed hostility +to the régime. Here I can only express the +view that the resumption of order ought +always to be followed forthwith by the normal +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[116]</span>principles of judicial control; and that +the military authorities ought not, save +where it is quite impossible for the civil +courts to exercise their jurisdiction, to have +any powers over ordinary citizens.</p> + +<p>These are rigorous views; and, perhaps, +I may devote a little time to their exposition. +I know of no case where the state has +exercised extraordinary power outside the +normal process of law, in which that authority +has not been grossly abused. It was +abused in the Civil War even under a mind +so humane and generous as that of Lincoln; +it was emphatically and dangerously +abused in the Amritsar rebellion of 1919. +Let me illustrate, from this latter example, +some of the things that were done. Two +men were arrested in Amritsar prior to the +declaration of martial law and deported to an +extreme and undisturbed part of the province; +on the declaration of martial law, +they were brought back to Lahore, which +was in the martial law area, and tried and +sentenced by a martial law tribunal. A +number of pleaders were arrested in Gudaspur, +where there was no disturbance, taken +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[117]</span>under revolting conditions to Lahore, and +confined there in the common jail for a +period lasting up to a month. They were +then released, without any charges being +preferred against them; on the evidence, +indeed, it is difficult to know with what +offence they could have been charged. In +the trial, again, of one Harkishan Lal, and +others, for treason and waging war against +the King-Emperor, the accused were not +allowed to have a lawyer of their own choosing; +a full record of the case was not taken, +and the private notes of counsel for the +defence had to be surrendered by him to +the Court at the end of each day. Under +such conditions it is difficult to see how +any adequate defence was possible. A punitive +detachment, again, under a Colonel +Jacob, tried by drumhead court-martial and +flogged, a man who refused, it appears with +some truculence, to say who had destroyed +some telegraph wires; later it appeared +that the man, as he had asserted, had in +fact no knowledge of who had destroyed +them. In Lahore—to take a final instance—the +military officer in command prohibited +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">[118]</span>more than a few persons to congregate +in the streets; a few persons did so +congregate and they were flogged. On investigation, +after the flogging, it was found +that the group was a wedding-party whose +purpose was not more dangerous than that +of any other persons engaged in a similar +function.⁠<a id="FNanchor_31_31" href="#Footnote_31_31" class="fnanchor">[31]</a></p> + +<p>I do not, of course, suggest that there is +anything especially cruel or remarkable in +these instances. Whether you study repression +in Ireland or Russia, Bavaria or Hungary +or India, its history is always the same. +The fact always emerges that once the +operation of justice is transferred from the +ordinary courts to some branch of the executive, +abuses always occur. The proper +protection of the individual is deliberately +neglected in the belief that a reign of terror +will minimize disaffection. There is no +evidence that it does. If it could, there +would have been no Russian Revolution; +and there would be no movement for Indian +self-government today. The error inherent +in any invasion of individuality, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[119]</span>such as a system of special courts implies, +is that it blinds the eyes of government to +the facts not only by suppressing illegitimate +expression of opinion, but by persuading +it that most opinion which finds +expression is illegitimate if it is not in the +nature of eulogy. Even Lincoln supported +his generals in completely indefensible attacks +on civilian rights. Executive justice, +in fact, is simply an euphemism for the +denial of justice; and the restoration of +order at this cost involves dangers of which +the price is costly indeed.</p> + +<p>The problem of war is, in a sense, a special +case of the problem of disorder; but, +in fact, it raises quite different considerations. +Let me first of all make the point that +if you are a citizen in a besieged town, you +cannot expect a normal freedom of speech; +to be within the area of actual military +operations means that you must not hope +to be regarded as an individual. You become, +from the nature of things, a unit of +attack or defence whose personality is immaterial +and insignificant. The position +here is extraordinary; and principles have +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[120]</span>little or no relation to the problems that +arise. The case, as elsewhere, merely affords +proof that liberty and violence are +antithetic terms.</p> + +<p>But let us rather take the position of a +citizen whose country is involved in war +as, say, England in 1914, or America in +1917. What are his rights and duties then? +I would begin by making the point that +the fact of belligerency does not suspend +his citizenship; he owes as much, perhaps +more than ever, the contribution his instructed +judgment can make, to the public +good. The scale of operations cannot, I +think, make any difference to that duty. +It is as real, and as compelling, when they +are big, as in the war of 1914, as when, +as in the Boer War, or the Spanish-American +War, they are relatively small. If I +think the war a just one, it is my duty to +support it, and if I think it unjust there is +no alternative open to me except opposition +to it. I believe, for instance, that the +opposition of Mr Ramsay MacDonald and +Mr Snowden to the war of 1914 was a fulfilment, +on their part, of the highest civil +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[121]</span>obligation. No citizen can assume that his +duty in wartime is so to abdicate the exercise +of his judgment that the executive +has a blank cheque to act as it pleases. No +government, therefore, is entitled to penalize +opinion at a time when it is more than +ever urgent to perform the task of citizenship. +If a man sincerely thinks, like James +Russell Lowell, that war is merely an alias +for murder, it is his duty to say so even +if his pronouncement is inconvenient to +the government of the day.</p> + +<p>I cannot, indeed, believe that there is +any case on the other side worthy of serious +consideration. In the war of 1914, it was +said that hostile opinion must be controlled +because it hinders the successful prosecution +of the war. But behind the facade of +prejudice contained in the imputation of a +term like hostility, there are several issues +each one of which requires analysis. For +what does “hostile opinion” mean? Does +it imply hostility to the inception of a war, +to the methods of its prosecution, to the end +at which it aims, to the terms on which +its conclusion is proposed? In the war of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">[122]</span>1914, the critics were divided into camps +on each of these views. There were men, +like Mr MacDonald, who thought the war +unjustified in its inception and bad in its +conclusion. There were others who criticized +the manner, both diplomatic and technical, +of its prosecution. Was it, for +instance, hostility to the prosecution of the +late war to criticize Lord Jellicoe’s conduct +at the Battle of Jutland, or Sir Ian Hamilton’s +handling of the operations at the Dardanelles? +Was it, again, hostility on the +part of <i>The Times</i> to attack the Asquith +Government on the ground, rightly or +wrongly, that it showed a lack of energy +in building up a munitions supply? If a +statesman not in office, Mr Roosevelt, for +example, thinks the diplomatic policy of +the executive likely to be attended by fatal +results, must he confine himself to private +representations, lest public utterance +hinder the national unity? If an Englishman +like Lord Lansdowne believed, as +President Wilson believed in 1916, that +peace by negotiation is preferable to peace +by victory in the field, because of the human +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[123]</span>cost that victory entails, has he no +obligation to his fellow-citizens who are +paying that cost with their lives?</p> + +<p>It is evident from our experience that +to limit the expression of opinion in wartime +to opinion which does not hinder its +prosecution is, in fact, to give the executive +an entirely free hand, whatever its policy, +and to assume that, while the armies are +in the field, an absolute moral moratorium +is imperative. That is, surely, a quite impossible +position. No one who has watched +at all carefully the process of governance +in time of war can doubt that criticism was +never more necessary. Its limitation is, in +fact, an assurance that the unity of outlook +is a guarantee that mistakes will be +made and wrong done. For once the right +to criticize is withdrawn, the executive commits +all the natural follies of dictatorship. +It assumes a semi-divine character for its +acts. It deprives the people of information +essential to a proper judgment of its policy. +It misrepresents the situation it confronts +by that art of propaganda which, as Mr +Cornford has happily said, enables it to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[124]</span>deceive its friends without deceiving its +enemies. A people in wartime is always +blind to the facts of its position and anxious +to believe only agreeable news; the government +takes care to provide it only with +news that is pleasant. If no such news is at +hand it will be manufactured. Petty successes +will be magnified into resounding +victories; defeats will be minimized, +wherever possible. The agony of the troops +will be obscured by the clouds of censorship. +A wartime government is always obtuse +to suggestion, angry when inquiry is +suggested, careless of truth. It can, in fact, +only be moralized to the degree to which +it is subject to critical examination in every +aspect of its policy. And to penalize, therefore, +the critic is not only to poison the +moral foundations of the state, but to make +it extremely difficult, when peace comes, +for both government and the mass of citizens +to resume the habits of normal +decency.</p> + +<p>Freedom of speech, therefore, in wartime +seems to me broadly to involve the +same rights as freedom of speech in peace. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[125]</span>It involves them, indeed, more fully because +a period of national trial is one when, +above all, it is the duty of citizens to hear +their witness. I do not, of course, mean that +a citizen in wartime should be free to communicate +secret military plans to the enemy; +I do mean that if a man feels, like +Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, that British +policy in South Africa is “methods of +barbarism,” it is his right, as well as his +duty, to say so. Obviously critical activity +of this kind will be unpopular, and a government +which helps in the making of its +unpopularity will find the task of suppression +easy. But it will pay a heavy price for +suppression. The winged words of criticism +scatter, only too often, the seeds of peace. +Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s attack +on the Balfour Government persuaded +General Botha that trust in Great Britain +might not be misplaced; President Wilson’s +speeches, especially his Fourteen Points, +were, impliedly, a criticism of Allied policy, +and that which, also, awakened liberal +opinion in Germany to a sense of its responsibilities. +Wartime unity of outlook, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[126]</span>in a word, is never worth the cost of prohibitions. +If the policy of a state which decides +upon war does not command the general +assent of citizens, it has no right to +make war. If the number of those hostile +is considerable, the policy is, at the least, +a dubious one. If the number is small, there +is no need to attempt suppression in the +interest of success. The only way, in fact, +to attain the right is by free discussion; +and a period of crisis, when the perception +of right is difficult, only makes the emphasis +upon freedom more fundamental.</p> + +<p>Let me illustrate my view with reference +to one or two of the decisive factors in the +Peace of Versailles. No one now believes +the wartime lie that Germany was solely +responsible for the war; her responsibility +may be greater than that of some others, +but it is agreed that the burden of Russia +is at least as heavy and that war, in any +case, was rooted in the nature of the European +system. But, in the interest of national +unity, it was regarded as essential to +represent Germany as the sole conspirator +against European peace. She was painted +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[127]</span>as a malefactor whose sins were incapable +of exaggeration. Her virtues were denied, +her achievements belittled, until what Mr +Lippmann terms a “stereotype” of her was +built up for public use which made her +appear to the average man a criminal who +could not be too severely punished. The +statesmen who constructed this stereotype +knew that it was untrue; but they hoped, +doubtless, to escape its consequences, +when the victory had been won. They +found that they could not do so. They had +so successfully repressed all effort at reasonable +delineation, that the atmosphere +of hate was unconquerable. They had no +alternative to a Carthaginian peace because +that seemed, to the masses they had deceived, +the only possible course for justice +to take. They knew, as the famous memorandum, +for instance, of Mr. Lloyd George +makes manifest,⁠<a id="FNanchor_32_32" href="#Footnote_32_32" class="fnanchor">[32]</a> that a Carthaginian peace +was disastrous for Europe; but it was too +late to destroy the legend they had created. +Like those whom Dante describes in the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[128]</span>Inferno, they were punished by the realization +of their announced desires.</p> + +<p>The world, in this context, has paid the +price for the suppression of truth; and another +phase of the suppression should also +be remembered. It is usually agreed that +some of the worst elements in the Peace of +Versailles were the result of the Secret +Treaties by which the Allies, exclusive of +America, bound themselves to each other +before the entrance of America into the +war. Nowhere among the associated powers +was the desire for a just peace more +widespread than in America; nowhere, +also, was the discussion of war-aims more +rigorously curtailed as a hindrance to the +full prosecution of the war. Had discussion +of the peace been full and effective +in those critical years, the liberal instincts +of President Wilson might, when reinforced +by the weight of informed opinion, +have compelled at least a considerable +mitigation of the secret treaties. They had +been published in the American Press after +their issue by the Bolsheviks in 1917; full +discussion would have revealed their inadequacies, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[129]</span>and enabled the President to +counteract what there was of evil in their +substance. But the destruction of free opinion +acted as a smoke-screen to conceal +them, and Mr Wilson did not seriously give +his mind to them until he reached Paris. +It was then too late to undo their consequences. +Here, in fact, as elsewhere, uncontrolled +power acted like a miasma to +blot out the only atmosphere in which +truth could be made manifest. No government +was compelled to do its duty, because +the means were wanting to inform it of +what its duty was. The powers had forgotten, +or had chosen to forget, that they could +not hope for a just peace save by freeing +the minds of men and women who cared +for justice.</p> + + +<h3 id="IV_1"> + IV +</h3> + +<p>So far, I have considered freedom in the +political sphere as though it concerned only +a single individual placed over against society +and the state. I have sought to discuss +what his freedom means in the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[130]</span>complex relationships in which he is involved. +But, obviously, this is an undue +simplification of the problem. The individual, +in fact, does not stand alone; he +joins hands with others of like mind to +persuade, sometimes to compel, society to +the adoption of the view they share. It is +unnecessary for me to emphasize the vital +part played by associations in the modern +community.⁠<a id="FNanchor_33_33" href="#Footnote_33_33" class="fnanchor">[33]</a> Granted that they have their +dangers, they are not only a vital expression +of human personality, but an expression +as natural as the state itself. That a +man must be free to combine with his fellows +for joint-action in some realm in +which they have a kindred interest is, I +take it, of the essence of liberty. The point +it is important to examine is the degree of +control, if any, that the state is entitled +to exercise over voluntary associations.</p> + +<p>Let me say at once that I know no question +more difficult in the whole range of +political science. I am quite certain that, +from the angle of individual freedom, the +less interference the state attempts, the better +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[131]</span>for everyone concerned; but, equally, I +am clear that to some interference the state +is fully entitled. I should deny, for instance, +the right of any voluntary association to +inflict physical punishment or imprisonment +upon its members; and I should argue +that any state was justified in immediate +and drastic interference to this end. But +the real problems we encounter are not so +simple as this. Joseph Smith announces his +reception of a message from Heaven ordaining +the duty of men to practise polygamy +in a community where the law only +recognizes monogamy; what rights of interference +has the state when a body of +men and women join him and begin to give +effect to his teaching? What are the rights +of the state when a congress of trade unionists +declares a general strike? Are those +rights different when the purpose of the +strike is industrial from what they are if +it is political? How are we to distinguish +between the two? What are the rights of +combination among men employed in industries +the nature of which makes the +service they perform fundamental to the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[132]</span>community? What should be the attitude +of the state to a society of men engaged +in propaganda for a revolution by the use +of physical force? Is there a difference between +such a society when it merely +preaches the desirability of such a revolution +and when it acts to that end? Does +action, in the latter case, mean embarkation +upon rebellion, for example, the purchase +of machine-guns, or does it extend, +say, to the stirring-up of industrial strife in +the hope that a resort to political rebellion +may be its outcome?</p> + +<p>You will see that these are not merely +academic questions; every one of them has +been in the forefront of political discussion +this last half-century, and all save the +first have been vital themes of decision in +the years since the war. Take first the case +of an association which, like the Mormon +Church, desires to practise modes of conduct +different from those pursued by the +society as a whole. We have to assume that +the members of the association have joined +it voluntarily, and continue voluntarily in +its membership. We have to assume, further, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[133]</span>that they do not desire to force their +particular way of life upon others; for +some single realm of conduct, like the +realm of marriage, they desire that they +shall be left free from interference by the +organized power of society. I cannot see +that we are entitled to interfere with them. +We may think them unwise, foolish, muddle-headed, +immoral. We know perfectly +well that we cannot hope, by the external +constraint of law, to abolish all conduct +that comes within those terms. I happen +to think that it is a gross superstition to +leave money to the Roman Catholic Church +that masses may be said for the testator’s +soul; but I should think it an unwarrantable +interference with the relations between +that Church and its members if such bequests +were forbidden. I see no evidence +to suggest that the practice of polygamy is +worse, in its nature, than a hundred other +practices which organized society either directly +permits, or wisely leaves alone, because +it knows that rigorous control would +be utterly futile. The only way to deal with +the ideals of the Mormon Church is to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[134]</span>prove their undesirability to their members. +On the evidence of history, persecution will +not be acceptable as proof; and it is not +improbable that the only legal effect of +prohibition has been to make furtive and +dishonest what was, at first, open and +avowed. <i>Mutatis mutandis</i>, this seems to +me the case with all similar problems of +association. If a society of women, enthusiastic +for the independence of their sex, +formed themselves into an association to +propagate and practise the (to them) ideal +of children outside the tie of marriage, I +should not think the state entitled to interfere +with its work. So, too, I should argue, +with a principle like birth-control. +The state is not entitled to prohibit diffusion +of such knowledge, or the practice +of it. When it does, it makes the family +nothing more than an instrument of fecundity, +and destroys the whole character of +that right to privacy which is the foundation +of harmonious sexual relationship.</p> + +<p>I argue, therefore, that voluntary bodies +are entitled outside the realm where their +ideas and conduct are intended directly to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[135]</span>alter the law, or to arrest the continuity of +general social habits, to believe what they +please and to practise what they please. +This would not permit a body of burglars +to take over from Proudhon the principle +that property is theft and assume their +right to restore it to themselves; but it +would justify, to take the case of principles +I personally abhor, a society of Mormons +practising polygamy in a society like that +of the United States. Let me turn from this +to the political field. I take first the question +of the right of the state to control freedom +of association in the industrial sphere. +Practically speaking, the question reduces +itself to one of whether the state is justified +in limiting the power of a trade union, or +of a combination of trade unions to call out +its members on strike. I want to put on one +side the technical juristic questions involved +and to discover, if I can, the justice +of the general principles which underlie +the problem.</p> + +<p>These are, I think, broadly four in number. +It is argued that the state has a right +to prohibit a general strike on the ground +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[136]</span>that this is an attempt to coerce the government +either directly, by making it introduce +legislation which it would not +otherwise do, or indirectly, by inflicting +such hardship on the community that public +opinion forces the government to act. +It is said, secondly, that the state is entitled +to prohibit those whom it directly employs, +for example postmen, from either going on +strike, or affiliating themselves with any +organization the nature of which may compromise +the neutrality of the government. +It is said, thirdly, that certain industries, +railways, for example, or electricity supply, +are so vital to the community that +continuity of service in them is the law of +their being, and that, therefore, the right to +strike can be legitimately denied to those +engaged in them. It is argued, fourthly, +that a limitation upon the purposes of trade +unions, so that they are confined within +their proper industrial sphere, is also justified.</p> + +<p>I want to analyse each of these principles +separately, but certain preliminary observations +are important. In any industrial +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">[137]</span>society, as Mr Justice Holmes has insisted,⁠<a id="FNanchor_34_34" href="#Footnote_34_34" class="fnanchor">[34]</a> +liberty of contract always begins where +equality of bargaining power begins. +Granted, therefore, the normal conditions +of modern enterprise, only the existence of +strong trade unions will ensure to the +average worker just terms in his contract of +service. If he stands alone, he has neither +the knowledge nor the power to secure for +himself proper protection. Nor is this all. +Strong trade unionism always means that +public opinion can be made effective in an +industrial dispute. One has only to compare +the situation in the British textile industries, +where the power of the unions +necessarily involves a search by the state, +if there is a dispute, for the terms of a just +settlement, with that in America where, +from the weakness of the unions, the state +seems hardly to know when a dispute has +occurred, where, also, the police-power is +almost invariably exerted on the side of the +employer, to realize the meaning of strong +trade unionism. It is, in fact, the condition +of industrial justice. No limitation upon +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[138]</span>freedom to associate is, I urge, permissible +unless it can be demonstrated that clear +and decisive advantage to the community, +including, be it remembered, trade unionists +themselves, is likely to result.