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+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77798 ***
+
+
+
+
+[Illustration: VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE.
+
+DIRECTOR OF PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.
+
+_Photo: Hoppé._]
+
+
+
+
+                        SECRETS OF CREWE HOUSE
+
+
+                   _The Story of a Famous Campaign_
+
+                                  BY
+
+                      SIR CAMPBELL STUART, K.B.E.
+
+
+                         HODDER AND STOUGHTON
+                     LONDON    NEW YORK    TORONTO
+                                MCMXXI
+
+
+
+
+                 _First Edition printed September, 1920._
+                 _Second Edition printed October, 1920._
+                 _Third Edition printed November, 1920._
+                  _Fourth Edition printed March, 1921._
+
+
+
+
+                                  TO
+                         VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE
+                                  IN
+                       GRATEFUL AND AFFECTIONATE
+                             APPRECIATION
+
+
+
+
+AUTHOR’S FOREWORD
+
+
+Some courage is required to add to the already too swollen list of
+war books, of the making of which there seems to be no end. The
+justification for the present volume, which tells the remarkable story
+of British propaganda in enemy countries during 1918, lies in the fact
+that it records historic activities, some of which were of a pioneer
+character.
+
+Necessarily its publication had to be postponed until the main
+principles of the Peace had been decided. The nature of the documents
+quoted precluded earlier publication, which might have embarrassed
+the Allied Governments. No such embarrassment will be caused at this
+late stage. The march of events has removed the need, which existed
+during the War and during the peace-making, for withholding from public
+knowledge particulars of the organisation and work directed with such
+effect from Crewe House.
+
+Much that was interesting, and even dramatic, can never be divulged.
+Otherwise, many who did valuable and dangerous service might, by a
+breach of faith, be exposed to reprisals.
+
+The activities of Crewe House will stand the test of judgment by
+results. German comments on Viscount Northcliffe’s department leave no
+room for doubt as to the verdict of enemy countries.
+
+
+
+
+  CONTENTS
+
+
+  CHAPTER I
+
+  PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES                             1
+
+
+  CHAPTER II
+
+  CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND _PERSONNEL_               8
+
+
+  CHAPTER III
+
+  OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S
+  MOST STRIKING SUCCESS                                      20
+
+
+  CHAPTER IV
+
+  OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY                                 50
+
+
+  CHAPTER V
+
+  TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY                                   105
+
+
+  CHAPTER VI
+
+  OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES          134
+
+
+  CHAPTER VII
+
+  INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION                                 146
+
+
+  CHAPTER VIII
+
+  FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO PEACE PROPAGANDA                   201
+
+
+  CHAPTER IX
+
+  _VALE!_                                                   233
+
+
+  APPENDIX--Facsimile leaflets and translations             237
+
+  INDEX                                                     253
+
+
+
+
+  LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
+
+
+  Viscount Northcliffe                          _Frontispiece_
+
+                                                   BETWEEN PAGES
+
+  Crewe House                                          8 and 9
+
+  Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, K.C.M.G.,
+  C.B., M.P.                                           8 and 9
+
+  Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh,
+  K.C.M.G., C.B.                                      16 and 17
+
+  The Rt. Hon. Lord Beaverbrook                       16 and 17
+
+  Mr. H. Wickham Steed                                32 and 33
+
+  Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson                              32 and 33
+
+  News of Allied successes on Western Front for
+  Jugo-Slav soldiers in the Austrian Armies           48 and 49
+
+  A manifesto from Dr. Trumbitch distributed
+  from aeroplanes among Jugo-Slav troops
+  in the Austrian Army                                48 and 49
+
+  Mr. H. G. Wells                                     64 and 65
+
+  Leaflet--probably the first--distributed by
+  British aeroplanes among German troops
+  in October, 1914. It announced a Russian
+  victory in East Prussia                             64 and 65
+
+  Mr. Hamilton Fyfe                                   64 and 65
+
+  Aeroplane distribution of copies of an early
+  leaflet prepared for the German soldier             64 and 65
+
+  Brigadier-General G. K. Cockerill, C.B.             80 and 81
+
+  A typical news-sheet for German soldiers            80 and 81
+
+  Captain Chalmers Mitchell                           96 and 97
+
+  “Reporting Progress”--Leaflet which gave
+  particulars of Allied progress against the
+  Germans                                             96 and 97
+
+  Diagrammatic representation of the growth of
+  the American Army in the Field                      96 and 97
+
+  Map-leaflet showing the breaking of the
+  Hindenburg line                                   112 and 113
+
+  News for German soldiers of the destruction
+  of the Turkish Army in Palestine                  112 and 113
+
+  Some pointed quotations for German soldiers
+  culled from German sources                        112 and 113
+
+  A medallion struck by the Germans in “dishonour”
+  of Lord Northcliffe                               128 and 129
+
+  Leaflet with particulars of the fate of 150
+  German submarine commanders, which
+  created great depression in German naval
+  ports                                             128 and 129
+
+  Leaflet warning the Germans that such places
+  as Berlin and Hamburg had been brought
+  within range of aerial attack and could be
+  bombed if the war were prolonged                  128 and 129
+
+  A German dream and the result. A leaflet
+  illustrating the collapse of the Mittel-Europa
+  ambition of German militarism                     144 and 145
+
+  Front page of a “Trench Newspaper,” issued
+  by Crewe House for German troops                  144 and 145
+
+  The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart., M.P.       144 and 145
+
+  Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E.                        160 and 161
+
+  Illustrated leaflet portraying contentment of
+  German prisoners in British hands                 160 and 161
+
+  Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.               160 and 161
+
+  Leaflet showing how the Allies had
+  shattered the great Berlin-Bagdad plan            160 and 161
+
+  Mr. Robert Donald                                 176 and 177
+
+  Manifesto to Magyar Troops                        176 and 177
+
+  “Drifting down in white showers”: Leaflets,
+  from Italian aeroplane squadron,
+  dropping on Vienna                                176 and 177
+
+  Manifesto, signed by Professor (now President)
+  Masaryk, to Czecho-Slovak soldiers                176 and 177
+
+  Sir Sidney Low                                    192 and 193
+
+  Rapidly-distributed leaflets for German troops
+  telling of Allied successes in the Balkans
+  and in Syria                                      192 and 193
+
+  Mr. James O’Grady, M.P.                           192 and 193
+
+  Inflating the balloons and attaching the
+  truth-telling leaflets                            208 and 209
+
+  Registering the direction and velocity of the
+  wind, in order to judge where the leaflets
+  would fall                                        208 and 209
+
+  How leaflets were attached to the balloons        208 and 209
+
+  Dispatching the balloons                          208 and 209
+
+  Testing the lifting power of balloons used for
+  propaganda purposes                               224 and 225
+
+
+  LIST OF MAPS.
+
+  Ethnographic map of Austria-Hungary                 32 and 38
+
+  The partition of Austria-Hungary: Showing
+  the boundaries as defined in the Peace
+  Treaties                                            48 and 49
+
+  Germany’s new boundaries as fixed by the
+  Treaty of Peace                                     80 and 81
+
+  Bulgaria as delimited by the Peace treaty         144 and 145
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES
+
+Definition and Axioms: Why German Propaganda Failed: Ludendorff’s
+Lament and Tribute.
+
+
+Propaganda in war is a comparatively modern activity. Certainly, in
+the stage of development to which it attained in the closing phases of
+the Great War, it is a new weapon of warfare and a powerful weapon.
+Therefore it requires skilful and careful handling. Otherwise it
+destroys rather than creates, and alienates whom it should conciliate.
+
+What is propaganda? It is the presentation of a case in such a way
+that others may be influenced. In so far as its use against an enemy
+is concerned, the subject matter employed must not be self-evidently
+propagandist. Except in special circumstances, its origin should be
+completely concealed. As a general rule, too, it is desirable to hide
+the channels of communication.
+
+Creation of a favourable “atmosphere” is the first object of
+propaganda. Until this psychological effect is produced (as the result
+of military events, of propagandist activity or of internal political
+disaffection) the mentality of enemy troops and civil population--and
+both are equally important in modern warfare--will be naturally
+unsympathetic and unresponsive to influence. In order to produce
+this “atmosphere” of receptivity and susceptibility, continuity of
+propaganda policy is indispensable. This presupposes definition of
+sound policy, based upon comprehensive knowledge of the facts and of
+the developments of the political, military, and economic situation,
+and also of the enemy psychology.
+
+When a line of policy has been laid down, actual propaganda operations
+may be begun, but not before. First of all axioms of propaganda
+is that only truthful statements be made. Secondly, there must be
+no conflicting arguments, and this can only be ensured by close
+co-operation of all propagandists and by strict adherence to the policy
+defined. A false step may possibly be irretrievable.
+
+Owing to inattention to these cardinal principles of propaganda
+against an enemy--inattention due to lack of appreciation of their
+importance--the Germans’ very energetic propaganda effort miscarried.
+Wrongly assuming that the war would be of short duration, they made use
+of untruths and half-truths, mis-statements and over-statements. These
+produced a temporary effect, but the protraction of the war brought its
+own refutation of their misrepresentation, and, instead of operating
+to the good of the Central Empires, the campaign wrought harm to their
+cause.
+
+Moreover, as they afterwards realised, the Germans did not agree among
+themselves in their misrepresentations. There was, as a well-known
+British authority on German propaganda has pointed out, a chaotic
+exuberance of different points of view. And they were incapable of
+understanding other nations. Dr. Karl Lamprecht, the distinguished
+German professor, deplored this in the course of a lecture at the end
+of 1914, when the Germans regarded their victory as assured. “When the
+war came,” he said, “everyone who could write obtained the largest
+possible goose quill and wrote to all his foreign friends, telling
+them that they did not realise what splendid fellows the Germans were,
+and not infrequently adding that in many cases their conduct required
+some excuse. The effect was stupendous.” “I can speak with the most
+open heart on the subject,” he added, “for amongst the whole crowd
+it was the professors who were most erratic. The consequences were
+gruesome. Probably much more harm came to our cause in this way than
+from all the efforts of the enemy. None the less, it was done with the
+best intentions. The self-confidence was superb, but the knowledge
+was lacking. People thought that they could explain the German cause
+without preparation. What was wanted was organisation.”
+
+Before coming to Allied methods and matter, it will be interesting to
+examine the scope of German propaganda. In the early stages of the war,
+Germany loudly proclaimed that she was winning. As the progress of
+events belied such words, she changed her theme. The Allies could not
+win, she averred, and the longer they took to realise this the greater
+would be their suffering and losses. She continually endeavoured to
+sow discord between the Allies. Great Britain was not taking her fair
+share of the Allied burden; Great Britain intended to retain Belgium
+and the northern part of France; Great Britain was using France and
+Russia for her own selfish ends; the interests of the Balkan Powers
+could not be reconciled. These were some of the foolish falsehoods in
+which she indulged. They were ineffective, as were her many attempts to
+stir up disaffection within Allied countries. Ireland, South Africa,
+India, Egypt and Mohammedan countries were examples in the case of
+Great Britain, and Algeria in that of France. She spared no effort to
+encourage Pacifism among the Allied peoples.
+
+Their lack of success became evident even to the Germans themselves.
+Government agencies and Press became more reticent as the war went
+on and the propaganda was found to be doing more harm than good.
+The military leaders became apprehensive of the effectiveness and
+superiority of British propaganda. Soldiers and writers made bitter
+complaints of the lack of any German organisation to maintain an
+adequate counter-campaign.
+
+General Ludendorff (“My War Memories,” pp. 360 _et seq._) is pathetic
+in his laments at the non-success of German efforts. “The German
+propaganda,” he writes, “was only kept going with difficulty. In spite
+of all our efforts, its achievements, in comparison to the magnitude
+of the task, were inadequate. We produced no real effect on the
+enemy peoples.” He admits failure, too, in propaganda efforts on the
+fighting fronts. In the East, he says, the Russians were the authors
+of their own collapse. In the West, “the fronts of our enemies had not
+been made susceptible by the state of public opinion in their home
+countries, and the propaganda we gradually introduced had no success.”
+He records his efforts to induce the Imperial Chancellor to create a
+great organisation, as it had become “undeniably essential to establish
+an Imperial Ministry of Propaganda,” and he was convinced that no
+adequate counter-campaign to Allied propaganda could be organised
+except by an Imperial department possessing special powers. “At last
+a feeble step in this direction was taken in August, 1918. A totally
+inadequate organisation was set up; besides, it was then too late.
+In these circumstances it was quite impossible to achieve uniformity
+in propaganda work between Germany and Austria-Hungary, as was
+conspicuously the case with our enemies. The Army found no ally in a
+strong propaganda directed from home. While her Army was victorious on
+the field of battle, Germany failed in the fight against the _moral_ of
+the enemy peoples.”
+
+Ludendorff’s _apologia_ shows that he understood the principles which
+should govern a propaganda campaign; but he did not understand that
+the German case was bad. He has the doubtful consolation of knowing he
+was right in his theories; for they coincided in large degree with the
+principles upon which Viscount Northcliffe based his famous intensive
+campaign from Crewe House. No other German has exhibited such a grasp
+of the fundamentals of propaganda as Ludendorff, and he had excellent
+opportunity of judging the efficacy of the action into which these
+theoretical principles were translated. His verdict is an unqualified
+tribute, as the extracts from his writings quoted in another chapter
+show.
+
+How this success was attained it is the purpose of this book to reveal.
+
+[Illustration: CREWE HOUSE.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND _PERSONNEL_
+
+Viscount Northcliffe’s appointment: The Formation of an Advisory
+Committee: Other Government Departments’ Co-operation.
+
+
+In February, 1918, Viscount Northcliffe accepted the Prime Minister’s
+invitation to become Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. Only
+a few weeks earlier, Lord Northcliffe had concluded his mission to
+the United States, where he had undertaken the co-ordination and
+supervision of the multiplex British missions engaged in purchasing
+food and munitions and in other vitally important operations. Upon his
+return to England, he had become Chairman of the London headquarters
+of the British War Mission to the United States of America, after
+having declined a seat in the Cabinet. Despite the importance of his
+new duties, he elected to retain his connection with the British War
+Mission to the United States.
+
+Lord Northcliffe’s name bore in itself a propaganda value in enemy
+countries. None knew better than the Germans with what assiduity and
+tenacity he had striven to awaken the British nation to the extent and
+significance of the war preparations of German militarism. From the
+time of his entry into this office he and his work were the subjects of
+continual reference in the German Press. The vehemence of their attacks
+showed the depth of their apprehension.
+
+The direction and organisation of propaganda abroad, and especially
+against enemy countries, required a _personnel_ deeply versed in
+foreign politics, with an intimate understanding of enemy psychology,
+and with professional knowledge of the art of presenting facts plainly
+and forcefully. The work was of a highly specialised character,
+designed to reveal to the enemy the hopelessness of their cause
+and case and the inevitability of Allied victory. This called for
+continuity of policy and persevering effort. But the problems of the
+penetration of propaganda into enemy countries were as exacting as the
+definition of policy and the presentation of the facts of the situation.
+
+In order to bring as wide a knowledge as possible to bear upon the
+conduct of this campaign of education and enlightenment of enemy
+peoples, Lord Northcliffe invited and obtained the enthusiastic
+co-operation of a committee of well-known men of affairs and
+publicists. Each had won distinction in some sphere of public service
+which rendered his aid in this work valuable.
+
+Lord Northcliffe appointed me as Deputy-Director of the department and
+Deputy-Chairman of the Committee.
+
+The members of the Committee were:--
+
+  Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.
+
+  Mr. Robert Donald (then Editor of the _Daily Chronicle_).
+
+  Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E. (Managing Director of Reuters Agency).
+
+  Sir Sidney Low.
+
+  Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., M.P.
+
+  Mr. James O’Grady, M.P.
+
+  Mr. H. Wickham Steed (Foreign Editor and later Editor-in-Chief of
+  _The Times_).
+
+  Mr. H. G. Wells.
+
+  Secretary, Mr. H. K. Hudson, C.B.E.
+
+It was an advisory committee of wide knowledge and many talents, with
+a strong representation of authors and journalists of distinction.
+Regular fortnightly meetings were held, at which each section of
+the department reported progress and submitted programmes of future
+activities for approval.
+
+The headquarters of the department were established at Crewe House,
+the town mansion of the Marquis of Crewe, who had, with characteristic
+public spirit, placed it at the disposal of the Government for war
+purposes.
+
+The department was divided into two main branches, the one for
+production, and the other for distribution, of propaganda material.
+In its turn the production branch was divided into German,
+Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian sections.
+
+For reasons which will be given in the next chapter, the
+Austro-Hungarian section was the first to begin operations. Mr. Steed
+and Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson were co-directors of this section. They
+were an admirable choice. As Foreign Editor (as he then was) of _The
+Times_, author of “The Hapsburg Monarchy,” and with experience from
+1902 to 1913 as correspondent of _The Times_ at Vienna, Mr. Steed had
+intimate and authoritative knowledge of the peoples and conditions of
+the Dual Monarchy. Dr. Seton-Watson was also a distinguished authority
+on Austro-Hungarian and Balkan history and politics, to which he had
+devoted many years of study.
+
+After determination of the policy to be pursued against
+Austria-Hungary, Lord Northcliffe entrusted to them the important
+mission to Italy which initiated the campaign against the Dual
+Monarchy, resulting in such far-reaching and remarkable consequences.
+In the course of this mission they attended the historic Rome Congress
+of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities and they took a prominent
+part in the establishment of the inter-Allied commission which waged
+propaganda warfare against Austria-Hungary. The subsequent conduct of
+this campaign necessitated keeping in close touch with the different
+national organisations of the oppressed Hapsburg races--Poles,
+Czecho-Slovaks, Southern Slavs, Rumanes--throughout 1918, and they
+were able to render signal services to these peoples as well as to the
+Allies.
+
+When operations began against Germany, Mr. H. G. Wells accepted Lord
+Northcliffe’s invitation to take charge of the German Section. Mr.
+Wells made an exhaustive study of the conditions affecting Germany
+from a propaganda point of view, with the co-operation of Dr. J. W.
+Headlam-Morley, and his memorandum (which is published in Chapter IV
+of this book) is a noteworthy document of exceptional interest. When,
+in July, 1918, he found himself unable to continue the direction of
+the German Section (although retaining membership of the Committee) he
+had collected a mass of valuable data for the use of his successor,
+Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, the well-known journalist. To Mr. Fyfe and his
+colleagues of the German Section fell the organisation of the
+“intensive” propaganda activities of the last three months of the war.
+
+There thus remained the work against Turkey and Bulgaria. By
+arrangement between Lord Northcliffe and Lord Beaverbrook, propaganda
+against Turkey was ably conducted by the Near East section of the
+Ministry of Information, in charge of Mr. (now Sir Hugo) Cunliffe-Owen.
+This was obviously wise in the interests of economy and efficiency.
+Propaganda in Bulgaria, however, was directed from Crewe House.
+
+The production of propaganda literature and its distribution were
+different functions and were performed by separate sections of the
+department, but, of course, in the closest co-operation. So far
+as enemy troops were concerned, the distribution for Germans and
+Bulgarians was undertaken by the British military authorities. For
+Austro-Hungarian troops, the work was placed on an inter-Allied basis,
+distribution being organised by the Italian Army.
+
+Distribution through civil channels, a difficult task, was in the hands
+of Mr. S. A. Guest, who, alone of British propagandists against the
+enemy, had been constantly engaged in that work since the early days
+of the war. He built up a series of organisations in different parts
+of Europe by which news and views could be introduced into all the
+enemy countries. Great ingenuity and perseverance were required, but no
+little measure of success crowned his efforts.
+
+Co-ordination of these activities was a vital necessity, and this
+was effectively ensured by a daily meeting of those in charge of the
+different sections, the liaison officers between Crewe House and other
+departments, and the heads of the administrative branches of Crewe
+House. At this meeting, held usually under my chairmanship, the general
+details of policy and operations of all sections were systematically
+discussed. Each section knew what the other was doing, and uniformity
+of policy and action was secured. In addition, the consideration of
+the problems which arose, whether in the general work of Crewe House or
+in the work of one particular section, benefited from the collective
+attention of a combination of enthusiastic minds. Mr. Hudson, the able
+secretary of the advisory committee, also acted as secretary of these
+daily meetings.
+
+All at Crewe House were profoundly grateful for the cordiality with
+which the many other Government departments, with whom they were
+brought into contact, lent their co-operation. In this respect
+the Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty, Treasury, Ministry of
+Information, and Stationery Office, all contributed materially to
+the success attained, although this list by no means exhausts the
+departments which willingly placed their resources at the disposal of
+Crewe House. It is pleasing to be able to record this as a recollection
+of and tribute to the service rendered by these departments in this
+phase of war activity.
+
+The liaison officers’ duties were extremely important. Mr. C. J.
+Phillips, a distinguished Civil Servant, who had been transferred from
+the Board of Education for special work in the Foreign Office, was the
+connecting link between the latter department and Crewe House. To him
+fell the task of keeping Crewe House informed of foreign developments
+which affected the work of propaganda in enemy countries and of
+keeping the Foreign Office _au courant_ with Crewe House activities.
+His assistance and judgment were of immense value in dealing with the
+questions affecting foreign affairs which were constantly arising.
+
+For a few months after Lord Northcliffe’s appointment, the Military
+Intelligence Directorate of the War Office continued the production
+of literature for propaganda work against the Germans, and during
+this period Major the Earl of Kerry, M.P., acted as liaison officer
+between the two departments. Each department was able to complement
+and supplement the other’s work with good effect, and the co-operation
+was carried out most harmoniously. When production was subsequently
+centralised at Crewe House, Captain Chalmers Mitchell became liaison
+officer with the War Office and with the Air Ministry. No greater
+tribute can be paid to his work than the record in the pages that
+follow.
+
+Most cordial, too, were the relations maintained with the Admiralty,
+and especially with Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall (Director
+of Naval Intelligence), through Commander (now Sir Guy) Standing,
+R.N.V.R. Crewe House was rightly grateful for constant co-operation of
+a confidential character through the exercise on its behalf of naval
+resources.
+
+Most valuable assistance was readily given to Crewe House by the
+Ministry of Information, so efficiently organised by Lord Beaverbrook.
+Close consultation was maintained between heads of sections of the
+two departments wherever co-operation could be advantageous. In
+certain European countries, for instance, the same agents acted for
+both departments--an arrangement which proved effective as well as
+economical. Invaluable service for Crewe House was performed by one
+agent of the Ministry in regard to Bulgarian affairs in which he
+displayed high competence and discretion. Crewe House was also indebted
+to the Ministry for the use of its wireless service in sending out
+matter for the enlightenment of the enemy by that means, and for many
+similar facilities, too numerous to mention, willingly offered and
+gladly accepted.
+
+With the Treasury--_bête noire_ to so many temporary war
+departments--Crewe House had the smoothest working arrangements
+through Mr. C. S. Kent, who acted as Financial Controller and
+Accounting Officer in addition to other duties connected with the
+general administration of Crewe House. At no time was Treasury sanction
+withheld or delayed in regard to any expenditure proposed in connection
+with enemy propaganda.
+
+The enemy leaders frequently alleged that Lord Northcliffe expended
+huge sums of money on his propaganda work. According to the report
+of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, the expenditure for the four
+months from September 1 to December 31, 1918--which was the period
+of the “intensive” campaign and consequently the most expensive--was
+£31,360 4s. 9d., which included expenses borne by the Office of
+Works, the Stationery Office, and the War Office on behalf of Crewe
+House. Only £7,946 2s. 7d. of this amount was incurred directly by
+Crewe House, one reason for the smallness of the amount being that
+many members of the department worked without remuneration for their
+services. The Auditor-General made a complimentary reference to the
+manner in which the accounts were rendered.
+
+Last, but not least, the Stationery Office which undertook all
+the printing arrangements for the millions of leaflets and other
+publications required in German, Croat, Bulgarian, and other languages,
+rendered great assistance by the promptness and efficiency with which
+they met Crewe House requirements which, from their very nature,
+generally necessitated working against time.
+
+It is particularly pleasing to look back and remember all the help
+so willingly given by other Government departments and to record the
+unfailing courtesy with which it was proffered and the zeal displayed.
+Crewe House gladly recognised the value of such loyal co-operation,
+of which those who were concerned in its work still retain grateful
+memories.
+
+[Illustration: REAR-ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD HALL, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.P.
+
+[DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]
+
+_Photo: Russell, London._]
+
+[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACDONOGH, K.C.M.G., C.B.
+
+[DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918].
+
+_Photo: Russell, London._]
+
+[Illustration: RT. HON. LORD BEAVERBROOK, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, 1918.
+
+_Photo: M. S. Kay, Bolton._]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S MOST STRIKING SUCCESS
+
+Anti-German Hapsburg Races: The Secret Treaty of London: Problem of
+the Adriatic: Importance of the Rome Congress: Lord Northcliffe’s
+Policy against Austria-Hungary: Formation of an Inter-Allied Propaganda
+Commission and its Effective Operations: The Final Triumph.
+
+
+Little time was spent in deciding that, of all enemy countries,
+Austria-Hungary would be most susceptible to propaganda. With
+the assistance of such authorities as Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr.
+Seton-Watson, Lord Northcliffe was soon able to propose a line of sound
+policy for the sanction of the Foreign Office.
+
+It is strange that determined action on some such lines had not been
+initiated previously by the Allied Governments. They had failed
+to profit from the anti-Hapsburg and anti-German sentiment of the
+oppressed subject races of the Dual Monarchy. Three-fifths of the
+Hapsburg peoples were actually or potentially well disposed to the
+Allies, and it was towards this majority that Lord Northcliffe decided
+that propaganda must be directed with two objectives, one constructive
+and one destructive:--
+
+  (1) The moral and active support of the national desires of these
+  races for independence, with the ultimate aim of forming a strong
+  non-German chain of Central European and Danubian States.
+
+  (2) The encouragement of their disinclination to fight on behalf of
+  the Central Empires, thus greatly handicapping the Austro-Hungarian
+  Armies as a fighting force, and seriously embarrassing the German
+  military leaders.
+
+It will be seen with what success each object was secured.
+
+The nationalities chiefly affected were the Czechs and the Southern
+Slavs. There were also lesser numbers of Italians, Poles and Rumanes,
+whom it was intended to place under their own national Governments of
+Italy, the State of Poland (then projected and now established), and
+Rumania, which countries marched with the districts of Austria-Hungary
+inhabited by their respective races.
+
+Operations were comparatively straightforward in every case except
+that of the Southern Slavs, in which the secret Treaty of London of
+April, 1915, presented a serious obstacle. At the beginning of 1918
+few people realised the difficulties thus created, but since the
+cessation of hostilities the “Adriatic question” has loomed largely in
+the public view of international relations and is rightly regarded as
+one of the most troublesome problems of world politics. Its bearing on
+propaganda lay in the fact that by this treaty Great Britain, France
+and Russia had promised to Italy certain Austrian territories inhabited
+by Southern Slavs. These territories, moreover, provided trading access
+to the sea and were of the highest economic value to any Southern Slav
+state which might be formed. So long as that treaty was regarded by
+the Southern Slavs as representing Allied policy, it was difficult
+to persuade them that Allied sympathies were with them or that the
+Allies would secure for them the economic interests necessary to the
+establishment of the united Southern Slav state peopled by the Serbs,
+Croats, and Slovenes.
+
+With the object of creating a counterpoise to the secret pact,
+representatives of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had assembled
+in Corfu, under the leadership of Dr. Trumbitch (president of the
+Southern Slav Committee) and M. Pashitch (Prime Minister of Serbia),
+and had issued the Southern Slav Unitary Declaration on June 20, 1917,
+proclaiming the union of the three peoples and claiming all territory
+compactly inhabited by them, which (said the Declaration) “cannot be
+mutilated without attaint to the vital interests of the community.
+Our nation demands nothing that belongs to others, but only what is
+its own.” On the one hand, this was an important counter-step to the
+partition of Dalmatia proposed in the Treaty of London; while on
+the other, it was a definite advance towards the solidification of
+the three peoples into nationhood. Consequently it was not without
+effect upon the German military leaders, who foresaw its influence
+upon the Southern Slav regiments of the Austro-Hungarian armies, and
+it undoubtedly hastened their decision to take direct control of the
+forces of the Dual Monarchy.
+
+The next move was made after the Italian armies had recovered from the
+disaster of Caporetto and had re-established their line on the Piave.
+On the initiative of Mr. Wickham Steed, Dr. Seton-Watson, and other
+members of the Serbian Society of Great Britain, conferences took place
+in London between leading Italians and Southern Slavs, with the aim of
+outlining a solution of the question which would be acceptable to the
+two nations. A memorandum of the discussions was given to the Prime
+Minister of Italy (Signor Orlando), who was then (January, 1918) in
+London. At Mr. Steed’s suggestion, Signor Orlando met Dr. Trumbitch and
+they discussed the question at great length, with the result that Dr.
+Trumbitch accepted an invitation from the Italian Premier to go to Rome.
+
+Before that visit took place, Dr. Torre, a prominent member of the
+Italian Parliament, was sent to London, as representative of an
+influential joint committee of the two Italian Houses of Parliament,
+to endeavour to establish a definite basis of agreement. After much
+negotiation the representatives of the two nations engaged themselves
+to settle amicably the various territorial controversies in the
+interest of the future good and sincere relations between the two
+peoples, on the basis of the principles of nationality and of the right
+of peoples to decide their own destiny. The linguistic and economic
+interests of such minorities as might have to be included in the
+national territory of either party were also guaranteed.
+
+This agreement of principle, made under the stress of war, coincided
+approximately with Lord Northcliffe’s entry into office. One of his
+first official acts was to dispatch Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson as a
+special mission to Italy. While there, they represented his department
+at the Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities which met with
+the consent of the Italian Government at Rome on April 7, 8, and 9,
+1918. The holding of this Congress was, in itself, an important act of
+propaganda. This unprecedented assembly, representing Italians, Poles,
+Czecho-Slovaks, Southern Slavs, and Rumanes, resolved upon common
+action in the proclamation of the right of national unity of these
+peoples and also confirmed, in striking fashion, the decisions arrived
+at between Italians and Southern Slavs in London. Signor Orlando,
+Signor Bissolati and other Italian Ministers expressed publicly their
+adhesion to the resolutions, which were as follows:--
+
+   “The representatives of the nationalities subjected in whole or in
+  part to the rule of Austria-Hungary--the Italians, Poles, Rumanes,
+  Czechs, and Southern Slavs--join in affirming their principles of
+  common action as follows:--
+
+  “(1) _Each of these peoples proclaims its right to constitute its own
+  nationality and State unity, or to complete it, and to attain full
+  political and economic independence._
+
+  “(2) _Each of these peoples recognises in the Austro-Hungarian
+  Monarchy the instrument of German domination and the fundamental
+  obstacle to the realisation of its aspirations and rights._
+
+  “(3) _The assembly recognises the necessity of a common struggle
+  against the common oppressors, in order that each people may attain
+  complete liberation and national unity within a free State unit._
+
+  “The representatives of the Italian people and of the Jugo-Slav
+  people in particular, agree as follows:--
+
+   “(1) _In the relations of the Italian nation and the nation of
+  the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes--known also under the name of the
+  Jugo-Slav nation--the representatives of the two peoples recognise
+  that the unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav nation is a vital
+  interest of Italy, just as the completion of Italian national unity
+  is a vital interest of the Jugo-Slav nation. And therefore the
+  representatives of the two peoples pledge themselves to employ every
+  effort in order that during the war and at the moment of peace, these
+  ends of the two nations may be completely attained._
+
+  “(2) _They declare that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea and its
+  defence against every present and future enemy is a vital interest of
+  the two peoples._
+
+  “(3) _They pledge themselves also, in the interest of good and
+  sincere relations between the two peoples in the future to solve
+  amicably the various territorial controversies on the basis of the
+  principles of nationality and of the right of peoples to decide their
+  own fate, and in such a way as not to injure the vital interests of
+  the two nations, as they shall be defined at the moment of peace._
+
+   “(4) _To such racial groups_ (nuclei) _of one people as it may be
+  found necessary to include within the frontiers of the other, there
+  shall be recognised and guaranteed the right of their language,
+  culture, and moral and economic interests._”
+
+Meanwhile, Lord Northcliffe and his experts had, in accordance with the
+principle consistently followed by Crewe House, determined the broad
+lines of policy upon which propaganda against Austria-Hungary was to
+be based. A memorandum on the subject was prepared and forwarded by
+Lord Northcliffe on February 24, 1918, to the Secretary of State for
+Foreign Affairs for his consideration and approval. The following are
+the principal points of the memorandum:
+
+  “I have long been of opinion that it would be well to concentrate on
+  Propaganda in Austria.
+
+  “I have made a point of seeing every available person who has come
+  out of Austria, including many Americans who returned to the United
+  States when I was there. All shared the same view--that the Dual
+  Monarchy entered the greater war in a halfhearted spirit; is weary of
+  the war; has endured hardships approaching starvation; and realises
+  that there is no benefit for Austria arising out of the war.
+
+  “The control of the Presses of the various nationalities composing
+  the Dual Monarchy is so absolute that the real facts of the war are
+  unknown to the multitude. Germany is not idle in Austria or elsewhere.
+
+  “For example, the entrance of the United States into the war has been
+  belittled, and described as mere American ‘bluff.’ Many subjects of
+  Austrian nationalities had, before the war, considerable knowledge
+  of the United States, owing to the great emigration to that country.
+  They would realise the power of the United States if explained to
+  them.
+
+  “It is submitted with respect, therefore, that one of the first steps
+  to be taken is to spread, through all available channels, accurate
+  facts about the American preparations.
+
+  “But, before making any beginning in that direction, or any others, I
+  feel that I must be placed in possession of knowledge of the policy
+  of the Allies as to the Dual Monarchy.
+
+  “I should be greatly obliged if you would give me your opinion on
+  the following suggestions, which are made after consultation with
+  those well acquainted with Austria. If they merit your approval, it
+  is suggested that they be submitted to the United States, France, and
+  Italy.
+
+  “It is suggested that there are two policies for the Department
+  of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. In order that there may be no
+  misunderstanding I have recapitulated elementary facts generally
+  known.
+
+  “These two policies are as follows:
+
+  “(_a_) To work for a separate peace with the Emperor, the Court,
+  and the aristocracy, on the principle of not interfering with the
+  domestic affairs of the Hapsburg Monarchy, and of leaving its
+  territory almost or quite intact; or
+
+  “(_b_) To try to break the power of Austria-Hungary, as the weakest
+  link in the chain of enemy States, by supporting and encouraging all
+  anti-German and pro-Ally peoples and tendencies.
+
+  “The (_a_) policy has been tried without success. The Hapsburgs are
+  not free agents. They have not the power, even though they may wish,
+  to break away from Germany, because--
+
+  “(1) They are controlled by the internal structure of their dominions
+  (the Dual System), which gives Germany decisive leverage over them
+  through the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary; and
+
+  “(2) Because the Allies cannot offer them acceptable terms without
+  breaking with Italy.
+
+  “It remains to try the (_b_) policy.
+
+  “This policy is not primarily, or even, in the last resort,
+  necessarily anti-Hapsburgian; it is not opposed to the interests of
+  the Roman Catholic religion; and it is in harmony with the declared
+  aims of the Allies.
+
+  “The Empire of Austria contains some 31,000,000 inhabitants. Of these
+  less than one-third, _i.e._, the 9,000,000 or 10,000,000 Germans of
+  Austria, are pro-German. The other two-thirds (including the Poles,
+  Czecho-Slovaks, Rumanes, Italians, and Southern Slavs) are actively
+  or passively anti-German.
+
+  “The Kingdom of Hungary, including the ‘autonomous’ kingdom of
+  Croatia-Slavonia has a population of approximately 21,000,000
+  of which one-half (Magyars, Jews, Saxons, and Swabians) may be
+  considered pro-German, and the rest (Slovaks, Rumanes, and Southern
+  Slavs) actively or passively anti-German.
+
+  “There are thus in Austria-Hungary, as a whole, some 31,000,000
+  anti-Germans, and some 21,000,000 pro-Germans. The pro-German
+  minority rules the anti-German majority. Apart from questions of
+  democratic principle, the policy of the Allies should evidently be to
+  help and encourage the anti-Germans.
+
+  “The chief means of helping them may be specified thus:
+
+  “(1) The Allied Governments and the President of the United States
+  should insist upon their determination to secure democratic freedom
+  for the races of Austria-Hungary on the principle of ‘government by
+  consent of the governed.’ Expressions such as ‘self-government,’
+  or ‘autonomous development’ should be avoided, because they have
+  a sinister meaning in Austria-Hungary and tend to discourage the
+  friends of the Allies.
+
+  “(2) For the same reason, statements that the Allies do not wish to
+  ‘dismember Austria’ should be avoided. The war cannot be won without
+  so radical a transformation of Austria-Hungary as to remove its
+  peoples from German control. The Hapsburgs may be driven to help
+  in this transformation if Allied encouragement of the anti-German
+  Hapsburg peoples is effective. By themselves the Hapsburgs cannot
+  effect a transformation except in an increasingly pro-German sense.
+
+  “(3) For propaganda among the anti-German peoples the agencies
+  already existing should be utilised. These agencies are chiefly
+  the Bohemian (Czecho-Slovak) National Alliance, the Southern Slav
+  Committee, and various Polish organisations.
+
+  “(4) The present tendency of the Italian Government to shelve
+  the policy embodied in the London Convention of April 26, 1915,
+  and to adopt a policy of agreement with the anti-German races of
+  Austria-Hungary should be encouraged and stimulated.
+
+  “(5) The ultimate aim of Allied policy should be, not to form a
+  number of small, disjointed States, but to create a non-German
+  Confederation of Central European and Danubian States.
+
+  “(6) The Germans of Austria should be free to join the Confederated
+  States of Germany. They would, in any case, tend to secede from a
+  transformed Austria, in which they would no longer be able to rule
+  over non-German peoples.
+
+  “In view of the great amount of cabling that will be necessary
+  to achieve unity, may I ask you to let me have either your own
+  suggestions, or your approval of those above mentioned, as speedily
+  as possible?”
+
+In his reply, Mr. Balfour wrote on February 26, 1918:--
+
+  “Your very lucid memorandum raises in one shape or another the
+  fundamental problem of the Hapsburg Empire. A final and authoritative
+  answer to the question you put to me can only be given (if given at
+  all) by the Cabinet, speaking in the name of the Government. But I
+  offer the following observations on the subject, in the hope that
+  they may help you in the immediate task for which you have been made
+  responsible.
+
+  “If the two alternative policies of dealing with the Dual Monarchy
+  set forth in your paper were mutually exclusive, and if they involved
+  distinct and even opposite methods of propaganda, our position would
+  be even more difficult than it is. For what we can do with the
+  Austrian Empire does not wholly depend upon our wishes, but upon
+  the success of our arms and the views of our Allies, and, as these
+  elements in our calculations cannot be estimated with certainty, we
+  should inevitably remain in doubt as to which of the two mutually
+  exclusive methods of propaganda it would be judicious to adopt.
+
+  “Fortunately, however, our position is not quite so embarrassing. As
+  you point out with unanswerable force, everything which encourages
+  the anti-German elements in the Hapsburg dominions really helps
+  to compel the Emperor and the Court to a separate peace, and also
+  diminishes the efficiency of Austria-Hungary as a member of the
+  Middle-Europe combination. The Emperor, by these means, might be
+  induced, or compelled, fundamentally to modify the constitution
+  of his own State. If he refused to lend himself to such a policy,
+  the strengthening of the non-German elements might bring about
+  the same end even more effectually than if he lent his assistance
+  to the process. But in either case the earlier stages of that
+  process are the same, and a propaganda which aids the struggle of
+  the nationalities now subject either to Austrian Germans or to
+  Magyar Hungarians towards freedom and self-determination, must be
+  right, whether the complete break-up of the Austrian Empire or
+  its de-Germanisation under Hapsburg rule be the final goal of our
+  efforts.”
+
+When acknowledging this prompt reply, Lord Northcliffe pointed out that
+his anxiety to move as rapidly as possible was due to the belief of
+the Italians that a strong Austrian or Austro-German offensive against
+Italy would be launched within the next two months. “If our propaganda
+in Austria is to help to weaken this offensive, or to turn it into
+a defeat, it ought, in my judgment, to begin at once, and all the
+agencies we can command ought to be hard at work within a fortnight.
+
+“The representative of the American Propaganda Department is in London.
+The Italian will be here next week, and we could no doubt have a French
+representative at the same time.
+
+“As to the memorandum, I am very pleased that you are in substantial
+agreement with the policy outlined. The two policies may not be
+mutually exclusive in the last resort, but it is very important that
+one or the other of them should be given absolute precedence. It would
+place me in an awkward predicament if, after basing vigorous propaganda
+on the (_b_) policy, I were confronted with some manifestation of the
+(_a_) policy on the part of the British or other Allied Government.
+For this reason I hope that the War Cabinet will not delay its own
+decision, and that it will try to get a decision from France, Italy,
+and the United States as quickly as possible.
+
+“It goes without saying that public declarations on behalf of the
+British, French, and Allied Governments, and, if possible, on the
+part of President Wilson, in the sense of the (_b_) policy would, if
+promptly made, greatly facilitate my efforts.”
+
+Obviously the wise course was to place action in carrying out this
+policy on an Inter-Allied basis. Lord Northcliffe, therefore, convened
+meetings in London which were attended by Italian, French and American
+representatives. It was decided to organise a committee to arrange with
+France and Italy for united operations on the Italian front against
+the Austro-Hungarian armies.
+
+Accordingly, the special mission which Lord Northcliffe had sent
+to Italy, and of which Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were the
+principal members, was entrusted with this task. With the willing
+support and co-operation of the Italian Prime Minister, the Italian
+Commander-in-Chief, and the British and French Commanders on the
+Italian Front, a permanent Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission was
+organised at the Italian General Headquarters. Italy provided the
+President (Colonel Siciliani) and one commissioner (Captain Ojetti)
+and Great Britain and France one commissioner each (Lieutenant-Colonel
+B. Granville Baker and Major Gruss respectively). To the Commission
+were attached, as a result of representations from Mr. Steed,
+representatives of committees of each of the oppressed nationalities.
+Mr. Steed, speaking on behalf of Lord Northcliffe, urged that only
+representatives of these races were fully qualified to speak to their
+co-nationals on the vital subjects which would form the theme of their
+propagandist productions.
+
+The Commission began work on April 18, 1918. It acquired a polyglot
+printing press at Reggio Emilia. A weekly journal was published
+containing news (collected by a special Italian office ably organised
+by Professor Borgese at Berne) quadruplicated in the Czech, Polish,
+Southern Slav, and Rumanian languages. The assistance of the national
+representatives was valuable to the point of indispensability in
+ensuring accuracy of translation and suitability of contents.
+These representatives also composed leaflet manifestoes. Coloured
+reproductions of pictures of a patriotic, or religious, nature which
+appealed to the nationalist aspirations and piety of the races,
+were made. All this literary matter was dispatched straight to the
+front-line armies from the printing press, and distributed by means of
+aeroplanes (one per army being detailed for this purpose), rockets,
+which were constructed to hold about 30 pamphlets, and grenades, and
+also by contact patrols. These patrols were originally formed by
+bodies of troops raised on the responsibility of the various Italian
+armies, and were composed of deserters of Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav,
+Polish, or Rumanian nationalities who had volunteered for this service
+against their hereditary enemy. They were wonderfully successful. The
+total number of leaflets and other productions thus distributed ran
+into many millions. But this by no means exhausted the channels of
+propagandist effort. Gramophone records of Czecho-Slovak and Southern
+Slav songs were secured by the British Commissioner and effectively
+used for the awakening of the nationalist sentiment among the troops of
+these races in the Austrian armies. The instruments were placed in “No
+Man’s Land,” and so close to each other were the front trenches of the
+opposing armies that the words and music could easily be heard.
+
+The Austro-Hungarian section of Crewe House, of which section Mr.
+Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were the directors, maintained the closest
+touch with the Commission. Specimens of literature were exchanged
+between the Commission and other sections of Crewe House, and it was
+not uncommon for one news leaflet to appear in eight or ten different
+languages, with a total circulation of several millions of copies. The
+Austro-Hungarian section also necessarily kept in the closest touch
+with the Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav, Polish, and Rumanian leaders and
+organisations in Allied and neutral countries. It also co-operated with
+Mr. S. A. Guest in the organisation of civil and secret channels in
+neutral countries by which propaganda literature could be introduced
+into Austria-Hungary.
+
+The effect of the launching of the propaganda leaflet campaign was soon
+apparent. Unrest became manifest among the Austro-Hungarian forces.
+Deserters belonging to the subject races came over to the Allied lines.
+This was one of the chief causes contributory to the postponements of
+the Austrian offensive carefully planned for April. When this attack
+was eventually made--in June--the Italian commanders, and their Allied
+colleagues, had full information concerning enemy plans and positions.
+
+But, unhappily, the propaganda, and, consequently, the military,
+campaigns were impaired by reactionary tendencies within the Italian
+Government. Had the Italian Government been prepared in May, 1918,
+to join with their Allies and Associates in making a joint public
+declaration in strong and unmistakable language in favour of the
+creation of a united and independent Southern Slav State and in
+recognising the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied and belligerent nation, the
+result would undoubtedly have precipitated the collapse of Austria in
+the early part of the summer of 1918.
+
+Instead of seizing the opportunity for this united and strong
+pronouncement which presented itself at a meeting of the Prime
+Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy, held at Versailles, on
+June 3, 1918, the following declarations were made:--
+
+  (1) The creation of a united and independent Polish State with free
+  access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and
+  just peace and of the rule of right in Europe.
+
+  (2) The Allied Governments have noted with pleasure the declaration
+  made by the Secretary of State of the United States Government (in
+  referring to the resolutions of the Rome Congress of Austro-Hungarian
+  nationalities), and desire to associate themselves in an expression
+  of earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations towards freedom
+  of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo (Southern)-Slav peoples.
+
+The regrettable weakness of the second declaration, which followed very
+closely the wording of Mr. Lansing’s earlier announcement on behalf of
+the United States Government, was entirely due to the opposition of
+Baron Sonnino (Italian Foreign Minister), who rejected the stronger
+declarations prepared by Mr. Balfour and the French Foreign Minister,
+M. Pichon. It was a retrogressive step by Italy from the position
+she had taken at the Rome Congress, at which her Prime Minister had
+expressly associated himself with the terms of the Italo-Southern Slav
+agreement that recognised the “unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav
+nation as a vital Italian interest.” In regard to the Czecho-Slovaks,
+the British, French, and Italian Governments had already recognised the
+Czecho-Slovak Army, under the Bohemian National Council, as an Allied
+force.
+
+Towards the end of June, Mr. Lansing made considerable advance with
+a definite statement that the United States aimed at the complete
+liberation of all Slav peoples from Austro-German domination.
+
+While Lord Northcliffe and his associates were striving hard in London
+to retrieve the opportunities thus wasted, the propaganda organisation
+in Italy was making remarkable progress despite the vacillations of
+the politicians. Undoubtedly the reactionary attitude of Baron Sonnino
+at Versailles influenced adversely the response of the Southern Slav
+troops in the Austrian ranks to the appeals made by the propaganda
+leaflets. Nevertheless, there was a considerable amount of desertion
+from the Austro-Hungarian Army. Among the deserters were numbers of
+junior officers, not professional soldiers, but men who in private life
+were lawyers, merchants, and so on. These men were all led to come over
+by the prospect of liberation which the propaganda held out to them.
+Men of other ranks were induced to desert, either in order to join
+relatives among their co-nationals fighting in the Italian Army, of
+whom news had reached them through the propaganda agency, or else by
+the more elementary considerations of food, comfort, and safety. It was
+noticeable that nearly all the deserters brought with them copies of
+the leaflets distributed by the Allied Commission.
+
+That the propaganda had seriously alarmed the Austro-Hungarian
+authorities was made evident by reference to it in Army Orders and
+in the Austrian and German Press, which even reproduced some of the
+literary efforts, and vilified Lord Northcliffe in their most fervent
+manner. It even affected the minor tactics of the Austro-Hungarian
+Army, for it necessitated the detachment of machine-gun sections to
+deal with attempts at desertion _en masse_ during the Piave offensive,
+which was eventually launched by the Austrians at the end of June.
+There was at least one authenticated account of a mutiny among Czech
+troops being suppressed by Germans and Magyars during that offensive.
+Desertions of single men or small parties were frequent before and
+during the action, and one case is known of a whole unit having come
+over. This was a company composed entirely of Jugo-Slavs. The Company
+Commander (Jugo-Slav and strongly Nationalist), on going his rounds
+a couple of hours before the attack began, gathered from his men’s
+conversation that they had no intention of fighting. He was able to
+bring his whole company over.
+
+The delay of the offensive, mainly on account of Allied propaganda,
+proved to be very important, because, when it came the Piave rose
+behind the Austrian army and converted the attack into something like a
+disaster. There is reason to believe that many ammunition dumps behind
+the enemy lines were blown up by the Czechs. A rumour was spread in the
+Press that the Southern Slavs had been fighting desperately against
+Italy, but this was officially denied. The divisions in question were a
+mixture of Germans, Magyars, Poles, and Ruthenes. It appeared that the
+Southern Slav divisions had been divided up and mixed with “reliable”
+troops, which showed that the Austrians were afraid of them. The
+prisoners taken, as a rule, expressed willingness to volunteer at once.
+Dalmatian prisoners showed great enthusiasm for Jugo-Slavia and the
+Allies.
+
+After the Piave battle, members of the Inter-Allied Propaganda
+Commission were received and thanked by the Italian Commander-in-Chief.
+General Diaz said that the victory was due in considerable measure to
+their efforts.
+
+In August the Inter-Allied Conference on Enemy Propaganda, convoked by
+Lord Northcliffe, met at Crewe House. In regard to propaganda against
+Austria-Hungary, the Committee formed to consider questions of policy
+found itself in complete agreement with the scheme of policy sanctioned
+by the British Government for purposes of Propaganda, and amplified
+by the decisions of the British, French, and Italian Governments at
+the time of, or in connection with, the Rome Congress of Oppressed
+Austro-Hungarian Nationalities. It recognised that such extensions
+of policy, while springing from considerations of Allied principles,
+had, in part, corresponded to the real demands of the propaganda
+situation, which, in their turn, had sprung from the exigencies of the
+military situation and, in particular, from the necessity of utilising
+the established principles of the alliance for the purpose of impeding
+or hampering the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy. Subsequent
+acts and declarations on the part of Allied Governments and of the
+Government of the United States made it clear that the joint policy of
+the Allies was tending increasingly towards the constructive liberation
+of the subject Austro-Hungarian races. The main task of the Committee
+in relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to
+be one of unifying for propaganda purposes these various acts and
+declarations, and of preparing, if possible, the way for a joint
+Allied declaration that might complete and render more effective the
+work of Allied propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary and
+among Austro-Hungarian troops at the front. The Committee resolved to
+suggest that the Italian Government take the initiative in promoting
+a joint and unanimous public declaration that all the Allies regard
+the establishment of a free and united Jugo-Slav State, embracing
+Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a just and
+lasting peace, and of the rule of right in Europe. Such a declaration
+was actually made by the Italian Government, but so tardily that its
+propaganda effect was reduced to a minimum.
+
+Reports from the British Commissioner at Padua chronicled the
+uninterrupted continuance of the preparation and distribution of
+leaflets. The work was so developed that a distributing capacity of
+almost a million leaflets a day was obtained. Proof of the value of
+the work was afforded by the arrival of deserters, belonging to the
+subject races, in the Italian lines bringing with them the manifestoes
+and saying, “I have come because you invited me.” A special leaflet was
+prepared in London, with the co-operation of a member of the Southern
+Slav Committee, for distribution by aeroplane at various points on the
+Dalmatian coast, where Southern Slav insurgents were ascertained to
+be gathered in considerable numbers. A detailed description, compiled
+from official sources, of the overwhelming character of American
+war preparations (which the enemy was constantly belittling) was
+telegraphed to Padua for translation into Austro-Hungarian languages,
+and for distribution in leaflet form among Austro-Hungarian troops.
+
+Progress was even made among the Magyars who had fought with remarkable
+ferocity on the Montello. The agrarian question that had troubled
+Hungary for some time was used for propaganda purposes and many Magyar
+desertions ensued. The constant efforts exerted an ever-increasing
+and cumulative influence on the enemy. The collapse of Bulgaria
+opened a new front for operations against Austria-Hungary and a
+Propaganda Commission under Lieutenant-Colonel Granville Baker was
+quickly organised on the lines of the Padua Commission and dispatched
+to Salonika. Operations were promptly started, but it soon became
+evident that the end was near. As the Allied armies on the Western
+fronts advanced, news of their progress and of Bulgaria’s defection
+was continually and promptly sent over the Austrian lines. There is
+no doubt that this contributed to the increased amount of desertion
+and disorder among the Austrian forces, culminating in the _débâcle_
+produced by the final Allied attack in October, which brought down the
+military and political organisations of the Dual Monarchy.
+
+ Crewe House had every reason to be proud of the success of its
+work against Austria-Hungary. The conception of the whole propaganda
+campaign--its policy, its scope, its application--was due to Lord
+Northcliffe and the co-directors of the Austrian Section of his
+department, Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson. The results fully
+vindicated every basic principle of their propaganda strategy. There
+were difficulties to be overcome at every turn, of which political and
+personal ambitions abroad were not the least. To keep the work on the
+straight metals of uninterrupted progress necessitated unremitting
+vigilance and ceaseless consultation with the numerous interests
+concerned. The result was the greatest victory achieved by war
+propaganda--the culmination of a constructive campaign, which, could
+it have been extended to its logical conclusions, would have achieved
+a just and lasting peace, liberating millions of our fellow-men from a
+tyrannous yoke to the enjoyment of that political freedom which is the
+inalienable right of civilised mankind.
+
+[Illustration: MR. H. WICKHAM STEED.
+
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND ONE OF THE DIRECTORS OF
+THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION.
+
+_Photo: Russell, London._]
+
+[Illustration: DR. R. W. SETON-WATSON.
+
+CO-DIRECTOR OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION OF CREWE HOUSE.]
+
+[Illustration: MR. H. G. WELLS.
+
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND FIRST DIRECTOR OF GERMAN
+SECTION.
+
+_“Daily Mirror” Photograph._]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY
+
+Early British neglect of propaganda--War Office establishes a
+department--Lord Northcliffe takes office--Mr. H. G. Wells’s and Mr.
+Hamilton Fyfe’s work--The final “intensive” campaign--Ways and means.
+
+
+The successful launch of the “propaganda offensive” against
+Austria-Hungary raised high hopes for the success of the corresponding
+campaign against the Germans on the Western Front. These hopes were
+shared by the Prime Minister, who wrote to Lord Northcliffe on May 16,
+1918:--“It seems to me that you have organised admirable work in your
+Austrian propaganda.... I trust that you will soon turn your attention
+towards German propaganda along the French and British Fronts. I feel
+sure that much can be done to disintegrate the _moral_ of the German
+army along the same lines as we appear to have adopted with great
+success in the Austro-Hungarian army.”
+
+For the first eighteen months of the war all propaganda had been
+sadly neglected by the British Government. Few realised its value, and
+officially it was regarded as an unimportant “side-line.” That it might
+be a weapon of warfare, equal in effect to several army corps, would at
+that time have been ridiculed. Money for such purposes was grudgingly
+spent, while the whole-hearted endeavours of a few enthusiasts were
+disparaged as the exuberances of harmless “cranks.”
+
+In October, 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General) Swinton, who
+was then acting as “Eye-Witness” with the British Army, prepared a
+propaganda leaflet, a reproduction of which appears in this book. To
+enable him to produce it, Lord Northcliffe lent the aid of his Paris
+organisation, and a large number of copies were printed and distributed
+by aeroplane among the German troops. But the Army chiefs at that time
+did not show any enthusiasm for the innovation, and Colonel Swinton was
+unable to proceed with the project.
+
+Propaganda against the enemy was, during a long period, almost a
+single-handed campaign by Mr. S. A. Guest. He struggled on, despite
+official discouragement or lack of encouragement, undeterred by all
+the vicissitudes through which British propaganda passed. Indeed,
+the early direction of British propaganda was like an epidemic; it
+occasionally took strange forms and occurred in unexpected places. Mr.
+Guest’s work was the institution and maintenance of those agencies by
+which propagandist literature was produced and smuggled into Germany
+and Austria-Hungary.
+
+Within the War Office, there were some in favour of propagandist
+activity, but for a long time they were in a minority. Early in 1916,
+Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Sir George Macdonogh, K.C.M.G.,
+C.B., returned from France to become Director of Military Intelligence,
+and mainly owing to his efforts and those of Brigadier-General G. K.
+Cockerill, C.B. (then Director of Special Intelligence), a propaganda
+branch of the Military Intelligence Department of the War Office was
+established. From small beginnings, the activities of this branch grew.
+
+It was in the spring of 1916 that a sub-section of this branch began
+the preparation of leaflets in German for distribution among enemy
+troops. One use of the leaflets was to disprove the false beliefs
+spread among German soldiers that the British and French treated their
+prisoners with great severity. To counteract this, reproductions of
+letters actually written by German prisoners of war, photographs and
+descriptions of prisoners and their camps, and similar material, were
+prepared and distributed. As the political and social discontent in
+Germany increased it was thought useful that the German soldiers should
+be provided with more evidence of the internal conditions in their own
+country than their officers would allow them to have, and leaflets
+prepared from German sources, as, for instance, from suppressed
+editions of German pamphlets and newspapers, were scattered on the
+lines and rest billets.
+
+It then undertook the publication of an excellent weekly news-sheet,
+entitled _Le Courrier de l’Air_, containing news in French for
+circulation among the French and Belgian inhabitants of occupied
+districts. This newspaper, save for one short break, was regularly
+distributed by air until November, 1918, and naturally was greatly
+valued by those who otherwise would only have received “news” from
+German sources.
+
+During 1917 reports obtained by the examination of prisoners and
+information derived from more secret sources showed that the propaganda
+campaign was achieving useful results, and the Directorate of Military
+Intelligence, in co-operation with the G.H.Q. in France, made
+arrangements for the work to be extended, until by the spring of 1918
+about a million leaflets monthly were being issued.
+
+The task of distribution of propaganda literature by air would have
+been simpler but for an extraordinary military decision. When this work
+was started by the military authorities the leaflets were dropped from
+aeroplanes. This method had the widest limits, and, at the same time,
+was the best means of carrying a large bulk and of distributing with
+accuracy. Perturbed by the success attained, the Germans threatened
+to inflict severe penalties upon airmen captured when performing
+such duties, and, on capturing two British airmen, followed their
+threats by action. Instead of instituting immediate reprisals, the
+British authorities tamely submitted and gave instructions for the
+discontinuance of the use of aeroplanes for the purpose.
+
+In consequence of this weak action, experiments had to be undertaken
+to find a substitute for the aeroplane. There were a number of
+possible, although inferior, methods. Hand and rifle grenades were
+devised to burst and shower leaflets over a limited area among enemy
+troops. Trench mortars would serve a similar purpose. But thanks
+to the progress of military meteorological science during the war
+and to several months’ patient experimenting with various devices,
+it was found possible to utilise specially adapted balloons. The
+Air Inventions Committee, the Munitions Inventions Department, the
+Inspectorate of H.M. Stores, Woolwich, Army Intelligence officers
+experienced in the use of silk balloons for other military purposes,
+and the manufacturers, all assisted the War Office in arriving at
+a result which proved to be effective and as nearly as possible
+“fool-proof.” Designs and apparatus were tested in the workshop and
+laboratory, at experimental stations near London, and on Salisbury
+Plain. They were taken out to France and tried under the actual
+conditions of war, and gradually each difficulty was overcome and each
+detail reduced to its simplest form.
+
+In its standard form in which it was being manufactured at the rate of
+nearly 2,000 a week the propaganda balloon was made of paper, cut in 10
+longitudinal panels, with a neck of oiled silk about 12 inches long.
+The circumference was about 20 feet and the height, when inflated, over
+eight feet. The absolute capacity was approximately 100 cubic feet,
+but the balloons were liberated when not quite taut, containing 90
+to 95 cubic feet of hydrogen. Hydrogen readily passes through paper,
+and the part of the experimental work that caused most trouble was
+the discovery of a suitable varnish, or “dope,” to make the paper
+gas-tight. After many disappointments, a formula was arrived at, the
+application of which prevented appreciable evaporation of the gas for
+two or three hours, and which left a balloon with some lifting capacity
+after thirty-six hours.
+
+The lifting power of a balloon is the difference between the weight
+of the hydrogen and the weight of the same bulk of air, _less_ the
+weight of the balloon itself. The weight of the paper balloon was
+just over one pound; the available lifting power varied with the
+degree of tautness to which the balloon was filled, the height of the
+barometer and the temperature, but on the average, at ground level,
+the balloon as inflated would just support five and a half pounds.
+After a good deal of experiment the load of propaganda and releasing
+apparatus was fixed at four pounds and a few ounces, this allowing
+from 500 to 1,000 leaflets, according to their size, to be carried by
+each balloon, the balance of lifting power being sufficient to take
+the balloon sharply into the air to a height of five or six thousand
+feet. As a balloon rises the pressure of the air decreases and the
+contained hydrogen expands. In the earlier experiments the neck of the
+balloon was tied after inflation, and, to allow for expansion, the
+balloon was filled only to a little over two-thirds of its capacity.
+This was unsatisfactory; it reduced the load of propaganda and led to
+many failures from bursting and to great uncertainty as to where the
+load would fall. It was found more satisfactory to inflate the balloon
+nearly to its full capacity and to liberate it with the neck open, or
+with a large slit cut at the base of the neck, to allow the gas to
+escape as it expanded. At a height of, on the average, from 4,000 to
+6,000 feet the escape of gas had reduced the free lift to a negative
+quantity, and the balloon would begin to drop slowly, but for the
+liberation of ballast.
+
+After several ingenious mechanical devices had been tested, a
+method of releasing leaflets by the burning of a fuse was adopted.
+A suitable length of prepared cotton wick, similar to that used in
+flint pipe-lighters, and burning evenly at the rate of five minutes
+to the inch, was securely threaded to a wire by which it was attached
+to the neck of the balloon. Several inches of the upper end were
+left free, and the load of leaflets was strung in small packets by
+cotton threads along the length of the fuse. As soon as a balloon was
+inflated and the loaded release attached, the free end of the fuse was
+cut to the required length, so as to burn for five, ten, or so many
+minutes, before the first packet was reached, the cut end was lighted,
+usually from the pipe or cigarette the soldier was smoking, and the
+balloon sent off on its journey. The release of each packet acted as
+a discharge of ballast, and the balloon, although continually losing
+gas, kept in the air until the end of its course. The arrangement used
+most frequently was designed for liberating the balloons a few miles
+behind the front lines and for distributing the leaflets from the enemy
+lines to a few miles behind them. The total length of fuse was twelve
+inches, giving an hour’s run. The first six inches were left free to
+be cut before lighting according to the position of the station and
+the strength of the wind; the load of propaganda was arranged over
+the second half-hour at intervals of two and a half minutes. Much
+longer fuses, with the load distributed at greater intervals, were
+used for longer runs. Experiment showed that the lateral scattering
+of the leaflets, dropped from a height of 4,000 feet and upwards, was
+considerable. The length of the track varied with the strength of the
+wind.
+
+The unit for distribution consisted of two motor lorries, which took
+the men, the cylinders of hydrogen, and the propaganda loaded on
+releases to a sheltered position selected in the morning by the officer
+in charge after consultation with the meteorological experts. The vans
+were drawn up end to end, separated by a distance of about ten feet,
+and a curtain of canvas was then stretched on the windward side between
+the vans, thus forming a three-sided chamber. The balloon was laid on
+the ground, rapidly filled, the release attached and lighted, and the
+balloon liberated, the whole operation taking only a few minutes.
+
+The load of the balloons was chosen according to the direction of
+the wind. If it was blowing towards Belgium, copies of _Le Courrier
+de l’Air_ were attached; if towards Germany, propaganda leaflets for
+enemy troops. The experimental improvement of the “dope” with which
+the paper was treated in order to prevent loss of gas by diffusion,
+and the manufacture of balloons of double the standard capacity, had
+placed runs of upwards of 150 miles well within the capacity of the
+method before the Armistice suspended operations, but the bulk of the
+propaganda was distributed over an area of from 10 to 50 miles behind
+the enemy lines. Fortunately, during the late summer and autumn of 1918
+the wind was blowing almost consistently favourable for their dispatch.
+
+When Lord Northcliffe took office in February, 1918, Austria-Hungary
+was the most urgent field for his operations, as has been explained.
+While Crewe House was concentrating upon that work he desired the
+War Office to continue on his behalf the admirable and assiduous
+work carried on since 1916. Early in May, 1918, Mr. H. G. Wells
+accepted Lord Northcliffe’s invitation to direct the preparation of
+propaganda literature against Germany, with the co-operation of Dr.
+J. W. Headlam-Morley. The first need was felt to be the definition
+of a policy to be followed against Germany, in order to prevent
+dissipation of energy and diversity of treatment. It was obvious that
+this propaganda policy must be in accord with the general policy of the
+Allies. In some points it followed the declared aims of the Allies; in
+others, it preceded the general policy as a pathmaker and pacemaker.
+Mr. Wells undertook to prepare a memorandum on the position of Germany
+at that time from the point of view of propaganda. This was submitted
+by Mr. Wells to the Enemy Propaganda Committee and fully discussed. A
+preface was prepared and upon the two statements was based a letter
+to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as in the case of the
+propaganda policy against Austria-Hungary, asking for the assent of the
+British Government to the policy therein contained.
+
+Mr. Wells’s memorandum was of the highest interest as a contemporary
+study of Germany, by a master of psychology, at that juncture when
+Germany was making her great (and, fortunately, her final) bid for
+world-mastery. The document possesses no little historical value; much
+that was prophetic has been forged into history by the rapid march of
+events; and the non-fulfilment of much of what has not attained to its
+consummation is due to lack of political wisdom in the chancelleries.
+Following is the text of preface and memorandum:--
+
+  _Preface._
+
+  “Propaganda in Germany, as in other enemy countries, must obviously
+  be based upon a clear Allied policy. Hitherto Allied policy and
+  Allied war aims have been defined too loosely to be comprehensible to
+  the Germans.
+
+  “The real war aim of the Allies is not only to beat the enemy, but to
+  establish a world peace that shall preclude the resumption of war.
+  Successful propaganda in Germany presupposes the clear definition
+  of the kind of world-settlement which the Allies are determined to
+  secure and the place of Germany in it.
+
+  “The points to be brought home to the Germans are:--
+
+    “1. _The determination of the Allies to continue the war until
+    Germany accepts the Allied peace settlement._
+
+    “2. _The existing alliance as a Fighting League of Free Nations
+    will be deepened and extended, and the military, naval, financial
+    and economic resources of its members will be pooled until_--
+
+    “(_a_) _Its military purpose is achieved, and_
+
+    “(_b_) _Peace is established on lasting foundations._
+
+  “German minds are particularly susceptible to systematic statements.
+  They are accustomed to discuss and understand co-ordinate
+  projects. The ideas represented by the phrase ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ and
+  ‘Mittel-Europa’ have been fully explained to them and now form the
+  bases of German political thought. Other projects, represented by
+  ‘Berlin-Teheran’ and ‘Berlin-Tokyo’ are becoming familiar to them.
+  Against these ideas the Allies have not yet set up any comprehensive
+  and comprehensible scheme of world organisation. There is no Allied
+  counterpart of Naumann’s ‘Mittel-Europa’ which the neutral and
+  the German Press could discuss as a practical proposition. This
+  counterpart should be created without delay by competent Allied
+  writers. It would form an effective basis for propaganda, and would
+  work automatically.
+
+  “It follows that one of the first requisites is to study and to lay
+  down the lines of a practical League of Free Nations. The present
+  alliance must be taken as the nucleus of any such League. Its control
+  of raw materials, of shipping, and its power to exclude for an
+  indefinite period enemy or even neutral peoples until they subscribe
+  to and give pledges of their acceptance of its principles should be
+  emphasised. It should be pointed out that nothing stands between
+  enemy peoples and a lasting peace except the predatory designs of
+  their ruling dynasties and military and economic castes; that the
+  design of the Allies is not to crush any people, but to assure the
+  freedom of all on a basis of self-determination to be exercised under
+  definite guarantees of justice and fair play; that, unless enemy
+  peoples accept the Allied conception of a world peace settlement, it
+  will be impossible for them to repair the havoc of the present war,
+  to avert utter financial ruin, and to save themselves from prolonged
+  misery; and that the longer the struggle lasts the deeper will
+  become the hatred of everything German in the non-German world, and
+  the heavier the social and economic handicap under which the enemy
+  peoples will labour, even after their admission into a League of
+  Nations.
+
+  “The primary war aim of the Allies thus becomes the changing
+  of Germany, not only in the interest of the Allied League, but in
+  that of the German people itself. Without the honest co-operation
+  of Germany, disarmament on a large scale would be impossible, and,
+  without disarmament, social and economic reconstruction would be
+  impracticable. Germany has, therefore, to choose between her own
+  permanent ruin by adhering to her present system of government and
+  policy and the prospect of economic and political redemption by
+  overthrowing her militarist system so as to be able to join honestly
+  in the Allied scheme of world organisation.”
+
+
+  _Memorandum._
+
+  “It has become manifest that for the purposes of an efficient
+  pro-Ally propaganda in neutral and enemy countries a clear and full
+  statement of the war aims of the Allies is vitally necessary. What
+  is wanted is something in the nature of an authoritative text to
+  which propagandists may refer with confidence and which can be made
+  the standard of their activities. It is not sufficient to recount
+  the sins of Germany and to assert that the defeat of Germany is the
+  Allied war aim. What all the world desires to know is what is to
+  happen _after_ the war. The real war aim of a belligerent, it is more
+  and more understood, is not merely victory, but a peace of a certain
+  character which that belligerent desires shall arise out of that
+  victory. What, therefore, is the peace sought by the Allies?
+
+  “It would be superfluous even to summarise here the primary case
+  of the Allies, that the war is on their part a war to resist the
+  military aggression of Germany, assisted by the landowning Magyars
+  of Hungary, the Turks, and the King of Bulgaria, upon the rest of
+  mankind. It is a war against belligerence, against aggressive war,
+  and the preparation for aggressive war. Such it was in its beginning,
+  and such it remains. But it would be idle to pretend that the ideas
+  of the Governments and peoples allied against Germany have not
+  developed very greatly during the years of the war. There has been a
+  deepening realisation of the danger to mankind of existing political
+  divisions and separations, a great experience in the suffering,
+  destruction, and waste of war; a quickening of consciences against
+  conquests, annexations, and subjugations; and a general clearing up
+  of ideas that have hitherto stood in the way of an organised world
+  peace. While German Imperialism, to judge by the utterances of its
+  accredited heads, and by the behaviour of Germany in the temporarily
+  disorganised States on her Eastern Front, is still as truculent,
+  aggressive, and treacherous as ever, the mind of her antagonists has
+  learnt and has matured. There has arisen in the great world outside
+  the inner lives of the Central Powers a will that grows to gigantic
+  proportions, that altogether overshadows the boasted _will to power_
+  of the German junker and exploiter, _the will to a world peace_. It
+  is like the will of an experienced man set against the will of an
+  obstinate and selfish youth. The war aims of the anti-German Allies
+  take more and more definitely the form of a world of States leagued
+  together to maintain a common law, to submit their mutual differences
+  to a conclusive tribunal, to protect weak communities, to restrain
+  and suppress war threats and war preparations throughout the earth.
+
+  “Steadfastly the great peoples of the world outside the shadow of
+  German Imperial domination have been working their way to unanimity,
+  while the ruling intelligences of Germany have been scheming for
+  the base advantages of conquest; while they have been undermining,
+  confusing, and demoralising the mentality of Russia, crushing
+  down the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Imperialism, and
+  threatening and cajoling neutrals there has been a wide, free
+  movement in the minds of their antagonists towards the restraint and
+  wisdom of a greater and nobler phase in human affairs. The thought
+  of the world crystallises now about a phrase, the phrase ‘The League
+  of Free Nations.’ The war aims of the Allies become more and more
+  explicitly associated with the spirit and implications of that.
+
+  “Like all such phrases, ‘The League of Free Nations’ is subject
+  to a great variety of detailed interpretation, but its broad
+  intentions can now be stated without much risk of dissent. The ideal
+  would, of course, include all the nations of the earth, including
+  a Germany purged of her military aggressiveness; it involves some
+  sort of INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS that can revise, codify, amend and
+  extend international law, a supreme Court of Law in which States
+  may sue and be sued, and whose decision the League will be pledged
+  to enforce, and the supervision, limitation, and use of armaments
+  under the direction of the international congress. It is also
+  felt very widely that such a congress must set a restraint upon
+  competitive and unsanctioned ‘expansionist’ movements into unsettled
+  and disordered regions, must act as the guardian of feeble races and
+  communities, and must be empowered to make conclusive decisions upon
+  questions of transport, tariffs, access to raw material, migration,
+  and international intercourse generally. The constitution of this
+  congress remains indefinite; it is the crucial matter upon which the
+  best thought of the world is working at the present time. But given
+  the prospect of a suitable congress there can be little dispute that
+  the great Imperial Powers among the Allies are now prepared for
+  great and generous limitations of their sovereignty in the matter of
+  armaments, of tropical possessions and of subject peoples, in the
+  common interest of mankind. The spectacle of German Imperialism,
+  boastful, selfish, narrow, and altogether hateful, in its terrible
+  blood-dance through Europe, has been an object-lesson to humanity
+  against excesses of national vanity and national egotism and against
+  Imperial pride. Among the Allies, the two chief Imperial Powers,
+  measured by the extent of territory they control, are Britain and
+  France, and each of these is more completely prepared to-day than
+  ever it has been before to consider its imperial possessions as a
+  trust for their inhabitants and for mankind, and its position in
+  the more fertile and less settled regions of the world as that of a
+  mandatory and trustee. These admissions involve a plain prospect and
+  promise of the ultimate release and liberation of all the peoples in
+  these great and variegated Empires to complete world-citizenship.
+
+  “But in using the phrase ‘The League of Nations,’ it may be well
+  to dispel certain misconceptions that have arisen through the
+  experimental preparation by more or less irresponsible persons and
+  societies of elaborate schemes and constitutions of such a league.
