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diff --git a/77699-0.txt b/77699-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e27693 --- /dev/null +++ b/77699-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5878 @@ +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77699 *** + + A Greater than Napoleon: Scipio Africanus + +[Illustration: From the bust in the Capitoline Museum, supposed to be +Scipio Africanus.] + + + + + A GREATER THAN NAPOLEON + + SCIPIO AFRICANUS + + BY + + Captain B. H. LIDDELL HART + + _WITH FRONTISPIECE AND MAPS_ + + FOURTH IMPRESSION + + + WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS LTD. + EDINBURGH AND LONDON + MCMXXX + + _Printed in Great Britain_ _All Rights reserved_ + + _TO + THE MASTER, FELLOWS AND SCHOLARS + OF + CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE + CAMBRIDGE_ + + + + + PREFACE. + + +The excuse for this book is that no recent biography of Scipio exists; +the first and last in English appeared in 1817, and is the work of a +country clergyman, who omits any study of Scipio as a soldier! The +reason for this book is that, apart from the romance of Scipio’s +personality and his political importance as the founder of Rome’s +world-dominion, his military work has a greater value to modern students +of war than that of any other great captain of the past. A bold claim, +and yet its truth will, I hope, be substantiated in the following pages. + +For the study of tactical methods the campaigns of Napoleon or of 1870, +even of 1914-1918 perhaps, are as dead as those of the third century +B.C. But the art of generalship does not age, and it is because Scipio’s +battles are richer in stratagems and ruses—many still feasible +to-day—than those of any other commander in history that they are an +unfailing object-lesson to soldiers. + +Strategically Scipio is still more “modern.” The present is a time of +disillusionment, when we are realising that slaughter is not synonymous +with victory, that the “destruction of the enemy’s main armed forces on +the battlefield” is at best but a means to the end, and not an end in +itself, as the purblind apostles of Clausewitz had deceived +themselves—and the world, unhappily. In the future, even more than in +the past, the need is to study and understand the interplay of the +military, economic, and political forces, which are inseparable in +strategy. Because Scipio more than any other great captain understood +and combined these forces in his strategy, despite the very “modern” +handicap of being the servant of a republic—not, like Alexander, +Frederick, Napoleon, a despot,—the study of his life is peculiarly +apposite to-day. Above all, because the moral objective was the aim of +all his plans, whether political, strategical, or tactical. + +My grateful thanks are due to Sir Geoffrey Butler, K.B.E., M.P., Fellow +of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge; to Mr W. E. Heitland, M.A., Fellow +of St John’s College, Cambridge; and to Mr E. G. Hawke, M.A., Lecturer +at Queen’s College, London, for their kindness in reading the proofs and +for helpful comments. + +B. H. L. H. + + + + + CONTENTS. + +INTRODUCTION ... 1 + +I. HALF LIGHT ... 9 + +II. DAWN ... 20 + +III. THE STORM OF CARTAGENA ... 31 + +IV. THE BATTLE OF BÆCULA ... 44 + +V. THE BATTLE OF ILIPA ... 56 + +VI. THE SUBJUGATION OF SPAIN ... 67 + +VII. THE TRUE OBJECTIVE ... 88 + +VIII. A POLITICAL HITCH ... 106 + +IX. AFRICA ... 123 + +X. A VIOLATED PEACE ... 151 + +XI. ZAMA ... 164 + +XII. AFTER ZAMA ... 191 + +XIII. SIESTA ... 204 + +XIV. THE LAST LAP ... 222 + +XV. DUSK ... 238 + +XVI. ROME’S ZENITH ... 248 + + + LIST OF MAPS. + +BATTLE OF BÆCULA ... _Facing p._ 46 + +BATTLE OF ILIPA (SCIPIO’S MANŒUVRE) ... _Facing p._ 60 + +SPAIN (AT TIME OF 2ND PUNIC WAR) ... _Facing p._ 84 + +UTICA ... _Facing p._ 126 + +AFRICA (THE TERRITORY OF CARTHAGE) ... _Facing p._ 144 + +BATTLE OF ZAMA ... _Facing p._ 176 + +THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD ... _Facing p._ 202 + + + + + A GREATER THAN NAPOLEON + INTRODUCTION. + + +The road to failure is the road to fame—such apparently must be the +verdict on posterity’s estimate of the world’s greatest figures. The +flash of the meteor impresses the human imagination more than the +remoter splendour of the star, fixed immutably in the high heavens. Is +it that final swoop earthwards, the unearthly radiance ending in the +common dust, that, by its evidence of the tangible or the finite, gives +to the meteor a more human appeal? So with the luminaries of the human +system, provided that the ultimate fall has a dramatic note, the memory +of spectacular failure eclipses that of enduring success. Again, it may +be that the completeness of his course lends individual emphasis to the +great failure, throwing his work into clearer relief, whereas the man +whose efforts are crowned with permanent success builds a stepping-stone +by which others may advance still farther, and so merges his own fame in +that of his successors. + +The theory at least finds ample confirmation in the realm of action. A +Napoleon and a Lee are enshrined in drama, in novel, and in memoir by +the hundred. A Wellington and a Grant are almost forgotten by the +writers of the nations they brought through peril intact and victorious. +Even a Lincoln may only have been saved from comparative oblivion by the +bullet of an assassin, a Nelson by death in the hour of victory, which +relieved by emotion-awakening tragedy the disrepute of a successful end. +It would seem likely that a century hence the name of Ludendorff will be +emblazoned as the heroic figure of the European War, while that of Foch +sinks into obscurity; there are signs already of this tendency to exalt +the defeated. + +For permanence of reputation a man of action must appeal to emotion, not +merely to the mind; and since the living man himself no longer can +kindle the emotions of posterity, the dramatic human touch of ultimate +failure is essential. This truth would seem to hold in most branches of +human effort. Scott’s gallant but belated attempt to reach the South +Pole lives in the world’s memory, while the successful ventures of +Amundsen and Peary are fading. In sport, Dorando’s Marathon is an +enduring memory; but who among the general public could recall the name +of Hayes, the actual victor, or, indeed, that of any subsequent Marathon +winner. + +For this irrational, this sentimental verdict, it is fashionable to fix +the blame on modern journalism, yet the barest survey of history shows +that its origins lie far back in the mists of time. On the historian, in +fact—who of all men should by training and outlook put his trust in +reason—falls the major responsibility for this eternal tendency—the +glorification of dramatic failure at the expense of enduring +achievement. The history of the ancient confirms that of the modern +world, and in no example more strikingly than that of Scipio Africanus, +the subject of this brief study, which is an attempt to redress the +“historical” balance by throwing further weights of knowledge and +military appreciation on Scipio’s side, not as commonly by detraction +from his rivals. Gradually, progressively, the belittlement of Scipio +has been pressed by historians anxious to enhance the fame of Hannibal. +It is the more unreasonable, the less excusable, because here there are +no mass of conflicting sources and contemporary opinions. The reliable +data on which to base a study and a judgment are practically limited to +the works of Polybius and Livy, with but a few grains from other, and +admittedly less trustworthy, ancient authorities. And of these two, +Polybius, the earlier, is almost contemporary with events, the friend of +Gaius Lælius, Scipio’s constant subordinate, from whom he could get +first-hand evidence and judgments. He had the family archives of the +Scipios at his disposal for research, and he had been over the actual +battlefields while many of the combatants were still alive. Thus he +gained an almost unique base upon which to form his estimate. + +Further, being a Greek, his views are less suspect than those of Livy of +being coloured by Roman patriotic bias, while modern historical +criticism is unanimous in its tribute alike to his impartiality, his +thoroughness of research, and the soundness of his critical insight. + +The verdict of Polybius is clear, and his facts still more so. + +That there were divergent judgments of Scipio among the Romans of +succeeding generations is true; but Polybius explains the reasons so +convincingly, their truth borne out by the known facts of Scipio’s +strategical and tactical plans, that there is no vestige of excuse for +modern writers to regard as due to luck what superstition led the +ancients to ascribe to divine aid. “The fact that he was almost the most +famous man of all time makes every one desirous to know what sort of man +he was, and what were the natural gifts and the training which enabled +him to accomplish so many great actions. But none can help falling into +error and acquiring a mistaken impression of him, as the estimate of +those who have given us their views about him is very wide of the +truth.” “... They represent him as a man favoured by fortune ... such +men being, in their opinion, more divine and more worthy of admiration +than those who always act by calculation. They are not aware that the +one deserves praise and the other only congratulation, being common to +ordinary men, whereas what is praiseworthy belongs only to men of sound +judgment and mental ability, whom we should consider to be the most +divine and most beloved by the gods. To me it seems that the character +and principles of Scipio much resembled those of Lycurgus, the +Lacedæmonian legislator. For neither must we suppose that Lycurgus drew +up the constitution of Sparta under the influence of superstition and +solely prompted by the Pythia, nor that Scipio won such an empire for +his country by following the suggestion of dreams and omens. But since +both of them saw that most men neither readily accept anything +unfamiliar to them, nor venture on great risks without the hope of +divine help, Lycurgus made his own scheme more acceptable and more +easily believed in by invoking the oracles of the Pythia in support of +projects due to himself, while Scipio similarly made the men under his +command more sanguine and more ready to face perilous enterprises by +instilling into them the belief that his projects were divinely +inspired. But that he invariably acted on calculation and foresight, and +that the successful issue of his plans was always in accord with +rational expectation, will be evident.” + +To the mind of to-day not only does such an explanation appear +inherently probable, but affords a key to the understanding of a man +whose triumphs, whether military, political, or diplomatic, were, above +all, due to his supreme insight into the psychology of men. Who, +moreover, applied this gift like the conductor of a great orchestra to +the production of a world harmony. In conducting policy, through war to +peace, he indeed attained a concord which aptly fulfilled the musical +definition: “A combination which both by its ... smoothness and by its +logical origin and purpose in the scheme can form a point of repose.” As +a conductor of the human orchestra he had, however, two weaknesses, one +inborn and one developing with years. He could not comprehend the low +notes—the narrowness and baseness to which men can descend,—and the +exaltation of spirit born of his power over men prevented him from +hearing the first warnings of that discord which was to impair the +glorious symphony so nearly completed. + + + + + CHAPTER I. + HALF LIGHT. + + +Publius Cornelius Scipio was born at Rome in the 517th year from the +city’s foundation—235 B.C. Though a member of one of the most +illustrious and ancient families, the Cornelii, of his early years and +education no record, not even an anecdote, has come down to us. Indeed, +not until he is chosen, through a combination of circumstances and his +own initiative, to command the army in Spain at the age of twenty-four, +does history give us more than an occasional fleeting glimpse of his +progress. Yet bare and brief as these are, each is significant. The +first is at the battle of the Ticinus, Hannibal’s initial encounter with +the Roman arms on Italian soil, after his famous passage of the Alps. +Here the youthful Scipio, a lad of seventeen, accompanied his father, +the Roman commander. If his first experience of battle was on the losing +side, he at least emerged with enviable distinction. Let the story be +told in Polybius’s words: “His father had placed him in command of a +picked troop of horse” (in reserve on a small hill) “in order to ensure +his safety; but when he caught sight of his father in the battle, +surrounded by the enemy and escorted only by two or three horsemen and +dangerously wounded, he at first endeavoured to urge those with him to +go to the rescue, but when they hung back for a time owing to the large +numbers of the enemy round them, he is said with reckless daring to have +charged the encircling force alone. Upon the rest being now forced to +attack, the enemy were terror-struck and broke up, and Publius Scipio, +thus unexpectedly rescued, was the first to salute his son as his +deliverer.” It is said that the consul ordered a civic crown, the Roman +V.C., to be presented to his son, who refused it, saying that “the +action was one that rewarded itself.” The exploit does credit to the +young Scipio’s gallantry, but the outcome, as emphasised by Polybius, +does still more credit to his psychological insight. “Having by this +service won a universally acknowledged reputation for bravery, he in +subsequent times refrained from exposing his person without sufficient +reason when his country reposed her hopes of success on him—conduct +characteristic not of a commander who relies on luck, but on one gifted +with intelligence.” + +To the present generation, with personal experience of war, the point +may have greater force than to the closeted historians. To the former, +the higher commander who aspires to be a platoon leader, thrusting +himself into the fight at the expense of his proper duty of direction, +is not the heroic or inspired figure that he appears to the civilian. To +some too, not natural lovers of danger for its own sake—and these are +rare in any army,—the point will touch a chord of memory, reminding them +of how by the moral hold on their men given by one such exploit they +were thereafter enabled to take the personal precautions which better +befit the officer entrusted with the lives of others. The civilian at +home poured scorn on the German officer “leading” his men from behind; +not so the fighting soldier, for he knew that when the occasion called, +his officer enemy did not hesitate to risk, nay throw away his life, as +an example. The story still lives of the German officer who led a +forlorn hope mounted on a white horse. + +The exploit, and the popular fame it brought, launched Scipio’s military +career so auspiciously as to earn him rapid advancement. For, less than +two years later, 216 B.C., Livy’s account speaks of him as one of the +military tribunes, from whom the commanders of the legions were +nominated, and in itself a post that made him one of the deputies or +staff officers of the legion commander. If a parallel is desired, the +nearest modern equivalent is a staff colonel. + +This second glimpse of Scipio comes on the morrow of Cannæ, Rome’s +darkest hour, and it is curious that the future general, who, like +Marlborough, was never to fight a battle that he did not win, should in +his subordinate days have been witness of unrelieved disaster. There is +no record of Scipio’s share in the battle, but from Livy’s account it +seems clear that he was among the ten thousand survivors who escaped to +the greater Roman camp across the River Aufidus, and further, one of the +undaunted four thousand who, rather than surrender with their fellows, +quitted the camp after nightfall, and eluding the Carthaginian horse, +made their way to Canusium. Their situation was still perilous, for this +place lay only some four miles distant, and why Hannibal did not follow +up his success by the destruction of this remnant, isolated from +succour, remains one of the enigmas of history, to all appearance a +blemish on his generalship. + +With the four thousand at Canusium were four military tribunes, and, as +Livy tells us, “by the consent of all, the supreme command was vested in +Publius Scipio, then a very young man, and Appius Claudius.” Once more +Scipio shines amid the darkness of defeat; once more a time of general +disaster is the opportunity of youth backed by character. Disruption, if +not mutiny, threatens. Word is brought that men are saying that Rome is +doomed, and that certain of the younger patricians, headed by Lucius +Cæcilius Metellus, are proposing to leave Rome to its fate and escape +overseas to seek service with some foreign king. These fresh tidings of +ill-fortune dismay and almost paralyse the assembled leaders. But while +the others urge that a council be called to deliberate upon the +situation, Scipio acts. He declares “that it is not a proper subject for +deliberation; that courage and action, and not deliberation, were +necessary in such a calamity. That those who desired the safety of the +state would attend him in arms forthwith; that in no place was the camp +of the enemy more truly than where such designs were meditated.” Then, +with only a few companions, he goes straight to the lodging of Metellus, +surprising the plotters in council. Drawing his sword, Scipio proclaims +his purpose: “I swear that I will neither desert the cause of Rome, nor +allow any other citizen of Rome to desert it. If knowingly I violate +this oath, may Jupiter visit with the most horrible perdition my house, +my family, and my fortune. I insist that you, Lucius Cæcilius, and the +rest of you present, take this oath; and let the man who demurs be +assured that this sword is drawn against him.” The upshot is that, +“terrified, as though they were beholding the victorious Hannibal, they +all take the oath, and surrender themselves to Scipio to be kept in +custody.” + +This danger quelled, Scipio and Appius, hearing that Varro, the +surviving consul, had reached Venusia, sent a messenger there, placing +themselves under his orders. + +Scipio’s next brief entry on the stage of history is in a different +scene. His elder brother, Lucius, was a candidate for the ædileship,[1] +and the younger Publius “for long did not venture to stand for the same +office as his brother. But on the approach of the election, judging from +the disposition of the people that his brother had a poor chance of +being elected, and seeing that he himself was exceedingly popular, he +came to the conclusion that the only means by which his brother would +attain his object would be by their coming to an agreement and both of +them making the attempt, and so he hit on the following plan. Seeing +that his mother was visiting the different temples and sacrificing to +the gods on behalf of his brother and generally showing great concern +about the result, he told her, as a fact, that he had twice had the same +dream. He had dreamt that both he and his brother had been elected to +the ædileship, and were going up from the Forum to their house when she +met them at the door and fell on their necks and kissed them. She was +affected by this, as a woman would be, and exclaimed, ‘Would I might see +that day,’ or something similar. ‘Then would you like us to try, +mother?’ he said. Upon her consenting, as she never dreamt he would +venture on it, but thought it was merely a casual joke—for he was +exceedingly young,—he begged her to get a white toga ready for him at +once, this being the dress that candidates are in the habit of wearing. +What she had said had entirely gone out of her head, and Scipio, waiting +until he received the white toga, appeared in the Forum while his mother +was still asleep. The people, owing to the unexpectedness of the sight, +and owing to his previous popularity, received him with enthusiastic +surprise; and afterwards, when he went on to the station appointed for +candidates and stood by his brother, they not only conferred the office +on Publius but on his brother too for his sake, and both appeared at +their home elected ædiles. When the news suddenly reached his mother’s +ears, she, overjoyed, met them at the door and embraced the young men +with deep emotion, so that from this circumstance all who had heard of +the dreams believed that Publius communed with the gods not only in his +sleep, but still more in reality and by day.” + +“Now, it was not a matter of a dream at all; but as he was kind, +munificent, and agreeable in his address, he reckoned on his popularity +with the people, and so by cleverly adapting his action to the actual +sentiment of the people and of his mother, he not only attained his +object, but was believed to have acted under a sort of divine +inspiration. For those who are incapable of taking an accurate view of +opportunities, causes, and dispositions, attribute to the gods and to +fortune the causes of what is accomplished by shrewdness and with +calculation and foresight.” + +To some the deception, even though for a worthy end, may seem out of +tune with the higher Roman virtues; and Livy, to whom as a Roman the +artifice would appear less admirable than to Polybius, a Greek, leaves +in doubt the origin of this habit of Scipio’s, developed in his after +career either by reason of its success or practice. Here is Livy’s +appreciation: “Scipio was undoubtedly the possessor of striking gifts; +but besides that he had from childhood studied the art of their +effective display. Whether there was some vein of superstition in his +own temperament, or whether it was with the aim of securing for his +commands the authority of inspired utterances, he rarely spoke in public +without pretending to some nocturnal vision or supernatural suggestion.” +Livy may exaggerate the frequency, for he wrote at a later date, and +legends grow round the characteristics of the great. Such supernatural +claims only appear occasionally in Scipio’s recorded utterances, and he, +a supreme artist in handling human nature, would realise the value of +reserving them for critical moments. + +Livy continues: “In order to impress public opinion in this direction, +he had made a practice from the day he reached manhood of never engaging +in any business, public or private, without first paying a visit to the +Capitol. There he would enter the sanctuary and pass some time, +generally in solitude and seclusion. This habit ... made converts to a +belief, to which accident or design had given wide currency, that his +origin was other than human. There was a story once widely believed +about Alexander the Great, that his male parent had been a huge serpent, +often seen in his mother’s chamber, but vanishing directly men appeared. +This miracle was told again of Scipio ... but he himself never cast +ridicule upon it; indeed, he rather lent it countenance by the course +which he adopted of neither wholly disclaiming such tales nor openly +asserting their truth.” This last tale, incidentally, is repeated by +several of the ancient writers and enshrined in ‘Paradise Lost,’ where +Milton writes:— + + “He with Olympias, this with her that bore + Scipio, the height of Rome.” + +The view that this claim to divine inspiration had a religious and not +merely an intellectual basis gains some support from Scipio’s conduct in +the Syrian War of 190 B.C., when, because he was a member of the college +of the priests of Mars, known as Salian priests, he stayed behind the +army and indirectly kept it waiting at the Hellespont, as the rule bound +him to stay where he was until the month ended. + +Again, modern psychologists may suggest that his dreams were true and +not invented, such is known to be the power of strong desire to fulfil +itself in dreams. Whatever the explanation and the source of his +“visions,” there can be no doubt as to the skill with which he turned +them to practical account. And it is a supreme moral tribute to Scipio +that this power was exerted by him purely to further his country’s good, +never his own. When trouble and accusation came in later days, and an +ungrateful State forgot its saviour, Scipio did not invoke any divine +vision in his defence. That he so refrained is the more definite and the +more significant, because, with other psychological means, he showed +himself still the supreme “organist” of the human instrument. + +Scipio’s election to the ædileship is historically important, not only +because it illumines the sources of his success and influence over men, +but also for its light on the causes of his political decline, the +self-imposed exile from an ungrateful country, which saw a marvellously +brilliant career close in shadow. It is Livy who shows that his election +was not so unopposed as Polybius’s account would suggest; that the +tribunes of the people opposed his pretensions to the office because he +had not attained the legal age for candidature. Whereupon Scipio +retorted that “if the citizens in general are desirous of appointing me +ædile, I am old enough”—an appeal over the heads of the tribunes which +was instantly successful, but which by its triumphant defiance of +tradition and rule was likely to add resentment to the jealousy which +inevitably accompanies the precocious success of youth. + +Footnote 1: + + The ædileship was normally the first rung of the ladder to the higher + magistracy. Its functions were those of a civic “Home Office”—the care + of the city and the enforcement of the by-laws, the supervision of the + markets and of prices and measures, the superintendence and + organisation of the public games. + + + + + CHAPTER II. + DAWN. + + +These three episodes form the prologue to the real drama of Scipio’s +career. On this the curtain rises in 210 B.C., which, if not Rome’s +blackest hour in her life and death struggle with Carthage, was at least +the greyest. That conflict, which she had entered upon originally in 264 +B.C., was the inevitable sequel to the supremacy of the Italian +peninsula won by her combination of political genius and military +vigour, for this supremacy could never be secure so long as an alien sea +power—Carthage—commanded the waters of the peninsula, a continual menace +to its seaboard and commerce. But when, after many hazards, the close of +the First Punic War in 241 B.C. yielded Rome this maritime security, the +vision and ambition of Hamilcar Barca not merely revived, but widened +the scope of the struggle between Rome and Carthage into one with world +power or downfall as the stakes. During the long interval of outward +peace this Carthaginian Bismarck prepared the mental and material means +for a stroke at the heart of the Roman power, educating his sons and +followers to conceive the conquest of Rome as their goal, and using +Spain as the training ground for the Barcine school of war, as well as +the base of their forthcoming military effort. In 218 B.C., Hannibal, +crossing the Alps, began his invasion of Italy to reap the harvest for +which his father had sown the seeds. His victories on the Ticinus, the +Trebia, at the Trasimene Lake, grew in scale until they reached their +apex on the battlefield of Cannæ. If Roman fortitude, the loyalty of +most of the Italian allies, and Hannibal’s strategic caution then gained +for Rome a reprieve, the passage of five years’ unceasing warfare so +drained her resources and exhausted her allies that by 211 B.C. Roman +power, internally if not superficially, was perhaps nearer than ever +before to a breakdown. A machine that is new and in good condition can +withstand repeated severe shocks, but when badly worn a jar may suffice +to cause its collapse. Such a jar came, for while Hannibal was +campaigning in Southern Italy, destroying Roman armies if apparently +drawing no nearer his object—the destruction of the Roman power,—the +Carthaginian arms in Spain had been crowned with a victory that +threatened Rome’s footing on the peninsula. + +For several years Scipio’s father and uncle, Publius the elder and +Gnæus, had been in command of the Roman forces there, winning repeated +successes until, caught divided, the two brothers were defeated in turn, +both falling on the battlefield. The shattered remnants of the Roman +forces were driven north of the Ebro, and only a gallant rally by +Marcius prevented the Romans being driven out of Spain. Even so their +situation was precarious, for many of the Spanish tribes had forsaken +the Romans in their hour of adversity. Though the determination of Rome +itself, as before, was unbroken, and the disaster only spurred her to +retrieve it, the choice of a successor proved difficult. Finally, it was +decided to call an assembly of the people to elect a pro-consul for +Spain. But no candidates offered themselves for the dangerous honour. +“The people, at their wits’ end, came down to the Campus Martius on the +day of the election, where, turning towards the magistrate, they looked +round at the countenances of their most eminent men, who were earnestly +gazing at each other, and murmured bitterly that their affairs were in +so ruinous a state, and the condition of the commonwealth so desperate, +that no one dared undertake the command in Spain. When suddenly Publius +Cornelius, son of Publius who had fallen in Spain, who was about +twenty-four years of age, declared himself a candidate, and took his +station on an eminence by which he could be seen by all” (Livy). His +election was unanimous, not only by every century, but by every man +there present. “But after the business had been concluded, and the +ardour and impetuosity of their zeal had subsided, a sudden silence +ensued, and a secret reflection on what they had done—whether their +partiality had not got the better of their judgment. They chiefly +regretted his youth; but some were terrified at the fortune which +attended his house and his name, for while the two families to which he +belonged were in mourning, he was going into a province where he must +carry on his operations amid the tombs of his father and his uncle.” + +Realising the prevalence of these second thoughts, these doubts, Scipio +sought to offset them by summoning an assembly, at which his sagacious +arguments did much to restore confidence. The secret of his sway, +extraordinary in one so young, over the crowd mind, especially in times +of crisis, was his profound self-confidence, which radiated an influence +to which the stories of his divine inspiration were but auxiliary. +Self-confidence is a term often used in a derogatory sense, but Scipio’s +was not only justified by results but essentially different, a spiritual +exaltation which is epitomised by Aulus Gellius as “conscientia sui +subnixus”—“lifted high on his consciousness of himself.” + +To the remains of the army in Spain ten thousand foot and a thousand +horse were added, and taking these reinforcements, Scipio set sail with +a fleet of thirty quinqueremes from the mouth of the Tiber. Coasting +along the Gulf of Genoa, the Riviera shore, and the Gulf of Lions, he +landed his troops just inside the Spanish frontier, and then marched +overland to Tarraco—modern Tarragona. Here he received embassies from +the various Spanish allies. His appreciation of the moral factor and of +the value of personal observation, two vital elements in generalship, +was shown in his earliest steps. The rival forces were in winter +quarters, and before attempting to formulate any plan he visited the +States of his allies and every one of the various parts of his army, +seeking always by his attitude, even more than by his words, to rekindle +confidence and dissipate the influence of past defeat. His own moral +stature could not be better shown than by his treatment of Marcius, the +man who had partly retrieved the Roman disasters, and thus one whom an +ambitious general might well regard as a rival to his own position and +fame. But “Marcius he kept with him, and treated him with such respect +that it was perfectly clear that there was nothing he feared less than +lest any one should stand in the way of his own glory.” Napoleon’s +jealousy of Moreau, his deliberate overshadowing of his own marshals, is +in marked contrast with Scipio’s attitude, and one of the finest of +military tributes to him is the abiding affection felt for him by his +subordinate generals. “No man is a hero to his valet,” and but few +generals are heroes to their chief staff officers, who see them +intimately in their nude qualities beneath the trappings of authority +and public reputation. Loyal subordinates will maintain the fiction of +infallibility for the good of the army, and so long as is necessary, but +they know the man as he is, and in later years the truth leaks out. Thus +it is worth remembering that the verdict of Polybius is founded on +direct conversations with Gaius Lælius, Scipio’s coadjutor, and the one +man to whom he confided his military plans before operations. + +To the soldiers suffering under defeat he made no reproaches, but aptly +mingled an appeal to their reason and to their spirit, reminding them +how often in Roman history early defeat had been the presage to ultimate +victory, how the sure tilting of the balance had already begun, the +initial disasters found their counterpoise, and in Italy and Sicily +everything was going prosperously. Then he pointed out that the +Carthaginian victories were not due to superior courage, but “to the +treachery of the Celtiberians and to rashness, the generals having been +cut off from each other owing to their trust in the alliance of that +people.” Next he showed how their disadvantages had shifted to the other +side, the Carthaginian armies “being encamped a long distance apart,” +their allies estranged by tactlessness and tyranny, and, above all, +personal ill-feeling between the enemy’s commanders would make them slow +to come to each other’s assistance. Finally, he kindled their enthusiasm +by touching their affection for their lost leaders: “I will soon bring +it to pass that, as you can now trace in me a likeness to my father and +uncle in my features, countenance, and figure, I will so restore a copy +of their genius, honour, and courage, that every man of you shall say +that his commander, Scipio, has either returned to life, or has been +born again.” + +His first step was to restore and fortify the confidence of his own +troops and allies, his next to attack that of his enemies, to strike not +at their flesh but at their moral Achilles heel. His acute strategical +insight, in a day when strategy, as distinct from battle tactics, had +hardly been born, made him realise that Spain was the real key to the +whole struggle. Spain was Hannibal’s real base of operations; there he +had trained his armies, and thence he looked for his reinforcements. + +Scipio’s first move was to apply his appreciation of the moral objective +within the Spanish theatre of war. While others urged him to attack one +of the Carthaginian armies, he decided to strike at their base, their +life-line. First, he concentrated all his troops at one place, leaving +one small but compact detachment of 3000 foot and 300 horse under Marcus +Silanus to secure his own essential pivot of operations—Tarraco. Then, +with all the rest, 25,000 foot and 2500 horse—here was true economy of +force,—he crossed the Ebro, “revealing his plan to no one.” “The fact +was that he had decided not to do any of the things he had publicly +announced, but to invest suddenly” New Carthage—modern Cartagena. To +this end “he gave secret orders to Gaius Lælius, who commanded the +fleet, who alone was aware of the project, to sail to that place, while +he himself with his land forces marched rapidly against it.” As Polybius +sagely emphasises, calculation marked this youth, for “he, in the first +place, took in hand a situation pronounced by most people as desperate +... and secondly, in dealing with it he put aside the measures obvious +to any one, and planned out and decided on a course which neither his +enemies nor his friends expected.” “On his arrival in Spain he ... +inquired from every one about the circumstances of the enemy, and learnt +that the Carthaginian forces were divided into three bodies,” Mago, near +the pillars of Hercules—Gibraltar; Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, near the +mouth of the Tagus; and Hasdrubal Barca besieging a city in Central +Spain not far from modern Madrid. None of them were within less than ten +days’ march from New Carthage; he himself, as the event proved, was +within seven days’ forced marches of it. The news of his attack must +take several days to reach them, and if he could take it by a surprise +_coup de main_ he would forestall any aid, and “in the event of failure +he could, since he was master of the sea, place his troops in a position +of safety.” Polybius further tells us how “during the winter he made +detailed inquiries from people acquainted with it.” “He learnt that it +stood almost alone among Spanish cities in possessing harbours fit for a +fleet and for naval forces, and also that it was for the Carthaginians +the direct sea crossing from Africa. Next he heard that the +Carthaginians kept the bulk of their money and their war material in +this city, as well as their hostages from the whole of Spain; and, what +was of most importance, that the trained soldiers who garrisoned the +citadel were only about a thousand strong, because no one dreamt that +while the Carthaginians were masters of nearly the whole of Spain it +would enter any one’s head to besiege the city, while the remaining +population was exceedingly large, but composed of artisans, tradesmen, +and sailors, men very far from having any military experience. This he +considered to be a thing that would tell against the city if he appeared +suddenly before it”—the moral calculation again. “Abandoning, therefore, +all other projects, he spent his time while in winter quarters in +preparing for this,” but “he concealed the plan from every one except +Gaius Lælius.” The account shows that he was master of two more +attributes of generalship—the power to keep his intentions secret until +their disclosure was necessary for the execution of the plan, and the +wisdom to realise that military success depends largely on the +thoroughness of the previous preparation. + +Polybius’s assertion that Scipio’s move was due to masterly calculation, +and not to inspiration or fortune, is confirmed indirectly by the +reference to a letter of Scipio’s which he had seen, and directly by +Livy’s quotation of Scipio’s speech to the troops before the attack. One +phrase epitomises the strategic idea: “You will in actuality attack the +walls of a single city, but in that single city you will have made +yourselves masters of all Spain,” and he explains exactly how capture of +the hostages, the treasure, and the war stores will be turned to their +advantage and react to the enemy’s disadvantage, moral, economic, and +material. Even if Livy’s phrase was coined to meet Scipio’s fact, its +note is so exactly in accord with Scipio’s actions as to give it a ring +of basic truth. + + + + + CHAPTER III. + THE STORM OF CARTAGENA. + + +On the seventh day from the start of the march Scipio arrived before the +city and encamped, the fleet arriving simultaneously in the harbour, +thus cutting off communication on all sides. This harbour formed a +circular bottle, its mouth almost corked by an island, while Cartagena +itself was like a candle stuck in the bottom of the bottle, the city +standing on a narrow rocky spit of land protruding from the mainland. +This small peninsula bore a distinct resemblance to Gibraltar, and the +isthmus joining it to the mainland was only some four hundred yards +across. The city was guarded on two sides by the sea, and on the west by +a lagoon. Here was a hard nut to crack, seemingly impregnable to any +action save a blockade, and this, time prevented. + +Scipio’s first step was to ensure his tactical security by defending the +outer side of his camp with a palisade and double trench stretching from +sea to sea. On the inner side, facing the isthmus, he erected no +defences, partly because the nature of the ground gave protection, and +partly in order not to hinder the free movement of his assaulting +troops. The Carthaginian commander, Mago, to oppose him armed two +thousand of the sturdiest citizens, and posted them by the landward gate +for a sortie. The rest he distributed to defend the walls to the best of +their power, while of his own regulars he disposed five hundred in the +citadel on the top of the peninsula, and five hundred on the eastern +hill. + +Next day Scipio encircled the city with ships, throwing a constant +stream of missiles, and about the third hour[2] sent forward along the +isthmus two thousand picked men with the ladder-bearers, for its +narrowness prevented a stronger force being deployed. Appreciating the +handicap of their cramped position if counter-attacked by the yet +unshaken defenders, he astutely designed to turn this handicap to his +own advantage. The expected sortie came as soon as Scipio sounded the +bugle for assault, and a close-matched struggle ensued. “But as the +assistance sent to either side was not equal, the Carthaginians arriving +through a single gate and from a longer distance, the Romans from close +by and from several points, the battle for this reason was an unequal +one. For Scipio had purposely posted his men close to the camp itself in +order to entice the enemy as far out as possible” (Livy says the Roman +advanced troops retired according to orders on the reserves), “well +knowing that if he destroyed those who were, so to speak, the steel edge +of the population he would cause universal dejection, and none of those +inside would venture out of the gate again” (Polybius). This last point +was essential for the freedom of his decisive move. + +By the skilful infusion of successive reserves into the combat, the +Carthaginian onset was first stemmed and then driven back in disorder, +the pursuit being pressed so promptly that the Romans nearly succeeded +in forcing an entrance on the heels of the fugitives. Even as it was, +the scaling ladders were able to be put up in full security, but the +great height of the walls hampered the escaladers, and the assault was +beaten off. Polybius gives a picture of the Roman commander during this +phase which reveals how he combined personal influence and control with +the duty of avoiding rash exposure: “Scipio took part in the battle, but +studied his safety as far as possible, for he had with him three men +carrying large shields, who, holding these close, covered the surface +exposed to the wall, and so afforded him protection.” “... Thus he could +both see what was going on, and being seen by all his men he inspired +the combatants with great spirit. The consequence was that nothing was +omitted which was necessary in the engagement, but the moment that +circumstances suggested any step to him, he set to work at once to do +what was necessary.” + +In modern war no feature has told more heavily against decisive results +than the absence of the commander’s personal observation and control. +Scipio’s method, viewed in the light of modern science, may suggest a +way to revive this influence. Peradventure the commander of the future +will go aloft in an aeroplane, protected by a patrol of fighters, and in +communication by wireless telephony with his staff. + +Scipio had achieved his first object of wearing down the defenders, and +checking the likelihood of further interference with his plans from +Carthaginian sorties. The way was thus paved for his next decisive move. +To develop this he was only waiting for the ebb of the tide, and this +design had been conceived by him long since at Tarraco, where, from +inquiries among fishermen who knew Cartagena, he had learnt that at low +water the lagoon was fordable. + +For this project he assembled five hundred men with ladders on the shore +of the lagoon, and meanwhile reinforced his forces in the isthmus with +both men and ladders, enough to ensure that in the next direct assault +“the whole extent of the walls should be covered with escaladers”—an +early example of the modern tactical axiom that a “fixing” attack should +be on the broadest possible front in order to occupy the enemy’s +attention and prevent him turning to meet the decisive blow elsewhere. +He launched this assault simultaneously with a landing attack by the +fleet, and when it was at its height “the tide began to ebb and the +water gradually receded from the edge of the lagoon, a strong and deep +current setting in through the channel to the neighbourhood, so that to +those who were not prepared for the sight the thing appeared incredible. +But Scipio had his guides ready, and bade all the men told off for this +service enter the water and have no fear. He, indeed, possessed a +particular talent for inspiring confidence and sympathy in his troops +when he called upon them. Now when they obeyed and raced through the +shallow water, it struck the whole army that it was the work of some god +... and their courage was redoubled” (Polybius). Of this episode Livy +says: “Scipio, crediting this discovery, due to his own diligence and +penetration, to the gods and to miracle, which had turned the course of +the sea, withdrawn it from the lake, and opened ways never before +trodden by human feet to afford a passage to the Romans, ordered them to +follow Neptune as their guide.” But it is interesting to see that, while +exploiting the moral effect of this idea, he made practical use of less +divine guides. The five hundred passed without difficulty through the +lagoon, reached the wall, and mounted it without opposition, because all +the defenders “were engaged in bringing succour to that quarter in which +the danger appeared.” “The Romans having once taken the wall, at first +marched along it, sweeping the enemy off it.” They were clearly imbued +with the principle that a penetration must be promptly widened before it +is deepened—a principle which in the war of 1914-1918 was only learnt +after hard lessons, at Loos and elsewhere. Next they converged on the +landward gate, already assailed in front, and taking the defenders in +rear and by surprise, overpowered the resistance and opened the way for +the main body of the attackers. The walls thus captured, Scipio at once +exploited his success. For while the mass of those who had by now scaled +the walls set about the customary massacre of the townsmen, Scipio +himself took care to keep in regular formation those who entered by the +gate, and led them against the citadel. Here Mago, once he “saw that the +city had undoubtedly been captured,” surrendered. + +If the massacre of the townspeople is revolting to modern ideas, it was +the normal custom then and for many centuries thereafter, and with the +Romans was a deliberate policy aimed at the moral factor rather than +mere insensate slaughter. The direct blow at the civil population, who +are the seat of the hostile will, may indeed be revived by the +potentialities of aircraft, which can jump, halmawise, over the armed +“men” who form the shield of the enemy nation. Such a course, if +militarily practicable, is the logical one, and ruthless logic usually +overcomes the humaner sentiments in a life and death struggle. + +Proof of the discipline of Scipio’s troops is that the massacre ceased +on a signal after the citadel surrendered, and only then did the troops +begin pillaging. The massacre, however difficult for modern minds to +excuse, was a military measure, and the conduct of the action was not +impeded by the individual’s desire to obtain loot or “souvenirs”—an +undisciplined impulse which has affected even recent battles. + +The massacre, moreover, was partly offset by Scipio’s generous, if +diplomatic, conduct to the vanquished, once the initial ruthlessness had +achieved its purpose of quenching the citizens’ will to resist. Of the +ten thousand male prisoners, he set free all who were citizens of New +Carthage, and restored their property. The artisans, to the number of +two thousand, he declared the property of Rome, but promised them their +freedom when the war was over if they “showed goodwill and industry in +their several crafts.” The pick of the remainder were taken for sea +service, thus enabling him to man the captured vessels and so increase +the size of his fleet; these also were promised their freedom after the +final defeat of Carthage. Even to Mago and the other Carthaginian +leaders he acted as became a chivalrous victor, ordering Lælius to pay +them due attention, until subsequently they were sent to Rome in the +latter’s charge, as a tangible evidence of victory which would revive +the Romans’ spirits, and lead them to redouble their efforts to support +him. Finally, he won new allies for himself by his kindness to the +Spanish hostages, for instead of retaining them in his custody as +unwilling guarantees, he sent them home to their own States. + +Two incidents, related by both Livy and Polybius, throw Scipio’s +character into relief, and enhance his reputation as one of the most +humane and far-sighted of the great conquerors. “When one of the captive +women, the wife of Mandonius, who was brother to Andobales, King of the +Ilergetes, fell at his feet and entreated him with tears to treat them +with more proper consideration than the Carthaginians had done, he was +touched, and asked her what they stood in need of.... Upon her making no +reply, he sent for the officials appointed to attend on the women. When +they presented themselves, and assured him that they kept the women +generously supplied with all they required, she repeated her entreaty, +upon which Scipio was still more puzzled, and conceiving the idea that +the officials were neglecting their duty and had now made a false +statement, he bade the woman be of good cheer, saying that he would +himself appoint other attendants, who would see to it that they were in +want of nothing. The old lady, after some hesitation, said, ‘General, +you do not take me rightly if you think that our present petition is +about our food.’ Scipio then understood what she meant, and noticing the +youth and beauty of the daughters of Andobales and the other princes, he +was forced to tears, recognising in how few words she had pointed out to +him the danger to which they were exposed. So now he made it clear to +her that he understood, and grasping her hand bade her and the rest be +of good cheer, for he would look after them as if they were his own +sisters and children, and would appoint trustworthy men to attend on +them” (Polybius). + +The second incident, as told by Polybius, was: “Some young Romans came +across a girl of surpassing bloom and beauty, and being aware that +Scipio was fond of women brought her to him ... saying that they wished +to make a present of the damsel to him. He was overcome and astonished +by her beauty, and he told them that had he been in a private position +no present would have been more welcome, but as he was the general it +would be the least welcome of any.... So he expressed his gratitude to +the young men, but called the girl’s father, and handing her over to +him, at once bade him give her in marriage to whomever of the citizens +he preferred. The self-restraint and moderation Scipio showed on this +occasion secured him the warm approbation of his troops.” Livy’s account +enlarges the picture, saying that she was previously betrothed to a +young chief of the Celtiberians, named Allucius, who was desperately +enamoured of her; that Scipio, hearing this, sent for Allucius and +presented her to him; and that when his parents pressed thank-offerings +upon him, he gave these to Allucius as a dowry from himself. This kindly +and tactful act not only spread his praises through the Spanish tribes, +but earned a more tangible reinforcement, for Allucius reappeared a few +days later with fourteen hundred horsemen to join Scipio. + +With his own troops also his blend of generosity and wisdom was no less +noticeable. The booty was scrupulously divided according to the Roman +custom, which ensured that all was pooled; and as he had so cleverly +used every art to inspire them beforehand, so now he appreciated the +moral value of praise and distinctive reward for feats achieved. Better +still was his haste to make the victory secure against any unforeseen +slip or enemy counter-stroke. He had led back the legions to their +entrenched camp on the same day as the city’s capture, leaving Lælius +with the marines to guard the city. Then, after one day’s rest, he began +a course of military exercises to keep the troops up to concert-pitch. +On the first day the soldiers had to double three and a half miles in +their armour, and the legions carried out various drill movements; the +second day they had to polish up, repair, and examine their arms; the +third day they rested; and the fourth day they carried out weapon +training, “some of them sword-fighting with wooden swords covered with +leather and with a button on the point, while others practised javelin +throwing, the javelins also having a button on the point”; on the fifth +day they began the course again, and continued during their stay at +Cartagena. “The rowers and marines, pushing out to sea when the weather +was calm, made trial of the manœuvring of their ships in mock +sea-fights.” “The general went round to all the works with equal +attention. At one time he was employed in the dockyard with his fleet, +at another he exercised with the legions; sometimes he would devote +himself to the inspection of the works, which every day were carried out +with the greatest eagerness by a multitude of artificers, both in the +workshops and in the armoury and docks” (Livy). + +Then, when the walls had been repaired, he left adequate detachments to +hold the city, and set out for Tarraco with the army and the fleet. + +In summing up this first brilliant exploit in command, the first tribute +is due to the strategic vision and judgment shown in the choice of +Cartagena as his objective. Those who exalt the main armed forces of the +enemy as the primary objective are apt to lose sight of the fact that +the destruction of these is only a means to the end, which is the +subjugation of the hostile will. In many cases this means is +essential—the only safe one, in fact; but in other cases the opportunity +for a direct and secure blow at the enemy’s base may offer itself, and +of its possibility and value this master-stroke of Scipio’s is an +example, which deserves the reflection of modern students of war. + +In the sphere of tactics there is a lesson in his consummate blending of +the principles of surprise and security, first in the way he secured +every offensive move from possible interference or mischance, second in +the way he “fixed” the enemy before, and during, his decisive manœuvre. +To strike at an enemy who preserves his freedom of action is to risk +hitting the air and being caught off one’s balance. It is to gamble on +chances, and the least mischance is liable to upset the whole plan. Yet +how often in war, and even in peace-time manœuvres, have commanders +initiated some superficially brilliant manœuvre only to find that the +enemy have slipped away from the would-be knock-out, because the +assailant forgot the need of “fixing.” And the tactical formula of +_fixing plus decisive manœuvre_ is, after all, but the domestic proverb, +“First catch your hare, then cook it.” Precept, however, is simpler than +practice, and not least of Scipio’s merits is his superb calculation of +the time factor in his execution of the formula. + +Footnote 2: + + The Roman day began at sunrise. + + + + + CHAPTER IV. + THE BATTLE OF BÆCULA. + + +With Cartagena in his grip, Scipio had gained the strategical +initiative, which is by no means identical with the offensive. To attack +the Carthaginian field armies while he was still markedly inferior in +numbers would be to throw away this advantage and imperil all that he +had gained. On the other hand, he held the key to any possible +Carthaginian move. If they moved to regain Cartagena, itself impregnable +if adequately garrisoned, and still more so when the defender had +command of the sea, he lay on their flank with his main striking force. +If they moved against him, he would have the advantage of choosing his +own ground, and, in addition, Cartagena would threaten their rear, for +his command of the sea would enable him to transfer forces there. If +they remained passive, and this inaction proved their choice, they would +suffer the handicap due to the loss of their base, depot, and main line +of communication with Carthage. Nothing could have suited Scipio better, +for the respite allowed the moral effect of Cartagena’s capture to sink +into the minds of the Spanish, and allowed him also time to win over +fresh allies to offset his numerical handicap. The result proved the +soundness of his calculations, for during the next winter Edeco, +Andobales, and Mandonius, three of the most powerful chieftains in +Spain, came over to him, and most of the Iberian tribes followed their +example. As Polybius justly says, “Those who have won victories are far +more numerous than those who have used them to advantage,” and Scipio, +more than any other great captain, seems to have grasped the truth that +the fruits of victory lie in the after years of peace—a truth hardly +realised even to-day, despite the lessons of Versailles. + +The outcome was that Hasdrubal Barca, faced with this shifting of the +balance, felt forced to take the offensive. This gage Scipio, thus +reinforced, was not loth to accept, for it promised him the chance to +deal with one hostile army before the others had joined it. But with the +principle of security impressed on his mind, he still further +strengthened his forces, to meet the possibility that he might be forced +to fight more than one army at once. This he did by the ingenious +measure of hauling his ships on shore at Tarraco and adding their crews +to his army, a course which was feasible because the Carthaginian ships +had been swept from the sea, and because he was about to advance into +the interior. His foresight in exploiting the workshop resources of +Cartagena gave him an ample reserve of weapons from which to arm them. + +While Hasdrubal was still preparing, Scipio moved. On his advance from +his winter quarters he was joined by Andobales and Mandonius with their +forces, handing over to them their daughters, whom he had apparently +retained—because of their key importance,—unlike the other hostages +taken at Cartagena. Next day he made a treaty with them, of which the +essential part was that they should follow the Roman commanders and obey +their orders. Scipio evidently appreciated the importance of unity of +command. The army of Hasdrubal lay in the district of Castalon, near the +town of Bæcula on the upper reaches of the Bætis, to-day called the +Guadalquiver. On the approach of the Romans he shifted his camp to an +admirable defensive position—a small but high plateau, deep enough for +security, and wide enough to deploy his troops, difficult of access on +the flanks, and with a river protecting its rear. The formation of this +plateau, moreover, was in two “steps,” and on the lower Hasdrubal posted +his screen of light troops, Numidian horse and Balearic slingers, while +on the higher ridge behind he entrenched his camp. + +[Illustration: Battle of Baecula. The map shows the town of Baecula to +the northwest, Scipio’s camp to the southeast, and Hasdrubal’s camp +mid-way between. The Carthaginian main body is stretched +southwest-to-northeast, in front of their camp, while the Roman main +body, in two halves, moves to flank the ends of the Carthaginian line.] + +Scipio for a moment was at a loss how to tackle such a strong position, +but not daring to wait lest the two other Carthaginian armies should +come up, he devised a plan. He sent the velites and other light troops +to scale the first “step” of the enemy’s position, and despite the rocky +ascent and the shower of darts and stones, their determination and +practice in using cover enabled them to gain the crest. Once a footing +was secured, their better weapons and training for close combat +prevailed over skirmishers trained for missile action with ample space +for a running fight. Thus the Carthaginian light troops were driven back +in disorder on the higher ridge. + +Scipio, who had the rest of his army ready but inside their camp, “now +despatched the whole of his light troops with orders to support the +frontal attack,” while, dividing his heavy foot into two bodies, he +himself led one half round the left flank of the enemy’s position, and +sent Lælius with the other to skirt the opposite flank of the ridge +until he could find a good line of ascent. Making the shorter circuit, +Scipio’s men climbed the ridge first, and fell on the Carthaginians’ +flank before they had properly deployed, as Hasdrubal, relying on the +strength of his position, had delayed leading his main forces out of the +camp. Thus trapped before they had formed up and while still on the +move, the Carthaginians were thrown into disorder, and during the +confusion Lælius came up and charged their other flank. It may be +mentioned that Livy, in contradiction to Polybius, says that Scipio led +the left wing and Lælius the right, a divergence obviously due to +whether the position is considered from the attackers’ or the defenders’ +side. + +Polybius states that Hasdrubal’s original intention in case of a reverse +had been to retreat to Gaul, and after recruiting as many of the natives +as possible, to join his brother Hannibal in Italy. Whether this be +surmise or fact, as soon as Hasdrubal realised the battle was lost he +hurried from the hill with his treasure and his elephants, and +collecting in his retreat as many of the fugitives as he could, retired +up the river Tagus in the direction of the Pyrenees. But Scipio’s double +envelopment, and still more his foresight in sending beforehand two +cohorts to block two of the main lines of retreat, caught as in a net +the bulk of the Carthaginian troops. Eight thousand were slain, twelve +thousand taken prisoners. While the African prisoners were sold as +slaves, Scipio once more showed his political sagacity by sending home +the Spanish prisoners without ransom. + +Polybius says, “Scipio did not think it advisable to follow Hasdrubal, +as he was afraid of being attacked by the other generals,” and to a +military critic the reason is convincing. It would have been foolhardy +to press farther into the mountainous interior with two more hostile +armies, superior in strength, able to converge on him or to cut him off +from his base. A bare statement of the military problem is ample answer +to those, mainly civil historians, who decry Scipio on the score that he +allowed Hasdrubal to quit Spain and move into Italy on his ill-fated +attempt to join Hannibal. It is interesting to note that Hasdrubal +followed the route of Wellington after Vittoria, making his way to the +northern coast of Spain, and crossing by modern San Sebastian and the +western gap where the Pyrenees slope down to the sea. + +To pretend that Scipio, had he remained on the defensive, could have +barred this passage is absurd, based as he was on the eastern coast. +Either of the other Carthaginian armies could have contained him while +Hasdrubal slipped through one of the numerous western passes, or again, +if he attempted so distant a move through wild and mountainous country, +not only would he have exposed his base but have invited disaster. But +for Scipio’s offensive and victory at Bæcula, Hasdrubal could have +entered Gaul in force, and thus have avoided the two years’ delay—so +fatal to the Carthaginian cause—enforced by his need to recruit and +reorganise his army in Gaul before passing on. + +The aftermath of Bæcula, like that of Cartagena, contains two incidents +which illumine Scipio’s character. The first was when the Spanish +allies, old and new, all saluted him as king. Edeco and Andobales had +done so when joining him on the outward march, and he had then paid +little attention, but when the title was re-echoed so universally he +took action. Summoning them to an assembly, he “told them that he wished +to be called kingly by them and actually to be kingly, but that he did +not wish to be king or to be called so by any one. After saying this he +ordered them to call him general” (Polybius). Livy, relating this +incident in other words, adds, “Even barbarians were sensible of the +greatness of mind which from such an elevation could despise a name, at +the greatness of which the rest of mankind was overawed.” It is +assuredly the clearest indication of Scipio’s mental stature that in the +first flush of triumph this youthful conqueror could preserve such +self-command and balance of mind. Weighed solely by his character, apart +from his achievements, Scipio has claims to be considered the highest +embodiment of the Roman virtues, humanised and broadened by the culture +of Greece, yet proof against its degenerate tendencies. + +The second incident, whether it be due solely to the sympathetic insight +which peculiarly distinguished him or to the diplomatic foresight which +made this gift of such inestimable value to his country, is equally +significant. The quæstor selling the African prisoners came upon a +handsome boy, and learning that he was of royal blood, sent him to +Scipio. In answer to the latter’s questions, the boy said that he was a +Numidian, his name Massiva, and that he had come to Spain with his uncle +Masinissa, who had raised a force of cavalry to assist the +Carthaginians. That, disobeying his uncle, who considered him too young +to be in battle, “he had clandestinely taken a horse and arms, and, +without his uncle’s knowledge, gone on the field, where, his horse +falling, he was thrown and taken prisoner.” Scipio asked him whether he +wished to return to Masinissa, and on his assenting with tears of joy, +presented the youth with “a gold ring, a vest with broad purple border, +a Spanish cloak with gold clasp, and a horse completely caparisoned, and +then released him, ordering a party of horse to escort him as far as he +chose.” + +Scipio then fell back on his base, and spent the remainder of the summer +in exploiting the effect of the victory by securing the alliance of most +of the Spanish States. His wisdom in not following up Hasdrubal was +justified by the fact that within a few days after the battle of Bæcula, +Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, and Mago arrived to join Hasdrubal Barca. This +arrival, too late to save the last-named from defeat, served to bring +about a conference to settle their future plans. Realising that Scipio +by his diplomacy and his victories had gained the sympathies of almost +all Spain, they decided that Mago should transfer his forces to +Hasdrubal Barca, and go to the Balearic Isles to raise fresh +auxiliaries; that Hasdrubal Barca should move into Gaul as soon as +possible before his remaining Spanish troops deserted, and then march on +into Italy; that Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, should retire into the +remotest part of Lusitania, near Gades—modern Cadiz,—where alone the +Carthaginians might hope for Spanish aid. Finally, Masinissa, with a +body of three thousand horse, was to have a roving commission, his +object being to harass and ravage the lands of the Romans and of their +Spanish allies. + +The chronology of these years is somewhat difficult to determine, but +the victory at Bæcula seems to have been in 208 B.C. The next year +Scipio’s hold on the country was threatened afresh. A new general, +Hanno, had come with a fresh army from Carthage to replace Hasdrubal +Barca. Mago also had returned from the Balearic Isles, and after arming +native levies in Celtiberia, which embraced parts of modern Arragon and +Old Castile, was joined by Hanno. Nor was the threat only from one +direction, for Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, had advanced from Gades into +Bætica (Andalusia). If Scipio moved into the interior against Hanno and +Mago he might find Hasdrubal across his rear. Therefore he detached his +lieutenant, Silanus, with ten thousand foot and five hundred horse, to +attack the former, while he himself apparently kept watch and check on +Hasdrubal. + +Silanus marched so fast, despite the rugged defiles and thick woods on +his route, that he came on the Carthaginians before any messengers or +even rumours had warned them of his approach. The advantage of surprise +offset his inferior strength, and falling first on the Celtiberian camp, +where no proper watch or guard was kept, he had routed them before the +Carthaginians had come up to their aid. Mago with almost all the cavalry +and two thousand foot fled from the field as soon as the verdict was +clear, and retreated towards the province of Gades. But Hanno and those +of the Carthaginians who arrived on the field when the battle was +decided were taken prisoners, and the Celtiberian levies so thoroughly +dispersed as to nip in the bud the danger that other tribes might copy +their example and join the Carthaginians. + +It is characteristic of Scipio that he was unstinting in his praise of +Silanus. Having thus ensured the security of his flank for an advance +southward, he moved against Hasdrubal, whereupon the latter not only +fell back in indecent haste, but lest his united army should attract +Scipio on to him, he broke it up to form small garrisons for the various +walled towns. + +Scipio, seeing the enemy thus abandon himself to a passive defensive, +decided that there was no object in conducting a series of petty sieges +likely to drain his own force without adequate advantage. However, he +sent his brother Lucius to storm one town, Orinx, which served Hasdrubal +as a strategical pivot from which to make incursions into the inland +States. This task Lucius carried out successfully, and Scipio’s nature +is again instanced in the record that he commended Lucius with the +highest praise, representing the capture of Orinx as equal in importance +to his own feat at Cartagena. As winter was by now approaching he +dismissed the legions to winter quarters, and sent his brother with +Hanno and other distinguished prisoners to Rome. + + + + + CHAPTER V. + THE BATTLE OF ILIPA. + + +In the spring of 206 B.C. the Carthaginians made their last great +effort. Hasdrubal, encouraged by Mago, Hannibal’s brother, raised and +armed fresh levies, and with an army of seventy thousand foot, four +thousand horse, and thirty-two elephants moved north to Ilipa (or +Silpia), which was not far from where Seville stands to-day. Scipio +advanced south from Tarraco to meet the Carthaginians, collecting +auxiliaries at Bæcula on his way. When he drew near the Bætis and got +fuller information of the opposing force, he appreciated the formidable +nature of the problem. He felt convinced that with the Roman legions +only he would not be a match for so large an enemy army, yet to use a +large proportion of allies and rely on their support was to risk the +fate of his father and uncle, whose downfall was due to the sudden +desertion of their allies. Therefore he decided to use them for the +purpose of impressing and misleading the enemy “by an imposing show,” +but leave the main fighting rôle to his own legions. He had learnt, like +Wellington two thousand years later, that it was wiser not to place +reliance on the co-operation of his Spanish allies. The French in +Morocco have imbibed it afresh. Advancing towards Ilipa with a total +force, Romans and allies, of forty-five thousand foot and three thousand +horse, he came in sight of the Carthaginians, and encamped on certain +low hills opposite them. It deserves notice that his advance was on a +line which, in the event of victory, would cut them off from the nearest +road to Gades, this road running along the south bank of the Bætis +river. + +Mago, thinking this a favourable chance for a sudden disorganising blow, +took most of his cavalry as well as Masinissa with his Numidian horse, +and attacked those engaged in forming the camp. But Scipio, as usual, +imbued with the principle of security, had foreseen such a possibility, +and had posted his own cavalry ready in concealment under shelter of a +hill. These charged the forward part of the Carthaginian horse in flank +and threw them into disorder, and though the rear echelons, coming up to +reinforce the attack, restored the balance for a time, the issue was +settled by the sortie of a large body of legionaries from the Roman +camp. At first the Carthaginians fell back in good order; but as the +pursuit was vigorously pressed, they broke up and fled to the shelter of +their own camp. The result gave Scipio an initial moral advantage. + +The two camps lay facing each other across a valley between the two low +ridges. For several successive days Hasdrubal led his army out and +offered battle. On each occasion Scipio waited until the Carthaginians +were moving out before he followed suit. Neither side, however, began +the attack, and towards sundown the two armies, weary of standing, +retired to their camps—the Carthaginians always first. One cannot doubt, +in view of the upshot, that on Scipio’s side the delay had a special +motive. On each occasion also the legions were placed in the Roman +centre opposite to the Carthaginian and African regulars, with the +Spanish allies on the wings of each army. It became common talk in the +camps that this order of battle was definite, and Scipio waited until +this belief had taken firm hold. + +Then he acted. He had observed that the Carthaginians made their daily +advance at a late hour, and had himself purposely waited still later, to +fix this habit on his opponent’s mind. Late in the evening he sent +orders through the camp that the troops should be fed and armed before +daylight, and the cavalry have their horses saddled. Then, while it was +scarcely yet daylight, he sent on the cavalry and light troops to attack +the enemy’s outposts, and himself followed with the legions. This was +the first surprise change, and its effect was that the Carthaginians, +caught napping by the onset of the Roman cavalry and light troops, had +to arm themselves and sally forth without a meal. It further ensured +that Hasdrubal would have no time to alter his normal dispositions, even +should the idea occur to him. For the second surprise change was that +Scipio reversed his former order of battle, and placed the Spanish in +his centre and the legions on the wings. + +The Roman infantry made no attempt to advance for some hours, the reason +for this being Scipio’s desire and design to let his hungry opponents +feel the effects of their lost breakfast. There was no risk to his other +surprise change by so doing, for once drawn up in order of battle the +Carthaginians dared not alter their array in face of a watchful and +ready opponent. The skirmishing fight between the opposing cavalry and +light troops remained indecisive, each when hard-pressed able to take +shelter behind their own infantry. Eventually, when Scipio judged the +time ripe, he sounded a retreat, and received his skirmishers back +through the intervals between the cohorts, then placing them in reserve +behind each wing, the velites behind the heavy infantry and the cavalry +behind the velites. + +[Illustration: Map of the Battle of Ilipa. Hasdrubal has lines of +Africans flanked by Spanish, faced by the Roman Spanish Allies in the +center, flanked by regular Roman foot. The map shows the Roman horse +swing to left and right to flank the ends of the Spanish lines.] + +It was about the seventh hour[3] when he ordered the line to advance, +but the Spanish centre only at a slow pace. On arriving within eight +hundred yards of the enemy, Scipio, with the right wing, turned to the +right and, wheeling left, made an oblique advance outwards by successive +cohorts—in column. He had previously sent a messenger to Silanus and +Marcius, commanding the left wing, to manœuvre similarly. Advancing +rapidly, so that the slow moving centre was well _refused_, the Roman +infantry cohorts wheeled successively inwards into line as they neared +the enemy, and fell directly on the enemy’s flanks, which but for this +manœuvre would have overlapped them. While the heavy infantry thus +pressed the enemy’s wings in front, the cavalry and the velites, under +orders, wheeled outwards, and sweeping round the enemy’s flanks took +them in enfilade. This convergent blow on each wing, sufficiently +disruptive because it forced the defenders to face attack from two +directions simultaneously, was made more decisive in that it fell on the +Spanish irregulars. To add to Hasdrubal’s troubles the cavalry flank +attacks drove his elephants, mad with fright, in upon the Carthaginian +centre, spreading confusion. + +All this time the Carthaginian centre was standing helplessly inactive, +unable to help the wings for fear of attack by Scipio’s Spaniards, who +threatened it without coming to close quarters. Scipio’s calculation had +enabled him to “fix” the enemy’s centre with a minimum expenditure of +force, and thus to effect the maximum concentration for his decisive +double manœuvre. + +Hasdrubal’s wings destroyed, the centre, worn out by hunger and fatigue, +fell back, at first in good order, but gradually under relentless +pressure they broke up, fleeing to their entrenched camp. A drenching +downpour, churning the ground in mud under the soldiers’ feet, gave them +a temporary respite, and prevented the Romans storming the camp on their +heels. During the night Hasdrubal evacuated his camp, but as Scipio’s +strategic advance had placed the Romans across the line of retreat to +Gades, he was forced to retire down the western bank towards the +Atlantic. Nearly all his Spanish Allies deserted him. + +Scipio’s light troops were evidently alive to the duty of maintaining +contact with the enemy, for he got word from them as soon as it was +light of Hasdrubal’s departure. He at once followed them up, sending the +cavalry ahead, and so rapid was the pursuit that, despite being misled +by guides in attempting a short cut to get across Hasdrubal’s new line +of retreat, the cavalry and velites caught him up. Harassing him +continuously, by attacks in flank or in rear, they forced such frequent +halts that the legions were able to come up. “After this it was no +longer a fight, but a butchering as of cattle,” till only Hasdrubal and +six thousand half-armed men escaped to the neighbouring hills, out of +seventy odd thousand who had fought at Ilipa. The Carthaginians hastily +fortified a camp on the highest summit, but though its inaccessibility +hindered assault, lack of food caused a constant stream of deserters. At +last Hasdrubal left his troops by night, and reaching the sea, not far +distant, took ship to Gades, and Mago soon followed him. + +Scipio thereupon left Silanus with a force to await the inevitable +surrender of the camp, and returned to Tarraco. + +Military history contains no more classic example of generalship than +this battle of Ilipa. Rarely has so complete a victory been gained by a +weaker over a stronger force, and this result was due to a perfect +application of the principles of _surprise_ and _concentration_, that is +in essence an example for all time. How crude does Frederick’s famed +oblique order appear beside Scipio’s double oblique manœuvre and +envelopment, which effected a crushing concentration _du fort au faible_ +while the enemy’s centre was surely fixed. Scipio left the enemy no +chance for the change of front which cost Frederick so dear at Kolin. +Masterly as were his battle tactics, still more remarkable perhaps were +the decisiveness and rapidity of their exploitation, which found no +parallel in military history until Napoleon came to develop the pursuit +as the vital complement of battle, and one of the supreme tests of +generalship. To Scipio no cavalry leader could have complained as +Maharbal, whether justly or not, to Hannibal, “You know, indeed, how to +win a victory, Hannibal, but you know not how to use one!” + +But Scipio, in whom the idea of strategic exploitation was as inborn as +the tactical, was not content to rest on his laurels. Already he was +looking to the future, directing his view on Africa. As he had seen that +Cartagena was the key to Spain, that Spain was the key to the situation +in Italy, so he saw that Africa was the key to the whole struggle. +Strike at Africa, and he would not only relieve Italy of Hannibal’s +ever-menacing presence—a menace which he had already reduced by +paralysing Hannibal’s source of reinforcement,—but would undermine the +foundations of Carthaginian power, until the edifice itself collapsed in +ruin. + +To the congratulations of his friends, who entreated him to take a rest, +he replied “that he had now to consider how he should begin the war +against Carthage; for up to now the Carthaginians had been making war on +the Romans, but now fortune had given the Romans the opportunity of +making war on the Carthaginians.” + +Although it must still be some time before he could convert the Roman +Senate to his strategy, he set about preparing the ground. Masinissa, +after the defeat at Ilipa, had come over to the Roman side, and was +despatched to Africa to induce the Numidians to follow his lead. +Further, Scipio sent Lælius on an embassy to sound Syphax, King of the +Massæsylians, whose territory embraced most of what is to-day Algeria. +Syphax, while expressing his willingness to break with Carthage, refused +to ratify any treaty except with Scipio in person. + +Though promised a safe conduct, the hazard of such a journey was +immense. Diplomatic privileges were then in infancy, and an envoy ran +risks, and not infrequently suffered a fate that was enough to chill the +stoutest heart. How much greater, too, when the envoy was Rome’s one +victorious leader, the man whose existence was an ever-growing menace to +Carthage and her allies, and who was now asked to entrust himself, far +from his army, to the care of a dubious neutral. Yet this risk Scipio, +calculating the risk against the prize, took, considering that the +winning over of Syphax was an essential step to the further development +of his policy. After making the necessary dispositions for the +protection of Spain, he sailed from Cartagena with two quinqueremes. The +risk, as it proved, was even greater than he calculated. Indeed, it may +be that the history of the ancient world turned on a puff of wind. For +he arrived off the harbour just after Hasdrubal, driven out of Spain, +had cast anchor there on his way back to Carthage. Hasdrubal had with +him seven triremes, and sighting the approach of what were obviously +Roman ships, he hurriedly attempted to prepare his own ships and weigh +anchor, in order to overpower the two quinqueremes before they could +enter the neutral harbour. But a freshening breeze helped the Roman +ships to enter before Hasdrubal’s fleet could sail forth, and once +Scipio was inside the harbour the Carthaginians did not dare to +interfere. + +Hasdrubal and Scipio both then sought audience of Syphax, who was much +flattered by this recognition of his importance. He invited them both to +be his guests, and after some demur they overcame their scruples, and +supped together at Syphax’s table. In such a delicate situation, +Scipio’s personal charm and diplomatic gifts effected a brilliant coup. +Not only Syphax but Hasdrubal succumbed to his charm, the Carthaginian +openly avowing that Scipio “appeared to him more to be admired for the +qualities he displayed on a personal interview with him than for his +exploits in war, and that he had no doubt that Syphax and his kingdom +were already at the disposal of the Romans, such was the knack that man +possessed for gaining the esteem of others.” Hasdrubal was a true +prophet, for Scipio sailed back with the treaty ratified. + +Footnote 3: + + The Roman day began at sunrise. + + + + + CHAPTER VI. + THE SUBJUGATION OF SPAIN. + + +Scipio had ploughed the ground and sown the seeds for his African +campaign. The time for reaping its fruits was not yet, however. He had +first to complete the subjugation of Spain, and to deal out punishment +to those tribes who had forsaken Rome in her hour of crisis on the +Peninsula, after the death of the elder Scipios. Their heir had been too +shrewd a diplomatist to show his hand earlier while the scales still +hung in the balance, but now, with the Carthaginian power finally +broken, it was essential for the future security of the Roman power that +such treachery should not pass without retribution. The two chief +offenders were Illiturgis and Castulo, cities in the neighbourhood of +the battlefield of Bæcula, on the upper reaches of the Bætis +(Guadalquiver). Sending a third of his forces under Marcius to deal with +Castulo, he himself moved with the remainder on Illiturgis. A guilty +conscience is an alert sentinel, and Scipio arrived to find that the +Illiturgi had made every preparation for defence without awaiting any +declaration of hostilities. He thereupon prepared to assault, dividing +his army into two parts, giving command of one to Lælius, in order that +they might “attack the city in two places simultaneously, thus creating +an alarm in two quarters at the same time” (Livy). Here again it is +interesting to note how consistently Scipio executes a convergent +assault—his force divided into independently manœuvring parts to effect +surprise and strain the enemy’s defence, yet combining on a common +objective. How strongly does his appreciation of this, the essential +formula of tactics, contrast with its rarity in ancient warfare, in +modern also, for how often do commanders wreck their plan either on the +Scylla of a divided objective or on the Charybdis of a feint or +“holding” attack to divert the enemy’s attention and reserves from their +main blow. + +His plan made, Scipio, realising the soldiers’ inherently lesser ardour +against mere insurgents, strove to stimulate their determination by +playing on their feelings for their betrayed comrades. He reminded them +that the need for a salutary vengeance ought to make them fight more +fiercely than against the Carthaginians. “For with the latter the +struggle was for empire and glory almost without any exasperation, while +they had now to punish perfidy and cruelty.” Such an urge was needful, +for the men of Illiturgis, fighting with the courage of despair, with no +hope but to sell their lives as dearly as possible, repulsed assault +after assault. Indeed, because of the circumstances that Scipio had +evidently foreseen, the previously victorious army “showed such a want +of resolution as was not very honourable to it.” At this crisis, Scipio, +like Napoleon at the bridge of Lodi, did not hesitate to stake his own +life. “Considering it incumbent upon him to exert himself in person and +share the danger, he reproved his soldiers for their cowardice, and +ordered the scaling ladders to be brought up again, threatening to mount +the wall himself since the rest hesitated.” “He had now advanced near +the walls with no small danger, when a shout was raised from all sides +by the soldiers, alarmed at the danger to which their leader was +exposed, and the scaling ladders were raised in several places at once.” +This fresh impulse, coinciding with Lælius’s pressure elsewhere, turned +the scales, and the walls were captured. During the resultant confusion +the citadel, too, fell to an assault on a side where it was thought +impregnable. + +The treachery of Illiturgis was then avenged in a manner so drastic as +to be an object-lesson of its requital, the inhabitants put to the +sword, and the city itself razed to the ground. Here apparently Scipio +made no attempt to restrain the fury of the troops, though, as he was to +show on the morrow of Zama, he could be generous beyond comparison to an +open foe. In all his acts he evidently envisaged the future, and even in +allowing the obliteration of Illiturgis he had a direct purpose. For the +news so shook the defenders of Castulo, an obstacle made the more +formidable because the garrison had been reinforced by the remains of +the Carthaginian forces, that the Spanish commander, throwing over his +allies, secretly capitulated. The moral purpose of the Illiturgis sack +thus accomplished, Castulo escaped more lightly. + +Then, sending Marcius to clear up the few remaining centres of +disaffection, Scipio returned to Cartagena to pay his vows to the gods, +and to give a gladiatorial show in memory of his father and uncle. This +deserves passing mention, for whether due to chance or, as seems more +likely, to Scipio’s taste, its nature was different from the normal +contest. Instead of the gladiators being slaves or captives, doomed to +fight “to make a Roman holiday,” they were all voluntary and unpaid, +either picked representatives of tribes or soldiers anxious to show +their prowess in compliment to their general or for desire of glory. Nor +were they all of obscure position, but included several men of +distinction, so that these games at Cartagena might be considered the +birthplace of the mediæval tourney. Some, too, used it as a means to +settle personal disputes, forecasting that still later development, the +duel. + +It was shortly after this