</p> + +<p>In this background, let us examine the +first of the four principles I have enumerated. +No coercion of the government, direct +or indirect, is legitimate. If men want to +obtain from government a solution other +than government is willing to attempt, the +way to that end is not by the use of industrial +power, but through the ballot-box at +a general election. Or, from the angle of indirect +coercion, the first interest of the state +is in the general well-being of the community; +a general strike necessarily aims +at that well-being and may therefore be +prohibited. The general strike, even a large +sympathetic strike, is in fact a revolutionary +weapon. As such, it is a threat to the +Constitution and illegal as well as unjustifiable.</p> + +<p>I do not think the problem is so straightforward +as the delusive simplicity of this +argument would seem to make it. If it is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[139]</span>said that the Trades Union Congress of +Great Britain would not be justified in calling +a general strike to compel the government +to make Great Britain a federation, I +should agree at once. But I point out that +no one supposes it would take such action +and that therefore a prohibition of it is unnecessary. +But I should not agree that a +general strike is unjustified to secure the +eight-hour day, or to protect the payment +of unemployment relief, or to continue the +Trade Board system in sweated industries. +Whether a general strike for these, or +similar ends, would be wise is another +matter. That it cannot in any circumstances +be justified I am not prepared to +say until I know the circumstances of +some given case. I am not willing, for instance, +to condemn the General Strike of +1926; on a careful analysis of its history, +I believe that the blame for its inception +lies wholly at the door of the Baldwin +Government. No one acquainted with the +character of the trade union movement but +knows that a weapon so tremendous as +the general strike will only be called into +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[140]</span>play on the supreme occasion. To lay it +down as law that, whatever the occasion, +the weapon shall not be used, seems to me +an unjustifiable interference with freedom.</p> + +<p>I am not greatly moved by the argument +that it involves coercion of the government. +There are occasions when that coercion is +necessary, and even essential. I believe that +was the case in Great Britain in 1926. The +trade unions would never have called the +strike had they seen in the policy of the +government even the fragment of a genuine +search for justice. But the fact was that Mr +Baldwin and his colleagues simply acted as +the mouthpiece of the coalowners. To illegalize +a general strike in that background +is to say that the trade unions should have +acquiesced in the defeat of the miners without +an attempt to prove their solidarity with +them. It would be to announce to government +that the ultimate weapon of Labour is +one the use of which it need never fear. +There is no danger that the general strike +will ever be other than a weapon of last +resort; the occasions when it can be successfully +used will be of the utmost rarity. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">[141]</span>But they may occur. I cannot accept the +position that government is always entitled +to count on industrial peace, whatever its +policy. Nor do I see why it is unconstitutional +for Labour, as in 1926, to withdraw +from work in an orderly and coherent way.</p> + +<p>I do not deny, of course, that both a +general strike, and others of far less amplitude, +inflict grave injury and hardship upon +the community. But when trade unions seek +for what they regard as justice, one of their +most powerful sources of strength is the +awakening of the slow and inert public to +a sense of the position. Effectively to do +this, in a real world, it must inconvenience +the public; that awkward giant has no +sense of its obligations until it is made uncomfortable. +When it is aroused, if, for instance, +trains do not run, or coal is not +mined, the public begins to have interest +in the position, to call for action. Without +some alternative which attempts to secure +attention for a just result—I know of no +such alternative—the infliction of hardship +on the community seems to me the sole +way, even if an unfortunate way, to the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[142]</span>end the trade unions have in view. To limit +the right to strike is a form of industrial +servitude. It means, ultimately, that the +worker must labour on the employer’s +terms lest the public be inconvenienced. I +can see no justice in such a denial of freedom.</p> + +<p>Two further points it is worth while to +make. It is sometimes agreed that while the +state ought not to restrict freedom of association +for industrial ends, it is justified +in doing so when the strike-weapon is used +for some political purpose. This, indeed, +was one of the objects of the Baldwin Government +in enacting the Trades Disputes +Act of 1927. But I know of no formula +whereby such a division of purposes can +be successfully made. There is no hard and +fast line between industrial action and political +action. There is no hard and fast +line which enables us to say, for instance, +that pressure for a Factory Act is industrial +action, but pressure for the ratification of +the Washington Hours Convention political. +Extreme cases are easy to define; but +there is a vast middle ground with which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[143]</span>the trade unions must concern themselves +and this escapes definition of a kind that will +not hamper the trade union in legitimate +activity vital to its purpose. And there are +certain types of political action by trade +unions—a strike against war, for example—which +I do not think they ought in the +interest of the community itself, to abandon. +Quite frankly, I should have liked to +see a general strike proclaimed against the +outbreak of war in 1914; and I conceive +the power to act in that way as a necessary +and wise protection of a people against a +government which proposes such adventures. +You cannot compartmentalize life; +and where grave emergencies arise, the +weapons to be utilized must be fitted to +meet them. A government which knew that +its declaration of war was, where it intended +aggressive action, likely to involve a general +strike, would be far less likely to think +in belligerent terms. I do not see why such +a weapon should be struck from the community’s +hand. I do not forget that the +German Republic was saved from the Kapp +Putsch by a general strike.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[144]</span></p> + +<p>Nor must we forget the limits within +which effective legal action is possible. <i>Jus +est quod jussum est</i> is a maxim the validity +of which is singularly unimpressive. When +the issue in dispute seems to the trade +unions so vital that only by a general strike +can they defend their position adequately, +they will, in those circumstances, defend +their position whatever the law may be. +Legal prohibition will merely exacerbate +the dispute. It will transfer the discussion +of legality which serves merely to conceal +it. A legal command is, after all, a mere +static form of words; what gives it appropriateness +is its relevance as just to the situation +to which it is applied. And its +relevance as just is made not by those who +announce that it is to be applied, but by +those who receive its application. The secret +of avoiding general strikes does not lie +in their prohibition but in the achievement +of the conditions which render them unnecessary.</p> + +<p>Nor is the denial of the right to declare a +general strike a necessary protection of the +total interest of the community. Right and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">[145]</span>wrong in these matters are matters to be +defined in each particular case. A government +which meets the threat of a general +strike is not entitled to public support +merely because it meets the threat. It is no +more possible to take that view than it is +to say that all governments deserve support +when they confront a rebellion of their subjects. +Everything depends on what the general +strike is for, just as everything depends +on the purpose of the rebellion; and the individual +trade unionist must make up his +mind about the one, just as the individual +citizen must make up his mind about the +other. Law in this realm is, in fact, largely +futile. It could not prevent a general strike +by men who saw no alternative open to +them; and, in that event, it would merely +intensify its rigours when it came. The limitation +of liberty in this realm seems to me, +therefore, neither just in its purpose nor +beneficent in its results.</p> + +<p>I do not, of course, deny that freedom of +action in this field is capable of being +abused. That is the nature of liberty. Any +body of persons who exercise power may +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[146]</span>abuse it. It is an abuse of power when an +employer dismisses his workmen because +he does not like their political opinions. It +is an abuse of power when the owners of +halls in Boston refuse to hire them to the +promoters of a meeting in memory of Sacco +and Vanzetti. It was an abuse of power +when British naval officers connived at the +attempted internment of the Belgian socialist, +M. Camille Huysmans, in England. It +was, I think, an abuse of power when the +Universities of Oxford and Cambridge refused +to admit Nonconformists as students, +or Parliament to seat Mr Bradlaugh because +he was an infidel. But the trade +unions are no more likely, on the historic +record, to abuse their power than is Parliament +itself. The latter, if it wished, has +the legal competence to abolish the trade +unions, to disenfranchise the working +classes, to confine membership of the +House of Commons to persons with an independent +income. We know that Parliament +is unlikely to do any of these things +because omnicompetence, when gravely +abused, ceases to be omnicompetent. And +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[147]</span>the same truth holds, as it seems to me, of +the liberty to proclaim a general strike.</p> + +<p>A much more difficult problem arises +where the second of my four principles is +concerned. A government is, I think, entitled +generally to the loyal and continuous +service of its employees. It is therefore entitled +to make regulations which restrain +their liberty of action. The army and navy +and the police, in particular, occupy a special +position in the state; if they were free, +like ordinary citizens, to withdraw their labour +as they pleased, the executive power +would be in an impossible position. The +government, therefore, may make suitable +regulations for their control. But it is important, +in the framing of these regulations, +that the conditions of service should +be just. To be just, two principles are, I +suggest, of primary importance. They +should be made and administered in conjunction +with those who are affected by +them; and in their application or change +executive action should not be the final +court of appeal. The principles which, in +England, we call Whitleyism are the <i>quid +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[148]</span>pro quo</i> which government servants of this +type are entitled to expect in return for the +surrender of the right to strike; and Whitleyism +must include the right of those servants +to appeal from an executive decision +to such a body as the Civil Service Division +of the Industrial Court. To leave the executive +sole master of the field is to invite +the kind of purblind folly which resulted, +in 1919, in the police strikes of Boston and +London. Here, certainly, the fact that the +governments concerned were the judges in +their own cause made it impossible for the +police to get either attention or justice without +drastic action. And I draw your attention +to the fact that although in each case +the original strikers were defeated, their +successors obtained the terms, and even +more than the terms, for which they fought.</p> + +<p>The defence forces of the state constitute +a special case. When we turn to the ordinary +public services, central and local, +quite different considerations emerge. If +you analyse Whitehall, for instance, you +will find a very small body of men and +women who may be regarded as concerned +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[149]</span>with the making of policy; below them is +another body, perhaps two or three times +as large, engaged in assembling the material +out of which policy is made, and applying +it in minor cases; while below these +once more is a vast army of clerks engaged +in routine work of a more or less mechanical +kind. To this last class, it cannot, I +think, be said that government emerges as +an employer different in kind from what +they would encounter in the ordinary labour +market. General economic conditions +govern their pay; in France and America, +indeed, it is below, rather than above, the +level obtaining elsewhere for their kind of +work. All their interests go along with those +engaged in similar employment outside the +sphere of government activity. Their union, +therefore, with persons in private firms +seems to me justified in order to raise their +general economic level; and I do not see +the justice of prohibiting it as was done by +the Baldwin Government in the Trades Disputes +Act of 1927. I think, further, that +they are entitled to strike, if there is no +other way in which they can, as they think, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[150]</span>secure the enforcement of their demands; +though I think, also, that the executive +would be justified in compelling them to +exhaust the resources of a comprehensive +scheme of conciliation before they went so +far. The history, indeed, of most modern +civil services. France being a notable exception⁠<a id="FNanchor_35_35" href="#Footnote_35_35" class="fnanchor">[35]</a> +shows clearly that there is no danger +of officials abusing the right to strike. +But it shows also the unwisdom of leaving +the government free to determine the substance +of the contract of service. It is just +as likely as any private employer to extract +the most it can get for the least it needs to +give; and it is no more fit than any other +employer to be left uncontrolled in this +field. The more labour conditions in government +service are determined finally by +an independent authority, the more reasonable +they are likely to be. We must not +be led away by false claims to a special +majesty born of its sovereign character to +regard the state as entitled to a peculiar and +uncontrolled power over its servants. History +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">[151]</span>shows that it is just as likely as anyone +else to abuse an unlimited authority.</p> + +<p>The civil servant is not merely an employee +of government; he is also a citizen. +In our own day, especially, delicate questions +have arisen as to the right of the civil +servant, or of a person engaged in the +armed forces of the state, to enjoy all the +normal political privileges of a person in +private employ. Is a civil servant, for instance, +entitled to enter on a political career +with the chance, if it is interrupted, to return +to his department? Most modern +states, England, for instance, Canada, +South Africa, regard political activities as +beyond the area within which a civil servant +may engage; France, on the other hand, +hardly limits its officials in this way, while +Germany expressly allows its officials to +engage in politics, and some fifty civil +servants are now in the Reichstag, with +the power to return to their departments if +they are defeated. Certainly there are few +rights for which the rank and file of officials +press so strongly as for this; and they regard +the limitation of their political opportunities +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[152]</span>as an invasion of civic liberty at +once unnecessary and unjustifiable.</p> + +<p>I do not think the problem is a simple +one; and I think any solution of it must +therefore be complex in character. If a high +official of the Foreign Office in England +could be elected to Parliament, spend a +term there in bitter criticism of the Foreign +Secretary and then, on defeat, return to +work with the minister whom he had sought +to destroy, the latter’s position would, I +think, be intolerable. There is, that is to +say, a class of civil service work the very nature +and associations of which involves exclusion +from political life; and if those engaged +therein desire a political career, they +must terminate their connexion with the +civil service. We can, of course, draw a +line. I see no reason why all the industrial +employees of the government, postmen, for +instance, or shipwrights in a national dockyard, +should not enjoy all ordinary civil +rights. I see no reason, either, to expect +any deleterious consequence if civil servants +below what we call in England the +executive class are allowed ordinary political +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[153]</span>rights, so long as a decent discretion +in their exercise is observed. Those engaged +in the making of policy must, in my judgment, +accept a self-denying ordinance in +this regard. Unless government can be assured +that its chief officials are aloof from +political ties, it cannot trust them; and all +the considerations which create a “spoils +system” will then come into play. Since +experience makes it evident that a spoils +system is incompatible with either honest +or efficient administration, a restriction +upon the liberty of public officials is, I +would argue, justified. It is an inevitable +part of their contract of service from the +point of view of the end that service is intended +to secure.</p> + +<p>I believe, further, that this restriction +applies with special force to the Army and +Navy and to the police. The state is justified, +in the interest of the community, in +placing an absolute embargo upon the political +activities of all their members. For +unless this liberty is restrained, their allegiance +becomes the possession of a party +and they cannot give that neutral service +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[154]</span>which is the basic principle of their existence. +Anyone who remembers the attempted +use of the Army in 1913–14 for +Ulster, the habits of the French Army during +the Dreyfus period, the peculiar relations +between the German Army and the +Monarchy, will easily see how vital is this +abstinence. There are American cities +where the relations between big business +and the police mean that the authority of +the latter is certain to be abused in an industrial +dispute. Nothing, perhaps, illustrates +more nicely the delicacy of this +problem than the activities of Sir Henry +Wilson⁠<a id="FNanchor_36_36" href="#Footnote_36_36" class="fnanchor">[36]</a> during the years from 1912. He +was, it appears, prepared to go from a meeting +of the Committee of Imperial Defence +to a discussion of its plans with the leaders +of the Conservative opposition; and to advise +with them upon the best way of rendering +some of those plans nugatory. Even +during the Great War he did not cease from +the cultivation of political intimacies of +this kind. Nor must we forget that Sir John +French, at the time the Commander-in-Chief +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[155]</span>of the British Armies in France, was +ready to go behind the back of the Government +he served to offer secret information +to the military correspondent of a Conservative +newspaper; and the result of that +betrayal of confidence was the breakdown +of the first Asquith Government in 1915. +The proper conduct of political life is +clearly impossible, if the armed forces of +the state are free to take a definite part in +its formation. No one would endorse the +Russian principle that a soldier’s quality +is a function of his agreement with the political +faith of the government; yet once +relations are established between the politician +and the Army a movement towards +this principle is inevitable. Sooner or later, +in this condition, the Army, like the Praetorian +guard, determines the personality of +the state. When that occurs, no one can +hope for the enjoyment of political freedom.</p> + +<p>I turn, in the third place, to the view +that industries which have a vital impact +on social life can restrain the right to strike +in those engaged in them. That is a peculiarly +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[156]</span>favoured doctrine at the present +time; some writers even use the analogy of +the Army and Navy, and argue that the +principles applicable to these have a legitimate +extension to this field. Others, the +eminent French jurist M. Duguit, for example, +take a similar view, but upon other +grounds. They argue that vital public service, +transport, for instance, or electricity +supply, derive their whole meaning from +continuity; to allow an interruption of them +is, therefore, to destroy the whole law of +their being.</p> + +<p>I am as willing, I hope, as anyone to +agree that an interruption of a vital public +service is undesirable, and that every possible +step to minimize the possibility of its +occurrence should be taken. But I do not +think the denial of the right to strike obtains +this end in any of them; and I do not +believe that the same considerations apply +to every sort of vital public service. It must, +I think, make a difference whether the industry +is primarily operated for private +profit or no; for only in the latter case is +its quality as both vital and public fully +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[157]</span>recognized. No one, surely, can examine +the record of the coal industry either in +England or in America and say that the +motives which underlie its ownership by +private interest are compatible with the +view that an uninterrupted service to the +community has been the first object of +the owners. There are several reasons of +primary importance for retaining the right +to strike so long as private ownership continues +in this sphere. If, for instance, a +steamship company proposes to send out its +ship under the conditions in which the <i>Vestris</i> +of ill-fated memory sailed in the spring +of 1929, I think the crew would be justified +in striking in the public interest. So, also, +I should argue that the Seamen’s Union +would be justified in striking, to see to it, +if it could, that every vessel putting to sea +carries with it wireless equipment. Again, a +body of miners might, in my judgment, justifiably +strike if they believed that some +part of a pit to which they were to be sent +was in fact too dangerous for coal to be +hewed there without an alteration of the +physical conditions of mining in that particular +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[158]</span>place. I should, further, urge that +a strike to secure a national agreement for +uniform conditions in a particular industry +as against a variety of local agreements was +a justifiable enterprise if that end could not +be attained in any other way.</p> + +<p>My view, broadly, reduces itself to this. +Where the vital industry is in public hands, +the conditions which should operate are +those which relate to government service +in general where it is in private hands; the +state is, I think, justified in seeing to it that +the danger of dislocation is reduced to a +minimum; but it is not justified in saying +that, in the event of a disagreement, the +men shall always abide by the results of +compulsory arbitration. For, first of all, the +men will not always do so; their refusal, +doubtless, will be exceptional, but there +will be instances in which it will occur. The +famous munitions strikes on the Clyde, and +the South Wales Miners’ strike, during the +war show that this is the case. It is, I suggest, +obvious folly to attempt legislation +which cannot be enforced at the critical +point of urgency. The business of the state, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[159]</span>therefore, is not to prohibit, but to find +how best to make the use of the strike the +final and not the first instrument in conflict.</p> + +<p>This, I suggest, can be accomplished in +two ways. It can be done, first, by limiting +the profits private ownership can make in +any industry of vital importance, either absolutely +so that the owners are debenture-holders +merely, and not the residuary +legatees of any profit made, or relatively, +as in a scheme like that laid down for the +gas companies of London. The state is then, +I suggest, legitimately entitled to argue that +a curb on the liberty of the employer to +make what profit he can justifies a curb on +the right to strike by postulating the conditions +under which alone it can become operative. +Those conditions are, I think, met +by some such instrument as the Canadian +Industrial Disputes Investigation Act. Under +its terms, we should then have, at least, +enforced public inquiry into the dispute, +and the consideration by both sides, as well +as by the general opinion of the community, +of a reasoned attempt at a solution of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[160]</span>the difficulty. We respect freedom of association +by leaving it at liberty to insist that +the proposed solution is unjust, while we +protect the public interest in continuity of +service by insisting that the right to strike +shall not operate until the resources of conciliation +have been exhausted.