+  Proposals have been printed and published, for example, of a Court of
+  World Conciliation, in which each sovereign State will be represented
+  by one member--Montenegro, for example, by one, and the British
+  Empire by one--and other proposals have been mooted of a Congress
+  of the League of Nations, in which such States as Hayti, Abyssinia,
+  and the like will be represented by one or two representatives, and
+  France and Great Britain by five or six. All such projects should
+  be put out of mind when the phrase ‘League of Free Nations’ is used
+  by responsible speakers for the Allied Powers. Certain most obvious
+  considerations have evidently been overlooked by the framers of such
+  proposals. It will, for example, be a manifest disadvantage to the
+  smaller Powers to be at all over-represented upon the Congress of any
+  such League; it may even be desirable that certain of them should not
+  have a _voting_ representative at all, for this reason, that a great
+  Power still cherishing an aggressive spirit would certainly attempt,
+  as the beginning of its aggression, to compel adjacent small Powers
+  to send representatives practically chosen by itself. The coarse
+  fact of the case in regard to an immediate world peace is this, that
+  only five or six great Powers possess sufficient economic resources
+  to make war under modern conditions at the present time, namely, the
+  United States of America, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and,
+  doubtfully, Austria-Hungary. Italy suffers under the disadvantage
+  that she has no coal supply. These five or six Powers we may say,
+  therefore, permit war and can prevent it. They are at present
+  necessarily the custodians of the peace of the world, and it is mere
+  pedantry not to admit that this gives them a practical claim to
+  preponderance in the opening Congress of the World League. It may be
+  pointed out that a small State with a voice in the discussions, but
+  no vote in the decisions of the League, would logically be excused
+  from the liability to assist in enforcing those decisions.
+
+  “But this question of the constitution of a world Congress is
+  not to be solved by making a coarse classification of States into
+  large and war-capable Powers, and small and weak Powers. Take
+  the case of Italy, for example: though she is almost incapable
+  of sustaining a war against the world by herself because of her
+  weakness in the matter of coal, she can as an ally be at once of
+  enormous importance. Take the case of Spain again, a very similar
+  case. And whatever the war ability of Latin-America may be to-day,
+  there can be no question that this great constellation of States
+  must count very heavily in the framing of the world of to-morrow.
+  Then, again, we have to consider the vast future possibilities of
+  the Chinese Republic, with coal, steel, and a magnificent industrial
+  population, and the probable reconstruction of Eastern Europe and
+  a renascence of Russia which may give the world a loose-knit but
+  collectively-important Slavonic confederation. While an isolated
+  small Power within the orbit of attraction of a large Power, a State
+  of 5,000,000 people or less, must always remain a difficult problem
+  in the world representation, it is clear that something like an
+  adequate representation of small and weak Powers becomes possible
+  so soon as they develop a disposition towards aggregation, for the
+  purposes of world politics, into associations with States racially,
+  linguistically, and historically akin to them. The trend of Allied
+  opinion is to place not Peru or Ukrainia, nor Norway, nor Finland on
+  a level with the United States of America or the British Empire at
+  the League of Nations Congress, but to prepare the way for adequate
+  representation through a preliminary Latin-American or a Slavonic or
+  a Scandinavian Confederation, which could speak with a common idea at
+  the World Congress.
+
+  “It should be manifest that there is one Power whose splendid
+  achievement in this war, and whose particular needs, justify her
+  over-representation (as measured by material wealth, and millions
+  of population) upon the Congress of the League, and that is
+  France. It is open to question whether Italy should not also be
+  disproportionately over-represented, seeing that she will not have,
+  as Spain will have, the moral reinforcement of kindred nations over
+  seas. And with regard to the British Empire, seeing that there exists
+  no real Imperial legislature, it is open to consideration whether
+  Canada, South Africa, and Australasia should come into the Council
+  as separate nationalities. The Asiatic and African possessions of
+  Britain and France, Belgium and Italy, possessions, that is, which
+  have no self-government, might possibly for a time be represented
+  by members appointed by the governing power in each case. These are
+  merely suggestions here, indications of a disposition of mind, but
+  they are suggestions upon which it is necessary for the Allied Powers
+  to decide as speedily as possible. The effective working out of this
+  problem of the League of Nations Congress by the Allies without
+  undue delay is as vital a part of the Allied policy as the effective
+  conduct of the war.
+
+  “It has to be recognised that the institution of a League of Nations
+  precludes any annexations or any military interference with any
+  peoples whatever, without a mandate from the Congress of the League.
+  The League must directly or indirectly become the guardian of all
+  unsettled regions and order must be kept and development promoted
+  by it in such derelict regions as Mesopotamia and Armenia, for
+  example, have now become. In these latter instances it is open to
+  consideration whether the League should operate through some single
+  power acting as a mandatory of the League, or else by international
+  forces under the control of the League as a whole. Theoretically the
+  latter course is to be preferred, but there are enormous practical
+  advantages in many cases to be urged for the former. The Allies
+  have indeed had a considerable experience during the war of joint
+  controls and joint expeditions; there has been a great education
+  in internationalism since August, 1914; but nevertheless the end
+  of the war is likely to come long before any real international
+  forces have been evolved. It is, however, towards the ultimate use
+  of international forces in such cases that the joint policy of the
+  Allies is plainly and openly directed.
+
+  “The bringing of the League into practical politics profoundly
+  affects the question of territorial adjustment after the war. The
+  Allies are bound in honour to follow the will of France in the matter
+  of Alsace-Lorraine, and the rectification of the Italian frontier
+  and the bringing of the bulk of the Italian-speaking population,
+  now under Austrian dominion, into one ring-fence with Italy, also
+  seem a necessary part of a world pacification. It is, however, of
+  far less importance in the war aims of the Allies that this and that
+  particular scrap of territory should change hands from the control of
+  one group of combatants to that of the other, than that the present
+  practical ascendency of German Imperialism over the resources of the
+  Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Jugo-Slav, Finnish, and Roumanian
+  peoples should cease. The war aim of the Allies in Eastern Europe
+  is to create in the place of the present Austro-Hungarian Empire a
+  larger synthesis of associated States, something in the nature of
+  an ‘East Central European League,’ within the League of Nations, a
+  confederation that might possibly reach from Poland to the Black
+  and Adriatic Seas, and have also access to, if not a port upon, the
+  Baltic at Danzig. The Allies are necessarily obliged to wait upon
+  the development of affairs in Russia, but the hopes and efforts of
+  the Allies are towards a reconciliation of at least Great Russia,
+  Siberia, and Ukrainia into a workable association within the League.
+  It is premature to speculate upon the grouping of Finland at the
+  present time. Relieved of the feverish and impossible ambitions the
+  political weaknesses of these peoples have stimulated, a free and
+  united Germany could then become one of the predominant partners
+  in the World League of Free Nations. The Allies do not propose an
+  unconditional return of the former African possessions of Germany,
+  but they contemplate an over-ruling international _régime_ in
+  Africa between the Sahara and the Zambesi, restraining armament,
+  reorganising native education, and giving absolute equality of trade
+  to all the nations in the League. Such an international _régime_
+  under the League may not be incompatible with the retention of
+  national flags in the former ‘possessions’ of the leagued Powers.
+
+  “Exact territorial definition does not appear to the Allies to be
+  of nearly such importance as the establishment of a common system of
+  disarmament and a common effort to restore the ravages of the war.
+  The full effect of the war is still not realised by the mass of the
+  belligerent peoples, more especially in America and Western Europe,
+  where life is still fairly comfortable. There has already been a
+  destruction not merely of the political, but of the social order over
+  great areas of the world, especially in Eastern Europe, and it is
+  doubtful whether any peace can restore these disorganised areas to
+  anything like their former productivity for many years. A universal
+  shortage not merely of man-power, but of transport and machinery
+  available for the purposes of peace cannot be avoided. It is
+  doubtful, moreover, if social discipline in the ports of the British
+  Empire and America will be strong enough to restrain an organised
+  resistance to the use of German shipping after the war for any
+  purpose and to the use of Allied shipping for the transport of goods
+  to and from Germany on the part of Allied and neutral seamen and
+  transport workers indignant at the U-boat campaign; moreover, there
+  is a world-wide cry for a vindictive trade after the war against
+  Germany, and for organised boycotts that may further restrict the
+  process of economic world recovery. It is doubtful if the menace of
+  these ‘revenge’ movements and the difficulty of controlling them in
+  democratic States is properly appreciated in Germany. The militarist
+  Government of Germany, fighting now for bare existence, is concealing
+  from its people this world-wide disposition to boycott German trade
+  and industry at any cost to the boycotting populations, and buoying
+  them up with preposterous hopes of ‘business as usual’ as soon as
+  peace is made. The fact has to be faced that while the present
+  German Government remains no such economic resumption is possible.
+  The ‘War after the War’ possibility has to be added to the economic
+  destruction in Russia, Belgium, and elsewhere in any estimate of the
+  situation after the war.
+
+  “The plain prospect of material disorganisation thus opened
+  should alone suffice to establish the absolute necessity for peace
+  now of such a nature as will permit a world-wide concentration upon
+  reconstruction, in good faith and without any complications of enmity
+  and hostility. But in addition to the material destruction and
+  dislocation, and to the ‘hatred’ disorganisation already noted, the
+  financial transactions of the last few years have created a monetary
+  inflation which, _without the concerted action of all the Powers_,
+  may mean a collapse of world credit. Add now the plain necessity
+  for continued armament if a real League of Nations is not attained.
+  Without any exaggeration the prospect of the nations facing these
+  economic difficulties in an atmosphere of continuing hostility,
+  intrigue, and conflict, under a continuing weight of armaments, and
+  with a continuing distrust, is a hopeless one. The consequences stare
+  us in the face; Russia is only the first instance of what must happen
+  generally. The alternative to a real League of Nations is the steady
+  descent of our civilisation towards a condition of political and
+  social fragmentation such as the world has not seen since the fall of
+  the Roman Empire. The honest co-operation of Germany in the League of
+  Nations, in disarmament, and in world reconstruction is, therefore,
+  fundamentally necessary. There is now no other rational policy. And
+  since it is impossible to hope for any such help or co-operation
+  from the Germany of the Belgian outrage, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty,
+  the betrayal of Ukrainia, THE CHANGING OF GERMANY becomes a primary
+  war aim, _the_ primary war aim for the Allies. How Germany is to be
+  changed is a complex question. The word _Revolution_ is, perhaps, to
+  be deprecated. We do not, for instance, desire a Bolshevik breakdown
+  in Germany, which would make her economically useless to mankind. We
+  look, therefore, not so much to the German peasant and labourer as to
+  the ordinary, fairly well-educated mediocre German for co-operation
+  in the reinstatement of civilisation. Change there _must_ be in
+  Germany; in the spirit in which the Government is conducted, in the
+  persons who exercise the control, and in the relative influence
+  of different classes in the country. The sharpest distinction,
+  therefore, has to be drawn between Germany and its present Government
+  in all our propaganda and public utterances; and a constant appeal
+  has to be made by the statesmen of the Alliance, and by a frank and
+  open propaganda through the Germans of the United States of America
+  and of Switzerland, through neutral countries and by every possible
+  means, from Germany Junker to Germany sober. We may be inclined
+  to believe that every German is something of a Junker, we have to
+  remember he is also potentially a reasonable man.
+
+  “And meanwhile, the Allies must continue with haste and diligence to
+  fight and defeat Junker Germany, which cannot possibly conquer but
+  which may nevertheless succeed in ruining the world. They must fight
+  the German armies upon the fronts, they must fight an unregenerate
+  Germany economically and politically, and they must bring home to the
+  German reason and conscience at home, by an intensive air war and
+  by propaganda alike, the real impossibility of these conceptions of
+  national pride and aggressiveness in which the German population has
+  been bred.”
+
+These documents were used as a basis for the policy of Crewe House,
+which was summarised into seven parts in Lord Northcliffe’s subsequent
+letter to Mr. Balfour, extracts from which follow:--
+
+  “I wish to submit to you the following general scheme of policy as
+  a basis for British--and eventually Allied--propaganda in Germany.
+  Propaganda, as an active form of policy, must be in harmony with the
+  settled war aims of the Allies:--
+
+  “1. The object of all propaganda is to weaken the will of the enemy
+  to war and victory. For this purpose it is necessary to put in the
+  forefront the ultimate object of the Allies, and the use which they
+  would make of victory, for this is the matter with which the Germans
+  are most concerned. We cannot, of course, expect that the war aims of
+  the Allies should be determined solely by the effect which they may
+  have upon the German people, but, on the other hand, it is clearly
+  undesirable to put forward for propaganda purposes objects which it
+  is not really intended to secure. It appears to me, however, that
+  our war aims, as I understand them, are such as could, if presented
+  in a suitable form, be made to do something to strengthen whatever
+  ‘opposition’ exists in Germany.
+
+  “2. From such information as is available as to the internal
+  condition of Germany two points emerge which are of the greatest
+  importance for immediate purposes:--
+
+      “(_a_) There is much evidence that the German people as a whole
+    desire above all a cessation of the war. They are suffering more
+    than their opponents, and war weariness has advanced further with
+    them than it has with us. They acquiesce in the continuance of the
+    present offensive chiefly because they are assured by their leaders
+    that this is the only way in which a speedy peace can be achieved.
+    It is, therefore, necessary to impress upon them that they are face
+    to face with a determined and immutable will on the part of Allied
+    nations to continue the war at whatever cost, notwithstanding
+    German military successes, and that for this reason military
+    success is not the way to bring about the peace they desire. It
+    must be made plain that we are prepared to continue a ruthless
+    policy of commercial blockade.
+
+     “(_b_) Side by side with this we have another motive of the
+    highest importance. One of the chief instruments of the German
+    Government is the belief which they foster that any peace that the
+    Allies would, if they had their way, impose would mean the internal
+    ruin of Germany, and this again would mean that each individual
+    German family would find itself without work, without money, and
+    without food. As against this it is necessary to impress on the
+    German nation that these results might happen, but that they can be
+    avoided. They will happen if the Government of Germany continues
+    to carry out its openly avowed design of subjecting the other free
+    nations of Europe to its domination. They can be avoided if the
+    German nation will resign these projects of domination and consent
+    to accept the Allied scheme for a new organisation of the world.
+
+  “These two points (_a_) and (_b_) must be kept in close connection;
+  the first provides the element of fear, the second provides the
+  element of hope.
+
+  “3. The first point presents no difficulty to us; we can go ahead
+  in full confidence that we are in harmony with both the nation and
+  the Government. As to the second, on the other hand, I must ask for
+  your guidance and support. Hitherto Allied policy and war aims have
+  been defined too loosely to be comprehensible to the Germans, and
+  there have been apparent inconsistencies, of which they have quickly
+  taken advantage. Moreover, it has been possible for German writers
+  to misrepresent our war aims as dictated by Imperialistic ambitions,
+  similar in kind to those by which they are themselves actuated, and
+  involving ‘annexations and indemnities,’ such as have in the past
+  been too often the result of victory in war. I take it that the
+  real object of the Allies is, after defeating Germany, to establish
+  such a world peace as shall, within the limits of human foresight,
+  preclude another conflagration. It seems necessary, therefore, that
+  the separate aims which would, of course, be maintained, such as
+  the restoration of Belgium, the liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, the
+  establishment of civilised government in Mesopotamia and Palestine,
+  should be put forward in their proper places as individual but
+  essential points in the general scheme for the settlement of world
+  politics on a basis which would go far to remove the causes of future
+  wars.
+
+  “4. Any such scheme would, in effect, amount to the constitution of
+  a ‘League of Free Nations.’ It is, I presume, generally understood
+  that eventually Germany would be invited to take her place in such
+  a League on condition that she accepted the principles of its
+  foundation. Her admission to the League would be in itself her
+  guarantee against the establishment of, _e.g._, a hostile monopoly of
+  raw materials. Our terms of peace, therefore, can be represented as
+  the conditions on which Germany should be invited to take her part
+  in such a League. In order to secure the economic benefits she would
+  have to accept the political conditions. If this is so, the task of
+  propaganda is greatly lightened, for it would be easier to put our
+  aims in such a form as to make them to some extent acceptable to the
+  moderate elements in Germany than if they were put forward merely as
+  terms to be imposed on a defeated enemy.
+
+  “5. It is, however, obvious that propaganda conducted on these
+  lines will be of little use unless it is supported by public and
+  authoritative statements from the Allied Governments. Otherwise,
+  it would be represented that the real object is to beguile Germany
+  into accepting a peace of renunciation, and that, as soon as this
+  object has been achieved, these schemes will be repudiated, and a
+  weakened Germany will find herself face to face with an Anglo-Saxon
+  combination which aims at dominating the world, and keeping Germany
+  permanently in a position of political inferiority.
+
+  “6. No such statement has yet been made, so far as I am aware, by
+  the British Government or by the Allies. What, therefore, I should
+  venture to ask is for such support from you as will enable us to
+  carry on our work with the full consciousness that we have behind us
+  the support of His Majesty’s Government. If it were known that the
+  Government itself, in conjunction with the Allies, was investigating
+  the problem with a view to speedy action, this knowledge would give a
+  great and needed incentive to the more popular work which we should
+  be doing.
+
+  “7. I am well aware of the very great practical difficulties which
+  are bound to arise so soon as an attempt is made to give formal
+  expression to the general idea of a ‘League of Free Nations.’ But for
+  the purposes of our work, it is of the most urgent importance that
+  some statement of this kind should be put forward at the earliest
+  possible date. Such a statement would in effect be an offer to the
+  Germans of peace on stated conditions. If it were accepted, Germany
+  would be able shortly after the conclusion of the war to come into
+  the new society of nations; if it were refused, the war would have
+  to continue. But it should also be made clear to the German people
+  that the privilege of admission to this society would inevitably be
+  postponed for a period proportional to the length of time that they
+  continued the war.”
+
+In answer to an inquiry, Lord Northcliffe wrote a supplementary letter,
+dealing with propaganda policy as to the German colonies. The following
+is an extract:--
+
+  “I have no settled views as to the future of what were the German
+  colonies, beyond a very strong conviction that they must never again
+  be allowed to fall, for any military or naval purpose, under German
+  control. But, broadly, my feeling is this: The whole situation of
+  the Allies in regard to Germany is governed by the fact that Germany
+  is responsible for the war. The Allies are, therefore, entitled
+  to demand from her restitution, reparation, and guarantees as
+  preliminary conditions of any peace settlement. The territories which
+  the Allies have taken from Germany in the course of their legitimate
+  self-defence do not come into the same category as the territories
+  seized by Germany, and the allies of Germany, in the course of their
+  predatory aggression. To contemplate barter or exchange between
+  one set of territories and the other would be to assimilate, by
+  implication, the moral situation of the Allies to that of Germany.
+  Therefore, however closely we may study the question, or rather the
+  questions--for there are several--of the German colonies, we ought to
+  make it clear that the ultimate settlement of those questions will
+  be reserved for treatment by the Allies as a fighting league of free
+  nations, or by the general League of Nations should the behaviour of
+  Germany entitle her to admission to it in time to take part in any
+  scheme of world reorganisation.”
+
+The policy laid down in these letters was approved by the Government as
+a basis for propaganda, and Mr. Wells was able to develop his work in
+many directions.
+
+He kept in close touch with the different organisations at home and
+abroad which were endeavouring to promote the League of Nations. In
+conjunction with Mr. Steed, Mr. Wells assisted in the drawing up of
+a restatement of the aims of the League of Nations Society in Great
+Britain and in the formation of a new association for the study of the
+problems arising out of the League proposal. This movement was always
+kept prominently before the German mind, for it was a threat of future
+isolation, with its resultant economic disabilities, and yet was an
+invitation to national repentance.
+
+A second line of action was designed to appeal to the German workers.
+For this purpose Mr. Wells arranged, among other things, for the
+preparation and issue of a short and compact summary of the British
+Labour War Aims, which was subsequently used with much effectiveness
+not only in Germany but also in Austria.
+
+Economic conditions, both during and after the war, were made by Mr.
+Wells and his co-workers the subject of systematic and scientific study
+with the object of undertaking a propaganda of economic discouragement
+and persuasion in Germany. Signs were not lacking of the existence
+of misgivings among the commercial communities in that country at
+the prospect of loss of commerce, ships, and colonies in the case
+of defeat. Here was an opportunity to bring home to the Germans the
+conviction that the longer they persisted in continuing the war, so
+would their loss and sufferings increase.
+
+Unfortunately, in July, Mr. Wells found himself unable to continue
+the direction of the German Section and, at his request, the Enemy
+Propaganda Committee accepted his resignation of that office, although
+he retained his membership of the Committee. Mr. Hamilton Fyfe was
+appointed to succeed him and continued in the important post until the
+end. Mr. Fyfe developed the work along the lines already laid down.
+
+From the time of Mr. Wells’s appointment, Crewe House and the enemy
+propaganda section of the Military Intelligence Department maintained
+close touch with each other, but in July, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote
+to the Secretary of State for War expressing his considered view
+that it would be advisable that British propaganda agencies against
+the enemy should, both for technical reasons and in order to preclude
+possible differences of statement in propaganda literature, as far as
+possible be closely co-ordinated. While gladly recognising the most
+friendly relations which had been cultivated between his department and
+the enemy propaganda branch of the War Office, through Major the Earl
+of Kerry, Lord Northcliffe thought that the time had come for the whole
+of the work of production to be centralised at Crewe House. This did
+not alter the arrangements for distribution through military channels
+which were always admirably organised and carried out by the military
+authorities. And, as a matter of fact, a large proportion of the
+literature, apart from the “priority” leaflets referred to hereinafter,
+was produced by the War Office on Lord Northcliffe’s behalf. Lord
+Northcliffe asked for urgent consideration of the matter, in view of
+the necessity for the intensification and extension of propaganda on
+the Western Front. On Lord Milner’s agreeing to this reorganisation, it
+was arranged that the services of Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell, who,
+well-known in civil life as a distinguished man of science, had been
+the officer immediately in charge of this enemy propaganda branch,
+should be transferred to Crewe House. He was a valuable acquisition,
+and his experience, knowledge, and counsel were of great practical
+service. Captain Chalmers Mitchell also acted as liaison officer
+with the War Office (in succession to Lord Kerry) and with the Royal
+Air Force, and, in conjunction with Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, co-ordinated
+production and distribution.
+
+This centralisation soon bore fruit. One of the earliest developments
+aimed at abolishing the delays which might have caused the contents
+of leaflets to become stale owing to the time which elapsed between
+their composition and their distribution. This defect was obviated by
+dividing the leaflets into two classes, namely, “priority” leaflets for
+those of a news character and “stock” leaflets with matter of a less
+urgent nature.
+
+A time-table was prepared for the “priority” leaflets in which the
+time allotted for the different processes of composition, translation,
+printing, transport to France, and distribution, was cut down to an
+absolute minimum. With the willing aid of Messrs. Harrison and Son, the
+printers, and of Messrs. Gamage, who undertook the work of attaching
+the leaflets to the “releases,” it was found possible to arrange
+for these news bulletins to be in the hands of the Germans within
+approximately forty-eight hours of their being written. Three times a
+week a consignment of not fewer than 100,000 leaflets of this character
+was rushed over to France for prompt dispatch to the Germans. This
+“speeding-up” became a factor of the highest importance when military
+events moved so rapidly in the closing months of the war.
+
+In June and July the number of leaflets dropped over the German lines
+and behind them totalled 1,689,457 and 2,172,794 respectively. During
+August an average of over 100,000 a day was attained, the actual number
+of leaflets issued by the Enemy Propaganda Department in that month
+being 3,958,116, in September 3,715,000, and in October 5,360,000,
+while in the first ten days of November, before the Armistice put an
+end to such activities, 1,400,000 were sent out. The Germans were
+greatly disturbed. One of their writers described the flood of leaflets
+picturesquely as “English poison raining down from God’s clear sky.”
+Marshal von Hindenburg, in his autobiography, “Out of My Life” (Cassell
+& Co.), admits that this propaganda intensified the process of German
+demoralisation. “This was a new weapon,” he continues, “or rather a
+weapon which had never been employed on such a scale and so ruthlessly
+in the past.”
+
+The leaflets were written in simple language, and aimed at letting
+the Germans know the truth which was being concealed from them by
+their leaders. They gave information as to the progress of the war in
+all theatres, and showed at a glance, by means of shaded maps, the
+territory gained by the Associated Nations. Great stress was laid upon
+the large number of troops arriving daily from the United States.
+While, by the use of diagrams, the steadily progressive increase of
+the American forces was strikingly illustrated, German losses and the
+consequent futility of making further sacrifices in a losing cause
+were strongly emphasised. We have again the testimony of Hindenburg’s
+autobiography as to the effect on the German troops: “Ill-humour and
+disappointment that the war seemed to have no end, in spite of all our
+victories, had” (he writes) “ruined the character of many of our brave
+men. Dangers and hardships in the field, battle and turmoil, on top of
+which came the complaints from home about many real and some imaginary
+privations! All this gradually had a demoralising effect, especially
+as no end seemed to be in sight. In the shower of pamphlets which was
+scattered by enemy airmen our adversaries said and wrote that they did
+not think so badly of us; that we must only be reasonable and perhaps
+here and there renounce something we had conquered. Then everything
+would be soon right again and we could live together in peace, in
+perpetual international peace. As regards peace within our own borders,
+new men and new Governments would see to that. What a blessing peace
+would be after all the fighting! There was, therefore, no point in
+continuing the struggle. Such was the purport of what our men read and
+said. The soldier thought it could not be all enemy lies, allowed it to
+poison his mind, and proceeded to poison the minds of others.”
+
+Despite such compliments as to the effectiveness of the distribution,
+this branch of the work provided the thorn in the Crewe House flesh.
+Distribution by aeroplane was the ideal method, and the decision
+to discontinue the use of aeroplanes for the purpose was a serious
+handicap to Lord Northcliffe’s work. Balloon distribution was dependent
+upon favourable winds, and could only be performed in one direction,
+whereas aeroplanes could cover a much more extensive area at great
+speed. On several occasions Lord Northcliffe pressed for the resumption
+of their use. Lord Milner replied to the first request, early in May,
+to the effect that the British authorities were disputing the German
+contention that the distribution of literature from aeroplanes was
+contrary to the laws of war, and had given notice that they intended
+to institute prompt reprisals if they received information that any
+British airmen were undergoing punishment for similar action. Although
+distribution by aeroplane on the Western Front had been temporarily
+suspended, they held themselves free at any moment to resume it, and
+stated that meanwhile literature would be distributed by other and, as
+they thought, more effective means. _Yet it was admitted that there
+had been no stoppage of the use of aeroplanes for the purpose on the
+Italian Front._
+
+A month later, Lord Northcliffe again wrote, asking if anything had
+been done to cancel the temporary suspension of the distribution of
+leaflets by aeroplane on the Western Front. He and his co-workers
+felt strongly that propaganda work against Germany was being severely
+handicapped by disuse of this method of distribution, especially as,
+according to his information, the Germans themselves continued to drop
+leaflets over the British lines from aeroplanes. He could not believe
+that distribution by balloon was as accurate or as effective. It was a
+curious commentary on the British attitude that the French continued to
+use aeroplanes for the purpose on the Western Front.
+
+Many weeks passed before the War Cabinet agreed to the resumption of
+the use of aeroplanes, and even then the Air Ministry raised further
+objection. Finally, all obstacles were overcome, but not until the
+end of October. In one week 3,000,000 leaflets were prepared for the
+interior of Germany, and the distribution of these was begun just
+before the Armistice.
+
+With the turn of the tide of military events in the summer of 1918,
+propaganda had assumed greater importance than ever. Military defeat
+rendered the German soldier more amenable to propagandist influences,
+to which in victory he could afford to turn a blind eye and deaf
+ear. Moreover, the Allied successes seriously disturbed the German
+nation, and as the news was disseminated by the various agencies
+carefully organised by Crewe House the spirit of the people became
+generally depressed. The commercial classes exhibited great fear at
+the threatened economic war. Thus the soil became fertilised for the
+reception of propagandist views. One obvious but important way of
+spreading such views was by ensuring that important speeches of leading
+British statesmen should be adequately and promptly reported in enemy
+countries. Means were found of accomplishing this object. When occasion
+arose, publication in neutral newspapers of interviews with British
+public men on important subjects was arranged for, and these were
+widely quoted in the enemy Press.
+
+The valuable material collected by Mr. Wells on British progress in
+those lines of industry in which Germany had excelled was used by Mr.
+Fyfe in many ways. Articles on the subject were sent to, and published
+by, German-Swiss papers, which were known to be much read in Germany.
+Pamphlets were written in German in tones of serious warning and
+distributed through channels prepared by the perseverance and ingenuity
+of Mr. S. A. Guest. By these means, also, a large number of descriptive
+catalogues of an exhibition in London of British scientific products
+were introduced into Germany and were snapped up and read with
+avidity. Treatment of these issues was found to influence enlightened
+German opinion more than any other kind of propaganda.
+
+From time to time special topics were selected. For instance, a
+series of “London Letters” was sent to Swiss and Scandinavian papers
+purporting to be written with a pro-German flavour, but containing,
+under this disguise, a true picture of food and other conditions in
+Great Britain. It was gratifying to find these reprinted in enemy
+papers, for the German reader was thus led to institute mental
+comparisons with the much worse conditions prevalent in Germany.
+Secret means, too, were found to circulate in German naval ports, as
+a deterrent to men picked for service in submarines, leaflets (of
+which a reproduction appears in this volume) containing a long list of
+U-boat commanders, dead or captured, with description of their rank.
+Particulars so easy of verification proved the mastery of the British
+Navy over the U-boat campaigners and created great depression in the
+German ports.
+
+In addition to the “priority” leaflets containing news of Allied
+successes, illustrated with shaded maps and diagrams, a “trench
+newspaper” was prepared in a style which exactly resembled a German
+publication. The propaganda pill was coated to make it attractive.
+The newspaper was homely in appearance--its title-decoration included
+a head of the Kaiser--and it provided excellent reading matter which
+would appeal to the German soldier, while revealing facts hitherto
+carefully hidden from him. As many as from 250,000 to 500,000 copies
+of each weekly issue were distributed. Some leaflets, on the other
+hand, were in religious vein, for there is a deep religious strain in
+the German character. These leaflets pointed out that their military
+defeats were a just retribution for the crimes of their Government. One
+was a little sermon on the text “Be sure your sin will find you out.”
+
+With knowledge of the dwindling of their own reserves, the Germans
+became increasingly anxious about the supply of American troops,
+artillery, and munitions. No opportunity was lost by Crewe House of
+keeping the enemy armies and civil populations fully aware of the
+wonderful extent of the American effort. A series of leaflets was
+prepared which gave in succinct and vigorous form the latest details
+about that effort, both in the field and at home in the factory, the
+shipyard and the farm.
+
+British propagandist work against Germany was both positive and
+negative. Its aim was to give the German people something to hope
+for in an early peace and much to fear from the prolongation of the
+war--that is, to make it clear to them that the only way to escape
+complete ruin would be to break with the system that brought the war
+upon Europe, and to qualify for admission eventually into the League
+of Nations on the Allied terms. In addition to these very necessary
+educative efforts, the enemy armies were supplied with constant and
+_invariably truthful_ information about the actual military position.
+Its veracity was a more essential factor to its success than its
+quantity. The news withheld by the German authorities was supplied by
+us. Hence the cries of alarm from Marshal von Hindenburg and General
+von Hutier, to which fuller reference is made in the next chapter.
+
+In the “intensive propaganda” of the last few weeks of hostilities the
+Hohenzollern Government was denounced. It was pointed out that all
+Germany’s sufferings and tribulations were due to its “Old Gang,” of
+which a clean sweep would have to be made before the world would make
+friends or do business with Germans again. Chapter and verse were given
+to prove that the German Government could not be trusted, and that it
+was a great obstacle to peace. Attention, too, was drawn to the changes
+then taking place in Germany, to the cries raised for the abdication
+of the Emperor, and to the growing demand for the punishment of all
+who had brought Germany to her disastrous situation. German soldiers
+were urged to consider whether it was worth while to risk being killed
+when they had nothing left to fight for, and it was suggested that
+their best course was to make off to their homes and ensure the safety
+of their families. The consequences to Germans of the continuation of
+the war were plainly indicated. Maps and diagrams showed at a glance
+how Allied air raids over Germany had increased in number, how larger
+and larger Allied air squadrons and more powerful bombs were being
+provided and how easily it would be possible to attack Berlin, Hamburg,
+Hanover, and other places which had previously escaped. A map was also
+prepared showing all the steamship routes by which food, munitions,
+and raw materials were being brought to Great Britain and France, and
+demonstrating the falsity of the German leaders’ assurance that we
+could be starved into submission.
+
+By the courtesy of the Admiralty and of the Ministry of Information,
+use was regularly made of wireless telegraphy as a means of
+disseminating information, combating false German statements, and
+influencing German opinion through neutral newspapers and public
+opinion.
+
+Many other agencies for introducing propagandist material into
+enemy countries were organised by Mr. Guest, whose work demanded
+extraordinary patience and perseverance. He experimented with many
+methods, and, despite the vigilance of the Germans, the inflow into
+Germany increased. Some of the methods can never be revealed, but it
+is permissible to hint that, for instance, among foreign workmen of a
+certain nationality who went into Germany each morning and returned
+each evening there might be some to whom propagandist work was not
+uncongenial. And, of course, all secret agents were not necessarily
+Allies or neutrals. Somehow, huge masses of literature were posted in
+Germany to selected addresses from which the German postal revenues
+derived no benefit. Easiest of all were certain obvious channels left
+wholly or partially open in most incredible fashion, as, for instance,
+the book trade, which was by no means as closely supervised as might
+have been expected. None were more amazed at the facility with which
+such valuable propaganda material as Prince Lichnowsky’s pamphlet
+achieved clandestine circulation in Germany and Austria than were
+British propagandists. Perhaps, as a gratuitous hint to the curious, it
+may be added that the outside covers with titles of works by revered
+German authors did not always correspond to the contents of the books,
+but, oft-times, as the poet said, “things are not what they seem.”
+
+Personal propaganda among enemy subjects resident in neutral
+countries--and especially those unsympathetic to the perverted
+ideals of their respective nations--was tactfully pursued. Neutrals
+in prominent positions in any walk of life whose views were likely
+to react on enemy opinion were brought within the orbit of salutary
+personal intercourse. Enemy newspaper correspondents were carefully
+“nursed.” No avenue of approach into enemy countries was considered too
+insignificant, for each had its particular use.
+
+[Illustration: MR. HAMILTON FYFE.
+
+SUCCEEDED MR. H. G. WELLS AS DIRECTOR OF THE GERMAN SECTION.
+
+_Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd._]
+
+[Illustration: CAPTAIN CHALMERS MITCHELL.]
+
+[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. K. COCKERILL, C.B.
+
+[DEPUTY-DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]
+
+_Photo: Russell, London._]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY
+
+Hindenburg’s outburst: German Press Comments: Ludendorff on the conduct
+and effect of British Propaganda against the Central Powers.
+
+
+The Press of the enemy countries was closely watched for references
+to British propaganda in editorial articles or in the reports of
+utterances of political and military leaders. During August, 1918,
+the misgivings engendered by the trend of events, as revealed by our
+propaganda, found expression in print. Then, as if a pent-up stream
+had at last carried away the dam, came a flood of wails from many
+quarters, generals vying with editors in hurling imprecations at the
+British Enemy Propaganda Department, with blackest vilifications of
+Lord Northcliffe, and in beseeching German troops and people not to be
+affected by the leaflets which had by this time found their way into
+even the remotest corner of rural Germany.
+
+These outbursts were symptomatic of the fear of defeat which had laid
+hold of the Germans, and were correctly interpreted in England as
+foreshadowing the end which came so dramatically in November, 1918. It
+was obvious that even the German Government felt it unwise to restrain,
+by use of the censorship, the publication of such damaging admissions
+of the deadliness of British propaganda. It was impossible to stop the
+rising tide of truth which was covering Germany.
+
+To attempt to quote even a small proportion of these unintentional
+tributes to the work of Sir George Macdonogh’s department of the War
+Office and of Crewe House would be wearisome. Perhaps the best specimen
+of all came in the form of a manifesto from no less a person than Field
+Marshal von Hindenburg, the war idol and personification of German
+militarism. This is the text of the remarkable document:
+
+   We are engaged in a hard struggle with our enemies. If numerical
+  superiority alone guaranteed victory, Germany would long since have
+  lain shattered on the ground. The enemy knows, however, that Germany
+  and her Allies cannot be conquered by arms alone. The enemy knows
+  that the spirit which dwells within our troops and our people makes
+  us unconquerable. Therefore, together with the struggle against the
+  German arms, he has undertaken a struggle against the German spirit;
+  he seeks to poison our spirit and believes that German arms will also
+  become blunted if the German spirit is eaten away.
+
+  We should not take this plan of the enemy lightly. The enemy conducts
+  his campaign against our spirit by various means. He bombards our
+  Front, not only with a drumfire of artillery, but also with a
+  drumfire of printed paper. Besides bombs which kill the body, his
+  airmen throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul.
+
+  Of these enemy leaflets our field-grey men delivered up:
+
+  In May 84,000
+  In June 120,000
+  In July 300,000
+
+   A gigantic increase! Ten thousand poisoned arrows daily in July;
+  10,000 times daily the attempt to deprive the individual and the
+  whole body of belief in the justice of our cause and of the strength
+  and confidence for ultimate victory! We can reckon, in addition, that
+  a great part of the enemy leaflets will not have been found by us.
+
+  POISONING THE HOME SPIRIT.
+
+   But the enemy is not merely satisfied in attacking the spirit of
+  our Front, he wishes above all also to poison the spirit of our
+  home. He knows what sources of strength for the Front rest in the
+  home. True, his aeroplanes and balloons do not carry these leaflets
+  far into our homeland; they lie far from it in the lines in which
+  the enemy vainly struggles for victory by arms. But the enemy hopes
+  that many a field-grey soldier will send home the leaflet which has
+  innocently fluttered down from the air. At home it will pass from
+  hand to hand and be discussed at the beer-table, in families, in the
+  sewing-room, in factories, and in the street. Unsuspectingly many
+  thousands consume the poison. For thousands the burden the war in
+  any case imposes upon them is increased, and the will and hope for a
+  victorious issue of the war is taken from them. All these again write
+  their doubts to the Front, and Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau
+  rub their hands.
+
+  The enemy attacks the spirit of the home in another way besides. The
+  silliest rumours, designed to break our inner power of resistance,
+  are put into circulation. We find them simultaneously in Switzerland,
+  in Holland, and in Denmark. Thence they spread like a wave over the
+  whole of Germany. Or they emerge simultaneously, agreeing in silly
+  details, in the remotest regions of our country--in Silesia, in
+  East Prussia, in the Rhineland--and wend their way thence over the
+  remainder of the home territory. This poison works on the men on
+  leave and flows in letters to the Front. Again the enemy rubs his
+  hands.
+
+  The enemy is ingenious. He knows how to mix the little powder for
+  everyone. He decoys the fighters at the Front. One leaflet runs:
+
+   “German soldiers! It is a shameful lie that the French ill-treat
+  German prisoners. We are not brutes; only come over to us without
+  fear; here you will find a most considerate reception, good food, and
+  a peaceful refuge.”
+
+  Ask brave men who have succeeded with unspeakable difficulty in
+  escaping from the enemy captivity about this. Plundered to the
+  utmost in wire compounds, roofless, goaded by hunger and thirst into
+  treasonable utterances, forced by blows and threats of death to
+  betray their comrades, spat upon, pelted with filth by the French
+  populace while being driven to hard labour, that is what the paradise
+  that the enemy conjures up really looks like.
+
+  Reproductions of original letters written by prisoners are also
+  thrown down, in which these men describe how well it goes with them.
+  God be praised, there are still also decent and humane commandants of
+  prisoners’ camps in England and France; but these are the exception,
+  and the letters the enemy throws down are only of three or four
+  different kinds. But he sends these multiplied by many thousands of
+  copies. The enemy intimidates the faint-hearted by saying:
+
+   “Your struggle is hopeless; America will settle you; your
+  submarines are no good; we are building more ships than they sink;
+  after the war we shall debar you from getting raw materials, then
+  Germany’s industry must starve. You will never see your colonies
+  again.”
+
+  That is the tone of the leaflets; now enticement, now threat.
+
+
+  GERMAN FACTS AND FANCIES.
+
+  What is the real situation? We have enforced peace in the East
+  and are strong enough to do it in the West, notwithstanding the
+  Americans; but we must be strong and united; that is what the enemy
+  is fighting against with these leaflets and rumours. He wishes to
+  deprive us of faith and confidence, will and force.
+
+  Why is the enemy continually seeking new allies in the struggle
+  against us? Why does he try to press nations still neutral into the
+  struggle against us? Because in strength we are his equals.
+
+  Why does he incite black and other coloured men against German
+  soldiers? Because his will is to destroy us.
+
+  Again, the enemy says another thing:
+
+   “You Germans, your form of government is wrong. Fight against the
+  Hohenzollerns, against capitalism; help us, the Entente, to give you
+  a better form of State.”
+
+  The enemy knows perfectly what strength resides in our State and
+  Empire; but that is precisely why he combats it. The enemy also seeks
+  to tear open old wounds in the German body politic. With his leaflets
+  and by rumours he attempts to sow division and distrust among the
+  Federal States. At Lake Constance we confiscated many thousands of
+  leaflets conveyed to Bavaria and intended to excite anger against
+  the North Germans. They wish to destroy the German Empire, which for
+  centuries was the dream of Germans and which our fathers won for us,
+  and to condemn Germany to the impotence of the Thirty Years’ War.
+
+   The enemy also wishes to shake our loyalty to our allies. He does
+  not know the German way and the word of a German man. He himself
+  sacrifices his allies; he who is England’s ally dies of it.
+
+
+  TRAITORS TO THE FATHERLAND.
+
+  And finally the enemy sends not the least dangerous of his poisoned
+  arrows dipped in printers’ ink when he throws down the utterances of
+  German men and German newspapers. The utterances of German newspapers
+  are torn from their context. Regarding the utterances of Germans
+  which are reproduced, remember that at every time there have been
+  conscious and unconscious traitors to the Fatherland. Most of them
+  reside abroad in neutral countries, in order not to be obliged to
+  share our struggle and our privations, or to be condemned by our
+  Judges as guilty of high treason. Nor have champions of extreme party
+  tendencies any right to claim to speak for the generality of the
+  German people.
+
+   It is our strength, but also our weakness that even in war we
+  allow unrestricted utterance to every opinion. We still tolerate the
+  reproduction in our newspapers of enemy Army reports and the speeches
+  of enemy statesmen which are weapons of attack directed against the
+  spirit of the German Army and people. This is a sign of strength,
+  because it proves a consciousness of might. But it is a weakness
+  because it allows the enemy’s poison to find an entrance among us.
+
+  Therefore, German Army, German Homeland, if one of these thrown-out
+  pieces of poison in the form of leaflet or rumour comes before your
+  eyes and ears, remember that its originates with the enemy. Remember
+  nothing comes from the enemy which is not harmful to Germany. Every
+  one must be mindful of this, whatever his position or party. If you
+  meet anyone whose name and origin indeed are German, but who by
+  nature stands in the enemy’s camp, keep him at a distance, despise
+  him, put him publicly in the pillory in order that every other true
+  German may despise him.
+
+  Defend yourself, German Army, German Homeland!
+
+Hindenburg’s fear that only a small part of the leaflets was given up
+was fully justified. The numbers which he quotes suggest that hundreds
+of thousands must have been carried to their homes by the “field-grey
+men.”
+
+The whole manifesto is an interesting study in psychology. Hope had
+slipped away; dismay had ripened into despair and despair had sown
+wild anger and hatred. The dissemination of the unwelcome facts of
+the position caused him to burst out in vituperation and so to give a
+valuable clue as to the effect which Allied propaganda was producing on
+the German troops and public.
+
+After such a mighty oracle, it is not surprising that others took up
+the cry. Not long after, the following noteworthy message, signed by
+General von Hutier of the Sixth German Army, was captured:
+
+   The enemy begins to realise that we cannot be crushed by blockade,
+  superiority of numbers, or force of arms. He is, therefore, trying
+  a last resource. While engaging to the utmost of his military
+  force he is racking his imagination for ruses, trickery, and other
+  underhand methods of which he is a past master, to induce in the
+  minds of the German people a doubt of their invincibility. He has
+  founded for this purpose a special Ministry (“The Ministry for the
+  Destruction of German Confidence”), at the head of which he has put
+  the most thoroughgoing rascal of all the Entente--Lord Northcliffe,
+  who has been given billions for use in influencing opinion in the
+  interior of the country and at the Front by means of paid agents, the
+  assassination of Ambassadors, and all the other ways in favour with
+  the Entente.
+
+  The method of Northcliffe at the Front is to distribute through
+  airmen a constantly increasing number of leaflets and pamphlets; the
+  letters of German prisoners are falsified in the most outrageous
+  way; tracts and pamphlets are concocted, to which the names of
+  German poets, writers, and statesmen are forged, or which present
+  the appearance of having been printed in Germany, and bear, for
+  example, the title of the Reclam series, when they really come from
+  the Northcliffe Press, which is working day and night for this same
+  purpose. His thought and aim are that these forgeries, however
+  obvious they may appear to the man who thinks twice, may suggest a
+  doubt, even for a moment, in the minds of those who do not think for
+  themselves, and that their confidence in their leaders, in their
+  own strength, and in the inexhaustible resources of Germany may be
+  shattered.
+
+   Fortunately, Northcliffe, the Minister for the Destruction
+  of German Confidence, forgets that German soldiers are neither
+  Negroes nor Hindus, nor illiterate French, English, and Americans,
+  incapable of seeing through such machinations. Explain these infamous
+  attempts to your young and inexperienced comrades, and tell them
+  what our mortal enemy expects of them, and what is at stake. Pick
+  up the leaflets and pamphlets and give them to our commanders for
+  transmission to the High Command, which may be able to make valuable
+  deductions from them as to the aims of our enemies. You will thus
+  help the Command, and you will also help to hasten the hour of
+  victory.
+
+The allegation that huge sums of money were expended by Lord
+Northcliffe is comic. As will have been seen already, the total cost
+of the operations conducted by Lord Northcliffe during his tenure
+of office was considerably less than a one-hundredth part of Great
+Britain’s _daily_ war bill.
+
+German Army orders, which fell into Allied hands, showed plainly how
+widespread was the effect produced among the enemy troops by the
+leaflets. Officers and men were threatened with severe punishment if
+they neglected to hand the leaflets in immediately. On the other hand,
+bonuses for the delivery of unknown specimens of pamphlets, books,
+leaflets, and pictures were offered as follows:--
+
+    3 marks (nominally 3_s._) for the first copy.
+    30 pfgs. (nominally 4_d._) for other copies.
+    5 marks (nominally 5_s._) for a book.
+
+An order issued by Ludendorff showed that the influence of the
+propaganda extended beyond the troops to the population of Germany.
+This read:
+
+  “There has been an increase in the number of complaints received from
+  home that men on leave from the front create a very unfavourable
+  impression by making statements actually bordering on high treason
+  and incitement to disobedience. Instances such as these drag through
+  the mud the honour and respect of the individual as well as of the
+  whole Army, and have a disastrous effect upon the _moral_ of the
+  people at home.”
+
+A “high officer at the front” describing, in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ of
+October 31, 1918, the demoralisation of the German Army as a result of
+the retreat, wrote:
+
+   What damaged us most of all was the paper war carried on by the
+  enemy, who dropped daily among us 100,000 leaflets, which were
+  extraordinarily well distributed and well edited.
+
+This strikingly confirmed a report received by the Foreign Office the
+previous month which stated:
+
+  Leaflets thrown by Allied airmen have much more effect now. Instead
+  of being thrown away or laughed at, as was often the case in the
+  past, they are eagerly picked up and read. There is no doubt that
+  recent events have seriously shaken the _moral_ of the German people
+  and Army. One of the returned officers mentioned above said that if
+  the Entente knew what poison these leaflets, etc., were working in
+  the minds of the German soldiers they would give up lead and bombard
+  with paper only in future.
+
+That neither threats nor bribes was inducing the surrender of the
+leaflets to German Headquarters was plainly shown by the statements
+of prisoners captured during the last four months of hostilities,
+and by the fact that most of them had British leaflets in their
+possession. Among the subjects which seemed to have attracted special
+attention were the German responsibility for starting the war, for the
+adoption of poison gas attacks, and for the bombing of open towns; the
+ineffectiveness of Zeppelin attacks and of the U-boats preventing the
+transport of food and troops; the arrival of the American armies; the
+Allied war aims; comparison of food conditions in Germany with those
+in Great Britain; and the extracts from German Socialist newspapers.
+Inhabitants of the recaptured territory testified to the effect of the
+propaganda on the German troops, remarking on the lowering of _moral_
+and the increasing number of deserters which they attributed to it.
+
+Politicians and newspapers were also greatly excited, and raised loud
+cries for the creation of an organisation for counter-propaganda. Herr
+F. Stossinger described British propaganda in the _Frankfurter Zeitung_
+as “the most complicated and dangerous of all,” and commented on its
+“countless” activities. The Minister of War, General von Stein was
+complimentary enough to say “In propaganda the enemy is undoubtedly our
+superior.” (Berlin _Morgenpost_, August 25, 1918.) Other tributes were:
+
+   _Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung_: “At any rate, the British
+  Propaganda Department has worked hard. Had we shown the same activity
+  in our Propaganda perhaps many a thing would have been different now.
+  But in this, we regret to say, we were absolutely unprepared, but we
+  hope that by now we have learned differently.”
+
+  _Deutsche Tageszeitung_: “We Germans have a right to be proud of our
+  General Staff. We have a feeling that our enemies’ General Staff
+  cannot hold a candle to it, but we also have the feeling that our
+  enemies have a brilliant Propaganda General Staff, whereas we have
+  none.”
+
+Violent and bitter attacks were repeatedly made. The revelations of the
+British propaganda created great nervousness, which in turn gave rise
+to all kinds of wild rumours, which spread all over Germany. These were
+attributed to Lord Northcliffe’s department. Speaking in the Bavarian
+Lower House of Parliament during August, 1918, General von Hellingrath,
+the Bavarian Minister of War, said:--
+
+   “These rumours are nothing but the result of the industrious and
+  determined agitation which our enemies carry on in the interior
+  through their agents.”
+
+Herr von Kupffer, the editor of the Berlin _Lokal-Anzeiger_, referred
+to them as “a carnival of soul-storms, idiotic terror, and criminal
+irresponsibility,” and he continued:
+
+  “The main thing is to remember the source of such rumours and to bear
+  in mind what their object is. Their object is to demoralise us and,
+  by so doing, turn into realities what otherwise would remain merely
+  nightmares. One would have to be really blind not to see that these
+  things radiate from that organisation in England formed to shatter
+  the German nervous system by means of shameful and impudent lies. Is
+  not the figure of Lord Northcliffe, the great Propaganda Chief of the
+  English Home Army, pilloried in world-history for all time?
+
+   “Is anybody in doubt as to the purpose of this propaganda? Does not
+  everybody know that the generalissimo of this campaign of mendacity
+  has unlimited funds at his disposal in order to circulate streams
+  of lies through neutral channels with devilish cunning and almost
+  impressive skill? Does not everybody realise that the Northcliffe
+  Propaganda is too shrewd to work by means of mere newspaper tales
+  that could easily be disproved, and therefore resorts to the much
+  more subtle method of carrying unrest, disloyalty, and alarm into
+  our country and into the lands of our allies by means of verbal
+  communications of all sorts? Paid rascals are systematically employed
+  for this purpose. It is this sort of person who propagates these wild
+  stories in Germany and upsets our sense of proportion in connection
+  with war events. These are the facts. Let people bear them in mind
+  before they promote the Northcliffe Propaganda by repeating every
+  bit of washerwoman’s gossip as gospel, even though it be without the
+  slightest foundation in fact.”
+
+In the Hamburg district matters were much the same, for the influential
+shipping journal _Hansa_ printed the following on September 14:--
+
+   “God be thanked! At last we are just beginning to recognise what
+  the hour of war demands; what is our duty as Germans and as citizens.
+  Despondency, discontent, depression, hanging heads, grumbling! We
+  meet them at every step and turn, but we did not know their origin,
+  these growths of evil fantasy. We did not understand what meant these
+  secret whispers about alleged unfavourable news from the front,
+  these exaggerated reports, fraught with misfortune, which passed so
+  glibly from mouth to mouth. One had heard this, another that, but
+  always it was something bad in regard to our military situation.
+  Nothing definite was ever mentioned. There were only suggestions,
+  which proved to be chimeras as soon as ever they could be run to
+  earth. They were the birth of ignoble defeatism. Yet there they were,
+  invisibly surrounding us, disturbing our spiritual balance, darkening
+  our temper; like an epidemic, like poisonous bacilli, they flew
+  hither and thither in all directions through our German air.
+
+   “Whence came they? Who brought them to us? To-day we know. To-day
+  we can recognise the origin of this depression of German will-power.
+  It was the long-advertised publicity offensive of the Entente
+  directed against us under England’s lead, and under the special
+  direction of that unprincipled, unscrupulous rascal, Northcliffe.”
+
+In the _Kölnische Volkszeitung_ for September 11, a letter from the
+front said:
+
+  “Leaflets destined to cause low spirits and despair, or to send
+  deserters to the enemy, are being showered down in thousands in
+  certain places and their surroundings. It is this combat, waged
+  openly or secretly, which, particularly at home, produces low spirits
+  and despair. Here you find statements that Hindenburg was once
+  regarded as a Divinity, but that his laurels are beginning to fade,
+  which is quite evident from the way the enemy advance daily; that our
+  troops have lost courage, whole companies are deserting to the enemy,
+  and such like things.”
+
+In another letter to the same newspaper, published on August 20, the
+writer said:
+
+   “Our enemies have recently been very busy distributing leaflets
+  from the air. I have had two of these leaflets in my hands, and it is
+  not to be doubted that our enemies are in that, also, our masters,
+  for the pamphlets are so well produced that anyone who is not on the
+  lookout is very likely to fall a victim to them.”
+
+That such Propaganda might have had an effect if it had been tried
+earlier was evident from the admissions of war correspondents as
+well as of generals. Herr W. Scheurmann wrote in the _Norddeutsche
+Allgemeine Zeitung_ (October 30):
+
+  “We Germans have learnt _for the first time this autumn_ that the
+  moral resistance of the fighter at the front is a power with which
+  the Command must reckon, all the more cautiously inasmuch as it is
+  difficult to estimate.”
+
+All charges of the mendacity of British propaganda were unfounded, for
+the greatest care was unremittingly exercised to tell only the truth.
+One effect of this was to make the Germans distrust their official
+_communiqués_. “We have in our dear Fatherland to-day,” wrote the
+_Kölnische Zeitung_ on September 11, “great numbers of innocent and
+ingenuous minds who doubt the plain statements of the German Army
+reports, but _believe the false reports and omissions of the enemy_.
+To prove constantly the contrary to them is a rather thankless task,
+but of which one should never tire.”
+
+It was, indeed, a thankless task to try to keep the truth from the
+whole German nation. “Warn your brothers, your sons, your husbands,
+not to believe the enemy’s leaflets,” was one of “Ten Commandments for
+German Women,” published by the _Kölnische Volkszeitung_ on October 20,
+but it was then too late to maintain the lie-system by which the German
+resistance had been stimulated for so long.
+
+Writing in July, 1919, Herr Arnold Rechberg said in the _Tägliche
+Rundschau_: “It cannot be doubted that Lord Northcliffe very
+substantially contributed to England’s victory in the world war.
+His conduct of English propaganda during the war will some day find
+its place in history as a performance hardly to be surpassed. The
+Northcliffe propaganda during the war correctly estimated ... the
+character and intellectual peculiarities of the Germans.”
+
+Praise from an enemy, when there is no underlying motive, can usually
+be accepted as sincere. Most of the foregoing quotations were primarily
+warnings and exhortations to their own people issued during the war,
+and compliments to Allied propaganda only indirectly.
+
+When, however, hostilities had ceased disastrously for Germany and
+her allies, passions of hatred and pride began to give place to the
+cold logic of reason. Ludendorff, who, as First Quartermaster-General
+from 1916 to the end of the war, was regarded as one of the cleverest
+of Germany’s military leaders, sat down to write his “War Memories”
+(Hutchinson and Co., London). His reputation entitles him to respect,
+and he has much to say of value regarding propaganda.
+
+He learned one important lesson. “Good propaganda,” he wrote, “must
+keep well ahead of actual political events. It must act as pacemaker
+to policy and mould public opinion without appearing to do so.” This
+was the great basic principle upon which was built the success of Lord
+Northcliffe’s department. To try to make propaganda shape policy is as
+fatal as endeavouring to conduct propaganda campaigns without policy
+or with conflicting policies. Illuminating volumes could be written
+on failures from all these causes. But whoever follows the history of
+the operations conducted from Crewe House will find that painstaking
+study was made of the factors governing the political, economic, and
+military position of each of the enemy countries concerned before
+action was taken. As _The Times_ observed in a leading article (October
+31, 1919) Lord Northcliffe’s work “differed from the praiseworthy
+and painstaking efforts that had preceded it mainly by adopting as
+its guiding principle the very maxim which Ludendorff lays down. The
+consideration that, without a definite policy in regard to each enemy
+country, propaganda must be at best a hand-to-mouth business was, from
+the first, regarded as self-evident by Lord Northcliffe and the handful
+of experts who advised him.”
+
+Ludendorff compared the work of the British and German propaganda
+departments, to the great disparagement of the latter. Indeed he
+attributed the moral collapse of the German soldier--and consequently
+the military defeat--in part to British propaganda and in part to
+the demoralisation of the German home population, which, in turn, he
+ascribed to British propaganda and to the feebleness of the German
+Government in counteracting it. Of British propaganda he wrote:--
+
+   [1]Lloyd George knew what he was doing when, after the close of
+  the war, he gave Lord Northcliffe the thanks of England for the
+  propaganda he had carried out. Lord Northcliffe was a master of
+  mass-suggestion. The enemy’s propaganda attacked us by transmitting
+  reports and print from the neutral States on our frontier, especially
+  Holland and Switzerland. It assailed us in the same way from Austria,
+  and finally in our own country by using the air. It did this with
+  such method and on such a scale that many people were no longer able
+  to distinguish their own impressions from what the enemy propaganda
+  had told them. This propaganda was all the more effective in our
+  case as we had to rely, not on the numbers, but on the quality of
+  our battalions in prosecuting the war. The importance of numbers
+  in war is incontestable. Without soldiers there can be no war. But
+  numbers count only according to the spirit which animates them. As
+  it is in the life of peoples, so it is also on the battlefield. We
+  had fought against the world, and could continue to do so with good
+  conscience so long as we were spiritually ready to endure the burden
+  of war. So long as we were this, we had hope of victory and refused
+  to bow to the enemy’s determination to annihilate us. But with the
+  disappearance of our moral readiness to fight everything changed
+  completely. We no longer battled to the last drop of our blood. Many
+  Germans were no longer willing to die for their country.
+
+  The shattering of public confidence at home affected our moral
+  readiness to fight. The attack on our home front and on the spirit
+  of the Army was the chief weapon with which the Entente intended to
+  conquer us, after it had lost all hope of a military victory.
+
+[1] This passage is a translation from the German edition.
+
+His references to German enemy propaganda are generally in terms of
+disgust. He considered it rendered Germany no service. “Our political
+aims and decisions, issued to the world as sudden surprises, often
+seemed to be merely brutal and violent. This could have been skilfully
+avoided by broad and far-sighted propaganda.... The German propaganda
+was only kept going with difficulty. In spite of all our efforts,
+its achievements, in comparison to the magnitude of the task, were
+inadequate. We produced no real effect on the enemy peoples.... We
+also attempted to carry on propaganda on the enemy fronts. In the
+East, the Russians were the authors of their own collapse, and our
+work there was of secondary importance. In the West, the fronts of our
+enemies had not been made susceptible by the state of public opinion in
+their home countries, and the propaganda we gradually introduced had
+no success.... Germany failed in the fight against the _moral_ of the
+enemy peoples.”
+
+Again and again Ludendorff quotes instances of the effect of
+propaganda. For example, just before the last German offensive of July
+15, 1918:
+
+  “The Army complained of the enemy propaganda. It was the more
+  effective because the Army was rendered impressionable by the
+  attitude at home.... The enemy propaganda had seized on Prince
+  Lichnowsky’s pamphlet, which, in a way that I myself could not
+  explain, placed on the German Government the responsibility for the
+  outbreak of war. And this, though his Majesty and the Chancellor
+  again and again asserted that the Entente was responsible....
+
+   “The Army was literally drenched with enemy propaganda
+  publications. Their great danger to us was clearly recognised. The
+  Supreme Command offered rewards for such as were handed over to
+  us, but we could not prevent them from poisoning the heart of our
+  soldiers.”
+
+No greater effect could have been desired by the British authorities
+than that described by Ludendorff, and such an acknowledgment of the
+results produced gave the highest satisfaction.
+
+[Illustration: A MEDALLION STRUCK BY THE GERMANS IN “DISHONOUR” OF LORD
+NORTHCLIFFE.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES
+
+Peculiar difficulties of propaganda against Bulgaria--Educative work
+among prisoners of war.
+
+
+Operations against Bulgaria--the other objective of Crewe House
+activities--were somewhat dissimilar to those against either
+Austria-Hungary or Germany. There were complications due to the general
+state of Balkan affairs and politics, and to the fact that technically
+the United States was not at war with Bulgaria. The definition of
+propaganda policy against Bulgaria called for most delicate expression,
+lest any offence should be given to Serbia, Roumania, or Greece.
+
+Lord Northcliffe, in submitting to the Foreign Office a statement of
+policy proposed for use against Bulgaria, pointed out that he and his
+advisers felt that there was need for a definite Allied policy in
+regard to the Jugo-Slav and Roumanian questions. These, in their turn,
+were dependent upon Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary. On May
+25, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign
+Affairs:
+
+  “After careful consideration, and with the advice of our most
+  competent authorities on Bulgarian and Balkan affairs, I beg to
+  submit to you the following scheme of Allied policy in regard to
+  Balkan countries as the framework within which any propaganda in
+  Bulgaria should be carried out. I would especially direct your
+  attention to the need for a Government decision in regard to the
+  Southern Slav, Greek, and Roumanian questions before any definite
+  proposals from Bulgaria are entertained:
+
+    “The adoption of a clear and comprehensive Balkan policy by the
+    British and Allied Governments is an essential condition of any
+    propaganda in Bulgaria.
+
+    “Without such a policy any propaganda in Bulgaria would resolve
+    itself into competitive bargaining between the Allies on the one
+    hand and the Austro-Germans on the other.
+
+     “This bargaining would tend to estrange and to dishearten the
+    Serbians and the Greeks. In attempting it the Allies would be,
+    moreover, at a disadvantage, inasmuch as Bulgaria already occupies,
+    as a member of the enemy Alliance, considerably more than all the
+    territories that would be the subject of the bargaining.
+
+    “The aim of Allied policy in the Balkans should be a lasting
+    territorial and political settlement, framed as nearly as possible
+    on lines of ethnography, with the object of paving the way for a
+    permanent League of the Balkan Nations.
+
+    “Bulgaria cannot possess all the territories ethnographically
+    Bulgarian unless she retain at the peace districts held by Serbia,
+    Greece, and Roumania before the war. Serbia, Greece, and Roumania,
+    on the other hand, cannot fairly be asked or compelled to abandon
+    those districts unless they, in their turn, be united with
+    territories ethnographically Serbo-Croatian (Jugo-Slav), Greek, and
+    Roumanian.
+
+     “Allied policy should therefore deliberately aim at the solution
+    of the Southern Slav, Hellenic, and Roumanian questions in the
+    sense of the fullest possible racial unity and independence.
+
+    “The chief difficulty in defining the just claims of Bulgaria lies
+    in the uncertainty as to the proper delimitation of Bulgarian
+    Macedonia. A purely ethnographical delimitation might involve
+    economic and strategical injustice to Serbia and Greece, unless
+    it were accompanied by due provision, internationally guaranteed,
+    for Serbian and Greek rights of way. Similarly, the retention of
+    ports like Salonika and Kavalla by Greece would involve hardship
+    to Bulgaria unless adequate provision, internationally guaranteed,
+    were made for a Bulgarian right of way to those ports.
+
+     “Should it prove impossible to obtain, by persuasion or pressure,
+    the assent of Serbia and Greece to the retention of ethnographical
+    Macedonia by Bulgaria, an autonomous Macedonia might be set up,
+    proper provision being made for the maintenance of order and for
+    the repression of armed Serbian and Greek or Bulgarian ‘propaganda’
+    by an international force of _gendarmerie_. One advantage of an
+    autonomous Macedonia would be that it would meet the wishes of
+    the Macedonian Bulgars themselves, who would prefer autonomy to
+    annexation outright by Bulgaria.
+
+    “The Allied policy in the Balkans should be made known to the
+    Bulgarians by the Allies and by the United States. The necessary
+    ethnographical delimitation of Bulgarian, or of autonomous
+    Macedonian territory should be undertaken by a competent Allied
+    Commission, possibly under the presidency of the United States.
+    The announcement of Allied policy should be accompanied by an
+    intimation that only by accepting it can Bulgaria hope to escape
+    economic and political ostracism for an indefinite period; but that
+    acceptance of the Allied policy would, on the contrary, carry with
+    it a claim to financial and economic support.
+
+     “Bulgaria should at the same time be told that the Allies would
+    guarantee to her the Enos-Midia line as her minimum frontier on the
+    east, provided that she refrained from further active co-operation
+    with the enemies of the Allies. Active co-operation on the side of
+    the Allies should be rewarded by a frontier yet more favourable to
+    her aspirations, _e.g._ by the line Midia-Rodosto. The inclusion of
+    Silistria in the future Bulgarian territory should likewise be made
+    contingent upon the behaviour of Bulgaria before the conclusion of
+    peace.
+
+  “May I ask you to give me your views on this scheme of policy as
+  early as possible?
+
+  “I wish to send to Salonika, without delay, a competent mission to
+  begin propaganda on this, or some similar basis, but cannot authorise
+  its departure unless the ideas it would propagate have the explicit
+  approval of His Majesty’s Government.”
+
+Mr. Balfour replied on June 6, 1918:
+
+  “I have carefully considered your letter of May 25, in which you were
+  so kind as to furnish me with your ideas as to the lines on which we
+  should conduct our propaganda in the Balkans.
+
+   “I fully agree with the general ideas underlying your policy.
+
+  “I feel, indeed, that it will be of value if our own efforts in this
+  direction, which, for obvious reasons, can at present be only of
+  the most tentative nature, are preceded by discreet and intelligent
+  propaganda, such as will not only appeal to our enemies but enlighten
+  our friends.”
+
+It was well-known that influential Bulgarians realised the meaning
+of the trend of events in the main theatres of war and would have
+welcomed the opening of negotiations with the Allies. But it was
+obviously impossible to begin territorial bargaining with Bulgarian
+representatives of any party, because Bulgaria already possessed more
+territory than that to which she was ethnographically entitled. On
+the other hand, strictly to follow the ethnographic principle would
+raise difficulties to which Lord Northcliffe referred in the foregoing
+letter. As it would obviously require long and patient negotiations
+with our Allies to establish a just basis, it was deemed to be strongly
+advisable to restrict immediate propaganda to telling the Bulgarians
+the fate which must inevitably befall them and that unless they made a
+complete and effective reversal of their policy, the Allies would do
+nothing to save them from that fate or to alleviate their position.
+
+Four preliminary conditions were laid down as essential to the
+establishment of relations with Bulgaria:
+
+  “(_a_) The expulsion of King Ferdinand and his family;
+
+  “(_b_) A complete rupture with Germany;
+
+  “(_c_) Establishment of a democratic Government;
+
+  “(_d_) The orientation of Bulgarian policy in the direction of a
+  Balkan Confederation under the _ægis_ of the Allied Powers and of the
+  United States.”
+
+These lines were suggested as the suitable basis for a reply to secret
+overtures which had been made by Bulgarian emissaries claiming to speak
+for the new Premier, M. Malinof.
+
+In due course, Crewe House was authorised to convey an informal message
+to the effect “that until Bulgaria had given proof that a complete
+reversal of her policy had actually been brought about, we are not
+prepared to entertain any suggestions from her.” The Bulgarian agents
+were duly notified in this sense, and it is to be presumed that so firm
+a message was not without its effect upon the Malinof Government.
+
+Meanwhile propaganda material in this sense was prepared, reinforced
+by pamphlets, such as, for example, that by Lichnowsky, and another
+giving full particulars of American preparations. These were translated
+into Bulgarian, and this was a matter of some difficulty, as was the
+subsequent arrangement for printing. Distribution was principally
+arranged through naval and military channels and through secret
+agencies of the character operating against other enemy countries.
+
+Most painstaking work was undertaken to prepare for the publication of
+a newspaper in Bulgarian to be smuggled into Bulgaria. When a series
+of perplexing difficulties had been surmounted and all arrangements
+were in train for an immediate start, the news came that Bulgaria had
+surrendered.
+
+In this connection, too, Ludendorff pays tribute to the effect of
+propaganda. “A few days after the 15th (September, 1918), a secret
+report of the French General fell into my hands which made it
+evident that the French no longer expected any resistance from the
+Bulgarian army. Entente propaganda and money, and the United States
+representatives who had remained in Sofia, had done their work. In this
+instance again the Entente had made a thoroughly good job of it.” (“My
+War Memories.”)
+
+Besides the work in enemy countries, Crewe House also undertook the
+enlightenment of prisoners of war in the camps of Great Britain. The
+first necessity was the eradication of innate ideas of militarism,
+if it had left them with any illusions which their own experience
+had failed to shatter. Then the advantages of democratic government
+would be inculcated. Rightly it was thought that if these men could
+be taught that government of a country must be by the free will and
+assent of the governed, a small step at least would have been taken in
+the right direction. Such beneficent influences as could be brought
+to bear upon them would affect their compatriots on their return home
+and might fructify in the expression of changed views in their letters
+to their friends. There were several Prisoners of War camps scattered
+about Great Britain, each of them being in charge of a Commandant
+responsible to the War Office. The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt.,
+a valued member of the Enemy Propaganda Committee, took charge of
+this section of Crewe House work, his usual procedure being to have a
+personal interview with each of the Commandants, in order to ascertain
+from them what newspapers and books were allowed inside the camps,
+and what were the English and German newspapers which were most read
+by the prisoners. He then submitted to the Commandant a list of books
+and newspapers which were approved for such purposes, and suggested to
+them that these should be circulated among the prisoners and added to
+the library which existed in each of the camps. Among the newspapers
+in German which were found to be useful for this purpose were the
+_Arbeiterzeitung_ of Vienna, the _Vorwärts_, the _Frankfurter Zeitung_,
+the _Berliner Tageszeitung_, and the _Volkstimme_, and such pamphlets
+as Prince Lichnowsky’s “_Meine Londoner Mission_,” Hermann Fernau’s
+“_Gerade weil ich Deutscher bin_,” Dr. Karl Liebknecht’s “_Brief an
+das Kommandanturgericht_,” Dr. Muehlon’s “_Die Schuld der Deutschen
+Regierung am Kriege_” and “_Die Verheerung Europas_,” Dr. Anton
+Nystroem’s “_Vor dem Tribunale_,” and, in addition, German translations
+of Mr. H. G. Wells’s “Mr. Britling Sees it Through,” and copies of Mr.
+James W. Gerard’s “My Four Years in Germany.”
+
+Letters which were sent out by the prisoners of war to their friends
+at home were, of course, examined by the postal censor. Sometimes
+this examination indicated that certain of the prisoners would prove
+susceptible to influence, and a point was made of seeing that such
+prisoners were specially supplied with literature. The examination of
+prisoners of war was useful, too, in ascertaining what were the ideas
+prevalent in the minds of the Germans as to the cause of the war, the
+progress of events, and the prospect of ultimate success or failure.
+
+[Illustration: THE LATE SIR CHARLES NICHOLSON, BART., M.P. MEMBER OF
+ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND DIRECTOR OF PRISONERS OF WAR SECTION.
+
+_Photo: Russell & Sons._]
+
+[Illustration: SIR RODERICK JONES, K.B.E.
+
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.
+
+_Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd._]
+
+[Illustration: COLONEL THE EARL OF DENBIGH, C.V.O.
+
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.
+
+_Photo: Speight_]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION
+
+An axiom for propaganda--Results of a successful conference--Policy,
+Means and Methods.
+
+
+Experience gained at Crewe House proved that it is as necessary for
+Allies to co-ordinate propaganda against a common enemy as to unify
+military command. To conduct propaganda without a policy is bad enough;
+but to shut up sets of propagandists working independently of each
+other in a number of water-tight compartments, each set representative
+of a different nationality, is to court ridicule instead of attracting
+serious attention from an intelligent enemy, and to result in the
+production of contradictory thoughts and confusion in the minds of
+unintelligent adversaries.
+
+An axiom for propaganda of allies in future wars is that a clear
+common policy must be defined, based upon such a foundation of fact
+and justice that it need not be altered in its essential principles,
+but can be, _and must be_, rigidly adhered to. It will doubtless be
+necessary to lay down such a policy for each nation of an opposing
+alliance, in the event of the enemy not being a single nation.
+
+Clearly, too, it should be recognised that propaganda policy, or
+policies, must accord with the policy of the diplomatic, military, and
+naval authorities. Possessing no administrative function, propaganda
+is dependent upon them to make policy operative. Here, again, lack of
+co-ordination would involve the risk of confusion, contradiction, and
+consequent inefficiency. Propaganda may well and rightly be in advance
+of these other departments as a forerunner (with what success other
+chapters of this book record) or it may follow, but it must be in
+agreement with them.
+
+Lord Northcliffe had always conceived it to be a fundamental
+principle of propaganda against enemy countries that when a line
+of policy had been laid by him before the British Government and
+sanctioned as a basis for propaganda, the Allied Governments should
+be asked for their assent to it, so that their propaganda departments
+might act in conformity. In practice it was found that most rapid
+co-ordination could be attained by representatives of the Allied
+propaganda departments meeting together. One of Lord Northcliffe’s
+earliest acts was to convene an inter-Allied gathering at Crewe House
+which was attended by Lord Beaverbrook (Minister of Information), M.
+Franklin-Bouillon (France), and Signor Gallenga-Stuart (Italy), as well
+as by a number of other British, French, Italian, and United States
+representatives.
+
+To some extent this gathering paved the way for the close Allied
+co-operation in Italy. Lord Northcliffe would have desired the
+immediate establishment of an inter-Allied body for propaganda in
+enemy countries, but difficulties were encountered which postponed
+the formation of such a body until a later date. Meanwhile, as close
+touch as possible was kept with the French and Italian departments
+concerned. But the course of events in the summer made it obvious to
+Lord Northcliffe and his advisers that an inter-Allied conference on
+Enemy Propaganda was indispensable to success. With the assent of the
+British War Cabinet, therefore, he issued invitations to the French,
+Italian, and United States Governments to send delegates to an official
+conference in London. These invitations were cordially accepted and the
+Conference assembled at Crewe House on August 14, 1918.