that deserters arrived at Cartagena from +Gades, offering to betray to Scipio this last stronghold of the +Carthaginian power in Spain, where Mago had collected ships, fugitive +troops from outlying garrisons in Spain, and auxiliaries from the +African coast across the straits. The opportunity was one not to be +missed by Scipio, and he at once despatched Marcius “with the light +cohorts” and Lælius “with seven triremes and one quinquereme, in order +that they might act in concert by land and sea” (Livy). Apart from the +light these few words shed on Scipio’s grasp of the advantage of +combined land and sea operations, already made evident at Cartagena, the +specific mention of “light cohorts” would seem to have a significance. +From Cartagena to Gades is a full four hundred miles. To detach light +troops, purely, for a move of this range—a landmark in military +evolution—suggests Scipio’s appreciation not only of the time factor, +but also of the advantage of a highly mobile striking force in +situations where rapidity was the coping-stone on opportunity. + +The likelihood also is that he intended to follow with his legions; but +if so, this and his plans in general were upset by a severe illness, +which laid him low. Exaggerated by rumour, reports that he was dead soon +spread throughout the land, causing such commotion that “neither did the +allies keep their allegiance nor the army their duty.” + +Mandonius and Andobales, dissatisfied because after the expulsion of the +Carthaginians the Romans had not obligingly walked out and left them in +possession, raised the standard of revolt, and began harassing the +territory of the tribes faithful to the Roman alliance. As so often in +history, the disappearance of the oppressor was the signal for +dependencies to find the presence of their protector irksome. Mandonius +and Andobales were but the forerunners of the American colonists and the +modern Egyptians. There is no bond so irksome as that of gratitude. + +But the menace of the situation was made more acute through the mutiny +of the Roman troops themselves at Sucro, midway on the line of +communication between Cartagena and Tarraco. It is a truism that line of +communication troops are ever the least reliable, the most prone to +discontent and disorder. Lack of employment, lack of plunder, were +aggravated in this case by lack of pay, which had fallen into arrears. +Beginning at first with mere disregard of orders and neglect of duty, +the men soon broke out into open mutiny, and, driving the tribunes out +of the camp, set up in command two common soldiers, Albius and Atrius, +who had been the chief instigators of the trouble. + +The mutineers had anticipated that with the general disturbance +resulting from Scipio’s death, they would be able to plunder and exact +tribute at will, while escaping notice to a large extent. But when the +rumour of Scipio’s death was refuted, the movement was, if not quenched, +at least damped down. They were in this more subdued frame of mind when +seven military tribunes arrived, sent by Scipio. These, evidently under +instructions, took a mild line, inquiring as to their grievances instead +of upbraiding them, and speaking to them by groups rather than +attempting to address an assembly, where the mob spirit has full play at +the expense of reason. + +Polybius, and Livy clearly following him, tells us that Scipio, +experienced as he was in war but not in dealing with sedition, felt +great anxiety and perplexity. If this be so, his course of action does +not suggest it. For a novice, or, indeed, for a veteran commander, his +handling of the situation was a masterpiece of blended judgment, tact, +and decision. He had sent collectors round to gather in the +contributions levied on the various cities for the army’s maintenance, +and took care to let it be known that this was to adjust the arrears of +pay. Then he issued a proclamation that the soldiers should come to +Cartagena to receive their pay, in a body or in detached parties as they +wished. At the same time he ordered the army at Cartagena to prepare to +march against Mandonius and Andobales. These chiefs, incidentally, had +withdrawn within their own borders on hearing that Scipio was definitely +alive. Thus the mutineers on the one hand felt themselves stripped of +possible allies, and on the other, were emboldened to venture to +Cartagena by the prospect of pay and, still more, of the army’s +departure. They took the precaution, however, to come in a body. + +The seven tribunes who had inquired into their grievances were sent to +meet them, with secret instructions to single out the ringleaders, and +invite them to their own quarters to sup. The mutineers arrived at +Cartagena at sunset, and while encouraged by the sight of the army’s +preparations to march, their suspicions were also lulled by their +reception, being greeted as if they made a timely arrival to relieve the +departing troops. These marched out, according to orders, at daybreak +with their baggage, but on reaching the gate were halted and their +baggage dumped. Then, promptly, guards were told off to bar all the +exits from the camp, and the rest of the troops to surround the +mutineers. Meanwhile the latter had been summoned to an assembly, a +summons which they obeyed the more readily because they imagined that +the camp, and, indeed, the general himself, were at their mercy. + +Their first shock was when they saw their general vigorous and full of +health, far from the sick man they had supposed, and their second +followed when, after a disconcerting silence, he addressed them in a +manner strangely inconsistent with the apparent insecurity of his +position. Livy purports to give this speech word for word and at great +length, and in his rendering it is a masterpiece of oratory and of +style. Polybius’s is shorter and crisper, more natural too, and is +prefaced by the remark that Scipio “began to speak somewhat as follows.” +The lover of literature will prefer Livy’s version; but the historian, +weighing the evidence of date and circumstance, will prefer to accept +Polybius’s version, and that as giving the general sense rather than the +exact words of Scipio. + +Despite these doubts, we will quote Livy for the opening phrases, +because they are so telling, and because it is not unlikely that such a +beginning might have been recorded with some exactitude. Saying that he +was at a loss how to address them, he proceeded: “Can I call you +countrymen, who have revolted from your country? Or soldiers, who have +rejected the command and authority of your general, and violated your +solemn oath? Can I call you enemies? I recognise the persons, faces, and +dress, and mien of fellow-countrymen; but I perceive the actions, +expressions, and intentions of enemies. For what have you wished and +hoped for, but what the Illitergi and Lacetani did?” Next he expresses +wonderment as to what grievance or what expectations had led them to +revolt. If it is simply a grievance over delays of pay, caused by his +illness, is such action—jeopardising their country—justified, especially +as they have always been paid in full since he assumed command? +“Mercenary troops may, indeed, sometimes be pardoned for revolting +against their employers, but no pardon can be extended to those who are +fighting for themselves and their wives and children. For that is just +as if a man who said he had been wronged by his own father over money +matters were to take up arms to kill him who was the author of his life” +(Polybius). If the cause is not merely a grievance, is it because they +hoped for more profit and plunder by taking service with the enemy? If +so, who would be their possible allies? Men like Andobales and +Mandonius; a fine thing to put their trust in such repeated turncoats! +Then he turns his scorn on the leaders they have chosen, ignorant and +baseborn, parodying their names, Atrius and Albius—“Blackie” and +“Whitie,”—and so appealing to their sense of the ridiculous and their +superstition. He throws in a grim reminder of the legion which revolted +at Rhegium, and for it suffered beheading to the last man. But even +these put themselves under command of a military tribune. What hope of +successful revolt could they have entertained? Even had the rumour of +his death been correct, did they imagine that such tried leaders as +Silanus, Lælius, or Scipio’s brother could have failed to avenge the +insult to Rome? + +When he has shattered their confidence and stimulated their fears by +such telling arguments, the way is paved for him to detach them from the +instigators of the revolt and to win back their loyalty. Changing his +tone from harshness to gentleness, he continues: “I will plead for you +to Rome and to myself, using a plea universally acknowledged among +men—that all multitudes are easily misled and easily impelled to +excesses, so that a multitude is ever liable to the same changes as the +sea. For as the sea is by its own nature harmless to voyagers and quiet, +yet when agitated by winds it appears of the same turbulent character as +the winds, so a multitude ever appears to be and actually is of the same +character as the leaders and counsellors it happens to have.” In Livy’s +version he makes also a deftly sympathetic comparison, well calculated +to touch their hearts, between his own recent sickness of body and their +sickness of mind. “Therefore I, too, on the present occasion ... consent +to be reconciled to you, and grant you an amnesty. But with the guilty +instigators of revolt we refuse to be reconciled, and have decided to +punish for their offences....” As he finished speaking, the loyal +troops, who had encircled the assembly, clashed their swords on their +shields to strike terror into the mutineers; the herald’s voice was +heard citing by name the condemned agitators; and these offenders were +brought bound and naked into the midst of the assembly, and then +executed in the sight of all. It was a perfectly timed and concerted +plan, and the mutineers were too cowed to raise a hand or utter a +protest. The punishment carried out, the mass received assurance of +forgiveness, and took a fresh oath of loyalty to the tribunes. By a +characteristic touch of Scipio’s, each man received his full demand of +pay as he answered his name. + +This masterly handling of a gravely menacing situation has more than a +reminder of Pétain’s methods in quelling the mutinies of 1917—had the +great Frenchman perchance studied the mutiny of Sucro?—not only in its +blend of severity to ringleaders with the just rectification of +grievances, but in the way the moral health of the body military was +restored with the least possible use of the knife. This was true economy +of force, for it meant that the eight thousand became not merely +unwilling reinforcements, cowed into acquiescence with orders, but loyal +supporters. + +But the suppression of this mutiny was only one step towards restoring +the situation caused by Scipio’s illness. The expedition against Gades +had been abortive, primarily because the plot had been discovered by the +Carthaginian commander, and the conspirators arrested. Though they won +local successes, Lælius and Marcius found Gades prepared, and so, forced +to abandon their project, returned to Cartagena. + +There Scipio was about to march against the Spanish rebels. In ten days +he reached the Ebro, a full three hundred miles, and four days later +pitched his camp within sight of the enemy. A circular valley lay +between the two camps, and into this he drove some cattle protected only +by light troops, to “excite the rapacity of the barbarians.” At the same +time he placed Lælius with the cavalry in concealment behind a spur. The +bait succeeded, and while the rival skirmishers were merrily engaged, +Lælius emerged from cover, part of his cavalry charging the Spanish in +front, and the other part riding round the foot of the hill to cut them +off from their camp. The consequent reverse so irritated the Spanish +that next morning at daybreak their army marched out to offer battle. + +This suited Scipio excellently, for the valley was so confined that the +Spanish by this act committed themselves to a cramped close quarter +combat on the level, where the peculiar aptitude of the Romans in +hand-to-hand fighting gave them an initial advantage over troops more +adapted to hill fighting at longer ranges. And, furthermore, in order to +find room for their horse they were forced to leave one-third of their +foot out of the battle, stationed on the slope behind. + +The conditions suggested a fresh expedient to Scipio. The valley was so +narrow that the Spanish could not post their cavalry on the flanks of +the infantry line, which took up the whole space. Seeing this, Scipio +realised that his own infantry flanks were automatically secured, and +accordingly sent Lælius with the cavalry round by the hills in a wide +turning movement. Then, ever alive to the vital importance of securing +his intended manœuvre by a vigorous fixing attack, he himself advanced +into the valley with his infantry, with four cohorts in front, this +being the most he could effectively deploy on the narrow front. This +thrust, as he intended, occupied the attention of the Spanish, and +prevented them from observing the cavalry manœuvre until the blow fell, +and they heard the noise of the cavalry engagement in their rear. Thus +the Spanish were forced to fight two separate battles, their cavalry +neither able to aid their infantry, nor the infantry their cavalry, and +each doomed to the demoralising sound of conflict in their rear, so that +each action had a moral reaction on the other. + +Cramped and assailed by skilled close-quarter fighters, whose formation +gave them the advantage of depth for successive blows, the Spanish +infantry were cut to pieces. Then the Spanish cavalry, surrounded, +suffering the pressure of the fugitives, the direct attack of the Roman +infantry, and the rear attack of the Roman cavalry, could not use their +mobility, and, forced to a standing fight, were slain to the last man +after a gallant but hopeless resistance. It is a testimony to the +fierceness of the fight and to the quality of the Spanish resistance, +when hope had gone, that the Roman losses were twelve hundred killed and +over three thousand wounded. Of the Spanish the only survivors were the +light-armed third of their force who had remained on the hill, idle +spectators of the tragedy in the valley. These, along with their chiefs, +fled in time. + +This decisive triumph was a fitting conclusion to Scipio’s Spanish +campaigns—campaigns which for all their long neglect by military +students reveal a profound grasp of strategy—at a time when strategy had +hardly been born,—and of its intimate relation to policy. But, above +all, they deserve to be immortalised for their richness of tactical +achievement. Military history hardly contains such another series of +ingenious and inspired battle manœuvres, surpassing on balance even +those of Hannibal in Italy. If Scipio profited by Hannibal’s unintended +course of instruction on the battlefields of Italy, the pupil surpassed +even the master. Nor does such a probability diminish Scipio’s credit, +for the highest part of the art of war is inborn, not acquired, or why +did not later captains, ancient and modern, profit more by Scipio’s +demonstrations. Wonderful as was Hannibal’s fertility of plan, there +appears in Scipio’s record a still richer variety, a still more complete +calculation, and in three directions a definite superiority. The attack +on a fortified place was admittedly in Hannibal a weakness; in Scipio +the reverse, for Cartagena is a landmark in history. The pursuit after +Ilipa marks a new advance in warfare, also as the wide concealed turning +movement in this last battle against Andobales, a development clearly +beyond the narrow outflanking manœuvres which had hitherto been the +high-water mark of tactical skill. + +Scipio’s military motto would seem to have been “every time a new +stratagem.” Has ever a general been so fertile an artist of war? Beside +him most of the celebrated captains of history appear mere dabblers in +the art, showing in their whole career but one or two variations of +orthodox practice. And be it remembered that with one exception Scipio’s +triumphs were won over first-class opponents; not, like Alexander, over +Asiatic mobs; like Cæsar, over tribal hordes; or like Frederick and +Napoleon, over the courtier-generals and senile pedants of an atrophied +military system. + +[Illustration: Spain at the time of the 2nd Punic War.] + +This victory over Andobales and Mandonius proved to be the coping-stone +not only on his military career in Spain, but on the political conquest +of the country. So decisive had it been that Andobales realised the +futility of further resistance, and sent his brother Mandonius to sue +for peace unconditionally. One imagines that Mandonius must have felt +some pessimism as to his reception and as to his tenure of life. It +would have been natural to have dealt out to these twice-repeated rebels +a dire vengeance. But Scipio knew human nature, including Spanish +nature. No vengeance could improve his military or political position, +now unchallenged, whereas, on the other hand, it would merely sow the +seeds of future trouble, convert the survivors into embittered foes, +biding their time for a fresh outbreak. Little as he counted on their +fidelity, generosity was the one course which might secure it. +Therefore, after upbraiding Mandonius, and through him, Andobales, +driving home the helplessness of their position and the rightful +forfeiture of their lives, he made a peace as generous as it was +diplomatically foresighted. To show how little he feared them, he did +not demand the surrender of their arms and all their possessions, as was +the custom, nor even the required hostages, saying that “should they +revolt, he would not take vengeance on their unoffending hostages, but +upon themselves, inflicting punishment not upon defenceless but on armed +enemies” (Livy). The wisdom of this policy found its justification in +the fact that from this juncture Spain disappears from the history of +the Punic War, whether as a base of recruitment and supply for the +Carthaginian armies or as a distraction from Scipio’s concentration on +his new objective—Carthage itself. True, revolts broke out at intervals, +the first avowedly from the contempt felt by the Spanish for the +generals who succeeded Scipio, and recurred for centuries. But they were +isolated and spasmodic outbursts, and limited to the hill tribes, in +whose blood fighting was a malarial fever. + +Scipio’s mission in Spain was accomplished. Only Gades held out as the +last fragment of the Carthaginian power, and this, being then an island +fortress, was impregnable save through possible betrayal by its +defenders. By some historians Mago’s escape from Gades is made an +imputation on Scipio’s generalship, yet from a comparison of the +authorities it would seem probable that Mago left there, under orders +from Carthage, while Scipio was occupied with the far more pressing +menace of the mutiny and Andobales’s revolt. Mago, too, was not such a +redoubtable personality that his departure, with a handful of troops, +for other fields was in itself a menace to the general situation, even +if it could have been prevented, which militarily was impossible. +Actually, on his voyage from Gades, he attempted a surprise assault on +Cartagena in the absence of Scipio, and was so easily repulsed and so +strongly counter-attacked, that the ships cut their anchors in order to +avoid being boarded, leaving many of the defeated soldiers to drown or +be slain. Forced to return to Gades to recruit afresh, he was refused +entry to the city by the inhabitants, who shortly surrendered to the +Romans, and had to retrace his course to the island of Pityusa (modern +Iviça), the westernmost of the Balearic Isles, which was inhabited by +Carthaginians. After receiving recruits and supplies, he attempted a +landing on Majorca, but was repulsed by the natives, famous as slingers, +and had to choose the less advantageous site of Minorca as his winter +quarters, there hauling his ships on shore. + +With regard to the chronology of this last phase, in Livy’s account the +suppression of Andobales’s rebellion is followed by the story of a +meeting between Scipio and Masinissa, and then by the details of Mago’s +departure from Gades, from which it would appear that this happened +while Scipio was still in Spain. But for accuracy of historical sequence +Livy is a less reliable guide than Polybius, and the latter’s narrative +definitely states that directly after the subjugation of Andobales +Scipio returned to Tarraco, and then, “anxious not to arrive in Rome too +late for the consular elections,” sailed for Rome, after handing over +the army to Silanus and Marcius, and arranging for the administration of +the province. + +The meeting with Masinissa, whenever it occurred, is worth notice, for +here the seeds of Scipio’s generous treatment of Masinissa’s nephew +years before bore fruit in the exchange of pledges of an alliance, which +was to be one of Scipio’s master-tools in undermining the Carthaginian +power at its base in Africa. + + + + + CHAPTER VII. + THE TRUE OBJECTIVE. + + +On arrival at Rome Scipio obtained an audience of the Senate outside the +city, at the temple of Bellona, and there gave them a formal report of +his campaigns. “On account of these services he rather tried his +prospect of a triumph than pressed it pertinaciously,” for the honour +had never been given except to those whose services were rendered when +holders of a magistracy. His tact was wise, for the astonishing success +of youth had already inspired envy among his seniors. The Senate did not +break with precedent, and at the close of the audience he entered the +city in the ordinary way. His reward, however, came without delay. At +the assembly for the election of the two consuls for the coming year he +was named by all the centuries. The popularity of his election was shown +not only by the enthusiasm which greeted it, but by the gathering of a +larger number of voters than at any time during the Punic War, crowds +swarming to his house and to the Capitol full of curiosity to see the +victor of the Spanish wars. + +But on the morrow of this personal triumph, compensation for the formal +“triumph” denied him by a hidebound Senate, the first shoots appeared of +that undergrowth of narrow-minded conservatism, reinforced by envy, +which was to choke the personal fruits of his work, though happily not +before he had garnered for Rome the first-fruits—Hannibal’s overthrow. + +Hitherto in Spain he had enjoyed a free hand unfettered by jealous +politicians or the compromising counsels of government by committee. If +he had to rely on his own local resources, he was at least too far +distant for his essential freedom of action to be controlled by any +many-headed guardian of national policy. But from now on he was to +suffer, like Marlborough and Wellington some two thousand years later, +the curb of political faction and jealousy, and finally, like +Marlborough, end his days in embittered retirement. The report got about +that he was saying that he had been declared consul not merely to +prosecute, but to finish the war; that for this object it was essential +for him to move with his army into Africa; and that if the Senate +opposed this plan he would carry it through with the people’s backing, +overriding the Senate. Perhaps his friends were indiscreet; perhaps +Scipio himself, so old beyond his years in other ways, allowed youthful +confidence to outride his discretion; perhaps, most probable of all, he +knew the Senate’s innate narrowness of vision and had been sounding the +people’s opinion. + +The upshot was, that when the question was raised in the Senate, Fabius +Cunctator voiced the conservative view. The man who had worthily won his +name by inaction, his natural caution reinforced by an old man’s +jealousy, cleverly if spitefully criticises the plan of a young man +whose action threatens to eclipse his fame. First, he points out that +neither had the Senate voted nor the people ordered that Africa should +be constituted a consul’s province this year, insinuating that if the +consul came before them with his mind already made up, such conduct is +an insult to them. Next, Fabius seeks to parry any imputation of +jealousy by dwelling on his own past achievements as if they were too +exalted for any possible feats of Scipio to threaten comparison. How +characteristic, too, of age the remark, “What rivalry can there exist +between myself and a man who is not equal in years even to my son?” He +urges that Scipio’s duty is to attack Hannibal in Italy. “Why do you not +apply yourself to this, and carry the war in a straightforward manner to +the place where Hannibal is, rather than pursue that roundabout course, +according to which you expect that when you have crossed into Africa +Hannibal will follow you thither.” How vivid is the reminder here of +Eastern _v._ Western controversy in the war of 1914-1918. “What if +Hannibal should advance against Rome?” How familiar to modern ears is +this argument employed against any military heretic who questions the +doctrine of Clausewitz that the enemy’s main army is the primary +military objective. + +Fabius then insinuates that Scipio’s head has been turned by his +successes in Spain. These Fabius damns with faint praise and covert +sneers—sneers which Mommsen and other modern historians seem to have +accepted as literal truth, forgetting how decisively all Fabius’s +arguments were refuted by Scipio’s actions. How different, Fabius +contends, is the problem Scipio will have to face if he ventures to +Africa. Not a harbour open, not even a foothold already secured, not an +ally. Does Scipio trust his hold over Masinissa when he could not trust +even his own soldiers?—a jibe at the Sucro mutiny. Land in Africa, and +he will rally the whole land against him, all internal disputes +forgotten in face of the foreign foe. Even in the unlikely event of +forcing Hannibal’s return, how much worse will it be to face him near +Carthage, supported by all Africa, instead of with a remnant in Southern +Italy? “What sort of policy is that of yours, to prefer fighting where +your own forces will be diminished by one-half, and the enemy’s greatly +augmented?” + +Fabius finishes with a scathing comparison of Scipio with his father, +who, setting out for Spain, returned to Italy to meet Hannibal, “while +you are going to leave Italy when Hannibal is there, not because you +consider such a course beneficial to the State, but because you think it +will redound to your honour and glory ... the armies were enlisted for +the protection of the city and of Italy, and not for the consuls, like +kings, to carry into whatever part of the world they please from motives +of vanity.” + +This speech makes a strong impression on the Senators, “especially those +advanced in years,” and when Scipio rises to reply the majority are +clearly against him. His opening is an apt counter-thrust: “Even Quintus +Fabius himself has observed ... that in the opinion he gave a feeling of +jealousy might be suspected. And though I dare not myself charge so +great a man with harbouring that feeling, yet, whether it is owing to a +defect in his phrasing, or to the fact, that suspicion has certainly not +been removed. For he has so magnified his own honours and the fame of +his exploits, to do away with the imputation of envy, that it would +appear I am in danger of being rivalled by every obscure person, but not +by himself, because he enjoys an eminence above everybody else....” “He +has represented himself as an old man, and as one who has gone through +every gradation of honour, and me as below the age even of his son, as +if he supposed that the desire of glory did not exceed the span of life, +and as if its chief part had no respect to memory and future ages.” +Then, with gentle sarcasm Scipio refers to Fabius’s expressed solicitude +for his safety, and not only for the army and the State, should he cross +over to Africa. Whence has this concern so suddenly sprung? When his +father and uncle were slain, when Spain lay beneath the heel of four +victorious Carthaginian armies, when no one except himself would offer +themselves for such a forlorn venture, “why was it that no one at that +time made any mention of my age, of the strength of the enemy, of the +difficulties, of the recent fate of my father and uncle?” “Are there now +larger armies in Africa, more and better generals, than were then in +Spain? Was my age then more mature for conducting a war than now...?” +“After having routed four Carthaginian armies ... after having regained +possession of the whole of Spain, so that no trace of war remains, it is +an easy matter to make light of my services; just as easy as it would +be, should I return from Africa, to make light of those very conditions +which are now magnified for the purpose of detaining me here.” Then, +after demolishing the historical examples which Fabius had quoted as +warnings, Scipio makes this appeal to history recoil against Fabius by +adducing Hannibal’s example in support of his plan. “He who brings +danger upon another has more spirit than he who repels it. Add to this, +that the terror excited by the unexpected is increased thereby. When you +have entered the territory of an enemy you obtain a near view of his +strong and weak points.” After pointing out the moral “soft spots” in +Africa, Scipio continues: “Provided no impediment is caused here, you +will hear at once that I have landed, and that Africa is blazing with +war; that Hannibal is preparing to depart from this country.” “... Many +things which are not now apparent at this distance will develop; and it +is the part of a general not to be wanting when opportunity arises, and +to bend its events to his designs. I shall, Quintus Fabius, have the +opponent you assign me, Hannibal, but I shall rather draw him after me +than be kept here by him.” As for the danger of a move by Hannibal on +Rome, it is a poor compliment to Crassus, the other consul, to suppose +that he will not be able to keep Hannibal’s reduced and shaken forces in +check, when Fabius did so with Hannibal at the height of his power and +success—an unanswerable master-thrust this! + +After emphasising that now is the time and the opportunity to turn the +tables on Carthage, to do to Africa what Hannibal did to Italy, Scipio +ends on a characteristic note of restraint and exaltation combined: +“Though Fabius has depreciated my services in Spain, I will not attempt +to turn his glory into ridicule and magnify my own. If in nothing else, +though a young man, I will show my superiority over this old man in +modesty and in the government of my tongue. Such has been my life, and +such the services I have performed, that I can rest content in silence +with that opinion which you have spontaneously formed of me.” + +The Senate, however, were more concerned with the preservation of their +own privileges than with the military arguments, and demanded to know if +Scipio would leave the decision with them, or, if they refused, appeal, +over their heads, to the people’s verdict. They refused to give a +decision until they had an assurance that he would abide by it. After a +consultation with his colleague, Scipio gave way to this demand. +Thereupon the Senate, a typical committee, effected a compromise by +which the consul to whose lot Sicily fell might have permission to cross +into Africa if he judged it to be for the advantage of the State. +Curiously, Sicily fell to Scipio! + +He took with him thirty warships, which by great energy he had built and +launched within forty-five days of the timber being taken from the +woods; of these twenty were quinqueremes and ten quadriremes. On board +he embarked seven thousand volunteers, as the Senate, afraid to block +him but keen to obstruct him, had refused him leave to levy troops. + +The story of how, beset with difficulties and hampered by those he was +aiming to save, he took this unorganised band of volunteers and trained +it to be the nucleus of an effective expeditionary force finds a notable +parallel in our own history. Sicily was to be Scipio’s Shorncliffe Camp, +the place where he forged the weapon that was to be thrust at the heart +of Carthage. But Scipio, unlike Sir John Moore in the Napoleonic War, +was himself to handle the weapon his genius had created, and with it to +strike the death-blow at Hannibal’s power. His vision penetrating the +distant future, a quality in which he perhaps surpasses all other great +commanders, enabled him to realise that the tactical key to victory lay +in the possession of a superior mobile arm of decision—cavalry. It is +not the least tribute to his genius that to appreciate this he had to +break loose from the fetters of a great tradition, for Rome’s military +greatness was essentially built on the power of her legionary infantry. +The long and splendid annals of Roman history are the testimony to its +effectiveness, and only in Scipio’s brief passage across the stage do we +find a real break with this tradition, a balance between the two arms by +which the power of the one for fixing and of the other for decisive +manœuvre are proportioned and combined. It is an object-lesson to modern +general staffs, shivering on the brink of mechanicalisation, fearful of +the plunge despite the proved ineffectiveness of the older arms in their +present form, for no military tradition has been a tithe so enduring and +so resplendent as that of the legion. From his arrival in Sicily onwards +Scipio bent his energies to developing a superior cavalry, and Zama, +where Hannibal’s decisive weapon was turned against himself, is Scipio’s +justification. + +How unattainable must this goal have seemed when he landed in Sicily +with a mere seven thousand heterogeneous volunteers. Yet within a few +days the first progress was recorded. At once organising his volunteers +into cohorts and centuries, Scipio kept aside three hundred of the pick. +One can imagine their perplexed wonder at being left without arms and +not told off to centuries like their comrades. + +Next he nominated three hundred of the noblest born Sicilian youths to +accompany him to Africa, and appointed a day on which they were to +present themselves equipped with horses and arms. The honour of +nomination for such a hazardous venture affrighted both them and their +parents, and they paraded most reluctantly. Addressing them, Scipio +remarked that he had heard rumours of their aversion to this arduous +service, and rather than take unwilling comrades he would prefer that +they would openly avow their feelings. One of them immediately seized +this loophole of escape, and Scipio thereupon released him from service +and promised to provide a substitute on condition that he handed over +his horse and arms and trained his substitute in their handling. The +Sicilian joyfully accepted, and the rest, seeing that the general did +not take his action amiss, promptly followed his example. By this means +Scipio obtained a nucleus of picked Roman cavalry “at no expense to the +State.” + +His next measures show not only how his every step tended towards his +ultimate object, but also how alive he was to the importance of +foresight in securing his future action. He sent Lælius on an advance +reconnoitring expedition to Africa, and in order not to impair the +resources he was building up repaired his old ships for this expedition, +hauling his new ones upon shore for the winter at Panormus, as they had +been hastily and inevitably built of unseasoned timber. Further, after +distributing his army through the towns, he ordered the Sicilian States +to furnish corn for the troops, saving up the corn which he had brought +with him from Italy—economy of force even in the details of supply. +Scipio knew that strategy depends on supply, that without security of +food the most dazzling manœuvres may come to nought. + +Furthermore, an offensive, whether strategical or tactical, must operate +from a secure base—this is one of the cardinal axioms of war. “Basis” +would perhaps be a better term, for “base” is apt to be construed too +narrowly, whereas truly it comprises security to the geographical base, +both internal and external, as well as security of supply and of +movement. Napoleon in 1814, the Germans in 1918, both suffered the +dislocation of their offensive action through the insecurity of their +base internally. It is thus interesting to note how Scipio sought among +his preparatory measures to ensure this security. He found Sicily, and +especially Syracuse, suffering from internal discontent and disorder +which had arisen out of the war. The property of the Syracusans had been +seized after the famous siege by covetous Romans and Italians, and +despite the decrees of the Senate for its restitution, had never been +handed back. Scipio took an early opportunity of going to Syracuse, and +“deeming it of the first importance to maintain trust in Rome’s plighted +word,” restored their property to the citizens, by proclamation and even +by direct action against those who still clung fast to the plundered +property. This act of justice had a wide effect throughout Sicily, and +not only ensured the tranquillity of his base but won the active support +of the Sicilians in furnishing his forces for the expedition. + +Meanwhile Lælius had landed at Hippo Regius (modern Bona), about 150 +miles distant from Carthage. According to Livy the news threw Carthage +into a panic, the citizens believing that Scipio himself had landed with +his army, and anticipating an immediate march on Carthage. To ward this +off seemed hopeless, as their own people were untrained for war, their +mercenary troops of doubtful loyalty, and among the African chiefs +Syphax was alienated from them since his conference with Scipio, and +Masinissa a declared enemy. The panic did not abate until news came that +the invader was Lælius, not Scipio, and that his forces were only strong +enough for a raid. Livy further tells us that the Carthaginians took +advantage of the respite to send embassies to Syphax and others of the +African chiefs for the purpose of strengthening their alliance, and +envoys were also sent to Hannibal and Mago to urge them to keep Scipio +at home by playing on the fears of the Romans. Mago had, earlier, landed +at Genoa, but was too weak to act effectively, and to encourage him to +move towards Rome and join Hannibal, the Carthaginian Senate sent him +seven thousand troops and also money to hire auxiliaries. + +If these facts be true, they would on the surface suggest that Scipio +lost an opportunity and was unwise to put the Carthaginians on their +guard by this raid of Lælius’s, and this impression is strengthened by +the words ascribed to Masinissa. For Livy says that Masinissa came, with +a small body of horse, to meet Lælius, and complained that “Scipio had +not acted with promptness, in that he had not already passed his army +over into Africa, while the Carthaginians were in consternation, and +while Syphax was entangled in wars with neighbouring States, and in +doubt as to the side he should take; that if Syphax was allowed time to +settle his own affairs, he would not keep faith with the Romans.” +Masinissa then begged that Lælius would urge Scipio not to delay, +promising that he, though driven from his kingdom, would join Scipio +with a force of horse and foot. + +When, however, we appreciate the situation from a military angle it +appears in a different light. Lælius landed at the port which was +nearest to Numidia, and which was not only 150 miles distant from +Carthage, but with a wide belt of hill country intervening. When Scipio +himself landed it was at a spot only some twenty-five miles distant. +Hence Lælius’s expedition can have been in no sense a reconnaissance +against Carthage, and the clear deduction is that it was a +reconnaissance to discover the state and feeling of the African States +where Scipio hoped to find allies, and in particular to get in touch +with Masinissa. As we have shown, Scipio had realised that a superiority +in the cavalry arm was the key to victory over the Carthaginians, and he +looked to the Numidian chief for his main source. His appreciation of +the latter’s brilliant cavalry leadership on the battlefields of Spain +had inspired him to win Masinissa over. Thus the inherent probability is +that Lælius’s mission was primarily to discover if the Numidian would +actually hold to his new alliance when Roman troops landed on African +soil, and if so, what were the resources he could contribute. If the +Carthaginians were really panic-stricken at a raid so distant, the fact +but helped to confirm Scipio’s view of the moral advantage to be gained +from a thrust at Carthage. As for the warning thus given, the danger of +putting the Carthaginians on their guard, this had already been given by +Scipio’s speeches in the Senate and his preparations. Where consent for +his expedition had to be wrung from a reluctant Senate, where the forces +and resources for it had to be raised without State help, strategic +surprise was out of the question from the outset. Here were exemplified +the chronic drawbacks of a constitutional system of government for +conducting war. It is one of Scipio’s supreme merits that he obtained +completely decisive results, though lacking the tremendous asset of +political control. He, the servant of a republic, is the one exception +to the rule that throughout the history of war the most successful of +the great captains have been despots or autocrats. Countless historians +have lavished sympathy on Hannibal for the handicap he suffered through +lack of support from home, and laid all his set-backs at the door of the +Carthaginian Senate. None seem to have stressed Scipio’s similar +handicap. Yet to Rome there was none of the physical difficulty in +sending reinforcements that Carthage could plead as an excuse. In this +lack of support—nay worse, the active opposition—from the Roman Senate +lies unquestionably the reason of Scipio’s delay of a year in Sicily to +prepare for the expedition. He had to find unaided his own resources in +Sicily and Africa. How groundless as well as irrational was Masinissa’s +complaint, if he made it, is shown by the fact that when, in 204 B.C., +Scipio landed in Africa, the “landless prince,” to quote Mommsen, +“brought in the first instance nothing beyond his personal ability to +the aid of the Romans.” Few generals have been so bold as Scipio when +boldness was the right policy, but he was too imbued with the principle +of security to strike before he had armed himself and tempered his +weapon by training. The wonder is not at Scipio’s delay of a year, but +that he moved so soon, and with a force that in numbers if not in +training was still so puny for the scope of his task. But this seeming +audacity was made secure by his strategy after the landing, and Zama was +its justification. It is an ironical comment on the value of their +judgments that the same historians who criticise Scipio for his +tardiness in 205 B.C., tax him with rashness for the smallness of the +force with which he sailed in 204 B.C.! One of these, Dodge, when +dealing with the first year, remarks that “Scipio does not seem to have +been very expeditious about the business. In this he resembled +McClellan, as well as in his popularity.” Later, dealing with Scipio’s +embarkation, Dodge says: “Some generals would have declared these means +insufficient; but Scipio possessed an abundance of self-confidence which +supplemented material strength in all but severe tests.” Such criticism +is a boomerang recoiling on the critic. + + + + + CHAPTER VIII. + A POLITICAL HITCH. + + +The interval between the return of Lælius and the embarkation for Africa +is occupied, apart from material preparation, by two episodes of +significance. The first is Scipio’s apparent “sideshow” at Locri; the +second, the political imbroglio which for a time threatened his ruin and +that of his plans. Both deserve study for the light they shed on his +character as a commander and a man. + +Locri lay on the underpart of the toe of Italy (near modern Gerace), and +was in Hannibal’s possession. After his brother Hasdrubal’s defeat at +the Metaurus, Hannibal had fallen back on Bruttium, the southernmost +province of Italy, and here he held at bay the consular armies, who +dared not advance to seek out the scarred but indomitable lion in his +mountain fastnesses. + +Some Locrians who had gone outside the walls were captured by a Roman +raiding party, and taken to Rhegium—the port adjacent to Sicily,—where +they were recognised by the pro-Roman Locrian nobles, who