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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77863 ***
+
+
+
+
+Transcriber's Notes:
+
+ Underscores "_" before and after a word or phrase indicate _italics_
+ in the original text.
+ Equal signs "=" before and after a word or phrase indicate =bold=
+ in the original text.
+ Small capitals have been converted to SOLID capitals.
+ Illustrations have been moved so they do not break up paragraphs.
+ Deprecated spellings have been preserved.
+ Typographical and punctuation errors have been silently corrected.
+
+
+
+
+ TECHNIQUE OF MODERN TACTICS
+
+ A STUDY OF TROOP LEADING
+ METHODS IN THE OPERATIONS
+ OF DETACHMENTS OF ALL ARMS
+
+ BY
+ P. S. BOND
+ _Major, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army_,
+
+ AND
+ M. J. McDonough
+ _Major, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army_.
+
+ THIRD EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED
+
+ _Adopted by the War Department as a preparation for the War College;
+ Bulletin 4, War Department, 1915._
+
+ _Adopted by the War Department as a text for garrison schools and in
+ the examination of officers for promotion. For issue to
+ organizations of the Army and the Militia; Bulletin 3, War
+ Department, 1914._
+
+ _Adopted by the War Department as one of the books recommended by
+ the Division of Militia Affairs for the use of the Organized
+ Militia. Circular No. 3, Division Militia Affairs, War Department,
+ 1914._
+
+ _Adopted as a text for the garrison course for all officers of the
+ Marine Corps--Orders No. 18, 1914, U. S. Marine Corps._
+
+ _Adopted as a text for use in the Marine Officers’ School, Norfolk,
+ Virginia._
+
+ _Adopted as a text for use in the Coast Artillery School, Fort
+ Monroe, Virginia._
+
+ _Recommended for study and reference in the National Guard Division
+ of New York; G. O. 4, 1914, Headquarters Division, N. G. N. Y._
+
+ _Used as a reference at the Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth,
+ Kansas._
+
+ _For sale by Book Department, Army Service Schools, Ft. Leavenworth,
+ Kan., by the U. S. Cavalry Association, Ft. Leavenworth, and by the
+ publishers._
+
+ The Collegiate Press
+ GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY
+ MENASHA, WISCONSIN
+
+ _Copyright 1916
+ by
+ P. S. BOND_
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE TO THIRD EDITION
+
+
+The cordial reception that has been accorded this volume by the Army,
+the Marine Corps, the National Guard, Military Schools, Training Camps,
+etc., has made necessary a second and third editions. The present
+edition embodies the essential modifications contained in the 1914 F.
+S. R., and the act of June 3, 1916.
+
+The chief reason leading to the publication of the volume in the first
+instance was the authors’ belief that the excellent instruction given
+at the Leavenworth Schools should be disseminated to the widest extent
+practicable among all those in the United States who are charged with
+preparation for the active physical defense of the nation. To assist
+in such an extension of military education, there seemed a need for a
+volume which would collect and make available within a small compass,
+the fruits of the study, observation, and experience of those officers
+who have unceasingly devoted themselves to the improvement of American
+tactical training.
+
+It is well that the traditional indifference of the American people
+toward military preparedness is in this day being rudely disturbed.
+Fate has hitherto been lenient to the growing American nation. It has
+not demanded the full or the logical forfeit proportionate to the
+laxity displayed by us in meeting former crises. In the Revolution,
+fate was indeed kind to the Colonists. In the War of 1812 it awarded
+us greatly more than our efforts merited, and seemed to overlook the
+pitiful inefficiency of our land forces. At sea the brilliant series of
+naval exploits was made possible only by the unfaltering determination
+of the naval chieftains serving under a supine administration that
+desired to lock up the navy in home ports. In the Mexican War, in
+permitting us to conduct two campaigns without the loss of a single
+battle, and in spite of a woeful deficiency in men, in equipment, and
+in administrative support, fate was more than indulgent.
+
+In the Civil War fate did not assess the full retribution of disruption
+of the Union, which it might logically have done, but it did exact for
+our neglect of preparation an immense payment in blood and treasure.
+This indulgence of fate may be not wholly a kindness. To the extent
+that it violates justice, it merely postpones the final reckoning and
+tends to lull its recipient into a false sense of national security,
+resulting from unearned success. The nation has not yet experienced the
+chastening discipline of defeat. In the future, therefore, we must not
+be surprised when full compensation is exacted if, as an adult people,
+we continue to misread the true import of history and persist in our
+traditional negligence.
+
+A people may not logically assume great responsibilities without making
+timely provision for the discharge of those responsibilities. Sooner or
+later an exact accounting will be had. History shows many examples of
+nations which have paid the price of their neglect. Despite the hopes
+of Utopians history shows that human nature undergoes no progressive
+change, and it shows to the present day no substantial diminution in
+the frequency of wars.
+
+That our people are beginning to manifest an intelligent interest in
+the condition of the National defense cannot fail to be gratifying
+to those whose lives are consecrated to such defense. Such interest
+is a vital support and an inspiration to the defenders. It is hoped
+that this volume may be of assistance in guiding to some extent the
+awakening interest.
+
+In the first edition the subjects of air craft and motor vehicles were
+not treated, because although it was recognized from the outset that
+these machines would exert a very great influence upon the conduct of
+war, their tactics was at the time largely speculative. Such is not the
+case today.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+ CHAPTER PAGE
+ Introduction 5
+ Organization of the U. S. Army. Road distances
+ and camp areas 10
+ I The preparation and solution of tactical problems.
+ Bibliography 19
+ II Field orders 37
+ III Patrolling 45
+ IV Advance guards 56
+ V Rear guards. Flank guards 70
+ VI Marches, Change of direction of march, Camps
+ and bivouacs 83
+ VII Convoys 95
+ VIII Artillery tactics 109
+ IX Cavalry tactics 144
+ X Outposts 170
+ XI Combat. Attack and defense 204
+ XII Organization of a defensive position 248
+ XIII Combat-Attack and defense of a river line, Withdrawal
+ from action, Rencontre or meeting engagement,
+ Delaying action, Pursuit, Night attacks,
+ Machine guns 277
+ XIV A position in readiness 308
+ XV Sanitary tactics 318
+ XVI The rifle in War 324
+ XVII Division tactics and supply 337
+ XVIII Air craft and Motor vehicles in War 381
+ Glossary 393
+ Index 405
+
+
+
+
+LIST OF PLATES
+
+
+ FIGURE FACING PAGE
+
+ I Diagrammatic analysis of tactical problems 31
+ II Typical arrangements of a convoy on the march 104
+ III Typical arrangements of a convoy on the march 107
+ IV Battery of artillery on the march 126
+ V Trajectories and cones of dispersion of shell
+ and shrapnel 134
+ VI Heavy field artillery in action 135
+ VII Cavalry mounted attack diagrams 163
+ VIII Diagram of an outpost 195
+ IX Infantry attack diagrams 219
+ X Standard field trenches 265
+ XI Illustrating Problem No. 1, Field Fortification 274
+ XII Illustrating Problem No. 2, Field Fortification 276
+ XIII Regimental sanitary troops in battle 320
+ XIV Diagram illustrating the evacuation system of
+ the medical department 322
+ XV A division on the march 342
+ XVI Camp of a division 358
+ XVII Diagram showing movements of the supply and
+ ammunition trains of a division during a march 368
+ XVIII Outline of the system for supplying an army in the
+ field 375
+
+
+
+
+ PAGE
+ INTRODUCTION 5-9
+
+ ORGANIZATION OF THE U. S. ARMY.
+ ROAD DISTANCES. CAMP AREAS 10-17
+
+ CHAPTER I
+ THE PREPARATION AND SOLUTION OF
+ TACTICAL PROBLEMS 18-36
+ PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE SOLUTION OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS (table) 18
+ THE APPLICATORY SYSTEM OF MILITARY INSTRUCTION 19
+ Kinds of problems. Map problems, terrain exercises,
+ war games, tactical walks and rides, field maneuvers 19-20
+ Problems of decision 19
+ Troop leading problems 19
+ Limitations of terrain exercises 19
+ General form and details of tactical problems 20-21
+ General and special situation 20
+ Estimate of the situation 21-22
+ The mission 21-22
+ General and special assumptions 22-23
+ Use of maps 23
+ Visibility problems 24
+ Principles of the Art of War 24
+ Military responsibility and the peace training of officer 24-25
+ Mental processes and methods in the solution of
+ tactical problems 25-28
+ Independent solutions. Personality of the author 26-27
+ Simplicity of plan 27
+ Advantages of the initiative 27
+ Reviews of solutions 27-28
+ Apparatus required 28
+ DIAGRAMMATIC ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS 29-31
+ SUGGESTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF PROBLEMS 31-33
+ BIBLIOGRAPHY 33-36
+
+ CHAPTER II
+ FIELD ORDERS 37-44
+ Forms for orders. Verbiage of orders, how acquired 37-38
+ Administrative and routine matters 38
+ What to include in orders 38-39
+ Detailed instructions usually inadvisable 38
+ KINDS OF ORDERS--verbal, written, dictated, individual,
+ combined 39
+ STRUCTURE OF ORDERS 39-40
+ The 5 paragraph form. Contents of numbered paragraphs 39-40
+ Marginal distribution of troops 40
+ Map references. Signature 40
+ Transmission of orders. Receipts for orders 40
+ Simple English. Short sentences. Arguments and discussions.
+ Ambiguity 40
+ Abbreviations. Description of localities 41
+ Amount of information contained in an order 41-42
+ Plan of the commander. Good and bad news 41
+ Trespassing upon the province of a subordinate 42
+ Division of responsibility with a subordinate 42
+ Equivocal language 42
+ Discussion of contingencies 42
+ Advantages of combined orders 42
+ Copies of dictated orders 42
+ Proper time for the issue of orders 42-43
+ PRELIMINARY OR PREPARATORY ORDERS. Assembly orders 43
+ Time required for preparation and circulation of orders 43-44
+ Motor cars and motorcycles 44
+ Consonance of orders and plans. Minor details 44
+ Duty of staff officers in the preparation of orders 44
+
+ CHAPTER III
+ PATROLLING 45-55
+ CLASSIFICATION OF PATROLS 45
+ COMPOSITION AND STRENGTH. Commander 45
+ Mounted and dismounted patrols. Auto patrols 45-47
+ Functions of mounted orderlies 46
+ Cavalry and aeronautical services 47
+ Motor cars for patrolling 47
+ INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PATROL LEADER BEFORE THE START 47-48
+ ACTION TAKEN BY THE LEADER BEFORE THE START 48-49
+ Preliminary arrangements, equipment, inspection
+ of patrol, etc. 48-49
+ CONDUCT OF PATROL 49-55
+ Formations. Gaits 49-50
+ Routes. Reconnoitering 50
+ Advance by “successive bounds” 50
+ Woods and defiles 50
+ Detachments from the patrol 50
+ Houses, villages and inclosures. Rendezvous 50
+ Corrections to maps 50
+ Watering the horses 50
+ Civilians preceding patrol 50
+ Combats--when justifiable 51
+ Prisoners 51
+ Lookout points. Halts. March outposts 51
+ Hostile patrols. Conduct in case of attack, etc. 51
+ Exchange of information with friendly patrols 51
+ Signs of the enemy 52
+ Accomplishment of the mission 52
+ Main and secondary roads 52
+ Interviewing inhabitants. Bivouac of patrol 53
+ Hearsay evidence 53
+ MESSAGES. How transmitted. Relay posts 53-54
+ Form and contents of messages 54
+ WHAT TO REPORT 54-55
+ Prompt transmission of information 54
+ First certain information of enemy 54
+ Final reports 55
+ Negative messages 55
+ Use of telegraph and telephone 55
+
+ CHAPTER IV
+ ADVANCE GUARDS 56-69
+ STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION 56-58
+ Advance guards of various organizations 56
+ Machine guns 56
+ Mounted men. Advance guard cavalry. Duties 56
+ Engineers. Signal and sanitary troops 56-58
+ Artillery. Field trains 57-58
+ Splitting organizations to form advance guard 57
+ Leading troops 57
+ Removal of obstacles to the march 58
+ THE START--DETAILS OF. Initial point 58
+ Route of advance guard 58
+ Outpost troops and cavalry 58
+ Assembly of field trains 58
+ Assembly in column of route. Elongation 59
+ ASSEMBLY ORDER 59
+ Calculations of times of starting for various organizations 59
+ Interference of routes 59
+ Subdivisions of advance guard 60
+ DISTANCES. How regulated 60
+ Cavalry advance guards 60-63
+ RECONNAISSANCE 60-62
+ Duty of cavalry. Independent and advance cavalry 60-62
+ Parallel roads 61
+ Flank guards 61
+ Mounted point 61
+ Method of “offset patrolling,” by infantry 61
+ Connecting files 61
+ Operations of advance cavalry 61-62
+ Communication with neighboring troops 62
+ Important features of the terrain 62
+ Places of advance guard and supreme commanders 62
+ March outposts 62
+ Control of means of communication 62
+ Civilians not to precede advance guard 63
+ Conduct of advance guard on meeting the enemy 63
+ Passage of bridges and defiles 63
+ OUTLINE OF SOLUTION OF SMALL ADVANCE GUARD PROBLEMS 64
+ EXAMPLES OF ADVANCE GUARD ORDERS 65-69
+
+ CHAPTER V
+ REAR GUARDS. FLANK GUARDS 70-82
+ STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF REAR GUARDS IN RETREAT 70-72
+ Rear guard on a forward march and in retreat 70
+ Delaying actions 70
+ Reinforcements of rear guard 70
+ Outpost troops 70
+ Infantry. Cavalry. Artillery 70-71
+ Use of motor cars in retreat and pursuit 71
+ Engineers--duties in retreat 71
+ Machine guns. Signal and sanitary troops 71
+ Field trains 71
+ Subdivisions of rear guard 71
+ Tactical employment of cavalry 72
+ DISTANCES--HOW REGULATED. Progress of main body 72
+ CONDUCT OF REAR GUARD 72-75
+ Contact with enemy. Observation of routes adjacent
+ to line of march or retreat 72
+ Covering the main body 72-73
+ Delaying actions of a rear guard 73
+ Reinforcement of rear guard 73
+ Requirements of a delaying position 73-74
+ Use of cavalry, artillery and machine guns in delaying
+ the enemy 73-74
+ Withdrawal of outpost 73
+ Masking the fire of the delaying position 73
+ Use of flank positions for delaying the enemy 73
+ Security of line of retreat from delaying position 73
+ Advantages of a single determined stand 74
+ Keeping rear guard in hand. Simplicity of movements 74
+ Latitude allowed rear guard commander 74
+ Special patrols from main body 74
+ Flank detachments 74-75
+ Retreating upon the front of a defensive position 75
+ Offensive tactics by rear guards 75
+ Supreme commander with rear guard 75
+ EXAMPLE OF RETREAT ORDER 75-77
+ STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF FLANK GUARDS 78-79
+ Movements in two columns 78-79
+ Cavalry, artillery, machine guns, signal and sanitary
+ troops and field trains with a flank guard 78
+ Wagon trains, routes and escorts. Double column 78-79
+ FLANK GUARDS-WHEN REQUIRED 79-80
+ Considerations influencing the decision as to use of
+ a flank guard 79
+ Examples of use of flank guards 80
+ Flank guards with large and small forces 80-81
+ Distance between flank guard and main body, obstacles
+ and communicating routes 80-82
+ Convoys, armored autos, auto transport for escort 80
+ Cavalry flank guards 81
+ CONDUCT OF FLANK GUARDS 81-82
+ Formation 81
+ Reconnaissance on exposed flank. Contact with enemy 81
+ Duty of cavalry with a flank guard 81
+ Bringing on a decisive engagement 81
+ Communication with other troops. Relation of flank guard
+ to rear guard 81-82
+ Reinforcement of flank guard 82
+ Latitude allowed flank guard commander 82
+
+ CHAPTER VI
+ MARCHES. CHANGE OF DIRECTION
+ OF MARCH. CAMPS AND BIVOUACS 83-94
+ ARRANGEMENT OF TROOPS ON THE MARCH 83-84
+ Marches in peace time 83
+ Intermingling of foot and mounted troops 83
+ Auto truck trains 83
+ Artillery and trains. Protection of long columns of wagons 83
+ Handling of trains on the march 83-84
+ Separation of trains and troops 84
+ Passage of defiles 85
+ Alternation of organizations in column on successive days 85
+ Advance guards, rear guards and leading troops 85
+ Distribution of troops in camp. Camping in column 85
+ Independent mission for cavalry. Prospects of combat,
+ and tactical use of cavalry 85
+ Place of the supreme commander 85-86
+ Distances between elements in a flank march 86
+ TIMES OF STARTING FOR FOOT AND MOUNTED TROOPS AND TRAINS 86-87
+ Early starting 86
+ Late arrivals in camp 87
+ Night marches 87-89
+ Movements by rail 87
+ Movements by motor car 87
+ TABLE OF TIMES OF SUNRISE AND SUNSET 88
+ MANNER OF STARTING THE MARCH 88-89
+ Initial point 88
+ Regulation of march. End of a day’s march 89
+ LENGTH AND SPEED OF MARCHES 89-90
+ Forced marches. Marches by green troops.
+ Progressive increase in length of marches.
+ Marches by large and small bodies 89
+ Halts 89
+ Days of rest 89
+ Speed of infantry, mixed troops, artillery and trains 90
+ TABLE OF RATES OF MARCH OF DIFFERENT ARMS 90
+ Elongation 90
+ Limiting depths of fords 90
+ Selection of route 90
+ Effects of temperature on marching troops 91
+ Artillery and trains in double column 91
+ CHANGE IN DIRECTION OF MARCH 91-92
+ Reasons for change of direction.
+ “Marching to the sound of the guns” 91
+ “Containing” a hostile force 91
+ Manner of changing direction. Use of a flank guard 91-92
+ Safety of trains in changing direction 92
+ EXAMPLE OF ORDER FOR CHANGE OF DIRECTION OF MARCH 92-93
+ CAMPS AND BIVOUACS 93-94
+ When to bivouac 93
+ Time of issue of halt order. Arrangements for
+ distribution of troops in camp 93
+ Requirements of a camp site 93-94
+ Assignment with reference to convenience of arrival and
+ departure. Camping in column 94
+ Use of buildings for shelter. Billeting 94
+
+ CHAPTER VII
+ CONVOYS 95-108
+ Definition of convoy 95
+ Vulnerability of a convoy. Limit of size. Straggling 95
+ Flank marches by convoys. Moving trains on separate road 95
+ General rule for position of covering troops 95
+ Subdivisions and dispositions of escort 95-96
+ Motor convoys 96
+ ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MARCH 96-97
+ Division of wagon train into sections 96
+ Classification of wagons-army, hired, impressed 96
+ Teamsters and wagonmasters 96
+ Order of march 96
+ Field train of escort 96
+ Police guards, infantry and cavalry 96-97
+ Duties of quartermaster in charge of wagons 96-97
+ THE ESCORT 97-100
+ Commander. Duty of escort 97-98
+ Strength and composition of escort 98-100
+ Infantry, cavalry, artillery, machine guns, engineers 98
+ Motor transport for escort. Armored cars. Motor cars
+ in pursuit of a convoy 98
+ DISTRIBUTION AND DUTIES OF TROOPS 98
+ Subdivisions and relative strengths 98-99
+ Reconnaissance. Dispersion of fighting force 99
+ Position of main body of escort 99
+ Infantry in middle of a long column of wagons 99
+ Police guards 99
+ Advance cavalry and scouting parties 99
+ Mounted and dismounted point 99
+ Establishing contact with friendly troops in direction of march 99
+ Selection of defensive positions and camp sites 99
+ Engineers 99
+ Flank guards 99-100
+ Method of employing the cavalry of the escort 100
+ Rear guards. Strength, position, duties 100
+ Routes available for the march. Considerations governing
+ the selection of route. Topography 100-101
+ Rate of progress and halts 101
+ Position and movements of the enemy 101
+ Defensive measures to be adopted. Lines of retreat.
+ Alternative routes 101
+ Localities favorable for the attack of a convoy 101
+ Change of direction of march. Precautions 101-102
+ Parking the convoy for the night. Measures for the
+ security of the camp 102
+ Change of route in moving back and forth 102
+ CONDUCT ON ENCOUNTERING THE ENEMY 102-103
+ Halting or parking the convoy prematurely 102
+ Localities favorable for defense 102
+ Details of defensive operations. Messages to adjacent
+ friendly troops 102-103
+ ATTACK OF A CONVOY 103
+ Cavalry, armored cars 103
+ Obstacles. Ambuscades 103
+ Usual method of attack 103
+ Damaging the convoy by long range fire 103
+ CONVOYS OF PRISONERS. Strength of escort. Conduct 104
+ EXAMPLE OF ORDER FOR THE MARCH OF A CONVOY 107-108
+
+ CHAPTER VIII
+ ARTILLERY TACTICS 109-148
+ MATERIEL OF LIGHT FIELD ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY 109-110
+ Subdivisions of a battery 109
+ Signal equipment. Ammunition 109
+ Description of carriage and sights.
+ Weights behind the teams 109-110
+ Front covered by fire of a battery 110
+ DISPOSITIONS OF ARTILLERY ON THE MARCH. Combat trains.
+ Field trains. Protection of long columns 110
+ Usual dispositions of battery and combat trains in action 110
+ Concealment from hostile observation 110-111
+ DUTIES OF ARTILLERY PERSONNEL. Artillery commander.
+ Regimental commander. Battalion commander.
+ Battery commander. Lieutenants. Reconnaissance officer.
+ Sergeants and corporals. Scouts, signalers,
+ agents and route markers 111-113
+ Artillery officers with supreme commander and with
+ advance guard 113
+ KINDS OF FIRE. Masked and unmasked fire. Defilade. Fire for
+ adjustment, demolition, registration and effect. Direct
+ and indirect laying. Salvo fire, continuous fire, volley
+ fire and fire at will. Time fire and percussion fire.
+ Area of burst of shrapnel. Fire at single and at
+ successive ranges, sweeping fire 113-116
+ Individual and collective distribution. Adjustment 116
+ Firing data. Aiming point 116
+ OBSERVATION AND CONTROL OF FIRE 117-118
+ Post of officer conducting the fire 117
+ Battery commander’s station and auxiliary observing
+ stations. Location 117
+ Aiming points. Location 117-118
+ TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY 118-128
+ Covering the front of a defensive position 118
+ Considerations governing the dispositions of
+ artillery in attack 118-120
+ Position in interval between frontal and enveloping attack.
+ Position on the flank 120
+ Ranges in attack and defense 120
+ Mission of the artillery 120-121
+ Operations of attacker’s artillery during the combat 120-121
+ Dispositions and employment of artillery in defense.
+ Dagger batteries 121-122
+ Advantages enjoyed by defense 121-122
+ Firing over heads of friendly troops 122
+ Movements to position 122
+ Supports for the artillery. Machine guns 122
+ Positions and duties of artillery. By whom prescribed 122
+ Positions “for immediate action,” “in observation,” and
+ “in readiness.” Subdivision for action 122-124
+ Positions of field and combat trains. Communication 123
+ Subdivision of battalions and batteries 123
+ Grouping of artillery. Fire control 124-125
+ Artillery “reserves.” Number of guns to place in action 123-124
+ Positions of ammunition trains 124
+ Special tasks and duties of artillery. Counter batteries,
+ infantry batteries, etc. 124
+ “Prepare for action.” “March Order” 125
+ Changes of position during action. Why, how and when made.
+ Economy of ammunition 125-126
+ Co-operation of artillery and other arms 126
+ Dummy emplacements 126
+ Horse artillery 126
+ Ranges, targets, ammunition employed, etc. 126
+ Oblique, enfilade and frontal fire 127
+ Moving across country to position 127
+ Supports for the artillery 127
+ Ranging and bracketing 127
+ ARTILLERY WITH ADVANCE GUARDS, REAR GUARDS AND OUTPOSTS 127-128
+ PROBLEM INVOLVING A BATTERY IN POSITION.
+ (Duties of personnel. B. C. and auxiliary observing
+ stations. Limbers and combat trains. Field trains.
+ Communication. Moving to position, etc., etc.) 128-130
+ BATTALION OR LARGER UNIT IN ACTION 130-132
+ EMPLOYMENT OF HEAVY FIELD ARTILLERY 132-136
+ Heavy field ordnance of U. S. Army.
+ Description, ranges, etc. 132-133
+ Organization and methods of fire 133-135
+ Tactical employment. Heavy artillery on the march 133-136
+ Motor transport 136
+ EMPLOYMENT OF MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY 136-138
+ Description of materiel. Tactical employment 136-138
+ ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY 138-139
+ Types of guns 138
+ Effective ranges 138
+ Observation and fire control 139
+ Function of anti-aircraft artillery 139
+ REMARKS CONCERNING THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
+ OF LIGHT FIELD ARTILLERY 139-143
+ Subdivision of battalions 140
+ Positions for artillery and combat trains 140
+ Concealment and covered approach to position 140-141
+ Positions between frontal and enveloping attacks 140
+ Positions for direct fire 140
+ Flash defilade 140
+ Ranges 141
+ Movements of artillery daring an action 141
+ Elimination of “dead space” 141
+ Reconnaissance 141
+ Battery commander’s station 141
+ Use of shrapnel and shell. Ranging 141
+ The artillery duel. Firing over heads of infantry 141
+ Proper targets for artillery. Co-operation with other arms 141
+ Place of artillery commander 142
+ General positions for artillery in attack and defense 142
+ Orders and instructions to artillery. What to include
+ and what to omit 142-143
+
+ CHAPTER IX
+ CAVALRY TACTICS 144-169
+ USES OF CAVALRY IN CAMPAIGN SUMMARIZED 144
+ Improper uses of cavalry. Division of the cavalry forces 144
+ Conservation of energies of men and horses. Night work 144
+ Wagons and pack trains with cavalry 144-145
+ Artillery, signal troops and mounted engineers with cavalry 145
+ Discretionary powers of the cavalry commander and nature
+ of the instructions to be given him 145-146
+ Cavalry in masses seeks hostile cavalry 146
+ ARMY AND DIVISIONAL CAVALRY. Duties 146
+ Cavalry with advance, rear and flank guards, outposts
+ and detachments 147
+ Cavalry in delaying actions 147
+ Independent cavalry. When employed 147-148
+ Principal duties of the independent cavalry.
+ Range of its operations.
+ Return to main camp at night 148
+ Contact with the enemy. Reports 148
+ Functions of cavalry and aeronautical services 149
+ Overthrow of hostile cavalry. How accomplished 149
+ Cavalry screen 149
+ Contact squadrons and strategic patrols 149-150
+ Means of transmitting information. Relay and collecting
+ stations, etc. Field wireless equipment, automobiles,
+ motorcycles, etc. 150
+ CAVALRY IN COMBAT 150-160
+ Methods of offensive action. Mounted charge, mounted
+ and dismounted fire action 150-151
+ Dismounted fire action, when employed 151
+ Advantages of remaining mounted. Mounted reserve 151-152
+ Mounted reconnaissance 152
+ Horse holders. Mobility and immobility of horses. Coupling 152
+ Time required to dismount and to mount 152
+ Horse artillery, machine guns and mounted engineers
+ with cavalry. Functions 152-153
+ Training of cavalry for pioneer work 153
+ CAVALRY vs. INFANTRY 153-155
+ Mounted attack on infantry, when practicable 153
+ The element of surprise 153
+ Dismounted action 153
+ Turning movements by cavalry. Delaying actions. Successive
+ positions. Harrassing the flanks of a pursuing enemy 153
+ Mounted reserves and combat patrols 154
+ Security of led horses 154
+ Requirements of a delaying position 154
+ Time to withdraw. How close enemy may be allowed to approach.
+ Provisions for withdrawal 154-155
+ CAVALRY vs. CAVALRY 155-160
+ Mounted action and element of surprise 155
+ Recall of detachments 155
+ Preparations for the charge 156
+ Ground scouts and combat patrols 156
+ Protection of the flanks 156
+ Dismounted fire action in support of mounted action.
+ Machine guns and artillery fire 156-157
+ Division of troops for mounted action. Formations and gaits 157-158
+ Approach to position 157-158
+ Formation for and delivery of charge. The rally 158
+ Duties of support, reserve and dismounted troops 158-159
+ Distance at which charge should be launched 159
+ Wheeled vehicles and pack trains during combat 159
+ Carriage of extra ammunition and rations 159
+ Most favorable times for attacking cavalry, mounted 159-160
+ SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS IN CAVALRY COMBAT,
+ FOR SMALL FORCES. Procedure and orders 160-164
+ THE CAVALRY SCREEN 164-165
+ Position and duties of cavalry screen 164-165
+ Offensive and defensive screens 165
+ Front covered by screen 165
+ Daily marching rates of cavalry and patrols 165
+ CAVALRY PATROLS 165-166
+ Classification and functions 165-166
+ Reconnoitering and screening patrols. Tactical and
+ strategical patrols 165-166
+ Nature of information gathered. Distances from supporting
+ troops, radii of action 165-166
+ Combat by patrols 166
+ Strength of patrols 166
+ LESSONS IN CAVALRY TACTICS FROM THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 166-169
+
+ CHAPTER X
+ OUTPOSTS 170-203
+ DUTIES OF THE OUTPOST 170
+ Outpost in advance and retreat, how detailed 170
+ STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION 170-174
+ General rule for strength of outpost 170
+ Considerations influencing the decision as to the
+ strength of an outpost 170-171
+ Front covered by a battalion as a support 171
+ Outposts in close and in open country. Influence of roads 171
+ Cavalry and other mounted troops on outpost. Effect on
+ strength of infantry outpost 171-172
+ Proportions of cavalry and infantry on outpost 172
+ Apportioning the burden of outpost duty 172
+ Duties and assignments of mounted troops on outpost 172
+ Artillery, machine guns, engineers, signal and sanitary
+ troops on outpost 172-173
+ Distribution of the elements of a large command in camp 173
+ Outposts of small commands 174
+ Use of cavalry for the security of a stationary command 174
+ Organization of a cavalry outpost 174
+ INTEGRITY OF TACTICAL UNITS, how preserved 175
+ Strength of supports, pickets, sentry squads and cossack posts 175
+ Assignment of patrols 175
+ LOCATION OF OUTPOST 176-177
+ Selection of camp site and outpost line 176
+ Distance at which enemy must be held 176
+ Line of resistance. Obstacles in front of position.
+ Security of the flanks 176
+ Outpost on the line of a river 176
+ Influence of roads on disposition of outpost.
+ Rule for general guidance 176-177
+ Contact with enemy 177
+ Special mounted patrols 177
+ Regimental sectors of an outpost line 177
+ LIMITS OF FRONT OF AN OUTPOST 177-178
+ Line of resistance 178
+ Security of the flanks. Detached posts 178
+ Interior guards 178
+ DISTANCES AND INTERVALS IN AN OUTPOST 179-180
+ Relative positions of reserve, supports and outguards 179
+ Position of outpost or advance cavalry 179
+ Depth of the outpost 179
+ Intervals between adjacent groups 179-180
+ Bivouac in line of battle 180
+ Guarding the line of a stream. Bridge heads 179-180
+ THE RESERVE. Post. Camping arrangements. Cavalry and
+ mounted men. Artillery. Field trains 180-181
+ Field trains of the supports 181-182
+ THE SUPPORTS. Strength and composition 181
+ Patrolling. Assignment of the cavalry of an outpost 181-182
+ Stations of supports. Influence of roads 182
+ Support sectors 182
+ Selection and preparation of defensive positions 182-183
+ Machine guns. Company wagons of supports 182
+ Fires, tent pitching, meals, etc. 183
+ Number of supports from one reserve 183
+ Numerical designation of supports 183
+ OUTGUARDS AND SENTINELS 183-184
+ Disposition of outguards. Influence of roads 183
+ Classification of outguards. Numerical designation 183
+ Strength of outguards 183
+ Intrenching, meals, concealment 184
+ Reliefs for sentinels and patrols 184
+ Examining posts 184
+ Communications within the outpost.
+ Clearing and marking routes 184
+ OUTPOST PATROLS 184-187
+ The cordon and patrol systems of outpost 184
+ Reconnoitering patrols. Strength and composition.
+ Radius of action. Functions 185
+ Special information patrols 185
+ Visiting patrols. Strength. Radius of action 185-186
+ Reliefs for patrols 186
+ Patrolling during the day 186
+ Patrols from the reserve 186
+ Patrolling by supports. Mounted men 186-187
+ Patrolling by pickets 187
+ Night signals 187
+ DAY AND NIGHT POSITIONS AND DUTIES OF ELEMENTS
+ OF AN OUTPOST 187-189
+ Posting of reserve, supports, outguards and sentinels.
+ Patrolling by day and by night 187-188
+ Preparation of defensive positions. Reconnaissance 187
+ Times for assuming day and night positions 187
+ Time of relief of outpost 188
+ Position and duties of advance cavalry by day and by night 188-189
+ Independent cavalry 189
+ Standing patrols 189
+ Cavalry patrolling on the flanks of an outpost 189
+ CAVALRY OUTPOSTS. Organization. Patrolling.
+ Disposition of horses 189-190
+ MARCH OUTPOSTS. Duties of cavalry 190-191
+ OUTPOST ORDERS 191-192
+ Issue of halt order 191-192
+ Orders of advance guard and outpost commanders 191
+ ESTABLISHING THE OUTPOST 191-193
+ Selection of camp site 191
+ Use of maps 192
+ Inspection of terrain by advance guard and outpost commanders 192
+ Inspection of outpost dispositions 193
+ Demolitions, obstacles, etc. 193
+ OUTPOST SKETCHES AND TABLES 193-196
+ OUTLINES OF HALT AND OUTPOST ORDERS 196-199
+ VERBAL OUTPOST ORDER FOR A SMALL COMMAND 199-200
+ ADVANCE GUARD COMMANDER’S HALT AND OUTPOST ORDER 200-202
+ OUTPOST COMMANDER’S FIRST ORDER 202-203
+
+ CHAPTER XI
+ COMBAT. ATTACK AND DEFENSE 204-247
+ GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 204-205
+ Offensive and defensive tactics 204
+ Raw troops, how utilized 204
+ Passive defense--when to be adopted 204
+ Fire superiority keynote of success 204
+ Dispersion, complicated movements, half-hearted measures 204
+ Uncovering the line of retreat and main body 204-205
+ Concentration of forces. Detachments--when permissible 205
+ Containing and covering forces 205
+ Night attacks. Night movements--when advisable 205
+ Examination of terrain preliminary to attack. Use of maps 205
+ Attacks offering no chance of success 205
+ Reconnaissance during an action 205
+ Integrity of tactical units 205
+ FORMS OF ATTACK 205-209
+ Advantages and disadvantages of frontal and of
+ enveloping attacks 206
+ Considerations influencing the decision as to form and
+ direction of attack 206-207
+ Considerations influencing selection of flank
+ to be enveloped 207
+ Best dispositions for attacking infantry the
+ primary consideration 207
+ Envelopment of both hostile flanks 207
+ Combined frontal and enveloping attacks 208
+ Relative strengths of frontal and enveloping attacks 208
+ Density of firing line in attack 208
+ Strength of supports 208
+ Envelopment to be provided for in first deployment 208
+ Convergence of fire. Separation of frontal and
+ enveloping attacks 209
+ ADVANCING TO THE ATTACK.
+ Formation in approaching the position 209
+ Establishment of fire superiority 209
+ Conjunction of movement 209
+ Cover for advancing troops. Contact during advance 209
+ ASSIGNMENT OF FRONTS 210-211
+ Covering the defender’s line 210
+ Landmarks and guiding points. Routes 210
+ Extension of defender’s line to meet enveloping attack 210
+ Orders to the attacking columns 210-211
+ RESERVES 211-212
+ Need for reserves. The influence of their judicious
+ use on the course of the action 211
+ Concentration of force at critical point 211
+ Relative strength of reserves in attack and in defense 211
+ Battalion supports. Regimental and brigade reserves 211
+ Employment of local reserves 211
+ Supports and reserves in defense. Position of the reserves.
+ Division of reserves 211
+ Distances of supports and reserves from firing line 212
+ PROTECTION OF THE FLANKS 212-214
+ Necessity for protecting the flanks. Means employed 212
+ Obstacles and field of fire 212
+ Cavalry and mounted men on the flanks 212
+ Infantry flank combat patrols. Strength and duties 212-213
+ Duty of flank organization in providing protection 213
+ Supreme commander’s orders for flank protection 213
+ Reconnaissance to the front 213
+ Strength of flank combat patrols 213-214
+ Ammunition in combat trains. When and by whom issued.
+ Time required for issue. Disposition of empty wagons
+ of combat trains 214
+ Ammunition trains 214
+ Amount of ammunition available. How carried on the march 214
+ Expenditure of ammunition in attack and defense.
+ Long range fire in attack and in defense 214-215
+ Economy of ammunition 215
+ INTRENCHMENTS, OBSTACLES, ETC. 215-217
+ Intrenchments in attack and in defense. Time required for
+ construction. Objects of intrenchments in defense 215-216
+ Location and construction of firing and of support trenches.
+ Communicating trenches 216
+ Duties of engineers in intrenching, removal of obstacles, etc. 216
+ Obstacles, nature and effect. Artificial obstacles 216-217
+ Location of obstacles 217
+ Obstacles to be covered by fire of defense 217
+ Measuring and marking ranges 217
+ FRONTAGES IN ATTACK AND IN DEFENSE 217-219
+ Density of the firing line. Strength of supports and reserves 219
+ THE ATTACK OF A POSITION BY A SMALL INFANTRY FORCE 219-225
+ Disposal of trains 220
+ Examination of terrain 220
+ Orders to subordinates 220
+ ATTACK ORDER FOR A SMALL FORCE 220-223
+ Routes to position 223
+ Issues of ammunition 223
+ Description of localities 223-224
+ Hostile artillery fire 224
+ Hostile reinforcements 224
+ Designation of enemy’s line 224
+ Engineers, signal and sanitary troops in attack 224
+ Dressing stations and slightly wounded stations 224-225
+ REMARKS CONCERNING AN ATTACK BY A REINFORCED BRIGADE 225-228
+ Reconnaissance and preliminary orders of the commander 225
+ Locating the enemy’s flanks 226
+ Considerations prior to attack 226
+ Assignment of regiments 226-227
+ Conjunction of holding and enveloping attacks 227
+ Provisions for the protection of the flanks 227
+ Duties of cavalry prior to and during the action 227
+ Dispositions of attacking artillery 227-228
+ Reserve, station and functions 228
+ Engineers, signal and sanitary troops and trains during
+ the attack. Dressing stations. Empty ammunition wagons 228
+ Station of the supreme commander during the action 228
+ REMARKS CONCERNING ADVANCE GUARD ACTION 228-230
+ Occasions for committing the advance guard to action 228-229
+ Considerations influencing the decision as to action to be
+ taken on meeting the enemy. Mission of the command
+ as a whole 229
+ Advantages of frontal attack by advance guard 229
+ Pursuit of a defeated enemy 229-230
+ Supreme commander with advance guard 230
+ THE OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION 230-236
+ Considerations prior to the occupation of a defensive
+ position. Requirements of a position 230-231
+ Position in readiness, when to be assumed 231
+ Positions farther to front or rear. Rencontre engagements 231
+ Time that small forces can maintain themselves
+ against larger 231-232
+ Effect of improvements in weapons on power of defense 232
+ Delaying and decisive actions 232
+ Posts of artillery in defense 232
+ Obstacles in front of position. Passages for counter attack 232
+ Probable direction of hostile attack. Posting the reserve 232
+ Division of defensive line into sections and assignment
+ of troops 232-233
+ Use of machine guns in defense 232-233
+ Openings in the line 233
+ Detailed organization of sectors or sections 233
+ Density of firing line. Influence of terrain 233
+ Employment of large reserves in defense 233
+ Long range fire in defense 233
+ Delaying actions. Cavalry in delaying actions 233
+ Marking ranges and clearing field of fire 233-234
+ Preparation of position for defense 234
+ Disposal of empty wagons of combat trains 234
+ Direct fire by artillery in defense 234
+ Duties of the cavalry 234
+ Security to the front during the preparation
+ and occupation of the position 234
+ Machine guns. “Dagger” batteries 234-235
+ Flank combat patrols. General and special measures for
+ the security of the flanks 235
+ Security of the lines of retreat 235
+ Employment of reserves and engineers in the preparation
+ of the position 235
+ Dressing station 235
+ Strong reserves characteristic of active defense 235
+ Advanced posts and advanced positions 235
+ THE COUNTER ATTACK 236-238
+ Eventual assumption of offensive 236
+ Employment of the general reserve 236
+ Concealment of troops for counter attack 236
+ Time and manner of delivering the counter attack 236-237
+ Supporting points in rear of line 237
+ Artillery of defense 237
+ Selection of terrain to favor counter attack 237
+ Suggestions as to the conduct of an active defense 237-238
+ Aggressive employment of large reserves by defense 237
+ Most favorable opportunity for a counter-stroke 238
+ ORDER FOR A FRONTAL ATTACK BY AN ADVANCE GUARD 238-242
+ ORDER FOR AN ENVELOPING ATTACK BY A REINFORCED BRIGADE 243-244
+ ORDER FOR THE OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION 244-247
+
+ CHAPTER XII
+ THE ORGANIZATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION 248-276
+ Field and permanent fortification 248
+ Defensive principles applicable to portions of
+ an extended line 248
+ Small forces in intrenched positions 248
+ PRINCIPAL REQUIREMENTS OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION 248-249
+ The rôle of field fortifications 248-249
+ Selection of the general line from a map 249
+ Study of details on the terrain 249
+ Reconnaissance by supreme and subordinate commanders 249
+ Necessity for an examination of the position from the
+ enemy’s point of view 249-250
+ Matters to be considered in the organization of
+ a defensive position 250
+ Field of fire for the infantry 250
+ Utilization of natural advantages of the terrain 250-251
+ Thin defensive lines. Dummy trenches 251
+ Location and disposition of the fire trenches 251
+ Offsets, re-entrants and salients 251
+ SUPPORTING POINTS. Location with reference to the terrain 251-252
+ Closed works and rifle trenches in field fortification 252
+ Development of frontal and cross fire 252
+ Covering the foreground with fire. Expedients by which
+ this may be accomplished 252-253
+ Cross fire of adjacent supporting points.
+ Distribution of trenches. Removal of obstructions to
+ fire. Construction of obstacles to enemy’s advance 252-253
+ Traverses. Head cover. Grenade nets. Concealment of trenches 253
+ Intervals in the defensive line. Discontinuity of trenches 253-254
+ Defensive lines in close country 254
+ Division of front into sections or sectors 254
+ Relative strength of firing line, supports and reserves 254
+ Purpose of field fortifications. Misuse thereof 254-255
+ Supporting points by whom organized 255
+ Portable and park tools 255
+ DETAILS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF A REGIMENTAL SECTOR 255
+ DETAILS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF A BATTALION SUPPORTING POINT 255-256
+ Relative importance of different tasks 256-257
+ Relative importance of near and distant fields of fire
+ under various conditions 257
+ Distance of battalion supports behind the firing line 257
+ Natural cover. Support and communicating trenches 257
+ Utilization of natural features 257
+ Posts and duties of and cover for reserves 257
+ Division of reserves 257
+ Position fire by supports and local reserves 257-258
+ Study of ground in location of trenches. Avoidance
+ of unnecessary labor 258
+ Removal of trees from field of fire. Filling ravines
+ and hollows 258
+ Blending the works with the terrain for concealment 258
+ Employment of engineers. Demolitions, obstacles,
+ communications, measuring ranges, head and overhead
+ cover, observing stations, splinter-proofs, works in
+ the second line of defense, etc. 258
+ Division and assignment of engineer troops. Tasks of
+ engineers, by whom indicated 258-259
+ Provisions for security to front and flanks during the
+ organization of the position 259
+ Location of artificial obstacles. Distance in front
+ of firing line 259
+ ORGANIZATION OF THE FLANKS 259-260
+ Protection of the flanks, natural obstacles,
+ fortifications and reserves 259
+ Flanks “in the air” 259
+ Refusing the line to provide security for a flank 260
+ Echeloning trenches to the rear on a flank 260
+ Concealment of works. Utilization of natural features
+ of the terrain 260
+ TABLE OF PERSONNEL, TIME AND TOOLS REQUIRED FOR VARIOUS
+ TASKS IN CONNECTION WITH FIELD FORTIFICATION 261
+ Character of soils 261
+ Simple standing and completed standing trenches 261
+ Size of individual tasks. Reliefs for workers 261-262
+ BRITISH EXPERIENCES IN TRENCH WARFARE 262-266
+ Concealment of trenches from hostile artillery 262
+ Limited field of fire better than loss of concealment 262
+ Concealment of obstacle 262
+ Accuracy of modern artillery fire 262
+ Narrow and deep trenches 262
+ Position of support trenches 262
+ Communicating trenches 262-263
+ Parados. Dummy parapets 263
+ Recesses under parapet. Ceiling 263
+ Head and overhead cover. Loopholes 263
+ Night attacks 263
+ Frontal and cross fire. Straight trenches 263
+ Dressing stations. Latrines. Drainage 263-265
+ Machine guns 265
+ Cover and concealment for reserves 265
+ Barbed wire entanglements. Concealment 265
+ Repair of obstacles. Supports for wire 265
+ Illumination 265
+ Echeloned trenches on the flanks 265
+ Conspicuous features of field fortifications
+ as seen by aeronauts 265-266
+ Resemblance of modern trench warfare to siege operations 266
+ Power of defense of modern weapons 266
+ Need for artillery support 266
+ The guiding principles of field fortification 266-267
+ PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN FIELD FORTIFICATION, WITH SOLUTIONS 267-276
+
+ CHAPTER XIII
+ COMBAT--ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE,
+ WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION, RENCONTRE, DELAYING
+ ACTION, PURSUIT, NIGHT ATTACKS, MACHINE GUNS 277-307
+ Mountain ranges, deserts and rivers as obstacles 277
+ ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE 277-288
+ Use of existing bridges and fords,
+ hasty bridges and ferries 277-278
+ METHODS OF ATTACK OF A RIVER LINE. Turning movement.
+ Turning movement combined with holding attack.
+ Frontal attacks at one or more points 278-279
+ Object of feint attack 279
+ Conditions to be fulfilled by feint 279-280
+ Conditions to be fulfilled by main attack 280-281
+ Necessity of deceiving the defender 281
+ Counter attack by the defender 281
+ CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK 281-283
+ Reconnaissance. Seizure of bridges 281
+ Outpost troops, cavalry and artillery 281-282
+ Time for attack. Night movements 281
+ Camping prior to attack 281
+ Artillery positions in attack of a river line 281-282
+ Machine guns. Position fire by infantry 282
+ Duties of the outpost 282
+ Launching the feint and main attack 282
+ Demonstrations on flank by cavalry. Pursuit 282
+ Position of reserve 283
+ Engineer reconnaissance. Construction of crossings 283
+ DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE 284
+ General dispositions for and essential elements of
+ a river line defense 284
+ Alternative plans for defense. Counter attacks 284
+ Prompt detection of enemy’s intentions 284
+ Need of mobile reserves 284
+ Aerial reconnaissance 284
+ ORDERS FOR ATTACK OF A RIVER LINE 285-288
+ WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION 288-295
+ Occasions for withdrawal 288
+ Difficulty of withdrawing troops committed to an action 288-289
+ Sacrifice of a portion of the command to save the remainder 289
+ Withdrawal under cover of darkness 289
+ Intrenching the advanced position in attack 289
+ Removal of trains, ambulance company and wounded 289
+ Requirements of supporting position to be occupied
+ by the reserves 289-290
+ Masking fire of supporting position 290
+ Flank positions 290
+ Long range fire. Cover. Getaway 290
+ Distance to rear of supporting position 290
+ Artillery fire during withdrawal. Withdrawal of artillery.
+ Ammunition trains 291
+ General rule for withdrawal 291
+ Order of withdrawal of troops and conditions influencing same 291
+ Rendezvous positions for retiring troops 292
+ Stream crossings 292
+ Utilization of several lines of retreat 292
+ Successive supporting positions to cover withdrawal 292
+ Formation of and troops for rear guard 292
+ Cavalry and signal troops 292-293
+ Transmission of orders 293
+ EXAMPLES OF VERBAL ORDERS FOR A WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION 293-295
+ RENCONTRE OR MEETING ENGAGEMENT 295-297
+ Advantages of prompt action. Seizing the initiative 295
+ Reconnaissance prior to attack 295
+ Greatest possible force to be launched at enemy 296
+ Direction of deployment and of attack.
+ Machine guns and artillery 296
+ General duties of an advance guard. Proper strength
+ and distance from main body 296-297
+ Maneuvering zone for main body 296
+ Place of the supreme commander on the march 297
+ DELAYING ACTION 297-300
+ Offensive and defensive tactics in delaying actions 297
+ Use of long thin lines and weak supports 297
+ Necessity for a secure line of retreat 297
+ Delay of enemy, how accomplished 297
+ Necessity for good field of fire at mid and long ranges 297-298
+ Occupation of the geographical crest 298
+ Relative difficulty of withdrawing infantry and cavalry 298
+ Deceiving the enemy as to the strength of the position.
+ Risk involved 298
+ Assumption of the offensive. Obstacles 298-299
+ Number of successive positions to be occupied 299
+ Advantages of a determined stand 299
+ Danger of decisive engagement 299
+ Selection and preparation of delaying positions 299
+ Tendency of troops to break straight to rear 299
+ Flank positions. Distance between positions.
+ Step by step defensive. Rallying 299
+ Demolitions. Ambuscades 299
+ Line of an unfordable stream as a delaying position 300
+ Seizure of a position well to the front.
+ Orderly occupation of the position 300
+ Artillery and machine guns in delaying actions 300
+ Issue of ammunition for delaying actions 300
+ PURSUIT 300-302
+ Energetic pursuit necessary to reap fruits of victory 300
+ Fresh troops necessary for pursuit 301
+ Prompt initiation of pursuit 301
+ Cavalry, horse artillery and motor cars 301
+ Continuous contact with enemy 301
+ Gaining the flanks and rear 301
+ Seizure of bridges and defiles 301
+ Pursuit on a broad front 301
+ ORDER FOR A PURSUIT 301-302
+ NIGHT ATTACKS 302-304
+ Essential features of night attacks 302-303
+ Simplicity of plan 303
+ Importance of preliminary reconnaissance 303
+ Infantry, cavalry and artillery in night attacks 303
+ Badges and watchwords 303
+ Depth of attacking formations. Formed reserves 303
+ Night attacks by large and by small forces 303
+ Assembly for attack 303
+ Precautions to insure surprise of the enemy 303-304
+ Point of attack. False attacks and demonstrations 304
+ Rendezvous for assembly after the attack 304
+ Collection of scattered forces in case of failure 304
+ Time for delivery of attack 304
+ Night attack of a bridge head 304
+ Protection against night attacks. Field of fire 304
+ Artificial illumination. Alarm signals. Obstacles.
+ Close ranges for fire 304
+ Use of the bayonet. Machine guns 304
+ MACHINE GUNS. 304-307
+ Extensive use in modern warfare 304
+ Effective ranges and rates of fire.
+ Need for skilled operators 304-305
+ Pack and motor transport 305
+ Chief purpose of machine guns 305
+ Ammunition supply. Most favorable targets 305
+ Artillery vs. machine guns 305-306
+ Offensive and defensive use. Mobility 305-306
+ Immobilization of machine guns 305
+ Dispersion of guns 306
+ Supports for machine guns 306
+ SPECIAL CASES IN WHICH MACHINE GUNS MAY
+ BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED 306-307
+
+
+ CHAPTER XIV
+ A POSITION IN READINESS 308-317
+ When to assume a position in readiness. Examples 308
+ CONSIDERATIONS PRIOR TO THE OCCUPATION OF A
+ POSITION IN READINESS 308-309
+ Cross roads. Cover. Lines of retreat 309
+ Reconnaissance of enemy and his possible lines of approach 309
+ Intrenching. “Framework” of position 309-310
+ Influence of ill-advised intrenchments 309-310
+ Posts of the artillery and combat trains. Firing data 310
+ Concentration of the forces. Advanced posts 310
+ Obstacles in front of the position 310
+ Duties of the cavalry 311
+ Security provided by the other arms 311
+ Issue of ammunition. Field trains and sanitary troops 311-312
+ Security of lines of retreat 312
+ Short movements to a position in readiness 312
+ ORDER FOR A POSITION IN READINESS WHILE ON THE MARCH 312-314
+ FIRST ORDER FOR A RETREAT, DELAYING THE ENEMY 314-317
+
+ CHAPTER XV
+ SANITARY TACTICS 318-323
+ SANITARY PERSONNEL AND MATERIEL WITH COMBATANT TROOPS 318
+ GENERAL DUTY OF THE SANITARY UNITS 318
+ Capacities of ambulance companies and field hospitals 319
+ SANITARY STATIONS DURING COMBAT. Battalion collecting
+ stations. Regimental aid stations. Dressing stations.
+ Slightly wounded stations. Location, duties, etc. 319-320
+ POLICE OF THE BATTLEFIELD. Transportation of wounded 321-322
+
+ CHAPTER XVI
+ THE RIFLE IN WAR 324-336
+ Location of firing line with respect to geographical
+ and military crests 324
+ The skyline 324
+ Grazing effect and plunging fire 324
+ Firing line in retreat or in delaying actions 324
+ Location of supports with respect to firing line 324
+ Defilade on reverse slopes. Formations of supports 324-325
+ Position fire in attack and in defense 325
+ RELATIVE VULNERABILITIES OF DIFFERENT FORMATIONS
+ UNDER AIMED AND UNDER SWEEPING FIRE OF SMALL ARMS 325-326
+ Effects of oblique and enfilade fire 326
+ Squad and platoon columns. Successive thin lines 326-327
+ Formations in approaching combat position.
+ Proper time for deployment 326
+ Effect of slopes on vulnerability 326-327
+ Deployment of squad and platoon columns 326-327
+ ADVANCE UNDER SHRAPNEL FIRE 327-329
+ Area covered by burst of shrapnel 327
+ Vulnerability of lines of skirmishers and of squad columns 327-328
+ Effect of oblique and enfilade fire, errors in range,
+ direction and burst 327-328
+ Squad columns, when employed 328
+ Vulnerability of lines of platoon columns 328
+ Use of successive thin lines, advantages and disadvantages 328-329
+ Slow, controlled fire. Rapid fire. Volley fire 329
+ Maximum and minimum rates of fire 329
+ Tendency of troops to fire rapidly 329
+ Ranges at which fire is opened in attack and in defense.
+ Firing on cavalry and artillery 329-330
+ Number of rounds to fire. Density of firing line 330
+ Effect of visibility of target and prominent landmarks
+ on dispersion and distribution 330
+ Methods of designating and identifying indistinct targets 330-331
+ Use of combined sights. Battle sights 331
+ Targets for attacker and for defender 331
+ Concentration of fire on critical points. How accomplished 331
+ Assignment of fronts. Covering the enemy’s line with fire 331-332
+ Overlapping and switching fire. Platoon sectors 331-332
+ Too great refinement to be avoided 332
+ DUTIES OF PERSONNEL IN A FIRE FIGHT. Major. Captain.
+ Chief of Platoon. Platoon Guide. Squad leader 332-334
+ Orders of the Captain 334
+ A CATECHISM OF THE RIFLE IN WAR 334-336
+
+ CHAPTER XVII
+ DIVISION TACTICS AND SUPPLY 337-380
+ MARCHES 337-344
+ Length of a day’s march. Marching rate. Rest days 337
+ Strength of advance guard. Splitting tactical units 337
+ Different arms and auxiliary troops with an advance guard 337
+ Position of division commander 337
+ Initial point of march and time of departure, in march orders 337
+ Rotation of units in position in column during a march 337-338
+ Division cavalry on the march. Time of starting. Duty 338
+ Distribution of artillery on the march. Artillery with
+ advance guard. Heavy field artillery.
+ Combat trains of the artillery 338-339
+ Artillery with flank guards or in two column formation 339
+ Artillery in rencontre engagements. Right of way for
+ firing batteries 339-340
+ Engineer troops and bridge trains on the march 340
+ Road space and capacities of light and heavy bridge equipage 340
+ Distribution and duties of signal troops on the march.
+ Telegraph and telephone lines 340-341
+ Time of starting the march. Details of the start. Assembly
+ of trains. Escort for trains. March outposts 341
+ ORDER FOR THE FORWARD MARCH OF A DIVISION 342-344
+ COMBAT 344-353
+ Time required for deployment of a division 344
+ FRONTAL AND ENVELOPING ATTACKS 344-345
+ Separation of attacks. Coordination. Launching the
+ attack. Obstacles of terrain 344-345
+ TURNING MOVEMENTS. Advantages and disadvantages 345
+ Plan of attack based on best dispositions of the infantry 345
+ Development and attack orders 346
+ FRONTAGES FOR DEPLOYMENT OF LARGER UNITS 346
+ Timing the advance. Signals 346
+ Distance from hostile line at which brigades deploy 346
+ Position of reserves 346-347
+ Depth of deployment. Distribution in depth 347-349
+ CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING DEPTH OF DEPLOYMENT 348
+ Dispositions of artillery 349
+ Release of trains on entering combat 349
+ Posts of artillery and small arms ammunition 349
+ Sanitary and engineer trains 349
+ Ambulance companies and field hospitals.
+ Stations and duties 349-350
+ Messages during combat 350
+ DUTIES SUBSEQUENT TO COMBAT. Evacuation of wounded.
+ Police of battlefield. Replenishment of ammunition
+ and rations. Prisoners. Trains. Instructions to
+ commander of line of communications 350-351
+ ORDER FOR A DIVISION ATTACK 351-353
+ CAMPING 353-360
+ TACTICAL AND SANITARY REQUIREMENTS OF A CAMP SITE 353-354
+ EXAMPLE OF A DIVISION CAMP ILLUSTRATED AND DISCUSSED 354-356
+ Routine orders in connection with camp. Issues,
+ disposal of empty wagons, etc. 356
+ ORDER FOR CAMPING AND OUTPOSTING OF A DIVISION 357-360
+ SUPPLY 360-380
+ AUTHORIZED TRAINS OF A DIVISION 360-361
+ Bakery train. Engineer train 361
+ SOURCES OF SUPPLY FOR ARMIES IN THE FIELD 361
+ Purchase and requisition. Methods 361-362
+ Authority of field Commander 362
+ Living off the country 362
+ Base depot. Advance supply depot. Means of transportation 362-367
+ Zone of the advance 364
+ Multiple lines of communication 364
+ The supply unit 364
+ Classes of trains. Ammunition, supply and field trains.
+ General supply trains. Combat trains 365-368
+ Access to trains by troops. Excessive size of trains 365
+ Methods of replenishing trains 366-367
+ Rations carried by individual soldiers and in trains 366-367
+ General supply column. Flying depots and refilling points 367
+ Personnel of field transport service 368
+ EXAMPLE OF THE SUPPLY OF A DIVISION ON THE MARCH,
+ WITH DISCUSSION 368-370
+ Problem of the supply of an advancing division
+ mathematically illustrated 370-372
+ Refilling points. Location 372
+ Maintenance of advance supply depot well to the front
+ Railroads and steamboats 372
+ Field bakery on line of communications 372
+ GENERAL RULES FOR GUIDANCE OF SUPPLY OFFICERS 372-373
+ Supply of Sherman’s army in the Atlanta campaign,
+ and of Grant’s army in the campaign of '64 373
+ Protection of supply depot 373
+ Camping place of division trains.
+ Issues of rations and ammunition 373-375
+ Access to trains by troops 375
+ Supplies for the cavalry 375
+ Arrangement of division trains on the march according
+ to probable needs 376
+ Stations of trains during combat 376
+ Rates of march of wagon trains 376-377
+ Supplies obtained locally 377-378
+ Miscellaneous data on supply and transportation 378-380
+ Table of rations, kinds, weights, number of rations
+ to an army wagon, a railroad car, ship’s ton, etc. 379
+
+ CHAPTER XVIII
+ AIR CRAFT AND MOTOR VEHICLES IN WAR 381-390
+ History of development 381
+ Precursors of air craft of today 381
+ Aeroplanes and airships 381
+ Development of scope in military operations 381
+ Tendency to exaggerate importance and minimize limitations 381
+ CHARACTERISTICS 381-383
+ Aeroplanes, flying radius, speed, carrying capacity,
+ starting and landing, susceptibility to hostile fire 381-382
+ Dependability for immediate service 381
+ Machine and engine fragile 382
+ Care and repair of aeroplanes. Need of highly trained personnel 382
+ Development. Types of craft, destroyers, battleplanes,
+ artillery spotters, scouts 382
+ Equipment. Organization. Motor trucks as tenders 382
+ Airships, flying radius, speed, ability to hover over spot,
+ carrying capacity, effect of rain and darkness 382-383
+ Reconnaissance, wireless equipment 383
+ Target afforded 383
+ Large crews required 383
+ Bases of operation 383
+ Balloons. Hydroaeroplanes 383
+ Armor and armament of aircraft 383
+ DUTIES OF AIRCRAFT. Strategic and tactical reconnaissance 383-384
+ Verification by actual contact 384
+ Prevention of hostile reconnaissance 384
+ Direction of artillery fire. Air raids 384
+ Messenger and staff duty 384
+ PRACTICABLE HEIGHTS FOR OBSERVATION 384-385
+ Altitude and speed demanded by reconnaissance 385
+ Fire of small arms and anti-aircraft artillery 385
+ Use of field glasses 385
+ Relative vulnerabilities of airships and aeroplanes 385
+ DEFENSIVE MEASURES 385-386
+ Command of the air. Tactics of aircraft 385
+ Anti-aircraft artillery. Methods of fire 385-386
+ POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF AIR CRAFT 386
+ THE MOTOR CAR IN WAR 387-390
+ Tactical movements of troops by auto 387
+ Facility of loading, dispatch and unloading 387
+ Difficulty of interrupting motor transport 387
+ Concentration of reserves at critical points 387
+ Motor cars in retreat and pursuit 387
+ Motor transport for artillery 387
+ Armored cars 387
+ Overseas operations 388
+ Motor cars for staff transportation 388
+ Motor trucks for supply. Advantages over animal transport 388
+ Motor kitchens 388
+ Effect of motor transport on distance of an army from its base 388
+ Economic size of motor trucks for supply 388-389
+ Use of motor trucks on railroads 389
+ Motor ambulances 389
+ Service of information. Motor patrols 389
+ Motors as adjunct to aero service 389
+ Necessity for motor cars in modern war 389
+ Employment of motor cars in groups of the same type 389-390
+ Animal transport for field and combat trains 390
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+
+The almost studied indifference of the American people toward
+reasonable preparation for the contingency of war makes more urgent the
+duty of all officers or those who hope to become officers, to do all
+in their power in advance to prepare themselves and those committed to
+their care for the immense responsibilities that will rest upon them
+when the storm bursts upon the nation.
+
+The modern theory of war as exemplified in the practice of the
+so-called military nations, is that all the resources of the
+state--moral, physical and intellectual--should be at the disposal
+of the government for use in case of war. War is the most critical
+condition of the modern state with its highly developed and peculiarly
+sensitive and vulnerable industrial and commercial systems. For the
+successful prosecution of a conflict on which the very fate of the
+nation may depend, every ounce of its strength should be available.
+The aim is to strike immediately with all the force at the nation’s
+command. That state is best prepared which can most rapidly bring to
+bear its resources in men and materials. In this modern theory is
+involved the principle that every able-bodied male citizen owes to the
+state the obligation of service. This principle is not incompatible
+with democratic ideals and is recognized in theory by our own
+constitution. Personal service to be truly effective must be universal,
+compulsory and regular. It constitutes the true and only solution of
+the problem of adequate defense. All other solutions are makeshifts
+resulting from the attempt to get something without paying the cost.
+All have been tried again and again by the United States and other
+countries, and all have invariably been found wanting.
+
+War today is one of the most highly developed of the arts--the field of
+the expert and the professional. This being the case there is more than
+ever before a need for adequate preparation in advance of the outbreak
+of war. The unprepared people or government who now-a-days find
+themselves on the brink of hostilities with a nation that is trained
+for the struggle, must expect inevitably to pay a severe national
+penalty.
+
+The preparation of a nation for war is of two kinds; one of material
+things, the construction of forts, arsenals, fabrication of weapons,
+munitions, etc., the other the training of its people. While both are
+essential, the latter is the more important, as well as the more
+difficult to provide. The American people, in fancied security, have
+steadfastly refused to pass laws or vote funds for adequate military
+preparation, either in materiel or personnel. It is evident that we
+regard the risk as insufficient to warrant the insurance, and we prefer
+to court war and pay its cost in blood and pensions, not to mention the
+risk of huge indemnities and the loss of valuable territory, national
+prestige and honor. We insure our own insignificant lives and pitiful
+possessions but refuse to insure the life of the nation.
+
+The systematic and intelligent progress that has marked our industrial
+growth has been conspicuously lacking in our military affairs. “Whether
+we may be willing to admit it or not,” says General Upton, “in the
+conduct of war we have rejected the practice of European nations and,
+with little variation, have thus far pursued the policy of China.”
+
+As to the amount of the risk involved in our policy of national defense
+or, as some would say, our lack of policy, it has increased by leaps
+and bounds with the constantly augmented military strength of the other
+great nations of the earth. This strength is hundreds of times as
+great as in the days of our thirteen colonies. The seas, which we have
+hitherto regarded as barriers for our protection, are today favorable
+avenues for the transport of troops and materials. As to the imminence
+of the risk we may gain an insight from contemplation of the present
+situation in Europe, and consideration of the effect of our vast
+undefended territory and wealth upon the envy and cupidity of other
+powerful states less fortunately situated than ourselves.
+
+Preparedness for national defense, says Hudson Maxim, is simply a
+quarantine against the pestilence of war.
+
+The best training for war is, of course, the actual experience of
+warfare; but for practical purposes this school is too limited to be
+of much assistance to the actors in person. If a reasonable period
+of peace intervenes between wars the actors of one war are to a very
+limited extent only, those having experience of the previous conflict.
+Even the general lessons of war are too quickly set aside. How little
+military knowledge has the present generation of Americans to show for
+the priceless expenditure of the Nation in the unsurpassed school of
+the Civil War. Wars are fought by the very young men of the country,
+and this is true not only of the rank and file but also of the majority
+of the commanders. The hope of the nation lies therefore, in its
+youth, and how shall this youth be trained?
+
+The duty devolves upon the older officers. There is no higher mission
+for older officers in time of peace than the systematic development
+of the talents of the younger officers entrusted to their care. These
+young officers will be the leaders in the next great war and the fate
+of the nation may indeed depend upon them. The nation, therefore, has
+every right to demand of the superiors that nothing will be left undone
+that may prepare these youths for the trial. Thus will the superiors
+be exerting their powerful influence upon the course of the coming
+war. The methods available are the study of history, working of map
+problems, and terrain exercises, tactical rides or walks, the war
+game--all in connection with field maneuvers with troops.
+
+Correct training for service in campaign must aim to develop the sound
+characteristics of the individual, rather than to bind him to a system.
+The eternal fighting unit being the man, and no two men being created
+alike, anything which unduly hampers the initiative or self reliance of
+the officer, though intended as an aid, is in fact a restraint. Hence
+the caution cannot be too oft repeated that the officer must exert
+himself to keep aloof from rigid forms or models or precedents because,
+as in the military service there are no actual equals in rank, so there
+is no complete precedent for a military situation. Each situation is
+unique, as is also the man who meets it.
+
+Nevertheless in the broad training of large numbers of young men
+the whims of the individual must not be confused with his sound
+characteristics, lest the results of his training be as a crop of
+weeds. The desire to develop the essential traits of each individual’s
+character is not a reason for haphazard instruction or lack of system.
+Those charged with the education of officers can accomplish broader
+results if their methods are based on systematic effort with the
+fundamental idea that the system is an aid to the individual, rather
+than that the individual is an agent of the system.
+
+Outside of campaign the officer obtains his schooling from the
+experience of handling men and from individual study. These sources are
+complementary, neither is complete without the other. The commander
+receives his education not only in the saddle, but at his desk. It is
+fortunate that this is so, because if outdoor maneuvers with troops
+were alone of value, the greater part of his time would have to be
+spent unprofitably. And no single effort expended in the peace training
+of officers will give greater results in the supreme test of war than
+the inculcation of habits of ceaseless industry.
+
+On Von Moltke’s estimate of the value of tactical problems as a
+preparation for war we get an interesting side-light in an incident
+related of him by a French officer who, prior to the Franco-Prussian
+War, was on a mission to Berlin. Von Moltke was speaking of the
+decadence of French military training at that time, and he said to the
+officer: “Have you even the superficial smattering of the elements of
+the military art? I am tempted to doubt it. I wager that you do not
+know the most valuable piece of furniture of an officer in garrison.
+Come with me,” and so saying the old Prussian led his visitor into a
+small bed chamber suitable for a sub-lieutenant, containing a small bed
+without curtains, three straw chairs, shelves of books from floor to
+ceiling, and in the center a blackboard on an easel, the floor littered
+with pieces of chalk. “It is with this,” said Von Moltke, “that we beat
+our adversaries every morning, and as for art, here is all we want,”
+and he exhibited a series of topographic sketches.
+
+The purpose then of this volume is to supply in compact form the
+help needed by the instructor,--or the student working alone--in the
+applicatory method of study. It is not intended as a text alone; its
+principal rôle is that of a guide to those engaged in the study of
+practical problems in tactics, either as instructor or student--for
+the preparation or solution of those problems. It is believed to
+be the only single work overlooking, from this point of view, the
+entire field of minor tactics. Nearly everything contained in this
+volume can be found elaborated in special treatises, but time is of
+value to the military student and this work gives in a single volume
+authoritatively the data that must otherwise be searched for through
+a small library. The organizations used in the text are those of the
+American service, but the tactical principles discussed are of general
+application. They pertain however, primarily to systematic organized
+warfare against a civilized foe, and have but a limited application
+to “bushwhacking,” guerrilla and savage warfare. Furthermore they are
+applicable especially to the warfare of the open field, with its rapid
+changes in situation, rather than the trench deadlocks so nearly akin
+to siege warfare which, under modern conditions, may often characterize
+the operations of highly trained belligerents in large forces of
+nearly equal strength. Many minor details given in Field Service
+Regulations, Infantry Drill Regulations, and other manuals, are of
+necessity omitted. This volume is not intended to take the place of the
+authorized government publications.
+
+The apparently deliberate evasion of definite or even approximate
+statements as to formations, strength, distances, intervals, etc.,
+and the frequent repetition of the phrase, “this depends upon
+circumstances,” which characterize many writings on the subject of
+tactics, give rise to a desire, frequently expressed, for more specific
+information on these and similar matters. So far as seemed practicable
+the authors have endeavored herein to satisfy this desire. This is done
+with the full knowledge that warfare cannot be pursued as an exact
+science, and that the endeavor to be specific may in some instances
+elicit criticism.
+
+Whatever one attempts he should be familiar with the methods which
+have characterized good practice in that particular line of endeavor.
+When confronted with a specific case the individual searches for the
+underlying principles which find application therein, and it is here
+that his resourcefulness and originality are called into play. The
+authors in each case discussed have endeavored to state clearly all
+the principles which may be applicable, giving at the same time some
+concrete illustrations in figures, distances, etc., of simple cases.
+These illustrations are not to be considered as models or patterns.
+Their purpose is solely that of illustrating the manner in which the
+stated principles are exemplified by a stated case.
+
+For the officer charged with the conduct of garrison schools, militia
+instruction, field maneuvers, war games, the preparation of lectures
+and problems, etc., it is believed this volume will form a valuable
+ready reference. And of equal importance will it be to the officer
+of the army or militia, compelled for any reason to study alone. To
+such, the book is a silent instructor, a guide, a critic. To officers
+preparing for promotion examination, and to those at the Service
+Schools or in preparation therefor, it has special application.
+
+If merit be found in the work, the credit is due to the large number
+of officers of the army, many of them recognized authorities, with
+whose assistance and under whose advice, inspiration, and guidance it
+has been produced. Criticisms or suggestions for improvement will be
+appreciated by the authors.
+
+
+ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.
+
+The following organization is a simple summary of that given in Field
+Service Regulations, 1914, (F.S.R.), as amended by the Act of June 3,
+1916.
+
+A typical _army corps_ consists of:
+
+ Headquarters
+ 2 or more infantry divisions
+ 1 or more cavalry brigades or a cavalry division
+ 1 field artillery brigade
+ 1 telegraph battalion
+ 1 field signal battalion
+
+There will be included such ammunition, supply, engineer and sanitary
+trains as the President may deem necessary. A corps is the appropriate
+command of a Lieutenant General.
+
+A typical _infantry division_ consists of:
+
+ Headquarters
+ 3 infantry brigades
+ 1 regiment of cavalry
+ 1 brigade of field artillery
+ 1 regiment of engineers
+ 1 field signal battalion
+ 1 aero squadron
+ 1 ammunition train
+ 1 supply train
+ 1 engineer train
+ 1 sanitary train
+
+A division is the appropriate command of a Major General.
+
+A typical _cavalry brigade_ consists of the headquarters and three
+cavalry regiments. When the brigade acts independently, horse artillery
+may be attached.
+
+A typical _cavalry division_ consists of:
+
+ Headquarters
+ 3 cavalry brigades
+ 1 regiment of field artillery (horse)
+ 1 battalion of engineers (mounted)
+ 1 field signal battalion (mounted)
+ 1 aero squadron
+ 1 ammunition train
+ 1 supply train
+ 1 engineer train
+ 1 sanitary train
+ A light bridge train and 1 or more pack trains are attached when
+ necessary.
+
+A _brigade_ consists of 3 regiments (inf. or cav.) When operating alone
+or independently it usually has auxiliary troops attached. A brigade is
+the appropriate command of a Brigadier General.
+
+
+_Line of communications._ For each army corps or important
+expeditionary force about to take the field, a _base_ is selected and
+equipped and a service of the _line of communications_ established,
+both under the control of the commander of the army corps or
+expeditionary force.
+
+The _staffs_ of brigades and higher units shall be as prescribed by the
+President of the United States. Typical _staffs_ are as follows:
+
+ Brigade, including cavalry brigade
+ 1 brigade adjutant, major (1 civilian clerk)
+ 2 aides, lieutenants
+
+ Division, including cavalry division
+ 1 chief of staff, colonel
+ 2 assistant chiefs of staff, majors or captains
+ 1 division adjutant, major
+ 1 division inspector, major
+ 1 judge advocate, major
+ (for above, 6 civilian clerks)
+ 1 chief quartermaster, lieut. colonel
+ 1 chief surgeon, lieutenant colonel
+ 3 aides, captains or lieutenants
+
+When necessary the commanders of the engineers and signal troops may
+be directed, in addition to their other duties, to act, respectively,
+as chief engineer and chief signal officer. When a division acts
+independently, a chief engineer, (lieutenant colonel) may be detailed
+on the staff of the division commander.
+
+ Corps.
+ 1 chief of staff, brigadier general
+ 1 adjutant general, colonel
+ 1 inspector general, colonel
+ 1 judge advocate, colonel or lieutenant colonel
+ 1 chief quartermaster, colonel
+ 1 chief surgeon, colonel
+ 1 chief engineer, colonel
+ 1 chief ordnance officer, colonel, or lieutenant colonel
+ 1 chief signal officer, colonel or lieutenant colonel
+ 3 aides, with the rank of lieutenant colonel
+ (each of the above is assisted by one or more subordinates
+ and the necessary clerical force)
+
+_Details of organization._
+
+ INFANTRY.
+
+ A company:
+ 1 captain
+ 1 1st lieutenant
+ 1 2d lieutenant
+ 100 enlisted men
+ Provided: That the President may increase each company by
+ 50 enlisted men
+
+ A machine gun company:
+ 1 captain (mounted)
+ 1 1st lieutenant (mounted)
+ 2 2d lieutenants (mounted)
+ 53 enlisted men
+ 4 guns (2 platoons)
+
+ A battalion:
+ 1 major (mounted)
+ 1 adjutant (mounted)
+ 4 companies
+
+ A regiment:
+ 1 colonel (mounted)
+ 1 lieutenant colonel (mounted)
+ headquarters company, 1 captain, 58 enlisted men (8 mounted);
+ includes part of the noncommissioned staff of regiment and
+ battalions band, mounted orderlies, etc. supply company,
+ 2 officers, 10 enlisted men, and one wagoner for each
+ authorized wagon of field and combat trains
+ 3 battalions
+ 1 machine gun company
+
+ CAVALRY.
+
+ A troop:
+ 1 captain
+ 2 lieutenants
+ 70 enlisted men (4 platoons)
+ Provided: That the President may increase each troop by
+ 35 enlisted men
+
+ A machine gun troop:
+ 4 officers
+ 70 enlisted men
+ 4 guns (2 platoons)
+
+ A squadron:
+ 1 major
+ 1 adjutant
+ 4 troops
+
+ A regiment:
+ 1 colonel
+ 1 lieutenant colonel
+ 2 veterinarians
+ headquarters troop, 1 captain, 54 enlisted men;
+ includes part of the non-commissioned staff of regiment
+ and squadrons, band, orderlies, etc. supply troop, 3 officers,
+ 10 enlisted men and one wagoner for each authorized wagon of
+ field and combat trains
+ 3 squadrons
+ 1 machine gun troop
+
+ FIELD ARTILLERY.[1]
+
+ A battery:
+ 1 captain
+ 4 lieutenants
+ 126 enlisted men
+ 4 guns
+ 12 caissons
+ (A mountain battery includes also 1 packmaster,
+ 1 assistant packmaster and 3 cargadores)
+ Provided: That the President may increase each battery
+ by 64 enlisted men
+
+ A battalion:
+ 1 major
+ 1 captain
+ 3 batteries for light or mountain artillery, 2 batteries
+ for horse or heavy field
+
+ A regiment of 2 battalions:
+ 1 colonel
+ 1 lieutenant colonel
+ 1 captain
+ 2 veterinarians
+ headquarters company, 2 officers, 67 enlisted men;
+ includes part of the non-commissioned staffs of regiment
+ and battalions, band, orderlies, etc. supply company,
+ 2 officers, 10 enlisted men and 1 wagoner for each
+ authorized wagon of field and combat trains.
+ 2 battalions. The number of battalions may be increased
+ with corresponding changes in the headquarters and
+ supply companies.
+
+[Footnote 1: Field artillery includes mountain, light, horse, and heavy
+artillery (field and siege types).]
+
+The organization of horse artillery is similar to that of light
+artillery. Most of the men are individually mounted. (See also
+“Artillery tactics,” Chapter VIII.)
+
+ ENGINEERS.
+
+ A company:
+ 1 captain (mounted)
+ 3 lieutenants (mounted)
+ 109 enlisted men (24 mounted)
+ Provided: That the President may increase each company
+ by 55 enlisted men.
+
+ A mounted company:
+ 1 captain
+ 3 lieutenants
+ 74 enlisted men
+ Provided: That the President may increase each mounted
+ company by 37 enlisted men
+
+ A battalion:
+ 1 major (mounted)
+ 1 captain (mounted)
+ 1 battalion sergeant major
+ 3 master engineers, junior grade
+ 3 companies
+
+ A mounted battalion:
+ 1 major
+ 2 captains
+ 1 1st lieutenant
+ 1 veterinarian
+ 1 master engineer, senior grade
+ 3 master engineers, junior grade
+ non-commissioned staff
+ 3 mounted companies
+
+ A regiment:
+ 1 colonel (mounted)
+ 1 lieutenant colonel (mounted)
+ non-commissioned staff
+ 2 master engineers, senior grade
+ 1 wagoner for each authorized wagon of field and combat trains
+ 2 battalions
+
+ Note.--Mounted engineers have no regimental organization.
+
+A company with bridge equipage usually has 3 divisions of bridge
+equipage. A battalion has therefore 9 divisions of bridge equipage,
+3 light and 6 heavy. One division of the heavy equipage (225 ft. of
+bridge) has 16 wagons and 84 mules. One division of the light equipage
+(186 ft. of bridge) has 14 wagons and 56 mules.
+
+SIGNAL CORPS.
+
+The President is authorized to organize such numbers of companies,
+battalions and aero squadrons of the Signal corps as the necessities of
+the service may demand. Typical organizations are as follows:
+
+ Wire company: (all mounted)
+ 1 captain
+ 2 lieutenants
+ 75 enlisted men
+ 6 wire carts
+ 1 instrument wagon
+
+ Radio company: (all mounted)
+ 1 captain
+ 2 lieutenants
+ 75 enlisted men; 2 platoons of 2 radio sections each
+ (2 wheel and 2 pack)
+ 3 combat wagons (2 radio, 1 instrument)
+ 6 pack mules
+
+ Field battalion:
+ 1 major
+ 1 adjutant
+ n. c. staff
+ 4 mounted orderlies
+ 4 field wagons
+ 1 shop wagon
+ 2 companies, 1 wire and 1 radio
+
+A wire company of signal troops has two platoons of two wire sections
+each. The wire section has 5 miles of wire (single conductor, ground
+return) and instruments (telegraph and telephone) for 4 stations. Each
+radio section can set up one station, having a radius of about 200
+miles for wheel sections and 30 miles for pack sections. The distances
+are subject to great variations. (See also F. S. R. 1914.)
+
+ TRANSPORTATION.
+
+ Wagon company:
+ 36 enlisted personnel
+ 112 draft mules
+ 6 saddle mules
+ 27 wagons
+
+ Auto truck company:
+ 37 enlisted personnel
+ 27 auto trucks, freight
+ 1 auto truck, supply
+
+ Pack train:
+ 14 enlisted personnel
+ 50 pack mules
+ 14 saddle mules
+
+Note:--The tables of organization are subject to change from time to
+time. The latest tables of organization issued by the War Dept. should
+be consulted for details.
+
+WAR STRENGTH, IN ROUND NUMBERS, ROAD SPACE, AND DIMENSIONS OF CAMPS.
+--(F. S. R., 1914.)
+
+ ------------------------------+-----------------+---------+
+ | War strength, | |
+ | in | |
+ | round numbers | |
+ Units. +--------+--------+ |
+ | | |Vehicles,|
+ | | | guns. |
+ | Men. |(horses | |
+ | |mules). | |
+ ------------------------------+--------+--------+---------+
+ Divisions: | | | |
+ Infantry | 22,000 | 7,500 | 900 |
+ Calvary | 10,000 | 12,000 | 500 |
+ Brigades: | | | |
+ Infantry | 5,500 | 520 | 67 |
+ Cavalry | 2,500 | 2,900 | 53 |
+ Artillery | 2,300 | 2,300 | 257 |
+ Smaller units (including | | | |
+ attached sanitary troops):| | | |
+ Infantry regiment | 1,860 | 170 | 22 |
+ Cavalry regiment | 1,250 | 1,430 | 26 |
+ Field artillery, light, | | | |
+ regiment | 1,150 | 1,150 | 128 |
+ Field artillery, horse, | | | |
+ regiment | 1,150 | 1,150 | 131 |
+ Field artillery, heavy, | | | |
+ regiment | 1,240 | 1,340 | 131 |
+ Field artillery, mountain, | | | |
+ regiment | 1,100 | 1,160 | |
+ Engineers, pioneer battalion| 490 | 160 | 12 |
+ Engineers, pioneer | | | |
+ battalion (mounted) | 270 | 370 | 11 |
+ Engineers, ponton | | | |
+ battalion | 500 | 820 | 145 |
+ Signal troops, field | | | |
+ battalion | 160 | 200 | 15 |
+ Signal troops, field cavalry| | | |
+ battalion | 170 | 200 | 11 |
+ Signal troops, aero | | | |
+ squadron (including | | | |
+ landing place 150 | | | |
+ yards by 350 yards) | 90 | | 16 |
+ Trains: | | | |
+ Infantry division-- | | | |
+ Ammunition | 260 | 750 | 162 |
+ Supply | 190 | 630 | 126 |
+ Sanitary[2] | 530 | 500 | 90 |
+ Engineer | 10 | 40 | 9 |
+ Cavalry division-- | | | |
+ Ammunition | 60 | 140 | 33 |
+ Supply | 220 | 860 | 75 |
+ Sanitary | 300 | 300 | 53 |
+ -------------------------------+--------+--------+---------+
+ ------------------------------+------------------------------------+
+ | |
+ | Length of columns. |
+ | |
+ ------------------------------+------------+----------+------------+
+ | | | |
+ | Organiz- | | Ammunition |
+ | ations, | + Field | supply, |
+ Units. | including | trains | sanitary, |
+ | combat | without | and |
+ | trains. | distance | engineer |
+ | | | trains. |
+ ------------------------------+------------+----------+------------+
+ Divisions: | | | |
+ Infantry | 9.5 mi. | 11.0 mi. | 3.5 mi. |
+ Calvary | 8.0 mi. | 9.5 mi. | 1.5 mi. |
+ Brigades: | | | |
+ Infantry | 1.7 mi. | 2.0 mi. | |
+ Cavalry | 1.5 mi. | 1.9 mi. | |
+ Artillery | [3]2.6 mi. | 2.9 mi. | |
+ Smaller units (including | | | |
+ attached sanitary troops):| _Yards._ | _Yards._ | _Yards._ |
+ Infantry regiment | 970 | 1,150 | |
+ Cavalry regiment | 1,310 | 1,640 | |
+ Field artillery, light, | | | |
+ regiment | [4]1,720 | 2,800 | |
+ Field artillery, horse, | | | |
+ regiment | 1,960 | 3,160 | |
+ Field artillery, heavy, | | | |
+ regiment | 2,240 | 3,660 | |
+ Field artillery, mountain, | | | |
+ regiment | 1,520 | 2,540 | |
+ Engineers, pioneer battalion| 410 | 470 | |
+ Engineers, pioneer | | | |
+ battalion (mounted) | 350 | 440 | |
+ Engineers, ponton | | | |
+ battalion | 3,360 | 3,480 | |
+ Signal troops, field | | | |
+ battalion | 310 | 370 | |
+ Signal troops, field cavalry| | | |
+ battalion | 240 | 300 | |
+ Signal troops, aero | | | |
+ squadron (including | | | |
+ landing place 150 | | | |
+ yards by 350 yards) | 140 | 200 | |
+ Trains: | | | |
+ Infantry division-- | | | |
+ Ammunition | | | 2,440 |
+ Supply | | | 2,000 |
+ Sanitary | | | 1,530 |
+ Engineer | | | 150 |
+ Cavalry division-- | | | |
+ Ammunition | | | 500 |
+ Supply | | | 1,200 |
+ Sanitary | | | 890 |
+ ------------------------------+------------+----------+------------+
+ --------------------------------+-----------------------
+ | Contracted camping
+ | space (troops
+ | and trains).
+ ------------------------------+------------+------------
+ | |
+ Units. | | Approximate
+ | | number
+ | Yards. | of
+ | | acres.
+ | |
+ | |
+ ------------------------------+-------------+------------
+ Divisions: | |
+ Infantry | | 180
+ Calvary | | 150
+ Brigades: | |
+ Infantry | | 19
+ Cavalry | | 18
+ Artillery | | 30
+ Smaller units (including | |
+ attached sanitary troops):| |
+ Infantry regiment | 160 by 180 | 6.2
+ Cavalry regiment | 200 by 200 | 8.2
+ Field artillery, light, | |
+ regiment | 240 by 300 | 14.7
+ Field artillery, horse, | |
+ regiment | 240 by 400 | 19.6
+ Field artillery, heavy, | |
+ regiment | 260 by 300 | 16.0
+ Field artillery, mountain, | |
+ regiment | 80 by 380 | 6.2
+ Engineers, pioneer battalion| 50 by 200 | 2.0
+ Engineers, pioneer | |
+ battalion (mounted) | 50 by 260 | 2.6
+ Engineers, ponton | |
+ battalion | 160 by 315 | 10.0
+ Signal troops, field | |
+ battalion | 30 by 240 | 1.7
+ Signal troops, field cavalry| |
+ battalion | 30 by 210 | 1.3
+ Signal troops, aero | |
+ squadron (including | |
+ landing place 150 | |
+ yards by 350 yards) | 175 by 350 | 12.5
+ Trains: | |
+ Infantry division-- | |
+ Ammunition | 75 by 380 | 5.8
+ Supply | 80 by 380 | 6.2
+ Sanitary[5] | 100 by 260 | 5.3
+ Engineer | 20 by 140 | .6
+ Cavalry division-- | |
+ Ammunition | 30 by 200 | 1.2
+ Supply | 80 by 280 | 4.6
+ Sanitary | 50 by 260 | 2.7
+ ----------------------------------+------------+-----------
+
+[Footnote 2: This table is based upon the road spaces occupied by
+troops at war strength, infantry in column of squads, cavalry in column
+of fours, artillery and trains in single column.
+
+The spaces differ but little from the requirements of drill
+regulations. On the march, after a command is straightened out on the
+road, elongation always takes place. In calculating the length of a
+column further allowance must, therefore, be made in accordance with
+circumstances--sometimes as much as 25 per cent.
+
+The contracted camping spaces afford sufficient room for a one-night
+halt. They require that the animals and vehicles of a single troop,
+battery, or company be placed on the same line with the men where
+practicable to do so within the camp lengths above given; that the
+men be in double shelter tents (or in double row of shelter tents),
+and that the lines on which adjacent companies are established be
+separated by distances not exceeding 11 yards for infantry and other
+dismounted organizations, double carriage length for field artillery
+(except mountain), and 12 yards for cavalry and remaining mounted
+organizations. Latrines are placed on the opposite side of camp from
+company kitchens and at a minimum distance of 50 yards from the men.
+
+The camp areas given represent minimum requirements under favorable
+conditions of terrain and should be increased whenever practicable,
+particularly for sanitary reasons in those cases where a camp is to be
+occupied for more than one day.
+
+For approximate calculations, assume 1,600 meters = 1 mile; 5 miles = 8
+kilometers; the number of acres in a rectangular tract = the product of
+one-seventieth of the length in yards by one-seventieth of the width in
+yards.]
+
+[Footnote 3: Combat train 1 mile long.]
+
+[Footnote 4: Combat train 840 yards long.]
+
+[Footnote 5: Combat train 840 yards long.]
+
+ PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE SOLUTION OF TERRAIN EXERCISES,
+ MAP MANEUVERS, AND MAP PROBLEMS.
+
+ ESTIMATE OF SITUATION
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Do you understand it clearly?
+ Mission Has it changed at time considered?
+ In order to accomplish it must you temporarily adopt
+ another mission?
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Strength (Is he deficient in any particular arm?)
+ Position (Has he probably moved or is he likely to?)
+ Enemy Probable intentions?
+ Is he likely to be reinforced?
+ Is he deficient in training or morale or other quality?
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Strength (Are you deficient in any arm?)
+ Your Own Position of your troops (Are they in hand or scattered?)
+ Forces Are you likely to be reinforced?
+ Can you send for help?
+ (Do not ask for help unless you need it.)
+ Are your troops deficient in morale or training or
+ other quality?
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Conditions Favorable and unfavorable.
+
+ In good weather.
+ When covered with snow.
+ Condition of roads When frozen.
+ When muddy and rainy (slippery).
+ When thawing.
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Bridges.
+ Rivers--depth--fordable.
+ Hills.
+ Terrain Mountains.
+ Forests.
+ Is soil difficult to entrench?
+ What is your line of retreat? (Have you more than one?)
+ What is enemy’s line of retreat? (Has he more than one?)
+ Where is your base?
+ If enemy is in position which is his weak flank?
+ Which will endanger his retreat?
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Comparison Different courses open;
+ of Plans for Roads by which you may advance (retreat).
+ Accomplishing Roads by which enemy may advance (retreat).
+ Your Mission Defensive positions, if mission requires it.
+ Positions in readiness, if mission requires it.
+ Best plan for attack, if mission requires it.
+ Make your plan simple.
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Rain and its effects.
+ Drouth--is water for drinking scarce?
+ Effect of floods.
+ Dust--Will it disclose your movements?
+ Weather Snow and its effects.
+ Are roads frozen?
+ Are roads thawing?
+ What is phase of moon? Does it favor night movements?
+ Are fogs or high winds likely to occur?
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Decision Clear and concise statement of what you propose to do.
+ Clear and concise statement of how you propose to do it.
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+ Make it simple.
+ Avoid dispersion.
+ Send away no detachments unless considered absolutely
+ necessary.
+ Look out for your flanks.
+ Plan for Provide for ample reserves properly distributed.
+ Carrying Do not commit too many men at the start until situation
+ Out Your is sized up.
+ Decision Take advantage of ground.
+ Do not neglect your reconnaissance.
+ Beware of half measures.
+ You must obtain fire superiority to win.
+ You can obtain fire superiority easier by an enveloping
+ attack,
+ other things being equal.
+ Give each element of your command a task.
+ ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I.
+
+THE PREPARATION AND SOLUTION OF TACTICAL PROBLEMS.
+
+
+The solution of practical problems in tactics, either on the map or
+on the terrain, constitutes what is known as the applicatory method
+of instruction. It is the method followed by all modern armies, being
+properly regarded as the best substitute possible in time of peace for
+the actual experience of war. Indeed it is not to be regarded purely as
+a substitute for actual experience, inasmuch as it affords opportunity
+for the frequent and repeated application of principles to various
+concrete cases. Actual warfare will furnish to the majority of officers
+comparatively few opportunities of this kind.
+
+
+_Kinds of problems._--Tactical problems may be solved on the map or on
+the terrain. In the former class are included map problems, and one or
+two-sided war games. Problems on the terrain include tactical walks
+or rides, terrain exercises (without troops) and one and two-sided
+field maneuvers (with troops). These problems are prepared with a view
+to illustrating certain tactical principles. In some cases they call
+especially for decision, in other cases they are intended to give
+practice in the technique of carrying out a decision already made.
+Often the two functions are combined in a single problem. The former
+class are known as problems of decision. The latter are usually called
+troop leading problems.
+
+Each class of problem has its particular field, and tactical
+instruction should not be limited to any one class. Problems involving
+a decision as to a course of action for a large force must necessarily
+be solved on a map, due to the inability of one man to see in person
+the terrain that would be covered by a division, for example. Thus, for
+the higher commanders, all problems of decision must of necessity be
+map problems even if, as in actual warfare or maneuvers, the decision
+is carried out on the terrain. Troop leading problems on the terrain
+should, for similar reasons, generally be limited to forces not
+exceeding a regiment in size. Problems involving the detailed location
+of defensive works can be solved satisfactorily only on the ground and
+should always take the form of terrain exercises.
+
+The two-sided war game is played by two individuals or two groups under
+the direction of an umpire. It is of peculiar value in that it calls
+for quick and frequent decision and, by its form--particularly the
+competition involved--it serves to stimulate interest.
+
+The tactical walk or ride is an exercise on the terrain in which
+various situations, either independent or continuous, are presented
+by the instructor and discussed with the students. It has the defect
+of failing to place upon the shoulders of most of the students the
+responsibility of making a decision, and in this respect is inferior
+to the terrain exercise in which each student is required to write out
+his solution to every situation. The tactical ride, however, affords
+opportunity for bringing out, more or less forcibly, certain tactical
+principles which the instructor has in mind, and it may occasionally be
+employed to advantage.
+
+Field maneuvers are problems in which the solution, instead of being
+written by the student, is actually executed on the terrain with troops.
+
+The map problem will be the means of instruction most readily
+available to the largest number of officers, but this should whenever
+practicable, be supplemented by exercises on the terrain, both with and
+without troops.
+
+Tactical problems vary greatly in substance, in fact no two are alike.
+In their general form, however, they are usually similar. The problem
+will ordinarily open with a statement of the general conditions in the
+theatre of war as a whole, the two combatants being usually designated
+by colors, such as Blue and Red. This statement is called the “general
+situation,” and is usually presumed to be known to both combatants,
+at least in a general way. It is, of course, always imaginary, even
+if the problem actually involves real troops. In small problems the
+“general situation” may be omitted. The problem next sets forth in
+some detail the circumstances of some particular body of troops on one
+side, under the heading “special situation--Blue,” (or “Red.”) Under
+this heading may be included a statement of the strength and position
+of the troops under consideration (of which the student is assumed to
+be the supreme or one of the subordinate commanders); information as to
+friendly troops in the vicinity with a statement of their movements and
+intentions (if necessary); the orders received from higher authority;
+certain information concerning the enemy, more or less incomplete
+and often unreliable, usually in the form of advices from higher
+authority, messages and reports from subordinates, spies, deserters,
+prisoners or civilians, newspapers, etc.; information as to the hour
+and date at which the situation opens, weather, terrain, and such other
+local conditions as may have a bearing on the situation; etc., etc.
+The information set forth in the “special situation” in whole or in
+part, may, or may not be known to the enemy. As to this the student
+is generally required to judge for himself. The problem concludes
+with a statement of certain “requirements,” the fulfillment of which
+constitutes the “solution.” These requirements may include:
+
+ 1. The “estimate of the situation,” with the decision and plan
+ of action of the commander.
+
+ 2. The orders and messages issued by the commander.
+
+ 3. Actions of the commander.
+
+ 4. Sketches or plans of dispositions, etc.
+
+The “estimate of the situation” is a logical process of thought,
+terminating in a tactical “decision.” Such a process will be no
+innovation in the brain of any thinking man, since it is characteristic
+not only of tactics, but of all other serious affairs of life. It
+involves a careful consideration and analysis of all the evidence
+bearing upon the situation. The form given at the beginning of this
+Chapter sets forth in brief and comprehensive manner the principal
+points to be considered in making this estimate. It is intended to
+guide and assist the mental process, by insuring consideration of
+all matters of importance, but it should not be allowed to restrict
+independent thought. Not all of these considerations will exert an
+influence on the solution of any given problem. There is often some one
+preponderating condition, seldom more than two or three, which really
+influence the decision.
+
+The most important consideration, which forms the basis of all
+subsequent thought and action, is the _mission_ of the command. In a
+force which is an integral part of a larger force the mission will
+usually, although not always, be embodied in the orders of higher
+authority. For an independent command, however, the mission must
+generally be deduced from the commander’s knowledge of the wishes or
+intentions of superior authority, and of the existing situation and
+conditions. It is here that the judgment of the commander is called
+into play, since the accomplishment of his true mission may require a
+course of action entirely at variance with the orders he has received.
+It is for this reason that orders too restrictive, and in too great
+detail, should not be given to subordinates who are expected to
+exercise to any considerable degree, independence of command. Their
+initiative must not be unduly hampered, as unexpected developments may
+entirely change the situation, and with it the mission. For example;
+an independent command, sent forward to seize a certain town finds it
+occupied by a superior force of the enemy, while another large force is
+approaching from a flank, and threatening to cut off retreat. It is now
+apparent that the original mission must be abandoned. The commander’s
+new mission has become that of saving his command by a prompt retreat.
+Gen. Von Verdy du Vernois says: “The officer who suddenly encounters
+the enemy while patrolling with his platoon must conduct his actions
+from a different point of view than if he commands his platoon as
+skirmishers in front of his company. A division in an army corps will
+generally be so situated that it must carry out an action, even though
+it be completely annihilated in so doing, and then it would still be
+promoting the general purpose; on the other hand, a division widely
+separated from an army would, as a rule, utterly fail to accomplish
+its mission if it allowed itself to be annihilated.” In such cases the
+commander must consider whether his division is not worth more than the
+accomplishment of his specific mission.
+
+An estimate of the situation usually involves a careful consideration
+of times and distances. The information as to the enemy will be more
+or less incomplete, and often contradictory. Each item of information
+must be carefully weighed to determine the degree of credibility to be
+attached thereto, and from the preponderance of evidence the course of
+action must be determined. The only absolutely reliable information of
+the enemy is that obtained from the personal observation of trained
+officers, and even this may sometimes be at fault.
+
+In order to secure some degree of uniformity in the solution of map
+problems and to avoid confusion of ideas, it is necessary to adopt
+certain systematic assumptions. Those which bear on any particular
+case will usually be stated in the problem, such as the condition of
+the weather, fordability of streams, etc. The most usual of these
+assumptions, however, are not ordinarily stated, but are always to be
+understood. These are:
+
+1. It is to be assumed that the (imaginary) troops under your command
+are, unless otherwise expressly stated, brave, well disciplined
+and experienced soldiers and that every subordinate is thoroughly
+instructed, and fully competent, each within his own sphere.
+
+2. It is to be assumed that the enemy will probably act with good
+judgment, and make no mistakes. This usually means that he will take
+that course of action which you would least desire to have him take, or
+which would be, amongst the courses open to him, that most embarrassing
+to you.
+
+It is apparent, of course, that neither of these assumptions will
+always hold in real life. We know that Gen. Lee’s plans for his
+campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, were based very largely on his
+knowledge of the personal characteristics of his opponents. Also, that
+after the death of Jackson, he never again attempted such a movement
+as that executed by Jackson’s corps at the battle of Chancellorsville.
+Some assumptions, however, are necessary as a basis for systematic
+study. Those adopted are the most natural and reasonable in the usual
+case.
+
+In order to successfully solve tactical problems the commander must be
+able to read and interpret a map with rapidity and accuracy, and must
+have an eye for ground forms. He must be familiar with the organization
+of both his own and the opposing army, and acquainted with the powers
+and limitations, and with the tactics of each arm of the service. He
+must be familiar with the methods which constitute “good practice,”
+and acquainted with military precedents. In this manner he best fits
+himself to properly perform his high duty, for knowledge and experience
+as well as character and intellect are necessary as a basis for
+decision.
+
+A good map, of course, affords a much quicker and better comprehension
+of the general situation than can possibly be obtained by any one
+individual on the terrain. In fact without good maps a large force
+would be seriously hampered in its operations. As it is impossible
+for any single individual to see in a limited time, or to comprehend
+as a whole if he had seen, the extent of ground surface that would be
+covered by a large force, terrain exercises should be limited to the
+smaller units, or to portions only, of the larger forces, preferably
+not larger than a regiment. By this is not meant that _field maneuvers_
+should be limited to small bodies of troops. But for the higher
+commanders all problems, either in office or field, with or without
+troops, will be virtually map problems. The terrain exercises will be
+limited in effect to the commanders of the smaller units.
+
+One form of problem, easy of solution on the ground, is more difficult
+on the map, i. e. _visibility problems_, the determination of whether
+a certain point or locality is visible from a certain other point or
+locality, a question often of grave importance in military operations.
+Methods of solving visibility problems on the map are given in various
+textbooks on mapping and topography. A little practice soon gives such
+facility that the less critical problems of this kind can be solved by
+inspection.
+
+The tactical suggestions contained in this volume, are often referred
+to as the “rules” or “principles” of the Art of War. It may be said
+that they will apply to the majority of cases, otherwise they could
+hardly be dignified under the title of “principles.” They are, however,
+subject to frequent exception, and must always give way to judgment
+and common sense. It is for this reason that the Art of War is the
+most difficult branch of human endeavor. Experienced commanders will
+continue to violate the “rules” when their judgment dictates such a
+course, but unlike the tyro, they will do so with their eyes open,
+fully appreciating the necessity for their action, and the risks
+that are involved. They will, on occasion, throw aside the “rules,”
+not through ignorance, but with the keen insight and ripe judgment
+of trained intelligence, which will always be superior to rule and
+precedent. War is an art, rather than a science. Its ever varying
+problems cannot be solved by the application of rules of mathematical
+rigidity. Scientific progress has indeed a great influence upon warfare
+as upon other arts, but it can never replace the human element, and the
+victories of the future no less than those of the past, will be won
+by the talents and genius of the general, and the bravery, skill and
+devotion of his soldiers.
+
+It is responsibility above all else that develops character, initiative
+and judgment. The knowledge of responsibility strengthens even the
+weak, and often calls into action powers they were not previously
+suspected of possessing. It is for this reason that the most important
+object in the military training of officers is the development of
+responsibility. The supreme commander and each subordinate within his
+own sphere, should be required to exercise his own judgment, and be
+responsible for his own actions. Thus alone can he be qualified to
+meet the exigencies that are constantly arising in warfare. Military
+writings are accordingly filled with cautions such as “Do not interfere
+with your subordinates, nor usurp their prerogatives,” “Tell a
+subordinate what you want him to do, not how he is to do it,” “Avoid
+orders too much in detail,” etc., etc.
+
+How then, in time of peace, may military responsibility, and the
+benefits resulting therefrom be attained? When an officer reads
+military history and textbooks on the Art of War, the responsibility
+for the facts alleged or the conclusions and deductions made rests
+entirely on the authors. The student gains from such works a certain
+amount of knowledge, but he certainly assumes no mental responsibility.
+When, however, he undertakes an independent solution of a tactical
+_problem_ the entire responsibility for this solution rests on his
+shoulders alone. Capt. Buddecke of the German Army says:
+
+“After we have gained in the above manner a correct insight into the
+details of the problem, we get to the main task, which is to think
+ourselves completely into the spirit of the problem and to arrive at an
+estimate and decision for our future course.
+
+By repeatedly and quietly reading the problem, paying due regard to
+the map in front of us, we gain, just as in focussing a telescope,
+a clearer and clearer conception of the situation. The more we
+succeed in placing ourselves mentally in the given situation and
+recognizing all the details in their relation to the general problem,
+the more we succeed in thinking ourselves into the soul of the
+leader, in conceiving the magnitude of his task, and in sharing his
+responsibility, the more eager we shall become to take over his duties
+and play an active part in the operations.
+
+The longer we pore over the map, the clearer will be our conception of
+the measures which the situation demands. And in this it is important
+to hold and consider carefully; that is, to follow out, to their
+furthest effects, all the thoughts and ideas which come to us, often
+passing like lightning through our brains, and suggesting various
+lines of action. Often it is precisely these fleeting thoughts which
+lead us to the right path. But ideas which are not fully thought
+out and thoroughly weighed can not have a decisive influence on our
+judgment and decision. A head which has a hundred thoughts, but which
+can neither hold fast nor think out a single one, will always remain
+undecided and irresolute in tactics.
+
+Only by intensive reflection is found in the confusion, the Ariadne
+thread which will lead us from the maze. However, although attention to
+details is to be recommended, yet the larger points of view which we
+have gained must not be lost in the consideration of minor details--a
+mistake often made and naturally often leading to false conclusions. It
+is rather our chief duty to find just these main points, and attention
+to minor details is but a means to this end.
+
+Character and intuition unconsciously weave their thread into this
+labor of comprehension. To that which our brain devises is added, with
+good or bad effects, that which our intuition presents; and from the
+combined activity of both come as a product judgment and decision.
+
+It is a delicate psychological process which takes place in the head
+and breast of the tactician, and without doubt this inner effort is one
+of the most stimulating and interesting of activities.
+
+A tactical question awakens all our spiritual and mental powers. It
+demands keenness and understanding, common sense and imagination,
+firmness and patience, caution and daring, sense of locality and
+memory, judgment and the power of decision. The whole character,
+the whole disposition, the whole individuality of a man finds its
+expression here. Thus the solution of a tactical problem reflects the
+spirit of its author, since it is based on the peculiarities of his own
+individual character. A hesitating character will, in doubtful cases,
+prefer the defensive to the offensive. Kindred natures will follow
+similar trains of thought and in the majority of cases reach similar
+solutions.”
+
+The independent solution of tactical problems affords a means of
+training to both the intellect and the character superior to that
+afforded by any other kind of tactical study save only the actual
+experiences of war. In war a commander’s mistakes are paid for in
+blood, and experience is dearly bought. In the solution of tactical
+problems in peace the student’s mistakes are paid for at most only in
+chagrin, the experience is cheap.
+
+There is always more than one, and there may be many satisfactory
+solutions to any problem. Hence the fact that two solutions differ
+radically by no means proves that one or the other is wrong. Each
+reflects the personality of its author, and either might accomplish
+the desired result. A simple plan, based on a sound decision and
+consistently carried out, will be better than the best plan executed in
+a dilatory and half-hearted fashion. Above all the plan must be simple,
+“Simplicity is the keynote of sane tactical procedure.” Complicated
+maneuvers offer little promise of success.
+
+The plan should not be based wholly, nor in general even chiefly upon
+the known or probable movements of the enemy. The commander’s plan
+should be dictated chiefly by his own mission. In war it is best to
+lead, to retain the initiative, and to force the enemy to adapt his
+plans to yours. Hence if in doubt it is usually best to follow a bold
+and aggressive plan of action. Caution may avoid defeat, but boldness
+alone wins victories.
+
+There is a certain manner in which tactical problems, particularly
+map problems, should be solved in order to gain the greatest possible
+benefit from this form of training. In brief this may be stated as
+follows: solve the problem _yourself_, make a thorough, honest and
+independent solution, and _write it out_. When you are fully satisfied
+with your solution, and not until then, read the “approved solution,”
+(if there be one) or submit your work to a reviewer for remark and
+criticism. For a beginner the solution of a map problem may require
+hours, even days. Becoming mentally wearied there is a strong tendency
+to “slur over” parts of the solution which may appear for the instant
+relatively unimportant; to be content with less than one’s best;
+to solve portions of the problem, and then read the corresponding
+portions of the approved solution, etc. Such tendencies are inimical
+to progress, and they are, moreover, an indication of a weakness of
+character which one should strive to overcome.
+
+The statement of the problem should be read carefully, a number of
+times, localities being noted and marked on the map. Having become
+thoroughly impregnated with the situation, the student then proceeds
+to make his mental estimate, jotting down the points that occur to
+him, in pencil. For the beginner, at least, it is then best to write
+out the estimate in full, using the form at the beginning of this
+chapter as a guide, in order to early acquire the habit of making a
+logical and complete estimate. If the problem calls for the estimate
+and orders, and is accompanied by an approved solution, it is usually
+well to complete the estimate to include the decision, and then read
+the approved solution to the same point and compare. Then assume the
+decision of the approved solution and write the orders necessary to
+carry out that decision, comparing these on completion with those
+of the approved solution. If the student writes orders based on his
+own decision they might differ so greatly from those of the approved
+solution that there would be no satisfactory basis for comparison.
+
+Upon completing his independent solution the student should read the
+approved solution, if there is one, and submit his work to a critic for
+remark. The student’s mistakes and omissions in decision and detail
+will then be plainly apparent. These he should carefully consider,
+honestly acknowledge, and determine to avoid in future. They will thus
+be strongly impressed on his mind as _practical experiences_. As has
+been remarked, however, a difference or apparent difference in two
+solutions is by no means proof that one of them is in error. It is, of
+course, manifestly impossible that two solutions by different persons
+could ever be exactly alike. It is not of problems in arithmetic that
+we are speaking.
+
+Take the problem as you find it, and do not waste time criticising and
+attempting to pick flaws in the “situation.” Nature cannot be “faked,”
+and it is difficult enough to create an imaginary situation which is
+even reasonably plausible, a fact which each will appreciate when he
+attempts to write a problem himself. To write a good problem is usually
+a task more difficult than to solve one.
+
+In the solution of map problems considerable advantage may be derived
+from combined study with a congenial mate. Each man serves as a spur,
+a critic and a guide to the other. They should work in company, each
+independently, and then compare and discuss their results while these
+are fresh in their minds.
+
+The apparatus required for the solution of map problems is very simple;
+including a “map measure” (wheel), scales, colored pins for marking the
+positions of troops, etc., small rectangles of cardboard or sheet lead,
+representing bodies of troops to the scale of the map, and colored
+according to the arms of the service, etc., etc.
+
+
+_Diagrammatic analysis and synthesis._ In both the solution and
+preparation of problems it is frequently a great aid to comprehension
+to lay out the situation (the combatant troops and critical features of
+the terrain) in a diagrammatic form. This clears away for the time, the
+mass of details which sometimes befog the main issues. Problems which
+at first reading appear complicated, are often seen to be quite simple
+when laid out in this manner, and the decision will often be plainly
+apparent. As has been said heretofore, questions of time and distance
+will usually be of great importance. Unless the troops are placed in
+their proper relative positions at the epoch considered, incorrect
+decisions are apt to result. A few examples will serve to illustrate
+this method. (See Fig. I.)
+
+_Fig. A._ A Blue division, acting as right flank guard to a Blue field
+army, is marching east when it receives reports of a Red column of
+all arms, advancing from the southeast toward the Blue flank with the
+evident intention of attacking. The Blue division turns southeast
+and advances in two columns against the Red force. In the resulting
+encounter, it is evident, the Blues will be able to deploy and
+establish a line of battle much faster than the Reds, provided the
+latter continue to advance in one column. Should the Reds form two
+columns to the front their march will be delayed while waiting for the
+columns to form abreast.
+
+_Fig. B._ A Blue army on the offensive, advancing east in two columns,
+approaches the line of an unfordable river, passable only at the
+bridges shown. A Red army also in two columns, is approaching the
+stream from the opposite direction, for the purpose of checking the
+Blue advance at the river. The Blue northern column reaches the
+northern bridge in advance of the Red northern column, and effects a
+crossing. The Blue southern column, on approaching the other bridge,
+learns that the advance of the Red southern column has already reached
+it, and that the Reds are making dispositions to dispute the passage.
+
+The commander of the Blue northern column places his leading troops in
+a defensive position (A-B) so selected that the Red northern column can
+advance neither west nor south without first attacking the position.
+With the remainder of his column he turns south and marches to attack
+the right flank of the Red southern column in order to enable the Blue
+southern column to effect a crossing.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. I]
+
+_Fig. C._ The advance guard of a large Blue force acting on the
+offensive is marching south. The main body has been somewhat delayed,
+and is several miles in rear. On approaching the screen, the Blue
+advance guard commander learns that a Red force is approaching in two
+columns. The aggregate strength of the two Red columns is considerably
+greater than that of the Blue advance guard, although less than that of
+the entire Blue force. To continue his advance and attack the superior
+Red force in its two column formation, favoring rapid deployment, while
+the Blue main body is still well to the rear, would be extremely apt
+to prove disastrous to the Blue advance guard commander. He therefore
+decides to seize the best defensive position available, one moreover
+which he will have time to occupy in an orderly fashion, and there
+hold the Reds until the arrival of the Blue main body, which will take
+the tactical offensive upon its arrival.
+
+_Fig. D._ A Blue army (A) and a Red army (B) are engaged in battle on
+an east and west line. A Blue division is approaching the battlefield
+from the southeast under orders to attack the left flank of the Red
+position at B. While passing the screen on his right the commander
+of the Blue division receives word from his patrols, which have been
+beyond the screen, that a Red force, estimated to consist of at least
+two divisions is approaching from the northeast, apparently with the
+intention of reaching the right rear of the Blue position at A. The
+Blue division commander at once decides to discontinue his advance
+northwest, to change direction to the right, and to seize a defensive
+position as far from the main battlefield as possible without risking
+a premature or rencontre engagement with the superior Red force now
+approaching. To facilitate the prompt occupation of the defensive
+position selected he advances toward it in two columns. Here he hopes
+to “contain” the Red force, keeping it out of the main battle until a
+decision is reached, or until the main Blue army can make arrangements
+to withdraw.
+
+
+_Preparation of problems._ In the preparation of practical problems,
+either map problems, terrain exercises, one or two-sided war games or
+field maneuver problems, the following hints will be found useful:
+
+1. Give the problem a semblance of reality, make the situations
+plausible, and introduce as few unnatural conditions as possible. For
+example, in a terrain exercise or field maneuver problem it is better
+not to state that a certain stream is impassable when in fact it is
+easily passable. Bridges which are assumed in the problem to have been
+destroyed should be conspicuously placarded. Otherwise they are very
+apt to be used. It is usually preferable, even in map problems, to make
+the problem fit the terrain as it actually exists, rather than to alter
+the terrain to fit the problem. In a map problem it is permissible
+to assume that corn shown on the map has been cut, that woods where
+underbrush is indicated are impassable for infantry, that streams are
+swollen and roads muddy from recent rains, etc. But do not assume
+that there is snow on the ground in July, or that corn is standing in
+January. In maneuver problems it is always best to let the commanders
+take the terrain as they find it.
+
+2. Make the problem simple and brief, and omit ordinarily all data
+which has no direct bearing upon the solution. Simple problems are best
+for purposes of instruction. It is however, occasionally desirable
+to introduce in the statement certain data which is really of no
+importance in order to give the student practice in analyzing and
+weighing information, and to teach him to base his decision on the best
+of the information, and to avoid being led astray by unimportant or
+conflicting reports. The commander must acquire by experience the power
+to see and cleave to the main issues amidst the fog of uncertainty,
+conflicting, erroneous and unimportant information, etc. The analysis
+of information is a most important part of his duty, as upon this his
+plan of action must be based.
+
+3. The problem should be made instructive. Ordinarily it will be drawn
+with a view to illustrating certain tactical principles. It should,
+however, never be forced, but always allowed to develop naturally,
+especially in war games and field maneuvers. The officer who prepares
+the problem should not be disappointed if the solutions take a course
+quite different from his expectations. Authorship confers no special
+rights of interpretation.
+
+4. Field maneuver problems should be made progressive and interesting
+to both officers and men. Unless their interest can be sustained they
+will get little benefit from the instruction. Unreality, unnecessary
+fatigue, delays and inaction should be avoided. Officers charged
+with the instruction of troops of the army or militia often lay out
+schedules which allow insufficient time for relaxation, and this
+results in dulling the interest of the troops thereby decreasing the
+benefits obtained from the course of instruction.
+
+5. Field maneuver problems should be adapted to the kind and number
+of the troops which are to take part in them. Elaborate “general
+situations” are usually undesirable. Each commander should be given
+such information as he might reasonably be expected to have under real
+conditions.
+
+6. Where the situation given in the problem includes both real and
+imaginary troops (as may be the case) great care should be taken
+to avoid a contact or mixing of real and imaginary troops. This
+complicates the situation, and introduces the most objectionable
+element of unreality.
+
+7. In field maneuver problems it is best to make the tasks of the
+opposing commanders nearly equal. Arrange the troops and the situation
+so that each has a chance to accomplish his mission. A commander cannot
+be expected to put his heart into the game if he knows that he is bound
+to fail in his mission, or certain to meet with defeat. On the other
+hand, the knowledge that they have a chance to succeed, even against
+superior numbers, stimulates the interest of both officers and men.