</p> + +<p>I reject, therefore, M. Duguit’s notion +that public interest in continuity of service +is a paramount consideration which should +overrule all others; and I see no reason to +apply his vituperative adjectives⁠<a id="FNanchor_37_37" href="#Footnote_37_37" class="fnanchor">[37]</a> to those +who take a different view. It seems to me +quite definitely a denial of liberty for which +no justification can be found to say that +men shall work on terms they think utterly +unjust; and the argument that, if they do +not like those terms, they can find other +work, is, increasingly, without force in a +community like our own. The number of +those in any society who have a genuine +choice, at any given time, of alternative occupations +is notably small. An electrician +cannot suddenly become a barrister, as the +latter can suddenly become a journalist; +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[161]</span>and if it is a matter of hundreds, or even +thousands of men, the compulsion upon +them to continue in the vocation for which +they have been trained is obvious. The community +never gains, in the long run, from +work performed by men who labour under +a sense of injustice. That psychological +feeling of frustration is poisonous to a harmonious +personality. As such, it is incompatible +with that search for freedom which +I have urged is a condition of happiness. I +cannot, therefore, agree that the community +is entitled, on any terms, to put its convenience +first, and the workers’ freedom +afterwards.</p> + +<p>A final problem in this same realm remains. +The trade union, it is said, must +obviously concern itself with all that +touches the industrial conditions of its +members. But it is not entitled to a general +licence to roam all over the field of public +activity. We should resent it if a football +club passed resolutions upon the foreign +policy of a government; and it is in the +same way illegitimate for a trade union to +deal with matters outside its sphere. The +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[162]</span>state, therefore, is entitled to define that +sphere and to limit the activities of trade +unions to matters that come within it.</p> + +<p>But I have already sought to show that +such a definition of spheres is, in fact, impossible +of achievement. Take, for instance, +foreign policy. You cannot say that trade +unions ought not to concern themselves +with foreign policy since this is intimately +bound up with economic policy which, in +turn, is the chief factor in the determination +of the conditions of employment. You +cannot exclude any part of the economic +realm from the trade union sphere. I should +agree that a trade union ought not to concern +itself, let us say, with the question of +whether the Pope was justified in making +the Immaculate Conception a dogma of the +Roman Church; but the likelihood of a +trade union acting in this way is as small +as that of a football club concerning itself +with foreign policy. We cannot legislate +for the exceptional instance. Law can only +deal with normal habits susceptible of logical +reduction to well-established categories. +When it goes further, it merely reveals +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[163]</span>its own impotence. A trade union, moreover, +is a living body; and no law has ever +been successful in coping with the growth +of living things by legal promulgations +upon the fact of growth. Many matters are +regarded today as normally and naturally +within the sphere of the trade unions which +a generation ago, even a decade ago, most +men would have insisted were in nowise +their concern. In the American garment +trade, the union concerns itself, as a vital +part of its function, with the efficiency of +the employers for whom its members work. +A generation ago, this would have been dismissed +as “an insolent interference with the +rights of management”; today it is obvious +that upon no other terms can the function +of the trade union be fulfilled. In 1914 the +unions would never have deemed it their +business to concern themselves with the +bank rate and credit policy; today they +realize that these matters lie at the heart of +their problems. Any such Procrustes’ bed +of definition as this principle suggests +seems to me, therefore, a quite wanton and +foolish interference with freedom.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[164]</span></p> + + +<h3 id="V_1"> + V +</h3> + +<p>Such a discussion of the relation of trade +unionism to the state, illustrates, I think, +the general problem of the approach to freedom +of association in the political sphere. I +have denied the right of the state to control +the internal life of such bodies; and I have +sought to show the limits of liberty where +that life has ramifications outside their +membership. It is, I think, a good general +rule that the state should not interfere in +this realm unless it must. Whenever, for +example, it has interfered with the claims +of churches to lead their own life, conflict +has been the inevitable outcome. For in +any meeting of church and state, the latter +will assert its paramountcy; and a church +has no alternative but to deny that assertion. +For this reason I believe that any attempt +at partnership between them is +bound to result in injury to freedom somewhere. +If, as in England, the Church is formally +established by the state, its dependency +becomes obvious as soon as it develops +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[165]</span>ideas of which the state does not approve; +in matters like marriage and divorce +and education, the church has had to surrender +positions held for centuries to preserve +the privileges of establishment. It +now appears that where there is disagreement +in an established church, the minority, +on defeat, will not hesitate to go beyond +the organs which formally record the voice +of the church, in order to maintain doctrine +or ritual which the church itself seeks to +change; and a legislative assembly most +members of which are either alien from +the church, or without competence in its +technical problems, will find themselves +defining its most sacred principles. Such a +church, quite obviously, is the mere creature +of the state; it sacrifices its spiritual +birthright for a material mess of pottage. +Or, as in the concordat between Italy and +the Papacy, there may be a looser alliance +of which the result is to deprive all non-Catholics +of their right to a secular state +treating all religions equally, in the realm +of marriage and education. I cannot avoid +the conclusion that in this historic realm +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[166]</span>only the American principle of complete +separation and non-interference can produce +freedom. Unless state and church +pursue an independent path, liberty is sacrificed; +for either fusion or partnership will, +in fact, involve a conflict for supremacy.</p> + +<p>The remaining question I wish to discuss +in this context is the right of the state over +associations the purpose of which is the +overthrow of the existing social order. +What powers here ought the state to possess? +At what point can it interfere? Has +it what may be termed a preventive capacity, +a right to prevent the development +of associations the natural tendency of +which will be an attempt at such overthrow? +Or should its jurisdiction be limited +to punishment for overt acts? +Obviously the quality of liberty depends +very largely upon the powers we give the +state in this realm. I take it as elementary +that the state has a right to protect itself +from attack. It must, as a state, assume +that its life is worth preserving. It must demand +that changes in its organization be +the outcome of peaceful persuasion and not +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[167]</span>the consequence of violent assault. A state +must, therefore, assume that its duty to +maintain peace and security lies at the very +root of its existence. The liberty which associations +enjoy must therefore be set in +the context that they cannot have a liberty +to overthrow the state. To that extent, any +denial of freedom to them is justified.</p> + +<p>But what are the limits within which that +denial must work. The world today is littered +with organizations that are denied a +legal existence and suppressed at any opportunity. +The existence of a Communist +party is denied by Lithuanian law; the +Peasants’ Party in Jugoslavia was formally +dissolved; Russian principle seems to be +the imprisonment or exile of members of +any organization which can be suspected +of counter-revolutionary tendencies. We +must, I think, begin with the principle that +a government is not entitled to suppress associations +the beliefs of which alone are +subversive of the established order. For, +otherwise, persecution will be built, not on +fact, but on suspicion that facts may one +day emerge, not on overt acts, but on principles +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[168]</span>of faith which are in truth only dangerous +when they are expressed in practice. +A society might be formed, for instance, to +discuss and propagate the principles of +Tolstoyan anarchy; I do not think any government +has legitimate ground for interference +with it. The time for that interference +comes only when, outside the specific +categories of peaceful persuasion, men +have moved to action which cannot logically +be interpreted as other than a determination +to overthrow the social order.</p> + +<p>I agree, for instance, that a society of +Communists which began to teach its members +military drill could legitimately be regarded +as a direct threat to peace. So, also, +when a political party, the Ulster Volunteers, +for instance, or their opponents, the +Nationalists, begin to purchase munitions +of war, interference by government is justified. +But I cannot see that a government is +entitled to prevent a society of Communists +from preaching their doctrines either by +speech or by publication of the printed +word. It is, I think, essential that, as with +the English law of treason, the government +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[169]</span>should be compelled to prove the commission +of some overt act which directly tends +to imminent rebellion in a court of law, +and to bring two witnesses at least to bear +testimony to its commission. It ought not +to be sufficient for a government to say that +since a particular party has beliefs which +include the right to violence and has elsewhere +practised violence, that its suppression +is legitimate. Recently, again, Mr +Ghandi announced that if the British Government +did not grant Dominion Home +Rule to India by the end of 1929, he and +his followers would practise civil disobedience +such as a refusal to pay taxes. We +do not think that announcement would +have justified the British Government in +imprisoning Mr Ghandi before the end of +1929 in order that he might be prevented +from accomplishing his threat at a later +time. Or, once more, Mr Arthur Ponsonby’s +organization of men pledged to refuse military +service in the event of Great Britain +going again to war ought not to be suppressed +because, if Great Britain did go +to war, some hundred thousand individuals +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[170]</span>would refuse to obey any military +service Act that would then be enacted.</p> + +<p>I am anxious, as you will see, to make +it difficult for the government of a state to +attack an organization the views of which +it happens to dislike. In the light of the evidence, +we can rest assured that, unless we +compel proof, in an ordinary court of law, +that overt acts have been committed, such +attacks will be made. One has only to remember +the Treason Trials of 1794, where +there was not a scintilla of evidence against +any one of the accused, or the follies enacted +by governments during the Great +War, to see that this is the case. In August +of 1929, an Italian official actually drew +public attention to the undue circulation, +as he deemed, of books by Chekov, Turgenev +and Tolstoy;⁠<a id="FNanchor_38_38" href="#Footnote_38_38" class="fnanchor">[38]</a> we can be sure that if a +Society for the study of Russian literature +had then existed in Italy, the attention of +the government to its suppression would +have been called. In the opening stages of +the Communist trial in Meerut, the counsel +for the prosecution drew attention not +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[171]</span>merely to the alleged offences of the accused, +but also to the actions of the Russian +Communist leaders from 1917–20, +though it is difficult to see how either Indian +or English Communists could have +been held responsible for them. The logic, +indeed, of habitual government suppression +seems to be that abnormal opinion is +always dangerous because, if it is acted +upon, the supremacy of the law will be +endangered. That is, of course, perfectly +true. If the Communist Party in England +sought to initiate a rebellion, there would +be a threat to the supremacy of the law. But +no one of common sense believes today in +a Communist menace in England, least of +all, perhaps, the Communists themselves. +What can possibly be gained by an attempt +to suppress that philosophy by an imprisonment +of its members is quite beyond my +understanding. I see no evidence to suggest +that the slightest good has been +accomplished in America by all the legislation +against criminal syndicalism. Nor can +I see that anything would have been gained +by the kind of prohibitions which the Lusk +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">[172]</span>Committee, of dubious memory, sought to +put upon the statute-book.</p> + +<p>My point is that men are always entitled +to form voluntary associations for the expression +of grievance, and for the propagation +of ideas which, as they think, will +remedy what they believe to be wrong. +They are not entitled to move to the commission +of acts which bring them into conflict +with the state. By acts I mean things +like the planning of Mussolini’s march on +Rome, or the training of civilians as soldiers +by the Ulster Defence Council. Things +like these the government may legitimately +attack because they have a clear and direct +relation to immediate violence, actual +or prospective. But governments would do +well to remember, what they are too prone +to forget, that they do not remove grievance, +however ill-conceived, by suppressing +it. And if they are allowed to associate violent +opinion with actual violence, there are +few follies upon which they cannot be persuaded +to embark. The persecution of opinion +grows by what it feeds on. Every social +order is ardently upheld by fanatics who +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">[173]</span>are eager to make dissent from their view +a crime. The last thing that is desirable is +to give them an opportunity for the exercise +of their fanaticism.</p> + +<p>It is, further, of great importance that +all trials relating to these offences should +be held in the ordinary courts under the +ordinary forms of law. Experience makes +it painfully clear that special tribunals are +simply special methods for securing a conviction. +For the mere creation of a special +tribunal persuades the ordinary man that +there is an <i>a priori</i> case against the accused, +that the burden of proof lies upon him +rather than upon the government. Whatever +we can do to safeguard these trials +from the introduction of passion is an obligation +we owe to liberty. However wrong or +unwise we may think the actions of men so +accused, we have to remember that they +represent, as a general rule, the expression +of a deep-felt resentment against social injustice. +We have to protect ourselves from +protest which seeks deliberately to dissolve +the bonds of order. But it is our duty, too, +to respect that protest when it is sincerely +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[174]</span>made. And we cannot, therefore, permit attack +upon it because it represents ideas or +experience alien from our own. <i>De nobis +fabula narretur</i> is a maxim which every +citizen should recognize as the real lesson +of political punishment.</p> + +<p>Implied in all this is a view of the place +of voluntary associations in the community +the significance of which I do not wish to +minimize. I am, in fact, denying that they +owe their existence to the state, or that the +latter is entitled, by means of its agents, to +prescribe the terms upon which they can +live. The special place of the state in the +great society does not, in my judgment, give +it an unlimited right to effect that co-ordination +which is its function on any terms +it pleases. The principles of a legitimate +co-ordination bind the state as much as they +bind any other body of men. Each of us +finds himself part of a vast organization +in the midst of which we must seek the +realization of desire. We cannot attain it +alone. We have to find others with kindred +desires who will join hands with us to +proclaim the urgency of their realization. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[175]</span>There is no other way to the attainment of +that end; and an attitude, therefore, like +that of Rousseau, who denied the legitimacy +of any voluntary associations, fails +altogether to take account of the elementary +facts of social life. Such bodies, indeed, +must run in the leading-strings of +principle, but the question of what that +principle must be is not one the state alone +is entitled to make. For the latter is not +justified in preventing the expression of desire; +it is justified only in preventing the +realization of desire by violent means. It +must tolerate the expression of experience +it hates because it is there, as a state, to +satisfy even the experience it cannot understand. +We must not, in fact, allow ourselves +to fall into the error of believing that +opinion which is antagonistic to the state-purpose +is unworthy to survive. The state-purpose, +like any other, is expressed +through the agency of men. They may misinterpret +it; they may, consciously or unconsciously, +pervert it to their own ends. +To leave them free to settle the limits of +free association would be to leave them +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">[176]</span>free to settle what criticism of their work +they were prepared to permit. That is a +power which could not safely be entrusted +to any body of men who have ever operated +as a government.</p> + +<p>For consider, once more, the historic record. +The Roman suppression of Christianity +was built upon the belief that unity of +religious belief is the necessary condition +of citizenship; later experience shows that +view to be without any substance. What +in fact emerges from the history of religious +persecution is the lesson that the unity +made by the suppression of Nonconformity +is the unity of stagnation. That was the +history of France under the repeal of the +Edict of Nantes; it has been the history of +Spain ever since the sixteenth century; it +is, indeed, the history of any community, +however rich and powerful, the rulers of +which assume that they know what constitute +truth and right, what opinions, therefore, +they are entitled to prescribe. Any +government which attacks a body organized +to promote some set of opinions which +may become dangerous to its safety may +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[177]</span>fairly be presumed to have something to +conceal. It is co-ordinating social life not +to the end of its greater fullness, but simply +for the sake of co-ordination.</p> + +<p>But law, as I have insisted earlier, does +not exist for the sake of law. It is not entitled +to obedience because it is legal, because, +that is, it proceeds from a source of +reference formally competent to enact it. +Law exists for what it does; and its rightness +is made by the attitude adopted to it +by those whose lives it proposes to shape. +Since bodies like the Communist Party are +in fact an announcement that some lives at +least are shaped inadequately by the laws +of a régime like our own, suppression seems +to me an indefensible way of meeting that +announcement. Force is never a reply to +argument; and until argument itself seeks +force as the expression of its principle, it +is only by argument that it can justifiably +be countered.</p> + + +<h3 id="VI_1"> + VI +</h3> + +<p>I turn to a very different phase of the +subject. In every society there are modes +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[178]</span>of conduct which, though not in themselves +harmful, offer an easy prospect of becoming +so. It is therefore assumed by many that +it is the business of the state actively to discourage +such conduct, even to the point, if +necessary, of making its most innocuous +expression illegal. No one is harmed, for +instance, by a moderate indulgence in alcoholic +liquor; but since drunkenness is +harmful both to the individual and society, +the state, it is said, is justified in prohibiting +the manufacture or sale of alcoholic +liquor. The same principle is urged of noxious +drugs, of the use of tobacco, of gambling. +Sometimes, indeed, the principle is +carried to an extreme point and it is said +that the state may prohibit any form of +conduct, Sunday games, for example, +which a majority of the society finds obnoxious. +The claim to freedom, it is urged, +may be denied in the interest of a social +view of good.</p> + +<p>I do not find it easy to accept any single +principle that is obvious and straightforward +as applicable to the very complex +problems we encounter in this realm. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[179]</span>Neither the fact that a mode of conduct may +be harmful in excess, nor the fact that, +whether harmful or no, society dislikes it, +seems to me in itself a just ground for its +suppression by the law. The first case seems +to me one for safeguards against excess; +care, for instance, may be taken to see to +it that it is manufactured at a limited +strength, is sold only under careful restrictions, +and so on. The second case I find it +impossible to decide as a general principle, +and apart from particular cases each of +which is judged upon its own merits. I am +prepared, for example, to make it illegal to +keep a gaming-house; but I am not prepared +to legislate against a social game of +bridge played for money in a private house. +Conduct must be punished or prohibited +when it is harmful in itself or in the excess +in which it touches society before we ought +to seek access to the clumsy machinery of +the law.</p> + +<p>For we cannot suppress all modes of conduct +in which excess does harm. In most +cases, we have to leave the individual free +to judge at what point excess is a fact. Over-eating +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">[180]</span>does great harm, but no one would +propose legislation against over-eating. +Many motorists sacrifice their lives to their +motor-car, especially in America; but no +one would propose legislation against an +undue indulgence in motoring. False social +standards result from our excessive adulation +of film-stars and athletes; but we +should obviously be merely foolish if we +legislated against the publicity which +makes for that excessive adulation. We +have always, I think, to study any proposed +social prohibition in terms of the object to +which it is applied. We have to remember +that it always runs the risk of undermining +character by a limitation of responsibility. +Men are made not by being safeguarded +against temptation but by being +able to triumph over it. It would be impossible +to forbid the use of cheques because +some people succumb to the habit of +embezzlement. There is a clear case for +forbidding the sale of noxious drugs like +heroin or cocaine except under severe restrictions, +because it is clear that in themselves +their consumption is bound to harm +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[181]</span>the recipient. There is a clear case for insisting +that persons, even if they be passionate +Christian Scientists, who are suffering +from an infectious disease like small-pox, +shall be isolated until they are cured; +for anyone who goes about with small-pox +inflicts direct and measurable injury on +other persons. But unless we can show that +the particular mode of conduct it is proposed +to repress must necessarily destroy +the will-power of those who practise it, as +is true of noxious drugs, or directly and unquestionably +injures the rest of society in +a measurable way, I think the method of +prohibition an unwarranted interference +with freedom.</p> + +<p>I take this view on three grounds. I believe, +first, that it is socially most important +to leave the individual as uninhibited +as possible in forming his own way of life, +granted, of course, that he is adult and +mature. To shelter him at every point from +experience which, if carried to excess, may +harm him is not only impossible, but also +dangerous. It makes him pass his life under +the aegis of a system of fear-sanctions +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[182]</span>which, for the most part, he will be quite +unable to sublimate, and the result will +be that sense of continuous frustration +which is fatal to freedom. I must, in general, +learn my own limitations by experimentation +with myself. I cannot pass my +life adjusting my conduct to standards and +habits which represent the experiments of +other people. For the reasons which make +the results of particular experiments seem +to them convincing, I may in my own case +regard as completely unsuccessful. To insist +that their rule of life is to be mine is, +normally, to destroy my personality. It is to +compel me to live at the behest of others +even where I can discover no ground for +the behest. Most people would agree that a +statute compelling an atheist to go to +church was utterly foolish. His absence +does not affect the salvation of any other +person. His presence there does him no +good because his mood is inevitably one of +gnawing indignation at being compelled to +participate in ceremonies that have no +meaning for him. Either he will invent excuses +which enable him to stay away, or he +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[183]</span>will adopt an aggressive disbelief which +makes him a source of offence to the faithful. +He loses, that is, the habit of truth, on +the one hand, or the capacity to give and +take which makes for decent citizenship, +on the other. Both forms of behaviour do +real injury to him; neither produces an attitude +of conviction. From the angle of +character, the only rules of conduct in this +realm that work, are those that are self-imposed. +And these, so far as I know, are +the invariable outcome of experiment made +by oneself with one’s own personality.