+
+In addition to representatives of Lord Northcliffe’s department,
+and of the Allied propaganda departments, there were also present
+representatives of the British Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty,
+Air Ministry, and Ministry of Information.
+
+The full list of delegates was:
+
+  Great Britain:
+
+  Viscount Northcliffe (Chairman).    } Department
+  Lieutenant-Colonel Sir              }   of Propaganda
+    Campbell Stuart.                  }   in Enemy
+  Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart, M.P.   }   Countries.
+  Mr. Wickham Steed.                  }
+
+  Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald           }
+    Hall (Director of Naval           }
+    Intelligence).                    } Admiralty.
+  Captain Guy Gaunt.                  }
+  Commander G. Standing.              }
+
+  Brigadier-General G. K.             }
+    Cockerill (Deputy-Director        }
+    of Military Intelligence).        } War Office.
+  Major The Earl of Kerry, M.P.       }
+  Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell.       }
+
+  Colonel E. H. Davidson.               Air Ministry.
+
+  Mr. C. J. Phillips.                   Foreign Office.
+
+  Sir Roderick Jones (representing    }
+    the Minister of Information).     } Ministry of
+                                      }   Information.
+  Mr. Cunliffe-Owen (Controller       }
+    of Propaganda against Turkey).    }
+
+  France:
+
+  M. Klobukowski.
+  M. Haguenin.
+  M. Sabatier D’Espeyran.
+  Major-General le Vicomte de la Panouse.
+  M. le Capitaine Prince Pierre d’Arenberg.
+  Lieutenant le Comte Stanislas de Montebello.
+  M. Comert.
+  Lieutenant P. Mantoux.
+
+  Italy:
+
+  Professor Borgese.
+  Signor G. Emanuel.
+  Captain Count Vicino-Pallavicino.
+  Lieutenant R. Cajrati-Crivello.
+
+  United States of America:
+
+  Mr. James Keeley.
+  Captain Walter Lippmann.    }
+  Captain Heber Blankenhorn.  } Present as
+  Lieutenant Charles Merz.    }   observers.
+  Lieutenant Ludlow Griscom.  }
+
+In the speech with which, as Chairman, Lord Northcliffe opened the
+Conference, he pointed out that the organisation of British Propaganda
+in Enemy Countries had reached a stage at which greater co-ordination
+of Allied purpose and effort was required if its objects were to be
+achieved in full measure. Propaganda in enemy countries presupposed:
+
+  _a._ The definition, for propaganda purposes at least, of Allied
+  policy in regard to our enemies;
+
+  _b._ The public manifestation of this policy; and
+
+  _c._ The study of technical means of bringing its main features to
+  the knowledge of the enemy.
+
+He suggested that the Conference should resolve itself into a number of
+Committees to examine and to report upon these and other matters. Such
+Committees would be concerned with:
+
+  1. The great subject of the policy of propaganda;
+
+  2. The difficult question of means of distribution:
+
+      (_a_) Military.
+      (_b_) Civil.
+
+  3. Propaganda material;
+
+  4. Educative work among prisoners of war who might return to Germany
+  to tell their compatriots the real facts.
+
+Unless based on a definite policy, propaganda could only be
+fragmentary and superficial. On the basis of a clear policy it might
+become destructive of enemy _moral_, a valuable adjunct to military
+operations, and constructive of the necessary conditions of a lasting
+peace.
+
+The three enemy countries with which his Department was mainly
+concerned were Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany. He cited
+Austria-Hungary first, because, of all our enemies, the Hapsburg
+Monarchy was the field where positive results were most readily
+attainable.
+
+In the early months of 1918, when he began that work, Germany was
+too flushed with her facile triumphs in Russia to be susceptible to
+propaganda, and the attitude of Bulgaria was too closely bound up with
+German fortunes to be at that moment easily affected by propaganda.
+Allied policy in regard to Bulgaria was, moreover, closely connected
+with the general Balkan policy of the Allies, the formulation of which
+necessarily depended, in its turn, upon the adoption of a definite
+policy towards Austria-Hungary. All these considerations pointed to
+Austria-Hungary as the foremost object of attack, and therefore as the
+country in regard to which a clear propaganda policy was most urgently
+required.
+
+Lord Northcliffe then outlined the steps taken in regard to
+Austria-Hungary, described fully in Chapter III. He went on to state
+that there was abundant evidence that the work thus begun had helped
+to prevent an Austrian offensive in April, and to check it when it
+was finally launched in June. There was also strong reason to believe
+that, had action on these lines been taken earlier, far greater results
+might have been obtained. This was an aspect of the vital connection
+between propaganda policy and military operations to which he earnestly
+directed attention. He trusted that the Policy Committee of the
+Conference might be able to make valuable recommendations in this
+respect.
+
+One important aspect of propaganda against Austria-Hungary and, indeed,
+against all our enemies, was the dissemination of knowledge of the
+greatness of the war effort of the American people. With that effort
+he had had personal acquaintance; and on that very day he had received
+a secret report that the Germans had little idea of the supreme effort
+which the Americans were making. To this aspect he attributed great and
+growing significance.
+
+In regard to Bulgaria, he had also ventured to lay before the British
+Government an outline of propaganda policy, which had received general
+approval. Its main features were the necessity of a definite Allied
+decision in regard to the Jugo-Slav and Rumanian questions, before any
+direct attempt could be made to influence Bulgaria by propaganda. A
+definite Jugo-Slav and Rumanian policy presupposed, however, a definite
+Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary. Upon the details of this
+important subject the Policy Committee would be fully informed. Broadly
+speaking, he considered it at once inexpedient and dangerous to enter
+into any direct or indirect negotiations with Bulgaria or to make to
+her proposals even as propaganda until a complete change of attitude
+had actually taken place in Bulgaria itself. Until then, propaganda
+could consist only in conveying information to the Bulgarian troops
+and people as to the fate that inevitably awaited them unless they
+reversed completely their attitude; and in preparing by agreement
+among the Allied Governments an outline of Balkan policy, aiming at
+a solution of the various Balkan questions as nearly as possible on
+ethnographical lines. In this way, Allied propaganda might eventually
+help to prepare the way for a League of Balkan States.
+
+Though for many reasons it had not thereto been possible to develop
+British propaganda in Germany as fully or as efficiently as it had been
+developed in Austria-Hungary, Lord Northcliffe said his department had,
+in co-operation with the military authorities, and by the utilisation
+of secret channels, been able to introduce into Germany a certain
+amount of propaganda literature. The decision of the British military
+authorities not to allow the use of aeroplanes on the British Front
+in France for the distribution of propaganda had naturally retarded
+and hampered the necessary extension of his work. He trusted that this
+question of the use of aeroplanes for propaganda purposes would be most
+carefully considered by the committee on military distribution. In
+the meantime, balloons had been employed, though they were manifestly
+far inferior to aeroplanes as instruments of distribution. The view
+seemed to prevail that propaganda was not worth casualties. Were this
+view well-founded it would be hard to understand why the Germans
+should have taken such drastic measures against British airmen accused
+of dropping propaganda leaflets. The Germans, who ought to be good
+judges, evidently feared our leaflets more than they feared our bombs.
+But the main issue was the determination of an Allied propaganda
+policy in regard to Germany--a matter of no little difficulty. As he
+had said in relation to Austria-Hungary, one of the chief features
+of Allied propaganda--apart from questions of policy--would be the
+constant dissemination of knowledge of the immensity and of the growing
+efficiency of American effort. This feature he had endeavoured to
+develop, and he intended to develop it increasingly. On the subject of
+policy, however, he had submitted to the British Government an outline
+comprising the following points, which it was necessary to bring home
+to the Germans.
+
+  1. The determination of the Allies to continue the war until Germany
+  accepted the Allied peace terms.
+
+   2. The existing alliance as a fighting league of free nations would
+  be deepened and extended and the military, naval, financial, and
+  economic resources of its members would be pooled until its military
+  purpose was achieved and peace could be established on lasting
+  foundations. He had suggested further that, as German minds were
+  peculiarly susceptible to systematic statement, the Allies should
+  prepare a comprehensive scheme of world organisation as a counterpart
+  to the German schemes represented by the phrases “Berlin-Baghdad” and
+  “Mittel-Europa.” As a preliminary to the drafting of such a scheme,
+  he had urged that the lines of a practical League of Free Nations
+  should be studied and laid down.
+
+Pending the formulation of this scheme, he thought that Allied
+propaganda should insist upon Allied control of raw materials, of
+shipping, and on the Allies’ power to ostracise for an indefinite
+period enemy peoples, until the terms of the Allied peace settlement
+were fully accepted. At the same time it should be pointed out that
+nothing stood between enemy people and a lasting peace except the
+designs of their ruling dynasties and of their military and economic
+castes. The primary war aim of the Allies was the changing of Germany,
+not only in their own interest, but also in that of the German
+people itself, since, without the honest co-operation of a reformed
+Germany, disarmament on a large scale might be impossible, and without
+disarmament social and economic reconstruction would be impracticable.
+He trusted that this question of Allied propaganda policy in regard to
+Germany would be carefully weighed by the Policy Committee.
+
+There remained the extremely important question of the co-ordination of
+Allied propaganda effort. It was obvious, he said, that if each Ally
+carried on its propaganda in enemy countries without reference to what
+the other Allies were doing, there must result great dispersion of
+effort, overlapping, and, possibly, some conflict of statement if not
+of aims. In order to secure the greatest possible military efficiency,
+the Allied Governments had established the Versailles Council, and
+had agreed to the appointment of an Allied Commander-in-Chief. Up
+till then the only Inter-Allied propaganda institution set up was
+the Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission at Padua. The working of this
+Commission had revealed the great advantages of concerted effort,
+but it had also revealed certain defects which only fuller Allied
+co-ordination in matters of propaganda seemed likely to overcome. He
+would therefore submit a proposal, definite in aim, though variable
+in detail, that there be created a central body for the conduct of
+propaganda in enemy countries. By such a step it seemed to him many
+delays might be avoided, great economy of energy and expense might
+be secured, and progress be made towards the unification of Allied
+propaganda policy and of the means for carrying it into effect.
+
+In conclusion, he asked pardon for reverting once more to the great
+importance of a true conception of propaganda in enemy countries, not
+only as a means of winning the war, but also and especially as a means
+of winning the peace. It was a work that demanded all the intelligence
+of the best minds in Allied countries, and the sustained support of
+responsible Allied statesmen.
+
+M. Klobukowski, the head of the French delegation, who followed Lord
+Northcliffe with an eloquent speech in French, which Lieutenant Mantoux
+interpreted, concurred in all that Lord Northcliffe had said. The
+French Government, he said, answered willingly to the invitation sent
+to them by the British Government to send their representatives to the
+Inter-Allied Conference on Propaganda in Enemy Countries. It seemed to
+them necessary to call it to intensify by methodical co-operation and
+concerted direction the powerful means of action at the disposal of
+the Allies. To see exactly what could be done; to know exactly where
+they meant to go--that was the principal aim which must inspire their
+propaganda.
+
+The campaign of systematic untruth which was being waged by the enemy
+need not for one moment divert the Allies from their line. Honesty had
+never seemed to the Allies to be an inferior policy. In the second
+place, French propaganda had taken care to put in a strong light the
+responsibility for the war. The war, on the part of our enemies, was
+a war of aggression and the service of a policy of conquest and the
+enslavement of nationalities. On the Allied side it was a purely
+defensive war, for the defence not only of territories, but also of the
+great cause of Right violated in Belgium, as in Alsace-Lorraine, in
+Poland, in the Ukraine, in Serbia, in Rumania, and in all the Balkan
+countries. “We try,” said M. Klobukowski, “to reach in enemy countries
+consciences which have hitherto shut out free examination and which
+cannot yet control themselves. We try to open eyes and ears now shut by
+the most extraordinary education of discipline which has at any time
+dominated men. And this with the help not only of arguments taken from
+facts which might be considered as arbitrary in practice and intention,
+but also with the help of what is admitted by our enemies themselves
+in declarations (the sincerity of which is incontestable for they come
+from their own agents) from those who dared write what they know, like
+Prince Lichnowsky and Dr. Muehlon.”
+
+Co-operation in the work of liberating the oppressed nationalities
+(continued M. Klobukowski) defined clearly one of the ends of our
+action against Austria-Hungary; but although we cannot speak of
+immediate results, Allied propaganda was not least indispensable
+in Germany. If Austria was guilty towards her peoples, Germany was
+guilty towards the whole of mankind. Since the war began, the French
+Government had been constantly preoccupied with the propaganda to be
+effected in Germany. Faced with the monstrous distortion of facts which
+the Imperial Government tried to force upon the world, the first French
+Yellow Book, in December, 1914, gave the full list of responsibilities
+for the war, and showed, by going back to its origin, that Germany
+prepared and finally launched the war.
+
+One of the essential objects of Allied propagandists, therefore, must
+be to come back frequently to the origin of the war, in the hope that
+such effort will not be in vain. The experience of the publication of
+the Lichnowsky memorandum was very encouraging from that point of view,
+but that was not enough, as the majority of the German nation had still
+confidence in the official versions of the causes of the world conflict
+such as had been given to them by the Imperial Government. The Germans
+must not be allowed to lower the Allies’ defensive war to the level of
+a war of conquest. The Allies must never be tired of insisting that
+they were victims of a deliberate aggression.
+
+On the other hand, it was their interest to insist more and more upon
+the character of the struggle in which they were engaged. They were
+upon the defensive; they were defending themselves, they were defending
+right and humanity; that was their war aim, and all other war aims
+were only consequences of it. Deeply imbued as the German nation might
+be with doctrines of historical realism, hostile as their Government
+might be to the notion of a policy founded upon the respect of right,
+the day nevertheless must come when their ideas would triumph over
+their resistance, when gradually on one hand the revelations (daily
+becoming more definite) would show the criminal complicities which were
+the cause of the war. On the other hand the gradual failure of that
+bid for domination would oblige the Germans themselves to look for the
+culprits. The anxiety about the injustice of their own cause would
+finally penetrate into the German nation.
+
+It was also important clearly to show how useless was the effort made
+by the enemy to sever the link between the Powers of the Entente.
+The enemy Press was never tired of giving its readers the imaginary
+spectacle of divisions between their enemies. After their tales about
+France being conquered by the British Army, they proceeded to announce
+that the Americans were going to get hold of France.
+
+Every peace offensive undertaken by the German Government in the hour
+of military difficulty gave evidence of the naïve confidence which the
+best-informed among them employed in such an attempt to divide us. To
+show that the Allied front was indissolubly united, to show that the
+Alliance extends still further than the war, that it will extend from
+the military to the economic field--that would be the efficient answer
+of the Allies.
+
+It must be said above all that the Allies would conquer and that they
+had the means to conquer. They must not let themselves be led towards
+discussions. There was always a danger of seeing the enemy get hold
+of Allied formulæ, after having emptied them of what they contained.
+The German mind, so complex and treacherous, had great ability in the
+art of turning to its own account the principles laid down by others.
+Germany might attempt once more to mislead the peoples by writing
+on her own flag their mottoes while they reserved to themselves the
+possibility of giving to those mottoes later on an interpretation
+diametrically opposed to the real one.
+
+Nothing was more important than to defend Allied public opinions
+against such enterprises, which would certainly be undertaken by
+Germany. The liberation of the peoples, affirmation of the justice of
+the Allied cause, demonstration of the violation of right perpetrated
+by the Central Empires--such must be the basis of Allied propaganda.
+
+That was in full harmony with the general policy of principles and
+tended to assure to all the peoples the right freely to develop, as
+the constitutions of the Allied States had given the same right to
+every individual. So Allied victory would have that character of moral
+elevation which was the character of the great Allied nations during
+their history. But until they reached that victory of liberty and
+right, according to the strong words of M. Clemenceau, “let us make
+war!”
+
+Signor Borgese, the representative of Italy, said that he agreed
+generally with all the ideas and proposals that had been made by Lord
+Northcliffe.
+
+The Italians had of late been particularly active on the field of
+anti-enemy propaganda. For example, they had one office in Rome whose
+chief duty it was to spread news arriving from the enemy in order
+that his position in the world, and his internal resistance, might
+be weakened. They had also in Switzerland a large organisation, the
+principal aim of which was to secure daily knowledge of what was going
+on in enemy countries, and to utilise to the full every possible means
+of securing information about their internal condition.
+
+The first act of Allied joint propaganda against the enemy was the
+Rome Congress in April, which was due largely to the concord and the
+friendship of the most enlightened and intelligent elements of public
+opinion in England and in Italy. As a result of that Congress, great
+consequences had followed in Austria-Hungary, and generally in the
+world of the enemy; and the principal task was to pursue the way that
+had thus been opened by the Rome Congress. The peculiar position
+of Italy as the enemy of Austria naturally entered largely into
+the motives that inspired Italian action. The declarations of Lord
+Northcliffe--whose influence upon the question of enemy propaganda
+was immense--and the declaration of M. Klobukowski were entirely
+anti-Austrian in tendency.
+
+As regards the Italians, they had been enemies of Austria not only
+because Austria was their enemy, but also because they felt that it was
+the most direct and sure way of being the enemies of Germany and of
+Germanism. Those Italians who had understood the true position since
+the beginning of the war had always been enemies of Austria in this
+sense, and had sought the best means of attacking and annihilating
+German militarism through Austria. Although German militarism was not
+completely invulnerable, and although the vulnerability of Germany
+was not so certain as that of Austria, Austria was the Achilles’ heel
+of Germany. Two important conditions that had rendered possible such
+action against Austria, were that the necessity of disintegrating
+Austria had become generally realised throughout the world, and that
+Austria’s responsibility for the war had been generally acknowledged
+not only by the Allies, but also by the enemy. Lichnowsky and Muehlon
+had acknowledged that the chief and immediate responsibility for the
+war rested with Austria. The question of guilt was certainly one of
+the chief questions with which propaganda had to deal; and it would
+be examined by the committees, because he believed that it might be
+possible to accelerate movements of opinion in Germany and in Austria
+if a confession of guilt as to the origin of the war were made widely
+known.
+
+As to what had been done by Italian propaganda during the last few
+months, he had mentioned the offices at Rome and at Berne, to which he
+would refer in more detail in the committees. As to the work of the
+Padua Inter-Allied Commission, it was assuredly a very great work,
+if one were to judge of its activity not only by personal convictions
+but by the convictions of the foe, who had publicly acknowledged
+that the defeat on the Piave was partly caused by the efforts of the
+Padua Commission, and by information that had been brought to them
+by the Jugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks. Allied propaganda must be a
+propaganda of truth. The chief difficulty lay in making a distinction
+between copying the enemy’s system of actual military operations
+and imitating his methods in the war of ideas. It was true that the
+military technique of war must be dependent upon that of the adversary,
+unless we were to be at a disadvantage; but there was a danger that we
+might imitate methods adopted by the enemy in the war of ideas--that
+is to say, that we might copy German methods of propaganda. Although
+there were people who thought that the Allies should copy lies and
+hypocritical statements of German propaganda, he was convinced that
+their real arm in the propaganda war was the truth. The Allies could
+tell the truth because they were persuaded that they were right. It
+was easy for them to have a system of ideas, because they believed
+in them as in a kind of religion. Germany and Austria-Hungary would
+listen intently to the words that we should say--not necessarily in
+that Conference, but to the words of our Governments. Political action
+and propaganda would have very great importance at the end of this
+campaign, and therefore he hoped that Italians would be able to make
+their contribution to the shortening and to the victorious decision of
+the war.
+
+One circumstance that gave them absolute certainty of victory, and was
+a certificate of the moral purity of the Allied cause, was the action
+of the United States, whom no one--not even the enemy--could accuse
+of any selfish motive or interest. While it was conceivable that the
+European Allies might be charged, however unjustly, with having some
+thought of their direct interests, the United States could not by any
+stretch of imagination be regarded as having intervened for any issue
+save that of high principle. Therefore, he agreed entirely with Lord
+Northcliffe and M. Klobukowski that the more the significance of the
+American effort, both in its material and its moral aspects, were
+brought to the knowledge of enemy peoples, the more rapid would be the
+decline of their _moral_, and the surer the attainment of the just
+peace which was the great common aim of the Allies and the purpose of
+their action, both military and propagandist.
+
+Mr. James Keeley, the representative of the United States, said that he
+received his appointment through the Committee on Public Information
+of the United States Government. Four U.S. military officers were
+present, from the Military Intelligence Branch of the General Staff, as
+observers. They all met the Conference as pupils, having a most earnest
+desire to learn so that they might do their part as whole-heartedly in
+this as in all other phases of Allied effort.
+
+Learning from those who have had experience, they would be enabled to
+devote whatever resources they had to the common purpose. They would
+report to the American Government what men of experience in this work
+had to recommend, and on the basis of that report it was hoped that an
+American organisation could be created as quickly as possible, which
+should work in the fullest, frankest, and most effective co-operation
+with the corresponding organisations of the Allied nations. It would
+not be amiss, perhaps, to suggest that, in addition to material
+equipment, the United States could contribute one element that might
+possibly be of peculiar importance in this work. Its population
+contained a large representation of all the peoples of Central Europe.
+These peoples were well organised in the United States, and, with a
+few exceptions perfectly well-known, were loyal to the Allied cause.
+Those peoples, of course, had intimate connections with the peoples of
+Central Europe, and it was more than possible that they might be, in
+various ways, of great use in carrying messages across the frontiers.
+On this point, particularly, they would be glad of the advice of the
+Conference.
+
+After these speeches the four Committees referred to by Lord
+Northcliffe were appointed to deliberate on policy, distribution,
+material, and prisoners of war. The members of the Conference were
+suitably distributed among the different committees, which accomplished
+most invaluable work in a business-like manner, and presented their
+reports to the full Conference for consideration at its sitting on the
+third day.
+
+The Policy Committee, presided over by M. Klobukowski, considered
+exhaustively the problems of propaganda policy in all its fields
+and phases of action. Its discussion crystallised into a series
+of resolutions and recommendations for sanction, modification
+or rejection by the Allied Governments. It was, of course, fully
+understood that such resolutions could be only _ad referendum_ and not
+binding on the respective Governments.
+
+In regard to propaganda against Austria-Hungary, the Committee found
+itself in complete agreement with the scheme of policy sanctioned
+by the British Government for purposes of propaganda, and amplified
+by the decisions of the British, French and Italian Governments at
+the time of, or in connection with, the Rome Congress of Oppressed
+Austro-Hungarian Nationalities. It recognised that such extensions of
+policy, while springing from considerations of Allied principles, had,
+in part, corresponded to the real demands of the propaganda situation,
+which, in their turn, had sprung from the exigencies of the military
+situation and, in particular, from the necessity of utilising the
+established principles of the alliance for the purpose of impeding or
+hampering the Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy. Subsequent
+acts and declarations on the part of Allied Governments and of the
+Government of the United States made it clear that the joint policy of
+the Allies was tending increasingly towards the constructive liberation
+of the subject Austro-Hungarian races. The main task of the Committee
+in relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to
+be one of unifying for propaganda purposes these various acts and
+declarations, and of preparing, if possible, the way for a joint Allied
+declaration that might complete and render more effective the work of
+Allied propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary and among
+Austro-Hungarian troops at the Front.
+
+The discussion upon the expediency and the possibility of such a joint
+Allied declaration was exhaustive and illuminating. In view of the
+position already taken up by the Allied Governments and by the United
+States in regard to the Czecho-Slovaks, the Poles, and the Rumanians,
+it appeared that the main issue awaiting definition concerned the
+question of Jugo-Slav unity and independence, and of the attitude of
+Italy towards them. The Committee adopted the following recommendation:
+
+   “With reference to the best means of aiding Allied Propaganda in
+  favour of the freedom of the Austro-Hungarian subject races, the
+  Committee expresses a strong hope that all controversial discussions
+  of the frontiers between Italy and the future Jugo-Slav State will be
+  avoided by the Jugo-Slav Press and the Jugo-Slav leaders both outside
+  and, as far as the Jugo-Slav leaders may be able to exert their
+  influence, also inside the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, just as they
+  have been avoided of late by the most important organs of the Italian
+  Press and in the public speeches of influential Italian leaders.”
+
+During the debate upon this recommendation it became clearly apparent
+that the Committee regarded, and was confident that the Conference
+would regard, the Italian national claims to the union with Italy
+of the cities and regions of Trent, Trieste, and the other regions
+of Italian character as not only entirely justified, but also as
+an elementary dictate of the Allies’ respect for the principles of
+nationality and of ethnical justice. Precisely because the Committee
+supported the principles formulated in the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement of
+last March and saw in them the basis of fruitful co-ordination between
+Italy, Jugo-Slavia, and the other nationalities then oppressed of the
+Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, it held the Italian national rights above
+mentioned to be imprescriptible and not open to discussion.
+
+The Committee also felt that both for reason of propaganda and from
+the point of view of the future independence and moral and political
+security of the Italian nation a foremost part in the work of creating
+a free and united Jugo-Slav State naturally fell to Italy. Therefore,
+after the most careful consideration, it unanimously adopted--and
+recommended to the Conference--the following resolution:
+
+  “Considering the adhesion of the Italian Government, by the Prime
+  Minister’s speech of April, 1918, to the resolutions of the Rome
+  Congress of Austro-Hungarian subject races (which embodied the
+  agreement between the Jugo-Slavs and the Italian Committee) and by
+  his recent telegram to the Prime Minister of Serbia, M. Pashitch;
+
+   “Considering the exemplifications of Allied Policy towards
+  Austria-Hungary in the French and Italian Convention with the
+  Czecho-Slovak National Council, the British declaration recognising
+  the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied Nation, the Allied declaration at the
+  Versailles Conference of June 3rd, 1918 in favour of the unity and
+  independence of Poland and Mr. Lansing’s statement of the 28th June,
+  that all branches of the Slav races should be completely freed from
+  German and Austrian rule;
+
+  “Considering further the extreme expediency, especially in view
+  of possible military developments on the Italian front, that the
+  Allied policy of liberating the oppressed Hapsburg peoples should
+  be represented, in the first place, by Italy, on whose front Allied
+  propaganda against Austria-Hungary is principally located;
+
+   “The Policy Committee of the Inter-Allied Propaganda Conference
+  resolves to suggest that the Italian Government take the initiative
+  in promoting a joint and unanimous public declaration that all the
+  Allies regard the establishment of a free and united Jugo-Slav State,
+  embracing Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a
+  just and lasting peace, and of the rule of right in Europe.”
+
+Passing to the consideration of propaganda against Bulgaria, the
+Committee recognised the essential connection between Allied propaganda
+policy towards Austria-Hungary and Allied propaganda policy in the
+Balkans. Without the adoption by the Allied Governments of a definite
+policy in regard to Jugo-Slav and Rumanian unity and independence, it
+was impossible to formulate any effective propaganda policy in regard
+to Bulgaria. Upon the merits of propaganda in Bulgaria, the Committee
+unanimously adhered to the principles laid down in Lord Northcliffe’s
+opening statement, that is to say, that an essential preliminary to
+any conversations or negotiations with Bulgaria must be a complete
+and effective reversal of the policy hitherto pursued by Bulgaria as
+the enemy of the Allies; and until this reversal had taken place,
+the objects of the Allied propaganda should be to bring home to the
+Bulgarian people a sense of the dangers that threatened them unless
+they could convince the Allies by their conduct of their sincere
+repentance. The Committee was also of the opinion that pending this
+necessary change, their Serbian and Greek Allies should not be left in
+ignorance of the propaganda policy which the chief Allied Powers might
+adopt.
+
+With reference to Poland, the Chairman of the Committee made a brief
+but pregnant statement, declaring the policy of propaganda in regard
+to the Poles to be identical with that laid down by President Wilson
+and President Poincaré and formulated by the Allied Prime Ministers on
+June 3 in the words: “The creation of a united and independent Polish
+State, with free access to the sea, constitutes one of the conditions
+of a solid and just peace and of the rule of right in Europe.” He added
+that the growth of Prussian power for evil, and the present position
+of Prussia in the world, had their origin in the partition of Poland.
+Consequently he urged that the reunion of the various parts of Poland
+would be not only the reparation of an historical injustice, but would
+constitute a strong guarantee against any revival of the Prussian
+system. He claimed that the greater the strength of Poland, the firmer
+would be the security of Europe and the world against any renewal of
+aggressive Prussian militarism.
+
+In the discussion which followed, general agreement was expressed with
+this view; but it was pointed out that a reunited Poland might be
+stronger in proportion as its territory was ethnographically compact
+and did not include other neighbouring racial elements with whom Poland
+would have every interest to live in concord, but which, were they
+included against their will within her frontiers, might become sources
+of disturbance and weakness. It was also considered desirable that the
+Polish National Committee, in order to become not less valuable to
+the Allies as an adjunct and agency of propaganda in enemy countries
+than were the Czech and Jugo-Slav Committees, might extend the basis
+of its representation, so as to secure more unanimous support from
+the various sections of Polish opinion. The Committee adopted, and
+submitted to the approval of the Conference, the following resolution
+and recommendation. It proposed to communicate the recommendation to
+the Polish National Committee:
+
+  “The Conference records its conviction that the creation of a united
+  and independent Polish State, with free access to the sea, is an
+  essential requirement of lasting peace in Europe, and expresses the
+  belief that the more closely the frontiers of this future Polish
+  State follow ethnographical lines, the stronger will it be to play
+  its part in safeguarding that peace, and the more harmonious will be
+  its relations with neighbouring peoples which, like the Poles, are
+  striving to secure a free existence.
+
+   “The Conference, anxious that Allied propaganda may truly express
+  the desires of the Polish people, as a whole, and may tend to promote
+  its welfare, expresses the hope that the Polish National Council may
+  extend the basis of its representation so as to be in a position to
+  lend still further aid to Allied Propaganda in enemy countries.”
+
+On the question of Alsace-Lorraine, the Committee found itself in
+entire agreement with its Chairman’s declaration that the return of
+the two provinces to France was an imperative demand of international
+justice and not a concession to be made by the Allies to French
+national feeling. The undoing of the flagrant wrong done by Germany in
+1871 was so clearly a condition of any just peace that it required no
+further demonstration; quite apart from the historical justification
+of the French claim to the reincorporation of these provinces in
+France by their disannexation from Germany, the title of the people of
+Alsace-Lorraine to determine their own allegiance proceeded from their
+voluntary adhesion to France in 1790, no less than from the protests
+of their elected representatives against the Treaty of Frankfurt in
+the French National Assembly at Bordeaux in 1871, and in the German
+Reichstag in 1874. In regard to Alsace-Lorraine, the Committee was
+convinced that Allied Propaganda in Germany should make known to
+the German people the determination of the Allies to insist in all
+circumstances upon this vindication of rights.
+
+Consequently it adopted the following resolutions:
+
+  1. Propaganda on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine should be unified and
+  conducted on general lines indicated by France.
+
+  2. The argument to which first place should always be given is that
+  of outraged right and of the will of the inhabitants as expressed in
+  their solemn and repeated protests.
+
+  3. The question of Alsace-Lorraine is a question of international
+  right, the solution of which interests the whole world.
+
+As to propaganda addressed to the German people themselves in regard
+to the future position of Germany, the Committee was in full agreement
+with the policy recommended by Lord Northcliffe with the approval of
+the British Government and summarised in his opening statements. It
+believed that Allied propaganda should make it clear that the chief
+object of the Allies was the changing of Germany, not the destruction
+of the German people; and that the German people could hope for
+an adequate position in the world, and for admission into a future
+society of nations, when they had qualified themselves for partnership
+with civilised communities by making the necessary reparations and
+restorations (primarily in the case of Belgium) by overthrowing the
+system known as Prussian militarism, and when they had effectively
+abandoned all designs of mastery over Europe. At the same time, the
+Committee laid stress upon the importance of bringing home to the
+German people a sense of the economic pressure which the Allies, and
+above all the United States of America, were in a position to exercise,
+and would exercise, until the conditions of a just peace were accepted.
+
+To this end the Committee strongly urged that, in the various Allied
+countries and in the United States, a comprehensive scheme of world
+organisation be studied and worked out, and that, in particular,
+the steps already taken to co-ordinate the economic policy of the
+Allies and of the United States be publicly explained and brought to
+the knowledge of the Germans. The Committee, therefore, adopted and
+recommended to the Conference the following resolution:
+
+  “In consideration of the fact that the Allied Governments have in
+  their own respective fields of action and by their joint action begun
+  to give effect to economic co-operation, which is to-day a powerful
+  instrument of war, and which may, after the war, serve as a basis for
+  the systematic organisation of the resources of the world:
+
+  “The Conference expresses its satisfaction with the results already
+  attained and believes that it would be expedient to make plain to
+  enemy public opinion, by means of a service of information, which
+  would set forth both the principles of Allied economic action and
+  their results as worked out in daily practice, the gravity of the
+  danger by which the enemy is threatened, and the advantages assured
+  to those who are admitted to co-operation with the Allies.”
+
+The Committee adopted the following resolution:
+
+   “That in view of the great importance of co-ordinating the Allies’
+  policies and organisations for the conduct of propaganda in enemy
+  countries, a permanent body be constituted for this purpose;
+
+  “That this body consist of four members, representing respectively
+  the four propaganda departments which have taken part in this
+  Conference; each member having the power to nominate an assistant or
+  a substitute, or both, if necessary;
+
+  “That the provisional headquarters of the body shall be at Crewe
+  House, London, until permanent headquarters be determined;
+
+  “That the establishment expenses be shared equally between the four
+  Governments; and that a permanent secretariat be appointed thereto.”
+
+In adhering to this resolution, and in deciding that it be recommended
+for adoption by the Allied Governments and by the United States,
+the Policy Committee had been influenced especially by the hope
+that the proposed arrangement might expedite the co-ordination of
+Allied propaganda policy, facilitate the preparation of concordant
+declarations by the Allied Governments at suitable moments, and assist
+in the proper organisation of congresses.
+
+The discussions of the Distribution Committee were exceedingly
+interesting and fruitful. They ranged over the whole field of
+propaganda effort, and the Committee’s report summarised the means
+of distribution of propaganda in use and assessed their respective
+values. So far as military means were concerned, it was found that
+the Italians employed aeroplanes, projectiles, and contact patrols;
+the French, aeroplanes, projectiles, and balloons; the British,
+only balloons on the Western Front, but aeroplanes in the East; and
+that seaplanes might be employed to reach special objectives in the
+Mediterranean. Each country gave favourable reports on the methods they
+employed, but all were agreed that a constant exchange of information
+as to results was required. In certain cases, such as the mountainous
+Italian Front, where very limited targets had to be reached, the
+dropping of propaganda in bulk was necessary; but in most cases methods
+that secured a wide scattering of the leaflets, so that those might
+be secured and hidden by individuals, were necessary. The French
+explained a device, in its experimental stage, to secure an automatic
+scattering from aeroplanes. The “releases” of English balloons were
+agreed to produce a most adequate scattering. Various devices employed
+in projectiles were successful in the case of leaflets when the angle
+of projection was high and the wind was favourable, but hitherto had
+not been successful with pamphlets. It was recognised that aeroplanes
+were the best means of reaching distant targets with accuracy; that
+for shorter distances, from a few hundred yards up to ten miles,
+projectiles would secure great accuracy.
+
+With regard to range, it was recognised that aeroplanes had the widest
+limits, and the scattering of literature in Berlin by the French and
+in Vienna by the Italians was considered an accomplishment of great
+brilliancy and promise of usefulness, and that the types of paper
+balloons in use were thoroughly effective for ranges up to twenty or
+thirty miles, and with less certainty of aim up to 100 or 150 miles;
+but that with larger balloons (such as the fabric balloons in the
+possession of the English, or the new larger “doped” paper balloons
+then being prepared in England, or the reinforced paper balloons being
+experimented with in France) the distances could be increased to
+several hundred miles.
+
+As to the bulk that could be distributed, it was stated that each of
+the standard balloons, then used by the English and French, carried
+4 lb. 2 oz. of literature, and that projectiles could take from a few
+ounces up to 8 or 9 lb. The large fabric balloons then available at
+G.H.Q. could carry up to 15 lb.
+
+It was recognised that there were no objections to the use of balloons,
+as the operations did not interfere with other work and did not excite
+retaliation from the enemy. The use of projectiles was apt to provoke
+retaliation unless it were carried out at night or to a limited extent.
+There was difference of experience and opinion with regard to the use
+of aeroplanes. The Italians and French stated that no action had been
+taken by the enemy in the case of their airmen who had been captured,
+and that they found no difficulty in imposing this duty on their
+airmen. The British, however, stated that the Germans had taken strong
+measures, and had threatened their continuance, against airmen captured
+after distributing leaflets. The representative of the British Air
+Ministry stated that, after giving full consideration to the matter,
+and notwithstanding their appreciation of the value of propaganda,
+they were opposed to the use of aeroplanes for this purpose, partly
+on the ground of the bad psychological effect of such work on young
+pilots and aviators and partly because the supply of trained men and of
+machines was no more than sufficient for the direct purposes of this
+arm of the Forces. The representative of G.H.Q., France, said that the
+British Army had accepted this view. He added that balloons could be
+employed on the Western Front three days a week on the average, and
+that there was no mechanical reason why the method by balloons could
+not be increased to meet every reasonable requirement.
+
+A French representative in the course of a discussion as to the utility
+of throwing some leaflets in bombing expeditions, reported the opinion
+of a well-known pro-ally German citizen that in the case of the Rhine
+towns and rich cities of Germany the propaganda of fear, that is to
+say, the actual dropping of bombs, was more useful than the dropping of
+literature.
+
+It was agreed that the suggested use of aeroplanes to scatter leaflets
+at great heights parallel with the enemy lines encountered most of the
+objections to, and none of the dangers of, their direct use by crossing
+the lines. A device which had been worked out experimentally in
+England, but was not employed because of the danger it might occasion
+to aeroplanes, was explained and the apparatus shown. It consisted in
+sending up leaflets to be liberated at the necessary height for wind
+driftage by means of a messenger travelling up and down the cable of
+a box kite. This means was recognised to be cheap and efficient for
+employment where it would not be dangerous to aeroplanes.
+
+The Committee agreed that the regular exchange of information as to
+methods employed by the Allies, and as to the results actually obtained
+by these, would be of great value, and recommended that a permanent
+bureau should be established to collect and exchange such information
+and reports.
+
+As regards civil means of distribution, the Committee recommended that
+increased attention be paid to the insertion of news and articles in
+neutral organs which were either read or quoted in the enemy countries.
+Special stress was laid on the importance of establishing effective
+relations with organs which had a reputation for strict neutrality or
+pro-enemy bias.
+
+The Committee also recommended that each Power should seek through
+its agencies to establish channels through which enemy newspaper
+correspondents could be influenced or provided with information. The
+task of approaching all sufficiently important correspondents with
+whom contact had not been established should be apportioned among the
+agencies of the Powers according to the opportunities of approach
+available. Channels created under a scheme of this kind should be made
+mutually available to the respective Allied agents in the localities
+concerned.
+
+Having regard to the extent to which the ordinary book trade channels
+into Germany were still operating, the Committee recommended the
+publication in neutral countries of works which, though not directly
+bearing on the issues of the war, were expressly calculated to educate
+enemy opinion in a democratic sense. The Committee held that, in view
+of its great utility, clandestine circulation in the enemy countries of
+carefully-chosen literature, especially if actually written by enemy
+subjects of pro-Ally or revolutionary tendencies, should be secured
+through every available channel. In view of the precarious and delicate
+nature of this work, the Committee desired specially to emphasise the
+necessity of seeking out and developing new channels for distribution
+of this kind.
+
+The main part of the time which the Committee on Material gave to the
+discussion of its subject was devoted to the question of the most
+effective forms of propaganda and to the special methods desirable
+for putting these forms into practice. There was general agreement
+that the best way to depress the _moral_ of the German troops and the
+German population was to show them that it was against their interest
+to continue the war; that the longer they went on the worse they
+would fare both during the war and after; and that their only hope of
+regaining their place in the community of nations lay in throwing over
+the bad advisers who had led them into the war, and whose repeated
+promises of success had been one after the other falsified. Thereto the
+Germans had always had a hope before them. They were taught to hope
+for great advantage from the downfall of Russia, from the unrestricted
+U-boat warfare, from the last offensive on the Western Front. For the
+first time their leaders did not know what hope to dangle before them.
+Therefore, the moment was one peculiarly favourable for propaganda if
+undertaken upon the right lines.
+
+It appeared to the Committee that the best lines upon which to work
+would be to emphasise as much as possible the great American effort,
+both in the field and at home in the factory, the shipyard, and the
+farm. At the same time the dark commercial outlook for Germans, the
+dangers lying latent for them in the control of raw materials by
+the Allies, the discovery of so many of their trade secrets, and
+the building up in France, Italy, England, and the United States of
+industries in which they had almost a monopoly before the war ought
+also to be brought as vividly as possible before them. They should
+be told the truth about the food situation in France and England,
+which so far had been kept from them. They should be given news as
+quickly as possible of Allied successes. They should be depressed as
+much as possible, yet at the same time care should be taken not to
+let them think they were for ever excluded from relations of business
+and friendship with the peoples then fighting against them. If they
+were made to believe this, their backs would be stiffened to fight
+on desperately as long as possible. A sound line of propaganda, the
+Committee considered, would be to leave open a doorway through which
+if they got rid of Pan-Germanism and renounced its theories of world
+domination by blood and iron they would in time be admitted again to
+the same intercourse as before. It was agreed that for soldiers the
+most elementary propaganda was the best. More elaborate arguments
+and demonstrations should be kept for pamphlets to be smuggled into
+Germany and for articles in neutral papers. Use should be made wherever
+possible of diagrams appealing instantly to the eye.
+
+A long discussion took place on the question of revolutionary
+propaganda. The opinion was expressed that it was better to denounce
+the Pan-German party generally and throw upon them the responsibility
+for the war and for all the misfortunes which Germany had suffered
+and would still further suffer from it, rather than to attack the
+Emperor. On the other hand, it was pointed out that attacks on an
+individual are always more effective than attacks on a party. Finally,
+it was agreed that anything said against the Hohenzollern dynasty
+should be taken, either in reality or in appearance, from German
+sources, so as to avoid the risk that attacks clearly emanating from
+Allied sources might strengthen rather than weaken the Emperor’s
+hold upon the people of Germany. While a good deal of material was
+available from German anti-Imperial sources, it was suggested that
+the advantage of circulating, for example, speeches of Socialists,
+might be counterbalanced by the disadvantage that it would make such
+speakers less inclined to talk. Some Socialists had appealed to the
+French Government not to use their speeches for propaganda, because
+this weakened their efforts. It was agreed that incitements to German
+soldiers to desert were legitimate and might be useful. The sending
+into Germany of photographs of prisoners of war taken immediately after
+their capture, when they were usually in a deplorable condition, and
+after two months of captivity, when their physical condition was good,
+was recommended.
+
+With regard to Austria-Hungary, the Committee discussed whether it was
+illegitimate to exploit the land hunger among the Magyar peasants and
+the discontent among the German proletariat. It was agreed that it
+would do no harm to support the agrarian agitators in Hungary, but, as
+regards Bolshevik propaganda among the Austro-German working classes,
+that the Allies ought only to circulate their own literature. It was
+suggested that the United States, in mobilising its Slav elements,
+might spare members of each of the Slav nationalities for propaganda
+work in England and in France.
+
+Propaganda in Bulgaria depended on the policy which the Entente Powers
+and the United States decided to follow with regard to that country.
+Until such a policy was settled little could be done in a large way. It
+was useful, however, to make the Bulgarians acquainted with a number
+of facts of which they were ignorant, as for example, the failure of
+U-boats to reduce England to the verge of starvation, the large number
+of American troops already in France, and so on. Leaflets on these and
+other topics were being dropped regularly by aeroplanes on the Salonica
+front in considerable quantities. A good deal, it was suggested, could
+be done through Bulgars in Switzerland. But so long as the Bulgarians
+believed that the United States was their friend and would see them
+through whatever happened, little impression could be made upon them.
+
+With regard to co-operation between the various bodies engaged in
+propaganda, it was proposed that closer relations should be established
+between the local agents of the Allied Powers in neutral countries;
+that they should meet from time to time to exchange ideas and to give
+each other full information as to their activities. Special stress
+was laid upon the necessity of these local agents working in union
+with the diplomatic and military representatives and with any other
+agencies engaged in the same kind of work. The Committee unanimously
+accepted this suggestion, with the proviso that the local agents
+should, if possible, be under the direction of the Central Committee,
+to which they could refer for instructions and advice. Pending the
+establishment of such a central body, arrangements were made for the
+various Propaganda Departments to begin at once to exchange information
+about all that they were doing and that each should send out copies of
+all the material produced by it to the other departments. It was, of
+course, agreed that such circulation of material produced would be one
+of the chief activities of the proposed central body, which would do it
+with greater rapidity and effect.
+
+It was also agreed that such a central body could be most useful
+in employing methods for testing the effectiveness of propaganda.
+The means of doing this were generally admitted to be defective.
+Only by co-ordinating effort and by comparing information could
+they be improved. It was decided that the existing system of
+examining prisoners of war for purposes of military information
+ought to be supplemented by a special further examination for the
+purposes of propaganda information, and it was suggested that special
+representatives of the Enemy Propaganda Departments should be allowed
+to conduct such examinations.
+
+Some important points connected with propaganda brought to bear upon
+Germany through neutral countries were raised, and it was agreed
+that the work of controlling and distributing films for moving
+picture theatres, which was to be done by an Inter-Allied Commission
+in Switzerland, ought to be extended to other neutral countries,
+especially Sweden. Information before the Committee bore testimony that
+German-owned picture theatres had of late increased very much in number
+both in Switzerland and in Scandinavia, and that these relied for the
+lighter part of their entertainments upon films from Allied countries,
+Germany supplying special propaganda films. By controlling the supply
+of films from Allied countries, the activity of these theatres could be
+very much diminished and possibly brought to an end.
+
+It was also agreed that it would be advisable to invite a number of
+neutral editors and newspaper writers to pay a visit to the United
+States. It was considered that articles describing what they saw and
+what they were able to judge of the feeling of the American nation
+would have a very useful effect upon German opinion.
+
+With a view to influencing German opinion, it was agreed that more news
+agencies, to all appearance independent and self-supporting, might well
+be established in other neutral countries; that more efforts should be
+made to get articles inserted in enemy newspapers, not controversial
+articles, but statements of what the Allies were doing, especially
+in the economic field, written as a German might write them who was
+anxious about the future of his country; and that dispatch of Allied
+newspapers to neutral countries should be improved and extended so that
+there might be more chance of their finding their way into Germany.
+
+The discussions of the Prisoners of War Committee showed that agreement
+existed as to the soundness of the methods adopted by Crewe House for
+this particular work, and the report took the form of a recommendation
+that they should be generally adopted by the Allies.
+
+At the final plenary session of the Conference, on August 17, 1918,
+it was unanimously resolved that the Committees’ reports should be
+accepted, and submitted by the heads of the four Missions to their
+respective Governments for their approval and adoption. The Conference
+resolved to constitute (as suggested by the Policy Committee) a
+permanent inter-Allied body for the conduct of propaganda in enemy
+countries and by so doing made a great advance. In order to maintain
+close touch with the French propaganda authorities, Lord Northcliffe
+appointed Colonel Lord Onslow as resident representative of Crewe
+House in Paris. By the time the Armistice was signed the different
+Governments had nominated their delegates to the permanent Inter-Allied
+body and all the necessary preliminary arrangements had been
+satisfactorily made. This organisation would have opened a new chapter
+in the history of war propaganda but for the conclusion of hostilities.
+As Lord Northcliffe said in his final speech to the Conference, the
+constitution of a permanent Inter-Allied body was a step towards that
+general co-ordination of Allied purpose and organisation which the
+experience of the war had proved to be a postulate of rapidity and
+efficiency of action. The work of the Conference itself, however, was
+invaluable as it surveyed the policy and organisation of propaganda
+against the enemy in all its phases and from many points of view at
+a time when propaganda had just passed into the intensive stage. Its
+reports in themselves form a text-book in the science and art of
+propaganda.
+
+[Illustration: “DRIFTING DOWN IN WHITE SHOWERS”: LEAFLETS (INSTEAD OF
+BOMBS), FROM ITALIAN AEROPLANE SQUADRON, DROPPING ON VIENNA--AN AIR
+PHOTOGRAPH.
+
+_Photograph supplied by the Photographic Studios of the Italian Air
+Service. By kind permission of the “Illustrated London News.”_]
+
+[Illustration: MR. ROBERT DONALD.
+
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.
+
+_Photo: Elliott & Fry, Ltd._]
+
+[Illustration: SIR SIDNEY LOW.
+
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE
+
+_Photo: Elliott & Fry. Ltd_]
+
+[Illustration: MR. JAMES O’GRADY, M.P.
+
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO PEACE PROPAGANDA
+
+The Co-ordination of British Policy--A representative committee--Lord
+Northcliffe’s Article: “From War to Peace.”
+
+
+In addition to its success in its practical bearing and direct
+influence on the work of spreading the truth concerning the war in
+the enemy countries, the Inter-Allied Conference at Crewe House
+in August, 1918, was a distinctly useful act of propaganda in two
+other directions. First, it led to a mutual appreciation, among the
+influential representatives of the four countries, of the effort and
+determination of each nation and of their willingness to combine to
+achieve victory--in other words, to a better understanding of each
+other’s will to conquer and readiness to subordinate self-interest to
+the larger object of Allied accomplishment of purpose.
+
+In the second place, the Conference was an object-lesson to the British
+Government Departments which participated in it as to the value of
+concerted and co-ordinated action in propaganda matters. Shortly
+afterwards, a suggestion was made by an influential representative
+of one of these Departments that a committee should be formed to
+represent all British departments concerned in any way with propaganda.
+Moreover, it gradually became evident to all concerned that the
+collapse of Bulgaria was the beginning of the end, and that “war
+propaganda” must by a process of steady evolution become “peace-terms
+propaganda,” by which public opinion in enemy countries as well as at
+home, in the Dominions, and in Allied and neutral countries, might be
+made accustomed to the peace which the Allies intended to make. The
+maintenance of British prestige demanded that our position in regard
+to the peace should be explained and justified by the widespread
+dissemination of news and views, both before and during the Peace
+Conference.
+
+Thus it was more than ever imperative that all British propagandists
+should speak with one voice. Here then was work ready to be done by
+the suggested inter-departmental committee, for the formation of which
+invitations had already been issued to the departments concerned to
+send as delegates to this Committee responsible officials able to give
+decisions for their departments on such matters as would be discussed
+by such a committee. These invitations were accepted by:
+
+  The War Cabinet,
+  The Admiralty,
+  The War Office,
+  The Foreign Office,
+  The Treasury,
+  The Ministry of Information,
+  The Air Ministry,
+  The Colonial Office,
+  The India Office,
+  The War Aims Committee, and
+  The Official Press Bureau.
+
+Representatives of these departments and of Lord Northcliffe’s
+department, which, for official purposes, had been renamed The British
+War Mission, thus formed what was known as the Policy Committee of the
+British War Mission.
+
+While this Committee was in process of formation, Crewe House had been
+studying the problems of “peace-terms propaganda” and had, as a result
+of a series of conferences, prepared a memorandum outlining a basis
+upon which such propaganda could be developed.
+
+The first meeting of the Policy Committee was held at Crewe House on
+October 4, 1918, and I presided in the absence, through indisposition,
+of Lord Northcliffe. After giving a summarised account of the work
+carried on from Crewe House, I said that whatever results it had been
+possible to achieve had proceeded mainly from the circumstance that it
+had in each case been based upon definite policies in regard to the
+countries concerned. These policies had all been submitted to, and
+had received the approval of, the British Government. The advantages
+of this procedure were obvious. It enabled propagandists to work on
+consistent lines without fear that the representations they made to
+the enemy would be contradicted by actual occurrences. In this way,
+propaganda representations had a cumulative effect. If, for instance,
+enemy troops were at first inclined to regard representations with
+scepticism, they were gradually convinced by the force of events that
+they had been told the truth from the outset, and that consequently
+subsequent representations deserved serious attention. Another
+advantage had proceeded from the obvious circumstance that as Allied
+policy must correspond to the aims which the Allies were determined to
+secure at the peace, the representation of that policy to propaganda
+was in harmony with the war aims of the Allies, and was strengthened
+by every successive declaration by Allied statesmen of the objects for
+which they were fighting. A third advantage was that the propaganda
+of the enemy could not destroy the effects of our propaganda without
+having gained such military successes as to render the Allied war aims
+themselves unattainable. Consequently every Allied victory that brought
+the war aims nearer attainment enhanced also the efficacy of propaganda.
+
+At the outset, the efforts made by Crewe House were naturally tentative
+and experimental. Their real value could only be proved by the test of
+experience. This test had been applied in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria,
+and Germany. As against Austria-Hungary, Crewe House propaganda
+contributed to the defeat of the Austrians on the Piave in June, and
+had its efforts not been thwarted by political short-sightedness and
+some personal intrigue on the part of various Italian authorities, it
+was certain that much greater headway would have been made and that the
+Italian armies would have been in a much more favourable position. As
+it was, the policy of liberating the Austro-Hungarian subject races,
+upon which propaganda had been based, had already had a marked effect
+in the interior of the Dual Monarchy, and had brought large sections
+of the inhabitants to the point of revolt. This would be clear when
+it was said that the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement of March, 1918, the
+Rome Congress of the Hapsburg Subject Races of April, with its sequel
+in the declarations by the Allies and the United States to the Poles,
+Czecho-Slovaks and Southern Slavs, as well as the actual recognition of
+the Czecho-Slovaks and the prospective recognition of the Jugo-Slavs
+as Allied and belligerent nations, had all been influenced, if not
+directly promoted, by the efforts of Crewe House.
+
+As regards Bulgaria, Crewe House definitely rejected Bulgarian
+overtures until there should be a complete reversal of Bulgarian
+policy. That reversal had taken place, and had opened up further
+prospects of propaganda against Austria-Hungary of which speedy
+advantage was being taken.
+
+The work in Germany had been positive and negative. Its aim had been to
+give the German people something to hope for and much to fear--in other
+words, to make it clear to them that the only way to escape complete
+ruin would be to break with the system that brought the war upon
+Europe, and to qualify for admission into a League of Nations on the
+Allied terms. In addition to these educative efforts, we had supplied
+the enemy armies with constant and invariably truthful information
+about the actual military position. The news which the German military
+authorities were withholding from their troops had been supplied by
+us. Hence their cries of alarm. Nevertheless, much remained to be done
+in the co-ordination of the efforts of all Government Departments so
+as to make the general work of propaganda as rapid and as efficient as
+possible. Much use had unfortunately deprived the term “propaganda”
+of its real meaning. In its true sense it meant the education of the
+enemy to a knowledge of what kind of world the Allies meant to create,
+and of the place reserved in it for enemy peoples according as they
+assisted in, or continued to resist, its creation. It implied also
+the dissemination of this knowledge among the Allied peoples, so that
+there might be full popular support for Allied policy and no tendency
+at the critical moment of peace to sacrifice any essential feature of
+the settlement because its importance might not have been explained
+or understood in time. Next to the actual work of fighting the enemy
+on land and sea, there was no more important work than this; and the
+joint intelligence and energy of all Departments of the Government were
+required to accomplish it successfully. For this reason the suggestion
+that this council of representatives of the Government Departments
+chiefly concerned should be formed had been warmly welcomed, in order
+that there might be less dispersion of effort, less overlapping, and
+greater mutual comprehension of the work which each Department was
+striving to do, and fuller co-ordination in the direction of all those
+efforts to one single end.
+
+As the war approached its end, enemy propaganda must gradually pass
+into peace offensives and counter-offensives. The British War Mission
+therefore had already in existence an organisation to collect and
+collate various suggestions, territorial, political, economic, and so
+forth, that had been made by the different sections and parties in
+Allied, neutral, and enemy countries. A step in this direction was the
+report on the Propaganda Library, issued by the War Office early in
+1917, by Captain Chalmers Mitchell, who had since become the liaison
+officer between the British War Mission and the War Office, and who
+had been asked to act as Secretary of the Policy Committee. Captain
+Chalmers Mitchell was in charge of the aforesaid organisation at Crewe
+House, and although its immediate function was to collect information
+useful for propaganda, it was clear that it would also obtain material
+useful to those who had to shape peace policy. For propaganda to the
+enemy was in a sense a forecast of policy; it must be inspired by
+policy, but at the same time its varying needs also suggested policy.
+
+It was hoped, therefore, that this Policy Committee might assist
+in furnishing materials for the compilation of the various peace
+proposals, in revising the collation of them, in drawing inferences
+from them and in discussing the action and reaction of peace propaganda
+and peace policy that the inferences suggested.
+
+The Committee decided to undertake the following immediate activities:
+
+  Study of Peace Terms.
+
+   Study of utterances by important enemy representatives to form
+  decisions as to what credence should be given them and what response
+  should be made to them.
+
+  Suggestion of statements to be made by Allied representatives, and
+  consideration of their phraseology and substance.
+
+  Special consideration of the reception to be given to German
+  statements as to the course of democratisation in Germany.
+
+At an emergency meeting of the Committee summoned a few days later to
+draft a statement of propaganda policy with reference to the German
+Peace Note, Lord Northcliffe said his department had prepared for
+submission to the Committee a draft statement, based on a consideration
+of President Wilson’s pronouncements. After various slight
+modifications had been made, the statement was adopted in principle.
+
+In its final form it read:
+
+  “In order to stop further bloodshed, the German Government requests
+  the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and water and in the
+  air.
+
+   “The Note accepts the programme set forth by the President of the
+  United States in his message to Congress of January 8th, 1918, and in
+  his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27th, as
+  a basis for peace negotiations.
+
+  “In point of fact, the pronouncements of President Wilson were a
+  statement of attitude made before the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and
+  enforcement of the peace of Bucharest on Rumania, and the German
+  statement of their intentions at the outset of the Spring offensive.
+  They cannot, therefore, be understood as a full recitation of the
+  conditions of peace.
+
+  “The phrasing of the German acceptance of them as a ‘basis for
+  peace negotiations’ covers every variety of interpretation from
+  sincere acceptance to that mere desire for negotiations which is the
+  inevitable consequence of the existing military situation. It is,
+  therefore, impossible to grant any armistice to Germany which does
+  not give the Entente full and acceptable guarantees that the terms
+  arranged will be complied with. There must be a clear understanding
+  that Germany accepts certain principles as indisputable, and
+  reserves for negotiation only such details as, in the opinion of the
+  Associated Powers, are negotiable.
+
+   “In the full conviction of the power and the will of the Associated
+  Powers to enforce a peace that shall be just and lasting, we shall
+  thankfully accept conclusive evidence that the peoples of our present
+  enemies are willing to co-operate in the establishment of such a
+  peace. With the object of making the conditions of such co-operation
+  clear, we take the opportunity, presented by the German peace note,
+  of exploring more fully the ground covered by President Wilson’s
+  pronouncements and of distinguishing explicitly between principles
+  and conditions that must be accepted as indisputable, and terms and
+  details that may be the subject of negotiation.
+
+  “The following conditions are indisputable:--
+
+  “_In no sense whatever shall restoration or reparation in the case of
+  Belgium be taken into consideration when adjusting any other claims
+  arising from the war._
+
+   “1. The complete restoration, territorial and political, of
+  Belgium. The assumption by Germany of the full financial burden
+  involved in material restoration and reconstruction, including
+  the replacement of machinery, the provision of war pensions and
+  adequate compensation for all civilian losses and injuries, and the
+  liquidation of all Belgian war debts. In view of the circumstances in
+  which Germany invaded Belgium, no allegations that Belgian civilians
+  acted against military law or imposed authority shall be taken into
+  consideration. The future international status of Belgium shall be
+  settled in accordance with the wishes of the Belgian nation.
+
+  “2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction of the invaded
+  provinces, compensation for all civilian losses and injuries.
+
+  “3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, not as a
+  territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity, but as reparation
+  for the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants of the two
+  Provinces, whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance, were
+  incorporated in Germany against their will.
+
+  “4. Readjustment of the Northern frontiers of Italy as nearly as
+  possible along the lines of nationality.
+
+  “5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary of their
+  place amongst the free nations of the world and of their right to
+  enter into union with their kindred beyond the present boundaries of
+  Austria-Hungary.
+
+   “6. The evacuation of all Territory formerly included in
+  the boundaries of the Russian Empire, the annulment of all
+  treaties, contracts, or agreements made with subjects, agents, or
+  representatives of Enemy Powers since the Revolution and affecting
+  territory or interests formerly Russian, and co-operation of the
+  Associated Powers in securing conditions under which the various
+  nationalities of the former Empire of Russia shall determine their
+  own form of Government.
+
+  “7. The formation of an independent Polish State with access to
+  the Sea, which State shall include the territories inhabited by
+  predominantly Polish populations, and the indemnification of Poland
+  by the Powers responsible for the havoc wrought.
+
+  “8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest, the evacuation and
+  restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the Associated Powers
+  to aid the Balkan States in settling finally the Balkan question on
+  an equitable basis.
+
+  “9. The removal, so far as is practicable, of Turkish dominion over
+  all non-Turkish peoples.
+
+  “10. The people of Schleswig shall be free to determine their own
+  allegiance.
+
+   “11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare waged by
+  Germany and Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held liable to
+  replace the merchant tonnage belonging to the Associated and Neutral
+  nations illegally damaged or destroyed.
+
+  “12. The appointment of a tribunal before which there shall be
+  brought for impartial justice individuals of any of the belligerents
+  accused of offences against the laws of war or of humanity.
+
+  “13. The former Colonial possessions of Germany lost by her in
+  consequence of her illegal aggression against Belgium shall in no
+  case be returned to Germany.
+
+  “The following conditions of Peace are negotiable:
+
+  “1. The adjustment of claims for damage necessarily arising from
+  the operations of war, and not included amongst the indisputable
+  conditions.
+
+  “2. The establishment, constitution, and conditions of Membership of
+  a League of Free Nations for the purpose of preventing future wars,
+  and improving international relations.
+
+   “3. The League of Free Nations shall be inspired by the resolve of
+  the Associated Powers to create a world in which, when the conditions
+  of the Peace have been carried out, there shall be opportunity and
+  security for the legitimate development of all the Peoples.”
+
+This was approved by a representative of the Government, designated _ad
+hoc_, for unofficial use as propaganda policy. Each department adapted
+it to its own needs. So far as Crewe House was concerned, effective use
+was made of it on two occasions--the first being when Lord Northcliffe,
+at the suggestion of the Enemy Propaganda Committee, dealt with the
+subject of peace terms in an address to United States officers at the
+“Washington Inn,” London, on October 22, 1918.
+
+At a meeting of the Policy Committee at Crewe House on October 28, the
+action of the various departments on the memorandum was stated and
+approved.
+
+The Crewe House Committee reported first as to Lord Northcliffe’s
+address at the Washington Inn; next that the production department of
+the Enemy Propaganda Committee was engaged on a series of pamphlets
+and leaflets dealing with different points of the terms; third, that
+a reasoned statement covering the whole ground, and showing what
+Germany had to gain in the end, was being drafted for publication,
+the idea being that it should appear as an article or as a speech to
+which wide circulation would be given; and lastly that the secretary
+of the permanent Inter-Allied Body for Propaganda in Enemy Countries
+had written to the French, Italian, and American members of that body
+enclosing a copy of the Peace Policy Memorandum and suggesting that
+they should take action similar to that of the British Policy Committee
+and bring the subject up for discussion at the next meeting of the
+Inter-Allied Body. (It may be mentioned here that the rapid course of
+events prevented the contemplated meeting of the Inter-Allied Body.)
+
+That was the last meeting of the Policy Committee. There remains to
+be set forth the final result of its work. Crewe House, as explained
+above, had stated its intention of publishing an article covering the
+whole ground of the memorandum in such a way that the policy could be
+presented in the same terms to our own people, to our Allies, and to
+the enemy. It was found impracticable to get such an article published
+quickly enough in a high-class magazine, or to get an immediate
+occasion for making it the text of a speech. In these circumstances
+the Committee asked their chairman, Viscount Northcliffe, to give the
+Peace Policy the wide publicity possible by the use of his name and
+by the sources of distribution which he was able to command. Lord
+Northcliffe agreed, and accordingly produced the article which follows
+and which was a full statement of the agreed policy. He arranged for
+its simultaneous publication in the London Press and, at his own
+expense, had it cabled to the remotest parts of the world. As stated
+in the House of Commons by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury,
+the document was unofficial. Its purpose was to form the basis of a
+policy of publicity and the fact that it was proposed to elaborate it
+for publication was announced beforehand, and approved by the Policy
+Committee. This is the text of the article from _The Times_ of November
+4, 1918:
+
+  FROM WAR TO PEACE
+
+  By LORD NORTHCLIFFE
+
+  _This article is appearing to-day in the leading papers in Canada,
+  Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Newfoundland, India, the
+  British Dependencies, United States, South America, France, Italy,
+  Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Japan and
+  elsewhere._
+
+  _It will be circulated in Germany during the present week._
+
+   Now that peace is at last in sight, I hear the question being
+  asked on all sides: “How are we to pass from war conditions to peace
+  conditions?” This cannot be done by a sudden and dramatic declaration
+  like the declaration which in August, 1914, changed peace into war.
+  It must be a slow and laborious process--a process with, as it seems
+  to me, at least three distinct and successive stages. Out of these
+  stages will be formed the organic whole which will constitute the
+  machinery for replacing war conditions by peace conditions.
+
+  It is important to get these three stages clearly outlined in our
+  imaginations, and it is important also to bear in mind that each
+  stage will smooth the path for its successor precisely in proportion
+  to the sincerity and thoroughness with which it has been completed.
+  There is but one goal for those who are honest and far-seeing. That
+  goal is to create a condition of the world in which there shall
+  be opportunity and security for the legitimate development of all
+  Peoples. The road is long and difficult, but I believe that its
+  course is already clear enough to be described, in the same words, to
+  those who are our friends and to those who are now our enemies.
+
+  I
+
+  The first stage is the cessation of hostilities. Here, whether they
+  cease on account of an armistice or by reason of surrender, there can
+  be no question as to the “Honour” of the German people, or as to any
+  adjustment of the conditions to any supposed strategical or actual
+  strength of the Central Powers.
+
+   If they feel humiliated, they must blame those who brought
+  humiliation upon them; and as to military strength, the semi-official
+  organ of the German Government, the _Norddeutsche Allgemeine
+  Zeitung_, has admitted that our reserves are such as Germany cannot
+  compete with.
+
+  It is clear [said this newspaper on October 12] that if we
+  systematically continued the war in this way, fighting might go on
+  for a long time. The annihilation of the German Army is still a long
+  way from attainment; we still have a quantity of unspent forces at
+  our command in the recruit depôts behind the front, in the reserve
+  battalions, and at home. But _doubtless there are certain limits to
+  all this on our side, whereas our enemies--chiefly America--are in a
+  position to replace men and materials on an ever-increasing scale_.
+
+  Another equally important admission I found in the _Münchner Neueste
+  Nachrichten_, the leading South-German organ, on October 25.
+
+  A German retreat beyond the frontier [this journal said] and
+  especially an advance by the enemy to the frontier, would render the
+  German situation much worse, as it would expose Germany’s industrial
+  territory to the Entente’s artillery fire, and particularly their air
+  attacks, while the danger to the enemy’s industrial districts would
+  be correspondingly removed. _This condition alone would not only
+  secure the enemy’s military preponderance, but would increase it._
+
+  Thus it is clear that Germany, deprived now of the help of her
+  allies, recognises her hopeless situation. The conditions upon which
+  hostilities can cease must be laid down by the military and naval
+  leaders of the Associated Powers and accepted by the Central Powers
+  in such form that no resumption of hostilities is possible.
+
+   And this I will say: The spirit in which Germany accepts these
+  stern and necessary conditions will do much to determine the course
+  of future events. If she haggles over the conditions, or is sullen
+  and obstructive in her mode of carrying them out, then our profound
+  distrust of her spirit and motives will survive into the subsequent
+  stages and still further delay that re-establishment of tolerable
+  relations which must be our object. But if Germany by word and deed
+  makes plain her abandonment of that belief in Might which her rulers,
+  supported until recently by the majority of her people, have used as
+  a menace to the power of Right, the greatest obstacle in the path of
+  equal justice will have been removed.
+
+  By a stroke of the pen, in accepting the conditions of armistice,
+  or by a mere gesture of unconditional surrender, Germany can cause
+  fighting to cease. Naturally, the business of evacuation and of
+  reoccupation will have to be conducted by concert between the
+  military and naval leaders. The first governing condition in these
+  operations and detailed arrangements will be the safety of the
+  peace. The second condition will be the security of civilian life
+  and property. The emotional background to all this will be a daily
+  increasing desire on the part of all to get back to normal conditions
+  of life. Co-operation and agreement will be required, not so much to
+  secure that demobilisation and disarmament shall be forced sternly
+  on those who have surrendered as to secure that each side takes its
+  fair share in the burden of maintaining order and in facilitating the
+  change from military to civilian organisation.
+
+  II
+
+   The second stage of the passage from war conditions to peace
+  conditions will begin as soon as it is certain that security has
+  been obtained for the permanence of the first stage. It will consist
+  in the acceptance by Germany of certain principles as indisputable.
+  The security provided in the first stage ought to be sufficient to
+  enable us to pass through the second stage quickly. With sufficient
+  guarantees there need be no waiting to see whether the transformation
+  of the German Government from irresponsible autocracy to responsible
+  democracy is as genuine as it is represented to be, or whether the
+  changed professions of those who speak for the People represent a
+  change of heart.
+
+  The indisputable principles which Germany must accept in this second
+  stage have been stated in different forms at different times, but the
+  consensus of opinion amongst all classes of the Associated Powers
+  seems to me to be so clear that it is not difficult to state them
+  objectively in a form very close to that which they are likely to
+  assume in their final enunciation.
+
+  The first is the complete restoration, territorial, economic, and
+  political, of Belgium. In this there can be no reservation, no
+  bargaining, no attempt to raise counter-claims or offsets of any
+  kind. By her initial violation of International Law, and by her
+  subsequent treatment of Belgium, Germany has forfeited all right
+  to discussion. Reparation is impossible, but she must undertake
+  restoration in such form and measure as shall be indicated to her.
+
+  2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction of the invaded
+  provinces, compensation for all civilian losses and injuries. Here
+  again reparation in any full sense of the word is beyond human power,
+  but Germany must accept the full burden of material reconstruction,
+  replacement, and compensation, again in such form and measure as
+  shall be laid down.
+
+   3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine, not as a
+  territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity, but as reparation
+  for the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants of the two
+  provinces, whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance, were
+  incorporated in Germany against their will.
+
+  4. Readjustment of the Northern Frontiers of Italy as nearly as
+  possible along the lines of nationality; the Eastern and Adriatic
+  frontiers to be determined in accordance with the principles embodied
+  in the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement and ratified by the Rome Congress of
+  April, 1918.
+
+  5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary of their
+  place amongst the free nations of the world and of their right to
+  enter into union with their kindred beyond the present boundaries
+  of Austria-Hungary. This involves the creation of independent
+  Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav States, the reduction of Hungary to
+  the ethnographic limits of the Magyar race, and the union of all
+  Rumanians with the present kingdom of Rumania. In the same way the
+  Poles and Ukrainians of the Dual Monarchy must be free to unite with
+  their co-nationals across existing frontiers, and it is obvious
+  that the same right of self-determination cannot be denied to the
+  German provinces of Austria, should they desire to enter Germany as a
+  federal unit.
+
+  6. The evacuation of all territory formerly included in the
+  boundaries of the Russian Empire; the annulment of all Russian
+  treaties, contracts, or agreements made with subjects, agents, or
+  representatives of Enemy Powers since the Revolution and affecting
+  territory or interests formerly Russian; and the unimpeded
+  co-operation of the Associated Powers in securing conditions under
+  which the various nationalities of the former Empire of Russia shall
+  determine their own forms of government.
+
+   When Russia offered a peace of reconciliation without annexations
+  or indemnities, the Central Powers, taking advantage of the military
+  position, rejected all considerations of justice and imposed terms
+  that were brutal and selfish. Thus they forfeited the right to aid
+  Russia and the various nationalities of the former Empire of Russia
+  in their efforts to establish self-determination and their own form
+  of government.
+
+  The seventh indisputable principle concerns (_a_) the formation of
+  an independent Polish State with access to the sea, which State
+  shall include the territories inhabited by predominantly Polish
+  populations; and (_b_) the indemnification of Poland by the Powers
+  responsible for the havoc wrought.
+
+  This condition is indispensable for the reign of justice in Europe.
+  Germany has ruthlessly oppressed the Poles within her Empire. Justice
+  and stability demand the restoration of the predominantly Polish
+  parts of the present German Empire to the new Polish State.
+
+  8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest; the evacuation and
+  restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro; the Associated Powers
+  to aid the Balkan States in settling finally the Balkan question on
+  an equitable basis.
+
+  The Balkan question must be settled, and it follows from that
+  principle of self-determination to which the Associated Powers adhere
+  that the Balkan States must be encouraged to agree among themselves
+  and give what advice or assistance they may ask in coming to an
+  agreement.
+
+   9. The removal, as far as is practicable, of Turkish dominion
+  over all non-Turkish peoples.
+
+  The complexity of the distribution of nationalities in the present
+  Empire of Turkey makes the details of the problem difficult, but the
+  failure of the Turks, in act and in intention, to rule justly has
+  been so disastrous, and the acquiescence of the Central Powers in
+  Turkish misdeeds so complete, that no departure from this principle
+  can be considered.
+
+  10. The people of Schleswig to be free to determine their own
+  allegiance.
+
+  The case of Schleswig is a fundamental instance of the fashion in
+  which Prussia and Austria used their might to override the principle
+  of self-determination. The wrong done must be redressed.
+
+  11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare waged by Germany
+  and Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held liable to replace the
+  merchant tonnage, belonging to the associated and neutral nations,
+  illegally damaged or destroyed.
+
+  In spite of repeated warnings, and in defiance of the pledges which
+  they had given to the Government of the United States, then a neutral
+  Power, the Central Powers have persisted in operations which, by
+  their nature and by the fashion in which they were conducted,
+  outraged both International Law and common humanity. The question of
+  punishment must be dealt with separately; that of restoring the ships
+  or their equivalents, and of material compensation to the victims and
+  their families, cannot be subject to discussion or negotiation.
+
+  12. The appointment of tribunals before which there shall be brought
+  for impartial justice as soon as possible individuals of any of
+  the belligerents accused of offences against the laws of war or of
+  humanity.
+
+   While I regard this condition as an essential preliminary to
+  peace, as a just concession to the outraged conscience of humanity,
+  I admit freely that its practical application is full of difficulty.