+In map problems, however, the student may occasionally be given a
+situation in which it is impossible for him to accomplish his mission.
+
+8. In starting a field maneuver problem it is best to have the opposing
+sides out of contact. Do not state in the situation that a commander
+has a mounted patrol at such a point, unless the patrol is actually
+there. Do not manufacture messages for real patrols, but allow them to
+report what they actually learn. The commander should be allowed to
+send out his own patrols.
+
+9. The commander (in a field maneuver problem) should be allowed
+ample latitude in making his decision, and should not be coerced into
+any particular plan of action. It is well, however, to arrange the
+situation so that a contact of the opposing sides will take place
+at some suitable locality. This adds greatly to the interest of the
+problem. It is desirable when practicable to have the problem end
+within a reasonable distance of the camping place, in order to avoid a
+long and fatiguing march thereafter.
+
+10. Consider the distances that the troops must march during the day
+and do not exceed what is reasonable under the conditions. A long rest
+should be given at mid-day, and the troops should return to their
+camp at a reasonable hour in the afternoon. If this does not allow
+sufficient latitude temporary camps may be established at suitable
+localities. A problem once commenced should, of course, be carried to
+completion with the least possible interruption.
+
+
+BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC.
+
+The “Gettysburg-Antietam Map” referred to in this volume is a 3 inch
+map (3 in. to the mile) of the vicinity of Gettysburg, Pa., issued by
+the Book Department, Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
+where it can be purchased for a nominal sum. It is the best map for its
+particular purpose with which the authors are acquainted.
+
+Maps on a scale of 1:62,500 (commonly called 1 inch maps) of many
+portions of the United States, are now issued by the United States
+Geological Survey (Washington) at a nominal cost. They are excellent
+maps, and suitable for the solution of map problems, especially those
+involving the operations of divisions or larger forces.
+
+Special maps of the vicinity of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and of
+various other maneuver grounds used by the Army and the Militia, may be
+obtained from the Book Department, Army Service Schools, or from the
+War Department.
+
+The following is a short list of books which will be found useful for
+study and reference in connection with the subject of minor tactics.
+Most of them have been consulted in the preparation of this volume.
+Government publications may be obtained from the War Department,
+Washington, D. C., by issue or purchase. The other works can be
+obtained through the Book Department, Army Service Schools, Fort
+Leavenworth, Kansas.
+
+Field Service Regulations, U. S. A., 1914. Government Publication.
+
+Drill Regulations of Inf., Cav., and Field Artillery. Government
+Publications, (separate volumes)
+
+Engineer Field Manual. Government Publication.
+
+Organization of the bridge equipage of the U. S. Army. Government
+Publication.
+
+Bulletin No. 4, War Dept.
+
+Notes on Field Fortification, Army Field Engineer School.
+
+How to feed an army. Government Publication.
+
+American Campaigns. Steele.
+
+Applied minor tactics. Morrison.
+
+Battle orders. Von Kiesling.
+
+Cavalry in future wars. Von Bernhardi.
+
+Cavalry in war and peace. Von Bernhardi.
+
+Cavalry tactics as illustrated by the War of the Rebellion. Gray.
+
+Conduct of war. Von der Goltz.
+
+Critical study of German tactics. De Pardieu.
+
+Criticisms on solutions of map problems. Boyd.
+
+Duties of the General Staff. Von Schellendorff.
+
+Elements of strategy. Fiebeger.
+
+Essays, studies and letters of Col. Maude of the British Army.
+ (5 volumes)
+
+Estimating tactical situations and composing field orders. Fitch.
+
+Examination and repair of simple highway bridges. Sherrill.
+
+Field fortification. Fiebeger.
+
+Fortification. Clark.
+
+Lectures on cavalry. Hayne.
+
+Letters on applied tactics. (with maps) Griepenkerl.
+
+Letters on strategy and tactics. (4 volumes) Hohenlohe.
+
+Map maneuvers and tactical rides. Sayre.
+
+Military policy of the U. S. Upton.
+
+Military topography. Sherrill.
+
+Napoleon’s maxims of war. Burnod.
+
+Nation in arms. Von der Goltz.
+
+Notes on bridges and bridging. Spalding.
+
+On war. Clausewitz.
+
+Organization and operation of the lines of communication in war. Furse.
+
+Patrols, advance guards and outposts. Morrison.
+
+Selected division problems. Gizycki and Litzmann.
+
+Service of security and information. Wagner.
+
+Some notes on the solution of tactical problems. Fiske.
+
+Studies in applied tactics. Von Alten.
+
+Studies in minor tactics. Army School of the Line.
+
+Studies in the leading of troops. Du Vernois.
+
+Supply of Sherman’s army in Atlanta campaign. Major and Fitch.
+
+Tactical decisions and orders. Buddecke.
+
+Tactical principles and problems. Hanna.
+
+Tactics. Infantry, Cavalry and Field Arty. Balck. Two volumes.
+
+Tactical ride. Du Vernois.
+
+The art of reconnaissance. Henderson.
+
+The principles of land defense. Thuillier.
+
+The provisioning of the modern army in the field. Sharpe.
+
+The regimental war game. Immanuel.
+
+The rifle in war. Eames.
+
+Times of sunrise and sunset in U. S. Willson. (Published Harvard
+Co-operative Society)
+
+Transportation of troops and materiel. Baker.
+
+Troop leading and management of the sanitary service in war. Morrison
+and Munson.
+
+Von Moltke’s tactical problems.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II.
+
+FIELD ORDERS.
+
+
+_General Remarks._ The composition of field orders is so important
+a feature of nearly every problem that the student may well devote
+a considerable amount of study and _practice_ to the acquisition of
+facility in writing orders.
+
+The forms given in F. S. R. are excellent guides, and instructions as
+to what should be placed in orders and what should be omitted therefrom
+are given in F. S. R. and in a number of pamphlets on the subject
+of orders. But the closest study of these forms and instructions
+will still leave the student very poorly prepared to write a crisp,
+intelligible order. The ability to do this must be acquired by practice
+in writing orders to cover concrete cases. The Army Service Schools (at
+Fort Leavenworth) have developed a certain crisp, epigrammatic verbiage
+which is the result of long practice by many individuals, and it is
+of the utmost importance that this verbiage be early acquired by the
+student officer. This is done by solving a great number of problems
+and selecting therefrom the best forms of expression. To illustrate
+what is meant by this one example will suffice: In giving orders for
+the occupation of a defensive position while on the march the order
+(Par. 2) may state: “The duties of the advance guard as such will now
+cease.” This is plain enough for the advance guard, but how about the
+rear guard, the flank guard and the main body? What inferences are
+they to draw as to when _their_ duties cease? Do the instructions to
+the advance guard apply also to them or are they purposely omitted,
+and if so what is to be done about it? Will the commander notify them
+later as to exactly when _they_ are relieved of their former duties?
+The commander might have left the situation less in doubt by saying:
+“The duties heretofore performed by the advance guard, the rear guard,
+the flank guard, etc., as such, will now be discontinued.” But such an
+expression, while grammatically correct, is too rambling and verbose
+for an order. Instead he might say: “March conditions now cease.” This
+sentence contains four words, as against 11 in the first case and 20
+or more in the second. It covers the entire command and leaves no one
+in doubt for an instant. Many similar examples will be encountered in
+the study of problems. Clearness, of course, is even more important
+than brevity, but the two usually go hand in hand. A number of short
+sentences is usually preferable to one long one. The verbiage of orders
+should be brief, clear, concise, _sententious_ and succinct. (See
+examples of orders in the text.)
+
+It is often said that the forms given are suggestions only and not to
+be blindly followed. You will seldom be wrong, however, if you stick to
+the form, whereas if you attempt to show your originality and freedom
+from constraint by devising forms of your own you will usually find
+them more cumbersome than an order on the regular form. A tactical
+decision so complicated that it cannot be clearly and concisely
+expressed in a standard 5-paragraph order should be looked upon with
+distrust. In an assembly order Par. 1 (information of the enemy, etc.,)
+may be omitted, and of course if there are no trains or sanitary troops
+Par. 4 would also naturally be omitted, and the other paragraphs
+numbered accordingly. Administrative and routine details (supply,
+internal economy, etc.), should generally be omitted from field
+orders unless they bear directly upon the tactical situation. In this
+case they may be placed in a paragraph or paragraphs by themselves.
+Otherwise they will be the subject of _orders_ as distinguished
+from _field orders_, which latter are understood to cover only the
+operations of the combatant troops or matters intimately connected
+therewith. The 5-paragraph form will always be an excellent model for
+all orders, both verbal and written, as its form is such as to insure
+consideration of all the essential tactical details. It will usually be
+well, then, to follow this form unless it is plainly apparent that it
+does not cover the case under consideration.
+
+Considerable difficulty will be experienced in determining what to
+include in orders and what to omit. On this subject individuals will
+not always agree. Instructions in great detail are nearly always
+undesirable, but on the other hand nothing essential should be omitted.
+Individual and verbal orders will usually be somewhat more detailed
+than combined and written orders. The higher the commander the
+briefer and less detailed will be his orders. Detailed instructions
+to subordinates may often properly be made the subject of a personal
+interview between the commander and the subordinate in question, and
+omitted from the formal written, combined order. In making written
+solutions of problems for his own instruction it is suggested that
+the student add to his order certain explanatory notes as to why
+certain details are included in or omitted from the order. Such notes
+constitute a useful criticism of the student’s own work and tend to
+develop his judgment as to what matter should properly be included
+in orders of various kinds and to subordinates of various rank. They
+should not of course, take the form of an “estimate of the situation.”
+Only doubtful points need be covered, and these briefly. A number of
+examples of orders with explanatory notes of the kind referred to will
+be found throughout this volume.
+
+
+_Kinds of Orders._ Orders may be verbal, dictated or written,
+individual or combined. A combined order is usually understood to mean
+one covering the entire command.
+
+The orders for a command less than a brigade are almost invariably
+verbal. The march orders of a brigade are usually dictated, its combat
+orders are usually verbal. All division orders are habitually written,
+when practicable.
+
+Even when orders are actually issued verbally and individually it is
+the custom to subsequently prepare a _written combined_ order for the
+organization records. It is the written form of orders that is usually
+called for in problems. But in order to afford practice in troop
+leading, problems in this subject often call for the orders _exactly as
+they would be given at the time_ by the commander in the field.
+
+
+_Structure of Orders._ The standard field order contains 5 paragraphs.
+It is fully explained and illustrated by examples in the F. S. R.
+
+Par. 3 contains in detail the duties for the various fractions of the
+command each under a sub-heading, a, b, c. Instructions which refer
+collectively to two or more of the fractions mentioned in the a, b,
+c, paragraphs, or to a portion of a fraction mentioned in an a, b, c,
+paragraph, are lettered x, y, and z.
+
+The marginal distribution is habitually used for march and outpost
+orders but not for combat orders. Instead of the marginal distribution
+it is preferable in dictated orders (on account of the narrow pad on
+which they are written) and _permissible in all orders_, to place the
+distribution of troops in the center of the page between Pars. 2 and 3.
+
+An order should show clearly the map or maps on which it is drawn or
+to which references are made in the order. These map references may be
+placed between the heading and Par. 1. (See examples of orders in the
+text.)
+
+All operation orders should preferably be signed A, Colonel, or A,
+Brigadier General, only--not “By order of, etc.”
+
+At the foot of the order should be a complete list of all persons to
+whom it is to be delivered. Thus “verbally to assembled officers”
+does not cover the case if the cavalry commander is ten miles to
+the front and the quartermaster with the trains ten miles to the
+rear. The written record of a verbal order should include a list of
+the individuals to whom delivered. Officers to whom written orders
+are delivered should generally be required to sign for them, often
+their initials opposite their names at the foot of the retained copy
+will be sufficient. This matter is one of extreme importance, as it
+is necessary to insure the delivery of an important order to every
+commander who is directly affected thereby and usually to others who
+are only indirectly affected. The best of orders will be useless unless
+they are promptly and surely communicated to all who are charged
+with their execution. Copies or synopses of important orders should
+be sent to superior commanders and, when necessary, to those who are
+co-operating with the officer who issues the order.
+
+The nature of the orders to cover various different classes of
+operations must be learned by study and practice and there can be no
+hard and fast rules laid down. A few general precautions may, however,
+well be observed. Among these are the following:
+
+Follow the forms given in the F. S. R. departing therefrom only when
+the application of the form results in a clumsy order, which will
+seldom or never be the case.
+
+Use simple English and short, clear sentences. Omit arguments and
+discussions. Avoid the excessive use of participles and infinitives.
+Ambiguity is a fatal mistake.
+
+Ordinarily all words should be spelled out in full. Certain
+abbreviations are authorized, however--as follows:
+
+ The abbreviations for military organizations and titles,
+ as given in F. S. R.
+
+ The abbreviations for months of the year, a. m. and p. m.,
+ names of states.
+
+ The name of a locality abbreviated on the map may be
+ abbreviated in the same form in the order, as WOODSIDE
+ S. H. (Woodside School House). Names of localities in
+ an order or message should be in CAPITALS.
+
+In referring to points, describe them so that they can be located
+_on the ground_ as well as on the map. The description of a locality
+should, when practicable, be independent of any map. Do not use the
+expressions “in front of,” or “to the right of,” but “south of,” or
+“northeast of.” Do not order anything done at “dusk” or “sunrise,”
+but give standard times. “Dusk” is an indefinite time, and it is not
+possible by inspecting the sky to predict the time until sunrise,
+especially if it is cloudy. Do not assume that your subordinates can
+see on the ground all the points that you can see on the map.
+
+The amount of information contained in an order should be sufficient
+to secure the intelligent co-operation of all subordinates and _no
+more_. It is not wise to tell them all your plans, but they must
+sufficiently understand the _mission_ of the command to enable them
+to act intelligently in an emergency. Orders without knowledge of the
+commander’s desire _may_ leave the subordinate totally at sea when
+facing a situation in which the orders must be modified or disregarded.
+Prominence should be given to good news, and bad news should be touched
+upon lightly or omitted entirely unless it is necessary to warn
+subordinates of impending danger. Thus, if the commander knows that
+reinforcements are on their way to the enemy he will take the necessary
+steps to provide against the danger, but it would not always be wise
+to dishearten his command by gratuitously giving them the bad news.
+Provisions for a _possible_ retreat should be considered in advance by
+the commander, but should not be _ordered_ until the necessity arises,
+and similarly for other contingencies of the future. In order to
+provide against the possibility of his being killed, seriously wounded
+or captured the commander should communicate to the next in rank, or
+to a trusted staff officer, information of impending danger, etc., and
+so much of his plans for the future as may seem to be necessary.
+
+An order should not trespass upon the province of a subordinate by
+entering into details which might safely be left to his judgment.
+Ordinarily tell him what you wish him to do but not how he is to do it,
+as methods will be largely dependent upon circumstances which cannot be
+foreseen. If detailed instructions seem to be necessary they might well
+be made the subject of a personal interview with the subordinate, but
+omitted from the written orders. The higher the rank of the subordinate
+the less detailed should be the instructions given him. A private
+soldier must do exactly as he is told without always knowing the reason
+why. A general commanding a division often exercises his own judgment
+as to how best to co-operate in the general plan.
+
+On the other hand a commander should never divide responsibility with a
+subordinate. Tell him in unequivocal terms what he is to do and avoid
+such expressions as “if you think best,” or “as far as possible,” etc.
+
+An order should not discuss contingencies nor attempt to provide for
+same, and it should not look too far ahead.
+
+Circumstances often make it necessary to issue individual orders, even
+in cases where a combined order would be preferable. In such cases it
+is usually necessary for co-operation that each subordinate should know
+the general plan, and what other subordinates are to do. The combined
+order is therefore, generally to be preferred, as it saves time and
+assures co-operation. In a combined order every fraction of the command
+should be accounted for, and receive the necessary instructions.
+Where orders are issued individually the adjutant, or other staff
+officer, makes notes of the individual orders for the purpose of later
+consolidating them in a combined order.
+
+In the case of dictated orders the officers who take the dictation
+should make a number of carbon copies in order to provide a supply for
+distribution and to save the time required in copying.
+
+The time for issuing orders is a matter requiring careful
+consideration. If issued too far in advance there is the danger that
+later information or developments may make it necessary to modify or
+rescind the order, something which it is very desirable to avoid, as
+besides the confusion thus created it tends to diminish the confidence
+of the troops in their commander. Also the information contained in
+the order may, either directly or indirectly, fall into the hands of
+unauthorized persons, and perhaps be communicated to the enemy. On the
+other hand the order should be issued sufficiently far in advance to
+allow time for its proper circulation, to allow subordinate commanders
+time to make their own estimates of the situation and issue their own
+orders, etc. Messing arrangements, supply, and other internal economies
+are also largely dependent upon the commander’s plans, and the troops
+can usually rest better if they know somewhat in advance when they
+must be ready to move. Accordingly it is sometimes advisable to issue
+preliminary orders in advance, the final order being reserved until
+later. An example of this would be the “assembly order” referred to in
+the chapter on “Advance Guards.” Another would be the “halt and outpost
+order” in which the troops for and general location of the outpost line
+would be designated, the detailed disposition of troops upon this line
+being arranged for later. Complicated orders should not, as a rule, be
+issued late at night, ordinarily not after 11 p. m. except in cases of
+emergency. On the other hand if late information which may affect the
+commander’s plans is expected it would not be wise for him to make his
+decision too far in advance, nor to communicate it to his command. Such
+a situation can often be met by the issue of a preliminary order.
+
+Time must be allowed for making estimates, and for the issue and
+circulation of orders. To come to a decision after he is in possession
+of all available information the commander will require from 5 to 30
+minutes, or even more if the situation be complicated. To issue a
+verbal or dictated order requires 5 to 15 minutes additional. A formal
+written order will usually require even more time. In a division action
+it will ordinarily require not less than 40 minutes for the commander
+to come to a decision and issue his written orders. (The time stated
+in an order is the instant of signature for a written order or the
+conclusion of a verbal or dictated order.)
+
+It is necessary, in large commands, to make allowance for the time
+required for orders, subsequent to their issue, to reach all parts of
+the command. In a brigade, in some cases, as much as an hour may be
+required, in a division as much as one and a half to two hours. It is
+to be remembered that each subordinate must make an estimate of the
+situation so far as it concerns _his_ command, issue the necessary
+orders and circulate them amongst _his_ subordinates, and so on, all
+after the receipt of the supreme commander’s order. In important cases
+it may be well to calculate the actual time required for orders to
+reach and take effect upon all parts of the command.
+
+Motor cars and cycles by their speed facilitate the distribution of
+orders.
+
+An order must be consonant with the decision it is supposed to embody.
+A disagreement between the two might be fatal. In solving a problem
+then, the student should check and cross check the decision and order,
+to make certain that they agree. It is ordinarily unnecessary to enter
+into minor details in the decision, which will usually cover the
+main points alone, giving such detail only as is required to enable
+a competent staff officer to write the necessary orders to carry the
+decision into effect.
+
+The supreme commander will estimate the situation and make his
+decision. The duty of translating this decision into action through the
+medium of appropriate orders will devolve upon a staff officer. The
+preparation of military orders is in no essential respect different
+from the preparation of orders and correspondence in civil affairs.
+The successful business man should have little difficulty in acquiring
+skill in the preparation of military orders. Such skill is best
+acquired by practice in preparing orders to carry out the decisions
+of others. The military student, therefore, may profitably devote
+considerable time to such practice.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III.
+
+PATROLLING.
+
+
+_Classification._ Patrols are classified according to their uses as
+tactical or strategical (discussed under “Cavalry Tactics”), security
+or information. Combat patrols are placed on the flanks of battle lines
+for the security thereof. Outposts and advance guards always send out
+patrols which ordinarily go but a short distance from the body which
+sent them out. The discussion under this heading pertains primarily to
+officer’s patrols sent out on independent missions. It is with such
+patrols that the special problems usually deal. Advance guard and
+outpost patrols are discussed under those headings, (Chapters IV and X.)
+
+
+_Composition and Strength._ The men for a patrol should generally be
+selected for the purpose in view and not taken at random, or by roster.
+The same applies to their mounts.
+
+For important duty on an independent mission the patrol should be
+commanded by an officer. However, do not get the habit of sending
+out officer’s patrols for _all_ duty. All officers are available to
+command mounted patrols when necessary. Certain officers of an infantry
+regiment are mounted, and dismounted officers may be provided with
+mounts from the horses attached to the regiment.
+
+A patrol should never be any larger than necessary for the purpose in
+view. Consider how many men may be required for messengers, and whether
+you will probably have to fight to accomplish your mission. A good rule
+is that less than 6 men are too few to send messages, and more than 10
+too many to be readily concealed. In a _hostile country_ you generally
+need _two men for each message_. In friendly country one is enough if
+distance is not too great, no enemy near, etc.
+
+Mounted patrols are generally more efficient than foot patrols on
+account of their greater mobility, especially for information purposes.
+On an _independent_ mission to a distance _greater_ than two miles it
+is the rule to use mounted or auto patrols. But small mounted patrols
+must proceed very cautiously if enemy is known to have bodies of
+infantry in the locality. If the enemy has cavalry about, there is also
+great risk for either mounted or dismounted patrols. The patrol leader
+should select men and horses when he can. Mounted and dismounted men
+should not be used in the same patrol.
+
+The mounted orderlies which form part of an infantry regiment are
+intended to meet the constant need for the service of mounts while
+avoiding the disadvantages of detailing considerable numbers of cavalry
+for this purpose. The uses of these mounts will be many and will
+include the following:
+
+ (a) For agents of communication. This is to be regarded
+ as the most usual function.
+
+ (b) For orderlies and horseholders.
+
+ (c) For mounted scout duty in detachments and detached
+ regiments when cavalry is not available.
+
+The orderlies to whom the mounts are regularly assigned should be
+thoroughly trained as messengers and signalers and their usefulness may
+be greatly increased if they be trained also as scouts. While their
+prime function will be that of agents of communication the commander of
+a detached regiment, unaccompanied by a cavalry detail, who has need
+of mounted scouting will certainly use these mounts for such purpose.
+Such duty need not be performed by the orderlies regularly assigned,
+but their mounts may be used for officers and specially selected
+infantrymen assigned to scouting duty. Hostler duty will be required
+for the various mounts accompanying an infantry regiment, but hostlers
+need not be mounted. It is not to be supposed that the mounted men
+attached to an infantry regiment are to be considered primarily as
+hostlers, and the orderlies should not be regularly employed on such
+duty to an extent which would interfere with the performance of their
+more important functions.
+
+The uses to which these mounted orderlies will be put will depend
+upon circumstances and upon the nature of their training. They will
+occupy space in the column and necessitate the transportation of a
+considerable amount of forage. They should not be utilized solely for
+the personal convenience and comfort of mounted officers. The skilled
+commander will train and utilize his mounted men in such manner as to
+obtain the largest possible return on the investment.
+
+In the operations of great masses of troops which are becoming more and
+more characteristic of modern warfare, especially in densely populated
+countries, the duty of reconnaissance will be performed by the cavalry
+and aeronautical services. Under such conditions detachment warfare
+will be reduced to a minimum and there will be little occasion to
+employ the mounted orderlies of the infantry, except for communication,
+etc. The general organization may well contemplate such conditions.
+Detachment warfare has, however, hitherto been frequent in the wars
+of the United States and is very apt to continue for some years to
+come in military operations on this continent. The detached brigade
+or regiment, even if accompanied by a cavalry command, will have
+frequent occasion to employ all available mounted men for the duty of
+reconnaissance.
+
+Motor cars are often useful in the conduct of patrols. They are swift,
+and can travel almost anywhere that troops operate. They are present in
+great numbers with modern armies and in many cases are not as apt to
+attract hostile attention as bodies of mounted men.
+
+Patrolling problems ordinarily require three things:
+
+ 1st. Instructions given to the patrol leader by the officer who
+ sends him out.
+
+ 2nd. What the patrol leader does before starting.
+
+ 3rd. Conduct of the patrol in various situations.
+
+
+_Instructions to patrol leader before starting._ The officer sending
+out a patrol should give the leader very full instructions while being
+careful not to hamper him with details. Tell him fully what you want
+him to do but not _how to do it_. The information and instructions
+given him will include the following.
+
+ 1. Information of the enemy and our supporting troops.
+
+ 2. Plan of the commander.
+
+ 3. Mission of the patrol--explain very carefully all that you
+ want it to learn.
+
+ 4. Size of the patrol and where obtained.
+
+ 5. Furnish patrol leader with a map if he has not one already.
+
+ 6. General route of patrol and hour of departure.
+
+ 7. Limits of the country it is to observe, and location of other
+ friendly patrols.
+
+ 8. Time patrol is to return, and if necessary latest hour by
+ which first message should be back.
+
+ 9. When and where messages are to be sent.
+
+ 10. Location of Blue (friendly) outposts.
+
+ 11. Contemplated movements of the command during patrol’s
+ absence, if any.
+
+ 12. Cause patrol leader to set his watch with yours.
+
+
+_Action of patrol leader before starting._ 1. He confers with
+the officer from whom he is to obtain his men, asks about their
+qualifications, or if they are his own men selects those who are
+specially qualified. He makes the necessary arrangements for the start,
+such as the hour when the men are to be called, breakfast before
+starting, provides for a cooked meal to be carried if patrol is apt to
+be out over 6 hours, especially in hostile territory, etc.
+
+2. He provides his own equipment, which besides his mount should
+include the following:
+
+ (a) Arms & ammunition. (b) Watch.
+ (c) Field glasses. (d) Message pad.
+ (e) Pencils. (f) Notebook.
+ (g) Maps. (h) Compass.
+ (i) Whistle. (j) Wire cutter (if mtd.)
+
+3. He studies his map and the route he is to take, notes distances,
+features of terrain, including prominent landmarks and lookout points,
+lays his plans, etc.
+
+4. He assembles his detail and inspects the men and their equipment
+and the horses. He sees that all his men are physically fit, that they
+have everything that is necessary and nothing that is unnecessary.
+He inspects the backs, feet and mouths of the horses, has any white
+horses replaced by some of darker color, if practicable, and changes
+any horses that are said to have a habit of neighing excessively. He
+sees that each man has a canteen full of water or coffee, and one or
+two luncheons or cooked meals, as circumstances require, and that each
+has a feed of grain for his horse in his saddle bags. He sees that the
+accouterments of the men do not glisten or rattle, and that none has
+any maps, letters or newspapers which might be of value to the enemy in
+case of capture. He assures himself that both men and horses have been
+watered and fed before starting.
+
+5. He questions his men as to their qualifications. He explains in
+detail the mission of the patrol, and the instructions he has received.
+He shows them his map, and points out the route and important features
+of the terrain. He tells them where messages are to be sent. He
+instructs them as to their conduct, particularly as to the necessity
+for keeping concealed and avoiding a fight.
+
+6. He rehearses with his men a simple code of signals.
+
+7. He designates a second in command (unless such exists ex-officio).
+
+
+_Conduct of the Patrol._ 1. The patrol, proceeds in column of twos at
+a trot until the outpost line is reached. At the outpost the patrol
+halts and the leader calls the attention of the men to the position of
+the outpost. He then points out the route and such landmarks as are of
+importance. He questions the outpost sentry as to any knowledge he has
+of the enemy, etc. He tells the sentry by what route he is going, by
+what route he will probably return, and how long he expects to be out.
+
+2. On leaving the outpost the patrol takes up a more extended
+formation. This formation is essentially that of any body of troops
+on the march, consisting of advance guard, main body, flank guards
+(when required) and rear guard. A patrol should cover a road space of
+not less than 100 yards nor more than 250 under average conditions.
+100 to 200 yards is about correct. A large patrol is not strung out
+much more than a small one. The formation should be such as to reduce
+vulnerability and to favor the escape of at least one man in case of
+attack. Distances much in excess of those given offer few advantages in
+these respects and make control by the leader very difficult. In very
+open country distances may be somewhat increased. In very close country
+or at night they may be reduced. A good formation for a mounted patrol
+of 8 men is as follows: In the lead Sergeant and one man at 20 yards
+distance, on opposite sides of road, Sergeant in lead, 60 yards back
+the Lieutenant and 4 men, at 10 yards distance, alternately on opposite
+sides of the road, 60 yards farther to the rear the remaining 2 men, at
+15 yards distance, on opposite sides of road. Flank reconnaissance done
+by main body. The men should all be so close that they can promptly be
+assembled by low command or preferably by signal. Men reconnoitering
+to flanks must necessarily at times be out of the leader’s sight, but
+they should never remain so long.
+
+3. Remain on the road and proceed as rapidly as consistent with your
+mission and your safety. If you have a distant mission, and do not
+expect to encounter hostiles at once, and particularly if you are in a
+friendly country do not waste time by excessive reconnoitering at the
+start. You will of course grow more cautious as you approach the enemy.
+
+4. The usual method of advance for a mounted patrol is by “successive
+bounds.” This means, in brief, from behind each crest look ahead to
+the next, and if the coast is clear ride rapidly ahead, repeating the
+process from the next crest. Of course the view may be limited also
+by turns of the road. Important cross roads should be reconnoitered
+as far as the next crest or turn. Shunt roads, if not too long, may
+be traversed by a couple of men. Woods may be reconnoitered in the
+judgment of the leader. It is well to see the country beyond them if
+practicable. Defiles should be approached with caution. In passing
+such send a couple of men through if defile is not too long or else
+reconnoiter it on a broad front. Men sent out from the patrol should
+be told where to go and when to rejoin. Sometimes they may be told to
+report direct to the commander any information they obtain. As a rule,
+however, avoid an actual splitting of the patrol, except for short
+distances and for local security. Men detached from a patrol for any
+purpose are very apt to become permanently separated.
+
+5. From time to time the patrol leader designates a rendezvous in case
+patrol is scattered.
+
+6. Houses and villages on the line of march should be approached with
+caution, especially in hostile country. Generally it is better to
+reconnoiter a village from a distance and then pass around it unless
+this would waste time, or unless there is some particular reason for
+entering the town. Ordinarily keep out of inclosures.
+
+7. The patrol leader should verify his map and make essential military
+corrections to it as he proceeds. He should point out important
+landmarks to his men.
+
+8. Water the horses in the morning after being out about an hour, and
+again in the afternoon.
+
+9. Do not allow civilians to precede the patrol.
+
+10. Security or covering patrols will fight whenever necessary to their
+mission of guarding the main body from observation, and they will be
+made strong enough for this purpose. Information or reconnoitering
+patrols, however, should as a rule endeavor to avoid fighting and keep
+themselves concealed, as far as practicable, from observation. They
+will usually fail to accomplish their mission of gaining information if
+they allow themselves to be drawn into unnecessary combats with hostile
+patrols. Fighting, however, may be permissible or even necessary in
+some cases:
+
+ (a) To gain important information, or escape with information
+ gained.
+
+ (b) To avoid capture.
+
+ (c) In exceptional cases, to prevent an enemy from gaining important
+ information or escaping with information gained. In general,
+ however, reconnoitering patrols will not be expected to
+ perform also the duty of covering and preventing hostile
+ observation.
+
+ (d) To prevent hostile patrols from getting in rear and thus
+ endangering the transmission of important messages.
+
+ (e) In exceptional cases, to capture prisoners if this may be
+ done without great danger and there is a probability that
+ important information may be gained from them.
+
+In the above cases and such others as may arise, the patrol leader
+must consider his own mission, and whether his chances of success
+will be improved by fighting. The best patrolling is where the patrol
+accomplishes its mission without being seen by the enemy. As a rule the
+patrol should not fight for the sake of capturing prisoners. But if
+any be captured they should be closely questioned and a record made of
+any information gained from them. If this appears to be sufficiently
+important to warrant such a procedure the prisoners may be sent back to
+the outpost. Otherwise they may be deprived of their arms and mounts
+and turned loose, taken along with the patrol, or otherwise disposed of
+as circumstances may warrant, or instructions require.
+
+11. Take advantage of all good lookout points for observation. The
+leader himself should take a look with his glasses, posting a couple of
+men near him to guard him from surprise.
+
+12. Make your halts in concealed places, and generally utilize a halt
+for observation from some lookout. Put out “march outposts” during a
+halt.
+
+13. If a hostile patrol passes you it may be well to take his back
+trail--you are less liable to meet others than on a new road, and may
+also intercept important messages.
+
+14. In concealing yourself make sure your retreat is not cut off.
+
+15. If attacked by superior force scatter if necessary, and assemble
+later; if cut off make a detour; if checked on one line of advance take
+another.
+
+16. Exchange information with any friendly (Blue) patrols you happen to
+meet, but generally keep out of the territory assigned to them.
+
+17. Watch carefully for indications of the enemy--small points may
+often be important. In estimating strength of a hostile column try to
+gain a position from which you can see the entire column, rather than
+wait for it to pass a single point. The following table is useful for
+estimating strength of a column:
+
+Troops passing a point in one minute:’
+
+ Infantry in 4’s 175
+ Infantry in 2’s 88
+ Cavalry in 4’s 110 (walk) 200 (trot)
+ Cavalry in 2’s 55 ” 100 ”
+ Guns or caissons 5
+
+A thick cloud of dust indicates infantry.
+
+A high, thin cloud indicates cavalry.
+
+A broken cloud indicates artillery or trains.
+
+18. A patrol should never desist until its mission is accomplished.
+
+19. The main roads are best for travel. The enemy is more apt to be
+encountered there which may or may not be an advantage. It is sometimes
+advisable to return by a different route. Often it may be best to
+travel on a less frequented side road from which the main road can be
+observed.
+
+20. A patrol’s mission is usually to locate the enemy’s main body,
+or at least a hostile force large enough to affect the plans of the
+commander who sent out the patrol. So keep on until you have done
+this. When you have located such a body hang to it as long as there is
+anything of value to be learned. Your commander will want to know the
+enemy’s location, strength, movements and intentions.
+
+21. Be cautious about interviewing the inhabitants in a hostile
+country--they may betray your presence to the enemy. But in a friendly
+country the inhabitants may give you valuable information, and will
+generally refrain from giving the enemy information about you--though
+not always. Take all hearsay evidence for what it is worth.
+
+22. If a patrol remains out over night it is, of course, advisable
+to camp near the enemy in order to keep touch with him. Care should
+be exercised, however, in selecting a bivouac. In a friendly country
+the inhabitants _may_, with caution, be applied to for shelter. In a
+hostile country such a proceeding is dangerous. A patrol should usually
+avoid spending two successive nights in the same place in hostile
+territory.
+
+23. If patrols go to a great distance and it is probable that there
+will be many important messages to be sent back, arrangements may
+be made to relay the messages. This is not usual, but is sometimes
+done, especially in a hostile country. Relay posts insure the safety
+and rapidity of transmission. These posts would ordinarily be placed
+at intervals of about 5 miles. They may be established by the patrol
+itself by dropping off a few men at intervals along the route, or they
+may be established by other bodies. To illustrate, suppose a company of
+infantry with some mounted men were holding a bridge 10 miles in front
+of the outpost line, and on the route of a patrol sent to the front.
+This company could establish 3 relay posts, one midway between the
+bridge and the outpost, one at the bridge and one 5 miles beyond. The
+two isolated relay posts should consist of two or more mounted men and
+6 or 8 infantrymen for protection. In such a case the messengers coming
+in from the patrol might return to it from the outermost relay post,
+after a rest. The commander of each relay post should read and record
+all messages that arrive, and assure himself that they are safely
+transmitted to the next post.
+
+24. _Messages._ The only strictly reliable information is that obtained
+by personal observation of a reliable officer. Do not report as a
+_fact_ something that has been told you, but give the source of your
+information and your opinion as to its reliability if this seems
+advisable.
+
+Generally send _written_ messages by two men (giving each a copy).
+Repeat the messages to them and have them repeat to you. Tell them the
+route to take, rate of speed, and caution them to destroy the messages
+rather than allow them to fall into the hands of the enemy. The rates
+of speed for a mounted messenger are, ordinary 5 miles per hour, rapid,
+7 to 8, urgent, 10 to 12.
+
+If you are in a friendly country, not too far out, with no enemy in
+your rear, one man may be enough to carry a message.
+
+Messengers, as a rule, do not rejoin.
+
+Intermediate commanders along the route, such as the outpost commander,
+may read messages.
+
+In your messages, ordinarily give time and place of sending and
+state what you will do next. But if you have reason to fear that
+this will compromise your safety or lead to your capture and hence
+_your failure_, should message fall into hands of the enemy, this
+information may be omitted, especially if it is of no particular value
+to the commander. For similar reasons it may be advisable to omit the
+name, rank and organization, and even in some cases the location, of
+the superior to whom the message is sent, addressing it simply “Blue
+commander,” the messenger being given the necessary instructions as to
+its delivery. Arrangements are often made to have messages delivered at
+stations other than that occupied by the main command, preferably of
+course, a place connected by telegraph or telephone with the command.
+This may avoid danger of capture of messengers and insure more prompt
+delivery.
+
+In each message usually give a rèsumé of important information in
+previous messages, in case these should not have been delivered, also
+any information obtained in the meantime, but which was not important
+or urgent enough for a special message. Keep a record of all you learn
+in your notebook and make a full report on your return.
+
+The style of messages should be brief and clear, somewhat like
+telegrams. All cautions as to clearness and brevity in orders apply
+similarly to messages.
+
+Messages should be numbered serially as a rule. Use your message pad in
+the solution of problems. Names of places should be PRINTED IN CAPITALS.
+
+25. _What to report._ A patrol’s mission is not alone to gain certain
+information but to transmit it to the commander, and this last duty
+may be the more difficult. Information is of greatest value if
+promptly transmitted. The first certain information of the enemy must
+be promptly reported. Thus, if you see two Red cavalrymen, report
+the fact at once, unless your commander was previously aware of the
+presence of small hostile parties in the locality. In such case the
+information is of no immediate value and need only be noted for final
+report. In reporting the presence of a hostile force always make sure
+that it is not immediately followed by other troops, and state this in
+your report. The next important information will usually be something
+concerning the enemy’s main force, or at least a considerable body. It
+is not necessary to report every patrol that you meet. Ordinarily do
+not send in _negative_ messages, unless the commander desires negative
+information or has ordered you to send in a message by a certain hour.
+In some cases, however, negative information may be of the greatest
+importance. The patrol leader should always make use of the telegraph
+and telephone for transmitting messages when such facilities are
+available.
+
+(For the use of Air Craft in reconnaissance see Chap. XVIII.)
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV.
+
+ADVANCE GUARDS.
+
+
+_Strength and Composition._ The strength of an advance guard in actual
+campaign, is from 1-3 to 1-20 of command, usually nearer the former
+figure. In general, for a company, 1 platoon, for a battalion, 1
+company, for a regiment, 1 battalion, for a brigade, 1 regiment, for a
+division, 1 brigade, reinforced. A company sends out a point or advance
+party, a battalion an advance party or support, a regiment a support.
+An advance guard smaller than a battalion usually has no reserve, but
+it is permissible for a battalion to have a reserve. Machine guns of
+leading regiment generally at tail of leading battalion. In an advance
+guard of 1 battalion machine guns are with the reserve usually at the
+tail. In a larger body with the support. It is a general rule to have
+at least a battalion in front of the machine guns.
+
+There should always be some mounted men with an advance guard. If
+preceded by independent cavalry the advance guard does not need much
+cavalry. Otherwise it should have some. A number of mounted orderlies
+may be attached to the advance guard for patrol duty if no cavalry is
+available for the purpose.
+
+Engineers are generally useful with an advance guard but seldom
+accompany one smaller than a regiment. The mounted section may
+accompany the advance cavalry.
+
+Advance guard cavalry is the cavalry assigned to the advance guard
+commander. Advance cavalry is that portion of the advance guard
+cavalry which precedes the mounted point. Some or all of the cavalry,
+if the force is small, may be attached to the support for local
+reconnaissance. Mounted men are almost invariably assigned to the
+support. They may be sent out as flank patrols under officers, and used
+for mounted point and for nearby reconnaissance. In exceptional cases
+the advance guard commander may send out special patrols of mounted
+men to front or flanks, without attaching them to the support. In such
+cases their duties are somewhat similar to those of advance cavalry but
+usually more restricted.
+
+Signal troops are seldom attached to an advance guard, unless it be at
+least a reinforced brigade.
+
+The sanitary troops properly belonging to an organization accompany it
+in advance guard. A brigade as advance guard usually has an ambulance
+company assigned to it, a regiment, 3 ambulances.
+
+Artillery is not usually assigned to an advance guard of less than a
+brigade, but a battery might be assigned to two regiments in advance
+guard. Artillery is usually not safe with a small advance guard on
+account of its limited reconnaissance. Also a small infantry force with
+artillery becomes merely an escort for the artillery and neglects its
+more important duties. Artillery should have _at least_ a regiment in
+front of it.
+
+Advance guard artillery is generally with the reserve with at least
+a battalion and preferably a regiment immediately in front of it.
+Artillery is seldom placed in an advance guard in close country.
+
+If there is much infantry patrolling to be done (usually in absence
+of mounted men) the advance party, whose special duty is patrolling,
+should be strong and commanded by an officer. But if there be plenty
+of mounted men, the advance party is relieved of this duty to a great
+extent and need not ordinarily be stronger than ¼the support.
+
+The field trains of a small advance guard are usually with the main
+body during the march. This is also better with a large advance guard,
+unless the situation is such that a combat is not probable during the
+day and the trains could not reach the advance guard to supply it at
+night. On halting for the night the field trains of the advance guard
+troops (baggage section and one day’s rations) habitually join their
+organizations.
+
+Avoid splitting organizations in forming an advance guard or any of its
+fractions. If you need more than 1 battalion better send the entire
+regiment.
+
+“Leading troops” are not the same as an advance guard and should
+not be confused therewith. They are generally used where a regular
+advance guard is unnecessary, as for instance, ahead of the trains
+in a retreat or retrograde movement. If it is intended to delay the
+enemy or to prepare positions for delaying actions, engineers should
+generally be with “leading troops”--sometimes constituting their entire
+strength. They “prepare bridges for demolition,” and a mounted section
+of engineers (with the rear guard) completes the demolition when last
+friendly troops have cleared, if necessary to delay the enemy.
+
+The engineers, with either advance guard or leading troops are charged
+with the duty of removing obstacles to the march and repairing
+crossings, etc.
+
+
+_The Start._ The supreme commander may order the advance guard to clear
+a certain point at a certain hour, or he may designate the hour of
+march and point of departure of the main body and the distance at which
+the advance guard will precede it. From these data the advance guard
+commander figures the time of departure of the different parts of his
+command. He usually designates for the start an initial point which
+all organizations can reach by one or preferably several convenient
+routes without countermarching, delay or confusion. The point, while
+well forward should generally be inside the outpost line. The hour of
+departure of the advance cavalry is designated in advance guard order
+as well as its route unless this is the same as that of advance guard
+and there is no danger of interference. In the advance guard order the
+hours at which the support will clear the initial point, and the head
+of the reserve reach it are also designated. The advance guard always
+marches by same route as main body. The outpost troops (if part of the
+advance guard) are usually assigned to the reserve. They remain in
+position until the support has passed the outpost line, and then close
+in time to take their places in the column.
+
+Some convenient advanced point on the line of march beyond the initial
+point may be designated as the place at which the cavalry on outpost
+duty (day positions) may join the advance cavalry as it passes. The
+approximate time of junction should also be given in the order. Similar
+arrangements may be made for mounted orderlies on outpost duty to join
+their regiment, or head of reserve, etc., if they are out to the front.
+
+The field trains with the advance guard should be assembled immediately
+after the departure of the advance guard (and in time to be out of the
+way of the main body) clear of the main road, preferably on a branch
+road on the less exposed flank. They will then usually join those of
+the main body. The trains with the outpost troops must move to the
+rear in time to be off the main road before any troops move. They are
+brought back the evening before the march, after supper, or else early
+next morning.
+
+A small command may be assembled in column of route on the road before
+starting, but with a large command this is neither desirable nor
+(ordinarily) practicable.
+
+Do not allow anything for elongation at the beginning of a day’s march.
+
+
+_Assembly Order._ In a large advance guard, in order to allow all the
+troops as much rest as possible, it is sometimes desirable to issue
+an “assembly order” (written or dictated) the night before the march,
+the “march order” being issued the next morning. The assembly order
+should not be issued later than 11 p. m., if this can be avoided, and
+the earlier the hour the better for the troops. The usual form of an
+assembly order will be a statement of the time at which the command
+will be in readiness to march in the morning. If the force be a large
+one different hours may be designated for different troops in order to
+give all as much rest as possible. To determine these times proceed as
+follows: Considering the position of the organization in the column
+calculate the time at which its head should reach the “initial point,”
+then subtract the time required to reach the initial point from the
+camp of the organization. This gives the time at which the organization
+should march from its camp. The organization should be “ready to march”
+from 3 to 10 minutes sooner--depending on size of entire advance guard.
+In writing an assembly order make sure that the marches of various
+organizations do not interfere. This would be a serious mistake. The
+assembly order should close with a statement of when and where the
+march order will be issued next morning. The assembly order may or
+may not contain information as to the enemy, the commander’s plan,
+etc., depending on the situation. If it is practicable to issue the
+complete march order the night before it is usually better to do so,
+as this gives subordinate commanders time to estimate the situation so
+far as it pertains to their commands, and to make all the necessary
+preliminary arrangements in ample time. This is usually practicable if
+there is not apt to be a _change in the situation_ before morning, if
+spies are not feared, etc. The assembly order may sometimes include
+everything except the exact time of departure, objective of the march
+and route to be followed, this information being reserved until
+morning. Thus the commander avoids betraying prematurely his full
+plans. (See also “Field Orders,” Chap. II.)
+
+The order of the advance guard commander divides the advance guard into
+two main parties only (usually support and reserve). The subdivisions
+of the leading body and their distances are left to the commander
+thereof.
+
+
+_Distances._ The distance at which the advance guard precedes the main
+body should be sufficient to secure the latter against surprise by
+rifle fire or, if a large command, by artillery fire, and in case the
+enemy is encountered, to permit of his being delayed long enough, and
+sufficiently far to the front to allow the main body ample time to make
+the dispositions necessary to meet him. Each fraction of the advance
+guard should be similarly disposed with regard to the fraction next
+in rear, it being remembered that small bodies are not likely to be
+made targets for artillery fire. Distances are greater in open country
+than in close country, greater if artillery fire is to be feared than
+if rifle fire only, greater if there is a possibility of attack in
+force by cavalry, than if foot troops alone are apt to be encountered,
+greater for a cavalry advance guard than for one of infantry or mixed
+troops. Distances are often reduced at night. The dispositions of a
+cavalry advance guard are similar to those of infantry, but usually
+with greater distances.
+
+If any fraction of an advance guard consists of a battalion or more
+the fraction next in rear (including the main body) usually guides
+on it, following at a certain distance. If the fraction is smaller
+than a battalion it regulates its march on the fraction next in rear,
+preceding it at a certain distance. This should be covered in orders.
+This regulation of one body on another must be more or less reciprocal.
+
+
+_Reconnaissance._ If there is a mission for the cavalry outside the
+sphere of the advance guard commander it should be used as independent
+cavalry. This will usually be the case if contact with the enemy has
+not been gained. But if approximate position of enemy is known and
+a combat is imminent it may be better to use cavalry as “advance
+cavalry.” This will allow it to go far enough out to gain contact with
+enemy in time, and yet does not allow it to get so far out of hand that
+it can not perform its proper functions during the combat. The cavalry
+should protect the advance guard from surprise by artillery fire.
+
+Patrolling is very fatiguing to foot soldiers, hence mounted men are
+used where practicable. Parallel roads adjacent to the line of march
+(not more than 1 to 2 miles distant) may be used for flank guards or
+patrols. A flank guard of an advance guard should usually be of mounted
+men. But if it is liable to encounter resistance or is expected to
+delay an enemy’s advance it must be supported by infantry. Usually
+observation alone is sufficient for flank protection.
+
+A mounted point of a few men, ½ to 1 mile ahead of the infantry point
+is very desirable, especially if there is no advance cavalry.
+
+Flank patrols should not march through the fields, especially as
+this would be of little use. If there are no suitable parallel roads
+available, flanking patrols (mounted or foot) are sent out to all good
+lookout points or country which it is desired to search, from the
+advance party when the latter is abreast of these points. These patrols
+occupy the lookout points until the advance guard has cleared them and
+then close in on the road and join the reserve. In a small force these
+lookouts remain in position until the main body has cleared, and then
+join the tail of the main column, rejoining their proper organization
+during a halt, or at the end of the day’s march. A large advance guard
+would always have mounted men, and so need not adopt to any great
+extent, this method of patrolling or lookout with dismounted men. Small
+patrols on parallel roads should occasionally rejoin, report, and be
+relieved by new patrols.
+
+Connecting files must be maintained between all fractions of advance
+guard and between the reserve and the main body. It is the duty of
+each fraction to maintain communication with the one in front. Mounted
+orderlies are useful for this purpose. If these are not available, foot
+soldiers must be used, in which case they should be not over 200 yards
+apart.
+
+A flank guard at a distance of two miles is far enough out to prevent
+surprise by artillery fire--the greatest danger to be anticipated on
+the flank (See “Flank guards” for further discussion of this subject.)
+
+The support commander attends to details of nearby reconnaissance and
+makes the necessary divisions of his command.
+
+If cavalry has been attached to advance guard it is, of course, not to
+be used as independent cavalry. It usually has the function of gaining
+contact with the enemy to the front or exposed flank. After gaining
+touch it reconnoiters the enemy’s flanks, and may operate against
+his “flank and rear.” If there are friendly troops within its range,
+especially if it is marching to join them, the advance cavalry should
+maintain contact with them. The advance cavalry should not duplicate
+the work of the independent cavalry when there is such.
+
+The advance cavalry should generally proceed in one body toward the
+place where the enemy is supposed to be. After contact is gained it
+will work around his flanks.
+
+It is the duty of the cavalry or other mounted troops with the advance
+guard to establish contact and to keep in touch with the flank guard
+(if there is such), with the escort of the trains if these are marching
+by separate road, with the independent cavalry, with any friendly
+troops in the vicinity (especially if a junction with them is to be
+effected), and with the enemy. These duties should be specified in
+orders.
+
+The important features of the terrain to be considered by the advance
+guard commander are: those affecting reconnaissance, such as branch and
+parallel roads, woods, hills, ridges, etc., those which may impede the
+march, such as road grades and surfaces, woods, bridges, streams and
+defiles; those bearing on attack and defense, including the foregoing,
+also towns, fences, etc., and exceptionally, artillery positions and
+camp sites.
+
+The commander of the advance guard may be with the supreme commander at
+the head of the reserve. Otherwise he will be between the support and
+reserve or with the support. The support commander is usually with the
+advance party.
+
+
+_Miscellaneous duties of advance guards._ On halting it is the duty
+of an advance guard to put out temporary or march outposts. This must
+never be neglected. (See also Chap. X.) On entering a hostile town the
+advance guard should seize the railroad, post, telephone and telegraph
+offices.
+
+All possible methods by which the inhabitants might communicate with
+the enemy, whether wire, road or rail, should be controlled. If the
+local means of communication and transportation are not already under
+military control the supreme commander will issue the necessary orders
+for their regulation with a view to the service and safety of the armed
+forces. Civilians, especially if mounted or in automobiles, should
+not be allowed to precede the advance guard or advance cavalry, either
+on the route of march or any parallel route. If overtaken on the march
+they are compelled to remain in rear. Neglect of this precaution,
+especially in hostile territory or near the frontier, may result in
+information of the numbers and movements of the troops being furnished
+to the enemy.
+
+An advance guard must act aggressively in brushing aside small bodies
+of the enemy so that the march may not be delayed. Each part of an
+advance guard should try to handle any hostile force of less strength
+than itself without causing larger bodies in rear to deploy, thus
+delaying the march.
+
+The conduct of an advance guard on encountering the enemy in force,
+must be governed by the circumstances and the mission of the command as
+a whole. If the latter be on the aggressive this will usually warrant
+aggressive action by the advance guard. Nevertheless the advance guard
+must be cautious about risking its own defeat and possibly that of
+the main body also, by becoming too deeply involved in a combat with
+a greatly superior force before the main body is up. If the strength
+of the enemy is unknown the advance guard may make a reconnaissance in
+force to develop him. It is not necessary to attempt to push home an
+attack if this appears too risky. If fire superiority can be gained the
+advance guard can then press the attack vigorously, being watchful,
+however, of its flanks. (See also Chaps. XI and XIII.)
+
+Avoid intricate maneuvers and wide turning movements. Go straight at
+the enemy. The advance guard should not uncover the front of the main
+body.
+
+If the support has been deployed in driving out the enemy, time may
+be saved by pushing out a new support from the undeployed reserve on
+resuming the march.
+
+Do not deploy a large part of the force when fired on by a small body
+of the enemy. Otherwise the march may be unnecessarily delayed.
+
+In passing a bridge or defile it is advisable to send strong infantry
+flank guards well out in order to drive out any hostiles on the flanks.
+
+A cavalry advance guard, on account of its great flexibility of gaits
+may use the method of “successive bounds” for its advance. (See
+“Patrolling.”)
+
+
+OUTLINE OF SOLUTION OF SMALL ADVANCE GUARD PROBLEM.
+
+_Estimate of Situation_: (By advance guard commander.)
+
+1. Have you any special mission besides that usual to an advance guard,
+if so what measures does it call for?
+
+2. What forces are likely to oppose you, infantry, cavalry, artillery?
+How about their distances from critical points as compared to yours,
+and their probable movements?
+
+3. _Terrain._ (a) Consider the network of roads, specifically those by
+which you may advance, those available for flank guards or patrols,
+those by which enemy may approach. (b) Other features affecting
+reconnaissance. (c) Features affecting facility of march. (d) Features
+bearing on questions of attack and defense.
+
+4. How shall the cavalry be used? The order of importance is (a)
+Advance cavalry. (b) Mounted point. (c) Nearby reconnaissance. (d)
+Flank reconnaissance. If there is a mission for cavalry outside of
+sphere of support commander use as advance cavalry--generally if
+contact with enemy has not been gained, or there is an important point
+in front to be seized. Do not use a relatively weak force as advance
+cavalry.
+
+5. _Distribution of troops._ As much cavalry as possible should
+be assigned to the advance cavalry. The support should be made
+sufficiently large to provide for all necessary patrolling both mounted
+and dismounted, as well as for resistance. The necessary mounted men
+for nearby reconnaissance should be attached to the support. Dismounted
+patrolling is the special function of the advance party. To the reserve
+are assigned all troops not specially required elsewhere.
+
+6. _Starting times._ Advance cavalry, starts at ______, proceeding via
+______. Support will clear such point by ______. Reserve in order of
+march will start from camp at ______ (or head of reserve will pass such
+point at ______). Field trains usually join those of main body, forming
+on a branch road to wait for their arrival.
+
+7. _March_--how regulated--depends on size of fractions.
+
+8. _Orders._ One order issued as late as practicable (or about 10 p.
+m.) preceding night is best. But if there is apt to be a change in
+situation over night, issue assembly order (except in small advance
+guard) and reserve march order for morning. Complicated orders should
+not be issued late at night, usually not after 10 p. m. An assembly
+order may be issued somewhat later, say up to 11 p. m.
+
+
+_Advance Guard Order (verbal) for a Battalion._ (See Gettysburg-Antietam
+Map.)
+
+Verbally to co. commanders, staff, and commander of m. g. company.
+
+“The enemy is believed to have a bn. in NEW OXFORD guarding supplies
+in the village and the railroad bridge over the LITTLE CONEWAGO, three
+quarters of a mile northwest thereof, and to have several bns. in
+GETTYSBURG.
+
+The remainder of our brigade should reach YORK SPRINGS by 10 a. m.
+today.
+
+Our regiment advances today to break the railroad west of NEW OXFORD
+and to destroy the supplies in the town. Our mounted patrols have been
+sent early this morning to GRANITE HILL and towards NEW OXFORD.
+
+The 1st Bn. reinforced by the machine gun company and seven mounted
+orderlies will constitute the advance guard under my command.
+
+Cos. A and B with 7 mtd. orderlies will constitute the support, under
+command of Capt. A. Lieuts. X and Y will report to Capt. A to command
+patrols.
+
+The support will clear the crossroads at BOWLDER at 5:58 a. m.
+preceding the reserve by 500 yds. and marching via ______ on NEW OXFORD.
+
+The reserve, in order of march, Co. C, the machine gun company, Co. D,
+will start from the crossroads at BOWLDER at 6:04 a. m., preceding the
+main body by 600 yds.
+
+The field trains will join those of the regiment in camp by 6:15 a. m.
+
+Messages to head of support.”
+
+Report of dispositions to regimental commander.
+
+
+_Assembly Order._
+
+ Advance Guard, 1st Div., 1st Army Corps,
+ Farmhouse of ______ near ______
+ Field Orders } 8 Aug., '12, 10:00 p. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Geological Survey Map.
+
+1. Organizations will, tomorrow, be ready to march from their
+respective camps as follows:
+
+1st Inf.; 8 Mtd. orderlies, 2d, Inf.; Co. A, 1st Engrs. (less mtd.
+detch.) at 5:30 a. m.
+
+2d Inf. (less 8 mtd. orderlies); 1st Cav. (less Tr. A); 1st Bn. 1st L.
+A.; mtd. detch. Co. A, 1st Engrs., at 6:20 a. m.
+
+2. Supports of the outpost will remain in position until further
+orders. 6 Mtd. orderlies, 3d Inf. will join the reserve at ______ at
+7:00 a. m.
+
+3. Field trains of the 3d Inf. will be at crossroads ______ by 5:45 a.
+m.
+
+4. Orders will be issued at the JOHN SMITH farmhouse at 5:15 a. m.
+
+ A,
+ Brig. Gen.
+
+Dictated to officers detailed to receive. (Record names and
+organizations.)
+
+Report of dispositions to division commander.
+
+The march orders for an entire command are quite similar to those for
+an advance guard.
+
+Following is an example of a reinforced brigade acting as advance guard
+to a division:
+
+ 6 troopers. Tr. A, 1st Cav. (Mounted point)
+ ½ to 1 mile
+ Sergt. and 1 squad, Co. A, 1st Inf. (Infantry point)
+ 250 yards.
+ Lieut, and 2 plats., Co. A, 1st Inf. (less 1 squad)
+ 500 yds.
+ 1 plat., Tr. A, 1st Cav. (less 6 troopers)
+ 1st Bn., 1st Inf. (less 2 plats.) (Advance party)
+ M. G. Co., 1st Inf.
+ 600 yds.
+ 1st Inf. (less 1 bn. and m. g. co.) (Support)
+ 1 radio sec. pack, Sig.
+ 800 yds.
+ 1st Bn., 2nd Inf. (Reserve)
+ 1st Bn., 1st L. A.
+ 2d Inf. (less 1 bn.)
+ 3d Inf.
+ Co. A, 1st Engrs.
+ 1st Amb. Co.
+ 1 to 2 miles
+ 1st Division (less advance guard) (Main body)
+
+ (See also Fig. XV)
+
+The foregoing indicates the approximate distances between elements of
+varying sizes in advance guards of any strength up to a brigade.
+
+_A Battalion_ with 10 mounted orderlies and a machine gun platoon, as
+advance guard:
+
+ 4 Mtd. orderlies (Mtd. point)
+ ¾ mile.
+ Sergeant & 8 men, Co. A (Inf. point)
+ 250 yds.
+ Co. A (less Sgt. and 1 (Adv. Party)
+ squad) and 6 Mtd.
+ orderlies.
+ (Adv. Gd. Commander)
+ 400 to 500 yds.
+ 1st Bn. (less Co. A) (Support)
+ 1 Plat. M. G. Co.
+
+ADVANCE GUARD ORDER FOR A REINFORCED BRIGADE.
+
+ Advance Guard, 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ EMMITSBURG, MD.,
+ Field Orders, } 20 Nov., '12--9:30 p. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg-Antietam 3" Map.
+
+1. Our independent cavalry is north of LITTLESTOWN tonight. The enemy’s
+columns halted east of NEW OXFORD and BRUSHTOWN this afternoon,
+and outposted the line of the LITTLE CONEWAGO. The advance of our
+2d Division reaches BOYD SCHOOL, north of GETTYSBURG, about noon
+tomorrow. Our division marches on GETTYSBURG tomorrow, via the
+EMMITSBURG-GETTYSBURG Road.
+
+2. The Advance Guard is ordered to precede the main body by 1½ miles.
+
+ TROOPS
+
+ (a) Advance Cavalry:
+ Capt. B
+ Tr. A, 1st Cav. (less 1 plat.)
+ (b) Support:
+ Col. C
+ 1st Inf.
+ 1 plat., Tr. A, 1st Cav.
+ (less 6 troopers)
+ Co. A, 1st Engrs.
+ (c) Reserve, in order
+ of march:
+ 6 troopers, Tr. A, 1st Cav.
+ 2d Inf. (less 2 bns.)
+ 1st Bn., 1st L. A. (less C. Tn.)
+ 2 bns. 2d Inf.
+ 3d Inf.
+ C. Tn., 1st Bn., 1st L. A.
+ 1st Amb. Co.
+
+3. (a) The Advance Cavalry will move out at 6:30 a. m. to the vicinity
+of ROUND TOP, whence it will connect with our independent cavalry, and
+the 2d Division, and reconnoiter towards NEW OXFORD and BRUSHTOWN.
+
+(b) The Support will clear FLAT RUN (first stream northeast of
+EMMITSBURG) at 7:00 a. m., marching by the GETTYSBURG Road.
+
+(c) The Reserve will follow at 1,000 yards.
+
+(x) The Outpost Troops will close in on the line of march in time to
+take their place in column. The mtd. orderlies, 3d Inf., will join the
+Reserve in FAIRPLAY at 8:10 a. m.
+
+4. The Field Trains (less those of 3d Inf.) will cross the highway to
+the west immediately after the departure of the last troops from camp.
+All field trains will assemble by 8:00 a. m. on the country road
+diagonally 200 to 500 yards west of the highway with the head of column
+at the entrance, on the country road, to EMMITSBURG. They will take
+their proper place in the division trains when these come up.
+
+The wagons of the 3rd Inf. will be southwest of EMMITSBURG by 6:30 a. m.
+
+5. Messages to the Support.
+
+ A,
+ Brig. Gen.
+
+Dictated to staff and representatives of:
+
+ Tr. A, 1st Cav. 1st Bn., 1st L. A.
+ Co. A, 1st Engrs. 1st Amb. Co.
+ 1st Inf. Outpost
+ 2d Inf. F. Tn.
+ 3d Inf.
+
+Copy to C. G., 1st Div., by mtd. messenger.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V.
+
+REAR GUARDS. FLANK GUARDS.
+
+
+REAR GUARDS.
+
+_Strength and Composition._ A rear guard is practically the inverse of
+an advance guard, its distribution and arrangements are quite similar.
+On a forward march (toward the enemy) it is unusual to detail a regular
+rear guard. The rear organization, without special orders, details a
+few men to cover the rear. If danger is to be apprehended from the
+rear as well as the front, a command might have both advance and rear
+guards. This would be exceptional.
+
+It is in a retreat that a rear guard is of particular importance,
+especially in the retreat of a defeated force pursued by the enemy.
+In such a case the rear guard should be made as strong as or even
+stronger than the advance guard in a forward march. If enemy is
+pursuing closely, all the available troops still in hand may be used
+to oppose his advance. Thus a rear guard grades imperceptibly into a
+delaying force, and its orders may vary from those for a simple march
+to the occupation of a defensive position, _for delaying action only_.
+Ordinarily the strength of a rear guard in retreat is about the same
+as that of an advance guard in a forward march. But as a rear guard,
+unlike an advance guard, cannot ordinarily count on reinforcements,
+since the main body is marching _away_ from it, be sure to make it
+strong enough in the beginning, so that it will not be necessary to
+detach additional troops to reinforce it.
+
+The rear guard in retreat, usually includes the outpost of the previous
+night.
+
+Infantry will ordinarily form part of a rear guard, but the proportion
+should preferably be less than with an advance guard. Infantry has more
+difficulty in withdrawing from action than mounted troops.
+
+As much cavalry as possible should be assigned to the rear guard, both
+for reconnaissance and delaying actions. The cavalry should not be
+independent of the rear guard commander unless the enemy is so far to
+the rear that touch with him might be lost if cavalry were restricted.
+A rear guard may well consist entirely of cavalry if there is enough of
+that arm available.
+
+Motor cars are extremely useful in the pursuit of a defeated force and
+correspondingly useful in effecting a rapid retreat.
+
+Artillery, especially horse artillery, is extremely useful for delaying
+the enemy. Hence a rear guard should as a usual thing have artillery.
+Even a battalion may have a battery or two with it. It is usually
+concentrated with the reserve.
+
+The conduct of Engineers in a retreat is ordinarily as follows: The
+engineer company marches with the advance guard or leading troops
+and prepares bridges for destruction, constructs obstacles, and,
+if necessary, prepares delaying positions for defense. The mounted
+section of the engineers accompanies the rear guard and completes the
+demolitions after all friendly troops have passed. The destruction
+of bridges is a most efficacious means of delaying the enemy, but
+care should be exercised not to cut off the retreat of the rear guard
+cavalry. Also be careful about destroying bridges without the orders
+of the supreme commander if this might interfere with his plans. It is
+usually sufficient to merely disable the bridges by removing planking,
+_if there is time_. If no explosives are available a wooden bridge may
+be destroyed by fire. The engineers carry explosives. Each squadron of
+cavalry has also a “demolition squad.”
+
+Machine guns are useful with a rear guard.
+
+Signal troops seldom accompany a rear guard. If present they connect it
+with the main body.
+
+The field trains of the rear guard usually march with those of the main
+body in front of all troops in the main column. If with the rear guard
+they should be sent on well in advance of the reserve--the farther the
+better--with orders to proceed to some definite point.
+
+Sanitary troops if present with a rear guard should ordinarily be sent
+ahead of the reserve, but must remain within call in case of need. The
+artillery combat trains are usually with the sanitary troops, within
+call. They should not be separated entirely from the rear guard if a
+serious fight is anticipated.
+
+The fractions of a rear guard are rear cavalry, rear point, rear
+party, support and reserve. These are analogous to the corresponding
+fractions of an advance guard, and similarly constituted. Cavalry is
+employed _tactically_ with a rear guard to a much greater extent than
+with an advance guard. Hence be cautious about letting it get too much
+out of hand.
+
+
+_Distances._ The distances between fractions and from the main body
+are ordinarily greater than in the case of an advance guard. When the
+reserve of an advance guard would be 1,000 yards in front of the main
+body, that of a rear guard might be 1,500 to 2,000 yards in the rear.
+In the case of a convoy the rear guard usually remains closer (See
+“Convoys”). The distances of a rear guard cannot be maintained if it
+has to delay the enemy. It should not become too far separated from the
+main body, but it may be still more dangerous to be driven in too close.
+
+As the distances are so variable it is not always advisable to
+prescribe them exactly. If enemy is not in immediate contact, the rear
+guard may be ordered to follow the main body at a certain distance.
+Otherwise it may be ordered to “follow delaying the enemy,” or to
+“march at such an hour,” or in the extreme case the supreme commander
+may merely inform the rear guard commander of the hour at which the
+main body will start, leaving the conduct of the rear guard entirely
+to its commander. It is, however, entirely proper to direct the rear
+guard commander in orders, to maintain touch with the enemy by means of
+patrols and to reconnoiter his flanks.
+
+The rear guard commander should keep himself accurately informed as to
+the progress of the main body, so that he need not risk his safety any
+more than necessary. The supreme commander should, from time to time,
+advise the rear guard commander as to the progress of the main body,
+etc.
+
+
+_Conduct._ As the column is usually withdrawing from the enemy the
+reconnaissance of a rear guard is different from that of an advance
+guard. It seeks to establish contact with the enemy, not only with his
+advance troops but with his _main body_, and to maintain it as long as
+possible. Its special duty in the way of reconnaissance is to cover the
+rear of the main body, not only on the road by which it is retreating,
+but on parallel roads, so that the enemy while engaging the rear guard
+with a portion of his force cannot slip by it on a parallel road and
+strike the main body, or cut off the retreat of the rear guard. Thus it
+is important to keep in touch with enemy’s _main body_.
+
+The rear guard should take the main road as soon as possible, and
+retreat as nearly as practicable straight to the rear, following the
+main body, and covering it at all times.
+
+Its usual procedure if closely pressed by the enemy, is a series of
+delaying actions, one portion covering the retreat of another. The
+special duty of the rear guard commander, in addition to reconnaissance
+of the enemy, is the selection of suitable delaying positions. These
+should fulfill as many as possible of the requirements of a defensive
+position. But as they will usually not be held to a decision, it is
+both permissible and proper to occupy an extended front in order to
+deceive the enemy and force him to make a wide detour to turn the
+position. In case of an unexpected delay to the main body, such as a
+broken bridge, the rear guard might have to fight to a decision. In
+such case it might be reinforced, but ordinarily should not expect nor
+call for help from the main body.
+
+If it is possible to delay the enemy with the artillery and cavalry it
+is well to put as little infantry as possible into action, since it is
+difficult to withdraw without loss and confusion.
+
+The rear guard commander should consider several positions along the
+line of march from which the enemy may be delayed. It is well to make
+the first stand as far to the front as possible--at the outpost line
+if this is a good defensive position. Consequently the outpost should
+not be withdrawn prematurely, especially as this also gives the enemy
+notice of your intentions if he observes it. Another position must
+then be selected to cover the withdrawal of the outpost and so on.
+Each position should be such that its fire will not be masked by any
+retiring troops. As these will generally retire straight to the rear,
+positions squarely or obliquely on the flank of the line of retreat
+or line of enemy’s advance are often advantageous. If one flank is
+toward the enemy in such cases, it should be secure, and there should
+be a good getaway--the front edge of a woods, impenetrable for the
+most part, but having lanes through it is a good place for a flanking
+position. In retreating from such positions the troops may have
+temporarily to leave the main line of retreat. They should rejoin as
+soon as possible, since main body must not be uncovered.
+
+If the enemy can be sufficiently delayed by forcing him to deploy one
+or more times, this is the safest procedure. Accordingly look for
+high points along the line of retreat, hills and ridges, which may be
+utilized by the artillery or for position fire of machine guns, and
+long range rifle fire.
+
+If it is necessary to make a stand, one determined stand in a good
+position is usually preferable to several half-hearted ones. You may
+not be able to deceive the enemy more than once as to your strength. If
+you have a good position do not leave it as long as it is safe to hang
+on.
+
+A delaying position should preferably have a broad front, a good screen
+to conceal strength of troops occupying it, an obstacle in its front
+and a good getaway.
+
+The instructions to an officer commanding a portion of the rear guard
+in a delaying position might be about as follows: “Major A, you will
+take up a position at ______ for the purpose of delaying the enemy’s
+advance (or to cover withdrawal of such troops from such place). When
+you are in danger of being cut off, break off the engagement and retire
+via ______ to ______, where further orders will be given you. Messages
+will reach me at ______.”
+
+The rear guard should be kept as well in hand as conditions permit. All
+movements should be as simple as possible and as far as practicable,
+straight to the rear.
+
+The commander of a rear guard should be allowed great latitude. His
+defensive measures should seldom be prescribed in advance by the
+supreme commander.
+
+In his own orders the rear guard commander cannot in any case prescribe
+more than the first two delaying positions--the rear one to cover the
+retreat from the most advanced. Additional orders are given verbally as
+necessity arises, but other delaying positions should be considered in
+estimating the situation.
+
+If the supreme commander has sent out any special patrols to the rear
+he should mention this in Par. 1 of his retreat order so that rear
+guard commander may take notice. He should also at all times keep the
+rear guard commander posted as to the situation, transmitting to him
+all information bearing upon his duty.
+
+It is unusual for a rear guard to have a flank detachment. If special
+protection on the flank is required the supreme commander should
+generally give orders in regard to this, either detailing a special
+flank guard, or directing the rear guard to do so. If this has not
+been done the rear guard commander must consider whether his mission
+_requires_ a flank guard. Apply the rules given under “Flank Guards.”
+You will then _usually_ find that a flank guard is not required.
+Moreover it is properly, as stated, the duty of the supreme commander
+to attend to this. If he had wanted a flank guard he would probably
+have said so.
+
+In retreating upon the front of a defensive position a retiring force
+should draw off to a flank or retire into an interval in the line, so
+as to avoid masking the fire of the position, while at the same time
+drawing the enemy across the front of the position in such a manner
+as to subject him to its fire. Consider which flank it is better to
+approach.
+
+A rear guard must not take the offensive without _special_ orders from
+the supreme commander, unless necessary for the accomplishment of its
+mission. In this respect it differs from an advance guard. There will
+be occasions, however, when aggressive action will best serve to delay
+the enemy. If the pursuit be conducted too recklessly opportunity for
+an effective counter-stroke may be presented. In a critical case the
+supreme commander may himself remain with the rear guard. This would
+not be usual.
+
+Rear guard orders, in general, are quite similar to those of an advance
+guard.
+
+ A RETREAT ORDER.
+ Detch., 2nd Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ TWO TAVERNS, PA.
+ Field Orders, } 28 Nov., 1912--10:00 p. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg-Antietam 3" Map.
+
+1. The enemy has camped on ROCK CREEK near GETTYSBURG and near ROUND
+TOP. About 1 squadron of Red cavalry is in camp near POWERS HILL,
+additional Red cavalry is reported near BONEAUVILLE.
+
+Our 1st Division marched this afternoon from GETTYSBURG to NEW OXFORD
+where it will be reinforced. We also are ordered to join it tomorrow.
+
+2. This detachment marches tomorrow, the 29th inst., to join the 1st
+Division near NEW OXFORD.
+
+ TROOPS
+
+ (a) Advance Guard:
+ Col. C.
+ 3rd Inf. (less 1 bn.)
+ Tr. A, 1st Cav. (less 2
+ plats.)
+ (b) Main Body, in order
+ of march:
+ 1 Bn., 3d Inf.
+ 1st Bn., 1st L. A. (less Btry.
+ A, and C. Tn.)
+ 2nd Inf. (less 1st Bn.)
+ (c) Rear Guard:
+ Major A.
+ 1st Bn., 1st Inf.
+ 2 plats. Tr. A, 1st Cav.
+ Mtd. Detch., Co. A, 1st Engrs.
+ (d) Left Flank Guard:
+ Col. A.
+ 1st Inf. (less 1st Bn.)
+ 1st Sq., 1st Cav. (less Trs.
+ A & D)
+ Btry. A, 1st L. A. (less C. Tn.)
+ 4. Train:
+ Major B.
+ 1st Bn., 2d Inf.
+ Co. A. 1st Engrs. (less
+ Mtd. detch.)
+ F. Tn.
+ 1st Amb. Co.
+ C. Tn., 1st Bn., 1st L. A.
+
+3. (a). The advance guard will clear MEYER F. H. at 6:00 a. m. and
+march via ST. LUKE’S CHURCH on SQUARE CORNER. It will maintain
+communication with the flank guard and train and establish
+communication with our 1st Division.
+
+(b). The main body will follow the advance guard at 600 yards.
+
+(c). The rear guard, now on duty as outpost, will remain in position
+until 6:10 a. m. and will then follow the main body. It will keep
+touch with the Red troops near ROUND TOP by means of patrols and will
+reconnoiter the enemy’s right.
+
+(d). The left flank guard will march from M. RUDISH F. H. at 6:00 a. m.
+on SWEET HOME S. H. It will maintain communication with the rear guard,
+reconnoiter the HANOVER ROAD and not permit the enemy to advance east
+of BONEAUVILLE before the command has cleared SQUARE CORNER.
+
+4. The train with escort, in the order named, will form by
+5:50 a. m. on the GERMANTOWN--555--WHITEHALL Road with the
+head of the column at BAIR F. H., and will then march via
+WHITEHALL--601--MARYSVILLE--IRISHTOWN to REDHILL S. H.
+
+5. Messages to the head of the main body.
+
+ A,
+ Brig. Gen.
+
+Dictated to officers designated to receive. (Append list of
+organizations, see previous order.) Report of dispositions to C. G. 1st
+Div. by wire.
+
+NOTE:--In this case the detachment is _not required to delay the
+enemy’s advance_ but only to make good its own retreat. The enemy is
+not in contact with its outposts. If a serious rear or flank guard
+action were anticipated it might be better to place all the artillery
+with the rear and flank guards and the combat trains at the tail of the
+main body.
+
+If, in a retreat, the enemy is pressing closely it may not be possible
+to conduct an uninterrupted march, and orders for same cannot be given
+in advance. In such a case it is often necessary to delay the enemy
+in successive positions, which duty may be assigned to the rear guard
+alone, or to the entire force. The rear guard commander, if charged
+with this duty, will then issue orders for a position in readiness
+prepared either to reinforce the outpost (which in such a case should
+have been placed under his command), cover its withdrawal, or take up
+the march in rear of the main body. Subsequent orders (for a delaying
+action, another position in readiness, or for taking up the march) may
+then be issued as the occasion demands. (See “Position in Readiness.”)
+
+
+FLANK GUARDS.
+
+_Strength and Composition._ No rules can be given for the strength
+of a flank detachment, as this depends on circumstances to a greater
+extent than in cases of advance and rear guards. Its limiting strength
+is about ½ that of the body which sends it out, which amounts to a
+movement in two columns, and it varies from this maximum down to a
+mounted patrol, which of course would not be called a flank guard. A
+flank guard proper is a body which has _some power of resistance_.
+
+A flank guard should generally have a large proportion of cavalry.
+It may well consist entirely of this arm if there is enough for the
+purpose, or if a determined resistance is not likely to be required.
+But if there is paucity of cavalry, not enough to have sufficient
+resisting power, then infantry should be sent to support the cavalry.
+As a rule a _special_ flank guard is detailed only when resistance is
+necessary, hence it will ordinarily consist of infantry and cavalry.
+
+Artillery as a rule does not accompany a flank guard, especially if
+the situation is such that the artillery from the main body can be
+thrown over to the flank in case of need. But if the flank guard has
+sufficient strength artillery may be attached if there appears to be
+an actual need of it. With a cavalry flank guard horse artillery if
+available should preferably be used.
+
+Mounted men and machine guns are useful with a flank guard. Engineers,
+signal and sanitary troops are usually not required.
+
+There should be no wagons with a flank guard, except the regular combat
+trains. In a flank march the trains should be closed upon the main
+body, or sent on another road (on unexposed flank) with an escort if
+required. The trains of the flank guard would be with those of the main
+body. Ordinarily the wounded or footsore infantrymen riding on the
+wagons (in addition to the personnel which regularly accompanies them)
+are sufficient escort for the trains. Do not send the wagon train over
+a bad road. It is slow enough at best, and on a bad road might, by its
+slow progress, defeat the very object for which it was separated from
+the main body. If engineers accompany the command they may be sent with
+the train to facilitate its progress by repairing bridges, etc. They,
+of course, also act as escort. In the U. S. field trains can seldom
+travel in double column, as the roads are not sufficiently capacious.
+
+In a flank march the advance guard (of the main body) need seldom be as
+strong as in a forward march.
+
+
+_When required._ A flank guard is not a matter of course like an
+advance guard. It should be used only when the situation demands it. In
+deciding whether or not to use a flank guard and if yes what troops to
+assign thereto, ask and answer the following questions:
+
+1. Is there a hostile force on the flank so strong and so close that
+it might strike the flank of the column during the march? Make careful
+calculations of times and distances and consider what enemy is able to
+do.
+
+2. Will observation on the flank be sufficient, or is resistance very
+likely to be necessary?
+
+3. Is a flank guard necessary for safety, does it promise a real
+advantage, or will it merely disperse the troops without any
+compensation?
+
+4. Will a flank guard actually facilitate the march, or is it more apt
+to delay it?
+
+5. Is there a suitable road for the flank guard at about 1½ miles
+distance, with several crossroads connecting it with line of march of
+main body?
+
+6. Are there any impassable obstacles between the two routes?
+
+7. Is the flank guard likely to have a serious fight? If yes generally
+send some infantry.
+
+After answering these questions the decision will usually be that no
+flank guard is required. If you are in doubt do not send one. It is
+ordinarily better to keep your troops in hand especially in a small
+force, and protection on a flank can usually be provided by active
+mounted reconnaissance.
+
+If the flank guard is very strong as compared to the main body the
+formation becomes virtually a movement in two columns. This may
+sometimes be an advantage. It shortens the distance from front to rear,
+and facilitates deployment to the front, so that it might be used to
+advantage where a combat is anticipated and position of enemy known.
+The distance between the two columns should be about equal to the depth
+of one column (combatant troops only) as this facilitates deployment
+to the front. The trains should be with the column on the less exposed
+flank, or better still on a third road with an escort. An infantry
+flank guard not stronger than a regiment, should seldom be more than 1½
+miles from the main body.
+
+The ideal case for the use of a flank guard is where there is a certain
+point, such as a junction of several roads or a lone bridge over an
+unfordable stream, through which the enemy is certain or at least
+extremely likely to pass if he operates against the flank, or a strong
+position commanding the country through which he must pass even when
+he is not limited to a single route. In this case the flank guard,
+in sufficient strength, proceeds rapidly to the critical point and
+there delays the enemy until the main body including the rear guard if
+there is one, is clear of all danger. But even in this favorable case
+observation from some commanding point of the country through which the
+enemy must pass may be sufficient.
+
+Another case in which a flank guard is often used is where a change in
+direction of march is executed, especially in the case of a convoy.
+In this case the whole (or a portion) of the former advance guard,
+reinforced if necessary, may be pushed out to the former front now
+become the flank, especially if the enemy is known to be in that
+direction. Here it may seize a strong position and hold it until the
+main body is out of danger or, according to circumstances, continue the
+march on a parallel road. A new advance guard is, of course, required,
+usually not as strong as the former one.
+
+A convoy, being much more vulnerable to an attack than a body of
+troops, would usually have a flank guard if any danger was anticipated
+in the direction of its flank. (See “Convoys.”)
+
+An auto convoy may be accompanied by cavalry, foot troops transported
+by auto, or by a number of armored cars, suitably disposed as advance
+and rear guards, and as flank guards on parallel roads. On a good road
+cavalry cannot always keep pace with an auto convoy of light trucks
+without retarding the speed of the convoy.
+
+The smaller the force the less apt it is to need a flank guard. A large
+force is much more apt to need one as it requires more time to prepare
+to meet an attack. For the same reason the flank guard will generally
+be farther out. A distance of 1½ to 2 miles is sufficient to protect a
+column against surprise by artillery fire, and this is ordinarily the
+_limiting distance_ for a flank guard. A very large flank guard, being
+more independent and able to stand a longer time without reinforcement,
+might be farther out. Such a body, however, would be a detachment
+rather than a true flank guard.
+
+If the flank guard consists entirely of cavalry its distance away,
+and the matters of communicating roads and obstacles between it and
+the main body (see ante) are of much less importance than where the
+bulk of the flank guard is infantry. A strong covering body of cavalry
+some distance out, however, is virtually independent cavalry and would
+generally be called such. Its movements would seldom be limited to any
+particular route.
+
+
+_Conduct._ A flank guard marches like any other body, with advance
+guard, rear guard if necessary, and other security measures. This, of
+course, is not prescribed in the orders to the flank guard, but is
+left to its commander. A flank guard does not usually put out its own
+(another) flank guard. If of cavalry it should send officers’ patrols
+well to the exposed flank, and if of infantry it employs its cavalry or
+other mounted men to reconnoiter its exposed flank. It is, of course,
+extremely desirable to gain touch with the enemy.
+
+Unless there is distinctly an independent mission for the cavalry on
+the flank it is advisable to place the cavalry with the flank guard
+and under the commander thereof. Otherwise the cavalry is very apt to
+get out of hand and fail to co-operate with the infantry. If, however,
+the cavalry commander is also the commander of the entire flank guard,
+the necessary freedom of action of the cavalry will not be restricted,
+while at the same time co-operation between the cavalry and the
+infantry is assured. Therefore if the cavalry with the flank guard is
+relatively strong (as compared to the infantry) and the relative rank
+of the officers concerned permits it, the entire flank guard may well
+be placed under the cavalry commander.
+
+A flank guard should not bring on a decisive engagement unless it is
+empowered to do so, as this might involve the main body, contrary to
+the wishes of the supreme commander.
+
+A flank guard usually marches abreast of the main body. The advance
+guard (of the main body) keeps touch with the flank guard, but the
+latter should maintain communication with the rear guard (of the main
+body) and not fail to consider the safety of the latter, as it might be
+endangered if the flank guard advanced or retired too rapidly, allowing
+the enemy to cut in.
+
+A flank guard usually will not be reinforced. But this may be necessary
+for the safety of the main column. Hence the obstacles between the two
+routes and the roads by which the flank guard may be reinforced in case
+of necessity, must be carefully considered.
+
+The orders of the supreme commander should ordinarily prescribe the
+time of departure, route and special mission of the flank guard. After
+this considerable latitude should be allowed the flank guard commander
+as his actions will depend to a great extent on those of the enemy.
+The march of a flank guard will not always be continuous. It must,
+when necessary, halt in suitable places en route, assuming a defensive
+attitude if necessary, to delay the enemy until main body is clear. The
+flank guard commander must consider the enemy’s probable line or lines
+of advance, and the dispositions he will make to delay him. He will not
+hesitate to leave the prescribed route of march if his mission demands
+it. He will keep the supreme commander informed as to his actions,
+particularly if the enemy is encountered, and call for reinforcements
+when absolutely required.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI.
+
+MARCHES, CHANGE OF DIRECTION OF MARCH, CAMPS AND BIVOUACS.
+
+
+MARCHES.
+
+_Arrangement of troops._
+
+The different elements on a march are:
+
+ (a) The independent cavalry.
+ (b) The advance guard.
+ (c) The main body.
+ (d) The flank guard.
+ (e) The rear guard.
+ (f) The train (including field hospitals,
+ ammunition, supply and pack trains).
+
+In marches in peace time or at a distance from the enemy, cavalry and
+artillery may march in rear of the infantry or on a different road.
+Large bodies of cavalry and horse artillery should not, as a rule, be
+intermingled with foot troops, except so far as is necessary for their
+safety.
+
+Auto truck trains may be routed on a separate road from wagons and
+troops where safe and practicable. A good road should be selected for
+their movement as they suffer greater proportionate delay on a poor
+road than either troops or wagons.
+
+The combat trains ordinarily accompany their organizations, except that
+the artillery combat trains are usually in rear of the last infantry
+organization. The firing batteries should be as a rule near the head
+of the main body with a battalion or an entire regiment of infantry
+immediately in front of them. A column of artillery or wagons more than
+a mile in length should ordinarily have some infantry in the middle for
+protection against a sudden attack in flank.
+
+Trains follow in advance, precede in retreat, the position of the
+trains thus usually indicates the direction for retreat. Sometimes
+trains are sent on a separate road, on unexposed flank. The field
+trains are usually combined under the command of an officer, who is
+designated only in the first order or when a change is made.
+
+There should generally be a small body of cavalry or other mounted men
+at the head of the main body especially in a flank march, and a few
+mounted men with the train, 6 to 12 men under an officer, designated
+in orders if train is separated from main body, and not sufficiently
+exposed to require a stronger escort.
+
+Brigade trains in a forward march follow the main body at ½ to 2
+miles. In a flank march they are usually closed up. In retreat they
+are sent well ahead. If separated from the main body they should have
+an escort if there is any risk. Often a few mounted men in addition
+to the slightly wounded and footsore infantrymen on the wagons (who
+are still able to fight) will be enough. Also the field trains are
+usually accompanied by a number of armed men in addition to the
+wagoners, including sergeants, cooks, mechanics, clerks, etc. Supply
+and ammunition trains are likewise habitually accompanied by a number
+of armed men. Engineers are very useful as an escort as they can
+facilitate the progress of the train. The escort, if any, should be
+mentioned in orders when train is separated from troops. It should
+always be under the command of an officer, preferably one senior to the
+Q. M.
+
+Field trains may (a) Follow without distance (b) Follow at a certain
+distance (c) Remain behind (d) Follow to a certain locality and there
+remain (e) Precede at a certain distance or as rapidly as possible (f)
+Move by a different route to the same or another locality. In (a) and
+(b) no special escort is necessary. In the other cases circumstances
+decide. The arrangement of field trains in column should generally be
+the same as that of the troops to which they pertain. This is a matter
+of course, and need not be mentioned in orders, at least not after
+the first order. It is desirable to have the field trains join their
+organizations at the end of the march. But if tactical considerations
+demand, the troops can subsist for several days without their trains.
+Trains should never be taken through a defile or over a bridge if a
+combat is imminent, especially if retreat is possible. Keep them well
+to the rear, and off the main road when entering a fight. If it be
+necessary to separate the command from its trains for a considerable
+period an extra reserve ration or two may be issued to the troops
+before the separation. In a division action some or all of the
+ammunition train would usually accompany the troops into action, the
+remainder of the trains being left at or sent to a safe place in rear.
+(See Chap. XVII.)
+
+In passing a defile have a strong body of infantry at the head of the
+column. It is usually inadvisable to have a strong body of cavalry
+_immediately_ ahead of the infantry in such a situation. A defile
+should be reconnoitered carefully, preferably on a broad front, before
+allowing any considerable number of troops to enter.
+
+The companies in a battalion and the battalions in a regiment may
+alternate daily in position (this is not prescribed in orders of
+supreme commander). But beyond this, daily changes in the order of
+march are not advisable as they produce confusion and fatigue. The same
+troops may remain as advance guard for several days at a time, say for
+one series of marches--5 or 6 days--unless for some good reason, such
+as their having suffered severely in combat, it seems advisable to
+relieve them.
+
+A rear guard is exceptional in a forward march--an advance guard in a
+retrograde movement. In the former case the rear infantry regiment,
+without orders, puts out a small rear guard (behind the trains), in the
+latter case “leading troops” (designated in orders) precede the trains.
+In a flank march both advance and rear guards as well as a flank guard
+may be necessary--all designated in march order.
+
+Troops should be camped or quartered conveniently with reference to
+their position in column on arrival and on departure. It is well to
+camp in column of route along the road if command is not too large
+and conditions permit. It saves time and fatigue on both arrival and
+departure.
+
+If there is an independent mission for the cavalry beyond the sphere
+of the advance guard and if the cavalry is relatively strong enough it
+should be made independent. Otherwise the bulk of it is attached to the
+advance guard. If a combat is imminent the tactical use of the cavalry
+to develop the enemy and operate against his flanks and rear may take
+precedence over other considerations, in which case the cavalry may
+better be kept in hand (assigned to advance guard).
+
+The supreme commander may march (a) Between support and reserve of
+advance guard (b) At head of reserve (c) At head of main body. If he is
+with the advance guard a commander should be designated for the main
+body. The supreme commander may go wherever his presence is necessary.
+He generally designates a certain place (as “head of reserve”) to which
+messages are to be sent, and if he is not there when they come in,
+an orderly takes them to him. When he is with the advance guard its
+commander will usually accompany him. The supreme commander should
+generally march with the advance guard if combat is at all probable. In
+retreat he may join the rear guard if the enemy is pressing the pursuit.
+
+In a flank march the distances between elements should generally be
+less than in a forward march--the entire column is “closed up.”
+
+
+_Time of Starting._ Infantry and other foot troops should have an hour
+of daylight prior to commencing the march. Hence the first troops to
+march should start about sunrise. Mounted troops should have two hours
+of daylight before starting. Hence they should march about an hour
+after sunrise. These are the proper hours for starting, and orders
+should be arranged accordingly. Circumstances may require an earlier
+start, at daybreak or, in exceptional cases, even a little earlier.
+But there should be cogent reasons for a very early start. It is well
+to avoid the _habit_ of early starting. Both men and animals rest well
+in the hours just preceding dawn. To habitually interfere with this
+rest will rapidly lower the efficiency of the troops. If the number
+of mounted troops is _small_, and tactical considerations require it,
+their comfort may occasionally be disregarded, and they will start
+with the infantry at sunrise. As a rule the cavalry will not trot in
+starting a day’s march, they should walk at least a mile. In any case
+the gaits should be left to the judgment of the cavalry commander. The
+independent cavalry, if it moves by a separate road, may start _later
+than the infantry_, as it can make up for lost time by increase of
+gait. Ordinarily it should not be sent past foot troops on the same
+road (unless it be wide and paved) as this will cause confusion, delay
+and discomfort.
+
+Trains may be started out considerably earlier than troops if
+necessary, as they are not subjected to such great fatigue. This, of
+course, will never be necessary when trains follow in rear of troops,
+but in retreat they should be sent on about 2 hours ahead of the
+troops, or even sooner if necessary for their safety and to get them
+out of the way. Hence they, with their escort, will frequently march
+before daybreak.
+
+In considering the probable movements of the enemy, always make
+allowance for what might happen if he marches at daybreak or earlier
+still, for he has this option. Are there any reasons why he might wish
+to start early? If he arrived late at his camping place (after 3:00 p.
+m.) this indicates the possibility of his making a start early the next
+morning.
+
+A late arrival (after 3:00 p. m.) is even more objectionable than an
+early start, unless hours of march have been arranged with a long
+rest to avoid the heat of mid-day. It is better to break camp before
+daylight than to make it after dark.
+
+Night marches of any considerable length should generally be avoided
+except in cases of extreme urgency. If indulged in to any great extent
+they will soon wear out both men and animals. Troops which have made
+a long night march will not be in good trim for active operations on
+the following day. Night marches are sometimes made in hot weather to
+avoid the heat of the day. They may also be made for the purpose of
+surprising the enemy, as to secure a favorable position from which he
+may be attacked at dawn, in the retreat or pursuit of a defeated force
+and in certain other special cases.
+
+Under the conditions that obtain in modern warfare the movements of
+large bodies of troops during daylight will seldom escape detection by
+the enemy’s aerial scouts. Accordingly the cover of darkness will at
+times be used for the concentration of reserves at critical points on
+the field of battle. If the troops can be concealed at the end of such
+movements it will often be advisable to allow them to rest during a
+portion at least of the day following their night movement. This will
+restore their vigor and render them fresh for active operations. For
+night marches it is desirable that the troops be accompanied by guides.
+(See also Chaps. XI and XIII.)
+
+Movements by rail are usually not practicable except for long distances
+(more than 40 miles) and when well protected from the enemy by distance
+or covering troops. They pertain to strategical concentrations, but
+seldom to tactical operations on a small scale.
+
+Movements of troops in large or small numbers and over considerable
+distances are successfully accomplished by the use of motor cars. Motor
+transportation is adaptable to campaign, in that cars may start or end
+a journey almost anywhere in the theater without regard to a fixed rail
+right of way. They load, dispatch and unload without formality; they
+require no sidings nor elaborate terminals.
+
+In a large command the advance guard will be some distance in advance
+of the main body. Therefore the time of starting of the latter should
+not be set so early that advance guard must march before sunrise. Hence
+a large force cannot make an early start as readily as a small one,
+unless it camps in column of route.
+
+
+Standard Times of Sunrise and Sunset at Gettysburg, Pa., 40° N lat.
+
+(Authority--Prof. R. H. Willson, Harvard Univ.)
+
+(Correct to within 5 minutes)
+
+ +-------------+----------+-----------+
+ | Date | Sunrise, | Sunset, |
+ | | a. m. | p. m. |
+ +-------------+----------+-----------+
+ | January 1 | 7:30 | 4:50 |
+ | February 1 | 7:10 | 5:20 |
+ | March 1 | 6:40 | 5:50 |
+ | April 1 | 5:50 | 6:20 |
+ | May 1 | 5:10 | 7:00 |
+ | June 1 | 4:40 | 7:20 |
+ | July 1 | 4:40 | 7:30 |
+ | August 1 | 5:00 | 7:10 |
+ | September 1 | 5:30 | 6:40 |
+ | October 1 | 6:00 | 5:50 |
+ | November 1 | 6:30 | 5:00 |
+ | December 1 | 7:10 | 4:40 |
+ +-------------+----------+-----------+
+
+ NOTE: For intermediate dates, interpolate.
+ Daybreak and dusk occur about an hour (more or
+ less) before sunrise and after sunset. They are
+ indefinite times, and it is better not to use such
+ expressions in orders, but to give standard times.
+
+
+_The Start._ The start is arranged as described under “Advance Guards.”
+A large body cannot be assembled at one point. The initial point
+should preferably be at a crossroad, which organizations can reach by
+a number of different routes. If there is any danger of confusion or
+interference the routes of different organizations to the initial point
+should be prescribed. In a large command, where the advance guard and
+main body are separated by a considerable distance, an initial point
+should be designated for each. The order of the supreme commander will
+designate the hour at which the main body will start from its initial
+point and the hour at which the advance guard will clear _its_ initial
+point, or preferably, the distance at which the advance guard will
+precede the main body (in starting). This latter arrangement allows the
+advance guard commander to select his initial point, which is usually
+desirable. During the march the main body will usually regulate its
+march on that of the advance guard if the latter be larger than a
+battalion. In a small command the same initial point is used for the
+advance guard and main body. The order of the supreme commander in this
+case will ordinarily designate the hour at which the advance guard is
+to clear the initial point and the hour at which the main body starts
+therefrom, or the distance at which it is to follow the advance guard.
+Each subordinate commander is responsible that his command takes its
+proper place in column at the proper time without interference with
+other organizations. In an assembly order for a large command troops
+whose starting times do not differ by more than ten minutes would be
+grouped under one time heading. See also remarks under “The start,” and
+“Assembly order,” in the Chapter on advance guards.
+
+It is not always possible to foresee the end of a day’s march. In
+such cases the order should direct the march “provisionally” on some
+intermediate point in the right direction, arrival at which without
+interruption is reasonably certain.
+
+
+_Length and speed of marches._ Marches often cause greater losses than
+battles. A forced march may cost more than a fierce engagement. Hence
+avoid forced marches and all unnecessary hardships. A long march should
+not be undertaken with green troops. The early marches of a campaign
+should not be more than 8 or 9 miles per day for infantry or mixed
+troops. From this they can be gradually increased to a maximum of about
+15 miles for a brigade or smaller force. Small bodies can make longer
+marches than large ones. Thus a battalion might march 16 miles, whereas
+12 to 13 would be the usual limit for a division. Anything more than
+15 miles for infantry or 25 for cavalry, is a forced march, except for
+small commands of seasoned troops.
+
+The average speed of infantry without halts is 3 miles per hour (a mile
+in 20 minutes) or, including halts, 2½ miles per hour. There should
+be a halt of 10 minutes in each hour, and if the march extends into
+the afternoon a long halt of about an hour near noon. Troops should be
+informed of duration of halts.
+
+Troops cannot march continually. After 5 or 6 days of steady marching
+(or less if combats also are included) even seasoned troops need
+a day of rest. Tactical requirements are paramount, but one must
+not forget that endurance of troops, even of cavalry, has a limit.
+Unnecessary hardships must be avoided. The fighting power of a command
+is considerably below the normal immediately after a forced march, and
+almost nil after a night march. Night marches may require half again as
+much time to cover the same distance as those executed during the day,
+in the case of a large command.
+
+It is not safe to assume a speed of more than 2 miles an hour for a
+wagon train. Field Artillery can keep pace with infantry, unless roads
+are very poor as in some mountainous sections of the U. S. On good
+roads and for moderate distances Light Field Arty. can keep pace with
+cavalry, but horse arty. is better for service with a cavalry command.
+
+The following table shows the marching rates of various arms:
+
+ +----------------+----------+------------+------------+------------+
+ | | Miles/hr | Miles/hr | Miles/day | Miles/day |
+ | ARM | At drill |on the march| Ordinary | Forced |
+ | | | with halts | march | march |
+ +----------------+----------+------------+------------+------------+
+ |Infantry or | | | | |
+ | mixed troops | 3 | 2¼ to 2¾ | 12 to 16 | 16 to 30 |
+ +----------------+----------+------------+------------+------------+
+ |Cavalry | | | 20 to 25 | 25 to 50 |
+ |Walk | 4 | 3¼ to 3½ | | |
+ |Trot | 8 | | | |
+ |Gallop | 12 | | | |
+ |Alternating | | | | |
+ | walk and trot | | 5 | | |
+ +----------------+----------+------------+------------+------------+
+ |Wagons | | 2 to 2¼ | 12 to 20 | |
+ +----------------+----------+------------+------------+------------+
+
+ NOTE. _Empty_ wagons on good roads can make longer
+ marches. Small convoys of light auto trucks can average from 5 to
+ 10 miles per hour, according to the nature of the road and other
+ conditions. (See Chap. XVII.)
+
+
+_General Remarks._ The elongation of a column (over road distances
+given in F. S. R.) may vary from nothing at the start to 20 per cent at
+the conclusion of a day’s march. 10 per cent is a fair average.
+
+For a rapid current the limiting depths fordable are, for infantry 3
+ft., for cavalry 4 ft., for artillery or wagons 2½ ft. If current is
+sluggish allow ⅓ more for infantry and cavalry.
+
+Usually march on the main or best road. The distance may be somewhat
+greater, but the time required will usually be less. The best roads in
+the U. S. are none too good. During the march troops should remain on
+the road, but in taking position for combat both troops and artillery
+may move across country. Even in such a case it is best to remain on
+the road as long as possible.
+
+The front is always in the direction of the enemy. Thus in a retreat
+the _right flank_ guard would be on the _left hand_ of the column. The
+head of a column is in the direction of march, which may be to the rear.
+
+Do not use words “sunrise” or “daybreak” in orders, but give standard
+time.
+
+Troops usually march better and suffer less from fatigue in cold
+weather than in very warm weather.
+
+It is not ordinarily practicable to march artillery or trains in double
+column on roads in the U. S. But trains or troops in rear of other
+trains may be brought to the front by halting the wagons ahead of them
+on one side of the road. It is very embarrassing for artillery to have
+to countermarch on U. S. roads. But it is _possible_. During a march
+one side of the road should be left clear for the passage of messengers.
+
+In connection with subject of marches read also “Advance,” “Rear and
+Flank Guards,” and “Cavalry tactics.”
+
+
+_Change in direction of march._ A change of direction of march usually
+results from a change in the situation causing a change of mission. An
+example of this would be a case in which the main body unexpectedly
+encountered the enemy in force. In such a case it would ordinarily
+be the duty of all detachments within reach to rejoin for the main
+battle--“march to the sound of the guns,”--abandoning for the time
+being their less important missions. Upon arrival such detachments
+should as a rule not attack the enemy independently, but should send
+word of the time and place of their arrival and place themselves under
+the orders of the supreme commander. While it is the rule that all
+detachments within reach should rejoin for the main conflict, yet
+there will be cases where a detachment is justified in staying out
+of a battle it might have joined. Of this the best example is where
+the detachment can “contain” a relatively larger force of the enemy,
+thus keeping it out of the main combat. If the enemy opposed to the
+detachment is of less strength than itself it may be contained by a
+portion of the detachment, while the rest marches to join the battle. A
+detachment should not allow itself to be contained by an inferior force.
+
+In making the change of direction some suitable point to the former
+front should be selected and occupied by the advance guard to cover
+the change of direction. If there be any danger from the direction
+of the former front the advance guard continues its march as a flank
+guard, a new advance guard being pushed out from the main body. For
+such a movement two roads at suitable distance are required (see
+“Flank Guards.”) In making a change of direction it is well to avoid
+countermarching troops, and especially artillery, if practicable.
+
+In making a change of direction the safety of the trains must be
+carefully considered. If the detachment is joining the main body for
+battle, its trains (if with it) may well be sent by the shortest
+practicable route, escorted if necessary, to join those of the main
+body, or to some other safe place. If danger is to be anticipated from
+the former front now become a flank, the trains should preferably be
+moved on a parallel road on the unexposed flank.
+
+ ORDER--CHANGE IN DIRECTION OF MARCH.
+
+ Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ HUNTERSTOWN, PA.,
+ Field Orders, } 17 Nov., '12--11:20 a. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg-Antietam 3" Map.
+
+1. Our division is engaged with the enemy in force near BONEAUVILLE.
+A hostile detachment estimated at 5 bns., a battery and a troop,
+apparently unsupported, is intrenching near NEWCHESTER. The 1st
+Squadron, 1st Cavalry, defeated the hostile troop near road junction
+594, and drove it back towards NEWCHESTER.
+
+2. This command will march southeast in two columns, to join the
+division. Former march conditions now cease.
+
+3. (a) The cavalry will continue in observation of the force near
+NEWCHESTER, delaying it in case it attempts to advance, and will
+reconnoiter to the north and through NEW OXFORD to the east.
+
+(b) The advance guard, reinforced by a platoon of the 1st Sq., 1st
+Cav., will march southeast via 585--573--586--R. F. WEAVER on 572, and
+as left flank guard cover the march of the main body.
+
+(c) The main body will turn south at 554 and will march provisionally
+on 562.
+
+The Commanding Officer of the 2nd Inf. will send forward 2 companies as
+advance guard to precede the main body at about 600 yards.
+
+4. Messages to head of main body.
+
+ A,
+ Brig. General.
+
+Verbally to staff, C. O. Adv. Gd. (1st Inf.).
+
+By mtd. messenger to C. O. 2d and 3d Inf., 1st Sq., 1st Cav.
+
+Report of dispositions to C. G., 1st Div., by aide.
+
+Note: In this case the trains of the detachment are with those of the
+division. Hence all reference to trains is omitted from the order. This
+order as dictated will be written by the staff present and copies sent
+to officers not present.
+
+
+CAMPS AND BIVOUACS.
+
+Troops should not be bivouacked in the open except for very cogent
+reasons. A comfortable camp on a sanitary site is always desirable,
+provided tactical requirements permit the selection.
+
+Troops should not be kept in column at the end of a day’s march but
+should be placed in camp immediately upon their arrival so as to give
+the men as much rest as possible. Hence the halt order should be issued
+well in advance, should be brief, and if practicable a staff officer
+accompanied by a surgeon should be sent ahead to make the necessary
+preliminary arrangements, and be ready with the aid of assistants to
+assign and lead organizations to their camps upon arrival, with a
+minimum of delay and confusion.
+
+The important considerations in the selection of camps, aside from
+those of a tactical nature are:
+
+1. A plentiful supply of water, streams or wells. It is usually
+assumed that any stream shown in blue on the map has water in it. The
+troops should be camped with reference to the water supply so that
+all may reach it as conveniently as possible. Along the banks of the
+same stream infantry or other foot troops should preferably be camped
+_upstream_, and cavalry, artillery and trains, _downstream_.
+
+2. A camp should preferably be near a crossroad, as this gives a choice
+and multiplicity of routes for movements and facilitates communication
+generally. It is always desirable that a camp be _near_ the main road,
+for the sake of convenience in arrival and departure, and if it be a
+large camp, roads through the camp and even a railroad for convenient
+supply are desirable. The camp should not be so close to an important
+road as to be disturbed by the noise and dust of traffic.
+
+3. Fuel is an essential requisite, and forage desirable.
+
+4. The available area should be sufficient to accommodate the command.
+(See ante for table of camp areas.)
+
+5. Especially in cold weather a southern exposure with a hill or wood
+to give protection from the prevailing winds is desirable. In summer,
+if the weather is very warm, an _open_ wood which gives shade without
+interfering with the circulation of air, makes an excellent camp site.
+
+6. Firm ground, such as good turf or gravel, with good drainage (ground
+water not too high), is very essential. These features may, of course,
+be artificially improved.
+
+Troops should be assigned to camp conveniently with reference to
+their manner of arrival and departure. A camp in column of route
+facilitates placing the troops as well as resumption of the march.
+It is therefore, to be preferred for a short stay (over night) when
+tactical requirements allow it. The usual regimental camp is a column
+of battalion camps. (See also Chap. XVII.)
+
+The health and efficiency of the troops are often best conserved by
+utilizing buildings for shelter, especially in cold or inclement
+weather. When tactical considerations permit troops may be billeted.
+Public buildings, warehouses, etc., if available, are to be preferred
+to private residences.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII.
+
+CONVOYS.
+
+
+A convoy is a train of wagons or motor trucks, not regularly attached
+to any body of troops, with its escort. The term “convoy” is sometimes
+used for the wagons alone, not including the troops which accompany
+them.
+
+Convoys, being peculiarly vulnerable, as well as liable to an attack,
+require more elaborate measures for their protection than would be
+usual for a body of troops in the same situation.
+
+The vulnerability of a convoy increases rapidly with its length. As
+a rule then, a single column should contain not more than about one
+hundred wagons. Such a train would be (in single column) about a mile
+long. If allowed to straggle it might be very much longer. It is
+usually impracticable in the United States to march a convoy in double
+column, on account of the limited width of the roads. It is a wise
+measure when practicable.
+
+No rigid rules can be laid down for the conduct of march of a convoy,
+as this will vary with the conditions.
+
+In executing a flank march with a large convoy the mass of the troops
+would ordinarily be on the exposed flank, at some distance and would
+be called a “covering detachment.” The immediate guard of the convoy
+is called the “escort” and is of a strength sufficient only (in this
+case) to protect the wagons from attack by small parties of hostile
+cavalry, etc. The wagons with their immediate escort proceed as rapidly
+as possible to their destination by a separate route while the covering
+detachment keeps itself between the enemy and the convoy. The trains
+accompanying a body of troops during a flank march would similarly
+proceed on a separate road on the unexposed flank if a good road were
+available.
+
+One rule of general if not universal application may be stated:--the
+mass of the troops should be between the wagons and the known or
+supposed position of the most threatening force of the enemy. It is a
+corollary of this rule that the trains of a combatant body of troops
+ordinarily “follow in advance, precede in retreat.” The distance
+between the wagons and the covering detachment is governed entirely by
+circumstances. There should, however, be a small guard with the wagons.
+
+A small convoy will not become the objective of a large body of hostile
+troops. Its escort will be called upon to repel the attacks of small
+parties only and will usually remain in close proximity to the wagons,
+the whole forming one detachment under one commander. The escort will,
+of course, employ advance, rear or flank guards as the situation
+requires. The “main body” will be the nucleus of troops remaining with
+the wagons after all detachments have been made. This arrangement will
+then be the usual case, and is the one to which particular reference is
+made in the following discussion.
+
+Motor trucks are particularly advantageous for convoys. Their speed, by
+shortening the duration of the trip, reduces the risk of interference
+or capture. Moreover, the reserve motive power permits a burst of speed
+that assists in escape if the convoy be attacked. The vehicles cannot
+be stampeded and are less vulnerable than animals to injury from rifle,
+machine gun or shrapnel fire. Cars should be employed preferably in
+groups of the same type when practicable.
+
+
+_Arrangements for the March._ The wagons are usually under the
+immediate charge of a Quartermaster, who will be mounted. Before
+starting, the train is divided into sections or provisional wagon
+companies of from twenty to thirty wagons each, twenty-seven being
+a convenient number, and a wagon master (or an old teamster) is
+assigned to the command of each section. The organization corresponds
+approximately to that of a regular train. Wagons may be army, hired
+or impressed, and their teamsters may be soldiers, regular civilian
+employees, hired or impressed citizens. Wagons and drivers of the
+same class should, as far as practicable, be placed in the same wagon
+sections. The slowest wagons are placed in the lead to reduce fatigue
+and elongation. The field train of the escort marches with the other
+wagons--usually at the head of the column. The impressed wagons should
+preferably be in rear, except when this causes excessive straggling, or
+when the rear is greatly exposed to attack.
+
+A sufficient number of infantry for police guards are placed under
+orders of the Quartermaster, and a few mounted men assigned under his
+orders as messengers, etc. A police guard of at least one squad is
+assigned to each wagon section. If the drivers are hired or impressed a
+stronger police guard is required. If the wagons are driven by enlisted
+men, police guards may be dispensed with if the escort is small.
+Police guards are usually permitted to ride on the wagons. Footsore
+or slightly wounded infantrymen, if any there be, may be assigned as
+police guards. These guards never leave the wagons even when attacked,
+but if the wagons have been parked a portion of the police guards may
+be released to join in the fight. Cavalry is more suitable for police
+guards than is infantry. But usually there will not be enough cavalry
+for this purpose, after allowing for more important duties.
+
+The Quartermaster is charged with the duty of keeping the wagons closed
+up and moving in an orderly fashion. He removes broken down wagons from
+the road, shifting their loads to other wagons or destroying them as
+circumstances require.
+
+The division of the wagons of convoy into sections or wagon companies
+and the assignment of wagonmasters may be covered in the first order,
+after which unless there is a change to be made, it is not again
+referred to. If the Quartermaster has made these arrangements in
+advance they need not be referred to in orders, but should be covered
+by a note after the order (in solution).
+
+
+THE ESCORT.
+
+
+_Commander and Duties._ The senior line officer with the escort
+commands the entire convoy and is responsible for all measures
+necessary for its safe and steady progress. It is of course _desirable_
+that he should be senior in rank to the Quartermaster in charge of the
+wagons.
+
+The commander will generally be at the place where an attack is
+expected. Usually he is with the main body, but if he is with the
+advance or flank guard, the next in rank with the main body assumes
+charge of same during his absence, or a commander for the main body may
+be designated in orders.
+
+The duty of the escort is to facilitate the progress of the wagons
+and protect them from rifle or artillery fire. It will make such
+dispositions as are best calculated to afford security. While active
+reconnaissance in the probable direction of the enemy is very
+essential, the bulk of the escort should be kept well in hand in order
+to strike a powerful blow if the enemy be encountered. The escort must
+not assume the offensive unless absolutely essential for the safety of
+the convoy, no matter how tempting an opportunity may be presented. The
+main body moves promptly to any threatened point of the convoy.
+
+
+_Strength and Composition._ No rule can be prescribed for the strength
+of an escort. It depends upon the size of the convoy, the nature of the
+country, the length of the march, the importance of the convoy and the
+risk. The risk, of course, involves a number of considerations, chief
+amongst which are the strength and proximity of the enemy.
+
+For an average case one battalion of infantry and one troop of cavalry
+might be assigned as escort to one hundred wagons. For a large convoy
+the following rough rule as to the strength of the escort may serve as
+a guide.
+
+ 2 infantry per wagon.
+ 1 cavalry per 8 wagons.
+ 1 gun per 100 wagons.
+
+The escort will ordinarily be composed of infantry. There should
+usually be some cavalry. Machine guns are useful, but artillery is
+generally not employed. Engineers are always useful with a convoy as by
+repairing roads and bridges, and removing obstacles they can greatly
+facilitate its progress, being in addition equivalent to an equal
+number of infantry in fighting strength.
+
+Motor cars are useful in the escort for the rapid transportation of
+the infantry and also for carrying machine guns or artillery in open
+or in armored cars. Cars containing guns are equally useful with an
+escort composed of cavalry. The invulnerability of the armored car to
+small arms fire and shrapnel, together with its speed, gives it great
+offensive power. Motor cars will be correspondingly useful in the
+pursuit and attack of a convoy. (See also Chap. XVIII.)
+
+
+_Distribution and Duties of Troops._ The troops of the escort are
+distributed as follows:
+
+ Advance guard.
+ (Police guards)
+ Main body.
+ Flank guard.
+ Rear guard.
+
+The relative strength of the different parts depends on the direction
+from which attack is most probable. The main body (including police
+guards) should generally comprise about one half of the infantry of the
+escort, and it will be the immediate guard of the convoy. The bulk of
+all the remaining troops should be placed in the direction from which
+the enemy’s attack is expected, either as advance, flank or in some
+cases rear guard. If the direction from which the enemy may attack is
+uncertain, the great bulk of the escort should remain with the convoy,
+and active reconnaissance be carried on in order to give ample warning
+of the enemy’s presence. Undue dispersion of the fighting forces must
+be carefully avoided.
+
+The main body of the escort may march at the head of the column of
+wagons, or in the middle of same (or on another road--see ante). The
+first is the more comfortable place and should be preferred if tactical
+considerations allow. A small body of infantry and a few mounted men
+should be placed at the head of the wagons (when main body is in
+center) and a small body of infantry at the tail. If the wagon column
+is more than 1,200 yards long there should be some infantry at the
+middle of it, to protect its flanks. Some organization in the main body
+is directed in orders, to furnish the necessary police guards which are
+placed at the disposal of the Quartermaster.
+
+The advance cavalry or advance scouting parties, need not ordinarily be
+very strong. They reconnoiter 3 to 5 miles to the front, and well to
+the flanks.
+
+The infantry point of the advance guard should be about a mile in front
+of the wagons. A mounted point is desirable, especially if there be
+no cavalry with the advance guard. It reconnoiters up all side roads
+a distance of 1,000 yds. or more. It is the duty of the advance guard
+to establish contact with any friendly troops in the direction in
+which the convoy is marching, if they be not too distant, especially
+if they are awaiting its arrival. The advance guard commander examines
+the country with a view to selecting suitable places for sheltering or
+parking the convoy should the enemy be encountered. He selects suitable
+sites for camps.
+
+The Engineers, if present, are usually with the advance guard.
+
+A small convoy will usually have no regular flank guard. A flank guard,
+if used at all would be put out because an attack is expected from
+that direction. Hence it should usually be strong, ⅓ to ½ the entire
+force. Its conduct is similar to that of the flank guard of a body of
+troops, except that it is of particular importance to hold the enemy
+beyond rifle or artillery range of the convoy, especially if it is
+carrying explosives. The flank guard should endeavor to accomplish this
+without calling for reinforcements, as it is desirable that the main
+body remain with the wagons. If there be sufficient cavalry with the
+escort to offer an effective _resistance_ in case of a fight the bulk
+of it should be kept in hand and assigned to the flank guard, if the
+latter is strong. If the cavalry is too weak in numbers to be effective
+in combat even when concentrated, there is no objection to splitting
+it up into small detachments for reconnaissance, messenger and police
+duty. But a strong body of cavalry may be better employed tactically to
+assist in holding off the enemy. The flank guard marches opposite the
+convoy on a parallel road at least half a mile distant, or proceeds to
+some favorable locality from which it can cover the flank. It maintains
+communication with the main body during its march. A flank guard,
+instead of marching continuously on the flank can often obtain better
+results by successively occupying strong positions from which it can
+oppose the enemy, leaving each position and moving rapidly to the next
+as soon as the convoy is safely past. (See “Flank Guards.”)