had found +sanctuary there when their town fell into Carthaginian hands. Certain of +the prisoners, who were skilled artisans and had been in the employment +and trust of the Carthaginians, suggested that, if ransomed, they would +be willing to betray the citadel at Locri. The nobles, eager to regain +their town, at once ransomed the artisans, and after concerting a plan +and signals, sent them back to Locri. Then, going to Scipio at Syracuse, +they told him of the scheme. He saw the opportunity, and despatched on +the venture a detachment of three thousand men under two military +tribunes. Exchanging signals with the conspirators inside, ladders were +let down about midnight, and the attackers swarmed up the walls. +Surprise magnified their strength, and the Carthaginians in confusion +fled from the citadel to a second citadel on the farther side of the +town. For several days encounters occurred between the two parties +without decisive result. Alive to the danger to his garrison, and to the +threatened loss of an important point, Hannibal moved to the rescue, +sending a messenger ahead with orders to the garrison to make a sortie +at daybreak as a cloak to what he hoped would be his surprise assault. +He had not, however, brought scaling ladders with him, and so was forced +to postpone his attack a day while he was preparing these and other +materials for storming the walls. + +Scipio, who was at Messana, received word of Hannibal’s move, and +planned a counter-surprise. Leaving his brother in command at Messana, +he embarked a force, and, setting sail on the next tide, arrived in the +harbour of Locri shortly before nightfall. The troops were hidden in the +town during the night, a concealment made possible by the townspeople +favouring, though not openly taking, the side of the Romans. Next +morning Hannibal launched his assault in conjunction with the sortie +from the Carthaginians’ citadel. As the scaling ladders were being +brought forward, Scipio sallied out from one of the town gates and +attacked the Carthaginians in flank and rear. The shock of the surprise +dislocated and disorganised the Carthaginians, and, his plan upset, +Hannibal fell back on his own camp. Realising that the Romans, because +of their grip on the town, were masters of the situation, he withdrew +during the night, sending word to his garrison in the citadel to make +their way out as best they could and rejoin him. + +For Scipio this “side-show” was a very real asset. Apart from the +personal prestige he gained from his success in this first encounter +with the dreaded Hannibal, scoring a trick even off the master of ruses, +he had helped the Roman campaign in Italy by curtailing Hannibal’s +remaining foothold in that country—and without any diminution of his own +force. But, beyond these personal and indirect gains, his success had an +important bearing on his own future plan of operations. For he had +“blooded” his troops against Hannibal, and by this successful enterprise +given them a moral tonic, which would be of immense value in the crucial +days to come. It is unfortunate that for this episode, as for Lælius’s +reconnaissance in Africa, we have no Polybius to reveal to us the +motives and calculations which inspired Scipio’s moves. The loss of +Polybius’s books on this period must be replaced by deduction from the +facts, and from the knowledge already gained of Scipio’s mind. To those +who have followed his constant and farsighted exploitation of the moral +element during his Spanish campaigns, there can be little doubt that he +seized on the Locri expedition as a heaven-sent chance not only to test +and sharpen his weapon for the day of trial, but to dispel in his troops +the impression of Hannibalic invincibility. + +The second episode arose out of the subsequent administration of +recaptured Locri. When Scipio had sent the original force to seize the +town, he had instructed Quintus Pleminius, the proprætor at Rhegium, to +assist the tribunes, and when the place was captured Pleminius, by +virtue of his seniority, assumed the command until Scipio arrived. After +the repulse of Hannibal’s relieving force, Scipio returned to Sicily, +and Pleminius was naturally left in chief command of the town and its +defence, though the detachment from Sicily remained under the direct +command of the tribunes. + +How Pleminius abused his trust is one of the most sordid pages in Roman +history. The wretched inhabitants suffered worse from his tyranny and +lust than ever they had from the Carthaginians—an ill-requital of their +aid to the Romans in regaining the town. The example of their leader +infected the troops, and their greed for loot not only harassed the +townspeople but inevitably led to disorder among themselves. It would +seem that the tribunes strove to check this growing license, and to +uphold the true standards of military discipline. One of Pleminius’s +men, running away with a silver cup that he had stolen from a house and +pursued by its owners, met the tribunes in his flight. They stopped him +and had the cup taken away, whereat his comrades showered abuse on the +tribunes, and the disturbance soon ended in a free fight between the +soldiers of the tribunes and those of Pleminius. The latter were worsted +and invoked the aid of their commander, inciting him by tales of the +reproaches cast upon his behaviour and control. Pleminius thereupon +ordered the tribunes to be brought before him, stripped, and beaten. +During the short delay while the rods were being brought and themselves +stripped, the tribunes called upon their men for aid. The latter, +hastily gathering from all quarters, were so inflamed at the sight that, +breaking loose from the habits of discipline, they vented their rage on +Pleminius. Cutting him off from his party, they mutilated his nose and +ears, and left him almost lifeless. + +When word of the disturbance reached Scipio, he sailed immediately for +Locri and held a court of inquiry. Of the evidence and of the reasons +for his judgment we know nothing. All that is handed down is the fact +that he acquitted Pleminius, restored him to command, and pronouncing +the tribunes guilty, ordered them to be thrown into chains and sent back +to Rome for the Senate to deal with. He then returned to Sicily. + +The verdict appears somewhat astonishing, the one serious blemish, in +fact, on Scipio’s judgment. The motives which inspired it are difficult +to surmise. Perhaps it was partly pity for the mutilated Pleminius, +combined with anger that his own men should have shown such gross +insubordination and committed such an atrocity. It is a natural instinct +with the best type of commander to be more severe on the misconduct of +his own direct subordinates than on those who are only attached to him, +and in case of dispute between the two such a man may err because of his +very scrupulousness to hold the balance fairly, and to avoid partiality +towards his own. It was said of one of the finest British commanders in +the war of 1914-18 that if he had a personal dislike or distrust of a +subordinate he invariably gave the latter more rope than the others, +knowing that if his distrust was justified the man would assuredly use +this rope to hang himself. Similar may have been the motives underlying +Scipio’s outwardly inexplicable verdict. In criticising it the historian +must consider not only the gaps in our knowledge of the case, but view +the incident in the general light of all Scipio’s recorded acts as a +commander. The whole weight of evidence, as we have seen, goes to show +that two qualities which especially distinguished Scipio were the +acuteness of his understanding of men, and his humanity to the +conquered. Trust in a Pleminius or condonation of brutality were the +last things to be expected of him, and so, lacking evidence as to the +facts on which his decision was based, it would be rash to pass adverse +judgment on his action. + +We need to remember also that Locri was in Italy, and therefore outside +his province, and a close attention to its administration could only be +at the expense of his primary object—preparation for the expedition to +Africa. + +The importance of the Locri incident is not as a light on Scipio’s +character, but as a political rock on which his military plans nearly +foundered. How this came about can be briefly told. After Scipio’s +departure, Pleminius, who thought that the injury he had sustained had +been treated too lightly by Scipio, disobeyed the latter’s instructions. +He had the tribunes dragged before him and tortured to death, refusing +even to allow their mangled bodies to be buried. His injuries still +rankling, he then sought to avenge himself by multiplying the burdens +put on the Locrians. In despair, they sent a deputation to the Roman +Senate. Their envoys arrived soon after the consular elections, which +had marked the end of Scipio’s term of office, though he was continued +in command of the troops in Sicily. Their tale of misery raised a storm +of popular indignation at Rome, and Scipio’s senatorial opponents were +not slow to divert this on to the head of the man nominally responsible. +It is no surprise to find that Fabius initiated this by asking if they +had carried their complaints to Scipio. The envoys replied, according to +Livy, that “deputies were sent to him, but he was occupied with the +preparations for the war, and had either already crossed over into +Africa, or was on the point of doing so.” They added that his previous +decision between Pleminius and the tribunes had given them the +impression that the former was in favour with Scipio. + +Fabius had got the answer he wanted, and after the envoys had withdrawn, +hastened to condemn Scipio unheard, declaring “that he was born for the +corruption of military discipline. In Spain he almost lost more men in +consequence of the mutiny than in the war. That, after the manner of +foreigners and kings, he indulged the licentiousness of the soldiers, +and then punished them with cruelty.” This envenomed speech Fabius +followed up with “a resolution equally harsh.” It was “that Pleminius +should be conveyed to Rome in chains, and in chains plead his cause; +that, if the complaints of the Locrians were founded in truth, he should +be put to death in prison, and his effects confiscated. That Publius +Scipio should be recalled for having quitted his province without the +permission of the Senate.” + +A hot debate followed, in which, “besides the atrocious conduct of +Pleminius, much was said about the dress of the general himself, as +being not only un-Roman, but even unsoldierly.” His critics complained +that “he walked about the gymnasium in a cloak and slippers, and that he +gave his whole time to light books and the palæstra. That his whole +staff were enjoying the delights which Syracuse afforded, with the same +indolence and effeminacy. That Carthage and Hannibal had dropped out of +his memory”—somewhat inconsistent on the part of the people who were +proposing to recall him because he had been fighting with Hannibal. How +petty, but how true to human nature! The real grievance of his crusted +seniors was not his leniency with Pleminius, but his Greek refinement +and studies. + +But wiser counsels prevailed. Metellus pointed out how inconsistent it +would be for the State now to recall, condemned in his absence and +without a hearing, the very man whom they had commissioned to finish the +war, and to do so in the face of the Locrians’ evidence that none of +their tribulations occurred while Scipio was there. On the motion of +Metellus a commission of inquiry was appointed to visit Scipio in +Sicily, or even in Africa had he departed thither, with power to deprive +him of his command if they found that the acts at Locri had been +committed at his command or with his concurrence. This commission was +also to investigate the charges brought against his military régime, +whether his own alleged indolency or the relaxation of discipline among +the troops. These charges were brought by Cato, who, besides being an +adherent of Fabius, conceived it his special mission in life to oppose +the new Hellenic culture and to effect cheese-paring economies. It is +related that to save money he sold his slaves as soon as they were too +old for work, that he esteemed his wife no more than his slaves, and +that he left behind in Spain his faithful charger rather than incur the +charge of transporting it to Italy. As quæstor under Scipio in Sicily he +reproached his general with his liberality to the troops, until Scipio +dispensed with his services, whereupon Cato returned disgruntled to +Italy to join Fabius in an anti-waste campaign in the Senate. + +The commission went first to Locri. Pleminius had already been thrown +into prison at Rhegium, according to some accounts by Scipio, who had +sent a _legatus_ with a guard to seize him and his principal coadjutors. +At Locri restitution of their property and civic privileges was made to +the citizens, and they willingly agreed to send deputies to give +evidence against Pleminius at Rome. But though invited to bring +complaints against Scipio, the citizens declined, saying that they were +convinced that the injuries inflicted on them were neither by his orders +nor with his approval. + +The commission, relieved of the duty of investigating such charges, +nevertheless went on to Syracuse, to see for themselves the military +condition of his command. There are parallels in history to such a +political investigation on the eve of a great military venture—the +Nivelle affair is the most recent,—and often they have reacted +disastrously both on the confidence of the commander and the confidence +of his subordinates in him. But Scipio survived the test. “While they +were on their way to Syracuse, Scipio prepared to clear himself, not by +words but by facts. He ordered all his troops to assemble there, and the +fleet to be got in readiness, as though a battle had to be fought that +day with the Carthaginians by sea and land. On the day of their arrival +he entertained them hospitably, and on the next day presented to their +view his land and sea forces, not only drawn up in order, but the former +carrying out field operations, while the fleet fought a mock naval +battle in the harbour. The prætor and the deputies were then conducted +round to view the armouries, the granaries, and other preparations for +the war. And so great was the admiration aroused in them of each +particular, and the whole together, that they formed the conviction that +under the conduct of that general, and with that army, the Carthaginians +would be vanquished, or by none other. They bid him with the blessing of +the gods, cross over....” (Livy). + +These deputies were not, as the “frocks” of 1914-18, remarkable only for +their ignorance of matters military. Like most Romans they were men of +military training and experience, and no “eye-wash” would have deceived +them. In face of such a verdict it is surprising that a historian of the +reputation of Mommsen should here again swallow Fabius’s spiteful +charges, and repeat as his own the opinion that Scipio failed to +maintain discipline. Only a lay historian, militarily ignorant, could +imagine that an army which had been allowed to run to seed could carry +out the complex Roman battle drill and develop its preparations to a +pitch of efficiency that not only gained the approval but aroused the +enthusiasm of this expert commission. + +On their return to Rome the warmth of their praise induced the Senate to +vote that Scipio should cross to Africa, and that he should be given +permission to select himself, _out of those forces which were in +Sicily_, the troops which he wanted to accompany him. The irony of this +grudging and tardy permission lies in the clause in italics. He was +given their blessing, and that was all. For a venture of such magnitude, +he was worse supported by the Senate than even Hannibal by Carthage. Of +Roman troops, apart from his own volunteers, he had in Sicily only the +5th and 6th Legions, the remnant of those who had fought at Cannæ, and +who in punishment for the defeat had been sentenced to serve in exile in +Sicily. A less understanding commander might well have hesitated to rely +on troops suffering such a degradation. But “Scipio was very far from +feeling contempt for such soldiers, inasmuch as he knew that the defeat +at Cannæ was not attributable to their cowardice, and that there were no +soldiers in the Roman army who had served so long, or were so +experienced in the various types of combat.” They on their side were +burning to wipe off the unjust stigma of disgrace, and when he declared +that he would take them with him he could feel sure that by this proof +of his trust and generosity he had won their utter devotion. He +inspected them “man by man,” and putting aside those unfit for service +he filled up their places with his own men, bringing the strength of +each Legion up to 6200 infantry and 300 horse. + +Roman accounts differ widely as to the total strength of the force that +embarked, and even in Livy’s time the uncertainty was such that he +preferred not to give an opinion. The smallest estimate is 10,000 foot +and 200 horse; a second is 16,000 infantry and 1600 horse; the third, +and largest, is a total of 35,000, including horse and foot. The first +is disproved by the previous facts, and these seem rather to point to +the second as the correct estimate. In any case it was slender indeed +for the object aimed at. + +There is a striking parallel between the situation and numbers of Scipio +in 204 B.C. and those of Gustavus Adolphus in 1630 A.D., when the +Swedish King crossed the Baltic to strike at the seat of the Imperial +power. And each force, small as it was, had been welded by the training +genius and personal magnetism of its leader into a superb instrument of +war—a cadre or framework for later expansion. How purely this expedition +and its triumphant success was the plan and the work of Scipio can be +aptly shown by quoting Mommsen, a far from friendly witness: “It was +evident that the Senate did not appoint the expedition, but merely +allowed it: Scipio did not obtain half the resources which had formerly +been placed at the command of Regulus, and he got that very corps which +for years had been subjected by the Senate to intentional degradation. +The African army was, in the view of the majority of the Senate, a +forlorn hope of disrated companies and volunteers, whose loss in any +event the State had no great occasion to regret.” And yet many +historians assert that Rome’s victory in the Punic War was due to the +generous support she gave to her generals, the failure of Carthage to +the reverse cause! + +Not only were Scipio’s means slender, but the African situation had +changed for the worse during the year’s delay forced on him by the need +to raise and train his expeditionary force, in default of Rome’s aid, a +delay still further protracted by the Locri inquiry. Hasdrubal, son of +Gisco, on his return from Spain had checkmated Scipio’s newly won +influence over Syphax, by giving the king his daughter Sophonisba in +marriage, and in return got Syphax to renew his pledge of alliance with +Carthage. Still afraid that Syphax would adhere to his old pledges to +Scipio, Hasdrubal “took advantage of the Numidian while under the +influence of the first transports of love, and calling to his aid the +caresses of the bride, prevailed upon him to send envoys into Sicily to +Scipio, and by them to warn him ‘not to cross over into Africa in +reliance on his former promise.’” The message begged Scipio to carry on +the war elsewhere, so that Syphax might maintain his neutrality, adding +that if the Romans came he would be compelled to fight against them. + +Passion had beaten diplomacy. One can imagine what a blow the message +proved to Scipio. Yet he determined to carry through his plan, and +merely sought to counteract the moral harm which might accrue if +Syphax’s defection became known. He sent the envoys back as quickly as +possible, with a stern reminder to Syphax of his treaty obligations. +Further, realising that the envoys had been seen by many, and that if he +maintained silence about their visit rumours would spread, Scipio +announced to the troops that the envoys had come, like Masinissa earlier +to Lælius, to urge him to hasten his invasion of Africa. It was a shrewd +ruse, for the truth might have caused grave moral depression at the +critical time. Scipio, wiser than the military authorities of 1914, +understood crowd psychology, and knew that the led put the worst +construction on the silence of the leaders, that they assume no news to +be bad news, despite all the proverbs. + + + + + CHAPTER IX. + AFRICA. + + +Thus in the spring of 204 B.C. Scipio embarked his army at Lilybæum +(modern Marsala), and sailed for Africa. His fleet is said to have +comprised forty warships and four hundred transports, and on board was +carried water and rations for fifty-five days, of which fifteen days’ +supply was cooked. Complete dispositions were made for the protection of +the convoy by the warships, and each class of vessel was distinguished +by lights at night—the transports one, the warships two, and his own +flagship three. It is worth notice that he personally supervised the +embarkation of the troops. + +A huge crowd gathered to witness the departure, not only the inhabitants +of Lilybæum, but all the deputies from Sicily—as a compliment to +Scipio,—and the troops who were being left behind. At daybreak Scipio +delivered a farewell oration and prayer, and then by a trumpet gave the +signal to weigh anchor. Favoured by a strong wind the fleet made a quick +passage, and next morning when the sun rose they were in sight of land, +and could discern the promontory of Mercury (now Cape Bon). Scipio +ordered the pilot to make for a landing farther west, but a dense fog +coming on later forced the fleet to cast anchor. Next morning, the wind +rising, dispelled the fog, and the army disembarked at the Fair +promontory (now Cape Farina), a few miles from the important city of +Utica. The security of the landing was at once ensured by entrenching a +camp on the nearest rising ground. + +These two promontories formed the horns, pointing towards Sicily, of the +territory of Carthage, that bull’s head of land projecting into the +Mediterranean which is to-day known as Tunisia. The horns, some +thirty-five miles apart, enclosed a vast semicircular bay in the centre +of which stood Carthage, on a small peninsula pointing east. Utica lay +just below and inside the tip of the western horn, and a few miles east +of the city was the Bagradas river, whose rich and fertile valley was +the main source of supplies for Carthage. Another strategic point was +Tunis, at the junction of the Carthage peninsula with the +mainland—geographically south-west of Carthage but militarily east, +because it lay across the landward approaches from that flank. + +Although the Carthaginians had long been expecting the blow, and had +watch-towers on every cape, the news created feverish excitement and +alarm, stimulated by the stream of fugitives from the country districts. +At Carthage, emergency defensive measures were taken as if Scipio was +already at the gates. The Roman’s first step was clearly to gain a +secure base of operations, and with this aim his preliminary move was +against Utica. His fleet was despatched there forthwith while the army +marched overland, his advanced guard cavalry encountering a body of five +hundred Carthaginian horse who had been sent to reconnoitre and +interrupt the landing. After a sharp engagement these were put to +flight. A still better omen was the arrival of Masinissa, true to his +word, to join Scipio. Livy states that the earlier sources from which he +compiled his history differed as to the strength of Masinissa’s +reinforcement, some saying that he brought two hundred horse, and some +two thousand. Livy accepts the smaller estimate, for the very sound +reason that Masinissa after his return from Spain had been driven out of +his father’s kingdom by the joint efforts of Syphax and the +Carthaginians, and for the past year and more had been eluding pursuit +by repeated changes of quarter. An exile, who had escaped from the last +battle with only sixty horsemen, it is unlikely that he could have +raised his band of followers to any large proportions. + +Meanwhile, the Carthaginians despatched a further body of four thousand +horse, mainly Numidians, to oppose Scipio’s advance and gain time for +Syphax and Hasdrubal to come to their aid. To their ally and to their +chief general in Africa the most urgent messages had been sent. Hanno +with the four thousand cavalry occupied a town, Salæca, about fifteen +miles from the Roman camp near Utica, and it is said by Livy that +Scipio, on hearing of this, remarked, “What, cavalry lodging in houses +during the summer! Let there be even more in number while they have such +a leader.” “Concluding that the more dilatory they were in their +operations, the more active he ought to be, he sent Masinissa forward +with the cavalry, directing him to ride up to the gates of the enemy and +draw them out to battle, and when their whole force had poured out and +committed themselves thoroughly to the attack, then to retire by +degrees.” Scipio himself waited for what he judged sufficient time for +Masinissa’s advanced party to draw out the enemy, and then followed with +the Roman cavalry, “proceeding without being seen, under cover of some +rising ground.” He took up a position near the so-called Tower of +Agathocles, on the northern slope of a saddle between two ridges. + +[Illustration: Battle of Utica.] + +Masinissa, following Scipio’s plan, made repeated advances and +retirements. At first he drew out small skirmishing parties, then +counterattacked them so that Hanno was forced to reinforce them, lured +them on again by a simulated retreat and repeated the process. At last +Hanno, irritated by these tactical tricks—so typical of the Parthians +and the Mongols later,—sallied forth with his main body, whereupon +Masinissa retired slowly, drawing the Carthaginians along the southern +side of the ridges and past the saddle which concealed the Roman +cavalry. When the moment was ripe, Scipio’s cavalry emerged and +encircled the flank and rear of Hanno’s cavalry, while Masinissa, +turning about, attacked them in front. The first line of a thousand were +surrounded and slain, and of the remainder two thousand were captured or +killed in a vigorous pursuit. + +Scipio followed up this success by a seven days’ circuit through the +countryside, clearing it of cattle and supplies, and creating a wide +devastated zone as a barrier against attack. Security, both in supply +and protection, thus effected, he concentrated his efforts on the siege +of Utica, which he wanted for his base of operations. Utica, however, +was not destined to be a second Cartagena. Although he combined attack +from the sea by the marines with the land assault, the fortress defied +all his efforts and ruses. + +Hasdrubal by this time had collected a force of thirty thousand foot and +three thousand horse, but with painful recollections of the maulings he +had suffered in Spain, did not venture to move to Utica’s relief until +reinforced by Syphax. When the latter at last came, with an army stated +to have been fifty thousand foot and ten thousand horse, the menace +compelled Scipio to raise the siege—after forty days. Faced with such a +concentration of hostile force, Scipio’s situation must have been +hazardous, but he extricated himself without mishap and fortified a camp +for the winter on a small peninsula, connected to the mainland by a +narrow isthmus. This lay on the eastern, or Carthage, side of Utica, +thus lying on the flank of any relieving force, and was later known as +Castra Cornelia. The enemy then encamped some seven miles farther east, +covering the approaches to the River Bagradas. + +If there is a parallel between Scipio’s landing in Africa and Gustavus’s +landing in Germany, there is a still more striking parallel between +their action during the first season on hostile soil. Both campaigns to +the unmilitary critic appear limited in scope compared with the avowed +object with which they had set forth. Both generals have been criticised +for over-caution, if not hesitation. And both were justified not only by +the result, but by the science of war. Scipio and Gustavus alike, unable +for reasons outside their control to adjust the means to the end, +displayed that rare strategical quality—of adjusting the end to the +means. Their strategy foreshadowed Napoleon’s maxim that “the whole art +of war consists in a well ordered and prudent defensive, followed by a +bold and rapid offensive.” Both sought first to lay the foundations for +the offensive which followed by gaining a secure base of operations +where they could build up their means to a strength adequate to ensure +the attainment of the end. + +Gustavus is known to have been a great student of the classics: was his +strategy in 1630 perhaps a conscious application of Scipio’s method? Nor +is this campaign of Gustavus’s the only military parallel with Scipio’s +that history records. For the action of Wellington in fortifying and +retiring behind the lines of Torres Vedras in 1810 to checkmate the +French superior concentration of force has a vivid reminder, both +topographical and strategical, of Scipio’s action in face of the +concentration of Syphax and Hasdrubal. + +In this secure retreat Scipio devoted the winter to build up his +strength and supplies for the next spring’s campaign. Besides the corn +he had collected in his preliminary foraging march, he obtained a vast +quantity from Sardinia, and also fresh stores of clothing and arms from +Sicily. The success of his landing, his sharp punishment of the +Carthaginian attempts to meet him in battle, and, above all, the fact +that he had dissipated the terrors of the unknown, had falsified all the +fears of the wiseacres, by holding his own, small though his force, on +the dreaded soil of Africa, almost at the gates of Carthage—all these +factors combined to turn the current of opinion and arouse the State to +give him adequate support. Reliefs were sent to Sicily so that he could +reinforce his strength with the troops at first left behind for local +defence. + +But, as usual, while seeking to develop his own strength, he did not +overlook the value of subtracting from the enemy’s. He reopened +negotiations with Syphax, “whose passion for his bride he thought might +now perhaps have become satiated from unlimited enjoyment.” In these he +was disappointed, for while Syphax went so far as to suggest terms of +peace by which the Carthaginians should quit Italy in return for a Roman +evacuation of Africa, he did not hold out any hope that he would abandon +the Carthaginian cause if the war continued. For such terms Scipio had +no use, but he only rejected them in a qualified manner, in order to +maintain a pretext for his emissaries to visit the hostile camp. The +reason was that he had conceived a plan whereby to weaken the enemy and +anticipate the attack that he feared owing to the enemy’s heavy +superiority of numbers. Some of his earlier messengers to Syphax had +reported that the Carthaginians’ winter huts were built almost entirely +of wood, and those of the Numidians of interwoven reeds and matting, +disposed without order or proper intervals, and that a number even lay +outside the ramparts of the camps. This news suggested to Scipio the +idea of setting fire to the enemy’s camp and striking a surprise blow in +the confusion. + +Therefore in his later embassies Scipio sent certain expert scouts and +picked centurions dressed as officers’ servants. While the conferences +were in progress, these rambled through the camps, both that of Syphax +and of Hasdrubal, noting their approaches and entrances and studying the +general plan of the camps, the distance between them, the times and +methods of stationing guards and outposts. With each embassy, too, a +different lot of observers were sent, so that as large a number as +possible should familiarise themselves with the lie of the enemy camps. +As a result of their reports Scipio ascertained that Syphax’s camp was +the more inflammable and the easier to attack. + +He then sent further envoys to Syphax, who was hoping for peace, with +instructions not to return until they received a decisive answer on the +proposed terms, saying that it was time that either an agreement was +settled or the war vigorously prosecuted. After consultation between +Syphax and Hasdrubal, they apparently decided to accept, whereupon +Scipio made further stipulations, as a suitable way of terminating the +truce, which he did next day, informing Syphax that while he himself +desired peace, the rest of his council were opposed to it. By this means +he gained freedom to carry out his plan without breaking his faith, +though he undoubtedly went as close to the border between strategical +ruse and deliberate craft as was possible without overstepping it. + +Syphax, much vexed at this breakdown of negotiations, at once conferred +with Hasdrubal, and it was decided to take the offensive and challenge +Scipio to battle, on level ground if possible. But Scipio was ready to +strike, his preparations complete. Even in his final preparations, he +sought to mystify and mislead the enemy in order to make his surprise +more effective. The orders issued to the troops spoke of the surprise +being aimed at Utica; he launched his ships and mounted on board siege +machines as if he was about to assault Utica from the sea, and he +despatched two thousand infantry to seize a hill which commanded the +town. This move had a dual purpose—to convince the enemy that his plan +was directed against Utica, and to occupy the city garrison to prevent +them making a sortie against his camp when he marched out to attack the +hostile camps. Thus he was able to achieve economy of force, by +concentrating the bulk of his troops for the decisive blow, and leaving +only a slight force to guard the camp, and thus once more he did not +lose sight of the principle of security in carrying out that of +surprise. He had fixed the enemy’s attention in the wrong direction. + +About mid-day he summoned a conference of his ablest and most trusted +tribunes and disclosed his plan. To this conference he summoned the +officers who had been to the enemy’s camp. “He questioned them closely +and compared the accounts they gave of the approaches and entrances of +the camp, letting Masinissa decide, and following his advice owing to +his personal knowledge of the ground.” Then he ordered the tribunes to +give the troops their evening meal early, and lead the legions out of +the camp after “Retreat” had been sounded as usual. On this point +Polybius adds the interesting note that “it is the custom among the +Romans at supper-time for the trumpeters to sound their instruments +outside the general’s tent as a signal that it is time to set the +night-watches at their several posts.” + +About the first watch the troops were formed up in march order and moved +off on their seven-mile march, and about midnight arrived in the +vicinity of the hostile camps, which were just over a mile apart. +Thereupon Scipio divided his force, placing all the Numidians and half +his legionaries under Lælius and Masinissa with orders to attack +Syphax’s camp. The two commanders he first took aside and urged on them +the need for caution, emphasising that “the more the darkness in night +attacks hinders and impedes the sight, the more must one supply the +place of actual vision by skill and care.” He further instructed them +that he would wait to launch his attack on Hasdrubal’s camp until Lælius +had set fire to the other camp, and with this purpose marched his own +men at a slow pace. + +Lælius and Masinissa, dividing their force, attacked the camp from two +directions simultaneously—a convergent manœuvre,—and Masinissa also +posted his Numidians, because of their knowledge of the camp, to cut off +the various exits of escape. As had been foreseen, once the leading +Romans had set the fire alight, it spread rapidly along the first row of +huts, and in a brief while the whole camp was aflame, because of the +closeness of the huts and the lack of proper intervals between rows. + +Fully imagining that it was an accidental conflagration, Syphax’s men +rushed out of their huts unarmed, and in a disorderly flight. Many +perished in their huts while half asleep, many were trampled to death in +the frenzied rush for the exits, while those who escaped the flames were +cut down unawares by the Numidians posted at the gates of the camp. + +Meanwhile in the Carthaginian camp the soldiers, aroused by the +sentries’ report of the fire in the other camp, and seeing how vast was +the volume of flame, rushed out of their own camp to assist in +extinguishing the fire, they also imagining it an accident and Scipio +seven miles distant. This was as Scipio had hoped and anticipated, and +he at once fell on the rabble, giving orders not to let a man escape to +give warning to the troops still in the camp. Instantly he followed up +this by launching his attack on the gates of the camp, which were +unguarded as a result of the confusion. + +By the cleverness of his plan in attacking Syphax’s camp first, he had +turned to advantage the fact that a number of the latter’s huts were +outside the ramparts and so easily accessible, and had created the +opportunity to force the gates of the better protected Carthaginian +camp. + +The first troops inside set fire to the nearest huts, and soon the whole +camp was aflame, the same scenes of confusion and destruction being here +repeated, and those who escaped through the gates meeting their fate at +the hands of Roman parties posted for the purpose. “Hasdrubal at once +desisted from any attempt to extinguish the fire, as he knew now from +what had befallen him that the calamity which had overtaken the +Numidians also was not, as they had supposed, the result of chance, but +was due to the initiative and daring of the enemy.” He therefore forced +his way out and escaped, along with only two thousand foot and five +hundred horsemen, half-armed and many wounded or scorched. With this +small force he took refuge in a near-by town, but when Scipio’s pursuing +troops came up, and seeing that the inhabitants were disaffected, he +resumed his flight to Carthage. Syphax who had also escaped, probably +with a larger proportion, retired to a fortified position at Abba, a +town quite close. + +The armies of Sennacherib had not suffered a swifter, more unexpected, +or more complete fate than those of Hasdrubal and Syphax. According to +Livy forty thousand men were either slain or destroyed by the flames, +and about five thousand were captured, including many Carthaginian +nobles. As a spectacle of disaster it surpasses any in history. +Polybius, who presumably got his information from Lælius and other +eye-witnesses, thus describes it: “The whole place was filled with +wailing and confused cries, panic, fear, strange noises, and above all +raging fire and flames that overbore all resistance, things any one of +which would be sufficient to strike terror into a human heart, and how +much more this extraordinary combination of them all. It is not possible +to find any other disaster which however magnified could be compared +with this, so much did it exceed in horror all previous events. +Therefore of all the brilliant exploits performed by Scipio this seems +to me the most brilliant and most adventurous....” + +In Carthage the news caused great alarm and anxiety—Hasdrubal’s purpose +in retreating there had been to allay the panic and forestall any +capitulation. His presence and his resolute spirit was needed. The +Carthaginians had expected with the spring campaign to find their armies +shutting in Scipio on the cape near Utica, cutting him off by land and +sea. Finding the tables so dramatically turned, they swung from +confidence to extreme despondency. At an emergency debate in the Senate +three different opinions were put forward: to send envoys to Scipio to +treat for peace; to recall Hannibal; to raise fresh levies and urge +Syphax to renew the struggle in co-operation with them. The influence of +Hasdrubal, combined with that of all the Barcine party, carried the day, +and the last policy was adopted. It is worth a passing note, in view of +the charge of ultra-Roman prejudice often made against Livy, that he +speaks with obvious admiration of this third motion which “breathed the +spirit of Roman constancy in adversity.” + +Syphax and his Numidians had at first decided to continue their retreat +and, abandoning the war, retire to their own country, but three +influences caused them to change their minds. These were the pleadings +of Sophonisba to Syphax not to desert her father and his people, the +prompt arrival of the envoys from Carthage, and the arrival of a body of +over four thousand Celtiberian mercenaries from Spain—whose numbers were +exaggerated by popular rumour, doubtless inspired by the war party, to +ten thousand. Accordingly Syphax gave the envoys a message that he would +co-operate with Hasdrubal, and showed them the first reinforcement of +fresh Numidian levies who had arrived. By energetic recruiting Hasdrubal +and Syphax were able to take the field again within thirty days, joining +forces, and entrenched a camp on the Great Plain. Their strength is put +as between thirty and thirty-five thousand fighting men. + +Scipio, after his dispersion of the enemy’s field forces in the recent +surprise, had turned his attention to the siege of Utica, in order to +gain the secure base which he wanted as a prelude to further operations. +It is evident that he intentionally refrained from pressing the retreat +of Syphax, for such pressure by forcing the latter to fight would tend +to pour fresh fuel on a fire that was flickering out of itself. The +ground for such a hope we have already shown, as also the factors which +caused its disappointment. Polybius gives us a valuable sidelight at +this juncture on Scipio’s care and forethought for his troops—“He also +at the same time distributed the booty, but expelled the merchants who +were making too good an affair of it; for as their recent success had +made them form a rosy picture of the future, the soldiers attached no +value to their actual booty, and were very ready to dispose of it for a +song to the merchants.” + +When the news reached Scipio of the junction of the Carthaginian and +Numidian forces and of their approach, he acted promptly. Leaving only a +small detachment to keep up the appearance of a siege by land and sea, +he set out to meet the enemy, his whole force being in light marching +order—he evidently judged that rapidity was the key to this fresh +menace, to strike before they could weld their new force into a strong +weapon. On the fifth day he reached the Great Plain, and fortified a +camp on a hill some three and a half miles distant from the enemy’s +camp. The two following days he advanced his forces, harassing the +enemy’s outposts, in order to tempt them out to battle. The bait +succeeded on the third day, and the enemy’s combined army came out of +their camp and drew up in order of battle. They placed the Celtiberians, +their picked troops, in the centre, the Numidians on the left, and the +Carthaginians on the right. “Scipio simply followed the usual Roman +practice of placing the maniples of _hastati_ in front, behind them the +_principes_, and hindmost of all the _triarii_.” He disposed his Italian +cavalry on his right, facing Syphax’s Numidians, and Masinissa’s +Numidians on his left, facing the Carthaginian horse. At the first +encounter the enemy’s wings were broken by the Italian and Masinissa’s +cavalry. Scipio’s rapidity of march and foresight in striking before +Hasdrubal and Syphax had consolidated their raw levies was abundantly +justified. Moreover, on one side moral was heightened by recent success, +and on the other lowered by recent disaster. + +In the centre the Celtiberians fought staunchly, knowing that flight was +useless, because of their ignorance of the country, and that surrender +was futile, because of their treason in coming from Spain to take +service against the Romans. It would appear that Scipio used his second +and third lines—the _principes_ and _triarii_—as a mobile reserve to +attack the Celtiberians’ flanks, instead of to reinforce the _hastati_ +directly, as was the normal custom. Thus surrounded on all sides the +Celtiberians were cut to pieces where they stood, though only after an +obstinate resistance, which enabled the commanders, Hasdrubal and +Syphax, as well as a good number of the fugitives, to make their escape. +Hasdrubal