</p> + +<p>My second reason is not less important. +The power of law to define modes of social +conduct depends very largely upon its ability +to command a sentiment of general approval. +What it seeks to do must broadly +commend itself, on rational grounds, to +those over whose lives its principles are to +preside. Legislation which does not fulfil +this condition is always unsuccessful, and +always has the result of bringing the idea +of law itself into contempt. For where a +particular statute is regarded as foolish or +obnoxious by a considerable body of persons, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[184]</span>they will rejoice in breaking it. Illegal +conduct becomes a matter even of +pride. It becomes a principle of conduct +which gives rise to special pleasure and +peculiarly satisfies human vanity. No one +in London, so far as I know, regards the +average policeman as an unwarrantable attack +on liberty; but it seems to be the case +that thousands of people in New York regard +the prohibition agent in that way. +They wear a breach of the law as a badge +of courage, like the revolutionary in Czarist +Russia or the suffragette in pre-war England; +and the imposition of penalties upon +them arouses in them and their friends a +sense of angry injustice. Now I think it is +an elementary principle of penal psychology +that you cannot make a crime of conduct +which people do not <i>a priori</i> regard as +criminal. Popular sentiment approves a +law against murder, and you can enforce +that law. But popular sentiment, in England +at least, would not, in my judgment, +approve a law forbidding the manufacture +and sale of alcoholic liquor; and its chief +result would be to direct the minds of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">[185]</span>thousands to the problem of ways and +means of evading the law. That is a habit +which grows upon those who indulge in +it. It loosens all the principles of conduct +which make for social peace by making us +think of the rules under which we live as +unjustifiable and oppressive. It forces social +effort quite unduly and unwisely in one +direction. It persuades it to think out mean +and petty expedients for the enforcement +of the law in the same way as its subjects +think out mean and petty expedients for +its evasion. The spectacle, for instance, of +the Supreme Court deciding that the American +government is entitled to tap telephone +wires in order to obtain evidence of +infraction of the Volstead Act is not an +encouraging one.⁠<a id="FNanchor_39_39" href="#Footnote_39_39" class="fnanchor">[39]</a> That way lies corruption +and blackmail, the kind of habits which, +in England, we associate with names like +that of Oliver the spy,⁠<a id="FNanchor_40_40" href="#Footnote_40_40" class="fnanchor">[40]</a> in Russia with that +of agents-provocateurs like Azeff. Few +things are more detrimental than this to +the moral equilibrium of a social order.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">[186]</span></p> + +<p>Nor must we forget two other effects of +attempted enforcement, both of which are, +I think, entirely evil. A government which +is continually flouted in its attempt at administration +is bound to attempt even +greater severity. There will be an extension +not only of the area of offence, but also of +the methods of coping with offence, and +the punishment to be inflicted where it occurs. +The classic instance of this result is +the government of Geneva from the period +of Calvin’s dispensation. It does not result +in the satisfactory enforcement of the law, +but in its wider evasion. Severity on one +side is met by brutality upon another; one +might as well be hung for a sheep as a +lamb. And the disproportion between crime +and punishment which emerges draws the +sympathy of the general population away +from the government to the offender. This +is, I suggest, wholly bad for any society. +It makes the habits of government generally +suspect to the multitude. It creates +martyrs unduly and unwisely. And this has, +of course, the consequence that it becomes +ever more impossible to enforce the law. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[187]</span>Its irrationalism is advertised to the multitude. +It becomes inacceptable to an ever-increasing +circle who, while they may +sympathize with its principle, are not prepared +to acquiesce in the price that has to +be paid for its application. Not only, sooner +or later, does such legislation perish, but +the habits to which it gives rise persist, and +are frequently carried over into realms +where they are still more undesirable. And +the severity which a government is tempted +to practise makes it blind to wrong through +becoming inured to its consequences. When +the British Government first met the +weapon of the hunger-strike it was baffled; +later, it turned that weapon against those +who employed it by what was called the +Cat and Mouse Act. Much of this proceeding, +where the suffragettes were concerned, +had a comic, as well as a tragic side. But +the whole procedure had the serious result +of making the public expect that any hunger-strike +would be a dramatic battle between +the government and its prisoner, in +which the cause of the imprisonment was +lost sight of in the gamble of the procedure. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">[188]</span>The public, accordingly, was not greatly +moved by the hunger-striking which took +place during the Irish Revolution; and +when Mr Lloyd George left the Lord Mayor +of Cork to die, people were more interested +in the circumstance of his death than +in the vital question of whether he should +have been allowed to die. In all this realm, +the denial of liberty seems to result in the +slow maximization of unhappiness.</p> + +<p>The second effect is also wholly bad. +Whenever government interferes to suppress +some service which a considerable +body of persons think they require, when, +also, the suppression is disapproved by a +large number of citizens, an industry to +supply that service will come into existence. +Its ways will be devious, its charges +will be high. It will attract to its ranks +many of the most undesirable elements in +society. It will form an army of lawbreakers +whose habits are only too often condoned +by a large section of public opinion. That +has been the case with bootleggers in America +and with night-clubs in London. And +the risks being great, the profits are high, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[189]</span>the interests, consequently, to be protected +are correspondingly great. The history of +these adventures in England and America +is one of organized immorality and corruption. +Condemnation by the law seems to +have little or no effect in dispelling its influence. +Men and women attain power +through its means who normally would be +shunned by most decent-minded persons. +The degree to which the police are corrupted +by these influences is very difficult +to exaggerate. There is hardly a bribe too +high for them to pay. They are organizing, +too, an adventure which stimulates every +sort of dubious instinct in perfectly ordinary +people. Mr Babbitt approaches his +bootlegger, you will remember, in something +like a religious frame of mind. The +night-club <i>habitué</i> finds nothing quite so +exciting as the prospect of a raid; and he +leaves his meretricious surroundings with +the sense that he knows the glory of danger +and has escaped the humdrum pettiness of +suburbia. I think it bad for society to make +illegal conduct heroic. I think it still worse +to make the central figures in the drama of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[190]</span>illegality powerful in the lives of those to +whom they purvey their service; men and +women whose methods of obtaining a living +it does not occur to their clients to condemn. +Nor is it an answer to say that when +the law does act, those clients immediately +desert the arrested offender which is proof +that they really disapprove. An enforcement +which induces cowardice at the critical +moment in those who are <i>participes +criminis</i> does not seem to me anything of +which to be proud.</p> + +<p>My third reason is rather different in +character. Every state contains fussy and +pedantic moralists who seek to use its machinery +to insist that these habits shall +become the official standard of conduct in +the population. They are interested in prohibition +and uniformity for their own sake, +and every success that they win only spurs +them to greater efforts. If they stop the sale +of alcohol, they become ardent for the limitation +of the right to tobacco. They are +anxious to control the publication of books, +the production of plays, women’s dress, the +laws governing sexual life, the use of leisure. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[191]</span>They are terrified by what they call +immorality, by which they mean behaviour +of which they do not happen to approve. +They are scandalized by the unconventional. +They luxuriate in its denunciation. +They form committees and leagues to prove +the degeneracy of our times. They rush to +the legislature to compel action every time +they discover some exceptional incident of +dubious conduct. To themselves, of course, +they appear as little Calvins saving the +modern Geneva from the insidious invasion +of the Devil. No one, I suppose, can seriously +doubt that men like Mr Comstock regard +themselves as the saviours of society. +They have an unlimited sense of a divinely +appointed mission, and the whole of their +life is set in its perspective. They are the +men who find in <i>Candide</i> the means of corrupting +the mind of the community. They +are horrified by the nude in art. They think +the performance of <i>Mrs. Warren’s Profession</i> +the public profanation of the ideal. +They regard Darwin as an “infidel” whose +works were an outrage upon God; and the +circumstances of Maxim Gorky’s married +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">[192]</span>life seem to them to demand his public excoriation.</p> + +<p>I know nothing more incompatible with +the climate of mental freedom than the inference +of such people. They lack altogether +a respect for the dignity of human +personality. They are utterly unable to see +that people who live differently think differently +and that in so various a civilization +as ours absolute standards in these matters +are out of place. It is difficult to overestimate +the price we pay for their successes. +Certainly no great art and no literature +great in anything save indignation can be +produced where they have sway. It is not +for nothing that from the time of Calvin +not a single work of ultimate literary significance +was produced by a resident of +Geneva. It is easy to understand why the +grim excesses of Puritanism produced the +luxuriant license of the Restoration. These +would be, if they could, modern Inquisitors, +without tolerance and without pity, +thinking no means unjustified if only their +end can be attained. They are the kind of +people who drove Byron and Shelley into +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[193]</span>exile, and they remain unable to see upon +whom that exile reflects. Their pride is inordinate; +and human instincts are its chief +victim. They are often ignorant, usually +dangerous, and invariably active. Since the +friends of liberty too often sleep, their unceasing +vigilance not seldom meets with +its reward. To me, at least, they commit +the ultimate blasphemy since they seek to +fashion man in their own image.</p> + +<p>I do sincerely plead that, especially in a +democratic society, these are grave dangers +to freedom, against which we cannot +too stringently be upon our guard. Especially, +I say, in a democratic society. For +there, the proportion of men zealous in the +service of freedom, is likely to be small unless +great and dramatic issues are at stake. +Tyranny flows easily from the accumulation +of petty restrictions. It is important that +each should have to prove its undeniable +social necessity before it is admitted within +the fabric of the law. No conduct should +be inhibited unless it can be definitely +shown that its practice in a reasonable +way can have no other result than to stunt +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[194]</span>the development of personality. No opportunity +should be offered for the exercise +of power unless by its application men are +released from trammels of which it is the +necessary price of purchase. We ought not +to accept the easy gospel that liberty must +prove that it is not license. We ought rather +to be critical of every proposal that asks +for a surrender of liberty. Its enemies, we +must remember, never admit that they are +concerned to attack it; they always base +their defence of their purpose upon other +grounds. But I could not, for myself, serve +principles which claimed to be just if their +result was to make the temple of freedom +a prison for the impulses of men.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[195]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_III"> + CHAPTER III + <br> + LIBERTY AND SOCIAL POWER + </h2> +</div> + + +<h3>I</h3> + +<p>In these pages, I have taken the view +that liberty means that there is no restraint +upon those conditions which, in +modern civilization, are the necessary guarantees +of individual happiness. There is no +liberty without freedom of speech. There is +no liberty if special privilege restricts the +franchise to a portion of the community. +There is no liberty if a dominant opinion +can control the social habits of the rest +without persuading the latter that there are +reasonable grounds for the control. For, as +I have argued, since each man’s experience +is ultimately unique, he alone can fully +appreciate its significance himself; he can +never be free save as he is able to act upon +his own private sense of that interpretation. +Unfreedom means to him a denial of his experience, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[196]</span>a refusal on the part of organized +society to satisfy what he cannot help taking +to be the lesson of his life.</p> + +<p>But no man, of course, stands alone. He +lives with others and in others. His liberty, +therefore, is never absolute, since the conflict +of experience means the imposition +of certain ways of behaviour upon all of +us lest conflict destroy peace. That imposition, +broadly speaking, is essential to liberty +since it makes for peace; and peace is +the condition of continuity of liberty. The +prohibitions, therefore, that are imposed +are an attempt to extract from the experience +of society certain principles of action +by which, in their own interest, men ought +to be bound. We cannot, indeed, say that +all the principles a given government imposes +are those it ought to impose. We can +only say that some principles, by being imposed, +are bound up with the very heart of +freedom.</p> + +<p>That is the paradox of self-government. +Certain restraints upon freedom add to a +man’s happiness. Partly, they save him +from the difficulty of going back to first +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[197]</span>principles for every step he has to take; +they summarize for him the past experience +of the community. Partly, also, they prevent +every opposition of desire from resulting +in conflict; they thus assure him of +security. In a sense, he is like a traveller +who reaches a sign-post pointing in many +directions. Law helps him by telling him +where one, at least, will lead; and it invites +him to assume that its direction is also, or +should be, his destination. Clearly this will +not always be the case. For it to be so, the +end of the law must be his as well, its +experience must not contradict his own. +For that contradiction, as a rule, means +punishment for him since, at the end of the +road he takes, if it is not the path of the +law, he will find a policeman waiting for +him. We must, that is to say, find ways +of maximizing our agreement with the law.</p> + +<p>I sought earlier to show that this maximization +can only take place when the substance +of law is continuously woven from +the fabric of a wide consent. Here I propose +to inquire into certain essential conditions +which determine whether that consent can +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[198]</span>be obtained. I propose to inquire, in other +words, into that weird complex of prejudice, +judgment, interest, which we call public +opinion and to seek the terms of its +adequate relationship to liberty. For if my +argument be valid that a man’s citizenship +is the contribution of his instructed judgment +to the public good, and that right action, +for him, is action upon the basis of +that judgment, clearly, the factor of instruction +is of decisive importance. Instructed +judgment is considered and not +impulsive, ultimate and not immediate. It +is a conclusion arrived at after an attempt +to penetrate behind the superficial appearance +to what is truth-seeming. It is a +decision made after evidence has been collected +and weighed, distortion allowed for, +prejudice discounted. If, for instance, I am +to oppose the State in a matter like military +service, I ought not to do so until I have +rigorously examined the facts upon which +I build my principles. And, <i>mutatis mutandis</i>, +that is true of every aspect of social +activity. The first urgency is assurance that +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[199]</span>the facts upon which I base my action are +valid.</p> + +<p>Now the world of facts which impinge +upon each of us is difficult and complex and +enormous. None of us can know all of that +world. A large part of it, it may be in some +context a fundamental part, we have to take +on trust from other persons. Obviously, it is +of primary importance that the things we +take on trust should correspond with the +reality on which alone a right judgment +can be made. My view of the proper peace-terms +that should be made with Germany +will be one thing if I believe that Germans, +when at leisure, crucify innocent Belgian +citizens, rape their women, and cut off the +breasts of their young girls; and quite another +thing if I believe that the Germans +are rather like other people, decent, kindly, +respectable, wanting much the same things +in life as I do myself. My attitude to the +nationalization of the mines will obviously +profoundly depend upon, first, the facts in +the mining industry itself, and, second, the +facts about the operation of nationalization +in other fields. I cannot, in the vast majority +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[200]</span>of the problems I have to decide, +make my own inquiries into the facts. +Somewhere, sometime, I have to halt and +say, “This man’s report, or this paper’s account, +is a thing I can trust.”</p> + +<p>It is because opinion is so vitally dependent +upon the truthfulness of facts that observers +have come more and more to insist +on the connexion between liberty and the +news.⁠<a id="FNanchor_41_41" href="#Footnote_41_41" class="fnanchor">[41]</a> For a judging public is unfree if +it has to judge not between competing +theories of what an agreed set of facts +mean, but between competing distortions +of what is, at the outset, unedifying and invented +mythology. Things like the incident +of the <i>Maine</i>, the Pekin Massacre which +never occurred, the Zenoviev letter, make +an enormous difference to what Mr Lippmann +has happily termed my “stereotype” +of the environment about which I have to +make up my mind. I bring already to its +interpretation a mass of preconceptions +which tend to distort it. If there is prepared +for me “evidence” which has been distilled +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[201]</span>through the filter of a special interest the +distortion may become so complete as to +make a rational judgment impossible. The +English journalist who invented the word +“dole” has built into the minds of innumerable +people of the comfortable classes +a picture of the unemployed in England as +a mass of work-shy persons, comfortably +lazy and anxious at all costs to live parasitically +upon the taxpayer; the proven +fact that less than a fraction of one per cent +really avoids the effort to work is unable +to penetrate the miasma of that stereotype. +The newspapers which belong to the Power +Trust in America, the subsidized press in +Paris, the journals which must satisfy Mussolini +or suffer suppression, the government +newspapers of Communist Russia, +these are all efforts to dictate an environment +to the citizen in order that the stereotype +he forms may serve some interest their +owners, or controllers, are anxious to promote. +Men may actually go out to die for +purposes in which they profoundly believe, +though the cause which, as they judge, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[202]</span>embodies those purposes has not, in fact, +the remotest connexion with it.</p> + +<p>We have, in short, the difficulty that the +control of news by special interests may +make prisoners of men who believe themselves +to be free. The Englishman who +has to form an opinion about a miners’ +strike is not likely to be “free” in any sense +to which meaning can be attached if the +facts which he encounters have been specially +doctored in order to make it as certain +as possible that he conclude in favour +of the mine owners. A Chinaman who hears +that the “Liberal” party in Rumania has +won a victory at the polls, an American +who is informed that London is governed +by Municipal “Reformers”, approaches the +discovery of the facts with a body of preconceptions, +derived from quite alien experience, +which will make a true judgment +of those facts a very complex matter. In +the Conference of The Hague upon reparations +in August 1929, the Italian newspapers +continued to paint Mr Snowden as +the Shylock withholding from Italy its due +share, while the English Press was equally +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[203]</span>unanimous in painting him as the protagonist +against a continental effort to make +Great Britain the milch-cow of Europe. The +Italian, or the Englishman, who wished to +obtain a just view of the issues really at +stake there, would have had to engage in +arduous researches into technical material +about which he might lack competence and +for which he would certainly not easily find +leisure.</p> + +<p>Let us remember, too, that our stereotype +of the contemporary environment is +only the last phase, so to speak, of the +problem. The psychologists are unanimous +in telling us how important for our future +are the impressions we gather in our early +years. Clearly, from that angle, the things +we are taught, the mental habits of those +who teach us, are of quite primary urgency. +It may make all the difference +to the intellectual climate of a people +whether, for instance, the history learned +by children in schools is wide and generous, +or parochial and narrow, whether its teachers +cultivate the sceptical mind, or the positive +mind. People who are imprisoned in +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[204]</span>dogmas in childhood will have an agonizing +struggle to escape from its stereotypes, and +they may well have been so taught that +they either, after effort, succumb, or do not +even know that it is necessary to struggle +at all. I do not know how to emphasize sufficiently +the quite inescapable importance +to freedom of the content of the educational +process.</p> + +<p>Teach a child year in and year out that +the American Constitution is the ultimate +embodiment of political wisdom and you +increase tenfold the difficulty of rational +and necessary amendment by the generation +to which that child belongs. Set him +under teachers like those of whom Professor +Harper tells us that seventy-seven +per cent “contended that one should never +allow his own experience and reason to lead +him in ways that he knows are contrary to +the teaching of the Bible”, and fifty-one +per cent that “our laws should forbid much +of the radical criticism that we often hear +and read concerning the injustice of our +country and government”, and the openness +of mind upon which reason depends +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[205]</span>for its victories will be well-nigh unattainable.⁠<a id="FNanchor_42_42" href="#Footnote_42_42" class="fnanchor">[42]</a> +Those only who realize the importance +of education will understand how a +Southern audience could go wild with anger +over an account, in large outline untrue, +of German atrocities, and yet listen +with indifference to the description of a +lynching in their own community so revolting +in its detail as to be unfit almost for +transcription. And we must add to the +school influence in childhood, that of the +home, the church, the streets, in the terrible +certainty that there are few impressions +which do not leave their trace.