+
+The rear guard is usually small, unless danger is anticipated from the
+rear, and marches close up--at from 300 to 500 yds. behind the tail of
+the wagon column. In case of a fight it reinforces the main body.
+
+
+_The March._ The available routes for the march should be carefully
+considered. Long distances, poor and dusty or muddy road surfaces,
+steep grades, many stream crossings, sharp turns, defiles and close
+country, are particularly objectionable features for the march of a
+convoy, as they may subject it to delay and danger. A few draft animals
+shot down by a handful of men in ambush would seriously delay the
+march. A road along an open ridge exposed to view from considerable
+distances is also objectionable, especially if it may be commanded
+by artillery or rifle fire from adjacent heights. A road through
+an open valley protected on the flank by impenetrable obstacles,
+beyond effective range, or covered by a parallel ridge from which the
+approaches to the flank may be commanded, is excellent. The route
+should be selected with a view to avoiding the enemy, and a detour is
+justifiable if it is certain that the enemy may thus be avoided. Other
+things being equal the best road, which may often also be the most
+direct, is to be preferred. In a march of any length, facilities for
+watering the animals en route are desirable. A due consideration of all
+of the features of the various routes available which bear upon the
+safety and rapidity of the march, will enable the command to select
+that route which gives the greatest promise of a successful transit.
+
+The wagons usually proceed without regular hourly halts, as their
+gait is so slow that continuous progress for two or more hours at a
+time will not result in excessive fatigue unless the road is a very
+poor one. Under favorable conditions a convoy might make an average
+progress of 2¼ to 2½ miles per hour for a day’s march. But in making
+calculations it is not safe to count on more than 2 miles per hour for
+a day’s march. Motor convoys of light trucks can average from 5 to 10
+miles an hour depending on road and other conditions. They are capable
+of even higher speeds for short periods. (See table in “Marches”--Chap.
+VI.)
+
+Consider the reported position of the enemy and calculate the times at
+which both the enemy and the convoy will probably reach the various
+critical points along the line of march (assuming that the enemy will
+direct his march on such points). Then consider the defensive measures
+that might be adopted at each critical point for the safety of the
+convoy, the lines of retreat from such points and the alternative
+routes by means of which they might be avoided. Do not overlook the
+fact that the enemy is dangerous whenever he gets within rifle range
+(or artillery range if he has artillery) of the convoy.
+
+The best places to attack a convoy are at a defile, bridge, or sharp
+turn in the road, in the woods, or by artillery fire from a concealed
+position. Hence convoys should avoid such localities, or approach them
+with extreme caution.
+
+A convoy should not hesitate to abandon its selected line of march and
+take a new one if necessary to avoid a hostile force stronger than the
+escort.
+
+The far sides of adjacent ridges, clumps of wood, branch roads and the
+outlets of defiles must be carefully reconnoitered. The convoy must
+never enter a defile until the advance guard has reconnoitered the
+sides and secured the outlet. The reconnaissance should be such that no
+considerable body of troops and especially no artillery, can get within
+range of the convoy unobserved.
+
+A sharp change of direction is always fraught with danger, and measures
+should be taken for security to the former front. A portion or the
+whole of the former advance guard may be pushed out to a suitable
+position to cover the change of direction. When the convoy has
+completed the turn the troops so detached may rejoin or continue the
+march on a parallel road as a flank guard.
+
+On reaching camp the wagons are parked for the night, the form of park
+depending on the terrain and on the risk. If there is little risk they
+may be parked in column of route, double column, two lines facing each
+other, etc. If there is danger of attack some form of closed park or
+corral should be used, with the animals inside (such as the “diamond
+corral”). The escort takes the usual measures for the security of the
+camp.
+
+In moving back and forth with convoy or for the return of the escort
+it may be advisable to change route as the enemy might anticipate the
+return by the former route. The same precaution would apply to a small
+force going out to intercept a convoy.
+
+
+_Conduct on encountering the enemy._ If the enemy is encountered in
+a position from which he can interfere with the march, the escort,
+if strong enough, will attack at once and drive him out, the wagons
+continuing the march, or halting temporarily if this be essential for
+their safety. If the enemy is too strong to be driven out the escort
+will hold him in position, while the wagons take another route, park or
+retreat.
+
+The wagons should not be parked or even halted prematurely, as this in
+itself will cause a great loss of time. If the enemy is reported near,
+the wagons close up and continue the march in an orderly manner.
+
+In case of a serious attack a suitable place is selected and the
+wagons are parked. The park should be as little exposed as possible.
+A most favorable locality is a basin or depression in the terrain,
+readily accessible from the road and surrounded by a ridge from which
+the escort may oppose the enemy. A good form of park is the “diamond
+corral” as it is easily formed and quickly broken in resuming the
+march. The park is formed under the supervision of the Quartermaster
+and police guards. A portion of the latter remain to guard the park
+from surprise attacks by small parties of the enemy (especially
+cavalry), and such as can be spared are sent to take part in the
+combat. The rear guard closes up to assist in repelling the attack,
+or takes a suitable position to cover the rear. Mounted messengers,
+(usually 2 parties of 2 men each) are despatched to notify the nearest
+body of friendly troops, if there is any hope of their being able to
+render assistance in time, or any other reason why they should be
+apprised of the situation.
+
+The enemy as a rule cannot afford to spend a great deal of time in
+capturing a small convoy. If he can be held off for 2 or 3 hours the
+convoy will usually be able to escape. As a last resort the escort
+retreats, taking with it a part of the convoy if possible, and
+endeavoring to destroy or at least seriously cripple all that is left.
+
+
+_Attack of a Convoy._ As great mobility is desirable mounted troops,
+armored cars, or foot troops transported by automobile are the most
+suitable for the attack of a convoy.
+
+A convoy may be delayed, with a view to attacking it, by destroying
+bridges or placing other obstacles in its path, or by shooting the
+animals, especially those of the leading wagons, from an ambush.
+
+The usual method for a determined attack on a convoy is to check its
+head and tail with small bodies (preferably cavalry) and concentrate
+the main forces against a flank. A small force should be sent to
+overpower the police guard and cut loose or shoot down the animals
+(unless it is hoped to capture the trains intact and make off with
+them).
+
+Hence if fired upon from front and rear by small bodies a convoy should
+be on the lookout for a determined attack on its flank.
+
+If it is desired merely to damage the convoy or delay its march,
+or if the attacking troops are too weak to cope with the escort,
+they may select a concealed position along the route of the convoy
+(preferably near a town, bridge, defile, etc.) from which long range
+fire (artillery, infantry or machine gun) may be brought to bear upon
+the convoy. Serious damage may thus be inflicted without danger to the
+attacker. A convoy, as before mentioned, is far more vulnerable to such
+an attack than a body of troops, the wagons being, of course, utterly
+unable either to protect themselves or take cover from the fire. The
+escort of a convoy should consequently carefully reconnoiter all
+localities from which long range fire is possible before allowing the
+wagons to come within range of same.
+
+
+_Convoys of prisoners._ (See F. S. R.) In addition to an escort to
+repel attempts at rescue, a guard of about 10 infantry and several
+mounted men is required for each 100 prisoners. The captives are formed
+into companies and marched in column, their officers being separated
+from the troops. Prisoners should be given to understand that any
+attempt to escape will draw fire. If the convoy is attacked they are
+ordered to lie down. A convoy of prisoners protects the escort, as the
+enemy cannot fire or (in the case of cavalry), charge if the escort is
+close to the prisoners, especially on the opposite side. The prisoners
+thus form a shield.
+
+[Illustration: FIG. II
+
+TYPICAL ARRANGEMENTS OF A CONVOY ON THE MARCH]
+
+[Illustration: FIG. III
+
+TYPICAL ARRANGEMENTS OF A CONVOY ON THE MARCH]
+
+ COMBINED ORDERS FOR CASE IV. (See Fig. III.)
+
+ 1st Bn., 1st Inf.,
+ LEAVENWORTH, KAN.
+ Field orders, } 10 Sept., 1912, 5:45 a. m.
+ No. -- }
+ (Map Reference.)
+
+ 1. Information of the enemy (especially his raiding cavalry)
+ and of our troops.
+ 2. This detachment will march today to ____.
+
+ (a) Advance guard:
+ Capt. A.
+ Co. A, 1st Inf.
+ 1 Plat. Tr. A. 1st Cav.
+ (b) Main body in order of march:
+ Combined F. Tn.
+ 1st and 2nd sections of convoy.
+ Co. B, 1st Inf. (less detchs.)
+ M. G. Co., 1st Inf. (less 1 plat.)
+ 1 Plat., Tr. A. 1st Cav. (less detchs.)
+ 3rd and 4th sections of convoy.
+ 3 Troopers, Tr. A, 1st Cav.
+ (c) Rearguard:
+ Lieut. B.
+ 2 squads, Co. B, 1st Inf.
+ 8 Troopers, Tr. A, 1st Cav.
+ (d) Left flank guard:
+ Capt. B.
+ 1st Bn., 1st Inf. (less Cos. A & B)
+ Tr. A, 1st Cav. (less 2 plats.)
+ Tr. B, 1st Cav.
+ 1 Plat., M. G. Co., 1st Inf.
+
+3. (a) The advance guard will clear ______ at ______ a. m. marching via
+---- and preceding the main body by ______ yds.
+
+(b) The main body will march from ______ at -- a. m., following the
+route of the advance guard. Lieut. X (Bn. Q. M.) is placed in charge
+of the field trains and the wagons of the convoy. Wagonmasters A, B,
+C and D, are designated for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th sections of the
+convoy, respectively, and will report at ______ a. m. to Lieut. X for
+orders. Co. B, 1st Inf. will furnish the necessary police guards for
+the wagons (or will furnish -- squads as police guard for the wagons,)
+and will place a squad at their head.
+
+(c) The rear guard will follow the main body at 250 yds.
+
+(d) The right flank guard will start from ______ at ______ a. m. and
+will march via ______ to ______ covering our right, reconnoitering
+to ______ and ______ (or will proceed to the vicinity of ______,
+reconnoitering, &c. and delay the advance of any hostile troops until
+the convoy has cleared ______.)
+
+4. Messages to the main body (or to the left flank guard.)
+
+ A, Major.
+
+(How and to whom communicated: See previous examples.)
+
+(Report of dispositions to superior comdr.)
+
+Note that this order has only 4 pars. instead of 5. Trains accounted
+for in par. 3. If the situation seems to render it advisable some or
+all of the cav. may be ordered to march in advance an hour before the
+rest of the troops, with instructions to “cover the movement” or if the
+commander is inexperienced to reconnoiter front and flanks and special
+localities. If a defile is to be passed the cav. comdr. may be told to
+report at near side of defile the results of his reconnaissance to the
+far side. Be careful about giving detailed instructions to the cav.
+unless the commander of it is inexperienced. If the situation is such
+as to render it possible, the convoy should establish communication
+with the troops at the place to which it is marching. If this is
+practicable (they being not too far away) the advance guard (or advance
+cav.) would be directed in the order to do this.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII.
+
+ARTILLERY TACTICS.
+
+
+_Materiel._ A battery of _light field artillery_ (3"), in the United
+States service, is sub-divided for action as follows:
+
+ Firing battery--4 guns and 6 caissons. (5 sections).
+ Combat train--6 caissons, 1 battery wagon, 1 store wagon.
+ Field train--4 army wagons.
+
+The firing battery includes the first five sections (4 gun and 1
+caisson).
+
+The combat train includes the 3 remaining caisson sections and the
+battery and store wagons. The 9th section comprises the battery and
+store wagons and 4 field wagons. In subdivision part of the 9th section
+(battery and store wagons) is with the combat train. The battery is
+also divided into 4 platoons, each includes 2 sections.
+
+A battalion consists of 3 batteries, a regiment of 2 battalions. A
+battery has 3 telephones and 1 mile of double conductor buzzer wire.
+A battalion has 2 telephones and 3 miles of double conductor armored
+cable, on a reel cart. A regiment has same telephone equipment as a
+battalion with extra buzzer wire.
+
+Each battery carries 358 rounds of ammunition per gun, a portion of
+which, varying with circumstances, is shell, the remainder being
+shrapnel. Remarkable results are claimed for the large capacity high
+explosive shell, against both personnel and materiel. The proper
+proportions of shell and shrapnel and the feasibility of the use of
+high explosive shell are still undecided. The weight behind the teams
+is: gun and limber about 4,300 lbs., caisson and limber about 4,600 lbs.
+
+The gun elevates 15°, and depresses 5°, and these angles may be
+increased by depressing or elevating the trail. It traverses 4° each
+side of center. Height of axle 41 inches, tread of carriage, 60 inches.
+
+In the panoramic sight the deflection is measured in mils (angle
+subtended by .001 times the range--hence approximately ¹/₆₄₀₀ of a
+circumference). The elevation (range) is measured in yards. The highest
+reading is 6,250 yards.
+
+The clinometer of the range quadrant is graduated in mils. The range
+disc of the quadrant is graduated from 0 to 6,500 yards. For greater
+ranges, with either sight or quadrant, an arbitrary index setting may
+be employed. The clinometer is used for indirect laying. Set off angle
+of site on clinometer and range on range disc.
+
+The front covered by the fire of a battery of 4 guns without shifting
+trails is 60 yds. + 140 mils; this equals 200 yds. at 1,000 yds. range,
+480 yds. at 3,000 yds. range, etc.
+
+_Dispositions of Artillery._ On the march the firing batteries of
+light field artillery are usually near head of main body, a regiment
+(or battalion) of infantry being immediately in front of them. The
+combat trains usually march immediately in rear of the last foot
+troops in the main body. Exceptionally they may be with the firing
+batteries, especially in a small command, if there seems to be good
+reason for so placing them. Artillery in column with other troops
+should preferably occupy not more than about a mile of road space. If
+the artillery column be much longer than this its flanks will not be
+properly protected by the fire of the troops in front and rear in case
+of a sudden attack. In such a case then, a body of foot troops should
+be placed in the middle of the artillery. The field trains of the
+artillery on the march, are combined with those of the other troops, in
+rear.
+
+For dispositions of artillery with advance, rear and flank guards see
+the Chapters on these subjects. (IV and V.)
+
+In battery a gun and its caisson are placed side by side. Guns are
+at 20 yard intervals and the caissons of the 5th section are on the
+flanks of battery at 20 yard intervals. Hence the ordinary front of
+a battery is 100 yards. The limbers are placed under cover near the
+battery and to the flank. The combat train should be about 600 yards
+distant, in a secure position. These will be the usual dispositions,
+which may, however, be varied to suit the terrain or other conditions.
+To avoid detection of the location of the artillery by hostile air
+scouts exact alignments and uniform intervals should be avoided. Dust
+raised by the blast of discharge may betray the artillery’s location.
+This can be reduced by wetting or oiling the ground or covering with
+brush or paulins of inconspicuous color. When not actually firing,
+guns, limbers and caissons may be concealed by covering with brush or
+branches of trees. If the ground permits, the guns may be placed in
+pits with parapets for protection, the works being concealed by trees
+and branches.
+
+A division is the smallest body of troops having artillery permanently
+assigned to it.
+
+
+_Personnel._
+
+_Artillery Commander._ Informs himself as to enemy. Examines terrain,
+selects general positions. Assigns units (usually large ones only) to
+general positions and targets in accord with plan of supreme commander.
+Takes general measures for communication, supply and reinforcement of
+artillery.
+
+_Regimental Commander._ Informs himself as to location and disposition
+of enemy and friendly troops. Makes reconnaissance of area for
+artillery, and assigns battalions to general positions and targets.
+Takes measures for communication, supply and reinforcement.
+
+_Battalion Commander._ Makes close reconnaissance with officers and
+scouts as to position of enemy and friendly troops, their disposition,
+terrain around his position, best method of approach. Selects positions
+for his batteries and assigns duties (targets, etc.) to each. Assigns
+direction point and sectors of observation. Gives orders about
+artificial cover, provides for auxiliary observing stations. Provides
+for local communications. Sees the position is secure or that there are
+supporting troops or scouts out. Selects routes for possible subsequent
+movements and provides for supply of ammunition, location of combat
+trains, etc.
+
+The functions of the foregoing commanders are mainly tactical. They
+assign and employ the groups of artillery to meet the requirements of
+the initial and all succeeding phases of the combat. They keep in close
+touch with the higher commander under whose orders they are operating,
+and with the changing conditions on the battlefield.
+
+_Battery Commander._ Examines target and ground near it, and general
+location assigned him. Picks out place for his battery and way to
+approach, under cover if possible, similarly for his limbers and combat
+train (if posted separately) with an eye to supply of ammunition
+under cover. If direct laying is to be used makes sure each gunner
+can see target, or if indirect that nothing interferes with fire,
+that guns are defiladed, etc. and that gunners can see aiming point.
+Selects an aiming point, a battery commander’s station and auxiliary
+observing stations. Arranges for communications (telephone and signal),
+for ammunition supply. Secures firing data. Conducts his battery to
+position and posts it. Conducts the fire. The functions of the battery
+commander, especially in battalion, are thus mainly technical.
+
+
+NOTE: If any of the higher commanders mentioned are not present or if
+the command is too small to have such, each officer must perform such
+of the duties of rank next above as the situation requires.
+
+_Lieutenants._ In march or maneuver they command platoons. In
+subdivision for action the first two command the platoons of the firing
+battery, the 3d is reconnaissance officer and the junior commands the
+combat train.
+
+_Reconnaissance Officer._ Determines firing data. Supervises work of
+scouts and auxiliary observing parties. Watches battlefield and notes
+tactical changes. Supervises communications. Prior to an action, while
+on the march, the reconnaissance officer may be sent with the advance
+guard to make such reconnaissance as may be of value to artillery. May
+conduct battery to position.
+
+_1st Sergeant._ Assists captain. Posts limbers under cover. Keeps
+captain informed as to ammunition supply, supervises removal of empty
+caissons. Has charge of replacement of casualties, removal of wounded,
+etc.
+
+_Sergeants._ (Q. M. Sgt. commands field train) Command sections.
+Supervise service of guns. Chief of 5th section sets up B. C. telescope
+and assists in using it.
+
+_Corporals._ Act as gunners, caisson corporals, scouts, observers, etc.
+
+_Scouts and Signalers._ In each battery 2 corporals trained as scouts,
+one corporal, 2 privates as signalers. Scouts may be used to guard
+flanks of battery. Scouts usually operate in pairs. The scouts are
+trained as ground scouts in selecting routes and guiding batteries
+along them. They act as auxiliary observers. In battalion the ground
+scouting is done by battalion scouts.
+
+_Agents._ Agents are men who transmit information from one commander to
+another, and keep a commander in touch with the lower commanders. Each
+headquarters in an artillery organization has agents.
+
+
+_Route Markers._ These are men who are stationed at certain points to
+indicate the route to a position.
+
+Artillery is so trained that if any of these positions are vacant they
+are readily filled by an alternate.
+
+An artillery officer, preferably the senior present, should accompany
+the supreme commander during the advance to battle to learn the
+situation and the wishes of the commander. An artillery officer should
+accompany an advance guard. An artillery officer or other agent should
+accompany an attacking infantry line in order to communicate to the
+supporting artillery the needs of the infantry. He will generally keep
+in touch with the commander of the attacking force. The artillery
+commander is represented at supreme headquarters by a suitable agent
+from the artillery personnel.
+
+
+_Kinds of fire._ Fire is classified in various ways:
+
+ _Masked fire_ (indirect laying is used)
+ _Unmasked fire_ (either direct or indirect laying may be used)
+
+Masked fire is where guns are concealed from view and corresponds to
+indirect laying, where gunner does not see target but uses an aiming
+point.
+
+If the target can be just seen through the sights (over the mask) the
+position has sight defilade, if by a mounted or dismounted man, mounted
+or dismounted defilade. If the mask conceals the flashes of the guns
+(in day time) the position has flash defilade, this requires 12 to 15
+feet vertical cover. Even twigs will explode a shrapnel so make sure
+mask does not interfere with _fire_. To ascertain this allow height of
+muzzle 4 feet, angle of departure for range of 3,000 yards = 5° 40´,
+(Inverse tangent of 0.10). Thus, Distance from mask ÷ 10 > Height of
+mask - 4 (all figures in feet); or D > 10 (H - 4). To fire over a mask
+20 feet high, the distance from the gun to the mask on level ground
+should be greater than 10 (20 - 4) = 160 feet.
+
+
+_Fire for adjustment. Fire for demolition. Fire for registration. Fire
+for effect._
+
+Fire for adjustment is to get on the target. It is adjusted for range,
+direction, distribution and height of burst (4). Fire for registration
+is fire to determine ranges, to a position which may in future be
+occupied by enemy. (It should generally not be employed prematurely
+unless enemy already knows about your artillery as it would otherwise
+betray your presence and possibly your position.) Fire for effect is
+fire on the enemy, materiel or personnel. It is ordinarily directed to
+that portion of the enemy which is doing or may do most damage to the
+friendly infantry. Thus in the earlier stages of the action, and while
+the friendly infantry is in the zone of hostile artillery fire, but
+not yet within range of the infantry, the fire of the artillery will
+be directed against the hostile artillery. Later in the attack, during
+the struggle for fire superiority between the opposing infantries,
+the artillery will usually direct its fire upon the hostile infantry,
+that being at this stage, the most threatening element to the friendly
+infantry. Fire for demolition is fire against material objects, such as
+walls, houses, etc. For this purpose shell is invariably used.
+
+
+_Direct laying. Indirect laying._
+
+In direct laying the gunner sees and aims on the target or a designated
+portion thereof. In indirect laying (whether the target is visible
+to the gunner or not) he aims on an auxiliary aiming point. Indirect
+laying is that generally employed, whether the guns are masked or not.
+It is usually simpler to use a clearly defined aiming point than to
+indicate to each gunner his allotted portion of a (possibly poorly
+defined) target. In case of a rapidly moving target, especially at
+close range, direct laying may be preferable to indirect, as the
+gunner can see his target, and often observe the effects of his fire.
+It may also be used in the last stages of an action, the guns being
+pushed forward to the crest, or for the defense of the guns themselves
+at close range. Direct laying has the disadvantage that it does not
+permit the proper concealment of the guns, and renders more difficult
+the conduct, control and direction of the fire by the captain and the
+higher artillery commanders. Its employment, therefore, will not be
+habitual. Indirect laying cannot as a rule be effectively employed
+against small, rapidly moving targets.
+
+
+_Salvo fire. Continuous fire. Volley fire. Fire at will._
+
+A salvo is a single discharge of successive pieces at stated intervals
+from one flank of the battery (or platoon) to the other. It is used
+especially for ranging, (adjustment) as a series of bursts will give
+more information than a single burst. In continuous fire shots are
+fired singly at stated intervals. Volley fire is where each piece fires
+a stated number of rounds as fast as is consistent with proper laying,
+independent of the other pieces. Fire at will is used, generally for
+the defense of the guns themselves, at short ranges. The sights are
+set at 1,000 yards and the fuses of the shrapnel at zero, this setting
+being analagous to the “battle sight” of the infantry.
+
+
+_Time fire and percussion fire._ Percussion fire is generally with
+shell and is directed against materiel. Time fire is always with
+shrapnel, and is usually directed against personnel. Shrapnel have a
+smoke producing matrix to produce a large, dense ball of smoke, at
+the point of burst, facilitating observation of fire. A shrapnel well
+burst (at a height of 3 mils) covers effectively a depth of 200 yards
+at ranges up to 3,000. Beyond this range the depth of the “beaten zone”
+falls off rapidly, being only 125 yards at 4,500. Due to dispersion
+along the range of the shots (longitudinal dispersion) the depth of the
+beaten zone at 3,000 yards is assumed at about 250 yards. It is 150
+at 4,500. Width of beaten zone, 20 to 25 yards. Errors of fuse become
+serious as the range increases beyond 3,000.
+
+
+_Fire at single range. Searching fire (fire at successive ranges).
+Sweeping fire._ Fire at a single range is employed in case accurate
+adjustment has been surely obtained by previous firing. As such
+accurate adjustment is very difficult to obtain it will generally be
+advisable to increase the dispersion by employing fire at successive
+ranges, gradually reducing the number of ranges as observation may
+warrant. Searching fire is also used to sweep ground known to be
+occupied by the enemy’s reserves or over which they must pass in
+reinforcing the firing line or making a counter-attack.
+
+In absence of opportunity for observation of fire such practice will
+cause a great expenditure of ammunition often with little result. It
+may, however, be justified by circumstances. Sweeping fire is that
+which sweeps the front at same range. It is obtained by giving a full
+turn to the traversing wheel after each shot. This corresponds to a
+change of 8 mils of front. Ordinarily sweeping fire will be from right
+to left. But note that when entire sheaf is moved along the front it
+is better to begin at the leeward side, so that the first shots fired
+will not obscure target for the remainder. At a range of about 2,500
+yards sweeping will just about cover the front. If the range is greater
+there will be intervals unswept and if it is less the successive cones
+of dispersion will overlap. If the front of the target is not much over
+35 mils it can be covered without sweeping. If more it can be swept, or
+the B. C. may shift the entire sheaf and attack first one part of the
+front and then another (see post).
+
+
+ _Individual distribution._
+ _Collective distribution._
+
+In the former each gunner is assigned a definite part of the target to
+attack. Direct laying is used. In the latter the pieces have a common
+aiming point, and the B. C. distributes the fire over the target by
+varying the deflections of the different guns (deflection difference).
+Indirect laying is always employed. The B. C. can open or close the
+sheaf to fit the front of his target, and can shift the entire sheaf to
+the right or the left, the latter by varying the deflection, the former
+by varying the deflection difference. Or he may do both at once. To
+obtain or verify adjustment the sheaf may be converged until adjustment
+is secured and then properly distributed. Searching fire (at successive
+ranges) is used when the adjustment is imperfect, or to cover an
+area of some depth known or believed to be occupied by the enemy,
+or through which his supports or reserves must pass in reinforcing
+his firing line, making a counter-attack, etc. It usually implies a
+large expenditure of ammunition in proportion to the physical effect
+produced, but must, nevertheless be frequently employed, albeit with
+judgment and not at random.
+
+The “firing data” obtained by the captain or reconnaissance officer are:
+
+ 1. Deflection for directing gun.
+ 2. Deflection difference for other guns.
+ 3. Corrector for height of burst.
+ 4. Angle of site.
+ 5. Range.
+
+In addition to this information the battery is also shown the aiming
+point and told the kind of fire to be used.
+
+
+_Observation and control of fire._ The officer conducting the fire
+should generally be posted near his battery so that he can watch it if
+possible or at least communicate readily, and to facilitate adjustment.
+In order to observe ground which cannot be seen from his station,
+as well as to assist in the control of the fire it may be desirable
+to have auxiliary observing stations. These should generally be on
+commanding sites.
+
+Observing stations well to the front will give a closer view than
+possible to the B. C. and a station on the flank will afford better
+opportunity for observing errors in range and burst. A flank observer
+may be able to detect movements of troops, and also secure the
+battery against a flank or surprise attack. If there is no supporting
+detachment, observers to guard the exposed flank of the artillery
+should never be omitted. These auxiliary observing stations are usually
+established by the captain or reconnaissance officer, and usually
+occupied by battery scouts. Their number depends on circumstances.
+They communicate with B. C. by telephone, flag or helio. They should
+report promptly everything they see including movements of troops.
+There should also be communication between the B. C. and the advanced
+friendly troops. An agent may accompany the advance for this purpose.
+Trees and houses or other elevated points may be utilized for observing
+stations. Stations close to the guns like B. C. Sta. should generally
+be to windward, if practicable. Stations well out to the flanks are
+often favorable for observing the enemy’s interior lines, particularly
+the location of his artillery. If there are no natural observing
+stations artificial ones must be erected. The B. C. station should if
+possible be within 200 yards of the battery, preferably on a flank, in
+prolongation of the front of the battery and on a high point. It is
+desirable that it be within megaphone range if practicable. It would
+be quite rare for the B. C. station to be distant as much as 800 yards
+from the battery. It is very desirable that the captain should be able
+to observe the effect of the fire. It is very important that the B. C.
+station should not be too conspicuous. If it is it may draw enemy’s
+fire, and perhaps betray location of battery.
+
+Aiming points should be considered as follows:
+
+ 1. Are they surely visible from each gun?
+ 2. Are they distinctive, easily described and identified?
+ 3. Are they at a considerable distance from the guns?
+ (Preferably over 2,000 yards).
+ 4. Are they near the normal to the front?
+
+A point in front or rear is best if it is at least 1,000 yards distant.
+It should preferably be in rear in order that the guns may be defiladed
+from possible hostile observing stations. If not more than 1,000 yards
+away it had better be on a flank.
+
+
+TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
+
+The recent great improvements in materiel and methods of modern field
+artillery lend most of their advantages to the attack. The defender
+should cover the front of his position by a careful distribution of his
+batteries, permitting co-operation and mutual support. Batteries may be
+placed to cover areas which would otherwise be defiladed, on or near
+the military crest, or immediately in rear thereof, whence they can be
+run forward by hand to cover the defiladed area.
+
+The positions of artillery in the attack will be governed by the
+following considerations:
+
+1. What is the mission or purpose of the commander?
+
+2. Is the attack a feint or holding action, or is it to be decisive?
+Is it made for the purpose only of developing the enemy’s strength and
+position? Is it the action of an advance guard, pushing forward to
+seize a favorable position, to cover the deployment of the main body?
+Is it a deliberately planned attack, or a rencontre engagement? Is
+it an attack over ordinary terrain, or a river line or other special
+form of attack? Is it intended to pursue the defeated enemy in case of
+success? etc., etc.
+
+3. What are the relative strengths of the attack and defense in all
+arms?
+
+4. What is known of the enemy’s dispositions, including those of his
+artillery, and what further inferences can be drawn?
+
+5. The terrain: what bearing has it on the dispositions of the
+artillery? etc., etc.
+
+The more detailed technical, tactical and topographical requirements of
+an artillery position will include the following:
+
+1. CAN THE ARTILLERY FROM THIS POSITION EFFECTIVELY PERFORM THE TASKS
+ASSIGNED IT?
+
+2. Is the range much over 4,000 yards? If so look for a closer
+position. The fire of light artillery is very effective up to about
+4,500 yds. The principal objection to long ranges is the difficulty of
+observation. 3,000 yds., being beyond the range of hostile infantry and
+machine guns and yet close enough for good observation of fire, is an
+ideal range; but a good position at 4,000 yds., or at 2,000, is to be
+preferred to a poor or indifferent one at 3,000 yds.
+
+3. Has it a wide field of fire, wide in angle? Guns well disposed can
+fire 45 degrees on each side of normal to front. Sometimes the position
+may cover a still wider front by a shifting of the guns without change
+of location.
+
+4. Is the position wide enough for the artillery to occupy it? (A
+battery normally takes up a front of 100 yards.)
+
+5. Is the position such as to afford suitable ranges for all stages
+of the action, or will it be necessary to shift and if so are there
+suitable positions which can be approached under cover, and which are
+otherwise good?
+
+6. Is there concealment from view, especially by aero scouts, both in
+position and approaching same?
+
+7. Is the front approximately normal to the mean direction of fire?
+
+8. Is the position such that it is possible to change to direct laying
+without moving the guns too far?
+
+9. Are there many dead spaces, how are they located, and are any of
+them such as to menace the safety of the guns or afford cover from
+which the friendly infantry might be effectively opposed?
+
+10. Particularly is the field of fire to the flanks good, and could the
+guns protect themselves to the flanks by indirect fire and direct fire
+at short range?
+
+11. Are there good natural observing stations available?
+
+12. Is the position likely to be easily detected, especially by
+observers well out on the enemy’s flank or by aero scouts?
+
+13. Are the communications good, front, rear and flanks? Also for
+ammunition supply?
+
+14. Is there cover for limbers and teams? And for the ammunition or
+combat trains at a suitable distance?
+
+15. Are there suitable aiming points for indirect fire which are not
+also possible hostile observing stations?
+
+16. Can the position be readily “connected up” by telephone or
+signaling? etc., etc.
+
+A position in the interval between the frontal and enveloping attacks
+has the advantages that the artillery is well protected, and can
+support either attack with oblique or possibly flanking fire. A
+position on the flank, while usually requiring an escort, is very
+effective for oblique fire. It is also very useful in opposing an
+envelopment, as it may be able to cause it to make so great a detour as
+to defeat its purpose, or to delay it until the necessary dispositions
+can be made to oppose the movement. The conformation of the terrain
+will have a great influence on the decision as to where to place the
+artillery. The position in any case should be such as to best permit
+the artillery to accomplish its mission.
+
+In the beginning of an action longer ranges may be permissible for
+the defense than for the attack. If the defense is relatively weak in
+artillery it is sometimes an advantage to have it out of range of the
+attacking artillery while still able to fire on advancing infantry. The
+attack must get within range of the defense artillery and may sometimes
+be forced to take an exposed position if defender’s artillery is well
+back.
+
+Whatever the situation the mission of the field artillery is to
+support the infantry, particularly at the critical stages. While the
+infantry is deploying and during its advance through the zone of
+hostile artillery fire, the artillery of the attack engages that of
+the defense. When the infantry contest for fire superiority opens, the
+artillery of the attack, or a portion of it, will sweep the hostile
+infantry lines with the objects of causing the hostile infantry to
+keep their heads down, getting on their nerves, diminishing the
+effect of their fire, preventing supports from coming forward, etc.
+The actual physical effect of such fire may not be great, but if its
+moral influence is sufficient to diminish the efficacy of the hostile
+infantry fire, thereby permitting the steady advance of the friendly
+infantry, its purpose is accomplished. When the attacking infantry is
+so close to the hostile lines as to be in danger from the fire of its
+supporting artillery directed thereat, the latter should increase the
+range without cessation of fire. This will have a decided moral effect
+on the defenders in the fire trenches as the shrapnel will burst nearly
+over their heads. It also establishes a fire swept zone in rear of the
+hostile firing line through which supports and reserves must pass in
+moving forward, or through which the firing line must retreat in case
+it breaks to the rear. It is desirable that the attacker’s artillery
+positions should be sufficiently close to permit effective fire
+upon retreating troops, known as “pursuing by fire.” The attacker’s
+artillery should move to advanced positions by echelon, in order that
+there be no cessation of artillery fire.
+
+In defense the dispositions of the artillery will be very largely
+dependent upon the probable moves of the attacker. The principal
+consideration will be, is the combat to be to a decision, or is it a
+delaying action merely? In either case a long range fire is desirable
+in order to force the attacker to an early deployment, and to embarrass
+as much as possible his preliminary dispositions. In a decisive action
+the defender’s artillery should cover every portion of the front over
+which the attacker may pass. This may be done by taking a position
+near the crest, or by so distributing the artillery units that each
+will sweep the dead space in front of others (defensive relation). Or
+a combination of the two methods may be employed. Of these the second
+method is generally to be preferred, as it permits the occupation of
+covered positions difficult to detect, and at suitable ranges. If in
+this case there be dead space (defiladed from all the guns in the
+sheltered localities) this may be covered by “dagger batteries,” placed
+well forward in the defiladed area. The fronts of the dagger batteries
+should be covered by artillery fire, and they should also be supported
+by infantry and machine guns.
+
+The artillery of the defense enjoys a certain advantage in that it
+frequently has opportunity to make preliminary arrangements, such as
+determining ranges, constructing shelter, providing for ammunition
+supply, etc., so that it is able to deliver an effective fire from the
+start. Some at least of the artillery of the defense may be held “in
+readiness,” or “in observation,” pending the development of the enemy’s
+attack, being placed in action according to the developments of the
+situation. Fire must be brought to bear upon the advancing infantry
+regardless of the attacker’s artillery. If overmatched by hostile
+artillery the defender’s artillery ceases fire temporarily but resumes
+again at the critical moment. Such a proceeding may often deceive the
+attacker. The defender’s artillery must prevent the attacking artillery
+from advancing to the position if captured, must concentrate its fire
+on the hostile infantry which has penetrated, support a counter-attack,
+or cover the rallying of the defender’s infantry, sacrificing itself
+without hesitation if necessary. Unless it be necessary to reply to the
+attacking artillery because of the damage due to its unrestricted fire
+the artillery in defense (unless favorable targets are presented) may
+often remain silent and avoid disclosing its position until it is ready
+to fire on the hostile infantry. If it is perfectly concealed it may
+begin firing at any time, even if inferior to the attack.
+
+Firing over the heads of friendly troops will be the rule in both
+attack and defense. In the attack this may be continued until the
+assaulting infantry is quite close to the enemy’s line, the exact
+distance depending on the accuracy of adjustment, terrain and other
+conditions. It is the duty of the artillery to support the infantry
+assault to the last practicable moment. Thereafter the attacking
+artillery increases the range to cover the ground in rear.
+
+Positions are not occupied by formal maneuvers, but each battery
+proceeds under cover in most convenient manner. In moving in vicinity
+of a masked position it is advisable to go at a walk so as not to raise
+dust and betray location.
+
+The artillery is safeguarded generally by the other troops. It should
+not have special supports unless these be required by its exposure or
+distance from the attacking or defending forces. Such a detachment if
+required weakens the other arms. Machine guns are especially useful as
+a support for artillery. The artillery must carefully watch its own
+flanks even when it has a support. It should be particularly watchful
+also of dead spaces.
+
+The general positions of the artillery, its general duties, target,
+etc. are prescribed by the supreme commander. The exact positions and
+the control and direction of fire are under the artillery commander.
+Artillery should make necessary reconnaissance, take position with
+promptness, and at once obtain data, etc. The supreme commander will
+designate whether batteries will take position for immediate action,
+in observation, or in readiness. In the first case the artillery opens
+fire as soon as possible. The position may be masked or unmasked.
+In the second case (observation) the battery unlimbers and takes
+position, obtains data, and prepares to open fire on indicated targets
+when directed. The position is generally masked. In the third case
+(readiness) the guns are not unlimbered, but are held near the selected
+approximate position ready to go into action or to move to another
+locality. Meantime the tactical situation is studied and the locality
+reconnoitered, preparation being made to go into action if directed.
+Before going into action a battery is sub-divided into firing battery,
+combat train and field train. As to when it is divided this depends on
+circumstances. If done too soon the other arms may get between battery
+and combat train and interfere with supply of ammunition. If not done
+soon enough the combat trains may interfere with movement to front
+of other arms. The field trains are usually held in rear with other
+trains. The order for subdivision is “form for action.”
+
+The combat trains may be with the batteries or the battalions. If
+at the rear of the combatant troops they are usually assembled by
+battalion or regiment. Communication must always be maintained with the
+fighting batteries by agents from the combat trains. Battalions are
+rarely split to permit the employment of batteries singly, batteries
+are practically never split.
+
+The artillery should be kept well in hand, not necessarily all in
+one group, but where it can be under one control. The desideratum is
+concentration or dispersion of fire, at will. If batteries are somewhat
+dispersed they will not be so readily silenced or overcome by hostile
+fire. Facilities for communication permit greater dispersion with
+better control. Artillery employs no “reserves” in the sense in which
+the term is used with reference to infantry. Its reserve consists in
+its reserve supply of ammunition and in its power to increase the
+rapidity of its fire to meet crises of the combat. Nevertheless, it
+will not always be advisable to place all the artillery in action
+at the outset. The mission of the force and the circumstances of
+the case must be considered. If it be desired to develop from the
+outset an overwhelming superiority of artillery fire all the guns
+may be posted for immediate action. An example of this would be a
+rencontre engagement of an advance guard, seeking to seize or hold an
+advantageous position pending the arrival of its main body. In the
+case, however, that the enemy’s strength and dispositions (including
+those of his artillery) are not accurately known, and when the nature
+and course of the engagement cannot be foreseen, it would be unwise
+to commit all the guns to action prematurely, as it would then be
+difficult to meet rapid and unexpected developments in the situation.
+In such a case part of the artillery may be held “in observation”
+or “in readiness,” to be put into action as the developments of the
+situation may require. A few guns may develop a considerable volume
+of fire, for a limited period, by utilizing the rapid fire qualities
+of the weapon. The proper assignment of the artillery is not a matter
+of rule, but a question of judgment. Enough guns should be placed in
+action at any time to meet the existing situation and accomplish the
+mission of the artillery. The combat and ammunition trains should
+be kept together (in large groups) to facilitate proper control and
+ammunition supply. They should be in safe positions, but not too far to
+the rear. Ammunition trains are marked with red flags or lanterns so
+that they may be readily identified.
+
+Different batteries may be assigned special tasks, but these may be
+subject to change, in fact usually are, one battery also fulfilling
+several different functions. The functions are: Counter batteries: To
+fire on hostile artillery. Infantry batteries: To prepare and support
+the infantry attack. They include batteries of preparation which fire
+on opposing infantry, and breaching batteries which open passages
+through the enemy’s line. Batteries of the counter-attack: Usually
+posted in observation to watch for and oppose a counter-attack if
+made. Accompanying batteries: To advance to the close support of the
+infantry. They usually support the close advance without themselves
+actually advancing. Reinforcing batteries: Held in observation to come
+to the support of other batteries when needed. Decoy batteries: To draw
+fire of hostile batteries not yet discovered. Usually posted with wide
+intervals, they employ rapid fire. These classifications and terms,
+while necessary for study and discussion, are seldom employed in the
+verbiage of _field orders_. They are not to be considered as fixed or
+rigid. A single battery may successively fulfill several functions at
+different stages of the action, and it will be rare that all would be
+required in a single engagement. When infantry batteries are directed
+to support certain organizations in the attack, the Commander of the
+organization to be supported would generally indicate the target and
+exercise some supervision, but the artillery would not be under his
+command, but under that of the artillery commander of the entire force.
+The front of the position especially in defense, may be divided into
+areas to be assigned to the various groups. These groups should be so
+disposed as to permit the greatest possible concentration or dispersion
+of fire, in other words the best possible _control_. Where the terrain
+does not favor this, or the course of the action is uncertain, some
+artillery should be held “in observation” or “in readiness” to meet
+developments.
+
+At the command “Prepare for Action” the instruments are taken out,
+breech and muzzle covers removed, guns examined and cleaned, shields
+set, etc. This command may be given before or after reaching position
+and before or after unlimbering.
+
+At the command “March order,” battery being limbered or unlimbered,
+these operations are reversed and the gun and equipment secured for
+the march. When the commander rides forward, leaving command to follow
+he instructs officer in charge as to tactical situation, and gives
+him such other pertinent information as may appear desirable. He may
+also, in his judgment, instruct this officer as to time and place of
+subdivision for action (if not already made), time to prepare for
+action, route to be followed, gait, etc. An officer preceding a command
+to a position should determine the route to be followed and post the
+necessary markers.
+
+It is desirable to secure at the outset a position suitable for all
+stages of the action. The terrain must be carefully examined for
+such positions. If batteries are well located and doing good service
+changes during an action should be made only when it is apparent
+that a distinct advantage can be thus gained. These changes take
+time, necessitate readjustment on the target and are often dangerous.
+They should be made under cover if possible. Sometimes they may
+advantageously be made at night, or the first position may be taken at
+night. Advantage should also be taken of lulls in the action. Changes
+may be necessitated by the artillery of the enemy having adjusted
+on a battery. In such a case a short move during a lull, may be all
+that is required. Movements must be anticipated and the necessary
+reconnaissance, clearing, repair of bridges, etc. and all other things
+necessary as preliminaries must be attended to. Changes of position
+are ordinarily made in echelon, the stationary part covering the
+change with its fire. Batteries do not retire because they are out of
+ammunition, they wait for more. A disabled gun is not sent to rear to
+be repaired during action. A battery does not move in echelon, but all
+at once.
+
+It is the province of the supreme commander to order changes of his
+artillery positions. But in emergency the artillery commander may order
+changes.
+
+Before important change, have plenty of ammunition. Economy of
+ammunition at all times is a duty of all officers and non-commissioned
+officers.
+
+There must always be the closest co-operation between the artillery and
+the other arms. The artillery commander should be kept advised of the
+tactical situation and of any changes therein, and of the requirements
+of the other arms. He should be in frequent conference and constant
+communication with the supreme commander.
+
+“Dummy” emplacements are sometimes used, especially on defense, to draw
+fire and expose enemy’s artillery position.
+
+Horse artillery usually accompanies a cavalry force of any size. Its
+tactical employment is similar to that of light artillery. It is
+particularly useful in a rear guard on account of its great mobility.
+
+Do not get closer than 2,000 yards to hostile infantry of defense.
+Their artillery will likely be about 500 yards behind the infantry. Get
+within 3,000 to 3,500 yards of the defender’s artillery if practicable.
+
+The best results against artillery will be obtained by the effect of
+shrapnel on the men and animals. After a battery has been immobilized
+by shrapnel fire high explosive shell may be used for the demolition
+of the materiel. With the 3 inch rifle it is generally a waste of
+ammunition to attempt the destruction of battery materiel except at
+ranges within 2,500 yards, and then only when the fire can be observed.
+With the high power ordnance, materiel may be destroyed at greater
+ranges (see post).
+
+In firing on a rapidly moving target direct laying will usually
+be preferred. If direct fire is, for any reason, contemplated the
+artillery, while employing indirect fire should be near a crest to
+which the guns can be moved forward for direct fire. The movement of
+the guns by hand, except for short distances and on smooth and gentle
+slopes, is a very laborious task. It will usually be better to limber
+up.
+
+Opportunities for surprise fire at relatively close ranges will
+occasionally be practicable in defense, but seldom in attack.
+
+Oblique and enfilade fire are ordinarily more effective than frontal
+fire, and are desirable when they can be obtained without too great
+dispersion or exposure of the artillery.
+
+A support for the artillery is usually not needed except on the march.
+It can generally defend itself. If so isolated as to need a support,
+generally place it in rear on the exposed flank.
+
+Do not travel too far over fields in getting to a position. Look for a
+position which can be reached without too much cross-country traveling.
+
+Use shrapnel for ranging. Make the first bracket 400 yards. Do not
+waste time over a small bracket. Under favorable conditions a first
+bracket of 200 yds. may sometimes be obtained. In firing on cavalry a
+600 yd. bracket is usual.
+
+A battery should not halt to await orders if it can be avoided,
+but should come on promptly if possible, while a position is being
+reconnoitered. A good position promptly occupied may be better than the
+best position tardily taken.
+
+[Illustration: FIG. IV BATTERY WITH A REGIMENT.]
+
+_Artillery with Advance Guard._ It should not occupy positions from
+which it cannot readily withdraw, and so risk bringing on a general
+action unless this has been authorized.
+
+It should be so placed that it cannot be readily surprised in march
+formation by hostile fire, especially artillery fire.
+
+Artillery is seldom assigned to the advance guard of a force not larger
+than a brigade.
+
+If there is artillery with the main body an artillery reconnaissance
+officer usually accompanies the advance guard.
+
+Do not as a rule use artillery with an advance guard in wooded or
+mountainous country. It is generally useless, and especially vulnerable
+to attack at close range. In open country it is useful except at night.
+
+Horse artillery may accompany a cavalry force. (See also Chap. IV.)
+
+In a small force of artillery, there would be no objection to the
+combat train marching immediately in rear of the firing batteries,
+as the total continuous length of the artillery column would not be
+objectionably great.
+
+
+_With Rear Guard._ Artillery, especially horse artillery is
+particularly useful for delaying the enemy. Hence the proportion with a
+rear guard is generally large. (See also Chap. V.)
+
+
+_With Outposts._ The use of artillery with an outpost is not usual, as
+it is very trying duty and rapidly wears out the men and horses. If so
+used it is generally to command important roads, bridges and defiles,
+and is placed with the reserve.
+
+
+PROBLEM INVOLVING A BATTERY IN POSITION.
+
+_Mission._ The mission is to take position promptly and support attack.
+Develop hostile artillery and later fire on hostile infantry.
+
+Artillery commander accompanies supreme commander or latter will send
+for him. Artillery commander usually has with him the reconnaissance
+officer and scouts, the chief of 5th section with telescope, a
+musician, with tripod, two orderlies.
+
+_He considers_ the orders of the supreme commander, especially as to
+limits of his position (on this point he may give advice) and general
+plan of attack, disposition of enemy as learned from his reconnaissance
+officer, etc. He takes the terrain under observation at once.
+
+_He selects_ positions for battery, limbers, combat train, B. C.
+station, auxiliary observing stations, aiming point, routes for battery
+and combat train, etc.
+
+_He sends word_ to battery to form and prepare for action (it may
+already be formed) gives stations of fractions and routes thereto
+and directs them to proceed, telephone detail to report at B. C.
+station. He sends word by orderlies who also guide battery, or the
+reconnaissance officer who is familiar with ground may be sent to do
+this. Or Captain himself may do it.
+
+_He has chief of 5th section_ set up B. C. telescope. Meantime,
+assisted by the scouts, he selects exact position for the battery and
+lays it out.
+
+_He next_ obtains the firing data.
+
+_Auxiliary observing stations_ may be established when desirable, by B.
+C. or reconnaissance officer. They are occupied by the reconnaissance
+officer, scouts, agents, or other available personnel.
+
+_The position_ of the battery should have a range near 3,000, indirect
+fire and flash defilade. It should be near a crest so that the guns
+may be moved forward later for direct fire, especially in defense. It
+should be concealed from view of observers on enemy’s flank.
+
+_The limbers_ should be under cover preferably on a flank near the
+battery.
+
+_The combat train_ should be under cover, about 600 yards away.
+
+_The field trains_ generally join those of main body.
+
+_The B. C. station_ should be within 200 yards of the battery,
+preferably in rear or on a flank. The battery should be visible and the
+location favorable for observation of fire by the Captain. Sta. should
+be to windward of battery.
+
+_The auxiliary observing stations_ should generally be well to the
+front, and at least one on a flank, to observe errors of range and
+burst. The one on the flank also protects the battery from surprise.
+
+_The aiming point_ should be a mile away preferably in rear, or else on
+a flank. If not more than 1,000 yards off, the flank is better.
+
+_The telephones_, 3 in number, are placed at B. C. station, battery (if
+necessary) and at the observing station occupied by the reconnaissance
+officer.
+
+_The approaches_ to the positions should be under cover. Exposure for
+a brief moment may not incur danger of fire, but may indicate where
+battery is going. Covered approach more desirable for battery than for
+combat train. If necessary for concealment dismount drivers in moving
+to position.
+
+_Flank guards_ should be placed by the Captain unless provided for by
+an infantry support.
+
+_In addition to the Captain_ the following artillery personnel, some or
+all, must be accounted for:
+
+The reconnaissance officer: On the march usually with the advance
+guard, to select artillery positions and routes, learn enemy’s
+dispositions, etc. He has charge of the battery scouts. He may lead
+the battery over route to its position, or obtain firing data (usually
+not both). Establishes the auxiliary observing stations and may occupy
+one of them, supervises communications, watches battle for tactical
+developments, etc.
+
+The senior lieutenant: Commands the battery up to the time it is
+unlimbered for action, and then commands one of the firing platoons.
+
+Junior lieutenant, commands the combat train, (reserves) Q. M. Sergeant
+commands field train.
+
+Chief of 5th Section on entering action, sets up B. C. telescope (which
+he brings forward) and assists in obtaining firing data.
+
+Scouts. During march in advance guard with reconnaissance officer.
+Scout the ground and locate routes, seek information of enemy. May
+conduct battery to position. Assist Captain to lay out exact position
+of battery. Act as auxiliary observers. Guard flanks of battery.
+
+Telephone detail set up and operate the 3 telephones. Usually report to
+Captain at B. C. Station.
+
+An agent is usually with the supreme commander to transmit information
+to the artillery.
+
+Route markers, placed to mark routes and guide battery along them.
+
+Musicians, one carries tripod of B. C. telescope. With Captain to act
+as messengers.
+
+
+REMARKS CONCERNING A BATTALION OR LARGER UNIT IN ACTION.
+
+The Major will usually be with the supreme commander during the march.
+Having received orders to place the artillery in position, he rides to
+the designated locality with his staff, etc., to reconnoiter, observe
+the terrain, and select positions for his batteries. When ready for
+the batteries to come forward he sends the battery agents (who are
+with him) to direct the Captains to join him. The battery agents may
+also take word as to the route or routes by which the batteries are
+to advance. Word is also sent back as to the disposition to be made
+of the combat trains, the entire combat train of the battalion being
+usually consolidated at one place. The batteries form for action and
+are brought forward as directed by the senior officer of each, or all
+together by the senior officer present.
+
+The battery commanders, on receiving word, ride forward to join the
+Major, usually taking with them their reconnaissance officers, scouts,
+musicians, chiefs of the 5th section (with B. C. telescopes), etc. The
+Major instructs the battery commanders as to the general situation, and
+the orders he has received. He then indicates the approximate stations
+of the different batteries, the exact positions being marked out by
+the battery commanders, or by their orders. If posted for immediate
+action the Major may now designate the target for each battery, and
+give instructions as to opening fire. Otherwise he may indicate the
+localities for which firing data are to be prepared, or give such other
+instructions as the situation may demand. He designates a direction
+point and sectors of observation. He informs the battery commanders
+where his own station will be, and where the battalion telephone line
+will be laid, so they may connect with same.
+
+The Major instructs the Sergeant Major to bring up the reel cart, tells
+him where his station will be, and where the cable is to be laid.
+
+If the position of the hostile artillery is not known the Major may
+send his adjutant, or one of the battery reconnaissance officers,
+with some scouts to try to locate same. Aero reconnaissance will be
+especially useful in locating hostile positions. Fire may be directed
+by aeroplane and visual or wireless signaling, unless the enemy be well
+provided with anti-aircraft guns and skillful in their use.
+
+When practicable the artillery commander should be with the supreme
+commander during the engagement, the same station being ordinarily
+suitable for both. If not with the supreme commander the artillery
+commander should place an agent, preferably an officer with some
+orderlies, with the supreme commander, unless his station (artillery)
+is connected with that of the supreme commander by telephone. For this
+latter purpose the apparatus of the Signal Corps will generally be used.
+
+If the batteries are close together, the Major may place a single
+auxiliary observing station (consisting of a couple of scouts, or one
+of the battery reconnaissance officers and a scout) for all. Or each
+battery will be allowed to place its own observing station in the
+judgment of its commander.
+
+Each battery places its own limbers, usually about 100 to 150 yds. from
+the battery, preferably on a flank. The combat trains are combined at
+a locality designated by the Major unless there be some special reason
+for keeping them separated. Ordinarily they should be some 600 yds. or
+so from the fighting batteries, if cover is available.
+
+An ammunition company from the division train (if there be one) on
+taking station will send an agent to the artillery commander. The
+latter informs his subordinates as to the location of the ammunition
+company, when necessary.
+
+The Major directs in a general way the fire of his battalion.
+
+The duties of a Colonel commanding a regiment, or of a General
+commanding an Artillery Brigade, are quite similar to those of the
+Major commanding a battalion, but in less detail. The higher the
+commander the more general his duties and the less detailed his orders.
+The Brigade Commander outlines to his regimental commanders the general
+situation, designates the approximate positions of the regiments, and
+assigns general targets, etc.
+
+The duties of a Major in the regiment are the same as when commanding
+a separate battalion, except that he receives his orders through the
+Colonel of his regiment instead of direct from the supreme commander.
+(See ante.)
+
+
+HEAVY FIELD ARTILLERY.
+
+Heavy field artillery includes all ordnance heavier than the 3" field
+gun, but still mobile enough to accompany an army in the field. It
+would be used (if present) in practically every battle.
+
+The field artillery adopted for U. S. service is the following:
+
+ --------------+----------+--------------+-------------+-------------
+ | | | Approximate |Slope of fall
+ Designation |Weight of | Assumed |weight behind|of projectile
+ of piece. |projectile|limiting range| teams | at limiting
+ | (lbs.) | (yds.) | (lbs.) | range.
+ --------------+----------+--------------+-------------+-------------
+ 3" gun | 15 | 8,500[6] | 4,300 |
+ 3.8" howitzer | 30 | 6,600 | 4,300 | 1/1.2
+ 4.7" howitzer | 60 | 6,640 | 5,300 | 1/1.1
+ 4.7" gun | 60 | 11,000 | 8,800 | 1/1.3
+ 6" howitzer | 120 | 6,700 | 8,600 | 1/1
+ --------------+----------+--------------+-------------+-------------
+
+[Footnote 6: For shrapnel by fuse, 6,500 yds.]
+
+All of these pieces fire both shell and shrapnel, and they will
+break up most of the field works that are likely to be constructed
+(it is ordinarily not practicable to construct in field a work which
+would resist their fire unless considerable time is available for
+preparation). The 3.8" howitzer having same weight as 3” gun is quite
+as mobile. The 4.7" howitzer is as mobile as the 3” gun when it has
+eight horses. With 6 horses it cannot move as rapidly. The 4.7" gun can
+move over roads and fields, maneuver and take positions exactly like 3”
+gun, but it cannot move as rapidly.
+
+The organization, tactical uses and methods of fire control of this
+ordnance are similar to those of the 3" gun. Each battery has 4 pieces,
+but howitzer battalions have only 2 batteries.
+
+This ordnance is to be regarded as intended for the same uses as the 3”
+gun and as supplementary thereto. It should not be used for tasks where
+the 3" gun would do as well, but should be used for targets beyond the
+range or destructive power of the 3” gun.
+
+These pieces may be needed against troops who have had 24 hours or so
+to prepare a defensive position, as in this time they can throw up
+works which would protect them from the 3" gun fire.
+
+These guns use indirect laying as a rule, but may also use direct
+laying, being in this respect like 3" gun. They should be placed back
+of the 3” gun and not assigned to living targets which can be reached
+by the 3" gun. They should generally be concealed, for this purpose
+they require a flash defilade of 20 ft. Behind a second ridge is a good
+place. A clearing in the woods is also good, provided an aiming point
+is available.
+
+The position should afford good lines of approach and retreat and for
+ammunition supply. The limbers are usually posted farther to the rear
+than in the case of the 3" gun. There should always be an infantry
+escort for these pieces, and machine guns may also be so used.
+
+Usually this heavy artillery will take only one position during an
+action, and it is therefore desirable that this position be carefully
+selected. Ample time must be allowed for reconnoitering a position
+and therefore a representative of the heavy artillery should be well
+forward during the march, for this purpose.
+
+On account of the great ranges at which heavy artillery is usually
+employed, battalions are split up even less often than in the case of
+3" guns.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. V
+
+TRAJECTORIES AND CONES OF DISPERSION FOR SHELL AND SHRAPNEL]
+
+The shell fire of these pieces will destroy the materiel of a battery.
+The 4.7" gun can destroy battery materiel with great accuracy at ranges
+up to 5,000 yds. Thus they can often prevent hostile light artillery
+from coming into action at all.
+
+Whereas a reverse slope of about 15 degrees affords some protection
+against 3" artillery, only very steep slopes, 50 degrees or more,
+afford complete protection against the shrapnel of the field howitzer.
+(Fig V.)
+
+If at the opening of the attack the howitzers cannot find the hostile
+artillery they may fire at the infantry. Later in the attack if the
+defender runs his artillery forward for direct fire, he may then be
+subject to the fire of the attacker’s heavy artillery.
+
+Auxiliary observing stations from which target can be seen are of great
+importance, and as little can be seen from a range of 8,000 yds., it is
+necessary to have an observing station well to the front. Usually the
+artillery (bn.) commander himself will occupy a station from which the
+target can be seen. These stations are connected with the battery by
+the telephone equipment, which is ample. Sweeping fire is not used with
+these pieces, as it is too wasteful of the ammunition which is heavy
+and expensive. Fire only at what can be seen, or otherwise accurately
+located.
+
+In defense these pieces are very useful in compelling the attacker to
+deploy early, or to make a very long detour to get out of their range
+if he turns the position.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. VI]
+
+_On the March._ As the 3.8“ howitzer and the 4.7” howitzer when
+provided with 8 horses, are very mobile there is no serious objection
+to having them well up at the head of the column except for the road
+space they occupy. Therefore if the tactical situation is such as to
+make it desirable to have these pieces well to the front they may be
+placed there. They would seldom, however, be attached to the advance
+guard. The 6" howitzer and 4.7” gun (and usually also the 3.8“ and 4.7”
+howitzers) should be placed immediately in rear of the last infantry
+organization in the main body (just ahead of the artillery combat
+trains). The possible necessity of having to strengthen the bridges
+for this heavy ordnance is an argument in favor of leaving them in the
+rear, as this necessity would delay the march of the infantry if the
+guns were in front. Ordinarily there is not as much speed required in
+placing this ordnance in action as is usual with the lighter pieces.
+Positions are selected with more deliberation.
+
+Motor cars are extensively used for the transportation of field and
+siege artillery of all types from the lightest to the heaviest.
+Machine guns and some of the lighter types of rapid fire guns,
+including anti-aircraft guns, are often mounted directly upon the
+truck. The heavier pieces are hauled as trailers by the motor trucks,
+which serve also to carry ammunition and supplies. The mobility of
+the automobile motive power is greater than that of animals and the
+machine is less vulnerable to fire. The possibilities of motor operated
+vehicles in conducting artillery off the roads have not yet been fully
+demonstrated, but the conduct of the “quads” or 4-wheel drive cars is
+very satisfactory.
+
+
+MOUNTAIN ARTILLERY.
+
+There are many instances in campaign where the lack of roads or trails
+prohibits or unduly restricts the employment of light artillery. To
+meet such conditions, the mountain gun transported on pack animals
+has been constructed. The gun should, in principle, be as effective
+a weapon as the field gun but transportation conditions limit its
+practicable size and power.
+
+The various patterns of mountain guns are distributed in 3- 4- and
+5-mule loads. The weight that can be borne by the best pack mules, for
+other than brief periods, is limited to about 250 lbs. in addition to
+the weight of the saddle. As a gun of acceptable power can hardly be
+built within this weight, most mountain guns are made in two or more
+parts, each constituting the load of a mule. The piece is equipped with
+wheels and drag ropes for moving short distances without packing.
+
+The weight of projectile fired from mountain artillery is approximately
+the same as that from 3" field guns but the muzzle velocity is
+considerably less and the range therefore shorter. The guns have a
+larger allowable angle of elevation than 3” guns (usually to 27° or
+30°); they are in effect howitzers.
+
+The general construction of the gun, carriage and ammunition is largely
+similar to those of light artillery. The gun is not permanently
+connected to the recoil mechanism on account of the division into mule
+loads but is dropped into recessed blocks on a sleigh when assembled
+for action; and there it is secured by a key. The sleigh forms the
+cover of the cradle and slides on the cradle guides in recoil. The
+trail is made folding and is adapted for firing in cramped positions.
+The guns fire fixed ammunition, shell and shrapnel. Mountain batteries
+have no limbers or wagons. The battery is provided with an ammunition
+train which may consist entirely of pack transportation or may include
+some carts or light wagons. The gun can be unpacked and ready to fire
+in one minute.
+
+In the American service, a mountain battery consists of four guns and
+their accessories. It is divided into six sections and has in addition
+an ammunition train and a supply train. The first, second, third, and
+fourth sections are gun sections to each of which is attached a mule
+with pioneer tools. The gun section consists of a gun squad of 10 men
+together with a gun team of 4 mules with drivers and an ammunition team
+of the same strength. The 5th and 6th sections are ammunition sections
+with 6 mules in each team.
+
+The ammunition train comprises ammunition mules and the mules carrying
+the forge, stores, tools, etc. The supply train carries kits, rations,
+forage, etc.
+
+Though mountain artillery is the only form of artillery that can be
+used in country where wheel traffic is impossible, its use is by no
+means limited to such terrain. For assisting the attacking infantry
+throughout all stages of combat, it is very effective. The mule can go
+practically anywhere that man can, except where the latter resorts
+to climbing; hence mountain batteries are peculiarly effective in
+country that restricts the scope of light artillery. These guns require
+virtually no more cover for concealment on the march than do infantry
+and they are thereby able to effect movements on the battlefield,
+without attracting hostile attention or fire, that would be impossible
+with light arty. They are very useful in the defense of woods, in
+temporary forward positions, in rear guard actions or in general where
+their mobility and easy concealment have special application.
+
+On equal terms, they are no match for light artillery, but in terrain
+that hinders the use of that weapon, the mountain gun is capable of a
+usefulness that increases with the restrictions imposed on the former.
+
+
+ANTI AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY.
+
+The introduction of air craft into warfare has naturally resulted
+in the use of special means of protection against this new menace.
+Probably the most effective method is attack by a superior number of
+similar craft on the principle of the cavalry screen.
+
+Anti aircraft weapons include small arms, machine guns, and field
+pieces having a range and power approximating that of the lighter
+types of field artillery. Small arms are regarded as of little use in
+the attack of air craft. The field gun type, using shrapnel and high
+explosive shell appears to be the most effective. One German type has
+a calibre of 104 mm. and throws a projectile weighing 34 lbs. It has
+a maximum rate of fire of 15 shots per minute and a range (in height)
+of 12,500 ft. For some types of gun hits are claimed at altitudes
+of 10,000 ft. or more. Such performances must be regarded as most
+exceptional and their probability will not be great enough to force
+aeroplanes to remain at such altitudes. A lower elevation is necessary
+for effective reconnaissance and the aeronauts must of necessity
+frequently take the risk involved. Swift aeroplanes will be practically
+immune from anti aircraft fire at altitudes of 10,000 ft. or more. They
+will have a fair chance of escape as low as 5,000 ft. As the altitude
+is reduced below this figure the risk will very rapidly increase.
+Observation at heights of about a mile will, however, be frequently
+attempted, but efficient guns in sufficient numbers should be able to
+exact a heavy toll in the event of systematic efforts to observe at
+less elevations. Airships, because of their greater size, and slower
+and more regular movements, must remain at greater elevations to escape
+the effects of hostile fire.
+
+The greatest difficulties encountered in anti aircraft firing are
+estimating the range and hitting a rapidly moving object. Results must
+be obtained by great rapidity of fire.
+
+Thus, unless the burst happens to be directly in line with the target,
+it is impracticable to determine by observation from the firing point
+whether the shot is over or short.
+
+Guns cannot fire vertically. Their elevation never exceeds 60° and in
+general 50° is the practicable limit. Beyond these angles accordingly
+the aircraft are immune.
+
+New problems in exterior ballistics are introduced. The influence of
+air currents on the trajectory is considerable. Tracer shells which
+emit a smoke flame are occasionally used to verify the aim.
+
+As the aeroplane may use any line of approach at will and moves at
+great speed, the need for a large number of very mobile, quick firing
+guns will be apparent. The guns are frequently mounted on motor trucks
+when used in the field.
+
+Except for possible use in fortifications, special guns cannot
+evidently always be provided in sufficient numbers for this purpose.
+Arrangements must, therefore, be made for utilizing the standard
+field and siege guns and howitzers. This is usually accomplished by
+providing special types of mounts such as the split trail carriage, or
+by extemporizing means whereby the trail can be sunk in the ground to
+an extraordinary degree and the gun then prevented from overturning, by
+cables to holdfasts, etc.
+
+The anti aircraft gun may be considered to have satisfactorily
+fulfilled its function if it prevents aircraft from flying at altitudes
+sufficiently low to permit effective reconnaissance.
+
+
+REMARKS CONCERNING THE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF LIGHT FIELD ARTILLERY.
+
+The following principles are of general (but not universal) application
+in the tactics of field artillery. They may be considered as useful
+suggestions, to be varied, however, as circumstances may dictate.
+
+A battalion of artillery should seldom be sub-divided. A battery of
+artillery has but one range finding equipment. Its subdivision would be
+justified only by most unusual conditions.
+
+At the opening of an engagement some of the artillery may, according
+to circumstances, be held “in observation,” or “in readiness,”
+exceptionally in a small force, more frequently in a large one.
+
+It having been decided to place the artillery in action it should be
+brought to its position promptly.
+
+The artillery and combat trains should, when practicable, be conducted
+to their positions by concealed routes. Utilize the roads as far as
+practicable, avoiding long movements across country. Concealment in
+position and en route thereto and good observing stations are the
+principal technical requirements of an artillery position. The position
+should be concealed from the enemy’s observation from either front or
+flank. The position should be sufficiently roomy for the unit which
+occupies it. It is not desirable to crowd guns at less than their
+proper interval (20 yds.), but it often is necessary.
+
+A good position for artillery in attack may often be found between the
+holding and enveloping attack. In either attack or defense a favorable
+position may be found on the flank. If the artillery is thus exposed
+it will usually require a guard or escort of other troops (to be
+designated by the supreme commander, often from the advance guard) both
+in position and en route thereto. The artillery in any case should have
+out the necessary details for protection and observation of fire.
+
+If there be a choice between two crests it will generally be better,
+when other considerations are not paramount, to select the one farther
+from the enemy.
+
+If direct fire is contemplated at any stage of the action the position
+should be selected with a view to this. Such a provision would be more
+usual in defense than in attack.
+
+Flash defilade requires 12 to 15 ft. of vertical cover. In solving
+defilade and other visibility problems allowance should be made for the
+vegetation.
+
+It is ordinarily desirable to obtain a range between 2,500 and 3,500
+yards from the probable target. Initial range in defense may be
+somewhat greater than in attack, since the hostile infantry will
+approach the position.
+
+It is desirable to secure at the outset a position suitable for all
+stages of the action. Artillery once committed to action should not be
+moved during the course of the engagement unless it is apparent that a
+distinct advantage may thereby be gained, or unless such a movement is
+unavoidable.
+
+The front may be covered and dead spaces eliminated by a subdivision
+and distribution of the artillery units.
+
+Covered approach and concealment in position are desirable for the
+combat trains. Unless otherwise specially ordered the combat trains
+will be at the disposal of the artillery commander. In some cases they
+may take their stations under cover of the artillery fire.
+
+The artillery prior to and during the action reconnoiters the terrain
+with a view to the selection of artillery positions. This is done
+without special orders. An artillery officer with the necessary
+reconnaissance detail should be with the advance guard during the march
+for this purpose.
+
+The B. C. station should be close to the battery, and not in a
+conspicuous position, likely to draw the enemy’s fire.
+
+Shrapnel should be used against living targets and for ranging. Shell
+is used against material objects. A hostile battery which has been
+immobilized by shrapnel fire may be destroyed by shell fire.
+
+In ranging the first bracket should be of ample span, 400 yards is
+generally a good distance.
+
+A duel between the opposing artilleries is not a necessary preliminary
+to every combat. It is the duty of the artillery in both attack and
+defense to support the infantry. It should therefore direct its fire
+as a rule, upon that element of the enemy which is at the time or may
+become the most threatening to the friendly infantry. Firing over the
+heads of the infantry will be the rule, in both attack and defense. The
+attacker’s artillery, having once opened fire upon the infantry firing
+line of the defense, should ordinarily continue this fire until the
+proximity of the assaulting infantry to the position makes it necessary
+to increase the range.
+
+There should always be the closest co-operation between the artillery
+and the other arms. The artillery commander during the engagement
+will often be with the supreme commander. If not he should be in close
+communication with him, generally through an artillery agent.
+
+With rare exceptions the artillery in both attack and defense will be
+in rear of the general line of battle of the infantry. It may be stated
+as a very rough guide that the artillery of the defense will be, in the
+average case, approximately 500 yds. in rear of the infantry firing
+line, particularly when indirect fire is employed. The mission of the
+force, the nature of the terrain and the conditions of the case will
+determine the position of the artillery, which may also be subject to
+change during the action. In case of a counter-attack, pursuit, or
+occupation of a captured position, the artillery may often be pushed
+boldly to the front.
+
+Instructions too much in detail should not be given to artillery in
+orders. It is usually unnecessary in the ordinary case for the supreme
+commander to encroach upon the province of the artillery commander
+by directing him to (a) Fire on any specified target, (b) Obtain
+firing data, (c) Reconnoiter advanced positions, (d) Take station at
+a definite point, (e) Open fire at any specified time. He should,
+according to circumstances, be directed ordinarily merely to take
+position (1) for immediate action, (2) in observation, or (3) in
+readiness. The information in the order as to the enemy and his own
+troops indicates to him what the probable targets will be and when and
+where they will probably appear. This information, together with the
+rule to fire on the hostile element most dangerous to the friendly
+infantry, enables the artillery to obtain the necessary firing data
+and fire on the proper target, (a) and (b). As to (c) the artillery
+commander will, without orders, consider the possibility of occupying
+a new position, according to developments, and he will conduct the
+necessary reconnaissance for this purpose, so as to be ready to move
+to a new position when later ordered to do so. As to (d) the supreme
+commander should, in his orders, direct the artillery to take position
+_near_ such a place, leaving the selection of the exact location for
+the artillery to its commander. As to (e) if posted for immediate
+action the artillery will open fire as soon as the target appears.
+In the other two cases it will not open until it receives additional
+orders. Case (2) in observation, is used when the supreme commander
+does not wish fire opened prematurely, although he has decided where
+to place the artillery. Case (3) in readiness, is characteristic
+of a position in readiness, where combat position of the artillery
+is not yet definitely decided upon. The supreme commander may, both
+prior to and during the engagement, consult the artillery commander,
+obtaining the latter’s views as to the positions for and handling of
+the artillery, and give him detailed instructions, but this should
+not appear in the orders. When using the expressions (1), (2) and
+(3) in orders, it is well (in solutions) to add after your order, an
+explanatory note as to why more definite instructions are not given to
+the artillery commander. In some cases it may be desirable to give the
+artillery more definite instructions in orders but such cases would
+not be usual, and could often be covered by a consultation, omitting
+detailed instructions from the orders. If detailed instructions, as
+to particular targets on which to fire, advanced positions, etc., are
+considered necessary in orders it is usually well to add (in your
+solution) a note explaining why such orders are considered necessary
+in this case. If firing data are to be obtained by “registration”
+(bracketing fire) the order may contain instructions to that effect.
+See also Chapters IV, V, VI, XI, XIII, XIV, XVII and XVIII.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX.
+
+CAVALRY TACTICS.
+
+
+The uses of cavalry in campaign are summarized as follows:
+
+ (a) To seek and destroy the enemy’s cavalry.
+
+ (b) Screening, contact and reconnaissance.
+
+ (c) Seizing and holding important advanced positions thus delaying
+ the advance of the enemy until the arrival of other arms.
+
+ (d) To operate on the flank and in the rear of the enemy.
+
+ (e) Raids and other enterprises requiring great mobility.
+
+ (f) The mounted charge at the opportune moment against
+ infantry or field artillery.
+
+ (g) Energetic pursuit of a retreating enemy or covering
+ retreat of its own forces.
+
+ (h) When none of the above rôles have been assigned to it
+ cavalry may go to the assistance (dismounted) of hard
+ pressed infantry to fill gaps in the firing line.
+
+Cavalry being an expensive arm to equip and maintain should be used for
+the duty for which it is especially qualified, and not frittered away
+as messengers, orderlies, etc.
+
+A division of the cavalry force while undesirable is frequently
+necessary. As little as possible should be assigned to the lesser tasks
+and the bulk to the principal duty. Many of the minor tasks for which
+cavalry has been often used may well be performed by mounted orderlies
+and the use of automobiles and motorcycles.
+
+Cavalry should not ordinarily be used to perform duty which infantry
+could do as well (or better) when infantry is available. There will
+usually be many duties which the cavalry alone can perform.
+
+The efficiency of cavalry depends very greatly on the condition of the
+horses, and they should be spared all unnecessary fatigue. Night work
+especially is very exhausting and so should be held to the minimum,
+although it cannot, of course, be entirely dispensed with. Always allow
+the cavalry to rest at night if practicable.
+
+Cavalry operating alone, except for very short periods, should
+generally be accompanied by a sufficient train to provide reasonable
+comfort for the men and horses and maintain their health and
+efficiency. The presence of the train restricts, to some extent,
+the movements of the cavalry, but the added comfort increases its
+efficiency and the range of its operations.
+
+If the cavalry is out but a short distance its field trains would, as
+a rule, be in the rear with those of the other troops. They join the
+cavalry occasionally in order to replenish rations. When the cavalry is
+out for several days and mobility is of special importance it may be
+accompanied by a pack train in lieu of wagons. When combat is imminent
+all wagons and pack animals should be kept well to the rear. In such
+cases extra ammunition may be carried in the saddle bags.
+
+Large bodies of cavalry would frequently be accompanied by artillery,
+preferably horse artillery if such is available. Artillery is always
+desirable with a large cavalry command.
+
+Signal troops, especially radio sections pack (wireless) may be
+attached to cavalry operating independently, to maintain communication
+between separated portions, or with the foot troops which the cavalry
+is covering. The wireless sections are sent wherever there is a demand
+for their services. They would not _habitually_ be attached to bodies
+smaller than a troop.
+
+Mounted engineers frequently accompany advance cavalry and may, if
+there is special need for them, also accompany the independent cavalry.
+Cavalry commands have a limited number of tools of their own including
+demolition outfits (containing explosive). The men who handle the
+explosives are called the demolition squad--there being one to each
+squadron.
+
+The cavalry commander, especially when he is acting independently,
+should be allowed great discretionary powers, and orders too much in
+detail should not be given him. He should be told what he is expected
+to do, but not _how_ he is to do it. Otherwise the cavalry will be so
+hampered in its movements that its usefulness will be greatly impaired.
+“Success in reconnaissance depends greatly on the character of orders
+given. The hackneyed phrase that the cavalry is to advance and discover
+the strength and position of the enemy is useless, for this is only
+its natural duty. If, as is often the case, it is told to discover the
+intentions of the enemy, the commander really demands that it perform
+a duty incumbent on himself. Both cases betray a hesitancy on the part
+of the commander which results in a halting sort of action. It is
+wisest to put to the cavalry simply the questions which it is desirable
+at the moment for the commander to have answered, viz: whether hostile
+encampments are met with in given localities, whether certain towns
+are occupied, whether the enemy’s advance guard or main body has
+reached a certain line, how far the enemy’s flanks extend, whether
+on a given road or railroad troops are moving. Such commissions,
+which cannot be misunderstood, will bring in clear reports from which
+the commander-in-chief can draw his own picture of the strength and
+position of the enemy, and divine his intentions.”
+
+The cavalry will seek and destroy the enemy’s cavalry. Its important
+duties of screening, contact and reconnaissance will be rendered easier
+of accomplishment by the overthrow of the hostile mounted force. In the
+consummation of this important duty the best results will be obtained
+by concentrating the cavalry in large masses independent of all save
+the supreme commander in the theatre of operations. A relatively small
+part of the cavalry force should be assigned to divisions (or other
+units) and the great bulk of it concentrated under a single independent
+commander. The duty of cavalry may therefore be classified as follows:
+
+ Major rôle: Army (independent) cavalry.
+ Minor rôle: Divisional cavalry.
+
+The divisional cavalry will be under the immediate orders of the
+division commander. It may be used independently, that is to say
+independent of all save the division commander, or as advance, rear,
+or outpost cavalry. In the latter cases it will be under the command
+of the advance guard, rear guard or outpost commanders. The divisional
+cavalry is charged with such duties (principally security and
+reconnaissance) as pertain especially to the operations of the division
+to which it is attached. While engaged in these duties it may be
+allowed a considerable degree of independence of action. It should not,
+however, encroach upon the sphere of activity of the _army_ cavalry
+and should never be beyond recall by the division commander. When
+the division is operating independently the duties of the divisional
+cavalry will be similar to those of the independent cavalry of an army,
+although of course less in degree and scope. The following paragraphs
+pertain primarily to the operations of the divisional cavalry.
+According to our present organization a regiment of cavalry will be
+attached to each division.
+
+
+_Advance, rear and outpost cavalry._ Advance cavalry is that attached
+to and under the orders of the advance guard commander. Its function
+is the same as that of the whole advance guard, to insure the safe
+and uninterrupted advance of the main body. It would be exceptional
+to use an entire regiment of divisional cavalry in this manner, and
+in general, as in the case of army cavalry, better results will be
+obtained by keeping the divisional cavalry intact and independent. If,
+however, the cavalry with the division is too weak for independent
+action, or if there is no mission for it independent of that of the
+advance guard, it may be attached to the latter in a forward movement.
+The circumstances of each case will decide the best mode of employing
+the divisional cavalry.
+
+Cavalry will be employed more frequently with the rear guard in retreat
+than with the advance guard in a forward movement. Cavalry is the arm
+_par excellence_ for delaying actions, hence the entire divisional
+cavalry will frequently be assigned to the rear guard in retreat.
+
+Divisional cavalry may also be assigned to flank guards and outposts
+in which duty it is very useful. If the situation demands, part of
+the divisional cavalry may be temporarily assigned to a detachment of
+the division operating independently. Such use of the cavalry must,
+however, be regarded as exceptional in systematic operations on a large
+scale, in common with all other “detachment warfare.” The independent
+“reinforced brigade,” of frequent occurrence in map problems and small
+maneuvers, will be not so often encountered in actual campaign against
+a civilized and organized foe. It will probably, however, continue for
+a time to find a field of usefulness in the operations of the American
+army.
+
+For the use of cavalry with advance, rear and flank guards, outposts
+and detachments see Chaps. IV, V, VI, VII, X, XI, XIII, and XIV.
+
+
+_Independent Cavalry._ Cavalry may and _should_ be used independently:
+
+ (a) When there is an independent mission for the cavalry--that is,
+ one independent of the operations of the other troops--either
+ in time or place, and
+
+ (b) When the cavalry is strong enough for independent action.
+ This means both strong enough in itself and by comparison
+ with the enemy. A platoon might act independently if the
+ enemy had _no_ cavalry, whereas a regiment could accomplish
+ little if opposed to a brigade. As a rule a force of less than
+ two troops should not be employed independently unless there
+ be very strong reasons for same.
+
+The expression “independent cavalry,” means that the cavalry is
+independent of all but the supreme commander.
+
+The duty of the independent cavalry is to gain and maintain contact
+with the enemy, usually with the main force, thus securing information
+as to his movements and intentions, and screening the front of its own
+main body, so as to prevent the hostile cavalry from gaining similar
+information of the friendly forces; to operate against the enemy and
+his communications, etc.; to maintain communication between separated
+friendly forces; and to perform its other special functions, (see
+ante). The independent cavalry forages for itself to a greater or less
+degree and often aids in the collection of supplies for the entire
+command. It is also commonly employed in raiding, in attacking convoys,
+to destroy railroads, seize unprotected depots of supply, etc. In
+general the cavalry may be properly employed independently on any duty
+where great mobility and celerity of action are required.
+
+The operations of independent cavalry have of necessity a very wide
+range. Depending on its strength and on other conditions the cavalry
+may be several days’ march from its supporting troops. It will nearly
+always be too far out to come in to the main camp every night.
+
+The cavalry must at all times maintain touch with the enemy and
+communication with its own forces in rear. If there be advance cavalry
+between the main body and the independent cavalry, it will be charged
+with maintaining communication unless the independent cavalry is too
+far in advance.
+
+All information of the enemy should be promptly transmitted. The
+presence of a hostile force should seldom be reported without
+information also as to its strength and composition. The presence of a
+hostile force having once been detected all its subsequent movements
+should be observed. In other words, the cavalry having once gained
+contact with the enemy should never thereafter lose it.
+
+In maintaining continuous contact aero reconnaissance is not entirely
+effective. It usually loses contact with the enemy temporarily
+during darkness and foul weather, and in this respect cavalry has an
+advantage. In the duty of reconnaissance the aeroplane and dirigible
+cannot fulfill all the functions of the cavalry. The two services are
+to be regarded as supplementary. In the usual case both will be needed.
+
+In sending in reports the cavalry commander should state his plans or
+intentions for the future and, when necessary, the manner in which
+messages may be transmitted to him.
+
+If the enemy has a strong and aggressive mounted force in the field
+the cavalry, while at no time neglecting its important duties of
+reconnaissance and screening, should keep a strong central mass well in
+hand to defeat the hostile cavalry as soon as it is encountered. Having
+defeated and thoroughly demoralized the enemy’s cavalry a much greater
+dispersion is permissible. The enemy’s cavalry having been overthrown
+he can no longer keep touch with the forces opposing him, nor screen
+himself from observation by their cavalry. His patrols and messengers,
+both going and returning, will have great difficulty in eluding the
+screen which will have been established.
+
+Cavalry in the presence of infantry alone may be considerably dispersed
+with safety. But it should be kept well in hand so long as opposed to a
+strong and aggressive cavalry.
+
+A large force of cavalry, in gaining contact advances toward the
+enemy in one or more columns, which should keep in close touch with
+each other. On reaching the vicinity of the enemy each column sends
+forward a “contact squadron” (from 1 to 4 troops, generally at least
+2.) This contact squadron approaches still closer to enemy’s position
+and then sends out one or more strong strategic patrols, under
+command of officers. The sole function of these patrols, is to gain
+information of the enemy’s main body for _strategic purposes_. Their
+radius of action depends upon conditions. In a friendly country they
+may operate at considerable distances from their supporting troops. In
+hostile country, however, if the enemy’s cavalry is still active, the
+distances at which they can operate will be greatly diminished, and
+the difficulties of obtaining information correspondingly increased.
+Uniformed men in small bodies and in a hostile country overrun by
+the enemy’s cavalry will have great difficulty in gathering and
+transmitting information sufficiently exact to be of strategic value.
+In such cases therefore, resort will often be had to the additional
+aid of spies. These patrols do not report minor information, and
+hence the number of their messages will be limited. Where practicable
+the commercial telegraph and telephone lines should be utilized in
+the transmission of messages. Motorcycles, light autos, air craft
+and wireless are all useful in maintaining communication. Important
+information which cannot be telegraphed should be sent to the rear over
+several routes, especially in hostile country. As the duty of these
+patrols is very arduous they should be relieved at suitable intervals,
+depending on conditions. They will usually subsist off the country.
+(See also “Patrolling.”)
+
+The contact squadron supports the patrols and furnishes their reliefs.
+It arranges for the transmission of information from the patrols to the
+squadron, and from the squadron to designated stations in rear. For
+this purpose relay and collecting stations are established at suitable
+points and free use is made of the telegraph and telephone, motorcycles
+and any other available means of transmitting information. Signal
+troops (usually wireless sections pack) may be attached to bodies of
+cavalry engaged in reconnaissance. The maximum sending radius of the
+present field wireless sets (pack) in our service is about 30 miles,
+but they are not always dependable beyond 15 miles, and occasionally
+fail altogether in an emergency. They can seldom be relied upon as the
+sole means of communication. In the employment of wireless it may be
+advisable to use a code for important messages.
+
+
+_Cavalry in combat._ Cavalry uses the following methods of offensive
+action:
+
+ (a) The mounted charge in one or more lines in close order
+ (usually 3 lines); in column or line of columns (rare);
+ as foragers or as skirmishers.
+
+ (b) Dismounted fire action (used also in defense, especially
+ in delaying actions).
+
+ (c) Mounted fire action (rare).
+
+ (d) A combination of (a) with (b) or (c).
+
+Of the above the mounted charge in line will generally be the most
+effective although the opportunities for its successful employment
+will probably be rare and fleeting. It is, therefore, to be preferred
+whenever it is practicable, even when the cavalry is in a generally
+defensive attitude, since cavalry has less power of resistance than
+infantry, and a successful charge is the most effective means of
+defense. If the ground is too rough or broken for a charge in line, if
+it is desired to extend the front for purposes of envelopment or in
+the rare case of a charge against a deployed line (either Infantry or
+Cavalry) a charge in line with extended intervals, usually accompanied
+by mounted fire action, may be employed, viz:
+
+ Charge as skirmishers, using the revolver, automatic pistol,
+ or sabre.
+
+ Charge as foragers, the men in couples, using their revolvers,
+ pistols or sabres.
+
+A charge in column of fours should be used only when charge in line is,
+for some reason, impracticable, as when charging along a road, or when
+there is not time to form line.
+
+Dismounted fire action is employed:
+
+ (a) Usually when opposed to infantry.
+
+ (b) On the defensive, or in delaying actions.
+
+ (c) When the terrain or other conditions render a mounted
+ attack impracticable.
+
+ (d) By a portion of the force, in support of the mounted
+ action.
+
+Even if intending eventually to fight on foot the cavalry should remain
+mounted as long as possible. It may often be better to remain mounted
+in concealment, awaiting a favorable opportunity to charge, rather than
+to hasten prematurely into a dismounted action. Cavalry which dismounts
+usually thereby surrenders the initiative, certainly when opposed to
+an enemy still mounted. In case of defeat by a superior mounted force
+there is usually no opportunity to retreat, and most of the dismounted
+men and all of the led horses will probably be lost. Therefore it is
+necessary, in dismounting to fight on foot, to hold a mounted reserve,
+especially when opposed to cavalry. One of the functions of this
+mounted reserve will be to check the enemy, if necessary, while the
+rest of the command is mounting. Even if it is contemplated to use a
+portion of the reserve eventually for dismounted action it is well to
+keep it mounted as long as practicable as it is thus more mobile.
+
+Cavalry should not start to dismount to fight on foot with a mounted
+enemy formed and ready to charge, within 1,000 yards, unless the
+terrain affords protection against a charge.
+
+When opposed to infantry alone the risk in dismounting is not so
+great as when a hostile cavalry force is near, and cavalry will often
+dismount to fight infantry, especially in delaying actions. Even in
+this case, however, the cavalry should make its movements to position
+mounted as it has in this respect an advantage over infantry.
+
+Even when dismounting to fight on foot cavalry should at all times keep
+up an active mounted reconnaissance, especially when opposed to cavalry.
+
+When there is one horse holder to each four led horses they can be
+readily shifted from place to place, and are then said to be _mobile_.
+If the proportion of horseholders is less than this the horses are
+not readily shifted from place to place, and are then said to be
+_immobile_. If the horses are linked it is inadvisable to have less
+than one holder to eight horses, and even in this case it is not
+practicable to move them and they may be easily stampeded. To reduce to
+a minimum the number of horseholders (if the horses are not to be kept
+mobile) the animals may be linked in large circles. A better method is
+that of “coupling,” in which pairs of horses are linked each to the
+cantle of the other’s saddle thus facing in opposite directions. All
+troopers are then liberated for firing. The horses cannot move away or
+be stampeded, if the links hold.
+
+To dismount to fight on foot, horses mobile, requires a minimum of ½
+to 1 minute, not counting the time required to take position on the
+firing line. To mount requires about the same time. If the horses be
+immobilized more time is required both in mounting and dismounting.
+
+Horse artillery and machine guns often accompany the cavalry, and are
+used as auxiliaries in combat. They usually hold a pivotal position
+(supported if necessary by a few dismounted men) to cover the formation
+of the troops preparing for the attack (usually mounted), to support
+the attack, to hold the enemy in check while the troops disorganized by
+the charge are rallying, or to cover a withdrawal in case of repulse.
+
+Mounted engineers should accompany cavalry, especially advance
+cavalry, whenever such are available. They facilitate the progress
+of the cavalry, inspect and repair bridges for the use of the main
+body, execute demolitions, etc. As mounted engineers will, however,
+not always be available, the cavalry should be trained to do its own
+pioneer work.
+
+
+_Cavalry vs. Infantry._ The cases in which mounted cavalry can
+attack infantry with any prospect of success are rare and fleeting.
+Nevertheless the cavalry should be on the lookout for such
+opportunities. Infantry may be attacked mounted:
+
+ (a) When it can be taken in flank or rear while actively engaged
+ in a fire fight.
+
+ (b) When it is out of ammunition.
+
+ (c) When it can be caught in column of route or other close
+ formation, and has not time or room to deploy.
+
+ (d) When it is in disorderly retreat.
+
+ (e) When it is of poor quality or low in morale.
+
+The element of surprise is generally essential and always desirable.
+If the infantry has time and opportunity to make the necessary
+dispositions, it can easily repel the attack. Against infantry in mass,
+cavalry charges in line, boot to boot, against deployed infantry it
+charges as foragers.
+
+Against infantry deployed for battle a cavalry charge has little
+prospect of success. If compelled to attack infantry cavalry must
+usually resort to dismounted action, and its tactics will be similar
+to those of infantry except that its greater mobility permits small
+forces of cavalry to make turning movements which would be impossible
+or at least extremely dangerous for a body of infantry similarly
+situated. The force executing the turning movement proceeds mounted to
+a favorable locality and there dismounts for the attack--unless a good
+opportunity for mounted action there presents itself.
+
+Because of its mobility and the ease with which it may be withdrawn
+from action, cavalry is the arm _par excellence_ for delaying actions,
+such as those of a rear guard in retreat. Cavalry can delay the advance
+of an enemy by harassing his flanks (which is the more effective
+method) or by taking a position for dismounted fire action directly
+across his line of advance. In such actions the cavalry may take up a
+very extended line and the entire force (except the horseholders and
+a small mounted reserve) may be placed in the firing line. A mounted
+reserve is needed to watch the flanks, cover the led horses, check the
+enemy in case of need, etc. It need not be as large when acting against
+infantry as when opposed to cavalry. Mounted combat patrols on the
+flanks should never be omitted.
+
+Cavalry when dismounted is tied to its led horses. A threat against
+these will often cause the retreat of the dismounted firing line.
+Consequently the led horses should be held in a secure place and a
+mounted force of suitable size told off to cover them. As the horses
+are easily stampeded operations against them are very effective.
+
+Cavalry fighting a delaying action may take a greater number of
+successive positions and permit a much closer approach of the enemy
+than would be either safe or possible for infantry.
+
+The two principal requisites of a delaying position for cavalry (next
+to a good field of fire to front and flanks) are cover from fire for
+the led horses, immediately in rear of the firing line, and good
+covered lines of retreat straight to the rear. If there be but one line
+of retreat it should preferably be in rear of the center. If there is
+no cover from fire (cover from _view_ is not sufficient) for the led
+horses in rear of the firing line they should be echeloned in rear of
+the flanks in order to escape the effects of hostile fire directed at
+the dismounted line.
+
+It is very important that the cavalry should be withdrawn in such good
+time that it will not be subjected to fire during its retreat to its
+next delaying position, and will have opportunity to deploy in time to
+again delay the advancing enemy. If subjected to fire from the rear the
+best cavalry will soon get out of hand.
+
+As to how close a dismounted enemy may be allowed to approach, before
+withdrawing from the position, this depends on:
+
+ (a) The distance the men on the firing line must travel to
+ reach the horses in mounting up to withdraw.
+
+ (b) The nature of the country in rear of the position as
+ affecting the rapidity of retreat.
+
+ (c) The amount of cover from the enemy’s fire during the retreat
+ afforded by the terrain.
+
+ (d) The nature of the terrain in front of the position as
+ affecting the facility of the enemy’s advance.
+
+By keeping the horses mobile the strength of the firing line is
+diminished by 25 per cent of the total strength. If it be desired
+to increase the strength of the firing line the horses must be
+immobilized. If they are liable to be exposed to fire, requiring that
+they be moved, they must, of course, be kept mobile. In this case also
+the firing line can mount and retreat much more quickly since the
+troopers can find and disengage their mounts in less time, and since
+also the led horses may be moved up closer to the firing line when it
+is ready to retire.
+
+The terrain in rear of the position should be carefully scouted to see
+that it presents no serious obstacles to a retreat. It will generally
+not be practicable for all to take the roads. The retreat, at least
+at the beginning, must usually be made straight to the rear, some of
+the men moving across country. Hence openings should be made in fences
+and the best points for crossing streams selected, and improved if
+necessary.
+
+Under favorable conditions as to proximity of led horses, facilities
+for and cover during retreat and obstacles to the enemy’s advance, the
+cavalry may safely allow him to approach within about 600 yards of
+the position before withdrawing, or if the retiring force be not more
+than a troop, to within about 400 yards. If the conditions are not
+especially favorable the withdrawal should be made when the hostile
+firing line arrives within 700 to 800 yards. The volume of fire should
+usually be increased just before the withdrawal.
+
+
+_Cavalry vs. Cavalry._ Against cavalry, mounted action will always be
+preferred. As the element of surprise is important the cavalry will
+endeavor to conceal its strength and position as long as possible.
+
+Every available man should be on hand for the charge. Hence all
+detachments within reach should be recalled (except the necessary
+combat patrols), which emphasizes the wisdom of having as few and as
+small detachments as possible from the fighting force when combat is
+probable and the cavalry unsupported by foot troops. Detachments coming
+in join their proper troop if possible. If too late for this they join
+the reserve, or the nearest troop.
+
+The ground over which the charge is to be made should be carefully
+examined by mounted ground scouts, which may be sent out from the most
+advanced fraction of the command. Of course if all features of the
+terrain can be seen from a position in rear, ground scouts would not be
+sent out, as they might in such case merely betray the presence of the
+cavalry force and afford indication (to the enemy) as to its position
+and intentions, without any compensating advantages. The ground scouts
+move to the flanks and rejoin their troops, or the nearest formed
+body, on completion of their duties or as the attack is launched. If
+the charge is made at extended intervals they may be absorbed by the
+charging line as it overtakes them. Fences and ditches, the latter
+being often difficult to detect at a distance, are serious obstacles to
+a cavalry charge.
+
+Combat patrols protect the flanks and give warning of the presence
+and movements of any hostile bodies in the vicinity of same. Their
+distance from the flanks will depend on the size of the force,
+terrain and other conditions. They should be so placed that they
+will be able to give ample warning of danger. In open terrain easily
+traversed they should be well out, as distance will be necessary
+for safety. In terrain which does not permit of an easy approach to
+the flanks they may be closer in. They are invariably mounted. At a
+time of combat all detachments from the fighting force should be as
+small as practicable. A small command requires little time to change
+its dispositions, and cannot afford to make large detachments. Its
+flanks, therefore, will be secured by small patrols (4 to 12 men).
+The instructions to such patrols, to “cover our right,”--mean to give
+timely information of danger in that locality so that dispositions may
+be made to meet it. Such patrols are not expected to offer resistance
+except to small hostile patrols. A larger command requires more notice.
+It may therefore send out stronger patrols capable of offering some
+resistance, at least enough to delay the enemy while a message is sent
+back to the main body. The flanks must never be neglected in any of the
+operations of cavalry, as it is very vulnerable to a sudden attack in
+flank.
+
+If necessary to delay the enemy a portion of the troops in advance may
+be compelled to resort to dismounted fire action while those in rear
+are preparing for the charge. The advanced troops generally should
+not charge a superior force of the enemy unless the main body is close
+enough at the time to give immediate support. If the enemy is superior
+in strength and cannot be surprised by a charge the weaker force must
+usually seek another locality where conditions may be more favorable.
+A body of cavalry, not expecting reinforcements, which dismounts a
+considerable proportion of its strength in the presence of a markedly
+superior mounted enemy will, unless exceptionally favored by the
+terrain or other conditions, run great risk of capture. Such tactics
+are seldom to be recommended. Such troops as may be dismounted should,
+when they have the option, take a position from which they can support
+and cover the mounted attack (without interfering with the charge or
+having their fire masked too soon) and also hold the enemy in check
+after the charge while the troops engaged therein are rallying.
+
+The machine guns are generally placed, if practicable, with the
+dismounted troops for co-operation and mutual support. If there be no
+dismounted troops the machine guns are placed in a suitable position
+from which they can support the attack and cover a withdrawal in case
+of defeat. Usually they will be on a flank, and if exposed should have
+a small escort--about a platoon. The machine guns should take position
+promptly and endeavor to open fire as the attack is launched, or even
+sooner if the need for concealment has ceased. While machine guns
+materially assist a charge a good opportunity must not be lost while
+waiting for the machine guns to come into action. Artillery fire is a
+most valuable assistance to a cavalry charge.
+
+The troops for the mounted attack are divided into the attacking line,
+the support and the reserve, as far as possible without splitting
+units. The attacking line should generally include about half the total
+available mounted strength. A good division for a squadron acting
+alone, would be: attacking line 2 troops, support and reserve 1 each.
+The support usually follows a short distance in rear of the exposed
+flank of the attacking line, the reserve following in rear of the
+center or the other flank. For a force not larger than a squadron two
+lines only may be employed.
+
+In approaching the position from which the attack will probably
+be launched, all troops remain concealed as long as possible. The
+attacking line forms line of columns (line of troops in columns of
+fours-called “line of fours”) at deploying intervals or in mass (with
+11-yard intervals between troops) as rapidly as the terrain permits.
+This formation facilitates change of direction (if necessary) and
+deployment. The gait in approaching the deploying position should not
+be so rapid that the horses will not be fresh and vigorous for the
+charge.
+
+The attacking line is formed at the last moment consistent with
+delivering the charge with the utmost momentum. If formed too soon it
+lacks cohesion, if too late the necessary momentum cannot be obtained,
+and there is danger of interference by the enemy. The line should
+generally be formed at from 400 to 800 yards from the enemy, under
+cover if possible. It should never be formed within 400 yards of an
+enemy ready to charge. It is desirable that the attacking line should
+overlap the flanks of the enemy’s first line. Having formed for the
+charge the attacking line advances at a steadily increasing gait to
+within about 80 yards of the enemy and then delivers the charge at
+top speed--boot to boot. The objective of the attacking line is the
+nearest formed body of the enemy. In a decisive action the first blow
+should be made strong. The attacking line should endeavor to completely
+overthrow the enemy’s leading troops, follow them up and force them
+back in confusion on those in rear. It should keep going as long as
+there is an opportunity to reach any fraction of the enemy, rallying
+only when its momentum is completely expended. In an action not
+decisive the overthrow of the enemy’s first line only may be the aim.
+In an extremity, as where it is necessary for the cavalry to cut its
+way through a superior force in order to escape, it may stake all on
+a single throw, placing its entire strength in the first line of the
+charge.
+
+The support follows, conforming to the movements of the attacking line,
+and forming for the charge at the proper time. Its objective is the
+nearest formed element of the enemy. It should not charge into the
+melée created by the first line.
+
+The reserve, in one or more bodies, follows the support and takes the
+latter’s place as it charges. It is used at the critical instant as
+circumstances require. The reserve usually will not charge without an
+order from the commander. The combatant who can place in the fight the
+last body of formed troops will usually win.
+
+Each line rallies as promptly as possible after the charge, to be used
+again later as circumstances require.
+
+The dismounted troops and machine guns keep up fire as long as possible
+(until it is masked by their own troops).
+
+A mounted charge against cavalry, in order to possess the essential
+element of surprise, should generally be launched from concealment
+within 800 yds. of the enemy, and if it be practicable to approach
+unobserved to about 400 yards it will usually be best to do so. If
+the distance be much over 800 the enemy, if superior in strength, may
+have time to form for and deliver a charge himself, and if inferior
+he may be able to avoid the shock and escape. Also a long gallop
+just before the charge diminishes the effect of the shock and the
+subsequent activity of the horses. Under favorable conditions, such
+as when the ground is hard, level and unobstructed, the enemy still
+in column, etc., a charge which must necessarily be launched from a
+greater distance, may have good prospects of success, and favorable
+opportunities should not be thrown away. Ordinarily it is desirable to
+launch the attack from concealment within 800 yards. The smaller the
+forces the less the distance, as a rule, at which it is desirable to
+launch a mounted attack. A small force can more readily approach under
+cover and, on the other hand, more easily evade a mounted attack.
+
+The most favorable time for a charge against cavalry is when, in a
+dismounted action, its firing line breaks to the rear to mount and
+retire. At this time a charge by a much inferior body of mounted men
+may throw it into utter confusion. The attacker should keep in hand a
+mounted force to take advantage of such an opportunity if presented,
+and the defense should likewise hold a mounted reserve to protect
+itself from such an attack.
+
+There should be no wheeled vehicles close by during a combat _with
+cavalry_. Even the ammunition wagons should be kept well to the rear.
+In going out for a short distance (from its infantry support) cavalry
+should leave all wagons behind, extra ammunition and rations being
+carried in the saddle bags.
+
+A pack train is more mobile than wagons, but even this is a drag on
+the cavalry in rapid operations. If combat is imminent even the pack
+animals (except those of the machine guns) should be well to the rear.
+
+The most favorable times for attacking cavalry (mounted) are:
+
+ (a) When it is in the act of mounting or dismounting.
+
+ (b) When it can be taken in flank or caught in column.
+
+ (c) When it can be surprised while charging another body.
+
+ (d) When it can be surprised while in an unsuitable formation
+ or while changing formation.
+
+ (e) When it is issuing from a defile.
+
+ And in general whenever it can be taken by surprise.
+
+Victory in a mounted action will generally be with the combatant who
+can overlap his opponent and throw in the last mounted reserve.
+
+
+SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS IN CAVALRY COMBAT (FOR SMALL FORCES).
+
+The commander (accompanied by his adjutant and 1 or 2 orderlies) if
+not already there, gallops forward to an advanced point suitable for
+observation, and looks over the situation, quickly makes his decision,
+and issues the necessary orders to the commander of the advanced
+troop--who will usually be with him. These orders will usually cover
+the following:
+
+ (a) Dismounted fire action (if to be used), position for same, etc.
+
+ (b) Observation of the enemy, retardation of his advance.
+
+ (c) Examination of the terrain over which the charge will probably
+ be made (by mounted ground scouts, or officers’ patrols.)
+
+ (d) Recall of all detachments within reach.
+
+ (e) Combat patrols on the flanks (these may be sent from
+ troops in rear), support for machine guns, etc.
+
+ (f) Information as to general plan of commander, duties of
+ balance of command, etc., etc.
+
+Upon completion of these duties the advanced troops, if still mounted,
+are usually directed to join the nearest body. If the commander of
+the advanced troop is not with the supreme commander the necessary
+instructions may be conveyed to him by the adjutant. He should also be
+informed as to the general plan of the commander, including place where
+the troops for the attack are to assemble, etc.
+
+The main body should come on as promptly as possible. It may take up
+the trot, or even the canter as the commander gallops forward. It is
+usually a mistake for the cavalry to halt to await developments, as
+it thereby sacrifices the advantages due to its mobility at the very
+time when these are most needed. Of course cavalry may occasionally get
+into serious difficulty by pushing on too rapidly against a superior
+force. But it will far more frequently lose a golden opportunity if it
+surrenders its initiative by a premature halt.
+
+Having come to a decision the commander signals (arm or sabre) to
+the main body to “increase the gait”--if they are within sight, or
+else at once sends his adjutant or an orderly with a message to that
+effect. He then gives the necessary instructions to the commander of
+the leading troop, after which he gallops back to meet the main body,
+and leads it to the rendezvous (place from which the attack is to be
+launched) giving the necessary order as he goes. If for any reason
+the commander desires to remain at the front he may send his adjutant
+back with instructions to the subordinate commanders to report to him
+at a designated locality, where he issues the necessary orders while
+the troops are moving to the rendezvous. It is generally inadvisable
+and often impossible to separate the subordinate commanders from their
+troops if the enemy is close and combat probable. Hence orders must
+usually be given piece-meal, but it is very important that each portion
+of the force should know what the others are doing so that proper
+co-operation may be insured. No rule can be given as to the manner in
+which the orders shall be issued and transmitted. The criterion is that
+each portion of the force shall be placed in its position for attack
+with the least possible delay and confusion.
+
+The machine guns (with necessary escort), and combat patrols are sent
+out (or necessary instructions are sent to some patrols already on the
+flanks) and all other detachments called in.
+
+Preparatory to forming for the charge the troops assume a convenient
+formation, usually “line of fours,” or mass.
+
+Unless the commander in person leads the troops to the place from which
+the attack is to be launched it is well to detail a staff officer or an
+orderly (someone familiar with the ground) for this purpose. The routes
+to be followed by each portion of the command, and the formation to be
+assumed, should be carefully prescribed.
+
+If there is little time and the enemy is aggressive it would be wrong
+to separate subordinate commanders from their troops and assemble
+them to receive orders. In such cases the orders will be transmitted
+as promptly as possible without separating subordinates from their
+immediate commands.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. VII]
+
+The commander will designate the troops for the attacking line,
+support and reserve, with commander and duties for each, distances
+at which the successive lines are to follow each other, gaits, etc.,
+or the attacking line and support may be covered in one order by the
+expression “attack in two lines, etc., such troops in reserve.” The
+commander’s order will usually conclude: “I will give the order (or
+signal) for the attack,” or “attack at once.”
+
+In case it is not practicable or advisable to launch the charge at
+once the cavalry may take a concealed position in readiness either in
+line or line of columns in a suitable locality to await a favorable
+opportunity for a charge, while being at the same time ready to retreat
+or fight on foot, should developments in the situation require such
+actions. It is seldom advisable to charge the front of the enemy with
+the entire force, if he is deployed for dismounted fire action. A
+portion of the command may, however, attack the front for the purpose
+of developing the enemy’s strength, engaging his attention, etc.
+
+The foregoing outline is intended for a rough guide to the proper
+procedure in an ordinary case of cavalry attack. It must not be
+regarded as a rigid form to cover all cases, but as an illustration of
+a particular case.
+
+The following verbal orders cover a typical case of a squadron making a
+mounted attack:
+
+They are given verbally by Maj. A, commanding, to Capt. A, in command
+of the advance troop, and to other subordinates.
+
+ To Capt. A:
+
+ “Your troop will dismount and hold this ridge. The machine guns
+ will be sent to join you. The other troops will come up on
+ the right and attack mounted. Support the attack with fire, opening
+ when I give you the signal from ____. Have the ground
+ to the southeast scouted to see that it is suitable for a charge.
+ Send a patrol of 5 men to ____ to observe to the north and east,
+ covering our left flank.”
+
+Before giving orders to Capt. A the Major signals remainder of squadron
+(if in sight) to come on at an increased gait.
+
+ To his adjutant:
+
+ “Ride back at a gallop and tell the machine gun platoon to report
+ to Capt. A behind this ridge. Tell Capt. D that we will attack
+ mounted and that his troop will be in reserve behind the right
+ flank of the attacking line. Tell him to proceed under cover
+ to ____, sending a patrol of 4 men to ____ to observe to the
+ south and east, covering our right flank.”
+
+The Major then proceeds at a gallop to meet Troops B and C, at the
+head of which he finds Capt. B (the senior captain) and Capt. C. (who
+had been ordered forward). He leads them at a trot to the rendezvous
+position, and en route he briefly explains the situation, and then says:
+
+“We will attack the Red cavalry. Troops B and C under Capt. B will
+form the attacking line. You will charge mounted in two lines, if
+conditions are favorable. I will give you the necessary orders. Troop A
+(dismounted) and the machine guns are on your left just north of here
+behind the ridge and will support the attack with fire. Troop D, in
+reserve, will be behind your right flank. I will be with the reserve
+during the attack.”
+
+Maj. A directs the two troops to form line under cover of the ridge (as
+the enemy is quite close). As this movement is completed a messenger
+from Capt. A reports to Maj. A that the ground in front of the position
+is suitable for a charge.
+
+Maj. A now reconnoiters to the front and seeing that the situation
+is favorable for a charge he signals to Capt. A to open fire, and
+this having been done he directs Capt. B to charge. He then joins the
+reserve (Troop D) as the latter moves forward at a trot in rear of the
+right of the attacking line.
+
+
+_The Cavalry Screen._ Cavalry is habitually employed to screen from
+hostile observation forces of all sizes from a regiment up. The
+distance between the cavalry screen and the body it covers varies
+greatly with conditions, chief of which are the strength of the cavalry
+and of the force it covers, the strength and proximity of the enemy,
+particularly his cavalry, the mission of the command, nature of the
+country, etc.
+
+It is the duty of the cavalry screen to prevent the passage through it
+of the cavalry or mounted patrols of the enemy, sent out by him to gain
+information. This duty will often be combined with that of gaining
+information of tactical or strategical importance.
+
+A cavalry screen may be defensive or offensive, independently of the
+attitude of the troops covered by the cavalry. The defensive screen
+is that in which the cavalry covers the entire front, blocking all
+lines of approach. It is the more effective when the cavalry is
+strong enough. But usually, unless greatly superior to the enemy’s
+cavalry, the line will be so attenuated that the enemy can pierce it
+by concentrating his cavalry at a favorable point. In the offensive
+screen the cavalry is concentrated and it seeks out the main body of
+the enemy’s cavalry, to defeat it. If this is successfully accomplished
+his patrols must generally withdraw, or their subsequent passage can be
+blocked by change to the defensive screen. Until the enemy’s cavalry
+has been overthrown the offensive screen, will, then, generally be the
+more effective. Afterwards the defensive screen may well be employed.
+
+A brigade of cavalry as a screen can cover a front usually not
+exceeding about 10 miles.
+
+As the main forces approach contact, the cavalry screen gradually
+withdraws to and covers the flanks.
+
+On the average the progress of cavalry will not exceed 25 miles per
+day, nor the distances traveled by patrols, 35 to 40 miles per day.
+
+
+_Cavalry patrols._ Cavalry patrols are of two general classes,
+reconnoitering (information), and screening (security). The duty of
+reconnoitering patrols is to gather information of the hostile forces.
+The duty of screening patrols is to prevent the enemy from gathering
+similar information concerning the friendly forces. Reconnoitering
+patrols are again divided into two general classes, tactical and
+strategical. These classifications, while usual, are not rigid. A
+single patrol may, under certain conditions, be charged with the duties
+both of screening and reconnoitering, or may gather information of both
+tactical and strategical nature.
+
+The essential difference between reconnoitering tactical and
+strategical patrols is in the nature of the information they gather.
+Information of tactical value is ordinarily gathered in the near
+vicinity of the forces. Information of strategic value, on the other
+hand, is usually gathered at a greater distance. No fixed rules can be
+laid down for a rigid classification covering all cases. As a very
+rough guide it may be said that the operations of tactical patrols
+will ordinarily be limited to a distance of about ten miles from the
+supporting troops.
+
+Tactical patrols may or may not be commanded by an officer. They gather
+information of immediate tactical value, and hence their sphere of
+action is limited. The information they gather to be of value, must be
+_fresh_, and this means that it must be promptly transmitted.
+
+Strategical patrols should always be commanded by an officer. They
+gather information of strategical value which has, as a rule, no
+bearing upon local tactics nor the immediate security of any particular
+body of troops. Their radius of action, consequently will be greater
+than in the case of tactical patrols. They are never charged with
+the duty of covering, and hence conduct their operations as secretly
+as possible, resorting to combat only when this is necessary to the
+accomplishment of their mission.
+
+Reconnoitering patrols are essentially non-combatant, whilst
+screening patrols, on the other hand, are in their nature combatant.
+Reconnoitering patrols which allow themselves to be drawn unnecessarily
+into combat with hostile patrols, will usually fail in the
+accomplishment of their mission. They should ordinarily endeavor to
+remain concealed and avoid fighting. The action of a patrol in any
+particular case, however, is determined by its mission. It will adopt
+that line of conduct, whether concealment or combat, best calculated to
+accomplish its purpose.
+
+Patrols should be made of a strength just sufficient for the duties
+they will probably be required to perform in the accomplishment
+of their missions, whether combat or messenger duty. (See also
+“Patrolling,” Chapter III.)
+
+
+_The following lessons_ in cavalry tactics are among those drawn from
+the records of the American Civil War by Capt. Alonzo Gray. (Cavalry
+tactics as illustrated by the War of the Rebellion.)
+
+The sabre is essentially the weapon for shock action and the thick
+of the _melée_. For scattered or individual action, in the woods, or
+whenever the regular order is broken up the revolver will be the most
+effective weapon. For dismounted action the rifle will be used.
+
+A timid cavalry leader will usually fail where a bold one will succeed.
+Boldness will take the place of numbers.
+
+A charge should always be met by a counter-charge.
+
+The charge is most destructive if the enemy can be caught in the act of
+maneuvering.
+
+A mounted column should always be held in readiness to take the
+initiative.
+
+Ground scouts should always be sent out in advance of a mounted attack.
+
+Care must be exercised that the cavalry does not arrive at the charging
+point in a blown or distressed condition.
+
+A frontal charge against artillery is not apt to succeed. The flank
+attack offers some chance of success if the artillery is not adequately
+supported. The best time to charge artillery is when it is in the act
+of limbering or unlimbering. The revolver is the weapon to be preferred.
+
+Infantry may be charged with some prospects of success, when changing
+front, while forming, when in column, in any position where it cannot
+readily deploy, when it can be taken in flank, when it is shaken by
+fire, when its fire is held down by that of other troops, when it is of
+inferior quality or low in morale. Dismounted troops which have broken
+through a line may often be checked by a vigorous charge. The ideal
+time to charge infantry is when its line breaks, as when it breaks to
+the rear after a repulse.
+
+Unless cavalry can pass ordinary obstacles it will fail when otherwise
+it might succeed.
+
+Cavalry must be prepared to do its own pioneer work, and it should
+be trained for this. Mounted engineers when they are available, are
+particularly useful to cavalry.
+
+As soon as the leading element has delivered its shock it should rally
+in rear of the column.
+
+The charge should, when possible, be made boot to boot.
+
+In the 3 line formation the 1st line should generally be heavier than
+either of the other two, especially if time is precious, and success
+depends on a single cast of the die. But if the enemy has reserves
+constantly arriving, troops must be held in hand to meet these.
+
+The successive lines should be far enough apart so that if the first
+line be overthrown the confusion will not be communicated to those in
+rear.
+
+The fire of mounted men is very inaccurate, especially with the rifle,
+and with the revolver, except at close range.
+
+The mobility of cavalry renders it extremely useful in reinforcing weak
+points in a line of battle, or attacking weak points in the enemy’s
+line.
+
+Successful turning movements to attack the enemy’s flank and rear are
+possible to cavalry.
+
+Cavalry may often seize important tactical or strategical positions,
+and hold them until relieved by other troops.
+
+Cavalry should work to the central idea, and while so doing it can
+and will fight anything. But it is too expensive an arm to equip and
+maintain, and too difficult to replace, to be habitually used against
+infantry in position.
+
+Cavalry is particularly well fitted for covering a retreat and for
+other delaying actions. When engaged in this duty it will habitually
+make use of successive positions.
+
+Cavalry should not _habitually_ be used for outposting infantry,
+guarding trains, or performing any other duty which infantry can do as
+well or better, when infantry is available. (Note. Cavalry is trained
+and equipped for the performance of every kind of duty, and can always
+be used as the situation demands. Thus if in a special case it is
+more important to conserve the energies of the infantry than those of
+the cavalry, the latter may properly be used to relieve the former of
+some of its work. But if such use of the cavalry should become common
+practice it will be diverted from and rendered unfit to perform those
+important tasks which cavalry alone can accomplish. The authors.)