with his Carthaginian survivors found shelter in Carthage, and +Syphax with his cavalry retreated home to his own capital, Cirta. + +Night had put a stop to the scene of carnage, and next day Scipio sent +Masinissa and Lælius in pursuit of Syphax, while he himself cleared the +surrounding country, and occupied its strong places, as a preliminary to +a move on Carthage. Here fresh alarm had been caused, but the people +were more staunch in the hour of trial than is the tendency to regard +them. Few voices were raised in favour of peace, and energetic measures +were taken for resistance. The city was provisioned for a long siege, +and the work of strengthening and enlarging the fortifications was +pushed on. At the same time the Senate decided to send the fleet to +attack the Roman ships at Utica and attempt to raise the siege, and as a +further step the recall of Hannibal was decided on. + +Scipio, lightening his transport by the despatch of the booty to his +camp near Utica, had already reached and occupied Tunis, with little +opposition despite the strength of the place. Tunis was only some +fifteen miles from Carthage and could be clearly seen, and as Polybius +tells us of Scipio, “this he thought would be a most effective means of +striking the Carthaginians with terror and dismay”—the moral objective +again. + +Hardly had he completed this “bound,” however, before his sentries +sighted the Carthaginian fleet sailing past the place. He realised what +their plan was and also the danger, knowing that his own ships, burdened +with siege machines or converted into transports, were unprepared for a +naval battle. Unhesitatingly, he made his decision to stave off the +threat, and made a forced march back to Utica. There was no time to +clear his ships for action, and so he hit on the plan of anchoring the +warships close inshore, and protecting them by a four-deep row of +transports lashed together as a floating wall. He also laid planks from +one to the other, to enable the free movement of troops, leaving narrow +intervals for small patrol-boats to pass in and out under these bridges. +He then put on board the transports a thousand picked men with a very +high proportion of weapons, particularly missiles—an interesting point +in foreshadowing the modern doctrine of using increased fire-power in +defence to replace man-power. + +These emergency measures were completed before the enemy’s attack came, +thanks first to the slow sailing of the Carthaginian fleet, and their +further delay in offering battle in the open sea. Thus they were forced +to sail in against the Romans’ unexpected type of formation, like ships +attacking a wall. Their weight of numbers, too, was partly discounted by +the fact of the transports being higher out of the water, so that the +Carthaginians had to throw their weapons upwards, and the Romans, +conversely, gained additional impetus and better aim through casting +their missiles from a superior height. But the device of sending +patrol-boats and light craft out through the intervals to harass the +Carthaginian ships—a device obviously adapted by Scipio from military +tactics—failed of its effect, and proved an actual handicap to the +defence. For when they went out to harass the approaching warships they +were run down by the mere momentum and bulk of the latter, and in the +later stages became so intermingled with the Carthaginian ships as to +mask the fire of the troops on the transports. + +Beaten off in their direct assaults, the Carthaginians tried a new +measure, throwing long beams with iron hooks at the end on to the Roman +transports, these beams being secured by chains to their own vessels. By +this means the fastenings were broken, and a number of transports +dragged away, the troops manning them having barely time to leap on to +the second line of ships. Only one line had been broken, and the +opposition had been so severe that the Carthaginians contented +themselves with this limited success, and sailed back to Carthage. They +towed away six captured transports, though doubtless more were broken +adrift and lost by the Romans. + +[Illustration: Africa: The Territory of Carthage.] + +Baulked in this quarter, the Carthaginians’ hopes were shattered in +another, for the pursuing force sent by Scipio after Syphax had +fulfilled its object and finally cut away this prop of Carthaginian +power in Africa. The success went still further, as it gained for Scipio +that Numidian source of man-power which he had so long schemed for, and +which he needed to build up his forces to an adequate strength for his +decisive blow. + +Following up Syphax, Lælius and Masinissa arrived in Massylia +(Masinissa’s hereditary kingdom from which he had been driven) after a +fifteen days’ march, and there expelled the garrisons left by Syphax. +The latter had fallen back farther east to his own dominions, +Massæsylia—modern Algeria,—and there, spurred on by his wife, raised a +fresh force from the abundant resources of his kingdom. He proceeded to +organise them on the Roman model, imagining, like so many military +copyists in history, that imitation of externals gave him the secret of +the Roman success. His force was large enough—as large, in fact, as his +original strength,—but it was utterly raw and undisciplined. With this +he advanced to meet Lælius and Masinissa. At the first encounter between +the opposing cavalry, numerical superiority told, but the advantage was +lost when the Roman infantry reinforced the intervals of their cavalry, +and before long the raw troops broke and fled. The victory was +essentially one due to superior training and discipline, and not to any +subtle manœuvre such as appears in all Scipio’s battles. This is worth +note in view of the fact that some historians lose no opportunity of +hinting that Scipio’s success was due more to his able lieutenants than +to himself. + +Syphax, seeing his force crumbling, sought to shame his men into +resistance by riding forward and exposing himself to danger. In this +gallant attempt he was unhorsed, made prisoner, and dragged into the +presence of Lælius. As Livy remarks, this was “a spectacle calculated to +afford peculiar satisfaction to Masinissa.” The latter showed fine +military spirit as well as judgment after the battle, when he declared +to Lælius that, much as he would like to visit his regained kingdom, “it +was not proper in prosperity any more than in adversity to lose time.” +He therefore asked permission to push on with the cavalry to Cirta, +Syphax’s capital, while Lælius followed with the infantry. Having won +Lælius’s assent, Masinissa advanced, taking Syphax with him. On arrival +in front of Cirta, he summoned the principal inhabitants to appear, but +they refused until he showed them Syphax in chains, whereupon the +faint-hearted threw open the gates. Masinissa, posting guards, galloped +off to seize the palace, and was met by Sophonisba. This woman, almost +as famous as Helen or Cleopatra for her beauty and for her disastrous +influence, made such a clever appeal to his pride, his pity, and his +passion, that she not only won his pledge not to hand her over to the +Romans, but “as the Numidians are an excessively amorous race, he became +the slave of his captive.” When she had withdrawn, and he had to face +the problem of how to reconcile his duty with his pledge, his passion +suggested to him a loophole—to marry her himself that very day. When +Lælius came up he was so annoyed that at first he was on the point of +having her dragged from the marriage-bed and sent with the other +captives to the Utica camp, but afterwards relented, agreeing to leave +the decision to Scipio. The two then set to work on the reduction of the +remaining towns in Numidia, which were still garrisoned by the troops of +Syphax. + +When the captives arrived at Scipio’s camp, Syphax himself in chains at +their head, the troops poured out to see the spectacle. What a contrast +with a few years back! Now, a captive in chains; then, a powerful ruler +who held the balance of power, for whose friendship Scipio and Hasdrubal +vied on their simultaneous visits, both placing themselves in his power, +so highly did they assess the prize at stake. + +This thought evidently passed through Scipio’s mind, the recollection, +too, of their quondam friendship, and moved him to sympathy. He +questioned Syphax as to the motives that had led him to break his pledge +of alliance with the Romans and make war on them unprovoked. Syphax, +gaining confidence from Scipio’s manner, replied that he had been mad to +do so, but that taking up arms was only the consummation of his frenzy, +and not its beginning, which dated from his marriage to Sophonisba. +“That fury and pest” had fascinated and blinded him to his undoing. But +ruined and fallen as he was, he declared that he gained some consolation +from seeing her fatal lures transferred to his greatest enemy. + +These words caused Scipio great anxiety, for he appreciated both her +influence and the menace to the Roman plans from Masinissa’s hasty +wedding. She had detached one passionate Numidian; she might well lead +astray another. When Lælius and Masinissa arrived shortly after, Scipio +showed no signs of his feelings in his public greeting, praising both in +the highest terms for their work. But as soon as possible he took +Masinissa aside privately. His talk with the delinquent was a +masterpiece of tact and psychological appeal. “I suppose, Masinissa, +that it was because you saw in me some good qualities that you first +came to me when in Spain for the purpose of forming a friendship with +me, and that afterwards in Africa you committed yourself and all your +hopes to my protection. But of all those virtues, which made me seem +worthy of your regard, there is none of which I am so proud as +temperance and control of my passions.” Then pointing out the dangers +caused by want of self-control, he continued: “I have mentioned with +delight, and I remember with pleasure, the instances of fortitude and +courage you displayed in my absence. As to other matters, I would rather +that you should reflect on them in private, than that I should cause you +to blush by reciting them.” Then, with a final call to Masinissa’s sense +of duty, he dismissed him. Where reproaches might have stiffened +Masinissa, such a friendly appeal broke him down, and bursting into +tears, he retired to his own tent. Here, after a prolonged inward +struggle, he sent for a confidential servant, and ordered him to mix +some poison in a cup and carry it to Sophonisba, with the message that +“Masinissa would gladly have fulfilled the first obligation which as a +husband he owed to her, his wife; but as those who had the power had +deprived him of the exercise of those rights, he now performed his +second promise—that she should not come alive into the power of the +Romans.” When the servant came to Sophonisba she said, “I accept this +nuptial present; nor is it an unwelcome one, if my husband can render me +no better service. Tell him, however, that I should have died with +greater satisfaction had I not married so near on my death.” Then, +calmly and without a quiver, she took and drained the cup. + +As soon as Scipio heard the news, fearing that the high-spirited young +man, when so distraught, might take some desperate step, “he immediately +sent for him, and at one time endeavoured to solace him, at another +gently rebuked him for trying to expiate one rash act with another, and +making the affair more tragical than was necessary.” + +Next day Scipio sought to erase this grief from Masinissa’s mind by a +well-calculated appeal to his ambition and pride. Summoning an assembly, +he first saluted Masinissa by the title of king, speaking in the highest +terms of his achievements, and then presented him with a golden goblet, +an ivory sceptre, a curule chair, and other symbols of honour. “He +increased the honour by observing that among the Romans there was +nothing more magnificent than a ‘triumph,’ and that those who received +the reward of a ‘triumph’ were not invested with more splendid ornaments +than those of which the Roman people considered Masinissa alone, of all +foreigners, worthy.” This action, and the encouragement to his dreams of +becoming master of all Numidia, had the desired effect, and Masinissa +speedily forgot his private sorrows in his public distinction. Lælius, +whom Scipio had been careful to praise similarly and reward, was then +sent with Syphax and the other captives back to Rome. + + + + + CHAPTER X. + A VIOLATED PEACE. + + +His political base in Africa secured, Scipio moved back to Tunis, and +this time the moral threat, strengthened by recent events, was +successful. It tilted the scales against the war party, and the +Carthaginians sent thirty of their principal elders—the Council of +Elders being superior even to the Senate—to beg for terms of peace. +According to Livy, they prostrated themselves in Eastern manner on +entering Scipio’s presence, and their pleas showed equal humility. They +implored pardon for their State, saying that it had been twice brought +to the brink of ruin by the rashness of its citizens, and they hoped it +would again owe its safety to the indulgence of its enemies. This hope +was based on their knowledge that the Roman people’s aim was dominion, +and not destruction, and they declared that they would accept whatever +terms he saw fit to grant. Scipio replied “that he had come to Africa +with the hope, which had been increased by his success, that he should +carry home victory and not terms of peace. Still, though he had victory +in a manner within his grasp, he would not refuse accommodation, that +all the nations might know that the Roman people both undertake and +conclude wars with justice.” + +The terms which he laid down were: the restoration of all prisoners and +deserters, the withdrawal of the Carthaginian armies from Italy and Gaul +and all the Mediterranean islands, the giving up of all claim to Spain, +the surrender of all their warships except twenty. A considerable, but +not heavy, indemnity in grain and money was also demanded. He gave them +three days’ grace to decide whether to accept these terms, adding that +if they accepted they were to make a truce with him and send envoys to +the Senate at Rome. + +The moderation of these terms is remarkable, especially considering +the completeness of Scipio’s military success. It is a testimony not +only to Scipio’s greatness of soul, but to his transcendent political +vision. Viewed in conjunction with his similar moderation after Zama, +it is not too much to say that Scipio had a clear grasp of what is +just dawning on the mind of the world to-day—that the true national +object in war, as in peace, is a more perfect peace. War is the result +of a menace to this policy, and is undertaken in order to remove the +menace, and by the subjugation of the will of the hostile State “to +change this adverse will into a compliance with our own policy, and +the sooner and more cheaply in lives and in money we can do this, the +better chance is there of a continuance of national prosperity in the +widest sense. The aim of a nation in war is, therefore, to subdue the +enemy’s will to resist with the least possible human and economic loss +to itself.”[4] The lesson of history, of very recent history moreover, +enables us to deduce this axiom, that “A military victory is not in +itself equivalent to success in war.”[5] Further, as regards the peace +terms, “the contract must be reasonable; for to compel a beaten foe to +agree to terms which cannot be fulfilled is to sow the seeds of a war +which one day will be declared in order to cancel the contract.”[6] +There is only one alternative—annihilation. Mommsen’s comment on +Scipio’s moderation over these terms is that they “seemed so +singularly favourable to Carthage, that the question obtrudes itself +whether they were offered by Scipio more in his own interest or in +that of Rome.” A self-centred seeker after popularity would surely +have prolonged the war to end it with a spectacular military decision, +rather than accept the paler glory of a peace by agreement. But +Mommsen’s insinuation, as also his judgment, is contradicted by +Scipio’s similar moderation after Zama, despite the extreme +provocation of a broken treaty. + +These terms the Carthaginians accepted, and complied with the first +provision by sending envoys to Scipio to conclude a truce and also to +Rome to ask for peace, the latter taking with them a few prisoners and +deserters, as a diplomatic promissory note. But the war party had again +prevailed, and though ready to accept the peace negotiations as a cloak +and a means of gaining time, they sent an urgent summons to Hannibal and +Mago to return to Africa. The latter was not destined to see his +homeland, for wounded just previously in an indecisive battle, he died +of his injuries as his fleet of transports was passing Sardinia. + +Hannibal, anticipating such a recall, had already prepared ships and +withdrawn the main strength of his army to the port, keeping only his +worst troops as garrisons for the Bruttian towns. It is said that no +exile leaving his own land ever showed deeper sorrow than Hannibal on +quitting the land of his enemies, and that he cursed himself that he had +not led his troops on Rome when fresh from the victory of Cannæ. +“Scipio,” he said, “who had not looked at a Carthaginian enemy in Italy, +had dared to go and attack Carthage, while he, after slaying a hundred +thousand men at Trasimene and Cannæ, had suffered his strength to wear +away around Casilinum, Cannæ, and Nola.” + +The news of his departure was received in Rome with mingled joy and +apprehension, for the commanders in southern Italy had been ordered by +the Senate to keep Hannibal in play, and so fix him while Scipio was +securing the decision in Africa. Now, they felt that his presence in +Carthage might rekindle the dying embers of the war and endanger Scipio, +on whose single army the whole weight of the war would fall. + +On the arrival of Lælius in Rome, amid uproarious scenes of jubilation, +the Senate had decided that he should remain there until the +Carthaginians’ envoys arrived. With the envoys of Masinissa mutual +congratulations were exchanged, and the Senate not only confirmed him in +the title of King conferred by Scipio, but presented him by proxy with +further presents of honour and the military trappings usually provided +for a consul. They also acceded to his request to release their Numidian +captives, a politic step by which he hoped to strengthen his hold on his +countrymen. + +When the envoys from Carthage arrived, they addressed the Senate in +terms similar to those they had used to Scipio, putting the whole blame +on Hannibal, and arguing that so far as Carthage was concerned the peace +which closed the First Punic War remained unbroken. This being so they +craved to continue the same peace terms. A debate followed in the +Senate, which revealed a wide conflict of opinion, some advocating that +no decision should be taken without the advice of Scipio, others that +the war should at once be renewed, as Hannibal’s departure suggested +that the request for peace was a subterfuge. Lælius, called on for his +opinion, said that Scipio had grounded his hopes of effecting a peace on +the assurance that Hannibal and Mago would not be recalled from Italy. +The Senate failed to come to a definite decision, and the debate was +adjourned, though it would appear from Polybius that it was renewed +later, and a settlement reached. + +Meanwhile, however, the war had already restarted in Africa by a +violation of the truce. While the embassy was on its way to Rome, fresh +reinforcements and stores had been sent from Sardinia and Sicily to +Scipio. The former arrived safely, but the convoy of two hundred +transports from Sicily encountered a freshening gale when almost within +sight of Africa, and though the warships struggled into harbour, the +transports were blown towards Carthage; the greater part to the island +of Ægimurus—thirty miles distant at the mouth of the Bay of +Carthage,—and the rest were driven on to the shore near the city. The +sight caused great popular excitement, the people clamouring that such +immense booty should not be missed. At a hasty assembly, into which the +mob penetrated, it was agreed that Hasdrubal should cross over to +Ægimurus with a fleet and seize the transports. After they had been +brought in, those that had been driven ashore near Carthage were +refloated and brought into harbour. + +Directly Scipio heard of this breach of the truce he despatched three +envoys to Carthage to take up the question of this incident, and also to +inform the Carthaginians that the Roman people had ratified the treaty; +for despatches had just arrived for Scipio with this news. The envoys, +after a strong speech of protest, delivered the message that while “the +Romans would be justified in inflicting punishment, they entreated them +in the name of the common fortune of mankind not to push the matter to +an issue, but rather let their folly afford a proof of the generosity of +the Romans.” The envoys then retired for the Senate to debate. +Resentment at the bold language of the envoys, reluctance to give up the +ships and their supplies, new confidence from Hannibal’s imminent help, +combined to turn the scales against the peace party. It was decided +simply to dismiss the envoys without a reply. The latter, who had barely +escaped from mob violence on arrival, requested an escort on their +return journey, and two triremes were assigned them. This fact gave some +of the leaders of the war party an idea whereby to detonate a fresh +explosion which should make the breach irreparable. They sent to +Hasdrubal, whose fleet was then anchored off the coast near Utica, to +have some ships lying in wait near the Roman camp to attack and sink the +envoys’ ship. Under orders, the commanders of the escort quitted the +Roman quinquereme when within sight of the Roman camp. Before it could +make the harbour it was attacked by three Carthaginian quadriremes +despatched for the purpose. The attempt to board her was beaten off, but +the crew, or rather the survivors, only saved themselves by running the +ship ashore. + +This dastardly action drove Scipio to renew operations for the final +trial of strength. An immediate move direct on Carthage was impossible, +for this would have meant a long siege, and to settle down to siege +operations in face of the imminent arrival of Hannibal, who might menace +his rear and cut his communications, would have been madness. Nor was +his own situation pleasant, for not only had he suffered the heavy loss +of the supplies and reinforcements from Sicily, but Masinissa was absent +with his own and part of the Roman force—ten cohorts. Immediately on the +conclusion of the provisional treaty Masinissa had set out for Numidia +to recover his own kingdom, and, with the assistance of the Romans, add +that of Syphax to it. + +When the truce was broken, Scipio sent urgent and repeated messages to +Masinissa, telling him to raise as strong a force as possible and rejoin +him with all speed. Then, having taken measures for the security of his +fleet, he deputed the command of the Roman base to his legate Bæbius, +and started on a march up the valley of the Bagradas, aiming to isolate +Carthage, and by cutting off all supplies and reinforcements from the +interior undermine its strength as a preliminary to its direct +subjugation—the principle of security once more. On his march, he no +longer consented to receive the submission of towns which offered to +surrender, but took them all by assault, and sold the inhabitants as +slaves—to show his anger and impress the moral of the Carthaginians’ +violation of the treaty. + +During this “approach” march—for such it was in fact if not in +semblance—the envoys returning from Rome reached the naval camp. Bæbius +at once despatched the Roman envoys to Scipio, but detained the +Carthaginians, who, hearing of what had befallen, were naturally +distressed as to their own fate. But Scipio, to his credit, refused to +avenge on them the maltreatment of his own envoys. “For, aware as he was +of the value attached by his own nation to keeping faith with +ambassadors, he took into consideration not so much the deserts of the +Carthaginians as the duty of the Romans. Therefore restraining his own +anger and the bitter resentment he felt, he did his best to preserve +‘the glorious record of our fathers,’ as the saying is.” He sent orders +to Bæbius to treat the Carthaginian envoys with all courtesy and send +them home. “The consequence was that he humiliated all the people of +Carthage and Hannibal himself, by thus requiting in ampler measure their +baseness by his generosity.” (Polybius.) + +In this act Scipio revealed his understanding of the ethical object in +war, and of its value. Chivalry governed by reason is an asset both in +war and in view of its sequel—peace. Sensible chivalry should not be +confounded with the quixotism of declining to use a strategical or +tactical advantage, of discarding the supreme moral weapon of surprise, +of treating war as if it were a match on the tennis court—such quixotism +as is typified by the burlesque of Fontenoy, “Gentlemen of France, fire +first.” This is merely stupid. So also is the traditional tendency to +regard the use of a new weapon as “hitting below the belt,” regardless +of whether it is inhuman or not in comparison with existing weapons. So +the Germans called the use of tanks an atrocity, and so did we term +gas—so also the mediæval knight spoke of firearms when they came to +interfere with his safe slaughter of unarmoured peasants. Yet the +proportion of combatants slain in any battle decreased as much when +firearms superseded the battleaxe and sword as when gas came to replace +shell and the bullet. This antagonism to new weapons is mere +conservatism, not chivalry. + +But chivalry, as in this example of Scipio’s, is both rational and +far-sighted, for it endows the side which shows it with a sense of +superiority, and the side which falls short with a sense of inferiority. +The advantage in the moral sphere reacts on the physical. + +If this chivalrous act of Scipio’s was partly the fruit of such +psychological calculation, it was clearly in accord also with his +natural character, for his attitude earlier in Spain shows that it was +no single theatrical gesture. Just as in war we cannot separate the +moral from the mental or physical spheres, so also in assessing +character. We cannot separate the nobility of Scipio’s moral conduct, +throughout his career, from the transcendent clearness of his mental +vision—they blended to form not only a great general but a great man. + +Some time before this, probably during the episode which broke the +truce, Hannibal had landed at Leptis—in what to-day is the Gulf of +Hammamet—with twenty-four thousand men, and had moved to Hadrumetum. +Stopping here[7] to refresh his troops, he sent an urgent appeal to the +Numidian chief Tychæus, who “was thought to have the best cavalry in +Africa,” to join him in saving the situation. He sought to play on the +fears of Tychæus, who was a relative of Syphax, by the argument that if +the Romans won he would risk losing his dominion, and his life too, +through Masinissa’s greed of power. As a result, Tychæus responded, and +came with a body of two thousand horse. This was a welcome accession, +for Hannibal had lost his old superiority in cavalry, his master-weapon. +In addition Hannibal could expect, and shortly received, the twelve +thousand troops of Mago’s force from Liguria, composed of Gauls who had +shown their fine quality in the last battle before the recall; also a +large body of new levies raised in Africa, whose quality would be less +assuring. Further—according to Livy,—four thousand Macedonians had +recently come to the aid of Carthage, sent by King Philip. + +Let this force once reach Carthage and be able to base its operations on +such a fortress, and source of reinforcement, and the situation would +turn strongly in favour of Hannibal. In contrast, Scipio had been robbed +of the bulk of his supplies and reinforcements, he was isolated on +hostile soil, part of his force was detached with Masinissa, and the +strength the latter could recruit was still uncertain. + +It is well to weigh these conditions, for they correct common but false +historical impressions. At this moment the odds were with Hannibal, and +the feeling in the rival capitals, as recorded by Livy and Polybius, is +a true reflection of the fact. + +Footnote 4: + + ‘Paris, or the Future of War,’ by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart. 1925. + +Footnote 5: + + ‘The Foundations of the Science of War,’ by Colonel J. F. C. Fuller. + 1926. + +Footnote 6: + + Ibid. + +Footnote 7: + + Livy says for a few days only, and Polybius is obscure on the point, + but the known factors suggest a longer stay, because of the inevitable + time required for the arrival of Tychæus’s cavalry, and the junction + with him of the other Carthaginian forces. + + + + + CHAPTER XI. + ZAMA. + + +Even at this critical juncture, jealousy of Scipio was rife in the Roman +Senate. His backing, as all through, came from the people, not from his +military rivals in the Senate. The consuls had done nothing to assist +Scipio’s campaign through fixing Hannibal in Italy, save that Servilius +advanced to the shore after Hannibal was safely away. But at the +beginning of the year when the allocation of the various provinces was +decided, according to custom, both consuls pressed for the province of +Africa, eager to reap the fruits of Scipio’s success and thus earn glory +cheaply. Metellus again tried to play the part of protecting deity. As a +result the consuls were ordered to make application to the tribunes for +the question to be put to the people to decide whom they wished to +conduct the war in Africa. All the tribes thereupon nominated Scipio. +Despite this emphatic popular verdict, the consuls drew lots for the +province of Africa, having persuaded the Senate to make a decree to this +effect. The lot fell to Tiberius Claudius, who was given an equal +command with Scipio, and an armada of fifty quinqueremes for his +expedition. Happily for Scipio, this jealousy-inspired move failed to +prevent him putting the coping-stone on his own work, for Claudius was +slow over his preparations, and when he eventually set out was caught in +a storm and driven to Sardinia. Thus he never reached Africa. + +Soon, too, as news of the changed situation in Africa filtered through, +Scipio’s detractors combined with the habitual pessimists in the +distillation of gloom. They recalled that “Quintus Fabius, recently +deceased, who had foretold how arduous the contest would be, had been +accustomed to predict that Hannibal would prove a more formidable enemy +in his own country than he had been in a foreign one; and that Scipio +would have to encounter not Syphax, a king of undisciplined barbarians +...; nor his father-in-law Hasdrubal, that most fugacious general”—a +Fabian libel on a man of undaunted spirit; “nor tumultuary armies +hastily collected out of a crowd of half-armed rustics, but Hannibal ... +who, having grown old in victory, had filled Spain, Gaul, and Italy with +monuments of his vast achievements; who commanded troops of equal length +of service; troops hardened by superhuman endurance; stained a thousand +times with Roman blood....” The tension in Rome was increased by the +past years of indecisive warfare, carried on languidly and apparently +endless, whereas now Scipio and Hannibal had stimulated the minds of all +as generals prepared for a final death-clinch. + +In Carthage the scales of public opinion appear to have been evenly +balanced, on the one hand gaining confidence from Hannibal’s +achievements and invincibility, on the other depressed by reflection on +Scipio’s repeated victories, and on the fact that through his sole +efforts they had lost their hold on Spain and Italy—as if he had been “a +general marked out by destiny, and born, for their destruction.” + +On the threshold of this final phase, the support, moral and material, +given to Hannibal by his country seems to have been, on balance, more +than that accorded to Scipio—one more nail in the coffin of a common +historical error. + +His situation, already discussed, was one to test the moral fibre of a +commander. Security lies often in calculated audacity, and an analysis +of the military problems makes it highly probable that his march inland +up the Bagradas valley was aimed, by its menace to the rich interior on +which Carthage depended for supplies, to force Hannibal to push west to +meet him instead of north to Carthage. By this clever move he threatened +the economic base of Carthage and protected his own, also luring +Hannibal away from his military base—Carthage. + +A complementary purpose was that this line of movement brought him +progressively nearer to Numidia, shortening the distance which Masinissa +would have to traverse with his expected reinforcement of strength. The +more one studies and reflects on this manœuvre, the more masterly does +it appear as a subtly blended fulfilment of the principles of war. + +It had the intended effect, for the Carthaginians sent urgent appeals to +Hannibal to advance towards Scipio and bring him to battle, and although +Hannibal replied that he would judge his own time, within a few days he +marched west from Hadrumetum, and arrived by forced marches at Zama. He +then sent out scouts to discover the Roman camp and its dispositions for +defence—it lay some miles farther west. Three of the scouts, or spies, +were captured, and when they were brought before Scipio he adopted a +highly novel method of treatment. “Scipio was so far from punishing +them, as is the usual practice, that on the contrary he ordered a +tribune to attend them and point out clearly to them the exact +arrangement of the camp. After this had been done he asked them if the +officer had explained everything to their satisfaction. When they +answered that he had done so, Scipio furnished them with provisions and +an escort, and told them to report carefully to Hannibal what had +happened to them” (Polybius). This superb insolence of Scipio’s was a +shrewd blow at the moral objective, calculated to impress on Hannibal +and his troops the utter confidence of the Romans, and correspondingly +give rise to doubts among themselves. This effect must have been still +further increased by the arrival next day of Masinissa with six thousand +foot and four thousand horse. Livy makes their arrival coincide with the +visit of the Carthaginian spies, and remarks that Hannibal received this +information, like the rest, with no feelings of joy. + +The sequel to this incident of the scouts has a human interest of an +unusual kind. “On their return, Hannibal was so much struck with +admiration of Scipio’s magnanimity and daring, that he conceived ... a +strong desire to meet him and converse with him. Having decided on this +he sent a herald saying that he desired to discuss the whole situation +with him, and Scipio, on receiving the herald’s message, accepted and +said that he would send to Hannibal, fixing a place and hour for the +interview. He then broke up his camp and moved to a fresh site not far +from the town of Narragara, his position being well chosen tactically, +and having water ‘within a javelin’s throw.’ He then sent to Hannibal a +message that he was now ready for the meeting. Hannibal also moved his +camp forward to meet him, occupying a hill safe and convenient in every +respect except that he was rather too far away from water, and his men +suffered considerable hardship as a result.” It looks as if Scipio had +scored the first trick in the battle of wits between the rival captains! +The second trick also, because he ensured a battle in the open plain, +where his advantage in cavalry could gain its full value. He was ready +to trump Hannibal’s master-card. + +On the following day both generals came out of their camps with a small +armed escort, and then, leaving these behind at an equal distance, met +each other alone, except that each was attended by one interpreter. Livy +prefaces the account of the interview with the remark that here met “the +greatest generals not only of their own times, but of any to be found in +the records of preceding ages ...”—a verdict with which many students of +military history will be inclined to agree, and even to extend the scope +of the judgment another two thousand years. + +Hannibal first saluted Scipio and opened the conversation. The accounts +of his speech, as of Scipio’s, must be regarded as only giving its +general sense, and for this reason as also the slight divergences +between the different authorities may best be paraphrased, except for +some of the more striking phrases. Hannibal’s main point was the +uncertainty of fortune—which, after so often having victory almost +within his reach, now found him coming voluntarily to sue for peace. How +strange, too, the coincidence that it should have been Scipio’s father +whom he met in his first battle, and now he came to solicit peace from +the son! “Would that neither the Romans had ever coveted possessions +outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians outside Africa, for both had +suffered grievously.” However, the past could not be mended, the future +remained. Rome had seen the arms of an enemy at her very gates; now the +turn of Carthage had come. Could they not come to terms, rather than +fight it out to the bitter end? “I myself am ready to do so, as I have +learnt by actual experience how fickle Fortune is, and how by a slight +turn of the scale either way she brings about changes of the greatest +moment, as if she were sporting with little children. But I fear that +you, Publius, both because you are very young, and because success has +constantly attended you both in Spain and in Africa, and you have never +up to now at least fallen into the counter-current of Fortune, will not +be convinced by my words, however worthy of credit they may be.” Let +Scipio take warning by Hannibal’s own example. “What I was at Trasimene +and at Cannæ, that you are this day.” “And now here am I in Africa on +the point of negotiating with you, a Roman, for the safety of myself and +my country. Consider this, I beg you, and be not over-proud.” “... What +man of sense, I ask, would rush into such danger as confronts you now?” +The chance of a single hour might blot out all that Scipio had +achieved—let him remember the fate of Regulus, from whom likewise the +Carthaginians had sought peace on African soil. Hannibal then outlined +his peace proposals—that Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain should be +definitely given up to Rome, and Carthage confine her ambitions to +Africa. In conclusion he said that if Scipio felt a natural doubt as to +the sincerity of the proposals, after his recent experience, he should +remember that these came from Hannibal himself, the real power, who +would guarantee so to exert himself that no one should regret the peace. +Hannibal later was to prove both his sincerity and the truth of this +guarantee. But in the circumstances of the moment and of the past, +Scipio had good ground for doubt. + +To Hannibal’s overture he pointed out that it was easy to express regret +that the two powers had gone to war—but who had begun it? Had Hannibal +even proposed them before the Romans crossed to Africa, and voluntarily +retired from Italy, his proposals would almost certainly have been +accepted. Yet in spite of the utterly changed position, with the Romans +“in command of the open country,” Hannibal now proposed easier terms +than Carthage had already accepted in the broken treaty. All he offered, +in fact, was to give up territory which was already in Roman possession, +and had been for a long time. It was futile for him to submit such empty +concessions to Rome. If Hannibal would agree to the conditions of the +original treaty, and add compensation for the seizure of the transports +during the truce, and for the violence offered to the envoys, then he +would have something to lay before his council. Otherwise, “the question +must be decided by arms.” This brief speech is a gem of clear and +logical reasoning. Hannibal apparently made no advance on his former +proposals, and the conference therefore came to an end, the rival +commanders returning to their camps. + +Both sides recognised the issues that hung upon the morrow—“the +Carthaginians fighting for their own safety and the dominion of Africa, +and the Romans for the empire of the world. Is there any one who can +remain unmoved in reading the narrative of such an encounter? For it +would be impossible to find more valiant soldiers, or generals who had +been more successful and were more thoroughly experienced in the art of +war, nor indeed had Fortune ever offered to contending armies a more +splendid prize of victory” (Polybius). If the prize was great, so was +the price of defeat. For the Romans if beaten were isolated in the +interior of a foreign land, while the collapse of Carthage must follow +if the army that formed her last bulwark was beaten. These crucial +factors were stressed by the opposing commanders when next morning at +daybreak they led out their troops for the supreme trial, and had made +their dispositions. + +Scipio rode along the lines and addressed his men in a few appropriate +words. Polybius’s account, though necessarily but the substance and not +an exact record, is so in tune with Scipio’s character as to be worth +giving. “Bear in mind your past battles and fight like brave men worthy +of yourselves and of your country. Keep it before your eyes that if you +overcome your enemies not only will you be unquestioned masters of +Africa, but you will gain for yourselves and your country the undisputed +command and sovereignty of the rest of the world. But if the result of +the battle be otherwise, those who have fallen bravely in the fight will +be for ever shrouded in the glory of dying thus for their country, while +those who save themselves by flight will spend the remainder of their +lives in misery and disgrace. For no place in Africa will afford you +safety, and if you fall into the hands of the Carthaginians it is plain +enough to those who reflect what fate awaits you. May none of you, I +pray, live to experience that fate, now that Fortune offers us the most +glorious of prizes; how utterly craven, nay, how foolish shall we be, if +we reject the greatest of goods and choose the greatest of evils from +mere love of life. Go, therefore, to meet the foe with two objects +before you, either victory or death. For men animated by such a spirit +must always overcome their adversaries, since they go into battle ready +to throw their lives away.” Of this address Livy says “he delivered +these remarks with a body so erect, and with a countenance so full of +exultation, that one would have supposed that he had already conquered.” + +On the other side Hannibal ordered each commander of the foreign +mercenaries to address his own men, appealing to their greed for booty, +and bidding them be sure of victory from his presence and that of the +forces he had brought back. With the Carthaginian levies he ordered +their commanders to dwell on the sufferings of their wives and children +should the Romans conquer. Then to his own men he spoke personally, +reminding them of their seventeen years’ comradeship and invincibility, +of the victory of Trebia won over the father of the present Roman +general, of Trasimene and Cannæ—“battles with which the action in which +we are about to engage is not worthy of comparison.” Speaking thus, he +bade them cast their eyes on the opposing army and see for themselves +that the Romans were fewer in numbers, and further, only a fraction of +the forces they had conquered in Italy. + +The dispositions made by the rival leaders have several features of +note. Scipio placed his heavy Roman foot—he had probably two legions—in +the centre; Lælius with the Italian cavalry on the left wing, and on the +right wing Masinissa with the whole of the Numidians, horse and foot, +the latter presumably prolonging the centre and the cavalry on their +outer flank. + +The heavy infantry were drawn up in the normal three lines, first the +_hastati_, then the _principes_, and finally the _triarii_. But instead +of adopting the usual chequer formation, with the maniples of the second +line opposite to and covering the intervals between the maniples of the +first line, he ranged the maniples forming the rear lines directly +behind the respective maniples of the first line. Thus he formed wide +lanes between each cohort—which was primarily composed of one maniple of +_hastati_, one