</p> + +<p>It is necessary, if I may so phrase it, to +urge men to live dangerously. To the degree +that their happiness depends upon +making their decisions conform to the facts, +they cannot avoid danger. It is dangerous +to leave a child in the hands of teachers +who believe that all experience and reason +must be abandoned which does not square +with that recorded in the partly mythical +annals of a primitive Semitic tribe several +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[206]</span>thousand years ago, or who equate patriotism +with a fervid acceptance of the +present political system. The adult is endangering +his happiness if he believes that +truth is what Karl Marx said, or Mussolini +tells him, or the inferences of Mr Baldwin +which the latter has in turn drawn from +material prepared for him by the Research +Department of the Conservative Central +Office. Happiness depends upon being able +to approach with an open mind facts which +have been prepared by independent persons +who have no interest in seeing that +their incidence is bent in some particular +way. Anything else imprisons the mind in +dogmas which only work so long as that +mind does not travel beyond the narrow +confines within which the dogmas work. +Once it goes beyond, unhappiness is the +inevitable outcome.</p> + +<p>How are we to get independent fact-finding +and the open mind? The answer, of +course, is the tragic one that there is no +high-road to it. Partly, it lies in the development +of particular techniques, but, most +largely, it lies in the kind of educational +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">[207]</span>methods we use, and this, in its turn, in the +purposes for which those methods are employed. +I entirely agree that a multiplication +of independent fact-finding agencies, +as disinterested and impartial about wages +and other social conditions as a medical +man in the making of a diagnosis, will take +us some distance.⁠<a id="FNanchor_43_43" href="#Footnote_43_43" class="fnanchor">[43]</a> Not, I think, very far; +for between the finding of facts by independent +agencies and the driving of them +home to the public are interpolated just +those factors of special interest which are +the enemies we confront. I agree, too, that +freedom is partly better served than when +a great public organ falls into the hands of +one who, like C. P. Scott with his <i>Manchester +Guardian</i>, determines to make news and +truth coincide. But men like Mr Scott are +rare enough to make reliance upon their +emergence a very dubious ground of hope. +Nor need we deny that the growth of a professional +spirit among journalists, their organization +into a profession with standards +of entrance and performance, will add +greatly to the chances of solving the problem. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[208]</span>So, also, will the development of specialized +journals of opinion, and new inventions +like the wireless. To some extent—not, +I think, a great extent—competitive +fact-finding makes for truth. Outrageous +propaganda kills itself; men do not believe +the “papers” because they have found them +lying at some point where the facts forced +themselves upon attention.</p> + +<p>And so, too, with a training for the open +mind in schools. People may come to see +that where the quality of intelligence is concerned, +the second-rate, the dull, the incurious, +the routineer, simply will not do. +They may be prepared to make education a +profession sufficiently well paid to attract +the highest ability, and sufficiently honourable +to satisfy the keenest ambition. Even +now we cannot over estimate the influence +exerted in his generation by a great teacher. +Do what we will, let him teach what he +please, the minds with which he is in contact +will go along with his mind, they will +learn his enthusiasms, share his zest in +inquiry. It may be Huxley in London, William +James in Harvard, Alain in Paris. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[209]</span>Students who have lived with such men +are their spiritual children not less than +those who have learned the habits of a gentleman +at Eton or a proper respect for the +Emperor of Japan in Tokio. And, equally, +we may learn that a narrow patriotism in +history and politics has social results less +admirable than a quick scepticism built +from the sense that our country has not +always been right, our institutional standards +not invariably perfect. Our governors +may be willing to admit that one inference +from the rebellion of Washington is the +possible legitimacy of rebellion, one inference +even from the new theology of Jesus, +that we are sometimes justified in the making +of new theologies. It is even possible +that the value of the power to think may +become so much more widely recognized, +that we shall not ask that those who are +able creatively to teach this supreme art, +be dismissed because we dislike either what +they teach or the opinions they profess outside +the practice of their profession. We +may come to insist upon security of tenure +for the teacher even when his principles of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">[210]</span>faith do not coincide with those for which +we desire the triumph.</p> + +<p>Yet these possibilities do not, in themselves, +seem to me to confer a right to optimism +if they stand alone. If it pays to +spread false news, let us be sure that false +news will be spread. If some special interest +gains by corrupting the facts, so far as +it can, the facts will be corrupted. If a poor +educational system strengthens the existing +foundations of power, it will tend to remain +poor; if its extension is costly, those who +are to bear the cost will find good reason +either not to extend it, or to proceed at such +a snail’s pace that the new way has no +chance of affecting mankind except in +terms of geological time. Our difficulty is +the twofold one that propaganda can produce +immense results in a brief space of +time and that creative educational change +takes something like a generation before its +results are manifest upon a wide scale. The +forces at work to prevent the emergence +of truth, the forces, also, which have every +reason to dislike the development of the +mind which seeks for truth, are many and +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[211]</span>concentrated and powerful. They do not +want the general reporting of experience, +but only of that experience which favours +themselves. They do not want the general +population so trained as to prize truth, but +only so trained that they believe whatever +they read. In our own day it would not be +an unfair description of education to define +it as the art which teaches men to be deceived +by the printed word. Those who +profit by that deception are, at the moment, +the masters of society.</p> + +<p>For we must remember that in these +matters we have to concern ourselves with +short-term values and not long-term values. +We do not legislate for some conceivable +Utopia to be born in some unimaginable +time, but for the kind of world we know +ourselves, for lives like our own lives. The +freedom we ask we have to make. Every +postponement we accept, every failure before +which we are dumb, only consolidates +the forces that are hostile to freedom. They +themselves realize this well enough. They +have, in the past, fought every step on +every road to freedom because they have +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[212]</span>seen that the accumulation of small concessions +will, in the end, be their defeat. +Everywhere they have been guilty of +definite error, or wrong, they have denied +the error or wrong, lest it upset faith in +their own right to power. Not the least powerful +to silence, you will recollect, which +persuaded even those who thought Sacco +and Vanzetti innocent was their fear that +proof of that innocence might disturb popular +faith in the Massachusetts Courts. The +same was true in the Dreyfus case. The +same, on a lesser plane, was true of Mr +Winston Churchill when he sought to deceive +the House of Commons over the treatment +of Lady Constance Lytton in prison.⁠<a id="FNanchor_44_44" href="#Footnote_44_44" class="fnanchor">[44]</a> +Those in power will always deny freedom +if, thereby, they can conceal wrong. And +any successful denial only makes its repetition +easier. Had California released +Mooney in 1916, when the world knew he +was innocent, it would have been easier for +Massachusetts to have acted justly ten years +later. The will to freedom, like the will to +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[213]</span>power, is a habit, and it perishes of +atrophy.</p> + +<p>The inference I would draw is the quite +basic one that in any society men only have +an equal interest in freedom when they +have an equal interest in its results. Where +those results are already possessed by some, +they seldom have the imagination to see the +consequence of their denial to others. They +will persuade themselves that those others +are contented with their lot, or made differently +in nature, so that they are unfit to +enjoy what others possess. There is no myth +we are not capable of inventing to lull our +conscience. We see the futility of action on +our part, because we are so unimportant. +We see that it would be dangerous in this +particular case, because we have an influence +that, in other cases, might be exerted +to useful purpose. We do not think the time +has come for action. We think that action +here might lead to other and quite unjustifiable +demands. We would have associated +ourselves with the demand, but those who +are making it, or the way in which it is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[214]</span>being made, unfortunately renders this impossible. +Life is so complex and tangled +and full, that those who desire to abstain +from the battle for freedom can always find +ample excuse. The workman may be afraid +for his job; Babbitt may shrink from being +shunned by the group whose fellowship is +his life; it may be the handful of silver, the +riband for the coat, the love of power, the +loathing of what freedom may bring. Whatever +the motive of abstention, let us remember +that men think differently who live +differently, and that, as they think, so they +build principles of action to remedy what, +in their lives, they find bitter or unjust, to +preserve what they find pleasant or right.</p> + +<p>We cannot, of course, remedy all experience +which makes for a sense of bitterness +or injustice. Things like the betrayal of +friendship are, only too often, beyond the +power of organization to affect. But the +sense of bitterness or injustice that comes +from bad housing, low wages, or the denial +of an adequate political status, these +we are able to remedy by social action. Or, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[215]</span>rather, we are free to move to their remedy, +if we have an equal interest in doing so. +If our interest is unequal, our sense of a +need to share with others in action will be +small. Other things will seem more significant +or more urgent; and the need itself +will shrink as it obtrudes. The less we live +in the experience of our neighbours, the +less shall we feel wrong in the denial of +their wants. Trade unionists appreciate a +demand for higher wages more keenly than +employers: the wealthy rentier reads of a +strike in the cotton trade as a newspaper +incident, of a railway dispute, whatever its +grounds, as a threat to the community. The +sense of solidarity comes only when the +result of joint action impinges equally on +the common life.</p> + +<p>We are in the difficulty that every step +we take towards freedom is a step towards +the equalization of privileges now held unequally. +Those who hold them are not anxious +to abandon what they entail; sometimes +they can even persuade themselves +that the well-being of society depends upon +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">[216]</span>a refusal to surrender them. For them, +therefore, the honest publication of facts, +the making of free minds, are simply paths +to disaster. Why should they surrender +their weapons of defence? Why, the more, +when many of them do not even suspect +that they fight with poisoned weapons? To +explain to a loyal Roman Catholic that he +should tell his children that there is grave +reason to deny the truth of all he believes +is to invite him to shatter the foundation +upon which he has built his life. To suggest +to the average citizen who took part +in the Great War that his school-books +should abandon the legend that his particular +state entered it with the whole-souled +motive of serving justice would appear +scandalous simply because he is honestly +unconscious of any other motive. To +urge even upon the public-spirited heir to +a great estate the possible duty of acting +upon the principle of Mill’s argument +about the laws of inheritance is, at the best, +an adventure in the lesser hope. There was +good reason for the unpopularity of the +Socratic temper in Athens.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[217]</span></p> + + +<h3 id="II_2"> + II +</h3> + +<p>I conclude, therefore, that whatever our +mechanisms and institutions, liberty can +hope to emerge and to be maintained in a +society where men are, broadly speaking, +equally interested in its emergency and its +maintenance. I accept the insight Harrington +had when he insisted that the distribution +of economic power in a state will +control the distribution of its political +power. I think James Madison was right +when he argued that property is the only +durable source of faction. I think the perception +of the early socialists entirely justified +when they urged that a society divided +into a small number of rich, and a +large number of poor persons, will be a +society of exploiters and exploited. I cannot +believe that, in such an atmosphere, +liberty will be a matter of serious concern +to the possessors of power.</p> + +<p>What will concern them is how they can +best maintain their power. They will permit +anything save the laying of hands upon +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">[218]</span>the ark of their covenant. They will allow +freedom in inessentials; but when the pith +of freedom is attack upon their monopoly +they will define it as sedition or blasphemy. +For if the form of social organization is a +pyramid, men are bound to struggle towards +its apex. In a society of economic unequals, +gross unequalities make conflict +inherent in its foundations. The possession +of wealth means the possession of so much +that makes for a happy life, beautiful physical +surroundings, leisure to read and to +think, safeguards against the insecurity of +the morrow. It is, I think, inevitable that +those to whom these things are denied +should envy those who possess them. It is +inevitable, also, that envy should be the +nurse of hate and faction. Those who are +so denied struggle to attain, those who possess +struggle to preserve. Justice becomes +the rule of the stronger, liberty the law +which the stronger allow. The freedom that +the poor desire in a society such as this is +the freedom to enjoy the things their rulers +enjoy. The penumbra of freedom, its purpose +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[219]</span>and its life, is the movement for +equality.</p> + +<p>And it is equality that is decried by those +who rule. It means parting with the exercise +of power and all the pleasures that go +with its exercise. It means that their wants +do not define the ends of production, their +standards do not set the objects of consideration, +their right to determine the +equilibrium of social forces is no longer +recognized. Equality, in fact, is a denial of +the philosophy of life which is bred into +their bones by their way of living. It does +not seem to me remarkable that they should +fight against this denial. Who of us, on +these terms, but would find it difficult to +accept as valid experience which contradicts +our experiences, a system of values +which attempts the transvaluation of our +own? Who of us but would not feel that a +freedom which seeks radical alteration of +the contours of existence is perverse and +dangerous and worthy only to be suppressed? +The Pagan felt that of the Christian, +the Catholic of the Protestant, the +landowner of the merchant. The new power +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">[220]</span>which seeks its place in the sun is inevitably +suspected by the old with whom it +claims equal rights.</p> + +<p>The equality will be denied, and, with +it, the freedom to claim equality. Inevitably, +also, the right to freedom will be maintained, +and the two powers will, sooner or +later, mass their forces for battle. I know +no instance in history in which men in possession +of power have voluntarily abdicated +its privileges. They say that reason and +justice prevail; but they mean their reason +and their justice. They are prepared to +coerce in the hope of success, and they are +prepared to die fighting rather than to surrender. +It is the result of such a way of life +that the ideal of freedom is inapplicable to +matters upon which there is urgent difference +of opinion between the rulers and +their subjects. It is impossible for reason +to prevail if men are prepared to fight about +the consequences of its victory. And if they +are prepared to fight there is no room in +the society for freedom since this is incompatible +with habits of violence.</p> + +<p>Any society, in fact, the fruits of whose +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[221]</span>economic operations are unequally distributed +will be compelled to deny freedom +as the law of its being; and the same will +be true of any society in process of forcible +transition from one way of life to another. +Cromwellian England, Revolutionary +France, Communist Russia, Fascist Italy, +each of these, of set purpose, made an end +of the pretence that freedom was a justifiable +object of desire. In each, it was proposed +to maintain some particular form of +social organization at any cost; to inquire +into the cost might result in doubt of the +value of the effort; and the value of that +freedom which releases reason was therefore +denied. A revolutionary state, of +course, makes the position peculiarly clear. +But it is not merely true of the revolutionary +state.</p> + +<p>In England, or France, or Germany, +there is no freedom where the fundamentals +of the society are called into question, +if their rulers think that this may cause +danger to those questions. The government +may decide that William Godwin is innocuous; +but it will not hesitate to convict +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[222]</span>Tom Paine—in truth far less drastic—of +high treason. The cause of this attitude is, +I think, beyond discussion. If freedom +seeks to alter fundamentals, freedom must +go; and freedom can hardly help but concentrate +on fundamentals in a society distinguished +by economic inequality. I do +not need to point out to you the extraordinary +timidity of society before subversive +discussion of property-rights, nor to insist +upon the complicated legal precautions that +are taken for its defence. You have only to +examine the attitude in which Labour combinations +are approached by those who possess +economic power, as instanced, for +example, by the use of the injunction by +American judges,⁠<a id="FNanchor_45_45" href="#Footnote_45_45" class="fnanchor">[45]</a> to realize that the main +purpose of limitations on freedom is to prevent +undue encroachments upon the existing +inequalities. We announce that we are +open to conviction in matters of social arrangement. +But we take the most careful +steps to see that our convictions are not +likely to be overthrown.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[223]</span></p> + +<p>For the chance that reason will prevail +in an unequal society is necessarily small. +It is always at a disadvantage compared +with interest, for, to the latter, especially +in property matters, passion is harnessed, +and in the presence of passion people become +blind to truth. They see what they +want to see, and they select as truth that +which serves the purpose they desire to see +prevail. The preparation of news for the +making of opinion is, indeed, extraordinarily +like the old religious controversy in +which men hurled text and counter-text at +one another. The real problem was one of +proportions; but the protagonists altered +the proportions that the material might the +better serve their cause. Some years ago, a +Labour Delegation returned from Russia +with a statement about its character from +Peter Kropotkin. A leading capitalist newspaper +in London printed all those parts of +it which attacked the Russian régime; and +the leading Labour newspaper printed +those parts of it favourable to the Bolshevik +experiment. The readers of the first +were, therefore, satisfied with the knowledge +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[224]</span>that an eminent anarchist heartily +disliked Bolshevism; and the readers of +the second were heartened by discovering +that so eminent a friend of freedom was +nevertheless prepared to support a Dictatorship +as favourable to freedom. You will +remember that Luther and Calvin were always +prepared to abide by the plain words +of Scripture; but each was careful, at critical +points, to insist that his own interpretation +alone possessed validity. In that +atmosphere, a solution which strikes opposing +controversialists as just is not, at least +easily, to be found.</p> + +<p>This, I suggest, is the kind of environment +any plea for freedom must meet in +the modern state. Discussion of inessentials +can be ample and luxurious; discussion of +essentials will always, where it touches the +heart of existing social arrangements, meet +at least with difficulty and probably with +attack. It will find it extraordinarily hard +to organize supporters for its view, if this +opposes the will of those in authority. In +wartime, any plea for reasonableness is at +a discount; and it was at a discount in England +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[225]</span>during the general strike when the +government sought at once for the conditions +of a belligerent atmosphere. Attack +an interest, in a word, and you arouse passion; +arouse passion, especially where +property is concerned, and the technique of +<i>raison d’état</i> will sooner or later be invoked. +But liberty and <i>raison d’état</i> are +mutually incompatible for the simple reason +that <i>raison d’état</i> is a principle which +seeks, <i>a priori</i>, to exclude rational discussion +from the field. It seeks neither truth +nor justice, but surrender.</p> + +<p>It is a technique, I think, which almost +always comes into play when dangerous +opinion is challenged by the state. A good +instance of this is afforded by the trial of +the British Communists in 1925. No one +could seriously claim that their effort constituted +a serious menace to the state, for +they were a handful among millions, and +there was not even evidence that their +propaganda met with any success. Yet their +condemnation was a foregone conclusion, +granted the terms of the indictment. And +the habits of power were interestingly illustrated +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">[226]</span>by the judge who presided over +the trial. He had conducted the case with +quite scrupulous fairness, and had shown +no leaning to one side or the other until the +jury had rendered its verdict. He then made +an offer to the defendants that if they would +abandon their belief in Communism he +would adjust the sentence in the light of +that abandonment. He made the offer, I do +not doubt, in the utmost good faith and an +entirely sincere conviction that Communist +opinions are morally wicked. But that attitude +was precisely similar to the Roman +offer to the early Christians: they could +avoid the arena if they would offer but a +pinch of incense on the pagan altar. It was +precisely similar to the willingness of the +Inquisitor to mitigate his sentence where +there is confession of heresy and repentance. +Mr Justice Swift seemed to have no +realization at all that the defendants were +Communists in the light of an experience +of social life which, for them, was as vivid +and compelling as the Christian revelation +to its early adherents; that the offer he +made to them was mitigation of punishment +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[227]</span>in return for the sacrifice of their sincerity; +that the state, for him, was Hobbes’ “moral +God” at whose altar they must do reverence. +His views, of course, were the natural +expression of his own experience of life, +and, without doubt, sincerely held; but +they implied an inability imaginatively to +understand alien experience which is pathetic +in the limitation it involves. And +perhaps the supreme irony in the situation +was the fact that to be tried as Communists +was, for the defendants, perhaps the supreme +test of truth to which their faith +could be submitted.</p> + +<p>When Plato, in the <i>Laws</i>, set out a revised +version of his ideal policy for application +to the real world about him, he +surrendered his demand for the complete +communism which had distinguished his +Utopia. But he was still emphatic enough +about the need for equality to lay it down +that no member of his state should possess +property more than four times in amount of +that owned by the poorest citizens. The +ground of that drastic conclusion was quite +clear in his mind. Great economic inequalities +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[228]</span>are, as he saw, incompatible with a +unity of interest in the community. There is +no common basis upon which citizens can +move to the attainment of kindred ideals. +The lives of the few are too remote from +the lives of the many for disagreement +about social questions to be possible in +terms of peace, if the ultimate organization +of the society is not to be changed. The remoteness +means that the few will always +fear the invasion of their privilege, and +the many will envy them its possession. It +is not only, as I have said, that men think +differently who live differently; it is, essentially, +that men think antagonistically +who live so differently. That antagonism +is bound to result in violence unless the +domination of the many by the few is almost +complete, or is tempered by so continuous +a flow of concession as results, in +the end, in the effective mitigation of the inequality. +There cannot, in a word, be democratic +government without equality; and +without democratic government there cannot +be freedom.