+  I foresee the extraordinary difficulty of assigning responsibility;
+  I recognise that during the actual conduct of war there are reasons
+  why belligerents should hesitate to punish adequately those whom
+  in normal times they would unhesitatingly condemn. I offer my own
+  solution of the difficulty. It is that the appointed tribunals
+  should act as Courts of First Instance. They would hear the evidence
+  brought against the accused, and, if they found a _prima facie_ case
+  established against them, would refer them to their own countries for
+  ultimate trial, judgment, and sentence. I believe that more stern
+  justice will be done if nations which desire to purge themselves
+  condemn their own criminals than if the punishment were left to other
+  nations which might hesitate to be severe lest they should invest the
+  individuals punished with the halo of martyrdom.
+
+  13. The former colonial possessions of Germany, lost by her in
+  consequence of her illegal aggression against Belgium, shall in no
+  case be returned to Germany.
+
+   Germany’s possession of her colonies would have been inviolate but
+  for her illegal aggression against Belgium, which brought England
+  into the war. She has proclaimed that the fate of her colonies would
+  be decided on the Western front; it has been so decided. She has
+  proclaimed the uses to which, if victorious, she would have put her
+  colonies; such uses must be prevented for ever in the interest of the
+  peace of the world. Furthermore, there is this consideration that,
+  after what has happened, it would be as intolerable for Australasia
+  to have New Guinea in German hands as it would be for the United
+  States to have Germany in possession of Cuba. The colonies therefore
+  cannot be returned to Germany, but their assignment as possessions,
+  or in trusteeship, together with the fashion in which they shall be
+  administered in the interests of their inhabitants and of the world
+  generally, are matters for future decisions.
+
+  These are the indisputable conditions of peace which must be accepted
+  in the second stage of the negotiations.
+
+  I have dealt with the first two stages as logically separate and
+  successive. In actual fact agreement on them might be coincident in
+  time. In any event, acceptance of the indisputable conditions would
+  be made before the guarantees required under the terms of surrender
+  or of armistice had become accomplished facts.
+
+  The conclusion of the first two stages, whether concurrent or
+  consecutive, will be the end of dictation. They form the preliminary
+  to co-operation. They will be an earnest of a complete break with the
+  past on the part of Germany. They will go far to satisfy the natural
+  desire of those who demand that the guilty should be punished, and
+  yet I believe that they contain nothing that is not imperative for
+  a just and lasting peace. And I hope that their imposition and
+  acceptance will, in the subsequent stages, make it possible to
+  take advantage, for the benefit of the world, of those powers of
+  discipline and organisation which Germany has perverted to the great
+  harm of the world.
+
+  III
+
+   The third stage, should I consider, consist in the appointment of
+  a large number of Commissions to study and work out the details of
+  the principles which I have enumerated. These will report ultimately,
+  some of them quickly, some of them after months or years, to the
+  Central Peace Conference. For my part I see no reason why the members
+  of the Commissions, if the principles on which they shall act are
+  settled beforehand, should not be selected chiefly from among
+  those who have the greatest interest in the matters to be settled.
+  I do not see, for instance, why a Commission consisting largely
+  of Poles and Prussians should not be asked to work out the future
+  frontier of Prussia and Poland. This may be thought the suggestion
+  of an idealist. But I claim that in this instance the idealist is
+  the realist. If our goal be lasting peace, then let us give every
+  opportunity for arrangement and mutual accommodation before we resort
+  to compulsion.
+
+  So far I have said nothing of the future government of Germany. The
+  Germans assure us that the transformation of autocratic government
+  to responsible government is taking place. I should like to believe
+  them. I am certain that its accomplishment is necessary to Germany
+  itself and to the final attainment of a just and lasting peace. I
+  frankly admit that the perfect form of government does not exist, and
+  that the genius of Germany may evolve some form as good as, or even
+  better than, existing constitutions.
+
+   But Germany must understand that it will take time to convince the
+  world, which has so much reason to distrust her, that this sudden
+  change is to be a permanent reality. Fortunately the stages which
+  I have described do not require for their accomplishment more than
+  the hope that Germany has set out on the right path. Whilst the last
+  stage is in progress there will be time, and more than time, to see
+  whether Germany realises our hopes and what I believe to be now the
+  wishes of the majority of her own people.
+
+  For the last stage will mean nothing less than reconstructing the
+  organisation of the world, and establishing a new policy in which a
+  League of Free Nations shall replace the old system of the balance of
+  rival Powers.
+
+  The accomplishment of a change so gigantic as the adjusting of
+  national organisations to fit into new super-national machinery must
+  be difficult and slow. Fortunately the very steps necessary to make
+  it possible are steps that will slowly make it actual. Let me select
+  a few simple examples. The cessation of hostilities will leave the
+  world short of food, short of transport, short of raw materials. The
+  machinery that has regulated these during war will have to be kept in
+  action beyond the war. Food will have to be rationed, transport will
+  have to be rationed, raw material will have to be rationed. It is a
+  world problem that can be settled only on a world basis, and there
+  will be every opportunity, in the years of transition, to transform
+  those economic relations which are forced upon us by necessity into a
+  system which will meet with free and general acceptance.
+
+   Intimately connected with these matters will be the problem of
+  the returned soldier, whether wounded or otherwise, the problem of
+  pensions, the problems of wages, housing, hours and conditions of
+  work, regulation of child labour, female labour, and so forth. The
+  equalisation of those in different countries will be necessary to
+  fair rationing, and from this necessity will arise international
+  conferences of workers which may be able to settle some of the most
+  difficult questions of super-national organisation. When the question
+  of disarmament arises, some will demand as a fundamental necessity
+  that their nation must have a large army or a large navy. Some will
+  advocate, as an act of punishment or of justice, the disarmament
+  of other nations. In the consequent negotiations it will soon be
+  found that to insist on an unduly large army or navy is to saddle
+  one’s country with a huge expense; to insist on the disarmament of
+  another country may be to present that country with a huge annual
+  income that can be used in commercial rivalry. And so we may come to
+  a condition in which, if there be international security, there will
+  be a contest, not as to which country shall maintain the largest navy
+  and the largest army, but as to which country shall most completely
+  disarm.
+
+  I foresee international Commissions at work for a long time, trying
+  to establish frontiers, conditions of Parliamentary responsibility,
+  canons of international law, rules of international commerce, laws
+  even of religious freedom, and a thousand other conditions of
+  national organisation. In the very act of seeking the foundation for
+  a League of Free Nations, and in slowly building up the fabric, we
+  shall get rid of the passions and fears of war. By the mere endeavour
+  to find the way to a better condition of the world, we shall bring
+  this better condition about.
+
+This article created the desired interest and public discussion in the
+enemy countries. It was widely reproduced by German newspapers and it
+had the effect of producing a state of mind which culminated in the
+complete collapse of German resistance. It was a fitting wind-up to
+the work of propaganda in enemy countries. The article gave rise to a
+great deal of comment at home and elsewhere abroad also, and did much
+to form a public opinion favourable to the conditions of peace which
+were in the minds of Allied statesmen but which they had themselves
+refrained from declaring in public.
+
+Thus the Policy Committee, although it existed so short a time, had
+useful achievement to its credit. Had it been possible to constitute
+such a Committee early in the war the results might have been
+incalculable in the effect on British propaganda.
+
+On November 15, 1918, Lord Northcliffe sent the following valedictory
+letter to each of the members of the Committee:--
+
+  “I am sending you herewith a copy of the minutes of the last meeting
+  of the Policy Committee, and feel that it is unnecessary under the
+  changed circumstances to call another meeting.
+
+   “May I remind you that this Committee was formed under my
+  chairmanship by the British War Mission at a time when it seemed
+  urgent to correlate propaganda addressed to the enemy, to Allies,
+  and to Neutrals? In the opening remarks by the Chairman at the first
+  meeting it was pointed out that as the war approached its end, war
+  propaganda would change into peace propaganda. This change took
+  place with even greater rapidity than was at the moment anticipated,
+  and the Committee had at once to undertake the task of devising a
+  propaganda policy with regard to peace. You are acquainted with
+  the steps that the Committee took and with the large measure of
+  success that their efforts achieved. All questions of policy have
+  now, however, passed from the hands of the Committee to those of the
+  Council of the Nations, and there seems to me no immediate sphere
+  for our action, especially as by arrangement with the Government the
+  British War Mission is being wound up.
+
+  “May I take this opportunity of thanking you for your co-operation,
+  and of stating my belief that, had the war continued, the Policy
+  Committee would have developed into an organ of ever-increasing value?
+
+                                         Yours very truly,
+                                             (Signed) “NORTHCLIFFE.”
+
+[Illustration: INFLATING THE BALLOONS AND ATTACHING THE TRUTH-TELLING
+LEAFLETS.
+
+_Official Photograph._]
+
+[Illustration: HOW LEAFLETS WERE ATTACHED TO THE BALLOONS.
+
+_Official Photograph._]
+
+[Illustration: REGISTERING THE DIRECTION AND VELOCITY OF THE WIND, IN
+ORDER TO JUDGE WHERE THE LEAFLETS WOULD FALL.]
+
+[Illustration: DISPATCHING THE BALLOONS.]
+
+[Illustration: TESTING THE LIFTING POWER OF BALLOONS USED FOR
+PROPAGANDA PURPOSES
+
+_“Daily Mirror” Photograph._]
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IX
+
+_VALE!_
+
+
+With the foundations well and truly laid and with increasing and
+widening avenues of approach into enemy countries, the work of the
+British War Mission was always expanding. Had the war continued, the
+gathering momentum of Crewe House activities would have dealt many
+other blows which, even in November, 1918, were in an advanced state of
+preparation. But, happily for the Allies, one enemy collapsed quickly
+after another. When the following letter was received from the War
+Office on November 9, and was followed by the signing of the Armistice
+with Germany--the last of our enemies--on November 11, the work of
+Crewe House as the headquarters of Propaganda in Enemy Countries was
+finished:--
+
+  “SIR,
+
+   “I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that, in view of
+  the armistices which have been concluded with Austria, Turkey, and
+  Bulgaria, the Council has decided that the distribution of propaganda
+  in those countries by military means should cease during the period
+  of the armistice.
+
+  “I am to say that, in the event of the conclusion of an armistice
+  with Germany, distribution of propaganda by military means in that
+  country will also cease during the existence of the armistice.
+
+  “I am further to inform you that the Commanders-in-Chief in the
+  various theatres of war have been notified in the above sense.
+
+                                         “I am, Sir,
+                                             “Your obedient servant,
+                                                 “B. B. CUBITT.
+
+  “The Secretary,
+    “The British War Mission,
+      “Crewe House.”
+
+On the day following the signing of the Armistice with Germany Lord
+Northcliffe wrote to the Prime Minister:
+
+  “DEAR PRIME MINISTER,
+
+   “The signing of the last armistice with our enemies has necessarily
+  brought the labours upon which I have been engaged for the past year
+  to a close. The very nature of the armistices themselves necessitates
+  the termination of enemy propaganda, and I beg, therefore, to request
+  you to accept my resignation of my post as Director of Propaganda in
+  Enemy Countries.
+
+  “I wish to thank you for the confidence you have reposed in me in
+  appointing me to this office. I have endeavoured, with the assistance
+  of a most able Committee and of an untiring staff of experts, to
+  render the very best possible services to the Government and to the
+  country.
+
+                                   “Believe me, dear Prime Minister,
+                                       “Yours sincerely,
+                                           “NORTHCLIFFE.”
+
+In reply, the Prime Minister wrote on the same day:
+
+  “MY DEAR NORTHCLIFFE,
+
+  “I have received your letter, and I agree with you that the office of
+  Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries is rendered unnecessary by
+  recent events.
+
+   “In accepting your resignation, I wish to assure you how grateful I
+  am for the great services you have rendered to the Allied Cause while
+  holding this important post. I have had many direct evidences of the
+  success of your invaluable work and of the extent to which it has
+  contributed to the dramatic collapse of the enemy strength in Austria
+  and Germany.
+
+  “I shall be glad if Sir Campbell Stuart, the present Vice-Chairman of
+  the Mission, will remain in office as Acting-Chairman of the Mission
+  until December 31st, 1918, in order to wind up its activities.
+
+                                              “Ever sincerely,
+                                                  “D. LLOYD GEORGE.”
+
+When the year 1918 came to its close the affairs of the Mission had
+been wound up, and Crewe House as a propaganda force ceased to exist.
+The building was handed over to another Government department, but
+by those who had even a remote connection with the work carried on
+within its walls in 1918 Crewe House will always be remembered for
+its propaganda politics for which, as has been truly said, it became
+as well-known in the Chancelleries of Europe as it had been in Great
+Britain for so long as a social centre for national politics.
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX
+
+Facsimile Leaflets and Translations.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 1._
+
+NEWS OF ALLIED SUCCESSES ON WESTERN FRONT FOR JUGO-SLAV SOLDIERS IN THE
+AUSTRIAN ARMIES.]
+
+Map representing the great offensive of the Allies, with the results
+achieved from August 9th to September 1st:--
+
+[MAP]
+
+In the offensive from July 15th to August 31st the Allies captured
+140,000 Germans (2,674 of whom were officers), 2,500 guns, 1,734
+Flamethrowers, 13,783 machine guns, together with a huge amount of
+other war material.
+
+                                                THE JUGOSLAV COMMITTEE.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 2._
+
+A MANIFESTO FROM DR. TRUMBITCH DISTRIBUTED FROM AEROPLANES AMONG
+JUGO-SLAV TROOPS IN THE AUSTRIAN ARMY.]
+
+SERBOCROATS AND SLOVENES.
+
+The “Agenzia Stefani” announces officially:--
+
+“By a decree of the Ministerial Council on September 8th the Home
+(Italian) Government has informed the Allied Governments that it
+regards the Jugoslav movement for obtaining independence and the
+formation of a free State as a principle for which the Allies are
+fighting, and as a condition of a just and lasting peace.”
+
+The Governments of the Allied States have replied that they have
+received with satisfaction this declaration of the Italian Government.
+
+JUGOSLAVS!
+
+By this historic and fateful declaration Italy has set up the following
+war aim: The destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy such as it is
+to-day, and upon its ruins the establishment of an independent State of
+Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
+
+This noble decree of hers is accepted by all our Allies.
+
+SOLDIERS!
+
+The part which Italy has been assigned by history has been manifested
+to-day more strongly than ever. She is the protector of the weak, the
+bearer of freedom and of the ideal for which the Allies have been
+fighting for four years. The aim of the fighting is not the peace of
+Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, but the freedom of the weak and oppressed.
+
+Therefore open your eyes. Remember that by fighting against it you are
+fighting against yourselves, against our posterity, against our freedom
+and unity.
+
+Long live Italy, long live the united and free Jugoslavia, long live
+our Allies!
+
+                                                      DR. ANTE TRUMBIC,
+                                      Chairman of the Jugoslav Council.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 3._
+
+LEAFLET--PROBABLY THE FIRST--DISTRIBUTED BY BRITISH AEROPLANES AMONG
+GERMAN TROOPS IN OCTOBER 1914. IT ANNOUNCED A RUSSIAN VICTORY IN EAST
+PRUSSIA.]
+
+[_Note.--This was distributed in October, 1914._]
+
+NOTICE.
+
+EXPLANATION FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS.
+
+It has become known that German soldiers have been told the British
+treat their captives inhumanly. That is a lie.
+
+All German prisoners of war are well-treated and receive from the
+British the same food as their own soldiers.
+
+The opportunity is now taken to enlighten the German soldier about some
+facts which hitherto have been kept secret from him.
+
+The German Army never reached or occupied Paris and has been retiring
+since September 5.
+
+The British Army has been neither made prisoner nor beaten. It
+increases in strength every day.
+
+The French Army is not beaten. Quite on the contrary, for it inflicted
+a heavy defeat on the Germans at MONTMIRAIL.
+
+Russia and Serbia have so decisively defeated Austria that she no
+longer plays any part in the war. With the exception of a few cruisers,
+German shipping, the merchant service as well as the fighting fleet, is
+no longer to be seen upon the seas.
+
+The British and German Navies have both suffered casualties, but the
+German the heaviest.
+
+Germany has already lost several colonies and will presently also lose
+what now remains to her. Japan has declared war on Germany. Kiauchau is
+now besieged by the British and the Japanese.
+
+The report circulated in the Press that the British Colonies and India
+have rebelled against Great Britain is wholly untrue. Quite on the
+contrary, these Colonies have sent to France large masses of troops and
+many supplies to come to the help of the Fatherland.
+
+Ireland is one with England, and from North and South is sending her
+soldiers who are fighting with enthusiasm alongside their English
+comrades.
+
+The Kaiser and the Prussian War Party wanted this war against all
+interests of the Fatherland. In secret they prepared for this war.
+Germany alone was prepared, which explains her temporary successes.
+Now we have succeeded in checking her victorious advance. Supported by
+the sympathies of the whole civilised world, which regards with horror
+an arbitrary war of conquest, Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium,
+Serbia, Montenegro, and Japan will carry on the war to the end.
+
+We bring these facts to general notice in order to throw light upon the
+truth which has been hidden from you. You are not fighting to defend
+your Fatherland, as no one ever thought of attacking Germany. You are
+fighting to satisfy the ambitious war-lust of the military party at the
+cost of the true interests of the Fatherland. The whole business is
+blackguardly.
+
+At first sight these facts will seem improbable to you. But now it is
+for you to compare the events of the past weeks with the information
+manufactured by the military authorities.
+
+ON OCTOBER 4 THE RUSSIANS GAINED A TREMENDOUS VICTORY OVER THE GERMAN
+ARMIES IN EAST PRUSSIA. GERMAN LOSSES 70,000.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 4._
+
+AEROPLANE DISTRIBUTION OF COPIES OF AN EARLY LEAFLET PREPARED BY THE
+FRENCH AUTHORITIES FOR THE GERMAN SOLDIER.]
+
+To the German Soldiers!
+
+IT IS NOT TRUE that we French shoot or ill-treat German prisoners.
+
+ON THE CONTRARY, our prisoners are well-treated and receive plenty to
+eat and drink.
+
+All who are tired of this wretched life may report themselves unarmed,
+without fear, to the French outposts.
+
+They will be well received there.
+
+After the war everyone can go home again.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 5._
+
+A TYPICAL NEWS-SHEET FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS.]
+
+INFORMATION LEAFLET FOR THE TROOPS.
+
+IS PEACE AT THE DOOR?
+
+Our enemies reject negotiations until we have evacuated Belgium and
+France.
+
+WHAT MUST WE DO NOW?
+
+Well, what does it all mean?
+
+“A few weeks ago,” says the _Frankfurter Zeitung_, “it appeared as if
+our armies were very near their goal, the defeat of the enemy forces
+and peace. But what a change!”
+
+In these few weeks the German armies have lost three-quarters of a
+million men. More than a quarter of a million have given themselves up
+and are now out of danger and have plenty to eat.
+
+In these few weeks Bulgaria has dropped out of the war and has been
+compelled to surrender unconditionally. The best Turkish armies have
+been destroyed and Turkey is about to follow Bulgaria’s example.
+
+And what is the result of all these events in the last few weeks?
+
+All hope of victory by the military Junker party in Germany abandoned:
+an armistice demanded: the admission of the new Imperial Chancellor,
+Prince Max von Baden, that Belgium was wrongfully attacked.
+
+The following is the text of the Note addressed to President Wilson
+through the Swiss Government:--
+
+“The German Government requests the President of the United States
+to bring about the restoration of peace, to inform all belligerent
+States of this request and to summon them to send plenipotentiaries
+to open negotiations. Germany takes as a basis for peace negotiations
+the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his
+Message to Congress of January 8th, 1918, and particularly in his
+speech of September 27th.
+
+“With a view to preventing further bloodshed the German Government
+requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land, on water,
+and in the air.
+
+                                        (Signed) MAX, Prince von Baden,
+                                                  Imperial Chancellor.”
+
+
+Why was this Note addressed to President Wilson?
+
+Partly because he laid down certain conditions which he explained the
+German Government must accept before he would enter into any discussion
+whatever on peace terms.
+
+But also partly because the German Government at length became aware of
+the United States’ military effort.
+
+In this, as in every other important matter dealing with the war, our
+leaders deceived us in the most unheard-of way. They fed us with false
+hopes.
+
+They have brought us to such a desperate pass that we are retiring on
+every front and are now compelled to sue for peace.
+
+But will our enemies consent to discuss peace?
+
+Not as long as we are still in Belgium, which, as our Government
+admits, was wrongfully attacked; not whilst we are still in Northern
+France.
+
+Before our enemies will consent to negotiate with us we must retire to
+Germany. For, they say, they will gladly conclude a just and honourable
+peace with the German people if they can be sure that militarism and
+medieval methods of statesmanship are abolished for good.
+
+What must we do to save ourselves? We must retire to our own country,
+then we may hope for an end of all the horror and hardships we have
+suffered for more than four years, only because our Government let
+its policy be dictated by militarism and underestimated the forces
+which had to be arrayed against us owing to the attempt to realise the
+criminal ambition of the Pan-Germans.
+
+We have been miserably deceived.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 6._
+
+“REPORTING PROGRESS”--LEAFLETS (SUCH AS THE ONE, BOTH SIDES OF WHICH
+ARE REPRODUCED, ABOVE) GAVE PARTICULARS OF ALLIED PROGRESS AGAINST THE
+GERMANS. CLEARLY-PRINTED MAPS DROVE THE TRUTH HOME. THE SHADED PORTION
+SHOWS TERRITORY WON BY THE ALLIES.]
+
+WHAT THE ALLIES HAVE WON. Back on the Line of Last March.
+
+[MAP]
+
+The whole ground has been twice won and twice lost by the German
+armies. How much blood has been spilled, and how much misery has been
+caused? For what object? Think it over!
+
+_On the other side of the leaflet was the following_:
+
+FURTHER SUCCESSES OF THE ENTENTE; THE GERMAN RETREAT CONTINUES.
+
+During the last few weeks there has been fighting west of Cambrai and
+St. Quentin. The battle reached a degree of vehemence fully equal to
+any previously experienced in the course of the whole war.
+
+The Germans and British attacked simultaneously; both sides fought with
+stubborn determination, but
+
+THE BRITISH GAINED THE VICTORY.
+
+They beat off the German attack, made many prisoners, and killed an
+enormous number, thanks to the manner in which the German troops were
+driven forward under murderous machine-gun fire.
+
+The British attack succeeded. The German front was pressed back closer
+to St. Quentin.
+
+TEN THOUSAND PRISONERS
+
+were made and a number of guns were captured. The outer works of the
+Siegfried Line are in British possession in spite of the determined and
+plucky attempts of the German troops to hold them. The latter did not
+retreat “according to plan,” but because in open honourable fight
+
+THEY GOT THE WORST OF IT.
+
+The operations of the Entente forces have in no way reached an end, as
+reported in the German newspapers a week ago by military writers. The
+German forces were unable to stand their ground. The French threaten
+Laon and the Chemin des Dames and in these regions are driving the
+Germans back.
+
+On the Balkan Front
+
+THE BULGARIANS ARE TOTALLY DEFEATED
+
+and are still retreating. The French and Serbian troops have advanced
+20 kilometres. Many thousands of Bulgarians have surrendered. The
+prisoners ascribe the blame for Bulgaria’s disastrous situation to
+Germany.
+
+The Austrian proposal that representatives of the belligerent nations
+should hold a secret conference in order to discuss
+
+THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE
+
+was described by the representatives of the Workmen’s and Socialist
+parties assembled at the London Conference as inspired more by
+the anxiety to strengthen the monarchy than by the desire to help
+effectively to put an end to the world war.
+
+No voice was raised for the acceptance of the Austrian proposal.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 7._
+
+DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN ARMY IN THE
+FIELD. THE IMMENSITY OF THE AMERICAN EFFORT WAS A STRONG POINT OF THE
+CREWE HOUSE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN.]
+
+TO-DAY WE ARE IN RETREAT.
+
+NEXT YEAR WE SHALL BE DESTROYED.
+
+America, which has now 1,750,000 men in France, had made arrangements
+to send 3,500,000 troops by next year.
+
+But now, in view of the refusal of the German Government to make a
+genuine peace proposal, America has decided to increase the number.
+
+By next year America will have 5,000,000 men on the Western Front.
+
+What do our leaders say to this--our leaders who declared that America
+was not a danger to us because our U-boats would prevent them from
+sending troops to Europe?
+
+What do we say to this, we who will be completely crushed by the huge
+superiority of numbers?
+
+[DIAGRAM]
+
+The increase of the American Army on the Western Front.
+
+     1917.     1918.      1919.
+    100,000  1,750,000  5,000,000
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 8._
+
+MAP-LEAFLET SHOWING THE BREAKING OF THE HINDENBURG LINE.]
+
+WHERE THE HINDENBURG LINE IS BROKEN
+
+[MAP]
+
+This map shows exactly where the British troops have forced a way
+through an important part of the Hindenburg defence line. The dotted
+line from North to South indicates these defences. The black line shows
+the positions reached by the British. Their advance continues. In
+Flanders the German armies are in full retreat. Kemmel Hill has been
+given up. “Our troops left it with heavy heart,” writes Karl Rosner,
+war correspondent of the _Lokalanzeiger_.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 9._
+
+NEWS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN
+PALESTINE. TWO SIDES OF THE SAME LEAFLET.]
+
+TURKISH ARMY IN PALESTINE DESTROYED.
+
+NO FURTHER RESISTANCE AGAINST THE BRITISH TROOPS. BRILLIANT ENCIRCLING
+MANŒUVRE.
+
+20,000 PRISONERS.
+
+TURKEY INCENSED AGAINST GERMANY FOR LEADING HER TO IRRETRIEVABLE
+DISASTER.
+
+The Turkish Army in Palestine has ceased to exist. The British took
+them unawares, broke through the front, sent through large masses of
+cavalry, cut off all lines of retreat and completely surrounded the
+Turks.
+
+Twenty thousand surrendered, a large number were killed, and only a few
+stragglers succeeded in escaping. The Holy Land has been liberated from
+the Mussulman suzerainty which the German Government did its best to
+uphold. Turkey could not have received a harder blow. Her best troops
+have been destroyed. The Turks’ feeling against Germany is extremely
+bitter. They openly threaten to turn against the German Government.
+
+The Bulgarians are scarcely less embittered against Germany. They are
+still pursued in the Balkan mountains by the French and Serbian troops,
+who have driven them back 64 kilometres. Their defeat is a wholesale
+disaster.
+
+On the Western Front the British and French troops are still gaining
+ground, slowly but steadily, a little every day.
+
+Everywhere Germany and her allies are in retreat.
+
+Read no leaflets which you may find accidentally, say Field Marshal
+Hindenburg and General von Hutier.
+
+WHY?
+
+Because they know that the leaflets contain the truth which they and
+the Government want to conceal.
+
+They fear the truth. When the German people know it the Government and
+militarism will be wiped out.
+
+Read overleaf of the successes of the Entente Powers and ask yourselves
+
+HOW LONG CAN IT GO ON LIKE THIS?
+
+Map illustrating the Turkish disasters.
+
+[MAP OF PALESTINE]
+
+The black lines and arrows show the position of the English forces. The
+Turks were between Samaria and Nablus. They were wiped out. Their army
+no longer exists.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 10._
+
+SOME POINTED QUOTATIONS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS CULLED FROM GERMAN SOURCES.]
+
+THE HIGH OFFICIAL.
+
+“We have no cause for anxiety.”--Dr. Wekerle, Hungarian Premier.
+
+THE PEOPLE.
+
+“The men must thoroughly understand that they must stand fast.”--Order
+of the Day to 200th Infantry Division.
+
+THE GENERAL.
+
+“We have no reason to be downhearted.”--General von Wrisberg, War
+Minister in the Reichstag.
+
+THE SOLDIER.
+
+“The principle that troops must continue fighting all day long, to the
+last man, to the last cartridge, even when they are surrounded, appears
+to have sunk into oblivion.”--General Army Order, signed by General
+Ludendorff.
+
+PREPARATIONS FOR CIVIL WAR.
+
+Every precaution has been taken in Berlin and other places to suppress
+an eventual attempt at revolution.
+
+Orders for the suppression of risings are issued under the heading
+“Measures for the Suppression of Strikes.” Proof of this is furnished
+by the order of German G.H.Q. to all Guards Infantry troops and to the
+3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps.
+
+On receipt of the telegraphic order “Prepare for the suppression of
+strikes,” all man-power must be mobilised. On receipt of the order
+“Suppress strikes,” the commandant of the transport troops must be
+immediately informed. The men must be equipped as for field service,
+only without masks. On receipt of the telegraphic order “Make
+preparations for surrounding,” all detachments of troops will be
+marched to their allotted positions. Battalion commanders should place
+themselves at the head of their units and direct all further movements.
+
+On receipt of the telegraphic order “Surround,” the troops selected
+for this duty, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps, will march on Berlin to
+the Vorstadtbahn (Suburban Railway). The Guards will take the opposite
+direction from the centre of the city to the Vorstadtbahn, driving
+the populace before them. Headquarters will be Kaulsdorf. Then follow
+detailed instructions for the employment of machine guns. The order is
+strictly secret.
+
+WHAT SHALL WE DO WITH THE KAISER?
+
+Stockholm, 10th September.--The German Minister in Stockholm has
+requested the Swedish Foreign Office to seize the copy of the “_New
+York Herald_ Magazine of the War” of the 14th July because it publishes
+on the first page a photograph of the German Emperor underneath which
+are the words:--
+
+“What shall we do with the Kaiser after the War?”
+
+The Minister of Justice is said to have ordered the copies in question
+to be seized.
+
+ARREST OF SOCIALISTS.
+
+According to the _Neue Badische Landeszeitung_, wild scenes took place
+last week at a meeting of Independent Socialists in Berlin. “In the
+course of the meeting the Reichstag member Hoffmann was arrested by two
+policemen because of provocative speeches. A scene of such excitement
+ensued that in the general disturbance Hoffmann escaped, while the hall
+rang with cries of ‘Down with the War!’ ‘Long live Liebknecht!’
+
+“The following morning the officials arrived at Hoffmann’s house in
+order to arrest him again, but the deputy was not to be found. Many
+arrests were made among his adherents.”
+
+PORK IN BOTTLES.
+
+“The smugglers are still devising new tricks so as to prevent their
+costly goods from falling into the clutches of the war contraband
+officials. At the Schlesicher Station a man was stopped as he was
+fetching away two carboys such as are used for the transport of
+dangerous acids. A closer inspection showed that the carboys were
+divided in two parts, a small receptacle at the top being filled with
+vinegar, while the lower and larger part contained 55 kilos. of freshly
+killed pork neatly packed. The expensive pork was seized.”--_Berliner
+Tageblatt_, Sept. 19, 1918.
+
+THE VETO ON DANCING.
+
+“In the Hanover Command dancing lessons are only allowed for men
+and women separately, and anyone who has already taken a course of
+dancing is not allowed to learn again. A sensible regulation has been
+issued at Essen. Only dancing instructors belonging to the two German
+dancing instructors’ unions may hold dancing classes as in peace
+time.”--_Berliner Tageblatt_, Sept. 19, 1918.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 11._
+
+THIS LEAFLET WITH PARTICULARS OF THE FATE OF 150 GERMAN SUBMARINE
+COMMANDERS CREATED GREAT DEPRESSION IN GERMAN NAVAL PORTS.]
+
+THE 150 LOST GERMAN U-BOATS.
+
+In the House of Commons the British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George,
+said, “Our British vessels are serving as convoys, patrolling, laying
+mines, sweeping mines, protecting merchant ships and hunting U-boats
+over vast and uncharted distances. They have destroyed at least 150 of
+these ocean pests, the German U-boats--more than half that number in
+the course of last year.”
+
+In reply to this, the following official Berlin telegram was sent out
+to the German papers and to neutral countries:
+
+“We are in the position to state that the enemy’s war against the
+U-boats does not show anything like so great a success as that claimed
+by the British Prime Minister.”
+
+The Chief of the Naval General Staff in London has in his possession a
+complete list of the names of the commanders of the 150 U-boats which
+Germany has lost through sinking, capture, or internment. The greater
+part of these officers are dead, a certain percentage are prisoners
+of war, a few are interned in neutral countries. The truth of the
+statement of the British Prime Minister is thus proved. It is also
+proved that the statement contained in the official Berlin telegram is
+untrue. Here is the list:
+
+[_List of U-boat commanders._]
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 12._
+
+LEAFLET WARNING THE GERMANS THAT SUCH PLACES AS BERLIN AND HAMBURG HAD
+BEEN BROUGHT WITHIN RANGE OF AERIAL ATTACK AND COULD BE BOMBED IF THE
+WAR WERE PROLONGED.]
+
+A MAP WHICH EXPLAINS ITSELF.
+
+In 1914 the English air squadrons which carried out reprisals for the
+attacks made on English towns were small and carried small bombs.
+In 1915 they grew larger and dropped larger bombs. In 1916 both had
+doubled in size. In 1917 there was a further increase in the size of
+the bombing squadrons and the bombs were 7½ times again as heavy. 1918
+saw further increases and throughout the period under review the range
+of attacks steadily extended. In 1919 Berlin, Hamburg, Brunswick, and
+Hanover will be easily within range of attack--if we do not make peace
+in the meantime.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 13._
+
+A GERMAN DREAM AND THE RESULT. A LEAFLET ILLUSTRATING THE COLLAPSE OF
+THE MITTEL-EUROPA AMBITION OF GERMAN MILITARISM.]
+
+HOW THE THING WENT WRONG.
+
+_The upper map is entitled_ “PAN-GERMAN DREAM,” _the wording under it
+being as follows_:
+
+“Our rulers went to war because they hoped to found a gigantic empire
+for the Kaiser and the Junkers. All the territories shaded in on the
+above map were to be their realm. It would have meant the subjection of
+half the world under the German sword.”--_Vorwärts_, Oct. 11, 1918.
+
+_The lower map is entitled_ “THE AWAKENING OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE.”
+_Under it is the following inscription_:
+
+This is how Germany looks to-day. Her allies can give no further aid.
+What the Kaiser calls “his heritage from God” will soon be smaller than
+it was at the beginning of the war. But the German people will be the
+better for it. They will have escaped from autocracy and militarism.
+Freedom at last!
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 14._
+
+FRONT PAGE OF A “TRENCH NEWSPAPER” ISSUED BY CREWE HOUSE FOR GERMAN
+TROOPS.]
+
+WAR AND HOME.
+
+THE SUMMONS TO UNITY.
+
+_The picture on the left is headed_ “THE IDEAL” _and represents “The
+Assembly.” On its right is the following parody, entitled_ “PARADISE
+LOST,” _on Goethe’s “Faust”_:
+
+“PARADISE LOST.”
+
+“Gretchen, how different thou wast!”--(Goethe--“Faust.”)
+
+    Germany, how different thou wast before the war
+    Brought about by thy lust of conquest.
+    With self-assurance thou wentst from triumph to triumph
+    And reached the summit of thy power
+    Untouched, with ample possessions
+    In earthly goods, in fame and world renown
+    Thou hadst all mankind can crave,
+    In high respect regarded, if not beloved.
+
+    But now what disgust, what horror
+    The mere name of Germany excites!
+    There is deep mourning for thy vanished happiness,
+    Thy honour lost, thy peace of mind destroyed!
+    Thou liest parted by the iron wall
+    Which thy crime has built between us
+    Fast fettered to thy false ideal
+    And all thy former glory gone!
+
+_The lower picture is called_ “THE REALITY,” _the quotation from Moltke
+underneath being “March separately, strike together.” On its left_:
+
+THE WAR WAS DECIDED AT POTSDAM.
+
+During a debate on the origin of the war in the Hungarian Parliament,
+Count Tisza claimed that the ultimatum to Serbia was drawn up at a
+conference at which no German representative was present.
+
+_A Deputy_: Not in Vienna but in Potsdam.
+
+_Count Tisza_: Neither in Potsdam nor anywhere else.
+
+_The Deputy_: The ultimatum was not drawn up at Potsdam, but the
+outbreak of war was decided there.
+
+A PROPHECY.
+
+The Dutch newspaper, the _Handelsblad_, reports that a person who
+has just returned from Germany saw this rhyme written up in gigantic
+letters at an important factory:
+
+    “If the war lasts another year,
+    William’s fate will be the Tsar’s!”
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 15._
+
+ILLUSTRATED LEAFLET PORTRAYING CONTENTMENT OF GERMAN PRISONERS IN
+BRITISH HANDS. THIS WAS ISSUED TO COUNTERACT ENEMY ASSERTIONS OF SEVERE
+TREATMENT.]
+
+German prisoners of war arriving behind the British lines are greeted
+by their comrades, who assure them of good treatment.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 16._
+
+THIS LEAFLET SHOWED HOW THE ALLIES HAD SHATTERED THE GREAT
+BERLIN-BAGDAD PLAN.]
+
+WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS SUING FOR PEACE.
+
+The reason is clear.
+
+The Government undertook the war in the hope of realising the
+Pan-German dream of a Middle Europe.
+
+This was the real cause of the war.
+
+If there remained any doubt on the subject it is clearly proved by the
+fact that the moment the realisation of the Pan-German dream became
+impossible the Government sues for peace.
+
+This was the plan of the Pan-Germans who led us into the war.
+
+The whole of the territory coloured black was to become German.
+
+Bulgaria and Turkey would become vassal States.
+
+The Kaiser and the Prussian Junker aristocracy, the bureaucrats and
+the rich who exploit the rest of the people, should become the most
+powerful class in the world.
+
+THIS IS WHAT HAS BECOME OF THE PAN-GERMAN PLAN.
+
+Bulgaria refuses to be a vassal State.
+
+Turkey is becoming anxious.
+
+The plan for the realisation of which the Pan-Germans persuaded Germany
+to go to war and which has cost so many millions of lives and caused
+such universal misery is completely frustrated.
+
+What reason remains why we should fight?
+
+The Government has no further reason for continuing the struggle and is
+therefore suing our enemies for peace.
+
+Therefore all the talk about a defensive war proves to have been
+absolutely untruthfully and dishonestly
+
+STARTED TO DECEIVE US.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 17._
+
+MANIFESTO TO MAGYAR TROOPS.]
+
+HUNGARIAN SOLDIERS!
+
+What are you fighting for?
+
+For the Emperor of Austria and the King of Hungary!
+
+Or is it for the German Emperor?
+
+You are only fighting for the German Emperor. The Austrian Emperor has
+given over to him the army and the State revenues for twenty-five years
+by a formal treaty the contents of which are kept from you.
+
+But your newspapers also announce a “Waffenbund” which was entered upon
+on May 12th, 1918, between your old and your new masters.
+
+But you Magyars, whose ancestors shed so much blood for freedom, you
+are ignorant of the truth.
+
+For behold according to the Germans you are idle and slow.
+
+The _Frankfurter Zeitung_ says on May 13th, “=The new treaty should
+finally seal the disappearance of Austria as an independent State and
+the seizing of the Hapsburg Monarchy by Germany=.”
+
+The _Deutsche Zeitung_ of the 19th May remarks, “What the Mittel-Europa
+Confederacy chiefly needs is strength, and never more so than at the
+time the war broke out. Austria-Hungary was not sufficiently prepared.
+According to the ‘Waffenbund’ =Austria-Hungary must arm its inhabitants
+in exactly the same way as Germany=. It is no longer possible that it
+should happen that the delegates should vote extraordinary credits
+for military purposes, and that afterwards they should waste a long
+time before they pass the amount because either the Hungarian or the
+Austrian Minister of Finance says there is no money; or that the
+delegates vote the guns but that the =Hungarian Parliament= refuses the
+necessary calling up of the recruits, so that afterwards the guns are
+there but there are not soldiers to man them.”
+
+Is this clear enough? The Germans struggle for a mad whim--they wish to
+rule the whole world. To fight for years, to pour out Hungarian blood
+for German glory for years and years.
+
+Naturally the _Neue Freie Presse_ should with triumph proclaim that
+the new treaty is specially a triumph for the “upholders of Germany in
+Austria.”
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 18._
+
+MANIFESTO, SIGNED BY PROFESSOR (NOW PRESIDENT) MASARYK, TO
+CZECHO-SLOVAK SOLDIERS IN THE AUSTRIAN ARMIES.]
+
+MESSAGE OF PROFESSOR MASARYK TO THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY IN ITALY.
+
+Through the agency of the Italian Legation, Professor T. G. Masaryk
+has sent the following message from Washington to the autonomous
+Czecho-Slovak army in Italy:
+
+  “Brothers! Austria-Hungary, desiring to break the opposition at
+  home, has asserted that our army is a rabble which has no political
+  or military significance. She has even uttered the lie that our
+  army is composed of Russians and other nationalities, and that a
+  Czecho-Slovak army does not exist. Our nation does not believe this
+  dishonesty and has remained obdurate and proud of its army. Then
+  Austria-Hungary endeavoured to deal a decisive blow to our nation by
+  destroying you, and with you its army. She desired to gain possession
+  of our banners of resistance and independence, the symbol of trust
+  and aspiration cherished by our people.
+
+  “Brothers! Your will, your far-reaching glance frustrated the enemy’s
+  plans. Our flag is still flying proudly upon the position entrusted
+  to you for defence. Our nation recognises your heroic deeds and all
+  hearts are stirred by profound gratitude to you. They extol you and
+  the proud memory of your fallen brothers.
+
+  “As your Commander-in-Chief I send you my heartiest thanks for the
+  bravery by which you have contributed to the victory of our nation,
+  of Italy, the Allies and all mankind.
+
+  “Greetings!
+
+                                                       “T. G. MASARYK.”
+
+We cannot help telling you how proud we are of the recognition by our
+beloved leader, who will guide us and our nation to the goal of victory.
+
+We are convinced that you also, in concert with the whole nation, see
+the salvation of our country and the realisation of our sacred rights
+only in the destruction of Austria.
+
+When they drive you forward to protect the treacherous dynasty, to
+which the nation has no obligations, you will certainly find an
+opportunity of retaliating worthily for centuries of oppression and of
+saving yourselves for a better future.
+
+Greetings!
+
+VOLUNTEERS OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY IN ITALY.
+
+October 2nd, 1918.
+
+
+[Illustration: _Leaflet No. 19._
+
+RAPIDLY-DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS FOR GERMAN TROOPS TELLING OF ALLIED
+SUCCESSES IN THE BALKANS AND IN SYRIA.]
+
+INFORMATION LEAFLET FOR THE TROOPS.
+
+FLIGHT OF GERMAN GENERAL.
+
+THE TURKS MAKE LIMAN VON SANDERS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR MISERY.
+
+TWO ARMIES DESTROYED.
+
+BULGARIANS PURSUED ON AN EXTENDED FRONT IN THE BALKANS.
+
+COUNT HERTLING’S GLOOM.
+
+The victory of the British troops in Palestine over the Turkish troops
+commanded by General Liman von Sanders has made further progress and
+assumed much greater dimensions than was indicated by the first reports.
+
+Two Turkish armies, the 7th and 8th, have ceased to exist. The whole of
+their baggage train, all their guns, and their entire material of war
+have been captured.
+
+30,000 MEN SURRENDERED
+
+and the few who escaped death or captivity fled in small dispersed
+bodies across the Jordan and are now wandering about the country.
+
+The British are now pursuing the 4th Turkish Army, which is also
+in danger of destruction. In any case the Turkish resistance in
+Palestine is definitely broken. General Liman von Sanders, the German
+Commander-in-Chief, who was so completely surprised and so much
+surpassed in leadership by the enemy headquarters,
+
+IS IN FLIGHT BEFORE THE BRITISH.
+
+The Turks claim that they have been betrayed and led into misfortune
+by the German officers appointed to command their forces. Palestine is
+now lost to them for ever. The Holy Places have been liberated from
+the suzerainty of the Mussulman. The Entente has undertaken to restore
+Palestine to the Jewish people. The victory of the French and Serbian
+troops over the Bulgarians in the Balkan mountains has strikingly
+developed. The Bulgarians are now
+
+WITHDRAWING ON A FRONT OF 160 KILOMETRES.
+
+They have made no strong opposition to the advance of the Entente
+troops. The German defeats on the Western front have merely depressed
+them and weakened their fighting ardour. We know it is useless to
+continue the struggle.
+
+Count Hertling, the Imperial Chancellor, knows this too. He told the
+Chief Commission of the Reichstag that deep discontent had seized wide
+circles of the people. What does he recommend? That the German people
+shall maintain its old and sure confidence in Hindenburg and Ludendorff
+in the hope that they may improve the situation a little? But he knows,
+we know, and the whole world knows that they cannot improve it.
+
+ONLY THE GERMAN PEOPLE ITSELF
+
+can bring about an improvement by putting an end to autocracy and
+militarism, pan-Germanism, and the out-of-date absurdities which other
+peoples have long since done away with.
+
+_On the other side of the leaflet_:
+
+The upper map shows the encircling movement of the British which
+annihilated the Turkish forces under General Liman von Sanders.
+
+_Notes in the body of the map_:
+
+    British cavalry.
+    Here 25,000 Turks surrendered.
+    Site of break-through on the Turkish front.
+
+The lower map shows the ground gained in the Balkans by the French and
+Serbian troops which have inflicted on the Bulgarians the heaviest
+defeat they have suffered in the war.
+
+[Illustration: ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.
+
+OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S PRE-WAR POPULATION OF 52,000,000, ONLY ABOUT
+21,000,000 WERE GERMANS OR MAGYARS. THE REMAINING 31,000,000,
+COMPRISING POLES, CZECHS, SLOVAKS, SOUTHERN SLAVS, RUMANES, ITALIANS,
+ETC., WERE ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY ANTI-GERMAN. THE ABOVE MAP SHOWS HOW
+THESE OPPRESSED RACES WERE DISTRIBUTED OVER THE DUAL MONARCHY.]
+
+[Illustration: THE PARTITION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: SHOWING THE BOUNDARIES
+AS DEFINED IN THE PEACE TREATIES. IT IS INTERESTING TO COMPARE THIS
+WITH THE ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP BETWEEN PAGES 32 AND 33.]
+
+[Illustration: GERMANY’S NEW BOUNDARIES AS FIXED BY THE TREATY OF
+PEACE. THE DARK PORTIONS SHOW THE TERRITORY LOST TO GERMANY; THE SHADED
+PORTIONS INDICATE TERRITORY WITHIN WHICH THE INHABITANTS WERE TO CHOOSE
+BY PLEBISCITE UNDER WHOSE FLAG THEY WOULD LIVE. THE FREE TERRITORY OF
+DANZIG IS ALSO MARKED.]
+
+[Illustration: BULGARIA, AS DELIMITED BY THE PEACE TREATY.]
+
+
+
+
+  INDEX
+
+
+  A
+
+  Alsace-Lorraine, Propaganda policy, 180-1
+
+  Austria-Hungary--propaganda against, 20 _et seqq._;
+    Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities: resolutions, 25-7;
+    propaganda policy: memorandum to Foreign Office, 28;
+    policies outlined, 30-3;
+    Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission organised at Italian G.H.Q., 37;
+    publishes weekly journal, 38;
+    effect of leaflet campaign, 40;
+    work impaired by reactionary tendencies within Italian Government,
+    40, 205;
+    weakness of declaration made at Versailles meeting of June 3, 1918,
+    41;
+    effect of propaganda, desertions, 43-4;
+    recommendations of Inter-Allied Policy Committee, 173-6
+
+
+  B
+
+  Baker, Lieut.-Col. B. Granville, 37, 48
+
+  Balfour, Mr. A. J., reply to Lord Northcliffe’s memorandum on policy
+  to be adopted against Austria, 33;
+    against Bulgaria, 139
+
+  Beaverbrook, Lord, 17, 148
+
+  Bissolati, Signor, 25
+
+  Borgese, Professor, 38, 150;
+    on inter-Allied co-operation, 165
+
+  Bulgaria, propaganda against:
+    policy submitted to Foreign Office, 134-9;
+    Mr. Balfour’s reply, 139;
+    Ludendorff on effect of, 142
+
+
+  C
+
+  Cinematograph films, use for propaganda purposes, 197
+
+  Cockerill, Brig.-Gen. G. K., 52, 149
+
+  Comert, M., 150
+
+  Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities at Rome:
+  resolutions, 25-6
+
+  Cunliffe-Owen, Sir H., in charge of propaganda against Turkey, 13, 150
+
+
+  D
+
+  Denbigh, Col. the Earl of, 10
+
+  Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries (Crewe House):
+    Lord Northcliffe appointed Director, 8;
+    personnel of advisory committee, 10;
+    two main branches, 11;
+    co-operation of other Government Departments, 15, 19;
+    expenditure during “intensive” campaign (Sept.-Dec. 1918), 18;
+    production work centralised at Crewe House, 91-2;
+    good effect of, 93;
+    inter-Allied Conference: list of delegates, 149;
+    propaganda to cease during period of Armistice, 234
+
+    Austro-Hungarian Section, 11, 12
+
+    German Section, 12, 13
+
+    Peace terms propaganda, 202 _et seqq._;
+      Lord Northcliffe’s article published in _The Times_ and circulated
+      throughout the World, 218-230.
+
+    Work against Turkey, 13
+
+  _Deutsche Tageszeitung_, tribute to propaganda staff, 121
+
+  Diaz, General, on effect of propaganda work on Italian front, 45
+
+  Donald, Mr. Robert, 10
+
+
+  F
+
+  Franklin-Bouillon, M., 148
+
+  Fyfe, Mr. H., succeeds Mr. H. G. Wells as head of German Section, 13,
+  90
+
+
+  G
+
+  Gallenga-Stuart, Signor, 148.
+
+  Germany:--
+    Allied propaganda against, early neglect of, 50-2;
+    use of leaflets, 52;
+    effect, 53;
+    suspension of distribution by aeroplane: reasons, 54: use of
+    balloons, 55-7;
+    Mr. H. G. Wells’s memorandum on policy, 61 _et seqq._;
+    Lord Northcliffe’s letter to Mr. Balfour, 81;
+    summary of British Labour War Aims distributed: effect, 89;
+    use of aeroplanes resumed, 97;
+    leaflets circulated among submarine crews: effect, 99;
+    use of “trench newspaper,” 100;
+    German press comments, 105 _et seqq._;
+    rewards offered for leaflets, 117-8;
+    admission of Allied superiority, 120;
+    basis for peace negotiations, 212 _et seqq._;
+    Lord Northcliffe’s article, 218 _et seqq._
+
+    German propaganda, methods, 3 _et seqq._;
+    reasons for failure, 4;
+    organisation set up, 6
+
+  Gramophone records of Czech and Slav songs used on Italian front, 39
+
+  Gruss, Major, 37
+
+  Guest, Mr. S. A., propaganda campaign, 14, 39, 51, 98;
+    methods, 103
+
+
+  H
+
+  Hall, Rear-Adm. Sir R., 17, 149
+
+  _Hansa_, article quoted, 123.
+
+  Headlam-Morley, Dr. J. W., 13, 60
+
+  Hellingrath, General von, 121
+
+  Hindenburg, Marshal von, on effect of propaganda on German troops,
+  93-4;
+    manifesto on, 106-15
+
+  Hudson, Mr. H. K., 10, 15
+
+  Hutier, General von, manifesto; attack on Lord Northcliffe, 115-7
+
+
+  J
+
+  Jones, Sir Roderick, 10, 150
+
+
+  K
+
+  Keeley, Mr. James, 150;
+    on need for inter-Allied co-operation, 170
+
+  Kent, Mr. C. S., financial controller of Crewe House, 18
+
+  Kerry, Major, the Earl of, 16, 91, 149
+
+  Klobukowski, M., 150, 160, 171
+
+  _Kölnische Zeitung_, letter describing effect of leaflets, 119;
+    “Ten Commandments for German Women,” 127
+
+  _Kölnische Volkszeitung_, letters quoted, 125
+
+  Kupffer, Herr von, article quoted, 122
+
+
+  L
+
+  Lamprecht, Dr. Karl, 3
+
+  Lansing, Mr., 41, 42
+
+  League of Nations, 67, _et seqq._
+
+  _Le Courrier de l’Air_, 53, 59
+
+  Lichnowsky, Prince, his pamphlet used by Allies for propaganda, 104,
+  132, 142
+
+  Lloyd George, Mr. D., on success of propaganda against Austria, 50;
+    appreciation of Lord Northcliffe’s work, 235
+
+  Low, Sir Sidney, 10
+
+  Ludendorff, Gen., on failure of German propaganda, 5;
+    efforts to create organisation, 6;
+    order showing influence of propaganda on German population, 118;
+    value of good propaganda, 128;
+    comparison between British and German departments, 129-31;
+    on effect of propaganda on Bulgarian defeat, 142
+
+
+  M
+
+  Macdonogh, Lieut.-Gen. Sir George, 52, 106
+
+  Malinof, M., 141
+
+  Ministry of Information, 17
+
+  Mitchell, Capt. P. Chalmers, 16, 91, 92, 149, 209
+
+
+  N
+
+  Nicholson, Sir Charles, 10, 143, 149
+
+  Northcliffe, Lord, Mission to United States;
+    Chairman of London H.Q. of British War Mission;
+    declines seat in Cabinet;
+    appointed Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, 8;
+    anxiety to commence work against Austria, 35;
+    letter of appreciation from Mr. Lloyd George, 50;
+    on need for greater co-ordination, 151;
+    outline of policy, 156
+
+    Bulgaria, outlines policy against, 135-139
+
+    Enemy attacks on, 43, 105, 115-7, 125
+
+    Germany, outlines policy against, 81
+
+    Ludendorff, tribute, 130
+
+    Peace terms, article published in _The Times_ and circulated
+    throughout the world, 218-230
+
+    Rechberg, Herr A., tribute, 127
+
+    Resignation, letter to Mr. Lloyd George, 234;
+      Mr. Lloyd George’s reply, 235
+
+    _The Times_, leading article on propaganda work quoted, 129
+
+
+  O
+
+  O’Grady, Mr. James, 10
+
+  Ojetti, Capt., 37
+
+  Onslow, Col. Lord, 199
+
+  Orlando, Signor, meeting with Dr. Trumbitch, 24
+
+
+  P
+
+  Pashitch, M., 23
+
+  Phillips, Mr. C. J., 15, 150
+
+  Poland, propaganda policy in regard to, 178-180
+
+  Prisoners of War, information for, 143
+
+  Propaganda, objects, 2;
+    axioms: truthful statements only to be made, 2;
+    necessity of co-ordination, 146;
+    inter-Allied conference at Crewe House, list of delegates, 149;
+    distribution devices, 54-59; 184-190
+
+
+  R
+
+  Rechberg, Herr A., tribute to Lord Northcliffe’s work, 127
+
+  _Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung_, article quoted, 121
+
+  Rome Congress, 25 _et seqq._
+
+
+  S
+
+  Scheurmann, Herr W., letter quoted, 126
+
+  Seton-Watson, Dr. R. W., 11, 12, 20, 24, 37, 49
+
+  Siciliani, Col., 37
+
+  Sonnino, Baron, 41, 42
+
+  Standing, Sir Guy, 17, 149
+
+  Steed, Mr. H. Wickham, 10, 20, 24, 39, 49, 149;
+    Co-Director of Austro-Hungarian Section, 11;
+    mission to Italy, 37
+
+  Stein, Gen. von, admission of superiority of Allies’ propaganda, 120
+
+  Stossinger, Herr F., 120
+
+  Stuart, Lieut.-Col. Sir Campbell, 10, 149, 204, 236
+
+  Swinton, Maj.-Gen., 51
+
+
+  T
+
+  _The Times_, leading article on Lord Northcliffe’s work quoted, 129
+
+  Torre, Dr., 24
+
+  Trumbitch, Dr., 23, 24
+
+
+  W
+
+  Wells, Mr. H. G., 10, 12, 60, 89, 90;
+    memorandum on propaganda policy against Germany, 61 _et seqq._
+
+  Wireless Telegraphy, used as means of disseminating information, 17,
+  103
+
+
+PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE CORNWALL PRESS, LTD.,
+PARIS GARDEN, STAMFORD STREET, LONDON, S.E.1.
+
+
+Transcriber’s notes:
+
+Italic text is indicated with _underscores_, bold text with =equals=.
+Small/mixed capitals have been replaced with ALL CAPITALS.
+
+Underlining in the translation of leaflet 17, where it is used for
+emphasis, has been marked as bold, but ignored elsewhere.
+
+Evident typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected
+silently. Inconsistent spelling/hyphenation has been normalised.
+
+The usage of both Roumania & Rumania is the author’s.
+
+A half-title page has been discarded.
+
+A single footnote has been relocated at the end of the quoted passage
+to which it refers.
+
+To improve text flow, illustrations have been relocated as follows:
+
+Photographs have been grouped between chapters.
+
+Each “leaflet” has been moved to the appendix, to accompanying its
+translation.
+
+Redundant cross-references and reiterations of the leaflet number have
+been discarded.
+
+The explanatory text “Facsimile leaflets and translations” has been
+appended to the appendix and table of contents.
+
+Maps follow immediately after the appendix.
+
+*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77798 ***
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+<body>
+<div style='text-align:center'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77798 ***</div>
+
+
+
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp47" id="i_f004" style="max-width: 85.5625em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_f004.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE.<br>
+DIRECTOR OF PROPAGANDA IN ENEMY COUNTRIES.<br>
+<i>Photo: Hoppé.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iii">[iii]</span></p>
+
+
+<h1 class="nobreak" id="SECRETS_OF">SECRETS OF CREWE HOUSE</h1>
+</div>
+
+
+<p class="center"><i>The Story of a Famous Campaign</i></p>
+
+<p class="fs80 p4 center">BY</p>
+
+<p class="center">SIR CAMPBELL STUART, K.B.E.</p>
+
+
+<p class="fs80 p4 center">HODDER AND STOUGHTON<br>
+LONDON&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;NEW YORK&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;TORONTO<br>
+MCMXXI
+</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_iv">[iv]</span></p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p class="center">
+<i>First Edition printed September, 1920.</i><br>
+<i>Second Edition printed October, 1920.</i><br>
+<i>Third Edition printed November, 1920.</i><br>
+<i>Fourth Edition printed March, 1921.</i><br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_v">[v]</span></p>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+<p class="center">TO<br>
+VISCOUNT NORTHCLIFFE<br>
+IN<br>
+GRATEFUL AND AFFECTIONATE
+APPRECIATION
+</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_vii">[vii]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="AUTHORS_FOREWORD">AUTHOR’S FOREWORD</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+<p>Some courage is required to add to the
+already too swollen list of war books, of the
+making of which there seems to be no end.
+The justification for the present volume,
+which tells the remarkable story of British
+propaganda in enemy countries during 1918,
+lies in the fact that it records historic
+activities, some of which were of a pioneer
+character.</p>
+
+<p>Necessarily its publication had to be postponed
+until the main principles of the Peace
+had been decided. The nature of the documents
+quoted precluded earlier publication,
+which might have embarrassed the Allied
+Governments. No such embarrassment will
+be caused at this late stage. The march of
+events has removed the need, which existed
+during the War and during the peace-making,
+for withholding from public knowledge particulars
+of the organisation and work directed
+with such effect from Crewe House.</p>
+
+<p>Much that was interesting, and even<span class="pagenum" id="Page_viii">[viii]</span>
+dramatic, can never be divulged. Otherwise,
+many who did valuable and dangerous service
+might, by a breach of faith, be exposed to
+reprisals.</p>
+
+<p>The activities of Crewe House will stand
+the test of judgment by results. German
+comments on Viscount Northcliffe’s department
+leave no room for doubt as to the verdict
+of enemy countries.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_ix">[ix]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CONTENTS">CONTENTS</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<table class="tw60 autotable">
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER I</td>
+
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER II</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND <i>PERSONNEL</i></td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_8">8</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER III</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: PROPAGANDA’S MOST STRIKING SUCCESS</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_20">20</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER IV</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_50">50</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER V</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_105">105</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER VI</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND OTHER ACTIVITIES</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_134">134</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_x">[x]</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER VII</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_146">146</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER VIII</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO PEACE PROPAGANDA</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_201">201</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">CHAPTER IX</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80"><i>VALE!</i></td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_233">233</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">APPENDIX—Facsimile leaflets and translations</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_237">237</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl fs80">INDEX</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#Page_253">253</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xi">[xi]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="LIST_OF_ILLUSTRATIONS">LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<table class="tw80 autotable">
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Viscount Northcliffe</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><i><a href="#i_f004">Frontispiece</a></i></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2"></td>
+<td class="tdc fs50">BETWEEN PAGES</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Crewe House</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p008a">8 and 9</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.P.</td>
+<td class="tdr"><a href="#i_p008b">8 and 9</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh, K.C.M.G., C.B.</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p016a">16 and 17</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">The Rt. Hon. Lord Beaverbrook</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p016b">16 and 17</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. H. Wickham Steed</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p032a">32 and 33</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p032d">32 and 33</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">News of Allied successes on Western Front for Jugo-Slav soldiers in the Austrian Armies</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet01">48 and 49</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">A manifesto from Dr. Trumbitch distributed from aeroplanes among Jugo-Slav troops in the Austrian Army</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet02">48 and 49</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. H. G. Wells</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p064a">64 and 65</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Leaflet—probably the first—distributed by British aeroplanes among German troops in October, 1914. It announced a Russian victory in East Prussia</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet03">64 and 65</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. Hamilton Fyfe</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p064c">64 and 65</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Aeroplane distribution of copies of an early leaflet prepared for the German soldier</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet04">64 and 65</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Brigadier-General G. K. Cockerill, C.B.</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p080a">80 and 81</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">A typical news-sheet for German soldiers</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet05">80 and 81</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Captain Chalmers Mitchell</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p096a">96 and 97</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xii">[xii]</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">“Reporting Progress”—Leaflet which gave particulars of Allied progress against the Germans</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet06">96 and 97</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Diagrammatic representation of the growth of the American Army in the Field</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet07">96 and 97</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Map-leaflet showing the breaking of the Hindenburg line</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet08">112 and 113</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">News for German soldiers of the destruction of the Turkish Army in Palestine</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet09">112 and 113</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Some pointed quotations for German soldiers culled from German sources</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet10">112 and 113</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">A medallion struck by the Germans in “dishonour” of Lord Northcliffe</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p128a">128 and 129</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Leaflet with particulars of the fate of 150 German submarine commanders, which created great depression in German naval ports</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet11">128 and 129</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Leaflet warning the Germans that such places as Berlin and Hamburg had been brought within range of aerial attack and could be bombed if the war were prolonged</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet12">128 and 129</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">A German dream and the result. A leaflet illustrating the collapse of the Mittel-Europa ambition of German militarism</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet13">144 and 145</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Front page of a “Trench Newspaper,” issued by Crewe House for German troops</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet14">144 and 145</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">The late Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart., M.P.</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p144d">144 and 145</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E.</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p160a">160 and 161</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Illustrated leaflet portraying contentment of German prisoners in British hands</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet15">160 and 161</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p160c">160 and 161</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Leaflet showing how the Allies had shattered the great Berlin-Bagdad plan</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet16">160 and 161</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. Robert Donald</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p176a">176 and 177</a><span class="pagenum" id="Page_xiii">[xiii]</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Manifesto to Magyar Troops</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet17">176 and 177</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">“Drifting down in white showers”: Leaflets, from Italian aeroplane squadron, dropping on Vienna</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p176c">176 and 177</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Manifesto, signed by Professor (now President) Masaryk, to Czecho-Slovak soldiers</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet18">176 and 177</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Sir Sidney Low</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p192a">192 and 193</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Rapidly-distributed leaflets for German troops telling of Allied successes in the Balkans and in Syria</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#leaflet19">192 and 193</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Mr. James O’Grady, M.P.</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p192d">192 and 193</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Inflating the balloons and attaching the truth-telling leaflets</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p208a">208 and 209</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Registering the direction and velocity of the wind, in order to judge where the leaflets would fall</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p208b">208 and 209</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">How leaflets were attached to the balloons</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p208c">208 and 209</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Dispatching the balloons</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p208d">208 and 209</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Testing the lifting power of balloons used for propaganda purposes</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#i_p224a">224 and 225</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc" colspan="2">LIST OF MAPS.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Ethnographic map of Austria-Hungary</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#map1">32 and 38</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">The partition of Austria-Hungary: Showing the boundaries as defined in the Peace Treaties</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#map2">48 and 49</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Germany’s new boundaries as fixed by the Treaty of Peace</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#map3">80 and 81</a></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl hang2">Bulgaria as delimited by the Peace treaty</td>
+<td class="tdrbot"><a href="#map4">144 and 145</a></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_1">[1]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_I">CHAPTER I<br>
+<span class="fs80">PROPAGANDA: ITS USES AND ABUSES</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<p class="sub">Definition and Axioms: Why German Propaganda Failed:
+Ludendorff’s Lament and Tribute.</p>
+
+
+<p>Propaganda in war is a comparatively
+modern activity. Certainly, in the stage
+of development to which it attained in the
+closing phases of the Great War, it is a new
+weapon of warfare and a powerful weapon.
+Therefore it requires skilful and careful
+handling. Otherwise it destroys rather than
+creates, and alienates whom it should conciliate.</p>
+
+<p>What is propaganda? It is the presentation
+of a case in such a way that others may
+be influenced. In so far as its use against
+an enemy is concerned, the subject matter
+employed must not be self-evidently propagandist.
+Except in special circumstances,
+its origin should be completely concealed.
+As a general rule, too, it is desirable to hide
+the channels of communication.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_2">[2]</span></p>
+
+<p>Creation of a favourable “atmosphere”
+is the first object of propaganda. Until this
+psychological effect is produced (as the result
+of military events, of propagandist activity
+or of internal political disaffection) the mentality
+of enemy troops and civil population—and
+both are equally important in modern
+warfare—will be naturally unsympathetic
+and unresponsive to influence. In order to
+produce this “atmosphere” of receptivity
+and susceptibility, continuity of propaganda
+policy is indispensable. This presupposes
+definition of sound policy, based upon comprehensive
+knowledge of the facts and of the
+developments of the political, military, and
+economic situation, and also of the enemy
+psychology.</p>
+
+<p>When a line of policy has been laid down,
+actual propaganda operations may be begun,
+but not before. First of all axioms of propaganda
+is that only truthful statements be
+made. Secondly, there must be no conflicting
+arguments, and this can only be
+ensured by close co-operation of all propagandists
+and by strict adherence to the
+policy defined. A false step may possibly be
+irretrievable.</p>
+
+<p>Owing to inattention to these cardinal
+principles of propaganda against an enemy—inattention<span class="pagenum" id="Page_3">[3]</span>
+due to lack of appreciation of
+their importance—the Germans’ very energetic
+propaganda effort miscarried. Wrongly
+assuming that the war would be of short
+duration, they made use of untruths and half-truths,
+mis-statements and over-statements.
+These produced a temporary effect, but the
+protraction of the war brought its own refutation
+of their misrepresentation, and, instead
+of operating to the good of the Central
+Empires, the campaign wrought harm to their
+cause.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, as they afterwards realised, the
+Germans did not agree among themselves
+in their misrepresentations. There was, as a
+well-known British authority on German
+propaganda has pointed out, a chaotic
+exuberance of different points of view. And
+they were incapable of understanding other
+nations. Dr. Karl Lamprecht, the distinguished
+German professor, deplored this in
+the course of a lecture at the end of 1914,
+when the Germans regarded their victory as
+assured. “When the war came,” he said,
+“everyone who could write obtained the
+largest possible goose quill and wrote to all
+his foreign friends, telling them that they did
+not realise what splendid fellows the Germans
+were, and not infrequently adding that in<span class="pagenum" id="Page_4">[4]</span>
+many cases their conduct required some
+excuse. The effect was stupendous.” “I
+can speak with the most open heart on the
+subject,” he added, “for amongst the whole
+crowd it was the professors who were most
+erratic. The consequences were gruesome.
+Probably much more harm came to our
+cause in this way than from all the efforts
+of the enemy. None the less, it was done
+with the best intentions. The self-confidence
+was superb, but the knowledge was
+lacking. People thought that they could
+explain the German cause without preparation.
+What was wanted was organisation.”</p>
+
+<p>Before coming to Allied methods and
+matter, it will be interesting to examine the
+scope of German propaganda. In the early
+stages of the war, Germany loudly proclaimed
+that she was winning. As the progress of
+events belied such words, she changed her
+theme. The Allies could not win, she averred,
+and the longer they took to realise this the
+greater would be their suffering and losses.
+She continually endeavoured to sow discord
+between the Allies. Great Britain was not
+taking her fair share of the Allied burden;
+Great Britain intended to retain Belgium
+and the northern part of France; Great
+Britain was using France and Russia for her<span class="pagenum" id="Page_5">[5]</span>
+own selfish ends; the interests of the Balkan
+Powers could not be reconciled. These were
+some of the foolish falsehoods in which she
+indulged. They were ineffective, as were her
+many attempts to stir up disaffection within
+Allied countries. Ireland, South Africa,
+India, Egypt and Mohammedan countries
+were examples in the case of Great Britain,
+and Algeria in that of France. She spared
+no effort to encourage Pacifism among the
+Allied peoples.</p>
+
+<p>Their lack of success became evident even
+to the Germans themselves. Government
+agencies and Press became more reticent as
+the war went on and the propaganda was
+found to be doing more harm than good.
+The military leaders became apprehensive of
+the effectiveness and superiority of British
+propaganda. Soldiers and writers made
+bitter complaints of the lack of any German
+organisation to maintain an adequate counter-campaign.</p>
+
+<p>General Ludendorff (“My War Memories,”
+pp. 360 <i>et seq.</i>) is pathetic in his laments
+at the non-success of German efforts. “The
+German propaganda,” he writes, “was only
+kept going with difficulty. In spite of all our
+efforts, its achievements, in comparison to the
+magnitude of the task, were inadequate. We<span class="pagenum" id="Page_6">[6]</span>
+produced no real effect on the enemy
+peoples.” He admits failure, too, in propaganda
+efforts on the fighting fronts. In the
+East, he says, the Russians were the authors of
+their own collapse. In the West, “the
+fronts of our enemies had not been made
+susceptible by the state of public opinion in
+their home countries, and the propaganda
+we gradually introduced had no success.”
+He records his efforts to induce the Imperial
+Chancellor to create a great organisation, as
+it had become “undeniably essential to
+establish an Imperial Ministry of Propaganda,”
+and he was convinced that no adequate
+counter-campaign to Allied propaganda
+could be organised except by an Imperial
+department possessing special powers. “At
+last a feeble step in this direction was taken
+in August, 1918. A totally inadequate organisation
+was set up; besides, it was then too
+late. In these circumstances it was quite
+impossible to achieve uniformity in propaganda
+work between Germany and Austria-Hungary,
+as was conspicuously the case with
+our enemies. The Army found no ally in a
+strong propaganda directed from home. While
+her Army was victorious on the field of
+battle, Germany failed in the fight against
+the <i>moral</i> of the enemy peoples.”</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_7">[7]</span></p>
+
+<p>Ludendorff’s <i>apologia</i> shows that he understood
+the principles which should govern a
+propaganda campaign; but he did not
+understand that the German case was bad.
+He has the doubtful consolation of knowing
+he was right in his theories; for they coincided
+in large degree with the principles
+upon which Viscount Northcliffe based his
+famous intensive campaign from Crewe House.
+No other German has exhibited such a grasp
+of the fundamentals of propaganda as
+Ludendorff, and he had excellent opportunity
+of judging the efficacy of the action into which
+these theoretical principles were translated.
+His verdict is an unqualified tribute, as the
+extracts from his writings quoted in another
+chapter show.</p>
+
+<p>How this success was attained it is the
+purpose of this book to reveal.</p>
+
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p008a" style="max-width: 125.4375em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p008a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">CREWE HOUSE.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_8">[8]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_II">CHAPTER II<br>
+<span class="fs80">CREWE HOUSE: ITS ORGANISATION AND
+<i>PERSONNEL</i></span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<p class="sub">Viscount Northcliffe’s appointment: The Formation of an
+Advisory Committee: Other Government Departments’
+Co-operation.</p>
+
+
+
+<p>In February, 1918, Viscount Northcliffe
+accepted the Prime Minister’s invitation to
+become Director of Propaganda in Enemy
+Countries. Only a few weeks earlier, Lord
+Northcliffe had concluded his mission to the
+United States, where he had undertaken the
+co-ordination and supervision of the multiplex
+British missions engaged in purchasing
+food and munitions and in other vitally
+important operations. Upon his return to
+England, he had become Chairman of the
+London headquarters of the British War
+Mission to the United States of America,
+after having declined a seat in the Cabinet.
+Despite the importance of his new duties,
+he elected to retain his connection with the
+British War Mission to the United States.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_9">[9]</span></p>
+
+<p>Lord Northcliffe’s name bore in itself a
+propaganda value in enemy countries. None
+knew better than the Germans with what
+assiduity and tenacity he had striven to
+awaken the British nation to the extent and
+significance of the war preparations of
+German militarism. From the time of his
+entry into this office he and his work were
+the subjects of continual reference in the
+German Press. The vehemence of their
+attacks showed the depth of their apprehension.</p>
+
+<p>The direction and organisation of propaganda
+abroad, and especially against enemy
+countries, required a <i>personnel</i> deeply versed
+in foreign politics, with an intimate understanding
+of enemy psychology, and with
+professional knowledge of the art of presenting
+facts plainly and forcefully. The work
+was of a highly specialised character,
+designed to reveal to the enemy the hopelessness
+of their cause and case and the inevitability
+of Allied victory. This called
+for continuity of policy and persevering
+effort. But the problems of the penetration
+of propaganda into enemy countries were as
+exacting as the definition of policy and the
+presentation of the facts of the situation.</p>
+
+<p>In order to bring as wide a knowledge as<span class="pagenum" id="Page_10">[10]</span>
+possible to bear upon the conduct of this
+campaign of education and enlightenment of
+enemy peoples, Lord Northcliffe invited and
+obtained the enthusiastic co-operation of a
+committee of well-known men of affairs and
+publicists. Each had won distinction in
+some sphere of public service which rendered
+his aid in this work valuable.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Northcliffe appointed me as Deputy-Director
+of the department and Deputy-Chairman
+of the Committee.</p>
+
+<p>The members of the Committee were:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>Colonel the Earl of Denbigh, C.V.O.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Robert Donald (then Editor of the
+<i>Daily Chronicle</i>).</p>
+
+<p>Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E. (Managing
+Director of Reuters Agency).</p>
+
+<p>Sir Sidney Low.</p>
+
+<p>Sir Charles Nicholson, Bt., M.P.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. James O’Grady, M.P.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. H. Wickham Steed (Foreign Editor
+and later Editor-in-Chief of <i>The
+Times</i>).</p>
+
+<p>Mr. H. G. Wells.</p>
+
+<p>Secretary, Mr. H. K. Hudson, C.B.E.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>It was an advisory committee of wide
+knowledge and many talents, with a strong<span class="pagenum" id="Page_11">[11]</span>
+representation of authors and journalists
+of distinction. Regular fortnightly meetings
+were held, at which each section of the
+department reported progress and submitted
+programmes of future activities for approval.</p>
+
+<p>The headquarters of the department were
+established at Crewe House, the town mansion
+of the Marquis of Crewe, who had, with
+characteristic public spirit, placed it at the
+disposal of the Government for war purposes.</p>
+
+<p>The department was divided into two main
+branches, the one for production, and the
+other for distribution, of propaganda material.