of _principes_, and one of _triarii_. + +[Illustration: Battle of Zama, with Hannibal’s forces facing northwest +and Scipio’s facing southeast.] + +His object was twofold: on the one hand, to provide an antidote to the +menace of Hannibal’s war elephants and to guard against the danger that +their onset might throw his ranks into disorder; on the other, to oil +the working of his own machine by facilitating the sallies and +retirements of his skirmishers. These _velites_ he placed in the +intervals in the first line, ordering them to open the action, and if +they were forced back by the charge of the elephants, to retire. Even +this withdrawal he governed by special instructions, ordering those who +had time to fall back by the straight passages and pass right to the +rear of the army, and those who were overtaken to turn right or left as +soon as they passed the first line, and make their way along the lateral +lanes between the lines. This wise provision economised life, ensured +smooth functioning, and increased the offensive power—a true fulfilment +of economy of force. It may even be termed the origin of modern extended +order, for its object was the same—to negative the effect of the enemy’s +projectiles by creating empty intervals, a reduction of the target by +dispersion, the only difference being that Hannibal’s projectiles were +animal, not mineral. + +The Carthaginian had eighty elephants, more than in any previous battle, +and in order to terrify the enemy he placed them in front of his line. +Supporting them, in the first line, were the Ligurian and Gallic +mercenaries intermixed with Balearic and Moorish light troops. These +were the troops with whom Mago had sailed home, about twelve thousand in +number, and it is a common historical mistake to regard the whole force +as composed of light troops. + +In the second line Hannibal placed the Carthaginian and African levies +as well as the Macedonian force, their combined strength probably +exceeding that of the first line. Finally Hannibal’s own troops formed +the third line, held back more than two hundred yards distant from the +others, in order evidently to keep it as an intact reserve, and lessen +the risk of it becoming entangled in the mêlée before the commander +intended. On the wings Hannibal disposed his cavalry, the Numidian +allies on the left and the Carthaginian horse on the right. His total +force was probably in excess of fifty thousand, perhaps fifty-five +thousand. The Roman strength is less certain, but if we assume that each +of Scipio’s two legions was duplicated by an equal body of Italian +allies, and add Masinissa’s ten thousand, the complete strength would be +about thirty-six thousand if the legions were at full strength. It was +probably less, because some wastage must have occurred during the +earlier operations since quitting his base. + +_The First Phase._—The battle opened, after preliminary skirmishing +between the Numidian horse, with Hannibal’s orders to the drivers of the +elephants to charge the Roman line. Scipio promptly trumped his +opponent’s ace, by a tremendous blare of trumpets and cornets along the +whole line. The strident clamour so startled and terrified the elephants +that many of them at once turned tail and rushed back on their own +troops. This was especially the case on the left wing, where they threw +the Numidians, Hannibal’s best cavalry wing, into disorder just as they +were advancing to the attack. Masinissa seized this golden opportunity +to launch a counter-stroke, which inevitably overthrew the disorganised +opponents. With Masinissa in hot pursuit, they were driven from the +field, and so left the Carthaginian left wing exposed. + +The remainder of the elephants wrought much havoc among Scipio’s +_velites_, caught by their charge in front of the Roman line. But the +foresight that had provided the “lanes” and laid down the method of +withdrawal was justified by its results. For the elephants took the line +of least resistance, penetrating into the lanes rather than face the +firm-knit ranks of the heavy infantry maniples. Once in these lanes the +_velites_ who had retired into the lateral passages, between the fines, +bombarded them with darts from both sides. Their reception was far too +warm for them to linger when the door of escape was held wide open. +While some of the elephants rushed right through, harmlessly, and out to +the open in rear of the Roman army, others were driven back out of the +lanes and fled towards the Carthaginian right wing. Here the Roman +cavalry received them with a shower of javelins, while the Carthaginian +cavalry could not follow suit, so that the elephants naturally trended +towards the least unpleasant side. “It was at this moment that Lælius, +availing himself of the disturbance created by the elephants, charged +the Carthaginian cavalry and forced them to headlong flight. He pressed +the pursuit closely, as likewise did Masinissa.” Both Hannibal’s flanks +were thus stripped bare. The decisive manœuvre of Cannæ was repeated, +but reversed. + +Scipio was certainly an artist in tactical “boomerangs,” as at Ilipa so +now at Zama his foresight and art turned the enemy’s best weapon back +upon themselves. How decisive might have been the charge of the +elephants is shown by the havoc they wrought at the outset among the +_velites_. + +_The Second Phase._—In the meantime the infantry of both armies had +“slowly and in imposing array advanced on each other,” except that +Hannibal kept his own troops back in their original position. Raising +the Roman war-cry on one side, polyglot shouts on the other—this vocal +discord was a moral drawback,—the lines met. At first the Gauls and +Ligurians had the balance of advantage, through their personal skill in +skirmishing and more rapid movement. But the Roman line remained +unbroken, and the weight of their compact formation pushed the enemy +back despite losses. Another factor told, for while the leading Romans +were encouraged by the shouts from the rear lines, coming on to back +them up, Hannibal’s second line—the Carthaginians—failed to support the +Gauls, but hung back in order to keep their ranks firm. Forced steadily +back, and feeling they had been left in the lurch by their own side, the +Gauls turned about and fled. When they tried to seek shelter in the +second line, they were repulsed by the Carthaginians, who, with +apparently sound yet perhaps unwise military instinct, deemed it +essential to avoid any disarray which might enable the Romans to +penetrate their line. Exasperated and now demoralised, many of the Gauls +tried to force an opening in the Carthaginian ranks, but the latter +showed that their courage was not deficient and drove them off. In a +short time the relics of the first line had dispersed completely, or +disappeared round the flanks of the second line. The latter confirmed +their fighting quality by thrusting back the Roman first line—the +_hastati_—also. In this they were helped by a human obstacle, the ground +encumbered with corpses and slippery with blood, which disordered the +ranks of the attacking Romans. Even the _principes_ had begun to waver +when they saw the first line driven back so decisively, but their +officers rallied them and led them forward in the nick of time to +restore the situation. This reinforcement was decisive. Hemmed in, +because the Roman formation produced a longer frontage and so overlapped +the Carthaginian line, the latter was steadily cut to pieces. The +survivors fled back on the relatively distant third line, but Hannibal +continued his policy of refusing to allow the fugitives to mix with and +disturb an ordered line. He ordered the foremost ranks of his “Old +Guard” to lower their spears as a barrier against them, and they were +forced to retreat towards the flanks and the open ground beyond. + +_The Third Phase._—The curtain now rose on what was practically a fresh +battle. The Romans “had penetrated to their real antagonists, men equal +to them in the nature of their arms, in their experience of war, in the +fame of their achievements....” Livy’s tribute is borne out by the +fierceness and the for long uncertain issue of the subsequent conflict, +which gives the lie to those who pretend that Hannibal’s “Old Guard” was +but a shadow of its former power in the days of Trasimene and Cannæ. + +The Romans had the moral advantage of having routed two successive +lines, as well as the cavalry and elephants, but they had now to face a +compact and fresh body of twenty-four thousand veterans, under the +direct inspiration of Hannibal. And no man in history has shown a more +dynamic personality in infusing his own determination in his troops. + +The Romans, too, had at last a numerical advantage, not large, +however—Polybius says that the forces were “nearly equal in +numbers,”—and in reality still less than it appeared. For, while all +Hannibal’s third line were fresh, on Scipio’s side only the _triarii_ +had not been engaged, and these represented but half the strength of the +_hastati_ or _principes_. Further, the _velites_ had been so badly +mauled that they had to be relegated to the reserve, and the cavalry +were off the field, engaged in the pursuit. Thus it is improbable that +Scipio had at his disposal for this final blow more than eighteen or +twenty thousand infantry, less the casualties these had already +suffered. + +His next step is characteristic of the man—of his cool calculation even +in the heart of a battle crisis. Confronted by this gigantic human +wall—such the Carthaginians would appear in phalanx,—he sounds the +recall to his leading troops, and it is a testimony to their discipline +that they respond like a well-trained pack of hounds. Then in face of an +enemy hardly more than a bow-shot distant he not only reorganises his +troops but reconstructs his dispositions! His problem was this—against +the first two enemy lines the Roman formation, shallower than the +Carthaginian phalanx and with intervals, had occupied a wider frontage +and so enabled him to overlap theirs. Now, against a body double the +strength, his frontage was no longer, and perhaps less than Hannibal’s. +His appreciation evidently took in this factor, and with it two others. +First, that in order to concentrate his missile shock power for the +final effort it would be wise to make his line as solid as possible, and +this could be done because there was no longer need or advantage for +retaining intervals between the maniples. Second, that as his cavalry +would be returning any moment, there was no advantage in keeping the +orthodox formation in depth and using the _principes_ and _triarii_ as a +direct support and reinforcement to his front line. The blow should be +as concentrated as possible in time and as wide as possible in striking +force, rather than a series of efforts. We see him, therefore, making +his _hastati_ close up to form a compact centre without intervals. Then +similarly he closes each half of his _principes_ and _triarii_ outwards, +and advances them to extend the flank on either wing. The order from +right to left of his now continuous line would thus be half the +_triarii_, half the _principes_, the _hastati_, the other half of the +_principes_, the other half of the _triarii_. He now once more overlaps +the hostile front. To British readers this novel formation of Scipio’s, +inspired by a flash of genius in the middle of a momentous conflict, +should have a special interest. For here is born the “line” which the +Peninsular War and Waterloo have made immortal, here Scipio anticipated +Wellington by two thousand years in revealing the truth that the long +shallow line is the formation which allows of the greatest volume of +fire, which fulfils the law of economy of force by bringing into play +the fire—whether bullets or javelins—of the greatest possible proportion +of the force. The rôle of Scipio’s infantry in the final phase was to +fix Hannibal’s force ready for the decisive manœuvre to be delivered by +the cavalry. For this rôle violence and wideness of onslaught was more +important than sustenance. Scipio made his redistribution deliberately +and unhurriedly—the longer he could delay the final tussle the more time +he gained for the return of his cavalry. It is not unlikely that +Masinissa and Lælius pressed the pursuit rather too far, and so caused +an unnecessary strain on the Roman infantry and on Scipio’s plan. For +Polybius tells us that when the rival infantries met “the contest was +for long doubtful, the men falling where they stood out of +determination, until Masinissa and Lælius arrived providentially at the +proper moment.” Their charge, in the enemy’s rear, clinched the +decision, and though most of Hannibal’s men fought grimly to the end, +they were cut down in their ranks. Of those who took to flight few +escaped, nor did the earlier fugitives fare any better, for Scipio’s +cavalry swept the whole plain, and because of the wide expanse of level +country, found no obstacle to their searching pursuit. + +Polybius and Livy agree in putting the loss of the Carthaginians and +their allies at twenty thousand slain and almost as many captured. On +the other side, Polybius says that “more than fifteen hundred Romans +fell,” and Livy, that “of the victors as many as two thousand fell.” The +discrepancy is explained by the word “Romans,” for Livy’s total clearly +includes the allied troops. It is a common idea among historians that +these figures are an underestimate, and that in ancient battles the +tallies given always minimise the losses of the victor. Ardant du Picq, +a profound and experienced thinker, has shown the fallacy of these +cloistered historians. Even in battle to-day the defeated side suffers +its heaviest loss after the issue is decided, in what is practically the +massacre of unresisting or disorganised men. How much more must this +disproportion have occurred when bullets, still less machine-guns, did +not exist to take their initial toll of the victors. So long as +formations remained unbroken the loss of life was relatively small, but +when they were isolated or dissolved the massacre began. + +“Hannibal, slipping off during the confusion with a few horsemen, came +to Hadrumetum, not quitting the field till he had tried every expedient +both in the battle and before the engagement; having, according to the +admission of Scipio, acquired the fame of having handled his troops on +that day with singular judgment” (Livy). Polybius’s tribute is equally +ungrudging: “For, firstly, he had by his conference with Scipio +attempted to end the dispute by himself alone; showing thus that while +conscious of his former successes he mistrusted Fortune, and was fully +aware of the part that the unexpected plays in war. In the next place, +when he offered battle, he so managed matters that it was impossible for +any commander to make better dispositions for a contest against the +Romans than Hannibal did on that occasion. The order of a Roman force in +battle makes it very difficult to break through, for without any change +it enables every man individually and in common with his fellows to +present a front in any direction, the maniples which are nearest to the +danger turning themselves by a single movement to face it. Their arms +also give the men both protection and confidence, owing to the size of +the shield and owing to the sword being strong enough to endure repeated +blows.... But nevertheless to meet each of these assets Hannibal had +shown supreme skill in adopting ... all such measures as were in his +power and could reasonably be expected to succeed. For he had hastily +collected that large number of elephants, and had placed them in front +on the day of the battle in order to throw the enemy into confusion and +break his ranks. He had placed the mercenaries in advance with the +Carthaginians behind them, in order that the Romans before the final +engagement might be fatigued by their exertions, and that their swords +might lose their edge ... and also in order to compel the Carthaginians +thus hemmed in front and rear to stand fast and fight, in the words of +Homer: ‘That e’en the unwilling might be forced to fight.’ + +“The most efficient and steadfast of his troops he had held in rear at +an unusual distance in order that, anticipating and observing from afar +the course of the battle, they might with undiminished strength and +spirit influence the battle at the right moment. If he, who had never +yet suffered defeat, after taking every possible step to ensure victory, +yet failed to do so, we must pardon him. For there are times when +Fortune counteracts the plans of valiant men, and again at times, as the +proverb says, ‘A brave man meets another braver still,’ as we may say +happened in the case of Hannibal.” + +Using this proverb in the sense that Polybius clearly meant it, here in +a brief phrase is our verdict on the battle—a master of war had met a +greater master. Hannibal had no Flaminius or Varro to face. No longer +was a complacent target offered him by a Roman general, conservative and +ignorant of the “sublime part of war” like those who first met Hannibal +in Italy, unwilling recipients of his instructional course. At Zama he +faced a man whose vision had told him that in a cavalry superiority lay +the master-card of battle; whose diplomatic genius had led him long +since to convert, in spirit and in effect, Hannibal’s source of cavalry +to his own use; whose strategic skill had lured the enemy to a +battle-ground where this newly gained power could have full scope and +offset his own numerical weakness in the other arms. + +Rarely has any commander so ably illustrated the meaning of that +hackneyed phrase “gaining and retaining the initiative.” From the day +when Scipio had defied the opinion of Fabius, monument of orthodoxy, and +moved on Carthage instead of on the “main armed forces of the enemy,”[8] +he had kept the enemy dancing to his tune. Master in the mental sphere, +he had compassed their moral disintegration to pave the way for the +final act—their overthrow in the physical sphere. That this followed is +less remarkable than the manner of its execution. Scipio is almost +unique in that as a tactician he was as consummate an artist as in his +strategy. Of few of the great captains can it be said that their +tactical rivalled their strategical skill, or the reverse. Napoleon is +an illustration. But in battle as in the wider field Scipio achieved +that balance and blend of the mental, moral, and physical sphere which +distinguishes him in the roll of history. Thus it came about that on the +battlefield of Zama Scipio not only proved capable of countering each of +Hannibal’s points, but turned the latter’s own weapon back upon himself +to his mortal injury. Scan the records of time and we cannot find +another decisive battle where two great generals gave of their best. +Arbela, Cannæ, Pharsalus, Breitenfeld, Blenheim, Leuthen, Austerlitz, +Jena, Waterloo, Sedan—all were marred by fumbling or ignorance on one +side or the other. + +Footnote 8: + + Two thousand years later this is still the unshakable dogma of + orthodox military opinion, despite the hard lessons of 1914-18, when + the armies battered out their brains against the enemy’s strongest + bulwark. + + + + + CHAPTER XII. + AFTER ZAMA. + + +The completeness of the victory left no room for a strategic pursuit, +but Scipio did not linger in developing the moral exploitation of his +victory. “Concluding that he ought to bring before Carthage everything +which could increase the consternation already existing there ... he +ordered Gneius Octavius to conduct the legions thither by land; and +setting out himself from Utica with the fresh fleet of Lentulus added to +his former one, made for the harbour of Carthage” (Livy). The immediate +move achieved its object, a bloodless capitulation, thus crowning his +eight years’ fulfilment of the law of economy of force by saving the +costly necessity of a siege. + +A short distance from the harbour of Carthage he was met by a ship +decked with fillets and branches of olive. “There were ten deputies, the +leading men in the State, sent at the instance of Hannibal to solicit +peace, to whom, when they had come up to the stern of the general’s +ship, holding out the badges of suppliants and entreating the protection +and compassion of Scipio, the only answer given was that they must come +to Tunis, whither he would move his camp. After taking a view of +Carthage, not with any particular object of acquainting himself of it, +but to dispirit the enemy, he returned to Tunis, and also recalled +Octavius there” (Livy). The army on its way had received word that +Vermina, the son of Syphax, was on his way to the succour of Carthage +with a large force. But Octavius, employing a part of the infantry and +all the cavalry, intercepted their march and routed them with heavy +loss, his cavalry blocking all the routes of escape. + +As soon as the camp at Tunis was pitched, thirty envoys arrived from +Carthage, and to play on their fears they were kept waiting a day +without an answer. At the renewed audience next day Scipio began by +stating briefly that the Romans had no call to treat them with leniency, +in view not only of their admission that they had begun the war, but of +their recent treachery in violating a written agreement they had sworn +to observe. + +“But for our own sake and in consideration of the fortune of war and of +the common ties of humanity we have decided to be clement and +magnanimous. This will be evident to you also, if you estimate the +situation rightly. For you should not regard it as strange if we impose +hard obligations on you or if we demand sacrifices of you, but rather it +should surprise you if we grant you any favours, since Fortune owing to +your own misconduct has deprived you of any right to pity or pardon, and +placed you at the mercy of your enemies.” Then he stated first the +indulgences, and next the conditions of peace—from that day onward the +Romans would abstain from devastation or plunder; the Carthaginians were +to retain their own laws and customs, and to receive no garrison; +Carthage was to be restored all the territory in Africa that had been +hers before the war, to keep all her flocks, herds, slaves, and other +property. The conditions were—that reparation was to be made to the +Romans for the injuries inflicted during the truce; the transports and +cargoes then seized were to be given up; all prisoners and deserters +were to be handed over. The Carthaginians were to surrender all their +warships except ten triremes, all their elephants, and not to tame any +more—Scipio evidently held these in more respect than some modern +military historians do. The Carthaginians were not to make war at all on +any nation outside Africa, and on no nation in Africa without consulting +Rome. They were to restore to Masinissa, within boundaries that should +subsequently be settled, all the territory and property that had +belonged to him or his forbears. They were to furnish the Roman army +with sufficient corn for three months, and pay the troops until the +peace mission had returned from Rome. They were to pay an indemnity of +ten thousand talents of silver, in equal annual instalments spread over +fifty years. Finally, they were to give as surety a hundred hostages, to +be chosen by Scipio from their young men between fourteen and thirty +years. The restoration of the transports was to be an immediate +condition of a truce, “otherwise they would have no truce, nor any hope +of peace.” + +202 B.C.—1919 A.D.! What moderation compared with the conditions of +Versailles. Here was true grand strategy—the object a better peace, a +peace of security and prosperity. Here were sown no seeds of revenge. +The necessary guarantees of security were obtained by the surrender of +the Carthaginian fleet, by the hostages, and by placing a strong and +loyal watchdog in Masinissa next door to Carthage. But they were kept +down to the minimum both of cost to the conqueror and hardship to the +conquered. This cheaply afforded security paved the way for the future +prosperity of Rome, and at the same time made possible, justly, the +revival of Carthage’s prosperity. + +The vindication of Scipio’s generous and foresighted moderation lies in +the fifty years of peace, unspotted on the Carthaginian side, which +followed Zama. And had the Roman politicians been as wise and +dispassionate as Scipio this peace would of a certainty have endured, +with Carthage a prosperous and placid satellite of Rome, and the +immortal phrase, _Delenda est Carthago_, instead of being translated +into dreadful fact, would have been no more than the transitory +hobby-horse of a senile “die-hard,” a jest for a generation and then +forgotten. Moreover, had the execution of the treaty terms been left +with Scipio, there would not have been that malignant distortion of its +clauses whereby constant complaints, but no more, were wrung from a +long-suffering State. Even as it was, despite these constant petty +inflictions, Carthage became as prosperous and populous as in the height +of its power, and only by deliberate and outrageous provocation—the +order to the citizens to destroy their own city—could these patient +traders be forced into the revolt that afforded the desired pretext for +their obliteration. + +Let it be added that the moderation of Scipio called forth the response +of Hannibal, and the true peace initiated by the former was being +faithfully fulfilled by the latter, until the unrelenting hatred of the +Roman Senate drove him into exile from the country whose peaceful +prosperity he was rebuilding. Not for the last time in history, the +vision and humanity of two great rival soldiers gave a shining example +of true policy to revengeful and narrow-minded politicians. Yet for this +constructive wisdom Hannibal paid by exile and forced suicide, Scipio by +ending his days in voluntary exile from a State that had long since +“dropped the pilot.” His envious and narrow political rivals in the +Senate could not refuse to ratify his peace terms in face of his +influence over the people, and were for the moment too conscious of +relief in this happy ending of a ruinous and prolonged struggle. But as +the memory of danger passed, and also of how narrowly they had escaped, +these checks on their hatred waned, and they could not forgive “the man +who had disdained to punish more thoroughly the crime of having made +Romans tremble.” + +When Scipio had announced the terms of peace to the envoys from +Carthage, they carried them at once to their Senate. His moderation did +not evoke an instant echo in an assembly that was coincidently +“indisposed for peace and unfit for war.” One of the Senators was about +to oppose the acceptance of the terms, and had begun his speech when +Hannibal came forward and pulled him down from the tribune. The other +members became irate at this breach of senatorial usage, whereupon +Hannibal rose again, and, admitting that he had been hasty, asked their +pardon for this “unparliamentary” conduct, saying, that as they knew, he +had left at nine years of age, and returned after thirty-six years’ +absence on more practical debating. He asked them to dwell rather on his +patriotism, for it was due to this that he had offended against +senatorial usage. “It seems to me astounding and quite incomprehensible, +that any man who is a citizen of Carthage, and is conscious of the +designs that we all individually and as a body have entertained against +Rome, does not bless his stars that now he is at the mercy of the Romans +he has obtained such lenient terms. If you had been asked but a few days +ago what you expected your country to suffer in the event of a Roman +victory, you would not have been able even to voice your fears, so +extreme were the calamities then in prospect. So now I beg you not to +argue the question, but to agree unanimously to the terms, and to pray, +all of you, that the Roman people may ratify the treaty.”[9] This +dust-dispelling breeze of common-sense so cleared their minds that they +voted to accept the terms, and the Senate at once sent envoys with +instructions to agree to them. + +They had some difficulty in complying with the preliminary conditions +for the truce, as although they could find the transports they could not +return their cargoes, because much of the property was still in the +hands of the irreconcilables. The envoys were forced to ask Scipio to +accept a monetary compensation, and as he put no obstacles in the way, a +three months’ truce was settled and granted. + +The envoys sent to Rome were chosen from the first men in the State—for +the Romans had made it a ground of complaint that the former embassy +lacked age and authority,—and they were further recommended to the Roman +Senate by the inclusion of Hasdrubal Hædus, a consistent peace advocate +and longstanding opponent of the Barcine party. This good impression he, +as spokesman, developed by a speech that subtly flattered their +dispassionate justice, and while tactfully admitting guilt, toned down +its blackness. + +The majority of the Senate were clearly in favour of peace, but +Lentulus, who had succeeded to Claudius’s consulship and also his +ambition for cheap glory, protested against the decision of the Senate, +as he had been canvassing to be allotted Africa as his province, and +hoped that if he could keep alive the dying embers of the war he might +attain his ambition. But this was promptly snuffed out, for when the +question was put to the assembly of the people, they unanimously voted +that the Senate should make peace, that Scipio should be empowered to +grant it, and that he alone should conduct the army home. The Senate +therefore agreed accordingly, and on the return of the Carthaginian +envoys peace was concluded on the terms set forth by Scipio. The terms +were punctually fulfilled, and Scipio ordered the warships, five hundred +in number, to be towed out to the open sea and there set on fire—the +funeral pyre of Carthaginian supremacy. + +Scipio’s enemies used in later years to insinuate that the moderation of +his terms was due to his fear that harsher conditions might, by +prolonging the war, force him to share his glory with a successor. As +this vulgar motive has also been hinted at by some historians, it is +worth while to stress two facts which utterly demolish the slander. +First, the helplessness and passivity of Carthage from that time onward; +second, the way the Roman people squashed all attempts to supersede him +during this last phase. After Zama, when all Rome was wild with +enthusiasm, no usurper, however pushful, would have stood the least +chance of success. + +Before leaving Africa, he first saw Masinissa established in his +kingdom, and presented him with the lands of Syphax, delaying his own +triumph in order to ensure the reward of his loyal assistants. Then at +last, his task accomplished, he withdrew his army of occupation, and +embarked them for Sicily. On arriving there he sent the bulk of his +troops on by sea while he proceeded overland through Italy, one long +triumphal procession, for not only did the people of every town turn out +to do him honour, but the country folk thronged the roads. On arriving +in Rome he “entered the city in a ‘triumph’ of unparalleled splendour, +and afterwards distributed to each of his soldiers four hundred _asses_ +out of the spoils.” At this time, too, was born his surname of +Africanus, “the first general who was distinguished by a name derived +from the country which he had conquered.” Whether this was bestowed by +his soldiers, by his friends, or as a popular nickname is uncertain. + +The enthusiasm of the people was so great that he could have obtained a +title far more definite than any nickname, however distinguished. We +know from a speech of Tiberius Gracchus, years later in the darkest hour +of Scipio’s career, that the people clamoured to make him perpetual +consul and dictator, and that he severely rebuked them for striving to +exalt him to what would have been, in reality if not in name, regal +power. The authenticity of the fact is the more assured because Gracchus +was then charging him with disregarding the authority of the tribunes. +From this speech we also learn that Scipio “hindered statues being +erected to him in the comitium, in the rostrum, in the Senate house, in +the Capitol, in the chapel of Jupiter’s temple, and that he prevented a +decree being passed that his image, in a triumphal habit, should be +brought in procession out of the temple of Jupiter.... Such particulars +as these, which even an enemy acknowledged while censuring him ... would +demonstrate an uncommon greatness of mind, in limiting his honours +conformably with his position as a citizen” (Livy). + +Is there any other man in all history who has put aside so great a prize +when it was not only within his reach but pressed upon him? The incident +of Cincinnatus returning to his farm after accomplishing his mission as +dictator is immortal, yet Scipio’s not only paralleled but eclipsed it. +Which was the greater test—for a simple tribesman to conform to the +traditions of a primitive State, or for a highly cultured and ambitious +man of the world to eschew the virtual kingship of a supreme civilised +power? Compare, again, Scipio’s action with the picture of Cæsar +reluctantly refusing, in face of the groans of the multitude, the royal +diadem which was offered by pre-arrangement with his supporters. In +assessing the world’s great figures, other than the definitely +religious, we have tended to base our estimate mainly on concrete +achievement and mental calibre, overlooking the moral values—the same +lack of balance between the three spheres which has been remarked in the +conduct of policy in peace and war. Even this test of achievement has +been based on quantity rather than quality. That Cæsar’s work is known +universally, and Scipio little more than a name to the ordinary educated +man, is a curious reflection on our historical standards, for the one +inaugurated the world dominion of Roman civilisation, the other paved +the way for its decay. + +[Illustration: The Mediterranean World.] + +Extraordinary as is the nobility of mind which led Scipio to this +self-abnegation, it becomes yet more so in view of his age. It is +conceivable that a man in the last lap of life might have gained a +philosophical outlook on the prizes of ambition, and spurned them from +experience of their meretricious glitter. But that a man who at the +early age of thirty-five had scaled the Himalayan peaks of achievement +and fame should do so is a miracle of human nature. Little wonder that +his countrymen gradually turned from adulation to petty criticism; +little wonder that historians have forgotten him, for such loftiness of +mind is beyond the comprehension of ordinary men—and ordinary men hate +what they cannot understand. + +Footnote 9: + + While this is a Roman version of Hannibal’s speech, the comments + ascribed to him are justified by the peace terms, and it is unlikely + that the Romans would give him undue credit for a pacific influence. + + + + + CHAPTER XIII. + SIESTA. + + +After being for eight of the most critical years of Rome’s life the +central figure, Scipio, for the remainder of his life, comes only at +intervals into the limelight of history. He had saved Rome physically, +and now by retiring into private citizenship he sought to save her +morally. If a man who had attained such unapproachable heights of fame +could sink his own ambition and interests, and show that the State was +greater than the individual, the example might influence later +generations. Supreme self-sacrifice has been one of the greatest moral +forces in the civilisation of the world. But the force of Scipio’s +example was unhappily to be submerged by the self-seeking of such men as +Marius, Sulla, and Cæsar. + +To trace the latter and longer part of his career is difficult—the +curtain is raised only on a series of brief scenes. We hear of him +concerned with the resettlement of his soldiers; to each of his Spanish +and African veterans is allotted land in the proportion of two acres for +every year’s active service. Then three years after Zama he was elected +censor, an office which was not only one of the higher magistracies, but +regarded as the crown of a political career. As the title implies, the +censors, two in number, conducted the census, which was not merely a +registration but an occasion for checking the condition of public and +private life. It was then that the censors issued edicts concerning the +moral rules they intended to enforce, then that they punished +irregularities of conduct, and then that they chose fresh members of the +Senate. The censors were immune from responsibility for their acts, and +the only limitation was that re-election was forbidden, and that no act +was valid without the assent of both censors. Scipio’s period of office +seems to have been marked by unusual harmony, and a clean sheet as +regards punishments. + +We have to wait until 192 B.C. before we hear of him again, and once +more the incident is an illuminating example of his generosity and +breadth of view. In the seven years since the peace after Zama, Hannibal +had been turning his genius into new channels—the restoration of +Carthage’s prosperity and the improvement of its administration. But in +this labour he incurred the hostility of many of his own countrymen. In +his efforts to safeguard the liberty of the people he stopped the abuse +of the judicial power—an abuse which recalls the worst days of Venice. +Similarly, finding that the revenue could not raise the annual payment +to Rome without fresh taxation, he made an investigation into the +embezzlement which lay at the root of this faulty administration. Those +who had been plundering the public combined with the order of judges to +instigate the Romans against Hannibal. The Romans, whose fear of the +great Carthaginian had not faded, had been watching with envy and +distrust the commercial revival of Carthage. They eagerly seized on such +a pretext for intervention. From Livy, however, we learn that “a +strenuous opposition was for long made to this by Scipio Africanus, who +thought it highly unbecoming the dignity of the Roman people to make +themselves a party to the animosities and charges against Hannibal; to +interpose the public authority in the faction strife of the +Carthaginians, not deeming it sufficient to have conquered that +commander in the field, but to become as it were his prosecutors in a +judicial process....” Scipio’s opposition delayed but it could not stop +the lust for revenge of smaller men—Cato was consul,—and an embassy was +sent to Carthage to arraign Hannibal. He, realising the futility of +standing his trial, decided to escape before it was too late, and sailed +for Tyre, lamenting the misfortunes of his country oftener than his own. + +At the beginning of the next year Scipio was elected consul for the +second time, and his election along with Tiberius Longus afforded a +coincidence in that their fathers had been consuls together in the first +year of the Hannibalic war. Scipio’s second consulship was comparatively +uneventful, at least in a military sense, for the Senate decided that as +there was no immediate foreign danger both consuls should remain in +Italy. To this decision Scipio was strongly opposed, though he bowed to +it, and once again history was to confirm his foresight and rebuke the +“wait and see” policy of the near-sighted Roman Senators. + +During the interval between Zama and his second consulship, Rome had +been engaged in a struggle in Greece. The freedom of action which Zama +conferred had combined with certain earlier factors to re-orient, or +more literally to orient, her foreign policy. Ever since the repulse of +Pyrrhus, Rome had been driving towards an inevitable contact with the +Near East. Here the three great powers were the empires into which after +Alexander the Great’s death his vast dominion had been divided—Macedon, +Egypt, and Syria, or, as it was then termed, Asia. + +With Egypt, Rome had made an alliance eighty years before, and this +alliance had been cemented by commercial ties. But Philip V. of Macedon +had allied himself with Hannibal, and though his help was verbal rather +than practical, the threat of an attack on Italy had driven the Romans +to take the offensive against him, with the aid of a coalition of the +Greek States. The drain on her resources elsewhere made Rome seize the +first chance, in 205 B.C., for an indecisive peace. Taking advantage of +her preoccupation with Hannibal, Philip made a compact with Antiochus of +Syria to seize on and share the dominions of Egypt. + +But after Zama, Rome was free to respond to the appeal of her ally, and +eager also to take revenge for Philip’s unneutral act in sending four +thousand Macedonians to aid Hannibal in the final battle. The Senate, +however, could only persuade the assembly of the people—anxious to enjoy +the fruits of peace—by pretending that Philip was on the point of +invading Italy. At Cynoscephalæ the legion conquered the phalanx, and +Philip was forced to accept terms which reduced him to a second-rate +power—like Carthage, stripped of his foreign possessions, and forbidden +to make war without the consent of Rome. + +The Roman Senate did not realise, however, that this removal of the +Macedonian danger made war inevitable with Antiochus of Syria, for the +tide of Roman dominion clearly threatened his own submersion sooner or +later. Rome had in effect swallowed first Carthage and then Macedon, and +Antiochus had no liking for the rôle of Jonah. The Mediterranean world +was too small to hold them both. Antiochus, inflated with his own +grandiloquent title of “King of Kings,” decided to take the initiative +and enlarge his own dominions while the opportunity was good. In 197-196 +B.C. he overran the whole of Asia Minor, and even crossed into Thrace. + +Greece was obviously his next objective, but the Romans could not see +this, though Scipio did. In a prophetic speech he declared “that there +was every reason to apprehend a dangerous war with Antiochus, for he had +already, of his own accord, come into Europe; and how did they suppose +he would act in future, when he should be encouraged to a war, on one +hand by the Ætolians, avowed enemies of Rome, and stimulated, on the +other, by Hannibal, a general famous for his victories over the +Romans?”