</p> + +<p>For the real meaning of democratic government +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[229]</span>is the equal weighing of individual +claims to happiness by social institutions. +A society built upon economic inequality +cannot attempt that sort of measure. Consciously +or unconsciously, it starts from +the assumption that there is a greater right +in some claims than in others. It cannot be +said that response to claims is made in +terms of justice. The nature of economic +inequality is a compulsion to respond to +effective demand, and this pays no regard +to science on the one hand, or to need upon +the other. It thinks only of the presence of +purchasing power and not of its connotation +in terms of social purpose. The whole +productive scheme is thereby tilted to the +favour of those who possess the power to +make their wants effective. There is cake +for some before there is bread for all. The +palace neighbours the slum. And those who +find that their wants do not secure attention +are, inevitably, tempted to an examination +of the moral foundations of such a +society. Their interest drives them to demand +its reconstruction in terms of those +wants. Liberty means, in such a context, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[230]</span>the power continuously to exercise initiative +in social reconstruction. The whole +ethos which surrounds their effort is that +of equality. They search for freedom for +no other end but this.</p> + +<p>I do not need to remind you that most +observers who have sought to estimate the +significance of the democratic movement +have seen that equality is the key to its +understanding. That was the case with +Tocqueville; it was the case with John +Stuart Mill; and, in a famous lecture which +reads now as though it was the utterance of +a prophet,⁠<a id="FNanchor_46_46" href="#Footnote_46_46" class="fnanchor">[46]</a> it was the case, also, with Matthew +Arnold. Broadly, their insight converged +towards a recognition of three +important things. They realized, first, that +in any society where power is gravely unequal, +the character and intelligence of +those at the base is unnaturally depressed. +The community loses by this in two ways. +The energy and capacity of which it might +make use are not released for action; and +the concentration of effective power in a +few hands means that the wishes, opinions, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">[231]</span>needs, of the majority do not receive sufficient +consideration. An aristocracy, +whether of birth, or creed, or wealth, always +suffers from self-sufficiency. It is inaccessible +to ideals which originate from +without itself. It tends to think them unimportant +if they are urged tactfully, and +dangerous if they are urged with vigour. It +is so accustomed to the idea of its own superiority, +that it is resentful of considerations +which inquire into the validity of that +assumption. It may be generous, charitable, +kind; but the surrounding principle of +those qualities is always their exercise as of +grace and not in justice. An aristocracy, in +a word, is the prisoner of its own power, +and that the most completely when men +begin to question its authority. It does not +know how to act wisely at the very moment +when it most requires wise action.</p> + +<p>It is not only that any aristocracy becomes +unduly absorbed in the consideration +of its own interests. Its depression of the +people has the dangerous effect of persuading +the latter of its necessary inferiority. It +is unable to carry on its own affairs with +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[232]</span>order and intelligence. It does not know +how to represent its wants with decision. +It develops a sense of indignation because +its interests are neglected; but it does not +know how to attach its indignation to the +right objects or, when so attached, how to +remedy the ills from which it suffers. An +aristocracy, in a word, deprives its subjects +of character and responsibility; and as the +revolutions of 1848 so clearly demonstrated, +while they can destroy, they have +never been taught how to create. The success +of the Puritan Rebellion and the American +Revolution was built upon the fact +that, in each case, the exercise of power +had been a habit of the general population; +in the one case in the management of Nonconformist +Churches, in the other in the +governance of local legislatures and township +meetings. In each case, a blind government +confronted men who knew how to +formulate their wants, and to organize their +attainment. But, in general, aristocracies do +not provide their subjects with this opportunity. +Their own effort is substituted for +popular effort, their own will for the popular +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[233]</span>will. The development of the total resources +at their disposal is postponed to the +preservation of their interest and convenience. +They dwarf the masses that they may +the better contemplate the stateliness of +their own state. But that, in the end, always +means that the vital power of the people is +absent at the moment when it is most required.</p> + +<p>The third weakness of aristocracies is +their inevitable impermanence. There is no +method known of confining character and +energy and ability to their own ranks. +These, where they emerge in the people, +will always seek the means of their satisfaction. +From this angle, few things are so +significant as the history of the British Labour +Party. It rose to power largely because +there was no room in the leadership of the +historic parties for self-made men who had +not sought success either as lawyers or as +business men. The result was that the +knowledge at the disposal of Liberals and +Conservatives, the significant experience +upon which they could draw for the making +of their policy, was always more narrow +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[234]</span>than the area of the problems they had to +meet. The lives of the typical Labour leaders +of the second generation, Keir Hardie, +Mr Ramsay MacDonald, Mr Arthur Henderson, +invariably show a period where the +regretful decision has to be taken against +further co-operation with a party which +cannot see the needs they see, which does +not desire service to the ideals they seek +to serve.⁠<a id="FNanchor_47_47" href="#Footnote_47_47" class="fnanchor">[47]</a> And men such as these make articulate +in the minds of all who have a sense +that their interests are neglected not only +the fact of negligence, the demand, therefore, +for satisfaction, but also the search +for the principles whereby satisfaction can +be attained. Their insight into an emphasis +to which little attention has been paid +grows by the volume of the experience they +encounter into a movement; and those who +have permitted the interest to be neglected +find that the old battle-cries no longer attract +its allegiance even when they are given +new form.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[235]</span></p> + +<p>It is curious to note that not even the impact +of defeat gives this lesson its proper +perspective to the defeated. English Liberalism +has suffered eclipse because, +broadly speaking, it was unable to discover +an industrial philosophy suitable to the +wants of the new electorate. It served admirably +the requirements of the manufacturer +and the shopkeeper who were +enfranchised in 1832. It gave them freedom +of trade, liberty of contract and full +religious toleration. But it never understood +either the fact of trade unionism or +the philosophy of trade unionism. Its attitude +to citizenship was atomic in character. +It saw the community as a government +on the one side, and a mass of discrete individuals +on the other. It assumed that each +of these, given liberation from the special +privilege of the <i>ancien régime</i>, had the full +means of happiness at his disposal; it accepted, +in a word, the principles of Benthamite +radicalism as absolute. But its error +was not to see that the community is not +merely a mass of discrete individuals. Jones +is not merely Jones, but also a miner, a railwayman, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[236]</span>a cotton operative, an engineer. +As one of these, he has interests to be +jointly promoted and jointly realized. A +philosophy of politics that is to work must +find a full place in the state for organized +workers to whom freedom in the industrial +sphere is, in its fullest implications, as urgent +and as imperative as freedom in the +sphere of politics or religion.</p> + +<p>The Liberal Party did not see this until +it was too late. Built largely on the support +of the Nonconformist business man, the interests +it understood were essentially his +interests; and to recognize the implications +of trade unionism, as Keir Hardie and his +colleagues did, was to invade the interests +upon which it was able to count for allegiance. +It was forced, obviously unwillingly, +into concessions like the Trades +Disputes Act of 1906; but its policy, as the +detailed history of the process of social legislation +from 1906 to 1914 makes clear +was, so far as it could, to mitigate social +inequality by recognition of individual +claims, and to build machinery for their +satisfaction which continued to neglect the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[237]</span>fact of trade unionism. When, after the +war, the remarkable growth of the Labour +Party showed how vast was the decline of +the Liberal hold upon the working-classes, +the Liberal leaders were driven, by the need +of self-preservation, to the invention of industrial +principles likely to prove attractive +to trade unionists. But these wore the air +of being produced for the occasion; and +they did not fit into the character of Liberal +Leadership. For the latter was quite unable +to attract to its ranks either working-men +candidates or trade union support; and the +emphatic declaration of a Liberal politician +that his party could not join the ranks of +Labour because the latter was built upon +the trade unions showed how unreal was +the body of industrial principles which Liberalism +had developed.⁠<a id="FNanchor_48_48" href="#Footnote_48_48" class="fnanchor">[48]</a> It remained an +atomic philosophy applicable to a world in +which employer and worker confronted +each other, as individuals, on equal terms. +The assumption was unjustified; and the +way lay open for the consolidation by Labour +of its growing hold upon the workers. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">[238]</span>Liberalism remained a middle-class outlook, +admirable in its exposition of basic +principle, but incapable of adjusting principle +to a medium with which its supporters +were largely unacquainted.</p> + +<p>In an interesting passage⁠<a id="FNanchor_49_49" href="#Footnote_49_49" class="fnanchor">[49]</a> Lord Balfour +has drawn attention to the fact that the success +of the British Constitution in the nineteenth +century—it is worth adding the +general success of representative government—was +built upon an agreement between +parties in the state upon fundamental +principles. There was, that is, a kindred +outlook upon large issues; and since fighting +was confined to matters of comparative +detail, men were prepared to let reason +have its sway in the realm of conflict. For +it is significant that in the one realm where +depth of feeling was passionate—Irish +home rule—events moved rapidly to the +test of the sword; and the settlement made +was effected by violence and not by reason. +That was the essence of the Russian problem. +The effort to transform a dull and corrupt +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[239]</span>autocracy into a quasi-constitutional +system came, like the efforts of Louis XVI +at reform, too late to affect men who had +already passed beyond any possibility of +compromise with the idea of monarchical +power. The concessions which the autocracy +was prepared to offer did not touch +the fringe of what the opposition regarded +as nominal. Nor was that all. Post-war Russia +illustrated admirably the truth of Mill’s +insistence that “a state which dwarfs its +men in order that they may be more docile +instruments in its hands, even for beneficial +purposes, will find that with small men no +great thing can really be accomplished; and +that the perfection of machinery to which it +has sacrificed everything, will in the end +avail it nothing, for want of the vital power +which, in order that the machine might +work more smoothly, it has preferred to +banish.”⁠<a id="FNanchor_50_50" href="#Footnote_50_50" class="fnanchor">[50]</a></p> + + +<h3 id="III_2"> + III +</h3> + +<p>I conclude, therefore, that the factor of +consent is not likely effectively to operate +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[240]</span>in any society where there is a serious unequality +of economic condition; and I assume, +further, that the absence of such +consent is, in the long run, fatal to social +peace. I do not deny that men will long +postpone their protest against that absence; +there are few wrongs to which men do not +become habituated by experience, few, +therefore, which, after the long passage of +time, they will not be persuaded are inherent +in nature. But such habituation is +never permanent; sooner or later someone +arises, like the child in the fairy-story, to +point out that in fact the emperor is naked. +If attention is drawn to some need which +is widely experienced, the denial that the +need is real by those who have not experienced +it, will not prove effective. Workingmen +never found it easy to believe that long +hours of work or low wages were the essential +conditions of industrial leadership +in the nineteenth century. Few Nonconformists +sympathized with Burke’s attitude +to parliamentary reform. Few American +trade unionists see in the use of the injunction +by the courts a method of preserving +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[241]</span>social peace in terms of a strict impartiality +between capital and labour. Opponents of +Mussolini are not moved by his plea that +he thinks only of the well-being of Italy. +Russian working-men have probably been +often tempted to the view that their Bolshevik +masters mistake Communist dogma for +social truth.</p> + +<p>To satisfy experience, in short, we must +weigh experience as we move to the making +of decisions. We cannot rule it out because +it is not ours; that is the error of autocracy +which insists upon the <i>a priori</i> rightness of +its own experience. We have to regard experience +as significant in itself and seek to +come to terms with it. If it is mistaken in +the implications it assumes, we have to convince +it of its error. Our business, hard as +it is, is the discovery of that need in the experience +which must be satisfied if successful +government is to be possible. For +successful government is simply government +which satisfies the largest possible +area of demand. It is not mysterious or divine. +It is simply a body of men making +decisions which, in the long run, live or die +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[242]</span>by what other men think of them. Their +validity as decisions is in that thought if +only because its content is born of what +the decisions mean to ourselves. All of us +are inescapably citizens, and, at some point, +therefore, the privacy in which we seek escape +from our obligation as citizens, will +seem unsatisfying. A crisis comes which +touches us; a decision is made which contradicts +something we happen to have experienced +as fundamental; we then judge +our rulers by the fact of that denial, and +act as we think its terms warrant.</p> + +<p>This, as I think, is the real pathway to an +answer to the kind of problem which students +of public opinion like Mr Lippmann +have posed. They are right in their analysis +of the constituent factors in its making, especially +in their emphasis of the difficulties +we confront in making that opinion correspond +to the realities it must satisfy. They +are right, further, I believe, in their emphasis +upon the vital connexion between +truthful news and liberty; nor do I doubt +that some of the remedies they propose +would have the valuable effect of increasing +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[243]</span>the degree of truth in the news. But all of +them, I think, miss out the vital fact that +truthful news is dangerous to a society the +actual contours of which its presentation +might seriously change. It would have been +a different war in 1914 without propaganda; +the history of political parties +would have been different if the principles +they announced were measured by their application +to total and not to partial experience. +It only pays to print the truth when +the interest responsible for publication is +not prejudiced thereby. My point has been +that in an unequal society that prejudice is +inevitable.</p> + +<p>And that prejudice, in its basic implications, +is incompatible with liberty. For what +it does is to emphasize some experience at +the expense of other experience, to enable +one need to make its way while another +need remains unknown. The policy of censorship +during the war meant that everyone +anxious for its prosecution to the end had +ample opportunity to express his view; the +pacifist, the Christian, the believer in peace +by negotiation, found it extraordinarily difficult +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">[244]</span>to speak. Clamant opinion was, as always, +taken for actual opinion; and policy, +particularly in the making of peace, was +built upon the assumption that no other +opinion existed save that which made itself +heard. To any observer with a grain of common +sense, it was obvious that no treaty +would be possible of application save as it +impressed Germany as just, and that where, +when the glow of war had gone, Germany +resisted its application, a public opinion +would not easily be found to demand the +imposition of penalties. Nothing is more +dangerous in the taking of decisions than to +assume that because people are silent, they +have nothing to say.</p> + +<p>Yet that is the underlying assumption of +much of our social life. We emphasize opinion +which satisfies those in power, we discount +opinion which runs counter to it; +above all we take it for granted that silence +and consent are one and the same thing. +Every one of these attitudes is a blunder; +especially is it a blunder, for which we pay +heavily, in matters of social importance. It +is extraordinarily dangerous, for example, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[245]</span>to assume that English public opinion disapproved +the General Strike because Mayfair +was indignant, the <i>Morning Post</i> hysterical, +and Sir John Simon coldly hostile; +for Mayfair and the <i>Morning Post</i>, even +with Sir John Simon, do not constitute +English public opinion. Our difficulty is +that they will be taken to constitute it when +it is to the interest of government to do so. +Such an equation is serious, and may well +be fatal, to any who think of social peace as +a thing really worth while to preserve.</p> + +<p>We must remember, too, what goes along +with a process of this kind. Those who +lament the ignorance of public opinion too +often forget that in an unequal society it is +necessary to repress the expression of individuality. +Every attempt at such expression +is an attempt at the equalization of social +conditions; it is an attempt to make myself +count, an insistence on my claim, an assertion +of my right to be treated as equal in +that claim with other persons. To admit +that I ought to have that freedom is to +deny that the inequality upon which society +rests is valid. And, accordingly, every sort +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[246]</span>of devious method, conscious and unconscious, +is adopted to prevent my assertiveness. +The most subtle, perhaps, is the +denial of adequate educational facilities; +for what, in fact, that does is to prevent me +from knowing how to formulate my claim +effectively, and unattention is the price I +have to pay for my ineffectiveness. My +claim, then, however real or just, because +it is clumsily presented fails to secure the +consideration it deserves. Or, again, the +view of a group may be simply discounted +where it fails to please the holders of +power. We are impressed, for instance, +when we hear that a government, say that +of Mr Lloyd George, is solid in its determination +not to give way to the miners; we +assume a careful weighing of the facts and +a decision taken in the light of their total +significance. But when we hear that the +miners are solidly behind their leaders, we +feel that this is a clear case of ignorant +and misguided men being led to their destruction +by agitators enjoying the exercise +of power. The whole machinery of news-making +is directed to the confirmation of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[247]</span>that impression; and the chance that the +miners’ claim will be considered equally +is destroyed by the weight which unequal +economic power attaches to the case against +that claim. The opinion represented by the +miners is not objectively valued. It is the +victim of a process of valuation the purpose +of which is to prevent, so far as possible, +an alteration of the <i>status quo</i>; and, +<i>mutatis mutandis</i>, this is true of all claims +which seek alteration in a significant degree.</p> + +<p>Now it is, I think, unquestionable that +in an unequal society, the effort of ordinary +men to attain the condition we call +happiness is hampered at every turn. The +power of numbers is sacrificed to the interest +of a few. The truth of the facts which +might make a just solution is distorted for +a similar end. Freedom, therefore, in an +unequal society has no easy task as it seeks +realization. For its search is not to realize +itself for its own sake, but for what, as it +is realized, it is able to bring. We seek +religious freedom for the truth our religion +embodies. We seek political freedom for +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[248]</span>the ends that, in the political world, we +deem good. We seek economic freedom for +the satisfaction brought by making an end +of the frustration to our personality an irrational +subordination implies. Men do not, +I believe, resent an environment when they +feel that they share adequately in its making +and in the end for which it is made. +But they are bound to be at least apathetic, +and possibly hostile, when the sense is wide +and deep that they are no more than its +instruments. That is the secret of the profound +allegiance trade unionism is able to +create. Its members see in its activities the +expression of the power for which they are +individually searching. Few states—it is +surely a significant thing—have ever won +from their subjects a loyalty so profound +as the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain, +or the trade unions in the cotton trades. +Even the blunders of their leaders meet +with a pardon far more generous than +would be extended to the political heads of +the state. The reason lies in the degree to +which the trade union expresses the intimate +experience of its members. And until +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[249]</span>the policy of the state meets that experience +with similar profundity conflict between +the government and the trade union +will rarely involve the desertion by the +members of the association they have +themselves made. What the government +will represent as disloyalty to the state will +seem to trade unionists a service which is +freedom.</p> + +<p>The point I am seeking to make was +summarized with the insight of genius by +Disraeli when he spoke of the rich and +poor as in fact two nations. For the poor, +their voluntary organizations evoke the +same kind of impassioned loyalty as a nation +struggling to be free is able to win +from its members. Anyone who reads, for +example, the early history of bodies like +the miners’ unions, and seeks to measure +the meaning of the sacrifices men were willing +to make on their behalf, will realize that +he is meeting precisely the same kind of +temper as he can parallel from the history +of the Italian struggle against Austria or +of the Balkan fight against Turkish domination. +What Keir Hardie did for the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[250]</span>miners of Ayrshire, what Sidney Hillman +has done for the garment workers of America, +are as epic and as creative, in their way, +as the work of Garibaldi and Mazzini. The +latter must have seemed at Vienna just as +wrong and as unwise as Keir Hardie seemed +to the mineowners fifty years ago, or Hillman +to the garment manufacturer accustomed, +in the classic phrase, to “conduct +his own business in his own way.” The +point in each case is the important one that +power is challenged in the interest of self-government; +that the focal point of conflict +is an inability on the part of those who +govern to interpret the experience of their +subjects as these read its meaning; with +the result, again in each case, that the imposition +of an interpretation from without +leaves those upon whom it is imposed with +the sense that their lives and their happiness +are instruments and not ends.