+
+Night marches are particularly trying for cavalry.
+
+Cavalry may temporarily replace infantry on outpost duty, as when the
+latter is retreating.
+
+Cavalry is very useful for flank and rear guards.
+
+There should be a well organized mounted force in hand to take up the
+pursuit in case of victory. Exhausted infantry cannot pursue. The best
+results will be obtained by the “parallel pursuit.” (Note. Military
+writers agree that to reap the full fruits of victory an active pursuit
+is necessary. Yet we find in history comparatively few examples of the
+successful pursuit of a defeated force by foot troops alone. The reason
+for this is, as stated by Capt. Gray, that infantry which has been
+engaged in an exhausting combat is in no condition for active pursuit.
+The cavalry must be ready to reap the fruits of the infantry’s victory.
+The authors.)
+
+Raids are seldom worth their cost. Gen. Grant says of them: “They
+contribute very little to the grand result.” They have better chances
+of success in a friendly country.
+
+Cavalry operating against the enemy has little use for trains.
+
+Cavalry must expect to live off the country, impressing such wagons as
+it may require.
+
+Gen. Sheridan says: “Our cavalry should fight the enemy’s cavalry, our
+infantry his infantry.”
+
+Gen. J. H. Wilson says: “Cavalry is useless for defense. Its only power
+is a vigorous offensive. Therefore I urge its concentration.”
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER X.
+
+OUTPOSTS.
+
+
+_Duties._ The duties of an outpost are to protect the main body so
+that the troops may rest undisturbed, to screen them from hostile
+observation, and in case of attack to check the enemy long enough
+to enable the main body to make the necessary dispositions to meet
+him. The outpost also performs such special reconnaissance as may
+be directed by the superior commander. Often its duty will be to
+gain touch with the hostile outpost line, when the latter is not
+too distant, as this is the best possible means of security. Firing
+upon, or otherwise harassing the enemy will not be indulged in unless
+specially directed.
+
+In general the duties of an outpost are reconnaissance, observation and
+resistance.
+
+In an advance the outpost is generally detailed from the advance guard.
+In retreat the outpost for the night usually forms part of the rear
+guard, or all of it, for the following day. If the command remains
+in camp the outpost is relieved at daybreak, in order to have double
+strength present at the time when the enemy is most likely to attack.
+
+
+_Strength and composition._ The proper strength for an outpost is a
+matter of judgment as it is very dependent on conditions. In general it
+may be said to vary from about ¹/₂₀ to ⅓ of the command, ⅙ being about
+an average. The only rule that can be given as to the strength of an
+outpost is: “provide reasonable security with a minimum of men.” This
+criterion, if intelligently applied, will produce satisfactory results.
+
+The conditions to be considered in deciding the strength of an outpost
+are:
+
+ (a) Size of command.
+
+ (b) Extent of front and number of roads to be covered, and
+ nature of terrain, including roads.
+
+ (c) Plans of supreme commander, whether for advance or retreat,
+ etc.
+
+ (d) Proximity, strength and aggressiveness of the enemy.
+
+ (e) Operations of friendly cavalry. Position of independent
+ (or advance) cavalry. Strength of cavalry assigned to
+ outpost.
+
+ (f) Weather and season, etc., etc.
+
+As a rough guide it may be assumed that under ordinary conditions in
+the presence of the enemy a battalion of infantry as a support, can
+cover a front of not more than 2,500 yards, and a squadron of cavalry
+about 3,500 yards. Of course the frontage of impassable obstacles
+will be deducted from the total length of front. Then divide the
+remainder by 2,500 which will give _approximately_ the number of
+battalions required on the line of supports. To this must be added the
+reserves, from ¼ to ½ the entire strength of the outpost, depending
+on conditions, and the special troops, including cavalry. This rule,
+however, is only a rough guide. If the enemy is known to be so distant
+that an attack by his infantry is impossible the line of observation
+may be drawn much closer to the camp and the strength of the outpost
+greatly reduced. If cavalry efficiently covers the front of the command
+a strong infantry outpost is usually not required. Finally if the enemy
+is nowhere in the vicinity a regular outpost may be dispensed with, a
+few exterior guards around the camp being sufficient for security in
+such cases.
+
+In a close country, especially at night, infantry is usually more
+efficient than cavalry on outpost duty, as the movements of the latter
+are generally confined to the roads. In open country and during the day
+cavalry affords the greatest measure of security. In a close country
+even the movements of infantry are to a large extent confined to the
+roads. The enemy is not likely to advance in any force through a close
+wood or thicket, especially at night. Hence outguards at the points of
+passage and patrolling between, to such extent as conditions seem to
+demand, will be the rule.
+
+Mounted troops are very useful on outpost duty. For observation and
+reconnaissance a few mounted men will often be more efficient than a
+considerable body of foot troops. For resistance infantry, of course,
+will be required; but when the front of the command is covered by an
+efficient force of cavalry which is in touch with the enemy, timely
+warning by the cavalry of any hostile movements will greatly relieve
+the infantry of the burden of outpost duty, thereby conserving the
+fighting strength of the foot troops. When no cavalry is available,
+or when it is too weak to properly perform the duty of distant
+reconnaissance, lack of observation must be compensated by considerably
+increased power of resistance, which throws a heavy burden upon the
+infantry outpost. The necessity for placing a considerable portion of
+the infantry on outpost may thus often be avoided by the judicious
+use of even a small force of cavalry. The prospective duties of the
+infantry and cavalry in the immediate future should be carefully
+considered in determining the relative proportions of the two arms to
+be assigned to outpost duty. The commander must decide whether it is
+more important under the existing conditions to conserve the strength
+of the trooper and his horse for reconnaissance, or the energy of
+the foot soldier for march and combat; bearing always in mind that
+success in combat is the usual aim of military operations, and that the
+judicious use of one cavalryman may enable a number of infantrymen to
+rest in security. A reasonable compromise may thus be effected. Outpost
+duty is very trying for both infantry and cavalry, and both should be
+spared unnecessary duty of this kind. The commander should apportion
+the burden between the two arms so as to keep his command as a whole in
+the best possible condition to accomplish its mission.
+
+In a retreat cavalry may temporarily replace infantry on outpost in
+order to facilitate the withdrawal of the latter.
+
+The outpost proper will ordinarily consist mainly of infantry. There
+should, however, always be some mounted men attached, especially if
+the front is not covered by the cavalry. These mounted men are used as
+follows:
+
+ (a) Messengers.
+
+ (b) Patrols within the outpost lines, along the line of observation
+ and to the front.
+
+ (c) For detached posts or standing patrols at important
+ localities too far out for the infantry.
+
+In cases (a) and (b) the mounted men are assigned to the reserve,
+supports, and pickets.
+
+Artillery is not usually assigned to an outpost. If present it would be
+used to cover some important bridge or defile, or to keep the enemy’s
+artillery out of range by preventing the occupation of positions too
+close to the outpost. It would generally be with the reserve. Machine
+guns are very useful. They may be used to defend bridges or defiles,
+fire along the roads, etc. They are especially useful at night as their
+fire is so easily controlled. They may be with the supports, usually
+behind barricades, covering important roads, bridges or defiles.
+Machine guns should be distributed by company or platoon, not as
+individual guns.
+
+Engineers may be used with a large outpost to assist in the preparation
+of the position for defense, construction of obstacles, improvement of
+means of communication, demolitions, etc. Upon the completion of their
+tasks they camp with the reserve, or return to the main body.
+
+Signal troops may be usefully employed to maintain communication with
+the advance cavalry and different parts of the infantry outpost,
+usually from the reserve to the supports and important detached posts.
+They camp with the reserve, except such detachments as are out to
+operate the signal apparatus.
+
+Sanitary troops, except those regularly assigned to organizations, are
+usually unnecessary. If present they are with the reserve.
+
+All special troops should be under the orders of the outpost commander
+only. They should not be placed under the orders of the support
+commanders.
+
+The various elements from rear to front of a large command in camp may
+include:
+
+ (a) The camp of the main body with interior and exterior
+ guards, detached posts for protection of flanks, when
+ necessary, etc.
+
+ (b) The camp of the advance guard with necessary precautionary
+ measures.
+
+ (c) The camp of the reserve of the outpost, with guards, detached
+ posts, etc.
+
+ (d) The line of infantry supports (usually the line of resistance).
+
+ (e) The line of observation (outguards and sentries).
+
+ (f) Patrols in front of line of observation.
+
+ (g) Advance or outpost cavalry, with its patrols and necessary
+ security measures.
+
+ (h) The independent cavalry.
+
+It would be exceptional for all these elements to be present in one
+command. For economy’s sake some of them would be omitted or combined
+with others. An outpost of two companies may or may not have a reserve.
+A larger one usually would and a smaller one would not. In a small camp
+the main body is usually close enough to act as the reserve of the
+outpost. In a very small command the outpost may consist of outguards
+only, without supports or reserve, or merely of sentries posted around
+the camp. The main body remains in such a condition of readiness as the
+situation demands.
+
+The use of cavalry for the security of a stationary command has three
+phases:
+
+1. When the enemy is very distant the cavalry should be well out to the
+front, observing him. In this case it does not come inside the outpost
+line at night, but establishes rendezvous, and places an outpost for
+its own protection. The cavalry is thus independent. The cavalry
+commander should generally be allowed to select his own rendezvous
+(one or more points) and make his own dispositions, the order from
+the supreme commander designating the front to be covered, special
+reconnaissance to be conducted, place where messages for the cavalry
+will be sent, etc.
+
+2. When the enemy is closer, but there is still room to interpose
+the cavalry between the enemy and the infantry outpost line. In this
+case the cavalry may, or may not come inside the outpost line at
+night, depending on circumstances (see post). The instructions to and
+dispositions of the cavalry commander would be similar to (1). In case
+the cavalry withdraws at night it may leave standing patrols over night
+at important points too far out to be occupied by the infantry.
+
+3. When the cavalry is too weak in numbers to conduct distant
+reconnaissance in the face of the opposing cavalry, or when the enemy
+is so close that the cavalry is “squeezed out” by the firmer contact
+of the infantry outposts. In this case some cavalry may be assigned to
+the outpost for reconnoitering and visiting patrols, detached posts or
+standing patrols, etc.
+
+The strength and vigilance required of the infantry outposts will
+obviously vary in these three cases.
+
+An outpost entirely of cavalry may well be organized like one of mixed
+troops, the horses of the outguards, and even those of the supports
+(except such as are required for patrol and messenger duty) being to
+the rear and unsaddled for the night (see post).
+
+
+_Integrity of tactical units._ It has been stated as a general
+principle that as few men as possible should be kept on outpost duty as
+it is very fatiguing. Nevertheless in organizing an outpost and each of
+its component parts the integrity of tactical units should be preserved
+as far as possible. Above all, companies should not be so divided as to
+interfere with their messing arrangements and other internal economies.
+Hence the following rules concerning the sizes of different elements
+may be observed, when tactical requirements do not necessitate a
+departure therefrom:
+
+If more than one battalion is required for an outpost it is well to
+send an entire regiment. The troops in the reserve will get as much
+rest as if they were camped with the main body, so long as there is no
+attack.
+
+If a support larger than a company is required it generally should
+consist of an entire battalion, or at least two full companies.
+
+A picket should consist of a number of full squads or platoons. If an
+entire company is sent out as outguards, its cooks and kitchen police
+should remain with the support to prepare meals.
+
+A sentry squad should be a full squad (7 men and a corporal) rather
+than 6 men and a corporal (the minimum number required). A cossack post
+should consist of a half squad (4 men) and two halves of any squad
+should be on adjacent posts, one commanded by the corporal, the other
+by the senior private.
+
+Better results are usually obtained by concentrating the patrols in
+a few of the larger bodies, instead of attaching extra men to sentry
+squads and cossack posts for this purpose. Of course adjacent cossack
+posts and sentry squads should keep touch with each other, one man from
+each making occasional visits to the adjacent posts between rounds of
+the regular patrols from the larger bodies.
+
+As the two sentinels of a sentry squad are posted together for mutual
+support their range of vision is no greater than that of a cossack post
+and they require twice as many men. A sentry squad is more efficient
+than a cossack post as two men will naturally observe more than one and
+each, feeling the presence of the other is relieved from the sense of
+loneliness which affects the sentry of a cossack post. Also a sentry
+squad, being larger, has more resisting power than a cossack post.
+The requirements of the particular locality and situation must be
+considered in deciding which form of outguard to employ.
+
+
+_Location._ A camp site is not usually selected with a view to securing
+a strong outpost position, although circumstances might demand or
+permit that this be done. Other considerations usually govern the
+selection of a camp site, and the outpost must make the best use
+possible of conditions as they are found.
+
+For a large command the outpost must hold the enemy beyond artillery
+range of the main camp (about 5,000 yards off). For a smaller command
+protection against rifle fire is sufficient. Thus for a division camp,
+the line of resistance of the outpost should be distant 2 to 3 miles
+or more from the main camp. For protection against rifle fire 1,000 to
+2,000 yards, according to the terrain, is sufficient.
+
+The first step is to select a line of resistance at a suitable
+distance. The line should fulfill as far as possible, the requirements
+of a defensive position (see “Combat”) except that if offensive
+operations are not contemplated, an obstacle along the whole, or any
+portion of the front, is an advantage. The best natural obstacles are
+unfordable streams, swamps or morasses, impenetrable thickets, etc.
+Artificial obstacles may also be constructed. They would generally be
+limited to the roads, or to the most dangerous open ground. The line
+of resistance should be as short as practicable. The flanks should
+preferably be secured by impassable obstacles or by the flank of an
+adjacent outpost.
+
+An outpost placed to hold a river line may be directed to “secure
+the line of the stream from ______ to ______.” This leaves its
+commander free to select a suitable line of resistance. If the stream
+is unfordable, resistance will probably be required only at the
+bridges--the line of the stream between being simply patrolled, to
+prevent the enemy from using ferries or ponton bridges. The duty may be
+still further lightened by disabling some of the bridges.
+
+The supports are usually placed on the defensive line selected and
+constitute the “line of resistance.” Roads, however, exercise a very
+great influence on the location of the supports, as they are the lines
+by which the enemy is most likely to advance, especially at night. A
+good rule for general guidance is to select that road by which the
+enemy is most likely to make an advance in force, and place a strong
+support where it can command the road with its fire. The remainder
+of the outpost then conforms to this arrangement. Supports or strong
+pickets are placed where they can command all the roads over which the
+enemy might advance, as well as unobstructed country between the roads,
+over which an attack might be made. The general method of locating an
+outpost is to observe and guard the avenues of approach at points where
+these avenues are crossed by the best natural line of resistance.
+
+In exceptional cases the line of resistance may be at some locality in
+rear of the line of supports. In such cases the reserve would generally
+be placed on this line and would prepare it for defense. The supports
+would then become merely reservoirs for the relief of the outguards. In
+case of attack they would delay the enemy, and gradually fall back on
+the defensive line in rear.
+
+An outpost should generally not be placed so close to that of the
+enemy that continual firing between the opposing lines would result.
+It should, however, when in the near vicinity of a hostile outpost or
+line of battle maintain contact with the latter by either mounted or
+dismounted patrols, depending on the distance between the two lines,
+as this provides the very best security. Such contact is especially
+desirable when pursuing a retreating enemy, in order that his
+withdrawal may be promptly detected.
+
+Special mounted patrols may observe the flanks of the enemy’s outpost
+line, but usually no attempt will be made to pierce the hostile
+line of resistance in order to gain information concerning the main
+force unless special orders to that effect have been received.
+Information concerning the enemy’s main body is generally gathered by
+the independent cavalry, or by special officers’ patrols sent out by
+the supreme commander, or by his direction (see “Patrolling”). These
+patrols have no connection with the regular outpost, the duty of the
+latter being primarily security, rather than information.
+
+A large outpost, having two or more regiments on the line, may be
+divided into regimental sectors, each under a separate commander, and
+each having its own sector (local) reserve, like a line of battle.
+
+
+_Limits._ The front to be covered by an outpost, and the distance it is
+to extend its protection to the flanks, are questions to be decided in
+each case, and for which general rules cannot be given.
+
+The order of the superior commander will indicate the approximate line
+to be outposted and the limits of same. From these instructions it may
+be inferred that he considers this the best line of resistance--this
+being a certainty if he also says “in case of attack this line will
+be held.” Hence the supports should be posted on or quite close to
+the designated line. The orders also indicate the approximate extent
+of front which the supreme commander desires covered. If the flanks
+as indicated do not rest on impassable obstacles or connect with
+adjacent outposts or detached posts from some other organization, some
+provisions for the security of the flanks are usually required. If
+detached posts are sent to the flanks by troops other than the regular
+outpost, the latter has only to maintain communication with these. An
+exposed flank should be bent slightly to the rear by refusing the line
+of the outposts on that flank.
+
+In deciding how far to the flanks to extend protection it is necessary
+to consider the probable moves of the enemy. Where is he known to be
+and what forces has he? Is it likely or even possible that he may make
+an attack at night from the flank? If so it must certainly be guarded.
+It is to be noted that protection to the flanks is much more necessary
+for a small force than for a large one since the enemy does not have
+to make such a long detour to turn its flanks. A very small force may
+require an all-around outpost--one extending not only to the flanks but
+even to the rear.
+
+The flanks of an outpost may be covered by detached posts sent directly
+from the reserve (of the outpost), from the camp of the advance guard
+(or rear guard), or from the camp of the main body. In such cases the
+regular outpost will connect with the detached posts on its flanks.
+Such posts would be placed on important roads leading to the flanks, at
+bridges, defiles, etc.
+
+The distance to the flanks and rear to which the outpost should extend
+protection is determined by conditions and the measures for security
+adopted by the troops in rear. Thus the organizations in the main camp
+may be directed to place detached posts at certain localities or they
+may be ordered to “provide for their own security against attacks by
+small bodies of the enemy,” or given some similar instructions. In
+the absence of any special orders each organization will provide the
+routine interior camp guards.
+
+
+_Distances and intervals._ No fixed rules can be given for intervals
+and distances, but there are certain precautions which should be
+observed in distributing the parts of an outpost.
+
+The distance between the main body and the outpost line (see ante) has
+been stated to depend on the requirements that the latter must protect
+the former from rifle or artillery fire, as circumstances require. Each
+group must be sufficiently far in front of the larger group to the rear
+to give the latter time to prepare for an attack before the advanced
+group is driven in, but the distance should not be so great that the
+advanced group cannot be conveniently relieved or supported, nor
+communication readily maintained. The following distances may be used
+as a rough guide to be departed from according to circumstances:
+
+ From the reserve to the supports about 1,000 yds.
+
+ From the supports to the outguards about 800 yds.
+
+ From pickets to sentry squads or cossack posts sent
+ therefrom, about 400 yds.
+
+ From reserve, a support or picket to the sentinel on
+ duty over same 100 yds.
+
+ From a sentry squad or cossack post to sentries of same
+ or from cavalry outguard to vedettes 40 yds.
+
+In very close country all distances should be reduced. For a mounted
+cavalry outpost, distances may be somewhat greater than for one
+composed of infantry, or dismounted cavalry.
+
+The advance (outpost) cavalry, if it is to come in at night and go out
+again early next morning, should not be over four miles out, and 2½
+to 3 would be better. The independent cavalry, as it usually does not
+come inside the infantry outpost line at night, may be any reasonable
+distance out, depending on the situation.
+
+An outpost must always have sufficient depth from front to rear to
+provide reasonable security. The enemy must be forced to _fight_ his
+way through a considerable distance so that the large bodies in rear
+may have ample time to make the necessary dispositions to meet him.
+
+_The intervals_ between groups on the same line are even more difficult
+to fix than distances, as they depend so much upon the nature of
+the country. Thus where an outpost is placed on the near side of an
+unfordable stream, outguards are needed only at the bridges, the
+intervals between being simply patrolled.
+
+As has been stated, in open country, the maximum sector or front for a
+battalion of infantry as a support is about 2,500 yards. The front for
+a company would then be about 600 yards. Sentry squads should generally
+be not over 300 to 450 yards apart and cossack posts not over 250 yards
+apart, unless there be active patrolling between them. In close country
+the distances might be greater or less, depending on whether or not the
+woods were impenetrable, and on the amount of patrolling. The distances
+here given must be regarded as very rough guides only. Considering
+the great variation in conditions rules for these distances cannot be
+prescribed.
+
+When an army bivouacs in line of battle a regular outpost is not
+required as the troops are already formed to resist attack. In this
+case, only sentinels in front of the line and patrols beyond are
+required. A regular outpost would only interfere with fire from the
+line of battle.
+
+In guarding the line of a stream the supports or pickets are posted
+where they can command the crossings, usually under cover some 300 or
+400 yards back. At night the covering groups move up to the near end of
+the bridge, and if machine guns are available they may be placed behind
+barricades to sweep the bridge. A defile is guarded in the same manner.
+At night a sentry squad should be placed at the far end of the bridge
+or defile and patrols may be sent on beyond. If the bridge is to be
+used by the army for its advance, it is usually necessary to hold the
+far side. In this case a strong detachment is sent beyond the bridge
+to guard its far approach and it would usually intrench a defensive
+position and throw out a small outpost beyond. Such a detachment would
+not be a true outpost but rather a covering force, and its defensive
+works would be called a bridge head.
+
+
+_The Reserve._ The reserve includes all outpost troops not specially
+assigned elsewhere, and the special troops (engineers, signal and
+sanitary troops). It should be posted in a central position where it
+can readily reinforce any of its supports, preferably on the principal
+road to the camp of the main body. Concealment is very desirable, also
+covered approaches to the stations of the supports. Wood and water for
+the camp are necessary. If placed on the line of resistance the reserve
+will prepare the position for defense.
+
+The camping arrangements of the reserve, such as internal and external
+guards, messing arrangements, etc., are arranged by its commander
+(either the outpost commander himself or a subordinate). They may
+be covered by verbal instructions or routine orders, but would not
+as a rule properly form a subject for field orders. The “2d outpost
+order” (see post) may, however, prescribe whether or not fires will
+be permitted in the camp at night. Detached posts to be sent from the
+reserve should be covered by the orders of the outpost commander.
+
+Some cavalry, or a number of mounted orderlies, should be with the
+reserve for patrol and messenger duty. The main body of the advance
+cavalry may retire to the camp of the reserve at night, or camp beyond
+the outpost line, depending on the situation.
+
+The artillery, if any be assigned to the outpost, is habitually
+with the reserve. If it takes an exposed position for covering the
+approaches to the outpost line it would have a support detailed from
+the reserve.
+
+The field trains of the outpost are usually at the reserve camp, whence
+those of the supports may, in the discretion of the outpost commander,
+be sent to join them. If an attack is feared the trains may be ordered
+by the superior commander, to return to the camp of the advance guard
+(or main body) sometime before daybreak the following morning. The
+field trains of the supports may usually be allowed to join them and
+remain at least until after supper, or else until just before daybreak,
+being then withdrawn to the reserve camp. Field wagons should not be
+allowed with outguards.
+
+
+_The Supports._ Supports vary in size from a platoon to a battalion.
+In an outpost of any size they would generally be not smaller than
+a company. They consist mainly of infantry. A few mounted men,
+generally at least three, should be attached to each support for
+patrol and messenger duty. It may be better to use mounted orderlies
+for this purpose, rather than to split up the cavalry into a number of
+small detachments, although the latter may be necessary if extended
+reconnaissance to the front is required. But it should be remembered in
+this connection that when practicable it is better to use the cavalry
+as “advance cavalry” rather than as part of the supports. The advance
+cavalry even when withdrawing for the night is often required to
+maintain touch with the enemy during the night by means of patrols,
+and this of course relieves the supports of the duty of carrying on
+any _extended_ or _distant_ patrolling, though they should not neglect
+such local reconnaissance as security requires. If the cavalry is
+too weak or for any other reason it is not advisable to use it as
+advance cavalry it may then be split up and parts of it assigned to
+the supports for more extended patrolling than they could conduct with
+infantry alone.
+
+Supports are usually placed to cover the main roads. They will, of
+course, not be on the roads, but either astride of them or in positions
+on one side or the other from which they can command the roads and
+adjacent country by their fire. A sentinel will be placed on the road
+to challenge persons moving along it. He also serves as sentinel for
+an examining post if one is required. If the bivouac of the support
+is more than 100 yards from the road, an additional sentinel will
+generally be necessary over the bivouac by night. Supports should
+always be placed in a concealed position, and exercise caution not to
+betray their location to the enemy.
+
+A definite sector of the outpost line, with carefully defined limits,
+preferably prominent natural objects, houses or the like, which must
+not fall on or even near a road, is assigned to each support, and its
+approximate station is designated. The support selects a good defensive
+position near its designated post from which it can cover with fire the
+most important road in its sector and the country adjacent thereto. If
+possible it should cover two or more roads directly. If it cannot cover
+all the roads in its sector directly it places outguards of sufficient
+strength on the other roads, or closes them by destroying bridges or
+placing obstacles. The support, if on the line of resistance, prepares
+its position for defense by intrenching and clearing the field of fire,
+etc.
+
+A machine gun platoon may be assigned to each support.
+
+The company wagons of a support may be allowed to join it, at least
+until after supper, unless an attack is expected. If an attack is
+expected wagons would remain with the reserve, where meals might also
+be prepared. The outpost commander will give verbal instructions as to
+fires, tent pitching, meals, etc. At the support these may be mentioned
+in the night order if one is issued, inasmuch as they have a direct
+bearing upon the question of security and are not merely routine
+matters.
+
+A good field of fire is the first requisite for the position of a
+support when posted on the line of resistance, as would usually be the
+case. Defensive strength is more important than ease of observation.
+The two requirements that a support should have a good field of fire
+and at the same time be in a concealed position may often conflict to a
+greater or less extent. The trenches should be made as inconspicuous as
+possible, and of course it is not necessary for the support to occupy
+its trenches throughout the day--it may be placed in a covered position
+near the trenches. At night the support will usually be perfectly
+concealed in or immediately behind its trenches, unless they are on
+the sky line. An ideal location for a support is at the far edge of an
+open wood, or a wood with light underbrush as this will often afford a
+good view to the front with concealment from view and a covered line of
+approach and of retreat.
+
+As a rule not more than 4 supports should be sent from any one reserve.
+(An exception would be in an “all-around” outpost where all the
+supports were approximately the same distance from the reserve and
+readily reinforced.)
+
+Supports are numbered serially from right to left.
+
+
+_Outguards._ Outguards are stationary groups sent from the supports,
+and their dispositions and duties are left to the discretion of the
+support commander subject to the inspection of the outpost commander.
+They are placed so as to cover all lines of approach. Outguards include
+generally (a) pickets, (b) sentry squads, (c) cossack posts. Important
+roads within the sector assigned to a support which cannot be directly
+covered by it, are guarded by pickets from 2 squads to a company in
+strength. Such pickets would be disposed in the same manner as a
+support, intrenching if necessary and covering their own fronts with
+small outguards. The outguards sent direct from a support are numbered
+serially from right to left for that support, regardless of their
+size. The smaller groups sent direct from a large picket are numbered
+similarly for that picket, but are not included in the support series
+of numbers.
+
+Sentry squads normally consist of 8 men (including a corporal) and
+post a double sentry. Cossack posts consist of 4 men and post a single
+sentry.
+
+The meals of the outguards are prepared at and sent to them from their
+supports.
+
+Outguards placed to command approaches may intrench their positions.
+
+Outguards, as well as the sentinels posted therefrom should whenever
+possible be concealed from observation by the enemy. It is their duty
+to see without being seen.
+
+Sentinels should be on duty not more than 2 hours in every 6. Visiting
+patrols should have 3 full reliefs and be relieved at regular hours
+when practicable.
+
+
+_Examining posts._ Examining posts may be established on the principal
+roads. They are usually near a support or picket; the sentinel on duty
+over the bivouac serving also as sentry for an examining post.
+
+
+_Communication._ Communication between all the different elements of
+an outpost is of the utmost importance. Each stationary group should
+know the position and strength of other groups in its vicinity, and
+should keep in touch with them. In a large outpost signal troops
+may be attached for this purpose (see ante). The usual method of
+intercommunication will be by patrols. Patrols should, before dark, go
+over the routes they will use at night, opening up and blazing trails,
+where necessary. Routes of travel which would be used by the reserve in
+reinforcing the line of resistance, and those from the supports to the
+outguards should be cleared and marked, where necessary, so that they
+can be used at night.
+
+
+_Outpost patrols._ There are two general methods of providing security
+on the line of observation:
+
+1. By posting a number of small stationary groups at close intervals,
+so that no considerable force can pass between them without being seen
+or heard. This is called the “cordon system” of outposts.
+
+2. By posting a less number of stationary groups at the more important
+points only and covering the ground between groups by constant
+patrolling. This second method is called the “patrol system” of
+outposts.
+
+As to which method is to be preferred circumstances will decide.
+Sometimes both systems are employed on the same outposts. In any case
+a considerable amount of patrolling is done by every outpost. Outpost
+patrols are of two classes:
+
+
+1. _Reconnoitering patrols._ These are patrols sent beyond the line
+of observation to reconnoiter in the direction of the enemy, gaining
+touch with him if practicable. The limit of their action is ordinarily
+the hostile outpost line. These patrols may be mounted or dismounted.
+Having a limited field of action and not being expected ordinarily to
+offer resistance, they should usually be small--2 to 5 men. Patrols
+on the important roads may well be commanded by officers if any are
+available. If composed entirely of infantry, outpost patrols are
+usually limited to a distance of not more than about 1½ miles from
+their point of departure as they should ordinarily return inside
+of 2 hours. Mounted patrols may, of course, go farther out and are
+usually preferable to infantry patrols if available, except at night
+when dismounted men are to be preferred for limited patrolling.
+Reconnoitering patrols to the front usually travel on the roads. They
+should give sentinels notice as to the probable time and route of their
+return, exchange information with them, arrange for signals, etc. If
+important information is to be gained, or if the distance to the front
+is considerable, patrolling should be performed by special mounted
+officers’ patrols. Such patrols would usually be sent from the reserve
+or main body. The function of the _supports_ is primarily security,
+rather than information, and it is difficult to coordinate the work of
+the outpost if patrols are sent to a great distance from the supports
+since these bodies are independent of each other. (See “Patrolling.”)
+
+The duty of the outpost is primarily to provide _security_ for the
+command. Such information as it gathers is usually limited to that
+which is essential for security. Information of tactical or strategical
+importance is obtained by means of special patrols, spies, etc. Any
+information which the supreme commander specially desires will be more
+certainly obtained by patrols sent out under his own orders.
+
+
+2. _Visiting patrols._ These are patrols which maintain communication
+between the different parts of an outpost and reconnoiter the line of
+observation between the stationary groups. They do not ordinarily go
+beyond the line of observation except when necessary to make special
+examinations of localities immediately in front of the line. Visiting
+patrols are always small, one or two privates and a non-commissioned
+officer being usually sufficient. When the conditions are favorable,
+mounted men may be used to advantage, but as there is usually
+cross-country traveling to be done visiting patrols will ordinarily be
+dismounted. The round of an infantry visiting patrol should therefore
+usually be limited to less than 3 miles.
+
+Both reconnoitering and visiting patrols should have three full
+reliefs. This may not always be practicable in the case of
+reconnoitering patrols, but in such case the duty must not be too heavy.
+
+During the day few, if any, visiting patrols will be required, except
+in close country. Reconnoitering patrols may also be dispensed with
+by day if there be available good observation points from which the
+country for a considerable distance in front of the outpost line may be
+seen. There should always be, however, sufficient patrolling to insure
+vigilance on the part of sentries.
+
+_The reserve_ sends visiting patrols, usually once an hour, and at
+least once in two hours, to each support or detached post of the
+outpost proper, or of its sector thereof. If practicable these patrols
+should be mounted, for which purpose a few mounted men should be
+attached to the reserve. In large outposts these patrols may be under
+an officer. Two or three men will usually be sufficient. In some
+cases the reserve may send out special reconnoitering patrols under
+an officer beyond the line of observation, to gain information of the
+enemy. (See ante.)
+
+_The supports_ maintain patrol communication with adjacent supports and
+send visiting patrols (usually one an hour) to each outguard (picket,
+sentry squad or cossack post) sent out _directly_ from support. These
+patrols are small (2 or 3 men) and _if practicable_ may be mounted. In
+any case at least two or three mounted men should be attached to each
+support for patrol and messenger duty. A support on the flank of an
+outpost line maintains patrol communication with adjacent outposts or
+detached posts.
+
+The supports habitually send reconnoitering patrols along the important
+roads in front of the line of observation. The duties of such patrols
+are:
+
+ (a) To reconnoiter the country in advance of the line of
+ observation.
+
+ (b) To maintain communication with the advance cavalry.
+
+ (c) To gain and maintain contact with the enemy, if he be not
+ too distant.
+
+If the enemy (or the advance cavalry) is more than 2 miles beyond the
+supports the duties (b) and (c) cannot well be performed by infantry
+(foot) patrols. If such duty (b) and (c) is required it generally
+should be specified in the outpost orders, and a few mounted men should
+then be attached to the supports for the purpose.
+
+_The pickets_ maintain patrol communication with adjacent pickets
+and patrols along the line of observation. These patrols are usually
+small infantry patrols commanded by a non-commissioned officer or an
+experienced private. In special cases, if so directed, large pickets
+may send reconnoitering patrols beyond the line of observation; but
+this duty is usually assigned to the supports, or if it be very distant
+work, to the reserve or the cavalry (see ante).
+
+_Sentry squads and cossack posts_ do no routine patrolling. They should
+keep touch with adjacent posts between the rounds of the regular
+visiting patrols from the pickets.
+
+Patrol duty at night may be lightened by the use of prearranged signals
+(matches or electric flashlight) from the outguards to the pickets or
+supports. Care should be taken that such signals cannot be seen by the
+enemy.
+
+
+_Day and night positions and duties._
+
+_Infantry._ The reserve proceeds to its camping place and the supports
+to their posts immediately after the issue of the outpost order. If
+the halt is made late in the afternoon the supports may be sent to
+their approximate stations _before_ the issue of the full order, that
+they may have time to prepare their suppers. Otherwise, if late, they
+prepare supper at the reserve camp. Having arrived at their designated
+stations the supports select and prepare their defensive positions (if
+on the line of resistance) and reconnoiter the ground within their
+sectors with a view to placing the outguards.
+
+If the country is open and a good view to the front is obtainable the
+outguards need not be placed until shortly before dusk. A single
+sentinel at each support may be sufficient for security, especially if
+cavalry is covering the front.
+
+The outguards are placed in position shortly before dusk so that they
+have opportunity to become familiar with the terrain in their vicinity
+while there is still daylight.
+
+In a close country where observation is limited, some or all of the
+outguards may be in position during the day.
+
+The visiting patrols should start their rounds as soon as the outguards
+take position. Patrolling during the day should be held to the minimum,
+but at night continued patrolling may be required.
+
+The times for assuming night and resuming day positions are not
+ordinarily mentioned in the first outpost order except for the cavalry.
+Instructions for this are given verbally by the outpost or sector
+commander when he makes his round (before dark) or may be embodied in
+the second order. To avoid the necessity of sending a second message to
+the cavalry (if it is out in front) the times when it is to withdraw
+from the front and resume its day positions may be mentioned in the
+first order.
+
+Day positions should not be assumed until broad daylight (usually at
+sunrise or later). If the outpost is to be relieved, the relief arrives
+at the supports at daybreak, thus giving the outpost double strength at
+the time when an attack is most to be feared.
+
+
+_Cavalry._ The advance cavalry, during the day, will be in front of
+the infantry. About half an hour or so after the infantry outpost has
+assumed its night position, the bulk of the cavalry, if not too far
+out, may be withdrawn behind the outpost line. In such a case the
+cavalry would usually resume its day position by daybreak, or even
+earlier, if an attack is to be feared; and should be well to the front
+before the infantry outguards are withdrawn from their night positions.
+In withdrawing behind the outpost line the cavalry will usually camp
+with the reserve (of the outpost). Here it may be joined by its field
+trains. While the cavalry can rest with greater security behind the
+outpost line, and may have its trains, yet on the other hand this
+necessitates a march to the rear of several miles, and making camp,
+etc., often in the dark. Also the cavalry must be saddled up again
+during the night in order to march out and resume its day positions by
+daybreak or earlier, being thus deprived of much of its night rest.
+The absence of the cavalry from the front increases the outpost duty
+of the infantry. It will accordingly often be advisable to leave the
+cavalry out over night. The particular circumstances of each case will
+determine the proper course to pursue. The independent cavalry, being
+usually 5 miles or more beyond the outpost line will habitually remain
+out over night, providing for its own security.
+
+Even when withdrawn for the night the cavalry should maintain touch
+with the enemy by means of patrols, if practicable, unless this duty
+is assigned to the infantry supports (or reserve) for which purpose
+cavalry should generally be attached to the outpost for the night.
+Standing patrols may also be placed at important points (crossroads,
+bridges, etc.) too far out to be occupied by the infantry, during the
+night.
+
+To avoid a greatly extended infantry outpost line the cavalry may be
+used by day and night to cover the country to the flanks by patrolling,
+the central or more dangerous portion being held by the infantry
+outpost. An example of this would be a river line, the section opposite
+the enemy being held by the outpost, and the banks above and below
+being patrolled by cavalry.
+
+In issuing orders as to times for assuming night and day positions,
+etc., it is better when practicable to use standard times rather than
+references to “daybreak,” “dusk,” or “dark.” (See tables of sunrise and
+sunset, Chapter VI. “Daybreak” is about an hour before sunrise, “dark”
+about the same time after sunset.)
+
+
+_Cavalry outposts._ An outpost consisting _entirely_ of cavalry would
+be used only by a cavalry command. It is organized in a general way
+quite like an outpost of mixed troops, but on account of its greater
+mobility the distances between fractions may be somewhat greater. The
+sentinels of a cavalry outpost may be mounted. From this extreme a
+cavalry outpost may vary to one organized exactly like an outpost of
+mixed troops, all the horses (except those of patrols, detached posts,
+etc.) being at a safe place in rear and unsaddled for the night. This
+latter form of outpost will usually be preferable, and is practically
+essential if any determined _resistance_ is contemplated. A cavalry
+outpost is usually not required to make as stubborn resistance as
+one composed of mixed troops. If it is merely the advance or outpost
+cavalry of a mixed command it would usually make no resistance, except
+such as was necessary to insure its own withdrawal. The vigilance
+required of the outpost proper may, especially in the case of cavalry,
+be greatly diminished by the judicious use of mounted patrols to the
+front and flanks and air craft to observe the avenues of approach.
+Parties of some strength may be sent to the front on important roads
+to resist or delay an advance of the enemy by obstacles and dismounted
+fire action. Their horses are held conveniently near under cover, to
+facilitate withdrawal when further resistance is impracticable.
+
+
+_March outposts._ Every command on halting, even temporarily, should
+cover its front and flanks by temporary or “march” outposts. These
+march outposts are withdrawn on resuming the march or, in case of
+a halt for the night, when the regular outpost is in position. The
+placing of march outposts is the special duty of the advance guard, and
+is usually performed by the advance party. Cavalry covering the front
+affords a considerable measure of security, but this should usually be
+supplemented by small patrols of infantry or mounted orderlies, sent to
+the front and flanks along the roads or across country when necessary.
+
+On receipt of orders to halt for the night and establish outposts,
+the cavalry with the advance guard, if not already there, should be
+sent to the front to cover the movement of the outpost troops to their
+positions. Patrols of mounted or dismounted men should be sent to the
+front a short distance on all important roads, especially those on
+which supports of the outpost are to be placed. These patrols, which
+may be as strong as a platoon, proceed to some important point, such
+as a hill or ridge, road junction, stream or defile. Here they satisfy
+themselves that no enemy is near, returning at a designated time or
+when recalled by a mounted messenger. If the enemy be encountered they
+delay his advance, sending word to the rear and falling back gradually.
+Patrols should also be sent to the flanks, if any danger is anticipated
+in those directions. Mounted patrols of this kind may go out as much as
+two miles; infantry patrols usually from a half to three-quarters of a
+mile. The advance cavalry, if out, will usually be from 2 to 5 miles in
+front, and will generally remain out until about dusk. Even when the
+front is covered by the cavalry, however, patrols should be sent out on
+the important roads on halting, unless danger from the enemy is known
+to be out of question. If the halt be temporary these patrols rejoin
+by the shortest practicable route as the march is resumed. If the halt
+be for the night they are selected if practicable from the troops
+intended for the outpost and join their organization when the outpost
+has moved forward to its position.
+
+
+_Outpost orders._ The formal orders covering the placing of an outpost
+are as follows:
+
+1. The halt order of the supreme commander which designates the troops
+for the outpost and the approximate position of same, or directs the
+advance guard (or rear guard) to establish the outpost on a designated
+line. This order should be issued well in advance of the halt (1 to
+2 hrs.) in order to allow subordinate commanders time to issue the
+necessary orders before reaching the camping place.
+
+2. The order of the advance guard (or rear guard) commander,
+designating the troops for the outpost and the line to be held.
+
+3. The first order of the outpost commander, designating the troops
+for the outpost (under his command), the exact line of same, and the
+composition and location of each support, with special instructions for
+same. This order usually covers only the day positions of the infantry.
+
+4. The 2d (night) order of the outpost commander, covering necessary
+changes in the outpost dispositions for the night.
+
+No. 2 is omitted when the entire advance guard goes on outpost duty.
+No. 4 should preferably take the form of verbal instructions, unless
+the command is large or extensive changes, such as might result from
+additional information concerning the enemy, are necessary.
+
+The orders for the dispositions and duties of the outguards and patrols
+are given verbally by the support commanders. (Examples of outpost
+orders follow. See also F. S. R.)
+
+
+_Establishing the outpost._ The supreme commander’s halt order should
+generally be issued from an hour to two hours before the halt. This
+gives the advance guard and outpost commanders opportunity to estimate
+the situation and issue their own preliminary orders before the halt.
+If a command fatigued by a day’s march must wait under arms while camp
+sites are selected, serious discontent will be the logical result. The
+intelligent commander and his staff should generally contrive to select
+the camp site in advance and route the various organizations to their
+stations without delay, confusion or unnecessary movement. Herein is
+found a test of the efficiency of the staff.
+
+The halt order of the supreme commander must generally be issued from
+the map, supplemented by such information as may have been received
+from the cavalry, etc.
+
+Having estimated the situation the advance guard commander issues his
+orders, and gives the necessary instructions for placing the march
+outposts. If practicable, he should make a personal examination of the
+terrain to supplement the information obtained from his map, but in a
+large command this might cause great delay, and the order may be issued
+from a good map. The advance guard halts on reaching its camp site and
+march outposts are at once sent out.
+
+When the advance guard halts, the outpost commander with the troops
+designated for the outpost, proceeds to the vicinity of the spot
+selected, from the map, for the reserve camp. Here the outpost
+troops are halted (usually by a staff officer) while the outpost
+commander, accompanied by such of his subordinates as are mounted,
+proceeds rapidly ahead to the designated outpost line for personal
+reconnaissance. If it has been practicable to select the approximate
+stations of the supports and determine their strength from the map
+alone, they may be directed to continue the march beyond the reserve
+camp, take their approximate stations and prepare their suppers. On
+reaching a suitable lookout point on the outpost line the commander
+sends a mounted messenger (usually an aide) with the orders to the
+advance cavalry (when to withdraw for the night, standing patrols to be
+left out, etc.). He then makes an examination of the ground and with
+the aid of his map, issues the necessary orders to his subordinates. If
+the subordinates are not mounted they usually assemble at the reserve
+camp to await the return of the commander from his reconnaissance.
+
+No rules for the procedure of the various commanders can be prescribed.
+It is always advisable to place all troops in camp as quickly as
+possible, so that the men can remove their accoutrements and rest.
+On the other hand if outpost supports are placed from the map alone,
+faulty dispositions necessitating a change of positions later on,
+may result, and this is trying to the men and tends to weaken their
+confidence in their commander.
+
+The supports and detached posts having been placed, the outpost
+commander, sometime before dark, makes an inspection of the entire
+outpost line, examines the defense and security measures, and questions
+the support commanders as to the dispositions they intend to make for
+the night. He makes such changes as appear to be necessary, gives the
+support commanders instructions as to when to take up night and resume
+day positions, and orders any special reconnoitering which he desires.
+If extensive changes are necessary particularly in view of fresh news
+concerning the enemy, a second order should be issued, but generally
+this will not be required.
+
+Instructions for demolitions, obstacles, or other work of the
+engineers, are usually given verbally. They may be briefly referred to
+in orders so that the balance of the command may take notice.
+
+In withdrawing to a camp after an engagement, if still in the presence
+of the enemy, the troops holding the front (who will usually be
+deployed in line of battle) should not retire from their positions
+until relieved by the outpost, otherwise the security of the command
+might be compromised.
+
+
+_Outpost sketches and tables._ Each support commander makes a sketch
+of his dispositions for the information of the outpost commander,
+and the latter a sketch of the entire outpost for the information of
+the superior commander. Tables, showing the number of men actually
+on duty as sentinels or patrols by day and by night, may accompany
+the sketches. These tables are particularly useful, as an examination
+of them often indicates how the number of men on duty may be reduced
+without loss of security. An example of such a table for the outpost
+shown in the sketch herewith (Fig. VIII) follows:
+
+[Illustration: Fig. VIII DIAGRAM OF OUTPOST]
+
+ SUPPORT NO. 1. _Day_ _Night_
+ Single sentinel at support (1 n. c. o.) 4 4
+ Officer and mounted orderly to visit outguards 2 and 3 0 2
+ Reconnoitering patrols beyond outpost line 4 8
+
+ _Outguards._
+ 1. Cossack post at 0 4
+ 2. Sentry squad at 0 8
+ 3. Picket at
+ Single sentinel at picket 0 4
+ Cossack post at 0 4
+ Cossack post at 0 4
+ Patrol, 3 men, patrol along front and connect with
+ detached post from the reserve at 0 9
+ Patrol, 2 men, to connect with adjacent picket and
+ patrol along front 0 6
+ 4. Cossack post at 0 4
+
+ SUPPORT NO. 2.
+ Double sentinel at support (2 n. c. o.) 4 8
+ Officer and 2 mtd. orderlies to visit pickets 2 6
+ Reconnoitering patrols beyond outpost line 8 16
+
+ _Outguards._
+ 1. Cossack post at 0 4
+ 2. Picket at
+ (out day and night)
+ Single sentinel at picket 4 4
+ Cossack post at 0 4
+ Cossack post at 0 4
+ 2 patrols, 3 men each, patrol along front and connect
+ with adjacent pickets 0 18
+ 3. Sentry squad at 0 8
+ 4. Sentry squad at 8 8
+ (serves also as examining post)
+ 5. Picket at
+ (out night and day)
+ Single sentinel at picket 4 4
+ Cossack post at 0 4
+ Cossack post at 0 4
+ 2 patrols, 2 men each, patrol along front and connect
+ with adjacent pickets 0 12
+
+ SUPPORT NO. 3.
+ Single sentinel at support 4 4
+ Officer and mounted orderly to visit outguards 2 and 4 0 2
+ Patrol, 1 officer (or n. c. o.) and 4 troopers
+ maintain communication with cavalry post at
+ and detached post from main body at 0 15
+
+ _Outguards._
+ 1. Sentry squad at 0 8
+ 2. Picket at
+ Single sentinel at picket 0 4
+ Cossack post at 0 4
+ Cossack post at 0 4
+ 2 patrols, 2 men each, patrol along front and connect
+ with adjacent picket 0 12
+ 3. Cossack post at 0 4
+ 4. Sentry squad at 8 8
+ ---------
+ Total 50 226
+
+ A careful study of such a table and accompanying maps
+ or sketches will enable the outpost commander to
+ determine how he can economize men without loss of
+ security.
+
+
+ADVANCE GUARD COMMANDER’S HALT ORDER.
+
+_Par. 1._ Information of the enemy.
+
+Location and security measures of independent cavalry, if known.
+
+Location of adjacent bodies of friendly troops and of their outpost
+lines.
+
+Location of march outposts (these have been posted under verbal
+instructions).
+
+Camp of the main body, location of its headquarters.
+
+Detached posts from the main body--strength, location.
+
+_Par. 2._ Camp of the advance guard, location of its headquarters.
+
+_Par. 3._ (a) Instructions to the advance cavalry, when not attached to
+the outpost.
+
+General orders as to country to be reconnoitered, any special tasks to
+be performed, contact with the enemy.
+
+Time to withdraw for the night, where to camp.
+
+Time to resume day positions.
+
+Instructions as to standing patrols to be left out over night--strength,
+posts, special reconnaissance, etc.
+
+The place to which messages for the cavalry will be sent.
+
+(b) Instructions for the outpost. Troops, commander, location, line
+to be held in case of attack (or “in case of attack the outpost will
+be supported”), connection with other outposts or detached posts,
+examining posts, any special instructions. (Camp of reserve of outpost
+may be designated or this may be left to the discretion of the outpost
+commander.)
+
+(c) Camp of the remainder of the advance guard. Commander.
+
+Conduct in case of attack.
+
+Detached posts (if any), troops, commanders, duties.
+
+Instructions for the camp (preferably conveyed in verbal instructions
+or routine orders.)
+
+Instructions to special troops, if any.
+
+_Par. 4._ Instructions for field trains. Those of outpost generally
+placed at disposal of its commander. May be directed to return to camp
+of advance guard after supper or before dawn.
+
+Field trains usually assemble at an early hour at a designated
+locality, off the road, to join those of the main body (as they pass)
+on resuming the forward march.
+
+Instructions to sanitary troops.
+
+ _Par. 5._ Messages to _________________________.
+ Location of lines of information, if any.
+ Signature.
+
+How and to whom communicated.
+
+Report of dispositions to superior commander.
+
+
+OUTPOST COMMANDER’S ORDER.
+
+_Par. 1._ All the information contained in Pars. 1 and 2 of the Advance
+Guard Commander’s order--or so much thereof as may seem necessary.
+
+_Par. 2._ Troops for the outpost, commander. Outpost line “to be
+held in case of attack,” or “in case of attack the outpost will be
+supported.”
+
+Connection with adjacent outposts (if any), or detached posts.
+
+ TROOPS:
+
+ (a) Outpost cavalry:
+ Commander.
+ Troops.
+
+ (b) Supports:
+ No. 1. Commander.
+ Troops.
+ etc.
+
+ (c) Detached post:
+ Commander.
+ Troops.
+
+ (d) Reserve:
+ Commander.
+ Troops.
+
+_Par. 3._ (a) (Same as preceding order--if cavalry is attached _to
+outpost_.)
+
+ (b) Instructions for supports, right to left.
+ Station. Sector to occupy or guard.
+
+ Special reconnaissance. Contact with enemy. Patrol connection
+ with adjacent outposts or detached posts.
+
+ Instructions as to examining posts, intrenching, obstacles,
+ demolitions, etc.
+
+ (c) Detached posts (from reserve).
+
+ Instructions similar to those for supports.
+
+ (d) Reserve. Camp, special duty. Conduct of in case of attack.
+
+Special troops--duties. Engineers assist in clearing, construction of
+obstacles, improvement of communications, demolitions, etc. Signal
+troops--connect parts of outpost.
+
+_Par. 4._ Instructions for field trains (and sanitary troops if any).
+Wagons may join supports, usually return to camp of reserve after
+supper or before dawn. Assembly for march in the morning. (See previous
+form.)
+
+ _Par. 5._ Messages to __________________________.
+ Location of lines of information, if any.
+ Signature.
+
+How and to whom communicated.
+
+Report of dispositions to superior commander, with sketch of outpost
+when prepared.
+
+
+SECOND ORDER OF OUTPOST COMMANDER.
+
+(It is usually not necessary to issue this order, especially in a small
+command, as verbal instruction would suffice. If extensive changes are
+necessary a second order would be issued before dark in this form.)
+
+_Par. 1._ Additional information or statement, “No change in situation.”
+
+_Par. 2._ The following changes are ordered for the night.
+
+_Par. 3._ (a) Instructions for advance cavalry (if not covered in first
+order).
+
+Time to withdraw from night position, camp for the night (usually with
+reserve), assignment of mounted men to the infantry supports for the
+night (if any). Standing patrols to be left out over night, special
+duties. Time for cavalry to resume day positions.
+
+ (b) Instructions for supports, any changes of position,
+ reinforcements, additional intrenching, additional security
+ measures, reconnaissance, etc.
+
+ Time to assume night and resume day positions. Patrol connection
+ with cavalry posts during the night. Instructions as to
+ camp fires, cooking, tent pitching, etc. (These camp details may
+ be covered verbally and omitted from order.)
+
+ (c) Instructions to reserve.
+
+Detached posts, exterior guards or other security measures for the
+night.
+
+Instructions as to fires, cooking, tents, etc.
+
+Reserve to be under arms at designated hour before dawn. (An extreme
+precaution adopted only when an attack is feared.)
+
+Additional instructions for special troops.
+
+_Par. 4._ Additional instructions for field trains. Usually wagons at
+supports to return to camp of reserve. Assembly of field trains in the
+morning.
+
+ _Par. 5._ No change, (or messages to ______________________.)
+ Signature.
+
+How and to whom communicated.
+
+Report of dispositions to superior comd’r.
+
+Note: It would be seldom that any outpost orders would contain _all_
+the information and instructions set forth in the foregoing forms. On
+the other hand under certain conditions special instructions might be
+required. The forms indicate the subjects that should be considered.
+Not all of these need in the usual case be covered by the orders.
+
+
+VERBAL OUTPOST ORDER FOR A SMALL COMMAND.
+
+Information of the enemy and our supporting troops.
+
+Our main body camps at __________, with a detached post of (such
+troops) at __________.
+
+March outposts are now __________.
+
+Troops for the outpost, commander, outpost line, conduct in case of
+attack--usually “in case of attack this line will be held.” Such troops
+under such commander will constitute Support No. 1, and will occupy (or
+guard) the sector from such landmark to such landmark, both inclusive.
+Reconnaissance to __________.
+
+(Support No. 2--instructions in same form.)
+
+All supports will prepare their positions for defense. Planking of
+bridges will be loosened and fords obstructed, etc.
+
+Patrols will be sent to the line of __________ (usually enemy’s
+outposts if not too distant.)
+
+Three mtd. orderlies will report to each support.
+
+Reserve. Troops, commander, camp, detached posts, distant patrolling,
+etc.
+
+Wagons may join their companies but will return to park south of the
+reserve by 9:00 p. m.
+
+Messages to __________.
+
+
+ADVANCE GUARD COMMANDER’S HALT AND OUTPOST ORDER.
+
+ Adv. Gd., 1st Brig., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ TWO TAVERNS, PA.,
+ Field Orders } 20 June 1912, 2:20 p. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
+
+1. A hostile division advancing through CASHTOWN has occupied
+GETTYSBURG. A hostile troop has been driven from ST. MARY’S REFORMED
+CHURCH by our cavalry, which now occupies that place, observing the
+line of ROCK CREEK and towards GETTYSBURG. March outposts are now
+observing on the line of WHITE RUN.
+
+Our army halts for the night with the left of its outpost at 550 (1⅔
+miles north of TWO TAVERNS.)
+
+Our brigade camps at GERMANTOWN with headquarters at the town hall and
+sends a detached post of 1 platoon of infantry to the TRUSTLE F. H.
+
+2. This advance guard will camp at TWO TAVERNS.
+
+3. (a) The 1st Sq., 1st Cav. (less Tr.D) will continue to cover our
+front until 7:00 p. m. when it will withdraw and camp at TWO TAVERNS,
+north of the main road and east of LITTLE’S RUN. Day positions will be
+resumed at 4:00 a. m. Half a troop under an officer will be sent at
+once to the vicinity of BARLOW to watch the crossings at that place and
+one mile south thereof, and patrol to the west and to GETTYSBURG on the
+TANEYTOWN Road, throughout the night. One platoon under an officer
+will be sent to report to the outpost commander.
+
+(b) Lt. Col. B with the 1st and 2nd Bns. and 12 mtd. orderlies of the
+1st Inf., and 1 platoon, 1st Sq., 1st Cav., will establish an outpost
+on the line from the left of the army’s outpost through 525--479--Hill
+449--to include the bridge 393W. In case of attack this line will be
+held and the outpost will be supported. Contact will be maintained with
+the cavalry post at BARLOW and the detached post from the main body
+at TRUSTLE. An examining post will be established on the BALTIMORE
+TURNPIKE.
+
+(c) The remainder of the advance guard will camp at TWO TAVERNS; north
+of the road and west of LITTLE’S RUN, under command of Major C. In case
+of attack the outpost will be supported.
+
+4. The field trains will join the troops. Those of the outpost troops
+are placed at the disposal of the outpost commander. All field trains
+will assemble on the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE east of 508 by 3:00 a. m.
+tomorrow when Capt. X, Q. M., 1st Inf., will conduct them to join the
+brigade train.
+
+5. Messages to the school house at TWO TAVERNS.
+
+ A,
+ Colonel, 1st Inf.
+
+ Dictated to Staff:
+
+ Copies to C. O. of:
+ Outpost
+ 1st Sq., 1st Cav.
+ 1st Bn., 1st Inf.
+ 2d Bn.
+ 3d Bn.
+ M. G. Co., 1st Inf.
+ By mounted messenger to C. G. 1st Brigade.
+
+Notes: The march outposts consist of small patrols of cavalry. They are
+withdrawn by verbal instructions as soon as the outpost is in position.
+In addition to these march outposts the advance guard, of course,
+establishes the necessary guards for the security of the camp.
+
+Here the cavalry is independent of the outpost commander. It comes in
+at night leaving out a standing patrol at Barlow. During the night
+some cavalry is assigned to the outpost for patrolling toward the
+enemy. The patrols from Barlow are told to go _to_ Gettysburg, not
+_toward_. Perhaps they cannot reach the town, but will go as close as
+possible.
+
+
+OUTPOST COMMANDER’S FIRST ORDER.
+
+ Outpost, 1st Brig., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ Farm house 1,000 yds. S. of
+ ST. MARY’S REFORMED CHURCH, PA.
+ Field Orders } 20 June, 1912, 4:20 p. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
+
+1. (Include in this paragraph pertinent information contained in Pars.
+1 and 2 of preceding order, also information as to the location of the
+headquarters of the advance guard and concerning the cavalry post to be
+at BARLOW during the night.)
+
+2. The 1st and 2d Bns. and 9 mtd. orderlies, 1st Inf., and 1 Plat. Tr.
+A, 1st Cav., under my command will establish the outpost from the left
+of the army’s outpost on the line through 525--479-Hill 449 to include
+the bridge 393W. In case of attack this line will be held and the
+outpost will be supported.
+
+ Troops
+ (a) Supports:
+ No. 1, Maj. B.
+ 1st Bn. 1st Inf.
+ (less Co. D)
+ 6 mtd. orderlies.
+ No. 2, Capt. D.
+ Co. D, 1st Inf.
+ 1 Plat. Tr. A, 1st
+ Cav. (less 2 n.c.o’s
+ and 7 troopers.)
+
+ No. 3, Maj. D.
+ 2d Bn. 1st Inf.
+ (less Cos. E & F)
+ 2 n.c.o’s & 7 trprs.
+ Tr. A, 1st Cav.
+
+ (b) Reserve:
+ Capt. F.
+ Cos. E & F, 1st Inf.
+ 3 mtd. orderlies.
+
+3. (a) Support No. 1 will take post just west of 525, connect with the
+left of the Army’s outpost, and guard the sector, stream just south
+of the 529--550--516 road inclusive, ravine 400 yds. south of ST.
+MARY’S REFORMED CHURCH inc. The line of WHITE RUN will be observed.
+Reconnaissance to WOLF HILL and along the BALTIMORE PIKE to GETTYSBURG.
+An examining post will be established on the BALTIMORE PIKE.
+
+Support No. 2 will take post about 500 yds. west of 479 and guard the
+sector, ravine 400 yds. S. of ST. MARY’S REFORMED CHURCH exclusive,
+LITTLE’S RUN inclusive. Reconnaissance to the north and northwest from
+DIENER.
+
+Support No. 3 will take post near 491 and guard the sector LITTLE’S RUN
+exclusive, 491--393W road inclusive. Limited reconnaissance from 418
+west. Patrol connection will be maintained with the cavalry post at
+BARLOW and the detached post at TRUSTLE during the night.
+
+Each support will prepare its position for defense.
+
+(b) The reserve will camp at the farm house 1,000 yds. south of ST.
+MARY’S REFORMED CHURCH.
+
+4. Company wagons may join their organizations but all trains will be
+reported to Capt. X, Q. M. 1st Inf., at road junction 508 east of TWO
+TAVERNS by 2:50 a. m. tomorrow.
+
+5. Messages to the reserve camp and in case of emergency by duplicate
+direct to advance guard comdr. at TWO TAVERNS.
+
+ B,
+ Lt. Col., 1st Inf.
+
+ Verbally to support commanders.
+ By Lt. T, Bn. Adjt., to C. O. Cav.
+ Copy with sketch of outpost to C. O. Adv. Guard.
+
+Notes: The expression “limited reconnaissance” means within the limits
+of an infantry patrol as Support No. 3 has not enough cavalry for this
+reconnaissance after allowing patrols to go to BARLOW and TRUSTLE, as
+these must be mounted on account of the distance. Support No. 2 will
+place a picket at DIENER in accordance with its instructions. This
+arrangement illustrates the statement that there can be no fixed rules
+for the dispositions of an outpost.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XI.
+
+COMBAT--ATTACK AND DEFENSE.
+
+
+_General observations._ Decisive results are obtained only by the
+offense. The attack leads, the defense must conform.
+
+Do not contemplate a purely passive defense unless your mission
+requires it.
+
+Raw, untrained troops are not suitable for active offensive operations;
+they are best utilized in defense, on the line of communications, or in
+a pivotal position supporting the maneuver of the first line troops.
+
+A purely passive defense may be adopted in the following cases:
+
+ (a) With inferior troops.
+
+ (b) To contain a larger force of the enemy.
+
+ (c) When expecting reinforcements.
+
+ (d) In delaying actions.
+
+It is by no means to be understood, however, that a purely passive
+defense should always be adopted in the above cases. This will depend
+on circumstances. At times a vigorous offensive may offer the only
+chance of success.
+
+Fire superiority is the keynote of success.
+
+Avoid too great dispersion of the front or separation of the troops in
+a decisive action. A regiment united has greater fighting strength than
+3 separated battalions. All movements should be simple. Complicated
+maneuvers should never be attempted in battle. Make a conservative
+solution--never attempt anything grotesque.
+
+Avoid half-hearted measures. If the decision is to attack, all
+available force should be thrown into the fight. This does not mean,
+however, that no reserves should be kept in hand at the opening of the
+attack.
+
+Do not uncover the line of retreat unless the force is small and the
+country friendly. If, however, circumstances permit this to be done
+it will often force the enemy to also uncover _his_ line of retreat,
+and may thus increase the fruits of victory. An advance guard should
+usually not uncover the main body, though in a pursuit it may be
+justifiable to do so in order to prevent the delay of the main body.
+
+Put into the main fight all available force, calling in all detachments
+within reach. The only detachments which are justifiable are (a) one
+which contains a _relatively_ stronger force of the enemy and keeps it
+out of the main combat, or (b) one which protects the flanks of the
+main force, secures it against surprise, or covers its communications,
+etc.
+
+A detachment operating as a containing force separated by some distance
+from the main body, should if practicable be relatively strong in
+cavalry and artillery.
+
+Night attacks are usually dangerous, and ordinarily practicable only
+for small forces. Night movements, however, may be advisable under
+certain conditions:
+
+ 1. To seize a position prior to the enemy.
+
+ 2. To gain ground over a fire swept zone.
+
+ 3. To concentrate reserves for an assault, without detection
+ by the enemy.
+
+ 4. To effect a withdrawal in safety.
+
+ 5. In pursuit of a defeated force.
+
+ (See post for night attacks)
+
+An attack order will be much more intelligently made when issued as a
+result of an examination of the ground rather than from the map alone.
+For small commands, some examination of the terrain by the commander
+in person, will usually be possible, but for commands the size of a
+division or larger, the examination may not be possible. Dependence
+must then be placed upon the map supplemented by such reports as are
+obtainable.
+
+Attacks which offer no chance of tactical success should generally
+be avoided. Combats which have no bearing on the general plan should
+also be avoided, as a rule, even though they offer the chance of easy
+victory.
+
+Never neglect reconnaissance at any time.
+
+Avoid splitting or mixing tactical units as far as possible.
+
+Aggressiveness wins battles. If in doubt it is generally better to
+attack. But _make sure_ that the advantage derived from victory will be
+well worth the cost.
+
+
+_Form of attack._ A turning movement should seldom be undertaken by a
+force smaller than a division (except by cavalry, or in the attack of a
+river line, etc.)
+
+The usual forms of attack for a small force are but two in number:
+
+ (a) A frontal attack.
+
+ (b) A frontal attack with envelopment of a flank of the enemy.
+
+ A frontal attack with envelopment of both flanks, (rare--).
+
+The advantages of a frontal attack are simplicity, speed and
+directness. Its disadvantages are that it is usually very costly
+(due to difficulty of obtaining fire superiority) and generally less
+effective if successful than an enveloping attack. It is most commonly
+employed in advance guard actions (see post).
+
+The object of an enveloping attack is fire superiority. It usually
+implies a considerable superiority of numbers and should ordinarily be
+preferred to a frontal attack when practicable.
+
+In deciding as to whether to attack, the commander must consider what
+his mission requires, the nature and extent of the enemy’s defensive
+line, the relative numbers of his own command and that of the enemy,
+the strength and positions of the supporting troops of each and the
+enemy’s probable intentions.
+
+An attack usually implies superior force either in numbers or
+quality of troops, hence if the enemy is equal or superior it would
+generally be disastrous to attack him in position unless expecting
+reinforcements. In such case an attack may be made in order to develop
+the enemy’s strength, location and intentions, and hold him in position
+until the arrival of reinforcements. The attack need not be pushed home
+until the reinforcements arrive. Such an attack would generally be
+frontal as this would be the safest procedure, usually least exposed to
+counter attack, and would allow the reinforcements to envelop either
+flank upon their arrival. In deciding on the method of attack, the
+position of the enemy’s reserves should also be considered. Moreover
+the enemy’s line might be too long to be enveloped after covering its
+front.
+
+If the enemy occupies a line too long to be enveloped, but which is
+known to be lightly held, a frontal attack may be made with the object
+of piercing the attenuated line. Such an attack would, of course, be
+less costly than in the ordinary case, especially as the enemy almost
+certainly would not fight to a decision. If the enemy is known to be
+fighting a delaying action only, a frontal attack will as a general
+rule most promptly drive him from his position, although this of
+course depends to some extent on the nature of the terrain.
+
+Finally if the enemy’s flanks rest on impassable obstacles, or if the
+attack is a local operation on an extended and continuous line of
+battle, a frontal attack is the only course open.
+
+When practicable an enveloping attack is to be preferred and it becomes
+a question of which flank to envelop. The following considerations will
+be a guide to a decision on this point:
+
+(a) Which flank allows the nearest approach under cover?
+
+(b) Against which flank can an attack be more quickly launched
+consistent with due preparation and without undesirable separation of
+the attacking columns?
+
+(c) Which flank has the better field of fire? (For the enemy).
+
+(d) What bearing if any have the available artillery positions?
+
+(e) Where is the enemy’s line of retreat and from whence will his
+reinforcements (if any are expected) probably arrive? (The enemy will
+withdraw more readily from an attack which threatens to separate him
+from his line of retreat or reinforcements, unless he has a small force
+and is in friendly country, in which case separation from his preferred
+line of retreat is not so serious a matter.)
+
+(f) In view of the direction from which our own reinforcements may
+arrive, which flank is preferable?
+
+(g) In view of the direction from which the enemy’s reinforcements
+may arrive, and the position of our own line of retreat, which flank
+may be more safely attacked? The possibility of a reverse must not be
+overlooked.
+
+_The best disposition for the attacking infantry is the primary
+consideration in determining which flank to attack._
+
+A consideration of these tactical questions will usually result in a
+preponderance in favor of one flank. Always envelop that flank which
+gives more promise of a tactical victory. If both flanks are promising,
+then consider which attack would give the greater strategical results
+if successful.
+
+A simultaneous envelopment of _both_ hostile flanks would be rare, and
+would ordinarily imply great superiority of forces. It will almost
+invariably be better to concentrate on the enemy’s weaker flank.
+
+The usual attack will then have two parts, the secondary or holding
+(frontal) attack and the main or enveloping attack. They are, however,
+never so called in orders as the expression, “secondary attack” is
+objectionable, tending to diminish the ardor of the troops engaged
+therein. Moreover, it is not always possible to foresee which attack
+will actually be pushed home. The “secondary” may become the decisive
+attack. There must be nothing either in the appearance or conduct of
+the frontal attack to indicate that it is not being made in earnest,
+for if the enemy perceives that this attack is not to be pushed, he
+will contain it with a _relatively_ smaller proportion of his force and
+concentrate against the main attack.
+
+Generally the main attack is made stronger than the holding attack. The
+strength lies in its depth of deployment, it may or may not be stronger
+in total numbers according to circumstances. The difference of density
+per yard is not manifested in the firing lines, however. The enemy
+must not be permitted to judge the holding attack by any weakness in
+its firing line. The difference lies chiefly in the supports. The main
+attack must hold out stronger supports because usually it will have
+more gaps from casualties, fatigued men, skulkers, etc. The main attack
+is to be driven home at all costs. To do so the density of its firing
+line must be maintained to the last. It must be expected that an attack
+having a firing line density of 1 man per yard may need _supports_ of
+equal or greater numerical strength before it will be able to throw the
+enemy out of his trenches. The _firing line_ density of each attack
+should therefore be essentially the same, say about 1 man per yard
+of front. The main attack may hold out from each battalion say two
+companies in support where the holding attack retains one. (See also
+Chap. XVII).
+
+Envelopment should generally be provided for in the first deployment,
+not afterward. The enveloping attack may be extended during the action
+by putting in the reserves. The defender also will probably extend his
+line during the fight to meet the enveloping attack.
+
+The main attack should generally be made as strong as possible. The
+minimum number of troops should be assigned to the holding attack in
+order to have all possible strength in the main attack (and reserves).
+A usual disposition for a division would be: 1 brigade in the holding
+attack, 1 in the main attack, 1 in the reserve.
+
+The advance guard regiment in a brigade action, would generally be
+assigned to the holding attack, covering the maneuver of the main body.
+
+An enveloping movement must not expect to _enfilade_ the enemy’s line.
+He will echelon his line to the rear and throw in his reserves to meet
+it, so that it usually becomes merely a frontal attack in a different
+direction. The advantage of envelopment is the convergence of fire as
+against the divergence of the enemy’s fire. An enveloping attack should
+be separated sufficiently from the holding attack and directed well
+to the rear of the enemy, as it has strong tendency to join up with
+frontal attack and become merely an extension of the latter on the same
+line, thus sacrificing the advantage of converging fire. On the other
+hand the separation should not be so great as to sacrifice co-operation
+and mutual support. (For discussion of turning movements see Chap.
+XVII.)
+
+
+_Advancing to the attack._ An attack should generally not be launched
+until the strength of the enemy and the position of his flanks are well
+established.
+
+The attacking troops keep to the roads and remain in column as long as
+practicable, in advancing to their deploying positions. If subjected to
+artillery or long range rifle fire the advance should be made in some
+less vulnerable formation. (See Chap. XVI.)
+
+The attack should advance under such cover as is available as close as
+possible to the enemy’s line before opening fire. It is desirable to
+obtain a first position within 800 yards and seldom beyond 1,000 yards.
+Fire superiority must be established in the first position. Otherwise
+an advance is not practicable.
+
+The main and secondary attacks (in an enveloping action) should
+generally advance in conjunction with each other. Both should advance
+from cover _when practicable_ and (particularly for the main attack)
+have the element of surprise.
+
+Cover for the advancing troops both before and after deployment is
+the most important consideration, but must not be allowed to outweigh
+_all other_ considerations. The best cover is fire superiority, as it
+encourages the attacker while natural cover tends to enervate him.
+
+Adjacent organizations endeavor to maintain contact during the advance,
+but nobody waits for a laggard.
+
+The various echelons of the attack generally move forward together--the
+supports and local reserves keeping their distances from the firing
+line as well as circumstances--especially cover for the advance--permit.
+
+
+_Assignment of fronts._
+
+_Every portion_ of the defender’s line must be covered by fire
+throughout the attack. This is accomplished by assigning a portion
+of his front to each organization in the attack. The front so
+assigned should be about equal to the deployed width of the attacking
+organization and opposite to it.
+
+The brigade commander assigns fronts to the regiments, the regimental
+commanders to their battalions, the battalion commanders to their
+companies, etc.
+
+These fronts should be assigned as accurately as the landmarks of
+the terrain allow. Often the enemy’s line is so poorly defined or so
+indefinitely located, that it is impossible to give an organization
+anything more definite than a guiding point or general direction for
+one flank. (See Chap. XVI.)
+
+Great care should be exercised in the assignment of fronts. If the
+adjacent flanks of two organizations advancing from slightly different
+directions guide on the same point _in the enemy’s line_ during their
+advance, they will arrive in a continuous line upon his front. If the
+point is in advance of the line there will be crowding or overlapping,
+which is objectionable as it causes confusion and may subject a portion
+of one line to the fire of the other. Casualties during the advance may
+tend to reduce this difficulty. If the guiding point is in rear of the
+enemy’s line there will be a gap between the two organizations, which
+however, may be filled if that is desirable. If the two organizations
+are advancing in the same direction, contiguous to each other (as in
+a frontal attack) no difficulty is encountered and the arrangement is
+excellent.
+
+The interior flank of the enveloping attack will usually be directed
+on the supposed position of the flank of the enemy, or on a point a
+little inside of it. Consequently, at the start, there may be no troops
+opposite the enveloping attack, but the enemy may be expected to extend
+his line promptly to meet it when he becomes aware of the envelopment.
+(See Fig. IX.)
+
+Each column assigned to the first line in attack should be instructed
+(in orders) as to:
+
+ (a) The route to its deploying position, when necessary.
+
+ (b) Certain landmarks to guide it during the advance.
+
+ (c) The portion of the enemy’s line it is to cover--defined as
+ accurately as circumstances permit.
+
+
+_Reserves._ Troops once committed to an attack can be withdrawn only
+with the greatest difficulty. When once in action they are usually
+beyond the control of the commander. It is by the judicious use of
+his reserves alone that the commander can influence the course of an
+action once he has launched his attack. Hence too many troops should
+not be committed to the action at the outset. Especially if the enemy’s
+strength and position are not yet fully developed should large reserves
+be kept in hand. The defense, as it must meet the attacker’s moves,
+usually employs larger _reserves_ than the attack.
+
+The aim of all tactics, either in attack or defense, is the
+concentration of overwhelming force at the critical point. Numerical
+strength that furnished overwhelming force at the proper time may
+be inferior at a later time. Rapidity of maneuver is equivalent
+to increased numerical strength. Hence the value of motor cars in
+effecting tactical or strategic concentration of troops.
+
+A company ordinarily deploys on one line. A battalion holds out one or
+two companies as local supports. These are used to replace losses in
+the firing line during the advance over the fire swept zone.
+
+Each regiment holds out one or two battalions as regimental reserves.
+Their purpose is to carry the firing line into the assault.
+
+Each brigade in attack ordinarily holds out a regiment as brigade
+reserve. It is employed to reinforce the decisive attack, to secure
+possession of the captured position, to meet the defender’s counter
+attack, or to take up the pursuit of the defeated force.
+
+The defense is characterized by small local supports and reserves, and
+large general reserves, except in delaying actions. The reserves are
+almost always employed to protect the flanks, although not necessarily
+to furnish combat patrols. They should therefore generally be posted
+near the exposed flank or the one that will need reinforcement. If
+there be doubt as to which flank may need reinforcement the reserve is
+held in a central position from which it can conveniently reach either
+flank, or else divided.
+
+If there is cover available the local supports may be within 50 yards
+of the firing line. If no cover is available they should be farther
+back. The general reserve seeks a convenient covered locality, behind a
+flank or opposite the center.
+
+
+_Protection of the flanks._ On account of the difficulty of changing
+front during the action and the annihilating effect of enfilading
+fire, the flanks of a line are its most vulnerable parts, and the most
+_elaborate_ measures are habitually taken for their protection, both in
+offense and defense, as they are the cynosure of attack.
+
+The best protection for the flanks of the defender is afforded by
+impassable obstacles, which render them absolutely secure from
+envelopment. Next in order come a good field of fire and fortifications.
+
+The cavalry or mounted men provide a measure of security for the flanks
+by observation and if possible, resistance. It is also their duty to
+maintain communication with any friendly troops in the vicinity--and
+their orders should contain instructions to that effect. The supreme
+commander (both in attack and defense) usually retains in his own hand
+a few mounted men to act as messengers during the engagement. Artillery
+favorably posted may also protect the flanks with fire.
+
+Irrespective of the protection afforded by the other arms, infantry
+patrols are placed to guard the flanks of a line. These are known
+as “combat patrols” and should never be omitted either in attack or
+defense during any stage of an action. Combat patrols are in the
+nature of covering detachments whose principal function is to give
+warning. Where resistance is needed in addition to warning, the patrol
+is strengthened accordingly, and, if of some size, may be called a
+covering detachment. Such a body accomplishes its purpose by taking
+station at some convenient point on the exposed flank and covering it.
+Here it halts in a defensive position or attitude, (it may intrench)
+sending a few men to nearby points of observation. The bulk however is
+held in hand ready to open fire on hostile reconnoitering patrols and
+fight them off or to give prompt warning of the approach of any large
+body toward the flank it is covering. It will open fire on the superior
+force and fight until forced back, thus securing all possible delay in
+order to permit of measures being taken to oppose the flank attack.
+
+It is the duty of each organization on a flank to provide for the
+security thereof without special orders to that effect. But a small
+unit will not ordinarily detach any considerable portion of its
+strength to a great distance for this purpose. Thus a battalion in
+the first line may send out one or two squads or a platoon from its
+supports, a few hundred yards to the flank, as a combat patrol. If
+larger measures are necessary for security they should be taken by the
+regimental or brigade reserve. The flanks of a line are usually its
+most vulnerable parts and hence they demand special attention. The
+protection of the flanks (either in attack or defense) is of such vital
+importance that it should not devolve as a matter of course upon the
+commanders of the flank organizations. The supreme commander should
+make positive provision for flank protection in his attack (or defense)
+order. In the absence of such orders the regimental (or battalion)
+commanders on the flanks will take the ordinary precautions in the way
+of combat patrols.
+
+During the early stages of an action and before the regular attack is
+launched, patrols should also be sent to the front (directly toward
+the enemy) to feel his position by drawing his fire, and to examine
+the ground over which the attack must be made. Such patrols may vary
+in strength from a few individuals to a firing line making a frontal
+attack. A reconnaissance in force therefore, may become a small
+attack. It is generally not intended to push home unless the situation
+developed as the reconnaissance in force proceeds, warrants a regular
+attack. Small patrols in front of the line, must generally seek cover
+before fire is opened. If necessary they withdraw to the rear or
+flanks. While a defensive position is being prepared or occupied,
+provisions should always be made for security to the front. Usually
+some regiment will be directed to provide for this. If no special
+instructions are given each organization watches its own front, and
+flank (if exposed).
+
+A flank combat patrol, except when sent out for the special purpose of
+concerted participation in the defense (or attack) provides security
+primarily by observation. Nevertheless it should have _some_ power of
+resistance, at least enough to push back reconnoitering patrols of the
+enemy. Hence 3 to 4 men would usually be insufficient; 2 squads to
+a platoon is better unless the force is a very small one. From this
+the flank groups may vary in size up to a battalion, placed for the
+special purpose of active participation in the engagement during the
+later stages.
+
+Troops withdrawing from battle to camp should not uncover the front
+they have been guarding until the outpost troops are in position.
+
+
+_Ammunition._ The extra ammunition in the battalion combat trains is
+habitually issued before an attack or in the occupation of a defensive
+position, unless the orders expressly state that this will not be done.
+The issue of ammunition is ordered by the battalion commander when it
+becomes necessary for the battalion to separate from its combat train
+upon entering an engagement.
+
+The regimental commanders will give orders as to whether or not packs
+are to be carried into action, and if not where they will be left.
+It takes about 10 minutes to issue ammunition after the arrival of
+the wagons. When the issue of ammunition is completed the wagons are
+assembled at some convenient point by order of the supreme commander.
+They may be sent to the rear to refill usually from the ammunition
+train, or retained temporarily to transport wounded.
+
+During an action the ammunition _trains_, if likely to be required,
+should be brought well to front, and their positions marked by red
+flags or lanterns. The pack train may be ordered up to facilitate the
+distribution of ammunition. In our service pack outfits are carried in
+each wagon of the infantry combat trains, thus allowing the lead mules
+to be converted into pack animals.
+
+The ammunition carried in the men’s belts is 100 rounds, and the extra
+ammunition in the combat trains, 120 rounds. Hence the engagement may
+open with 220 rounds on the men, if all the extra ammunition in the
+combat trains has been issued. The amount of ammunition expended at
+each firing position will be that sufficient to establish (or maintain)
+fire superiority. In first establishing fire superiority 25 to 100
+rounds or even more may be expended. Usually at the succeeding halts
+a lesser expenditure will be required. If, however, the advance be
+checked by a loss of fire superiority the expenditure of ammunition
+before advancing must be sufficient to reëstablish that superiority
+without which a further advance is impracticable. Following are some
+examples of actual expenditures:
+
+ Russians at Plevna (attack) 160 in 4 hrs.
+ Turks at Plevna (defense) 120 to 360 per day.
+ English in Boer War, 150 to 200 per day.
+ 9th U. S. Infantry at Tientsin, 150.
+ Cuba, Spanish American War, July 1. Cavalry less than 100,
+ Infantry 20 to 85.
+ Russo-Jap. War. Japanese, 120 to 160 in heavy engagements.
+
+With improved modern weapons having far greater efficiency than those
+of former times, and modern facilities for the supply of ammunition it
+is certain that the figures given above will often be greatly exceeded.
+It is quite possible for an individual soldier to expend 1,000 rounds
+or more during a single period of daylight, and the average consumption
+of a body of troops in a protracted conflict may run to 500 rounds per
+day or even more. Under these conditions very heavy demands will be
+made on the ammunition supply service.
+
+The defense, having better facilities for supplying ammunition, may
+expend more than the attacker. Its better facilities for resupply give
+the defense an advantage in this respect. Long range fire (beyond
+1,200 yards), seldom advisable in attack, may be frequently employed
+in defense when the conditions are favorable. If the attacker can be
+brought under effective fire and forced to deploy beyond 1,200 yards,
+he will have great difficulty in pushing home the attack.
+
+The ammunition of the dead and wounded should be removed from their
+persons, and advantage should be taken of cover, lulls in the action,
+and all other favorable conditions to distribute ammunition. All
+officers and non-commissioned officers are charged with the duty of
+preventing the waste of ammunition.
+
+
+_Intrenchments, obstacles, etc._ Intrenchments are habitually employed
+by the defense, and when practicable may be utilized also by the
+attack. Ground once gained by the assailant should be held tenaciously,
+thus only can success be assured. Moreover a retreat under fire would
+ordinarily result in greater losses than if the position were held. If
+necessary to hold their position the attackers should dig themselves
+into the ground. With the portable tools trenches may be dug in a
+prone position, part of the line intrenching while the rest maintains
+the fire. The attacker may also intrench under cover of darkness.
+Shelter trenches providing considerable security against rifle fire may
+be dug in 30 mins, or even less in favorable ground, with the portable
+intrenching tool. These trenches afford only slight protection against
+shrapnel fire and if they are to be occupied for any considerable time,
+they should be enlarged to the kneeling or standing type. Greater
+protection from shrapnel fire can be gained by the use of head or
+overhead cover. Such cover requires several hours to construct and
+would seldom be employed by the attack. (See table Chapter XII.)
+
+The _invariable_ use of intrenchments in the attack, however, is
+not advisable. The best means of gaining fire superiority and the
+best protection against hostile fire is the attacker’s own fire. The
+habit of intrenching tends to diminish the ardor of attacking troops.
+Therefore the decision in this matter should not habitually be left to
+the soldiers or the company officers. The order for intrenching should
+generally emanate from the battalion or other superior commanders.
+
+The object of intrenchments in defense is to economize men on the
+firing line in order to hold a longer line, or permit the retention of
+large general reserves for the decisive stages of the action. (See “The
+organization of a defensive position,” post.)
+
+Trenches should preferably be located and constructed by the troops
+who are to occupy them. If there be time, communicating trenches and
+shelters for supports and reserves may be constructed. The Engineers
+perform the more difficult work, such as obstacles, heavy clearing,
+communications, etc., works of general interest not properly part of
+the task assigned to any line unit, and any works for which infantry
+are not equipped or specially trained.
+
+Obstacles along the front of a position may favor either the attacker
+or defender. If they afford shelter from view while allowing easy
+passage (like an open wood), they of course favor the attack and can
+hardly be called obstacles, but must be classed as cover for the
+advance. If, on the other hand, they hinder progress without affording
+concealment (like a marsh or bog) they naturally favor the defense. All
+artificial obstacles are of this latter kind.
+
+Between these two extremes are many obstacles which according to
+conditions may favor one side or the other. In general anything which
+affords concealment, to that extent favors the attacker, and anything
+that delays progress, to that extent favors the defender.
+
+Obstacles tend to confuse and break up the attacker’s formations,
+especially if they run obliquely to his line of advance.
+
+An absolutely impenetrable obstacle along a portion of the defender’s
+front, even if it conceals the attacker, is generally an advantage if
+not too close (within about 300 yards) as it limits the attacker’s
+advance to the open spaces. It is to be remarked, however, that few
+obstacles are absolutely impenetrable. If such there be, however, as
+for instance an unfordable stream, they give rise to special forms of
+attack. (See “Attack of a River Line.”) If the defender contemplates
+assuming the offensive a continuous obstacle in his front may be a
+positive disadvantage. It may also entirely discourage the attacker and
+cause him to turn the position instead of assaulting it. This may or
+may not be an advantage to the defense, depending on its mission.
+
+Artificial obstacles, usually constructed by the Engineers, may be
+placed in front of a defensive position at effective ranges. The most
+practicable forms are abatis, slashing and wire entanglements, or a
+combination of these. Ordinary fences are obstacles serious to cavalry,
+but less so to infantry. Barbed wire entanglements are the most
+effective form of obstacles.
+
+It is to be noted that obstacles _not covered by the fire of the
+defender_ fall short of the full measure of usefulness, as the enemy
+can remove then with comparatively little difficulty or loss.
+
+The greatest obstacle to the attacker’s advance is a clear field of
+fire. The defense, therefore, will usually take steps to clear the
+front of the position, measure and mark ranges beyond 600 yds. (battle
+sight range), etc. The infantry is provided with tools for light
+clearing. The heavier work should be done by the engineers if any are
+available. (See “The organization of a defensive position.”)
+
+
+_Frontage in attack and defense._ A company (unless acting alone) goes
+complete into the firing line. All larger units hold out a part of
+their strength (usually from one-fourth to one-half) as supports and
+reserves. Avoid splitting or mixing units.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. IX]
+
+[Illustration]
+
+[Illustration]
+
+The density of the _firing line_ in attack and defense is about 1 man
+per yard. A 16 squad company can place 128 rifles (8 x 16) in the
+firing line. Hence the frontage of any line will be equal to about 128
+yards multiplied by number of companies in the firing line, plus or
+minus about 20 per cent. Thus the front of a battalion with 3 companies
+in the firing line would be from 300 to 450 yards. (But see also Chap.
+XII.)
+
+The expressions “1 man per yard” and “at one yard intervals,” are
+usually intended to mean that each yard of the front is to be occupied
+by one man. Actually, the interval or open space between the shoulders
+of adjacent men in this case is about ½ pace (15 inches).
+
+In defense or in the holding or secondary attack a battalion may
+place 3 companies in the firing line. In the main (enveloping) attack
+it would more commonly place 2 companies in the line. The companies
+(of the leading battalions) not in the firing line are called local
+or battalion supports. Each regiment may hold out 1 battalion as
+regimental reserve, each brigade 1 regiment as brigade reserve, and
+each division 1 brigade (and auxiliary troops) as general reserve.
+Circumstances might cause the strength of these reserves to be greater
+at the beginning of an action, but they seldom should be less. The
+defense usually has weaker supports and local reserves, but stronger
+_general reserves_ than the attack. As the defense must play to the
+attacker’s move ample reserves must be held for the purpose. The
+density of a defensive line is not subject to arbitrary rule, so
+greatly does it depend on the mission and other conditions. In a
+delaying action a greater extension is permissible than in a fight to a
+decision. (See also Chaps. XII and XVII.)
+
+
+PROBLEMS INVOLVING THE ATTACK OF A POSITION BY A SMALL INFANTRY FORCE
+
+(Regiment or battalion.)
+
+(See also “The Rifle in War,” Chap. XVI.)
+
+The first stage of the action, which will be given in the problem,
+opens generally with a report from the cavalry or by the advance
+guard being fired upon, or some such occurrence to the front. If it
+is certain that there will be an attack the commander will usually
+order extra ammunition to be issued. The field trains are halted off
+the road or sent to a safe place. The commander then rides forward to
+the most advanced position possible where he can obtain a view of the
+terrain and the enemy’s dispositions and receive reports from cavalry
+or mounted patrols. The adjutant is usually with him and he sends word
+for the column to continue its march or to halt at a certain point and
+await orders. He directs his subordinate commanders to accompany him
+or to follow him to the advanced position. If these subordinates are
+not mounted make due allowance for that fact, considering the time it
+will take them to get up. The circumstances may be such that it is not
+advisable to separate all of his subordinates from their commands,
+but generally he will direct them to proceed to the advance lookout
+point. These subordinates will include the company (or battalion)
+commanders, the adjutant, and the commander of the machine gun company
+(or platoon). The quartermaster and surgeon are usually not called to
+the front. Having reached the advance point, he directs his efforts
+particularly toward ascertaining the location of the hostile flanks
+and examines the ground from which he may launch his attack. Having
+estimated the situation and his subordinates being assembled he issues
+his orders. He must be very sure that every subordinate who has a task
+to perform receives his orders. If any of these are not present the
+orders must be sent to them, and the commander will usually direct his
+adjutant to see that his orders are transmitted to any subordinates who
+are not present. His actual orders will invariably be verbal. Sometimes
+the problem will ask for his combined order. This means the order
+for all parts of the force as it would be dictated to his adjutant
+subsequent to the action. The actual orders may be issued piece-meal,
+but generally try to issue the combined order and then direct the
+adjutant to see that those not present are advised.
+
+The order must cover the following points:
+
+1. Information of the enemy, particularly his strength and the position
+of his flanks. Information of our own and the enemy’s supporting troops.
+
+2. This command (or We) will attack the enemy at once, making a frontal
+attack (or enveloping his right flank). Former march conditions now
+cease.
+
+3. Cos. A and B will constitute the firing line, and will move via ----
+under cover to ______ (edge of woods, ravine, crest, or other cover),
+and will deploy, perpendicular to (or parallel to) ______ at one yard
+intervals, Co. A on the left with its left flank ______ yds. from
+______. Co. A will attack that section of the enemy’s line from ______
+to ______ (inclusive or exclusive); Co. B, that section from ______ to
+______ (inclusive or exclusive.) (Indicate clearly visible landmarks,
+or give definite distances. Be sure that every part of the enemy’s line
+is covered.) I will give the order for the advance (or to open fire).
+
+The foregoing paragraph is for frontal attack. In case the attack is
+enveloping, the order would be:
+
+Cos. A and B will constitute the firing line. Co. A will move via
+______ under cover to ______, and will deploy perpendicular to ______,
+at 1 yard intervals with its left flank at ______ (or -- yards from
+______) and when ordered to do so will advance and attack the enemy’s
+line from ______ to ______ (inclusive or exclusive) directing its right
+on ______, and moving to attack in conjunction with Co. B.
+
+Co. B will move via ______ under cover to ______, deploying when
+necessary perpendicular to ______, at 1 yard intervals with its left
+flank on ______, (or -- yards from ______) and when ordered to do so
+will advance and attack the enemy’s line north of ______ directing its
+left on ______ (or will advance and attack the enemy’s left, etc.)
+
+(No definite limits are assigned to the outside flank. The enemy may
+not be opposite the enveloping attack when it is launched, but will
+likely extend his line to meet it. If the two companies are separated
+at the start and converge on the enemy’s line the orders would be
+similar to those for an enveloping attack. Sometimes the enveloping
+attack will be directed on an interior part of the enemy’s original
+line in which case it will cover part of his front and also envelop
+him. Instead of being ordered to deploy at 1 yard intervals, a company
+may be ordered to deploy on a front of ______ yds.)
+
+I will give the order to advance.
+
+Lieut. Y, with your machine gun platoon and one platoon of Co. C, which
+will report to you as escort, move via ______ to ______ (usually some
+hill or crest). As soon as the attack is well developed open fire on
+the enemy and assist the advance. You will provide protection for our
+left flank (if he is on a flank).
+
+The mounted orderlies under Lt. G (the adjutant or some officer
+especially detailed) will patrol to ______ and ______, covering our
+flanks and observing, etc.
+
+Co. C will send one platoon (or such force) to report to Lieut. Y,
+commander of the machine gun platoon, as escort. It will also send
+a sergeant and ______ men (or such force) well to the right (or via
+______ to ______) as right flank patrol (or to cover our right flank).
+
+Note. It would generally be inadvisable to assign any considerable
+portion of a _small_ force as an escort to the machine guns unless
+it was necessary for effective fire, to place them in a very exposed
+position (on a flank). It may be better to place the machine guns where
+they will need no escort. In the actions of larger forces, however,
+machine guns may often be employed with decisive effect against the
+flanks of the enemy. In such cases they should be used in larger
+masses, not by platoon. They are very effective in repelling surprise
+attacks and are often employed in exposed positions without an escort.
+
+The remainder of Co. C and Co. D, under my command (or under command
+of ______) will constitute the support (or reserve) and will move via
+______ under cover to ______ and there await my orders (or follow Co.
+______ at ______ yards distance, or ______ yards in rear of the right
+flank, or center, etc.)
+
+4. When issue of ammunition is completed the empty ammunition wagons
+will proceed to ______ and park off the road (return to ______ and
+refill, or join field train.)
+
+(Empty ammunition wagons may be used to transport wounded.)
+
+A regt. aid station will be established at ______ (or location of regt.
+aid station will be announced later.) The band will report to the
+regimental surgeon (in a regimental action).
+
+The company wagons (or field train) will halt off the road where they
+now are (or proceed to ______, or take station on such road with head
+at such crossroad, etc.)
+
+(If no dressing station is to be established at first the order may
+direct the sanitary troops to join the field trains or halt at some
+other locality “in readiness.”)
+
+5. Messages may be sent to ______ (generally name a definite point) (or
+I shall be at ______, or with ______).
+
+Explain how and to whom this order is delivered.
+
+Make report to superior commander, by telegraph or telephone, mounted
+messengers, or other available means. Sometimes it may not be possible
+to report until after the action, but a report should always be sent as
+soon as practicable.
+
+The foregoing order applies to any force up to a regiment. A regiment
+is assigned by battalions, each battalion being given its section of
+the attack. Each battalion holds out its own support. The orders,
+while covering all necessary points, must be so drawn as not to
+hamper subordinates by invading their province, nor to destroy their
+initiative by usurping their prerogatives. In the actual case the
+commander will regulate his orders to suit the experience, capacity and
+personal characteristics of the subordinate. In tactical problems the
+assumption will be made that all subordinates are fully instructed and
+competent, each within his own sphere and according to his rank.
+
+Give the route to position for individual companies or battalions
+especially when trouble might ensue from interference of organizations.
+Thus to a battalion or lower commander say--“Move under cover via
+______ to ______.” Be sure that available cover is utilized to the
+utmost extent practicable in the special case. In a regimental action
+the Colonel may direct that the packs be left in a convenient place on
+going into action. The Majors always give the orders about issue of
+ammunition, and see to the sending of combat patrols either as result
+of the colonel’s orders or without special orders. But if no extra
+ammunition is to be issued, or a portion of it only, the orders of the
+superior commander should so state. In some cases it may be inadvisable
+to issue _all_ the extra ammunition. In any case extra ammunition is
+issued when the troops are compelled to separate from their combat
+trains on going into action.
+
+_Be sure_ that localities and dispositions are so described as to be
+perfectly plain not only to your imaginary subordinates but also to the
+_instructor_ who is to review your problem. Great care should be taken
+to designate localities beyond the possibility of misunderstanding. Use
+landmarks, not map-marks, in fixing a locality. In describing a point
+by its reference number make sure there is no other point having the
+same reference, or else say “Hill 622, 600 yds. NW. of SMITH F. H.,”
+etc., etc.
+
+Be very sure that none of the troops come under hostile artillery fire
+in moving to their deploying position if it can be avoided.
+
+_Before deciding on an attack_ the commander should satisfy himself
+as to whether any reinforcements are on their way to the enemy, and
+throughout the action he must be constantly on the lookout for such.
+This is the special duty of the cavalry, or other mounted men.
+
+_The enemy’s line_ and the portion assigned to each unit should be
+designated as clearly as possible, preferably by landmarks, if there
+are such. If there are no landmarks an organization may be directed to
+attack the enemy’s front or his right wing, or for enveloping attack,
+his right flank, etc., distances and other means of orientation being
+given.
+
+The attack orders for larger bodies, so far as the infantry is
+concerned, are similar to the foregoing, but in much less detail.
+
+The engineers in attack may remove obstacles, improve communications,
+repair bridges or construct additional crossings. On the completion of
+their tasks they usually join reserves. They may be used also as an
+escort to the artillery.
+
+Signal troops usually connect the position of the supreme commander
+with the commanders of the main and secondary attacks, artillery
+commander and reserves (if he is not with the reserve). Do not exceed
+the limit of their capacity in wire and telephones. (See “Organization
+of the U. S. Army,” ante.)
+
+The sanitary troops establish the usual collecting, aid and dressing
+stations, and take charge of the evacuation of the wounded.
+
+There is ordinarily a dressing station established for each brigade,
+and in addition a slightly wounded station for each division. The
+dressing station should be near fuel and water, preferably in a village
+or at least near some houses. It should be near the main attack but
+not too close to an artillery position. It should be on the main
+road to the rear and in a conspicuous place easily discovered. The
+slightly wounded station should fulfill as far as possible the same
+requirements, usually somewhat farther to the rear. For a force less
+than a brigade a single dressing station serving also as a slightly
+wounded station, would be established.
+
+The supreme commander gives the orders to the sanitary troops, usually
+after consultation with and upon the recommendation of the senior
+medical officer. The location of the dressing station and, in a
+division action, of the slightly wounded station, should be announced
+to the command in orders. But in case of attack where developments
+cannot be foreseen the order may say “location of dressing station will
+be announced later.” In this case the sanitary troops halt off the road
+at a designated place in rear, or remain with the trains. Usually they
+will be at a place somewhat forward of the trains. (See also “Sanitary
+tactics,” Chap. XV.)
+
+The employment of small units in combat (except as part of a larger
+force) will be exceptional in systematic warfare. For combat tactics of
+small units see I. D. R., Part II, and F. S. R.
+
+
+_Remarks concerning an attack by a reinforced brigade._ If an attack is
+imminent the supreme commander should march with the advance guard.
+
+When the enemy is reported the supreme commander, accompanied by the
+colonel of the advance guard regiment, rides rapidly ahead to some
+point from which the enemy’s line can be seen. If the messages received
+indicate that an attack is probable the brigade commander sends an aide
+to the rear with such of the following orders as the situation may seem
+to justify:
+
+1. Infantry in main body to continue the march, closing up on the
+advance guard, and halting when head of column reaches a point beyond
+which it would be exposed to artillery fire.
+
+2. Colonels of the infantry regiments in the main body, and the
+artillery, engineer and signal commanders to join the supreme commander
+or assemble at the head of the main body to await his return from the
+front.
+
+3. Disposition of the emptied ammunition wagons.
+
+4. Artillery firing batteries to move promptly to the fore, passing
+the infantry in front of them and taking post off the main road in the
+vicinity of their combat position.
+
+5. Field trains and sanitary troops to halt off the road at designated
+localities in rear.
+
+6. Any detachments within reach to rejoin as promptly as possible.
+
+It may not always be practicable to carry out all of the above measures
+until the supreme commander has estimated the situation and fully
+decided to attack. As many as possible should be attended to in
+advance, in order to save time.
+
+Having reached the lookout point to the front the commander endeavors
+to locate or verify reports concerning the location of the enemy’s
+flanks, what intrenching he is doing, etc.
+
+He then considers:
+
+1. Does the mission of the command require an attack, or will an attack
+best accomplish the mission?
+
+2. Is there a reasonable prospect of success?
+
+3. Shall the attack be frontal? Is the enemy’s line so attenuated
+that it can probably be pierced by a frontal attack, or is such an
+attack safer or for other reasons desirable? (Such as undue extension
+necessitated by an enveloping attack.)
+
+4. Shall the attack be enveloping; if so against which flank? (For
+consideration of choice of flank see ante.)
+
+5. From what locality can the friendly artillery best support the
+attack? Between the main and secondary attacks or behind the secondary
+is a good place, as here the artillery will be well protected, will
+need no escort, can support both attacks and, in the latter case (from
+behind secondary attack), can support the main attack with its oblique
+fire up to the last possible instant. Probable positions of the hostile
+artillery should be considered in connection with the selection.
+
+6. Are there any strong positions, such as knolls or ridges which
+should be occupied by infantry (and possibly machine guns) for the
+protection of a flank (or both flanks)?
+
+7. Where should the main and secondary attacks deploy? Can they reach
+their deploying positions in concealment, or with very little exposure?
+
+8. Where should the reserve be held? Generally in rear of the inner
+flank of the main attack is a good place at first.
+
+Having estimated the situation and made his decision the commander
+waits for his subordinates to join him, or returns to the head of
+the column, halting it when necessary (if not already halted) and
+issues his orders verbally, using the map to orient and direct his
+subordinates. It is necessary to note the positions of all elements of
+the command before issuing orders.
+
+The advance guard regiment will usually be assigned to the secondary
+or holding attack, and the next regiment in rear to the main or
+enveloping attack, the rear regiment constituting the reserve.
+
+A front for each regiment in the fighting line is defined as accurately
+as conditions permit, and the approximate deploying position of
+each regiment is indicated. Ordinarily the regimental commanders
+are permitted to conduct their regiments to the deploying positions
+and deploy when necessary. But if there is any danger of confusion,
+interference or unnecessary exposure the supreme commander may
+designate routes to the deploying positions, which should be approached
+as promptly as possible under cover.
+
+The secondary attack may be ordered to “attack in conjunction” with
+the main attack, or the commander may say, “I will give the order (or
+signal) to attack.” In some cases however, the secondary attack may be
+launched before the main attack, to divert the enemy’s attention from
+the latter, etc. The main attack may be launched at once, or may await
+a subsequent command or signal, pending completion of preparations.
+
+Any _special_ provisions necessary for the protection of the flanks
+(such as posting infantry and machine guns in commanding positions
+on the flanks) should be ordered by the brigade commander. If not
+ordered the regimental commanders will make such provisions as they
+deem necessary for the protection of their flanks. If no arrangements
+appear to have been made for this matter, the duty devolves upon the
+commanders of the flank battalions in the firing line.
+
+The cavalry, prior to the attack, feels for the enemy’s line and drives
+in his cavalry. During the attack it operates on and covers the flanks,
+while threatening those of the enemy. The bulk of the cavalry should
+be placed on the flank where the enemy’s cavalry is known to be, or
+on that flank which is more exposed. A smaller body of cavalry, or a
+detachment of mounted men under an officer, covers the other flank. The
+duties of the cavalry during an action are to force back the enemy’s
+cavalry, to guard the flanks and threaten those of the enemy, and to
+watch for and give timely notice of the approach of reinforcements for
+the enemy, delaying their advance when practicable.
+
+The artillery of the attack should be placed in one or more positions
+from which it can support the infantry throughout the action.
+Ordinarily it is best to hold the artillery in large masses, but
+a division is permissible if the tactical situation demands. The
+artillery of the attack usually directs its fire on that element
+of the defense which is at the time the most threatening to the
+attacking infantry. In the assault it supports the infantry to the last
+practicable moment and then switches its fire to search the ground
+occupied by the defender’s reserves, or that over which they must pass
+in delivering a counter-stroke, etc. The artillery combat trains are
+at the disposal of the artillery commander unless otherwise specially
+ordered.
+
+The reserve follows the main attack at a certain distance, or proceeds
+to a convenient locality designated and awaits orders. Usually the
+reserve will follow or be posted conveniently near the main attack, as
+it is on this flank that it will ordinarily be used. Exceptionally it
+may be posted in a more central position.
+
+The engineers may be used to remove obstacles, improve communications,
+etc. They then join the reserve.
+
+The signal troops connect the commander with the main and secondary
+attacks, the reserve and the artillery, to the limit of their capacity.
+
+The field trains and sanitary troops are halted well to the rear. A
+dressing station may be established by the first order, or announced
+later.
+
+After the issue of the extra ammunition the battalion ammunition wagons
+are collected at some convenient point in rear.
+
+The supreme commander should take station at some good lookout point
+from which he can watch the progress of the action, and should
+generally remain there. If possible this point should be near
+the general reserve so that the commander can readily direct its
+employment. The station must not be too exposed nor too near the
+artillery.
+
+Every fraction of the command must be accounted for in orders. Every
+subordinate who has a special mission to perform must receive definite
+orders concerning same.
+
+
+_Remarks concerning advance guard action._ An advance guard action does
+not, in its detail differ particularly from any other combat of all
+arms, except that an advance guard has less independence of action than
+a separate detachment.
+
+It may result from:
+
+ a. Guarding main body against surprise.
+
+ b. Reconnoitering.
+
+ c. Pushing back reconnoitering forces of the enemy.
+
+ d. Pressing upon delaying forces of the enemy.
+
+ e. Pursuit of a defeated or retiring enemy.
+
+ f. Checking the enemy’s advance to give the main body time to
+ prepare for action.
+
+ g. Seizing and holding a position to cover the passage of the
+ main body through a defile or across a bridge. (In this
+ case the enemy must be kept well beyond artillery range
+ of the outlet of the defile.)
+
+ h. When the enemy is encountered in force on the defensive,
+ holding him in position and reconnoitering his lines (in
+ force, if necessary) while awaiting the arrival of the main
+ body.
+
+In deciding what action to take on meeting the enemy the advance guard
+must consider (a) Its mission, and also that of the main body, whether
+aggressive or not. (b) The comparative strength of the enemy and his
+apparent intentions. (c) The relative positions of the enemy, the
+advance guard and the main body, as well as other hostile or friendly
+troops. (d) Provisions for the security of the main body. This in
+general means that its front must not be uncovered, except in pursuit
+of a badly demoralized enemy.
+
+In selecting flank to attack consider tactical success first and
+strategical advantages second.
+
+An advance guard, while usually acting aggressively, must not engage
+in very doubtful enterprises, jeopardizing the safety of main body or
+committing it to action against its will. The mission of the whole
+command must be considered.
+
+The advance guard by deploying for a frontal attack along the line of
+advance keeps the main body covered, leaves the supreme commander free
+to decide on which flank he will extend, and holds the enemy until he
+can come up. Frontal attacks are therefore of frequent occurrence in
+advance guard actions.
+
+In pursuing a defeated enemy even if advance guard encounters him
+in force a prompt attack, usually frontal, is advisable. It is not
+necessary to drive it home if this does not seem advisable; and there
+is usually little risk of a counter attack. But if enemy is still in
+good morale and there is reason for caution, an advance guard may take
+a position in readiness. If in doubt an attack is usually best, but the
+advance guard must not risk the defeat of the entire force in detail
+by a too impetuous attack on a greatly superior enemy. Good judgment
+is required in handling an advance guard in such situations, and for
+this reason it is advisable that the supreme commander be with the
+advance guard on the march. It is the proper duty of the cavalry to
+clear up the situation in advance. (See “Advance guards,” Chap. IV and
+“Rencontre engagement,” Chap. XIII.)
+
+
+_The occupation of a defensive position._ In selecting a defensive
+position the following should be considered:
+
+1. Is it necessary to take a defensive position, and has the time
+arrived to do so? (See “Position in Readiness.”)
+
+2. Must the enemy attack the position or can he march around it?
+
+3. Are there good positions with clear field of fire for infantry and
+artillery? (For delaying actions a good field of fire at long and mid
+ranges is a prime requisite.)
+
+4. Natural protection for both?
+
+5. Line or lines of retreat secure and accessible to all parts of
+the force? If there is but one line of retreat it should be central.
+Several lines of retreat are often an advantage to the retiring force
+if it is a large one, but on the other hand they may also favor the
+enemy by allowing parallel pursuit. Good rallying points in rear?
+
+6. Flanks secure?
+
+7. Communications good to front, rear and flanks?
+
+8. Ground favorable for cavalry action?
+
+9. Good locations for attacker’s artillery within effective range, if
+so are they registered?
+
+10. Line enfiladed anywhere?
+
+11. Obstacles to enemy’s advance, front and flanks? How do they bear
+upon possible assumption of offensive if such is contemplated?
+
+12. Any rallying points or dead spaces for enemy within effective range?
+
+13. Has position been improved as much as possible? Are ranges to
+important points known?
+
+14. Where is the main attack most likely to fall?
+
+15. Are there good stations for the supports and reserves at proper
+distance? Can reserves be held in safe place favorable for counter
+attack?
+
+16. Should the line be divided into sections? If so can the sections
+support each other, and if there are any intervals are they well
+covered?
+
+17. Is the extent of the front suitable to the size of the command? Is
+it approximately perpendicular to the line of retreat? To the line of
+enemy’s advance?
+
+18. Is the view good to the front and in the position itself?
+
+19. Is the position well concealed from enemy’s view?
+
+20. Are there any weak salients in the line?
+
+21. Are there any advanced posts which should be occupied to prevent
+the enemy from doing so, or to cause his early deployment, etc? Can the
+troops be withdrawn from them in safety without masking fire of main
+position? (Advanced posts should, as a rule, be avoided.)
+
+A single position giving a favorable answer to _all_ these questions
+will never be found. They indicate, however, the desiderata.
+
+A defensive position should be occupied only when general direction of
+enemy’s advance is known, and it is evident about where his attack will
+fall. Otherwise take a position in readiness, from which a defensive
+position may later be evolved.
+
+Consider whether the mission is best accomplished by taking a position
+farther to the front or one to the rear. Frequently there will be time
+only to make the best of what is near at hand. It is to be remembered
+in this connection, that a rencontre engagement usually favors
+the stronger and more aggressive combatant. A weaker force should
+generally therefore allow itself ample time to occupy and prepare
+a defensive position, rather than risk a rencontre or at least a
+premature engagement by pushing too far to the front. The time that a
+smaller force can delay a larger one depends on the terrain, the time
+available for preparation, and the absolute and relative strengths of
+the combatants. To give a rough idea of the times that smaller bodies
+can maintain themselves against larger ones it may be said that a
+reinforced brigade in a hastily prepared position should ordinarily
+be able to hold a division for some 2 to 3 hours; and that in similar
+circumstances, a division should hope to maintain itself against a
+corps for some 6 to 9 hours. Where the situation specially favors the
+defender, he may, of course, be able to hold very much longer. Each
+case is special and can hardly be said to have precedents.
+
+The recent improvements in weapons have conferred greatly increased
+powers of resistance upon the defense. Except small forces, which
+cannot adequately secure their flanks nor block turning movements,
+troops on the defensive in a prepared position can be driven therefrom
+only with the greatest difficulty and, usually, a considerable
+expenditure of ammunition.
+
+Must the enemy attack the position selected, or can he turn it? If
+delay only is the object this may be accomplished if enemy has to turn
+the position. But if it is desired to bar his advance and court an
+attack he should be both forced and enticed to attack. In such case
+do not take a position which _appears_ impregnable or enemy may be
+discouraged from attacking.
+
+The artillery should not be posted so close to the infantry line that
+it will draw fire upon it--five hundred yards or so behind the line is
+best.
+
+Obstacles in front of the entire position are seldom of advantage to
+the defense. Obstacles which delay the enemy without concealing him,
+such as marshy ground, are a strong element of defense. There must be
+passages for the counter attack if such is contemplated, and in general
+the bearing of obstacles upon the conduct of an active defense must be
+carefully considered.
+
+Consider which flank the enemy will probably attack and post the main
+reserves behind that flank. If there is some doubt seek a central
+position for the reserve from which it can reach either flank, or
+consider the advisability of dividing the reserve.
+
+If the force be a regiment assign sections of the line to battalions;
+if a brigade, to regiments. Machine guns are not usually assigned to a
+battalion section. Their proper function is for surprise of the enemy
+at effective ranges, reinforcing weak portions of the line, etc. They
+are usually left under the orders of the regimental commanders, but
+may be assigned by orders of the supreme commander for flank defense
+or for fire of position if the enemy has no artillery. (See “Machine
+guns,” Chap. XIII.)
+
+Openings in the line are sometimes permissible, provided they are
+covered by the fire of adjacent organizations, or protected by
+reserves. In fact slight openings all along the line will be the
+rule, as it will seldom be practicable to occupy the entire front
+continuously, unless the force be a very small one. In the order of
+the supreme commander however, the assigned sectors will generally be
+contiguous, the detailed organization of each being left to the sector
+commander.
+
+The density of the firing line in defense is seldom uniform. Some parts
+of the line may be lightly held to allow more men where a greater
+volume of fire is required. Obstacles in the front may also have an
+influence on the density of the firing line. Hence the fronts assigned
+to two regiments need not always be equal in extent.
+
+In the early stages of a combat the defense, by reasons of its
+intrenchments, concealment, superior fire discipline, and smaller
+losses, may economize on men in the firing line and local supports _in
+order to have larger general reserves_ to throw in at the decisive
+point in the later stages of the action, or for a counter attack.
+
+If ammunition is plentiful, long range fire, to force the attacker
+to an early deployment, is permissible and often advantageous on the
+defense. The limiting range of such fire, under good conditions, is
+about 1,800 yards.
+
+If a delaying action only is contemplated, the intention being merely
+to force the attacker to deploy, the line may be very lightly held
+and greatly extended with few local supports, or none at all, and
+small reserves. Such tactics of course, may be risky. The position
+should be promptly evacuated as soon as the attacker has completed his
+dispositions for the attack, since it is very difficult to withdraw
+infantry from a position after it is committed to action. Cavalry, by
+reason of its superior mobility is better than infantry for delaying
+actions. If there is a good line of retreat and cover for the led
+horses close in rear, cavalry may allow the enemy to approach within
+700 yards or less, before withdrawing. (See “Cavalry tactics,” Chap.
+IX.)
+
+Ranges to important points in the foreground should be determined
+(and marked) if there is time. The field of fire is cleared and the
+position intrenched to the extent that time allows, or conditions
+require.
+
+The instructions to “prepare the line for defense” cover the
+construction of intrenchments and obstacles and the necessary clearing.
+In this the engineers assist at the most difficult places. The
+intrenching proper should usually be done by the troops who are to
+occupy the trenches, but this rule is not rigid.
+
+The supreme commander will direct in orders that the empty ammunition
+wagons be assembled at a point (or points) in rear. Subsequently they
+refill at designated point from the ammunition train, one or more
+companies of which are ordered up for this purpose or, in a smaller
+action, the combat wagons may be assembled and marched back to a depot
+to refill. Empty wagons of all kinds moving to the rear may be utilized
+for the evacuation of the wounded.
+
+If the fight is to be to decision the artillery should if possible be
+so located that it can be run up to a crest for direct fire in the
+later stages of the defense.
+
+When contact is established the cavalry uncovers the front and
+transfers its activities to the flanks, reconnoitering those of the
+enemy, and operating to his rear to observe the approach of possible
+hostile reinforcements. In retiring to a flank the movements of the
+hostile cavalry must be considered, and the enemy should be denied a
+superiority in this arm on either flank if the strength of the cavalry
+permits it. It is therefore inadvisable, unless greatly superior in
+strength to the enemy, to disperse the cavalry. The bulk of it should
+be kept in hand to oppose that of the enemy. A small detachment of the
+cavalry may be used for observation on the other flank.
+
+The advance guard regiment may be directed to provide for the security
+of the command to the front until the position is occupied. Former
+march conditions cease (if command has been on the march). In retiring
+to its position the advance guard regiment must not mask the fire
+of troops already on the line, or allow the enemy to follow it too
+closely, and possibly gain an advantageous position.
+
+Machine guns should be preferably near the flanks. If especially
+desirable positions for dagger batteries are available they may be
+used. (A dagger battery is one so situated as to be protected from
+frontal fire and able to surprise the attacker by flanking or oblique
+fire from a position at short range, such as a saddle in front of and
+perpendicular to the line. See “Machine Guns”--post.)
+
+Flank patrols (inf.) are sent out by the regiment on the flank without
+special orders. But if special measures such as a strong flank guard
+with a machine gun platoon, are required, the supreme commander should
+order flank organization (or reserve) to provide for this. In general
+it will be the duty of flank organizations to provide for security to
+the flanks.
+
+The reserve should provide for the security of the lines of retreat,
+especially the bridges. They may be used to assist in preparing the
+position for defense--preferably clearing rather than intrenching. They
+will assemble at their designated post in rear on cessation of the
+work. Same for engineers, who join the reserve when work ceases.
+
+Dressing station will be established by order or the location of
+dressing station may be announced later.
+
+A usual formation for a brigade in defense is two regiments on the
+line and one in reserve. If any departure from this is made it should
+be in the way of a _larger reserve_ (except in delaying actions). (See
+“Counter attack”--post.)