—for Hannibal had recently moved to the court of Antiochus. But +the Senate, acting like the proverbial ostrich, rejected this advice, +and decided that not only should no new army be sent to Macedonia, but +that the one which was there should be brought home and disbanded. Had +Scipio been allotted Macedonia as his province, the danger from +Antiochus might have been nipped in the bud and the subsequent invasion +of Greece prevented. + +Politically, the main feature of his year of office was a wide extension +of the policy of settling colonies of Roman citizens throughout Italy—a +safeguard against such a dangerous revolt of the Italian States as had +followed the invasion of Hannibal. Scipio himself enjoyed the honour of +being nominated by the censors as prince of the Senate, an office which +apart from its honour had greater influence than that of president, +which it had replaced. For the president’s functions were limited to +those of the modern “Speaker,” whereas the prince of the Senate could +express his opinions as well as presiding. + +The only serious hostilities during this year were in north-western +Italy, where the Insubrian and Ligurian Gauls and the Boii had made one +of their periodical risings. Longus, the other consul, whose province it +was, moved against the Boii. Finding how strong and determined were +their forces, he sent post-haste to Scipio, asking him, if he thought +proper, to join him. The Gauls, however, seeing the consul’s defensive +attitude and guessing the reason, attacked at once before Scipio could +arrive. It is evident that the Romans narrowly escaped a disaster, but +the battle was sufficiently indecisive for them to retire unmolested to +Placentia on the Po, while the Gauls withdrew to their own country. + +The sequel is obscure, though some writers say that Scipio, after he had +joined forces with his colleague, overran the country of the Boii and +Ligurians as far as the woods and marshes allowed him to proceed. In any +case he went there, for it is stated that he returned from Gaul to hold +the elections. One other incident of his term of office was that, on his +proposal, the Senators were for the first time allotted reserved and +separate seats at the Roman games. While many held that this was an +honour which ought to have been accorded long before, others opposed it +vehemently, contending that “every addition made to the grandeur of the +Senate was a diminution of the dignity of the people,” that it distilled +class feeling, and if the ordinary seats had been good enough for five +hundred and thirty-eight years, why should a change be made now. “It is +said that even Africanus himself at last became sorry for having +proposed that matter in his consulship: so difficult is it to bring +people to approve of any alteration of long-standing customs” (Livy). + +All very petty; and yet Scipio’s good-natured consideration for the +comfort and dignity of others—it could not enhance his own—may have +contributed to weaken his old influence with the people, who had been +his support against the short-sighted Senators. + +After the election of his successors, Scipio retired once more into +private life, instead of taking a foreign province, as retiring consuls +so often did. This circumstance has led one or two of the latter Roman +historians to search for a motive. Thus Cornelius Nepos, the biographer +of Cato, says that Scipio wanted to remove Cato from his province of +Spain and become his successor, and that failing to obtain the Senate’s +assent, Scipio, to show his displeasure, retired into private life when +his consulship was ended. Plutarch also, in his life of Cato, +contradicts this, and says that Scipio actually succeeded Cato in Spain. +Apart from the known historical inaccuracies of both these later +writers, such pettiness would be inconsistent with all the assured facts +of Scipio’s character. We know that Cato and Scipio were always at +variance, but the animosity, so far as speeches are recorded, was all on +the side of Cato, to whom Scipio’s Greek culture was as a red rag to a +bull, and not less his moderation towards Carthage. The man whose parrot +cry was _Delenda est Carthago_—fit ancestry of the Yellow Press—could +not brook the man whose loftier soul and reputation stood in his way, +nor his narrow spirit rest until he had brought about the destruction +both of Carthage and Scipio. Their quarrel, if one-sided spite can be so +called, dated from Zama, when Cato—serving as quæstor under Scipio, and +already hating his Greek habits so much that he would not live in the +same quarters—took violent exception to his general’s lavish generosity +to the soldiers in the distribution of the spoil. + +Fortunately there are external facts which demolish the statements of +both Nepos and Plutarch on this matter. A decision to disband Cato’s +army in Spain was made by the Senate at the same time as they refused +Scipio’s request to allot Macedonia as his consular province, and +disbanded that army also. Cato accordingly returned, and received a +triumph at the outset of Scipio’s consulship. As there was no army there +was obviously no post for a proconsul, which shows the futility of the +statement that Scipio desired to go to Spain at the end of his +consulship. + +His real motive, however, in staying at Rome instead of seeking some +other foreign province is not difficult to guess. He had predicted the +danger from Antiochus, and as the Senate’s refusal to anticipate it made +a struggle inevitable, Scipio would wish to be on hand, ready for the +call that he felt sure would come. He was right, for Hannibal was even +then proposing to Antiochus an expedition against Italy, maintaining as +ever that a campaign in Italy was the only key to Rome’s defeat, because +such invasion crippled the full output of Rome’s man-power and +resources. As a preliminary Hannibal proposed that he should be given a +force to land in Africa and raise the Carthaginians, while Antiochus +moved into Greece and stood by, ready for a spring across to Italy when +the moment was ripe. + +An envoy of Hannibal’s, a Tyrian called Aristo, was denounced by the +anti-Hannibalic party at Carthage. Aristo escaped, but the discovery +caused such internal dissension that Masinissa thought the moment ripe +to encroach on their territory. + +The Carthaginians sent to Rome to complain, and he also to justify +himself. The embassy of the former aroused uneasiness by their account +of Aristo’s mission and escape, and the envoys of Masinissa fanned this +flame of suspicion. The Senate decided to send a commission to +investigate, and Scipio was nominated one of the three, but after making +an inquiry “left everything in suspense, their opinions inclining +neither to one side or the other.” This failure to give a verdict is +hardly to the credit of Scipio, who had the knowledge and the influence +with both parties to have settled the controversy on the spot. But Livy +hints that the commissioners may have been acting on instructions from +the Senate to abstain from a settlement, and adds that in view of the +general situation “it was highly expedient to leave the dispute +undecided.” By this he presumably means that as Hannibal was meditating +an invasion it was policy to keep the Carthaginians too occupied to +support him. + +At the end of the year an incident occurred that sheds a significant +light—rather twilight—on Scipio’s career. The two candidates for the +patrician vacancy as consul were Lucius Quinctius Flamininus, brother of +the victor of Cynoscephalæ, and Publius Cornelius Scipio, namesake and +half-brother to Africanus. + +The upshot is aptly told by Livy: “Above everything else, the brothers +of the candidates, the two most illustrious generals of the age, +increased the violence of the struggle. Scipio’s fame was the more +splendid, and in proportion to its greater splendour, the more obnoxious +to envy. That of Quinctius was the most recent, as he had received a +‘triumph’ that same year. Besides, the former had now for almost two +years been continually in people’s sight; which circumstance, by the +mere effect of satiety, causes great characters to be less revered.” +“All Quinctius’s claims to the favour of the public were fresh and new; +since his triumph, he had neither asked nor received anything from the +people; ‘he solicited votes,’ he said, ‘in favour of his own brother, +not of a half-brother; in favour of his _legatus_ and partner in the +conduct of the war’”—his brother having commanded the fleet against +Philip of Macedon. “By these arguments he carried his point.” Lucius +Quinctius was elected, and Scipio Africanus received a further rebuff +when Lælius, his old comrade and lieutenant, failed to secure election +as plebeian consul despite Scipio’s canvassing. The crowd, eternally +fickle and forgetful, preferred the rising star to the setting sun. + +Meantime the war clouds were gathering in the East. Antiochus had +safeguarded his rear by marrying his daughter to Ptolemy, King of Egypt. +He then advanced to Ephesus, but lost time by waging a local campaign +with the Pisidians. Across the Ægean, the Ætolians were labouring hard +to stir up war against the Romans, and to find allies for Antiochus. +Rome, on the contrary, was weary and exhausted with years of struggle, +and sought by every means to postpone or avert a conflict with +Antiochus. To this end the Senate sent an embassy to him, and Livy +states that, according to the history written in Greek by Acilius, +Scipio Africanus was employed on this mission. The envoys went to +Ephesus, and while halting there on their way “took pains to procure +frequent interviews with Hannibal, in order to sound his intentions, and +to remove his fears of danger threatening him from the Romans.” These +meetings had the accidental and indirect but important consequence that +the report of them made Antiochus suspicious of Hannibal. + +But the main interest to us of these interviews, assuming that Acilius’s +witness is reliable, is the account of one of the conversations between +Scipio and Hannibal. In it Scipio asked Hannibal, “Whom he thought the +greatest captain?” The latter answered, “Alexander ... because with a +small force he defeated armies whose numbers were beyond reckoning, and +because he had overrun the remotest regions, merely to visit which was a +thing above human aspirations.” Scipio then asked, “To whom he gave the +second place?” and Hannibal replied, “To Pyrrhus, for he first taught +the method of encamping, and besides no one ever showed such exquisite +judgment in choosing his ground and disposing his posts; while he also +possessed the art of conciliating mankind to himself to such a degree +that the natives of Italy wished him, though a foreign prince, to hold +the sovereignty among them, rather than the Roman people....” On Scipio +proceeding to ask, “Whom he esteemed the third?” Hannibal replied, +“Myself, beyond doubt.” On this Scipio laughed, and added, “What would +you have said if you had conquered me?” “Then I would have placed +Hannibal not only before Alexander and Pyrrhus, but before all other +commanders.” + +“This answer, turned with Punic dexterity, and conveying an unexpected +kind of flattery, was highly grateful to Scipio, as it set him apart +from the crowd of commanders, as one of incomparable eminence.” + +From Antiochus this embassy gained no direct result, for the “king of +kings” was too swollen with pride on account of his Asiatic successes, +too sure of his own strength, to profit by the examples of Carthage and +Macedon. His standards of military measurement were strictly +quantitative. + +Realising at last that war was inevitable and imminent, the Roman Senate +set about the preparations for this fresh struggle. As a first step they +pre-dated the consular election so as to be ready for the coming year; +the new consuls were Publius Scipio, the rejected of the previous year, +and Manius Acilius. Next, Bæbius was ordered to cross over with his army +from Brundisium (Brindisi) into Epirus, and envoys were sent to all the +allied cities to counteract Ætolian propaganda. The Ætolians, +nevertheless, gained some success by a mixture of diplomacy and force, +and besides causing general commotion throughout Greece, did their best +to hasten the arrival of Antiochus. Had his energy approximated to his +confidence, he might well have gained command of Greece before the +Romans were able to thwart him. Further, to his own undoing, he +abandoned Hannibal’s plan and the expedition to Africa, from a jealousy +inspired fear that if Hannibal were given an executive rôle public +opinion would regard him as the real commander. Even when he made his +belated landing in Greece, with inadequate forces, he missed such +opportunity as was left by frittering away his strength and time in +petty attacks against the Thessalian towns, and in idle pleasure at +Chalcis. + +Meantime, at Rome the consuls cast lots for their provinces; Greece fell +to Acilius, and the expeditionary force which he was to take assembled +at Brundisium. For its supply, commissaries had been sent to Carthage +and Numidia to purchase corn. It is a tribute alike to the spirit in +which the Carthaginians were seeking to fulfil their treaty with Rome, +and to Scipio’s wise policy after Zama, that they not only offered the +corn as a present, but offered to fit out a fleet at their own expense, +and to pay in a lump sum the annual tribute money for many years ahead. +The Romans, however, whether from proud self-reliance or dislike of +being under an obligation to Carthage, refused the fleet and the money, +and insisted on paying for the corn. + +In face of all these preparations, Antiochus awoke to his danger too +late. His allies, the Ætolians, provided only four thousand men, his own +troops delayed in Asia, and in addition he had alienated Philip of +Macedon, who stood firm on the Roman side. With a force only ten +thousand strong he took up his position at the pass of Thermopylæ, but +failed to repeat the heroic resistance of the immortal Spartans, and was +routed. Thereupon, forsaking his Ætolian allies to their fate, Antiochus +sailed back across the Ægean. + +Rome, however, was unwilling to rest content with this decision. She +realised that in Greece her army had defeated only the advanced guard +and not the main body of Antiochus’s armed strength, and that unless he +was subdued he would be a perpetual menace. Further, so long as he +dominated Asia Minor from Ephesus, her loyal allies, the Pergamenes and +Rhodians, and the Greek cities on the Asiatic side of the Ægean, were at +his mercy. All these motives impelled Rome to counter-invasion. + +Once more Hannibal’s grand strategical vision proved right, for he +declared that “he rather wondered the Romans were not already in Asia, +than had doubts of their coming.” This time Antiochus took heed of his +great adviser, and strengthened his garrisons as well as maintaining a +constant patrol of the coast. + + + + + CHAPTER XIV. + THE LAST LAP. + + +Rome, faced with a great emergency—second only to that of the Hannibalic +War,—looked for its new saviour in its old. If the danger was less, and +less close, the risk at least must have seemed greater, for her armies +were venturing into the unknown. The first great trial of strength +between Rome and Asiatic civilisation was about to be staged, and the +theatre of war was alarmingly distant, connected with the homeland by +long and insecure lines of communication. The spur of emergency quickens +the memory, and Rome in her fresh hour of trial remembered the man who +had saved her in the last, and who had been standing by for several +years ready for the occasion which he had prophesied to deaf ears. Yet +Scipio Africanus did not himself stand for the consulship—why it is +difficult to guess. It may have been that he deemed the forces of +jealousy too strong, and wanted to take no risks, or that affection and +sympathy for his brother Lucius, a defeated candidate the year before, +inspired Africanus to give the latter his chance. Africanus had glory +enough, and all through his career he had been ready to share his glory +with his assistants. He left envy of others’ fame to lesser men. His aim +was service, and in any case he knew that if Lucius was consul, he +himself would exercise the real power—Lucius was welcome to the nominal +triumph. + +His brother’s election was secured, and with him, as plebeian consul, +was elected Gaius Lælius, the old assistant of Africanus. It may be that +Scipio worked for this, in order to ensure that to whichever Greece fell +as a province he would be able to exercise an influence on the +operations. As it happened, however, the double election put him in the +unpleasant position of having to support his brother against his friend. +For both consuls naturally desired Greece, which meant the command +against Antiochus. Lælius, who had a powerful interest with the Senate, +asked the Senate to decide—drawing lots was too uncertain for his taste. +Lucius Scipio thereupon asked time to seek advice, and consulted +Africanus, “who desired him to leave it unhesitatingly to the Senate.” +Then, when a prolonged debate was anticipated, Africanus arose in the +Senate and said that “if they decreed that province to his brother, +Lucius Scipio, he would go along with him as his lieutenant.” This +proposal “being received with almost universal approbation,” settled the +dispute and was carried by an almost unanimous vote. + +Though it is clear that Africanus planned this result, the fact does not +lessen our appreciation of the nobility of a man who, after being the +most illustrious commander in Rome’s history, would stoop to take a +subordinate position. If the means was diplomatic, the motive was of the +purest—to save his country, leaving to another the reward. Apart from +blood ties, he doubtless felt more sure of real control through his +brother than through Lælius—though Lucius’s obstinacy with the Ætolians +refutes Mommsen’s verdict that he was “a man of straw.” Two good leaders +in the same command are not a good combination. It says much for both +Scipio Africanus and Lælius that this act did not break down their +friendship, and it is a proof of the latter’s generous nature, if also +of the former’s transcendent qualities, that in later years Lælius gave +Polybius such testimony of Scipio’s greatness. + +In addition to the two legions which he was to take over in Greece from +Acilius, the consul was given three thousand Roman foot and one hundred +horse, and another five thousand foot and two hundred horse from the +Latin confederates. Further, directly it was known that Africanus was +going, four thousand veterans of the Hannibalic War volunteered in order +to serve again “under their beloved leader.” + +The expedition set forth in March (the Roman July), 190 B.C., but the +advance into Asia was to be delayed because of the Senate’s obstinacy in +refusing to grant reasonable peace terms to the Ætolians, so driving +them to take up arms anew and maintain a stubborn warfare in their +mountain strongholds. It is curious that Scipio, who had always +contributed to his military object by the moderation of his political +demands, should now be blocked by others’ immoderation. + +When the Scipios landed in Epirus they found their destined army +thoroughly embroiled by Acilius in this guerilla warfare. Africanus went +ahead while his brother followed with his main body. On arrival at +Amphissa, Athenian envoys met them, who, addressing first Africanus and +afterwards the consul, pleaded for leniency to the Ætolians. “They +received a milder answer from Africanus, who, wishing for an honourable +pretext for finishing the Ætolian war, was directing his view towards +Asia and King Antiochus.” Apparently Africanus, with his habitual +foresight, had actually inspired this mission of the Athenians, and +another to the Ætolians. Scipio could have given points even to Colonel +House as an ambassador of peace as a means to victory. As a result of +Athenian persuasion, the Ætolians sent a large embassy to the Roman +camp, and from Africanus received a most encouraging reply. But when the +decision was referred to the consul, as was necessary, his reply was +uncompromising—he put his fist through the web his brother had so +delicately woven. A second embassy met with the same obstinate refusal. +Then the principal Athenian envoy advised the Ætolians to ask simply for +a six months’ armistice in order that they might send an embassy to +Rome. The real source of this advice is too obvious to require any +guess. Accordingly the Ætolian envoys came back, and “making their first +application to Publius Scipio, obtained, through him, from the consul a +suspension of arms for the time they desired.” + +Thus by diplomacy Africanus secured his lines of communication and +released his army; the determination with which he sought a peaceful +solution, and avoided being embroiled in a sideshow, is an object-lesson +in economy of force and the maintenance of the true objective. + +The consul, having taken over the army from Acilius, decided to lead his +troops into Asia through Macedonia and Thrace—taking the long land +instead of the short sea route, because Antiochus had one fleet at +Ephesus and another being raised by Hannibal in Phœnicia specially to +prevent their crossing by sea. Africanus, while approving of this route, +told his brother that everything depended on the attitude of Philip of +Macedon; “for if he be faithful to our Government he will afford us a +passage, and all provisions and material necessary for an army on a long +march. But if he should fail you in this, you will find no safety in any +part of Thrace. In my opinion, therefore, the King’s dispositions ought +to be ascertained first of all. He will best be tested if whoever is +sent comes suddenly upon him, instead of by prearrangement.” + +Acting on this advice, as instinct with security as with psychology, +Tiberius Gracchus, a specially active young man, was sent, riding by +relays of horses, and so fast that he travelled from Amphissa to +Pella—from the Gulf of Corinth almost to Salonika—in under three days, +and caught Philip in the middle of a banquet—“far gone in his cups.” +This helped to remove suspicion that he was planning any countermove, +and next day Gracchus saw provision dumps prepared, bridges made over +rivers, and hill roads buttressed—ready for the coming of the Roman +army. + +He then rode back to meet the army, which was thus able to move through +Macedonia with confidence. On their passage through his domains Philip +met and accompanied them, and Livy relates that “much geniality and good +humour appeared in him, which recommended him much to Africanus, a man +who, as he was unparalleled in other respects, was not averse to +courteousness unaccompanied by luxury.” The army then pushed on through +Thrace to the Hellespont—the Dardanelles,—taking the same route +apparently as Xerxes, in an opposite direction. + +Their crossing of the Dardanelles had been smoothed for them as much by +the mistakes of Antiochus as by the action of their own fleet. Livius, +the Roman naval commander, had sailed for the Dardanelles, in accordance +with instructions, in order to seize the fortress which guarded the +passage of the Narrows. Sestos—modern Maidos—was already occupied, and +Abydos—now Chanak—parleying for surrender, when news reached Livius of +the surprise and defeat of the allied Rhodian fleet at Samos. He +abandoned his primary object—an action which might have upset Scipio’s +plans—and sailed south to restore the naval situation in the Ægean. +However, after some rather aimless operations, the arrival of Hannibal’s +fleet and its defeat—in his first and last sea battle—cleared the +situation in the Mediterranean. A second victory in August, this time +over Antiochus’s Ægean fleet, ensured for the Romans command of the sea. + +With Antiochus, the loss of it led him into a move, intended for safety, +that was actually the reverse. Despairing of being able to defend his +possessions across the Dardanelles, he ordered the garrison to retire +from Lysimachia, “lest it should there be cut off by the Romans.” Now +Lysimachia stood close to where Bulair stands to-day, and there is no +need to emphasise how difficult it would have been to force those +ancient Bulair Lines, commanding the isthmus of the Gallipoli peninsula. +The garrison might well have held out till winter. Perhaps another +factor, apart from the naval defeat, was his failure to gain the +alliance of Prusias, King of Bithynia—a country whose sea coast lay +partly on the Black Sea and partly on the Sea of Marmora. Antiochus sent +to play on his fears of being swallowed by Rome, but once again Scipio’s +grand strategical vision had led him to foresee this move and take steps +to checkmate it. Months before he reached Gallipoli, Scipio had written +a letter to Prusias to dispel any such fears. “The petty chieftains in +Spain,” he wrote, “who had become allies, he had left kings. Masinissa +he had not only re-established in his father’s kingdom, but had put him +in possession of that of Syphax”—a clever hint! + +The double news of the naval victory and the evacuation of Lysimachia +reached the Scipios on arrival at Ænos (Enos), and, considerably +relieved, they pressed forward and occupied the city. After a few days’ +halt, to allow the baggage and sick to overtake them, they marched down +the Chersonese—the Gallipoli peninsula,—arrived at the Narrows, and made +an unopposed crossing. They crossed, however, without Africanus, who was +detained behind by his religious duties as one of the Salian priests. +The rules of his order compelled him during this festival of the Sacred +Shields to remain wherever he was until the month was out—and without +Africanus the army had lost its dynamo, so that “he himself was a source +of delay, until he overtook the rest of the army.” Unnecessary delay was +far from one of his military characteristics, so that the incident +serves to suggest that his piety was genuine and not merely a +psychological tool to inspire his troops. While the army was waiting for +him, an envoy came to the camp from Antiochus, and as he had been +ordered by the king to address Africanus first, he also waited for him +before discussing his mission! + +“In him he had the greatest hope, besides that his greatness of soul, +and the fulness of his glory, tended very much to make him inclined to +peace, and it was known to all nations what sort of a conqueror he had +been, both in Spain and afterwards in Africa; and also because his son +was then a prisoner with Antiochus” (Livy). How the son was captured is +uncertain, whether in a distant cavalry reconnaissance, or earlier at +sea, as Appian suggests. + +At a full council the Syrian envoy put forward a basis for peace—that +Antiochus would give up the Greek cities in Asia Minor allied to Rome, +as he had already evacuated Europe, and would pay the Romans half the +expenses of the war. The council regarded these concessions as +inadequate, contending that Antiochus should give up all the Greek +seaboard on the Ægean, and, in order to establish a wide and secure +neutral zone, relinquish possession of all Asia Minor west of the Taurus +mountains. Further, he ought to pay all the expense of the war, as he +had caused and initiated it. + +Thus rebuffed, the envoy sought a private interview with Africanus, +according to his orders. “First of all he told him that the King would +restore his son without a ransom; and then, as ignorant of the +disposition of Scipio as he was of Roman manners, he promised an immense +weight of gold, and, save for the title of king, an absolute partnership +in the sovereignty—if through his means Antiochus should obtain peace.” +To these advances Scipio replied, “I am the less surprised that you are +ignorant of the Romans in general, and of me, to whom you have been +sent, when I see that you do not realise the military situation of the +person from whom you come. You ought to have kept Lysimachia to prevent +our entering the Chersonese (Gallipoli), or to have opposed us at the +Hellespont to hinder our passing into Asia, if you meant to ask peace as +from people anxious as to the issue of the war. But after leaving the +passage into Asia open, and receiving not only a bridle but a yoke,[10] +what negotiation on equal terms is left to you, when you must submit to +orders? I shall consider my son as a very great gift from the generosity +of the King. I pray to the gods that my circumstances may never require +others; my mind certainly never will require any. For such an act of +generosity to me he shall find me grateful, if for a personal favour he +will accept a personal return of gratitude. In my public capacity, I +will neither accept from him nor give anything. All that I can give at +present is sincere advice. Go, then, and desire him in my name to cease +hostilities, and to refuse no terms of peace” (Livy). Polybius’s version +of the last sentence is a shade different: “In return for his promise in +regard to my son, I will give him a hint which is well worth the favour +he offers me—make any concession, do anything, rather than fight with +the Romans.” + +This advice had no effect on Antiochus, and he decided to push on his +military preparations, which were already well in hand. The consular +army then advanced south-east, by way of Troy, towards Lydia. “They +encamped near the source of the Caicus river, preparing provisions for a +rapid march against Antiochus, in order to crush him before winter +should prevent operations.” Antiochus faced them at Thyatira—modern +Akhissar. At this moment, just as the curtain was about to rise on the +final act, and Scipio reap the reward of his strategy, fate stepped in. +He was laid low by sickness, and had to be conveyed to Elæa on the +coast. Hearing of this, Antiochus sent an escort to take back his son to +him. This unexpected return of his son was so great a relief to Scipio’s +mind as to hasten his recovery from the illness. To the escort he said, +“Tell the King that I return him thanks, that at present I can make him +no other return but my advice; which is, not to come to an engagement +until he hears that I have rejoined the army”—by this Scipio evidently +meant that if he was in charge Antiochus’s life at least was safe. + +Although the king had a vast army of sixty-two thousand foot and more +than twelve thousand horse, he deemed this advice sufficiently sound to +fall back behind the Hermus river, and there at Magnesia—modern +Minissa—fortify a strong camp. The consul, however, followed him, and +seeing that he refused battle called a council of war. Though the Romans +only counted two legions, the equivalent of two allied legions, and some +local detachments—about thirty thousand all told,—their verdict was +unanimous. “The Romans never despised any enemy so much.” However, they +did not have to storm his camp, for on the third day, fearing the effect +of inaction on the moral of his troops, Antiochus came out to offer +battle. + +Though the Roman victory was ultimately decisive, they clearly missed +the tactical mastery of Africanus, and were even in trouble, if not in +jeopardy, for a time. For while the Romans were driving in the enemy’s +centre, and the mass of their cavalry were attacking the enemy’s left +flank, Antiochus himself with his right wing cavalry crossed the +river—left almost unguarded—and fell on the consul’s left flank. The +troops there were routed and fled to the camp, and only the resolution +of the tribune left in charge rallied them and staved off the danger +until reinforcements came. Foiled here and seeing a heavy concentration +developing against him, Antiochus fled to Sardis, and the survivors of +his broken army followed. Further resistance was hopeless, his western +dominions crumbling all around him, and the subject States making their +peace with Rome. He therefore retired to Apamea, and from there sent a +peace mission to the Consul at Sardis, whither Africanus came from Elæa +as soon as he was fit to travel. + +Before the mission arrived the terms had been decided on, and it was +agreed that Africanus should deliver them. “Scipio began by saying that +victory never made the Romans more severe than before.” The conditions +were the same as had been offered before Magnesia, when the issue was +still open; not a whit augmented because of Antiochus’s present +helplessness. Antiochus was to retire to the other side of the Taurus +range; to pay fifteen thousand Euboic talents towards the expenses of +the war, part at once and the rest in twelve annual instalments, and to +hand over twenty selected hostages as pledge of his good faith. In +addition Antiochus was to give up Hannibal, as it was “clear that the +Romans could never hope to enjoy peace wherever he was,” and certain +other notorious instigators of the war. Hannibal, however, getting news +of this clause, took refuge in Crete. + +The notable feature of these terms, as of those in Africa and Greece, +was that the Romans sought security and prosperity merely. So long as +Scipio guided Rome’s policy, annexation, with all its dangers and +troubles, is eschewed. His object is simply to ensure the peaceful +predominance of Roman interests and influence, and to secure them +against external dangers. It was true grand strategy which, instead of +attempting any annexation of Antiochus’s normal domains, simply +compelled him to retire behind an ideal strategic boundary—the Taurus +mountains, and built up a series of sovereign buffer States as a second +line of defence between the Taurus range and the Ægean Sea. These were +definitely the allies of Rome and not her subjects, and Asia Minor was +organised for security by strengthening and rewarding the allies who had +been faithful throughout the war. How might the course of history have +been changed had not Scipio’s successors reversed his policy and entered +upon the fateful path of annexation? When the barbarian invasions came +they found the Mediterranean world composed of States so thoroughly +Romanised that they had long since forgotten the feel of their fetters, +yet from this one fact so atrophied as to be a drain and a weakness to +Rome. Instead of the ring of virile outposts planned by Scipio, a ring +of political eunuchs. + +It is an amusing last comment on the settlement with Antiochus, and the +removal of the last danger to Rome in the Mediterranean, that on Lucius +Scipio’s return to Rome “he chose to be called Asiaticus, that he might +not be inferior to his brother in point of a surname.” He also took +steps to ensure that his “triumph” was more splendid in display than +that of Africanus over Carthage. The only reward of Africanus was that +for a third time he was nominated Prince of the Senate. + +Footnote 10: + + Polybius’s version is, “having not only submitted to the bridle, but + allowed the rider to mount”—and while less graphic it sounds more to + the point, and more probable. + + + + + CHAPTER XV. + DUSK. + + +The moderation and far-sighted policy of Scipio, which had undermined +his influence in the years succeeding Zama, was now to cause his +political ruin. The sequence of events is somewhat hazy, but their +outline is clear. The narrow-minded party, led by Cato, who could not be +content with the disarming of the enemy but demanded their destruction, +were so chagrined at this fresh peace of mercy and wisdom that they +vented their anger on its author. Unable to revoke the peace, they +schemed to compass the downfall of Scipio, and fastened on the +suggestion of bribery as the most plausible charge. Perhaps, quite +honestly, men like Cato could conceive no other cause for generosity to +a vanquished foe. However, they seem to have been clever enough not to +assail the stronger brother first, but rather, aiming at weakness +instead of strength, to strike at Africanus indirectly through his +brother. + +The first move seems to have been the prosecution of Lucius for +misappropriation of the indemnity paid by Antiochus. Africanus was so +indignant at the charge that, when his brother was in the act of +producing his account books, he took them from him, tore them in pieces, +and threw them on the floor of the Senate house. This action was unwise, +but very human. Let any one put himself in the place of a man who by +unparalleled services had rescued Rome from a deadly menace on her very +hearth, and raised her to be the unchallenged and unchallengeable +mistress of the world, and then, as he said indignantly, to be called on +to account for four million sesterces when through him the treasury had +been enriched by two hundred million. We must remember, too, that Scipio +was a man suffering from an illness, soon to cause his death, and sick +men are inclined to be irritable. Doubtless, too, that supreme +self-confidence which marked him developed in later and sickness-ridden +years into something approaching arrogance. Thus Polybius tells us that +on one occasion, whether this or at the trial later, he bitingly +retorted that, “It ill became the Roman people to listen to accusations +against Publius Cornelius Scipio, to whom his accusers owed it that they +had the power of speech at all.” He had refused regal power when it had +been thrust upon him, and been content to remain a private citizen, but +he expected some measure of special consideration for his supreme +services. + +The defiant act, however, gave his enemies the opportunity they had +longed for. Two tribunes, the Petilii, instigated by Cato, began a +prosecution against him for taking a bribe from Antiochus in return for +the moderation of his peace terms. The news set all Rome aflame with +excitement and discussion. “Men construed this according to their +different dispositions; some did not blame the plebeian tribunes, but +the public in general that could suffer such a process to be carried on” +(Livy). A frequent remark was that “the two greatest States in the world +proved, nearly at the same time, ungrateful to their chief commanders; +but Rome the more ungrateful of the two, because Carthage was subdued +when she sent the vanquished Hannibal into exile, whereas Rome, when +victorious, was for banishing the conqueror Africanus.” + +The opposing party argued that no citizen should stand so high as not to +be answerable for his conduct, and that it was a salutary tonic that the +most powerful should be brought to trial. + +When the day appointed for the hearing came, “never was either any other +person, or Scipio himself—when consul or censor,—escorted to the Forum +by a larger multitude than he was on that day when he appeared to answer +the charge against him.” The case opened, the plebeian tribunes sought +to offset their lack of any definite evidence by raking up the old +imputations about his luxurious Greek habits when in winter quarters in +Sicily and about the Locri episode. The voices were those of the +Petilii, but the words were clearly Cato’s. For Cato had not only been +the disciple of Fabius, but himself in Sicily had made the unfounded +allegations which the commission of inquiry had refuted. Then after this +verbal smoke-cloud, they discharged the poison gas. For want of evidence +they pointed to the restoration of his son without ransom, and to the +way Antiochus had addressed his peace proposals to Scipio. “He had acted +towards the consul, in his province, as dictator, and not as lieutenant. +Nor had he gone thither with any other view than it might appear to +Greece and Asia, as had long since been the settled conviction of Spain, +Gaul, Sicily, and Africa, that he alone was the head and pillar of the +Roman power; that a State which was mistress of the world lay sheltered +under the shade of Scipio; and that his nods were equivalent to decrees +of the Senate and orders of the people.” + +A cloud of words have rarely covered a poorer case, their purpose, as +Livy remarks, to “attack by envy, as much as they can, him out of the +reach of dishonour.” The pleading having lasted until dusk, the trial +was adjourned until next day. + +Next morning when the tribunes took their seat and the accused was +summoned to reply, the answer was characteristic of the man. No proof +was possible either way, and besides being too proud to enter into +explanations, he knew they would be wasted on his enemies as on his +friends. Therefore, with the last psychological counter-stroke of his +career, he achieves a dramatic triumph. + +“Tribunes of the people, and you, Romans, on the anniversary of this day +I fought a pitched battle in Africa against Hannibal and the +Carthaginians, with good fortune and success. As, therefore, it is but +decent that a stop be put for this day to litigation and wrangling, I am +going straightway to the Capitol, there to return my acknowledgments to +Jupiter the supremely great and good, to Juno, Minerva, and the other +deities presiding over the Capitol and citadel, and will give them +thanks for having, on this day, and at many other times, endowed me both +with the will and ability to perform extraordinary services to the +commonwealth. Such of you also, Romans, who choose, come with me and +beseech the gods that you may have commanders like myself. Since from my +seventeenth year until old age, you have always anticipated my years +with honour, and I your honours with services.” + +Thereupon he went up towards the Capitol, and the whole assembly +followed; at last, even the clerks and messengers, so that his accusers +were left in a deserted forum. “This day was almost more famous owing to +the favour of the Romans towards him, and their high estimation of his +real greatness, than that on which he rode through Rome in triumph over +Syphax and the Carthaginians.” “It was, however, the last day that shone +with lustre on Publius Scipio. For, as he could foresee nothing but the +prosecutions of envy, and continual dispute with the tribunes, the trial +being adjourned to a future day, he retired to his estate at Liternum, +with a fixed determination not to attend the trial. His spirit was by +nature too lofty, and habituated to such an elevated course of fortune, +that he did not know how to act the part of an accused person, or stoop +to the humble deportment of men pleading their cause” (Livy). + +When the adjourned trial took place, and his name was called, Lucius +Scipio put forward sickness as the cause for his brother’s absence. The +prosecuting tribunes refused to admit this, contending that it was +merely his habitual disregard of the laws, and reproached the people for +following him to the Capitol and for their lack of determination now: +“We had resolution enough, when he was at the head of an army and a +fleet, to send into Sicily ... to bring him home, yet we dare not now +send to compel him, though a private citizen, to come from his country +seat to stand his trial.” They failed, however, to carry their point. On +Lucius appealing to the other tribunes of the commons, the latter moved +that, as the excuse of sickness was pleaded, this should be admitted, +and the trial again adjourned. One, however, Tiberius Gracchus, +dissented, and the assembly, knowing that there had been friction +between him and Scipio, expected a more severe decision. Instead he +declared that, “Inasmuch as Lucius Scipio had pleaded sickness in excuse +for his brother, that plea appeared to him sufficient; that he would not +suffer Publius Scipio to be accused until he returned to Rome, and even +then, if Scipio appealed to him, he would support him in refusing to +stand his trial. That Publius Scipio, by his great achievements, by the +honours received from the Roman people, by the joint consent of gods and +men, had risen to such a height of dignity that, were he to stand as a +criminal under the rostrum and afford a hearing to the insults of young +men, it would reflect more disgrace on the Romans than on him.” + +Livy adds that Gracchus followed up his decree by a speech of +indignation: “Shall Scipio, the famous conqueror of Africa, stand at +your feet—tribunes? Was it for this he defeated and routed in Spain four +of the most distinguished generals of Carthage and their four armies? +Was it for this he took Syphax prisoner, conquered Hannibal, made +Carthage tributary to you, and removed Antiochus beyond the Taurus +mountains—that he should crouch under two Petilii? That you should gain +the palm of victory over Publius Africanus?” This speech, as well as his +decree, made so strong an impression that the Senate called a special +meeting and bestowed the warmest praise on Gracchus “for having +consulted the public good in preference to private animosity.” The +prosecutors met with general hostility, and the prosecution was dropped. + +“After that there was silence concerning Africanus. He passed the +remainder of his life at Liternum, without a wish to revisit the city, +and it is said that when he was dying he ordered his body to be buried +there ... that even his obsequies might not be performed in his +ungrateful country.” + +That he died in voluntary exile at Liternum, probably in 183 B.C., seems +assured, but his burial-place is less certain, and monuments of him +existed both at Liternum and Rome. At the time of his death he was only +fifty-two years of age. By a fitting coincidence his great rival, +Hannibal, also died about the same time, and probably in the same +year—at the age of sixty-seven. He had escaped, after Magnesia, to +Crete, and then taken refuge with Prusias of Bithynia. The Roman Senate +had the good sense to realise that it was beneath their dignity to harry +him from his last refuge, but the local commander, Flaminius, thought to +gain distinction by instigating Prusias to murder his trusting guest. +Hannibal thereupon defeated the assassins by taking poison. + +Even after Scipio’s death, his enemies could not rest. It rather +“increased the courage of his enemies, the chief of whom was Marcus +Porcius Cato, who even during his life was accustomed to sneer at his +splendid character.” Instigated by Cato, the demand was pressed for an +inquiry into the disposal of Antiochus’s tribute. Lucius was now the +direct target, though his brother’s memory was still the indirect. +Lucius and several of his lieutenants and staff were arraigned. Judgment +was made against them, and when Lucius declared that all the money +received by him was in the treasury, and therefore refused to give +security for repayment, he was ordered to prison. His cousin, Publius +Scipio Nasica, made a strong and convincing protest, but the prætor +declared that he had no option, in view of the judgment, so long as +Lucius refused repayment. Gracchus again intervened to save his personal +enemies from disgrace. Using his tribunitiary authority, he ordered +Lucius’s discharge on account of his services to Rome, and decreed +instead that the prætor should levy the sum due from Lucius’s property. +The prætor thereupon sent to take possession of it, “and not only did no +trace appear of money received from Antiochus, but the sum realised by +the sale of his property did not even equal the amount of the fine” +(Livy). This convincing proof of the Scipios’ innocence caused a +revulsion of public feeling, “and