</p> + +<p>What is the outcome of it all? For me, +at least, essentially that a society pervaded +by the fact of unequality is bound to deny +freedom and, therefore, to provoke conflict. +Its values will be so distorted, its apparatus +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[251]</span>for magnifying that distortion so complete, +that it is blinded to the realities which confront +it. We do not need to go far for proof. +The daily newspaper, the novel, the poet, +all confirm it. Compare Macaulay’s glorification +of Victorian progress with the picture +in Carlyle’s <i>Chartism</i>, or Dickens’ +<i>Hard Times</i>. Set the resounding complacency +of Mr. Gladstone’s perorations against +the indignant insight of William Morris +and Ruskin. Think of the America of President +Coleridge’s speeches, and the America +as bitterly described by Mr Sinclair Lewis. +Remember that Treitzschke’s eulogy of +blood and iron is a picture of the same Germany +as that which Bebel and Liebkneckt +sought to overthrow. Guizot’s era of the +<i>juste milieu</i> is the period of Proudhon and +Leroux, of Considerant and Louis Blanc, +all of them, however mistakenly, the protagonists +of a just society. Men think differently +who live differently. If we have +a society of unequals, how can we agree +either about means or ends? And if this +agreement is absent how can we, at least +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">[252]</span>over a considerable period, hope to move +on our way in peace?</p> + +<p>An unequal society always lives in fear, +and with a sense of impending disaster in +its heart. The effect of this atmosphere is +clear enough. We have only to examine the +history of France after the death of Louis +XIV to realize exactly what it implies. +Everyone who seeks to penetrate below the +surface sees some vast calamity ahead. It +may be a visitor like Chesterfield, a timid +lawyer like Barbier, an ex-minister like +D’Argenson, a philosopher like Voltaire. +The government itself, and those with +whom it is allied, has a perception that +something new is abroad. They fear the +novelty and they seek to suppress it, in the +belief that a bold front and an adequate +severity will stem the tide of critical scepticism. +But neither boldness nor severity +can stem that tide. The government falters +for a moment on the verge of concession: +there is an hour when the ministry of Turgot +seemed likely to inaugurate an era of +conciliation. It is too late because the price +of conciliation is the sacrifice of precisely +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[253]</span>the vested interests with which the government +is in partnership. So the ancient +régime moves relentlessly to its destruction. +It is forced to consult those whose experience +it had never taken into account in the +hope of salvation; and they find that, if +they are to fulfil, they must also destroy.</p> + +<p>That is, other things being equal, the +inevitable history of such societies. Their +mental habits resemble nothing so much as +the horrified timidity which persuaded +Hobbes to find in despotism the only cure +for social disagreement. They are afraid of +reason, for this involves an examination +into their own prerogative and, as at least +probable, a denunciation of the title by +which it is preserved. They are afraid of +concession, because they see in it an admission +of the weakness of their case. They +magnify scepticism into sedition and they +accuse even their friends who doubt the +virtue of severity of betraying the allegiance +which is their due. They cannot see +that men will not accept the state as the +appointed conscience of the nation unless +they conceive themselves to possess a full +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[254]</span>share of its benefits. They minimize the +sufferings of others, because they do not +have experience of them, and they magnify +their own virtues that they may gain +confidence in themselves. They distort history, +and call it patriotism; they repress +the expression of grievance and call it the +maintenance of law and order. In such a +society, the governors appear to their subjects +as dwellers in another world; and +communication between them lacks the +vivifying quality of fellowship. For the +truth of one party is never sufficiently the +truth of another for the members to talk a +common language. Every vehemence becomes +a threat; and by a kind of mad logic +every threat is taken as an act of treason. +The society is unbalanced because justice +is not its habitation. Even its generosity +will be resented because it has not known +how to be just.</p> + +<p>I do not want to be taken as implying +that violence is the inevitable end. I only +argue that the irrefutable and inherent +logic of a society where the gain of living +is not proportioned to its toil is one of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[255]</span>which violence is the inevitable end. We +have never any choice in history except +to follow reason wholly or, ultimately, to +expect disaster; and as we approach that +ultimate, the temper of the society will be +what I have described. For the rule of +reason in a community means that a special +interest must always give way before the +principles it discovers. And the rule of reason +is the only kind of rule which can afford +the luxury of freedom. That is, I think, because +an admission that the claims of reason +are paramount makes possible the +emergence of a spirit of compromise. The +basis of the society being just, men are not +prepared for conflict over detail; but when +the basis itself is unacceptable, conflict over +detail is magnified into a fight over principle. +In such a temper, men are always discussing +with their backs on the edge of a +precipice. Social discussion becomes Carlyle’s +ultimate question of “Can I kill thee +or canst thou kill me?” Every utterance +is necessarily a challenge; and suppressed +because so taken; every association is a +conspiracy and attacked because so imagined. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[256]</span>The only way to avoid so poisonous +an atmosphere is to be prepared to surrender +what you cannot prove it is reasonable +to hold. But, human nature being +what it is, men do not easily surrender what +they have the power to retain; and they +will pay the price of conflict if they think +they can win. They do not remember that +the price of conflict is the destruction of +freedom and that with its loss there go the +qualities which make for the humanity of +men.</p> + + +<h3 id="IV_2"> + IV +</h3> + +<p>I spoke a little earlier of the sense of +national freedom; and these lectures would +be even more incomplete than they are unless +I sought to dwell briefly on what such +freedom means. Let me take here as my +text a sentence from John Stuart Mill which +might well stand as the classic embodiment +of one of the outstanding ideals of the +nineteenth century. “It is” he wrote “in +general a necessary condition of free institutions +that the boundaries of governments +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_257">[257]</span>should coincide in the main with those of +nationalities.” I do not need to remind you +of the commentary history has written upon +that text. In its name were accomplished +the unity of Italy and Germany, the breakup +of the Turkish and Russian empires, the +separation of the Baltic peoples from the +domination of Russia. The economic motive +apart, no principle has been more fruitful +of war than the demand for national freedom. +Even yet, the day of its power is far +from ended; for every misapplication of +Mill’s principle in the peace treaties of +1919 has raised problems of government +which the world will find it difficult to solve +without the bloody arbitrament of the +sword.</p> + +<p>Now nationality is a subjective conception +that eludes definition in scientific +terms. As an Englishman, I can feel in my +bones the sense of what English nationality +implies; I feel intimately, for instance, the +things that enable me to claim Shakespeare +or Jane Austen or Dickens as typically +English, without being able to put into +words the things that make them so. Every +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_258">[258]</span>factor to which nationality has been traced, +race, language, common political allegiance, +is an excessive simplicity which betrays +scientific exactitude. It is true that +nationality is born of a common historic +tradition, of achievement and suffering mutually +shared; it is true, also, that language +and race, and even a common political allegiance, +have played their part in its formation. +It is obvious that there is something +exclusive about nationality, that the members +of any given nation have a sense of +separateness from other people which gives +them a feeling of difference, of uniqueness, +which makes domination by others so unpleasant +as to involve profound discomfort +to a point which may involve, even justly +involve, resistance to that domination. But +the fact remains that nationality is a psychological +phenomenon rather than a +juridical principle. It is in the former, not +the latter, sphere that we must seek to meet +its claims.</p> + +<p>Mill’s principle, if carried to its logical +conclusion, would mean that every nation +has a title to statehood. I want you to think +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_259">[259]</span>what that implies. The modern state is a +sovereign state, and in terms of that title +no will can bind its purpose but its own. +The legal meaning of sovereignty is omnicompetence. +The state may, as it please, +make peace or war. It can erect its own +tariffs, restrict its immigration, decide upon +the rights of aliens within its borders, without +the duty of consulting its neighbours, +or paying any attention to principles of justice. +States have done all these things. +There is no crime they have not been prepared +to commit for the defence or the extension +of their own power. A different +moral code has been applied in history to +their acts from what we insist upon applying +to individual acts, and it is, quite definitely, +a lower moral code. The history +of the nation which becomes a state and +insists upon the prerogatives of its statehood +is a history incompatible with the +terms upon which the maintenance of peace +depends. That exclusive temper which, as +I have argued, is the root of nationality +means a measurable loss of ethical quality +in those international relations which are +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_260">[260]</span>concerned with questions of power. You +have only to remember the acts which, during +the war, states attempted against one +another amid the applause of their subjects +to realize that the recognition of national +unity as a state means the destruction of +private liberty and the violation of international +justice, unless we can find means +of setting some limit to the powers of which +a nation-state can dispose.</p> + +<p>I am particularly concerned with the exercise +of those powers on their economic +side. The nation-state is expected to protect +the activities of its citizens outside its +own boundaries. Its prestige becomes associated +with its power to act in this way. So +Germany supports the Mannesman brothers +in Morocco, England the Rothschilds in +Egypt, America its citizens in half the territories +of South America. Nationalism becomes +imperialism and this means the +enslavement of lesser nations to the imperialistic +power. In its worst temper, its +eternal character was described by Thucydides +in that passage where he relates the +tragic end of Melos, a passage it would be +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_261">[261]</span>mere insolence either to summarize or to +praise. Even where imperialism has resulted +in measurable benefit to the subject +people, as with Great Britain in India, or +the United States in the Philippines, the +resultant loss of responsibility and character, +which an imposed rule implies, is +a heavy price to pay for the efficiency of +administration that has been conferred. +The noble phrase of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman +that good government is no +substitute for self-government seems to me +borne out by every phase of the history of +imperialism. It is the imposition of a system +of experience upon a people ignorant +of the character of that experience for ends +only partially its own, and by methods +which neglect unduly the relation of consent +to happiness in the process of +government. The classic case in my own +experience is that of Ireland. I cannot find +ground upon which to defend the habits of +Great Britain there. But those habits seem +to me the inevitable outcome of an assumption +that Great Britain was entitled to decide +alone the character of her own destiny.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_262">[262]</span></p> + +<p>Nationality, in a word, must, if it is to +be consistent with the needs of civilization, +be set in the context that matters of +common interest to more than one nation-state +cannot be decided by the fiat of one +member of the international community. +Modern science and modern economic organization +has reduced this world to the +unity of interdependence: the inference +from this condition is, as I think, the supremacy +of cosmopolitan need over the national +claim. A nation, that is, is not +entitled to be the sole judge of its conduct +where that conduct, by its subject-matter, +implicates others. It must consult with +them, compromise with them, find the +means of resolving the problem in terms of +peace. Everyone of us can think of functions +that, in the modern world, entail international +consequences by their inherent +character. We have passed the stage where +we can allow a state to fix its own boundaries +as it thinks best, without consultation +with other states. The same is true of +matters like the treatment of racial minorities, +of the scale of armaments, of the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_263">[263]</span>making of war and peace. Everyone can +see that matters like the control of the traffic +in noxious drugs, or of women and children, +of epidemics like cholera and typhus, +cannot be settled save as states co-operate +upon agreed methods of action. Most people +can see, at least in principle, that the +same thing applies to labour conditions, +to legal questions like the law of bills and +notes, or the rights of aliens before a municipal +court, or the incorporation of public +companies. An historian who surveyed the +history of international investment would, +I think, not illegitimately conclude that +there are principles applicable to its control +which can justly regard with indifference +the question of the nationality of the +investor or the state-power to which, save +in cases of default, he is certain to appeal. +The importance of the supply of raw materials +to international economic life forces +us to consider the deliberate rationing of +that supply, and the maintenance of a +stable world price level which thinks first +of cosmopolitan need, and, only after a +long interval, of national profit. A sane +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_264">[264]</span>man would, I suggest, conclude that if +bodies like the International Rail Syndicate, +or the Continental Commercial Union +in the glass industry, find it sensible to +transcend national competition by international +agreement, <i>a fortiori</i> the principle +applies to matters of world-concern.</p> + +<p>I am, of course, only illustrating the +problem.⁠<a id="FNanchor_51_51" href="#Footnote_51_51" class="fnanchor">[51]</a> The principle which seems to me +to emerge is the necessity for world-control +where the decision is of world-concern. The +inference from that principle is that the +rights of the state are always subject to, and +limited by, the necessarily superior rights +of the international community. State-sovereignty, +that is, in the sense in which the +nineteenth century used that term, is obsolete +and dangerous in a world like our +world. It gives an authority to the nation-state +which, in the light of the facts, is +incompatible with the well-being of the +world. It invokes the factor of prestige in +realms where it has no legitimate application. +It means that problems of which a +wise solution is possible only in terms of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_265">[265]</span>reason have to find a solution amid circumstances +of passion and power which obviate +any possibility of justice.</p> + +<p>For in the external, as in the internal, +sphere of the state, the choice is between +the use of reason and conflict. The use of +reason is the law of liberty; conflict means +the erosion of liberty. If states are to conduct +their operations always with the +knowledge in the background that the price +of disagreement is war, the consequences +are obvious. The atmosphere of international +affairs will be poisoned by fear, and +fear will bring with it the system of armaments +and alliances which, in 1914, issued +naturally and logically in the Great War. +That was the price properly paid for a +scheme of things which assumed that the +legal right of the state was unlimited, and +harnessed to the support of that legality +every primitive and barbarous passion by +which nationalism can degrade humanity. +We need not be afraid to assert that, in the +international sphere, the sovereignty of the +state simply means the right of any powerful +nation to make its own conception of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_266">[266]</span>self-interest applicable to its weaker opponents. +It is the old doctrine of self-help +clothed in legal form; the doctrine against +which law itself came as a protest in the +name of order and common sense. And +exactly as we cannot admit the right of a +man to make his own law in the internal +life of the community, so we cannot allow +the single nation-state to make its own law +in the wider life of the international community. +Because that is what the sovereignty +of the state ultimately means, the +sovereignty of the state is a conception +which outrages the patent needs of international +well-being.</p> + +<p>I conclude, therefore, that if the nation +is entitled to self-government, it is to a self-government +limited and defined by the demands +of a wider interest. I conclude that +its recognition as a state, if sovereignty be +involved in that recognition, is incompatible +with a just system of international relations. +It is, further, incompatible with the +notion of an international law regarded as +binding upon the member-states of the international +community. I need not dwell +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_267">[267]</span>upon the impossible difficulties in which +the defenders of this doctrine have found +themselves.⁠<a id="FNanchor_52_52" href="#Footnote_52_52" class="fnanchor">[52]</a> In their extreme form they +have even led a great jurist to write of war +as the supreme expression of the national +will.⁠<a id="FNanchor_53_53" href="#Footnote_53_53" class="fnanchor">[53]</a> I am unable to share such a view. +Where war begins, freedom ends. Where +war begins, the opportunity of making just +solutions of any problem in dispute is indefinitely +postponed. And I ask you to remember +that, although, under modern +conditions, a whole nation is implicated in +war after its beginning, that is not the case +either with its preparation or its declaration. +That is an affair of the agents of the +state whose interest in the action they take +may be totally at variance with the interest +of the people for whom they are taken as +acting. They may be serving private ambition, +a particular party; they may be acting +on false information or wrong conceptions. +My point is that they dispose of the whole +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_268">[268]</span>power of the state, and that there is no +means of checking their activity save the +very unlikely means of revolution. The full +implications of national sovereignty are a +license to wreck civilization. I cannot recognize +those implications as necessary to a +proper view of national freedom.</p> + +<p>I deny, therefore, that there is any qualitative +difference between the interests or +the rights of states, and the interests or +rights of other associations or individuals. +Their purposes are ordinary, human purposes +like any other: they are a means to +the happiness of their members. They +have, it seems to me, to be judged by exactly +the same principles as those by which +we judge the conduct of a trade union, or +a church, or a scientific society. They do +not constitute a corporate person living on +a plane different from, and having standards +other than, those of the individuals +of whom they are composed. I fully agree +that no decision ought to be taken about +them, in the making of which they do not +amply share. I fully agree, also, that limitations +imposed upon their activities must +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_269">[269]</span>pay scrupulous regard to the psychological +facts out of which they are built. I do not, +for instance, deny that the Partition of Poland +was a crime against Poland, or that +its inevitable result was to persuade millions +of human beings that a war for their +resuscitation was a morally justified adventure. +But I see no difference between the +Partition of Poland and, let us say, the +suppression in the community of a Communist +Party. Each seems to me an attack +upon a corporate experience which is wrong +because it does not persuade those who +share that experience to abandon its implications. +I do not advocate the supremacy +of international authority over the national +state in order to destroy the national state. +I advocate that supremacy as the sole way +with which I am acquainted to set the great +fact of nationalism in its proper perspective.</p> + +<p>My point is, then, that the fact of a nation’s +existence does not entitle it to the +full panoply of a sovereign state. Scotland +and Wales are both of them nations; +neither possesses that panoply; neither, I +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_270">[270]</span>think, suffers in moral or psychological +stature by reason of its absence. Neither, +let me add, do the Scandinavian peoples—perhaps +the happiest of modern communities—who +are only sovereign states +upon the essential condition that they do +not exercise their sovereignty. But there is +no more humiliation in that position than +in the position any government occupies +in the context of its own subjects. Power +is, by its very nature, an exercise in the +conditional mood. Those who exert it can +only have their way by making its objects +commend themselves, as, also, its methods +of pursuing those objects, to those over +whom it is exerted. The sovereign king in +Parliament could legally disfranchise the +working-classes in England; practically we +know that it dare not do so. Everyone in +England is aware of the grim, practical +limitations under which parliamentary +sovereignty operates; no one, I believe, +finds humiliation in limits such as we know.</p> + +<p>What is happening to the world is something +of the same sort. The Covenant of +the League of Nations is a method of limiting +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_271">[271]</span>the unfettered exercise of national sovereign +power. It is a painful and delicate +operation; how painful and how delicate +the timidity that has been characteristic of +the League’s history makes hideously manifest. +At any point in which the history of +the League is examined, elections to the +Council, operations of the Mandate system, +application of a plebiscite, resolution of an +international dispute, the statesmen of +Geneva have hesitated to act upon the logic +of the world’s facts. They have seen great +nations confronting them, and they have +feared that those nations might, if angered, +flout the League and go their own way. So +the League has fumbled and compromised +and evaded. The big states have controlled +it, and over almost all of its history there +has fallen, darkening it, the shadow of the +war.</p> + +<p>Yet experience of the League gives us +hope rather than despair. It took three centuries +to build up the sovereign national +state to that amplitude which proclaimed +its own disastrous character in 1914; it +would be remarkable indeed if a decade +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_272">[272]</span>full of memories and hates so passionate +as those of the last ten years sufficed to +overthrow its authority. We can at least +say out of the experience of those ten years +that remarkable incursions into that authority +have occurred. We have discovered a +great range of social questions the solution +of which is not relevant to the national +state or to the problems of power that state +first of all considers. We have been able, +that is, to devise subjects of government +in which national control is not the obvious +technique of operation. We have found, +further, that a platform can be constructed +at Geneva the nature of which throws any +possible aggressor upon the defensive, and +suggests the possible organization against +it of the rest of the civilized world. We are +finding ways of reaching the opinion of +citizens in different states over the heads +of their governments; of making those citizens +demand attention to League recommendations +in a way that a generation ago +would have been unthinkable. We have +shown, and this, in some ways, is the vital +discovery of our time, that men of different +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_273">[273]</span>nationalities can co-operate together in the +task of international government in such a +way as to sink the pettiness of a narrow +outlook before the greatness of the common +task. I know that Sir Arthur Salter +is a great Englishman; but I believe his +quality as an Englishman has been made +complete because he is above all a great +citizen of the world.