+In its turn the production branch was divided
+into German, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian
+sections.</p>
+
+<p>For reasons which will be given in the next
+chapter, the Austro-Hungarian section was
+the first to begin operations. Mr. Steed
+and Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson were co-directors
+of this section. They were an
+admirable choice. As Foreign Editor (as he
+then was) of <i>The Times</i>, author of “The
+Hapsburg Monarchy,” and with experience
+from 1902 to 1913 as correspondent of <i>The
+Times</i> at Vienna, Mr. Steed had intimate
+and authoritative knowledge of the peoples
+and conditions of the Dual Monarchy. Dr.
+Seton-Watson was also a distinguished<span class="pagenum" id="Page_12">[12]</span>
+authority on Austro-Hungarian and Balkan
+history and politics, to which he had devoted
+many years of study.</p>
+
+<p>After determination of the policy to be
+pursued against Austria-Hungary, Lord
+Northcliffe entrusted to them the important
+mission to Italy which initiated the campaign
+against the Dual Monarchy, resulting in such
+far-reaching and remarkable consequences.
+In the course of this mission they attended
+the historic Rome Congress of the Oppressed
+Hapsburg Nationalities and they took a
+prominent part in the establishment of the
+inter-Allied commission which waged propaganda
+warfare against Austria-Hungary.
+The subsequent conduct of this campaign
+necessitated keeping in close touch with the
+different national organisations of the oppressed
+Hapsburg races—Poles, Czecho-Slovaks,
+Southern Slavs, Rumanes—throughout
+1918, and they were able to render signal
+services to these peoples as well as to the
+Allies.</p>
+
+<p>When operations began against Germany,
+Mr. H. G. Wells accepted Lord Northcliffe’s
+invitation to take charge of the German
+Section. Mr. Wells made an exhaustive
+study of the conditions affecting Germany
+from a propaganda point of view, with the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_13">[13]</span>
+co-operation of Dr. J. W. Headlam-Morley,
+and his memorandum (which is published
+in Chapter IV of this book) is a noteworthy
+document of exceptional interest. When, in
+July, 1918, he found himself unable to continue
+the direction of the German Section
+(although retaining membership of the Committee)
+he had collected a mass of valuable
+data for the use of his successor, Mr. Hamilton
+Fyfe, the well-known journalist. To Mr.
+Fyfe and his colleagues of the German Section
+fell the organisation of the “intensive”
+propaganda activities of the last three months
+of the war.</p>
+
+<p>There thus remained the work against
+Turkey and Bulgaria. By arrangement
+between Lord Northcliffe and Lord Beaverbrook,
+propaganda against Turkey was ably
+conducted by the Near East section of the
+Ministry of Information, in charge of Mr.
+(now Sir Hugo) Cunliffe-Owen. This was
+obviously wise in the interests of economy
+and efficiency. Propaganda in Bulgaria,
+however, was directed from Crewe House.</p>
+
+<p>The production of propaganda literature
+and its distribution were different functions
+and were performed by separate sections of
+the department, but, of course, in the closest
+co-operation. So far as enemy troops were<span class="pagenum" id="Page_14">[14]</span>
+concerned, the distribution for Germans and
+Bulgarians was undertaken by the British
+military authorities. For Austro-Hungarian
+troops, the work was placed on an inter-Allied
+basis, distribution being organised by the
+Italian Army.</p>
+
+<p>Distribution through civil channels, a
+difficult task, was in the hands of Mr. S. A.
+Guest, who, alone of British propagandists
+against the enemy, had been constantly
+engaged in that work since the early days of
+the war. He built up a series of organisations
+in different parts of Europe by which
+news and views could be introduced into all
+the enemy countries. Great ingenuity and
+perseverance were required, but no little
+measure of success crowned his efforts.</p>
+
+<p>Co-ordination of these activities was a
+vital necessity, and this was effectively
+ensured by a daily meeting of those in charge
+of the different sections, the liaison officers
+between Crewe House and other departments,
+and the heads of the administrative branches
+of Crewe House. At this meeting, held
+usually under my chairmanship, the general
+details of policy and operations of all sections
+were systematically discussed. Each
+section knew what the other was doing,
+and uniformity of policy and action was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_15">[15]</span>
+secured. In addition, the consideration of
+the problems which arose, whether in the
+general work of Crewe House or in the
+work of one particular section, benefited
+from the collective attention of a combination
+of enthusiastic minds. Mr. Hudson,
+the able secretary of the advisory committee,
+also acted as secretary of these daily
+meetings.</p>
+
+<p>All at Crewe House were profoundly grateful
+for the cordiality with which the many
+other Government departments, with whom
+they were brought into contact, lent their
+co-operation. In this respect the Foreign
+Office, War Office, Admiralty, Treasury,
+Ministry of Information, and Stationery
+Office, all contributed materially to the success
+attained, although this list by no means
+exhausts the departments which willingly
+placed their resources at the disposal of
+Crewe House. It is pleasing to be able to
+record this as a recollection of and tribute to
+the service rendered by these departments in
+this phase of war activity.</p>
+
+<p>The liaison officers’ duties were extremely
+important. Mr. C. J. Phillips, a distinguished
+Civil Servant, who had been transferred from
+the Board of Education for special work in
+the Foreign Office, was the connecting link<span class="pagenum" id="Page_16">[16]</span>
+between the latter department and Crewe
+House. To him fell the task of keeping
+Crewe House informed of foreign developments
+which affected the work of propaganda
+in enemy countries and of keeping
+the Foreign Office <i>au courant</i> with Crewe
+House activities. His assistance and judgment
+were of immense value in dealing with
+the questions affecting foreign affairs which
+were constantly arising.</p>
+
+<p>For a few months after Lord Northcliffe’s
+appointment, the Military Intelligence
+Directorate of the War Office continued the
+production of literature for propaganda work
+against the Germans, and during this period
+Major the Earl of Kerry, M.P., acted as
+liaison officer between the two departments.
+Each department was able to complement
+and supplement the other’s work with good
+effect, and the co-operation was carried out
+most harmoniously. When production was
+subsequently centralised at Crewe House,
+Captain Chalmers Mitchell became liaison
+officer with the War Office and with the Air
+Ministry. No greater tribute can be paid to
+his work than the record in the pages that
+follow.</p>
+
+
+<p>Most cordial, too, were the relations maintained
+with the Admiralty, and especially<span class="pagenum" id="Page_17">[17]</span>
+with Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald Hall (Director
+of Naval Intelligence), through Commander
+(now Sir Guy) Standing, R.N.V.R. Crewe
+House was rightly grateful for constant
+co-operation of a confidential character
+through the exercise on its behalf of naval
+resources.</p>
+
+<p>Most valuable assistance was readily given
+to Crewe House by the Ministry of Information,
+so efficiently organised by Lord
+Beaverbrook. Close consultation was maintained
+between heads of sections of the
+two departments wherever co-operation could
+be advantageous. In certain European
+countries, for instance, the same agents
+acted for both departments—an arrangement
+which proved effective as well as
+economical. Invaluable service for Crewe
+House was performed by one agent of the
+Ministry in regard to Bulgarian affairs in
+which he displayed high competence and
+discretion. Crewe House was also indebted
+to the Ministry for the use of its wireless
+service in sending out matter for the enlightenment
+of the enemy by that means, and for
+many similar facilities, too numerous to
+mention, willingly offered and gladly accepted.</p>
+
+<p>With the Treasury—<i>bête noire</i> to so many
+temporary war departments—Crewe House<span class="pagenum" id="Page_18">[18]</span>
+had the smoothest working arrangements
+through Mr. C. S. Kent, who acted as Financial
+Controller and Accounting Officer in
+addition to other duties connected with the
+general administration of Crewe House. At
+no time was Treasury sanction withheld or
+delayed in regard to any expenditure proposed
+in connection with enemy propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy leaders frequently alleged
+that Lord Northcliffe expended huge sums
+of money on his propaganda work. According
+to the report of the Comptroller and
+Auditor-General, the expenditure for the
+four months from September 1 to December
+31, 1918—which was the period of the
+“intensive” campaign and consequently the
+most expensive—was £31,360 4s. 9d., which
+included expenses borne by the Office of
+Works, the Stationery Office, and the War
+Office on behalf of Crewe House. Only
+£7,946 2s. 7d. of this amount was incurred
+directly by Crewe House, one reason for
+the smallness of the amount being that
+many members of the department worked
+without remuneration for their services.
+The Auditor-General made a complimentary
+reference to the manner in which the
+accounts were rendered.</p>
+
+<p>Last, but not least, the Stationery Office<span class="pagenum" id="Page_19">[19]</span>
+which undertook all the printing arrangements
+for the millions of leaflets and other
+publications required in German, Croat,
+Bulgarian, and other languages, rendered
+great assistance by the promptness and
+efficiency with which they met Crewe House
+requirements which, from their very nature,
+generally necessitated working against time.</p>
+
+<p>It is particularly pleasing to look back and
+remember all the help so willingly given by
+other Government departments and to record
+the unfailing courtesy with which it was
+proffered and the zeal displayed. Crewe
+House gladly recognised the value of such
+loyal co-operation, of which those who were
+concerned in its work still retain grateful
+memories.</p>
+
+
+  <div class="column">
+   <figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p008b">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p008b.jpg" alt="" style="width:100%">
+  <figcaption class="caption">REAR-ADMIRAL SIR REGINALD HALL, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.P.<br>
+[DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]<br>
+<i>Photo: Russell, London.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+  </div>
+
+  <div class="column">
+    <figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p016a" >
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p016a.jpg" alt="" style="width:100%">
+  <figcaption class="caption">LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACDONOGH, K.C.M.G., C.B.<br>
+[DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]<br>
+<i>Photo: Russell, London.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+  </div>
+
+  <div class="column">
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p016b" >
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p016b.jpg" alt="" style="width:100%">
+  <figcaption class="caption">RT. HON. LORD BEAVERBROOK, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, 1918.<br>
+<i>Photo: M. S. Kay, Bolton.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+  </div>
+
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_20">[20]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_III">CHAPTER III<br>
+<span class="fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST AUSTRIA-HUNGARY:
+PROPAGANDA’S MOST STRIKING SUCCESS</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="sub">Anti-German Hapsburg Races: The Secret Treaty of London:
+Problem of the Adriatic: Importance of the Rome Congress:
+Lord Northcliffe’s Policy against Austria-Hungary:
+Formation of an Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission and
+its Effective Operations: The Final Triumph.</p>
+
+
+
+<p>Little time was spent in deciding that, of
+all enemy countries, Austria-Hungary would
+be most susceptible to propaganda. With
+the assistance of such authorities as Mr.
+Wickham Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson, Lord
+Northcliffe was soon able to propose a line
+of sound policy for the sanction of the
+Foreign Office.</p>
+
+<p>It is strange that determined action on
+some such lines had not been initiated
+previously by the Allied Governments. They
+had failed to profit from the anti-Hapsburg
+and anti-German sentiment of the oppressed
+subject races of the Dual Monarchy. Three-fifths<span class="pagenum" id="Page_21">[21]</span>
+of the Hapsburg peoples were actually
+or potentially well disposed to the Allies,
+and it was towards this majority that Lord
+Northcliffe decided that propaganda must be
+directed with two objectives, one constructive
+and one destructive:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>(1) The moral and active support of
+the national desires of these races
+for independence, with the ultimate aim
+of forming a strong non-German chain
+of Central European and Danubian
+States.</p>
+
+<p>(2) The encouragement of their disinclination
+to fight on behalf of the
+Central Empires, thus greatly handicapping
+the Austro-Hungarian Armies
+as a fighting force, and seriously embarrassing
+the German military leaders.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>It will be seen with what success each
+object was secured.</p>
+
+<p>The nationalities chiefly affected were the
+Czechs and the Southern Slavs. There were
+also lesser numbers of Italians, Poles and
+Rumanes, whom it was intended to place
+under their own national Governments of
+Italy, the State of Poland (then projected
+and now established), and Rumania, which
+countries marched with the districts of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_22">[22]</span>
+Austria-Hungary inhabited by their respective
+races.</p>
+
+<p>Operations were comparatively straightforward
+in every case except that of the
+Southern Slavs, in which the secret Treaty
+of London of April, 1915, presented a serious
+obstacle. At the beginning of 1918 few
+people realised the difficulties thus created,
+but since the cessation of hostilities the
+“Adriatic question” has loomed largely in
+the public view of international relations
+and is rightly regarded as one of the most
+troublesome problems of world politics. Its
+bearing on propaganda lay in the fact that by
+this treaty Great Britain, France and Russia
+had promised to Italy certain Austrian territories
+inhabited by Southern Slavs. These territories,
+moreover, provided trading access to
+the sea and were of the highest economic value
+to any Southern Slav state which might be
+formed. So long as that treaty was regarded
+by the Southern Slavs as representing Allied
+policy, it was difficult to persuade them that
+Allied sympathies were with them or that the
+Allies would secure for them the economic
+interests necessary to the establishment of
+the united Southern Slav state peopled by
+the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.</p>
+
+<p>With the object of creating a counterpoise<span class="pagenum" id="Page_23">[23]</span>
+to the secret pact, representatives of the
+Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, had assembled
+in Corfu, under the leadership of Dr. Trumbitch
+(president of the Southern Slav Committee)
+and M. Pashitch (Prime Minister of
+Serbia), and had issued the Southern Slav
+Unitary Declaration on June 20, 1917, proclaiming
+the union of the three peoples and
+claiming all territory compactly inhabited by
+them, which (said the Declaration) “cannot
+be mutilated without attaint to the vital
+interests of the community. Our nation
+demands nothing that belongs to others, but
+only what is its own.” On the one hand,
+this was an important counter-step to the
+partition of Dalmatia proposed in the Treaty
+of London; while on the other, it was a
+definite advance towards the solidification
+of the three peoples into nationhood. Consequently
+it was not without effect upon the
+German military leaders, who foresaw its
+influence upon the Southern Slav regiments
+of the Austro-Hungarian armies, and it undoubtedly
+hastened their decision to take
+direct control of the forces of the Dual
+Monarchy.</p>
+
+<p>The next move was made after the Italian
+armies had recovered from the disaster of
+Caporetto and had re-established their line<span class="pagenum" id="Page_24">[24]</span>
+on the Piave. On the initiative of Mr.
+Wickham Steed, Dr. Seton-Watson, and other
+members of the Serbian Society of Great
+Britain, conferences took place in London
+between leading Italians and Southern Slavs,
+with the aim of outlining a solution of the
+question which would be acceptable to the
+two nations. A memorandum of the discussions
+was given to the Prime Minister of
+Italy (Signor Orlando), who was then
+(January, 1918) in London. At Mr. Steed’s
+suggestion, Signor Orlando met Dr. Trumbitch
+and they discussed the question at
+great length, with the result that Dr. Trumbitch
+accepted an invitation from the Italian
+Premier to go to Rome.</p>
+
+<p>Before that visit took place, Dr. Torre, a
+prominent member of the Italian Parliament,
+was sent to London, as representative of an
+influential joint committee of the two Italian
+Houses of Parliament, to endeavour to
+establish a definite basis of agreement. After
+much negotiation the representatives of the
+two nations engaged themselves to settle
+amicably the various territorial controversies
+in the interest of the future good and sincere
+relations between the two peoples, on the
+basis of the principles of nationality and of
+the right of peoples to decide their own<span class="pagenum" id="Page_25">[25]</span>
+destiny. The linguistic and economic interests
+of such minorities as might have to
+be included in the national territory of either
+party were also guaranteed.</p>
+
+<p>This agreement of principle, made under the
+stress of war, coincided approximately with
+Lord Northcliffe’s entry into office. One
+of his first official acts was to dispatch Mr.
+Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson as a special
+mission to Italy. While there, they represented
+his department at the Congress of the
+Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities which met
+with the consent of the Italian Government
+at Rome on April 7, 8, and 9, 1918. The
+holding of this Congress was, in itself,
+an important act of propaganda. This
+unprecedented assembly, representing
+Italians, Poles, Czecho-Slovaks, Southern
+Slavs, and Rumanes, resolved upon common
+action in the proclamation of the right of
+national unity of these peoples and also
+confirmed, in striking fashion, the decisions
+arrived at between Italians and Southern
+Slavs in London. Signor Orlando, Signor
+Bissolati and other Italian Ministers
+expressed publicly their adhesion to the
+resolutions, which were as follows:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“The representatives of the nationalities
+subjected in whole or in part to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_26">[26]</span>
+rule of Austria-Hungary—the Italians,
+Poles, Rumanes, Czechs, and Southern
+Slavs—join in affirming their principles
+of common action as follows:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot2"><p>“(1) <i>Each of these peoples proclaims
+its right to constitute its own nationality
+and State unity, or to complete it, and to
+attain full political and economic independence.</i></p>
+
+<p>“(2) <i>Each of these peoples recognises in
+the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy the instrument
+of German domination and the
+fundamental obstacle to the realisation of
+its aspirations and rights.</i></p>
+
+<p>“(3) <i>The assembly recognises the
+necessity of a common struggle against
+the common oppressors, in order that each
+people may attain complete liberation
+and national unity within a free State
+unit.</i></p></div>
+
+<p>“The representatives of the Italian
+people and of the Jugo-Slav people in
+particular, agree as follows:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot2"><p>“(1) <i>In the relations of the Italian
+nation and the nation of the Serbs, Croats
+and Slovenes—known also under the name
+of the Jugo-Slav nation—the representatives
+of the two peoples recognise that the
+unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav<span class="pagenum" id="Page_27">[27]</span>
+nation is a vital interest of Italy, just as
+the completion of Italian national unity
+is a vital interest of the Jugo-Slav nation.
+And therefore the representatives of the
+two peoples pledge themselves to employ
+every effort in order that during the war
+and at the moment of peace, these ends
+of the two nations may be completely
+attained.</i></p>
+
+<p>“(2) <i>They declare that the liberation
+of the Adriatic Sea and its defence against
+every present and future enemy is a vital
+interest of the two peoples.</i></p>
+
+<p>“(3) <i>They pledge themselves also, in
+the interest of good and sincere relations
+between the two peoples in the future to
+solve amicably the various territorial controversies
+on the basis of the principles of
+nationality and of the right of peoples to
+decide their own fate, and in such a way
+as not to injure the vital interests of the
+two nations, as they shall be defined at the
+moment of peace.</i></p>
+
+<p>“(4) <i>To such racial groups</i> (nuclei)
+<i>of one people as it may be found necessary
+to include within the frontiers of the other,
+there shall be recognised and guaranteed
+the right of their language, culture, and
+moral and economic interests.</i>”</p>
+</div></div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_28">[28]</span></p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile, Lord Northcliffe and his experts
+had, in accordance with the principle
+consistently followed by Crewe House,
+determined the broad lines of policy upon
+which propaganda against Austria-Hungary
+was to be based. A memorandum on the
+subject was prepared and forwarded by Lord
+Northcliffe on February 24, 1918, to the
+Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for his
+consideration and approval. The following
+are the principal points of the memorandum:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>“I have long been of opinion that it would
+be well to concentrate on Propaganda in
+Austria.</p>
+
+<p>“I have made a point of seeing every
+available person who has come out of Austria,
+including many Americans who returned to
+the United States when I was there. All
+shared the same view—that the Dual
+Monarchy entered the greater war in a halfhearted
+spirit; is weary of the war; has
+endured hardships approaching starvation;
+and realises that there is no benefit for Austria
+arising out of the war.</p>
+
+<p>“The control of the Presses of the various
+nationalities composing the Dual Monarchy
+is so absolute that the real facts of the war
+are unknown to the multitude. Germany is
+not idle in Austria or elsewhere.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_29">[29]</span></p>
+
+<p>“For example, the entrance of the United
+States into the war has been belittled, and
+described as mere American ‘bluff.’ Many
+subjects of Austrian nationalities had, before
+the war, considerable knowledge of the United
+States, owing to the great emigration to that
+country. They would realise the power of
+the United States if explained to them.</p>
+
+<p>“It is submitted with respect, therefore,
+that one of the first steps to be taken is to
+spread, through all available channels, accurate
+facts about the American preparations.</p>
+
+<p>“But, before making any beginning in
+that direction, or any others, I feel that I
+must be placed in possession of knowledge
+of the policy of the Allies as to the Dual
+Monarchy.</p>
+
+<p>“I should be greatly obliged if you would
+give me your opinion on the following suggestions,
+which are made after consultation
+with those well acquainted with Austria.
+If they merit your approval, it is suggested
+that they be submitted to the United States,
+France, and Italy.</p>
+
+<p>“It is suggested that there are two
+policies for the Department of Propaganda in
+Enemy Countries. In order that there may
+be no misunderstanding I have recapitulated
+elementary facts generally known.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_30">[30]</span></p>
+
+<p>“These two policies are as follows:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot2"><p>“(<i>a</i>) To work for a separate peace with
+the Emperor, the Court, and the aristocracy,
+on the principle of not interfering with the
+domestic affairs of the Hapsburg Monarchy,
+and of leaving its territory almost or quite
+intact; or</p>
+
+<p>“(<i>b</i>) To try to break the power of Austria-Hungary,
+as the weakest link in the chain of
+enemy States, by supporting and encouraging
+all anti-German and pro-Ally peoples
+and tendencies.</p></div>
+
+<p>“The (<i>a</i>) policy has been tried without
+success. The Hapsburgs are not free agents.
+They have not the power, even though they
+may wish, to break away from Germany,
+because—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot2"><p>“(1) They are controlled by the internal
+structure of their dominions (the Dual System),
+which gives Germany decisive leverage
+over them through the Germans of Austria
+and the Magyars of Hungary; and</p>
+
+<p>“(2) Because the Allies cannot offer them
+acceptable terms without breaking with
+Italy.</p></div>
+
+<p>“It remains to try the (<i>b</i>) policy.</p>
+
+<p>“This policy is not primarily, or even, in
+the last resort, necessarily anti-Hapsburgian;
+it is not opposed to the interests of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_31">[31]</span>
+Roman Catholic religion; and it is in harmony
+with the declared aims of the Allies.</p>
+
+<p>“The Empire of Austria contains some
+31,000,000 inhabitants. Of these less than
+one-third, <i>i.e.</i>, the 9,000,000 or 10,000,000
+Germans of Austria, are pro-German. The
+other two-thirds (including the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks,
+Rumanes, Italians, and Southern
+Slavs) are actively or passively anti-German.</p>
+
+<p>“The Kingdom of Hungary, including the
+‘autonomous’ kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia
+has a population of approximately 21,000,000
+of which one-half (Magyars, Jews, Saxons,
+and Swabians) may be considered pro-German,
+and the rest (Slovaks, Rumanes,
+and Southern Slavs) actively or passively
+anti-German.</p>
+
+<p>“There are thus in Austria-Hungary, as a
+whole, some 31,000,000 anti-Germans, and
+some 21,000,000 pro-Germans. The pro-German
+minority rules the anti-German
+majority. Apart from questions of democratic
+principle, the policy of the Allies should
+evidently be to help and encourage the anti-Germans.</p>
+
+<p>“The chief means of helping them may be
+specified thus:</p>
+
+<p>“(1) The Allied Governments and the
+President of the United States should insist<span class="pagenum" id="Page_32">[32]</span>
+upon their determination to secure democratic
+freedom for the races of Austria-Hungary
+on the principle of ‘government by consent of
+the governed.’ Expressions such as ‘self-government,’
+or ‘autonomous development’
+should be avoided, because they have a
+sinister meaning in Austria-Hungary and
+tend to discourage the friends of the
+Allies.</p>
+
+<p>“(2) For the same reason, statements that
+the Allies do not wish to ‘dismember Austria’
+should be avoided. The war cannot be won
+without so radical a transformation of Austria-Hungary
+as to remove its peoples from German
+control. The Hapsburgs may be driven
+to help in this transformation if Allied encouragement
+of the anti-German Hapsburg
+peoples is effective. By themselves the
+Hapsburgs cannot effect a transformation
+except in an increasingly pro-German sense.</p>
+
+<p>“(3) For propaganda among the anti-German
+peoples the agencies already existing
+should be utilised. These agencies are
+chiefly the Bohemian (Czecho-Slovak)
+National Alliance, the Southern Slav Committee,
+and various Polish organisations.</p>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_33">[33]</span></p>
+
+<p>“(4) The present tendency of the Italian
+Government to shelve the policy embodied
+in the London Convention of April 26, 1915,
+and to adopt a policy of agreement with
+the anti-German races of Austria-Hungary
+should be encouraged and stimulated.</p>
+
+<p>“(5) The ultimate aim of Allied policy
+should be, not to form a number of small,
+disjointed States, but to create a non-German
+Confederation of Central European
+and Danubian States.</p>
+
+<p>“(6) The Germans of Austria should be
+free to join the Confederated States of
+Germany. They would, in any case, tend to
+secede from a transformed Austria, in which
+they would no longer be able to rule over
+non-German peoples.</p>
+
+<p>“In view of the great amount of cabling
+that will be necessary to achieve unity, may
+I ask you to let me have either your own
+suggestions, or your approval of those above
+mentioned, as speedily as possible?”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In his reply, Mr. Balfour wrote on February
+26, 1918:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p>“Your very lucid memorandum raises in
+one shape or another the fundamental problem
+of the Hapsburg Empire. A final and
+authoritative answer to the question you
+put to me can only be given (if given at all)
+by the Cabinet, speaking in the name of the
+Government. But I offer the following observations
+on the subject, in the hope that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_34">[34]</span>
+they may help you in the immediate task for
+which you have been made responsible.</p>
+
+<p>“If the two alternative policies of dealing
+with the Dual Monarchy set forth in your
+paper were mutually exclusive, and if they involved
+distinct and even opposite methods of
+propaganda, our position would be even more
+difficult than it is. For what we can do with
+the Austrian Empire does not wholly depend
+upon our wishes, but upon the success of our
+arms and the views of our Allies, and, as
+these elements in our calculations cannot
+be estimated with certainty, we should inevitably
+remain in doubt as to which of the
+two mutually exclusive methods of propaganda
+it would be judicious to adopt.</p>
+
+<p>“Fortunately, however, our position is
+not quite so embarrassing. As you point
+out with unanswerable force, everything
+which encourages the anti-German elements
+in the Hapsburg dominions really helps
+to compel the Emperor and the Court to a
+separate peace, and also diminishes the
+efficiency of Austria-Hungary as a member
+of the Middle-Europe combination. The
+Emperor, by these means, might be induced,
+or compelled, fundamentally to modify the
+constitution of his own State. If he refused
+to lend himself to such a policy, the strengthening<span class="pagenum" id="Page_35">[35]</span>
+of the non-German elements might
+bring about the same end even more effectually
+than if he lent his assistance to the
+process. But in either case the earlier stages
+of that process are the same, and a propaganda
+which aids the struggle of the nationalities
+now subject either to Austrian Germans
+or to Magyar Hungarians towards freedom
+and self-determination, must be right, whether
+the complete break-up of the Austrian Empire
+or its de-Germanisation under Hapsburg
+rule be the final goal of our efforts.”</p>
+
+<p>When acknowledging this prompt reply,
+Lord Northcliffe pointed out that his anxiety
+to move as rapidly as possible was due to
+the belief of the Italians that a strong
+Austrian or Austro-German offensive against
+Italy would be launched within the next
+two months. “If our propaganda in Austria
+is to help to weaken this offensive, or to turn
+it into a defeat, it ought, in my judgment,
+to begin at once, and all the agencies we can
+command ought to be hard at work within a
+fortnight.</p>
+
+<p>“The representative of the American
+Propaganda Department is in London. The
+Italian will be here next week, and we could
+no doubt have a French representative at
+the same time.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_36">[36]</span></p>
+
+<p>“As to the memorandum, I am very
+pleased that you are in substantial agreement
+with the policy outlined. The two policies
+may not be mutually exclusive in the last
+resort, but it is very important that one or
+the other of them should be given absolute
+precedence. It would place me in an
+awkward predicament if, after basing
+vigorous propaganda on the (<i>b</i>) policy, I
+were confronted with some manifestation of
+the (<i>a</i>) policy on the part of the British or
+other Allied Government. For this reason
+I hope that the War Cabinet will not delay
+its own decision, and that it will try to get
+a decision from France, Italy, and the United
+States as quickly as possible.</p>
+
+<p>“It goes without saying that public
+declarations on behalf of the British, French,
+and Allied Governments, and, if possible, on
+the part of President Wilson, in the sense of
+the (<i>b</i>) policy would, if promptly made,
+greatly facilitate my efforts.”</p>
+</div>
+<p>Obviously the wise course was to place
+action in carrying out this policy on an Inter-Allied
+basis. Lord Northcliffe, therefore,
+convened meetings in London which were
+attended by Italian, French and American
+representatives. It was decided to organise
+a committee to arrange with France and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_37">[37]</span>
+Italy for united operations on the Italian
+front against the Austro-Hungarian armies.</p>
+
+<p>Accordingly, the special mission which
+Lord Northcliffe had sent to Italy, and of
+which Mr. Steed and Dr. Seton-Watson were
+the principal members, was entrusted with
+this task. With the willing support and co-operation
+of the Italian Prime Minister,
+the Italian Commander-in-Chief, and the
+British and French Commanders on the
+Italian Front, a permanent Inter-Allied
+Propaganda Commission was organised at
+the Italian General Headquarters. Italy
+provided the President (Colonel Siciliani) and
+one commissioner (Captain Ojetti) and Great
+Britain and France one commissioner each
+(Lieutenant-Colonel B. Granville Baker and
+Major Gruss respectively). To the Commission
+were attached, as a result of representations
+from Mr. Steed, representatives
+of committees of each of the oppressed
+nationalities. Mr. Steed, speaking on behalf
+of Lord Northcliffe, urged that only representatives
+of these races were fully qualified
+to speak to their co-nationals on the vital
+subjects which would form the theme of
+their propagandist productions.</p>
+
+<p>The Commission began work on April 18,
+1918. It acquired a polyglot printing press<span class="pagenum" id="Page_38">[38]</span>
+at Reggio Emilia. A weekly journal was
+published containing news (collected by a
+special Italian office ably organised by Professor
+Borgese at Berne) quadruplicated in
+the Czech, Polish, Southern Slav, and
+Rumanian languages. The assistance of the
+national representatives was valuable to the
+point of indispensability in ensuring accuracy
+of translation and suitability of contents.
+These representatives also composed leaflet
+manifestoes. Coloured reproductions of
+pictures of a patriotic, or religious, nature
+which appealed to the nationalist aspirations
+and piety of the races, were made. All this
+literary matter was dispatched straight to
+the front-line armies from the printing press,
+and distributed by means of aeroplanes (one
+per army being detailed for this purpose),
+rockets, which were constructed to hold
+about 30 pamphlets, and grenades, and also
+by contact patrols. These patrols were
+originally formed by bodies of troops raised
+on the responsibility of the various Italian
+armies, and were composed of deserters of
+Czecho-Slovak, Southern Slav, Polish, or
+Rumanian nationalities who had volunteered
+for this service against their hereditary
+enemy. They were wonderfully successful.
+The total number of leaflets and other<span class="pagenum" id="Page_39">[39]</span>
+productions thus distributed ran into many
+millions. But this by no means exhausted
+the channels of propagandist effort. Gramophone
+records of Czecho-Slovak and Southern
+Slav songs were secured by the British
+Commissioner and effectively used for the
+awakening of the nationalist sentiment among
+the troops of these races in the Austrian
+armies. The instruments were placed in
+“No Man’s Land,” and so close to each
+other were the front trenches of the opposing
+armies that the words and music could easily
+be heard.</p>
+
+<p>The Austro-Hungarian section of Crewe
+House, of which section Mr. Steed and Dr.
+Seton-Watson were the directors, maintained
+the closest touch with the Commission.
+Specimens of literature were exchanged
+between the Commission and other sections
+of Crewe House, and it was not uncommon
+for one news leaflet to appear in eight or ten
+different languages, with a total circulation
+of several millions of copies. The Austro-Hungarian
+section also necessarily kept in
+the closest touch with the Czecho-Slovak,
+Southern Slav, Polish, and Rumanian leaders
+and organisations in Allied and neutral
+countries. It also co-operated with Mr.
+S. A. Guest in the organisation of civil and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_40">[40]</span>
+secret channels in neutral countries by which
+propaganda literature could be introduced
+into Austria-Hungary.</p>
+
+<p>The effect of the launching of the propaganda
+leaflet campaign was soon apparent.
+Unrest became manifest among the Austro-Hungarian
+forces. Deserters belonging to
+the subject races came over to the Allied
+lines. This was one of the chief causes
+contributory to the postponements of the
+Austrian offensive carefully planned for April.
+When this attack was eventually made—in
+June—the Italian commanders, and their
+Allied colleagues, had full information concerning
+enemy plans and positions.</p>
+
+<p>But, unhappily, the propaganda, and,
+consequently, the military, campaigns were
+impaired by reactionary tendencies within
+the Italian Government. Had the Italian
+Government been prepared in May, 1918, to
+join with their Allies and Associates in making
+a joint public declaration in strong and unmistakable
+language in favour of the creation
+of a united and independent Southern Slav
+State and in recognising the Czecho-Slovaks
+as an Allied and belligerent nation, the result
+would undoubtedly have precipitated the
+collapse of Austria in the early part of the
+summer of 1918.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_41">[41]</span></p>
+
+<p>Instead of seizing the opportunity for this
+united and strong pronouncement which
+presented itself at a meeting of the Prime
+Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy,
+held at Versailles, on June 3, 1918, the following
+declarations were made:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>(1) The creation of a united and independent
+Polish State with free access
+to the sea constitutes one of the conditions
+of a solid and just peace and of
+the rule of right in Europe.</p>
+
+<p>(2) The Allied Governments have noted
+with pleasure the declaration made by
+the Secretary of State of the United
+States Government (in referring to the
+resolutions of the Rome Congress of
+Austro-Hungarian nationalities), and
+desire to associate themselves in an
+expression of earnest sympathy for the
+nationalistic aspirations towards freedom
+of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo
+(Southern)-Slav peoples.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The regrettable weakness of the second
+declaration, which followed very closely the
+wording of Mr. Lansing’s earlier announcement
+on behalf of the United States Government,
+was entirely due to the opposition of
+Baron Sonnino (Italian Foreign Minister),<span class="pagenum" id="Page_42">[42]</span>
+who rejected the stronger declarations prepared
+by Mr. Balfour and the French Foreign
+Minister, M. Pichon. It was a retrogressive
+step by Italy from the position she had taken
+at the Rome Congress, at which her Prime
+Minister had expressly associated himself
+with the terms of the Italo-Southern Slav
+agreement that recognised the “unity and
+independence of the Jugo-Slav nation as a
+vital Italian interest.” In regard to the
+Czecho-Slovaks, the British, French, and
+Italian Governments had already recognised
+the Czecho-Slovak Army, under the Bohemian
+National Council, as an Allied force.</p>
+
+<p>Towards the end of June, Mr. Lansing made
+considerable advance with a definite statement
+that the United States aimed at the
+complete liberation of all Slav peoples from
+Austro-German domination.</p>
+
+<p>While Lord Northcliffe and his associates
+were striving hard in London to retrieve the
+opportunities thus wasted, the propaganda
+organisation in Italy was making remarkable
+progress despite the vacillations of the politicians.
+Undoubtedly the reactionary attitude
+of Baron Sonnino at Versailles influenced
+adversely the response of the Southern Slav
+troops in the Austrian ranks to the appeals
+made by the propaganda leaflets. Nevertheless,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_43">[43]</span>
+there was a considerable amount of
+desertion from the Austro-Hungarian Army.
+Among the deserters were numbers of junior
+officers, not professional soldiers, but men who
+in private life were lawyers, merchants, and
+so on. These men were all led to come over
+by the prospect of liberation which the propaganda
+held out to them. Men of other ranks
+were induced to desert, either in order to
+join relatives among their co-nationals fighting
+in the Italian Army, of whom news had
+reached them through the propaganda agency,
+or else by the more elementary considerations
+of food, comfort, and safety. It was
+noticeable that nearly all the deserters
+brought with them copies of the leaflets
+distributed by the Allied Commission.</p>
+
+<p>That the propaganda had seriously alarmed
+the Austro-Hungarian authorities was made
+evident by reference to it in Army Orders and
+in the Austrian and German Press, which
+even reproduced some of the literary efforts,
+and vilified Lord Northcliffe in their most
+fervent manner. It even affected the minor
+tactics of the Austro-Hungarian Army, for
+it necessitated the detachment of machine-gun
+sections to deal with attempts at desertion
+<i>en masse</i> during the Piave offensive,
+which was eventually launched by the Austrians<span class="pagenum" id="Page_44">[44]</span>
+at the end of June. There was at
+least one authenticated account of a mutiny
+among Czech troops being suppressed by
+Germans and Magyars during that offensive.
+Desertions of single men or small parties were
+frequent before and during the action, and
+one case is known of a whole unit having
+come over. This was a company composed
+entirely of Jugo-Slavs. The Company Commander
+(Jugo-Slav and strongly Nationalist),
+on going his rounds a couple of hours before
+the attack began, gathered from his men’s
+conversation that they had no intention of
+fighting. He was able to bring his whole
+company over.</p>
+
+<p>The delay of the offensive, mainly on
+account of Allied propaganda, proved to be
+very important, because, when it came the
+Piave rose behind the Austrian army and
+converted the attack into something like a
+disaster. There is reason to believe that
+many ammunition dumps behind the enemy
+lines were blown up by the Czechs. A
+rumour was spread in the Press that the
+Southern Slavs had been fighting desperately
+against Italy, but this was officially denied.
+The divisions in question were a mixture of
+Germans, Magyars, Poles, and Ruthenes. It
+appeared that the Southern Slav divisions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_45">[45]</span>
+had been divided up and mixed with “reliable”
+troops, which showed that the
+Austrians were afraid of them. The prisoners
+taken, as a rule, expressed willingness
+to volunteer at once. Dalmatian prisoners
+showed great enthusiasm for Jugo-Slavia and
+the Allies.</p>
+
+<p>After the Piave battle, members of the
+Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission were
+received and thanked by the Italian Commander-in-Chief.
+General Diaz said that
+the victory was due in considerable measure
+to their efforts.</p>
+
+<p>In August the Inter-Allied Conference on
+Enemy Propaganda, convoked by Lord
+Northcliffe, met at Crewe House. In regard
+to propaganda against Austria-Hungary,
+the Committee formed to consider questions
+of policy found itself in complete agreement
+with the scheme of policy sanctioned by the
+British Government for purposes of Propaganda,
+and amplified by the decisions of the
+British, French, and Italian Governments
+at the time of, or in connection with, the
+Rome Congress of Oppressed Austro-Hungarian
+Nationalities. It recognised that such
+extensions of policy, while springing from
+considerations of Allied principles, had, in
+part, corresponded to the real demands of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_46">[46]</span>
+propaganda situation, which, in their turn,
+had sprung from the exigencies of the
+military situation and, in particular, from
+the necessity of utilising the established
+principles of the alliance for the purpose of
+impeding or hampering the Austro-Hungarian
+offensive against Italy. Subsequent acts and
+declarations on the part of Allied Governments
+and of the Government of the United
+States made it clear that the joint policy
+of the Allies was tending increasingly towards
+the constructive liberation of the subject
+Austro-Hungarian races. The main task
+of the Committee in relation to propaganda
+in Austria-Hungary seemed, therefore, to be
+one of unifying for propaganda purposes
+these various acts and declarations, and of
+preparing, if possible, the way for a joint
+Allied declaration that might complete and
+render more effective the work of Allied
+propaganda both in the interior of Austria-Hungary
+and among Austro-Hungarian
+troops at the front. The Committee resolved
+to suggest that the Italian Government take
+the initiative in promoting a joint and unanimous
+public declaration that all the Allies
+regard the establishment of a free and united
+Jugo-Slav State, embracing Serbs, Croats, and
+Slovenes, as one of the conditions of a just<span class="pagenum" id="Page_47">[47]</span>
+and lasting peace, and of the rule of right in
+Europe. Such a declaration was actually
+made by the Italian Government, but so
+tardily that its propaganda effect was reduced
+to a minimum.</p>
+
+<p>Reports from the British Commissioner at
+Padua chronicled the uninterrupted continuance
+of the preparation and distribution
+of leaflets. The work was so developed that a
+distributing capacity of almost a million
+leaflets a day was obtained. Proof of the
+value of the work was afforded by the arrival
+of deserters, belonging to the subject races,
+in the Italian lines bringing with them the
+manifestoes and saying, “I have come because
+you invited me.” A special leaflet
+was prepared in London, with the co-operation
+of a member of the Southern Slav
+Committee, for distribution by aeroplane
+at various points on the Dalmatian coast,
+where Southern Slav insurgents were ascertained
+to be gathered in considerable numbers.
+A detailed description, compiled from official
+sources, of the overwhelming character of
+American war preparations (which the enemy
+was constantly belittling) was telegraphed
+to Padua for translation into Austro-Hungarian
+languages, and for distribution in
+leaflet form among Austro-Hungarian troops.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_48">[48]</span></p>
+
+<p>Progress was even made among the Magyars
+who had fought with remarkable ferocity
+on the Montello. The agrarian question
+that had troubled Hungary for some time
+was used for propaganda purposes and many
+Magyar desertions ensued. The constant
+efforts exerted an ever-increasing and cumulative
+influence on the enemy. The collapse
+of Bulgaria opened a new front for operations
+against Austria-Hungary and a Propaganda
+Commission under Lieutenant-Colonel Granville
+Baker was quickly organised on the lines
+of the Padua Commission and dispatched to
+Salonika. Operations were promptly started,
+but it soon became evident that the end
+was near. As the Allied armies on the
+Western fronts advanced, news of their progress
+and of Bulgaria’s defection was continually
+and promptly sent over the Austrian
+lines. There is no doubt that this contributed
+to the increased amount of desertion
+and disorder among the Austrian forces,
+culminating in the <i>débâcle</i> produced by the
+final Allied attack in October, which brought
+down the military and political organisations
+of the Dual Monarchy.</p>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_49">[49]</span>
+Crewe House had every reason to be proud
+of the success of its work against Austria-Hungary.
+The conception of the whole
+propaganda campaign—its policy, its scope,
+its application—was due to Lord Northcliffe
+and the co-directors of the Austrian Section of
+his department, Mr. Wickham Steed and Dr.
+Seton-Watson. The results fully vindicated
+every basic principle of their propaganda
+strategy. There were difficulties to be overcome
+at every turn, of which political and
+personal ambitions abroad were not the
+least. To keep the work on the straight
+metals of uninterrupted progress necessitated
+unremitting vigilance and ceaseless consultation
+with the numerous interests concerned.
+The result was the greatest victory
+achieved by war propaganda—the culmination
+of a constructive campaign, which,
+could it have been extended to its logical
+conclusions, would have achieved a just
+and lasting peace, liberating millions of our
+fellow-men from a tyrannous yoke to the
+enjoyment of that political freedom which is
+the inalienable right of civilised mankind.</p>
+
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p032a" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p032a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">MR. H. WICKHAM STEED.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND
+ONE OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION.<br>
+<i>Photo: Russell, London.</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p032d" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p032d.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">DR. R. W. SETON-WATSON.<br>
+CO-DIRECTOR OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SECTION OF CREWE HOUSE.</figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p064a" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p064a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">MR. H. G. WELLS.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE,
+AND FIRST DIRECTOR OF GERMAN SECTION.<br>
+<i>“Daily Mirror” Photograph.</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_50">[50]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IV">CHAPTER IV<br>
+<span class="fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="sub">Early British neglect of propaganda—War Office establishes
+a department—Lord Northcliffe takes office—Mr. H. G. Wells’s
+and Mr. Hamilton Fyfe’s work—The final “intensive” campaign—Ways
+and means.</p>
+
+
+
+<p>The successful launch of the “propaganda
+offensive” against Austria-Hungary raised
+high hopes for the success of the corresponding
+campaign against the Germans on the
+Western Front. These hopes were shared
+by the Prime Minister, who wrote to Lord
+Northcliffe on May 16, 1918:—“It seems to
+me that you have organised admirable work
+in your Austrian propaganda.... I trust
+that you will soon turn your attention
+towards German propaganda along the
+French and British Fronts. I feel sure that
+much can be done to disintegrate the <i>moral</i>
+of the German army along the same lines as
+we appear to have adopted with great success
+in the Austro-Hungarian army.”</p>
+
+<p>For the first eighteen months of the war all<span class="pagenum" id="Page_51">[51]</span>
+propaganda had been sadly neglected by the
+British Government. Few realised its value,
+and officially it was regarded as an unimportant
+“side-line.” That it might be a weapon of
+warfare, equal in effect to several army
+corps, would at that time have been ridiculed.
+Money for such purposes was grudgingly
+spent, while the whole-hearted endeavours
+of a few enthusiasts were disparaged as the
+exuberances of harmless “cranks.”</p>
+
+<p>In October, 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel (now
+Major-General) Swinton, who was then acting
+as “Eye-Witness” with the British Army,
+prepared a propaganda leaflet, a reproduction
+of which appears in this book. To
+enable him to produce it, Lord Northcliffe lent
+the aid of his Paris organisation, and a large
+number of copies were printed and distributed
+by aeroplane among the German troops.
+But the Army chiefs at that time did not
+show any enthusiasm for the innovation, and
+Colonel Swinton was unable to proceed with
+the project.</p>
+
+<p>Propaganda against the enemy was, during
+a long period, almost a single-handed campaign
+by Mr. S. A. Guest. He struggled on,
+despite official discouragement or lack of
+encouragement, undeterred by all the vicissitudes
+through which British propaganda<span class="pagenum" id="Page_52">[52]</span>
+passed. Indeed, the early direction of
+British propaganda was like an epidemic; it
+occasionally took strange forms and occurred
+in unexpected places. Mr. Guest’s work was
+the institution and maintenance of those
+agencies by which propagandist literature
+was produced and smuggled into Germany
+and Austria-Hungary.</p>
+
+<p>Within the War Office, there were some
+in favour of propagandist activity, but for
+a long time they were in a minority. Early
+in 1916, Major-General (now Lieutenant-General)
+Sir George Macdonogh, K.C.M.G.,
+C.B., returned from France to become Director
+of Military Intelligence, and mainly owing
+to his efforts and those of Brigadier-General
+G. K. Cockerill, C.B. (then Director of
+Special Intelligence), a propaganda branch
+of the Military Intelligence Department of
+the War Office was established. From small
+beginnings, the activities of this branch grew.</p>
+
+<p>It was in the spring of 1916 that a sub-section
+of this branch began the preparation
+of leaflets in German for distribution among
+enemy troops. One use of the leaflets was
+to disprove the false beliefs spread among
+German soldiers that the British and French
+treated their prisoners with great severity.
+To counteract this, reproductions of letters<span class="pagenum" id="Page_53">[53]</span>
+actually written by German prisoners of war,
+photographs and descriptions of prisoners
+and their camps, and similar material, were
+prepared and distributed. As the political
+and social discontent in Germany increased
+it was thought useful that the German soldiers
+should be provided with more evidence of
+the internal conditions in their own country
+than their officers would allow them to have,
+and leaflets prepared from German sources,
+as, for instance, from suppressed editions of
+German pamphlets and newspapers, were
+scattered on the lines and rest billets.</p>
+
+<p>It then undertook the publication of
+an excellent weekly news-sheet, entitled
+<i>Le Courrier de l’Air</i>, containing news in
+French for circulation among the French
+and Belgian inhabitants of occupied districts.
+This newspaper, save for one short break,
+was regularly distributed by air until November,
+1918, and naturally was greatly
+valued by those who otherwise would only
+have received “news” from German sources.</p>
+
+<p>During 1917 reports obtained by the
+examination of prisoners and information
+derived from more secret sources showed that
+the propaganda campaign was achieving
+useful results, and the Directorate of Military
+Intelligence, in co-operation with the G.H.Q.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_54">[54]</span>
+in France, made arrangements for the work
+to be extended, until by the spring of 1918
+about a million leaflets monthly were being
+issued.</p>
+
+<p>The task of distribution of propaganda
+literature by air would have been simpler but
+for an extraordinary military decision. When
+this work was started by the military authorities
+the leaflets were dropped from aeroplanes.
+This method had the widest limits, and, at
+the same time, was the best means of carrying
+a large bulk and of distributing with accuracy.
+Perturbed by the success attained, the Germans
+threatened to inflict severe penalties
+upon airmen captured when performing such
+duties, and, on capturing two British airmen,
+followed their threats by action. Instead of
+instituting immediate reprisals, the British
+authorities tamely submitted and gave instructions
+for the discontinuance of the use of
+aeroplanes for the purpose.</p>
+
+<p>In consequence of this weak action, experiments
+had to be undertaken to find a substitute
+for the aeroplane. There were a
+number of possible, although inferior,
+methods. Hand and rifle grenades were
+devised to burst and shower leaflets over a
+limited area among enemy troops. Trench
+mortars would serve a similar purpose. But<span class="pagenum" id="Page_55">[55]</span>
+thanks to the progress of military meteorological
+science during the war and to several
+months’ patient experimenting with various
+devices, it was found possible to utilise
+specially adapted balloons. The Air Inventions
+Committee, the Munitions Inventions
+Department, the Inspectorate of H.M. Stores,
+Woolwich, Army Intelligence officers experienced
+in the use of silk balloons for other
+military purposes, and the manufacturers,
+all assisted the War Office in arriving at a
+result which proved to be effective and as
+nearly as possible “fool-proof.” Designs
+and apparatus were tested in the workshop
+and laboratory, at experimental stations
+near London, and on Salisbury Plain. They
+were taken out to France and tried under the
+actual conditions of war, and gradually each
+difficulty was overcome and each detail
+reduced to its simplest form.</p>
+
+<p>In its standard form in which it was being
+manufactured at the rate of nearly 2,000 a
+week the propaganda balloon was made of
+paper, cut in 10 longitudinal panels, with a
+neck of oiled silk about 12 inches long. The
+circumference was about 20 feet and the
+height, when inflated, over eight feet. The
+absolute capacity was approximately 100
+cubic feet, but the balloons were liberated<span class="pagenum" id="Page_56">[56]</span>
+when not quite taut, containing 90 to 95
+cubic feet of hydrogen. Hydrogen readily
+passes through paper, and the part of the
+experimental work that caused most trouble
+was the discovery of a suitable varnish, or
+“dope,” to make the paper gas-tight. After
+many disappointments, a formula was arrived
+at, the application of which prevented appreciable
+evaporation of the gas for two or three
+hours, and which left a balloon with some
+lifting capacity after thirty-six hours.</p>
+
+<p>The lifting power of a balloon is the
+difference between the weight of the hydrogen
+and the weight of the same bulk of air, <i>less</i>
+the weight of the balloon itself. The weight
+of the paper balloon was just over one
+pound; the available lifting power varied
+with the degree of tautness to which the
+balloon was filled, the height of the barometer
+and the temperature, but on the average, at
+ground level, the balloon as inflated would
+just support five and a half pounds. After a
+good deal of experiment the load of propaganda
+and releasing apparatus was fixed at
+four pounds and a few ounces, this allowing
+from 500 to 1,000 leaflets, according to their
+size, to be carried by each balloon, the
+balance of lifting power being sufficient to
+take the balloon sharply into the air to a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_57">[57]</span>
+height of five or six thousand feet. As a
+balloon rises the pressure of the air decreases
+and the contained hydrogen expands. In
+the earlier experiments the neck of the
+balloon was tied after inflation, and, to
+allow for expansion, the balloon was filled
+only to a little over two-thirds of its capacity.
+This was unsatisfactory; it reduced the load
+of propaganda and led to many failures from
+bursting and to great uncertainty as to
+where the load would fall. It was found
+more satisfactory to inflate the balloon
+nearly to its full capacity and to liberate
+it with the neck open, or with a large slit
+cut at the base of the neck, to allow the
+gas to escape as it expanded. At a height
+of, on the average, from 4,000 to 6,000 feet
+the escape of gas had reduced the free lift
+to a negative quantity, and the balloon would
+begin to drop slowly, but for the liberation of
+ballast.</p>
+
+<p>After several ingenious mechanical devices
+had been tested, a method of releasing
+leaflets by the burning of a fuse was adopted.
+A suitable length of prepared cotton wick,
+similar to that used in flint pipe-lighters,
+and burning evenly at the rate of five minutes
+to the inch, was securely threaded to a wire
+by which it was attached to the neck of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_58">[58]</span>
+balloon. Several inches of the upper end
+were left free, and the load of leaflets was
+strung in small packets by cotton threads
+along the length of the fuse. As soon as a
+balloon was inflated and the loaded release
+attached, the free end of the fuse was
+cut to the required length, so as to burn
+for five, ten, or so many minutes, before the
+first packet was reached, the cut end was
+lighted, usually from the pipe or cigarette
+the soldier was smoking, and the balloon
+sent off on its journey. The release of each
+packet acted as a discharge of ballast, and
+the balloon, although continually losing gas,
+kept in the air until the end of its course.
+The arrangement used most frequently was
+designed for liberating the balloons a few
+miles behind the front lines and for distributing
+the leaflets from the enemy lines to
+a few miles behind them. The total length of
+fuse was twelve inches, giving an hour’s run.
+The first six inches were left free to be cut
+before lighting according to the position of
+the station and the strength of the wind; the
+load of propaganda was arranged over the
+second half-hour at intervals of two and a
+half minutes. Much longer fuses, with the
+load distributed at greater intervals, were
+used for longer runs. Experiment showed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_59">[59]</span>
+that the lateral scattering of the leaflets,
+dropped from a height of 4,000 feet and
+upwards, was considerable. The length of
+the track varied with the strength of the wind.</p>
+
+<p>The unit for distribution consisted of two
+motor lorries, which took the men, the
+cylinders of hydrogen, and the propaganda
+loaded on releases to a sheltered position
+selected in the morning by the officer in
+charge after consultation with the meteorological
+experts. The vans were drawn up
+end to end, separated by a distance of about
+ten feet, and a curtain of canvas was then
+stretched on the windward side between the
+vans, thus forming a three-sided chamber.
+The balloon was laid on the ground, rapidly
+filled, the release attached and lighted, and
+the balloon liberated, the whole operation
+taking only a few minutes.</p>
+
+<p>The load of the balloons was chosen according
+to the direction of the wind. If it was
+blowing towards Belgium, copies of <i>Le
+Courrier de l’Air</i> were attached; if towards
+Germany, propaganda leaflets for enemy
+troops. The experimental improvement of
+the “dope” with which the paper was treated
+in order to prevent loss of gas by diffusion,
+and the manufacture of balloons of double the
+standard capacity, had placed runs of upwards<span class="pagenum" id="Page_60">[60]</span>
+of 150 miles well within the capacity of the
+method before the Armistice suspended operations,
+but the bulk of the propaganda was
+distributed over an area of from 10 to 50
+miles behind the enemy lines. Fortunately,
+during the late summer and autumn of 1918
+the wind was blowing almost consistently
+favourable for their dispatch.</p>
+
+<p>When Lord Northcliffe took office in
+February, 1918, Austria-Hungary was the
+most urgent field for his operations, as has
+been explained. While Crewe House was
+concentrating upon that work he desired the
+War Office to continue on his behalf the
+admirable and assiduous work carried on
+since 1916. Early in May, 1918, Mr. H. G.
+Wells accepted Lord Northcliffe’s invitation
+to direct the preparation of propaganda
+literature against Germany, with the co-operation
+of Dr. J. W. Headlam-Morley.
+The first need was felt to be the definition
+of a policy to be followed against Germany,
+in order to prevent dissipation of energy
+and diversity of treatment. It was obvious
+that this propaganda policy must be in
+accord with the general policy of the Allies.
+In some points it followed the declared
+aims of the Allies; in others, it preceded the
+general policy as a pathmaker and pacemaker.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_61">[61]</span>
+Mr. Wells undertook to prepare a
+memorandum on the position of Germany at
+that time from the point of view of propaganda.
+This was submitted by Mr. Wells
+to the Enemy Propaganda Committee
+and fully discussed. A preface was prepared
+and upon the two statements was
+based a letter to the Secretary of State
+for Foreign Affairs, as in the case of the
+propaganda policy against Austria-Hungary,
+asking for the assent of the British Government
+to the policy therein contained.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. Wells’s memorandum was of the
+highest interest as a contemporary study of
+Germany, by a master of psychology, at that
+juncture when Germany was making her
+great (and, fortunately, her final) bid for
+world-mastery. The document possesses no
+little historical value; much that was prophetic
+has been forged into history by the
+rapid march of events; and the non-fulfilment
+of much of what has not attained to its
+consummation is due to lack of political
+wisdom in the chancelleries. Following is
+the text of preface and memorandum:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p><i>Preface.</i></p>
+
+<p>“Propaganda in Germany, as in other
+enemy countries, must obviously be based<span class="pagenum" id="Page_62">[62]</span>
+upon a clear Allied policy. Hitherto Allied
+policy and Allied war aims have been defined
+too loosely to be comprehensible to the
+Germans.</p>
+
+<p>“The real war aim of the Allies is not only
+to beat the enemy, but to establish a world
+peace that shall preclude the resumption of
+war. Successful propaganda in Germany
+presupposes the clear definition of the kind
+of world-settlement which the Allies are
+determined to secure and the place of Germany
+in it.</p>
+
+<p>“The points to be brought home to the
+Germans are:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“1. <i>The determination of the Allies to
+continue the war until Germany accepts
+the Allied peace settlement.</i></p>
+
+<p>“2. <i>The existing alliance as a Fighting
+League of Free Nations will be deepened
+and extended, and the military, naval,
+financial and economic resources of its
+members will be pooled until</i>—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“(<i>a</i>) <i>Its military purpose is achieved,
+and</i></p>
+
+<p>“(<i>b</i>) <i>Peace is established on lasting
+foundations.</i></p>
+</div></div></div>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“German minds are particularly susceptible
+to systematic statements. They are<span class="pagenum" id="Page_63">[63]</span>
+accustomed to discuss and understand co-ordinate
+projects. The ideas represented
+by the phrase ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ and ‘Mittel-Europa’
+have been fully explained to them
+and now form the bases of German political
+thought. Other projects, represented by
+‘Berlin-Teheran’ and ‘Berlin-Tokyo’ are
+becoming familiar to them. Against these
+ideas the Allies have not yet set up any
+comprehensive and comprehensible scheme
+of world organisation. There is no Allied
+counterpart of Naumann’s ‘Mittel-Europa’
+which the neutral and the German Press
+could discuss as a practical proposition.
+This counterpart should be created without
+delay by competent Allied writers. It would
+form an effective basis for propaganda, and
+would work automatically.</p>
+
+<p>“It follows that one of the first requisites
+is to study and to lay down the lines of a
+practical League of Free Nations. The
+present alliance must be taken as the nucleus
+of any such League. Its control of raw
+materials, of shipping, and its power to
+exclude for an indefinite period enemy or
+even neutral peoples until they subscribe
+to and give pledges of their acceptance of its
+principles should be emphasised. It should
+be pointed out that nothing stands between<span class="pagenum" id="Page_64">[64]</span>
+enemy peoples and a lasting peace except
+the predatory designs of their ruling dynasties
+and military and economic castes; that
+the design of the Allies is not to crush any
+people, but to assure the freedom of all on
+a basis of self-determination to be exercised
+under definite guarantees of justice and fair
+play; that, unless enemy peoples accept
+the Allied conception of a world peace
+settlement, it will be impossible for them to
+repair the havoc of the present war, to
+avert utter financial ruin, and to save themselves
+from prolonged misery; and that the
+longer the struggle lasts the deeper will
+become the hatred of everything German in
+the non-German world, and the heavier the
+social and economic handicap under which
+the enemy peoples will labour, even after
+their admission into a League of Nations.</p>
+
+<p>“The primary war aim of the Allies thus
+becomes the changing of Germany, not
+only in the interest of the Allied League, but
+in that of the German people itself. Without
+the honest co-operation of Germany,
+disarmament on a large scale would be impossible,
+and, without disarmament, social
+and economic reconstruction would be impracticable.
+Germany has, therefore, to
+choose between her own permanent ruin by
+adhering to her present system of government
+and policy and the prospect of economic
+and political redemption by overthrowing her
+militarist system so as to be able to join
+honestly in the Allied scheme of world
+organisation.”</p>
+</div>
+
+
+<p class="cl"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_65">[65]</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p>
+<i>Memorandum.</i><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“It has become manifest that for the
+purposes of an efficient pro-Ally propaganda
+in neutral and enemy countries a clear and
+full statement of the war aims of the Allies is
+vitally necessary. What is wanted is something
+in the nature of an authoritative text
+to which propagandists may refer with confidence
+and which can be made the standard
+of their activities. It is not sufficient to
+recount the sins of Germany and to assert
+that the defeat of Germany is the Allied war
+aim. What all the world desires to know is
+what is to happen <i>after</i> the war. The real
+war aim of a belligerent, it is more and more
+understood, is not merely victory, but a
+peace of a certain character which that
+belligerent desires shall arise out of that
+victory. What, therefore, is the peace sought
+by the Allies?</p>
+
+<p>“It would be superfluous even to summarise
+here the primary case of the Allies,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_66">[66]</span>
+that the war is on their part a war to resist
+the military aggression of Germany, assisted
+by the landowning Magyars of Hungary,
+the Turks, and the King of Bulgaria, upon the
+rest of mankind. It is a war against belligerence,
+against aggressive war, and the
+preparation for aggressive war. Such it
+was in its beginning, and such it remains.
+But it would be idle to pretend that the ideas
+of the Governments and peoples allied against
+Germany have not developed very greatly
+during the years of the war. There has been
+a deepening realisation of the danger to
+mankind of existing political divisions and
+separations, a great experience in the suffering,
+destruction, and waste of war; a quickening
+of consciences against conquests, annexations,
+and subjugations; and a general
+clearing up of ideas that have hitherto stood
+in the way of an organised world peace.
+While German Imperialism, to judge by the
+utterances of its accredited heads, and by the
+behaviour of Germany in the temporarily
+disorganised States on her Eastern Front, is
+still as truculent, aggressive, and treacherous
+as ever, the mind of her antagonists has
+learnt and has matured. There has arisen
+in the great world outside the inner lives of
+the Central Powers a will that grows to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_67">[67]</span>
+gigantic proportions, that altogether overshadows
+the boasted <i>will to power</i> of the
+German junker and exploiter, <i>the will to a
+world peace</i>. It is like the will of an experienced
+man set against the will of an obstinate
+and selfish youth. The war aims of the anti-German
+Allies take more and more definitely
+the form of a world of States leagued together
+to maintain a common law, to submit their
+mutual differences to a conclusive tribunal,
+to protect weak communities, to restrain and
+suppress war threats and war preparations
+throughout the earth.</p>
+
+<p>“Steadfastly the great peoples of the world
+outside the shadow of German Imperial
+domination have been working their way
+to unanimity, while the ruling intelligences
+of Germany have been scheming for the base
+advantages of conquest; while they have
+been undermining, confusing, and demoralising
+the mentality of Russia, crushing down
+the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian
+Imperialism, and threatening and cajoling
+neutrals there has been a wide, free movement
+in the minds of their antagonists towards the
+restraint and wisdom of a greater and nobler
+phase in human affairs. The thought of the
+world crystallises now about a phrase, the
+phrase ‘The League of Free Nations.’ The<span class="pagenum" id="Page_68">[68]</span>
+war aims of the Allies become more and
+more explicitly associated with the spirit
+and implications of that.</p>
+
+<p>“Like all such phrases, ‘The League of
+Free Nations’ is subject to a great variety of
+detailed interpretation, but its broad intentions
+can now be stated without much risk of
+dissent. The ideal would, of course, include
+all the nations of the earth, including a
+Germany purged of her military aggressiveness;
+it involves some sort of <span class="smcap">International
+Congress</span> that can revise, codify,
+amend and extend international law, a
+supreme Court of Law in which States may
+sue and be sued, and whose decision the
+League will be pledged to enforce, and the
+supervision, limitation, and use of armaments
+under the direction of the international
+congress. It is also felt very widely that
+such a congress must set a restraint upon
+competitive and unsanctioned ‘expansionist’
+movements into unsettled and disordered
+regions, must act as the guardian of feeble
+races and communities, and must be empowered
+to make conclusive decisions upon
+questions of transport, tariffs, access to raw
+material, migration, and international intercourse
+generally. The constitution of this
+congress remains indefinite; it is the crucial<span class="pagenum" id="Page_69">[69]</span>
+matter upon which the best thought of the
+world is working at the present time. But
+given the prospect of a suitable congress
+there can be little dispute that the great
+Imperial Powers among the Allies are now
+prepared for great and generous limitations
+of their sovereignty in the matter of armaments,
+of tropical possessions and of subject
+peoples, in the common interest of mankind.
+The spectacle of German Imperialism, boastful,
+selfish, narrow, and altogether hateful,
+in its terrible blood-dance through Europe,
+has been an object-lesson to humanity against
+excesses of national vanity and national
+egotism and against Imperial pride. Among
+the Allies, the two chief Imperial Powers,
+measured by the extent of territory they
+control, are Britain and France, and each of
+these is more completely prepared to-day
+than ever it has been before to consider its
+imperial possessions as a trust for their
+inhabitants and for mankind, and its position
+in the more fertile and less settled regions of
+the world as that of a mandatory and trustee.
+These admissions involve a plain prospect
+and promise of the ultimate release and liberation
+of all the peoples in these great and
+variegated Empires to complete world-citizenship.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_70">[70]</span></p>
+
+<p>“But in using the phrase ‘The League of
+Nations,’ it may be well to dispel certain
+misconceptions that have arisen through the
+experimental preparation by more or less
+irresponsible persons and societies of elaborate
+schemes and constitutions of such a league.
+Proposals have been printed and published,
+for example, of a Court of World Conciliation,
+in which each sovereign State will be represented
+by one member—Montenegro, for
+example, by one, and the British Empire
+by one—and other proposals have been
+mooted of a Congress of the League of
+Nations, in which such States as Hayti,
+Abyssinia, and the like will be represented
+by one or two representatives, and France
+and Great Britain by five or six. All such
+projects should be put out of mind when the
+phrase ‘League of Free Nations’ is used by
+responsible speakers for the Allied Powers.
+Certain most obvious considerations have
+evidently been overlooked by the framers of
+such proposals. It will, for example, be
+a manifest disadvantage to the smaller Powers
+to be at all over-represented upon the
+Congress of any such League; it may
+even be desirable that certain of them should
+not have a <i>voting</i> representative at all, for
+this reason, that a great Power still cherishing<span class="pagenum" id="Page_71">[71]</span>
+an aggressive spirit would certainly attempt,
+as the beginning of its aggression, to compel
+adjacent small Powers to send representatives
+practically chosen by itself. The coarse fact
+of the case in regard to an immediate world
+peace is this, that only five or six great Powers
+possess sufficient economic resources to make
+war under modern conditions at the present
+time, namely, the United States of America,
+Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and,
+doubtfully, Austria-Hungary. Italy suffers
+under the disadvantage that she has no coal
+supply. These five or six Powers we may
+say, therefore, permit war and can prevent it.
+They are at present necessarily the custodians
+of the peace of the world, and it is mere
+pedantry not to admit that this gives them a
+practical claim to preponderance in the opening
+Congress of the World League. It may
+be pointed out that a small State with a
+voice in the discussions, but no vote in the
+decisions of the League, would logically be
+excused from the liability to assist in enforcing
+those decisions.</p>
+
+<p>“But this question of the constitution of
+a world Congress is not to be solved by
+making a coarse classification of States into
+large and war-capable Powers, and small
+and weak Powers. Take the case of Italy,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_72">[72]</span>
+for example: though she is almost incapable
+of sustaining a war against the world by
+herself because of her weakness in the matter
+of coal, she can as an ally be at once of
+enormous importance. Take the case of
+Spain again, a very similar case. And whatever
+the war ability of Latin-America may
+be to-day, there can be no question that this
+great constellation of States must count very
+heavily in the framing of the world of to-morrow.
+Then, again, we have to consider
+the vast future possibilities of the Chinese
+Republic, with coal, steel, and a magnificent
+industrial population, and the probable reconstruction
+of Eastern Europe and a renascence
+of Russia which may give the world a loose-knit
+but collectively-important Slavonic confederation.
+While an isolated small Power
+within the orbit of attraction of a large
+Power, a State of 5,000,000 people or less,
+must always remain a difficult problem in
+the world representation, it is clear that
+something like an adequate representation of
+small and weak Powers becomes possible so
+soon as they develop a disposition towards
+aggregation, for the purposes of world politics,
+into associations with States racially, linguistically,
+and historically akin to them. The
+trend of Allied opinion is to place not Peru<span class="pagenum" id="Page_73">[73]</span>
+or Ukrainia, nor Norway, nor Finland on a
+level with the United States of America or
+the British Empire at the League of Nations
+Congress, but to prepare the way for adequate
+representation through a preliminary Latin-American
+or a Slavonic or a Scandinavian
+Confederation, which could speak with a
+common idea at the World Congress.</p>
+
+<p>“It should be manifest that there is one
+Power whose splendid achievement in this
+war, and whose particular needs, justify her
+over-representation (as measured by material
+wealth, and millions of population) upon the
+Congress of the League, and that is France.
+It is open to question whether Italy should
+not also be disproportionately over-represented,
+seeing that she will not have, as
+Spain will have, the moral reinforcement of
+kindred nations over seas. And with regard
+to the British Empire, seeing that there
+exists no real Imperial legislature, it is
+open to consideration whether Canada, South
+Africa, and Australasia should come into the
+Council as separate nationalities. The Asiatic
+and African possessions of Britain and France,
+Belgium and Italy, possessions, that is,
+which have no self-government, might possibly
+for a time be represented by members
+appointed by the governing power in each<span class="pagenum" id="Page_74">[74]</span>
+case. These are merely suggestions here,
+indications of a disposition of mind, but they
+are suggestions upon which it is necessary for
+the Allied Powers to decide as speedily as
+possible. The effective working out of this
+problem of the League of Nations Congress by
+the Allies without undue delay is as vital a
+part of the Allied policy as the effective conduct
+of the war.</p>
+
+<p>“It has to be recognised that the institution
+of a League of Nations precludes any
+annexations or any military interference with
+any peoples whatever, without a mandate
+from the Congress of the League. The
+League must directly or indirectly become
+the guardian of all unsettled regions and
+order must be kept and development promoted
+by it in such derelict regions as
+Mesopotamia and Armenia, for example,
+have now become. In these latter instances
+it is open to consideration whether the League
+should operate through some single power
+acting as a mandatory of the League, or else
+by international forces under the control of
+the League as a whole. Theoretically the
+latter course is to be preferred, but there
+are enormous practical advantages in many
+cases to be urged for the former. The Allies
+have indeed had a considerable experience<span class="pagenum" id="Page_75">[75]</span>
+during the war of joint controls and joint
+expeditions; there has been a great education
+in internationalism since August, 1914;
+but nevertheless the end of the war is likely
+to come long before any real international
+forces have been evolved. It is, however,
+towards the ultimate use of international
+forces in such cases that the joint policy of
+the Allies is plainly and openly directed.</p>
+
+<p>“The bringing of the League into practical
+politics profoundly affects the question of
+territorial adjustment after the war. The
+Allies are bound in honour to follow the will
+of France in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine,
+and the rectification of the Italian frontier
+and the bringing of the bulk of the Italian-speaking
+population, now under Austrian
+dominion, into one ring-fence with Italy,
+also seem a necessary part of a world pacification.
+It is, however, of far less importance
+in the war aims of the Allies that this and that
+particular scrap of territory should change
+hands from the control of one group of combatants
+to that of the other, than that the
+present practical ascendency of German Imperialism
+over the resources of the Polish,
+Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Jugo-Slav, Finnish,
+and Roumanian peoples should cease.
+The war aim of the Allies in Eastern Europe<span class="pagenum" id="Page_76">[76]</span>
+is to create in the place of the present Austro-Hungarian
+Empire a larger synthesis of
+associated States, something in the nature of
+an ‘East Central European League,’ within
+the League of Nations, a confederation that
+might possibly reach from Poland to the
+Black and Adriatic Seas, and have also access
+to, if not a port upon, the Baltic at Danzig.
+The Allies are necessarily obliged to wait
+upon the development of affairs in Russia,
+but the hopes and efforts of the Allies are
+towards a reconciliation of at least Great
+Russia, Siberia, and Ukrainia into a workable
+association within the League. It is premature
+to speculate upon the grouping of
+Finland at the present time. Relieved of the
+feverish and impossible ambitions the political
+weaknesses of these peoples have stimulated,
+a free and united Germany could then become
+one of the predominant partners in the World
+League of Free Nations. The Allies do not
+propose an unconditional return of the former
+African possessions of Germany, but they
+contemplate an over-ruling international
+<i>régime</i> in Africa between the Sahara and the
+Zambesi, restraining armament, reorganising
+native education, and giving absolute equality
+of trade to all the nations in the League.