+
+A defensive position should not be too strongly garrisoned at the
+opening of the attack. The line should be held lightly with strong
+general reserves until the attacker has shown his intentions. The
+reserves are thrown in at the threatened point and used to deliver a
+counter attack.
+
+It is sometimes advisable to defend advanced posts (but not advanced
+positions as a rule) to prevent enemy from seizing them too early.
+They cannot be held to a decision. One determined stand is better
+than several half-hearted ones. Especially is this the case if troops
+retreating out of one position under cover of fire from another, mask
+part of this fire, and arrive in disorder on the front. Also this means
+a dispersion of troops, and a diminution of the defender’s fighting
+strength at the very beginning of the action. One good prepared
+position to be defended by all troops is preferable to a succession of
+positions, in a decisive action.
+
+An independent detachment is seldom justified in sacrificing itself. A
+covering detachment must do so when necessary for the protection of its
+main body.
+
+
+_The Counter attack._ Every active defense should contemplate an
+eventual assumption of the offensive. The defense, being intrenched,
+not subject to losses nor exhaustion to such an extent as the attacker,
+and being more easily supplied with ammunition and better able to
+maintain an accurate, continuous fire, can use fewer men in its firing
+line and supports. Hence the defense is characterized by large general
+reserves. This feature should be developed to the utmost possible, the
+defensive line being held with the least practicable number, in order
+that the general reserves may be as strong as possible.
+
+The general reserve is employed in three ways: (a) To extend the flanks
+in order to meet the enemy’s enveloping attack. When the terrain
+allows, the troops on the flank should be so disposed as to bring
+oblique or enfilade fire to bear upon the enveloping attack. (b) To
+reinforce critical points of the line, against which the enemy has
+concentrated his force. (c) For counter attacks.
+
+Counter attacks are perhaps less subject to rule than any other
+tactical operation. They vary in size from small local counter attacks
+to a general reversal of the situation and an assumption of the
+offensive by the entire force of the defender.
+
+The troops for the counter attack are kept well in hand and _concealed_
+near the position from which it is proposed to launch the attack.
+
+The proper time and manner of delivering a counter attack require
+good judgment on the part of the commander. A counter attack to be
+successful should be sprung as a surprise on the enemy.
+
+The counter attack may be delivered just as the enemy has carried the
+position and is disorganized and in confusion. It may be delivered
+before his assault and while he is closely held within effective
+range by the fire of the defense. A counter attack is naturally most
+effective, when delivered from a flank. The attacker’s reserves will,
+of course, be on the lookout for counter attacks, hence the defense
+must hold out reserves to protect the counter attack. The most
+favorable time, then, to make a counter attack, is when the enemy is
+known to have thrown in his last reserve. He then has nothing to oppose
+to the defender’s counter attack.
+
+Supporting points in rear of the main line of defense aid in breaking
+up an assault and contribute to the success of a counter attack.
+
+The attacker’s artillery, after supporting the infantry to the last
+practicable moment will probably switch its fire to search the ground
+occupied by the defender’s reserves, or that over which they must
+approach in delivering the counter attack. The artillery of the defense
+should be posted and handled to meet this contingency.
+
+If the attacker fails to establish fire superiority and his advance
+is checked the defender increases the volume of his fire, reinforcing
+his firing line if necessary. As the attacker wavers or starts to
+withdraw, the defender assumes the offensive and advances against him.
+If at the same time a strong counter-stroke can be launched against
+the attacker’s flank, his repulse or even his utter rout is probable.
+The nature of the terrain should, of course, be such as to favor the
+assumption of the offensive, and the position should be selected with
+this in view.
+
+The commander of the defense should study the terrain and carefully
+watch the progress of the action with a view to taking the offensive at
+the proper moment.
+
+From the foregoing considerations it is possible to draw the following
+suggestions as to the conduct of an ideal active defense.
+
+(a) Select a position whose front is such as to favor the assumption of
+the offensive.
+
+(b) Cover, concealment and good communications for the reserves are
+essential.
+
+(c) The position should be artificially strengthened to as great an
+extent as time allows, or as conditions appear to demand.
+
+(d) The defensive position should not be too greatly extended nor too
+strongly garrisoned at the outset, and before the enemy’s intentions
+have become manifest. The line may be extended and strengthened during
+the course of the action, as the developments thereof may require.
+At the opening of an engagement, however, a line lightly held, with
+_strong reserves_, is characteristic of an _active_ defense.
+
+(e) Compel the attack to deploy at long range.
+
+(f) Meet the attacker’s envelopment by an extension of the line.
+
+(g) Prevent the enemy from gaining fire superiority, reinforcing the
+firing line if necessary. Cause him to throw in his supports and
+reserves.
+
+(h) Check the enemy’s advance in a position favorable for a counter
+attack.
+
+(i) Launch a strong counter attack against one of his flanks, holding
+out some reserves to meet those of the enemy.
+
+(k) As the counter attack rolls back the enemy, advance against him
+along the whole line, the artillery following up the infantry.
+
+It will not often be possible for the defender to regulate the course
+of the action, unless he be nearly equal in strength to the attacker or
+exceptionally favored by the terrain.
+
+It will be usually a question of taking advantage of such opportunities
+as may in the course of events be presented. The only rule that can be
+given is that the defender should have large reserves and be constantly
+on the lookout for a favorable opportunity to make aggressive use
+of them. The most favorable opportunities for a counter stroke will
+_usually_ be presented on that flank which the enemy is endeavoring to
+envelop.
+
+(For the use of auxiliary arms in combat see also “Artillery Tactics,”
+and “Cavalry Tactics,” Chaps. VIII and IX.)
+
+
+ORDER FOR A FRONTAL ATTACK BY AN ADVANCE GUARD.
+
+ Advance Guard, 1st Division, 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ ASH GROVE S. H., PA.,
+ Field Orders, } 1 July, '12, 9:05 a. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
+
+1. A hostile detachment consisting of 3 or 4 regiments of cavalry and
+1 or 2 batteries of horse artillery occupies a defensive line across
+the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE just east of GERMANTOWN. The left of the line
+rests on the wood southeast of MEYER F. H., the right on the small wood
+northeast of the B. D. SNYDER F. H. Our main body halts at LITTLESTOWN
+until 10:30 a. m.
+
+2. This advance guard will make a frontal attack on the hostile force
+near GERMANTOWN at once, and clear the road to GETTYSBURG. Former march
+conditions now cease.
+
+3. (a) The 1st Battalion, 1st Light Artillery, will move at a trot
+under cover to a position in the vicinity of Hill 607 and at once open
+fire on the enemy and support the attack.
+
+(b) The 1st Infantry will move north of the turnpike under cover to the
+vicinity of road junction 584, deploying perpendicular to the BALTIMORE
+TURNPIKE with its left resting thereon and, in conjunction with the
+2d Infantry, will advance and attack that portion of the enemy’s line
+north of the turnpike.
+
+(c) The 2d Infantry will move south of the turnpike under cover to the
+vicinity of GOUKER F. H., deploying perpendicular to the turnpike with
+its right resting thereon, and will advance and attack that portion of
+the enemy’s line south of the turnpike.
+
+(d) The 3rd Infantry, in reserve, will follow the 1st Infantry to
+the vicinity of road junction 584, and there await orders. 8 mounted
+orderlies of this regiment will report to me at once.
+
+(e) The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, on withdrawing from the front will
+cover our right, operating against the enemy’s left and rear. A half
+troop under an officer will be sent to cover our left.
+
+(f) Co. A, 1st Engineers, will repair the bridge on the BALTIMORE
+TURNPIKE east of GIDD F. H., making it safe for the passage of
+artillery, and construct two additional crossings for foot troops only
+over ALLOWAY CREEK, one north of the turnpike the other south of same.
+Upon the completion of this work the engineers will join the reserve.
+
+4. The 1st Ambulance Co. will take a position in readiness off the road
+just east of Hill 607. Location of dressing station will be announced
+later.
+
+When extra ammunition has been issued the empty battalion ammunition
+wagons will assemble off the road opposite the 1st Amb. Co.
+
+5. Messages to GIDD F. H.
+
+ A,
+ Brigadier General.
+
+ Verbally to Staff and C. O. of:
+
+ 1st Inf.
+ 2d Inf.
+ 3d Inf.
+ 1st Bn., 1st L. A.
+ Co. A, 1st Engrs.
+ Copy by aide to C. O., 1st Sq., 1st Cav.
+ Copy by mtd. messenger to C. O., 1st Amb. Co.
+
+ By mtd. officer:
+ Adv. Gd., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ 1 July, '12, 9:08 a. m.
+
+ C. G., 1st Div.:
+
+3 or 4 regts. Red Cavalry with 1 or 2 btrys. H. A. across BALTIMORE
+PIKE, just east of GERMANTOWN, left near MEYER F. H., right near B. D.
+SNYDER F. H. Am making frontal attack at once, 3d inf. in reserve, cav.
+covering our right. Messages to GIDD F. H.
+
+ A,
+ Brig. Gen.
+
+_Notes_: Considerable latitude has been allowed the artillery commander.
+
+He is not told to reconnoiter advanced positions for the reason that he
+always does this as a matter of course. Gen. A will consult him when
+the time arrives to move the artillery forward.
+
+The exact routes to their deploying positions are not prescribed for
+the infantry regiments. Gen. A has no time to make a deep study of
+the matter of cover. There is no danger of the regiments getting lost
+or interfering with each other, and their colonels may be trusted to
+lead them to their positions with as little exposure as possible,
+reconnoitering in advance with mounted men as they proceed.
+
+General A considers no special measures necessary for the protection
+of his flanks, beyond those provided for in the orders to the cavalry.
+In the absence of any special instructions the Colonels of the 1st and
+2nd Infantry will take such measures as they deem necessary for flank
+protection, using mounted and infantry patrols.
+
+Very general instructions only, are given to the cavalry. Major
+A is an experienced cavalry officer. He understands that he is
+dealing with a large cavalry force which, while fighting a dismounted
+action, undoubtedly has strong mounted reserves in hand. He therefore
+appreciates the need for caution. He also understands that the enemy’s
+most vulnerable parts are his groups of led horses.
+
+All the bridges over Alloway Creek have been destroyed or injured
+by flood and the creek is flowing bank full. The engineer commander
+will at once despatch his mounted section with the necessary tools
+to prepare crossings north and south of the turnpike for the 1st
+and 2d Infantry. He will do this by repairing the old crossings if
+practicable; and endeavor to finish the work promptly so as not to
+delay the attacking troops in getting into position. Later the foot
+section of the engineer company will improve these crossings (for the
+use of the Division should it have to take part in the attack) and will
+put the bridge near Gidd F. H. in good order.
+
+The ammunition wagons are assembled in one place in order to have them
+at hand when wanted. Without such orders they might be scattered all
+along the road, interfering also with the movements of troops. General
+A may use them later to transport wounded to Littlestown, at which time
+also they would proceed to the division trains to refill.
+
+The references given in this order (such as “the woods S. of MEYER
+F. H.”) might not be readily understood at the time by General A’s
+subordinates, who are not provided with 3" maps. At the time of giving
+his orders General A would point out the various localities mentioned
+to his subordinates (who are with him on Hill 607). Then by the aid of
+their Geological (1”) Maps they can easily identify the places referred
+to. The brigade adjutant in later writing up the order, would ascertain
+the names of the various farm houses as far as practicable, as this is
+the easiest and surest means of identifying them.
+
+Following is the foregoing order reduced to smaller compass:
+
+ Adv. Gd., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ ASH GROVE S. H., PA.,
+ Field Orders, } 1 July, '13, 9:05 a. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
+
+1. A hostile detachment of 3 or 4 regiments of cavalry and 1 or 2
+batteries of horse artillery is in position just east of GERMANTOWN;
+right at small wood northeast of B. D. SNYDER, left at wood southeast
+of MEYER.
+
+Our main body halts at LITTLESTOWN until 10:30 a. m.
+
+2. We attack at once.
+
+3. (a) Artillery takes position near Hill 607 and supports attack.
+
+(b) 1st Inf. moves north of turnpike to near road jct. 584, thence in
+conjunction with 2d Inf. attacks enemy line north of turnpike.
+
+(c) 2d Inf. moves south of turnpike to near GOUKER, thence at once
+attacks enemy line south of turnpike.
+
+(d) 3d Inf., reserve, follows 2d to near road jct. 584 and awaits
+orders.
+
+(e) Cavalry on withdrawing from front covers right and operates against
+enemy’s left and rear. A half troop covers our left.
+
+(f) Engineers make bridge east of GIDD passable for artillery,
+construct two crossings for foot troops over ALLOWAY CREEK, north and
+south of turnpike, join reserve.
+
+4. Ambulance Co., and empty ammunition wagons east of Hill 607.
+
+5. Messages to GIDD.
+
+ A,
+ Brig. Gen.
+
+How and to whom transmitted, etc., etc.
+
+The body of the order in this second example contains but half as many
+words as the first and yet conveys all the instructions necessary in
+this case. Thus for instance the guiding directions for the infantry
+regiments in attack are omitted as it will be perfectly apparent that
+they will use the turnpike which separates the enemy’s line into the
+sectors assigned to each attack. A comparison of these two orders will
+indicate how unnecessary verbiage may often be eliminated. It is to be
+noted, however, that clearness is more important than brevity.
+
+
+ORDER FOR AN ENVELOPING ATTACK.
+
+ Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ Hill 636 (1 mi. southeast of HUNTERSTOWN, PA.)
+ Field Orders, } 1 October, '12, 10:20 a. m.
+ No. -- }
+
+ Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
+
+1. A hostile detachment of 2 regts. of infantry, one or two btrys.
+of field artillery, and a troop of cavalry, has taken up a defensive
+position on the heights west of HUNTERSTOWN. Its right flank rests on
+Hill 603, its left near HENDERSON MEETING HOUSE.
+
+Our cavalry has driven in the hostile cavalry which retreated to the
+north of HUNTERSTOWN.
+
+2. This detachment will attack the enemy in its front at once,
+enveloping his right flank. Former march conditions now cease.
+
+3. (a) The 1st Bn., 1st Light Arty. will take a position near Hill 636
+and support the attack.
+
+(b) The 1st Inf. will proceed along main road to the edge of the wood
+near road junction 585, deploying perpendicular to the road with its
+left about 250 yds. south thereof. From here it will advance and attack
+the enemy’s line north of Hill 603, directing its left on the hill and
+moving to the attack in conjunction with the 2d Inf.
+
+A half company will be sent to the vicinity of the orchard on Hill 592
+to cover our right.
+
+(c) The 2d Inf. will leave the main road near 606 and move via the
+632--600--585 road, thence under cover to the small wood ½ mile east
+of 572. From there, it will advance and attack the enemy’s line south
+and west of Hill 603, directing its right on the eastern corner of the
+orchard southwest of HUNTERSTOWN.
+
+A half company will be sent to the orchard at 572 to cover our left.
+
+(d) The 3d Inf. in reserve, will follow in rear of the right flank of
+the 2d Inf.
+
+(e) The cavalry will withdraw to and cover our right flank, operating
+against the enemy’s left and rear. A half troop will be sent well to
+our left. Reconnaissance to GOLDENVILLE and TABLE ROCK.
+
+(f) The engineers will open up two trails through the thicket northeast
+of HUNTERSTOWN, and then take station at the eastern edge of same.
+
+(g) The signal troops will connect me with the 1st Inf. and the
+artillery.
+
+4. The 1st Amb. Co. will establish a dressing station south of the main
+road at the stream crossing ⅓ mile west of 632.
+
+When the issue of extra ammunition is completed the empty ammunition
+wagons will join 1st Amb. Co. where they will be at the disposal of the
+Chief Surgeon until further orders.
+
+The field trains will halt off the road at place of receipt of this
+order.
+
+5. Messages to the reserve.
+
+ A,
+ Brig. Gen.
+
+ Verbally to Staff and C. O.:
+
+ 1st Bn., 1st L. A.
+ Signal troops.
+ Co. A, 1st Engrs.
+ 1st Inf.
+ 2d Inf.
+ 3d Inf.
+
+ Copy by aide to C. O., 1st Sq., 1st Cav.
+ Copy by mtd. messenger to C. O., 1st Amb. Co., F. Tn.
+ (Report of dispositions to C. G., 1st Div.--see ante.)
+
+_Notes_: General A considers special measures necessary for the
+protection of his flanks. The engineers are so placed as to guard
+against a counter attack on the Blue right.
+
+The cavalry amongst other duties watches for the approach of hostile
+reinforcements.
+
+As General A will be with the reserve regiment he does not need any
+orderlies other than those of that regiment.
+
+
+ORDER FOR THE OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION.
+
+ Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ Road Junction 616, South of PLAINVIEW, PA.,
+ Field Orders, } 20 Sept., '12, 10:00 a. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
+
+1. A hostile force of all arms is moving northward on the
+GETTYSBURG--HARRISBURG ROAD, advance party at the COUNTY ALMSHOUSE,
+just outside of GETTYSBURG, at 9:00 a. m.
+
+Our cavalry defeated the hostile cavalry near this point this morning
+and is now engaged in delaying the enemy’s advance.
+
+2. This detachment will take up a defensive position across the
+HARRISBURG ROAD near road junction 561 to cover the crossings of the
+CONEWAGO CREEK for our division. Former march conditions now cease.
+
+3. (a) The artillery will take a position in observation on the north
+slope of the ridge near Hill 707.
+
+(b) The 1st Inf. will occupy the section from a point on the 666-576
+road about 400 yds. southwest of 666 thence westward to the farm road
+leading southwest from Hill 712. This regiment will provide for the
+security of the entire command to the front until the position is
+occupied.
+
+The 2d Inf. will occupy the section from the left of the 1st Inf. to
+a point on the nose about 200 yds. northeast of 561. A company with a
+machine gun platoon will be sent to the woods about 700 yds. south of
+PLAINVIEW and a half company to the woods about 1,500 yds. southeast of
+PLAINVIEW.
+
+The entire position will be prepared for defense.
+
+(c) The 3d Infantry in reserve, will take position in mass near 605.
+This regiment will provide for the security of the bridges 502W and
+near HERSHEY MILL. 10 mtd. orderlies of this regiment will report to me
+at once.
+
+(d) The cavalry will continue to delay the enemy and when obliged to
+fall back will cover our right. A half troop will be sent to cover our
+left.
+
+(e) The engineers will start work at once on the section assigned to
+the 1st Infantry, assisting that regiment, and joining the reserve when
+work ceases.
+
+4. The 1st Amb Co. will take a position in readiness north of the
+bridge 502W.
+
+The field trains will park east of the HARRISBURG ROAD north of WERMAN
+F. H.
+
+The bn. combat trains and the caissons of the artillery when empty will
+be sent to YORK SPRINGS to refill.
+
+5. Messages to Hill 712.
+
+ A,
+ Brigadier General.
+
+ Dictated to Staff and C. O.:
+ 1st Inf.
+ 2d Inf.
+ 3d Inf.
+ 1st Bn., 1st L. A.
+ Co. A, 1st Engrs.
+
+ Copies by mtd. messengers to C. O., 1st Amb. Co. and Tns.
+
+Telegram.
+
+ Detch. 1st Div.,
+ PLAINVIEW, PA.,
+ 1 Oct. '12--10:05 a. m.
+ C. G., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ YORK SPRINGS, PA.
+
+Red force all arms weak in cavalry, probably 2d Div., 1st Red Corps,
+moved north from GETTYSBURG, starting 9:00 a. m. Detch. takes position
+across HARRISBURG ROAD near 561 (GETTYSBURG-ANTIETAM map) to delay
+advance. Cavalry covers right. Will guard bridges 502W and at HERSHEY
+MILL for div. Telegrams to PLAINVIEW.
+
+ A,
+ Brig. Gen.
+
+_Notes_: General A considers it unnecessary to mention to his own
+troops, the enemy’s great superiority of strength, although it is
+essential that he advise his superior. The fact that he is taking up a
+defensive position is sufficiently suggestive.
+
+The position is described in general terms only in Par. 2, and more
+precisely in Par 3.
+
+The Col. of the 1st Inf., without orders, will place a small combat
+patrol to the right. General A has made special provisions (outside the
+sphere of the Col. of the 2d Inf.) for the security of his left.
+
+The expression “prepared for defense” includes (besides intrenching)
+clearing foreground, measuring ranges, constructing obstacles, etc.,
+all so far as time allows. The infantry will do the intrenching--the
+engineers (if present) the special work. (See “Organization of a
+defensive position.”)
+
+The message contains all the information which the division commander
+requires at this time. Upon approaching the position he will receive
+personal advices as to the latest developments in the situation.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XII.
+
+THE ORGANIZATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION.
+
+
+The following remarks pertain to tactical or field fortification as
+distinguished from provisional or permanent fortification. With the
+latter the average line officer has little to do. With the former he
+should be intimately familiar.
+
+The principles herein discussed are to be considered as generally
+applicable to portions of an extended defensive line to be occupied
+by a force at least as great as a reinforced brigade. Smaller forces
+rarely take up an intrenched position except for special purposes such
+as: to delay the enemy in a defile, to protect bridges, stores or
+munitions, etc., against raiding parties, in time of stress to hold out
+against a larger force of irregulars until assistance comes, etc. In
+all such special cases the tactics employed would be quite different
+from those which would be applicable to a regular defensive position
+occupied by a large force, and each problem would be dealt with in
+accordance with the demands of the situation. Intrenched positions,
+except in special situations, are usually impracticable for small
+forces as, on account of their limited extent, they are easily turned.
+
+The first requirement of a defensive position is that it shall be one
+which the enemy must attack to accomplish his mission. If he can attain
+his purpose by a turning movement or other maneuver the time spent in
+organizing the position will be more than wasted. Another important
+requirement is that the position be so selected and organized that the
+enemy cannot hold the defenders in position with a small portion of his
+force in their front while he turns their line with the bulk of his
+command. Unless a purely passive defense is contemplated the aim of
+each combatant should be to concentrate a superiority of force at the
+critical point while holding the enemy in check at other points, for
+herein lies the secret of success. Field fortifications exercise a most
+baneful influence if they induce the defender to forego this purpose
+or cause him to fail in the accomplishment. Under the usual assumption
+that the attacking force is the stronger the defender’s organization
+should be such that his intrenched troops can hold their front against
+a superior number of the enemy, leaving the mobile reserves free for
+the more active operations which must be relied upon to win decisive
+victory. Field fortifications, then, are a means to an end. If used
+indiscriminately, without a due regard for the strategical and tactical
+requirements of the situation they may actually defeat instead of
+promote the aims of the commander.
+
+The general line to be occupied by a large force must usually be
+selected from the map, in such manner as to meet the strategical and
+tactical requirements of the situation. If the map is a good one (such
+as the maps of the U. S. Geological Survey) the brigade sectors may
+be selected therefrom. For the assignment of the smaller sectors, and
+the organization of supporting points an examination of the ground is
+absolutely essential. Any attempt to make such assignments from the
+map alone would be very apt to result disastrously. Hence map problems
+in defense should generally be limited to the assignment of brigade
+sectors. Further details in the organization of a defensive position
+should be studied as terrain exercises. The commanders of units from
+a division down should make, either in person, or through a competent
+staff officer, a reconnaissance of the sector assigned to the unit.
+Engineer officers when available, may well be utilized for such
+reconnaissance. The terrain should also be examined from the enemy’s
+point of view (from the front) as such an examination will often afford
+information that might otherwise be lacking.
+
+Capt. Thuillier, R. E. (Principles of Land Defense) says, with
+reference to the organization of a position where time permits of
+a careful reconnaissance: “It is most necessary that the designer
+should traverse and carefully examine the whole of the ground which
+the attackers would occupy and that over which they must advance. The
+points in which the latter’s artillery could advantageously be placed
+should be noted.... The attacker’s communications both lateral and
+from front to rear should be carefully studied as they will indicate
+the points on which he can most easily concentrate his forces, and
+thus point to the measures that must be taken to oppose them. All
+ground hidden from the position of the defense should be noted and the
+possibility of bringing on it an enfilade or indirect fire from other
+points of the defender’s line ascertained. The facilities for attack or
+for execution of trench work by the enemy will thus be discovered, and
+the visibility or otherwise of the proposed sites for defensive works
+made evident. Much valuable information will be obtained in this way
+which could never be gotten from a study only of the defender’s ground.
+
+The above procedure will also make plain what parts of a defensive
+line may be safely neglected and what parts must be held in strength.
+Generally speaking positions naturally strong may be left more or less
+undefended, while weak points require special treatment. For instance
+suppose the line to be defended has a length of ridge or a hill with
+gently sloping open ground in front of it, and on the flanks broken
+and rough ground with ravines, etc. If looked at from the defender’s
+point of view only, the temptation will be to hold the ridge with
+open ground in front as it so eminently lends itself to defense. But
+if looked at from the attacker’s viewpoint it will be at once evident
+that the latter would never make his advance over ground where he
+would be at such a disadvantage, but would direct his attention to the
+broken ground on the flanks where he might hope to make part of his
+advance under cover. The open, easily defensible portion may therefore
+be neglected, and the broken ground, though far less favorable for
+defense, must be carefully defended.”
+
+The matters to be considered in organizing a defensive position are:
+the mission of the command, numbers and quality of troops, strength,
+position and probable intentions of the enemy or of any supporting
+troops in the vicinity, the nature of the terrain, the weapons of both
+combatants, the efficiency of fire, artillery positions available for
+both sides, ease of support, maneuver or retreat, what reinforcements
+expected, if any, whether delaying or decisive action is contemplated,
+time the position must be held, time available for preparation, etc.,
+etc.
+
+A field of fire at all ranges up to 2,000 yds. for the infantry, is
+desirable in a decisive action. It is, however, practically never
+obtainable naturally along the entire front of an extended defensive
+position, and it is this fact that calls into play the skill of the
+tactician and engineer in availing themselves to the utmost of the
+natural advantages which the terrain affords, while avoiding its
+disadvantages, and utilizing to the greatest possible extent all
+available resources in time, labor, tools and materials.
+
+So much depends on the conditions, purposes in view, relative qualities
+of troops, armament, etc., that any set of rules as to the density
+of occupation of a defensive position is apt to be misleading. If
+the purpose is merely to deceive the enemy as to the strength of the
+position and of the force occupying it and thereby cause him to halt
+and deploy, thus losing time, a very long, thin line, dummy trenches,
+etc., may be permissible, whereas such tactics would be little short of
+suicidal in a decisive action.
+
+It is by no means necessary nor even desirable that the fire trenches
+of a defensive position should be in a line continuous along the
+entire front, but it is wise to avoid deep echelons or offsets in
+the line (except on the flanks, see post). An offset, reëntrant or
+salient results in poor alignment which may present a weak flank to the
+attacker’s infantry, or be subject to enfilade. There is frequently
+danger from the fire of friendly trenches in rear, or the fire of
+these trenches may be masked by those offset to the front of them.
+Opportunities for mutual support may be sacrificed. If the exposed
+flank of an advanced trench be attacked the troops in rear have a
+tendency to surge forward out of control, in an endeavor to readjust
+the line. Such offsets partake of the nature of salients in the line;
+they possess most of the disadvantages of the latter with few of their
+virtues.
+
+The defenders then, will ordinarily be grouped by units at various
+points along the line with intervals between. The areas occupied by
+these groups are called “supporting points.”
+
+Supporting points are the unit areas of the defensive position. They
+may consist of a single knoll, a single nose convex toward the enemy,
+a piece of wooded ground, a small village, suitable for defense by a
+small combat unit, a large woods, a group of hills or noses, a large
+town suitable for defense by a large combat unit, etc., etc.
+
+The combat unit assigned for the defense of any supporting point will
+vary with the size and importance of the area to be defended, its
+relation to the rest of the line, the difficulty of organization,
+proximity to a threatened flank of the general line, distance from
+active supporting troops, etc. In our organization a battalion is the
+smallest unit which ordinarily holds out a support, and it is the
+smallest unit usually assigned to the occupation of a supporting point.
+
+The location of the supporting points will depend on the terrain. In a
+general way they occupy those portions of the ground which are convex
+toward the front (front slopes of “noses” or of knolls) with ravines or
+indentations between.
+
+In field fortification closed works find little application. The front
+is covered by a wide extent of rifle trenches, so disposed as to fire
+on all portions of the terrain over which an advance of the enemy is
+practicable. There should be a maximum development of frontal fire and
+arrangements for mutual support by means of cross fire.
+
+The general location of the line, and the area assigned to the unit
+will fix approximately the position to be occupied. It must, of course,
+be within the sector, but some leeway in the direction of depth is
+allowed, so long as the unit does not unduly expose its own flank, or
+those of the adjacent supporting points on either side, which are (in a
+measure) dependent upon it for fire support.
+
+It will thus be apparent that a unit may often be forced to organize
+a supporting point in a locality which at first glance appears to
+offer a very poor field of fire. This difficulty may be met by several
+expedients:
+
+1. The front should be covered by the cross fire of adjacent supporting
+points, machine guns suitably placed, etc.
+
+2. The trenches of the battalion should be so distributed as to cover
+their own fronts and to cross fire as effectively as possible with the
+other trenches of the battalion and those of the adjacent supporting
+points to the right and left. A little careful study of the situation
+will almost invariably reveal great possibilities in this way.
+
+3. Where the field of fire or the view is unduly restricted by trees,
+houses and other natural or artificial obstructions it is desirable
+that these be removed. The burning of houses, crops, brush, etc.,
+is usually inadvisable, as it renders the position very conspicuous
+both during and after the conflagration. If the available time or the
+equipment of tools and explosives does not permit the removal of such
+obstructions by these means, covered approach thereto must be denied
+by obstacles and strong cross fire. Ravines and hollows which might
+afford shelter for the enemy should be covered with fire by a suitable
+disposition of the trenches, and also rendered difficult of passage by
+filling them with trees and brush, interlaced with wire if this seems
+necessary.
+
+4. Obstacles may be constructed in the foreground to hold the attacker
+under the fire of the defense.
+
+ etc., etc.
+
+For the purpose of mutual support and in order to permit of
+concentration of fire it is very desirable that every supporting point
+should be able to cross fire with those adjacent to it on either side.
+Machine guns may be employed in covered emplacements, for surprise
+at critical instants, or at places where a special reinforcement of
+the infantry fire is likely to be required. Care should be taken that
+machine guns are not _unnecessarily_ immobilized.
+
+Trenches should usually be traversed, a traverse being placed every
+squad or every two squads. As traverses in open trenches should not
+ordinarily be built of higher relief than the parapet (or they will be
+conspicuous) the protection afforded against oblique or enfilade fire
+is not very great, unless they are introduced more frequently than at
+every squad. The real advantage of traverses so far apart is that they
+localize and reduce demoralization among the defenders. Communications
+should be dug around traverses either in front or rear. Communications
+around the front have the advantage of not reducing the space available
+for riflemen. If time allows, head cover for the fire trenches should
+be provided. If the trenches are close enough to the enemy to be in
+danger from grenades, nets are sometimes provided as a protection
+against these missiles. The trenches even if very close to the enemy
+should be made as inconspicuous as possible. Great pains may well be
+taken to conceal them from the view of the attacker, including view by
+aero scouts.
+
+Intervals are sometimes deliberately left between the larger
+organizations on the defensive line in order to tempt the enemy to
+attack the intervals, and thus expose himself to a counter-stroke of
+the defender’s mobile reserves. Such tactics should be employed with
+caution.
+
+Even in the supporting point itself trenches should be discontinuous,
+both laterally and in depth. As a rule the length of a single trench
+should be limited to that necessary to accommodate a single company,
+and if necessary to properly cover the assigned front even squad
+trenches may be used. This allows great flexibility in making the
+dispositions for effective fire, and is necessary to permit the best
+adaptation of the trenches to the terrain, and the fullest development
+of fire, as well as being in other ways desirable.
+
+In very close country, where it is difficult to protect the intervals
+by cross fire of adjacent supporting points, a practically continuous
+line of trenches may be necessary to fully cover the front.
+
+The entire front is divided into sectors or sections, assigned to
+brigades, regiments and battalions. This simplifies command and insures
+continuity of the defense.
+
+The larger sectors (brigade and regimental) will usually have sector
+reserves--the size of these reserves depending upon the tactical object
+in view. A general reserve for the entire position is also provided.
+If an active defense is contemplated (and this should usually be the
+case) the general reserve will be made as strong as possible, the
+least practicable number of troops being assigned to the firing line,
+supports and local (sector) reserves. The relative numbers of troops to
+be assigned to the various elements of the defense is one of the most
+important as well as the most difficult details in the organization
+of a defensive position. No rules for this can be laid down. An army
+will seldom take up a defensive position unless it be weaker than its
+adversary, either in number or quality of troops, armament, or some
+other detail. In a purely passive defense field fortifications, by
+increasing the resisting power of the defenders, permit the occupation
+of a much longer defensive line than would be possible without their
+aid. In an active defense the judicious use of fortification enables
+the defensive line to be held with the minimum of force, thereby making
+more troops available for the active, mobile reserves, with which
+victory must be won. If the defender’s troops are dispirited or low in
+morale, field fortifications give increased strength and confidence to
+the troops occupying them and may enable them to successfully resist an
+army which might defeat (or has defeated) them in the open. If field
+fortifications do not economize in men for a force weak in numbers, or
+give increased confidence to one which is low in morale, they fail in
+their purpose and do more harm than good.
+
+Supporting points will usually be organized by the troops which are to
+defend them. Occasionally technical troops may be available for some of
+the special tasks. All troops are provided with portable intrenching
+and cutting tools, and for work of this class a certain number of
+park tools will also be available. Local resources in the way of
+labor, tools and materials should also be utilized if necessary. The
+authorized allowance of tools of various organizations is subject to
+changes which are set forth from time to time in orders.
+
+The organization of a regimental sector may include some or all of the
+following:
+
+1. Assignment of troops to the first line and to reserves.
+
+2. Division of the regimental sector into battalion sectors, and
+assignment of troops thereto.
+
+3. Selection and preparation of a covered station or stations for the
+regimental commander.
+
+4. Improvement of communications for movements of reserve, counter
+attack, retreat, etc.
+
+5. Selection of position or positions for machine guns, and
+construction of emplacements. A portion or all of the machine guns may
+be assigned to battalions in the first line, though this would not be
+usual. Machine gun platoons should not be split.
+
+6. Arrangements for communication by telephone, flag, etc. between the
+different elements of the position.
+
+7. Assignment of tasks to the reserves. Portions of the reserves may be
+assigned to assist the battalions in the first line.
+
+8. Selection and preparation of a suitable site for the regimental aid
+station, and arrangements for the evacuation of the wounded.
+
+9. Disposal of empty battalion ammunition wagons.
+
+10. Arrangement for position fire of reserves, if contemplated.
+
+ etc.
+
+The organization of a battalion sector (supporting point) may include
+some or all of the following:
+
+1. Assignment of companies to the firing line and battalion supports.
+
+2. Selection of positions for and preparation of the fire trenches,
+including traverses and head cover, if necessary, and if time is
+available.
+
+3. Selection of station or stations for the battalion supports and
+arrangements for cover if natural cover is not available. Arrangements
+for a second tier of fire to be occupied by the supports if desirable
+and practicable.
+
+4. Preparation of communications between the firing line and supports,
+and adjacent trenches of the former, utilizing natural features of the
+terrain to the greatest possible extent.
+
+5. Selection and preparation of a suitable observing station for the
+battalion commander.
+
+6. Selection of position for the machine guns (if any are assigned to
+the battalions) and construction of emplacements.
+
+7. Construction of latrines at convenient places, as in returns of
+communicating trenches.
+
+8. Selection and preparation of a suitable site for the battalion
+collecting station.
+
+9. Selection of suitable sites for company kitchens.
+
+10. Clearing the foreground, removal of all obstructions which
+interfere with view and fire.
+
+11. Preparation of obstacles to the enemy’s advance (covered by the
+fire of the defenders). Ravines and hollows which might afford cover
+to the enemy should be filled with trees, brush, etc., and wire
+entanglements or other obstacles constructed to hold the enemy under
+fire.
+
+12. Measuring and marking ranges in the foreground.
+
+13. Concealment of all works from view, including view by aero scouts
+and observers for the hostile artillery.
+
+14. Rough estimate of time required for the work contemplated and
+assignment of men and tools to the various tasks.
+
+ etc.
+
+It will frequently be the case that the situation does not demand, nor
+the time available permit, the complete organization of the position
+as outlined. In any case it is necessary to decide upon the relative
+importance of the various tasks. The more important tasks are then
+executed first, and the others as far as necessary, or as time allows.
+It is often a matter of some difficulty to decide in any particular
+case the exact relative importance of all the various tasks, as this
+varies with the circumstances. In a general way it may be said that the
+first requirement is a good field of fire, with ranges measured and
+marked and the second, trenches for the troops on the firing line.
+
+It will not always be practicable to secure a good field of fire at
+both short and long ranges. Frequently one must be sacrificed to the
+other and good judgment is required to determine which is of more
+importance. In a decisive action effective fire at short and mid
+ranges is most desirable, and ordinarily to be preferred when the
+entire foreground cannot be covered. If a delaying action only is
+contemplated, fire at the longer ranges may be all that is required.
+In a decisive action the shorter ranges may be covered by the firing
+line proper, while the longer are covered by position fire of troops
+specially posted for this purpose.
+
+The battalion supports should preferably be placed within 50 yds. or so
+of the firing line, and rarely more than 150 yds. therefrom. If natural
+cover is not available near at hand support trenches must be provided.
+The supports should be conveniently located with a view to reinforcing
+the firing line, preferably in one body (for each bn.) although they
+may be divided if necessary. Covered communications to the fire
+trenches are provided, utilizing the natural features of the ground as
+far as possible.
+
+The reserves are posted for use in protecting the flanks, or openings
+in the line, or delivering counter attacks. Hence they should not be
+too close to the firing line. They should be secure from fire, but it
+is usually inadvisable (in field fortification) to provide artificial
+cover. There will usually be no time for this, as reserves can be
+better utilized otherwise, and the existence of artificial cover tends
+also to diminish the mobility and initiative of the reserves. Natural
+cover should therefore be sought. The reserves should not be too close
+to a friendly artillery position, if likely to receive fire directed at
+the latter. Sector reserves should generally be held in one body unless
+the situation imperatively demands a division.
+
+If the situation requires and conditions permit, supports and reserves
+may be used for position fire, either in a second tier in rear of the
+firing line proper or (in the case of the reserves) on a flank of same.
+They may thus support the firing line at critical moments, force the
+enemy to deploy at long range, or cover with fire portions of the
+front which cannot be reached by the firing line proper. (See “The
+Rifle in War,”--Chap. XVI.) It must be borne in mind, however, that
+there is danger involved in immobilizing the reserves for the sake of
+position fire. Once they are committed to action it will be difficult
+to withdraw them. In any situation then, the advantages of position
+fire must sufficiently outweigh the disadvantages of immobilizing
+the reserves to warrant such procedure. It would seldom be wise to
+immobilize the entire sector reserve for this purpose.
+
+In deciding upon the location of the firing trenches the ground should
+be carefully studied in order to obtain good results while avoiding
+unnecessary labor in the way of clearing, communications, etc. In
+removing trees from the front of a position it is seldom either
+necessary or desirable to remove _all_ the trees. The undergrowth and
+some of the smaller trees should be removed first. Most of the larger
+trees can usually be left standing, being trimmed where necessary,
+thus forming a screen for the position, rendering it less conspicuous.
+Fallen trees should be removed. They may be used to fill ravines and
+hollows which might otherwise afford cover to the attack.
+
+All works should be carefully blended with the natural features of the
+terrain to render them as inconspicuous as possible. Concealment is of
+the utmost importance and great pains may well be taken to effect it.
+
+The engineers should ordinarily be employed on works of general
+importance or those which, by reason of their special training and
+equipment, they are best qualified to perform. These may include:
+demolitions, obstacles, cutting of heavy timber, construction or repair
+of roads and bridges and improvement of communications in general,
+measuring and marking ranges, special works such as head and overhead
+cover, loop-holes, observing stations, splinter-proofs, etc., works in
+the second line of defense if one there be, etc., etc.
+
+The engineers should not be divided into many small parties (except by
+their own officers) nor distributed along the entire front, as this
+would result in a frittering away of their energies. It is permissible
+that a company of engineers be assigned to each brigade sector under
+the commander thereof. The tasks for the engineers should be indicated
+by superior authority, but their distribution to best accomplish these
+tasks should be left to the judgment of their own officers.
+
+Provision should be made for security to the front and flanks during
+the organization and occupation of the position. For this purpose
+suitable outposts should be placed. The cavalry, by moving to the front
+and gaining contact with the enemy, provides the greatest measure of
+security, but an infantry outpost, or at least observers in front and
+to the flanks of the line, should not in any case be omitted. Each
+regiment or other unit may be directed to provide for the security of
+its own front during the organization, or special provisions may be
+made for the position as a whole.
+
+Obstacles to delay the enemy _under fire_ should ordinarily be placed
+not closer than 40 yards, nor more than 300 yards from the fire
+trenches. If at a greater distance they are too readily destroyed by
+the enemy. Wire entanglements are the most efficient form of obstacle,
+as well as the easiest to construct. They should be concealed by tall
+grass, hedges, branches of trees, a specially constructed glacis or
+some other device.
+
+
+_Organization of the flanks._ The flanks are ordinarily the most
+vulnerable parts of an intrenched position. Unless these are secured
+by impassable natural obstacles they must be artificially strengthened
+by fortification, reserves, or both. When the assailant’s plan of
+attack has been developed the reserves can, of course, be massed on the
+threatened flank which will be also, in most cases, the locality most
+favorable for counter attack. It is necessary, however, to make due
+allowance for the time that will be required for the movements of the
+reserves in an extended defensive position. If both flanks are “in the
+air” (not secured by natural obstacles) the position is to that extent
+a faulty one, and reserves may be required on both flanks. By making
+the less vulnerable flank stronger by artificial means the reserves
+on that flank may be reduced to a minimum, leaving the great bulk of
+the mobile troops available for use on the more vulnerable flank which
+is, naturally, the one more apt to be assailed. In the event of the
+main attack falling on the stronger flank its natural and artificial
+strength should be great enough to enable the troops defending it to
+hold out until sufficient reserve can be brought to their assistance.
+
+Refusing the line to provide security for a flank is objectionable in
+that it immobilizes troops to face only to a flank which may not be
+attacked, while presenting also a salient to the enemy. It is better to
+provide protection against an enveloping attack by echeloning trenches
+to the rear in short lengths. Where these trenches are visible from
+the direction of enfilade it will usually be impracticable to provide
+complete protection for the men when actually on the firing line, but
+shelters may be constructed near at hand. These should be right angles
+to the firing line, with their backs in the direction of enfilade, and
+like the trenches to which they pertain, will be in short lengths and
+echeloned. Communication is provided by means of oblique trenches. With
+trenches thus echeloned enfilade fire can rake only short lengths of
+trench, and its effect is thus greatly reduced. Every effort should
+be made to conceal the works from view, especially from the flank, by
+skilfully disposing them with reference to the natural features of the
+terrain and by artificial means. If the terrain does not naturally
+afford this concealment the parapets should be made low. The natural
+features which screen the works should not be so close nor of such a
+nature that they may be utilized by the attacker for cover during an
+enveloping movement.
+
+The proper organization of a flank calls for the highest skill of the
+field engineer. Engineer troops when available, may well be assigned to
+the complete preparation of this feature.
+
+The following table gives the approximate times required for the
+execution of the more usual classes of work, with the personnel and
+tools required for different tasks. (See also F. S. R.) The times
+stated are to be regarded as the best that may be expected with well
+trained troops under reasonably favorable conditions. With green troops
+or unfavorable conditions more time should be allowed.
+
+ -----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-------------
+ WORKS | PERSONNEL | TOOLS | TIME
+ -----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-------------
+ Simple standing |1 man per yd | Portable | 2 hours
+ rifle trench | | |
+ | | |
+ Simple overhead |1 man per yd | Park model | 2 hours, plus
+ covers | | | time for
+ | | | gathering
+ | | | and bringing
+ | | | up material.
+ | | |
+ Cutting down |6 in. diameter; | 2 axes or | 3 minutes
+ trees | 2 men | 1 jointed saw |
+ | | |
+ |12 in. diameter; | 2 axes | 15 minutes
+ | 2 men | 1 jointed saw | 10 minutes
+ | | 1 cross cut saw | 5 minutes
+ | | |
+ |18 in. diameter; | 2 axes | 30 minutes
+ | 2 men | 1 cross cut saw | 12 minutes
+ | | |
+ Clearing brush |20 men, 300 sq. | 5 axes and | 1 hour,
+ | yards | 5 billhooks | 30 sq. yds.
+ | | | per tool.
+ | | |
+ Abatis |6 men per | 1 axe, 1 saw, | 2 hours
+ |6 running | 1 billhook |
+ | yards | |
+ | | |
+ Wire entanglement|Preparing stakes;| 2 axes, 1 saw | 3 min. per
+ | 3 men | | stake
+ | | |
+ |Placing wire; | 1 maul, 3 wire | 1 hour
+ | 6 men per | cutters |
+ | 15 to 18 | |
+ | sq. yds. | |
+ | | |
+ Excavation in |1 man, 12 cu. ft.| Portable | 1 hour
+ medium soils, |1 man, 20 cu. ft.| Park model | 1 hour
+ 2 hour reliefs | | |
+
+By medium soils is meant those which can be excavated without the
+use of a pick or pick mattock. The character of the soil greatly
+influences the time required for excavation. In rocky soil the time
+will be very greatly increased, and the task may be impracticable with
+portable tools. Also the cutting tools of the infantry are suitable
+only for light work, brush and small trees. The “simple standing
+trench” referred to has a cross section area of about 7.5 sq. ft. and
+1 running yd. can be constructed in about two hours with a portable
+tool. This trench does not allow easy passage of men in rear of the
+firers, and does not allow the latter room to sit down. The additional
+room necessary for these purposes is obtained by the addition of about
+10 sq. ft. to the cross section of the trench, converting it into the
+“completed standing trench.” This requires about 2 hrs. additional
+labor for each tool. The excavated earth may be wasted or part of it
+added to the parapet. A 5 ft. length is a convenient task for one man
+with a park (full sized) tool. Plows, when obtainable, are of great
+assistance in the excavation of trenches in stiff soils. All the above
+tasks (except wire entanglements) contemplate reliefs at periods not
+exceeding two hours in length. If there be not enough men to furnish
+reliefs additional time must be allowed for all tasks requiring more
+than 2 hours time.
+
+The following remarks are extracted from Instructions in Field Training
+for the British Army. They are based upon the experience of the
+European War. They are especially applicable to fortifications which
+are to be occupied for a relatively long time and in relatively close
+proximity to similar works of the enemy. They are also of special
+interest as indications of the very great power of modern weapons and
+the resulting necessity for concealment from view.
+
+Trenches should be located so that they are not under observation by
+hostile artillery. Possible observing stations on ground occupied by
+the enemy should also be considered. This concealment is regarded as of
+greater importance than an extensive field of fire.
+
+A field of fire of 100 yds. will be sufficient if it cannot be extended
+without loss of concealment. Obstacles in front of the trenches must be
+carefully concealed as otherwise they will assist the enemy to locate
+the trenches in rear.
+
+A location for the trenches back of a slight rise or back of a second
+hedge with obstacles hidden or entangled in the hedge in front has been
+found to afford satisfactory concealment.
+
+Modern artillery fire is practically continuous and the accuracy of
+ranging phenomenal. Accordingly, the target must be reduced to the
+smallest possible dimensions. This is best accomplished by making
+the trenches as narrow and as deep as possible with practically no
+parapet. Support trenches especially should be made deep. The support
+trenches should be about 40 yds. in rear of and parallel to the fire
+trenches with ample communications to the latter. To these most of
+the men retire during a bombardment leaving as few as possible in the
+fire trenches. Eighteen to twenty-four inches is sufficient width for
+a trench. As this does not permit of the free passage of men along the
+trench, communication is secured by means of a narrow trench about 15
+yds. in rear of firing trench and connected to the latter at each
+traverse by a narrow passage of the same depth (See Fig. X).
+
+The fire trenches should be of the recessed traversed type whenever
+time permits, traverses about 5 ft. wide at the base and 35 ft. center
+to center (See Fig. X).
+
+Surplus earth from trench excavation should be spread or sodded,
+depending on the nature of the soil.
+
+A bank of earth as a parados should be placed behind and close to
+the trenches for protection against the back blast of high explosive
+shells, provided this can be done without rendering the trenches
+conspicuous. These parados should be sodded or otherwise concealed in
+the same manner as the parapet. Dummy parapets may be constructed with
+surplus earth.
+
+Recesses under the parapet must be ceiled. If planking or other similar
+material is available, time and trouble may be saved by laying the
+ceiling for the recesses on the ground at the front of the trench, with
+a good bearing at the ends, and then excavating the recess and throwing
+the earth on top of the ceiling to form the inner part of the parapet.
+The recesses serve to protect their occupants from shrapnel fire.
+
+Elbow rests should be omitted or made very narrow. Most of the men
+will prefer to make their own niches for the forearm. A device to
+ensure proper aiming in the absence of lights during a night attack is
+desirable.
+
+Head cover and overhead cover are usually impracticable except at
+points to be used as observing stations. They restrict the use of the
+rifle and bayonet. Where head cover can be constructed to advantage a
+continuous loophole is the best form.
+
+The arrangement of trenches should be such as to develop as much
+frontal fire as possible. Attacks by the enemy usually occur at short
+intervals at night along the whole line. Under such conditions adjacent
+sections of the line can give but little support to each other by
+crossing fire. As cross and flanking fire is not to be relied on,
+straight trenches are preferred.
+
+Dressing stations and latrines may be provided in recesses in the
+support trenches.
+
+Drainage should be considered in laying out the trenches. When
+practicable they should be drained to a low point in the locality. When
+this is not practicable, sump holes must be provided in the trenches,
+to be pumped or baled out.
+
+[Illustration: FIG. X STANDARD FIELD TRENCH]
+
+[Illustration: RECESSED AND TRAVERSED FIRING TRENCH]
+
+Machine gun emplacements should be on the flanks of a section and as
+well concealed as possible. They should not be unmasked too soon as
+this exposes them to premature destruction by the hostile artillery.
+
+Cover required for the reserves will depend upon their distance in
+rear of the firing line and the enemy’s ability to search with fire
+the ground in which the reserves are stationed. The possibility of
+observation by aerial reconnaissance must always be considered.
+
+Obstacles must be provided to check the enemy’s attempts to rush the
+trenches. Barbed wire is the most effective obstacle, especially if
+well concealed. The advantage of concealment, in addition to preventing
+the use of the obstacles as range marks for the trenches in rear,
+is that working parties are enabled to repair each night any damage
+to the obstacles. This repair work must frequently be carried out
+not over 100 yds. and occasionally not over 50 yds. from the enemy’s
+trenches. High wire entanglements involving the use of posts extending
+3’6" or 4' above the ground, are impracticable owing to the difficulty
+of concealment and of repair. The driving of such posts is out of
+the question when hostile trenches are in close proximity. Various
+substitutes for these posts may be employed such as tripods constructed
+of the limbs of trees lashed together, carried out and set in front of
+the firing line at night, at intervals of about 15 feet. The tripods
+are anchored to the ground and barbed wire laced between them. Any
+light, strong, portable support for barbed wire entanglements is
+acceptable.
+
+Flare lights shielded on the side of the defender are useful.
+
+If the flank of a line is to be refused, the trenches should be
+echeloned to the rear. Otherwise the trenches on the flank will be
+subject to enfilade fire, especially by heavy artillery at long ranges.
+
+The following observations of the aeronauts will be of assistance to
+those engaged in the construction of field fortifications:
+
+1. A long continuous line of trenches is more visible than groups of
+trenches.
+
+2. Straight trenches are conspicuous.
+
+3. Trenches across plowed fields are easily distinguished.
+
+4. Straw spread in the bottom of trenches renders them conspicuous.
+
+5. Trenches against hedges cannot be distinguished.
+
+6. It is difficult to tell whether trenches or gun emplacements are
+occupied.
+
+7. Tracks to emplacements are easily distinguished.
+
+8. Trenches should be covered with brush to hide deep shadows at bottom.
+
+The operations on the European battle fields closely resemble the
+methods which have hitherto been considered characteristic of sieges.
+
+Sir John French says:
+
+ “In war as it is today, between civilized nations armed
+ to the teeth with the present deadly rifle and machine
+ gun, heavy casualties are absolutely unavoidable.
+ For the slightest undue exposure the heaviest toll
+ is exacted. The power of defense conferred by modern
+ weapons is the main cause for the long duration of
+ the battles of the present day, and it is this fact
+ which mainly accounts for such loss and waste of life.
+ Both one and the other can, however, be shortened
+ and lessened if attacks can be supported by a most
+ efficient and powerful force of artillery available;
+ but an almost unlimited supply of ammunition is
+ necessary, and a most liberal discretionary power as
+ to its use must be given to artillery commanders. I am
+ confident that this is the only means by which great
+ results can be obtained with a minimum of loss.”
+
+Capt. Thuillier in his “Principles of Land Defense” states the
+objects of field fortifications to be 1st, to increase to the fullest
+possible extent the effective use of the defender’s weapons, and 2nd,
+to restrict to the greatest possible extent the effective use of the
+weapons of the attacker. These guiding principles are applicable to all
+situations, and they should never be lost sight of in the organization
+of a position. Col. Kuhn, Corps of Engineers, U.S.A., says: “The
+highest expression of the art of field fortification consists in the
+utilization of the _natural_ strength of the terrain in the most
+advantageous manner with the minimum means including the avoidance
+of its disadvantages. All natural screens, covers, obstacles and
+communications have a distinct advantage over artificial creations,
+not only in the relatively smaller amount of work required, but also
+in the fact that the troops will, as a rule, advance from them more
+readily than they will from purely artificial works.”
+
+Sir John Jones (“Journals of Sieges in Spain”) says: “It should be
+recollected that the number of men required to guard a position depends
+less on the extent of its front than on the facility of access to the
+several portions of it.” “This sentence,” says Thuillier, “contains the
+very pith of defensive tactics.”
+
+The foregoing remarks concerning the organization of a defensive
+position may be illustrated by a few practical problems solved on the
+map. The officer who desires, however, to become thoroughly qualified
+for this most important duty, should practice the organization of
+supporting points _on the terrain_.
+
+
+_Note._ Details of construction of various intrenchments, shelters,
+obstacles, and other works of field fortification, with the tools,
+materials, personnel and time required, and the methods of conducting
+the tasks are given in many textbooks, manuals and pamphlets on the
+subject of field fortification, some of which are listed at the
+beginning of this volume. (Chap I.)
+
+
+PROBLEM NO. 1.
+
+FIELD FORTIFICATION.
+
+As part of an extended defensive line, facing generally west, your
+regiment has been assigned the organization and occupation of the
+sector EAST AND WEST RAVINE NORTH OF HILL 872, exclusive,--RAVINE
+MARKED X-Y (See Fig. XI), exclusive. The first battalion will organize
+a supporting point on 872 Hill, the 3rd battalion will be in reserve,
+and the next regiment to the south will organize its north supporting
+point on Bell Point, all as indicated upon the accompanying 6 inch
+map. A platoon of the machine gun company has been attached to the 2d
+battalion.
+
+REQUIRED:
+
+ I. Location of the supporting point to be organized by
+ the 2d battalion, showing dispositions of troops
+ of the battalion. Division of the foreground,
+ indicating portions assigned to each supporting
+ point of your regiment.
+
+ II. Considering yourself now in command of the 2nd
+ battalion, give a detailed description of the
+ organization of your supporting point, with a
+ reasonable proof that it can be carried out in two
+ hours, which will be assumed as the time available
+ for work. Your companies are of 16 squads each
+ and have the authorized allowance of park and
+ portable tools. A platoon of 40 engineers has been
+ assigned to assist your battalion and their tool
+ equipment is ample to meet the requirements of any
+ reasonable task you may see fit to assign to them,
+ but engineer tools will be used by engineers only.
+ There is also assigned to assist your battalion one of
+ the reserve companies with its complete tool equipment.
+
+ III. In the assignment of work to the engineers, what
+ considerations governed your decision?
+
+ IV. Indicate all dispositions, works etc., upon the
+ accompanying map, employing conventional signs.
+
+
+_Note._ In this problem (and the one following) each company of
+infantry is assumed to have 16 squads of 8 men each, available for
+work. Each company is assumed to have 64 portable digging tools
+(shovels and picks), and its allowance of park digging tools (full
+size, commercial pattern) is 24 shovels and 12 picks. Each company
+has 16 portable wood and brush cutting tools (hatchets and machetes)
+and its allowance of park wood cutting tools (full size, commercial
+pattern) is 1 cross cut (2 man) saw and 2 axes.
+
+_Solution._ (See Fig. XI).
+
+_Requirement I_: 1st Battalion to right supporting point; to organize
+supporting point on 872 hill; to cover the foreground from east and
+west ravine north of hill 872 exclusive to ravine south of the Sharp
+House exclusive, crossing fire with left supporting point of next
+regiment on the right and with supporting point number 2 as far as and
+across Salt Creek at the loop obtruding into the foreground in front of
+Zalinsky House.
+
+2d Battalion to the left supporting point; to organize 855 hill and
+adjoining noses; to cover the foreground from ravine just south of
+Sharp House inclusive to ravine X-Y exclusive; crossing fire with 1st
+supporting point as far as and beyond the bridge over Salt Creek and
+with right supporting point of next regiment on the left across X-Y
+ravine.
+
+Colonel directs that at least two companies in each battalion be placed
+on the firing line, more if a closer examination of the ground seems
+to justify, but that at least one company in each battalion be held in
+support.
+
+_Requirement II_: The front assigned to the battalion is about six
+hundred yards; the foreground is generally open and concave for a
+distance (from Salt Creek to the east) of nearly six hundred yards,
+except in the center of the front where Salt Creek makes a loop into
+the foreground; here the field of fire is much interfered with by the
+growth along Salt Creek (the steep banks of which offer excellent
+opportunities for the approach of an enemy screened by the trees), the
+convex nose on which the Zalinsky House is located and the building and
+trees on that nose. The enemy, taking advantage of these conditions,
+could approach to within a very short distance of the firing line
+unless prevented by adequate cross fire. This is the weak portion of
+the line and must be well attended to. A fire trench just west of the
+Zalinsky buildings could cover the loop, but it is only about 100
+yards from the banks of the creek, which avenue of approach can not be
+entirely denied to the enemy; this is too close and such a location is
+to be avoided if possible. A location east of the convex Zalinsky House
+nose is therefore desirable. Just in front of the timber line along
+Sheridan ridge the conditions for firing trenches are nearly ideal.
+A company trench can be conveniently located on 855 hill as shown on
+map; this trench with 1 foot command can cross fire in front of 1st
+supporting point as far as the bridge and all along Salt Creek bottom
+from the creek to immediate front of the fire trenches of the 1st
+supporting point. To the front the fire of the trenches is interfered
+with by the buildings, orchards, and trees along Salt Creek, all of
+these can and must be removed, there is dead space however from the
+house to Salt Creek which can not be obviated and must be covered
+by heavy cross fire. The location of the left company of the right
+supporting point crosses fire, when timber is removed, across the loop
+in the creek, sweeping the old corn field on the west side of creek;
+the machine gun platoon, located as shown, sweeps by an enfilading fire
+the whole line of Salt Creek in front of the regiment as far as the
+bridge and, when the trees are removed, the bottom of Salt Creek and
+both its banks from A to B. Such use of the machine guns, to reinforce
+a weak portion of the line, is desirable in this case. This cross fire
+from the machine guns is reinforced by the platoon of G Company, and
+the right platoon of H Company; the two center platoons of H Company
+covering the front from the Zalinsky house to the X-Y ravine. The left
+platoon of H Company in the existing trench to the left and rear of the
+machine gun platoon, crosses fire with the right supporting point of
+the next regiment on the left. (See Fig. XI.)
+
+This development of the firing line is believed to be sufficient; the
+squad trenches are, however, to be made at least 18 feet long and where
+possible 20 feet long, and communicating trenches between companies and
+squads to be prepared as far as possible for firing so that a heavier
+firing line can be brought into play by feeding in the supports if
+necessary.
+
+The time for the organization of the supporting point is short but
+the work behind the line is reduced very much by the ideal cover for
+supports, collecting station, etc., offered by the deep ravine 30 yards
+back of E Company.
+
+The work to be done then, is reduced to the digging of fire trenches
+(time will not allow the construction of head cover), arrangements
+for lateral and other communications, clearing of the foreground and
+marking out ranges. These duties are assigned as follows.
+
+E Company has its own portable tools and the park digging tools of E
+and F Cos. Twelve squads, each with 4 park shovels and 2 picks, dig 20
+ft. trenches in two hours; four squads, each with 6 portable digging
+tools, dig 18 ft. trenches; men not actually employed on this work use
+the remaining portable tools and dig communications around the front of
+the traverses which are left between squads. These communications are
+of the same depth as the fire trenches.
+
+H Company, which finds a platoon trench already constructed in a
+suitable location, has its own portable and park tools. Six squads,
+each with 4 park shovels and 2 picks, dig 20 ft. trenches in two
+hours; six squads, each with 6 portable tools, dig 18 ft. trenches;
+the remaining four squads, with the remaining portable tools, dig the
+communications around the front of the traverses between squads, and a
+communicating trench from the right of H Co. to the left of the G Co.
+platoon trench.
+
+G Company (3 platoons in support and 1 on the firing line) has its own
+tools and the park digging tools of the reserve company. It will dig
+30 yards of communicating trench forward to E Company’s fire trench,
+and 65 yards of communicating trench laterally across the ravine to
+the G Co. platoon trench. This latter communicating trench will be
+made available for use as a fire trench in case of need, and will
+therefore have the same profile as the fire trenches (7.5 sq. ft. cross
+section) except for the northern 10 yards which cannot deliver fire,
+(being under cover from the front) and has therefore a cross section
+of 6 sq. ft. The platoon fire trench is dug by the platoon which is to
+occupy it, this platoon has 16 park shovels and 8 picks. 55 yards of
+communicating trench across the ravine is dug by eight squads, each
+of which has 4 park shovels and 2 picks, this gives each squad about
+20 ft. of trench, which they can complete in 2 hrs. The remaining
+platoon (4 squads) each man with a portable digging tool, will dig the
+communicating trench to E Co. fire trench (with observing station for
+battalion commander) and the northern 10 yards of the communicating
+trench across the ravine. The total length of trench for this platoon
+to construct is therefore 40 yards or 120 ft. It has a cross section
+of 6 sq. ft. and contains 720 cu. ft. Thirty-two men digging 12 cu.
+ft. each per hour, will excavate 768 cu. ft. in 2 hours--just about
+the allotted task, including the observing station. Reliefs are not
+provided as the tasks last but 2 hours.
+
+This leaves the engineers, F Co., and the company from the reserve for
+the work on the foreground.
+
+The work which it is desirable to do will be as follows: cutting trees
+varying from 8 ins. to 16 ins. diam. along Salt Creek, from A to B
+to C, 200 trees in all; scatter two straw stacks and a pile of cord
+wood at D; destroy house, barn and outbuildings at Zalinsky’s; cut 20
+four-inch orchard trees back of house, 14 in front of house and 6 large
+trees, 60 small orchard trees to right front of house; 10 trees 8 in.
+diam. at E; scatter pile of bricks; measure and mark ranges.
+
+All the park cutting tools of the battalion are given to the reserve
+company making (with its own) a total of 5 cross cut saws and 10 axes;
+they have also their 16 portable cutting tools. One squad with two axes
+is assigned to cut and trim the 10 large trees at E; 4 squads with
+the portable tools are assigned to clear out a small amount of brush
+immediately in front of the E Co. fire trench, very little work, and
+then to assist in the orchards. Seven squads are given the remaining 8
+axes and 5 saws and assigned to the task of cutting and trimming the
+orchards and trees around the Zalinsky house. They will be assisted in
+this work by the platoon with the portable cutting tools. There are
+about 100 trees 6 ins. or less in diameter. One saw or 2 axes will cut
+about 20 of these trees in an hour (see table, ante); all can easily
+be cut and trimmed in the time available. The remaining squads of this
+company will scatter the bricks and cord-wood in the yard.
+
+The support company (F) with its own portable tools, some 6 pitch forks
+and 2 axes (found at Zalinsky’s) and crowbars will remove the straw
+stacks and tear down the cattle pens and the small outhouse near the
+creek; scatter cord-wood, and assist the engineer detachment in tearing
+down the large buildings.
+
+To the engineers are assigned the tasks of destroying the house and
+barn at Zalinsky’s and cutting the trees along Salt Creek at the loop.
+All of the 200 need not be cut down, the view would be greatly improved
+if only ¼ of them were cut but as many as necessary will be cut or
+trimmed. They will average 12 inches. One cross cut saw will cut 12 per
+hour or 24 in two hours; 10 will do the job assuming all must be cut
+down, this will take twenty of the men; the other twenty are assigned
+to the destruction of the house and barn. The total destruction of
+these buildings by fire may not be possible in the time available,
+and the smoke from the smouldering ruins would be more objectionable
+than the buildings themselves. Moreover the barn is on a high stone
+foundation and has an interior cross wall of stone. These would remain
+standing after the conflagration as it would then be impossible to
+destroy them by other means, and would afford cover to the enemy. Both
+buildings will be closed as tightly as possible and a concentrated
+charge of dynamite exploded in a central position in each. The men
+will then with their picks and crowbars, blocks and tackle, etc., tear
+down what remains, filling the cellars with debris so that they cannot
+be used for shelter. The destruction of the buildings would require a
+large amount of explosives, and the situation on the rest of the line
+would determine whether or not it could be spared for this purpose. If
+not, lesser charges could be used on the framework of the buildings and
+thus weakened they could be pulled down with block and tackle, men from
+F Co. being called upon to assist if necessary.
+
+The large trees along the creek bottom would, as far as possible, be
+fallen into the bed of the stream, and all trimmings (branches) would
+be placed therein, both to get them out of the field of fire and to
+block the channel as far as possible, to render its passage or use as
+cover the more difficult to the enemy.
+
+_Requirement III_: The reason for the assignment, is that this work is
+of general interest. The engineers were assigned to the destruction of
+the house and barn because it was not thought wise to burn them and the
+demolition by explosives and destruction by mechanical means require
+articles of their equipment and technical skill in execution; they were
+given the work of cutting down the trees along Salt Creek as most of
+these are pretty large and the cross cut saws and other timber tools in
+the hands of the engineers are better adapted to the work and the men
+more skilled in tree felling than the infantry.
+
+_Requirement IV_: (See Fig. XI.)
+
+
+PROBLEM NO. 2.
+
+FIELD FORTIFICATION.
+
+_General Situation._ (See 1 inch Geological Survey and 6 inch Maps.)
+
+Missouri, Blue and Kansas, Red, are at War. A Blue Army Corps is
+invading Kansas. On June 8th the 1st Blue Division, in the advance,
+near Lowemont, was being attacked by superior Red forces.
+
+_Special Situation, Blue._ The 2nd Blue Division was following the
+first and was disposed as follows on the morning of the 8th: the 10th,
+11th, 12th and 13th Inf., 1st Bn., 1st L. A., 1st Sq., 1st Cav., Co.
+A, 1st Engrs., 1st Amb. Co., had crossed the Terminal Bridge and were
+marching on Lowemont to support the 1st Division, which had been
+attacked by superior Red forces estimated at 2 divisions, on the
+afternoon of the seventh of June. The head of this detachment at
+8:30 a. m. was on the Atchison Pike at the railroad crossings east
+of Salt Creek village. The remainder of the Division was expected to
+reach Leavenworth late that afternoon via the Terminal Bridge. The 3rd
+Division was expected to reach Leavenworth on the morning of the tenth
+of June.
+
+At 8:30 a. m., June 8th, Gen. A, commanding the detachment of the 2d
+Division, received the following message at Atchison Hill, from Gen. X,
+1st Division (who is in command of all the Blue forces in Kansas until
+the arrival of the Corps Commander).
+
+ Wireless: 8 MILE HOUSE, near LOWEMONT, KAN.,
+ 8 June,’16, 8:15 a. m.
+
+ To Gen. A:
+
+The enemy resumed his attack in great force at daybreak. A heavy Red
+column, estimated at about a division, is reported moving east toward
+KICKAPOO. I shall retire at once via the ATCHISON PIKE and ZIMMERMAN
+ROAD to a defensive position west of LEAVENWORTH. Place your detachment
+in position on the line SHERIDAN RIDGE--ATCHISON HILL, to cover our
+withdrawal.
+
+ X,
+ Major General.
+
+Gen. A decides to occupy a position with his right resting on the
+Missouri River, and running thence south along the front slope of
+Sheridan Ridge. He directs the 10th Inf. to occupy and intrench the
+sector Missouri River to Millwood Road, inclusive, 11th Inf., from the
+Millwood Road, exclusive, to Bell Point, exclusive, &c., &c. (See Fig.
+XII.)
+
+_Requirements_:
+
+ I. As commander of the 10th Infantry, what assignments
+ of troops and divisions of sectors do you make?
+
+ You are in command of the 1st Bn., 10th Inf. One
+ company of the reserve bn. and a half company of engineers
+ have reported to you to assist in the organization of
+ your sector, as assigned in Requirement I. All (Inf)
+ companies are of 16 squads and have their usual equipment
+ of portable tools, with the authorized allowance of
+ park tools. The engineers have tool equipment ample
+ to execute any reasonable task that may be assigned them,
+ but have none available for issue to the infantry.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. XI]
+
+ After arrival in the position information received indicates
+ that three hours will be available for preparation.
+
+
+ II. Your general plan for the organization of your supporting
+ point, including a statement of the works you deem
+ necessary.
+
+ III. Your assignment of the men and tools to the different
+ tasks, and proof that your plan is practicable in the
+ available time.
+
+ IV. Indicate to scale on the accompanying map all works
+ undertaken. (Works executed by the 1st Bn., only.)
+
+_Solution._ (See Fig. XII.)
+
+I. The regimental commander of the 10th Infantry decides to place
+two battalions on the line, and one in reserve. The 1st Bn. (with 1
+plat. Mach. Gun Co.) is assigned to the sector Missouri River to large
+ravine flowing into Salt Creek and heading up toward the Shafer House,
+inclusive; the 2d Bn. is assigned to the sector, ravine exclusive to
+Millwood Road, inclusive. The 3d Bn. is held in reserve.
+
+II. The bn. commander decides to place 2½ companies on the line, and
+to hold 1½ companies in local support. Half of A Co. is placed on the
+nose forming the extreme northern end of the Sheridan Ridge. This is a
+sort of natural fort, slightly hollow on top, with very high command,
+and precipitous side slopes. In its front Salt Creek forms an obstacle
+passable with considerable difficulty by infantry only. The position is
+practically inaccessible from the front, and lying within 200 yds. of
+the river it forms an excellent flank for the Sheridan Ridge position.
+To the northwest lies a plain, perfectly open to view for some 600
+yds., which can also be covered by artillery fire from the Blue
+position. The slopes in front of the position are covered with trees.
+The removal of a few rows of trees just below the crest will completely
+open the field of fire, while the retention of the topmost trees will
+serve to screen the position. The other half of A Co. is placed on
+the front slope of the first nose south of the right flank, well up
+the slope to command the foreground, and in such a position as to be
+defiladed from the fire of the trenches to the left. The foreground of
+this position is thickly covered with trees. These will be thinned out
+to improve the field of fire, and the creek in the front will be made
+impassable by felling trees into the backwater of the river. A half of
+B Co. and all of C Co. are placed on the ridge extending to the south,
+the right wing being placed well up on the high ground. The left wing
+falls off to the low ground to the south, this flank being slightly
+refused to cover the ravine forming the left of the bn. sector. By
+placing this portion of the line well back on the high ground a double
+advantage is secured, viz: the near field of fire, down to the creek,
+is widened, and command is gained over a distant field (mid and long
+ranges) which would be impossible were the trenches placed close to the
+creek. When a certain amount of clearing has been done in the creek
+bottom, these trenches will command the foreground to a distance of
+nearly a mile, and will cross fire with the adjacent supporting point
+in the approach to the latter. All fire trenches will be standing,
+traversed trenches, provided with head cover. D Co. and half of B Co.
+will be in local support, not intrenched, on the steep reverse slopes
+of the position. Communicating trenches will be provided as indicated.
+The machine guns will be placed on the high ground in rear of the left
+from which position they can enfilade the two reaches of the creek in
+the foreground. The bn. comdr’s. station will be placed on the highest
+point of the knoll near the center of the position, as shown.
+
+III. The fire line companies will dig their own trenches, and assisted
+by 16 engineers, will provide head cover for same. They will use their
+own portable digging tools, plus the park digging tools of the entire
+battalion as well as the park digging tools assigned to the reserve
+company.
+
+Half of B Co. will prepare the communicating trenches and the bn.
+comdr’s. station, using their own portable digging tools.
+
+The mach. gun platoon will intrench itself, using park digging tools.
+
+The half company of engineers, with the reserve company and Co. D,
+(support) will clear the foreground, under the supervision of the
+Captain of the engineer company. The more difficult tasks will be
+assigned to the engineers, who will also prepare for destruction the
+railroad bridge over Salt Creek on the right flank. The infantry
+companies will use all the portable and all the park cutting tools of
+the entire battalion, as well as those of the reserve company.
+
+IV. See Fig. XII.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. XII]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIII.
+
+ COMBAT--ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE,
+ WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION, RENCONTRE,
+ DELAYING ACTION, PURSUIT, NIGHT
+ ATTACKS, MACHINE GUNS.
+
+
+There are certain natural obstacles, mountain ranges, deserts,
+and rivers, continually utilized by military forces, which afford
+special aid to the defender while imposing peculiar conditions on the
+assailant. The attack and defense of such obstacles follow accepted
+principles of combat, but involve the application of certain special
+measures adapted to the nature of the obstacle. Each case must be
+treated in accordance with the conditions thereof and set rules are
+seldom applicable. The following paragraphs indicate some of the
+principles and expedients that may find application in the attack and
+defense of a river line.
+
+
+ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE.
+
+A defensive line lying behind an unfordable stream cannot be carried by
+the usual frontal (or enveloping) attack, because of the obstacle in
+front of the attacker.
+
+The attacker is limited to the existing bridges or fords to effect his
+passage, unless he can contrive to throw temporary bridges or ferry his
+troops across. The attacker will endeavor to cross by means of hasty
+bridges or ferries:
+
+ (a) Under cover of darkness.
+
+ (b) Secretly at a point not under observation, or not sufficiently
+ guarded by the defense.
+
+ (c) At some point where, from the nature of the terrain, the
+ superiority of the attacker’s fire (infantry or artillery
+ or both,) the defender cannot bring to bear a
+ sufficient volume of effective fire to prevent the construction
+ of bridges and the passage of the attacker’s troops.
+
+(a) and (b) will be of limited application. If the defender has
+destroyed the bridges the attacker will usually be forced to construct
+hasty bridges under cover of the fire of his infantry and artillery.
+
+
+_Methods of attack of a river line._ The following methods of forcing
+passage are then open to the attacker.
+
+1. _A turning movement._ The attacker proceeds a considerable distance
+up or down stream seeking an unguarded passage beyond the flanks of
+the defender’s line. This method if successful avoids the great losses
+in killed and wounded which might result from a frontal attack. It has
+the disadvantages of all turning movements, namely that it requires
+a considerable amount of time, that it may uncover the attacker’s
+line of retreat or communications, and that the defender may change
+his dispositions to meet the turning movement, which will thus gain
+nothing, etc., etc. A wide turning movement would not usually be
+undertaken by a force less than a division.
+
+2. _A turning movement combined with a holding attack._ The attacker
+holds the defender to his position with a portion of his force and with
+the rest executes a turning movement and (after passage) attacks the
+enemy’s flank and uncovers the principal crossings. The forces for the
+turning movement and for the holding attack must neither be so weak
+(nor the separation so great) as to give the defender an opportunity
+to defeat them in detail. Such a proceeding then ordinarily implies a
+large force and a considerable numerical superiority over the defense.
+
+3. _Frontal attack at one point._ The attacker may throw his entire
+strength against one point of passage, using an existing bridge or
+ford, or improvising a crossing (bridge or ferry). The passage is
+covered by heavy fire of infantry, machine guns or artillery from the
+attacker’s side of the river. This is the simplest and most direct form
+of attack on a river line. The defender will probably be able to meet
+it with his entire force. A strong fire superiority over the defender
+at the point of attack is absolutely essential. This ordinarily implies
+a considerable superiority of force, especially in artillery. If the
+attacker, due to his superiority of force, particularly when coupled
+with favorable conditions of terrain, can bring to bear such a fire as
+to prevent the defender from effectually covering the crossing with
+_his_ fire, the passage may be made with small loss. Without a marked
+fire superiority the passage if effected at all will be exorbitantly
+costly. The attacker relies chiefly on the superiority of his artillery
+fire for success.
+
+4. _Frontal attacks at two or more separated points._ This will be the
+usual form of attack on a river line. For a force not larger than a
+reinforced brigade there would usually be but two attacks with possibly
+a demonstration at a third point. Of this form of attack there are also
+two cases:
+
+(a) Two co-ordinate attacks. Both attacks are made strong and the
+reserve is held in a convenient central location to reinforce at the
+proper time whichever attack gives more promise of success. The success
+of either attack usually insures that of the other.
+
+(b) A main attack accompanied by a feint. The object of the feint is to
+induce the defender to believe that it is to be the main attack, and
+to throw his reserves in to meet it. The main attack is then launched
+when the defender has used up his reserves. The attacker’s reserves
+should be placed with a view to supporting the main attack. If however,
+they can at the same time be so placed as to also be available to
+support the feint this may be an advantage, as it may be possible to
+drive home the feint by throwing in the reserves if the defender throws
+_his_ reserves against the main attack. This form of attack may also be
+accompanied by a demonstration by the cavalry at a third point.
+
+4 (b) will be a usual form of attack on a river line and is covered
+more in detail in the following discussion.
+
+_The feint_ should fulfill the following conditions:
+
+1. The point selected should be one where a crossing is possible so
+that the enemy may be induced to believe that the feint is to be the
+real attack.
+
+2. The feint should be so distant from the main attack in respect to
+time of transit that the enemy’s reserves committed to oppose either
+attack cannot be withdrawn in time to repel the other.
+
+3. It should be possible to conceal from the defender the number of
+troops engaged in the feint. If he recognizes it as a feint he will,
+of course, not throw in his reserves to meet it. This requires that
+there be cover or concealment for the troops engaged in the feint,
+sufficient to prevent the enemy from being sure of their numbers, and
+that the feint be pushed with as great vigor as if it were the main
+attack.
+
+_The main attack_ should fulfill the following conditions:
+
+1. The point selected should be at the site of an existing bridge
+or ford, or a place where it is possible to ferry troops across or
+construct temporary bridges.
+
+2. There should be cover both for the approach to the position and in
+the vicinity of the position itself. The advantages of cover are as
+follows:
+
+(a) Troops can be collected close to point of passage without
+defender’s knowledge as to their numbers or even their presence, and
+attack launched suddenly at close range.
+
+(b) Cover reduces the effect of the defender’s fire.
+
+(c) The attacker’s reserves can be brought up without the defender’s
+knowledge, or at least without betraying their numbers.
+
+It is very essential that the numbers engaged in both the feint and
+the main attack should be concealed from the defender until it is too
+late for him to profit by this knowledge, which reveals the attacker’s
+intentions.
+
+3. Conversely the ground on the defender’s side should not afford him
+cover from the fire of the attacker within effective range of the
+crossing.
+
+4. The terrain generally should be such as to increase the
+effectiveness of the attacker’s fire and diminish that of the defender,
+for unless the attacker can establish fire superiority there is no
+chance for his success except by stealth. A terrain which enables the
+attacker to bring a cross fire to bear on the defender is favorable.
+Superiority of fire is especially necessary when the attacker has to
+construct bridges for the passage. It will often be necessary to ferry
+troops to the far bank to protect the bridge builders.
+
+5. The ground on the defender’s side should be such that the first of
+the attacking troops to cross can seize a good defensive position from
+which they can hold the defender in check and uncover the crossing for
+the remaining troops.
+
+6. The point selected should be so distant from or located with respect
+to the point of feint that the defender’s reserves if thrown in to
+oppose the feint cannot be withdrawn in time to repel the main attack.
+
+In brief the selection of the points for the feint and main attack and
+the dispositions for and conduct of the action should be such as to
+deceive the defender as to the intentions of the attacker, until it is
+too late for him to prevent the passage. The separation between the
+two attacks instead of being a disadvantage, as would ordinarily be
+the case, is an advantage, in that the defender’s reserves committed
+to repel one attack cannot be withdrawn in time to meet the other. The
+danger of a counter attack by the defender before the attacker has
+crossed, is very slight.
+
+
+_Conduct of the attack._ On approaching the river line the attacker
+reconnoiters all possible points of passage within a reasonable
+distance of the line of march. Bridges which may be used should be
+seized to prevent the enemy from destroying them. This duty will be
+performed by the cavalry if it is strong enough. If the attacker spends
+the night near the proposed point of passage the outpost troops will
+guard the points of passage in his immediate front, while the cavalry
+patrols the flanks and if practicable crosses the river and gains
+contact with the enemy. The artillery, especially heavy artillery if
+it be present, may take position and fire on the enemy in order to
+annoy him, prevent him from intrenching, destroying bridges, etc.
+This firing will ordinarily be discontinued at dark, but may be kept
+up at intervals throughout the night if it is apparent that any real
+advantage is gained thereby--if not it should be omitted as the
+ammunition is heavy and expensive.
+
+Just before dawn is a favorable time for the attack on a river line,
+as the troops can be moved under cover of darkness to their positions
+and the attack launched just before daybreak. Night movements of troops
+to position must be of the simplest nature. Anything complicated is
+extremely liable to result in confusion.
+
+In camping behind a river line prior to an attack, troops should be
+conveniently disposed with reference to their use in the action of the
+following day.
+
+The artillery takes, if practicable, a position from which it can
+support both attacks. It will in the first instance strongly support
+the feint, shifting its fire later to the main attack with change
+of position if necessary. Cross fire is very advantageous, and it is
+permissible to divide the artillery if it is evident that a distinct
+advantage is thus gained. To support an attack the artillery must
+be within effective range of the known or probable positions of the
+hostile infantry and artillery which will oppose that attack.
+
+Machine guns and infantry may support either attack with fire of
+position when the terrain is favorable. The reserves may often be
+advantageously employed in this fashion.
+
+If the attack is made at dawn the troops on outpost cover the assembly
+and preliminary dispositions for the attack and join their proper
+organizations as the attack is launched. Crossings between the two
+attacks or near the flanks of either must either be destroyed before
+the attack or observed (and if necessary defended) during its progress.
+Otherwise the enemy might use them to cross and make a counter attack.
+Provisions against this should be made. Ordinarily this duty will fall
+to the outposts or the cavalry, but if necessary (as when there is no
+outpost) special detachments may be assigned to guard crossings which
+for any reason have not been disabled, or places where crossings are
+possible, and whose positions are such as to threaten the safety of the
+attacker.
+
+The feint is usually launched first and pushed with great vigor,
+supported by the artillery. While the feint is in progress the troops
+for the main attack assemble as close as practicable to the point of
+passage and deliver their attack on receipt of the supreme commander’s
+order.
+
+The cavalry guards the flanks and may be used to make a demonstration,
+“without incurring heavy losses,” against some point on the flank. Such
+demonstration should usually be made dismounted and may deceive the
+enemy by causing him to believe that the demonstration is the feint
+and the feint the main attack. If practicable the cavalry crosses
+the stream and operates against the enemy’s flank and rear. For this
+purpose the cavalry should be concentrated on one flank, a small
+detachment being sent to cover the other flank. Cavalry may be used
+later to press the pursuit of the defeated force.
+
+The reserve occupies a central _concealed_ position, preferably one
+from which it can reinforce either attack, but especially the main
+attack.
+
+The two attacks may be designated in the orders by the names of their
+commanders, as “Col. A’s column.” They should never be referred to as
+“the feint” or the “main attack.”
+
+The bulk of the infantry will naturally be for the main attack. Thus
+in a brigade one regiment might be assigned to the feint, one to the
+main attack and one to the reserve. The reserve would probably be later
+thrown into the main attack. Circumstances will govern in each case. If
+there is no intention of pushing home the feint a battalion might be
+sufficient for this purpose. It must be borne in mind, however, that
+the object of the feint is to deceive the defender. Hence it must not
+be so weak that the defender will readily detect its unreality, nor at
+a point where the crossing is plainly impossible.
+
+The engineer commander makes a preliminary reconnaissance of the
+proposed point or points of crossings. The engineer troops collect
+under cover (as close as practicable to the point of passage) material
+for crossings or additional crossings (bridges). This should be done in
+advance of the opening of the attack if practicable.
+
+The duties of the engineers in a river line attack may then be
+summarized as follows:
+
+ (1) Preliminary reconnaissance or examination of proposed
+ points of passage with a view to the construction of bridges
+ (or fords).
+
+ (2) Preparation and assembly of bridge material near site of
+ proposed bridges.
+
+ (3) Construction of bridges or operation of ferries under protection
+ of the infantry. Ferriage of troops to cover the operations of
+ the bridge builders.
+
+ (4) Removal of obstacles to passage.
+
+ etc., etc.
+
+If there be two attacks both intended to force a passage some engineers
+may be assigned to each, there being no objection to dividing the
+engineers. The mounted engineers may accompany the cavalry.
+
+
+_Defense of a river line._ The defense of a river line will be based
+upon the methods of attack as outlined in the foregoing. The essential
+features of a river line defense are as follows:
+
+1. The most probable points of passage will be held by small
+detachments (infantry sometimes reinforced by artillery) sufficiently
+strong to check a sudden rush of the enemy and to develop his
+intentions (whether to actually force a passage at the point in
+question or merely to make a feint.)
+
+2. The bridges or fords which might be used by the enemy will be
+destroyed or obstructed if possible--unless the defense feels able to
+hold them and contemplates their use later on.
+
+3. The curtains between the probable points of crossing, and the stream
+line well to the flanks of the enemy’s line will be actively patrolled
+by the cavalry which also maintains communication between the various
+infantry detachments and the reserve.
+
+4. A strong reserve is held back of the line in a central position
+conveniently placed with reference to the roads leading to various
+parts of the position, ready to reinforce the threatened point as soon
+as the attacker’s intentions are developed.
+
+5. Intrenchments and other defensive preparations may be made at the
+most probable points of attack if time and other conditions permit.
+They should not be allowed, however, to hold a large portion of the
+defender’s force to one locality, as it must remain mobile to meet the
+moves of the attacker.
+
+The defender may:
+
+ (a) Catch the attacker astride of the stream and defeat him
+ in detail.
+
+ (b) Let him cross and then drive him back on the river.
+
+ (c) Prevent his passage entirely.
+
+The latter is usually the safest method. Due to the defender’s
+inferiority and the natural difficulties attendant upon such a
+movement, a counter attack involving _a crossing of the stream_ will be
+of rare occurrence.
+
+The secret of success in the defense of a river line is to detect
+promptly the intentions of the attacker so that they may be frustrated
+by the judicious use of the defender’s reserves. This requires that
+defender’s force be kept _mobile_. Aerial reconnaissance will be of the
+greatest assistance in detecting the attacker’s intentions.
+
+
+ORDERS FOR ATTACK OF A RIVER LINE.
+
+ Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ PLAINVIEW, PA.,
+ Field Orders, } 16 May, '16, 3:00 a. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
+
+1. No further information of the enemy nor of our division.
+
+2. This detachment will attack the enemy along the line of the CONEWAGO
+Creek from BRIDGE S. H. to BRIDGE 502W, northeast of PLAINVIEW.
+
+3. (a) The Light Artillery Battalion and the Howitzer Battery under
+command of Major Y will support both attacks. The Light Artillery
+Battalion will move at once via 552 and take up a position west of
+crossroads 561; the Howitzer Battery will move at once via 517--507W to
+a position near WOODSIDE S. H. Fire will first be opened in support of
+Col. B’s attack.
+
+(b) The 2d Infantry and 1 platoon, Co. A, 1st Engrs., under Col.
+C, will move at once via country road east of and parallel to the
+588--FIDLER--BENDER’S CHURCH road, and will attack and cross at 523W,
+moving thence east against the enemy on the 586 RIDGE north of HERSHEY
+MILL.
+
+The 1st Infantry and Co. A, 1st Engrs. (less 1 platoon), under Col. B,
+will move at once to a covered position off the road near PLAINVIEW,
+and when so ordered will attack and cross at 502W. The troops on
+outpost (less detachments guarding the HERSHEY MILL and FORD) will join
+the regiment as the attack is launched.
+
+The 3d Infantry (less Co. M) will move at once via 576--666 to a
+covered position near 605 and then form in readiness, awaiting
+orders. Co. M, 3rd Infantry, will at once report to Maj. Y, 1st Light
+Artillery, as escort for the artillery. One platoon of this company
+will be sent to relieve the cavalry detachment at the farm house near
+529.
+
+(c) The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry (less 1 plat.) will cross the
+CONEWAGO Creek west of BRIDGE S. H., cover our left and operate
+against the enemy’s right and rear. The platoon now near 529 when
+relieved by Co. M, 3rd Inf., will cross the CONEWAGO at or southeast of
+529 and cover our right. Reconnaissance of the enemy’s flanks and rear.
+The roads leading north will be observed as far west as CENTER MILLS
+and as far east as BOWLDER.
+
+(d) The Engrs. with Cols. B and C will construct, under their orders,
+additional crossings at 523W and 502W, as soon as the attacks begin.
+
+4. The 1st Ambulance Co. will move at 5 a. m. to D. WIRT and there
+await orders.
+
+When the issue of extra ammunition is completed the empty battalion
+ammunition wagons will assemble off the road opposite Ambulance Co. No.
+1.
+
+5. Messages to HILL 707.
+
+ A,
+ Brigadier General.
+
+(How and to whom communicated. Report of dispositions to superior
+commander.)
+
+_Notes_: The troops are sent to their positions under cover of darkness
+to avoid detection by aerial scouts, etc.
+
+In this case either or both of the attacks may succeed, so that neither
+is a true “feint.” Gen. A will throw in his reserve where there is the
+greater chance of success.
+
+The artillery commander will confer with Cols. B and C to the end that
+he may intelligently aid their assaults by artillery fire.
+
+ Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ HEIDLERSBURG, PA.,
+ Field Orders, } 2 May, '15, 9:45 p. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg 3" map.
+
+1. A hostile force, estimated to be a weak infantry brigade reinforced
+by a squadron and a battalion of light artillery, is across the
+CONEWAGO in our front. It has an infantry battalion intrenched at
+HERSHEY MILL, two battalions at PLAINVIEW, and a battalion northeast
+of WOODSIDE S. H., with small detachments opposite the fords above
+the mouth of BEAVERDAM CREEK. Red cavalry has been seen near TABLE
+ROCK, BRIDGE S. H., PLAINVIEW, NEWCHESTER and the mouth of the LITTLE
+CONEWAGO. Our division is already in possession of the CONEWAGO
+crossings south of HAMPTON and will attack a hostile force of all arms
+in position near NEW OXFORD tomorrow morning.
+
+2. This command will attack the river line at daybreak to effect the
+capture of GETTYSBURG.
+
+3. (a) The artillery battalion (less Btry. A) will be in position in
+observation about 800 yards south of HEIDLERSBURG at 4:00 a. m. Btry.
+A will be in a position in observation just south of BELMONT S. H. at
+4:15 a. m. The artillery will support the attacks of the 1st and 2d
+Infantries.
+
+(b) The 1st Infantry, with one platoon of engineers and a light ponton
+division, will attack at 4:00 a. m. to force a crossing at HERSHEY MILL.
+
+(c) The 2d Infantry with the remainder of the engineer company, and two
+ponton divisions will move via 601 CROSSROADS and mass near BELMONT S.
+H. by 3:00 a. m. The engineers will then assemble their ponton material
+on the left bank 1 mile down stream of Bridge 502W on the HARRISBURG
+road, and ferry the 1st Bn., 2d Inf., to the grove on right bank. This
+battalion will cover this crossing while the engineers throw two ponton
+bridges at this point. The remainder of the 2d Inf. will be deployed
+on the high ground near 529 CROSSROAD by 4:30 a. m., covering the ARCH
+BRIDGE (300 yards to the southwest). When ordered by me, the 1st Bn.
+will rush the position of the hostile force opposite the ARCH BRIDGE,
+supported by fire of position from the remainder of the 2d Inf. A party
+of engineers will then clear the ARCH BRIDGE of obstructions.
+
+(d) The 3d Inf. will follow the 2d and form in two columns opposite the
+ponton bridges in readiness to cross on orders from me.
+
+(e) The cavalry (less Tr. A) will make a dismounted demonstration at
+BRIDGE S. H. at 4:00 a. m. and cover the right. Troop A will cover the
+left and keep up communication with our division.
+
+(f) The wire sec. Sig. will keep me connected with the infantry
+regiments and will run one wire for artillery use as the artillery
+commander may direct.
+
+(x) Troops on outpost are relieved at 3:00 a. m.
+
+4. Am. Companies, the Amb. Co., and Engr. Tn. report at Heidlersburg at
+5:00 a. m. The Sp. Tn. and F. Tn, remain at MUD CREEK.
+
+5. Messages to BELMONT S. H. after 3:00 a. m.
+
+ A,
+ Brig. Gen.
+
+ Copies to: C. O’s. of Inf. Regts., Arty., Cav.,
+ Engrs., Sig. sec., Tns.
+ Report by wire to C. G., 1st Div.
+ General A adds verbally: “It is now 9:45 p. m. Set your watches.”
+
+
+WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION.
+
+A withdrawal from action whether on the offensive or defensive may
+result from any of the following causes:
+
+1. Direct orders from superior commander to break off the engagement
+and withdraw.
+
+2. Notification from a superior commander that he has completed or is
+withdrawing from an engagement of which the combat in question was a
+side issue.
+
+3. Strong reinforcements of enemy approaching, especially from a
+flank. In this case the time element will govern. If the commander
+believes he has a good chance to gain a tactical decision and get his
+troops in hand before the arrival of the hostile reinforcements he
+may be justified in continuing the action. But if the preservation
+of his force is of vital importance (as when he is the sole covering
+detachment of some important city) he should avoid serious risks.
+
+4. When the general situation will be bettered by a withdrawal.
+
+5. When there is an opportunity to contain the enemy with a portion
+of the force and throw the remainder into a larger and more important
+combat. In this case a portion only of the force is withdrawn.
+
+6. When there is no longer any hope of a favorable decision.
+
+ etc., etc.
+
+In the earlier stages of a combat it is often possible to effect a
+withdrawal in an orderly manner. When, however, the troops are fully
+committed to the action, withdrawal will be a difficult and dangerous
+operation. A retreat over a fire swept zone will usually result in
+far greater losses than sustained during the advance. It is difficult
+to keep the troops in hand and a panic in one organization is very apt
+to be communicated to the entire force. This should be most carefully
+guarded against to the end that the retreat shall not become a complete
+rout. An orderly withdrawal under fire will usually be possible only
+when the terrain is favorable and there is a reserve still in hand. It
+is more difficult to break off an action in defense than in attack, as
+the assailant is approaching.
+
+If the situation is critical the cavalry may be thrown in to check
+the enemy. The artillery continues its fire regardless of the risk of
+losing guns. It may be necessary to sacrifice a portion of the command
+to save the remainder.
+
+When a retreat is necessary the best means to effect it without great
+loss and confusion is to hold fast until nightfall and then withdraw
+under cover of darkness. If in attack, the advanced position should be
+intrenched and stubbornly held. It will usually be easier to hold out
+against a considerably superior force than to effect an orderly retreat
+in broad daylight over a fire swept zone.
+
+A withdrawal of a force fully committed to an action should therefore
+be attempted in daylight only when such a course seems to be
+unavoidable.
+
+No fixed program can be laid down for a withdrawal as the mode of
+procedure is dependent on the terrain, the extent to which the troops
+have become engaged, and other conditions. Every effort must be made
+to place distance and a rear guard between the enemy and the retiring
+troops, and order must be restored as promptly as possible without
+unduly delaying the march.
+
+The first step in the withdrawal is the prompt removal of the trains,
+ambulance companies and wounded. These are sent at once to the rear
+and routed in such manner as not to interfere with the movement of the
+combatant troops.
+
+The reserve is sent promptly to a supporting position in rear and to
+a flank of the line of retreat, to cover the withdrawal of the troops
+committed to the action. In selecting this position the following
+points should be considered:
+
+1. The position should be so located as to cover the retreat of the
+troops engaged before it can become a rout. If the troops are closely
+engaged and the enemy still in good morale the position might have
+to be closer than when these conditions did not obtain, and a second
+supporting position might be required to cover the withdrawal of troops
+from the first, and so on.
+
+2. It should be so located as not to interfere with the retreat
+nor have its fire masked by the retiring troops. As these troops
+must retire straight to the rear, at least in the beginning of the
+withdrawal, the supporting position should ordinarily be on a flank of
+the line of retreat.
+
+3. It must be possible to bring to bear a strong fire at effective and
+long ranges, on any hostile troops which attempt to pursue.
+
+4. The position should be such as to permit a safe and timely
+withdrawal of the covering troops occupying it. It is desirable to have
+good cover from the enemy’s fire immediately in rear of the position.
+The geographical crest of a ridge, or a position in front of an open
+wood fulfills this condition.
+
+5. No rule can be given as to the distance of the supporting position
+in rear of the firing line except that it should be as far back as
+conditions will permit, so that the troops therein may not themselves
+become so closely engaged as to require the occupation of a second
+supporting position to cover their withdrawal. It must on the other
+hand (see 1.) be close enough to prevent the enemy from turning the
+withdrawal into a rout. The distance should seldom be less than one
+mile nor ordinarily more than two miles. The successive covering
+positions in any case must be so selected as to permit the most prompt
+withdrawal with the least loss, confusion and injury to morale of the
+force _as a whole_.
+
+Artillery and cavalry are particularly useful as supporting troops to
+cover a retreat, as they can later be withdrawn more readily than the
+infantry.
+
+It is desirable that the reserve be in its supporting position before
+the first troops on the firing line begin to withdraw, but if time
+is pressing the withdrawal of the first troops may be ordered at the
+same time, for of course the movement of any troops on the firing line
+cannot be started as promptly as that of the reserve, which is not
+under fire. Allowance for this should be made in issuing orders.
+
+Artillery fire should be maintained with undiminished volume until the
+safety of the retreating troops is assured. The artillery position
+during the withdrawal should be at a suitable range in rear of the
+supporting position of the reserve and not too far to the flank. If not
+already in such position the artillery will withdraw thereto usually
+by battery, the remaining batteries increasing their rate of fire
+meantime. Each battery upon reaching its new position will re-open
+fire as promptly as possible. If in an exposed position the artillery
+should have a support, either a company from reserve, the engineers, or
+cavalry.
+
+If ammunition trains accompany the command they should be placed in
+a safe position, but should not be too far to the rear as it may be
+necessary to replenish the combat trains.
+
+The order of withdrawal of the troops engaged (infantry) will depend
+on conditions. The rule for all cases is that the withdrawal should
+be effected in such a manner as to cause the least possible loss,
+confusion and delay _in the force as a whole_.
+
+The troops which are most exposed should be withdrawn first if this
+can be done without risk of a rout, which might involve other troops.
+Otherwise these troops will be left to the last. This will, of
+course, increase their losses and the confusion attendant upon their
+withdrawal, but may be the safest procedure considering the force as
+a whole. The troops most exposed will ordinarily be those most hotly
+engaged with the enemy. Hence in a combat in which some of the troops
+have been fully committed to the action those most closely engaged
+should ordinarily be withdrawn _last_. If, however, the enemy’s
+reinforcements are approaching from a flank and are already close
+enough to be a menace, the troops on the exposed flank would generally
+be the first to withdraw. When other considerations are not paramount
+the troops farthest from the line of retreat will be first withdrawn.
+Care should be taken that the withdrawal of certain troops does not
+unduly expose those remaining on the line. The circumstances of each
+particular case must determine the manner in which the withdrawal shall
+be effected, and the only rule that can be given is that stated in the
+preceding paragraph.
+
+In a brigade action the withdrawal is usually effected by regiment.
+The troops last to withdraw are notified of the plan and cover the
+withdrawal of the others by a vigorous fire without, however, advancing
+further. They are withdrawn by a later order as soon as the other
+troops are well started on their retreat.
+
+Each organization is informed as to the general line of retreat
+and a rendezvous position designated sufficiently far to the rear.
+If necessary to avoid interference the route for each fraction is
+designated. It is to be remembered that so long as they are within
+range of the hostile fire or even for a considerable time thereafter
+the troops will retire as best they can straight to the rear from
+their line of battle. Hence a precise route for the early part of the
+withdrawal should not generally be prescribed.
+
+The retiring troops should be drawn in hand and formed in column of
+route as soon as practicable. This will require ordinarily from 3 to 5
+miles, or even more, depending on how seriously they have been engaged,
+the activity of the pursuit, if any, the nature of the terrain, etc. In
+retreating across a stream all available crossings should be utilized
+to avoid delays resulting from congestion.
+
+A withdrawal may often be more promptly and safely effected by
+utilizing several lines of retreat.
+
+_If necessary_ to cover the withdrawal of the reserve a second
+supporting position may be occupied by some of the troops from the
+firing line, usually those first withdrawn, and hence the retreating
+troops should be drawn in hand promptly and not allowed to get too
+far to the roar until it is evident that the rear guard can cover the
+retreat without assistance. If the enemy pursues vigorously and in
+force, a second and even a third or fourth delaying position may be
+required. (It is usually unnecessary, in problems, to consider more
+than two such positions.)
+
+The reserve (which occupies the first supporting position) together
+with all available cavalry and artillery will ordinarily, upon
+completion of the withdrawal, be formed into a rear guard to cover the
+retreat. The artillery, after having been withdrawn to the supporting
+position, may be placed under the orders of the rear guard commander,
+who then takes charge, and gives all further orders for the security of
+the retreat.
+
+The cavalry, during the action, watches for and delays the advance of
+the enemy’s reinforcements. Thereafter it reports to the rear guard
+commander. Cavalry may delay the enemy’s advance by dismounted action
+either directly across the line of retreat or on its flanks.
+
+The signal troops promptly take up their wires and accompany the trains
+or the reserve.
+
+There will generally be no time to assemble the subordinate commanders
+to receive orders. If in attack signals may be given to cease advance.
+The supreme commander will give orders verbally to such officers as are
+with him (Col. of reserve regt., Chief Surgeon, Engr., Arty, and Signal
+comdrs.) and send messages by aides and orderlies to the commanders not
+present (Cols. of regts. in firing line, Cav. comdr., Q. M. in charge
+of trains, etc.)
+
+The following will indicate the general form and verbiage of orders for
+a withdrawal.
+
+Verbally to Chief Surgeon:
+
+“The enemy will soon be heavily reinforced. This detachment will
+withdraw at once to Gettysburg.
+
+“Remove the wounded as soon as possible to that place.
+
+“The Baltimore turnpike must be kept clear for the movement of troops.”
+
+Verbally to Col. A, 1st Inf. (in reserve):
+
+“A hostile force of one brigade of infantry with a bn. of field
+artillery is approaching our left. Head of advance guard was at
+______ at -- o’clock, where our cavalry was delaying their advance.
+This detachment will withdraw at once to Gettysburg via the Baltimore
+Turnpike. The movement begins on our left.
+
+“Move your regiment at once to ______ and take a position to cover the
+withdrawal of the 2d and 3d Infantries, then follow as rear guard.
+
+“The cavalry and artillery will be placed under your orders.
+
+“Keep the roads clear for the other troops.”
+
+(If necessary this regiment would be directed to send one company
+to act as a support for the artillery. This should be avoided if
+practicable. An escort for the trains, if considered necessary, could
+be furnished by the reserve regiment or the cavalry, and covered in
+orders.)
+
+Verbally to Capt. S, Signal Corps:
+
+“Take up your lines and with your company follow the trains to
+Gettysburg via the Hanover Road.”
+
+Verbally to Major A, 1st Field Artillery:
+
+(Information of approach of hostile reinforcements and plan for
+withdrawal or “You have heard my orders to Col. A.”)
+
+“Col. A with the 1st Inf., your battalion and the cavalry will cover
+the withdrawal and form the rear guard. The 1st Inf. moves at once to
+______.
+
+“Move by battery to ______, take position and check the enemy’s advance
+with your fire. When your movement is completed report to Col. A for
+further orders.”
+
+(If an escort is to be furnished the artillery, Major A would be so
+informed.)
+
+By Aide to Col. B, 2d Inf. (on left of firing line):
+
+(Information as to approach of hostile reinforcements and plan for
+withdrawal as in orders to Col. A.)
+
+“Withdraw at once to Germantown, thence via the Baltimore Turnpike to
+beyond White Run, there to await orders.
+
+“The 3d Inf. remains in position to cover your withdrawal, 1st Inf.
+goes into position near ______, arty. near ______.”
+
+By Aide to Col. C, 3d Infantry:
+
+(Information and plan as in orders to Cols. A and B.)
+
+“The 2d Inf. withdraws at once. Increase your fire as theirs ceases but
+do not advance beyond your present position. I will send you further
+orders for withdrawal.
+
+“The 1st Inf., Arty. and Cav. will cover your withdrawal. 1st Inf.
+takes position near ______, arty. near ______.”
+
+By messenger to Capt. X, Q. M. in charge of trains:
+
+“The enemy will soon be heavily reinforced. This detachment retires at
+once to Gettysburg via the Baltimore Turnpike.
+
+“Move the trains promptly via the Hanover Road to southern entrance of
+Gettysburg and there await orders.”
+
+By Aide to Major B, 1st Cavalry:
+
+“Detachment retreats at once to Gettysburg via the Baltimore Turnpike.
+Col. A commands the rear guard consisting of 1st Inf., arty. bn., and
+your squadron. 1st Inf. takes position at ______ to cover withdrawal.
+
+“When compelled to fall back report to Col. A for orders.”
+
+When 2d Infantry has retired sufficiently to avoid interference with
+retreat of 3d Infantry:
+
+By Aide (or other mounted officer) to Col. C, 3d Inf.:
+
+“Withdraw at once and continue your retreat via the Baltimore Turnpike
+to just beyond Rock Creek, there to await orders.”
+
+Having issued his orders and seen the movement started, the supreme
+commander may, according to circumstances:
+
+(a) Remain at the front to superintend the withdrawal, issuing such
+additional orders as the situation may require, or:
+
+(b) Leave measures for security in hands of the rear guard commander,
+proceed to the rear and devote his attention to restoring order
+amongst the retreating troops, selecting and occupying such additional
+supporting positions as may be necessary, etc.
+
+Conditions will determine which duty, (a) or (b), more urgently
+requires the presence of the commander.
+
+
+RENCONTRE OR MEETING ENGAGEMENT.
+
+A rencontre engagement is one in which, from lack of timely
+information, one or both sides have been unable to make complete
+disposition for attack or defense, prior to the opening of the combat.
+
+The advantage will usually lie with the side which acts the quicker and
+strikes first. In general, a rencontre favors the stronger and more
+aggressive combatant. The proper course then, is to strike the enemy
+before he can complete his dispositions for either attack or defense.
+
+If time is taken to make thorough reconnaissance before launching the
+attack, the opportunity to surprise the enemy and to prevent him from
+taking the initiative against us may be lost. Little fresh information
+can be expected, the commander therefore, must be guided by his mission
+and his previous knowledge of the situation as a whole. The lack of
+knowledge as to the enemy must be compensated by boldness and rapidity
+in seizing the initiative. A bold and impetuous attack which would
+probably meet with disaster against a deployed enemy, is very apt to be
+successful, even against a superior force. A blind attack should not be
+made, however, unless the mission and the general situation seem to
+call for it.
+
+The greatest possible force should be launched promptly against the
+enemy, when possible the entire main body. If time is pressing, the
+advanced troops may be launched at once, being promptly reinforced
+before their attack is checked. Otherwise the advanced troops may seize
+important ground and hold the enemy, covering the deployment of the
+troops in rear.
+
+The deployment, of the leading troops at least, should generally be to
+the front, straight at the enemy.
+
+The attack should generally be frontal. As the knowledge of the enemy’s
+strength and dispositions is usually very vague, turning or enveloping
+movements will generally be slow, difficult to direct, and risky, but
+may in some cases be employed to advantage.
+
+Machine guns may be used with great advantage well to the front during
+the opening stage of the attack. They can remain in action until the
+hostile artillery opens.
+
+The artillery should be brought into action with all possible speed.
+Careful location and consolidation of units is of less importance than
+in a deliberately planned attack. It is the duty of the advanced troops
+to seize positions suitable for the artillery.
+
+The machine guns of the advanced troops, and the artillery should
+therefore be so disposed that they can be placed in action promptly.
+
+It is the duty of an advance guard to protect the main body from
+surprise, and if the enemy be encountered, to hold him until the main
+body can make the necessary dispositions. If combat is possible,
+therefore, the advance guard should be strong enough to fulfill
+its proper functions. In coming into action the main body needs a
+maneuvering zone. If it is cramped by being too close to the advance
+guard it will be difficult to maneuver, and confusion and even disaster
+may result. If the mission of the command is aggressive and it is
+seeking combat, the advance guard should be strong enough to promptly
+initiate an attack on the enemy when encountered, and the main body
+should be close enough to render prompt support but not so close as to
+be cramped in its deployment. The desiderata in such a case then, are
+a strong advance guard and a maneuvering zone for the main body. If
+the enemy be encountered in greatly superior strength retreat may be
+advisable. But a strong and aggressive advance guard might, by a too
+impetuous attack, commit the entire force to action against the will of
+its commander. On the other hand if the advance guard be too weak to
+secure the necessary delay, or the main body too close, the same result
+may be experienced in a more disastrous form. Whenever practicable,
+therefore, the supreme commander should be with the advance guard in
+order to promptly estimate the situation when it arises, control the
+very important first dispositions of the advance guard, and take the
+other measures necessary, whether for attack or retreat.
+
+
+DELAYING ACTION.
+
+A hostile force may be delayed by either offensive or defensive
+tactics. In many cases a vigorous attack will be the most effective,
+if not the only means, of securing the desired delay. The following
+remarks, however, pertain especially to delaying actions where
+defensive tactics only are employed.
+
+Delaying actions are the special duty of rear guards. (See “Rear
+Guards,” also “Cavalry Tactics” and I. D. R.)
+
+As delay only is sought it is permissible to occupy in such actions, a
+much longer line than would be safe in a decisive engagement. A thin
+firing line using much ammunition will generally answer. As the firing
+line will not usually be reinforced, local supports and reserves may be
+made very weak or dispensed with entirely. Local reserves are needed
+chiefly for the protection of the flanks.
+
+A good “getaway” is a prime requisite of a delaying position. If the
+situation demands and the terrain is favorable other troops may be
+posted to cover the withdrawal of the troops in the delaying action.
+(See “Withdrawal from action.”)
+
+Delay is caused by compelling the enemy to deploy and make dispositions
+for a formal attack at as great a range as possible. Hence a good field
+of fire at decisive ranges is essential and at long ranges desirable.
+As the troops must be withdrawn before becoming closely engaged,
+a good field of fire at short ranges (inside of 600 yds.) is not
+necessary, in fact often a disadvantage, as the absence thereof will
+facilitate withdrawal if it prevents the enemy from firing at short
+and mid-ranges on the retreating troops. Hence in a delaying action
+troops occupying a ridge may often be advantageously posted on the
+geographical crest instead of the military crest. They may thus avoid
+the fire to which they might be subjected during their retreat from the
+military to the geographical crest, retreating at once to cover behind
+the ridge.
+
+Infantry can with difficulty he withdrawn from action when seriously
+committed to a fire fight. After the enemy has arrived at short range
+(600 or 700 yds.) an orderly withdrawal is generally impossible, and
+unless the terrain affords protection the losses of the retreating
+force will be severe. If the delaying force is very weak, and
+especially if the position is extended (so that one or both flanks are
+at a considerable distance from the line of retreat) the withdrawal
+should generally commence as soon as the attacker has definitely
+completed his deployment and launched his attack. If the delaying
+force has considerable strength the enemy should be prevented as long
+as possible from establishing that fire superiority without which he
+cannot advance to decisive ranges. In any case, unless exceptionally
+favorable conditions exist, the withdrawal should not be delayed (in
+case of infantry) after the enemy has arrived within 1,000 yds. of the
+position. Cavalry, on account of its greater mobility, is more suitable
+for delaying actions than infantry. (See “Cavalry tactics.”)
+
+In order to deceive the enemy as to the strength of the delaying
+force the line may be considerably extended, unfavorable sections
+being left unoccupied. If the enemy can be deceived and induced to
+undertake a turning or enveloping movement instead of a prompt frontal
+attack, much time may be gained. It must be borne in mind, however,
+that such dispersion in the face of a strong, aggressive enemy, is
+exceedingly risky, and conditions should be carefully considered
+before it is undertaken. It will generally be permissible only in
+the first position, as thereafter the enemy will probably be aware
+that he has only a delaying force to deal with and will push his
+subsequent attacks with more speed and less caution. If time allows,
+portions of the position may be intrenched, even in ostentatious
+fashion, both to strengthen the position and to deceive the enemy
+(“dummy” intrenchments). The position need not be such as to favor the
+assumption of the offensive, if this is not contemplated in a delaying
+action. Hence obstacles which delay and embarrass the attacker’s
+advance are of advantage to the defender in a delaying position.
+
+The number of successive delaying positions to be occupied will
+depend on the terrain, the relative strength of the opposing forces,
+the time it is necessary to delay, etc. As great risk is involved in
+each withdrawal, one determined stand in a good position (prepared
+in advance, if practicable) while the enemy is still, possibly,
+unacquainted with the strength and intentions of the force opposed
+to him, will usually be preferable to several half-hearted stands. A
+“determined stand” by a delaying force means a determined effort to
+delay the enemy in establishing fire superiority and advancing within
+1,000 yds. The action should not be unduly prolonged. The great danger
+in a delaying action is that the force so engaged may be drawn into
+decisive engagement and its retreat comprised.
+
+The successive positions, if more than one is required, should be
+selected, prepared (when practicable) and occupied in advance by a
+portion of the troops. The force withdrawing from one position should
+not retire directly upon that next in rear, in such a manner as to
+mask its fire and possibly involve its defenders in the confusion of
+the retreat. Retreating troops have a tendency to break straight to
+the rear, and will naturally take the best and most apparent line of
+retreat. When practicable, therefore, a delaying position should be
+located somewhat to the flank of the natural line of retreat from the
+one next in advance. The successive positions should not be so close
+together nor so disposed that the troops in one may become involved
+in the retreat from the next in front, and each position should cover
+the retreat from the former position. A delaying action in successive
+positions thus becomes a “step by step” defensive. The retreating
+troops are rallied as promptly as possible, usually at a designated
+locality in rear, in order to be available for further resistance. (See
+“Withdrawal from action.”)
+
+Every available artifice should be employed to delay the enemy,
+destruction of bridges, ambuscades, etc. (For use of flanking positions
+in delaying actions see “Rear Guards.”)
+
+The line of an unfordable river is an excellent position for a delaying
+action.
+
+A force advancing to delay the enemy should seize a strong position as
+far to the front as practicable. It should, however, avoid the danger
+of a rencontre engagement with a superior force by pushing out too far.
+Ample time must be allowed to occupy the position in an orderly fashion
+without interference from the enemy.
+
+Artillery is especially valuable with a delaying force as it can cause
+the enemy to deploy at long range, and may alone effect the necessary
+delay, thereby avoiding the necessity for committing the infantry to
+action. Machine guns may also be employed to advantage. They should be
+used boldly and sacrificed if necessary. In selecting positions for
+delaying actions it should be borne in mind that the hostile artillery
+must be kept at least 5,000 yds. away from wagons or troops in column
+of route. Artillery within 5,000 yds. of a bridge or the mouth of a
+defile may cause great losses to troops passing over or debouching
+therefrom and ruinous losses to artillery or trains.
+
+In a delaying action, where it is expected to occupy more than one
+position, it will usually be inadvisable to issue _all_ the extra
+ammunition of _all_ the troops prior to the occupation of the first
+position. Troops plentifully supplied with ammunition have a tendency
+to use an excessive quantity, and any organization which has expended
+its ammunition is, of course, practically helpless until resupplied.
+Judgment must therefore be exercised and the orders of the supreme
+commander may properly prescribe the issues to be made. In the absence
+of instructions the matter is left to the judgment of the battalion
+commanders, who may in such case issue more or less than is advisable.
+
+
+PURSUIT.
+
+Only by means of an energetic pursuit can the full fruits of victory
+be reaped. It is not the defeat of the enemy alone but his destruction
+that we seek.
+
+As the enemy retires from his position while still maintaining his
+deployment, the attacking troops press forward against the retreating
+lines in an endeavor to drive home a decisive attack before the enemy
+can effect an orderly withdrawal. This is usually the most favorable
+time for a crushing blow and supports and reserves should be used
+liberally. Troops which have been actively engaged in a protracted
+combat are usually in no condition for an active pursuit. Accordingly,
+in anticipation of a systematic pursuit, all fresh troops should be
+assembled for the purpose. Those which have been actually engaged are
+reformed as soon as the danger of a counter attack is over. The pursuit
+is initiated as promptly as possible in order to give the enemy no
+opportunity for recovery. Cavalry and horse artillery, because of their
+mobility, will be especially valuable in pursuit. Motor cars can be
+utilized to great advantage for the movement of foot troops.
+
+An effort is made to keep in continuous contact with the enemy, to
+draw a large number of his troops into action, and to inflict all
+possible losses. Great boldness will be the best policy as a vigorous
+counter-stroke from a defeated force is not greatly to be feared. The
+mobile troops will endeavor, not only to keep contact with the enemy,
+but to gain his flanks and even his rear, to anticipate him in seizing
+bridges and defiles. If unable to break down the enemy’s resistance the
+mobile troops will seek to delay him until the pursuing infantry and
+light artillery can come up.