the public hatred which had been +directed against the Scipios recoiled on the prætor, his advisers, and +the accusers.” + +That his name should have been cleared after death was, however, no +consolation to the last years of Africanus. “Ingratitude towards their +great men is the mark of strong peoples”—so the proverb runs. Little +wonder that Rome attained the sovereignty of the ancient world. + + + + + CHAPTER XVI. + ROME’S ZENITH. + + +There is perhaps no military dictum so universally quoted as Napoleon’s +“Read and reread the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus +Adolphus, Turenne, Eugène, and Frederick; take them for your model, that +is the only way of becoming a great captain, to obtain the secrets of +the art of war.” In another of his maxims he said, “Knowledge of the +great operations of war can only be acquired by experience and by the +applied study of all the great captains. Gustavus, Turenne, and +Frederick, as well as Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar, have all acted on +the same principles.” + +Here Napoleon appears to single out a list of six, or possibly seven, +commanders who stand out as supreme in the history of warfare. Whether +consciously or unconsciously, there has been a general tendency among +students of war to accept Napoleon’s list as a standard classification +of merit—not merely a haphazard mention—when completed by the addition +of his own name. True, some have felt the absurdity of counting Eugène +as worthy to the exclusion of Marlborough, and others have dropped +Turenne because of a perhaps mistaken idea that greatness is synonymous +with vastness of destruction, or for the rather better reason that his +record lacked the decisive results gained by his compeers. In this way +one finds that not a few commentators have arrived at a list of three +ancient commanders—Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar—and three +modern—Gustavus, Frederick, and Napoleon—as the Himalayan peaks of +military history. That Frederick, with his gross blunders and most +unoriginal “oblique order,” should receive preference over such +consummate artists as Turenne and Marlborough must remain one of the +mysteries of military criticism. This is not the place to deal with the +fallacy. Here we are concerned with the great captains of the ancient +world, and so far as we desire a comparison with the modern, Napoleon +himself affords it, since his supremacy is hardly questioned. + +Let us therefore compare Scipio with these three ancient great captains, +by a threefold study and test—as general, as man, and as statesman. Any +such comparison must be based on the conditions these men had to deal +with, and on the skill with which they turned these conditions to their +advantage. + +Alexander, and to a hardly less degree Cæsar, enjoyed the immense asset +of having autocratic power, complete control over the forces and +resources available. Even Hannibal, if poorly supported, was immune from +the petty interference with his operations against which Scipio, like +Marlborough later, had to contend. + +Alexander’s victories were won over Asiatic hordes, whose lack of +tactical order and method offset their numerical superiority, and as +Napoleon demonstrated in his well-known comment on the Mamelukes, the +defects of Asiatic troops increased in ratio with their numbers. No +critic places Clive in the first rank of great captains, and but for the +clear brilliance of his manœuvres and the scale of his conquests +Alexander would suffer a like discount. Cæsar, also, was hardly more +than an able “sepoy general” until Ilerda and Pharsalus, and, as he +himself is said to have remarked, he went “to Spain to fight an army +without a general, and thence to the East to fight a general without an +army.” And even so, Cæsar found himself, owing to an unwise dispersion +of force, twice forced to fight under the handicap of inferior strength. +In the first, at Dyrrhacium, he suffered defeat, and though he atoned +for it at Pharsalus, this single first-class victory is a slender base +on which to build a claim to supreme generalship. + +But if we are to accept Napoleon’s dictum that “in war it is not men but +the man who counts,” the most significant fact is that both Alexander +and Cæsar had their path smoothed for them by the feebleness and +ignorance of the commanders who opposed them. Only Hannibal, like +Scipio, fought consistently against trained generals, and even as +between these the advantage of conditions is on Hannibal’s side. For his +three decisive victories—the Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannæ—were won over +generals not only headstrong and rash, but foolishly disdainful of any +tactics which savoured of craft rather than of honest bludgeon work. +Hannibal knew this well—witness his remark to the troops who were to lie +concealed for the flank attack at the Trebia, “You have an enemy blind +to such arts of war.” Flaminius and Varro were mental Beefeaters, and +their names are instinctively bracketed in history with those of +Tallard, Daun, Beaulieu, and MacMahon. Hannibal taught the Romans the +art, as distinct from the mechanism, of war, and once they had profited +by his instruction his successes were limited. Marcellus and Nero were +capable of winning tricks off him, and if they could not take a rubber +neither could Hannibal. But in surveying Scipio’s record, not only do we +find his tactical success unchequered, but that his opponents from the +outset were generals trained in the Barcine school, and all the evidence +goes to show that Hannibal’s brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago, were no mean +commanders. And the apex of Scipio’s career, Zama, is unique in history +as the only battle where one acknowledged great captain has, on his own, +defeated another decisively. + +Thus if conditions, and the extent to which they are not only met but +turned to advantage, be the test, Scipio’s pre-eminence is clear. + +If the quality of a general’s art be the test, universal opinion +concedes that Hannibal excelled Alexander and Cæsar. Alexander’s +victories were rather triumphs of method, calculations working out with +straightforward precision, but unmarked by any subtle variations and +traps for the enemy. In Alexander, for all his greatness, still lingered +traces of the Homeric hero, the glorification of the physical elements +at the expense of the mental. It was this knight-errantry which led him +to stake his life so often in the forefront of the battle, needlessly +risking thereby the collapse of his plans and the lives of his army. To +him might well be applied the rebuke made by Timotheus to Chares, when +the former remarked: “How greatly ashamed I was at the siege of Samos +when a bolt fell near me; I felt I was behaving more like an impetuous +youth than like a general in command of so large a force.” This mistaken +Bayardism, too, explains the absence of the subtler artistry in his +battles—it is epitomised in his rejection of Parmenio’s proposal to +attack Darius by night at Arbela, on the ground that he would not “steal +a victory.” Cæsar’s plans were assuredly more difficult to guess, but he +did not “mystify, mislead, and surprise” to anything like the degree +that Hannibal attained. So general is the recognition of Hannibal’s +genius in this battle art that he is commonly termed the supreme +tactician of history. Yet in ruse and strategem the record of Scipio’s +battles is even richer. Recall the unfortified front, the timing of the +direct assault, and the lagoon manœuvre at Cartagena; the double +envelopment and reversal of adverse ground conditions at Bæcula. The +change of hour and of dispositions, the refused centre, the double +oblique, and the double convergent flank blows at Ilipa. As Colonel +Denison notes in his ‘History of Cavalry,’ Ilipa is “generally +considered to be the highest development of tactical skill in the +history of Roman arms.” I would suggest that the student of war, if he +considers it as a whole—from the mental opening moves to the physical +end of the pursuit,—cannot but regard it as without a peer in all +history. Continuing, observe the use of ground first to counter his +enemy’s numbers and then to force him to fight separated battles, as +well as the wide turning movement, against Andobales. Watch Scipio +luring on his enemy into the ambush at Salæca; study his masterpiece in +firing the Bagradas camps—the feint at Utica, the sounding of the +evening call, the timing of and distinction between the two attacks, and +the subtlety with which he gains possession of the main obstacle, the +gates of the Carthaginian camp, without a struggle. Note, later, his +novel use of his second and third lines as a mobile reserve for +envelopment at the Great Plains, and the chameleon-like quickness with +which he translates his art into the naval realm when he frustrates the +attack on his fleet. Finally, at Zama, where he is confronted with an +opponent proof against the more obvious if more brilliant stratagems, we +see his transcendent psychological and tactical judgment in his more +careful but subtly effective moves—the “lanes” in his formation, and the +synchronised trumpet blast to counter the elephants; the deliberate +“calling off” of the _hastati_; the calculated change of dispositions by +which he overlaps Hannibal’s third, and main, line; the pause by which +he gains time for the return of his cavalry, and their decisive blow in +Hannibal’s rear. + +Is there such another collection of gems of military art in all history? +Can even Hannibal show such originality and variety of surprise? +Moreover, if Hannibal’s “collection” in open battle is somewhat less +full than Scipio’s, in two other essentials it is bare. Even his devoted +biographers admit that siegecraft, as with Frederick, was his weakness, +and he has nothing to set off against Scipio’s storm of Cartagena, +which, weighed by its difficulties, its calculated daring and skill, and +its celerity, has no parallel ancient or modern. + +The other and more serious void in Hannibal’s record is his failure to +complete and exploit his victories by pursuit. Nowhere does he show a +strategic pursuit, and the lack of even a tactical pursuit after the +Trebia and Cannæ is almost unaccountable. In contrast we have Scipio’s +swift and relentless pursuit after Ilipa, and hardly less after the +battle on the Great Plains—which alike for range and decisiveness are +unapproached until Napoleon, if then. In ancient times Scipio has but +one possible rival, Alexander, and in his case there was repeatedly an +interregnum between the tactical and the strategic pursuit, which caused +a distinct debit against his economy of force. For his turning aside +after Issus a strategic argument can be made out, but for his delay +after Granicus and Arbela there appears no cogent reason save possibly +that of distance—the fact at least remains that his campaigns offer no +pursuit so sustained and complete as that down the Bætis, or +Guadalquiver. It may be suggested that Scipio did not always pursue as +after the two battles cited. But an examination of his other battles +show that pursuit was usually either rash or unnecessary—rash after +Bæcula, where he had two fresh armies converging on him, and unnecessary +after Zama, where there was no enemy left to be a danger. + +From tactics we pass to strategy, and here a preliminary demarcation and +definition may simplify the task of forming a judgment. Strategy is too +often considered to comprise merely military factors, to the +overshadowing of the political and economic, with which it is +interwoven. The fallacy has been responsible for incalculable damage to +the fabric of warring nations. When such critics speak of strategy, they +are thinking almost solely of logistical strategy—the combination in +time, space, and force of the military pieces on the chessboard of war. +Between logistical strategy and chess there is a distinct analogy. But +on a higher plane, and with a far wider scope, is grand strategy, which +has been defined as “the transmission of power in all its forms in order +to maintain policy.” “While strategy is more particularly concerned with +the movement of armed masses, grand strategy, including these movements, +embraces the motive forces which lie behind them, material and +psychological.... The grand strategist we see is, consequently, also a +politician and a diplomatist.”[11] + +As a logistical strategist Napoleon is unrivalled in history—save +possibly by the Mongol, Subutai, from what we can piece together of the +scanty records of his campaigns. The ancients suffer, in common with the +modern precursors of Napoleon, the handicap that the organisation of +armies in their day did not permit of the manifold combinations that he +effected, a handicap which persisted until the divisional system was +born in the late eighteenth century, beginning with De Broglie. +Previously we find detachments, or occasionally, as in Nero’s classic +move to the Metaurus against Hasdrubal, a two-army combination, but the +scope and variation of such combination were inevitably narrow until +armies came to be organised in self-contained and independent strategic +parts—the modern division or army corps—just in time for the genius of +Napoleon to exploit these new possibilities. But within the inherent +limitations of pre-Napoleonic times, Scipio develops a range of +strategical moves which, it may be fairly claimed, is unequalled in the +ancient world. The hawk-like swoop on Cartagena, so calculated that none +of the three Carthaginian armies could succour their base in time. The +hardly less bold and calculated blow at Hasdrubal Barca before either +Hasdrubal Gisco or Mago could effect a junction—how closely the margin +of time worked out we know from Polybius. Nor is there any doubt whether +these strategic moves were deliberate, as in many ascribed to ancient +commanders on supposition by military critics who view old theatres of +war through modern spectacles. Polybius and Livy both tell us that these +calculations were in Scipio’s mind. Again, the way in which Scipio stood +guard over Hasdrubal Gisco while his detachment under Silanus moved and +fell on Hanno and Mago before they had word of his approach. Swift as +the march, as thorough was the defeat. + +Next, the master move leading to Ilipa, whereby his direction of advance +cut Hasdrubal and Mago off from their line of communication with Gades, +which in the event of their defeat meant that retreat to their fortified +base was barred by the river Bætis (Guadalquiver). The upshot showed +both the truth of his calculation and the proof of the fact—the result +was the annihilation of the Carthaginian armies. This seems the first +clear example in history of a blow against the strategic flank. Here is +born the truth which Napoleon was to crystallise in his cardinal maxim +that “the important secret of war is to make oneself master of the +communications.” Its initiation is sometimes claimed for Issus, but at +best Alexander’s manœuvre was on the battlefield, not in strategic +approach, while the simple explanation is that the sea prevented a move +on the other flank and that the bend in the river Pinarus dictated the +direction of it. + +Admittedly Scipio’s strategic intention at Ilipa is a hypothesis, and +not definitely stated in Livy or Polybius; but the established facts of +the advance, and still more of its sequel, form a chain of indirect +evidence that could not be firmer. Even Dodge, one of Scipio’s +consistent detractors, emphasises this threat to the strategic flank. + +Before passing on to his African campaigns, we may note Scipio’s +anticipation of, and trap for Hannibal at Locri. Then note how, on +landing in Africa, his first care is to gain a secure base of +operations, fulfilling the principle of security before he passes to the +offensive. See him baulk the enemy’s superior concentration of strength +by the “Torres Vedras” lines near Utica. Note the rapidity with which he +strikes at Hasdrubal and Syphax at the Great Plain, before their new +levies can be organised and consolidated, and how in the sequel he once +more stands guard, this time over Carthage, while his detachment under +Lælius and Masinissa knocks Syphax out of the war. Finally, there is his +move up the Bagradas Valley by which he simultaneously compels Hannibal +to follow, and facilitates his own junction with Masinissa’s +reinforcement from Numidia. So complete is his mastery on the +strategical chessboard that he even selects the battlefield most +favourable to the qualities of his own tactical instrument. Then, Zama +decided, he pounces on Carthage before the citizens can rally from the +moral shock. + +What, if any, mistakes can be set down on the debit side of his +strategy? A study of military commentaries shows that his critics +advance but three—that Hasdrubal Barca and Mago in turn escaped from +Spain, and that Scipio did not lay siege to Carthage immediately on +landing in Africa. The obvious reply is to ask how many times did +Darius, a far more vital personal factor, escape Alexander, why Cæsar +let slip Pompey after Pharsalus, or Hannibal fail to move on Rome after +Trasimene or Cannæ—there were far less adequate reasons. But apart from +the extreme difficulty of catching an individual without an army, it is +hoped that the earlier chapters may have disposed of these empty +criticisms. Even after Bæcula, Scipio was still markedly inferior in +strength to the Carthaginian forces in Spain, and further, Hasdrubal was +only able to elude Scipio’s watch and cross the Pyrenees with so weak a +contingent that he was forced to recruit in Gaul for two years before he +could advance on Italy. Mago’s escape was still more an individualistic +effort. As for the question of an immediate advance on Carthage, Scipio +would have been an impetuous fool, not a general, if he had laid siege +to so vast a fortified city as Carthage with the small original force +that he carried into Africa. The clearest proof of his wisdom in first +seeking a secure base of operations lies in the overwhelming enemy +concentration from which he only escaped by his foresight in forming his +“Torres Vedras” lines. + +In Alexander’s record even his modern biographers do not suggest any +notable examples of logistical strategy, apart from certain swift +marches such as that from Pelium on Thebes. There are no combinations or +checks to enemy combination. His strength lies in his grand strategy, of +which we shall speak later. + +With Hannibal, too, his logistical strategy is mainly a matter of direct +marches and of admirable care to secure his communications, apart from +the very disputable purpose of his move on the line of the Po which, in +effect, separated the elder Scipio from Sempronius, his fellow-consul; +and secondly, his feint at Rome in the attempt to relieve the pressure +on his allies at Capua, which, though clearly intended, was abortive. +Against these must be set, first, the fact that the advantage of his +hazardous march over the Alps was foiled of its purpose by the elder +Scipio’s quicker return from the Rhone by the Riviera route; second, the +fact that he failed to prevent the junction of Sempronius with Scipio on +the Trebia. Later, there are, among other indisputable failures, the +neglect to exploit Cannæ even by the seizure of Canusium, let alone a +thrust at Rome; the times his moves were parried by Fabius and +Marcellus; Nero’s brilliant deception by which Hannibal remained +stationary and in the dark, while his brother was being crushed on the +Metaurus. Finally, we see him outmanœuvred by Scipio in the preliminary +moves before Zama. Outstandingly great as a tactician, Hannibal is not +impressive as a strategist; less so, indeed, than several of Scipio’s +forerunners among the Roman generals. + +Cæsar, in contrast, stands out more in logistical strategy than in +tactics. But classic as are many of his moves in Gaul one has to +remember that they were made against barbarians, not trained generals +such as those with whom Scipio, Hannibal, Nero, and Marcellus had to +contend. Against Pompey’s lieutenants in Spain he extricated himself +with surpassing skill from a critical position, into which perhaps he +should not have got. Then in Greece he threw away his superiority of +force by dispersion, and suffered a severe defeat at Dyrrhacium, nearly +disastrous as he confessed when he said: “To-day the victory had been +the enemy’s, had there been any one among them to gain it.” His retreat +was a masterly feat, if we overlook the quality of his opponents, but +later he failed in his attempt to prevent the junction of Pompey and +Scipio Nasica, and had to fight at Pharsalus without his detachments +against a concentrated force. That his tactics turned the balance does +not affect the reflection on his strategy. + +If Scipio, then, may be given the palm for logistical strategy among the +ancients, how does he compare with Napoleon? We could adopt the +historical argument that a man must be judged by the conditions and +tools of his time, pointing out not only the indivisible organisation +with which Scipio had to work, but that he was a pioneer where Napoleon +had the experience of ages to build on. But we prefer rather to abandon +this sound and normal test, which inevitably negatives true comparison, +and admit frankly Napoleon’s supremacy in this sphere. The scales are +amply balanced by Scipio’s superiority as a tactician. By wellnigh +universal opinion Napoleon’s tactics were below his strategical level, +and it is this compensating factor which has led military criticism to +bracket Hannibal with Napoleon among the great captains—a factor which +we suggest applies still more in Scipio’s favour compared with Napoleon. + +From logistical strategy we come to grand strategy. This lies in the +domain of peace as much as in war, and hence for simplicity it may be +well to deal with the grand strategy which contributed to the winning of +wars, and reserve for our study of Scipio as statesman that part of his +grand strategy which had its goal in the subsequent peace. + +If our examination of the years 210-190 B.C. has achieved its historical +purpose, it should be clear that Scipio showed an understanding of war +in its three spheres—mental, moral, and physical, and of their +interplay, such as is just dawning on the most progressive +politico-military thought of to-day. Further, he translated this +understanding into effective action in a way that we may possibly +achieve in the next great war—more probably, we shall be fortunate to +get out of the physical rut by 2000 A.D. + +For proof of this claim look at the progressive and co-ordinated steps +by which, starting from the valley in Rome’s darkest hour, he climbs +steadily and surely upwards to the summit of his aims, and plants Rome’s +flag on the sunlit peaks of earthly power. Scipio is a mountaineer, not +a mere athlete of war. The vision that selects his line of approach, and +the diplomatic gifts which enable him to surmount obstacles, are for him +what rock-craft is to a climber. His realisation of the importance of +securing his base for each fresh advance is his snow-craft, and his +employment of military force his ice-axe. + +Watch him, on arrival in Spain, make wide inquiries about the position +of the Carthaginian forces, and the importance and topography of +Cartagena. His genius tells him that here is the base and pivot of the +Carthaginian power in Spain, and shows him the feasibility, the way, and +the effect of such a stroke—at the moral and economic rather than the +purely military objective. + +Cartagena gained, note the wisdom which by conciliating the citizens +secures his acquisition against internal treachery, and further enables +him to economise the garrison by converting the citizens into active +partners in the defence. What a diplomatic coup is the prompt release +and care of the Spanish hostages. If Napoleon’s presence was worth an +army corps, Scipio’s diplomacy was literally worth two. It converted +allies of the enemy into allies of his own. + +There was grand strategy, too, in his wise restraint from a further +advance, in order to allow the moral and political effect of Cartagena +and its sequel to develop. Thus Hasdrubal Barca, seeing the Spanish sand +trickling fast from his end of the hour-glass to Scipio’s, was drawn +into the offensive move which enabled Scipio to beat him before the +other Carthaginian armies came up. Once more victory paves the way for +diplomacy, as that in turn will pave the way for further victories. He +sends home the Spanish captives without ransom, and, still more +shrewdly, returns Masinissa’s nephew loaded with presents—surely never +in history has the money invested in presents brought a greater ultimate +dividend. + +Next, note the rapidity with which Scipio nips in the bud the incipient +threat from Hanno, and in contrast the constraint by which he avoids +wasting his force on a number of petty sieges which could bring no +commensurate profit. The wider effect of Scipio’s action in Spain also +deserves notice, for Livy tells us that this year Hannibal in Italy was +for the first time reduced to inaction, because he received no supplies +from home owing to Carthage being more anxious about the retention of +Spain. + +Scipio’s grand strategy was from now onwards to lift the pressure off +Rome in ever-increasing degree. His success in Spain compelled the +Carthaginians to invest there the forces that might have been decisive +in Italy, and at Ilipa he wipes them off the military balance-sheet. + +The instant that victory in Spain is sure, and before turning to the +mere clearing operations, his grand strategical eye focusses itself on +Africa. His daring visit to Syphax, his meeting with and despatch of +Masinissa to Numidia—here are two strings to a bow which shall soon +loose a shaft at the heart of Carthage. For an object-lesson in the +selection of the true objective, and its unswerving maintenance in face +of all obstacles and perils, the next few years are a beacon light for +all time. He schemes, he prepares, he works unceasingly towards the +goal. The military interference of the enemy is almost the least of his +difficulties. Sexual passion frustrates one of his shrewdest diplomatic +moves, but his plan is too flexible, too well conceived, for even this +blow to have more than a transient effect. Jealous rivals, short-sighted +politicians, military “die-hards” do their best, or worst, to block his +plan, and failing in this, to obstruct him and curtail his strength. He +builds and trains a fresh army out of adventurers and disgraced troops. +Yet he never makes a rash or a false move, mindful always of the +principle of security. By diplomacy again he creates in Sicily a sure +source of supply. He sends a reconnoitring expedition to clear up the +African situation, and appreciating Masinissa’s material weakness, +refuses to be rushed into a move before his own weapon is forged. When +he lands, his first efforts are directed to gain a secure base of +operations. And gauging exactly the strength and weakness of Carthage +and of his own position, he adapts consummately his immediate end to his +existing means. Each successive move is so directed as to subtract from +the military and political credit of Carthage and transfer the balance +to his own account. His restraint when this ultimate goal is so close in +mileage, though not in reality, is almost miraculous in a commander so +youthful and so early successful. But he has long realised that Syphax +and Masinissa are the two props of the Carthaginian power in Africa, and +before he attempts to turn this power out of its seat his first aim is +to upset its stability, by taking away one prop and knocking away the +other. Just as he has gained this end, passion once more intervenes to +threaten his military achievement as it previously thwarted his +diplomacy, but the psychological master-move by which he foils +Sophonisba’s wiles averts the danger. + +Now assured of security he aims at Carthage itself, and +characteristically pauses in sight of Carthage to achieve, if possible, +the supreme economy of force of a moral victory instead of the drain of +a physical siege. The move succeeds, and Carthage capitulates with +Hannibal still across the seas, helpless to aid. And when by a gross +breach of faith the treaty is violated, Scipio is not caught off his +guard. By a fresh and rapid series of moves, a perfect combination of +military, economic, and psychological pieces, he achieves the checkmate +in a brief span of time. Is there anything in history which for +continuity of policy, combination of forces—material and moral,—and +completeness of attainment can compare with it? Scipio is the embodiment +of grand strategy, as his campaigns are the supreme example in history +of its meaning. + +Alexander certainly preceded Scipio as the first grand strategist, but +without arguing the question how far his moral and economic action was +fortuitous rather than marked by the exquisite calculation of Scipio’s, +his task was much simpler, and as a despot he had none of Scipio’s +internal obstacles to surmount. It is, above all, because of the close +parallel with modern conditions, political and organic, that Scipio’s +grand strategy is so living a study for us to-day. + +Alexander’s achievements may have excelled Scipio’s in scale—not really +so much, for if Alexander established for himself an empire from the +Danube to the Indus, which collapsed on his death, Scipio built for Rome +an empire which stretched from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and the +Taurus mountains—an empire which endured and increased. And whereas +Alexander built on the foundations laid by Philip, Scipio came on the +scene at a moment when the very foundations of Roman power in Italy were +shaken by a foreign foe. There are grave blemishes, too, on Alexander’s +strategy—while he was consolidating his offensive base in Asia Minor, he +was in acute danger of losing his home base in Europe. By the +disbandment of his fleet he exposed the European coasts to the superior +Persian fleet, and Darius’s one able commander, Memnon, seized the +chance to raise Greece, where the embers of discontent smouldered in +Alexander’s rear. Only Memnon’s death saved Alexander from disaster, and +gained time for him to carry out his plan of crippling Persian sea power +by land attack on their naval bases. Again, by lack of strategical +reconnaissance, Alexander blundered past the army of Darius, lying in +wait in northern Syria, which moved down and cut his communications, a +danger from which he only saved himself, facing about, by tactical +victory at Issus. It is well to contrast this with Scipio’s thorough +strategical reconnaissance and search for information before every move. +If Alexander’s grand strategy has a narrow advantage by the test of +quantity, Scipio’s is clearly superior in quality. + +In the comparison of Scipio with Napoleon, if the latter’s superiority +in logistical strategy is recognised, we have to set against this both +his tactical and his grand strategical inferiority. As a grand +strategist Napoleon’s claims are marred not only by his failure to +realise the aim of grand strategy—a prosperous and secure peace,—but by +his several blunders over the psychology of his opponents, over the +political and economic effects of his actions, and in the extravagant +later use of his forces and resources. + +Finally, let us point out that while Alexander had the military +foundations laid by Philip to build on, while Hannibal built on +Hamilcar, Cæsar on Marius, Napoleon on Carnot—Scipio had to rebuild on +disaster. + +From the comparison of generalship we pass to the comparison of +character. Here, to enumerate at length the qualities which +distinguished Scipio as a man would be wearisome. His moderation, his +self-control, his human sympathy, his charm of manner, his magnetic +influence over troops—shared by all the greatest captains,—his +exaltation of spirit, these have shone through his deeds and speeches. +Of his private life we know little save by inference. He married Æmilia, +daughter of the consul Æmilius Paullus who fell at Cannæ, the marriage +apparently taking place after his return from Spain and before his +departure for Africa. + +From the solitary anecdote or two which survive, the marriage seems to +have been a happy one, and Scipio to have shown more deference to his +wife’s opinion than was common at the time. That she had tastes too +expensive for Cato’s liking seems assured; she was probably one of those +leaders of Roman female society against whom he directed his +complaints—that by wearing “a garment of various colours, or riding in a +carriage drawn by horses” in the towns, they would undermine the social +fabric and create discontent. The indulgence shown by Scipio to his +wife, and his breach with tradition in treating her better than his +slave, was certainly one of the factors which rankled in Cato’s mind. Of +the moral influence distilled in the Scipio family life, the best proof +is an indirect one. Their daughter Cornelia was given in marriage to +Tiberius Gracchus, apparently after he had so generously defended +Scipio’s reputation, and was the mother of the Gracchi. The way in which +she carried out their education, and the principles with which she +inspired these future reformers, make one of history’s noblest pages. + +Outside the domestic sphere, Scipio’s influence on social history rests +on his love for and introduction of Greek literature and philosophy. “A +man of great intellectual culture,” he could speak and write Greek as +well as he could Latin—he is said to have written his own memoirs in +Greek. To his Greek studies he clearly owed that philosophy of life +which permeates all his recorded acts and sayings. He seems to have +taken the best elements from Greece and Rome, and to have blended +them—refining the crudeness and narrowness of early republican Rome +without diminishing its virility. So marked was his influence that he +may, with some justice, be termed the founder of Roman _civilisation_. +“To him is attributed the rise of manners, the origin of their taste for +propriety, and of their love of letters.” A rather touching instance of +his own love of letters is enshrined in his friendship and admiration +for the poet Ennius, a regard so profound that he left orders that after +his death a bust of the poet should be placed with his in the tomb of +the Scipios. Yet it was this very influence as an apostle of +civilisation and of the humanities that earned him the bitter animosity, +as it stimulated the fear, of Romans of the old school. Cato and his +kind might have forgiven his military success and his self-confidence, +but nothing but his downfall could atone for his crime in introducing +Greek customs, philosophy, and literature. It is not unlikely that this +damaged him, and undermined his influence even more than his contempt +for pettier minds and his moderation to conquered foes. These are the +only charges which his enemies could bring against his character, and in +this fact lies perhaps the strongest proof of his superior moral +nobility. For the malice of an enemy will fasten on any conceivable +weakness, and thus the charges levied against a great man form a +standard of moral measure which is one of the best of comparisons. + +From this test Scipio alone of the great captains of antiquity emerges +scatheless of any charge that suggests a definite moral blemish. It is +true that we can discount most of the charges brought against +Hannibal—impiety, avarice, perfidy, and cruelty beyond the customs of +his day. But Alexander, whatever allowance we make in other accusations, +stands convicted of want of self-control, violent outbursts of temper +and prejudice, cruel injustice as to Parmenio, ambitious egotism verging +on megalomania, and ruffianism in his cups. Alexander was tarred with +the brush of Achilles. + +Similarly, Cæsar’s many great qualities cannot disguise his sexual +license, his political corruption and intrigue, and the predominantly +selfish motives which inspired his work and achievements. There are +interesting parallels between the careers of Cæsar and Scipio. Compare +Cæsar gaining the province of Gaul by intrigue and threat, Scipio the +province of Spain at the call of his country in the hour of adversity. +Compare Cæsar forming and training an army for the conquest of Rome, +Scipio for the salvation of Rome from her foreign foes. Compare Cæsar +crossing the Rubicon, Scipio the Bagradas—and their objects. Compare +Cæsar receiving the honour of a triumph over fellow-Romans, Scipio over +Syphax and Hannibal. Lastly, if it be true that “a man can be known by +the friends he keeps,” compare Catiline with Lælius and Ennius. +Napoleon’s saying that “Laurels are no longer so when covered with the +blood of citizens,” comes curiously from his lips. For Napoleon’s +ambition drained the blood of France as surely as Cæsar’s spilt the +blood of Rome. It would suffice to strip the laurels from the brows of +both, and enhance the contrast with Scipio, the supreme economist of +blood and of force in the selfless service of his country. It is not +difficult to guess why Napoleon should ignore Scipio in his list of +military models! + +By any moral test Scipio is unique among the greater captains, +possessing a greatness and purity of soul which we might anticipate, not +necessarily find, among the leaders of philosophy or religion, but +hardly among the world’s supreme men of action. The clergyman who, a +century ago, was Scipio’s one English biographer, and whose work suffers +by its brevity, its historical slips and the omission of all study of +Scipio as a soldier, had yet one flash of rare insight and epigrammatic +genius when he said that Scipio was “greater than the greatest of bad +men, and better than the reputed best of good ones.” + +Last of all we turn to Scipio as statesman—that part of his grand +strategy which lies definitely in the state of peace. The Abbé Seran de +la Tour, who compiled a life of Scipio in 1739, dedicated it to Louis +XV., and in his dedication wrote: “A king has only to take for his model +the greatest man by far in the whole of Roman history, Scipio Africanus. +Heaven itself seems to have formed this particular hero to mark out to +the rulers of this world the art of governing with justice.” The lesson, +we are afraid, was lost on Louis XV., a man who at the council table +“opened his mouth, said little, and thought not at all,” whose life is +as full of vulgar vice as it is bare of higher aims. We suspect the Abbé +of a capacity for subtle sarcasm. + +When Scipio came on the stage of history, Rome’s power did not even +extend over the whole of Italy and Sicily, and this narrow territorial +sway was gravely menaced by the encroachments, and still more the +presence, of Hannibal. At Scipio’s death Rome was the unchallenged +mistress of the whole Mediterranean world, without a single possible +rival on the horizon. This period saw by far the greatest expansion in +the whole of Roman history, and it was due either directly to Scipio’s +action, or made possible by him. But if territorially he stands out as +the founder of the Roman Empire, politically his aim was not the +absorption but the control of other Mediterranean races. He followed, +but enlarged, the old Roman policy, his purpose not to establish a +centralised, a despotic empire, but a confederation with a head, in +which Rome should have the political and commercial supremacy, and over +which her will should be paramount. Here lies the close parallel with +modern conditions, which gives to the study of his policy a peculiar and +vital interest. Cæsar’s work paved the way for the decline and fall of +Roman power. Scipio’s work made possible a world community of virile +States, acknowledging the overlordship of Rome, but retaining the +independent internal organs necessary for the nourishment and continued +life of the body politic. Had his successors possessed but a tithe of +the wisdom and vision of Scipio, the Roman Empire might have taken a +course analogous to that of the modern British Empire, and by the +creation of a ring of semi-independent and healthy buffer States around +the heart of Roman power, the barbarian invasions might have been +thwarted, the course of history changed, and the progress of +civilisation have escaped a thousand years of coma and nearly as much of +convalescence. + +His peace terms alone would place Scipio on a pinnacle among the world’s +great conquerors—his entire absence of vindictiveness, his masterly +insurance of military security with a minimum of hardship to the +conquered, his strict avoidance of annexation of any civilised State. +They left no festering sores of revenge or injury, and so prepared the +way for the conversion of enemies into real allies, effective props of +the Roman power. In the meaning of Scipio’s name—a “staff”—was +epitomised his grand strategy in war and peace. + +The character of his policy was in tune with his character as a man, +disdaining the tinsel glory of annexation as of kingship, for the solid +gold of beneficent leadership. Scipio laboured for the good and +greatness of Rome, but he was no narrow patriot, instead a true world +statesman. The distinction between Scipio and Cæsar has been +crystallised in the phrase, “Zama gave the world to Rome, Pharsalus gave +it to Cæsar,” but even this does not render Scipio full justice, for he +could look beyond the greatness of Rome’s glory to the greatness of her +services to humanity. Not an internationalist, he was a +supra-nationalist in the widest and best sense. + +Attila was called the “scourge of the world,” and with a difference only +in degree most of the great captains, from Hannibal to Napoleon, have +had no higher objective conception than to thrash their enemies, or at +best their country’s enemies, into submission. Thus this fallacy paved +the way for a reaction equally shortsighted, which led Green, in his +‘History of the English People,’ to write: “It is a reproach of +historians that they have turned history into a mere history of the +butchery of men by their fellow-men,” and to follow this up by the +absurd declaration that “war plays a small part in the real story of +European nations.” So arose a very large modern school of historians who +sought, irrationally, to write history without mentioning, let alone +studying, war. To ignore the influence of war as a world-force is to +divorce history from science, and to turn it into a fairy tale. The +grand strategy of Scipio is a signpost pointing the true path of +historical study. Scipio could administer military beatings at least as +effectively and brilliantly as any other of the greater captains, but he +saw beyond the beating to its object. His genius revealed to him that +peace and war are the two wheels on which the world runs, and he +supplied a pole or axle which should link and control the two to ensure +an onward and co-ordinated progress. Scipio’s claim to eternal fame is +that he was the staff, not the whip, of Rome and of the world. + +Footnote 11: + + ‘Reformation of War,’ by J. F. C. Fuller. + + + + + BIBLIOGRAPHY. + + +After due reflection and discussion with others, I have decided not to +litter the actual pages of the book with footnote references, but to +list the various historical sources in this bibliographical appendix. +The modern fashion tends to treat an historical study as a literary +card-index rather than as a book to be read, and in many instances this +tendency is carried so far that the footnotes swamp the text. Experience +suggests that even the barest footnote reference is a distraction to the +reader’s eye, and momentarily dams the flow of the narrative through his +mind. For this reason I have omitted references from the actual pages +except where they could be woven into the text, and if some readers hold +that I err in this decision, I can at least plead that I do so in good +company. + +The ancient sources—all of which, except Polybius, require to be treated +with critical caution—have been:— + + Polybius, X. 2-20, 34-40; XI. 20-33; XIV. 1-10; XV. 1-19; XVI. 23; + XXI. 4-25; XXIII. 14. + + Livy, XXI.-XXII., XXV.-XXXIX. + + Appian, _Punica_, _Hisp._, _Hann._, _Syr._ + + Aulus Gellius, IV. 18. + + Cornelius Nepos, XXXI.-XXXII.; _Cato_; _Hannibal_. + + Plutarch, _Cato_; _Æmilius Paullus_; _Tib. Gracchus_. + + Valerius Maximus, III. 7. + + +_Printed in Great Britain by_ + +WILLIAM BLACKWOOD & SONS LTD. + + + + + ● Transcriber’s Notes: + ○ Text that was in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_). + ○ Footnotes have been moved to follow the chapters in which they are + referenced. + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK 77699 *** |