+Such an international <i>régime</i> under the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_77">[77]</span>
+League may not be incompatible with the
+retention of national flags in the former
+‘possessions’ of the leagued Powers.</p>
+
+<p>“Exact territorial definition does not
+appear to the Allies to be of nearly such
+importance as the establishment of a common
+system of disarmament and a common effort
+to restore the ravages of the war. The full
+effect of the war is still not realised by the
+mass of the belligerent peoples, more especially
+in America and Western Europe,
+where life is still fairly comfortable. There
+has already been a destruction not merely of
+the political, but of the social order over
+great areas of the world, especially in Eastern
+Europe, and it is doubtful whether any peace
+can restore these disorganised areas to anything
+like their former productivity for many
+years. A universal shortage not merely of
+man-power, but of transport and machinery
+available for the purposes of peace cannot be
+avoided. It is doubtful, moreover, if social
+discipline in the ports of the British Empire
+and America will be strong enough to restrain
+an organised resistance to the use of German
+shipping after the war for any purpose and
+to the use of Allied shipping for the transport
+of goods to and from Germany on the part of
+Allied and neutral seamen and transport<span class="pagenum" id="Page_78">[78]</span>
+workers indignant at the U-boat campaign;
+moreover, there is a world-wide cry for a
+vindictive trade after the war against Germany,
+and for organised boycotts that may
+further restrict the process of economic world
+recovery. It is doubtful if the menace of
+these ‘revenge’ movements and the difficulty
+of controlling them in democratic States is
+properly appreciated in Germany. The militarist
+Government of Germany, fighting now
+for bare existence, is concealing from its
+people this world-wide disposition to boycott
+German trade and industry at any cost to the
+boycotting populations, and buoying them
+up with preposterous hopes of ‘business as
+usual’ as soon as peace is made. The fact
+has to be faced that while the present
+German Government remains no such economic
+resumption is possible. The ‘War after
+the War’ possibility has to be added to the
+economic destruction in Russia, Belgium, and
+elsewhere in any estimate of the situation
+after the war.</p>
+
+<p>“The plain prospect of material disorganisation
+thus opened should alone suffice to
+establish the absolute necessity for peace
+now of such a nature as will permit a world-wide
+concentration upon reconstruction, in
+good faith and without any complications of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_79">[79]</span>
+enmity and hostility. But in addition to the
+material destruction and dislocation, and
+to the ‘hatred’ disorganisation already noted,
+the financial transactions of the last few
+years have created a monetary inflation which,
+<i>without the concerted action of all the Powers</i>,
+may mean a collapse of world credit. Add
+now the plain necessity for continued armament
+if a real League of Nations is not
+attained. Without any exaggeration the
+prospect of the nations facing these economic
+difficulties in an atmosphere of continuing
+hostility, intrigue, and conflict, under a continuing
+weight of armaments, and with a
+continuing distrust, is a hopeless one. The
+consequences stare us in the face; Russia
+is only the first instance of what must happen
+generally. The alternative to a real League
+of Nations is the steady descent of our
+civilisation towards a condition of political
+and social fragmentation such as the world
+has not seen since the fall of the Roman
+Empire. The honest co-operation of Germany
+in the League of Nations, in disarmament,
+and in world reconstruction is, therefore,
+fundamentally necessary. There is now no
+other rational policy. And since it is impossible
+to hope for any such help or co-operation
+from the Germany of the Belgian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_80">[80]</span>
+outrage, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the betrayal
+of Ukrainia, <span class="allsmcap">THE CHANGING OF GERMANY</span>
+becomes a primary war aim, <i>the</i> primary war
+aim for the Allies. How Germany is to be
+changed is a complex question. The word
+<i>Revolution</i> is, perhaps, to be deprecated.
+We do not, for instance, desire a Bolshevik
+breakdown in Germany, which would make
+her economically useless to mankind. We
+look, therefore, not so much to the German
+peasant and labourer as to the ordinary,
+fairly well-educated mediocre German for
+co-operation in the reinstatement of civilisation.
+Change there <i>must</i> be in Germany;
+in the spirit in which the Government is
+conducted, in the persons who exercise the
+control, and in the relative influence of
+different classes in the country. The sharpest
+distinction, therefore, has to be drawn between
+Germany and its present Government
+in all our propaganda and public utterances;
+and a constant appeal has to be made by the
+statesmen of the Alliance, and by a frank and
+open propaganda through the Germans of the
+United States of America and of Switzerland,
+through neutral countries and by every possible
+means, from Germany Junker to Germany
+sober. We may be inclined to believe
+that every German is something of a Junker,
+we have to remember he is also potentially
+a reasonable man.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_81">[81]</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“And meanwhile, the Allies must continue
+with haste and diligence to fight and defeat
+Junker Germany, which cannot possibly
+conquer but which may nevertheless succeed
+in ruining the world. They must fight the
+German armies upon the fronts, they must
+fight an unregenerate Germany economically
+and politically, and they must bring home
+to the German reason and conscience at
+home, by an intensive air war and by propaganda
+alike, the real impossibility of these
+conceptions of national pride and aggressiveness
+in which the German population has
+been bred.”</p>
+
+<p>These documents were used as a basis for
+the policy of Crewe House, which was summarised
+into seven parts in Lord Northcliffe’s
+subsequent letter to Mr. Balfour,
+extracts from which follow:—</p>
+
+<p>“I wish to submit to you the following
+general scheme of policy as a basis for
+British—and eventually Allied—propaganda
+in Germany. Propaganda, as an active form
+of policy, must be in harmony with the
+settled war aims of the Allies:—</p>
+
+<p>“1. The object of all propaganda is to
+weaken the will of the enemy to war and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_82">[82]</span>
+victory. For this purpose it is necessary to
+put in the forefront the ultimate object of
+the Allies, and the use which they would
+make of victory, for this is the matter with
+which the Germans are most concerned.
+We cannot, of course, expect that the war
+aims of the Allies should be determined solely
+by the effect which they may have upon the
+German people, but, on the other hand, it is
+clearly undesirable to put forward for propaganda
+purposes objects which it is not really
+intended to secure. It appears to me, however,
+that our war aims, as I understand
+them, are such as could, if presented in a
+suitable form, be made to do something to
+strengthen whatever ‘opposition’ exists in
+Germany.</p>
+
+<p>“2. From such information as is available
+as to the internal condition of Germany two
+points emerge which are of the greatest
+importance for immediate purposes:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“(<i>a</i>) There is much evidence that the
+German people as a whole desire above
+all a cessation of the war. They are
+suffering more than their opponents, and
+war weariness has advanced further with
+them than it has with us. They acquiesce
+in the continuance of the present
+offensive chiefly because they are assured<span class="pagenum" id="Page_83">[83]</span>
+by their leaders that this is the only way
+in which a speedy peace can be achieved.
+It is, therefore, necessary to impress upon
+them that they are face to face with a
+determined and immutable will on the
+part of Allied nations to continue the
+war at whatever cost, notwithstanding
+German military successes, and that for
+this reason military success is not the
+way to bring about the peace they desire.
+It must be made plain that we are prepared
+to continue a ruthless policy of
+commercial blockade.</p>
+
+<p>“(<i>b</i>) Side by side with this we have
+another motive of the highest importance.
+One of the chief instruments of
+the German Government is the belief
+which they foster that any peace that
+the Allies would, if they had their way,
+impose would mean the internal ruin of
+Germany, and this again would mean that
+each individual German family would
+find itself without work, without money,
+and without food. As against this it is
+necessary to impress on the German
+nation that these results might happen,
+but that they can be avoided. They will
+happen if the Government of Germany
+continues to carry out its openly avowed<span class="pagenum" id="Page_84">[84]</span>
+design of subjecting the other free nations
+of Europe to its domination. They can
+be avoided if the German nation will
+resign these projects of domination and
+consent to accept the Allied scheme for
+a new organisation of the world.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>“These two points (<i>a</i>) and (<i>b</i>) must be
+kept in close connection; the first provides
+the element of fear, the second provides the
+element of hope.</p>
+
+<p>“3. The first point presents no difficulty
+to us; we can go ahead in full confidence
+that we are in harmony with both the nation
+and the Government. As to the second, on
+the other hand, I must ask for your guidance
+and support. Hitherto Allied policy and
+war aims have been defined too loosely to be
+comprehensible to the Germans, and there
+have been apparent inconsistencies, of which
+they have quickly taken advantage. Moreover,
+it has been possible for German writers
+to misrepresent our war aims as dictated by
+Imperialistic ambitions, similar in kind to
+those by which they are themselves actuated,
+and involving ‘annexations and indemnities,’
+such as have in the past been too often the
+result of victory in war. I take it that the
+real object of the Allies is, after defeating
+Germany, to establish such a world peace<span class="pagenum" id="Page_85">[85]</span>
+as shall, within the limits of human foresight,
+preclude another conflagration. It
+seems necessary, therefore, that the separate
+aims which would, of course, be maintained,
+such as the restoration of Belgium, the
+liberation of Alsace-Lorraine, the establishment
+of civilised government in Mesopotamia
+and Palestine, should be put forward in their
+proper places as individual but essential
+points in the general scheme for the settlement
+of world politics on a basis which would
+go far to remove the causes of future wars.</p>
+
+<p>“4. Any such scheme would, in effect,
+amount to the constitution of a ‘League of
+Free Nations.’ It is, I presume, generally
+understood that eventually Germany would
+be invited to take her place in such a League
+on condition that she accepted the principles
+of its foundation. Her admission to the
+League would be in itself her guarantee
+against the establishment of, <i>e.g.</i>, a hostile
+monopoly of raw materials. Our terms of
+peace, therefore, can be represented as the
+conditions on which Germany should be
+invited to take her part in such a League.
+In order to secure the economic benefits she
+would have to accept the political conditions.
+If this is so, the task of propaganda is
+greatly lightened, for it would be easier to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_86">[86]</span>
+put our aims in such a form as to make
+them to some extent acceptable to the
+moderate elements in Germany than if they
+were put forward merely as terms to be
+imposed on a defeated enemy.</p>
+
+<p>“5. It is, however, obvious that propaganda
+conducted on these lines will be of
+little use unless it is supported by public
+and authoritative statements from the Allied
+Governments. Otherwise, it would be represented
+that the real object is to beguile
+Germany into accepting a peace of renunciation,
+and that, as soon as this object
+has been achieved, these schemes will be
+repudiated, and a weakened Germany will
+find herself face to face with an Anglo-Saxon
+combination which aims at dominating the
+world, and keeping Germany permanently
+in a position of political inferiority.</p>
+
+<p>“6. No such statement has yet been made,
+so far as I am aware, by the British Government
+or by the Allies. What, therefore, I
+should venture to ask is for such support
+from you as will enable us to carry on our
+work with the full consciousness that we
+have behind us the support of His Majesty’s
+Government. If it were known that the
+Government itself, in conjunction with the
+Allies, was investigating the problem with<span class="pagenum" id="Page_87">[87]</span>
+a view to speedy action, this knowledge
+would give a great and needed incentive to
+the more popular work which we should be
+doing.</p>
+
+<p>“7. I am well aware of the very great
+practical difficulties which are bound to arise
+so soon as an attempt is made to give formal
+expression to the general idea of a ‘League of
+Free Nations.’ But for the purposes of our
+work, it is of the most urgent importance
+that some statement of this kind should be
+put forward at the earliest possible date.
+Such a statement would in effect be an offer
+to the Germans of peace on stated conditions.
+If it were accepted, Germany would be able
+shortly after the conclusion of the war to
+come into the new society of nations; if it
+were refused, the war would have to continue.
+But it should also be made clear to the
+German people that the privilege of admission
+to this society would inevitably be
+postponed for a period proportional to the
+length of time that they continued the
+war.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In answer to an inquiry, Lord Northcliffe
+wrote a supplementary letter, dealing with
+propaganda policy as to the German colonies.
+The following is an extract:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot"><p>“I have no settled views as to the future<span class="pagenum" id="Page_88">[88]</span>
+of what were the German colonies, beyond a
+very strong conviction that they must never
+again be allowed to fall, for any military or
+naval purpose, under German control. But,
+broadly, my feeling is this: The whole
+situation of the Allies in regard to Germany
+is governed by the fact that Germany is
+responsible for the war. The Allies are,
+therefore, entitled to demand from her restitution,
+reparation, and guarantees as preliminary
+conditions of any peace settlement.
+The territories which the Allies have taken
+from Germany in the course of their legitimate
+self-defence do not come into the same
+category as the territories seized by Germany,
+and the allies of Germany, in the course of
+their predatory aggression. To contemplate
+barter or exchange between one set of territories
+and the other would be to assimilate,
+by implication, the moral situation of the
+Allies to that of Germany. Therefore, however
+closely we may study the question, or
+rather the questions—for there are several—of
+the German colonies, we ought to make it
+clear that the ultimate settlement of those
+questions will be reserved for treatment by
+the Allies as a fighting league of free nations,
+or by the general League of Nations should
+the behaviour of Germany entitle her to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_89">[89]</span>
+admission to it in time to take part in any
+scheme of world reorganisation.”</p></div>
+
+<p>The policy laid down in these letters was
+approved by the Government as a basis for
+propaganda, and Mr. Wells was able to
+develop his work in many directions.</p>
+
+<p>He kept in close touch with the different
+organisations at home and abroad which were
+endeavouring to promote the League of
+Nations. In conjunction with Mr. Steed,
+Mr. Wells assisted in the drawing up of a restatement
+of the aims of the League of Nations
+Society in Great Britain and in the formation
+of a new association for the study of the
+problems arising out of the League proposal.
+This movement was always kept prominently
+before the German mind, for it was a threat
+of future isolation, with its resultant economic
+disabilities, and yet was an invitation to
+national repentance.</p>
+
+<p>A second line of action was designed to
+appeal to the German workers. For this
+purpose Mr. Wells arranged, among other
+things, for the preparation and issue of a
+short and compact summary of the British
+Labour War Aims, which was subsequently
+used with much effectiveness not only in
+Germany but also in Austria.</p>
+
+<p>Economic conditions, both during and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_90">[90]</span>
+after the war, were made by Mr. Wells and
+his co-workers the subject of systematic and
+scientific study with the object of undertaking
+a propaganda of economic discouragement
+and persuasion in Germany. Signs were not
+lacking of the existence of misgivings among
+the commercial communities in that country
+at the prospect of loss of commerce, ships,
+and colonies in the case of defeat. Here was
+an opportunity to bring home to the Germans
+the conviction that the longer they persisted
+in continuing the war, so would their loss and
+sufferings increase.</p>
+
+<p>Unfortunately, in July, Mr. Wells found
+himself unable to continue the direction of
+the German Section and, at his request, the
+Enemy Propaganda Committee accepted his
+resignation of that office, although he retained
+his membership of the Committee.
+Mr. Hamilton Fyfe was appointed to succeed
+him and continued in the important post
+until the end. Mr. Fyfe developed the work
+along the lines already laid down.</p>
+
+<p>From the time of Mr. Wells’s appointment,
+Crewe House and the enemy propaganda
+section of the Military Intelligence Department
+maintained close touch with each other,
+but in July, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote to
+the Secretary of State for War expressing his<span class="pagenum" id="Page_91">[91]</span>
+considered view that it would be advisable
+that British propaganda agencies against the
+enemy should, both for technical reasons and
+in order to preclude possible differences of
+statement in propaganda literature, as far as
+possible be closely co-ordinated. While gladly
+recognising the most friendly relations which
+had been cultivated between his department
+and the enemy propaganda branch of the
+War Office, through Major the Earl of Kerry,
+Lord Northcliffe thought that the time had
+come for the whole of the work of production
+to be centralised at Crewe House. This did
+not alter the arrangements for distribution
+through military channels which were always
+admirably organised and carried out by the
+military authorities. And, as a matter of
+fact, a large proportion of the literature,
+apart from the “priority” leaflets referred to
+hereinafter, was produced by the War Office
+on Lord Northcliffe’s behalf. Lord Northcliffe
+asked for urgent consideration of the
+matter, in view of the necessity for the intensification
+and extension of propaganda on the
+Western Front. On Lord Milner’s agreeing to
+this reorganisation, it was arranged that the
+services of Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell, who,
+well-known in civil life as a distinguished
+man of science, had been the officer immediately<span class="pagenum" id="Page_92">[92]</span>
+in charge of this enemy propaganda
+branch, should be transferred to Crewe House.
+He was a valuable acquisition, and his
+experience, knowledge, and counsel were of
+great practical service. Captain Chalmers
+Mitchell also acted as liaison officer with the
+War Office (in succession to Lord Kerry) and
+with the Royal Air Force, and, in conjunction
+with Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, co-ordinated production
+and distribution.</p>
+
+<p>This centralisation soon bore fruit. One
+of the earliest developments aimed at abolishing
+the delays which might have caused the
+contents of leaflets to become stale owing to
+the time which elapsed between their composition
+and their distribution. This defect
+was obviated by dividing the leaflets into two
+classes, namely, “priority” leaflets for those
+of a news character and “stock” leaflets
+with matter of a less urgent nature.</p>
+
+<p>A time-table was prepared for the “priority”
+leaflets in which the time allotted for the
+different processes of composition, translation,
+printing, transport to France, and distribution,
+was cut down to an absolute
+minimum. With the willing aid of Messrs.
+Harrison and Son, the printers, and of
+Messrs. Gamage, who undertook the work of
+attaching the leaflets to the “releases,” it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_93">[93]</span>
+was found possible to arrange for these news
+bulletins to be in the hands of the Germans
+within approximately forty-eight hours of
+their being written. Three times a week a
+consignment of not fewer than 100,000 leaflets
+of this character was rushed over to
+France for prompt dispatch to the Germans.
+This “speeding-up” became a factor of the
+highest importance when military events
+moved so rapidly in the closing months of
+the war.</p>
+
+<p>In June and July the number of leaflets
+dropped over the German lines and behind
+them totalled 1,689,457 and 2,172,794 respectively.
+During August an average of
+over 100,000 a day was attained, the actual
+number of leaflets issued by the Enemy
+Propaganda Department in that month being
+3,958,116, in September 3,715,000, and in
+October 5,360,000, while in the first ten days
+of November, before the Armistice put an
+end to such activities, 1,400,000 were sent
+out. The Germans were greatly disturbed.
+One of their writers described the flood of
+leaflets picturesquely as “English poison
+raining down from God’s clear sky.”
+Marshal von Hindenburg, in his autobiography,
+“Out of My Life” (Cassell &amp; Co.),
+admits that this propaganda intensified the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_94">[94]</span>
+process of German demoralisation. “This
+was a new weapon,” he continues, “or rather
+a weapon which had never been employed on
+such a scale and so ruthlessly in the past.”</p>
+
+<p>The leaflets were written in simple language,
+and aimed at letting the Germans
+know the truth which was being concealed
+from them by their leaders. They gave
+information as to the progress of the war
+in all theatres, and showed at a glance, by
+means of shaded maps, the territory gained
+by the Associated Nations. Great stress
+was laid upon the large number of troops
+arriving daily from the United States. While,
+by the use of diagrams, the steadily progressive
+increase of the American forces
+was strikingly illustrated, German losses
+and the consequent futility of making further
+sacrifices in a losing cause were strongly
+emphasised. We have again the testimony
+of Hindenburg’s autobiography as to the
+effect on the German troops: “Ill-humour
+and disappointment that the war seemed
+to have no end, in spite of all our victories,
+had” (he writes) “ruined the character of
+many of our brave men. Dangers and hardships
+in the field, battle and turmoil, on
+top of which came the complaints from home
+about many real and some imaginary privations!<span class="pagenum" id="Page_95">[95]</span>
+All this gradually had a demoralising
+effect, especially as no end seemed to be in
+sight. In the shower of pamphlets which was
+scattered by enemy airmen our adversaries
+said and wrote that they did not think so
+badly of us; that we must only be reasonable
+and perhaps here and there renounce something
+we had conquered. Then everything
+would be soon right again and we could live
+together in peace, in perpetual international
+peace. As regards peace within our own
+borders, new men and new Governments
+would see to that. What a blessing peace
+would be after all the fighting! There was,
+therefore, no point in continuing the struggle.
+Such was the purport of what our men read
+and said. The soldier thought it could not
+be all enemy lies, allowed it to poison his
+mind, and proceeded to poison the minds of
+others.”</p>
+
+<p>Despite such compliments as to the effectiveness
+of the distribution, this branch of
+the work provided the thorn in the Crewe
+House flesh. Distribution by aeroplane was
+the ideal method, and the decision to discontinue
+the use of aeroplanes for the purpose
+was a serious handicap to Lord Northcliffe’s
+work. Balloon distribution was dependent
+upon favourable winds, and could only be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_96">[96]</span>
+performed in one direction, whereas aeroplanes
+could cover a much more extensive
+area at great speed. On several occasions
+Lord Northcliffe pressed for the resumption
+of their use. Lord Milner replied to the first
+request, early in May, to the effect that the
+British authorities were disputing the German
+contention that the distribution of literature
+from aeroplanes was contrary to the laws of
+war, and had given notice that they intended
+to institute prompt reprisals if they received
+information that any British airmen were
+undergoing punishment for similar action.
+Although distribution by aeroplane on the
+Western Front had been temporarily suspended,
+they held themselves free at any
+moment to resume it, and stated that meanwhile
+literature would be distributed by
+other and, as they thought, more effective
+means. <i>Yet it was admitted that there had been
+no stoppage of the use of aeroplanes for the
+purpose on the Italian Front.</i></p>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_97">[97]</span></p>
+
+<p>A month later, Lord Northcliffe again
+wrote, asking if anything had been done to
+cancel the temporary suspension of the
+distribution of leaflets by aeroplane on the
+Western Front. He and his co-workers felt
+strongly that propaganda work against Germany
+was being severely handicapped by disuse
+of this method of distribution, especially
+as, according to his information, the Germans
+themselves continued to drop leaflets over
+the British lines from aeroplanes. He
+could not believe that distribution by balloon
+was as accurate or as effective. It was a
+curious commentary on the British attitude
+that the French continued to use aeroplanes
+for the purpose on the Western Front.</p>
+
+<p>Many weeks passed before the War Cabinet
+agreed to the resumption of the use of aeroplanes,
+and even then the Air Ministry raised
+further objection. Finally, all obstacles were
+overcome, but not until the end of October.
+In one week 3,000,000 leaflets were prepared
+for the interior of Germany, and the distribution
+of these was begun just before the
+Armistice.</p>
+
+<p>With the turn of the tide of military events
+in the summer of 1918, propaganda had assumed
+greater importance than ever. Military
+defeat rendered the German soldier more
+amenable to propagandist influences, to which
+in victory he could afford to turn a blind
+eye and deaf ear. Moreover, the Allied
+successes seriously disturbed the German
+nation, and as the news was disseminated
+by the various agencies carefully organised
+by Crewe House the spirit of the people<span class="pagenum" id="Page_98">[98]</span>
+became generally depressed. The commercial
+classes exhibited great fear at the threatened
+economic war. Thus the soil became fertilised
+for the reception of propagandist
+views. One obvious but important way of
+spreading such views was by ensuring that
+important speeches of leading British statesmen
+should be adequately and promptly
+reported in enemy countries. Means were
+found of accomplishing this object. When
+occasion arose, publication in neutral newspapers
+of interviews with British public men
+on important subjects was arranged for, and
+these were widely quoted in the enemy
+Press.</p>
+
+<p>The valuable material collected by Mr.
+Wells on British progress in those lines of
+industry in which Germany had excelled
+was used by Mr. Fyfe in many ways. Articles
+on the subject were sent to, and published
+by, German-Swiss papers, which were known
+to be much read in Germany. Pamphlets
+were written in German in tones of serious
+warning and distributed through channels
+prepared by the perseverance and ingenuity
+of Mr. S. A. Guest. By these means, also, a
+large number of descriptive catalogues of an
+exhibition in London of British scientific
+products were introduced into Germany and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_99">[99]</span>
+were snapped up and read with avidity.
+Treatment of these issues was found to
+influence enlightened German opinion more
+than any other kind of propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>From time to time special topics were
+selected. For instance, a series of “London
+Letters” was sent to Swiss and Scandinavian
+papers purporting to be written with a pro-German
+flavour, but containing, under this
+disguise, a true picture of food and other
+conditions in Great Britain. It was gratifying
+to find these reprinted in enemy papers, for
+the German reader was thus led to institute
+mental comparisons with the much worse
+conditions prevalent in Germany. Secret
+means, too, were found to circulate in
+German naval ports, as a deterrent to men
+picked for service in submarines, leaflets (of
+which a reproduction appears in this
+volume) containing a long list of U-boat
+commanders, dead or captured, with description
+of their rank. Particulars so easy
+of verification proved the mastery of the
+British Navy over the U-boat campaigners
+and created great depression in the German
+ports.</p>
+
+<p>In addition to the “priority” leaflets
+containing news of Allied successes, illustrated
+with shaded maps and diagrams, a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_100">[100]</span>
+“trench newspaper” was prepared in a style
+which exactly resembled a German publication.
+The propaganda pill was coated to
+make it attractive. The newspaper was
+homely in appearance—its title-decoration
+included a head of the Kaiser—and it
+provided excellent reading matter which
+would appeal to the German soldier, while
+revealing facts hitherto carefully hidden from
+him. As many as from 250,000 to 500,000
+copies of each weekly issue were distributed.
+Some leaflets, on the other hand, were in
+religious vein, for there is a deep religious
+strain in the German character. These
+leaflets pointed out that their military defeats
+were a just retribution for the crimes of their
+Government. One was a little sermon on
+the text “Be sure your sin will find you
+out.”</p>
+
+<p>With knowledge of the dwindling of their
+own reserves, the Germans became increasingly
+anxious about the supply of American
+troops, artillery, and munitions. No opportunity
+was lost by Crewe House of keeping
+the enemy armies and civil populations fully
+aware of the wonderful extent of the American
+effort. A series of leaflets was prepared which
+gave in succinct and vigorous form the latest
+details about that effort, both in the field<span class="pagenum" id="Page_101">[101]</span>
+and at home in the factory, the shipyard and
+the farm.</p>
+
+<p>British propagandist work against Germany
+was both positive and negative.
+Its aim was to give the German people
+something to hope for in an early peace
+and much to fear from the prolongation of
+the war—that is, to make it clear to them
+that the only way to escape complete ruin
+would be to break with the system that
+brought the war upon Europe, and to qualify
+for admission eventually into the League of
+Nations on the Allied terms. In addition to
+these very necessary educative efforts, the
+enemy armies were supplied with constant
+and <i>invariably truthful</i> information about the
+actual military position. Its veracity was a
+more essential factor to its success than its
+quantity. The news withheld by the German
+authorities was supplied by us. Hence the
+cries of alarm from Marshal von Hindenburg
+and General von Hutier, to which fuller
+reference is made in the next chapter.</p>
+
+<p>In the “intensive propaganda” of the last
+few weeks of hostilities the Hohenzollern
+Government was denounced. It was pointed
+out that all Germany’s sufferings and tribulations
+were due to its “Old Gang,” of which a
+clean sweep would have to be made before<span class="pagenum" id="Page_102">[102]</span>
+the world would make friends or do business
+with Germans again. Chapter and verse
+were given to prove that the German Government
+could not be trusted, and that it was
+a great obstacle to peace. Attention, too,
+was drawn to the changes then taking place
+in Germany, to the cries raised for the abdication
+of the Emperor, and to the growing
+demand for the punishment of all who had
+brought Germany to her disastrous situation.
+German soldiers were urged to consider
+whether it was worth while to risk being
+killed when they had nothing left to fight for,
+and it was suggested that their best course
+was to make off to their homes and ensure
+the safety of their families. The consequences
+to Germans of the continuation of the war
+were plainly indicated. Maps and diagrams
+showed at a glance how Allied air raids over
+Germany had increased in number, how
+larger and larger Allied air squadrons and
+more powerful bombs were being provided
+and how easily it would be possible to attack
+Berlin, Hamburg, Hanover, and other places
+which had previously escaped. A map was
+also prepared showing all the steamship
+routes by which food, munitions, and raw
+materials were being brought to Great Britain
+and France, and demonstrating the falsity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_103">[103]</span>
+of the German leaders’ assurance that we
+could be starved into submission.</p>
+
+<p>By the courtesy of the Admiralty and of
+the Ministry of Information, use was regularly
+made of wireless telegraphy as a means of
+disseminating information, combating false
+German statements, and influencing German
+opinion through neutral newspapers and
+public opinion.</p>
+
+<p>Many other agencies for introducing
+propagandist material into enemy countries
+were organised by Mr. Guest, whose work
+demanded extraordinary patience and perseverance.
+He experimented with many
+methods, and, despite the vigilance of the
+Germans, the inflow into Germany increased.
+Some of the methods can never be revealed,
+but it is permissible to hint that, for instance,
+among foreign workmen of a certain nationality
+who went into Germany each morning
+and returned each evening there might be
+some to whom propagandist work was not
+uncongenial. And, of course, all secret
+agents were not necessarily Allies or neutrals.
+Somehow, huge masses of literature were
+posted in Germany to selected addresses
+from which the German postal revenues
+derived no benefit. Easiest of all were
+certain obvious channels left wholly or partially<span class="pagenum" id="Page_104">[104]</span>
+open in most incredible fashion, as, for
+instance, the book trade, which was by no
+means as closely supervised as might have
+been expected. None were more amazed
+at the facility with which such valuable
+propaganda material as Prince Lichnowsky’s
+pamphlet achieved clandestine circulation in
+Germany and Austria than were British
+propagandists. Perhaps, as a gratuitous
+hint to the curious, it may be added that the
+outside covers with titles of works by revered
+German authors did not always correspond
+to the contents of the books, but, oft-times,
+as the poet said, “things are not what
+they seem.”</p>
+
+<p>Personal propaganda among enemy subjects
+resident in neutral countries—and especially
+those unsympathetic to the perverted
+ideals of their respective nations—was tactfully
+pursued. Neutrals in prominent
+positions in any walk of life whose views
+were likely to react on enemy opinion were
+brought within the orbit of salutary personal
+intercourse. Enemy newspaper correspondents
+were carefully “nursed.” No
+avenue of approach into enemy countries
+was considered too insignificant, for each
+had its particular use.</p>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p064c" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p064c.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">MR. HAMILTON FYFE.<br>
+SUCCEEDED MR. H. G. WELLS AS DIRECTOR OF THE
+GERMAN SECTION.<br>
+<i>Photo: Elliott &amp; Fry, Ltd.</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p096a" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p096a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">CAPTAIN CHALMERS MITCHELL.</figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p080a" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p080a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. K. COCKERILL, C.B.<br>
+[DEPUTY-DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, 1918.]<br>
+<i>Photo: Russell, London.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+</div>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_105">[105]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_V">CHAPTER V<br>
+<span class="fs80">TRIBUTES FROM THE ENEMY</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+<p class="sub">Hindenburg’s outburst: German Press Comments: Ludendorff
+on the conduct and effect of British Propaganda against the
+Central Powers.</p>
+
+
+
+<p>The Press of the enemy countries was
+closely watched for references to British
+propaganda in editorial articles or in the
+reports of utterances of political and military
+leaders. During August, 1918, the
+misgivings engendered by the trend of
+events, as revealed by our propaganda,
+found expression in print. Then, as if
+a pent-up stream had at last carried
+away the dam, came a flood of wails
+from many quarters, generals vying with
+editors in hurling imprecations at the British
+Enemy Propaganda Department, with
+blackest vilifications of Lord Northcliffe, and
+in beseeching German troops and people not
+to be affected by the leaflets which had by
+this time found their way into even the
+remotest corner of rural Germany.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_106">[106]</span></p>
+
+<p>These outbursts were symptomatic of the
+fear of defeat which had laid hold of the
+Germans, and were correctly interpreted in
+England as foreshadowing the end which
+came so dramatically in November, 1918. It
+was obvious that even the German Government
+felt it unwise to restrain, by use of the
+censorship, the publication of such damaging
+admissions of the deadliness of British propaganda.
+It was impossible to stop the
+rising tide of truth which was covering
+Germany.</p>
+
+<p>To attempt to quote even a small proportion
+of these unintentional tributes to the
+work of Sir George Macdonogh’s department
+of the War Office and of Crewe House
+would be wearisome. Perhaps the best
+specimen of all came in the form of a manifesto
+from no less a person than Field
+Marshal von Hindenburg, the war idol and
+personification of German militarism. This
+is the text of the remarkable document:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>We are engaged in a hard struggle
+with our enemies. If numerical superiority
+alone guaranteed victory, Germany
+would long since have lain shattered on
+the ground. The enemy knows, however,
+that Germany and her Allies cannot
+be conquered by arms alone. The enemy<span class="pagenum" id="Page_107">[107]</span>
+knows that the spirit which dwells within
+our troops and our people makes us unconquerable.
+Therefore, together with
+the struggle against the German arms,
+he has undertaken a struggle against the
+German spirit; he seeks to poison our
+spirit and believes that German arms
+will also become blunted if the German
+spirit is eaten away.</p>
+
+<p>We should not take this plan of the
+enemy lightly. The enemy conducts his
+campaign against our spirit by various
+means. He bombards our Front, not
+only with a drumfire of artillery, but
+also with a drumfire of printed paper.
+Besides bombs which kill the body, his
+airmen throw down leaflets which are
+intended to kill the soul.</p>
+
+<p>Of these enemy leaflets our field-grey
+men delivered up:</p>
+
+
+<table class="autotable">
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">In May</td>
+<td class="tdr">84,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">In June</td>
+<td class="tdr">120,000</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">In July</td>
+<td class="tdr">300,000</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+
+<p>A gigantic increase! Ten thousand
+poisoned arrows daily in July; 10,000
+times daily the attempt to deprive the
+individual and the whole body of belief
+in the justice of our cause and of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_108">[108]</span>
+strength and confidence for ultimate
+victory! We can reckon, in addition,
+that a great part of the enemy leaflets
+will not have been found by us.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Poisoning the Home Spirit.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>But the enemy is not merely satisfied
+in attacking the spirit of our Front, he
+wishes above all also to poison the spirit
+of our home. He knows what sources
+of strength for the Front rest in the
+home. True, his aeroplanes and balloons
+do not carry these leaflets far into our
+homeland; they lie far from it in the
+lines in which the enemy vainly struggles
+for victory by arms. But the enemy
+hopes that many a field-grey soldier will
+send home the leaflet which has innocently
+fluttered down from the air. At
+home it will pass from hand to hand
+and be discussed at the beer-table, in
+families, in the sewing-room, in factories,
+and in the street. Unsuspectingly many
+thousands consume the poison. For
+thousands the burden the war in any
+case imposes upon them is increased, and
+the will and hope for a victorious issue
+of the war is taken from them. All these
+again write their doubts to the Front,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_109">[109]</span>
+and Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau
+rub their hands.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy attacks the spirit of the
+home in another way besides. The
+silliest rumours, designed to break our
+inner power of resistance, are put into
+circulation. We find them simultaneously
+in Switzerland, in Holland,
+and in Denmark. Thence they spread
+like a wave over the whole of Germany.
+Or they emerge simultaneously, agreeing
+in silly details, in the remotest regions
+of our country—in Silesia, in East
+Prussia, in the Rhineland—and wend
+their way thence over the remainder of
+the home territory. This poison works
+on the men on leave and flows in letters
+to the Front. Again the enemy rubs
+his hands.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy is ingenious. He knows
+how to mix the little powder for everyone.
+He decoys the fighters at the Front.
+One leaflet runs:</p>
+
+<p>“German soldiers! It is a shameful
+lie that the French ill-treat German
+prisoners. We are not brutes; only
+come over to us without fear; here you
+will find a most considerate reception,
+good food, and a peaceful refuge.”</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_110">[110]</span></p>
+
+<p>Ask brave men who have succeeded
+with unspeakable difficulty in escaping
+from the enemy captivity about this.
+Plundered to the utmost in wire compounds,
+roofless, goaded by hunger and
+thirst into treasonable utterances, forced
+by blows and threats of death to betray
+their comrades, spat upon, pelted with
+filth by the French populace while being
+driven to hard labour, that is what the
+paradise that the enemy conjures up
+really looks like.</p>
+
+<p>Reproductions of original letters
+written by prisoners are also thrown
+down, in which these men describe how
+well it goes with them. God be praised,
+there are still also decent and humane
+commandants of prisoners’ camps in
+England and France; but these are the
+exception, and the letters the enemy
+throws down are only of three or four
+different kinds. But he sends these
+multiplied by many thousands of copies.
+The enemy intimidates the faint-hearted
+by saying:</p>
+
+<p>“Your struggle is hopeless; America
+will settle you; your submarines are
+no good; we are building more ships
+than they sink; after the war we shall<span class="pagenum" id="Page_111">[111]</span>
+debar you from getting raw materials,
+then Germany’s industry must starve.
+You will never see your colonies again.”</p>
+
+<p>That is the tone of the leaflets; now
+enticement, now threat.</p>
+
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">German Facts and Fancies.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>What is the real situation? We have
+enforced peace in the East and are
+strong enough to do it in the West, notwithstanding
+the Americans; but we
+must be strong and united; that is what
+the enemy is fighting against with these
+leaflets and rumours. He wishes to
+deprive us of faith and confidence, will
+and force.</p>
+
+<p>Why is the enemy continually seeking
+new allies in the struggle against us?
+Why does he try to press nations still
+neutral into the struggle against us?
+Because in strength we are his equals.</p>
+
+<p>Why does he incite black and other
+coloured men against German soldiers?
+Because his will is to destroy us.</p>
+
+<p>Again, the enemy says another thing:</p>
+
+<p>“You Germans, your form of government
+is wrong. Fight against the
+Hohenzollerns, against capitalism; help<span class="pagenum" id="Page_112">[112]</span>
+us, the Entente, to give you a better
+form of State.”</p>
+
+<p>The enemy knows perfectly what
+strength resides in our State and Empire;
+but that is precisely why he
+combats it. The enemy also seeks to
+tear open old wounds in the German
+body politic. With his leaflets and by
+rumours he attempts to sow division
+and distrust among the Federal States.
+At Lake Constance we confiscated many
+thousands of leaflets conveyed to Bavaria
+and intended to excite anger against the
+North Germans. They wish to destroy
+the German Empire, which for centuries
+was the dream of Germans and which
+our fathers won for us, and to condemn
+Germany to the impotence of the Thirty
+Years’ War.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy also wishes to shake our
+loyalty to our allies. He does not
+know the German way and the word of
+a German man. He himself sacrifices
+his allies; he who is England’s ally
+dies of it.</p>
+</div>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_113">[113]</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Traitors to the Fatherland.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>And finally the enemy sends not the
+least dangerous of his poisoned arrows
+dipped in printers’ ink when he throws
+down the utterances of German men and
+German newspapers. The utterances of
+German newspapers are torn from their
+context. Regarding the utterances of
+Germans which are reproduced, remember
+that at every time there have been
+conscious and unconscious traitors to
+the Fatherland. Most of them reside
+abroad in neutral countries, in order
+not to be obliged to share our struggle
+and our privations, or to be condemned
+by our Judges as guilty of high treason.
+Nor have champions of extreme party
+tendencies any right to claim to speak
+for the generality of the German people.</p>
+
+<p>It is our strength, but also our weakness
+that even in war we allow unrestricted
+utterance to every opinion.
+We still tolerate the reproduction in
+our newspapers of enemy Army reports
+and the speeches of enemy statesmen
+which are weapons of attack directed
+against the spirit of the German Army
+and people. This is a sign of strength,
+because it proves a consciousness of
+might. But it is a weakness because it
+allows the enemy’s poison to find an
+entrance among us.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_114">[114]</span></p>
+
+<p>Therefore, German Army, German
+Homeland, if one of these thrown-out
+pieces of poison in the form of leaflet or
+rumour comes before your eyes and
+ears, remember that its originates with
+the enemy. Remember nothing comes
+from the enemy which is not harmful to
+Germany. Every one must be mindful
+of this, whatever his position or party.
+If you meet anyone whose name and
+origin indeed are German, but who by
+nature stands in the enemy’s camp,
+keep him at a distance, despise him,
+put him publicly in the pillory in order
+that every other true German may
+despise him.</p>
+
+<p>Defend yourself, German Army,
+German Homeland!</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Hindenburg’s fear that only a small part
+of the leaflets was given up was fully justified.
+The numbers which he quotes suggest that
+hundreds of thousands must have been
+carried to their homes by the “field-grey
+men.”</p>
+
+<p>The whole manifesto is an interesting
+study in psychology. Hope had slipped
+away; dismay had ripened into despair
+and despair had sown wild anger and hatred.
+The dissemination of the unwelcome facts<span class="pagenum" id="Page_115">[115]</span>
+of the position caused him to burst out in
+vituperation and so to give a valuable clue
+as to the effect which Allied propaganda was
+producing on the German troops and public.</p>
+
+<p>After such a mighty oracle, it is not
+surprising that others took up the cry. Not
+long after, the following noteworthy message,
+signed by General von Hutier of the Sixth
+German Army, was captured:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>The enemy begins to realise that we
+cannot be crushed by blockade,
+superiority of numbers, or force of arms.
+He is, therefore, trying a last resource.
+While engaging to the utmost of his
+military force he is racking his imagination
+for ruses, trickery, and other underhand
+methods of which he is a past
+master, to induce in the minds of the
+German people a doubt of their invincibility.
+He has founded for this
+purpose a special Ministry (“The Ministry
+for the Destruction of German
+Confidence”), at the head of which he
+has put the most thoroughgoing rascal
+of all the Entente—Lord Northcliffe,
+who has been given billions for use in
+influencing opinion in the interior of
+the country and at the Front by means of
+paid agents, the assassination of Ambassadors,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_116">[116]</span>
+and all the other ways in
+favour with the Entente.</p>
+
+<p>The method of Northcliffe at the
+Front is to distribute through airmen
+a constantly increasing number of leaflets
+and pamphlets; the letters of German
+prisoners are falsified in the most
+outrageous way; tracts and pamphlets
+are concocted, to which the names of
+German poets, writers, and statesmen
+are forged, or which present the appearance
+of having been printed in Germany,
+and bear, for example, the title of the
+Reclam series, when they really come
+from the Northcliffe Press, which is
+working day and night for this same
+purpose. His thought and aim are that
+these forgeries, however obvious they
+may appear to the man who thinks
+twice, may suggest a doubt, even for a
+moment, in the minds of those who do
+not think for themselves, and that their
+confidence in their leaders, in their own
+strength, and in the inexhaustible resources
+of Germany may be shattered.</p>
+
+<p>Fortunately, Northcliffe, the Minister
+for the Destruction of German Confidence,
+forgets that German soldiers
+are neither Negroes nor Hindus, nor<span class="pagenum" id="Page_117">[117]</span>
+illiterate French, English, and Americans,
+incapable of seeing through such machinations.
+Explain these infamous attempts
+to your young and inexperienced comrades,
+and tell them what our mortal
+enemy expects of them, and what is at
+stake. Pick up the leaflets and pamphlets
+and give them to our commanders
+for transmission to the High Command,
+which may be able to make valuable
+deductions from them as to the aims of
+our enemies. You will thus help the
+Command, and you will also help to
+hasten the hour of victory.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The allegation that huge sums of money
+were expended by Lord Northcliffe is comic.
+As will have been seen already, the total cost
+of the operations conducted by Lord Northcliffe
+during his tenure of office was considerably
+less than a one-hundredth part of
+Great Britain’s <i>daily</i> war bill.</p>
+
+<p>German Army orders, which fell into
+Allied hands, showed plainly how widespread
+was the effect produced among the enemy
+troops by the leaflets. Officers and men
+were threatened with severe punishment if
+they neglected to hand the leaflets in immediately.
+On the other hand, bonuses for
+the delivery of unknown specimens of pamphlets,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_118">[118]</span>
+books, leaflets, and pictures were
+offered as follows:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>3 marks (nominally 3<i>s.</i>) for the first
+copy.</p>
+
+<p>30 pfgs. (nominally 4<i>d.</i>) for other
+copies.</p>
+
+<p>5 marks (nominally 5<i>s.</i>) for a book.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>An order issued by Ludendorff showed that
+the influence of the propaganda extended
+beyond the troops to the population of
+Germany. This read:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“There has been an increase in the
+number of complaints received from
+home that men on leave from the front
+create a very unfavourable impression
+by making statements actually bordering
+on high treason and incitement to
+disobedience. Instances such as these
+drag through the mud the honour and
+respect of the individual as well as of
+the whole Army, and have a disastrous
+effect upon the <i>moral</i> of the people at
+home.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>A “high officer at the front” describing,
+in the <i>Kölnische Zeitung</i> of October 31, 1918,
+the demoralisation of the German Army as
+a result of the retreat, wrote:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>What damaged us most of all was
+the paper war carried on by the enemy,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_119">[119]</span>
+who dropped daily among us 100,000
+leaflets, which were extraordinarily well
+distributed and well edited.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>This strikingly confirmed a report received
+by the Foreign Office the previous month
+which stated:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>Leaflets thrown by Allied airmen have
+much more effect now. Instead of being
+thrown away or laughed at, as was
+often the case in the past, they are
+eagerly picked up and read. There is
+no doubt that recent events have
+seriously shaken the <i>moral</i> of the German
+people and Army. One of the returned
+officers mentioned above said that if
+the Entente knew what poison these
+leaflets, etc., were working in the minds
+of the German soldiers they would
+give up lead and bombard with paper
+only in future.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>That neither threats nor bribes was inducing
+the surrender of the leaflets to German
+Headquarters was plainly shown by the
+statements of prisoners captured during the
+last four months of hostilities, and by the
+fact that most of them had British leaflets in
+their possession. Among the subjects which
+seemed to have attracted special attention<span class="pagenum" id="Page_120">[120]</span>
+were the German responsibility for starting
+the war, for the adoption of poison gas
+attacks, and for the bombing of open towns;
+the ineffectiveness of Zeppelin attacks and of
+the U-boats preventing the transport of
+food and troops; the arrival of the American
+armies; the Allied war aims; comparison
+of food conditions in Germany with those in
+Great Britain; and the extracts from German
+Socialist newspapers. Inhabitants of
+the recaptured territory testified to the
+effect of the propaganda on the German
+troops, remarking on the lowering of <i>moral</i>
+and the increasing number of deserters which
+they attributed to it.</p>
+
+<p>Politicians and newspapers were also greatly
+excited, and raised loud cries for the creation
+of an organisation for counter-propaganda.
+Herr F. Stossinger described British propaganda
+in the <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i> as “the
+most complicated and dangerous of all,”
+and commented on its “countless” activities.
+The Minister of War, General von Stein
+was complimentary enough to say “In
+propaganda the enemy is undoubtedly our
+superior.” (Berlin <i>Morgenpost</i>, August 25,
+1918.) Other tributes were:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p><i>Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung</i>: “At
+any rate, the British Propaganda Department<span class="pagenum" id="Page_121">[121]</span>
+has worked hard. Had we
+shown the same activity in our Propaganda
+perhaps many a thing would have
+been different now. But in this, we
+regret to say, we were absolutely unprepared,
+but we hope that by now we
+have learned differently.”</p>
+
+<p><i>Deutsche Tageszeitung</i>: “We Germans
+have a right to be proud of our General
+Staff. We have a feeling that our
+enemies’ General Staff cannot hold a
+candle to it, but we also have the
+feeling that our enemies have a brilliant
+Propaganda General Staff, whereas we
+have none.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Violent and bitter attacks were repeatedly
+made. The revelations of the British propaganda
+created great nervousness, which in
+turn gave rise to all kinds of wild rumours,
+which spread all over Germany. These were
+attributed to Lord Northcliffe’s department.
+Speaking in the Bavarian Lower House of
+Parliament during August, 1918, General
+von Hellingrath, the Bavarian Minister of
+War, said:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“These rumours are nothing but the
+result of the industrious and determined<span class="pagenum" id="Page_122">[122]</span>
+agitation which our enemies carry on in
+the interior through their agents.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Herr von Kupffer, the editor of the Berlin
+<i>Lokal-Anzeiger</i>, referred to them as “a
+carnival of soul-storms, idiotic terror, and
+criminal irresponsibility,” and he continued:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“The main thing is to remember the
+source of such rumours and to bear in
+mind what their object is. Their object
+is to demoralise us and, by so doing,
+turn into realities what otherwise would
+remain merely nightmares. One would
+have to be really blind not to see that
+these things radiate from that organisation
+in England formed to shatter the
+German nervous system by means of
+shameful and impudent lies. Is not
+the figure of Lord Northcliffe, the great
+Propaganda Chief of the English Home
+Army, pilloried in world-history for all
+time?</p>
+
+<p>“Is anybody in doubt as to the
+purpose of this propaganda? Does not
+everybody know that the generalissimo
+of this campaign of mendacity has
+unlimited funds at his disposal in order
+to circulate streams of lies through
+neutral channels with devilish cunning<span class="pagenum" id="Page_123">[123]</span>
+and almost impressive skill? Does not
+everybody realise that the Northcliffe
+Propaganda is too shrewd to work by
+means of mere newspaper tales that
+could easily be disproved, and therefore
+resorts to the much more subtle method
+of carrying unrest, disloyalty, and alarm
+into our country and into the lands of
+our allies by means of verbal communications
+of all sorts? Paid rascals are
+systematically employed for this purpose.
+It is this sort of person who propagates
+these wild stories in Germany and upsets
+our sense of proportion in connection
+with war events. These are the facts.
+Let people bear them in mind before they
+promote the Northcliffe Propaganda by
+repeating every bit of washerwoman’s
+gossip as gospel, even though it be
+without the slightest foundation in fact.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In the Hamburg district matters were
+much the same, for the influential shipping
+journal <i>Hansa</i> printed the following on
+September 14:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“God be thanked! At last we are
+just beginning to recognise what the
+hour of war demands; what is our
+duty as Germans and as citizens. Despondency,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_124">[124]</span>
+discontent, depression, hanging
+heads, grumbling! We meet them
+at every step and turn, but we did not
+know their origin, these growths of
+evil fantasy. We did not understand
+what meant these secret whispers about
+alleged unfavourable news from the
+front, these exaggerated reports, fraught
+with misfortune, which passed so glibly
+from mouth to mouth. One had heard
+this, another that, but always it was
+something bad in regard to our military
+situation. Nothing definite was ever
+mentioned. There were only suggestions,
+which proved to be chimeras as
+soon as ever they could be run to earth.
+They were the birth of ignoble defeatism.
+Yet there they were, invisibly surrounding
+us, disturbing our spiritual balance,
+darkening our temper; like an epidemic,
+like poisonous bacilli, they flew hither
+and thither in all directions through our
+German air.</p>
+
+<p>“Whence came they? Who brought
+them to us? To-day we know. To-day
+we can recognise the origin of this
+depression of German will-power. It
+was the long-advertised publicity offensive
+of the Entente directed against us<span class="pagenum" id="Page_125">[125]</span>
+under England’s lead, and under the
+special direction of that unprincipled,
+unscrupulous rascal, Northcliffe.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In the <i>Kölnische Volkszeitung</i> for September
+11, a letter from the front said:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“Leaflets destined to cause low spirits
+and despair, or to send deserters to the
+enemy, are being showered down in
+thousands in certain places and their
+surroundings. It is this combat, waged
+openly or secretly, which, particularly
+at home, produces low spirits and despair.
+Here you find statements that Hindenburg
+was once regarded as a Divinity,
+but that his laurels are beginning to
+fade, which is quite evident from the
+way the enemy advance daily; that
+our troops have lost courage, whole
+companies are deserting to the enemy,
+and such like things.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In another letter to the same newspaper,
+published on August 20, the writer said:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“Our enemies have recently been
+very busy distributing leaflets from the
+air. I have had two of these leaflets
+in my hands, and it is not to be doubted
+that our enemies are in that, also, our<span class="pagenum" id="Page_126">[126]</span>
+masters, for the pamphlets are so well
+produced that anyone who is not on the
+lookout is very likely to fall a victim to
+them.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>That such Propaganda might have had
+an effect if it had been tried earlier was
+evident from the admissions of war correspondents
+as well as of generals. Herr W.
+Scheurmann wrote in the <i>Norddeutsche Allgemeine
+Zeitung</i> (October 30):</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“We Germans have learnt <i>for the
+first time this autumn</i> that the moral
+resistance of the fighter at the front is
+a power with which the Command must
+reckon, all the more cautiously inasmuch
+as it is difficult to estimate.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>All charges of the mendacity of British
+propaganda were unfounded, for the greatest
+care was unremittingly exercised to tell only
+the truth. One effect of this was to make
+the Germans distrust their official <i>communiqués</i>.
+“We have in our dear Fatherland
+to-day,” wrote the <i>Kölnische Zeitung</i>
+on September 11, “great numbers of
+innocent and ingenuous minds who doubt
+the plain statements of the German Army
+reports, but <i>believe the false reports and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_127">[127]</span>
+omissions of the enemy</i>. To prove constantly
+the contrary to them is a rather thankless
+task, but of which one should never tire.”</p>
+
+<p>It was, indeed, a thankless task to try
+to keep the truth from the whole German
+nation. “Warn your brothers, your sons,
+your husbands, not to believe the enemy’s
+leaflets,” was one of “Ten Commandments
+for German Women,” published by the
+<i>Kölnische Volkszeitung</i> on October 20,
+but it was then too late to maintain the
+lie-system by which the German resistance
+had been stimulated for so long.</p>
+
+<p>Writing in July, 1919, Herr Arnold
+Rechberg said in the <i>Tägliche Rundschau</i>:
+“It cannot be doubted that Lord Northcliffe
+very substantially contributed to England’s
+victory in the world war. His conduct of
+English propaganda during the war will
+some day find its place in history as a performance
+hardly to be surpassed. The
+Northcliffe propaganda during the war correctly
+estimated ... the character and
+intellectual peculiarities of the Germans.”</p>
+
+<p>Praise from an enemy, when there is no
+underlying motive, can usually be accepted
+as sincere. Most of the foregoing quotations
+were primarily warnings and exhortations
+to their own people issued during the war,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_128">[128]</span>
+and compliments to Allied propaganda only
+indirectly.</p>
+
+<p>When, however, hostilities had ceased
+disastrously for Germany and her allies,
+passions of hatred and pride began to give
+place to the cold logic of reason. Ludendorff,
+who, as First Quartermaster-General from
+1916 to the end of the war, was regarded as
+one of the cleverest of Germany’s military
+leaders, sat down to write his “War
+Memories” (Hutchinson and Co., London).
+His reputation entitles him to respect, and
+he has much to say of value regarding
+propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>He learned one important lesson. “Good
+propaganda,” he wrote, “must keep well
+ahead of actual political events. It must
+act as pacemaker to policy and mould
+public opinion without appearing to do so.”
+This was the great basic principle upon which
+was built the success of Lord Northcliffe’s
+department. To try to make propaganda
+shape policy is as fatal as endeavouring to
+conduct propaganda campaigns without
+policy or with conflicting policies. Illuminating
+volumes could be written on failures
+from all these causes. But whoever follows
+the history of the operations conducted from
+Crewe House will find that painstaking study
+was made of the factors governing the
+political, economic, and military position of
+each of the enemy countries concerned
+before action was taken. As <i>The Times</i>
+observed in a leading article (October 31,
+1919) Lord Northcliffe’s work “differed from
+the praiseworthy and painstaking efforts
+that had preceded it mainly by adopting as
+its guiding principle the very maxim which
+Ludendorff lays down. The consideration
+that, without a definite policy in regard to each
+enemy country, propaganda must be at best
+a hand-to-mouth business was, from the first,
+regarded as self-evident by Lord Northcliffe
+and the handful of experts who advised him.”</p>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_129">[129]</span></p>
+
+<p>Ludendorff compared the work of the
+British and German propaganda departments,
+to the great disparagement of the latter.
+Indeed he attributed the moral collapse of
+the German soldier—and consequently the
+military defeat—in part to British propaganda
+and in part to the demoralisation of
+the German home population, which, in
+turn, he ascribed to British propaganda and
+to the feebleness of the German Government
+in counteracting it. Of British propaganda
+he wrote:—</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_130">[130]</span></p><div class="blockquot">
+
+<p><a id="FNanchor_1" href="#Footnote_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a>Lloyd George knew what he was
+doing when, after the close of the war,
+he gave Lord Northcliffe the thanks of
+England for the propaganda he had
+carried out. Lord Northcliffe was a
+master of mass-suggestion. The enemy’s
+propaganda attacked us by transmitting
+reports and print from the neutral States
+on our frontier, especially Holland and
+Switzerland. It assailed us in the same
+way from Austria, and finally in our own
+country by using the air. It did this
+with such method and on such a scale
+that many people were no longer able
+to distinguish their own impressions
+from what the enemy propaganda had
+told them. This propaganda was all
+the more effective in our case as we
+had to rely, not on the numbers, but on
+the quality of our battalions in prosecuting
+the war. The importance of
+numbers in war is incontestable. Without
+soldiers there can be no war. But
+numbers count only according to the
+spirit which animates them. As it is
+in the life of peoples, so it is also on
+the battlefield. We had fought against
+the world, and could continue to do so
+with good conscience so long as we were
+spiritually ready to endure the burden<span class="pagenum" id="Page_131">[131]</span>
+of war. So long as we were this, we
+had hope of victory and refused to bow
+to the enemy’s determination to annihilate
+us. But with the disappearance
+of our moral readiness to fight everything
+changed completely. We no
+longer battled to the last drop of our
+blood. Many Germans were no longer
+willing to die for their country.</p>
+
+<p>The shattering of public confidence
+at home affected our moral readiness to
+fight. The attack on our home front
+and on the spirit of the Army was the
+chief weapon with which the Entente
+intended to conquer us, after it had lost
+all hope of a military victory.</p>
+</div>
+
+<div class="footnote">
+
+<p><a id="Footnote_1" href="#FNanchor_1" class="label">[1]</a> This passage is a translation from the German edition.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+<p>His references to German enemy propaganda
+are generally in terms of disgust. He
+considered it rendered Germany no service.
+“Our political aims and decisions, issued to
+the world as sudden surprises, often seemed
+to be merely brutal and violent. This could
+have been skilfully avoided by broad and
+far-sighted propaganda.... The German
+propaganda was only kept going with difficulty.
+In spite of all our efforts, its achievements,
+in comparison to the magnitude of the
+task, were inadequate. We produced no
+real effect on the enemy peoples.... We<span class="pagenum" id="Page_132">[132]</span>
+also attempted to carry on propaganda on
+the enemy fronts. In the East, the Russians
+were the authors of their own collapse, and
+our work there was of secondary importance.
+In the West, the fronts of our enemies had
+not been made susceptible by the state of
+public opinion in their home countries, and
+the propaganda we gradually introduced had
+no success.... Germany failed in the fight
+against the <i>moral</i> of the enemy peoples.”</p>
+
+<p>Again and again Ludendorff quotes instances
+of the effect of propaganda. For
+example, just before the last German offensive
+of July 15, 1918:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“The Army complained of the enemy
+propaganda. It was the more effective
+because the Army was rendered impressionable
+by the attitude at home....
+The enemy propaganda had seized
+on Prince Lichnowsky’s pamphlet, which,
+in a way that I myself could not explain,
+placed on the German Government the
+responsibility for the outbreak of war.
+And this, though his Majesty and the
+Chancellor again and again asserted
+that the Entente was responsible....</p>
+
+<p>“The Army was literally drenched with
+enemy propaganda publications. Their
+great danger to us was clearly recognised.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_133">[133]</span>
+The Supreme Command offered rewards
+for such as were handed over to us, but
+we could not prevent them from poisoning
+the heart of our soldiers.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>No greater effect could have been desired
+by the British authorities than that described
+by Ludendorff, and such an acknowledgment
+of the results produced gave the highest
+satisfaction.</p>
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p128a" style="max-width: 130.25em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p128a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">A MEDALLION STRUCK BY THE GERMANS IN “DISHONOUR” OF LORD NORTHCLIFFE.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_134">[134]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VI">CHAPTER VI<br>
+<span class="fs80">OPERATIONS AGAINST BULGARIA AND
+OTHER ACTIVITIES</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+<p class="sub">Peculiar difficulties of propaganda against Bulgaria—Educative
+work among prisoners of war.</p>
+
+
+
+<p>Operations against Bulgaria—the other
+objective of Crewe House activities—were
+somewhat dissimilar to those against either
+Austria-Hungary or Germany. There were
+complications due to the general state of
+Balkan affairs and politics, and to the fact
+that technically the United States was not at
+war with Bulgaria. The definition of propaganda
+policy against Bulgaria called for
+most delicate expression, lest any offence
+should be given to Serbia, Roumania, or Greece.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Northcliffe, in submitting to the
+Foreign Office a statement of policy proposed
+for use against Bulgaria, pointed out
+that he and his advisers felt that there was
+need for a definite Allied policy in regard
+to the Jugo-Slav and Roumanian questions.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_135">[135]</span>
+These, in their turn, were dependent upon
+Allied policy in regard to Austria-Hungary.
+On May 25, 1918, Lord Northcliffe wrote
+to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“After careful consideration, and with
+the advice of our most competent authorities
+on Bulgarian and Balkan affairs, I
+beg to submit to you the following
+scheme of Allied policy in regard to
+Balkan countries as the framework
+within which any propaganda in Bulgaria
+should be carried out. I would especially
+direct your attention to the need for a
+Government decision in regard to the
+Southern Slav, Greek, and Roumanian
+questions before any definite proposals
+from Bulgaria are entertained:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“The adoption of a clear and
+comprehensive Balkan policy by the
+British and Allied Governments is an
+essential condition of any propaganda
+in Bulgaria.</p>
+
+<p>“Without such a policy any propaganda
+in Bulgaria would resolve itself
+into competitive bargaining between
+the Allies on the one hand and the
+Austro-Germans on the other.</p>
+
+<p>“This bargaining would tend to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_136">[136]</span>
+estrange and to dishearten the Serbians
+and the Greeks. In attempting
+it the Allies would be, moreover, at a
+disadvantage, inasmuch as Bulgaria
+already occupies, as a member of the
+enemy Alliance, considerably more
+than all the territories that would be
+the subject of the bargaining.</p>
+
+<p>“The aim of Allied policy in the
+Balkans should be a lasting territorial
+and political settlement, framed as
+nearly as possible on lines of ethnography,
+with the object of paving the
+way for a permanent League of the
+Balkan Nations.</p>
+
+<p>“Bulgaria cannot possess all the
+territories ethnographically Bulgarian
+unless she retain at the peace districts
+held by Serbia, Greece, and Roumania
+before the war. Serbia, Greece, and
+Roumania, on the other hand, cannot
+fairly be asked or compelled to
+abandon those districts unless they,
+in their turn, be united with territories
+ethnographically Serbo-Croatian (Jugo-Slav),
+Greek, and Roumanian.</p>
+
+<p>“Allied policy should therefore deliberately
+aim at the solution of the
+Southern Slav, Hellenic, and Roumanian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_137">[137]</span>
+questions in the sense of the
+fullest possible racial unity and independence.</p>
+
+<p>“The chief difficulty in defining the
+just claims of Bulgaria lies in the
+uncertainty as to the proper delimitation
+of Bulgarian Macedonia. A purely
+ethnographical delimitation might involve
+economic and strategical injustice
+to Serbia and Greece, unless it
+were accompanied by due provision,
+internationally guaranteed, for Serbian
+and Greek rights of way. Similarly,
+the retention of ports like Salonika
+and Kavalla by Greece would involve
+hardship to Bulgaria unless adequate
+provision, internationally guaranteed,
+were made for a Bulgarian right of way
+to those ports.</p>
+
+<p>“Should it prove impossible to
+obtain, by persuasion or pressure, the
+assent of Serbia and Greece to the
+retention of ethnographical Macedonia
+by Bulgaria, an autonomous Macedonia
+might be set up, proper provision
+being made for the maintenance
+of order and for the repression of armed
+Serbian and Greek or Bulgarian ‘propaganda’
+by an international force of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_138">[138]</span>
+<i>gendarmerie</i>. One advantage of an
+autonomous Macedonia would be that
+it would meet the wishes of the Macedonian
+Bulgars themselves, who would
+prefer autonomy to annexation outright
+by Bulgaria.</p>
+
+<p>“The Allied policy in the Balkans
+should be made known to the Bulgarians
+by the Allies and by the
+United States. The necessary ethnographical
+delimitation of Bulgarian,
+or of autonomous Macedonian territory
+should be undertaken by a competent
+Allied Commission, possibly under
+the presidency of the United States.
+The announcement of Allied policy
+should be accompanied by an intimation
+that only by accepting it can
+Bulgaria hope to escape economic
+and political ostracism for an indefinite
+period; but that acceptance of the
+Allied policy would, on the contrary,
+carry with it a claim to financial and
+economic support.</p>
+
+<p>“Bulgaria should at the same time
+be told that the Allies would guarantee
+to her the Enos-Midia line as her
+minimum frontier on the east, provided
+that she refrained from further<span class="pagenum" id="Page_139">[139]</span>
+active co-operation with the enemies
+of the Allies. Active co-operation on
+the side of the Allies should be rewarded
+by a frontier yet more favourable
+to her aspirations, <i>e.g.</i> by the line
+Midia-Rodosto. The inclusion of Silistria
+in the future Bulgarian territory
+should likewise be made contingent
+upon the behaviour of Bulgaria before
+the conclusion of peace.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>“May I ask you to give me your views
+on this scheme of policy as early as
+possible?</p>
+
+<p>“I wish to send to Salonika, without
+delay, a competent mission to begin
+propaganda on this, or some similar
+basis, but cannot authorise its departure
+unless the ideas it would propagate have
+the explicit approval of His Majesty’s
+Government.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Mr. Balfour replied on June 6, 1918:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“I have carefully considered your
+letter of May 25, in which you were so
+kind as to furnish me with your ideas
+as to the lines on which we should
+conduct our propaganda in the Balkans.</p>
+
+<p>“I fully agree with the general ideas
+underlying your policy.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_140">[140]</span></p>
+
+<p>“I feel, indeed, that it will be of value
+if our own efforts in this direction, which,
+for obvious reasons, can at present be
+only of the most tentative nature, are
+preceded by discreet and intelligent
+propaganda, such as will not only appeal
+to our enemies but enlighten our friends.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>It was well-known that influential Bulgarians
+realised the meaning of the trend of
+events in the main theatres of war and would
+have welcomed the opening of negotiations
+with the Allies. But it was obviously
+impossible to begin territorial bargaining with
+Bulgarian representatives of any party, because
+Bulgaria already possessed more territory
+than that to which she was ethnographically
+entitled. On the other hand,
+strictly to follow the ethnographic principle
+would raise difficulties to which Lord Northcliffe
+referred in the foregoing letter. As
+it would obviously require long and patient
+negotiations with our Allies to establish a
+just basis, it was deemed to be strongly
+advisable to restrict immediate propaganda
+to telling the Bulgarians the fate which must
+inevitably befall them and that unless they
+made a complete and effective reversal of their
+policy, the Allies would do nothing to save them
+from that fate or to alleviate their position.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_141">[141]</span></p>
+
+<p>Four preliminary conditions were laid
+down as essential to the establishment of
+relations with Bulgaria:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“(<i>a</i>) The expulsion of King Ferdinand
+and his family;</p>
+
+<p>“(<i>b</i>) A complete rupture with Germany;</p>
+
+<p>“(<i>c</i>) Establishment of a democratic
+Government;</p>
+
+<p>“(<i>d</i>) The orientation of Bulgarian policy
+in the direction of a Balkan Confederation
+under the <i>ægis</i> of the
+Allied Powers and of the United
+States.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>These lines were suggested as the suitable
+basis for a reply to secret overtures which
+had been made by Bulgarian emissaries
+claiming to speak for the new Premier,
+M. Malinof.</p>
+
+<p>In due course, Crewe House was authorised
+to convey an informal message to the
+effect “that until Bulgaria had given proof
+that a complete reversal of her policy had
+actually been brought about, we are not
+prepared to entertain any suggestions from
+her.” The Bulgarian agents were duly
+notified in this sense, and it is to be presumed
+that so firm a message was not without its
+effect upon the Malinof Government.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile propaganda material in this<span class="pagenum" id="Page_142">[142]</span>
+sense was prepared, reinforced by pamphlets,
+such as, for example, that by Lichnowsky, and
+another giving full particulars of American
+preparations. These were translated into
+Bulgarian, and this was a matter of some
+difficulty, as was the subsequent arrangement
+for printing. Distribution was principally
+arranged through naval and military channels
+and through secret agencies of the character
+operating against other enemy countries.</p>
+
+<p>Most painstaking work was undertaken to
+prepare for the publication of a newspaper
+in Bulgarian to be smuggled into Bulgaria.
+When a series of perplexing difficulties had
+been surmounted and all arrangements were
+in train for an immediate start, the news came
+that Bulgaria had surrendered.</p>
+
+<p>In this connection, too, Ludendorff pays
+tribute to the effect of propaganda. “A
+few days after the 15th (September, 1918),
+a secret report of the French General fell into
+my hands which made it evident that the
+French no longer expected any resistance
+from the Bulgarian army. Entente propaganda
+and money, and the United States
+representatives who had remained in Sofia,
+had done their work. In this instance again
+the Entente had made a thoroughly good job
+of it.” (“My War Memories.”)</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_143">[143]</span></p>
+
+<p>Besides the work in enemy countries,
+Crewe House also undertook the enlightenment
+of prisoners of war in the camps of
+Great Britain. The first necessity was the
+eradication of innate ideas of militarism,
+if it had left them with any illusions which
+their own experience had failed to shatter.
+Then the advantages of democratic government
+would be inculcated. Rightly it was
+thought that if these men could be taught
+that government of a country must be by the
+free will and assent of the governed, a small
+step at least would have been taken in the
+right direction. Such beneficent influences as
+could be brought to bear upon them would
+affect their compatriots on their return home
+and might fructify in the expression of
+changed views in their letters to their friends.
+There were several Prisoners of War camps
+scattered about Great Britain, each of them
+being in charge of a Commandant responsible
+to the War Office. The late Sir Charles
+Nicholson, Bt., a valued member of the
+Enemy Propaganda Committee, took charge
+of this section of Crewe House work, his usual
+procedure being to have a personal interview
+with each of the Commandants, in order to
+ascertain from them what newspapers and
+books were allowed inside the camps, and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_144">[144]</span>
+what were the English and German newspapers
+which were most read by the prisoners.
+He then submitted to the Commandant a list
+of books and newspapers which were approved
+for such purposes, and suggested to them
+that these should be circulated among the
+prisoners and added to the library which
+existed in each of the camps. Among the
+newspapers in German which were found to
+be useful for this purpose were the <i>Arbeiterzeitung</i>
+of Vienna, the <i>Vorwärts</i>, the <i>Frankfurter
+Zeitung</i>, the <i>Berliner Tageszeitung</i>, and
+the <i>Volkstimme</i>, and such pamphlets as
+Prince Lichnowsky’s “<i>Meine Londoner Mission</i>,”
+Hermann Fernau’s “<i>Gerade weil ich
+Deutscher bin</i>,” Dr. Karl Liebknecht’s “<i>Brief
+an das Kommandanturgericht</i>,” Dr. Muehlon’s
+“<i>Die Schuld der Deutschen Regierung am
+Kriege</i>” and “<i>Die Verheerung Europas</i>,”
+Dr. Anton Nystroem’s “<i>Vor dem Tribunale</i>,”
+and, in addition, German translations of
+Mr. H. G. Wells’s “Mr. Britling Sees it
+Through,” and copies of Mr. James W. Gerard’s
+“My Four Years in Germany.”</p>
+
+<p>Letters which were sent out by the prisoners
+of war to their friends at home were, of course,
+examined by the postal censor. Sometimes
+this examination indicated that certain of
+the prisoners would prove susceptible to
+influence, and a point was made of seeing that<span class="pagenum" id="Page_145">[145]</span>
+such prisoners were specially supplied with
+literature. The examination of prisoners of
+war was useful, too, in ascertaining what
+were the ideas prevalent in the minds of the
+Germans as to the cause of the war, the
+progress of events, and the prospect of
+ultimate success or failure.</p>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p144d" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p144d.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">THE LATE SIR CHARLES NICHOLSON, BART., M.P.<br>
+MEMBER OF ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE, AND
+DIRECTOR OF PRISONERS OF WAR SECTION.<br>
+<i>Photo: Russell &amp; Sons.</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p160a" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p160a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">SIR RODERICK JONES, K.B.E.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.<br>
+<i>Photo: Elliott &amp; Fry, Ltd.</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p160c" style="max-width:100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p160c.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">COLONEL THE EARL OF DENBIGH, C.V.O.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.<br>
+<i>Photo: Speight</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_146">[146]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VII">CHAPTER VII<br>
+<span class="fs80">INTER-ALLIED CO-OPERATION</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+<p class="sub">An axiom for propaganda—Results of a successful conference—Policy,
+Means and Methods.</p>
+
+<p>Experience gained at Crewe House proved
+that it is as necessary for Allies to co-ordinate
+propaganda against a common enemy as to
+unify military command. To conduct propaganda
+without a policy is bad enough; but
+to shut up sets of propagandists working
+independently of each other in a number of
+water-tight compartments, each set representative
+of a different nationality, is to
+court ridicule instead of attracting serious
+attention from an intelligent enemy, and to
+result in the production of contradictory
+thoughts and confusion in the minds of
+unintelligent adversaries.</p>
+
+<p>An axiom for propaganda of allies in future
+wars is that a clear common policy must be
+defined, based upon such a foundation of fact
+and justice that it need not be altered in its
+essential principles, but can be, <i>and must be</i>,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_147">[147]</span>
+rigidly adhered to. It will doubtless be
+necessary to lay down such a policy for each
+nation of an opposing alliance, in the event
+of the enemy not being a single nation.</p>
+
+<p>Clearly, too, it should be recognised that
+propaganda policy, or policies, must accord
+with the policy of the diplomatic, military, and
+naval authorities. Possessing no administrative
+function, propaganda is dependent upon
+them to make policy operative. Here, again,
+lack of co-ordination would involve the risk
+of confusion, contradiction, and consequent
+inefficiency. Propaganda may well and
+rightly be in advance of these other departments
+as a forerunner (with what success other
+chapters of this book record) or it may follow,
+but it must be in agreement with them.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Northcliffe had always conceived it
+to be a fundamental principle of propaganda
+against enemy countries that when a line of
+policy had been laid by him before the
+British Government and sanctioned as a
+basis for propaganda, the Allied Governments
+should be asked for their assent to it, so that
+their propaganda departments might act in
+conformity. In practice it was found that
+most rapid co-ordination could be attained
+by representatives of the Allied propaganda
+departments meeting together. One of Lord<span class="pagenum" id="Page_148">[148]</span>
+Northcliffe’s earliest acts was to convene an
+inter-Allied gathering at Crewe House which
+was attended by Lord Beaverbrook (Minister
+of Information), M. Franklin-Bouillon
+(France), and Signor Gallenga-Stuart (Italy),
+as well as by a number of other British,
+French, Italian, and United States representatives.</p>
+
+<p>To some extent this gathering paved the
+way for the close Allied co-operation in Italy.
+Lord Northcliffe would have desired the
+immediate establishment of an inter-Allied
+body for propaganda in enemy countries,
+but difficulties were encountered which postponed
+the formation of such a body until a
+later date. Meanwhile, as close touch as
+possible was kept with the French and Italian
+departments concerned. But the course of
+events in the summer made it obvious to
+Lord Northcliffe and his advisers that an
+inter-Allied conference on Enemy Propaganda
+was indispensable to success. With the assent
+of the British War Cabinet, therefore, he
+issued invitations to the French, Italian, and
+United States Governments to send delegates
+to an official conference in London. These
+invitations were cordially accepted and the
+Conference assembled at Crewe House on
+August 14, 1918.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_149">[149]</span></p>
+
+<p>In addition to representatives of Lord
+Northcliffe’s department, and of the Allied
+propaganda departments, there were also
+present representatives of the British
+Foreign Office, War Office, Admiralty, Air
+Ministry, and Ministry of Information.</p>
+
+<p>The full list of delegates was:</p>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<table class="autotable">
+
+<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3">Great Britain:</td>
+
+</tr>
+
+
+
+<tr class="nw">
+<td class="tdl nw">Viscount Northcliffe (Chairman).<br>
+Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Campbell Stuart.<br>
+Sir Charles Nicholson, Bart, M.P.<br>
+Mr. Wickham Steed.