+
+Pursuit on a broad front is productive of best results as it
+facilitates contact and makes it possible to turn the enemy out of any
+position in which he may endeavor to make a stand.
+
+
+ORDER FOR A PURSUIT
+
+ 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ Hill 1 mi. north-northwest WASHINGTON S. H., PA.,
+ Field Orders } 28 Feb., '16, 8:15 a. m.
+ No. -- }
+ U. S. Geo. Sur. Map, Taneytown, Gettysburg sheets.
+
+1. The enemy has retreated apparently towards HUNTERSTOWN in two or
+more columns. Our cavalry is in contact with the Red at ST. LUKES
+CHURCH.
+
+2. We will pursue at once with two columns and attack the enemy
+wherever found.
+
+3. (a) The cavalry (less ½ troop and the troop north of HARNEY), with
+the mounted engineers and 1 rad. sec. pack Sig., attached, will gain
+contact with and delay hostile main columns.
+
+(b) 3d Brig., reinforced by ½ tr. 2d Cav., 4th Art. Brig, (less
+1 regt.), 1st Bn. 1st Engrs. (less 1 Co.), and 3d Amb. Co., via
+bridge over ALLOWAY CREEK 1 mile north of 492--country road--TWO
+TAVERNS--BONEAUVILLE--GRANITE HILL Station on HUNTERSTOWN.
+
+(c) 1st Brig., reinforced by troop north of HARNEY, 1 regt. art., 1 co.
+engrs., and 4th Amb. Co., via 478--515--LOW DUTCH road to 543--726--592
+to HARRISBURG PIKE by road west of HUNTERSTOWN.
+
+(d) 2d Brig. to follow right column at 1 mile.
+
+(e) Sig. Bn. (less 1 rad. sec. pack) to march with right column between
+the advance guard and main body and maintain communication from
+division headquarters to the cavalry, the two columns and the 2d Brig.
+
+(x) The march to be forced until the enemy is overtaken.
+
+4. Messages to the head of the main body, right column.
+
+ A,
+ Maj. Gen.
+ Dictated to:
+ Staff.
+ C. O. 1st Inf. Brig. (senior officer with left column).
+ C. O. 2d Inf. Brig.
+ C. O. 3d Inf. Brig. (senior officer with right column).
+ C. O. 4th Art. Brig.
+ C. O. Engrs.
+ C. O. Sig.
+ Copy to C. O. 2d Cav., by aide.
+ Copy to C. O. troop north of Harney, by motorcyclist.
+ Copy to commander of trains, by motorcyclist.
+ Report of dispositions to C. G., 1st A. C., by wire.
+ Copy by mail.
+
+
+NIGHT ATTACKS.
+
+Night attacks frequently go astray. They should generally be attempted
+only as a last resort when there is no hope of success by any other
+means, and usually only by small forces.
+
+The essentials of a night attack are:
+
+ 1. Careful daylight reconnaissance or excellent guides or both.
+
+ 2. Careful organization of the attacking force to avoid confusion
+ in the dark.
+
+ 3. Retention of the troops in close order. Simple formations
+ are necessary as complicated ones cause confusion. The
+ rear lines follow at a short distance.
+
+ 4. Use of the bayonet. Troops deployed on a wide front are
+ very difficult to handle and a bayonet attack in close formation
+ is preferable. In any case the premature discharge
+ of firearms is to be avoided. Pieces should
+ generally be unloaded.
+
+ 5. The captured position must be immediately prepared for
+ defense and measures taken to oppose a counter attack.
+ A reserve should be kept in hand.
+
+The first prerequisite of a night attack is a simple plan, and the next
+a knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions and of the locality.
+
+If intrenched positions are to be assaulted they should be
+reconnoitered (during the day) by competent officers.
+
+Night attacks are made mainly by infantry.
+
+Cavalry and artillery cannot be safely maneuvered in close proximity to
+the enemy at night except under very favorable conditions. They would
+seldom be used in a night attack, and in any event should be held in
+rear of the foot troops. All animals and vehicles had best be left
+behind.
+
+Troops for the assault are given badges and watchwords. They keep in
+close touch.
+
+Special arrangements should be made for the supply of ammunition.
+
+The attacking formation usually has little depth (few supports and
+reserves) but some formed troops must be kept in hand to occupy the
+position in case of success.
+
+The simpler the plan and smaller the force the more readily it can be
+controlled and the better the chances for success.
+
+A night attack by a large force is very apt to end in confusion.
+
+The troops are assembled at a rendezvous, if practicable before dark.
+They proceed under guides, or by compass bearing, to the point of
+attack. This should be easy of recognition.
+
+Roads liable to be commanded by the enemy’s artillery or machine guns
+should be avoided.
+
+Every precaution is taken to prevent information of the proposed attack
+reaching the enemy. Reconnaissance is made cautiously, and orders are
+issued just enough in advance to complete the necessary preliminaries.
+
+Due to the difficulty of controlling men at night a single main attack
+at a carefully selected point is usually preferable to several real
+attacks at various points. False attacks or demonstrations may be made
+for the purpose of deceiving the enemy.
+
+A rendezvous for assembly of all troops _after_ the attack, must be
+designated in advance. In case of failure it is very necessary to rally
+the scattered forces of the attacker.
+
+A night attack should generally be delivered when the bulk of the
+defender’s forces will _probably_ be asleep, hence not too early in the
+evening, say after 10:00 p. m.
+
+In attacking a bridge head the main attack should be made on defender’s
+main force. A secondary attack may be made on the troops actually at
+the bridge. If either succeeds the mission is accomplished. A selected
+party (of engineers if any are available) is sent along the bed of the
+stream, with explosives in an effort to destroy the bridge, during the
+confusion created by the two attacks.
+
+If the defense apprehends a night attack provisions should be made for
+sweeping the field of probable attack, construction of obstacles, etc.
+If practicable artificial illumination and alarm signals in conjunction
+with obstacles, etc., should be provided.
+
+After dark every precaution is taken to provide against surprise. Fire
+is not opened except at close range. Units in rear must be close at
+hand to drive out with the bayonet any of the enemy who succeeds in
+forcing an entrance to the position.
+
+Machine guns are useful in repelling night attacks.
+
+
+MACHINE GUNS.
+
+The progress of tactics manifests itself in a great increase in the
+number of machine guns in all modern armies. They are now employed by
+all branches of the service, including the artillery.
+
+Against masses of troops machine guns may be used to an extreme range
+of 2500 yards. They are, however, primarily weapons for medium and
+short ranges. At very great ranges their effect is comparatively
+insignificant. They should seldom be employed beyond 1500 yds.
+
+The rate of fire of machine guns may reach 600 shots per minute and in
+some cases 900. 100 to 200 shots is regarded as slow fire, 200 to 300
+ordinary fire, anything over 300 rapid fire. A machine gun is hence
+equivalent to about 50 rifles.
+
+Modern machine guns are fairly dependable weapons in the hands of men
+trained to their use. Satisfactory results cannot be obtained if they
+are operated by unskilled men.
+
+Pack transportation is generally employed. Light trucks may be used to
+transport both materiel and personnel, especially for anti aircraft
+guns.
+
+The chief purpose of machine guns is to produce a sudden and powerful
+fire effect in the nature of a surprise, at short or mid range. It
+is difficult to supply ammunition at the rate demanded by continuous
+rapid fire of these weapons. The beaten zone is not great as compared
+with that of rifle fire and diminishes rapidly as the range increases.
+Slight errors in estimating distances may nullify the effect at long
+ranges. Accordingly these weapons are most effective against masses of
+troops which appear in the open at short ranges, usually at infrequent
+intervals and for short periods only. Machine guns which remain in
+action for a considerable period may usually be detected, and once
+located they are easily silenced by artillery or concentrated rifle
+fire. Hence their fire should be reserved until the opportunity for a
+surprise is offered.
+
+Machine guns accordingly are weapons of opportunity. Their mobility,
+the ease and rapidity with which they are brought into action and
+their high rate of fire makes them especially useful in meeting the
+opportunities and crises of a combat. They may be used both defensively
+and offensively, but their principal rôle is defensive. There are
+instances of their successful employment as the principal defense of
+portions of an intrenched position.
+
+The lighter types of guns may be used in the trenches and may even
+accompany the infantry in an advance.
+
+In order that they may be free to meet the crises of the combat machine
+guns generally should not be immobilized by being assigned to the
+continuous defense of portions of a line. They are to be regarded as a
+reserve of fire. They are most useful in rear of the flanks or in the
+intervals of an advanced line, their fire being held in reserve until
+needed.
+
+In defense they may be used to reinforce the line at weak or threatened
+points or to oppose envelopment. In opposing an infantry assault on an
+intrenched position they are the most effective of all weapons. They
+should be placed to enfilade the trenches in case of their capture.
+
+In the offense they may be used for concentrating fire on sections of
+the defenders’ line, thereby causing them to keep under cover, reducing
+the effect of their fire, and enabling the friendly infantry to
+advance. They are peculiarly effective for enfilading a line or rolling
+up a flank. In some rare instances attacks of this nature have been
+carried out by machine guns alone.
+
+Machine guns should be used with great boldness in both attack and
+defense. In the assault they are pushed rapidly forward to occupy the
+captured position and oppose a counter attack.
+
+Machine guns should generally remain with the regiments to which they
+belong and under the control of the regimental commander. If unduly
+dispersed they will be unable to take advantage of the opportunities
+afforded. In special circumstances machine guns may be assigned by
+platoon to units smaller than a regiment.
+
+If employed in an exposed position the machine guns may have such
+support as the situation demands.
+
+Machine guns cannot compete with artillery and are of little effect
+against thin lines of skirmishers.
+
+Machine guns also find a useful field for employment in the following
+cases:
+
+1. In the delaying actions of a rear guard. They can force the attacker
+to deploy at long range, and are readily withdrawn from action.
+
+2. At the opening of a rencontre engagement. They can often force
+the enemy to deploy at long range and may remain in action for a
+considerable period before becoming targets for the hostile artillery.
+Hence they are useful with an advance guard, and should generally be
+well to the front.
+
+3. In the pursuit of a defeated and partially demoralized enemy,
+machine gun fire, boldly employed is very effective in completing the
+rout. It is more readily concentrated and controlled than is rifle fire.
+
+4. For repulsing or for supporting a cavalry charge.
+
+5. In attacking or defending the flanks of a line.
+
+6. When the enemy has no artillery they may be used with great boldness
+and vigor at any stage of the action and to a certain extent fulfill
+the functions of artillery within their effective ranges.
+
+7. On outpost to sweep the avenues of approach and defend bridges and
+defiles. For this purpose they may be barricaded.
+
+8. For night attacks and in defense against night attacks. Machine
+gun fire is of great volume and at night especially, is more easily
+controlled than rifle fire.
+
+9. Machine guns are most useful for supporting artillery in exposed
+positions. For repelling surprise attacks on the artillery they will
+often be more effective than an infantry escort.
+
+10. Machine guns are commonly employed on battle or combat type
+aeroplanes and dirigibles, primarily for the attack of or defense
+against similar craft. Anti aircraft machine guns are employed in great
+numbers for the attack of aeroplanes flying at low altitudes. At higher
+altitudes they give way to anti aircraft artillery.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XIV.
+
+A POSITION IN READINESS.
+
+
+A position in readiness is one where troops are held close together
+and under cover if possible, so that they can be readily deployed for
+attack or defense or marched in any desired direction.
+
+It is a maneuver of frequent application, especially in defensive
+operations such as those of covering detachments, flank and rear guards.
+
+A position in readiness is generally assumed when the information
+concerning the enemy is too meagre or the knowledge of his strength,
+position or intentions too uncertain to form a basis for more definite
+operations. It is usually preliminary to the occupation of a defensive
+position, but may develop into an attack (as in the case of an advance
+guard awaiting reinforcements from the main body on encountering the
+enemy in force) a forward or a flank march, a retreat, or a succession
+of two or more of these. Hence a position in readiness may grade
+imperceptibly into a true defensive position, or on the other hand may
+be in effect a delayed march, as when a force gradually withdraws,
+delaying the enemy in successive positions.
+
+An example of this last case would be one where a detachment intending
+ultimately to retreat, takes a position in readiness, prepared to
+retreat, to reinforce its outpost, or to cover the withdrawal of the
+latter, as the situation may demand. In such a case a true march order
+for a retreat cannot be issued in advance of developments. Only the
+first position in readiness can be designated in the first order, as
+subsequent measures necessary cannot usually be foreseen. (See orders,
+post, and “Rear and Flank Guards.”)
+
+In deciding on a position in readiness the following points should be
+considered:
+
+ (a) The mission. What is to be accomplished?
+
+ (b) The strength of our troops, their position, etc.
+
+ (c) The strength and position of our supporting troops, and
+ the plans or intentions of the superior commander. Are
+ reinforcements expected?
+
+ (d) The strength and position of the enemy as last reported,
+ and his probable movements since.
+
+ (e) The probable intentions of the enemy. What will he probably
+ wish to do, and what lines of action are open to him under
+ the given conditions?
+
+ (f) How can the various possible moves of the enemy best be
+ met, or what action will be ultimately taken against him?
+
+ (g) Consider the terrain--roads available for our movements
+ and those of the enemy, bridges, obstacles, defensive positions,
+ artillery positions, cover, lines of retreat, etc.
+
+ (h) Calculations of time, distance, etc.
+
+ (i) From what position can we best meet the enemy’s most
+ probable move, while making allowance for his other possible
+ moves?
+
+A position in readiness should generally be near an important
+crossroads, as this facilitates movement in any direction. If in
+addition this crossroads is one through which the enemy must pass to
+accomplish his mission, so much the better. Cover, under which the
+troops may be massed out of view of the enemy, is very important. This
+might be a covering ridge, a wood or large orchard. A good line of
+retreat is also desirable. The troops other than covering detachments
+or those engaged in special work (such as intrenching, etc.) should be
+held at a central point, in a convenient assembly formation.
+
+Since a defensive position should seldom be occupied until the nature
+and direction of the enemy’s attack is known, all lines of approach
+that enemy may use must be closely watched and early knowledge of
+enemy’s strength, position, movements and intentions, is essential.
+
+Parts of the line which are sure to be occupied in any case may be
+intrenched and otherwise prepared for defense. In a detachment action
+(reinforced brigade) where a defense is contemplated, usually a
+battalion or two battalions should be assigned to intrench any one
+continuous section. The engineers may aid in this work, or perform any
+special task, after which they usually take station in the central
+position.
+
+It is usually a mistake to do a large amount of intrenching in advance.
+Trenches may betray the position and intentions to the enemy. They
+may also exercise a bad influence on the commander’s plans, and to be
+forced to leave intrenchments which they have constructed in order to
+take an exposed position is discouraging to the troops.
+
+The intrenched portions of the line together with the artillery
+positions, form what is called the “framework” of the position.
+
+The artillery should be placed, if possible, where it will command
+all lines of approach which may be used by the enemy, as well as all
+his probable artillery positions. The artillery will be posted, in
+observation, or in readiness, depending on circumstances. The artillery
+combat trains are, unless otherwise ordered, at the disposal of the
+artillery commander, even when separated from the firing batteries, and
+placed at tail of infantry. Firing data may be obtained covering all
+the probable lines of the enemy’s advance, possible hostile artillery
+positions, etc.
+
+It is generally best to unite the entire force in one position. To
+hold an advanced line and then fall back to one in rear is risky.
+It necessitates a division of the force either before or during the
+action, and the troops driven from the first position are apt to retire
+in confusion, probably involving those in rear. In any case the moral
+effect is bad. It is better to hold one good main position only.
+
+Advanced posts which have great natural strength and are not beyond
+effective rifle range of the main position may be occupied to delay the
+enemy and prevent him as long as possible from gaining possession of
+them. They should not be held so long that the enemy can closely pursue
+the retiring defenders, thus masking the fire of the main position.
+Advanced posts should be avoided if possible.
+
+An obstacle extending along the entire front of the position
+at suitable range is an advantage if offensive operations or a
+counter-attack are not contemplated. But consider that in such case the
+enemy may not attack the position at all, but attempt to turn it.
+
+Consider carefully where enemy’s attack may or can fall. It is
+unlikely that he will divide his force and make a turning movement in
+attacking the position unless he is greatly superior in strength, as
+this would cause him, otherwise, to lose time and expose himself to a
+counter-attack.
+
+The cavalry is sent to the front to gain contact with the enemy and
+develop his position, strength, and intentions as this information is
+of the greatest importance. It then falls back, uncovering the front
+of the position by withdrawing to a flank, and delaying the enemy’s
+advance. All possible lines of approach must be reconnoitered, and
+information of the enemy promptly reported. The cavalry should not be
+given too detailed instructions. The orders may direct the cavalry (a)
+Delay or continue to delay the enemy, (b) Make special reconnaissance
+to designated localities. (c) Early information of enemy’s movements
+essential. (d) Fall back on _such_ flank, covering that flank. The
+cavalry as a rule should not be divided in the orders of the supreme
+commander. This should be left to the judgment of the cavalry
+commander. The enemy should, if possible, be denied a superiority in
+cavalry on either flank.
+
+In addition to the security provided by the cavalry one regiment
+may be directed to provide security to the front, another “for our
+right flank,” etc. This may be done by use of the mounted men of the
+regiment and such infantry patrols as the situation seems to require.
+Or standing patrols of mounted men, under command of officers may be
+sent to certain localities to cover the flanks and front. There should
+always be such patrols on both flanks, unless they rest on impassable
+obstacles, and to the front when needed. The mounted patrols may be
+instructed to remove planking of bridges to prevent turning movements
+of enemy, etc. They are instructed to “cover (such) flank, observing
+south and west,” etc. This should be provided for in orders. Infantry
+patrols may also be sent to the flanks and front if this is necessary
+in the judgment of the commander.
+
+The cavalry hunts for the enemy. Other patrols watch for him.
+
+The infantry not assigned to intrenching is in a convenient assembly
+formation under cover nearby. The order should generally prescribe the
+position of each organization.
+
+Small arms ammunition is not issued on taking a position in readiness
+unless there be special orders to that effect.
+
+The field trains remain, or are sent, well to the rear, or in the
+direction of retreat, out of danger. The sanitary troops may be sent
+or remain to the rear, there to await orders, or they may be brought
+to a more advanced position, depending on the probabilities of an
+early retreat, or of their services being required in the care of the
+wounded. A dressing station is not established in orders for a position
+in readiness.
+
+The security of the line of retreat is provided for by keeping
+open roads, guarding bridges, etc. This may be covered by verbal
+instructions and omitted from orders, as reference to such matters has
+a bad moral effect.
+
+In marching from camp a short distance to a position in readiness the
+order partakes to some extent of the nature of a regular march order,
+the various organizations being routed to their position, etc., by as
+many roads as are available (if this would save time over a march on
+one road.) No regular advance guard is established if the distance is
+short and danger slight, but each organization is directed to “provide
+for its own security” during the march.
+
+If the march is a long one a regular march order should be issued--the
+order for the position in readiness being issued later.
+
+These examples are mentioned to show that the circumstances under which
+a position in readiness may be assumed are many and various. The orders
+must be varied to suit the particular case and the examples given must
+not be considered as rigid forms to cover all cases. It is usually
+practicable however, to follow the 5-paragraph form.
+
+
+ORDER FOR A POSITION IN READINESS WHILE ON THE MARCH.
+
+ Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ Crossroads near BRUSH RUN S. H., PA.,
+ Field Orders, } 13 Dec., '16, 8:30 a. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
+
+1. A hostile division weak in cavalry is advancing from the southwest
+in two columns. Heads of columns at 7:50 a. m. were at GERMANTOWN and
+TWO TAVERNS.
+
+Our cavalry has driven back the hostile cavalry to ST. LUKE’S CHURCH.
+
+Our division will be across the LITTLE CONEWAGO CREEK by 11:00 a. m.
+
+2. This detachment will take a position in readiness near this place to
+cover the movement of the division. Former march conditions now cease.
+
+3. (a) The cavalry will delay the enemy’s advance, reconnoitering to
+______ and ______. When compelled to fall back the cavalry will retire
+to HILL 612 and cover our right. Early information of the enemy’s
+movements is desired.
+
+Strong patrols under officers will be sent at once to the vicinity of
+HILL 612 and STORE to cover the flanks and observe the terrain to the
+front and flanks.
+
+(b) The artillery will take position in readiness near FLICKENDER F. H.
+
+(c) The 1st Inf. (less 1 bn.) will intrench and occupy a line from the
+farmhouse 300 yds. northwest of 606, extending southwest along the edge
+of the orchard for 800 yds.
+
+The remainder of the infantry will mass in the woods north of the road
+606--555, facing south, 1st Inf. on the right, 2nd Inf. center, 3d Inf.
+left.
+
+The 1st Inf. will provide for the security of the command to the front.
+Six mounted orderlies of this regt. will report to me.
+
+(d) Co. A, 1st Engrs. will take station near FLICKENDER F. H., and will
+examine and provide for the security of the crossings of the LITTLE
+CONEWAGO CREEK at AIKENRODE F. H. and DIEHL’S MILL. The mtd. section
+will be sent to disable the bridge 492W.
+
+4. The 1st Amb. Co. will proceed to the vicinity of KOHLER S. H. and
+there await orders.
+
+5. Messages to the farmhouse near crossroads 606.
+
+ A,
+ Brigadier General.
+
+(How and to whom transmitted.)
+
+(Report to C. G., 1st Division.)
+
+_Notes_: The instructions to the artillery commander to take a
+“position in readiness” cover all the measures that he should take,
+such as selecting places for his batteries, obtaining firing data,
+reconnoitering alternative positions, etc. He knows all that is yet
+reported of the enemy, so he is aware what his target will probably
+be. General A will see that any additional information bearing on his
+duties which may be received later is transmitted to him, and will
+tell him when to unlimber and go into action.
+
+The terms “the cavalry” and “the artillery” are used because it is
+evident that the complete squadron and battalion are referred to, and
+hence there is no ambiguity.
+
+Troops intrenching would ordinarily provide for _their own_ security
+without special orders. But in this case it is desired that the 1st
+Infantry provide for the security of the entire command.
+
+General A takes measures for the security of his line of retreat by
+directing the engineers to watch the bridges at Aikenrode and Diehl’s
+Mill, and destroy the one at 492W. He is careful however, not to give
+prominence to such provisions in his orders. The engineer company is
+placed where it can also act as a guard for the artillery.
+
+
+FIRST ORDER FOR A RETREAT, DELAYING THE ENEMY.
+
+ Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ BRIDGEPORT, PA.,
+ 15 Sept., '16, 10:30 p. m.
+ Field Orders, }
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg-Antietam 3" map.
+
+1. A hostile division has halted 3 miles west of the MONOCACY RIVER.
+Its outpost is in touch with ours along the line of that stream from
+PALMER’S to road junction 433.
+
+Our division will reach the vicinity of PIPE CREEK before 11:00 a. m.
+tomorrow, where we are ordered to join.
+
+2. This detachment will tomorrow the 16th inst. march provisionally on
+TANEYTOWN, delaying the enemy’s advance.
+
+ Troops:
+
+ (a) Leading Troops: 3. (a) The leading troops will clear the
+ Major M, 3d Inf. PINEY CREEK crossing at ____, at
+ 3d Bn., 3d Inf. 5:10 a. m., and proceed via ____ road to
+ 6 Mtd. Orderlies, TANEYTOWN. The bridges along the
+ 3d Inf. route will be prepared for destruction.
+ Co. A, 1st Engrs.
+ (Less mtd. section)
+
+ (b) The main body will start from its
+ camp at 5:30 a. m., and take position in
+ mass facing west near crossroads 476 as
+ follows:
+
+ (b) Main Body: (in The 2d Inf. in the northeast angle of the
+ order of march) crossroads.
+ Col. B, 2d Inf.
+ 2d Inf. The 3d Inf. (less detachments) in the
+ 3d Inf. (less 3d Bn. southeast angle of the crossroads.
+ & 6 mtd. orderlies)
+ C. Tn., 1st Bn., 1st Amb. Co., north of the road just
+ 1st L. A. east of PINEY CREEK.
+ 1st Amb. Co.
+ Arty. Combat trains, south of the road
+ opposite 1st Amb. Co.
+
+ Each organization in the main body will
+ provide for its own security during the
+ march.
+
+ The 2d Inf. will provide for security to
+ the front and flanks after the occupation
+ of the position.
+
+ (c) Rear Guard: (c) The rear guard will occupy a position
+ Col. A, 1st Inf. on the line ---- for the purpose
+ 1st Inf. of delaying the enemy.
+ 1st Sq., 1st Cav.
+ 1st Bn., 1st L. A.
+ (less C. Tn.)
+ Mtd. Sec., Co. A,
+ 1st Engrs.
+
+ (d) The outpost will remain in position
+ until further orders. The troops on outpost
+ will be under the rear guard commander
+ after 4:00 a. m.
+
+4. The field train will clear the PINEY CREEK crossing at 4:30 a. m.,
+and will proceed via TANEYTOWN to WEISHAARS MILL, reporting its arrival
+at that place to the Chief of Staff of the Division.
+
+5. Messages to ______.
+
+ A,
+ Brigadier General.
+
+ Dictated to Staff and representatives of:
+ 1st Bn., 1st L. A.
+ Co. A, 1st Engrs.
+ 1st Inf.
+ 2d Inf.
+ 3d Inf.
+ 1st Amb. Co.
+ F. Tn.
+ Outpost.
+
+ Telegram.
+ Detch., 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ BRIDGEPORT, PA.,
+ 15 Sept., '16, 10:85 p. m.
+
+ C. G., 1st Div.,
+ WESTMINSTER, MD.
+
+ Hostile division 3 miles west of MONOCACY, outpost on west
+ bank. Detch. marches at 5 a. m., Sept. 16, provisionally on
+ TANEYTOWN delaying enemy’s advance. Field trains to
+ WEISHAARS MILL.
+
+ Messages to TANEYTOWN.
+
+ A,
+ Brig. Gen.
+
+_Notes_: It cannot be foreseen what route will be adopted after
+reaching Taneytown as this will depend on developments. Hence the
+command is directed _provisionally_ to that place.
+
+The leading troops may proceed at once to Taneytown, preparing the
+bridges for destruction. General A personally instructs the commander
+of the leading troops as to the details of his duties. The preparation
+of the bridges is mentioned in the order so that other subordinates may
+take notice. The demolition will be completed by the mounted engineers
+with the rear guard upon the latter’s withdrawal.
+
+As it is part of the duty of the detachment to delay the enemy long
+enough for the division to take up a defensive position near Pipe Creek
+without being interfered with while so doing, General A should not
+withdraw prematurely from the excellent delaying position just east of
+the Monocacy River. He therefore directs the rear guard commander to
+occupy this position. General A (who will be with the rear guard) will
+give orders for the withdrawal from this position at the proper time.
+The artillery and cavalry are placed with the rear guard to assist in
+delaying the enemy.
+
+As it might be necessary (although exceptional) for the main body to
+reinforce the rear guard in the first delaying position, or cover
+its withdrawal therefrom it must not be withdrawn prematurely. It
+is therefore placed in a convenient position in readiness either to
+reinforce the rear guard or continue its march on Taneytown. The
+measures for the security of the main body during its march to the
+position in readiness and after occupying same might have been left to
+Colonel B, who is placed in command since General A will be with the
+rear guard. But as these measures are very important General A deems it
+advisable to give orders about them. (If they had not been mentioned,
+Colonel B would take the necessary measures without special orders.)
+
+The artillery combat trains and the ambulance company are held with the
+main body as they may be needed.
+
+During the night the security of the camp should be left to the outpost
+commander. But as the outpost troops will necessarily take part in the
+delaying action at the river line they should be placed under the rear
+guard commander (who is charged with the duty of delaying the enemy)
+before the delaying action begins--that is before daybreak, as the
+enemy is not likely to make a _serious_ attack during the night.
+
+As the field train will not be needed during the day it is sent to a
+safe place in rear, well ahead of all troops. It is already in charge
+of the senior Quartermaster present. It requires no escort other than
+its regular personnel and a few footsore and slightly wounded men who
+are riding on the wagons.
+
+General A will report his dispositions to the Division Commander by
+telegraph or telephone tonight if this be practicable. Otherwise he
+will send an aide. The aide can explain the situation to the Division
+commander and answer his questions, which an enlisted man with a
+written message could not do.
+
+General A’s subsequent movements will depend on developments, and will
+be made the subject of future orders. In view of the uncertainty as
+to the course of events in the morning it is not wise to issue orders
+covering _possible_ future movements, as it might be necessary to
+countermand them--which is very undesirable.
+
+(See also “Rear Guards.”)
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XV.
+
+SANITARY TACTICS.
+
+
+_Personnel and materiel with combatant troops._ The sanitary personnel
+and equipment normally assigned to various units is given in F. S. R.
+A regiment acting alone might, in addition to its regular personnel
+and equipment, be accompanied by 3 ambulances and an infirmary of 12
+beds detached from the sanitary units; a brigade acting alone may be
+accompanied by one ambulance company. This is not to be assumed unless
+so stated in the problem. An ambulance company may be assigned to a
+brigade acting as advance guard to a larger force.
+
+
+_Duty._ The duty of the sanitary organization is to transfer or
+evacuate all wounded from the battlefield to the sanitary stations
+in rear with the least possible delay and the minimum of treatment.
+Each successive station is emptied as soon as possible in order to be
+prepared to receive fresh cases. The wounded are given at each station
+only such attention as necessary before they can be transferred.
+
+The wounded are collected as rapidly as possible and receive at each
+station the necessary attention. They should never be left on the field
+of battle nor allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy if this
+can be avoided, as it has a demoralizing effect on the troops. In an
+advance little difficulty will be encountered, but in retreat after a
+defeat, especially if the losses have been severe, it may be necessary
+in avoiding delay and the loss of sanitary personnel and materiel,
+to abandon some of the more seriously wounded either on the field of
+battle or at some of the stations in rear. They fall into the hands of
+the enemy, but are protected by the Geneva Convention. The wounded in
+such cases become prisoners of war and are available for exchange. The
+necessary sanitary personnel and medical supplies should be left behind
+unless the wounded can be placed in care of competent civilians, as may
+often be done in friendly country.
+
+_Capacity._ An ambulance company has 12 ambulances each of which will
+accommodate 9 patients sitting or 4 recumbent and 1 sitting.
+
+A field hospital can set up 216 beds.
+
+_Sanitary stations in combat._ The stations and duties of the sanitary
+troops during combat, are as set forth below. (See Figs. XIII and XIV.)
+
+_Bn. collecting stations._ These stations are established by the
+assigned personnel as close as practicable to the firing line. The
+wounded are collected by litter. Each battalion and squadron has
+7 litters (on combat wagons); each machine gun company 1 litter;
+regimental sanitary personnel 8 litters; total with a regiment, 30.
+
+_Regimental aid stations._ These are established by the regimental
+sanitary troops in a convenient central location as close to the firing
+line as the necessity for shelter from the enemy’s fire permits. The
+wounded from the bn. collecting stations are assembled and first aid
+rendered. Slightly wounded men are directed to the rear. The regimental
+bands may be placed at the disposal of regimental surgeons to assist in
+collecting the wounded, etc.
+
+_Dressing stations._ Dressing stations are established by Ambulance
+Companies, each company can establish one station. In order to avoid
+unnecessary loading and unloading of wounded and immobilization of
+the ambulance companies, dressing stations should not be established
+prematurely, nor too far to the rear. If the course of the action
+permits, the ambulance companies advance and take over the wounded
+directly from the regimental aid stations. If however, the action is
+protracted, or likely to take an unfavorable turn, the evacuation of
+wounded from the regimental aid stations must often commence prior to
+the close of the engagement, in which case dressing stations must be
+established in rear. The location of a dressing station should fulfill
+the following conditions:
+
+ (a) It should be out of range, or otherwise secure from hostile
+ artillery fire.
+
+ (b) It should be close to and conveniently located with reference
+ to the battle district it serves, the roads leading thereto, and
+ the general line of communication to the rear.
+
+ (c) It should be near but not on a good road.
+
+ (d) It should not be near a (friendly) arty. position.
+
+ (e) Fuel (fire-wood), water and shelter are necessary.
+
+It is desirable that the stations be near a building or group of
+buildings. These afford shelter in inclement weather and provide a
+refuge for the wounded pending their transfer to the Field Hospital in
+case the Ambulance Co. has to move forward.
+
+The location of dressing station (or stations) is designated at the
+proper time by the Supreme Commander after consultation with the Chief
+Surgeon. Serious operations are not ordinarily attempted at dressing
+stations.
+
+
+_Slightly wounded station._ The object of a slightly wounded station
+is to relieve the dressing station of the care of slightly wounded
+men who are able to walk and require little attention. A slightly
+wounded station is not ordinarily established for a command less than
+a division. It is usually established by a field hospital, if one is
+present, near the station of the latter, or by an ambulance company
+and later taken over by a field hospital. It should be in rear of
+dressing stations, on the natural line of retreat, near the important
+roads and conspicuously marked so that it may be readily found. Here
+the slightly wounded receive attention and are returned to duty at the
+front, or sent to the rear. Slightly wounded going to the rear should
+be collected in small bodies under the command of (slightly wounded)
+officers and non-commissioned officers.
+
+
+_Field hospitals._ The field hospitals receive the wounded from
+the dressing stations. They should in any case be so located as to
+facilitate the rapid transfer of the wounded to the rear, without
+unnecessary man-handling of patients. If practicable the hospitals are
+located in towns and near to rail head. During a forward movement when
+it is desirable to release the ambulance companies as soon as possible
+in order that they may go forward with the combatant troops, the field
+hospitals may move forward and take over the wounded directly from
+the dressing stations of the ambulance companies. The evacuation of
+dressing stations is not the first duty of the ambulance companies
+when they are needed with the advancing troops.
+
+
+_Police of the battlefield._ After an action the police of the field
+is completed as promptly as possible, under direction of the Chief
+Surgeon, by details from the combatant troops. The police of the
+battlefield includes:
+
+ (a) Collection and removal of the wounded (friendly or hostile.)
+
+ (b) Collection and disposal of all corpses and carcasses, (burial
+ and cremation.)
+
+ (c) Identification and record of all dead and wounded with
+ diagnoses.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. XIII
+
+REGIMENTAL SANITARY TROOPS IN BATTLE.]
+
+
+_Transportation of wounded._ All wounded who are able to walk are
+required to do so. The seriously wounded are transported to the rear in
+stretchers, ambulances, and by any other means available. Empty wagons
+of combat and other trains may be utilized for this purpose.
+
+When the tactical situation permits, the ambulance companies will
+transport the wounded to the field hospitals. When, however, the
+combatant troops are moving forward the ambulance companies should
+follow them as soon as possible. In such cases the field hospitals
+may be pushed up to the front, and use made of all hired or impressed
+transportation available.
+
+Civilian help, both in the transportation and care of the wounded,
+should be utilized to the fullest possible extent, to relieve the
+congestion in the sanitary stations. The evacuation system of the
+Medical Dept, is illustrated by diagrams herewith. (Fig. XIV.)
+
+Transportation by rail should be utilized to the greatest possible
+extent.
+
+[Illustration: FIG. XIV.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVI.
+
+THE RIFLE IN WAR.
+
+
+In a decisive engagement (on the defensive) the firing line should
+ordinarily be located a little down hill from the geographical crest,
+rather than on the crest itself. This keeps the men off the skyline,
+places them on the front slope where a better view of the foreground
+is obtained (on or near military crest) and shots aimed at the firing
+line are not so apt to go over the crest and possibly strike troops
+in rear thereof. While a slight command (elevation above the enemy)
+is desirable, it should not be so great that the grazing effect is
+sacrificed and a plunging fire produced. If, however, the crest is not
+a skyline, affords a good view of the foreground and has a reverse
+slope perfectly defiladed, there is, of course, no reason then for
+going down the slope. The disadvantages of going down the slope are
+that supports coming into the firing line, or the latter itself in
+case of retreat, may be exposed to hostile fire on the front slope.
+As this is particularly disastrous for troops moving to the rear it
+is frequently advisable in a retreat or delaying action to place
+the firing line on the geographical crest instead of down the slope
+therefrom. Also in such actions fire at the nearer ranges is not
+usually contemplated, and hence there may be no necessity for occupying
+the military crest.
+
+The supports should be placed where they will be the least exposed to
+hostile fire, while yet readily available. Ordinarily this will require
+that they be intrenched close to the firing line. If, however, the
+reverse slope of the ridge (on the front of which the firing line is
+placed) is steeper than the angle of fall of the hostile fire a portion
+of this slope will be defiladed from such fire, and the supports may be
+placed thereon without being intrenched. They must not, of course, be
+too close to the crest, since there is here a danger space, and on the
+other hand they must not be as far to the rear as the place where the
+hostile bullets strike the ground. By causing the men to lie down they
+may be placed closer to the crest. The defilade on the reverse slope in
+this case increases as the hostile firing line approaches, especially
+if it is also moving down hill. If the reverse slope is such as to be
+swept by the hostile fire the supports must generally be intrenched.
+On a partially defiladed slope the supports may be held lying down in
+a line of narrow columns. They may be moved nearer to the crest as
+the enemy approaches and the defilade increases. If the supports can
+conveniently be placed in rear of the flanks of the firing line, they
+will be largely protected from fire directed at the latter.
+
+The terms “front slope,” “reverse slope,” “down hill,” etc., are to be
+understood as relative or comparative.
+
+Position fire may be used either in attack or defense when conditions
+are favorable. It is more characteristic of the latter, and is
+permissible up to quite long ranges, 1,800 yds. or even more. The
+desiderata for position fire are:
+
+ 1. Troops available without detriment to other tactical operations
+ (usually reserves.)
+
+ 2. Plenty of ammunition and facilities for supplying same.
+
+ 3. A well selected position. It should generally be on a crest
+ and should have some command. If on a flank of the main
+ firing line it cannot accidentally fire on the men therein, will
+ not receive fire directed at them, and can cross fire with
+ them on any target. If in rear of the main firing line it
+ is best that the men in the second tier should not be able to
+ see the men in the first tier. If any of the latter are hit
+ by fire from their rear the effect is most demoralizing.
+
+The relative vulnerability to frontal fire of small arms of different
+formations (on level ground) is as follows: (beginning with the most
+vulnerable)
+
+Under aimed fire:
+
+ 1. Column of platoons.
+ 2. Line and column of squads, same.
+ 3. Line of platoons in columns of squads.
+ 4. Line of squad columns.
+ 5. Line of platoon columns.
+
+Under sweeping (unaimed) fire:
+
+ 1. Line.
+ 2. Column of platoons.
+ 3. Line of platoons in columns of squads.
+ 4. Line of squad columns.
+ 5. Line of platoon columns.
+ 6. Column of squads.
+
+As the fire becomes oblique and approaches enfilade the relative
+vulnerabilities of these formations are subject to progressive
+change. Thus under sweeping enfilade fire the column of squads is
+more vulnerable than line, since depth increases vulnerability as
+the direction of fire becomes more oblique. Extreme precautions must
+invariably be taken to guard the combatant troops against very oblique
+or enfilade fire, inasmuch as it usually involves relatively great
+losses, and produces a demoralizing effect out of proportion to the
+actual number of casualties. It is for these reasons chiefly that the
+flanks of a line are its most vulnerable parts.
+
+Platoon and squad columns are the narrow front columns described in I.
+D. R. They may be taken up at any time and from any formation. Platoon
+columns are the more easily controlled.
+
+In order to save time, avoid fatigue, and keep the troops in hand
+it is advisable to remain in column of route as long as possible in
+approaching the deploying position. But on the other hand no risk must
+be taken of encountering hostile fire while in vulnerable formation.
+A division advances into action in columns of brigades, the brigades
+later divide into regimental columns, the regiments into battalion
+columns, and so on. The advance into an engagement should be made in
+column of squads until the probability of encountering hostile fire
+necessitates deployment. After deployment, and before opening fire,
+the advance may be made in line of platoon or squad columns, thin
+successive lines, etc., depending upon the terrain and the nature of
+the enemy’s fire.
+
+The vulnerability of all formations is reduced by rising ground (rising
+with respect to the firers) but line is relatively less vulnerable than
+column formation. This applies to aimed fire only. Hence in advancing
+down a slope under aimed fire a line of skirmishers will be the least
+vulnerable formation. In all other cases of frontal fire of small arms
+on any kind of ground and under either aimed or sweeping fire platoon
+or squad columns will be the least vulnerable.
+
+Squad or platoon columns in the advance are not deployed until they
+reach the place where it has been decided to establish a firing line.
+Supports moving into the line in narrow columns deploy just before
+reaching the line.
+
+If the distance from the supports to the firing line be quite short
+the former may go forward as skirmishers and drop at once into their
+place in line. If the distance is somewhat greater and the fire heavy,
+squad columns may be used, as these can deploy with less exposure
+on the firing line than platoon columns. Where the supports have a
+considerable distance to advance, platoon columns allow better control,
+especially in broken and diversified terrain. If the enemy’s fire be
+very oblique, lines are to be preferred to columns for the advance.
+Successive thin lines may be advantageously employed in such cases.
+(See post.)
+
+Rising ground (with respect to the firer) decreases vulnerability by
+plunging effect (decrease of swept space). Falling ground (reverse
+slopes) equal to or less in slope than the angle of fall increases the
+vulnerability or swept space. Slopes (reverse) steeper than the angle
+of fall are completely defiladed from fire. But of course troops placed
+close to the crest may be hit unless they lie down.
+
+An average burst of 3" shrapnel covers an ellipse about 200 yds. long
+by about 20 yds. wide at a range of 3000 yds. Errors in range and
+burst are greater and more frequent than errors in direction. Frontal
+shrapnel fire, if properly ranged and burst, will cover 18 to 20 men
+in a line of skirmishers (at 1 yd. intervals) even with an error in
+direction, or will involve 3 squad columns at 8 yd. intervals, 24
+men. Slight errors in range or burst would afford little immunity.
+Under such fire, accordingly, squad columns are more vulnerable than a
+line of skirmishers. The more oblique the fire, that is the nearer it
+approaches enfilade, the greater the vulnerability of both formations.
+This is for the reasons that a single shrapnel, correct in range,
+direction and burst, will involve a greater number of troops than where
+the fire is frontal, and errors in range or burst afford less immunity.
+On the other hand errors of direction of oblique or enfilade fire
+afford greater immunity to both formations (line of skirmishers and
+squad columns) but are of less frequent occurrence than errors of range
+or burst. Errors of all kinds in oblique or enfilade fire favor the
+line of skirmishers more than the line of squad columns. Under shrapnel
+fire, therefore, whether frontal or oblique, a line of skirmishers is
+less vulnerable than a line of squad columns. Squad columns accordingly
+should not be used except to facilitate an advance over rough ground
+and reduce the period of exposure. They are more conspicuous and hence
+are more apt to draw fire and furnish better targets than a line of
+skirmishers. They should be deployed whenever the terrain permits easy
+progress in line.
+
+Under frontal shrapnel fire a line of platoon columns, properly
+conducted, may afford an advantage over line of skirmishers. The
+columns should have an interval of 30 to 35 yds. and advance
+erratically. Whereas errors in direction afford little protection to a
+line of skirmishers, an error in direction of from about 10 to about
+20 or 25 yds. would cause the shrapnel to burst between two adjacent
+platoon columns without hitting either. As the fire becomes oblique the
+vulnerability of platoon columns rapidly increases. Under very oblique
+or enfilade shrapnel fire they are suicidal.
+
+Successive thin lines, if judiciously employed, may afford considerable
+immunity from rifle, machine gun and shrapnel fire, both frontal and
+oblique. This formation gives but 2 men in the swept space of a single
+shrapnel. The hostile artillery can scarcely afford to use shrapnel
+against such lines as the probability of hits is not sufficient to
+warrant the expenditure of ammunition. Machine guns, which are most
+effective against masses of troops, would seldom be used against such
+attenuated lines. Similarly these lines are less apt to draw aimed
+rifle fire than a denser formation. Under continuous fire they are,
+in the aggregate, as vulnerable as the same number of men in a single
+line although it will require more of the enemy’s time and ammunition
+to make the same number of hits. They are most advantageous when not
+subject to continuous sweeping (unaimed) fire.
+
+The greatest objection to successive thin lines as a means of advance,
+is loss of time. Allowing a distance of 200 yds. between lines the
+first and last would be separated by 1400 yds. and there would be an
+interval of time of about 15 minutes before the last line arrived at
+the advanced position. They are also more difficult to control than a
+single line, whether skirmishers or squad columns. If the advanced line
+is to be built up without disorganization--breaking up of squads, etc.,
+the men should be trained to keep their eyes on the man of their own
+squad next in front and to follow him into place.
+
+Many considerations enter the problem of crossing the zone of artillery
+fire. A formation that is correct one time may be wrong the next.
+Platoon columns may be best under frontal shrapnel fire, and worst
+under very oblique fire. Officers must learn by study and practice on
+the ground the formations best suited to the conditions to be met.
+They should understand the principles of vulnerability, observe the
+direction, intensity and accuracy of the enemy’s fire, and adapt their
+formations thereto.
+
+The ordinary fire of battle is slow, controlled fire at will. It is
+employed at both long and short ranges. Rapid fire is used when an
+exceptionally favorable target appears for a short time, in a close
+encounter with the enemy, to gain fire superiority just before an
+advance, to increase dispersions when this is desired. Volley fire is
+used in 3 exceptional cases: 1. For ranging. 2. For massed or favorable
+targets. 3. To steady the men if they are getting out of hand. Slow
+fire will generally be at the rate of 3 to 5 shots per minute. Rapid
+fire should never be faster than 10 shots per minute. (See I. D.
+R.) The tendency of soldiers generally is to fire too rapidly and
+fire training should aim to control this tendency. Increase of rate
+is accompanied by a rapid falling off in accuracy, and by waste of
+ammunition. It also excites the men making the intelligent control and
+direction of fire much more difficult.
+
+In defense, fire may be opened, usually by specially designated troops,
+at long ranges in order to compel an early deployment of the attacker.
+This is particularly desirable in a delaying action. The attack, even
+if it begins to suffer losses at long range, should generally reserve
+its fire until effective range (1,000 to 1,200 yds.) is reached, and
+if it can be reserved until within about 800 yds. of the enemy so much
+the better. Experience indicates that an attack which is compelled to
+open fire beyond effective rifle range has little prospect of success.
+If the strength and position of the defender are unknown or imperfectly
+known to the attacker and if he advances in a vulnerable formation,
+better results may be obtained by the defense by withholding its fire
+until the attacker is well within effective range. Thus if the attacker
+is advancing in a vulnerable formation over a wide space visible to
+the defense, especially if the position and strength of the latter
+is unknown, a sudden outburst of fire may prevent the attacker from
+establishing a firing line and compel him to retreat to cover. In such
+a case the farther he has to retreat under fire the greater will be
+his losses, and he may thus well be permitted to approach quite close,
+say to 800 yds. or so. The attacker should not, however, be allowed to
+approach too close to a covered position in which he might be able to
+establish fire superiority. Thus fire by the defense should be opened
+at such a time that the attacker will be more apt to retreat than to
+rush forward to a covered position. If cavalry, mounted, approaches
+a defensive position of whose presence it is unaware (ambuscade)
+the defenders if secure from a mounted charge by reason of their
+strength or an obstacle in their front, may allow the cavalry to
+approach to point blank range (if it will do so) before opening fire.
+The inevitable retreat of the cavalry under fire will then be most
+disastrous. Artillery in column may be greatly damaged and prevented
+from coming into action at ranges from 2,000 to 2,500 yds. by infantry
+fire. Rapid or volley fire should be employed in such a case.
+
+In his first firing position the attacker puts into the firing line
+as many men and fires as many rounds as necessary to establish fire
+superiority. Without such superiority of fire a further advance is
+usually impracticable. The usual density of the firing line will be
+about 1 man per yd. of front.
+
+Visibility of the target decreases dispersions, but a very conspicuous
+point on the hostile line (such as a prominent tree, etc.) may result
+in bad distribution from the tendency of the firers to concentrate
+their aim on the conspicuous point.
+
+A number of methods are employed for designating and identifying
+indistinct targets, of which the following is an example: A prominent
+object in the near vicinity of the target is selected as a reference
+point, and the exact position of the target indicated by reference
+thereto, thus:
+
+ Direction to reference point: 1 o’clock (on a horizontal dial)
+ or to our right front.
+
+ Nature of reference point: Large white house.
+
+ Position of target relative
+ to reference point: 4 o’clock (on vertical dial)--3
+ fingers (90 mils, or 2 inches).
+
+ Range: 1,000 yds.
+
+ Objective: Skirmish line--length 4 fingers.
+
+This means that the target is to the right of and below the reference
+point a distance of 3 fingers, or the equivalent 90 mils or 2 inches.
+
+In order to increase the dispersion at mid and long ranges combined
+sights, 50 yds. under and 50 yds. over the estimated range are used in
+all cases where the estimated range is 1,000 yds. or over. Combined
+sights may be used inside of 1,000 yds. against an enemy on rising
+ground, or the dispersion may be increased by rapid fire, or both
+artifices may be employed. Battle sights are used habitually below 600
+yds., or in repulsing cavalry, up to 900 yds.
+
+Fire is usually directed on the most immediately threatening element of
+the enemy. It may also be directed on targets which because of their
+size or vulnerability are likely to render fire especially effective.
+The attack concentrates its fire on the point where it is proposed
+to deliver the assault. The defense usually concentrates on the most
+advanced fractions or groups of the assailant, since these groups
+will rapidly grow in size if permitted to hold their ground. Fire is
+concentrated on critical points by increasing the rapidity of fire, by
+putting more rifles in the line opposite these points, by the cross
+fire of adjacent organizations, and by position fire of reserves and
+machine guns.
+
+While concentrating on the critical points, it is of the utmost
+importance both in attack and defense that all parts of the hostile
+line be kept under fire at all times. Otherwise the portions not
+under fire will shoot with peace time accuracy or, in the case of
+the assailant, will take advantage of the opportunity to push their
+firing line forward. The front of the enemy is accordingly divided into
+sectors which are assigned to the various fire units in order.
+
+The covering of the entire front is insured by overlapping or switching
+fire. Thus, in attack, the company target may be divided into two
+parts, the first part being covered by the 1st and 2d platoons, the
+other by the 3d and 4th. If there be but three platoons, those on the
+flanks fire on their own halves of the target while the center platoon
+covers the entire target. If two platoons only, each covers the entire
+target. When a platoon ceases fire to advance, the other having the
+same portion of the target, increases its rate of fire. Or the target
+may be divided into a number of parts, one less than the number of
+platoons. These parts are assigned to platoons and the odd platoon
+fires on the target of the platoon that advances. In actual combat
+the absence of prominent landmarks at the proper places may render it
+impracticable to assign platoon targets. Too great refinement in the
+size of targets and switching of fire may result in confusion. When
+this is apt to be the case the whole target of the company may be
+assigned to each platoon, care being taken that the fire is properly
+distributed. To insure the covering of the entire front the targets of
+adjacent companies on the firing line may be made overlapping.
+
+The duties of the personnel in a fire engagement are as follows:
+
+
+ _The Major._
+
+ 1. He assembles the Captains.
+
+ 2. He designates the support and fire line companies.
+
+ 3. He explains the situation and points out the objective.
+
+ 4. He assigns sectors of the target to each fire line co.,
+ indicating the limits of these sectors, preferably by
+ prominent land marks, or by mils or fingers from some
+ reference point.
+
+ 5. He orders the advance and designates the time and place
+ for opening fire.
+
+ 6. He orders the supports into the firing line at the proper
+ time.
+
+ 7. He sees that the extra ammunition is issued.
+
+ 8. He observes the enemy, the effects of the friendly and hostile
+ fire, tactical changes on the battlefield, etc.
+
+
+ _The Captain._
+
+
+ 1. He assembles his Chiefs of Platoons.
+
+ 2. He explains the situation and points out the section of
+ the objective assigned to the company.
+
+ 3. He assigns sections of the company target to each platoon,
+ indicating limits of each.
+
+ 4. He estimates the range, or has this done by several skilled
+ men (called “range-finders”) and takes their average.
+
+ 5. He gives the sight setting.
+
+ 6. He orders the kind of fire.
+
+ 7. He signals to the Major when he is ready to open fire.
+
+ 8. He designates the time and place to open fire, or transmits
+ the order of the Major.
+
+ 9. He sees that the extra ammunition sent him by the Major
+ is properly distributed, as well as ammunition from the
+ dead and wounded.
+
+ 10. He watches the enemy, the effects of fire, and the tactical
+ changes on the battlefield.
+
+ 11. In general he _directs_ the fire of his company.
+
+
+ _The Chief of Platoon._
+
+ 1. He assembles the non-commissioned officers.
+
+ 2. He explains the situation, points out the objective, and
+ indicates the section assigned to the platoon.
+
+ 3. He sees that each n. c. o. knows the target and the sight
+ setting.
+
+ 4. He signals the Captain when ready to open fire.
+
+ 5. He transmits all orders of the Captain.
+
+ 6. He controls the rate of fire, keeps his men steady and sees
+ that ammunition is not wasted.
+
+ 7. He sees that fire is properly distributed over the assigned
+ front. (VERY IMPORTANT).
+
+ 8. He watches the enemy and the effects of fire.
+
+ 9. In general he carries out the orders of the Capt., _controls_
+ the fire, and enforces fire discipline.
+
+
+ _The Platoon Guide._
+
+ 1. He verifies the sight setting.
+
+ 2. He watches the firing line and checks breaches of fire
+ discipline.
+
+ 3. He watches for signals from the Captain and transmits
+ them to the Chief of Platoon.
+
+
+ _The Squad Leader._
+
+ 1. He sees that each man of his squad recognizes the target.
+
+ 2. He sees that sights are properly set.
+
+ 3. He transmits all commands and signals and sees that they
+ are obeyed.
+
+ 4. He observes and regulates the conduct of his squad, abates
+ excitement and keeps his men steady.
+
+ 5. He leads his squad and sees that all the men move forward
+ or halt at the command.
+
+ 6. He assists generally in enforcing fire discipline.
+
+ 7. He _may_ participate in the fire.
+
+The foregoing includes all of the more important duties of subordinates
+of various grades in the control and direction of infantry fire. Not
+all of these instructions will be applicable to every case. Thus where
+it was inadvisable to separate subordinates from their immediate
+commands they would _not_ be assembled, but their instructions would
+be conveyed to them, etc. In the event of a shortage of officers and
+non-commissioned officers in a company possibly depleted in strength,
+the Captain may give his orders direct to the entire company or the
+chiefs of Platoon direct to their entire platoons. This will often
+favor simplicity--which should be the first and last rule in all
+tactical procedure.
+
+The Captain’s orders would be about as follows: He explains the general
+situation as in the orders of the battalion commander and indicates
+the sector of front assigned to the company. He then says: “Reference
+point, large white house at 1 o’clock; target 5 o’clock 3 fingers, line
+of skirmishers 4 fingers long, range 1050 yds. Rear rank set at 50 yds.
+more than range, front rank at 50 yds. less; 1st and 2d platoons, right
+half of target; 3d and 4th platoons, left half. Fire at will.”
+
+When the platoon commanders have signaled that they are ready, the
+captain signals the battalion commander, and upon receiving the major’s
+order, he orders or signals the company--“commence firing.”
+
+
+A CATECHISM OF THE RIFLE IN WAR.
+
+_Note._ The questions in this catechism are in the same order as the
+preceding discussions.
+
+1. In a decisive engagement how should the firing line (in defense) be
+located with respect to the crest? With respect to the enemy? Why?
+
+2. What can you say as to the position of the firing line in retreat,
+delaying or rear guard action? Give reasons.
+
+3. In (1) how should the supports be located with respect to the crest?
+With respect to the firing line? Why?
+
+4. Discuss position fire in attack and defense.
+
+5. State the relative vulnerabilities of different formations under
+aimed and sweeping fire, on level ground. What is the effect of oblique
+or enfilade fire on the vulnerabilities of various formations?
+
+6. What formations should be used in approaching the combat position,
+and when are these abandoned? Why?
+
+7. Discuss the effect of slopes on vulnerability.
+
+8. When do squad and platoon columns deploy, (a) When they are in
+advance? (b) When they are supports coming into the firing line?
+
+9. What formations may be adopted in advancing under artillery
+(shrapnel) fire? What are the effects of oblique fire?
+
+10. Discuss the use of successive thin lines, skirmish lines and narrow
+columns, in building up or reinforcing the firing line.
+
+11. When is slow, controlled fire at will employed? Rapid fire? Volley
+fire?
+
+12. What should be the maximum and minimum rates of fire? Why?
+
+13. At what ranges should fire be opened under various conditions in
+attack and defense, and why? Discuss fully.
+
+14. At what ranges may arty. in column be damaged by rifle fire, and
+what kind of fire should be employed in such cases?
+
+15. How many rounds should the attacker fire in his first position?
+
+16. What is the proper density of the firing line in attack?
+
+17. What effect has visibility of the target on dispersion and
+distribution?
+
+18. Discuss the methods employed for designating and identifying
+targets.
+
+19. Discuss the use of combined sights. Of battle sights.
+
+20. At what should the attack fire? At what should the defense fire?
+
+21. How is fire concentrated on critical points?
+
+22. What is the reason for keeping all parts of the hostile line under
+fire at all times and how may this be insured?
+
+23. Discuss the duties of the personnel during the engagement. (Major,
+Capt., Chief of Platoon, Platoon Guide, Squad Leader.)
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVII.
+
+DIVISION TACTICS AND SUPPLY.
+
+
+MARCHES.
+
+A day’s march under ordinary conditions will be from 10 to 15 miles,
+usually about 12. The rate of march, including halts, is 2½ miles
+per hour. One day in each six or seven should be devoted to rest. In
+a forward march in campaign the advance guard will ordinarily be a
+regiment or a brigade. Units should not be split as a rule, to furnish
+advance guards of a strength other than that stated. Artillery should
+seldom be placed in an advance guard of a regiment but with a brigade
+it would be usual to place a battalion of artillery. Other auxiliary
+troops with an advance guard are the engineers, signal and sanitary,
+each in numbers proportioned to the size of the advance guard, or in
+accordance with the requirements of the situation. A reinforced brigade
+as advance guard therefore, may consist of an infantry brigade, a
+battalion of artillery, one company of engineers, one section of signal
+troops, one ambulance company.
+
+A commander for the main body may be designated. The division commander
+may thus go wherever his presence is necessary; he will occasionally
+review the division as it moves out in the morning, afterward joining
+the advance guard. If combat is probable he should in all cases be with
+the advance guard that he may have time to weigh the reports arriving
+from the front and influence the very important first dispositions
+of the advance guard. The march order will ordinarily prescribe the
+initial point and time of departure of the main body, and the distance
+at which it is to follow the advance guard, together with the route of
+march. This gives the complete data required to enable the commander
+of each organization (including the advance guard) to take his proper
+place in the column of march thus insuring a systematic departure. If
+a brigade be advance guard of a division it is not usually rotated
+with other brigades on a single march of say a week. The component
+elements of the brigade itself rotate in their security duties, but
+the disadvantages of frequent rotation of brigades in the division are
+generally believed to be greater than the advantages.
+
+
+_Cavalry._ The divisional cavalry is made independent of the advance
+guard whenever it has an independent mission. If the division is acting
+alone this will be the usual case. Its strength should not be frittered
+away; but for urgent tactical reasons one or two troops or a squadron
+may exceptionally be attached to the advance guard. The cavalry if
+camped with the division, is generally ordered to start from a half
+hour to an hour after sunrise, with orders as to its special mission,
+“to cover the march of the division,” “gain contact with the enemy and
+observe towards ______,” etc. If the independent cavalry starts at
+about the same time as the advance guard brigade the time stated will
+be about one hour before the advance guard _clears_ its initial point,
+the length of the advance guard with its intervals, being about an
+hour’s march (for foot troops). It may be desirable to attach a pack
+train to the cavalry. Avoid detail in orders to the divisional cavalry.
+Tell the cavalry commander clearly what tasks he is to accomplish, the
+means of so doing should be left to his judgment.
+
+
+_Artillery._ The distribution of the artillery in the column of march
+depends upon the tactical requirements. For its own security it should
+never be too far to the front. Artillery needs a maneuvering zone,
+and it should not have to countermarch to gain this. In an advance
+guard of a reinforced brigade the artillery should be in the reserve,
+and immediately preceded by a bn. or more of infantry, according to
+the tactical situation. It would be inadvisable to have the artillery
+forward with the support. The center of gravity of the artillery with
+the advance guard, should therefore ordinarily be well to the rear
+for security and maneuvering purposes, and of that with the main body
+well to the front in an advance in the presence of the enemy. It is
+usual in such case to have the artillery of the main body preceded by a
+regiment of infantry (in the main body). When the tactical requirements
+are less urgent, the artillery brigade (less the bn. with the advance
+guard) may be between the brigades of the main body, or may even be
+in rear of all the infantry of the main body. Heavy field artillery,
+if present, would usually be placed in rear of all the foot troops of
+the main body. Where the artillery as thus disposed forms too long a
+column it is well to place a detachment of infantry in the middle. The
+local conditions will indicate the correct course. Artillery combat
+trains are seldom permitted in the main body ahead of foot troops; they
+incommode the infantry in the column as well as delay the deployment of
+the division. They should be routed immediately in rear of the special
+troops at the tail of the column. Combat trains of artillery with the
+advance guard, usually march with the advance guard.
+
+The division marching in two columns, with the prospect of encountering
+the enemy, will usually have artillery in each column. There may be
+a regiment of artillery with each or more usually a battalion only
+with the smaller. Whether or not a flank guard will contain artillery
+depends upon its mission and the conditions. If the purpose of the
+flank guard is reconnaissance only it should consist of cavalry alone,
+and would have no artillery accompanying. If the flank guard be
+composed of a regiment of infantry with some attached mounted troops it
+would still be unwise to attach artillery. But where the flank guard
+as a covering detachment is expected to fight decisively, or where
+there is essentially double column formation for purposes of partial
+deployment in marching to meet the enemy, its strength is made greater,
+and it may include artillery. If the lateral communications between the
+routes of the two columns are such that artillery from the main body
+may be readily moved to the flank in case of need there will usually be
+no occasion to attach artillery to the flank guard.
+
+In a meeting engagement it is generally of vital importance to bring
+the artillery into action with the least delay. For this purpose it
+should be brought forward, either by giving it right of way over the
+infantry, or preferably, by advancing it on a parallel road. Where
+the situation permits it is best in such cases to have the artillery
+advance on the parallel road farthest from possible interference by
+the enemy, the infantry column taking the more exposed road. In either
+case the artillery comes ahead at an increased gait. Where no parallel
+route exists, and it is determined to give the artillery right of way
+over the infantry, the latter may continue the march in the fields
+alongside, or if this is not practicable they must halt off the road
+until the artillery passes them. Right of way over the infantry is
+given to the firing batteries only, the combat trains come forward
+later as the situation permits.
+
+
+_Engineers._ Engineers are used in an advance as pioneers and
+pontoniers. Pioneers should invariably be attached to the advance
+troops of a large command. They take up little road space and are
+needed on every march. If it is known that bridging must be done during
+the march the bridge train should be with the advance guard. It marches
+in the intervals of the advance guard, or in that between the advance
+guard and the main body. If it is known definitely that no bridging
+will be needed the train should be in rear with the division trains.
+It should never march with the combatant troops of the main body. If
+the bridge conditions ahead cannot be learned definitely the equipage
+should march with the advance guard, otherwise the progress of the
+command may be greatly delayed. The road space for one division of the
+advance guard (light) equipage, which will bridge a minimum span of
+186 ft., is about 300 yards. A division of reserve (heavy) equipage,
+with a minimum capacity of 225 ft., occupies a road space of about 400
+yds. The capacity of this equipage can be increased by the amount of
+material that can be obtained locally at the crossings.
+
+
+_Signal troops._ On the march the radio sections of the signal troops
+may be disposed as follows, 1 with the independent cavalry, and 1 with
+the advance guard. A section, radio or even wire, may be sent with a
+flank guard, or even with the trains, if on a separate road, or far
+to the rear. A wire section may be placed at the head of the main
+body, and the remainder of the signal troops at the tail thereof, in
+rear of the engineers, or in the interval between the advance guard
+and the main body. The duties of the signal troops on the march are
+to maintain communication between the various detachments along the
+line of march (always including division headquarters) and with the
+independent cavalry by wireless. The signal troops may keep up moving
+communication, or better establish stations along the line of march,
+continually pushing out new stations to the front, and drawing in those
+in rear as the column advances. Existing telegraph and telephone lines
+may be utilized. Instructions to the signal troops would read “lines
+of information will connect division headquarters with the advance
+guard, flank guard, trains, etc.” As with all other officers who are
+expected to exercise any degree of initiative, instructions in great
+detail should not be given the signal commander. He should be told what
+is desired and allowed to arrange details himself.
+
+The starting hour of the division should not be too early. Large bodies
+lack the flexibility of small, and it is exceptional that the division
+starts before one hour after sunrise. It must be remembered that if the
+division starts its march earlier than this, the advance guard, which
+may have an hour’s march to clear its initial point, must start at an
+unseasonable hour. If the mounted point starts at daybreak the head of
+the main body will pass the same place about an hour after sunrise.
+In a map problem or maneuver there is a tendency to endeavor to make
+the utmost of the time available, but it should be remembered that if
+much is expected from the division today, yesterday was probably as
+hard a day, and tomorrow may call for even greater effort. Hence avoid
+the early starting habit. Starting before daybreak, however, is less
+objectionable than making camp in the dark. Large bodies cannot be
+expected to form in column on the road before starting. Each element of
+the command is responsible for reaching the initial point in time to
+take its place in column without delay. Trains assemble off the road
+until the troops have cleared and proceed as ordered. The commander of
+the field trains is charged with the duty of arranging his wagons in
+the order of march of the units to which they belong. Usually the field
+trains of the division, including that of the advance guard, are united
+in one body. If the situation of the trains requires a guard, one is
+detailed for the purpose. Some mounted men should always be attached to
+a train escort. Engineers are useful for this purpose, if their other
+duties permit. They may constitute the entire escort. Their services
+are valuable in facilitating the progress of the trains. Fig. XV shows
+an arrangement of a division on the march.
+
+The march outposting of a division does not differ in principle from
+that of smaller bodies. Detachments of suitable strength up to a
+battalion may be sent out to important crossroads, crests, bridges,
+etc., and if desirable they remain there until the safety of the column
+is assured.
+
+
+ORDER FOR THE FORWARD MARCH OF A DIVISION.
+
+ 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ FREDERICK, MD.,
+ Field Orders, } 15 May, '16, 9 p. m.
+ No. 1. }
+ Geological Survey map.
+
+ Troops
+
+ (a) Independent
+ Cavalry:
+ Col. F.
+ 1st Cav. (less 1 tr.)
+ 1 radio sec. pack Sig.
+
+ (b) Advance Guard:
+ Brig. Gen. B.
+ Tr. A, 1st Cav.,
+ (less 1 plat.)
+ 1st Brigade
+ 1st Bn. 1st L. A.
+ Co. A, 1st Engrs.
+ 1st Amb. Co.
+
+ (c) Main body--in
+ order of march:
+ 1 plat. Tr. A, 1st
+ Cav.
+ 1st Bn. 4th Inf.
+ 1st Brig. F. A.
+ (less 1 bn. and
+ C. Tn.)
+ 2d Brigade (less
+ 1 bn.)
+ 3rd Brigade.
+ 1st Engineers
+ (less 1 co.)
+ Artillery C. Tn.
+ 3 Ambulance cos.
+
+ (d) Signal Troops:
+ Maj. K.
+
+1. The frontier is being observed by hostile detachments. Their main
+army is about BALTIMORE and WASHINGTON. The greater part of their army
+is believed to be unprepared to move. One division and possibly more
+are ready and may have moved toward the frontier.
+
+Our army will advance so as to reach GETTYSBURG on the 18th.
+
+2. This division is ordered to advance on GETTYSBURG and cover the exit
+of the army from the mountains.
+
+We will begin the march tomorrow.
+
+3. (a) The independent cavalry will start at 5:30 a. m. and cover
+the movement. They will reconnoiter TANEYTOWN and the roads leading
+southeast therefrom.
+
+(b) The advance guard will march on EMMITSBURG Turnpike and clear the
+first railroad crossing north of town by 6:30 a. m.
+
+The crossings of the MONOCACY and their approaches from the east will
+be observed.
+
+(c) The head of the main body will start from the first railroad
+crossing north of town at 6:50 a. m. and follow the advance guard at
+about one mile.
+
+(d) The Signal battalion will march between the main body and the
+advance guard, and will maintain communication with the cavalry.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. XV]
+
+[Illustration]
+
+
+ 1st Bn. Sig. (less 1
+ Radio sec. pack Sig.)
+
+(x) The outpost will stand relieved at 6:30 a. m.
+
+(y) Hourly halts of ten minutes on the even hour.
+
+4. The field trains will assemble north of the town after the troops
+have cleared the place, and report to C. O. trains.
+
+5. The Division Commander will remain in FREDERICK until 8:30 a. m. and
+will then join the reserve of the advance guard.
+
+ A,
+ Maj. Gen.
+
+ Copies to:
+
+ Staff.
+ 1st Brig.
+ 2d Brig.
+ 3d Brig.
+ 1st Brig. F. A.
+ 1st Cav.
+ 1st Engrs.
+ Sig. Bn.
+ Director of Amb. Cos.
+ F. Tn.
+ Div. Tns.
+ Outpost.
+
+ Copy to Corps Hq. by mail, synopsis by wire.
+
+ 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ FREDERICK, MD.,
+ 15 May, '16, 9:20 p. m.
+ Orders No. --
+ (Map reference)
+
+1. For the march May 12, the trains will be divided into two sections:
+
+First section, in order of march: Field trains, 1st section supply
+train, 1st Am. Co., Engr. train.
+
+Second section, in order of march: Field hospitals, 2d Am. Co., supply
+train (less 1st sec.).
+
+2. The 1st section will follow about two miles in rear of the troops.
+The 2d section will follow the first at about two miles.
+
+ By command of Maj. Gen. A.
+
+ Copies to: B,
+ Staff. C. of S.
+ C. O. F. Tn.
+ C. O. Div. Tn.
+
+The members of the division staff would do well to supply themselves
+with diagrams to scale of the division on the march. (See Fig. XV.)
+These are applied to the map and the position of any unit at any time
+is thus approximately determined.
+
+
+COMBAT.
+
+To enter upon a deliberate and protracted engagement late in the
+afternoon, especially with troops tired from a day’s march is
+justifiable only under exceptional conditions. Even if the attack
+be successful before nightfall there will hardly be enough daylight
+remaining to reap the fruits of victory. If advancing in a single
+column a division may require, depending upon the terrain, from 1½ to
+2½ hours for deployment alone.
+
+The desire to obtain fire superiority leads the attacker to an endeavor
+to extend his line and overlap that of the defender, thus subjecting
+part of the latter’s line to both frontal and oblique fire. Purely
+frontal attacks may force the enemy back but have little prospect of
+annihilating him. Nevertheless the decisive blow is not invariably
+directed at the defender’s flank. Often a determined frontal attack
+combined with a demonstration against the defender’s flank or pressure
+against his line of retreat will have good prospects of decisive
+results. Enveloping attacks, with their great extension of front
+are a form of dispersion and subject to the risks thereof. A timid
+commander will often allow too small an interval and too obtuse an
+angle between his frontal and enveloping attacks, whereby the latter
+fails of envelopment. A rash commander, on the other hand, may provide
+at the outset too great an interval between the attacks, whereby they
+fail of coordination and mutual support and run the risk of repulse
+or even annihilation in detail. It is necessary then to find in each
+case the golden mean between two undesirable extremes. Here again many
+conditions enter into the problem and “rules” cannot be given. An
+enveloping attack to be decisive must generally aim well to the rear.
+It is a condition precedent to a successful envelopment, however, that
+enemy be attacked in front with ample strength. The gap between the
+attacks should, taken in connection with the nature of the terrain,
+be such that the defender cannot advance against the holding attack
+without exposing his flank to the envelopment. As the attacker moves
+forward the gap between his forces will usually diminish and with
+it the risk of a counter-attack against the troops in front of the
+defender. The difficulty of coordinating the separated portions
+is usually the greatest danger to be anticipated. The envelopment
+should generally be provided for in the first deployment, as it is
+much more difficult to secure when initiated after the opening of the
+frontal attack by the employment of retained reserves. The troops for
+the envelopment will often be ordered to a preparatory position from
+which their attack is launched. As to which attack will be launched
+first this will depend upon circumstances. Ordinarily the entry of
+the enveloping troops into action will be the signal for the general
+attack. Whether the troops holding the front will participate in the
+assault depends also on conditions. They may be able to exercise a more
+decisive influence by oblique or enfilade fire on the hostile troops
+opposed to the envelopment. Great separation of the forces or obstacles
+of the terrain between them are elements of danger to be given such
+consideration as they may, in the particular case, demand.
+
+Turning movements like envelopments, though to an even greater extent,
+are forms of dispersion. They are usually to be condemned in the
+operations of small forces, the weak detachments of which are too
+readily and too quickly overwhelmed by superior strength when alone and
+unsupported. They are of occasional application in the operations of a
+division and of more frequent application by larger forces. In spite of
+the risks involved in such maneuvers they will continue to be in favor
+with bold commanders since they frequently promise decisive results
+in case of success. Envelopments grade into turning movements and no
+sharp line can be drawn between the two maneuvers. An envelopment so
+separated from a holding attack by distance or natural obstacles as
+to render co-operation and mutual support difficult or impossible,
+partakes of the nature of a turning movement, and of the risks inherent
+in this form of dispersion.
+
+The plan of attack should generally be based upon the best dispositions
+for the infantry, other elements conforming thereto. Cover for
+advancing infantry is a prime consideration up to the opening of the
+struggle for fire superiority. Afterwards the attacker’s own fire must
+be his principal protection. The envelopment of a hostile flank, where
+contemplated, should be provided for from the start; do not wait until
+after the deployment is commenced. For the considerations determining
+which flank to envelop see Chap. XI. The separation of the main and
+secondary attacks depends upon the terrain, the relative sizes of the
+opposing forces, the means of communication, the state of the enemy’s
+morale, the mission, etc.
+
+If the division is on the march it will often be advisable to issue two
+orders, the first a development order, the second an attack order.
+
+The order for attack indicates the front upon which the large units
+deploy, and the portion of the enemy’s line they are to cover. The
+brigades are directed to proceed to their assigned positions, where
+they will usually await the order to attack. In a rencontre engagement
+the units may attack at once. When all is ready the division commander
+signals the advance. The telegraph is the best means of insuring a
+properly timed advance. It has the advantage that it allows the attack
+to be launched in the light of the latest information received by the
+commander. Launching the attack at a stated hour, or by prearranged
+signal (gun or flag) although frequently resorted to, has some
+disadvantages. Communication by the signal troops on the field does not
+ordinarily extend to organizations below a brigade. The position to
+which the brigade proceeds for deployment should have covered approach.
+It should be as close to the hostile line as will still enable the
+brigade to effect its deployment without undue interference from the
+hostile artillery. The distance will usually be from 1½ to 2½ miles.
+
+The selection and placing of the reserves depends largely upon the
+flanks, both friendly and hostile. Except for compelling reasons they
+should be held intact at the outset. Ordinarily it is to be presumed
+that the reserve will be eventually employed in the enveloping attack.
+In such cases it would be posted in rear of the outer flank thereof.
+If, however, there be a reasonable probability of its employment
+elsewhere, it should be held at first in a more central position.
+In rear of the inner flank of the main attack will ordinarily be a
+convenient place in view of several possibilities. It should always
+be under the immediate control of the supreme commander. When a force
+has once been committed to an engagement it is by the prompt and
+judicious use of the reserves alone that the commander can influence
+the subsequent course of the action. The station of the reserve in the
+preliminary disposition will ordinarily be from 2 to 3 miles from the
+hostile line. Engineers upon completion of such special tasks as may be
+assigned them will ordinarily join the reserve. For a purely passive
+defense strong reserves are not usually necessary. Such reserves as are
+held out should make preparations to cover the withdrawal, in case of
+defeat.
+
+The depth of deployment in the beginning of an attack will depend
+upon a number of considerations. “Depth of deployment” as the term
+is here used means the ratio of the total strength of the combatant
+force to the deployed front in yards. The strength of the firing line
+proper (in attack) should be about one man per yard of front. Depth
+therefore depends on the relative strength of supports and reserves,
+as compared to the firing line. It is measured in men, not in yards,
+and is expressed as so many men per yard of deploying front. It has no
+reference to the distance of the reserve behind the firing line. The
+greatest care must be taken then that too many men be not committed
+prematurely to the action. The combat, however, is decided by the
+firing line. Retained forces which are not launched against the enemy
+produce no effect on the result. To deploy an insufficient number of
+men and then reinforce them by driblets is wrong. Distribution in depth
+therefore, is a means to an end. It is necessary in the preparatory
+stages of the fight to enable the commander to meet unexpected
+developments, especially when the knowledge as to the strength,
+dispositions and intentions of the enemy is insufficient. A force then
+should go into action in a relatively deep formation, but it must
+extend its front during the action, and when the decisive moment is
+recognized every available man should be thrown in for the assault.
+While too great depth of deployment at the outset is a serious mistake
+it is a less one than the opposite extreme of deploying from the start
+on too broad a front. The decision as to the proper depth of deployment
+in any particular case cannot be made a matter of rule, but calls for
+all the skill and judgment of the commander. Success alone can justify
+his dispositions. The criterion is this: at the decisive point were
+the attacking (or defending) lines the strongest that it was possible
+to have obtained? The following are some of the considerations which
+influence the decision as to depth of deployment.
+
+1. The fighting qualities of the enemy. Are his troops in retreat, have
+they been defeated, are they of poor quality or low in morale? If so a
+greater extension of front is permissible.
+
+2. Is the force fighting alone, or as a part of a larger force? Is
+it on the offensive or defensive, and if the former is it making a
+decisive or merely a holding attack? Is the fight to be to a decision
+or is it a delaying action? Is it a deliberately planned attack or a
+rencontre? If fighting alone, if on the offensive, if in a decisive
+engagement, if in a deliberately planned attack greater depth of
+deployment at the outset will usually be advisable than in the contrary
+cases.
+
+3. Are reinforcements expected on either side?
+
+4. The nature of the terrain, cover, security of the flanks. In
+favorable terrain, particularly that which affords security to the
+flanks greater extension of front is usually justifiable.
+
+5. Are the enemy’s strength, dispositions and intentions accurately
+known? If not it is better to have at first a relatively great depth of
+deployment pending developments.
+
+6. The frontage of units cannot be definitely fixed as it depends upon
+the conditions and the object of the combat. Companies ordinarily
+go complete into the firing line. Larger units ordinarily hold out
+supports and reserves. The frontage of deployment does not increase in
+proportion to the size of the force. It is usually relatively less for
+large forces. The necessity for distribution in depth usually increases
+with the size of the force.
+
+7. The depth of deployment will be greater opposite the decisive points
+in the front.
+
+ etc. etc.
+
+In view of the great variety of conditions and the many considerations
+which influence the decision it is impossible to enunciate arithmetical
+rules for the depth of deployment in various situations. The following
+figures can serve therefore, only as a very general guide.
+
+The deployed front of a brigade of about 4,000 men (in division) at the
+opening of a decisive attack against good troops should not usually
+exceed 1,200 to 1,500 yards. The division, at have from 5 to 7 men per
+yard of deployed front.
+
+Artillery should be kept well in hand under the senior artillery
+officers. This does not mean that the entire artillery brigade
+need be in one mass. The terrain often will not permit of this.
+Where practicable, however, it is desirable that regiments be not
+sub-divided. One may be assigned in rear of each attack (the main
+and secondary). Enfilade fire should be sought, as also the longest
+continued fire on the hostile infantry, especially that opposed to the
+main attack, over the heads of the advancing troops. This is usually
+best obtained from positions behind the holding attack.
+
+When combat is imminent certain trains are released from the division
+train and ordered to designated localities. The artillery ammunition
+is hastened to the front and placed at the disposal of the artillery
+commander. It is posted at a convenient point or points a mile or so
+in rear of the artillery positions. The position should be selected
+with reference to the location of the roads. Small arms ammunition
+is similarly brought forward and disposed for convenience of supply.
+Usually the artillery ammunition will be required first and will be
+given right of way. The sanitary and engineer trains are usually also
+released. To avoid obstructing the roads wagons should be parked clear
+thereof.
+
+Ambulance Companies are stationed, according to the probable
+necessities, usually one behind each brigade in the attacking line. The
+considerations that govern the stationing of the ammunition companies,
+point usually, to the same locality for the ambulance companies, about
+3 to 4 miles from the enemy’s line. The remaining ambulance companies
+are kept in hand well to the rear. Ambulance companies should not be
+immobilized prematurely by the establishment of dressing stations.
+Until the course of events indicates where these stations will most
+be needed as well as how near the wounded they can be established, it
+is usually unwise to set them up. The field hospitals should at first
+remain well to the rear. Later they may be moved forward to or near the
+dressing stations, if the course of the action and other conditions
+permit. For the best performance of their functions it is desirable
+that the field hospitals be located on a railroad or in a town,
+preferably both. If the command advances after a successful action the
+ambulance companies must be released, and the field hospitals should
+advance and take over the wounded directly from the dressing stations.
+Otherwise the ambulance companies and other available transportation
+should be utilized to transport the wounded back to the field hospitals
+at a point convenient for their care and further evacuation. During the
+action one of the field hospitals sets up a station for the slightly
+wounded.
+
+Combat orders should cover the disposition of all trains which are
+thereby released from the control of the commander of the trains,
+including disposition of ambulance companies, field hospitals, slightly
+wounded station, ammunition distributing stations, etc. All officers
+concerned with the handling of the released trains should receive
+copies of the orders. The commander of the trains need not invariably
+be furnished a copy of the field order, but the necessary information
+may be embodied in a brief order, thus:
+
+“Division attacks hostile force at HUNTERSTOWN. Sn. Tn., Am. Tn.,
+and Engr. Tn., released to MUMMASBURG to await orders from Chief
+Surgeon, Arty. and Engr. commanders. Remainder of trains will park near
+MUMMASBURG. Messages for Div. Hq. to GOLDENVILLE.”
+
+Important messages, especially during combat, should preferably be
+written rather than verbal, and this is true whether they be carried by
+enlisted men or officers. When practicable, therefore, the person who
+is to deliver the message should write it down as dictated, repeating
+it afterwards in the presence of the officer by whom sent.
+
+After combat the following must be attended to:
+
+1. The wounded sent to the rear. The ambulance companies, if not
+immediately required in the advance of the division, may, with other
+available transportation, be used to carry the wounded to the field
+hospitals or the latter come forward as noted above. In the evacuation
+of the wounded to the rear, empty supply and ammunition wagons as well
+as all impressed wagons are utilized as far as conditions permit.
+If the combat is followed by a retreat the sanitary troops precede
+the combatant forces, removing as many of the wounded as possible. A
+suitable detail should be left for the care of the seriously wounded
+that cannot be removed. None of the wounded, if it can be avoided,
+should be abandoned to the enemy’s sole care. He cannot be expected to
+attend them until all of his own are cared for.
+
+2. Ammunition in men’s belts and combat trains should be replenished.
+This should be accomplished at the latest by daybreak following. In the
+operation orders this item is accompanied by an announcement of the
+location of the ammunition company designated to make the issues.
+
+3. Rations in the men’s packs and field wagons should be replenished
+promptly.
+
+4. Police of the battlefield when practicable.
+
+5. Prisoners should be sent to the rear. The immediate escort will be
+approximately 10 per cent of the strength of the prisoners.
+
+6. Necessary instructions for trains.
+
+7. The commander of the line of communications is given instructions
+covering such of the following details as may be necessary:
+
+(a) Information as to the situation.
+
+(b) Re-supply of ammunition, rations, forage, medical supplies,
+equipment, men and animals.
+
+(c) Transportation for wounded and prisoners with necessary personnel.
+
+(d) Such special instructions as the situation may demand.
+
+
+ORDER FOR A DIVISION ATTACK
+
+ 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ GOODINTENT S. H.,
+ (Near GOLDENVILLE, PA.),
+ Field Orders } 2 April, '16, 11:15 a. m.
+ No. -- }
+ Gettysburg 3" map.
+
+1. A hostile force of less than two infantry brigades and a regiment of
+artillery has occupied the line hill 602--hill 597 and is intrenching
+the four main spurs projecting west from that ridge. Red artillery has
+been located between hills 602 and 601. The defeated Red cavalry has
+reappeared on YORK TURNPIKE west of GRANITE HILL.
+
+2. This division will attack enveloping the hostile left. March
+conditions now cease.
+
+3. (a) The 2d Bn., 2d L. A. will take position on the ridge southeast
+of GOLDENVILLE and fire on the hostile artillery.
+
+The 2d L. A. (less 2d Bn.), from a position east of HERMAN, will
+support the attack of the 1st Brig.
+
+The 1st L.A., from a position near VARNEY, will support the attack of
+the 2d Brig.
+
+(b) The 1st Brig. will attack the three northern spurs of the Red
+position. Its right will follow the line J. WEAVER--farmhouse north of
+592. Its left will not extend north of hill 574. The advance will not
+be carried east of the HARRISBURG ROAD until further orders.
+
+(c) The 2d Brig., moving via 608--513--511 road, will vigorously attack
+the south spur of the Red position and envelop the hostile left. Its
+right will not extend east of the FAIRVIEW S. H.--HUNTERSTOWN road.
+
+(d) The 3d Brig. and 1st Engrs. (less Co. A), Gen. D comdg., will move
+via GOLDENVILLE and 608 to 513 west of VARNEY and await orders.
+
+(e) The 1st Cav. (less 2 trs.) will move to the vicinity of J. KAAS,
+south of FAIRVIEW S. H. and wait in readiness to assist the 2d Brig’s.
+attack. Reconnaissance will be pushed out towards HUNTERSTOWN,
+BONEAUVILLE and east of GRANITE HILL.
+
+Tr. B will remain at its present position and cover our left,
+reconnoitering towards HUNTERSTOWN and NEWCHESTER and through
+HEIDLERSBURG.
+
+(f) 1st Engrs. (less Co. A) will join the reserve. Co. A (less mtd.
+sec.) will remain at HERMAN. Mtd. sec. Co. A, will move north of the
+CONEWAGO and destroy all bridges near NEWCHESTER.
+
+(g) 1st Bn. Sig. will establish a wire line between each brigade and
+these headquarters. Present radio distribution remains.
+
+4. The 1st Amb. Co. will remain at HERMAN. The 2d Amb. Co. will move to
+creek crossing south of 513. 3d and 4th Amb. Cos. will await orders at
+621 crossroads west of GOLDENVILLE. Station for slightly wounded will
+be at first crossroads west of GOLDENVILLE. Am. distributing stations,
+1st Brig. and 2d L. A., at crossroads 679 on MUMMASBURG road; 2d and
+3d Brigs. and 1st L. A., at BOYD S. H.
+
+5. Messages to farmhouse west of J. WEAVER.
+
+ A,
+ Maj. Gen.
+
+ Copies to:
+ Staff.
+ 1st Brig.
+ 2d Brig.
+ 3d Brig.
+ Arty. Brig.
+ 1st Cav.
+ 1st Engrs.
+ 1st Bn. Sig.
+ Tr. B, 1st Cav. (extract)
+ (Report to Superior Commander.)
+
+Note--As soon as the 2d Brig. has launched its attack and approached
+the line of the 1st Brig., General A will order the latter to continue
+its advance.
+
+
+CAMPING.
+
+The requirements of a division camp are of two kinds, tactical and
+sanitary. Tactical considerations when present, take precedence in
+every case. The tactical considerations are:
+
+1. Mission of the command, orders from higher authority, contemplated
+tactical operations in the immediate future, relations to other
+friendly or hostile forces in the locality, etc.
+
+2. Sufficient space to accommodate the command. There is a physical
+limit to crowding as well as the disadvantage that may accrue due to
+cramped dispositions, if attacked.
+
+3. The site should, if practicable, be screened against hostile
+observation. This is not always possible but the easy observation of
+the main body by hostile patrols should be prevented.
+
+4. Outpost line. The camp should have a defensible outpost line.
+
+5. The network of roads and the location of water supply largely
+determine the distribution of the troops in the site selected. It is
+desirable that each fraction of the command have a road or a good trail
+leading to its camp from the highway, so that it will not have to pass
+through the camps of other organizations. For mounted troops this is
+especially desirable.
+
+6. Infantry should be camped in front of other troops that cannot so
+readily defend themselves in case of a sudden attack.
+
+7. The site of a crossroads usually aids in the fulfillment of
+conditions 5 and 6. It has the added advantage that the command
+occupies virtually a position in readiness. It is able to move to the
+front or either flank, promptly, without confusion or countermarching.
+
+8. Whether the command shall camp in depth or in mass depends upon
+conditions, chief amongst which is the proximity of the enemy. Camping
+in depth is the more convenient, facilitating both arrival and
+departure; camping in mass the more secure.
+
+The sanitary considerations are:
+
+1. Water. Only the most compelling tactical necessities can outweigh
+the need for an adequate supply of good water. Every separate water
+shed should be utilized for a separate fraction of the command.
+
+2. Mounted organizations should be down stream from foot troops.
+
+3. Heat, cold, dust, wind and soil, are matters of importance in camps
+to be occupied for some time. But usually little weight can be given
+them in a one-night camp.
+
+4. Fuel.
+
+5. Drainage.
+
+Sanitary conditions should be given all the weight that tactical
+conditions will permit.
+
+Fig. XVI illustrates a convenient arrangement of a division camp or
+bivouac. The division has just arrived from the southwest, and is in
+close contact with a force believed to be inferior, to the northeast.
+The 2d Brigade which marched at the head of the main body during the
+day, is assigned the site farthest from the highway because it can
+reach it first. The brigade enters its camp via the road which turns to
+the northwest from the highway at a point about 1,400 yds. northeast
+of Taneytown. The 3d Brigade then marches directly to its camp,
+opposite the 2d, without interfering with other troops. Water is ample
+in quantity and convenient of access to both brigades. The Artillery
+Brigade is assigned a camp under the protection of the infantry. It has
+a separate water supply downstream of the foot troops.
+
+It enters its camp by the lane shown, and distributes on each side of
+this lane. The situation of the artillery here economizes in security
+measures.
+
+All three of these camps are of ample area, they are capable of easy
+description in the halt orders. No one is contingent upon the others;
+no organization need be ordered “next south of” or “immediately east
+of” another. Each site can be described by identifying it with the
+natural and artificial features, roads, railroads, streams, etc. Each
+subordinate commander thus knows at once precisely where to go without
+waiting to take the space left him by any other organization. Special
+troops in this case are treated as a single body, the senior officer
+commanding. Their site is convenient for the organization last to
+arrive in camp. They have a good water supply opposite the artillery.
+The Ambulance Companies are assigned to the site selected because it
+gives them a separate source of water supply and places them near the
+town so that some of the buildings could be used in case of necessity
+for the sick of the command. No use is made of the stream flowing north
+from Taneytown; it is probably polluted by the drainage of the town.
+
+The advance guard, 1st Brigade reinforced, outposts the camp during the
+night. It camps near Galt a mile and a half ahead of the division, and
+places the 1st Infantry on outpost. The outpost line (see map) is about
+a mile beyond the advance guard camp. The baggage section and one day’s
+rations of the field trains join the troops. The division trains camp
+in two sections as follows: First section, composed of remaining field
+trains, 1st sec. supply train, 1st ammunition company, and pack train
+are camped south of Taneytown. The second section, consisting of supply
+train (less 1st sec.), ammunition train (less 1st Am. Co.), field
+hospitals, and engineer train, is camped near Ladiesburg.
+
+The main body of the division in this instance is not camped in column.
+The 2d and 3d Brigades watch their own flanks with small detachments as
+shown, thereby avoiding undue extension of the outpost line. The camp
+is screened from any close view by the enemy.
+
+The halt and outpost order should be issued well in advance so that
+subordinate commanders may conduct their organizations to the places
+assigned without countermarching, delay or confusion. One or two
+hours before the close of the day’s march is not too early for the
+issue of the order. The order designates the troops for outpost,
+usually from the advance guard. The line to be outposted is given in
+general terms only, from the map. The division commander cannot hope,
+nor is it necessary for him to select the line on the ground. This
+duty ordinarily devolves upon the commanders of the advance guard and
+outpost. If the order is issued early enough a copy is sent to the
+cavalry in front, otherwise special instructions must be sent them. The
+instructions for the cavalry include the following: new information
+of enemy and friendly troops, plans for the following day; mission
+of the cavalry for the remainder of the day, when to cease work for
+the night and where to camp (this last may be left to the judgment of
+the cavalry commander in which case he reports his whereabouts to the
+supreme commander), what troops are to be left out over night, what
+troops are to be assigned to the outpost if any, and when they are to
+report, location of outpost line, camp of advance guard, main body,
+location of division headquarters, where the cavalry field trains will
+be sent, place of issue of supplies, time and place for the next issue
+of division orders, etc. The prompt and orderly distribution of the
+troops to their camps at the close of a day’s march is necessary to the
+maintenance of discipline and fighting efficiency, and is an index of
+the competence of the division staff.
+
+Other orders issued would include:
+
+1. Orders as to time and place of making issues when this information
+is obtained too late for insertion in the halt order. Routine orders
+covering matters of general interest, not properly belonging in
+operation orders.
+
+2. Instructions to the Chief Quartermaster of the division concerning
+the procurement of supplies, disposition of empty wagons, etc.
+
+3. Instructions to the commander of the line of communications
+concerning supplies, repair of railroads, movement of advance supply
+depot, etc.
+
+(See orders following).
+
+
+ORDER FOR CAMPING AND OUTPOSTING OF A DIVISION.
+
+To the Divisional Cavalry by mounted messenger (or wireless.)
+
+ 1st Division, 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ TANEYTOWN, MD.,
+ 10 Sept., '16, 2:45 p. m.
+
+ Commanding Officer,
+ 1st Cav.
+
+ Division camps north of TANEYTOWN for the night. Advance
+ guard will camp near GALT and place outposts. Determine
+ first the location of the flanks of the enemy’s line near
+ KINGSDALE; second whether any hostile troops are on the
+ march between KINGSDALE and MCSHERRYSTOWN. Withdraw behind
+ the outpost line by 9:00 p. m. Your wagons will join the
+ advance guard at GALT. Division headquarters road jct.
+ 1½ mile N. E. of town.
+ A,
+ Maj. Gen.
+
+ 1st Division,
+ TANEYTOWN, MD.,
+ Field Order, } 10 Sept., '16, 3 p. m.
+ No. 3. }
+ Geological Survey map.
+
+1. Our cavalry has been in contact with hostile cavalry since the
+crossing of the LITTLE PIPE CREEK, and has been successful in driving
+them back. It reports that it has developed the enemy holding a line
+just south of KINGSDALE. The railroad bridges over the BIG PIPE and
+LITTLE PIPE CREEKS have been destroyed.
+
+2. The division will halt for the night.
+
+3. (a) The advance guard will halt and camp near GALT, and will provide
+for the security of the camp.
+
+(b) The main body will camp as follows:
+
+The 2d Brigade on the right bank of PINEY CREEK, south of the 469--526
+road and north of the road leading west from this road junction. A
+small detachment will be sent towards the high ground near 526 to
+observe the roads leading towards LONGVILLE and 528.
+
+The 3d Brigade on the left bank of PINEY CREEK, south of the 469--554
+road and opposite the 2d Brigade. A small detachment will be sent
+towards 554 to observe towards STUMPTOWN.
+
+The artillery brigade (less the 1st Bn. 1st L. A.) on the right bank of
+the tributary to PINEY CREEK which flows into the same at a point 200
+yards southwest of this road junction.
+
+The Signal Battalion, and 1st Engrs. (less Co. A.) on the left bank of
+the tributary to PINEY CREEK and opposite the artillery.
+
+The 2d, 3d, and 4th Ambulance Companies at the head of the stream at
+the northern edge of TANEYTOWN.
+
+4. The baggage section and one day’s rations of the Field trains will
+join their organizations, those of the 1st Cavalry will join the
+advance guard at GALT.
+
+5. Division headquarters will be at this road junction.
+
+ A,
+ Maj. Gen.
+
+(How and to whom communicated.)
+
+ 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ TANEYTOWN, MD.,
+ Orders } 10 Sept., '16, 3 p. m.
+ No. 2 }
+
+1. The division camps tonight northeast of TANEYTOWN.
+
+2. The first section of the division trains, less baggage section field
+trains, will camp near the southwest exit of TANEYTOWN; 2d section at
+LADIESBURG.
+
+3. Distributing point near southwest exit of TANEYTOWN, 7:30 p.m.
+
+4. Refilling point rail head, LITTLE PIPE CREEK (via MIDDLESBURG).
+
+ By command of Maj. Gen. A.
+ X
+ Asst. C. of S.
+
+ Copies to:
+ Staff.
+ C. O. Div. Tn.
+ C. O. F. Tn.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. XVI CAMP OF A DIVISION.
+
+_Contour interval 20 feet._
+
+_Datum is mean sea level._]
+
+Telegram to the commander of the depot at Frederick.
+
+ 1st Div., 1st Blue Army Corps,
+ TANEYTOWN, MD.,
+ 10 Sept., '16, 3 p. m.
+ Commanding Officer,
+ Supply Depot, FREDERICK, MD.
+
+
+ 1st Division camps for the night Sept. 10-11 one half mile
+ northeast of TANEYTOWN. Request that supplies for this
+ division for one day be sent by special train to arrive at
+ rail head LITTLE PIPE CREEK by 8 p. m. Also send 1,000,000
+ rounds small arms ammunition and 5,000 rounds artillery
+ ammunition to arrive at LADIESBURG by rail on the morning
+ of the 11th. You will have railroad construction crew ready
+ to start to replace bridges over LITTLE PIPE and BIG PIPE
+ CREEKS. Am sending estimates by motorcyclist.
+
+ A,
+ Chief of Staff.
+
+ Copies to:
+ Staff.
+ C. O. Div. Tn.
+
+
+SUPPLY.
+
+The division is the administrative unit for supply, and the tactics of
+a division differ in principle from those of smaller units chiefly in
+that they are concerned additionally with the handling of supply trains.
+
+The vehicles, etc., with an infantry division as authorized by F. S. R.
+1914 are as follows:
+
+ Guns 48
+ Other artillery carriages with firing batteries 78
+ Combat trains, including artillery, wagons 210
+ Field trains Baggage section, wagons 54
+ Ration section, wagons 124
+ Ammunition train, wagons 162
+ Supply train, wagons 126
+ Sanitary train, wagons and ambulances 90
+ Engineer train, wagons 9
+ Machine guns 40
+ Pack mules 273
+
+The bakery train is not now a part of the division trains unless
+specially attached. Ordinarily it is with the line of communications.
+Bridge trains likewise are part of the division only when specially
+attached.
+
+In the U. S. service it is now provided that certain reserve (park)
+intrenching tools for each battalion of infantry and each squadron of
+cavalry will be carried in their combat wagons. A reserve of engineer
+supplies including park intrenching tools, explosives, etc., will be
+carried in wagons to be furnished for that purpose. These wagons will,
+on the march in division, be consolidated into an engineer train, under
+charge of the senior engineer officer of the division. It habitually
+marches with the other trains of the division. (See Fig. XV.)
+
+There are two sources of supply for armies in the field:
+
+1. The theatre of operations; and 2. The base of operations. Supply
+operations in the theatre are controlled directly by the commander of
+the field forces, while the operations of supply from the home country
+to the base depot, called “the service of the interior” are conducted
+by the department commanders, and bureau chiefs, acting under the War
+Department.
+
+It is desirable to utilize to the utmost the produce of the theatre
+of operations and this is particularly true of forage because of its
+great weight and the drag on the operations of the army incident to its
+transportation. Other supplies which may be obtained in varying and
+usually uncertain quantities in the theatre of operations will include
+food, medicine and surgical supplies, commercial tools and building
+materials, fuel, wagons, automobiles and railroad rolling stock, etc.
+Arms and ammunition, uniform clothing and equipment, and in general all
+distinctively military supplies and equipment must be obtained from the
+base.
+
+Supplies are gathered in the theatre of operations by purchase or
+requisition or both, as may seem most desirable. In friendly country
+purchase is the rule while in hostile territory requisition is usual
+although not invariable. Requisition will take the form either of
+foraging or systematic collection at depots. Foraging is usually
+conducted directly by the troops acting under their own officers
+but where practicable collections are best made through the local
+authorities. The collection thus taps a larger area, giving greater
+results and a more equitable distribution of the burden on the
+inhabitants. Supplies collected in hostile territory are acknowledged
+by means of receipts given to the parties furnishing the supplies.
+Such receipts will be redeemed generally by the invader in public
+funds or captured public funds or by funds collected in the form of
+contributions or tax levies, or the receipts may be presented to the
+local government for redemption. Copies of these receipts are retained
+by the officers giving them. Article 52, Sec. I, Hague Convention,
+1907, reads: “The requisitions in kind shall as far as possible, be
+paid for in ready money; if not a receipt shall be given, and the
+payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible.” Moreover
+there is nothing that will bring forth supplies more readily or in
+greater quantity than cash payments.
+
+In the theatre of operations the functions of the War Dept, and of
+the various commanders are in general as follows: the War Dept,
+designates the commander of the field forces, assigns him a definite
+mission, prescribes the zone under his command, and supplies him with
+means necessary to the accomplishment of his mission. The commander
+of the field forces exercises supreme authority over all military and
+administrative matters within the zone assigned him, organizing the
+means placed at his disposal so as to insure efficiency, and directing
+and controlling all operations necessary for the accomplishment of the
+mission. The commander of the line of communications is responsible
+to the commander of the field forces for the efficient operation and
+defense of the line of communications and directs and controls all
+administrative and staff services attached thereto.
+
+Under the most favorable conditions, a large army cannot live wholly
+off the country and supplies must be forwarded to it from its base.
+This is especially true of armies which are stationary or nearly so
+for considerable periods. The purpose of utilizing to the utmost the
+supplies of the theatre is to increase the mobility of the army by
+reducing the amount of transportation, and avoiding some of the many
+restrictions inherent in a line of communications. But the size of
+modern armies is increasing to such extent that dependence to any
+great degree upon the supplies obtainable in the theatre is out of the
+question. The attempt in such cases to subsist from the theatre instead
+of increasing the mobility of the army would decrease its mobility,
+and hence its operative superiority over the enemy. A better rule
+would be to amass at the base depots a large reserve in excess of the
+contemplated need.
+
+_The operations of supply_ from the Service of the Interior to
+the front are as follows: One or more points are selected in rear
+of the troops (exceptionally they may be on a flank) having ample
+communications with the producing districts of the home country, rail
+or water, or preferably a combination of the two. These points should
+be so situated as to have ample security from hostile incursion,
+generally well to the rear. They should be equipped with store-houses,
+barracks, corrals, shops, etc. To such a point are shipped the supplies
+of food, ammunition, forage, medical and surgical supplies, and
+equipment of all kinds, as well as men and animals. This point is known
+as the base depot. From this base depot to the troops at the front,
+supplies and reinforcements are sent over the “line of communications.”
+This line may be either rail or water or both, but in some cases
+nothing but a wagon road will be available.
+
+The whole is under the charge of the commander of the line of
+communications. This officer has the necessary staff. He commands
+the base depot itself, as well as the line of communications, and
+the troops detached for their security. He is the officer upon whom
+devolves the duty of forwarding the necessary supplies to the troops at
+the front. Frequently his influence upon the outcome of the campaign is
+second only to that of the supreme commander in the field. He should,
+of course, be under the orders of the supreme commander, though this
+practice has been by no means habitual in the American service of the
+past. He divides his line of communications into three services, (a)
+defense, (b) supply, sanitary and telegraph, (c) military railways.
+
+From the home country to the base depot supplies are transported by
+rail or water or both; shipments must usually be broken at the base
+depot, as the supplies must be stored each class in its appropriate
+place until ready for distribution at the front. From the base depot
+to the rail or water head is the zone of the line of communications.
+At this rail or water head supplies are collected into what is known
+as the “advance supply depot.” The carriers used in this zone are
+usually directly controlled by the government, while those used for
+transportation to the base depot are in the general case commercially
+controlled.[7] The advance supply depot should be maintained as
+close to the rear of the moving army, as is tactically and otherwise
+possible. Herein lies the secret of successful administration of the
+line of communications. If it is kept far to the rear of the troops,
+there will result immense increase of labor for the draft animals, with
+consequent loss of animals, destruction of the roads, inadequate supply
+of the troops and greatly decreased mobility of the army. The positions
+of the advance depot and of the refilling points are fixed from time to
+time by the commander of the forces in the field.
+
+[Footnote 7: “In time of war or threatened war, preference and
+precedence shall, upon the demand of the President of the United
+States, be given, over all other traffic, to the transportation of
+troops and matériel of war, and carriers shall adopt every means within
+their control to facilitate and expedite the military traffic.” Chap.
+3591, Vol. XXXIV, U. S. Statutes at Large.]
+
+From the advance supply depot to the troops is known as the zone of
+the advance. In this zone, supplies are ordinarily hauled in wagons
+and motor trucks. If rail or water transportation be established or
+re-established ahead of the advance supply depot, it is of course at
+all times utilized to the fullest extent. Also motor transport will
+be utilized when conditions permit. Where wagon transportation is not
+operative, for any cause, supplies may be hauled by pack animals,
+coolies, etc. The trains of wagons or motor trucks are divided into
+classes belonging to the Line of Communications and to the divisions or
+supply units whatever they be. The management of these latter classes
+is a part of the tactics of the Division.
+
+The greater the number of lines of communication possessed by an army
+the better. The confusion incident to the presence of the immense wagon
+trains in the rear of a large force in the most favorable case is great
+enough. It is therefore specially desirable that each supply unit
+(Corps or Division) shall, so far as practicable have its own line of
+communications either from the base depot itself or certainly from the
+advance supply depots.
+
+The supply unit here considered is assumed to be the division as given
+in the F. S. R. It is in fact a body of troops whose length on a single
+road is from 10 to 17 miles. If the marching column have a length
+much greater than this, supply limited to a single road (unless it
+be a good road on which motor transport is practicable) cannot keep
+pace with the steady advance of the troops, unless occasional days of
+rest be interposed. Two separate supply services can seldom operate
+successfully on the same road at the same time.
+
+Up to the advance supply depot the supply of all modern armies is,
+in general, similar. Beyond this point there are differences. In the
+American Service, the wagon or motor trains used in this zone are
+of three general classes. The first is known to most armies as the
+regimental train, the second as the administrative or supply train, and
+the third as the general supply column sometimes called the auxiliary
+train. Regimental and supply trains belong to the Divisions whilst
+general supply columns belong to the Line of Communications.
+
+The regimental train carries the immediate baggage, cooking utensils,
+food, forage, and ammunition of the troops. The Field Service
+Regulations give to these wagons the name field train and combat train.
+The number of such wagons allowed each regiment is the subject of
+regulations published from time to time; the more active the campaign,
+the smaller being the allowance of regimental wagons. Regulations in
+time of peace tend to increase the allowance of wagons to amounts that
+can not be tolerated in aggressive campaign. The efficiency of troops
+in campaign depends on their having as far as practicable daily access
+to the regimental trains. When the trains are excessive in size, the
+troops frequently cannot obtain daily access to them and the trains
+are a drag on the operations. At the beginning of the Civil War,
+regiments were allowed field trains of 10 to 13 wagons. At the close,
+the allowance in the Appomattox campaign was 1 wagon per regiment and
+about the same in the Western Armies. The regiments were of course
+small. The F. S. R. at present allow to each infantry regiment 12
+field wagons. These are habitually divided into two sections: (1) a
+baggage section carrying baggage; and (2) a ration section carrying
+rations and grain exclusively, and including rolling kitchens, if
+supplied. For transportation of baggage each organization is assigned
+its proportionate space on the vehicles of the baggage section. The
+field trains are habitually routed on the march in a body, and usually
+all the field trains of the different regiments are united in a single
+body as the division field trains, marching in rear of the troops.
+Combat wagons pertain to each battalion or squadron, etc. They are an
+integral part of the battalion or squadron, and habitually march with
+it in the column. Marching into probable action they remain loaded with
+their combat unit until the last practicable moment, ammunition being
+issued when it becomes necessary for the troops to separate from their
+combat trains.
+
+The administrative trains are known in the American Service as the
+ammunition and supply trains. They carry ammunition, food and forage.
+The ammunition train (of a division) consists of 6 wagon companies
+of 27 wagons each, divided into 2 ammunition companies. They carry
+the artillery and small arms ammunition of the division. A wagon will
+carry about 100 rounds of light artillery or 30,000 rounds of small
+arms ammunition. The food for men and animals is carried in a supply
+train of 126 wagons or 4⅖ wagon companies. Pack trains are attached
+when required. This supply train carries two days’ food and grain
+for the division. It is divided into a first and a second section,
+each carrying a day’s supply of food and grain for the division. The
+composition of the supply train will be subject to modification to meet
+conditions due to depletion of the division in campaign and the amount
+of supplies obtained locally.
+
+The supply and ammunition trains are the carriers generally used from
+the advance supply depot to the field trains. The wagons are filled at
+the advance depot (or where that depot is not sufficiently forward,
+at refilling points) and they follow up the troops. Each day or as
+often as may be necessary, supplies are issued from these columns to
+replenish the issues from the field and combat wagons. The supply
+trains are connecting links between the line of communications and the
+immediate supply of the troops. From the supply trains to the troops
+the carriers used are the field and combat trains of organizations.
+The ration section of the field train carries for each man two days’
+field and one day’s reserve ration, and for each animal two days’
+grain ration. The soldier carries on his person at least two days’
+reserve rations or more, according to the conditions of the case. In
+the Civil War as well as in foreign wars there are innumerable examples
+of the soldiers carrying, in cases of necessity as many as four or
+five or more rations on the person. The _reserve_ ration, is the
+simplest efficient ration. Its net weight is 2 pounds. The field ration
+consists of the reserve ration in whole or in part, supplemented by
+other articles. Reserve rations are consumed only in cases of emergency
+by order of superior authority. They are renewed periodically to
+prevent deterioration. The ration issued in the field will depend upon
+the transportation facilities. Where these are inadequate the ration
+will usually have to be diminished. Full field rations are issued
+whenever practicable. Thus the division carries with it, in advance
+of the supply depot 7 rations, 4 field and 3 reserve. By reducing the
+ration, by carrying extra rations in place of some baggage, and by
+living partly off the country, the division can subsist, when cut off
+from its supply depot for a period much longer than 8 days. The exact
+length of time will depend on all the circumstances of the case.
+
+In addition to the regimental and divisional supply trains, the Line
+of Communications must be prepared to maintain, usually, a class
+of wagon transportation, called the general supply column, whose
+business is to forward supplies from the advance supply depot to a
+flying depot or refilling point where the supplies can be reached by
+the division supply trains operating with the army. It will be shown
+shortly that the division supply trains must keep up with their units
+if the operations are to succeed. To this end, the advance supply
+depot must be maintained closely in rear of the troops; but that the
+operations of troops be not too intimately dependent on the location of
+the advance supply depot, the commander of the Line of Communications
+must be able to place supplies in emergency ahead of the advance
+supply depot--within reach of the division supply trains. This is
+accomplished by the use of the general supply columns of the Line of
+Communications. The constitution of these columns is less the subject
+of regulation allowance than that of regimental or divisional supply
+trains. It will vary greatly with conditions whereas the other two
+classes of wagon trains bear a reasonably fixed relation to the size
+of the units. The general supply column may consist of army transport
+or it may be locally hired or impressed. If a large army is operating
+on a broad front and is limited to a single line of communications by
+rail or river, it may tend to expedite supply to establish one or more
+sub-supply depots on the same front with the advance supply depot.
+
+The divisional supply trains and the general supply columns are not
+usually reduced in numbers, due to the exigencies of campaign, in the
+same proportion as are the regimental trains. Under recent legislation,
+all the personnel of the field transport service, most of which was
+heretofore civilian will now be enlisted--to the obvious improvement of
+the service.
+
+Fig. XVII[8] illustrates diagrammatically, after the manner of a
+railroad graphic time table, the movement of supplies during 5 days
+of a forward march, including a combat, of a division. (Reference 1
+inch map, Geological Survey, Gettysburg and vicinity.) A Pennsylvania
+division, based upon Gettysburg, is marching from Gettysburg to
+attack a hostile force to the south. The Northern Central Railroad
+has been interrupted south of Littlestown. It is intended to repair
+this railroad as rapidly as possible, under cover of the advancing
+division, for use as a line of communications. The division marches
+from Gettysburg on the morning of June 2nd, on Emmitsburg, arriving
+at the latter place shortly after noon, where it camps for the night.
+Field wagons join the troops, and issue rations and forage for the
+night. Supply trains following the division halt in rear, north of
+Emmitsburg. After the issue to the troops the field wagons proceed
+back to a designated point to which one section of the supply train is
+forwarded. Here the field wagons replenish and return to their troops.
+The emptied supply wagons thereupon are sent back to Gettysburg to
+refill and afterward rejoin the division. They start at 6 p. m. and
+reach Gettysburg at 10 p. m. That night while the teamsters and animals
+get some rest, the wagons are refilled at the depot, and at 6 a. m.
+June 3rd, they again take the road to rejoin the division at the front.
+Early the same morning the division starts south towards Woodsboro. All
+its trains are full, but the first section of the supply train is one
+march to the rear. The division about 2:30 p. m. goes into camp for
+the night, south of Woodsboro. Here the arrangements of the previous
+evening are repeated. The field trains issue a day’s supply of rations
+and forage to the troops, and proceed to the rear where they are met
+by a section of the supply train; they replenish what they issued. If
+nothing is purchased locally an entire section of the supply train will
+be needed to replenish the issues from the field wagons. Habitually,
+however, every exertion would be made to obtain from the locality all
+the stores practicable, especially of the weighty forage item. The
+purchase would be made by the Chief Quartermaster of the division, and
+from his knowledge of the amount he can obtain locally, he is able at
+once to determine how many of the wagons of the supply train will be
+needed to replenish the field trains. Every wagon load of supplies thus
+purchased locally saves a round trip of a wagon to the advance supply
+depot.
+
+[Footnote 8: Calculated for a supply train consisting of 3 sections,
+each containing one day’s supply of rations and forage (grain only),
+and an ammunition train of 6 wagon companies, 4 of small arms and 2 of
+artillery ammunition. This is the tentative organization of 1914, but
+the method indicated may be applied to any given organization of the
+trains.]
+
+[Illustration: Fig. XVII
+
+Supply Service - Division
+
+(<i>not drawn to scale</i>)
+
+Ammunition Service - Division]
+
+At 4 a. m. June 4th, the empty section of two wagon companies starts
+back to Gettysburg to refill. It has 25 miles to go, and it reaches
+Gettysburg at 7 p. m., having marched all day, except for a halt
+for rest from 10 a. m. to 2 p. m. Meanwhile the first section, now
+refilled, has joined from Gettysburg, and again the division has four
+wagon companies of its supply train filled, as are also field wagons.
+Meanwhile the troops have not drawn upon the reserve rations on their
+persons. Up to this time there have been no expenditures of ammunition
+or medical supplies, and there is nothing, therefore, for the trains
+containing those supplies to do except to follow the division.
+
+On the morning of June 4th the division meets the enemy, and attacks
+him near Frederick. As soon as the attack is planned the trains are
+halted in a place of safety near Woodsboro. Two wagon companies of
+ammunition, however, are sent forward from Woodsboro, to stations
+closely in rear of the division in action, for the purpose of
+maintaining the ammunition supply during the action. The attack
+terminates successfully, and the division camps for the night on the
+field near Frederick, the cavalry moving out in pursuit of the defeated
+enemy. The supply trains come forward from their halting place near
+Woodsboro. The two wagon companies of ammunition, which replenished
+the ammunition in the belts of the men and in the wagons of the
+combat trains on the field of battle, then start for Gettysburg on
+the afternoon of June 4th to refill. The wounded are transported by
+ambulance to the field hospitals at Woodsboro, from which point they
+will be taken to the rear by rail as soon as railroad communication
+is re-established. The field trains issue to the troops or replace
+expended reserve rations, and themselves replenish from the supply
+train. The emptied section of the supply train then proceeds in the
+early morning of June 5th to the rear to refill. Meanwhile word is
+received that the line of communications will be extended by rail to
+Woodsboro, probably during the afternoon of the 5th of June. Orders
+are accordingly issued at 8 a. m., June 5th, directing the ammunition
+wagons to return to Woodsboro, and directing the third section of the
+supply train to stop at Woodsboro to refill instead of proceeding back
+to Gettysburg. This order is not received by the ammunition companies
+until nearly noon.
+
+The division continues south on the morning of the 5th, to the Potomac
+River, where it camps for the night, its supplies being again issued,
+as before. The division then rests for the 6th of June, and the
+railhead is pushed forward to Frederick, closely in rear. The state of
+the division supply is then as follows (on June 6th); one section of
+the supply train with the division, another loaded section has just
+arrived at Frederick from Gettysburg, and a third is filling at the
+railhead at Frederick. The field trains and the men’s packs are filled.
+Of ammunition supply, the men’s belts and the combat trains are filled,
+two wagon companies of small arms ammunition and one of artillery
+ammunition are with the division, while two other wagon companies, one
+of each class of ammunition, are en route back to the division from
+Woodsboro, where they refilled.