</p> + +<p>I do not want to exaggerate the prospects +of achievement that lie before us; +one blunder in Moscow or Rome might +easily destroy every hope we may tentatively +cherish. I want merely to note that +the idea of a world-state is slowly, painfully, +hesitantly, taking shape before our +eyes. I want to emphasize the logic of that +state in an international community so inescapably +interdependent as this. I want +to draw therefrom the inference that national +sovereignty and the international +community confront one another as incompatibles. +Even the states which have most +carefully stood aloof from Geneva are in +a degree to which they are themselves unconscious +within the orbit of that influence +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_274">[274]</span>which its idea makes so compelling. There +is hardly one aspect of the League’s work +in which American citizens have not borne +their share; and I should hazard the suspicion +that there have been occasions when +“unofficial observers” have done considerably +more than observe unofficially. I do +not believe it is exaggeration to suggest +that the underlying motive of the Kellogg +Pact was compensation by America for her +abstention from the Geneva Covenant. The +Pact, by itself, is an empty declaration; +but its logic, like that of the Covenant, is +likely to take it much further in the direction +of international government than +its authors intended it should go. Even +Russia, in some sort the antipodes of Geneva, +has appeared there at Disarmament +Conferences; and even granted the rigour +of the premises upon which her life is +built, she cannot remain unrelated to the +structure of a world-order.</p> + +<p>I believe, accordingly, that we can retain +all that is essential to the freedom of +national life, and yet fully admit the implications +of the international community. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_275">[275]</span>We can leave to England, for instance, her +full cultural independence, her characteristic +internal institutions, her special contacts +with the Dominions she has begotten; +to sacrifice the predominance of her navy, +her right, by its means, to dictate the law +of the sea, would still leave her England. +She would still be England even if, to push +speculation to the furthest point, the Suez +Canal were internationalized and Gibraltar +returned to Spain. France would be not the +less France if the gold policy of her bank +were set by an international authority, if +she gave up her zeal for a conscript army, +if she built her frontiers upon the impalpable +solidity of friendship rather than the +shifting waters of the Rhine. I can see nothing +in the conceivable policy of a stronger +League which would take from her the +glory that has made her the Athens of the +modern world. Changes in law policy, a +different colonial outlook, a willingness to +improve the physical standards of labour, +an acceptance of novel and military forces +determined upon the basis of world safety +instead of national aggressiveness—it is +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_276">[276]</span>difficult to see in any of these things such +a blow at freedom as destroys the prospect +of national happiness. I can see grounds +for the view that an international authority +which forbade the teaching of French +in French schools; or altered the boundary +of France so as to make Marseilles Italian; +or sought the abrogation of the French +civil code with its profound impact on the +social customs of France; might reasonably +be regarded as invading what in a nation’s +life that nation only can claim to decide. I +can see that a nation might feel an international +authority to be oppressive if it +sought, say, by an immigration policy seriously +to alter the <i>mores</i> of a national life; +it should not impose Japanese immigration +on California any more than Great Britain +seeks to impose it upon Australia. I can +even see that oppression might be felt +where, in the building of an international +civil service, there was a sense that there +is discrimination against the members of +any particular nation, or that in composing +the committees of its government proper +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_277">[277]</span>attention is not given to the claims of some +particular power.</p> + +<p>The likelihood of any of these difficulties +becoming real is, surely, exceedingly small. +An international authority must presumably +be endowed with an average volume of +human common sense; and it is no more +likely than any other authority to invite +disaster. Indeed it is rather likely to fail to +embark upon experiments and decisions it +ought to make from an excessively delicate +sense of what some particular nation may +feel. International life in this realm is much +more likely to be a régime of example and +influence than one of legislative compulsion +simply because the penalties of national +dissent would strain too gravely the structure +of the authority which sought an unwise +imposition of its will. Here, once +more, the situation is very like that of the +internal life of a national state. There is +hardly any association the state could not +overthrow if it bent its energies to the task. +But, also, most states are wise enough to +realize that victories of this kind are empty +victories, that solutions imposed by force +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_278">[278]</span>have consequences invariably too grave to +be satisfactory in their application. Consent +has its full place in the international +sphere; and it is a safeguard of national +right as creative here, as elsewhere. Indeed +it may reasonably be argued that with +the disappearance of national sovereignty, +the factor of consent is likely to be far more +effective, far more genuinely related to the +realities of the world; than it is at the present +time. For consent between two powers +like, say, America and Nicaragua, or Great +Britain and Iraq has something in it which +partakes of the ironical spirit. It is consent +always in the knowledge that refusal to +agree will make no serious difference to +the result that occurs. But the surrender of +national sovereignty is the surrender of aggressive +power; and the nation can move +on its way the more freely since it knows +that it no longer lives in the shadow of +international injustice.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_279">[279]</span></p> + + + <h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IV"> + CHAPTER IV + <br> + THE OUTLOOK FOR LIBERTY + </h2> +</div> + + +<p>Every study of freedom is a plea for +toleration; and every plea for toleration +is a vindication of the rights of reason. +The chief danger which always confronts +a society is the desire of those who possess +power to prohibit ideas and conduct which +may disturb them in their possession. They +are rarely concerned with the possible virtues +of novelty and experiment. They are +interested in the preservation of a static +society because in such an order their desires +are more likely to be fulfilled. Their +ideas of right and wrong lie at the service +of those desires. The standards they formulate +are nothing so much as methods of +maintaining an order with which they are +satisfied; and those they repress or resent, +are equally methods of establishing a new +order in which different demands would +secure fulfilment.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_280">[280]</span></p> + +<p>But this is not a static world, and there +is no means of making it so. Curiosity, discovery, +invention, all of these jeopardize +by their nature the foundations of any society +to which their results are denied admission. +Toleration is therefore not merely +desirable in itself, but also politically wise, +because no other atmosphere of activity +offers the assurance of peaceful adjustment. +If power is held by a few, happiness will +be confined to a few also. Every novelty +will seem a challenge to that confinement; +and it will always accrete about itself the +wills of those who are excluded from a +share in its benefits. For this world is not +only dynamic; it is also diverse. The path +to happiness is not a single one. Men are +not willing to yield the insight of their experience +to other men’s insight merely because +they are commanded to do so. They +must be persuaded by reason that one vision +of desire is better than another vision, +the experience commended to them must +persuade and not enforce, if they are to +accept its implications with a sense of contentment.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_281">[281]</span></p> + +<p>This is, of course, a counsel of perfection. +Men enjoy the exercise of power; no +passion has a deeper hold upon human +impulse. The willingness to admit the prospect +of difference, the courage to see that +one’s private truth is never commensurate +with the whole truth, these are the rarest +of human qualities. That is why the friends +of liberty are always a minority in every +society. That is why, also, the maintenance +of liberty is a thing that has to be fought +for afresh every day, lest an inert acceptance +of some particular imposition make +the field of action accessible to a general +tyranny. For it is impossible to confine the +area in which freedom may be permitted +to some special and defined part of conduct. +Those who have fought for the right +to think freely in theology or the natural +sciences are not less certainly the ancestors +of political freedom. Without Bruno and +Galileo there would have been neither +Rousseau nor Voltaire.</p> + +<p>Liberty, therefore, cannot help being a +courage to resist the demands of power at +some point that is deemed decisive; and, +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_282">[282]</span>because of this, liberty, also, is an inescapable +doctrine of contingent anarchy. It is always +a threat to those who operate the +engines of authority that prohibition of experience +will be denied. It is always an +assertion that he who has learned from life +some lesson he takes to be truth will seek +to live that lesson unless he can be persuaded +of its falsehood. Punishment may +persuade some to abandon the effort; and +others may be driven by its imposition to +conceal their impulse to act upon the view +they take. But persecution, however thoroughgoing, +will never, over any long period, +be able to suppress significant truth. +If the principles that are urged by a few +correspond to some widespread experience +those who recognize the expression of their +experience will inevitably reaffirm it. It has +been the historic character of persecution +always to degrade the persecutor and to +strengthen the persecuted by drawing attention +to their claims. The only way to +deal with novelty is to understand it, and +the only way to deal with grievance is to +seek a remedy for the complaint it embodies. +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_283">[283]</span>To deny novelty or grievance a +right of expression is a certain, if, indeed, +an ultimate, validation of the truth they +contain.</p> + +<p>We have, it appears, to learn this anew +in each generation. We grant toleration in +one part of the field only to deny it in +another. We grant it in religion to deny it +in politics; we grant it in politics, to deny +it in economic matters. Each age finds that +the incidence of freedom is significant at +some special point, and there, once more, +the lesson of freedom has to be learned. +Each age makes some idol in its own image +and sacrifices upon its altar the freedom of +those who refuse it worship. Ultimately, +that denial is always made upon the same +ground: it is insisted that the doctrines or +practices attacked are subversive of the +civil order. The intolerance may be Catholic, +when it insists that a unity of outlook +is essential for the preservation of society; +or it may be Protestant when, as with Calvin +and the Socinians, it holds that the +blasphemous nature of the belief anathematized +destroys the reverence upon which +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_284">[284]</span>society depends. The essence of the persecuting +position is always that the persecutor +has hold of truth and that he would +betray its service by allowing it to be questioned. +He is able, accordingly, to indulge +in the twofold luxury not only of preserving +his own authority, but also of assisting the +persons attacked to enter, if they so choose, +the way of truth.</p> + +<p>When attacks on liberty are political or +economic, it is their motive rather than +their nature that changes. A political pattern +has the same hold upon its votaries +as a religion; the enthusiasts of Moscow +and of Rome differ only in the object of +their worship. An economic system defends +itself in just the same way: the devotees of +Marxism in its extreme form have never +doubted their right to impose their outlook +upon the recalcitrant, even at the cost of +blood. In a constitutional state like America +the suppression of liberty is called the +inhibition of license; in a dictatorship like +Moscow it is termed resistance to the admission +of incorrect “bourgeois” notions. +Always the effort is to insist upon an artificial +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_285">[285]</span>unity the maintenance of which is +necessary to the desires of those who hold +power. Suppression, doubtless, eases the +way of authority, for scepticism is always +painful, and to arrive at a conclusion after +careful testing of evidence always involves +the possibility that authority may have to +admit that its conclusions are mistaken.</p> + +<p>Yet it may still be maintained with some +confidence that the only adequate answer +to a principle which claims social recognition +is the rational proof that it is untrue. +It may even be argued that the world +would be a happier world if this were the +general theory underlying the activities of +society. Civilization is strewn with the +wrecks of systems which men at one time +held for true; systems, also, in the name +of which liberty was denied and pain needlessly +inflicted. A scrutiny of history, moreover, +makes it plain that the right to liberty +will always be challenged where its consequence +is the equalization of some privilege +which is not generally shared by men. The +more consciously, therefore, we can seek +that equalization as a desirable object of +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_286">[286]</span>social effort, the more likely we are to make +attacks upon liberty more rare, the evil results +of such attack less frequent. No man’s +love of justice is strong enough to survive +the right to inflict punishment in the name +of the creed he professes; and the simplest +way to retain his sense of justice is to take +away the interest which persuades him of +the duty to punish. Scepticism, it may be, +is a dissolvent of enthusiasm; but enthusiasm +has always been the enemy of freedom. +The atmosphere we require, if we are +to attain happiness for the multitude, is +one in which we have everything to gain by +the statement of experience and nothing to +lose by the investigation of its convictions. +That atmosphere is the condition of liberty +and its quality is light rather than heat. +For light permits of argument, and we cannot +argue with men who are in a passion. +Nothing is so likely to engender passion as +the perception that they are called to sacrifice +a privilege. The way, therefore, of freedom +is to arrange the pattern of social +institutions so that there are no privileges +to sacrifice.</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_287">[287]</span></p> + +<p>This kind of plea for liberty is built, +after all, upon the simple consideration +that the world is likely to be the more +happy if it refuses to build its institutions +upon injustice. And institutions are necessarily +unjust if the impression they continually +produce in the majority is a feeling +of envy and hatred for the results they impose. +There is something wrong in a system +which, like ours, maintains itself not +by the respect and affection it evokes, but +by the sanctions to which it can appeal. +What is wrong in them is their erection +upon the basis of passion and their insistence +that reason shall serve what that passion +is seeking to protect. So long as that +is true of our society, we shall continue to +deny the validity of all principles which +attack the existing disposition of social +forces. Those principles may often be +wrong; yet sometimes, at least, they represent +the certainties of the future. It is always +a hazardous enterprise to suppress +belief which claims to be rooted in the experience +of men.</p> + +<p>For no outlook which has behind it the +<span class="pagenum" id="Page_288">[288]</span>support of considerable numbers will ever +silently acquiesce in its reduction to impotence. +It will fight for its right to be heard +whatever the price of the conflict. Here it +has been urged that conflict of this kind is +usually unnecessary and frequently disastrous. +It has been claimed that truth can be +established by reason alone; that departure +from the way of reason as a method of securing +conviction is an indication always of +a desire to protect injustice. Where there +is respect for reason, there, also, is respect +for freedom. And only respect for freedom +can give final beauty to men’s lives.</p> + + +<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop"> +<div class="chapter"> + <h2 class="nobreak" id="FOOTNOTES"> + FOOTNOTES + </h2> +</div> + + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_1_1" href="#FNanchor_1_1" class="label">[1]</a> Acton, <i>History of Freedom</i>, p. 57.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_2_2" href="#FNanchor_2_2" class="label">[2]</a> As Mr. Aldous Huxley, for instance, does with a +quite unnecessary apparatus of scholarship in his +<i>Proper Studies</i>, pp. 1–31.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_3_3" href="#FNanchor_3_3" class="label">[3]</a> All this has been put in classic form by the late +Professor Hobhouse in his <i>Metaphysical Theory of +the State</i> (1918).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_4_4" href="#FNanchor_4_4" class="label">[4]</a> Cf. Barker, <i>Political Thought from Herbert +Spencer to Today</i> (1915), p. 80.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_5_5" href="#FNanchor_5_5" class="label">[5]</a> W. H. Taft, <i>Our Supreme Magistrate and His +Powers</i> (1921), pp. 102–3.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_6_6" href="#FNanchor_6_6" class="label">[6]</a> See my detailed discussion of the point in 34 +Michigan Law Review, p. 529.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_7_7" href="#FNanchor_7_7" class="label">[7]</a> 189 U.S. 253.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_8_8" href="#FNanchor_8_8" class="label">[8]</a> (1915) A. C. 120.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_9_9" href="#FNanchor_9_9" class="label">[9]</a> 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 122.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_10_10" href="#FNanchor_10_10" class="label">[10]</a> (1923) 2 K. B. 61.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_11_11" href="#FNanchor_11_11" class="label">[11]</a> Cf. my <i>Grammar of Politics</i>, pp. 541 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_12_12" href="#FNanchor_12_12" class="label">[12]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_13_13" href="#FNanchor_13_13" class="label">[13]</a> <i>Esprit des Lois</i>, Bk. XI, Chap. VI.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_14_14" href="#FNanchor_14_14" class="label">[14]</a> Second Treatise, Sec. 12.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_15_15" href="#FNanchor_15_15" class="label">[15]</a> Cf. my paper on American Federalism in the +volume entitled <i>The Dangers of Obedience</i> (1930).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_16_16" href="#FNanchor_16_16" class="label">[16]</a> Cf. Louis Post, <i>The Deportations Delirium</i> +(1921).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_17_17" href="#FNanchor_17_17" class="label">[17]</a> 250 U.S. 616.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_18_18" href="#FNanchor_18_18" class="label">[18]</a> See Taney’s <i>Report</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_19_19" href="#FNanchor_19_19" class="label">[19]</a> I. W. Graham, <i>Conscription and Conscience</i> +(1922), Chap. III.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_20_20" href="#FNanchor_20_20" class="label">[20]</a> <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 209.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_21_21" href="#FNanchor_21_21" class="label">[21]</a> <i>Ibid.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_22_22" href="#FNanchor_22_22" class="label">[22]</a> See, for example, Wickwar’s <i>Freedom of the +Press</i> for an account of judicial <i>mores</i> in the early +nineteenth century; and H. T. Buckle’s pamphlet on +the Pooley case for similar conduct thirty years +later.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_23_23" href="#FNanchor_23_23" class="label">[23]</a> Z. C. Chafee’s classic discussion in <i>Freedom of +Speech</i> is the best account of this unhappy period.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_24_24" href="#FNanchor_24_24" class="label">[24]</a> Thereby laying himself open to FitzJames +Stephen’s crushing attack.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_25_25" href="#FNanchor_25_25" class="label">[25]</a> Cf. my <i>Grammar of Politics</i>, Chap. VII.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_26_26" href="#FNanchor_26_26" class="label">[26]</a> Cf. my <i>Grammar of Politics</i>, p. 82 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_27_27" href="#FNanchor_27_27" class="label">[27]</a> A list is printed in Ernst and Segal, <i>To the Pure</i> +(1929), pp. 296–302.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_28_28" href="#FNanchor_28_28" class="label">[28]</a> This is brought out well in Mr Nokes’ excellent +book on the blasphemy laws.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_29_29" href="#FNanchor_29_29" class="label">[29]</a> 53 G. III, C. 160.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_30_30" href="#FNanchor_30_30" class="label">[30]</a> <i>Ut supra.</i></p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_31_31" href="#FNanchor_31_31" class="label">[31]</a> Cf. my <i>Grammar of Politics</i>, p. 554.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_32_32" href="#FNanchor_32_32" class="label">[32]</a> Cd. 1614 (1922).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_33_33" href="#FNanchor_33_33" class="label">[33]</a> Cf. my <i>Grammar of Politics</i>, pp. 256 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_34_34" href="#FNanchor_34_34" class="label">[34]</a> <i>Coppage</i> v. <i>Kansas</i>, 236 U.S. 1.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_35_35" href="#FNanchor_35_35" class="label">[35]</a> Cf. my <i>Authority in the Modern State</i>, Chap. V.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_36_36" href="#FNanchor_36_36" class="label">[36]</a> Calwell, <i>Life of Sir H. Wilson</i>, Vol. II, <i>passim</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_37_37" href="#FNanchor_37_37" class="label">[37]</a> <i>Le Droit Social</i>, Lect. III.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_38_38" href="#FNanchor_38_38" class="label">[38]</a> <i>The Observer</i>, 18 August 1929.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_39_39" href="#FNanchor_39_39" class="label">[39]</a> 277 U.S. 438.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_40_40" href="#FNanchor_40_40" class="label">[40]</a> Hammond, <i>The Skilled Labourer</i>, Chap. XII.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_41_41" href="#FNanchor_41_41" class="label">[41]</a> Cf. Mr Lippmann’s excellent analysis in <i>Liberty +and the News</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_42_42" href="#FNanchor_42_42" class="label">[42]</a> I take my account from a summary in the <i>Lantern</i> +(Boston), July 1929.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_43_43" href="#FNanchor_43_43" class="label">[43]</a> Lippmann, <i>Public Opinion</i>, pp. 379 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_44_44" href="#FNanchor_44_44" class="label">[44]</a> Cf. Lady Constance Lytton, <i>Prisons and Prisoners</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_45_45" href="#FNanchor_45_45" class="label">[45]</a> Cf. Frankfurter and Green, <i>The Injunction in +Labour Disputes</i> (1930).</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_46_46" href="#FNanchor_46_46" class="label">[46]</a> See the lecture on Equality in <i>Mixed Essays</i>.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_47_47" href="#FNanchor_47_47" class="label">[47]</a> See for instance, the very interesting letter of +Mr MacDonald to Keir Hardie in W. Stewart, <i>Life +of Keir Hardie</i> (1921), p. 92.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_48_48" href="#FNanchor_48_48" class="label">[48]</a> Mr Ramsay Muir in the <i>Nation</i>, 17 August 1929.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_49_49" href="#FNanchor_49_49" class="label">[49]</a> Preface to the World’s Classics edition of Bagshot’s +<i>English Constitution</i>, p. xxiii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_50_50" href="#FNanchor_50_50" class="label">[50]</a> <i>On Liberty</i> (People’s edition), p. 68.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_51_51" href="#FNanchor_51_51" class="label">[51]</a> Cf. my <i>Grammar of Politics</i>, Chap. XI.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_52_52" href="#FNanchor_52_52" class="label">[52]</a> Cf. Lauterpacht, <i>Private Law Analogies in International +Law</i>, for a brilliant discussion of this +question; and my paper ‘Law and the State’ in +<i>Economica</i>, No. 27, pp. 267 f.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a id="Footnote_53_53" href="#FNanchor_53_53" class="label">[53]</a> Kaufman, <i>Das Wesen der Volkerrechts</i>.</p></div> + +<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 78171 ***</div> +</body> +</html> |