+</td>
+<td class="tdctop">&nbsp;<img src="images/rightbr.png" alt=""
+style="width: 10px; height: 100px;">&nbsp;</td>
+<td class="tdl">Department of<br>Propaganda in<br>Enemy Countries.</td>
+</tr>
+
+
+
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">Rear-Admiral Sir Reginald
+ Hall<br>(Director of Naval Intelligence).<br>
+Captain Guy Gaunt.<br>
+Commander G. Standing.
+</td>
+<td class="tdc">&nbsp;<img src="images/rightbr.png" alt=""
+style="width: 10px; height: 100px;"></td>
+<td class="tdl">Admiralty.  </td>
+</tr>
+
+
+
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">Brigadier-General G. K.
+Cockerill<br>(Deputy-Director of Military Intelligence).<br>
+Major The Earl of Kerry, M.P.<br>
+Captain P. Chalmers Mitchell.<br>
+</td>
+<td class="tdc">&nbsp;<img src="images/rightbr.png" alt=""
+style="width: 10px; height: 100px;"></td>
+<td class="tdl">War Office.  </td>
+</tr>
+
+
+
+
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">Colonel E. H. Davidson.</td>
+<td class="tdc"></td>
+<td class="tdl">Air Ministry.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_150">[150]</span></td>
+</tr>
+<tr class="blank">
+<td colspan="3"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">Mr. C. J. Phillips.</td>
+<td class="tdc"></td>
+<td class="tdl">Foreign Office.</td>
+</tr>
+
+<tr>
+<td class="tdl">Sir Roderick Jones<br>(representing
+the Minister of Information).<br>
+Mr. Cunliffe-Owen<br>(Controller
+of Propaganda against Turkey).
+</td>
+<td class="tdc">&nbsp;<img src="images/rightbr.png" alt=""
+style="width: 10px; height: 120px;"></td>
+<td class="tdl">Ministry of Information. </td>
+</tr>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3">France:</td>
+
+</tr>
+
+<tr><td colspan="3">M. Klobukowski.<br>
+M. Haguenin.<br>
+M. Sabatier D’Espeyran.<br>
+Major-General le Vicomte de la Panouse.<br>
+M. le Capitaine Prince Pierre d’Arenberg.<br>
+Lieutenant le Comte Stanislas de Montebello.<br>
+M. Comert.<br>
+Lieutenant P. Mantoux.<br></td></tr>
+
+
+
+<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3">Italy:</td>
+
+</tr>
+
+<tr><td colspan="3">Professor Borgese.<br>
+Signor G. Emanuel.<br>
+Captain Count Vicino-Pallavicino.<br>
+Lieutenant R. Cajrati-Crivello.<br></td></tr>
+
+
+
+<tr><td class="tdc" colspan="3">United States of America:</td>
+
+</tr>
+
+<tr><td>Mr. James Keeley.<br>
+Captain Walter Lippmann.<br>
+Captain Heber Blankenhorn.<br>
+Lieutenant Charles Merz.<br>   
+Lieutenant Ludlow Griscom.<br></td> 
+<td class="tdcbot"><br>&nbsp;<img src="images/rightbr.png" alt=""
+style="width: 10px; height: 80px;"></td>
+<td><br>Present as observers.</td>
+</tr>
+
+</table>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_151">[151]</span></p>
+
+<p>In the speech with which, as Chairman,
+Lord Northcliffe opened the Conference, he
+pointed out that the organisation of British
+Propaganda in Enemy Countries had reached
+a stage at which greater co-ordination of
+Allied purpose and effort was required if its
+objects were to be achieved in full measure.
+Propaganda in enemy countries presupposed:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p><i>a.</i> The definition, for propaganda purposes
+at least, of Allied policy in
+regard to our enemies;</p>
+
+<p><i>b.</i> The public manifestation of this
+policy; and</p>
+
+<p><i>c.</i> The study of technical means of
+bringing its main features to the
+knowledge of the enemy.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>He suggested that the Conference should
+resolve itself into a number of Committees
+to examine and to report upon these and other
+matters. Such Committees would be concerned
+with:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>1. The great subject of the policy of
+propaganda;</p>
+
+<p>2. The difficult question of means of
+distribution:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>(<i>a</i>) Military.</p>
+
+<p>(<i>b</i>) Civil.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_152">[152]</span></p>
+
+<p>3. Propaganda material;</p>
+
+<p>4. Educative work among prisoners of
+war who might return to Germany
+to tell their compatriots
+the real facts.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Unless based on a definite policy, propaganda
+could only be fragmentary and superficial.
+On the basis of a clear policy it might
+become destructive of enemy <i>moral</i>, a valuable
+adjunct to military operations, and
+constructive of the necessary conditions of a
+lasting peace.</p>
+
+<p>The three enemy countries with which his
+Department was mainly concerned were
+Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany.
+He cited Austria-Hungary first, because, of
+all our enemies, the Hapsburg Monarchy was
+the field where positive results were most
+readily attainable.</p>
+
+<p>In the early months of 1918, when he began
+that work, Germany was too flushed with
+her facile triumphs in Russia to be susceptible
+to propaganda, and the attitude of
+Bulgaria was too closely bound up with
+German fortunes to be at that moment easily
+affected by propaganda. Allied policy in
+regard to Bulgaria was, moreover, closely
+connected with the general Balkan policy of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_153">[153]</span>
+the Allies, the formulation of which necessarily
+depended, in its turn, upon the adoption
+of a definite policy towards Austria-Hungary.
+All these considerations pointed to Austria-Hungary
+as the foremost object of attack,
+and therefore as the country in regard to
+which a clear propaganda policy was most
+urgently required.</p>
+
+<p>Lord Northcliffe then outlined the steps
+taken in regard to Austria-Hungary, described
+fully in Chapter III. He went on
+to state that there was abundant evidence that
+the work thus begun had helped to prevent
+an Austrian offensive in April, and to check
+it when it was finally launched in June. There
+was also strong reason to believe that, had
+action on these lines been taken earlier,
+far greater results might have been obtained.
+This was an aspect of the vital connection
+between propaganda policy and military
+operations to which he earnestly directed
+attention. He trusted that the Policy Committee
+of the Conference might be able to
+make valuable recommendations in this
+respect.</p>
+
+<p>One important aspect of propaganda
+against Austria-Hungary and, indeed, against
+all our enemies, was the dissemination of
+knowledge of the greatness of the war effort<span class="pagenum" id="Page_154">[154]</span>
+of the American people. With that effort he
+had had personal acquaintance; and on that
+very day he had received a secret report that
+the Germans had little idea of the supreme
+effort which the Americans were making.
+To this aspect he attributed great and growing
+significance.</p>
+
+<p>In regard to Bulgaria, he had also ventured
+to lay before the British Government an
+outline of propaganda policy, which had
+received general approval. Its main features
+were the necessity of a definite Allied decision
+in regard to the Jugo-Slav and Rumanian
+questions, before any direct attempt could
+be made to influence Bulgaria by propaganda.
+A definite Jugo-Slav and Rumanian policy
+presupposed, however, a definite Allied policy
+in regard to Austria-Hungary. Upon the
+details of this important subject the Policy
+Committee would be fully informed. Broadly
+speaking, he considered it at once inexpedient
+and dangerous to enter into any direct or
+indirect negotiations with Bulgaria or to
+make to her proposals even as propaganda
+until a complete change of attitude had
+actually taken place in Bulgaria itself. Until
+then, propaganda could consist only in conveying
+information to the Bulgarian troops
+and people as to the fate that inevitably<span class="pagenum" id="Page_155">[155]</span>
+awaited them unless they reversed completely
+their attitude; and in preparing by agreement
+among the Allied Governments an
+outline of Balkan policy, aiming at a solution
+of the various Balkan questions as nearly as
+possible on ethnographical lines. In this
+way, Allied propaganda might eventually
+help to prepare the way for a League of
+Balkan States.</p>
+
+<p>Though for many reasons it had not thereto
+been possible to develop British propaganda
+in Germany as fully or as efficiently as it
+had been developed in Austria-Hungary,
+Lord Northcliffe said his department had,
+in co-operation with the military authorities,
+and by the utilisation of secret channels,
+been able to introduce into Germany a
+certain amount of propaganda literature.
+The decision of the British military authorities
+not to allow the use of aeroplanes on
+the British Front in France for the distribution
+of propaganda had naturally retarded
+and hampered the necessary extension of his
+work. He trusted that this question of the
+use of aeroplanes for propaganda purposes
+would be most carefully considered by the
+committee on military distribution. In the
+meantime, balloons had been employed,
+though they were manifestly far inferior to<span class="pagenum" id="Page_156">[156]</span>
+aeroplanes as instruments of distribution.
+The view seemed to prevail that propaganda
+was not worth casualties. Were this view
+well-founded it would be hard to understand
+why the Germans should have taken such
+drastic measures against British airmen
+accused of dropping propaganda leaflets.
+The Germans, who ought to be good judges,
+evidently feared our leaflets more than they
+feared our bombs. But the main issue was
+the determination of an Allied propaganda
+policy in regard to Germany—a matter of no
+little difficulty. As he had said in relation
+to Austria-Hungary, one of the chief features
+of Allied propaganda—apart from questions
+of policy—would be the constant dissemination
+of knowledge of the immensity and of
+the growing efficiency of American effort.
+This feature he had endeavoured to develop,
+and he intended to develop it increasingly.
+On the subject of policy, however, he had
+submitted to the British Government an
+outline comprising the following points, which
+it was necessary to bring home to the
+Germans.</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>1. The determination of the Allies to
+continue the war until Germany accepted
+the Allied peace terms.</p>
+
+<p>2. The existing alliance as a fighting<span class="pagenum" id="Page_157">[157]</span>
+league of free nations would be deepened
+and extended and the military, naval,
+financial, and economic resources of its
+members would be pooled until its
+military purpose was achieved and peace
+could be established on lasting foundations.
+He had suggested further that,
+as German minds were peculiarly susceptible
+to systematic statement, the
+Allies should prepare a comprehensive
+scheme of world organisation as a counterpart
+to the German schemes represented
+by the phrases “Berlin-Baghdad” and
+“Mittel-Europa.” As a preliminary to
+the drafting of such a scheme, he had
+urged that the lines of a practical League
+of Free Nations should be studied and
+laid down.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Pending the formulation of this scheme,
+he thought that Allied propaganda should
+insist upon Allied control of raw materials,
+of shipping, and on the Allies’ power to
+ostracise for an indefinite period enemy
+peoples, until the terms of the Allied peace
+settlement were fully accepted. At the same
+time it should be pointed out that nothing
+stood between enemy people and a lasting
+peace except the designs of their ruling
+dynasties and of their military and economic<span class="pagenum" id="Page_158">[158]</span>
+castes. The primary war aim of the Allies
+was the changing of Germany, not only in
+their own interest, but also in that of the
+German people itself, since, without the
+honest co-operation of a reformed Germany,
+disarmament on a large scale might be
+impossible, and without disarmament social
+and economic reconstruction would be impracticable.
+He trusted that this question of
+Allied propaganda policy in regard to Germany
+would be carefully weighed by the
+Policy Committee.</p>
+
+<p>There remained the extremely important
+question of the co-ordination of Allied propaganda
+effort. It was obvious, he said, that
+if each Ally carried on its propaganda in
+enemy countries without reference to what
+the other Allies were doing, there must result
+great dispersion of effort, overlapping, and,
+possibly, some conflict of statement if not of
+aims. In order to secure the greatest possible
+military efficiency, the Allied Governments
+had established the Versailles Council, and
+had agreed to the appointment of an Allied
+Commander-in-Chief. Up till then the only
+Inter-Allied propaganda institution set up
+was the Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission
+at Padua. The working of this Commission
+had revealed the great advantages of concerted<span class="pagenum" id="Page_159">[159]</span>
+effort, but it had also revealed certain
+defects which only fuller Allied co-ordination
+in matters of propaganda seemed likely to
+overcome. He would therefore submit a
+proposal, definite in aim, though variable in
+detail, that there be created a central body
+for the conduct of propaganda in enemy
+countries. By such a step it seemed to him
+many delays might be avoided, great economy
+of energy and expense might be secured, and
+progress be made towards the unification of
+Allied propaganda policy and of the means
+for carrying it into effect.</p>
+
+<p>In conclusion, he asked pardon for reverting
+once more to the great importance
+of a true conception of propaganda in enemy
+countries, not only as a means of winning
+the war, but also and especially as a means of
+winning the peace. It was a work that
+demanded all the intelligence of the best
+minds in Allied countries, and the sustained
+support of responsible Allied statesmen.</p>
+
+<p>M. Klobukowski, the head of the French
+delegation, who followed Lord Northcliffe
+with an eloquent speech in French, which
+Lieutenant Mantoux interpreted, concurred
+in all that Lord Northcliffe had said. The
+French Government, he said, answered willingly
+to the invitation sent to them by the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_160">[160]</span>
+British Government to send their representatives
+to the Inter-Allied Conference on Propaganda
+in Enemy Countries. It seemed to
+them necessary to call it to intensify by
+methodical co-operation and concerted direction
+the powerful means of action at the
+disposal of the Allies. To see exactly what
+could be done; to know exactly where they
+meant to go—that was the principal aim
+which must inspire their propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>The campaign of systematic untruth which
+was being waged by the enemy need not for
+one moment divert the Allies from their line.
+Honesty had never seemed to the Allies to be
+an inferior policy. In the second place,
+French propaganda had taken care to put
+in a strong light the responsibility for the
+war. The war, on the part of our enemies,
+was a war of aggression and the service of a
+policy of conquest and the enslavement of
+nationalities. On the Allied side it was a
+purely defensive war, for the defence not
+only of territories, but also of the great cause
+of Right violated in Belgium, as in Alsace-Lorraine,
+in Poland, in the Ukraine, in
+Serbia, in Rumania, and in all the Balkan
+countries. “We try,” said M. Klobukowski,
+“to reach in enemy countries consciences
+which have hitherto shut out free examination
+and which cannot yet control themselves.
+We try to open eyes and ears now shut by
+the most extraordinary education of discipline
+which has at any time dominated men. And
+this with the help not only of arguments
+taken from facts which might be considered
+as arbitrary in practice and intention, but
+also with the help of what is admitted by our
+enemies themselves in declarations (the sincerity
+of which is incontestable for they
+come from their own agents) from those who
+dared write what they know, like Prince
+Lichnowsky and Dr. Muehlon.”</p>
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_161">[161]</span></p>
+
+<p>Co-operation in the work of liberating the
+oppressed nationalities (continued M. Klobukowski)
+defined clearly one of the ends of
+our action against Austria-Hungary; but
+although we cannot speak of immediate
+results, Allied propaganda was not least
+indispensable in Germany. If Austria was
+guilty towards her peoples, Germany was
+guilty towards the whole of mankind. Since
+the war began, the French Government had
+been constantly preoccupied with the propaganda
+to be effected in Germany. Faced
+with the monstrous distortion of facts which
+the Imperial Government tried to force
+upon the world, the first French Yellow Book,
+in December, 1914, gave the full list of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_162">[162]</span>
+responsibilities for the war, and showed, by
+going back to its origin, that Germany prepared
+and finally launched the war.</p>
+
+<p>One of the essential objects of Allied
+propagandists, therefore, must be to come
+back frequently to the origin of the war,
+in the hope that such effort will not be in
+vain. The experience of the publication of
+the Lichnowsky memorandum was very encouraging
+from that point of view, but that
+was not enough, as the majority of the German
+nation had still confidence in the
+official versions of the causes of the world
+conflict such as had been given to them by
+the Imperial Government. The Germans
+must not be allowed to lower the Allies’
+defensive war to the level of a war of conquest.
+The Allies must never be tired of
+insisting that they were victims of a deliberate
+aggression.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, it was their interest to
+insist more and more upon the character of
+the struggle in which they were engaged.
+They were upon the defensive; they were
+defending themselves, they were defending
+right and humanity; that was their war aim,
+and all other war aims were only
+consequences of it. Deeply imbued as the
+German nation might be with doctrines of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_163">[163]</span>
+historical realism, hostile as their Government
+might be to the notion of a policy
+founded upon the respect of right, the day
+nevertheless must come when their ideas
+would triumph over their resistance, when
+gradually on one hand the revelations (daily
+becoming more definite) would show the
+criminal complicities which were the cause
+of the war. On the other hand the gradual
+failure of that bid for domination would
+oblige the Germans themselves to look for the
+culprits. The anxiety about the injustice of
+their own cause would finally penetrate into
+the German nation.</p>
+
+<p>It was also important clearly to show how
+useless was the effort made by the enemy
+to sever the link between the Powers of the
+Entente. The enemy Press was never tired
+of giving its readers the imaginary spectacle
+of divisions between their enemies. After
+their tales about France being conquered
+by the British Army, they proceeded to
+announce that the Americans were going to
+get hold of France.</p>
+
+<p>Every peace offensive undertaken by the
+German Government in the hour of military
+difficulty gave evidence of the naïve confidence
+which the best-informed among them
+employed in such an attempt to divide us.<span class="pagenum" id="Page_164">[164]</span>
+To show that the Allied front was indissolubly
+united, to show that the Alliance extends
+still further than the war, that it will extend
+from the military to the economic field—that
+would be the efficient answer of the Allies.</p>
+
+<p>It must be said above all that the Allies
+would conquer and that they had the means
+to conquer. They must not let themselves
+be led towards discussions. There was always
+a danger of seeing the enemy get hold of
+Allied formulæ, after having emptied them of
+what they contained. The German mind,
+so complex and treacherous, had great ability
+in the art of turning to its own account the
+principles laid down by others. Germany
+might attempt once more to mislead the
+peoples by writing on her own flag their
+mottoes while they reserved to themselves
+the possibility of giving to those mottoes
+later on an interpretation diametrically
+opposed to the real one.</p>
+
+<p>Nothing was more important than to
+defend Allied public opinions against such
+enterprises, which would certainly be undertaken
+by Germany. The liberation of the
+peoples, affirmation of the justice of the
+Allied cause, demonstration of the violation
+of right perpetrated by the Central Empires—such
+must be the basis of Allied propaganda.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_165">[165]</span></p>
+
+<p>That was in full harmony with the general
+policy of principles and tended to assure to
+all the peoples the right freely to develop,
+as the constitutions of the Allied States had
+given the same right to every individual.
+So Allied victory would have that character
+of moral elevation which was the character
+of the great Allied nations during their
+history. But until they reached that victory
+of liberty and right, according to the strong
+words of M. Clemenceau, “let us make
+war!”</p>
+
+<p>Signor Borgese, the representative of Italy,
+said that he agreed generally with all the
+ideas and proposals that had been made by
+Lord Northcliffe.</p>
+
+<p>The Italians had of late been particularly
+active on the field of anti-enemy propaganda.
+For example, they had one office in Rome
+whose chief duty it was to spread news
+arriving from the enemy in order that his
+position in the world, and his internal
+resistance, might be weakened. They had
+also in Switzerland a large organisation, the
+principal aim of which was to secure daily
+knowledge of what was going on in enemy
+countries, and to utilise to the full every
+possible means of securing information about
+their internal condition.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_166">[166]</span></p>
+
+<p>The first act of Allied joint propaganda
+against the enemy was the Rome Congress
+in April, which was due largely to the
+concord and the friendship of the most
+enlightened and intelligent elements of public
+opinion in England and in Italy. As a result
+of that Congress, great consequences had
+followed in Austria-Hungary, and generally
+in the world of the enemy; and the principal
+task was to pursue the way that had thus
+been opened by the Rome Congress. The
+peculiar position of Italy as the enemy of
+Austria naturally entered largely into the
+motives that inspired Italian action. The
+declarations of Lord Northcliffe—whose influence
+upon the question of enemy propaganda
+was immense—and the declaration
+of M. Klobukowski were entirely anti-Austrian
+in tendency.</p>
+
+<p>As regards the Italians, they had been
+enemies of Austria not only because Austria
+was their enemy, but also because they felt
+that it was the most direct and sure way of
+being the enemies of Germany and of Germanism.
+Those Italians who had understood
+the true position since the beginning of the
+war had always been enemies of Austria in
+this sense, and had sought the best means of
+attacking and annihilating German militarism<span class="pagenum" id="Page_167">[167]</span>
+through Austria. Although German
+militarism was not completely invulnerable,
+and although the vulnerability of Germany
+was not so certain as that of Austria, Austria
+was the Achilles’ heel of Germany. Two
+important conditions that had rendered
+possible such action against Austria, were
+that the necessity of disintegrating Austria
+had become generally realised throughout
+the world, and that Austria’s responsibility
+for the war had been generally acknowledged
+not only by the Allies, but also by the enemy.
+Lichnowsky and Muehlon had acknowledged
+that the chief and immediate responsibility
+for the war rested with Austria. The question
+of guilt was certainly one of the chief questions
+with which propaganda had to deal;
+and it would be examined by the committees,
+because he believed that it might be possible
+to accelerate movements of opinion in Germany
+and in Austria if a confession of guilt
+as to the origin of the war were made widely
+known.</p>
+
+<p>As to what had been done by Italian
+propaganda during the last few months, he
+had mentioned the offices at Rome and at
+Berne, to which he would refer in more detail
+in the committees. As to the work of the
+Padua Inter-Allied Commission, it was<span class="pagenum" id="Page_168">[168]</span>
+assuredly a very great work, if one were to
+judge of its activity not only by personal
+convictions but by the convictions of the
+foe, who had publicly acknowledged that the
+defeat on the Piave was partly caused by the
+efforts of the Padua Commission, and by
+information that had been brought to them
+by the Jugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks.
+Allied propaganda must be a propaganda
+of truth. The chief difficulty lay in making
+a distinction between copying the enemy’s
+system of actual military operations and
+imitating his methods in the war of ideas.
+It was true that the military technique of
+war must be dependent upon that of the
+adversary, unless we were to be at a disadvantage;
+but there was a danger that we
+might imitate methods adopted by the enemy
+in the war of ideas—that is to say, that we
+might copy German methods of propaganda.
+Although there were people who thought that
+the Allies should copy lies and hypocritical
+statements of German propaganda, he was
+convinced that their real arm in the propaganda
+war was the truth. The Allies
+could tell the truth because they were persuaded
+that they were right. It was easy
+for them to have a system of ideas,
+because they believed in them as in a<span class="pagenum" id="Page_169">[169]</span>
+kind of religion. Germany and Austria-Hungary
+would listen intently to the words
+that we should say—not necessarily in that
+Conference, but to the words of our Governments.
+Political action and propaganda
+would have very great importance at the end
+of this campaign, and therefore he hoped
+that Italians would be able to make their
+contribution to the shortening and to the
+victorious decision of the war.</p>
+
+<p>One circumstance that gave them absolute
+certainty of victory, and was a certificate
+of the moral purity of the Allied cause, was
+the action of the United States, whom no one—not
+even the enemy—could accuse of any
+selfish motive or interest. While it was
+conceivable that the European Allies might
+be charged, however unjustly, with having
+some thought of their direct interests, the
+United States could not by any stretch of
+imagination be regarded as having intervened
+for any issue save that of high principle.
+Therefore, he agreed entirely with Lord
+Northcliffe and M. Klobukowski that the
+more the significance of the American effort,
+both in its material and its moral aspects,
+were brought to the knowledge of enemy
+peoples, the more rapid would be the decline
+of their <i>moral</i>, and the surer the attainment<span class="pagenum" id="Page_170">[170]</span>
+of the just peace which was the great
+common aim of the Allies and the purpose of
+their action, both military and propagandist.</p>
+
+<p>Mr. James Keeley, the representative of
+the United States, said that he received his
+appointment through the Committee on
+Public Information of the United States
+Government. Four U.S. military officers
+were present, from the Military Intelligence
+Branch of the General Staff, as observers.
+They all met the Conference as pupils,
+having a most earnest desire to learn so that
+they might do their part as whole-heartedly
+in this as in all other phases of Allied effort.</p>
+
+<p>Learning from those who have had experience,
+they would be enabled to devote
+whatever resources they had to the common
+purpose. They would report to the American
+Government what men of experience in this
+work had to recommend, and on the basis
+of that report it was hoped that an American
+organisation could be created as quickly as
+possible, which should work in the fullest,
+frankest, and most effective co-operation with
+the corresponding organisations of the Allied
+nations. It would not be amiss, perhaps,
+to suggest that, in addition to material
+equipment, the United States could contribute
+one element that might possibly be of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_171">[171]</span>
+peculiar importance in this work. Its population
+contained a large representation of all
+the peoples of Central Europe. These peoples
+were well organised in the United States, and,
+with a few exceptions perfectly well-known,
+were loyal to the Allied cause. Those
+peoples, of course, had intimate connections
+with the peoples of Central Europe, and it
+was more than possible that they might be,
+in various ways, of great use in carrying
+messages across the frontiers. On this point,
+particularly, they would be glad of the
+advice of the Conference.</p>
+
+<p>After these speeches the four Committees
+referred to by Lord Northcliffe were appointed
+to deliberate on policy, distribution, material,
+and prisoners of war. The members of the
+Conference were suitably distributed among
+the different committees, which accomplished
+most invaluable work in a business-like
+manner, and presented their reports to the
+full Conference for consideration at its sitting
+on the third day.</p>
+
+<p>The Policy Committee, presided over by
+M. Klobukowski, considered exhaustively
+the problems of propaganda policy in all its
+fields and phases of action. Its discussion
+crystallised into a series of resolutions and
+recommendations for sanction, modification<span class="pagenum" id="Page_172">[172]</span>
+or rejection by the Allied Governments. It
+was, of course, fully understood that such
+resolutions could be only <i>ad referendum</i> and
+not binding on the respective Governments.</p>
+
+<p>In regard to propaganda against Austria-Hungary,
+the Committee found itself in
+complete agreement with the scheme of
+policy sanctioned by the British Government
+for purposes of propaganda, and amplified by
+the decisions of the British, French and
+Italian Governments at the time of, or in
+connection with, the Rome Congress of
+Oppressed Austro-Hungarian Nationalities.
+It recognised that such extensions of policy,
+while springing from considerations of Allied
+principles, had, in part, corresponded to the
+real demands of the propaganda situation,
+which, in their turn, had sprung from the
+exigencies of the military situation and, in
+particular, from the necessity of utilising
+the established principles of the alliance for
+the purpose of impeding or hampering the
+Austro-Hungarian offensive against Italy.
+Subsequent acts and declarations on the
+part of Allied Governments and of the
+Government of the United States made it
+clear that the joint policy of the Allies was
+tending increasingly towards the constructive
+liberation of the subject Austro-Hungarian<span class="pagenum" id="Page_173">[173]</span>
+races. The main task of the Committee in
+relation to propaganda in Austria-Hungary
+seemed, therefore, to be one of unifying for
+propaganda purposes these various acts and
+declarations, and of preparing, if possible,
+the way for a joint Allied declaration that
+might complete and render more effective
+the work of Allied propaganda both in the
+interior of Austria-Hungary and among
+Austro-Hungarian troops at the Front.</p>
+
+<p>The discussion upon the expediency and
+the possibility of such a joint Allied declaration
+was exhaustive and illuminating. In view of
+the position already taken up by the Allied
+Governments and by the United States in
+regard to the Czecho-Slovaks, the Poles, and
+the Rumanians, it appeared that the main
+issue awaiting definition concerned the question
+of Jugo-Slav unity and independence,
+and of the attitude of Italy towards them.
+The Committee adopted the following recommendation:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“With reference to the best means of
+aiding Allied Propaganda in favour of
+the freedom of the Austro-Hungarian
+subject races, the Committee expresses a
+strong hope that all controversial discussions
+of the frontiers between Italy
+and the future Jugo-Slav State will be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_174">[174]</span>
+avoided by the Jugo-Slav Press and the
+Jugo-Slav leaders both outside and, as
+far as the Jugo-Slav leaders may be able
+to exert their influence, also inside the
+Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, just as
+they have been avoided of late by the
+most important organs of the Italian
+Press and in the public speeches of
+influential Italian leaders.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>During the debate upon this recommendation
+it became clearly apparent that the
+Committee regarded, and was confident that
+the Conference would regard, the Italian
+national claims to the union with Italy of the
+cities and regions of Trent, Trieste, and the
+other regions of Italian character as not only
+entirely justified, but also as an elementary
+dictate of the Allies’ respect for the principles
+of nationality and of ethnical justice. Precisely
+because the Committee supported the
+principles formulated in the Italo-Jugo-Slav
+Agreement of last March and saw in them the
+basis of fruitful co-ordination between Italy,
+Jugo-Slavia, and the other nationalities then
+oppressed of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,
+it held the Italian national rights above
+mentioned to be imprescriptible and not open
+to discussion.</p>
+
+<p>The Committee also felt that both for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_175">[175]</span>
+reason of propaganda and from the point of
+view of the future independence and moral
+and political security of the Italian nation
+a foremost part in the work of creating a
+free and united Jugo-Slav State naturally
+fell to Italy. Therefore, after the most
+careful consideration, it unanimously adopted—and
+recommended to the Conference—the
+following resolution:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“Considering the adhesion of the
+Italian Government, by the Prime Minister’s
+speech of April, 1918, to the
+resolutions of the Rome Congress of
+Austro-Hungarian subject races (which
+embodied the agreement between the
+Jugo-Slavs and the Italian Committee)
+and by his recent telegram to the Prime
+Minister of Serbia, M. Pashitch;</p>
+
+<p>“Considering the exemplifications of
+Allied Policy towards Austria-Hungary
+in the French and Italian Convention
+with the Czecho-Slovak National Council,
+the British declaration recognising the
+Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied Nation, the
+Allied declaration at the Versailles Conference
+of June 3rd, 1918 in favour of
+the unity and independence of Poland
+and Mr. Lansing’s statement of the 28th
+June, that all branches of the Slav races<span class="pagenum" id="Page_176">[176]</span>
+should be completely freed from German
+and Austrian rule;</p>
+
+<p>“Considering further the extreme expediency,
+especially in view of possible
+military developments on the Italian
+front, that the Allied policy of liberating
+the oppressed Hapsburg peoples should
+be represented, in the first place, by
+Italy, on whose front Allied propaganda
+against Austria-Hungary is principally
+located;</p>
+
+<p>“The Policy Committee of the Inter-Allied
+Propaganda Conference resolves
+to suggest that the Italian Government
+take the initiative in promoting a joint
+and unanimous public declaration that
+all the Allies regard the establishment of
+a free and united Jugo-Slav State, embracing
+Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as
+one of the conditions of a just and lasting
+peace, and of the rule of right in Europe.”</p>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_177">[177]</span></p>
+
+<p>Passing to the consideration of propaganda
+against Bulgaria, the Committee recognised
+the essential connection between Allied propaganda
+policy towards Austria-Hungary
+and Allied propaganda policy in the Balkans.
+Without the adoption by the Allied Governments
+of a definite policy in regard to Jugo-Slav
+and Rumanian unity and independence,
+it was impossible to formulate any effective
+propaganda policy in regard to Bulgaria.
+Upon the merits of propaganda in Bulgaria,
+the Committee unanimously adhered to the
+principles laid down in Lord Northcliffe’s
+opening statement, that is to say, that an
+essential preliminary to any conversations or
+negotiations with Bulgaria must be a complete
+and effective reversal of the policy
+hitherto pursued by Bulgaria as the enemy of
+the Allies; and until this reversal had taken
+place, the objects of the Allied propaganda
+should be to bring home to the Bulgarian
+people a sense of the dangers that threatened
+them unless they could convince the Allies by
+their conduct of their sincere repentance.
+The Committee was also of the opinion that
+pending this necessary change, their Serbian
+and Greek Allies should not be left in
+ignorance of the propaganda policy which
+the chief Allied Powers might adopt.</p>
+
+<p>With reference to Poland, the Chairman
+of the Committee made a brief but pregnant
+statement, declaring the policy of propaganda
+in regard to the Poles to be identical with
+that laid down by President Wilson and
+President Poincaré and formulated by the
+Allied Prime Ministers on June 3 in the words:
+“The creation of a united and independent<span class="pagenum" id="Page_178">[178]</span>
+Polish State, with free access to the sea,
+constitutes one of the conditions of a solid
+and just peace and of the rule of right in
+Europe.” He added that the growth of
+Prussian power for evil, and the present
+position of Prussia in the world, had their
+origin in the partition of Poland. Consequently
+he urged that the reunion of the
+various parts of Poland would be not only
+the reparation of an historical injustice,
+but would constitute a strong guarantee
+against any revival of the Prussian system.
+He claimed that the greater the strength of
+Poland, the firmer would be the security of
+Europe and the world against any renewal of
+aggressive Prussian militarism.</p>
+
+<p>In the discussion which followed, general
+agreement was expressed with this view;
+but it was pointed out that a reunited Poland
+might be stronger in proportion as its
+territory was ethnographically compact and
+did not include other neighbouring racial
+elements with whom Poland would have
+every interest to live in concord, but which,
+were they included against their will within
+her frontiers, might become sources of disturbance
+and weakness. It was also considered
+desirable that the Polish National
+Committee, in order to become not less<span class="pagenum" id="Page_179">[179]</span>
+valuable to the Allies as an adjunct and
+agency of propaganda in enemy countries
+than were the Czech and Jugo-Slav Committees,
+might extend the basis of its representation,
+so as to secure more unanimous
+support from the various sections of Polish
+opinion. The Committee adopted, and submitted
+to the approval of the Conference,
+the following resolution and recommendation.
+It proposed to communicate the recommendation
+to the Polish National Committee:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“The Conference records its conviction
+that the creation of a united
+and independent Polish State, with free
+access to the sea, is an essential requirement
+of lasting peace in Europe,
+and expresses the belief that the more
+closely the frontiers of this future Polish
+State follow ethnographical lines, the
+stronger will it be to play its part in
+safeguarding that peace, and the more
+harmonious will be its relations with
+neighbouring peoples which, like the
+Poles, are striving to secure a free
+existence.</p>
+
+<p>“The Conference, anxious that
+Allied propaganda may truly express
+the desires of the Polish people, as a
+whole, and may tend to promote its<span class="pagenum" id="Page_180">[180]</span>
+welfare, expresses the hope that the
+Polish National Council may extend the
+basis of its representation so as to be
+in a position to lend still further aid to
+Allied Propaganda in enemy countries.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>On the question of Alsace-Lorraine, the
+Committee found itself in entire agreement
+with its Chairman’s declaration that the
+return of the two provinces to France was
+an imperative demand of international justice
+and not a concession to be made by the
+Allies to French national feeling. The
+undoing of the flagrant wrong done by
+Germany in 1871 was so clearly a condition
+of any just peace that it required no further
+demonstration; quite apart from the
+historical justification of the French claim
+to the reincorporation of these provinces in
+France by their disannexation from Germany,
+the title of the people of Alsace-Lorraine to
+determine their own allegiance proceeded
+from their voluntary adhesion to France in
+1790, no less than from the protests of their
+elected representatives against the Treaty of
+Frankfurt in the French National Assembly
+at Bordeaux in 1871, and in the German
+Reichstag in 1874. In regard to Alsace-Lorraine,
+the Committee was convinced that
+Allied Propaganda in Germany should make<span class="pagenum" id="Page_181">[181]</span>
+known to the German people the determination
+of the Allies to insist in all circumstances
+upon this vindication of rights.</p>
+
+<p>Consequently it adopted the following
+resolutions:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>1. Propaganda on the subject of
+Alsace-Lorraine should be unified and
+conducted on general lines indicated by
+France.</p>
+
+<p>2. The argument to which first place
+should always be given is that of outraged
+right and of the will of the
+inhabitants as expressed in their solemn
+and repeated protests.</p>
+
+<p>3. The question of Alsace-Lorraine
+is a question of international right, the
+solution of which interests the whole
+world.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>As to propaganda addressed to the German
+people themselves in regard to the future
+position of Germany, the Committee was in
+full agreement with the policy recommended
+by Lord Northcliffe with the approval of the
+British Government and summarised in his
+opening statements. It believed that Allied
+propaganda should make it clear that the
+chief object of the Allies was the changing of
+Germany, not the destruction of the German<span class="pagenum" id="Page_182">[182]</span>
+people; and that the German people could
+hope for an adequate position in the world,
+and for admission into a future society of
+nations, when they had qualified themselves
+for partnership with civilised communities
+by making the necessary reparations and
+restorations (primarily in the case of Belgium)
+by overthrowing the system known as
+Prussian militarism, and when they had
+effectively abandoned all designs of mastery
+over Europe. At the same time, the Committee
+laid stress upon the importance of
+bringing home to the German people a sense
+of the economic pressure which the Allies,
+and above all the United States of America,
+were in a position to exercise, and would
+exercise, until the conditions of a just peace
+were accepted.</p>
+
+<p>To this end the Committee strongly urged
+that, in the various Allied countries and in
+the United States, a comprehensive scheme
+of world organisation be studied and worked
+out, and that, in particular, the steps already
+taken to co-ordinate the economic policy of
+the Allies and of the United States be
+publicly explained and brought to the knowledge
+of the Germans. The Committee,
+therefore, adopted and recommended to the
+Conference the following resolution:</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_183">[183]</span></p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“In consideration of the fact that the
+Allied Governments have in their own
+respective fields of action and by their
+joint action begun to give effect to
+economic co-operation, which is to-day
+a powerful instrument of war, and which
+may, after the war, serve as a basis
+for the systematic organisation of the
+resources of the world:</p>
+
+<p>“The Conference expresses its
+satisfaction with the results already
+attained and believes that it would be
+expedient to make plain to enemy public
+opinion, by means of a service of information,
+which would set forth both
+the principles of Allied economic action
+and their results as worked out in daily
+practice, the gravity of the danger by
+which the enemy is threatened, and the
+advantages assured to those who are
+admitted to co-operation with the Allies.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The Committee adopted the following
+resolution:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“That in view of the great importance
+of co-ordinating the Allies’ policies and
+organisations for the conduct of
+propaganda in enemy countries, a
+permanent body be constituted for this
+purpose;</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_184">[184]</span></p>
+
+<p>“That this body consist of four members,
+representing respectively the four
+propaganda departments which have
+taken part in this Conference; each
+member having the power to nominate
+an assistant or a substitute, or both, if
+necessary;</p>
+
+<p>“That the provisional headquarters
+of the body shall be at Crewe House,
+London, until permanent headquarters
+be determined;</p>
+
+<p>“That the establishment expenses be
+shared equally between the four Governments;
+and that a permanent secretariat
+be appointed thereto.”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In adhering to this resolution, and in
+deciding that it be recommended for adoption
+by the Allied Governments and by the
+United States, the Policy Committee had
+been influenced especially by the hope that
+the proposed arrangement might expedite
+the co-ordination of Allied propaganda policy,
+facilitate the preparation of concordant
+declarations by the Allied Governments at
+suitable moments, and assist in the proper
+organisation of congresses.</p>
+
+<p>The discussions of the Distribution Committee
+were exceedingly interesting and
+fruitful. They ranged over the whole field<span class="pagenum" id="Page_185">[185]</span>
+of propaganda effort, and the Committee’s
+report summarised the means of distribution
+of propaganda in use and assessed their
+respective values. So far as military means
+were concerned, it was found that the
+Italians employed aeroplanes, projectiles, and
+contact patrols; the French, aeroplanes,
+projectiles, and balloons; the British, only
+balloons on the Western Front, but aeroplanes
+in the East; and that seaplanes
+might be employed to reach special objectives
+in the Mediterranean. Each country gave
+favourable reports on the methods they
+employed, but all were agreed that a constant
+exchange of information as to results was
+required. In certain cases, such as the
+mountainous Italian Front, where very
+limited targets had to be reached, the
+dropping of propaganda in bulk was
+necessary; but in most cases methods that
+secured a wide scattering of the leaflets, so
+that those might be secured and hidden by
+individuals, were necessary. The French
+explained a device, in its experimental stage,
+to secure an automatic scattering from aeroplanes.
+The “releases” of English balloons
+were agreed to produce a most adequate
+scattering. Various devices employed in
+projectiles were successful in the case of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_186">[186]</span>
+leaflets when the angle of projection was
+high and the wind was favourable, but
+hitherto had not been successful with pamphlets.
+It was recognised that aeroplanes
+were the best means of reaching distant
+targets with accuracy; that for shorter
+distances, from a few hundred yards up to
+ten miles, projectiles would secure great
+accuracy.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to range, it was recognised
+that aeroplanes had the widest limits, and
+the scattering of literature in Berlin by the
+French and in Vienna by the Italians was
+considered an accomplishment of great
+brilliancy and promise of usefulness, and
+that the types of paper balloons in use
+were thoroughly effective for ranges up
+to twenty or thirty miles, and with less
+certainty of aim up to 100 or 150 miles;
+but that with larger balloons (such as the
+fabric balloons in the possession of the
+English, or the new larger “doped” paper
+balloons then being prepared in England, or
+the reinforced paper balloons being experimented
+with in France) the distances could
+be increased to several hundred miles.</p>
+
+<p>As to the bulk that could be distributed,
+it was stated that each of the standard
+balloons, then used by the English and<span class="pagenum" id="Page_187">[187]</span>
+French, carried 4 lb. 2 oz. of literature, and
+that projectiles could take from a few
+ounces up to 8 or 9 lb. The large fabric
+balloons then available at G.H.Q. could
+carry up to 15 lb.</p>
+
+<p>It was recognised that there were no
+objections to the use of balloons, as the
+operations did not interfere with other work
+and did not excite retaliation from the
+enemy. The use of projectiles was apt to
+provoke retaliation unless it were carried out
+at night or to a limited extent. There was
+difference of experience and opinion with
+regard to the use of aeroplanes. The
+Italians and French stated that no action
+had been taken by the enemy in the case of
+their airmen who had been captured, and
+that they found no difficulty in imposing
+this duty on their airmen. The British,
+however, stated that the Germans had taken
+strong measures, and had threatened their
+continuance, against airmen captured after
+distributing leaflets. The representative of
+the British Air Ministry stated that, after
+giving full consideration to the matter, and
+notwithstanding their appreciation of the
+value of propaganda, they were opposed to
+the use of aeroplanes for this purpose,
+partly on the ground of the bad psychological<span class="pagenum" id="Page_188">[188]</span>
+effect of such work on young pilots and
+aviators and partly because the supply of
+trained men and of machines was no more
+than sufficient for the direct purposes of this
+arm of the Forces. The representative of
+G.H.Q., France, said that the British Army
+had accepted this view. He added that
+balloons could be employed on the Western
+Front three days a week on the average, and
+that there was no mechanical reason why
+the method by balloons could not be increased
+to meet every reasonable requirement.</p>
+
+<p>A French representative in the course of
+a discussion as to the utility of throwing some
+leaflets in bombing expeditions, reported the
+opinion of a well-known pro-ally German
+citizen that in the case of the Rhine towns
+and rich cities of Germany the propaganda
+of fear, that is to say, the actual dropping
+of bombs, was more useful than the dropping
+of literature.</p>
+
+<p>It was agreed that the suggested use of
+aeroplanes to scatter leaflets at great heights
+parallel with the enemy lines encountered
+most of the objections to, and none of the
+dangers of, their direct use by crossing the
+lines. A device which had been worked
+out experimentally in England, but was not
+employed because of the danger it might<span class="pagenum" id="Page_189">[189]</span>
+occasion to aeroplanes, was explained and
+the apparatus shown. It consisted in sending
+up leaflets to be liberated at the necessary
+height for wind driftage by means of a
+messenger travelling up and down the cable
+of a box kite. This means was recognised
+to be cheap and efficient for employment
+where it would not be dangerous to aeroplanes.</p>
+
+<p>The Committee agreed that the regular
+exchange of information as to methods employed
+by the Allies, and as to the results
+actually obtained by these, would be of
+great value, and recommended that a permanent
+bureau should be established to
+collect and exchange such information and
+reports.</p>
+
+<p>As regards civil means of distribution, the
+Committee recommended that increased
+attention be paid to the insertion of news
+and articles in neutral organs which were
+either read or quoted in the enemy countries.
+Special stress was laid on the importance of
+establishing effective relations with organs
+which had a reputation for strict neutrality
+or pro-enemy bias.</p>
+
+<p>The Committee also recommended that each
+Power should seek through its agencies to
+establish channels through which enemy
+newspaper correspondents could be influenced<span class="pagenum" id="Page_190">[190]</span>
+or provided with information. The
+task of approaching all sufficiently important
+correspondents with whom contact had not
+been established should be apportioned
+among the agencies of the Powers according
+to the opportunities of approach available.
+Channels created under a scheme of this
+kind should be made mutually available to
+the respective Allied agents in the localities
+concerned.</p>
+
+<p>Having regard to the extent to which the
+ordinary book trade channels into Germany
+were still operating, the Committee recommended
+the publication in neutral countries
+of works which, though not directly bearing
+on the issues of the war, were expressly
+calculated to educate enemy opinion in a
+democratic sense. The Committee held that,
+in view of its great utility, clandestine
+circulation in the enemy countries of
+carefully-chosen literature, especially if
+actually written by enemy subjects of pro-Ally
+or revolutionary tendencies, should
+be secured through every available channel.
+In view of the precarious and delicate nature
+of this work, the Committee desired specially
+to emphasise the necessity of seeking out and
+developing new channels for distribution of
+this kind.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_191">[191]</span></p>
+
+<p>The main part of the time which the
+Committee on Material gave to the discussion
+of its subject was devoted to the question
+of the most effective forms of propaganda
+and to the special methods desirable for
+putting these forms into practice. There
+was general agreement that the best way
+to depress the <i>moral</i> of the German troops
+and the German population was to show
+them that it was against their interest to
+continue the war; that the longer they
+went on the worse they would fare both
+during the war and after; and that their
+only hope of regaining their place in the
+community of nations lay in throwing over
+the bad advisers who had led them into the
+war, and whose repeated promises of success
+had been one after the other falsified.
+Thereto the Germans had always had a hope
+before them. They were taught to hope
+for great advantage from the downfall of
+Russia, from the unrestricted U-boat warfare,
+from the last offensive on the Western
+Front. For the first time their leaders did
+not know what hope to dangle before them.
+Therefore, the moment was one peculiarly
+favourable for propaganda if undertaken
+upon the right lines.</p>
+
+<p>It appeared to the Committee that the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_192">[192]</span>
+best lines upon which to work would be to
+emphasise as much as possible the great
+American effort, both in the field and at
+home in the factory, the shipyard, and the
+farm. At the same time the dark commercial
+outlook for Germans, the dangers
+lying latent for them in the control of raw
+materials by the Allies, the discovery of so
+many of their trade secrets, and the building
+up in France, Italy, England, and the
+United States of industries in which they
+had almost a monopoly before the war
+ought also to be brought as vividly as
+possible before them. They should be told
+the truth about the food situation in France
+and England, which so far had been kept from
+them. They should be given news as quickly
+as possible of Allied successes. They should
+be depressed as much as possible, yet at the
+same time care should be taken not to let
+them think they were for ever excluded from
+relations of business and friendship with the
+peoples then fighting against them. If they
+were made to believe this, their backs
+would be stiffened to fight on desperately as
+long as possible. A sound line of propaganda,
+the Committee considered, would be to
+leave open a doorway through which if they
+got rid of Pan-Germanism and renounced its
+theories of world domination by blood and
+iron they would in time be admitted again
+to the same intercourse as before. It was
+agreed that for soldiers the most elementary
+propaganda was the best. More elaborate
+arguments and demonstrations should be
+kept for pamphlets to be smuggled into
+Germany and for articles in neutral papers.
+Use should be made wherever possible of
+diagrams appealing instantly to the eye.</p>
+
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_193">[193]</span></p>
+
+<p>A long discussion took place on the question
+of revolutionary propaganda. The opinion
+was expressed that it was better to denounce
+the Pan-German party generally and throw
+upon them the responsibility for the war and
+for all the misfortunes which Germany had
+suffered and would still further suffer from
+it, rather than to attack the Emperor.
+On the other hand, it was pointed out that
+attacks on an individual are always more
+effective than attacks on a party. Finally,
+it was agreed that anything said against the
+Hohenzollern dynasty should be taken, either
+in reality or in appearance, from German
+sources, so as to avoid the risk that attacks
+clearly emanating from Allied sources might
+strengthen rather than weaken the Emperor’s
+hold upon the people of Germany. While
+a good deal of material was available from<span class="pagenum" id="Page_194">[194]</span>
+German anti-Imperial sources, it was
+suggested that the advantage of circulating,
+for example, speeches of Socialists, might
+be counterbalanced by the disadvantage that
+it would make such speakers less inclined to
+talk. Some Socialists had appealed to the
+French Government not to use their speeches
+for propaganda, because this weakened their
+efforts. It was agreed that incitements to
+German soldiers to desert were legitimate
+and might be useful. The sending into
+Germany of photographs of prisoners of war
+taken immediately after their capture, when
+they were usually in a deplorable condition,
+and after two months of captivity, when
+their physical condition was good, was
+recommended.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to Austria-Hungary, the Committee
+discussed whether it was illegitimate
+to exploit the land hunger among the Magyar
+peasants and the discontent among the
+German proletariat. It was agreed that it
+would do no harm to support the agrarian
+agitators in Hungary, but, as regards Bolshevik
+propaganda among the Austro-German
+working classes, that the Allies ought only
+to circulate their own literature. It was
+suggested that the United States, in mobilising
+its Slav elements, might spare members<span class="pagenum" id="Page_195">[195]</span>
+of each of the Slav nationalities for propaganda
+work in England and in France.</p>
+
+<p>Propaganda in Bulgaria depended on the
+policy which the Entente Powers and the
+United States decided to follow with regard
+to that country. Until such a policy was
+settled little could be done in a large way.
+It was useful, however, to make the Bulgarians
+acquainted with a number of facts
+of which they were ignorant, as for example,
+the failure of U-boats to reduce England to
+the verge of starvation, the large number of
+American troops already in France, and so on.
+Leaflets on these and other topics were being
+dropped regularly by aeroplanes on the
+Salonica front in considerable quantities.
+A good deal, it was suggested, could be done
+through Bulgars in Switzerland. But so
+long as the Bulgarians believed that the
+United States was their friend and would
+see them through whatever happened, little
+impression could be made upon them.</p>
+
+<p>With regard to co-operation between the
+various bodies engaged in propaganda, it was
+proposed that closer relations should be
+established between the local agents of the
+Allied Powers in neutral countries; that
+they should meet from time to time to
+exchange ideas and to give each other full<span class="pagenum" id="Page_196">[196]</span>
+information as to their activities. Special
+stress was laid upon the necessity of these
+local agents working in union with the
+diplomatic and military representatives and
+with any other agencies engaged in the same
+kind of work. The Committee unanimously
+accepted this suggestion, with the proviso
+that the local agents should, if possible, be
+under the direction of the Central Committee,
+to which they could refer for instructions and
+advice. Pending the establishment of such
+a central body, arrangements were made for
+the various Propaganda Departments to
+begin at once to exchange information about
+all that they were doing and that each should
+send out copies of all the material produced
+by it to the other departments. It was, of
+course, agreed that such circulation of
+material produced would be one of the chief
+activities of the proposed central body, which
+would do it with greater rapidity and effect.</p>
+
+<p>It was also agreed that such a central
+body could be most useful in employing
+methods for testing the effectiveness of
+propaganda. The means of doing this were
+generally admitted to be defective. Only
+by co-ordinating effort and by comparing
+information could they be improved. It
+was decided that the existing system of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_197">[197]</span>
+examining prisoners of war for purposes of
+military information ought to be supplemented
+by a special further examination for
+the purposes of propaganda information,
+and it was suggested that special representatives
+of the Enemy Propaganda Departments
+should be allowed to conduct such examinations.</p>
+
+<p>Some important points connected with
+propaganda brought to bear upon Germany
+through neutral countries were raised, and
+it was agreed that the work of controlling
+and distributing films for moving picture
+theatres, which was to be done by an Inter-Allied
+Commission in Switzerland, ought to
+be extended to other neutral countries,
+especially Sweden. Information before the
+Committee bore testimony that German-owned
+picture theatres had of late increased
+very much in number both in Switzerland
+and in Scandinavia, and that these relied
+for the lighter part of their entertainments
+upon films from Allied countries, Germany
+supplying special propaganda films. By controlling
+the supply of films from Allied
+countries, the activity of these theatres
+could be very much diminished and possibly
+brought to an end.</p>
+
+<p>It was also agreed that it would be advisable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_198">[198]</span>
+to invite a number of neutral editors
+and newspaper writers to pay a visit to
+the United States. It was considered that
+articles describing what they saw and what
+they were able to judge of the feeling of the
+American nation would have a very useful
+effect upon German opinion.</p>
+
+<p>With a view to influencing German opinion,
+it was agreed that more news agencies, to all
+appearance independent and self-supporting,
+might well be established in other neutral
+countries; that more efforts should be made
+to get articles inserted in enemy newspapers,
+not controversial articles, but statements of
+what the Allies were doing, especially in the
+economic field, written as a German might
+write them who was anxious about the
+future of his country; and that dispatch of
+Allied newspapers to neutral countries should
+be improved and extended so that there
+might be more chance of their finding their
+way into Germany.</p>
+
+<p>The discussions of the Prisoners of War
+Committee showed that agreement existed
+as to the soundness of the methods adopted
+by Crewe House for this particular work,
+and the report took the form of a recommendation
+that they should be generally
+adopted by the Allies.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_199">[199]</span></p>
+
+<p>At the final plenary session of the
+Conference, on August 17, 1918, it was
+unanimously resolved that the Committees’
+reports should be accepted, and submitted
+by the heads of the four Missions to their
+respective Governments for their approval
+and adoption. The Conference resolved to
+constitute (as suggested by the Policy Committee)
+a permanent inter-Allied body for
+the conduct of propaganda in enemy countries
+and by so doing made a great advance.
+In order to maintain close touch with
+the French propaganda authorities, Lord
+Northcliffe appointed Colonel Lord Onslow
+as resident representative of Crewe House
+in Paris. By the time the Armistice was
+signed the different Governments had
+nominated their delegates to the permanent
+Inter-Allied body and all the necessary preliminary
+arrangements had been satisfactorily
+made. This organisation would have opened
+a new chapter in the history of war propaganda
+but for the conclusion of hostilities.
+As Lord Northcliffe said in his final speech
+to the Conference, the constitution of a permanent
+Inter-Allied body was a step towards
+that general co-ordination of Allied purpose
+and organisation which the experience of the
+war had proved to be a postulate of rapidity<span class="pagenum" id="Page_200">[200]</span>
+and efficiency of action. The work of the
+Conference itself, however, was invaluable
+as it surveyed the policy and organisation of
+propaganda against the enemy in all its
+phases and from many points of view at a
+time when propaganda had just passed into
+the intensive stage. Its reports in themselves
+form a text-book in the science and art
+of propaganda.</p>
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp100" id="i_p176c" style="max-width: 148.0625em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p176c.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">“DRIFTING DOWN IN WHITE SHOWERS”: LEAFLETS (INSTEAD OF BOMBS), FROM ITALIAN
+AEROPLANE SQUADRON, DROPPING ON VIENNA—AN AIR PHOTOGRAPH.<br>
+<i>Photograph supplied by the Photographic Studios of the Italian Air Service.
+By kind permission of the “Illustrated London News.”</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p176a" style="max-width: 100%">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p176a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">MR. ROBERT DONALD.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.<br>
+<i>Photo: Elliott &amp; Fry, Ltd.</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80"  id="i_p192a" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p192a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">SIR SIDNEY LOW.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE<br>
+<i>Photo: Elliott &amp; Fry. Ltd</i></figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+<div class="column"><figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p192d" style="max-width: 100%;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p192d.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">MR. JAMES O’GRADY, M.P.<br>
+MEMBER OF THE ENEMY PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.</figcaption>
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_201">[201]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_VIII">CHAPTER VIII<br>
+<span class="fs80">FROM WAR PROPAGANDA TO
+PEACE PROPAGANDA</span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+<p class="sub">The Co-ordination of British Policy—A representative committee—Lord
+Northcliffe’s Article: “From War to Peace.”</p>
+
+
+
+<p>In addition to its success in its practical
+bearing and direct influence on the work of
+spreading the truth concerning the war in the
+enemy countries, the Inter-Allied Conference
+at Crewe House in August, 1918, was a
+distinctly useful act of propaganda in two
+other directions. First, it led to a mutual
+appreciation, among the influential representatives
+of the four countries, of the effort
+and determination of each nation and of their
+willingness to combine to achieve victory—in
+other words, to a better understanding of
+each other’s will to conquer and readiness
+to subordinate self-interest to the larger
+object of Allied accomplishment of purpose.</p>
+
+<p>In the second place, the Conference was an
+object-lesson to the British Government Departments
+which participated in it as to the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_202">[202]</span>
+value of concerted and co-ordinated action
+in propaganda matters. Shortly afterwards,
+a suggestion was made by an influential
+representative of one of these Departments
+that a committee should be formed to
+represent all British departments concerned
+in any way with propaganda. Moreover, it
+gradually became evident to all concerned
+that the collapse of Bulgaria was the beginning
+of the end, and that “war propaganda”
+must by a process of steady evolution
+become “peace-terms propaganda,” by which
+public opinion in enemy countries as well
+as at home, in the Dominions, and in Allied
+and neutral countries, might be made accustomed
+to the peace which the Allies
+intended to make. The maintenance of
+British prestige demanded that our position
+in regard to the peace should be explained
+and justified by the widespread dissemination
+of news and views, both before and during
+the Peace Conference.</p>
+
+<p>Thus it was more than ever imperative
+that all British propagandists should speak
+with one voice. Here then was work ready
+to be done by the suggested inter-departmental
+committee, for the formation of which
+invitations had already been issued to the
+departments concerned to send as delegates<span class="pagenum" id="Page_203">[203]</span>
+to this Committee responsible officials able
+to give decisions for their departments on
+such matters as would be discussed by such
+a committee. These invitations were accepted
+by:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p>
+The War Cabinet,<br>
+The Admiralty,<br>
+The War Office,<br>
+The Foreign Office,<br>
+The Treasury,<br>
+The Ministry of Information,<br>
+The Air Ministry,<br>
+The Colonial Office,<br>
+The India Office,<br>
+The War Aims Committee, and<br>
+The Official Press Bureau.<br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>Representatives of these departments and
+of Lord Northcliffe’s department, which,
+for official purposes, had been renamed The
+British War Mission, thus formed what was
+known as the Policy Committee of the
+British War Mission.</p>
+
+<p>While this Committee was in process of
+formation, Crewe House had been studying
+the problems of “peace-terms propaganda”
+and had, as a result of a series of conferences,
+prepared a memorandum outlining a basis
+upon which such propaganda could be
+developed.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_204">[204]</span></p>
+
+<p>The first meeting of the Policy Committee
+was held at Crewe House on October 4, 1918,
+and I presided in the absence, through
+indisposition, of Lord Northcliffe. After
+giving a summarised account of the work
+carried on from Crewe House, I said that
+whatever results it had been possible to
+achieve had proceeded mainly from the
+circumstance that it had in each case been
+based upon definite policies in regard to the
+countries concerned. These policies had all
+been submitted to, and had received the
+approval of, the British Government. The
+advantages of this procedure were obvious.
+It enabled propagandists to work on consistent
+lines without fear that the representations
+they made to the enemy would be
+contradicted by actual occurrences. In this
+way, propaganda representations had a cumulative
+effect. If, for instance, enemy troops
+were at first inclined to regard representations
+with scepticism, they were gradually convinced
+by the force of events that they had
+been told the truth from the outset, and that
+consequently subsequent representations
+deserved serious attention. Another advantage
+had proceeded from the obvious
+circumstance that as Allied policy must
+correspond to the aims which the Allies<span class="pagenum" id="Page_205">[205]</span>
+were determined to secure at the peace,
+the representation of that policy to propaganda
+was in harmony with the war aims of
+the Allies, and was strengthened by every
+successive declaration by Allied statesmen
+of the objects for which they were fighting.
+A third advantage was that the propaganda
+of the enemy could not destroy the effects of
+our propaganda without having gained such
+military successes as to render the Allied
+war aims themselves unattainable. Consequently
+every Allied victory that brought the
+war aims nearer attainment enhanced also
+the efficacy of propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>At the outset, the efforts made by Crewe
+House were naturally tentative and experimental.
+Their real value could only be
+proved by the test of experience. This
+test had been applied in Austria-Hungary,
+Bulgaria, and Germany. As against Austria-Hungary,
+Crewe House propaganda contributed
+to the defeat of the Austrians on
+the Piave in June, and had its efforts not
+been thwarted by political short-sightedness
+and some personal intrigue on the part of
+various Italian authorities, it was certain that
+much greater headway would have been
+made and that the Italian armies would
+have been in a much more favourable<span class="pagenum" id="Page_206">[206]</span>
+position. As it was, the policy of liberating
+the Austro-Hungarian subject races, upon
+which propaganda had been based, had
+already had a marked effect in the interior
+of the Dual Monarchy, and had brought large
+sections of the inhabitants to the point of
+revolt. This would be clear when it was
+said that the Italo-Jugo-Slav Agreement of
+March, 1918, the Rome Congress of the
+Hapsburg Subject Races of April, with its
+sequel in the declarations by the Allies and
+the United States to the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks
+and Southern Slavs, as well as the
+actual recognition of the Czecho-Slovaks and
+the prospective recognition of the Jugo-Slavs
+as Allied and belligerent nations, had all been
+influenced, if not directly promoted, by the
+efforts of Crewe House.</p>
+
+<p>As regards Bulgaria, Crewe House
+definitely rejected Bulgarian overtures until
+there should be a complete reversal of
+Bulgarian policy. That reversal had taken
+place, and had opened up further prospects
+of propaganda against Austria-Hungary of
+which speedy advantage was being taken.</p>
+
+<p>The work in Germany had been positive
+and negative. Its aim had been to give the
+German people something to hope for and
+much to fear—in other words, to make it<span class="pagenum" id="Page_207">[207]</span>
+clear to them that the only way to escape
+complete ruin would be to break with the
+system that brought the war upon Europe,
+and to qualify for admission into a League
+of Nations on the Allied terms. In addition
+to these educative efforts, we had supplied
+the enemy armies with constant and invariably
+truthful information about the
+actual military position. The news which
+the German military authorities were withholding
+from their troops had been supplied
+by us. Hence their cries of alarm. Nevertheless,
+much remained to be done in the
+co-ordination of the efforts of all Government
+Departments so as to make the general
+work of propaganda as rapid and as efficient
+as possible. Much use had unfortunately
+deprived the term “propaganda” of its real
+meaning. In its true sense it meant the
+education of the enemy to a knowledge of
+what kind of world the Allies meant to
+create, and of the place reserved in it for
+enemy peoples according as they assisted in,
+or continued to resist, its creation. It implied
+also the dissemination of this knowledge
+among the Allied peoples, so that there
+might be full popular support for Allied
+policy and no tendency at the critical moment
+of peace to sacrifice any essential feature of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_208">[208]</span>
+the settlement because its importance might
+not have been explained or understood in
+time. Next to the actual work of fighting
+the enemy on land and sea, there was no
+more important work than this; and the
+joint intelligence and energy of all Departments
+of the Government were required to
+accomplish it successfully. For this reason
+the suggestion that this council of representatives
+of the Government Departments
+chiefly concerned should be formed had
+been warmly welcomed, in order that there
+might be less dispersion of effort, less overlapping,
+and greater mutual comprehension
+of the work which each Department was
+striving to do, and fuller co-ordination in the
+direction of all those efforts to one single end.</p>
+
+
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_209">[209]</span></p>
+
+<p>As the war approached its end, enemy
+propaganda must gradually pass into peace
+offensives and counter-offensives. The British
+War Mission therefore had already in
+existence an organisation to collect and
+collate various suggestions, territorial,
+political, economic, and so forth, that had
+been made by the different sections and
+parties in Allied, neutral, and enemy
+countries. A step in this direction was the
+report on the Propaganda Library, issued by
+the War Office early in 1917, by Captain
+Chalmers Mitchell, who had since become the
+liaison officer between the British War
+Mission and the War Office, and who had
+been asked to act as Secretary of the Policy
+Committee. Captain Chalmers Mitchell
+was in charge of the aforesaid organisation
+at Crewe House, and although its immediate
+function was to collect information useful
+for propaganda, it was clear that it would
+also obtain material useful to those who had
+to shape peace policy. For propaganda to
+the enemy was in a sense a forecast of
+policy; it must be inspired by policy, but
+at the same time its varying needs also
+suggested policy.</p>
+
+<p>It was hoped, therefore, that this Policy
+Committee might assist in furnishing materials
+for the compilation of the various
+peace proposals, in revising the collation
+of them, in drawing inferences from them
+and in discussing the action and reaction of
+peace propaganda and peace policy that the
+inferences suggested.</p>
+
+<p>The Committee decided to undertake the
+following immediate activities:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>Study of Peace Terms.</p>
+
+<p>Study of utterances by important
+enemy representatives to form decisions<span class="pagenum" id="Page_210">[210]</span>
+as to what credence should be
+given them and what response should
+be made to them.</p>
+
+<p>Suggestion of statements to be made
+by Allied representatives, and consideration
+of their phraseology and substance.</p>
+
+<p>Special consideration of the reception
+to be given to German statements as
+to the course of democratisation in
+Germany.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>At an emergency meeting of the Committee
+summoned a few days later to draft a
+statement of propaganda policy with
+reference to the German Peace Note, Lord
+Northcliffe said his department had prepared
+for submission to the Committee a draft
+statement, based on a consideration of
+President Wilson’s pronouncements. After
+various slight modifications had been made,
+the statement was adopted in principle.</p>
+
+<p>In its final form it read:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“In order to stop further bloodshed, the
+German Government requests the immediate
+conclusion of an armistice on land and
+water and in the air.</p>
+
+<p>“The Note accepts the programme set
+forth by the President of the United States
+in his message to Congress of January 8th,
+1918, and in his later pronouncements,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_211">[211]</span>
+especially his speech of September 27th, as
+a basis for peace negotiations.</p>
+
+<p>“In point of fact, the pronouncements of
+President Wilson were a statement of attitude
+made before the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and
+enforcement of the peace of Bucharest on
+Rumania, and the German statement of
+their intentions at the outset of the Spring
+offensive. They cannot, therefore, be understood
+as a full recitation of the conditions of
+peace.</p>
+
+<p>“The phrasing of the German acceptance
+of them as a ‘basis for peace negotiations’
+covers every variety of interpretation from
+sincere acceptance to that mere desire for
+negotiations which is the inevitable consequence
+of the existing military situation.
+It is, therefore, impossible to grant any
+armistice to Germany which does not give
+the Entente full and acceptable guarantees
+that the terms arranged will be complied with.
+There must be a clear understanding that
+Germany accepts certain principles as indisputable,
+and reserves for negotiation only
+such details as, in the opinion of the Associated
+Powers, are negotiable.</p>
+
+<p>“In the full conviction of the power and
+the will of the Associated Powers to enforce
+a peace that shall be just and lasting, we<span class="pagenum" id="Page_212">[212]</span>
+shall thankfully accept conclusive evidence
+that the peoples of our present enemies are
+willing to co-operate in the establishment of
+such a peace. With the object of making
+the conditions of such co-operation clear, we
+take the opportunity, presented by the
+German peace note, of exploring more fully
+the ground covered by President Wilson’s
+pronouncements and of distinguishing
+explicitly between principles and conditions
+that must be accepted as indisputable, and
+terms and details that may be the subject of
+negotiation.</p>
+
+<p>“The following conditions are indisputable:—</p>
+
+<p>“<i>In no sense whatever shall restoration or
+reparation in the case of Belgium be taken
+into consideration when adjusting any other
+claims arising from the war.</i></p>
+
+<p>“1. The complete restoration, territorial
+and political, of Belgium. The assumption
+by Germany of the full financial burden
+involved in material restoration and reconstruction,
+including the replacement of
+machinery, the provision of war pensions
+and adequate compensation for all civilian
+losses and injuries, and the liquidation of all
+Belgian war debts. In view of the circumstances
+in which Germany invaded Belgium,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_213">[213]</span>
+no allegations that Belgian civilians acted
+against military law or imposed authority
+shall be taken into consideration. The
+future international status of Belgium shall
+be settled in accordance with the wishes of
+the Belgian nation.</p>
+
+<p>“2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction
+of the invaded provinces, compensation
+for all civilian losses and injuries.</p>
+
+<p>“3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine,
+not as a territorial acquisition or
+part of a war indemnity, but as reparation
+for the wrong done in 1871, when the inhabitants
+of the two Provinces, whose
+ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance,
+were incorporated in Germany against their
+will.</p>
+
+<p>“4. Readjustment of the Northern
+frontiers of Italy as nearly as possible
+along the lines of nationality.</p>
+
+<p>“5. The assurance to all the peoples of
+Austria-Hungary of their place amongst the
+free nations of the world and of their right
+to enter into union with their kindred
+beyond the present boundaries of Austria-Hungary.</p>
+
+<p>“6. The evacuation of all Territory
+formerly included in the boundaries of the
+Russian Empire, the annulment of all treaties,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_214">[214]</span>
+contracts, or agreements made with subjects,
+agents, or representatives of Enemy Powers
+since the Revolution and affecting territory
+or interests formerly Russian, and co-operation
+of the Associated Powers in securing
+conditions under which the various
+nationalities of the former Empire of Russia
+shall determine their own form of Government.</p>
+
+<p>“7. The formation of an independent
+Polish State with access to the Sea, which
+State shall include the territories inhabited
+by predominantly Polish populations, and
+the indemnification of Poland by the Powers
+responsible for the havoc wrought.</p>
+
+<p>“8. The abrogation of the Treaty of
+Bucharest, the evacuation and restoration of
+Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the
+Associated Powers to aid the Balkan States
+in settling finally the Balkan question on an
+equitable basis.</p>
+
+<p>“9. The removal, so far as is practicable,
+of Turkish dominion over all non-Turkish
+peoples.</p>
+
+<p>“10. The people of Schleswig shall be free
+to determine their own allegiance.</p>
+
+<p>“11. As reparation for the illegal submarine
+warfare waged by Germany and
+Austria-Hungary, these Powers shall be held<span class="pagenum" id="Page_215">[215]</span>
+liable to replace the merchant tonnage belonging
+to the Associated and Neutral nations
+illegally damaged or destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>“12. The appointment of a tribunal before
+which there shall be brought for impartial
+justice individuals of any of the belligerents
+accused of offences against the laws of
+war or of humanity.</p>
+
+<p>“13. The former Colonial possessions of
+Germany lost by her in consequence of her
+illegal aggression against Belgium shall in no
+case be returned to Germany.</p>
+
+<p>“The following conditions of Peace are
+negotiable:</p>
+
+<p>“1. The adjustment of claims for damage
+necessarily arising from the operations of
+war, and not included amongst the indisputable
+conditions.</p>
+
+<p>“2. The establishment, constitution, and
+conditions of Membership of a League of
+Free Nations for the purpose of preventing
+future wars, and improving international
+relations.</p>
+
+<p>“3. The League of Free Nations shall be
+inspired by the resolve of the Associated
+Powers to create a world in which, when the
+conditions of the Peace have been carried out,
+there shall be opportunity and security for
+the legitimate development of all the Peoples.”</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_216">[216]</span></p>
+</div>
+
+<p>This was approved by a representative of
+the Government, designated <i>ad hoc</i>, for
+unofficial use as propaganda policy. Each
+department adapted it to its own needs. So
+far as Crewe House was concerned, effective
+use was made of it on two occasions—the
+first being when Lord Northcliffe, at the
+suggestion of the Enemy Propaganda Committee,
+dealt with the subject of peace
+terms in an address to United States officers
+at the “Washington Inn,” London, on
+October 22, 1918.</p>
+
+<p>At a meeting of the Policy Committee at
+Crewe House on October 28, the action of the
+various departments on the memorandum
+was stated and approved.</p>
+
+<p>The Crewe House Committee reported
+first as to Lord Northcliffe’s address at the
+Washington Inn; next that the production
+department of the Enemy Propaganda Committee
+was engaged on a series of pamphlets
+and leaflets dealing with different points of
+the terms; third, that a reasoned statement
+covering the whole ground, and showing
+what Germany had to gain in the end, was
+being drafted for publication, the idea being
+that it should appear as an article or as a
+speech to which wide circulation would be
+given; and lastly that the secretary of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_217">[217]</span>
+permanent Inter-Allied Body for Propaganda
+in Enemy Countries had written to the
+French, Italian, and American members of
+that body enclosing a copy of the Peace
+Policy Memorandum and suggesting that
+they should take action similar to that of
+the British Policy Committee and bring the
+subject up for discussion at the next meeting
+of the Inter-Allied Body. (It may be
+mentioned here that the rapid course of
+events prevented the contemplated meeting
+of the Inter-Allied Body.)</p>
+
+<p>That was the last meeting of the Policy
+Committee. There remains to be set forth
+the final result of its work. Crewe House,
+as explained above, had stated its intention
+of publishing an article covering the whole
+ground of the memorandum in such a way
+that the policy could be presented in the same
+terms to our own people, to our Allies, and
+to the enemy. It was found impracticable
+to get such an article published quickly
+enough in a high-class magazine, or to get an
+immediate occasion for making it the text
+of a speech. In these circumstances the
+Committee asked their chairman, Viscount
+Northcliffe, to give the Peace Policy the
+wide publicity possible by the use of his
+name and by the sources of distribution<span class="pagenum" id="Page_218">[218]</span>
+which he was able to command. Lord
+Northcliffe agreed, and accordingly produced
+the article which follows and which was a
+full statement of the agreed policy. He
+arranged for its simultaneous publication in
+the London Press and, at his own expense,
+had it cabled to the remotest parts of the
+world. As stated in the House of Commons
+by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury,
+the document was unofficial. Its purpose
+was to form the basis of a policy of publicity
+and the fact that it was proposed to elaborate
+it for publication was announced beforehand,
+and approved by the Policy Committee.