+
+It will readily be apparent that with but three sections of the supply
+train the division cannot move far from its advance supply depot
+without falling behind in its supply if dependent on wagons. Or stated
+differently, the supply depot must not be permitted to lag behind the
+advance of the troops. The relations between steadily advancing troops
+and the advance supply depot which are necessary to the maintenance
+of a satisfactory state of supply, may be expressed in a simple way,
+mathematically, as follows:
+
+ Let
+ n = the number of sections in the supply train, each
+ containing one day’s supply for the troops.
+
+ e = number of miles empty wagons can travel in one day.
+
+ f = number of miles loaded wagons can travel in one day.
+
+ y = average daily advance of the troops.
+
+ X = number of marches (day’s travel) to the rear for empty
+ wagons to reach the supply depot, average.
+
+ Then
+
+ ex = miles travel to rear by empties in one trip.
+
+ ny = miles the division advances between issues from the same
+ section, assuming that the sections issue in regular
+ rotation.
+
+ ex + ny = miles traveled by any section from the time it
+ loads to the time it issues.
+
+This must equal the miles traveled loaded.
+
+ Therefore
+
+ ex + ny = (n - x) f =1=
+
+ f - y
+ x = n ----- =2=
+ f + e
+
+ x
+ y = f - --- (f + e) =3=
+ n
+
+ f + 3
+ n = x ----- =4=
+ f - y
+
+The maximum marching capacity of the trains, round trip, (that is from
+point of issue to next point of issue) is ex + (n - x) f.
+
+The distance they _must_ march to overtake the division is 2ex + ny.
+
+ Hence
+ ex + (n-x) f > 2ex + ny
+
+ (n-x) f > ex + ny.
+
+Let us now assign actual values to the various quantities, and solve
+for x.
+
+Make n = 3; f = 20; e = 28; y = 12.
+
+Then the inequality reduces to
+
+x < ½ march of an empty wagon, or x < 14 miles.
+
+This is to say that if the troops advance steadily every day, at the
+rate of 12 miles, and have 3 supply sections to serve them, and if
+those sections can travel empty and loaded at the liberal rates of 28
+and 20 miles per day, respectively, then the advance supply depot,
+or refilling point must not lag farther to the rear than 14 miles,
+or slightly more than one day’s march of the division, unless the
+division is to draw supplies locally, or fall behind. How are these
+figures reconciled with known practice? In campaign the troops subsist
+to the utmost from the local resources along the line of operations.
+Moreover large bodies do not keep up a rate of advance of 12 miles per
+diem long. There are rest and combat periods, etc., which reduce y (in
+foregoing discussion.)
+
+Equation 2 may be considered an expression of the supply train radius
+somewhat similar to the war ship’s steaming radius. For, let us
+assume the Division is stationary; then y = O and from Equation 2 we
+have x = ₆₀/₄₈ = 1¼. Hence the conclusion that when the Division is
+_stationary_, the supply depot cannot be in rear more than 1¼ marches
+of an empty wagon (35 miles for the value assumed above). The radius of
+the supply train can be increased by having the field train go well to
+the rear to meet it for refilling after the daily issue of rations in
+camp.
+
+Generally speaking, the refilling points should be kept within two
+marches of the rear of the troops, if the latter are subsisting chiefly
+from their base and are supplied by animal-drawn vehicles. If the rail
+or water head cannot keep thus close, the operations of the forces
+may be restricted and their mission may be frustrated, unless motor
+transport be employed.
+
+In order to keep the advance supply depot well to the front the
+commander of the line of communications must maintain an ample and
+efficient railroad or steamboat force for operation and for maintenance
+and repair. This work pertains solely to the line of communications
+personnel, and if the fighting troops are detached for repair work on
+the line of communications the operations of the fighting forces cannot
+fail to suffer.
+
+The field bakery on the Line of Communication does not attempt to
+keep pace with all the changes of the advance supply depot in a rapid
+advance. Too much time would thereby be lost. When the bakery _does_
+change station, reserves of baked bread should be provided beforehand.
+
+It may be laid down as the ideal condition for supply in campaign
+that the supply trains be always full, and never drawn from. How can
+such ideal be approximated? 1. By living off the country, the field
+trains every day drawing their supplies direct from the collection
+depots. 2. By maintaining the advance supply depot so close to the
+troops that the field trains may draw direct, or 3. By a combination
+of 1 and 2. Another desideratum is that the reserve rations in the
+men’s packs be not used oftener than is necessary to keep them from
+spoiling. These two ideals give the daily rules of conduct for supply
+officers in campaign. A portion of a supply train, when empty, has no
+status with the command. The first duty of an empty supply train is to
+proceed to refill and rejoin as soon as practicable. Similarly packs
+should not be permitted to remain depleted, but should be refilled at
+the first opportunity. The service of supply is considered good when
+the transportation with the troops is kept at a minimum, and military
+operations are not hampered by lack of food and other necessary
+supplies.
+
+In Sherman’s campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 136 miles, the
+following places were successively used as advance supply depots:
+Ringgold, Dalton, Resaca, Kingston, Allatoona, Acworth, Big Shanty,
+Marietta. Counting Allatoona, Acworth and Big Shanty as a single
+depot (they were on a single front) we find that the extraordinarily
+vigorous railroad construction enabled the advance supply depot to be
+pushed ahead six times; that these moves averaged 23 miles. The depot
+was thus habitually within two marches of the troops. At Resaca and
+again at Marietta Sherman accumulated a great quantity of supplies
+as a precaution against his line being cut at points farther to the
+rear. These depots and the critical portions of the railroad had to be
+guarded constantly against the raids of the Confederate cavalry and the
+intense hostility of the inhabitants. At Resaca, Kingston and other
+points, where the tactical situation, and the condition of the railroad
+permitted, supplies were carried forward by rail ahead of the advance
+supply depots, and issued directly to the field wagons, thus keeping
+intact the rolling reserve in the supply columns. Grant’s '64 campaign
+against Lee exhibits similar activity under different conditions. His
+line of communications was the open sea, and he utilized 5 depots, to
+wit: Alexandria, Aquia Creek, Port Royal, West Point, City Point, thus
+keeping within two or at most three marches of the troops.
+
+The operations of the forces should be conducted so as to cover at
+all times the advance depot. If the forces be cut off from their
+supply depot and be unable to regain it, disaster must result. Where,
+therefore, maneuvers to a flank are attempted, that necessarily tend to
+uncover the supply depot, it is well that the depot be not too close to
+the forces, and that it be well protected against raids, etc.
+
+[Illustration: Fig. XVIII Supply Service - Division
+
+(_not drawn to scale_)]
+
+[Illustration: Ammunition Service - Division]
+
+In the advance, the supply trains will ordinarily halt for the night
+about half a march in rear of the division. The baggage section of the
+field trains and one day’s ration from the ration sections join the
+troops without delay, so as to provide the rations and utensils for the
+preparation of supper. The baggage of the troops though reduced to a
+minimum in campaign, is essential to the maintenance of their fighting
+strength, hence the field wagons should always be permitted to join the
+troops unless the tactical situation positively forbids. As soon as
+practicable after the arrival in camp of the ration vehicles, they are
+unloaded and, without delay, rejoin the grouped portions of the ration
+vehicles. The baggage sections usually go to the same place early the
+following morning. Empty ration vehicles at the time designated in
+administration orders, proceed to the distributing or issue point for
+the purpose of replenishing their supplies. This point is selected in
+rear of the division, both for safety, and convenience, and because
+it tends to equalize the travel of the field and supply trains. It
+should be at some place easily described in orders. A road junction is
+desirable as it facilitates approach and departure and affords space
+for the movements of wagons. The distributing point may be at the camp
+of the supply train, or it may be a point in advance thereof. In the
+latter case the necessary wagons of the supply train are sent forward
+to make the issue. It is essential that this point of issue shall lend
+itself to an orderly issue without delay or confusion amongst the
+wagons. Cavalry operating at a distance from the division must usually
+expect to live off the country. A pack train may accompany the cavalry
+when it is undesirable or impracticable for them to take their wagons,
+or the cavalry may impress or hire wagons. Cavalry draws ammunition
+from any source most convenient.
+
+Issues of ammunition are made in essentially the same way as that of
+rations, from the ammunition train to the combat wagons, at ammunition
+distributing stations. The issues are not made regularly however as are
+rations, but only as ammunition is expended.
+
+The time and place of issue must be published to the command, in
+operation or routine orders. When the local conditions permit, time may
+be gained by having the wagons unload at the place of issue without
+awaiting the arrival of the field wagons, and thence proceed at once
+back to the advance supply depot. Supply trains are under the command
+of an officer detailed for the purpose.
+
+Figure XVIII issued by the War Department is intended to illustrate
+diagrammatically the method of supplying troops in campaign.
+
+Supply trains are commanded by officers detailed for the purpose. On
+the march trains are made up to follow the division in the order of
+their probable need for the day. If no combat is probable the field
+trains would be at or near the head and the field hospitals near the
+tail. If combat seems probable some ammunition should be held well
+toward the head of the combined trains. For convenience of march
+trains may be divided into two sections with an interval. A convenient
+arrangement for an ordinary march, where combat is not probable, is
+in two sections, as follows: 1st section. Field trains, 1st section
+supply train, 1st ammunition co., engineer train. 2nd section. Field
+hospitals, 2d ammunition co., 2d section supply train, pack train.
+The first section may follow the troops at from 1 to 3 miles, and the
+second section follow the first at from 1 to 2 miles.
+
+Where danger threatens in front so that combat appears likely, the
+trains should be halted well to the rear. They may be halted on the
+road, or parked off the road at the place of receipt of the order, if
+sufficiently well protected in such place, and if they are not thereby
+a menace to the safety of the command. They should not be allowed to
+pass a defile until the conditions on the far side are known to be
+safe. During combat they should never be permitted to remain on the
+hostile side of a river or defile, even if it be necessary to leave
+them many miles to the rear. The necessary ammunition and sanitary
+supplies are of course sent forward for their appropriate use in the
+combat. In making a flank march the trains may be held closely in
+rear in a single section, but if the danger be at all great it will
+be safer to route the trains, with or without a guard, according
+to circumstances, on a separate road on the unexposed flank. In a
+retrograde movement the trains precede, usually alone but with a guard
+if a flank is exposed. The field trains and the section that is to make
+the next issue must not be sent too far away from the place where it
+is intended to camp until the resupply is accomplished. In retreat the
+service of supply is simplified.
+
+The rate of march of a wagon train depends upon the condition of the
+stock and rolling equipment, state of the roads, weather, wagon loads,
+etc. 20 to 30 miles per day for empty wagons is, in the U. S., about
+the best that can ordinarily be expected, and for loaded wagons, 15 to
+22 miles. Wagon trains do not usually halt for rest, but roll along
+to their destination. If the trip is very long or fatiguing, they may
+halt, for several hours, unhitch and feed, and then resume. They do not
+ordinarily halt for hourly rests, as do the troops. The speed of wagon
+trains usually averages about 2 mi. per hour on all kinds of roads.
+On good stretches of road it may reach 2½ miles, rarely better. Auto
+trucks will average 5 to 10 miles per hour, depending on roads and
+other conditions.
+
+The amount of supplies that may be obtained from a given locality
+depends on a number of factors; whether the community is agricultural
+or otherwise, and if agricultural what are the ruling crops; the
+transportation facilities, season of the year, etc. Rural communities
+are usually well stocked with food supplies, especially in the fall.
+Of forage especially there will usually be large supplies. Cities and
+towns habitually maintain a reserve in their store-houses. This reserve
+is more concentrated, and of greater variety, than the rural reserves.
+
+It is not the policy of the American government in the early stages of
+a war to strip a locality too closely of its supplies, particularly
+in friendly territory, and this is also forbidden by the 1907 Hague
+Convention. But in case of necessity the army must be supplied at any
+cost. It may be said as a rough rule that a town of 10,000 inhabitants
+has sufficient reserves of food always on hand to supply a force of
+20,000 men for one day without great embarrassment to the population,
+provided the commercial transportation facilities be not paralyzed.
+Col. Hazenkampf in his work entitled “The supply of an army in time of
+war,” says: “From the experiences of former wars we have come to the
+following general conclusions:
+
+1st. If the population of a given point or locality be equal to the
+number of troops, it can supply them for a period of 4, but not more
+than 6 days.
+
+2nd. If the number of troops be half the number of the population, they
+can be maintained at the expense of the latter for 1 to 2 weeks.
+
+3rd. Lastly, the number of troops being a quarter of the number of
+inhabitants, they can be supplied for a space of 3 or 4 weeks.”
+
+These figures are too great for application to the American service.
+The food thus obtained locally is not, of course, the balanced
+regulation ration. In campaign, soldiers must take things as they come
+and make the best of the food they get from day to day.
+
+
+_Some Supply Data._
+
+The following data will be useful in connection with the subject of
+supply:
+
+Standard gauge box freight cars in the U. S. have capacities varying
+from 20 to 50 tons. Their inside cargo space is about 8 ft. X 8 ft. and
+the length runs from 30 to 40 feet, or more.
+
+Box cars for narrow gauge roads are similar in construction to, but
+of smaller dimensions than those for a standard gauge road; they have
+carrying capacities up to 15 tons.
+
+Flat cars and gondolas have about the same carrying capacities as box
+cars. An average car has a capacity of 80,000 lbs. They are designed to
+carry heavy and bulky articles that will not be injured by exposure to
+the weather.
+
+The supplies of an army are bulkier than much of commercial freight.
+The cars will not always be carefully loaded, nor their full capacities
+realized. Allowances should be made for these facts in estimating the
+number of cars required.
+
+Day coaches accommodate comfortably 40 to 50 men, but 60 to 65 can be
+crowded into them for short hauls.
+
+Sleepers carry 3 men to a section, and have 12, 14 or 16 sections.
+
+Wounded should not be packed in too closely; ordinarily each will
+require an entire berth. A large box car will accommodate 20 to 25
+recumbent wounded.
+
+Ordinary stock cars carry 16 to 20 animals. For short hauls they will
+carry 25. They are slatted but have no stalls. They are arranged for
+feeding hay but not grain or water. Animals should be unloaded and
+watered once in 24 or certainly 36 hours. Palace stock cars carry 16
+to 24 animals. They are fitted with stalls and with arrangements for
+feeding and watering en route. Care is necessary to see that the water
+tanks are filled and tight.
+
+In railroad movements a guard and unloading detail should be arranged
+for when necessary. The details if desired may best be sent with the
+leading train.
+
+The table following gives the weights and cubic contents of various
+rations for men and animals, and the capacities of carriers for careful
+loading. If the loading is not carefully done the stated capacities
+will not be realized and allowance should generally be made for this.
+From this table the number of carriers of any class required for a
+stated number of rations may be computed.
+
+Thus assuming a division at approximately 20,000 men and 8,000 animals,
+one day’s reserve rations will require 15 wagons, 1 day’s hay for
+animals 46 wagons, 1 day’s grain for animals (250 rations to a wagon),
+32 wagons. A 40,000 lb. box car, fully loaded, is equivalent to about
+15 wagons; for ordinary loading (20% waste) about 12 wagons. In any
+case the actual capacities of the cars available should be ascertained,
+and 20% excess allowed for inefficiency of loading.
+
+Beef is often transported on the hoof, 16 to 20 cattle to a car. For
+fresh vegetables the required cubic capacity is computed.
+
+
+ALLOWANCE OF FORAGE, AND APPROXIMATE WEIGHTS AND MEASURES OF FORAGE AND
+SUBSISTENCE.
+
+ LEGEND:
+ A = Gross weight of one ration (lbs.).
+ B = Number of rations to a 40,000 lb. box car (36 by 8 by 8).
+ C = Part of box car required for one ration.
+ D = Number of rations to an Army wagon (2,765 lbs.).
+ E= Number of rations to an auto truck (3,000 lbs.).
+ F= Cubic feet to one ration.
+ G = Number of rations to a cubic foot.
+ H = Number of rations to a ship’s ton (40 cubic feet).
+ I = Part of a ship’s ton required for one ration.
+
+ ----------+----+------+-------+-----+-----+-----+------+---------+------
+ Kind of | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I
+ ration. | | | | | | | | |
+ ----------+----+------+-------+-----+-----+-----+------+---------+------
+ Forage: | | | | | | | | |
+ Oats-- | | | | | | | | |
+ Horse |12 | 3,333|.0003 | 230| 250|.39 | 2.564|102.6 |.00974
+ Mule | 9 | 4,444|.000225| 300| 333|.2925| 3.42 |136.75 |.0074
+ Hay-- | | | | | | | | |
+ Horse |14 | 1,571|.000636| 175| 175|1.12 | .893| 69.69[9]|.0143
+ Mule |14 | 1,571|.000636| 175| 175|1.12 | .893| 69.69 |.0143
+ Barley--| | | | | | | | |
+ Horse |12 | 3,333|.0003 | 230| 250|.312 | 3.205|128.2 |.0078
+ Mule | 9 | 4,444|.000225| 300| 333|.234 | 4.274|170.9 |.00585
+ Corn-- | | | | | | | | |
+ Horse |12 | 3,333|.0003 | 230| 250|.27 | 3.703|148.15 |.00675
+ Mule | 9 | 4,444|.000225| 300| 333|.2025| 4.94 |197.53 |.00511
+ Bran-- | | | | | | | | |
+ Horse |12 | 2,500|.0004 | 230| 250|.72 | 1.39 | 55.55 |.018
+ Mule | 9 | 3,333|.0003 | 300| 333|.54 | 1.85 | 74.07 |.0135
+ Subsistence:| | | | | | | | |
+ Garrison| 4.9| 8,226|.000122| 565| 600|.149 | 6.73 |269 |.0037
+ Travel | 4.1| 9,818|.000102| 675| 750|.129 | 7.76 |311 |.0032
+ Field | 3.0|13,428|.000075| 920|1,000|.111 | 9.04 |362 |.0028
+ Reserve | 2.0|20,142|.00005 |1,380|1,500|.074 |13.56 |543 |.0019
+ ----------+----+------+-------+-----+-----+-----+------+---------+------
+
+[Footnote 9: Compressed to 82 cubic feet per ton (2,000 pounds), the
+minimum density for oversea shipments.]
+
+The supply data and discussion in this chapter are to be regarded
+as tentative and serving only for purposes of illustration. The
+organization of the supply service as well as that of the tactical
+units, varies from time to time and the latest tables of organization
+issued by the War Dept, should be consulted. Moreover, it is certain
+that any prescribed organization will be varied to a considerable
+degree in actual campaign. So many conditions enter supply problems
+that each must be solved in the light of those conditions. The
+foregoing discussion is intended only to indicate the general nature of
+the problem and the manner in which its solution should be approached.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER XVIII.
+
+AIR CRAFT AND MOTOR VEHICLES IN WAR.
+
+
+While other branches of the service have hundreds of years of
+precedents back of them, there is very little past experience to guide
+us in the use of air craft in war. Portable observation stations,
+captive balloons, and man-lifting kites still form part of the
+equipment of all modern armies, but the two principal classes of air
+craft today are air ships and aeroplanes.
+
+That air craft will play a very important part in future wars is no
+longer questioned, but the development of both air ships and aeroplanes
+is proceeding so rapidly that it is difficult to say today what they
+will be capable of doing tomorrow. There are many possible uses for
+this new arm of the service, but a number of these are still largely
+matters of speculation. Others, however, are now well determined
+and these in themselves are of sufficient importance to require the
+adoption of air craft as an indispensable part of the equipment of any
+army.
+
+There is a natural tendency on the part of those who are engaged in
+the development of a new instrument of war to exaggerate its power and
+minimize its limitations. Air craft at the present moment are capable
+of rendering most valuable service, and with the improvements that
+are bound to come, their value for military purposes will be greatly
+increased; but the claims of certain enthusiasts that aeroplanes and
+air ships have rendered cavalry obsolete and revolutionized the art of
+war have no foundation of fact.
+
+
+_Characteristics._ _Aeroplanes_ can travel about 350 miles and have
+a maximum speed of 80 or 90 miles an hour, or more. Service machines
+normally carry a pilot, an observer, and fuel and oil for from four to
+six hours. Aeroplanes can start and can land without assistance. They
+can be handled on the ground by three or four men. They can remain in
+the open for short periods without serious deterioration. When flying
+at normal working altitudes they are difficult to hit. Their chief use
+is for reconnaissance. On the other hand, aeroplanes cannot always be
+depended upon to be ready for work whenever they are needed. Compared
+with most war equipment, both aeroplanes and aeroplane engines are
+extremely fragile. Flying round an aerodrome where landings can be made
+on suitable ground, an average pilot will rarely injure his machine.
+But in war, pilots will be required to fly in all sorts of weather
+and will be forced to land on all sorts of ground in order to deliver
+promptly the information they have obtained. Minor breakages are
+bound to result and machines will be so badly strained that frequent
+overhauling will be necessary. Moreover, the engine, even with the
+best of care, should be overhauled after running twenty or twenty-five
+hours. It will be necessary, therefore, to provide large quantities of
+spare parts and to deliver these wherever needed. The care and repair
+of aeroplanes and engines require a highly trained commissioned and
+enlisted personnel.
+
+Types are in active process of development and they vary with different
+nations. It seems certain that for the immediate future, no single type
+of aeroplane will suffice for all purposes but that air fleets will be
+composed of craft suited to different functions as is the case with sea
+craft. Examples of the variety of types are: The _destroyer_, a pusher
+biplane, armed with a machine gun in front and arranged to carry bombs
+and a wireless equipment but without armor. The _battleplane_, of great
+size, speed and offensive power, has a pilot with two soldiers each
+operating a machine gun that fires in all directions. The _artillery
+spotter_, carries armor, operates at a low height and has low speed; it
+carries an observer and a wireless equipment. The _scout_, a one man
+craft capable of great speed up to 80 or 90 miles per hour, or more,
+and great climbing power. It is equipped with rifle or revolver and is
+unarmored.
+
+The principal problems remaining for solution in aeroplane development
+are concerned with obtaining a dependable motor and a propeller able to
+withstand the very great centrifugal stresses.
+
+In several countries, and depending upon the nature of the duty,
+aeroplanes are organized and operate in squadrons of 6 to 8 machines.
+These squadrons are served by motor trucks that tow them from place to
+place. Some machines have wings that fold when being towed.
+
+
+_Air Ships._ Air ships have a radius of action of about 1000 miles
+and a speed of from 40 to 50 miles an hour. They can remain in the
+air for many hours at a time, can hover over a selected spot, and can
+be used safely at night and in mist or rain. They afford a good field
+of view and can carry a number of observers. Their chief use is for
+distant reconnaissance which is greatly facilitated by their long range
+wireless equipment. Compared with aeroplanes, they offer an easy target
+and require a large number of trained men to handle them on the ground.
+The difficulty of maintaining them in the field makes it necessary to
+operate them from fixed bases established in time of peace.
+
+Balloons are still used. Captive balloons are employed for tactical
+reconnaissance, and for observation of artillery fire; they are usually
+equipped with telephones.
+
+Hydroaeroplanes are employed with navies, but have not come into
+extensive use.
+
+
+_Armor and armament._ The weight of armor reduces the speed and the
+lifting capacity of aeroplanes. At present, armor is in general limited
+to a bullet proof seat for the pilot, and bullet proof protection
+to the fuel tank. Airships are able to carry more extensive armor.
+Aeroplanes are not very vulnerable to fire; to bring one to earth it
+is in general necessary to disable the pilot or to puncture the fuel
+tank. Even these accidents do not necessarily involve the destruction
+of the craft; pilots volplane successfully to earth without the use
+of the motor. Aeroplanes are frequently riddled with bullets without
+interfering with their operation. The principal armament of the
+aeroplane is the machine gun. The rifle and revolver are also used, as
+also small calibre guns. The armor and armament of a particular type
+depend upon the use to which that type is destined.
+
+
+_Duties._ The primary duty is reconnaissance, both strategic and
+tactical. Reconnaissance consists usually in the location of troops and
+artillery positions.
+
+Strategic reconnaissance by aeroplane is practicable for a distance of
+150 miles; it endeavors to ascertain the position, strength, directions
+of movement, and dispositions of the larger elements of the enemy and
+also knowledge of the terrain in the theatre.
+
+Tactical reconnaissance by air is used in both attack and defense. It
+is necessarily general in nature because the height of observation
+prevents close view. It endeavors to discover movements of the enemy,
+location of his reserve, his cavalry, artillery, movements of wagon and
+auto trains, camps, lines of communication, the nature of terrain, etc.
+Air reconnaissance extends and supplements that of cavalry but does not
+supplant it. Often verification of reconnaissance must be secured by
+actual contact.
+
+The duty of reconnaissance involves the corresponding prevention of
+hostile reconnaissance. This duty has resulted in developing in most
+armies special types of fighting craft, the aim of which is to secure
+command of the air within the military theatre. There is in this a
+close analogy with the domination of the military theatre by sea power
+or by cavalry. Another important duty of air craft is that of directing
+artillery fire. For this purpose air craft are usually assigned one
+to each group of batteries, and operate directly under the orders of
+the artillery commander. Their information is conveyed by wireless, by
+smoke bombs, by visual signals, and by dropping messages. These methods
+are all in active process of development and vary with the different
+nations.
+
+Hostile artillery in position, is discovered by the flash of its guns,
+by telltale wheel tracks to the artillery position and by activity in
+the position. For mid-range firing, aeroplanes can frequently direct
+the fire from a position directly above or even behind the friendly
+artillery.
+
+Another duty of air craft is that of air raids. This duty is less
+important than the others. Like most other raids, those by aircraft are
+likely to have but little direct bearing on the military situation; but
+within special range they will continue to be performed. The objectives
+for air raids are capitals of states, military bases, hangars, lines
+of communication, depots, arsenals, etc. Raids are usually ineffective
+against troops or fortifications.
+
+Another important function is the carrying of staff officers, of
+maps, dispatches, etc., as also reporting promptly the positions and
+movements of friendly troops.
+
+
+_Practicable heights for observation._ Satisfactory reconnaissance
+from air craft requires low flying height and low speed. These two
+elements increase greatly the vulnerability of the craft. Air craft
+are comparatively safe from all kinds of fire, at 6000 feet elevation
+and are entirely safe at 10,000 feet. In clear weather the observer,
+at an elevation of about 5000 feet, can detect bodies of troops for a
+radius of four to six miles. Aeroplanes are practically safe from rifle
+fire at 2000 yards range or at an elevation of 3000 feet. They are
+reasonably safe from field artillery fire at 4000 yards range or at an
+elevation of approximately 4500 feet. It is difficult to reconnoiter in
+a wooded country. Timbered areas, therefore, have a new importance in
+the concealment they afford from overhead observation.
+
+The safe heights above mentioned are in general too great to afford
+detailed observation, the necessity for close observation will,
+therefore, lead bold airmen to a closer approach to the enemy. By
+swerving, changing velocities, diving, soaring, etc., the airman
+reduces the risk involved in a close approach to the enemy. He will
+have added protection from hostile fire when he can soar directly
+over the anti aircraft guns, none of which is able to fire vertically
+upwards; also by operating where hostile projectiles will be likely
+in their fall to damage other hostile troops, and also by utilizing
+the protection of hills, etc. The vibration of the machine prevents
+satisfactory use of field glasses. The observer is restricted to
+observation with the naked eye.
+
+Airships because of their greater size and slower and more regular
+motion, must remain at greater altitudes for safety than aeroplanes.
+Accordingly they will be less frequently employed for battlefield
+reconnaissance or wherever exposed to rapid fire of anti aircraft
+artillery.
+
+
+_Defensive measures._ The principal defense against air craft is
+command of the air by superior air fleets. The tactics of air
+reconnaissance are, therefore, largely similar to those of cavalry or
+of sea power. The secondary defense against air craft consists of anti
+aircraft artillery. For elevations up to 3000 feet, the machine gun is
+effective. For greater elevations land forces must protect themselves
+by artillery. Special types of guns of great rapidity of fire are used
+as is also the standard light field types. The special types of anti
+aircraft artillery are usually employed in the protection of capitals,
+lines of communication, etc. They have a lesser application to mobile
+forces, because the need is less and the economy of road space greater.
+Light field artillery to be effective against air craft must be capable
+of firing at an elevation of 45 to 50 degrees. This calls for special
+types of trail and the necessity of digging pits for the trail.
+
+Range finders are in general of little efficacy in locating the fast
+moving target. Artillery fire seeks its object in speed and volume of
+fire, rather than in attempted accuracy. Volume of fire may keep air
+craft away even if hits are few. Tracer shells emitting smoke are much
+used to assist observation of fire. To bring down an aeroplane it is
+almost absolutely necessary to disable the pilot or the fuel tank. The
+airship is much more vulnerable. The target is the gas bag, rather than
+the pilot.
+
+
+_Powers and limitations._ From the very first it has been obvious that
+air craft would be of enormous value for all kinds of reconnaissance
+work. Some of their advantages for this purpose are:
+
+1. Speed. It will often be possible for air craft to obtain in a few
+hours, information that it would require days to secure by any other
+means.
+
+2. Ability to surmount both natural and artificial obstacles.
+
+3. Ability to determine depth of enemy’s troops as well as front.
+
+4. Having once obtained the desired information, it is comparatively
+easy to ascend to a reasonably safe altitude and bring the information
+back.
+
+Some of the limitations of air craft in reconnaissance work are:
+
+1. They can accomplish but little in heavy rains, gales, fog or
+darkness, though they are steadily improving in their ability to travel
+in heavy weather.
+
+2. Inability to reconnoiter at night makes it impossible for air craft
+to keep in continuous touch with the enemy.
+
+3. They cannot be depended upon to be ready for duty whenever they are
+needed.
+
+4. Observing downwards from a considerable height, detailed knowledge
+of terrain cannot be obtained.
+
+The European war has given the greatest stimulus to the development
+of aerial navigation. The art is doubtless destined to the widest
+expansion in the future. At present it has many limitations, and the
+absurd claims made for it should be carefully discounted. It has become
+another arm in warfare.
+
+Like other inventions it is indispensable to the conduct of warfare. A
+relative preponderance in this arm confers on a belligerent an immense
+advantage.
+
+(See also “Anti Aircraft Artillery,” Chap. VIII.)
+
+_The motor car_, as lately applied to military purposes, has influenced
+practically every phase of campaign. As affecting _tactics_, it
+permits the rapid transport of troops over short distances where
+rail transport, even if available, might be slower than marching.
+The loading, dispatch and unloading are very rapid and flexible in
+arrangement. Even where the railroad is available, the motor car or
+truck is a valuable adjunct, provided suitable roads are available.
+The railroad can reach only its various stations, but with a system of
+good highways the motor vehicle can load or deliver at or very close
+to any designated point. Whereas a very slight accident will interrupt
+rail traffic the automobile can be stopped only by the destruction of
+the road (a comparatively rare occurrence) and sometimes even this
+will cause very little delay. The transportation begins at almost any
+point, such as camp, bivouac, or barrack, and is complete to the final
+destination without resorting to marches at either or both ends of the
+line.
+
+The routing is not confined to any one prepared road bed. Moreover, the
+transport is not confined to short distances. The European war shows
+instances of transporting large bodies of troops over distances as
+great as 100 miles.
+
+In effecting tactical concentrations of bodies of troops, such as
+reserves at critical points on the battle field itself, the motor car
+is very useful. The rapid concentration of forces at critical points
+of the field is the aim of all tactical operations and the secret of
+success in battle. The motor vehicle rapidly brings the troops to the
+desired point, fresh for action.
+
+Motor vehicles are useful in the transport of troops pursuing a
+defeated enemy and correspondingly useful to the retreating force.
+
+Heavy field artillery is utilizing motor transport to an ever
+increasing extent. The motor truck also lends itself admirably to use
+as swift, powerful armored cars, which are virtually small, movable
+forts. Motor trucks have demonstrated their ability to rapidly
+transport siege howitzers to threatened points along undefended
+portions of a coast line and thus greatly aid the mobile army in
+resisting landings. In operations on land the heaviest types of guns
+and howitzers are successfully transported.
+
+For overseas operations the motor is useful, as it needs less room
+aboard ship and dispenses with much of the care and attention that
+animals require.
+
+For _Staff_ uses the motor is specially adapted to the transportation
+of general and staff officers over the field of battle. It also assists
+greatly in the distribution of orders; for this purpose the motorcycle
+also is much used. Officers can thus cover vastly greater territory
+than by the use of a horse and with practically no fatigue. The result
+is that officers of ripe experience and advanced age, whose failing
+physical powers would formerly have prevented their riding horses
+are now employed in the field. The scope of staff service is greatly
+increased.
+
+For the _Supply_ of an army the motor truck is particularly valuable.
+Its speed will vary with the condition of roads but on even mediocre
+roads it will cover daily several times the distance covered by the
+horse-drawn vehicle. It needs no halts for rest, operates in a country
+without regard to green forage areas, is hardier than the animal and is
+but little affected by weather. Nearly its total carrying capacity is
+available for cargo, whereas the necessity for carrying forage reduces
+that of the horse-drawn vehicle.
+
+The motor truck is well adapted to use as a mobile soup kitchen; one
+small truck will serve a meal for 500 men.
+
+Motor transportation now permits the army to operate at a distance
+from the base or railhead several times greater than is possible by
+the use of wagons or, conversely, it permits the supply of the army at
+moderate distances from a base with a much less number of vehicles;
+thus it shortens the total road distance of a force and tends to make
+armies less dependent for subsistence on the military theater. The
+increasing numerical strength of the modern army requires more and more
+independence of subsistence drawn from the country in which it operates.
+
+In line of communication service, the armored car greatly assists in
+thwarting hostile attempts to cut the line.
+
+The greater the capacity of motor trucks the more economical they are
+as carriers if the roads are satisfactory. In many theaters where
+American forces will continue to operate for some time to come,
+indifferent roads will be the rule; the economic size of the truck is
+accordingly restricted to a cargo capacity of about 1½ tons.
+
+Motor trucks equipped with flanged steel wheels may be used on
+railroads in lieu of or in addition to the regular rolling stock.
+If both kinds of wheels (road and railroad) are carried, or
+interchangeable sets of demountable rims, the same truck may be used on
+both road and railroad. The change of wheels or rims can be made in a
+few minutes.
+
+The motor vehicle is extensively employed in the ambulance service.
+In addition to its superiority from an humanitarian point of view, it
+has a very great capacity for the evacuation of sick and wounded, thus
+contributing to the increase of tactical efficiency of the army.
+
+For the service of _information_, the motor is useful in patrolling;
+its speed and carrying capacity is great; it is in many ways less
+likely to attract notice than is a group of horsemen. It has been used
+for the prompt occupation of important points weakly defended. It is a
+useful adjunct to the aero service; aeroplanes organized into divisions
+of 7 or 8 machines are served by motor vehicles which transport the
+aeroplanes; the wings of the latter being folded for transport. The
+aeroplanes, which would otherwise be very vulnerable in camp, have thus
+some protection against the risk of sudden capture.
+
+The motor car, in short, aids in strategic and tactical concentration
+of troops and heavy guns and in the defense of isolated points,
+lessens fatigue, and extends the theater of command, inspection and
+reconnaissance. It greatly increases the scope of operations by
+increasing the mobility of an army and making it largely independent of
+local food supplies; its humanitarian service is very satisfactory.
+
+No army devoid of good motor transport service can thus hope to
+maintain itself against an adversary well equipped in that respect. All
+trained armies will be equipped with motors; therefore the motor will
+not permit a diminution of effort by a belligerent; to impose one’s
+will upon a trained adversary, the effort must in fact be greater than
+ever.
+
+For efficiency of service, motors are employed where practicable in
+groups of the same type. This facilitates training of personnel,
+interchangeability of parts, repairs, etc. In armies generally, the
+field and combat wagons continue to use animal power.
+
+The motor can enter every department of military activity, increasing
+the efficiency of operation therein. It is as applicable to campaign as
+to most other phases of modern life.
+
+
+
+
+ GLOSSARY
+ of
+ Military Terms Employed in the Text
+ (Consult also Alphabetical Index)
+
+ =Abatis.=--An obstacle consisting of felled trees,
+ often interlaced with wire. The trees are felled or
+ placed with their tops toward the enemy, the butts
+ often remain attached to the stumps, or are secured
+ to the ground by stakes.
+
+ =Adjutant.=--The executive officer of a command.
+
+ =Advance cavalry.=--_See Cavalry._
+
+ =Advance guard.=--A body of troops which marches
+ in front of a command in column of route to
+ facilitate the march and protect the main body from
+ surprise. _See Chap. IV._
+
+ =Advance party.=--The leading formed element of an
+ advance guard.
+
+ =Advance supply depot.=--A station for the issue
+ of ammunition, rations and other supplies, where
+ the trains attached to the combatant troops are
+ sent to refill. _See Chap. XVII._
+
+ =Advanced position.=--A defensive position in
+ advance of the main line of defense.
+
+ =Aiming point.=--_See Artillery fire._
+
+ =Ambuscade.=--A surprise attack delivered by a
+ body lying in wait for its enemy.
+
+ =Angle of site.=--The inclination or slope of the
+ ground as affecting the angles of elevation of
+ artillery.
+
+ =Applicatory method.=--A system of military
+ peace training by means of the solution of
+ practical problems in strategy and tactics. These
+ problems are solved on a map or on the terrain,
+ and are called =map problems=, =terrain
+ exercises=, =war games=, etc. _See Chap.
+ I._
+
+ =Artillery.=--The heavier pieces of ordnance, as
+ distinguished from small arms and machine guns.
+ Artillery includes guns, howitzers, and mortars of
+ various calibers, and the troops attached thereto.
+ All modern artillery is rifled. Mobile artillery
+ is habitually mounted, both for transport and use,
+ on wheeled carriages, and accompanies the mobile
+ troops. _See Ordnance._
+
+ =Artillery fire.=--_See Chap. VIII._ The
+ usual method of fire of modern artillery is that
+ which employs =indirect laying=. The guns are
+ concealed and the target is usually not visible
+ to the gunners. The officer directing the fire
+ ascertains the range and direction of the target
+ from one of the guns of the battery, called
+ the =directing gun=. He also determines
+ the difference in azimuth or direction (at the
+ directing gun) between the target and some
+ conspicuous object visible to all the gunners. This
+ point is called the =aiming point= and the
+ angular difference of azimuth of the target and the
+ aiming point is known as the =deflection=.
+ This is set off on the gun sight in such manner
+ that when the sight is directed on the aiming
+ point the gun will be directed on the target.
+ Due to their different positions the deflections
+ at the other guns will vary slightly from that
+ at the directing gun. This variation is called
+ the =deflection difference=. By varying the
+ =deflection= and =deflection difference=
+ the officer in charge may distribute the fire over
+ the front of the target. The range is determined
+ by the process known as =bracketing=. The
+ approximate range having been estimated or
+ determined by a mechanical =range finder=, a
+ shot or group of shots is fired at the estimated
+ =range=. They burst on impact, and from
+ observation of the smoke it is possible to
+ determine whether the shots are =short of= or
+ =over the target=. The range is then increased
+ or decreased and the firing continued until two
+ consecutive bursts are obtained, one on either
+ side of the target. Thus if a shot at 3,000 yds.
+ bursts short of the target and one at 3,400 bursts
+ over, it is known that the target lies between
+ these ranges. Two shots at known ranges, one over
+ and one short, form a =bracket=. The length
+ of the bracket may be reduced by interpolating
+ intermediate shots. Bracketing need not be done
+ by a single piece. To save time a number of shots
+ on both sides of the estimated range may be fired
+ simultaneously by different pieces.
+
+ =Barrage.=--A zone or belt of the terrain more
+ or less continuously swept by the fire of field
+ artillery, with the purpose of preventing or
+ discouraging the passage of hostile troops across
+ the fire swept space. Such a barrage or =curtain
+ of fire= might be designed to break down the
+ fighting power of a line of battle by preventing
+ the forwarding of ammunition, supplies and
+ reinforcements. It may also be established in front
+ of hostile line for the purpose of checking or
+ breaking up an assault or counter-attack, etc.
+
+ =Base depot.=--_See p. 365._
+
+ =Billeting.=--Quartering troops in the homes
+ of local residents, who may be required also to
+ furnish food. The practice is common in Europe but
+ has seldom been employed in this country.
+
+ =Bivouac.=--A camp of very temporary nature, such
+ as that of troops on the open field of battle. The
+ shelter and bedding are such as the troops carry on
+ their persons.
+
+ =Bracket.=--_See Artillery fire._
+
+ =Bomb-proof.=--A shelter, usually subterranean,
+ against high explosive shell.
+
+ =Caisson.=--A carriage for artillery ammunition.
+ It consists of two parts, the =body= and
+ =limber=, each mounted on wheels. The two
+ parts may be separated. The limber is the forward
+ portion to which the team is attached, and is
+ identical with the limber to which the gun is
+ attached on the march. The separation of the
+ caisson body and limber, or of the gun and limber,
+ is called =unlimbering=.
+
+ =Cantonment.=--A camp of rather permanent nature
+ where the accommodations are more elaborate than in
+ the ordinary camp under canvas. The shelters often
+ consist of rough huts or simple frame buildings
+ erected for the purpose. The term is also applied
+ to portions of towns occupied by troops for a
+ protracted stay.
+
+ =Cavalry.=--Cavalry, according to its uses, has
+ several classifications:
+
+ =Advance guard cavalry.=--Attached to the
+ advance guard.
+
+ =Advance cavalry.=--That portion of the
+ advance guard cavalry which precedes the point of
+ the advance guard.
+
+ =Independent cavalry.=--Cavalry operating
+ independently of all save the supreme commander.
+
+ =Outpost cavalry.=--Attached to the outpost.
+
+ =Rear cavalry.=--Attached to the rear guard.
+
+ =Chevaux-de-frise.=--An obstacle in the form of a
+ saw-horse with several legs.
+
+ =Clinometer.=--A small hand instrument used to
+ measure the inclination or slope of the ground, or
+ the angle of elevation of a gun.
+
+ =Column.=--A formation of troops in which the
+ elements are placed one in rear of the other, as a
+ column of route.
+
+ =Combined sights.=--_See p. 331._
+
+ =Communications.=--The prepared routes by which
+ troops move from one part of a position to another;
+ also their lines of supply and reinforcement. The
+ term is also applied to telegraph, telephone, and
+ other signaling apparatus.
+
+ =Connecting files.=--_See p. 61._
+
+ =Conscription.=--The act of impressing men for
+ compulsory military service; the draft.
+
+ =Contact squadron.=--_See p. 149._
+
+ =Containing.=--The act of restraining or delaying
+ the movements of a hostile force, by attack or
+ threatened attack, with the object of preventing
+ its junction with other hostile forces. _See p.
+ 91._
+
+ =Convoy.=--_See p. 95._
+
+ =Cordon system of outposts.=--_See p. 184._
+
+ =Cossack post.=--A group on the line of
+ observation of an outpost. It consists of four men,
+ and places one sentinel.
+
+ =Counter-attack.=--Offensive operations by troops
+ whose general attitude is or has been defensive.
+ _See p. 236._
+
+ =Counter-mining.=--The subterranean operations
+ of troops on the defensive for the purpose of
+ frustrating the efforts of the attack.
+
+ =Cover.=--Protection from fire or view, or both.
+
+ =Crest, geographical or topographical.=--The
+ highest part of a ridge or elevation.
+
+ =Crest, Military.=--A line or position on the
+ front slope of a hill or ridge which affords a good
+ view of the whole or of some special portion of
+ the foreground. Depending on the configuration of
+ the terrain, it may or may not coincide with the
+ geographical crest. _See Fig. V, p. 135._
+
+ =Curtain of fire.=--_See Barrage_.
+
+ =Danger space.=--That portion of the trajectory in
+ which the height of the projectile above the ground
+ is less than the height of the target. The length
+ of the danger space varies with the flatness of the
+ trajectory and the height of the target. Thus, for
+ a man standing, the danger space is that portion
+ of the trajectory in which the height of the
+ projectile above the ground does not exceed about 5
+ ft. 8 in.
+
+ =Dead space.=--A portion of the terrain,
+ especially in front of a defensive position, not
+ covered by fire; a defiladed area.
+
+ =Defensive position.=--A line or zone of the
+ terrain occupied by troops and prepared for defense
+ by means of field fortifications.
+
+ =Defilade.=--Vertical cover from view or from
+ fire. Troops behind a crest are said to be
+ defiladed if shots which skim the crest also pass
+ over their heads. =Flash defilade= is a mask
+ of sufficient height to conceal the flashes of guns.
+
+ =Defile.=--A narrow passage, such as a bridge or
+ mountain pass, that prevents or embarrasses the
+ deployment of troops passing through it.
+
+ =Deflection.=--_See Artillery fire._
+
+ =Delaying action.=--A combat entered into for the
+ purpose of temporarily delaying the enemy.
+
+ =Demolition.=--The destruction of material objects
+ by any means.
+
+ =Deployment.=--An extension of the front, usually
+ for the purpose of forming line of battle.
+
+ =Deployment, depth of.=--_See p. 349._
+
+ =Depth.=--Space measured from front to rear.
+
+ =Detonator.=--A small charge of explosive used to
+ ignite a larger charge.
+
+ =Diagrammatic analysis.=--_See p. 29._
+
+ =Direct laying.=--_See Artillery fire._
+
+ =Directing gun.=--_See Artillery fire._
+
+ =Distance.=--_See Depth._
+
+ =Dispersion.=--A separation of the elements of a
+ command, especially when combat is imminent; the
+ opposite of concentration.
+
+ =Division.=--A unit of army organization, the
+ smallest which includes all branches of the
+ service. In the United States Army a division has
+ a strength of about 20,000. It includes infantry,
+ cavalry, and field artillery, and the necessary
+ special troops such as engineers, signal, sanitary,
+ etc., with all the requisite wagon or motor
+ transport.
+
+ =Draft.=--_See Conscription._
+
+ =Echelon.=--A term applied to lines or groups that
+ are stepped or “staggered” with respect to one
+ another.
+
+ =Elongation.=--An increase in the usual road space
+ or length of a column of troops, due to fatigue,
+ poor discipline, or other causes.
+
+ =Enfilade.=--Fire from the flank, parallel or
+ nearly parallel to the line against which it is
+ directed. It is peculiarly effective and demoralizing
+ to troops against which directed, and is therefore always
+ carefully guarded against.
+
+ =Envelopment.=--An attack directed obliquely
+ against the flank of a position. _See Fig. IX, p.
+ 219._
+
+ =Estimate of the situation.=--A mental review of
+ a military situation made as a preliminary to and
+ basis for a plan of action.
+
+ =Examining post.=--An outpost station at which
+ persons endeavoring to pass through the lines are
+ examined and identified.
+
+ =Fascine.=--A long cylindrical bundle of brush
+ used as a flexible log in a revetment.
+
+ =Feint.=--An attack made primarily for the purpose
+ of diverting the enemy’s attention from more
+ important operations.
+
+ =Field maneuver.=--A practical problem in tactics
+ prepared for solution on the terrain, with troops.
+ Both combatants may be represented by real troops
+ or one by imaginary troops.
+
+ =File.=--A single soldier; an element consisting
+ of one front rank and one rear rank man. A
+ =column of files= is one having a front of one
+ or two men.
+
+ =Fire superiority.=--Superior moral or physical
+ fire effect as compared to that of the adversary.
+ Fire superiority is implied if the assailant
+ can advance or force back the defender. Fire
+ superiority for the defender is implied if he
+ can hold his ground and check the advance of the
+ assailant.
+
+ =Firing data.=--_See p. 116._
+
+ =Fixed ammunition.=--Ammunition in which the
+ projectile and propelling charge are a single
+ piece, the charge being contained in a cylindrical
+ metal case with the projectile fixed in the end
+ like a rifle cartridge. It is used in all small
+ arms and machine guns and in practically all of the
+ smaller field guns and howitzers.
+
+ =Flanks.=--The extremities of a line of battle,
+ outpost, etc., and the terrain in their vicinity.
+
+ =Foraging.=--The process of obtaining supplies,
+ especially food, from the local inhabitants, force
+ being used when necessary.
+
+ =Forced march.=--_See p. 89._
+
+ =Fortification.=--Any engineering work or
+ accessory device which increases the fighting power
+ of troops by affording shelter or concealment or
+ increased fire effect, or which restricts the
+ tactical maneuvers or fire effect of the enemy.
+
+ =Fortification, field or hasty.=--Those works
+ executed by combatant troops in the field to meet
+ immediate tactical needs.
+
+ =Fougasse.=--A small land mine with a charge of
+ explosive and broken stone. It is fired by powder
+ fuse or electricity, as the enemy approaches.
+
+ =Front.=--The known or supposed direction of the
+ enemy; the theater of active military operations as
+ distinguished from the country in rear.
+
+ =Frontage.=--The extent of front of a command
+ deployed for battle, of an outpost, etc.
+
+ =Fuse.=--A device used for detonating the
+ explosive charge of a shell or shrapnel. Fuses
+ are classified as time, percussion, combination
+ (percussion and time), and delayed action. Time
+ fuses detonate at the end of a given time,
+ percussion fuses on impact. A delayed action fuse
+ is one which delays the explosion of the charge
+ until the projectile has penetrated the structure
+ which it strikes. The term fuse is also applied
+ to powder trains used to ignite placed charges of
+ explosive in demolition. Electric fuses are devices
+ which detonate a charge by means of the heating
+ effect of an electric current. They are also called
+ primers.
+
+ =Gabion.=--A hollow cylinder of brush or other
+ material which is filled with earth and used as a
+ revetment.
+
+ =General Staff.=--A corps of highly trained
+ officers charged with the study of the conduct
+ of war and the detailed methods of military
+ operations. In time of war they direct and
+ administer the operations of mobilization,
+ concentration, supply, transportation, etc.,
+ and assist the field commanders in planning and
+ executing their operations.
+
+ =Grenade.=--A charge of high explosive in a
+ container hurled a relatively short distance by
+ hand or by means of a catapult, rifle, or small
+ mortar. The charge explodes by time fuse or
+ concussion. Large grenades are called air mines or
+ air torpedoes. They are distinguished from high
+ explosive shell by their relatively short range,
+ which ordinarily does not exceed 500 yards.
+
+ =Guerrillas.=--Irregular troops, not belonging to
+ the organized combatant forces of a belligerent
+ state, and not recognized by the laws of civilized
+ warfare.
+
+ =Gun.=--A piece of ordnance fired from a platform
+ or wheeled mount. A gun, as compared with a
+ =howitzer=, has a relatively long barrel,
+ flat trajectory and high velocity. Its effect is
+ produced largely by the vigor of the blow struck
+ by the projectile, which is usually combined
+ with the action of a charge of explosive. Guns,
+ according to their size and uses, are classed
+ as =mountain=, =light= or =heavy
+ field=, =siege= and =seacoast=. All
+ modern guns are breech-loading rifles.
+
+ =Head cover.=--A vertical or nearly vertical
+ shield of any material which protects the heads of
+ troops from flat trajectory fire. _See Overhead
+ cover._
+
+ =Heliograph.=--An instrument used for signaling by
+ flashing the rays of the sun from a mirror.
+
+ =High explosive shell.=--A projectile containing
+ a charge of high explosive fired from a gun or
+ howitzer. The charge explodes by time fuse or upon
+ impact. It is used to demolish material objects,
+ such as fortifications, but is often employed also
+ against living targets.
+
+ =Howitzer.=--A piece of ordnance having, as
+ compared with a gun, a short barrel, low velocity
+ and curved trajectory. Its effect is produced
+ chiefly by the explosion of the charge contained
+ in the projectile. _See Mortar._
+
+ =Hurdle.=--A revetment of woven brush.
+
+ =Initial point.=--A point of the terrain from
+ which the starting times for all elements of a
+ command are calculated for the commencement of a
+ march. _See p. 58._
+
+ =Initiative.=--A commander is said to have the
+ initiative when he carries out a preconceived plan,
+ dictating and controlling the course of operations
+ and forcing the adversary to meet his lead. The
+ initiative is ordinarily, though not always,
+ possessed by the attacker, inasmuch as he usually
+ selects the time, place and manner of attack, and
+ forces the defender to adapt his measures to meet
+ it. A vigorous counter attack, which forces a
+ suspension of the attack, transfers the initiative
+ to the original defender.
+
+ =Interval.=--An open space between adjacent men
+ or adjacent organizations on the same line. It is
+ measured parallel to the front.
+
+ =Latrine.=--A dry sewage pit or trench; a cesspool.
+
+ =Leading troops.=--The advanced elements of a
+ command; more specifically a less formal substitute
+ for an advance guard, employed in retreat or other
+ situations where a regular advance guard is not
+ required.
+
+ =Limber.=--A portion of an artillery carriage
+ consisting of an ammunition chest mounted on two
+ wheels, with a pole for the attachment of the
+ team. For the march the field guns are attached to
+ the limbers by engaging the eye at the end of the
+ trail with a pin or pintle on the limber. _See
+ Caisson._
+
+ =Line.=--A general term applied to all combatant
+ troops as distinguished from the non-combatant;
+ a position occupied by troops, as a defensive or
+ outpost line, etc.; a military formation in which
+ the elements are placed alongside or abreast of
+ each other. _See Column and Echelon._
+
+ =Line of columns.=--A number of parallel columns
+ of troops with their heads on the same line.
+
+ =Line of communications.=--_See p. 363._
+
+ =Line of investment.=--A cordon of troops drawn
+ around a fortress for the purpose of cutting off
+ its supply and communication; usually the first
+ step in siege operations for the reduction of the
+ fortress.
+
+ =Line of observation.=--The line occupied by the
+ sentinels and observing groups of an outpost.
+ _See Fig. VIII, p. 195._
+
+ =Line of resistance.=--Specifically, the prepared
+ line of defense of an outpost, usually occupied by
+ the supports. _See Fig. VIII, p. 195._
+
+ =Listening galleries.=--Subterranean galleries
+ driven to the front for the purpose of detecting
+ the mining operations of the enemy.
+
+ =Listening posts.=--Sheltered positions in
+ advance of a defensive line for the purpose of
+ early detection of the enemy’s movements. They are
+ connected with the main line by a communicating
+ trench or subterranean gallery.
+
+ =Loopholes.=--Openings in a parapet or head cover
+ through which fire is delivered.
+
+ =Machine gun.=--An automatic or semi-automatic
+ gun of small caliber, capable of great rapidity
+ of fire. It uses fixed ammunition, preferably
+ identical with that employed in small arms. The
+ ammunition is fed automatically from a hopper, clip
+ or belt. Machine guns are of various sizes and
+ types, but all are characterized by rather light
+ construction and great mobility. Some require a
+ crew of several men for their operation, others are
+ operated by a single individual. There is hence no
+ sharp line of demarcation between machine guns and
+ automatic rifles. _See p. 304._
+
+ =Maneuver.=--A movement of a body of troops.
+ Strategical maneuvers include movements of troops,
+ on a relatively large scale in preparation for
+ prospective battle, but usually at a distance from
+ the enemy. Tactical maneuvers include movements
+ executed on the battlefield or in the near presence
+ of the enemy. As compared with strategical
+ maneuvers they are usually on a smaller scale, in
+ closer proximity to the enemy, and more immediately
+ related to battle tactics.
+
+ =Map distance.=--The horizontal interval between
+ contours (on the map) corresponding to a given
+ slope or gradient.
+
+ =Map maneuver.=--A tactical study or exercise
+ followed out on a map.
+
+ =Map measure.=--A recording or counting device
+ used for measuring distances on a map.
+
+ =Map problem.=--A real or imaginary tactical
+ problem solved on a map. _See Chap. I._
+
+ =March outposts.=--Temporary outposts placed by
+ a marching column during a halt or at the end of
+ a day’s march. They are withdrawn on resuming the
+ march or when the regular outpost is in position.
+
+ =Marginal distribution.=--An outline of the
+ dispositions of troops placed in the margin of a
+ field order. _See pp. 40 and 342._
+
+ =Mask.=--A cover from hostile view or fire.
+
+ =Matériel.=--The equipment and non-expendable
+ supplies of an army; any material object.
+
+ =Melée.=--Specifically, the confusion following a
+ cavalry charge, often characterized by hand to hand
+ combat.
+
+ =Mil.=--A unit of angular measurement, the inverse
+ tangent of one thousandth. _See p. 109._
+
+ =Mine.=--A subterranean charge of explosive, used
+ to destroy hostile fortifications.
+
+ =Mining.=--The operations of subterranean attack
+ and defense.
+
+ =Mission.=--The aim or purpose of a commander on
+ which his decisions and plans are based.
+
+ =Mobility.=--The power of rapid movement. Mobile
+ troops are those capable of quickly changing their
+ location and dispositions to meet tactical needs.
+ Non-mobile troops are capable only of passive
+ defense. It is therefore essential that first line
+ troops shall be highly mobile. Otherwise they cannot
+ seize or retain the initiative. Even in defensive
+ operations mobility is essential to meet the movements
+ of the assailant.
+
+ =Mobilization.=--The change from peace to war
+ footing. An army is said to be mobilized when it is
+ assembled, organized, armed, and equipped to take
+ the field.
+
+ =Morale.=--The collective psychological condition
+ or spirit of troops, especially combatant troops
+ engaged in battle. High morale is implied when
+ troops respond readily to the will of their
+ commander. Morale is therefore measured by the
+ extent to which troops submit to the control of
+ their officers.
+
+ =Mortar.=--A piece of ordnance having a very short
+ barrel, low velocity, and curved trajectory. It
+ throws a projectile containing a large charge of
+ high explosive, at angles of elevation varying
+ from 45 degrees to 60 degrees so as to drop the
+ projectile on top of its target.
+
+ =Mutual support.=--Two or more portions of a
+ firing line which can cross fire on a part of the
+ front of the position are said to afford mutual
+ support.
+
+ =Obstacle.=--Any natural object or artificial
+ device which retards the enemy’s movements without
+ affording him shelter from fire. _See p. 216._
+
+ =Orders, field.=--Written or verbal orders
+ covering the tactical dispositions and operations
+ of combatant troops. _See Chap. II._
+
+ =Ordnance.=--A collective term applied to all
+ firearms which hurl projectiles. As generally used
+ the term excludes small arms, such as rifles and
+ pistols, and applies especially to the heavier
+ pieces. _See Small arms and Artillery._
+
+ =Outguard.=--One of the observing groups of an
+ outpost. _See p. 183._
+
+ =Organization.=--_For the organization of all
+ tactical units in the U. S. Army, see p. 10 et
+ seq._
+
+ =Outpost.=--A line of observation and resistance
+ established between a body of troops and the known
+ or supposed position of the enemy, to guard against
+ surprise attacks.
+
+ =Overhead cover.=--A horizontal or inclined shield
+ of any material which extends over the heads of
+ the troops and protects them from grenades or high
+ angle fire. _See Head cover._
+
+ =Pack train.=--A train of animals, usually
+ mules, carrying packs on saddles. This form of
+ transportation is used in mountainous country or
+ where roads are very poor.
+
+ =Parados.=--A bank of earth in rear of a trench to
+ protect the occupants from the back draft of shells
+ bursting behind the trench.
+
+ =Parapet.=--A bank of earth or other material
+ in front of a =trench= or emplacement which
+ protects the occupants from fire.
+
+ =Patrol.=--A small body of troops, foot or
+ mounted, sent out from a larger body for the
+ purposes of observation and reconnaissance. _See
+ Chap. III, pp. 165, 185, 212, etc._
+
+ =Percussion.=--_See Fuse._
+
+ =Picket.=--A large outguard.
+
+ =Pioneer.=--A member of the mobile engineer forces
+ of an army.
+
+ =Platoon.=--A division of a company, troop or
+ battery.
+
+ =Platoon column.=--A platoon in double column of
+ files. This formation is much used in advancing
+ under fire, especially in rough country.
+
+ =Point.=--The extreme forward element of an
+ advance guard, or rear element of a rear guard.
+
+ =Ponton.=--A portable boat used as a support or
+ pier for a floating bridge.
+
+ =Ponton equipage.=--The portable floating bridge
+ equipment of an army.
+
+ =Position fire.=--_See p. 325._
+
+ =Position in readiness.=--_See p. 308._
+
+ =Pusher.=--An aeroplane in which the propeller is
+ placed in the back of the machine.
+
+ =Railhead.=--The forward limit of rail transport
+ for the supplies and reinforcements of an army.
+
+ =Range finder.=--Any device for determining
+ distances.
+
+ =Ration.=--The daily food allowance of a soldier.
+
+ =Reconnaissance.=--A rapid examination of a
+ hostile body of troops, structure, locality,
+ district, etc., for the purpose of noting features
+ and gathering information of military value.
+
+ =Re-entrant.=--A more or less sharp projection
+ from a line toward the rear. _See Salient._
+
+ =Reinforced brigade.=--A brigade of infantry
+ with attached auxiliary troops, usually on an
+ independent mission.
+
+ =Relay post.=--_See p. 53._
+
+ =Rencontre.=--_See p. 295._
+
+ =Requisition.=--A demand for supplies made by an
+ army upon the local inhabitants.
+
+ =Reserves.=--Troops temporarily withheld from
+ action for the purpose of reinforcement at critical
+ times and places, to meet emergencies, etc. As
+ distinguished from =supports=, the place
+ of their employment in combat cannot always be
+ foreseen. Also, individuals who have undergone
+ military training and are available for service but
+ not at the time a part of the standing army.
+
+ =Revetment.=--Any device used to retain earth or
+ other material at a slope steeper than the natural
+ slope.
+
+ =Road space.=--The distance covered by an
+ organization in its usual marching formation or
+ column of route. _See p. 16._
+
+ =Salient.=--A more or less sharp projection from a
+ line toward the front.
+
+ =Salvo.=--_See p. 114._
+
+ =Sap.=--A zigzag trench dug for the purpose of a
+ covered advance against the enemy.
+
+ =Screen.=--A feature of the terrain which favors
+ concealment. A disposition of troops designed to
+ prevent the enemy from obtaining information.
+ _See p. 165._
+
+ =Sentry squad.=--A group on the line of
+ observation of an outpost. It consists of eight men
+ and places a double sentinel.
+
+ =Shrapnel.=--A projectile containing a number
+ of small bullets or fragments with a propelling
+ charge. It explodes in the air and scatters
+ the bullets and fragments of the case over a
+ considerable area, being in effect a flying
+ shotgun. The shrapnel of the 3-inch, U. S. field
+ gun, when properly burst, will sweep an area 200
+ to 300 yards in depth and 20 to 25 yards in width,
+ killing or seriously wounding any man or animal in
+ the area. It has little effect on fortifications
+ and is used only against troops. Shrapnel is hence
+ known as the “man-killing projectile.”
+
+ =Siege.=--The formal investment and attack of
+ a fortress. A fortified place may be reduced by
+ cutting off its supply, by assault, or by both
+ methods. Occasionally the actual reduction of the
+ fortress is not attempted, it being simply covered
+ by a force of sufficient strength to prevent the
+ garrison of the fortress from interfering with the
+ operations of the invader.
+
+ =Situation, general and special.=--The (real or
+ imaginary) circumstances or conditions confronting
+ a body of troops at any stated time. A military
+ situation has two parts which are described
+ as =general= and =special=, or with
+ respect to time and place, as =distant=
+ and =immediate=. Past events and future
+ possibilities or probabilities usually form part of
+ the situation. _See p. 20._
+
+ =Small arms.=--Firearms, such as rifles and
+ pistols, carried by individuals. The term is
+ occasionally applied also to machine guns which use
+ small arms cartridges.
+
+ =Spar bridge.=--A type of military bridge in which
+ the support consists of two trestles which are
+ tilted toward each other and locked together.
+
+ =Splinter-proof.=--A shelter similar to a
+ bomb-proof but designed to afford protection
+ only against rifle bullets, shrapnel and shell
+ fragments. It is not proof against penetration by
+ large projectiles.
+
+ =Squad.=--A unit consisting of eight men, four
+ files in double rank. The commander, usually a
+ corporal, is called the squad leader.
+
+ =Squad column.=--A squad in double column of
+ files. _See Platoon column._
+
+ =Staff.=--A number of highly trained officers
+ attached to the larger units who are charged with
+ the administration of special departments and
+ who constitute an advisory board to the supreme
+ commander. _See General Staff._
+
+ =Strategy.=--The application of the broad
+ fundamental principles of the art of war. The
+ object of strategy is to place troops in the most
+ favorable or least unfavorable position for battle,
+ which is the logical culmination of strategy.
+ Strategy deals with questions of national policy,
+ national resources, geography, mobilization and
+ concentration of troops, supply, transportation,
+ etc.
+
+ =Successive bounds.=--_See p. 50._
+
+ =Successive thin lines.=--_See p. 328._
+
+ =Supporting point.=--_See p. 251._
+
+ =Supports.=--Troops held in rear of the firing
+ line for the purpose of replacing losses, so as
+ to maintain the firing line at proper strength;
+ the large groups on the line of resistance of an
+ outpost; one of the formed bodies of an advance,
+ rear or flank guard.
+
+ =Tactical walk (or ride).=--Tactical instruction
+ given upon the terrain with imaginary troops.
+
+ =Tactics.=--The methods employed in handling
+ troops in battle or in immediate preparation
+ therefor.
+
+ =Terrain.=--An area of ground considered as to its
+ extent and topography in relation to its use for a
+ specific purpose, as for a battle or the erection
+ of fortifications.
+
+ =Terrain exercise.=--A practical problem in
+ tactics prepared for solution on the terrain, with
+ imaginary troops.
+
+ =Theater of war.=--The territory covered by the
+ operations of belligerent forces.
+
+ =Time fire.=--_See Fuse._
+
+ =Trains.=--The supply wagons accompanying an army.
+ =Combat= and =field= trains are attached
+ to battalions and squadrons and carry respectively,
+ the ammunition and rations of the troops.
+ =Ammunition= and =supply= trains are
+ attached to the larger units such as a division.
+ There are also a number of special trains,
+ including =sanitary= and =engineer=
+ trains. _See Chap. XVII, Division Supply._
+
+ =Trajectory.=--The path of a projectile. Guns of
+ high power are said to have a flat trajectory, that
+ is to say, one which approaches a straight line.
+
+ =Traverse.=--A bank of earth or other material
+ in rear of and perpendicular to the parapet of a
+ trench for the purpose of protecting the occupants
+ from oblique or enfilade fire and to localize the
+ effect of shells bursting in the trench.
+
+ =Trenches.=--The purpose of trenches is to protect
+ the troops occupying them from hostile fire.
+ According to their use they are classified as fire,
+ support and communicating trenches.
+
+ =Troop leading.=--The practical art of commanding
+ troops. =Troop leading= is often used in
+ contradistinction to =decision=. The latter
+ involves the formulation of a plan of action, the
+ former the practical technique by which the plan is
+ executed.
+
+ =Turning movement.=--The attack of an enemy,
+ usually on a flank or in rear, by an element of the
+ command widely separated from the remainder of the
+ attacking force.
+
+ =Visibility problems.=--_See p. 24._
+
+ =War game.=--A competitive game conducted on a
+ map and involving the tactical handling of troops.
+ The two-sided war game is the usual form, and is
+ carried on by two individuals or groups under the
+ direction of an umpire. In the one-sided war game
+ the umpire dictates the operations of one of the
+ imaginary combatants.
+
+ =Wire entanglement.=--An obstacle of wire or
+ barbed wire strung on posts or other supports; the
+ most commonly employed artificial obstacle.
+
+
+
+
+ INDEX
+
+ TECHNIQUE OF MODERN TACTICS
+
+
+ Practically all the tactical principles and methods discussed in the
+ text are copiously illustrated by concrete cases in the examples of
+ orders. These illustrations are taken from carefully selected problems
+ of the Army Service Schools and constitute a valuable adjunct to and
+ illustration of the discussions. It is recommended that the student in
+ each case examine the appropriate examples of orders and supplement
+ the references sought in the text. The orders are indexed under the
+ caption--“ORDERS, examples of.”
+
+ A
+
+ Abandoning selected line of march, 82, 101.
+ Abandonment of wounded, 318, 351.
+ Abbreviations in orders, 41.
+ Abatis, 217, 261.
+ Access to trains, by troops, 57, 84, 144, 145, 159,
+ 169, 181, 183, 365.
+ Accompanying batteries, 124.
+ Adjustment, fire for, _See Artillery_.
+ Administrative orders, _See Orders_.
+ Advance cavalry, _See Cavalry and Advance guard_.
+ ADVANCE GUARD, 56.
+ action, 228.
+ advance party, 56, 57.
+ aggressive action by, 63, 229, 296.
+ ambulance company with, 57, 318.
+ artillery with, 57, 127, 337, 338, 339.
+ artillery officer with, 112, 113, 128,
+ 133, 141.
+ attack, occasions for, 229.
+ bridge train with, 340.
+ bringing on a general engagement, 63, 229.
+ camp of, 356.
+ cavalry, 56, 60, 61, 62, 64, 147, 338.
+ civilians not to precede, 62, 63.
+ composition, 56, 57, 337.
+ conduct on encountering enemy, 63, 296.
+ connecting files, 61.
+ contact with enemy, 62.
+ contact with flank guard, 62, 81.
+ contact with supporting troops, 62, 81.
+ covering main body in attack, 63, 209,
+ 229, 296.
+ on the march, 204.
+ detail of outpost from, 170, 356.
+ distances, 60, 66, 67, 337.
+ distribution of troops, 64.
+ effect of terrain on tactics of, 62, 64.
+ engineers with, 56, 57, 337,
+ 340.
+ field trains of, 57, 58.
+ in change of direction of march, 91.
+ in defense, 234.
+ in flank march, 79.
+ in position in readiness, 230, 308.
+ in pursuit, 229.
+ in rencontre, 123, 296.
+ in retreat, 57, 85.
+ initial point for march, 58, 88.
+ integrity of tactical units in forming, 57, 337.
+ interference of routes, 58, 59.
+ location of camp, 355.
+ machine guns with, 56, 306.
+ march outposts placed by, 62, 190, 201.
+ miscellaneous duties, 62.
+ mission of, 62, 63, 64,
+ 147, 229, 296.
+ mounted orderlies with, 56, 61.
+ of a convoy, 97, 98, 99.
+ of a division, 337.
+ orders, 58, 59, 60.
+ outpost troops join, 58.
+ patrols, _See Patrols_, 56, 61.
+ place of commander, 62.
+ reconnaissance, 57, 60, 64.
+ in force, 63.
+ regiment assigned to holding attack, 226.
+ in brigade attack, 209.
+ provides security to front during
+ occupation of position, 234.
+ regulation of march, 60, 64, 88.
+ rotation of organizations in, 85, 337, 338.
+ route of, 58.
+ sanitary troops with, 57, 318, 337.
+ seizes post and telegraph offices, etc., 62.
+ signal troops with, 56, 337, 340.
+ starting march, 58, 64, 88.
+ strength, 56, 79, 296, 337.
+ as affected by independent cavalry, 56, 85.
+ subdivisions of, 56, 60, 61, 64.
+ support, 56, 62.
+ supreme commander with, 62, 85, 86,
+ 225, 230,
+ 297, 337.
+ Advance in two columns, 29, 30, 31,
+ 78, 79, 91,
+ 95, 149, 339.
+ Advance party, strength and duty, 56.
+ patrolling, 57.
+ Advance supply depot, 363, 365, 366, 367, 375.
+ distance in rear of troops, 364, 367, 370, 371, 372.
+ protection of, 373.
+ Advance, zone of, 363, 364.
+ Advanced posts, 230, 231, 235, 296, 310.
+ Advancing to attack, 209, 223, 277, 326, 346.
+ Advantages, relative, of frontal and enveloping attacks, 206,
+ 209, 344.
+ relative, of rail and motor transport, 387.
+ Advantages of single position in defense, 74, 235, 310.
+ AEROPLANES, _See Air craft, Airships, Reconnaissance_.
+ armor and armament, 382, 383.
+ artillery spotters, 382.
+ battleplanes, 382.
+ care and repair of, 382.
+ carrying capacity, 381.
+ characteristics, 381.
+ chief function, 381, 383.
+ crews, 381.
+ dependability, 381, 386.
+ destroyers, 382.
+ difficulty of hitting, 138, 139, 381.
+ direction of artillery fire by, 131, 384.
+ effect of darkness, rain, fog, high winds, etc., 149, 386.
+ engines, 382.
+ fragility of, 382.
+ fuel carried, 381.
+ hydroaeroplanes, 383.
+ machine guns, 307, 382, 383.
+ motor transport for, 382, 389.
+ need of trained personnel, 382.
+ observers, 381.
+ organization of, 382.
+ pilots, 381, 382.
+ practicable height of observation, 138, 139,
+ 384, 385.
+ radius of action, 381, 383.
+ rapidity of development, 382.
+ scout type, 382.
+ spare parts for, 382.
+ speed, 381, 382.
+ types, 382.
+ volplaning, 383.
+ vulnerability to fire, 138, 139, 383,
+ 384, 385, 386.
+ wireless equipment, 131, 382, 384.
+ Aero reconnaissance, _See Reconnaissance_.
+ Agents of communication, mounted orderlies as, 46.
+ Agents, artillery, _See Artillery_.
+ Aggressive tactics, _See Counter attack_.
+ by advance guard, 63, 229, 296.
+ by escort of convoy, 98, 102.
+ by rear guard, 75.
+ essential to success, 204, 205.
+ in defense, 204, 236.
+ in delaying action, 75, 204, 297,
+ 299.
+ in pursuit, 300, 301.
+ in rencontre, 231, 295.
+ Aid stations, regimental, 222, 224,
+ 255, 319.
+ Aimed fire, small arms, 325, 326.
+ Aiming points, _See Artillery_.
+ AIR CRAFT, _See Aeroplanes, Airships, Reconnaissance_, 381.
+ command of the air, 384.
+ communication by, 150, 384.
+ defense against, 138, 385.
+ dependability, 381, 386.
+ development, 381.
+ powers and limitations, 381, 386.
+ radius of observation, 385.
+ raids, 384.
+ tactical analogy to sea craft, 382, 384, 385.
+ Air screen, 138, 384, 385.
+ AIRSHIPS, _See Aeroplanes, Air craft, Reconnaissance_.
+ ability to hover over one spot, 383.
+ armor, 383.
+ bases for, 383.
+ carrying capacity, 383.
+ characteristics, 382.
+ chief function, 383.
+ dependability, 386.
+ effect of darkness, rain, fog, etc., 149, 383, 386.
+ machine guns, 307.
+ need of trained personnel, 383.
+ practicable heights of observation, 139, 385.
+ radius of action, 382.
+ vulnerability to fire, 134, 383, 384,
+ 385, 386.
+ wireless equipment, 383, 384.
+ Alignment of artillery in action, 110.
+ Alignment of trenches, 231, 251, 257,
+ 260, 262, 270.
+ Alternation of troops in column of route, 85, 337, 338.
+ Altitudes for effective aero reconnaissance, 138, 139,
+ 384, 385.
+ Altitudes of effective fire, anti-aircraft artillery, 138, 139.
+ Ambulance company, _See Sanitary_.
+ capacity, 319.
+ establishment of dressing and slightly wounded stations, 319, 320.
+ evacuation of wounded by, 350.
+ in camp, 355.
+ in combat, 349.
+ in position in readiness, 317.
+ in withdrawal, 289.
+ motor transport for, 389.
+ to remain with combatant troops, 321, 349, 350.
+ with advance guard, 57, 318.
+ Ambuscade, 299, 330.
+ AMMUNITION
+ amount carried by troops and trains, 214.
+ assembly of empty wagons, 214, 222, 225,
+ 228, 234, 241,
+ 255, 350.
+ artillery, _See Artillery_.
+ carried on person of soldier, 214.
+ companies, _See Trains_.
+ distributing stations and refilling points, 234, 349, 350,
+ 351, 369, 370.
+ expenditure and waste, 135, 214, 215,
+ 300, 329, 333.
+ issue of
+ after combat, 351.
+ by whom ordered, 214, 220, 223,
+ 300, 311, 332.
+ in delaying action, 300.
+ in position in readiness, 311.
+ pack transportation, 214.
+ time of, 214, 220, 223,
+ 332, 366, 375.
+ time required for, 214.
+ of dead and wounded, 215, 333.
+ supply in defense, 215, 236.
+ for cavalry, 375.
+ for machine guns, 305.
+ for position fire, 325.
+ in night attacks, 303.
+ trains, _See Trains_.
+ wagons, empty
+ assembly of, 214, 222, 225,
+ 228, 234, 241,
+ 255.
+ used for transport of wounded, 214, 222, 234,
+ 241, 350.
+ Amount of supplies obtainable from a community, 377.
+ Analysis, diagrammatic, in solution of tactical problems, 29.
+ Angle between main and holding attack, 344.
+ Angles of elevation, artillery, 109, 137, 139, 385.
+ Angle of site, 110, 116.
+ Animal motive power for field and combat trains, 390.
+ Animals, transportation of, 378.
+ Animals, number to a division, 379.
+ Anti-aircraft artillery, _See Artillery_.
+ machine guns, 138, 305,
+ 307, 385.
+ Apparatus for solution of problems, 28.
+ Applicatory system of tactical instruction, 19.
+ Approach, covered, to artillery position, 119, 122,
+ 129, 140.
+ of hostile reinforcements, 207, 224, 227,
+ 234, 288, 291.
+ to position, _See Routes_.
+ Areas of camp sites, 16, 17.
+ Armament of aircraft, 382, 383.
+ Armed men, with trains, 78, 84, 97,
+ 317, 341.
+ Armored cars, _See Motor vehicles_, 80, 98, 388.
+ Army, U. S., organization of, 10.
+ Arrangement of troops and trains on the march, _See Marches_.
+ ARTILLERY, 109.
+ agents, _See Personnel_.
+ aiming points, 112, 113, 114,
+ 116, 117, 118,
+ 119, 129, 133.
+ requirements for, 117, 118, 129.
+ accompanying batteries, 124.
+ advantages enjoyed in defense, 121.
+ alignment, exact, to be avoided, 110.
+ ammunition, 109.
+ economy of, 126, 135.
+ supply, 111, 121, 123,
+ 132, 133, 135,
+ 266, 349.
+ trains, _See Trains_.
+ weights of, 132.
+ angles of fall of projectiles, 132.
+ angles of fire, 109, 137.
+ angle of site, 110, 116.
+ anti-aircraft, 137.
+ altitudes at which effective, 138, 139,
+ 384, 385.
+ angles of fire, 137, 139, 385.
+ function, 139.
+ mounts for, 139.
+ motor transport, 136, 139.
+ observation of fire, 139, 386.
+ ranges, 138, 139, 384, 385.
+ rates of fire, 138, 305.
+ special types, 139, 385.
+ area of burst of shrapnel, 115, 327.
+ batteries of the counter attack, 124.
+ b. c. stations, 117, 129, 141.
+ between main and secondary attacks, 120, 141.
+ carriage, 109.
+ changes of position during action, 119, 121, 125,
+ 126, 133, 141,
+ 142.
+ classification of pieces employed in U. S. service, 132.
+ clinometer, 110.
+ combat train, composition, 109, 137.
+ in action, 110, 119, 123,
+ 124, 129, 130,
+ 131, 132, 141,
+ 228, 340.
+ in position in readiness, 310, 317.
+ in retreat, 71.
+ on the march, 71, 83, 110,
+ 123, 128, 339.
+ commander, latitude allowed, 142, 143,
+ 240, 266.
+ on the march, 130.
+ station during combat, 131, 142.
+ concealment, 110, 111, 114,
+ 119, 122, 125,
+ 129, 138, 140,
+ 141.
+ cooperation with other arms, 111, 120, 124,
+ 126, 141, 266.
+ counter batteries, 124.
+ covered approach to position, 119, 122, 129,
+ 140, 141.
+ covering front of a defensive position, 118, 121, 125,
+ 140, 141.
+ dagger batteries, 121.
+ decoy batteries, 124.
+ defensive relation, 121.
+ defilade, flash, sight, mounted, dismounted, 113, 133, 140.
+ deflection and deflection difference, 116.
+ direction points, 111, 131.
+ dispositions in combat, _See Artillery, positions_.
+ dispositions on the march, _See Advance guard,
+ Marches, etc._, 83, 110,
+ 338, 136.
+ duel, 120, 141.
+ dummy emplacements, 126.
+ engineers as escort to, 224, 291, 314.
+ escort for, _See Artillery, supports_.
+ field trains, composition, 109.
+ in action, 129.
+ on march, 83, 110,
+ 123, 338.
+ fire
+ adjustment, 113, 115,
+ 116, 262.
+ against machine guns, 305.
+ at what directed, 114, 120, 121,
+ 122, 128, 141,
+ 142, 228.
+ corrector for height of burst, 113, 116.
+ crossing zone of, _See Shrapnel_, 327, 329.
+ demolition by, _See Shell_, 109, 113, 114,
+ 126, 133, 135,
+ 141.
+ direct, when employed, 126, 140, 234.
+ direction of by air craft, 131, 383, 384.
+ distance required for protection against, 60, 61, 80,
+ 176, 300.
+ distribution, 115, 116, 123.
+ enfilade and oblique, 120, 127, 226,
+ 265, 327, 328,
+ 349.
+ forces early deployment, 74, 121,
+ 135, 300.
+ front of a battery, 110, 119.
+ in cavalry attack, 157.
+ kinds of, 113.
+ at single and successive ranges; direct, indirect;
+ for adjustment, for registration; for demolition,
+ for effect; masked, unmasked; salvo, continuous;
+ sweeping;
+ time, percussion; volley, at will.
+ observation and control, 115, 117, 122,
+ 123, 125, 131,
+ 140, 383.
+ pursuing by, 121.
+ ranges, in attack and defense, 115, 119, 121,
+ 126, 129, 132,
+ 135, 138, 141.
+ ranging and bracketing, 114, 115, 121,
+ 127, 141, 143.
+ shifting sheaf of, 116.
+ shrapnel, _See Shrapnel_.
+ surprise by, 60, 61, 80, 127.
+ to oppose envelopment, 120.
+ firing batteries, position on the march, 83.
+ right of way to front, 225.
+ firing data, 112, 116, 122,
+ 129, 130, 131,
+ 142, 310, 313,
+ 349.
+ firing over heads of infantry, 120, 122,
+ 141, 349.
+ flank protection, 110, 117, 119,
+ 122, 129, 130,
+ 212.
+ “form for action,” 123.
+ front of a battery, 110, 119, 140.
+ heavy field, 132.
+ aiming points, 133.
+ escort for, 133.
+ flash defilade, 133.
+ mobility of, 133.
+ motor transport, 136, 387.
+ observing stations, 135.
+ organization of, 133.
+ position on the march, 136, 339.
+ ranges, 132, 135.
+ single position during action, 133.
+ splitting units, 133.
+ weights of pieces and projectiles, 132.
+ with advance guard, 136.
+ horse
+ in delaying action, 71.
+ in pursuit, 301.
+ with cavalry force, 78, 126, 128,
+ 145, 152.
+ with rear guard, 126.
+ hostile, location of by air craft, 384.
+ observing stations of, 262.
+ in attack and defense, _See special references desired_, 109.
+ in close country, 128.
+ in counter attack, 122, 124, 142.
+ in double column, 91, 339.
+ in flank positions, 120.
+ in night attacks, 303.
+ in a general position in readiness, 310.
+ in pursuit, 121, 142, 301.
+ in retreat and delaying actions, 71, 73, 74,
+ 77, 126, 128,
+ 290, 291, 300,
+ 316.
+ in rencontre, 123, 296, 339.
+ in river line attack, 277, 278, 281,
+ 282, 286.
+ intervals in battery, 110, 119, 140.
+ in withdrawal from action, 289, 290,
+ 291, 292.
+ infantry in long columns of, 83, 110, 339.
+ laying, direct and indirect, 111.
+ limbers, position during action, 110, 119, 128,
+ 129, 132.
+ machine guns as supports for, 121, 122, 133,
+ 304, 307.
+ maneuvering zone for, 338.
+ maneuvers in occupation of a position, 122.
+ march order, 125.
+ materiel of light field, 109.
+ mission of, 118, 120, 122, 123,
+ 126, 128, 142,
+ 227.
+ motor transport for, 136, 387.
+ mountain, 136.
+ ammunition and supply trains, 137.
+ carts and light wagons for, 137.
+ combat trains, 137.
+ ease of concealment, 138.
+ mobility of, 137, 138.
+ organization of battery, 137.
+ pack transportation for, 136, 137.
+ tactical employment, 137, 138.
+ time required to unpack, 137.
+ weights of piece and projectile, 137.
+ with rear guard, 138.
+ movements across country, 127, 140.
+ during action, 119, 121, 125,
+ 126, 133, 135,
+ 141, 142, 238.
+ in echelon, 121, 125,
+ 126, 291.
+ number of guns placed in action, 123, 124.
+ observing stations, 111, 117, 119,
+ 129, 130, 131,
+ 135, 140.
+ officer with advance guard, 112, 113, 128,
+ 133, 141.
+ with supreme commander, 113, 126, 128,
+ 130, 142, 225.
+ on outpost, 128, 172, 181.
+ on the march, _See Advance Guard, Marches, etc._, 71, 83, 110,
+ 123, 128, 136,
+ 338.
+ orders for, 122, 124, 126,
+ 128, 130, 132,
+ 142, 143, 240,
+ 266.
+ personnel, duties of, 111, 128, 130.
+ positions in combat
+ aero reconnaissance of, 110, 119,
+ 131, 384.
+ between holding and enveloping attacks, 120, 140,
+ 141, 226.
+ changes of, 119, 121, 125,
+ 126, 133, 135,
+ 141, 142.
+ concealment in, 111, 112, 119,
+ 121, 122, 133,
+ 140.
+ considerations governing selection of, 118.
+ distance in rear of infantry line, 126, 142, 232.
+ for all stages of action, 119, 125, 133,
+ 141, 227, 281.
+ for direct fire, 118, 121, 126,
+ 129, 133, 140,
+ 234.
+ in attack of a river line, 281.
+ in rear of main and secondary attacks, 226, 349.
+ in rencontre, 123, 296.
+ in withdrawal, 291.
+ near a crest, 118, 121, 126,
+ 129, 133, 140,
+ 234.
+ of limbers, 110, 119, 128,
+ 129, 132.
+ on a flank, 120, 140.
+ selection of, 111, 118, 121,
+ 122, 125, 128,
+ 130.
+ prepare for action, 125.
+ protection of flanks, 117, 119, 129,
+ 130, 212.
+ ranges in attack and defense, _See Artillery, fire_.
+ ranging, _See Artillery, fire_.
+ reconnaissance, 111, 112, 121,
+ 122, 125, 130,
+ 131, 133, 141,
+ 142, 249.
+ reconnaissance officer, _See Artillery, personnel_.
+ registration of hostile artillery positions, 113, 230, 249,
+ 282, 310.
+ reinforcing batteries, 124.
+ reserves, 123.
+ right of way for firing batteries, 225, 339, 340.
+ route markers, _See Artillery, personnel_.
+ routes to position, selection, cover, etc., 111, 119, 122,
+ 125, 129, 133,
+ 140, 141.
+ scouts, _See Artillery, personnel_.
+ searching fire on ground occupied by hostile reserves,
+ 115, 116, 120,
+ 122, 228, 237,
+ 265.
+ sectors of observation, 111, 131.
+ sight, panoramic, 109.
+ signal equipment, 109, 129.
+ signalers, _See Artillery, personnel_.
+ splitting units of, 123, 133, 140,
+ 228, 345, 349.
+ spotters, 382.
+ subdivision of regiments, 349.
+ of battery, 109, 123.
+ supports for, 121, 122, 127,
+ 129, 133, 140,
+ 181, 224, 226,
+ 291, 304, 307,
+ 314.
+ tactical employment of, 118, 130, 139.
+ tactics, 109.
+ telephone equipment, 109, 129.
+ vs. machine guns, 265, 305, 306.
+ weights of pieces and projectiles, 109, 132, 137.
+ with advance guard, 57, 127, 337,
+ 338, 339.
+ with containing force, 205.
+ with cavalry force, 126, 128, 145,
+ 152, 157.
+ with escort of a convoy, 98.
+ with flank guard, 77, 78, 339.
+ with rear guard, 71, 73, 77,
+ 126, 128, 293,
+ 316.
+ Assembly in column of route, 59, 341.
+ of troops in retreat, 292, 294.
+ Assembly orders, 43, 59, 89.
+ Assumptions in tactical problems, 22, 23, 223.
+ ATTACK, _See Combat_.
+ advance guard regiment in, 209, 226.
+ advance to, 209, 223, 277,
+ 326, 346.
+ ammunition supply in, _See Ammunition_.
+ angle between main and holding, 344.
+ artillery in, _See Artillery_.
+ assignment of fronts, 210, 223, 224,
+ 227, 331, 332,
+ 346.
+ best disposition for infantry in, 207, 345.
+ by advance guard, _See Advance guard_.
+ by reinforced brigade, 225.
+ cavalry in, _See Cavalry_.
+ combat patrols, _See Patrols_.
+ concentration of force at critical points, 87, 211, 248,
+ 347, 387.
+ conditions influencing decision to, 206, 226.
+ conjunction of main and holding, 209, 227,
+ 344, 345.
+ contact of organizations in, 209.
+ coordination of, 209, 227, 344,
+ 345, 346.
+ counter, _See Counter attack_.
+ cover for troops in position and approach thereto, 87, 207, 209,
+ 216, 226, 227,
+ 236, 237, 240,
+ 250, 345, 346.
+ covering enemy’s line with fire, 210, 221,
+ 331, 332.
+ covering line of retreat, 204, 207.
+ density of firing line, 208, 219, 330, 347.
+ deployment of, forced at long range, 74, 121, 135,
+ 215, 233, 238,
+ 257, 297, 299,
+ 300, 306, 329.
+ deploying positions in, 226, 227, 346.
+ depth of deployment in, 208, 347.
+ dispersion of force in, 204, 205, 226,
+ 344, 345.
+ disposition of division in, 208.
+ distance at which fire is opened, 209, 329.
+ division, 344.
+ duties subsequent to, 321, 350.
+ effect of obstacles on formation of, 216, 217,
+ 277, 345.
+ enemy, strength of to be known, 209, 211, 213,
+ 220, 348.
+ engineers in, 224, 228,
+ 241, 347.
+ enveloping, 206, 344.
+ convergence of fire, 209.
+ extension of line to meet, 208, 209, 210.
+ of both flanks, 207.
+ provision against, 260.
+ selection of flank for, 207, 226, 229.
+ in rencontre, 296.
+ to be provided for in first deployment, 208, 345.
+ expenditure of ammunition in, 215.
+ fire superiority in, _See Fire superiority_.
+ flank protection, 211, 212, 226,
+ 227, 240, 348.
+ flanks, hostile to be located, 146, 209, 220, 226.
+ forms of, 205, 344.
+ fortification in, _See Fortification_, 215, 216.
+ frontages in, 217, 348.
+ frontal, 206, 344.
+ in advance guard action, 229.
+ in pursuit, 229.
+ in rencontre, 296.
+ of a river line, 278.
+ guiding points in, 210, 211, 221,
+ 223, 224, 330,
+ 332.
+ holding, _See Attack, frontal_, 248.
+ integrity of tactical units, 204, 205, 344,
+ 345, 346.
+ interval between main and holding, 209, 344,
+ 345, 346.
+ landmarks in, _See Attack, guiding points in_.
+ machine guns in, 217, 218, 222,
+ 282, 304.
+ night, _See Night attacks_.
+ obstacles in, _See Obstacles_.
+ of a bridge head, 304.
+ of a convoy, _See Convoys_, 101, 103.
+ of a river line, _See River line attack_, 277.
+ piercing an attenuated line, 206, 226.
+ plan of based on best dispositions of infantry, 207, 345.
+ problem for small infantry force, 219.
+ ranges in, 209, 329.
+ raw troops in, 204.
+ reconnaissance, _See Reconnaissance_.
+ reinforcing the firing line, 208, 211,
+ 327, 328.
+ reserves
+ brigade, 211.
+ concentration under cover of darkness, 87, 205.
+ division of, 211, 346.
+ flank protection by, 211, 236, 346.
+ general, 212, 219.
+ position fire by, 325.
+ position of, 211, 212, 226,
+ 228, 346, 347.
+ regimental, 211.
+ strength of, 208, 211, 217,
+ 219, 227.
+ use of in influencing course of action, 211, 346.
+ routes to position, 209, 211, 223,
+ 224, 225, 226,
+ 227, 240.
+ sanitary troops in, _See Sanitary Troops_.
+ signal troops in, _See Signal Troops_.
+ supports
+ battalion, 208, 211,
+ 219, 223.
+ distance from firing line, 210, 212, 324.
+ formations in advance to firing line, _See Rifle in War_, 325.
+ intrenchments for, 325.
+ prime function of, 211.
+ strength of, 208, 211, 217, 219.
+ timing the advance, 345, 346.
+ trains in, _See Trains_.
+ turning movements, _See Turning movements_.
+ Automobiles, _See Motor vehicles_.
+
+ B
+
+ Bakery, field, 361, 372.
+ Balloons, captive, 381, 383.
+ observation of artillery fire by, 383.
+ telephone equipment, 383.
+ Band, regimental, assists in collection of wounded, 222, 319.
+ Barricades, 180, 182, 307.
+ Base depots, 361, 363, 364.
+ Base of operations, 361.
+ Battalion
+ collecting stations, _See Sanitary_.
+ frontage in combat, 219.
+ frontage on outpost, 171, 180.
+ Batteries, accompanying, breaching, counter, decoy, infantry,
+ of the counter attack, of preparation, reinforcing, 124.
+ Battlefield, illumination of, 265, 304.
+ police of, 321, 351.
+ Battle sights, 115, 331.
+ Bayonet, effect of intrenchments on use of, 263.
+ in night attacks, 303, 304.
+ B. C. station, artillery, 117, 129, 141.
+ Beaten zone, machine gun fire, 305.
+ shrapnel fire, 115, 327.
+ Beef cattle, 379.
+ Best dispositions for infantry primary consideration
+ in attack, 207, 345.
+ Bibliography, 33.
+ Billeting, 94.
+ Bivouac, _See Camps_.
+ in line of battle, 180.
+ of patrols, 53.
+ Blazing trails on outpost, 184.
+ Blending defensive works with terrain, 258, 260, 266.
+ Bracketing, 127, 141, 143.
+ Breaching batteries, 124.
+ BRIDGES
+ construction and repair
+ for movements of artillery, 125, 136.
+ in attack of a river line, 277, 278,
+ 280, 283.
+ in combat, 224, 258.
+ in retreat, 58.
+ on the march, 78, 98, 153.
+ demolition
+ by fire, 71.
+ in combat, 276, 304.
+ in defense of a river line, 284.
+ in position in readiness, 311.
+ in retreat, 57, 58, 71, 299, 316.
+ on outpost, 176, 182.
+ ordered by supreme commander, 71.
+ ponton, 14, 176, 277, 340.
+ placarding, 31.
+ protection
+ by artillery, 172.
+ by machine guns, 173.
+ by outpost, 176, 281.
+ in retreat, 312.
+ Bridge equipage, floating or portable.
+ capacity, 340.
+ organization, 14.
+ place on march, 340.
+ road space, 340.
+ Bridge head, 180, 304.
+ Bridge train, _See Bridge equipage_, 340, 361.
+ Brigade attack, 225.
+ Brigade, reinforced, _See Reinforced brigade_.
+ British experiences in trench warfare, 262.
+ Broad front in pursuit, 301.
+ in retreat and delaying action, 219, 233, 251,
+ 297, 298.
+ Broken ground, advance over, 327.
+ Buildings
+ demolition of, 252, 272, 273.
+ use for shelter, 355.
+
+ C
+
+ CAMPS, 93.
+ advance guard, location of, 355.
+ areas of, 16, 94.
+ arrangement with reference to position of troops
+ in column, 85, 94.
+ assignment of organizations to, 93, 192.
+ at crossroads, 93, 354.
+ concealment of, 353, 355.
+ delay in placing troops in, 93, 191, 356.
+ dimensions of, 16.
+ distribution of troops from front to rear, 173.
+ distribution of troops in, 93, 192, 281,
+ 354.
+ division, detailed disposition of, 354.
+ drainage of, 94, 354.
+ fuel and water for, 93, 180, 353,
+ 354, 355.
+ guards, 171, 174,
+ 178, 181.
+ in column of route 85, 88, 94,
+ 354, 355.
+ influence of roads, 353, 354.
+ late arrival at, 87, 341.
+ mounted troops in, 354.
+ of convoy, 99, 102.
+ of reserve of outpost, 173, 180, 181,
+ 187, 192.
+ outpost line, 353, 355.
+ place of trains in, 355.
+ prior to attack of river line, 281.
+ relative positions of foot and mounted troops and trains, 93.
+ sites for convoys, 99.
+ sanitary requirements of, 93, 94, 354.
+ selection of, 62, 93, 176,
+ 191, 353.
+ tactical requirements of, 176, 353.
+ southern exposure, 94.
+ temporary, in field maneuvers, 33.
+ trains in, 354, 373, 375.
+ Camping in depth and in mass, 85, 88, 94,
+ 354.
+ Camping with reference to facility of arrival
+ and departure, 85, 94, 354.
+ Carcasses, collection and disposal of, 321.
+ Capacities of carriers, 366, 379.
+ as affected by care in loading, 378, 379.
+ freight, passenger, and stock cars, 378, 379.
+ Capacity of sanitary units, 319.
+ Capital letters, use of in orders and messages, 41, 54.
+ Captive balloons, 381, 383.
+ Cash payments for supplies, 362.
+ Catechism of rifle in war, 334.
+ Cattle, beef, 379.
+ CAVALRY
+ advance and advance guard,
+ _See Advance guard_, 56, 60, 63,
+ 146, 147, 148,
+ 173, 181, 188.
+ advance in two columns, 149.
+ ammunition supply of, 375.
+ army, _See Cavalry, independent_, 146.
+ artillery with, 78, 126, 128,
+ 145, 152, 157.
+ as escort to artillery, 291.
+ as escort to trains, 84, 168.
+ as flank guard, 81.
+ as police guard with convoy, 97.
+ as rear guard, 71.
+ at head of main body, 84.
+ attack, gaits in, 158, 159, 160.
+ attack of infantry when practicable, 153.
+ attacking line, 157.
+ charge, 150, 153,
+ 155, 167.
+ at extended intervals, 150, 151, 156.
+ details of, 157, 160, 167.
+ distance at which launched, 158, 159.
+ examination of ground for, 156.
+ formations for, 158.
+ gaits in, 158, 159, 160.
+ in column, 151.
+ melee, 166.
+ most favorable times for, 153, 159, 167.
+ orders for, 160, 163.
+ combat patrols, 154, 156,
+ 160, 161.
+ combat trains, 145, 159, 361.
+ commander, discretionary powers, 145, 146, 174,
+ 240, 241, 311,
+ 338.
+ contact squadron, 149, 150.
+ contact with enemy, 60, 62, 144,
+ 146, 148, 149,
+ 171, 174, 177,
+ 181, 189, 212,
+ 234, 259, 281,
+ 311, 338.
+ coupling and linking horses, 152.
+ defensive power, 169.
+ demolition outfits, 71, 145.
+ detachments during combat, 155, 156,
+ 160, 161.
+ discretionary powers of commander, 145, 174, 241,
+ 311, 338.
+ dismounted action, 150, 153.
+ how close enemy may be allowed to approach, 154, 233.
+ dismounted fire action, 150, 151, 153,
+ 156, 160.
+ dispersion of, 144, 147, 149,
+ 155, 234, 311,
+ 338.
+ division of for mounted attack, 157.
+ distance in front of outpost, 174, 179.
+ divisional, _See Cavalry, independent_, 146, 338.
+ economy in use of, 144, 168, 172.
+ effect of air craft on functions of, 381, 384.
+ effects of fire from rear, 154.
+ effect on strength of an outpost, 171.
+ engineers with, 56, 145, 153,
+ 167, 283.
+ field train of, in camp, 56, 145, 356.
+ filling gaps in firing line, 144, 168.
+ fire action, 150, 153, 168.
+ flank patrols, 154, 155, 156,
+ 160, 161, 212,
+ 227, 234.
+ foraging by, 148, 150, 169, 375.
+ front covered by squadron on outpost, 171.
+ functions in campaign, 144.
+ gaits in mounted attack, 158, 159, 160.
+ on march, 86.
+ ground scouts, 155, 156,
+ 160, 167.
+ horse artillery with, 78, 126, 128,
+ 145, 152.
+ horses mobile and immobile, 152, 155.
+ horses, stampede of, 152, 154.
+ horseholders, 152, 154.
+ hostile, overthrow of, 144, 146,
+ 149, 165.
+ in combat, 72, 85, 100,
+ 144, 150, 227,
+ 234.
+ in delaying action and withdrawal, 70, 71, 72,
+ 73, 147, 153,
+ 154, 155, 168,
+ 233, 289, 290,
+ 292, 293, 298.
+ in night attacks, 303.
+ in position in readiness, 310, 311.
+ in pursuit, 144, 168, 282,
+ 301, 369.
+ in retreat, 70, 71, 144,
+ 154, 168, 172,
+ 290, 298.
+ in river line attack, 279, 281, 282.
+ in river line defense, 189, 284.
+ independent, 148.
+ communication by, 148.
+ concentration of, 144, 146, 149.
+ contact squadrons, 149, 150.
+ contact with enemy, 148, 149, 171,
+ 174, 177, 338.
+ distance from supporting troops, 148, 149, 174.
+ effect on strength of advance guard, 56, 85.
+ effect on strength of outpost, 171, 172, 174.
+ foraging, 148, 150, 169.
+ in advance, 56, 85.
+ mission of, 81, 85, 144,
+ 146, 147, 148,
+ 149, 338.
+ mounted engineers with, 145.
+ on flank, 81.
+ orders for, 145.
+ patrols, _See Patrols, strategic_.
+ range of operations, 148.
+ reconnaissance, _See Reconnaissance_.
+ relay posts, 150.
+ return to camp at night, 148.
+ screening, 144, 146, 148,
+ 149, 164, 165,
+ 174.
+ signal troops with, 145, 150, 340.
+ strength of, 147, 148.
+ time of starting march, 86, 338.
+ under immediate control of supreme commander, 146, 147, 338.
+ when employed, 147, 148, 338.
+ wireless equipment, 145, 150, 340.
+ with detachments, 147.
+ initiative, 151, 161, 167.
+ led horses, 152.
+ cover for, 154, 233.
+ operations against, 154.
+ vulnerability of, 151, 154, 241.
+ line of columns, 157, 158, 161, 163.
+ line of fours, 158, 161.
+ lines of, in attack, 157, 167.
+ lines of retreat, 154.
+ machine guns with, 152, 157, 159,
+ 161, 306.
+ march outposts, 190, 192.
+ messages for, 174.
+ mission, See _Cavalry, independent_, 60, 62, 64,
+ 164, 234.
+ mobility and immobility of horses, 152, 155.
+ mounted action, orders for, 163.
+ mounted and dismounted action, 150.
+ mounted engineers with, 56, 145, 153,
+ 167, 283.
+ mounted fire action, 150.
+ mounted fire, inaccuracy of, 168.
+ mounted reconnaissance during action, 152.
+ mounted reserve, 151, 154,
+ 159, 241.
+ night movements, 144, 168.
+ on infantry firing line, 144, 168.
+ on outpost
+ contact with enemy, 171, 177.
+ covering flanks, 189.
+ day and night positions, 188, 189.
+ distance to front, 174, 179,
+ 187, 189.
+ effect on strength of infantry, 171, 172, 174,
+ 188, 189, 190.
+ front covered by a squadron, 171. habitual use, effect of, 168.
+ joins advance cavalry, 58.
+ march outposts, 190, 192.
+ messenger duty, 181, 186.
+ patrols, _See Outposts and Patrols_.
+ phases of use in security, 174.
+ reconnaissance, _See Patrols, Reconnaissance, etc._
+ relieving infantry, 168, 172.
+ strength, 171.
+ withdrawal behind outpost line, 148, 174, 179,
+ 181, 188, 189,
+ 190, 192.
+ operations against hostile flanks, 62, 85, 144,
+ 153, 168, 227,
+ 234, 293, 301.
+ orders for, 145, 146, 160,
+ 174, 240, 311,
+ 338, 356.
+ outpost of, 174, 179, 189.
+ pack trains with, 145, 159,
+ 338, 375.
+ patrols, _See Patrols_.
+ phases of use in security, 174.
+ pioneer training, 153, 167.
+ protection of flanks by, 212, 227, 234.
+ raids, 144, 148, 169.
+ rally after charge, 152, 157,
+ 158, 167.
+ rates of march, 90, 165.
+ rear, _See Cavalry, with rear guard_.
+ reconnaissance, _See Reconnaissance_.
+ remains mounted when practicable, 151, 152, 157.
+ reports, 149.
+ retirement behind outpost line, 148, 174, 179,
+ 181, 188, 189,
+ 190, 192.
+ screen, 144, 146,
+ 149, 164.
+ distance to front, 164.
+ front covered by, 165, 174.
+ offensive and defensive, 165.
+ purpose of, 148, 164, 165.
+ security duties, _See Advance, Rear, and Flank guards,
+ Outposts, Reconnaissance, etc._
+ seizing advanced positions, 144.
+ separation of subordinates from commands, 161.
+ signal troops with, 145, 150, 340.
+ skirmishers, 150, 151.
+ stampede of horses, 152, 154.
+ supplies for, 375.
+ support and reserve of attacking line, 157, 163.
+ surprise, element of in operations, 153, 154, 155,
+ 156, 157, 159,
+ 160.
+ surrender of initiative, 151, 161, 167.
+ tactical employment with rear guard, 72.
+ tactical use of in combat, 72, 85, 100,
+ 150, 227, 234.
+ tactics, 144.
+ lessons in, from American Civil War, 166.
+ time required to mount and dismount, 152.
+ time of starting march, 86, 338.
+ to be used for duty for which qualified, 144, 168, 172.
+ trains with, 144, 145, 159,
+ 169, 188, 338,
+ 361, 375.
+ turning movements by 153, 168, 205.
+ vs. artillery, 167.
+ vs. cavalry, 153, 155,
+ 167, 169.
+ vs. infantry, 153, 167,
+ 168, 330.
+ vulnerability to flank attack, 156.
+ wagons and pack trains with, 144, 145, 159,
+ 169, 188, 338,
+ 375.
+ watches for hostile reinforcements, 224, 227, 234,
+ 244, 292, 311.
+ weapons employed, 151, 166, 168.
+ when used independently, 147, 148, 338.
+ wireless equipment with, 145, 150, 340.
+ with advance guard, 56, 60, 61, 62,
+ 64, 147, 338.
+ with containing forces, 205.
+ with convoy, 80, 97, 98, 99,
+ 100.
+ with motor convoy, 80.
+ with flank guard, 78, 81, 147,
+ 168, 339.
+ with rear guard, 70, 147, 168,
+ 290, 292.
+ with trains, 84, 168, 341.
+ withdrawal from action, 73, 154, 233,
+ 289, 290, 291,
+ 292, 298.
+ Change in direction of march, 80, 91,
+ 92, 102.
+ Change in situation, 59, 65.
+ Change of position during action, artillery, 119, 121, 125,
+ 126, 133, 135,
+ 141, 142, 238.
+ Characteristics of air craft, 381, 382.
+ Charge, cavalry, _See Cavalry_.
+ Circulation of orders, _See Orders_.
+ Civilians, care of wounded by, 318, 322.
+ interviews with, 53.
+ preceding advance guard, 63.
+ preceding patrol, 50.
+ Clearing the field of fire, 217, 233, 235,
+ 246, 252, 256,
+ 258, 269, 270,
+ 272, 275, 276.
+ Clinometer, 110.
+ Close country
+ effect on dispositions of advance guard, 60, 128.
+ of artillery, 128.
+ of outpost, 171, 179, 180,
+ 186, 188.
+ of patrols, 49.
+ effect on field fortifications, 254.
+ on march of a convoy, 100.
+ Close order in night attacks, 303.
+ Codes, telegraphic, 150.
+ Collecting stations, 224, 256,
+ 270, 319.
+ Collective distribution, _See Artillery fire_.
+ Collection of wounded, _See Wounded_.
+ Column, cavalry charge in, 151.
+ Column of route, assembly in, 58, 341.
+ camp in, 85, 94.
+ Columns, line of, vulnerability, 325, 326,
+ 327, 328.
+ COMBAT, _See Attack and Defense, etc._
+ ammunition supply, _See Ammunition_.
+ approach of hostile reinforcements, 167, 206, 207,
+ 224, 227, 234,
+ 288, 291, 292,
+ 311, 348.
+ by patrols, 51, 166, 190,
+ 212, 213.
+ companies go complete into firing line, 211, 217, 348.
+ concentration of force at critical points, 87, 211, 248,
+ 347, 387.
+ detachments during, 91, 149, 155,
+ 205, 225.
+ density of firing line, 208, 216, 219,
+ 233, 235, 330,
+ 347.
+ depth of deployment, 208, 347.
+ dispersion in, 204, 205, 226,
+ 236, 237, 344,
+ 345.
+ division, 344.
+ duties subsequent to, 321, 350, 351.
+ expenditure of ammunition in, 215.
+ fortification, _See Fortification_.
+ frontages in, 217, 348.
+ integrity of tactical units, 205, 217, 329.
+ messages during, 350.
+ offering no chance of success, 205.
+ orders, 39, 40, 205,
+ 208, 210, 211,
+ 220, 225, 332,
+ 346, 350.
+ patrols, _See Patrols_.
+ position fire, 74, 255, 257,
+ 282, 325, 331.
+ protection of flanks in, 211, 212, 226,
+ 227, 230, 232,
+ 235, 240, 257,
+ 259, 305, 306,
+ 348.
+ reconnaissance, _See Reconnaissance_.
+ routes to position, 209, 211, 223,
+ 224, 225, 226,
+ 227, 240.
+ sanitary stations in, _See Sanitary_.
+ simple movements in, 204.
+ small units in, 224, 225, 231,
+ 232, 248.
+ special forms of, 277.
+ special troops in, _See references to special troops_.
+ splitting tactical units in, 205, 217.
+ trains during, _See Trains_.
+ Combat patrols, _See Patrols_.
+ Combat trains, _See Trains_.
+ Combined orders, 38, 39, 42,
+ 220.
+ Combined sights, 331, 334.
+ Command of the air, 384, 385.
+ Command for firing line, 324.
+ Commander, battalion
+ observing station, 256.
+ orders issue of ammunition, 214, 220, 223,
+ 300, 332.
+ regimental, observing station for, 255.
+ orders disposition of packs, 223.
+ Commander, supreme, _See Supreme commander_.
+ Communication, as affecting number of troops required
+ in a defensive position, 267.
+ control of local means of, 63.
+ flank guard, rear guard, and main body, 81.
+ in defensive position, _See Defensive position_.
+ in outpost, 184.
+ with friendly troops during combat, 212.
+ with friendly troops on the march, 62, 81, 99,
+ 103, 108, 148.
+ Communicating trenches, _See Fortification_.
+ Companies go complete into firing line, 211, 217, 348.
+ Company wagons, _See Trains, field_.
+ Composition of advance, rear and flank guards, outposts, etc.,
+ _See these subjects_.
+ Compulsory military service, 5.
+ CONCEALMENT, _See Attack, Defense, Terrain, etc._
+ from aero reconnaissance, 119, 253, 256,
+ 265, 286, 385.
+ in attack and defense, _See these subjects_.
+ in counter attack, 236, 237.
+ in delaying action, 74.
+ in position in readiness, 309.
+ in river line attack, 277, 279, 280.
+ of artillery, _See Artillery_.
+ of camp site, 353.
+ of obstacles, 259, 262, 265.
+ of outpost dispositions, 180, 182,
+ 183, 184.
+ of works of field fortification, 183, 231, 233,
+ 253, 256, 258,
+ 260, 262, 265,
+ 266.
+ Concentration
+ of fire on critical points, 331.
+ of force at critical points, 87, 211, 247,
+ 248, 347, 387.
+ of reserves under cover of darkness, 87, 205,
+ 281, 286.
+ of troops by motor vehicles, 87, 211,
+ 387, 389.
+ Connecting files, 61.
+ Considerations influencing advance guard attack, 229.
+ choice of flank for envelopment, 207.
+ decision to attack, 206, 226.
+ depth of deployment, 348.
+ form of attack, 206, 226.
+ occupation of a position in readiness, 308, 309.
+ selection of artillery position, 118.
+ selection of camp site, 93, 94, 176,
+ 353, 354.
+ selection of a defensive position, 230.
+ selection of route of march, 90, 100.
+ strength of outpost, 170.
+ use of flank guard, 79.
+ Consonance of decision and orders, 44.
+ Contact of adjacent outposts, 186.
+ of opposing sides in field maneuvers, 33.
+ of organizations in attack, 209.
+ squadron, _See Cavalry_.
+ Contact with enemy
+ by advance guard, 62.
+ by aero reconnaissance, 149, 383,
+ 384, 386.
+ by cavalry, 60, 62, 144,
+ 146, 148, 149,
+ 171, 174, 177,
+ 181, 189, 212,
+ 234, 259, 281,
+ 311, 338.
+ by flank guard, 81.
+ by rear guard, 72, 73.
+ by outpost, 170, 177, 181,
+ 185, 189.
+ first, to be reported, 54.
+ in pursuit, 177, 301.
+ in retreat, 72, 301.
+ to verify reconnaissance, 384.
+ Contact with friendly troops, 62, 81, 99,
+ 103, 108, 148,
+ 212.
+ Containing force, 91, 204, 205,
+ 208, 288.
+ Contingencies in orders, 41, 42,
+ 314, 317.
+ Continuity of fire trenches, 251, 253,
+ 254, 265.
+ Continuous fire, _See Artillery, fire_.
+ Control and observation of artillery fire, 115, 117, 122,
+ 123, 125, 131,
+ 140, 383.
+ Convergence of fire, secured by enveloping attack, 209.
+ CONVOYS, 95.
+ abandoning line of march, 101.
+ advance guard of, 97, 98, 99.
+ artillery with, 98.
+ attack of, 101, 103.
+ ambuscade, 103.
+ by cavalry, 148.
+ by small forces, 96.
+ long range fire in, 103, 104.
+ mobile troops in, 103.
+ motor vehicles in, 103.
+ places favorable for, 103.
+ usual method, 103.
+ auto, 80, 96, 101.
+ camp sites
+ selection of, 99.
+ security measures, 102.
+ cavalry with, 80, 97, 98, 99, 100.
+ change of direction of march, 101, 102.
+ classification of wagons, army, hired, impressed, 96.
+ conduct on encountering enemy, 102.
+ contact with friendly troops, 99, 103, 108.
+ defensive measures, 101, 102.
+ details of march, 96.
+ dispersion of troops, 99.
+ distance between convoy and covering detachment, 95
+ division into sections, 96, 97.
+ double column of wagons, 95.
+ engineers with, 99.
+ escort, strength, composition, duties, etc., 85, 97.
+ field trains of, 96.
+ of prisoners, 104.
+ flank guards, 80, 95, 96,
+ 99, 100.
+ flank marches, 95.
+ in double column, 95.
+ infantry in long columns of wagons, 99.
+ limiting size of single column, 95.
+ machine guns with, 98.
+ motor vehicles, convoy and escort, 80, 96,
+ 98, 101.
+ mounted point, 99.
+ occupation of critical points by escort, 100.
+ of prisoners, 104.
+ offensive tactics by escort, 98, 102.
+ parking, 102.
+ parks
+ form of, 102.
+ sites for, 99.
+ passage of defiles, 101.
+ place of commander, 97.
+ police guards, 96, 97, 99.
+ position of main body, 99.
+ quartermaster, duties of, 96, 97.
+ rate of progress and halts, 101.
+ rear guard, 72, 100.
+ reconnaissance on march, 97, 99, 100,
+ 101, 102, 104,
+ 108.
+ relative rank of quartermaster and commander of escort, 97.
+ retreat of, 102, 103.
+ routes of march, 100, 101, 102.
+ rule for position of covering troops, 95, 99.
+ slowest wagons in lead, 96.
+ straggling, 95.
+ teamsters and wagon masters, 96, 97.
+ vulnerability, 95, 96, 101,
+ 103.
+ Cooks and kitchen police with outpost supports, 175.
+ Cooperation of artillery and other arms, 126, 141.
+ Coordination of main and holding attack, 345.
+ Cordon and patrol systems of outposts, 184.
+ Corrector for height of burst, 113, 116.
+ Cossack posts, _See Outposts_.
+ COUNTER ATTACK, 236.
+ artillery in, 122, 124, 142,
+ 237, 238.
+ batteries of the, 124.
+ concealment in, 236, 237.
+ conduct of, 236.
+ fire superiority, 237, 238.
+ from flank, 236, 237, 238,
+ 259.
+ general rule for, 238.
+ in defense of a river line, 281, 282, 284.
+ in retreat, 75, 301.
+ local, 236.
+ obstacles, effect of, 230, 233,
+ 235, 310.
+ reinforcing firing line, 237, 238.
+ reserves for, 231, 233, 236,
+ 237, 238, 253,
+ 257, 259.
+ risk of, 75, 230, 281,
+ 282, 284, 301,
+ 344.
+ supporting points in rear of main line, 237.
+ surprise in, 236.
+ terrain favorable for, 237, 238.
+ Counter batteries, 124.
+ Countermanding of orders, 42, 317.
+ Coupling horses, 152.
+ Cover, _See Concealment_.
+ head and overhead, _See Fortification_.
+ in combat position and approach, _See Attack and Defense_.
+ natural, _See Terrain_.
+ Covering advance supply depot, 373.
+ detachments, 205, 212,
+ 236, 308.
+ line of retreat, 204, 278.
+ main body, in advance, 204.
+ in attack, 209, 229, 296.
+ in retreat, 72, 73.
+ enemy’s line with fire, 118, 210, 331.
+ Crest, geographical.
+ artillery positions near, 118, 121, 126,
+ 129, 133, 140,
+ 234.
+ location of firing line with respect to, 262, 298, 324.
+ location of supports with respect to, 324.
+ Crest, military, 118, 298, 324.
+ Crews of air craft, 381, 383.
+ Criterion for depth of deployment, 347.
+ Criterion for strength of outpost, 170.
+ Cross fire, mutual support, 233, 250, 251,
+ 252, 253, 254,
+ 258, 263, 268,
+ 269, 276, 325,
+ 331.
+ Cross roads, for camp sites, 93, 354.
+ for position in readiness, 309.
+ issue points at, 375.
+ march outposts at, 190, 341.
+
+ D
+
+ Dagger batteries, 121, 234, 235.
+ Danger space, 324.
+ Darkness, concentration of reserves under cover of, 87, 205,
+ 281, 286.
+ effect on aero reconnaissance, 149, 383, 386.
+ intrenching under cover of, 216.
+ making camp in, 87, 188, 341.
+ withdrawal from action under cover of, 205, 289.
+ Day and night positions of elements of an outpost, 187, 191,
+ 193, 356.
+ Days of rest, 87, 89, 337,
+ 365.
+ Dead, ammunition on persons of, 215, 333.
+ collection, identification and disposal of, 321.
+ Dead spaces
+ dagger batteries cover, 121.
+ distribution of artillery to cover, 118, 121, 141.
+ in a defensive position, 230, 249, 252,
+ 258, 269.
+ influence on artillery position, 119.
+ observation of, 122.
+ Decision problems, 19.
+ Decision to attack, by what influenced, 206, 226.
+ Decisive action.
+ by advance, rear and flank guards, etc., _See these subjects_.
+ danger of in retreat, 299.
+ Decisive results obtained only by offensive, 204, 205.
+ Decoy batteries, 124.
+ DEFENSE
+ active, conduct of, _See Counter Attack_, 237, 254.
+ strong reserves characteristic of, 211, 219, 233,
+ 235, 236, 237,
+ 238, 254.
+ advance guard in, 234.
+ against air craft, 135, 385.
+ ambuscade in, 299, 330.
+ ammunition supply in, _See Ammunition_, 215, 349.
+ artillery in, _See Artillery_.
+ cavalry in, _See Cavalry_, 234, 259.
+ concentration of fire, 253, 331.
+ concentration of force at critical points, 211, 233,
+ 235, 248.
+ conforms to attack, 204, 219.
+ covering front of enemy, 252, 331.
+ density of firing line, 216, 219,
+ 233, 235.
+ depth of deployment, 219, 347, 348.
+ extension of front in, 208, 210, 216,
+ 221, 235, 236,
+ 237, 238, 251,
+ 254.
+ engineers in, 216, 217, 228,
+ 234, 235, 247,
+ 258, 260, 272,
+ 273, 276.
+ fire superiority, _See Fire superiority_.
+ influence of obstacles on assumption of offensive, 176, 217, 230,
+ 232, 299, 310.
+ location of firing line, 324.
+ long range fire in, 121, 215, 230,
+ 233, 250, 325,
+ 329, 330.
+ machine guns in, 173, 228, 232,
+ 233, 234, 252,
+ 253, 255, 256,
+ 265, 269, 270,
+ 276, 304, 328.
+ of a river line, _See River line defense_.
+ passive, 204, 248,
+ 254, 347.
+ position fire, 255, 256, 257,
+ 325, 331.
+ position in readiness in, 231, 308.
+ ranges, 250, 257, 262.
+ raw troops in, 204.
+ reconnaissance, _See Reconnaissance_.
+ reinforcing the firing line, 237, 238, 257,
+ 327, 328.
+ reserves
+ aggressive use of, 236, 237,
+ 238, 249.
+ assist in organization of position, 235, 255,
+ 271, 272.
+ brigade, 235.
+ communications for, 230, 255.
+ cover for, 216, 231, 236,
+ 237, 257, 265.
+ counter attack by, 231, 233, 235,
+ 236, 237, 238,
+ 257.
+ distance from firing line, 257.
+ division of, 211, 232, 257.
+ effect of intrenchments on strength of, 216, 254.
+ employment of, 211, 233, 235,
+ 236, 249, 257,
+ 259.
+ general, 219, 232, 233,
+ 236, 254.
+ influence on course of action, 211, 289, 346.
+ local, 219, 254.
+ position fire by, _See Position fire_.
+ position of, 211, 212, 232,
+ 235, 257, 259.
+ protection of flanks by, 211, 213, 232,
+ 236, 257, 259.
+ security of line of retreat by, 235, 236,
+ 249, 253.
+ strength, 217, 233,
+ 275, 347.
+ second line of, 258.
+ signal troops in, _See Signal troops_.
+ splitting and mixing units, 217.
+ supports
+ battalion, 211, 219, 251,
+ 255, 257, 269.
+ communications for, _See Fortification_, 256, 257,
+ 260, 276.
+ cover for, 216, 231, 256,
+ 257, 260, 262.
+ distance from firing line, 212, 257, 262,
+ 324, 325, 327.
+ division of, 257.
+ formations in advance to firing line, 327, 328.
+ local, 211, 219, 233, 257.
+ position fire by, _See Position fire_.
+ strength of, 211, 217, 219,
+ 233, 236, 269.
+ trenches for, _See Fortification_.
+ time that small forces can hold larger, 231, 232.
+
+ DEFENSIVE POSITION, _See Fortification_.
+ advantages of a single position, 74, 235, 310.
+ assignment of frontages to organizations, 232, 254,
+ 255, 269.
+ blending works with terrain, 258, 260, 266.
+ clearing the front, 217, 233, 235,
+ 246, 252, 256,
+ 258, 269, 270,
+ 272, 275, 276.
+ closed works in, 252.
+ communications, _See Communicating trenches_, 216, 255, 256,
+ 257, 260, 262,
+ 267, 270, 276.
+ as effecting number of troops required, 267.
+ concealment, 231, 233, 256,
+ 257, 258, 260,
+ 262, 275.
+ considerations prior to occupation of, 230.
+ continuity of trenches, 233, 251, 253,
+ 254, 265.
+ effect on visibility, 265.
+ cross fire and mutual support, 233, 250, 251,
+ 252, 253, 254,
+ 258, 263, 268,
+ 269, 276, 325,
+ 331.
+ dagger batteries, 121, 234, 235.
+ dead spaces, _See Dead spaces_.
+ demolitions, _See Demolitions_.
+ development of frontal fire, 250, 254, 263.
+ echelon in refusal of flanks, 209, 260, 265.
+ examination of terrain from enemy’s point of view, 249, 250.
+ flanks, _See Patrols, combat_.
+ organization of, 259.
+ protection of, 212, 232, 234,
+ 235, 236, 257,
+ 259, 260.
+ refusal of, 209, 260, 265.
+ illumination of battlefield, 265, 304.
+ intervals in, 75, 231, 233,
+ 251, 253.
+ lines of retreat, 220, 226,
+ 230, 235.
+ masking the fire of a, 73, 75, 231,
+ 234, 235, 251,
+ 290, 299, 310.
+ measuring and marking ranges, 216, 217, 230,
+ 233, 246, 252,
+ 253, 256, 257,
+ 258, 259, 262,
+ 270, 271.
+ observing stations, 255, 256, 258,
+ 271, 276.
+ obstacles, _See Obstacles_.
+ occupation of, 244.
+ offsets, re-entrants and salients, 231, 251, 260.
+ organization of, 248.
+ outposts of, 180, 259.
+ practical problems in, 267, 273.
+ ravines and hollows, treatment of, 252, 256,
+ 258, 273.
+ regimental sectors, 255.
+ requirements of, 230, 232,
+ 248, 257.
+ second line of defense, 237.
+ sectors, 232, 254, 255,
+ 269, 274.
+ security to front during occupation, 213, 234, 259.
+ selection from map, 249.
+ small forces in, 232, 248.
+ supporting points.
+ details of organization, 249, 251, 252,
+ 255, 268, 274.
+ in rear of main line, 237.
+ to be studied as terrain exercise, 19, 249, 267.
+ utilization of natural features of terrain, _See Terrain_.
+ when to be occupied, 231.
+ Defensive power of cavalry, 169.
+ of small forces, 231, 232.
+ Defilade, flash, 113, 133, 140.
+ mounted and dismounted, 113.
+ of reverse slopes, 135, 324, 325.
+ sight, 113.
+ Defiladed areas, _See Dead spaces_.
+ DEFILES
+ artillery fire on outlet, 128, 172, 300.
+ attack of cavalry at, 101, 103.
+ attack of convoy at, 101, 103.
+ defense of, 80, 128, 172,
+ 173, 178, 180,
+ 190, 307.
+ in pursuit, 301.
+ passage of, 63, 85,
+ 229, 300.
+ by convoys, 108.
+ by patrols, 50.
+ by trains, 84, 376.
+ reconnaissance of, 50, 62,
+ 102, 108, 190.
+ Deflection, deflection difference, 116.
+ DELAYING ACTION, _See Rear guard, Retreat, Withdrawal, etc._, 297.
+ advantages of single position, 74.
+ aggressive tactics in, 75, 204,
+ 297, 299.
+ ambuscade, 299.
+ ammunition supply, 300.
+ artillery in, 71, 73, 74,
+ 77, 128, 290,
+ 300, 316.
+ by small forces, 231, 232.
+ cavalry in, 70, 71, 72,
+ 73, 147, 153,
+ 154, 155, 168,
+ 233, 290, 293,
+ 298.
+ concealment, 74.
+ danger of decisive engagement, 299.
+ demolitions, _See Demolitions_.
+ dummy trenches, 298.
+ engineers in, 57, 71, 316.
+ extension of front in, 73, 74, 219,
+ 233, 251, 297,
+ 298.
+ field fortification, _See Fortification_, 298.
+ fire superiority, 299.
+ flank guard in, 80.
+ flank positions in, 73, 290, 299.
+ line of retreat, 74, 297.
+ location of firing line, 298, 324.
+ long range fire in, 74, 230, 257,
+ 297, 299, 300,
+ 329.
+ machine guns in, 74, 300, 306.
+ obstacles, _See Obstacles_.
+ offensive tactics in, 75, 204,
+ 297, 299.
+ outpost troops, 73, 313, 317.
+ passive defense in, 200, 204,
+ 293, 297.
+ positions for, 57, 73, 74,
+ 289, 297, 298,
+ 316.
+ flank, 73, 290, 299.
+ in withdrawal, 289.
+ on line of a river, 300.
+ successive, 73, 77, 154,
+ 292, 299.
+ procedure in, 73, 297.
+ rear guard in, 70, 73,
+ 297, 316.
+ supports and reserves in, 211, 233, 297.
+ withdrawal from, 297, 298, 299.
+ DEMOLITIONS
+ by fire, 71, 252.
+ fire for, _See Artillery_.
+ of bridges, _See Bridges_.
+ of buildings, 252, 272, 273.
+ of materiel by artillery fire, 109, 114, 126,
+ 133, 135, 138,
+ 141.
+ of obstacles, _See Obstacles_.
+ outfits, cavalry, 71, 145.
+ outpost, 173, 193.
+ Demonstrations
+ against hostile flanks, 227.
+ in attack of a river line, 279, 282.
+ Density of firing line, _See Attack and Defense_.
+
+ Deploying positions in attack, _See Attack_.
+ Deployment, at long range, _See Attack_.
+ depth of, 208, 347.
+ in night attack, 303.
+ envelopment to be provided for in, 208, 345.
+ from two column formation, 78, 79, 339.
+ in rencontre, 296.
+ of a division, time required, 344.
+ place of, 346.
+ time for, 326.
+ Depot, advance supply, _See Advance supply depot_.
+ Depth of deployment, 208, 347.
+ of outposts, 179.
+ Description of localities in orders, 41, 223.
+ Destruction of hostile cavalry, _See Cavalry_.
+ Detached posts, 172, 174,
+ 178, 193.
+ Detachments during combat, 91, 149, 155,
+ 205, 225.
+ Detachments rejoin for combat, 91, 155, 156,
+ 205, 225.
+ Detachment warfare, 47, 147.
+ Detail in orders, 25, 38, 39,
+ 42, 47, 108,
+ 142, 143, 145.
+ Detailed observation by air craft, 383, 386.
+ Development of aeroplanes, 382.
+ Development orders, 346.
+ Diagrammatic analysis of problems, 29.
+ Diagrams of division in column of route, 343.
+ Diamond corral, 102.
+ Direct fire, positions for, _See Artillery_.
+ Direct laying, 114, 126.
+ Discretionary powers
+ of artillery commander, 142, 143,
+ 240, 266.
+ of cavalry commander, 145, 146, 174,
+ 240, 241, 311,
+ 338.
+ of engineer commander, 259.
+ of flank guard commander, 74, 82.
+ of rear guard commander, 74, 295.
+ of signal commander, 341.
+ Dismounted action, cavalry, 150.
+ DISPERSION, _See Attack, Defense, etc._
+ in delaying action, 251, 297, 298.
+ in river line attack, 278.
+ longitudinal, 115.
+ of cavalry force, 234.
+ of fire, how increased, 331.
+ of machine guns, 173, 255, 306.
+ DISTANCES
+ and intervals in outposts, 179.
+ at night, 60.
+ as affected by close country, _See Close country_.
+ at which outpost must hold enemy, 176.
+ advance guard, 60.
+ between main body and advance guard, 67, 88, 337.
+ estimation of, 305, 333.
+ in flank march, 86.
+ of advance supply depot in rear of troops, 364, 367, 370,
+ 371, 372.
+ of flank guard, 79, 80.
+ of obstacles from firing line, 217, 259, 265.
+ of supports from firing line, 212, 257, 262,
+ 324, 325, 327.
+ rear guard, 72.
+ required for protection from fire, 80, 176, 300,
+ 346.
+ to which motor transport is effective, 387.
+ Distribution
+ in depth, 347.
+ individual and collective, _See Artillery_.
+ of fire, 331.
+ of orders, 40, 43, 44,
+ 220, 228, 293,
+ 350, 388.
+ of troops, advance guard, 64.
+ in camp, 173, 354.
+ Dividing responsibility with a subordinate, 42.
+ DIVISION
+ advance guard of, 337.
+ bridge trains with, 340, 361.
+ camp, 353.
+ cavalry, organization of, 10.
+ combat, 344.
+ commander, place of, 337.
+ depth of deployment, 348, 349.
+ dispositions in attack, 208.
+ in column of route, diagram of, 343.
+ march outposts, 341.
+ on the march, 337.
+ supply, 360.
+ tactics, 337.
+ influence of supply, 360.
+ time required for deployment, 344.
+ trains, _See Trains_.
+ Division of responsibility with subordinates, 42.
+ Division of reserves, _See Attack and Defense_.
+ Divisional cavalry, _See Cavalry_.
+ Double column, 29, 30, 31,
+ 78, 79, 149.
+ artillery and trains in, 78, 91, 95,
+ 339.
+ deployment from, 78, 79, 339.
+ Drainage, _See Camps_.
+ Drainage of trenches, 263.
+ Dressing stations, 222, 224,
+ 312, 319.
+ location of, 224, 225, 263,
+ 319, 320, 349.
+ time for establishment, 222, 228, 235,
+ 319, 320, 349.
+ Dummy intrenchments, 126, 251, 263,
+ 266, 298.
+ Dust raised by blast of discharge, 110.
+ Duties of artillery personnel, 129, 130, 131.
+ of personnel in fire engagements, 332.
+
+ E
+
+ Early start for marches, 86, 88, 341.
+ Echelons
+ in a defensive line, 251.
+ in advance to attack, 210.
+ movements of artillery in, 121, 125, 291.
+ of trenches on a flank, 209, 260, 265.
+ Economy in use of cavalry, 144, 168, 172.
+ Effect, fire for, _See Artillery fire_.
+ Elbow rests, 259.
+ Elevation, angle of, _See Artillery_.
+ Elongation, 17, 59, 90.
+ Enemy
+ assumption as to probable action of, 23.
+ contact with, _See Contact_.
+ first contact to be reported, 55.
+ indications of presence, 52, 54.
+ information of, 20, 52, 55,
+ 148, 209, 211,
+ 213, 220, 295,
+ 296, 308, 311,
+ 348, 356, 384.
+ location of flanks of, 209, 220, 226.
+ Enfilade and oblique fire, 209, 230, 236,
+ 344, 345.
+ artillery, 120, 127, 226,
+ 265, 328, 349.
+ effect on vulnerability, 212, 326, 327,
+ 328.
+ machine gun, 235, 306.
+ ENGINEERS
+ as escort for artillery, 224, 291, 314.
+ as escort for trains, 84, 341.
+ demolitions by, _See Demolitions_.
+ discretionary powers of commander, 259.
+ in attack, 224, 228,
+ 241, 347.
+ in night attack, 304.
+ in organization of a defensive position,
+ _See Fortification_, 216, 217, 228,
+ 234, 235, 247,
+ 258, 260, 272,
+ 273, 276.
+ in position in readiness, 309, 314, 316.
+ in retreat, 57, 58, 71,
+ 316.
+ in river line attack, 283.
+ mounted, with cavalry, 56, 145, 153,
+ 167, 283.
+ mounted section, 57, 71.
+ on the march in division, 340.
+ on outpost, 173, 180.
+ splitting units of, 258.
+ train, 349, 355, 360,
+ 361, 376.
+ with advance guard, 56, 57,
+ 337, 340.
+ with convoy, 99.
+ with flank guard, 78.
+ Entanglements, wire, 217, 259,
+ 261, 265.
+ Enveloping attack, _See Attack_.
+ Envelopment to be provided for in first deployment, 208, 345.
+ Equipage, bridge or ponton, _See Bridges_.
+ Escort
+ for artillery, 224.
+ for machine guns, 157, 161,
+ 222, 306.
+ for prisoners, 104, 351.
+ for trains, 62, 78, 84, 86,
+ 293, 317, 341,
+ 376.
+ of a convoy, _See Convoys_.
+ Establishment of an outpost, 187, 191.
+ Estimate of situation, 18, 21, 22,
+ 27, 44, 64,
+ 65, 191, 192,
+ 220, 225, 226,
+ 297, 308.
+ time required for, 43.
+ Estimating distances, 305.
+ Evacuation of wounded, _See Ambulances, Sanitary troops,
+ Wounded, etc._
+ Examination of terrain, _See Reconnaissance_.
+ Examining posts, 182, 184.
+ EXAMPLES
+ of messages, _See Messages_.
+ of orders, _See Orders_.
+ Excavation, time required for, 261.
+ Exchange of information by patrols, 52.
+ Expenditure of ammunition in combat, 214.
+ Explosives, _See Demolitions_.
+ Extended intervals, _See Cavalry charge_.
+ Extension of front
+ in combat, _See Attack and Defense_.
+ in delaying action, _See Delaying action_.
+ in pursuit, 301.
+
+ F
+
+ Feint, _See River line attack_.
+ Ferries, 176, 277, 280,
+ 283.
+ Field artillery, _See Artillery_.
+ Field bakery, 361, 372.
+ Field fortification, _See Fortification_.
+ Field glasses, 48, 51, 385.
+ Field hospitals, 320, 369, 376.
+ capacity of, 319.
+ place in action, 349.
+ Field kitchens, 365, 388.
+ Field of fire, _See Attack, Defense, etc._, 154, 216, 230,
+ 250, 257, 262,
+ 275.
+ as an obstacle, 212, 217.
+ clearing, 217, 233, 235,
+ 246, 252, 256,
+ 258, 269, 270,
+ 272, 275, 276.
+ extent of, 250, 257,
+ 262, 297.
+ in delaying and decisive actions, 230, 251,
+ 257, 297.
+ outpost, 182, 183.
+ Field orders, _See Orders_.
+ Field trains, _See Trains_.
+ FIRE
+ aimed, vulnerability of various formations, 325.
+ artillery, _See Artillery, fire_.
+ at what directed, 331.
+ at will, _See Artillery, fire_.
+ classification of, 329.
+ concentration on critical points, 331.
+ control, 333.
+ convergence of, 209.
+ covering enemy’s line with, 210, 331.
+ discipline, 333, 334.
+ distribution of, 330, 331, 332.
+ dispersion, effect of visibility of target, 330.
+ how secured, 331.
+ enfilade and oblique, _See Enfilade fire_.
+ engagement, duties of personnel, 332.
+ orders of captain in, 334.
+ field of, _See Field of fire_.
+ from the rear, effects of, 154, 325.
+ frontal, maximum development, 252, 254, 263.
+ grazing effect, 324.
+ long range, in defense and delaying action, _See these subjects_.
+ mounted, inaccuracy of, 168.
+ overlapping and switching, 331.
+ platoon targets, 331, 332.
+ position, _See Position fire_.
+ plunging, 324, 327.
+ rapid, 305, 329, 330, 335.
+ rates of, infantry, 329.
+ machine guns, 305.
+ shrapnel, _See Shrapnel_.
+ slow, 329.
+ small arms, vulnerability of various formations, 325.
+ superiority, 63, 114, 120,
+ 204, 206, 209,
+ 237, 238, 277,
+ 278, 279, 280,
+ 298, 299, 331,
+ 334.
+ affords best cover, 209, 216, 345.
+ number of rounds required to establish, 214, 330.
+ when established, 209, 330.
+ sweeping, vulnerability of various formations, 325.
+ swept zone, 120, 205, 211,
+ 215, 289, 324,
+ 327, 329.
+ tiers of, 325.
+ volley, when employed, 329, 330, 335.
+ when opened in attack, 209.
+ Fires, and tent pitching of outpost, 182.
+ Firing data, 116, 142, 310.
+ Firing line, density of, 208, 219, 233,
+ 330, 347.
+ location of in retreat and delaying action, 324.
+ reinforcement of, 208, 211, 237,
+ 238, 257, 327,
+ 328.
+ Firing over heads of infantry, 120, 122, 141,
+ 349.
+ Flanged wheels for motor vehicles, 389.
+ Flank, _See Attack, Defense, Cavalry, Patrols, etc._
+ hostile, position to be ascertained, 209, 220, 226.
+ observers, artillery, 115.
+ reconnaissance, _See Reconnaissance_.
+ refusal of, 178, 209,
+ 260, 265.
+ FLANK GUARDS, 78.
+ artillery with, 78, 339.
+ cavalry with, 78, 81, 168,
+ 339.
+ composition of, 78, 79.
+ conduct of, 81.
+ connecting routes with main body, 79, 81, 82,
+ 339.
+ considerations influencing decision as to use, 79.
+ contact with advance and rear guards, 62, 81.
+ contact with enemy, 81.
+ decisive engagements by, 81, 339.
+ delaying action, 80.
+ discretionary powers of commander, 74, 82.
+ distance from main body, 61, 79, 80.
+ engineers with, 78.
+ formation, 81.
+ in change of direction, 80, 91.
+ in retreat, 74.
+ leaving prescribed route, 82.
+ machine guns with, 78.
+ occupation of critical points, 80, 82.
+ of cavalry, 78, 81, 339.
+ of convoy, 80, 95, 96, 99, 100.
+ of large and of small forces, 80, 81.
+ orders for, 82.
+ organization of, 259.
+ reconnaissance by, 79, 81.
+ reinforcement, 82.
+ routes of, 79, 82.
+ sanitary troops with, 78.
+ signal troops with, 78, 340.
+ strength of, 78.
+ trains, 78, 79.
+ when required, 79.
+ Flank, hostile, cavalry operations against, _See Cavalry_.
+ Flank march, _See Convoys, Flank guard, Marches_.
+ Flank positions
+ artillery, 120, 141.
+ in delaying action, 73, 290, 299.
+ in retreat and withdrawal, 73, 74, 289,
+ 290, 293.
+ Flank protection, _See Attack and Defense_.
+ by artillery, 110, 117, 119,
+ 122, 129, 130,
+ 212.
+ by cavalry, 212, 227, 234.
+ by machine guns, 227, 234, 235,
+ 305, 306.
+ by obstacles, 176, 178, 207,
+ 212, 259, 311.
+ by outpost, 176.
+ by reserves, 211, 236, 257,
+ 259, 297, 346.
+ during combat, _See Patrols_, 205, 211, 212,
+ 226, 227, 230,
+ 232, 235, 240,
+ 257, 259, 305,
+ 306, 348.
+ in retreat, 74.
+ of small forces, 178, 232, 248.
+ on march, 61, 79, 81.
+ patrols, _See Patrols_.
+ provision for by supreme commander, 213, 227, 232,
+ 235, 346.
+ Flare lights, 265.
+ Flash defilade, 113, 133, 140.
+ Flying depots, 367.
+ Forage, 361, 365, 366,
+ 368, 388.
+ weights of, 379.
+ Foragers, cavalry, 150, 151.
+ Foraging, 148, 169, 361.
+ Fords, 90, 284.
+ Form for action, 123, 131.
+ Forms for orders, 37, 38, 40.
+ Forms of attack, 205.
+ Form of messages, 54.
+ Formation, in two columns, _See Double column_.
+ FORTIFICATION, FIELD, _See Defensive position_, 215, 248.
+ as cover from artillery fire, 133, 216.
+ blending works with natural features of terrain, 258, 260, 266.
+ by whom ordered, 216.
+ clearing front, 217, 233, 235,
+ 246, 252, 256,
+ 258, 269, 270,
+ 272, 275, 276.
+ closed works in, 252.
+ concealment of, 183, 253, 256,
+ 258, 260, 262,
+ 265, 266.
+ constructed by troops who occupy, 216, 234,
+ 255, 276.
+ demolitions, _See Demolitions_.
+ duties of engineers in, 216, 217, 228,
+ 234, 235, 247,
+ 258, 260, 272,
+ 273, 276.
+ effect on initiative and morale, 209, 216, 254,
+ 257, 267, 310.
+ grenade nets, 253.
+ guiding principles, 266, 267.
+ in attack, 215, 216.
+ in close country, 254.
+ in delaying action, 298.
+ in position in readiness, 309, 310,
+ 311, 314.
+ in river line defense, 284.
+ in withdrawal, 289.
+ latrines, 256, 263.
+ misuse of, 216, 248, 249,
+ 257, 284, 310.
+ obstacles, _See Obstacles_.
+ outpost, 173, 177,
+ 182, 183.
+ parados, 263.
+ problems in, 267, 273.
+ relief for workers, 262.
+ rôle?of, 216, 248, 249,
+ 254, 266.
+ tasks, amount of, 261, 262.
+ time, tools, and personnel required, 216, 256,
+ 261, 270.
+ trenches
+ alignment of, 231, 251, 257,
+ 260, 262, 270.
+ communicating, 216, 253, 255,
+ 271, 276.
+ dummy, 126, 251, 263,
+ 266, 298.
+ drainage, 263.
+ location of, 252, 257, 258,
+ 262, 324.
+ trenches, fire
+ communications in, 253, 255.
+ continuity of, 233, 251, 253,
+ 254, 265.
+ details of construction, 261.
+ elbow rests, 263.
+ head and overhead cover, 216, 253, 255,
+ 256, 258, 261,
+ 263, 276.
+ loop-holes, 258, 263.
+ traverses, 253, 255, 256,
+ 257, 260, 262,
+ 263, 270.
+ trenches, support, 216, 256, 257,
+ 260, 262.
+ utilization of natural features of terrain, 250, 252, 254,
+ 256, 257, 258,
+ 259, 260, 266.
+ visibility of works to aeronauts, 265, 266.
+ works to be located on terrain, 249, 267.
+ Framework of a position in readiness, 310.
+ Freight cars, dimensions and capacity of, 378, 379.
+ Frontage
+ covered by fire of a battery, 110.
+ in attack and defense, 210, 217, 223,
+ 331, 332, 346,
+ 348.
+ of a battalion and squadron on outpost, 171, 180.
+ of a battalion in combat, 219.
+ of a battery in action, 110, 119, 140.
+ of a cavalry screen, 165, 174.
+ of an outpost, 177.
+ Frontal attack, _See Attack, frontal_, 206.
+ in advance guard action, 229.
+ in pursuit, 229.
+ of a river line, 278.
+ Frontal fire, maximum development of, 252, 254, 263.
+ Fuel, _See Camps_.
+ carried by aeroplanes, 387.
+
+ G
+
+ Gaits, in cavalry attack, 158, 159, 160.
+ Gap, _See Interval_.
+ General situation, 20.
+ General supply column, 365, 367, 368.
+ Geneva Convention, 318.
+ Geographical crest, 324.
+ artillery positions near, 121, 126, 129,
+ 133, 140, 234.
+ in delaying action, 290, 298.
+ Geological Survey, maps of, 34, 249.
+ Good and bad news, 41, 246, 314.
+ Good practice in tactics, 9, 23.
+ Good roads, for wagon and motor transport, 78, 83, 364,
+ 377, 387, 388.
+ Grazing effect of rifle fire, 324.
+ Grenades, 253.
+ Ground scouts, 155, 156, 160,
+ 167, 213.
+ Guerrilla warfare, 8.
+ Guides for night attacks, 302.
+ for night marches, 87.
+ Guiding points in attack, 210, 211, 221,
+ 223, 224, 330,
+ 332.
+
+ H
+
+ Habit of early starting, 86, 341.
+ of intrenching, 216.
+ Hague Convention, 362, 377.
+ Half-hearted measures, 204.
+ Halt order, time of issue, 93, 191, 355,
+ 356.
+ Halts of trains, 377.
+ Halts during a march, 89, 343, 377.
+ Head and overhead cover, 216, 253, 255,
+ 256, 258, 263,
+ 276.
+ Heavy field artillery, _See Artillery_.
+ Height of axle, artillery carriage, 109.
+ Height of mask, artillery fire, 113, 133.
+ Heights of observation for air craft, 138, 139,
+ 384, 385.
+ Heliograph, 115, 117.
+ High explosive shell, _See Shell_.
+ Holding attack, _See Attack, frontal_.
+ Horse artillery, _See Artillery_.
+ Horseholders, 152, 154.
+ Houses, demolition of, 252, 272, 273.
+ reconnaissance of, 50.
+ Hostile reinforcements, _See Reinforcements_.
+ Hostlers, 46.
+ Howitzers, _See Artillery_.
+ Hydroaeroplanes, 383.
+
+ I
+
+ Ideal conditions for supply, 372.
+ Identification of targets, 330.
+ of dead, 321.
+ Illumination of the battlefield, 265, 304.
+ Imaginary troops, 23, 32.
+ Immobilization of machine guns, 253, 305.
+ Inaccuracy of mounted fire, 168.
+ Increase in length of marches, 89.
+ Independent cavalry, _See Cavalry, independent_.
+ Indications of enemy’s presence, 52, 55.
+ Indirect laying, 114.
+ heavy field artillery, 133.
+ Individual characteristics reflected in solution
+ of tactical problems, 26, 27.
+ to be developed, 7.
+ Individual distribution, _See Artillery fire_.
+ Individual orders, 38, 39, 42, 220.
+ Inefficiency of loading, effect on capacity of carriers, 379.
+ Infantry batteries, 124.
+ Infantry in long columns of artillery or trains, 83, 99, 110,
+ 339.
+ plan of attack based on best dispositions of, 207, 345.
+ Infirmary, regimental, 318.
+ Influence of cavalry on strength of outpost, 171, 172, 174,
+ 188, 189, 190.
+ of fortifications on morale, 209, 216, 254,
+ 257, 267, 310.
+ of motor vehicles on warfare, _See Motor vehicles_.
+ of obstacles on assumption of offensive, 176, 217, 230,
+ 232, 299, 310.
+ of roads on strength and disposition of outposts, 170, 176, 183.
+ Information contained in patrol’s message, 55.
+ in orders, 41, 246, 314.
+ Information, lines of, 341.
+ of enemy, 20, 52, 55, 148,
+ 209, 211, 213, 220,
+ 295, 308, 311, 348,
+ 356, 384.
+ patrols, _See Patrols_.
+ service of, _See Air craft, Cavalry, Patrols, etc._
+ by cavalry, 148, 165.
+ Inhabitants, interviews with, 53.
+ Initial point of march, 58, 59, 88,
+ 89, 337, 338,
+ 341.
+ Initiative, 27.
+ effect of fortification on, 254, 257.
+ in operations of cavalry, 151, 161, 167.
+ in pursuit, 301.
+ in rencontre, 295, 296.
+ of subordinates, 22, 25, 42,
+ 223.
+ Inspection of outpost dispositions, 193.
+ Instructions, to artillery, 140, 143.
+ to patrol leaders, 47.
+ Interference of routes, 58, 59, 88,
+ 89, 227, 292.
+ Integrity of tactical units
+ in combat, 204, 205, 217.
+ in forming advance guard, 57, 337.
+ of artillery, 123, 133, 140,
+ 228, 345, 349.
+ on outpost, 175.
+ Interval
+ between guns in battery, 110, 140.
+ between main and holding attack, 209, 344,
+ 345, 346.
+ extended, in cavalry charge, 151.
+ in a defensive line, 231, 233,
+ 251, 253.
+ in an outpost, 179, 180.
+ Intrenchments, _See Fortification_.
+ Invading the province of subordinates, 22, 25, 42,
+ 223.
+ Issues, _See Ammunition and Supply_.
+ of rations, 81, 351, 355, 356,
+ 366, 367, 368, 369,
+ 375.
+ Issue points, 356, 375.
+
+ K
+
+ Kinds of orders, 39.
+ Kitchens, field, 365, 388.
+ location of in combat, 256.
+ Kites, 381.
+
+ L
+
+ Landmarks
+ as guiding points in attack, 210, 211, 221,
+ 224, 330, 332.
+ for designation of targets, 332.
+ for designation of outpost sectors, 182.
+ in assignments of fronts, 210.
+ in patrolling, 48, 50.
+ preferred to map-marks in orders, 41, 223.
+ Late arrival in camp, 87.
+ Latitude allowed artillery commander, 142, 143,
+ 240, 266.
+ cavalry commander, 145, 146, 174,
+ 240, 241, 311,
+ 338.
+ engineer commander, 259.
+ flank guard commander, 74, 82.
+ rear guard commander, 74, 295.
+ signal commander, 341.
+ Latrines, 256, 263.
+ Laying, direct, 114, 126.
+ indirect, 114, 133.
+ Leading troops, 57, 85, 316.
+ Led horses, 154, 233, 241.
+ Length and speed of marches, 54, 89, 90,
+ 101, 165, 195,
+ 337, 377.
+ Limbers, artillery, position in action, 119, 128, 132.
+ Limitations of air craft, 386.
+ Limiting ranges in attack and defense, _See Attack and Defense_.
+ Limiting ranges of field artillery, 132.
+ Limits of front of outpost, 177.
+ Line of columns, cavalry, 157, 161, 163.
+ Line of communication, 11.
+ administration of, 362, 372.
+ commander of, 351, 356, 362, 363.
+ interruption of, 373.
+ motor transport for, 388.
+ multiple, 364.
+ operations against, 148.
+ service of, 363, 364.
+ zone of, 363, 364.
+ Line of fours, _See Cavalry_.
+ Line of observation, outpost, 171, 173, 184,
+ 185, 186, 187.
+ Line of resistance, outpost, 73, 173, 176,
+ 177, 178, 180,
+ 182, 183, 187,
+ 353.
+ Line of retreat
+ delaying positions on flank of, 73, 299.
+ in position in readiness, 309, 311, 312, 313.
+ in withdrawal or delaying action, 73, 74, 292,
+ 297.
+ multiple, 230, 292.
+ of enemy, 204, 207, 344.
+ of patrol, 52.
+ position of trains indicates, 83, 95.
+ pressure against, 344.
+ security of, 74, 154, 183,
+ 204, 207, 230,
+ 235, 278, 297,
+ 312.
+ separation from, 207.
+ Line, vulnerability of, 325.
+ Lines of information, _See Signal_, 341.
+ Linking horses, 152.
+ Litters, 319.
+ Living off the country, 361, 362, 363,
+ 369, 377, 388.
+ Loading, care in as affecting capacity of carriers, 379.
+ Localities, capital letters in orders and messages, 41, 54.
+ description of in orders, 41, 223.
+ Location of outposts, _See Outposts_, 176.
+ of works of field fortification, _See Fortification_.
+ Long range fire in attack and defense, _See Attack and Defense_.
+ Lookout points, _See Observing stations_.
+ Loopholes, 258, 263.
+ Losses in retreat over fire swept zone, 215, 289, 324.
+
+ M
+
+ MACHINE GUNS
+ ammunition supply, 305.
+ anti-aircraft, 138, 305,
+ 307, 385.
+ as supports for artillery, 121, 122, 133,
+ 304, 307.
+ dispersion of, 173, 255, 306.
+ effect of artillery fire, 265.
+ emplacements for, 255, 256, 265,
+ 276.
+ flank defense by, 227, 234, 235,
+ 305, 306.
+ immobilization of, 253, 305.
+ in attack, 217, 218, 222,
+ 282, 304.
+ in defense, 173, 228, 232,
+ 233, 234, 252,
+ 253, 255, 256,
+ 265, 269, 270,
+ 276, 304, 328.
+ in delaying actions, 74, 300, 306.
+ in night attack, 304, 307.
+ in pursuit, 306.
+ in rencontre, 296, 306.
+ mobility, 305.
+ motor transport for, 136, 305.
+ need of skilled operators, 305.
+ on air craft, 307, 382, 383.
+ on outpost, 172, 173, 180,
+ 182, 307.
+ pack transportation, 305.
+ position fire, 74, 331.
+ ranges and rates of fire, 304, 305.
+ supports for, 157, 161, 222, 306.
+ surprise fire by, 253, 305.
+ vs. artillery, 265, 296,
+ 305, 306.
+ with advance guard, 56, 306.
+ with cavalry, 152, 157, 159,
+ 161, 306.
+ with flank guard, 78.
+ with rear guard, 71, 74, 306.
+ Maneuvering zone, for artillery, 338.
+ for main body, 296.
+
+ Maps, 23, 41, 48,
+ 49.
+ corrections to, 50.
+ for solution of tactical problems, 25, 33.
+ Geological Survey, 34, 249.
+ issue of attack orders from, 205.
+ location of defensive position from, 249.
+ location of outpost from, 192, 356.
+ Map maneuver, _See Problems_.
+ Map measure, 28.
+ Map problems, _See Problems_.
+ Map references in orders, 41, 42.
+ March outposts
+ at crossroads, 341.
+ functions of cavalry, 190, 201.
+ of a division, 341.
+ of a patrol, 51.
+ patrolling by, 190.
+ placed by advance guard, 62, 190, 201.
+ when placed and withdrawn, 190, 192.
+ MARCHES, _See Advance, Rear and Flank Guards, etc._
+ abandoning selected line of, 82, 101.
+ alternation of troops in column, 85, 337, 338.
+ arrangement of troops and trains, 83.
+ artillery on, 71, 83, 110,
+ 123, 128, 136,
+ 338.
+ assembly of trains, 341.
+ bridge trains, 340.
+ by large and by small forces, 89.
+ cavalry on, _See Cavalry_.
+ change in direction, 80, 91, 102.
+ data in orders, 337.
+ days of rest, 87, 89, 337.
+ details of start, 88, 341.
+ disposition of trains, _See Trains_, 83, 84.
+ early, of a campaign, 89.
+ effects of cold and of warm weather, 91.
+ elongation, 17, 59, 90.
+ engineers on, _See Engineers_, 340.
+ forced, 89, 90.
+ habit of early starting, 86, 341.
+ halts during, 89, 343, 377.
+ infantry in long columns of artillery or wagons, 83, 99, 110,
+ 339.
+ influence of terrain, 62.
+ in double column, 78, 79, 91,
+ 95, 149, 339.
+ in peace time, 83.
+ initial point, 58, 59, 88,
+ 89, 337, 338,
+ 341.
+ interference of routes, 58, 59, 88,
+ 89.
+ intermingling foot and mounted troops, 83, 86.
+ late arrivals in camp, 87.
+ length and speed of, 54, 89, 101,
+ 165, 195, 337,
+ 377.
+ night, _See Night marches_.
+ of a convoy, _See Convoys_.
+ of a division, 337.
+ orders, 39, 58, 59,
+ 60, 83, 88,
+ 89, 97, 337.
+ passage of defiles, 63, 85, 229,
+ 300.
+ place of supreme commander, 85, 86, 337.
+ reconnaissance during, _See Advance guard, Reconnaissance, etc._
+ regulation of, 60, 88.
+ selection of route, 90, 100, 337.
+ sanitary troops on, _See Sanitary_.
+ signal troops on, 340.
+ time of starting, 86, 88, 337,
+ 338, 341.
+ Marginal distribution in orders, 40.
+ Marshes as obstacles, 176, 216, 232.
+ Mask, artillery, 113, 133.
+ Masked fire, _See Artillery_.
+ Masking the fire of a defensive position, 73, 75, 231,
+ 234, 235, 251,
+ 290, 299, 310.
+ Materiel, artillery, 109.
+ demolition by artillery fire, 109, 114, 126,
+ 133, 135, 138,
+ 141.
+ Meals for outposts, 175, 182, 184,
+ 187, 192.
+ for patrols, 48.
+ Measuring and marking ranges, 216, 217, 230,
+ 233, 246, 252,
+ 253, 256, 257,
+ 258, 259, 262,
+ 270, 171.
+ Meeting engagements, _See Rencontre_.
+ Messages
+ by cavalry, 149.
+ by patrols, 45, 53,
+ codes for, 150.
+ during combat, 350.
+ examples of, 240, 246, 274,
+ 316, 350, 357,
+ 360.
+ form and verbiage of, 54.
+ negative, 55.
+ transmission of, 53, 54, 144,
+ 149, 384, 388.
+ Mil, 109, 331, 332.
+ Military crest, 118, 298, 324.
+ Military policy of United States, 6.
+ MISSION
+ change of, 22, 91.
+ in defense, 217, 219.
+ in estimate of situation, 18, 21.
+ in position in readiness, 308.
+ in pursuit, 300.
+ in rencontre, 231, 295, 296.
+ of advance guard, 62, 63, 64,
+ 147, 229, 296.
+ of artillery, 118, 120, 122,
+ 123, 126, 128,
+ 142, 227.
+ of cavalry, 60, 62, 64,
+ 81, 85, 144,
+ 146, 147, 148,
+ 149, 164, 165,
+ 234, 338.
+ of flank guard, 339.
+ of patrols, 47, 51, 52.
+ of sanitary troops, 318.
+ plan of action governed by, 27, 219, 229,
+ 295, 308.
+ subordinates to be informed of, 41, 47.
+ Mixing tactical units in combat, 205.
+ Mobility and immobility of cavalry horses, 152, 155.
+ Mobility
+ as affected by supply, 362, 388, 389.
+ as affected by motor vehicles, 87, 387, 388,
+ 389.
+ of heavy field artillery, 133.
+ of machine guns, 305.
+ of mountain artillery, 137, 138.
+ Modern theory of war, 5.
+ Motorcycles, 144, 150.
+ MOTOR VEHICLES, 387.
+ armored cars, 80, 98, 387,
+ 388.
+ as adjunct to aero service, 382, 389.
+ as adjunct to rail transport, 387.
+ as affecting mobility, 87, 387, 388,
+ 389.
+ as tenders for air craft, 382.
+ communication by, 144, 150, 388.
+ concentration of troops by, 87, 211, 387,
+ 389.
+ convoys of, 83, 96.
+ distribution of orders by, 44.
+ economic size of, 388, 389.
+ employment in groups of same type, 96, 389, 390.
+ fatigue avoided by use of, 387, 388.
+ field kitchens, 388.
+ for escort of convoy, 98.
+ for overseas operations, 388.
+ for staff uses, 388.
+ for transport of artillery and machine guns, 136, 139, 305,
+ 387, 389.
+ good roads for, 364, 387, 388.
+ in ambulance service, 389.
+ in messenger service, 144, 150, 384,
+ 388.
+ in pursuit, 98, 301, 387.
+ in retreat, 71, 387.
+ in service of information, 47, 144, 150,
+ 388, 389.
+ in supply, 83, 96, 364,
+ 388.
+ interruption of movement, 387.
+ loading, dispatch, and unloading, 387.
+ on railroads, 389.
+ patrolling by, 45, 47, 389.
+ speed of, 90, 101, 377, 388.
+ training of personnel, 389.
+ trains of, 80, 83, 95,
+ 96, 364, 365,
+ 388.
+ Mountain artillery, _See Artillery_, 136.
+ Mountain ranges and deserts as obstacles, 277.
+ Mounted engineers, _See Engineers_.
+ Mounted orderlies, 46, 144, 222,
+ 311.
+ on outpost, 172, 181, 190.
+ with advance guard, 56, 61.
+ Mounted point, 61, 99.
+ Mounted reserve, cavalry, 151, 154.
+ Movements across country, 90, 140.
+ by night, _See Night Marches_, 86, 87, 89,
+ 125, 144, 168,
+ 205, 277, 281,
+ 289, 302.
+ during action, artillery, _See Artillery_.
+ in two columns, 29, 30, 31,
+ 78, 79, 91,
+ 95, 149, 339.
+ Mules, pack, _See Pack trains_.
+ maximum load, 136.
+ Mutual support by cross fire, 233, 250, 251,
+ 252, 253, 254,
+ 258, 263, 268,
+ 269, 276, 325,
+ 331.
+ Multiple lines of retreat, 230, 292.
+
+ N
+
+ Natural features of terrain, _See Terrain_.
+ Negative messages, 55.
+ News, good and bad in orders, 41, 246, 314.
+ Night and day positions of elements of an outpost, 187, 191, 193,
+ 356.
+ NIGHT
+ distances at, 60.
+ marches and movements
+ assembly, 303.
+ by artillery, 125, 303.
+ by cavalry, 144, 168.
+ effect on efficiency of troops, 86, 87, 89.
+ guides for, 87, 302, 303.
+ in concentration, 87, 205.
+ in pursuit, 87, 205.
+ in retreat, 87, 205, 289.
+ in river line attack, 277, 281.
+ in withdrawal, 205, 289.
+ occasion for, 87, 205.
+ reconnaissance prior to, 302.
+ time required for, 89.
+ reconnaissance, _See Night attacks and Outposts_.
+ NIGHT ATTACKS, 263, 302, 317.
+ ammunition supply, 303.
+ animals and vehicles, 303.
+ artillery, 303.
+ badges and watchwords, 303.
+ by large forces, 303.
+ by small forces, 205, 302.
+ cavalry, 303.
+ close order and simple formations, 303.
+ counter attacks, 303.
+ defense against, 304.
+ depths of formation, 303.
+ engineers, 304.
+ false attacks and demonstrations, 304.
+ guides, 302, 303.
+ issue of orders, 304.
+ machine guns in, 304, 307.
+ of bridge heads, 304.
+ reconnaissance prior to, 302, 303.
+ rendezvous, 303.
+ reserves, 303.
+ simplicity of plan, 303.
+ time for, 170, 188, 304.
+ trains in, 303.
+ use of bayonets, 303.
+ Numerical designation of supports and outguards, 183.
+
+ O
+
+ Oblique fire, _See Fire, enfilade_.
+ Objectives of air raids, 384.
+ Observation and control of artillery fire, 115, 117, 122,
+ 125, 131, 140,
+ 383.
+ Observation, position in, _See Artillery_.
+ Observing stations
+ artillery, 111, 117, 119,
+ 129, 130, 131,
+ 135.
+ balloons and kites as, 381, 383.
+ battalion, 256, 271, 276.
+ for patrols, 51.
+ for supreme commander, 131, 225, 226,
+ 228.
+ hostile, 262.
+ in combat, 131, 212, 225,
+ 226, 255, 256,
+ 258, 271, 276.
+ outpost, 186, 192.
+ portable, 381.
+ regimental, 255.
+ trees as, 117.
+ OBSTACLES
+ air craft surmount, 386.
+ as security for flanks, 176, 178, 207,
+ 212, 259, 311.
+ between flank guard and main body, 79, 81, 82.
+ between main and holding attacks, 345.
+ classification of, 216, 217.
+ concealment of, 259, 262, 265.
+ construction of, 173, 176, 234,
+ 246, 253, 256,
+ 258, 259, 267,
+ 304.
+ covering with fire, 217, 256.
+ demolition of, 58, 252, 259.
+ distance from firing line, 217, 259, 265.
+ effect on formations of attack, 216, 217,
+ 277, 345.
+ fences as, 156, 217.
+ field of fire as, 212, 217.
+ forms of, 216, 217.
+ in delaying action, 74.
+ in night attack, 304.
+ in position in readiness, 310, 311.
+ influence on assumption of offensive, 176, 217, 230,
+ 232, 299, 310.
+ influence on density of firing line, 233.
+ natural, 176, 216, 252,
+ 277, 345, 386.
+ on flank, 176, 178, 207,
+ 212, 259, 311.
+ on the march, 58, 62, 64,
+ 100, 103.
+ outpost, 171, 173, 176,
+ 180, 182, 190, 193.
+ removal of, 58, 98, 224,
+ 228, 252, 256,
+ 258, 269, 271,
+ 272, 273, 275,
+ 283.
+ repair of, 265.
+ streams as, 29, 176, 217,
+ 275, 277.
+ swamps as, 176, 216, 232.
+ to be covered by fire, 217, 256.
+ to cavalry, 156, 167, 217.
+ trees as, 252, 253, 256,
+ 258, 269, 275.
+ wire entanglements, 217, 259,
+ 261, 265.
+ Occupation of a defensive position, _See Defensive position_.
+ Offensive tactics, _See Aggressive tactics_.
+ Offensive tactics in defense,
+ _See Counter attack, Defense, Delaying action, etc._
+ Offsets, re-entrants and salients in a defensive line, 231, 251,
+ 260.
+ Operations, surgical, at dressing stations, 320.
+ against hostile flanks by cavalry, _See Cavalry_.
+ ORDERS, 37.
+ a, b, c, and x, y, z, paragraphs, 39.
+ abbreviations, 41.
+ advance guard, 58, 59, 60.
+ amount of information in, 41, 337.
+ assembly, 43, 59, 89.
+ brevity in, 38, 242.
+ circulation or distribution of, 40, 43, 44,
+ 220, 228, 293,
+ 350, 388.
+ combat, 39, 40, 205,
+ 208, 210, 211,
+ 220, 225, 332,
+ 346, 350.
+ combined, 38, 39, 42,
+ 220.
+ consonance with decision, 44.
+ contingencies in, 41, 42, 314,
+ 317.
+ copies to superior commanders, 40.
+ countermanding of, 42, 317.
+ data in, 58.
+ description of localities in, 41, 223.
+ detail in, 25, 38, 39,
+ 42, 43, 47,
+ 108, 142, 143,
+ 145.
+ development, 346.
+ dictated, 42, 43.
+ division of responsibility with subordinates, 42.
+ examples of
+ advance guard, of a small force, _verbal_, 65.
+ one brigade, reinforced, 67.
+ assembly, advance guard of a division, 66.
+ attack by a division, 351.
+ by a small force of infantry, _verbal_, 220.
+ enveloping, by reinforced brigade, 243.
+ frontal, by advance guard, 238, 241.
+ of a river line, 285, 286.
+ camp and outpost of a division, 357.
+ cavalry combat, small force, _verbal_, 163.
+ change in direction of march, 92.
+ delaying action, _verbal_, 74.
+ disposition of trains and issues of a division, 358.
+ fire engagement, company in, _verbal_, 334.
+ halt and outpost order of advance guard commander, 196, 200.
+ march of a convoy, 107.
+ march of a division, 342.
+ movement of division trains, 343.
+ occupation of defensive position, by reinforced brigade, 244.
+ outpost commander’s first order, 197, 202.
+ outpost commander’s second order, 198.
+ outpost commander’s small force, _verbal_, 199.
+ position in readiness on the march, 312.
+ pursuit, 301.
+ retreat and delaying action, 314.
+ retreat of a reinforced brigade, 75.
+ withdrawal from action, _verbal_, 293.
+ for artillery, 122, 124, 126,
+ 128, 130, 132,
+ 142, 143, 240,
+ 266.
+ for cavalry, 145, 146, 174,
+ 240, 311, 338,
+ 356.
+ for cavalry charge, 160.
+ for fire engagement, 332.
+ for flank guard, 82.
+ for flank protection, 213, 227, 232,
+ 235, 240, 246.
+ for intrenching, 216.
+ for issue of ammunition, 214, 220, 223,
+ 300, 311, 332.
+ for patrols, 47, 48.
+ for position in readiness, 311, 312.
+ for rear guard, 70, 72, 74,
+ 75, 77.
+ forms for, 37, 38, 40.
+ good and bad news in, 41, 246, 314.
+ halt, 93, 191, 355, 356.
+ individual, 38, 39, 42, 220.
+ kinds of, 39.
+ landmarks, 41, 223.
+ lists of individuals to whom delivered, 40.
+ map references in, 40, 41.
+ march, 39, 58, 59,
+ 60, 83, 88,
+ 89, 97, 337.
+ marginal distribution in, 40.
+ outpost, 176, 178, 181,
+ 187, 188, 189,
+ 190, 191, 196.
+ preliminary or preparatory, 43.
+ provisions for possible retreat, 41, 314.
+ receipts for, 40.
+ routine or administrative, 38, 42, 43,
+ 181, 356.
+ signatures to, 40.
+ standard time to be used, 41, 189.
+ structure of, 39.
+ style of, 37.
+ time of issue, 42, 59, 64,
+ 93, 191, 304,
+ 355, 356.
+ time required for circulation, 43.
+ trespass on province of subordinates, 22, 25, 42,
+ 223.
+ use of capital letters, 41.
+ verbal, 38, 39, 43,
+ 220, 293.
+ verbiage of, 37, 38, 40.
+ Orderlies, mounted, _See Mounted orderlies_, 46.
+ Ordnance, _See Artillery_.
+ Organization
+ of defensive position, 248.
+ of heavy field artillery, 133.
+ of tactical and supply units, U. S. Army, 10.
+ Outguards, _See Outposts_.
+ OUTPOSTS, 170.
+ all-around, 178, 183.
+ apportionment of duty, infantry, and cavalry, 168, 171, 172,
+ 174, 188.
+ artillery, 128, 172, 181.
+ assigned to reserve of advance guard, 58.
+ barricades, 173, 180.
+ camping arrangements, 181, 191.
+ cavalry, _See Cavalry_.
+ communications, 179, 184, 185,
+ 187.
+ composition, 170, 189.
+ concealment, 180, 182, 183,
+ 184.
+ contact with adjacent outposts, 186.
+ contact with enemy, 170, 177, 181,
+ 185, 189.
+ cordon and patrol systems of, 184.
+ cossack posts, _See Outguards_.
+ day and night positions and duties, 187, 191,
+ 193, 356.
+ depth of, 179.
+ detached posts, 172, 173, 174,
+ 178, 186.
+ detail from advance guard, 170, 356.
+ detail from rear guard, 170.
+ distances and intervals, 179, 189.
+ distance at which enemy is held, 176, 179.
+ duties, 170, 177, 185.
+ effect of cavalry on strength of, 171, 172, 174,
+ 188, 189, 190.
+ of close country on dispositions of, 171, 179, 180,
+ 186, 188.
+ of roads on strength and dispositions of, 170, 171, 176,
+ 177, 181, 182,
+ 183.
+ engineers, 173, 193.
+ establishment of, 187, 191.
+ examining posts, 182, 184.
+ exterior guards, 171, 174, 181.
+ field trains, 58, 181, 182,
+ 188.
+ fires, tent pitching, 181, 182.
+ firing on enemy, 171, 177.
+ flanks, 176, 177, 178,
+ 186, 189, 190,
+ 227, 355.
+ front covered by battalion or squadron, 171, 180.
+ front, limits of, 177.
+ in advance, 170.
+ in retreat or delaying action, 73, 77, 170,
+ 172, 317.
+ infantry vs. cavalry, 171.
+ inspection of, 193.
+ integrity of tactical units, 175.
+ interior guards, 178, 181.
+ intervals and distances, 179, 189.
+ intrenching, 177, 182, 183,
+ 184.
+ line of observation, 171, 173, 184,
+ 185, 186, 187.
+ line of resistance, 73, 173, 176,
+ 177, 178, 180,
+ 182, 183, 187,
+ 353.
+ preparation for defense, 173, 180, 182,
+ 183, 187.
+ reserve on, 177, 180.
+ location of, 176, 353, 356.
+ general rule for, 176.
+ use of maps in, 192, 356.
+ machine guns on, 172, 173, 180,
+ 182, 307.
+ march, _See March outposts_.
+ meals, 175, 182, 184,
+ 187, 192.
+ mounted men, 171, 172, 181,
+ 185, 186, 187,
+ 203.
+ night signals, 187.
+ observation points, 186, 192.
+ obstacles on line of resistance, 173, 182, 186,
+ 193.
+ of cavalry, 174, 179, 189.
+ of small commands, 174, 178.
+ on front of a defensive position, 180, 259.
+ on line of a river, 176, 179, 180,
+ 189, 281.
+ orders, 191.
+ day and night, 189, 191, 193.
+ of various commanders, 176, 178, 181,
+ 187, 188, 189,
+ 190, 191, 192,
+ 193, 196.
+ outlines of, 196.
+ time of issue, 191, 192, 193.
+ outguards, 175, 183.
+ at bridges, 180.
+ classification, 183.
+ distances, 179.
+ intervals, 179, 180.
+ intrenching, 184.
+ numerical designation, 183.
+ on roads, 182.
+ patrolling by, 187.
+ placing, 187, 188.
+ reliefs for, 184.
+ strength of, 175, 183.
+ patrol and cordon systems, 184.
+ patrolling, day and night, 188, 189.
+ limited, 203.
+ patrols, 184.
+ classification, 185.
+ communicating, 184, 185.
+ concentration of, 175.
+ day and night, 186, 187.
+ foot and mounted, 172, 185, 187.
+ from pickets, 187.
+ from reserve, 185, 186.
+ from supports, 182, 186, 187.
+ functions, 187.
+ in front of line of observation, 173, 174, 177,
+ 180, 182, 185.
+ insure vigilance of sentries, 186.
+ on flanks, 189, 190.
+ radii of action, 185, 186, 190.
+ reconnoitering, 185.
+ reduce vigilance required of outpost, 190.
+ routes and trails for, 184, 185.
+ reliefs for, 184, 186.
+ standing, 172, 174.
+ strength of, 185, 186.
+ visiting, 184, 185.
+ pickets, _See Outguards_.
+ proximity to enemy, 171, 177.
+ reconnaissance, _See Patrols_, 170, 171, 174,
+ 177, 182, 184.
+ relief of, 170, 188.
+ regimental sectors, 177.
+ reserve, 180.
+ camp, 173, 180, 181,
+ 187, 192.
+ location, 184.
+ on line of resistance, 177.
+ patrolling by, 185, 186.
+ special troops assigned to, 173, 180, 181.
+ roads, effect on dispositions, 170, 171, 176,
+ 177, 181, 182.
+ rules for strength and location, 170, 173,
+ 176, 177.
+ sanitary troops, 173.
+ security of flanks, 176, 177, 178,
+ 186, 189, 190,
+ 227.
+ sentinels, 182, 183.
+ sentry squads, _See Outguards_.
+ signal troops, 173, 184.
+ sketches and tables, 193.
+ strength and composition, 170.
+ as affected by cavalry, 171, 172, 174,
+ 188, 189, 190.
+ supports
+ concealment, 182, 183.
+ field of fire, 182, 183.
+ function of, 185.
+ intrenching, 182, 183.
+ location, 176, 178, 183.
+ number from one reserve, 183.
+ numerical designation, 183.
+ on roads, 177, 182.
+ patrolling by, 182, 186, 187.
+ sectors of observation, 182.
+ sentinels, 182, 183.
+ strength, 175, 181.
+ tents and fires, 181, 182.
+ time of relief, 170, 188.
+ trains, 58, 181, 182, 188.
+ vedettes, 179.
+ Overthrow of hostile cavalry, 144, 146, 149, 165.
+
+ P
+
+ Pack mule, maximum load of, 136.
+ Pack trains, 137, 145, 159,
+ 214, 338, 355,
+ 364, 366, 375,
+ 376.
+ Pack transportation for machine guns, 305.
+ for mountain artillery, 136, 137.
+ Packs, to be discarded in action, 223.
+ Panic in withdrawal, 289, 291.
+ Parados, 263.
+ Parallel pursuit, 72, 168, 230,
+ 301.
+ Parking a convoy, 99, 102.
+ Passive defense, _See Defense_.
+ Patrol and cordon systems of outposts, 184.
+ PATROLS, 45.
+ advance guard, 56, 61.
+ auto, 45, 47, 389.
+ capture of prisoners, 51.
+ cavalry, _See Cavalry_, 165.
+ civilians not to precede, 50.
+ classification, 45, 165.
+ combat, 45, 212, 311.
+ cavalry, 154, 155, 156,
+ 160, 161, 212,
+ 227, 234.
+ conduct, 212, 213.
+ distance from flanks, 156, 190.
+ strength, 156, 213, 235.
+ combat by, 51, 166, 213.
+ composition, 45.
+ conduct, 49.
+ formations of, 49.
+ inspection, 48.
+ interviewing inhabitants, 53.
+ leader, 45, 47, 48.
+ action before start, 48.
+ equipment, 48.
+ instructions to, 47.
+ march outposts, 51.
+ meals, 48.
+ messages, 45, 53, 150.
+ mission, 52.
+ mounted orderlies, 46.
+ outpost, _See Outpost_.
+ radius of action, 45, 166, 185, 186.
+ reconnaissance on march, 49, 50.
+ reconnoitering or information, 165, 166, 185.
+ relay posts, 53.
+ rendezvous, 50.
+ report first contact with enemy, 55.
+ road space, 49.
+ screening or covering, _See Cavalry_, 165.
+ security, 45, 190.
+ standing, 172, 174, 189, 311.
+ strategical, 45, 149, 150,
+ 165, 166, 185.
+ strength of, 45, 166.
+ tactical, 45, 165, 166.
+ Percussion fire, _See Artillery_.
+ Pickets, outpost, _See Outposts_.
+ Piercing an attenuated line, 206, 226.
+ Pioneers, _See Engineers_.
+ Pioneer training for cavalry, 153, 167.
+ Plan of attack based on best disposition of infantry, 207, 345.
+ Platoon columns, 325, 326, 327,
+ 328, 329.
+ Platoon sectors of targets, 331, 332.
+ Plows, 262.
+ Plunging fire, 324, 327.
+ Police guards, 99, 102.
+ Police of battlefield, 321, 351.
+ Ponton equipage, _See Bridge equipage_.
+ Portable tools, _See Tools_.
+ Positions, artillery, _See Artillery_.
+ Position fire, 74, 233, 255,
+ 256, 257, 258,
+ 282, 325, 331.
+ danger involved in, 258.
+ in river line attack, 282.
+ machine guns, 74, 233.
+ POSITION IN READINESS, 308.
+ advance guard in, 230, 308.
+ advanced positions, 310.
+ advantages of single position, 310.
+ artillery in, _See Artillery_, 310, 313,
+ 316, 317.
+ camp, 354.
+ cavalry in, 311, 312, 316.
+ concealment, 309.
+ considerations influencing decision, 308, 309.
+ demolition of bridges, 314, 316.
+ engineers in, 309, 314, 316.
+ field fortification in, 309, 310, 311,
+ 314.
+ framework of, 310.
+ in retreat, 77.
+ issue of ammunition, 311.
+ line of retreat, 309, 311, 312, 313.
+ location with reference to roads, 309.
+ obstacles, 310, 311.
+ orders for, 311, 312.
+ rear guard in, 316, 317.
+ reconnaissance in, 311.
+ relation to defensive position, 308.
+ security to front and flanks, 311, 312, 317.
+ trains and sanitary troops, 311, 312. 317.
+ when assumed, 231, 308.
+ Post offices, seizure, 62.
+ Precedents for military situations, 7, 23, 232.
+ Preparation, batteries of, 124.
+ for war, 5.
+ of defensive position, _See Defensive position_.
+ of tactical problems, 31.
+ Prepare for action, _See Artillery_, 125.
+ Prerogatives of subordinates, 22, 25, 42,
+ 223.
+ Principles of art of war, 8, 9, 24.
+ Prisoners
+ capture of by patrols, 51.
+ convoys of, 104.
+ disposal, 351.
+ escort for, 104, 351.
+ PROBLEMS, TACTICAL, 19.
+ apparatus for solution of, 28.
+ assumptions in, 22, 23, 223.
+ decision, 19.
+ diagrammatic analysis and synthesis, 29.
+ estimate of situation, 18, 22, 27.
+ examples of
+ advance guard of a small force, 64.
+ attack, by reinforced brigade, 225.
+ by small infantry force, 219.
+ battery of artillery in position, 128.
+ camp of a division, 354.
+ cavalry combat, small force, 160.
+ diagrammatic analysis and synthesis, 29.
+ division supply on the march, 368.
+ field fortification, No. 1, 267.
+ field fortification, No. 2, 273.
+ form of, 20.
+ imaginary troops, 23, 32.
+ in field fortification to be solved on terrain, 19, 249, 267.
+ kinds of, 19.
+ maps for, 23, 24,
+ 25, 33.
+ method of solution, 27.
+ mission in, 18, 21, 27.
+ preparation of, 31.
+ reality in, 20, 23, 28,
+ 31, 33.
+ troop leading, 19.
+ Protection
+ against rifle and artillery fire, distance required, 80, 176, 300,
+ 346.
+ of flanks, _See Attack, Defense, Outposts, etc._
+ Purchase of supplies, 361.
+ of line of retreat, _See Line of retreat_.
+ of supply depot, 373.
+ Pursuing by fire, 121.
+ PURSUIT, 300.
+ advance guard in, 229.
+ artillery in, 118, 121,
+ 142, 301.
+ broad front in, 301.
+ by fire, 121.
+ cavalry in, 144, 168, 282,
+ 301, 369.
+ contact during, 177, 301.
+ decisive attack in, 300, 301.
+ fresh troops for, 168, 211, 301.
+ frontal attack in, 229.
+ gaining flanks of enemy, 301.
+ machine guns in, 306.
+ mission in, 300.
+ motor vehicles in, 301, 387.
+ night movements in, 205.
+ parallel, 72, 168, 230, 301.
+ prompt initiation of, 301.
+ uncovering line of retreat, 205.
+ uncovering main body, 229.
+
+ Q
+
+ Quartermaster of convoy, 96, 97.
+
+ R
+
+ Radio, _See Wireless and Signal_.
+ Radius of action, air craft, 381, 382, 383.
+ patrols, 45, 149, 166,
+ 185, 186.
+ Radius of observation, air craft, 385.
+ Raids, air, 384.
+ cavalry, 144, 148, 169,
+ 175, 373.
+ Rail head, 320, 363, 370,
+ 372, 388.
+ RAILROADS
+ capacity of rolling stock, 378.
+ compared to motor vehicles, 387.
+ evacuation of wounded by, 322, 369, 378.
+ military control of, 363, 364.
+ motor vehicles on, 389.
+ movements of troops by, when advisable, 87, 387.
+ supply by, 356, 363, 367,
+ 372, 378.
+ Rally, after cavalry charge, 158.
+ after night attack, 304.
+ in retreat, 230, 292, 295.
+ Range-finders, 333, 386.
+ Range quadrant, 110.
+ Ranges, _See Artillery, Attack, Defense, etc._
+ Ranging, _See Artillery_.
+ Rapid fire, _See Fire_.
+ Rates of fire, 329.
+ anti-aircraft artillery, 138.
+ machine guns, 305.
+ Rates of march
+ cavalry and patrols, 54, 89, 90,
+ 165.
+ convoy, 101.
+ troops and trains, 89, 90, 101,
+ 165, 195, 337,
+ 371, 376, 377.
+ Rations
+ carried by trains, 366, 367.
+ for patrols, 48.
+ issue of, 84, 351, 355,
+ 356, 366, 367,
+ 368, 369, 375.
+ kinds of, 366, 379.
+ of cavalry, 159.
+ on person of soldier, 366, 367, 369.
+ weight and volume, 379.
+ Ravines and hollows in a defensive position, 252, 256,
+ 258, 273.
+ Raw troops, 204, 260.
+ Readiness, position in, _See Position in readiness_.
+ Reality in tactical problems, 20, 23, 28,
+ 31, 33.
+ Rear cavalry, _See Cavalry_.
+ REAR GUARDS, 70.
+ aggressive tactics by, 75.
+ artillery with, 71, 77, 128,
+ 138, 290, 291,
+ 292, 316.
+ cavalry with, 70, 147, 168,
+ 290, 292.
+ composition, 70, 292.
+ conduct of, 72.
+ contact with enemy, 72, 73.
+ contact with flank guard, 81.
+ counter attack by, 75.
+ covering main body, 72, 73.
+ detail of outpost from, 70, 170.
+ distances between fractions, 72.
+ engineers with, 71, 316.
+ field trains, 71.
+ flank detachments, 74, 75.
+ flank positions, 73, 289, 290,
+ 293.
+ in delaying action, _See Delaying action_.
+ in forward march, 70, 85.
+ in position in readiness, 77, 308.
+ in withdrawal from action, _See Withdrawal_.
+ latitude allowed commander of, 74, 295.
+ machine guns with, 71, 74, 306.
+ of convoy, 72, 100.
+ of cavalry, 71.
+ orders, 70, 72, 74,
+ 75, 77.
+ outpost attached to, 317.
+ proportions of infantry and cavalry, 70, 71.
+ reconnaissance, 72.
+ reinforcement of, 70, 73, 316.
+ sanitary troops with, 71.
+ signal troops with, 71.
+ strength of, 70.
+ subdivisions of, 71, 72.
+ supreme commander with, 75, 86, 316.
+ Receipts for orders, 40.
+ for supplies, 362.
+ RECONNAISSANCE, _See Air craft, Cavalry, Outposts, Patrols, etc._
+ aero
+ altitudes at which effective, 138, 139,
+ 384, 385.
+ balloons and kites, 381, 383.
+ concealment from, 119, 253, 256,
+ 265, 286, 385.
+ detailed observation impossible, 383, 386.
+ duties of, 383.
+ effect of darkness, rain, fog, etc., 149, 383, 386.
+ in defense of a river line, 284.
+ maintenance of contact by, 149, 386.
+ of artillery positions, 110, 119,
+ 131, 384.
+ of wooded areas, 385.
+ protection against, 138, 384,
+ 385, 386.
+ radius of, 381, 382, 383.
+ supplements that of cavalry, 47, 384.
+ use of field glasses, 385.
+ verification by actual contact, 384.
+ visibility of field works, 265.
+ by advance guard, 57, 60, 64.
+ by artillery, 111, 112, 121,
+ 122, 125, 130,
+ 131, 133, 141,
+ 142, 249.
+ by cavalry, _See Cavalry_.
+ by escort of convoy, 97, 99, 100,
+ 101, 102, 104,
+ 108.
+ by flank guard, 79, 81.
+ by rear guard, 72.
+ combat, _See Attack, Defense, Patrols, etc._
+ in force, 63, 206, 213,
+ 229.
+ in night attack, 302, 303.
+ in position in readiness, 311.
+ in rencontre, 295.
+ in selection of defensive position, 249.
+ limited, 203.
+ observing stations, _See Observing stations_.
+ of defiles, 50, 62, 102,
+ 108, 190.
+ of houses and villages, 50.
+ of river line, 281, 283, 284.
+ of terrain
+ by air craft, 384, 385, 386.
+ by artillery commanders, 111, 125,
+ 128, 130.
+ by outpost commander, 192.
+ by patrols, 50.
+ in attack of a river line, 281, 283.
+ prior to attack, 205, 220, 225.
+ of woods, 50, 101, 385.
+ officer, _See Artillery, personnel_.
+ outpost, 170, 171, 174,
+ 177, 182, 184.
+ prior to attack, 205, 220, 225,
+ 227, 230.
+ strategical and tactical, _See Patrols_.
+ Re-entrants in a defensive line, 251.
+ Refilling points, 364, 366, 367,
+ 368, 372.
+ Refusing the flanks of a line, 209, 260, 265.
+ Regimental aid station, 222, 224,
+ 255, 319.
+ Regimental sector, defensive position, _See Defensive position_.
+ outpost, 177.
+ Registration, _See Artillery_.
+ Regulation, of march, 60, 88, 89.
+ of main body on advance guard, 60, 88.
+ Reinforced brigade
+ as advance guard, 56.
+ attack by, 225.
+ composition of, 337.
+ defensive power of, 231.
+ order of march, 65.
+ use in campaign, 147.
+ Reinforcements, _See Supporting troops_.
+ for flank guard, 82.
+ for rear guard, 70, 73.
+ hostile, approach of, 167, 206, 207,
+ 224, 227, 234,
+ 288, 291, 292,
+ 311, 348.
+ Reinforcing the firing line, 208, 211, 237,
+ 238, 257, 327,
+ 328.
+ Relief, in construction of works of field fortification, 262.
+ of outpost, time of, 170, 187.
+ patrols and sentries of outposts, 184, 186.
+ strategical patrols, 150.
+ RENCONTRE ENGAGEMENT, 295.
+ advance guard in, 123.
+ aggressive action in, 231, 295.
+ artillery in, 123, 296, 339.
+ danger of, 297, 300.
+ initiative in, 295, 296.
+ machine guns in, 296, 306.
+ reconnaissance prior to, 295.
+ turning movements in, 296.
+ Rendezvous
+ for patrols, 50.
+ in night attack, 303, 304.
+ in retreat, 230, 292, 299.
+ of cavalry, 174.
+ Reports to superior commanders, 223, 317.
+ by cavalry, 146, 149.
+ Requirements of an artillery position, 118.
+ of a camp site, 93, 94, 353,
+ 354.
+ of a defensive position, 230, 232, 248,
+ 257.
+ Reserves, _See Attack, Defense, etc._
+ Resources of a State, 5.
+ Responsibility, division of with subordinates, 42.
+ military, 24, 25.
+ Rest, days of, 87, 89, 337, 365.
+ RETREAT, _See Delaying action, Rear guards, Withdrawal_, 70.
+ cavalry in, 147, 154, 172.
+ conduct of, 72.
+ contact with enemy, 72, 73.
+ covering main body, 72, 73.
+ danger of decisive engagement, 299.
+ flank positions in, 73, 74, 289,
+ 290, 293.
+ line of, _See Lines of retreat_.
+ location of firing line, 324.
+ motor vehicles in, 71, 387.
+ orders, 70, 72,
+ 75, 77.
+ over fire swept zone, 215, 289, 324.
+ position of readiness in, 308.
+ provisions for in orders, 41, 314.
+ rendezvous in, 230, 292, 299.
+ supply during, 376.
+ tendency to break straight to rear, 73, 74, 155,
+ 290, 292, 299.
+ trains in, 71.
+ withdrawal of outpost, 73.
+ Reverse slopes, defilade of, 135.
+ Rifle fire, _See Fire_.
+ Rifle in war, 324.
+ catechism of, 334.
+ Right of way for artillery firing batteries, 225, 339, 340.
+ Rivers as obstacles, 217, 277.
+ River line, outpost on, 176, 179, 180,
+ 189, 281.
+ RIVER LINE ATTACK, 277.
+ artillery in, 277, 278, 281,
+ 282, 286.
+ bridges, 277, 278, 280,
+ 281, 283.
+ cavalry in, 279, 281, 282.
+ conduct of, 281.
+ concealment in, 279, 280.
+ counter attack, 281, 282.
+ deceiving the defender, 279, 280, 281.
+ demonstrations, 279, 282.
+ engineers in, 283.
+ feint, 279, 281, 284.
+ ferries, 176, 277, 280, 283.
+ fire superiority in, 277, 278,
+ 279, 280.
+ frontal attack, 278, 279.
+ machine guns in, 278, 282.
+ means of passage, 277.
+ methods of, 278.
+ movements under cover of darkness, 281, 286.
+ night firing, 281.
+ outpost troops, 281, 282.
+ point of attack, 279, 280, 281.
+ position fire, 282.
+ reconnaissance, 281, 283.
+ reserves, 279, 280, 281,
+ 282, 283.
+ separation of forces, 278, 279, 281.
+ turning movements, 278.
+ uncovering crossings, 280.
+ uncovering line of retreat, 278.
+ River line defense, 284.
+ aero reconnaissance in, 284.
+ artillery in, 284, 300.
+ bridges and fords, 284.
+ cavalry in, 189, 284.
+ crossing the stream, 284.
+ detecting intentions of attacker, 284.
+ field fortification, 284.
+ methods of, 284.
+ reconnaissance, 284.
+ reserve, 284.
+ Road junctions, _See Crossroads_.
+ Road space, of bridge trains, 340.
+ of tactical units, 16.
+ Roads
+ as affecting location of camps, 353.
+ as affecting strength and location of outposts, 170, 171, 176,
+ 177, 181, 182,
+ 183.
+ for convoys, 100, 101, 102.
+ for flank guards, 79, 82.
+ for wagon and motor transport, 78, 83, 364,
+ 377, 387, 388.
+ in position in readiness, 309.
+ Rotation of organizations in advance guard, 85, 337, 338.
+ Rôle of field fortification, 254, 266.
+ Rôle of machine guns, 304.
+ Routes
+ concealed, for movements of artillery, 140.
+ between flank guard and main body, 79, 81, 82,
+ 339.
+ of advance guard, 58.
+ markers, artillery, _See Artillery personnel_.
+ of march, flank guard, 79, 82.
+ for convoy, 100, 101, 102.
+ of travel, outpost patrols, 184.
+ to combat positions, 209, 211, 223,
+ 224, 225, 226,
+ 227, 240.
+ Routine orders, 38, 42, 43,
+ 181, 356.
+ Rule, general
+ for covering troops of convoy, 95, 96.
+ for conduct of an active defense, 238.
+ for guidance of supply officers, 372, 373.
+ for strength and location of outpost, 170, 173,
+ 176, 177.
+ for withdrawal from action, 291.
+ Rules of art of war, 8, 9, 24.
+
+ S
+
+ Safe heights for air craft, 138, 139, 384.
+ Salients in a defensive line, 231, 251, 260.
+ Salvo fire, _See Artillery, fire_.
+ Sanitary equipment, _See Ambulance companies and Field hospitals_.
+ Sanitary requirements of a camp site, 93, 354.
+ Sanitary stations in combat, 319.
+ battalion collecting stations, 224, 256,
+ 270, 319.
+ dressing stations, 222, 224, 225,
+ 228, 235, 263,
+ 312, 319, 320,
+ 349, 350.
+ regimental aid stations, 222, 224,
+ 255, 319.
+ slightly wounded stations, 224, 225,
+ 320, 350.
+ Sanitary troops, _See Ambulance companies and Field hospitals_.
+ evacuation of wounded, _See Wounded_.
+ general duties, 318.
+ in position in readiness, 311, 312, 317.
+ in retreat, 71, 350.
+ on outpost, 173.
+ police of battlefield, 321, 351.
+ with advance, rear, and flank guards, etc., _See these subjects_.
+ Savage and guerrilla warfare, 8.
+ Scientific progress, effect on warfare, 24.
+ Scouts, aeroplane, 382.
+ artillery, _See Artillery personnel_.
+ ground, 155, 156, 160,
+ 167, 213.
+ Screen, aero, 138, 384, 385.
+ cavalry, 144, 146, 148,
+ 149, 164, 165,
+ 174.
+ Screening patrols, _See Patrols_.
+ Sea as a frontier, 6.
+ Searching fire on ground occupied by hostile
+ reserves, 115, 116, 120,
+ 122, 228, 237,
+ 265.
+ Sectors, of defensive line, 232, 254.
+ of observation, outpost supports, 182.
+ regimental, of outpost, 177.
+ Security
+ of flanks in combat, _See Attack, Defense, Patrols, etc._, 212.
+ of flanks of outpost, 176, 178.
+ of line of retreat, _See Line of retreat_.
+ service of, _See Advance, Rear, and Flank guards, Cavalry,
+ Outposts, etc._ to front, during organization of a
+ defensive position, 213, 234, 259.
+ in position in readiness, 311.
+ prior to combat, 213.
+ Selection of camp site, sanitary considerations, 93, 94, 354.
+ tactical considerations, 176, 353.
+ Selection of defensive position, 230.
+ of flank for envelopment, 207.
+ of outpost line, 353.
+ of route for convoy, 100.
+ Sentry squads and cossack posts, _See Outposts_.
+ Separation of feint and main attack of a river line, 280.
+ of main and holding attacks, 209, 344,
+ 345, 346.
+ of subordinates from their commands, 161, 220.
+ of trains and troops, 84.
+ Service of information, _See Cavalry, Patrols,
+ Reconnaissance, etc._
+ of the interior, 361, 363.
+ of the line of communications, 363.
+ Shell, high explosive, 109, 263.
+ demolition by, 109, 114, 126,
+ 133, 135, 138,
+ 141.
+ tracer, 139, 386.
+ Shelter for wounded, 320.
+ Shrapnel, 109, 133.
+ area of burst, 115, 327.
+ fire, against artillery, 126, 141.
+ moral effect, 120.
+ of anti-aircraft artillery, 138.
+ of heavy field artillery, 135.
+ protection from, 135, 216, 263.
+ vulnerability of various formations, 327.
+ height of burst, 113, 116.
+ ranging by, 115, 127, 141.
+ smoke producing matrix, 115.
+ Sight defilade, 113.
+ Sight, panoramic, 109.
+ Sights, battle, 115, 331.
+ combined, 331.
+ Signal commander, discretionary powers of, 341.
+ Signal equipment, _See Wireless_.
+ of air craft, 382, 383, 384.
+ of artillery, 109, 131.
+ of cavalry, 145, 150, 340.
+ Signal troops
+ in combat, 224, 228, 346.
+ on march in division, 340.
+ on outpost, 173, 180, 184.
+ with advance guard, 56, 337, 340.
+ with cavalry, 145, 150, 340.
+ with flank guard, 78, 340.
+ with rear guard, 71.
+ Signals
+ for advance to attack, 346.
+ of air craft, 384.
+ of outpost, 187.
+ of patrols, 49.
+ Signatures to orders, 40.
+ Simplicity in tactical procedure, 27, 32, 63,
+ 74, 204, 303,
+ 332, 334.
+ Single range, fire at, _See Artillery_.
+ Site, angle of, 116.
+ Situation
+ change in, 59.
+ estimate of, 18, 21, 22,
+ 27, 44, 64,
+ 65, 191, 192,
+ 220, 225, 226,
+ 297, 308.
+ general, 20, 32, 273.
+ precedents for, 7, 23.
+ special, 20, 273.
+ Size of armies as affecting problem of supply, 362, 388.
+ of motor vehicles for military use, 388, 389.
+ Sketches and tables, outpost, 193.
+ Skilled operators for machine guns and air craft, 305, 382, 383.
+ Skirmishers, line of, vulnerability, 325, 327. cavalry, 150, 151.
+ Sky line, 324.
+ Slashings, 217.
+ Slightly wounded, 319, 320.
+ Slightly wounded station, 224, 225,
+ 320, 350.
+ Slopes, effect on vulnerability, 326, 327.
+ Slope of fall, field artillery, 132.
+ Slopes, reverse, defilade, 135, 324, 325.
+ Small forces
+ in attack of convoy, 96.
+ in combat, 224, 225, 231,
+ 232, 248.
+ in defensive position, 248.
+ in night attack, 205, 302.
+ marches by, 89.
+ outposts of, 174, 178.
+ security of flanks of, 178, 232, 248.
+ terrain exercises of, 19, 23, 24.
+ turning movements by, 205, 278, 345.
+ Smoke bombs, 384.
+ Soil, character of as affecting time for excavation, 261.
+ Soup kitchens, motor vehicles for, 388.
+ Sources of supply, 361.
+ Sources of information, 21.
+ Spare parts for aeroplanes and motor vehicles, 382, 390.
+ Special situation, 20, 273.
+ Special troops on outpost, 180.
+ Speed
+ of air craft, 381, 382.
+ of motor vehicles, 101, 377, 388.
+ of troops on the march, 89, 90,
+ 165, 337.
+ of wagon trains, 90, 101, 371,
+ 376, 377.
+ Spies, 21, 59, 150,
+ 185.
+ Splinter-proof, 258.
+ Splitting
+ artillery units, 123, 133, 140,
+ 228, 345, 349.
+ organizations in combat, 205, 217.
+ on outpost, 175.
+ to form advance guard, 57, 337.
+ Squad columns, 325, 326, 327.
+ Staff duty, air craft and motor vehicles in, 384, 388.
+ Staffs of various units, 11.
+ Stampede of cavalry horses, 152, 154.
+ Standing patrols, _See Patrols_.
+ Starting a march, _See Advance guards and Marches_.
+ Stations, observing, _See Observing stations_.
+ sanitary, _See Sanitary_.
+ Step by step defensive, 77, 168, 235,
+ 292, 299, 308.
+ Stock cars, 378.
+ Streams, _See Rivers_.
+ Strength of column, how estimated, 52.
+ of organizations in U. S. Army, 10, 16.
+ of various bodies, _See reference in question_.
+ Style of orders, 37.
+ of messages, 54.
+ Subdivisions, battery of artillery, 109.
+ for action, time of, 123.
+ Subordinate commanders, assembly of, 220, 293.
+ trespass on province of, 22, 25, 42,
+ 223.
+ “Successive bounds,” 50, 63.
+ Successive positions in withdrawal or
+ delaying action, 77, 168, 235,
+ 292, 299, 308.
+ Successive ranges, fire at, _See Artillery_.
+ Successive thin lines, 326, 327, 328.
+ Sunrise and sunset, times of, 88.
+ Supplies
+ amount obtainable from a community, 377.
+ issue of, 356, 366, 368,
+ 370, 375, 376.
+ issue points, 356, 375.
+ motor transport for 364, 372, 388.
+ obtained in theater of operations, 361, 362, 367,
+ 372, 375, 377.
+ pack transportation, 364.
+ payments and receipts, 362.
+ purchase and requisition, 361, 362, 369.
+ rail and water transport for, 363, 364, 372.
+ refilling points, 364, 366, 367,
+ 368, 372.
+ reserves of, 363, 377.
+ Supply
+ data, 378.
+ depots, _See Advance supply depots_.
+ division, 360.
+ during retreat, 376.
+ effect on division tactics, 359.
+ ideal conditions of, 372.
+ problems in, with solutions, 368, 370.
+ problem of, as affected by size of armies, 362, 388.
+ sources of, 361.
+ trains, _See Trains_.
+ unit, 360, 364.
+ Supporting points, _See Defensive position_.
+ Supporting positions in withdrawal, 289.
+ Supporting troops, 20, 62, 99,
+ 103, 108, 148,
+ 149, 206, 207,
+ 212, 220, 229,
+ 250, 290, 348,
+ 353.
+ Support, mutual, in defense, _See Defensive Position_.
+ Support trenches, _See Fortification_.
+ Supports, _See Attack, Defense, Outposts, etc._
+ for artillery, 121, 122, 127,
+ 129, 133, 140,
+ 181, 224, 226,
+ 291, 304, 307,
+ 314.
+ for machine guns, 157, 161,
+ 222, 306.
+ for wire entanglements, 265.
+ Supreme commander
+ artillery officer with, 113, 126, 128,
+ 130, 142, 225.
+ controls operations of independent cavalry, 146, 147, 338.
+ designates front covered by advance cavalry, 174.
+ estimate of situation by, 44, 225.
+ general functions of, 362.
+ in combat, 225, 228.
+ influences course of action by use of reserves, 211, 346.
+ in withdrawal from action, 295.
+ observing stations for, 131, 225,
+ 226, 228.
+ on the march, 85, 86, 337.
+ orders disposition of packs, 223.
+ orders issue of ammunition, 223, 300, 311.
+ provides for flank protection, 213, 227, 232,
+ 233, 235, 246.
+ reports to, _See Examples of orders_, 317.
+ with advance guard, 62, 85, 86,
+ 225, 230, 297,
+ 337.
+ with rear guard, 75, 86, 316.
+ Surprise
+ advance guard protects main body from, 296.
+ by artillery fire, 62, 80, 97,
+ 101, 103, 127.
+ by machine gun fire, 253, 305.
+ in attack, 209.
+ in counter attack, 236.
+ in operations of cavalry, 153, 154, 155,
+ 156, 157, 159,
+ 160.
+ in rencontre, 295.
+ Surrender of initiative, 27, 151,
+ 161, 257.
+ Swamps and morasses as obstacles, 176, 216, 232.
+ Sweeping fire, _See Artillery_.
+ Switching and overlapping fire, 331.
+
+ T
+
+ TABLES
+ distribution of troops on outpost, 193.
+ equipment of patrol leader, 48.
+ estimate of situation, considerations in, 18.
+ marching rates of troops and trains, 90.
+ organization, U. S. Army, 10.
+ ranges, weights, etc., of field artillery materiel, 132.
+ time, tools, and personnel required for works of
+ field fortification, 261.
+ times of sunrise and sunset at Gettysburg, Pa., 88.
+ troops passing a point in one minute, 52.
+ war strength, road spaces, and camp areas of tactical units, 16.
+ weights of rations and forage and capacity of containers, 379.
+ Tactical considerations in selection of camp site, 176, 353.
+ Tactical problems, _See Problems_.
+ Tactical rides and walks, 20.
+ Tactical units
+ integrity of in combat, 205, 217.
+ in forming advance guard, 57, 337.
+ in forming outpost, 175.
+ organization of in U. S. Army, 10.
+ Tactics, _See Artillery, Cavalry, etc._
+ as influenced by motor transport, 387.
+ as influenced by supply, 365, 373.
+ division, 337.
+ of air craft, 381.
+ Targets
+ designation, 330.
+ identification of, 330.
+ platoon sectors, 331, 332.
+ Task, intrenching, size of, 261.
+ Telegraph and telephone, _See Wireless_.
+ advance guard seizes, 62.
+ equipment of artillery, 109, 135.
+ of balloons, 383.
+ of signal troops, 15.
+ in defensive position, 255.
+ military control of local lines, 62, 63.
+ reports by, 223, 317.
+ service on line of communications, 363.
+ timing the advance in combat, 346.
+ use for messages of patrols, 55, 150.
+ use on the march, 340.
+ Tendency of troops to rapid fire, 300, 329.
+ to break straight to rear in retreat, 73, 74, 155,
+ 290, 292, 299.
+ TERRAIN
+ as affecting advance guard tactics, 60, 62, 64.
+ as affecting dispositions of outpost, 170, 171, 176,
+ 178, 179, 180,
+ 182, 183, 186,
+ 188, 192.
+ as affecting operations of cavalry, 151, 154, 155,
+ 159, 230.
+ detailed knowledge from aero reconnaissance, 384, 385, 386.
+ examination of by artillery commander, 111, 125,
+ 128, 130.
+ by outpost commander, 192.
+ from enemy’s point of view, 249.
+ prior to issue of attack orders, 205, 220, 225.
+ exercises, 19, 31.
+ limited to smaller units, 19, 23, 24.
+ favorable for counter attack, 237, 238.
+ features affecting march, 62, 64, 90,
+ 100, 101.
+ fortifications to be located on, 249, 267.
+ in estimate of situation, 18, 23.
+ utilization of natural features
+ as cover in attack, 209, 210, 212,
+ 216, 217, 250,
+ 260, 269, 280.
+ as cover in defense, 256, 257, 309.
+ as obstacles, 207, 216, 217, 256, 259,
+ 273, 277, 310.
+ in field fortification, 250, 252, 254,
+ 256, 257, 258,
+ 259, 260, 266.
+ Theater of operations, 361.
+ Thin lines, _See Successive thin lines_.
+ Tiers of fire, 256, 257, 325.
+ TIME
+ and distance in tactical problems, 22, 29, 79,
+ 309.
+ fire, _See Artillery_.
+ for night attacks, 304.
+ for relief of outpost, 170, 187.
+ for starting a march, 86, 88, 337,
+ 338, 341.
+ of issue of ammunition, 214, 220, 223,
+ 332, 366, 375.
+ of issue of orders, 42, 59, 64,
+ 93, 191, 304,
+ 355, 356.
+ of issue of supplies, 356, 368,
+ 370, 375.
+ of sunrise and sunset, 88.
+ required for construction of field fortification, 256, 261.
+ required for deployment, 344.
+ required for issue of ammunition, 214.
+ required for preparation and circulation of orders, 43.
+ required to mount and dismount, 152.
+ standard, to be used in orders, 41, 189.
+ that small forces can delay larger, 231.
+ that troops can subsist without trains, 84, 367.
+
+ Timing the advance, 345, 346.
+ Tools, park and portable for fortification, 215, 217, 255,
+ 261, 268, 270,
+ 271, 272, 273,
+ 276, 361.
+ Training for war, 6.
+ TRAINS, _See Convoys, Issues, Supply, etc._
+ access to by troops, 57, 84, 144,
+ 145, 159, 169,
+ 181, 183, 365.
+ administrative, 365.
+ ammunition
+ composition and capacity, 366.
+ in combat, 84, 119, 124, 132,
+ 214, 234, 349,
+ 369.
+ in withdrawal, 291.
+ mountain artillery, 137.
+ on the march, 369, 370, 376.
+ armed men with, 78, 84, 97,
+ 317, 341.
+ assembly for march, 341.
+ auto truck, 80, 83, 95,
+ 96, 101, 364,
+ 365, 388.
+ auxiliary, 365.
+ bakery, 361, 372.
+ bridge, _See Bridge trains, etc._
+ classification of, 365.
+ combat
+ assembly of empty wagons, 214, 222, 225,
+ 228, 234, 241,
+ 255.
+ empties used to transport wounded, 234, 241, 255,
+ 321, 350.
+ ammunition carried by, 214.
+ artillery, _See Artillery_.
+ cavalry, 145, 159, 361.
+ flank guard, 78.
+ mountain artillery, 137.
+ replenishment, 291, 351, 375.
+ separation from troops, 83, 214, 366.
+ commander of, 350, 375, 376.
+ division, authorized number of wagons, 360, 361.
+ division, on the march, 341.
+ division into sections, 355, 376.
+ engineer, 349, 355, 360, 361, 376.
+ escort for, 62, 78, 84, 86, 293, 317, 341, 376.
+ field, 71, 365, 366, 370.
+ animal transport for, 390.
+ arrangement on the march, 83, 84, 341, 365.
+ artillery, 109, 110, 123, 129.
+ baggage section, 355, 365, 366, 373, 375.
+ in action, 220, 225, 228, 376.
+ in position in readiness, 311.
+ in retreat, 71.
+ join organizations at end of march, 84, 375.
+ of advance cavalry, 181.
+ of advance guard, 57, 58.
+ of escort of convoy, 96.
+ of flank guard, 78.
+ of outpost, 58, 181, 182, 188.
+ on march in division, 365, 376.
+ ration section, 355, 365, 366, 373, 375.
+ replenishment of, 366, 368, 369, 370, 372.
+ flank guard, 78, 79.
+ general supply, 365, 367.
+ good roads for movements of, 78, 83, 364, 387, 388.
+ halts, 377.
+ in action, 84, 225, 228, 349, 396.
+ in camp, 354, 373, 375.
+ in change of direction, 92.
+ in double column, 78, 91, 95.
+ in flank march, 78, 79, 83, 84, 92, 95, 376.
+ in night attack, 303.
+ in position in readiness, 310, 311, 317.
+ in retreat, 71, 376.
+ in withdrawal from action, 289, 291.
+ infantry in long columns of, 83, 99, 339.
+ location in camp, 355.
+ mounted troops with, 84, 168, 341.
+ on the march, 78, 79, 83, 376.
+ pack, 137, 145, 159, 214, 338, 355, 364, 366, 375, 376.
+ passage of defiles, 84, 376.
+ personnel of, 15, 368.
+ position of indicates direction of retreat, 83, 95.
+ rate of march, 90, 101, 371, 376, 377.
+ regimental, 365, 367.
+ release of in combat, 349, 350, 376.
+ sanitary, _See_ _Sanitary_.
+ size of in campaign, 360, 365.
+ supply
+ commander, 375, 376.
+ composition and capacity, 366.
+ of mountain artillery, 137
+ on march, 368, 376.
+ radius of operations, 370.
+ refill and rejoin, 372.
+ time of starting march, 86.
+ with cavalry, 144, 145, 159,
+ 169, 188, 338,
+ 375.
+ Transportation
+ by motor vehicle, 387.
+ by rail, 363, 364,
+ 372, 373.
+ by water, 363, 364,
+ 372, 373.
+ data, 378.
+ of animals, 378.
+ of wounded, _See_ _Wounded_.
+ organization of, 15, 16.
+ Traverses, 253, 255, 263.
+ Tread of artillery carriages, 109.
+ Trees, removal from front of defensive position, 258, 261, 269,
+ 270, 271, 272,
+ 273, 275.
+ Trenches, _See_ _Fortification_.
+ Trespass on the province of a subordinate, 22, 25, 42,
+ 223.
+ Troop leading problems, 19.
+ Turning movements, 345.
+ against small forces, 232, 248.
+ by advance guard, 63.
+ by cavalry, 153, 168, 205.
+ by small forces, 205, 278, 345.
+ in attack of a river line, 205, 278.
+ in rencontre, 63, 296.
+ inducing enemy to make, 298, 310.
+ Types of aeroplanes, 382.
+
+ U
+
+ Universal military service, 5.
+ Unloading details, 378.
+ Untrained troops, in offensive operations, 204.
+ Usurping prerogatives of subordinates, 22, 25, 42,
+ 223.
+ U. S. Army, organization of, 10.
+ U. S. Geological Survey, maps of, 34, 249.
+
+ V
+
+ Vegetation, allowance for in determining visibility, 140.
+ Vehicles, _See_ _Trains_.
+ allowance of to a regiment, 365.
+ capacity of, 366, 379.
+ motor, _See_ _Motor vehicles_.
+ vulnerability to fire, 95, 96, 101, 103.
+ with cavalry force, 145, 159, 169.
+ with infantry division, 360.
+ Verbal orders, 38, 39, 43,
+ 220.
+ Verbiage of orders and messages, 37, 40, 54.
+ Verification of reconnaissance by direct contact, 384.
+ Vertical cover for flash defilade, 113, 133, 140.
+ Villages, reconnaissance of, 50.
+ Visibility of target, effect of on dispersion of fire, 330.
+ of works of field fortification to aero reconnaissance, 265, 266.
+ Visibility problems, 24, 140.
+ Volley fire, _See_ _Artillery_.
+ Volplaning, 383.
+ Vulnerability
+ effect of slopes on, 326.
+ of air craft, 134, 138, 139,
+ 383, 384, 385,
+ 386.
+ of cavalry to attack in flank, 156.
+ of convoy, 95, 96, 101,
+ 103.
+ of infantry to cavalry attack, 153.
+ of led horses of cavalry, 151, 154, 241.
+ relative, of airships and aeroplanes, 139, 385.
+ to rifle fire, of various formations, 325.
+ to shrapnel fire of various formations, 327.
+ effect on of enfilade fire, 326.
+ effect of slopes, 326, 327.
+
+ W
+
+ Wagons, _See_ _Vehicles_, _Trains_, _etc._
+ War
+ as an art and science, 5, 9, 24.
+ game, 20.
+ modern theory of, 5.
+ preparation for, 5.
+ strength of units, U. S. Army, 10, 16.
+ training for, 6, 7, 8.
+ Warfare, detachment, 147.
+ savage and guerilla, 8.
+ Waste of ammunition, 135, 215, 300,
+ 329, 333.
+ Watchwords in night attacks, 303.
+ Water supply, _See_ _Camps_.
+ Water transport, 363, 364,
+ 372, 373.
+ Watering animals, 48, 50,
+ 101, 378.
+ Weapons employed by cavalry, 151, 166, 168.
+ Weather
+ effect on aero reconnaissance, 149, 383, 386.
+ effect on marching rates, 90.
+ in estimate of tactical situation, 18.
+ Weight behind teams, field artillery, 109, 132.
+ Weights of rations and forage, etc., 379.
+ of field artillery projectiles, 132.
+ Wire entanglements. _See_ _Obstacles_.
+ Wire sections, signal, 340.
+ Wireless, communication by, 150.
+ Wireless equipment, _See_ _Signal_.
+ dependability, 150.
+ of air craft, 382, 383, 384.
+ of cavalry, 145, 150, 340.
+ range of operations, 150.
+ WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION, 288.
+ ambulance companies and wounded, 289.
+ artillery in, 289, 290,
+ 291, 292.
+ cavalry in, 289, 290,
+ 292, 293.
+ distance of supporting position from firing line, 290.
+ duties of commander, 295.
+ flank positions in, 289, 290, 293.
+ general rule for, 291.
+ infantry, 70, 73, 298.
+ long range fire in, 290.
+ multiple lines of retreat, 292.
+ occasions for, 288.
+ of outpost, 73, 77, 308.
+ of part of force, 288.
+ order of, 291.
+ panic of troops, 289, 291.
+ rear guard, 292.
+ rendezvous, 292.
+ reserves, 289, 290,
+ 292, 347.
+ successive positions in, 77, 292.
+ time to commence, 298.
+ trains, 289.
+ under cover of darkness, 205, 289.
+ Withdrawal of cavalry behind outpost line, 148, 174, 179,
+ 181, 188, 189,
+ 190, 192.
+ Wooded areas, reconnaissance of, 50, 101, 385.
+ WOUNDED
+ abandonment of, 318, 351.
+ ammunition on persons of, 321.
+ as prisoners of war, 318.
+ civilian assistance in care of, 318, 322.
+ collection of, 318, 319.
+ evacuation of, 214, 222, 224,
+ 234, 241, 255,
+ 289, 318, 321,
+ 350, 341, 369,
+ 378, 389.
+ identification of, 321.
+ motor transport for, 389.
+ rail transport for, 322, 369, 378.
+ shelter for, 320.
+
+ X
+
+ x, y, z, paragraphs in orders, 39.
+
+ Z
+
+ Zone
+ beaten, of machine gun fire, 305.
+ beaten, of shrapnel fire, 115, 327.
+ fire swept, 120, 205, 211,
+ 215, 289, 324,
+ 327, 329.
+ maneuvering, for artillery, 338.
+ for main body, 296.
+ of the advance, 362, 364.
+ of line of communications, 363, 364.
+
+
+
+
+THE TECHNIQUE OF MODERN TACTICS
+
+
+ FOLLOWING ARE SOME REVIEWS OF SERVICE JOURNALS
+ AND A FEW CHARACTERISTIC COMMENTS CLIPPED
+ FROM LETTERS OF OFFICERS WHO HAVE
+ READ THE BOOK
+
+BY MAJOR GENERAL, J. FRANKLIN BELL, U. S. ARMY
+
+“The book is excellent. It consists of an unusually complete and sound
+digest of tactical principles, outlines of points to be considered
+in formulating tactical decisions, manner of drafting and models of
+field orders and instructions, methods of procedure to be followed in
+carrying out tactical decisions, power and limitations of all mobile
+units, etc. All statements and deductions appear to be based upon the
+best accepted tactical ideas of the present day.
+
+“While in its opening chapter the text introduces an officer to the
+proper method of pursuing the applicatory system of study, it is in
+fact a clearly concise presentation of all the essential points of
+tactics and logistics, assembled and arranged for a rapid review. It
+should, therefore, save an officer, concerned with some particular
+tactical problems, hours of poring over 'regulations’ and lengthy
+textbooks.
+
+“The English of the book is clear and to the point. The chapter on
+'Field Orders’ is very well written, and the chapter on 'Artillery
+Tactics’ is particularly good.”
+
+BY BRIG. GEN. A. L. MILLS, U. S. ARMY
+
+“While this volume contains much that is original in its subject
+matter, it seems to be especially characterized by the large field
+covered by its contents as well as by the simplicity with which
+the whole subject is presented. It is believed that no other book
+is available in which so many valuable military facts, principles,
+and suggestions are included within one volume as is the case in
+this publication. And it is not only the amount of material that is
+contained in the volume, but also the manner in which it is presented
+which enables the work to offer the student such valuable study. The
+book will also be useful to the soldier in the field as a book of
+reference. Especially valuable is the 'estimate of the situation'
+appearing on page 18. It is easily conceivable that the possession of
+this one page at the proper time might have a most material effect upon
+an important action.
+
+“The authors are to be congratulated on having given this work to the
+American Army and it is believed that the more widely it becomes known,
+the greater will it be in demand.”
+
+REVIEW OF THE JOURNAL OF THE U. S. INFANTRY ASSOCIATION
+
+“The authors present an excellent epitome of the tactics taught today
+in The Army Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The principles
+and considerations which should govern in the marching, fighting and
+securing of all bodies of troops, from a patrol to a division, are
+concisely stated, yet in greater detail than can be found in any other
+single volume of our language. For each form of map or maneuver problem
+the reader is furnished minute instructions to guide him in determining
+the best solution, followed by examples of solutions and orders that
+have been used in like problems at the Service Schools, and all is made
+clear by sketches and diagrams. The striking characteristic of the text
+is the quantity of precise information as to what experience teaches
+should or should not be done to obtain the greatest probability of
+success, and the total lack of vague discussion, followed by tentative
+or uncertain conclusions, so familiar in many other modern writings.
+
+“Formations and orders for patrols, advance, rear and flank guards,
+outposts, marches, changes of direction, convoys, the various types
+of combat, and the leading of the troops concerned, are discussed
+and illustrated. Other chapters deal with the tactics of light and
+heavy field and mountain artillery, cavalry, sanitary troops, the
+organization and fortification of a defensive position, the use of
+the rifle in war, the supply of our infantry division, orders in
+general, and the preparation and solution of tactical problems, and
+are of peculiar value to the general reader because their contents can
+otherwise be obtained only by search through a number of technical
+volumes.
+
+“This book will be absolutely beyond price to anyone entering the
+Service Schools and those concerned in the preparation or solution of
+problems in the Garrison Schools. It will also be of great value to all
+officers for careful study at first reading, and then, because of the
+wide range of subjects to be found between its covers, as an extremely
+handy book of reference.”
+
+REVIEW OF THE JOURNAL OF THE U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION
+
+“The purpose of this work, as stated in the readable and interesting
+introduction, is to furnish a guide to those engaged in the study of
+practical problems in tactics, and a convenient ready reference for
+officers charged with the preparation and conduct of field maneuvers,
+tactical rides, war games, etc.
+
+“The solution of tactical problems is treated in a masterly manner in
+Chapter I; the style is clear and attractive and reveals a deep insight
+into the foundations of human character. The simplification of the
+difficulties of tactical problems by diagrammatic analysis is deserving
+of special notice, and the suggestions for the preparation of problems
+will be appreciated by all those called upon to submit general and
+special situations -- often on short notice.
+
+“The acquisition of a crisp, epigrammatic style of expression by
+assiduous practice, after consulting good forms of field orders, as
+recommended by the authors, is the best way to avoid mere imitation
+of 'telegram' style on one hand, and the verbosity of the tyro on the
+other. The recommendation to stick to the usual form in writing orders
+is approved. The discussion of field orders by the authors lends new
+interest to an important subject.
+
+“The chapter on patrolling is so full and good that it is difficult to
+find anything to add.
+
+“The whole subject of advance guards, and the kindred subjects, rear
+and flank guards, are fully considered, and illustrated by examples of
+field orders.
+
+“The condensed information with reference to artillery material,
+organization, powers and tactics, will be of great value to officers of
+other arms.
+
+“The treatment of the subject 'Cavalry Tactics,' is in line with modern
+thought.
+
+'The subjects of 'Outpost,' 'Combat,' and 'Organization of a Defensive
+Position,' are comprehensively treated and richly illustrated by
+diagrams, maps and examples of orders.
+
+“The chapter on 'The Rifle in War' will be found to be one of the most
+interesting in the book. The 'Chapter on Division Tactics and Supply'
+contains a mass of valuable data of a practical nature.
+
+“The book as a whole forms a compendium of reliable military
+information which will prove to be a great convenience to the student.
+
+“The authors are to be congratulated on clearness of style and felicity
+of expression throughout the work.”
+
+REVIEW OF THE PROFESSIONAL MEMOIRS CORPS OF ENGINEERS
+
+“One of the most significant signs of the progress of these Schools
+(Leavenworth) is the appearance in the field of military literature
+of a number of works by their graduates, works which have compelled
+attention and which have reflected well deserved credit and honor both
+on the authors and the schools.
+
+“In the 348 pages of text and 15 figures, including maps, the authors
+have provided what might be termed a concentrated extract of the
+teachings of the recognized authorities in the art of war and tactics,
+as interpreted and taught at The Army Service Schools.
+
+“For those who are seeking to improve themselves by self study or to
+prepare for the Service Schools or Army War College, the work will be
+invaluable and will save much reading of Griepenkerl, Von Alten, Balck,
+Kiesling and the host of other writers on tactics.”
+
+REVIEW OF THE JOURNAL OF THE U. S. ARTILLERY
+
+“This book will be very useful to the coast artillery officer, for
+it contains much valuable information that has a direct bearing upon
+the preparation of plans and orders for the land defense of coast
+fortifications. It will also be of use to him in a larger sense. About
+97 per cent of the actions in which our coast companies have taken part
+have been field actions as distinguished from coast defense actions.
+The importance to coast artillerymen, therefore, of studies in tactics
+should be emphasized from time to time, lest they forget.
+
+“THE TECHNIQUE OF MODERN TACTICS has the merit of being a readable book
+devoted to a serious and important subject. But it was not made for
+mere skimming. It will repay careful study on the part of all officers
+of all grades and of every age in the various arms of the service.”
+
+FROM A GENERAL OFFICER
+
+“It contains in a single volume (handy, well arranged, and very
+comprehensive) information which would require much time to find
+elsewhere, and time required to find things deters most people from
+hunting them. The arrangement of the matter is excellent; the style
+plain, concise, and attractive. It is long since I have read a finer
+piece of writing than the introduction to the work. Any officer who
+masters this book will be a valuable officer when war comes.”
+
+FROM A GENERAL OFFICER OF THE GENERAL STAFF
+
+“The book shows most careful study and clear presentment. It is a work
+of great value to the service-one which ought to be particularly useful
+to instructors in our service schools as well as to all students, and
+an important addition to their military libraries.”
+
+A WELL-KNOWN OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD
+
+“The concise, plain and yet thorough manner of treating the subjects in
+the text is very gratifying. It comes nearer covering the entire field
+of minor tactics than anything else I ever saw. The book is one which
+should be in the hands of every National Guard officer who desires to
+prepare himself properly to meet the responsibilities entailed by his
+commission. The authors are to be congratulated on having accomplished
+so much in so compact a volume.”
+
+FROM A WELL-KNOWN CAVALRY OFFICER, AT ONE TIME INSTRUCTOR AT THE
+LEAVENWORTH SCHOOLS
+
+“From what I have seen I feel certain that it will give me a whole lot
+of help in conducting the Garrison School work. I find formulating map
+maneuvers, map problems, and the like, no mean task. Assistance in this
+line of work will be like a rope to a drowning man.”
+
+FROM A WELL-KNOWN INFANTRY OFFICER
+
+“The book is the one road I know that leads straight to the goal of
+good sense in tactics. It should be read and studied and reread by
+every officer until every word is burned into his everyday life in the
+service. Every officer who goes to Leavenworth should carry it.”
+
+ANOTHER INFANTRYMAN
+
+“It is in my opinion the best work of its kind ever published. Every
+field officer should absorb it from cover to cover.”
+
+A RECOGNIZED AUTHORITY, FORMERLY INSTRUCTOR AT THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS
+
+“The book merits the immediate recognition of all students of the
+Military Art, as a distinct advance on any existing work on applied
+tactics. It contains, briefly and concisely stated, the essentials for
+correct solutions of the important problems included in the course
+in Military Art at the Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, but more
+important still to the service at large, it has brought together a
+large amount of information from a number of different sources, which
+will be of immense value to every officer in the field, whether in
+maneuvers or in active campaign. If only one book besides the Field
+Service Regulations could be carried into the field, this should be
+chosen.
+
+“THE TECHNIQUE OF MODERN TACTICS is the culmination of the advance made
+in the study of applied tactics in our army during the last ten years.”
+
+FROM A PROMINENT INSTRUCTOR OF THE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS
+
+“Of all the books that have appeared in late years dealing with the
+subject of modern tactics, this one seems to occupy a niche of its
+own. There have been any number of excellent works on the methods of
+handling modern armies; so many in fact that the student who tries
+without a guide to make a study of the subject soon finds himself at
+a loss as to the best way to proceed. In this work the authors have
+succeeded in finding a clue to lead the student out of the labyrinth
+of books and methods. The name is well chosen. Besides its use in
+the progressive study of tactics, the book will find a wide field as
+a reference work when it is desired to refresh the memory upon some
+particular phase of the subject. For this purpose, it furnishes in
+concise form, the methods of procedure and the approved handling of
+troops and matériel as given by those on whom we look as authorities.”
+
+A PROMINENT CAVALRY OFFICER, FORMERLY INSTRUCTOR AT THE LEAVENWORTH
+SCHOOLS
+
+“I have read over the chapter on the attack and think it very good. The
+book justifies its existence by being more definite and intelligible
+and more readily applied than the Infantry Drill Regulations and
+Balck’s Tactics. At the same time it appears to be sound and to avoid
+ruts, such as the excessive use of models and normal formations.”
+
+FROM A PROMINENT INFANTRY OFFICER, FORMERLY AN INSTRUCTOR AT THE
+SERVICE SCHOOLS
+
+“The book contains a most exact statement of the principles taught at
+the Army School of the Line. It will be of the utmost value to those
+entering the school, and to the service at large.”
+
+A GENERAL STAFF OFFICER
+
+“The book is the best American military work we have ever had and is
+the best exponent of the Leavenworth idea and spirit that is available
+to our officers.”
+
+AN INFANTRY CAPTAIN
+
+“The advantage of having a copy of the Technique will become apparent,
+because it contains the principles which constitute the frame work of
+all tactical exercises and tactical study. It will save many a busy
+man hours of unnecessary work in looking up methods of procedure under
+given tactical conditions.”
+
+A CAVALRY MAJOR
+
+“If the Line Class man can see as many pointers in it as I can he will
+receive much aid. I am astonished at the amount of precise information
+the book contains. It enables me to refresh my memory quickly and the
+more readily reach my conclusions.”
+
+ Price $2.65 Postpaid
+
+ _For Sale by_
+
+ Book Dept., Army Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth,
+ Kansas.
+
+ U. S. Cavalry Association, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
+
+ George Banta Publishing Company, Menasha, Wisconsin.
+
+ MILITARY TOPOGRAPHY
+ FOR THE
+ MOBILE FORCES
+
+ Comprising Map Reading, Rapid Sketching
+ and Topographical Surveying
+
+ _By_
+ MAJOR C. O. SHERRILL
+ Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army
+
+ Late Instructor, United States Army Service Schools
+ Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
+
+ Adopted for use as a textbook in the Army Service
+ Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Adopted by the war
+ Department for use in the Garrison Schools for Officers;
+ as the basis for all examinations in Topography for
+ promotions; and for the use of the Organized Militia.
+ Adopted as a textbook by the Coast Artillery School at
+ Fort Monroe, Virginia.
+
+ This book gives the latest and simplest method of
+ making reconnaissance sketches and topographical maps,
+ and teaches the use of all kinds of maps in military
+ operations. The subject of rapid contour sketching
+ is fully covered with such simplicity that any
+ non-commissioned officer can learn to make good sketches
+ without the aid of an instructor, by the application of
+ the methods given in the text.
+
+ Over 350 pages, 154 text figures and folding maps
+
+ PRICE $2.50 POSTPAID
+
+ Map Reading, bound separately, 70c postpaid
+ Rapid Sketching, bound separately, $1.25 postpaid
+
+ GENERAL AGENTS:
+ U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION
+ Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
+
+ _THE MOSS PUBLICATIONS_
+
+ (By Major Jas. A. Moss, U. S. Army.)
+
+ OFFICERS’ MANUAL Price, $2.50 postpaid
+ An invaluable guide in all matters pertaining to the
+ social and official “Customs of the Service,” and in
+ administration, paperwork, duties of company officers,
+ adjutants, quartermasters, aides-de-camps, etc.
+ Especially valuable to officers just joining the Army
+ and to officers of the Organized Militia.
+
+ non-commissionED OFFICERS’ MANUAL Price, $1.50 postpaid
+ Based on the collated experiences of over fifty old and
+ experienced non-commissioned officers of the Regular
+ Army, and covering fully in a simple, _practical_
+ way the duties of all grades.
+
+ PRIVATES’ MANUAL Price, $1.00 postpaid
+ It gives in one book, in convenient, attractive,
+ illustrated and understandable form, the principal
+ things that the soldier should know, and which one must
+ now go through many books to get.
+
+ MANUAL OF MILITARY TRAINING Price, $2.25 postpaid
+ Profusely illustrated. Makes unnecessary all other books
+ for the training and instruction of Volunteer COMPANIES
+ and of COMPANY officers of Volunteers. _Adopted as the
+ military textbook of EIGHTY (80) of our military schools
+ and colleges_; 40,000 copies sold in two years.
+
+ APPLIED MINOR TACTICS Price, $1.00 postpaid
+ (Including Map Problems and War Game Map Reading.)
+ Map Reading--Map Sketching. Simplified for beginners.
+ Especially adapted to the instruction of subalterns,
+ non-commissioned officers and privates in their duties in
+ campaign.
+
+ FIELD SERVICE Price, $1.25 postpaid
+ Treats in a practical and concrete way the subject of
+ field service. Gives the result of the experiences of
+ many officers and enlisted men.
+
+ INFANTRY DRILL REGULATIONS SIMPLIFIED Price, 75c postpaid
+ An illustrated, annotated and indexed edition of the War
+ Department edition.
+
+ SPANISH FOR SOLDIERS Price, $1.00 postpaid
+ (By Major Moss and Lieut. John W. Lang.)
+ A combination grammar, and English-Spanish and
+ Spanish-English dictionary and phrase book, intended to
+ give officers and soldiers a fair working conversational
+ knowledge of military Spanish.
+
+ SELF-HELPS FOR THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER Price, $1.25 postpaid
+ (By Major Moss and Major M. B. Stewart.)
+ Profusely illustrated. A popular explanation of things
+ military.
+
+ RIOT DUTY Price, 50c postpaid
+ Presents the subject in _practical_, tabloid form,
+ telling an officer exactly what to do tactically and
+ legally if ordered out on riot duty.
+
+ Any of the above books with which you are not entirely
+ satisfied may be returned at our expense.
+
+ Geo. Banta Publishing Co., Menasha, Wis.
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77863 ***
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