+This is the text of the article from <i>The Times</i>
+of November 4, 1918:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+<p class="center">
+FROM WAR TO PEACE<br>
+<br>
+By <span class="smcap">Lord Northcliffe</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p><i>This article is appearing to-day in the leading papers
+in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa,
+Newfoundland, India, the British Dependencies, United
+States, South America, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland,
+Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Japan and
+elsewhere.</i></p>
+
+<p><i>It will be circulated in Germany during the present
+week.</i></p>
+
+<p>Now that peace is at last in sight, I hear the question
+being asked on all sides: “How are we to pass from
+war conditions to peace conditions?” This cannot
+be done by a sudden and dramatic declaration like<span class="pagenum" id="Page_219">[219]</span>
+the declaration which in August, 1914, changed peace
+into war. It must be a slow and laborious process—a
+process with, as it seems to me, at least three distinct
+and successive stages. Out of these stages will be
+formed the organic whole which will constitute the
+machinery for replacing war conditions by peace
+conditions.</p>
+
+<p>It is important to get these three stages clearly
+outlined in our imaginations, and it is important
+also to bear in mind that each stage will smooth the
+path for its successor precisely in proportion to the
+sincerity and thoroughness with which it has been
+completed. There is but one goal for those who are
+honest and far-seeing. That goal is to create a condition
+of the world in which there shall be opportunity
+and security for the legitimate development of all
+Peoples. The road is long and difficult, but I believe
+that its course is already clear enough to be described,
+in the same words, to those who are our friends and
+to those who are now our enemies.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+I<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The first stage is the cessation of hostilities. Here,
+whether they cease on account of an armistice or by
+reason of surrender, there can be no question as to the
+“Honour” of the German people, or as to any adjustment
+of the conditions to any supposed strategical or
+actual strength of the Central Powers.</p>
+
+<p>If they feel humiliated, they must blame those who
+brought humiliation upon them; and as to military
+strength, the semi-official organ of the German Government,
+the <i>Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung</i>, has admitted
+that our reserves are such as Germany cannot
+compete with.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_220">[220]</span></p>
+
+<p>It is clear [said this newspaper on October 12]
+that if we systematically continued the war in this
+way, fighting might go on for a long time. The
+annihilation of the German Army is still a long way
+from attainment; we still have a quantity of unspent
+forces at our command in the recruit depôts behind
+the front, in the reserve battalions, and at home. But
+<i>doubtless there are certain limits to all this on our side,
+whereas our enemies—chiefly America—are in a position
+to replace men and materials on an ever-increasing scale</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Another equally important admission I found in
+the <i>Münchner Neueste Nachrichten</i>, the leading South-German
+organ, on October 25.</p>
+
+<p>A German retreat beyond the frontier [this journal
+said] and especially an advance by the enemy to the
+frontier, would render the German situation much
+worse, as it would expose Germany’s industrial territory
+to the Entente’s artillery fire, and particularly
+their air attacks, while the danger to the enemy’s
+industrial districts would be correspondingly removed.
+<i>This condition alone would not only secure the enemy’s
+military preponderance, but would increase it.</i></p>
+
+<p>Thus it is clear that Germany, deprived now of the
+help of her allies, recognises her hopeless situation.
+The conditions upon which hostilities can cease must
+be laid down by the military and naval leaders of the
+Associated Powers and accepted by the Central Powers
+in such form that no resumption of hostilities is possible.</p>
+
+<p>And this I will say: The spirit in which Germany
+accepts these stern and necessary conditions will do
+much to determine the course of future events. If
+she haggles over the conditions, or is sullen and obstructive
+in her mode of carrying them out, then
+our profound distrust of her spirit and motives will<span class="pagenum" id="Page_221">[221]</span>
+survive into the subsequent stages and still further
+delay that re-establishment of tolerable relations
+which must be our object. But if Germany by word
+and deed makes plain her abandonment of that belief
+in Might which her rulers, supported until recently
+by the majority of her people, have used as a menace
+to the power of Right, the greatest obstacle in the
+path of equal justice will have been removed.</p>
+
+<p>By a stroke of the pen, in accepting the conditions
+of armistice, or by a mere gesture of unconditional
+surrender, Germany can cause fighting to cease.
+Naturally, the business of evacuation and of reoccupation
+will have to be conducted by concert
+between the military and naval leaders. The first
+governing condition in these operations and detailed
+arrangements will be the safety of the peace. The
+second condition will be the security of civilian life
+and property. The emotional background to all this
+will be a daily increasing desire on the part of all to
+get back to normal conditions of life. Co-operation and
+agreement will be required, not so much to secure that
+demobilisation and disarmament shall be forced
+sternly on those who have surrendered as to secure
+that each side takes its fair share in the burden of
+maintaining order and in facilitating the change from
+military to civilian organisation.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+II<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The second stage of the passage from war conditions
+to peace conditions will begin as soon as it is certain
+that security has been obtained for the permanence
+of the first stage. It will consist in the acceptance by
+Germany of certain principles as indisputable. The
+security provided in the first stage ought to be sufficient<span class="pagenum" id="Page_222">[222]</span>
+to enable us to pass through the second stage quickly.
+With sufficient guarantees there need be no waiting
+to see whether the transformation of the German
+Government from irresponsible autocracy to responsible
+democracy is as genuine as it is represented to be, or
+whether the changed professions of those who speak
+for the People represent a change of heart.</p>
+
+<p>The indisputable principles which Germany must
+accept in this second stage have been stated in different
+forms at different times, but the consensus of opinion
+amongst all classes of the Associated Powers seems to
+me to be so clear that it is not difficult to state them
+objectively in a form very close to that which they
+are likely to assume in their final enunciation.</p>
+
+<p>The first is the complete restoration, territorial,
+economic, and political, of Belgium. In this there
+can be no reservation, no bargaining, no attempt to
+raise counter-claims or offsets of any kind. By her
+initial violation of International Law, and by her
+subsequent treatment of Belgium, Germany has
+forfeited all right to discussion. Reparation is impossible,
+but she must undertake restoration in such
+form and measure as shall be indicated to her.</p>
+
+<p>2. The freeing of French territory, reconstruction
+of the invaded provinces, compensation for all civilian
+losses and injuries. Here again reparation in any full
+sense of the word is beyond human power, but Germany
+must accept the full burden of material reconstruction,
+replacement, and compensation, again in such form and
+measure as shall be laid down.</p>
+
+<p>3. The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine,
+not as a territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity,
+but as reparation for the wrong done in
+1871, when the inhabitants of the two provinces,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_223">[223]</span>
+whose ancestors voluntarily chose French allegiance,
+were incorporated in Germany against their will.</p>
+
+<p>4. Readjustment of the Northern Frontiers of
+Italy as nearly as possible along the lines of nationality;
+the Eastern and Adriatic frontiers to be determined in
+accordance with the principles embodied in the Italo-Jugo-Slav
+Agreement and ratified by the Rome Congress
+of April, 1918.</p>
+
+<p>5. The assurance to all the peoples of Austria-Hungary
+of their place amongst the free nations
+of the world and of their right to enter into union
+with their kindred beyond the present boundaries of
+Austria-Hungary. This involves the creation of
+independent Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav States,
+the reduction of Hungary to the ethnographic limits
+of the Magyar race, and the union of all Rumanians
+with the present kingdom of Rumania. In the same
+way the Poles and Ukrainians of the Dual Monarchy
+must be free to unite with their co-nationals across
+existing frontiers, and it is obvious that the same right
+of self-determination cannot be denied to the German
+provinces of Austria, should they desire to enter
+Germany as a federal unit.</p>
+
+<p>6. The evacuation of all territory formerly included
+in the boundaries of the Russian Empire; the annulment
+of all Russian treaties, contracts, or agreements
+made with subjects, agents, or representatives of
+Enemy Powers since the Revolution and affecting
+territory or interests formerly Russian; and the unimpeded
+co-operation of the Associated Powers in securing
+conditions under which the various nationalities of the
+former Empire of Russia shall determine their own
+forms of government.</p>
+
+<p>When Russia offered a peace of reconciliation<span class="pagenum" id="Page_224">[224]</span>
+without annexations or indemnities, the Central
+Powers, taking advantage of the military position,
+rejected all considerations of justice and imposed
+terms that were brutal and selfish. Thus they forfeited
+the right to aid Russia and the various nationalities
+of the former Empire of Russia in their efforts
+to establish self-determination and their own form of
+government.</p>
+
+<p>The seventh indisputable principle concerns (<i>a</i>) the
+formation of an independent Polish State with access
+to the sea, which State shall include the territories
+inhabited by predominantly Polish populations; and
+(<i>b</i>) the indemnification of Poland by the Powers
+responsible for the havoc wrought.</p>
+
+<p>This condition is indispensable for the reign of
+justice in Europe. Germany has ruthlessly oppressed
+the Poles within her Empire. Justice and stability
+demand the restoration of the predominantly Polish
+parts of the present German Empire to the new Polish
+State.</p>
+
+<p>8. The abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest; the
+evacuation and restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and
+Montenegro; the Associated Powers to aid the Balkan
+States in settling finally the Balkan question on an
+equitable basis.</p>
+
+<p>The Balkan question must be settled, and it follows
+from that principle of self-determination to which the
+Associated Powers adhere that the Balkan States
+must be encouraged to agree among themselves and
+give what advice or assistance they may ask in coming
+to an agreement.</p>
+
+<p>9. The removal, as far as is practicable, of Turkish
+dominion over all non-Turkish peoples.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_225">[225]</span></p>
+
+<p>The complexity of the distribution of nationalities
+in the present Empire of Turkey makes the details of
+the problem difficult, but the failure of the Turks, in
+act and in intention, to rule justly has been so disastrous,
+and the acquiescence of the Central Powers in
+Turkish misdeeds so complete, that no departure from
+this principle can be considered.</p>
+
+<p>10. The people of Schleswig to be free to determine
+their own allegiance.</p>
+
+<p>The case of Schleswig is a fundamental instance of
+the fashion in which Prussia and Austria used their
+might to override the principle of self-determination.
+The wrong done must be redressed.</p>
+
+<p>11. As reparation for the illegal submarine warfare
+waged by Germany and Austria-Hungary, these Powers
+shall be held liable to replace the merchant tonnage,
+belonging to the associated and neutral nations,
+illegally damaged or destroyed.</p>
+
+<p>In spite of repeated warnings, and in defiance
+of the pledges which they had given to the Government
+of the United States, then a neutral Power, the Central
+Powers have persisted in operations which, by their
+nature and by the fashion in which they were conducted,
+outraged both International Law and common humanity.
+The question of punishment must be dealt
+with separately; that of restoring the ships or their
+equivalents, and of material compensation to the
+victims and their families, cannot be subject to discussion
+or negotiation.</p>
+
+<p>12. The appointment of tribunals before which
+there shall be brought for impartial justice as soon as
+possible individuals of any of the belligerents accused
+of offences against the laws of war or of humanity.</p>
+
+<p>While I regard this condition as an essential preliminary
+to peace, as a just concession to the outraged<span class="pagenum" id="Page_226">[226]</span>
+conscience of humanity, I admit freely that its practical
+application is full of difficulty. I foresee the extraordinary
+difficulty of assigning responsibility; I
+recognise that during the actual conduct of war there
+are reasons why belligerents should hesitate to punish
+adequately those whom in normal times they would
+unhesitatingly condemn. I offer my own solution of
+the difficulty. It is that the appointed tribunals
+should act as Courts of First Instance. They would
+hear the evidence brought against the accused, and, if
+they found a <i>prima facie</i> case established against them,
+would refer them to their own countries for ultimate
+trial, judgment, and sentence. I believe that more
+stern justice will be done if nations which desire to
+purge themselves condemn their own criminals than if
+the punishment were left to other nations which might
+hesitate to be severe lest they should invest the
+individuals punished with the halo of martyrdom.</p>
+
+<p>13. The former colonial possessions of Germany, lost
+by her in consequence of her illegal aggression against
+Belgium, shall in no case be returned to Germany.</p>
+
+<p>Germany’s possession of her colonies would have
+been inviolate but for her illegal aggression against
+Belgium, which brought England into the war. She
+has proclaimed that the fate of her colonies would be
+decided on the Western front; it has been so decided.
+She has proclaimed the uses to which, if victorious, she
+would have put her colonies; such uses must be
+prevented for ever in the interest of the peace of the
+world. Furthermore, there is this consideration that,
+after what has happened, it would be as intolerable for
+Australasia to have New Guinea in German hands as
+it would be for the United States to have Germany in
+possession of Cuba. The colonies therefore cannot be<span class="pagenum" id="Page_227">[227]</span>
+returned to Germany, but their assignment as possessions,
+or in trusteeship, together with the fashion in
+which they shall be administered in the interests of their
+inhabitants and of the world generally, are matters for
+future decisions.</p>
+
+<p>These are the indisputable conditions of peace
+which must be accepted in the second stage of the
+negotiations.</p>
+
+<p>I have dealt with the first two stages as logically
+separate and successive. In actual fact agreement
+on them might be coincident in time. In any event,
+acceptance of the indisputable conditions would be
+made before the guarantees required under the terms
+of surrender or of armistice had become accomplished
+facts.</p>
+
+<p>The conclusion of the first two stages, whether
+concurrent or consecutive, will be the end of dictation.
+They form the preliminary to co-operation. They will
+be an earnest of a complete break with the past on the
+part of Germany. They will go far to satisfy the natural
+desire of those who demand that the guilty should be
+punished, and yet I believe that they contain nothing
+that is not imperative for a just and lasting peace.
+And I hope that their imposition and acceptance will,
+in the subsequent stages, make it possible to take
+advantage, for the benefit of the world, of those powers
+of discipline and organisation which Germany has
+perverted to the great harm of the world.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+III<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The third stage, should I consider, consist in the appointment
+of a large number of Commissions to study
+and work out the details of the principles which I have
+enumerated. These will report ultimately, some of<span class="pagenum" id="Page_228">[228]</span>
+them quickly, some of them after months or years, to
+the Central Peace Conference. For my part I see no
+reason why the members of the Commissions, if the
+principles on which they shall act are settled beforehand,
+should not be selected chiefly from among those
+who have the greatest interest in the matters to be
+settled. I do not see, for instance, why a Commission
+consisting largely of Poles and Prussians should not
+be asked to work out the future frontier of Prussia and
+Poland. This may be thought the suggestion of an
+idealist. But I claim that in this instance the idealist
+is the realist. If our goal be lasting peace, then let us
+give every opportunity for arrangement and mutual
+accommodation before we resort to compulsion.</p>
+
+<p>So far I have said nothing of the future government
+of Germany. The Germans assure us that the transformation
+of autocratic government to responsible
+government is taking place. I should like to believe
+them. I am certain that its accomplishment is
+necessary to Germany itself and to the final attainment
+of a just and lasting peace. I frankly admit that the
+perfect form of government does not exist, and that the
+genius of Germany may evolve some form as good as,
+or even better than, existing constitutions.</p>
+
+<p>But Germany must understand that it will take
+time to convince the world, which has so much reason
+to distrust her, that this sudden change is to be a
+permanent reality. Fortunately the stages which I
+have described do not require for their accomplishment
+more than the hope that Germany has set out on the
+right path. Whilst the last stage is in progress there
+will be time, and more than time, to see whether
+Germany realises our hopes and what I believe to be
+now the wishes of the majority of her own people.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_229">[229]</span></p>
+
+<p>For the last stage will mean nothing less than
+reconstructing the organisation of the world, and
+establishing a new policy in which a League of Free
+Nations shall replace the old system of the balance of
+rival Powers.</p>
+
+<p>The accomplishment of a change so gigantic as the
+adjusting of national organisations to fit into new super-national
+machinery must be difficult and slow. Fortunately
+the very steps necessary to make it possible are
+steps that will slowly make it actual. Let me select
+a few simple examples. The cessation of hostilities
+will leave the world short of food, short of transport,
+short of raw materials. The machinery that has
+regulated these during war will have to be kept in
+action beyond the war. Food will have to be rationed,
+transport will have to be rationed, raw material will
+have to be rationed. It is a world problem that can be
+settled only on a world basis, and there will be every
+opportunity, in the years of transition, to transform
+those economic relations which are forced upon us by
+necessity into a system which will meet with free and
+general acceptance.</p>
+
+<p>Intimately connected with these matters will be the
+problem of the returned soldier, whether wounded or
+otherwise, the problem of pensions, the problems of
+wages, housing, hours and conditions of work, regulation
+of child labour, female labour, and so forth. The
+equalisation of those in different countries will be
+necessary to fair rationing, and from this necessity
+will arise international conferences of workers which
+may be able to settle some of the most difficult questions
+of super-national organisation. When the question of
+disarmament arises, some will demand as a fundamental
+necessity that their nation must have a large army<span class="pagenum" id="Page_230">[230]</span>
+or a large navy. Some will advocate, as an act of
+punishment or of justice, the disarmament of other
+nations. In the consequent negotiations it will soon
+be found that to insist on an unduly large army or
+navy is to saddle one’s country with a huge expense; to
+insist on the disarmament of another country may
+be to present that country with a huge annual income
+that can be used in commercial rivalry. And so we
+may come to a condition in which, if there be international
+security, there will be a contest, not as to
+which country shall maintain the largest navy and the
+largest army, but as to which country shall most completely
+disarm.</p>
+
+<p>I foresee international Commissions at work for a
+long time, trying to establish frontiers, conditions of
+Parliamentary responsibility, canons of international
+law, rules of international commerce, laws even of
+religious freedom, and a thousand other conditions of
+national organisation. In the very act of seeking the
+foundation for a League of Free Nations, and in slowly
+building up the fabric, we shall get rid of the passions
+and fears of war. By the mere endeavour to find the
+way to a better condition of the world, we shall bring
+this better condition about.</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>This article created the desired interest
+and public discussion in the enemy countries.
+It was widely reproduced by German newspapers
+and it had the effect of producing
+a state of mind which culminated in the
+complete collapse of German resistance. It
+was a fitting wind-up to the work of propaganda
+in enemy countries. The article gave<span class="pagenum" id="Page_231">[231]</span>
+rise to a great deal of comment at home and
+elsewhere abroad also, and did much to form
+a public opinion favourable to the conditions
+of peace which were in the minds of Allied
+statesmen but which they had themselves
+refrained from declaring in public.</p>
+
+<p>Thus the Policy Committee, although it
+existed so short a time, had useful achievement
+to its credit. Had it been possible to
+constitute such a Committee early in the
+war the results might have been incalculable
+in the effect on British propaganda.</p>
+
+<p>On November 15, 1918, Lord Northcliffe
+sent the following valedictory letter to each
+of the members of the Committee:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“I am sending you herewith a copy
+of the minutes of the last meeting of the
+Policy Committee, and feel that it is
+unnecessary under the changed circumstances
+to call another meeting.</p>
+
+<p>“May I remind you that this Committee
+was formed under my chairmanship
+by the British War Mission at
+a time when it seemed urgent to correlate
+propaganda addressed to the enemy, to
+Allies, and to Neutrals? In the opening
+remarks by the Chairman at the first
+meeting it was pointed out that as the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_232">[232]</span>
+war approached its end, war propaganda
+would change into peace propaganda.
+This change took place with even greater
+rapidity than was at the moment anticipated,
+and the Committee had at once
+to undertake the task of devising a
+propaganda policy with regard to peace.
+You are acquainted with the steps that
+the Committee took and with the large
+measure of success that their efforts
+achieved. All questions of policy have
+now, however, passed from the hands of
+the Committee to those of the Council
+of the Nations, and there seems to me no
+immediate sphere for our action, especially
+as by arrangement with the
+Government the British War Mission
+is being wound up.</p>
+
+<p>“May I take this opportunity of
+thanking you for your co-operation, and
+of stating my belief that, had the war
+continued, the Policy Committee would
+have developed into an organ of ever-increasing
+value?</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 9.5em;">Yours very truly,</span><br>
+(Signed) “<span class="smcap">Northcliffe</span>.”<br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+<figure class="figleft illowp45" id="i_p208a" style="max-width: 92.5625em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p208a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">INFLATING THE BALLOONS AND ATTACHING THE TRUTH-TELLING
+LEAFLETS.<br>
+<i>Official Photograph.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<figure class="figright illowp45" id="i_p208c" style="max-width: 88.625em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p208c.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">HOW LEAFLETS WERE ATTACHED TO THE BALLOONS.<br>
+<i>Official Photograph.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<figure class="cl figcenter illowp80" id="i_p208b" style="max-width: 134.6875em;">
+  <img class="w100"  src="images/i_p208b.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption" >REGISTERING THE DIRECTION AND VELOCITY OF THE WIND, IN ORDER TO JUDGE WHERE THE
+LEAFLETS WOULD FALL.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p208d" style="max-width: 128.6875em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p208d.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">DISPATCHING THE BALLOONS.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="i_p224a" style="max-width: 135.5em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/i_p224a.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">TESTING THE LIFTING POWER OF BALLOONS USED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES<br>
+<i>“Daily Mirror” Photograph.</i></figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_233">[233]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="CHAPTER_IX">CHAPTER IX<br>
+<span class="fs80"><i>VALE!</i></span>
+</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+<p>With the foundations well and truly laid
+and with increasing and widening avenues
+of approach into enemy countries, the work
+of the British War Mission was always
+expanding. Had the war continued, the
+gathering momentum of Crewe House
+activities would have dealt many other
+blows which, even in November, 1918, were
+in an advanced state of preparation. But,
+happily for the Allies, one enemy collapsed
+quickly after another. When the following
+letter was received from the War Office on
+November 9, and was followed by the signing
+of the Armistice with Germany—the last of
+our enemies—on November 11, the work of
+Crewe House as the headquarters of Propaganda
+in Enemy Countries was finished:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“<span class="smcap">Sir</span>,</p>
+
+<p>“I am commanded by the Army
+Council to inform you that, in view of
+the armistices which have been concluded
+with Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria,<span class="pagenum" id="Page_234">[234]</span>
+the Council has decided that the
+distribution of propaganda in those
+countries by military means should cease
+during the period of the armistice.</p>
+
+<p>“I am to say that, in the event of the
+conclusion of an armistice with Germany,
+distribution of propaganda by military
+means in that country will also cease
+during the existence of the armistice.</p>
+
+<p>“I am further to inform you that
+the Commanders-in-Chief in the various
+theatres of war have been notified in the
+above sense.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 10em;">“I am, Sir,</span><br>
+<span style="margin-right: 2em;">“Your obedient servant,</span><br>
+“<span class="smcap">B. B. Cubitt</span>.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+“The Secretary,<br>
+<span class="ind1">“The British War Mission,</span><br>
+<span class="ind2">“Crewe House.”</span><br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>On the day following the signing of the
+Armistice with Germany Lord Northcliffe
+wrote to the Prime Minister:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“<span class="smcap">Dear Prime Minister</span>,</p>
+
+<p>“The signing of the last armistice
+with our enemies has necessarily brought
+the labours upon which I have been
+engaged for the past year to a close.
+The very nature of the armistices themselves<span class="pagenum" id="Page_235">[235]</span>
+necessitates the termination of
+enemy propaganda, and I beg, therefore,
+to request you to accept my resignation
+of my post as Director of Propaganda
+in Enemy Countries.</p>
+
+<p>“I wish to thank you for the confidence
+you have reposed in me in
+appointing me to this office. I have
+endeavoured, with the assistance of a
+most able Committee and of an untiring
+staff of experts, to render the very best
+possible services to the Government
+and to the country.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+“Believe me, dear Prime Minister,<br>
+<span style="margin-right: 6em;">“Yours sincerely,</span><br>
+<span style="margin-right: 1em;">“<span class="smcap">Northcliffe</span>.”</span><br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>In reply, the Prime Minister wrote on the
+same day:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“<span class="smcap">My Dear Northcliffe</span>,</p>
+
+<p>“I have received your letter, and I
+agree with you that the office of Director
+of Propaganda in Enemy Countries is
+rendered unnecessary by recent events.</p>
+
+<p>“In accepting your resignation, I
+wish to assure you how grateful I am
+for the great services you have rendered
+to the Allied Cause while holding this
+important post. I have had many<span class="pagenum" id="Page_236">[236]</span>
+direct evidences of the success of your
+invaluable work and of the extent to
+which it has contributed to the dramatic
+collapse of the enemy strength in Austria
+and Germany.</p>
+
+<p>“I shall be glad if Sir Campbell
+Stuart, the present Vice-Chairman of the
+Mission, will remain in office as Acting-Chairman
+of the Mission until December
+31st, 1918, in order to wind up its
+activities.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 7.5em;">“Ever sincerely,</span><br>
+“<span class="smcap">D. Lloyd George</span>.”<br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>When the year 1918 came to its close the
+affairs of the Mission had been wound up,
+and Crewe House as a propaganda force
+ceased to exist. The building was handed
+over to another Government department,
+but by those who had even a remote
+connection with the work carried on within
+its walls in 1918 Crewe House will always
+be remembered for its propaganda politics
+for which, as has been truly said, it
+became as well-known in the Chancelleries
+of Europe as it had been in Great Britain
+for so long as a social centre for national
+politics.</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_237">[237]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="APPENDIX">APPENDIX<br>
+<span class="smcap">Facsimile Leaflets and Translations.</span></h2>
+
+</div>
+
+
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp38" id="leaflet01" style="max-width: 61.4375em;">
+
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 1.</i><br>
+NEWS OF ALLIED SUCCESSES ON WESTERN FRONT
+FOR JUGO-SLAV SOLDIERS IN THE AUSTRIAN
+ARMIES.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet01.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p>Map representing the great offensive of the Allies, with the
+results achieved from August 9th to September 1st:—</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+[<span class="smcap">Map</span>]<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>In the offensive from July 15th to August 31st the Allies
+captured 140,000 Germans (2,674 of whom were officers), 2,500
+guns, 1,734 Flamethrowers, 13,783 machine guns, together with
+a huge amount of other war material.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span class="smcap">The Jugoslav Committee.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp53" id="leaflet02" style="max-width: 63.125em;">
+<figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 2.</i><br>
+A MANIFESTO FROM DR. TRUMBITCH DISTRIBUTED
+FROM AEROPLANES AMONG JUGO-SLAV TROOPS IN
+THE AUSTRIAN ARMY.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet02.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+SERBOCROATS AND SLOVENES.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The “Agenzia Stefani” announces officially:—</p>
+
+<p>“By a decree of the Ministerial Council on September 8th
+the Home (Italian) Government has informed the Allied Governments
+that it regards the Jugoslav movement for obtaining
+independence and the formation of a free State as a principle
+for which the Allies are fighting, and as a condition of a just
+and lasting peace.”</p>
+
+<p>The Governments of the Allied States have replied that they
+have received with satisfaction this declaration of the Italian
+Government.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Jugoslavs!</span></p>
+
+<p>By this historic and fateful declaration Italy has set up the
+following war aim: The destruction of the Austro-Hungarian
+monarchy such as it is to-day, and upon its ruins the establishment
+of an independent State of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.</p>
+
+<p>This noble decree of hers is accepted by all our Allies.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">Soldiers!</span></p>
+
+<p>The part which Italy has been assigned by history has been
+manifested to-day more strongly than ever. She is the protector
+of the weak, the bearer of freedom and of the ideal for which
+the Allies have been fighting for four years. The aim of the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_238">[238]</span>
+fighting is not the peace of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, but
+the freedom of the weak and oppressed.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore open your eyes. Remember that by fighting against
+it you are fighting against yourselves, against our posterity,
+against our freedom and unity.</p>
+
+<p>Long live Italy, long live the united and free Jugoslavia,
+long live our Allies!</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 1.5em;"><span class="smcap">Dr. Ante Trumbic</span>,</span><br>
+Chairman of the Jugoslav Council.<br>
+</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+
+
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp53" id="leaflet03" style="max-width: 86.1875em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 3.</i><br>
+LEAFLET—PROBABLY THE FIRST—DISTRIBUTED BY BRITISH
+AEROPLANES AMONG GERMAN TROOPS IN OCTOBER 1914.
+IT ANNOUNCED A RUSSIAN VICTORY IN EAST PRUSSIA.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet03.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+[<i>Note.—This was distributed in October, 1914.</i>]<br>
+<br>
+NOTICE.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">Explanation for German Soldiers.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>It has become known that German soldiers have been told
+the British treat their captives inhumanly. That is a lie.</p>
+
+<p>All German prisoners of war are well-treated and receive
+from the British the same food as their own soldiers.</p>
+
+<p>The opportunity is now taken to enlighten the German soldier
+about some facts which hitherto have been kept secret from him.</p>
+
+<p>The German Army never reached or occupied Paris and has
+been retiring since September 5.</p>
+
+<p>The British Army has been neither made prisoner nor beaten.
+It increases in strength every day.</p>
+
+<p>The French Army is not beaten. Quite on the contrary,
+for it inflicted a heavy defeat on the Germans at <span class="smcap">Montmirail</span>.</p>
+
+<p>Russia and Serbia have so decisively defeated Austria that
+she no longer plays any part in the war. With the exception
+of a few cruisers, German shipping, the merchant service as
+well as the fighting fleet, is no longer to be seen upon the seas.</p>
+
+<p>The British and German Navies have both suffered casualties,
+but the German the heaviest.</p>
+
+<p>Germany has already lost several colonies and will presently
+also lose what now remains to her. Japan has declared war
+on Germany. Kiauchau is now besieged by the British and
+the Japanese.</p>
+
+<p>The report circulated in the Press that the British Colonies
+and India have rebelled against Great Britain is wholly untrue.
+Quite on the contrary, these Colonies have sent to France large
+masses of troops and many supplies to come to the help of the
+Fatherland.</p>
+
+<p>Ireland is one with England, and from North and South is
+sending her soldiers who are fighting with enthusiasm alongside
+their English comrades.</p>
+
+<p>The Kaiser and the Prussian War Party wanted this war
+against all interests of the Fatherland. In secret they prepared<span class="pagenum" id="Page_239">[239]</span>
+for this war. Germany alone was prepared, which explains her
+temporary successes. Now we have succeeded in checking her
+victorious advance. Supported by the sympathies of the whole
+civilised world, which regards with horror an arbitrary war of
+conquest, Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium, Serbia,
+Montenegro, and Japan will carry on the war to the end.</p>
+
+<p>We bring these facts to general notice in order to throw light
+upon the truth which has been hidden from you. You are not
+fighting to defend your Fatherland, as no one ever thought of
+attacking Germany. You are fighting to satisfy the ambitious
+war-lust of the military party at the cost of the true interests of
+the Fatherland. The whole business is blackguardly.</p>
+
+<p>At first sight these facts will seem improbable to you. But
+now it is for you to compare the events of the past weeks with
+the information manufactured by the military authorities.</p>
+
+<p class="center">ON OCTOBER 4 THE RUSSIANS GAINED A TREMENDOUS
+VICTORY OVER THE GERMAN ARMIES IN
+EAST PRUSSIA. GERMAN LOSSES 70,000.</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp54" id="leaflet04" style="max-width: 97.125em;">
+
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 4.</i><br>
+AEROPLANE DISTRIBUTION OF COPIES OF AN EARLY LEAFLET PREPARED
+BY THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES FOR THE GERMAN SOLDIER.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet04.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+To the German Soldiers!<br>
+</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">It is not true</span> that we French shoot or ill-treat German
+prisoners.</p>
+
+<p><span class="smcap">On the contrary</span>, our prisoners are well-treated and receive
+plenty to eat and drink.</p>
+
+<p>All who are tired of this wretched life may report themselves
+unarmed, without fear, to the French outposts.</p>
+
+<p>They will be well received there.</p>
+
+<p>After the war everyone can go home again.</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp40" id="leaflet05" style="max-width: 70.0625em;">
+
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 5.</i><br>
+A TYPICAL NEWS-SHEET FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet05.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Information Leaflet for the Troops.</span><br>
+<br>
+IS PEACE AT THE DOOR?<br>
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">Our enemies reject negotiations until we have evacuated
+Belgium and France.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">What must we do now?</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>Well, what does it all mean?</p>
+
+<p>“A few weeks ago,” says the <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i>, “it appeared
+as if our armies were very near their goal, the defeat of the
+enemy forces and peace. But what a change!”</p>
+
+<p>In these few weeks the German armies have lost three-quarters
+of a million men. More than a quarter of a million
+have given themselves up and are now out of danger and have
+plenty to eat.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_240">[240]</span></p>
+
+<p>In these few weeks Bulgaria has dropped out of the war and
+has been compelled to surrender unconditionally. The best
+Turkish armies have been destroyed and Turkey is about to
+follow Bulgaria’s example.</p>
+
+<p>And what is the result of all these events in the last few
+weeks?</p>
+
+<p>All hope of victory by the military Junker party in Germany
+abandoned: an armistice demanded: the admission of the
+new Imperial Chancellor, Prince Max von Baden, that Belgium
+was wrongfully attacked.</p>
+
+<p>The following is the text of the Note addressed to President
+Wilson through the Swiss Government:—</p>
+
+<p>“The German Government requests the President of the
+United States to bring about the restoration of peace, to inform
+all belligerent States of this request and to summon them to
+send plenipotentiaries to open negotiations. Germany takes
+as a basis for peace negotiations the programme set forth by
+the President of the United States in his Message to Congress
+of January 8th, 1918, and particularly in his speech of September
+27th.</p>
+
+<p>“With a view to preventing further bloodshed the German
+Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice
+on land, on water, and in the air.</p>
+
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right: 3em;">(Signed) <span class="smcap">Max</span>, Prince von Baden,</span><br>
+Imperial Chancellor.”<br>
+</p>
+
+
+<p>Why was this Note addressed to President Wilson?</p>
+
+<p>Partly because he laid down certain conditions which he
+explained the German Government must accept before he would
+enter into any discussion whatever on peace terms.</p>
+
+<p>But also partly because the German Government at length
+became aware of the United States’ military effort.</p>
+
+<p>In this, as in every other important matter dealing with the
+war, our leaders deceived us in the most unheard-of way. They
+fed us with false hopes.</p>
+
+<p>They have brought us to such a desperate pass that we are
+retiring on every front and are now compelled to sue for peace.</p>
+
+<p>But will our enemies consent to discuss peace?</p>
+
+<p>Not as long as we are still in Belgium, which, as our Government
+admits, was wrongfully attacked; not whilst we are still
+in Northern France.</p>
+
+<p>Before our enemies will consent to negotiate with us we must
+retire to Germany. For, they say, they will gladly conclude a
+just and honourable peace with the German people if they can
+be sure that militarism and medieval methods of statesmanship
+are abolished for good.</p>
+
+<p>What must we do to save ourselves? We must retire to our
+own country, then we may hope for an end of all the horror
+and hardships we have suffered for more than four years, only<span class="pagenum" id="Page_241">[241]</span>
+because our Government let its policy be dictated by militarism
+and underestimated the forces which had to be arrayed against
+us owing to the attempt to realise the criminal ambition of the
+Pan-Germans.</p>
+
+<p>We have been miserably deceived.</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp79" id="leaflet06" style="max-width: 141.5625em;">
+
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 6.</i><br>
+“REPORTING PROGRESS”—LEAFLETS (SUCH AS THE ONE, BOTH SIDES OF WHICH ARE REPRODUCED, ABOVE) GAVE
+PARTICULARS OF ALLIED PROGRESS AGAINST THE GERMANS. CLEARLY-PRINTED MAPS DROVE THE
+TRUTH HOME. THE SHADED PORTION SHOWS TERRITORY WON BY THE ALLIES.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet06.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+WHAT THE ALLIES HAVE WON.<br>
+Back on the Line of Last March.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p class="center">[<span class="smcap">Map</span>]</p>
+
+<p>The whole ground has been twice won and twice lost by the
+German armies. How much blood has been spilled, and how
+much misery has been caused? For what object? Think it
+over!</p>
+
+<p><i>On the other side of the leaflet was the following</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Further Successes of the Entente; the German Retreat
+continues.</span>
+</p>
+
+<p>During the last few weeks there has been fighting west of
+Cambrai and St. Quentin. The battle reached a degree of
+vehemence fully equal to any previously experienced in the
+course of the whole war.</p>
+
+<p>The Germans and British attacked simultaneously; both
+sides fought with stubborn determination, but</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">the British gained the victory.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>They beat off the German attack, made many prisoners, and
+killed an enormous number, thanks to the manner in which the
+German troops were driven forward under murderous machine-gun
+fire.</p>
+
+<p>The British attack succeeded. The German front was pressed
+back closer to St. Quentin.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Ten thousand prisoners</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>were made and a number of guns were captured. The outer
+works of the Siegfried Line are in British possession in spite of
+the determined and plucky attempts of the German troops to
+hold them. The latter did not retreat “according to plan,”
+but because in open honourable fight</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="allsmcap">THEY GOT THE WORST OF IT.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The operations of the Entente forces have in no way reached
+an end, as reported in the German newspapers a week ago by
+military writers. The German forces were unable to stand<span class="pagenum" id="Page_242">[242]</span>
+their ground. The French threaten Laon and the Chemin des
+Dames and in these regions are driving the Germans back.</p>
+
+<p>On the Balkan Front</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">the Bulgarians are totally defeated</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>and are still retreating. The French and Serbian troops have
+advanced 20 kilometres. Many thousands of Bulgarians have
+surrendered. The prisoners ascribe the blame for Bulgaria’s
+disastrous situation to Germany.</p>
+
+<p>The Austrian proposal that representatives of the belligerent
+nations should hold a secret conference in order to discuss</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="allsmcap">THE POSSIBILITIES OF PEACE</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>was described by the representatives of the Workmen’s and
+Socialist parties assembled at the London Conference as inspired
+more by the anxiety to strengthen the monarchy than by the
+desire to help effectively to put an end to the world war.</p>
+
+<p>No voice was raised for the acceptance of the Austrian proposal.</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp44" id="leaflet07" style="max-width: 71.125em;">
+
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 7.</i><br>
+DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE GROWTH OF THE
+AMERICAN ARMY IN THE FIELD. THE IMMENSITY OF THE
+AMERICAN EFFORT WAS A STRONG POINT OF THE CREWE
+HOUSE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet07.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+TO-DAY WE ARE IN RETREAT.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">Next Year we shall be destroyed.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>America, which has now 1,750,000 men in France, had made
+arrangements to send 3,500,000 troops by next year.</p>
+
+<p>But now, in view of the refusal of the German Government to
+make a genuine peace proposal, America has decided to increase
+the number.</p>
+
+<p>By next year America will have 5,000,000 men on the Western
+Front.</p>
+
+<p>What do our leaders say to this—our leaders who declared
+that America was not a danger to us because our U-boats would
+prevent them from sending troops to Europe?</p>
+
+<p>What do we say to this, we who will be completely crushed
+by the huge superiority of numbers?</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+[<span class="smcap">Diagram</span>]<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The increase of the American Army on the Western Front.</p>
+
+
+<table class="autotable">
+<tr>
+<td class="tdc">1917.<br>100,000</td>
+<td class="tdc">1918.<br>1,750,000</td>
+<td class="tdc">1919.<br>5,000,000</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+        
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_243">[243]</span></p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp48" id="leaflet08" style="max-width: 70em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 8.</i><br>
+MAP-LEAFLET SHOWING THE BREAKING OF
+THE HINDENBURG LINE.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet08.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+WHERE THE HINDENBURG LINE IS BROKEN<br>
+<br>
+[<span class="smcap">Map</span>]<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>This map shows exactly where the British troops have forced
+a way through an important part of the Hindenburg defence
+line. The dotted line from North to South indicates these
+defences. The black line shows the positions reached by the
+British. Their advance continues. In Flanders the German
+armies are in full retreat. Kemmel Hill has been given up.
+“Our troops left it with heavy heart,” writes Karl Rosner,
+war correspondent of the <i>Lokalanzeiger</i>.</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp86" id="leaflet09" style="max-width: 148.1875em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 9.</i><br>
+NEWS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH ARMY IN PALESTINE. TWO SIDES
+OF THE SAME LEAFLET.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet09.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+TURKISH ARMY IN PALESTINE DESTROYED.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">No further Resistance against the British Troops.
+Brilliant Encircling Manœuvre.</span><br>
+<br>
+20,000 PRISONERS.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">Turkey incensed against Germany for leading her to
+irretrievable disaster.</span>
+</p>
+
+<p>The Turkish Army in Palestine has ceased to exist. The
+British took them unawares, broke through the front, sent
+through large masses of cavalry, cut off all lines of retreat and
+completely surrounded the Turks.</p>
+
+<p>Twenty thousand surrendered, a large number were killed,
+and only a few stragglers succeeded in escaping. The Holy
+Land has been liberated from the Mussulman suzerainty which
+the German Government did its best to uphold. Turkey could
+not have received a harder blow. Her best troops have been
+destroyed. The Turks’ feeling against Germany is extremely
+bitter. They openly threaten to turn against the German
+Government.</p>
+
+<p>The Bulgarians are scarcely less embittered against Germany.
+They are still pursued in the Balkan mountains by the French
+and Serbian troops, who have driven them back 64 kilometres.
+Their defeat is a wholesale disaster.</p>
+
+<p>On the Western Front the British and French troops are still
+gaining ground, slowly but steadily, a little every day.</p>
+
+<p>Everywhere Germany and her allies are in retreat.</p>
+<br>
+<p>Read no leaflets which you may find accidentally, say Field Marshal
+Hindenburg and General von Hutier.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_244">[244]</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">
+WHY?<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>Because they know that the leaflets contain the truth which
+they and the Government want to conceal.</p>
+
+<p>They fear the truth. When the German people know it the
+Government and militarism will be wiped out.</p>
+
+<p>Read overleaf of the successes of the Entente Powers and ask
+yourselves</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">How long can it go on like this?</span><br>
+<br>
+Map illustrating the Turkish disasters.<br>
+<br>
+[<span class="smcap">Map of Palestine</span>]<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The black lines and arrows show the position of the English
+forces. The Turks were between Samaria and Nablus. They
+were wiped out. Their army no longer exists.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp41" id="leaflet10" style="max-width: 69.625em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 10.</i><br>
+SOME POINTED QUOTATIONS FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS
+CULLED FROM GERMAN SOURCES.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet10.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">The High Official.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“We have no cause for anxiety.”—Dr. Wekerle, Hungarian
+Premier.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">The People.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“The men must thoroughly understand that they must
+stand fast.”—Order of the Day to 200th Infantry Division.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">The General.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“We have no reason to be downhearted.”—General von
+Wrisberg, War Minister in the Reichstag.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">The Soldier.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“The principle that troops must continue fighting all day
+long, to the last man, to the last cartridge, even when they are
+surrounded, appears to have sunk into oblivion.”—General Army
+Order, signed by General Ludendorff.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Preparations for Civil War.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>Every precaution has been taken in Berlin and other places
+to suppress an eventual attempt at revolution.</p>
+
+<p>Orders for the suppression of risings are issued under the
+heading “Measures for the Suppression of Strikes.” Proof of
+this is furnished by the order of German G.H.Q. to all Guards
+Infantry troops and to the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps.</p>
+
+<p>On receipt of the telegraphic order “Prepare for the suppression
+of strikes,” all man-power must be mobilised. On
+receipt of the order “Suppress strikes,” the commandant of
+the transport troops must be immediately informed. The men
+must be equipped as for field service, only without masks. On
+receipt of the telegraphic order “Make preparations for<span class="pagenum" id="Page_245">[245]</span>
+surrounding,” all detachments of troops will be marched to
+their allotted positions. Battalion commanders should place
+themselves at the head of their units and direct all further
+movements.</p>
+
+<p>On receipt of the telegraphic order “Surround,” the troops
+selected for this duty, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps, will march
+on Berlin to the Vorstadtbahn (Suburban Railway). The
+Guards will take the opposite direction from the centre of the
+city to the Vorstadtbahn, driving the populace before them.
+Headquarters will be Kaulsdorf. Then follow detailed instructions
+for the employment of machine guns. The order is strictly
+secret.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">What shall we do with the Kaiser?</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>Stockholm, 10th September.—The German Minister in
+Stockholm has requested the Swedish Foreign Office to seize
+the copy of the “<i>New York Herald</i> Magazine of the War” of the
+14th July because it publishes on the first page a photograph of
+the German Emperor underneath which are the words:—</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“What shall we do with the Kaiser after the War?”</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>The Minister of Justice is said to have ordered the copies in
+question to be seized.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Arrest of Socialists.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>According to the <i>Neue Badische Landeszeitung</i>, wild scenes
+took place last week at a meeting of Independent Socialists in
+Berlin. “In the course of the meeting the Reichstag member
+Hoffmann was arrested by two policemen because of provocative
+speeches. A scene of such excitement ensued that in the general
+disturbance Hoffmann escaped, while the hall rang with cries of
+‘Down with the War!’ ‘Long live Liebknecht!’</p>
+
+<p>“The following morning the officials arrived at Hoffmann’s
+house in order to arrest him again, but the deputy was not to be
+found. Many arrests were made among his adherents.”</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Pork in Bottles.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“The smugglers are still devising new tricks so as to prevent
+their costly goods from falling into the clutches of the war contraband
+officials. At the Schlesicher Station a man was stopped
+as he was fetching away two carboys such as are used for the
+transport of dangerous acids. A closer inspection showed that
+the carboys were divided in two parts, a small receptacle at the
+top being filled with vinegar, while the lower and larger part
+contained 55 kilos. of freshly killed pork neatly packed. The
+expensive pork was seized.”—<i>Berliner Tageblatt</i>, Sept. 19, 1918.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">The Veto on Dancing.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>“In the Hanover Command dancing lessons are only allowed
+for men and women separately, and anyone who has already<span class="pagenum" id="Page_246">[246]</span>
+taken a course of dancing is not allowed to learn again. A
+sensible regulation has been issued at Essen. Only dancing
+instructors belonging to the two German dancing instructors’
+unions may hold dancing classes as in peace time.”—<i>Berliner
+Tageblatt</i>, Sept. 19, 1918.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp81" id="leaflet11" style="max-width: 135.8125em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 11.</i><br>
+THIS LEAFLET WITH PARTICULARS OF THE FATE OF 150 GERMAN SUBMARINE COMMANDERS CREATED
+GREAT DEPRESSION IN GERMAN NAVAL PORTS.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet11.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+THE 150 LOST GERMAN U-BOATS.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>In the House of Commons the British Prime Minister, Mr.
+Lloyd George, said, “Our British vessels are serving as convoys,
+patrolling, laying mines, sweeping mines, protecting merchant
+ships and hunting U-boats over vast and uncharted distances.
+They have destroyed at least 150 of these ocean pests, the German
+U-boats—more than half that number in the course of last
+year.”</p>
+
+<p>In reply to this, the following official Berlin telegram was sent
+out to the German papers and to neutral countries:</p>
+
+<p>“We are in the position to state that the enemy’s war against
+the U-boats does not show anything like so great a success as
+that claimed by the British Prime Minister.”</p>
+
+<p>The Chief of the Naval General Staff in London has in his
+possession a complete list of the names of the commanders of the
+150 U-boats which Germany has lost through sinking, capture,
+or internment. The greater part of these officers are dead, a
+certain percentage are prisoners of war, a few are interned in
+neutral countries. The truth of the statement of the British
+Prime Minister is thus proved. It is also proved that the
+statement contained in the official Berlin telegram is untrue.
+Here is the list:</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+[<i>List of U-boat commanders.</i>]<br>
+</p>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp55" id="leaflet12" style="max-width: 85.3125em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 12.</i><br>
+LEAFLET WARNING THE GERMANS THAT SUCH PLACES
+AS BERLIN AND HAMBURG HAD BEEN BROUGHT
+WITHIN RANGE OF AERIAL ATTACK AND COULD BE
+BOMBED IF THE WAR WERE PROLONGED.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet12.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+A MAP WHICH EXPLAINS ITSELF.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>In 1914 the English air squadrons which carried out reprisals
+for the attacks made on English towns were small and carried
+small bombs. In 1915 they grew larger and dropped larger
+bombs. In 1916 both had doubled in size. In 1917 there was
+a further increase in the size of the bombing squadrons and the
+bombs were 7½ times again as heavy. 1918 saw further increases
+and throughout the period under review the range of attacks
+steadily extended. In 1919 Berlin, Hamburg, Brunswick, and
+Hanover will be easily within range of attack—if we do not make
+peace in the meantime.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_247">[247]</span></p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp46" id="leaflet13" style="max-width: 79.4375em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 13.</i><br>
+A GERMAN DREAM AND THE RESULT. A LEAFLET
+ILLUSTRATING THE COLLAPSE OF THE MITTEL-EUROPA
+AMBITION OF GERMAN MILITARISM.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet13.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+HOW THE THING WENT WRONG.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p><i>The upper map is entitled</i> “<span class="smcap">Pan-German Dream</span>,” <i>the wording
+under it being as follows</i>:</p>
+
+<p>“Our rulers went to war because they hoped to found a
+gigantic empire for the Kaiser and the Junkers. All the territories
+shaded in on the above map were to be their realm. It
+would have meant the subjection of half the world under the
+German sword.”—<i>Vorwärts</i>, Oct. 11, 1918.</p>
+
+<p><i>The lower map is entitled</i> “<span class="smcap">The Awakening of the German
+People</span>.” <i>Under it is the following inscription</i>:</p>
+
+<p>This is how Germany looks to-day. Her allies can give no
+further aid. What the Kaiser calls “his heritage from God”
+will soon be smaller than it was at the beginning of the war.
+But the German people will be the better for it. They will have
+escaped from autocracy and militarism. Freedom at last!</p>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp43" id="leaflet14" style="max-width: 79.75em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 14.</i><br>
+FRONT PAGE OF A “TRENCH NEWSPAPER” ISSUED BY CREWE
+HOUSE FOR GERMAN TROOPS.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet14.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+WAR AND HOME.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">The Summons to Unity.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p><i>The picture on the left is headed</i> “<span class="smcap">The Ideal</span>” <i>and represents
+“The Assembly.” On its right is the following parody, entitled</i>
+“<span class="smcap">Paradise Lost</span>,” <i>on Goethe’s “Faust”</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+“PARADISE LOST.”<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>
+“Gretchen, how different thou wast!”—(Goethe—“Faust.”)<br>
+<br>
+Germany, how different thou wast before the war<br>
+Brought about by thy lust of conquest.<br>
+With self-assurance thou wentst from triumph to triumph<br>
+And reached the summit of thy power<br>
+Untouched, with ample possessions<br>
+In earthly goods, in fame and world renown<br>
+Thou hadst all mankind can crave,<br>
+In high respect regarded, if not beloved.<br>
+<br>
+But now what disgust, what horror<br>
+The mere name of Germany excites!<br>
+There is deep mourning for thy vanished happiness,<br>
+Thy honour lost, thy peace of mind destroyed!<br>
+Thou liest parted by the iron wall<br>
+Which thy crime has built between us<br>
+Fast fettered to thy false ideal<br>
+And all thy former glory gone!<br>
+</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_248">[248]</span></p>
+
+<p><i>The lower picture is called</i> “<span class="smcap">The Reality</span>,” <i>the quotation from
+Moltke underneath being “March separately, strike together.” On
+its left</i>:</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">The War was decided at Potsdam.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>During a debate on the origin of the war in the Hungarian
+Parliament, Count Tisza claimed that the ultimatum to Serbia
+was drawn up at a conference at which no German representative
+was present.</p>
+
+<p><i>A Deputy</i>: Not in Vienna but in Potsdam.</p>
+
+<p><i>Count Tisza</i>: Neither in Potsdam nor anywhere else.</p>
+
+<p><i>The Deputy</i>: The ultimatum was not drawn up at Potsdam, but
+the outbreak of war was decided there.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">A Prophecy.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The Dutch newspaper, the <i>Handelsblad</i>, reports that a person
+who has just returned from Germany saw this rhyme written up
+in gigantic letters at an important factory:</p>
+
+<div class="poetry-container">
+<div class="poetry">
+  <div class="stanza">
+    <div class="verse indent0">“If the war lasts another year,</div>
+    <div class="verse indent0">William’s fate will be the Tsar’s!”</div>
+  </div>
+</div>
+</div>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp49" id="leaflet15" style="max-width: 66.625em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 15.</i><br>
+ILLUSTRATED LEAFLET PORTRAYING CONTENTMENT
+OF GERMAN PRISONERS IN BRITISH HANDS.
+THIS WAS ISSUED TO COUNTERACT ENEMY
+ASSERTIONS OF SEVERE TREATMENT.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet15.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+
+<p>German prisoners of war arriving behind the British lines are
+greeted by their comrades, who assure them of good treatment.</p>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp42" id="leaflet16" style="max-width: 73.5em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 16.</i><br>
+THIS LEAFLET SHOWED HOW THE ALLIES HAD
+SHATTERED THE GREAT BERLIN-BAGDAD PLAN.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet16.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS SUING FOR PEACE.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The reason is clear.</p>
+
+<p>The Government undertook the war in the hope of realising
+the Pan-German dream of a Middle Europe.</p>
+
+<p>This was the real cause of the war.</p>
+
+<p>If there remained any doubt on the subject it is clearly proved
+by the fact that the moment the realisation of the Pan-German
+dream became impossible the Government sues for peace.</p>
+
+<p>This was the plan of the Pan-Germans who led us into the
+war.</p>
+
+<p>The whole of the territory coloured black was to become
+German.</p>
+
+<p>Bulgaria and Turkey would become vassal States.</p>
+
+<p>The Kaiser and the Prussian Junker aristocracy, the bureaucrats
+and the rich who exploit the rest of the people, should
+become the most powerful class in the world.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_249">[249]</span></p>
+
+<p class="center">
+THIS IS WHAT HAS BECOME OF THE PAN-GERMAN PLAN.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>Bulgaria refuses to be a vassal State.</p>
+
+<p>Turkey is becoming anxious.</p>
+
+<p>The plan for the realisation of which the Pan-Germans persuaded
+Germany to go to war and which has cost so many
+millions of lives and caused such universal misery is completely
+frustrated.</p>
+
+<p>What reason remains why we should fight?</p>
+
+<p>The Government has no further reason for continuing the
+struggle and is therefore suing our enemies for peace.</p>
+
+<p>Therefore all the talk about a defensive war proves to have
+been absolutely untruthfully and dishonestly</p>
+
+<p class="center"><span class="allsmcap">STARTED TO DECEIVE US.</span></p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp50" id="leaflet17" style="max-width: 86.5625em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 17.</i><br>
+MANIFESTO TO MAGYAR TROOPS.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet17.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+HUNGARIAN SOLDIERS!<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>What are you fighting for?</p>
+
+<p>For the Emperor of Austria and the King of Hungary!</p>
+
+<p>Or is it for the German Emperor?</p>
+<p>You are only fighting for the German Emperor. The Austrian
+Emperor has given over to him the army and the State revenues
+for twenty-five years by a formal treaty the contents of which
+are kept from you.</p>
+
+<p>But your newspapers also announce a “Waffenbund” which
+was entered upon on May 12th, 1918, between your old and your
+new masters.</p>
+
+<p>But you Magyars, whose ancestors shed so much blood for
+freedom, you are ignorant of the truth.</p>
+
+<p>For behold according to the Germans you are idle and slow.</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i> says on May 13th, “<b>The new treaty
+should finally seal the disappearance of Austria as an independent
+State and the seizing of the Hapsburg Monarchy by
+Germany</b>.”</p>
+
+<p>The <i>Deutsche Zeitung</i> of the 19th May remarks, “What the
+Mittel-Europa Confederacy chiefly needs is strength, and never
+more so than at the time the war broke out. Austria-Hungary
+was not sufficiently prepared. According to the ‘Waffenbund’
+<b>Austria-Hungary must arm its inhabitants in exactly the same
+way as Germany</b>. It is no longer possible that it should happen
+that the delegates should vote extraordinary credits for military
+purposes, and that afterwards they should waste a long time
+before they pass the amount because either the Hungarian or
+the Austrian Minister of Finance says there is no money; or<span class="pagenum" id="Page_250">[250]</span>
+that the delegates vote the guns but that the <b>Hungarian
+Parliament</b> refuses the necessary calling up of the recruits, so
+that afterwards the guns are there but there are not soldiers to
+man them.”</p>
+
+<p>Is this clear enough? The Germans struggle for a mad
+whim—they wish to rule the whole world. To fight for years,
+to pour out Hungarian blood for German glory for years and
+years.</p>
+
+<p>Naturally the <i>Neue Freie Presse</i> should with triumph proclaim
+that the new treaty is specially a triumph for the “upholders of
+Germany in Austria.”</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp57" id="leaflet18" style="max-width: 71.5625em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 18.</i><br>
+MANIFESTO, SIGNED BY PROFESSOR (NOW PRESIDENT)
+MASARYK, TO CZECHO-SLOVAK SOLDIERS IN THE AUSTRIAN
+ARMIES.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet18.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+MESSAGE OF PROFESSOR MASARYK TO THE
+CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY IN ITALY.
+</p>
+
+<p>Through the agency of the Italian Legation, Professor T. G.
+Masaryk has sent the following message from Washington to the
+autonomous Czecho-Slovak army in Italy:</p>
+
+<div class="blockquot">
+
+<p>“Brothers! Austria-Hungary, desiring to break the
+opposition at home, has asserted that our army is a rabble
+which has no political or military significance. She has
+even uttered the lie that our army is composed of Russians
+and other nationalities, and that a Czecho-Slovak army
+does not exist. Our nation does not believe this dishonesty
+and has remained obdurate and proud of its army. Then
+Austria-Hungary endeavoured to deal a decisive blow to
+our nation by destroying you, and with you its army.
+She desired to gain possession of our banners of resistance
+and independence, the symbol of trust and aspiration
+cherished by our people.</p>
+
+<p>“Brothers! Your will, your far-reaching glance frustrated
+the enemy’s plans. Our flag is still flying proudly
+upon the position entrusted to you for defence. Our nation
+recognises your heroic deeds and all hearts are stirred by
+profound gratitude to you. They extol you and the proud
+memory of your fallen brothers.</p>
+
+<p>“As your Commander-in-Chief I send you my heartiest
+thanks for the bravery by which you have contributed to
+the victory of our nation, of Italy, the Allies and all
+mankind.</p>
+
+
+<p>
+“Greetings!
+</p>
+<p class="right">
+<span style="margin-right:2em;">
+“<span class="smcap">T. G. Masaryk.</span>”</span><br>
+</p>
+</div>
+
+<p>We cannot help telling you how proud we are of the recognition
+by our beloved leader, who will guide us and our nation to the
+goal of victory.</p>
+
+<p>We are convinced that you also, in concert with the whole<span class="pagenum" id="Page_251">[251]</span>
+nation, see the salvation of our country and the realisation of
+our sacred rights only in the destruction of Austria.</p>
+
+<p>When they drive you forward to protect the treacherous
+dynasty, to which the nation has no obligations, you will
+certainly find an opportunity of retaliating worthily for centuries
+of oppression and of saving yourselves for a better future.</p>
+
+<p>Greetings!</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Volunteers of the Czecho-Slovak Army in Italy.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>October 2nd, 1918.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="captiontop"><figure class="figcenter illowp85" id="leaflet19" style="max-width: 144.875em;">
+  <figcaption class="caption"><i>Leaflet No. 19.</i><br>
+RAPIDLY-DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS FOR GERMAN TROOPS TELLING OF ALLIED SUCCESSES IN THE
+BALKANS AND IN SYRIA.</figcaption>
+  <img class="w100" src="images/leaflet19.jpg" alt="">
+</figure></div>
+
+
+
+
+<p class="center">
+INFORMATION LEAFLET FOR THE TROOPS.<br>
+<br>
+FLIGHT OF GERMAN GENERAL.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">The Turks make Liman von Sanders responsible for
+their Misery.</span><br>
+<br>
+TWO ARMIES DESTROYED.<br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">Bulgarians pursued on an Extended Front in the
+Balkans.</span><br>
+<br>
+<span class="smcap">Count Hertling’s Gloom.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The victory of the British troops in Palestine over the Turkish
+troops commanded by General Liman von Sanders has made
+further progress and assumed much greater dimensions than
+was indicated by the first reports.</p>
+
+<p>Two Turkish armies, the 7th and 8th, have ceased to exist.
+The whole of their baggage train, all their guns, and their entire
+material of war have been captured.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+30,000 <span class="allsmcap">MEN SURRENDERED</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>and the few who escaped death or captivity fled in small dispersed
+bodies across the Jordan and are now wandering about the
+country.</p>
+
+<p>The British are now pursuing the 4th Turkish Army, which is
+also in danger of destruction. In any case the Turkish resistance
+in Palestine is definitely broken. General Liman von Sanders,
+the German Commander-in-Chief, who was so completely
+surprised and so much surpassed in leadership by the enemy
+headquarters,</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">is in flight before the British</span>.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The Turks claim that they have been betrayed and led into
+misfortune by the German officers appointed to command their
+forces. Palestine is now lost to them for ever. The Holy
+Places have been liberated from the suzerainty of the Mussulman.
+The Entente has undertaken to restore Palestine to the Jewish
+people. The victory of the French and Serbian troops over the<span class="pagenum" id="Page_252">[252]</span>
+Bulgarians in the Balkan mountains has strikingly developed.
+The Bulgarians are now</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="allsmcap">WITHDRAWING ON A FRONT OF 160 KILOMETRES.</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>They have made no strong opposition to the advance of the
+Entente troops. The German defeats on the Western front
+have merely depressed them and weakened their fighting ardour.
+We know it is useless to continue the struggle.</p>
+
+<p>Count Hertling, the Imperial Chancellor, knows this too.
+He told the Chief Commission of the Reichstag that deep discontent
+had seized wide circles of the people. What does he
+recommend? That the German people shall maintain its old
+and sure confidence in Hindenburg and Ludendorff in the hope
+that they may improve the situation a little? But he knows,
+we know, and the whole world knows that they cannot improve it.</p>
+
+<p class="center">
+<span class="smcap">Only the German people itself</span><br>
+</p>
+
+<p>can bring about an improvement by putting an end to autocracy
+and militarism, pan-Germanism, and the out-of-date absurdities
+which other peoples have long since done away with.</p>
+
+<p><i>On the other side of the leaflet</i>:</p>
+
+<p>The upper map shows the encircling movement of the British
+which annihilated the Turkish forces under General Liman von
+Sanders.</p>
+
+<p><i>Notes in the body of the map</i>:</p>
+
+<p>
+British cavalry.<br>
+Here 25,000 Turks surrendered.<br>
+Site of break-through on the Turkish front.<br>
+</p>
+
+<p>The lower map shows the ground gained in the Balkans by
+the French and Serbian troops which have inflicted on the
+Bulgarians the heaviest defeat they have suffered in the war.</p>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="chapter"></div>
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="map1" style="max-width: 162.375em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/map1.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.<br>
+OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY’S PRE-WAR POPULATION OF 52,000,000, ONLY ABOUT 21,000,000 WERE GERMANS OR MAGYARS. THE REMAINING 31,000,000,
+COMPRISING POLES, CZECHS, SLOVAKS, SOUTHERN SLAVS, RUMANES, ITALIANS, ETC., WERE ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY ANTI-GERMAN. THE ABOVE
+MAP SHOWS HOW THESE OPPRESSED RACES WERE DISTRIBUTED OVER THE DUAL MONARCHY.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="map2" style="max-width: 152.875em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/map2.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">THE PARTITION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: SHOWING THE BOUNDARIES AS DEFINED IN THE PEACE TREATIES. IT IS INTERESTING TO COMPARE
+THIS WITH THE ETHNOGRAPHIC MAP BETWEEN PAGES 32 AND 33.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<figure class="figcenter illowp80" id="map3" style="max-width: 199.625em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/map3.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">GERMANY’S NEW BOUNDARIES AS FIXED BY THE TREATY OF PEACE. THE DARK PORTIONS SHOW THE TERRITORY LOST TO GERMANY; THE SHADED
+PORTIONS INDICATE TERRITORY WITHIN WHICH THE INHABITANTS WERE TO CHOOSE BY PLEBISCITE UNDER WHOSE FLAG THEY WOULD LIVE.
+THE FREE TERRITORY OF DANZIG IS ALSO MARKED.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<figure class="figcenter illowp79" id="map4" style="max-width: 95.75em;">
+  <img class="w100" src="images/map4.jpg" alt="">
+  <figcaption class="caption">BULGARIA, AS DELIMITED BY THE PEACE TREATY.</figcaption>
+</figure>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+
+<div class="chapter">
+<p><span class="pagenum" id="Page_253">[253]</span></p>
+
+<h2 class="nobreak" id="INDEX">INDEX</h2>
+</div>
+
+
+<ul class="index">
+<li class="ifrst">A</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Alsace-Lorraine, Propaganda policy, <a href="#Page_180">180-1</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Austria-Hungary—propaganda against, <a href="#Page_20">20</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities: resolutions, <a href="#Page_25">25-7</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">propaganda policy: memorandum to Foreign Office, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">policies outlined, <a href="#Page_30">30-3</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">Inter-Allied Propaganda Commission organised at Italian G.H.Q., <a href="#Page_37">37</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">publishes weekly journal, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">effect of leaflet campaign, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">work impaired by reactionary tendencies within Italian Government, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">weakness of declaration made at Versailles meeting of June 3, 1918, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">effect of propaganda, desertions, <a href="#Page_43">43-4</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">recommendations of Inter-Allied Policy Committee, <a href="#Page_173">173-6</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">B</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Baker, Lieut.-Col. B. Granville, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>, <a href="#Page_48">48</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Balfour, Mr. A. J., reply to Lord Northcliffe’s memorandum on policy to be adopted against Austria, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">against Bulgaria, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Beaverbrook, Lord, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bissolati, Signor, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Borgese, Professor, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">on inter-Allied co-operation, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Bulgaria, propaganda against:</li>
+<li class="isub1">policy submitted to Foreign Office, <a href="#Page_134">134-9</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">Mr. Balfour’s reply, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">Ludendorff on effect of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">C</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cinematograph films, use for propaganda purposes, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cockerill, Brig.-Gen. G. K., <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Comert, M., <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Congress of the Oppressed Hapsburg Nationalities at Rome: resolutions, <a href="#Page_25">25-6</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Cunliffe-Owen, Sir H., in charge of propaganda against Turkey, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">D</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Denbigh, Col. the Earl of, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries (Crewe House):</li>
+<li class="isub1">Lord Northcliffe appointed Director, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">personnel of advisory committee, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">two main branches, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">co-operation of other Government Departments, <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">expenditure during “intensive” campaign (Sept.-Dec. 1918), <a href="#Page_18">18</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">production work centralised at Crewe House, <a href="#Page_91">91-2</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">good effect of, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">inter-Allied Conference: list of delegates, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</span>propaganda to cease during period of Armistice, <a href="#Page_234">234</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Austro-Hungarian Section, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  German Section, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Peace terms propaganda, <a href="#Page_202">202</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">Lord Northcliffe’s article published in <i>The Times</i> and circulated throughout the World, <a href="#Page_218">218-230</a>.</li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Work against Turkey, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Deutsche Tageszeitung</i>, tribute to propaganda staff, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Diaz, General, on effect of propaganda work on Italian front, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Donald, Mr. Robert, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">F</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Franklin-Bouillon, M., <a href="#Page_148">148</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Fyfe, Mr. H., succeeds Mr. H. G. Wells as head of German Section, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">G</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gallenga-Stuart, Signor, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>.</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Germany:—</li>
+<li class="isubsep">Allied propaganda against, early neglect of, <a href="#Page_50">50-2</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">use of leaflets, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">effect, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">suspension of distribution by aeroplane: reasons, <a href="#Page_54">54</a>: use of balloons, <a href="#Page_55">55-7</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">Mr. H. G. Wells’s memorandum on policy, <a href="#Page_61">61</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">Lord Northcliffe’s letter to Mr. Balfour, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">summary of British Labour War Aims distributed: effect, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">use of aeroplanes resumed, <a href="#Page_97">97</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">leaflets circulated among submarine crews: effect, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">use of “trench newspaper,” <a href="#Page_100">100</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">German press comments, <a href="#Page_105">105</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">rewards offered for leaflets, <a href="#Page_117">117-8</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">admission of Allied superiority, <a href="#Page_120">120</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">basis for peace negotiations, <a href="#Page_212">212</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">Lord Northcliffe’s article, <a href="#Page_218">218</a> <i>et seqq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  German propaganda, methods, <a href="#Page_3">3</a> <i>et seqq.</i>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">reasons for failure, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">organisation set up, <a href="#Page_6">6</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gramophone records of Czech and Slav songs used on Italian front, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Gruss, Major, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Guest, Mr. S. A., propaganda campaign, <a href="#Page_14">14</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_98">98</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">methods, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">H</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hall, Rear-Adm. Sir R., <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Hansa</i>, article quoted, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>.</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Headlam-Morley, Dr. J. W., <a href="#Page_13">13</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hellingrath, General von, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hindenburg, Marshal von, on effect of propaganda on German troops, <a href="#Page_93">93-4</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">manifesto on, <a href="#Page_106">106-15</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hudson, Mr. H. K., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_15">15</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Hutier, General von, manifesto; attack on Lord Northcliffe, <a href="#Page_115">115-7</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">J</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Jones, Sir Roderick, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">K</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Keeley, Mr. James, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">on need for inter-Allied co-operation, <a href="#Page_170">170</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kent, Mr. C. S., financial controller of Crewe House, <a href="#Page_18">18</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kerry, Major, the Earl of, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Klobukowski, M., <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_160">160</a>, <a href="#Page_171">171</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Kölnische Zeitung</i>, letter describing effect of leaflets, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</span>“Ten Commandments for German Women,” <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Kölnische Volkszeitung</i>, letters quoted, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Kupffer, Herr von, article quoted, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">L</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lamprecht, Dr. Karl, <a href="#Page_3">3</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lansing, Mr., <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">League of Nations, <a href="#Page_67">67</a>, <i>et seqq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Le Courrier de l’Air</i>, <a href="#Page_53">53</a>, <a href="#Page_59">59</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lichnowsky, Prince, his pamphlet used by Allies for propaganda, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Lloyd George, Mr. D., on success of propaganda against Austria, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">appreciation of Lord Northcliffe’s work, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Low, Sir Sidney, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ludendorff, Gen., on failure of German propaganda, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">efforts to create organisation, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">order showing influence of propaganda on German population, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">value of good propaganda, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">comparison between British and German departments, <a href="#Page_129">129-31</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">on effect of propaganda on Bulgarian defeat, <a href="#Page_142">142</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">M</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Macdonogh, Lieut.-Gen. Sir George, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Malinof, M., <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ministry of Information, <a href="#Page_17">17</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Mitchell, Capt. P. Chalmers, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>, <a href="#Page_92">92</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_209">209</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">N</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Nicholson, Sir Charles, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_143">143</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Northcliffe, Lord, Mission to United States;
+Chairman of London H.Q. of British War Mission;
+declines seat in Cabinet; appointed Director of Propaganda in Enemy Countries, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">anxiety to commence work against Austria, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">letter of appreciation from Mr. Lloyd George, <a href="#Page_50">50</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">on need for greater co-ordination, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">outline of policy, <a href="#Page_156">156</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Bulgaria, outlines policy against, <a href="#Page_135">135-139</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Enemy attacks on, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>, <a href="#Page_105">105</a>, <a href="#Page_115">115-7</a>, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Germany, outlines policy against, <a href="#Page_81">81</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Ludendorff, tribute, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Peace terms, article published in <i>The Times</i> and circulated throughout the world, <a href="#Page_218">218-230</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Rechberg, Herr A., tribute, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  Resignation, letter to Mr. Lloyd George, <a href="#Page_234">234</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub2">Mr. Lloyd George’s reply, <a href="#Page_235">235</a></li>
+
+<li class="isubsep">  <i>The Times</i>, leading article on propaganda work quoted, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">O</li>
+
+<li class="indx">O’Grady, Mr. James, <a href="#Page_10">10</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Ojetti, Capt., <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Onslow, Col. Lord, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Orlando, Signor, meeting with Dr. Trumbitch, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">P</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Pashitch, M., <a href="#Page_23">23</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Phillips, Mr. C. J., <a href="#Page_15">15</a>, <a href="#Page_150">150</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Poland, propaganda policy in regard to, <a href="#Page_178">178-180</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Prisoners of War, information for, <a href="#Page_143">143</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Propaganda, objects, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">axioms: truthful statements only to be made, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">necessity of co-ordination, <a href="#Page_146">146</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1"><span class="pagenum" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</span>inter-Allied conference at Crewe House, list of delegates, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">distribution devices, <a href="#Page_54">54-59</a>; <a href="#Page_184">184-190</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">R</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rechberg, Herr A., tribute to Lord Northcliffe’s work, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>Rheinische-Westfälische-Zeitung</i>, article quoted, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Rome Congress, <a href="#Page_25">25</a> <i>et seqq.</i></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">S</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Scheurmann, Herr W., letter quoted, <a href="#Page_126">126</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Seton-Watson, Dr. R. W., <a href="#Page_11">11</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_49">49</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Siciliani, Col., <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Sonnino, Baron, <a href="#Page_41">41</a>, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Standing, Sir Guy, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Steed, Mr. H. Wickham, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a>, <a href="#Page_39">39</a>, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>,
+    <a href="#Page_149">149</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">Co-Director of Austro-Hungarian Section, <a href="#Page_11">11</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">mission to Italy, <a href="#Page_37">37</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stein, Gen. von, admission of superiority of Allies’ propaganda, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stossinger, Herr F., <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Stuart, Lieut.-Col. Sir Campbell, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_149">149</a>, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_236">236</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Swinton, Maj.-Gen., <a href="#Page_51">51</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">T</li>
+
+<li class="indx"><i>The Times</i>, leading article on Lord Northcliffe’s work quoted, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Torre, Dr., <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Trumbitch, Dr., <a href="#Page_23">23</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li>
+
+
+<li class="ifrst">W</li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wells, Mr. H. G., <a href="#Page_10">10</a>, <a href="#Page_12">12</a>, <a href="#Page_60">60</a>, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_90">90</a>;</li>
+<li class="isub1">memorandum on propaganda policy against Germany, <a href="#Page_61">61</a> <i>et seqq.</i></li>
+
+<li class="indx">Wireless Telegraphy, used as means of disseminating information, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li>
+</ul>
+
+
+<p class="center fs80">
+PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE CORNWALL PRESS, LTD.,<br>
+PARIS GARDEN, STAMFORD STREET, LONDON, S.E.1.<br>
+</p>
+
+
+<hr class="chap x-ebookmaker-drop">
+<div class="chapter transnote">
+<p class="center">Transcriber’s notes:</p>
+
+<p>Underlining in the translation of leaflet 17, where it is used for emphasis,
+has been marked as bold, but ignored elsewhere.</p>
+
+<p>
+Evident typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected
+silently.  Inconsistent spelling/hyphenation has been normalised.
+</p>
+
+<p> The usage of both Roumania & Rumania is the author’s.
+</p>
+
+<p> A half-title page has been discarded.
+</p>
+
+<p>
+A single footnote has been relocated at the end of the quoted passage to which it refers.
+</p>
+
+
+<p>To improve text flow, illustrations have been relocated as follows:</p>
+<div class="blockquot"><p>Photographs have been grouped between chapters.</p>
+<p>Each “leaflet” has been moved to the appendix, to accompanying its translation.<br>
+Redundant cross-references and reiterations of the leaflet number have been discarded.<br>
+The explanatory text “Facsimile leaflets and translations” has been appended to the appendix and table of contents.</p>
+
+<p>Maps follow immediately after the appendix.</p></div>
+
+<p>Page numbers in the List of Illustrations are no longer relevant,
+but will link to the indicated image.</p>
+
+</div>
+
+
+
+
+
+<div style='text-align:center'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77798 ***</div>
+</body>
+</html>
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diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt
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+This book, including all associated images, markup, improvements,
+metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be
+in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES.
+
+Procedures for determining public domain status are described in
+the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org.
+
+No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in
+jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize
+this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright
+status under the laws that apply to them.
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+Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for eBook #77798
+(https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/77798)